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diff --git a/.depend b/.depend
index 0ec0736d8189..707890f63906 100644
--- a/.depend
+++ b/.depend
@@ -1,171 +1,177 @@
# DO NOT DELETE
-addrmatch.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h match.h log.h
-atomicio.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h atomicio.h
-audit-bsm.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
-audit-linux.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
-audit.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
-auth-bsdauth.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
-auth-krb5.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h ssh.h packet.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h dispatch.h log.h sshbuf.h sshkey.h misc.h servconf.h uidswap.h hostfile.h auth.h auth-pam.h audit.h loginrec.h
-auth-options.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h xmalloc.h ssherr.h log.h sshbuf.h misc.h sshkey.h match.h ssh2.h auth-options.h
-auth-pam.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
-auth-passwd.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h packet.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h dispatch.h sshbuf.h ssherr.h log.h misc.h servconf.h sshkey.h hostfile.h auth.h auth-pam.h audit.h loginrec.h auth-options.h
-auth-rhosts.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h packet.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h dispatch.h uidswap.h pathnames.h log.h misc.h sshbuf.h sshkey.h servconf.h canohost.h hostfile.h auth.h auth-pam.h audit.h loginrec.h
-auth-shadow.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
-auth-sia.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
-auth-skey.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
-auth.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h match.h groupaccess.h log.h sshbuf.h misc.h servconf.h sshkey.h hostfile.h auth.h auth-pam.h audit.h loginrec.h auth-options.h canohost.h uidswap.h packet.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h dispatch.h authfile.h
+addrmatch.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h match.h log.h
+atomicio.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h atomicio.h
+audit-bsm.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
+audit-linux.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
+audit.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
+auth-bsdauth.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
+auth-krb5.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h ssh.h packet.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h dispatch.h log.h sshbuf.h sshkey.h misc.h servconf.h uidswap.h hostfile.h auth.h auth-pam.h audit.h loginrec.h
+auth-options.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h xmalloc.h ssherr.h log.h sshbuf.h misc.h sshkey.h match.h ssh2.h auth-options.h
+auth-pam.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
+auth-passwd.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h packet.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h dispatch.h sshbuf.h ssherr.h log.h misc.h servconf.h sshkey.h hostfile.h auth.h auth-pam.h audit.h loginrec.h auth-options.h
+auth-rhosts.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h packet.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h dispatch.h uidswap.h pathnames.h log.h misc.h sshbuf.h sshkey.h servconf.h canohost.h hostfile.h auth.h auth-pam.h audit.h loginrec.h
+auth-shadow.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
+auth-sia.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
+auth.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h match.h groupaccess.h log.h sshbuf.h misc.h servconf.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h sshkey.h hostfile.h auth.h auth-pam.h audit.h loginrec.h auth-options.h canohost.h uidswap.h packet.h dispatch.h authfile.h
auth.o: monitor_wrap.h ssherr.h compat.h channels.h
-auth2-chall.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h ssh2.h sshkey.h hostfile.h auth.h auth-pam.h audit.h loginrec.h sshbuf.h packet.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h dispatch.h ssherr.h log.h misc.h servconf.h
-auth2-gss.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
-auth2-hostbased.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h ssh2.h packet.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h dispatch.h sshbuf.h log.h misc.h servconf.h compat.h sshkey.h hostfile.h auth.h auth-pam.h audit.h loginrec.h canohost.h monitor_wrap.h pathnames.h
+auth2-chall.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h ssh2.h sshkey.h hostfile.h auth.h auth-pam.h audit.h loginrec.h sshbuf.h packet.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h dispatch.h ssherr.h log.h misc.h servconf.h
+auth2-gss.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
+auth2-hostbased.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h ssh2.h packet.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h dispatch.h sshbuf.h log.h misc.h servconf.h compat.h sshkey.h hostfile.h auth.h auth-pam.h audit.h loginrec.h canohost.h monitor_wrap.h pathnames.h
auth2-hostbased.o: ssherr.h match.h
-auth2-kbdint.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h packet.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h dispatch.h hostfile.h auth.h auth-pam.h audit.h loginrec.h log.h misc.h servconf.h ssherr.h
-auth2-none.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h atomicio.h xmalloc.h sshkey.h hostfile.h auth.h auth-pam.h audit.h loginrec.h packet.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h dispatch.h log.h misc.h servconf.h compat.h ssh2.h ssherr.h monitor_wrap.h
-auth2-passwd.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h packet.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h dispatch.h ssherr.h log.h sshkey.h hostfile.h auth.h auth-pam.h audit.h loginrec.h monitor_wrap.h misc.h servconf.h
-auth2-pubkey.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h ssh.h ssh2.h packet.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h dispatch.h sshbuf.h log.h misc.h servconf.h compat.h sshkey.h hostfile.h auth.h auth-pam.h audit.h loginrec.h pathnames.h uidswap.h auth-options.h
-auth2-pubkey.o: canohost.h monitor_wrap.h authfile.h match.h ssherr.h channels.h session.h
-auth2.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h atomicio.h xmalloc.h ssh2.h packet.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h dispatch.h log.h sshbuf.h misc.h servconf.h compat.h sshkey.h hostfile.h auth.h auth-pam.h audit.h loginrec.h pathnames.h ssherr.h monitor_wrap.h
+auth2-kbdint.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h packet.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h dispatch.h hostfile.h auth.h auth-pam.h audit.h loginrec.h log.h misc.h servconf.h ssherr.h
+auth2-none.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h atomicio.h xmalloc.h sshkey.h hostfile.h auth.h auth-pam.h audit.h loginrec.h packet.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h dispatch.h log.h misc.h servconf.h compat.h ssh2.h ssherr.h monitor_wrap.h
+auth2-passwd.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h packet.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h dispatch.h ssherr.h log.h sshkey.h hostfile.h auth.h auth-pam.h audit.h loginrec.h monitor_wrap.h misc.h servconf.h
+auth2-pubkey.o: canohost.h monitor_wrap.h authfile.h match.h ssherr.h channels.h session.h sk-api.h
+auth2-pubkey.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h ssh.h ssh2.h packet.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h dispatch.h sshbuf.h log.h misc.h servconf.h compat.h sshkey.h hostfile.h auth.h auth-pam.h audit.h loginrec.h pathnames.h uidswap.h auth-options.h
auth2.o: digest.h
-authfd.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h ssh.h sshbuf.h sshkey.h authfd.h cipher.h cipher-chachapoly.h chacha.h poly1305.h cipher-aesctr.h rijndael.h compat.h log.h atomicio.h misc.h ssherr.h
-authfile.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h cipher.h cipher-chachapoly.h chacha.h poly1305.h cipher-aesctr.h rijndael.h ssh.h log.h authfile.h misc.h atomicio.h sshkey.h sshbuf.h ssherr.h krl.h
-bitmap.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h bitmap.h
-canohost.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h packet.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h dispatch.h log.h canohost.h misc.h
-chacha.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h chacha.h
-channels.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h xmalloc.h ssh.h ssh2.h ssherr.h sshbuf.h packet.h dispatch.h log.h misc.h channels.h compat.h canohost.h sshkey.h authfd.h pathnames.h match.h
-cipher-aes.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h
-cipher-aesctr.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h cipher-aesctr.h rijndael.h
-cipher-chachapoly.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h log.h sshbuf.h ssherr.h cipher-chachapoly.h chacha.h poly1305.h
-cipher-ctr.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
-cipher.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h cipher.h cipher-chachapoly.h chacha.h poly1305.h cipher-aesctr.h rijndael.h misc.h sshbuf.h ssherr.h digest.h openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h
-cleanup.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h log.h
-clientloop.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h xmalloc.h ssh.h ssh2.h packet.h dispatch.h sshbuf.h compat.h channels.h sshkey.h cipher.h cipher-chachapoly.h chacha.h poly1305.h cipher-aesctr.h rijndael.h kex.h mac.h crypto_api.h
+auth2.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h atomicio.h xmalloc.h ssh2.h packet.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h dispatch.h log.h sshbuf.h misc.h servconf.h compat.h sshkey.h hostfile.h auth.h auth-pam.h audit.h loginrec.h pathnames.h ssherr.h monitor_wrap.h
+authfd.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h ssh.h sshbuf.h sshkey.h authfd.h cipher.h cipher-chachapoly.h chacha.h poly1305.h cipher-aesctr.h rijndael.h compat.h log.h atomicio.h misc.h ssherr.h
+authfile.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h cipher.h cipher-chachapoly.h chacha.h poly1305.h cipher-aesctr.h rijndael.h ssh.h log.h authfile.h misc.h atomicio.h sshkey.h sshbuf.h ssherr.h krl.h
+bitmap.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h bitmap.h
+canohost.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h packet.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h dispatch.h log.h canohost.h misc.h
+chacha.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h chacha.h
+channels.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h xmalloc.h ssh.h ssh2.h ssherr.h sshbuf.h packet.h dispatch.h log.h misc.h channels.h compat.h canohost.h sshkey.h authfd.h pathnames.h match.h
+cipher-aes.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h
+cipher-aesctr.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h cipher-aesctr.h rijndael.h
+cipher-chachapoly.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h log.h sshbuf.h ssherr.h cipher-chachapoly.h chacha.h poly1305.h
+cipher-ctr.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
+cipher.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h cipher.h cipher-chachapoly.h chacha.h poly1305.h cipher-aesctr.h rijndael.h misc.h sshbuf.h ssherr.h digest.h openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h
+cleanup.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h log.h
+clientloop.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h xmalloc.h ssh.h ssh2.h packet.h dispatch.h sshbuf.h compat.h channels.h sshkey.h cipher.h cipher-chachapoly.h chacha.h poly1305.h cipher-aesctr.h rijndael.h kex.h mac.h crypto_api.h
clientloop.o: myproposal.h log.h misc.h readconf.h clientloop.h sshconnect.h authfd.h atomicio.h sshpty.h match.h msg.h ssherr.h hostfile.h
-compat.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h packet.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h dispatch.h compat.h log.h match.h kex.h mac.h crypto_api.h
-dh.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
-digest-libc.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h ssherr.h sshbuf.h digest.h
-digest-openssl.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
-dispatch.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h ssh2.h log.h dispatch.h packet.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h compat.h ssherr.h
-dns.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h sshkey.h ssherr.h dns.h log.h digest.h
-ed25519.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h crypto_api.h ge25519.h fe25519.h sc25519.h
-entropy.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
-fatal.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h log.h
-fe25519.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h fe25519.h crypto_api.h
-ge25519.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h fe25519.h crypto_api.h sc25519.h ge25519.h ge25519_base.data
-groupaccess.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h groupaccess.h match.h log.h
-gss-genr.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
-gss-serv-krb5.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
-gss-serv.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
-hash.o: crypto_api.h includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h digest.h log.h ssherr.h
-hmac.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h sshbuf.h digest.h hmac.h
-hostfile.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h match.h sshkey.h hostfile.h log.h misc.h ssherr.h digest.h hmac.h
-kex.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h ssh.h ssh2.h atomicio.h version.h packet.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h dispatch.h compat.h cipher.h cipher-chachapoly.h chacha.h poly1305.h cipher-aesctr.h rijndael.h sshkey.h kex.h mac.h crypto_api.h log.h match.h
+compat.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h packet.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h dispatch.h compat.h log.h match.h kex.h mac.h crypto_api.h
+dh.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
+digest-libc.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h ssherr.h sshbuf.h digest.h
+digest-openssl.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
+dispatch.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h ssh2.h log.h dispatch.h packet.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h compat.h ssherr.h
+dns.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h sshkey.h ssherr.h dns.h log.h digest.h
+ed25519.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h crypto_api.h ge25519.h fe25519.h sc25519.h
+entropy.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
+fatal.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h log.h
+fe25519.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h fe25519.h crypto_api.h
+ge25519.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h fe25519.h crypto_api.h sc25519.h ge25519.h ge25519_base.data
+groupaccess.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h groupaccess.h match.h log.h
+gss-genr.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
+gss-serv-krb5.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
+gss-serv.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
+hash.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h crypto_api.h
+hmac.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h sshbuf.h digest.h hmac.h
+hostfile.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h match.h sshkey.h hostfile.h log.h misc.h ssherr.h digest.h hmac.h
+kex.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h ssh.h ssh2.h atomicio.h version.h packet.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h dispatch.h compat.h cipher.h cipher-chachapoly.h chacha.h poly1305.h cipher-aesctr.h rijndael.h sshkey.h kex.h mac.h crypto_api.h log.h match.h
kex.o: misc.h monitor.h ssherr.h sshbuf.h digest.h
-kexc25519.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h sshkey.h kex.h mac.h crypto_api.h sshbuf.h digest.h ssherr.h ssh2.h
-kexdh.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
-kexecdh.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h ssherr.h
-kexgen.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h sshkey.h kex.h mac.h crypto_api.h log.h packet.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h dispatch.h ssh2.h sshbuf.h digest.h ssherr.h
-kexgex.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
-kexgexc.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
-kexgexs.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
-kexsntrup4591761x25519.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h sshkey.h kex.h mac.h crypto_api.h sshbuf.h digest.h ssherr.h
-krl.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h ./openbsd-compat/sys-tree.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h sshbuf.h ssherr.h sshkey.h authfile.h misc.h log.h digest.h bitmap.h krl.h
-log.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h log.h
-loginrec.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h sshkey.h hostfile.h ssh.h loginrec.h log.h atomicio.h packet.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h dispatch.h canohost.h auth.h auth-pam.h audit.h sshbuf.h ssherr.h
-logintest.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h loginrec.h
-mac.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h digest.h hmac.h umac.h mac.h misc.h ssherr.h sshbuf.h openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h
-match.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h match.h misc.h
-md5crypt.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
-misc.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h misc.h log.h ssh.h sshbuf.h ssherr.h
-moduli.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
-monitor.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h ./openbsd-compat/sys-tree.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h atomicio.h xmalloc.h ssh.h sshkey.h sshbuf.h hostfile.h auth.h auth-pam.h audit.h loginrec.h cipher.h cipher-chachapoly.h
-monitor.o: chacha.h poly1305.h cipher-aesctr.h rijndael.h kex.h mac.h crypto_api.h dh.h packet.h dispatch.h auth-options.h sshpty.h channels.h session.h sshlogin.h canohost.h log.h misc.h servconf.h monitor.h monitor_wrap.h monitor_fdpass.h compat.h ssh2.h authfd.h match.h ssherr.h
-monitor_fdpass.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h log.h monitor_fdpass.h
-monitor_wrap.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h xmalloc.h ssh.h sshbuf.h sshkey.h cipher.h cipher-chachapoly.h chacha.h poly1305.h cipher-aesctr.h rijndael.h kex.h mac.h crypto_api.h hostfile.h auth.h auth-pam.h audit.h loginrec.h
-monitor_wrap.o: auth-options.h packet.h dispatch.h log.h monitor.h monitor_wrap.h atomicio.h monitor_fdpass.h misc.h channels.h session.h servconf.h ssherr.h
-msg.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h sshbuf.h ssherr.h log.h atomicio.h msg.h misc.h
-mux.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h xmalloc.h log.h ssh.h ssh2.h pathnames.h misc.h match.h sshbuf.h channels.h msg.h packet.h dispatch.h monitor_fdpass.h sshpty.h sshkey.h readconf.h clientloop.h ssherr.h
-nchan.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h ssh2.h sshbuf.h ssherr.h packet.h dispatch.h channels.h compat.h log.h
-packet.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h xmalloc.h compat.h ssh2.h cipher.h cipher-chachapoly.h chacha.h poly1305.h cipher-aesctr.h rijndael.h sshkey.h kex.h mac.h crypto_api.h digest.h log.h canohost.h misc.h channels.h ssh.h
+kexc25519.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h sshkey.h kex.h mac.h crypto_api.h sshbuf.h digest.h ssherr.h ssh2.h
+kexdh.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
+kexecdh.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h ssherr.h
+kexgen.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h sshkey.h kex.h mac.h crypto_api.h log.h packet.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h dispatch.h ssh2.h sshbuf.h digest.h ssherr.h
+kexgex.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
+kexgexc.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
+kexgexs.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
+kexsntrup4591761x25519.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h sshkey.h kex.h mac.h crypto_api.h sshbuf.h digest.h ssherr.h
+krl.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h ./openbsd-compat/sys-tree.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h sshbuf.h ssherr.h sshkey.h authfile.h misc.h log.h digest.h bitmap.h krl.h
+log.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h log.h
+loginrec.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h sshkey.h hostfile.h ssh.h loginrec.h log.h atomicio.h packet.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h dispatch.h canohost.h auth.h auth-pam.h audit.h sshbuf.h ssherr.h
+logintest.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h loginrec.h
+mac.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h digest.h hmac.h umac.h mac.h misc.h ssherr.h sshbuf.h openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h
+match.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h match.h misc.h
+md5crypt.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
+misc.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h misc.h log.h ssh.h sshbuf.h ssherr.h
+moduli.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
+monitor.o: chacha.h poly1305.h cipher-aesctr.h rijndael.h kex.h mac.h crypto_api.h dh.h packet.h dispatch.h auth-options.h sshpty.h channels.h session.h sshlogin.h canohost.h log.h misc.h servconf.h monitor.h monitor_wrap.h monitor_fdpass.h compat.h ssh2.h authfd.h match.h ssherr.h sk-api.h
+monitor.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h ./openbsd-compat/sys-tree.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h atomicio.h xmalloc.h ssh.h sshkey.h sshbuf.h hostfile.h auth.h auth-pam.h audit.h loginrec.h cipher.h cipher-chachapoly.h
+monitor_fdpass.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h log.h monitor_fdpass.h
+monitor_wrap.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h xmalloc.h ssh.h sshbuf.h sshkey.h cipher.h cipher-chachapoly.h chacha.h poly1305.h cipher-aesctr.h rijndael.h kex.h mac.h crypto_api.h hostfile.h auth.h auth-pam.h audit.h
+monitor_wrap.o: loginrec.h auth-options.h packet.h dispatch.h log.h monitor.h monitor_wrap.h atomicio.h monitor_fdpass.h misc.h channels.h session.h servconf.h ssherr.h
+msg.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h sshbuf.h ssherr.h log.h atomicio.h msg.h misc.h
+mux.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h xmalloc.h log.h ssh.h ssh2.h pathnames.h misc.h match.h sshbuf.h channels.h msg.h packet.h dispatch.h monitor_fdpass.h sshpty.h sshkey.h readconf.h clientloop.h ssherr.h
+nchan.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h ssh2.h sshbuf.h ssherr.h packet.h dispatch.h channels.h compat.h log.h
+packet.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h xmalloc.h compat.h ssh2.h cipher.h cipher-chachapoly.h chacha.h poly1305.h cipher-aesctr.h rijndael.h sshkey.h kex.h mac.h crypto_api.h digest.h log.h canohost.h misc.h channels.h ssh.h
packet.o: packet.h dispatch.h ssherr.h sshbuf.h
-platform-misc.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
-platform-pledge.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
-platform-tracing.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h log.h
-platform.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h log.h misc.h servconf.h sshkey.h hostfile.h auth.h auth-pam.h audit.h loginrec.h
-poly1305.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h poly1305.h
-progressmeter.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h progressmeter.h atomicio.h misc.h utf8.h
-readconf.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h openbsd-compat/glob.h xmalloc.h ssh.h ssherr.h compat.h cipher.h cipher-chachapoly.h chacha.h poly1305.h cipher-aesctr.h rijndael.h pathnames.h log.h sshkey.h misc.h readconf.h match.h kex.h mac.h crypto_api.h
+platform-misc.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
+platform-pledge.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
+platform-tracing.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h log.h
+platform.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h log.h misc.h servconf.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h sshkey.h hostfile.h auth.h auth-pam.h audit.h loginrec.h
+poly1305.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h poly1305.h
+progressmeter.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h progressmeter.h atomicio.h misc.h utf8.h
+readconf.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h openbsd-compat/glob.h xmalloc.h ssh.h ssherr.h compat.h cipher.h cipher-chachapoly.h chacha.h poly1305.h cipher-aesctr.h rijndael.h pathnames.h log.h sshkey.h misc.h readconf.h match.h kex.h mac.h crypto_api.h
readconf.o: uidswap.h myproposal.h digest.h
-readpass.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h misc.h pathnames.h log.h ssh.h uidswap.h
-rijndael.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h rijndael.h
-sandbox-capsicum.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
-sandbox-darwin.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
-sandbox-null.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
-sandbox-pledge.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
-sandbox-rlimit.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
-sandbox-seccomp-filter.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
-sandbox-solaris.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
-sandbox-systrace.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
-sc25519.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h sc25519.h crypto_api.h
-scp.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h ssh.h atomicio.h pathnames.h log.h misc.h progressmeter.h utf8.h
-servconf.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h xmalloc.h ssh.h log.h sshbuf.h misc.h servconf.h compat.h pathnames.h cipher.h cipher-chachapoly.h chacha.h poly1305.h cipher-aesctr.h rijndael.h sshkey.h kex.h mac.h crypto_api.h
-servconf.o: match.h channels.h groupaccess.h canohost.h packet.h dispatch.h ssherr.h hostfile.h auth.h auth-pam.h audit.h loginrec.h myproposal.h digest.h
-serverloop.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h xmalloc.h packet.h dispatch.h sshbuf.h log.h misc.h servconf.h canohost.h sshpty.h channels.h compat.h ssh2.h sshkey.h cipher.h cipher-chachapoly.h chacha.h poly1305.h cipher-aesctr.h
+readpass.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h misc.h pathnames.h log.h ssh.h uidswap.h
+rijndael.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h rijndael.h
+sandbox-capsicum.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
+sandbox-darwin.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
+sandbox-null.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
+sandbox-pledge.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
+sandbox-rlimit.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
+sandbox-seccomp-filter.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
+sandbox-solaris.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
+sandbox-systrace.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
+sc25519.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h sc25519.h crypto_api.h
+scp.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h ssh.h atomicio.h pathnames.h log.h misc.h progressmeter.h utf8.h
+servconf.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h openbsd-compat/glob.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h xmalloc.h ssh.h log.h sshbuf.h misc.h servconf.h compat.h pathnames.h cipher.h cipher-chachapoly.h chacha.h poly1305.h cipher-aesctr.h rijndael.h sshkey.h kex.h
+servconf.o: mac.h crypto_api.h match.h channels.h groupaccess.h canohost.h packet.h dispatch.h ssherr.h hostfile.h auth.h auth-pam.h audit.h loginrec.h myproposal.h digest.h
+serverloop.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h xmalloc.h packet.h dispatch.h sshbuf.h log.h misc.h servconf.h canohost.h sshpty.h channels.h compat.h ssh2.h sshkey.h cipher.h cipher-chachapoly.h chacha.h poly1305.h cipher-aesctr.h
serverloop.o: rijndael.h kex.h mac.h crypto_api.h hostfile.h auth.h auth-pam.h audit.h loginrec.h session.h auth-options.h serverloop.h ssherr.h
-session.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h xmalloc.h ssh.h ssh2.h sshpty.h packet.h dispatch.h sshbuf.h ssherr.h match.h uidswap.h compat.h channels.h sshkey.h cipher.h cipher-chachapoly.h chacha.h poly1305.h cipher-aesctr.h
+session.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h xmalloc.h ssh.h ssh2.h sshpty.h packet.h dispatch.h sshbuf.h ssherr.h match.h uidswap.h compat.h channels.h sshkey.h cipher.h cipher-chachapoly.h chacha.h poly1305.h cipher-aesctr.h
session.o: rijndael.h hostfile.h auth.h auth-pam.h audit.h loginrec.h auth-options.h authfd.h pathnames.h log.h misc.h servconf.h sshlogin.h serverloop.h canohost.h session.h kex.h mac.h crypto_api.h monitor_wrap.h sftp.h atomicio.h
-sftp-client.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h xmalloc.h ssherr.h sshbuf.h log.h atomicio.h progressmeter.h misc.h utf8.h sftp.h sftp-common.h sftp-client.h openbsd-compat/glob.h
-sftp-common.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h ssherr.h sshbuf.h log.h misc.h sftp.h sftp-common.h
-sftp-glob.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h sftp.h sftp-common.h sftp-client.h openbsd-compat/glob.h
-sftp-realpath.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
-sftp-server-main.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h log.h sftp.h misc.h xmalloc.h
-sftp-server.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h sshbuf.h ssherr.h log.h misc.h match.h uidswap.h sftp.h sftp-common.h
-sftp.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h log.h pathnames.h misc.h utf8.h sftp.h ssherr.h sshbuf.h sftp-common.h sftp-client.h openbsd-compat/glob.h
-sntrup4591761.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h crypto_api.h
-ssh-add.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h ssh.h log.h sshkey.h sshbuf.h authfd.h authfile.h pathnames.h misc.h ssherr.h digest.h
-ssh-agent.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h xmalloc.h ssh.h sshbuf.h sshkey.h authfd.h compat.h log.h misc.h digest.h ssherr.h match.h
-ssh-dss.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
-ssh-ecdsa.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
-ssh-ed25519.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h crypto_api.h log.h sshbuf.h sshkey.h ssherr.h ssh.h
-ssh-keygen.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h sshkey.h authfile.h sshbuf.h pathnames.h log.h misc.h match.h hostfile.h dns.h ssh.h ssh2.h ssherr.h ssh-pkcs11.h atomicio.h krl.h digest.h utf8.h authfd.h sshsig.h
-ssh-keyscan.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h xmalloc.h ssh.h sshbuf.h sshkey.h cipher.h cipher-chachapoly.h chacha.h poly1305.h cipher-aesctr.h rijndael.h kex.h mac.h crypto_api.h compat.h myproposal.h packet.h dispatch.h log.h
+sftp-client.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h xmalloc.h ssherr.h sshbuf.h log.h atomicio.h progressmeter.h misc.h utf8.h sftp.h sftp-common.h sftp-client.h openbsd-compat/glob.h
+sftp-common.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h ssherr.h sshbuf.h log.h misc.h sftp.h sftp-common.h
+sftp-glob.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h sftp.h sftp-common.h sftp-client.h openbsd-compat/glob.h
+sftp-realpath.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
+sftp-server-main.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h log.h sftp.h misc.h xmalloc.h
+sftp-server.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h sshbuf.h ssherr.h log.h misc.h match.h uidswap.h sftp.h sftp-common.h
+sftp.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h log.h pathnames.h misc.h utf8.h sftp.h ssherr.h sshbuf.h sftp-common.h sftp-client.h openbsd-compat/glob.h
+sk-usbhid.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
+sntrup4591761.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h crypto_api.h
+ssh-add.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h ssh.h log.h sshkey.h sshbuf.h authfd.h authfile.h pathnames.h misc.h ssherr.h digest.h ssh-sk.h
+ssh-agent.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h xmalloc.h ssh.h sshbuf.h sshkey.h authfd.h compat.h log.h misc.h digest.h ssherr.h match.h msg.h pathnames.h ssh-pkcs11.h sk-api.h
+ssh-dss.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
+ssh-ecdsa-sk.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h sshbuf.h ssherr.h digest.h sshkey.h
+ssh-ecdsa.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
+ssh-ed25519-sk.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h crypto_api.h log.h sshbuf.h sshkey.h ssherr.h ssh.h digest.h
+ssh-ed25519.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h crypto_api.h log.h sshbuf.h sshkey.h ssherr.h ssh.h
+ssh-keygen.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h sshkey.h authfile.h sshbuf.h pathnames.h log.h misc.h match.h hostfile.h dns.h ssh.h ssh2.h ssherr.h ssh-pkcs11.h atomicio.h krl.h digest.h utf8.h authfd.h sshsig.h ssh-sk.h sk-api.h
ssh-keyscan.o: atomicio.h misc.h hostfile.h ssherr.h ssh_api.h ssh2.h dns.h
-ssh-keysign.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h log.h sshkey.h ssh.h ssh2.h misc.h sshbuf.h authfile.h msg.h canohost.h pathnames.h readconf.h uidswap.h ssherr.h
-ssh-pkcs11-client.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
-ssh-pkcs11-helper.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h xmalloc.h sshbuf.h log.h misc.h sshkey.h authfd.h ssh-pkcs11.h ssherr.h
-ssh-pkcs11.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h log.h sshkey.h
-ssh-rsa.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
-ssh-xmss.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
-ssh.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h xmalloc.h ssh.h ssh2.h canohost.h compat.h cipher.h cipher-chachapoly.h chacha.h poly1305.h cipher-aesctr.h rijndael.h digest.h packet.h dispatch.h sshbuf.h
+ssh-keyscan.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h xmalloc.h ssh.h sshbuf.h sshkey.h cipher.h cipher-chachapoly.h chacha.h poly1305.h cipher-aesctr.h rijndael.h kex.h mac.h crypto_api.h compat.h myproposal.h packet.h dispatch.h log.h
+ssh-keysign.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h log.h sshkey.h ssh.h ssh2.h misc.h sshbuf.h authfile.h msg.h canohost.h pathnames.h readconf.h uidswap.h ssherr.h
+ssh-pkcs11-client.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
+ssh-pkcs11-helper.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h xmalloc.h sshbuf.h log.h misc.h sshkey.h authfd.h ssh-pkcs11.h ssherr.h
+ssh-pkcs11.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h log.h sshkey.h
+ssh-rsa.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
+ssh-sk-client.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h log.h ssherr.h sshbuf.h sshkey.h msg.h digest.h pathnames.h ssh-sk.h misc.h
+ssh-sk-helper.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h log.h sshkey.h authfd.h misc.h sshbuf.h msg.h uidswap.h ssherr.h ssh-sk.h
+ssh-sk.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
+ssh-xmss.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
ssh.o: channels.h sshkey.h authfd.h authfile.h pathnames.h clientloop.h log.h misc.h readconf.h sshconnect.h kex.h mac.h crypto_api.h sshpty.h match.h msg.h version.h ssherr.h myproposal.h utf8.h
-ssh_api.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h ssh_api.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h cipher.h cipher-chachapoly.h chacha.h poly1305.h cipher-aesctr.h rijndael.h sshkey.h kex.h mac.h crypto_api.h ssh.h ssh2.h packet.h dispatch.h compat.h log.h authfile.h misc.h
+ssh.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h xmalloc.h ssh.h ssh2.h canohost.h compat.h cipher.h cipher-chachapoly.h chacha.h poly1305.h cipher-aesctr.h rijndael.h digest.h packet.h dispatch.h sshbuf.h
+ssh_api.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h ssh_api.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h cipher.h cipher-chachapoly.h chacha.h poly1305.h cipher-aesctr.h rijndael.h sshkey.h kex.h mac.h crypto_api.h ssh.h ssh2.h packet.h dispatch.h compat.h log.h authfile.h misc.h
ssh_api.o: version.h myproposal.h ssherr.h sshbuf.h openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h
-sshbuf-getput-basic.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h ssherr.h sshbuf.h
-sshbuf-getput-crypto.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h ssherr.h sshbuf.h
-sshbuf-misc.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h ssherr.h sshbuf.h
-sshbuf.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h ssherr.h sshbuf.h misc.h
-sshconnect.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h hostfile.h ssh.h sshbuf.h packet.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h dispatch.h compat.h sshkey.h sshconnect.h log.h misc.h readconf.h atomicio.h dns.h monitor_fdpass.h ssh2.h version.h authfile.h ssherr.h
+sshbuf-getput-basic.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h ssherr.h sshbuf.h
+sshbuf-getput-crypto.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
+sshbuf-io.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h ssherr.h sshbuf.h atomicio.h
+sshbuf-misc.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h ssherr.h sshbuf.h
+sshbuf.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h ssherr.h sshbuf.h misc.h
sshconnect.o: authfd.h kex.h mac.h crypto_api.h
-sshconnect2.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h xmalloc.h ssh.h ssh2.h sshbuf.h packet.h dispatch.h compat.h cipher.h cipher-chachapoly.h chacha.h poly1305.h cipher-aesctr.h rijndael.h sshkey.h kex.h mac.h crypto_api.h myproposal.h
-sshconnect2.o: sshconnect.h authfile.h dh.h authfd.h log.h misc.h readconf.h match.h canohost.h msg.h pathnames.h uidswap.h hostfile.h ssherr.h utf8.h
-sshd.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h ./openbsd-compat/sys-tree.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h xmalloc.h ssh.h ssh2.h sshpty.h packet.h dispatch.h log.h sshbuf.h misc.h match.h servconf.h uidswap.h compat.h cipher.h cipher-chachapoly.h chacha.h poly1305.h
-sshd.o: cipher-aesctr.h rijndael.h digest.h sshkey.h kex.h mac.h crypto_api.h myproposal.h authfile.h pathnames.h atomicio.h canohost.h hostfile.h auth.h auth-pam.h audit.h loginrec.h authfd.h msg.h channels.h session.h monitor.h monitor_wrap.h ssh-sandbox.h auth-options.h version.h ssherr.h
+sshconnect.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h hostfile.h ssh.h sshbuf.h packet.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h dispatch.h compat.h sshkey.h sshconnect.h log.h misc.h readconf.h atomicio.h dns.h monitor_fdpass.h ssh2.h version.h authfile.h ssherr.h
+sshconnect2.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h xmalloc.h ssh.h ssh2.h sshbuf.h packet.h dispatch.h compat.h cipher.h cipher-chachapoly.h chacha.h poly1305.h cipher-aesctr.h rijndael.h sshkey.h kex.h mac.h crypto_api.h
+sshconnect2.o: myproposal.h sshconnect.h authfile.h dh.h authfd.h log.h misc.h readconf.h match.h canohost.h msg.h pathnames.h uidswap.h hostfile.h ssherr.h utf8.h ssh-sk.h sk-api.h
+sshd.o: cipher-aesctr.h rijndael.h digest.h sshkey.h kex.h mac.h crypto_api.h myproposal.h authfile.h pathnames.h atomicio.h canohost.h hostfile.h auth.h auth-pam.h audit.h loginrec.h authfd.h msg.h channels.h session.h monitor.h monitor_wrap.h ssh-sandbox.h auth-options.h version.h ssherr.h sk-api.h
+sshd.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h ./openbsd-compat/sys-tree.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h xmalloc.h ssh.h ssh2.h sshpty.h packet.h dispatch.h log.h sshbuf.h misc.h match.h servconf.h uidswap.h compat.h cipher.h cipher-chachapoly.h chacha.h poly1305.h
ssherr.o: ssherr.h
-sshkey-xmss.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
-sshkey.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h crypto_api.h ssh2.h ssherr.h misc.h sshbuf.h cipher.h cipher-chachapoly.h chacha.h poly1305.h cipher-aesctr.h rijndael.h digest.h sshkey.h match.h openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h
-sshlogin.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h sshlogin.h ssherr.h loginrec.h log.h sshbuf.h misc.h servconf.h
-sshpty.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h sshpty.h log.h misc.h
-sshsig.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h authfd.h authfile.h log.h misc.h sshbuf.h sshsig.h ssherr.h sshkey.h match.h digest.h
-sshtty.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h sshpty.h
-ttymodes.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h packet.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h dispatch.h log.h compat.h sshbuf.h ssherr.h ttymodes.h
-uidswap.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h log.h uidswap.h xmalloc.h
-umac.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h umac.h misc.h rijndael.h
-umac128.o: umac.c includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h umac.h misc.h rijndael.h
-utf8.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h utf8.h
-verify.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h crypto_api.h
-xmalloc.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h log.h
-xmss_commons.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
-xmss_fast.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
-xmss_hash.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
-xmss_hash_address.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
-xmss_wots.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/rmd160.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
+sshkey-xmss.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
+sshkey.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h crypto_api.h ssh2.h ssherr.h misc.h sshbuf.h cipher.h cipher-chachapoly.h chacha.h poly1305.h cipher-aesctr.h rijndael.h digest.h sshkey.h match.h ssh-sk.h openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h
+sshlogin.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h sshlogin.h ssherr.h loginrec.h log.h sshbuf.h misc.h servconf.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h
+sshpty.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h sshpty.h log.h misc.h
+sshsig.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h authfd.h authfile.h log.h misc.h sshbuf.h sshsig.h ssherr.h sshkey.h match.h digest.h
+sshtty.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h sshpty.h
+ttymodes.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h packet.h openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h dispatch.h log.h compat.h sshbuf.h ssherr.h ttymodes.h
+uidswap.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h log.h uidswap.h xmalloc.h
+umac.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h umac.h misc.h rijndael.h
+umac128.o: umac.c includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h umac.h misc.h rijndael.h
+utf8.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h utf8.h
+verify.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h crypto_api.h
+xmalloc.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h xmalloc.h log.h
+xmss_commons.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
+xmss_fast.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
+xmss_hash.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
+xmss_hash_address.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
+xmss_wots.o: includes.h config.h defines.h platform.h openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h openbsd-compat/base64.h openbsd-compat/sigact.h openbsd-compat/readpassphrase.h openbsd-compat/vis.h openbsd-compat/getrrsetbyname.h openbsd-compat/sha1.h openbsd-compat/sha2.h openbsd-compat/md5.h openbsd-compat/blf.h openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h openbsd-compat/getopt.h openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h openbsd-compat/bsd-setres_id.h openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.h openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.h openbsd-compat/bsd-poll.h openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.h openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.h openbsd-compat/port-irix.h openbsd-compat/port-linux.h openbsd-compat/port-solaris.h openbsd-compat/port-net.h openbsd-compat/port-uw.h openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.h entropy.h
diff --git a/.gitignore b/.gitignore
index e7e02ea720df..34a95721dc66 100644
--- a/.gitignore
+++ b/.gitignore
@@ -1,29 +1,33 @@
Makefile
buildpkg.sh
config.h
config.h.in
+config.log
config.status
configure
openbsd-compat/Makefile
openbsd-compat/regress/Makefile
openssh.xml
opensshd.init
survey.sh
**/*.0
**/*.o
+**/*.lo
+**/*.so
**/*.out
**/*.a
autom4te.cache/
scp
sftp
sftp-server
ssh
ssh-add
ssh-agent
ssh-keygen
ssh-keyscan
ssh-keysign
ssh-pkcs11-helper
+ssh-sk-helper
sshd
!regress/misc/fuzz-harness/Makefile
tags
diff --git a/.skipped-commit-ids b/.skipped-commit-ids
index dd573532f27d..ac469cfe35b6 100644
--- a/.skipped-commit-ids
+++ b/.skipped-commit-ids
@@ -1,39 +1,44 @@
5317f294d63a876bfc861e19773b1575f96f027d remove libssh from makefiles
a337e886a49f96701ccbc4832bed086a68abfa85 Makefile changes
f2c9feb26963615c4fece921906cf72e248b61ee more Makefile
fa728823ba21c4b45212750e1d3a4b2086fd1a62 more Makefile refactoring
1de0e85522051eb2ffa00437e1885e9d7b3e0c2e moduli update
814b2f670df75759e1581ecef530980b2b3d7e0f remove redundant make defs
04431e8e7872f49a2129bf080a6b73c19d576d40 moduli update
c07772f58028fda683ee6abd41c73da3ff70d403 moduli update
db6375fc302e3bdf07d96430c63c991b2c2bd3ff moduli update
5ea3d63ab972691f43e9087ab5fd8376d48e898f uuencode.c Makefile accident
99dd10e72c04e93849981d43d64c946619efa474 include sshbuf-misc.c
9e1c23476bb845f3cf3d15d9032da3ed0cb2fcf5 sshbuf-misc.c in regress
569f08445c27124ec7c7f6c0268d844ec56ac061 Makefile tweaks for !openssl
+58ec755be4e51978ecfee73539090eb68652a987 moduli update
+4bd5551b306df55379afe17d841207990eb773bf Makefile.inc
+14806a59353152f843eb349e618abbf6f4dd3ada Makefile.inc
+8ea4455a2d9364a0a04f9e4a2cbfa4c9fcefe77e Makefile.inc
+d9b910e412d139141b072a905e66714870c38ac0 Makefile.inc
Old upstream tree:
321065a95a7ccebdd5fd08482a1e19afbf524e35 Update DH groups
d4f699a421504df35254cf1c6f1a7c304fb907ca Remove 1k bit groups
aafe246655b53b52bc32c8a24002bc262f4230f7 Remove intermediate moduli
8fa9cd1dee3c3339ae329cf20fb591db6d605120 put back SSH1 for 6.9
f31327a48dd4103333cc53315ec53fe65ed8a17a Generate new moduli
edbfde98c40007b7752a4ac106095e060c25c1ef Regen moduli
052fd565e3ff2d8cec3bc957d1788f50c827f8e2 Switch to tame-based sandbox
7cf73737f357492776223da1c09179fa6ba74660 Remove moduli <2k
180d84674be1344e45a63990d60349988187c1ae Update moduli
f6ae971186ba68d066cd102e57d5b0b2c211a5ee systrace is dead.
96c5054e3e1f170c6276902d5bc65bb3b87a2603 remove DEBUGLIBS from Makefile
6da9a37f74aef9f9cc639004345ad893cad582d8 Update moduli file
77bcb50e47b68c7209c7f0a5a020d73761e5143b unset REGRESS_FAIL_EARLY
38c2133817cbcae75c88c63599ac54228f0fa384 Change COMPILER_VERSION tests
30c20180c87cbc99fa1020489fe7fd8245b6420c resync integrity.sh shell
1e6b51ddf767cbad0a4e63eb08026c127e654308 integrity.sh reliability
fe5b31f69a60d47171836911f144acff77810217 Makefile.inc bits
5781670c0578fe89663c9085ed3ba477cf7e7913 Delete sshconnect1.c
ea80f445e819719ccdcb237022cacfac990fdc5c Makefile.inc warning flags
b92c93266d8234d493857bb822260dacf4366157 moduli-gen.sh tweak
b25bf747544265b39af74fe0716dc8d9f5b63b95 Updated moduli
1bd41cba06a7752de4df304305a8153ebfb6b0ac rsa.[ch] already removed
e39b3902fe1d6c4a7ba6a3c58e072219f3c1e604 Makefile changes
diff --git a/ChangeLog b/ChangeLog
index baa9a3fb1e88..fbbbca0edec5 100644
--- a/ChangeLog
+++ b/ChangeLog
@@ -1,10470 +1,12663 @@
-commit cdf1d0a9f5d18535e0a18ff34860e81a6d83aa5c
+commit 8aa3455b16fddea4c0144a7c4a1edb10ec67dcc8
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Feb 14 00:39:20 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: openssh-8.2
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0a1340ff65fad0d84b997ac58dd1b393dec7c19b
+
+commit 72f0ce33f0d5a37f31bad5800d1eb2fbdb732de6
Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Wed Oct 9 11:31:03 2019 +1100
+Date: Wed Feb 12 09:28:35 2020 +1100
- prepare for 8.1 release
+ crank version numbers
-commit 3b4e56d740b74324e2d7542957cad5a11518f455
+commit b763ed05bd1f1f15ae1727c86a4498546bc36ca8
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Tue Feb 11 12:51:24 2020 +1100
+
+ Minor documentation update:
+
+ - remove duplication of dependency information (it's all in INSTALL).
+ - SSHFP is now an RFC.
+
+commit 14ccfdb7248e33b1dc8bbac1425ace4598e094cb
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Sun Feb 9 11:23:35 2020 +1100
+
+ Check if UINT32_MAX is defined before redefining.
+
+commit be075110c735a451fd9d79a864e01e2e0d9f19d2
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Fri Feb 7 15:07:27 2020 +1100
+
+ typo; reported by Phil Pennock
+
+commit 963d71851e727ffdd2a97fe0898fad61d4a70ba1
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Oct 9 00:04:57 2019 +0000
+Date: Fri Feb 7 03:57:31 2020 +0000
- upstream: openssh-8.1
+ upstream: sync the description of the $SSH_SK_PROVIDER environment
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 3356bb34e2aa287f0e6d6773c9ae659dc680147d
+ variable with that of the SecurityKeyProvider ssh/sshd_config(5) directive,
+ as the latter was more descriptive.
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0488f09530524a7e53afca6b6e1780598022552f
-commit 29e0ecd9b4eb3b9f305e2240351f0c59cad9ef81
+commit d4d9e1d40514e2746f9e05335d646512ea1020c6
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Feb 7 03:54:44 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: Add ssh -Q key-sig for all key and signature types.
+
+ Teach ssh -Q to accept ssh_config(5) and sshd_config(5) algorithm keywords as
+ an alias for the corresponding query. Man page help jmc@, ok djm@.
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1e110aee3db2fc4bc5bee2d893b7128fd622e0f8
+
+commit fd68dc27864b099b552a6d9d507ca4b83afd6a76
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Oct 9 00:04:42 2019 +0000
+Date: Fri Feb 7 03:27:54 2020 +0000
- upstream: fix an unreachable integer overflow similar to the XMSS
+ upstream: fix two PIN entry bugs on FIDO keygen: 1) it would allow more
- case, and some other NULL dereferences found by fuzzing.
+ than the intended number of prompts (3) and 2) it would SEGV too many
+ incorrect PINs were entered; based on patch by Gabriel Kihlman
- fix with and ok markus@
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9c0011f28ba8bd8adf2014424b64960333da1718
+
+commit 96bd895a0a0b3a36f81c14db8c91513578fc5563
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Feb 6 22:48:23 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: When using HostkeyAlgorithms to merely append or remove
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0f81adbb95ef887ce586953e1cb225fa45c7a47b
+ algorithms from the default set (i.e. HostkeyAlgorithms=+/-...), retain the
+ default behaviour of preferring those algorithms that have existing keys in
+ known_hosts; ok markus
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 040e7fcc38ea00146b5d224ce31ce7a1795ee6ed
-commit a546b17bbaeb12beac4c9aeed56f74a42b18a93a
+commit c7288486731734a864b58d024b1395029b55bbc5
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Oct 9 00:02:57 2019 +0000
+Date: Thu Feb 6 22:46:31 2020 +0000
- upstream: fix integer overflow in XMSS private key parsing.
+ upstream: expand HostkeyAlgorithms prior to config dump, matching
- Reported by Adam Zabrocki via SecuriTeam's SSH program.
+ other algorithm lists; ok markus@
- Note that this code is experimental and not compiled by default.
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a66f0fca8cc5ce30405a2867bc115fff600671d0
+
+commit a6ac5d36efc072b15690c65039754f8e44247bdf
+Author: naddy@openbsd.org <naddy@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Feb 6 22:34:58 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: Add Include to the list of permitted keywords after a
- ok markus@
+ Match keyword. ok markus@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: cd0361896d15e8a1bac495ac583ff065ffca2be1
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 342e940538b13dd41e0fa167dc9ab192b9f6e2eb
-commit c2cc25480ba36ab48c1a577bebb12493865aad87
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Oct 8 22:40:39 2019 +0000
+commit a47f6a6c0e06628eed0c2a08dc31a8923bcc37ba
+Author: naddy@openbsd.org <naddy@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Feb 6 22:30:54 2020 +0000
- upstream: Correct type for end-of-list sentinel; fixes initializer
+ upstream: Replace "security key" with "authenticator" in program
- warnings on some platforms. ok deraadt.
+ messages.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a990dbc2dac25bdfa07e79321349c73fd991efa2
+ This replaces "security key" in error/usage/verbose messages and
+ distinguishes between "authenticator" and "authenticator-hosted key".
+
+ ok djm@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7c63800e9c340c59440a054cde9790a78f18592e
-commit e827aedf8818e75c0016b47ed8fc231427457c43
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Oct 7 23:10:38 2019 +0000
+commit 849a9b87144f8a5b1771de6c85e44bfeb86be9a9
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Thu Feb 6 11:28:14 2020 +1100
- upstream: reversed test yielded incorrect debug message
+ Don't look for UINT32_MAX in inttypes.h
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 78bb512d04cfc238adb2c5b7504ac93eecf523b3
+ ... unless we are actually going to use it. Fixes build on HP-UX
+ without the potential impact to other platforms of a header change
+ shortly before release.
-commit 8ca491d29fbe26e5909ce22b344c0a848dc28d55
+commit a2437f8ed0c3be54ddd21630a93c68ebd168286f
Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Tue Oct 8 17:05:57 2019 +1100
+Date: Thu Feb 6 12:02:22 2020 +1100
depend
-commit 86a0323374cbd404629e75bb320b3fa1c16aaa6b
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Wed Oct 9 09:36:06 2019 +1100
+commit 9716e8c4956acdd7b223d1642bfa376e07e7503d
+Author: Michael Forney <mforney@mforney.org>
+Date: Wed Nov 27 19:17:26 2019 -0800
- Make MAKE_CLONE no-op macro more correct.
+ Fix sha2 MAKE_CLONE no-op definition
- Similar to the previous change to DEF_WEAK, some compilers don't like
- the empty statement, so convert into a no-op function prototype.
+ The point of the dummy declaration is so that MAKE_CLONE(...) can have
+ a trailing semicolon without introducing an empty declaration. So,
+ the macro replacement text should *not* have a trailing semicolon,
+ just like DEF_WEAK.
-commit cfc1897a2002ec6c4dc879b24e8b3153c87ea2cf
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Wed Oct 9 09:06:35 2019 +1100
+commit d596b1d30dc158915a3979fa409d21ff2465b6ee
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Feb 4 09:58:04 2020 +0000
- wrap stdint.h include in HAVE_STDINT_H
+ upstream: require FIDO application strings to start with "ssh:"; ok
- make the indenting a little more consistent too..
+ markus@
- Fixes Solaris 2.6; reported by Tom G. Christensen
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 94e9c1c066d42b76f035a3d58250a32b14000afb
-commit 13b3369830a43b89a503915216a23816d1b25744
+commit 501f3582438cb2cb1cb92be0f17be490ae96fb23
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Feb 3 23:47:57 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: revert enabling UpdateHostKeys by default - there are still
+
+ corner cases we need to address; ok markus
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ff7ad941bfdc49fb1d8baa95fd0717a61adcad57
+
+commit 072f3b832d2a4db8d9880effcb6c4d0dad676504
+Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Feb 3 08:15:37 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: use better markup for challenge and write-attestation, and
+
+ rejig the challenge text a little;
+
+ ok djm
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9f351e6da9edfdc907d5c3fdaf2e9ff3ab0a7a6f
+
+commit 262eb05a22cb1fabc3bc1746c220566490b80229
Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Tue Oct 8 15:32:02 2019 +1100
+Date: Mon Feb 3 21:22:15 2020 +1100
- avoid "return (value)" in void-declared function
+ mention libfido2 in dependencies section
+
+commit ccd3b247d59d3bde16c3bef0ea888213fbd6da86
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Mon Feb 3 19:40:12 2020 +1100
+
+ add clock_gettime64(2) to sandbox allowed syscalls
- spotted by Tim Rice; ok dtucker
+ bz3093
-commit 0c7f8d2326d812b371f7afd63aff846973ec80a4
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Tue Oct 8 14:44:50 2019 +1100
+commit adffbe1c645ad2887ba0b6d24c194aa7a40c5735
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sun Feb 2 09:45:34 2020 +0000
- Make DEF_WEAK more likely to be correct.
+ upstream: Output (none) in debug in the case in the CheckHostIP=no case
- Completely nop-ing out DEF_WEAK leaves an empty statemment which some
- compilers don't like. Replace with a no-op function template. ok djm@
+ as suggested by markus@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4ab9117ee5261cbbd1868717fcc3142eea6385cf
-commit b1e79ea8fae9c252399677a28707661d85c7d00c
+commit 58c819096a2167983e55ae686486ce317b69b2d1
Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sun Oct 6 11:49:50 2019 +0000
+Date: Sun Feb 2 09:22:22 2020 +0000
- upstream: Instead of running sed over the whole log to remove CRs,
+ upstream: Prevent possible null pointer deref of ip_str in debug.
- remove them only where it's needed (and confuses test(1) on at least OS X in
- portable).
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 37b252e2e6f690efed6682437ef75734dbc8addf
+
+commit 0facae7bc8d3f8f9d02d0f6bed3d163ff7f39806
+Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sun Feb 2 07:36:50 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: shuffle the challenge keyword to keep the -O list sorted;
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: a6ab9b4bd1d33770feaf01b2dfb96f9e4189d2d0
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 08efad608b790949a9a048d65578fae9ed5845fe
-commit 8dc7d6b75a7f746fdd056acd41dffc0a13557a4c
-Author: Eduardo Barretto <ebarretto@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
-Date: Tue May 9 13:33:30 2017 -0300
+commit 6fb3dd0ccda1c26b06223b87bcd1cab9ec8ec3cc
+Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sat Feb 1 06:53:12 2020 +0000
- Enable specific ioctl call for EP11 crypto card (s390)
+ upstream: tweak previous;
- The EP11 crypto card needs to make an ioctl call, which receives an
- specific argument. This crypto card is for s390 only.
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0c42851cdc88583402b4ab2b110a6348563626d3
+
+commit 92725d4d3fde675acc0ca040b48f3d0c7be73b7f
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Sat Feb 1 17:25:09 2020 +1100
+
+ Use sys-queue.h from compat library.
- Signed-off-by: Eduardo Barretto <ebarretto@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
+ Fixes build on platforms that don't have sys/queue.h (eg MUSL).
-commit 07f2c7f34951c04d2cd796ac6c80e47c56c4969e
+commit 677d0ece67634262b3b96c3cd6410b19f3a603b7
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Oct 4 04:31:59 2019 +0000
+Date: Fri Jan 31 23:25:08 2020 +0000
- upstream: fix memory leak in error path; bz#3074 patch from
+ upstream: regress test for sshd_config Include directive; from Jakub
- krishnaiah.bommu@intel.com, ok dtucker
+ Jelen
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d031853f3ecf47b35a0669588f4d9d8e3b307b3c
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 0d9224de3297c7a5f51ba68d6e3725a2a9345fa4
-commit b7fbc75e119170f4d15c94a7fda4a1050e0871d6
+commit d4f4cdd681ab6408a98419f398b75a55497ed324
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Oct 4 04:13:39 2019 +0000
+Date: Fri Jan 31 23:13:04 2020 +0000
- upstream: space
+ upstream: whitespace
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 350648bcf00a2454e7ef998b7d88e42552b348ac
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 564cf7a5407ecf5da2d94ec15474e07427986772
-commit 643ab68c79ac1644f4a31e36928c2bfc8a51db3c
+commit 245399dfb3ecebc6abfc2ef4ee2e650fa9f6942b
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Oct 4 03:39:19 2019 +0000
+Date: Fri Jan 31 23:11:25 2020 +0000
- upstream: more sshsig regress tests: check key revocation, the
+ upstream: force early logging to stderr if debug_flag (-d) is set;
- check-novalidate signature test mode and signing keys in ssh-agent.
+ avoids missing messages from re-exec config passing
- From Sebastian Kinne (slightly tweaked)
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 02484b8241c1f49010e7a543a7098e6910a8c9ff
+
+commit 7365f28a66d1c443723fbe6f4a2612ea6002901e
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Jan 31 23:08:08 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: mistake in previous: filling the incorrect buffer
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: b39566f5cec70140674658cdcedf38752a52e2e2
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 862ee84bd4b97b529f64aec5d800c3dcde952e3a
-commit 714031a10bbe378a395a93cf1040f4ee1451f45f
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Oct 4 03:26:58 2019 +0000
+commit c2bd7f74b0e0f3a3ee9d19ac549e6ba89013abaf
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Jan 31 22:42:45 2020 +0000
- upstream: Check for gmtime failure in moduli generation. Based on
+ upstream: Add a sshd_config "Include" directive to allow inclusion
- patch from krishnaiah.bommu@intel.com, ok djm@
+ of files. This has sensible semantics wrt Match blocks and accepts glob(3)
+ patterns to specify the included files. Based on patch by Jakub Jelen in
+ bz2468; feedback and ok markus@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4c6a4cde0022188ac83737de08da0e875704eeaa
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 36ed0e845b872e33f03355b936a4fff02d5794ff
-commit 6918974405cc28ed977f802fd97a9c9a9b2e141b
+commit ba261a1dd33266168ead4f8f40446dcece4d1600
Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Oct 3 17:07:50 2019 +0000
+Date: Fri Jan 31 22:25:59 2020 +0000
- upstream: use a more common options order in SYNOPSIS and sync
-
- usage(); while here, no need for Bk/Ek;
-
- ok dtucker
+ upstream: spelling fix;
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 38715c3f10b166f599a2283eb7bc14860211bb90
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 3c079523c4b161725a4b15dd06348186da912402
-commit feff96b7d4c0b99307f0459cbff128aede4a8984
+commit 771891a044f763be0711493eca14b6b0082e030f
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Oct 2 09:50:50 2019 +0000
+Date: Thu Jan 30 22:25:34 2020 +0000
- upstream: thinko in previous; spotted by Mantas
-
- =?UTF-8?q?=20Mikul=C4=97nas?=
- MIME-Version: 1.0
- Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
- Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+ upstream: document changed default for UpdateHostKeys
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ffa3f5a45e09752fc47d9041e2203ee2ec15b24d
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 25c390b21d142f78ac0106241d13441c4265fd2c
-commit b5a89eec410967d6b712665f8cf0cb632928d74b
+commit d53a518536c552672c00e8892e2aea28f664148c
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Oct 2 08:07:13 2019 +0000
+Date: Thu Jan 30 22:19:32 2020 +0000
- upstream: make signature format match PROTOCO
+ upstream: enable UpdateKnownHosts=yes if the configuration
- =?UTF-8?q?=20as=20a=20string,=20not=20raw=20bytes.=20Spotted=20by=20Manta?=
- =?UTF-8?q?s=20Mikul=C4=97nas?=
- MIME-Version: 1.0
- Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
- Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+ specifies only the default known_hosts files, otherwise select
+ UpdateKnownHosts=ask; ok markus@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 80fcc6d52893f80c6de2bedd65353cebfebcfa8f
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ab401a5ec4a33d2e1a9449eae6202e4b6d427df7
-commit dc6f81ee94995deb11bbf7e19801022c5f6fd90a
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Oct 2 08:05:50 2019 +0000
+commit bb63ff844e818d188da4fed3c016e0a4eecbbf25
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Thu Jan 30 18:54:42 2020 +1100
- upstream: ban empty namespace strings for s
-
- =?UTF-8?q?shsig;=20spotted=20by=20Mantas=20Mikul=C4=97nas?=
- MIME-Version: 1.0
- Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
- Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+ Look in inttypes.h for UINT32_MAX.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7c5bcf40bed8f4e826230176f4aa353c52aeb698
+ Should prevent warnings on at least some AIX versions.
-commit fa5bd8107e0e2b3e1e184f55d0f9320c119f65f0
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Wed Oct 2 14:30:55 2019 +1000
+commit afeb6a960da23f0a5cbc4b80cca107c7504e932a
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Jan 30 07:21:38 2020 +0000
- Put ssherr.h back as it's actually needed.
+ upstream: use sshpkt_fatal() instead of plain fatal() for
+
+ ssh_packet_write_poll() failures here too as the former yields better error
+ messages; ok dtucker@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1f7a6ca95bc2b716c2e948fc1370753be772d8e3
-commit 3ef92a657444f172b61f92d5da66d94fa8265602
-Author: Lonnie Abelbeck <lonnie@abelbeck.com>
-Date: Tue Oct 1 09:05:09 2019 -0500
+commit 65d6fd0a8a6f31c3ddf0c1192429a176575cf701
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Jan 30 07:20:57 2020 +0000
- Deny (non-fatal) shmget/shmat/shmdt in preauth privsep child.
+ upstream: check the return value of ssh_packet_write_poll() and
- New wait_random_seeded() function on OpenSSL 1.1.1d uses shmget, shmat, and shmdt
- in the preauth codepath, deny (non-fatal) in seccomp_filter sandbox.
+ call sshpkt_fatal() if it fails; avoid potential busy-loop under some
+ circumstances. Based on patch by Mike Frysinger; ok dtucker@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c79fe5cf4f0cd8074cb6db257c1394d5139408ec
-commit edd1d3a6261aecbf9a55944fd7be1db83571b46e
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Wed Oct 2 10:54:28 2019 +1000
+commit dce74eab0c0f9010dc84c62500a17771d0131ff3
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Jan 30 07:20:05 2020 +0000
- remove duplicate #includes
+ upstream: have sshpkt_fatal() save/restore errno before we
- Prompted by Jakub Jelen
+ potentially call strerror() (via ssh_err()); ok dtucker
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 5590df31d21405498c848245b85c24acb84ad787
-commit 13c508dfed9f25e6e54c984ad00a74ef08539e70
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Wed Oct 2 10:51:15 2019 +1000
+commit 14ef4efe2bf4180e085ea6738fdbebc199458b0c
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Jan 29 08:17:49 2020 +0000
- typo in comment
+ upstream: markus suggests a simplification to previous
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 10bbfb6607ebbb9a018dcd163f0964941adf58de
-commit d0c3ac427f6c52b872d6617421421dd791664445
+commit 101ebc3a8cfa78d2e615afffbef9861bbbabf1ff
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Oct 2 00:42:30 2019 +0000
+Date: Wed Jan 29 07:51:30 2020 +0000
- upstream: remove some duplicate #includes
+ upstream: give more context to UpdateHostKeys messages, mentioning
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ed6827ab921eff8027669848ef4f70dc1da4098c
+ that the changes are validated by the existing trusted host key. Prompted by
+ espie@ feedback and ok markus@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b3d95f4a45f2692f4143b9e77bb241184dbb8dc5
-commit 084682786d9275552ee93857cb36e43c446ce92c
+commit 24c0f752adf9021277a7b0a84931bb5fe48ea379
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Oct 1 10:22:53 2019 +0000
+Date: Tue Jan 28 08:01:34 2020 +0000
- upstream: revert unconditional forced login implemented in r1.41 of
+ upstream: changes to support FIDO attestation
- ssh-pkcs11.c; r1.45 added a forced login as a fallback for cases where the
- token returns no objects and this is less disruptive for users of tokens
- directly in ssh (rather than via ssh-agent) and in ssh-keygen
+ Allow writing to disk the attestation certificate that is generated by
+ the FIDO token at key enrollment time. These certificates may be used
+ by an out-of-band workflow to prove that a particular key is held in
+ trustworthy hardware.
- bz3006, patch from Jakub Jelen; ok markus
+ Allow passing in a challenge that will be sent to the card during
+ key enrollment. These are needed to build an attestation workflow
+ that resists replay attacks.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 33d6df589b072094384631ff93b1030103b3d02e
+ ok markus@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 457dc3c3d689ba39eed328f0817ed9b91a5f78f6
-commit 6c91d42cce3f055917dc3fd2c305dfc5b3b584b3
-Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sun Sep 29 16:31:57 2019 +0000
+commit 156bef36f93a48212383235bb8e3d71eaf2b2777
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Jan 28 07:24:15 2020 +0000
- upstream: group and sort single letter options; ok deraadt
+ upstream: disable UpdateHostKeys=ask when in quiet mode; "work for
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e1480e760a2b582f79696cdcff70098e23fc603f
+ me" matthieu@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 60d7b5eb91accf935ed9852650a826d86db2ddc7
-commit 3b44bf39ff4d7ef5d50861e2e9dda62d2926d2fe
-Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Sep 27 20:03:24 2019 +0000
+commit ec8a759b4045e54d6b38e690ffee4cbffc53c7b7
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Tue Jan 28 12:57:25 2020 +1100
- upstream: fix the DH-GEX text in -a; because this required a comma,
+ compat for missing IPTOS_DSCP_LE in system headers
+
+commit 4594c7627680c4f41c2ad5fe412e55b7cc79b10c
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Jan 28 01:49:36 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: make IPTOS_DSCP_LE available via IPQoS directive; bz2986,
- i added a comma to the first part, for balance...
+ based on patch by veegish AT cyberstorm.mu
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2c3464e9e82a41e8cdfe8f0a16d94266e43dbb58
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9902bf4fbb4ea51de2193ac2b1d965bc5d99c425
-commit 3e53ef28fab53094e3b19622ba0e9c3d5fe71273
-Author: deraadt@openbsd.org <deraadt@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Sep 24 12:50:46 2019 +0000
+commit da22216b5db3613325aa7b639f40dc017e4c6f69
+Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Jan 27 20:51:32 2020 +0000
- upstream: identity_file[] should be PATH_MAX, not the arbitrary
+ upstream: disable UpdateHostKeys=ask if command is specified; ok
- number 1024
+ djm@ sthen@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e775f94ad47ce9ab37bd1410d7cf3b7ea98b11b7
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e5bcc45eadb78896637d4143d289f1e42c2ef5d7
-commit 90d4b2541e8c907793233d9cbd4963f7624f4174
-Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Sep 20 18:50:58 2019 +0000
+commit 1e1db0544fdd788e2e3fc21d972a7ccb7de6b4ae
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sun Jan 26 00:09:50 2020 +0000
- upstream: new sentence, new line;
+ upstream: unbreak unittests for recent API / source file changes
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c35ca5ec07be460e95e7406af12eee04a77b6698
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 075a899a01bbf7781d38bf0b33d8366faaf6d3c0
-commit fbec7dba01b70b49ac47f56031310865dff86200
+commit 0d1144769151edf65f74aee9a4c8545c37861695
Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Mon Sep 30 18:01:12 2019 +1000
+Date: Sun Jan 26 15:09:15 2020 +1100
- Include stdio.h for snprintf.
+ Move definition of UINT32_MAX.
- Patch from vapier@gentoo.org.
-
-commit 0a403bfde71c4b82147473298d3a60b4171468bd
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Mon Sep 30 14:11:42 2019 +1000
+ This allows us to always define it if needed not just if we also
+ define the type ourself.
- Add SKIP_LTESTS for skipping specific tests.
-
-commit 4d59f7a5169c451ebf559aedec031ac9da2bf80c
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Sep 27 05:25:12 2019 +0000
+commit f73ab8a811bc874c2fb403012aa8e4bfdcaf5ec7
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sun Jan 26 00:09:50 2020 +0000
- upstream: Test for empty result in expected bits. Remove CRs from log
-
- as they confuse tools on some platforms. Re-enable the 3des-cbc test.
+ upstream: unbreak unittests for recent API / source file changes
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: edf536d4f29fc1ba412889b37247a47f1b49d250
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 075a899a01bbf7781d38bf0b33d8366faaf6d3c0
-commit 7c817d129e2d48fc8a6f7965339313023ec45765
+commit 0373f9eba2b63455dceedbd3ac3d5dca306789ff
Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Fri Sep 27 15:26:22 2019 +1000
+Date: Sun Jan 26 14:09:17 2020 +1100
- Re-enable dhgex test.
-
- Since we've added larger fallback groups to dh.c this test will pass
- even if there is no moduli file installed on the system.
+ Include signal.h to prevent redefintion of _NSIG.
-commit c1e0a32fa852de6d1c82ece4f76add0ab0ca0eae
+commit 638a45b5c1e20a8539100ca44166caad8abf26f8
Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Tue Sep 24 21:17:20 2019 +1000
+Date: Sun Jan 26 13:40:51 2020 +1100
- Add more ToS bits, currently only used by netcat.
+ Wrap stdint.h in tests inside HAVE_STDINT_H.
-commit 5a273a33ca1410351cb484af7db7c13e8b4e8e4e
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Thu Sep 19 15:41:23 2019 +1000
+commit 74dfc2c859c906eaab1f88a27fd883115ffb928f
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sun Jan 26 00:14:45 2020 +0000
- Privsep is now required.
+ upstream: for UpdateHostKeys, don't report errors for unsupported
+
+ key types - just ignore them. spotted by and ok dtucker@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 91769e443f6197c983932fc8ae9d39948727d473
-commit 8aa2aa3cd4d27d14e74b247c773696349472ef20
+commit b59618246c332e251160be0f1e0e88a7d4e2b0ae
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Sep 16 03:23:02 2019 +0000
+Date: Sun Jan 26 00:13:20 2020 +0000
- upstream: Allow testing signature syntax and validity without verifying
-
- that a signature came from a trusted signer. To discourage accidental or
- unintentional use, this is invoked by the deliberately ugly option name
- "check-novalidate"
+ upstream: downgrade error() for missing subsequent known_hosts
- from Sebastian Kinne
+ files to debug() as it was intended to be; spotted by dtucker@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: cea42c36ab7d6b70890e2d8635c1b5b943adcc0b
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 18cfea382cb52f2da761be524e309cc3d5354ef9
-commit 7047d5afe3103f0f07966c05b810682d92add359
+commit 469df611f778eec5950d556aabfe1d4efc227915
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Sep 13 04:52:34 2019 +0000
+Date: Sat Jan 25 23:33:27 2020 +0000
- upstream: clarify that IdentitiesOnly also applies to the default
+ upstream: clarify that BatchMode applies to all interactive prompts
- ~/.ssh/id_* keys; bz#3062
+ (e.g. host key confirmation) and not just password prompts.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 604be570e04646f0f4a17026f8b2aada6a585dfa
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 97b001883d89d3fb1620d2e6b747c14a26aa9818
-commit b36ee3fcb2f1601693b1b7fd60dd6bd96006ea75
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Sep 13 04:36:43 2019 +0000
+commit de40876c4a5d7c519d3d7253557572fdfc13db76
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sat Jan 25 23:28:06 2020 +0000
- upstream: Plug mem leaks on error paths, based in part on github
+ upstream: tidy headers; some junk snuck into sshbuf-misc.c and
- pr#120 from David Carlier. ok djm@.
+ sshbuf-io.c doesn't need SSHBUF_INTERNAL set
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c57adeb1022a8148fc86e5a88837b3b156dbdb7e
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 27a724d2e0b2619c1a1490f44093bbd73580d9e6
-commit 2aefdf1aef906cf7548a2e5927d35aacb55948d4
+commit 6a107606355fa9547884cad6740e6144a7a7955b
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Sun Jan 26 10:28:21 2020 +1100
+
+ depend
+
+commit 59d01f1d720ebede4da42882f592d1093dac7adc
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Sep 13 04:31:19 2019 +0000
+Date: Sat Jan 25 23:13:09 2020 +0000
- upstream: whitespace
+ upstream: improve the error message for u2f enrollment errors by
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 57a71dd5f4cae8d61e0ac631a862589fb2bfd700
+ making ssh-keygen be solely responsible for printing the error message and
+ convertint some more common error responses from the middleware to a useful
+ ssherr.h status code. more detail remains visible via -v of course.
+
+ also remove indepedent copy of sk-api.h declarations in sk-usbhid.c
+ and just include it.
+
+ feedback & ok markus@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a4a8ffa870d9a3e0cfd76544bcdeef5c9fb1f1bb
-commit fbe24b142915331ceb2a3a76be3dc5b6d204fddf
+commit 99aa8035554ddb976348d2a9253ab3653019728d
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Sep 13 04:27:35 2019 +0000
+Date: Sat Jan 25 23:02:13 2020 +0000
- upstream: allow %n to be expanded in ProxyCommand strings
+ upstream: factor out reading/writing sshbufs to dedicated
- From Zachary Harmany via github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/pull/118
- ok dtucker@
+ functions; feedback and ok markus@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7eebf1b7695f50c66d42053d352a4db9e8fb84b6
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: dc09e5f1950b7acc91b8fdf8015347782d2ecd3d
-commit 2ce1d11600e13bee0667d6b717ffcc18a057b821
+commit 065064fcf455778b0918f783033b374d4ba37a92
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Sep 13 04:07:42 2019 +0000
+Date: Sat Jan 25 22:49:38 2020 +0000
- upstream: clarify that ConnectTimeout applies both to the TCP
+ upstream: add a comment describing the ranges of channel IDs that
- connection and to the protocol handshake/KEX. From Jean-Charles Longuet via
- Github PR140
+ we use; requested by markus@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ce1766abc6da080f0d88c09c2c5585a32b2256bf
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 83a1f09810ffa3a96a55fbe32675b34ba739e56b
-commit df780114278f406ef7cb2278802a2660092fff09
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Sep 9 02:31:19 2019 +0000
+commit 69334996ae203c51c70bf01d414c918a44618f8e
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sat Jan 25 22:41:01 2020 +0000
- upstream: Fix potential truncation warning. ok deraadt.
+ upstream: make sshd_config:ClientAliveCountMax=0 disable the
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d87b7e3a94ec935e8194e7fce41815e22804c3ff
+ connection killing behaviour, rather than killing the connection after
+ sending the first liveness test probe (regardless of whether the client was
+ responsive) bz2627; ok markus
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 5af79c35f4c9fa280643b6852f524bfcd9bccdaf
-commit ec0e6243660bf2df30c620a6a0d83eded376c9c6
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Fri Sep 13 13:14:39 2019 +1000
+commit bf986a9e2792555e0879a3145fa18d2b49436c74
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sat Jan 25 22:36:22 2020 +0000
- memleak of buffer in sshpam_query
+ upstream: clarify order of AllowUsers/DenyUsers vs
- coverity report via Ed Maste; ok dtucker@
+ AllowGroups/DenyGroups; bz1690, ok markus@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 5637584ec30db9cf64822460f41b3e42c8f9facd
-commit c17e4638e5592688264fc0349f61bfc7b4425aa5
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Fri Sep 13 13:12:42 2019 +1000
+commit 022ce92fa0daa9d78830baeb2bd2dc3f83c724ba
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sat Jan 25 07:17:18 2020 +0000
- explicitly test set[ug]id() return values
+ upstream: when AddKeysToAgent=yes is set and the key contains no
- Legacy !_POSIX_SAVED_IDS path only; coverity report via Ed Maste
- ok dtucker@
+ comment, add the key to the agent with the key's path as the comment. bz2564
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8dd8ca9340d7017631a27f4ed5358a4cfddec16f
-commit 91a2135f32acdd6378476c5bae475a6e7811a6a2
-Author: naddy@openbsd.org <naddy@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Sep 6 14:45:34 2019 +0000
+commit 0b813436bbf6546638b10c1fa71f54691bcf5e63
+Author: tedu@openbsd.org <tedu@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sat Jan 25 07:09:14 2020 +0000
- upstream: Allow prepending a list of algorithms to the default set
-
- by starting the list with the '^' character, e.g.
+ upstream: group14-sha1 is no longer a default algorithm
- HostKeyAlgorithms ^ssh-ed25519
- Ciphers ^aes128-gcm@openssh.com,aes256-gcm@openssh.com
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a96f04d5e9c2ff760c6799579dc44f69b4ff431d
+
+commit 3432b6e05d5c583c91c566c5708fed487cec79ac
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sat Jan 25 07:02:51 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: reword HashKnownHosts description a little more; some
- ok djm@ dtucker@
+ people found the wording confusing (bz#2560)
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1e1996fac0dc8a4b0d0ff58395135848287f6f97
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ac30896598694f07d498828690aecd424c496988
-commit c8bdd2db77ac2369d5cdee237656f266c8f41552
+commit f80d7d6aa98d6eddc5df02412efee6db75673d4c
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Sep 6 07:53:40 2019 +0000
+Date: Sat Jan 25 07:01:00 2020 +0000
- upstream: key conversion should fail for !openssl builds, not fall
+ upstream: weaken the language for what HashKnownHosts provides with
- through to the key generation code
+ regards to known_hosts name privacy, it's not practical for this option to
+ offer any guarantee that hostnames cannot be recovered from a disclosed
+ known_hosts file (e.g. by brute force).
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b957436adc43c4941e61d61958a193a708bc83c9
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 13f1e3285f8acf7244e9770074296bcf446c6972
-commit 823f6c37eb2d8191d45539f7b6fa877a4cb4ed3d
+commit 846446bf3e7421e6671a4afd074bdf15eecd7832
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Sep 6 06:08:11 2019 +0000
+Date: Sat Jan 25 06:40:20 2020 +0000
- upstream: typo in previous
+ upstream: the GatewayPorts vs -R listen address selection logic is
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7c3b94110864771a6b80a0d8acaca34037c3c96e
+ still confusing people, so add another comment explaining the special
+ handling of "localhost"; bz#3258
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e6bf0f0fbf1c7092bf0dbd9c6eab105970b5b53a
-commit 6a710d3e06fd375e2c2ae02546b9541c488a2cdb
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Sun Sep 8 14:48:11 2019 +1000
+commit 734f2f83f5ff86f2967a99d67be9ce22dd0394dd
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sat Jan 25 06:03:10 2020 +0000
- needs time.h for --without-openssl
+ upstream: mention that permitopen=/PermitOpen do no name to address
+
+ translation; prompted by bz3099
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0dda8e54d566b29855e76bebf9cfecce573f5c23
-commit f61f29afda6c71eda26effa54d3c2e5306fd0833
+commit e1e97cae19ff07b7a7f7e82556bc048c3c54af63
Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Sat Sep 7 19:25:00 2019 +1000
+Date: Sat Jan 25 16:30:22 2020 +1100
- make unittests pass for no-openssl case
+ include tunnel device path in error message
-commit 105e1c9218940eb53473f55a9177652d889ddbad
+commit 0ecd20bc9f0b9c7c697c9eb014613516c8f65834
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Sep 6 05:59:41 2019 +0000
+Date: Sat Jan 25 04:48:26 2020 +0000
- upstream: avoid compiling certain files that deeply depend on
+ upstream: unrevert this:
- libcrypto when WITH_OPENSSL isn't set
+ > revision 1.217
+ > date: 2019/11/27 03:34:04; author: dtucker; state: Exp; lines: +5 -7; commitid: wkiMn49XJyjzoJIs;
+ > Make channel_id u_int32_t and remove unnecessary check and cast that were
+ > left over from the type conversion. Noted by t-hashida@amiya.co.jp in
+ > bz#3098, ok markus@ djm@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 569f08445c27124ec7c7f6c0268d844ec56ac061
+ Darren was right the first time; ok dtucker@ "agreed" markus@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 641dd1b99a6bbd85b7160da462ae1be83432c7c8
-commit 670104b923dd97b1c06c0659aef7c3e52af571b2
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Sep 6 05:23:55 2019 +0000
+commit a0c81d2402eedc514b9c9f25ef9604eb0576b86a
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sat Jan 25 02:57:53 2020 +0000
- upstream: fixes for !WITH_OPENSSL compilation; ok dtucker@
+ upstream: Move setting $NC into test-exec since it's now used by
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7fd68eaa9e0f7482b5d4c7e8d740aed4770a839f
+ multiple tests, and in -portable we use our own local copy to avoid
+ portability problems.
+
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: ceb78445fcaac317bec2fc51b3f0d9589048c114
-commit be02d7cbde3d211ec2ed2320a1f7d86b2339d758
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Sep 6 04:53:27 2019 +0000
+commit e16dfa94f86358033531c4a97dcb51508ef84d49
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Sat Jan 25 13:05:42 2020 +1100
- upstream: lots of things were relying on libcrypto headers to
+ Put EC key export inside OPENSSL_HAS_ECC.
- transitively include various system headers (mostly stdlib.h); include them
- explicitly
-
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 5b522f4f2d844f78bf1cc4f3f4cc392e177b2080
+ Fixes link error when building against an OpenSSL that does not have
+ ECC.
-commit d05aaaaadcad592abfaa44540928e0c61ef72ebb
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Sep 6 03:30:42 2019 +0000
+commit 94a2e5951b374e1a89761ceaff72e66eb1946807
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sat Jan 25 00:27:56 2020 +0000
- upstream: remove leakmalloc reference; we used this early when
+ upstream: Wait a bit longer for the multiplex master to become ready
- refactoring but not since
+ since on very slow hosts the current delay is not sufficient and the test
+ will fail.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: bb28ebda8f7c490b87b37954044a6cdd43a7eb2c
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 6d90c7475d67ac3a95610b64af700629ece51a48
-commit 1268f0bcd8fc844ac6c27167888443c8350005eb
+commit b2df804f571d77b07059f087b90955ffbc2f67d4
Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Sep 6 04:24:06 2019 +0000
+Date: Fri Jan 24 10:08:17 2020 +0000
- upstream: Check for RSA support before using it for the user key,
+ upstream: Add a connection test for proxycommand. This would have
- otherwise use ed25519 which is supported when built without OpenSSL.
+ caught the problem caused by ssh.c rev 1.507 wherein Host and Hostname were
+ swapped. Prompted by beck@
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 3d23ddfe83c5062f00ac845d463f19a2ec78c0f7
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: d218500ae6aca4c479c27318fb5b09ebc00f7aae
-commit fd7a2dec652b9efc8e97f03f118f935dce732c60
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Fri Sep 6 14:07:10 2019 +1000
+commit c6f06fd38a257b9fcc7d6760f8fb6d505dccb628
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sat Jan 25 00:22:31 2020 +0000
- Provide explicit path to configure-check.
+ upstream: set UpdateKnownHosts=ask by default; bz#2894; ok
- On some platforms (at least OpenBSD) make won't search VPATH for target
- files, so building out-of-tree will fail at configure-check. Provide
- explicit path. ok djm@
+ markus@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f09cb3177f3a14c96428e14f347e976a8a531fee
-commit 00865c29690003b4523cc09a0e104724b9f911a4
+commit 7955633a554397bc24913cec9fd7285002935f7e
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Sep 6 01:58:50 2019 +0000
+Date: Sat Jan 25 00:21:08 2020 +0000
- upstream: better error code for bad arguments; inspired by
+ upstream: allow UpdateKnownHosts=yes to function when multiple
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: dfc263b6041de7f0ed921a1de0b81ddebfab1e0a
+ known_hosts files are in use. When updating host keys, ssh will now search
+ subsequent known_hosts files, but will add new/changed host keys to the first
+ specified file only. bz#2738
+
+ ok markus@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 6ded6d878a03e57d5aa20bab9c31f92e929dbc6c
-commit afdf27f5aceb4973b9f5308f4310c6e3fd8db1fb
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Thu Sep 5 21:38:40 2019 +1000
+commit e5a278a62ab49dffe96929fa8d8506c6928dba90
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sat Jan 25 00:06:48 2020 +0000
- revert config.h/config.h.in freshness checks
+ upstream: process security key provider via realpath() in agent,
- turns out autoreconf and configure don't touch some files if their content
- doesn't change, so the mtime can't be relied upon in a makefile rule
+ avoids malicious client from being able to cause agent to load arbitrary
+ libraries into ssh-sk-helper.
+
+ reported by puck AT puckipedia.com; ok markus
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1086643df1b7eee4870825c687cf0c26a6145d1c
-commit a97609e850c57bd2cc2fe7e175fc35cb865bc834
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Thu Sep 5 20:54:39 2019 +1000
+commit 89a8d4525e8edd9958ed3df60cf683551142eae0
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sat Jan 25 00:03:36 2020 +0000
- extend autoconf freshness test
+ upstream: expose PKCS#11 key labels/X.509 subjects as comments
- make it cover config.h.in and config.h separately
+ Extract the key label or X.509 subject string when PKCS#11 keys
+ are retrieved from the token and plumb this through to places where
+ it may be used as a comment.
+
+ based on https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/pull/138
+ by Danielle Church
+
+ feedback and ok markus@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: cae1fda10d9e10971dea29520916e27cfec7ca35
-commit 182297c10edb21c4856c6a38326fd04d81de41a5
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Thu Sep 5 20:34:54 2019 +1000
+commit a8c05c640873621681ab64d2e47a314592d5efa2
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Jan 24 23:56:01 2020 +0000
- check that configure/config.h is up to date
+ upstream: tweak proctitle to include sshd arguments, as these are
- Ensure they are newer than the configure.ac / aclocal.m4 source
+ frequently used to distinguish between multiple independent instances of the
+ server. New proctitle looks like this:
+
+ $ pgrep -lf sshd
+ 12844 sshd: /usr/sbin/sshd -f /etc/ssh/sshd_config [listener] 0 of 10-100 startups
+
+ requested by sthen@ and aja@; ok aja@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: cf235a561c655a3524a82003cf7244ecb48ccc1e
-commit 7d6034bd020248e9fc0f8c39c71c858debd0d0c1
+commit 8075fccbd4f70a4371acabcfb47562471ff0de6f
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Sep 5 10:05:51 2019 +0000
+Date: Fri Jan 24 23:54:40 2020 +0000
- upstream: if a PKCS#11 token returns no keys then try to login and
+ upstream: add xextendf() to extend a string with a format
- refetch them. Based on patch from Jakub Jelen; bz#2430 ok markus@
+ (reallocating as necessary). ok aja@ as part of a larger diff
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ab53bd6ddd54dd09e54a8bfbed1a984496f08b43
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 30796b50d330b3e0e201747fe40cdf9aa70a77f9
-commit 76f09bd95917862101b740afb19f4db5ccc752bf
+commit d15c8adf2c6f1a6b4845131074383eb9c3d05c3d
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Sep 5 09:35:19 2019 +0000
+Date: Fri Jan 24 05:33:01 2020 +0000
- upstream: sprinkle in some explicit errors here, otherwise the
+ upstream: minor tweaks to ssh-keygen -Y find-principals:
- percolate all the way up to dispatch_run_fatal() and lose all meaninful
- context
+ emit matched principals one per line to stdout rather than as comma-
+ separated and with a free-text preamble (easy confusion opportunity)
- to help with bz#3063; ok dtucker@
+ emit "not found" error to stderr
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 5b2da83bb1c4a3471444b7910b2120ae36438a0a
+ fix up argument testing for -Y operations and improve error message for
+ unsupported operations
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 3d9c9a671ab07fc04a48f543edfa85eae77da69c
-commit 0ea332497b2b2fc3995f72f6bafe9d664c0195b3
+commit c3368a5d5ec368ef6bdf9971d6330ca0e3bdca06
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Sep 5 09:25:13 2019 +0000
+Date: Fri Jan 24 00:28:57 2020 +0000
- upstream: only send ext_info for KEX_INITIAL; bz#2929 ok dtucker
+ upstream: remove ssh-rsa (SHA1) from the list of allowed CA
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 00f5c6062f6863769f5447c6346f78c05d2e4a63
+ signature algorithms ok markus
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: da3481fca8c81e6951f319a86b7be67502237f57
-commit f23d91f9fa7f6f42e70404e000fac88aebfe3076
-Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Sep 5 05:47:23 2019 +0000
+commit 4a41d245d6b13bd3882c8dc058dbd2e2b39a9f67
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Jan 24 00:27:04 2020 +0000
- upstream: macro fix; ok djm
+ upstream: when signing a certificate with an RSA key, default to
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e891dd6c7996114cb32f0924cb7898ab55efde6e
+ a safe signature algorithm (rsa-sha-512) if not is explicitly specified by
+ the user; ok markus@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e05f638f0be6c0266e1d3d799716b461011e83a9
-commit 8b57337c1c1506df2bb9f039d0628a6de618566b
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Thu Sep 5 15:46:39 2019 +1000
+commit 8dfb6a202c96cdf037c8ce05e53e32e0e0b7b454
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Jan 24 00:00:31 2020 +0000
- update fuzzing makefile to more recent clang
+ upstream: allow PEM export of DSA and ECDSA keys; bz3091, patch
+
+ from Jakub Jelen ok markus@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a58edec8b9f07acab4b962a71a5125830d321b51
-commit ae631ad77daf8fd39723d15a687cd4b1482cbae8
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Thu Sep 5 15:45:32 2019 +1000
-
- fuzzer for sshsig allowed_signers option parsing
-
-commit 69159afe24120c97e5ebaf81016c85968afb903e
+commit 72a8bea2d748c8bd7f076a8b39a52082c79ae95f
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Sep 5 05:42:59 2019 +0000
+Date: Thu Jan 23 23:31:52 2020 +0000
- upstream: memleak on error path; found by libfuzzer
+ upstream: ssh-keygen -Y find-principals fixes based on feedback
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 34d44cb0fb5bdb5fcbc6b02b804e71b20a7a5fc7
+ from Markus:
+
+ use "principals" instead of principal, as allowed_signers lines may list
+ multiple.
+
+ When the signing key is a certificate, emit only principals that match
+ the certificate principal list.
+
+ NB. the command -Y name changes: "find-principal" => "find-principals"
+
+ ok markus@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ab575946ff9a55624cd4e811bfd338bf3b1d0faf
-commit bab6feb01f9924758ca7129dba708298a53dde5f
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Sep 5 04:55:32 2019 +0000
+commit 0585b5697201f5d8b32e6f1b0fee7e188268d30d
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Jan 24 01:29:23 2020 +0000
- upstream: expose allowed_signers options parsing code in header for
+ upstream: Do not warn about permissions on symlinks.
- fuzzing
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 339d4cbae224bd8743ffad9c3afb0cf3cb66c357
+
+commit 415192348a5737a960f6d1b292a17b64d55b542c
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Jan 23 11:19:12 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: Handle zlib compression being disabled now that it's
- rename to make more consistent with philosophically-similar auth
- options parsing API.
+ optional.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0c67600ef04187f98e2912ca57b60c22a8025b7c
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 0af4fbc5168e62f89d0350de524bff1cb00e707a
-commit 4f9d75fbafde83d428e291516f8ce98e6b3a7c4b
-Author: naddy@openbsd.org <naddy@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Sep 4 20:31:15 2019 +0000
+commit fbce7c1a898ae75286349822950682cf46346121
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Jan 23 10:53:04 2020 +0000
- upstream: Call comma-separated lists as such to clarify semantics.
-
- Options such as Ciphers take values that may be a list of ciphers; the
- complete list, not indiviual elements, may be prefixed with a dash or plus
- character to remove from or append to the default list, respectively.
+ upstream: Fix typo in comment.
- Users might read the current text as if each elment took an optional prefix,
- so tweak the wording from "values" to "list" to prevent such ambiguity for
- all options supporting these semantics.
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d1d7a6553208bf439378fd1cf686a828aceb353a
+
+commit ba247af8e9e302910e22881ef9d307a8afeef036
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Jan 23 10:19:59 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: When checking for unsafe directories, ignore non-directories
- Fix instances missed in first commit. ok jmc@ kn@
+ (ie symlinks, where permissions are not relevant).
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7112522430a54fb9f15a7a26d26190ed84d5e417
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: fb6cfc8b022becb62b2dcb99ed3f072b3326e501
-commit db1e6f60f03641b2d17e0ab062242609f4ed4598
-Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Sep 4 05:56:54 2019 +0000
+commit 74deb7029be4c00810443114aac9308875a81dae
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Thu Jan 23 22:17:24 2020 +1100
- upstream: tweak previous;
+ zlib is now optional.
+
+commit 633a2af47ee90291aaf93969aeee1e5046074c7c
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Thu Jan 23 22:16:51 2020 +1100
+
+ Plumb WITH_ZLIB into configure.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0abd728aef6b5b35f6db43176aa83b7e3bf3ce27
+ This allows zlib support to be disabled by ./configure --without-zlib.
-commit 0f44e5956c7c816f6600f2a47be4d7bb5a8d711d
-Author: naddy@openbsd.org <naddy@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Sep 3 20:51:49 2019 +0000
+commit 7f8e66fea8c4e2a910df9067cb7638999b7764d5
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Jan 23 10:24:29 2020 +0000
- upstream: repair typo and editing mishap
+ upstream: Make zlib optional. This adds a "ZLIB" build time option
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d125ab720ca71ccf9baf83e08ddc8c12a328597e
+ that allows building without zlib compression and associated options. With
+ feedback from markus@, ok djm@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 44c6e1133a90fd15a3aa865bdedc53bab28b7910
-commit f4846dfc6a79f84bbc6356ae3184f142bacedc24
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Thu Sep 5 11:09:28 2019 +1000
+commit 69ac4e33023b379e9a8e9b4b6aeeffa6d1fcf6fa
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Jan 23 07:54:04 2020 +0000
- Fuzzer harness for sshsig
+ upstream: remove trailing period characters from pub/priv key
+
+ pathnames - they make them needlessly more difficult to cut and paste without
+ error; ok markus@ & dtucker@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: abdcfd1a5723fcac0711feee7665edc66ae2335a
-commit b08a6bc1cc7750c6f8a425d1cdbd86552fffc637
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Tue Sep 3 18:45:42 2019 +1000
+commit 945bf52c3c815d95b1e842ebf6c910c3524bd5bb
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Thu Jan 23 21:06:45 2020 +1100
- oops; missed including the actual file
+ Fix a couple of mysig_t leftovers.
-commit 1a72c0dd89f09754df443c9576dde624a17d7dd0
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Tue Sep 3 18:44:10 2019 +1000
+commit 84226b447d45fe4542613de68c2ca59a890d7c01
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Thu Jan 23 18:55:24 2020 +1100
- portability fixes for sshsig
+ Remove mysignal wrapper.
+
+ We switched the main code to use sigaction(), so the wrapper is no
+ longer used.
-commit 6d6427d01304d967e58544cf1c71d2b4394c0522
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Sep 3 08:37:45 2019 +0000
+commit 5533c2fb7ef21172fa3708d66b03faa2c6b3d93f
+Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Jan 23 07:16:38 2020 +0000
- upstream: regress test for sshsig; feedback and ok markus@
+ upstream: new sentence, new line;
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 74c0974f2cdae8d9599b9d76a09680bae55d8a8b
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b6c3f2f36ec77e99198619b38a9f146655281925
-commit 59650f0eaf65115afe04c39abfb93a4fc994ec55
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Sep 3 08:37:06 2019 +0000
+commit 3bf2a6ac791d64046a537335a0f1d5e43579c5ad
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Jan 23 07:10:22 2020 +0000
- upstream: only add plain keys to prevent any certs laying around
+ upstream: Replace all calls to signal(2) with a wrapper around
- from confusing the test.
+ sigaction(2). This wrapper blocks all other signals during the handler
+ preventing races between handlers, and sets SA_RESTART which should reduce
+ the potential for short read/write operations.
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: b8f1508f822bc560b98dea910e61ecd76f34100f
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 5e047663fd77a40d7b07bdabe68529df51fd2519
-commit d637c4aee6f9b5280c13c020d7653444ac1fcaa5
+commit e027c044c796f3a01081a91bee55741204283f28
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Sep 3 08:35:27 2019 +0000
+Date: Thu Jan 23 04:54:34 2020 +0000
- upstream: sshsig tweaks and improvements from and suggested by
+ upstream: missing header change from previous; spotted by dtucker@
- Markus
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 321ce74c0a5bbd0f02fa3f20cb5cf2a952c6b96f
+
+commit 7e1323102b1b04eef391b01e180710a2d408a7ab
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Jan 23 03:42:41 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: Check for and warn about StrictModes permission problems. ok tb@
- ok markus/me
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 4841704ccdee50ee7efc6035bc686695c6ac2991
+
+commit 84de1c27f845d15c859db44e7070a46f45504b66
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Jan 23 03:35:07 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: Also test PuTTY chacha20.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ea4f46ad5a16b27af96e08c4877423918c4253e9
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 7af6a0e8763b05f1f8eee6bca5f31fcb16151040
-commit 2a9c9f7272c1e8665155118fe6536bebdafb6166
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Sep 3 08:34:19 2019 +0000
+commit c7ed15a39695ecd5f1f21842d8d9cd22246d4ee2
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Jan 23 03:24:38 2020 +0000
- upstream: sshsig: lightweight signature and verification ability
+ upstream: Also test PuTTY ecdh kex methods.
- for OpenSSH
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: ec4017dce612131842398a03e93007a869c2c133
+
+commit c4b3a128954ee1b7fbcbda167baf8aca1a3d1c84
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Jan 23 02:46:49 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: Remove unsupported algorithms from list of defaults at run
- This adds a simple manual signature scheme to OpenSSH.
- Signatures can be made and verified using ssh-keygen -Y sign|verify
+ time and remove ifdef and distinct settings for OPENSSL=no case.
- Signatures embed the key used to make them. At verification time, this
- is matched via principal name against an authorized_keys-like list
- of allowed signers.
+ This will make things much simpler for -portable where the exact set
+ of algos depends on the configuration of both OpenSSH and the libcrypto
+ it's linked against (if any). ok djm@
- Mostly by Sebastian Kinne w/ some tweaks by me
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e0116d0183dcafc7a9c40ba5fe9127805c5dfdd2
+
+commit 56cffcc09f8a2e661d2ba02e61364ae6f998b2b1
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Jan 23 02:43:48 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: add a new signature operations "find-principal" to look
- ok markus@
+ up the principal associated with a signature from an allowed-signers file.
+ Work by Sebastian Kinne; ok dtucker@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2ab568e7114c933346616392579d72be65a4b8fb
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 6f782cc7e18e38fcfafa62af53246a1dcfe74e5d
-commit 5485f8d50a5bc46aeed829075ebf5d9c617027ea
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Sep 3 08:32:11 2019 +0000
+commit 65cf8730de6876a56595eef296e07a86c52534a6
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Jan 22 07:38:30 2020 +0000
- upstream: move authorized_keys option parsing helpsers to misc.c
+ upstream: Ignore whitespace when checking explict fingerprint.
- and make them public; ok markus@
+ When confirming a host key using the fingerprint itself, ignore leading and
+ trailing whitespace. ok deraadt@ djm@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c18bcb2a687227b3478377c981c2d56af2638ea2
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: cafd7f803bbdcd40c3a8f8f1a77747e6b6d8c011
-commit f8df0413f0a057b6a3d3dd7bd8bc7c5d80911d3a
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Sep 3 08:31:20 2019 +0000
+commit 8d3af6ebdf524b34087a0a3ae415b5141ba10572
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Jan 22 07:31:27 2020 +0000
- upstream: make get_sigtype public as sshkey_get_sigtype(); ok
+ upstream: Increase keyscan timeout from default. On slow hosts 3
- markus@
+ concurrent keyscans can hit the default 5 second timeout, so increase to 15
+ seconds.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 01f8cdbec63350490d2249f41112c5780d1cfbb8
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 16383dec166af369b7fb9948572856f5d544c93f
-commit dd8002fbe63d903ffea5be7b7f5fc2714acab4a0
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Sep 3 08:30:47 2019 +0000
+commit 6c30c9adbeeed09a8a9e7a69974cfa1f1ddd1e9e
+Author: tedu@openbsd.org <tedu@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Jan 22 04:58:23 2020 +0000
- upstream: move advance_past_options to authfile.c and make it
+ upstream: remove diffie-hellman-group14-sha1 from default kex to
- public; ok markus@
+ see what happens. general mostly ok
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: edda2fbba2c5b1f48e60f857a2010479e80c5f3c
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 216b7b8462d2ef5f4531f26cb2cb839b2153dad9
-commit c72d78ccbe642e08591a626e5de18381489716e0
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Sep 3 08:29:58 2019 +0000
+commit 4a32c0ca44a2dc2a358f69b5d43c08e528b44b39
+Author: claudio@openbsd.org <claudio@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Jan 22 04:51:51 2020 +0000
- upstream: move skip_space() to misc.c and make it public; ok
+ upstream: For ssh-keygen -lF only add a space after key fingerprint
- markus@
+ when there is a comment. This makes copy-paste of fingerprints into ssh
+ easier. OK djm@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: caa77e8a3b210948e29ad3e28c5db00852961eae
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: fa01d95624f65c1eb4dc7c575d20d77c78010dfd
-commit 06af3583f46e2c327fdd44d8a95b8b4e8dfd8db5
+commit 37d3b736506760e4ebc7fe56255f7b8ea823a00c
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Sep 3 08:29:15 2019 +0000
+Date: Wed Jan 22 04:49:16 2020 +0000
- upstream: authfd: add function to check if key is in agent
+ upstream: some __func__ and strerror(errno) here; no functional
- This commit adds a helper function which allows the caller to
- check if a given public key is present in ssh-agent.
-
- work by Sebastian Kinne; ok markus@
+ change
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d43c5826353e1fdc1af71eb42961b30782c7bd13
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 6c3ddd5f848b99ea560b31d3fba99ceed66cef37
-commit 2ab5a8464870cc4b29ddbe849bbbc255729437bf
+commit e2031b05c74c98b141179ceab13a323cf17d01e5
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Sep 3 08:28:30 2019 +0000
+Date: Wed Jan 22 02:25:21 2020 +0000
- upstream: fix memleak in ssh_free_identitylist(); ok markus@
+ upstream: factor out parsing of allowed-signers lines
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: aa51f77ae2c5330a1f61b2d22933f24a443f9abf
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 85ee6aeff608371826019ea85e55bfa87f79d06e
-commit 85443f165b4169b2a448b3e24bc1d4dc5b3156a4
+commit 47160e1de8c2f638f0ef41cef42c976417b61778
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Wed Jan 22 10:30:13 2020 +1100
+
+ unbreak fuzzer support for recent ssh-sk.h changes
+
+commit 70d38c3cfd4550e8ee66cc3bf1b91aa339c91df5
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Sep 3 08:27:52 2019 +0000
+Date: Tue Jan 21 22:39:57 2020 +0000
- upstream: factor out confirm_overwrite(); ok markus@
+ upstream: expose the number of currently-authenticating connections
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 304e95381b39c774c8fced7e5328b106a3ff0400
+ along with the MaxStartups limit in the proctitle; suggestion from Philipp
+ Marek, w/ feedback from Craig Miskell ok dtucker@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a4a6db2dc1641a5df8eddf7d6652176e359dffb3
-commit 9a396e33685633581c67d5ad9664570ef95281f2
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Sep 2 23:46:46 2019 +0000
+commit a78c66d5d2144bd49779bc80a647346bd3d7233d
+Author: naddy@openbsd.org <naddy@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Jan 21 12:40:04 2020 +0000
- upstream: constify an argument
+ upstream: document the default value of the ControlPersist option;
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 724bafc9f993746ad4303e95bede2c030de6233b
+ ok dtucker@ djm@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0788e7f2b5a9d4e36d3d2ab378f73329320fef66
-commit b52c0c2e64988277a35a955a474d944967059aeb
+commit b46a6325849e40aa2e4b0d962a6f00f708f6576a
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Wed Jan 22 09:28:32 2020 +1100
+
+ remove accidental change in f8c11461
+
+commit 80d3bebcab96fe1d177e45906e10db16895da01d
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Sep 2 00:19:25 2019 +0000
+Date: Tue Jan 21 11:06:09 2020 +0000
- upstream: downgrade PKCS#11 "provider returned no slots" warning
+ upstream: don't #ifdef out the KRL code when compiling without
- from log level error to debug. This is common when attempting to enumerate
- keys on smartcard readers with no cards plugged in. bz#3058 ok dtucker@
+ libcrypto support; it works just fine and disabling it breaks a few tests. ok
+ dtucker@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: bb8839ddeb77c271390488af1b771041d43e49c6
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 65f6272c4241eb4b04de78b012fe98b2b555ad44
-commit 0713322e18162463c5ab5ddfb9f935055ca775d8
+commit f8c11461aa6db168fc5e7eeae448b4cbbf59642a
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sun Sep 1 23:47:32 2019 +0000
+Date: Tue Jan 21 08:06:27 2020 +0000
- upstream: print comment when printing pubkey from private
+ upstream: pass SSH_SK_HELPER explicitly past $SUDO to avoid it getting
- bz#3052; ok dtucker
+ cleared; with dtucker@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a91b2a8d5f1053d34d7fce44523c53fb534ba914
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 03178a0580324bf0dff28f7eac6c3edbc5407f8e
-commit 368f1cc2fbd6ad10c66bc1b67c2c04aebf8a04a8
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Mon Sep 2 10:28:42 2019 +1000
+commit b5fcb0ac1cc0ef01aeec1c089146298654ab3ae0
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Jan 21 07:07:31 2020 +0000
- fixed test in OSX closefrom() replacement
+ upstream: check access(ssh-sk-helper, X_OK) to provide friendly
- from likan_999.student AT sina.com
+ error message for misconfigured helper paths
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 061bcc262155d12e726305c91394ac0aaf1f8341
-commit 6b7c53498def19a14dd9587bf521ab6dbee8988f
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Mon Sep 2 10:22:02 2019 +1000
+commit 56bced43c14dc6fa2bfa1816007e441644105609
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Jan 21 06:09:56 2020 +0000
- retain Solaris PRIV_FILE_LINK_ANY in sftp-server
+ upstream: Document sntrup4591761x25519-sha512@tinyssh.org. Patch
- Dropping this privilege removes the ability to create hard links to
- files owned by other users. This is required for the legacy sftp rename
- operation.
+ from jtesta@positronsecurity.com via github PR#151.
- bz#3036; approach ok Alex Wilson (the original author of the Solaris
- sandbox/pledge replacement code)
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f3d48168623045c258245c340a5a2af7dbb74edc
-commit e50f808712393e86d69e42e9847cdf8d473412d7
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Aug 30 05:08:28 2019 +0000
+commit 4a05d789b86314fef7303824f69defbc6b96ed60
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Jan 21 05:56:56 2020 +0000
- upstream: Use ed25519 for most hostkey rotation tests since it's
+ upstream: fix ssh-keygen not displaying authenticator touch
- supported even when built without OpenSSL. Use RSA for the secondary type
- test if supported, otherwise skip it. Fixes this test for !OpenSSL builds.
+ prompt; reported by jmc@
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 101cb34a84fd974c623bdb2e496f25a6e91be109
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 04d4f582fc194eb3897ebcbfe286c49958ba2859
-commit 5e4796c47dd8d6c38fb2ff0b3e817525fed6040d
-Author: bluhm@openbsd.org <bluhm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Aug 22 21:47:27 2019 +0000
+commit 881aded0389d999375f926051491a944c6d8752b
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Jan 21 05:56:27 2020 +0000
- upstream: Test did not compile due to missing symbols. Add source
+ upstream: a little more verbosity in sign_and_send_pubkey() debug
- sshbuf-misc.c to regress as it was done in ssh make file. from Moritz Buhl
+ messages
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 9e1c23476bb845f3cf3d15d9032da3ed0cb2fcf5
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 6da47a0e6373f6683006f49bc2a516d197655508
-commit e0e7e3d0e26f2c30697e6d0cfc293414908963c7
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Fri Aug 30 14:26:19 2019 +1000
+commit b715fdc71bbd009d0caff691ab3fc04903c4aee8
+Author: naddy@openbsd.org <naddy@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sat Jan 18 21:16:43 2020 +0000
- tweak warning flags
+ upstream: one more replacement "(security) key" -> "(FIDO)
- Enable -Wextra if compiler supports it
+ authenticator"
- Set -Wno-error=format-truncation if available to prevent expected
- string truncations in openbsd-compat from breaking -Werror builds
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 031bca03c1d1f878ab929facd561911f1bc68dfd
-commit 28744182cf90e0073b76a9e98de58a47e688b2c4
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Fri Aug 30 13:21:38 2019 +1000
+commit 84911da1beeb6ed258a43468efb316cd39fb6855
+Author: naddy@openbsd.org <naddy@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sat Jan 18 15:45:41 2020 +0000
- proc_pidinfo()-based closefrom() for OS X
+ upstream: undo merge error and replace the term "security key"
- Refactor closefrom() to use a single brute-force close() loop fallback.
+ again
- Based on patch from likan_999.student@sina.com in bz#3049. ok dtucker@
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 341749062c089cc360a7877e9ee3a887aecde395
-commit dc2ca588144f088a54febebfde3414568dc73d5f
-Author: kn@openbsd.org <kn@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Aug 16 11:16:32 2019 +0000
+commit e8c06c4ee708720efec12cd1a6f78a3c6d76b7f0
+Author: naddy@openbsd.org <naddy@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Jan 17 20:13:47 2020 +0000
- upstream: Call comma-separated lists as such to clarify semantics
+ upstream: Document loading of resident keys from a FIDO
- Options such as Ciphers take values that may be a list of ciphers; the
- complete list, not indiviual elements, may be prefixed with a dash or plus
- character to remove from or append to the default list respectively.
+ authenticator.
- Users might read the current text as if each elment took an optional prefix,
- so tweak the wording from "values" to "list" to prevent such ambiguity for
- all options supporting this semantics (those that provide a list of
- available elements via "ssh -Q ...").
+ * Rename -O to -K to keep "-O option" available.
+ * Document -K.
+ * Trim usage() message down to synopsis, like all other commands.
- Input and OK jmc
+ ok markus@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4fdd175b0e5f5cb10ab3f26ccc38a93bb6515d57
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 015c2c4b28f8e19107adc80351b44b23bca4c78a
-commit c4736f39e66729ce2bf5b06ee6b391e092b48f47
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Aug 16 06:35:27 2019 +0000
+commit 0d005d6372a067b59123dec8fc6dc905f2c09e1e
+Author: naddy@openbsd.org <naddy@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Jan 14 15:07:30 2020 +0000
- upstream: include sshbuf-misc.c in SRCS_BASE
+ upstream: sync ssh-keygen.1 and ssh-keygen's usage() with each
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 99dd10e72c04e93849981d43d64c946619efa474
+ other and reality ok markus@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: cdf64454f2c3604c25977c944e5b6262a3bcce92
-commit d0e51810f332fe44ebdba41113aacf319d35f5a5
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Sat Aug 24 15:12:11 2019 +1000
+commit b8a4ca2ebfddab862f7eb1ea2a07fb9f70330429
+Author: naddy@openbsd.org <naddy@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sat Jan 11 16:23:10 2020 +0000
- Fix pasto in fallback code.
+ upstream: revise the fix for reversed arguments on
- There is no parameter called "pathname", it should simply be "path".
- bz#3059, patch from samuel at cendio.se.
+ expand_proxy_command()
+
+ Always put 'host' before 'host_arg' for consistency. ok markus@ djm@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1ba5b25472779f1b1957295fcc6907bb961472a3
-commit e83c989bfd9fc9838b7dfb711d1dc6da81814045
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Fri Aug 23 10:19:30 2019 +1000
+commit 57b181eaf2d34fd0a1b51ab30cb6983df784de5a
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Jan 10 23:43:26 2020 +0000
- use SC_ALLOW_ARG_MASK to limit mmap protections
+ upstream: pass the log-on-stderr flag and log level through to
- Restrict to PROT_(READ|WRITE|NONE), i.e. exclude PROT_EXEC
+ ssh-sk-helper, making debugging a bit easier. ok markus@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2e7aea6bf5770d3f38b7c7bba891069256c5a49a
-commit f6906f9bf12c968debec3671bbf19926ff8a235b
+commit a8bd5fdbdb7581afc7123a042a7cd6ca25357388
Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Fri Aug 23 10:08:48 2019 +1000
+Date: Tue Jan 21 12:32:16 2020 +1100
- allow mprotect(2) with PROT_(READ|WRITE|NONE) only
+ Wrap copy_environment_blacklist() in #ifdef
- Used by some hardened heap allocators. Requested by Yegor
- Timoshenko in https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/pull/142
+ It's only needed for USE_PAM or HAVE_CYGWIN cases and will cause compiler
+ warnings otherwise.
-commit e3b6c966b79c3ea5d51b923c3bbdc41e13b96ea0
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Aug 16 06:13:15 2019 +0000
+commit 10ecc647fc1db8d2dde9f6b9b826b201dfc48b62
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Tue Jan 21 12:20:05 2020 +1100
- upstream: switch percent_expand() to use sshbuf instead of a limited
+ depend
+
+commit b3f7009c9ffa5891283ed96e043001e09934a8d4
+Author: Ruben Kerkhof <ruben@rubenkerkhof.com>
+Date: Mon Jan 20 11:56:48 2020 +0100
+
+ Fix missing prototype warning for copy_environment
- fixed buffer; ok markus@
+ This function is only used in this file, and only on Cygwin, so make
+ it static and hide it behind HAVE_CYGWIN. Prevents missing prototype
+ warning.
+
+commit 0c428c0e991e2c4fabc48cf5d9b8f84c9412e0c3
+Author: Ruben Kerkhof <ruben@rubenkerkhof.com>
+Date: Mon Jan 20 13:58:11 2020 +0100
+
+ configure.ac: fix ldns test
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 3f9ef20bca5ef5058b48c1cac67c53b9a1d15711
+ When running ./configure --with-ldns, if ldns-config cannot be found, we
+ add -Iyes/include to CPPFLAGS and -Lyes/lib to LDFLAGS. Fix that.
-commit 9ab5b9474779ac4f581d402ae397f871ed16b383
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Aug 9 05:05:54 2019 +0000
+commit 6089abf715e2784751c9f62697e09bb103295b93
+Author: Ruben Kerkhof <ruben@rubenkerkhof.com>
+Date: Mon Jan 20 12:13:26 2020 +0100
- upstream: produce a useful error message if the user's shell is set
+ Make sshpam_password_change_required static.
- incorrectly during "match exec" processing. bz#2791 reported by Dario
- Bertini; ok dtucker
+ sshpam_password_change_required is only used in auth-pam.c, so make it
+ static to prevent a mising prototype warning.
+
+commit 5a9b9c82851b7bc219dc3a65962a80803c76c102
+Author: Ruben Kerkhof <ruben@rubenkerkhof.com>
+Date: Mon Jan 20 12:24:51 2020 +0100
+
+ sandbox-darwin.c: fix missing prototypes.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: cf9eddd6a6be726cb73bd9c3936f3888cd85c03d
+ Include the right header just like the other sandbox files.
+ Fixes missing prototype warnings for ssh_sandbox_* functions.
-commit 8fdbc7247f432578abaaca1b72a0dbf5058d67e5
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Aug 9 04:24:03 2019 +0000
+commit 335dc93526942a650f6c69666b3f6ca44d0a2910
+Author: Ruben Kerkhof <ruben@rubenkerkhof.com>
+Date: Mon Jan 20 11:09:27 2020 +0100
- upstream: Change description of TCPKeepAlive from "inactive" to
+ Fix a few warnings when on Mac OS X.
- "unresponsive" to clarify what it checks for. Patch from jblaine at
- kickflop.net via github pr#129, ok djm@.
+ Include stdlib.h for calloc, malloc, free and setenv.
+
+commit 0488dc2d3050ea1a99ef5cf44afc50ffbf3f1315
+Author: Ruben Kerkhof <ruben@rubenkerkhof.com>
+Date: Mon Jan 20 10:32:23 2020 +0100
+
+ Fix building without openssl.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 3682f8ec7227f5697945daa25d11ce2d933899e9
+ This fixes the following when there are no openssl headers on the system:
+ ssh-ecdsa-sk.c:34:10: fatal error: 'openssl/bn.h' file not found
-commit 7afc45c3ed72672690014dc432edc223b23ae288
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Aug 8 08:02:57 2019 +0000
+commit e6b7157b4ef29c83ec3a2d1d7c927e4b8898f9bb
+Author: Ruben Kerkhof <ruben@rubenkerkhof.com>
+Date: Wed Jan 15 16:08:55 2020 +0100
- upstream: Allow the maximimum uint32 value for the argument passed to
+ Add config.log to .gitignore
+
+commit 515e10ddf9644010b88cfd7ecf601f4306d42232
+Author: Ruben Kerkhof <ruben@rubenkerkhof.com>
+Date: Wed Jan 15 16:16:31 2020 +0100
+
+ Fix typo in README.md, s/crytpo/crypto/
+
+commit 1af3354aea3c4bfa5b5ecfb5d1ff3ad231c2073c
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Wed Jan 15 16:22:36 2020 +1100
+
+ Wrap stdint.h in ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H.
+
+commit 429170f273ce1b0140f8111a45ba69390d98de3a
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Tue Jan 14 14:41:47 2020 +1100
+
+ Wrap stdint.h inside HAVE_STDINT_H.
+
+commit a0989b60211b6f1c2313e1397c526d883a23a075
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Tue Jan 14 14:26:41 2020 +1100
+
+ Include compat header for definitions.
+
+commit e0cedcad51fe02683943bf4f1ad2961aa3f35313
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Tue Jan 14 09:42:52 2020 +1100
+
+ Improve search for 'struct timespec'.
- -b which allows better error messages from later validation. bz#3050, ok
- djm@
+ Make struct timespec test consistent with existing timeval test.
+ Include time.h for timespec in compat header where required.
+
+commit acaf9e058594310001ce64468ed2923dc6323e81
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Tue Jan 14 12:43:03 2020 +1100
+
+ Update depend to remove rmd160.h.
+
+commit 26b2675b0c3e3efea11a52609073aec01736ec84
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Tue Jan 14 07:24:46 2020 +1100
+
+ Remove configure test & compat code for ripemd160.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 10adf6876b2401b3dc02da580ebf67af05861673
+ RIPEMD160 support was removed upstream in 2017, however we still had
+ a configure test and compat code for it, so clean those up now.
-commit c31e4f5fb3915c040061981a67224de7650ab34b
-Author: naddy@openbsd.org <naddy@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Aug 5 21:45:27 2019 +0000
+commit ed3ad71b17adcd1fb4431d145f53cee1c6a1135e
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Jan 9 03:28:38 2020 +0000
- upstream: Many key types are supported now, so take care to check
+ upstream: fix reversed arguments on expand_proxy_command(); spotted
- the size restrictions and apply the default size only to the matching key
- type. tweak and ok dtucker@
+ by anton@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b825de92d79cc4cba19b298c61e99909488ff57e
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: db1c32478a01dfbc9c4db171de0f25907bea5775
-commit 6b39a7b49ebacec4e70e24bfc8ea2f11057aac22
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Aug 5 11:50:33 2019 +0000
+commit cd53476383f0cf475f40ba8ac8deb6b76dd5ce4e
+Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Jan 6 07:43:28 2020 +0000
- upstream: Remove now-redundant perm_ok arg since
+ upstream: put the fido options in a list, and tidy up the text a
- sshkey_load_private_type will now return SSH_ERR_KEY_BAD_PERMISSIONS in that
- case. Patch from jitendra.sharma at intel.com, ok djm@
+ little; ok djm
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 07916a17ed0a252591b71e7fb4be2599cb5b0c77
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 491ce15ae52a88b7a6a2b3b6708a14b4aacdeebb
-commit d46075b923bf25e6f25959a3f5b458852161cb3e
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Mon Aug 5 21:36:48 2019 +1000
+commit 30f704ebc0e9e32b3d12f5d9e8c1b705fdde2c89
+Author: Jeremy Drake <github@jdrake.com>
+Date: Fri Oct 11 18:31:05 2019 -0700
- Fix mem leak in unit test.
+ Deny (non-fatal) ipc in preauth privsep child.
- Patch from jitendra.sharma at intel.com.
+ As noted in openssh/openssh-portable#149, i386 does not have have
+ _NR_shmget etc. Instead, it has a single ipc syscall (see man 2 ipc,
+ https://linux.die.net/man/2/ipc). Add this syscall, if present, to the
+ list of syscalls that seccomp will deny non-fatally.
-commit c4ffb72593c08921cf9291bc05a5ef1d0aaa6891
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Aug 2 01:41:24 2019 +0000
+commit b110cefdfbf5a20f49b774a55062d6ded2fb6e22
+Author: Khem Raj <raj.khem@gmail.com>
+Date: Tue Jan 7 16:26:45 2020 -0800
- upstream: fix some memleaks in test_helper code
+ seccomp: Allow clock_gettime64() in sandbox.
- bz#3037 from Jitendra Sharma
+ This helps sshd accept connections on mips platforms with
+ upcoming glibc ( 2.31 )
+
+commit 3cc60c899a92a469e5118310ba6b74cb57215618
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Jan 6 02:39:30 2020 +0000
+
+ upstream: missing else in check_enroll_options()
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 71440fa9186f5842a65ce9a27159385c6cb6f751
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e058fb918fda56ddbbf0bee910101004cec421d4
-commit 6e76e69dc0c7712e9ac599af34bd091b0e7dcdb5
+commit ff5784e2698d6c41e9f39ce4df24968c1beeb2bb
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Aug 2 01:23:19 2019 +0000
+Date: Mon Jan 6 02:24:28 2020 +0000
- upstream: typo; from Christian Hesse
+ upstream: fix error message
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 82f6de7438ea7ee5a14f44fdf5058ed57688fdc3
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1eb52025658eb78ea6223181e552862198d3d505
-commit 49fa065a1bfaeb88a59abdfa4432d3b9c35b0655
+commit dd2acc8b862c09751621995fba2d5fa6f4e24cc9
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Jul 30 05:04:49 2019 +0000
+Date: Mon Jan 6 02:07:50 2020 +0000
- upstream: let sshbuf_find/cmp take a void* for the
+ upstream: adapt sk-dummy to SK API changes
- search/comparison argument, instead of a u_char*. Saves callers needing to
- cast.
+ also, make it pull prototypes directly from sk-api.c and #error
+ if the expected version changes. This will make any future regress
+ test breakage because of SK API changes much more apparent
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d63b69b7c5dd570963e682f758f5a47b825605ed
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 79b07055de4feb988e31da71a89051ad5969829d
-commit 7adf6c430d6fc17901e167bc0789d31638f5c2f8
-Author: mestre@openbsd.org <mestre@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Jul 24 08:57:00 2019 +0000
+commit c312ca077cd2a6c15545cd6b4d34ee2f69289174
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Jan 6 02:00:46 2020 +0000
- upstream: When using a combination of a Yubikey+GnuPG+remote
+ upstream: Extends the SK API to accept a set of key/value options
- forwarding the gpg-agent (and options ControlMaster+RemoteForward in
- ssh_config(5)) then the codepath taken will call mux_client_request_session
- -> mm_send_fd -> sendmsg(2). Since sendmsg(2) is not allowed in that codepath
- then pledge(2) kills the process.
+ for all operations. These are intended to future-proof the API a little by
+ making it easier to specify additional fields for without having to change
+ the API version for each.
- The solution is to add "sendfd" to pledge(2), which is not too bad considering
- a little bit later we reduce pledge(2) to only "stdio proc tty" in that
- codepath.
+ At present, only two options are defined: one to explicitly specify
+ the device for an operation (rather than accepting the middleware's
+ autoselection) and another to specify the FIDO2 username that may
+ be used when generating a resident key. These new options may be
+ invoked at key generation time via ssh-keygen -O
- Problem reported and diff provided by Timothy Brown <tbrown at freeshell.org>
+ This also implements a suggestion from Markus to avoid "int" in favour
+ of uint32_t for the algorithm argument in the API, to make implementation
+ of ssh-sk-client/helper a little easier.
- OK deraadt@
+ feedback, fixes and ok markus@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7ce38b6542bbec00e441595d0a178e970a9472ac
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 973ce11704609022ab36abbdeb6bc23c8001eabc
-commit 0e2fe18acc1da853a9120c2e9af68e8d05e6503e
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Jul 23 23:06:57 2019 +0000
+commit 2ab335712d084d9ccaf3f53afc3fa9535329da87
+Author: beck@openbsd.org <beck@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sun Jan 5 16:28:22 2020 +0000
- upstream: Fix typo in CASignatureAlgorithms wherein what should be
+ upstream: fix CanonicalizeHostname, broken by rev 1.507
- a comma is a dot. Patch from hnj2 via github pr#141.
+ Issue noticed and reported by Pierre-Olivier Martel <pom@apple.com>
+ ok dtucker@ markus@ djm@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 01f5a460438ff1af09aab483c0a70065309445f0
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 749f3168ec520609c35b0c4e1984e5fa47f16094
-commit e93ffd1a19fc47c49d68ae2fb332433690ecd389
+commit 69e44ba701b90b0f530d64c3fe4363ea86e50cd3
Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Mon Jul 29 16:04:01 2019 +1000
+Date: Mon Jan 6 09:02:53 2020 +1100
- Report success of individual tests as well as all.
+ Fix typo: 'you' -> 'your'.
- This puts the "all tests passed" message back at the end where the
- test harnesses can find it.
+ bz#3108 from jmckitrick@gmail.com.
-commit 2ad5b36b18bddf2965fe60384c29b3f1d451b4ed
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Mon Jul 29 09:49:23 2019 +1000
+commit 7652a57662969bd5c61448b3843ec6d407ad12be
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Mon Jan 6 08:56:46 2020 +1100
- convert to UTF-8; from Mike Frysinger
+ Remove auth-skey.c.
+
+ S/Key support was removed in OpenSSH 7.8 but this file was missed.
-commit d31e7c937ba0b97534f373cf5dea34675bcec602
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Jul 26 04:22:21 2019 +0000
+commit c593cc5e826c9f4ec506e22b629d37cabfaacff9
+Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Jan 3 07:33:33 2020 +0000
- upstream: Restrict limit-keytype to types supported by build. This
+ upstream: the download resident keys option is -K (upper) not -k
- means we have to skip a couple tests when only one key type is supported.
+ (lower); ok djm
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 22d05befb9c7ce21ce8dc22acf1ffe9e2ef2e95e
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 71dc28a3e1fa7c553844abc508845bcf5766e091
-commit 0967a233b8a28907ae8a4a6773c89f21d2ace11b
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Thu Jul 25 18:36:28 2019 +1000
+commit ff31f15773ee173502eec4d7861ec56f26bba381
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Jan 3 03:02:26 2020 +0000
- Remove override disabling DH-GEX.
+ upstream: what bozo decided to use 2020 as a future date in a regress
- The DH-GEX override doesn't work when build without OpenSSL, and
- we'll prefer curve25519 these days, removing the need for it.
+ test?
+
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 3b953df5a7e14081ff6cf495d4e8d40e153cbc3a
-commit 061407efc19b41ab4a7485e5adcff2a12befacdb
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Jul 25 09:17:35 2019 +0000
+commit 680eb7749a39d0e4d046e66cac4e51e8e3640b75
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Jan 3 02:46:19 2020 +0000
- upstream: Only use supported key types during KRL test, preferring
+ upstream: implement recent SK API change to support resident keys
- ed25519 since it's supported by both OpenSSL and non-OpenSSL builds.
+ and PIN prompting in the dummy middleware that we use for the tests. Should
+ fix breakage spotted by dtucker@
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 9f2bb3eadd50fcc8245b1bd8fd6f0e53602f71aa
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 379cf9eabfea57aaf7f3f59dafde59889566c484
-commit 47f8ff1fa5b76790c1d785815fd13ee6009f8012
+commit 86834fe6b54ac57b8528c30cf0b27e5cac5b7af7
Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Jul 25 08:48:11 2019 +0000
+Date: Thu Jan 2 13:25:38 2020 +0000
- upstream: Switch keys-command test from rsa to ed25519 since it's
+ upstream: Update keygen moduli screen test to match recent command
- supported for both OpenSSL and non-OpenSSL builds.
+ line option change to ssh-keygen(1).
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 174be4be876edd493e4a5c851e5bc579885e7a0a
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 744a72755004377e9669b662c13c6aa9ead8a0c3
-commit 1e94afdfa8df774ab7dd3bad52912b636dc31bbd
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Jul 25 08:28:15 2019 +0000
+commit 9039971887cccd95b209c479296f772a3a93e8e7
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Jan 2 22:40:09 2020 +0000
- upstream: Make certificate tests work with the supported key
+ upstream: ability to download FIDO2 resident keys from a token via
- algorithms. Allows tests to pass when built without OpenSSL.
+ "ssh-keygen -K". This will save public/private keys into the current
+ directory.
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 617169a6dd9d06db3697a449d9a26c284eca20fc
-
-commit 26bf693661a48b97b6023f702b2af643676ac21a
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Jul 23 13:49:14 2019 +0000
-
- upstream: Construct list of key types to test based on the types
+ This is handy if you move a token between hosts.
- supported by the binaries.
+ feedback & ok markus@
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: fcbd115efacec8ab0ecbdb3faef79ac696cb1d62
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d57c1f9802f7850f00a117a1d36682a6c6d10da6
-commit 773c55b3d1230e8f7714a1b33873c37b85049c74
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Jul 23 13:32:48 2019 +0000
+commit 878ba4350d57e905d6bb1865d8ff31bdfe5deab4
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Jan 2 22:38:33 2020 +0000
- upstream: Only use DSA key type in tests if binaries support it.
+ upstream: add sshkey_save_public(), to save a public key; ok
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 770e31fe61dc33ed8eea9c04ce839b33ddb4dc96
+ markus@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 5d6f96a966d10d7fa689ff9aa9e1d6767ad5a076
-commit 159e987a54d92ccd73875e7581ffc64e8927a715
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Wed Jul 24 14:21:19 2019 +1000
+commit 3b1382ffd5e71eff78db8cef0f3cada22ff29409
+Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Dec 30 16:10:00 2019 +0000
- Split test targets further.
+ upstream: simplify the list for moduli options - no need for
- Splits test into file-tests, t-exec, unit and interop-tests and their
- respective dependencies. Should allow running any set individually
- without having to build the other dependencies that are not needed
- for that specific test.
+ -compact;
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 6492c72280482c6d072be46236b365cb359fc280
-commit 520d4550a2470106d63e30079bb05ce82f3a4f7d
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Wed Jul 24 11:20:18 2019 +1000
+commit 0248ec7c763dee9ff730a589e3d166eac5c74d7c
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Thu Jan 2 13:41:31 2020 +1100
- Add lib dependencies for regress binary targets.
+ ssh-sk-null.cc needs extern "C" {}
-commit 4e8d0dd78d5f6142841a07dc8b8c6b4730eaf587
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Wed Jul 24 00:12:51 2019 +1000
+commit 5ca4b414effe4b56f0cfe3058c92391aa8a43871
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Thu Jan 2 10:56:29 2020 +1100
- Make "unit" a dependency of "test".
+ add dummy ssh-sk API for linking with fuzzers
-commit 4317b2a0480e293e58ba115e47b49d3a384b6568
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Tue Jul 23 23:24:47 2019 +1000
+commit c4b2664be7ba25e4c233315b25212dec29b727ab
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Mon Dec 30 21:04:09 2019 +1100
- upstream rev 1.28: fix comment typo.
+ refresh depend
-commit e0055af2bd39fdb44566ff6594147664e1fac8b8
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Tue Jul 23 23:06:22 2019 +1000
+commit 3093d12ff80927cf45da08d9f262a26680fb14ee
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Dec 30 09:49:52 2019 +0000
- Split regress-binaries into two targets.
+ upstream: Remove the -x option currently used for
- Split the binaries for the unit tests out into a regress-unit-binaries
- target, and add a dependency on it for only the unit tests. This allows
- us to run the integration tests only ("make t-exec") without building
- the unit tests, which allows us to run a subset of the tests when
- building --without-openssl without trying (and failing) to build the
- unit tests.
+ FIDO/U2F-specific key flags. Instead these flags may be specified via -O.
- This means there are two targets for "unit" which I *think* is valid
- (it works in testing, and makedepend will generate Makefiles of this
- form)a but I could be wrong.
+ ok markus@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f23ebde2a8a7e1bf860a51055a711cffb8c328c1
-commit 7cdf9fdcf11aaaa98c2bd22c92882ea559e772ad
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Jul 23 08:19:29 2019 +0000
+commit ef65e7dbaa8fac3245aa2bfc9f7e09be7cba0d9d
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Dec 30 09:25:29 2019 +0000
- upstream: Skip DH group generation test if binaries don't support
+ upstream: document SK API changes in PROTOCOL.u2f
- DH-GEX.
+ ok markus@
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 7c918230d969ecf7656babd6191a74526bffbffd
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 52622363c103a3c4d3d546050480ffe978a32186
-commit 3a3eab8bb0da3d2f0f32cb85a1a268bcca6e4d69
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Jul 23 07:55:29 2019 +0000
+commit 43ce96427b76c4918e39af654e2fc9ee18d5d478
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Dec 30 09:24:45 2019 +0000
- upstream: Only test conversion of key types supported by the
+ upstream: translate and return error codes; retry on bad PIN
- binaries.
+ Define some well-known error codes in the SK API and pass
+ them back via ssh-sk-helper.
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: e3f0938a0a7407e2dfbb90abc3ec979ab6e8eeea
+ Use the new "wrong PIN" error code to retry PIN prompting during
+ ssh-keygen of resident keys.
+
+ feedback and ok markus@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9663c6a2bb7a0bc8deaccc6c30d9a2983b481620
-commit 7e66b7d98c6e3f48a1918c3e1940c9b11b10ec63
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Jul 23 07:39:43 2019 +0000
+commit d433596736a2cd4818f538be11fc94783f5c5236
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Dec 30 09:24:03 2019 +0000
- upstream: Only add ssh-dss to allowed key types if it's supported
+ upstream: improve some error messages; ok markus@
- by the binary.
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4ccd8ddabb8df4f995107dd3b7ea58220e93cb81
+
+commit c54cd1892c3e7f268b21e1f07ada9f0d9816ffc0
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Dec 30 09:23:28 2019 +0000
+
+ upstream: SK API and sk-helper error/PIN passing
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 395a54cab16e9e4ece9aec047ab257954eebd413
+ Allow passing a PIN via the SK API (API major crank) and let the
+ ssh-sk-helper API follow.
+
+ Also enhance the ssh-sk-helper API to support passing back an error
+ code instead of a complete reply. Will be used to signal "wrong PIN",
+ etc.
+
+ feedback and ok markus@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a1bd6b0a2421646919a0c139b8183ad76d28fb71
-commit fd0684b319e664d8821dc4ca3026126dfea3ccf4
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Tue Jul 23 22:36:39 2019 +1000
+commit 79fe22d9bc2868c5118f032ec1200ac9c2e3aaef
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Dec 30 09:22:49 2019 +0000
- Remove sys/cdefs.h include.
+ upstream: implement loading resident keys in ssh-add
- It's not needed on -portable (that's handled by includes.h) and not all
- platforms have it.
+ "ssh-add -O" will load resident keys from a FIDO2 token and add them
+ to a ssh-agent.
+
+ feedback and ok markus@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 608104ae957a7d65cb84e0a3a26c8f60e0df3290
-commit 9634ffbf29b3c2493e69d10b37077b09a8cbf5ff
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Tue Jul 23 22:25:44 2019 +1000
+commit 27753a8e21887d47fe6b5c78a4aed0efe558a850
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Dec 30 09:21:59 2019 +0000
- Add headers to prevent warnings w/out OpenSSL.
+ upstream: implement loading of resident keys in ssh-sk-helper
+
+ feedback and ok markus@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b273c23769ea182c55c4a7b8f9cbd9181722011a
-commit 2ea60312e1c08dea88982fec68244f89a40912ff
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Tue Jul 23 22:11:50 2019 +1000
+commit 14cea36df397677b8f8568204300ef654114fd76
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Dec 30 09:21:16 2019 +0000
- Include stdlib.h for free() and calloc().
+ upstream: resident keys support in SK API
+
+ Adds a sk_load_resident_keys() function to the security key
+ API that accepts a security key provider and a PIN and returns
+ a list of keys.
+
+ Implement support for this in the usbhid middleware.
+
+ feedback and ok markus@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 67e984e4e87f4999ce447a6178c4249a9174eff0
-commit 11cba2a4523fda447e2554ea457484655bedc831
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Tue Jul 23 21:51:22 2019 +1000
+commit 2fe05fcb4a2695f190b4fcf27770b655586ab349
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Dec 30 09:20:36 2019 +0000
- Re-apply portability changes to current sha2.{c,h}.
+ upstream: Factor out parsing of struct sk_enroll_response
- Rather than attempt to apply 14 years' worth of changes to OpenBSD's sha2
- I imported the current versions directly then re-applied the portability
- changes. This also allowed re-syncing digest-libc.c against upstream.
+ We'll reuse this for extracting resident keys from a device.
+
+ feedback and ok markus@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9bc1efd9c6897eac4df0983746cf6578c1542273
-commit 09159594a3bbd363429ee6fafde57ce77986dd7c
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Tue Jul 23 20:27:51 2019 +1000
+commit 4532bd01d57ee13c3ca881eceac1bf9da96a4d7e
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Dec 30 09:19:52 2019 +0000
- Import current sha2.c and sha2.h from OpenBSD.
+ upstream: basic support for generating FIDO2 resident keys
- These are not changed from their original state, the next commit will
- re-apply the portable changes.
+ "ssh-keygen -t ecdsa-sk|ed25519-sk -x resident" will generate a
+ device-resident key.
+
+ feedback and ok markus@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8e1b3c56a4b11d85047bd6c6c705b7eef4d58431
-commit 2e6035b900cc9d7432d95084e03993d1b426f812
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Tue Jul 23 08:11:22 2019 +1000
+commit 3e60d18fba1b502c21d64fc7e81d80bcd08a2092
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Dec 30 03:30:09 2019 +0000
- Rename valgrind "errors" to "failures".
+ upstream: remove single-letter flags for moduli options
- When valgrind is enabled, test-exec.sh counts the number of invocations
- that valgrind detects failures in, not the total number of errors detected.
- This makes the name to be more accurate.
+ Move all moduli generation options to live under the -O flag.
+
+ Frees up seven single-letter flags.
+
+ NB. this change break existing ssh-keygen commandline syntax for moduli-
+ related operations. Very few people use these fortunately.
+
+ feedback and ok markus@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d498f3eaf28128484826a4fcb343612764927935
-commit e82c9bb9ffa65725cc2e03ea81cb79ce3387f66b
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Fri Jul 19 18:51:18 2019 +1000
+commit 1e645fe767f27725dc7fd7864526de34683f7daf
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Dec 30 03:28:41 2019 +0000
- Skip running sftp-chroot under Valgrind.
+ upstream: prepare for use of ssh-keygen -O flag beyond certs
+
+ Move list of available certificate options in ssh-keygen.1 to the
+ CERTIFICATES section.
+
+ Collect options specified by -O but delay parsing/validation of
+ certificate options until we're sure that we're acting as a CA.
+
+ ok markus@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 33e6bcc29cfca43606f6fa09bd84b955ee3a4106
-commit 41e22c2e05cb950b704945ac9408f6109c9b7848
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sat Jul 20 09:50:58 2019 +0000
+commit 20ccd854245c598e2b47cc9f8d4955d645195055
+Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Dec 27 08:28:44 2019 +0000
- upstream: Remove the sleeps and thus races from the forwarding
+ upstream: sort -Y internally in the options list, as is already
- test. They were originally required to work with Protocol 1, but now we can
- use ssh -N and the control socket without the sleeps. While there, suppress
- output fro the control exit commands.
+ done in synopsis;
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 4c51a1d651242f12c90074c18c61008a74c1c790
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 86d033c5764404057616690d7be992e445b42274
-commit 0423043c5e54293f4dd56041304fd0046c317be9
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sat Jul 20 09:37:31 2019 +0000
+commit 5b6c954751dd3677466cda7adb92e4f05446c96c
+Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Dec 27 08:25:07 2019 +0000
- upstream: Allow SLEEPTIME to be overridden.
+ upstream: in the options list, sort -Y and -y;
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 1596ab168729954be3d219933b2d01cc93687e76
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 24c2e6a3aeab6e050a0271ffc73fdff91c10dcaa
-commit d466b6a5cfba17a83c7aae9f584ab164e2ece0a1
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sat Jul 20 09:14:40 2019 +0000
+commit 141df487ba699cfd1ec3dcd98186e7c956e99024
+Author: naddy@openbsd.org <naddy@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sat Dec 21 20:22:34 2019 +0000
- upstream: Move sleep time into a variable so that we can increase
+ upstream: Replace the term "security key" with "(FIDO)
- it for platforms or configurations that are much slower then usual.
+ authenticator".
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 88586cabc800062c260d0b876bdcd4ca3f58a872
+ The polysemous use of "key" was too confusing. Input from markus@.
+ ok jmc@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 12eea973a44c8232af89f86e4269d71ae900ca8f
-commit b4a7c9d2b5f928e0b902b580d35dc8b244a3aae0
+commit fbd9729d4eadf2f7097b6017156387ac64302453
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Jul 19 03:45:44 2019 +0000
+Date: Sat Dec 21 02:33:07 2019 +0000
- upstream: add regression tests for scp for out-of-destination path file
+ upstream: unit tests for ForwardAgent=/path; from Eric Chiang
- creation by Harry Sintonen via Jakub Jelen in bz3007
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 24f693f78290b2c17725dab2c614dffe4a88c8da
+
+commit e5b7cf8edca7e843adc125621e1dab14507f430a
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Dec 16 02:39:05 2019 +0000
+
+ upstream: test security key host keys in addition to user keys
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 01ae5fbc6ce400b2df5a84dc3152a9e31f354c07
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 9fb45326106669a27e4bf150575c321806e275b1
-commit bca0582063f148c7ddf409ec51435a5a726bee4c
+commit 40be78f503277bd91c958fa25ea9ef918a2ffd3d
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Jul 19 03:38:01 2019 +0000
+Date: Sat Dec 21 02:19:13 2019 +0000
- upstream: Accept the verbose flag when searching for host keys in known
+ upstream: Allow forwarding a different agent socket to the path
- hosts (i.e. "ssh-keygen -vF host") to print the matching host's random- art
- signature too. bz#3003 "amusing, pretty" deraadt@
+ specified by $SSH_AUTH_SOCK, by extending the existing ForwardAgent option to
+ accepting an explicit path or the name of an environment variable in addition
+ to yes/no.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 686221a5447d6507f40a2ffba5393984d889891f
+ Patch by Eric Chiang, manpage by me; ok markus@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 98f2ed80bf34ea54d8b2ddd19ac14ebbf40e9265
-commit 5299a09fa2879a068af200c91028fcfa9283c0f0
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Fri Jul 19 13:50:25 2019 +1000
+commit 416f15372bfb5be1709a0ad1d00ef5d8ebfb9e0e
+Author: naddy@openbsd.org <naddy@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Dec 20 20:28:55 2019 +0000
- Revert one dependency per line change.
+ upstream: SSH U2F keys can now be used as host keys. Fix a garden
- It turns out that having such a large number of lines in the .depend
- file will cause the memory usage of awk during AC_SUBST to blow up on at
- least NetBSD's awk, causing configure to fail.
+ path sentence. ok markus@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 67d7971ca1a020acd6c151426c54bd29d784bd6b
-commit 01dddb231f23b4a7b616f9d33a0b9d937f9eaf0e
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Fri Jul 19 13:19:19 2019 +1000
+commit 68010acbcfe36167b3eece3115f3a502535f80df
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Dec 20 02:42:42 2019 +0000
- fix SIGWINCH delivery of Solaris for mux sessions
+ upstream: Move always unsupported keywords to be grouped with the other
- Remove PRIV_PROC_SESSION which was limiting ability to send SIGWINCH
- signals to other sessions. bz#3030; report and fix from Darren Moffat
+ ones. Move oSecurityProvider to match the order in the OpCodes enum. Patch
+ from openbsd@academicsolutions.ch, ok djm@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 061e4505861ec1e02ba3a63e3d1b3be3cad458ec
-commit 05500af21d27c1a3ddac232b018cc23da7b1ee95
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Fri Jul 19 13:20:03 2019 +1000
+commit 8784b02dc49e1c98df4e7aca466be2f652ed4ad1
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Dec 20 02:29:21 2019 +0000
- Force dependencies one per line.
+ upstream: Remove obsolete opcodes from the configuation enum.
- Force makedepend to output one dependency per line, which will make
- reading diffs against it much easier. ok djm@
+ Patch from openbsd@academicsolutions.ch, ok djm@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 395c202228872ce8d9044cc08552ac969f51e01b
-commit b5bc5d016bbb83eb7f8e685390044e78b1ea1427
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Fri Jul 19 13:18:07 2019 +1000
+commit 345be6091bdc9be09c90a937d1320f97c01fab2a
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Dec 20 02:11:38 2019 +0000
- make depend.
+ upstream: Remove now-obsolete config options from example in
+
+ comment. Patch from openbsd@academicsolutions.ch, ok djm@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 35862beb0927b1cb0af476ec23cc07f6e3006101
-commit 65333f7454365fe40f7367630e7dd10903b9d99e
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Fri Jul 19 13:16:11 2019 +1000
+commit ae024b22c4fd68e7f39681d605585889f9511108
+Author: naddy@openbsd.org <naddy@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Dec 19 15:09:30 2019 +0000
- Show when skipping valgrind for a test.
+ upstream: Document that security key-hosted keys can act as host
+
+ keys.
+
+ Update the list of default host key algorithms in ssh_config.5 and
+ sshd_config.5. Copy the description of the SecurityKeyProvider
+ option to sshd_config.5.
+
+ ok jmc@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: edadf3566ab5e94582df4377fee3b8b702c7eca0
-commit fccb7eb3436da8ef3dcd22e5936ba1abc7ae6730
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Fri Jul 19 10:41:56 2019 +1000
+commit bc2dc091e0ac4ff6245c43a61ebe12c7e9ea0b7f
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Dec 19 03:50:01 2019 +0000
- Enable connect-privsep test with valgrind.
+ upstream: "Forward security" -> "Forward secrecy" since that's the
- connect-privsep seems to work OK with valgrind now so don't skip
- valgrind on it.
+ correct term. Add "MAC" since we use that acronym in other man pages. ok
+ naddy@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c35529e511788586725fb63bda3459e10738c5f5
-commit d7423017265c5ae6d0be39340feb6c9f016b1f71
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Fri Jul 19 07:43:07 2019 +1000
+commit e905f7260d72bc0e33ef5f10a0db737ff6e77ba7
+Author: naddy@openbsd.org <naddy@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Dec 17 16:21:07 2019 +0000
- Show valgrind results and error counts.
+ upstream: cut obsolete lists of crypto algorithms from outline of
+
+ how SSH works ok markus@ jmc@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8e34973f232ab48c4d4f5d07df48d501708b9160
-commit 22b9b3e944880db906c6ac5527c4228bd92b293a
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Thu Jul 18 13:40:12 2019 +1000
+commit f65cf1163ff01531ae02f3f9210391d0d692f699
+Author: tobhe@openbsd.org <tobhe@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Dec 16 13:58:53 2019 +0000
- Fix format string integer type in error message.
+ upstream: strdup may return NULL if memory allocation fails. Use
+
+ the safer xstrdup which fatals on allocation failures.
+
+ ok markus@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8b608d387120630753cbcb8110e0b019c0c9a0d0
-commit ed46a0c0705895834d3f47a46faa89c2a71b760a
+commit 57634bfc5708477826c0be265ddc59b9d83e4886
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Jul 18 13:26:00 2019 +0000
+Date: Mon Dec 16 03:16:58 2019 +0000
- upstream: fix off-by-one in sshbuf_dtob64() base64 wrapping that could
+ upstream: sort sk-* methods behind their plain key methods cousins
- cause extra newlines to be appended at the end of the base64 text (ugly, but
- harmless). Found and fixed by Sebastian Kinne
+ for now
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9fe290bd68f706ed8f986a7704ca5a2bd32d7b68
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c97e22c2b28c0d12ee389b8b4ef5f2ada7908828
-commit a192021fedead23c375077f92346336d531f8cad
+commit b8df8fe920e697edcc69c520390b78c3b7ad9d84
Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Thu Jul 18 11:09:38 2019 +1000
+Date: Tue Dec 17 19:46:15 2019 +1100
- Fail tests if Valgrind enabled and reports errors.
-
- Also dump the failing valgrind report to stdout (not the cleanest
- solution, but better than nothing).
+ Mac OS X has PAM too.
-commit d1c491ecb939ee10b341fa7bb6205dff19d297e5
+commit bf8de8b8251af69b5ce96a8faa69145af156af4d
Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Thu Jul 18 10:17:54 2019 +1000
+Date: Tue Dec 17 19:37:06 2019 +1100
- Allow low-priv tests to write to pipe dir.
-
- When running regression tests with Valgrind and SUDO, the low-priv agent
- tests need to be able to create pipes in the appropriate directory.
+ Show portable tarball pattern in example.
-commit 8a5bb3e78191cc206f970c26d2a26c949971e91a
+commit a19ef613e98141cc37c8acdeebe285b9dbe2531e
Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Wed Jul 17 21:24:55 2019 +1000
+Date: Tue Dec 17 19:35:59 2019 +1100
- Put valgrind vgdb files to a specific directory.
+ OpenSSL is now optional.
+
+commit 1a7217ac063e48cf0082895aeee81ed2b8a57191
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sun Dec 15 18:58:33 2019 +0000
+
+ upstream: adapt to ssh-sk-client change
- Valgrind by default puts vgdb files and pipes under /tmp, however it
- is not always able to clean them up, which can cause test failures when
- there's a pid/file collision. Using a specific directory ensures that
- we can clean up and start clean.
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 40481999a5928d635ab2e5b029e8239c112005ea
-commit f8829fe57fb0479d6103cfe1190095da3c032c6d
+commit a7fc1df246e80bfdabd09b069b91c72f9c578ca8
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Jul 16 22:16:49 2019 +0000
+Date: Wed Dec 11 18:47:14 2019 +0000
- upstream: adapt to sshbuf_dtob64() change
+ upstream: it's no longer possible to disable privilege separation
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 82374a83edf0955fd1477169eee3f5d6467405a6
+ in sshd, so don't double the tests' work by trying both off/on
+
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: d366665466dbd09e9b707305da884be3e7619c68
-commit 1254fcbb2f005f745f2265016ee9fa52e16d37b0
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Jul 16 03:21:54 2019 +0000
+commit 3145d38ea06820a66c0f5e068f49af14fd2b7ac1
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sun Dec 15 20:59:23 2019 +0000
- upstream: Remove ssh1 files from CLEANFILES since ssh1 no longer
+ upstream: don't treat HostKeyAgent=none as a path either; avoids
- supported.
+ spurious warnings from the cfgparse regress test
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 5b9ae869dc669bac05939b4a2fdf44ee067acfa0
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ba49ea7a5c92b8a16cb9c2e975dbb163853afc54
-commit 9dc81a5adabc9a7d611ed2e63fbf4c85d43b15c6
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Jul 16 02:09:29 2019 +0000
+commit 747e25192f436e71dd39e15d65aa32bca967533a
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sun Dec 15 20:57:15 2019 +0000
- upstream: Update names of host key files in CLEANFILES to match
+ upstream: do not attempt to find an absolute path for sshd_config
- recent changes to the tests.
+ SecurityKeyProvider=internal - unbreaks cfgparse regress test
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 28743052de3acf70b06f18333561497cd47c4ecf
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d2ddcf525c0dc3c8339522360c10b3c70f1fd641
-commit e44e4ad1190db22ed407a79f32a8cff5bcd2b815
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Tue Jul 16 23:26:53 2019 +1000
+commit 9b6e30b96b094ad787511a5b989253e3b8fe1789
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sun Dec 15 19:47:10 2019 +0000
- depend
+ upstream: allow ssh-keyscan to find security key hostkeys
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1fe822a7f714df19a7e7184e3a3bbfbf546811d3
-commit 16dd8b2c78a0de106c7429e2a294d203f6bda3c7
+commit 56584cce75f3d20aaa30befc7cbd331d922927f3
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Jul 16 13:18:39 2019 +0000
+Date: Sun Dec 15 18:57:30 2019 +0000
- upstream: remove mostly vestigal uuencode.[ch]; moving the only unique
+ upstream: allow security keys to act as host keys as well as user
- functionality there (wrapping of base64-encoded data) to sshbuf functions;
- feedback and ok markus@
+ keys.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4dba6735d88c57232f6fccec8a08bdcfea44ac4c
+ Previously we didn't do this because we didn't want to expose
+ the attack surface presented by USB and FIDO protocol handling,
+ but now that this is insulated behind ssh-sk-helper there is
+ less risk.
+
+ ok markus@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 77b068dd133b8d87e0f010987bd5131e640ee64c
-commit 45478898f9590b5cc8bc7104e573b84be67443b0
+commit 5af6fd5461bb709304e6979c8b7856c7af921c9e
Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Tue Jul 16 09:20:23 2019 +1000
+Date: Mon Dec 16 13:55:56 2019 +1100
- Hook memmem compat code into build.
+ Allow clock_nanosleep_time64 in seccomp sandbox.
- This fixes builds on platforms that don't have it (at least old DragonFly,
- probably others).
+ Needed on Linux ARM. bz#3100, patch from jjelen@redhat.com.
-commit c7bd4617293a903bd3fac3394a7e72d439af49a5
+commit fff8ff6dd580e1a72ba09a6775d185175cdc8d13
Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Tue Jul 16 09:07:18 2019 +1000
+Date: Sun Dec 15 18:27:02 2019 +1100
- Import memmem.c from OpenBSD.
+ Put SK ECDSA bits inside ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC.
+
+ Fixes build when linking against OpenSSLs built with no-ec.
-commit 477e2a3be8b10df76e8d76f0427b043280d73d68
+commit 9244990ecdcfa36bb9371058111685b05f201c1e
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Sat Dec 14 09:21:46 2019 +1100
+
+ remove a bunch of ENABLE_SK #ifdefs
+
+ The ssh-sk-helper client API gives us a nice place to disable
+ security key support when it is wasn't enabled at compile time,
+ so we don't need to check everywere.
+
+ Also, verification of security key signatures can remain enabled
+ all the time - it has no additional dependencies. So sshd can
+ accept security key pubkeys in authorized_keys, etc regardless of
+ the host's support for dlopen, etc.
+
+commit a33ab1688b5c460a7e2a301418241ce1b13b2638
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Sat Dec 14 09:15:06 2019 +1100
+
+ ssh-sk-client.c needs includes.h
+
+commit 633778d567ad50b63d2a3bca5e1b97d279d236d9
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Sat Dec 14 08:40:33 2019 +1100
+
+ only link ssh-sk-helper against libfido2
+
+commit 7b47b40b170db4d6f41da0479575f6d99dd7228a
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Sat Dec 14 08:20:52 2019 +1100
+
+ adapt Makefile to ssh-sk-client everywhere
+
+commit f45f3a8a12e2bee601046b916e6c5cd6eae08048
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Sat Dec 14 07:53:11 2019 +1100
+
+ fixup
+
+commit d21434766764d5babf99fc3937c19b625c0f6334
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Jul 15 13:12:02 2019 +0000
+Date: Fri Dec 13 20:16:56 2019 +0000
- upstream: unit tests for sshbuf_cmp() and sshbuf_find(); ok markus
+ upstream: actually commit the ssh-sk-helper client code; ok markus
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: b52d36bc3ab6dc158c1e59a9a4735f821cf9e1fd
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: fd2ea776a5bbbf4d452989d3c3054cf25a5e0589
-commit eb0d8e708a1f958aecd2d6e2ff2450af488d4c2a
+commit 611073fb40ecaf4ac65094e403edea3a08deb700
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Jul 15 13:16:29 2019 +0000
+Date: Fri Dec 13 19:11:14 2019 +0000
- upstream: support PKCS8 as an optional format for storage of
+ upstream: perform security key enrollment via ssh-sk-helper too.
- private keys, enabled via "ssh-keygen -m PKCS8" on operations that save
- private keys to disk.
+ This means that ssh-keygen no longer needs to link against ssh-sk-helper, and
+ only ssh-sk-helper needs libfido2 and /dev/uhid* access;
- The OpenSSH native key format remains the default, but PKCS8 is a
- superior format to PEM if interoperability with non-OpenSSH software
- is required, as it may use a less terrible KDF (IIRC PEM uses a single
- round of MD5 as a KDF).
+ feedback & ok markus@
- adapted from patch by Jakub Jelen via bz3013; ok markus
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9464233fab95708d2ff059f8bee29c0d1f270800
+
+commit 612b1dd1ec91ffb1e01f58cca0c6eb1d47bf4423
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Dec 13 19:09:37 2019 +0000
+
+ upstream: allow sshbuf_put_stringb(buf, NULL); ok markus@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 027824e3bc0b1c243dc5188504526d73a55accb1
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 91482c1ada9adb283165d48dafbb88ae91c657bd
-commit e18a27eedccb024acb3cd9820b650a5dff323f01
+commit b52ec0ba3983859514aa7b57d6100fa9759fe696
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Jul 15 13:11:38 2019 +0000
+Date: Fri Dec 13 19:09:10 2019 +0000
- upstream: two more bounds-checking sshbuf counterparts to common
+ upstream: use ssh-sk-helper for all security key signing operations
- string operations: sshbuf_cmp() (bcmp-like) and sshbuf_find() (memmem like)
+ This extracts and refactors the client interface for ssh-sk-helper
+ from ssh-agent and generalises it for use by the other programs.
+ This means that most OpenSSH tools no longer need to link against
+ libfido2 or directly interact with /dev/uhid*
- feedback and ok markus@
+ requested by, feedback and ok markus@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: fd071ec2485c7198074a168ff363a0d6052a706a
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1abcd3aea9a7460eccfbf8ca154cdfa62f1dc93f
-commit bc551dfebb55845537b1095cf3ccd01640a147b7
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Mon Jul 15 12:52:45 2019 +1000
+commit c33d46868c3d88e04a92610cdb429094aeeb5847
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Dec 11 22:19:47 2019 +0000
- Clear valgrind-out dir to prevent collisions.
+ upstream: add a note about the 'extensions' field in the signed
+
+ object
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 67c01e0565b258e0818c1ccfe1f1aeaf9a0d4c7b
-commit 5db9ba718e983661a9114ae1418f6e412d1f52d5
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Mon Jul 15 12:02:27 2019 +1000
+commit a62f4e1960691f3aeb1f972e009788b29e2ae464
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Dec 10 23:37:31 2019 +0000
- Allow agent tests to write to valgrind dir.
+ upstream: some more corrections for documentation problems spotted
+
+ by Ron Frederick
+
+ document certifiate private key format
+ correct flags type for sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com keys
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: fc4e9a1ed7f9f7f9dd83e2e2c59327912e933e74
-commit 121e48fa5305f41f0477d9908e3d862987a68a84
+commit 22d4beb79622fc82d7111ac941269861fc7aef8d
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sun Jul 14 23:33:19 2019 +0000
+Date: Tue Dec 10 23:21:56 2019 +0000
- upstream: unit tests for sshbuf_peek/poke bounds-checked random access
+ upstream: loading security keys into ssh-agent used the extension
- functions. ok markus@
+ constraint "sk-provider@openssh.com", not "sk@openssh.com"; spotted by Ron
+ Frederick
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 034c4284b1da6b12e25c762a6b958efacdafbaef
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: dbfba09edbe023abadd5f59c1492df9073b0e51d
-commit 101d164723ffbc38f8036b6f3ea3bfef771ba250
+commit 75f7f22a43799f6d25dffd9d6683de1601da05a3
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sun Jul 14 23:32:27 2019 +0000
+Date: Tue Dec 10 22:43:19 2019 +0000
- upstream: add some functions to perform random-access read/write
-
- operations inside buffers with bounds checking. Intended to replace manual
- pointer arithmetic wherever possible.
+ upstream: add security key types to list of keys allowed to act as
- feedback and ok markus@
+ CAs; spotted by Ron Frederick
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 91771fde7732738f1ffed078aa5d3bee6d198409
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9bb0dfff927b4f7aa70679f983f84c69d45656c3
-commit 7250879c72d28275a53f2f220e49646c3e42ef18
+commit 516605f2d596884cedc2beed6b262716ec76f63d
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Jul 12 04:08:39 2019 +0000
+Date: Tue Dec 10 22:37:20 2019 +0000
- upstream: include SHA2-variant RSA key algorithms in KEX proposal;
+ upstream: when acting as a CA and using a security key as the CA
- allows ssh-keyscan to harvest keys from servers that disable olde SHA1
- ssh-rsa. bz#3029 from Jakub Jelen
+ key, remind the user to touch they key to authorise the signature.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9f95ebf76a150c2f727ca4780fb2599d50bbab7a
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: fe58733edd367362f9766b526a8b56827cc439c1
-commit a0876bd994cab9ba6e47ba2a163a4417c7597487
+commit c4036fe75ea5a4d03a2a40be1f3660dcbbfa01b2
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Jul 12 03:56:21 2019 +0000
+Date: Tue Dec 10 22:36:08 2019 +0000
- upstream: print explicit "not modified" message if a file was
-
- requested for resumed download but was considered already complete.
+ upstream: chop some unnecessary and confusing verbiage from the
- bz#2978 ok dtucker
+ security key protocol description; feedback from Ron Frederick
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f32084b26a662f16215ee4ca4a403d67e49ab986
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 048c9483027fbf9c995e5a51b3ac502989085a42
-commit b9b0f2ac9625933db53a35b1c1ce423876630558
-Author: tb@openbsd.org <tb@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Jul 10 07:04:27 2019 +0000
+commit 59175a350fe1091af7528b2971e3273aa7ca7295
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Dec 6 03:06:08 2019 +0000
- upstream: Fix a typo and make <esc><right> move right to the
+ upstream: fix setting of $SSH_ASKPASS_PROMPT - it shouldn't be set
- closest end of a word just like <esc><left> moves left to the closest
- beginning of a word.
+ when asking passphrases, only when confirming the use of a key (i.e. for
+ ssh-agent keys added with "ssh-add -c keyfile")
- ok djm
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 6643c82960d9427d5972eb702c917b3b838ecf89
+
+commit 36eaa356d391a23a2d4e3a8aaa0223abc70b9822
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Dec 6 02:55:21 2019 +0000
+
+ upstream: bring the __func__
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 6afe01b05ed52d8b12eb1fda6e9af5afb5e198ee
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 71a3a45b0fe1b8f680ff95cf264aa81f7abbff67
-commit 8729498a5d239980a91d32f031b34e8c58c52f62
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Wed Jul 10 09:43:19 2019 +1000
+commit 483cc723d1ff3b7fdafc6239348040a608ebc78d
+Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sat Nov 30 07:07:59 2019 +0000
- fix typo that prevented detection of Linux VRF
+ upstream: tweak the Nd lines for a bit of consistency; ok markus
- Reported by hexiaowen AT huawei.com
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 876651bdde06bc1e72dd4bd7ad599f42a6ce5a16
-commit 5b2b79ff7c057ee101518545727ed3023372891d
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Jul 9 04:15:00 2019 +0000
+commit afffd310360b155df2133d1f5f1ab2f4e939b570
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Wed Dec 11 13:22:06 2019 +1100
- upstream: cap the number of permiopen/permitlisten directives we're
+ Check if memmem is declared in system headers.
- willing to parse on a single authorized_keys line; ok deraadt@
+ If the system (or one of the dependencies) implements memmem but does
+ not define the header, we would not declare it either resulting in
+ compiler warnings. Check for declaration explicitly. bz#3102.
+
+commit ad8cd420797695f3b580aea1034b9de60bede9b9
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Wed Dec 11 13:12:01 2019 +1100
+
+ Sort depends.
+
+commit 5e3abff39e01817f6866494416f2ada25c316018
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Wed Dec 11 13:09:34 2019 +1100
+
+ Sort .depend when rebuilding.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a43a752c2555d26aa3fc754805a476f6e3e30f46
+ This makes diffs more stable between makedepend implementations.
-commit eb0b51dac408fadd1fd13fa6d726ab8fdfcc4152
+commit 5df9d1f5c0943367d9b68435f4c82224ce11a73f
Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Mon Jul 8 17:27:26 2019 +1000
+Date: Wed Dec 11 13:06:43 2019 +1100
- Move log.h include inside ifdefs.
+ Update depend to include sk files.
+
+commit 9a967c5bbfca35835165f7d8a6165009f5b21872
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Mon Dec 9 20:25:26 2019 +1100
+
+ Describe how to build libcrypto as PIC.
- Fixes build on some other platforms that don't have va_list immediately
- available (eg NetBSD).
+ While there, move the OpenSSL 1.1.0g caveat closer to the other version
+ information.
-commit 43702f8e6fa22a258e25c4dd950baaae0bc656b7
+commit b66fa5da25c4b5b67cf9f0ce7af513f5a6a6a686
Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Sat Jul 6 23:07:04 2019 +1000
+Date: Mon Dec 9 17:23:22 2019 +1100
- Include log.h for debug() and friends.
+ Recommend running LibreSSL or OpenSSL self-tests.
+
+commit fa7924008e838cded7e8a561356ffe5e06e0ed64
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Fri Dec 6 14:17:26 2019 +1100
+
+ Wrap ECC specific bits in ifdef.
- Should fix some compiler warnings on IRIX (bz#3032).
+ Fixes tests when built against an OpenSSL configured with no-ec.
-commit 53a6ebf1445a857f5e487b18ee5e5830a9575149
+commit 2ff822eabd7d4461743f22d3b9ba35ab76069df5
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Fri Nov 29 20:21:36 2019 +1100
+
+ Wrap sha2.h include in ifdef.
+
+ Fixes build --without-openssl on at least Fedora.
+
+commit 443848155ffcda65a6077aac118c861b503a093f
Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Mon Jul 8 13:44:32 2019 +1000
+Date: Fri Nov 29 15:10:21 2019 +1100
- sftp-realpath.c needs includes.h
+ compile sk-dummy.so with no-PIE version of LDFLAGS
+
+ This lets it pick up the -L path to libcrypto for example.
-commit 4efe1adf05ee5d3fce44320fcff68735891f4ee6
+commit 37f5b5346e4cc6a894245aa89d2930649bb7045b
Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Mon Jul 8 13:38:39 2019 +1000
+Date: Fri Nov 29 14:48:46 2019 +1100
- remove realpath() compat replacement
+ includes.h for sk-dummy.c, dummy
+
+commit b218055e59a7c1a1816f7a55ca18e3f3c05d63a4
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Fri Nov 29 12:32:23 2019 +1100
+
+ (yet) another x-platform fix for sk-dummy.so
- We shipped a BSD implementation of realpath() because sftp-server
- depended on its behaviour.
+ Check for -fPIC support from compiler
- OpenBSD is now moving to a more strictly POSIX-compliant realpath(2),
- so sftp-server now unconditionally requires its own BSD-style realpath
- implementation. As such, there is no need to carry another independant
- implementation in openbsd-compat.
+ Compile libopenbsd-compat -fPIC
- ok dtucker@
+ Don't mix -fPIE and -fPIC when compiling
-commit 696fb4298e80f2ebcd188986a91b49af3b7ca14c
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sun Jul 7 01:05:00 2019 +0000
+commit 0dedb703adcd98d0dbc4479f5f312a2bd3df2850
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Fri Nov 29 11:53:57 2019 +1100
- upstream: Remove some set but never used variables. ok daraadt@
-
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 824baf9c59afc66a4637017e397b9b74a41684e7
+ needs includes.h for WITH_OPENSSL
-commit 156e9e85e92b46ca90226605d9eff49e8ec31b22
-Author: deraadt@openbsd.org <deraadt@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Jul 5 12:35:40 2019 +0000
+commit ef3853bb94c2c72e7eda0de6cec0bcb1da62058f
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Fri Nov 29 11:52:23 2019 +1100
- upstream: still compile uuencode.c, unbreaks build
+ another attempt at sk-dummy.so working x-platform
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 5ea3d63ab972691f43e9087ab5fd8376d48e898f
+ include a fatal() implementation to satisfy libopenbsd-compat
+
+ clean up .lo and .so files
+
+ .gitignore .lo and .so files
-commit cec9ee527a12b1f6c2e0a1c155fec64a38d71cf6
+commit d46ac56f1cbd5a855a2d5e7309f90d383dcf6431
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Jul 5 07:32:01 2019 +0000
+Date: Fri Nov 29 00:13:29 2019 +0000
- upstream: revert header removal that snuck into previous
+ upstream: lots of dependencies go away here with ed25519 no longer
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 3919cdd58989786660b8269b325646ef8856428e
+ needing the ssh_digest API.
+
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 785847ec78cb580d141e29abce351a436d6b5d49
-commit 569b650f93b561c09c655f83f128e1dfffe74101
+commit 7404b81f25a4a7847380c0f0cf7f1bea5f0a5cd3
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Jul 5 04:55:40 2019 +0000
+Date: Fri Nov 29 00:11:21 2019 +0000
- upstream: add a local implementation of BSD realpath() for
-
- sftp-server use ahead of OpenBSD's realpath changing to match POSIX;
+ upstream: perform hashing directly in crypto_hash_sha512() using
- ok deraadt@ (thanks for snaps testing)
+ libcrypto or libc SHA512 functions rather than calling ssh_digest_memory();
+ avoids many dependencies on ssh code that complicate standalone use of
+ ed25519, as we want to do in sk-dummy.so
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4f8cbf7ed8679f6237264301d104ecec64885d55
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 5a3c37593d3ba7add037b587cec44aaea088496d
-commit b8e2b797362526437e0642a6c2f2970d794f2561
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Sat Jul 6 13:13:57 2019 +1000
+commit d39a865b7af93a7a9b5a64cf7cf0ef4396c80ba3
+Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Nov 28 12:24:31 2019 +0000
- Add prototype for strnlen to prevent warnings.
+ upstream: improve the text for -A a little; input from naddy and
+
+ djm
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f9cdfb1d6dbb9887c4bf3bb25f9c7a94294c988d
-commit 4c3e00b1ed7e596610f34590eb5d54ee50d77878
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Sat Jul 6 13:02:34 2019 +1000
+commit 9a0e01bd0c61f553ead96b5af84abd73865847b8
+Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Nov 28 12:23:25 2019 +0000
- Cast *ID types to unsigned long when printing.
+ upstream: reshuffle the text to read better; input from naddy,
- UID and GID types vary by platform so cast to u_long and use %lu when
- printing them to prevent warnings.
+ djmc, and dtucker
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a0b2aca2b67614dda3d6618ea097bf0610c35013
-commit 2753521e899f30d1d58b5da0b4e68fde6fcf341e
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Sat Jul 6 12:54:43 2019 +1000
+commit 5ca52c0f2e5e7f7d01d8d557b994b5c2087bed00
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Thu Nov 28 18:09:07 2019 +1100
- Add prototype for compat strndup.(bz#3032).
+ $< doesn't work as` I thought; explicily list objs
-commit 01a1e21cd55d99293c8ff8ed7c590f2ee440da43
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Sat Jul 6 12:00:41 2019 +1000
+commit 18e84bfdc5906a73405c3b42d7f840013bbffe34
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Nov 28 05:20:54 2019 +0000
- Add missing bracket in EGD seeding code.
+ upstream: tweak wording
- When configured --with-prngd-socket the code had a missing bracket after
- an API change. Fix that and a couple of warnings. bz#3032 , from
- ole.weidner at protonmail.ch
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: bd002ca1599b71331faca735ff5f6de29e32222e
-commit e187b1d4607392cf2c19243afe0d0311a4ff3591
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Jul 5 04:19:39 2019 +0000
+commit 8ef5bf9d03aa0f047711cff47f5ffbe3b33ff8c9
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Thu Nov 28 13:12:30 2019 +1100
- upstream: Add (recently added) rsa_oldfmt to CLEANFILES.
-
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 405beda94e32aa6cc9c80969152fab91f7c54bd3
+ missing .SUFFIXES line makes make sad
-commit 74b541bfabdcb57c1683cd9b3f1d1f4d5e41563e
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Jul 5 04:12:46 2019 +0000
+commit 323da82b8ea993b7f2c5793fd53b4f5ca105d19d
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Thu Nov 28 09:53:42 2019 +1100
- upstream: Adapt the PuTTY/Conch tests to new key names.
+ (hopefully) fix out of tree builds of sk-dummy.so
+
+commit d8b2838c5d19bf409d44ede4d32df8ee47aeb4cd
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Nov 27 22:32:11 2019 +0000
+
+ upstream: remove stray semicolon after closing brace of function;
- A recent regress change (2a9b3a2ce411d16cda9c79ab713c55f65b0ec257 in
- portable) broke the PuTTY and Twisted Conch interop tests, because the
- key they want to use is now called ssh-rsa rather than rsa. Adapt the
- tests to the new file names. bz#3020, patch from cjwatson at debian.org.
+ from Michael Forney
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: fd342a37db4d55aa4ec85316f73082c8eb96e64e
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: fda95acb799bb160d15e205ee126117cf33da3a7
-commit de08335a4cfaa9b7081e94ea4a8b7153c230546d
+commit 6e1d1bbf5a3eca875005e0c87f341a0a03799809
Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Jul 5 04:03:13 2019 +0000
+Date: Wed Nov 27 05:38:43 2019 +0000
- upstream: Add a sleep to allow forwards to come up.
+ upstream: Revert previous commit. The channels code still uses int
- Currently when the multiplex client requests a forward it returns
- once the request has been sent but not necessarily when the forward
- is up. This causes intermittent text failures due to this race,
- so add some sleeps to mitigate this until we can fix it properly.
+ in many places for channel ids so the INT_MAX check still makes sense.
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 384c7d209d2443d25ea941d7f677e932621fb253
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 532e4b644791b826956c3c61d6ac6da39bac84bf
-commit 4d249284729f864faa2e8f3e015f9a41b674544a
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Fri Jul 5 14:58:57 2019 +1000
+commit 48989244658b9748b6801034ff4ffbdfc6b1520f
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Wed Nov 27 16:03:12 2019 +1100
- Remove nc stderr redirection to resync w/OpenBSD.
+ wire sk-dummy.so into test suite
-commit c5cfa90e03432181ffcc7ad3f9f815179bd0c626
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Fri Jul 5 13:21:45 2019 +1000
+commit f79364bacaebde4f1c260318ab460fceacace02f
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Nov 27 05:00:17 2019 +0000
- Do not fatal on failed lookup of group "tty".
+ upstream: use error()+_exit() instead of fatal() to avoid running
- Some platforms (eg AIX and Cygwin) do not have a "tty" group. In those
- cases we will fall back to making the tty device the user's primary
- group, so do not fatal if the group lookup fails. ok djm@
+ cleanup handlers in child process; spotted via weird regress failures in
+ portable
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 6902a9bb3987c7d347774444f7979b8a9ba7f412
-commit 8b4cc4bdc8a70bf209a274fa2b2a49c1e3c8d8a2
-Author: deraadt@openbsd.org <deraadt@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Jul 4 16:20:10 2019 +0000
+commit 70ec5e5e2681bcd409a9df94a2fec6f57a750945
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Nov 27 03:34:04 2019 +0000
- upstream: fatal() if getgrnam() cannot find "tty"
+ upstream: Make channel_id u_int32_t and remove unnecessary check
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d148c1c052fa0ed7d105b5428b5c1bab91630048
+ and cast that were left over from the type conversion. Noted by
+ t-hashida@amiya.co.jp in bz#3098, ok markus@ djm@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 3ad105b6a905284e780b1fd7ff118e1c346e90b5
-commit 48cccc275c6a1e91d3f80fdb0dc0d5baf529aeca
-Author: deraadt@openbsd.org <deraadt@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Jul 4 16:16:51 2019 +0000
+commit ad44ca81bea83657d558aaef5a1d789a9032bac3
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Nov 26 23:43:10 2019 +0000
- upstream: stat() returns precisely -1 to indicate error
+ upstream: test FIDO2/U2F key types; ok markus@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 668e8d022ed4ab847747214f64119e5865365fa1
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 367e06d5a260407619b4b113ea0bd7004a435474
-commit 8142fcaf9ed8ff66252deecbfd29fc59d5f2df4f
-Author: deraadt@openbsd.org <deraadt@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Jul 3 03:24:02 2019 +0000
+commit c6efa8a91af1d4fdb43909a23a0a4ffa012155ad
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Nov 26 23:41:23 2019 +0000
- upstream: snprintf/vsnprintf return < 0 on error, rather than -1.
+ upstream: add dummy security key middleware based on work by
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a261c421140a0639bb2b66bbceca72bf8239749d
+ markus@
+
+ This will allow us to test U2F/FIDO2 support in OpenSSH without
+ requiring real hardware.
+
+ ok markus@
+
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 88b309464b8850c320cf7513f26d97ee1fdf9aae
-commit 4d28fa78abce2890e136281950633fae2066cc29
-Author: deraadt@openbsd.org <deraadt@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Jun 28 13:35:04 2019 +0000
+commit 8635afa1cdc21366d61730d943f3cf61861899c8
+Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Nov 26 22:42:26 2019 +0000
- upstream: When system calls indicate an error they return -1, not
-
- some arbitrary value < 0. errno is only updated in this case. Change all
- (most?) callers of syscalls to follow this better, and let's see if this
- strictness helps us in the future.
+ upstream: tweak previous;
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 48081f00db7518e3b712a49dca06efc2a5428075
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a4c097364c75da320f1b291568db830fb1ee4883
-commit e8c974043c1648eab0ad67a7ba6a3e444fe79d2d
-Author: deraadt@openbsd.org <deraadt@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Jun 28 05:44:09 2019 +0000
+commit e0d38ae9bc8c0de421605b9021d8144e4d8ff22b
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Nov 26 03:04:27 2019 +0000
- upstream: asprintf returns -1, not an arbitrary value < 0. Also
+ upstream: more debugging; behind DEBUG_SK
- upon error the (very sloppy specification) leaves an undefined value in *ret,
- so it is wrong to inspect it, the error condition is enough. discussed a
- little with nicm, and then much more with millert until we were exasperated
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a978896227118557505999ddefc1f4c839818b60
+
+commit 9281d4311b8abc63b88259f354944c53f9b0b3c7
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Mon Nov 25 21:47:49 2019 +1100
+
+ unbreak fuzzers for recent security key changes
+
+commit c5f1cc993597fed0a9013743556b1567f476c677
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Nov 25 10:32:35 2019 +0000
+
+ upstream: unbreak tests for recent security key changes
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 29258fa51edf8115d244b9d4b84028487bf8923e
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 2cdf2fcae9962ca4d711338f3ceec3c1391bdf95
-commit 1b2d55d15c6240c15a1e1cf4203b82e54a766272
-Author: deraadt@openbsd.org <deraadt@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Jun 28 01:23:50 2019 +0000
+commit 64988266820cc90a45a21672be9d762cbde8d34d
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Nov 25 06:53:04 2019 +0000
- upstream: oops, from asou
+ upstream: unbreak after security key support landed
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 702e765d1639b732370d8f003bb84a1c71c4d0c6
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 3ab578b0dbeb2aa6d9969b54a9c1bad329c0dcba
-commit 5cdbaa78fcb718c39af4522d98016ad89d065427
-Author: deraadt@openbsd.org <deraadt@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Jun 27 18:03:37 2019 +0000
+commit e65e25c81e22ea622e89a142a303726a3882384f
+Author: tb@openbsd.org <tb@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Nov 21 05:18:47 2019 +0000
- upstream: Some asprintf() calls were checked < 0, rather than the
+ upstream: Remove workaround for broken 'openssl rsa -text' output
- precise == -1. ok millert nicm tb, etc
+ that was fixed in libcrypto/rsa/rsa_ameth.c r1.24.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: caecf8f57938685c04f125515b9f2806ad408d53
+ ok dtucker inoguchi
+
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: c260edfac177daa8fcce90141587cf04a95c4f5f
-commit b2e3e57be4a933d9464bccbe592573725765486f
+commit 21377ec2a9378579ba4b44a681af7bbca77581f4
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Jun 27 06:29:35 2019 +0000
+Date: Mon Nov 25 10:23:36 2019 +0000
- upstream: fix NULL deference (bzero) on err
+ upstream: redundant test
- =?UTF-8?q?or=20path=20added=20in=20last=20commit;=20spotted=20by=20Reynir?=
- =?UTF-8?q?=20Bj=C3=B6rnsson?=
- MIME-Version: 1.0
- Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
- Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 38fa7806c528a590d91ae560e67bd8b246c2d7a3
+
+commit 664deef95a2e770812533439b8bdd3f3c291ae59
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Nov 25 00:57:51 2019 +0000
+
+ upstream: document the "no-touch-required" certificate extension;
- ok deraadt@ markus@ tb@
+ ok markus, feedback deraadt
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b11b084bcc551b2c630560eb08618dd501027bbd
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 47640122b13f825e9c404ea99803b2372246579d
-commit 58ceacdcbaebefc77d120712de55c6fc6aa32bb1
-Author: Jitendra Sharma <jitendra.sharma@intel.com>
-Date: Fri Jun 21 09:54:17 2019 +0530
+commit 26cb128b31efdd5395153f4943f5be3eddc07033
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Nov 25 00:57:27 2019 +0000
- Update README doc to include missing test cases
+ upstream: Print a key touch reminder when generating a security
- Readme regress document is missing various individual tests,
- which are supported currently. Update README to
- include those test cases.
+ key. Most keys require a touch to authorize the operation.
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7fe8b23edbf33e1bb81741b9f25e9a63be5f6b68
-commit 7959330a554051b5587f8af3fec0c2c0d5820f64
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Jun 26 22:29:43 2019 +0000
+commit daeaf4136927c2a82af1399022103d67ff03f74a
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Nov 25 00:55:58 2019 +0000
- upstream: Remove unneeded unlink of xauthfile o
+ upstream: allow "ssh-keygen -x no-touch-required" when generating a
- =?UTF-8?q?n=20error=20path.=20=20From=20Erik=20Sj=C3=B6lund=20via=20githu?=
- =?UTF-8?q?b,=20ok=20djm@=20deraadt@?=
- MIME-Version: 1.0
- Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
- Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+ security key keypair to request one that does not require a touch for each
+ authentication attempt. The default remains to require touch.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 62a4893cf83b29a4bbfedc40e7067c25c203e632
+ feedback deraadt; ok markus@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 887e7084b2e89c0c62d1598ac378aad8e434bcbd
-commit 8de52eb224143783a49f9bddd9ab7800022a8276
+commit 2e71263b80fec7ad977e098004fef7d122169d40
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sun Jun 23 12:21:46 2019 +0000
+Date: Mon Nov 25 00:54:23 2019 +0000
- upstream: fix mismatch proto/decl from key shielding change; spotted
+ upstream: add a "no-touch-required" option for authorized_keys and
- via oss-fuzz
+ a similar extension for certificates. This option disables the default
+ requirement that security key signatures attest that the user touched their
+ key to authorize them.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1ea0ba05ded2c5557507bd844cd446e5c8b5b3b7
+ feedback deraadt, ok markus
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f1fb56151ba68d55d554d0f6d3d4dba0cf1a452e
-commit 1dfadb9b57c2985c95838a0292d1c2f6a501896e
+commit 0fddf2967ac51d518e300408a0d7e6adf4cd2634
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Jun 21 04:21:45 2019 +0000
+Date: Mon Nov 25 00:52:46 2019 +0000
- upstream: adapt for key shielding API changes (const removal)
+ upstream: Add a sshd_config PubkeyAuthOptions directive
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 298890bc52f0cd09dba76dc1022fabe89bc0ded6
+ This directive has a single valid option "no-touch-required" that
+ causes sshd to skip checking whether user presence was tested before
+ a security key signature was made (usually by the user touching the
+ key).
+
+ ok markus@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 46e434a49802d4ed82bc0aa38cb985c198c407de
-commit 4f7a56d5e02e3d04ab69eac1213817a7536d0562
+commit b7e74ea072919b31391bc0f5ff653f80b9f5e84f
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Jun 21 04:21:04 2019 +0000
+Date: Mon Nov 25 00:51:37 2019 +0000
- upstream: Add protection for private keys at rest in RAM against
+ upstream: Add new structure for signature options
- speculation and memory sidechannel attacks like Spectre, Meltdown, Rowhammer
- and Rambleed. This change encrypts private keys when they are not in use with
- a symmetic key that is derived from a relatively large "prekey" consisting of
- random data (currently 16KB).
+ This is populated during signature verification with additional fields
+ that are present in and covered by the signature. At the moment, it is
+ only used to record security key-specific options, especially the flags
+ field.
- Attackers must recover the entire prekey with high accuracy before
- they can attempt to decrypt the shielded private key, but the current
- generation of attacks have bit error rates that, when applied
- cumulatively to the entire prekey, make this unlikely.
+ with and ok markus@
- Implementation-wise, keys are encrypted "shielded" when loaded and then
- automatically and transparently unshielded when used for signatures or
- when being saved/serialised.
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 338a1f0e04904008836130bedb9ece4faafd4e49
+
+commit d2b0f88178ec9e3f11b606bf1004ac2fe541a2c3
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Nov 25 00:38:17 2019 +0000
+
+ upstream: memleak in error path
- Hopefully we can remove this in a few years time when computer
- architecture has become less unsafe.
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 93488431bf02dde85a854429362695d2d43d9112
+
+commit e2c0a21ade5e0bd7f0aab08d7eb9457f086681e9
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Nov 22 06:50:30 2019 +0000
+
+ upstream: Wait for FD to be readable or writeable during a nonblocking
- been in snaps for a bit already; thanks deraadt@
+ connect, not just readable. Prevents a timeout when the server doesn't
+ immediately send a banner (eg multiplexers like sslh) but is also slightly
+ quicker for other connections since, unlike ssh1, ssh2 doesn't specify
+ that the client should parse the server banner before sending its own.
+ Patch from mnissler@chromium.org, ok djm@
- ok dtucker@ deraadt@
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: aba9cd8480d1d9dd31d0ca0422ea155c26c5df1d
+
+commit 2f95d43dc222ce194622b706682e8de07c9cfb42
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Wed Nov 20 16:34:11 2019 +1100
+
+ Include openssl compat header.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 19767213c312e46f94b303a512ef8e9218a39bd4
+ Fixes warning for ECDSA_SIG_set0 on OpenSSL versions prior to 1.1.
-commit 4cd6b12cc9c10bf59c8b425041f3ea5091285a0f
+commit a70d92f236576c032a45c39e68ca0d71e958d19d
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Jun 21 03:19:59 2019 +0000
+Date: Tue Nov 19 22:23:19 2019 +0000
- upstream: print the correct AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand rather than
+ upstream: adjust on-wire signature encoding for ecdsa-sk keys to
- an uninitialised variable; spotted by dtucker@
+ better match ec25519-sk keys. Discussed with markus@ and Sebastian Kinne
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 02802018784250f68202f01c8561de82e17b0638
+ NB. if you are depending on security keys (already?) then make sure you
+ update both your clients and servers.
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 53d88d8211f0dd02a7954d3af72017b1a79c0679
-commit 5f68ab436b0e01751d564e9a9041e6ac3673e45a
-Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Jun 19 20:12:44 2019 +0000
+commit 26369a5f7d9c4e4ef44a3e04910126e1bcea43d8
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Nov 19 22:21:15 2019 +0000
- upstream: from tim: - for reput, it is remote-path which is
+ upstream: a little more information from the monitor when signature
- optional, not local-path - sync help
+ verification fails.
- from deraadt:
- - prefer -R and undocument -r (but add a comment for future editors)
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e6a30071e0518cac512f9e10be3dc3500e2003f3
+
+commit 4402d6c9b5bf128dcfae2429f1d41cdaa8849b6b
+Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Nov 19 16:02:32 2019 +0000
+
+ upstream: revert previous: naddy pointed out what's meant to
- from schwarze:
- - prefer -p and undocument -P (as above. the comment was schwarze's too)
+ happen. rethink needed...
- more:
- - add the -f flag to reput and reget
- - sort help (i can;t remember who suggested this originally)
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: fb0fede8123ea7f725fd65e00d49241c40bd3421
+
+commit 88056f881315233e990e4e04a815f8f96b4674e1
+Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Nov 19 14:54:47 2019 +0000
+
+ upstream: -c and -s do not make sense with -k; reshuffle -k into
- djm and deraadt were ok with earlier versions of this;
- tim and schwarze ok
+ the main synopsis/usage; ok djm
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 3c699b53b46111f5c57eed4533f132e7e58bacdd
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f881ba253da015398ae8758d973e3390754869bc
-commit 99bcbbc77fbd5a5027031f42a5931b21b07c947e
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Jun 14 04:03:48 2019 +0000
+commit 2cf262c21f35296c2ff718cfdb52e0473a1c3983
+Author: naddy@openbsd.org <naddy@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Nov 18 23:17:48 2019 +0000
- upstream: check for convtime() refusing to accept times that
+ upstream: document '$' environment variable expansion for
- resolve to LONG_MAX Reported by Kirk Wolf bz2977; ok dtucker
+ SecurityKeyProvider; ok djm@
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 15c9fe87be1ec241d24707006a31123d3a3117e0
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 76db507ebd336a573e1cd4146cc40019332c5799
-commit e5cccb2410247c9b8151b9510a876abdf5424b24
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sun Apr 28 22:53:26 2019 +0000
+commit f0edda81c5ebccffcce52b182c3033531a1aab71
+Author: naddy@openbsd.org <naddy@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Nov 18 23:16:49 2019 +0000
- upstream: Add unit tests for user@host and URI parsing.
+ upstream: more missing mentions of ed25519-sk; ok djm@
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 69d5b6f278e04ed32377046f7692c714c2d07a68
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f242e53366f61697dffd53af881bc5daf78230ff
-commit 0bb7e38834e3f9886302bbaea630a6b0f8cfb520
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Apr 18 18:57:16 2019 +0000
+commit 189550f5bc85148e85f4caa1f6b2fc623149a4ee
+Author: naddy@openbsd.org <naddy@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Nov 18 16:10:05 2019 +0000
- upstream: Add tests for sshd -T -C with Match.
+ upstream: additional missing stdarg.h includes when built without
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: d4c34916fe20d717692f10ef50b5ae5a271c12c7
+ WITH_OPENSSL; ok djm@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 881f9a2c4e2239849cee8bbf4faec9bab128f55b
-commit 73eb6cef41daba0359c1888e4756108d41b4e819
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Sun Jun 16 12:55:27 2019 +1000
+commit 723a5369864b338c48d22854bc2bb4ee5c083deb
+Author: naddy@openbsd.org <naddy@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Nov 18 16:08:57 2019 +0000
- Include stdio.h for vsnprintf.
+ upstream: add the missing WITH_OPENSSL ifdefs after the ED25519-SK
- Patch from mforney at mforney.org.
+ addition; ok djm@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a9545e1c273e506cf70e328cbb9d0129b6d62474
-commit adcaf40fd0a180e6cb5798317fdf479b52e3c09a
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Sat Jun 8 09:07:04 2019 +1000
+commit 478f4f98e4e93ae4ed1a8911dec4e5b75ea10f30
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Tue Nov 19 08:52:24 2019 +1100
- upstream rev 1.27: fix integer overflow.
+ remove all EC algs from proposals, no just sk ones
- Cast bitcount to u_in64_t before bit shifting to prevent integer overflow
- on 32bit platforms which cause incorrect results when adding a block
- >=512M in size. sha1 patch from ante84 at gmail.com via openssh github,
- sha2 with djm@, ok tedu@
+ ok dtucker@
-commit 7689048e6103d3c34cba24ac5aeea7bf8405d19a
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Sat Jun 8 09:06:06 2019 +1000
+commit 6a7ef310da100f876a257b7367e3b0766dac3994
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Mon Nov 18 22:22:04 2019 +1100
- upstream rev 1.25: add DEF_WEAK.
+ filter PUBKEY_DEFAULT_PK_ALG for ECC algorithms
- Wrap blowfish, sha*, md5, and rmd160 so that internal calls go direct
- ok deraadt@
+ Remove ECC algorithms from the PUBKEY_DEFAULT_PK_ALG list when
+ compiling without ECC support in libcrypto.
-commit 55f3153393ac7e072a4b4b21b194864460d8f44a
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Sat Jun 8 09:02:24 2019 +1000
+commit 64f56f1d1af3947a71a4c391f2c08747d19ee591
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Nov 18 09:15:17 2019 +0000
- upstream rev 1.25: add sys/types.h
+ upstream: LibreSSL change the format for openssl rsa -text output from
+
+ "publicExponent" to "Exponent" so accept either. with djm.
+
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: b7e6c4bf700029a31c98be14600d4472fe0467e6
-commit 10974f986fa842a3a3a693e3d5761072540002b4
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Sat Jun 8 09:01:14 2019 +1000
+commit 4bfc0503ad94a2a7190686a89649567c20b8534f
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Nov 18 06:58:00 2019 +0000
- upstream: Use explicit_bzero instead of memset
+ upstream: fix a bug that prevented serialisation of ed25519-sk keys
- in hash Final and End functions. OK deraadt@ djm@
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 066682b79333159cac04fcbe03ebd9c8dcc152a9
-commit cb8f56570f70b00abae4267d4bcce2bfae7dfff6
+commit d88205417084f523107fbe1bc92061635cd57fd2
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Jun 14 04:13:58 2019 +0000
+Date: Mon Nov 18 06:39:36 2019 +0000
- upstream: slightly more instructive error message when the user
+ upstream: Fix incorrect error message when key certification fails
- specifies multiple -J options on the commandline. bz3015 ok dtucker@
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7771bd77ee73f7116df37c734c41192943a73cee
+
+commit 740c4bc9875cbb4b9fc03fd5eac19df080f20df5
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Nov 18 06:39:02 2019 +0000
+
+ upstream: fix bug that prevented certification of ed25519-sk keys
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 181c15a65cac3b575819bc8d9a56212c3c748179
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 64c8cc6f5de2cdd0ee3a81c3a9dee8d862645996
-commit 2317ce4b0ed7d8c4b0c684e2d47bff5006bd1178
+commit 85409cbb505d8c463ab6e2284b4039764c7243de
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Jun 14 03:51:47 2019 +0000
+Date: Mon Nov 18 06:24:17 2019 +0000
- upstream: process agent requests for RSA certificate private keys using
+ upstream: allow *-sk key types to be turned into certificates
- correct signature algorithm when requested. Patch from Jakub Jelen in bz3016
- ok dtucker markus
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: cd365ee343934862286d0b011aa77fa739d2a945
+
+commit e2e1283404e06a22ac6135d057199e70dcadb8dd
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Nov 18 04:55:02 2019 +0000
+
+ upstream: mention ed25519-sk key/cert types here too; prompted by
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 61f86efbeb4a1857a3e91298c1ccc6cf49b79624
+ jmc@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e281977e4a4f121f3470517cbd5e483eee37b818
-commit c95b90d40170473825904be561b1eafba354f376
+commit 97dc5d1d82865a7d20f1eb193b5c62ce684024e5
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Jun 14 03:39:59 2019 +0000
+Date: Mon Nov 18 04:50:45 2019 +0000
- upstream: for public key authentication, check AuthorizedKeysFiles
+ upstream: mention ed25519-sk in places where it is accepted;
- files before consulting AuthorizedKeysCommand; ok dtucker markus
+ prompted by jmc@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 13652998bea5cb93668999c39c3c48e8429db8b3
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 076d386739ebe7336c2137e583bc7a5c9538a442
-commit a5a53914989ddd3521b6edc452bc3291784a4f4f
+commit 130664344862a8c7afd3e24d8d36ce40af41a99f
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Jun 14 03:28:19 2019 +0000
+Date: Mon Nov 18 04:34:47 2019 +0000
- upstream: if passed a bad fd, log what it was
+ upstream: document ed25519-sk pubkey, private key and certificate
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 582e2bd05854e49365195b58989b68ac67f09140
+ formats
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 795a7c1c80315412e701bef90e31e376ea2f3c88
-commit 7349149da1074d82b71722338e05b6a282f126cc
-Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Jun 12 11:31:50 2019 +0000
+commit 71856e1142fc01628ce53098f8cfc74765464b35
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Nov 18 04:29:50 2019 +0000
- upstream: Hostname->HostName cleanup; from lauri tirkkonen ok
+ upstream: correct order or ecdsa-sk private key fields
- dtucker
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4d4a0c13226a79f0080ce6cbe74f73b03ed8092e
+
+commit 93fa2a6649ae3e0626cbff25c985a4573d63e3f2
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Nov 18 04:16:53 2019 +0000
+
+ upstream: correct description of fields in pub/private keys (was
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4ade73629ede63b691f36f9a929f943d4e7a44e4
+ missing curve name); spotted by Sebastian Kinne
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2a11340dc7ed16200342d384fb45ecd4fcce26e7
-commit 76af9c57387243556d38935555c227d0b34062c5
-Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Jun 12 05:53:21 2019 +0000
+commit b497e920b409250309c4abe64229237b8f2730ba
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Mon Nov 18 15:05:04 2019 +1100
- upstream: deraadt noticed some inconsistency in the way we denote
+ Teach the GTK2/3 ssh-askpass the new prompt hints
- the "Hostname" and "X11UseLocalhost" keywords; this makes things consistent
- (effectively reversing my commit of yesterday);
+ ssh/ssh-agent now sets a hint environment variable $SSH_ASKPASS_PROMPT
+ when running the askpass program. This is intended to allow the
+ askpass to vary its UI across the three cases it supports: asking for
+ a passphrase, confirming the use of a key and (recently) reminding
+ a user to touch their security key.
- ok deraadt markus djm
+ This adapts the gnome-ssh-askpass[23] to use these hints. Specifically,
+ for SSH_ASKPASS_PROMPT=confirm it will skip the text input box and show
+ only "yes"/"no" buttons. For SSH_ASKPASS_PROMPT=none (used to remind
+ users to tap their security key), it shows only a "close" button.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 255c02adb29186ac91dcf47dfad7adb1b1e54667
+ Help wanted: adapt the other askpass programs in active use, including
+ x11-ssh-askpass, lxqt-openssh-askpass, etc.
-commit d1bbfdd932db9b9b799db865ee1ff50060dfc895
-Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Jun 11 13:39:40 2019 +0000
+commit 857f49e91eeae6feb781ef5f5e26c38ca3d953ec
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Mon Nov 18 14:15:26 2019 +1100
- upstream: consistent lettering for "HostName" keyword; from lauri
-
- tirkkonen
+ Move ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0c267a1257ed7482b13ef550837b6496e657d563
+ Found by -Wimplicit-fallthrough: one ECC case was not inside the ifdef.
+ ok djm@
-commit fc0340f7c4ee29bfb12bd1de9f99defa797e16b4
+commit 6cf1c40096a79e5eedcf897c7cdb46bb32d4a3ee
Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Sat Jun 8 00:10:59 2019 +1000
+Date: Mon Nov 18 14:14:18 2019 +1100
- Typo fixes in error messages.
+ Enable -Wimplicit-fallthrough if supported
- Patch from knweiss at gmail.com via github pull req #97 (portable-
- specific parts).
+ Suggested by djm.
-commit 4b7dd22b02b64b1ededd3c0e98a6e7ae21e31d38
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Jun 7 14:18:48 2019 +0000
+commit 103c51fd5f5ddc01cd6b5c1132e711765b921bf5
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Nov 18 01:59:48 2019 +0000
- upstream: Typo and spelling fixes in comments and error messages.
+ upstream: missing break in getopt switch; spotted by Sebastian Kinne
- Patch from knweiss at gmail.com via -portable.
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f002dbf14dba5586e8407e90f0141148ade8e8fc
+
+commit 9a1225e8ca2ce1fe809910874935302234399a6d
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sat Nov 16 23:17:20 2019 +0000
+
+ upstream: tweak debug message
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2577465442f761a39703762c4f87a8dfcb918b4b
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2bf336d3be0b7e3dd97920d7e7471146a281d2b9
-commit 130ef0695e1731392ca33831939fe89e8b70cc17
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Sat Jun 8 00:47:07 2019 +1000
+commit 4103a3ec7c68493dbc4f0994a229507e943a86d3
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sat Nov 16 22:42:30 2019 +0000
- Include missed bits from previous sync.
+ upstream: a little debug() in the security key interface
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4c70300609a5c8b19707207bb7ad4109e963b0e8
-commit 25e3bccbaa63d27b9d5e09c123f1eb28594d2bd6
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Jun 7 03:47:12 2019 +0000
+commit 05daa211de926f66f50b7380d637f84dc6341574
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sat Nov 16 22:36:48 2019 +0000
- upstream: Check for user@host when parsing sftp target. This
+ upstream: always use ssh-sk-helper, even for the internal USB HID
- allows user@[1.2.3.4] to work without a path in addition to with one.
- bz#2999, ok djm@
+ support. This avoid the need for a wpath pledge in ssh-agent.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d989217110932490ba8ce92127a9a6838878928b
+ reported by jmc@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 19f799c4d020b870741d221335dbfa5e76691c23
-commit 0323d9b619d512f80c57575b810a05791891f657
-Author: otto@openbsd.org <otto@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Jun 6 05:13:13 2019 +0000
+commit d431778a561d90131814f986b646299f9af33c8c
+Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Nov 15 15:41:01 2019 +0000
- upstream: Replace calls to ssh_malloc_init() by a static init of
+ upstream: fix typos in sk_enroll
- malloc_options. Prepares for changes in the way malloc is initialized. ok
- guenther@ dtucker@
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: faa9bf779e008b3e64e2eb1344d9b7d83b3c4487
+
+commit af90aec0443ec51e6b2d804cb91771d3905f8a6f
+Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Nov 15 11:16:28 2019 +0000
+
+ upstream: double word;
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 154f4e3e174f614b09f792d4d06575e08de58a6b
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 43d09bafa4ea9002078cb30ca9adc3dcc0b9c2b9
-commit c586d2d3129265ea64b12960c379d634bccb6535
+commit fd1a96490cef7f945a1b3b5df4e90c8a1070f425
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri May 31 03:20:07 2019 +0000
+Date: Fri Nov 15 06:00:20 2019 +0000
- upstream: fix ssh-keysign fd handling problem introduced in r1.304
+ upstream: remove most uses of BN_CTX
- caused by a typo (STDIN_FILENO vs STDERR_FILENO)
+ We weren't following the rules re BN_CTX_start/BN_CTX_end and the places
+ we were using it didn't benefit from its use anyway. ok dtucker@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 57a0b4be7bef23963afe24150e24bf014fdd9cb0
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ea9ba6c0d2e6f6adfe00b309a8f41842fe12fc7a
-commit 410b231aa41ff830b2f5b09b5aaf5e5cdc1ab86b
-Author: lum@openbsd.org <lum@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed May 29 08:30:26 2019 +0000
+commit 39b87104cdd47baf79ef77dc81de62cea07d119f
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Fri Nov 15 18:56:54 2019 +1100
- upstream: Make the standard output messages of both methods of
+ Add wrappers for other ultrix headers.
- changing a key pair's comments (using -c and -C) more applicable to both
- methods. ok and suggestions djm@ dtucker@
-
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b379338118109eb36e14a65bc0a12735205b3de6
+ Wrappers protect against multiple inclusions for headers that don't do
+ it themselves.
-commit 2b3402dc9f1d9b0df70291b424f36e436cdfa7e0
+commit 134a74f4e0cf750931f1125beb2a3f40c54c8809
Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Sat Jun 8 00:03:07 2019 +1000
+Date: Fri Nov 15 18:55:13 2019 +1100
- Always clean up before and after utimensat test.
+ Add SSIZE_MAX when we define ssize_t.
-commit 182898192d4b720e4faeafd5b39c2cfb3b92aa21
+commit 9c6d0a3a1ed77989d8c5436d8c3cc6c7045c0197
Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Fri Jun 7 23:47:37 2019 +1000
+Date: Fri Nov 15 17:13:19 2019 +1100
- Update utimensat test.
+ Remove ultrix realpath hack.
+
+commit c63fba5e3472307167850bbd84187186af7fa9f0
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Nov 15 05:37:27 2019 +0000
+
+ upstream: unshield security key privkey before attempting signature
- POSIX specifies that when given a symlink, AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW should
- update the symlink and not the destination. The compat code doesn't
- have a way to do this, so where possible it fails instead of following a
- symlink when explicitly asked not to. Instead of checking for an explicit
- failure, check that it does not update the destination, which both the
- real and compat implmentations should honour.
+ in agent. spotted by dtucker@
- Inspired by github pull req #125 from chutzpah at gentoo.org.
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: fb67d451665385b8a0a55371231c50aac67b91d2
-commit d220b675205185e0b4d6b6524acc2e5c599ef0e2
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Fri Jun 7 14:26:54 2019 +1000
+commit d165bb5396e3f718480e6039ca2cf77f5a2c2885
+Author: deraadt@openbsd.org <deraadt@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Nov 15 05:26:56 2019 +0000
- Have pthread_create return errno on failure.
+ upstream: rewrite c99-ism
- According to POSIX, pthread_create returns the failure reason in
- the non-zero function return code so make the fork wrapper do that.
- Matches previous change.
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d0c70cca29cfa7e6d9f7ec1d6d5dabea112499b3
-commit 1bd4f7f25f653e0cadb2e6f25d79bc3c35c6aa4d
-Author: Elliott Hughes <enh@google.com>
-Date: Thu Apr 25 13:36:27 2019 -0700
+commit 03e06dd0e6e1c0a9f4b4b9de7def8a44dcbf93a7
+Author: deraadt@openbsd.org <deraadt@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Nov 15 05:25:52 2019 +0000
- pthread_create(3) returns positive values on failure.
+ upstream: only clang understands those new -W options
- Found by inspection after finding similar bugs in other code used by
- Android.
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d9b910e412d139141b072a905e66714870c38ac0
-commit b3a77b25e5f7880222b179431a74fad76d2cf60c
-Author: Harald Freudenberger <freude@linux.ibm.com>
-Date: Fri May 24 10:11:15 2019 +0200
+commit 5c0bc273cba53f822b7d777bbb6c35d160d3b505
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Fri Nov 15 16:08:00 2019 +1100
- allow s390 specific ioctl for ecc hardware support
+ configure flag to built-in security key support
- Adding another s390 specific ioctl to be able to support ECC hardware
- acceleration to the sandbox seccomp filter rules.
+ Require --with-security-key-builtin before enabling the built-in
+ security key support (and consequent dependency on libfido2).
+
+commit fbcb9a7fa55300b8bd4c18bee024c6104c5a25d7
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Fri Nov 15 16:06:30 2019 +1100
+
+ upstream commit
- Now the ibmca openssl engine provides elliptic curve cryptography
- support with the help of libica and CCA crypto cards. This is done via
- jet another ioctl call to the zcrypt device driver and so there is a
- need to enable this on the openssl sandbox.
+ revision 1.48
+ date: 2019/02/04 16:45:40; author: millert; state: Exp; lines: +16 -17; commitid: cpNtVC7erojNyctw;
+ Make gl_pathc, gl_matchc and gl_offs size_t in glob_t to match POSIX.
+ This requires a libc major version bump. OK deraadt@
+
+commit 2cfb11abac85885de0cb888bbeb9a3e4303105ea
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Fri Nov 15 16:05:07 2019 +1100
+
+ upstream commit
- Code is s390 specific and has been tested, verified and reviewed.
+ revision 1.47
+ date: 2017/05/08 14:53:27; author: millert; state: Exp; lines: +34 -21; commitid: sYfxfyUHAfarP8sE;
+ Fix exponential CPU use with repeated '*' operators by changing '*'
+ handling to be interative instead of recursive.
+ Fix by Yves Orton, ported to OpenBSD glob.c by Ray Lai. OK tb@
+
+commit 228dd595c7882bb9b161dbb7d4dca15c8a5f03f5
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Fri Nov 15 16:04:28 2019 +1100
+
+ upstream commit
- Please note that I am also the originator of the previous changes in
- that area. I posted these changes to Eduardo and he forwarded the
- patches to the openssl community.
+ revision 1.46
+ date: 2015/12/28 22:08:18; author: mmcc; state: Exp; lines: +5 -9; commitid: 0uXuF2O13NH9q2e1;
+ Remove NULL-checks before free() and a few related dead assignments.
- Signed-off-by: Harald Freudenberger <freude@linux.ibm.com>
- Reviewed-by: Joerg Schmidbauer <jschmidb@de.ibm.com>
+ ok and valuable input from millert@
-commit 2459df9aa11820f8092a8651aeb381af7ebbccb1
-Author: Sorin Adrian Savu <sorin25@users.noreply.github.com>
-Date: Sun May 26 21:50:08 2019 +0300
+commit a16f748690139b9f452485d97511ad5e578f59b2
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Fri Nov 15 16:02:43 2019 +1100
- openssl-devel is obsoleted by libssl-devel
+ upstream commit
- openssl-devel is no longer installable via the cygwin setup and
- it's hidden by default, so you can't see the replacement very easy.
+ revision 1.44
+ date: 2015/09/14 16:09:13; author: tedu; state: Exp; lines: +3 -5; commitid: iWfSX2BIn0sLw62l;
+ remove null check before free. from Michael McConville
+ ok semarie
-commit 85ceb0e64bff672558fc87958cd548f135c83cdd
-Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon May 20 06:01:59 2019 +0000
+commit fd37cdeafe25adfcdc752280f535d28de7997ff1
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Fri Nov 15 16:02:27 2019 +1100
- upstream: tweak previous;
+ upstream commit
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 42f39f22f53cfcb913bce401ae0f1bb93e08dd6c
+ revision 1.43
+ date: 2015/06/13 16:57:04; author: deraadt; state: Exp; lines: +4 -4; commitid: zOUKuqWBdOPOz1SZ;
+ in glob() initialize the glob_t before the first failure check.
+ from j@pureftpd.org
+ ok millert stsp
-commit 30615295609f5c57b3137b3021fe63bfa45c1985
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon May 20 00:25:55 2019 +0000
+commit fd62769c3882adea118dccaff80a06009874a2d1
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Fri Nov 15 16:01:20 2019 +1100
- upstream: embiggen format buffer size for certificate serial number so
+ upstream commit
- that it will fit a full 64 bit integer. bz#3012 from Manoel Domingues Junior
+ revision 1.42
+ date: 2015/02/05 12:59:57; author: millert; state: Exp; lines: +2 -1; commitid: DTQbfd4poqBW8iSJ;
+ Include stdint.h, not limits.h to get SIZE_MAX. OK guenther@
+
+commit 2b6cba7ee2b8b36f393be739c860a9d2e5d8eb48
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Fri Nov 15 16:00:07 2019 +1100
+
+ upstream commit
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a51f3013056d05b976e5af6b978dcb9e27bbc12b
+ revision 1.41
+ date: 2014/10/08 05:35:27; author: deraadt; state: Exp; lines: +3 -3; commitid: JwTGarRLHQKDgPh2;
+ obvious realloc -> reallocarray conversion
-commit 476e3551b2952ef73acc43d995e832539bf9bc4d
+commit ab3600665387ae34785498558c4409e27f495b0b
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon May 20 00:20:35 2019 +0000
+Date: Fri Nov 15 04:12:32 2019 +0000
- upstream: When signing certificates with an RSA key, default to
+ upstream: don't consult dlopen whitelist for internal security key
- using the rsa-sha2-512 signature algorithm. Certificates signed by RSA keys
- will therefore be incompatible with OpenSSH < 7.2 unless the default is
- overridden.
+ provider; spotted by dtucker@
- Document the ability of the ssh-keygen -t flag to override the
- signature algorithm when signing certificates, and the new default.
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: bfe5fbd17e4ff95dd85b9212181652b54444192e
+
+commit 19f8ec428db835f68c1cfd63587e9880ccd6486c
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Fri Nov 15 15:08:28 2019 +1100
+
+ upstream commit
- ok deraadt@
+ revision 1.40
+ date: 2013/09/30 12:02:34; author: millert; state: Exp; lines: +14 -15;
+ Use PATH_MAX, NAME_MAX and LOGIN_NAME_MAX not MAXPATHNAMELEN,
+ MAXNAMLEN or MAXLOGNAME where possible. OK deraadt@
+
+commit bb7413db98e418d4af791244660abf6c829783f5
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Fri Nov 15 15:07:30 2019 +1100
+
+ upstream commit
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 400c9c15013978204c2cb80f294b03ae4cfc8b95
+ revision 1.39
+ date: 2012/01/20 07:09:42; author: tedu; state: Exp; lines: +4 -4;
+ the glob stat limit is way too low. bump to 2048.
+ while here, failed stats should count against the limit too.
+ ok deraadt sthen stsp
-commit 606077ee1e77af5908431d003fb28461ef7be092
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Fri May 17 13:14:12 2019 +1000
+commit 01362cf7cb979525c014714e2bccf799a46e772e
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Nov 15 03:41:57 2019 +0000
- Add no-op implementation of pam_putenv.
+ upstream: U2F tokens may return FIDO_ERR_USER_PRESENCE_REQUIRED when
- Some platforms such as HP-UX do not have pam_putenv. Currently the
- calls are ifdef'ed out, but a new one was recently added. Remove the
- ifdefs and add a no-op implementation. bz#3008, ok djm.
+ probed to see if they own a key handle. Handle this case so the find_device()
+ look can work for them. Reported by Michael Forney
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2ccd5b30a6ddfe4dba228b7159bf168601bd9166
-commit 1ac98be8724c9789d770ddb8e7f0dbf1b55e05a0
+commit cf62307bc9758105913dcb91b418e4968ac2244d
Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Fri May 17 12:42:17 2019 +1000
+Date: Fri Nov 15 14:01:00 2019 +1100
- Use the correct macro for SSH_ALLOWED_CA_SIGALGS.
+ Add libfido2 to INSTALL.
-commit 97370f6c2c3b825f8c577b7e6c00b1a98d30a6cf
+commit 69fbda1894349d1f420c842dfcbcc883239d1aa7
Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Fri May 17 10:54:51 2019 +1000
+Date: Fri Nov 15 13:42:15 2019 +1100
- Fix building w/out ECC.
-
- Ifdef out ECC specific code so that that it'll build against an OpenSSL
- configured w/out ECC. With & ok djm@
+ libcrypto is now optional.
-commit 633703babf8d9a88da85f23b800e1b88dec7cdbd
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Fri May 17 10:50:29 2019 +1000
+commit 45ffa369886e37930776d7c15dd8b973242d6ecc
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Nov 15 02:38:07 2019 +0000
- Conditionalize ECDH methods in CA algos.
+ upstream: show the "please touch your security key" notifier when
- When building against an OpenSSL configured without ECC, don't include
- those algos in CASignatureAlgorithms. ok djm@
+ using the (default) build-in security key support.
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4707643aaa7124501d14e92d1364b20f312a6428
-commit 5c8d14c512f5d413095b22bdba08a6bb990f1e97
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu May 16 08:47:27 2019 +0000
+commit 49dc9fa928d77807c53bdc2898db7fb515fe5eb3
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Nov 15 02:37:24 2019 +0000
- upstream: Move a variable declaration to the block where it's used
+ upstream: close the "touch your security key" notifier on the error
- to make things a little tidier for -portable.
+ path too
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 616379861be95619e5358768b7dee4793e2f3a75
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c7628bf80505c1aefbb1de7abc8bb5ee51826829
-commit a1d29cc36a5e6eeabc935065a8780e1ba5b67014
-Author: deraadt@openbsd.org <deraadt@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed May 15 04:43:31 2019 +0000
+commit 22a82712e89bf17c27427aeba15795fb4011a0c2
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Nov 15 02:20:06 2019 +0000
- upstream: When doing the fork+exec'ing for ssh-keysign, rearrange
-
- the socket into fd3, so as to not mistakenly leak other fd forward
- accidentally. ok djm
+ upstream: correct function name in debug message
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 24cc753f5aa2c6a7d0fbf62766adbc75cd785296
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2482c99d2ce448f39282493050f8a01e3ffc39ab
-commit db7606d4a62fee67b0cb2f32dfcbd7b3642bfef5
-Author: schwarze@openbsd.org <schwarze@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue May 14 12:47:17 2019 +0000
+commit 018e2902a65c22faded215a7c588492c948f108c
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Nov 15 00:32:40 2019 +0000
- upstream: Delete some .Sx macros that were used in a wrong way.
+ upstream: follow existing askpass logic for security key notifier:
- Part of a patch from Stephen Gregoratto <dev at sgregoratto dot me>.
+ fall back to _PATH_SSH_ASKPASS_DEFAULT if no $SSH_ASKPASS environment
+ variable is set.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 15501ed13c595f135e7610b1a5d8345ccdb513b7
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: cda753726b13fb797bf7a9f7a0b3022d9ade4520
-commit cb4accb1233865d9151f8a50cc5f0c61a3fd4077
-Author: florian@openbsd.org <florian@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri May 10 18:55:17 2019 +0000
+commit 575d0042a94997c1eeb86a6dcfb30b3c7bdbcba3
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Nov 14 21:56:52 2019 +0000
- upstream: For PermitOpen violations add the remote host and port to
+ upstream: remove debugging goop that snuck in to last commit
- be able to find out from where the request was comming.
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8ea4455a2d9364a0a04f9e4a2cbfa4c9fcefe77e
+
+commit 63a5b24f2dbdc9a4bf2182ac3db26731ddc617e8
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Fri Nov 15 11:21:26 2019 +1100
+
+ don't fatal if libfido2 not found
- Add the same logging for PermitListen violations which where not
- logged at all.
+ spotted by dtucker@
+
+commit 129952a81c00c332721b4ba3ede868c720ad7f4e
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Fri Nov 15 11:17:12 2019 +1100
+
+ correct object dependency
+
+commit 6bff9521ab9a9f7396d635755c342b72373bb4f9
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Nov 14 21:27:29 2019 +0000
+
+ upstream: directly support U2F/FIDO2 security keys in OpenSSH by
- Pointed out by Robert Kisteleki (robert AT ripe.net)
+ linking against the (previously external) USB HID middleware. The dlopen()
+ capability still exists for alternate middlewares, e.g. for Bluetooth, NFC
+ and test/debugging.
- input markus
- OK deraadt
-
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8a7d0f1b7175504c0d1dca8d9aca1588b66448c8
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 14446cf170ac0351f0d4792ba0bca53024930069
-commit cd16aceec148d55088fc8df6be88335578d85258
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Thu May 16 07:53:20 2019 +1000
+commit 4f5e331cb8e11face3025aa6578662dde489c3ad
+Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Nov 13 22:00:21 2019 +0000
- Add OpenSSL 1.1.1 to the supported list.
+ upstream: in order to be able to figure out the number of
- Clarify the language around prngd and egd.
-
-commit 6fd4aa2aafbce90acb11a328ca0aa0696cb01c6b
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Wed May 15 16:19:14 2019 +1000
-
- Fix typo in man page formatter selector.
+ signatures left on a shielded key, we need to transfer the number of
+ signatures left from the private to the public key. ok djm@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8a5d0d260aeace47d372695fdae383ce9b962574
-commit 285546b73e2c172565c992a695927ac8cf3b4cc6
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Fri May 10 15:04:42 2019 +1000
+commit dffd02e297e6c2a4e86775f293eb1b0ff01fb3df
+Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Nov 13 20:25:45 2019 +0000
- Use "doc" man page format if mandoc present.
+ upstream: fix check for sig_s; noted by qsa at qualys.com
- Previously configure would not select the "doc" man page format if
- mandoc was present but nroff was not. This checks for mandoc first
- and removes a now-superflous AC_PATH_PROG. Based on a patch from
- vehk at vehk.de and feedback from schwarze at usta.de.
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 34198084e4afb424a859f52c04bb2c9668a52867
-commit 62dd70613b77b229f53db3cc1c3e8a206fa2b582
+commit fc173aeb1526d4268db89ec5dfebaf8750dd26cd
Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri May 3 06:06:30 2019 +0000
+Date: Wed Nov 13 11:25:11 2019 +0000
- upstream: Use the correct (according to POSIX) format for
+ upstream: When clients get denied by MaxStartups, send a
- left-justification in snmprintf. bz#3002, patch from velemas at gmail.com, ok
- markus@.
+ noification prior to the SSH2 protocol banner according to RFC4253 section
+ 4.2. ok djm@ deraadt@ markus@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 65d252b799be0cc8f68b6c47cece0a57bb00fea7
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e5dabcb722d54dea18eafb336d50b733af4f9c63
-commit 62be1ffe5ffc68cfaac183320503c00a8c72e0b1
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri May 3 04:11:00 2019 +0000
+commit bf219920b70cafbf29ebc9890ef67d0efa54e738
+Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Nov 13 07:53:10 2019 +0000
- upstream: Free channel objects on exit path. Patch from markus at
+ upstream: fix shield/unshield for xmss keys: - in ssh-agent we need
- blueflash.cc, ok deraadt
+ to delay the call to shield until we have received key specific options. -
+ when serializing xmss keys for shield we need to deal with all optional
+ components (e.g. state might not be loaded). ok djm@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: dbe4db381603909482211ffdd2b48abd72169117
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: cc2db82524b209468eb176d6b4d6b9486422f41f
-commit 1c554a5d94b9de6bd5374e2992a5662746cc39ba
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri May 3 03:27:38 2019 +0000
+commit 40598b85d72a509566b7b2a6d57676c7231fed34
+Author: deraadt@openbsd.org <deraadt@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Nov 13 05:42:26 2019 +0000
- upstream: Free host on exit path. Patch from markus at
+ upstream: remove size_t gl_pathc < 0 test, it is invalid. the
- blueflash.cc, ok djm@
+ return value from glob() is sufficient. discussed with djm
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c54e9945d93c4ce28350d8b9fa8b71f744ef2b5a
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c91203322db9caaf7efaf5ae90c794a91070be3c
-commit 99043bd64e5e0f427173f4fa83ef25a4676624a3
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri May 3 03:25:18 2019 +0000
+commit 72687c8e7c38736e3e64e833ee7aa8f9cd9efed1
+Author: deraadt@openbsd.org <deraadt@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Nov 13 04:47:52 2019 +0000
- upstream: Wrap XMSS including in ifdef. Patch from markus at
+ upstream: stdarg.h required more broadly; ok djm
- blueflash.cc, ok djm
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b5b15674cde1b54d6dbbae8faf30d47e6e5d6513
+
+commit 1e0b248d47c96be944868a735553af8482300a07
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Thu Nov 14 16:08:17 2019 +1100
+
+ Put sshsk_sign call inside ifdef ENABLE_SK.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e3b34fc35cf12d33bde91ac03633210a3bc0f8b5
+ Fixes build against OpenSSL configured without ECC.
-commit 8fcfb7789c43a19d24162a7a4055cd09ee951b34
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Apr 26 08:37:17 2019 +0000
+commit 546274a6f89489d2e6be8a8b62f2bb63c87a61fd
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Wed Nov 13 23:27:31 2019 +1100
- upstream: Import regenerated moduli.
+ Remove duplicate __NR_clock_nanosleep
+
+commit b1c82f4b8adf3f42476d8a1f292df33fb7aa1a56
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Wed Nov 13 23:19:35 2019 +1100
+
+ seccomp: Allow clock_nanosleep() in sandbox.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: db6375fc302e3bdf07d96430c63c991b2c2bd3ff
+ seccomp: Allow clock_nanosleep() to make OpenSSH working with latest
+ glibc. Patch from Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com> via bz #3093.
-commit 3a7db919d5dd09f797971b3cf8ee301767459774
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Apr 23 11:56:41 2019 +0000
+commit 2b523d23804c13cb68db135b919fcf312c42b580
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Wed Nov 13 11:56:56 2019 +1100
- upstream: Use the LogLevel typdef instead of int where appropriate. Patch from Markus Schmidt via openssh-unix-dev, ok markus@
+ Include stdarg.h for va_list in xmalloc.h.
+
+commit 245dcbdca5374296bdb9c48be6e24bdf6b1c0af7
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Wed Nov 13 11:19:26 2019 +1100
+
+ Put headers inside ifdef _AIX.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4c0f0f458e3da7807806b35e3eb5c1e8403c968a
+ Prevents compile errors due to missing definitions (eg va_list) on
+ non-AIX platforms.
-commit d7c6e38b87efab1f140745fd8b1106b82e6e4a68
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Apr 19 05:47:44 2019 +0000
+commit a4cc579c6ad2b2e54bdd6cc0d5e12c2288113a56
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Wed Nov 13 10:41:41 2019 +1100
- upstream: Document new default RSA key size. From
+ Fix comment in match_usergroup_pattern_list.
- sebastiaanlokhorst at gmail.com via bz#2997.
+ Spotted by balu.gajjala@gmail.com via bz#3092.
+
+commit fccff339cab5aa66f2554e0188b83f980683490b
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Nov 12 22:38:19 2019 +0000
+
+ upstream: allow an empty attestation certificate returned by a
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: bdd62ff5d4d649d2147904e91bf7cefa82fe11e1
+ security key enrollment - these are possible for tokens that only offer self-
+ attestation. This also needs support from the middleware.
+
+ ok markus@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 135eeeb937088ef6830a25ca0bbe678dfd2c57cc
-commit e826bbcafe26dac349a8593da5569e82faa45ab8
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Apr 18 18:56:16 2019 +0000
+commit e44bb61824e36d0d181a08489c16c378c486a974
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Nov 12 22:36:44 2019 +0000
- upstream: When running sshd -T, assume any attibute not provided by
+ upstream: security keys typically need to be tapped/touched in
- -C does not match, which allows it to work when sshd_config contains a Match
- directive with or without -C. bz#2858, ok djm@
+ order to perform a signature operation. Notify the user when this is expected
+ via the TTY (if available) or $SSH_ASKPASS if we can.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1a701f0a33e3bc96753cfda2fe0b0378520b82eb
+ ok markus@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0ef90a99a85d4a2a07217a58efb4df8444818609
-commit 5696512d7ad57e85e89f8011ce8dec617be686aa
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Apr 18 07:32:56 2019 +0000
+commit 4671211068441519011ac0e38c588317f4157ba1
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Nov 12 22:35:02 2019 +0000
- upstream: Remove crc32.{c,h} which were only used by the now-gone
+ upstream: pass SSH_ASKPASS_PROMPT hint to y/n key confirm too
- SSH1 protocol. Patch from yumkam at gmail.com, ok deraadt.
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 08d46712e5e5f1bad0aea68e7717b7bec1ab8959
+
+commit 5d1c1590d736694f41b03e686045f08fcae20d62
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Nov 12 22:34:20 2019 +0000
+
+ upstream: dd API for performing one-shot notifications via tty or
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: cceda5876c5ba6b4d8abcd52335329198cee3240
+ SSH_ASKPASS
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9484aea33aff5b62ce3642bf259546c7639f23f3
-commit 34e87fb5d9ce607f5701ab4c31d837ad8133e2d1
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Tue Apr 30 12:27:57 2019 +1000
+commit 166927fd410823eec8a7b2472463db51e0e6fef5
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Nov 12 22:32:48 2019 +0000
- Remove unused variables from RLIMIT_NOFILE test.
+ upstream: add xvasprintf()
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e5e3671c05c121993b034db935bce1a7aa372247
-commit 35e82e62c1ef53cfa457473a4c4d957d6197371a
+commit 782093ec6cf64cc6c4078410093359869ea9329f
Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Fri Apr 26 18:38:27 2019 +1000
+Date: Wed Nov 13 09:08:55 2019 +1100
- Import regenerated moduli.
+ Remove leftover if statement from sync.
-commit 5590f53f99219e95dc23b0ebd220f19a6f46b101
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Fri Apr 26 18:22:10 2019 +1000
+commit b556cc3cbf0c43f073bb41bba4e92ca709a1ec13
+Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Nov 12 19:34:40 2019 +0000
- Whitespace resync w/OpenBSD.
+ upstream: remove extra layer for ed25519 signature; ok djm@
- Patch from markus at blueflash.cc via openssh-unix-dev.
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7672d9d0278b4bf656a12d3aab0c0bfe92a8ae47
-commit b7b8334914fb9397a6725f3b5d2de999b0bb69ac
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Fri Apr 26 18:06:34 2019 +1000
+commit 3fcf69ace19e75cf9dcd7206f396adfcb29611a8
+Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Nov 12 19:34:00 2019 +0000
- Don't install duplicate STREAMS modules on Solaris
+ upstream: check sig_r and sig_s for ssh-sk keys; ok djm
- Check if STREAMS modules are already installed on pty before installing
- since when compiling with XPG>=4 they will likely be installed already.
- Prevents hangs and duplicate lines on the terminal. bz#2945 and bz#2998,
- patch from djm@
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1a1e6a85b5f465d447a3800f739e35c5b74e0abc
-commit fd0fa130ecf06d7d092932adcd5d77f1549bfc8d
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Thu Apr 18 08:52:57 2019 +1000
+commit 2c55744a56de0ffc81fe445a1e7fc5cd308712b3
+Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Nov 12 19:33:08 2019 +0000
- makedepend
+ upstream: enable ed25519 support; ok djm
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1a399c5b3ef15bd8efb916110cf5a9e0b554ab7e
-commit 5de397a876b587ba05a9169237deffdc71f273b0
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Fri Apr 5 11:29:51 2019 -0700
+commit fd1a3b5e38721b1d69aae2d9de1a1d9155dfa5c7
+Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Nov 12 19:32:30 2019 +0000
- second thoughts: leave README in place
+ upstream: update sk-api to version 2 for ed25519 support; ok djm
- A number of contrib/* files refer to the existing README so let's leave
- it in place for release and add the new markdown version in parallel.
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 77aa4d5b6ab17987d8a600907b49573940a0044a
+
+commit 7c32b51edbed5bd57870249c0a45dffd06be0002
+Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Nov 12 19:31:45 2019 +0000
+
+ upstream: implement sshsk_ed25519_assemble(); ok djm
- I'll get rid of README after release.
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: af9ec838b9bc643786310b5caefc4ca4754e68c6
-commit 5d3127d9274519b25ed10e320f45045ba8d7f3be
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Fri Apr 5 11:29:31 2019 -0700
+commit fe05a36dc0ea884c8c2395d53d804fe4f4202b26
+Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Nov 12 19:31:18 2019 +0000
- Revert "rewrite README"
+ upstream: implement sshsk_ed25519_inner_sig(); ok djm
- This reverts commit 9444d82678cb7781820da4d1c23b3c2b9fb1e12f.
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f422d0052c6d948fe0e4b04bc961f37fdffa0910
-commit 9444d82678cb7781820da4d1c23b3c2b9fb1e12f
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Fri Apr 5 11:21:48 2019 -0700
+commit e03a29e6554cd0c9cdbac0dae53dd79e6eb4ea47
+Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Nov 12 19:30:50 2019 +0000
- rewrite README
+ upstream: rename sshsk_ecdsa_sign() to sshsk_sign(); ok djm
- Include basic build instructions and comments on commonly-used build-
- time flags, links to the manual pages and other resources.
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1524042e09d81e54c4470d7bfcc0194c5b46fe19
+
+commit bc7b5d6187de625c086b5f639b25bbad17bbabfc
+Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Nov 12 19:30:21 2019 +0000
+
+ upstream: factor out sshsk_ecdsa_inner_sig(); ok djm@
- Now in Markdown format for better viewing on github, etc.
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 07e41997b542f670a15d7e2807143fe01efef584
-commit a924de0c4908902433813ba205bee1446bd1a157
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Fri Apr 5 03:41:52 2019 +1100
+commit cef84a062db8cfeece26f067235dc440f6992c17
+Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Nov 12 19:29:54 2019 +0000
- update versions
+ upstream: factor out sshsk_ecdsa_assemble(); ok djm@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2313761a3a84ccfe032874d638d3c363e0f14026
-commit 312dcee739bca5d6878c536537b2a8a497314b75
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Apr 3 15:48:45 2019 +0000
+commit 7c096c456f33f3d2682736d4735cc10e790276e9
+Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Nov 12 19:29:24 2019 +0000
- upstream: openssh-8.0
+ upstream: implement ssh-ed25519-sk verification; ok djm@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 5aafdf218679dab982fea20771afd643be9a127b
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 37906d93948a1e3d237c20e713d6ca8fbf7d13f6
-commit 885bc114692046d55e2a170b932bdc0092fa3456
+commit ba5fb02bed1e556d0ce7b1740ae8a5f87b737491
Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Thu Apr 4 02:47:40 2019 +1100
+Date: Wed Nov 13 08:48:30 2019 +1100
- session: Do not use removed API
+ ignore ssh-sk-helper
+
+commit 78c96498947f711141f493a40d202c482cc59438
+Author: deraadt@openbsd.org <deraadt@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Nov 11 19:53:37 2019 +0000
+
+ upstream: skip demanding -fstack-protector-all on hppa. we never
- from Jakub Jelen
+ wrote a stack protector for reverse-stack architectures, and i don't think
+ anyone else did either. a warning per compiled file is just annoying.
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 14806a59353152f843eb349e618abbf6f4dd3ada
-commit 9d7b2882b0c9a5e9bf8312ce4075bf178e2b98be
+commit aa1c9e37789f999979fe59df74ce5c8424861ac8
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Mar 29 11:31:40 2019 +0000
+Date: Fri Nov 8 03:54:02 2019 +0000
- upstream: when logging/fataling on error, include a bit more detail
-
- than just the function name and the error message
+ upstream: duplicate 'x' character in getopt(3) optstring
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: dd72d7eba2215fcb89be516c378f633ea5bcca9f
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 64c81caa0cb5798de3621eca16b7dd22e5d0d8a7
-commit 79a87d32783d6c9db40af8f35e091d9d30365ae7
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Wed Apr 3 06:27:45 2019 +1100
+commit aa4c640dc362816d63584a16e786d5e314e24390
+Author: naddy@openbsd.org <naddy@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Nov 7 08:38:38 2019 +0000
- Remove "struct ssh" from sys_auth_record_login.
+ upstream: Fill in missing man page bits for U2F security key support:
- It's not needed, and is not available from the call site in loginrec.c
- Should only affect AIX, spotted by Kevin Brott.
+ Mention the new key types, the ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa_sk file, ssh's
+ SecurityKeyProvider keyword, the SSH_SK_PROVIDER environment variable,
+ and ssh-keygen's new -w and -x options.
+
+ Copy the ssh-sk-helper man page from ssh-pkcs11-helper with minimal
+ substitutions.
+
+ ok djm@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ef2e8f83d0c0ce11ad9b8c28945747e5ca337ac4
-commit 138c0d52cdc90f9895333b82fc57d81cce7a3d90
+commit b236b27d6dada7f0542214003632b4e9b7aa1380
Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Tue Apr 2 18:21:35 2019 +1100
+Date: Sun Nov 3 00:10:43 2019 +1100
- Adapt custom_failed_login to new prototype.
+ Put sftp-realpath in libssh.a
- Spotted by Kevin Brott.
+ and remove it from the specific binary targets.
-commit a0ca4009ab2f0b1007ec8ab6864dbf9b760a8ed5
+commit 382c18c20cdcec45b5d21ff25b4a5e0df91a68c4
Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Mon Apr 1 20:07:23 2019 +1100
+Date: Sun Nov 3 00:09:21 2019 +1100
- Add includes.h for compat layer.
+ statfs might be defined in sys/mount.h.
- Should fix build on AIX 7.2.
+ eg on old NetBSDs.
-commit 00991151786ce9b1d577bdad1f83a81d19c8236d
-Author: Tim Rice <tim@multitalents.net>
-Date: Sun Mar 31 22:14:22 2019 -0700
+commit 03ffc0951c305c8e3b5fdc260d65312a57f8f7ea
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Sat Nov 2 23:25:01 2019 +1100
- Stop USL compilers for erroring with "integral constant expression expected"
+ Put stdint.h inside ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H.
-commit 43f47ebbdd4037b569c23b8f4f7981f53b567f1d
-Author: Tim Rice <tim@multitalents.net>
-Date: Sun Mar 31 19:22:19 2019 -0700
+commit 19cb64c4b42d4312ce12091fd9436dbd6898998c
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Sat Nov 2 22:45:44 2019 +1100
- Only use O_NOFOLLOW in fchownat and fchmodat if defined
+ Rebuild .depend.
-commit 342d6e51589b184c337cccfc4c788b60ff8b3765
-Author: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
-Date: Fri Mar 29 12:29:41 2019 +0100
+commit 3611bfe89b92ada5914526d8ff0919aeb967cfa7
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Sat Nov 2 22:42:05 2019 +1100
- Adjust softhsm2 path on Fedora Linux for regress
+ Define __BSD_VISIBLE in fnmatch.h.
- The SoftHSM lives in Fedora in /usr/lib64/pkcs11/libsofthsm2.so
+ .. since we use symbols defined only when it is when using the compat
+ fnmatch.
-commit f5abb05f8c7358dacdcb866fe2813f6d8efd5830
+commit f5cc5816aaddb8eca3cba193f53e99d6a0b37d05
Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Thu Mar 28 09:26:14 2019 +1100
+Date: Sat Nov 2 16:39:38 2019 +1100
- Only use O_NOFOLLOW in utimensat if defined.
+ Only enable U2F if OpenSSL supports ECC.
- Fixes build on systems that don't have it (Solaris <=9) Found by
- Tom G. Christensen.
+ This requires moving the U2F bits to below the OpenSSL parts so we have
+ the required information. ok djm@
-commit 786cd4c1837fdc3fe7b4befe54a3f37db7df8715
-Author: Corinna Vinschen <vinschen@redhat.com>
-Date: Wed Mar 27 18:18:21 2019 +0100
+commit ad38406fc95fa223b0ef2edf8ff50508f8ab1cb6
+Author: naddy@openbsd.org <naddy@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Nov 1 12:10:43 2019 +0000
- drop old Cygwin considerations
-
- - Cygwin supports non-DOS characters in filenames
- - Cygwin does not support Windows XP anymore
+ upstream: fix miscellaneous text problems; ok djm@
- Signed-off-by: Corinna Vinschen <vinschen@redhat.com>
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0cbf411a14d8fa0b269b69cbb1b4fc0ca699fe9f
-commit 21da87f439b48a85b951ef1518fe85ac0273e719
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Mar 27 09:29:14 2019 +0000
+commit 9cac151c2dc76b8e5b727b2fa216f572e372170f
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Fri Nov 1 18:26:07 2019 +1100
- upstream: fix interaction between ClientAliveInterval and RekeyLimit
-
- that could cause connection to close incorrectly; Report and patch from Jakub
- Jelen in bz#2757; ok dtucker@ markus@
-
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 17229a8a65bd8e6c2080318ec2b7a61e1aede3fb
+ Add flags needed to build and work on Ultrix.
-commit 4f0019a9afdb4a94d83b75e82dbbbe0cbe826c56
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Mar 25 22:34:52 2019 +0000
+commit 0e3c5bc50907d2058407641b5a3581b7eda91b7e
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Fri Nov 1 18:24:29 2019 +1100
- upstream: Fix authentication failures when "AuthenticationMethods
-
- any" in a Match block overrides a more restrictive global default.
-
- Spotted by jmc@, ok markus@
-
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a90a4fe2ab81d0eeeb8fdfc21af81f7eabda6666
+ Hook up fnmatch for platforms that don't have it.
-commit d6e5def308610f194c0ec3ef97a34a3e9630e190
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Mar 25 22:33:44 2019 +0000
+commit b56dbfd9d967e5b6ce7be9f81f206112e19e1030
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Fri Nov 1 18:17:42 2019 +1100
- upstream: whitespace
-
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 106e853ae8a477e8385bc53824d3884a8159db07
+ Add missing bracket in realpath macro.
-commit 26e0cef07b04479537c971dec898741df1290fe5
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Mar 25 16:19:44 2019 +0000
+commit 59ccb56f15e5e530e7c1b5a0b361749d8c6217d5
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Fri Nov 1 17:32:47 2019 +1100
- upstream: Expand comment to document rationale for default key
-
- sizes. "seems worthwhile" deraadt.
-
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 72e5c0983d7da1fb72f191870f36cb58263a2456
+ Import fnmatch.c from OpenBSD.
-commit f47269ea67eb4ff87454bf0d2a03e55532786482
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Mar 25 15:49:00 2019 +0000
+commit 79d46de9fbea0f3c0e8ae7cf84effaba089071b0
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Fri Nov 1 15:22:32 2019 +1100
- upstream: Increase the default RSA key size to 3072 bits. Based on
-
- the estimates from NIST Special Publication 800-57, 3k bits provides security
- equivalent to 128 bits which is the smallest symmetric cipher we enable by
- default. ok markus@ deraadt@
-
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 461dd32ebe808f88f4fc3ec74749b0e6bef2276b
+ Use sftp_realpath if no native realpath.
-commit 62949c5b37af28d8490d94866e314a76be683a5e
-Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Mar 22 20:58:34 2019 +0000
+commit bb4f003ed8c5f61ec74a66bcedc8ab19bf5b35c4
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Fri Nov 1 15:06:16 2019 +1100
- upstream: full stop in the wrong place;
+ Configure flags for haiku from haikuports.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 478a0567c83553a2aebf95d0f1bd67ac1b1253e4
+ Should build with the default flags with ./configure
-commit 1b1332b5bb975d759a50b37f0e8bc8cfb07a0bb0
-Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sat Mar 16 19:14:21 2019 +0000
+commit 4332b4fe49360679647a8705bc08f4e81323f6b4
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Nov 1 03:54:33 2019 +0000
- upstream: benno helped me clean up the tcp forwarding section;
+ upstream: fix a race condition in the SIGCHILD handler that could turn
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d4bec27edefde636fb632b7f0b7c656b9c7b7f08
+ in to a kill(-1); bz3084, reported by Gao Rui, ok dtucker@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ac2742e04a69d4c34223505b6a32f6d686e18896
-commit 2aee9a49f668092ac5c9d34e904ef7a9722e541d
-Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Mar 8 17:24:43 2019 +0000
+commit 03f9205f0fb49ea2507eacc143737a8511ae5a4e
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Fri Nov 1 14:49:25 2019 +1100
- upstream: fix use-after-free in ssh-pkcs11; found by hshoexer w/AFL
+ conditionalise SK sign/verify on ENABLE_SK
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: febce81cca72b71f70513fbee4ff52ca050f675c
+ Spotted by Darren and his faux-Vax
-commit 9edbd7821e6837e98e7e95546cede804dac96754
+commit 5eb7b9563ff818e17de24231bf2d347d9db302c5
Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Thu Mar 14 10:17:28 2019 +1100
+Date: Fri Nov 1 14:41:07 2019 +1100
- Fix build when configured --without-openssl.
-
- ok djm@
+ Add prototype for localtime_r if needed.
-commit 825ab32f0d04a791e9d19d743c61ff8ed9b4d8e5
+commit d500b59a825f6a58f2abf7b04eb1992d81e45d58
Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Thu Mar 14 08:51:17 2019 +1100
+Date: Fri Nov 1 13:42:12 2019 +1100
- On Cygwin run sshd as SYSTEM where possible.
-
- Seteuid now creates user token using S4U. We don't create a token
- from scratch anymore, so we don't need the "Create a process token"
- privilege. The service can run under SYSTEM again...
-
- ...unless Cygwin is running on Windows Vista or Windows 7 in the
- WOW64 32 bit emulation layer. It turns out that WOW64 on these systems
- didn't implement MsV1_0 S4U Logon so we still need the fallback
- to NtCreateToken for these systems.
-
- Signed-off-by: Corinna Vinschen <vinschen@redhat.com>
+ Check if IP_TOS is defined before using.
-commit a212107bfdf4d3e870ab7a443e4d906e5b9578c3
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Wed Mar 13 10:49:16 2019 +1100
+commit 764d51e04460ec0da12e05e4777bc90c116accb9
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Fri Nov 1 13:34:49 2019 +1100
- Replace alloca with xcalloc.
+ autoconf pieces for U2F support
- The latter checks for memory exhaustion and integer overflow and may be
- at a less predictable place. Sanity check by vinschen at redhat.com, ok
- djm@
+ Mostly following existing logic for PKCS#11 - turning off support
+ when either libcrypto or dlopen(3) are unavailable.
-commit daa7505aadca68ba1a2c70cbdfce423208eb91ee
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Tue Mar 12 09:19:19 2019 +1100
+commit 45f17a159acfc5a8e450bfbcc2cffe72950ed7a3
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Nov 1 02:32:05 2019 +0000
- Use Cygwin-specific matching only for users+groups.
+ upstream: remove duplicate PUBKEY_DEFAULT_PK_ALG on !WITH_OPENSSL path
- Patch from vinschen at redhat.com, updated a little by me.
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 95a7cafad2a4665d57cabacc28031fabc0bea9fc
-commit fd10cf027b56f9aaa80c9e3844626a05066589a4
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Mar 6 22:14:23 2019 +0000
+commit db8d13f7925da7337df87248995c533e111637ec
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Nov 1 02:06:52 2019 +0000
- upstream: Move checks for lists of users or groups into their own
-
- function. This is a no-op on OpenBSD but will make things easier in
- -portable, eg on systems where these checks should be case-insensitive. ok
- djm@
+ upstream: more additional source files
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8bc9c8d98670e23f8eaaaefe29c1f98e7ba0487e
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 8eaa25fb901594aee23b76eda99dca5b8db94c6f
-commit ab5fee8eb6a011002fd9e32b1597f02aa8804a25
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Mar 6 21:06:59 2019 +0000
+commit f89c5df65dd307739ff22319c2cf847d3b0c5ab4
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Nov 1 02:04:25 2019 +0000
- upstream: Reset last-seen time when sending a keepalive. Prevents
-
- sending two keepalives successively and prematurely terminating connection
- when ClientAliveCount=1. While there, collapse two similar tests into one.
- ok markus@
+ upstream: additional source files here too
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 043670d201dfe222537a2a4bed16ce1087de5ddd
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 8809f8e1c8f7459e7096ab6b58d8e56cb2f483fd
-commit c13b74530f9f1d9df7aeae012004b31b2de4438e
-Author: naddy@openbsd.org <naddy@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Mar 5 16:17:12 2019 +0000
+commit 02275afa1ecbfbd39f27d34c97090e76bec232ec
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Nov 1 02:03:27 2019 +0000
- upstream: PKCS#11 support is no longer limited to RSA; ok benno@
-
- kn@
+ upstream: additional source files here too
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1a9bec64d530aed5f434a960e7515a3e80cbc826
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 09297e484327f911fd353489518cceaa0c1b95ce
-commit e9552d6043db7cd170ac6ba1b4d2c7a5eb2c3201
+commit dfc8f01b9886c7999e6e20acf3f7492cb8c80796
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Mar 1 03:29:32 2019 +0000
+Date: Fri Nov 1 01:57:59 2019 +0000
- upstream: in ssh_set_newkeys(), mention the direction that we're
+ upstream: adapt to extra sshkey_sign() argument and additional
- keying in debug messages. Previously it would be difficult to tell which
- direction it was talking about
+ dependencies
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c2b71bfcceb2a7389b9d0b497fb2122a406a522d
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 7a25604968486c4d6f81d06e8fbc7d17519de50e
-commit 76a24b3fa193a9ca3e47a8779d497cb06500798b
+commit afa59e26eeb44a93f36f043f60b936eaddae77c4
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Mar 1 02:32:39 2019 +0000
+Date: Fri Nov 1 01:55:41 2019 +0000
- upstream: Fix two race conditions in sshd relating to SIGHUP:
-
- 1. Recently-forked child processes will briefly remain listening to
- listen_socks. If the main server sshd process completes its restart
- via execv() before these sockets are closed by the child processes
- then it can fail to listen at the desired addresses/ports and/or
- fail to restart.
+ upstream: skip security-key key types for tests until we have a
- 2. When a SIGHUP is received, there may be forked child processes that
- are awaiting their reexecution state. If the main server sshd
- process restarts before passing this state, these child processes
- will yield errors and use a fallback path of reading the current
- sshd_config from the filesystem rather than use the one that sshd
- was started with.
-
- To fix both of these cases, we reuse the startup_pipes that are shared
- between the main server sshd and forked children. Previously this was
- used solely to implement tracking of pre-auth child processes for
- MaxStartups, but this extends the messaging over these pipes to include
- a child->parent message that the parent process is safe to restart. This
- message is sent from the child after it has completed its preliminaries:
- closing listen_socks and receiving its reexec state.
+ dummy U2F middleware to use.
- bz#2953, reported by Michal Koutný; ok markus@ dtucker@
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 37200462b44334a4ad45e6a1f7ad1bd717521a95
+
+commit de871e4daf346a712c78fa4ab8f18b231a47cb85
+Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Nov 1 00:52:35 2019 +0000
+
+ upstream: sort;
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7df09eacfa3ce13e9a7b1e9f17276ecc924d65ab
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8264b0be01ec5a60602bd50fd49cc3c81162ea16
-commit de817e9dfab99473017d28cdf69e60397d00ea21
+commit 2aae149a34b1b5dfbef423d3b7999a96818969bb
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Mar 1 02:16:47 2019 +0000
+Date: Thu Oct 31 21:37:33 2019 +0000
- upstream: mention PKCS11Provide=none, reword a little and remove
-
- mention of RSA keys only (since we support ECDSA now and might support others
- in the future). Inspired by Jakub Jelen via bz#2974
+ upstream: undo debugging bits that shouldn't have been committed
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a92e3686561bf624ccc64ab320c96c9e9a263aa5
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4bd5551b306df55379afe17d841207990eb773bf
-commit 95a8058c1a90a27acbb91392ba206854abc85226
+commit 3420e0464bd0e8fedcfa5fd20ad37bdc740ad5b4
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Fri Nov 1 09:24:58 2019 +1100
+
+ depend
+
+commit b923a90abc7bccb11a513dc8b5c0f13a0ea9682c
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Mar 1 02:08:50 2019 +0000
+Date: Thu Oct 31 21:28:27 2019 +0000
- upstream: let PKCS11Provider=none do what users expect
-
- print PKCS11Provider instead of obsolete SmartcardDevice in config dump.
-
- bz#2974 ok dtucker@
+ upstream: fix -Wshadow warning
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c303d6f0230a33aa2dd92dc9b68843d56a64f846
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 3441eb04f872a00c2483c11a5f1570dfe775103c
-commit 8e7bac35aa576d2fd7560836da83733e864ce649
-Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Feb 27 19:37:01 2019 +0000
+commit 9a14c64c38fc14d0029f1c7bc70cf62cc7f0fdf9
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Oct 31 21:23:19 2019 +0000
- upstream: dup stdout/in for proxycommand=-, otherwise stdout might
+ upstream: Refactor signing - use sshkey_sign for everything,
- be redirected to /dev/null; ok djm@
+ including the new U2F signatures.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 97dfce4c47ed4055042de8ebde85b7d88793e595
+ Don't use sshsk_ecdsa_sign() directly, instead make it reachable via
+ sshkey_sign() like all other signature operations. This means that
+ we need to add a provider argument to sshkey_sign(), so most of this
+ change is mechanically adding that.
+
+ Suggested by / ok markus@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d5193a03fcfa895085d91b2b83d984a9fde76c8c
-commit 9b61130fbd95d196bce81ebeca94a4cb7c0d5ba0
+commit 07da39f71d36fb547749a5b16aa8892e621a7e4a
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sat Feb 23 08:20:43 2019 +0000
+Date: Thu Oct 31 21:22:01 2019 +0000
- upstream: openssh-7.9 accidentally reused the server's algorithm lists
-
- in the client for KEX, ciphers and MACs. The ciphers and MACs were identical
- between the client and server, but the error accidentially disabled the
- diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1 KEX method.
-
- This fixes the client code to use the correct method list, but
- because nobody complained, it also disables the
- diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1 KEX method.
+ upstream: ssh-agent support for U2F/FIDO keys
- Reported by nuxi AT vault24.org via bz#2697; ok dtucker
+ feedback & ok markus@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e30c33a23c10fd536fefa120e86af1842e33fd57
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: bb544a44bc32e45d2ec8bf652db2046f38360acb
-commit 37638c752041d591371900df820f070037878a2d
-Author: Corinna Vinschen <vinschen@redhat.com>
-Date: Wed Feb 20 13:41:25 2019 +0100
+commit eebec620c9519c4839d781c4d5b6082152998f82
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Oct 31 21:20:38 2019 +0000
- Cygwin: implement case-insensitive Unicode user and group name matching
+ upstream: ssh AddKeysToAgent support for U2F/FIDO keys
- The previous revert enabled case-insensitive user names again. This
- patch implements the case-insensitive user and group name matching.
- To allow Unicode chars, implement the matcher using wchar_t chars in
- Cygwin-specific code. Keep the generic code changes as small as possible.
- Cygwin: implement case-insensitive Unicode user and group name matching
+ feedback & ok markus@
- Signed-off-by: Corinna Vinschen <vinschen@redhat.com>
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ac08e45c7f995fa71f8d661b3f582e38cc0a2f91
-commit bed1d43698807a07bb4ddb93a46b0bd84b9970b3
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Fri Feb 22 15:21:21 2019 +1100
+commit 486164d060314a7f8bca2a00f53be9e900c5e74d
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Oct 31 21:19:56 2019 +0000
- Revert unintended parts of previous commit.
+ upstream: ssh-add support for U2F/FIDO keys
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7f88a5181c982687afedf3130c6ab2bba60f7644
-commit f02afa350afac1b2f2d1413259a27a4ba1e2ca24
-Author: Corinna Vinschen <vinschen@redhat.com>
-Date: Wed Feb 20 13:41:24 2019 +0100
+commit b9dd14d3091e31fb836f69873d3aa622eb7b4a1c
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Oct 31 21:19:14 2019 +0000
- Revert "[auth.c] On Cygwin, refuse usernames that have differences in case"
+ upstream: add new agent key constraint for U2F/FIDO provider
- This reverts commit acc9b29486dfd649dfda474e5c1a03b317449f1c.
+ feedback & ok markus@
- Signed-off-by: Corinna Vinschen <vinschen@redhat.com>
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d880c380170704280b4003860a1744d286c7a172
-commit 4c55b674835478eb80a1a7aeae588aa654e2a433
-Author: Corinna Vinschen <vinschen@redhat.com>
-Date: Sat Feb 16 14:13:43 2019 +0100
+commit 884416bdb10468f1252e4d7c13d51b43dccba7f6
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Oct 31 21:18:28 2019 +0000
- Add tags to .gitignore
+ upstream: ssh client support for U2F/FIDO keys
- Signed-off-by: Corinna Vinschen <vinschen@redhat.com>
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: eb2cfa6cf7419a1895e06e398ea6d41516c5b0bc
-commit 625b62634c33eaef4b80d07529954fe5c6435fe5
+commit 01a0670f69c5b86e471e033b92145d6c7cc77c58
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Feb 22 03:37:11 2019 +0000
+Date: Thu Oct 31 21:17:49 2019 +0000
- upstream: perform removal of agent-forwarding directory in forward
+ upstream: Separate myproposal.h userauth pubkey types
- setup error path with user's privileged. This is a no-op as this code always
- runs with user privilege now that we no longer support running sshd with
- privilege separation disabled, but as long as the privsep skeleton is there
- we should follow the rules.
- MIME-Version: 1.0
- Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
- Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+ U2F/FIDO keys are not supported for host authentication, so we need
+ a separate list for user keys.
- bz#2969 with patch from Erik Sjölund
+ feedback & ok markus@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2b708401a5a8d6133c865d7698d9852210dca846
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7fe2e6ab85f9f2338866e5af8ca2d312abbf0429
-commit d9ecfaba0b2f1887d20e4368230632e709ca83be
-Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Feb 18 07:02:34 2019 +0000
+commit 23f38c2d8cda3fad24e214e1f0133c42435b54ee
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Oct 31 21:17:09 2019 +0000
- upstream: sync the description of ~/.ssh/config with djm's updated
-
- description in ssh.1; issue pointed out by andreas kahari
-
- ok dtucker djm
+ upstream: ssh-keygen support for generating U2F/FIDO keys
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1b01ef0ae2c6328165150badae317ec92e52b01c
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 6ce04f2b497ac9dd8c327f76f1e6c724fb1d1b37
-commit 38e83e4f219c752ebb1560633b73f06f0392018b
+commit ed3467c1e16b7396ff7fcf12d2769261512935ec
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Feb 12 23:53:10 2019 +0000
+Date: Thu Oct 31 21:16:20 2019 +0000
- upstream: fix regression in r1.302 reported by naddy@ - only the first
+ upstream: U2F/FIDO middleware interface
- public key from the agent was being attempted for use.
+ Supports enrolling (generating) keys and signatures.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 07116aea521a04888718b2157f1ca723b2f46c8d
+ feedback & ok markus@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 73d1dd5939454f9c7bd840f48236cba41e8ad592
-commit 5c68ea8da790d711e6dd5f4c30d089c54032c59a
+commit 02bb0768a937e50bbb236efc2bbdddb1991b1c85
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Feb 11 09:44:42 2019 +0000
+Date: Thu Oct 31 21:15:14 2019 +0000
- upstream: cleanup GSSAPI authentication context after completion of the
+ upstream: Initial infrastructure for U2F/FIDO support
- authmethod. Move function-static GSSAPI state to the client Authctxt
- structure. Make static a bunch of functions that aren't used outside this
- file.
+ Key library support: including allocation, marshalling public/private
+ keys and certificates, signature validation.
- Based on patch from Markus Schmidt <markus@blueflash.cc>; ok markus@
+ feedback & ok markus@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 497fb792c0ddb4f1ba631b6eed526861f115dbe5
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a17615ba15e0f7932ac4360cb18fc9a9544e68c7
-commit a8c807f1956f81a92a758d3d0237d0ff06d0be5d
-Author: benno@openbsd.org <benno@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sun Feb 10 16:35:41 2019 +0000
-
- upstream: ssh-keygen -D pkcs11.so needs to initialize pkcs11
-
- interactive, so it can ask for the smartcards PIN. ok markus@
-
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1be7ccf88f1876e0fc4d7c9b3f96019ac5655bab
-
-commit 3d896c157c722bc47adca51a58dca859225b5874
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sun Feb 10 11:15:52 2019 +0000
-
- upstream: when checking that filenames sent by the server side
-
- match what the client requested, be prepared to handle shell-style brace
- alternations, e.g. "{foo,bar}".
-
- "looks good to me" millert@ + in snaps for the last week courtesy
- deraadt@
-
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 3b1ce7639b0b25b2248e3a30f561a548f6815f3e
-
-commit 318e4f8548a4f5c0c913f61e27d4fc21ffb1eaae
+commit 57ecc10628b04c384cbba2fbc87d38b74cd1199d
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sun Feb 10 11:10:57 2019 +0000
+Date: Thu Oct 31 21:14:17 2019 +0000
- upstream: syslog when connection is dropped for attempting to run a
-
- command when ForceCommand=internal-sftp is in effect; bz2960; ok dtucker@
+ upstream: Protocol documentation for U2F/FIDO keys in OpenSSH
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8c87fa66d7fc6c0fffa3a3c28e8ab5e8dde234b8
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8f3247317c2909870593aeb306dff848bc427915
-commit 2ff2e19653b8c0798b8b8eff209651bdb1be2761
+commit f4fdcd2b7a2bbf5d8770d44565173ca5158d4dcb
Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Fri Feb 8 14:53:35 2019 +1100
+Date: Fri Nov 1 08:36:16 2019 +1100
- don't set $MAIL if UsePam=yes
-
- PAM typically specifies the user environment if it's enabled, so don't
- second guess. bz#2937; ok dtucker@
+ Missing unit test files
-commit 03e92dd27d491fe6d1a54e7b2f44ef1b0a916e52
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Fri Feb 8 14:50:36 2019 +1100
+commit 1bcd1169c5221688418fa38606e9c69055b72451
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Tue Oct 29 19:45:03 2019 +1100
- use same close logic for stderr as stdout
-
- Avoids sending SIGPIPE to child processes after their parent exits
- if they attempt to write to stderr.
-
- Analysis and patch from JD Paul; patch reworked by Jakub Jelen and
- myself. bz#2071; ok dtucker@
+ Add implementation of localtime_r.
-commit 8c53d409baeeaf652c0c125a9b164edc9dbeb6de
+commit 2046ed16c1202431b0307674c33a123a113e8297
Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Feb 5 11:35:56 2019 +0000
+Date: Tue Oct 29 07:47:27 2019 +0000
- upstream: Adapt code in the non-USE_PIPES codepath to the new packet
+ upstream: Signal handler cleanup: remove leftover support for
- API. This code is not normally reachable since USE_PIPES is always defined.
- bz#2961, patch from adrian.fita at gmail com.
+ unreliable signals and now-unneeded save and restore of errno. ok deraadt@
+ markus@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8d8428d678d1d5eb4bb21921df34e8173e6d238a
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 01dd8a1ebdd991c8629ba1f5237283341a93cd88
-commit 7a7fdca78de4b4774950be056099e579ef595414
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Feb 4 23:37:54 2019 +0000
+commit 70fc9a6ca4dd33cb2dd400a4dad5db9683a3d284
+Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Oct 22 08:50:35 2019 +0000
- upstream: fix NULL-deref crash in PKCS#11 code when attempting
-
- login to a token requiring a PIN; reported by benno@ fix mostly by markus@
+ upstream: fixes from lucas;
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 438d0b114b1b4ba25a9869733db1921209aa9a31
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4c4bfd2806c5bbc753788ffe19c5ee13aaf418b2
-commit cac302a4b42a988e54d32eb254b29b79b648dbf5
+commit 702368aa4381c3b482368257ac574a87b5a80938
Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Feb 4 02:39:42 2019 +0000
+Date: Tue Oct 22 07:06:35 2019 +0000
- upstream: Remove obsolete "Protocol" from commented out examples. Patch
-
- from samy.mahmoudi at gmail com.
+ upstream: Import regenerated moduli file.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 16aede33dae299725a03abdac5dcb4d73f5d0cbf
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 58ec755be4e51978ecfee73539090eb68652a987
-commit 483b3b638500fd498b4b529356e5a0e18cf76891
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Feb 1 03:52:23 2019 +0000
+commit 5fe81da22652f8caa63e9e3a1af519a85d36337e
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Mon Oct 28 21:19:47 2019 +1100
- upstream: Save connection timeout and restore for 2nd and
-
- subsequent attempts, preventing them from having no timeout. bz#2918, ok
- djm@
-
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4977f1d0521d9b6bba0c9a20d3d226cefac48292
+ Fix ifdefs to not mask needed bits.
-commit 5f004620fdc1b2108139300ee12f4014530fb559
-Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Jan 30 19:51:15 2019 +0000
+commit 7694e9d2fb5785bbdd0920dce7a160bd79feaf00
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Mon Oct 28 17:05:36 2019 +1100
- upstream: Add authors for public domain sntrup4591761 code;
-
- confirmed by Daniel J. Bernstein
-
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b4621f22b8b8ef13e063c852af5e54dbbfa413c1
+ Only use RLIMIT_NOFILE if it's defined.
-commit 2c21b75a7be6ebdcbceaebb43157c48dbb36f3d8
-Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sun Jan 27 07:14:11 2019 +0000
+commit d561b0b2fa2531b4cc3bc70a7d657c6485c9fd0b
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Mon Oct 28 16:09:04 2019 +1100
- upstream: add -T to usage();
-
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a7ae14d9436c64e1bd05022329187ea3a0ce1899
+ Make sure we have struct statfs before using.
-commit 19a0f0529d3df04118da829528cac7ceff380b24
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Jan 28 03:50:39 2019 +0000
+commit 2912596aecfcf48e5115c7a906d1e664f7717a4b
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Mon Oct 28 16:06:59 2019 +1100
- upstream: The test sshd_config in in $OBJ.
-
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 1e5d908a286d8e7de3a15a0020c8857f3a7c9172
+ Define UINT32_MAX if needed.
-commit 8fe25440206319d15b52d12b948a5dfdec14dca3
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Jan 28 03:28:10 2019 +0000
+commit 7169e31121e8c8cc729b55154deb722ae495b316
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Mon Oct 28 16:00:45 2019 +1100
- upstream: Remove leftover debugging.
+ Move utimensat definition into timespec section.
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 3d86c3d4867e46b35af3fd2ac8c96df0ffdcfeb9
+ Since utimensat uses struct timespec, move it to the section where we
+ define struct timespec when needed.
-commit e30d32364d12c351eec9e14be6c61116f9d6cc90
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Jan 28 00:12:36 2019 +0000
+commit 850ec1773d656cbff44d78a79e369dc262ce5853
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Mon Oct 28 15:57:22 2019 +1100
- upstream: Enable ssh-dss for the agent test. Disable it for the
-
- certificate test.
-
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 388c1e03e1def539d350f139b37d69f12334668d
+ Wrap OpenSSL bits in WITH_OPENSSL.
-commit ffdde469ed56249f5dc8af98da468dde35531398
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Jan 28 00:08:26 2019 +0000
+commit 6fc7e1c6fec3ba589869ae98e968c0e5e2e4695b
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Mon Oct 28 15:53:25 2019 +1100
- upstream: Count the number of key types instead of assuming there
-
- are only two.
-
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 0998702c41235782cf0beee396ec49b5056eaed9
+ Wrap poll.h includes in HAVE_POLL_H.
-commit 1d05b4adcba08ab068466e5c08dee2f5417ec53a
-Author: Corinna Vinschen <vinschen@redhat.com>
-Date: Sat Jan 26 23:42:40 2019 +0100
+commit 9239a18f96905cc1a353e861e33af093652f24e7
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Thu Oct 24 14:39:49 2019 +1100
- Cygwin: only tweak sshd_config file if it's new, drop creating sshd user
+ Add a function call stackprotector tests.
- The sshd_config tweaks were executed even if the old file was
- still in place. Fix that. Also disable sshd user creation.
- It's not used on Cygwin.
+ Including a function call in the test programs for the gcc stack
+ protector flag tests exercises more of the compiler and makes it more
+ likely it'll detect problems.
-commit 89843de0c4c733501f6b4f988098e6e06963df37
-Author: Corinna Vinschen <vinschen@redhat.com>
-Date: Sat Jan 26 23:03:12 2019 +0100
+commit b9705393be4612fd5e29d0cd8e7cf2b66ed19eb7
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Tue Oct 22 18:09:22 2019 +1100
- Cygwin: Change service name to cygsshd
-
- Microsoft hijacked the sshd service name without asking.
+ Import regenerated moduli file.
-commit 2a9b3a2ce411d16cda9c79ab713c55f65b0ec257
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sun Jan 27 06:30:53 2019 +0000
+commit 76ed2199491397e0f9902ade80d5271e4a9b2630
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Oct 16 06:05:39 2019 +0000
- upstream: Generate all key supported key types and enable for keyscan
+ upstream: potential NULL dereference for revoked hostkeys; reported
- test.
+ by krishnaiah bommu
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 72f72ff49946c61bc949e1692dd9e3d71370891b
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 35ff685e7cc9dd2e3fe2e3dfcdcb9bc5c79f6506
-commit 391ffc4b9d31fa1f4ad566499fef9176ff8a07dc
+commit 6500c3bc71bf4fe14972c1177e6b93f1164d07a4
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sat Jan 26 22:41:28 2019 +0000
+Date: Wed Oct 16 06:03:30 2019 +0000
- upstream: check in scp client that filenames sent during
-
- remote->local directory copies satisfy the wildcard specified by the user.
-
- This checking provides some protection against a malicious server
- sending unexpected filenames, but it comes at a risk of rejecting wanted
- files due to differences between client and server wildcard expansion rules.
-
- For this reason, this also adds a new -T flag to disable the check.
-
- reported by Harry Sintonen
- fix approach suggested by markus@;
- has been in snaps for ~1wk courtesy deraadt@
+ upstream: free buf before return; reported by krishnaiah bommu
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 00f44b50d2be8e321973f3c6d014260f8f7a8eda
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 091bb23a6e913af5d4f72c50030b53ce1cef4de1
-commit c2c18a39683db382a15b438632afab3f551d50ce
+commit d7d116b6d9e6cb79cc235e9801caa683d3db3181
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sat Jan 26 22:35:01 2019 +0000
+Date: Mon Oct 14 06:00:02 2019 +0000
- upstream: make ssh-keyscan return a non-zero exit status if it
-
- finds no keys. bz#2903
+ upstream: memleak in error path; spotted by oss-fuzz, ok markus@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 89f1081fb81d950ebb48e6e73d21807b2723d488
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d6ed260cbbc297ab157ad63931802fb1ef7a4266
-commit 05b9a466700b44d49492edc2aa415fc2e8913dfe
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Jan 24 17:00:29 2019 +0000
+commit 9b9e3ca6945351eefb821ff783a4a8e6d9b98b9a
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Fri Oct 11 14:12:16 2019 +1100
- upstream: Accept the host key fingerprint as a synonym for "yes"
-
- when accepting an unknown host key. This allows you to paste a fingerprint
- obtained out of band into the yes/no prompt and have the client do the
- comparison for you. ok markus@ djm@
+ Re-add SA_RESTART to mysignal.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 3c47d10b9f43d3d345e044fd9ec09709583a2767
+ This makes mysignal implement reliable BSD semantics according to
+ Stevens' APUE. This was first attempted in 2001 but was reverted
+ due to problems with HP-UX 10.20 and select() and possibly grantpt().
+ Modern systems should be fine with it, but if any current platforms have
+ a problem with it now we can disable it just for those. ok djm@
-commit bdc6c63c80b55bcbaa66b5fde31c1cb1d09a41eb
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Jan 24 16:52:17 2019 +0000
+commit 0bd312a362168c1eae3cd6b3889395a78e6fd0f8
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Thu Oct 10 09:42:03 2019 +1100
- upstream: Have progressmeter force an update at the beginning and
+ Fix ifdef typo for declaration of memmem.
- end of each transfer. Fixes the problem recently introduces where very quick
- transfers do not display the progressmeter at all. Spotted by naddy@
+ Fixes build on IRIX. bz#3081.
+
+commit 01ce1cd402d5eecde2bba35b67e08f5b266b37fd
+Author: Abhishek Arya <inferno@chromium.org>
+Date: Tue Oct 8 20:19:18 2019 -0700
+
+ Update README.md
+
+commit 1ba130ac8fb2884307f658126f04578f8aef409e
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Wed Oct 9 13:49:35 2019 +1100
+
+ add a fuzzer for private key parsing
+
+commit cdf1d0a9f5d18535e0a18ff34860e81a6d83aa5c
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Wed Oct 9 11:31:03 2019 +1100
+
+ prepare for 8.1 release
+
+commit 3b4e56d740b74324e2d7542957cad5a11518f455
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Oct 9 00:04:57 2019 +0000
+
+ upstream: openssh-8.1
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 68dc46c259e8fdd4f5db3ec2a130f8e4590a7a9a
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 3356bb34e2aa287f0e6d6773c9ae659dc680147d
-commit 258e6ca003e47f944688ad8b8de087b58a7d966c
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Jan 24 02:42:23 2019 +0000
+commit 29e0ecd9b4eb3b9f305e2240351f0c59cad9ef81
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Oct 9 00:04:42 2019 +0000
- upstream: Check for both EAGAIN and EWOULDBLOCK. This is a no-op
+ upstream: fix an unreachable integer overflow similar to the XMSS
- in OpenBSD (they are the same value) but makes things easier in -portable
- where they may be distinct values. "sigh ok" deraadt@
+ case, and some other NULL dereferences found by fuzzing.
- (ID sync only, portable already had this change).
+ fix with and ok markus@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 91f2bc7c0ecec905915ed59fa37feb9cc90e17d7
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0f81adbb95ef887ce586953e1cb225fa45c7a47b
-commit 281ce042579b834cdc1e74314f1fb2eeb75d2612
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Jan 24 02:34:52 2019 +0000
+commit a546b17bbaeb12beac4c9aeed56f74a42b18a93a
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Oct 9 00:02:57 2019 +0000
- upstream: Always initialize 2nd arg to hpdelim2. It populates that
+ upstream: fix integer overflow in XMSS private key parsing.
- *ONLY IF* there's a delimiter. If there's not (the common case) it checked
- uninitialized memory, which usually passed, but if not would cause spurious
- failures when the uninitialized memory happens to contain "/". ok deraadt.
+ Reported by Adam Zabrocki via SecuriTeam's SSH program.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4291611eaf2a53d4c92f4a57c7f267c9f944e0d3
-
-commit d05ea255678d9402beda4416cd0360f3e5dfe938
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Jan 23 21:50:56 2019 +0000
-
- upstream: Remove support for obsolete host/port syntax.
+ Note that this code is experimental and not compiled by default.
- host/port was added in 2001 as an alternative to host:port syntax for
- the benefit of IPv6 users. These days there are establised standards
- for this like [::1]:22 and the slash syntax is easily mistaken for CIDR
- notation, which OpenSSH now supports for some things. Remove the slash
- notation from ListenAddress and PermitOpen. bz#2335, patch from jjelen
- at redhat.com, ok markus@
+ ok markus@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: fae5f4e23c51a368d6b2d98376069ac2b10ad4b7
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: cd0361896d15e8a1bac495ac583ff065ffca2be1
-commit 177d6c80c557a5e060cd343a0c116a2f1a7f43db
+commit c2cc25480ba36ab48c1a577bebb12493865aad87
Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Jan 23 20:48:52 2019 +0000
+Date: Tue Oct 8 22:40:39 2019 +0000
- upstream: Remove duplicate word. bz#2958, patch from jjelen at
+ upstream: Correct type for end-of-list sentinel; fixes initializer
- redhat.com
-
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: cca3965a8333f2b6aae48b79ec1d72f7a830dd2c
-
-commit be3e6cba95dffe5fcf190c713525b48c837e7875
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Jan 23 09:49:00 2019 +0000
-
- upstream: Remove 3 as a guess for possible generator during moduli
-
- generation. It's not mentioned in RFC4419 and it's not possible for
- Sophie-Germain primes greater than 5. bz#2330, from Christian Wittenhorst ,
- ok djm@ tb@
-
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1467652e6802ad3333b0959282d8d49dfe22c8cd
-
-commit 8976f1c4b2721c26e878151f52bdf346dfe2d54c
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Jan 23 08:01:46 2019 +0000
-
- upstream: Sanitize scp filenames via snmprintf. To do this we move
-
- the progressmeter formatting outside of signal handler context and have the
- atomicio callback called for EINTR too. bz#2434 with contributions from djm
- and jjelen at redhat.com, ok djm@
+ warnings on some platforms. ok deraadt.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1af61c1f70e4f3bd8ab140b9f1fa699481db57d8
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a990dbc2dac25bdfa07e79321349c73fd991efa2
-commit 6249451f381755f792c6b9e2c2f80cdc699c14e2
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Thu Jan 24 10:00:20 2019 +1100
+commit e827aedf8818e75c0016b47ed8fc231427457c43
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Oct 7 23:10:38 2019 +0000
- For broken read/readv comparisons, poll(RW).
+ upstream: reversed test yielded incorrect debug message
- In the cases where we can't compare to read or readv function pointers
- for some reason we currently ifdef out the poll() used to block while
- waiting for reads or writes, falling back to busy waiting. This restores
- the poll() in this case, but has it always check for read or write,
- removing an inline ifdef in the process.
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 78bb512d04cfc238adb2c5b7504ac93eecf523b3
-commit 5cb503dff4db251520e8bf7d23b9c97c06eee031
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Thu Jan 24 09:55:16 2019 +1100
+commit 8ca491d29fbe26e5909ce22b344c0a848dc28d55
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Tue Oct 8 17:05:57 2019 +1100
- Include unistd.h for strmode().
+ depend
-commit f236ca2741f29b5c443c0b2db3aa9afb9ad9befe
+commit 86a0323374cbd404629e75bb320b3fa1c16aaa6b
Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Thu Jan 24 09:50:58 2019 +1100
-
- Also undef SIMPLEQ_FOREACH_SAFE.
-
- Prevents macro redefinition warning on at least NetBSD 6.1.
-
-commit be063945e4e7d46b1734d973bf244c350fae172a
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Jan 23 04:51:02 2019 +0000
+Date: Wed Oct 9 09:36:06 2019 +1100
- upstream: allow auto-incrementing certificate serial number for certs
-
- signed in a single commandline.
+ Make MAKE_CLONE no-op macro more correct.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 39881087641efb8cd83c7ec13b9c98280633f45b
+ Similar to the previous change to DEF_WEAK, some compilers don't like
+ the empty statement, so convert into a no-op function prototype.
-commit 851f80328931975fe68f71af363c4537cb896da2
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Jan 23 04:16:22 2019 +0000
+commit cfc1897a2002ec6c4dc879b24e8b3153c87ea2cf
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Wed Oct 9 09:06:35 2019 +1100
- upstream: move a bunch of global flag variables to main(); make the
+ wrap stdint.h include in HAVE_STDINT_H
- rest static
+ make the indenting a little more consistent too..
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: fa431d92584e81fe99f95882f4c56b43fe3242dc
+ Fixes Solaris 2.6; reported by Tom G. Christensen
-commit 2265402dc7d701a9aca9f8a7b7b0fd45b65c479f
+commit 13b3369830a43b89a503915216a23816d1b25744
Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Wed Jan 23 13:03:16 2019 +1100
+Date: Tue Oct 8 15:32:02 2019 +1100
- depend
+ avoid "return (value)" in void-declared function
+
+ spotted by Tim Rice; ok dtucker
-commit 2c223878e53cc46def760add459f5f7c4fb43e35
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Jan 23 02:01:10 2019 +0000
+commit 0c7f8d2326d812b371f7afd63aff846973ec80a4
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Tue Oct 8 14:44:50 2019 +1100
- upstream: switch mainloop from select(2) to poll(2); ok deraadt@
+ Make DEF_WEAK more likely to be correct.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 37645419a330037d297f6f0adc3b3663e7ae7b2e
+ Completely nop-ing out DEF_WEAK leaves an empty statemment which some
+ compilers don't like. Replace with a no-op function template. ok djm@
-commit bb956eaa94757ad058ff43631c3a7d6c94d38c2f
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Jan 23 00:30:41 2019 +0000
+commit b1e79ea8fae9c252399677a28707661d85c7d00c
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sun Oct 6 11:49:50 2019 +0000
- upstream: pass most arguments to the KEX hash functions as sshbuf
+ upstream: Instead of running sed over the whole log to remove CRs,
- rather than pointer+length; ok markus@
+ remove them only where it's needed (and confuses test(1) on at least OS X in
+ portable).
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ef0c89c52ccc89817a13a5205725148a28492bf7
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: a6ab9b4bd1d33770feaf01b2dfb96f9e4189d2d0
-commit d691588b8e29622c66abf8932362b522cf7f4051
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Jan 22 22:58:50 2019 +0000
+commit 8dc7d6b75a7f746fdd056acd41dffc0a13557a4c
+Author: Eduardo Barretto <ebarretto@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
+Date: Tue May 9 13:33:30 2017 -0300
- upstream: backoff reading messages from active connections when the
+ Enable specific ioctl call for EP11 crypto card (s390)
- input buffer is too full to read one, or if the output buffer is too full to
- enqueue a response; feedback & ok dtucker@
+ The EP11 crypto card needs to make an ioctl call, which receives an
+ specific argument. This crypto card is for s390 only.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: df3c5b6d57c968975875de40d8955cbfed05a6c8
+ Signed-off-by: Eduardo Barretto <ebarretto@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
-commit f99ef8de967949a1fc25a5c28263ea32736e5943
+commit 07f2c7f34951c04d2cd796ac6c80e47c56c4969e
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Jan 22 20:48:01 2019 +0000
+Date: Fri Oct 4 04:31:59 2019 +0000
- upstream: add -m to usage(); reminded by jmc@
+ upstream: fix memory leak in error path; bz#3074 patch from
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: bca476a5236e8f94210290b3e6a507af0434613e
+ krishnaiah.bommu@intel.com, ok dtucker
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d031853f3ecf47b35a0669588f4d9d8e3b307b3c
-commit 41923ce06ac149453debe472238e0cca7d5a2e5f
+commit b7fbc75e119170f4d15c94a7fda4a1050e0871d6
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Jan 22 12:03:58 2019 +0000
+Date: Fri Oct 4 04:13:39 2019 +0000
- upstream: Correct some bugs in PKCS#11 token PIN handling at
-
- initial login, the attempt at reading the PIN could be skipped in some cases
- especially on devices with integrated PIN readers.
-
- based on patch from Daniel Kucera in bz#2652; ok markus@
+ upstream: space
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: fad70a61c60610afe8bb0db538c90e343e75e58e
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 350648bcf00a2454e7ef998b7d88e42552b348ac
-commit 2162171ad517501ba511fa9f8191945d01857bb4
+commit 643ab68c79ac1644f4a31e36928c2bfc8a51db3c
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Jan 22 12:00:50 2019 +0000
+Date: Fri Oct 4 03:39:19 2019 +0000
- upstream: Support keys that set the CKA_ALWAYS_AUTHENTICATE by
+ upstream: more sshsig regress tests: check key revocation, the
- requring a fresh login after the C_SignInit operation.
+ check-novalidate signature test mode and signing keys in ssh-agent.
- based on patch from Jakub Jelen in bz#2638; ok markus
+ From Sebastian Kinne (slightly tweaked)
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a76e66996ba7c0923b46b74d46d499b811786661
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: b39566f5cec70140674658cdcedf38752a52e2e2
-commit 7a2cb18a215b2cb335da3dc99489c52a91f4925b
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Jan 22 11:51:25 2019 +0000
+commit 714031a10bbe378a395a93cf1040f4ee1451f45f
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Oct 4 03:26:58 2019 +0000
- upstream: Mention that configuration for the destination host is
+ upstream: Check for gmtime failure in moduli generation. Based on
- not applied to any ProxyJump/-J hosts. This has confused a few people...
+ patch from krishnaiah.bommu@intel.com, ok djm@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 03f4f641df6ca236c1bfc69836a256b873db868b
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4c6a4cde0022188ac83737de08da0e875704eeaa
-commit ecd2f33cb772db4fa76776543599f1c1ab6f9fa0
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Jan 22 11:40:42 2019 +0000
+commit 6918974405cc28ed977f802fd97a9c9a9b2e141b
+Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Oct 3 17:07:50 2019 +0000
- upstream: Include -m in the synopsis for a few more commands that
-
- support it
+ upstream: use a more common options order in SYNOPSIS and sync
- Be more explicit in the description of -m about where it may be used
+ usage(); while here, no need for Bk/Ek;
- Prompted by Jakub Jelen in bz2904
+ ok dtucker
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 3b398ac5e05d8a6356710d0ff114536c9d71046c
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 38715c3f10b166f599a2283eb7bc14860211bb90
-commit ff5d2cf4ca373bb4002eef395ed2cbe2ff0826c1
+commit feff96b7d4c0b99307f0459cbff128aede4a8984
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Jan 22 11:26:16 2019 +0000
+Date: Wed Oct 2 09:50:50 2019 +0000
- upstream: print the full pubkey being attempted at loglevel >=
+ upstream: thinko in previous; spotted by Mantas
- debug2; bz2939
+ =?UTF-8?q?=20Mikul=C4=97nas?=
+ MIME-Version: 1.0
+ Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+ Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ac0fe5ca1429ebf4d460bad602adc96de0d7e290
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ffa3f5a45e09752fc47d9041e2203ee2ec15b24d
-commit 180b520e2bab33b566b4b0cbac7d5f9940935011
+commit b5a89eec410967d6b712665f8cf0cb632928d74b
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Jan 22 11:19:42 2019 +0000
+Date: Wed Oct 2 08:07:13 2019 +0000
- upstream: clarify: ssh-keygen -e only writes public keys, never
+ upstream: make signature format match PROTOCO
- private
+ =?UTF-8?q?=20as=20a=20string,=20not=20raw=20bytes.=20Spotted=20by=20Manta?=
+ =?UTF-8?q?s=20Mikul=C4=97nas?=
+ MIME-Version: 1.0
+ Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+ Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7de7ff6d274d82febf9feb641e2415ffd6a30bfb
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 80fcc6d52893f80c6de2bedd65353cebfebcfa8f
-commit c45616a199c322ca674315de88e788f1d2596e26
+commit dc6f81ee94995deb11bbf7e19801022c5f6fd90a
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Jan 22 11:00:15 2019 +0000
+Date: Wed Oct 2 08:05:50 2019 +0000
- upstream: mention the new vs. old key formats in the introduction
+ upstream: ban empty namespace strings for s
- and give some hints on how keys may be converted or written in the old
- format.
+ =?UTF-8?q?shsig;=20spotted=20by=20Mantas=20Mikul=C4=97nas?=
+ MIME-Version: 1.0
+ Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+ Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9c90a9f92eddc249e07fad1204d0e15c8aa13823
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7c5bcf40bed8f4e826230176f4aa353c52aeb698
-commit fd8eb1383a34c986a00ef13d745ae9bd3ea21760
-Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Jan 22 06:58:31 2019 +0000
+commit fa5bd8107e0e2b3e1e184f55d0f9320c119f65f0
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Wed Oct 2 14:30:55 2019 +1000
- upstream: tweak previous;
-
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d2a80e389da8e7ed71978643d8cbaa8605b597a8
+ Put ssherr.h back as it's actually needed.
-commit 68e924d5473c00057f8532af57741d258c478223
-Author: tb@openbsd.org <tb@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Jan 21 23:55:12 2019 +0000
+commit 3ef92a657444f172b61f92d5da66d94fa8265602
+Author: Lonnie Abelbeck <lonnie@abelbeck.com>
+Date: Tue Oct 1 09:05:09 2019 -0500
- upstream: Forgot to add -J to the synopsis.
+ Deny (non-fatal) shmget/shmat/shmdt in preauth privsep child.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 26d95e409a0b72526526fc56ca1caca5cc3d3c5e
-
-commit 622dedf1a884f2927a9121e672bd9955e12ba108
-Author: tb@openbsd.org <tb@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Jan 21 22:50:42 2019 +0000
+ New wait_random_seeded() function on OpenSSL 1.1.1d uses shmget, shmat, and shmdt
+ in the preauth codepath, deny (non-fatal) in seccomp_filter sandbox.
- upstream: Add a -J option as a shortcut for -o Proxyjump= to scp(1)
-
- and sftp(1) to match ssh(1)'s interface.
-
- ok djm
-
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a75bc2d5f329caa7229a7e9fe346c4f41c2663fc
-
-commit c882d74652800150d538e22c80dd2bd3cdd5fae2
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Tue Jan 22 20:38:40 2019 +1100
-
- Allow building against OpenSSL dev (3.x) version.
-
-commit d5520393572eb24aa0e001a1c61f49b104396e45
+commit edd1d3a6261aecbf9a55944fd7be1db83571b46e
Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Tue Jan 22 10:50:40 2019 +1100
+Date: Wed Oct 2 10:54:28 2019 +1000
- typo
+ remove duplicate #includes
+
+ Prompted by Jakub Jelen
-commit 2de9cec54230998ab10161576f77860a2559ccb7
+commit 13c508dfed9f25e6e54c984ad00a74ef08539e70
Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Tue Jan 22 10:49:52 2019 +1100
+Date: Wed Oct 2 10:51:15 2019 +1000
- add missing header
+ typo in comment
-commit 533cfb01e49a2a30354e191669dc3159e03e99a7
+commit d0c3ac427f6c52b872d6617421421dd791664445
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Jan 21 22:18:24 2019 +0000
+Date: Wed Oct 2 00:42:30 2019 +0000
- upstream: switch sntrup implementation source from supercop to
-
- libpqcrypto; the latter is almost identical but doesn't rely on signed
- underflow to implement an optimised integer sort; from markus@
+ upstream: remove some duplicate #includes
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: cd09bbf0e0fcef1bedca69fdf7990dc360567cf8
-
-commit d50ab3cd6fb859888a26b4d4e333239b4f6bf573
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Tue Jan 22 00:02:23 2019 +1100
-
- new files need includes.h
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ed6827ab921eff8027669848ef4f70dc1da4098c
-commit c7670b091a7174760d619ef6738b4f26b2093301
+commit 084682786d9275552ee93857cb36e43c446ce92c
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Jan 21 12:53:35 2019 +0000
+Date: Tue Oct 1 10:22:53 2019 +0000
- upstream: add "-v" flags to ssh-add and ssh-pkcs11-helper to turn up
+ upstream: revert unconditional forced login implemented in r1.41 of
- debug verbosity.
+ ssh-pkcs11.c; r1.45 added a forced login as a fallback for cases where the
+ token returns no objects and this is less disruptive for users of tokens
+ directly in ssh (rather than via ssh-agent) and in ssh-keygen
- Make ssh-agent turn on ssh-pkcs11-helper's verbosity when it is run
- in debug mode ("ssh-agent -d"), so we get to see errors from the
- PKCS#11 code.
+ bz3006, patch from Jakub Jelen; ok markus
- ok markus@
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 33d6df589b072094384631ff93b1030103b3d02e
+
+commit 6c91d42cce3f055917dc3fd2c305dfc5b3b584b3
+Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sun Sep 29 16:31:57 2019 +0000
+
+ upstream: group and sort single letter options; ok deraadt
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0a798643c6a92a508df6bd121253ba1c8bee659d
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e1480e760a2b582f79696cdcff70098e23fc603f
-commit 49d8c8e214d39acf752903566b105d06c565442a
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Jan 21 12:50:12 2019 +0000
+commit 3b44bf39ff4d7ef5d50861e2e9dda62d2926d2fe
+Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Sep 27 20:03:24 2019 +0000
- upstream: adapt to changes in KEX APIs and file removals
+ upstream: fix the DH-GEX text in -a; because this required a comma,
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 54d6857e7c58999c7a6d40942ab0fed3529f43ca
+ i added a comma to the first part, for balance...
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2c3464e9e82a41e8cdfe8f0a16d94266e43dbb58
-commit 35ecc53a83f8e8baab2e37549addfd05c73c30f1
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Jan 21 12:35:20 2019 +0000
+commit 3e53ef28fab53094e3b19622ba0e9c3d5fe71273
+Author: deraadt@openbsd.org <deraadt@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Sep 24 12:50:46 2019 +0000
- upstream: adapt to changes in KEX API and file removals
+ upstream: identity_file[] should be PATH_MAX, not the arbitrary
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 92cad022d3b0d11e08f3e0055d6a14b8f994c0d7
+ number 1024
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e775f94ad47ce9ab37bd1410d7cf3b7ea98b11b7
-commit 7d69aae64c35868cc4f644583ab973113a79480e
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Jan 21 12:29:35 2019 +0000
+commit 90d4b2541e8c907793233d9cbd4963f7624f4174
+Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Sep 20 18:50:58 2019 +0000
- upstream: adapt to bignum1 API removal and bignum2 API change
+ upstream: new sentence, new line;
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: cea6ff270f3d560de86b355a87a2c95b55a5ca63
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c35ca5ec07be460e95e7406af12eee04a77b6698
-commit beab553f0a9578ef9bffe28b2c779725e77b39ec
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Jan 21 09:13:41 2019 +0000
+commit fbec7dba01b70b49ac47f56031310865dff86200
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Mon Sep 30 18:01:12 2019 +1000
- upstream: remove hack to use non-system libcrypto
+ Include stdio.h for snprintf.
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: ce72487327eee4dfae1ab0212a1f33871fe0809f
+ Patch from vapier@gentoo.org.
-commit 4dc06bd57996f1a46b4c3bababe0d09bc89098f7
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Mon Jan 21 23:14:04 2019 +1100
+commit 0a403bfde71c4b82147473298d3a60b4171468bd
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Mon Sep 30 14:11:42 2019 +1000
- depend
+ Add SKIP_LTESTS for skipping specific tests.
-commit 70edd73edc4df54e5eee50cd27c25427b34612f8
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Jan 21 12:08:13 2019 +0000
+commit 4d59f7a5169c451ebf559aedec031ac9da2bf80c
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Sep 27 05:25:12 2019 +0000
- upstream: fix reversed arguments to kex_load_hostkey(); manifested as
+ upstream: Test for empty result in expected bits. Remove CRs from log
- errors in cert-hostkey.sh regress failures.
+ as they confuse tools on some platforms. Re-enable the 3des-cbc test.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 12dab63850b844f84d5a67e86d9e21a42fba93ba
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: edf536d4f29fc1ba412889b37247a47f1b49d250
-commit f1185abbf0c9108e639297addc77f8757ee00eb3
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Jan 21 11:22:00 2019 +0000
+commit 7c817d129e2d48fc8a6f7965339313023ec45765
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Fri Sep 27 15:26:22 2019 +1000
- upstream: forgot to cvs add this file in previous series of commits;
-
- grrr
+ Re-enable dhgex test.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: bcff316c3e7da8fd15333e05d244442c3aaa66b0
+ Since we've added larger fallback groups to dh.c this test will pass
+ even if there is no moduli file installed on the system.
-commit 7bef390b625bdc080f0fd4499ef03cef60fca4fa
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Jan 21 10:44:21 2019 +0000
+commit c1e0a32fa852de6d1c82ece4f76add0ab0ca0eae
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Tue Sep 24 21:17:20 2019 +1000
- upstream: nothing shall escape this purge
-
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4795b0ff142b45448f7e15f3c2f77a947191b217
+ Add more ToS bits, currently only used by netcat.
-commit aaca72d6f1279b842066e07bff797019efeb2c23
+commit 5a273a33ca1410351cb484af7db7c13e8b4e8e4e
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Thu Sep 19 15:41:23 2019 +1000
+
+ Privsep is now required.
+
+commit 8aa2aa3cd4d27d14e74b247c773696349472ef20
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Jan 21 10:40:11 2019 +0000
+Date: Mon Sep 16 03:23:02 2019 +0000
- upstream: rename kex->kem_client_pub -> kex->client_pub now that
+ upstream: Allow testing signature syntax and validity without verifying
- KEM has been renamed to kexgen
+ that a signature came from a trusted signer. To discourage accidental or
+ unintentional use, this is invoked by the deliberately ugly option name
+ "check-novalidate"
- from markus@ ok djm@
+ from Sebastian Kinne
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: fac6da5dc63530ad0da537db022a9a4cfbe8bed8
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: cea42c36ab7d6b70890e2d8635c1b5b943adcc0b
-commit 70867e1ca2eb08bbd494fe9c568df4fd3b35b867
+commit 7047d5afe3103f0f07966c05b810682d92add359
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Jan 21 10:38:54 2019 +0000
+Date: Fri Sep 13 04:52:34 2019 +0000
- upstream: merge kexkem[cs] into kexgen
+ upstream: clarify that IdentitiesOnly also applies to the default
- from markus@ ok djm@
+ ~/.ssh/id_* keys; bz#3062
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 87d886b7f1812ff9355fda1435f6ea9b71a0ac89
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 604be570e04646f0f4a17026f8b2aada6a585dfa
-commit 71e67fff946396caa110a7964da23480757258ff
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Jan 21 10:35:09 2019 +0000
+commit b36ee3fcb2f1601693b1b7fd60dd6bd96006ea75
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Sep 13 04:36:43 2019 +0000
- upstream: pass values used in KEX hash computation as sshbuf
-
- rather than pointer+len
+ upstream: Plug mem leaks on error paths, based in part on github
- suggested by me; implemented by markus@ ok me
+ pr#120 from David Carlier. ok djm@.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 994f33c464f4a9e0f1d21909fa3e379f5a0910f0
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c57adeb1022a8148fc86e5a88837b3b156dbdb7e
-commit 4b83e2a2cc0c12e671a77eaba1c1245894f4e884
+commit 2aefdf1aef906cf7548a2e5927d35aacb55948d4
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Jan 21 10:33:49 2019 +0000
+Date: Fri Sep 13 04:31:19 2019 +0000
- upstream: remove kex_derive_keys_bn wrapper; no unused since the
-
- DH-like KEX methods have moved to KEM
-
- from markus@ ok djm@
+ upstream: whitespace
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: bde9809103832f349545e4f5bb733d316db9a060
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 57a71dd5f4cae8d61e0ac631a862589fb2bfd700
-commit 92dda34e373832f34a1944e5d9ebbebb184dedc1
+commit fbe24b142915331ceb2a3a76be3dc5b6d204fddf
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Jan 21 10:29:56 2019 +0000
+Date: Fri Sep 13 04:27:35 2019 +0000
- upstream: use KEM API for vanilla ECDH
+ upstream: allow %n to be expanded in ProxyCommand strings
- from markus@ ok djm@
+ From Zachary Harmany via github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/pull/118
+ ok dtucker@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 6fbff96339a929835536b5730585d1d6057a352c
-
-commit b72357217cbe510a3ae155307a7be6b9181f1d1b
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Mon Jan 21 23:11:21 2019 +1100
-
- fixup missing ssherr.h
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7eebf1b7695f50c66d42053d352a4db9e8fb84b6
-commit 9c9c97e14fe190931f341876ad98213e1e1dc19f
+commit 2ce1d11600e13bee0667d6b717ffcc18a057b821
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Jan 21 10:28:01 2019 +0000
+Date: Fri Sep 13 04:07:42 2019 +0000
- upstream: use KEM API for vanilla DH KEX
+ upstream: clarify that ConnectTimeout applies both to the TCP
- from markus@ ok djm@
+ connection and to the protocol handshake/KEX. From Jean-Charles Longuet via
+ Github PR140
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: af56466426b08a8be275412ae2743319e3d277c9
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ce1766abc6da080f0d88c09c2c5585a32b2256bf
-commit 2f6a9ddbbf6ca8623c53c323ff17fb6d68d66970
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Jan 21 10:24:09 2019 +0000
+commit df780114278f406ef7cb2278802a2660092fff09
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Sep 9 02:31:19 2019 +0000
- upstream: use KEM API for vanilla c25519 KEX
+ upstream: Fix potential truncation warning. ok deraadt.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 38d937b85ff770886379dd66a8f32ab0c1c35c1f
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d87b7e3a94ec935e8194e7fce41815e22804c3ff
-commit dfd591618cdf2c96727ac0eb65f89cf54af0d97e
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Jan 21 10:20:12 2019 +0000
+commit ec0e6243660bf2df30c620a6a0d83eded376c9c6
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Fri Sep 13 13:14:39 2019 +1000
- upstream: Add support for a PQC KEX/KEM:
-
- sntrup4591761x25519-sha512@tinyssh.org using the Streamlined NTRU Prime
- 4591^761 implementation from SUPERCOP coupled with X25519 as a stop-loss. Not
- enabled by default.
-
- introduce KEM API; a simplified framework for DH-ish KEX methods.
-
- from markus@ feedback & ok djm@
+ memleak of buffer in sshpam_query
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d687f76cffd3561dd73eb302d17a1c3bf321d1a7
+ coverity report via Ed Maste; ok dtucker@
-commit b1b2ff4ed559051d1035419f8f236275fa66d5d6
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Jan 21 10:07:22 2019 +0000
+commit c17e4638e5592688264fc0349f61bfc7b4425aa5
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Fri Sep 13 13:12:42 2019 +1000
- upstream: factor out kex_verify_hostkey() - again, duplicated
-
- almost exactly across client and server for several KEX methods.
-
- from markus@ ok djm@
+ explicitly test set[ug]id() return values
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4e4a16d949dadde002a0aacf6d280a684e20829c
+ Legacy !_POSIX_SAVED_IDS path only; coverity report via Ed Maste
+ ok dtucker@
-commit bb39bafb6dc520cc097780f4611a52da7f19c3e2
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Jan 21 10:05:09 2019 +0000
+commit 91a2135f32acdd6378476c5bae475a6e7811a6a2
+Author: naddy@openbsd.org <naddy@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Sep 6 14:45:34 2019 +0000
- upstream: factor out kex_load_hostkey() - this is duplicated in
+ upstream: Allow prepending a list of algorithms to the default set
- both the client and server implementations for most KEX methods.
+ by starting the list with the '^' character, e.g.
- from markus@ ok djm@
+ HostKeyAlgorithms ^ssh-ed25519
+ Ciphers ^aes128-gcm@openssh.com,aes256-gcm@openssh.com
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8232fa7c21fbfbcaf838313b0c166dc6c8762f3c
+ ok djm@ dtucker@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1e1996fac0dc8a4b0d0ff58395135848287f6f97
-commit dec5e9d33891e3bc3f1395d7db0e56fdc7f86dfc
+commit c8bdd2db77ac2369d5cdee237656f266c8f41552
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Jan 21 10:03:37 2019 +0000
+Date: Fri Sep 6 07:53:40 2019 +0000
- upstream: factor out kex_dh_compute_key() - it's shared between
-
- plain DH KEX and DH GEX in both the client and server implementations
+ upstream: key conversion should fail for !openssl builds, not fall
- from markus@ ok djm@
+ through to the key generation code
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 12186e18791fffcd4642c82e7e0cfdd7ea37e2ec
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b957436adc43c4941e61d61958a193a708bc83c9
-commit e93bd98eab79b9a78f64ee8dd4dffc4d3979c7ae
+commit 823f6c37eb2d8191d45539f7b6fa877a4cb4ed3d
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Jan 21 10:00:23 2019 +0000
+Date: Fri Sep 6 06:08:11 2019 +0000
- upstream: factor out DH keygen; it's identical between the client
-
- and the server
-
- from markus@ ok djm@
+ upstream: typo in previous
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2be57f6a0d44f1ab2c8de2b1b5d6f530c387fae9
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7c3b94110864771a6b80a0d8acaca34037c3c96e
-commit 5ae3f6d314465026d028af82609c1d49ad197655
+commit 6a710d3e06fd375e2c2ae02546b9541c488a2cdb
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Sun Sep 8 14:48:11 2019 +1000
+
+ needs time.h for --without-openssl
+
+commit f61f29afda6c71eda26effa54d3c2e5306fd0833
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Sat Sep 7 19:25:00 2019 +1000
+
+ make unittests pass for no-openssl case
+
+commit 105e1c9218940eb53473f55a9177652d889ddbad
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Jan 21 09:55:52 2019 +0000
+Date: Fri Sep 6 05:59:41 2019 +0000
- upstream: save the derived session id in kex_derive_keys() rather
-
- than making each kex method implementation do it.
+ upstream: avoid compiling certain files that deeply depend on
- from markus@ ok djm@
+ libcrypto when WITH_OPENSSL isn't set
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d61ade9c8d1e13f665f8663c552abff8c8a30673
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 569f08445c27124ec7c7f6c0268d844ec56ac061
-commit 7be8572b32a15d5c3dba897f252e2e04e991c307
+commit 670104b923dd97b1c06c0659aef7c3e52af571b2
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Jan 21 09:54:11 2019 +0000
+Date: Fri Sep 6 05:23:55 2019 +0000
- upstream: Make sshpkt_get_bignum2() allocate the bignum it is
-
- parsing rather than make the caller do it. Saves a lot of boilerplate code.
-
- from markus@ ok djm@
+ upstream: fixes for !WITH_OPENSSL compilation; ok dtucker@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 576bf784f9a240f5a1401f7005364e59aed3bce9
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7fd68eaa9e0f7482b5d4c7e8d740aed4770a839f
-commit 803178bd5da7e72be94ba5b4c4c196d4b542da4d
+commit be02d7cbde3d211ec2ed2320a1f7d86b2339d758
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Jan 21 09:52:25 2019 +0000
+Date: Fri Sep 6 04:53:27 2019 +0000
- upstream: remove obsolete (SSH v.1) sshbuf_get/put_bignum1
-
- functions
+ upstream: lots of things were relying on libcrypto headers to
- from markus@ ok djm@
+ transitively include various system headers (mostly stdlib.h); include them
+ explicitly
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0380b1b2d9de063de3c5a097481a622e6a04943e
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 5b522f4f2d844f78bf1cc4f3f4cc392e177b2080
-commit f3ebaffd8714be31d4345f90af64992de4b3bba2
+commit d05aaaaadcad592abfaa44540928e0c61ef72ebb
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Jan 21 09:49:37 2019 +0000
+Date: Fri Sep 6 03:30:42 2019 +0000
- upstream: fix all-zero check in kexc25519_shared_key
+ upstream: remove leakmalloc reference; we used this early when
- from markus@ ok djm@
+ refactoring but not since
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 60b1d364e0d9d34d1d1ef1620cb92e36cf06712d
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: bb28ebda8f7c490b87b37954044a6cdd43a7eb2c
-commit 9d1a9771d0ad3a83af733bf3d2650b53f43c269f
-Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Jan 21 07:09:10 2019 +0000
+commit 1268f0bcd8fc844ac6c27167888443c8350005eb
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Sep 6 04:24:06 2019 +0000
- upstream: - -T was added to the first synopsis by mistake - since
-
- "..." denotes optional, no need to surround it in []
+ upstream: Check for RSA support before using it for the user key,
- ok djm
+ otherwise use ed25519 which is supported when built without OpenSSL.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 918f6d8eed4e0d8d9ef5eadae1b8983d796f0e25
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 3d23ddfe83c5062f00ac845d463f19a2ec78c0f7
-commit 2f0bad2bf85391dbb41315ab55032ec522660617
+commit fd7a2dec652b9efc8e97f03f118f935dce732c60
Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Mon Jan 21 21:28:27 2019 +1100
+Date: Fri Sep 6 14:07:10 2019 +1000
- Make --with-rpath take a flag instead of yes/no.
+ Provide explicit path to configure-check.
- Linkers need various flags for -rpath and similar, so make --with-rpath
- take an optional flag argument which is passed to the linker. ok djm@
+ On some platforms (at least OpenBSD) make won't search VPATH for target
+ files, so building out-of-tree will fail at configure-check. Provide
+ explicit path. ok djm@
-commit 23490a6c970ea1d03581a3b4208f2eb7a675f453
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Mon Jan 21 15:05:43 2019 +1100
+commit 00865c29690003b4523cc09a0e104724b9f911a4
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Sep 6 01:58:50 2019 +0000
- fix previous test
+ upstream: better error code for bad arguments; inspired by
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: dfc263b6041de7f0ed921a1de0b81ddebfab1e0a
-commit b6dd3277f2c49f9584a2097bc792e8f480397e87
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Mon Jan 21 13:50:17 2019 +1100
+commit afdf27f5aceb4973b9f5308f4310c6e3fd8db1fb
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Thu Sep 5 21:38:40 2019 +1000
- Wrap ECC static globals in EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW too.
+ revert config.h/config.h.in freshness checks
+
+ turns out autoreconf and configure don't touch some files if their content
+ doesn't change, so the mtime can't be relied upon in a makefile rule
-commit b2eb9db35b7191613f2f4b934d57b25938bb34b3
+commit a97609e850c57bd2cc2fe7e175fc35cb865bc834
Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Mon Jan 21 12:53:40 2019 +1100
+Date: Thu Sep 5 20:54:39 2019 +1000
- pass TEST_SSH_SSHPKCS11HELPER to regress tests
+ extend autoconf freshness test
+
+ make it cover config.h.in and config.h separately
-commit ba58a529f45b3dae2db68607d8c54ae96e90e705
+commit 182297c10edb21c4856c6a38326fd04d81de41a5
Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Mon Jan 21 12:31:29 2019 +1100
+Date: Thu Sep 5 20:34:54 2019 +1000
- make agent-pkcs11 search harder for softhsm2.so
+ check that configure/config.h is up to date
+
+ Ensure they are newer than the configure.ac / aclocal.m4 source
-commit 662be40c62339ab645113c930ce689466f028938
+commit 7d6034bd020248e9fc0f8c39c71c858debd0d0c1
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Jan 21 02:05:38 2019 +0000
+Date: Thu Sep 5 10:05:51 2019 +0000
- upstream: always print the caller's error message in ossl_error(),
+ upstream: if a PKCS#11 token returns no keys then try to login and
- even when there are no libcrypto errors to report.
+ refetch them. Based on patch from Jakub Jelen; bz#2430 ok markus@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 09ebaa8f706e0eccedd209775baa1eee2ada806a
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ab53bd6ddd54dd09e54a8bfbed1a984496f08b43
-commit ce46c3a077dfb4c531ccffcfff03f37775725b75
+commit 76f09bd95917862101b740afb19f4db5ccc752bf
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Jan 21 02:01:03 2019 +0000
+Date: Thu Sep 5 09:35:19 2019 +0000
- upstream: get the ex_data (pkcs11_key object) back from the keys at
+ upstream: sprinkle in some explicit errors here, otherwise the
- the index at which it was inserted, rather than assuming index 0
+ percolate all the way up to dispatch_run_fatal() and lose all meaninful
+ context
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1f3a6ce0346c8014e895e50423bef16401510aa8
+ to help with bz#3063; ok dtucker@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 5b2da83bb1c4a3471444b7910b2120ae36438a0a
-commit 0a5f2ea35626022299ece3c8817a1abe8cf37b3e
+commit 0ea332497b2b2fc3995f72f6bafe9d664c0195b3
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Jan 21 01:05:00 2019 +0000
+Date: Thu Sep 5 09:25:13 2019 +0000
- upstream: GSSAPI code got missed when converting to new packet API
+ upstream: only send ext_info for KEX_INITIAL; bz#2929 ok dtucker
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 37e4f06ab4a0f4214430ff462ba91acba28b7851
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 00f5c6062f6863769f5447c6346f78c05d2e4a63
-commit 2efcf812b4c1555ca3aff744820a3b3bccd68298
+commit f23d91f9fa7f6f42e70404e000fac88aebfe3076
+Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Sep 5 05:47:23 2019 +0000
+
+ upstream: macro fix; ok djm
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e891dd6c7996114cb32f0924cb7898ab55efde6e
+
+commit 8b57337c1c1506df2bb9f039d0628a6de618566b
Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Mon Jan 21 11:57:21 2019 +1100
+Date: Thu Sep 5 15:46:39 2019 +1000
- Fix -Wunused when compiling PKCS#11 without ECDSA
+ update fuzzing makefile to more recent clang
-commit 3c0c657ed7cd335fc05c0852d88232ca7e92a5d9
+commit ae631ad77daf8fd39723d15a687cd4b1482cbae8
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Thu Sep 5 15:45:32 2019 +1000
+
+ fuzzer for sshsig allowed_signers option parsing
+
+commit 69159afe24120c97e5ebaf81016c85968afb903e
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sun Jan 20 23:26:44 2019 +0000
+Date: Thu Sep 5 05:42:59 2019 +0000
- upstream: allow override of ssh-pkcs11-helper binary via
-
- $TEST_SSH_SSHPKCS11HELPER from markus@
+ upstream: memleak on error path; found by libfuzzer
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 7382a3d76746f5a792d106912a5819fd5e49e469
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 34d44cb0fb5bdb5fcbc6b02b804e71b20a7a5fc7
-commit 760ae37b4505453c6fa4faf1aa39a8671ab053af
+commit bab6feb01f9924758ca7129dba708298a53dde5f
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sun Jan 20 23:25:25 2019 +0000
+Date: Thu Sep 5 04:55:32 2019 +0000
- upstream: adapt agent-pkcs11.sh test to softhsm2 and add support
+ upstream: expose allowed_signers options parsing code in header for
- for ECDSA keys
+ fuzzing
- work by markus@, ok djm@
+ rename to make more consistent with philosophically-similar auth
+ options parsing API.
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 1ebc2be0e88eff1b6d8be2f9c00cdc60723509fe
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0c67600ef04187f98e2912ca57b60c22a8025b7c
-commit b2ce8b31a1f974a13e6d12e0a0c132b50bc45115
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sun Jan 20 23:24:19 2019 +0000
+commit 4f9d75fbafde83d428e291516f8ce98e6b3a7c4b
+Author: naddy@openbsd.org <naddy@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Sep 4 20:31:15 2019 +0000
- upstream: add "extra:" target to run some extra tests that are not
+ upstream: Call comma-separated lists as such to clarify semantics.
- enabled by default (currently includes agent-pkcs11.sh); from markus@
+ Options such as Ciphers take values that may be a list of ciphers; the
+ complete list, not indiviual elements, may be prefixed with a dash or plus
+ character to remove from or append to the default list, respectively.
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 9a969e1adcd117fea174d368dcb9c61eb50a2a3c
+ Users might read the current text as if each elment took an optional prefix,
+ so tweak the wording from "values" to "list" to prevent such ambiguity for
+ all options supporting these semantics.
+
+ Fix instances missed in first commit. ok jmc@ kn@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7112522430a54fb9f15a7a26d26190ed84d5e417
-commit 632976418d60b7193597bbc6ac7ca33981a41aab
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Jan 21 00:47:34 2019 +0000
+commit db1e6f60f03641b2d17e0ab062242609f4ed4598
+Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Sep 4 05:56:54 2019 +0000
- upstream: use ECDSA_SIG_set0() instead of poking signature values into
+ upstream: tweak previous;
- structure directly; the latter works on LibreSSL but not on OpenSSL. From
- portable.
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0abd728aef6b5b35f6db43176aa83b7e3bf3ce27
+
+commit 0f44e5956c7c816f6600f2a47be4d7bb5a8d711d
+Author: naddy@openbsd.org <naddy@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Sep 3 20:51:49 2019 +0000
+
+ upstream: repair typo and editing mishap
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 5b22a1919d9cee907d3f8a029167f70a481891c6
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d125ab720ca71ccf9baf83e08ddc8c12a328597e
-commit 5de6ac2bad11175135d9b819b3546db0ca0b4878
+commit f4846dfc6a79f84bbc6356ae3184f142bacedc24
Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Mon Jan 21 11:44:19 2019 +1100
+Date: Thu Sep 5 11:09:28 2019 +1000
- remove HAVE_DLOPEN that snuck in
-
- portable doesn't use this
+ Fuzzer harness for sshsig
-commit e2cb445d786f7572da2af93e3433308eaed1093a
+commit b08a6bc1cc7750c6f8a425d1cdbd86552fffc637
Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Mon Jan 21 11:32:28 2019 +1100
+Date: Tue Sep 3 18:45:42 2019 +1000
- conditionalise ECDSA PKCS#11 support
-
- Require EC_KEY_METHOD support in libcrypto, evidenced by presence
- of EC_KEY_METHOD_new() function.
+ oops; missed including the actual file
-commit fcb1b0937182d0137a3c357c89735d0dc5869d54
+commit 1a72c0dd89f09754df443c9576dde624a17d7dd0
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Tue Sep 3 18:44:10 2019 +1000
+
+ portability fixes for sshsig
+
+commit 6d6427d01304d967e58544cf1c71d2b4394c0522
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sun Jan 20 23:12:35 2019 +0000
+Date: Tue Sep 3 08:37:45 2019 +0000
- upstream: we use singleton pkcs#11 RSA_METHOD and EC_KEY_METHOD
-
- now, so there is no need to keep a copy of each in the pkcs11_key object.
-
- work by markus@, ok djm@
+ upstream: regress test for sshsig; feedback and ok markus@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 43b4856516e45c0595f17a8e95b2daee05f12faa
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 74c0974f2cdae8d9599b9d76a09680bae55d8a8b
-commit 6529409e85890cd6df7e5e81d04e393b1d2e4b0b
+commit 59650f0eaf65115afe04c39abfb93a4fc994ec55
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sun Jan 20 23:11:11 2019 +0000
+Date: Tue Sep 3 08:37:06 2019 +0000
- upstream: KNF previous; from markus@
+ upstream: only add plain keys to prevent any certs laying around
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 3dfe35e25b310c3968b1e4e53a0cb1d03bda5395
+ from confusing the test.
+
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: b8f1508f822bc560b98dea910e61ecd76f34100f
-commit 58622a8c82f4e2aad630580543f51ba537c1f39e
+commit d637c4aee6f9b5280c13c020d7653444ac1fcaa5
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sun Jan 20 23:10:33 2019 +0000
+Date: Tue Sep 3 08:35:27 2019 +0000
- upstream: use OpenSSL's RSA reference counting hooks to
+ upstream: sshsig tweaks and improvements from and suggested by
- implicitly clean up pkcs11_key objects when their owning RSA object's
- reference count drops to zero. Simplifies the cleanup path and makes it more
- like ECDSA's
+ Markus
- work by markus@, ok djm@
+ ok markus/me
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 74b9c98f405cd78f7148e9e4a4982336cd3df25c
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ea4f46ad5a16b27af96e08c4877423918c4253e9
-commit f118542fc82a3b3ab0360955b33bc5a271ea709f
+commit 2a9c9f7272c1e8665155118fe6536bebdafb6166
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sun Jan 20 23:08:24 2019 +0000
+Date: Tue Sep 3 08:34:19 2019 +0000
- upstream: make the PKCS#11 RSA code more like the new PKCS#11
+ upstream: sshsig: lightweight signature and verification ability
- ECDSA code: use a single custom RSA_METHOD instead of a method per key
+ for OpenSSH
- suggested by me, but markus@ did all the work.
- ok djm@
+ This adds a simple manual signature scheme to OpenSSH.
+ Signatures can be made and verified using ssh-keygen -Y sign|verify
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8aafcebe923dc742fc5537a995cee549d07e4b2e
+ Signatures embed the key used to make them. At verification time, this
+ is matched via principal name against an authorized_keys-like list
+ of allowed signers.
+
+ Mostly by Sebastian Kinne w/ some tweaks by me
+
+ ok markus@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2ab568e7114c933346616392579d72be65a4b8fb
-commit 445cfce49dfc904c6b8ab25afa2f43130296c1a5
+commit 5485f8d50a5bc46aeed829075ebf5d9c617027ea
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sun Jan 20 23:05:52 2019 +0000
+Date: Tue Sep 3 08:32:11 2019 +0000
- upstream: fix leak of ECDSA pkcs11_key objects
+ upstream: move authorized_keys option parsing helpsers to misc.c
- work by markus, ok djm@
+ and make them public; ok markus@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9fc0c4f1d640aaa5f19b8d70f37ea19b8ad284a1
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c18bcb2a687227b3478377c981c2d56af2638ea2
-commit 8a2467583f0b5760787273796ec929190c3f16ee
+commit f8df0413f0a057b6a3d3dd7bd8bc7c5d80911d3a
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sun Jan 20 23:03:26 2019 +0000
+Date: Tue Sep 3 08:31:20 2019 +0000
- upstream: use EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY() instead of direct access of
-
- EC_KEY internals as that won't work on OpenSSL
+ upstream: make get_sigtype public as sshkey_get_sigtype(); ok
- work by markus@, feedback and ok djm@
+ markus@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4a99cdb89fbd6f5155ef8c521c99dc66e2612700
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 01f8cdbec63350490d2249f41112c5780d1cfbb8
-commit 24757c1ae309324e98d50e5935478655be04e549
+commit dd8002fbe63d903ffea5be7b7f5fc2714acab4a0
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sun Jan 20 23:01:59 2019 +0000
+Date: Tue Sep 3 08:30:47 2019 +0000
- upstream: cleanup PKCS#11 ECDSA pubkey loading: the returned
-
- object should never have a DER header
+ upstream: move advance_past_options to authfile.c and make it
- work by markus; feedback and ok djm@
+ public; ok markus@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b617fa585eddbbf0b1245b58b7a3c4b8d613db17
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: edda2fbba2c5b1f48e60f857a2010479e80c5f3c
-commit 749aef30321595435ddacef2f31d7a8f2b289309
+commit c72d78ccbe642e08591a626e5de18381489716e0
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sun Jan 20 23:00:12 2019 +0000
+Date: Tue Sep 3 08:29:58 2019 +0000
- upstream: cleanup unnecessary code in ECDSA pkcs#11 signature
+ upstream: move skip_space() to misc.c and make it public; ok
- work by markus@, feedback and ok djm@
+ markus@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: affa5ca7d58d59fbd16169f77771dcdbd2b0306d
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: caa77e8a3b210948e29ad3e28c5db00852961eae
-commit 0c50992af49b562970dd0ba3f8f151f1119e260e
+commit 06af3583f46e2c327fdd44d8a95b8b4e8dfd8db5
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sun Jan 20 22:57:45 2019 +0000
+Date: Tue Sep 3 08:29:15 2019 +0000
- upstream: cleanup pkcs#11 client code: use sshkey_new in instead
+ upstream: authfd: add function to check if key is in agent
- of stack- allocating a sshkey
+ This commit adds a helper function which allows the caller to
+ check if a given public key is present in ssh-agent.
- work by markus@, ok djm@
+ work by Sebastian Kinne; ok markus@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a048eb6ec8aa7fa97330af927022c0da77521f91
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d43c5826353e1fdc1af71eb42961b30782c7bd13
-commit 854bd8674ee5074a239f7cadf757d55454802e41
+commit 2ab5a8464870cc4b29ddbe849bbbc255729437bf
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sun Jan 20 22:54:30 2019 +0000
+Date: Tue Sep 3 08:28:30 2019 +0000
- upstream: allow override of the pkcs#11 helper binary via
-
- $SSH_PKCS11_HELPER; needed for regress tests.
-
- work by markus@, ok me
+ upstream: fix memleak in ssh_free_identitylist(); ok markus@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f78d8185500bd7c37aeaf7bd27336db62f0f7a83
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: aa51f77ae2c5330a1f61b2d22933f24a443f9abf
-commit 93f02107f44d63a016d8c23ebd2ca9205c495c48
+commit 85443f165b4169b2a448b3e24bc1d4dc5b3156a4
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sun Jan 20 22:51:37 2019 +0000
+Date: Tue Sep 3 08:27:52 2019 +0000
- upstream: add support for ECDSA keys in PKCS#11 tokens
-
- Work by markus@ and Pedro Martelletto, feedback and ok me@
+ upstream: factor out confirm_overwrite(); ok markus@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a37d651e221341376636056512bddfc16efb4424
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 304e95381b39c774c8fced7e5328b106a3ff0400
-commit aa22c20e0c36c2fc610cfcc793b0d14079c38814
+commit 9a396e33685633581c67d5ad9664570ef95281f2
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sun Jan 20 22:03:29 2019 +0000
+Date: Mon Sep 2 23:46:46 2019 +0000
- upstream: add option to test whether keys in an agent are usable,
-
- by performing a signature and a verification using each key "ssh-add -T
- pubkey [...]"
-
- work by markus@, ok djm@
+ upstream: constify an argument
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 931b888a600b6a883f65375bd5f73a4776c6d19b
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 724bafc9f993746ad4303e95bede2c030de6233b
-commit a36b0b14a12971086034d53c0c3dfbad07665abe
-Author: tb@openbsd.org <tb@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sun Jan 20 02:01:59 2019 +0000
+commit b52c0c2e64988277a35a955a474d944967059aeb
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Sep 2 00:19:25 2019 +0000
- upstream: Fix BN_is_prime_* calls in SSH, the API returns -1 on
-
- error.
-
- Found thanks to BoringSSL's commit 53409ee3d7595ed37da472bc73b010cd2c8a5ffd
- by David Benjamin.
+ upstream: downgrade PKCS#11 "provider returned no slots" warning
- ok djm, dtucker
+ from log level error to debug. This is common when attempting to enumerate
+ keys on smartcard readers with no cards plugged in. bz#3058 ok dtucker@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1ee832be3c44b1337f76b8562ec6d203f3b072f8
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: bb8839ddeb77c271390488af1b771041d43e49c6
-commit ec4776bb01dd8d61fddc7d2a31ab10bf3d3d829a
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sun Jan 20 01:12:40 2019 +0000
+commit 0713322e18162463c5ab5ddfb9f935055ca775d8
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sun Sep 1 23:47:32 2019 +0000
- upstream: DH-GEX min value is now specified in RFC8270. ok djm@
+ upstream: print comment when printing pubkey from private
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1229d0feb1d0ecefe05bf67a17578b263e991acc
+ bz#3052; ok dtucker
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a91b2a8d5f1053d34d7fce44523c53fb534ba914
-commit c90a7928c4191303e76a8c58b9008d464287ae1b
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Mon Jan 21 09:22:36 2019 +1100
+commit 368f1cc2fbd6ad10c66bc1b67c2c04aebf8a04a8
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Mon Sep 2 10:28:42 2019 +1000
- Check for cc before gcc.
+ fixed test in OSX closefrom() replacement
- If cc is something other than gcc and is the system compiler prefer using
- that, unless otherwise told via $CC. ok djm@
+ from likan_999.student AT sina.com
-commit 9b655dc9c9a353f0a527f0c6c43a5e35653c9503
+commit 6b7c53498def19a14dd9587bf521ab6dbee8988f
Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Sun Jan 20 14:55:27 2019 +1100
+Date: Mon Sep 2 10:22:02 2019 +1000
- last bits of old packet API / active_state global
+ retain Solaris PRIV_FILE_LINK_ANY in sftp-server
+
+ Dropping this privilege removes the ability to create hard links to
+ files owned by other users. This is required for the legacy sftp rename
+ operation.
+
+ bz#3036; approach ok Alex Wilson (the original author of the Solaris
+ sandbox/pledge replacement code)
-commit 3f0786bbe73609ac96e5a0d91425ee21129f8e04
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Sun Jan 20 10:22:18 2019 +1100
+commit e50f808712393e86d69e42e9847cdf8d473412d7
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Aug 30 05:08:28 2019 +0000
- remove PAM dependencies on old packet API
+ upstream: Use ed25519 for most hostkey rotation tests since it's
- Requires some caching of values, because the PAM code isn't
- always called with packet context.
+ supported even when built without OpenSSL. Use RSA for the secondary type
+ test if supported, otherwise skip it. Fixes this test for !OpenSSL builds.
+
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 101cb34a84fd974c623bdb2e496f25a6e91be109
-commit 08f66d9f17e12c1140d1f1cf5c4dce67e915d3cc
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Sun Jan 20 09:58:45 2019 +1100
+commit 5e4796c47dd8d6c38fb2ff0b3e817525fed6040d
+Author: bluhm@openbsd.org <bluhm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Aug 22 21:47:27 2019 +0000
- remove vestiges of old packet API from loginrec.c
+ upstream: Test did not compile due to missing symbols. Add source
+
+ sshbuf-misc.c to regress as it was done in ssh make file. from Moritz Buhl
+
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 9e1c23476bb845f3cf3d15d9032da3ed0cb2fcf5
-commit c327813ea1d740e3e367109c17873815aba1328e
+commit e0e7e3d0e26f2c30697e6d0cfc293414908963c7
Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Sun Jan 20 09:45:38 2019 +1100
-
- depend
-
-commit 135e302cfdbe91817294317c337cc38c3ff01cba
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sat Jan 19 22:30:52 2019 +0000
+Date: Fri Aug 30 14:26:19 2019 +1000
- upstream: fix error in refactor: use ssh_packet_disconnect() instead of
+ tweak warning flags
- sshpkt_error(). The first one logs the error and exits (what we want) instead
- of just logging and blundering on.
+ Enable -Wextra if compiler supports it
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 39f51b43641dce9ce0f408ea6c0e6e077e2e91ae
+ Set -Wno-error=format-truncation if available to prevent expected
+ string truncations in openbsd-compat from breaking -Werror builds
-commit 245c6a0b220b58686ee35bc5fc1c359e9be2faaa
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sat Jan 19 21:45:31 2019 +0000
+commit 28744182cf90e0073b76a9e98de58a47e688b2c4
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Fri Aug 30 13:21:38 2019 +1000
- upstream: remove last traces of old packet API!
+ proc_pidinfo()-based closefrom() for OS X
- with & ok markus@
+ Refactor closefrom() to use a single brute-force close() loop fallback.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9bd10437026423eb8245636ad34797a20fbafd7d
+ Based on patch from likan_999.student@sina.com in bz#3049. ok dtucker@
-commit 04c091fc199f17dacf8921df0a06634b454e2722
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sat Jan 19 21:43:56 2019 +0000
+commit dc2ca588144f088a54febebfde3414568dc73d5f
+Author: kn@openbsd.org <kn@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Aug 16 11:16:32 2019 +0000
- upstream: remove last references to active_state
+ upstream: Call comma-separated lists as such to clarify semantics
- with & ok markus@
+ Options such as Ciphers take values that may be a list of ciphers; the
+ complete list, not indiviual elements, may be prefixed with a dash or plus
+ character to remove from or append to the default list respectively.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 78619a50ea7e4ca2f3b54d4658b3227277490ba2
-
-commit ec00f918b8ad90295044266c433340a8adc93452
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sat Jan 19 21:43:07 2019 +0000
-
- upstream: convert monitor.c to new packet API
+ Users might read the current text as if each elment took an optional prefix,
+ so tweak the wording from "values" to "list" to prevent such ambiguity for
+ all options supporting this semantics (those that provide a list of
+ available elements via "ssh -Q ...").
- with & ok markus@
+ Input and OK jmc
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 61ecd154bd9804461a0cf5f495a29d919e0014d5
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4fdd175b0e5f5cb10ab3f26ccc38a93bb6515d57
-commit 6350e0316981489d4205952d6904d6fedba5bfe0
+commit c4736f39e66729ce2bf5b06ee6b391e092b48f47
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sat Jan 19 21:42:30 2019 +0000
+Date: Fri Aug 16 06:35:27 2019 +0000
- upstream: convert sshd.c to new packet API
-
- with & ok markus@
+ upstream: include sshbuf-misc.c in SRCS_BASE
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ea569d3eaf9b5cf1bad52779fbfa5fa0b28af891
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 99dd10e72c04e93849981d43d64c946619efa474
-commit a5e2ad88acff2b7d131ee6d5dc5d339b0f8c6a6d
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sat Jan 19 21:41:53 2019 +0000
+commit d0e51810f332fe44ebdba41113aacf319d35f5a5
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Sat Aug 24 15:12:11 2019 +1000
- upstream: convert session.c to new packet API
-
- with & ok markus@
+ Fix pasto in fallback code.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: fae817207e23099ddd248960c984f7b7f26ea68e
+ There is no parameter called "pathname", it should simply be "path".
+ bz#3059, patch from samuel at cendio.se.
-commit 3a00a921590d4c4b7e96df11bb10e6f9253ad45e
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sat Jan 19 21:41:18 2019 +0000
+commit e83c989bfd9fc9838b7dfb711d1dc6da81814045
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Fri Aug 23 10:19:30 2019 +1000
- upstream: convert auth.c to new packet API
-
- with & ok markus@
+ use SC_ALLOW_ARG_MASK to limit mmap protections
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7e10359f614ff522b52a3f05eec576257794e8e4
+ Restrict to PROT_(READ|WRITE|NONE), i.e. exclude PROT_EXEC
-commit 7ec5cb4d15ed2f2c5c9f5d00e6b361d136fc1e2d
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sat Jan 19 21:40:48 2019 +0000
+commit f6906f9bf12c968debec3671bbf19926ff8a235b
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Fri Aug 23 10:08:48 2019 +1000
- upstream: convert serverloop.c to new packet API
-
- with & ok markus@
+ allow mprotect(2) with PROT_(READ|WRITE|NONE) only
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c92dd19b55457541478f95c0d6b318426d86d885
+ Used by some hardened heap allocators. Requested by Yegor
+ Timoshenko in https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/pull/142
-commit 64c9598ac05332d1327cbf55334dee4172d216c4
+commit e3b6c966b79c3ea5d51b923c3bbdc41e13b96ea0
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sat Jan 19 21:40:21 2019 +0000
+Date: Fri Aug 16 06:13:15 2019 +0000
- upstream: convert the remainder of sshconnect2.c to new packet
-
- API
+ upstream: switch percent_expand() to use sshbuf instead of a limited
- with & ok markus@
+ fixed buffer; ok markus@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0986d324f2ceb5e8a12ac21c1bb10b3b4b1e0f71
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 3f9ef20bca5ef5058b48c1cac67c53b9a1d15711
-commit bc5e1169d101d16e3a5962a928db2bc49a8ef5a3
+commit 9ab5b9474779ac4f581d402ae397f871ed16b383
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sat Jan 19 21:39:12 2019 +0000
+Date: Fri Aug 9 05:05:54 2019 +0000
- upstream: convert the remainder of clientloop.c to new packet API
+ upstream: produce a useful error message if the user's shell is set
- with & ok markus@
+ incorrectly during "match exec" processing. bz#2791 reported by Dario
+ Bertini; ok dtucker
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ce2fbbacb86a290f31da1e7bf04cddf2bdae3d1e
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: cf9eddd6a6be726cb73bd9c3936f3888cd85c03d
-commit 5ebce136a6105f084db8f0d7ee41981d42daec40
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Sun Jan 20 09:44:53 2019 +1100
+commit 8fdbc7247f432578abaaca1b72a0dbf5058d67e5
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Aug 9 04:24:03 2019 +0000
- upstream: convert auth2.c to new packet API
+ upstream: Change description of TCPKeepAlive from "inactive" to
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ed831bb95ad228c6791bc18b60ce7a2edef2c999
+ "unresponsive" to clarify what it checks for. Patch from jblaine at
+ kickflop.net via github pr#129, ok djm@.
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 3682f8ec7227f5697945daa25d11ce2d933899e9
-commit 172a592a53ebe8649c4ac0d7946e6c08eb151af6
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sat Jan 19 21:37:48 2019 +0000
+commit 7afc45c3ed72672690014dc432edc223b23ae288
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Aug 8 08:02:57 2019 +0000
- upstream: convert servconf.c to new packet API
+ upstream: Allow the maximimum uint32 value for the argument passed to
- with & ok markus@
+ -b which allows better error messages from later validation. bz#3050, ok
+ djm@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 126553aecca302c9e02fd77e333b9cb217e623b4
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 10adf6876b2401b3dc02da580ebf67af05861673
-commit 8cc7a679d29cf6ecccfa08191e688c7f81ef95c2
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sat Jan 19 21:37:13 2019 +0000
+commit c31e4f5fb3915c040061981a67224de7650ab34b
+Author: naddy@openbsd.org <naddy@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Aug 5 21:45:27 2019 +0000
- upstream: convert channels.c to new packet API
+ upstream: Many key types are supported now, so take care to check
- with & ok markus@
+ the size restrictions and apply the default size only to the matching key
+ type. tweak and ok dtucker@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0b8279b56113cbd4011fc91315c0796b63dc862c
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b825de92d79cc4cba19b298c61e99909488ff57e
-commit 06232038c794c7dfcb087be0ab0b3e65b09fd396
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sat Jan 19 21:36:38 2019 +0000
+commit 6b39a7b49ebacec4e70e24bfc8ea2f11057aac22
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Aug 5 11:50:33 2019 +0000
- upstream: convert sshconnect.c to new packet API
+ upstream: Remove now-redundant perm_ok arg since
- with & ok markus@
+ sshkey_load_private_type will now return SSH_ERR_KEY_BAD_PERMISSIONS in that
+ case. Patch from jitendra.sharma at intel.com, ok djm@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 222337cf6c96c347f1022d976fac74b4257c061f
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 07916a17ed0a252591b71e7fb4be2599cb5b0c77
-commit 25b2ed667216314471bb66752442c55b95792dc3
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sat Jan 19 21:36:06 2019 +0000
+commit d46075b923bf25e6f25959a3f5b458852161cb3e
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Mon Aug 5 21:36:48 2019 +1000
- upstream: convert ssh.c to new packet API
-
- with & ok markus@
+ Fix mem leak in unit test.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: eb146878b24e85c2a09ee171afa6797c166a2e21
+ Patch from jitendra.sharma at intel.com.
-commit e3128b38623eef2fa8d6e7ae934d3bd08c7e973e
+commit c4ffb72593c08921cf9291bc05a5ef1d0aaa6891
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sat Jan 19 21:35:25 2019 +0000
+Date: Fri Aug 2 01:41:24 2019 +0000
- upstream: convert mux.c to new packet API
+ upstream: fix some memleaks in test_helper code
- with & ok markus@
+ bz#3037 from Jitendra Sharma
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4e3893937bae66416e984b282d8f0f800aafd802
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 71440fa9186f5842a65ce9a27159385c6cb6f751
-commit ed1df7226caf3a943a36d580d4d4e9275f8a61ee
+commit 6e76e69dc0c7712e9ac599af34bd091b0e7dcdb5
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sat Jan 19 21:34:45 2019 +0000
+Date: Fri Aug 2 01:23:19 2019 +0000
- upstream: convert sshconnect2.c to new packet API
-
- with & ok markus@
+ upstream: typo; from Christian Hesse
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1cb869e0d6e03539f943235641ea070cae2ebc58
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 82f6de7438ea7ee5a14f44fdf5058ed57688fdc3
-commit 23f22a4aaa923c61ec49a99ebaa383656e87fa40
+commit 49fa065a1bfaeb88a59abdfa4432d3b9c35b0655
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sat Jan 19 21:33:57 2019 +0000
+Date: Tue Jul 30 05:04:49 2019 +0000
- upstream: convert clientloop.c to new packet API
+ upstream: let sshbuf_find/cmp take a void* for the
- with & ok markus@
+ search/comparison argument, instead of a u_char*. Saves callers needing to
+ cast.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 497b36500191f452a22abf283aa8d4a9abaee7fa
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d63b69b7c5dd570963e682f758f5a47b825605ed
-commit ad60b1179c9682ca5aef0b346f99ef68cbbbc4e5
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sat Jan 19 21:33:13 2019 +0000
+commit 7adf6c430d6fc17901e167bc0789d31638f5c2f8
+Author: mestre@openbsd.org <mestre@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Jul 24 08:57:00 2019 +0000
- upstream: allow sshpkt_fatal() to take a varargs format; we'll
-
- use this to give packet-related fatal error messages more context (esp. the
- remote endpoint) ok markus@
+ upstream: When using a combination of a Yubikey+GnuPG+remote
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: de57211f9543426b515a8a10a4f481666b2b2a50
-
-commit 0fa174ebe129f3d0aeaf4e2d1dd8de745870d0ff
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sat Jan 19 21:31:32 2019 +0000
-
- upstream: begin landing remaining refactoring of packet parsing
+ forwarding the gpg-agent (and options ControlMaster+RemoteForward in
+ ssh_config(5)) then the codepath taken will call mux_client_request_session
+ -> mm_send_fd -> sendmsg(2). Since sendmsg(2) is not allowed in that codepath
+ then pledge(2) kills the process.
- API, started almost exactly six years ago.
+ The solution is to add "sendfd" to pledge(2), which is not too bad considering
+ a little bit later we reduce pledge(2) to only "stdio proc tty" in that
+ codepath.
- This change stops including the old packet_* API by default and makes
- each file that requires the old API include it explicitly. We will
- commit file-by-file refactoring to remove the old API in consistent
- steps.
+ Problem reported and diff provided by Timothy Brown <tbrown at freeshell.org>
- with & ok markus@
+ OK deraadt@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 93c98a6b38f6911fd1ae025a1ec57807fb4d4ef4
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7ce38b6542bbec00e441595d0a178e970a9472ac
-commit 4ae7f80dfd02f2bde912a67c9f338f61e90fa79f
-Author: tb@openbsd.org <tb@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sat Jan 19 04:15:56 2019 +0000
+commit 0e2fe18acc1da853a9120c2e9af68e8d05e6503e
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Jul 23 23:06:57 2019 +0000
- upstream: Print an \r in front of the password prompt so parts of
-
- a password that was entered too early are likely clobbered by the prompt.
- Idea from doas.
+ upstream: Fix typo in CASignatureAlgorithms wherein what should be
- from and ok djm
- "i like it" deraadt
+ a comma is a dot. Patch from hnj2 via github pr#141.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 5fb97c68df6d8b09ab37f77bca1d84d799c4084e
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 01f5a460438ff1af09aab483c0a70065309445f0
-commit a6258e5dc314c7d504ac9f0fbc3be96475581dbe
+commit e93ffd1a19fc47c49d68ae2fb332433690ecd389
Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Fri Jan 18 11:09:01 2019 +1100
+Date: Mon Jul 29 16:04:01 2019 +1000
- Add minimal fchownat and fchmodat implementations.
+ Report success of individual tests as well as all.
- Fixes builds on at least OS X Lion, NetBSD 6 and Solaris 10.
+ This puts the "all tests passed" message back at the end where the
+ test harnesses can find it.
-commit 091093d25802b87d3b2b09f2c88d9f33e1ae5562
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Fri Jan 18 12:11:42 2019 +1300
+commit 2ad5b36b18bddf2965fe60384c29b3f1d451b4ed
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Mon Jul 29 09:49:23 2019 +1000
- Add a minimal implementation of utimensat().
-
- Some systems (eg older OS X) do not have utimensat, so provide minimal
- implementation in compat layer. Fixes build on at least El Capitan.
+ convert to UTF-8; from Mike Frysinger
-commit 609644027dde1f82213699cb6599e584c7efcb75
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Jan 1 22:20:16 2019 +0000
+commit d31e7c937ba0b97534f373cf5dea34675bcec602
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Jul 26 04:22:21 2019 +0000
- upstream: regress bits for banner processing refactor (this test was
-
- depending on ssh returning a particular error message for banner parsing
- failure)
+ upstream: Restrict limit-keytype to types supported by build. This
- reminded by bluhm@
+ means we have to skip a couple tests when only one key type is supported.
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: f24fc303d40931157431df589b386abf5e1be575
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 22d05befb9c7ce21ce8dc22acf1ffe9e2ef2e95e
-commit f47d72ddad75b93d3cbc781718b0fa9046c03df8
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Jan 17 04:45:09 2019 +0000
+commit 0967a233b8a28907ae8a4a6773c89f21d2ace11b
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Thu Jul 25 18:36:28 2019 +1000
- upstream: tun_fwd_ifnames variable should b
-
- =?UTF-8?q?e=20extern;=20from=20Hanno=20B=C3=B6ck?=
- MIME-Version: 1.0
- Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
- Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+ Remove override disabling DH-GEX.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d53dede6e521161bf04d39d09947db6253a38271
+ The DH-GEX override doesn't work when build without OpenSSL, and
+ we'll prefer curve25519 these days, removing the need for it.
-commit 943d0965263cae1c080ce5a9d0b5aa341885e55d
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Jan 17 04:20:53 2019 +0000
+commit 061407efc19b41ab4a7485e5adcff2a12befacdb
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Jul 25 09:17:35 2019 +0000
- upstream: include time.h for time(3)/nanosleep(2); from Ian
+ upstream: Only use supported key types during KRL test, preferring
- McKellar
+ ed25519 since it's supported by both OpenSSL and non-OpenSSL builds.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 6412ccd06a88f65b207a1089345f51fa1244ea51
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 9f2bb3eadd50fcc8245b1bd8fd6f0e53602f71aa
-commit dbb4dec6d5d671b5e9d67ef02162a610ad052068
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Jan 17 01:50:24 2019 +0000
+commit 47f8ff1fa5b76790c1d785815fd13ee6009f8012
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Jul 25 08:48:11 2019 +0000
- upstream: many of the global variables in this file can be made static;
+ upstream: Switch keys-command test from rsa to ed25519 since it's
- patch from Markus Schmidt
+ supported for both OpenSSL and non-OpenSSL builds.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f3db619f67beb53257b21bac0e92b4fb7d5d5737
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 174be4be876edd493e4a5c851e5bc579885e7a0a
-commit 60d8c84e0887514c99c9ce071965fafaa1c3d34a
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Jan 16 23:23:45 2019 +0000
+commit 1e94afdfa8df774ab7dd3bad52912b636dc31bbd
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Jul 25 08:28:15 2019 +0000
- upstream: Add "-h" flag to sftp chown/chgrp/chmod commands to
-
- request they do not follow symlinks. Requires recently-committed
- lsetstat@openssh.com extension on the server side.
+ upstream: Make certificate tests work with the supported key
- ok markus@ dtucker@
+ algorithms. Allows tests to pass when built without OpenSSL.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f93bb3f6f7eb2fb7ef1e59126e72714f1626d604
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 617169a6dd9d06db3697a449d9a26c284eca20fc
-commit dbbc7e0eab7262f34b8e0cd6efecd1c77b905ed0
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Jan 16 23:22:10 2019 +0000
+commit 26bf693661a48b97b6023f702b2af643676ac21a
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Jul 23 13:49:14 2019 +0000
- upstream: add support for a "lsetstat@openssh.com" extension. This
-
- replicates the functionality of the existing SSH2_FXP_SETSTAT operation but
- does not follow symlinks. Based on a patch from Bert Haverkamp in bz#2067 but
- with more attribute modifications supported.
+ upstream: Construct list of key types to test based on the types
- ok markus@ dtucker@
+ supported by the binaries.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f7234f6e90db19655d55d936a115ee4ccb6aaf80
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: fcbd115efacec8ab0ecbdb3faef79ac696cb1d62
-commit 4a526941d328fc3d97068c6a4cbd9b71b70fe5e1
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Jan 4 03:27:50 2019 +0000
+commit 773c55b3d1230e8f7714a1b33873c37b85049c74
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Jul 23 13:32:48 2019 +0000
- upstream: eliminate function-static attempt counters for
-
- passwd/kbdint authmethods by moving them to the client authctxt; Patch from
- Markus Schmidt, ok markus@
+ upstream: Only use DSA key type in tests if binaries support it.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4df4404a5d5416eb056f68e0e2f4fa91ba3b3f7f
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 770e31fe61dc33ed8eea9c04ce839b33ddb4dc96
-commit 8a8183474c41bd6cebaa917346b549af2239ba2f
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Jan 4 03:23:00 2019 +0000
+commit 159e987a54d92ccd73875e7581ffc64e8927a715
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Wed Jul 24 14:21:19 2019 +1000
- upstream: fix memory leak of ciphercontext when rekeying; bz#2942
-
- Patch from Markus Schmidt; ok markus@
+ Split test targets further.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7877f1b82e249986f1ef98d0ae76ce987d332bdd
+ Splits test into file-tests, t-exec, unit and interop-tests and their
+ respective dependencies. Should allow running any set individually
+ without having to build the other dependencies that are not needed
+ for that specific test.
-commit 5bed70afce0907b6217418d0655724c99b683d93
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Jan 1 23:10:53 2019 +0000
+commit 520d4550a2470106d63e30079bb05ce82f3a4f7d
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Wed Jul 24 11:20:18 2019 +1000
- upstream: static on global vars, const on handler tables that contain
+ Add lib dependencies for regress binary targets.
+
+commit 4e8d0dd78d5f6142841a07dc8b8c6b4730eaf587
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Wed Jul 24 00:12:51 2019 +1000
+
+ Make "unit" a dependency of "test".
+
+commit 4317b2a0480e293e58ba115e47b49d3a384b6568
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Tue Jul 23 23:24:47 2019 +1000
+
+ upstream rev 1.28: fix comment typo.
+
+commit e0055af2bd39fdb44566ff6594147664e1fac8b8
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Tue Jul 23 23:06:22 2019 +1000
+
+ Split regress-binaries into two targets.
- function pointers; from Mike Frysinger
+ Split the binaries for the unit tests out into a regress-unit-binaries
+ target, and add a dependency on it for only the unit tests. This allows
+ us to run the integration tests only ("make t-exec") without building
+ the unit tests, which allows us to run a subset of the tests when
+ building --without-openssl without trying (and failing) to build the
+ unit tests.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7ef2305e50d3caa6326286db43cf2cfaf03960e0
+ This means there are two targets for "unit" which I *think* is valid
+ (it works in testing, and makedepend will generate Makefiles of this
+ form)a but I could be wrong.
-commit 007a88b48c97d092ed2f501bbdcb70d9925277be
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Dec 27 23:02:11 2018 +0000
+commit 7cdf9fdcf11aaaa98c2bd22c92882ea559e772ad
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Jul 23 08:19:29 2019 +0000
- upstream: Request RSA-SHA2 signatures for
+ upstream: Skip DH group generation test if binaries don't support
- rsa-sha2-{256|512}-cert-v01@openssh.com cert algorithms; ok markus@
+ DH-GEX.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: afc6f7ca216ccd821656d1c911d2a3deed685033
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 7c918230d969ecf7656babd6191a74526bffbffd
-commit eb347d086c35428c47fe52b34588cbbc9b49d9a6
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Dec 27 03:37:49 2018 +0000
+commit 3a3eab8bb0da3d2f0f32cb85a1a268bcca6e4d69
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Jul 23 07:55:29 2019 +0000
- upstream: ssh_packet_set_state() now frees ssh->kex implicitly, so
+ upstream: Only test conversion of key types supported by the
- don't do explicit kex_free() beforehand
+ binaries.
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: f2f73bad47f62a2040ccba0a72cadcb12eda49cf
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: e3f0938a0a7407e2dfbb90abc3ec979ab6e8eeea
-commit bb542f0cf6f7511a22a08c492861e256a82376a9
-Author: tedu@openbsd.org <tedu@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sat Dec 15 00:50:21 2018 +0000
+commit 7e66b7d98c6e3f48a1918c3e1940c9b11b10ec63
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Jul 23 07:39:43 2019 +0000
- upstream: remove unused and problematic sudo clean. ok espie
+ upstream: Only add ssh-dss to allowed key types if it's supported
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: ca90c20a15a85b661e13e98b80c10e65cd662f7b
+ by the binary.
+
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 395a54cab16e9e4ece9aec047ab257954eebd413
-commit 0a843d9a0e805f14653a555f5c7a8ba99d62c12d
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Dec 27 03:25:24 2018 +0000
+commit fd0684b319e664d8821dc4ca3026126dfea3ccf4
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Tue Jul 23 22:36:39 2019 +1000
- upstream: move client/server SSH-* banners to buffers under
-
- ssh->kex and factor out the banner exchange. This eliminates some common code
- from the client and server.
-
- Also be more strict about handling \r characters - these should only
- be accepted immediately before \n (pointed out by Jann Horn).
-
- Inspired by a patch from Markus Schmidt.
- (lots of) feedback and ok markus@
+ Remove sys/cdefs.h include.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1cc7885487a6754f63641d7d3279b0941890275b
+ It's not needed on -portable (that's handled by includes.h) and not all
+ platforms have it.
-commit 434b587afe41c19391821e7392005068fda76248
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Dec 7 04:36:09 2018 +0000
+commit 9634ffbf29b3c2493e69d10b37077b09a8cbf5ff
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Tue Jul 23 22:25:44 2019 +1000
- upstream: Fix calculation of initial bandwidth limits. Account for
-
- written bytes before the initial timer check so that the first buffer written
- is accounted. Set the threshold after which the timer is checked such that
- the limit starts being computed as soon as possible, ie after the second
- buffer is written. This prevents an initial burst of traffic and provides a
- more accurate bandwidth limit. bz#2927, ok djm.
-
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ff3ef76e4e43040ec198c2718d5682c36b255cb6
+ Add headers to prevent warnings w/out OpenSSL.
-commit a6a0788cbbe8dfce2819ee43b09c80725742e21c
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Dec 7 03:39:40 2018 +0000
+commit 2ea60312e1c08dea88982fec68244f89a40912ff
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Tue Jul 23 22:11:50 2019 +1000
- upstream: only consider the ext-info-c extension during the initial
-
- KEX. It shouldn't be sent in subsequent ones, but if it is present we should
- ignore it.
+ Include stdlib.h for free() and calloc().
+
+commit 11cba2a4523fda447e2554ea457484655bedc831
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Tue Jul 23 21:51:22 2019 +1000
+
+ Re-apply portability changes to current sha2.{c,h}.
- This prevents sshd from sending a SSH_MSG_EXT_INFO for REKEX for buggy
- these clients. Reported by Jakub Jelen via bz2929; ok dtucker@
+ Rather than attempt to apply 14 years' worth of changes to OpenBSD's sha2
+ I imported the current versions directly then re-applied the portability
+ changes. This also allowed re-syncing digest-libc.c against upstream.
+
+commit 09159594a3bbd363429ee6fafde57ce77986dd7c
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Tue Jul 23 20:27:51 2019 +1000
+
+ Import current sha2.c and sha2.h from OpenBSD.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 91564118547f7807030ec537480303e2371902f9
+ These are not changed from their original state, the next commit will
+ re-apply the portable changes.
-commit 63bba57a32c5bb6158d57cf4c47022daf89c14a0
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Dec 7 03:33:18 2018 +0000
+commit 2e6035b900cc9d7432d95084e03993d1b426f812
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Tue Jul 23 08:11:22 2019 +1000
- upstream: fix option letter pasto in previous
+ Rename valgrind "errors" to "failures".
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e26c8bf2f2a808f3c47960e1e490d2990167ec39
+ When valgrind is enabled, test-exec.sh counts the number of invocations
+ that valgrind detects failures in, not the total number of errors detected.
+ This makes the name to be more accurate.
-commit 737e4edd82406595815efadc28ed5161b8b0c01a
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Dec 7 03:32:26 2018 +0000
+commit e82c9bb9ffa65725cc2e03ea81cb79ce3387f66b
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Fri Jul 19 18:51:18 2019 +1000
- upstream: mention that the ssh-keygen -F (find host in
+ Skip running sftp-chroot under Valgrind.
+
+commit 41e22c2e05cb950b704945ac9408f6109c9b7848
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sat Jul 20 09:50:58 2019 +0000
+
+ upstream: Remove the sleeps and thus races from the forwarding
- authorized_keys) and -R (remove host from authorized_keys) options may accept
- either a bare hostname or a [hostname]:port combo. bz#2935
+ test. They were originally required to work with Protocol 1, but now we can
+ use ssh -N and the control socket without the sleeps. While there, suppress
+ output fro the control exit commands.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 5535cf4ce78375968b0d2cd7aa316fa3eb176780
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 4c51a1d651242f12c90074c18c61008a74c1c790
-commit 8a22ffaa13391cfe5b40316d938fe0fb931e9296
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Fri Dec 7 15:41:16 2018 +1100
+commit 0423043c5e54293f4dd56041304fd0046c317be9
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sat Jul 20 09:37:31 2019 +0000
- expose $SSH_CONNECTION in the PAM environment
+ upstream: Allow SLEEPTIME to be overridden.
- This makes the connection 4-tuple available to PAM modules that
- wish to use it in decision-making. bz#2741
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 1596ab168729954be3d219933b2d01cc93687e76
-commit a784fa8c7a7b084d63bae82ccfea902131bb45c5
-Author: Kevin Adler <kadler@us.ibm.com>
-Date: Wed Dec 12 22:12:45 2018 -0600
+commit d466b6a5cfba17a83c7aae9f584ab164e2ece0a1
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sat Jul 20 09:14:40 2019 +0000
- Don't pass loginmsg by address now that it's an sshbuf*
+ upstream: Move sleep time into a variable so that we can increase
- In 120a1ec74, loginmsg was changed from the legacy Buffer type
- to struct sshbuf*, but it missed changing calls to
- sys_auth_allowed_user and sys_auth_record_login which passed
- loginmsg by address. Now that it's a pointer, just pass it directly.
+ it for platforms or configurations that are much slower then usual.
- This only affects AIX, unless there are out of tree users.
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 88586cabc800062c260d0b876bdcd4ca3f58a872
-commit 285310b897969a63ef224d39e7cc2b7316d86940
+commit b4a7c9d2b5f928e0b902b580d35dc8b244a3aae0
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Dec 7 02:31:20 2018 +0000
+Date: Fri Jul 19 03:45:44 2019 +0000
- upstream: no need to allocate channels_pre/channels_post in
+ upstream: add regression tests for scp for out-of-destination path file
- channel_init_channels() as we do it anyway in channel_handler_init() that we
- call at the end of the function. Fix from Markus Schmidt via bz#2938
+ creation by Harry Sintonen via Jakub Jelen in bz3007
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 74893638af49e3734f1e33a54af1b7ea533373ed
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 01ae5fbc6ce400b2df5a84dc3152a9e31f354c07
-commit 87d6cf1cbc91df6815db8fe0acc7c910bc3d18e4
+commit bca0582063f148c7ddf409ec51435a5a726bee4c
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Nov 30 02:24:52 2018 +0000
+Date: Fri Jul 19 03:38:01 2019 +0000
- upstream: don't attempt to connect to empty SSH_AUTH_SOCK; bz#293
+ upstream: Accept the verbose flag when searching for host keys in known
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0e8fc8f19f14b21adef7109e0faa583d87c0e929
-
-commit 91b19198c3f604f5eef2c56dbe36f29478243141
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Nov 28 06:00:38 2018 +0000
-
- upstream: don't truncate user or host name in "user@host's
+ hosts (i.e. "ssh-keygen -vF host") to print the matching host's random- art
+ signature too. bz#3003 "amusing, pretty" deraadt@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e6ca01a8d58004b7f2cac0b1b7ce8f87e425e360
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 686221a5447d6507f40a2ffba5393984d889891f
-commit dd0cf6318d9b4b3533bda1e3bc021b2cd7246b7a
-Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Nov 23 06:58:28 2018 +0000
+commit 5299a09fa2879a068af200c91028fcfa9283c0f0
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Fri Jul 19 13:50:25 2019 +1000
- upstream: tweak previous;
+ Revert one dependency per line change.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 08f096922eb00c98251501c193ff9e83fbb5de4f
+ It turns out that having such a large number of lines in the .depend
+ file will cause the memory usage of awk during AC_SUBST to blow up on at
+ least NetBSD's awk, causing configure to fail.
-commit 8a85f5458d1c802471ca899c97f89946f6666e61
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Sun Nov 25 21:44:05 2018 +1100
+commit 01dddb231f23b4a7b616f9d33a0b9d937f9eaf0e
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Fri Jul 19 13:19:19 2019 +1000
- Include stdio.h for FILE if needed.
+ fix SIGWINCH delivery of Solaris for mux sessions
+
+ Remove PRIV_PROC_SESSION which was limiting ability to send SIGWINCH
+ signals to other sessions. bz#3030; report and fix from Darren Moffat
-commit 16fb23f25454991272bfe4598cc05d20fcd25116
+commit 05500af21d27c1a3ddac232b018cc23da7b1ee95
Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Sun Nov 25 14:05:57 2018 +1100
+Date: Fri Jul 19 13:20:03 2019 +1000
- Reverse order of OpenSSL init functions.
+ Force dependencies one per line.
- Try the new init function (OPENSSL_init_crypto) before falling back to
- the old one (OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms).
+ Force makedepend to output one dependency per line, which will make
+ reading diffs against it much easier. ok djm@
-commit 98f878d2272bf8dff21f2a0265d963c29e33fed2
+commit b5bc5d016bbb83eb7f8e685390044e78b1ea1427
Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Sun Nov 25 14:05:08 2018 +1100
+Date: Fri Jul 19 13:18:07 2019 +1000
- Improve OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms check.
-
- OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms() may be a macro so check for that too.
+ make depend.
-commit 9e34e0c59ab04514f9de9934a772283f7f372afe
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Nov 23 05:08:07 2018 +0000
+commit 65333f7454365fe40f7367630e7dd10903b9d99e
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Fri Jul 19 13:16:11 2019 +1000
- upstream: add a ssh_config "Match final" predicate
-
- Matches in same pass as "Match canonical" but doesn't require
- hostname canonicalisation be enabled. bz#2906 ok markus
-
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: fba1dfe9f6e0cabcd0e2b3be13f7a434199beffa
+ Show when skipping valgrind for a test.
-commit 4da58d58736b065b1182b563d10ad6765d811c6d
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Nov 23 02:53:57 2018 +0000
+commit fccb7eb3436da8ef3dcd22e5936ba1abc7ae6730
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Fri Jul 19 10:41:56 2019 +1000
- upstream: Remove now-unneeded ifdef SIGINFO around handler since it is
-
- now always used for SIGUSR1 even when SIGINFO is not defined. This will make
- things simpler in -portable.
+ Enable connect-privsep test with valgrind.
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 4ff0265b335820b0646d37beb93f036ded0dc43f
+ connect-privsep seems to work OK with valgrind now so don't skip
+ valgrind on it.
-commit c721d5877509875c8515df0215fa1dab862013bc
+commit d7423017265c5ae6d0be39340feb6c9f016b1f71
Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Fri Nov 23 14:11:20 2018 +1100
+Date: Fri Jul 19 07:43:07 2019 +1000
- Move RANDOM_SEED_SIZE outside ifdef.
-
- RANDOM_SEED_SIZE is used by both the OpenSSL and non-OpenSSL code
- This fixes the build with configureed --without-openssl.
+ Show valgrind results and error counts.
-commit deb51552c3ce7ce72c8d0232e4f36f2e7c118c7d
+commit 22b9b3e944880db906c6ac5527c4228bd92b293a
Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Thu Nov 22 19:59:28 2018 +1100
+Date: Thu Jul 18 13:40:12 2019 +1000
- Resync with OpenBSD by pulling in an ifdef SIGINFO.
+ Fix format string integer type in error message.
-commit 28c7b2cd050f4416bfcf3869a20e3ea138aa52fe
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Fri Nov 23 10:45:20 2018 +1100
+commit ed46a0c0705895834d3f47a46faa89c2a71b760a
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Jul 18 13:26:00 2019 +0000
- fix configure test for OpenSSL version
+ upstream: fix off-by-one in sshbuf_dtob64() base64 wrapping that could
- square brackets in case statements may be eaten by autoconf.
+ cause extra newlines to be appended at the end of the base64 text (ugly, but
+ harmless). Found and fixed by Sebastian Kinne
- Report and fix from Filipp Gunbin; tweaked by naddy@
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9fe290bd68f706ed8f986a7704ca5a2bd32d7b68
-commit 42c5ec4b97b6a1bae70f323952d0646af16ce710
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Fri Nov 23 10:40:06 2018 +1100
+commit a192021fedead23c375077f92346336d531f8cad
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Thu Jul 18 11:09:38 2019 +1000
- refactor libcrypto initialisation
-
- Don't call OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms() unless OpenSSL actually
- supports it.
+ Fail tests if Valgrind enabled and reports errors.
- Move all libcrypto initialisation to a single function, and call that
- from seed_rng() that is called early in each tool's main().
+ Also dump the failing valgrind report to stdout (not the cleanest
+ solution, but better than nothing).
+
+commit d1c491ecb939ee10b341fa7bb6205dff19d297e5
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Thu Jul 18 10:17:54 2019 +1000
+
+ Allow low-priv tests to write to pipe dir.
- Prompted by patch from Rosen Penev
+ When running regression tests with Valgrind and SUDO, the low-priv agent
+ tests need to be able to create pipes in the appropriate directory.
-commit 5b60b6c02009547a3e2a99d4886965de2a4719da
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Nov 22 08:59:11 2018 +0000
+commit 8a5bb3e78191cc206f970c26d2a26c949971e91a
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Wed Jul 17 21:24:55 2019 +1000
- upstream: Output info on SIGUSR1 as well as
+ Put valgrind vgdb files to a specific directory.
- SIGINFO to resync with portable. (ID sync only).
+ Valgrind by default puts vgdb files and pipes under /tmp, however it
+ is not always able to clean them up, which can cause test failures when
+ there's a pid/file collision. Using a specific directory ensures that
+ we can clean up and start clean.
+
+commit f8829fe57fb0479d6103cfe1190095da3c032c6d
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Jul 16 22:16:49 2019 +0000
+
+ upstream: adapt to sshbuf_dtob64() change
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 699d153e2de22dce51a1b270c40a98472d1a1b16
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 82374a83edf0955fd1477169eee3f5d6467405a6
-commit e4ae345dc75b34fd870c2e8690d831d2c1088eb7
+commit 1254fcbb2f005f745f2265016ee9fa52e16d37b0
Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Nov 22 08:48:32 2018 +0000
+Date: Tue Jul 16 03:21:54 2019 +0000
- upstream: Append pid to temp files in /var/run and set a cleanup
+ upstream: Remove ssh1 files from CLEANFILES since ssh1 no longer
- trap for them. This allows multiple instances of tests to run without
- colliding.
+ supported.
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 57add105ecdfc54752d8003acdd99eb68c3e0b4c
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 5b9ae869dc669bac05939b4a2fdf44ee067acfa0
-commit f72d0f52effca5aa20a193217346615ecd3eed53
+commit 9dc81a5adabc9a7d611ed2e63fbf4c85d43b15c6
Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Oct 31 11:09:27 2018 +0000
+Date: Tue Jul 16 02:09:29 2019 +0000
- upstream: UsePrivilegeSeparation no is deprecated
+ upstream: Update names of host key files in CLEANFILES to match
- test "yes" and "sandbox".
+ recent changes to the tests.
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 80e685ed8990766527dc629b1affc09a75bfe2da
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 28743052de3acf70b06f18333561497cd47c4ecf
-commit 35d0e5fefc419bddcbe09d7fc163d8cd3417125b
+commit e44e4ad1190db22ed407a79f32a8cff5bcd2b815
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Tue Jul 16 23:26:53 2019 +1000
+
+ depend
+
+commit 16dd8b2c78a0de106c7429e2a294d203f6bda3c7
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Oct 17 23:28:05 2018 +0000
+Date: Tue Jul 16 13:18:39 2019 +0000
- upstream: add some knobs:
-
- UNITTEST_FAST?= no # Skip slow tests (e.g. less intensive fuzzing).
- UNITTEST_SLOW?= no # Include slower tests (e.g. more intensive fuzzing).
- UNITTEST_VERBOSE?= no # Verbose test output (inc. per-test names).
+ upstream: remove mostly vestigal uuencode.[ch]; moving the only unique
- useful if you want to run the tests as a smoke test to exercise the
- functionality without waiting for all the fuzzers to run.
+ functionality there (wrapping of base64-encoded data) to sshbuf functions;
+ feedback and ok markus@
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: e04d82ebec86068198cd903acf1c67563c57315e
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4dba6735d88c57232f6fccec8a08bdcfea44ac4c
-commit c1941293d9422a14dda372b4c21895e72aa7a063
+commit 45478898f9590b5cc8bc7104e573b84be67443b0
Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Thu Nov 22 15:52:26 2018 +1100
+Date: Tue Jul 16 09:20:23 2019 +1000
- Resync Makefile.inc with upstream.
+ Hook memmem compat code into build.
- It's unused in -portable, but having it out of sync makes other syncs
- fail to apply.
+ This fixes builds on platforms that don't have it (at least old DragonFly,
+ probably others).
-commit 928f1231f65f88cd4c73e6e0edd63d2cf6295d77
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Nov 19 04:12:32 2018 +0000
+commit c7bd4617293a903bd3fac3394a7e72d439af49a5
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Tue Jul 16 09:07:18 2019 +1000
- upstream: silence (to log level debug2) failure messages when
-
- loading the default hostkeys. Hostkeys explicitly specified in the
- configuration or on the command-line are still reported as errors, and
- failure to load at least one host key remains a fatal error.
- MIME-Version: 1.0
- Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
- Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
-
- Based on patch from Dag-Erling Smørgrav via
- https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/pull/103
-
- ok markus@
-
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ffc2e35a75d1008effaf05a5e27425041c27b684
+ Import memmem.c from OpenBSD.
-commit 7fca94edbe8ca9f879da9fdd2afd959c4180f4c7
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sun Nov 18 22:43:29 2018 +0000
+commit 477e2a3be8b10df76e8d76f0427b043280d73d68
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Jul 15 13:12:02 2019 +0000
- upstream: Fix inverted logic for redirecting ProxyCommand stderr to
-
- /dev/null. Fixes mosh in proxycommand mode that was broken by the previous
- ProxyCommand change that was reported by matthieu@. ok djm@ danj@
+ upstream: unit tests for sshbuf_cmp() and sshbuf_find(); ok markus
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c6fc9641bc250221a0a81c6beb2e72d603f8add6
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: b52d36bc3ab6dc158c1e59a9a4735f821cf9e1fd
-commit ccef7c4faf914993b53035cd2b25ce02ab039c9d
+commit eb0d8e708a1f958aecd2d6e2ff2450af488d4c2a
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Nov 16 06:17:38 2018 +0000
+Date: Mon Jul 15 13:16:29 2019 +0000
- upstream: redirect stderr of ProxyCommands to /dev/null when ssh is
+ upstream: support PKCS8 as an optional format for storage of
- started with ControlPersist; based on patch from Steffen Prohaska
+ private keys, enabled via "ssh-keygen -m PKCS8" on operations that save
+ private keys to disk.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1bcaa14a03ae80369d31021271ec75dce2597957
+ The OpenSSH native key format remains the default, but PKCS8 is a
+ superior format to PEM if interoperability with non-OpenSSH software
+ is required, as it may use a less terrible KDF (IIRC PEM uses a single
+ round of MD5 as a KDF).
+
+ adapted from patch by Jakub Jelen via bz3013; ok markus
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 027824e3bc0b1c243dc5188504526d73a55accb1
-commit 15182fd96845a03216d7ac5a2cf31c4e77e406e3
+commit e18a27eedccb024acb3cd9820b650a5dff323f01
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Nov 16 06:10:29 2018 +0000
+Date: Mon Jul 15 13:11:38 2019 +0000
- upstream: make grandparent-parent-child sshbuf chains robust to
+ upstream: two more bounds-checking sshbuf counterparts to common
- use-after-free faults if the ancestors are freed before the descendents.
- Nothing in OpenSSH uses this deallocation pattern. Reported by Jann Horn
+ string operations: sshbuf_cmp() (bcmp-like) and sshbuf_find() (memmem like)
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d93501d1d2734245aac802a252b9bb2eccdba0f2
+ feedback and ok markus@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: fd071ec2485c7198074a168ff363a0d6052a706a
-commit 2a35862e664afde774d4a72497d394fe7306ccb5
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Nov 16 03:26:01 2018 +0000
+commit bc551dfebb55845537b1095cf3ccd01640a147b7
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Mon Jul 15 12:52:45 2019 +1000
- upstream: use path_absolute() for pathname checks; from Manoj Ampalam
-
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 482ce71a5ea5c5f3bc4d00fd719481a6a584d925
+ Clear valgrind-out dir to prevent collisions.
-commit d0d1dfa55be1c5c0d77ab3096b198a64235f936d
+commit 5db9ba718e983661a9114ae1418f6e412d1f52d5
Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Fri Nov 16 14:11:44 2018 +1100
+Date: Mon Jul 15 12:02:27 2019 +1000
- Test for OPENSSL_init_crypto before using.
-
- Check for the presence of OPENSSL_init_crypto and all the flags we want
- before trying to use it (bz#2931).
+ Allow agent tests to write to valgrind dir.
-commit 6010c0303a422a9c5fa8860c061bf7105eb7f8b2
+commit 121e48fa5305f41f0477d9908e3d862987a68a84
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Nov 16 03:03:10 2018 +0000
+Date: Sun Jul 14 23:33:19 2019 +0000
- upstream: disallow empty incoming filename or ones that refer to the
+ upstream: unit tests for sshbuf_peek/poke bounds-checked random access
- current directory; based on report/patch from Harry Sintonen
+ functions. ok markus@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f27651b30eaee2df49540ab68d030865c04f6de9
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 034c4284b1da6b12e25c762a6b958efacdafbaef
-commit aaed635e3a401cfcc4cc97f33788179c458901c3
+commit 101d164723ffbc38f8036b6f3ea3bfef771ba250
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Nov 16 02:46:20 2018 +0000
+Date: Sun Jul 14 23:32:27 2019 +0000
- upstream: fix bug in client that was keeping a redundant ssh-agent
+ upstream: add some functions to perform random-access read/write
- socket around for the life of the connection; bz#2912; reported by Simon
- Tatham; ok dtucker@
+ operations inside buffers with bounds checking. Intended to replace manual
+ pointer arithmetic wherever possible.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4ded588301183d343dce3e8c5fc1398e35058478
+ feedback and ok markus@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 91771fde7732738f1ffed078aa5d3bee6d198409
-commit e76135e3007f1564427b2956c628923d8dc2f75a
+commit 7250879c72d28275a53f2f220e49646c3e42ef18
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Nov 16 02:43:56 2018 +0000
+Date: Fri Jul 12 04:08:39 2019 +0000
- upstream: fix bug in HostbasedAcceptedKeyTypes and
+ upstream: include SHA2-variant RSA key algorithms in KEX proposal;
- PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes options. If only RSA-SHA2 siganture types were
- specified, then authentication would always fail for RSA keys as the monitor
- checks only the base key (not the signature algorithm) type against
- *AcceptedKeyTypes. bz#2746; reported by Jakub Jelen; ok dtucker
+ allows ssh-keyscan to harvest keys from servers that disable olde SHA1
+ ssh-rsa. bz#3029 from Jakub Jelen
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 117bc3dc54578dbdb515a1d3732988cb5b00461b
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9f95ebf76a150c2f727ca4780fb2599d50bbab7a
-commit 5c1a63562cac0574c226224075b0829a50b48c9d
+commit a0876bd994cab9ba6e47ba2a163a4417c7597487
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Nov 16 02:30:20 2018 +0000
+Date: Fri Jul 12 03:56:21 2019 +0000
- upstream: support a prefix of '@' to suppress echo of sftp batch
+ upstream: print explicit "not modified" message if a file was
- commands; bz#2926; ok dtucker@
+ requested for resumed download but was considered already complete.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9d635636bc84aeae796467e059f7634de990a79d
+ bz#2978 ok dtucker
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f32084b26a662f16215ee4ca4a403d67e49ab986
-commit 90ef45f7aac33eaf55ec344e101548a01e570f29
-Author: schwarze@openbsd.org <schwarze@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Nov 13 07:22:45 2018 +0000
+commit b9b0f2ac9625933db53a35b1c1ce423876630558
+Author: tb@openbsd.org <tb@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Jul 10 07:04:27 2019 +0000
- upstream: fix markup error (missing blank before delimiter); from
+ upstream: Fix a typo and make <esc><right> move right to the
- Mike Frysinger <vapier at gentoo dot org>
+ closest end of a word just like <esc><left> moves left to the closest
+ beginning of a word.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1bc5392f795ca86318d695e0947eaf71a5a4f6d9
+ ok djm
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 6afe01b05ed52d8b12eb1fda6e9af5afb5e198ee
-commit 960e7c672dc106f3b759c081de3edb4d1138b36e
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Nov 9 02:57:58 2018 +0000
-
- upstream: typo in error message; caught by Debian lintian, via
-
- Colin Watson
-
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: bff614c7bd1f4ca491a84e9b5999f848d0d66758
-
-commit 81f1620c836e6c79c0823ba44acca605226a80f1
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Nov 9 02:56:22 2018 +0000
-
- upstream: correct local variable name; from yawang AT microsoft.com
-
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a0c228390856a215bb66319c89cb3959d3af8c87
-
-commit 1293740e800fa2e5ccd38842a2e4970c6f3b9831
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Oct 31 11:20:05 2018 +0000
+commit 8729498a5d239980a91d32f031b34e8c58c52f62
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Wed Jul 10 09:43:19 2019 +1000
- upstream: Import new moduli.
+ fix typo that prevented detection of Linux VRF
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c07772f58028fda683ee6abd41c73da3ff70d403
+ Reported by hexiaowen AT huawei.com
-commit 46925ae28e53fc9add336a4fcdb7ed4b86c3591c
+commit 5b2b79ff7c057ee101518545727ed3023372891d
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Oct 26 01:23:03 2018 +0000
+Date: Tue Jul 9 04:15:00 2019 +0000
- upstream: mention ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com in list of cert
+ upstream: cap the number of permiopen/permitlisten directives we're
- key type at start of doc
+ willing to parse on a single authorized_keys line; ok deraadt@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b46b0149256d67f05f2d5d01e160634ed1a67324
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a43a752c2555d26aa3fc754805a476f6e3e30f46
-commit 8d8340e2c215155637fe19cb1a837f71b2d55f7b
+commit eb0b51dac408fadd1fd13fa6d726ab8fdfcc4152
Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Fri Nov 16 13:32:13 2018 +1100
+Date: Mon Jul 8 17:27:26 2019 +1000
- Remove fallback check for /usr/local/ssl.
+ Move log.h include inside ifdefs.
- If configure could not find a working OpenSSL installation it would
- fall back to checking in /usr/local/ssl. This made sense back when
- systems did not ship with OpenSSL, but most do and OpenSSL 1.1 doesn't
- use that as a default any more. The fallback behaviour also meant
- that if you pointed --with-ssl-dir at a specific directory and it
- didn't work, it would silently use either the system libs or the ones
- in /usr/local/ssl. If you want to use /usr/local/ssl you'll need to
- pass configure --with-ssl-dir=/usr/local/ssl. ok djm@
+ Fixes build on some other platforms that don't have va_list immediately
+ available (eg NetBSD).
-commit ce93472134fb22eff73edbcd173a21ae38889331
+commit 43702f8e6fa22a258e25c4dd950baaae0bc656b7
Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Fri Nov 16 12:44:01 2018 +1100
+Date: Sat Jul 6 23:07:04 2019 +1000
- Fix check for OpenSSL 1.0.1 exactly.
+ Include log.h for debug() and friends.
- Both INSTALL and configure.ac claim OpenSSL >= 1.0.1 is supported; fix
- compile-time check for 1.0.1 to match.
+ Should fix some compiler warnings on IRIX (bz#3032).
-commit f2970868f86161a22b2c377057fa3891863a692a
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Sun Nov 11 15:58:20 2018 +1100
+commit 53a6ebf1445a857f5e487b18ee5e5830a9575149
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Mon Jul 8 13:44:32 2019 +1000
- Improve warnings in cygwin service setup.
-
- bz#2922, patch from vinschen at redhat.com.
+ sftp-realpath.c needs includes.h
-commit bd2d54fc1eee84bf87158a1277a50e6c8a303339
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Sun Nov 11 15:54:54 2018 +1100
+commit 4efe1adf05ee5d3fce44320fcff68735891f4ee6
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Mon Jul 8 13:38:39 2019 +1000
- Remove hardcoded service name in cygwin setup.
+ remove realpath() compat replacement
- bz#2922, patch from Christian.Lupien at USherbrooke.ca, sanity check
- by vinschen at redhat.com.
-
-commit d0153c77bf7964e694f1d26c56c41a571b8e9466
-Author: Dag-Erling Smørgrav <des@des.no>
-Date: Tue Oct 9 23:03:40 2018 +0200
-
- AC_CHECK_SIZEOF() no longer needs a second argument.
+ We shipped a BSD implementation of realpath() because sftp-server
+ depended on its behaviour.
+
+ OpenBSD is now moving to a more strictly POSIX-compliant realpath(2),
+ so sftp-server now unconditionally requires its own BSD-style realpath
+ implementation. As such, there is no need to carry another independant
+ implementation in openbsd-compat.
+
+ ok dtucker@
-commit 9b47b083ca9d866249ada9f02dbd57c87b13806e
-Author: Manoj Ampalam <manojamp@microsoft.com>
-Date: Thu Nov 8 22:41:59 2018 -0800
+commit 696fb4298e80f2ebcd188986a91b49af3b7ca14c
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sun Jul 7 01:05:00 2019 +0000
- Fix error message w/out nistp521.
+ upstream: Remove some set but never used variables. ok daraadt@
- Correct error message when OpenSSL doesn't support certain ECDSA key
- lengths.
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 824baf9c59afc66a4637017e397b9b74a41684e7
-commit 624d19ac2d56fa86a22417c35536caceb3be346f
-Author: Eneas U de Queiroz <cote2004-github@yahoo.com>
-Date: Tue Oct 9 16:17:42 2018 -0300
+commit 156e9e85e92b46ca90226605d9eff49e8ec31b22
+Author: deraadt@openbsd.org <deraadt@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Jul 5 12:35:40 2019 +0000
- fix compilation with openssl built without ECC
-
- ECDSA code in openssh-compat.h and libressl-api-compat.c needs to be
- guarded by OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
+ upstream: still compile uuencode.c, unbreaks build
- Signed-off-by: Eneas U de Queiroz <cote2004-github@yahoo.com>
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 5ea3d63ab972691f43e9087ab5fd8376d48e898f
-commit 1801cd11d99d05a66ab5248c0555f55909a355ce
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Thu Nov 8 15:03:11 2018 +1100
+commit cec9ee527a12b1f6c2e0a1c155fec64a38d71cf6
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Jul 5 07:32:01 2019 +0000
- Simplify OpenSSL 1.1 function checks.
+ upstream: revert header removal that snuck into previous
- Replace AC_SEARCH_LIBS checks for OpenSSL 1.1 functions with a single
- AC_CHECK_FUNCS. ok djm@
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 3919cdd58989786660b8269b325646ef8856428e
-commit bc32f118d484e4d71d2a0828fd4eab7e4176c9af
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Mon Nov 5 17:31:24 2018 +1100
+commit 569b650f93b561c09c655f83f128e1dfffe74101
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Jul 5 04:55:40 2019 +0000
- Fix pasto for HAVE_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_SET_IV.
+ upstream: add a local implementation of BSD realpath() for
- Prevents unnecessary redefinition. Patch from mforney at mforney.org.
+ sftp-server use ahead of OpenBSD's realpath changing to match POSIX;
+
+ ok deraadt@ (thanks for snaps testing)
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4f8cbf7ed8679f6237264301d104ecec64885d55
-commit 3719df60c66abc4b47200d41f571d67772f293ba
+commit b8e2b797362526437e0642a6c2f2970d794f2561
Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Wed Oct 31 22:21:03 2018 +1100
+Date: Sat Jul 6 13:13:57 2019 +1000
- Import new moduli.
+ Add prototype for strnlen to prevent warnings.
-commit 595605d4abede475339d6a1f07a8cc674c11d1c3
+commit 4c3e00b1ed7e596610f34590eb5d54ee50d77878
Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Sun Oct 28 15:18:13 2018 +1100
+Date: Sat Jul 6 13:02:34 2019 +1000
- Update check for minimum OpenSSL version.
+ Cast *ID types to unsigned long when printing.
+
+ UID and GID types vary by platform so cast to u_long and use %lu when
+ printing them to prevent warnings.
-commit 6ab75aba340d827140d7ba719787aabaf39a0355
+commit 2753521e899f30d1d58b5da0b4e68fde6fcf341e
Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Sun Oct 28 15:16:31 2018 +1100
+Date: Sat Jul 6 12:54:43 2019 +1000
- Update required OpenSSL versions to match current.
+ Add prototype for compat strndup.(bz#3032).
-commit c801b0e38eae99427f37869370151b78f8e15c5d
+commit 01a1e21cd55d99293c8ff8ed7c590f2ee440da43
Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Sun Oct 28 14:34:12 2018 +1100
+Date: Sat Jul 6 12:00:41 2019 +1000
- Use detected version functions in openssl compat.
+ Add missing bracket in EGD seeding code.
- Use detected functions in compat layer instead of guessing based on
- versions. Really fixes builds with LibreSSL, not just configure.
+ When configured --with-prngd-socket the code had a missing bracket after
+ an API change. Fix that and a couple of warnings. bz#3032 , from
+ ole.weidner at protonmail.ch
-commit 262d81a259d4aa1507c709ec9d5caa21c7740722
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Sat Oct 27 16:45:59 2018 +1100
+commit e187b1d4607392cf2c19243afe0d0311a4ff3591
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Jul 5 04:19:39 2019 +0000
- Check for the existence of openssl version funcs.
+ upstream: Add (recently added) rsa_oldfmt to CLEANFILES.
- Check for the existence of openssl version functions and use the ones
- detected instead of trying to guess based on the int32 version
- identifier. Fixes builds with LibreSSL.
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 405beda94e32aa6cc9c80969152fab91f7c54bd3
-commit 406a24b25d6a2bdd70cacd16de7e899dcb2a8829
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Fri Oct 26 13:43:28 2018 +1100
+commit 74b541bfabdcb57c1683cd9b3f1d1f4d5e41563e
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Jul 5 04:12:46 2019 +0000
- fix builds on OpenSSL <= 1.0.x
+ upstream: Adapt the PuTTY/Conch tests to new key names.
- I thought OpenSSL 1.0.x offered the new-style OpenSSL_version_num() API
- to obtain version number, but they don't.
-
-commit 859754bdeb41373d372e36b5dc89c547453addb3
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Tue Oct 23 17:10:41 2018 +1100
-
- remove remaining references to SSLeay
+ A recent regress change (2a9b3a2ce411d16cda9c79ab713c55f65b0ec257 in
+ portable) broke the PuTTY and Twisted Conch interop tests, because the
+ key they want to use is now called ssh-rsa rather than rsa. Adapt the
+ tests to the new file names. bz#3020, patch from cjwatson at debian.org.
- Prompted by Rosen Penev
-
-commit b9fea45a68946c8dfeace72ad1f6657c18f2a98a
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Tue Oct 23 17:10:35 2018 +1100
-
- regen depend
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: fd342a37db4d55aa4ec85316f73082c8eb96e64e
-commit a65784c9f9c5d00cf1a0e235090170abc8d07c73
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Oct 23 05:56:35 2018 +0000
+commit de08335a4cfaa9b7081e94ea4a8b7153c230546d
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Jul 5 04:03:13 2019 +0000
- upstream: refer to OpenSSL not SSLeay;
+ upstream: Add a sleep to allow forwards to come up.
- we're old, but we don't have to act it
+ Currently when the multiplex client requests a forward it returns
+ once the request has been sent but not necessarily when the forward
+ is up. This causes intermittent text failures due to this race,
+ so add some sleeps to mitigate this until we can fix it properly.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9ca38d11f8ed19e61a55108d1e892d696cee08ec
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 384c7d209d2443d25ea941d7f677e932621fb253
-commit c0a35265907533be10ca151ac797f34ae0d68969
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Mon Oct 22 11:22:50 2018 +1100
+commit 4d249284729f864faa2e8f3e015f9a41b674544a
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Fri Jul 5 14:58:57 2019 +1000
- fix compile for openssl 1.0.x w/ --with-ssl-engine
-
- bz#2921, patch from cotequeiroz
+ Remove nc stderr redirection to resync w/OpenBSD.
-commit 31b49525168245abe16ad49d7b7f519786b53a38
+commit c5cfa90e03432181ffcc7ad3f9f815179bd0c626
Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Mon Oct 22 20:05:18 2018 +1100
+Date: Fri Jul 5 13:21:45 2019 +1000
- Include openssl compatibility.
+ Do not fatal on failed lookup of group "tty".
- Patch from rosenp at gmail.com via openssh-unix-dev.
-
-commit a4fc253f5f44f0e4c47aafe2a17d2c46481d3c04
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Oct 19 03:12:42 2018 +0000
+ Some platforms (eg AIX and Cygwin) do not have a "tty" group. In those
+ cases we will fall back to making the tty device the user's primary
+ group, so do not fatal if the group lookup fails. ok djm@
- upstream: when printing certificate contents "ssh-keygen -Lf
-
- /path/certificate", include the algorithm that the CA used to sign the cert.
-
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1ea20b5048a851a7a0758dcb9777a211a2c0dddd
-
-commit 83b3d99d2b47321b7ebb8db6f6ea04f3808bc069
-Author: florian@openbsd.org <florian@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Oct 15 11:28:50 2018 +0000
+commit 8b4cc4bdc8a70bf209a274fa2b2a49c1e3c8d8a2
+Author: deraadt@openbsd.org <deraadt@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Jul 4 16:20:10 2019 +0000
- upstream: struct sockaddr_storage is guaranteed to be large enough,
-
- no need to check the size. OK kn, deraadt
+ upstream: fatal() if getgrnam() cannot find "tty"
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0aa56e92eb49c79f495b31a5093109ec5841f439
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d148c1c052fa0ed7d105b5428b5c1bab91630048
-commit aede1c34243a6f7feae2fb2cb686ade5f9be6f3d
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Wed Oct 17 11:01:20 2018 +1100
+commit 48cccc275c6a1e91d3f80fdb0dc0d5baf529aeca
+Author: deraadt@openbsd.org <deraadt@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Jul 4 16:16:51 2019 +0000
- Require OpenSSL 1.1.x series 1.1.0g or greater
-
- Previous versions have a bug with EVP_CipherInit() when passed a
- NULL EVP_CIPHER, per https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4613
+ upstream: stat() returns precisely -1 to indicate error
- ok dtucker@
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 668e8d022ed4ab847747214f64119e5865365fa1
-commit 08300c211409c212e010fe2e2f2883e573a04ce2
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Wed Oct 17 08:12:02 2018 +1100
+commit 8142fcaf9ed8ff66252deecbfd29fc59d5f2df4f
+Author: deraadt@openbsd.org <deraadt@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Jul 3 03:24:02 2019 +0000
- unbreak compilation with --with-ssl-engine
+ upstream: snprintf/vsnprintf return < 0 on error, rather than -1.
- Missing last argument to OPENSSL_init_crypto()
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a261c421140a0639bb2b66bbceca72bf8239749d
-commit 1673274aee67ce0eb6f00578b6f3d2bcbd58f937
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Tue Oct 16 14:45:57 2018 +1100
+commit 4d28fa78abce2890e136281950633fae2066cc29
+Author: deraadt@openbsd.org <deraadt@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Jun 28 13:35:04 2019 +0000
- Remove gcc spectre mitigation flags.
+ upstream: When system calls indicate an error they return -1, not
- Current impementions of the gcc spectre mitigation flags cause
- miscompilations when combined with other flags and do not provide much
- protection. Found by fweimer at redhat.com, ok djm@
-
-commit 4e23deefd7959ef83c73ed9cce574423438f6133
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Tue Oct 16 10:51:52 2018 +1100
-
- Avoid deprecated OPENSSL_config when using 1.1.x
+ some arbitrary value < 0. errno is only updated in this case. Change all
+ (most?) callers of syscalls to follow this better, and let's see if this
+ strictness helps us in the future.
- OpenSSL 1.1.x soft-deprecated OPENSSL_config in favour of
- OPENSSL_init_crypto; pointed out by Jakub Jelen
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 48081f00db7518e3b712a49dca06efc2a5428075
-commit 797cdd9c8468ed1125ce60d590ae3f1397866af4
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Fri Oct 12 16:58:47 2018 +1100
+commit e8c974043c1648eab0ad67a7ba6a3e444fe79d2d
+Author: deraadt@openbsd.org <deraadt@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Jun 28 05:44:09 2019 +0000
- Don't avoid our *sprintf replacements.
+ upstream: asprintf returns -1, not an arbitrary value < 0. Also
- Don't let systems with broken printf(3) avoid our replacements
- via asprintf(3)/vasprintf(3) calling libc internally. From djm@
-
-commit e526127cbd2f8ad88fb41229df0c9b850c722830
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Fri Oct 12 16:43:35 2018 +1100
-
- Check if snprintf understands %zu.
+ upon error the (very sloppy specification) leaves an undefined value in *ret,
+ so it is wrong to inspect it, the error condition is enough. discussed a
+ little with nicm, and then much more with millert until we were exasperated
- If the platforms snprintf and friends don't understand %zu, use the
- compat replacement. Prevents segfaults on those platforms.
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 29258fa51edf8115d244b9d4b84028487bf8923e
-commit cf39f875191708c5f2f1a3c1c9019f106e74aea3
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Fri Oct 12 09:48:05 2018 +1100
+commit 1b2d55d15c6240c15a1e1cf4203b82e54a766272
+Author: deraadt@openbsd.org <deraadt@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Jun 28 01:23:50 2019 +0000
- remove stale link, tweak
+ upstream: oops, from asou
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 702e765d1639b732370d8f003bb84a1c71c4d0c6
-commit a7205e68decf7de2005810853b4ce6b222b65e2a
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Fri Oct 12 09:47:20 2018 +1100
+commit 5cdbaa78fcb718c39af4522d98016ad89d065427
+Author: deraadt@openbsd.org <deraadt@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Jun 27 18:03:37 2019 +0000
- update version numbers ahead of release
+ upstream: Some asprintf() calls were checked < 0, rather than the
+
+ precise == -1. ok millert nicm tb, etc
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: caecf8f57938685c04f125515b9f2806ad408d53
-commit 1a4a9cf80f5b92b9d1dadd0bfa8867c04d195391
+commit b2e3e57be4a933d9464bccbe592573725765486f
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Oct 11 03:48:04 2018 +0000
+Date: Thu Jun 27 06:29:35 2019 +0000
- upstream: don't send new-style rsa-sha2-*-cert-v01@openssh.com names to
+ upstream: fix NULL deference (bzero) on err
- older OpenSSH that can't handle them. spotted by Adam Eijdenberg; ok dtucker
+ =?UTF-8?q?or=20path=20added=20in=20last=20commit;=20spotted=20by=20Reynir?=
+ =?UTF-8?q?=20Bj=C3=B6rnsson?=
+ MIME-Version: 1.0
+ Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+ Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 662bbc402e3d7c9b6c322806269698106a6ae631
-
-commit dc8ddcdf1a95e011c263486c25869bb5bf4e30ec
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Thu Oct 11 13:08:59 2018 +1100
-
- update depends
-
-commit 26841ac265603fd2253e6832e03602823dbb4022
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Thu Oct 11 13:02:11 2018 +1100
-
- some more duplicated key algorithm lines
+ ok deraadt@ markus@ tb@
- From Adam Eijdenberg
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b11b084bcc551b2c630560eb08618dd501027bbd
-commit 5d9d17603bfbb620195a4581025052832b4c4adc
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Thu Oct 11 11:56:36 2018 +1100
+commit 58ceacdcbaebefc77d120712de55c6fc6aa32bb1
+Author: Jitendra Sharma <jitendra.sharma@intel.com>
+Date: Fri Jun 21 09:54:17 2019 +0530
- fix duplicated algorithm specification lines
+ Update README doc to include missing test cases
- Spotted by Adam Eijdenberg
+ Readme regress document is missing various individual tests,
+ which are supported currently. Update README to
+ include those test cases.
-commit ebfafd9c7a5b2a7fb515ee95dbe0e44e11d0a663
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Oct 11 00:52:46 2018 +0000
+commit 7959330a554051b5587f8af3fec0c2c0d5820f64
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Jun 26 22:29:43 2019 +0000
- upstream: typo in plain RSA algorithm counterpart names for
+ upstream: Remove unneeded unlink of xauthfile o
- certificates; spotted by Adam Eijdenberg; ok dtucker@
+ =?UTF-8?q?n=20error=20path.=20=20From=20Erik=20Sj=C3=B6lund=20via=20githu?=
+ =?UTF-8?q?b,=20ok=20djm@=20deraadt@?=
+ MIME-Version: 1.0
+ Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+ Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: bfcdeb6f4fc9e7607f5096574c8f118f2e709e00
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 62a4893cf83b29a4bbfedc40e7067c25c203e632
-commit c29b111e7d87c2324ff71c80653dd8da168c13b9
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Thu Oct 11 11:29:35 2018 +1100
+commit 8de52eb224143783a49f9bddd9ab7800022a8276
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sun Jun 23 12:21:46 2019 +0000
- check pw_passwd != NULL here too
+ upstream: fix mismatch proto/decl from key shielding change; spotted
- Again, for systems with broken NIS implementations.
+ via oss-fuzz
- Prompted by coolbugcheckers AT gmail.com
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1ea0ba05ded2c5557507bd844cd446e5c8b5b3b7
-commit fe8e8f349a553ef4c567acd418aac769a82b7729
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Thu Oct 11 11:03:15 2018 +1100
+commit 1dfadb9b57c2985c95838a0292d1c2f6a501896e
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Jun 21 04:21:45 2019 +0000
- check for NULL return from shadow_pw()
+ upstream: adapt for key shielding API changes (const removal)
- probably unreachable on this platform; pointed out by
- coolbugcheckers AT gmail.com
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 298890bc52f0cd09dba76dc1022fabe89bc0ded6
-commit acc59cbe7a1fb169e1c3caba65a39bd74d6e030d
-Author: deraadt@openbsd.org <deraadt@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Oct 10 16:43:49 2018 +0000
+commit 4f7a56d5e02e3d04ab69eac1213817a7536d0562
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Jun 21 04:21:04 2019 +0000
- upstream: introducing openssh 7.9
+ upstream: Add protection for private keys at rest in RAM against
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 42d526a9fe01a40dd299ac58014d3349adf40e25
-
-commit 12731158c75c8760a8bea06350eeb3e763fe1a07
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Thu Oct 11 10:29:29 2018 +1100
-
- supply callback to PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey
+ speculation and memory sidechannel attacks like Spectre, Meltdown, Rowhammer
+ and Rambleed. This change encrypts private keys when they are not in use with
+ a symmetic key that is derived from a relatively large "prekey" consisting of
+ random data (currently 16KB).
- OpenSSL 1.1.0i has changed the behaviour of their PEM APIs,
- so that empty passphrases are interpreted differently. This
- probabalistically breaks loading some keys, because the PEM format
- is terrible and doesn't include a proper MAC.
+ Attackers must recover the entire prekey with high accuracy before
+ they can attempt to decrypt the shielded private key, but the current
+ generation of attacks have bit error rates that, when applied
+ cumulatively to the entire prekey, make this unlikely.
- Avoid this by providing a basic callback to avoid passing empty
- passphrases to OpenSSL in cases where one is required.
+ Implementation-wise, keys are encrypted "shielded" when loaded and then
+ automatically and transparently unshielded when used for signatures or
+ when being saved/serialised.
- Based on patch from Jakub Jelen in bz#2913; ok dtucker@
-
-commit d1d301a1dd5d6cc3a9ed93ab7ab09dda4cb456e0
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Wed Oct 10 14:57:00 2018 +1100
-
- in pick_salt() avoid dereference of NULL passwords
+ Hopefully we can remove this in a few years time when computer
+ architecture has become less unsafe.
- Apparently some NIS implementations can leave pw->pw_passwd (or the
- shadow equivalent) NULL.
+ been in snaps for a bit already; thanks deraadt@
- bz#2909; based on patch from Todd Eigenschink
+ ok dtucker@ deraadt@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 19767213c312e46f94b303a512ef8e9218a39bd4
-commit edbb6febccee084d212fdc0cb05b40cb1c646ab1
+commit 4cd6b12cc9c10bf59c8b425041f3ea5091285a0f
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Oct 9 05:42:23 2018 +0000
+Date: Fri Jun 21 03:19:59 2019 +0000
- upstream: Treat all PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey() errors when a passphrase
+ upstream: print the correct AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand rather than
- is specified as "incorrect passphrase" instead of trying to choose between
- that and "invalid format".
+ an uninitialised variable; spotted by dtucker@
- libcrypto can return ASN1 parsing errors rather than the expected
- decrypt error in certain infrequent cases when trying to decrypt/parse
- PEM private keys when supplied with an invalid passphrase.
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 02802018784250f68202f01c8561de82e17b0638
+
+commit 5f68ab436b0e01751d564e9a9041e6ac3673e45a
+Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Jun 19 20:12:44 2019 +0000
+
+ upstream: from tim: - for reput, it is remote-path which is
- Report and repro recipe from Thomas Deutschmann in bz#2901
+ optional, not local-path - sync help
- ok markus@
+ from deraadt:
+ - prefer -R and undocument -r (but add a comment for future editors)
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b1d4cd92395f9743f81c0d23aab2524109580870
-
-commit 2581333d564d8697837729b3d07d45738eaf5a54
-Author: naddy@openbsd.org <naddy@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Oct 5 14:26:09 2018 +0000
-
- upstream: Support using service names for port numbers.
+ from schwarze:
+ - prefer -p and undocument -P (as above. the comment was schwarze's too)
- * Try to resolve a port specification with getservbyname(3) if a
- numeric conversion fails.
- * Make the "Port" option in ssh_config handle its argument as a
- port rather than a plain integer.
+ more:
+ - add the -f flag to reput and reget
+ - sort help (i can;t remember who suggested this originally)
- ok dtucker@ deraadt@
+ djm and deraadt were ok with earlier versions of this;
+ tim and schwarze ok
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e7f03633133205ab3dfbc67f9df7475fabae660d
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 3c699b53b46111f5c57eed4533f132e7e58bacdd
-commit e0d6501e86734c48c8c503f81e1c0926e98c5c4c
+commit 99bcbbc77fbd5a5027031f42a5931b21b07c947e
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Oct 4 07:47:35 2018 +0000
+Date: Fri Jun 14 04:03:48 2019 +0000
- upstream: when the peer sends a channel-close message, make sure we
+ upstream: check for convtime() refusing to accept times that
- close the local extended read fd (stderr) along with the regular read fd
- (stdout). Avoids weird stuck processed in multiplexing mode.
+ resolve to LONG_MAX Reported by Kirk Wolf bz2977; ok dtucker
- Report and analysis by Nelson Elhage and Geoffrey Thomas in bz#2863
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 15c9fe87be1ec241d24707006a31123d3a3117e0
+
+commit e5cccb2410247c9b8151b9510a876abdf5424b24
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sun Apr 28 22:53:26 2019 +0000
+
+ upstream: Add unit tests for user@host and URI parsing.
- ok dtucker@ markus@
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 69d5b6f278e04ed32377046f7692c714c2d07a68
+
+commit 0bb7e38834e3f9886302bbaea630a6b0f8cfb520
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Apr 18 18:57:16 2019 +0000
+
+ upstream: Add tests for sshd -T -C with Match.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a48a2467fe938de4de69d2e7193d5fa701f12ae9
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: d4c34916fe20d717692f10ef50b5ae5a271c12c7
-commit 6f1aabb128246f445e33b8844fad3de9cb1d18cb
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Oct 4 01:04:52 2018 +0000
+commit 73eb6cef41daba0359c1888e4756108d41b4e819
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Sun Jun 16 12:55:27 2019 +1000
- upstream: factor out channel status formatting from
+ Include stdio.h for vsnprintf.
- channel_open_message() so we can use it in other debug messages
+ Patch from mforney at mforney.org.
+
+commit adcaf40fd0a180e6cb5798317fdf479b52e3c09a
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Sat Jun 8 09:07:04 2019 +1000
+
+ upstream rev 1.27: fix integer overflow.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9c3903ca28fcabad57f566c9d0045b41ab7d52ba
+ Cast bitcount to u_in64_t before bit shifting to prevent integer overflow
+ on 32bit platforms which cause incorrect results when adding a block
+ >=512M in size. sha1 patch from ante84 at gmail.com via openssh github,
+ sha2 with djm@, ok tedu@
-commit f1dd179e122bdfdb7ca3072d9603607740efda05
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Oct 4 00:10:11 2018 +0000
+commit 7689048e6103d3c34cba24ac5aeea7bf8405d19a
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Sat Jun 8 09:06:06 2019 +1000
- upstream: include a little more information about the status and
+ upstream rev 1.25: add DEF_WEAK.
- disposition of channel's extended (stderr) fd; makes debugging some things a
- bit easier. No behaviour change.
+ Wrap blowfish, sha*, md5, and rmd160 so that internal calls go direct
+ ok deraadt@
+
+commit 55f3153393ac7e072a4b4b21b194864460d8f44a
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Sat Jun 8 09:02:24 2019 +1000
+
+ upstream rev 1.25: add sys/types.h
+
+commit 10974f986fa842a3a3a693e3d5761072540002b4
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Sat Jun 8 09:01:14 2019 +1000
+
+ upstream: Use explicit_bzero instead of memset
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 483eb6467dc7d5dbca8eb109c453e7a43075f7ce
+ in hash Final and End functions. OK deraadt@ djm@
-commit 2d1428b11c8b6f616f070f2ecedce12328526944
+commit cb8f56570f70b00abae4267d4bcce2bfae7dfff6
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Oct 4 00:04:41 2018 +0000
+Date: Fri Jun 14 04:13:58 2019 +0000
- upstream: explicit_bzero here to be consistent with other kex*.c;
+ upstream: slightly more instructive error message when the user
- report from coolbugcheckers AT gmail.com
+ specifies multiple -J options on the commandline. bz3015 ok dtucker@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a90f146c5b5f5b1408700395e394f70b440856cb
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 181c15a65cac3b575819bc8d9a56212c3c748179
-commit 5eff5b858e717e901e6af6596306a114de9f79f2
+commit 2317ce4b0ed7d8c4b0c684e2d47bff5006bd1178
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Oct 3 06:38:35 2018 +0000
+Date: Fri Jun 14 03:51:47 2019 +0000
- upstream: Allow ssh_config IdentityAgent directive to accept
+ upstream: process agent requests for RSA certificate private keys using
- environment variable names as well as explicit paths. ok dtucker@
+ correct signature algorithm when requested. Patch from Jakub Jelen in bz3016
+ ok dtucker markus
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2f0996e103876c53d8c9dd51dcce9889d700767b
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 61f86efbeb4a1857a3e91298c1ccc6cf49b79624
-commit a46ac4d86b25414d78b632e8173578b37e5f8a83
+commit c95b90d40170473825904be561b1eafba354f376
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Oct 2 12:51:58 2018 +0000
+Date: Fri Jun 14 03:39:59 2019 +0000
- upstream: mention INFO@openssh.com for sending SIGINFO
+ upstream: for public key authentication, check AuthorizedKeysFiles
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 132471eeb0df658210afd27852fe65131b26e900
-
-commit ff3a411cae0b484274b7900ef52ff4dad3e12876
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Tue Oct 2 22:49:40 2018 +1000
-
- only support SIGINFO on systems with SIGINFO
+ files before consulting AuthorizedKeysCommand; ok dtucker markus
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 13652998bea5cb93668999c39c3c48e8429db8b3
-commit cd98925c6405e972dc9f211afc7e75e838abe81c
+commit a5a53914989ddd3521b6edc452bc3291784a4f4f
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Oct 2 12:40:07 2018 +0000
+Date: Fri Jun 14 03:28:19 2019 +0000
- upstream: Add server support for signalling sessions via the SSH
-
- channel/ session protocol. Signalling is only supported to sesssions that are
- not subsystems and were not started with a forced command.
+ upstream: if passed a bad fd, log what it was
- Long requested in bz#1424
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 582e2bd05854e49365195b58989b68ac67f09140
+
+commit 7349149da1074d82b71722338e05b6a282f126cc
+Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Jun 12 11:31:50 2019 +0000
+
+ upstream: Hostname->HostName cleanup; from lauri tirkkonen ok
- Based on a patch from markus@ and reworked by dtucker@;
- ok markus@ dtucker@
+ dtucker
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4bea826f575862eaac569c4bedd1056a268be1c3
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4ade73629ede63b691f36f9a929f943d4e7a44e4
-commit dba50258333f2604a87848762af07ba2cc40407a
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Sep 26 07:32:44 2018 +0000
+commit 76af9c57387243556d38935555c227d0b34062c5
+Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Jun 12 05:53:21 2019 +0000
- upstream: remove big ugly TODO comment from start of file. Some of
+ upstream: deraadt noticed some inconsistency in the way we denote
- the mentioned tasks are obsolete and, of the remainder, most are already
- captured in PROTOCOL.mux where they better belong
+ the "Hostname" and "X11UseLocalhost" keywords; this makes things consistent
+ (effectively reversing my commit of yesterday);
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 16d9d76dee42a5bb651c9d6740f7f0ef68aeb407
+ ok deraadt markus djm
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 255c02adb29186ac91dcf47dfad7adb1b1e54667
-commit 92b61a38ee9b765f5049f03cd1143e13f3878905
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Sep 26 07:30:05 2018 +0000
+commit d1bbfdd932db9b9b799db865ee1ff50060dfc895
+Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Jun 11 13:39:40 2019 +0000
- upstream: Document mux proxy mode; added by Markus in openssh-7.4
+ upstream: consistent lettering for "HostName" keyword; from lauri
- Also add a little bit of information about the overall packet format
+ tirkkonen
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: bdb6f6ea8580ef96792e270cae7857786ad84a95
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0c267a1257ed7482b13ef550837b6496e657d563
-commit 9d883a1ce4f89b175fd77405ff32674620703fb2
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Sep 26 01:48:57 2018 +0000
+commit fc0340f7c4ee29bfb12bd1de9f99defa797e16b4
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Sat Jun 8 00:10:59 2019 +1000
- upstream: s/process_mux_master/mux_master_process/ in mux master
-
- function names,
+ Typo fixes in error messages.
- Gives better symmetry with the existing mux_client_*() names and makes
- it more obvious when a message comes from the master vs client (they
- are interleved in ControlMaster=auto mode).
+ Patch from knweiss at gmail.com via github pull req #97 (portable-
+ specific parts).
+
+commit 4b7dd22b02b64b1ededd3c0e98a6e7ae21e31d38
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Jun 7 14:18:48 2019 +0000
+
+ upstream: Typo and spelling fixes in comments and error messages.
- no functional change beyond prefixing a could of log messages with
- __func__ where they were previously lacking.
+ Patch from knweiss at gmail.com via -portable.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b01f7c3fdf92692e1713a822a89dc499333daf75
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2577465442f761a39703762c4f87a8dfcb918b4b
-commit c2fa53cd6462da82d3a851dc3a4a3f6b920337c8
+commit 130ef0695e1731392ca33831939fe89e8b70cc17
Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Sat Sep 22 14:41:24 2018 +1000
+Date: Sat Jun 8 00:47:07 2019 +1000
- Remove unused variable in _ssh_compat_fflush.
+ Include missed bits from previous sync.
-commit d1b3540c21212624af907488960d703c7d987b42
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Thu Sep 20 18:08:43 2018 +1000
+commit 25e3bccbaa63d27b9d5e09c123f1eb28594d2bd6
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Jun 7 03:47:12 2019 +0000
- Import updated moduli.
+ upstream: Check for user@host when parsing sftp target. This
+
+ allows user@[1.2.3.4] to work without a path in addition to with one.
+ bz#2999, ok djm@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d989217110932490ba8ce92127a9a6838878928b
-commit b5e412a8993ad17b9e1141c78408df15d3d987e1
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Sep 21 12:46:22 2018 +0000
+commit 0323d9b619d512f80c57575b810a05791891f657
+Author: otto@openbsd.org <otto@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Jun 6 05:13:13 2019 +0000
- upstream: Allow ssh_config ForwardX11Timeout=0 to disable the
+ upstream: Replace calls to ssh_malloc_init() by a static init of
- timeout and allow X11 connections in untrusted mode indefinitely. ok dtucker@
+ malloc_options. Prepares for changes in the way malloc is initialized. ok
+ guenther@ dtucker@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ea1ceed3f540b48e5803f933e59a03b20db10c69
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 154f4e3e174f614b09f792d4d06575e08de58a6b
-commit cb24d9fcc901429d77211f274031653476864ec6
+commit c586d2d3129265ea64b12960c379d634bccb6535
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Sep 21 12:23:17 2018 +0000
+Date: Fri May 31 03:20:07 2019 +0000
- upstream: when compiled with GSSAPI support, cache supported method
-
- OIDs by calling ssh_gssapi_prepare_supported_oids() regardless of whether
- GSSAPI authentication is enabled in the main config.
+ upstream: fix ssh-keysign fd handling problem introduced in r1.304
- This avoids sandbox violations for configurations that enable GSSAPI
- auth later, e.g.
+ caused by a typo (STDIN_FILENO vs STDERR_FILENO)
- Match user djm
- GSSAPIAuthentication yes
-
- bz#2107; ok dtucker@
-
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a5dd42d87c74e27cfb712b15b0f97ab20e0afd1d
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 57a0b4be7bef23963afe24150e24bf014fdd9cb0
-commit bbc8af72ba68da014d4de6e21a85eb5123384226
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Sep 21 12:20:12 2018 +0000
+commit 410b231aa41ff830b2f5b09b5aaf5e5cdc1ab86b
+Author: lum@openbsd.org <lum@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed May 29 08:30:26 2019 +0000
- upstream: In sshkey_in_file(), ignore keys that are considered for
-
- being too short (i.e. SSH_ERR_KEY_LENGTH). These keys will not be considered
- to be "in the file". This allows key revocation lists to contain short keys
- without the entire revocation list being considered invalid.
+ upstream: Make the standard output messages of both methods of
- bz#2897; ok dtucker
+ changing a key pair's comments (using -c and -C) more applicable to both
+ methods. ok and suggestions djm@ dtucker@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d9f3d857d07194a42ad7e62889a74dc3f9d9924b
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b379338118109eb36e14a65bc0a12735205b3de6
-commit 383a33d160cefbfd1b40fef81f72eadbf9303a66
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Sep 21 03:11:36 2018 +0000
+commit 2b3402dc9f1d9b0df70291b424f36e436cdfa7e0
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Sat Jun 8 00:03:07 2019 +1000
- upstream: Treat connections with ProxyJump specified the same as ones
-
- with a ProxyCommand set with regards to hostname canonicalisation (i.e. don't
- try to canonicalise the hostname unless CanonicalizeHostname is set to
- 'always').
-
- Patch from Sven Wegener via bz#2896
-
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 527ff501cf98bf65fb4b29ed0cb847dda10f4d37
+ Always clean up before and after utimensat test.
-commit 0cbed248ed81584129b67c348dbb801660f25a6a
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Sep 20 23:40:16 2018 +0000
+commit 182898192d4b720e4faeafd5b39c2cfb3b92aa21
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Fri Jun 7 23:47:37 2019 +1000
- upstream: actually make CASignatureAlgorithms available as a config
+ Update utimensat test.
- option
+ POSIX specifies that when given a symlink, AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW should
+ update the symlink and not the destination. The compat code doesn't
+ have a way to do this, so where possible it fails instead of following a
+ symlink when explicitly asked not to. Instead of checking for an explicit
+ failure, check that it does not update the destination, which both the
+ real and compat implmentations should honour.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 93fa7ff58314ed7b1ab7744090a6a91232e6ae52
+ Inspired by github pull req #125 from chutzpah at gentoo.org.
-commit 62528870c0ec48cd86a37dd7320fb85886c3e6ee
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Sep 20 08:07:03 2018 +0000
+commit d220b675205185e0b4d6b6524acc2e5c599ef0e2
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Fri Jun 7 14:26:54 2019 +1000
- upstream: Import updated moduli.
+ Have pthread_create return errno on failure.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 04431e8e7872f49a2129bf080a6b73c19d576d40
+ According to POSIX, pthread_create returns the failure reason in
+ the non-zero function return code so make the fork wrapper do that.
+ Matches previous change.
-commit e6933a2ffa0659d57f3c7b7c457b2c62b2a84613
-Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Sep 20 06:58:48 2018 +0000
+commit 1bd4f7f25f653e0cadb2e6f25d79bc3c35c6aa4d
+Author: Elliott Hughes <enh@google.com>
+Date: Thu Apr 25 13:36:27 2019 -0700
- upstream: reorder CASignatureAlgorithms, and add them to the
-
- various -o lists; ok djm
+ pthread_create(3) returns positive values on failure.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ecb88baecc3c54988b4d1654446ea033da359288
+ Found by inspection after finding similar bugs in other code used by
+ Android.
-commit aa083aa9624ea7b764d5a81c4c676719a1a3e42b
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Sep 20 03:31:49 2018 +0000
+commit b3a77b25e5f7880222b179431a74fad76d2cf60c
+Author: Harald Freudenberger <freude@linux.ibm.com>
+Date: Fri May 24 10:11:15 2019 +0200
- upstream: fix "ssh -Q sig" to show correct signature algorithm list
+ allow s390 specific ioctl for ecc hardware support
- (it was erroneously showing certificate algorithms); prompted by markus@
+ Adding another s390 specific ioctl to be able to support ECC hardware
+ acceleration to the sandbox seccomp filter rules.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1cdee002f2f0c21456979deeb887fc889afb154d
+ Now the ibmca openssl engine provides elliptic curve cryptography
+ support with the help of libica and CCA crypto cards. This is done via
+ jet another ioctl call to the zcrypt device driver and so there is a
+ need to enable this on the openssl sandbox.
+
+ Code is s390 specific and has been tested, verified and reviewed.
+
+ Please note that I am also the originator of the previous changes in
+ that area. I posted these changes to Eduardo and he forwarded the
+ patches to the openssl community.
+
+ Signed-off-by: Harald Freudenberger <freude@linux.ibm.com>
+ Reviewed-by: Joerg Schmidbauer <jschmidb@de.ibm.com>
-commit ecac7e1f7add6b28874959a11f2238d149dc2c07
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Sep 20 03:30:44 2018 +0000
+commit 2459df9aa11820f8092a8651aeb381af7ebbccb1
+Author: Sorin Adrian Savu <sorin25@users.noreply.github.com>
+Date: Sun May 26 21:50:08 2019 +0300
- upstream: add CASignatureAlgorithms option for the client, allowing
+ openssl-devel is obsoleted by libssl-devel
- it to specify which signature algorithms may be used by CAs when signing
- certificates. Useful if you want to ban RSA/SHA1; ok markus@
+ openssl-devel is no longer installable via the cygwin setup and
+ it's hidden by default, so you can't see the replacement very easy.
+
+commit 85ceb0e64bff672558fc87958cd548f135c83cdd
+Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon May 20 06:01:59 2019 +0000
+
+ upstream: tweak previous;
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9159e5e9f67504829bf53ff222057307a6e3230f
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 42f39f22f53cfcb913bce401ae0f1bb93e08dd6c
-commit 86e5737c39153af134158f24d0cab5827cbd5852
+commit 30615295609f5c57b3137b3021fe63bfa45c1985
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Sep 20 03:28:06 2018 +0000
+Date: Mon May 20 00:25:55 2019 +0000
- upstream: Add sshd_config CASignatureAlgorithms option to allow
-
- control over which signature algorithms a CA may use when signing
- certificates. In particular, this allows a sshd to ban certificates signed
- with RSA/SHA1.
+ upstream: embiggen format buffer size for certificate serial number so
- ok markus@
+ that it will fit a full 64 bit integer. bz#3012 from Manoel Domingues Junior
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b05c86ef8b52b913ed48d54a9b9c1a7714d96bac
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a51f3013056d05b976e5af6b978dcb9e27bbc12b
-commit f80e68ea7d62e2dfafc12f1a60ab544ae4033a0f
+commit 476e3551b2952ef73acc43d995e832539bf9bc4d
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Sep 19 02:03:02 2018 +0000
+Date: Mon May 20 00:20:35 2019 +0000
- upstream: Make "ssh-add -q" do what it says on the tin: silence
+ upstream: When signing certificates with an RSA key, default to
- output from successful operations.
+ using the rsa-sha2-512 signature algorithm. Certificates signed by RSA keys
+ will therefore be incompatible with OpenSSH < 7.2 unless the default is
+ overridden.
- Based on patch from Thijs van Dijk; ok dtucker@ deraadt@
+ Document the ability of the ssh-keygen -t flag to override the
+ signature algorithm when signing certificates, and the new default.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c4f754ecc055c10af166116ce7515104aa8522e1
+ ok deraadt@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 400c9c15013978204c2cb80f294b03ae4cfc8b95
-commit 5e532320e9e51de720d5f3cc2596e95d29f6e98f
-Author: millert@openbsd.org <millert@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Sep 17 15:40:14 2018 +0000
+commit 606077ee1e77af5908431d003fb28461ef7be092
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Fri May 17 13:14:12 2019 +1000
- upstream: When choosing a prime from the moduli file, avoid
-
- re-using the linenum variable for something that is not a line number to
- avoid the confusion that resulted in the bug in rev. 1.64. This also lets us
- pass the actual linenum to parse_prime() so the error messages include the
- correct line number. OK markus@ some time ago.
+ Add no-op implementation of pam_putenv.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4d8e5d3e924d6e8eb70053e3defa23c151a00084
+ Some platforms such as HP-UX do not have pam_putenv. Currently the
+ calls are ifdef'ed out, but a new one was recently added. Remove the
+ ifdefs and add a no-op implementation. bz#3008, ok djm.
-commit cce8cbe0ed7d1ba3a575310e0b63c193326ae616
+commit 1ac98be8724c9789d770ddb8e7f0dbf1b55e05a0
Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Sat Sep 15 19:44:06 2018 +1000
+Date: Fri May 17 12:42:17 2019 +1000
- Fix openssl-1.1 fallout for --without-openssl.
-
- ok djm@
+ Use the correct macro for SSH_ALLOWED_CA_SIGALGS.
-commit 149519b9f201dac755f3cba4789f4d76fecf0ee1
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Sat Sep 15 19:37:48 2018 +1000
+commit 97370f6c2c3b825f8c577b7e6c00b1a98d30a6cf
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Fri May 17 10:54:51 2019 +1000
- add futex(2) syscall to seccomp sandbox
-
- Apparently needed for some glibc/openssl combinations.
+ Fix building w/out ECC.
- Patch from Arkadiusz Miśkiewicz
+ Ifdef out ECC specific code so that that it'll build against an OpenSSL
+ configured w/out ECC. With & ok djm@
-commit 4488ae1a6940af704c4dbf70f55bf2f756a16536
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Sat Sep 15 19:36:55 2018 +1000
+commit 633703babf8d9a88da85f23b800e1b88dec7cdbd
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Fri May 17 10:50:29 2019 +1000
- really add source for authopt_fuzz this time
+ Conditionalize ECDH methods in CA algos.
+
+ When building against an OpenSSL configured without ECC, don't include
+ those algos in CASignatureAlgorithms. ok djm@
-commit 9201784b4a257c8345fbd740bcbdd70054885707
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Sat Sep 15 19:35:40 2018 +1000
+commit 5c8d14c512f5d413095b22bdba08a6bb990f1e97
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu May 16 08:47:27 2019 +0000
- remove accidentally checked-in authopt_fuzz binary
+ upstream: Move a variable declaration to the block where it's used
+
+ to make things a little tidier for -portable.
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 616379861be95619e5358768b7dee4793e2f3a75
-commit beb9e522dc7717df08179f9e59f36b361bfa14ab
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Sep 14 05:26:27 2018 +0000
+commit a1d29cc36a5e6eeabc935065a8780e1ba5b67014
+Author: deraadt@openbsd.org <deraadt@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed May 15 04:43:31 2019 +0000
- upstream: second try, deals properly with missing and private-only
-
- Use consistent format in debug log for keys readied, offered and
- received during public key authentication.
+ upstream: When doing the fork+exec'ing for ssh-keysign, rearrange
- This makes it a little easier to see what is going on, as each message
- now contains (where available) the key filename, its type and fingerprint,
- and whether the key is hosted in an agent or a token.
+ the socket into fd3, so as to not mistakenly leak other fd forward
+ accidentally. ok djm
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f1c6a8e9cfc4e108c359db77f24f9a40e1e25ea7
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 24cc753f5aa2c6a7d0fbf62766adbc75cd785296
-commit 6bc5a24ac867bfdc3ed615589d69ac640f51674b
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Fri Sep 14 15:16:34 2018 +1000
+commit db7606d4a62fee67b0cb2f32dfcbd7b3642bfef5
+Author: schwarze@openbsd.org <schwarze@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue May 14 12:47:17 2019 +0000
- fuzzer harness for authorized_keys option parsing
+ upstream: Delete some .Sx macros that were used in a wrong way.
+
+ Part of a patch from Stephen Gregoratto <dev at sgregoratto dot me>.
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 15501ed13c595f135e7610b1a5d8345ccdb513b7
-commit 6c8b82fc6929b6a9a3f645151b6ec26c5507d9ef
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Sep 14 04:44:04 2018 +0000
+commit cb4accb1233865d9151f8a50cc5f0c61a3fd4077
+Author: florian@openbsd.org <florian@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri May 10 18:55:17 2019 +0000
- upstream: revert following; deals badly with agent keys
+ upstream: For PermitOpen violations add the remote host and port to
- revision 1.285
- date: 2018/09/14 04:17:12; author: djm; state: Exp; lines: +47 -26; commitid: lflGFcNb2X2HebaK;
- Use consistent format in debug log for keys readied, offered and
- received during public key authentication.
+ be able to find out from where the request was comming.
- This makes it a little easier to see what is going on, as each message
- now contains the key filename, its type and fingerprint, and whether
- the key is hosted in an agent or a token.
+ Add the same logging for PermitListen violations which where not
+ logged at all.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e496bd004e452d4b051f33ed9ae6a54ab918f56d
+ Pointed out by Robert Kisteleki (robert AT ripe.net)
+
+ input markus
+ OK deraadt
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8a7d0f1b7175504c0d1dca8d9aca1588b66448c8
-commit 6da046f9c3374ce7e269ded15d8ff8bc45017301
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Sep 14 04:17:44 2018 +0000
+commit cd16aceec148d55088fc8df6be88335578d85258
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Thu May 16 07:53:20 2019 +1000
- upstream: garbage-collect moribund ssh_new_private() API.
+ Add OpenSSL 1.1.1 to the supported list.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7c05bf13b094093dfa01848a9306c82eb6e95f6c
+ Clarify the language around prngd and egd.
-commit 1f24ac5fc05252ceb1c1d0e8cab6a283b883c780
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Sep 14 04:17:12 2018 +0000
+commit 6fd4aa2aafbce90acb11a328ca0aa0696cb01c6b
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Wed May 15 16:19:14 2019 +1000
- upstream: Use consistent format in debug log for keys readied,
-
- offered and received during public key authentication.
-
- This makes it a little easier to see what is going on, as each message
- now contains the key filename, its type and fingerprint, and whether
- the key is hosted in an agent or a token.
+ Fix typo in man page formatter selector.
+
+commit 285546b73e2c172565c992a695927ac8cf3b4cc6
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Fri May 10 15:04:42 2019 +1000
+
+ Use "doc" man page format if mandoc present.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2a01d59285a8a7e01185bb0a43316084b4f06a1f
+ Previously configure would not select the "doc" man page format if
+ mandoc was present but nroff was not. This checks for mandoc first
+ and removes a now-superflous AC_PATH_PROG. Based on a patch from
+ vehk at vehk.de and feedback from schwarze at usta.de.
-commit 488c9325bb7233e975dbfbf89fa055edc3d3eddc
-Author: millert@openbsd.org <millert@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Sep 13 15:23:32 2018 +0000
+commit 62dd70613b77b229f53db3cc1c3e8a206fa2b582
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri May 3 06:06:30 2019 +0000
- upstream: Fix warnings caused by user_from_uid() and group_from_gid()
+ upstream: Use the correct (according to POSIX) format for
- now returning const char *.
+ left-justification in snmprintf. bz#3002, patch from velemas at gmail.com, ok
+ markus@.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b5fe571ea77cfa7b9035062829ab05eb87d7cc6f
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 65d252b799be0cc8f68b6c47cece0a57bb00fea7
-commit 0aa1f230846ebce698e52051a107f3127024a05a
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Fri Sep 14 10:31:47 2018 +1000
+commit 62be1ffe5ffc68cfaac183320503c00a8c72e0b1
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri May 3 04:11:00 2019 +0000
- allow SIGUSR1 as synonym for SIGINFO
+ upstream: Free channel objects on exit path. Patch from markus at
- Lets users on those unfortunate operating systems that lack SIGINFO
- still be able to obtain progress information from unit tests :)
+ blueflash.cc, ok deraadt
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: dbe4db381603909482211ffdd2b48abd72169117
-commit d64e78526596f098096113fcf148216798c327ff
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Thu Sep 13 19:05:48 2018 +1000
+commit 1c554a5d94b9de6bd5374e2992a5662746cc39ba
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri May 3 03:27:38 2019 +0000
- add compat header
+ upstream: Free host on exit path. Patch from markus at
+
+ blueflash.cc, ok djm@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c54e9945d93c4ce28350d8b9fa8b71f744ef2b5a
-commit a3fd8074e2e2f06602e25618721f9556c731312c
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Sep 13 09:03:20 2018 +0000
+commit 99043bd64e5e0f427173f4fa83ef25a4676624a3
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri May 3 03:25:18 2019 +0000
- upstream: missed a bit of openssl-1.0.x API in this unittest
+ upstream: Wrap XMSS including in ifdef. Patch from markus at
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: a73a54d7f7381856a3f3a2d25947bee7a9a5dbc9
+ blueflash.cc, ok djm
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e3b34fc35cf12d33bde91ac03633210a3bc0f8b5
-commit 86e0a9f3d249d5580390daf58e015e68b01cef10
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Sep 13 05:06:51 2018 +0000
+commit 8fcfb7789c43a19d24162a7a4055cd09ee951b34
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Apr 26 08:37:17 2019 +0000
- upstream: use only openssl-1.1.x API here too
+ upstream: Import regenerated moduli.
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: ae877064597c349954b1b443769723563cecbc8f
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: db6375fc302e3bdf07d96430c63c991b2c2bd3ff
-commit 48f54b9d12c1c79fba333bc86d455d8f4cda8cfc
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Thu Sep 13 12:13:50 2018 +1000
+commit 3a7db919d5dd09f797971b3cf8ee301767459774
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Apr 23 11:56:41 2019 +0000
- adapt -portable to OpenSSL 1.1x API
+ upstream: Use the LogLevel typdef instead of int where appropriate. Patch from Markus Schmidt via openssh-unix-dev, ok markus@
- Polyfill missing API with replacement functions extracted from LibreSSL
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4c0f0f458e3da7807806b35e3eb5c1e8403c968a
-commit 86112951d63d48839f035b5795be62635a463f99
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Thu Sep 13 12:12:42 2018 +1000
+commit d7c6e38b87efab1f140745fd8b1106b82e6e4a68
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Apr 19 05:47:44 2019 +0000
- forgot to stage these test files in commit d70d061
+ upstream: Document new default RSA key size. From
+
+ sebastiaanlokhorst at gmail.com via bz#2997.
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: bdd62ff5d4d649d2147904e91bf7cefa82fe11e1
-commit 482d23bcacdd3664f21cc82a5135f66fc598275f
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Sep 13 02:08:33 2018 +0000
+commit e826bbcafe26dac349a8593da5569e82faa45ab8
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Apr 18 18:56:16 2019 +0000
- upstream: hold our collective noses and use the openssl-1.1.x API in
+ upstream: When running sshd -T, assume any attibute not provided by
- OpenSSH; feedback and ok tb@ jsing@ markus@
+ -C does not match, which allows it to work when sshd_config contains a Match
+ directive with or without -C. bz#2858, ok djm@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: cacbcac87ce5da0d3ca7ef1b38a6f7fb349e4417
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1a701f0a33e3bc96753cfda2fe0b0378520b82eb
-commit d70d061828730a56636ab6f1f24fe4a8ccefcfc1
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Sep 12 01:36:45 2018 +0000
+commit 5696512d7ad57e85e89f8011ce8dec617be686aa
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Apr 18 07:32:56 2019 +0000
- upstream: Include certs with multiple RSA signature variants in
+ upstream: Remove crc32.{c,h} which were only used by the now-gone
- test data Ensure that cert->signature_key is populated correctly
+ SSH1 protocol. Patch from yumkam at gmail.com, ok deraadt.
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 56e68f70fe46cb3a193ca207385bdb301fd6603a
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: cceda5876c5ba6b4d8abcd52335329198cee3240
-commit f803b2682992cfededd40c91818b653b5d923ef5
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Sep 12 01:23:48 2018 +0000
+commit 34e87fb5d9ce607f5701ab4c31d837ad8133e2d1
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Tue Apr 30 12:27:57 2019 +1000
- upstream: test revocation by explicit hash and by fingerprint
+ Remove unused variables from RLIMIT_NOFILE test.
+
+commit 35e82e62c1ef53cfa457473a4c4d957d6197371a
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Fri Apr 26 18:38:27 2019 +1000
+
+ Import regenerated moduli.
+
+commit 5590f53f99219e95dc23b0ebd220f19a6f46b101
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Fri Apr 26 18:22:10 2019 +1000
+
+ Whitespace resync w/OpenBSD.
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 079c18a9ab9663f4af419327c759fc1e2bc78fd8
+ Patch from markus at blueflash.cc via openssh-unix-dev.
-commit 2de78bc7da70e1338b32feeefcc6045cf49efcd4
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Sep 12 01:22:43 2018 +0000
+commit b7b8334914fb9397a6725f3b5d2de999b0bb69ac
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Fri Apr 26 18:06:34 2019 +1000
- upstream: s/sshkey_demote/sshkey_from_private/g
+ Don't install duplicate STREAMS modules on Solaris
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 782bde7407d94a87aa8d1db7c23750e09d4443c4
+ Check if STREAMS modules are already installed on pty before installing
+ since when compiling with XPG>=4 they will likely be installed already.
+ Prevents hangs and duplicate lines on the terminal. bz#2945 and bz#2998,
+ patch from djm@
-commit 41c115a5ea1cb79a6a3182773c58a23f760e8076
+commit fd0fa130ecf06d7d092932adcd5d77f1549bfc8d
Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Wed Sep 12 16:50:01 2018 +1000
+Date: Thu Apr 18 08:52:57 2019 +1000
- delete the correct thing; kexfuzz binary
+ makedepend
-commit f0fcd7e65087db8c2496f13ed39d772f8e38b088
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Sep 12 06:18:59 2018 +0000
+commit 5de397a876b587ba05a9169237deffdc71f273b0
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Fri Apr 5 11:29:51 2019 -0700
- upstream: fix edit mistake; spotted by jmc@
+ second thoughts: leave README in place
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: dd724e1c52c9d6084f4cd260ec7e1b2b138261c6
+ A number of contrib/* files refer to the existing README so let's leave
+ it in place for release and add the new markdown version in parallel.
+
+ I'll get rid of README after release.
-commit 4cc259bac699f4d2a5c52b92230f9e488c88a223
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Sep 12 01:34:02 2018 +0000
+commit 5d3127d9274519b25ed10e320f45045ba8d7f3be
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Fri Apr 5 11:29:31 2019 -0700
- upstream: add SSH_ALLOWED_CA_SIGALGS - the default list of
-
- signature algorithms that are allowed for CA signatures. Notably excludes
- ssh-dsa.
-
- ok markus@
+ Revert "rewrite README"
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1628e4181dc8ab71909378eafe5d06159a22deb4
+ This reverts commit 9444d82678cb7781820da4d1c23b3c2b9fb1e12f.
-commit ba9e788315b1f6a350f910cb2a9e95b2ce584e89
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Sep 12 01:32:54 2018 +0000
+commit 9444d82678cb7781820da4d1c23b3c2b9fb1e12f
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Fri Apr 5 11:21:48 2019 -0700
- upstream: add sshkey_check_cert_sigtype() that checks a
+ rewrite README
- cert->signature_type against a supplied whitelist; ok markus
+ Include basic build instructions and comments on commonly-used build-
+ time flags, links to the manual pages and other resources.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: caadb8073292ed7a9535e5adc067d11d356d9302
+ Now in Markdown format for better viewing on github, etc.
-commit a70fd4ad7bd9f2ed223ff635a3d41e483057f23b
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Sep 12 01:31:30 2018 +0000
+commit a924de0c4908902433813ba205bee1446bd1a157
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Fri Apr 5 03:41:52 2019 +1100
- upstream: add cert->signature_type field and keep it in sync with
-
- certificate signature wrt loading and certification operations; ok markus@
-
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e8b8b9f76b66707a0cd926109c4383db8f664df3
+ update versions
-commit 357128ac48630a9970e3af0e6ff820300a28da47
+commit 312dcee739bca5d6878c536537b2a8a497314b75
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Sep 12 01:30:10 2018 +0000
+Date: Wed Apr 3 15:48:45 2019 +0000
- upstream: Add "ssh -Q sig" to allow listing supported signature
-
- algorithms ok markus@
+ upstream: openssh-8.0
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7a8c6eb6c249dc37823ba5081fce64876d10fe2b
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 5aafdf218679dab982fea20771afd643be9a127b
-commit 9405c6214f667be604a820c6823b27d0ea77937d
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Sep 12 01:21:34 2018 +0000
+commit 885bc114692046d55e2a170b932bdc0092fa3456
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Thu Apr 4 02:47:40 2019 +1100
- upstream: allow key revocation by SHA256 hash and allow ssh-keygen
-
- to create KRLs using SHA256/base64 key fingerprints; ok markus@
+ session: Do not use removed API
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a0590fd34e7f1141f2873ab3acc57442560e6a94
+ from Jakub Jelen
-commit 50e2687ee0941c0ea216d6ffea370ffd2c1f14b9
+commit 9d7b2882b0c9a5e9bf8312ce4075bf178e2b98be
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Sep 12 01:19:12 2018 +0000
+Date: Fri Mar 29 11:31:40 2019 +0000
- upstream: log certificate fingerprint in authentication
-
- success/failure message (previously we logged only key ID and CA key
- fingerprint).
+ upstream: when logging/fataling on error, include a bit more detail
- ok markus@
+ than just the function name and the error message
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a8ef2d172b7f1ddbcce26d6434b2de6d94f6c05d
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: dd72d7eba2215fcb89be516c378f633ea5bcca9f
-commit de37ca909487d23e5844aca289b3f5e75d3f1e1f
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Sep 7 04:26:56 2018 +0000
+commit 79a87d32783d6c9db40af8f35e091d9d30365ae7
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Wed Apr 3 06:27:45 2019 +1100
- upstream: Add FALLTHROUGH comments where appropriate. Patch from
-
- jjelen at redhat via bz#2687.
+ Remove "struct ssh" from sys_auth_record_login.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c48eb457be697a19d6d2950c6d0879f3ccc851d3
+ It's not needed, and is not available from the call site in loginrec.c
+ Should only affect AIX, spotted by Kevin Brott.
-commit 247766cd3111d5d8c6ea39833a3257ca8fb820f2
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Sep 7 01:42:54 2018 +0000
+commit 138c0d52cdc90f9895333b82fc57d81cce7a3d90
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Tue Apr 2 18:21:35 2019 +1100
- upstream: ssh -MM requires confirmation for all operations that
-
- change the multiplexing state, not just new sessions.
-
- mention that confirmation is checked via ssh-askpass
+ Adapt custom_failed_login to new prototype.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0f1b45551ebb9cc5c9a4fe54ad3b23ce90f1f5c2
+ Spotted by Kevin Brott.
-commit db8bb80e3ac1bcb3e1305d846cd98c6b869bf03f
-Author: mestre@openbsd.org <mestre@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Aug 28 12:25:53 2018 +0000
+commit a0ca4009ab2f0b1007ec8ab6864dbf9b760a8ed5
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Mon Apr 1 20:07:23 2019 +1100
- upstream: fix misplaced parenthesis inside if-clause. it's harmless
-
- and the only issue is showing an unknown error (since it's not defined)
- during fatal(), if it ever an error occurs inside that condition.
-
- OK deraadt@ markus@ djm@
+ Add includes.h for compat layer.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: acb0a8e6936bfbe590504752d01d1d251a7101d8
+ Should fix build on AIX 7.2.
-commit 086cc614f550b7d4f100c95e472a6b6b823938ab
-Author: mestre@openbsd.org <mestre@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Aug 28 12:17:45 2018 +0000
+commit 00991151786ce9b1d577bdad1f83a81d19c8236d
+Author: Tim Rice <tim@multitalents.net>
+Date: Sun Mar 31 22:14:22 2019 -0700
- upstream: fix build with DEBUG_PK enabled
-
- OK dtucker@
-
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ec1568cf27726e9638a0415481c20c406e7b441c
+ Stop USL compilers for erroring with "integral constant expression expected"
-commit 2678833013e97f8b18f09779b7f70bcbf5eb2ab2
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Fri Sep 7 14:41:53 2018 +1000
+commit 43f47ebbdd4037b569c23b8f4f7981f53b567f1d
+Author: Tim Rice <tim@multitalents.net>
+Date: Sun Mar 31 19:22:19 2019 -0700
- Handle ngroups>_SC_NGROUPS_MAX.
-
- Based on github pull request #99 from Darren Maffat at Oracle: Solaris'
- getgrouplist considers _SC_NGROUPS_MAX more of a guideline and can return
- a larger number of groups. In this case, retry getgrouplist with a
- larger array and defer allocating groups_byname. ok djm@
+ Only use O_NOFOLLOW in fchownat and fchmodat if defined
-commit 039bf2a81797b8f3af6058d34005a4896a363221
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Fri Sep 7 14:06:57 2018 +1000
+commit 342d6e51589b184c337cccfc4c788b60ff8b3765
+Author: Jakub Jelen <jjelen@redhat.com>
+Date: Fri Mar 29 12:29:41 2019 +0100
- Initial len for the fmt=NULL case.
+ Adjust softhsm2 path on Fedora Linux for regress
- Patch from jjelen at redhat via bz#2687. (OpenSSH never calls
- setproctitle with a null format so len is always initialized).
+ The SoftHSM lives in Fedora in /usr/lib64/pkcs11/libsofthsm2.so
-commit ea9c06e11d2e8fb2f4d5e02f8a41e23d2bd31ca9
+commit f5abb05f8c7358dacdcb866fe2813f6d8efd5830
Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Fri Sep 7 14:01:39 2018 +1000
+Date: Thu Mar 28 09:26:14 2019 +1100
- Include stdlib.h.
+ Only use O_NOFOLLOW in utimensat if defined.
- Patch from jjelen at redhat via bz#2687.
+ Fixes build on systems that don't have it (Solaris <=9) Found by
+ Tom G. Christensen.
-commit 9617816dbe73ec4d65075f4d897443f63a97c87f
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Mon Aug 27 13:08:01 2018 +1000
+commit 786cd4c1837fdc3fe7b4befe54a3f37db7df8715
+Author: Corinna Vinschen <vinschen@redhat.com>
+Date: Wed Mar 27 18:18:21 2019 +0100
- document some more regress control env variables
+ drop old Cygwin considerations
- Specifically SKIP_UNIT, USE_VALGRING and LTESTS. Sort the list of
- environment variables.
+ - Cygwin supports non-DOS characters in filenames
+ - Cygwin does not support Windows XP anymore
- Based on patch from Jakub Jelen
+ Signed-off-by: Corinna Vinschen <vinschen@redhat.com>
-commit 71508e06fab14bc415a79a08f5535ad7bffa93d9
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Thu Aug 23 15:41:42 2018 +1000
+commit 21da87f439b48a85b951ef1518fe85ac0273e719
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Mar 27 09:29:14 2019 +0000
- shorten temporary SSH_REGRESS_TMP path
+ upstream: fix interaction between ClientAliveInterval and RekeyLimit
- Previous path was exceeding max socket length on at least one platform (OSX)
-
-commit 26739cf5bdc9030a583b41ae5261dedd862060f0
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Thu Aug 23 13:06:02 2018 +1000
-
- rebuild dependencies
+ that could cause connection to close incorrectly; Report and patch from Jakub
+ Jelen in bz#2757; ok dtucker@ markus@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 17229a8a65bd8e6c2080318ec2b7a61e1aede3fb
-commit ff729025c7463cf5d0a8d1ca1823306e48c6d4cf
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Thu Aug 23 13:03:32 2018 +1000
+commit 4f0019a9afdb4a94d83b75e82dbbbe0cbe826c56
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Mar 25 22:34:52 2019 +0000
- fix path in distclean target
+ upstream: Fix authentication failures when "AuthenticationMethods
- Patch from Jakub Jelen
+ any" in a Match block overrides a more restrictive global default.
+
+ Spotted by jmc@, ok markus@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a90a4fe2ab81d0eeeb8fdfc21af81f7eabda6666
-commit 7fef173c28f7462dcd8ee017fdf12b5073f54c02
+commit d6e5def308610f194c0ec3ef97a34a3e9630e190
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Aug 23 03:01:08 2018 +0000
+Date: Mon Mar 25 22:33:44 2019 +0000
- upstream: memleak introduced in r1.83; from Colin Watson
+ upstream: whitespace
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 5c019104c280cbd549a264a7217b67665e5732dc
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 106e853ae8a477e8385bc53824d3884a8159db07
-commit b8ae02a2896778b8984c7f51566c7f0f56fa8b56
-Author: schwarze@openbsd.org <schwarze@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Aug 21 13:56:27 2018 +0000
+commit 26e0cef07b04479537c971dec898741df1290fe5
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Mar 25 16:19:44 2019 +0000
- upstream: AIX reports the CODESET as "ISO8859-1" in the POSIX locale.
-
- Treating that as a safe encoding is OK because even when other systems return
- that string for real ISO8859-1, it is still safe in the sense that it is
- ASCII-compatible and stateless.
+ upstream: Expand comment to document rationale for default key
- Issue reported by Val dot Baranov at duke dot edu. Additional
- information provided by Michael dot Felt at felt dot demon dot nl.
- Tested by Michael Felt on AIX 6.1 and by Val Baranov on AIX 7.1.
- Tweak and OK djm@.
+ sizes. "seems worthwhile" deraadt.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 36f1210e0b229817d10eb490d6038f507b8256a7
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 72e5c0983d7da1fb72f191870f36cb58263a2456
-commit bc44ee088ad269d232e514f037c87ada4c2fd3f0
-Author: Tim Rice <tim@multitalents.net>
-Date: Tue Aug 21 08:57:24 2018 -0700
+commit f47269ea67eb4ff87454bf0d2a03e55532786482
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Mar 25 15:49:00 2019 +0000
- modified: openbsd-compat/port-uw.c
- remove obsolete and un-needed include
+ upstream: Increase the default RSA key size to 3072 bits. Based on
+
+ the estimates from NIST Special Publication 800-57, 3k bits provides security
+ equivalent to 128 bits which is the smallest symmetric cipher we enable by
+ default. ok markus@ deraadt@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 461dd32ebe808f88f4fc3ec74749b0e6bef2276b
-commit 829fc28a9c54e3f812ee7248c7a3e31eeb4f0b3a
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Mon Aug 20 15:57:29 2018 +1000
+commit 62949c5b37af28d8490d94866e314a76be683a5e
+Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Mar 22 20:58:34 2019 +0000
- Missing unistd.h for regress/mkdtemp.c
+ upstream: full stop in the wrong place;
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 478a0567c83553a2aebf95d0f1bd67ac1b1253e4
-commit c8313e492355a368a91799131520d92743d8d16c
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Fri Aug 17 05:45:20 2018 +1000
+commit 1b1332b5bb975d759a50b37f0e8bc8cfb07a0bb0
+Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sat Mar 16 19:14:21 2019 +0000
- update version numbers in anticipation of release
+ upstream: benno helped me clean up the tcp forwarding section;
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d4bec27edefde636fb632b7f0b7c656b9c7b7f08
-commit 477b49a34b89f506f4794b35e3c70b3e2e83cd38
-Author: Corinna Vinschen <vinschen@redhat.com>
-Date: Mon Aug 13 17:08:51 2018 +0200
+commit 2aee9a49f668092ac5c9d34e904ef7a9722e541d
+Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Mar 8 17:24:43 2019 +0000
- configure: work around GCC shortcoming on Cygwin
-
- Cygwin's latest 7.x GCC allows to specify -mfunction-return=thunk
- as well as -mindirect-branch=thunk on the command line, albeit
- producing invalid code, leading to an error at link stage.
-
- The check in configure.ac only checks if the option is present,
- but not if it produces valid code.
-
- This patch fixes it by special-casing Cygwin. Another solution
- may be to change these to linker checks.
+ upstream: fix use-after-free in ssh-pkcs11; found by hshoexer w/AFL
- Signed-off-by: Corinna Vinschen <vinschen@redhat.com>
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: febce81cca72b71f70513fbee4ff52ca050f675c
-commit b0917945efa374be7648d67dbbaaff323ab39edc
-Author: Corinna Vinschen <vinschen@redhat.com>
-Date: Mon Aug 13 17:05:05 2018 +0200
+commit 9edbd7821e6837e98e7e95546cede804dac96754
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Thu Mar 14 10:17:28 2019 +1100
- cygwin: add missing stdarg.h include
+ Fix build when configured --without-openssl.
- Further header file standarization in Cygwin uncovered a lazy
- indirect include in bsd-cygwin_util.c
-
- Signed-off-by: Corinna Vinschen <vinschen@redhat.com>
+ ok djm@
-commit c3903c38b0fd168ab3d925c2b129d1a599593426
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Aug 13 02:41:05 2018 +0000
+commit 825ab32f0d04a791e9d19d743c61ff8ed9b4d8e5
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Thu Mar 14 08:51:17 2019 +1100
- upstream: revert compat.[ch] section of the following change. It
-
- causes double-free under some circumstances.
+ On Cygwin run sshd as SYSTEM where possible.
- --
+ Seteuid now creates user token using S4U. We don't create a token
+ from scratch anymore, so we don't need the "Create a process token"
+ privilege. The service can run under SYSTEM again...
- date: 2018/07/31 03:07:24; author: djm; state: Exp; lines: +33 -18; commitid: f7g4UI8eeOXReTPh;
- fix some memory leaks spotted by Coverity via Jakub Jelen in bz#2366
- feedback and ok dtucker@
+ ...unless Cygwin is running on Windows Vista or Windows 7 in the
+ WOW64 32 bit emulation layer. It turns out that WOW64 on these systems
+ didn't implement MsV1_0 S4U Logon so we still need the fallback
+ to NtCreateToken for these systems.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1e77547f60fdb5e2ffe23e2e4733c54d8d2d1137
+ Signed-off-by: Corinna Vinschen <vinschen@redhat.com>
-commit 1b9dd4aa15208100fbc3650f33ea052255578282
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sun Aug 12 20:19:13 2018 +0000
+commit a212107bfdf4d3e870ab7a443e4d906e5b9578c3
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Wed Mar 13 10:49:16 2019 +1100
- upstream: better diagnosics on alg list assembly errors; ok
-
- deraadt@ markus@
+ Replace alloca with xcalloc.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 5a557e74b839daf13cc105924d2af06a1560faee
+ The latter checks for memory exhaustion and integer overflow and may be
+ at a less predictable place. Sanity check by vinschen at redhat.com, ok
+ djm@
-commit e36a5f61b0f5bebf6d49c215d228cd99dfe86e28
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Sat Aug 11 18:08:45 2018 -0700
+commit daa7505aadca68ba1a2c70cbdfce423208eb91ee
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Tue Mar 12 09:19:19 2019 +1100
- Some AIX fixes; report from Michael Felt
+ Use Cygwin-specific matching only for users+groups.
+
+ Patch from vinschen at redhat.com, updated a little by me.
-commit 2f4766ceefe6657c5ad5fe92d13c411872acae0e
+commit fd10cf027b56f9aaa80c9e3844626a05066589a4
Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Aug 10 01:35:49 2018 +0000
+Date: Wed Mar 6 22:14:23 2019 +0000
- upstream: The script that cooks up PuTTY format host keys does not
+ upstream: Move checks for lists of users or groups into their own
- understand the new key format so convert back to old format to create the
- PuTTY key and remove it once done.
+ function. This is a no-op on OpenBSD but will make things easier in
+ -portable, eg on systems where these checks should be case-insensitive. ok
+ djm@
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 2a449a18846c3a144bc645135b551ba6177e38d3
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8bc9c8d98670e23f8eaaaefe29c1f98e7ba0487e
-commit e1b26ce504662a5d5b991091228984ccfd25f280
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Aug 10 00:44:01 2018 +0000
+commit ab5fee8eb6a011002fd9e32b1597f02aa8804a25
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Mar 6 21:06:59 2019 +0000
- upstream: improve
+ upstream: Reset last-seen time when sending a keepalive. Prevents
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 40d839db0977b4e7ac8b647b16d5411d4faf2f60
+ sending two keepalives successively and prematurely terminating connection
+ when ClientAliveCount=1. While there, collapse two similar tests into one.
+ ok markus@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 043670d201dfe222537a2a4bed16ce1087de5ddd
-commit 7c712966a3139622f7fb55045368d05de4e6782c
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Aug 10 00:42:29 2018 +0000
+commit c13b74530f9f1d9df7aeae012004b31b2de4438e
+Author: naddy@openbsd.org <naddy@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Mar 5 16:17:12 2019 +0000
- upstream: Describe pubkey format, prompted by bz#2853
+ upstream: PKCS#11 support is no longer limited to RSA; ok benno@
- While I'm here, describe and link to the remaining local PROTOCOL.*
- docs that weren't already mentioned (PROTOCOL.key, PROTOCOL.krl and
- PROTOCOL.mux)
+ kn@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2a900f9b994ba4d53e7aeb467d44d75829fd1231
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1a9bec64d530aed5f434a960e7515a3e80cbc826
-commit ef100a2c5a8ed83afac0b8f36520815803da227a
+commit e9552d6043db7cd170ac6ba1b4d2c7a5eb2c3201
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Aug 10 00:27:15 2018 +0000
+Date: Fri Mar 1 03:29:32 2019 +0000
- upstream: fix numbering
+ upstream: in ssh_set_newkeys(), mention the direction that we're
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: bc7a1764dff23fa4c5ff0e3379c9c4d5b63c9596
+ keying in debug messages. Previously it would be difficult to tell which
+ direction it was talking about
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c2b71bfcceb2a7389b9d0b497fb2122a406a522d
-commit ed7bd5d93fe14c7bd90febd29b858ea985d14d45
+commit 76a24b3fa193a9ca3e47a8779d497cb06500798b
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Aug 8 01:16:01 2018 +0000
+Date: Fri Mar 1 02:32:39 2019 +0000
- upstream: Use new private key format by default. This format is
-
- suported by OpenSSH >= 6.5 (released January 2014), so it should be supported
- by most OpenSSH versions in active use.
+ upstream: Fix two race conditions in sshd relating to SIGHUP:
- It is possible to convert new-format private keys to the older
- format using "ssh-keygen -f /path/key -pm PEM".
+ 1. Recently-forked child processes will briefly remain listening to
+ listen_socks. If the main server sshd process completes its restart
+ via execv() before these sockets are closed by the child processes
+ then it can fail to listen at the desired addresses/ports and/or
+ fail to restart.
- ok deraadt dtucker
+ 2. When a SIGHUP is received, there may be forked child processes that
+ are awaiting their reexecution state. If the main server sshd
+ process restarts before passing this state, these child processes
+ will yield errors and use a fallback path of reading the current
+ sshd_config from the filesystem rather than use the one that sshd
+ was started with.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e3bd4f2509a2103bfa2f710733426af3ad6d8ab8
-
-commit 967226a1bdde59ea137e8f0df871854ff7b91366
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sat Aug 4 00:55:06 2018 +0000
-
- upstream: invalidate dh->priv_key after freeing it in error path;
+ To fix both of these cases, we reuse the startup_pipes that are shared
+ between the main server sshd and forked children. Previously this was
+ used solely to implement tracking of pre-auth child processes for
+ MaxStartups, but this extends the messaging over these pipes to include
+ a child->parent message that the parent process is safe to restart. This
+ message is sent from the child after it has completed its preliminaries:
+ closing listen_socks and receiving its reexec state.
- avoids unlikely double-free later. Reported by Viktor Dukhovni via
- https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/pull/96 feedback jsing@ tb@
+ bz#2953, reported by Michal Koutný; ok markus@ dtucker@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e317eb17c3e05500ae851f279ef6486f0457c805
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7df09eacfa3ce13e9a7b1e9f17276ecc924d65ab
-commit 74287f5df9966a0648b4a68417451dd18f079ab8
+commit de817e9dfab99473017d28cdf69e60397d00ea21
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Jul 31 03:10:27 2018 +0000
+Date: Fri Mar 1 02:16:47 2019 +0000
- upstream: delay bailout for invalid authentic
+ upstream: mention PKCS11Provide=none, reword a little and remove
- =?UTF-8?q?ating=20user=20until=20after=20the=20packet=20containing=20the?=
- =?UTF-8?q?=20request=20has=20been=20fully=20parsed.=20Reported=20by=20Dar?=
- =?UTF-8?q?iusz=20Tytko=20and=20Micha=C5=82=20Sajdak;=20ok=20deraadt?=
- MIME-Version: 1.0
- Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
- Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+ mention of RSA keys only (since we support ECDSA now and might support others
+ in the future). Inspired by Jakub Jelen via bz#2974
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b4891882fbe413f230fe8ac8a37349b03bd0b70d
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a92e3686561bf624ccc64ab320c96c9e9a263aa5
-commit 1a66079c0669813306cc69e5776a4acd9fb49015
+commit 95a8058c1a90a27acbb91392ba206854abc85226
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Jul 31 03:07:24 2018 +0000
+Date: Fri Mar 1 02:08:50 2019 +0000
- upstream: fix some memory leaks spotted by Coverity via Jakub Jelen
+ upstream: let PKCS11Provider=none do what users expect
- in bz#2366 feedback and ok dtucker@
+ print PKCS11Provider instead of obsolete SmartcardDevice in config dump.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8402bbae67d578bedbadb0ce68ff7c5a136ef563
-
-commit 87f08be054b7eeadbb9cdeb3fb4872be79ccf218
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Fri Jul 20 13:18:28 2018 +1000
-
- Remove support for S/Key
+ bz#2974 ok dtucker@
- Most people will 1) be using modern multi-factor authentication methods
- like TOTP/OATH etc and 2) be getting support for multi-factor
- authentication via PAM or BSD Auth.
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c303d6f0230a33aa2dd92dc9b68843d56a64f846
-commit 5d14019ba2ff54acbfd20a6b9b96bb860a8c7c31
+commit 8e7bac35aa576d2fd7560836da83733e864ce649
Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Jul 27 12:03:17 2018 +0000
-
- upstream: avoid expensive channel_open_message() calls; ok djm@
-
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: aea3b5512ad681cd8710367d743e8a753d4425d9
-
-commit e655ee04a3cb7999dbf9641b25192353e2b69418
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Jul 27 05:34:42 2018 +0000
+Date: Wed Feb 27 19:37:01 2019 +0000
- upstream: Now that ssh can't be setuid, remove the
+ upstream: dup stdout/in for proxycommand=-, otherwise stdout might
- original_real_uid and original_effective_uid globals and replace with calls
- to plain getuid(). ok djm@
+ be redirected to /dev/null; ok djm@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 92561c0cd418d34e6841e20ba09160583e27b68c
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 97dfce4c47ed4055042de8ebde85b7d88793e595
-commit 73ddb25bae4c33a0db361ac13f2e3a60d7c6c4a5
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Jul 27 05:13:02 2018 +0000
+commit 9b61130fbd95d196bce81ebeca94a4cb7c0d5ba0
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sat Feb 23 08:20:43 2019 +0000
- upstream: Remove uid checks from low port binds. Now that ssh
+ upstream: openssh-7.9 accidentally reused the server's algorithm lists
- cannot be setuid and sshd always has privsep on, we can remove the uid checks
- for low port binds and just let the system do the check. We leave a sanity
- check for the !privsep case so long as the code is stil there. with & ok
- djm@
+ in the client for KEX, ciphers and MACs. The ciphers and MACs were identical
+ between the client and server, but the error accidentially disabled the
+ diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1 KEX method.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9535cfdbd1cd54486fdbedfaee44ce4367ec7ca0
-
-commit c12033e102760d043bc5c98e6c8180e4d331b0df
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Jul 27 03:55:22 2018 +0000
-
- upstream: ssh(1) no longer supports being setuid root. Remove reference
+ This fixes the client code to use the correct method list, but
+ because nobody complained, it also disables the
+ diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1 KEX method.
- to crc32 which went with protocol 1. Pointed out by deraadt@.
+ Reported by nuxi AT vault24.org via bz#2697; ok dtucker
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f8763c25fd96ed91dd1abdab5667fd2e27e377b6
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e30c33a23c10fd536fefa120e86af1842e33fd57
-commit 4492e2ec4e1956a277ef507f51d66e5c2aafaaf8
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Fri Jul 27 14:15:28 2018 +1000
+commit 37638c752041d591371900df820f070037878a2d
+Author: Corinna Vinschen <vinschen@redhat.com>
+Date: Wed Feb 20 13:41:25 2019 +0100
- correct snprintf truncation check in closefrom()
+ Cygwin: implement case-insensitive Unicode user and group name matching
- Truncation cannot happen unless the system has set PATH_MAX to some
- nonsensically low value.
+ The previous revert enabled case-insensitive user names again. This
+ patch implements the case-insensitive user and group name matching.
+ To allow Unicode chars, implement the matcher using wchar_t chars in
+ Cygwin-specific code. Keep the generic code changes as small as possible.
+ Cygwin: implement case-insensitive Unicode user and group name matching
- bz#2862, patch from Daniel Le
+ Signed-off-by: Corinna Vinschen <vinschen@redhat.com>
-commit 149cab325a8599a003364ed833f878449c15f259
+commit bed1d43698807a07bb4ddb93a46b0bd84b9970b3
Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Fri Jul 27 13:46:06 2018 +1000
-
- Include stdarg.h in mkdtemp for va_list.
+Date: Fri Feb 22 15:21:21 2019 +1100
-commit 6728f31bdfdc864d192773c32465b1860e23f556
-Author: deraadt@openbsd.org <deraadt@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Jul 25 17:12:35 2018 +0000
+ Revert unintended parts of previous commit.
- upstream: Don't redefine Makefile choices which come correct from
+commit f02afa350afac1b2f2d1413259a27a4ba1e2ca24
+Author: Corinna Vinschen <vinschen@redhat.com>
+Date: Wed Feb 20 13:41:24 2019 +0100
+
+ Revert "[auth.c] On Cygwin, refuse usernames that have differences in case"
- bsd.*.mk ok markus
+ This reverts commit acc9b29486dfd649dfda474e5c1a03b317449f1c.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 814b2f670df75759e1581ecef530980b2b3d7e0f
+ Signed-off-by: Corinna Vinschen <vinschen@redhat.com>
-commit 21fd477a855753c1a8e450963669e28e39c3b5d2
-Author: deraadt@openbsd.org <deraadt@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Jul 25 13:56:23 2018 +0000
+commit 4c55b674835478eb80a1a7aeae588aa654e2a433
+Author: Corinna Vinschen <vinschen@redhat.com>
+Date: Sat Feb 16 14:13:43 2019 +0100
- upstream: fix indent; Clemens Goessnitzer
+ Add tags to .gitignore
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b5149a6d92b264d35f879d24608087b254857a83
+ Signed-off-by: Corinna Vinschen <vinschen@redhat.com>
-commit 8e433c2083db8664c41499ee146448ea7ebe7dbf
-Author: beck@openbsd.org <beck@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Jul 25 13:10:56 2018 +0000
+commit 625b62634c33eaef4b80d07529954fe5c6435fe5
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Feb 22 03:37:11 2019 +0000
- upstream: Use the caller provided (copied) pwent struct in
+ upstream: perform removal of agent-forwarding directory in forward
- load_public_identity_files instead of calling getpwuid() again and discarding
- the argument. This prevents a client crash where tilde_expand_filename calls
- getpwuid() again before the pwent pointer is used. Issue noticed and reported
- by Pierre-Olivier Martel <pom@apple.com> ok djm@ deraadt@
+ setup error path with user's privileged. This is a no-op as this code always
+ runs with user privilege now that we no longer support running sshd with
+ privilege separation disabled, but as long as the privsep skeleton is there
+ we should follow the rules.
+ MIME-Version: 1.0
+ Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+ Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a067d74b5b098763736c94cc1368de8ea3f0b157
-
-commit e2127abb105ae72b6fda64fff150e6b24b3f1317
-Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Jul 23 19:53:55 2018 +0000
-
- upstream: oops, failed to notice that SEE ALSO got messed up;
+ bz#2969 with patch from Erik Sjölund
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 61c1306542cefdc6e59ac331751afe961557427d
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2b708401a5a8d6133c865d7698d9852210dca846
-commit ddf1b797c2d26bbbc9d410aa4f484cbe94673587
-Author: kn@openbsd.org <kn@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Jul 23 19:02:49 2018 +0000
+commit d9ecfaba0b2f1887d20e4368230632e709ca83be
+Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Feb 18 07:02:34 2019 +0000
- upstream: Point to glob in section 7 for the actual list of special
+ upstream: sync the description of ~/.ssh/config with djm's updated
- characters instead the C API in section 3.
+ description in ssh.1; issue pointed out by andreas kahari
- OK millert jmc nicm, "the right idea" deraadt
+ ok dtucker djm
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a74fd215488c382809e4d041613aeba4a4b1ffc6
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1b01ef0ae2c6328165150badae317ec92e52b01c
-commit 01c98d9661d0ed6156e8602b650f72eed9fc4d12
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sun Jul 22 12:16:59 2018 +0000
+commit 38e83e4f219c752ebb1560633b73f06f0392018b
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Feb 12 23:53:10 2019 +0000
- upstream: Switch authorized_keys example from ssh-dss to ssh-rsa
+ upstream: fix regression in r1.302 reported by naddy@ - only the first
- since the former is no longer enabled by default. Pointed out by Daniel A.
- Maierhofer, ok jmc
+ public key from the agent was being attempted for use.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 6a196cef53d7524e0c9b58cdbc1b5609debaf8c7
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 07116aea521a04888718b2157f1ca723b2f46c8d
-commit 472269f8fe19343971c2d08f504ab5cbb8234b33
+commit 5c68ea8da790d711e6dd5f4c30d089c54032c59a
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Jul 20 05:01:10 2018 +0000
+Date: Mon Feb 11 09:44:42 2019 +0000
- upstream: slightly-clearer description for AuthenticationMethods - the
+ upstream: cleanup GSSAPI authentication context after completion of the
- lists have comma-separated elements; bz#2663 from Hans Meier
+ authmethod. Move function-static GSSAPI state to the client Authctxt
+ structure. Make static a bunch of functions that aren't used outside this
+ file.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 931c983d0fde4764d0942fb2c2b5017635993b5a
+ Based on patch from Markus Schmidt <markus@blueflash.cc>; ok markus@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 497fb792c0ddb4f1ba631b6eed526861f115dbe5
-commit c59aca8adbdf7f5597084ad360a19bedb3f80970
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Fri Jul 20 14:53:42 2018 +1000
+commit a8c807f1956f81a92a758d3d0237d0ff06d0be5d
+Author: benno@openbsd.org <benno@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sun Feb 10 16:35:41 2019 +0000
- Create control sockets in clean temp directories
+ upstream: ssh-keygen -D pkcs11.so needs to initialize pkcs11
- Adds a regress/mkdtemp tool and uses it to create empty temp
- directories for tests needing control sockets.
+ interactive, so it can ask for the smartcards PIN. ok markus@
- Patch from Colin Watson via bz#2660; ok dtucker
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1be7ccf88f1876e0fc4d7c9b3f96019ac5655bab
-commit 6ad8648e83e4f4ace37b742a05c2a6b6b872514e
+commit 3d896c157c722bc47adca51a58dca859225b5874
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Jul 20 03:46:34 2018 +0000
+Date: Sun Feb 10 11:15:52 2019 +0000
- upstream: remove unused zlib.h
+ upstream: when checking that filenames sent by the server side
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8d274a9b467c7958df12668b49144056819f79f1
+ match what the client requested, be prepared to handle shell-style brace
+ alternations, e.g. "{foo,bar}".
+
+ "looks good to me" millert@ + in snaps for the last week courtesy
+ deraadt@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 3b1ce7639b0b25b2248e3a30f561a548f6815f3e
-commit 3ba6e6883527fe517b6e4a824876e2fe62af22fc
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Jul 19 23:03:16 2018 +0000
+commit 318e4f8548a4f5c0c913f61e27d4fc21ffb1eaae
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sun Feb 10 11:10:57 2019 +0000
- upstream: Fix typo in comment. From Alexandru Iacob via github.
+ upstream: syslog when connection is dropped for attempting to run a
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: eff4ec07c6c8c5483533da43a4dda37d72ef7f1d
+ command when ForceCommand=internal-sftp is in effect; bz2960; ok dtucker@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8c87fa66d7fc6c0fffa3a3c28e8ab5e8dde234b8
-commit c77bc73c91bc656e343a1961756e09dd1b170820
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Fri Jul 20 13:48:51 2018 +1000
+commit 2ff2e19653b8c0798b8b8eff209651bdb1be2761
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Fri Feb 8 14:53:35 2019 +1100
- Explicitly include openssl before zlib.
+ don't set $MAIL if UsePam=yes
- Some versions of OpenSSL have "free_func" in their headers, which zlib
- typedefs. Including openssl after zlib (eg via sshkey.h) results in
- "syntax error before `free_func'", which this fixes.
+ PAM typically specifies the user environment if it's enabled, so don't
+ second guess. bz#2937; ok dtucker@
-commit 95d41e90eafcd1286a901e8e361e4a37b98aeb52
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Jul 19 10:28:47 2018 +0000
+commit 03e92dd27d491fe6d1a54e7b2f44ef1b0a916e52
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Fri Feb 8 14:50:36 2019 +1100
- upstream: Deprecate UsePrivilegedPort now that support for running
+ use same close logic for stderr as stdout
- ssh(1) setuid has been removed, remove supporting code and clean up
- references to it in the man pages
+ Avoids sending SIGPIPE to child processes after their parent exits
+ if they attempt to write to stderr.
- We have not shipped ssh(1) the setuid bit since 2002. If ayone
- really needs to make connections from a low port number this can
- be implemented via a small setuid ProxyCommand.
+ Analysis and patch from JD Paul; patch reworked by Jakub Jelen and
+ myself. bz#2071; ok dtucker@
+
+commit 8c53d409baeeaf652c0c125a9b164edc9dbeb6de
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Feb 5 11:35:56 2019 +0000
+
+ upstream: Adapt code in the non-USE_PIPES codepath to the new packet
- ok markus@ jmc@ djm@
+ API. This code is not normally reachable since USE_PIPES is always defined.
+ bz#2961, patch from adrian.fita at gmail com.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d03364610b7123ae4c6792f5274bd147b6de717e
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8d8428d678d1d5eb4bb21921df34e8173e6d238a
-commit 258dc8bb07dfb35a46e52b0822a2c5b7027df60a
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Jul 18 11:34:04 2018 +0000
+commit 7a7fdca78de4b4774950be056099e579ef595414
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Feb 4 23:37:54 2019 +0000
- upstream: Remove support for running ssh(1) setuid and fatal if
+ upstream: fix NULL-deref crash in PKCS#11 code when attempting
- attempted. Do not link uidwap.c into ssh any more. Neuters
- UsePrivilegedPort, which will be marked as deprecated shortly. ok markus@
- djm@
+ login to a token requiring a PIN; reported by benno@ fix mostly by markus@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c4ba5bf9c096f57a6ed15b713a1d7e9e2e373c42
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 438d0b114b1b4ba25a9869733db1921209aa9a31
-commit ac590760b251506b0a152551abbf8e8d6dc2f527
+commit cac302a4b42a988e54d32eb254b29b79b648dbf5
Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Jul 16 22:25:01 2018 +0000
+Date: Mon Feb 4 02:39:42 2019 +0000
- upstream: Slot 0 in the hostbased key array was previously RSA1,
+ upstream: Remove obsolete "Protocol" from commented out examples. Patch
- but that is now gone and the slot is unused so remove it. Remove two
- now-unused macros, and add an array bounds check to the two remaining ones
- (array is statically sized, so mostly a safety check on future changes). ok
- markus@
+ from samy.mahmoudi at gmail com.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2e4c0ca6cc1d8daeccead2aa56192a3f9d5e1e7a
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 16aede33dae299725a03abdac5dcb4d73f5d0cbf
-commit 26efc2f5df0e3bcf6a6bbdd0506fd682d60c2145
+commit 483b3b638500fd498b4b529356e5a0e18cf76891
Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Jul 16 11:05:41 2018 +0000
+Date: Fri Feb 1 03:52:23 2019 +0000
- upstream: Remove support for loading HostBasedAuthentication keys
+ upstream: Save connection timeout and restore for 2nd and
- directly in ssh(1) and always use ssh-keysign. This removes one of the few
- remaining reasons why ssh(1) might be setuid. ok markus@
+ subsequent attempts, preventing them from having no timeout. bz#2918, ok
+ djm@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 97f01e1448707129a20d75f86bad5d27c3cf0b7d
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4977f1d0521d9b6bba0c9a20d3d226cefac48292
-commit 3eb7f1038d17af7aea3c2c62d1e30cd545607640
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Jul 16 07:06:50 2018 +0000
+commit 5f004620fdc1b2108139300ee12f4014530fb559
+Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Jan 30 19:51:15 2019 +0000
- upstream: keep options.identity_file_userprovided array in sync when we
+ upstream: Add authors for public domain sntrup4591761 code;
- load keys, fixing some spurious error messages; ok markus
+ confirmed by Daniel J. Bernstein
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c63e3d5200ee2cf9e35bda98de847302566c6a00
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b4621f22b8b8ef13e063c852af5e54dbbfa413c1
-commit 2f131e1b34502aa19f345e89cabf6fa3fc097f09
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Jul 16 03:09:59 2018 +0000
+commit 2c21b75a7be6ebdcbceaebb43157c48dbb36f3d8
+Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sun Jan 27 07:14:11 2019 +0000
- upstream: memleak in unittest; found by valgrind
+ upstream: add -T to usage();
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 168c23b0fb09fc3d0b438628990d3fd9260a8a5e
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a7ae14d9436c64e1bd05022329187ea3a0ce1899
-commit de2997a4cf22ca0a524f0e5b451693c583e2fd89
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Jul 16 03:09:13 2018 +0000
+commit 19a0f0529d3df04118da829528cac7ceff380b24
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Jan 28 03:50:39 2019 +0000
- upstream: memleaks; found by valgrind
+ upstream: The test sshd_config in in $OBJ.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 6c3ba22be53e753c899545f771e8399fc93cd844
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 1e5d908a286d8e7de3a15a0020c8857f3a7c9172
-commit 61cc0003eb37fa07603c969c12b7c795caa498f3
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Sat Jul 14 16:49:01 2018 +1000
+commit 8fe25440206319d15b52d12b948a5dfdec14dca3
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Jan 28 03:28:10 2019 +0000
- Undef a few new macros in sys-queue.h.
+ upstream: Remove leftover debugging.
- Prevents macro redefinition warnings on OSX.
-
-commit 30a2c213877a54a44dfdffb6ca8db70be5b457e0
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Fri Jul 13 13:40:20 2018 +1000
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 3d86c3d4867e46b35af3fd2ac8c96df0ffdcfeb9
- Include unistd.h for geteuid declaration.
-
-commit 1dd32c23f2a85714dfafe2a9cc516971d187caa4
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Fri Jul 13 13:38:10 2018 +1000
+commit e30d32364d12c351eec9e14be6c61116f9d6cc90
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Jan 28 00:12:36 2019 +0000
- Fallout from buffer conversion in AUDIT_EVENTS.
+ upstream: Enable ssh-dss for the agent test. Disable it for the
- Supply missing "int r" and fix error path for sshbuf_new().
+ certificate test.
+
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 388c1e03e1def539d350f139b37d69f12334668d
-commit 7449c178e943e5c4f6c8416a4e41d93b70c11c9e
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Jul 13 02:13:50 2018 +0000
+commit ffdde469ed56249f5dc8af98da468dde35531398
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Jan 28 00:08:26 2019 +0000
- upstream: make this use ssh_proxy rather than starting/stopping a
+ upstream: Count the number of key types instead of assuming there
- daemon for each testcase
+ are only two.
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 608b7655ea65b1ba8fff5a13ce9caa60ef0c8166
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 0998702c41235782cf0beee396ec49b5056eaed9
-commit dbab02f9208d9baa134cec1d007054ec82b96ca9
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Jul 13 02:13:19 2018 +0000
+commit 1d05b4adcba08ab068466e5c08dee2f5417ec53a
+Author: Corinna Vinschen <vinschen@redhat.com>
+Date: Sat Jan 26 23:42:40 2019 +0100
- upstream: fix leaks in unit test; with this, all unit tests are
-
- leak free (as far as valgrind can spot anyway)
+ Cygwin: only tweak sshd_config file if it's new, drop creating sshd user
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: b824d8b27998365379963440e5d18b95ca03aa17
+ The sshd_config tweaks were executed even if the old file was
+ still in place. Fix that. Also disable sshd user creation.
+ It's not used on Cygwin.
-commit 2f6accff5085eb79b0dbe262d8b85ed017d1a51c
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Fri Jul 13 11:39:25 2018 +1000
+commit 89843de0c4c733501f6b4f988098e6e06963df37
+Author: Corinna Vinschen <vinschen@redhat.com>
+Date: Sat Jan 26 23:03:12 2019 +0100
- Enable leak checks for unit tests with valgrind
+ Cygwin: Change service name to cygsshd
- Leave the leak checking on unconditionally when running with valgrind.
- The unit tests are leak-free and I want them to stay that way.
+ Microsoft hijacked the sshd service name without asking.
-commit e46cfbd9db5e907b821bf4fd0184d4dab99815ee
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Fri Jul 13 11:38:59 2018 +1000
+commit 2a9b3a2ce411d16cda9c79ab713c55f65b0ec257
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sun Jan 27 06:30:53 2019 +0000
- increase timeout to match cfgmatch.sh
+ upstream: Generate all key supported key types and enable for keyscan
- lets test pass under valgrind (on my workstation at least)
+ test.
+
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 72f72ff49946c61bc949e1692dd9e3d71370891b
-commit 6aa1bf475cf3e7a2149acc5a1e80e904749f064c
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Thu Jul 12 14:54:18 2018 +1000
+commit 391ffc4b9d31fa1f4ad566499fef9176ff8a07dc
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sat Jan 26 22:41:28 2019 +0000
- rm regress/misc/kexfuzz/*.o in distclean target
+ upstream: check in scp client that filenames sent during
+
+ remote->local directory copies satisfy the wildcard specified by the user.
+
+ This checking provides some protection against a malicious server
+ sending unexpected filenames, but it comes at a risk of rejecting wanted
+ files due to differences between client and server wildcard expansion rules.
+
+ For this reason, this also adds a new -T flag to disable the check.
+
+ reported by Harry Sintonen
+ fix approach suggested by markus@;
+ has been in snaps for ~1wk courtesy deraadt@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 00f44b50d2be8e321973f3c6d014260f8f7a8eda
-commit eef1447ddb559c03725a23d4aa6d03f40e8b0049
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Thu Jul 12 14:49:26 2018 +1000
+commit c2c18a39683db382a15b438632afab3f551d50ce
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sat Jan 26 22:35:01 2019 +0000
- repair !WITH_OPENSSL build
+ upstream: make ssh-keyscan return a non-zero exit status if it
+
+ finds no keys. bz#2903
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 89f1081fb81d950ebb48e6e73d21807b2723d488
-commit 4d3b2f36fd831941d1627ac587faae37b6d3570f
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Thu Jul 12 14:49:14 2018 +1000
+commit 05b9a466700b44d49492edc2aa415fc2e8913dfe
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Jan 24 17:00:29 2019 +0000
- missing headers
+ upstream: Accept the host key fingerprint as a synonym for "yes"
+
+ when accepting an unknown host key. This allows you to paste a fingerprint
+ obtained out of band into the yes/no prompt and have the client do the
+ comparison for you. ok markus@ djm@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 3c47d10b9f43d3d345e044fd9ec09709583a2767
-commit 3f420a692b293921216549c1099c2e46ff284eae
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Thu Jul 12 14:57:46 2018 +1000
+commit bdc6c63c80b55bcbaa66b5fde31c1cb1d09a41eb
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Jan 24 16:52:17 2019 +0000
- Remove key.h from portable files too.
+ upstream: Have progressmeter force an update at the beginning and
- Commit 5467fbcb removed key.h so stop including it in portable files
- too. Fixes builds on lots of platforms.
+ end of each transfer. Fixes the problem recently introduces where very quick
+ transfers do not display the progressmeter at all. Spotted by naddy@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 68dc46c259e8fdd4f5db3ec2a130f8e4590a7a9a
-commit e2c4af311543093f16005c10044f7e06af0426f0
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Jul 12 04:35:25 2018 +0000
+commit 258e6ca003e47f944688ad8b8de087b58a7d966c
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Jan 24 02:42:23 2019 +0000
- upstream: remove prototype to long-gone function
+ upstream: Check for both EAGAIN and EWOULDBLOCK. This is a no-op
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0414642ac7ce01d176b9f359091a66a8bbb640bd
+ in OpenBSD (they are the same value) but makes things easier in -portable
+ where they may be distinct values. "sigh ok" deraadt@
+
+ (ID sync only, portable already had this change).
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 91f2bc7c0ecec905915ed59fa37feb9cc90e17d7
-commit 394a842e60674bf8ee5130b9f15b01452a0b0285
-Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Jul 11 18:55:11 2018 +0000
+commit 281ce042579b834cdc1e74314f1fb2eeb75d2612
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Jan 24 02:34:52 2019 +0000
- upstream: treat ssh_packet_write_wait() errors as fatal; ok djm@
+ upstream: Always initialize 2nd arg to hpdelim2. It populates that
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f88ba43c9d54ed2d911218aa8d3f6285430629c3
+ *ONLY IF* there's a delimiter. If there's not (the common case) it checked
+ uninitialized memory, which usually passed, but if not would cause spurious
+ failures when the uninitialized memory happens to contain "/". ok deraadt.
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4291611eaf2a53d4c92f4a57c7f267c9f944e0d3
-commit 5467fbcb09528ecdcb914f4f2452216c24796790
-Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Jul 11 18:53:29 2018 +0000
+commit d05ea255678d9402beda4416cd0360f3e5dfe938
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Jan 23 21:50:56 2019 +0000
- upstream: remove legacy key emulation layer; ok djm@
+ upstream: Remove support for obsolete host/port syntax.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2b1f9619259e222bbd4fe9a8d3a0973eafb9dd8d
+ host/port was added in 2001 as an alternative to host:port syntax for
+ the benefit of IPv6 users. These days there are establised standards
+ for this like [::1]:22 and the slash syntax is easily mistaken for CIDR
+ notation, which OpenSSH now supports for some things. Remove the slash
+ notation from ListenAddress and PermitOpen. bz#2335, patch from jjelen
+ at redhat.com, ok markus@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: fae5f4e23c51a368d6b2d98376069ac2b10ad4b7
-commit 5dc4c59d5441a19c99e7945779f7ec9051126c25
-Author: martijn@openbsd.org <martijn@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Jul 11 08:19:35 2018 +0000
+commit 177d6c80c557a5e060cd343a0c116a2f1a7f43db
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Jan 23 20:48:52 2019 +0000
- upstream: s/wuth/with/ in comment
+ upstream: Remove duplicate word. bz#2958, patch from jjelen at
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9de41468afd75f54a7f47809d2ad664aa577902c
+ redhat.com
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: cca3965a8333f2b6aae48b79ec1d72f7a830dd2c
-commit 1c688801e9dd7f9889fb2a29bc2b6fbfbc35a11f
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Wed Jul 11 12:12:38 2018 +1000
+commit be3e6cba95dffe5fcf190c713525b48c837e7875
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Jan 23 09:49:00 2019 +0000
- Include stdlib.h for declaration of free.
+ upstream: Remove 3 as a guess for possible generator during moduli
- Fixes build with -Werror on at least Fedora and probably others.
+ generation. It's not mentioned in RFC4419 and it's not possible for
+ Sophie-Germain primes greater than 5. bz#2330, from Christian Wittenhorst ,
+ ok djm@ tb@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1467652e6802ad3333b0959282d8d49dfe22c8cd
-commit fccfa239def497615f92ed28acc57cfe63da3666
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Wed Jul 11 10:19:56 2018 +1000
+commit 8976f1c4b2721c26e878151f52bdf346dfe2d54c
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Jan 23 08:01:46 2019 +0000
- VALGRIND_CHECK_LEAKS logic was backwards :(
+ upstream: Sanitize scp filenames via snmprintf. To do this we move
+
+ the progressmeter formatting outside of signal handler context and have the
+ atomicio callback called for EINTR too. bz#2434 with contributions from djm
+ and jjelen at redhat.com, ok djm@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1af61c1f70e4f3bd8ab140b9f1fa699481db57d8
-commit 416287d45fcde0a8e66eee8b99aa73bd58607588
+commit 6249451f381755f792c6b9e2c2f80cdc699c14e2
Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Wed Jul 11 10:10:26 2018 +1000
+Date: Thu Jan 24 10:00:20 2019 +1100
- Fix sshbuf_new error path in skey.
+ For broken read/readv comparisons, poll(RW).
+
+ In the cases where we can't compare to read or readv function pointers
+ for some reason we currently ifdef out the poll() used to block while
+ waiting for reads or writes, falling back to busy waiting. This restores
+ the poll() in this case, but has it always check for read or write,
+ removing an inline ifdef in the process.
-commit 7aab109b8b90a353c1af780524f1ac0d3af47bab
+commit 5cb503dff4db251520e8bf7d23b9c97c06eee031
Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Wed Jul 11 10:06:18 2018 +1000
+Date: Thu Jan 24 09:55:16 2019 +1100
- Supply missing third arg in skey.
-
- During the change to the new buffer api the third arg to
- sshbuf_get_cstring was ommitted. Fixes build when configured with skey.
+ Include unistd.h for strmode().
-commit 380320bb72cc353a901790ab04b6287fd335dc4a
+commit f236ca2741f29b5c443c0b2db3aa9afb9ad9befe
Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Wed Jul 11 10:03:34 2018 +1000
+Date: Thu Jan 24 09:50:58 2019 +1100
- Supply some more missing "int r" in skey
+ Also undef SIMPLEQ_FOREACH_SAFE.
+
+ Prevents macro redefinition warning on at least NetBSD 6.1.
-commit d20720d373d8563ee737d1a45dc5e0804d622dbc
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Wed Jul 11 09:56:36 2018 +1000
+commit be063945e4e7d46b1734d973bf244c350fae172a
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Jan 23 04:51:02 2019 +0000
- disable valgrind memleak checking by default
+ upstream: allow auto-incrementing certificate serial number for certs
- Add VALGRIND_CHECK_LEAKS knob to turn it back on.
-
-commit 79c9d35018f3a5e30ae437880b669aa8636cd3cd
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Wed Jul 11 09:54:00 2018 +1000
+ signed in a single commandline.
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 39881087641efb8cd83c7ec13b9c98280633f45b
- Supply missing "int r" in skey code.
-
-commit 984bacfaacbbe31c35191b828fb5b5b2f0362c36
-Author: sf@openbsd.org <sf@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Jul 10 09:36:58 2018 +0000
+commit 851f80328931975fe68f71af363c4537cb896da2
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Jan 23 04:16:22 2019 +0000
- upstream: re-remove some pre-auth compression bits
-
- This time, make sure to not remove things that are necessary for
- pre-auth compression on the client. Add a comment that pre-auth
- compression is still supported in the client.
+ upstream: move a bunch of global flag variables to main(); make the
- ok markus@
+ rest static
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 282c6fec7201f18a5c333bbb68d9339734d2f784
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: fa431d92584e81fe99f95882f4c56b43fe3242dc
-commit 120a1ec74e8d9d29f4eb9a27972ddd22351ddef9
+commit 2265402dc7d701a9aca9f8a7b7b0fd45b65c479f
Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Tue Jul 10 19:39:52 2018 +1000
+Date: Wed Jan 23 13:03:16 2019 +1100
- Adapt portable to legacy buffer API removal
+ depend
-commit 0f3958c1e6ffb8ea4ba27e2a97a00326fce23246
+commit 2c223878e53cc46def760add459f5f7c4fb43e35
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Jul 10 09:13:30 2018 +0000
+Date: Wed Jan 23 02:01:10 2019 +0000
- upstream: kerberos/gssapi fixes for buffer removal
+ upstream: switch mainloop from select(2) to poll(2); ok deraadt@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1cdf56fec95801e4563c47f21696f04cd8b60c4c
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 37645419a330037d297f6f0adc3b3663e7ae7b2e
-commit c74ae8e7c45f325f3387abd48fa7dfef07a08069
+commit bb956eaa94757ad058ff43631c3a7d6c94d38c2f
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Jul 10 06:45:29 2018 +0000
+Date: Wed Jan 23 00:30:41 2019 +0000
- upstream: buffer.[ch] and bufaux.c are no more
+ upstream: pass most arguments to the KEX hash functions as sshbuf
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d1a1852284e554f39525eb4d4891b207cfb3d3a0
-
-commit a881e5a133d661eca923fb0633a03152ab2b70b2
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Jul 10 06:43:52 2018 +0000
-
- upstream: one mention of Buffer that almost got away :)
+ rather than pointer+length; ok markus@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 30d7c27a90b4544ad5dfacf654595710cd499f02
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ef0c89c52ccc89817a13a5205725148a28492bf7
-commit 49f47e656b60bcd1d1db98d88105295f4b4e600d
-Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Jul 9 21:59:10 2018 +0000
+commit d691588b8e29622c66abf8932362b522cf7f4051
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Jan 22 22:58:50 2019 +0000
- upstream: replace cast with call to sshbuf_mutable_ptr(); ok djm@
+ upstream: backoff reading messages from active connections when the
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4dfe9d29fa93d9231645c89084f7217304f7ba29
-
-commit cb30cd47041edb03476be1c8ef7bc1f4b69d1555
-Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Jul 9 21:56:06 2018 +0000
-
- upstream: remove legacy buffer API emulation layer; ok djm@
+ input buffer is too full to read one, or if the output buffer is too full to
+ enqueue a response; feedback & ok dtucker@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2dd5dc17cbc23195be4299fa93be2707a0e08ad9
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: df3c5b6d57c968975875de40d8955cbfed05a6c8
-commit 235c7c4e3bf046982c2d8242f30aacffa01073d1
-Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Jul 9 21:53:45 2018 +0000
+commit f99ef8de967949a1fc25a5c28263ea32736e5943
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Jan 22 20:48:01 2019 +0000
- upstream: sshd: switch monitor to sshbuf API; lots of help & ok
-
- djm@
+ upstream: add -m to usage(); reminded by jmc@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d89bd02d33974fd35ca0b8940d88572227b34a48
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: bca476a5236e8f94210290b3e6a507af0434613e
-commit b8d9214d969775e409e1408ecdf0d58fad99b344
-Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Jul 9 21:37:55 2018 +0000
+commit 41923ce06ac149453debe472238e0cca7d5a2e5f
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Jan 22 12:03:58 2019 +0000
- upstream: sshd: switch GSSAPI to sshbuf API; ok djm@
+ upstream: Correct some bugs in PKCS#11 token PIN handling at
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e48449ab4be3f006f7ba33c66241b7d652973e30
-
-commit c7d39ac8dc3587c5f05bdd5bcd098eb5c201c0c8
-Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Jul 9 21:35:50 2018 +0000
-
- upstream: sshd: switch authentication to sshbuf API; ok djm@
+ initial login, the attempt at reading the PIN could be skipped in some cases
+ especially on devices with integrated PIN readers.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 880aa06bce4b140781e836bb56bec34873290641
-
-commit c3cb7790e9efb14ba74b2d9f543ad593b3d55b31
-Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Jul 9 21:29:36 2018 +0000
-
- upstream: sshd: switch config to sshbuf API; ok djm@
+ based on patch from Daniel Kucera in bz#2652; ok markus@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 72b02017bac7feac48c9dceff8355056bea300bd
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: fad70a61c60610afe8bb0db538c90e343e75e58e
-commit 2808d18ca47ad3d251836c555f0e22aaca03d15c
-Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Jul 9 21:26:02 2018 +0000
+commit 2162171ad517501ba511fa9f8191945d01857bb4
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Jan 22 12:00:50 2019 +0000
- upstream: sshd: switch loginmsg to sshbuf API; ok djm@
+ upstream: Support keys that set the CKA_ALWAYS_AUTHENTICATE by
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f3cb4e54bff15c593602d95cc43e32ee1a4bac42
-
-commit 89dd615b8b531979be63f05f9d5624367c9b28e6
-Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Jul 9 21:20:26 2018 +0000
-
- upstream: ttymodes: switch to sshbuf API; ok djm@
+ requring a fresh login after the C_SignInit operation.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 5df340c5965e822c9da21e19579d08dea3cbe429
-
-commit f4608a7065480516ab46214f554e5f853fb7870f
-Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Jul 9 21:18:10 2018 +0000
-
- upstream: client: switch mux to sshbuf API; with & ok djm@
+ based on patch from Jakub Jelen in bz#2638; ok markus
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 5948fb98d704f9c4e075b92edda64e0290b5feb2
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a76e66996ba7c0923b46b74d46d499b811786661
-commit cecee2d607099a7bba0a84803e2325d15be4277b
-Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Jul 9 21:03:30 2018 +0000
+commit 7a2cb18a215b2cb335da3dc99489c52a91f4925b
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Jan 22 11:51:25 2019 +0000
- upstream: client: switch to sshbuf API; ok djm@
+ upstream: Mention that configuration for the destination host is
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 60cb0356114acc7625ab85105f6f6a7cd44a8d05
-
-commit ff55f4ad898137d4703e7a2bcc81167dfe8e9324
-Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Jul 9 20:39:28 2018 +0000
-
- upstream: pkcs11: switch to sshbuf API; ok djm@
+ not applied to any ProxyJump/-J hosts. This has confused a few people...
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 98cc4e800f1617c51caf59a6cb3006f14492db79
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 03f4f641df6ca236c1bfc69836a256b873db868b
-commit 168b46f405d6736960ba7930389eecb9b6710b7e
-Author: sf@openbsd.org <sf@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Jul 9 13:37:10 2018 +0000
+commit ecd2f33cb772db4fa76776543599f1c1ab6f9fa0
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Jan 22 11:40:42 2019 +0000
- upstream: Revert previous two commits
-
- It turns out we still support pre-auth compression on the client.
- Therefore revert the previous two commits:
-
- date: 2018/07/06 09:06:14; author: sf; commitid: yZVYKIRtUZWD9CmE;
- Rename COMP_DELAYED to COMP_ZLIB
-
- Only delayed compression is supported nowadays.
-
- ok markus@
+ upstream: Include -m in the synopsis for a few more commands that
- date: 2018/07/06 09:05:01; author: sf; commitid: rEGuT5UgI9f6kddP;
- Remove leftovers from pre-authentication compression
+ support it
- Support for this has been removed in 2016.
- COMP_DELAYED will be renamed in a later commit.
+ Be more explicit in the description of -m about where it may be used
- ok markus@
+ Prompted by Jakub Jelen in bz2904
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: cdfef526357e4e1483c86cf599491b2dafb77772
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 3b398ac5e05d8a6356710d0ff114536c9d71046c
-commit ab39267fa1243d02b6c330615539fc4b21e17dc4
-Author: sf@openbsd.org <sf@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Jul 6 09:06:14 2018 +0000
+commit ff5d2cf4ca373bb4002eef395ed2cbe2ff0826c1
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Jan 22 11:26:16 2019 +0000
- upstream: Rename COMP_DELAYED to COMP_ZLIB
-
- Only delayed compression is supported nowadays.
+ upstream: print the full pubkey being attempted at loglevel >=
- ok markus@
+ debug2; bz2939
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 5b1dbaf3d9a4085aaa10fec0b7a4364396561821
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ac0fe5ca1429ebf4d460bad602adc96de0d7e290
-commit 95db395d2e56a6f868193aead6cadb2493f036c6
-Author: sf@openbsd.org <sf@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Jul 6 09:05:01 2018 +0000
+commit 180b520e2bab33b566b4b0cbac7d5f9940935011
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Jan 22 11:19:42 2019 +0000
- upstream: Remove leftovers from pre-authentication compression
-
- Support for this has been removed in 2016.
- COMP_DELAYED will be renamed in a later commit.
+ upstream: clarify: ssh-keygen -e only writes public keys, never
- ok markus@
+ private
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 6a99616c832627157113fcb0cf5a752daf2e6b58
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7de7ff6d274d82febf9feb641e2415ffd6a30bfb
-commit f28a4d5cd24c4aa177e96b4f96957991e552cb70
-Author: sf@openbsd.org <sf@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Jul 6 09:03:02 2018 +0000
+commit c45616a199c322ca674315de88e788f1d2596e26
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Jan 22 11:00:15 2019 +0000
- upstream: Remove unused ssh_packet_start_compression()
+ upstream: mention the new vs. old key formats in the introduction
- ok markus@
+ and give some hints on how keys may be converted or written in the old
+ format.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9d34cf2f59aca5422021ae2857190578187dc2b4
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9c90a9f92eddc249e07fad1204d0e15c8aa13823
-commit 872517ddbb72deaff31d4760f28f2b0a1c16358f
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Fri Jul 6 13:32:02 2018 +1000
+commit fd8eb1383a34c986a00ef13d745ae9bd3ea21760
+Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Jan 22 06:58:31 2019 +0000
- Defer setting bufsiz in getdelim.
+ upstream: tweak previous;
- Do not write to bufsiz until we are sure the malloc has succeeded,
- in case any callers rely on it (which they shouldn't). ok djm@
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d2a80e389da8e7ed71978643d8cbaa8605b597a8
-commit 3deb56f7190a414dc264e21e087a934fa1847283
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Thu Jul 5 13:32:01 2018 +1000
+commit 68e924d5473c00057f8532af57741d258c478223
+Author: tb@openbsd.org <tb@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Jan 21 23:55:12 2019 +0000
- Fix other callers of read_environment_file.
+ upstream: Forgot to add -J to the synopsis.
- read_environment_file recently gained an extra argument Some platform
- specific code also calls it so add the argument to those too. Fixes
- build on Solaris and AIX.
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 26d95e409a0b72526526fc56ca1caca5cc3d3c5e
-commit 314908f451e6b2d4ccf6212ad246fa4619c721d3
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Jul 4 13:51:45 2018 +0000
+commit 622dedf1a884f2927a9121e672bd9955e12ba108
+Author: tb@openbsd.org <tb@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Jan 21 22:50:42 2019 +0000
- upstream: deal with API rename: match_filter_list() =>
+ upstream: Add a -J option as a shortcut for -o Proxyjump= to scp(1)
- match_filter_blacklist()
+ and sftp(1) to match ssh(1)'s interface.
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 2da342be913efeb51806351af906fab01ba4367f
+ ok djm
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a75bc2d5f329caa7229a7e9fe346c4f41c2663fc
-commit 89f54cdf6b9cf1cf5528fd33897f1443913ddfb4
+commit c882d74652800150d538e22c80dd2bd3cdd5fae2
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Tue Jan 22 20:38:40 2019 +1100
+
+ Allow building against OpenSSL dev (3.x) version.
+
+commit d5520393572eb24aa0e001a1c61f49b104396e45
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Tue Jan 22 10:50:40 2019 +1100
+
+ typo
+
+commit 2de9cec54230998ab10161576f77860a2559ccb7
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Tue Jan 22 10:49:52 2019 +1100
+
+ add missing header
+
+commit 533cfb01e49a2a30354e191669dc3159e03e99a7
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Jul 4 13:51:12 2018 +0000
+Date: Mon Jan 21 22:18:24 2019 +0000
- upstream: exercise new expansion behaviour of
-
- PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes and, by proxy, test kex_assemble_names()
+ upstream: switch sntrup implementation source from supercop to
- ok markus@
+ libpqcrypto; the latter is almost identical but doesn't rely on signed
+ underflow to implement an optimised integer sort; from markus@
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 292978902e14d5729aa87e492dd166c842f72736
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: cd09bbf0e0fcef1bedca69fdf7990dc360567cf8
-commit 187633f24c71564e970681c8906df5a6017dcccf
+commit d50ab3cd6fb859888a26b4d4e333239b4f6bf573
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Tue Jan 22 00:02:23 2019 +1100
+
+ new files need includes.h
+
+commit c7670b091a7174760d619ef6738b4f26b2093301
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Jul 3 13:53:26 2018 +0000
+Date: Mon Jan 21 12:53:35 2019 +0000
- upstream: add a comment that could have saved me 45 minutes of wild
+ upstream: add "-v" flags to ssh-add and ssh-pkcs11-helper to turn up
- goose chasing
+ debug verbosity.
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: d469b29ffadd3402c090e21b792d627d46fa5297
+ Make ssh-agent turn on ssh-pkcs11-helper's verbosity when it is run
+ in debug mode ("ssh-agent -d"), so we get to see errors from the
+ PKCS#11 code.
+
+ ok markus@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0a798643c6a92a508df6bd121253ba1c8bee659d
-commit 312d2f2861a2598ed08587cb6c45c0e98a85408f
+commit 49d8c8e214d39acf752903566b105d06c565442a
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Jul 4 13:49:31 2018 +0000
+Date: Mon Jan 21 12:50:12 2019 +0000
- upstream: repair PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes (and friends) after RSA
-
- signature work - returns ability to add/remove/specify algorithms by
- wildcard.
-
- Algorithm lists are now fully expanded when the server/client configs
- are finalised, so errors are reported early and the config dumps
- (e.g. "ssh -G ...") now list the actual algorithms selected.
+ upstream: adapt to changes in KEX APIs and file removals
- Clarify that, while wildcards are accepted in algorithm lists, they
- aren't full pattern-lists that support negation.
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 54d6857e7c58999c7a6d40942ab0fed3529f43ca
+
+commit 35ecc53a83f8e8baab2e37549addfd05c73c30f1
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Jan 21 12:35:20 2019 +0000
+
+ upstream: adapt to changes in KEX API and file removals
- (lots of) feedback, ok markus@
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 92cad022d3b0d11e08f3e0055d6a14b8f994c0d7
+
+commit 7d69aae64c35868cc4f644583ab973113a79480e
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Jan 21 12:29:35 2019 +0000
+
+ upstream: adapt to bignum1 API removal and bignum2 API change
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a8894c5c81f399a002f02ff4fe6b4fa46b1f3207
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: cea6ff270f3d560de86b355a87a2c95b55a5ca63
-commit 303af5803bd74bf05d375c04e1a83b40c30b2be5
+commit beab553f0a9578ef9bffe28b2c779725e77b39ec
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Jul 3 11:43:49 2018 +0000
+Date: Mon Jan 21 09:13:41 2019 +0000
- upstream: some magic for RSA-SHA2 checks
+ upstream: remove hack to use non-system libcrypto
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: e5a9b11368ff6d86e7b25ad10ebe43359b471cd4
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: ce72487327eee4dfae1ab0212a1f33871fe0809f
-commit 7d68e262944c1fff1574600fe0e5e92ec8b398f5
+commit 4dc06bd57996f1a46b4c3bababe0d09bc89098f7
Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Tue Jul 3 23:27:11 2018 +1000
+Date: Mon Jan 21 23:14:04 2019 +1100
depend
-commit b4d4eda633af433d20232cbf7e855ceac8b83fe5
+commit 70edd73edc4df54e5eee50cd27c25427b34612f8
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Jul 3 13:20:25 2018 +0000
+Date: Mon Jan 21 12:08:13 2019 +0000
- upstream: some finesse to fix RSA-SHA2 certificate authentication
+ upstream: fix reversed arguments to kex_load_hostkey(); manifested as
- for certs hosted in ssh-agent
+ errors in cert-hostkey.sh regress failures.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e5fd5edd726137dda2d020e1cdebc464110a010f
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 12dab63850b844f84d5a67e86d9e21a42fba93ba
-commit d78b75df4a57e0f92295f24298e5f2930e71c172
+commit f1185abbf0c9108e639297addc77f8757ee00eb3
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Jul 3 13:07:58 2018 +0000
+Date: Mon Jan 21 11:22:00 2019 +0000
- upstream: check correct variable; unbreak agent keys
+ upstream: forgot to cvs add this file in previous series of commits;
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c36981fdf1f3ce04966d3310826a3e1e6233d93e
+ grrr
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: bcff316c3e7da8fd15333e05d244442c3aaa66b0
-commit 2f30300c5e15929d0e34013f38d73e857f445e12
+commit 7bef390b625bdc080f0fd4499ef03cef60fca4fa
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Jul 3 11:42:12 2018 +0000
+Date: Mon Jan 21 10:44:21 2019 +0000
- upstream: crank version number to 7.8; needed for new compat flag
-
- for prior version; part of RSA-SHA2 strictification, ok markus@
+ upstream: nothing shall escape this purge
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 84a11fc0efd2674c050712336b5093f5d408e32b
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4795b0ff142b45448f7e15f3c2f77a947191b217
-commit 4ba0d54794814ec0de1ec87987d0c3b89379b436
+commit aaca72d6f1279b842066e07bff797019efeb2c23
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Jul 3 11:39:54 2018 +0000
+Date: Mon Jan 21 10:40:11 2019 +0000
- upstream: Improve strictness and control over RSA-SHA2 signature
-
- In ssh, when an agent fails to return a RSA-SHA2 signature when
- requested and falls back to RSA-SHA1 instead, retry the signature to
- ensure that the public key algorithm sent in the SSH_MSG_USERAUTH
- matches the one in the signature itself.
-
- In sshd, strictly enforce that the public key algorithm sent in the
- SSH_MSG_USERAUTH message matches what appears in the signature.
-
- Make the sshd_config PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes and
- HostbasedAcceptedKeyTypes options control accepted signature algorithms
- (previously they selected supported key types). This allows these
- options to ban RSA-SHA1 in favour of RSA-SHA2.
+ upstream: rename kex->kem_client_pub -> kex->client_pub now that
- Add new signature algorithms "rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com" and
- "rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com" to force use of RSA-SHA2 signatures
- with certificate keys.
+ KEM has been renamed to kexgen
- feedback and ok markus@
+ from markus@ ok djm@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c6e9f6d45eed8962ad502d315d7eaef32c419dde
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: fac6da5dc63530ad0da537db022a9a4cfbe8bed8
-commit 95344c257412b51199ead18d54eaed5bafb75617
+commit 70867e1ca2eb08bbd494fe9c568df4fd3b35b867
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Jul 3 10:59:35 2018 +0000
+Date: Mon Jan 21 10:38:54 2019 +0000
- upstream: allow sshd_config PermitUserEnvironment to accept a
-
- pattern-list of whitelisted environment variable names in addition to yes|no.
+ upstream: merge kexkem[cs] into kexgen
- bz#1800, feedback and ok markus@
+ from markus@ ok djm@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 77dc2b468e0bf04b53f333434ba257008a1fdf24
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 87d886b7f1812ff9355fda1435f6ea9b71a0ac89
-commit 6f56fe4b9578b0627667f8bce69d4d938a88324c
-Author: millert@openbsd.org <millert@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Jun 26 11:23:59 2018 +0000
+commit 71e67fff946396caa110a7964da23480757258ff
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Jan 21 10:35:09 2019 +0000
- upstream: Fix "WARNING: line 6 disappeared in /etc/moduli, giving up"
+ upstream: pass values used in KEX hash computation as sshbuf
- when choosing a prime. An extra increment of linenum snuck in as part of the
- conversion to getline(). OK djm@ markus@
+ rather than pointer+len
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0019225cb52ed621b71cd9f19ee2e78e57e3dd38
+ suggested by me; implemented by markus@ ok me
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 994f33c464f4a9e0f1d21909fa3e379f5a0910f0
-commit 1eee79a11c1b3594f055b01e387c49c9a6e80005
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Jul 2 14:13:30 2018 +0000
+commit 4b83e2a2cc0c12e671a77eaba1c1245894f4e884
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Jan 21 10:33:49 2019 +0000
- upstream: One ampersand is enough to backgroud an process. OpenBSD
+ upstream: remove kex_derive_keys_bn wrapper; no unused since the
- doesn't seem to mind, but some platforms in -portable object to the second.
+ DH-like KEX methods have moved to KEM
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: d6c3e404871764343761dc25c3bbe29c2621ff74
-
-commit 6301e6c787d4e26bfae1119ab4f747bbcaa94e44
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Mon Jul 2 21:16:58 2018 +1000
-
- Add implementation of getline.
+ from markus@ ok djm@
- Add getline for the benefit of platforms that don't have it. Sourced
- from NetBSD (OpenBSD's implementation is a little too chummy with the
- internals of FILE).
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: bde9809103832f349545e4f5bb733d316db9a060
-commit 84623e0037628f9992839063151f7a9f5f13099a
+commit 92dda34e373832f34a1944e5d9ebbebb184dedc1
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Jun 26 02:02:36 2018 +0000
+Date: Mon Jan 21 10:29:56 2019 +0000
- upstream: whitespace
+ upstream: use KEM API for vanilla ECDH
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9276951caf4daf555f6d262e95720e7f79244572
+ from markus@ ok djm@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 6fbff96339a929835536b5730585d1d6057a352c
-commit 90e51d672711c19a36573be1785caf35019ae7a8
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Jun 25 22:28:33 2018 +0000
+commit b72357217cbe510a3ae155307a7be6b9181f1d1b
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Mon Jan 21 23:11:21 2019 +1100
- upstream: fix NULL dereference in open_listen_match_tcpip()
-
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c968c1d29e392352383c0f9681fcc1e93620c4a9
+ fixup missing ssherr.h
-commit f535ff922a67d9fcc5ee69d060d1b21c8bb01d14
-Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Jun 19 05:36:57 2018 +0000
+commit 9c9c97e14fe190931f341876ad98213e1e1dc19f
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Jan 21 10:28:01 2019 +0000
- upstream: spelling;
+ upstream: use KEM API for vanilla DH KEX
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: db542918185243bea17202383a581851736553cc
+ from markus@ ok djm@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: af56466426b08a8be275412ae2743319e3d277c9
-commit 80e199d6175904152aafc5c297096c3e18297691
+commit 2f6a9ddbbf6ca8623c53c323ff17fb6d68d66970
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Jun 19 03:02:17 2018 +0000
+Date: Mon Jan 21 10:24:09 2019 +0000
- upstream: test PermitListen with bare port numbers
+ upstream: use KEM API for vanilla c25519 KEX
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 4b50a02dfb0ccaca08247f3877c444126ba901b3
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 38d937b85ff770886379dd66a8f32ab0c1c35c1f
-commit 87ddd676da0f3abd08b778b12b53b91b670dc93c
+commit dfd591618cdf2c96727ac0eb65f89cf54af0d97e
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Jun 19 02:59:41 2018 +0000
+Date: Mon Jan 21 10:20:12 2019 +0000
- upstream: allow bare port numbers to appear in PermitListen directives,
+ upstream: Add support for a PQC KEX/KEM:
- e.g.
+ sntrup4591761x25519-sha512@tinyssh.org using the Streamlined NTRU Prime
+ 4591^761 implementation from SUPERCOP coupled with X25519 as a stop-loss. Not
+ enabled by default.
- PermitListen 2222 8080
+ introduce KEM API; a simplified framework for DH-ish KEX methods.
- is equivalent to:
-
- PermitListen *:2222 *:8080
-
- Some bonus manpage improvements, mostly from markus@
-
- "looks fine" markus@
+ from markus@ feedback & ok djm@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 6546b0cc5aab7f53d65ad0a348ca0ae591d6dd24
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d687f76cffd3561dd73eb302d17a1c3bf321d1a7
-commit 26f96ca10ad0ec5da9b05b99de1e1ccea15a11be
+commit b1b2ff4ed559051d1035419f8f236275fa66d5d6
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Jun 15 07:01:11 2018 +0000
+Date: Mon Jan 21 10:07:22 2019 +0000
- upstream: invalidate supplemental group cache used by
+ upstream: factor out kex_verify_hostkey() - again, duplicated
- temporarily_use_uid() when the target uid differs; could cause failure to
- read authorized_keys under some configurations. patch by Jakub Jelen via
- bz2873; ok dtucker, markus
+ almost exactly across client and server for several KEX methods.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 48a345f0ee90f6c465a078eb5e89566b23abd8a1
+ from markus@ ok djm@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4e4a16d949dadde002a0aacf6d280a684e20829c
-commit 89a85d724765b6b82e0135ee5a1181fdcccea9c6
+commit bb39bafb6dc520cc097780f4611a52da7f19c3e2
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sun Jun 10 23:45:41 2018 +0000
+Date: Mon Jan 21 10:05:09 2019 +0000
- upstream: unbreak SendEnv; patch from tb@
+ upstream: factor out kex_load_hostkey() - this is duplicated in
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: fc808daced813242563b80976e1478de95940056
-
-commit acf4260f0951f89c64e1ebbc4c92f451768871ad
-Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sat Jun 9 06:36:31 2018 +0000
-
- upstream: sort previous;
+ both the client and server implementations for most KEX methods.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 27d80d8b8ca99bc33971dee905e8ffd0053ec411
+ from markus@ ok djm@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8232fa7c21fbfbcaf838313b0c166dc6c8762f3c
-commit 1678d4236451060b735cb242d2e26e1ac99f0947
+commit dec5e9d33891e3bc3f1395d7db0e56fdc7f86dfc
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sat Jun 9 03:18:11 2018 +0000
+Date: Mon Jan 21 10:03:37 2019 +0000
- upstream: slightly better wording re handing of $TERM, from Jakub
+ upstream: factor out kex_dh_compute_key() - it's shared between
- Jelen via bz2386
+ plain DH KEX and DH GEX in both the client and server implementations
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 14bea3f069a93c8be66a7b97794255a91fece964
+ from markus@ ok djm@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 12186e18791fffcd4642c82e7e0cfdd7ea37e2ec
-commit 28013759f09ed3ebf7e8335e83a62936bd7a7f47
+commit e93bd98eab79b9a78f64ee8dd4dffc4d3979c7ae
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sat Jun 9 03:03:10 2018 +0000
+Date: Mon Jan 21 10:00:23 2019 +0000
- upstream: add a SetEnv directive for sshd_config to allow an
+ upstream: factor out DH keygen; it's identical between the client
- administrator to explicitly specify environment variables set in sessions
- started by sshd. These override the default environment and any variables set
- by user configuration (PermitUserEnvironment, etc), but not the SSH_*
- variables set by sshd itself.
+ and the server
- ok markus@
+ from markus@ ok djm@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b6a96c0001ccd7dd211df6cae9e961c20fd718c0
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2be57f6a0d44f1ab2c8de2b1b5d6f530c387fae9
-commit 7082bb58a2eb878d23ec674587c742e5e9673c36
+commit 5ae3f6d314465026d028af82609c1d49ad197655
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sat Jun 9 03:01:12 2018 +0000
+Date: Mon Jan 21 09:55:52 2019 +0000
- upstream: add a SetEnv directive to ssh_config that allows setting
-
- environment variables for the remote session (subject to the server accepting
- them)
+ upstream: save the derived session id in kex_derive_keys() rather
- refactor SendEnv to remove the arbitrary limit of variable names.
+ than making each kex method implementation do it.
- ok markus@
+ from markus@ ok djm@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: cfbb00d9b0e10c1ffff1d83424351fd961d1f2be
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d61ade9c8d1e13f665f8663c552abff8c8a30673
-commit 3b9798bda15bd3f598f5ef07595d64e23504da91
+commit 7be8572b32a15d5c3dba897f252e2e04e991c307
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sat Jun 9 02:58:02 2018 +0000
+Date: Mon Jan 21 09:54:11 2019 +0000
- upstream: reorder child environment preparation so that variables
+ upstream: Make sshpkt_get_bignum2() allocate the bignum it is
- read from ~/.ssh/environment (if enabled) do not override SSH_* variables set
- by the server.
+ parsing rather than make the caller do it. Saves a lot of boilerplate code.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 59f9d4c213cdcef2ef21f4b4ae006594dcf2aa7a
+ from markus@ ok djm@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 576bf784f9a240f5a1401f7005364e59aed3bce9
-commit 0368889f82f63c82ff8db9f8c944d89e7c657db4
+commit 803178bd5da7e72be94ba5b4c4c196d4b542da4d
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Jun 8 03:35:36 2018 +0000
+Date: Mon Jan 21 09:52:25 2019 +0000
- upstream: fix incorrect expansion of %i in
+ upstream: remove obsolete (SSH v.1) sshbuf_get/put_bignum1
- load_public_identity_files(); reported by Roumen Petrov
+ functions
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a827289e77149b5e0850d72a350c8b0300e7ef25
+ from markus@ ok djm@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0380b1b2d9de063de3c5a097481a622e6a04943e
-commit 027607fc2db6a0475a3380f8d95c635482714cb0
+commit f3ebaffd8714be31d4345f90af64992de4b3bba2
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Jun 8 01:55:40 2018 +0000
+Date: Mon Jan 21 09:49:37 2019 +0000
- upstream: fix some over-long lines and __func__ up some debug
+ upstream: fix all-zero check in kexc25519_shared_key
- messages
+ from markus@ ok djm@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c70a60b4c8207d9f242fc2351941ba50916bb267
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 60b1d364e0d9d34d1d1ef1620cb92e36cf06712d
-commit 6ff6fda705bc204456a5fa12518dde6e8790bb02
+commit 9d1a9771d0ad3a83af733bf3d2650b53f43c269f
Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Jun 7 11:26:14 2018 +0000
+Date: Mon Jan 21 07:09:10 2019 +0000
- upstream: tweak previous;
+ upstream: - -T was added to the first synopsis by mistake - since
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f98f16af10b28e24bcecb806cb71ea994b648fd6
+ "..." denotes optional, no need to surround it in []
+
+ ok djm
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 918f6d8eed4e0d8d9ef5eadae1b8983d796f0e25
-commit f2c06ab8dd90582030991f631a2715216bf45e5a
+commit 2f0bad2bf85391dbb41315ab55032ec522660617
Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Fri Jun 8 17:43:36 2018 +1000
+Date: Mon Jan 21 21:28:27 2019 +1100
- Remove ability to override $LD.
+ Make --with-rpath take a flag instead of yes/no.
- Since autoconf always uses $CC to link C programs, allowing users to
- override LD caused mismatches between what LD_LINK_IFELSE thought worked
- and what ld thought worked. If you do need to do this kind of thing you
- need to set a compiler flag such as gcc's -fuse-ld in LDFLAGS.
+ Linkers need various flags for -rpath and similar, so make --with-rpath
+ take an optional flag argument which is passed to the linker. ok djm@
-commit e1542a80797b4ea40a91d2896efdcc76a57056d2
+commit 23490a6c970ea1d03581a3b4208f2eb7a675f453
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Mon Jan 21 15:05:43 2019 +1100
+
+ fix previous test
+
+commit b6dd3277f2c49f9584a2097bc792e8f480397e87
Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Fri Jun 8 13:55:59 2018 +1000
+Date: Mon Jan 21 13:50:17 2019 +1100
- Better detection of unsupported compiler options.
-
- Should prevent "unsupported -Wl,-z,retpoline" warnings during linking.
- ok djm@
+ Wrap ECC static globals in EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW too.
-commit 57379dbd013ad32ee3f9989bf5f5741065428360
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Jun 7 14:29:43 2018 +0000
+commit b2eb9db35b7191613f2f4b934d57b25938bb34b3
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Mon Jan 21 12:53:40 2019 +1100
- upstream: test the correct configuration option name
-
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 492279ea9f65657f97a970e0e7c7fd0b339fee23
+ pass TEST_SSH_SSHPKCS11HELPER to regress tests
-commit 6d41815e202fbd6182c79780b6cc90e1ec1c9981
+commit ba58a529f45b3dae2db68607d8c54ae96e90e705
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Mon Jan 21 12:31:29 2019 +1100
+
+ make agent-pkcs11 search harder for softhsm2.so
+
+commit 662be40c62339ab645113c930ce689466f028938
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Jun 7 09:26:42 2018 +0000
+Date: Mon Jan 21 02:05:38 2019 +0000
- upstream: some permitlisten fixes from markus@ that I missed in my
+ upstream: always print the caller's error message in ossl_error(),
- insomnia-fueled commits last night
+ even when there are no libcrypto errors to report.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 26f23622e928996086e85b1419cc1c0f136e359c
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 09ebaa8f706e0eccedd209775baa1eee2ada806a
-commit 4319f7a868d86d435fa07112fcb6153895d03a7f
+commit ce46c3a077dfb4c531ccffcfff03f37775725b75
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Jun 7 04:46:34 2018 +0000
+Date: Mon Jan 21 02:01:03 2019 +0000
- upstream: permitlisten/PermitListen unit test from Markus
+ upstream: get the ex_data (pkcs11_key object) back from the keys at
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: ab12eb42f0e14926980441cf7c058a6d1d832ea5
+ the index at which it was inserted, rather than assuming index 0
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1f3a6ce0346c8014e895e50423bef16401510aa8
-commit fa09076410ffc2d34d454145af23c790d728921e
+commit 0a5f2ea35626022299ece3c8817a1abe8cf37b3e
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Jun 7 04:31:51 2018 +0000
+Date: Mon Jan 21 01:05:00 2019 +0000
- upstream: fix regression caused by recent permitlisten option commit:
-
- authorized_keys lines that contained permitopen/permitlisten were being
- treated as invalid.
+ upstream: GSSAPI code got missed when converting to new packet API
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7ef41d63a5a477b405d142dc925b67d9e7aaa31b
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 37e4f06ab4a0f4214430ff462ba91acba28b7851
-commit 7f90635216851f6cb4bf3999e98b825f85d604f8
-Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Jun 6 18:29:18 2018 +0000
+commit 2efcf812b4c1555ca3aff744820a3b3bccd68298
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Mon Jan 21 11:57:21 2019 +1100
- upstream: switch config file parsing to getline(3) as this avoids
-
- static limits noted by gerhard@; ok dtucker@, djm@
-
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 6d702eabef0fa12e5a1d75c334a8c8b325298b5c
+ Fix -Wunused when compiling PKCS#11 without ECDSA
-commit 392db2bc83215986a91c0b65feb0e40e7619ce7e
+commit 3c0c657ed7cd335fc05c0852d88232ca7e92a5d9
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Jun 6 18:25:33 2018 +0000
+Date: Sun Jan 20 23:26:44 2019 +0000
- upstream: regress test for PermitOpen
+ upstream: allow override of ssh-pkcs11-helper binary via
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: ce8b5f28fc039f09bb297fc4a92319e65982ddaf
+ $TEST_SSH_SSHPKCS11HELPER from markus@
+
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 7382a3d76746f5a792d106912a5819fd5e49e469
-commit 803d896ef30758135e2f438bdd1a0be27989e018
+commit 760ae37b4505453c6fa4faf1aa39a8671ab053af
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Jun 6 18:24:15 2018 +0000
+Date: Sun Jan 20 23:25:25 2019 +0000
- upstream: man bits for permitlisten authorized_keys option
+ upstream: adapt agent-pkcs11.sh test to softhsm2 and add support
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 86910af8f781a4ac5980fea125442eb25466dd78
+ for ECDSA keys
+
+ work by markus@, ok djm@
+
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 1ebc2be0e88eff1b6d8be2f9c00cdc60723509fe
-commit 04df43208b5b460d7360e1598f876b92a32f5922
+commit b2ce8b31a1f974a13e6d12e0a0c132b50bc45115
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Jun 6 18:24:00 2018 +0000
+Date: Sun Jan 20 23:24:19 2019 +0000
- upstream: man bits for PermitListen
+ upstream: add "extra:" target to run some extra tests that are not
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 35b200cba4e46a16a4db6a80ef11838ab0fad67c
+ enabled by default (currently includes agent-pkcs11.sh); from markus@
+
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 9a969e1adcd117fea174d368dcb9c61eb50a2a3c
-commit 93c06ab6b77514e0447fe4f1d822afcbb2a9be08
+commit 632976418d60b7193597bbc6ac7ca33981a41aab
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Jun 6 18:23:32 2018 +0000
+Date: Mon Jan 21 00:47:34 2019 +0000
- upstream: permitlisten option for authorized_keys; ok markus@
+ upstream: use ECDSA_SIG_set0() instead of poking signature values into
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8650883018d7aa893173d703379e4456a222c672
-
-commit 115063a6647007286cc8ca70abfd2a7585f26ccc
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Jun 6 18:22:41 2018 +0000
-
- upstream: Add a PermitListen directive to control which server-side
-
- addresses may be listened on when the client requests remote forwarding (ssh
- -R).
-
- This is the converse of the existing PermitOpen directive and this
- includes some refactoring to share much of its implementation.
-
- feedback and ok markus@
+ structure directly; the latter works on LibreSSL but not on OpenSSL. From
+ portable.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 15a931238c61a3f2ac74ea18a98c933e358e277f
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 5b22a1919d9cee907d3f8a029167f70a481891c6
-commit 7703ae5f5d42eb302ded51705166ff6e19c92892
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Wed Jun 6 16:04:29 2018 +1000
+commit 5de6ac2bad11175135d9b819b3546db0ca0b4878
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Mon Jan 21 11:44:19 2019 +1100
- Use ssh-keygen -A to generate missing host keys.
+ remove HAVE_DLOPEN that snuck in
- Instead of testing for each specific key type, use ssh-keygen -A to
- generate any missing host key types.
+ portable doesn't use this
-commit e8d59fef1098e24f408248dc64e5c8efa5d01f3c
-Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Jun 1 06:23:10 2018 +0000
+commit e2cb445d786f7572da2af93e3433308eaed1093a
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Mon Jan 21 11:32:28 2019 +1100
- upstream: add missing punctuation after %i in ssh_config.5, and
-
- make the grammatical format in sshd_config.5 match that in ssh_config.5;
+ conditionalise ECDSA PKCS#11 support
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e325663b9342f3d556e223e5306e0d5fa1a74fa0
+ Require EC_KEY_METHOD support in libcrypto, evidenced by presence
+ of EC_KEY_METHOD_new() function.
-commit a1f737d6a99314e291a87856122cb4dbaf64c641
-Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Jun 1 05:52:26 2018 +0000
+commit fcb1b0937182d0137a3c357c89735d0dc5869d54
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sun Jan 20 23:12:35 2019 +0000
- upstream: oops - further adjustment to text neccessary;
+ upstream: we use singleton pkcs#11 RSA_METHOD and EC_KEY_METHOD
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 23585576c807743112ab956be0fb3c786bdef025
+ now, so there is no need to keep a copy of each in the pkcs11_key object.
+
+ work by markus@, ok djm@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 43b4856516e45c0595f17a8e95b2daee05f12faa
-commit 294028493471e0bd0c7ffe55dc0c0a67cba6ec41
-Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Jun 1 05:50:18 2018 +0000
+commit 6529409e85890cd6df7e5e81d04e393b1d2e4b0b
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sun Jan 20 23:11:11 2019 +0000
- upstream: %U needs to be escaped; tweak text;
+ upstream: KNF previous; from markus@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 30887b73ece257273fb619ab6f4e86dc92ddc15e
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 3dfe35e25b310c3968b1e4e53a0cb1d03bda5395
-commit e5019da3c5a31e6e729a565f2b886a80c4be96cc
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Jun 1 04:31:48 2018 +0000
+commit 58622a8c82f4e2aad630580543f51ba537c1f39e
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sun Jan 20 23:10:33 2019 +0000
- upstream: Apply umask to all incoming files and directories not
+ upstream: use OpenSSL's RSA reference counting hooks to
- just files. This makes sure it gets applied to directories too, and prevents
- a race where files get chmodded after creation. bz#2839, ok djm@
+ implicitly clean up pkcs11_key objects when their owning RSA object's
+ reference count drops to zero. Simplifies the cleanup path and makes it more
+ like ECDSA's
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 3168ee6c7c39093adac4fd71039600cfa296203b
+ work by markus@, ok djm@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 74b9c98f405cd78f7148e9e4a4982336cd3df25c
-commit a1dcafc41c376332493b9385ee39f9754dc145ec
+commit f118542fc82a3b3ab0360955b33bc5a271ea709f
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Jun 1 03:52:37 2018 +0000
+Date: Sun Jan 20 23:08:24 2019 +0000
- upstream: Adapt to extra default verboisity from ssh-keygen when
+ upstream: make the PKCS#11 RSA code more like the new PKCS#11
- searching for and hashing known_hosts entries in a single operation
- (ssh-keygen -HF ...) Patch from Anton Kremenetsky
+ ECDSA code: use a single custom RSA_METHOD instead of a method per key
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 519585a4de35c4611285bd6a7272766c229b19dd
+ suggested by me, but markus@ did all the work.
+ ok djm@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8aafcebe923dc742fc5537a995cee549d07e4b2e
-commit 76f314c75dffd4a55839d50ee23622edad52c168
+commit 445cfce49dfc904c6b8ab25afa2f43130296c1a5
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue May 22 00:22:49 2018 +0000
+Date: Sun Jan 20 23:05:52 2019 +0000
- upstream: Add TEST_SSH_FAIL_FATAL variable, to force all failures
+ upstream: fix leak of ECDSA pkcs11_key objects
- to instantly abort the test. Useful in capturing clean logs for individual
- failure cases.
+ work by markus, ok djm@
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: feba18cf338c2328b9601bd4093cabdd9baa3af1
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9fc0c4f1d640aaa5f19b8d70f37ea19b8ad284a1
-commit 065c8c055df8d83ae7c92e5e524a579d87668aab
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri May 11 03:51:06 2018 +0000
+commit 8a2467583f0b5760787273796ec929190c3f16ee
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sun Jan 20 23:03:26 2019 +0000
- upstream: Clean up comment.
+ upstream: use EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY() instead of direct access of
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 6adb35f384d447e7dcb9f170d4f0d546d3973e10
+ EC_KEY internals as that won't work on OpenSSL
+
+ work by markus@, feedback and ok djm@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4a99cdb89fbd6f5155ef8c521c99dc66e2612700
-commit 01b048c8eba3b021701bd0ab26257fc82903cba8
+commit 24757c1ae309324e98d50e5935478655be04e549
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Jun 1 04:21:29 2018 +0000
+Date: Sun Jan 20 23:01:59 2019 +0000
- upstream: whitespace
+ upstream: cleanup PKCS#11 ECDSA pubkey loading: the returned
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e5edb5e843ddc9b73a8e46518899be41d5709add
+ object should never have a DER header
+
+ work by markus; feedback and ok djm@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b617fa585eddbbf0b1245b58b7a3c4b8d613db17
-commit 854ae209f992465a276de0b5f10ef770510c2418
+commit 749aef30321595435ddacef2f31d7a8f2b289309
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Jun 1 04:05:29 2018 +0000
+Date: Sun Jan 20 23:00:12 2019 +0000
- upstream: make ssh_remote_ipaddr() capable of being called after
+ upstream: cleanup unnecessary code in ECDSA pkcs#11 signature
- the ssh->state has been torn down; bz#2773
+ work by markus@, feedback and ok djm@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 167f12523613ca3d16d7716a690e7afa307dc7eb
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: affa5ca7d58d59fbd16169f77771dcdbd2b0306d
-commit 3e088aaf236ef35beeef3c9be93fd53700df5861
+commit 0c50992af49b562970dd0ba3f8f151f1119e260e
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Jun 1 03:51:34 2018 +0000
+Date: Sun Jan 20 22:57:45 2019 +0000
- upstream: return correct exit code when searching for and hashing
+ upstream: cleanup pkcs#11 client code: use sshkey_new in instead
- known_hosts entries in a single operation (ssh-keygen -HF hostname); bz2772
- Report and fix from Anton Kremenetsky
+ of stack- allocating a sshkey
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ac10ca13eb9bb0bc50fcd42ad11c56c317437b58
+ work by markus@, ok djm@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a048eb6ec8aa7fa97330af927022c0da77521f91
-commit 9c935dd9bf05628826ad2495d3e8bdf3d3271c21
+commit 854bd8674ee5074a239f7cadf757d55454802e41
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Jun 1 03:33:53 2018 +0000
+Date: Sun Jan 20 22:54:30 2019 +0000
- upstream: make UID available as a %-expansion everywhere that the
+ upstream: allow override of the pkcs#11 helper binary via
- username is available currently. In the client this is via %i, in the server
- %U (since %i was already used in the client in some places for this, but used
- for something different in the server); bz#2870, ok dtucker@
+ $SSH_PKCS11_HELPER; needed for regress tests.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c7e912b0213713316cb55db194b3a6415b3d4b95
+ work by markus@, ok me
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f78d8185500bd7c37aeaf7bd27336db62f0f7a83
-commit d8748b91d1d6c108c0c260ed41fa55f37b9ef34b
+commit 93f02107f44d63a016d8c23ebd2ca9205c495c48
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Jun 1 03:11:49 2018 +0000
+Date: Sun Jan 20 22:51:37 2019 +0000
- upstream: prefer argv0 to "ssh" when re-executing ssh for ProxyJump
+ upstream: add support for ECDSA keys in PKCS#11 tokens
- directive; bz2831, feedback and ok dtucker@
+ Work by markus@ and Pedro Martelletto, feedback and ok me@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 3cec709a131499fbb0c1ea8a0a9e0b0915ce769e
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a37d651e221341376636056512bddfc16efb4424
-commit fbb4b5fd4f8e0bb89732670a01954e18b69e15ba
+commit aa22c20e0c36c2fc610cfcc793b0d14079c38814
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri May 25 07:11:01 2018 +0000
+Date: Sun Jan 20 22:03:29 2019 +0000
- upstream: Do not ban PTY allocation when a sshd session is restricted
+ upstream: add option to test whether keys in an agent are usable,
- because the user password is expired as it breaks password change dialog.
+ by performing a signature and a verification using each key "ssh-add -T
+ pubkey [...]"
- regression in openssh-7.7 reported by Daniel Wagner
+ work by markus@, ok djm@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9fc09c584c6f1964b00595e3abe7f83db4d90d73
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 931b888a600b6a883f65375bd5f73a4776c6d19b
-commit f6a59a22b0c157c4c4e5fd7232f868138223be64
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri May 25 04:25:46 2018 +0000
+commit a36b0b14a12971086034d53c0c3dfbad07665abe
+Author: tb@openbsd.org <tb@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sun Jan 20 02:01:59 2019 +0000
- upstream: Fix return value confusion in several functions (readdir,
+ upstream: Fix BN_is_prime_* calls in SSH, the API returns -1 on
- download and fsync). These should return -1 on error, not a sftp status code.
+ error.
- patch from Petr Cerny in bz#2871
+ Found thanks to BoringSSL's commit 53409ee3d7595ed37da472bc73b010cd2c8a5ffd
+ by David Benjamin.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 651aa0220ad23c9167d9297a436162d741f97a09
+ ok djm, dtucker
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1ee832be3c44b1337f76b8562ec6d203f3b072f8
-commit 1da5934b860ac0378d52d3035b22b6670f6a967e
+commit ec4776bb01dd8d61fddc7d2a31ab10bf3d3d829a
Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri May 25 03:20:59 2018 +0000
+Date: Sun Jan 20 01:12:40 2019 +0000
- upstream: If select() fails in ssh_packet_read_seqnr go directly to
+ upstream: DH-GEX min value is now specified in RFC8270. ok djm@
- the error path instead of trying to read from the socket on the way out,
- which resets errno and causes the true error to be misreported. ok djm@
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1229d0feb1d0ecefe05bf67a17578b263e991acc
+
+commit c90a7928c4191303e76a8c58b9008d464287ae1b
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Mon Jan 21 09:22:36 2019 +1100
+
+ Check for cc before gcc.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2614edaadbd05a957aa977728aa7a030af7c6f0a
+ If cc is something other than gcc and is the system compiler prefer using
+ that, unless otherwise told via $CC. ok djm@
-commit 4ef75926ef517d539f2c7aac3188b09f315c86a7
+commit 9b655dc9c9a353f0a527f0c6c43a5e35653c9503
Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Fri May 25 13:36:58 2018 +1000
+Date: Sun Jan 20 14:55:27 2019 +1100
- Permit getuid()/geteuid() syscalls.
-
- Requested for Linux/s390; patch from Eduardo Barretto via bz#2752;
- ok dtucker
+ last bits of old packet API / active_state global
-commit 4b22fd8ecefd059a66140be67f352eb6145a9d88
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue May 22 00:13:26 2018 +0000
+commit 3f0786bbe73609ac96e5a0d91425ee21129f8e04
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Sun Jan 20 10:22:18 2019 +1100
- upstream: support ProxyJump=none to disable ProxyJump
-
- functionality; bz#2869 ok dtucker@
+ remove PAM dependencies on old packet API
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1c06ee08eb78451b5837fcfd8cbebc5ff3a67a01
+ Requires some caching of values, because the PAM code isn't
+ always called with packet context.
-commit f41bcd70f55b4f0fc4d8e1039cb361ac922b23fb
-Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue May 15 05:40:11 2018 +0000
+commit 08f66d9f17e12c1140d1f1cf5c4dce67e915d3cc
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Sun Jan 20 09:58:45 2019 +1100
- upstream: correct keyowrd name (permitemptypasswords); from brendan
-
- macdonell
-
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ef1bdbc936b2ea693ee37a4c20a94d4d43f5fda3
-
-commit f18bc97151340127859634d20d79fd39ec8a7f39
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri May 11 04:01:11 2018 +0000
-
- upstream: Emphasise that -w implicitly sets Tunnel=point-to-point
-
- and that users should specify an explicit Tunnel directive if they don't want
- this. bz#2365.
-
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1a8d9c67ae213ead180481900dbbb3e04864560d
+ remove vestiges of old packet API from loginrec.c
-commit 32e4e94e1511fe0020fbfbb62399d31b2d22a801
+commit c327813ea1d740e3e367109c17873815aba1328e
Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Mon May 14 14:40:08 2018 +1000
+Date: Sun Jan 20 09:45:38 2019 +1100
- sync fmt_scaled.c
-
- revision 1.17
- date: 2018/05/14 04:39:04; author: djm; state: Exp; lines: +5 -2;
- commitid: 53zY8GjViUBnWo8Z;
- constrain fractional part to [0-9] (less confusing to static analysis); ok ian@
+ depend
-commit 54268d589e85ecc43d3eba8d83f327bdada9d696
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Fri May 11 14:04:40 2018 +1000
+commit 135e302cfdbe91817294317c337cc38c3ff01cba
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sat Jan 19 22:30:52 2019 +0000
- fix key-options.sh on platforms without openpty(3)
+ upstream: fix error in refactor: use ssh_packet_disconnect() instead of
- Skip the pty tests if the platform lacks openpty(3) and has to chown(2)
- the pty device explicitly. This typically requires root permissions that
- this test lacks.
+ sshpkt_error(). The first one logs the error and exits (what we want) instead
+ of just logging and blundering on.
- bz#2856 ok dtucker@
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 39f51b43641dce9ce0f408ea6c0e6e077e2e91ae
-commit b2140a739be4c3b43cc1dc08322dca39a1e39d20
+commit 245c6a0b220b58686ee35bc5fc1c359e9be2faaa
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri May 11 03:38:51 2018 +0000
+Date: Sat Jan 19 21:45:31 2019 +0000
- upstream: implement EMFILE mitigation for ssh-agent: remember the
-
- fd rlimit and stop accepting new connections when it is exceeded (with some
- grace). Accept is resumed when enough connections are closed.
+ upstream: remove last traces of old packet API!
- bz#2576. feedback deraadt; ok dtucker@
+ with & ok markus@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 6a85d9cec7b85741961e7116a49f8dae777911ea
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9bd10437026423eb8245636ad34797a20fbafd7d
-commit fdba503fdfc647ee8a244002f1581e869c1f3d90
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri May 11 03:22:55 2018 +0000
+commit 04c091fc199f17dacf8921df0a06634b454e2722
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sat Jan 19 21:43:56 2019 +0000
- upstream: Explicit cast when snprintf'ing an uint64. Prevents
+ upstream: remove last references to active_state
- warnings on platforms where int64 is long not long long. ok djm@
+ with & ok markus@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9c5359e2fbfce11dea2d93f7bc257e84419bd001
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 78619a50ea7e4ca2f3b54d4658b3227277490ba2
-commit e7751aa4094d51a9bc00778aa8d07e22934c55ee
-Author: bluhm@openbsd.org <bluhm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Apr 26 14:47:03 2018 +0000
+commit ec00f918b8ad90295044266c433340a8adc93452
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sat Jan 19 21:43:07 2019 +0000
- upstream: Since the previous commit, ssh regress test sftp-chroot was
+ upstream: convert monitor.c to new packet API
- failing. The sftp program terminated with the wrong exit code as sftp called
- fatal() instad of exit(0). So when the sigchld handler waits for the child,
- remember that it was found. Then don't expect that main() can wait again. OK
- dtucker@
+ with & ok markus@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: bfafd940c0de5297940c71ddf362053db0232266
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 61ecd154bd9804461a0cf5f495a29d919e0014d5
-commit 7c15301841e2e9d37cae732400de63ae9c0961d6
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Sun Apr 29 17:54:12 2018 +1000
+commit 6350e0316981489d4205952d6904d6fedba5bfe0
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sat Jan 19 21:42:30 2019 +0000
- Use includes.h instead of config.h.
+ upstream: convert sshd.c to new packet API
- This ensures it picks up the definition of DEF_WEAK, the lack of which
- can cause compile errors in some cases (eg modern AIX). From
- michael at felt.demon.nl.
-
-commit cec338967a666b7c8ad8b88175f2faeddf268116
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Thu Apr 19 09:53:14 2018 +1000
-
- Omit 3des-cbc if OpenSSL built without DES.
+ with & ok markus@
- Patch from hongxu.jia at windriver.com, ok djm@
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ea569d3eaf9b5cf1bad52779fbfa5fa0b28af891
-commit a575ddd58835759393d2dddd16ebe5abdb56485e
+commit a5e2ad88acff2b7d131ee6d5dc5d339b0f8c6a6d
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Apr 16 22:50:44 2018 +0000
+Date: Sat Jan 19 21:41:53 2019 +0000
- upstream: Disable SSH2_MSG_DEBUG messages for Twisted Conch clients
-
- without version numbers since they choke on them under some circumstances.
- https://twistedmatrix.com/trac/ticket/9422 via Colin Watson
+ upstream: convert session.c to new packet API
- Newer Conch versions have a version number in their ident string and
- handle debug messages okay. https://twistedmatrix.com/trac/ticket/9424
+ with & ok markus@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 6cf7be262af0419c58ddae11324d9c0dc1577539
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: fae817207e23099ddd248960c984f7b7f26ea68e
-commit 390c7000a8946db565b66eab9e52fb11948711fa
+commit 3a00a921590d4c4b7e96df11bb10e6f9253ad45e
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sat Apr 14 21:50:41 2018 +0000
+Date: Sat Jan 19 21:41:18 2019 +0000
- upstream: don't free the %C expansion, it's used later for
+ upstream: convert auth.c to new packet API
- LocalCommand
+ with & ok markus@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 857b5cb37b2d856bfdfce61289a415257a487fb1
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7e10359f614ff522b52a3f05eec576257794e8e4
-commit 3455f1e7c48e2e549192998d330214975b9b1dc7
+commit 7ec5cb4d15ed2f2c5c9f5d00e6b361d136fc1e2d
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Apr 13 05:04:12 2018 +0000
+Date: Sat Jan 19 21:40:48 2019 +0000
- upstream: notify user immediately when underlying ssh process dies;
-
- patch from Thomas Kuthan in bz2719; ok dtucker@
+ upstream: convert serverloop.c to new packet API
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 78fac88c2f08054d1fc5162c43c24162b131cf78
-
-commit 1c5b4bc827f4abc3e65888cda061ad5edf1b8c7c
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Fri Apr 13 16:23:57 2018 +1000
-
- Allow nanosleep in preauth privsep child.
+ with & ok markus@
- The new timing attack mitigation code uses nanosleep in the preauth
- codepath, allow in systrace andbox too.
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c92dd19b55457541478f95c0d6b318426d86d885
-commit 0e73428038d5ecfa5d2a28cff26661502a7aff4e
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Fri Apr 13 16:06:29 2018 +1000
+commit 64c9598ac05332d1327cbf55334dee4172d216c4
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sat Jan 19 21:40:21 2019 +0000
- Allow nanosleep in preauth privsep child.
+ upstream: convert the remainder of sshconnect2.c to new packet
- The new timing attack mitigation code uses nanosleep in the preauth
- codepath, allow in sandbox.
-
-commit e9d910b0289c820852f7afa67f584cef1c05fe95
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Apr 13 03:57:26 2018 +0000
-
- upstream: Defend against user enumeration timing attacks. This
+ API
- establishes a minimum time for each failed authentication attempt (5ms) and
- adds a per-user constant derived from a host secret (0-4ms). Based on work
- by joona.kannisto at tut.fi, ok markus@ djm@.
+ with & ok markus@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b7845b355bb7381703339c8fb0e57e81a20ae5ca
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0986d324f2ceb5e8a12ac21c1bb10b3b4b1e0f71
-commit d97874cbd909eb706886cd0cdd418f812c119ef9
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Fri Apr 13 13:43:55 2018 +1000
+commit bc5e1169d101d16e3a5962a928db2bc49a8ef5a3
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sat Jan 19 21:39:12 2019 +0000
- Using "==" in shell tests is not portable.
+ upstream: convert the remainder of clientloop.c to new packet API
- Patch from rsbecker at nexbridge.com.
-
-commit cfb1d9bc76734681e3dea532a1504fcd466fbe91
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Fri Apr 13 13:38:06 2018 +1000
-
- Fix tunnel forwarding broken in 7.7p1
+ with & ok markus@
- bz2855, ok dtucker@
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ce2fbbacb86a290f31da1e7bf04cddf2bdae3d1e
-commit afa6e79b76fb52a0c09a29688b5c0d125eb08302
+commit 5ebce136a6105f084db8f0d7ee41981d42daec40
Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Fri Apr 13 13:31:42 2018 +1000
+Date: Sun Jan 20 09:44:53 2019 +1100
- prefer to use getrandom() for PRNG seeding
+ upstream: convert auth2.c to new packet API
- Only applies when built --without-openssl. Thanks Jann Horn for
- reminder.
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ed831bb95ad228c6791bc18b60ce7a2edef2c999
-commit 575fac34a97f69bc217b235f81de9f8f433eceed
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Fri Apr 13 13:13:33 2018 +1000
+commit 172a592a53ebe8649c4ac0d7946e6c08eb151af6
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sat Jan 19 21:37:48 2019 +0000
- Revert $REGRESSTMP changes.
+ upstream: convert servconf.c to new packet API
- Revert 3fd2d229 and subsequent changes as they turned out to be a
- portability hassle.
-
-commit 10479cc2a4acd6faaf643eb305233b49d70c31c1
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Tue Apr 10 10:19:02 2018 +1000
-
- Many typo fixes from Karsten Weiss
+ with & ok markus@
- Spotted using https://github.com/lucasdemarchi/codespell
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 126553aecca302c9e02fd77e333b9cb217e623b4
-commit 907da2f88519b34189fd03fac96de0c52d448233
+commit 8cc7a679d29cf6ecccfa08191e688c7f81ef95c2
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Apr 10 00:14:10 2018 +0000
+Date: Sat Jan 19 21:37:13 2019 +0000
- upstream: more typos spotted by Karsten Weiss using codespell
+ upstream: convert channels.c to new packet API
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: d906a2aea0663810a658b7d0bc61a1d2907d4d69
+ with & ok markus@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0b8279b56113cbd4011fc91315c0796b63dc862c
-commit 37e5f4a7ab9a8026e5fc2f47dafb0f1b123d39e9
+commit 06232038c794c7dfcb087be0ab0b3e65b09fd396
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Apr 10 00:13:27 2018 +0000
+Date: Sat Jan 19 21:36:38 2019 +0000
- upstream: make this a bit more portable-friendly
+ upstream: convert sshconnect.c to new packet API
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 62f7b9e055e8dfaab92b3825f158beeb4ca3f963
+ with & ok markus@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 222337cf6c96c347f1022d976fac74b4257c061f
-commit 001aa55484852370488786bd40e9fdad4b465811
+commit 25b2ed667216314471bb66752442c55b95792dc3
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Apr 10 00:10:49 2018 +0000
+Date: Sat Jan 19 21:36:06 2019 +0000
- upstream: lots of typos in comments/docs. Patch from Karsten Weiss
+ upstream: convert ssh.c to new packet API
- after checking with codespell tool
- (https://github.com/lucasdemarchi/codespell)
+ with & ok markus@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 373222f12d7ab606598a2d36840c60be93568528
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: eb146878b24e85c2a09ee171afa6797c166a2e21
-commit 260ede2787fe80b18b8d5920455b4fb268519c7d
+commit e3128b38623eef2fa8d6e7ae934d3bd08c7e973e
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Apr 9 23:54:49 2018 +0000
+Date: Sat Jan 19 21:35:25 2019 +0000
- upstream: don't kill ssh-agent's listening socket entriely if we
+ upstream: convert mux.c to new packet API
- fail to accept a connection; bz#2837, patch from Lukas Kuster
+ with & ok markus@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 52413f5069179bebf30d38f524afe1a2133c738f
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4e3893937bae66416e984b282d8f0f800aafd802
-commit ebc8b4656f9b0f834a642a9fb3c9fbca86a61838
-Author: tj@openbsd.org <tj@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Apr 9 20:41:22 2018 +0000
+commit ed1df7226caf3a943a36d580d4d4e9275f8a61ee
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sat Jan 19 21:34:45 2019 +0000
- upstream: the UseLogin option was removed, so remove it here too.
+ upstream: convert sshconnect2.c to new packet API
- ok dtucker
+ with & ok markus@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7080be73a64d68e21f22f5408a67a0ba8b1b6b06
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1cb869e0d6e03539f943235641ea070cae2ebc58
-commit 3e36f281851fc8e9c996b33f108b2ae167314fbe
-Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sun Apr 8 07:36:02 2018 +0000
+commit 23f22a4aaa923c61ec49a99ebaa383656e87fa40
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sat Jan 19 21:33:57 2019 +0000
- upstream: tweak previous;
+ upstream: convert clientloop.c to new packet API
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2b9c23022ea7b9dddb62864de4e906000f9d7474
+ with & ok markus@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 497b36500191f452a22abf283aa8d4a9abaee7fa
-commit 8368571efd6693c5c57f850e23a2372acf3f865f
-Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sat Apr 7 13:50:10 2018 +0000
+commit ad60b1179c9682ca5aef0b346f99ef68cbbbc4e5
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sat Jan 19 21:33:13 2019 +0000
- upstream: tweak previous;
+ upstream: allow sshpkt_fatal() to take a varargs format; we'll
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 38e347b6f8e888f5e0700d01abb1eba7caa154f9
+ use this to give packet-related fatal error messages more context (esp. the
+ remote endpoint) ok markus@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: de57211f9543426b515a8a10a4f481666b2b2a50
-commit 555294a7279914ae6795b71bedf4e6011b7636df
+commit 0fa174ebe129f3d0aeaf4e2d1dd8de745870d0ff
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Apr 6 13:02:39 2018 +0000
+Date: Sat Jan 19 21:31:32 2019 +0000
- upstream: Allow "SendEnv -PATTERN" to clear environment variables
+ upstream: begin landing remaining refactoring of packet parsing
- previously labeled for sendind. bz#1285 ok dtucker@
+ API, started almost exactly six years ago.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f6fec9e3d0f366f15903094fbe1754cb359a0df9
+ This change stops including the old packet_* API by default and makes
+ each file that requires the old API include it explicitly. We will
+ commit file-by-file refactoring to remove the old API in consistent
+ steps.
+
+ with & ok markus@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 93c98a6b38f6911fd1ae025a1ec57807fb4d4ef4
-commit 40f5f03544a07ebd2003b443d42e85cb51d94d59
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Apr 6 04:15:45 2018 +0000
+commit 4ae7f80dfd02f2bde912a67c9f338f61e90fa79f
+Author: tb@openbsd.org <tb@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sat Jan 19 04:15:56 2019 +0000
- upstream: relax checking of authorized_keys environment="..."
+ upstream: Print an \r in front of the password prompt so parts of
- options to allow underscores in variable names (regression introduced in
- 7.7). bz2851, ok deraadt@
+ a password that was entered too early are likely clobbered by the prompt.
+ Idea from doas.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 69690ffe0c97ff393f2c76d25b4b3d2ed4e4ac9c
+ from and ok djm
+ "i like it" deraadt
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 5fb97c68df6d8b09ab37f77bca1d84d799c4084e
-commit 30fd7f9af0f553aaa2eeda5a1f53f26cfc222b5e
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Apr 6 03:51:27 2018 +0000
+commit a6258e5dc314c7d504ac9f0fbc3be96475581dbe
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Fri Jan 18 11:09:01 2019 +1100
- upstream: add a couple of missed options to the config dump; patch
+ Add minimal fchownat and fchmodat implementations.
- from Jakub Jelen via bz2835
+ Fixes builds on at least OS X Lion, NetBSD 6 and Solaris 10.
+
+commit 091093d25802b87d3b2b09f2c88d9f33e1ae5562
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Fri Jan 18 12:11:42 2019 +1300
+
+ Add a minimal implementation of utimensat().
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 5970adadf6ef206bee0dddfc75d24c2019861446
+ Some systems (eg older OS X) do not have utimensat, so provide minimal
+ implementation in compat layer. Fixes build on at least El Capitan.
-commit 8d6829be324452d2acd282d5f8ceb0adaa89a4de
+commit 609644027dde1f82213699cb6599e584c7efcb75
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Apr 6 03:34:27 2018 +0000
+Date: Tue Jan 1 22:20:16 2019 +0000
- upstream: ssh does not accept -oInclude=... on the commandline, the
+ upstream: regress bits for banner processing refactor (this test was
- Include keyword is for configuration files only. bz#2840, patch from Jakub
- Jelen
+ depending on ssh returning a particular error message for banner parsing
+ failure)
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 32d052b4a7a7f22df35fe3f71c368c02b02cacb0
+ reminded by bluhm@
+
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: f24fc303d40931157431df589b386abf5e1be575
-commit 00c5222ddc0c8edcaa4ea45ac03befdc8013d137
+commit f47d72ddad75b93d3cbc781718b0fa9046c03df8
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Apr 5 22:54:28 2018 +0000
+Date: Thu Jan 17 04:45:09 2019 +0000
- upstream: We don't offer CBC cipher by default any more. Spotted by
+ upstream: tun_fwd_ifnames variable should b
- Renaud Allard (via otto@)
+ =?UTF-8?q?e=20extern;=20from=20Hanno=20B=C3=B6ck?=
+ MIME-Version: 1.0
+ Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+ Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a559b1eef741557dd959ae378b665a2977d92dca
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d53dede6e521161bf04d39d09947db6253a38271
-commit 5ee8448ad7c306f05a9f56769f95336a8269f379
-Author: job@openbsd.org <job@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Apr 4 15:12:17 2018 +0000
+commit 943d0965263cae1c080ce5a9d0b5aa341885e55d
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Jan 17 04:20:53 2019 +0000
- upstream: Update default IPQoS in ssh(1), sshd(8) to DSCP AF21 for
+ upstream: include time.h for time(3)/nanosleep(2); from Ian
- interactive and CS1 for bulk
+ McKellar
- AF21 was selected as this is the highest priority within the low-latency
- service class (and it is higher than what we have today). SSH is elastic
- and time-sensitive data, where a user is waiting for a response via the
- network in order to continue with a task at hand. As such, these flows
- should be considered foreground traffic, with delays or drops to such
- traffic directly impacting user-productivity.
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 6412ccd06a88f65b207a1089345f51fa1244ea51
+
+commit dbb4dec6d5d671b5e9d67ef02162a610ad052068
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Jan 17 01:50:24 2019 +0000
+
+ upstream: many of the global variables in this file can be made static;
- For bulk SSH traffic, the CS1 "Lower Effort" marker was chosen to enable
- networks implementing a scavanger/lower-than-best effort class to
- discriminate scp(1) below normal activities, such as web surfing. In
- general this type of bulk SSH traffic is a background activity.
+ patch from Markus Schmidt
- An advantage of using "AF21" for interactive SSH and "CS1" for bulk SSH
- is that they are recognisable values on all common platforms (IANA
- https://www.iana.org/assignments/dscp-registry/dscp-registry.xml), and
- for AF21 specifically a definition of the intended behavior exists
- https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4594#section-4.7 in addition to the definition
- of the Assured Forwarding PHB group https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2597, and
- for CS1 (Lower Effort) there is https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3662
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f3db619f67beb53257b21bac0e92b4fb7d5d5737
+
+commit 60d8c84e0887514c99c9ce071965fafaa1c3d34a
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Jan 16 23:23:45 2019 +0000
+
+ upstream: Add "-h" flag to sftp chown/chgrp/chmod commands to
- The first three bits of "AF21" map to the equivalent IEEEE 802.1D PCP, IEEE
- 802.11e, MPLS EXP/CoS and IP Precedence value of 2 (also known as "Immediate",
- or "AC_BE"), and CS1's first 3 bits map to IEEEE 802.1D PCP, IEEE 802.11e,
- MPLS/CoS and IP Precedence value 1 ("Background" or "AC_BK").
+ request they do not follow symlinks. Requires recently-committed
+ lsetstat@openssh.com extension on the server side.
- OK deraadt@, "no objection" djm@
+ ok markus@ dtucker@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d11d2a4484f461524ef0c20870523dfcdeb52181
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f93bb3f6f7eb2fb7ef1e59126e72714f1626d604
-commit 424b544fbda963f973da80f884717c3e0a513288
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Apr 3 02:14:08 2018 +0000
+commit dbbc7e0eab7262f34b8e0cd6efecd1c77b905ed0
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Jan 16 23:22:10 2019 +0000
- upstream: Import regenerated moduli file.
+ upstream: add support for a "lsetstat@openssh.com" extension. This
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1de0e85522051eb2ffa00437e1885e9d7b3e0c2e
+ replicates the functionality of the existing SSH2_FXP_SETSTAT operation but
+ does not follow symlinks. Based on a patch from Bert Haverkamp in bz#2067 but
+ with more attribute modifications supported.
+
+ ok markus@ dtucker@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f7234f6e90db19655d55d936a115ee4ccb6aaf80
-commit 323f66ce934df2da551f256f37d69822428e1ca1
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Apr 6 04:18:35 2018 +0000
+commit 4a526941d328fc3d97068c6a4cbd9b71b70fe5e1
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Jan 4 03:27:50 2019 +0000
- upstream: Add test for username options parsing order, prompted by
+ upstream: eliminate function-static attempt counters for
- bz#2849.
+ passwd/kbdint authmethods by moving them to the client authctxt; Patch from
+ Markus Schmidt, ok markus@
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 6985cd32f38596882a3ac172ff8c510693b65283
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4df4404a5d5416eb056f68e0e2f4fa91ba3b3f7f
-commit e8f474554e3bda102a797a2fbab0594ccc66f097
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Fri Apr 6 14:11:44 2018 +1000
+commit 8a8183474c41bd6cebaa917346b549af2239ba2f
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Jan 4 03:23:00 2019 +0000
- Expose SSH_AUTH_INFO_0 to PAM auth modules
+ upstream: fix memory leak of ciphercontext when rekeying; bz#2942
- bz#2408, patch from Radoslaw Ejsmont; ok dtucker@
+ Patch from Markus Schmidt; ok markus@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7877f1b82e249986f1ef98d0ae76ce987d332bdd
-commit 014ba209cf4c6a159baa30ecebbaddfa97da7100
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Tue Apr 3 12:18:00 2018 +1000
+commit 5bed70afce0907b6217418d0655724c99b683d93
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Jan 1 23:10:53 2019 +0000
- Import regenerated moduli file.
+ upstream: static on global vars, const on handler tables that contain
+
+ function pointers; from Mike Frysinger
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7ef2305e50d3caa6326286db43cf2cfaf03960e0
-commit a0349a1cc4a18967ad1dbff5389bcdf9da098814
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Mon Apr 2 15:38:28 2018 +1000
+commit 007a88b48c97d092ed2f501bbdcb70d9925277be
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Dec 27 23:02:11 2018 +0000
- update versions in .spec files
+ upstream: Request RSA-SHA2 signatures for
+
+ rsa-sha2-{256|512}-cert-v01@openssh.com cert algorithms; ok markus@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: afc6f7ca216ccd821656d1c911d2a3deed685033
-commit 816ad38f79792f5617e3913be306ddb27e91091c
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Mon Apr 2 15:38:20 2018 +1000
+commit eb347d086c35428c47fe52b34588cbbc9b49d9a6
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Dec 27 03:37:49 2018 +0000
- update version number
+ upstream: ssh_packet_set_state() now frees ssh->kex implicitly, so
+
+ don't do explicit kex_free() beforehand
+
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: f2f73bad47f62a2040ccba0a72cadcb12eda49cf
-commit 2c71ca1dd1efe458cb7dee3f8a1a566f913182c2
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Fri Mar 30 18:23:07 2018 +1100
+commit bb542f0cf6f7511a22a08c492861e256a82376a9
+Author: tedu@openbsd.org <tedu@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sat Dec 15 00:50:21 2018 +0000
- Disable native strndup and strnlen on AIX.
+ upstream: remove unused and problematic sudo clean. ok espie
- On at least some revisions of AIX, strndup returns unterminated strings
- under some conditions, apparently because strnlen returns incorrect
- values in those cases. Disable both on AIX and use the replacements
- from openbsd-compat. Fixes problem with ECDSA keys there, ok djm.
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: ca90c20a15a85b661e13e98b80c10e65cd662f7b
-commit 6b5a17bc14e896e3904dc58d889b58934cfacd24
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Mon Mar 26 13:12:44 2018 +1100
+commit 0a843d9a0e805f14653a555f5c7a8ba99d62c12d
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Dec 27 03:25:24 2018 +0000
- Include ssh_api.h for struct ssh.
+ upstream: move client/server SSH-* banners to buffers under
- struct ssh is needed by implementations of sys_auth_passwd() that were
- converted in commit bba02a50. Needed to fix build on AIX, I assume for
- the other platforms too (although it should be harmless if not needed).
-
-commit bc3f80e4d191b8e48650045dfa8a682cd3aabd4d
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Mon Mar 26 12:58:09 2018 +1100
-
- Remove UNICOS code missed during removal.
+ ssh->kex and factor out the banner exchange. This eliminates some common code
+ from the client and server.
- Fixes compile error on AIX.
-
-commit 9d57762c24882e2f000a21a0ffc8c5908a1fa738
-Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sat Mar 24 19:29:03 2018 +0000
-
- upstream: openssh-7.7
+ Also be more strict about handling \r characters - these should only
+ be accepted immediately before \n (pointed out by Jann Horn).
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 274e614352460b9802c905f38fb5ea7ed5db3d41
-
-commit 4b7d8acdbbceef247dc035e611e577174ed8a87e
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Mon Mar 26 09:37:02 2018 +1100
-
- Remove authinfo.sh test dependency on printenv
+ Inspired by a patch from Markus Schmidt.
+ (lots of) feedback and ok markus@
- Some platforms lack printenv in the default $PATH.
- Reported by Tom G. Christensen
-
-commit 4afeaf3dcb7dc70efd98fcfcb0ed28a6b40b820e
-Author: Tim Rice <tim@multitalents.net>
-Date: Sun Mar 25 10:00:21 2018 -0700
-
- Use libiaf on all sysv5 systems
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1cc7885487a6754f63641d7d3279b0941890275b
-commit bba02a5094b3db228ceac41cb4bfca165d0735f3
-Author: Tim Rice <tim@multitalents.net>
-Date: Sun Mar 25 09:17:33 2018 -0700
+commit 434b587afe41c19391821e7392005068fda76248
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Dec 7 04:36:09 2018 +0000
- modified: auth-sia.c
- modified: openbsd-compat/port-aix.c
- modified: openbsd-compat/port-uw.c
+ upstream: Fix calculation of initial bandwidth limits. Account for
- propogate changes to auth-passwd.c in commit
- 7c856857607112a3dfe6414696bf4c7ab7fb0cb3 to other providers
- of sys_auth_passwd()
-
-commit d7a7a39168bdfe273587bf85d779d60569100a3f
-Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sat Mar 24 19:29:03 2018 +0000
-
- upstream: openssh-7.7
+ written bytes before the initial timer check so that the first buffer written
+ is accounted. Set the threshold after which the timer is checked such that
+ the limit starts being computed as soon as possible, ie after the second
+ buffer is written. This prevents an initial burst of traffic and provides a
+ more accurate bandwidth limit. bz#2927, ok djm.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 274e614352460b9802c905f38fb5ea7ed5db3d41
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ff3ef76e4e43040ec198c2718d5682c36b255cb6
-commit 9efcaaac314c611c6c0326e8bac5b486c424bbd2
-Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sat Mar 24 19:28:43 2018 +0000
+commit a6a0788cbbe8dfce2819ee43b09c80725742e21c
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Dec 7 03:39:40 2018 +0000
- upstream: fix bogus warning when signing cert keys using agent;
+ upstream: only consider the ext-info-c extension during the initial
- from djm; ok deraadt dtucker
+ KEX. It shouldn't be sent in subsequent ones, but if it is present we should
+ ignore it.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 12e50836ba2040042383a8b71e12d7ea06e9633d
-
-commit 393436024d2e4b4c7a01f9cfa5854e7437896d11
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Sun Mar 25 09:40:46 2018 +1100
-
- Replace /dev/stdin with "-".
+ This prevents sshd from sending a SSH_MSG_EXT_INFO for REKEX for buggy
+ these clients. Reported by Jakub Jelen via bz2929; ok dtucker@
- For some reason sftp -b doesn't work with /dev/stdin on Cygwin, as noted
- and suggested by vinschen at redhat.com.
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 91564118547f7807030ec537480303e2371902f9
-commit b5974de1a1d419e316ffb6524b1b277dda2f3b49
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Fri Mar 23 13:21:14 2018 +1100
+commit 63bba57a32c5bb6158d57cf4c47022daf89c14a0
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Dec 7 03:33:18 2018 +0000
- Provide $OBJ to paths in PuTTY interop tests.
+ upstream: fix option letter pasto in previous
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e26c8bf2f2a808f3c47960e1e490d2990167ec39
-commit dc31e79454e9b9140b33ad380565fdb59b9c4f33
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Mar 16 09:06:31 2018 +0000
+commit 737e4edd82406595815efadc28ed5161b8b0c01a
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Dec 7 03:32:26 2018 +0000
- upstream: Tell puttygen to use /dev/urandom instead of /dev/random. On
+ upstream: mention that the ssh-keygen -F (find host in
- OpenBSD they are both non-blocking, but on many other -portable platforms it
- blocks, stalling tests.
+ authorized_keys) and -R (remove host from authorized_keys) options may accept
+ either a bare hostname or a [hostname]:port combo. bz#2935
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 397d0d4c719c353f24d79f5b14775e0cfdf0e1cc
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 5535cf4ce78375968b0d2cd7aa316fa3eb176780
-commit cb1f94431ef319cd48618b8b771b58739a8210cf
-Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Mar 22 07:06:11 2018 +0000
+commit 8a22ffaa13391cfe5b40316d938fe0fb931e9296
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Fri Dec 7 15:41:16 2018 +1100
- upstream: ssh/xmss: fix build; ok djm@
+ expose $SSH_CONNECTION in the PAM environment
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c9374ca41d4497f1c673ab681cc33f6e7c5dd186
+ This makes the connection 4-tuple available to PAM modules that
+ wish to use it in decision-making. bz#2741
-commit 27979da9e4074322611355598f69175b9ff10d39
-Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Mar 22 07:05:48 2018 +0000
+commit a784fa8c7a7b084d63bae82ccfea902131bb45c5
+Author: Kevin Adler <kadler@us.ibm.com>
+Date: Wed Dec 12 22:12:45 2018 -0600
- upstream: ssh/xmss: fix deserialize for certs; ok djm@
+ Don't pass loginmsg by address now that it's an sshbuf*
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f44c41636c16ec83502039828beaf521c057dddc
-
-commit c6cb2565c9285eb54fa9dfbb3890f5464aff410f
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Thu Mar 22 17:00:28 2018 +1100
-
- Save $? before case statement.
+ In 120a1ec74, loginmsg was changed from the legacy Buffer type
+ to struct sshbuf*, but it missed changing calls to
+ sys_auth_allowed_user and sys_auth_record_login which passed
+ loginmsg by address. Now that it's a pointer, just pass it directly.
- In some shells (FreeBSD 9, ash) the case statement resets $?, so save
- for later testing.
+ This only affects AIX, unless there are out of tree users.
-commit 4c4e7f783b43b264c247233acb887ee10ed4ce4d
+commit 285310b897969a63ef224d39e7cc2b7316d86940
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Mar 14 05:35:40 2018 +0000
+Date: Fri Dec 7 02:31:20 2018 +0000
- upstream: rename recently-added "valid-before" key restriction to
+ upstream: no need to allocate channels_pre/channels_post in
- "expiry-time" as the former is confusing wrt similar terminology in X.509;
- pointed out by jsing@
+ channel_init_channels() as we do it anyway in channel_handler_init() that we
+ call at the end of the function. Fix from Markus Schmidt via bz#2938
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: ac8b41dbfd90cffd525d58350c327195b0937793
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 74893638af49e3734f1e33a54af1b7ea533373ed
-commit 500396b204c58e78ad9d081516a365a9f28dc3fd
+commit 87d6cf1cbc91df6815db8fe0acc7c910bc3d18e4
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Mar 12 00:56:03 2018 +0000
+Date: Fri Nov 30 02:24:52 2018 +0000
- upstream: check valid-before option in authorized_keys
+ upstream: don't attempt to connect to empty SSH_AUTH_SOCK; bz#293
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 7e1e4a84f7f099a290e5a4cbf4196f90ff2d7e11
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0e8fc8f19f14b21adef7109e0faa583d87c0e929
-commit a76b5d26c2a51d7dd7a5164e683ab3f4419be215
+commit 91b19198c3f604f5eef2c56dbe36f29478243141
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Mar 12 00:54:04 2018 +0000
+Date: Wed Nov 28 06:00:38 2018 +0000
- upstream: explicitly specify RSA/SHA-2 keytype here too
+ upstream: don't truncate user or host name in "user@host's
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 74d7b24e8c72c27af6b481198344eb077e993a62
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e6ca01a8d58004b7f2cac0b1b7ce8f87e425e360
-commit 3a43297ce29d37c64e37c7e21282cb219e28d3d1
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Mar 12 00:52:57 2018 +0000
+commit dd0cf6318d9b4b3533bda1e3bc021b2cd7246b7a
+Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Nov 23 06:58:28 2018 +0000
- upstream: exlicitly include RSA/SHA-2 keytypes in
+ upstream: tweak previous;
- PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes here
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 08f096922eb00c98251501c193ff9e83fbb5de4f
+
+commit 8a85f5458d1c802471ca899c97f89946f6666e61
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Sun Nov 25 21:44:05 2018 +1100
+
+ Include stdio.h for FILE if needed.
+
+commit 16fb23f25454991272bfe4598cc05d20fcd25116
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Sun Nov 25 14:05:57 2018 +1100
+
+ Reverse order of OpenSSL init functions.
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 954d19e0032a74e31697fb1dc7e7d3d1b2d65fe9
+ Try the new init function (OPENSSL_init_crypto) before falling back to
+ the old one (OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms).
-commit 037fdc1dc2d68e1d43f9c9e2586c02cabc8f7cc8
-Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Mar 14 06:56:20 2018 +0000
+commit 98f878d2272bf8dff21f2a0265d963c29e33fed2
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Sun Nov 25 14:05:08 2018 +1100
- upstream: sort expiry-time;
+ Improve OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms check.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8c7d82ee1e63e26ceb2b3d3a16514019f984f6bf
+ OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms() may be a macro so check for that too.
-commit abc0fa38c9bc136871f28e452c3465c3051fc785
+commit 9e34e0c59ab04514f9de9934a772283f7f372afe
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Mar 14 05:35:40 2018 +0000
+Date: Fri Nov 23 05:08:07 2018 +0000
- upstream: rename recently-added "valid-before" key restriction to
+ upstream: add a ssh_config "Match final" predicate
- "expiry-time" as the former is confusing wrt similar terminology in X.509;
- pointed out by jsing@
+ Matches in same pass as "Match canonical" but doesn't require
+ hostname canonicalisation be enabled. bz#2906 ok markus
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 376939466a1f562f3950a22314bc6505733aaae6
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: fba1dfe9f6e0cabcd0e2b3be13f7a434199beffa
-commit bf0fbf2b11a44f06a64b620af7d01ff171c28e13
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Mar 12 00:52:01 2018 +0000
+commit 4da58d58736b065b1182b563d10ad6765d811c6d
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Nov 23 02:53:57 2018 +0000
- upstream: add valid-before="[time]" authorized_keys option. A
+ upstream: Remove now-unneeded ifdef SIGINFO around handler since it is
- simple way of giving a key an expiry date. ok markus@
+ now always used for SIGUSR1 even when SIGINFO is not defined. This will make
+ things simpler in -portable.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1793b4dd5184fa87f42ed33c7b0f4f02bc877947
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 4ff0265b335820b0646d37beb93f036ded0dc43f
-commit fbd733ab7adc907118a6cf56c08ed90c7000043f
+commit c721d5877509875c8515df0215fa1dab862013bc
Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Mon Mar 12 19:17:26 2018 +1100
+Date: Fri Nov 23 14:11:20 2018 +1100
- Add AC_LANG_PROGRAM to AC_COMPILE_IFELSE.
+ Move RANDOM_SEED_SIZE outside ifdef.
- The recently added MIPS ABI tests need AC_LANG_PROGRAM to prevent
- warnings from autoconf. Pointed out by klausz at haus-gisela.de.
+ RANDOM_SEED_SIZE is used by both the OpenSSL and non-OpenSSL code
+ This fixes the build with configureed --without-openssl.
-commit c7c458e8261b04d161763cd333d74e7a5842e917
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Mar 7 23:53:08 2018 +0000
+commit deb51552c3ce7ce72c8d0232e4f36f2e7c118c7d
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Thu Nov 22 19:59:28 2018 +1100
- upstream: revert recent strdelim() change, it causes problems with
-
- some configs.
-
- revision 1.124
- date: 2018/03/02 03:02:11; author: djm; state: Exp; lines: +19 -8; commitid: nNRsCijZiGG6SUTT;
- Allow escaped quotes \" and \' in ssh_config and sshd_config quotes
- option strings. bz#1596 ok markus@
-
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 59c40b1b81206d713c06b49d8477402c86babda5
+ Resync with OpenBSD by pulling in an ifdef SIGINFO.
-commit 0bcd871ccdf3baf2b642509ba4773d5be067cfa2
-Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Mar 5 07:03:18 2018 +0000
+commit 28c7b2cd050f4416bfcf3869a20e3ea138aa52fe
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Fri Nov 23 10:45:20 2018 +1100
- upstream: move the input format details to -f; remove the output
-
- format details and point to sshd(8), where it is documented;
+ fix configure test for OpenSSL version
- ok dtucker
+ square brackets in case statements may be eaten by autoconf.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 95f17e47dae02a6ac7329708c8c893d4cad0004a
+ Report and fix from Filipp Gunbin; tweaked by naddy@
-commit 45011511a09e03493568506ce32f4891a174a3bd
-Author: Vicente Olivert Riera <Vincent.Riera@imgtec.com>
-Date: Tue Jun 20 16:42:28 2017 +0100
+commit 42c5ec4b97b6a1bae70f323952d0646af16ce710
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Fri Nov 23 10:40:06 2018 +1100
- configure.ac: properly set seccomp_audit_arch for MIPS64
+ refactor libcrypto initialisation
- Currently seccomp_audit_arch is set to AUDIT_ARCH_MIPS64 or
- AUDIT_ARCH_MIPSEL64 (depending on the endinness) when openssh is built
- for MIPS64. However, that's only valid for n64 ABI. The right macros for
- n32 ABI defined in seccomp.h are AUDIT_ARCH_MIPS64N32 and
- AUDIT_ARCH_MIPSEL64N32, for big and little endian respectively.
+ Don't call OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms() unless OpenSSL actually
+ supports it.
- Because of that an sshd built for MIPS64 n32 rejects connection attempts
- and the output of strace reveals that the problem is related to seccomp
- audit:
+ Move all libcrypto initialisation to a single function, and call that
+ from seed_rng() that is called early in each tool's main().
- [pid 194] prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, {len=57,
- filter=0x555d5da0}) = 0
- [pid 194] write(7, "\0\0\0]\0\0\0\5\0\0\0Ulist_hostkey_types: "..., 97) = ?
- [pid 193] <... poll resumed> ) = 2 ([{fd=5, revents=POLLIN|POLLHUP},
- {fd=6, revents=POLLHUP}])
- [pid 194] +++ killed by SIGSYS +++
+ Prompted by patch from Rosen Penev
+
+commit 5b60b6c02009547a3e2a99d4886965de2a4719da
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Nov 22 08:59:11 2018 +0000
+
+ upstream: Output info on SIGUSR1 as well as
- This patch fixes that problem by setting the right value to
- seccomp_audit_arch taking into account the MIPS64 ABI.
+ SIGINFO to resync with portable. (ID sync only).
- Signed-off-by: Vicente Olivert Riera <Vincent.Riera@imgtec.com>
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 699d153e2de22dce51a1b270c40a98472d1a1b16
-commit 580086704c31de91dc7ba040a28e416bf1fefbca
-Author: Vicente Olivert Riera <Vincent.Riera@imgtec.com>
-Date: Tue Jun 20 16:42:11 2017 +0100
+commit e4ae345dc75b34fd870c2e8690d831d2c1088eb7
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Nov 22 08:48:32 2018 +0000
- configure.ac: detect MIPS ABI
+ upstream: Append pid to temp files in /var/run and set a cleanup
- Signed-off-by: Vicente Olivert Riera <Vincent.Riera@imgtec.com>
+ trap for them. This allows multiple instances of tests to run without
+ colliding.
+
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 57add105ecdfc54752d8003acdd99eb68c3e0b4c
-commit cd4e937aa701f70366cd5b5969af525dff6fdf15
-Author: Alan Yee <alyee@ucsd.edu>
-Date: Wed Mar 7 15:12:14 2018 -0800
+commit f72d0f52effca5aa20a193217346615ecd3eed53
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Oct 31 11:09:27 2018 +0000
- Use https URLs for links that support it.
+ upstream: UsePrivilegeSeparation no is deprecated
+
+ test "yes" and "sandbox".
+
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 80e685ed8990766527dc629b1affc09a75bfe2da
-commit c0a0c3fc4a76b682db22146b28ddc46566db1ce9
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Mon Mar 5 20:03:07 2018 +1100
+commit 35d0e5fefc419bddcbe09d7fc163d8cd3417125b
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Oct 17 23:28:05 2018 +0000
- Disable UTMPX on SunOS4.
+ upstream: add some knobs:
+
+ UNITTEST_FAST?= no # Skip slow tests (e.g. less intensive fuzzing).
+ UNITTEST_SLOW?= no # Include slower tests (e.g. more intensive fuzzing).
+ UNITTEST_VERBOSE?= no # Verbose test output (inc. per-test names).
+
+ useful if you want to run the tests as a smoke test to exercise the
+ functionality without waiting for all the fuzzers to run.
+
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: e04d82ebec86068198cd903acf1c67563c57315e
-commit 58fd4c5c0140f6636227ca7acbb149ab0c2509b9
+commit c1941293d9422a14dda372b4c21895e72aa7a063
Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Mon Mar 5 19:28:08 2018 +1100
+Date: Thu Nov 22 15:52:26 2018 +1100
- Check for and work around buggy fflush(NULL).
+ Resync Makefile.inc with upstream.
- Some really old platforms (eg SunOS4) segfault on fflush(NULL) so check
- for and work around. With klausz at haus-gisela.de.
+ It's unused in -portable, but having it out of sync makes other syncs
+ fail to apply.
-commit 71e48bc7945f867029e50e06c665c66aed6d3c64
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Mon Mar 5 10:22:32 2018 +1100
+commit 928f1231f65f88cd4c73e6e0edd63d2cf6295d77
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Nov 19 04:12:32 2018 +0000
- Remove extra XMSS #endif
+ upstream: silence (to log level debug2) failure messages when
- Extra #endif breaks compile with -DWITH_XMSS. Pointed out by Jack
- Schmidt via github.
+ loading the default hostkeys. Hostkeys explicitly specified in the
+ configuration or on the command-line are still reported as errors, and
+ failure to load at least one host key remains a fatal error.
+ MIME-Version: 1.0
+ Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+ Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+ Based on patch from Dag-Erling Smørgrav via
+ https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/pull/103
+
+ ok markus@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ffc2e35a75d1008effaf05a5e27425041c27b684
-commit 055e09e2212ff52067786bf6d794ca9512ff7f0c
+commit 7fca94edbe8ca9f879da9fdd2afd959c4180f4c7
Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sat Mar 3 06:37:53 2018 +0000
+Date: Sun Nov 18 22:43:29 2018 +0000
- upstream: Update RSA minimum modulus size to 1024. sshkey.h rev 1.18
+ upstream: Fix inverted logic for redirecting ProxyCommand stderr to
- bumped the minimum from 768 to 1024, update man page accordingly.
+ /dev/null. Fixes mosh in proxycommand mode that was broken by the previous
+ ProxyCommand change that was reported by matthieu@. ok djm@ danj@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 27563ab4e866cd2aac40a5247876f6787c08a338
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c6fc9641bc250221a0a81c6beb2e72d603f8add6
-commit 7e4fadd3248d6bb7d39d6688c76a613d35d2efc1
+commit ccef7c4faf914993b53035cd2b25ce02ab039c9d
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sun Mar 4 01:46:48 2018 +0000
+Date: Fri Nov 16 06:17:38 2018 +0000
- upstream: for the pty control tests, just check that the PTY path
+ upstream: redirect stderr of ProxyCommands to /dev/null when ssh is
- points to something in /dev (rather than checking the device node itself);
- makes life easier for portable, where systems with dynamic ptys can delete
- nodes before we get around to testing their existence.
+ started with ControlPersist; based on patch from Steffen Prohaska
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: b1e455b821e62572bccd98102f8dd9d09bb94994
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1bcaa14a03ae80369d31021271ec75dce2597957
-commit 13ef4cf53f24753fe920832b990b25c9c9cd0530
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Sat Mar 3 16:21:20 2018 +1100
+commit 15182fd96845a03216d7ac5a2cf31c4e77e406e3
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Nov 16 06:10:29 2018 +0000
- Update PAM password change to new opts API.
+ upstream: make grandparent-parent-child sshbuf chains robust to
+
+ use-after-free faults if the ancestors are freed before the descendents.
+ Nothing in OpenSSH uses this deallocation pattern. Reported by Jann Horn
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d93501d1d2734245aac802a252b9bb2eccdba0f2
-commit 33561e68e0b27366cb769295a077aabc6a49d2a1
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Sat Mar 3 14:56:09 2018 +1100
+commit 2a35862e664afde774d4a72497d394fe7306ccb5
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Nov 16 03:26:01 2018 +0000
- Add strndup for platforms that need it.
+ upstream: use path_absolute() for pathname checks; from Manoj Ampalam
- Some platforms don't have strndup, which includes Solaris 10, NetBSD 3
- and FreeBSD 6.
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 482ce71a5ea5c5f3bc4d00fd719481a6a584d925
-commit e8a17feba95eef424303fb94441008f6c5347aaf
+commit d0d1dfa55be1c5c0d77ab3096b198a64235f936d
Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Sat Mar 3 14:49:07 2018 +1100
+Date: Fri Nov 16 14:11:44 2018 +1100
- Flatten and alphabetize object file lists.
+ Test for OPENSSL_init_crypto before using.
- This will make maintenance and changes easier. "no objection" tim@
+ Check for the presence of OPENSSL_init_crypto and all the flags we want
+ before trying to use it (bz#2931).
-commit de1920d743d295f50e6905e5957c4172c038e8eb
+commit 6010c0303a422a9c5fa8860c061bf7105eb7f8b2
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sat Mar 3 03:16:17 2018 +0000
+Date: Fri Nov 16 03:03:10 2018 +0000
- upstream: unit tests for new authorized_keys options API
+ upstream: disallow empty incoming filename or ones that refer to the
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 820f9ec9c6301f6ca330ad4052d85f0e67d0bdc1
+ current directory; based on report/patch from Harry Sintonen
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f27651b30eaee2df49540ab68d030865c04f6de9
-commit dc3e92df17556dc5b0ab19cee8dcb2a6ba348717
+commit aaed635e3a401cfcc4cc97f33788179c458901c3
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Mar 2 02:53:27 2018 +0000
+Date: Fri Nov 16 02:46:20 2018 +0000
- upstream: fix testing of pty option, include positive test and
+ upstream: fix bug in client that was keeping a redundant ssh-agent
- testing of restrict keyword
+ socket around for the life of the connection; bz#2912; reported by Simon
+ Tatham; ok dtucker@
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 4268f27c2706a0a95e725d9518c5bcbec9814c6d
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4ded588301183d343dce3e8c5fc1398e35058478
-commit 3d1edd1ebbc0aabea8bbe61903060f37137f7c61
+commit e76135e3007f1564427b2956c628923d8dc2f75a
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Mar 2 02:51:55 2018 +0000
+Date: Fri Nov 16 02:43:56 2018 +0000
- upstream: better testing for port-forwarding and restrict flags in
+ upstream: fix bug in HostbasedAcceptedKeyTypes and
- authorized_keys
+ PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes options. If only RSA-SHA2 siganture types were
+ specified, then authentication would always fail for RSA keys as the monitor
+ checks only the base key (not the signature algorithm) type against
+ *AcceptedKeyTypes. bz#2746; reported by Jakub Jelen; ok dtucker
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: ee771df8955f2735df54746872c6228aff381daa
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 117bc3dc54578dbdb515a1d3732988cb5b00461b
-commit 7c856857607112a3dfe6414696bf4c7ab7fb0cb3
+commit 5c1a63562cac0574c226224075b0829a50b48c9d
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sat Mar 3 03:15:51 2018 +0000
+Date: Fri Nov 16 02:30:20 2018 +0000
- upstream: switch over to the new authorized_keys options API and
+ upstream: support a prefix of '@' to suppress echo of sftp batch
- remove the legacy one.
+ commands; bz#2926; ok dtucker@
- Includes a fairly big refactor of auth2-pubkey.c to retain less state
- between key file lines.
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9d635636bc84aeae796467e059f7634de990a79d
+
+commit 90ef45f7aac33eaf55ec344e101548a01e570f29
+Author: schwarze@openbsd.org <schwarze@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Nov 13 07:22:45 2018 +0000
+
+ upstream: fix markup error (missing blank before delimiter); from
- feedback and ok markus@
+ Mike Frysinger <vapier at gentoo dot org>
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: dece6cae0f47751b9892080eb13d6625599573df
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1bc5392f795ca86318d695e0947eaf71a5a4f6d9
-commit 90c4bec8b5f9ec4c003ae4abdf13fc7766f00c8b
+commit 960e7c672dc106f3b759c081de3edb4d1138b36e
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sat Mar 3 03:06:02 2018 +0000
+Date: Fri Nov 9 02:57:58 2018 +0000
- upstream: Introduce a new API for handling authorized_keys options.
-
- This API parses options to a dedicated structure rather than the old API's
- approach of setting global state. It also includes support for merging
- options, e.g. from authorized_keys, authorized_principals and/or
- certificates.
+ upstream: typo in error message; caught by Debian lintian, via
- feedback and ok markus@
+ Colin Watson
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 98badda102cd575210d7802943e93a34232c80a2
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: bff614c7bd1f4ca491a84e9b5999f848d0d66758
-commit 26074380767e639ef89321610e146ae11016b385
+commit 81f1620c836e6c79c0823ba44acca605226a80f1
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sat Mar 3 03:01:50 2018 +0000
+Date: Fri Nov 9 02:56:22 2018 +0000
- upstream: warn when the agent returns a signature type that was
-
- different to what was requested. This might happen when an old/non-OpenSSH
- agent is asked to make a rsa-sha2-256/512 signature but only supports
- ssh-rsa. bz#2799 feedback and ok markus@
+ upstream: correct local variable name; from yawang AT microsoft.com
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 760c0f9438c5c58abc16b5f98008ff2d95cb13ce
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a0c228390856a215bb66319c89cb3959d3af8c87
-commit f493d2b0b66fb003ed29f31dd66ff1aeb64be1fc
-Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Mar 2 21:40:15 2018 +0000
+commit 1293740e800fa2e5ccd38842a2e4970c6f3b9831
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Oct 31 11:20:05 2018 +0000
- upstream: apply a lick of paint; tweaks/ok dtucker
+ upstream: Import new moduli.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 518a6736338045e0037f503c21027d958d05e703
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c07772f58028fda683ee6abd41c73da3ff70d403
-commit 713d9cb510e0e7759398716cbe6dcf43e574be71
+commit 46925ae28e53fc9add336a4fcdb7ed4b86c3591c
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Mar 2 03:02:11 2018 +0000
+Date: Fri Oct 26 01:23:03 2018 +0000
- upstream: Allow escaped quotes \" and \' in ssh_config and
+ upstream: mention ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com in list of cert
- sshd_config quotes option strings. bz#1596 ok markus@
+ key type at start of doc
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: dd3a29fc2dc905e8780198e5a6a30b096de1a1cb
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b46b0149256d67f05f2d5d01e160634ed1a67324
-commit 94b4e2d29afaaaef89a95289b16c18bf5627f7cd
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Mar 2 02:08:03 2018 +0000
+commit 8d8340e2c215155637fe19cb1a837f71b2d55f7b
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Fri Nov 16 13:32:13 2018 +1100
- upstream: refactor sshkey_read() to make it a little more, err,
-
- readable. ok markus
+ Remove fallback check for /usr/local/ssl.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2e9247b5762fdac3b6335dc606d3822121714c28
+ If configure could not find a working OpenSSL installation it would
+ fall back to checking in /usr/local/ssl. This made sense back when
+ systems did not ship with OpenSSL, but most do and OpenSSL 1.1 doesn't
+ use that as a default any more. The fallback behaviour also meant
+ that if you pointed --with-ssl-dir at a specific directory and it
+ didn't work, it would silently use either the system libs or the ones
+ in /usr/local/ssl. If you want to use /usr/local/ssl you'll need to
+ pass configure --with-ssl-dir=/usr/local/ssl. ok djm@
-commit 5886b92968b360623491699247caddfb77a74d80
-Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Mar 1 20:32:16 2018 +0000
+commit ce93472134fb22eff73edbcd173a21ae38889331
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Fri Nov 16 12:44:01 2018 +1100
- upstream: missing #ifdef for _PATH_HOST_XMSS_KEY_FILE; report by
-
- jmc@
+ Fix check for OpenSSL 1.0.1 exactly.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9039cb69a3f9886bfef096891a9e7fcbd620280b
+ Both INSTALL and configure.ac claim OpenSSL >= 1.0.1 is supported; fix
+ compile-time check for 1.0.1 to match.
-commit 3b36bed3d26f17f6a2b7e036e01777770fe1bcd4
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Feb 26 12:14:53 2018 +0000
+commit f2970868f86161a22b2c377057fa3891863a692a
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Sun Nov 11 15:58:20 2018 +1100
- upstream: Remove unneeded (local) include. ok markus@
+ Improve warnings in cygwin service setup.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 132812dd2296b1caa8cb07d2408afc28e4e60f93
+ bz#2922, patch from vinschen at redhat.com.
-commit 27b9f3950e0289e225b57b7b880a8f1859dcd70b
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Feb 26 03:56:44 2018 +0000
+commit bd2d54fc1eee84bf87158a1277a50e6c8a303339
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Sun Nov 11 15:54:54 2018 +1100
- upstream: Add $OpenBSD$ markers to xmss files to help keep synced
-
- with portable. ok djm@.
+ Remove hardcoded service name in cygwin setup.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 5233a27aafd1dfadad4b957225f95ae51eb365c1
+ bz#2922, patch from Christian.Lupien at USherbrooke.ca, sanity check
+ by vinschen at redhat.com.
-commit afd830847a82ebbd5aeab05bad6d2c8ce74df1cd
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Feb 26 03:03:05 2018 +0000
+commit d0153c77bf7964e694f1d26c56c41a571b8e9466
+Author: Dag-Erling Smørgrav <des@des.no>
+Date: Tue Oct 9 23:03:40 2018 +0200
- upstream: Add newline at end of file to prevent compiler warnings.
-
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 52f247d4eafe840c7c14c8befa71a760a8eeb063
+ AC_CHECK_SIZEOF() no longer needs a second argument.
-commit 941e0d3e9bb8d5e4eb70cc694441445faf037c84
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Wed Feb 28 19:59:35 2018 +1100
+commit 9b47b083ca9d866249ada9f02dbd57c87b13806e
+Author: Manoj Ampalam <manojamp@microsoft.com>
+Date: Thu Nov 8 22:41:59 2018 -0800
- Add WITH_XMSS, move to prevent conflicts.
+ Fix error message w/out nistp521.
- Add #ifdef WITH_XMSS to ssh-xmss.c, move it in the other files to after
- includes.h so it's less likely to conflict and will pick up WITH_XMSS if
- added to config.h.
+ Correct error message when OpenSSL doesn't support certain ECDSA key
+ lengths.
-commit a10d8552d0d2438da4ed539275abcbf557d1e7a8
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Tue Feb 27 14:45:17 2018 +1100
+commit 624d19ac2d56fa86a22417c35536caceb3be346f
+Author: Eneas U de Queiroz <cote2004-github@yahoo.com>
+Date: Tue Oct 9 16:17:42 2018 -0300
- Conditionally compile XMSS code.
+ fix compilation with openssl built without ECC
- The XMSS code is currently experimental and, unlike the rest of OpenSSH
- cannot currently be compiled with a c89 compiler.
+ ECDSA code in openssh-compat.h and libressl-api-compat.c needs to be
+ guarded by OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
+
+ Signed-off-by: Eneas U de Queiroz <cote2004-github@yahoo.com>
-commit 146c3bd28c8dbee9c4b06465d9c9facab96b1e9b
+commit 1801cd11d99d05a66ab5248c0555f55909a355ce
Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Mon Feb 26 12:51:29 2018 +1100
+Date: Thu Nov 8 15:03:11 2018 +1100
- Check dlopen has RTLD_NOW before enabling pkcs11.
+ Simplify OpenSSL 1.1 function checks.
+
+ Replace AC_SEARCH_LIBS checks for OpenSSL 1.1 functions with a single
+ AC_CHECK_FUNCS. ok djm@
-commit 1323f120d06a26074c4d154fcbe7f49bcad3d741
+commit bc32f118d484e4d71d2a0828fd4eab7e4176c9af
Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Tue Feb 27 08:41:25 2018 +1100
+Date: Mon Nov 5 17:31:24 2018 +1100
- Check for attributes on prototype args.
+ Fix pasto for HAVE_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_SET_IV.
- Some compilers (gcc 2.9.53, 3.0 and probably others, see gcc bug #3481)
- do not accept __attribute__ on function pointer prototype args. Check for
- this and hide them if they're not accepted.
+ Prevents unnecessary redefinition. Patch from mforney at mforney.org.
-commit f0b245b0439e600fab782d19e97980e9f2c2533c
+commit 3719df60c66abc4b47200d41f571d67772f293ba
Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Mon Feb 26 11:43:48 2018 +1100
+Date: Wed Oct 31 22:21:03 2018 +1100
- Check if HAVE_DECL_BZERO correctly.
+ Import new moduli.
-commit c7ef4a399155e1621a532cc5e08e6fa773658dd4
+commit 595605d4abede475339d6a1f07a8cc674c11d1c3
Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Mon Feb 26 17:42:56 2018 +1100
+Date: Sun Oct 28 15:18:13 2018 +1100
- Wrap <stdint.h> in #ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H.
+ Update check for minimum OpenSSL version.
-commit ac53ce46cf8165cbda7f57ee045f9f32e1e92b31
+commit 6ab75aba340d827140d7ba719787aabaf39a0355
Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Mon Feb 26 16:24:23 2018 +1100
+Date: Sun Oct 28 15:16:31 2018 +1100
- Replace $(CURDIR) with $(PWD).
-
- The former doesn't work on Solaris or BSDs.
+ Update required OpenSSL versions to match current.
-commit 534b2680a15d14e7e60274d5b29b812d44cc5a44
+commit c801b0e38eae99427f37869370151b78f8e15c5d
Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Mon Feb 26 14:51:59 2018 +1100
+Date: Sun Oct 28 14:34:12 2018 +1100
- Comment out hexdump().
+ Use detected version functions in openssl compat.
- Nothing currently uses them but they cause conflicts on at least
- FreeBSD, possibly others. ok djm@
-
-commit 5aea4aa522f61bb2f34c3055a7de203909dfae77
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Mon Feb 26 14:39:14 2018 +1100
-
- typo: missing ;
+ Use detected functions in compat layer instead of guessing based on
+ versions. Really fixes builds with LibreSSL, not just configure.
-commit cd3ab57f9b388f8b1abf601dc4d78ff82d83b75e
+commit 262d81a259d4aa1507c709ec9d5caa21c7740722
Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Mon Feb 26 14:37:06 2018 +1100
+Date: Sat Oct 27 16:45:59 2018 +1100
- Hook up flock() compat code.
+ Check for the existence of openssl version funcs.
- Also a couple of minor changes: fail if we can't lock instead of
- silently succeeding, and apply a couple of minor style fixes.
+ Check for the existence of openssl version functions and use the ones
+ detected instead of trying to guess based on the int32 version
+ identifier. Fixes builds with LibreSSL.
-commit b087998d1ba90dd1ddb6bfdb17873dc3e7392798
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Mon Feb 26 14:27:02 2018 +1100
+commit 406a24b25d6a2bdd70cacd16de7e899dcb2a8829
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Fri Oct 26 13:43:28 2018 +1100
- Import flock() compat from NetBSD.
+ fix builds on OpenSSL <= 1.0.x
- From NetBSD's src/trunk/tools/compat/flock.c, no OpenSSH changes yet.
+ I thought OpenSSL 1.0.x offered the new-style OpenSSL_version_num() API
+ to obtain version number, but they don't.
-commit 89212533dde6798324e835b1499084658df4579e
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Mon Feb 26 12:32:14 2018 +1100
+commit 859754bdeb41373d372e36b5dc89c547453addb3
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Tue Oct 23 17:10:41 2018 +1100
- Fix breakage when REGRESSTMP not set.
+ remove remaining references to SSLeay
- BUILDDIR is not set where used for REGRESSTMP, use make's CURDIR
- instead. Pointed out by djm@.
+ Prompted by Rosen Penev
-commit f885474137df4b89498c0b8834c2ac72c47aa4bd
+commit b9fea45a68946c8dfeace72ad1f6657c18f2a98a
Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Mon Feb 26 12:18:14 2018 +1100
+Date: Tue Oct 23 17:10:35 2018 +1100
- XMSS-related files get includes.h
+ regen depend
-commit 612faa34c72e421cdc9e63f624526bae62d557cc
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Mon Feb 26 12:17:55 2018 +1100
+commit a65784c9f9c5d00cf1a0e235090170abc8d07c73
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Oct 23 05:56:35 2018 +0000
- object files end with .o - not .c
+ upstream: refer to OpenSSL not SSLeay;
+
+ we're old, but we don't have to act it
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9ca38d11f8ed19e61a55108d1e892d696cee08ec
-commit bda709b8e13d3eef19e69c2d1684139e3af728f5
+commit c0a35265907533be10ca151ac797f34ae0d68969
Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Mon Feb 26 12:17:22 2018 +1100
+Date: Mon Oct 22 11:22:50 2018 +1100
- avoid inclusion of deprecated selinux/flask.h
+ fix compile for openssl 1.0.x w/ --with-ssl-engine
- Use string_to_security_class() instead.
+ bz#2921, patch from cotequeiroz
-commit 2e396439365c4ca352cac222717d09b14f8a0dfd
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Mon Feb 26 11:48:27 2018 +1100
+commit 31b49525168245abe16ad49d7b7f519786b53a38
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Mon Oct 22 20:05:18 2018 +1100
- updatedepend
+ Include openssl compatibility.
+
+ Patch from rosenp at gmail.com via openssh-unix-dev.
+
+commit a4fc253f5f44f0e4c47aafe2a17d2c46481d3c04
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Oct 19 03:12:42 2018 +0000
+
+ upstream: when printing certificate contents "ssh-keygen -Lf
+
+ /path/certificate", include the algorithm that the CA used to sign the cert.
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1ea20b5048a851a7a0758dcb9777a211a2c0dddd
+
+commit 83b3d99d2b47321b7ebb8db6f6ea04f3808bc069
+Author: florian@openbsd.org <florian@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Oct 15 11:28:50 2018 +0000
+
+ upstream: struct sockaddr_storage is guaranteed to be large enough,
+
+ no need to check the size. OK kn, deraadt
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0aa56e92eb49c79f495b31a5093109ec5841f439
+
+commit aede1c34243a6f7feae2fb2cb686ade5f9be6f3d
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Wed Oct 17 11:01:20 2018 +1100
+
+ Require OpenSSL 1.1.x series 1.1.0g or greater
+
+ Previous versions have a bug with EVP_CipherInit() when passed a
+ NULL EVP_CIPHER, per https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4613
+
+ ok dtucker@
+
+commit 08300c211409c212e010fe2e2f2883e573a04ce2
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Wed Oct 17 08:12:02 2018 +1100
+
+ unbreak compilation with --with-ssl-engine
+
+ Missing last argument to OPENSSL_init_crypto()
+
+commit 1673274aee67ce0eb6f00578b6f3d2bcbd58f937
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Tue Oct 16 14:45:57 2018 +1100
+
+ Remove gcc spectre mitigation flags.
+
+ Current impementions of the gcc spectre mitigation flags cause
+ miscompilations when combined with other flags and do not provide much
+ protection. Found by fweimer at redhat.com, ok djm@
+
+commit 4e23deefd7959ef83c73ed9cce574423438f6133
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Tue Oct 16 10:51:52 2018 +1100
+
+ Avoid deprecated OPENSSL_config when using 1.1.x
+
+ OpenSSL 1.1.x soft-deprecated OPENSSL_config in favour of
+ OPENSSL_init_crypto; pointed out by Jakub Jelen
+
+commit 797cdd9c8468ed1125ce60d590ae3f1397866af4
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Fri Oct 12 16:58:47 2018 +1100
+
+ Don't avoid our *sprintf replacements.
+
+ Don't let systems with broken printf(3) avoid our replacements
+ via asprintf(3)/vasprintf(3) calling libc internally. From djm@
+
+commit e526127cbd2f8ad88fb41229df0c9b850c722830
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Fri Oct 12 16:43:35 2018 +1100
+
+ Check if snprintf understands %zu.
+
+ If the platforms snprintf and friends don't understand %zu, use the
+ compat replacement. Prevents segfaults on those platforms.
+
+commit cf39f875191708c5f2f1a3c1c9019f106e74aea3
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Fri Oct 12 09:48:05 2018 +1100
+
+ remove stale link, tweak
+
+commit a7205e68decf7de2005810853b4ce6b222b65e2a
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Fri Oct 12 09:47:20 2018 +1100
+
+ update version numbers ahead of release
+
+commit 1a4a9cf80f5b92b9d1dadd0bfa8867c04d195391
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Oct 11 03:48:04 2018 +0000
+
+ upstream: don't send new-style rsa-sha2-*-cert-v01@openssh.com names to
+
+ older OpenSSH that can't handle them. spotted by Adam Eijdenberg; ok dtucker
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 662bbc402e3d7c9b6c322806269698106a6ae631
+
+commit dc8ddcdf1a95e011c263486c25869bb5bf4e30ec
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Thu Oct 11 13:08:59 2018 +1100
+
+ update depends
+
+commit 26841ac265603fd2253e6832e03602823dbb4022
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Thu Oct 11 13:02:11 2018 +1100
+
+ some more duplicated key algorithm lines
+
+ From Adam Eijdenberg
+
+commit 5d9d17603bfbb620195a4581025052832b4c4adc
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Thu Oct 11 11:56:36 2018 +1100
+
+ fix duplicated algorithm specification lines
+
+ Spotted by Adam Eijdenberg
+
+commit ebfafd9c7a5b2a7fb515ee95dbe0e44e11d0a663
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Oct 11 00:52:46 2018 +0000
+
+ upstream: typo in plain RSA algorithm counterpart names for
+
+ certificates; spotted by Adam Eijdenberg; ok dtucker@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: bfcdeb6f4fc9e7607f5096574c8f118f2e709e00
+
+commit c29b111e7d87c2324ff71c80653dd8da168c13b9
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Thu Oct 11 11:29:35 2018 +1100
+
+ check pw_passwd != NULL here too
+
+ Again, for systems with broken NIS implementations.
+
+ Prompted by coolbugcheckers AT gmail.com
+
+commit fe8e8f349a553ef4c567acd418aac769a82b7729
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Thu Oct 11 11:03:15 2018 +1100
+
+ check for NULL return from shadow_pw()
+
+ probably unreachable on this platform; pointed out by
+ coolbugcheckers AT gmail.com
+
+commit acc59cbe7a1fb169e1c3caba65a39bd74d6e030d
+Author: deraadt@openbsd.org <deraadt@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Oct 10 16:43:49 2018 +0000
+
+ upstream: introducing openssh 7.9
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 42d526a9fe01a40dd299ac58014d3349adf40e25
+
+commit 12731158c75c8760a8bea06350eeb3e763fe1a07
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Thu Oct 11 10:29:29 2018 +1100
+
+ supply callback to PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey
+
+ OpenSSL 1.1.0i has changed the behaviour of their PEM APIs,
+ so that empty passphrases are interpreted differently. This
+ probabalistically breaks loading some keys, because the PEM format
+ is terrible and doesn't include a proper MAC.
+
+ Avoid this by providing a basic callback to avoid passing empty
+ passphrases to OpenSSL in cases where one is required.
+
+ Based on patch from Jakub Jelen in bz#2913; ok dtucker@
+
+commit d1d301a1dd5d6cc3a9ed93ab7ab09dda4cb456e0
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Wed Oct 10 14:57:00 2018 +1100
+
+ in pick_salt() avoid dereference of NULL passwords
+
+ Apparently some NIS implementations can leave pw->pw_passwd (or the
+ shadow equivalent) NULL.
+
+ bz#2909; based on patch from Todd Eigenschink
+
+commit edbb6febccee084d212fdc0cb05b40cb1c646ab1
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Oct 9 05:42:23 2018 +0000
+
+ upstream: Treat all PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey() errors when a passphrase
+
+ is specified as "incorrect passphrase" instead of trying to choose between
+ that and "invalid format".
+
+ libcrypto can return ASN1 parsing errors rather than the expected
+ decrypt error in certain infrequent cases when trying to decrypt/parse
+ PEM private keys when supplied with an invalid passphrase.
+
+ Report and repro recipe from Thomas Deutschmann in bz#2901
+
+ ok markus@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b1d4cd92395f9743f81c0d23aab2524109580870
+
+commit 2581333d564d8697837729b3d07d45738eaf5a54
+Author: naddy@openbsd.org <naddy@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Oct 5 14:26:09 2018 +0000
+
+ upstream: Support using service names for port numbers.
+
+ * Try to resolve a port specification with getservbyname(3) if a
+ numeric conversion fails.
+ * Make the "Port" option in ssh_config handle its argument as a
+ port rather than a plain integer.
+
+ ok dtucker@ deraadt@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e7f03633133205ab3dfbc67f9df7475fabae660d
+
+commit e0d6501e86734c48c8c503f81e1c0926e98c5c4c
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Oct 4 07:47:35 2018 +0000
+
+ upstream: when the peer sends a channel-close message, make sure we
+
+ close the local extended read fd (stderr) along with the regular read fd
+ (stdout). Avoids weird stuck processed in multiplexing mode.
+
+ Report and analysis by Nelson Elhage and Geoffrey Thomas in bz#2863
+
+ ok dtucker@ markus@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a48a2467fe938de4de69d2e7193d5fa701f12ae9
+
+commit 6f1aabb128246f445e33b8844fad3de9cb1d18cb
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Oct 4 01:04:52 2018 +0000
+
+ upstream: factor out channel status formatting from
+
+ channel_open_message() so we can use it in other debug messages
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9c3903ca28fcabad57f566c9d0045b41ab7d52ba
+
+commit f1dd179e122bdfdb7ca3072d9603607740efda05
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Oct 4 00:10:11 2018 +0000
+
+ upstream: include a little more information about the status and
+
+ disposition of channel's extended (stderr) fd; makes debugging some things a
+ bit easier. No behaviour change.
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 483eb6467dc7d5dbca8eb109c453e7a43075f7ce
+
+commit 2d1428b11c8b6f616f070f2ecedce12328526944
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Oct 4 00:04:41 2018 +0000
+
+ upstream: explicit_bzero here to be consistent with other kex*.c;
+
+ report from coolbugcheckers AT gmail.com
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a90f146c5b5f5b1408700395e394f70b440856cb
+
+commit 5eff5b858e717e901e6af6596306a114de9f79f2
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Oct 3 06:38:35 2018 +0000
+
+ upstream: Allow ssh_config IdentityAgent directive to accept
+
+ environment variable names as well as explicit paths. ok dtucker@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2f0996e103876c53d8c9dd51dcce9889d700767b
+
+commit a46ac4d86b25414d78b632e8173578b37e5f8a83
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Oct 2 12:51:58 2018 +0000
+
+ upstream: mention INFO@openssh.com for sending SIGINFO
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 132471eeb0df658210afd27852fe65131b26e900
+
+commit ff3a411cae0b484274b7900ef52ff4dad3e12876
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Tue Oct 2 22:49:40 2018 +1000
+
+ only support SIGINFO on systems with SIGINFO
+
+commit cd98925c6405e972dc9f211afc7e75e838abe81c
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Oct 2 12:40:07 2018 +0000
+
+ upstream: Add server support for signalling sessions via the SSH
+
+ channel/ session protocol. Signalling is only supported to sesssions that are
+ not subsystems and were not started with a forced command.
+
+ Long requested in bz#1424
+
+ Based on a patch from markus@ and reworked by dtucker@;
+ ok markus@ dtucker@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4bea826f575862eaac569c4bedd1056a268be1c3
+
+commit dba50258333f2604a87848762af07ba2cc40407a
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Sep 26 07:32:44 2018 +0000
+
+ upstream: remove big ugly TODO comment from start of file. Some of
+
+ the mentioned tasks are obsolete and, of the remainder, most are already
+ captured in PROTOCOL.mux where they better belong
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 16d9d76dee42a5bb651c9d6740f7f0ef68aeb407
+
+commit 92b61a38ee9b765f5049f03cd1143e13f3878905
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Sep 26 07:30:05 2018 +0000
+
+ upstream: Document mux proxy mode; added by Markus in openssh-7.4
+
+ Also add a little bit of information about the overall packet format
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: bdb6f6ea8580ef96792e270cae7857786ad84a95
+
+commit 9d883a1ce4f89b175fd77405ff32674620703fb2
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Sep 26 01:48:57 2018 +0000
+
+ upstream: s/process_mux_master/mux_master_process/ in mux master
+
+ function names,
+
+ Gives better symmetry with the existing mux_client_*() names and makes
+ it more obvious when a message comes from the master vs client (they
+ are interleved in ControlMaster=auto mode).
+
+ no functional change beyond prefixing a could of log messages with
+ __func__ where they were previously lacking.
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b01f7c3fdf92692e1713a822a89dc499333daf75
+
+commit c2fa53cd6462da82d3a851dc3a4a3f6b920337c8
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Sat Sep 22 14:41:24 2018 +1000
+
+ Remove unused variable in _ssh_compat_fflush.
+
+commit d1b3540c21212624af907488960d703c7d987b42
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Thu Sep 20 18:08:43 2018 +1000
+
+ Import updated moduli.
+
+commit b5e412a8993ad17b9e1141c78408df15d3d987e1
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Sep 21 12:46:22 2018 +0000
+
+ upstream: Allow ssh_config ForwardX11Timeout=0 to disable the
+
+ timeout and allow X11 connections in untrusted mode indefinitely. ok dtucker@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ea1ceed3f540b48e5803f933e59a03b20db10c69
+
+commit cb24d9fcc901429d77211f274031653476864ec6
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Sep 21 12:23:17 2018 +0000
+
+ upstream: when compiled with GSSAPI support, cache supported method
+
+ OIDs by calling ssh_gssapi_prepare_supported_oids() regardless of whether
+ GSSAPI authentication is enabled in the main config.
+
+ This avoids sandbox violations for configurations that enable GSSAPI
+ auth later, e.g.
+
+ Match user djm
+ GSSAPIAuthentication yes
+
+ bz#2107; ok dtucker@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a5dd42d87c74e27cfb712b15b0f97ab20e0afd1d
+
+commit bbc8af72ba68da014d4de6e21a85eb5123384226
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Sep 21 12:20:12 2018 +0000
+
+ upstream: In sshkey_in_file(), ignore keys that are considered for
+
+ being too short (i.e. SSH_ERR_KEY_LENGTH). These keys will not be considered
+ to be "in the file". This allows key revocation lists to contain short keys
+ without the entire revocation list being considered invalid.
+
+ bz#2897; ok dtucker
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d9f3d857d07194a42ad7e62889a74dc3f9d9924b
+
+commit 383a33d160cefbfd1b40fef81f72eadbf9303a66
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Sep 21 03:11:36 2018 +0000
+
+ upstream: Treat connections with ProxyJump specified the same as ones
+
+ with a ProxyCommand set with regards to hostname canonicalisation (i.e. don't
+ try to canonicalise the hostname unless CanonicalizeHostname is set to
+ 'always').
+
+ Patch from Sven Wegener via bz#2896
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 527ff501cf98bf65fb4b29ed0cb847dda10f4d37
+
+commit 0cbed248ed81584129b67c348dbb801660f25a6a
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Sep 20 23:40:16 2018 +0000
+
+ upstream: actually make CASignatureAlgorithms available as a config
+
+ option
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 93fa7ff58314ed7b1ab7744090a6a91232e6ae52
+
+commit 62528870c0ec48cd86a37dd7320fb85886c3e6ee
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Sep 20 08:07:03 2018 +0000
+
+ upstream: Import updated moduli.
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 04431e8e7872f49a2129bf080a6b73c19d576d40
+
+commit e6933a2ffa0659d57f3c7b7c457b2c62b2a84613
+Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Sep 20 06:58:48 2018 +0000
+
+ upstream: reorder CASignatureAlgorithms, and add them to the
+
+ various -o lists; ok djm
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ecb88baecc3c54988b4d1654446ea033da359288
+
+commit aa083aa9624ea7b764d5a81c4c676719a1a3e42b
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Sep 20 03:31:49 2018 +0000
+
+ upstream: fix "ssh -Q sig" to show correct signature algorithm list
+
+ (it was erroneously showing certificate algorithms); prompted by markus@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1cdee002f2f0c21456979deeb887fc889afb154d
+
+commit ecac7e1f7add6b28874959a11f2238d149dc2c07
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Sep 20 03:30:44 2018 +0000
+
+ upstream: add CASignatureAlgorithms option for the client, allowing
+
+ it to specify which signature algorithms may be used by CAs when signing
+ certificates. Useful if you want to ban RSA/SHA1; ok markus@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9159e5e9f67504829bf53ff222057307a6e3230f
+
+commit 86e5737c39153af134158f24d0cab5827cbd5852
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Sep 20 03:28:06 2018 +0000
+
+ upstream: Add sshd_config CASignatureAlgorithms option to allow
+
+ control over which signature algorithms a CA may use when signing
+ certificates. In particular, this allows a sshd to ban certificates signed
+ with RSA/SHA1.
+
+ ok markus@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b05c86ef8b52b913ed48d54a9b9c1a7714d96bac
+
+commit f80e68ea7d62e2dfafc12f1a60ab544ae4033a0f
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Sep 19 02:03:02 2018 +0000
+
+ upstream: Make "ssh-add -q" do what it says on the tin: silence
+
+ output from successful operations.
+
+ Based on patch from Thijs van Dijk; ok dtucker@ deraadt@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c4f754ecc055c10af166116ce7515104aa8522e1
+
+commit 5e532320e9e51de720d5f3cc2596e95d29f6e98f
+Author: millert@openbsd.org <millert@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Sep 17 15:40:14 2018 +0000
+
+ upstream: When choosing a prime from the moduli file, avoid
+
+ re-using the linenum variable for something that is not a line number to
+ avoid the confusion that resulted in the bug in rev. 1.64. This also lets us
+ pass the actual linenum to parse_prime() so the error messages include the
+ correct line number. OK markus@ some time ago.
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4d8e5d3e924d6e8eb70053e3defa23c151a00084
+
+commit cce8cbe0ed7d1ba3a575310e0b63c193326ae616
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Sat Sep 15 19:44:06 2018 +1000
+
+ Fix openssl-1.1 fallout for --without-openssl.
+
+ ok djm@
+
+commit 149519b9f201dac755f3cba4789f4d76fecf0ee1
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Sat Sep 15 19:37:48 2018 +1000
+
+ add futex(2) syscall to seccomp sandbox
+
+ Apparently needed for some glibc/openssl combinations.
+
+ Patch from Arkadiusz Miśkiewicz
+
+commit 4488ae1a6940af704c4dbf70f55bf2f756a16536
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Sat Sep 15 19:36:55 2018 +1000
+
+ really add source for authopt_fuzz this time
+
+commit 9201784b4a257c8345fbd740bcbdd70054885707
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Sat Sep 15 19:35:40 2018 +1000
+
+ remove accidentally checked-in authopt_fuzz binary
+
+commit beb9e522dc7717df08179f9e59f36b361bfa14ab
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Sep 14 05:26:27 2018 +0000
+
+ upstream: second try, deals properly with missing and private-only
+
+ Use consistent format in debug log for keys readied, offered and
+ received during public key authentication.
+
+ This makes it a little easier to see what is going on, as each message
+ now contains (where available) the key filename, its type and fingerprint,
+ and whether the key is hosted in an agent or a token.
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f1c6a8e9cfc4e108c359db77f24f9a40e1e25ea7
+
+commit 6bc5a24ac867bfdc3ed615589d69ac640f51674b
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Fri Sep 14 15:16:34 2018 +1000
+
+ fuzzer harness for authorized_keys option parsing
+
+commit 6c8b82fc6929b6a9a3f645151b6ec26c5507d9ef
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Sep 14 04:44:04 2018 +0000
+
+ upstream: revert following; deals badly with agent keys
+
+ revision 1.285
+ date: 2018/09/14 04:17:12; author: djm; state: Exp; lines: +47 -26; commitid: lflGFcNb2X2HebaK;
+ Use consistent format in debug log for keys readied, offered and
+ received during public key authentication.
+
+ This makes it a little easier to see what is going on, as each message
+ now contains the key filename, its type and fingerprint, and whether
+ the key is hosted in an agent or a token.
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e496bd004e452d4b051f33ed9ae6a54ab918f56d
+
+commit 6da046f9c3374ce7e269ded15d8ff8bc45017301
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Sep 14 04:17:44 2018 +0000
+
+ upstream: garbage-collect moribund ssh_new_private() API.
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7c05bf13b094093dfa01848a9306c82eb6e95f6c
+
+commit 1f24ac5fc05252ceb1c1d0e8cab6a283b883c780
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Sep 14 04:17:12 2018 +0000
+
+ upstream: Use consistent format in debug log for keys readied,
+
+ offered and received during public key authentication.
+
+ This makes it a little easier to see what is going on, as each message
+ now contains the key filename, its type and fingerprint, and whether
+ the key is hosted in an agent or a token.
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2a01d59285a8a7e01185bb0a43316084b4f06a1f
+
+commit 488c9325bb7233e975dbfbf89fa055edc3d3eddc
+Author: millert@openbsd.org <millert@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Sep 13 15:23:32 2018 +0000
+
+ upstream: Fix warnings caused by user_from_uid() and group_from_gid()
+
+ now returning const char *.
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b5fe571ea77cfa7b9035062829ab05eb87d7cc6f
+
+commit 0aa1f230846ebce698e52051a107f3127024a05a
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Fri Sep 14 10:31:47 2018 +1000
+
+ allow SIGUSR1 as synonym for SIGINFO
+
+ Lets users on those unfortunate operating systems that lack SIGINFO
+ still be able to obtain progress information from unit tests :)
+
+commit d64e78526596f098096113fcf148216798c327ff
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Thu Sep 13 19:05:48 2018 +1000
+
+ add compat header
+
+commit a3fd8074e2e2f06602e25618721f9556c731312c
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Sep 13 09:03:20 2018 +0000
+
+ upstream: missed a bit of openssl-1.0.x API in this unittest
+
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: a73a54d7f7381856a3f3a2d25947bee7a9a5dbc9
+
+commit 86e0a9f3d249d5580390daf58e015e68b01cef10
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Sep 13 05:06:51 2018 +0000
+
+ upstream: use only openssl-1.1.x API here too
+
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: ae877064597c349954b1b443769723563cecbc8f
+
+commit 48f54b9d12c1c79fba333bc86d455d8f4cda8cfc
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Thu Sep 13 12:13:50 2018 +1000
+
+ adapt -portable to OpenSSL 1.1x API
+
+ Polyfill missing API with replacement functions extracted from LibreSSL
+
+commit 86112951d63d48839f035b5795be62635a463f99
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Thu Sep 13 12:12:42 2018 +1000
+
+ forgot to stage these test files in commit d70d061
+
+commit 482d23bcacdd3664f21cc82a5135f66fc598275f
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Sep 13 02:08:33 2018 +0000
+
+ upstream: hold our collective noses and use the openssl-1.1.x API in
+
+ OpenSSH; feedback and ok tb@ jsing@ markus@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: cacbcac87ce5da0d3ca7ef1b38a6f7fb349e4417
+
+commit d70d061828730a56636ab6f1f24fe4a8ccefcfc1
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Sep 12 01:36:45 2018 +0000
+
+ upstream: Include certs with multiple RSA signature variants in
+
+ test data Ensure that cert->signature_key is populated correctly
+
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 56e68f70fe46cb3a193ca207385bdb301fd6603a
+
+commit f803b2682992cfededd40c91818b653b5d923ef5
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Sep 12 01:23:48 2018 +0000
+
+ upstream: test revocation by explicit hash and by fingerprint
+
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 079c18a9ab9663f4af419327c759fc1e2bc78fd8
+
+commit 2de78bc7da70e1338b32feeefcc6045cf49efcd4
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Sep 12 01:22:43 2018 +0000
+
+ upstream: s/sshkey_demote/sshkey_from_private/g
+
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 782bde7407d94a87aa8d1db7c23750e09d4443c4
+
+commit 41c115a5ea1cb79a6a3182773c58a23f760e8076
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Wed Sep 12 16:50:01 2018 +1000
+
+ delete the correct thing; kexfuzz binary
+
+commit f0fcd7e65087db8c2496f13ed39d772f8e38b088
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Sep 12 06:18:59 2018 +0000
+
+ upstream: fix edit mistake; spotted by jmc@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: dd724e1c52c9d6084f4cd260ec7e1b2b138261c6
+
+commit 4cc259bac699f4d2a5c52b92230f9e488c88a223
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Sep 12 01:34:02 2018 +0000
+
+ upstream: add SSH_ALLOWED_CA_SIGALGS - the default list of
+
+ signature algorithms that are allowed for CA signatures. Notably excludes
+ ssh-dsa.
+
+ ok markus@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1628e4181dc8ab71909378eafe5d06159a22deb4
+
+commit ba9e788315b1f6a350f910cb2a9e95b2ce584e89
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Sep 12 01:32:54 2018 +0000
+
+ upstream: add sshkey_check_cert_sigtype() that checks a
+
+ cert->signature_type against a supplied whitelist; ok markus
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: caadb8073292ed7a9535e5adc067d11d356d9302
+
+commit a70fd4ad7bd9f2ed223ff635a3d41e483057f23b
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Sep 12 01:31:30 2018 +0000
+
+ upstream: add cert->signature_type field and keep it in sync with
+
+ certificate signature wrt loading and certification operations; ok markus@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e8b8b9f76b66707a0cd926109c4383db8f664df3
+
+commit 357128ac48630a9970e3af0e6ff820300a28da47
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Sep 12 01:30:10 2018 +0000
+
+ upstream: Add "ssh -Q sig" to allow listing supported signature
+
+ algorithms ok markus@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7a8c6eb6c249dc37823ba5081fce64876d10fe2b
+
+commit 9405c6214f667be604a820c6823b27d0ea77937d
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Sep 12 01:21:34 2018 +0000
+
+ upstream: allow key revocation by SHA256 hash and allow ssh-keygen
+
+ to create KRLs using SHA256/base64 key fingerprints; ok markus@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a0590fd34e7f1141f2873ab3acc57442560e6a94
+
+commit 50e2687ee0941c0ea216d6ffea370ffd2c1f14b9
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Sep 12 01:19:12 2018 +0000
+
+ upstream: log certificate fingerprint in authentication
+
+ success/failure message (previously we logged only key ID and CA key
+ fingerprint).
+
+ ok markus@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a8ef2d172b7f1ddbcce26d6434b2de6d94f6c05d
+
+commit de37ca909487d23e5844aca289b3f5e75d3f1e1f
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Sep 7 04:26:56 2018 +0000
+
+ upstream: Add FALLTHROUGH comments where appropriate. Patch from
+
+ jjelen at redhat via bz#2687.
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c48eb457be697a19d6d2950c6d0879f3ccc851d3
+
+commit 247766cd3111d5d8c6ea39833a3257ca8fb820f2
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Sep 7 01:42:54 2018 +0000
+
+ upstream: ssh -MM requires confirmation for all operations that
+
+ change the multiplexing state, not just new sessions.
+
+ mention that confirmation is checked via ssh-askpass
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0f1b45551ebb9cc5c9a4fe54ad3b23ce90f1f5c2
+
+commit db8bb80e3ac1bcb3e1305d846cd98c6b869bf03f
+Author: mestre@openbsd.org <mestre@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Aug 28 12:25:53 2018 +0000
+
+ upstream: fix misplaced parenthesis inside if-clause. it's harmless
+
+ and the only issue is showing an unknown error (since it's not defined)
+ during fatal(), if it ever an error occurs inside that condition.
+
+ OK deraadt@ markus@ djm@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: acb0a8e6936bfbe590504752d01d1d251a7101d8
+
+commit 086cc614f550b7d4f100c95e472a6b6b823938ab
+Author: mestre@openbsd.org <mestre@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Aug 28 12:17:45 2018 +0000
+
+ upstream: fix build with DEBUG_PK enabled
+
+ OK dtucker@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ec1568cf27726e9638a0415481c20c406e7b441c
+
+commit 2678833013e97f8b18f09779b7f70bcbf5eb2ab2
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Fri Sep 7 14:41:53 2018 +1000
+
+ Handle ngroups>_SC_NGROUPS_MAX.
+
+ Based on github pull request #99 from Darren Maffat at Oracle: Solaris'
+ getgrouplist considers _SC_NGROUPS_MAX more of a guideline and can return
+ a larger number of groups. In this case, retry getgrouplist with a
+ larger array and defer allocating groups_byname. ok djm@
+
+commit 039bf2a81797b8f3af6058d34005a4896a363221
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Fri Sep 7 14:06:57 2018 +1000
+
+ Initial len for the fmt=NULL case.
+
+ Patch from jjelen at redhat via bz#2687. (OpenSSH never calls
+ setproctitle with a null format so len is always initialized).
+
+commit ea9c06e11d2e8fb2f4d5e02f8a41e23d2bd31ca9
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Fri Sep 7 14:01:39 2018 +1000
+
+ Include stdlib.h.
+
+ Patch from jjelen at redhat via bz#2687.
+
+commit 9617816dbe73ec4d65075f4d897443f63a97c87f
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Mon Aug 27 13:08:01 2018 +1000
+
+ document some more regress control env variables
+
+ Specifically SKIP_UNIT, USE_VALGRING and LTESTS. Sort the list of
+ environment variables.
+
+ Based on patch from Jakub Jelen
+
+commit 71508e06fab14bc415a79a08f5535ad7bffa93d9
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Thu Aug 23 15:41:42 2018 +1000
+
+ shorten temporary SSH_REGRESS_TMP path
+
+ Previous path was exceeding max socket length on at least one platform (OSX)
+
+commit 26739cf5bdc9030a583b41ae5261dedd862060f0
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Thu Aug 23 13:06:02 2018 +1000
+
+ rebuild dependencies
+
+commit ff729025c7463cf5d0a8d1ca1823306e48c6d4cf
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Thu Aug 23 13:03:32 2018 +1000
+
+ fix path in distclean target
+
+ Patch from Jakub Jelen
+
+commit 7fef173c28f7462dcd8ee017fdf12b5073f54c02
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Aug 23 03:01:08 2018 +0000
+
+ upstream: memleak introduced in r1.83; from Colin Watson
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 5c019104c280cbd549a264a7217b67665e5732dc
+
+commit b8ae02a2896778b8984c7f51566c7f0f56fa8b56
+Author: schwarze@openbsd.org <schwarze@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Aug 21 13:56:27 2018 +0000
+
+ upstream: AIX reports the CODESET as "ISO8859-1" in the POSIX locale.
+
+ Treating that as a safe encoding is OK because even when other systems return
+ that string for real ISO8859-1, it is still safe in the sense that it is
+ ASCII-compatible and stateless.
+
+ Issue reported by Val dot Baranov at duke dot edu. Additional
+ information provided by Michael dot Felt at felt dot demon dot nl.
+ Tested by Michael Felt on AIX 6.1 and by Val Baranov on AIX 7.1.
+ Tweak and OK djm@.
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 36f1210e0b229817d10eb490d6038f507b8256a7
+
+commit bc44ee088ad269d232e514f037c87ada4c2fd3f0
+Author: Tim Rice <tim@multitalents.net>
+Date: Tue Aug 21 08:57:24 2018 -0700
+
+ modified: openbsd-compat/port-uw.c
+ remove obsolete and un-needed include
+
+commit 829fc28a9c54e3f812ee7248c7a3e31eeb4f0b3a
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Mon Aug 20 15:57:29 2018 +1000
+
+ Missing unistd.h for regress/mkdtemp.c
+
+commit c8313e492355a368a91799131520d92743d8d16c
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Fri Aug 17 05:45:20 2018 +1000
+
+ update version numbers in anticipation of release
+
+commit 477b49a34b89f506f4794b35e3c70b3e2e83cd38
+Author: Corinna Vinschen <vinschen@redhat.com>
+Date: Mon Aug 13 17:08:51 2018 +0200
+
+ configure: work around GCC shortcoming on Cygwin
+
+ Cygwin's latest 7.x GCC allows to specify -mfunction-return=thunk
+ as well as -mindirect-branch=thunk on the command line, albeit
+ producing invalid code, leading to an error at link stage.
+
+ The check in configure.ac only checks if the option is present,
+ but not if it produces valid code.
+
+ This patch fixes it by special-casing Cygwin. Another solution
+ may be to change these to linker checks.
+
+ Signed-off-by: Corinna Vinschen <vinschen@redhat.com>
+
+commit b0917945efa374be7648d67dbbaaff323ab39edc
+Author: Corinna Vinschen <vinschen@redhat.com>
+Date: Mon Aug 13 17:05:05 2018 +0200
+
+ cygwin: add missing stdarg.h include
+
+ Further header file standarization in Cygwin uncovered a lazy
+ indirect include in bsd-cygwin_util.c
+
+ Signed-off-by: Corinna Vinschen <vinschen@redhat.com>
+
+commit c3903c38b0fd168ab3d925c2b129d1a599593426
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Aug 13 02:41:05 2018 +0000
+
+ upstream: revert compat.[ch] section of the following change. It
+
+ causes double-free under some circumstances.
+
+ --
+
+ date: 2018/07/31 03:07:24; author: djm; state: Exp; lines: +33 -18; commitid: f7g4UI8eeOXReTPh;
+ fix some memory leaks spotted by Coverity via Jakub Jelen in bz#2366
+ feedback and ok dtucker@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1e77547f60fdb5e2ffe23e2e4733c54d8d2d1137
+
+commit 1b9dd4aa15208100fbc3650f33ea052255578282
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sun Aug 12 20:19:13 2018 +0000
+
+ upstream: better diagnosics on alg list assembly errors; ok
+
+ deraadt@ markus@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 5a557e74b839daf13cc105924d2af06a1560faee
+
+commit e36a5f61b0f5bebf6d49c215d228cd99dfe86e28
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Sat Aug 11 18:08:45 2018 -0700
+
+ Some AIX fixes; report from Michael Felt
+
+commit 2f4766ceefe6657c5ad5fe92d13c411872acae0e
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Aug 10 01:35:49 2018 +0000
+
+ upstream: The script that cooks up PuTTY format host keys does not
+
+ understand the new key format so convert back to old format to create the
+ PuTTY key and remove it once done.
+
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 2a449a18846c3a144bc645135b551ba6177e38d3
+
+commit e1b26ce504662a5d5b991091228984ccfd25f280
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Aug 10 00:44:01 2018 +0000
+
+ upstream: improve
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 40d839db0977b4e7ac8b647b16d5411d4faf2f60
+
+commit 7c712966a3139622f7fb55045368d05de4e6782c
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Aug 10 00:42:29 2018 +0000
+
+ upstream: Describe pubkey format, prompted by bz#2853
+
+ While I'm here, describe and link to the remaining local PROTOCOL.*
+ docs that weren't already mentioned (PROTOCOL.key, PROTOCOL.krl and
+ PROTOCOL.mux)
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2a900f9b994ba4d53e7aeb467d44d75829fd1231
+
+commit ef100a2c5a8ed83afac0b8f36520815803da227a
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Aug 10 00:27:15 2018 +0000
+
+ upstream: fix numbering
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: bc7a1764dff23fa4c5ff0e3379c9c4d5b63c9596
+
+commit ed7bd5d93fe14c7bd90febd29b858ea985d14d45
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Aug 8 01:16:01 2018 +0000
+
+ upstream: Use new private key format by default. This format is
+
+ suported by OpenSSH >= 6.5 (released January 2014), so it should be supported
+ by most OpenSSH versions in active use.
+
+ It is possible to convert new-format private keys to the older
+ format using "ssh-keygen -f /path/key -pm PEM".
+
+ ok deraadt dtucker
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e3bd4f2509a2103bfa2f710733426af3ad6d8ab8
+
+commit 967226a1bdde59ea137e8f0df871854ff7b91366
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sat Aug 4 00:55:06 2018 +0000
+
+ upstream: invalidate dh->priv_key after freeing it in error path;
+
+ avoids unlikely double-free later. Reported by Viktor Dukhovni via
+ https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/pull/96 feedback jsing@ tb@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e317eb17c3e05500ae851f279ef6486f0457c805
+
+commit 74287f5df9966a0648b4a68417451dd18f079ab8
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Jul 31 03:10:27 2018 +0000
+
+ upstream: delay bailout for invalid authentic
+
+ =?UTF-8?q?ating=20user=20until=20after=20the=20packet=20containing=20the?=
+ =?UTF-8?q?=20request=20has=20been=20fully=20parsed.=20Reported=20by=20Dar?=
+ =?UTF-8?q?iusz=20Tytko=20and=20Micha=C5=82=20Sajdak;=20ok=20deraadt?=
+ MIME-Version: 1.0
+ Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+ Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b4891882fbe413f230fe8ac8a37349b03bd0b70d
+
+commit 1a66079c0669813306cc69e5776a4acd9fb49015
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Jul 31 03:07:24 2018 +0000
+
+ upstream: fix some memory leaks spotted by Coverity via Jakub Jelen
+
+ in bz#2366 feedback and ok dtucker@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8402bbae67d578bedbadb0ce68ff7c5a136ef563
+
+commit 87f08be054b7eeadbb9cdeb3fb4872be79ccf218
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Fri Jul 20 13:18:28 2018 +1000
+
+ Remove support for S/Key
+
+ Most people will 1) be using modern multi-factor authentication methods
+ like TOTP/OATH etc and 2) be getting support for multi-factor
+ authentication via PAM or BSD Auth.
+
+commit 5d14019ba2ff54acbfd20a6b9b96bb860a8c7c31
+Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Jul 27 12:03:17 2018 +0000
+
+ upstream: avoid expensive channel_open_message() calls; ok djm@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: aea3b5512ad681cd8710367d743e8a753d4425d9
+
+commit e655ee04a3cb7999dbf9641b25192353e2b69418
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Jul 27 05:34:42 2018 +0000
+
+ upstream: Now that ssh can't be setuid, remove the
+
+ original_real_uid and original_effective_uid globals and replace with calls
+ to plain getuid(). ok djm@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 92561c0cd418d34e6841e20ba09160583e27b68c
+
+commit 73ddb25bae4c33a0db361ac13f2e3a60d7c6c4a5
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Jul 27 05:13:02 2018 +0000
+
+ upstream: Remove uid checks from low port binds. Now that ssh
+
+ cannot be setuid and sshd always has privsep on, we can remove the uid checks
+ for low port binds and just let the system do the check. We leave a sanity
+ check for the !privsep case so long as the code is stil there. with & ok
+ djm@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9535cfdbd1cd54486fdbedfaee44ce4367ec7ca0
+
+commit c12033e102760d043bc5c98e6c8180e4d331b0df
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Jul 27 03:55:22 2018 +0000
+
+ upstream: ssh(1) no longer supports being setuid root. Remove reference
+
+ to crc32 which went with protocol 1. Pointed out by deraadt@.
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f8763c25fd96ed91dd1abdab5667fd2e27e377b6
+
+commit 4492e2ec4e1956a277ef507f51d66e5c2aafaaf8
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Fri Jul 27 14:15:28 2018 +1000
+
+ correct snprintf truncation check in closefrom()
+
+ Truncation cannot happen unless the system has set PATH_MAX to some
+ nonsensically low value.
+
+ bz#2862, patch from Daniel Le
+
+commit 149cab325a8599a003364ed833f878449c15f259
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Fri Jul 27 13:46:06 2018 +1000
+
+ Include stdarg.h in mkdtemp for va_list.
+
+commit 6728f31bdfdc864d192773c32465b1860e23f556
+Author: deraadt@openbsd.org <deraadt@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Jul 25 17:12:35 2018 +0000
+
+ upstream: Don't redefine Makefile choices which come correct from
+
+ bsd.*.mk ok markus
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 814b2f670df75759e1581ecef530980b2b3d7e0f
+
+commit 21fd477a855753c1a8e450963669e28e39c3b5d2
+Author: deraadt@openbsd.org <deraadt@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Jul 25 13:56:23 2018 +0000
+
+ upstream: fix indent; Clemens Goessnitzer
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b5149a6d92b264d35f879d24608087b254857a83
+
+commit 8e433c2083db8664c41499ee146448ea7ebe7dbf
+Author: beck@openbsd.org <beck@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Jul 25 13:10:56 2018 +0000
+
+ upstream: Use the caller provided (copied) pwent struct in
+
+ load_public_identity_files instead of calling getpwuid() again and discarding
+ the argument. This prevents a client crash where tilde_expand_filename calls
+ getpwuid() again before the pwent pointer is used. Issue noticed and reported
+ by Pierre-Olivier Martel <pom@apple.com> ok djm@ deraadt@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a067d74b5b098763736c94cc1368de8ea3f0b157
+
+commit e2127abb105ae72b6fda64fff150e6b24b3f1317
+Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Jul 23 19:53:55 2018 +0000
+
+ upstream: oops, failed to notice that SEE ALSO got messed up;
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 61c1306542cefdc6e59ac331751afe961557427d
+
+commit ddf1b797c2d26bbbc9d410aa4f484cbe94673587
+Author: kn@openbsd.org <kn@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Jul 23 19:02:49 2018 +0000
+
+ upstream: Point to glob in section 7 for the actual list of special
+
+ characters instead the C API in section 3.
+
+ OK millert jmc nicm, "the right idea" deraadt
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a74fd215488c382809e4d041613aeba4a4b1ffc6
+
+commit 01c98d9661d0ed6156e8602b650f72eed9fc4d12
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sun Jul 22 12:16:59 2018 +0000
+
+ upstream: Switch authorized_keys example from ssh-dss to ssh-rsa
+
+ since the former is no longer enabled by default. Pointed out by Daniel A.
+ Maierhofer, ok jmc
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 6a196cef53d7524e0c9b58cdbc1b5609debaf8c7
+
+commit 472269f8fe19343971c2d08f504ab5cbb8234b33
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Jul 20 05:01:10 2018 +0000
+
+ upstream: slightly-clearer description for AuthenticationMethods - the
+
+ lists have comma-separated elements; bz#2663 from Hans Meier
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 931c983d0fde4764d0942fb2c2b5017635993b5a
+
+commit c59aca8adbdf7f5597084ad360a19bedb3f80970
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Fri Jul 20 14:53:42 2018 +1000
+
+ Create control sockets in clean temp directories
+
+ Adds a regress/mkdtemp tool and uses it to create empty temp
+ directories for tests needing control sockets.
+
+ Patch from Colin Watson via bz#2660; ok dtucker
+
+commit 6ad8648e83e4f4ace37b742a05c2a6b6b872514e
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Jul 20 03:46:34 2018 +0000
+
+ upstream: remove unused zlib.h
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8d274a9b467c7958df12668b49144056819f79f1
+
+commit 3ba6e6883527fe517b6e4a824876e2fe62af22fc
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Jul 19 23:03:16 2018 +0000
+
+ upstream: Fix typo in comment. From Alexandru Iacob via github.
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: eff4ec07c6c8c5483533da43a4dda37d72ef7f1d
+
+commit c77bc73c91bc656e343a1961756e09dd1b170820
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Fri Jul 20 13:48:51 2018 +1000
+
+ Explicitly include openssl before zlib.
+
+ Some versions of OpenSSL have "free_func" in their headers, which zlib
+ typedefs. Including openssl after zlib (eg via sshkey.h) results in
+ "syntax error before `free_func'", which this fixes.
+
+commit 95d41e90eafcd1286a901e8e361e4a37b98aeb52
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Jul 19 10:28:47 2018 +0000
+
+ upstream: Deprecate UsePrivilegedPort now that support for running
+
+ ssh(1) setuid has been removed, remove supporting code and clean up
+ references to it in the man pages
+
+ We have not shipped ssh(1) the setuid bit since 2002. If ayone
+ really needs to make connections from a low port number this can
+ be implemented via a small setuid ProxyCommand.
+
+ ok markus@ jmc@ djm@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d03364610b7123ae4c6792f5274bd147b6de717e
+
+commit 258dc8bb07dfb35a46e52b0822a2c5b7027df60a
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Jul 18 11:34:04 2018 +0000
+
+ upstream: Remove support for running ssh(1) setuid and fatal if
+
+ attempted. Do not link uidwap.c into ssh any more. Neuters
+ UsePrivilegedPort, which will be marked as deprecated shortly. ok markus@
+ djm@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c4ba5bf9c096f57a6ed15b713a1d7e9e2e373c42
+
+commit ac590760b251506b0a152551abbf8e8d6dc2f527
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Jul 16 22:25:01 2018 +0000
+
+ upstream: Slot 0 in the hostbased key array was previously RSA1,
+
+ but that is now gone and the slot is unused so remove it. Remove two
+ now-unused macros, and add an array bounds check to the two remaining ones
+ (array is statically sized, so mostly a safety check on future changes). ok
+ markus@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2e4c0ca6cc1d8daeccead2aa56192a3f9d5e1e7a
+
+commit 26efc2f5df0e3bcf6a6bbdd0506fd682d60c2145
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Jul 16 11:05:41 2018 +0000
+
+ upstream: Remove support for loading HostBasedAuthentication keys
+
+ directly in ssh(1) and always use ssh-keysign. This removes one of the few
+ remaining reasons why ssh(1) might be setuid. ok markus@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 97f01e1448707129a20d75f86bad5d27c3cf0b7d
+
+commit 3eb7f1038d17af7aea3c2c62d1e30cd545607640
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Jul 16 07:06:50 2018 +0000
+
+ upstream: keep options.identity_file_userprovided array in sync when we
+
+ load keys, fixing some spurious error messages; ok markus
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c63e3d5200ee2cf9e35bda98de847302566c6a00
+
+commit 2f131e1b34502aa19f345e89cabf6fa3fc097f09
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Jul 16 03:09:59 2018 +0000
+
+ upstream: memleak in unittest; found by valgrind
+
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 168c23b0fb09fc3d0b438628990d3fd9260a8a5e
+
+commit de2997a4cf22ca0a524f0e5b451693c583e2fd89
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Jul 16 03:09:13 2018 +0000
+
+ upstream: memleaks; found by valgrind
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 6c3ba22be53e753c899545f771e8399fc93cd844
+
+commit 61cc0003eb37fa07603c969c12b7c795caa498f3
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Sat Jul 14 16:49:01 2018 +1000
+
+ Undef a few new macros in sys-queue.h.
+
+ Prevents macro redefinition warnings on OSX.
+
+commit 30a2c213877a54a44dfdffb6ca8db70be5b457e0
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Fri Jul 13 13:40:20 2018 +1000
+
+ Include unistd.h for geteuid declaration.
+
+commit 1dd32c23f2a85714dfafe2a9cc516971d187caa4
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Fri Jul 13 13:38:10 2018 +1000
+
+ Fallout from buffer conversion in AUDIT_EVENTS.
+
+ Supply missing "int r" and fix error path for sshbuf_new().
+
+commit 7449c178e943e5c4f6c8416a4e41d93b70c11c9e
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Jul 13 02:13:50 2018 +0000
+
+ upstream: make this use ssh_proxy rather than starting/stopping a
+
+ daemon for each testcase
+
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 608b7655ea65b1ba8fff5a13ce9caa60ef0c8166
+
+commit dbab02f9208d9baa134cec1d007054ec82b96ca9
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Jul 13 02:13:19 2018 +0000
+
+ upstream: fix leaks in unit test; with this, all unit tests are
+
+ leak free (as far as valgrind can spot anyway)
+
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: b824d8b27998365379963440e5d18b95ca03aa17
+
+commit 2f6accff5085eb79b0dbe262d8b85ed017d1a51c
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Fri Jul 13 11:39:25 2018 +1000
+
+ Enable leak checks for unit tests with valgrind
+
+ Leave the leak checking on unconditionally when running with valgrind.
+ The unit tests are leak-free and I want them to stay that way.
+
+commit e46cfbd9db5e907b821bf4fd0184d4dab99815ee
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Fri Jul 13 11:38:59 2018 +1000
+
+ increase timeout to match cfgmatch.sh
+
+ lets test pass under valgrind (on my workstation at least)
+
+commit 6aa1bf475cf3e7a2149acc5a1e80e904749f064c
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Thu Jul 12 14:54:18 2018 +1000
+
+ rm regress/misc/kexfuzz/*.o in distclean target
+
+commit eef1447ddb559c03725a23d4aa6d03f40e8b0049
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Thu Jul 12 14:49:26 2018 +1000
+
+ repair !WITH_OPENSSL build
+
+commit 4d3b2f36fd831941d1627ac587faae37b6d3570f
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Thu Jul 12 14:49:14 2018 +1000
+
+ missing headers
+
+commit 3f420a692b293921216549c1099c2e46ff284eae
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Thu Jul 12 14:57:46 2018 +1000
+
+ Remove key.h from portable files too.
+
+ Commit 5467fbcb removed key.h so stop including it in portable files
+ too. Fixes builds on lots of platforms.
+
+commit e2c4af311543093f16005c10044f7e06af0426f0
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Jul 12 04:35:25 2018 +0000
+
+ upstream: remove prototype to long-gone function
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0414642ac7ce01d176b9f359091a66a8bbb640bd
+
+commit 394a842e60674bf8ee5130b9f15b01452a0b0285
+Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Jul 11 18:55:11 2018 +0000
+
+ upstream: treat ssh_packet_write_wait() errors as fatal; ok djm@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f88ba43c9d54ed2d911218aa8d3f6285430629c3
+
+commit 5467fbcb09528ecdcb914f4f2452216c24796790
+Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Jul 11 18:53:29 2018 +0000
+
+ upstream: remove legacy key emulation layer; ok djm@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2b1f9619259e222bbd4fe9a8d3a0973eafb9dd8d
+
+commit 5dc4c59d5441a19c99e7945779f7ec9051126c25
+Author: martijn@openbsd.org <martijn@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Jul 11 08:19:35 2018 +0000
+
+ upstream: s/wuth/with/ in comment
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9de41468afd75f54a7f47809d2ad664aa577902c
+
+commit 1c688801e9dd7f9889fb2a29bc2b6fbfbc35a11f
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Wed Jul 11 12:12:38 2018 +1000
+
+ Include stdlib.h for declaration of free.
+
+ Fixes build with -Werror on at least Fedora and probably others.
+
+commit fccfa239def497615f92ed28acc57cfe63da3666
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Wed Jul 11 10:19:56 2018 +1000
+
+ VALGRIND_CHECK_LEAKS logic was backwards :(
+
+commit 416287d45fcde0a8e66eee8b99aa73bd58607588
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Wed Jul 11 10:10:26 2018 +1000
+
+ Fix sshbuf_new error path in skey.
+
+commit 7aab109b8b90a353c1af780524f1ac0d3af47bab
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Wed Jul 11 10:06:18 2018 +1000
+
+ Supply missing third arg in skey.
+
+ During the change to the new buffer api the third arg to
+ sshbuf_get_cstring was ommitted. Fixes build when configured with skey.
+
+commit 380320bb72cc353a901790ab04b6287fd335dc4a
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Wed Jul 11 10:03:34 2018 +1000
+
+ Supply some more missing "int r" in skey
+
+commit d20720d373d8563ee737d1a45dc5e0804d622dbc
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Wed Jul 11 09:56:36 2018 +1000
+
+ disable valgrind memleak checking by default
+
+ Add VALGRIND_CHECK_LEAKS knob to turn it back on.
+
+commit 79c9d35018f3a5e30ae437880b669aa8636cd3cd
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Wed Jul 11 09:54:00 2018 +1000
+
+ Supply missing "int r" in skey code.
+
+commit 984bacfaacbbe31c35191b828fb5b5b2f0362c36
+Author: sf@openbsd.org <sf@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Jul 10 09:36:58 2018 +0000
+
+ upstream: re-remove some pre-auth compression bits
+
+ This time, make sure to not remove things that are necessary for
+ pre-auth compression on the client. Add a comment that pre-auth
+ compression is still supported in the client.
+
+ ok markus@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 282c6fec7201f18a5c333bbb68d9339734d2f784
+
+commit 120a1ec74e8d9d29f4eb9a27972ddd22351ddef9
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Tue Jul 10 19:39:52 2018 +1000
+
+ Adapt portable to legacy buffer API removal
+
+commit 0f3958c1e6ffb8ea4ba27e2a97a00326fce23246
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Jul 10 09:13:30 2018 +0000
+
+ upstream: kerberos/gssapi fixes for buffer removal
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1cdf56fec95801e4563c47f21696f04cd8b60c4c
+
+commit c74ae8e7c45f325f3387abd48fa7dfef07a08069
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Jul 10 06:45:29 2018 +0000
+
+ upstream: buffer.[ch] and bufaux.c are no more
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d1a1852284e554f39525eb4d4891b207cfb3d3a0
+
+commit a881e5a133d661eca923fb0633a03152ab2b70b2
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Jul 10 06:43:52 2018 +0000
+
+ upstream: one mention of Buffer that almost got away :)
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 30d7c27a90b4544ad5dfacf654595710cd499f02
+
+commit 49f47e656b60bcd1d1db98d88105295f4b4e600d
+Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Jul 9 21:59:10 2018 +0000
+
+ upstream: replace cast with call to sshbuf_mutable_ptr(); ok djm@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4dfe9d29fa93d9231645c89084f7217304f7ba29
+
+commit cb30cd47041edb03476be1c8ef7bc1f4b69d1555
+Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Jul 9 21:56:06 2018 +0000
+
+ upstream: remove legacy buffer API emulation layer; ok djm@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2dd5dc17cbc23195be4299fa93be2707a0e08ad9
+
+commit 235c7c4e3bf046982c2d8242f30aacffa01073d1
+Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Jul 9 21:53:45 2018 +0000
+
+ upstream: sshd: switch monitor to sshbuf API; lots of help & ok
+
+ djm@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d89bd02d33974fd35ca0b8940d88572227b34a48
+
+commit b8d9214d969775e409e1408ecdf0d58fad99b344
+Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Jul 9 21:37:55 2018 +0000
+
+ upstream: sshd: switch GSSAPI to sshbuf API; ok djm@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e48449ab4be3f006f7ba33c66241b7d652973e30
+
+commit c7d39ac8dc3587c5f05bdd5bcd098eb5c201c0c8
+Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Jul 9 21:35:50 2018 +0000
+
+ upstream: sshd: switch authentication to sshbuf API; ok djm@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 880aa06bce4b140781e836bb56bec34873290641
+
+commit c3cb7790e9efb14ba74b2d9f543ad593b3d55b31
+Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Jul 9 21:29:36 2018 +0000
-commit 1b11ea7c58cd5c59838b5fa574cd456d6047b2d4
+ upstream: sshd: switch config to sshbuf API; ok djm@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 72b02017bac7feac48c9dceff8355056bea300bd
+
+commit 2808d18ca47ad3d251836c555f0e22aaca03d15c
Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Feb 23 15:58:37 2018 +0000
+Date: Mon Jul 9 21:26:02 2018 +0000
- upstream: Add experimental support for PQC XMSS keys (Extended
+ upstream: sshd: switch loginmsg to sshbuf API; ok djm@
- Hash-Based Signatures) The code is not compiled in by default (see WITH_XMSS
- in Makefile.inc) Joint work with stefan-lukas_gazdag at genua.eu See
- https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-irtf-cfrg-xmss-hash-based-signatures-12 ok
- djm@
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f3cb4e54bff15c593602d95cc43e32ee1a4bac42
+
+commit 89dd615b8b531979be63f05f9d5624367c9b28e6
+Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Jul 9 21:20:26 2018 +0000
+
+ upstream: ttymodes: switch to sshbuf API; ok djm@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ef3eccb96762a5d6f135d7daeef608df7776a7ac
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 5df340c5965e822c9da21e19579d08dea3cbe429
-commit 7d330a1ac02076de98cfc8fda05353d57b603755
-Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Feb 23 07:38:09 2018 +0000
+commit f4608a7065480516ab46214f554e5f853fb7870f
+Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Jul 9 21:18:10 2018 +0000
+
+ upstream: client: switch mux to sshbuf API; with & ok djm@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 5948fb98d704f9c4e075b92edda64e0290b5feb2
+
+commit cecee2d607099a7bba0a84803e2325d15be4277b
+Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Jul 9 21:03:30 2018 +0000
+
+ upstream: client: switch to sshbuf API; ok djm@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 60cb0356114acc7625ab85105f6f6a7cd44a8d05
+
+commit ff55f4ad898137d4703e7a2bcc81167dfe8e9324
+Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Jul 9 20:39:28 2018 +0000
+
+ upstream: pkcs11: switch to sshbuf API; ok djm@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 98cc4e800f1617c51caf59a6cb3006f14492db79
+
+commit 168b46f405d6736960ba7930389eecb9b6710b7e
+Author: sf@openbsd.org <sf@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Jul 9 13:37:10 2018 +0000
+
+ upstream: Revert previous two commits
+
+ It turns out we still support pre-auth compression on the client.
+ Therefore revert the previous two commits:
+
+ date: 2018/07/06 09:06:14; author: sf; commitid: yZVYKIRtUZWD9CmE;
+ Rename COMP_DELAYED to COMP_ZLIB
+
+ Only delayed compression is supported nowadays.
+
+ ok markus@
+
+ date: 2018/07/06 09:05:01; author: sf; commitid: rEGuT5UgI9f6kddP;
+ Remove leftovers from pre-authentication compression
+
+ Support for this has been removed in 2016.
+ COMP_DELAYED will be renamed in a later commit.
+
+ ok markus@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: cdfef526357e4e1483c86cf599491b2dafb77772
+
+commit ab39267fa1243d02b6c330615539fc4b21e17dc4
+Author: sf@openbsd.org <sf@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Jul 6 09:06:14 2018 +0000
+
+ upstream: Rename COMP_DELAYED to COMP_ZLIB
+
+ Only delayed compression is supported nowadays.
+
+ ok markus@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 5b1dbaf3d9a4085aaa10fec0b7a4364396561821
+
+commit 95db395d2e56a6f868193aead6cadb2493f036c6
+Author: sf@openbsd.org <sf@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Jul 6 09:05:01 2018 +0000
+
+ upstream: Remove leftovers from pre-authentication compression
+
+ Support for this has been removed in 2016.
+ COMP_DELAYED will be renamed in a later commit.
+
+ ok markus@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 6a99616c832627157113fcb0cf5a752daf2e6b58
+
+commit f28a4d5cd24c4aa177e96b4f96957991e552cb70
+Author: sf@openbsd.org <sf@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Jul 6 09:03:02 2018 +0000
+
+ upstream: Remove unused ssh_packet_start_compression()
+
+ ok markus@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9d34cf2f59aca5422021ae2857190578187dc2b4
+
+commit 872517ddbb72deaff31d4760f28f2b0a1c16358f
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Fri Jul 6 13:32:02 2018 +1000
+
+ Defer setting bufsiz in getdelim.
+
+ Do not write to bufsiz until we are sure the malloc has succeeded,
+ in case any callers rely on it (which they shouldn't). ok djm@
+
+commit 3deb56f7190a414dc264e21e087a934fa1847283
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Thu Jul 5 13:32:01 2018 +1000
+
+ Fix other callers of read_environment_file.
+
+ read_environment_file recently gained an extra argument Some platform
+ specific code also calls it so add the argument to those too. Fixes
+ build on Solaris and AIX.
+
+commit 314908f451e6b2d4ccf6212ad246fa4619c721d3
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Jul 4 13:51:45 2018 +0000
+
+ upstream: deal with API rename: match_filter_list() =>
+
+ match_filter_blacklist()
+
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 2da342be913efeb51806351af906fab01ba4367f
+
+commit 89f54cdf6b9cf1cf5528fd33897f1443913ddfb4
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Jul 4 13:51:12 2018 +0000
+
+ upstream: exercise new expansion behaviour of
+
+ PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes and, by proxy, test kex_assemble_names()
+
+ ok markus@
+
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 292978902e14d5729aa87e492dd166c842f72736
+
+commit 187633f24c71564e970681c8906df5a6017dcccf
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Jul 3 13:53:26 2018 +0000
+
+ upstream: add a comment that could have saved me 45 minutes of wild
+
+ goose chasing
+
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: d469b29ffadd3402c090e21b792d627d46fa5297
+
+commit 312d2f2861a2598ed08587cb6c45c0e98a85408f
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Jul 4 13:49:31 2018 +0000
+
+ upstream: repair PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes (and friends) after RSA
+
+ signature work - returns ability to add/remove/specify algorithms by
+ wildcard.
+
+ Algorithm lists are now fully expanded when the server/client configs
+ are finalised, so errors are reported early and the config dumps
+ (e.g. "ssh -G ...") now list the actual algorithms selected.
+
+ Clarify that, while wildcards are accepted in algorithm lists, they
+ aren't full pattern-lists that support negation.
+
+ (lots of) feedback, ok markus@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a8894c5c81f399a002f02ff4fe6b4fa46b1f3207
+
+commit 303af5803bd74bf05d375c04e1a83b40c30b2be5
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Jul 3 11:43:49 2018 +0000
+
+ upstream: some magic for RSA-SHA2 checks
+
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: e5a9b11368ff6d86e7b25ad10ebe43359b471cd4
+
+commit 7d68e262944c1fff1574600fe0e5e92ec8b398f5
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Tue Jul 3 23:27:11 2018 +1000
+
+ depend
+
+commit b4d4eda633af433d20232cbf7e855ceac8b83fe5
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Jul 3 13:20:25 2018 +0000
+
+ upstream: some finesse to fix RSA-SHA2 certificate authentication
+
+ for certs hosted in ssh-agent
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e5fd5edd726137dda2d020e1cdebc464110a010f
+
+commit d78b75df4a57e0f92295f24298e5f2930e71c172
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Jul 3 13:07:58 2018 +0000
+
+ upstream: check correct variable; unbreak agent keys
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c36981fdf1f3ce04966d3310826a3e1e6233d93e
+
+commit 2f30300c5e15929d0e34013f38d73e857f445e12
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Jul 3 11:42:12 2018 +0000
+
+ upstream: crank version number to 7.8; needed for new compat flag
+
+ for prior version; part of RSA-SHA2 strictification, ok markus@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 84a11fc0efd2674c050712336b5093f5d408e32b
+
+commit 4ba0d54794814ec0de1ec87987d0c3b89379b436
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Jul 3 11:39:54 2018 +0000
+
+ upstream: Improve strictness and control over RSA-SHA2 signature
+
+ In ssh, when an agent fails to return a RSA-SHA2 signature when
+ requested and falls back to RSA-SHA1 instead, retry the signature to
+ ensure that the public key algorithm sent in the SSH_MSG_USERAUTH
+ matches the one in the signature itself.
+
+ In sshd, strictly enforce that the public key algorithm sent in the
+ SSH_MSG_USERAUTH message matches what appears in the signature.
+
+ Make the sshd_config PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes and
+ HostbasedAcceptedKeyTypes options control accepted signature algorithms
+ (previously they selected supported key types). This allows these
+ options to ban RSA-SHA1 in favour of RSA-SHA2.
+
+ Add new signature algorithms "rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com" and
+ "rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com" to force use of RSA-SHA2 signatures
+ with certificate keys.
+
+ feedback and ok markus@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c6e9f6d45eed8962ad502d315d7eaef32c419dde
+
+commit 95344c257412b51199ead18d54eaed5bafb75617
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Jul 3 10:59:35 2018 +0000
- upstream: some cleanup for BindInterface and ssh-keyscan;
+ upstream: allow sshd_config PermitUserEnvironment to accept a
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1a719ebeae22a166adf05bea5009add7075acc8c
+ pattern-list of whitelisted environment variable names in addition to yes|no.
+
+ bz#1800, feedback and ok markus@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 77dc2b468e0bf04b53f333434ba257008a1fdf24
-commit c7b5a47e3b9db9a0f0198f9c90c705f6307afc2b
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Sun Feb 25 23:55:41 2018 +1100
+commit 6f56fe4b9578b0627667f8bce69d4d938a88324c
+Author: millert@openbsd.org <millert@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Jun 26 11:23:59 2018 +0000
- Invert sense of getpgrp test.
+ upstream: Fix "WARNING: line 6 disappeared in /etc/moduli, giving up"
- AC_FUNC_GETPGRP tests if getpgrp(0) works, which it does if it's not
- declared. Instead, test if the zero-arg version we want to use works.
+ when choosing a prime. An extra increment of linenum snuck in as part of the
+ conversion to getline(). OK djm@ markus@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0019225cb52ed621b71cd9f19ee2e78e57e3dd38
-commit b39593a6de5290650a01adf8699c6460570403c2
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Sun Feb 25 13:25:15 2018 +1100
+commit 1eee79a11c1b3594f055b01e387c49c9a6e80005
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Jul 2 14:13:30 2018 +0000
- Add no-op getsid implmentation.
+ upstream: One ampersand is enough to backgroud an process. OpenBSD
+
+ doesn't seem to mind, but some platforms in -portable object to the second.
+
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: d6c3e404871764343761dc25c3bbe29c2621ff74
-commit 11057564eb6ab8fd987de50c3d7f394c6f6632b7
+commit 6301e6c787d4e26bfae1119ab4f747bbcaa94e44
Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Sun Feb 25 11:22:57 2018 +1100
+Date: Mon Jul 2 21:16:58 2018 +1000
- bsd-statvfs: include sys/vfs.h, check for f_flags.
+ Add implementation of getline.
+
+ Add getline for the benefit of platforms that don't have it. Sourced
+ from NetBSD (OpenBSD's implementation is a little too chummy with the
+ internals of FILE).
-commit e9dede06e5bc582a4aeb5b1cd5a7a640d7de3609
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Sun Feb 25 10:20:31 2018 +1100
+commit 84623e0037628f9992839063151f7a9f5f13099a
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Jun 26 02:02:36 2018 +0000
- Handle calloc(0,x) where different from malloc.
+ upstream: whitespace
- Configure assumes that if malloc(0) returns null then calloc(0,n)
- also does. On some old platforms (SunOS4) malloc behaves as expected
- (as determined by AC_FUNC_MALLOC) but calloc doesn't. Test for this
- at configure time and activate the replacement function if found, plus
- handle this case in rpl_calloc.
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9276951caf4daf555f6d262e95720e7f79244572
-commit 2eb4041493fd2635ffdc64a852d02b38c4955e0b
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Sat Feb 24 21:06:48 2018 +1100
+commit 90e51d672711c19a36573be1785caf35019ae7a8
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Jun 25 22:28:33 2018 +0000
- Add prototype for readv if needed.
+ upstream: fix NULL dereference in open_listen_match_tcpip()
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c968c1d29e392352383c0f9681fcc1e93620c4a9
-commit 6c8c9a615b6d31db8a87bc25033f053d5b0a831e
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Sat Feb 24 20:46:37 2018 +1100
+commit f535ff922a67d9fcc5ee69d060d1b21c8bb01d14
+Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Jun 19 05:36:57 2018 +0000
- Check for raise and supply if needed.
+ upstream: spelling;
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: db542918185243bea17202383a581851736553cc
-commit a9004425a032d7a7141a5437cfabfd02431e2a74
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Sat Feb 24 20:25:22 2018 +1100
+commit 80e199d6175904152aafc5c297096c3e18297691
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Jun 19 03:02:17 2018 +0000
- Check for bzero and supply if needed.
+ upstream: test PermitListen with bare port numbers
- Since explicit_bzero uses it via an indirect it needs to be a function
- not just a macro.
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 4b50a02dfb0ccaca08247f3877c444126ba901b3
-commit 1a348359e4d2876203b5255941bae348557f4f54
+commit 87ddd676da0f3abd08b778b12b53b91b670dc93c
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Feb 23 05:14:05 2018 +0000
+Date: Tue Jun 19 02:59:41 2018 +0000
- upstream: Add ssh-keyscan -D option to make it print its results in
+ upstream: allow bare port numbers to appear in PermitListen directives,
- SSHFP format bz#2821, ok dtucker@
+ e.g.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 831446b582e0f298ca15c9d99c415c899e392221
+ PermitListen 2222 8080
+
+ is equivalent to:
+
+ PermitListen *:2222 *:8080
+
+ Some bonus manpage improvements, mostly from markus@
+
+ "looks fine" markus@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 6546b0cc5aab7f53d65ad0a348ca0ae591d6dd24
-commit 3e19fb976a47b44b3d7c4f8355269f7f2c5dd82c
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Feb 23 04:18:46 2018 +0000
+commit 26f96ca10ad0ec5da9b05b99de1e1ccea15a11be
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Jun 15 07:01:11 2018 +0000
- upstream: Add missing braces.
+ upstream: invalidate supplemental group cache used by
- Caught by the tinderbox's -Werror=misleading-indentation, ok djm@
+ temporarily_use_uid() when the target uid differs; could cause failure to
+ read authorized_keys under some configurations. patch by Jakub Jelen via
+ bz2873; ok dtucker, markus
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d44656af594c3b2366eb87d6abcef83e1c88a6ca
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 48a345f0ee90f6c465a078eb5e89566b23abd8a1
-commit b59162da99399d89bd57f71c170c0003c55b1583
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Fri Feb 23 15:20:42 2018 +1100
+commit 89a85d724765b6b82e0135ee5a1181fdcccea9c6
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sun Jun 10 23:45:41 2018 +0000
- Check for ifaddrs.h for BindInterface.
+ upstream: unbreak SendEnv; patch from tb@
- BindInterface required getifaddr and friends so disable if not available
- (eg Solaris 10). We should be able to add support for some systems with
- a bit more work but this gets the building again.
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: fc808daced813242563b80976e1478de95940056
-commit a8dd6fe0aa10b6866830b4688a73ef966f0aed88
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Fri Feb 23 14:19:11 2018 +1100
+commit acf4260f0951f89c64e1ebbc4c92f451768871ad
+Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sat Jun 9 06:36:31 2018 +0000
- space before tab in previous
+ upstream: sort previous;
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 27d80d8b8ca99bc33971dee905e8ffd0053ec411
-commit b5e9263c7704247f9624c8f5c458e9181fcdbc09
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Feb 9 03:40:22 2018 +0000
+commit 1678d4236451060b735cb242d2e26e1ac99f0947
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sat Jun 9 03:18:11 2018 +0000
- upstream: Replace fatal with exit in the case that we do not have
+ upstream: slightly better wording re handing of $TERM, from Jakub
- $SUDO set. Prevents test failures when neither sudo nor doas are configured.
+ Jelen via bz2386
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 6a0464decc4f8ac7d6eded556a032b0fc521bc7b
-
-commit 3e9d3192ad43758ef761c5b0aa3ac5ccf8121ef2
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Fri Feb 23 14:10:53 2018 +1100
-
- Use portable syntax for REGRESSTMP.
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 14bea3f069a93c8be66a7b97794255a91fece964
-commit 73282b61187883a2b2bb48e087fdda1d751d6059
+commit 28013759f09ed3ebf7e8335e83a62936bd7a7f47
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Feb 23 03:03:00 2018 +0000
+Date: Sat Jun 9 03:03:10 2018 +0000
- upstream: unbreak interop test after SSHv1 purge; patch from Colin
+ upstream: add a SetEnv directive for sshd_config to allow an
- Watson via bz#2823
+ administrator to explicitly specify environment variables set in sessions
+ started by sshd. These override the default environment and any variables set
+ by user configuration (PermitUserEnvironment, etc), but not the SSH_*
+ variables set by sshd itself.
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 807d30a597756ed6612bdf46dfebca74f49cb31a
+ ok markus@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b6a96c0001ccd7dd211df6cae9e961c20fd718c0
-commit f8985dde5f46aedade0373365cbf86ed3f1aead2
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Feb 9 03:42:57 2018 +0000
+commit 7082bb58a2eb878d23ec674587c742e5e9673c36
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sat Jun 9 03:01:12 2018 +0000
- upstream: Skip sftp-chroot test when SUDO not set instead of
+ upstream: add a SetEnv directive to ssh_config that allows setting
- fatal().
+ environment variables for the remote session (subject to the server accepting
+ them)
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: cd4b5f1109b0dc09af4e5ea7d4968c43fbcbde88
+ refactor SendEnv to remove the arbitrary limit of variable names.
+
+ ok markus@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: cfbb00d9b0e10c1ffff1d83424351fd961d1f2be
-commit df88551c02d4e3445c44ff67ba8757cff718609a
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Feb 9 03:40:22 2018 +0000
+commit 3b9798bda15bd3f598f5ef07595d64e23504da91
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sat Jun 9 02:58:02 2018 +0000
- upstream: Replace fatal with exit in the case that we do not have
+ upstream: reorder child environment preparation so that variables
- $SUDO set. Prevents test failures when neither sudo nor doas are configured.
+ read from ~/.ssh/environment (if enabled) do not override SSH_* variables set
+ by the server.
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 6a0464decc4f8ac7d6eded556a032b0fc521bc7b
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 59f9d4c213cdcef2ef21f4b4ae006594dcf2aa7a
-commit 3b252c20b19f093e87363de197f1100b79705dd3
+commit 0368889f82f63c82ff8db9f8c944d89e7c657db4
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Feb 8 08:46:20 2018 +0000
+Date: Fri Jun 8 03:35:36 2018 +0000
- upstream: some helpers to check verbose/quiet mode
+ upstream: fix incorrect expansion of %i in
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: e736aac39e563f5360a0935080a71d5fdcb976de
+ load_public_identity_files(); reported by Roumen Petrov
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a827289e77149b5e0850d72a350c8b0300e7ef25
-commit ac2e3026bbee1367e4cda34765d1106099be3287
+commit 027607fc2db6a0475a3380f8d95c635482714cb0
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Feb 23 02:34:33 2018 +0000
+Date: Fri Jun 8 01:55:40 2018 +0000
- upstream: Add BindInterface ssh_config directive and -B
+ upstream: fix some over-long lines and __func__ up some debug
- command-line argument to ssh(1) that directs it to bind its outgoing
- connection to the address of the specified network interface.
+ messages
- BindInterface prefers to use addresses that aren't loopback or link-
- local, but will fall back to those if no other addresses of the
- required family are available on that interface.
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c70a60b4c8207d9f242fc2351941ba50916bb267
+
+commit 6ff6fda705bc204456a5fa12518dde6e8790bb02
+Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Jun 7 11:26:14 2018 +0000
+
+ upstream: tweak previous;
- Based on patch by Mike Manning in bz#2820, ok dtucker@
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f98f16af10b28e24bcecb806cb71ea994b648fd6
+
+commit f2c06ab8dd90582030991f631a2715216bf45e5a
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Fri Jun 8 17:43:36 2018 +1000
+
+ Remove ability to override $LD.
+
+ Since autoconf always uses $CC to link C programs, allowing users to
+ override LD caused mismatches between what LD_LINK_IFELSE thought worked
+ and what ld thought worked. If you do need to do this kind of thing you
+ need to set a compiler flag such as gcc's -fuse-ld in LDFLAGS.
+
+commit e1542a80797b4ea40a91d2896efdcc76a57056d2
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Fri Jun 8 13:55:59 2018 +1000
+
+ Better detection of unsupported compiler options.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c5064d285c2851f773dd736a2c342aa384fbf713
+ Should prevent "unsupported -Wl,-z,retpoline" warnings during linking.
+ ok djm@
-commit fcdb9d777839a3fa034b3bc3067ba8c1f6886679
+commit 57379dbd013ad32ee3f9989bf5f5741065428360
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Feb 19 00:55:02 2018 +0000
+Date: Thu Jun 7 14:29:43 2018 +0000
- upstream: emphasise that the hostkey rotation may send key types
-
- that the client may not support, and that the client should simply disregard
- such keys (this is what ssh does already).
+ upstream: test the correct configuration option name
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 65f8ffbc32ac8d12be8f913d7c0ea55bef8622bf
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 492279ea9f65657f97a970e0e7c7fd0b339fee23
-commit ce066f688dc166506c082dac41ca686066e3de5f
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Thu Feb 22 20:45:09 2018 +1100
+commit 6d41815e202fbd6182c79780b6cc90e1ec1c9981
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Jun 7 09:26:42 2018 +0000
- Add headers for sys/audit.h.
+ upstream: some permitlisten fixes from markus@ that I missed in my
- On some older platforms (at least sunos4, probably others) sys/audit.h
- requires some other headers. Patch from klausz at haus-gisela.de.
+ insomnia-fueled commits last night
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 26f23622e928996086e85b1419cc1c0f136e359c
-commit 3fd2d2291a695c96a54269deae079bacce6e3fb9
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Mon Feb 19 18:37:40 2018 +1100
+commit 4319f7a868d86d435fa07112fcb6153895d03a7f
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Jun 7 04:46:34 2018 +0000
- Add REGRESSTMP make var override.
+ upstream: permitlisten/PermitListen unit test from Markus
- Defaults to original location ($srcdir/regress) but allows overriding
- if desired, eg a directory in /tmp.
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: ab12eb42f0e14926980441cf7c058a6d1d832ea5
-commit f8338428588f3ecb5243c86336eccaa28809f97e
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Sun Feb 18 15:53:15 2018 +1100
+commit fa09076410ffc2d34d454145af23c790d728921e
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Jun 7 04:31:51 2018 +0000
- Remove now-unused check for getrusage.
+ upstream: fix regression caused by recent permitlisten option commit:
- getrusage was used in ssh-rand-helper but that's now long gone.
- Patch from klauszh at haus-gisela.de.
+ authorized_keys lines that contained permitopen/permitlisten were being
+ treated as invalid.
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7ef41d63a5a477b405d142dc925b67d9e7aaa31b
-commit 8570177195f6a4b3173c0a25484a83641ee3faa6
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Feb 16 04:43:11 2018 +0000
+commit 7f90635216851f6cb4bf3999e98b825f85d604f8
+Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Jun 6 18:29:18 2018 +0000
- upstream: Don't send IUTF8 to servers that don't like them.
+ upstream: switch config file parsing to getline(3) as this avoids
- Some SSH servers eg "ConfD" drop the connection if the client sends the
- new IUTF8 (RFC8160) terminal mode even if it's not set. Add a bug bit
- for such servers and avoid sending IUTF8 to them. ok djm@
+ static limits noted by gerhard@; ok dtucker@, djm@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 26425855402d870c3c0a90491e72e2a8a342ceda
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 6d702eabef0fa12e5a1d75c334a8c8b325298b5c
-commit f6dc2ba3c9d12be53057b9371f5109ec553a399f
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Fri Feb 16 17:32:28 2018 +1100
+commit 392db2bc83215986a91c0b65feb0e40e7619ce7e
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Jun 6 18:25:33 2018 +0000
- freezero should check for NULL.
+ upstream: regress test for PermitOpen
+
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: ce8b5f28fc039f09bb297fc4a92319e65982ddaf
-commit 680321f3eb46773883111e234b3c262142ff7c5b
+commit 803d896ef30758135e2f438bdd1a0be27989e018
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Feb 16 02:40:45 2018 +0000
+Date: Wed Jun 6 18:24:15 2018 +0000
- upstream: Mention recent DH KEX methods:
-
- diffie-hellman-group14-sha256
- diffie-hellman-group16-sha512
- diffie-hellman-group18-sha512
-
- From Jakub Jelen via bz#2826
+ upstream: man bits for permitlisten authorized_keys option
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 51bf769f06e55447f4bfa7306949e62d2401907a
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 86910af8f781a4ac5980fea125442eb25466dd78
-commit 88c50a5ae20902715f0fca306bb9c38514f71679
+commit 04df43208b5b460d7360e1598f876b92a32f5922
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Feb 16 02:32:40 2018 +0000
+Date: Wed Jun 6 18:24:00 2018 +0000
- upstream: stop loading DSA keys by default, remove sshd_config
+ upstream: man bits for PermitListen
- stanza and manpage bits; from Colin Watson via bz#2662, ok dtucker@
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 35b200cba4e46a16a4db6a80ef11838ab0fad67c
+
+commit 93c06ab6b77514e0447fe4f1d822afcbb2a9be08
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Jun 6 18:23:32 2018 +0000
+
+ upstream: permitlisten option for authorized_keys; ok markus@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d33a849f481684ff655c140f5eb1b4acda8c5c09
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8650883018d7aa893173d703379e4456a222c672
-commit d2b3db2860c962927def39a52f67f1c23f7b201a
-Author: jsing@openbsd.org <jsing@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Feb 14 16:27:24 2018 +0000
+commit 115063a6647007286cc8ca70abfd2a7585f26ccc
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Jun 6 18:22:41 2018 +0000
- upstream: Ensure that D mod (P-1) and D mod (Q-1) are calculated in
+ upstream: Add a PermitListen directive to control which server-side
- constant time.
+ addresses may be listened on when the client requests remote forwarding (ssh
+ -R).
- This avoids a potential side channel timing leak.
+ This is the converse of the existing PermitOpen directive and this
+ includes some refactoring to share much of its implementation.
- ok djm@ markus@
+ feedback and ok markus@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 71ff3c16be03290e63d8edab8fac053d8a82968c
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 15a931238c61a3f2ac74ea18a98c933e358e277f
-commit 4270efad7048535b4f250f493d70f9acfb201593
-Author: jsing@openbsd.org <jsing@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Feb 14 16:03:32 2018 +0000
+commit 7703ae5f5d42eb302ded51705166ff6e19c92892
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Wed Jun 6 16:04:29 2018 +1000
- upstream: Some obvious freezero() conversions.
+ Use ssh-keygen -A to generate missing host keys.
- This also zeros an ed25519_pk when it was not being zeroed previously.
+ Instead of testing for each specific key type, use ssh-keygen -A to
+ generate any missing host key types.
+
+commit e8d59fef1098e24f408248dc64e5c8efa5d01f3c
+Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Jun 1 06:23:10 2018 +0000
+
+ upstream: add missing punctuation after %i in ssh_config.5, and
- ok djm@ dtucker@
+ make the grammatical format in sshd_config.5 match that in ssh_config.5;
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 5c196a3c85c23ac0bd9b11bcadaedd90b7a2ce82
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e325663b9342f3d556e223e5306e0d5fa1a74fa0
-commit affa6ba67ffccc30b85d6e98f36eb5afd9386882
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Thu Feb 15 22:32:04 2018 +1100
+commit a1f737d6a99314e291a87856122cb4dbaf64c641
+Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Jun 1 05:52:26 2018 +0000
- Remove execute bit from modpipe.c.
+ upstream: oops - further adjustment to text neccessary;
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 23585576c807743112ab956be0fb3c786bdef025
-commit 9879dca438526ae6dfd656fecb26b0558c29c731
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Thu Feb 15 22:26:16 2018 +1100
+commit 294028493471e0bd0c7ffe55dc0c0a67cba6ec41
+Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Jun 1 05:50:18 2018 +0000
- Update prngd link to point to sourceforge.
+ upstream: %U needs to be escaped; tweak text;
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 30887b73ece257273fb619ab6f4e86dc92ddc15e
-commit b6973fa5152b1a0bafd2417b7c3ad96f6e87d014
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Thu Feb 15 22:22:38 2018 +1100
+commit e5019da3c5a31e6e729a565f2b886a80c4be96cc
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Jun 1 04:31:48 2018 +0000
- Remove references to UNICOS.
+ upstream: Apply umask to all incoming files and directories not
+
+ just files. This makes sure it gets applied to directories too, and prevents
+ a race where files get chmodded after creation. bz#2839, ok djm@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 3168ee6c7c39093adac4fd71039600cfa296203b
-commit f1ca487940449f0b64f38f1da575078257609966
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Thu Feb 15 22:18:37 2018 +1100
+commit a1dcafc41c376332493b9385ee39f9754dc145ec
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Jun 1 03:52:37 2018 +0000
- Remove extra newline.
+ upstream: Adapt to extra default verboisity from ssh-keygen when
+
+ searching for and hashing known_hosts entries in a single operation
+ (ssh-keygen -HF ...) Patch from Anton Kremenetsky
+
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 519585a4de35c4611285bd6a7272766c229b19dd
-commit 6d4e980f3cf27f409489cf89cd46c21501b13731
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Thu Feb 15 22:16:54 2018 +1100
+commit 76f314c75dffd4a55839d50ee23622edad52c168
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue May 22 00:22:49 2018 +0000
- OpenSSH's builtin entropy gathering is long gone.
+ upstream: Add TEST_SSH_FAIL_FATAL variable, to force all failures
+
+ to instantly abort the test. Useful in capturing clean logs for individual
+ failure cases.
+
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: feba18cf338c2328b9601bd4093cabdd9baa3af1
-commit 389125b25d1a1d7f22e907463b7e8eca74af79ea
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Thu Feb 15 21:43:01 2018 +1100
+commit 065c8c055df8d83ae7c92e5e524a579d87668aab
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri May 11 03:51:06 2018 +0000
- Replace remaining mysignal() with signal().
+ upstream: Clean up comment.
- These seem to have been missed during the replacement of mysignal
- with #define signal in commit 5ade9ab. Both include the requisite
- headers to pick up the #define.
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 6adb35f384d447e7dcb9f170d4f0d546d3973e10
-commit 265d88d4e61e352de6791733c8b29fa3d7d0c26d
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Thu Feb 15 20:06:19 2018 +1100
+commit 01b048c8eba3b021701bd0ab26257fc82903cba8
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Jun 1 04:21:29 2018 +0000
- Remove remaining now-obsolete cvs $Ids.
+ upstream: whitespace
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e5edb5e843ddc9b73a8e46518899be41d5709add
-commit 015749e9b1d2f6e14733466d19ba72f014d0845c
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Thu Feb 15 17:01:54 2018 +1100
+commit 854ae209f992465a276de0b5f10ef770510c2418
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Jun 1 04:05:29 2018 +0000
- Regenerate dependencies after UNICOS removal.
+ upstream: make ssh_remote_ipaddr() capable of being called after
+
+ the ssh->state has been torn down; bz#2773
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 167f12523613ca3d16d7716a690e7afa307dc7eb
-commit ddc0f3814881ea279a6b6d4d98e03afc60ae1ed7
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Tue Feb 13 09:10:46 2018 +1100
+commit 3e088aaf236ef35beeef3c9be93fd53700df5861
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Jun 1 03:51:34 2018 +0000
- Remove UNICOS support.
+ upstream: return correct exit code when searching for and hashing
- The code required to support it is quite invasive to the mainline
- code that is synced with upstream and is an ongoing maintenance burden.
- Both the hardware and software are literal museum pieces these days and
- we could not find anyone still running OpenSSH on one.
+ known_hosts entries in a single operation (ssh-keygen -HF hostname); bz2772
+ Report and fix from Anton Kremenetsky
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ac10ca13eb9bb0bc50fcd42ad11c56c317437b58
-commit 174bed686968494723e6db881208cc4dac0d020f
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Tue Feb 13 18:12:47 2018 +1100
+commit 9c935dd9bf05628826ad2495d3e8bdf3d3271c21
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Jun 1 03:33:53 2018 +0000
- Retpoline linker flag only needed for linking.
+ upstream: make UID available as a %-expansion everywhere that the
+
+ username is available currently. In the client this is via %i, in the server
+ %U (since %i was already used in the client in some places for this, but used
+ for something different in the server); bz#2870, ok dtucker@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c7e912b0213713316cb55db194b3a6415b3d4b95
-commit 075e258c2cc41e1d7f3ea2d292c5342091728d40
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Tue Feb 13 17:36:43 2018 +1100
+commit d8748b91d1d6c108c0c260ed41fa55f37b9ef34b
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Jun 1 03:11:49 2018 +0000
- Default PidFile is sshd.pid not ssh.pid.
+ upstream: prefer argv0 to "ssh" when re-executing ssh for ProxyJump
+
+ directive; bz2831, feedback and ok dtucker@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 3cec709a131499fbb0c1ea8a0a9e0b0915ce769e
-commit 49f3c0ec47730ea264e2bd1e6ece11167d6384df
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Tue Feb 13 16:27:09 2018 +1100
+commit fbb4b5fd4f8e0bb89732670a01954e18b69e15ba
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri May 25 07:11:01 2018 +0000
- Remove assigned-to-but-never-used variable.
+ upstream: Do not ban PTY allocation when a sshd session is restricted
+
+ because the user password is expired as it breaks password change dialog.
+
+ regression in openssh-7.7 reported by Daniel Wagner
- 'p' was removed in previous change but I neglected to remove the
- otherwise-unused assignment to it.
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9fc09c584c6f1964b00595e3abe7f83db4d90d73
-commit b8bbff3b3fc823bf80c5ab226c94f13cb887d5b1
+commit f6a59a22b0c157c4c4e5fd7232f868138223be64
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Feb 13 03:36:56 2018 +0000
+Date: Fri May 25 04:25:46 2018 +0000
- upstream: remove space before tab
+ upstream: Fix return value confusion in several functions (readdir,
+
+ download and fsync). These should return -1 on error, not a sftp status code.
+
+ patch from Petr Cerny in bz#2871
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 674edd214d0a7332dd4623c9cf8117301b012890
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 651aa0220ad23c9167d9297a436162d741f97a09
-commit 05046d907c211cb9b4cd21b8eff9e7a46cd6c5ab
+commit 1da5934b860ac0378d52d3035b22b6670f6a967e
Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sun Feb 11 21:16:56 2018 +0000
+Date: Fri May 25 03:20:59 2018 +0000
- upstream Don't reset signal handlers inside handlers.
+ upstream: If select() fails in ssh_packet_read_seqnr go directly to
- The signal handlers from the original ssh1 code on which OpenSSH
- is based assume unreliable signals and reinstall their handlers.
- Since OpenBSD (and pretty much every current system) has reliable
- signals this is not needed. In the unlikely even that -portable
- is still being used on such systems we will deal with it in the
- compat layer. ok deraadt@
+ the error path instead of trying to read from the socket on the way out,
+ which resets errno and causes the true error to be misreported. ok djm@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f53a1015cb6908431b92116130d285d71589612c
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2614edaadbd05a957aa977728aa7a030af7c6f0a
-commit 3c51143c639ac686687c7acf9b373b8c08195ffb
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Tue Feb 13 09:07:29 2018 +1100
+commit 4ef75926ef517d539f2c7aac3188b09f315c86a7
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Fri May 25 13:36:58 2018 +1000
- Whitespace sync with upstream.
+ Permit getuid()/geteuid() syscalls.
+
+ Requested for Linux/s390; patch from Eduardo Barretto via bz#2752;
+ ok dtucker
-commit 19edfd4af746bedf0df17f01953ba8c6d3186eb7
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Tue Feb 13 08:25:46 2018 +1100
+commit 4b22fd8ecefd059a66140be67f352eb6145a9d88
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue May 22 00:13:26 2018 +0000
- Whitespace sync with upstream.
+ upstream: support ProxyJump=none to disable ProxyJump
+
+ functionality; bz#2869 ok dtucker@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1c06ee08eb78451b5837fcfd8cbebc5ff3a67a01
-commit fbfa6f980d7460b3e12b0ce88ed3b6018edf4711
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Sun Feb 11 21:25:11 2018 +1300
+commit f41bcd70f55b4f0fc4d8e1039cb361ac922b23fb
+Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue May 15 05:40:11 2018 +0000
- Move signal compat code into bsd-signal.{c,h}
+ upstream: correct keyowrd name (permitemptypasswords); from brendan
+
+ macdonell
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ef1bdbc936b2ea693ee37a4c20a94d4d43f5fda3
-commit 24d2a33bd3bf5170700bfdd8675498aa09a79eab
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Sun Feb 11 21:20:39 2018 +1300
+commit f18bc97151340127859634d20d79fd39ec8a7f39
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri May 11 04:01:11 2018 +0000
- Include headers for linux/if.h.
+ upstream: Emphasise that -w implicitly sets Tunnel=point-to-point
+
+ and that users should specify an explicit Tunnel directive if they don't want
+ this. bz#2365.
- Prevents configure-time "present but cannot be compiled" warning.
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1a8d9c67ae213ead180481900dbbb3e04864560d
-commit bc02181c24fc551aab85eb2cff0f90380928ef43
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Sun Feb 11 19:45:47 2018 +1300
+commit 32e4e94e1511fe0020fbfbb62399d31b2d22a801
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Mon May 14 14:40:08 2018 +1000
- Fix test for -z,retpolineplt linker flag.
+ sync fmt_scaled.c
+
+ revision 1.17
+ date: 2018/05/14 04:39:04; author: djm; state: Exp; lines: +5 -2;
+ commitid: 53zY8GjViUBnWo8Z;
+ constrain fractional part to [0-9] (less confusing to static analysis); ok ian@
-commit 3377df00ea3fece5293db85fe63baef33bf5152e
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Sun Feb 11 09:32:37 2018 +1100
+commit 54268d589e85ecc43d3eba8d83f327bdada9d696
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Fri May 11 14:04:40 2018 +1000
- Add checks for Spectre v2 mitigation (retpoline)
+ fix key-options.sh on platforms without openpty(3)
+
+ Skip the pty tests if the platform lacks openpty(3) and has to chown(2)
+ the pty device explicitly. This typically requires root permissions that
+ this test lacks.
- This adds checks for gcc and clang flags for mitigations for Spectre
- variant 2, ie "retpoline". It'll automatically enabled if the compiler
- supports it as part of toolchain hardening flag. ok djm@
+ bz#2856 ok dtucker@
-commit d9e5cf078ea5380da6df767bb1773802ec557ef0
+commit b2140a739be4c3b43cc1dc08322dca39a1e39d20
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sat Feb 10 09:25:34 2018 +0000
+Date: Fri May 11 03:38:51 2018 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: implement EMFILE mitigation for ssh-agent: remember the
+
+ fd rlimit and stop accepting new connections when it is exceeded (with some
+ grace). Accept is resumed when enough connections are closed.
- constify some private key-related functions; based on
- https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/pull/56 by Vincent Brillault
+ bz#2576. feedback deraadt; ok dtucker@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: dcb94a41834a15f4d00275cb5051616fdc4c988c
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 6a85d9cec7b85741961e7116a49f8dae777911ea
-commit a7c38215d564bf98e8e9eb40c1079e3adf686f15
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sat Feb 10 09:03:54 2018 +0000
+commit fdba503fdfc647ee8a244002f1581e869c1f3d90
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri May 11 03:22:55 2018 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: Explicit cast when snprintf'ing an uint64. Prevents
- Mention ServerAliveTimeout in context of TCPKeepAlives;
- prompted by Christoph Anton Mitterer via github
+ warnings on platforms where int64 is long not long long. ok djm@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f0cf1b5bd3f1fbf41d71c88d75d93afc1c880ca2
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9c5359e2fbfce11dea2d93f7bc257e84419bd001
-commit 62562ceae61e4f7cf896566592bb840216e71061
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sat Feb 10 06:54:38 2018 +0000
+commit e7751aa4094d51a9bc00778aa8d07e22934c55ee
+Author: bluhm@openbsd.org <bluhm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Apr 26 14:47:03 2018 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: Since the previous commit, ssh regress test sftp-chroot was
- clarify IgnoreUserKnownHosts; based on github PR from
- Christoph Anton Mitterer.
+ failing. The sftp program terminated with the wrong exit code as sftp called
+ fatal() instad of exit(0). So when the sigchld handler waits for the child,
+ remember that it was found. Then don't expect that main() can wait again. OK
+ dtucker@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4fff2c17620c342fb2f1f9c2d2e679aab3e589c3
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: bfafd940c0de5297940c71ddf362053db0232266
-commit 4f011daa4cada6450fa810f7563b8968639bb562
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sat Feb 10 06:40:28 2018 +0000
+commit 7c15301841e2e9d37cae732400de63ae9c0961d6
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Sun Apr 29 17:54:12 2018 +1000
- upstream commit
+ Use includes.h instead of config.h.
- Shorter, more accurate explanation of
- NoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost without the confusing example. Prompted by
- Christoph Anton Mitterer via github and bz#2293.
+ This ensures it picks up the definition of DEF_WEAK, the lack of which
+ can cause compile errors in some cases (eg modern AIX). From
+ michael at felt.demon.nl.
+
+commit cec338967a666b7c8ad8b88175f2faeddf268116
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Thu Apr 19 09:53:14 2018 +1000
+
+ Omit 3des-cbc if OpenSSL built without DES.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 19dc96bea25b80d78d416b581fb8506f1e7b76df
+ Patch from hongxu.jia at windriver.com, ok djm@
-commit 77e05394af21d3f5faa0c09ed3855e4505a5cf9f
+commit a575ddd58835759393d2dddd16ebe5abdb56485e
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sat Feb 10 06:15:12 2018 +0000
+Date: Mon Apr 16 22:50:44 2018 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: Disable SSH2_MSG_DEBUG messages for Twisted Conch clients
- Disable RemoteCommand and RequestTTY in the ssh session
- started by scp. sftp is already doing this. From Camden Narzt via github; ok
- dtucker
+ without version numbers since they choke on them under some circumstances.
+ https://twistedmatrix.com/trac/ticket/9422 via Colin Watson
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 59e2611141c0b2ee579c6866e8eb9d7d8217bc6b
+ Newer Conch versions have a version number in their ident string and
+ handle debug messages okay. https://twistedmatrix.com/trac/ticket/9424
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 6cf7be262af0419c58ddae11324d9c0dc1577539
-commit ca613249a00b64b2eea9f52d3834b55c28cf2862
+commit 390c7000a8946db565b66eab9e52fb11948711fa
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sat Feb 10 05:48:46 2018 +0000
+Date: Sat Apr 14 21:50:41 2018 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: don't free the %C expansion, it's used later for
- Refuse to create a certificate with an unusable number of
- principals; Prompted by gdestuynder via github
+ LocalCommand
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8cfae2451e8f07810e3e2546dfdcce66984cbd29
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 857b5cb37b2d856bfdfce61289a415257a487fb1
-commit b56ac069d46b6f800de34e1e935f98d050731d14
+commit 3455f1e7c48e2e549192998d330214975b9b1dc7
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sat Feb 10 05:43:26 2018 +0000
+Date: Fri Apr 13 05:04:12 2018 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: notify user immediately when underlying ssh process dies;
- fatal if we're unable to write all the public key; previously
- we would silently ignore errors writing the comment and terminating newline.
- Prompted by github PR from WillerZ; ok dtucker
+ patch from Thomas Kuthan in bz2719; ok dtucker@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 18fbfcfd4e8c6adbc84820039b64d70906e49831
-
-commit cdb10bd431f9f6833475c27e9a82ebb36fdb12db
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Sat Feb 10 11:18:38 2018 +1100
-
- Add changelog entry for binary strip change.
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 78fac88c2f08054d1fc5162c43c24162b131cf78
-commit fbddd91897cfaf456bfc2081f39fb4a2208a0ebf
+commit 1c5b4bc827f4abc3e65888cda061ad5edf1b8c7c
Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Sat Feb 10 11:14:54 2018 +1100
+Date: Fri Apr 13 16:23:57 2018 +1000
- Remove unused variables.
+ Allow nanosleep in preauth privsep child.
+
+ The new timing attack mitigation code uses nanosleep in the preauth
+ codepath, allow in systrace andbox too.
-commit 937d96587df99c16c611d828cded292fa474a32b
+commit 0e73428038d5ecfa5d2a28cff26661502a7aff4e
Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Sat Feb 10 11:12:45 2018 +1100
+Date: Fri Apr 13 16:06:29 2018 +1000
- Don't strip binaries so debuginfo gets built.
+ Allow nanosleep in preauth privsep child.
- Tell install not to strip binaries during package creation so that the
- debuginfo package can be built.
+ The new timing attack mitigation code uses nanosleep in the preauth
+ codepath, allow in sandbox.
-commit eb0865f330f59c889ec92696b97bd397090e720c
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Sat Feb 10 10:33:11 2018 +1100
+commit e9d910b0289c820852f7afa67f584cef1c05fe95
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Apr 13 03:57:26 2018 +0000
- Fix bogus dates in changelog.
+ upstream: Defend against user enumeration timing attacks. This
+
+ establishes a minimum time for each failed authentication attempt (5ms) and
+ adds a per-user constant derived from a host secret (0-4ms). Based on work
+ by joona.kannisto at tut.fi, ok markus@ djm@.
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b7845b355bb7381703339c8fb0e57e81a20ae5ca
-commit 7fbde1b34c1f6c9ca9e9d10805ba1e5e4538e165
+commit d97874cbd909eb706886cd0cdd418f812c119ef9
Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Sat Feb 10 10:25:15 2018 +1100
+Date: Fri Apr 13 13:43:55 2018 +1000
- Remove SSH1 from description.
+ Using "==" in shell tests is not portable.
+
+ Patch from rsbecker at nexbridge.com.
-commit 9c34a76f099c4e0634bf6ecc2f40ce93925402c4
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Sat Feb 10 10:19:16 2018 +1100
+commit cfb1d9bc76734681e3dea532a1504fcd466fbe91
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Fri Apr 13 13:38:06 2018 +1000
- Add support for compat-openssl10 build dep.
+ Fix tunnel forwarding broken in 7.7p1
+
+ bz2855, ok dtucker@
-commit 04f4e8193cb5a5a751fcc356bd6656291fec539e
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Sat Feb 10 09:57:04 2018 +1100
+commit afa6e79b76fb52a0c09a29688b5c0d125eb08302
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Fri Apr 13 13:31:42 2018 +1000
- Add leading zero so it'll work when rhel not set.
+ prefer to use getrandom() for PRNG seeding
- When rhel is not set it will error out with "bad if". Add leading zero
- as per https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Packaging:DistTag so it'll work
- on non-RHEL.
+ Only applies when built --without-openssl. Thanks Jann Horn for
+ reminder.
-commit 12abd67a6af28476550807a443b38def2076bb92
+commit 575fac34a97f69bc217b235f81de9f8f433eceed
Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Sat Feb 10 09:56:34 2018 +1100
-
- Update openssl-devel dependency.
-
-commit b33e7645f8813719d7f9173fef24463c8833ebb3
-Author: nkadel <nkadel@gmail.com>
-Date: Sun Nov 16 18:19:58 2014 -0500
+Date: Fri Apr 13 13:13:33 2018 +1000
- Add mandir with-mandir' for RHEL 5 compatibility.
+ Revert $REGRESSTMP changes.
- Activate '--mandir' and '--with-mandir' settings in setup for RHEL
- 5 compatibility.
+ Revert 3fd2d229 and subsequent changes as they turned out to be a
+ portability hassle.
-commit 94f8bf360eb0162e39ddf39d69925c2e93511e40
-Author: nkadel <nkadel@gmail.com>
-Date: Sun Nov 16 18:18:51 2014 -0500
+commit 10479cc2a4acd6faaf643eb305233b49d70c31c1
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Tue Apr 10 10:19:02 2018 +1000
- Discard 'K5DIR' reporting.
+ Many typo fixes from Karsten Weiss
- It does not work inside 'mock' build environment.
-
-commit bb7e54dbaf34b70b3e57acf7982f3a2136c94ee5
-Author: nkadel <nkadel@gmail.com>
-Date: Sun Nov 16 18:17:15 2014 -0500
-
- Add 'dist' to 'rel' for OS specific RPM names.
-
-commit 87346f1f57f71150a9b8c7029d8c210e27027716
-Author: nkadel <nkadel@gmail.com>
-Date: Sun Nov 16 14:17:38 2014 -0500
-
- Add openssh-devel >= 0.9.8f for redhat spec file.
+ Spotted using https://github.com/lucasdemarchi/codespell
-commit bec1478d710866d3c1b119343a35567a8fc71ec3
-Author: nkadel <nkadel@gmail.com>
-Date: Sun Nov 16 13:10:24 2014 -0500
+commit 907da2f88519b34189fd03fac96de0c52d448233
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Apr 10 00:14:10 2018 +0000
- Enhance BuildRequires for openssh-x11-askpass.
+ upstream: more typos spotted by Karsten Weiss using codespell
+
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: d906a2aea0663810a658b7d0bc61a1d2907d4d69
-commit 3104fcbdd3c70aefcb0cdc3ee24948907db8dc8f
-Author: nkadel <nkadel@gmail.com>
-Date: Sun Nov 16 13:04:14 2014 -0500
+commit 37e5f4a7ab9a8026e5fc2f47dafb0f1b123d39e9
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Apr 10 00:13:27 2018 +0000
- Always include x11-ssh-askpass SRPM.
+ upstream: make this a bit more portable-friendly
- Always include x11-ssh-askpass tarball in redhat SRPM, even if unused.
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 62f7b9e055e8dfaab92b3825f158beeb4ca3f963
-commit c61d0d038d58eebc365f31830be6e04ce373ad1b
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Sat Feb 10 09:43:12 2018 +1100
+commit 001aa55484852370488786bd40e9fdad4b465811
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Apr 10 00:10:49 2018 +0000
- this is long unused; prompted by dtucker@
+ upstream: lots of typos in comments/docs. Patch from Karsten Weiss
+
+ after checking with codespell tool
+ (https://github.com/lucasdemarchi/codespell)
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 373222f12d7ab606598a2d36840c60be93568528
-commit 745771fb788e41bb7cdad34e5555bf82da3af7ed
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Feb 9 02:37:36 2018 +0000
+commit 260ede2787fe80b18b8d5920455b4fb268519c7d
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Apr 9 23:54:49 2018 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: don't kill ssh-agent's listening socket entriely if we
- Remove unused sKerberosTgtPassing from enum. From
- calestyo via github pull req #11, ok djm@
+ fail to accept a connection; bz#2837, patch from Lukas Kuster
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1008f8870865a7c4968b7aed402a0a9e3e5b9540
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 52413f5069179bebf30d38f524afe1a2133c738f
-commit 1f385f55332db830b0ae22a7663b98279ca2d657
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Feb 8 04:12:32 2018 +0000
+commit ebc8b4656f9b0f834a642a9fb3c9fbca86a61838
+Author: tj@openbsd.org <tj@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Apr 9 20:41:22 2018 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: the UseLogin option was removed, so remove it here too.
- Rename struct umac_ctx to umac128_ctx too. In portable
- some linkers complain about two symbols with the same name having differing
- sizes. ok djm@
+ ok dtucker
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: cbebf8bdd3310a9795b4939a1e112cfe24061ca3
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7080be73a64d68e21f22f5408a67a0ba8b1b6b06
-commit f1f047fb031c0081dbc8738f05bf5d4cc47acadf
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Feb 7 22:52:45 2018 +0000
+commit 3e36f281851fc8e9c996b33f108b2ae167314fbe
+Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sun Apr 8 07:36:02 2018 +0000
- upstream commit
-
- ssh_free checks for and handles NULL args, remove NULL
- checks from remaining callers. ok djm@
+ upstream: tweak previous;
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: bb926825c53724c069df68a93a2597f9192f7e7b
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2b9c23022ea7b9dddb62864de4e906000f9d7474
-commit aee49b2a89b6b323c80dd3b431bd486e51f94c8c
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Thu Feb 8 12:36:22 2018 +1100
+commit 8368571efd6693c5c57f850e23a2372acf3f865f
+Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sat Apr 7 13:50:10 2018 +0000
- Set SO_REUSEADDR in regression test netcat.
+ upstream: tweak previous;
- Sometimes multiplex tests fail on Solaris with "netcat: local_listen:
- Address already in use" which is likely due to previous invocations
- leaving the port in TIME_WAIT. Set SO_REUSEADDR (in addition to
- SO_REUSEPORT which is alread set on platforms that support it). ok djm@
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 38e347b6f8e888f5e0700d01abb1eba7caa154f9
-commit 1749991c55bab716877b7c687cbfbf19189ac6f1
-Author: jsing@openbsd.org <jsing@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Feb 7 05:17:56 2018 +0000
+commit 555294a7279914ae6795b71bedf4e6011b7636df
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Apr 6 13:02:39 2018 +0000
- upstream commit
-
- Convert some explicit_bzero()/free() calls to freezero().
+ upstream: Allow "SendEnv -PATTERN" to clear environment variables
- ok deraadt@ dtucker@
+ previously labeled for sendind. bz#1285 ok dtucker@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f566ab99149650ebe58b1d4b946ea726c3829609
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f6fec9e3d0f366f15903094fbe1754cb359a0df9
-commit 94ec2b69d403f4318b7a0d9b17f8bc3efbf4d0d2
-Author: jsing@openbsd.org <jsing@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Feb 7 05:15:49 2018 +0000
+commit 40f5f03544a07ebd2003b443d42e85cb51d94d59
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Apr 6 04:15:45 2018 +0000
- upstream commit
-
- Remove some #ifdef notyet code from OpenSSL 0.9.8 days.
-
- These functions have never appeared in OpenSSL and are likely never to do
- so.
+ upstream: relax checking of authorized_keys environment="..."
- "kill it with fire" djm@
+ options to allow underscores in variable names (regression introduced in
+ 7.7). bz2851, ok deraadt@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: fee9560e283fd836efc2631ef381658cc673d23e
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 69690ffe0c97ff393f2c76d25b4b3d2ed4e4ac9c
-commit 7cd31632e3a6607170ed0c9ed413a7ded5b9b377
-Author: jsing@openbsd.org <jsing@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Feb 7 02:06:50 2018 +0000
+commit 30fd7f9af0f553aaa2eeda5a1f53f26cfc222b5e
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Apr 6 03:51:27 2018 +0000
- upstream commit
-
- Remove all guards for calls to OpenSSL free functions -
- all of these functions handle NULL, from at least OpenSSL 1.0.1g onwards.
-
- Prompted by dtucker@ asking about guards for RSA_free(), when looking at
- openssh-portable pr#84 on github.
+ upstream: add a couple of missed options to the config dump; patch
- ok deraadt@ dtucker@
+ from Jakub Jelen via bz2835
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 954f1c51b94297d0ae1f749271e184141e0cadae
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 5970adadf6ef206bee0dddfc75d24c2019861446
-commit 3c000d57d46882eb736c6563edfc4995915c24a2
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
-Date: Wed Feb 7 09:19:38 2018 +1100
+commit 8d6829be324452d2acd282d5f8ceb0adaa89a4de
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Apr 6 03:34:27 2018 +0000
- Remove obsolete "Smartcard support" message
+ upstream: ssh does not accept -oInclude=... on the commandline, the
+
+ Include keyword is for configuration files only. bz#2840, patch from Jakub
+ Jelen
- The configure checks that populated $SCARD_MSG were removed in commits
- 7ea845e4 and d8f60022 when the smartcard support was replaced with
- PKCS#11.
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 32d052b4a7a7f22df35fe3f71c368c02b02cacb0
-commit 3e615090de0ce36a833d811e01c28aec531247c4
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Feb 6 06:01:54 2018 +0000
+commit 00c5222ddc0c8edcaa4ea45ac03befdc8013d137
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Apr 5 22:54:28 2018 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: We don't offer CBC cipher by default any more. Spotted by
- Replace "trojan horse" with the correct term (MITM).
- From maikel at predikkta.com via bz#2822, ok markus@
+ Renaud Allard (via otto@)
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e86ac64c512057c89edfadb43302ac0aa81a6c53
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a559b1eef741557dd959ae378b665a2977d92dca
-commit 3484380110d437c50e17f87d18544286328c75cb
-Author: tb@openbsd.org <tb@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Feb 5 05:37:46 2018 +0000
+commit 5ee8448ad7c306f05a9f56769f95336a8269f379
+Author: job@openbsd.org <job@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Apr 4 15:12:17 2018 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: Update default IPQoS in ssh(1), sshd(8) to DSCP AF21 for
- Add a couple of non-negativity checks to avoid close(-1).
+ interactive and CS1 for bulk
- ok djm
+ AF21 was selected as this is the highest priority within the low-latency
+ service class (and it is higher than what we have today). SSH is elastic
+ and time-sensitive data, where a user is waiting for a response via the
+ network in order to continue with a task at hand. As such, these flows
+ should be considered foreground traffic, with delays or drops to such
+ traffic directly impacting user-productivity.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4701ce0b37161c891c838d0931305f1d37a50880
-
-commit 5069320be93c8b2a6584b9f944c86f60c2b04e48
-Author: tb@openbsd.org <tb@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Feb 5 05:36:49 2018 +0000
-
- upstream commit
+ For bulk SSH traffic, the CS1 "Lower Effort" marker was chosen to enable
+ networks implementing a scavanger/lower-than-best effort class to
+ discriminate scp(1) below normal activities, such as web surfing. In
+ general this type of bulk SSH traffic is a background activity.
- The file descriptors for socket, stdin, stdout and stderr
- aren't necessarily distinct, so check if they are the same to avoid closing
- the same fd several times.
+ An advantage of using "AF21" for interactive SSH and "CS1" for bulk SSH
+ is that they are recognisable values on all common platforms (IANA
+ https://www.iana.org/assignments/dscp-registry/dscp-registry.xml), and
+ for AF21 specifically a definition of the intended behavior exists
+ https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4594#section-4.7 in addition to the definition
+ of the Assured Forwarding PHB group https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2597, and
+ for CS1 (Lower Effort) there is https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3662
- ok djm
+ The first three bits of "AF21" map to the equivalent IEEEE 802.1D PCP, IEEE
+ 802.11e, MPLS EXP/CoS and IP Precedence value of 2 (also known as "Immediate",
+ or "AC_BE"), and CS1's first 3 bits map to IEEEE 802.1D PCP, IEEE 802.11e,
+ MPLS/CoS and IP Precedence value 1 ("Background" or "AC_BK").
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 60d71fd22e9a32f5639d4ba6e25a2f417fc36ac1
+ OK deraadt@, "no objection" djm@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d11d2a4484f461524ef0c20870523dfcdeb52181
-commit 2b428f90ea1b21d7a7c68ec1ee334253b3f9324d
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Feb 5 04:02:53 2018 +0000
+commit 424b544fbda963f973da80f884717c3e0a513288
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Tue Apr 3 02:14:08 2018 +0000
- upstream commit
-
- I accidentially a word
+ upstream: Import regenerated moduli file.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4547ee713fa941da861e83ae7a3e6432f915e14a
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1de0e85522051eb2ffa00437e1885e9d7b3e0c2e
-commit 130283d5c2545ff017c2162dc1258c5354e29399
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Jan 25 03:34:43 2018 +0000
+commit 323f66ce934df2da551f256f37d69822428e1ca1
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Apr 6 04:18:35 2018 +0000
- upstream commit
-
- certificate options are case-sensitive; fix case on one
- that had it wrong.
+ upstream: Add test for username options parsing order, prompted by
- move a badly-place sentence to a less bad place
+ bz#2849.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 231e516bba860699a1eece6d48532d825f5f747b
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 6985cd32f38596882a3ac172ff8c510693b65283
-commit 89f09ee68730337015bf0c3f138504494a34e9a6
+commit e8f474554e3bda102a797a2fbab0594ccc66f097
Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Wed Jan 24 12:20:44 2018 +1100
-
- crypto_api.h needs includes.h
-
-commit c9c1bba06ad1c7cad8548549a68c071bd807af60
-Author: stsp@openbsd.org <stsp@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Jan 23 20:00:58 2018 +0000
+Date: Fri Apr 6 14:11:44 2018 +1000
- upstream commit
-
- Fix a logic bug in sshd_exchange_identification which
- prevented clients using major protocol version 2 from connecting to the
- server. ok millert@
+ Expose SSH_AUTH_INFO_0 to PAM auth modules
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8668dec04586e27f1c0eb039ef1feb93d80a5ee9
+ bz#2408, patch from Radoslaw Ejsmont; ok dtucker@
-commit a60c5dcfa2538ffc94dc5b5adb3db5b6ed905bdb
-Author: stsp@openbsd.org <stsp@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Jan 23 18:33:49 2018 +0000
+commit 014ba209cf4c6a159baa30ecebbaddfa97da7100
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Tue Apr 3 12:18:00 2018 +1000
- upstream commit
-
- Add missing braces; fixes 'write: Socket is not
- connected' error in ssh. ok deraadt@
-
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: db73a3a9e147722d410866cac34d43ed52e1ad24
+ Import regenerated moduli file.
-commit 20d53ac283e1c60245ea464bdedd015ed9b38f4a
+commit a0349a1cc4a18967ad1dbff5389bcdf9da098814
Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Tue Jan 23 16:49:43 2018 +1100
+Date: Mon Apr 2 15:38:28 2018 +1000
- rebuild depends
+ update versions in .spec files
-commit 552ea155be44f9c439c1f9f0c38f9e593428f838
+commit 816ad38f79792f5617e3913be306ddb27e91091c
Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Tue Jan 23 16:49:22 2018 +1100
+Date: Mon Apr 2 15:38:20 2018 +1000
- one SSH_BUG_BANNER instance that got away
+ update version number
-commit 14b5c635d1190633b23ac3372379517fb645b0c2
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Jan 23 05:27:21 2018 +0000
+commit 2c71ca1dd1efe458cb7dee3f8a1a566f913182c2
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Fri Mar 30 18:23:07 2018 +1100
- upstream commit
-
- Drop compatibility hacks for some ancient SSH
- implementations, including ssh.com <=2.* and OpenSSH <= 3.*.
-
- These versions were all released in or before 2001 and predate the
- final SSH RFCs. The hacks in question aren't necessary for RFC-
- compliant SSH implementations.
-
- ok markus@
+ Disable native strndup and strnlen on AIX.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4be81c67db57647f907f4e881fb9341448606138
+ On at least some revisions of AIX, strndup returns unterminated strings
+ under some conditions, apparently because strnlen returns incorrect
+ values in those cases. Disable both on AIX and use the replacements
+ from openbsd-compat. Fixes problem with ECDSA keys there, ok djm.
-commit 7c77991f5de5d8475cbeb7cbb06d0c7d1611d7bb
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Jan 23 05:17:04 2018 +0000
+commit 6b5a17bc14e896e3904dc58d889b58934cfacd24
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Mon Mar 26 13:12:44 2018 +1100
- upstream commit
-
- try harder to preserve errno during
- ssh_connect_direct() to make the final error message possibly accurate;
- bz#2814, ok dtucker@
+ Include ssh_api.h for struct ssh.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 57de882cb47381c319b04499fef845dd0c2b46ca
+ struct ssh is needed by implementations of sys_auth_passwd() that were
+ converted in commit bba02a50. Needed to fix build on AIX, I assume for
+ the other platforms too (although it should be harmless if not needed).
-commit 9e9c4a7e57b96ab29fe6d7545ed09d2e5bddbdec
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Jan 23 05:12:12 2018 +0000
+commit bc3f80e4d191b8e48650045dfa8a682cd3aabd4d
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Mon Mar 26 12:58:09 2018 +1100
- upstream commit
-
- unbreak support for clients that advertise a protocol
- version of "1.99" (indicating both v2 and v1 support). Busted by me during
- SSHv1 purge in r1.358; bz2810, ok dtucker
+ Remove UNICOS code missed during removal.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e8f9c2bee11afc16c872bb79d6abe9c555bd0e4b
+ Fixes compile error on AIX.
-commit fc21ea97968264ad9bb86b13fedaaec8fd3bf97d
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Jan 23 05:06:25 2018 +0000
+commit 9d57762c24882e2f000a21a0ffc8c5908a1fa738
+Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sat Mar 24 19:29:03 2018 +0000
- upstream commit
-
- don't attempt to force hostnames that are addresses to
- lowercase, but instead canonicalise them through getnameinfo/getaddrinfo to
- remove ambiguities (e.g. ::0001 => ::1) before they are matched against
- known_hosts; bz#2763, ok dtucker@
+ upstream: openssh-7.7
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ba0863ff087e61e5c65efdbe53be3cb92c9aefa0
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 274e614352460b9802c905f38fb5ea7ed5db3d41
-commit d6364f6fb1a3d753d7ca9bf15b2adce961324513
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Jan 23 05:01:15 2018 +0000
+commit 4b7d8acdbbceef247dc035e611e577174ed8a87e
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Mon Mar 26 09:37:02 2018 +1100
- upstream commit
-
- avoid modifying pw->pw_passwd; let endpwent() clean up
- for us, but keep a scrubbed copy; bz2777, ok dtucker@
+ Remove authinfo.sh test dependency on printenv
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 715afc0f59c6b82c4929a73279199ed241ce0752
+ Some platforms lack printenv in the default $PATH.
+ Reported by Tom G. Christensen
-commit a69bbb07cd6fb4dfb9bdcacd370ab26d0a2b4215
-Author: naddy@openbsd.org <naddy@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sat Jan 13 00:24:09 2018 +0000
+commit 4afeaf3dcb7dc70efd98fcfcb0ed28a6b40b820e
+Author: Tim Rice <tim@multitalents.net>
+Date: Sun Mar 25 10:00:21 2018 -0700
- upstream commit
-
- clarify authorship; prodded by and ok markus@
-
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e1938eee58c89b064befdabe232835fa83bb378c
+ Use libiaf on all sysv5 systems
-commit 04214b30be3d3e73a01584db4e040d5ccbaaddd4
-Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Jan 8 15:37:21 2018 +0000
+commit bba02a5094b3db228ceac41cb4bfca165d0735f3
+Author: Tim Rice <tim@multitalents.net>
+Date: Sun Mar 25 09:17:33 2018 -0700
- upstream commit
-
- group shared source files (e.g. SRCS_KEX) and allow
- compilation w/o OPENSSL ok djm@
+ modified: auth-sia.c
+ modified: openbsd-compat/port-aix.c
+ modified: openbsd-compat/port-uw.c
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: fa728823ba21c4b45212750e1d3a4b2086fd1a62
+ propogate changes to auth-passwd.c in commit
+ 7c856857607112a3dfe6414696bf4c7ab7fb0cb3 to other providers
+ of sys_auth_passwd()
-commit 25cf9105b849932fc3b141590c009e704f2eeba6
+commit d7a7a39168bdfe273587bf85d779d60569100a3f
Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Jan 8 15:21:49 2018 +0000
+Date: Sat Mar 24 19:29:03 2018 +0000
- upstream commit
-
- move subprocess() so scp/sftp do not need uidswap.o; ok
- djm@
+ upstream: openssh-7.7
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 6601b8360388542c2e5fef0f4085f8e54750bea8
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 274e614352460b9802c905f38fb5ea7ed5db3d41
-commit b0d34132b3ca26fe94013f01d7b92101e70b68bb
+commit 9efcaaac314c611c6c0326e8bac5b486c424bbd2
Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Jan 8 15:18:46 2018 +0000
+Date: Sat Mar 24 19:28:43 2018 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: fix bogus warning when signing cert keys using agent;
- switch ssh-pkcs11-helper to new API; ok djm@
+ from djm; ok deraadt dtucker
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e0c0ed2a568e25b1d2024f3e630f3fea837c2a42
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 12e50836ba2040042383a8b71e12d7ea06e9633d
-commit ec4a9831184c0c6ed5f7f0cfff01ede5455465a3
-Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Jan 8 15:15:36 2018 +0000
+commit 393436024d2e4b4c7a01f9cfa5854e7437896d11
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Sun Mar 25 09:40:46 2018 +1100
- upstream commit
-
- split client/server kex; only ssh-keygen needs
- uuencode.o; only scp/sftp use progressmeter.o; ok djm@
+ Replace /dev/stdin with "-".
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f2c9feb26963615c4fece921906cf72e248b61ee
+ For some reason sftp -b doesn't work with /dev/stdin on Cygwin, as noted
+ and suggested by vinschen at redhat.com.
-commit ec77efeea06ac62ee1d76fe0b3225f3000775a9e
-Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Jan 8 15:15:17 2018 +0000
+commit b5974de1a1d419e316ffb6524b1b277dda2f3b49
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Fri Mar 23 13:21:14 2018 +1100
- upstream commit
-
- only ssh-keygen needs uuencode.o; only scp/sftp use
- progressmeter.o
-
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a337e886a49f96701ccbc4832bed086a68abfa85
+ Provide $OBJ to paths in PuTTY interop tests.
-commit 25aae35d3d6ee86a8c4c0b1896acafc1eab30172
-Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Jan 8 15:14:44 2018 +0000
+commit dc31e79454e9b9140b33ad380565fdb59b9c4f33
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Mar 16 09:06:31 2018 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: Tell puttygen to use /dev/urandom instead of /dev/random. On
- uuencode.h is not used
+ OpenBSD they are both non-blocking, but on many other -portable platforms it
+ blocks, stalling tests.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 238eb4659f3c119904326b9e94a5e507a912796c
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 397d0d4c719c353f24d79f5b14775e0cfdf0e1cc
-commit 4f29309c4cb19bcb1774931db84cacc414f17d29
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Wed Jan 3 19:50:43 2018 +1100
+commit cb1f94431ef319cd48618b8b771b58739a8210cf
+Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Mar 22 07:06:11 2018 +0000
- unbreak fuzz harness
+ upstream: ssh/xmss: fix build; ok djm@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c9374ca41d4497f1c673ab681cc33f6e7c5dd186
-commit f6b50bf84dc0b61f22c887c00423e0ea7644e844
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Dec 21 05:46:35 2017 +0000
+commit 27979da9e4074322611355598f69175b9ff10d39
+Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Mar 22 07:05:48 2018 +0000
- upstream commit
-
- another libssh casualty
+ upstream: ssh/xmss: fix deserialize for certs; ok djm@
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 839b970560246de23e7c50215095fb527a5a83ec
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f44c41636c16ec83502039828beaf521c057dddc
-commit 5fb4fb5a0158318fb8ed7dbb32f3869bbf221f13
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Dec 21 03:01:49 2017 +0000
+commit c6cb2565c9285eb54fa9dfbb3890f5464aff410f
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Thu Mar 22 17:00:28 2018 +1100
- upstream commit
-
- missed one (unbreak after ssh/lib removal)
+ Save $? before case statement.
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: cfdd132143131769e2d2455e7892b5d55854c322
+ In some shells (FreeBSD 9, ash) the case statement resets $?, so save
+ for later testing.
-commit e6c4134165d05447009437a96e7201276688807f
+commit 4c4e7f783b43b264c247233acb887ee10ed4ce4d
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Dec 21 00:41:22 2017 +0000
+Date: Wed Mar 14 05:35:40 2018 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: rename recently-added "valid-before" key restriction to
- unbreak unit tests after removal of src/usr.bin/ssh/lib
+ "expiry-time" as the former is confusing wrt similar terminology in X.509;
+ pointed out by jsing@
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 3a79760494147b20761cbd2bd5c20e86c63dc8f9
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: ac8b41dbfd90cffd525d58350c327195b0937793
-commit d45d69f2a937cea215c7f0424e5a4677b6d8c7fe
+commit 500396b204c58e78ad9d081516a365a9f28dc3fd
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Dec 21 00:00:28 2017 +0000
+Date: Mon Mar 12 00:56:03 2018 +0000
- upstream commit
-
- revert stricter key type / signature type checking in
- userauth path; too much software generates inconsistent messages, so we need
- a better plan.
+ upstream: check valid-before option in authorized_keys
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4a44ddc991c803c4ecc8f1ad40e0ab4d22e1c519
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 7e1e4a84f7f099a290e5a4cbf4196f90ff2d7e11
-commit c5a6cbdb79752f7e761074abdb487953ea6db671
+commit a76b5d26c2a51d7dd7a5164e683ab3f4419be215
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Dec 19 00:49:30 2017 +0000
+Date: Mon Mar 12 00:54:04 2018 +0000
- upstream commit
-
- explicitly test all key types and their certificate
- counterparts
-
- refactor a little
+ upstream: explicitly specify RSA/SHA-2 keytype here too
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: e9ecd5580821b9ef8b7106919c6980d8e45ca8c4
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 74d7b24e8c72c27af6b481198344eb077e993a62
-commit f689adb7a370b5572612d88be9837ca9aea75447
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Dec 11 11:41:56 2017 +0000
+commit 3a43297ce29d37c64e37c7e21282cb219e28d3d1
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Mar 12 00:52:57 2018 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: exlicitly include RSA/SHA-2 keytypes in
- use cmp in a loop instead of diff -N to compare
- directories. The former works on more platforms for Portable.
+ PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes here
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: c3aa72807f9c488e8829a26ae50fe5bcc5b57099
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 954d19e0032a74e31697fb1dc7e7d3d1b2d65fe9
-commit 748dd8e5de332b24c40f4b3bbedb902acb048c98
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Tue Dec 19 16:17:59 2017 +1100
+commit 037fdc1dc2d68e1d43f9c9e2586c02cabc8f7cc8
+Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Mar 14 06:56:20 2018 +0000
- remove blocks.c from Makefile
+ upstream: sort expiry-time;
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8c7d82ee1e63e26ceb2b3d3a16514019f984f6bf
-commit 278856320520e851063b06cef6ef1c60d4c5d652
+commit abc0fa38c9bc136871f28e452c3465c3051fc785
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Dec 19 00:24:34 2017 +0000
+Date: Wed Mar 14 05:35:40 2018 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: rename recently-added "valid-before" key restriction to
- include signature type and CA key (if applicable) in some
- debug messages
+ "expiry-time" as the former is confusing wrt similar terminology in X.509;
+ pointed out by jsing@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b71615cc20e78cec7105bb6e940c03ce9ae414a5
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 376939466a1f562f3950a22314bc6505733aaae6
-commit 7860731ef190b52119fa480f8064ab03c44a120a
+commit bf0fbf2b11a44f06a64b620af7d01ff171c28e13
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Dec 18 23:16:23 2017 +0000
+Date: Mon Mar 12 00:52:01 2018 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: add valid-before="[time]" authorized_keys option. A
- unbreak hostkey rotation; attempting to sign with a
- desired signature algorithm of kex->hostkey_alg is incorrect when the key
- type isn't capable of making those signatures. ok markus@
+ simple way of giving a key an expiry date. ok markus@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 35ae46864e1f5859831ec0d115ee5ea50953a906
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1793b4dd5184fa87f42ed33c7b0f4f02bc877947
-commit 966ef478339ad5e631fb684d2a8effe846ce3fd4
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Dec 18 23:14:34 2017 +0000
+commit fbd733ab7adc907118a6cf56c08ed90c7000043f
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Mon Mar 12 19:17:26 2018 +1100
- upstream commit
-
- log mismatched RSA signature types; ok markus@
+ Add AC_LANG_PROGRAM to AC_COMPILE_IFELSE.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 381bddfcc1e297a42292222f3bcb5ac2b7ea2418
+ The recently added MIPS ABI tests need AC_LANG_PROGRAM to prevent
+ warnings from autoconf. Pointed out by klausz at haus-gisela.de.
-commit 349ecd4da3a985359694a74635748009be6baca6
+commit c7c458e8261b04d161763cd333d74e7a5842e917
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Dec 18 23:13:42 2017 +0000
+Date: Wed Mar 7 23:53:08 2018 +0000
- upstream commit
-
- pass kex->hostkey_alg and kex->hostkey_nid from pre-auth
- to post-auth unpriviledged child processes; ok markus@
+ upstream: revert recent strdelim() change, it causes problems with
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4a35bc7af0a5f8a232d1361f79f4ebc376137302
-
-commit c9e37a8725c083441dd34a8a53768aa45c3c53fe
-Author: millert@openbsd.org <millert@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Dec 18 17:28:54 2017 +0000
-
- upstream commit
+ some configs.
- Add helper function for uri handing in scp where a
- missing path simply means ".". Also fix exit code and add warnings when an
- invalid uri is encountered. OK otto@
+ revision 1.124
+ date: 2018/03/02 03:02:11; author: djm; state: Exp; lines: +19 -8; commitid: nNRsCijZiGG6SUTT;
+ Allow escaped quotes \" and \' in ssh_config and sshd_config quotes
+ option strings. bz#1596 ok markus@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 47dcf872380586dabf7fcc6e7baf5f8ad508ae1a
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 59c40b1b81206d713c06b49d8477402c86babda5
-commit 04c7e28f83062dc42f2380d1bb3a6bf0190852c0
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Dec 18 02:25:15 2017 +0000
+commit 0bcd871ccdf3baf2b642509ba4773d5be067cfa2
+Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Mar 5 07:03:18 2018 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: move the input format details to -f; remove the output
+
+ format details and point to sshd(8), where it is documented;
- pass negotiated signing algorithm though to
- sshkey_verify() and check that the negotiated algorithm matches the type in
- the signature (only matters for RSA SHA1/SHA2 sigs). ok markus@
+ ok dtucker
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 735fb15bf4adc060d3bee9d047a4bcaaa81b1af9
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 95f17e47dae02a6ac7329708c8c893d4cad0004a
-commit 931c78dfd7fe30669681a59e536bbe66535f3ee9
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Dec 18 02:22:29 2017 +0000
+commit 45011511a09e03493568506ce32f4891a174a3bd
+Author: Vicente Olivert Riera <Vincent.Riera@imgtec.com>
+Date: Tue Jun 20 16:42:28 2017 +0100
- upstream commit
+ configure.ac: properly set seccomp_audit_arch for MIPS64
- sshkey_sigtype() function to return the type of a
- signature; ok markus@
+ Currently seccomp_audit_arch is set to AUDIT_ARCH_MIPS64 or
+ AUDIT_ARCH_MIPSEL64 (depending on the endinness) when openssh is built
+ for MIPS64. However, that's only valid for n64 ABI. The right macros for
+ n32 ABI defined in seccomp.h are AUDIT_ARCH_MIPS64N32 and
+ AUDIT_ARCH_MIPSEL64N32, for big and little endian respectively.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d3772b065ad6eed97285589bfb544befed9032e8
-
-commit 4cdc5956f2fcc9e9078938db833142dc07d8f523
-Author: naddy@openbsd.org <naddy@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Dec 14 21:07:39 2017 +0000
-
- upstream commit
+ Because of that an sshd built for MIPS64 n32 rejects connection attempts
+ and the output of strace reveals that the problem is related to seccomp
+ audit:
- Replace ED25519's private SHA-512 implementation with a
- call to the regular digest code. This speeds up compilation considerably. ok
- markus@
+ [pid 194] prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, {len=57,
+ filter=0x555d5da0}) = 0
+ [pid 194] write(7, "\0\0\0]\0\0\0\5\0\0\0Ulist_hostkey_types: "..., 97) = ?
+ [pid 193] <... poll resumed> ) = 2 ([{fd=5, revents=POLLIN|POLLHUP},
+ {fd=6, revents=POLLHUP}])
+ [pid 194] +++ killed by SIGSYS +++
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: fcce8c3bcfe7389462a28228f63c823e80ade41c
+ This patch fixes that problem by setting the right value to
+ seccomp_audit_arch taking into account the MIPS64 ABI.
+
+ Signed-off-by: Vicente Olivert Riera <Vincent.Riera@imgtec.com>
-commit 012e5cb839faf76549e3b6101b192fe1a74d367e
-Author: naddy@openbsd.org <naddy@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Dec 12 15:06:12 2017 +0000
+commit 580086704c31de91dc7ba040a28e416bf1fefbca
+Author: Vicente Olivert Riera <Vincent.Riera@imgtec.com>
+Date: Tue Jun 20 16:42:11 2017 +0100
- upstream commit
-
- Create a persistent umac128.c source file: #define the
- output size and the name of the entry points for UMAC-128 before including
- umac.c. Idea from FreeBSD. ok dtucker@
+ configure.ac: detect MIPS ABI
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 463cfacfa07cb8060a4d4961e63dca307bf3f4b1
+ Signed-off-by: Vicente Olivert Riera <Vincent.Riera@imgtec.com>
-commit b35addfb4cd3b5cdb56a2a489d38e940ada926c7
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
-Date: Mon Dec 11 16:23:28 2017 +1100
+commit cd4e937aa701f70366cd5b5969af525dff6fdf15
+Author: Alan Yee <alyee@ucsd.edu>
+Date: Wed Mar 7 15:12:14 2018 -0800
- Update .depend with empty config.h
+ Use https URLs for links that support it.
-commit 2d96f28246938e0ca474a939d8ac82ecd0de27e3
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
-Date: Mon Dec 11 16:21:55 2017 +1100
+commit c0a0c3fc4a76b682db22146b28ddc46566db1ce9
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Mon Mar 5 20:03:07 2018 +1100
- Ensure config.h is always in dependencies.
-
- Put an empty config.h into the dependency list to ensure that it's
- always listed and consistent.
+ Disable UTMPX on SunOS4.
-commit ac4987a55ee5d4dcc8e87f7ae7c1f87be7257d71
-Author: deraadt@openbsd.org <deraadt@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sun Dec 10 19:37:57 2017 +0000
+commit 58fd4c5c0140f6636227ca7acbb149ab0c2509b9
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Mon Mar 5 19:28:08 2018 +1100
- upstream commit
-
- ssh/lib hasn't worked towards our code-sharing goals for
- a quit while, perhaps it is too verbose? Change each */Makefile to
- specifying exactly what sources that program requires, compiling it seperate.
- Maybe we'll iterate by sorting those into seperatable chunks, splitting up
- files which contain common code + server/client specific code, or whatnot.
- But this isn't one step, or we'd have done it a long time ago.. ok dtucker
- markus djm
+ Check for and work around buggy fflush(NULL).
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 5317f294d63a876bfc861e19773b1575f96f027d
+ Some really old platforms (eg SunOS4) segfault on fflush(NULL) so check
+ for and work around. With klausz at haus-gisela.de.
-commit 48c23a39a8f1069a57264dd826f6c90aa12778d5
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sun Dec 10 05:55:29 2017 +0000
+commit 71e48bc7945f867029e50e06c665c66aed6d3c64
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Mon Mar 5 10:22:32 2018 +1100
- upstream commit
-
- Put remote client info back into the ClientAlive
- connection termination message. Based in part on diff from lars.nooden at
- gmail, ok djm
+ Remove extra XMSS #endif
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 80a0f619a29bbf2f32eb5297a69978a0e05d0ee0
+ Extra #endif breaks compile with -DWITH_XMSS. Pointed out by Jack
+ Schmidt via github.
-commit aabd75ec76575c1b17232e6526a644097cd798e5
-Author: deraadt@openbsd.org <deraadt@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Dec 8 03:45:52 2017 +0000
+commit 055e09e2212ff52067786bf6d794ca9512ff7f0c
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sat Mar 3 06:37:53 2018 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: Update RSA minimum modulus size to 1024. sshkey.h rev 1.18
- time_t printing needs %lld and (long long) casts ok djm
+ bumped the minimum from 768 to 1024, update man page accordingly.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 4a93bc2b0d42a39b8f8de8bb74d07ad2e5e83ef7
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 27563ab4e866cd2aac40a5247876f6787c08a338
-commit fd4eeeec16537870bd40d04836c7906ec141c17d
+commit 7e4fadd3248d6bb7d39d6688c76a613d35d2efc1
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Dec 8 02:14:33 2017 +0000
+Date: Sun Mar 4 01:46:48 2018 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: for the pty control tests, just check that the PTY path
- fix ordering in previous to ensure errno isn't clobbered
- before logging.
+ points to something in /dev (rather than checking the device node itself);
+ makes life easier for portable, where systems with dynamic ptys can delete
+ nodes before we get around to testing their existence.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e260bc1e145a9690dcb0d5aa9460c7b96a0c8ab2
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: b1e455b821e62572bccd98102f8dd9d09bb94994
-commit 155072fdb0d938015df828836beb2f18a294ab8a
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Dec 8 02:13:02 2017 +0000
+commit 13ef4cf53f24753fe920832b990b25c9c9cd0530
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Sat Mar 3 16:21:20 2018 +1100
- upstream commit
-
- for some reason unix_listener() logged most errors twice
- with each message containing only some of the useful information; merge these
-
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1978a7594a9470c0dddcd719586066311b7c9a4a
+ Update PAM password change to new opts API.
-commit 79c0e1d29959304e5a49af1dbc58b144628c09f3
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
-Date: Mon Dec 11 14:38:33 2017 +1100
+commit 33561e68e0b27366cb769295a077aabc6a49d2a1
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Sat Mar 3 14:56:09 2018 +1100
- Add autogenerated dependency info to Makefile.
-
- Adds a .depend file containing dependency information generated by
- makedepend, which is appended to the generated Makefile by configure.
-
- You can regen the file with "make -f Makefile.in depend" if necessary,
- but we'll be looking at some way to automatically keep this up to date.
+ Add strndup for platforms that need it.
- "no objection" djm@
+ Some platforms don't have strndup, which includes Solaris 10, NetBSD 3
+ and FreeBSD 6.
-commit f001de8fbf7f3faddddd8efd03df18e57601f7eb
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
-Date: Mon Dec 11 13:42:51 2017 +1100
+commit e8a17feba95eef424303fb94441008f6c5347aaf
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Sat Mar 3 14:49:07 2018 +1100
- Fix pasto in ldns handling.
+ Flatten and alphabetize object file lists.
- When ldns-config is not found, configure would check the wrong variable.
- ok djm@
-
-commit c5bfe83f67cb64e71cf2fe0d1500f6904b0099ee
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
-Date: Sat Dec 9 10:12:23 2017 +1100
-
- Portable switched to git so s/CVS/git/.
-
-commit bb82e61a40a4ee52e4eb904caaee2c27b763ab5b
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
-Date: Sat Dec 9 08:06:00 2017 +1100
-
- Remove now-used check for perl.
+ This will make maintenance and changes easier. "no objection" tim@
-commit e0ce54c0b9ca3a9388f9c50f4fa6cc25c28a3240
+commit de1920d743d295f50e6905e5957c4172c038e8eb
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Dec 6 05:06:21 2017 +0000
+Date: Sat Mar 3 03:16:17 2018 +0000
- upstream commit
-
- don't accept junk after "yes" or "no" responses to
- hostkey prompts. bz#2803 reported by Maksim Derbasov; ok dtucker@
+ upstream: unit tests for new authorized_keys options API
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e1b159fb2253be973ce25eb7a7be26e6f967717c
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 820f9ec9c6301f6ca330ad4052d85f0e67d0bdc1
-commit 609d96b3d58475a15b2eb6b3d463f2c5d8e510c0
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Dec 5 23:59:47 2017 +0000
+commit dc3e92df17556dc5b0ab19cee8dcb2a6ba348717
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Mar 2 02:53:27 2018 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: fix testing of pty option, include positive test and
- Replace atoi and strtol conversions for integer arguments
- to config keywords with a checking wrapper around strtonum. This will
- prevent and flag invalid and negative arguments to these keywords. ok djm@
+ testing of restrict keyword
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 99ae3981f3d608a219ccb8d2fff635ae52c17998
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 4268f27c2706a0a95e725d9518c5bcbec9814c6d
-commit 168ecec13f9d7cb80c07df3bf7d414f4e4165e84
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Dec 5 23:56:07 2017 +0000
+commit 3d1edd1ebbc0aabea8bbe61903060f37137f7c61
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Mar 2 02:51:55 2018 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: better testing for port-forwarding and restrict flags in
- Add missing break for rdomain. Prevents spurious
- "Deprecated option" warnings. ok djm@
+ authorized_keys
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ba28a675d39bb04a974586241c3cba71a9c6099a
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: ee771df8955f2735df54746872c6228aff381daa
-commit 927f8514ceffb1af380a5f63ab4d3f7709b1b198
+commit 7c856857607112a3dfe6414696bf4c7ab7fb0cb3
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Dec 5 01:30:19 2017 +0000
+Date: Sat Mar 3 03:15:51 2018 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: switch over to the new authorized_keys options API and
+
+ remove the legacy one.
+
+ Includes a fairly big refactor of auth2-pubkey.c to retain less state
+ between key file lines.
- include the addr:port in bind/listen failure messages
+ feedback and ok markus@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: fdadb69fe1b38692608809cf0376b71c2c28e58e
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: dece6cae0f47751b9892080eb13d6625599573df
-commit a8c89499543e2d889629c4e5e8dcf47a655cf889
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Nov 29 05:49:54 2017 +0000
+commit 90c4bec8b5f9ec4c003ae4abdf13fc7766f00c8b
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sat Mar 3 03:06:02 2018 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: Introduce a new API for handling authorized_keys options.
- Import updated moduli.
+ This API parses options to a dedicated structure rather than the old API's
+ approach of setting global state. It also includes support for merging
+ options, e.g. from authorized_keys, authorized_principals and/or
+ certificates.
+
+ feedback and ok markus@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 524d210f982af6007aa936ca7f4c977f4d32f38a
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 98badda102cd575210d7802943e93a34232c80a2
-commit 3dde09ab38c8e1cfc28252be473541a81bc57097
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Nov 28 21:10:22 2017 +0000
+commit 26074380767e639ef89321610e146ae11016b385
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Sat Mar 3 03:01:50 2018 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: warn when the agent returns a signature type that was
- Have sftp print a warning about shell cleanliness when
- decoding the first packet fails, which is usually caused by shells polluting
- stdout of non-interactive starups. bz#2800, ok markus@ deraadt@.
+ different to what was requested. This might happen when an old/non-OpenSSH
+ agent is asked to make a rsa-sha2-256/512 signature but only supports
+ ssh-rsa. bz#2799 feedback and ok markus@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 88d6a9bf3470f9324b76ba1cbd53e50120f685b5
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 760c0f9438c5c58abc16b5f98008ff2d95cb13ce
-commit 6c8a246437f612ada8541076be2414846d767319
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
-Date: Fri Dec 1 17:11:47 2017 +1100
+commit f493d2b0b66fb003ed29f31dd66ff1aeb64be1fc
+Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Mar 2 21:40:15 2018 +0000
- Replace mkinstalldirs with mkdir -p.
+ upstream: apply a lick of paint; tweaks/ok dtucker
- Check for MIKDIR_P and use it instead of mkinstalldirs. Should fix "mkdir:
- cannot create directory:... File exists" during "make install".
- Patch from eb at emlix.com.
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 518a6736338045e0037f503c21027d958d05e703
-commit 3058dd78d2e43ed0f82ad8eab8bb04b043a72023
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
-Date: Fri Dec 1 17:07:08 2017 +1100
+commit 713d9cb510e0e7759398716cbe6dcf43e574be71
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Mar 2 03:02:11 2018 +0000
- Pull in newer install-sh from autoconf-2.69.
+ upstream: Allow escaped quotes \" and \' in ssh_config and
- Suggested by eb at emlix.com
-
-commit 79226e5413c5b0fda3511351a8511ff457e306d8
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
-Date: Fri Dec 1 16:55:35 2017 +1100
-
- Remove RSA1 host key generation.
+ sshd_config quotes option strings. bz#1596 ok markus@
- SSH1 support is now gone, remove SSH1 key generation.
- Patch from eb at emlix.com.
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: dd3a29fc2dc905e8780198e5a6a30b096de1a1cb
-commit 2937dd02c572a12f33d5c334d518f6cbe0b645eb
+commit 94b4e2d29afaaaef89a95289b16c18bf5627f7cd
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Nov 28 06:09:38 2017 +0000
+Date: Fri Mar 2 02:08:03 2018 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: refactor sshkey_read() to make it a little more, err,
- more whitespace errors
+ readable. ok markus
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 5e11c125378327b648940b90145e0d98beb05abb
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 2e9247b5762fdac3b6335dc606d3822121714c28
-commit 7f257bf3fd3a759f31098960cbbd1453fafc4164
-Author: djm@openbsd.org@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Nov 28 06:04:51 2017 +0000
+commit 5886b92968b360623491699247caddfb77a74d80
+Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
+Date: Thu Mar 1 20:32:16 2018 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: missing #ifdef for _PATH_HOST_XMSS_KEY_FILE; report by
- whitespace at EOL
+ jmc@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 76d3965202b22d59c2784a8df3a8bfa5ee67b96a
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9039cb69a3f9886bfef096891a9e7fcbd620280b
-commit 5db6fbf1438b108e5df3e79a1b4de544373bc2d4
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sat Nov 25 06:46:22 2017 +0000
+commit 3b36bed3d26f17f6a2b7e036e01777770fe1bcd4
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Feb 26 12:14:53 2018 +0000
- upstream commit
-
- Add monotime_ts and monotime_tv that return monotonic
- timespec and timeval respectively. Replace calls to gettimeofday() in packet
- timing with monotime_tv so that the callers will work over a clock step.
- Should prevent integer overflow during clock steps reported by wangle6 at
- huawei.com. "I like" markus@
+ upstream: Remove unneeded (local) include. ok markus@
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 74d684264814ff806f197948b87aa732cb1b0b8a
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 132812dd2296b1caa8cb07d2408afc28e4e60f93
-commit 2d638e986085bdf1a40310ed6e2307463db96ea0
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sat Nov 25 05:58:47 2017 +0000
+commit 27b9f3950e0289e225b57b7b880a8f1859dcd70b
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Feb 26 03:56:44 2018 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: Add $OpenBSD$ markers to xmss files to help keep synced
- Remove get_current_time() and replace with calls to
- monotime_double() which uses CLOCK_MONOTONIC and works over clock steps. "I
- like" markus@
+ with portable. ok djm@.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 3ad2f7d2414e2cfcaef99877a7a5b0baf2242952
-
-commit ba460acae48a36ef749cb23068f968f4d5d90a24
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
-Date: Fri Nov 24 16:24:31 2017 +1100
-
- Include string.h for explicit_bzero.
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 5233a27aafd1dfadad4b957225f95ae51eb365c1
-commit a65655fb1a12b77fb22f9e71559b9d73030ec8ff
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Fri Nov 24 10:23:47 2017 +1100
+commit afd830847a82ebbd5aeab05bad6d2c8ce74df1cd
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Feb 26 03:03:05 2018 +0000
- fix incorrect range of OpenSSL versions supported
+ upstream: Add newline at end of file to prevent compiler warnings.
- Pointed out by Solar Designer
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 52f247d4eafe840c7c14c8befa71a760a8eeb063
-commit 83a1e5dbec52d05775174f368e0c44b08619a308
-Author: djm@openbsd.org@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Nov 15 02:10:16 2017 +0000
+commit 941e0d3e9bb8d5e4eb70cc694441445faf037c84
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Wed Feb 28 19:59:35 2018 +1100
- upstream commit
-
- downgrade a couple more request parsing errors from
- process-fatal to just returning failure, making them consistent with the
- others that were already like that.
+ Add WITH_XMSS, move to prevent conflicts.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c111461f7a626690a2d53018ef26557b34652918
+ Add #ifdef WITH_XMSS to ssh-xmss.c, move it in the other files to after
+ includes.h so it's less likely to conflict and will pick up WITH_XMSS if
+ added to config.h.
-commit 93c68a8f3da8e5e6acdc3396f54d73919165e242
-Author: djm@openbsd.org@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Nov 15 00:13:40 2017 +0000
+commit a10d8552d0d2438da4ed539275abcbf557d1e7a8
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Tue Feb 27 14:45:17 2018 +1100
- upstream commit
-
- fix regression in 7.6: failure to parse a signature request
- message shouldn't be fatal to the process, just the request. Reported by Ron
- Frederick
+ Conditionally compile XMSS code.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e5d01b3819caa1a2ad51fc57d6ded43f48bbcc05
+ The XMSS code is currently experimental and, unlike the rest of OpenSSH
+ cannot currently be compiled with a c89 compiler.
-commit 548d3a66feb64c405733932a6b1abeaf7198fa71
-Author: djm@openbsd.org@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Nov 14 00:45:29 2017 +0000
+commit 146c3bd28c8dbee9c4b06465d9c9facab96b1e9b
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Mon Feb 26 12:51:29 2018 +1100
- upstream commit
-
- fix problem in configuration parsing when in config dump mode
- (sshd -T) without providing a full connection specification (sshd -T -C ...)
-
- spotted by bluhm@
-
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7125faf5740eaa9d3a2f25400a0bc85e94e28b8f
+ Check dlopen has RTLD_NOW before enabling pkcs11.
-commit 33edb6ebdc2f81ebed1bceadacdfb8910b64fb88
-Author: djm@openbsd.org@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Nov 3 05:18:44 2017 +0000
+commit 1323f120d06a26074c4d154fcbe7f49bcad3d741
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Tue Feb 27 08:41:25 2018 +1100
- upstream commit
-
- reuse parse_multistate for parse_flag (yes/no arguments).
- Saves a few lines of code and makes the parser more consistent wrt case-
- sensitivity. bz#2664 ok dtucker@
+ Check for attributes on prototype args.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b2ad1b6086858d5db71c7b11e5a74dba6d60efef
+ Some compilers (gcc 2.9.53, 3.0 and probably others, see gcc bug #3481)
+ do not accept __attribute__ on function pointer prototype args. Check for
+ this and hide them if they're not accepted.
-commit d52131a98316e76c0caa348f09bf6f7b9b01a1b9
-Author: djm@openbsd.org@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Nov 3 05:14:04 2017 +0000
+commit f0b245b0439e600fab782d19e97980e9f2c2533c
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Mon Feb 26 11:43:48 2018 +1100
- upstream commit
-
- allow certificate validity intervals that specify only a
- start or stop time (we already support specifying both or neither)
-
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9be486545603c003030bdb5c467d1318b46b4e42
+ Check if HAVE_DECL_BZERO correctly.
-commit fbe8e7ac94c2fa380421a9205a8bc966549c2f91
-Author: djm@openbsd.org@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Nov 3 03:46:52 2017 +0000
+commit c7ef4a399155e1621a532cc5e08e6fa773658dd4
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Mon Feb 26 17:42:56 2018 +1100
- upstream commit
-
- allow "cd" and "lcd" commands with no explicit path
- argument. lcd will change to the local user's home directory as usual. cd
- will change to the starting directory for session (because the protocol
- offers no way to obtain the remote user's home directory). bz#2760 ok
- dtucker@
-
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 15333f5087cee8c1ed1330cac1bd0a3e6a767393
+ Wrap <stdint.h> in #ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H.
-commit 0208a48517b5e8e8b091f32fa4addcd67c31ca9e
-Author: dtucker@openbsd.org@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Nov 3 03:18:53 2017 +0000
+commit ac53ce46cf8165cbda7f57ee045f9f32e1e92b31
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Mon Feb 26 16:24:23 2018 +1100
- upstream commit
-
- When doing a config test with sshd -T, only require the
- attributes that are actually used in Match criteria rather than (an
- incomplete list of) all criteria. ok djm@, man page help jmc@
+ Replace $(CURDIR) with $(PWD).
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b4e773c4212d3dea486d0259ae977551aab2c1fc
+ The former doesn't work on Solaris or BSDs.
-commit c357eed5a52cd2f4ff358b17e30e3f9a800644da
-Author: djm@openbsd.org@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Nov 3 02:32:19 2017 +0000
+commit 534b2680a15d14e7e60274d5b29b812d44cc5a44
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Mon Feb 26 14:51:59 2018 +1100
- upstream commit
-
- typos in ECDSA certificate names; bz#2787 reported by
- Mike Gerow
+ Comment out hexdump().
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 824938b6aba1b31321324ba1f56c05f84834b163
+ Nothing currently uses them but they cause conflicts on at least
+ FreeBSD, possibly others. ok djm@
-commit ecbf005b8fd80b81d0c61dfc1e96fe3da6099395
-Author: djm@openbsd.org@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Nov 3 02:29:17 2017 +0000
+commit 5aea4aa522f61bb2f34c3055a7de203909dfae77
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Mon Feb 26 14:39:14 2018 +1100
- upstream commit
-
- Private keys in PEM format have been encrypted by AES-128 for
- a while (not 3DES). bz#2788 reported by Calum Mackay
-
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: bd33da7acbbb3c882f0a0ee56007a35ce0d8a11a
+ typo: missing ;
-commit 81c9ccdbf6ddbf9bfbd6f1f775a5a7c13e47e185
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
-Date: Fri Nov 3 14:52:51 2017 +1100
+commit cd3ab57f9b388f8b1abf601dc4d78ff82d83b75e
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Mon Feb 26 14:37:06 2018 +1100
- Check for linux/if.h when enabling rdomain.
+ Hook up flock() compat code.
- musl libc doesn't seem to have linux/if.h, so check for its presence
- before enabling rdomain support on Linux.
+ Also a couple of minor changes: fail if we can't lock instead of
+ silently succeeding, and apply a couple of minor style fixes.
-commit fa1b834cce41a1ce3e6a8d57fb67ef18c9dd803f
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
-Date: Fri Nov 3 14:09:45 2017 +1100
+commit b087998d1ba90dd1ddb6bfdb17873dc3e7392798
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Mon Feb 26 14:27:02 2018 +1100
- Add headers for sys/sysctl.h and net/route.h
+ Import flock() compat from NetBSD.
- On at least older OpenBSDs, sys/sysctl.h and net/route.h require
- sys/types and, in the case of sys/sysctl.h, sys/param.h for MAXLOGNAME.
+ From NetBSD's src/trunk/tools/compat/flock.c, no OpenSSH changes yet.
-commit 41bff4da21fcd8a7c6a83a7e0f92b018f904f6fb
-Author: djm@openbsd.org@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Nov 3 02:22:41 2017 +0000
+commit 89212533dde6798324e835b1499084658df4579e
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Mon Feb 26 12:32:14 2018 +1100
- upstream commit
-
- avoid unused variable warnings for !WITH_OPENSSL; patch from
- Marcus Folkesson
+ Fix breakage when REGRESSTMP not set.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c01d27a3f907acdc3dd4ea48170fac3ba236d229
+ BUILDDIR is not set where used for REGRESSTMP, use make's CURDIR
+ instead. Pointed out by djm@.
-commit 6b373e4635a7470baa94253dd1dc8953663da9e8
-Author: Marcus Folkesson <marcus.folkesson@gmail.com>
-Date: Sat Oct 28 19:48:39 2017 +0200
+commit f885474137df4b89498c0b8834c2ac72c47aa4bd
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Mon Feb 26 12:18:14 2018 +1100
- only enable functions in dh.c when openssl is used
-
- Signed-off-by: Marcus Folkesson <marcus.folkesson@gmail.com>
+ XMSS-related files get includes.h
-commit 939b30ba23848b572e15bf92f0f1a3d9cf3acc2b
-Author: djm@openbsd.org@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Nov 1 00:04:15 2017 +0000
+commit 612faa34c72e421cdc9e63f624526bae62d557cc
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Mon Feb 26 12:17:55 2018 +1100
- upstream commit
-
- fix broken stdout in ControlPersist mode, introduced by me in
- r1.467 and reported by Alf Schlichting
-
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 3750a16e02108fc25f747e4ebcedb7123c1ef509
+ object files end with .o - not .c
-commit f21455a084f9cc3942cf1bde64055a4916849fed
-Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
-Date: Tue Oct 31 10:09:33 2017 +1100
+commit bda709b8e13d3eef19e69c2d1684139e3af728f5
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Mon Feb 26 12:17:22 2018 +1100
- Include includes.h for HAVE_GETPAGESIZE.
-
- The configure script checks for getpagesize() and sets HAVE_GETPAGESIZE in
- config.h, but bsd-getpagesize.c forgot to include includes.h (which
- indirectly includes config.h) so the checks always fails, causing linker
- issues when linking statically on systems with getpagesize().
+ avoid inclusion of deprecated selinux/flask.h
- Patch from Peter Korsgaard <peter at korsgaard.com>
+ Use string_to_security_class() instead.
-commit f2ad63c0718b93ac1d1e85f53fee33b06eef86b5
-Author: djm@openbsd.org@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Oct 30 22:01:52 2017 +0000
+commit 2e396439365c4ca352cac222717d09b14f8a0dfd
+Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
+Date: Mon Feb 26 11:48:27 2018 +1100
- upstream commit
-
- whitespace at EOL
-
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: f4b5df99b28c6f63478deb916c6ed0e794685f07
+ updatedepend
-commit c6415b1f8f1d0c2735564371647fd6a177fb9a3e
-Author: djm@openbsd.org@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Oct 30 21:59:43 2017 +0000
+commit 1b11ea7c58cd5c59838b5fa574cd456d6047b2d4
+Author: markus@openbsd.org <markus@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Feb 23 15:58:37 2018 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: Add experimental support for PQC XMSS keys (Extended
- whitespace at EOL
+ Hash-Based Signatures) The code is not compiled in by default (see WITH_XMSS
+ in Makefile.inc) Joint work with stefan-lukas_gazdag at genua.eu See
+ https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-irtf-cfrg-xmss-hash-based-signatures-12 ok
+ djm@
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 19b1394393deee4c8a2114a3b7d18189f27a15cd
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ef3eccb96762a5d6f135d7daeef608df7776a7ac
-commit e4d4ddbbba0e585ca3ec3a455430750b4622a6d3
-Author: millert@openbsd.org@openbsd.org <millert@openbsd.org@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Oct 25 20:08:36 2017 +0000
+commit 7d330a1ac02076de98cfc8fda05353d57b603755
+Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Feb 23 07:38:09 2018 +0000
- upstream commit
-
- Use printenv to test whether an SSH_USER_AUTH is set
- instead of using $SSH_USER_AUTH. The latter won't work with csh which treats
- unknown variables as an error when expanding them. OK markus@
+ upstream: some cleanup for BindInterface and ssh-keyscan;
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: f601e878dd8b71aa40381573dde3a8f567e6f2d1
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1a719ebeae22a166adf05bea5009add7075acc8c
-commit 116b1b439413a724ebb3320633a64dd0f3ee1fe7
-Author: millert@openbsd.org@openbsd.org <millert@openbsd.org@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Oct 24 19:33:32 2017 +0000
+commit c7b5a47e3b9db9a0f0198f9c90c705f6307afc2b
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Sun Feb 25 23:55:41 2018 +1100
- upstream commit
-
- Add tests for URI parsing. OK markus@
+ Invert sense of getpgrp test.
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 5d1df19874f3b916d1a2256a905526e17a98bd3b
+ AC_FUNC_GETPGRP tests if getpgrp(0) works, which it does if it's not
+ declared. Instead, test if the zero-arg version we want to use works.
-commit dbe0662e9cd482593a4a8bf58c6481bfe8a747a4
-Author: djm@openbsd.org@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Oct 27 01:57:06 2017 +0000
+commit b39593a6de5290650a01adf8699c6460570403c2
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Sun Feb 25 13:25:15 2018 +1100
- upstream commit
-
- whitespace at EOL
-
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c95549cf5a07d56ea11aaff818415118720214f6
+ Add no-op getsid implmentation.
-commit d2135474344335a7c6ee643b6ade6db400fa76ee
-Author: djm@openbsd.org@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Oct 27 01:01:17 2017 +0000
+commit 11057564eb6ab8fd987de50c3d7f394c6f6632b7
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Sun Feb 25 11:22:57 2018 +1100
- upstream commit
-
- whitespace at EOL (lots)
-
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 757257dd44116794ee1b5a45c6724973de181747
+ bsd-statvfs: include sys/vfs.h, check for f_flags.
-commit b77c29a07f5a02c7c1998701c73d92bde7ae1608
-Author: djm@openbsd.org@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Oct 27 00:18:41 2017 +0000
+commit e9dede06e5bc582a4aeb5b1cd5a7a640d7de3609
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Sun Feb 25 10:20:31 2018 +1100
- upstream commit
-
- improve printing of rdomain on accept() a little
+ Handle calloc(0,x) where different from malloc.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 5da58db2243606899cedaa646c70201b2d12247a
+ Configure assumes that if malloc(0) returns null then calloc(0,n)
+ also does. On some old platforms (SunOS4) malloc behaves as expected
+ (as determined by AC_FUNC_MALLOC) but calloc doesn't. Test for this
+ at configure time and activate the replacement function if found, plus
+ handle this case in rpl_calloc.
-commit 68d3bbb2e6dfbf117c46e942142795b2cdd0274b
-Author: jmc@openbsd.org@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Oct 26 06:44:01 2017 +0000
+commit 2eb4041493fd2635ffdc64a852d02b38c4955e0b
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Sat Feb 24 21:06:48 2018 +1100
- upstream commit
-
- mark up the rdomain keyword;
-
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1b597d0ad0ad20e94dbd61ca066057e6f6313b8a
+ Add prototype for readv if needed.
-commit 0b2e2896b9d0d6cfb59e9ec8271085296bd4e99b
-Author: jmc@openbsd.org@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Oct 25 06:19:46 2017 +0000
+commit 6c8c9a615b6d31db8a87bc25033f053d5b0a831e
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Sat Feb 24 20:46:37 2018 +1100
- upstream commit
-
- tweak the uri text, specifically removing some markup to
- make it a bit more readable;
-
- issue reported by - and diff ok - millert
-
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8b56a20208040b2d0633536fd926e992de37ef3f
+ Check for raise and supply if needed.
-commit 7530e77bdc9415386d2a8ea3d086e8b611b2ba40
-Author: jmc@openbsd.org@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Oct 25 06:18:06 2017 +0000
+commit a9004425a032d7a7141a5437cfabfd02431e2a74
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Sat Feb 24 20:25:22 2018 +1100
- upstream commit
-
- simplify macros in previous, and some minor tweaks;
+ Check for bzero and supply if needed.
- OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 6efeca3d8b095b76e21b484607d9cc67ac9a11ca
+ Since explicit_bzero uses it via an indirect it needs to be a function
+ not just a macro.
-commit eb9c582b710dc48976b48eb2204218f6863bae9a
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Tue Oct 31 00:46:29 2017 +1100
+commit 1a348359e4d2876203b5255941bae348557f4f54
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Feb 23 05:14:05 2018 +0000
- Switch upstream git repository.
-
- Previously portable OpenSSH has synced against a conversion of OpenBSD's
- CVS repository made using the git cvsimport tool, but this has become
- increasingly unreliable.
-
- As of this commit, portable OpenSSH now tracks a conversion of the
- OpenBSD CVS upstream made using the excellent cvs2gitdump tool from
- YASUOKA Masahiko: https://github.com/yasuoka/cvs2gitdump
-
- cvs2gitdump is considerably more reliable than gitcvsimport and the old
- version of cvsps that it uses under the hood, and is the same tool used
- to export the entire OpenBSD repository to git (so we know it can cope
- with future growth).
-
- These new conversions are mirrored at github, so interested parties can
- match portable OpenSSH commits to their upstream counterparts.
-
- https://github.com/djmdjm/openbsd-openssh-src
- https://github.com/djmdjm/openbsd-openssh-regress
-
- An unfortunate side effect of switching upstreams is that we must have
- a flag day, across which the upstream commit IDs will be inconsistent.
- The old commit IDs are recorded with the tags "Upstream-ID" for main
- directory commits and "Upstream-Regress-ID" for regress commits.
-
- To make it clear that the commit IDs do not refer to the same
- things, the new repository will instead use "OpenBSD-ID" and
- "OpenBSD-Regress-ID" tags instead.
+ upstream: Add ssh-keyscan -D option to make it print its results in
- Apart from being a longwinded explanation of what is going on, this
- commit message also serves to synchronise our tools with the state of
- the tree, which happens to be:
+ SSHFP format bz#2821, ok dtucker@
- OpenBSD-ID: 9c43a9968c7929613284ea18e9fb92e4e2a8e4c1
- OpenBSD-Regress-ID: b33b385719420bf3bc57d664feda6f699c147fef
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 831446b582e0f298ca15c9d99c415c899e392221
-commit 2de5c6b53bf063ac698596ef4e23d8e3099656ea
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Fri Oct 27 08:42:33 2017 +1100
+commit 3e19fb976a47b44b3d7c4f8355269f7f2c5dd82c
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Feb 23 04:18:46 2018 +0000
- fix rdomain compilation errors
+ upstream: Add missing braces.
+
+ Caught by the tinderbox's -Werror=misleading-indentation, ok djm@
+
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d44656af594c3b2366eb87d6abcef83e1c88a6ca
-commit 6bd5b569fd6dfd5e8c8af20bbc41e45c2d6462ab
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Wed Oct 25 14:15:42 2017 +1100
+commit b59162da99399d89bd57f71c170c0003c55b1583
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Fri Feb 23 15:20:42 2018 +1100
- autoconf glue to enable Linux VRF
+ Check for ifaddrs.h for BindInterface.
+
+ BindInterface required getifaddr and friends so disable if not available
+ (eg Solaris 10). We should be able to add support for some systems with
+ a bit more work but this gets the building again.
-commit 97c5aaf925d61641d599071abb56012cde265978
+commit a8dd6fe0aa10b6866830b4688a73ef966f0aed88
Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Wed Oct 25 14:09:56 2017 +1100
+Date: Fri Feb 23 14:19:11 2018 +1100
- basic valid_rdomain() implementation for Linux
+ space before tab in previous
-commit ce1cca39d7935dd394080ce2df62f5ce5b51f485
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Wed Oct 25 13:47:59 2017 +1100
+commit b5e9263c7704247f9624c8f5c458e9181fcdbc09
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Feb 9 03:40:22 2018 +0000
- implement get/set_rdomain() for Linux
+ upstream: Replace fatal with exit in the case that we do not have
- Not enabled, pending implementation of valid_rdomain() and autoconf glue
-
-commit 6eee79f9b8d4a3b113b698383948a119acb82415
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Wed Oct 25 13:22:29 2017 +1100
-
- stubs for rdomain replacement functions
+ $SUDO set. Prevents test failures when neither sudo nor doas are configured.
+
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 6a0464decc4f8ac7d6eded556a032b0fc521bc7b
-commit f5594f939f844bbb688313697d6676238da355b3
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Wed Oct 25 13:13:57 2017 +1100
+commit 3e9d3192ad43758ef761c5b0aa3ac5ccf8121ef2
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Fri Feb 23 14:10:53 2018 +1100
- rename port-tun.[ch] => port-net.[ch]
-
- Ahead of adding rdomain support
+ Use portable syntax for REGRESSTMP.
-commit d685e5a31feea35fb99e1a31a70b3c60a7f2a0eb
+commit 73282b61187883a2b2bb48e087fdda1d751d6059
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Oct 25 02:10:39 2017 +0000
+Date: Fri Feb 23 03:03:00 2018 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: unbreak interop test after SSHv1 purge; patch from Colin
- uninitialised variable in PermitTunnel printing code
+ Watson via bz#2823
- Upstream-ID: f04dc33e42855704e116b8da61095ecc71bc9e9a
-
-commit 43c29bb7cfd46bbbc61e0ffa61a11e74d49a712f
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Wed Oct 25 13:10:59 2017 +1100
-
- provide hooks and fallbacks for rdomain support
-
-commit 3235473bc8e075fad7216b7cd62fcd2b0320ea04
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Wed Oct 25 11:25:43 2017 +1100
-
- check for net/route.h and sys/sysctl.h
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 807d30a597756ed6612bdf46dfebca74f49cb31a
-commit 4d5456c7de108e17603a0920c4d15bca87244921
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Oct 25 00:21:37 2017 +0000
+commit f8985dde5f46aedade0373365cbf86ed3f1aead2
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Feb 9 03:42:57 2018 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: Skip sftp-chroot test when SUDO not set instead of
- transfer ownership of stdout to the session channel by
- dup2'ing /dev/null to fd 1. This allows propagation of remote stdout close to
- the local side; reported by David Newall, ok markus@
+ fatal().
- Upstream-ID: 8d9ac18a11d89e6b0415f0cbf67b928ac67f0e79
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: cd4b5f1109b0dc09af4e5ea7d4968c43fbcbde88
-commit 68af80e6fdeaeb79432209db614386ff0f37e75f
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Oct 25 00:19:47 2017 +0000
+commit df88551c02d4e3445c44ff67ba8757cff718609a
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Feb 9 03:40:22 2018 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: Replace fatal with exit in the case that we do not have
- add a "rdomain" criteria for the sshd_config Match
- keyword to allow conditional configuration that depends on which rdomain(4) a
- connection was recevied on. ok markus@
+ $SUDO set. Prevents test failures when neither sudo nor doas are configured.
- Upstream-ID: 27d8fd5a3f1bae18c9c6e533afdf99bff887a4fb
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: 6a0464decc4f8ac7d6eded556a032b0fc521bc7b
-commit 35eb33fb957979e3fcbe6ea0eaee8bf4a217421a
+commit 3b252c20b19f093e87363de197f1100b79705dd3
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Oct 25 00:17:08 2017 +0000
+Date: Thu Feb 8 08:46:20 2018 +0000
- upstream commit
-
- add sshd_config RDomain keyword to place sshd and the
- subsequent user session (including the shell and any TCP/IP forwardings) into
- the specified rdomain(4)
-
- ok markus@
+ upstream: some helpers to check verbose/quiet mode
- Upstream-ID: be2358e86346b5cacf20d90f59f980b87d1af0f5
+ OpenBSD-Regress-ID: e736aac39e563f5360a0935080a71d5fdcb976de
-commit acf559e1cffbd1d6167cc1742729fc381069f06b
+commit ac2e3026bbee1367e4cda34765d1106099be3287
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Oct 25 00:15:35 2017 +0000
+Date: Fri Feb 23 02:34:33 2018 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: Add BindInterface ssh_config directive and -B
+
+ command-line argument to ssh(1) that directs it to bind its outgoing
+ connection to the address of the specified network interface.
- Add optional rdomain qualifier to sshd_config's
- ListenAddress option to allow listening on a different rdomain(4), e.g.
+ BindInterface prefers to use addresses that aren't loopback or link-
+ local, but will fall back to those if no other addresses of the
+ required family are available on that interface.
- ListenAddress 0.0.0.0 rdomain 4
+ Based on patch by Mike Manning in bz#2820, ok dtucker@
- Upstream-ID: 24b6622c376feeed9e9be8b9605e593695ac9091
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c5064d285c2851f773dd736a2c342aa384fbf713
-commit b9903ee8ee8671b447fc260c2bee3761e26c7227
-Author: millert@openbsd.org <millert@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Oct 24 19:41:45 2017 +0000
+commit fcdb9d777839a3fa034b3bc3067ba8c1f6886679
+Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
+Date: Mon Feb 19 00:55:02 2018 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: emphasise that the hostkey rotation may send key types
- Kill dead store and some spaces vs. tabs indent in
- parse_user_host_path(). Noticed by markus@
+ that the client may not support, and that the client should simply disregard
+ such keys (this is what ssh does already).
- Upstream-ID: 114fec91dadf9af46c7c94fd40fc630ea2de8200
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 65f8ffbc32ac8d12be8f913d7c0ea55bef8622bf
-commit 0869627e00f4ee2a038cb62d7bd9ffad405e1800
-Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
-Date: Tue Oct 24 06:27:42 2017 +0000
+commit ce066f688dc166506c082dac41ca686066e3de5f
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Thu Feb 22 20:45:09 2018 +1100
- upstream commit
-
- tweak previous; ok djm
+ Add headers for sys/audit.h.
- Upstream-ID: 7d913981ab315296be1f759c67b6e17aea38fca9
+ On some older platforms (at least sunos4, probably others) sys/audit.h
+ requires some other headers. Patch from klausz at haus-gisela.de.
-commit e3fa20e2e58fdc88a0e842358778f2de448b771b
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Mon Oct 23 16:25:24 2017 +1100
+commit 3fd2d2291a695c96a54269deae079bacce6e3fb9
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Mon Feb 19 18:37:40 2018 +1100
- avoid -Wsign-compare warning in argv copying
+ Add REGRESSTMP make var override.
+
+ Defaults to original location ($srcdir/regress) but allows overriding
+ if desired, eg a directory in /tmp.
-commit b7548b12a6b2b4abf4d057192c353147e0abba08
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Oct 23 05:08:00 2017 +0000
+commit f8338428588f3ecb5243c86336eccaa28809f97e
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Sun Feb 18 15:53:15 2018 +1100
- upstream commit
-
- Expose devices allocated for tun/tap forwarding.
-
- At the client, the device may be obtained from a new %T expansion
- for LocalCommand.
-
- At the server, the allocated devices will be listed in a
- SSH_TUNNEL variable exposed to the environment of any user sessions
- started after the tunnel forwarding was established.
-
- ok markus
+ Remove now-unused check for getrusage.
- Upstream-ID: e61e53f8ae80566e9ddc0d67a5df5bdf2f3c9f9e
+ getrusage was used in ssh-rand-helper but that's now long gone.
+ Patch from klauszh at haus-gisela.de.
-commit 887669ef032d63cf07f53cada216fa8a0c9a7d72
-Author: millert@openbsd.org <millert@openbsd.org>
-Date: Sat Oct 21 23:06:24 2017 +0000
+commit 8570177195f6a4b3173c0a25484a83641ee3faa6
+Author: dtucker@openbsd.org <dtucker@openbsd.org>
+Date: Fri Feb 16 04:43:11 2018 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: Don't send IUTF8 to servers that don't like them.
- Add URI support to ssh, sftp and scp. For example
- ssh://user@host or sftp://user@host/path. The connection parameters
- described in draft-ietf-secsh-scp-sftp-ssh-uri-04 are not implemented since
- the ssh fingerprint format in the draft uses md5 with no way to specify the
- hash function type. OK djm@
+ Some SSH servers eg "ConfD" drop the connection if the client sends the
+ new IUTF8 (RFC8160) terminal mode even if it's not set. Add a bug bit
+ for such servers and avoid sending IUTF8 to them. ok djm@
- Upstream-ID: 4ba3768b662d6722de59e6ecb00abf2d4bf9cacc
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 26425855402d870c3c0a90491e72e2a8a342ceda
-commit d27bff293cfeb2252f4c7a58babe5ad3262c6c98
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Fri Oct 20 13:22:00 2017 +1100
+commit f6dc2ba3c9d12be53057b9371f5109ec553a399f
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Fri Feb 16 17:32:28 2018 +1100
- Fix missed RCSID merges
+ freezero should check for NULL.
-commit d3b6aeb546242c9e61721225ac4387d416dd3d5e
+commit 680321f3eb46773883111e234b3c262142ff7c5b
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Oct 20 02:13:41 2017 +0000
+Date: Fri Feb 16 02:40:45 2018 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: Mention recent DH KEX methods:
- more RCSIDs
+ diffie-hellman-group14-sha256
+ diffie-hellman-group16-sha512
+ diffie-hellman-group18-sha512
+
+ From Jakub Jelen via bz#2826
- Upstream-Regress-ID: 1aecbe3f8224793f0ec56741a86d619830eb33be
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 51bf769f06e55447f4bfa7306949e62d2401907a
-commit b011edbb32e41aaab01386ce4c0efcc9ff681c4a
+commit 88c50a5ae20902715f0fca306bb9c38514f71679
Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Oct 20 01:56:39 2017 +0000
+Date: Fri Feb 16 02:32:40 2018 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: stop loading DSA keys by default, remove sshd_config
- add RCSIDs to these; they make syncing portable a bit
- easier
+ stanza and manpage bits; from Colin Watson via bz#2662, ok dtucker@
- Upstream-ID: 56cb7021faea599736dd7e7f09c2e714425b1e68
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d33a849f481684ff655c140f5eb1b4acda8c5c09
-commit 6eb27597781dccaf0ec2b80107a9f0592a0cb464
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Fri Oct 20 12:54:15 2017 +1100
+commit d2b3db2860c962927def39a52f67f1c23f7b201a
+Author: jsing@openbsd.org <jsing@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Feb 14 16:27:24 2018 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: Ensure that D mod (P-1) and D mod (Q-1) are calculated in
- Apply missing commit 1.11 to kexc25519s.c
+ constant time.
- Upstream-ID: 5f020e23a1ee6c3597af1f91511e68552cdf15e8
-
-commit 6f72280553cb6918859ebcacc717f2d2fafc1a27
-Author: Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
-Date: Fri Oct 20 12:52:50 2017 +1100
-
- upstream commit
+ This avoids a potential side channel timing leak.
- Apply missing commit 1.127 to servconf.h
+ ok djm@ markus@
- Upstream-ID: f14c4bac74a2b7cf1e3cff6bea5c447f192a7d15
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 71ff3c16be03290e63d8edab8fac053d8a82968c
-commit bb3e16ab25cb911238c2eb7455f9cf490cb143cc
-Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Oct 18 05:36:59 2017 +0000
+commit 4270efad7048535b4f250f493d70f9acfb201593
+Author: jsing@openbsd.org <jsing@openbsd.org>
+Date: Wed Feb 14 16:03:32 2018 +0000
- upstream commit
+ upstream: Some obvious freezero() conversions.
- remove unused Pp;
+ This also zeros an ed25519_pk when it was not being zeroed previously.
+
+ ok djm@ dtucker@
- Upstream-ID: 8ad26467f1f6a40be887234085a8e01a61a00550
+ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 5c196a3c85c23ac0bd9b11bcadaedd90b7a2ce82
-commit 05b69e99570553c8e1eafb895b1fbf1d098d2e14
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Wed Oct 18 02:49:44 2017 +0000
+commit affa6ba67ffccc30b85d6e98f36eb5afd9386882
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Thu Feb 15 22:32:04 2018 +1100
- upstream commit
-
- In the description of pattern-lists, clarify negated
- matches by explicitly stating that a negated match will never yield a
- positive result, and that at least one positive term in the pattern-list must
- match. bz#1918
-
- Upstream-ID: 652d2f9d993f158fc5f83cef4a95cd9d95ae6a14
+ Remove execute bit from modpipe.c.
-commit eb80e26a15c10bc65fed8b8cdb476819a713c0fd
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Oct 13 21:13:54 2017 +0000
+commit 9879dca438526ae6dfd656fecb26b0558c29c731
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Thu Feb 15 22:26:16 2018 +1100
- upstream commit
-
- log debug messages sent to peer; ok deraadt markus
-
- Upstream-ID: 3b4fdc0a06ea5083f61d96e20043000f477103d9
+ Update prngd link to point to sourceforge.
-commit 071325f458d615d7740da5c1c1d5a8b68a0b4605
-Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Oct 13 16:50:45 2017 +0000
+commit b6973fa5152b1a0bafd2417b7c3ad96f6e87d014
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Thu Feb 15 22:22:38 2018 +1100
- upstream commit
-
- trim permitrootlogin description somewhat, to avoid
- ambiguity; original diff from walter alejandro iglesias, tweaked by sthen and
- myself
-
- ok sthen schwarze deraadt
-
- Upstream-ID: 1749418b2bc073f3fdd25fe21f8263c3637fe5d2
+ Remove references to UNICOS.
-commit 10727487becb897a15f658e0cb2d05466236e622
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Oct 13 06:45:18 2017 +0000
+commit f1ca487940449f0b64f38f1da575078257609966
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Thu Feb 15 22:18:37 2018 +1100
- upstream commit
-
- mention SSH_USER_AUTH in the list of environment
- variables
-
- Upstream-ID: 1083397c3ee54b4933121ab058c70a0fc6383691
+ Remove extra newline.
-commit 224f193d6a4b57e7a0cb2b9ecd3b6c54d721d8c2
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Fri Oct 13 06:24:51 2017 +0000
+commit 6d4e980f3cf27f409489cf89cd46c21501b13731
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Thu Feb 15 22:16:54 2018 +1100
- upstream commit
-
- BIO_get_mem_data() is supposed to take a char* as pointer
- argument, so don't pass it a const char*
-
- Upstream-ID: 1ccd91eb7f4dd4f0fa812d4f956987cd00b5f6ec
+ OpenSSH's builtin entropy gathering is long gone.
-commit cfa46825b5ef7097373ed8e31b01a4538a8db565
-Author: benno@openbsd.org <benno@openbsd.org>
-Date: Mon Oct 9 20:12:51 2017 +0000
+commit 389125b25d1a1d7f22e907463b7e8eca74af79ea
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Thu Feb 15 21:43:01 2018 +1100
- upstream commit
-
- clarify the order in which config statements are used. ok
- jmc@ djm@
+ Replace remaining mysignal() with signal().
- Upstream-ID: e37e27bb6bbac71315e22cb9690fd8a556a501ed
+ These seem to have been missed during the replacement of mysignal
+ with #define signal in commit 5ade9ab. Both include the requisite
+ headers to pick up the #define.
-commit dceabc7ad7ebc7769c8214a1647af64c9a1d92e5
-Author: djm@openbsd.org <djm@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Oct 5 15:52:03 2017 +0000
+commit 265d88d4e61e352de6791733c8b29fa3d7d0c26d
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Thu Feb 15 20:06:19 2018 +1100
- upstream commit
-
- replace statically-sized arrays in ServerOptions with
- dynamic ones managed by xrecallocarray, removing some arbitrary (though
- large) limits and saving a bit of memory; "much nicer" markus@
-
- Upstream-ID: 1732720b2f478fe929d6687ac7b0a97ff2efe9d2
+ Remove remaining now-obsolete cvs $Ids.
-commit 2b4f3ab050c2aaf6977604dd037041372615178d
-Author: jmc@openbsd.org <jmc@openbsd.org>
-Date: Thu Oct 5 12:56:50 2017 +0000
+commit 015749e9b1d2f6e14733466d19ba72f014d0845c
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Thu Feb 15 17:01:54 2018 +1100
- upstream commit
-
- %C is hashed; from klemens nanni ok markus
+ Regenerate dependencies after UNICOS removal.
+
+commit ddc0f3814881ea279a6b6d4d98e03afc60ae1ed7
+Author: Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
+Date: Tue Feb 13 09:10:46 2018 +1100
+
+ Remove UNICOS support.
- Upstream-ID: 6ebed7b2e1b6ee5402a67875d74f5e2859d8f998
+ The code required to support it is quite invasive to the mainline
+ code that is synced with upstream and is an ongoing maintenance burden.
+ Both the hardware and software are literal museum pieces these days and
+ we could not find anyone still running OpenSSH on one.
diff --git a/INSTALL b/INSTALL
index 814768791b60..23bcf384c883 100644
--- a/INSTALL
+++ b/INSTALL
@@ -1,266 +1,282 @@
1. Prerequisites
----------------
A C compiler. Any C89 or better compiler should work. Where supported,
configure will attempt to enable the compiler's run-time integrity checking
options. Some notes about specific compilers:
- clang: -ftrapv and -sanitize=integer require the compiler-rt runtime
(CC=clang LDFLAGS=--rtlib=compiler-rt ./configure)
-You will need working installations of Zlib and libcrypto (LibreSSL /
-OpenSSL)
+To support Privilege Separation (which is now required) you will need
+to create the user, group and directory used by sshd for privilege
+separation. See README.privsep for details.
+
+The remaining items are optional.
+
+A working installation of zlib:
Zlib 1.1.4 or 1.2.1.2 or greater (earlier 1.2.x versions have problems):
http://www.gzip.org/zlib/
-libcrypto from either of:
+libcrypto from either of LibreSSL or OpenSSL. Building without libcrypto
+is supported but severely restricts the avilable ciphers and algorithms.
- LibreSSL (https://www.libressl.org/)
- OpenSSL (https://www.openssl.org) with any of the following versions:
- 1.0.x >= 1.0.1 or 1.1.0 >= 1.1.0g or any 1.1.1
-LibreSSL/OpenSSL should be compiled as a position-independent library
-(i.e. with -fPIC) otherwise OpenSSH will not be able to link with it.
-If you must use a non-position-independent libcrypto, then you may need
-to configure OpenSSH --without-pie. Note that due to a bug in EVP_CipherInit
-OpenSSL 1.1 versions prior to 1.1.0g can't be used.
+Note that due to a bug in EVP_CipherInit OpenSSL 1.1 versions prior to
+1.1.0g can't be used.
-To support Privilege Separation (which is now required) you will need
-to create the user, group and directory used by sshd for privilege
-separation. See README.privsep for details.
+LibreSSL/OpenSSL should be compiled as a position-independent library
+(i.e. -fPIC, eg by configuring OpenSSL as "./config [options] -fPIC"
+or LibreSSL as "CFLAGS=-fPIC ./configure") otherwise OpenSSH will not
+be able to link with it. If you must use a non-position-independent
+libcrypto, then you may need to configure OpenSSH --without-pie.
-The remaining items are optional.
+If you build either from source, running the OpenSSL self-test ("make
+tests") or the LibreSSL equivalent ("make check") and ensuring that all
+tests pass is strongly recommended.
NB. If you operating system supports /dev/random, you should configure
libcrypto (LibreSSL/OpenSSL) to use it. OpenSSH relies on libcrypto's
direct support of /dev/random, or failing that, either prngd or egd.
PRNGD:
If your system lacks kernel-based random collection, the use of Lutz
Jaenicke's PRNGd is recommended. It requires that libcrypto be configured
to support it.
http://prngd.sourceforge.net/
EGD:
The Entropy Gathering Daemon (EGD) suppports the same interface as prngd.
It also supported only if libcrypto is configured to support it.
http://egd.sourceforge.net/
PAM:
OpenSSH can utilise Pluggable Authentication Modules (PAM) if your
system supports it. PAM is standard most Linux distributions, Solaris,
-HP-UX 11, AIX >= 5.2, FreeBSD and NetBSD.
+HP-UX 11, AIX >= 5.2, FreeBSD, NetBSD and Mac OS X.
Information about the various PAM implementations are available:
Solaris PAM: http://www.sun.com/software/solaris/pam/
Linux PAM: http://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/libs/pam/
OpenPAM: http://www.openpam.org/
If you wish to build the GNOME passphrase requester, you will need the GNOME
libraries and headers.
GNOME:
http://www.gnome.org/
Alternatively, Jim Knoble <jmknoble@pobox.com> has written an excellent X11
passphrase requester. This is maintained separately at:
http://www.jmknoble.net/software/x11-ssh-askpass/
LibEdit:
sftp supports command-line editing via NetBSD's libedit. If your platform
has it available natively you can use that, alternatively you might try
these multi-platform ports:
http://www.thrysoee.dk/editline/
http://sourceforge.net/projects/libedit/
LDNS:
LDNS is a DNS BSD-licensed resolver library which supports DNSSEC.
http://nlnetlabs.nl/projects/ldns/
Autoconf:
If you modify configure.ac or configure doesn't exist (eg if you checked
the code out of git yourself) then you will need autoconf-2.69 to rebuild
the automatically generated files by running "autoreconf". Earlier
versions may also work but this is not guaranteed.
http://www.gnu.org/software/autoconf/
Basic Security Module (BSM):
Native BSM support is known to exist in Solaris from at least 2.5.1,
FreeBSD 6.1 and OS X. Alternatively, you may use the OpenBSM
implementation (http://www.openbsm.org).
makedepend:
https://www.x.org/archive/individual/util/
If you are making significant changes to the code you may need to rebuild
the dependency (.depend) file using "make depend", which requires the
"makedepend" tool from the X11 distribution.
+libfido2:
+
+libfido2 allows the use of hardware security keys over USB. libfido2
+in turn depends on libcbor.
+
+https://github.com/Yubico/libfido2
+https://github.com/pjk/libcbor
+
+
2. Building / Installation
--------------------------
To install OpenSSH with default options:
./configure
make
make install
This will install the OpenSSH binaries in /usr/local/bin, configuration files
in /usr/local/etc, the server in /usr/local/sbin, etc. To specify a different
installation prefix, use the --prefix option to configure:
./configure --prefix=/opt
make
make install
Will install OpenSSH in /opt/{bin,etc,lib,sbin}. You can also override
specific paths, for example:
./configure --prefix=/opt --sysconfdir=/etc/ssh
make
make install
This will install the binaries in /opt/{bin,lib,sbin}, but will place the
configuration files in /etc/ssh.
If you are using PAM, you may need to manually install a PAM control
file as "/etc/pam.d/sshd" (or wherever your system prefers to keep
them). Note that the service name used to start PAM is __progname,
which is the basename of the path of your sshd (e.g., the service name
for /usr/sbin/osshd will be osshd). If you have renamed your sshd
executable, your PAM configuration may need to be modified.
A generic PAM configuration is included as "contrib/sshd.pam.generic",
you may need to edit it before using it on your system. If you are
using a recent version of Red Hat Linux, the config file in
contrib/redhat/sshd.pam should be more useful. Failure to install a
valid PAM file may result in an inability to use password
authentication. On HP-UX 11 and Solaris, the standard /etc/pam.conf
configuration will work with sshd (sshd will match the other service
name).
There are a few other options to the configure script:
--with-audit=[module] enable additional auditing via the specified module.
Currently, drivers for "debug" (additional info via syslog) and "bsm"
(Sun's Basic Security Module) are supported.
--with-pam enables PAM support. If PAM support is compiled in, it must
also be enabled in sshd_config (refer to the UsePAM directive).
--with-prngd-socket=/some/file allows you to enable EGD or PRNGD
support and to specify a PRNGd socket. Use this if your Unix lacks
/dev/random.
--with-prngd-port=portnum allows you to enable EGD or PRNGD support
and to specify a EGD localhost TCP port. Use this if your Unix lacks
/dev/random.
--with-lastlog=FILE will specify the location of the lastlog file.
./configure searches a few locations for lastlog, but may not find
it if lastlog is installed in a different place.
--without-lastlog will disable lastlog support entirely.
--with-osfsia, --without-osfsia will enable or disable OSF1's Security
Integration Architecture. The default for OSF1 machines is enable.
--with-md5-passwords will enable the use of MD5 passwords. Enable this
if your operating system uses MD5 passwords and the system crypt() does
not support them directly (see the crypt(3/3c) man page). If enabled, the
resulting binary will support both MD5 and traditional crypt passwords.
--with-utmpx enables utmpx support. utmpx support is automatic for
some platforms.
--without-shadow disables shadow password support.
--with-ipaddr-display forces the use of a numeric IP address in the
$DISPLAY environment variable. Some broken systems need this.
--with-default-path=PATH allows you to specify a default $PATH for sessions
started by sshd. This replaces the standard path entirely.
--with-pid-dir=PATH specifies the directory in which the sshd.pid file is
created.
--with-xauth=PATH specifies the location of the xauth binary
--with-ssl-dir=DIR allows you to specify where your Libre/OpenSSL
libraries are installed.
--with-ssl-engine enables Libre/OpenSSL's (hardware) ENGINE support
--with-4in6 Check for IPv4 in IPv6 mapped addresses and convert them to
real (AF_INET) IPv4 addresses. Works around some quirks on Linux.
If you need to pass special options to the compiler or linker, you
can specify these as environment variables before running ./configure.
For example:
CC="/usr/foo/cc" CFLAGS="-O" LDFLAGS="-s" LIBS="-lrubbish" ./configure
3. Configuration
----------------
The runtime configuration files are installed by in ${prefix}/etc or
whatever you specified as your --sysconfdir (/usr/local/etc by default).
The default configuration should be instantly usable, though you should
review it to ensure that it matches your security requirements.
To generate a host key, run "make host-key". Alternately you can do so
manually using the following commands:
ssh-keygen -t [type] -f /etc/ssh/ssh_host_key -N ""
for each of the types you wish to generate (rsa, dsa or ecdsa) or
ssh-keygen -A
to generate keys for all supported types.
Replacing /etc/ssh with the correct path to the configuration directory.
(${prefix}/etc or whatever you specified with --sysconfdir during
-configuration)
+configuration).
If you have configured OpenSSH with EGD support, ensure that EGD is
running and has collected some Entropy.
For more information on configuration, please refer to the manual pages
for sshd, ssh and ssh-agent.
4. (Optional) Send survey
-------------------------
$ make survey
[check the contents of the file "survey" to ensure there's no information
that you consider sensitive]
$ make send-survey
This will send configuration information for the currently configured
host to a survey address. This will help determine which configurations
are actually in use, and what valid combinations of configure options
exist. The raw data is available only to the OpenSSH developers, however
summary data may be published.
5. Problems?
------------
If you experience problems compiling, installing or running OpenSSH.
Please refer to the "reporting bugs" section of the webpage at
https://www.openssh.com/
diff --git a/Makefile.in b/Makefile.in
index adb1977e29d5..e7549470c520 100644
--- a/Makefile.in
+++ b/Makefile.in
@@ -1,679 +1,746 @@
# uncomment if you run a non bourne compatible shell. Ie. csh
#SHELL = @SH@
AUTORECONF=autoreconf
prefix=@prefix@
exec_prefix=@exec_prefix@
bindir=@bindir@
sbindir=@sbindir@
libexecdir=@libexecdir@
datadir=@datadir@
datarootdir=@datarootdir@
mandir=@mandir@
mansubdir=@mansubdir@
sysconfdir=@sysconfdir@
piddir=@piddir@
srcdir=@srcdir@
top_srcdir=@top_srcdir@
DESTDIR=
VPATH=@srcdir@
SSH_PROGRAM=@bindir@/ssh
ASKPASS_PROGRAM=$(libexecdir)/ssh-askpass
SFTP_SERVER=$(libexecdir)/sftp-server
SSH_KEYSIGN=$(libexecdir)/ssh-keysign
SSH_PKCS11_HELPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-pkcs11-helper
+SSH_SK_HELPER=$(libexecdir)/ssh-sk-helper
PRIVSEP_PATH=@PRIVSEP_PATH@
SSH_PRIVSEP_USER=@SSH_PRIVSEP_USER@
STRIP_OPT=@STRIP_OPT@
TEST_SHELL=@TEST_SHELL@
PATHS= -DSSHDIR=\"$(sysconfdir)\" \
-D_PATH_SSH_PROGRAM=\"$(SSH_PROGRAM)\" \
-D_PATH_SSH_ASKPASS_DEFAULT=\"$(ASKPASS_PROGRAM)\" \
-D_PATH_SFTP_SERVER=\"$(SFTP_SERVER)\" \
-D_PATH_SSH_KEY_SIGN=\"$(SSH_KEYSIGN)\" \
-D_PATH_SSH_PKCS11_HELPER=\"$(SSH_PKCS11_HELPER)\" \
+ -D_PATH_SSH_SK_HELPER=\"$(SSH_SK_HELPER)\" \
-D_PATH_SSH_PIDDIR=\"$(piddir)\" \
-D_PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR=\"$(PRIVSEP_PATH)\"
CC=@CC@
LD=@LD@
CFLAGS=@CFLAGS@
+CFLAGS_NOPIE=@CFLAGS_NOPIE@
CPPFLAGS=-I. -I$(srcdir) @CPPFLAGS@ $(PATHS) @DEFS@
+PICFLAG=@PICFLAG@
LIBS=@LIBS@
K5LIBS=@K5LIBS@
GSSLIBS=@GSSLIBS@
SSHLIBS=@SSHLIBS@
SSHDLIBS=@SSHDLIBS@
LIBEDIT=@LIBEDIT@
+LIBFIDO2=@LIBFIDO2@
AR=@AR@
AWK=@AWK@
RANLIB=@RANLIB@
INSTALL=@INSTALL@
SED=@SED@
ENT=@ENT@
XAUTH_PATH=@XAUTH_PATH@
LDFLAGS=-L. -Lopenbsd-compat/ @LDFLAGS@
+LDFLAGS_NOPIE=-L. -Lopenbsd-compat/ @LDFLAGS_NOPIE@
EXEEXT=@EXEEXT@
MANFMT=@MANFMT@
MKDIR_P=@MKDIR_P@
-TARGETS=ssh$(EXEEXT) sshd$(EXEEXT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh-keyscan${EXEEXT} ssh-keysign${EXEEXT} ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) scp$(EXEEXT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) sftp$(EXEEXT)
+.SUFFIXES: .lo
+
+TARGETS=ssh$(EXEEXT) sshd$(EXEEXT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh-keyscan${EXEEXT} ssh-keysign${EXEEXT} ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) scp$(EXEEXT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) sftp$(EXEEXT) ssh-sk-helper$(EXEEXT)
XMSS_OBJS=\
ssh-xmss.o \
sshkey-xmss.o \
xmss_commons.o \
xmss_fast.o \
xmss_hash.o \
xmss_hash_address.o \
xmss_wots.o
LIBOPENSSH_OBJS=\
ssh_api.o \
ssherr.o \
sshbuf.o \
sshkey.o \
sshbuf-getput-basic.o \
sshbuf-misc.o \
sshbuf-getput-crypto.o \
krl.o \
bitmap.o \
${XMSS_OBJS}
LIBSSH_OBJS=${LIBOPENSSH_OBJS} \
authfd.o authfile.o \
canohost.o channels.o cipher.o cipher-aes.o cipher-aesctr.o \
cipher-ctr.o cleanup.o \
compat.o fatal.o hostfile.o \
log.o match.o moduli.o nchan.o packet.o \
readpass.o ttymodes.o xmalloc.o addrmatch.o \
atomicio.o dispatch.o mac.o misc.o utf8.o \
- monitor_fdpass.o rijndael.o ssh-dss.o ssh-ecdsa.o ssh-rsa.o dh.o \
+ monitor_fdpass.o rijndael.o ssh-dss.o ssh-ecdsa.o ssh-ecdsa-sk.o \
+ ssh-ed25519-sk.o ssh-rsa.o dh.o \
msg.o progressmeter.o dns.o entropy.o gss-genr.o umac.o umac128.o \
ssh-pkcs11.o smult_curve25519_ref.o \
poly1305.o chacha.o cipher-chachapoly.o \
- ssh-ed25519.o digest-openssl.o digest-libc.o hmac.o \
- sc25519.o ge25519.o fe25519.o ed25519.o verify.o hash.o \
+ ssh-ed25519.o digest-openssl.o digest-libc.o \
+ hmac.o sc25519.o ge25519.o fe25519.o ed25519.o verify.o hash.o \
kex.o kexdh.o kexgex.o kexecdh.o kexc25519.o \
kexgexc.o kexgexs.o \
sntrup4591761.o kexsntrup4591761x25519.o kexgen.o \
- platform-pledge.o platform-tracing.o platform-misc.o
+ sftp-realpath.o platform-pledge.o platform-tracing.o platform-misc.o \
+ sshbuf-io.o
+SKOBJS= ssh-sk-client.o
SSHOBJS= ssh.o readconf.o clientloop.o sshtty.o \
- sshconnect.o sshconnect2.o mux.o
+ sshconnect.o sshconnect2.o mux.o $(SKOBJS)
SSHDOBJS=sshd.o auth-rhosts.o auth-passwd.o \
audit.o audit-bsm.o audit-linux.o platform.o \
sshpty.o sshlogin.o servconf.o serverloop.o \
auth.o auth2.o auth-options.o session.o \
auth2-chall.o groupaccess.o \
auth-bsdauth.o auth2-hostbased.o auth2-kbdint.o \
auth2-none.o auth2-passwd.o auth2-pubkey.o \
monitor.o monitor_wrap.o auth-krb5.o \
auth2-gss.o gss-serv.o gss-serv-krb5.o \
loginrec.o auth-pam.o auth-shadow.o auth-sia.o md5crypt.o \
- sftp-server.o sftp-common.o sftp-realpath.o \
+ sftp-server.o sftp-common.o \
sandbox-null.o sandbox-rlimit.o sandbox-systrace.o sandbox-darwin.o \
sandbox-seccomp-filter.o sandbox-capsicum.o sandbox-pledge.o \
- sandbox-solaris.o uidswap.o
+ sandbox-solaris.o uidswap.o $(SKOBJS)
+
+SCP_OBJS= scp.o progressmeter.o
+
+SSHADD_OBJS= ssh-add.o $(SKOBJS)
+
+SSHAGENT_OBJS= ssh-agent.o ssh-pkcs11-client.o $(SKOBJS)
+
+SSHKEYGEN_OBJS= ssh-keygen.o sshsig.o $(SKOBJS)
+
+SSHKEYSIGN_OBJS=ssh-keysign.o readconf.o uidswap.o $(SKOBJS)
+
+P11HELPER_OBJS= ssh-pkcs11-helper.o ssh-pkcs11.o $(SKOBJS)
+
+SKHELPER_OBJS= ssh-sk-helper.o ssh-sk.o sk-usbhid.o
+
+SSHKEYSCAN_OBJS=ssh-keyscan.o $(SKOBJS)
-MANPAGES = moduli.5.out scp.1.out ssh-add.1.out ssh-agent.1.out ssh-keygen.1.out ssh-keyscan.1.out ssh.1.out sshd.8.out sftp-server.8.out sftp.1.out ssh-keysign.8.out ssh-pkcs11-helper.8.out sshd_config.5.out ssh_config.5.out
-MANPAGES_IN = moduli.5 scp.1 ssh-add.1 ssh-agent.1 ssh-keygen.1 ssh-keyscan.1 ssh.1 sshd.8 sftp-server.8 sftp.1 ssh-keysign.8 ssh-pkcs11-helper.8 sshd_config.5 ssh_config.5
+SFTPSERVER_OBJS=sftp-common.o sftp-server.o sftp-server-main.o
+
+SFTP_OBJS= sftp.o sftp-client.o sftp-common.o sftp-glob.o progressmeter.o
+
+MANPAGES = moduli.5.out scp.1.out ssh-add.1.out ssh-agent.1.out ssh-keygen.1.out ssh-keyscan.1.out ssh.1.out sshd.8.out sftp-server.8.out sftp.1.out ssh-keysign.8.out ssh-pkcs11-helper.8.out ssh-sk-helper.8.out sshd_config.5.out ssh_config.5.out
+MANPAGES_IN = moduli.5 scp.1 ssh-add.1 ssh-agent.1 ssh-keygen.1 ssh-keyscan.1 ssh.1 sshd.8 sftp-server.8 sftp.1 ssh-keysign.8 ssh-pkcs11-helper.8 ssh-sk-helper.8 sshd_config.5 ssh_config.5
MANTYPE = @MANTYPE@
CONFIGFILES=sshd_config.out ssh_config.out moduli.out
CONFIGFILES_IN=sshd_config ssh_config moduli
PATHSUBS = \
-e 's|/etc/ssh/ssh_config|$(sysconfdir)/ssh_config|g' \
-e 's|/etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts|$(sysconfdir)/ssh_known_hosts|g' \
-e 's|/etc/ssh/sshd_config|$(sysconfdir)/sshd_config|g' \
-e 's|/usr/libexec|$(libexecdir)|g' \
-e 's|/etc/shosts.equiv|$(sysconfdir)/shosts.equiv|g' \
-e 's|/etc/ssh/ssh_host_key|$(sysconfdir)/ssh_host_key|g' \
-e 's|/etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key|$(sysconfdir)/ssh_host_ecdsa_key|g' \
-e 's|/etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key|$(sysconfdir)/ssh_host_dsa_key|g' \
-e 's|/etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key|$(sysconfdir)/ssh_host_rsa_key|g' \
-e 's|/etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key|$(sysconfdir)/ssh_host_ed25519_key|g' \
-e 's|/var/run/sshd.pid|$(piddir)/sshd.pid|g' \
-e 's|/etc/moduli|$(sysconfdir)/moduli|g' \
-e 's|/etc/ssh/moduli|$(sysconfdir)/moduli|g' \
-e 's|/etc/ssh/sshrc|$(sysconfdir)/sshrc|g' \
-e 's|/usr/X11R6/bin/xauth|$(XAUTH_PATH)|g' \
-e 's|/var/empty|$(PRIVSEP_PATH)|g' \
-e 's|/usr/bin:/bin:/usr/sbin:/sbin|@user_path@|g'
FIXPATHSCMD = $(SED) $(PATHSUBS)
FIXALGORITHMSCMD= $(SHELL) $(srcdir)/fixalgorithms $(SED) \
@UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHMS@
all: configure-check $(CONFIGFILES) $(MANPAGES) $(TARGETS)
$(LIBSSH_OBJS): Makefile.in config.h
$(SSHOBJS): Makefile.in config.h
$(SSHDOBJS): Makefile.in config.h
configure-check: $(srcdir)/configure
$(srcdir)/configure: configure.ac aclocal.m4
@echo "ERROR: configure is out of date; please run ${AUTORECONF} (and configure)" 1>&2
@exit 1
.c.o:
$(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) -c $< -o $@
LIBCOMPAT=openbsd-compat/libopenbsd-compat.a
$(LIBCOMPAT): always
(cd openbsd-compat && $(MAKE))
always:
libssh.a: $(LIBSSH_OBJS)
$(AR) rv $@ $(LIBSSH_OBJS)
$(RANLIB) $@
ssh$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a $(SSHOBJS)
$(LD) -o $@ $(SSHOBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(SSHLIBS) $(LIBS) $(GSSLIBS)
sshd$(EXEEXT): libssh.a $(LIBCOMPAT) $(SSHDOBJS)
$(LD) -o $@ $(SSHDOBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(SSHDLIBS) $(LIBS) $(GSSLIBS) $(K5LIBS)
-scp$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a scp.o progressmeter.o
- $(LD) -o $@ scp.o progressmeter.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
+scp$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a $(SCP_OBJS)
+ $(LD) -o $@ $(SCP_OBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
+
+ssh-add$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a $(SSHADD_OBJS)
+ $(LD) -o $@ $(SSHADD_OBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
-ssh-add$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-add.o
- $(LD) -o $@ ssh-add.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
+ssh-agent$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a $(SSHAGENT_OBJS)
+ $(LD) -o $@ $(SSHAGENT_OBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
-ssh-agent$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-agent.o ssh-pkcs11-client.o
- $(LD) -o $@ ssh-agent.o ssh-pkcs11-client.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
+ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a $(SSHKEYGEN_OBJS)
+ $(LD) -o $@ $(SSHKEYGEN_OBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
-ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-keygen.o sshsig.o
- $(LD) -o $@ ssh-keygen.o sshsig.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
+ssh-keysign$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a $(SSHKEYSIGN_OBJS)
+ $(LD) -o $@ $(SSHKEYSIGN_OBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
-ssh-keysign$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-keysign.o readconf.o uidswap.o compat.o
- $(LD) -o $@ ssh-keysign.o readconf.o uidswap.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
+ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a $(P11HELPER_OBJS)
+ $(LD) -o $@ $(P11HELPER_OBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
-ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-pkcs11-helper.o ssh-pkcs11.o
- $(LD) -o $@ ssh-pkcs11-helper.o ssh-pkcs11.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
+ssh-sk-helper$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a $(SKHELPER_OBJS)
+ $(LD) -o $@ $(SKHELPER_OBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) $(LIBFIDO2)
-ssh-keyscan$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a ssh-keyscan.o
- $(LD) -o $@ ssh-keyscan.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh $(LIBS)
+ssh-keyscan$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a $(SSHKEYSCAN_OBJS)
+ $(LD) -o $@ $(SSHKEYSCAN_OBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh $(LIBS)
-sftp-server$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a sftp.o sftp-common.o sftp-server.o sftp-realpath.o sftp-server-main.o
- $(LD) -o $@ sftp-server.o sftp-common.o sftp-realpath.o sftp-server-main.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
+sftp-server$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a $(SFTPSERVER_OBJS)
+ $(LD) -o $@ $(SFTPSERVER_OBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
-sftp$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a sftp.o sftp-client.o sftp-common.o sftp-glob.o progressmeter.o
- $(LD) -o $@ progressmeter.o sftp.o sftp-client.o sftp-common.o sftp-glob.o $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) $(LIBEDIT)
+sftp$(EXEEXT): $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a $(SFTP_OBJS)
+ $(LD) -o $@ $(SFTP_OBJS) $(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS) $(LIBEDIT)
# test driver for the loginrec code - not built by default
logintest: logintest.o $(LIBCOMPAT) libssh.a loginrec.o
$(LD) -o $@ logintest.o $(LDFLAGS) loginrec.o -lopenbsd-compat -lssh $(LIBS)
$(MANPAGES): $(MANPAGES_IN)
if test "$(MANTYPE)" = "cat"; then \
manpage=$(srcdir)/`echo $@ | sed 's/\.[1-9]\.out$$/\.0/'`; \
else \
manpage=$(srcdir)/`echo $@ | sed 's/\.out$$//'`; \
fi; \
if test "$(MANTYPE)" = "man"; then \
$(FIXPATHSCMD) $${manpage} | $(FIXALGORITHMSCMD) | \
$(AWK) -f $(srcdir)/mdoc2man.awk > $@; \
else \
$(FIXPATHSCMD) $${manpage} | $(FIXALGORITHMSCMD) > $@; \
fi
$(CONFIGFILES): $(CONFIGFILES_IN)
conffile=`echo $@ | sed 's/.out$$//'`; \
$(FIXPATHSCMD) $(srcdir)/$${conffile} > $@
# fake rule to stop make trying to compile moduli.o into a binary "moduli.o"
moduli:
echo
clean: regressclean
- rm -f *.o *.a $(TARGETS) logintest config.cache config.log
+ rm -f *.o *.lo *.a $(TARGETS) logintest config.cache config.log
rm -f *.out core survey
rm -f regress/check-perm$(EXEEXT)
rm -f regress/mkdtemp$(EXEEXT)
rm -f regress/unittests/test_helper/*.a
rm -f regress/unittests/test_helper/*.o
rm -f regress/unittests/sshbuf/*.o
rm -f regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf$(EXEEXT)
rm -f regress/unittests/sshkey/*.o
rm -f regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey$(EXEEXT)
rm -f regress/unittests/bitmap/*.o
rm -f regress/unittests/bitmap/test_bitmap$(EXEEXT)
rm -f regress/unittests/conversion/*.o
rm -f regress/unittests/conversion/test_conversion$(EXEEXT)
rm -f regress/unittests/hostkeys/*.o
rm -f regress/unittests/hostkeys/test_hostkeys$(EXEEXT)
rm -f regress/unittests/kex/*.o
rm -f regress/unittests/kex/test_kex$(EXEEXT)
rm -f regress/unittests/match/*.o
rm -f regress/unittests/match/test_match$(EXEEXT)
rm -f regress/unittests/utf8/*.o
rm -f regress/unittests/utf8/test_utf8$(EXEEXT)
rm -f regress/misc/kexfuzz/*.o
rm -f regress/misc/kexfuzz/kexfuzz$(EXEEXT)
+ rm -f regress/misc/sk-dummy/*.o
+ rm -f regress/misc/sk-dummy/*.lo
+ rm -f regress/misc/sk-dummy/sk-dummy.so
(cd openbsd-compat && $(MAKE) clean)
distclean: regressclean
rm -f *.o *.a $(TARGETS) logintest config.cache config.log
rm -f *.out core opensshd.init openssh.xml
rm -f Makefile buildpkg.sh config.h config.status
rm -f survey.sh openbsd-compat/regress/Makefile *~
rm -rf autom4te.cache
rm -f regress/check-perm
rm -f regress/mkdtemp
rm -f regress/unittests/test_helper/*.a
rm -f regress/unittests/test_helper/*.o
rm -f regress/unittests/sshbuf/*.o
rm -f regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf
rm -f regress/unittests/sshkey/*.o
rm -f regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey
rm -f regress/unittests/bitmap/*.o
rm -f regress/unittests/bitmap/test_bitmap
rm -f regress/unittests/conversion/*.o
rm -f regress/unittests/conversion/test_conversion
rm -f regress/unittests/hostkeys/*.o
rm -f regress/unittests/hostkeys/test_hostkeys
rm -f regress/unittests/kex/*.o
rm -f regress/unittests/kex/test_kex
rm -f regress/unittests/match/*.o
rm -f regress/unittests/match/test_match
rm -f regress/unittests/utf8/*.o
rm -f regress/unittests/utf8/test_utf8
rm -f regress/misc/kexfuzz/*.o
rm -f regress/misc/kexfuzz/kexfuzz$(EXEEXT)
(cd openbsd-compat && $(MAKE) distclean)
if test -d pkg ; then \
rm -fr pkg ; \
fi
veryclean: distclean
rm -f configure config.h.in *.0
cleandir: veryclean
mrproper: veryclean
realclean: veryclean
catman-do:
@for f in $(MANPAGES_IN) ; do \
base=`echo $$f | sed 's/\..*$$//'` ; \
echo "$$f -> $$base.0" ; \
$(MANFMT) $$f | cat -v | sed -e 's/.\^H//g' \
>$$base.0 ; \
done
depend: depend-rebuild
rm -f .depend.bak
depend-rebuild:
rm -f config.h
touch config.h
makedepend -w1000 -Y. -f .depend *.c 2>/dev/null
+ (head -2 .depend; tail +3 .depend | sort) >.depend.tmp
+ mv .depend.tmp .depend
rm -f config.h
depend-check: depend-rebuild
cmp .depend .depend.bak || (echo .depend stale && exit 1)
distprep: catman-do depend-check
$(AUTORECONF)
-rm -rf autom4te.cache .depend.bak
install: $(CONFIGFILES) $(MANPAGES) $(TARGETS) install-files install-sysconf host-key check-config
install-nokeys: $(CONFIGFILES) $(MANPAGES) $(TARGETS) install-files install-sysconf
install-nosysconf: $(CONFIGFILES) $(MANPAGES) $(TARGETS) install-files
check-config:
-$(DESTDIR)$(sbindir)/sshd -t -f $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/sshd_config
install-files:
$(MKDIR_P) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)
$(MKDIR_P) $(DESTDIR)$(sbindir)
$(MKDIR_P) $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1
$(MKDIR_P) $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)5
$(MKDIR_P) $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8
$(MKDIR_P) $(DESTDIR)$(libexecdir)
$(MKDIR_P) -m 0755 $(DESTDIR)$(PRIVSEP_PATH)
$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh$(EXEEXT)
$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) scp$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/scp$(EXEEXT)
$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-add$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh-add$(EXEEXT)
$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-agent$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh-agent$(EXEEXT)
$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT)
$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-keyscan$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh-keyscan$(EXEEXT)
$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sshd$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(sbindir)/sshd$(EXEEXT)
$(INSTALL) -m 4711 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-keysign$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_KEYSIGN)$(EXEEXT)
$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-pkcs11-helper$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_PKCS11_HELPER)$(EXEEXT)
+ $(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) ssh-sk-helper$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_SK_HELPER)$(EXEEXT)
$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sftp$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/sftp$(EXEEXT)
$(INSTALL) -m 0755 $(STRIP_OPT) sftp-server$(EXEEXT) $(DESTDIR)$(SFTP_SERVER)$(EXEEXT)
$(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh.1
$(INSTALL) -m 644 scp.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/scp.1
$(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh-add.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh-add.1
$(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh-agent.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh-agent.1
$(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh-keygen.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh-keygen.1
$(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh-keyscan.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh-keyscan.1
$(INSTALL) -m 644 moduli.5.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)5/moduli.5
$(INSTALL) -m 644 sshd_config.5.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)5/sshd_config.5
$(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh_config.5.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)5/ssh_config.5
$(INSTALL) -m 644 sshd.8.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/sshd.8
$(INSTALL) -m 644 sftp.1.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/sftp.1
$(INSTALL) -m 644 sftp-server.8.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/sftp-server.8
$(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh-keysign.8.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/ssh-keysign.8
$(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh-pkcs11-helper.8.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/ssh-pkcs11-helper.8
+ $(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh-sk-helper.8.out $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/ssh-sk-helper.8
install-sysconf:
$(MKDIR_P) $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)
@if [ ! -f $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/ssh_config ]; then \
$(INSTALL) -m 644 ssh_config.out $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/ssh_config; \
else \
echo "$(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/ssh_config already exists, install will not overwrite"; \
fi
@if [ ! -f $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/sshd_config ]; then \
$(INSTALL) -m 644 sshd_config.out $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/sshd_config; \
else \
echo "$(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/sshd_config already exists, install will not overwrite"; \
fi
@if [ ! -f $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/moduli ]; then \
if [ -f $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/primes ]; then \
echo "moving $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/primes to $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/moduli"; \
mv "$(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/primes" "$(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/moduli"; \
else \
$(INSTALL) -m 644 moduli.out $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/moduli; \
fi ; \
else \
echo "$(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/moduli already exists, install will not overwrite"; \
fi
host-key: ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT)
@if [ -z "$(DESTDIR)" ] ; then \
./ssh-keygen -A; \
fi
host-key-force: ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT) ssh$(EXEEXT)
./ssh-keygen -t dsa -f $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/ssh_host_dsa_key -N ""
./ssh-keygen -t rsa -f $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/ssh_host_rsa_key -N ""
./ssh-keygen -t ed25519 -f $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/ssh_host_ed25519_key -N ""
if ./ssh -Q key | grep ecdsa >/dev/null ; then \
./ssh-keygen -t ecdsa -f $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/ssh_host_ecdsa_key -N ""; \
fi
uninstallall: uninstall
-rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/ssh_config
-rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)/sshd_config
-rmdir $(DESTDIR)$(sysconfdir)
-rmdir $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)
-rmdir $(DESTDIR)$(sbindir)
-rmdir $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1
-rmdir $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8
-rmdir $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)
-rmdir $(DESTDIR)$(libexecdir)
uninstall:
-rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh$(EXEEXT)
-rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/scp$(EXEEXT)
-rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh-add$(EXEEXT)
-rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh-agent$(EXEEXT)
-rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh-keygen$(EXEEXT)
-rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/ssh-keyscan$(EXEEXT)
-rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(bindir)/sftp$(EXEEXT)
-rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(sbindir)/sshd$(EXEEXT)
-rm -r $(DESTDIR)$(SFTP_SERVER)$(EXEEXT)
-rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_KEYSIGN)$(EXEEXT)
-rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_PKCS11_HELPER)$(EXEEXT)
+ -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(SSH_SK_HELPER)$(EXEEXT)
-rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh.1
-rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/scp.1
-rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh-add.1
-rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh-agent.1
-rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh-keygen.1
-rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/sftp.1
-rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)1/ssh-keyscan.1
-rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/sshd.8
-rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/sftp-server.8
-rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/ssh-keysign.8
-rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/ssh-pkcs11-helper.8
+ -rm -f $(DESTDIR)$(mandir)/$(mansubdir)8/ssh-sk-helper.8
regress-prep:
$(MKDIR_P) `pwd`/regress/unittests/test_helper
$(MKDIR_P) `pwd`/regress/unittests/sshbuf
$(MKDIR_P) `pwd`/regress/unittests/sshkey
$(MKDIR_P) `pwd`/regress/unittests/bitmap
$(MKDIR_P) `pwd`/regress/unittests/conversion
$(MKDIR_P) `pwd`/regress/unittests/hostkeys
$(MKDIR_P) `pwd`/regress/unittests/kex
$(MKDIR_P) `pwd`/regress/unittests/match
$(MKDIR_P) `pwd`/regress/unittests/utf8
$(MKDIR_P) `pwd`/regress/misc/kexfuzz
+ $(MKDIR_P) `pwd`/regress/misc/sk-dummy
[ -f `pwd`/regress/Makefile ] || \
ln -s `cd $(srcdir) && pwd`/regress/Makefile `pwd`/regress/Makefile
REGRESSLIBS=libssh.a $(LIBCOMPAT)
regress/modpipe$(EXEEXT): $(srcdir)/regress/modpipe.c $(REGRESSLIBS)
$(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) -o $@ $(srcdir)/regress/modpipe.c \
$(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
regress/setuid-allowed$(EXEEXT): $(srcdir)/regress/setuid-allowed.c $(REGRESSLIBS)
$(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) -o $@ $(srcdir)/regress/setuid-allowed.c \
$(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
regress/netcat$(EXEEXT): $(srcdir)/regress/netcat.c $(REGRESSLIBS)
$(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) -o $@ $(srcdir)/regress/netcat.c \
$(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
regress/check-perm$(EXEEXT): $(srcdir)/regress/check-perm.c $(REGRESSLIBS)
$(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) -o $@ $(srcdir)/regress/check-perm.c \
$(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
regress/mkdtemp$(EXEEXT): $(srcdir)/regress/mkdtemp.c $(REGRESSLIBS)
$(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) -o $@ $(srcdir)/regress/mkdtemp.c \
$(LDFLAGS) -lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
UNITTESTS_TEST_HELPER_OBJS=\
regress/unittests/test_helper/test_helper.o \
regress/unittests/test_helper/fuzz.o
regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a: ${UNITTESTS_TEST_HELPER_OBJS}
$(AR) rv $@ $(UNITTESTS_TEST_HELPER_OBJS)
$(RANLIB) $@
UNITTESTS_TEST_SSHBUF_OBJS=\
regress/unittests/sshbuf/tests.o \
regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf.o \
regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_getput_basic.o \
regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_getput_crypto.o \
regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_misc.o \
regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_fuzz.o \
regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_getput_fuzz.o \
regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf_fixed.o
regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf$(EXEEXT): ${UNITTESTS_TEST_SSHBUF_OBJS} \
regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a libssh.a
$(LD) -o $@ $(LDFLAGS) $(UNITTESTS_TEST_SSHBUF_OBJS) \
regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a \
-lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
UNITTESTS_TEST_SSHKEY_OBJS=\
regress/unittests/sshkey/test_fuzz.o \
regress/unittests/sshkey/tests.o \
regress/unittests/sshkey/common.o \
regress/unittests/sshkey/test_file.o \
- regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey.o
+ regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey.o \
+ $(SKOBJS)
regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey$(EXEEXT): ${UNITTESTS_TEST_SSHKEY_OBJS} \
regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a libssh.a
$(LD) -o $@ $(LDFLAGS) $(UNITTESTS_TEST_SSHKEY_OBJS) \
regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a \
-lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
UNITTESTS_TEST_BITMAP_OBJS=\
regress/unittests/bitmap/tests.o
regress/unittests/bitmap/test_bitmap$(EXEEXT): ${UNITTESTS_TEST_BITMAP_OBJS} \
regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a libssh.a
$(LD) -o $@ $(LDFLAGS) $(UNITTESTS_TEST_BITMAP_OBJS) \
regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a \
-lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
UNITTESTS_TEST_CONVERSION_OBJS=\
regress/unittests/conversion/tests.o
regress/unittests/conversion/test_conversion$(EXEEXT): \
${UNITTESTS_TEST_CONVERSION_OBJS} \
regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a libssh.a
$(LD) -o $@ $(LDFLAGS) $(UNITTESTS_TEST_CONVERSION_OBJS) \
regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a \
-lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
UNITTESTS_TEST_KEX_OBJS=\
regress/unittests/kex/tests.o \
- regress/unittests/kex/test_kex.o
+ regress/unittests/kex/test_kex.o \
+ $(SKOBJS)
regress/unittests/kex/test_kex$(EXEEXT): ${UNITTESTS_TEST_KEX_OBJS} \
regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a libssh.a
$(LD) -o $@ $(LDFLAGS) $(UNITTESTS_TEST_KEX_OBJS) \
regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a \
-lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
UNITTESTS_TEST_HOSTKEYS_OBJS=\
regress/unittests/hostkeys/tests.o \
- regress/unittests/hostkeys/test_iterate.o
+ regress/unittests/hostkeys/test_iterate.o \
+ $(SKOBJS)
regress/unittests/hostkeys/test_hostkeys$(EXEEXT): \
${UNITTESTS_TEST_HOSTKEYS_OBJS} \
regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a libssh.a
$(LD) -o $@ $(LDFLAGS) $(UNITTESTS_TEST_HOSTKEYS_OBJS) \
regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a \
-lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
UNITTESTS_TEST_MATCH_OBJS=\
regress/unittests/match/tests.o
regress/unittests/match/test_match$(EXEEXT): \
${UNITTESTS_TEST_MATCH_OBJS} \
regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a libssh.a
$(LD) -o $@ $(LDFLAGS) $(UNITTESTS_TEST_MATCH_OBJS) \
regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a \
-lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
UNITTESTS_TEST_UTF8_OBJS=\
regress/unittests/utf8/tests.o
regress/unittests/utf8/test_utf8$(EXEEXT): \
${UNITTESTS_TEST_UTF8_OBJS} \
regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a libssh.a
$(LD) -o $@ $(LDFLAGS) $(UNITTESTS_TEST_UTF8_OBJS) \
regress/unittests/test_helper/libtest_helper.a \
-lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
MISC_KEX_FUZZ_OBJS=\
- regress/misc/kexfuzz/kexfuzz.o
+ regress/misc/kexfuzz/kexfuzz.o \
+ $(SKOBJS)
regress/misc/kexfuzz/kexfuzz$(EXEEXT): ${MISC_KEX_FUZZ_OBJS} libssh.a
$(LD) -o $@ $(LDFLAGS) $(MISC_KEX_FUZZ_OBJS) \
-lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lssh -lopenbsd-compat $(LIBS)
+# These all need to be compiled -fPIC, so they are treated differently.
+SK_DUMMY_OBJS=\
+ regress/misc/sk-dummy/sk-dummy.lo \
+ regress/misc/sk-dummy/fatal.lo \
+ ed25519.lo hash.lo ge25519.lo fe25519.lo sc25519.lo verify.lo
+
+.c.lo: Makefile.in config.h
+ $(CC) $(CFLAGS_NOPIE) $(PICFLAG) $(CPPFLAGS) -c $< -o $@
+
+regress/misc/sk-dummy/sk-dummy.so: $(SK_DUMMY_OBJS)
+ $(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) -fPIC -shared -o $@ $(SK_DUMMY_OBJS) \
+ -L. -Lopenbsd-compat -lopenbsd-compat $(LDFLAGS_NOPIE) $(LIBS)
+
regress-binaries: regress-prep $(LIBCOMPAT) \
regress/modpipe$(EXEEXT) \
regress/setuid-allowed$(EXEEXT) \
regress/netcat$(EXEEXT) \
regress/check-perm$(EXEEXT) \
- regress/mkdtemp$(EXEEXT)
+ regress/mkdtemp$(EXEEXT) \
+ regress/misc/sk-dummy/sk-dummy.so
regress-unit-binaries: regress-prep $(REGRESSLIBS) \
regress/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf$(EXEEXT) \
regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey$(EXEEXT) \
regress/unittests/bitmap/test_bitmap$(EXEEXT) \
regress/unittests/conversion/test_conversion$(EXEEXT) \
regress/unittests/hostkeys/test_hostkeys$(EXEEXT) \
regress/unittests/kex/test_kex$(EXEEXT) \
regress/unittests/match/test_match$(EXEEXT) \
regress/unittests/utf8/test_utf8$(EXEEXT) \
regress/misc/kexfuzz/kexfuzz$(EXEEXT)
tests: file-tests t-exec interop-tests unit
echo all tests passed
unit: regress-unit-binaries
BUILDDIR=`pwd`; \
cd $(srcdir)/regress || exit $$?; \
$(MAKE) \
.OBJDIR="$${BUILDDIR}/regress" \
.CURDIR="`pwd`" \
$@ && echo $@ tests passed
interop-tests t-exec file-tests: regress-prep regress-binaries $(TARGETS)
BUILDDIR=`pwd`; \
TEST_SSH_SCP="$${BUILDDIR}/scp"; \
TEST_SSH_SSH="$${BUILDDIR}/ssh"; \
TEST_SSH_SSHD="$${BUILDDIR}/sshd"; \
TEST_SSH_SSHAGENT="$${BUILDDIR}/ssh-agent"; \
TEST_SSH_SSHADD="$${BUILDDIR}/ssh-add"; \
TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN="$${BUILDDIR}/ssh-keygen"; \
TEST_SSH_SSHPKCS11HELPER="$${BUILDDIR}/ssh-pkcs11-helper"; \
+ TEST_SSH_SSHSKHELPER="$${BUILDDIR}/ssh-sk-helper"; \
TEST_SSH_SSHKEYSCAN="$${BUILDDIR}/ssh-keyscan"; \
TEST_SSH_SFTP="$${BUILDDIR}/sftp"; \
TEST_SSH_SFTPSERVER="$${BUILDDIR}/sftp-server"; \
- TEST_SSH_SSHPKCS11HELPER="$${BUILDDIR}/ssh-pkcs11-helper"; \
+ TEST_SSH_PKCS11_HELPER="$${BUILDDIR}/ssh-pkcs11-helper"; \
+ TEST_SSH_SK_HELPER="$${BUILDDIR}/ssh-sk-helper"; \
+ TEST_SSH_SFTPSERVER="$${BUILDDIR}/sftp-server"; \
TEST_SSH_PLINK="plink"; \
TEST_SSH_PUTTYGEN="puttygen"; \
TEST_SSH_CONCH="conch"; \
TEST_SSH_IPV6="@TEST_SSH_IPV6@" ; \
TEST_SSH_UTF8="@TEST_SSH_UTF8@" ; \
TEST_SSH_ECC="@TEST_SSH_ECC@" ; \
cd $(srcdir)/regress || exit $$?; \
$(MAKE) \
.OBJDIR="$${BUILDDIR}/regress" \
.CURDIR="`pwd`" \
BUILDDIR="$${BUILDDIR}" \
OBJ="$${BUILDDIR}/regress/" \
PATH="$${BUILDDIR}:$${PATH}" \
TEST_ENV=MALLOC_OPTIONS="@TEST_MALLOC_OPTIONS@" \
TEST_MALLOC_OPTIONS="@TEST_MALLOC_OPTIONS@" \
TEST_SSH_SCP="$${TEST_SSH_SCP}" \
TEST_SSH_SSH="$${TEST_SSH_SSH}" \
TEST_SSH_SSHD="$${TEST_SSH_SSHD}" \
TEST_SSH_SSHAGENT="$${TEST_SSH_SSHAGENT}" \
TEST_SSH_SSHADD="$${TEST_SSH_SSHADD}" \
TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN="$${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN}" \
TEST_SSH_SSHPKCS11HELPER="$${TEST_SSH_SSHPKCS11HELPER}" \
TEST_SSH_SSHKEYSCAN="$${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYSCAN}" \
TEST_SSH_SFTP="$${TEST_SSH_SFTP}" \
+ TEST_SSH_PKCS11_HELPER="$${TEST_SSH_PKCS11_HELPER}" \
+ TEST_SSH_SK_HELPER="$${TEST_SSH_SK_HELPER}" \
TEST_SSH_SFTPSERVER="$${TEST_SSH_SFTPSERVER}" \
TEST_SSH_PLINK="$${TEST_SSH_PLINK}" \
TEST_SSH_PUTTYGEN="$${TEST_SSH_PUTTYGEN}" \
TEST_SSH_CONCH="$${TEST_SSH_CONCH}" \
TEST_SSH_IPV6="$${TEST_SSH_IPV6}" \
TEST_SSH_UTF8="$${TEST_SSH_UTF8}" \
TEST_SSH_ECC="$${TEST_SSH_ECC}" \
TEST_SHELL="${TEST_SHELL}" \
EXEEXT="$(EXEEXT)" \
$@ && echo all $@ passed
compat-tests: $(LIBCOMPAT)
(cd openbsd-compat/regress && $(MAKE))
regressclean:
if [ -f regress/Makefile ] && [ -r regress/Makefile ]; then \
(cd regress && $(MAKE) clean) \
fi
survey: survey.sh ssh
@$(SHELL) ./survey.sh > survey
@echo 'The survey results have been placed in the file "survey" in the'
@echo 'current directory. Please review the file then send with'
@echo '"make send-survey".'
send-survey: survey
mail portable-survey@mindrot.org <survey
package: $(CONFIGFILES) $(MANPAGES) $(TARGETS)
if [ "@MAKE_PACKAGE_SUPPORTED@" = yes ]; then \
sh buildpkg.sh; \
fi
# @DEPEND@
diff --git a/PROTOCOL.certkeys b/PROTOCOL.certkeys
index 48338e671cc5..1fce87006f13 100644
--- a/PROTOCOL.certkeys
+++ b/PROTOCOL.certkeys
@@ -1,307 +1,314 @@
This document describes a simple public-key certificate authentication
system for use by SSH.
Background
----------
The SSH protocol currently supports a simple public key authentication
mechanism. Unlike other public key implementations, SSH eschews the use
of X.509 certificates and uses raw keys. This approach has some benefits
relating to simplicity of configuration and minimisation of attack
surface, but it does not support the important use-cases of centrally
managed, passwordless authentication and centrally certified host keys.
These protocol extensions build on the simple public key authentication
system already in SSH to allow certificate-based authentication. The
certificates used are not traditional X.509 certificates, with numerous
options and complex encoding rules, but something rather more minimal: a
key, some identity information and usage options that have been signed
with some other trusted key.
A sshd server may be configured to allow authentication via certified
keys, by extending the existing ~/.ssh/authorized_keys mechanism to
allow specification of certification authority keys in addition to
raw user keys. The ssh client will support automatic verification of
acceptance of certified host keys, by adding a similar ability to
specify CA keys in ~/.ssh/known_hosts.
All certificate types include certification information along with the
public key that is used to sign challenges. In OpenSSH, ssh-keygen
performs the CA signing operation.
Certified keys are represented using new key types:
ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com
ssh-dss-cert-v01@openssh.com
ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com
ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com
ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com
ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com
Two additional types exist for RSA certificates to force use of
SHA-2 signatures (SHA-256 and SHA-512 respectively):
rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com
rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com
These RSA/SHA-2 types should not appear in keys at rest or transmitted
on their wire, but do appear in a SSH_MSG_KEXINIT's host-key algorithms
field or in the "public key algorithm name" field of a "publickey"
SSH_USERAUTH_REQUEST to indicate that the signature will use the
specified algorithm.
Protocol extensions
-------------------
The SSH wire protocol includes several extensibility mechanisms.
These modifications shall take advantage of namespaced public key
algorithm names to add support for certificate authentication without
breaking the protocol - implementations that do not support the
extensions will simply ignore them.
Authentication using the new key formats described below proceeds
using the existing SSH "publickey" authentication method described
in RFC4252 section 7.
New public key formats
----------------------
The certificate key types take a similar high-level format (note: data
types and encoding are as per RFC4251 section 5). The serialised wire
encoding of these certificates is also used for storing them on disk.
#define SSH_CERT_TYPE_USER 1
#define SSH_CERT_TYPE_HOST 2
RSA certificate
string "ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com"
string nonce
mpint e
mpint n
uint64 serial
uint32 type
string key id
string valid principals
uint64 valid after
uint64 valid before
string critical options
string extensions
string reserved
string signature key
string signature
DSA certificate
string "ssh-dss-cert-v01@openssh.com"
string nonce
mpint p
mpint q
mpint g
mpint y
uint64 serial
uint32 type
string key id
string valid principals
uint64 valid after
uint64 valid before
string critical options
string extensions
string reserved
string signature key
string signature
ECDSA certificate
string "ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com" |
"ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com" |
"ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com"
string nonce
string curve
string public_key
uint64 serial
uint32 type
string key id
string valid principals
uint64 valid after
uint64 valid before
string critical options
string extensions
string reserved
string signature key
string signature
ED25519 certificate
string "ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com"
string nonce
string pk
uint64 serial
uint32 type
string key id
string valid principals
uint64 valid after
uint64 valid before
string critical options
string extensions
string reserved
string signature key
string signature
The nonce field is a CA-provided random bitstring of arbitrary length
(but typically 16 or 32 bytes) included to make attacks that depend on
inducing collisions in the signature hash infeasible.
e and n are the RSA exponent and public modulus respectively.
p, q, g, y are the DSA parameters as described in FIPS-186-2.
curve and public key are respectively the ECDSA "[identifier]" and "Q"
defined in section 3.1 of RFC5656.
pk is the encoded Ed25519 public key as defined by
draft-josefsson-eddsa-ed25519-03.
serial is an optional certificate serial number set by the CA to
provide an abbreviated way to refer to certificates from that CA.
If a CA does not wish to number its certificates it must set this
field to zero.
type specifies whether this certificate is for identification of a user
or a host using a SSH_CERT_TYPE_... value.
key id is a free-form text field that is filled in by the CA at the time
of signing; the intention is that the contents of this field are used to
identify the identity principal in log messages.
"valid principals" is a string containing zero or more principals as
strings packed inside it. These principals list the names for which this
certificate is valid; hostnames for SSH_CERT_TYPE_HOST certificates and
usernames for SSH_CERT_TYPE_USER certificates. As a special case, a
zero-length "valid principals" field means the certificate is valid for
any principal of the specified type.
"valid after" and "valid before" specify a validity period for the
certificate. Each represents a time in seconds since 1970-01-01
00:00:00. A certificate is considered valid if:
valid after <= current time < valid before
critical options is a set of zero or more key options encoded as
below. All such options are "critical" in the sense that an implementation
must refuse to authorise a key that has an unrecognised option.
extensions is a set of zero or more optional extensions. These extensions
are not critical, and an implementation that encounters one that it does
not recognise may safely ignore it.
Generally, critical options are used to control features that restrict
access where extensions are used to enable features that grant access.
This ensures that certificates containing unknown restrictions do not
inadvertently grant access while allowing new protocol features to be
enabled via extensions without breaking certificates' backwards
compatibility.
The reserved field is currently unused and is ignored in this version of
the protocol.
The signature key field contains the CA key used to sign the
certificate. The valid key types for CA keys are ssh-rsa,
ssh-dss, ssh-ed25519 and the ECDSA types ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,
ecdsa-sha2-nistp384, ecdsa-sha2-nistp521. "Chained" certificates, where
the signature key type is a certificate type itself are NOT supported.
Note that it is possible for a RSA certificate key to be signed by a
Ed25519 or ECDSA CA key and vice-versa.
signature is computed over all preceding fields from the initial string
up to, and including the signature key. Signatures are computed and
encoded according to the rules defined for the CA's public key algorithm
(RFC4253 section 6.6 for ssh-rsa and ssh-dss, RFC5656 for the ECDSA
types), and draft-josefsson-eddsa-ed25519-03 for Ed25519.
Critical options
----------------
The critical options section of the certificate specifies zero or more
options on the certificates validity. The format of this field
is a sequence of zero or more tuples:
string name
string data
Options must be lexically ordered by "name" if they appear in the
sequence. Each named option may only appear once in a certificate.
The name field identifies the option and the data field encodes
option-specific information (see below). All options are
"critical", if an implementation does not recognise a option
then the validating party should refuse to accept the certificate.
Custom options should append the originating author or organisation's
domain name to the option name, e.g. "my-option@example.com".
No critical options are defined for host certificates at present. The
supported user certificate options and the contents and structure of
their data fields are:
Name Format Description
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
force-command string Specifies a command that is executed
(replacing any the user specified on the
ssh command-line) whenever this key is
used for authentication.
source-address string Comma-separated list of source addresses
from which this certificate is accepted
for authentication. Addresses are
specified in CIDR format (nn.nn.nn.nn/nn
or hhhh::hhhh/nn).
If this option is not present then
certificates may be presented from any
source address.
Extensions
----------
The extensions section of the certificate specifies zero or more
non-critical certificate extensions. The encoding and ordering of
extensions in this field is identical to that of the critical options,
as is the requirement that each name appear only once.
If an implementation does not recognise an extension, then it should
ignore it.
Custom options should append the originating author or organisation's
domain name to the option name, e.g. "my-option@example.com".
No extensions are defined for host certificates at present. The
supported user certificate extensions and the contents and structure of
their data fields are:
Name Format Description
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
+no-presence-required empty Flag indicating that signatures made
+ with this certificate need not assert
+ user presence. This option only make
+ sense for the U2F/FIDO security key
+ types that support this feature in
+ their signature formats.
+
permit-X11-forwarding empty Flag indicating that X11 forwarding
should be permitted. X11 forwarding will
be refused if this option is absent.
permit-agent-forwarding empty Flag indicating that agent forwarding
should be allowed. Agent forwarding
must not be permitted unless this
option is present.
permit-port-forwarding empty Flag indicating that port-forwarding
should be allowed. If this option is
not present then no port forwarding will
be allowed.
permit-pty empty Flag indicating that PTY allocation
should be permitted. In the absence of
this option PTY allocation will be
disabled.
permit-user-rc empty Flag indicating that execution of
~/.ssh/rc should be permitted. Execution
of this script will not be permitted if
this option is not present.
-$OpenBSD: PROTOCOL.certkeys,v 1.16 2018/10/26 01:23:03 djm Exp $
+$OpenBSD: PROTOCOL.certkeys,v 1.17 2019/11/25 00:57:51 djm Exp $
diff --git a/PROTOCOL.u2f b/PROTOCOL.u2f
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..748111d5630b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/PROTOCOL.u2f
@@ -0,0 +1,337 @@
+This document describes OpenSSH's support for U2F/FIDO security keys.
+
+Background
+----------
+
+U2F is an open standard for two-factor authentication hardware, widely
+used for user authentication to websites. U2F tokens are ubiquitous,
+available from a number of manufacturers and are currently by far the
+cheapest way for users to achieve hardware-backed credential storage.
+
+The U2F protocol however cannot be trivially used as an SSH protocol key
+type as both the inputs to the signature operation and the resultant
+signature differ from those specified for SSH. For similar reasons,
+integration of U2F devices cannot be achieved via the PKCS#11 API.
+
+U2F also offers a number of features that are attractive in the context
+of SSH authentication. They can be configured to require indication
+of "user presence" for each signature operation (typically achieved
+by requiring the user touch the key). They also offer an attestation
+mechanism at key enrollment time that can be used to prove that a
+given key is backed by hardware. Finally the signature format includes
+a monotonic signature counter that can be used (at scale) to detect
+concurrent use of a private key, should it be extracted from hardware.
+
+U2F private keys are generated through an enrollment operation,
+which takes an application ID - a URL-like string, typically "ssh:"
+in this case, but a HTTP origin for the case of web authentication,
+and a challenge string (typically randomly generated). The enrollment
+operation returns a public key, a key handle that must be used to invoke
+the hardware-backed private key, some flags and signed attestation
+information that may be used to verify that a private key is hosted on a
+particular hardware instance.
+
+It is common for U2F hardware to derive private keys from the key handle
+in conjunction with a small per-device secret that is unique to the
+hardware, thus requiring little on-device storage for an effectively
+unlimited number of supported keys. This drives the requirement that
+the key handle be supplied for each signature operation. U2F tokens
+primarily use ECDSA signatures in the NIST-P256 field, though the FIDO2
+standard specifies additional key types, including one based on Ed25519.
+
+SSH U2F Key formats
+-------------------
+
+OpenSSH integrates U2F as new key and corresponding certificate types:
+
+ sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com
+ sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com
+ sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com
+ sk-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com
+
+While each uses ecdsa-sha256-nistp256 as the underlying signature primitive,
+keys require extra information in the public and private keys, and in
+the signature object itself. As such they cannot be made compatible with
+the existing ecdsa-sha2-nistp* key types.
+
+The format of a sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com public key is:
+
+ string "sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com"
+ string curve name
+ ec_point Q
+ string application (user-specified, but typically "ssh:")
+
+The corresponding private key contains:
+
+ string "sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com"
+ string curve name
+ ec_point Q
+ string application (user-specified, but typically "ssh:")
+ uint8 flags
+ string key_handle
+ string reserved
+
+The format of a sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com public key is:
+
+ string "sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com"
+ string public key
+ string application (user-specified, but typically "ssh:")
+
+With a private half consisting of:
+
+ string "sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com"
+ string public key
+ string application (user-specified, but typically "ssh:")
+ uint8 flags
+ string key_handle
+ string reserved
+
+The certificate form for SSH U2F keys appends the usual certificate
+information to the public key:
+
+ string "sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com"
+ string nonce
+ string curve name
+ ec_point Q
+ string application
+ uint64 serial
+ uint32 type
+ string key id
+ string valid principals
+ uint64 valid after
+ uint64 valid before
+ string critical options
+ string extensions
+ string reserved
+ string signature key
+ string signature
+
+and for security key ed25519 certificates:
+
+ string "sk-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com"
+ string nonce
+ string public key
+ string application
+ uint64 serial
+ uint32 type
+ string key id
+ string valid principals
+ uint64 valid after
+ uint64 valid before
+ string critical options
+ string extensions
+ string reserved
+ string signature key
+ string signature
+
+Both security key certificates use the following encoding for private keys:
+
+ string type (e.g. "sk-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com")
+ string pubkey (the above key/cert structure)
+ string application
+ uint8 flags
+ string key_handle
+ string reserved
+
+During key generation, the hardware also returns attestation information
+that may be used to cryptographically prove that a given key is
+hardware-backed. Unfortunately, the protocol required for this proof is
+not privacy-preserving and may be used to identify U2F tokens with at
+least manufacturer and batch number granularity. For this reason, we
+choose not to include this information in the public key or save it by
+default.
+
+Attestation information is useful for out-of-band key and certificate
+registration worksflows, e.g. proving to a CA that a key is backed
+by trusted hardware before it will issue a certificate. To support this
+case, OpenSSH optionally allows retaining the attestation information
+at the time of key generation. It will take the following format:
+
+ string "ssh-sk-attest-v00"
+ string attestation certificate
+ string enrollment signature
+ uint32 reserved flags
+ string reserved string
+
+OpenSSH treats the attestation certificate and enrollment signatures as
+opaque objects and does no interpretation of them itself.
+
+SSH U2F signatures
+------------------
+
+In addition to the message to be signed, the U2F signature operation
+requires the key handle and a few additional parameters. The signature
+is signed over a blob that consists of:
+
+ byte[32] SHA256(application)
+ byte flags (including "user present", extensions present)
+ uint32 counter
+ byte[] extensions
+ byte[32] SHA256(message)
+
+No extensons are yet defined for SSH use. If any are defined in the future,
+it will be possible to infer their presence from the contents of the "flags"
+value.
+
+The signature returned from U2F hardware takes the following format:
+
+ byte flags (including "user present")
+ uint32 counter
+ byte[] ecdsa_signature (in X9.62 format).
+
+For use in the SSH protocol, we wish to avoid server-side parsing of ASN.1
+format data in the pre-authentication attack surface. Therefore, the
+signature format used on the wire in SSH2_USERAUTH_REQUEST packets will
+be reformatted to better match the existing signature encoding:
+
+ string "sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com"
+ string ecdsa_signature
+ byte flags
+ uint32 counter
+
+Where the "ecdsa_signature" field follows the RFC5656 ECDSA signature
+encoding:
+
+ mpint r
+ mpint s
+
+For Ed25519 keys the signature is encoded as:
+
+ string "sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com"
+ string signature
+ byte flags
+ uint32 counter
+
+ssh-agent protocol extensions
+-----------------------------
+
+ssh-agent requires a protocol extension to support U2F keys. At
+present the closest analogue to Security Keys in ssh-agent are PKCS#11
+tokens, insofar as they require a middleware library to communicate with
+the device that holds the keys. Unfortunately, the protocol message used
+to add PKCS#11 keys to ssh-agent does not include any way to send the
+key handle to the agent as U2F keys require.
+
+To avoid this, without having to add wholly new messages to the agent
+protocol, we will use the existing SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_ID_CONSTRAINED message
+with a new key constraint extension to encode a path to the middleware
+library for the key. The format of this constraint extension would be:
+
+ byte SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_EXTENSION
+ string sk-provider@openssh.com
+ string middleware path
+
+This constraint-based approach does not present any compatibility
+problems.
+
+OpenSSH integration
+-------------------
+
+U2F tokens may be attached via a number of means, including USB and NFC.
+The USB interface is standardised around a HID protocol, but we want to
+be able to support other transports as well as dummy implementations for
+regress testing. For this reason, OpenSSH shall support a dynamically-
+loaded middleware libraries to communicate with security keys, but offer
+support for the common case of USB HID security keys internally.
+
+The middleware library need only expose a handful of functions:
+
+ #define SSH_SK_VERSION_MAJOR 0x00040000 /* API version */
+ #define SSH_SK_VERSION_MAJOR_MASK 0xffff0000
+
+ /* Flags */
+ #define SSH_SK_USER_PRESENCE_REQD 0x01
+ #define SSH_SK_USER_VERIFICATION_REQD 0x04
+ #define SSH_SK_RESIDENT_KEY 0x20
+
+ /* Algs */
+ #define SSH_SK_ECDSA 0x00
+ #define SSH_SK_ED25519 0x01
+
+ /* Error codes */
+ #define SSH_SK_ERR_GENERAL -1
+ #define SSH_SK_ERR_UNSUPPORTED -2
+ #define SSH_SK_ERR_PIN_REQUIRED -3
+ #define SSH_SK_ERR_DEVICE_NOT_FOUND -4
+
+ struct sk_enroll_response {
+ uint8_t *public_key;
+ size_t public_key_len;
+ uint8_t *key_handle;
+ size_t key_handle_len;
+ uint8_t *signature;
+ size_t signature_len;
+ uint8_t *attestation_cert;
+ size_t attestation_cert_len;
+ };
+
+ struct sk_sign_response {
+ uint8_t flags;
+ uint32_t counter;
+ uint8_t *sig_r;
+ size_t sig_r_len;
+ uint8_t *sig_s;
+ size_t sig_s_len;
+ };
+
+ struct sk_resident_key {
+ uint32_t alg;
+ size_t slot;
+ char *application;
+ struct sk_enroll_response key;
+ };
+
+ struct sk_option {
+ char *name;
+ char *value;
+ uint8_t important;
+ };
+
+ /* Return the version of the middleware API */
+ uint32_t sk_api_version(void);
+
+ /* Enroll a U2F key (private key generation) */
+ int sk_enroll(uint32_t alg,
+ const uint8_t *challenge, size_t challenge_len,
+ const char *application, uint8_t flags, const char *pin,
+ struct sk_option **options,
+ struct sk_enroll_response **enroll_response);
+
+ /* Sign a challenge */
+ int sk_sign(uint32_t alg, const uint8_t *message, size_t message_len,
+ const char *application,
+ const uint8_t *key_handle, size_t key_handle_len,
+ uint8_t flags, const char *pin, struct sk_option **options,
+ struct sk_sign_response **sign_response);
+
+ /* Enumerate all resident keys */
+ int sk_load_resident_keys(const char *pin, struct sk_option **options,
+ struct sk_resident_key ***rks, size_t *nrks);
+
+The SSH_SK_VERSION_MAJOR should be incremented for each incompatible
+API change.
+
+The options may be used to pass miscellaneous options to the middleware
+as a NULL-terminated array of pointers to struct sk_option. The middleware
+may ignore unsupported or unknown options unless the "important" flag is
+set, in which case it should return failure if an unsupported option is
+requested.
+
+At present the following options names are supported:
+
+ "device"
+
+ Specifies a specific FIDO device on which to perform the
+ operation. The value in this field is interpreted by the
+ middleware but it would be typical to specify a path to
+ a /dev node for the device in question.
+
+ "user"
+
+ Specifies the FIDO2 username used when enrolling a key,
+ overriding OpenSSH's default of using an all-zero username.
+
+In OpenSSH, the middleware will be invoked by using a similar mechanism to
+ssh-pkcs11-helper to provide address-space containment of the
+middleware from ssh-agent.
+
diff --git a/README b/README
index 5c83aa508d00..c95ff21627be 100644
--- a/README
+++ b/README
@@ -1,62 +1,52 @@
-See https://www.openssh.com/releasenotes.html#8.1p1 for the release notes.
+See https://www.openssh.com/releasenotes.html#8.2p1 for the release notes.
Please read https://www.openssh.com/report.html for bug reporting
instructions and note that we do not use Github for bug reporting or
patch/pull-request management.
This is the port of OpenBSD's excellent OpenSSH[0] to Linux and other
Unices.
OpenSSH is based on the last free version of Tatu Ylonen's sample
implementation with all patent-encumbered algorithms removed (to
external libraries), all known security bugs fixed, new features
reintroduced and many other clean-ups. OpenSSH has been created by
Aaron Campbell, Bob Beck, Markus Friedl, Niels Provos, Theo de Raadt,
and Dug Song. It has a homepage at https://www.openssh.com/
This port consists of the re-introduction of autoconf support, PAM
-support, EGD[1]/PRNGD[2] support and replacements for OpenBSD library
+support, EGD/PRNGD support and replacements for OpenBSD library
functions that are (regrettably) absent from other unices. This port
has been best tested on AIX, Cygwin, HP-UX, Linux, MacOS/X,
FreeBSD, NetBSD, OpenBSD, OpenServer, Solaris and UnixWare.
This version actively tracks changes in the OpenBSD CVS repository.
The PAM support is now more functional than the popular packages of
commercial ssh-1.2.x. It checks "account" and "session" modules for
all logins, not just when using password authentication.
-OpenSSH depends on Zlib[3], OpenSSL[4], and optionally PAM[5] and
-libedit[6]
-
There is now several mailing lists for this port of OpenSSH. Please
refer to https://www.openssh.com/list.html for details on how to join.
Please send bug reports and patches to the mailing list
openssh-unix-dev@mindrot.org. The list is open to posting by unsubscribed
users. Code contribution are welcomed, but please follow the OpenBSD
-style guidelines[7].
+style guidelines[1].
-Please refer to the INSTALL document for information on how to install
-OpenSSH on your system.
+Please refer to the INSTALL document for information on dependencies and
+how to install OpenSSH on your system.
Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
Miscellania -
-This version of OpenSSH is based upon code retrieved from the OpenBSD
-CVS repository which in turn was based on the last free sample
-implementation released by Tatu Ylonen.
+This version of OpenSSH is based upon code retrieved from the OpenBSD CVS
+repository which in turn was based on the last free sample implementation
+released by Tatu Ylonen.
References -
[0] https://www.openssh.com/
-[1] http://www.lothar.com/tech/crypto/
-[2] http://prngd.sourceforge.net/
-[3] https://www.zlib.net/
-[4] https://www.openssl.org/
-[5] https://www.openpam.org
- https://www.kernel.org/pub/linux/libs/pam/
- (PAM also is standard on Solaris and HP-UX 11)
-[6] https://thrysoee.dk/editline/ (portable version)
-[7] https://man.openbsd.org/style.9
+[1] https://man.openbsd.org/style.9
+
diff --git a/README.dns b/README.dns
index 97879183e396..29ecaee8da39 100644
--- a/README.dns
+++ b/README.dns
@@ -1,47 +1,47 @@
How to verify host keys using OpenSSH and DNS
---------------------------------------------
-OpenSSH contains support for verifying host keys using DNS as described in
-draft-ietf-secsh-dns-05.txt. The document contains very brief instructions
-on how to use this feature. Configuring DNS is out of the scope of this
-document.
+OpenSSH contains support for verifying host keys using DNS as described
+in https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc4255. The document contains very brief
+instructions on how to use this feature. Configuring DNS is out of the
+scope of this document.
(1) Server: Generate and publish the DNS RR
To create a DNS resource record (RR) containing a fingerprint of the
public host key, use the following command:
ssh-keygen -r hostname -f keyfile -g
where "hostname" is your fully qualified hostname and "keyfile" is the
file containing the public host key file. If you have multiple keys,
you should generate one RR for each key.
In the example above, ssh-keygen will print the fingerprint in a
generic DNS RR format parsable by most modern name server
implementations. If your nameserver has support for the SSHFP RR
you can omit the -g flag and ssh-keygen will print a standard SSHFP RR.
To publish the fingerprint using the DNS you must add the generated RR
to your DNS zone file and sign your zone.
(2) Client: Enable ssh to verify host keys using DNS
To enable the ssh client to verify host keys using DNS, you have to
add the following option to the ssh configuration file
($HOME/.ssh/config or /etc/ssh/ssh_config):
VerifyHostKeyDNS yes
Upon connection the client will try to look up the fingerprint RR
using DNS. If the fingerprint received from the DNS server matches
the remote host key, the user will be notified.
Jakob Schlyter
Wesley Griffin
$OpenBSD: README.dns,v 1.2 2003/10/14 19:43:23 jakob Exp $
diff --git a/README.md b/README.md
index 4e2624161b93..28fb43d2aa1f 100644
--- a/README.md
+++ b/README.md
@@ -1,74 +1,79 @@
# Portable OpenSSH
+[![Fuzzing Status](https://oss-fuzz-build-logs.storage.googleapis.com/badges/openssh.svg)](https://bugs.chromium.org/p/oss-fuzz/issues/list?sort=-opened&can=1&q=proj:openssh)
+
OpenSSH is a complete implementation of the SSH protocol (version 2) for secure remote login, command execution and file transfer. It includes a client ``ssh`` and server ``sshd``, file transfer utilities ``scp`` and ``sftp`` as well as tools for key generation (``ssh-keygen``), run-time key storage (``ssh-agent``) and a number of supporting programs.
This is a port of OpenBSD's [OpenSSH](https://openssh.com) to most Unix-like operating systems, including Linux, OS X and Cygwin. Portable OpenSSH polyfills OpenBSD APIs that are not available elsewhere, adds sshd sandboxing for more operating systems and includes support for OS-native authentication and auditing (e.g. using PAM).
## Documentation
The official documentation for OpenSSH are the man pages for each tool:
* [ssh(1)](https://man.openbsd.org/ssh.1)
* [sshd(8)](https://man.openbsd.org/sshd.8)
* [ssh-keygen(1)](https://man.openbsd.org/ssh-keygen.1)
* [ssh-agent(1)](https://man.openbsd.org/ssh-agent.1)
* [scp(1)](https://man.openbsd.org/scp.1)
* [sftp(1)](https://man.openbsd.org/sftp.1)
* [ssh-keyscan(8)](https://man.openbsd.org/ssh-keyscan.8)
* [sftp-server(8)](https://man.openbsd.org/sftp-server.8)
## Stable Releases
Stable release tarballs are available from a number of [download mirrors](https://www.openssh.com/portable.html#downloads). We recommend the use of a stable release for most users. Please read the [release notes](https://www.openssh.com/releasenotes.html) for details of recent changes and potential incompatibilities.
## Building Portable OpenSSH
### Dependencies
-Portable OpenSSH is built using autoconf and make. It requires a working C compiler, standard library and headers, as well as [zlib](https://www.zlib.net/) and ``libcrypto`` from either [LibreSSL](https://www.libressl.org/) or [OpenSSL](https://www.openssl.org) to build. Certain platforms and build-time options may require additional dependencies.
+Portable OpenSSH is built using autoconf and make. It requires a working C compiler, standard library and headers, and [zlib](https://www.zlib.net/). ``libcrypto`` from either [LibreSSL](https://www.libressl.org/) or [OpenSSL](https://www.openssl.org) may also be used, but OpenSSH may be built without it supporting a subset of crypto algorithms.
+
+FIDO security token support need [libfido2](https://github.com/Yubico/libfido2) and its dependencies. Also, certain platforms and build-time options may require additional dependencies, see README.platform for details.
### Building a release
Releases include a pre-built copy of the ``configure`` script and may be built using:
```
-tar zxvf openssh-X.Y.tar.gz
+tar zxvf openssh-X.YpZ.tar.gz
cd openssh
./configure # [options]
make && make tests
```
See the [Build-time Customisation](#build-time-customisation) section below for configure options. If you plan on installing OpenSSH to your system, then you will usually want to specify destination paths.
### Building from git
If building from git, you'll need [autoconf](https://www.gnu.org/software/autoconf/) installed to build the ``configure`` script. The following commands will check out and build portable OpenSSH from git:
```
git clone https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable # or https://anongit.mindrot.org/openssh.git
cd openssh-portable
autoreconf
./configure
make && make tests
```
### Build-time Customisation
There are many build-time customisation options available. All Autoconf destination path flags (e.g. ``--prefix``) are supported (and are usually required if you want to install OpenSSH).
For a full list of available flags, run ``configure --help`` but a few of the more frequently-used ones are described below. Some of these flags will require additional libraries and/or headers be installed.
Flag | Meaning
--- | ---
``--with-pam`` | Enable [PAM](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pluggable_authentication_module) support. [OpenPAM](https://www.openpam.org/), [Linux PAM](http://www.linux-pam.org/) and Solaris PAM are supported.
``--with-libedit`` | Enable [libedit](https://www.thrysoee.dk/editline/) support for sftp.
``--with-kerberos5`` | Enable Kerberos/GSSAPI support. Both [Heimdal](https://www.h5l.org/) and [MIT](https://web.mit.edu/kerberos/) Kerberos implementations are supported.
``--with-selinux`` | Enable [SELinux](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Security-Enhanced_Linux) support.
+``--with-security-key-builtin`` | Include built-in support for U2F/FIDO2 security keys. This requires [libfido2](https://github.com/Yubico/libfido2) be installed.
## Development
Portable OpenSSH development is discussed on the [openssh-unix-dev mailing list](https://lists.mindrot.org/mailman/listinfo/openssh-unix-dev) ([archive mirror](https://marc.info/?l=openssh-unix-dev)). Bugs and feature requests are tracked on our [Bugzilla](https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/).
## Reporting bugs
_Non-security_ bugs may be reported to the developers via [Bugzilla](https://bugzilla.mindrot.org/) or via the mailing list above. Security bugs should be reported to [openssh@openssh.com](mailto:openssh.openssh.com).
diff --git a/auth-options.c b/auth-options.c
index 90b0d7f25428..2d200944c17a 100644
--- a/auth-options.c
+++ b/auth-options.c
@@ -1,868 +1,882 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: auth-options.c,v 1.89 2019/09/13 04:36:43 dtucker Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: auth-options.c,v 1.90 2019/11/25 00:54:23 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2018 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
*
* Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
* copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
* WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
* ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
* WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
* ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
* OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <netdb.h>
#include <pwd.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <ctype.h>
#include <limits.h>
#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "sshbuf.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "sshkey.h"
#include "match.h"
#include "ssh2.h"
#include "auth-options.h"
static int
dup_strings(char ***dstp, size_t *ndstp, char **src, size_t nsrc)
{
char **dst;
size_t i, j;
*dstp = NULL;
*ndstp = 0;
if (nsrc == 0)
return 0;
if ((dst = calloc(nsrc, sizeof(*src))) == NULL)
return -1;
for (i = 0; i < nsrc; i++) {
if ((dst[i] = strdup(src[i])) == NULL) {
for (j = 0; j < i; j++)
free(dst[j]);
free(dst);
return -1;
}
}
/* success */
*dstp = dst;
*ndstp = nsrc;
return 0;
}
#define OPTIONS_CRITICAL 1
#define OPTIONS_EXTENSIONS 2
static int
cert_option_list(struct sshauthopt *opts, struct sshbuf *oblob,
u_int which, int crit)
{
char *command, *allowed;
char *name = NULL;
struct sshbuf *c = NULL, *data = NULL;
int r, ret = -1, found;
if ((c = sshbuf_fromb(oblob)) == NULL) {
error("%s: sshbuf_fromb failed", __func__);
goto out;
}
while (sshbuf_len(c) > 0) {
sshbuf_free(data);
data = NULL;
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(c, &name, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_froms(c, &data)) != 0) {
error("Unable to parse certificate options: %s",
ssh_err(r));
goto out;
}
debug3("found certificate option \"%.100s\" len %zu",
name, sshbuf_len(data));
found = 0;
if ((which & OPTIONS_EXTENSIONS) != 0) {
- if (strcmp(name, "permit-X11-forwarding") == 0) {
+ if (strcmp(name, "no-touch-required") == 0) {
+ opts->no_require_user_presence = 1;
+ found = 1;
+ } else if (strcmp(name, "permit-X11-forwarding") == 0) {
opts->permit_x11_forwarding_flag = 1;
found = 1;
} else if (strcmp(name,
"permit-agent-forwarding") == 0) {
opts->permit_agent_forwarding_flag = 1;
found = 1;
} else if (strcmp(name,
"permit-port-forwarding") == 0) {
opts->permit_port_forwarding_flag = 1;
found = 1;
} else if (strcmp(name, "permit-pty") == 0) {
opts->permit_pty_flag = 1;
found = 1;
} else if (strcmp(name, "permit-user-rc") == 0) {
opts->permit_user_rc = 1;
found = 1;
}
}
if (!found && (which & OPTIONS_CRITICAL) != 0) {
if (strcmp(name, "force-command") == 0) {
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(data, &command,
NULL)) != 0) {
error("Unable to parse \"%s\" "
"section: %s", name, ssh_err(r));
goto out;
}
if (opts->force_command != NULL) {
error("Certificate has multiple "
"force-command options");
free(command);
goto out;
}
opts->force_command = command;
found = 1;
}
if (strcmp(name, "source-address") == 0) {
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(data, &allowed,
NULL)) != 0) {
error("Unable to parse \"%s\" "
"section: %s", name, ssh_err(r));
goto out;
}
if (opts->required_from_host_cert != NULL) {
error("Certificate has multiple "
"source-address options");
free(allowed);
goto out;
}
/* Check syntax */
if (addr_match_cidr_list(NULL, allowed) == -1) {
error("Certificate source-address "
"contents invalid");
goto out;
}
opts->required_from_host_cert = allowed;
found = 1;
}
}
if (!found) {
if (crit) {
error("Certificate critical option \"%s\" "
"is not supported", name);
goto out;
} else {
logit("Certificate extension \"%s\" "
"is not supported", name);
}
} else if (sshbuf_len(data) != 0) {
error("Certificate option \"%s\" corrupt "
"(extra data)", name);
goto out;
}
free(name);
name = NULL;
}
/* successfully parsed all options */
ret = 0;
out:
free(name);
sshbuf_free(data);
sshbuf_free(c);
return ret;
}
struct sshauthopt *
sshauthopt_new(void)
{
struct sshauthopt *ret;
if ((ret = calloc(1, sizeof(*ret))) == NULL)
return NULL;
ret->force_tun_device = -1;
return ret;
}
void
sshauthopt_free(struct sshauthopt *opts)
{
size_t i;
if (opts == NULL)
return;
free(opts->cert_principals);
free(opts->force_command);
free(opts->required_from_host_cert);
free(opts->required_from_host_keys);
for (i = 0; i < opts->nenv; i++)
free(opts->env[i]);
free(opts->env);
for (i = 0; i < opts->npermitopen; i++)
free(opts->permitopen[i]);
free(opts->permitopen);
for (i = 0; i < opts->npermitlisten; i++)
free(opts->permitlisten[i]);
free(opts->permitlisten);
explicit_bzero(opts, sizeof(*opts));
free(opts);
}
struct sshauthopt *
sshauthopt_new_with_keys_defaults(void)
{
struct sshauthopt *ret = NULL;
if ((ret = sshauthopt_new()) == NULL)
return NULL;
/* Defaults for authorized_keys flags */
ret->permit_port_forwarding_flag = 1;
ret->permit_agent_forwarding_flag = 1;
ret->permit_x11_forwarding_flag = 1;
ret->permit_pty_flag = 1;
ret->permit_user_rc = 1;
return ret;
}
/*
* Parse and record a permitopen/permitlisten directive.
* Return 0 on success. Return -1 on failure and sets *errstrp to error reason.
*/
static int
handle_permit(const char **optsp, int allow_bare_port,
char ***permitsp, size_t *npermitsp, const char **errstrp)
{
char *opt, *tmp, *cp, *host, **permits = *permitsp;
size_t npermits = *npermitsp;
const char *errstr = "unknown error";
if (npermits > SSH_AUTHOPT_PERMIT_MAX) {
*errstrp = "too many permission directives";
return -1;
}
if ((opt = opt_dequote(optsp, &errstr)) == NULL) {
return -1;
}
if (allow_bare_port && strchr(opt, ':') == NULL) {
/*
* Allow a bare port number in permitlisten to indicate a
* listen_host wildcard.
*/
if (asprintf(&tmp, "*:%s", opt) == -1) {
free(opt);
*errstrp = "memory allocation failed";
return -1;
}
free(opt);
opt = tmp;
}
if ((tmp = strdup(opt)) == NULL) {
free(opt);
*errstrp = "memory allocation failed";
return -1;
}
cp = tmp;
/* validate syntax before recording it. */
host = hpdelim(&cp);
if (host == NULL || strlen(host) >= NI_MAXHOST) {
free(tmp);
free(opt);
*errstrp = "invalid permission hostname";
return -1;
}
/*
* don't want to use permitopen_port to avoid
* dependency on channels.[ch] here.
*/
if (cp == NULL ||
(strcmp(cp, "*") != 0 && a2port(cp) <= 0)) {
free(tmp);
free(opt);
*errstrp = "invalid permission port";
return -1;
}
/* XXX - add streamlocal support */
free(tmp);
/* Record it */
if ((permits = recallocarray(permits, npermits, npermits + 1,
sizeof(*permits))) == NULL) {
free(opt);
/* NB. don't update *permitsp if alloc fails */
*errstrp = "memory allocation failed";
return -1;
}
permits[npermits++] = opt;
*permitsp = permits;
*npermitsp = npermits;
return 0;
}
struct sshauthopt *
sshauthopt_parse(const char *opts, const char **errstrp)
{
char **oarray, *opt, *cp, *tmp;
int r;
struct sshauthopt *ret = NULL;
const char *errstr = "unknown error";
uint64_t valid_before;
if (errstrp != NULL)
*errstrp = NULL;
if ((ret = sshauthopt_new_with_keys_defaults()) == NULL)
goto alloc_fail;
if (opts == NULL)
return ret;
while (*opts && *opts != ' ' && *opts != '\t') {
/* flag options */
if ((r = opt_flag("restrict", 0, &opts)) != -1) {
ret->restricted = 1;
ret->permit_port_forwarding_flag = 0;
ret->permit_agent_forwarding_flag = 0;
ret->permit_x11_forwarding_flag = 0;
ret->permit_pty_flag = 0;
ret->permit_user_rc = 0;
} else if ((r = opt_flag("cert-authority", 0, &opts)) != -1) {
ret->cert_authority = r;
} else if ((r = opt_flag("port-forwarding", 1, &opts)) != -1) {
ret->permit_port_forwarding_flag = r == 1;
} else if ((r = opt_flag("agent-forwarding", 1, &opts)) != -1) {
ret->permit_agent_forwarding_flag = r == 1;
} else if ((r = opt_flag("x11-forwarding", 1, &opts)) != -1) {
ret->permit_x11_forwarding_flag = r == 1;
+ } else if ((r = opt_flag("touch-required", 1, &opts)) != -1) {
+ ret->no_require_user_presence = r != 1; /* NB. flip */
} else if ((r = opt_flag("pty", 1, &opts)) != -1) {
ret->permit_pty_flag = r == 1;
} else if ((r = opt_flag("user-rc", 1, &opts)) != -1) {
ret->permit_user_rc = r == 1;
} else if (opt_match(&opts, "command")) {
if (ret->force_command != NULL) {
errstr = "multiple \"command\" clauses";
goto fail;
}
ret->force_command = opt_dequote(&opts, &errstr);
if (ret->force_command == NULL)
goto fail;
} else if (opt_match(&opts, "principals")) {
if (ret->cert_principals != NULL) {
errstr = "multiple \"principals\" clauses";
goto fail;
}
ret->cert_principals = opt_dequote(&opts, &errstr);
if (ret->cert_principals == NULL)
goto fail;
} else if (opt_match(&opts, "from")) {
if (ret->required_from_host_keys != NULL) {
errstr = "multiple \"from\" clauses";
goto fail;
}
ret->required_from_host_keys = opt_dequote(&opts,
&errstr);
if (ret->required_from_host_keys == NULL)
goto fail;
} else if (opt_match(&opts, "expiry-time")) {
if ((opt = opt_dequote(&opts, &errstr)) == NULL)
goto fail;
if (parse_absolute_time(opt, &valid_before) != 0 ||
valid_before == 0) {
free(opt);
errstr = "invalid expires time";
goto fail;
}
free(opt);
if (ret->valid_before == 0 ||
valid_before < ret->valid_before)
ret->valid_before = valid_before;
} else if (opt_match(&opts, "environment")) {
if (ret->nenv > INT_MAX) {
errstr = "too many environment strings";
goto fail;
}
if ((opt = opt_dequote(&opts, &errstr)) == NULL)
goto fail;
/* env name must be alphanumeric and followed by '=' */
if ((tmp = strchr(opt, '=')) == NULL) {
free(opt);
errstr = "invalid environment string";
goto fail;
}
if ((cp = strdup(opt)) == NULL)
goto alloc_fail;
cp[tmp - opt] = '\0'; /* truncate at '=' */
if (!valid_env_name(cp)) {
free(cp);
free(opt);
errstr = "invalid environment string";
goto fail;
}
free(cp);
/* Append it. */
oarray = ret->env;
if ((ret->env = recallocarray(ret->env, ret->nenv,
ret->nenv + 1, sizeof(*ret->env))) == NULL) {
free(opt);
ret->env = oarray; /* put it back for cleanup */
goto alloc_fail;
}
ret->env[ret->nenv++] = opt;
} else if (opt_match(&opts, "permitopen")) {
if (handle_permit(&opts, 0, &ret->permitopen,
&ret->npermitopen, &errstr) != 0)
goto fail;
} else if (opt_match(&opts, "permitlisten")) {
if (handle_permit(&opts, 1, &ret->permitlisten,
&ret->npermitlisten, &errstr) != 0)
goto fail;
} else if (opt_match(&opts, "tunnel")) {
if ((opt = opt_dequote(&opts, &errstr)) == NULL)
goto fail;
ret->force_tun_device = a2tun(opt, NULL);
free(opt);
if (ret->force_tun_device == SSH_TUNID_ERR) {
errstr = "invalid tun device";
goto fail;
}
}
/*
* Skip the comma, and move to the next option
* (or break out if there are no more).
*/
if (*opts == '\0' || *opts == ' ' || *opts == '\t')
break; /* End of options. */
/* Anything other than a comma is an unknown option */
if (*opts != ',') {
errstr = "unknown key option";
goto fail;
}
opts++;
if (*opts == '\0') {
errstr = "unexpected end-of-options";
goto fail;
}
}
/* success */
if (errstrp != NULL)
*errstrp = NULL;
return ret;
alloc_fail:
errstr = "memory allocation failed";
fail:
sshauthopt_free(ret);
if (errstrp != NULL)
*errstrp = errstr;
return NULL;
}
struct sshauthopt *
sshauthopt_from_cert(struct sshkey *k)
{
struct sshauthopt *ret;
if (k == NULL || !sshkey_type_is_cert(k->type) || k->cert == NULL ||
k->cert->type != SSH2_CERT_TYPE_USER)
return NULL;
if ((ret = sshauthopt_new()) == NULL)
return NULL;
/* Handle options and critical extensions separately */
if (cert_option_list(ret, k->cert->critical,
OPTIONS_CRITICAL, 1) == -1) {
sshauthopt_free(ret);
return NULL;
}
if (cert_option_list(ret, k->cert->extensions,
OPTIONS_EXTENSIONS, 0) == -1) {
sshauthopt_free(ret);
return NULL;
}
/* success */
return ret;
}
/*
* Merges "additional" options to "primary" and returns the result.
* NB. Some options from primary have primacy.
*/
struct sshauthopt *
sshauthopt_merge(const struct sshauthopt *primary,
const struct sshauthopt *additional, const char **errstrp)
{
struct sshauthopt *ret;
const char *errstr = "internal error";
const char *tmp;
if (errstrp != NULL)
*errstrp = NULL;
if ((ret = sshauthopt_new()) == NULL)
goto alloc_fail;
/* cert_authority and cert_principals are cleared in result */
/* Prefer access lists from primary. */
/* XXX err is both set and mismatch? */
tmp = primary->required_from_host_cert;
if (tmp == NULL)
tmp = additional->required_from_host_cert;
if (tmp != NULL && (ret->required_from_host_cert = strdup(tmp)) == NULL)
goto alloc_fail;
tmp = primary->required_from_host_keys;
if (tmp == NULL)
tmp = additional->required_from_host_keys;
if (tmp != NULL && (ret->required_from_host_keys = strdup(tmp)) == NULL)
goto alloc_fail;
/*
* force_tun_device, permitopen/permitlisten and environment all
* prefer the primary.
*/
ret->force_tun_device = primary->force_tun_device;
if (ret->force_tun_device == -1)
ret->force_tun_device = additional->force_tun_device;
if (primary->nenv > 0) {
if (dup_strings(&ret->env, &ret->nenv,
primary->env, primary->nenv) != 0)
goto alloc_fail;
} else if (additional->nenv) {
if (dup_strings(&ret->env, &ret->nenv,
additional->env, additional->nenv) != 0)
goto alloc_fail;
}
if (primary->npermitopen > 0) {
if (dup_strings(&ret->permitopen, &ret->npermitopen,
primary->permitopen, primary->npermitopen) != 0)
goto alloc_fail;
} else if (additional->npermitopen > 0) {
if (dup_strings(&ret->permitopen, &ret->npermitopen,
additional->permitopen, additional->npermitopen) != 0)
goto alloc_fail;
}
if (primary->npermitlisten > 0) {
if (dup_strings(&ret->permitlisten, &ret->npermitlisten,
primary->permitlisten, primary->npermitlisten) != 0)
goto alloc_fail;
} else if (additional->npermitlisten > 0) {
if (dup_strings(&ret->permitlisten, &ret->npermitlisten,
additional->permitlisten, additional->npermitlisten) != 0)
goto alloc_fail;
}
- /* Flags are logical-AND (i.e. must be set in both for permission) */
-#define OPTFLAG(x) ret->x = (primary->x == 1) && (additional->x == 1)
- OPTFLAG(permit_port_forwarding_flag);
- OPTFLAG(permit_agent_forwarding_flag);
- OPTFLAG(permit_x11_forwarding_flag);
- OPTFLAG(permit_pty_flag);
- OPTFLAG(permit_user_rc);
-#undef OPTFLAG
+#define OPTFLAG_AND(x) ret->x = (primary->x == 1) && (additional->x == 1)
+ /* Permissive flags are logical-AND (i.e. must be set in both) */
+ OPTFLAG_AND(permit_port_forwarding_flag);
+ OPTFLAG_AND(permit_agent_forwarding_flag);
+ OPTFLAG_AND(permit_x11_forwarding_flag);
+ OPTFLAG_AND(permit_pty_flag);
+ OPTFLAG_AND(permit_user_rc);
+ OPTFLAG_AND(no_require_user_presence);
+#undef OPTFLAG_AND
/* Earliest expiry time should win */
if (primary->valid_before != 0)
ret->valid_before = primary->valid_before;
if (additional->valid_before != 0 &&
additional->valid_before < ret->valid_before)
ret->valid_before = additional->valid_before;
/*
* When both multiple forced-command are specified, only
* proceed if they are identical, otherwise fail.
*/
if (primary->force_command != NULL &&
additional->force_command != NULL) {
if (strcmp(primary->force_command,
additional->force_command) == 0) {
/* ok */
ret->force_command = strdup(primary->force_command);
if (ret->force_command == NULL)
goto alloc_fail;
} else {
errstr = "forced command options do not match";
goto fail;
}
} else if (primary->force_command != NULL) {
if ((ret->force_command = strdup(
primary->force_command)) == NULL)
goto alloc_fail;
} else if (additional->force_command != NULL) {
if ((ret->force_command = strdup(
additional->force_command)) == NULL)
goto alloc_fail;
}
/* success */
if (errstrp != NULL)
*errstrp = NULL;
return ret;
alloc_fail:
errstr = "memory allocation failed";
fail:
if (errstrp != NULL)
*errstrp = errstr;
sshauthopt_free(ret);
return NULL;
}
/*
* Copy options
*/
struct sshauthopt *
sshauthopt_copy(const struct sshauthopt *orig)
{
struct sshauthopt *ret;
if ((ret = sshauthopt_new()) == NULL)
return NULL;
#define OPTSCALAR(x) ret->x = orig->x
OPTSCALAR(permit_port_forwarding_flag);
OPTSCALAR(permit_agent_forwarding_flag);
OPTSCALAR(permit_x11_forwarding_flag);
OPTSCALAR(permit_pty_flag);
OPTSCALAR(permit_user_rc);
OPTSCALAR(restricted);
OPTSCALAR(cert_authority);
OPTSCALAR(force_tun_device);
OPTSCALAR(valid_before);
+ OPTSCALAR(no_require_user_presence);
#undef OPTSCALAR
#define OPTSTRING(x) \
do { \
if (orig->x != NULL && (ret->x = strdup(orig->x)) == NULL) { \
sshauthopt_free(ret); \
return NULL; \
} \
} while (0)
OPTSTRING(cert_principals);
OPTSTRING(force_command);
OPTSTRING(required_from_host_cert);
OPTSTRING(required_from_host_keys);
#undef OPTSTRING
if (dup_strings(&ret->env, &ret->nenv, orig->env, orig->nenv) != 0 ||
dup_strings(&ret->permitopen, &ret->npermitopen,
orig->permitopen, orig->npermitopen) != 0 ||
dup_strings(&ret->permitlisten, &ret->npermitlisten,
orig->permitlisten, orig->npermitlisten) != 0) {
sshauthopt_free(ret);
return NULL;
}
return ret;
}
static int
serialise_array(struct sshbuf *m, char **a, size_t n)
{
struct sshbuf *b;
size_t i;
int r;
if (n > INT_MAX)
return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
}
for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, a[i])) != 0) {
sshbuf_free(b);
return r;
}
}
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, n)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, b)) != 0) {
sshbuf_free(b);
return r;
}
/* success */
return 0;
}
static int
deserialise_array(struct sshbuf *m, char ***ap, size_t *np)
{
char **a = NULL;
size_t i, n = 0;
struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
u_int tmp;
int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &tmp)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_froms(m, &b)) != 0)
goto out;
if (tmp > INT_MAX) {
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
n = tmp;
if (n > 0 && (a = calloc(n, sizeof(*a))) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &a[i], NULL)) != 0)
goto out;
}
/* success */
r = 0;
*ap = a;
a = NULL;
*np = n;
n = 0;
out:
for (i = 0; i < n; i++)
free(a[i]);
free(a);
sshbuf_free(b);
return r;
}
static int
serialise_nullable_string(struct sshbuf *m, const char *s)
{
int r;
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(m, s == NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, s)) != 0)
return r;
return 0;
}
static int
deserialise_nullable_string(struct sshbuf *m, char **sp)
{
int r;
u_char flag;
*sp = NULL;
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(m, &flag)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, flag ? NULL : sp, NULL)) != 0)
return r;
return 0;
}
int
sshauthopt_serialise(const struct sshauthopt *opts, struct sshbuf *m,
int untrusted)
{
int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- /* Flag and simple integer options */
+ /* Flag options */
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(m, opts->permit_port_forwarding_flag)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u8(m, opts->permit_agent_forwarding_flag)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u8(m, opts->permit_x11_forwarding_flag)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u8(m, opts->permit_pty_flag)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u8(m, opts->permit_user_rc)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u8(m, opts->restricted)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u8(m, opts->cert_authority)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshbuf_put_u64(m, opts->valid_before)) != 0)
+ (r = sshbuf_put_u8(m, opts->no_require_user_presence)) != 0)
+ return r;
+
+ /* Simple integer options */
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u64(m, opts->valid_before)) != 0)
return r;
/* tunnel number can be negative to indicate "unset" */
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(m, opts->force_tun_device == -1)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, (opts->force_tun_device < 0) ?
0 : (u_int)opts->force_tun_device)) != 0)
return r;
/* String options; these may be NULL */
if ((r = serialise_nullable_string(m,
untrusted ? "yes" : opts->cert_principals)) != 0 ||
(r = serialise_nullable_string(m,
untrusted ? "true" : opts->force_command)) != 0 ||
(r = serialise_nullable_string(m,
untrusted ? NULL : opts->required_from_host_cert)) != 0 ||
(r = serialise_nullable_string(m,
untrusted ? NULL : opts->required_from_host_keys)) != 0)
return r;
/* Array options */
if ((r = serialise_array(m, opts->env,
untrusted ? 0 : opts->nenv)) != 0 ||
(r = serialise_array(m, opts->permitopen,
untrusted ? 0 : opts->npermitopen)) != 0 ||
(r = serialise_array(m, opts->permitlisten,
untrusted ? 0 : opts->npermitlisten)) != 0)
return r;
/* success */
return 0;
}
int
sshauthopt_deserialise(struct sshbuf *m, struct sshauthopt **optsp)
{
struct sshauthopt *opts = NULL;
int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
u_char f;
u_int tmp;
if ((opts = calloc(1, sizeof(*opts))) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ /* Flag options */
#define OPT_FLAG(x) \
do { \
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(m, &f)) != 0) \
goto out; \
opts->x = f; \
} while (0)
OPT_FLAG(permit_port_forwarding_flag);
OPT_FLAG(permit_agent_forwarding_flag);
OPT_FLAG(permit_x11_forwarding_flag);
OPT_FLAG(permit_pty_flag);
OPT_FLAG(permit_user_rc);
OPT_FLAG(restricted);
OPT_FLAG(cert_authority);
+ OPT_FLAG(no_require_user_presence);
#undef OPT_FLAG
+ /* Simple integer options */
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u64(m, &opts->valid_before)) != 0)
goto out;
/* tunnel number can be negative to indicate "unset" */
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(m, &f)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &tmp)) != 0)
goto out;
opts->force_tun_device = f ? -1 : (int)tmp;
/* String options may be NULL */
if ((r = deserialise_nullable_string(m, &opts->cert_principals)) != 0 ||
(r = deserialise_nullable_string(m, &opts->force_command)) != 0 ||
(r = deserialise_nullable_string(m,
&opts->required_from_host_cert)) != 0 ||
(r = deserialise_nullable_string(m,
&opts->required_from_host_keys)) != 0)
goto out;
/* Array options */
if ((r = deserialise_array(m, &opts->env, &opts->nenv)) != 0 ||
(r = deserialise_array(m,
&opts->permitopen, &opts->npermitopen)) != 0 ||
(r = deserialise_array(m,
&opts->permitlisten, &opts->npermitlisten)) != 0)
goto out;
/* success */
r = 0;
*optsp = opts;
opts = NULL;
out:
sshauthopt_free(opts);
return r;
}
diff --git a/auth-options.h b/auth-options.h
index 14cbfa49dc74..d96ffedee8b1 100644
--- a/auth-options.h
+++ b/auth-options.h
@@ -1,98 +1,101 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: auth-options.h,v 1.28 2019/07/09 04:15:00 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: auth-options.h,v 1.29 2019/11/25 00:54:23 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2018 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
*
* Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
* copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
* WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
* ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
* WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
* ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
* OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
*/
#ifndef AUTH_OPTIONS_H
#define AUTH_OPTIONS_H
struct passwd;
struct sshkey;
/* Maximum number of permitopen/permitlisten directives to accept */
#define SSH_AUTHOPT_PERMIT_MAX 4096
/*
* sshauthopt represents key options parsed from authorized_keys or
* from certificate extensions/options.
*/
struct sshauthopt {
/* Feature flags */
int permit_port_forwarding_flag;
int permit_agent_forwarding_flag;
int permit_x11_forwarding_flag;
int permit_pty_flag;
int permit_user_rc;
/* "restrict" keyword was invoked */
int restricted;
/* key/principal expiry date */
uint64_t valid_before;
/* Certificate-related options */
int cert_authority;
char *cert_principals;
int force_tun_device;
char *force_command;
/* Custom environment */
size_t nenv;
char **env;
/* Permitted port forwardings */
size_t npermitopen;
char **permitopen;
/* Permitted listens (remote forwarding) */
size_t npermitlisten;
char **permitlisten;
/*
* Permitted host/addresses (comma-separated)
* Caller must check source address matches both lists (if present).
*/
char *required_from_host_cert;
char *required_from_host_keys;
+
+ /* Key requires user presence asserted */
+ int no_require_user_presence;
};
struct sshauthopt *sshauthopt_new(void);
struct sshauthopt *sshauthopt_new_with_keys_defaults(void);
void sshauthopt_free(struct sshauthopt *opts);
struct sshauthopt *sshauthopt_copy(const struct sshauthopt *orig);
int sshauthopt_serialise(const struct sshauthopt *opts, struct sshbuf *m, int);
int sshauthopt_deserialise(struct sshbuf *m, struct sshauthopt **opts);
/*
* Parse authorized_keys options. Returns an options structure on success
* or NULL on failure. Will set errstr on failure.
*/
struct sshauthopt *sshauthopt_parse(const char *s, const char **errstr);
/*
* Parse certification options to a struct sshauthopt.
* Returns options on success or NULL on failure.
*/
struct sshauthopt *sshauthopt_from_cert(struct sshkey *k);
/*
* Merge key options.
*/
struct sshauthopt *sshauthopt_merge(const struct sshauthopt *primary,
const struct sshauthopt *additional, const char **errstrp);
#endif
diff --git a/auth-pam.c b/auth-pam.c
index d3f400bc3034..5a3ba09b43d3 100644
--- a/auth-pam.c
+++ b/auth-pam.c
@@ -1,1385 +1,1387 @@
/*-
* Copyright (c) 2002 Networks Associates Technology, Inc.
* All rights reserved.
*
* This software was developed for the FreeBSD Project by ThinkSec AS and
* NAI Labs, the Security Research Division of Network Associates, Inc.
* under DARPA/SPAWAR contract N66001-01-C-8035 ("CBOSS"), as part of the
* DARPA CHATS research program.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
/*
* Copyright (c) 2003,2004 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
* Copyright (c) 2003,2004 Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
*
* Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
* copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
* WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
* ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
* WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
* ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
* OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
*/
/* Based on FreeBSD: src/crypto/openssh/auth2-pam-freebsd.c,v 1.11 2003/03/31 13:48:18 des */
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <sys/wait.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <signal.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#ifdef USE_PAM
#if defined(HAVE_SECURITY_PAM_APPL_H)
#include <security/pam_appl.h>
#elif defined (HAVE_PAM_PAM_APPL_H)
#include <pam/pam_appl.h>
#endif
#if !defined(SSHD_PAM_SERVICE)
extern char *__progname;
# define SSHD_PAM_SERVICE __progname
#endif
/* OpenGroup RFC86.0 and XSSO specify no "const" on arguments */
#ifdef PAM_SUN_CODEBASE
# define sshpam_const /* Solaris, HP-UX, SunOS */
#else
# define sshpam_const const /* LinuxPAM, OpenPAM, AIX */
#endif
/* Ambiguity in spec: is it an array of pointers or a pointer to an array? */
#ifdef PAM_SUN_CODEBASE
# define PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, n, member) ((*(msg))[(n)].member)
#else
# define PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, n, member) ((msg)[(n)]->member)
#endif
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "sshbuf.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
#include "hostfile.h"
#include "auth.h"
#include "auth-pam.h"
#include "canohost.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "msg.h"
#include "packet.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "servconf.h"
#include "ssh2.h"
#include "auth-options.h"
+#include "misc.h"
#ifdef GSSAPI
#include "ssh-gss.h"
#endif
#include "monitor_wrap.h"
extern ServerOptions options;
extern struct sshbuf *loginmsg;
extern u_int utmp_len;
/* so we don't silently change behaviour */
#ifdef USE_POSIX_THREADS
# error "USE_POSIX_THREADS replaced by UNSUPPORTED_POSIX_THREADS_HACK"
#endif
/*
* Formerly known as USE_POSIX_THREADS, using this is completely unsupported
* and generally a bad idea. Use at own risk and do not expect support if
* this breaks.
*/
#ifdef UNSUPPORTED_POSIX_THREADS_HACK
#include <pthread.h>
/*
* Avoid namespace clash when *not* using pthreads for systems *with*
* pthreads, which unconditionally define pthread_t via sys/types.h
* (e.g. Linux)
*/
typedef pthread_t sp_pthread_t;
#else
typedef pid_t sp_pthread_t;
#define pthread_exit fake_pthread_exit
#define pthread_create fake_pthread_create
#define pthread_cancel fake_pthread_cancel
#define pthread_join fake_pthread_join
#endif
struct pam_ctxt {
sp_pthread_t pam_thread;
int pam_psock;
int pam_csock;
int pam_done;
};
static void sshpam_free_ctx(void *);
static struct pam_ctxt *cleanup_ctxt;
#ifndef UNSUPPORTED_POSIX_THREADS_HACK
/*
* Simulate threads with processes.
*/
static int sshpam_thread_status = -1;
-static mysig_t sshpam_oldsig;
+static sshsig_t sshpam_oldsig;
static void
sshpam_sigchld_handler(int sig)
{
- signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL);
+ ssh_signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL);
if (cleanup_ctxt == NULL)
return; /* handler called after PAM cleanup, shouldn't happen */
if (waitpid(cleanup_ctxt->pam_thread, &sshpam_thread_status, WNOHANG)
<= 0) {
/* PAM thread has not exitted, privsep slave must have */
kill(cleanup_ctxt->pam_thread, SIGTERM);
while (waitpid(cleanup_ctxt->pam_thread,
&sshpam_thread_status, 0) == -1) {
if (errno == EINTR)
continue;
return;
}
}
if (WIFSIGNALED(sshpam_thread_status) &&
WTERMSIG(sshpam_thread_status) == SIGTERM)
return; /* terminated by pthread_cancel */
if (!WIFEXITED(sshpam_thread_status))
sigdie("PAM: authentication thread exited unexpectedly");
if (WEXITSTATUS(sshpam_thread_status) != 0)
sigdie("PAM: authentication thread exited uncleanly");
}
/* ARGSUSED */
static void
pthread_exit(void *value)
{
_exit(0);
}
/* ARGSUSED */
static int
pthread_create(sp_pthread_t *thread, const void *attr,
void *(*thread_start)(void *), void *arg)
{
pid_t pid;
struct pam_ctxt *ctx = arg;
sshpam_thread_status = -1;
switch ((pid = fork())) {
case -1:
error("fork(): %s", strerror(errno));
return errno;
case 0:
close(ctx->pam_psock);
ctx->pam_psock = -1;
thread_start(arg);
_exit(1);
default:
*thread = pid;
close(ctx->pam_csock);
ctx->pam_csock = -1;
- sshpam_oldsig = signal(SIGCHLD, sshpam_sigchld_handler);
+ sshpam_oldsig = ssh_signal(SIGCHLD, sshpam_sigchld_handler);
return (0);
}
}
static int
pthread_cancel(sp_pthread_t thread)
{
- signal(SIGCHLD, sshpam_oldsig);
+ ssh_signal(SIGCHLD, sshpam_oldsig);
return (kill(thread, SIGTERM));
}
/* ARGSUSED */
static int
pthread_join(sp_pthread_t thread, void **value)
{
int status;
if (sshpam_thread_status != -1)
return (sshpam_thread_status);
- signal(SIGCHLD, sshpam_oldsig);
+ ssh_signal(SIGCHLD, sshpam_oldsig);
while (waitpid(thread, &status, 0) == -1) {
if (errno == EINTR)
continue;
fatal("%s: waitpid: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
}
return (status);
}
#endif
static pam_handle_t *sshpam_handle = NULL;
static int sshpam_err = 0;
static int sshpam_authenticated = 0;
static int sshpam_session_open = 0;
static int sshpam_cred_established = 0;
static int sshpam_account_status = -1;
static int sshpam_maxtries_reached = 0;
static char **sshpam_env = NULL;
static Authctxt *sshpam_authctxt = NULL;
static const char *sshpam_password = NULL;
static char *sshpam_rhost = NULL;
static char *sshpam_laddr = NULL;
static char *sshpam_conninfo = NULL;
/* Some PAM implementations don't implement this */
#ifndef HAVE_PAM_GETENVLIST
static char **
pam_getenvlist(pam_handle_t *pamh)
{
/*
* XXX - If necessary, we can still support environment passing
* for platforms without pam_getenvlist by searching for known
* env vars (e.g. KRB5CCNAME) from the PAM environment.
*/
return NULL;
}
#endif
#ifndef HAVE_PAM_PUTENV
static int
pam_putenv(pam_handle_t *pamh, const char *name_value)
{
return PAM_SUCCESS;
}
#endif /* HAVE_PAM_PUTENV */
/*
* Some platforms, notably Solaris, do not enforce password complexity
* rules during pam_chauthtok() if the real uid of the calling process
* is 0, on the assumption that it's being called by "passwd" run by root.
* This wraps pam_chauthtok and sets/restore the real uid so PAM will do
* the right thing.
*/
#ifdef SSHPAM_CHAUTHTOK_NEEDS_RUID
static int
sshpam_chauthtok_ruid(pam_handle_t *pamh, int flags)
{
int result;
if (sshpam_authctxt == NULL)
fatal("PAM: sshpam_authctxt not initialized");
if (setreuid(sshpam_authctxt->pw->pw_uid, -1) == -1)
fatal("%s: setreuid failed: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
result = pam_chauthtok(pamh, flags);
if (setreuid(0, -1) == -1)
fatal("%s: setreuid failed: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
return result;
}
# define pam_chauthtok(a,b) (sshpam_chauthtok_ruid((a), (b)))
#endif
-void
+static void
sshpam_password_change_required(int reqd)
{
extern struct sshauthopt *auth_opts;
static int saved_port, saved_agent, saved_x11;
debug3("%s %d", __func__, reqd);
if (sshpam_authctxt == NULL)
fatal("%s: PAM authctxt not initialized", __func__);
sshpam_authctxt->force_pwchange = reqd;
if (reqd) {
saved_port = auth_opts->permit_port_forwarding_flag;
saved_agent = auth_opts->permit_agent_forwarding_flag;
saved_x11 = auth_opts->permit_x11_forwarding_flag;
auth_opts->permit_port_forwarding_flag = 0;
auth_opts->permit_agent_forwarding_flag = 0;
auth_opts->permit_x11_forwarding_flag = 0;
} else {
if (saved_port)
auth_opts->permit_port_forwarding_flag = saved_port;
if (saved_agent)
auth_opts->permit_agent_forwarding_flag = saved_agent;
if (saved_x11)
auth_opts->permit_x11_forwarding_flag = saved_x11;
}
}
/* Import regular and PAM environment from subprocess */
static void
import_environments(struct sshbuf *b)
{
char *env;
u_int n, i, num_env;
int r;
debug3("PAM: %s entering", __func__);
#ifndef UNSUPPORTED_POSIX_THREADS_HACK
/* Import variables set by do_pam_account */
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &n)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
if (n > INT_MAX)
fatal("%s: invalid PAM account status %u", __func__, n);
sshpam_account_status = (int)n;
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &n)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
sshpam_password_change_required(n != 0);
/* Import environment from subprocess */
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &num_env)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
if (num_env > 1024)
fatal("%s: received %u environment variables, expected <= 1024",
__func__, num_env);
sshpam_env = xcalloc(num_env + 1, sizeof(*sshpam_env));
debug3("PAM: num env strings %d", num_env);
for(i = 0; i < num_env; i++) {
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &(sshpam_env[i]), NULL)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
}
sshpam_env[num_env] = NULL;
/* Import PAM environment from subprocess */
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &num_env)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
debug("PAM: num PAM env strings %d", num_env);
for (i = 0; i < num_env; i++) {
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &env, NULL)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
/* Errors are not fatal here */
if ((r = pam_putenv(sshpam_handle, env)) != PAM_SUCCESS) {
error("PAM: pam_putenv: %s",
pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, r));
}
/* XXX leak env? */
}
#endif
}
/*
* Conversation function for authentication thread.
*/
static int
sshpam_thread_conv(int n, sshpam_const struct pam_message **msg,
struct pam_response **resp, void *data)
{
struct sshbuf *buffer;
struct pam_ctxt *ctxt;
struct pam_response *reply;
int r, i;
u_char status;
debug3("PAM: %s entering, %d messages", __func__, n);
*resp = NULL;
if (data == NULL) {
error("PAM: conversation function passed a null context");
return (PAM_CONV_ERR);
}
ctxt = data;
if (n <= 0 || n > PAM_MAX_NUM_MSG)
return (PAM_CONV_ERR);
if ((reply = calloc(n, sizeof(*reply))) == NULL)
return PAM_CONV_ERR;
if ((buffer = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
free(reply);
return PAM_CONV_ERR;
}
for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) {
switch (PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg_style)) {
case PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_OFF:
case PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_ON:
if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(buffer,
PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg))) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
if (ssh_msg_send(ctxt->pam_csock,
PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg_style), buffer) == -1)
goto fail;
if (ssh_msg_recv(ctxt->pam_csock, buffer) == -1)
goto fail;
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(buffer, &status)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
if (status != PAM_AUTHTOK)
goto fail;
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(buffer,
&reply[i].resp, NULL)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
break;
case PAM_ERROR_MSG:
case PAM_TEXT_INFO:
if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(buffer,
PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg))) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
if (ssh_msg_send(ctxt->pam_csock,
PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg_style), buffer) == -1)
goto fail;
break;
default:
goto fail;
}
sshbuf_reset(buffer);
}
sshbuf_free(buffer);
*resp = reply;
return (PAM_SUCCESS);
fail:
for(i = 0; i < n; i++) {
free(reply[i].resp);
}
free(reply);
sshbuf_free(buffer);
return (PAM_CONV_ERR);
}
/*
* Authentication thread.
*/
static void *
sshpam_thread(void *ctxtp)
{
struct pam_ctxt *ctxt = ctxtp;
struct sshbuf *buffer = NULL;
struct pam_conv sshpam_conv;
int r, flags = (options.permit_empty_passwd == 0 ?
PAM_DISALLOW_NULL_AUTHTOK : 0);
#ifndef UNSUPPORTED_POSIX_THREADS_HACK
extern char **environ;
char **env_from_pam;
u_int i;
const char *pam_user;
const char **ptr_pam_user = &pam_user;
char *tz = getenv("TZ");
sshpam_err = pam_get_item(sshpam_handle, PAM_USER,
(sshpam_const void **)ptr_pam_user);
if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS)
goto auth_fail;
environ[0] = NULL;
if (tz != NULL)
if (setenv("TZ", tz, 1) == -1)
error("PAM: could not set TZ environment: %s",
strerror(errno));
if (sshpam_authctxt != NULL) {
setproctitle("%s [pam]",
sshpam_authctxt->valid ? pam_user : "unknown");
}
#endif
sshpam_conv.conv = sshpam_thread_conv;
sshpam_conv.appdata_ptr = ctxt;
if (sshpam_authctxt == NULL)
fatal("%s: PAM authctxt not initialized", __func__);
if ((buffer = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
sshpam_err = pam_set_item(sshpam_handle, PAM_CONV,
(const void *)&sshpam_conv);
if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS)
goto auth_fail;
sshpam_err = pam_authenticate(sshpam_handle, flags);
if (sshpam_err == PAM_MAXTRIES)
sshpam_set_maxtries_reached(1);
if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS)
goto auth_fail;
if (!do_pam_account()) {
sshpam_err = PAM_ACCT_EXPIRED;
goto auth_fail;
}
if (sshpam_authctxt->force_pwchange) {
sshpam_err = pam_chauthtok(sshpam_handle,
PAM_CHANGE_EXPIRED_AUTHTOK);
if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS)
goto auth_fail;
sshpam_password_change_required(0);
}
if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(buffer, "OK")) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
#ifndef UNSUPPORTED_POSIX_THREADS_HACK
/* Export variables set by do_pam_account */
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(buffer, sshpam_account_status)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(buffer, sshpam_authctxt->force_pwchange)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
/* Export any environment strings set in child */
for (i = 0; environ[i] != NULL; i++) {
/* Count */
if (i > INT_MAX)
fatal("%s: too many environment strings", __func__);
}
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(buffer, i)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
for (i = 0; environ[i] != NULL; i++) {
if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(buffer, environ[i])) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
}
/* Export any environment strings set by PAM in child */
env_from_pam = pam_getenvlist(sshpam_handle);
for (i = 0; env_from_pam != NULL && env_from_pam[i] != NULL; i++) {
/* Count */
if (i > INT_MAX)
fatal("%s: too many PAM environment strings", __func__);
}
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(buffer, i)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
for (i = 0; env_from_pam != NULL && env_from_pam[i] != NULL; i++) {
if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(buffer, env_from_pam[i])) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
}
#endif /* UNSUPPORTED_POSIX_THREADS_HACK */
/* XXX - can't do much about an error here */
ssh_msg_send(ctxt->pam_csock, sshpam_err, buffer);
sshbuf_free(buffer);
pthread_exit(NULL);
auth_fail:
if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(buffer,
pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err))) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
/* XXX - can't do much about an error here */
if (sshpam_err == PAM_ACCT_EXPIRED)
ssh_msg_send(ctxt->pam_csock, PAM_ACCT_EXPIRED, buffer);
else if (sshpam_maxtries_reached)
ssh_msg_send(ctxt->pam_csock, PAM_MAXTRIES, buffer);
else
ssh_msg_send(ctxt->pam_csock, PAM_AUTH_ERR, buffer);
sshbuf_free(buffer);
pthread_exit(NULL);
return (NULL); /* Avoid warning for non-pthread case */
}
void
sshpam_thread_cleanup(void)
{
struct pam_ctxt *ctxt = cleanup_ctxt;
debug3("PAM: %s entering", __func__);
if (ctxt != NULL && ctxt->pam_thread != 0) {
pthread_cancel(ctxt->pam_thread);
pthread_join(ctxt->pam_thread, NULL);
close(ctxt->pam_psock);
close(ctxt->pam_csock);
memset(ctxt, 0, sizeof(*ctxt));
cleanup_ctxt = NULL;
}
}
static int
sshpam_null_conv(int n, sshpam_const struct pam_message **msg,
struct pam_response **resp, void *data)
{
debug3("PAM: %s entering, %d messages", __func__, n);
return (PAM_CONV_ERR);
}
static struct pam_conv null_conv = { sshpam_null_conv, NULL };
static int
sshpam_store_conv(int n, sshpam_const struct pam_message **msg,
struct pam_response **resp, void *data)
{
struct pam_response *reply;
int r, i;
debug3("PAM: %s called with %d messages", __func__, n);
*resp = NULL;
if (n <= 0 || n > PAM_MAX_NUM_MSG)
return (PAM_CONV_ERR);
if ((reply = calloc(n, sizeof(*reply))) == NULL)
return (PAM_CONV_ERR);
for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) {
switch (PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg_style)) {
case PAM_ERROR_MSG:
case PAM_TEXT_INFO:
if ((r = sshbuf_putf(loginmsg, "%s\n",
PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg))) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
reply[i].resp_retcode = PAM_SUCCESS;
break;
default:
goto fail;
}
}
*resp = reply;
return (PAM_SUCCESS);
fail:
for(i = 0; i < n; i++) {
free(reply[i].resp);
}
free(reply);
return (PAM_CONV_ERR);
}
static struct pam_conv store_conv = { sshpam_store_conv, NULL };
void
sshpam_cleanup(void)
{
if (sshpam_handle == NULL || (use_privsep && !mm_is_monitor()))
return;
debug("PAM: cleanup");
pam_set_item(sshpam_handle, PAM_CONV, (const void *)&null_conv);
if (sshpam_session_open) {
debug("PAM: closing session");
pam_close_session(sshpam_handle, PAM_SILENT);
sshpam_session_open = 0;
}
if (sshpam_cred_established) {
debug("PAM: deleting credentials");
pam_setcred(sshpam_handle, PAM_DELETE_CRED);
sshpam_cred_established = 0;
}
sshpam_authenticated = 0;
pam_end(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err);
sshpam_handle = NULL;
}
static int
sshpam_init(struct ssh *ssh, Authctxt *authctxt)
{
const char *pam_user, *user = authctxt->user;
const char **ptr_pam_user = &pam_user;
if (sshpam_handle == NULL) {
if (ssh == NULL) {
fatal("%s: called initially with no "
"packet context", __func__);
}
} if (sshpam_handle != NULL) {
/* We already have a PAM context; check if the user matches */
sshpam_err = pam_get_item(sshpam_handle,
PAM_USER, (sshpam_const void **)ptr_pam_user);
if (sshpam_err == PAM_SUCCESS && strcmp(user, pam_user) == 0)
return (0);
pam_end(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err);
sshpam_handle = NULL;
}
debug("PAM: initializing for \"%s\"", user);
sshpam_err =
pam_start(SSHD_PAM_SERVICE, user, &store_conv, &sshpam_handle);
sshpam_authctxt = authctxt;
if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS) {
pam_end(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err);
sshpam_handle = NULL;
return (-1);
}
if (ssh != NULL && sshpam_rhost == NULL) {
/*
* We need to cache these as we don't have packet context
* during the kbdint flow.
*/
sshpam_rhost = xstrdup(auth_get_canonical_hostname(ssh,
options.use_dns));
sshpam_laddr = get_local_ipaddr(
ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh));
xasprintf(&sshpam_conninfo, "SSH_CONNECTION=%.50s %d %.50s %d",
ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh),
sshpam_laddr, ssh_local_port(ssh));
}
if (sshpam_rhost != NULL) {
debug("PAM: setting PAM_RHOST to \"%s\"", sshpam_rhost);
sshpam_err = pam_set_item(sshpam_handle, PAM_RHOST,
sshpam_rhost);
if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS) {
pam_end(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err);
sshpam_handle = NULL;
return (-1);
}
/* Put SSH_CONNECTION in the PAM environment too */
pam_putenv(sshpam_handle, sshpam_conninfo);
}
#ifdef PAM_TTY_KLUDGE
/*
* Some silly PAM modules (e.g. pam_time) require a TTY to operate.
* sshd doesn't set the tty until too late in the auth process and
* may not even set one (for tty-less connections)
*/
debug("PAM: setting PAM_TTY to \"ssh\"");
sshpam_err = pam_set_item(sshpam_handle, PAM_TTY, "ssh");
if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS) {
pam_end(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err);
sshpam_handle = NULL;
return (-1);
}
#endif
return (0);
}
static void
expose_authinfo(const char *caller)
{
char *auth_info;
/*
* Expose authentication information to PAM.
* The environment variable is versioned. Please increment the
* version suffix if the format of session_info changes.
*/
if (sshpam_authctxt->session_info == NULL)
auth_info = xstrdup("");
else if ((auth_info = sshbuf_dup_string(
sshpam_authctxt->session_info)) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_dup_string failed", __func__);
debug2("%s: auth information in SSH_AUTH_INFO_0", caller);
do_pam_putenv("SSH_AUTH_INFO_0", auth_info);
free(auth_info);
}
static void *
sshpam_init_ctx(Authctxt *authctxt)
{
struct pam_ctxt *ctxt;
int result, socks[2];
debug3("PAM: %s entering", __func__);
/*
* Refuse to start if we don't have PAM enabled or do_pam_account
* has previously failed.
*/
if (!options.use_pam || sshpam_account_status == 0)
return NULL;
/* Initialize PAM */
if (sshpam_init(NULL, authctxt) == -1) {
error("PAM: initialization failed");
return (NULL);
}
expose_authinfo(__func__);
ctxt = xcalloc(1, sizeof *ctxt);
/* Start the authentication thread */
if (socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, PF_UNSPEC, socks) == -1) {
error("PAM: failed create sockets: %s", strerror(errno));
free(ctxt);
return (NULL);
}
ctxt->pam_psock = socks[0];
ctxt->pam_csock = socks[1];
result = pthread_create(&ctxt->pam_thread, NULL, sshpam_thread, ctxt);
if (result != 0) {
error("PAM: failed to start authentication thread: %s",
strerror(result));
close(socks[0]);
close(socks[1]);
free(ctxt);
return (NULL);
}
cleanup_ctxt = ctxt;
return (ctxt);
}
static int
sshpam_query(void *ctx, char **name, char **info,
u_int *num, char ***prompts, u_int **echo_on)
{
struct sshbuf *buffer;
struct pam_ctxt *ctxt = ctx;
size_t plen;
u_char type;
char *msg;
size_t len, mlen;
int r;
debug3("PAM: %s entering", __func__);
if ((buffer = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
*name = xstrdup("");
*info = xstrdup("");
*prompts = xmalloc(sizeof(char *));
**prompts = NULL;
plen = 0;
*echo_on = xmalloc(sizeof(u_int));
while (ssh_msg_recv(ctxt->pam_psock, buffer) == 0) {
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(buffer, &type)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_cstring(buffer, &msg, &mlen)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
switch (type) {
case PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_ON:
case PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_OFF:
*num = 1;
len = plen + mlen + 1;
**prompts = xreallocarray(**prompts, 1, len);
strlcpy(**prompts + plen, msg, len - plen);
plen += mlen;
**echo_on = (type == PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_ON);
free(msg);
sshbuf_free(buffer);
return (0);
case PAM_ERROR_MSG:
case PAM_TEXT_INFO:
/* accumulate messages */
len = plen + mlen + 2;
**prompts = xreallocarray(**prompts, 1, len);
strlcpy(**prompts + plen, msg, len - plen);
plen += mlen;
strlcat(**prompts + plen, "\n", len - plen);
plen++;
free(msg);
break;
case PAM_ACCT_EXPIRED:
case PAM_MAXTRIES:
if (type == PAM_ACCT_EXPIRED)
sshpam_account_status = 0;
if (type == PAM_MAXTRIES)
sshpam_set_maxtries_reached(1);
/* FALLTHROUGH */
case PAM_AUTH_ERR:
debug3("PAM: %s", pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, type));
if (**prompts != NULL && strlen(**prompts) != 0) {
*info = **prompts;
**prompts = NULL;
*num = 0;
**echo_on = 0;
ctxt->pam_done = -1;
free(msg);
sshbuf_free(buffer);
return 0;
}
/* FALLTHROUGH */
case PAM_SUCCESS:
if (**prompts != NULL) {
/* drain any accumulated messages */
debug("PAM: %s", **prompts);
if ((r = sshbuf_put(loginmsg, **prompts,
strlen(**prompts))) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
free(**prompts);
**prompts = NULL;
}
if (type == PAM_SUCCESS) {
if (!sshpam_authctxt->valid ||
(sshpam_authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0 &&
options.permit_root_login != PERMIT_YES))
fatal("Internal error: PAM auth "
"succeeded when it should have "
"failed");
import_environments(buffer);
*num = 0;
**echo_on = 0;
ctxt->pam_done = 1;
free(msg);
sshbuf_free(buffer);
return (0);
}
error("PAM: %s for %s%.100s from %.100s", msg,
sshpam_authctxt->valid ? "" : "illegal user ",
sshpam_authctxt->user, sshpam_rhost);
/* FALLTHROUGH */
default:
*num = 0;
**echo_on = 0;
free(msg);
ctxt->pam_done = -1;
sshbuf_free(buffer);
return (-1);
}
}
sshbuf_free(buffer);
return (-1);
}
/*
* Returns a junk password of identical length to that the user supplied.
* Used to mitigate timing attacks against crypt(3)/PAM stacks that
* vary processing time in proportion to password length.
*/
static char *
fake_password(const char *wire_password)
{
const char junk[] = "\b\n\r\177INCORRECT";
char *ret = NULL;
size_t i, l = wire_password != NULL ? strlen(wire_password) : 0;
if (l >= INT_MAX)
fatal("%s: password length too long: %zu", __func__, l);
ret = malloc(l + 1);
if (ret == NULL)
return NULL;
for (i = 0; i < l; i++)
ret[i] = junk[i % (sizeof(junk) - 1)];
ret[i] = '\0';
return ret;
}
/* XXX - see also comment in auth-chall.c:verify_response */
static int
sshpam_respond(void *ctx, u_int num, char **resp)
{
struct sshbuf *buffer;
struct pam_ctxt *ctxt = ctx;
char *fake;
int r;
debug2("PAM: %s entering, %u responses", __func__, num);
switch (ctxt->pam_done) {
case 1:
sshpam_authenticated = 1;
return (0);
case 0:
break;
default:
return (-1);
}
if (num != 1) {
error("PAM: expected one response, got %u", num);
return (-1);
}
if ((buffer = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
if (sshpam_authctxt->valid &&
(sshpam_authctxt->pw->pw_uid != 0 ||
options.permit_root_login == PERMIT_YES)) {
if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(buffer, *resp)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
} else {
fake = fake_password(*resp);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(buffer, fake)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
free(fake);
}
if (ssh_msg_send(ctxt->pam_psock, PAM_AUTHTOK, buffer) == -1) {
sshbuf_free(buffer);
return (-1);
}
sshbuf_free(buffer);
return (1);
}
static void
sshpam_free_ctx(void *ctxtp)
{
struct pam_ctxt *ctxt = ctxtp;
debug3("PAM: %s entering", __func__);
sshpam_thread_cleanup();
free(ctxt);
/*
* We don't call sshpam_cleanup() here because we may need the PAM
* handle at a later stage, e.g. when setting up a session. It's
* still on the cleanup list, so pam_end() *will* be called before
* the server process terminates.
*/
}
KbdintDevice sshpam_device = {
"pam",
sshpam_init_ctx,
sshpam_query,
sshpam_respond,
sshpam_free_ctx
};
KbdintDevice mm_sshpam_device = {
"pam",
mm_sshpam_init_ctx,
mm_sshpam_query,
mm_sshpam_respond,
mm_sshpam_free_ctx
};
/*
* This replaces auth-pam.c
*/
void
start_pam(struct ssh *ssh)
{
Authctxt *authctxt = (Authctxt *)ssh->authctxt;
if (!options.use_pam)
fatal("PAM: initialisation requested when UsePAM=no");
if (sshpam_init(ssh, authctxt) == -1)
fatal("PAM: initialisation failed");
}
void
finish_pam(void)
{
sshpam_cleanup();
}
u_int
do_pam_account(void)
{
debug("%s: called", __func__);
if (sshpam_account_status != -1)
return (sshpam_account_status);
expose_authinfo(__func__);
sshpam_err = pam_acct_mgmt(sshpam_handle, 0);
debug3("PAM: %s pam_acct_mgmt = %d (%s)", __func__, sshpam_err,
pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err));
if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS && sshpam_err != PAM_NEW_AUTHTOK_REQD) {
sshpam_account_status = 0;
return (sshpam_account_status);
}
if (sshpam_err == PAM_NEW_AUTHTOK_REQD)
sshpam_password_change_required(1);
sshpam_account_status = 1;
return (sshpam_account_status);
}
void
do_pam_setcred(int init)
{
sshpam_err = pam_set_item(sshpam_handle, PAM_CONV,
(const void *)&store_conv);
if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS)
fatal("PAM: failed to set PAM_CONV: %s",
pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err));
if (init) {
debug("PAM: establishing credentials");
sshpam_err = pam_setcred(sshpam_handle, PAM_ESTABLISH_CRED);
} else {
debug("PAM: reinitializing credentials");
sshpam_err = pam_setcred(sshpam_handle, PAM_REINITIALIZE_CRED);
}
if (sshpam_err == PAM_SUCCESS) {
sshpam_cred_established = 1;
return;
}
if (sshpam_authenticated)
fatal("PAM: pam_setcred(): %s",
pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err));
else
debug("PAM: pam_setcred(): %s",
pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err));
}
static int
sshpam_tty_conv(int n, sshpam_const struct pam_message **msg,
struct pam_response **resp, void *data)
{
char input[PAM_MAX_MSG_SIZE];
struct pam_response *reply;
int i;
debug3("PAM: %s called with %d messages", __func__, n);
*resp = NULL;
if (n <= 0 || n > PAM_MAX_NUM_MSG || !isatty(STDIN_FILENO))
return (PAM_CONV_ERR);
if ((reply = calloc(n, sizeof(*reply))) == NULL)
return (PAM_CONV_ERR);
for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) {
switch (PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg_style)) {
case PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_OFF:
reply[i].resp =
read_passphrase(PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg),
RP_ALLOW_STDIN);
reply[i].resp_retcode = PAM_SUCCESS;
break;
case PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_ON:
fprintf(stderr, "%s\n", PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg));
if (fgets(input, sizeof input, stdin) == NULL)
input[0] = '\0';
if ((reply[i].resp = strdup(input)) == NULL)
goto fail;
reply[i].resp_retcode = PAM_SUCCESS;
break;
case PAM_ERROR_MSG:
case PAM_TEXT_INFO:
fprintf(stderr, "%s\n", PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg));
reply[i].resp_retcode = PAM_SUCCESS;
break;
default:
goto fail;
}
}
*resp = reply;
return (PAM_SUCCESS);
fail:
for(i = 0; i < n; i++) {
free(reply[i].resp);
}
free(reply);
return (PAM_CONV_ERR);
}
static struct pam_conv tty_conv = { sshpam_tty_conv, NULL };
/*
* XXX this should be done in the authentication phase, but ssh1 doesn't
* support that
*/
void
do_pam_chauthtok(void)
{
if (use_privsep)
fatal("Password expired (unable to change with privsep)");
sshpam_err = pam_set_item(sshpam_handle, PAM_CONV,
(const void *)&tty_conv);
if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS)
fatal("PAM: failed to set PAM_CONV: %s",
pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err));
debug("PAM: changing password");
sshpam_err = pam_chauthtok(sshpam_handle, PAM_CHANGE_EXPIRED_AUTHTOK);
if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS)
fatal("PAM: pam_chauthtok(): %s",
pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err));
}
void
do_pam_session(struct ssh *ssh)
{
debug3("PAM: opening session");
expose_authinfo(__func__);
sshpam_err = pam_set_item(sshpam_handle, PAM_CONV,
(const void *)&store_conv);
if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS)
fatal("PAM: failed to set PAM_CONV: %s",
pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err));
sshpam_err = pam_open_session(sshpam_handle, 0);
if (sshpam_err == PAM_SUCCESS)
sshpam_session_open = 1;
else {
sshpam_session_open = 0;
auth_restrict_session(ssh);
error("PAM: pam_open_session(): %s",
pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err));
}
}
int
is_pam_session_open(void)
{
return sshpam_session_open;
}
/*
* Set a PAM environment string. We need to do this so that the session
* modules can handle things like Kerberos/GSI credentials that appear
* during the ssh authentication process.
*/
int
do_pam_putenv(char *name, char *value)
{
int ret = 1;
char *compound;
size_t len;
len = strlen(name) + strlen(value) + 2;
compound = xmalloc(len);
snprintf(compound, len, "%s=%s", name, value);
ret = pam_putenv(sshpam_handle, compound);
free(compound);
return (ret);
}
char **
fetch_pam_child_environment(void)
{
return sshpam_env;
}
char **
fetch_pam_environment(void)
{
return (pam_getenvlist(sshpam_handle));
}
void
free_pam_environment(char **env)
{
char **envp;
if (env == NULL)
return;
for (envp = env; *envp; envp++)
free(*envp);
free(env);
}
/*
* "Blind" conversation function for password authentication. Assumes that
* echo-off prompts are for the password and stores messages for later
* display.
*/
static int
sshpam_passwd_conv(int n, sshpam_const struct pam_message **msg,
struct pam_response **resp, void *data)
{
struct pam_response *reply;
int r, i;
size_t len;
debug3("PAM: %s called with %d messages", __func__, n);
*resp = NULL;
if (n <= 0 || n > PAM_MAX_NUM_MSG)
return (PAM_CONV_ERR);
if ((reply = calloc(n, sizeof(*reply))) == NULL)
return (PAM_CONV_ERR);
for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) {
switch (PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg_style)) {
case PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_OFF:
if (sshpam_password == NULL)
goto fail;
if ((reply[i].resp = strdup(sshpam_password)) == NULL)
goto fail;
reply[i].resp_retcode = PAM_SUCCESS;
break;
case PAM_ERROR_MSG:
case PAM_TEXT_INFO:
len = strlen(PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg));
if (len > 0) {
if ((r = sshbuf_putf(loginmsg, "%s\n",
PAM_MSG_MEMBER(msg, i, msg))) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
}
if ((reply[i].resp = strdup("")) == NULL)
goto fail;
reply[i].resp_retcode = PAM_SUCCESS;
break;
default:
goto fail;
}
}
*resp = reply;
return (PAM_SUCCESS);
fail:
for(i = 0; i < n; i++) {
free(reply[i].resp);
}
free(reply);
return (PAM_CONV_ERR);
}
static struct pam_conv passwd_conv = { sshpam_passwd_conv, NULL };
/*
* Attempt password authentication via PAM
*/
int
sshpam_auth_passwd(Authctxt *authctxt, const char *password)
{
int flags = (options.permit_empty_passwd == 0 ?
PAM_DISALLOW_NULL_AUTHTOK : 0);
char *fake = NULL;
if (!options.use_pam || sshpam_handle == NULL)
fatal("PAM: %s called when PAM disabled or failed to "
"initialise.", __func__);
sshpam_password = password;
sshpam_authctxt = authctxt;
/*
* If the user logging in is invalid, or is root but is not permitted
* by PermitRootLogin, use an invalid password to prevent leaking
* information via timing (eg if the PAM config has a delay on fail).
*/
if (!authctxt->valid || (authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0 &&
options.permit_root_login != PERMIT_YES))
sshpam_password = fake = fake_password(password);
sshpam_err = pam_set_item(sshpam_handle, PAM_CONV,
(const void *)&passwd_conv);
if (sshpam_err != PAM_SUCCESS)
fatal("PAM: %s: failed to set PAM_CONV: %s", __func__,
pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err));
sshpam_err = pam_authenticate(sshpam_handle, flags);
sshpam_password = NULL;
free(fake);
if (sshpam_err == PAM_MAXTRIES)
sshpam_set_maxtries_reached(1);
if (sshpam_err == PAM_SUCCESS && authctxt->valid) {
debug("PAM: password authentication accepted for %.100s",
authctxt->user);
return 1;
} else {
debug("PAM: password authentication failed for %.100s: %s",
authctxt->valid ? authctxt->user : "an illegal user",
pam_strerror(sshpam_handle, sshpam_err));
return 0;
}
}
int
sshpam_get_maxtries_reached(void)
{
return sshpam_maxtries_reached;
}
void
sshpam_set_maxtries_reached(int reached)
{
if (reached == 0 || sshpam_maxtries_reached)
return;
sshpam_maxtries_reached = 1;
options.password_authentication = 0;
options.kbd_interactive_authentication = 0;
options.challenge_response_authentication = 0;
}
#endif /* USE_PAM */
diff --git a/auth-skey.c b/auth-skey.c
deleted file mode 100644
index b347527f6390..000000000000
--- a/auth-skey.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,107 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: auth-skey.c,v 1.27 2007/01/21 01:41:54 stevesk Exp $ */
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
- * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
- * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
- * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
- * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
- * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
- * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
- * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-
-#ifdef SKEY
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-
-#include <pwd.h>
-#include <stdio.h>
-
-#include <skey.h>
-
-#include "xmalloc.h"
-#include "hostfile.h"
-#include "auth.h"
-#include "ssh-gss.h"
-#include "log.h"
-#include "monitor_wrap.h"
-
-static void *
-skey_init_ctx(Authctxt *authctxt)
-{
- return authctxt;
-}
-
-int
-skey_query(void *ctx, char **name, char **infotxt,
- u_int* numprompts, char ***prompts, u_int **echo_on)
-{
- Authctxt *authctxt = ctx;
- char challenge[1024];
- struct skey skey;
-
- if (_compat_skeychallenge(&skey, authctxt->user, challenge,
- sizeof(challenge)) == -1)
- return -1;
-
- *name = xstrdup("");
- *infotxt = xstrdup("");
- *numprompts = 1;
- *prompts = xcalloc(*numprompts, sizeof(char *));
- *echo_on = xcalloc(*numprompts, sizeof(u_int));
-
- xasprintf(*prompts, "%s%s", challenge, SKEY_PROMPT);
-
- return 0;
-}
-
-int
-skey_respond(void *ctx, u_int numresponses, char **responses)
-{
- Authctxt *authctxt = ctx;
-
- if (authctxt->valid &&
- numresponses == 1 &&
- skey_haskey(authctxt->pw->pw_name) == 0 &&
- skey_passcheck(authctxt->pw->pw_name, responses[0]) != -1)
- return 0;
- return -1;
-}
-
-static void
-skey_free_ctx(void *ctx)
-{
- /* we don't have a special context */
-}
-
-KbdintDevice skey_device = {
- "skey",
- skey_init_ctx,
- skey_query,
- skey_respond,
- skey_free_ctx
-};
-
-KbdintDevice mm_skey_device = {
- "skey",
- skey_init_ctx,
- mm_skey_query,
- mm_skey_respond,
- skey_free_ctx
-};
-#endif /* SKEY */
diff --git a/auth.c b/auth.c
index ca450f4e44ff..086b8ebb1626 100644
--- a/auth.c
+++ b/auth.c
@@ -1,1188 +1,1190 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: auth.c,v 1.141 2019/10/02 00:42:30 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: auth.c,v 1.146 2020/01/31 22:42:45 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <sys/wait.h>
#include <netinet/in.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
# include <paths.h>
#endif
#include <pwd.h>
#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_H
#include <login.h>
#endif
#ifdef USE_SHADOW
#include <shadow.h>
#endif
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <limits.h>
#include <netdb.h>
#include <time.h>
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "match.h"
#include "groupaccess.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "sshbuf.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "servconf.h"
#include "sshkey.h"
#include "hostfile.h"
#include "auth.h"
#include "auth-options.h"
#include "canohost.h"
#include "uidswap.h"
#include "packet.h"
#include "loginrec.h"
#ifdef GSSAPI
#include "ssh-gss.h"
#endif
#include "authfile.h"
#include "monitor_wrap.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
#include "compat.h"
#include "channels.h"
/* import */
extern ServerOptions options;
+extern struct include_list includes;
extern int use_privsep;
extern struct sshbuf *loginmsg;
extern struct passwd *privsep_pw;
extern struct sshauthopt *auth_opts;
/* Debugging messages */
static struct sshbuf *auth_debug;
/*
* Check if the user is allowed to log in via ssh. If user is listed
* in DenyUsers or one of user's groups is listed in DenyGroups, false
* will be returned. If AllowUsers isn't empty and user isn't listed
* there, or if AllowGroups isn't empty and one of user's groups isn't
* listed there, false will be returned.
* If the user's shell is not executable, false will be returned.
* Otherwise true is returned.
*/
int
allowed_user(struct ssh *ssh, struct passwd * pw)
{
struct stat st;
const char *hostname = NULL, *ipaddr = NULL, *passwd = NULL;
u_int i;
int r;
#ifdef USE_SHADOW
struct spwd *spw = NULL;
#endif
/* Shouldn't be called if pw is NULL, but better safe than sorry... */
if (!pw || !pw->pw_name)
return 0;
#ifdef USE_SHADOW
if (!options.use_pam)
spw = getspnam(pw->pw_name);
#ifdef HAS_SHADOW_EXPIRE
if (!options.use_pam && spw != NULL && auth_shadow_acctexpired(spw))
return 0;
#endif /* HAS_SHADOW_EXPIRE */
#endif /* USE_SHADOW */
/* grab passwd field for locked account check */
passwd = pw->pw_passwd;
#ifdef USE_SHADOW
if (spw != NULL)
#ifdef USE_LIBIAF
passwd = get_iaf_password(pw);
#else
passwd = spw->sp_pwdp;
#endif /* USE_LIBIAF */
#endif
/* check for locked account */
if (!options.use_pam && passwd && *passwd) {
int locked = 0;
#ifdef LOCKED_PASSWD_STRING
if (strcmp(passwd, LOCKED_PASSWD_STRING) == 0)
locked = 1;
#endif
#ifdef LOCKED_PASSWD_PREFIX
if (strncmp(passwd, LOCKED_PASSWD_PREFIX,
strlen(LOCKED_PASSWD_PREFIX)) == 0)
locked = 1;
#endif
#ifdef LOCKED_PASSWD_SUBSTR
if (strstr(passwd, LOCKED_PASSWD_SUBSTR))
locked = 1;
#endif
#ifdef USE_LIBIAF
free((void *) passwd);
#endif /* USE_LIBIAF */
if (locked) {
logit("User %.100s not allowed because account is locked",
pw->pw_name);
return 0;
}
}
/*
* Deny if shell does not exist or is not executable unless we
* are chrooting.
*/
if (options.chroot_directory == NULL ||
strcasecmp(options.chroot_directory, "none") == 0) {
char *shell = xstrdup((pw->pw_shell[0] == '\0') ?
_PATH_BSHELL : pw->pw_shell); /* empty = /bin/sh */
if (stat(shell, &st) == -1) {
logit("User %.100s not allowed because shell %.100s "
"does not exist", pw->pw_name, shell);
free(shell);
return 0;
}
if (S_ISREG(st.st_mode) == 0 ||
(st.st_mode & (S_IXOTH|S_IXUSR|S_IXGRP)) == 0) {
logit("User %.100s not allowed because shell %.100s "
"is not executable", pw->pw_name, shell);
free(shell);
return 0;
}
free(shell);
}
if (options.num_deny_users > 0 || options.num_allow_users > 0 ||
options.num_deny_groups > 0 || options.num_allow_groups > 0) {
hostname = auth_get_canonical_hostname(ssh, options.use_dns);
ipaddr = ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh);
}
/* Return false if user is listed in DenyUsers */
if (options.num_deny_users > 0) {
for (i = 0; i < options.num_deny_users; i++) {
r = match_user(pw->pw_name, hostname, ipaddr,
options.deny_users[i]);
if (r < 0) {
fatal("Invalid DenyUsers pattern \"%.100s\"",
options.deny_users[i]);
} else if (r != 0) {
logit("User %.100s from %.100s not allowed "
"because listed in DenyUsers",
pw->pw_name, hostname);
return 0;
}
}
}
/* Return false if AllowUsers isn't empty and user isn't listed there */
if (options.num_allow_users > 0) {
for (i = 0; i < options.num_allow_users; i++) {
r = match_user(pw->pw_name, hostname, ipaddr,
options.allow_users[i]);
if (r < 0) {
fatal("Invalid AllowUsers pattern \"%.100s\"",
options.allow_users[i]);
} else if (r == 1)
break;
}
/* i < options.num_allow_users iff we break for loop */
if (i >= options.num_allow_users) {
logit("User %.100s from %.100s not allowed because "
"not listed in AllowUsers", pw->pw_name, hostname);
return 0;
}
}
if (options.num_deny_groups > 0 || options.num_allow_groups > 0) {
/* Get the user's group access list (primary and supplementary) */
if (ga_init(pw->pw_name, pw->pw_gid) == 0) {
logit("User %.100s from %.100s not allowed because "
"not in any group", pw->pw_name, hostname);
return 0;
}
/* Return false if one of user's groups is listed in DenyGroups */
if (options.num_deny_groups > 0)
if (ga_match(options.deny_groups,
options.num_deny_groups)) {
ga_free();
logit("User %.100s from %.100s not allowed "
"because a group is listed in DenyGroups",
pw->pw_name, hostname);
return 0;
}
/*
* Return false if AllowGroups isn't empty and one of user's groups
* isn't listed there
*/
if (options.num_allow_groups > 0)
if (!ga_match(options.allow_groups,
options.num_allow_groups)) {
ga_free();
logit("User %.100s from %.100s not allowed "
"because none of user's groups are listed "
"in AllowGroups", pw->pw_name, hostname);
return 0;
}
ga_free();
}
#ifdef CUSTOM_SYS_AUTH_ALLOWED_USER
if (!sys_auth_allowed_user(pw, loginmsg))
return 0;
#endif
/* We found no reason not to let this user try to log on... */
return 1;
}
/*
* Formats any key left in authctxt->auth_method_key for inclusion in
* auth_log()'s message. Also includes authxtct->auth_method_info if present.
*/
static char *
format_method_key(Authctxt *authctxt)
{
const struct sshkey *key = authctxt->auth_method_key;
const char *methinfo = authctxt->auth_method_info;
char *fp, *cafp, *ret = NULL;
if (key == NULL)
return NULL;
if (sshkey_is_cert(key)) {
fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key,
options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT);
cafp = sshkey_fingerprint(key->cert->signature_key,
options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT);
xasprintf(&ret, "%s %s ID %s (serial %llu) CA %s %s%s%s",
sshkey_type(key), fp == NULL ? "(null)" : fp,
key->cert->key_id,
(unsigned long long)key->cert->serial,
sshkey_type(key->cert->signature_key),
cafp == NULL ? "(null)" : cafp,
methinfo == NULL ? "" : ", ",
methinfo == NULL ? "" : methinfo);
free(fp);
free(cafp);
} else {
fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, options.fingerprint_hash,
SSH_FP_DEFAULT);
xasprintf(&ret, "%s %s%s%s", sshkey_type(key),
fp == NULL ? "(null)" : fp,
methinfo == NULL ? "" : ", ",
methinfo == NULL ? "" : methinfo);
free(fp);
}
return ret;
}
void
auth_log(struct ssh *ssh, int authenticated, int partial,
const char *method, const char *submethod)
{
Authctxt *authctxt = (Authctxt *)ssh->authctxt;
int level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE;
const char *authmsg;
char *extra = NULL;
if (use_privsep && !mm_is_monitor() && !authctxt->postponed)
return;
/* Raise logging level */
if (authenticated == 1 ||
!authctxt->valid ||
authctxt->failures >= options.max_authtries / 2 ||
strcmp(method, "password") == 0)
level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO;
if (authctxt->postponed)
authmsg = "Postponed";
else if (partial)
authmsg = "Partial";
else
authmsg = authenticated ? "Accepted" : "Failed";
if ((extra = format_method_key(authctxt)) == NULL) {
if (authctxt->auth_method_info != NULL)
extra = xstrdup(authctxt->auth_method_info);
}
do_log2(level, "%s %s%s%s for %s%.100s from %.200s port %d ssh2%s%s",
authmsg,
method,
submethod != NULL ? "/" : "", submethod == NULL ? "" : submethod,
authctxt->valid ? "" : "invalid user ",
authctxt->user,
ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh),
ssh_remote_port(ssh),
extra != NULL ? ": " : "",
extra != NULL ? extra : "");
free(extra);
#ifdef CUSTOM_FAILED_LOGIN
if (authenticated == 0 && !authctxt->postponed &&
(strcmp(method, "password") == 0 ||
strncmp(method, "keyboard-interactive", 20) == 0 ||
strcmp(method, "challenge-response") == 0))
record_failed_login(ssh, authctxt->user,
auth_get_canonical_hostname(ssh, options.use_dns), "ssh");
# ifdef WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE
if (authenticated)
sys_auth_record_login(authctxt->user,
auth_get_canonical_hostname(ssh, options.use_dns), "ssh",
loginmsg);
# endif
#endif
#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
if (authenticated == 0 && !authctxt->postponed)
audit_event(ssh, audit_classify_auth(method));
#endif
}
void
auth_maxtries_exceeded(struct ssh *ssh)
{
Authctxt *authctxt = (Authctxt *)ssh->authctxt;
error("maximum authentication attempts exceeded for "
"%s%.100s from %.200s port %d ssh2",
authctxt->valid ? "" : "invalid user ",
authctxt->user,
ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh),
ssh_remote_port(ssh));
ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "Too many authentication failures");
/* NOTREACHED */
}
/*
* Check whether root logins are disallowed.
*/
int
auth_root_allowed(struct ssh *ssh, const char *method)
{
switch (options.permit_root_login) {
case PERMIT_YES:
return 1;
case PERMIT_NO_PASSWD:
if (strcmp(method, "publickey") == 0 ||
strcmp(method, "hostbased") == 0 ||
strcmp(method, "gssapi-with-mic") == 0)
return 1;
break;
case PERMIT_FORCED_ONLY:
if (auth_opts->force_command != NULL) {
logit("Root login accepted for forced command.");
return 1;
}
break;
}
logit("ROOT LOGIN REFUSED FROM %.200s port %d",
ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh));
return 0;
}
/*
* Given a template and a passwd structure, build a filename
* by substituting % tokenised options. Currently, %% becomes '%',
* %h becomes the home directory and %u the username.
*
* This returns a buffer allocated by xmalloc.
*/
char *
expand_authorized_keys(const char *filename, struct passwd *pw)
{
char *file, uidstr[32], ret[PATH_MAX];
int i;
snprintf(uidstr, sizeof(uidstr), "%llu",
(unsigned long long)pw->pw_uid);
file = percent_expand(filename, "h", pw->pw_dir,
"u", pw->pw_name, "U", uidstr, (char *)NULL);
/*
* Ensure that filename starts anchored. If not, be backward
* compatible and prepend the '%h/'
*/
if (path_absolute(file))
return (file);
i = snprintf(ret, sizeof(ret), "%s/%s", pw->pw_dir, file);
if (i < 0 || (size_t)i >= sizeof(ret))
fatal("expand_authorized_keys: path too long");
free(file);
return (xstrdup(ret));
}
char *
authorized_principals_file(struct passwd *pw)
{
if (options.authorized_principals_file == NULL)
return NULL;
return expand_authorized_keys(options.authorized_principals_file, pw);
}
/* return ok if key exists in sysfile or userfile */
HostStatus
check_key_in_hostfiles(struct passwd *pw, struct sshkey *key, const char *host,
const char *sysfile, const char *userfile)
{
char *user_hostfile;
struct stat st;
HostStatus host_status;
struct hostkeys *hostkeys;
const struct hostkey_entry *found;
hostkeys = init_hostkeys();
load_hostkeys(hostkeys, host, sysfile);
if (userfile != NULL) {
user_hostfile = tilde_expand_filename(userfile, pw->pw_uid);
if (options.strict_modes &&
(stat(user_hostfile, &st) == 0) &&
((st.st_uid != 0 && st.st_uid != pw->pw_uid) ||
(st.st_mode & 022) != 0)) {
logit("Authentication refused for %.100s: "
"bad owner or modes for %.200s",
pw->pw_name, user_hostfile);
auth_debug_add("Ignored %.200s: bad ownership or modes",
user_hostfile);
} else {
temporarily_use_uid(pw);
load_hostkeys(hostkeys, host, user_hostfile);
restore_uid();
}
free(user_hostfile);
}
host_status = check_key_in_hostkeys(hostkeys, key, &found);
if (host_status == HOST_REVOKED)
error("WARNING: revoked key for %s attempted authentication",
- found->host);
+ host);
else if (host_status == HOST_OK)
debug("%s: key for %s found at %s:%ld", __func__,
found->host, found->file, found->line);
else
debug("%s: key for host %s not found", __func__, host);
free_hostkeys(hostkeys);
return host_status;
}
static FILE *
auth_openfile(const char *file, struct passwd *pw, int strict_modes,
int log_missing, char *file_type)
{
char line[1024];
struct stat st;
int fd;
FILE *f;
if ((fd = open(file, O_RDONLY|O_NONBLOCK)) == -1) {
if (log_missing || errno != ENOENT)
debug("Could not open %s '%s': %s", file_type, file,
strerror(errno));
return NULL;
}
if (fstat(fd, &st) == -1) {
close(fd);
return NULL;
}
if (!S_ISREG(st.st_mode)) {
logit("User %s %s %s is not a regular file",
pw->pw_name, file_type, file);
close(fd);
return NULL;
}
unset_nonblock(fd);
if ((f = fdopen(fd, "r")) == NULL) {
close(fd);
return NULL;
}
if (strict_modes &&
safe_path_fd(fileno(f), file, pw, line, sizeof(line)) != 0) {
fclose(f);
logit("Authentication refused: %s", line);
auth_debug_add("Ignored %s: %s", file_type, line);
return NULL;
}
return f;
}
FILE *
auth_openkeyfile(const char *file, struct passwd *pw, int strict_modes)
{
return auth_openfile(file, pw, strict_modes, 1, "authorized keys");
}
FILE *
auth_openprincipals(const char *file, struct passwd *pw, int strict_modes)
{
return auth_openfile(file, pw, strict_modes, 0,
"authorized principals");
}
struct passwd *
getpwnamallow(struct ssh *ssh, const char *user)
{
#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
extern login_cap_t *lc;
#ifdef BSD_AUTH
auth_session_t *as;
#endif
#endif
struct passwd *pw;
struct connection_info *ci;
ci = get_connection_info(ssh, 1, options.use_dns);
ci->user = user;
- parse_server_match_config(&options, ci);
+ parse_server_match_config(&options, &includes, ci);
log_change_level(options.log_level);
process_permitopen(ssh, &options);
#if defined(_AIX) && defined(HAVE_SETAUTHDB)
aix_setauthdb(user);
#endif
pw = getpwnam(user);
#if defined(_AIX) && defined(HAVE_SETAUTHDB)
aix_restoreauthdb();
#endif
if (pw == NULL) {
logit("Invalid user %.100s from %.100s port %d",
user, ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh));
#ifdef CUSTOM_FAILED_LOGIN
record_failed_login(ssh, user,
auth_get_canonical_hostname(ssh, options.use_dns), "ssh");
#endif
#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
audit_event(ssh, SSH_INVALID_USER);
#endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
return (NULL);
}
if (!allowed_user(ssh, pw))
return (NULL);
#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
if ((lc = login_getclass(pw->pw_class)) == NULL) {
debug("unable to get login class: %s", user);
return (NULL);
}
#ifdef BSD_AUTH
if ((as = auth_open()) == NULL || auth_setpwd(as, pw) != 0 ||
auth_approval(as, lc, pw->pw_name, "ssh") <= 0) {
debug("Approval failure for %s", user);
pw = NULL;
}
if (as != NULL)
auth_close(as);
#endif
#endif
if (pw != NULL)
return (pwcopy(pw));
return (NULL);
}
/* Returns 1 if key is revoked by revoked_keys_file, 0 otherwise */
int
auth_key_is_revoked(struct sshkey *key)
{
char *fp = NULL;
int r;
if (options.revoked_keys_file == NULL)
return 0;
if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, options.fingerprint_hash,
SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
error("%s: fingerprint key: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
goto out;
}
r = sshkey_check_revoked(key, options.revoked_keys_file);
switch (r) {
case 0:
break; /* not revoked */
case SSH_ERR_KEY_REVOKED:
error("Authentication key %s %s revoked by file %s",
sshkey_type(key), fp, options.revoked_keys_file);
goto out;
default:
error("Error checking authentication key %s %s in "
"revoked keys file %s: %s", sshkey_type(key), fp,
options.revoked_keys_file, ssh_err(r));
goto out;
}
/* Success */
r = 0;
out:
free(fp);
return r == 0 ? 0 : 1;
}
void
auth_debug_add(const char *fmt,...)
{
char buf[1024];
va_list args;
int r;
if (auth_debug == NULL)
return;
va_start(args, fmt);
vsnprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), fmt, args);
va_end(args);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(auth_debug, buf)) != 0)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_put_cstring: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
}
void
auth_debug_send(struct ssh *ssh)
{
char *msg;
int r;
if (auth_debug == NULL)
return;
while (sshbuf_len(auth_debug) != 0) {
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(auth_debug, &msg, NULL)) != 0)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_get_cstring: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
ssh_packet_send_debug(ssh, "%s", msg);
free(msg);
}
}
void
auth_debug_reset(void)
{
if (auth_debug != NULL)
sshbuf_reset(auth_debug);
else if ((auth_debug = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
}
struct passwd *
fakepw(void)
{
static struct passwd fake;
memset(&fake, 0, sizeof(fake));
fake.pw_name = "NOUSER";
fake.pw_passwd =
"$2a$06$r3.juUaHZDlIbQaO2dS9FuYxL1W9M81R1Tc92PoSNmzvpEqLkLGrK";
#ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_GECOS
fake.pw_gecos = "NOUSER";
#endif
fake.pw_uid = privsep_pw == NULL ? (uid_t)-1 : privsep_pw->pw_uid;
fake.pw_gid = privsep_pw == NULL ? (gid_t)-1 : privsep_pw->pw_gid;
#ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_CLASS
fake.pw_class = "";
#endif
fake.pw_dir = "/nonexist";
fake.pw_shell = "/nonexist";
return (&fake);
}
/*
* Returns the remote DNS hostname as a string. The returned string must not
* be freed. NB. this will usually trigger a DNS query the first time it is
* called.
* This function does additional checks on the hostname to mitigate some
* attacks on legacy rhosts-style authentication.
* XXX is RhostsRSAAuthentication vulnerable to these?
* XXX Can we remove these checks? (or if not, remove RhostsRSAAuthentication?)
*/
static char *
remote_hostname(struct ssh *ssh)
{
struct sockaddr_storage from;
socklen_t fromlen;
struct addrinfo hints, *ai, *aitop;
char name[NI_MAXHOST], ntop2[NI_MAXHOST];
const char *ntop = ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh);
/* Get IP address of client. */
fromlen = sizeof(from);
memset(&from, 0, sizeof(from));
if (getpeername(ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh),
(struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen) == -1) {
debug("getpeername failed: %.100s", strerror(errno));
- return strdup(ntop);
+ return xstrdup(ntop);
}
ipv64_normalise_mapped(&from, &fromlen);
if (from.ss_family == AF_INET6)
fromlen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6);
debug3("Trying to reverse map address %.100s.", ntop);
/* Map the IP address to a host name. */
if (getnameinfo((struct sockaddr *)&from, fromlen, name, sizeof(name),
NULL, 0, NI_NAMEREQD) != 0) {
/* Host name not found. Use ip address. */
- return strdup(ntop);
+ return xstrdup(ntop);
}
/*
* if reverse lookup result looks like a numeric hostname,
* someone is trying to trick us by PTR record like following:
* 1.1.1.10.in-addr.arpa. IN PTR 2.3.4.5
*/
memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_DGRAM; /*dummy*/
hints.ai_flags = AI_NUMERICHOST;
if (getaddrinfo(name, NULL, &hints, &ai) == 0) {
logit("Nasty PTR record \"%s\" is set up for %s, ignoring",
name, ntop);
freeaddrinfo(ai);
- return strdup(ntop);
+ return xstrdup(ntop);
}
/* Names are stored in lowercase. */
lowercase(name);
/*
* Map it back to an IP address and check that the given
* address actually is an address of this host. This is
* necessary because anyone with access to a name server can
* define arbitrary names for an IP address. Mapping from
* name to IP address can be trusted better (but can still be
* fooled if the intruder has access to the name server of
* the domain).
*/
memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
hints.ai_family = from.ss_family;
hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
if (getaddrinfo(name, NULL, &hints, &aitop) != 0) {
logit("reverse mapping checking getaddrinfo for %.700s "
"[%s] failed.", name, ntop);
- return strdup(ntop);
+ return xstrdup(ntop);
}
/* Look for the address from the list of addresses. */
for (ai = aitop; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) {
if (getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen, ntop2,
sizeof(ntop2), NULL, 0, NI_NUMERICHOST) == 0 &&
(strcmp(ntop, ntop2) == 0))
break;
}
freeaddrinfo(aitop);
/* If we reached the end of the list, the address was not there. */
if (ai == NULL) {
/* Address not found for the host name. */
logit("Address %.100s maps to %.600s, but this does not "
"map back to the address.", ntop, name);
- return strdup(ntop);
+ return xstrdup(ntop);
}
- return strdup(name);
+ return xstrdup(name);
}
/*
* Return the canonical name of the host in the other side of the current
* connection. The host name is cached, so it is efficient to call this
* several times.
*/
const char *
auth_get_canonical_hostname(struct ssh *ssh, int use_dns)
{
static char *dnsname;
if (!use_dns)
return ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh);
else if (dnsname != NULL)
return dnsname;
else {
dnsname = remote_hostname(ssh);
return dnsname;
}
}
/*
* Runs command in a subprocess with a minimal environment.
* Returns pid on success, 0 on failure.
* The child stdout and stderr maybe captured, left attached or sent to
* /dev/null depending on the contents of flags.
* "tag" is prepended to log messages.
* NB. "command" is only used for logging; the actual command executed is
* av[0].
*/
pid_t
subprocess(const char *tag, struct passwd *pw, const char *command,
int ac, char **av, FILE **child, u_int flags)
{
FILE *f = NULL;
struct stat st;
int fd, devnull, p[2], i;
pid_t pid;
char *cp, errmsg[512];
u_int envsize;
char **child_env;
if (child != NULL)
*child = NULL;
debug3("%s: %s command \"%s\" running as %s (flags 0x%x)", __func__,
tag, command, pw->pw_name, flags);
/* Check consistency */
if ((flags & SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_DISCARD) != 0 &&
(flags & SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_CAPTURE) != 0) {
error("%s: inconsistent flags", __func__);
return 0;
}
if (((flags & SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_CAPTURE) == 0) != (child == NULL)) {
error("%s: inconsistent flags/output", __func__);
return 0;
}
/*
* If executing an explicit binary, then verify the it exists
* and appears safe-ish to execute
*/
if (!path_absolute(av[0])) {
error("%s path is not absolute", tag);
return 0;
}
temporarily_use_uid(pw);
if (stat(av[0], &st) == -1) {
error("Could not stat %s \"%s\": %s", tag,
av[0], strerror(errno));
restore_uid();
return 0;
}
if (safe_path(av[0], &st, NULL, 0, errmsg, sizeof(errmsg)) != 0) {
error("Unsafe %s \"%s\": %s", tag, av[0], errmsg);
restore_uid();
return 0;
}
/* Prepare to keep the child's stdout if requested */
if (pipe(p) == -1) {
error("%s: pipe: %s", tag, strerror(errno));
restore_uid();
return 0;
}
restore_uid();
switch ((pid = fork())) {
case -1: /* error */
error("%s: fork: %s", tag, strerror(errno));
close(p[0]);
close(p[1]);
return 0;
case 0: /* child */
/* Prepare a minimal environment for the child. */
envsize = 5;
child_env = xcalloc(sizeof(*child_env), envsize);
child_set_env(&child_env, &envsize, "PATH", _PATH_STDPATH);
child_set_env(&child_env, &envsize, "USER", pw->pw_name);
child_set_env(&child_env, &envsize, "LOGNAME", pw->pw_name);
child_set_env(&child_env, &envsize, "HOME", pw->pw_dir);
if ((cp = getenv("LANG")) != NULL)
child_set_env(&child_env, &envsize, "LANG", cp);
for (i = 0; i < NSIG; i++)
- signal(i, SIG_DFL);
+ ssh_signal(i, SIG_DFL);
if ((devnull = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDWR)) == -1) {
error("%s: open %s: %s", tag, _PATH_DEVNULL,
strerror(errno));
_exit(1);
}
if (dup2(devnull, STDIN_FILENO) == -1) {
error("%s: dup2: %s", tag, strerror(errno));
_exit(1);
}
/* Set up stdout as requested; leave stderr in place for now. */
fd = -1;
if ((flags & SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_CAPTURE) != 0)
fd = p[1];
else if ((flags & SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_DISCARD) != 0)
fd = devnull;
if (fd != -1 && dup2(fd, STDOUT_FILENO) == -1) {
error("%s: dup2: %s", tag, strerror(errno));
_exit(1);
}
closefrom(STDERR_FILENO + 1);
/* Don't use permanently_set_uid() here to avoid fatal() */
if (setresgid(pw->pw_gid, pw->pw_gid, pw->pw_gid) == -1) {
error("%s: setresgid %u: %s", tag, (u_int)pw->pw_gid,
strerror(errno));
_exit(1);
}
if (setresuid(pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_uid) == -1) {
error("%s: setresuid %u: %s", tag, (u_int)pw->pw_uid,
strerror(errno));
_exit(1);
}
/* stdin is pointed to /dev/null at this point */
if ((flags & SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_DISCARD) != 0 &&
dup2(STDIN_FILENO, STDERR_FILENO) == -1) {
error("%s: dup2: %s", tag, strerror(errno));
_exit(1);
}
execve(av[0], av, child_env);
error("%s exec \"%s\": %s", tag, command, strerror(errno));
_exit(127);
default: /* parent */
break;
}
close(p[1]);
if ((flags & SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_CAPTURE) == 0)
close(p[0]);
else if ((f = fdopen(p[0], "r")) == NULL) {
error("%s: fdopen: %s", tag, strerror(errno));
close(p[0]);
/* Don't leave zombie child */
kill(pid, SIGTERM);
while (waitpid(pid, NULL, 0) == -1 && errno == EINTR)
;
return 0;
}
/* Success */
debug3("%s: %s pid %ld", __func__, tag, (long)pid);
if (child != NULL)
*child = f;
return pid;
}
/* These functions link key/cert options to the auth framework */
/* Log sshauthopt options locally and (optionally) for remote transmission */
void
auth_log_authopts(const char *loc, const struct sshauthopt *opts, int do_remote)
{
int do_env = options.permit_user_env && opts->nenv > 0;
int do_permitopen = opts->npermitopen > 0 &&
(options.allow_tcp_forwarding & FORWARD_LOCAL) != 0;
int do_permitlisten = opts->npermitlisten > 0 &&
(options.allow_tcp_forwarding & FORWARD_REMOTE) != 0;
size_t i;
char msg[1024], buf[64];
snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%d", opts->force_tun_device);
/* Try to keep this alphabetically sorted */
- snprintf(msg, sizeof(msg), "key options:%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s",
+ snprintf(msg, sizeof(msg), "key options:%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s",
opts->permit_agent_forwarding_flag ? " agent-forwarding" : "",
opts->force_command == NULL ? "" : " command",
do_env ? " environment" : "",
opts->valid_before == 0 ? "" : "expires",
do_permitopen ? " permitopen" : "",
do_permitlisten ? " permitlisten" : "",
opts->permit_port_forwarding_flag ? " port-forwarding" : "",
opts->cert_principals == NULL ? "" : " principals",
opts->permit_pty_flag ? " pty" : "",
opts->force_tun_device == -1 ? "" : " tun=",
opts->force_tun_device == -1 ? "" : buf,
opts->permit_user_rc ? " user-rc" : "",
- opts->permit_x11_forwarding_flag ? " x11-forwarding" : "");
+ opts->permit_x11_forwarding_flag ? " x11-forwarding" : "",
+ opts->no_require_user_presence ? " no-touch-required" : "");
debug("%s: %s", loc, msg);
if (do_remote)
auth_debug_add("%s: %s", loc, msg);
if (options.permit_user_env) {
for (i = 0; i < opts->nenv; i++) {
debug("%s: environment: %s", loc, opts->env[i]);
if (do_remote) {
auth_debug_add("%s: environment: %s",
loc, opts->env[i]);
}
}
}
/* Go into a little more details for the local logs. */
if (opts->valid_before != 0) {
format_absolute_time(opts->valid_before, buf, sizeof(buf));
debug("%s: expires at %s", loc, buf);
}
if (opts->cert_principals != NULL) {
debug("%s: authorized principals: \"%s\"",
loc, opts->cert_principals);
}
if (opts->force_command != NULL)
debug("%s: forced command: \"%s\"", loc, opts->force_command);
if (do_permitopen) {
for (i = 0; i < opts->npermitopen; i++) {
debug("%s: permitted open: %s",
loc, opts->permitopen[i]);
}
}
if (do_permitlisten) {
for (i = 0; i < opts->npermitlisten; i++) {
debug("%s: permitted listen: %s",
loc, opts->permitlisten[i]);
}
}
}
/* Activate a new set of key/cert options; merging with what is there. */
int
auth_activate_options(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshauthopt *opts)
{
struct sshauthopt *old = auth_opts;
const char *emsg = NULL;
debug("%s: setting new authentication options", __func__);
if ((auth_opts = sshauthopt_merge(old, opts, &emsg)) == NULL) {
error("Inconsistent authentication options: %s", emsg);
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
/* Disable forwarding, etc for the session */
void
auth_restrict_session(struct ssh *ssh)
{
struct sshauthopt *restricted;
debug("%s: restricting session", __func__);
/* A blank sshauthopt defaults to permitting nothing */
restricted = sshauthopt_new();
restricted->permit_pty_flag = 1;
restricted->restricted = 1;
if (auth_activate_options(ssh, restricted) != 0)
fatal("%s: failed to restrict session", __func__);
sshauthopt_free(restricted);
}
int
auth_authorise_keyopts(struct ssh *ssh, struct passwd *pw,
struct sshauthopt *opts, int allow_cert_authority, const char *loc)
{
const char *remote_ip = ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh);
const char *remote_host = auth_get_canonical_hostname(ssh,
options.use_dns);
time_t now = time(NULL);
char buf[64];
/*
* Check keys/principals file expiry time.
* NB. validity interval in certificate is handled elsewhere.
*/
if (opts->valid_before && now > 0 &&
opts->valid_before < (uint64_t)now) {
format_absolute_time(opts->valid_before, buf, sizeof(buf));
debug("%s: entry expired at %s", loc, buf);
auth_debug_add("%s: entry expired at %s", loc, buf);
return -1;
}
/* Consistency checks */
if (opts->cert_principals != NULL && !opts->cert_authority) {
debug("%s: principals on non-CA key", loc);
auth_debug_add("%s: principals on non-CA key", loc);
/* deny access */
return -1;
}
/* cert-authority flag isn't valid in authorized_principals files */
if (!allow_cert_authority && opts->cert_authority) {
debug("%s: cert-authority flag invalid here", loc);
auth_debug_add("%s: cert-authority flag invalid here", loc);
/* deny access */
return -1;
}
/* Perform from= checks */
if (opts->required_from_host_keys != NULL) {
switch (match_host_and_ip(remote_host, remote_ip,
opts->required_from_host_keys )) {
case 1:
/* Host name matches. */
break;
case -1:
default:
debug("%s: invalid from criteria", loc);
auth_debug_add("%s: invalid from criteria", loc);
/* FALLTHROUGH */
case 0:
logit("%s: Authentication tried for %.100s with "
"correct key but not from a permitted "
"host (host=%.200s, ip=%.200s, required=%.200s).",
loc, pw->pw_name, remote_host, remote_ip,
opts->required_from_host_keys);
auth_debug_add("%s: Your host '%.200s' is not "
"permitted to use this key for login.",
loc, remote_host);
/* deny access */
return -1;
}
}
/* Check source-address restriction from certificate */
if (opts->required_from_host_cert != NULL) {
switch (addr_match_cidr_list(remote_ip,
opts->required_from_host_cert)) {
case 1:
/* accepted */
break;
case -1:
default:
/* invalid */
error("%s: Certificate source-address invalid",
loc);
/* FALLTHROUGH */
case 0:
logit("%s: Authentication tried for %.100s with valid "
"certificate but not from a permitted source "
"address (%.200s).", loc, pw->pw_name, remote_ip);
auth_debug_add("%s: Your address '%.200s' is not "
"permitted to use this certificate for login.",
loc, remote_ip);
return -1;
}
}
/*
*
* XXX this is spammy. We should report remotely only for keys
* that are successful in actual auth attempts, and not PK_OK
* tests.
*/
auth_log_authopts(loc, opts, 1);
return 0;
}
diff --git a/auth2-chall.c b/auth2-chall.c
index 671f2f05f688..c57387b71423 100644
--- a/auth2-chall.c
+++ b/auth2-chall.c
@@ -1,384 +1,384 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: auth2-chall.c,v 1.51 2019/09/06 04:53:27 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: auth2-chall.c,v 1.52 2019/11/13 04:47:52 deraadt Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (c) 2001 Per Allansson. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
-#include <stdarg.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "ssh2.h"
#include "sshkey.h"
#include "hostfile.h"
#include "auth.h"
#include "sshbuf.h"
#include "packet.h"
#include "dispatch.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "servconf.h"
/* import */
extern ServerOptions options;
static int auth2_challenge_start(struct ssh *);
static int send_userauth_info_request(struct ssh *);
static int input_userauth_info_response(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
#ifdef BSD_AUTH
extern KbdintDevice bsdauth_device;
#else
#ifdef USE_PAM
extern KbdintDevice sshpam_device;
#endif
#endif
KbdintDevice *devices[] = {
#ifdef BSD_AUTH
&bsdauth_device,
#else
#ifdef USE_PAM
&sshpam_device,
#endif
#endif
NULL
};
typedef struct KbdintAuthctxt KbdintAuthctxt;
struct KbdintAuthctxt
{
char *devices;
void *ctxt;
KbdintDevice *device;
u_int nreq;
u_int devices_done;
};
#ifdef USE_PAM
void
remove_kbdint_device(const char *devname)
{
int i, j;
for (i = 0; devices[i] != NULL; i++)
if (strcmp(devices[i]->name, devname) == 0) {
for (j = i; devices[j] != NULL; j++)
devices[j] = devices[j+1];
i--;
}
}
#endif
static KbdintAuthctxt *
kbdint_alloc(const char *devs)
{
KbdintAuthctxt *kbdintctxt;
struct sshbuf *b;
int i, r;
#ifdef USE_PAM
if (!options.use_pam)
remove_kbdint_device("pam");
#endif
kbdintctxt = xcalloc(1, sizeof(KbdintAuthctxt));
if (strcmp(devs, "") == 0) {
if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
for (i = 0; devices[i]; i++) {
if ((r = sshbuf_putf(b, "%s%s",
sshbuf_len(b) ? "," : "", devices[i]->name)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
}
if ((kbdintctxt->devices = sshbuf_dup_string(b)) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_dup_string failed", __func__);
sshbuf_free(b);
} else {
kbdintctxt->devices = xstrdup(devs);
}
debug("kbdint_alloc: devices '%s'", kbdintctxt->devices);
kbdintctxt->ctxt = NULL;
kbdintctxt->device = NULL;
kbdintctxt->nreq = 0;
return kbdintctxt;
}
static void
kbdint_reset_device(KbdintAuthctxt *kbdintctxt)
{
if (kbdintctxt->ctxt) {
kbdintctxt->device->free_ctx(kbdintctxt->ctxt);
kbdintctxt->ctxt = NULL;
}
kbdintctxt->device = NULL;
}
static void
kbdint_free(KbdintAuthctxt *kbdintctxt)
{
if (kbdintctxt->device)
kbdint_reset_device(kbdintctxt);
free(kbdintctxt->devices);
explicit_bzero(kbdintctxt, sizeof(*kbdintctxt));
free(kbdintctxt);
}
/* get next device */
static int
kbdint_next_device(Authctxt *authctxt, KbdintAuthctxt *kbdintctxt)
{
size_t len;
char *t;
int i;
if (kbdintctxt->device)
kbdint_reset_device(kbdintctxt);
do {
len = kbdintctxt->devices ?
strcspn(kbdintctxt->devices, ",") : 0;
if (len == 0)
break;
for (i = 0; devices[i]; i++) {
if ((kbdintctxt->devices_done & (1 << i)) != 0 ||
!auth2_method_allowed(authctxt,
"keyboard-interactive", devices[i]->name))
continue;
if (strncmp(kbdintctxt->devices, devices[i]->name,
len) == 0) {
kbdintctxt->device = devices[i];
kbdintctxt->devices_done |= 1 << i;
}
}
t = kbdintctxt->devices;
kbdintctxt->devices = t[len] ? xstrdup(t+len+1) : NULL;
free(t);
debug2("kbdint_next_device: devices %s", kbdintctxt->devices ?
kbdintctxt->devices : "<empty>");
} while (kbdintctxt->devices && !kbdintctxt->device);
return kbdintctxt->device ? 1 : 0;
}
/*
* try challenge-response, set authctxt->postponed if we have to
* wait for the response.
*/
int
auth2_challenge(struct ssh *ssh, char *devs)
{
Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt;
debug("auth2_challenge: user=%s devs=%s",
authctxt->user ? authctxt->user : "<nouser>",
devs ? devs : "<no devs>");
if (authctxt->user == NULL || !devs)
return 0;
if (authctxt->kbdintctxt == NULL)
authctxt->kbdintctxt = kbdint_alloc(devs);
return auth2_challenge_start(ssh);
}
/* unregister kbd-int callbacks and context */
void
auth2_challenge_stop(struct ssh *ssh)
{
Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt;
/* unregister callback */
ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_RESPONSE, NULL);
if (authctxt->kbdintctxt != NULL) {
kbdint_free(authctxt->kbdintctxt);
authctxt->kbdintctxt = NULL;
}
}
/* side effect: sets authctxt->postponed if a reply was sent*/
static int
auth2_challenge_start(struct ssh *ssh)
{
Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt;
KbdintAuthctxt *kbdintctxt = authctxt->kbdintctxt;
debug2("auth2_challenge_start: devices %s",
kbdintctxt->devices ? kbdintctxt->devices : "<empty>");
if (kbdint_next_device(authctxt, kbdintctxt) == 0) {
auth2_challenge_stop(ssh);
return 0;
}
debug("auth2_challenge_start: trying authentication method '%s'",
kbdintctxt->device->name);
if ((kbdintctxt->ctxt = kbdintctxt->device->init_ctx(authctxt)) == NULL) {
auth2_challenge_stop(ssh);
return 0;
}
if (send_userauth_info_request(ssh) == 0) {
auth2_challenge_stop(ssh);
return 0;
}
ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_RESPONSE,
&input_userauth_info_response);
authctxt->postponed = 1;
return 0;
}
static int
send_userauth_info_request(struct ssh *ssh)
{
Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt;
KbdintAuthctxt *kbdintctxt;
char *name, *instr, **prompts;
u_int r, i, *echo_on;
kbdintctxt = authctxt->kbdintctxt;
if (kbdintctxt->device->query(kbdintctxt->ctxt,
&name, &instr, &kbdintctxt->nreq, &prompts, &echo_on))
return 0;
if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_REQUEST)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, name)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, instr)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "")) != 0 || /* language not used */
(r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, kbdintctxt->nreq)) != 0)
fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
for (i = 0; i < kbdintctxt->nreq; i++) {
if ((r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, prompts[i])) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, echo_on[i])) != 0)
fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
}
if ((r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0 ||
(r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0)
fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
for (i = 0; i < kbdintctxt->nreq; i++)
free(prompts[i]);
free(prompts);
free(echo_on);
free(name);
free(instr);
return 1;
}
static int
input_userauth_info_response(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
{
Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt;
KbdintAuthctxt *kbdintctxt;
int authenticated = 0, res;
int r;
u_int i, nresp;
const char *devicename = NULL;
char **response = NULL;
if (authctxt == NULL)
fatal("input_userauth_info_response: no authctxt");
kbdintctxt = authctxt->kbdintctxt;
if (kbdintctxt == NULL || kbdintctxt->ctxt == NULL)
fatal("input_userauth_info_response: no kbdintctxt");
if (kbdintctxt->device == NULL)
fatal("input_userauth_info_response: no device");
authctxt->postponed = 0; /* reset */
if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &nresp)) != 0)
fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
if (nresp != kbdintctxt->nreq)
fatal("input_userauth_info_response: wrong number of replies");
if (nresp > 100)
fatal("input_userauth_info_response: too many replies");
if (nresp > 0) {
response = xcalloc(nresp, sizeof(char *));
for (i = 0; i < nresp; i++)
if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &response[i],
NULL)) != 0)
fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
}
if ((r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
res = kbdintctxt->device->respond(kbdintctxt->ctxt, nresp, response);
for (i = 0; i < nresp; i++) {
explicit_bzero(response[i], strlen(response[i]));
free(response[i]);
}
free(response);
switch (res) {
case 0:
/* Success! */
authenticated = authctxt->valid ? 1 : 0;
break;
case 1:
/* Authentication needs further interaction */
if (send_userauth_info_request(ssh) == 1)
authctxt->postponed = 1;
break;
default:
/* Failure! */
break;
}
devicename = kbdintctxt->device->name;
if (!authctxt->postponed) {
if (authenticated) {
auth2_challenge_stop(ssh);
} else {
/* start next device */
/* may set authctxt->postponed */
auth2_challenge_start(ssh);
}
}
userauth_finish(ssh, authenticated, "keyboard-interactive",
devicename);
return 0;
}
void
privsep_challenge_enable(void)
{
#if defined(BSD_AUTH) || defined(USE_PAM)
int n = 0;
#endif
#ifdef BSD_AUTH
extern KbdintDevice mm_bsdauth_device;
#endif
#ifdef USE_PAM
extern KbdintDevice mm_sshpam_device;
#endif
#ifdef BSD_AUTH
devices[n++] = &mm_bsdauth_device;
#else
#ifdef USE_PAM
devices[n++] = &mm_sshpam_device;
#endif
#endif
}
diff --git a/auth2-hostbased.c b/auth2-hostbased.c
index d46047084463..5e9b7c65d325 100644
--- a/auth2-hostbased.c
+++ b/auth2-hostbased.c
@@ -1,262 +1,262 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: auth2-hostbased.c,v 1.41 2019/09/06 04:53:27 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: auth2-hostbased.c,v 1.42 2019/11/25 00:51:37 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <pwd.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "ssh2.h"
#include "packet.h"
#include "sshbuf.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "servconf.h"
#include "compat.h"
#include "sshkey.h"
#include "hostfile.h"
#include "auth.h"
#include "canohost.h"
#ifdef GSSAPI
#include "ssh-gss.h"
#endif
#include "monitor_wrap.h"
#include "pathnames.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
#include "match.h"
/* import */
extern ServerOptions options;
extern u_char *session_id2;
extern u_int session_id2_len;
static int
userauth_hostbased(struct ssh *ssh)
{
Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt;
struct sshbuf *b;
struct sshkey *key = NULL;
char *pkalg, *cuser, *chost;
u_char *pkblob, *sig;
size_t alen, blen, slen;
int r, pktype, authenticated = 0;
/* XXX use sshkey_froms() */
if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &pkalg, &alen)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &pkblob, &blen)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &chost, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &cuser, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &sig, &slen)) != 0)
fatal("%s: packet parsing: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
debug("%s: cuser %s chost %s pkalg %s slen %zu", __func__,
cuser, chost, pkalg, slen);
#ifdef DEBUG_PK
debug("signature:");
sshbuf_dump_data(sig, slen, stderr);
#endif
pktype = sshkey_type_from_name(pkalg);
if (pktype == KEY_UNSPEC) {
/* this is perfectly legal */
logit("%s: unsupported public key algorithm: %s",
__func__, pkalg);
goto done;
}
if ((r = sshkey_from_blob(pkblob, blen, &key)) != 0) {
error("%s: key_from_blob: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
goto done;
}
if (key == NULL) {
error("%s: cannot decode key: %s", __func__, pkalg);
goto done;
}
if (key->type != pktype) {
error("%s: type mismatch for decoded key "
"(received %d, expected %d)", __func__, key->type, pktype);
goto done;
}
if (sshkey_type_plain(key->type) == KEY_RSA &&
(ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5) != 0) {
error("Refusing RSA key because peer uses unsafe "
"signature format");
goto done;
}
if (match_pattern_list(pkalg, options.hostbased_key_types, 0) != 1) {
logit("%s: key type %s not in HostbasedAcceptedKeyTypes",
__func__, sshkey_type(key));
goto done;
}
if ((r = sshkey_check_cert_sigtype(key,
options.ca_sign_algorithms)) != 0) {
logit("%s: certificate signature algorithm %s: %s", __func__,
(key->cert == NULL || key->cert->signature_type == NULL) ?
"(null)" : key->cert->signature_type, ssh_err(r));
goto done;
}
if (!authctxt->valid || authctxt->user == NULL) {
debug2("%s: disabled because of invalid user", __func__);
goto done;
}
if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
/* reconstruct packet */
if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(b, session_id2, session_id2_len)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, authctxt->user)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, authctxt->service)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, "hostbased")) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_string(b, pkalg, alen)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_string(b, pkblob, blen)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, chost)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, cuser)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
#ifdef DEBUG_PK
sshbuf_dump(b, stderr);
#endif
auth2_record_info(authctxt,
"client user \"%.100s\", client host \"%.100s\"", cuser, chost);
/* test for allowed key and correct signature */
authenticated = 0;
if (PRIVSEP(hostbased_key_allowed(ssh, authctxt->pw, cuser,
chost, key)) &&
PRIVSEP(sshkey_verify(key, sig, slen,
- sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b), pkalg, ssh->compat)) == 0)
+ sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b), pkalg, ssh->compat, NULL)) == 0)
authenticated = 1;
auth2_record_key(authctxt, authenticated, key);
sshbuf_free(b);
done:
debug2("%s: authenticated %d", __func__, authenticated);
sshkey_free(key);
free(pkalg);
free(pkblob);
free(cuser);
free(chost);
free(sig);
return authenticated;
}
/* return 1 if given hostkey is allowed */
int
hostbased_key_allowed(struct ssh *ssh, struct passwd *pw,
const char *cuser, char *chost, struct sshkey *key)
{
const char *resolvedname, *ipaddr, *lookup, *reason;
HostStatus host_status;
int len;
char *fp;
if (auth_key_is_revoked(key))
return 0;
resolvedname = auth_get_canonical_hostname(ssh, options.use_dns);
ipaddr = ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh);
debug2("%s: chost %s resolvedname %s ipaddr %s", __func__,
chost, resolvedname, ipaddr);
if (((len = strlen(chost)) > 0) && chost[len - 1] == '.') {
debug2("stripping trailing dot from chost %s", chost);
chost[len - 1] = '\0';
}
if (options.hostbased_uses_name_from_packet_only) {
if (auth_rhosts2(pw, cuser, chost, chost) == 0) {
debug2("%s: auth_rhosts2 refused "
"user \"%.100s\" host \"%.100s\" (from packet)",
__func__, cuser, chost);
return 0;
}
lookup = chost;
} else {
if (strcasecmp(resolvedname, chost) != 0)
logit("userauth_hostbased mismatch: "
"client sends %s, but we resolve %s to %s",
chost, ipaddr, resolvedname);
if (auth_rhosts2(pw, cuser, resolvedname, ipaddr) == 0) {
debug2("%s: auth_rhosts2 refused "
"user \"%.100s\" host \"%.100s\" addr \"%.100s\"",
__func__, cuser, resolvedname, ipaddr);
return 0;
}
lookup = resolvedname;
}
debug2("%s: access allowed by auth_rhosts2", __func__);
if (sshkey_is_cert(key) &&
sshkey_cert_check_authority(key, 1, 0, lookup, &reason)) {
error("%s", reason);
auth_debug_add("%s", reason);
return 0;
}
host_status = check_key_in_hostfiles(pw, key, lookup,
_PATH_SSH_SYSTEM_HOSTFILE,
options.ignore_user_known_hosts ? NULL : _PATH_SSH_USER_HOSTFILE);
/* backward compat if no key has been found. */
if (host_status == HOST_NEW) {
host_status = check_key_in_hostfiles(pw, key, lookup,
_PATH_SSH_SYSTEM_HOSTFILE2,
options.ignore_user_known_hosts ? NULL :
_PATH_SSH_USER_HOSTFILE2);
}
if (host_status == HOST_OK) {
if (sshkey_is_cert(key)) {
if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key->cert->signature_key,
options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshkey_fingerprint fail", __func__);
verbose("Accepted certificate ID \"%s\" signed by "
"%s CA %s from %s@%s", key->cert->key_id,
sshkey_type(key->cert->signature_key), fp,
cuser, lookup);
} else {
if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key,
options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshkey_fingerprint fail", __func__);
verbose("Accepted %s public key %s from %s@%s",
sshkey_type(key), fp, cuser, lookup);
}
free(fp);
}
return (host_status == HOST_OK);
}
Authmethod method_hostbased = {
"hostbased",
userauth_hostbased,
&options.hostbased_authentication
};
diff --git a/auth2-kbdint.c b/auth2-kbdint.c
index f88ef2c39066..e23d2edd20f1 100644
--- a/auth2-kbdint.c
+++ b/auth2-kbdint.c
@@ -1,72 +1,71 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: auth2-kbdint.c,v 1.10 2019/09/06 04:53:27 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: auth2-kbdint.c,v 1.11 2019/11/13 04:47:52 deraadt Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <stdarg.h>
-
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "packet.h"
#include "hostfile.h"
#include "auth.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "servconf.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
/* import */
extern ServerOptions options;
static int
userauth_kbdint(struct ssh *ssh)
{
int r, authenticated = 0;
char *lang, *devs;
if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &lang, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &devs, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
debug("keyboard-interactive devs %s", devs);
if (options.challenge_response_authentication)
authenticated = auth2_challenge(ssh, devs);
free(devs);
free(lang);
return authenticated;
}
Authmethod method_kbdint = {
"keyboard-interactive",
userauth_kbdint,
&options.kbd_interactive_authentication
};
diff --git a/auth2-pubkey.c b/auth2-pubkey.c
index df12c2c60d7d..815ea0f25ebb 100644
--- a/auth2-pubkey.c
+++ b/auth2-pubkey.c
@@ -1,1037 +1,1062 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: auth2-pubkey.c,v 1.94 2019/09/06 04:53:27 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: auth2-pubkey.c,v 1.99 2020/02/06 22:30:54 naddy Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
# include <paths.h>
#endif
#include <pwd.h>
#include <signal.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <time.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <limits.h>
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "ssh.h"
#include "ssh2.h"
#include "packet.h"
#include "sshbuf.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "servconf.h"
#include "compat.h"
#include "sshkey.h"
#include "hostfile.h"
#include "auth.h"
#include "pathnames.h"
#include "uidswap.h"
#include "auth-options.h"
#include "canohost.h"
#ifdef GSSAPI
#include "ssh-gss.h"
#endif
#include "monitor_wrap.h"
#include "authfile.h"
#include "match.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
#include "channels.h" /* XXX for session.h */
#include "session.h" /* XXX for child_set_env(); refactor? */
+#include "sk-api.h"
/* import */
extern ServerOptions options;
extern u_char *session_id2;
extern u_int session_id2_len;
static char *
format_key(const struct sshkey *key)
{
char *ret, *fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key,
options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT);
xasprintf(&ret, "%s %s", sshkey_type(key), fp);
free(fp);
return ret;
}
static int
userauth_pubkey(struct ssh *ssh)
{
Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt;
struct passwd *pw = authctxt->pw;
struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
struct sshkey *key = NULL;
char *pkalg = NULL, *userstyle = NULL, *key_s = NULL, *ca_s = NULL;
u_char *pkblob = NULL, *sig = NULL, have_sig;
size_t blen, slen;
int r, pktype;
- int authenticated = 0;
+ int req_presence = 0, authenticated = 0;
struct sshauthopt *authopts = NULL;
+ struct sshkey_sig_details *sig_details = NULL;
if ((r = sshpkt_get_u8(ssh, &have_sig)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &pkalg, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &pkblob, &blen)) != 0)
fatal("%s: parse request failed: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
if (log_level_get() >= SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG2) {
char *keystring;
struct sshbuf *pkbuf;
if ((pkbuf = sshbuf_from(pkblob, blen)) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_from failed", __func__);
if ((keystring = sshbuf_dtob64_string(pkbuf, 0)) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_dtob64 failed", __func__);
debug2("%s: %s user %s %s public key %s %s", __func__,
authctxt->valid ? "valid" : "invalid", authctxt->user,
have_sig ? "attempting" : "querying", pkalg, keystring);
sshbuf_free(pkbuf);
free(keystring);
}
pktype = sshkey_type_from_name(pkalg);
if (pktype == KEY_UNSPEC) {
/* this is perfectly legal */
verbose("%s: unsupported public key algorithm: %s",
__func__, pkalg);
goto done;
}
if ((r = sshkey_from_blob(pkblob, blen, &key)) != 0) {
error("%s: could not parse key: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
goto done;
}
if (key == NULL) {
error("%s: cannot decode key: %s", __func__, pkalg);
goto done;
}
if (key->type != pktype) {
error("%s: type mismatch for decoded key "
"(received %d, expected %d)", __func__, key->type, pktype);
goto done;
}
if (sshkey_type_plain(key->type) == KEY_RSA &&
(ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5) != 0) {
logit("Refusing RSA key because client uses unsafe "
"signature scheme");
goto done;
}
if (auth2_key_already_used(authctxt, key)) {
logit("refusing previously-used %s key", sshkey_type(key));
goto done;
}
if (match_pattern_list(pkalg, options.pubkey_key_types, 0) != 1) {
logit("%s: key type %s not in PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes",
__func__, sshkey_ssh_name(key));
goto done;
}
if ((r = sshkey_check_cert_sigtype(key,
options.ca_sign_algorithms)) != 0) {
logit("%s: certificate signature algorithm %s: %s", __func__,
(key->cert == NULL || key->cert->signature_type == NULL) ?
"(null)" : key->cert->signature_type, ssh_err(r));
goto done;
}
key_s = format_key(key);
if (sshkey_is_cert(key))
ca_s = format_key(key->cert->signature_key);
if (have_sig) {
debug3("%s: have %s signature for %s%s%s",
__func__, pkalg, key_s,
ca_s == NULL ? "" : " CA ",
ca_s == NULL ? "" : ca_s);
if ((r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &sig, &slen)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
if (ssh->compat & SSH_OLD_SESSIONID) {
if ((r = sshbuf_put(b, session_id2,
session_id2_len)) != 0)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_put session id: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
} else {
if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(b, session_id2,
session_id2_len)) != 0)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_put_string session id: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
}
if (!authctxt->valid || authctxt->user == NULL) {
debug2("%s: disabled because of invalid user",
__func__);
goto done;
}
/* reconstruct packet */
xasprintf(&userstyle, "%s%s%s", authctxt->user,
authctxt->style ? ":" : "",
authctxt->style ? authctxt->style : "");
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, userstyle)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, authctxt->service)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, "publickey")) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, have_sig)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, pkalg)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_string(b, pkblob, blen)) != 0)
fatal("%s: build packet failed: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
#ifdef DEBUG_PK
sshbuf_dump(b, stderr);
#endif
/* test for correct signature */
authenticated = 0;
if (PRIVSEP(user_key_allowed(ssh, pw, key, 1, &authopts)) &&
PRIVSEP(sshkey_verify(key, sig, slen,
sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b),
(ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_SIGTYPE) == 0 ? pkalg : NULL,
- ssh->compat)) == 0) {
+ ssh->compat, &sig_details)) == 0) {
authenticated = 1;
}
+ if (authenticated == 1 && sig_details != NULL) {
+ auth2_record_info(authctxt, "signature count = %u",
+ sig_details->sk_counter);
+ debug("%s: sk_counter = %u, sk_flags = 0x%02x",
+ __func__, sig_details->sk_counter,
+ sig_details->sk_flags);
+ req_presence = (options.pubkey_auth_options &
+ PUBKEYAUTH_TOUCH_REQUIRED) ||
+ !authopts->no_require_user_presence;
+ if (req_presence && (sig_details->sk_flags &
+ SSH_SK_USER_PRESENCE_REQD) == 0) {
+ error("public key %s signature for %s%s from "
+ "%.128s port %d rejected: user presence "
+ "(authenticator touch) requirement "
+ "not met ", key_s,
+ authctxt->valid ? "" : "invalid user ",
+ authctxt->user, ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh),
+ ssh_remote_port(ssh));
+ authenticated = 0;
+ goto done;
+ }
+ }
auth2_record_key(authctxt, authenticated, key);
} else {
debug("%s: test pkalg %s pkblob %s%s%s",
__func__, pkalg, key_s,
ca_s == NULL ? "" : " CA ",
ca_s == NULL ? "" : ca_s);
if ((r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
if (!authctxt->valid || authctxt->user == NULL) {
debug2("%s: disabled because of invalid user",
__func__);
goto done;
}
/* XXX fake reply and always send PK_OK ? */
/*
* XXX this allows testing whether a user is allowed
* to login: if you happen to have a valid pubkey this
* message is sent. the message is NEVER sent at all
* if a user is not allowed to login. is this an
* issue? -markus
*/
if (PRIVSEP(user_key_allowed(ssh, pw, key, 0, NULL))) {
if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PK_OK))
!= 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, pkalg)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, pkblob, blen)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0 ||
(r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0)
fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
authctxt->postponed = 1;
}
}
done:
if (authenticated == 1 && auth_activate_options(ssh, authopts) != 0) {
debug("%s: key options inconsistent with existing", __func__);
authenticated = 0;
}
debug2("%s: authenticated %d pkalg %s", __func__, authenticated, pkalg);
sshbuf_free(b);
sshauthopt_free(authopts);
sshkey_free(key);
free(userstyle);
free(pkalg);
free(pkblob);
free(key_s);
free(ca_s);
free(sig);
+ sshkey_sig_details_free(sig_details);
return authenticated;
}
static int
match_principals_option(const char *principal_list, struct sshkey_cert *cert)
{
char *result;
u_int i;
/* XXX percent_expand() sequences for authorized_principals? */
for (i = 0; i < cert->nprincipals; i++) {
if ((result = match_list(cert->principals[i],
principal_list, NULL)) != NULL) {
debug3("matched principal from key options \"%.100s\"",
result);
free(result);
return 1;
}
}
return 0;
}
/*
* Process a single authorized_principals format line. Returns 0 and sets
* authoptsp is principal is authorised, -1 otherwise. "loc" is used as a
* log preamble for file/line information.
*/
static int
check_principals_line(struct ssh *ssh, char *cp, const struct sshkey_cert *cert,
const char *loc, struct sshauthopt **authoptsp)
{
u_int i, found = 0;
char *ep, *line_opts;
const char *reason = NULL;
struct sshauthopt *opts = NULL;
if (authoptsp != NULL)
*authoptsp = NULL;
/* Trim trailing whitespace. */
ep = cp + strlen(cp) - 1;
while (ep > cp && (*ep == '\n' || *ep == ' ' || *ep == '\t'))
*ep-- = '\0';
/*
* If the line has internal whitespace then assume it has
* key options.
*/
line_opts = NULL;
if ((ep = strrchr(cp, ' ')) != NULL ||
(ep = strrchr(cp, '\t')) != NULL) {
for (; *ep == ' ' || *ep == '\t'; ep++)
;
line_opts = cp;
cp = ep;
}
if ((opts = sshauthopt_parse(line_opts, &reason)) == NULL) {
debug("%s: bad principals options: %s", loc, reason);
auth_debug_add("%s: bad principals options: %s", loc, reason);
return -1;
}
/* Check principals in cert against those on line */
for (i = 0; i < cert->nprincipals; i++) {
if (strcmp(cp, cert->principals[i]) != 0)
continue;
debug3("%s: matched principal \"%.100s\"",
loc, cert->principals[i]);
found = 1;
}
if (found && authoptsp != NULL) {
*authoptsp = opts;
opts = NULL;
}
sshauthopt_free(opts);
return found ? 0 : -1;
}
static int
process_principals(struct ssh *ssh, FILE *f, const char *file,
const struct sshkey_cert *cert, struct sshauthopt **authoptsp)
{
char loc[256], *line = NULL, *cp, *ep;
size_t linesize = 0;
u_long linenum = 0;
u_int found_principal = 0;
if (authoptsp != NULL)
*authoptsp = NULL;
while (getline(&line, &linesize, f) != -1) {
linenum++;
/* Always consume entire input */
if (found_principal)
continue;
/* Skip leading whitespace. */
for (cp = line; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++)
;
/* Skip blank and comment lines. */
if ((ep = strchr(cp, '#')) != NULL)
*ep = '\0';
if (!*cp || *cp == '\n')
continue;
snprintf(loc, sizeof(loc), "%.200s:%lu", file, linenum);
if (check_principals_line(ssh, cp, cert, loc, authoptsp) == 0)
found_principal = 1;
}
free(line);
return found_principal;
}
/* XXX remove pw args here and elsewhere once ssh->authctxt is guaranteed */
static int
match_principals_file(struct ssh *ssh, struct passwd *pw, char *file,
struct sshkey_cert *cert, struct sshauthopt **authoptsp)
{
FILE *f;
int success;
if (authoptsp != NULL)
*authoptsp = NULL;
temporarily_use_uid(pw);
debug("trying authorized principals file %s", file);
if ((f = auth_openprincipals(file, pw, options.strict_modes)) == NULL) {
restore_uid();
return 0;
}
success = process_principals(ssh, f, file, cert, authoptsp);
fclose(f);
restore_uid();
return success;
}
/*
* Checks whether principal is allowed in output of command.
* returns 1 if the principal is allowed or 0 otherwise.
*/
static int
match_principals_command(struct ssh *ssh, struct passwd *user_pw,
const struct sshkey *key, struct sshauthopt **authoptsp)
{
struct passwd *runas_pw = NULL;
const struct sshkey_cert *cert = key->cert;
FILE *f = NULL;
int r, ok, found_principal = 0;
int i, ac = 0, uid_swapped = 0;
pid_t pid;
char *tmp, *username = NULL, *command = NULL, **av = NULL;
char *ca_fp = NULL, *key_fp = NULL, *catext = NULL, *keytext = NULL;
char serial_s[32], uidstr[32];
void (*osigchld)(int);
if (authoptsp != NULL)
*authoptsp = NULL;
if (options.authorized_principals_command == NULL)
return 0;
if (options.authorized_principals_command_user == NULL) {
error("No user for AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand specified, "
"skipping");
return 0;
}
/*
* NB. all returns later this function should go via "out" to
* ensure the original SIGCHLD handler is restored properly.
*/
- osigchld = signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL);
+ osigchld = ssh_signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL);
/* Prepare and verify the user for the command */
username = percent_expand(options.authorized_principals_command_user,
"u", user_pw->pw_name, (char *)NULL);
runas_pw = getpwnam(username);
if (runas_pw == NULL) {
error("AuthorizedPrincipalsCommandUser \"%s\" not found: %s",
username, strerror(errno));
goto out;
}
/* Turn the command into an argument vector */
if (argv_split(options.authorized_principals_command, &ac, &av) != 0) {
error("AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand \"%s\" contains "
"invalid quotes", options.authorized_principals_command);
goto out;
}
if (ac == 0) {
error("AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand \"%s\" yielded no arguments",
options.authorized_principals_command);
goto out;
}
if ((ca_fp = sshkey_fingerprint(cert->signature_key,
options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) {
error("%s: sshkey_fingerprint failed", __func__);
goto out;
}
if ((key_fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key,
options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) {
error("%s: sshkey_fingerprint failed", __func__);
goto out;
}
if ((r = sshkey_to_base64(cert->signature_key, &catext)) != 0) {
error("%s: sshkey_to_base64 failed: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
goto out;
}
if ((r = sshkey_to_base64(key, &keytext)) != 0) {
error("%s: sshkey_to_base64 failed: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
goto out;
}
snprintf(serial_s, sizeof(serial_s), "%llu",
(unsigned long long)cert->serial);
snprintf(uidstr, sizeof(uidstr), "%llu",
(unsigned long long)user_pw->pw_uid);
for (i = 1; i < ac; i++) {
tmp = percent_expand(av[i],
"U", uidstr,
"u", user_pw->pw_name,
"h", user_pw->pw_dir,
"t", sshkey_ssh_name(key),
"T", sshkey_ssh_name(cert->signature_key),
"f", key_fp,
"F", ca_fp,
"k", keytext,
"K", catext,
"i", cert->key_id,
"s", serial_s,
(char *)NULL);
if (tmp == NULL)
fatal("%s: percent_expand failed", __func__);
free(av[i]);
av[i] = tmp;
}
/* Prepare a printable command for logs, etc. */
command = argv_assemble(ac, av);
if ((pid = subprocess("AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand", runas_pw, command,
ac, av, &f,
SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_CAPTURE|SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDERR_DISCARD)) == 0)
goto out;
uid_swapped = 1;
temporarily_use_uid(runas_pw);
ok = process_principals(ssh, f, "(command)", cert, authoptsp);
fclose(f);
f = NULL;
if (exited_cleanly(pid, "AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand", command, 0) != 0)
goto out;
/* Read completed successfully */
found_principal = ok;
out:
if (f != NULL)
fclose(f);
- signal(SIGCHLD, osigchld);
+ ssh_signal(SIGCHLD, osigchld);
for (i = 0; i < ac; i++)
free(av[i]);
free(av);
if (uid_swapped)
restore_uid();
free(command);
free(username);
free(ca_fp);
free(key_fp);
free(catext);
free(keytext);
return found_principal;
}
/*
* Check a single line of an authorized_keys-format file. Returns 0 if key
* matches, -1 otherwise. Will return key/cert options via *authoptsp
* on success. "loc" is used as file/line location in log messages.
*/
static int
check_authkey_line(struct ssh *ssh, struct passwd *pw, struct sshkey *key,
char *cp, const char *loc, struct sshauthopt **authoptsp)
{
int want_keytype = sshkey_is_cert(key) ? KEY_UNSPEC : key->type;
struct sshkey *found = NULL;
struct sshauthopt *keyopts = NULL, *certopts = NULL, *finalopts = NULL;
char *key_options = NULL, *fp = NULL;
const char *reason = NULL;
int ret = -1;
if (authoptsp != NULL)
*authoptsp = NULL;
if ((found = sshkey_new(want_keytype)) == NULL) {
debug3("%s: keytype %d failed", __func__, want_keytype);
goto out;
}
/* XXX djm: peek at key type in line and skip if unwanted */
if (sshkey_read(found, &cp) != 0) {
/* no key? check for options */
debug2("%s: check options: '%s'", loc, cp);
key_options = cp;
if (sshkey_advance_past_options(&cp) != 0) {
reason = "invalid key option string";
goto fail_reason;
}
skip_space(&cp);
if (sshkey_read(found, &cp) != 0) {
/* still no key? advance to next line*/
debug2("%s: advance: '%s'", loc, cp);
goto out;
}
}
/* Parse key options now; we need to know if this is a CA key */
if ((keyopts = sshauthopt_parse(key_options, &reason)) == NULL) {
debug("%s: bad key options: %s", loc, reason);
auth_debug_add("%s: bad key options: %s", loc, reason);
goto out;
}
/* Ignore keys that don't match or incorrectly marked as CAs */
if (sshkey_is_cert(key)) {
/* Certificate; check signature key against CA */
if (!sshkey_equal(found, key->cert->signature_key) ||
!keyopts->cert_authority)
goto out;
} else {
/* Plain key: check it against key found in file */
if (!sshkey_equal(found, key) || keyopts->cert_authority)
goto out;
}
/* We have a candidate key, perform authorisation checks */
if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(found,
options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL)
fatal("%s: fingerprint failed", __func__);
debug("%s: matching %s found: %s %s", loc,
sshkey_is_cert(key) ? "CA" : "key", sshkey_type(found), fp);
if (auth_authorise_keyopts(ssh, pw, keyopts,
sshkey_is_cert(key), loc) != 0) {
reason = "Refused by key options";
goto fail_reason;
}
/* That's all we need for plain keys. */
if (!sshkey_is_cert(key)) {
verbose("Accepted key %s %s found at %s",
sshkey_type(found), fp, loc);
finalopts = keyopts;
keyopts = NULL;
goto success;
}
/*
* Additional authorisation for certificates.
*/
/* Parse and check options present in certificate */
if ((certopts = sshauthopt_from_cert(key)) == NULL) {
reason = "Invalid certificate options";
goto fail_reason;
}
if (auth_authorise_keyopts(ssh, pw, certopts, 0, loc) != 0) {
reason = "Refused by certificate options";
goto fail_reason;
}
if ((finalopts = sshauthopt_merge(keyopts, certopts, &reason)) == NULL)
goto fail_reason;
/*
* If the user has specified a list of principals as
* a key option, then prefer that list to matching
* their username in the certificate principals list.
*/
if (keyopts->cert_principals != NULL &&
!match_principals_option(keyopts->cert_principals, key->cert)) {
reason = "Certificate does not contain an authorized principal";
goto fail_reason;
}
if (sshkey_cert_check_authority(key, 0, 0,
keyopts->cert_principals == NULL ? pw->pw_name : NULL, &reason) != 0)
goto fail_reason;
verbose("Accepted certificate ID \"%s\" (serial %llu) "
"signed by CA %s %s found at %s",
key->cert->key_id,
(unsigned long long)key->cert->serial,
sshkey_type(found), fp, loc);
success:
if (finalopts == NULL)
fatal("%s: internal error: missing options", __func__);
if (authoptsp != NULL) {
*authoptsp = finalopts;
finalopts = NULL;
}
/* success */
ret = 0;
goto out;
fail_reason:
error("%s", reason);
auth_debug_add("%s", reason);
out:
free(fp);
sshauthopt_free(keyopts);
sshauthopt_free(certopts);
sshauthopt_free(finalopts);
sshkey_free(found);
return ret;
}
/*
* Checks whether key is allowed in authorized_keys-format file,
* returns 1 if the key is allowed or 0 otherwise.
*/
static int
check_authkeys_file(struct ssh *ssh, struct passwd *pw, FILE *f,
char *file, struct sshkey *key, struct sshauthopt **authoptsp)
{
char *cp, *line = NULL, loc[256];
size_t linesize = 0;
int found_key = 0;
u_long linenum = 0;
if (authoptsp != NULL)
*authoptsp = NULL;
while (getline(&line, &linesize, f) != -1) {
linenum++;
/* Always consume entire file */
if (found_key)
continue;
/* Skip leading whitespace, empty and comment lines. */
cp = line;
skip_space(&cp);
if (!*cp || *cp == '\n' || *cp == '#')
continue;
snprintf(loc, sizeof(loc), "%.200s:%lu", file, linenum);
if (check_authkey_line(ssh, pw, key, cp, loc, authoptsp) == 0)
found_key = 1;
}
free(line);
return found_key;
}
/* Authenticate a certificate key against TrustedUserCAKeys */
static int
user_cert_trusted_ca(struct ssh *ssh, struct passwd *pw, struct sshkey *key,
struct sshauthopt **authoptsp)
{
char *ca_fp, *principals_file = NULL;
const char *reason;
struct sshauthopt *principals_opts = NULL, *cert_opts = NULL;
struct sshauthopt *final_opts = NULL;
int r, ret = 0, found_principal = 0, use_authorized_principals;
if (authoptsp != NULL)
*authoptsp = NULL;
if (!sshkey_is_cert(key) || options.trusted_user_ca_keys == NULL)
return 0;
if ((ca_fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key->cert->signature_key,
options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL)
return 0;
if ((r = sshkey_in_file(key->cert->signature_key,
options.trusted_user_ca_keys, 1, 0)) != 0) {
debug2("%s: CA %s %s is not listed in %s: %s", __func__,
sshkey_type(key->cert->signature_key), ca_fp,
options.trusted_user_ca_keys, ssh_err(r));
goto out;
}
/*
* If AuthorizedPrincipals is in use, then compare the certificate
* principals against the names in that file rather than matching
* against the username.
*/
if ((principals_file = authorized_principals_file(pw)) != NULL) {
if (match_principals_file(ssh, pw, principals_file,
key->cert, &principals_opts))
found_principal = 1;
}
/* Try querying command if specified */
if (!found_principal && match_principals_command(ssh, pw, key,
&principals_opts))
found_principal = 1;
/* If principals file or command is specified, then require a match */
use_authorized_principals = principals_file != NULL ||
options.authorized_principals_command != NULL;
if (!found_principal && use_authorized_principals) {
reason = "Certificate does not contain an authorized principal";
goto fail_reason;
}
if (use_authorized_principals && principals_opts == NULL)
fatal("%s: internal error: missing principals_opts", __func__);
if (sshkey_cert_check_authority(key, 0, 1,
use_authorized_principals ? NULL : pw->pw_name, &reason) != 0)
goto fail_reason;
/* Check authority from options in key and from principals file/cmd */
if ((cert_opts = sshauthopt_from_cert(key)) == NULL) {
reason = "Invalid certificate options";
goto fail_reason;
}
if (auth_authorise_keyopts(ssh, pw, cert_opts, 0, "cert") != 0) {
reason = "Refused by certificate options";
goto fail_reason;
}
if (principals_opts == NULL) {
final_opts = cert_opts;
cert_opts = NULL;
} else {
if (auth_authorise_keyopts(ssh, pw, principals_opts, 0,
"principals") != 0) {
reason = "Refused by certificate principals options";
goto fail_reason;
}
if ((final_opts = sshauthopt_merge(principals_opts,
cert_opts, &reason)) == NULL) {
fail_reason:
error("%s", reason);
auth_debug_add("%s", reason);
goto out;
}
}
/* Success */
verbose("Accepted certificate ID \"%s\" (serial %llu) signed by "
"%s CA %s via %s", key->cert->key_id,
(unsigned long long)key->cert->serial,
sshkey_type(key->cert->signature_key), ca_fp,
options.trusted_user_ca_keys);
if (authoptsp != NULL) {
*authoptsp = final_opts;
final_opts = NULL;
}
ret = 1;
out:
sshauthopt_free(principals_opts);
sshauthopt_free(cert_opts);
sshauthopt_free(final_opts);
free(principals_file);
free(ca_fp);
return ret;
}
/*
* Checks whether key is allowed in file.
* returns 1 if the key is allowed or 0 otherwise.
*/
static int
user_key_allowed2(struct ssh *ssh, struct passwd *pw, struct sshkey *key,
char *file, struct sshauthopt **authoptsp)
{
FILE *f;
int found_key = 0;
if (authoptsp != NULL)
*authoptsp = NULL;
/* Temporarily use the user's uid. */
temporarily_use_uid(pw);
debug("trying public key file %s", file);
if ((f = auth_openkeyfile(file, pw, options.strict_modes)) != NULL) {
found_key = check_authkeys_file(ssh, pw, f, file,
key, authoptsp);
fclose(f);
}
restore_uid();
return found_key;
}
/*
* Checks whether key is allowed in output of command.
* returns 1 if the key is allowed or 0 otherwise.
*/
static int
user_key_command_allowed2(struct ssh *ssh, struct passwd *user_pw,
struct sshkey *key, struct sshauthopt **authoptsp)
{
struct passwd *runas_pw = NULL;
FILE *f = NULL;
int r, ok, found_key = 0;
int i, uid_swapped = 0, ac = 0;
pid_t pid;
char *username = NULL, *key_fp = NULL, *keytext = NULL;
char uidstr[32], *tmp, *command = NULL, **av = NULL;
void (*osigchld)(int);
if (authoptsp != NULL)
*authoptsp = NULL;
if (options.authorized_keys_command == NULL)
return 0;
if (options.authorized_keys_command_user == NULL) {
error("No user for AuthorizedKeysCommand specified, skipping");
return 0;
}
/*
* NB. all returns later this function should go via "out" to
* ensure the original SIGCHLD handler is restored properly.
*/
- osigchld = signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL);
+ osigchld = ssh_signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL);
/* Prepare and verify the user for the command */
username = percent_expand(options.authorized_keys_command_user,
"u", user_pw->pw_name, (char *)NULL);
runas_pw = getpwnam(username);
if (runas_pw == NULL) {
error("AuthorizedKeysCommandUser \"%s\" not found: %s",
username, strerror(errno));
goto out;
}
/* Prepare AuthorizedKeysCommand */
if ((key_fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, options.fingerprint_hash,
SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) {
error("%s: sshkey_fingerprint failed", __func__);
goto out;
}
if ((r = sshkey_to_base64(key, &keytext)) != 0) {
error("%s: sshkey_to_base64 failed: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
goto out;
}
/* Turn the command into an argument vector */
if (argv_split(options.authorized_keys_command, &ac, &av) != 0) {
error("AuthorizedKeysCommand \"%s\" contains invalid quotes",
command);
goto out;
}
if (ac == 0) {
error("AuthorizedKeysCommand \"%s\" yielded no arguments",
command);
goto out;
}
snprintf(uidstr, sizeof(uidstr), "%llu",
(unsigned long long)user_pw->pw_uid);
for (i = 1; i < ac; i++) {
tmp = percent_expand(av[i],
"U", uidstr,
"u", user_pw->pw_name,
"h", user_pw->pw_dir,
"t", sshkey_ssh_name(key),
"f", key_fp,
"k", keytext,
(char *)NULL);
if (tmp == NULL)
fatal("%s: percent_expand failed", __func__);
free(av[i]);
av[i] = tmp;
}
/* Prepare a printable command for logs, etc. */
command = argv_assemble(ac, av);
/*
* If AuthorizedKeysCommand was run without arguments
* then fall back to the old behaviour of passing the
* target username as a single argument.
*/
if (ac == 1) {
av = xreallocarray(av, ac + 2, sizeof(*av));
av[1] = xstrdup(user_pw->pw_name);
av[2] = NULL;
/* Fix up command too, since it is used in log messages */
free(command);
xasprintf(&command, "%s %s", av[0], av[1]);
}
if ((pid = subprocess("AuthorizedKeysCommand", runas_pw, command,
ac, av, &f,
SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDOUT_CAPTURE|SSH_SUBPROCESS_STDERR_DISCARD)) == 0)
goto out;
uid_swapped = 1;
temporarily_use_uid(runas_pw);
ok = check_authkeys_file(ssh, user_pw, f,
options.authorized_keys_command, key, authoptsp);
fclose(f);
f = NULL;
if (exited_cleanly(pid, "AuthorizedKeysCommand", command, 0) != 0)
goto out;
/* Read completed successfully */
found_key = ok;
out:
if (f != NULL)
fclose(f);
- signal(SIGCHLD, osigchld);
+ ssh_signal(SIGCHLD, osigchld);
for (i = 0; i < ac; i++)
free(av[i]);
free(av);
if (uid_swapped)
restore_uid();
free(command);
free(username);
free(key_fp);
free(keytext);
return found_key;
}
/*
* Check whether key authenticates and authorises the user.
*/
int
user_key_allowed(struct ssh *ssh, struct passwd *pw, struct sshkey *key,
int auth_attempt, struct sshauthopt **authoptsp)
{
u_int success = 0, i;
char *file;
struct sshauthopt *opts = NULL;
if (authoptsp != NULL)
*authoptsp = NULL;
if (auth_key_is_revoked(key))
return 0;
if (sshkey_is_cert(key) &&
auth_key_is_revoked(key->cert->signature_key))
return 0;
for (i = 0; !success && i < options.num_authkeys_files; i++) {
if (strcasecmp(options.authorized_keys_files[i], "none") == 0)
continue;
file = expand_authorized_keys(
options.authorized_keys_files[i], pw);
success = user_key_allowed2(ssh, pw, key, file, &opts);
free(file);
if (!success) {
sshauthopt_free(opts);
opts = NULL;
}
}
if (success)
goto out;
if ((success = user_cert_trusted_ca(ssh, pw, key, &opts)) != 0)
goto out;
sshauthopt_free(opts);
opts = NULL;
if ((success = user_key_command_allowed2(ssh, pw, key, &opts)) != 0)
goto out;
sshauthopt_free(opts);
opts = NULL;
out:
if (success && authoptsp != NULL) {
*authoptsp = opts;
opts = NULL;
}
sshauthopt_free(opts);
return success;
}
Authmethod method_pubkey = {
"publickey",
userauth_pubkey,
&options.pubkey_authentication
};
diff --git a/authfd.c b/authfd.c
index a5162790f070..05fd45401e12 100644
--- a/authfd.c
+++ b/authfd.c
@@ -1,610 +1,639 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: authfd.c,v 1.117 2019/09/03 08:29:15 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: authfd.c,v 1.121 2019/12/21 02:19:13 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
* All rights reserved
* Functions for connecting the local authentication agent.
*
* As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
* can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
* software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
* incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
* called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
*
* SSH2 implementation,
* Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/un.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <signal.h>
-#include <stdarg.h>
#include <string.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "ssh.h"
#include "sshbuf.h"
#include "sshkey.h"
#include "authfd.h"
#include "cipher.h"
#include "compat.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "atomicio.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
#define MAX_AGENT_IDENTITIES 2048 /* Max keys in agent reply */
#define MAX_AGENT_REPLY_LEN (256 * 1024) /* Max bytes in agent reply */
/* macro to check for "agent failure" message */
#define agent_failed(x) \
((x == SSH_AGENT_FAILURE) || \
(x == SSH_COM_AGENT2_FAILURE) || \
(x == SSH2_AGENT_FAILURE))
/* Convert success/failure response from agent to a err.h status */
static int
decode_reply(u_char type)
{
if (agent_failed(type))
return SSH_ERR_AGENT_FAILURE;
else if (type == SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS)
return 0;
else
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
}
-/* Returns the number of the authentication fd, or -1 if there is none. */
+/*
+ * Opens an authentication socket at the provided path and stores the file
+ * descriptor in fdp. Returns 0 on success and an error on failure.
+ */
int
-ssh_get_authentication_socket(int *fdp)
+ssh_get_authentication_socket_path(const char *authsocket, int *fdp)
{
- const char *authsocket;
int sock, oerrno;
struct sockaddr_un sunaddr;
- if (fdp != NULL)
- *fdp = -1;
-
- authsocket = getenv(SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME);
- if (authsocket == NULL || *authsocket == '\0')
- return SSH_ERR_AGENT_NOT_PRESENT;
-
memset(&sunaddr, 0, sizeof(sunaddr));
sunaddr.sun_family = AF_UNIX;
strlcpy(sunaddr.sun_path, authsocket, sizeof(sunaddr.sun_path));
if ((sock = socket(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0)) == -1)
return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
/* close on exec */
if (fcntl(sock, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC) == -1 ||
connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&sunaddr, sizeof(sunaddr)) == -1) {
oerrno = errno;
close(sock);
errno = oerrno;
return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
}
if (fdp != NULL)
*fdp = sock;
else
close(sock);
return 0;
}
+/*
+ * Opens the default authentication socket and stores the file descriptor in
+ * fdp. Returns 0 on success and an error on failure.
+ */
+int
+ssh_get_authentication_socket(int *fdp)
+{
+ const char *authsocket;
+
+ if (fdp != NULL)
+ *fdp = -1;
+
+ authsocket = getenv(SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME);
+ if (authsocket == NULL || *authsocket == '\0')
+ return SSH_ERR_AGENT_NOT_PRESENT;
+
+ return ssh_get_authentication_socket_path(authsocket, fdp);
+}
+
/* Communicate with agent: send request and read reply */
static int
ssh_request_reply(int sock, struct sshbuf *request, struct sshbuf *reply)
{
int r;
size_t l, len;
char buf[1024];
/* Get the length of the message, and format it in the buffer. */
len = sshbuf_len(request);
POKE_U32(buf, len);
/* Send the length and then the packet to the agent. */
if (atomicio(vwrite, sock, buf, 4) != 4 ||
atomicio(vwrite, sock, sshbuf_mutable_ptr(request),
sshbuf_len(request)) != sshbuf_len(request))
return SSH_ERR_AGENT_COMMUNICATION;
/*
* Wait for response from the agent. First read the length of the
* response packet.
*/
if (atomicio(read, sock, buf, 4) != 4)
return SSH_ERR_AGENT_COMMUNICATION;
/* Extract the length, and check it for sanity. */
len = PEEK_U32(buf);
if (len > MAX_AGENT_REPLY_LEN)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
/* Read the rest of the response in to the buffer. */
sshbuf_reset(reply);
while (len > 0) {
l = len;
if (l > sizeof(buf))
l = sizeof(buf);
if (atomicio(read, sock, buf, l) != l)
return SSH_ERR_AGENT_COMMUNICATION;
if ((r = sshbuf_put(reply, buf, l)) != 0)
return r;
len -= l;
}
return 0;
}
/*
* Closes the agent socket if it should be closed (depends on how it was
* obtained). The argument must have been returned by
* ssh_get_authentication_socket().
*/
void
ssh_close_authentication_socket(int sock)
{
if (getenv(SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME))
close(sock);
}
/* Lock/unlock agent */
int
ssh_lock_agent(int sock, int lock, const char *password)
{
int r;
u_char type = lock ? SSH_AGENTC_LOCK : SSH_AGENTC_UNLOCK;
struct sshbuf *msg;
if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, type)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, password)) != 0)
goto out;
if ((r = ssh_request_reply(sock, msg, msg)) != 0)
goto out;
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(msg, &type)) != 0)
goto out;
r = decode_reply(type);
out:
sshbuf_free(msg);
return r;
}
static int
deserialise_identity2(struct sshbuf *ids, struct sshkey **keyp, char **commentp)
{
int r;
char *comment = NULL;
const u_char *blob;
size_t blen;
if ((r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(ids, &blob, &blen)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_cstring(ids, &comment, NULL)) != 0)
goto out;
if ((r = sshkey_from_blob(blob, blen, keyp)) != 0)
goto out;
if (commentp != NULL) {
*commentp = comment;
comment = NULL;
}
r = 0;
out:
free(comment);
return r;
}
/*
* Fetch list of identities held by the agent.
*/
int
ssh_fetch_identitylist(int sock, struct ssh_identitylist **idlp)
{
u_char type;
u_int32_t num, i;
struct sshbuf *msg;
struct ssh_identitylist *idl = NULL;
int r;
/*
* Send a message to the agent requesting for a list of the
* identities it can represent.
*/
if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_AGENTC_REQUEST_IDENTITIES)) != 0)
goto out;
if ((r = ssh_request_reply(sock, msg, msg)) != 0)
goto out;
/* Get message type, and verify that we got a proper answer. */
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(msg, &type)) != 0)
goto out;
if (agent_failed(type)) {
r = SSH_ERR_AGENT_FAILURE;
goto out;
} else if (type != SSH2_AGENT_IDENTITIES_ANSWER) {
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
/* Get the number of entries in the response and check it for sanity. */
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &num)) != 0)
goto out;
if (num > MAX_AGENT_IDENTITIES) {
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
if (num == 0) {
r = SSH_ERR_AGENT_NO_IDENTITIES;
goto out;
}
/* Deserialise the response into a list of keys/comments */
if ((idl = calloc(1, sizeof(*idl))) == NULL ||
(idl->keys = calloc(num, sizeof(*idl->keys))) == NULL ||
(idl->comments = calloc(num, sizeof(*idl->comments))) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
for (i = 0; i < num;) {
if ((r = deserialise_identity2(msg, &(idl->keys[i]),
&(idl->comments[i]))) != 0) {
if (r == SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN) {
/* Gracefully skip unknown key types */
num--;
continue;
} else
goto out;
}
i++;
}
idl->nkeys = num;
*idlp = idl;
idl = NULL;
r = 0;
out:
sshbuf_free(msg);
if (idl != NULL)
ssh_free_identitylist(idl);
return r;
}
void
ssh_free_identitylist(struct ssh_identitylist *idl)
{
size_t i;
if (idl == NULL)
return;
for (i = 0; i < idl->nkeys; i++) {
if (idl->keys != NULL)
sshkey_free(idl->keys[i]);
if (idl->comments != NULL)
free(idl->comments[i]);
}
free(idl->keys);
free(idl->comments);
free(idl);
}
/*
* Check if the ssh agent has a given key.
* Returns 0 if found, or a negative SSH_ERR_* error code on failure.
*/
int
ssh_agent_has_key(int sock, struct sshkey *key)
{
int r, ret = SSH_ERR_KEY_NOT_FOUND;
size_t i;
struct ssh_identitylist *idlist = NULL;
if ((r = ssh_fetch_identitylist(sock, &idlist)) < 0) {
return r;
}
for (i = 0; i < idlist->nkeys; i++) {
if (sshkey_equal_public(idlist->keys[i], key)) {
ret = 0;
break;
}
}
ssh_free_identitylist(idlist);
return ret;
}
/*
* Sends a challenge (typically from a server via ssh(1)) to the agent,
* and waits for a response from the agent.
* Returns true (non-zero) if the agent gave the correct answer, zero
* otherwise.
*/
/* encode signature algorithm in flag bits, so we can keep the msg format */
static u_int
agent_encode_alg(const struct sshkey *key, const char *alg)
{
if (alg != NULL && sshkey_type_plain(key->type) == KEY_RSA) {
if (strcmp(alg, "rsa-sha2-256") == 0 ||
strcmp(alg, "rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com") == 0)
return SSH_AGENT_RSA_SHA2_256;
if (strcmp(alg, "rsa-sha2-512") == 0 ||
strcmp(alg, "rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com") == 0)
return SSH_AGENT_RSA_SHA2_512;
}
return 0;
}
/* ask agent to sign data, returns err.h code on error, 0 on success */
int
ssh_agent_sign(int sock, const struct sshkey *key,
u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
const u_char *data, size_t datalen, const char *alg, u_int compat)
{
struct sshbuf *msg;
u_char *sig = NULL, type = 0;
size_t len = 0;
u_int flags = 0;
int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
*sigp = NULL;
*lenp = 0;
if (datalen > SSH_KEY_MAX_SIGN_DATA_SIZE)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
flags |= agent_encode_alg(key, alg);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_AGENTC_SIGN_REQUEST)) != 0 ||
(r = sshkey_puts(key, msg)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_string(msg, data, datalen)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, flags)) != 0)
goto out;
if ((r = ssh_request_reply(sock, msg, msg)) != 0)
goto out;
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(msg, &type)) != 0)
goto out;
if (agent_failed(type)) {
r = SSH_ERR_AGENT_FAILURE;
goto out;
} else if (type != SSH2_AGENT_SIGN_RESPONSE) {
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(msg, &sig, &len)) != 0)
goto out;
/* Check what we actually got back from the agent. */
if ((r = sshkey_check_sigtype(sig, len, alg)) != 0)
goto out;
/* success */
*sigp = sig;
*lenp = len;
sig = NULL;
len = 0;
r = 0;
out:
freezero(sig, len);
sshbuf_free(msg);
return r;
}
/* Encode key for a message to the agent. */
static int
-encode_constraints(struct sshbuf *m, u_int life, u_int confirm, u_int maxsign)
+encode_constraints(struct sshbuf *m, u_int life, u_int confirm, u_int maxsign,
+ const char *provider)
{
int r;
if (life != 0) {
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(m, SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_LIFETIME)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, life)) != 0)
goto out;
}
if (confirm != 0) {
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(m, SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_CONFIRM)) != 0)
goto out;
}
if (maxsign != 0) {
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(m, SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_MAXSIGN)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, maxsign)) != 0)
goto out;
}
+ if (provider != NULL) {
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(m,
+ SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_EXTENSION)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m,
+ "sk-provider@openssh.com")) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, provider)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ }
r = 0;
out:
return r;
}
/*
* Adds an identity to the authentication server.
* This call is intended only for use by ssh-add(1) and like applications.
*/
int
ssh_add_identity_constrained(int sock, struct sshkey *key,
- const char *comment, u_int life, u_int confirm, u_int maxsign)
+ const char *comment, u_int life, u_int confirm, u_int maxsign,
+ const char *provider)
{
struct sshbuf *msg;
- int r, constrained = (life || confirm || maxsign);
+ int r, constrained = (life || confirm || maxsign || provider);
u_char type;
if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
switch (key->type) {
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
case KEY_RSA:
case KEY_RSA_CERT:
case KEY_DSA:
case KEY_DSA_CERT:
case KEY_ECDSA:
case KEY_ECDSA_CERT:
+ case KEY_ECDSA_SK:
+ case KEY_ECDSA_SK_CERT:
#endif
case KEY_ED25519:
case KEY_ED25519_CERT:
+ case KEY_ED25519_SK:
+ case KEY_ED25519_SK_CERT:
case KEY_XMSS:
case KEY_XMSS_CERT:
type = constrained ?
SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_ID_CONSTRAINED :
SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_IDENTITY;
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, type)) != 0 ||
(r = sshkey_private_serialize_maxsign(key, msg, maxsign,
NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, comment)) != 0)
goto out;
break;
default:
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
goto out;
}
if (constrained &&
- (r = encode_constraints(msg, life, confirm, maxsign)) != 0)
+ (r = encode_constraints(msg, life, confirm, maxsign,
+ provider)) != 0)
goto out;
if ((r = ssh_request_reply(sock, msg, msg)) != 0)
goto out;
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(msg, &type)) != 0)
goto out;
r = decode_reply(type);
out:
sshbuf_free(msg);
return r;
}
/*
* Removes an identity from the authentication server.
* This call is intended only for use by ssh-add(1) and like applications.
*/
int
ssh_remove_identity(int sock, struct sshkey *key)
{
struct sshbuf *msg;
int r;
u_char type, *blob = NULL;
size_t blen;
if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
if (key->type != KEY_UNSPEC) {
if ((r = sshkey_to_blob(key, &blob, &blen)) != 0)
goto out;
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg,
SSH2_AGENTC_REMOVE_IDENTITY)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_string(msg, blob, blen)) != 0)
goto out;
} else {
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
goto out;
}
if ((r = ssh_request_reply(sock, msg, msg)) != 0)
goto out;
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(msg, &type)) != 0)
goto out;
r = decode_reply(type);
out:
if (blob != NULL) {
explicit_bzero(blob, blen);
free(blob);
}
sshbuf_free(msg);
return r;
}
/*
* Add/remove an token-based identity from the authentication server.
* This call is intended only for use by ssh-add(1) and like applications.
*/
int
ssh_update_card(int sock, int add, const char *reader_id, const char *pin,
u_int life, u_int confirm)
{
struct sshbuf *msg;
int r, constrained = (life || confirm);
u_char type;
if (add) {
type = constrained ?
SSH_AGENTC_ADD_SMARTCARD_KEY_CONSTRAINED :
SSH_AGENTC_ADD_SMARTCARD_KEY;
} else
type = SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_SMARTCARD_KEY;
if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, type)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, reader_id)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, pin)) != 0)
goto out;
if (constrained &&
- (r = encode_constraints(msg, life, confirm, 0)) != 0)
+ (r = encode_constraints(msg, life, confirm, 0, NULL)) != 0)
goto out;
if ((r = ssh_request_reply(sock, msg, msg)) != 0)
goto out;
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(msg, &type)) != 0)
goto out;
r = decode_reply(type);
out:
sshbuf_free(msg);
return r;
}
/*
* Removes all identities from the agent.
* This call is intended only for use by ssh-add(1) and like applications.
*
* This supports the SSH protocol 1 message to because, when clearing all
* keys from an agent, we generally want to clear both protocol v1 and v2
* keys.
*/
int
ssh_remove_all_identities(int sock, int version)
{
struct sshbuf *msg;
u_char type = (version == 1) ?
SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_ALL_RSA_IDENTITIES :
SSH2_AGENTC_REMOVE_ALL_IDENTITIES;
int r;
if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, type)) != 0)
goto out;
if ((r = ssh_request_reply(sock, msg, msg)) != 0)
goto out;
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(msg, &type)) != 0)
goto out;
r = decode_reply(type);
out:
sshbuf_free(msg);
return r;
}
diff --git a/authfd.h b/authfd.h
index 57907650480f..c3bf6259aa9d 100644
--- a/authfd.h
+++ b/authfd.h
@@ -1,91 +1,94 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: authfd.h,v 1.46 2019/09/03 08:29:15 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: authfd.h,v 1.48 2019/12/21 02:19:13 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
* All rights reserved
* Functions to interface with the SSH_AUTHENTICATION_FD socket.
*
* As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
* can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
* software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
* incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
* called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
*/
#ifndef AUTHFD_H
#define AUTHFD_H
/* List of identities returned by ssh_fetch_identitylist() */
struct ssh_identitylist {
size_t nkeys;
struct sshkey **keys;
char **comments;
};
int ssh_get_authentication_socket(int *fdp);
+int ssh_get_authentication_socket_path(const char *authsocket, int *fdp);
void ssh_close_authentication_socket(int sock);
int ssh_lock_agent(int sock, int lock, const char *password);
int ssh_fetch_identitylist(int sock, struct ssh_identitylist **idlp);
void ssh_free_identitylist(struct ssh_identitylist *idl);
int ssh_add_identity_constrained(int sock, struct sshkey *key,
- const char *comment, u_int life, u_int confirm, u_int maxsign);
+ const char *comment, u_int life, u_int confirm, u_int maxsign,
+ const char *provider);
int ssh_agent_has_key(int sock, struct sshkey *key);
int ssh_remove_identity(int sock, struct sshkey *key);
int ssh_update_card(int sock, int add, const char *reader_id,
const char *pin, u_int life, u_int confirm);
int ssh_remove_all_identities(int sock, int version);
int ssh_agent_sign(int sock, const struct sshkey *key,
u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
const u_char *data, size_t datalen, const char *alg, u_int compat);
/* Messages for the authentication agent connection. */
#define SSH_AGENTC_REQUEST_RSA_IDENTITIES 1
#define SSH_AGENT_RSA_IDENTITIES_ANSWER 2
#define SSH_AGENTC_RSA_CHALLENGE 3
#define SSH_AGENT_RSA_RESPONSE 4
#define SSH_AGENT_FAILURE 5
#define SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS 6
#define SSH_AGENTC_ADD_RSA_IDENTITY 7
#define SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_RSA_IDENTITY 8
#define SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_ALL_RSA_IDENTITIES 9
/* private OpenSSH extensions for SSH2 */
#define SSH2_AGENTC_REQUEST_IDENTITIES 11
#define SSH2_AGENT_IDENTITIES_ANSWER 12
#define SSH2_AGENTC_SIGN_REQUEST 13
#define SSH2_AGENT_SIGN_RESPONSE 14
#define SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_IDENTITY 17
#define SSH2_AGENTC_REMOVE_IDENTITY 18
#define SSH2_AGENTC_REMOVE_ALL_IDENTITIES 19
/* smartcard */
#define SSH_AGENTC_ADD_SMARTCARD_KEY 20
#define SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_SMARTCARD_KEY 21
/* lock/unlock the agent */
#define SSH_AGENTC_LOCK 22
#define SSH_AGENTC_UNLOCK 23
/* add key with constraints */
#define SSH_AGENTC_ADD_RSA_ID_CONSTRAINED 24
#define SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_ID_CONSTRAINED 25
#define SSH_AGENTC_ADD_SMARTCARD_KEY_CONSTRAINED 26
#define SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_LIFETIME 1
#define SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_CONFIRM 2
#define SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_MAXSIGN 3
+#define SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_EXTENSION 255
/* extended failure messages */
#define SSH2_AGENT_FAILURE 30
/* additional error code for ssh.com's ssh-agent2 */
#define SSH_COM_AGENT2_FAILURE 102
#define SSH_AGENT_OLD_SIGNATURE 0x01
#define SSH_AGENT_RSA_SHA2_256 0x02
#define SSH_AGENT_RSA_SHA2_512 0x04
#endif /* AUTHFD_H */
diff --git a/authfile.c b/authfile.c
index 37341189cbea..20b66d9bd5d4 100644
--- a/authfile.c
+++ b/authfile.c
@@ -1,552 +1,524 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: authfile.c,v 1.135 2019/09/03 08:30:47 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: authfile.c,v 1.137 2020/01/25 23:02:13 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000, 2013 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <sys/uio.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <limits.h>
#include "cipher.h"
#include "ssh.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "authfile.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "atomicio.h"
#include "sshkey.h"
#include "sshbuf.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
#include "krl.h"
#define MAX_KEY_FILE_SIZE (1024 * 1024)
/* Save a key blob to a file */
static int
sshkey_save_private_blob(struct sshbuf *keybuf, const char *filename)
{
- int fd, oerrno;
+ int r;
+ mode_t omask;
- if ((fd = open(filename, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC, 0600)) == -1)
- return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
- if (atomicio(vwrite, fd, sshbuf_mutable_ptr(keybuf),
- sshbuf_len(keybuf)) != sshbuf_len(keybuf)) {
- oerrno = errno;
- close(fd);
- unlink(filename);
- errno = oerrno;
- return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
- }
- close(fd);
- return 0;
+ omask = umask(077);
+ r = sshbuf_write_file(filename, keybuf);
+ umask(omask);
+ return r;
}
int
sshkey_save_private(struct sshkey *key, const char *filename,
const char *passphrase, const char *comment,
int format, const char *openssh_format_cipher, int openssh_format_rounds)
{
struct sshbuf *keyblob = NULL;
int r;
if ((keyblob = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
if ((r = sshkey_private_to_fileblob(key, keyblob, passphrase, comment,
format, openssh_format_cipher, openssh_format_rounds)) != 0)
goto out;
if ((r = sshkey_save_private_blob(keyblob, filename)) != 0)
goto out;
r = 0;
out:
sshbuf_free(keyblob);
return r;
}
-/* Load a key from a fd into a buffer */
-int
-sshkey_load_file(int fd, struct sshbuf *blob)
-{
- u_char buf[1024];
- size_t len;
- struct stat st;
- int r;
-
- if (fstat(fd, &st) == -1)
- return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
- if ((st.st_mode & (S_IFSOCK|S_IFCHR|S_IFIFO)) == 0 &&
- st.st_size > MAX_KEY_FILE_SIZE)
- return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
- for (;;) {
- if ((len = atomicio(read, fd, buf, sizeof(buf))) == 0) {
- if (errno == EPIPE)
- break;
- r = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
- goto out;
- }
- if ((r = sshbuf_put(blob, buf, len)) != 0)
- goto out;
- if (sshbuf_len(blob) > MAX_KEY_FILE_SIZE) {
- r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
- goto out;
- }
- }
- if ((st.st_mode & (S_IFSOCK|S_IFCHR|S_IFIFO)) == 0 &&
- st.st_size != (off_t)sshbuf_len(blob)) {
- r = SSH_ERR_FILE_CHANGED;
- goto out;
- }
- r = 0;
-
- out:
- explicit_bzero(buf, sizeof(buf));
- if (r != 0)
- sshbuf_reset(blob);
- return r;
-}
-
-
/* XXX remove error() calls from here? */
int
sshkey_perm_ok(int fd, const char *filename)
{
struct stat st;
if (fstat(fd, &st) == -1)
return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
/*
* if a key owned by the user is accessed, then we check the
* permissions of the file. if the key owned by a different user,
* then we don't care.
*/
#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN
if (check_ntsec(filename))
#endif
if ((st.st_uid == getuid()) && (st.st_mode & 077) != 0) {
error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@");
error("@ WARNING: UNPROTECTED PRIVATE KEY FILE! @");
error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@");
error("Permissions 0%3.3o for '%s' are too open.",
(u_int)st.st_mode & 0777, filename);
error("It is required that your private key files are NOT accessible by others.");
error("This private key will be ignored.");
return SSH_ERR_KEY_BAD_PERMISSIONS;
}
return 0;
}
int
sshkey_load_private_type(int type, const char *filename, const char *passphrase,
struct sshkey **keyp, char **commentp)
{
int fd, r;
if (keyp != NULL)
*keyp = NULL;
if (commentp != NULL)
*commentp = NULL;
if ((fd = open(filename, O_RDONLY)) == -1)
return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
r = sshkey_perm_ok(fd, filename);
if (r != 0)
goto out;
r = sshkey_load_private_type_fd(fd, type, passphrase, keyp, commentp);
if (r == 0 && keyp && *keyp)
r = sshkey_set_filename(*keyp, filename);
out:
close(fd);
return r;
}
int
sshkey_load_private_type_fd(int fd, int type, const char *passphrase,
struct sshkey **keyp, char **commentp)
{
struct sshbuf *buffer = NULL;
int r;
if (keyp != NULL)
*keyp = NULL;
- if ((buffer = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
- r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
- goto out;
- }
- if ((r = sshkey_load_file(fd, buffer)) != 0 ||
+ if ((r = sshbuf_load_fd(fd, &buffer)) != 0 ||
(r = sshkey_parse_private_fileblob_type(buffer, type,
passphrase, keyp, commentp)) != 0)
goto out;
/* success */
r = 0;
out:
sshbuf_free(buffer);
return r;
}
/* XXX this is almost identical to sshkey_load_private_type() */
int
sshkey_load_private(const char *filename, const char *passphrase,
struct sshkey **keyp, char **commentp)
{
struct sshbuf *buffer = NULL;
int r, fd;
if (keyp != NULL)
*keyp = NULL;
if (commentp != NULL)
*commentp = NULL;
if ((fd = open(filename, O_RDONLY)) == -1)
return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
if (sshkey_perm_ok(fd, filename) != 0) {
r = SSH_ERR_KEY_BAD_PERMISSIONS;
goto out;
}
-
- if ((buffer = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
- r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
- goto out;
- }
- if ((r = sshkey_load_file(fd, buffer)) != 0 ||
+ if ((r = sshbuf_load_fd(fd, &buffer)) != 0 ||
(r = sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buffer, passphrase, keyp,
commentp)) != 0)
goto out;
if (keyp && *keyp &&
(r = sshkey_set_filename(*keyp, filename)) != 0)
goto out;
r = 0;
out:
close(fd);
sshbuf_free(buffer);
return r;
}
static int
sshkey_try_load_public(struct sshkey *k, const char *filename, char **commentp)
{
FILE *f;
char *line = NULL, *cp;
size_t linesize = 0;
int r;
if (commentp != NULL)
*commentp = NULL;
if ((f = fopen(filename, "r")) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
while (getline(&line, &linesize, f) != -1) {
cp = line;
switch (*cp) {
case '#':
case '\n':
case '\0':
continue;
}
/* Abort loading if this looks like a private key */
if (strncmp(cp, "-----BEGIN", 10) == 0 ||
strcmp(cp, "SSH PRIVATE KEY FILE") == 0)
break;
/* Skip leading whitespace. */
for (; *cp && (*cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'); cp++)
;
if (*cp) {
if ((r = sshkey_read(k, &cp)) == 0) {
cp[strcspn(cp, "\r\n")] = '\0';
if (commentp) {
*commentp = strdup(*cp ?
cp : filename);
if (*commentp == NULL)
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
}
free(line);
fclose(f);
return r;
}
}
}
free(line);
fclose(f);
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
}
/* load public key from any pubkey file */
int
sshkey_load_public(const char *filename, struct sshkey **keyp, char **commentp)
{
struct sshkey *pub = NULL;
char *file = NULL;
int r;
if (keyp != NULL)
*keyp = NULL;
if (commentp != NULL)
*commentp = NULL;
if ((pub = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
if ((r = sshkey_try_load_public(pub, filename, commentp)) == 0) {
if (keyp != NULL) {
*keyp = pub;
pub = NULL;
}
r = 0;
goto out;
}
sshkey_free(pub);
/* try .pub suffix */
if (asprintf(&file, "%s.pub", filename) == -1)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
if ((pub = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
if ((r = sshkey_try_load_public(pub, file, commentp)) == 0) {
if (keyp != NULL) {
*keyp = pub;
pub = NULL;
}
r = 0;
}
out:
free(file);
sshkey_free(pub);
return r;
}
/* Load the certificate associated with the named private key */
int
sshkey_load_cert(const char *filename, struct sshkey **keyp)
{
struct sshkey *pub = NULL;
char *file = NULL;
int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
if (keyp != NULL)
*keyp = NULL;
if (asprintf(&file, "%s-cert.pub", filename) == -1)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
if ((pub = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL) {
goto out;
}
if ((r = sshkey_try_load_public(pub, file, NULL)) != 0)
goto out;
/* success */
if (keyp != NULL) {
*keyp = pub;
pub = NULL;
}
r = 0;
out:
free(file);
sshkey_free(pub);
return r;
}
/* Load private key and certificate */
int
sshkey_load_private_cert(int type, const char *filename, const char *passphrase,
struct sshkey **keyp)
{
struct sshkey *key = NULL, *cert = NULL;
int r;
if (keyp != NULL)
*keyp = NULL;
switch (type) {
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
case KEY_RSA:
case KEY_DSA:
case KEY_ECDSA:
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
case KEY_ED25519:
case KEY_XMSS:
case KEY_UNSPEC:
break;
default:
return SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN;
}
if ((r = sshkey_load_private_type(type, filename,
passphrase, &key, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshkey_load_cert(filename, &cert)) != 0)
goto out;
/* Make sure the private key matches the certificate */
if (sshkey_equal_public(key, cert) == 0) {
r = SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_MISMATCH;
goto out;
}
if ((r = sshkey_to_certified(key)) != 0 ||
(r = sshkey_cert_copy(cert, key)) != 0)
goto out;
r = 0;
if (keyp != NULL) {
*keyp = key;
key = NULL;
}
out:
sshkey_free(key);
sshkey_free(cert);
return r;
}
/*
* Returns success if the specified "key" is listed in the file "filename",
* SSH_ERR_KEY_NOT_FOUND: if the key is not listed or another error.
* If "strict_type" is set then the key type must match exactly,
* otherwise a comparison that ignores certficiate data is performed.
* If "check_ca" is set and "key" is a certificate, then its CA key is
* also checked and sshkey_in_file() will return success if either is found.
*/
int
sshkey_in_file(struct sshkey *key, const char *filename, int strict_type,
int check_ca)
{
FILE *f;
char *line = NULL, *cp;
size_t linesize = 0;
int r = 0;
struct sshkey *pub = NULL;
int (*sshkey_compare)(const struct sshkey *, const struct sshkey *) =
strict_type ? sshkey_equal : sshkey_equal_public;
if ((f = fopen(filename, "r")) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
while (getline(&line, &linesize, f) != -1) {
sshkey_free(pub);
pub = NULL;
cp = line;
/* Skip leading whitespace. */
for (; *cp && (*cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'); cp++)
;
/* Skip comments and empty lines */
switch (*cp) {
case '#':
case '\n':
case '\0':
continue;
}
if ((pub = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
switch (r = sshkey_read(pub, &cp)) {
case 0:
break;
case SSH_ERR_KEY_LENGTH:
continue;
default:
goto out;
}
if (sshkey_compare(key, pub) ||
(check_ca && sshkey_is_cert(key) &&
sshkey_compare(key->cert->signature_key, pub))) {
r = 0;
goto out;
}
}
r = SSH_ERR_KEY_NOT_FOUND;
out:
free(line);
sshkey_free(pub);
fclose(f);
return r;
}
/*
* Checks whether the specified key is revoked, returning 0 if not,
* SSH_ERR_KEY_REVOKED if it is or another error code if something
* unexpected happened.
* This will check both the key and, if it is a certificate, its CA key too.
* "revoked_keys_file" may be a KRL or a one-per-line list of public keys.
*/
int
sshkey_check_revoked(struct sshkey *key, const char *revoked_keys_file)
{
int r;
r = ssh_krl_file_contains_key(revoked_keys_file, key);
/* If this was not a KRL to begin with then continue below */
if (r != SSH_ERR_KRL_BAD_MAGIC)
return r;
/*
* If the file is not a KRL or we can't handle KRLs then attempt to
* parse the file as a flat list of keys.
*/
switch ((r = sshkey_in_file(key, revoked_keys_file, 0, 1))) {
case 0:
/* Key found => revoked */
return SSH_ERR_KEY_REVOKED;
case SSH_ERR_KEY_NOT_FOUND:
/* Key not found => not revoked */
return 0;
default:
/* Some other error occurred */
return r;
}
}
/*
* Advanced *cpp past the end of key options, defined as the first unquoted
* whitespace character. Returns 0 on success or -1 on failure (e.g.
* unterminated quotes).
*/
int
sshkey_advance_past_options(char **cpp)
{
char *cp = *cpp;
int quoted = 0;
for (; *cp && (quoted || (*cp != ' ' && *cp != '\t')); cp++) {
if (*cp == '\\' && cp[1] == '"')
cp++; /* Skip both */
else if (*cp == '"')
quoted = !quoted;
}
*cpp = cp;
/* return failure for unterminated quotes */
return (*cp == '\0' && quoted) ? -1 : 0;
}
+/* Save a public key */
+int
+sshkey_save_public(const struct sshkey *key, const char *path,
+ const char *comment)
+{
+ int fd, oerrno;
+ FILE *f = NULL;
+ int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+
+ if ((fd = open(path, O_WRONLY|O_CREAT|O_TRUNC, 0644)) == -1)
+ return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
+ if ((f = fdopen(fd, "w")) == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ if ((r = sshkey_write(key, f)) != 0)
+ goto fail;
+ fprintf(f, " %s\n", comment);
+ if (ferror(f) || fclose(f) != 0) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
+ fail:
+ oerrno = errno;
+ if (f != NULL)
+ fclose(f);
+ else
+ close(fd);
+ errno = oerrno;
+ return r;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
diff --git a/authfile.h b/authfile.h
index 9c8a95a016c8..1db067a813a1 100644
--- a/authfile.h
+++ b/authfile.h
@@ -1,53 +1,54 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: authfile.h,v 1.23 2019/09/03 08:30:47 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: authfile.h,v 1.25 2020/01/25 23:02:13 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000, 2013 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#ifndef AUTHFILE_H
#define AUTHFILE_H
struct sshbuf;
struct sshkey;
/* XXX document these */
/* XXX some of these could probably be merged/retired */
int sshkey_save_private(struct sshkey *, const char *,
const char *, const char *, int, const char *, int);
-int sshkey_load_file(int, struct sshbuf *);
int sshkey_load_cert(const char *, struct sshkey **);
int sshkey_load_public(const char *, struct sshkey **, char **);
int sshkey_load_private(const char *, const char *, struct sshkey **, char **);
int sshkey_load_private_cert(int, const char *, const char *,
struct sshkey **);
int sshkey_load_private_type(int, const char *, const char *,
struct sshkey **, char **);
int sshkey_load_private_type_fd(int fd, int type, const char *passphrase,
struct sshkey **keyp, char **commentp);
int sshkey_perm_ok(int, const char *);
int sshkey_in_file(struct sshkey *, const char *, int, int);
int sshkey_check_revoked(struct sshkey *key, const char *revoked_keys_file);
int sshkey_advance_past_options(char **cpp);
+int sshkey_save_public(const struct sshkey *key, const char *path,
+ const char *comment);
#endif
diff --git a/channels.c b/channels.c
index 0f45aee4eb5f..226ba7a39123 100644
--- a/channels.c
+++ b/channels.c
@@ -1,4922 +1,4927 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: channels.c,v 1.394 2019/07/07 01:05:00 dtucker Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: channels.c,v 1.395 2020/01/25 06:40:20 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
* All rights reserved
* This file contains functions for generic socket connection forwarding.
* There is also code for initiating connection forwarding for X11 connections,
* arbitrary tcp/ip connections, and the authentication agent connection.
*
* As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
* can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
* software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
* incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
* called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
*
* SSH2 support added by Markus Friedl.
* Copyright (c) 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (c) 1999 Dug Song. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (c) 1999 Theo de Raadt. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <sys/ioctl.h>
#include <sys/un.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
# include <sys/time.h>
#endif
#include <netinet/in.h>
#include <arpa/inet.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <limits.h>
#include <netdb.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
# include <stdint.h>
#endif
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <termios.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "ssh.h"
#include "ssh2.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
#include "sshbuf.h"
#include "packet.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "channels.h"
#include "compat.h"
#include "canohost.h"
#include "sshkey.h"
#include "authfd.h"
#include "pathnames.h"
#include "match.h"
/* -- agent forwarding */
#define NUM_SOCKS 10
/* -- tcp forwarding */
/* special-case port number meaning allow any port */
#define FWD_PERMIT_ANY_PORT 0
/* special-case wildcard meaning allow any host */
#define FWD_PERMIT_ANY_HOST "*"
/* -- X11 forwarding */
/* Maximum number of fake X11 displays to try. */
#define MAX_DISPLAYS 1000
/* Per-channel callback for pre/post select() actions */
typedef void chan_fn(struct ssh *, Channel *c,
fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset);
/*
* Data structure for storing which hosts are permitted for forward requests.
* The local sides of any remote forwards are stored in this array to prevent
* a corrupt remote server from accessing arbitrary TCP/IP ports on our local
* network (which might be behind a firewall).
*/
/* XXX: streamlocal wants a path instead of host:port */
/* Overload host_to_connect; we could just make this match Forward */
/* XXX - can we use listen_host instead of listen_path? */
struct permission {
char *host_to_connect; /* Connect to 'host'. */
int port_to_connect; /* Connect to 'port'. */
char *listen_host; /* Remote side should listen address. */
char *listen_path; /* Remote side should listen path. */
int listen_port; /* Remote side should listen port. */
Channel *downstream; /* Downstream mux*/
};
/*
* Stores the forwarding permission state for a single direction (local or
* remote).
*/
struct permission_set {
/*
* List of all local permitted host/port pairs to allow for the
* user.
*/
u_int num_permitted_user;
struct permission *permitted_user;
/*
* List of all permitted host/port pairs to allow for the admin.
*/
u_int num_permitted_admin;
struct permission *permitted_admin;
/*
* If this is true, all opens/listens are permitted. This is the
* case on the server on which we have to trust the client anyway,
* and the user could do anything after logging in.
*/
int all_permitted;
};
/* Master structure for channels state */
struct ssh_channels {
/*
* Pointer to an array containing all allocated channels. The array
* is dynamically extended as needed.
*/
Channel **channels;
/*
* Size of the channel array. All slots of the array must always be
* initialized (at least the type field); unused slots set to NULL
*/
u_int channels_alloc;
/*
* Maximum file descriptor value used in any of the channels. This is
* updated in channel_new.
*/
int channel_max_fd;
/*
* 'channel_pre*' are called just before select() to add any bits
* relevant to channels in the select bitmasks.
*
* 'channel_post*': perform any appropriate operations for
* channels which have events pending.
*/
chan_fn **channel_pre;
chan_fn **channel_post;
/* -- tcp forwarding */
struct permission_set local_perms;
struct permission_set remote_perms;
/* -- X11 forwarding */
/* Saved X11 local (client) display. */
char *x11_saved_display;
/* Saved X11 authentication protocol name. */
char *x11_saved_proto;
/* Saved X11 authentication data. This is the real data. */
char *x11_saved_data;
u_int x11_saved_data_len;
/* Deadline after which all X11 connections are refused */
u_int x11_refuse_time;
/*
* Fake X11 authentication data. This is what the server will be
* sending us; we should replace any occurrences of this by the
* real data.
*/
u_char *x11_fake_data;
u_int x11_fake_data_len;
/* AF_UNSPEC or AF_INET or AF_INET6 */
int IPv4or6;
};
/* helper */
static void port_open_helper(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c, char *rtype);
static const char *channel_rfwd_bind_host(const char *listen_host);
/* non-blocking connect helpers */
static int connect_next(struct channel_connect *);
static void channel_connect_ctx_free(struct channel_connect *);
static Channel *rdynamic_connect_prepare(struct ssh *, char *, char *);
static int rdynamic_connect_finish(struct ssh *, Channel *);
/* Setup helper */
static void channel_handler_init(struct ssh_channels *sc);
/* -- channel core */
void
channel_init_channels(struct ssh *ssh)
{
struct ssh_channels *sc;
if ((sc = calloc(1, sizeof(*sc))) == NULL)
fatal("%s: allocation failed", __func__);
sc->channels_alloc = 10;
sc->channels = xcalloc(sc->channels_alloc, sizeof(*sc->channels));
sc->IPv4or6 = AF_UNSPEC;
channel_handler_init(sc);
ssh->chanctxt = sc;
}
Channel *
channel_by_id(struct ssh *ssh, int id)
{
Channel *c;
if (id < 0 || (u_int)id >= ssh->chanctxt->channels_alloc) {
logit("%s: %d: bad id", __func__, id);
return NULL;
}
c = ssh->chanctxt->channels[id];
if (c == NULL) {
logit("%s: %d: bad id: channel free", __func__, id);
return NULL;
}
return c;
}
Channel *
channel_by_remote_id(struct ssh *ssh, u_int remote_id)
{
Channel *c;
u_int i;
for (i = 0; i < ssh->chanctxt->channels_alloc; i++) {
c = ssh->chanctxt->channels[i];
if (c != NULL && c->have_remote_id && c->remote_id == remote_id)
return c;
}
return NULL;
}
/*
* Returns the channel if it is allowed to receive protocol messages.
* Private channels, like listening sockets, may not receive messages.
*/
Channel *
channel_lookup(struct ssh *ssh, int id)
{
Channel *c;
if ((c = channel_by_id(ssh, id)) == NULL)
return NULL;
switch (c->type) {
case SSH_CHANNEL_X11_OPEN:
case SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL:
case SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING:
case SSH_CHANNEL_DYNAMIC:
case SSH_CHANNEL_RDYNAMIC_OPEN:
case SSH_CHANNEL_RDYNAMIC_FINISH:
case SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING:
case SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN:
case SSH_CHANNEL_ABANDONED:
case SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_PROXY:
return c;
}
logit("Non-public channel %d, type %d.", id, c->type);
return NULL;
}
/*
* Register filedescriptors for a channel, used when allocating a channel or
* when the channel consumer/producer is ready, e.g. shell exec'd
*/
static void
channel_register_fds(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c, int rfd, int wfd, int efd,
int extusage, int nonblock, int is_tty)
{
struct ssh_channels *sc = ssh->chanctxt;
/* Update the maximum file descriptor value. */
sc->channel_max_fd = MAXIMUM(sc->channel_max_fd, rfd);
sc->channel_max_fd = MAXIMUM(sc->channel_max_fd, wfd);
sc->channel_max_fd = MAXIMUM(sc->channel_max_fd, efd);
if (rfd != -1)
fcntl(rfd, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC);
if (wfd != -1 && wfd != rfd)
fcntl(wfd, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC);
if (efd != -1 && efd != rfd && efd != wfd)
fcntl(efd, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC);
c->rfd = rfd;
c->wfd = wfd;
c->sock = (rfd == wfd) ? rfd : -1;
c->efd = efd;
c->extended_usage = extusage;
if ((c->isatty = is_tty) != 0)
debug2("channel %d: rfd %d isatty", c->self, c->rfd);
#ifdef _AIX
/* XXX: Later AIX versions can't push as much data to tty */
c->wfd_isatty = is_tty || isatty(c->wfd);
#endif
/* enable nonblocking mode */
if (nonblock) {
if (rfd != -1)
set_nonblock(rfd);
if (wfd != -1)
set_nonblock(wfd);
if (efd != -1)
set_nonblock(efd);
}
}
/*
* Allocate a new channel object and set its type and socket. This will cause
* remote_name to be freed.
*/
Channel *
channel_new(struct ssh *ssh, char *ctype, int type, int rfd, int wfd, int efd,
u_int window, u_int maxpack, int extusage, char *remote_name, int nonblock)
{
struct ssh_channels *sc = ssh->chanctxt;
u_int i, found;
Channel *c;
/* Try to find a free slot where to put the new channel. */
for (i = 0; i < sc->channels_alloc; i++) {
if (sc->channels[i] == NULL) {
/* Found a free slot. */
found = i;
break;
}
}
if (i >= sc->channels_alloc) {
/*
* There are no free slots. Take last+1 slot and expand
* the array.
*/
found = sc->channels_alloc;
if (sc->channels_alloc > CHANNELS_MAX_CHANNELS)
fatal("%s: internal error: channels_alloc %d too big",
__func__, sc->channels_alloc);
sc->channels = xrecallocarray(sc->channels, sc->channels_alloc,
sc->channels_alloc + 10, sizeof(*sc->channels));
sc->channels_alloc += 10;
debug2("channel: expanding %d", sc->channels_alloc);
}
/* Initialize and return new channel. */
c = sc->channels[found] = xcalloc(1, sizeof(Channel));
if ((c->input = sshbuf_new()) == NULL ||
(c->output = sshbuf_new()) == NULL ||
(c->extended = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
c->ostate = CHAN_OUTPUT_OPEN;
c->istate = CHAN_INPUT_OPEN;
channel_register_fds(ssh, c, rfd, wfd, efd, extusage, nonblock, 0);
c->self = found;
c->type = type;
c->ctype = ctype;
c->local_window = window;
c->local_window_max = window;
c->local_maxpacket = maxpack;
c->remote_name = xstrdup(remote_name);
c->ctl_chan = -1;
c->delayed = 1; /* prevent call to channel_post handler */
TAILQ_INIT(&c->status_confirms);
debug("channel %d: new [%s]", found, remote_name);
return c;
}
static void
channel_find_maxfd(struct ssh_channels *sc)
{
u_int i;
int max = 0;
Channel *c;
for (i = 0; i < sc->channels_alloc; i++) {
c = sc->channels[i];
if (c != NULL) {
max = MAXIMUM(max, c->rfd);
max = MAXIMUM(max, c->wfd);
max = MAXIMUM(max, c->efd);
}
}
sc->channel_max_fd = max;
}
int
channel_close_fd(struct ssh *ssh, int *fdp)
{
struct ssh_channels *sc = ssh->chanctxt;
int ret = 0, fd = *fdp;
if (fd != -1) {
ret = close(fd);
*fdp = -1;
if (fd == sc->channel_max_fd)
channel_find_maxfd(sc);
}
return ret;
}
/* Close all channel fd/socket. */
static void
channel_close_fds(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c)
{
int sock = c->sock, rfd = c->rfd, wfd = c->wfd, efd = c->efd;
channel_close_fd(ssh, &c->sock);
if (rfd != sock)
channel_close_fd(ssh, &c->rfd);
if (wfd != sock && wfd != rfd)
channel_close_fd(ssh, &c->wfd);
if (efd != sock && efd != rfd && efd != wfd)
channel_close_fd(ssh, &c->efd);
}
static void
fwd_perm_clear(struct permission *perm)
{
free(perm->host_to_connect);
free(perm->listen_host);
free(perm->listen_path);
bzero(perm, sizeof(*perm));
}
/* Returns an printable name for the specified forwarding permission list */
static const char *
fwd_ident(int who, int where)
{
if (who == FORWARD_ADM) {
if (where == FORWARD_LOCAL)
return "admin local";
else if (where == FORWARD_REMOTE)
return "admin remote";
} else if (who == FORWARD_USER) {
if (where == FORWARD_LOCAL)
return "user local";
else if (where == FORWARD_REMOTE)
return "user remote";
}
fatal("Unknown forward permission list %d/%d", who, where);
}
/* Returns the forwarding permission list for the specified direction */
static struct permission_set *
permission_set_get(struct ssh *ssh, int where)
{
struct ssh_channels *sc = ssh->chanctxt;
switch (where) {
case FORWARD_LOCAL:
return &sc->local_perms;
break;
case FORWARD_REMOTE:
return &sc->remote_perms;
break;
default:
fatal("%s: invalid forwarding direction %d", __func__, where);
}
}
/* Returns pointers to the specified forwarding list and its element count */
static void
permission_set_get_array(struct ssh *ssh, int who, int where,
struct permission ***permpp, u_int **npermpp)
{
struct permission_set *pset = permission_set_get(ssh, where);
switch (who) {
case FORWARD_USER:
*permpp = &pset->permitted_user;
*npermpp = &pset->num_permitted_user;
break;
case FORWARD_ADM:
*permpp = &pset->permitted_admin;
*npermpp = &pset->num_permitted_admin;
break;
default:
fatal("%s: invalid forwarding client %d", __func__, who);
}
}
/* Adds an entry to the spcified forwarding list */
static int
permission_set_add(struct ssh *ssh, int who, int where,
const char *host_to_connect, int port_to_connect,
const char *listen_host, const char *listen_path, int listen_port,
Channel *downstream)
{
struct permission **permp;
u_int n, *npermp;
permission_set_get_array(ssh, who, where, &permp, &npermp);
if (*npermp >= INT_MAX)
fatal("%s: %s overflow", __func__, fwd_ident(who, where));
*permp = xrecallocarray(*permp, *npermp, *npermp + 1, sizeof(**permp));
n = (*npermp)++;
#define MAYBE_DUP(s) ((s == NULL) ? NULL : xstrdup(s))
(*permp)[n].host_to_connect = MAYBE_DUP(host_to_connect);
(*permp)[n].port_to_connect = port_to_connect;
(*permp)[n].listen_host = MAYBE_DUP(listen_host);
(*permp)[n].listen_path = MAYBE_DUP(listen_path);
(*permp)[n].listen_port = listen_port;
(*permp)[n].downstream = downstream;
#undef MAYBE_DUP
return (int)n;
}
static void
mux_remove_remote_forwardings(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c)
{
struct ssh_channels *sc = ssh->chanctxt;
struct permission_set *pset = &sc->local_perms;
struct permission *perm;
int r;
u_int i;
for (i = 0; i < pset->num_permitted_user; i++) {
perm = &pset->permitted_user[i];
if (perm->downstream != c)
continue;
/* cancel on the server, since mux client is gone */
debug("channel %d: cleanup remote forward for %s:%u",
c->self, perm->listen_host, perm->listen_port);
if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh,
"cancel-tcpip-forward")) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, 0)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh,
channel_rfwd_bind_host(perm->listen_host))) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, perm->listen_port)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) {
fatal("%s: channel %i: %s", __func__,
c->self, ssh_err(r));
}
fwd_perm_clear(perm); /* unregister */
}
}
/* Free the channel and close its fd/socket. */
void
channel_free(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c)
{
struct ssh_channels *sc = ssh->chanctxt;
char *s;
u_int i, n;
Channel *other;
struct channel_confirm *cc;
for (n = 0, i = 0; i < sc->channels_alloc; i++) {
if ((other = sc->channels[i]) == NULL)
continue;
n++;
/* detach from mux client and prepare for closing */
if (c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_CLIENT &&
other->type == SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_PROXY &&
other->mux_ctx == c) {
other->mux_ctx = NULL;
other->type = SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN;
other->istate = CHAN_INPUT_CLOSED;
other->ostate = CHAN_OUTPUT_CLOSED;
}
}
debug("channel %d: free: %s, nchannels %u", c->self,
c->remote_name ? c->remote_name : "???", n);
if (c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_CLIENT)
mux_remove_remote_forwardings(ssh, c);
if (log_level_get() >= SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3) {
s = channel_open_message(ssh);
debug3("channel %d: status: %s", c->self, s);
free(s);
}
channel_close_fds(ssh, c);
sshbuf_free(c->input);
sshbuf_free(c->output);
sshbuf_free(c->extended);
c->input = c->output = c->extended = NULL;
free(c->remote_name);
c->remote_name = NULL;
free(c->path);
c->path = NULL;
free(c->listening_addr);
c->listening_addr = NULL;
while ((cc = TAILQ_FIRST(&c->status_confirms)) != NULL) {
if (cc->abandon_cb != NULL)
cc->abandon_cb(ssh, c, cc->ctx);
TAILQ_REMOVE(&c->status_confirms, cc, entry);
explicit_bzero(cc, sizeof(*cc));
free(cc);
}
if (c->filter_cleanup != NULL && c->filter_ctx != NULL)
c->filter_cleanup(ssh, c->self, c->filter_ctx);
sc->channels[c->self] = NULL;
explicit_bzero(c, sizeof(*c));
free(c);
}
void
channel_free_all(struct ssh *ssh)
{
u_int i;
struct ssh_channels *sc = ssh->chanctxt;
for (i = 0; i < sc->channels_alloc; i++)
if (sc->channels[i] != NULL)
channel_free(ssh, sc->channels[i]);
free(sc->channels);
sc->channels = NULL;
sc->channels_alloc = 0;
sc->channel_max_fd = 0;
free(sc->x11_saved_display);
sc->x11_saved_display = NULL;
free(sc->x11_saved_proto);
sc->x11_saved_proto = NULL;
free(sc->x11_saved_data);
sc->x11_saved_data = NULL;
sc->x11_saved_data_len = 0;
free(sc->x11_fake_data);
sc->x11_fake_data = NULL;
sc->x11_fake_data_len = 0;
}
/*
* Closes the sockets/fds of all channels. This is used to close extra file
* descriptors after a fork.
*/
void
channel_close_all(struct ssh *ssh)
{
u_int i;
for (i = 0; i < ssh->chanctxt->channels_alloc; i++)
if (ssh->chanctxt->channels[i] != NULL)
channel_close_fds(ssh, ssh->chanctxt->channels[i]);
}
/*
* Stop listening to channels.
*/
void
channel_stop_listening(struct ssh *ssh)
{
u_int i;
Channel *c;
for (i = 0; i < ssh->chanctxt->channels_alloc; i++) {
c = ssh->chanctxt->channels[i];
if (c != NULL) {
switch (c->type) {
case SSH_CHANNEL_AUTH_SOCKET:
case SSH_CHANNEL_PORT_LISTENER:
case SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER:
case SSH_CHANNEL_X11_LISTENER:
case SSH_CHANNEL_UNIX_LISTENER:
case SSH_CHANNEL_RUNIX_LISTENER:
channel_close_fd(ssh, &c->sock);
channel_free(ssh, c);
break;
}
}
}
}
/*
* Returns true if no channel has too much buffered data, and false if one or
* more channel is overfull.
*/
int
channel_not_very_much_buffered_data(struct ssh *ssh)
{
u_int i;
u_int maxsize = ssh_packet_get_maxsize(ssh);
Channel *c;
for (i = 0; i < ssh->chanctxt->channels_alloc; i++) {
c = ssh->chanctxt->channels[i];
if (c == NULL || c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN)
continue;
if (sshbuf_len(c->output) > maxsize) {
debug2("channel %d: big output buffer %zu > %u",
c->self, sshbuf_len(c->output), maxsize);
return 0;
}
}
return 1;
}
/* Returns true if any channel is still open. */
int
channel_still_open(struct ssh *ssh)
{
u_int i;
Channel *c;
for (i = 0; i < ssh->chanctxt->channels_alloc; i++) {
c = ssh->chanctxt->channels[i];
if (c == NULL)
continue;
switch (c->type) {
case SSH_CHANNEL_X11_LISTENER:
case SSH_CHANNEL_PORT_LISTENER:
case SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER:
case SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_LISTENER:
case SSH_CHANNEL_CLOSED:
case SSH_CHANNEL_AUTH_SOCKET:
case SSH_CHANNEL_DYNAMIC:
case SSH_CHANNEL_RDYNAMIC_OPEN:
case SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING:
case SSH_CHANNEL_ZOMBIE:
case SSH_CHANNEL_ABANDONED:
case SSH_CHANNEL_UNIX_LISTENER:
case SSH_CHANNEL_RUNIX_LISTENER:
continue;
case SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL:
continue;
case SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING:
case SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN:
case SSH_CHANNEL_RDYNAMIC_FINISH:
case SSH_CHANNEL_X11_OPEN:
case SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_CLIENT:
case SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_PROXY:
return 1;
default:
fatal("%s: bad channel type %d", __func__, c->type);
/* NOTREACHED */
}
}
return 0;
}
/* Returns the id of an open channel suitable for keepaliving */
int
channel_find_open(struct ssh *ssh)
{
u_int i;
Channel *c;
for (i = 0; i < ssh->chanctxt->channels_alloc; i++) {
c = ssh->chanctxt->channels[i];
if (c == NULL || !c->have_remote_id)
continue;
switch (c->type) {
case SSH_CHANNEL_CLOSED:
case SSH_CHANNEL_DYNAMIC:
case SSH_CHANNEL_RDYNAMIC_OPEN:
case SSH_CHANNEL_RDYNAMIC_FINISH:
case SSH_CHANNEL_X11_LISTENER:
case SSH_CHANNEL_PORT_LISTENER:
case SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER:
case SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_LISTENER:
case SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_CLIENT:
case SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_PROXY:
case SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING:
case SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING:
case SSH_CHANNEL_ZOMBIE:
case SSH_CHANNEL_ABANDONED:
case SSH_CHANNEL_UNIX_LISTENER:
case SSH_CHANNEL_RUNIX_LISTENER:
continue;
case SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL:
case SSH_CHANNEL_AUTH_SOCKET:
case SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN:
case SSH_CHANNEL_X11_OPEN:
return i;
default:
fatal("%s: bad channel type %d", __func__, c->type);
/* NOTREACHED */
}
}
return -1;
}
/* Returns the state of the channel's extended usage flag */
const char *
channel_format_extended_usage(const Channel *c)
{
if (c->efd == -1)
return "closed";
switch (c->extended_usage) {
case CHAN_EXTENDED_WRITE:
return "write";
case CHAN_EXTENDED_READ:
return "read";
case CHAN_EXTENDED_IGNORE:
return "ignore";
default:
return "UNKNOWN";
}
}
static char *
channel_format_status(const Channel *c)
{
char *ret = NULL;
xasprintf(&ret, "t%d %s%u i%u/%zu o%u/%zu e[%s]/%zu "
"fd %d/%d/%d sock %d cc %d",
c->type,
c->have_remote_id ? "r" : "nr", c->remote_id,
c->istate, sshbuf_len(c->input),
c->ostate, sshbuf_len(c->output),
channel_format_extended_usage(c), sshbuf_len(c->extended),
c->rfd, c->wfd, c->efd, c->sock, c->ctl_chan);
return ret;
}
/*
* Returns a message describing the currently open forwarded connections,
* suitable for sending to the client. The message contains crlf pairs for
* newlines.
*/
char *
channel_open_message(struct ssh *ssh)
{
struct sshbuf *buf;
Channel *c;
u_int i;
int r;
char *cp, *ret;
if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new", __func__);
if ((r = sshbuf_putf(buf,
"The following connections are open:\r\n")) != 0)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_putf: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
for (i = 0; i < ssh->chanctxt->channels_alloc; i++) {
c = ssh->chanctxt->channels[i];
if (c == NULL)
continue;
switch (c->type) {
case SSH_CHANNEL_X11_LISTENER:
case SSH_CHANNEL_PORT_LISTENER:
case SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER:
case SSH_CHANNEL_CLOSED:
case SSH_CHANNEL_AUTH_SOCKET:
case SSH_CHANNEL_ZOMBIE:
case SSH_CHANNEL_ABANDONED:
case SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_LISTENER:
case SSH_CHANNEL_UNIX_LISTENER:
case SSH_CHANNEL_RUNIX_LISTENER:
continue;
case SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL:
case SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING:
case SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING:
case SSH_CHANNEL_DYNAMIC:
case SSH_CHANNEL_RDYNAMIC_OPEN:
case SSH_CHANNEL_RDYNAMIC_FINISH:
case SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN:
case SSH_CHANNEL_X11_OPEN:
case SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_PROXY:
case SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_CLIENT:
cp = channel_format_status(c);
if ((r = sshbuf_putf(buf, " #%d %.300s (%s)\r\n",
c->self, c->remote_name, cp)) != 0) {
free(cp);
fatal("%s: sshbuf_putf: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
}
free(cp);
continue;
default:
fatal("%s: bad channel type %d", __func__, c->type);
/* NOTREACHED */
}
}
if ((ret = sshbuf_dup_string(buf)) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_dup_string", __func__);
sshbuf_free(buf);
return ret;
}
static void
open_preamble(struct ssh *ssh, const char *where, Channel *c, const char *type)
{
int r;
if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, type)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->self)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->local_window)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->local_maxpacket)) != 0) {
fatal("%s: channel %i: open: %s", where, c->self, ssh_err(r));
}
}
void
channel_send_open(struct ssh *ssh, int id)
{
Channel *c = channel_lookup(ssh, id);
int r;
if (c == NULL) {
logit("channel_send_open: %d: bad id", id);
return;
}
debug2("channel %d: send open", id);
open_preamble(ssh, __func__, c, c->ctype);
if ((r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
fatal("%s: channel %i: %s", __func__, c->self, ssh_err(r));
}
void
channel_request_start(struct ssh *ssh, int id, char *service, int wantconfirm)
{
Channel *c = channel_lookup(ssh, id);
int r;
if (c == NULL) {
logit("%s: %d: unknown channel id", __func__, id);
return;
}
if (!c->have_remote_id)
fatal(":%s: channel %d: no remote id", __func__, c->self);
debug2("channel %d: request %s confirm %d", id, service, wantconfirm);
if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->remote_id)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, service)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, wantconfirm)) != 0) {
fatal("%s: channel %i: %s", __func__, c->self, ssh_err(r));
}
}
void
channel_register_status_confirm(struct ssh *ssh, int id,
channel_confirm_cb *cb, channel_confirm_abandon_cb *abandon_cb, void *ctx)
{
struct channel_confirm *cc;
Channel *c;
if ((c = channel_lookup(ssh, id)) == NULL)
fatal("%s: %d: bad id", __func__, id);
cc = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*cc));
cc->cb = cb;
cc->abandon_cb = abandon_cb;
cc->ctx = ctx;
TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&c->status_confirms, cc, entry);
}
void
channel_register_open_confirm(struct ssh *ssh, int id,
channel_open_fn *fn, void *ctx)
{
Channel *c = channel_lookup(ssh, id);
if (c == NULL) {
logit("%s: %d: bad id", __func__, id);
return;
}
c->open_confirm = fn;
c->open_confirm_ctx = ctx;
}
void
channel_register_cleanup(struct ssh *ssh, int id,
channel_callback_fn *fn, int do_close)
{
Channel *c = channel_by_id(ssh, id);
if (c == NULL) {
logit("%s: %d: bad id", __func__, id);
return;
}
c->detach_user = fn;
c->detach_close = do_close;
}
void
channel_cancel_cleanup(struct ssh *ssh, int id)
{
Channel *c = channel_by_id(ssh, id);
if (c == NULL) {
logit("%s: %d: bad id", __func__, id);
return;
}
c->detach_user = NULL;
c->detach_close = 0;
}
void
channel_register_filter(struct ssh *ssh, int id, channel_infilter_fn *ifn,
channel_outfilter_fn *ofn, channel_filter_cleanup_fn *cfn, void *ctx)
{
Channel *c = channel_lookup(ssh, id);
if (c == NULL) {
logit("%s: %d: bad id", __func__, id);
return;
}
c->input_filter = ifn;
c->output_filter = ofn;
c->filter_ctx = ctx;
c->filter_cleanup = cfn;
}
void
channel_set_fds(struct ssh *ssh, int id, int rfd, int wfd, int efd,
int extusage, int nonblock, int is_tty, u_int window_max)
{
Channel *c = channel_lookup(ssh, id);
int r;
if (c == NULL || c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL)
fatal("channel_activate for non-larval channel %d.", id);
if (!c->have_remote_id)
fatal(":%s: channel %d: no remote id", __func__, c->self);
channel_register_fds(ssh, c, rfd, wfd, efd, extusage, nonblock, is_tty);
c->type = SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN;
c->local_window = c->local_window_max = window_max;
if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->remote_id)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->local_window)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
fatal("%s: channel %i: %s", __func__, c->self, ssh_err(r));
}
static void
channel_pre_listener(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c,
fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
{
FD_SET(c->sock, readset);
}
static void
channel_pre_connecting(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c,
fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
{
debug3("channel %d: waiting for connection", c->self);
FD_SET(c->sock, writeset);
}
static void
channel_pre_open(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c,
fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
{
if (c->istate == CHAN_INPUT_OPEN &&
c->remote_window > 0 &&
sshbuf_len(c->input) < c->remote_window &&
sshbuf_check_reserve(c->input, CHAN_RBUF) == 0)
FD_SET(c->rfd, readset);
if (c->ostate == CHAN_OUTPUT_OPEN ||
c->ostate == CHAN_OUTPUT_WAIT_DRAIN) {
if (sshbuf_len(c->output) > 0) {
FD_SET(c->wfd, writeset);
} else if (c->ostate == CHAN_OUTPUT_WAIT_DRAIN) {
if (CHANNEL_EFD_OUTPUT_ACTIVE(c))
debug2("channel %d: "
"obuf_empty delayed efd %d/(%zu)", c->self,
c->efd, sshbuf_len(c->extended));
else
chan_obuf_empty(ssh, c);
}
}
/** XXX check close conditions, too */
if (c->efd != -1 && !(c->istate == CHAN_INPUT_CLOSED &&
c->ostate == CHAN_OUTPUT_CLOSED)) {
if (c->extended_usage == CHAN_EXTENDED_WRITE &&
sshbuf_len(c->extended) > 0)
FD_SET(c->efd, writeset);
else if (c->efd != -1 && !(c->flags & CHAN_EOF_SENT) &&
(c->extended_usage == CHAN_EXTENDED_READ ||
c->extended_usage == CHAN_EXTENDED_IGNORE) &&
sshbuf_len(c->extended) < c->remote_window)
FD_SET(c->efd, readset);
}
/* XXX: What about efd? races? */
}
/*
* This is a special state for X11 authentication spoofing. An opened X11
* connection (when authentication spoofing is being done) remains in this
* state until the first packet has been completely read. The authentication
* data in that packet is then substituted by the real data if it matches the
* fake data, and the channel is put into normal mode.
* XXX All this happens at the client side.
* Returns: 0 = need more data, -1 = wrong cookie, 1 = ok
*/
static int
x11_open_helper(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshbuf *b)
{
struct ssh_channels *sc = ssh->chanctxt;
u_char *ucp;
u_int proto_len, data_len;
/* Is this being called after the refusal deadline? */
if (sc->x11_refuse_time != 0 &&
(u_int)monotime() >= sc->x11_refuse_time) {
verbose("Rejected X11 connection after ForwardX11Timeout "
"expired");
return -1;
}
/* Check if the fixed size part of the packet is in buffer. */
if (sshbuf_len(b) < 12)
return 0;
/* Parse the lengths of variable-length fields. */
ucp = sshbuf_mutable_ptr(b);
if (ucp[0] == 0x42) { /* Byte order MSB first. */
proto_len = 256 * ucp[6] + ucp[7];
data_len = 256 * ucp[8] + ucp[9];
} else if (ucp[0] == 0x6c) { /* Byte order LSB first. */
proto_len = ucp[6] + 256 * ucp[7];
data_len = ucp[8] + 256 * ucp[9];
} else {
debug2("Initial X11 packet contains bad byte order byte: 0x%x",
ucp[0]);
return -1;
}
/* Check if the whole packet is in buffer. */
if (sshbuf_len(b) <
12 + ((proto_len + 3) & ~3) + ((data_len + 3) & ~3))
return 0;
/* Check if authentication protocol matches. */
if (proto_len != strlen(sc->x11_saved_proto) ||
memcmp(ucp + 12, sc->x11_saved_proto, proto_len) != 0) {
debug2("X11 connection uses different authentication protocol.");
return -1;
}
/* Check if authentication data matches our fake data. */
if (data_len != sc->x11_fake_data_len ||
timingsafe_bcmp(ucp + 12 + ((proto_len + 3) & ~3),
sc->x11_fake_data, sc->x11_fake_data_len) != 0) {
debug2("X11 auth data does not match fake data.");
return -1;
}
/* Check fake data length */
if (sc->x11_fake_data_len != sc->x11_saved_data_len) {
error("X11 fake_data_len %d != saved_data_len %d",
sc->x11_fake_data_len, sc->x11_saved_data_len);
return -1;
}
/*
* Received authentication protocol and data match
* our fake data. Substitute the fake data with real
* data.
*/
memcpy(ucp + 12 + ((proto_len + 3) & ~3),
sc->x11_saved_data, sc->x11_saved_data_len);
return 1;
}
static void
channel_pre_x11_open(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c,
fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
{
int ret = x11_open_helper(ssh, c->output);
/* c->force_drain = 1; */
if (ret == 1) {
c->type = SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN;
channel_pre_open(ssh, c, readset, writeset);
} else if (ret == -1) {
logit("X11 connection rejected because of wrong authentication.");
debug2("X11 rejected %d i%d/o%d",
c->self, c->istate, c->ostate);
chan_read_failed(ssh, c);
sshbuf_reset(c->input);
chan_ibuf_empty(ssh, c);
sshbuf_reset(c->output);
chan_write_failed(ssh, c);
debug2("X11 closed %d i%d/o%d", c->self, c->istate, c->ostate);
}
}
static void
channel_pre_mux_client(struct ssh *ssh,
Channel *c, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
{
if (c->istate == CHAN_INPUT_OPEN && !c->mux_pause &&
sshbuf_check_reserve(c->input, CHAN_RBUF) == 0)
FD_SET(c->rfd, readset);
if (c->istate == CHAN_INPUT_WAIT_DRAIN) {
/* clear buffer immediately (discard any partial packet) */
sshbuf_reset(c->input);
chan_ibuf_empty(ssh, c);
/* Start output drain. XXX just kill chan? */
chan_rcvd_oclose(ssh, c);
}
if (c->ostate == CHAN_OUTPUT_OPEN ||
c->ostate == CHAN_OUTPUT_WAIT_DRAIN) {
if (sshbuf_len(c->output) > 0)
FD_SET(c->wfd, writeset);
else if (c->ostate == CHAN_OUTPUT_WAIT_DRAIN)
chan_obuf_empty(ssh, c);
}
}
/* try to decode a socks4 header */
static int
channel_decode_socks4(Channel *c, struct sshbuf *input, struct sshbuf *output)
{
const u_char *p;
char *host;
u_int len, have, i, found, need;
char username[256];
struct {
u_int8_t version;
u_int8_t command;
u_int16_t dest_port;
struct in_addr dest_addr;
} s4_req, s4_rsp;
int r;
debug2("channel %d: decode socks4", c->self);
have = sshbuf_len(input);
len = sizeof(s4_req);
if (have < len)
return 0;
p = sshbuf_ptr(input);
need = 1;
/* SOCKS4A uses an invalid IP address 0.0.0.x */
if (p[4] == 0 && p[5] == 0 && p[6] == 0 && p[7] != 0) {
debug2("channel %d: socks4a request", c->self);
/* ... and needs an extra string (the hostname) */
need = 2;
}
/* Check for terminating NUL on the string(s) */
for (found = 0, i = len; i < have; i++) {
if (p[i] == '\0') {
found++;
if (found == need)
break;
}
if (i > 1024) {
/* the peer is probably sending garbage */
debug("channel %d: decode socks4: too long",
c->self);
return -1;
}
}
if (found < need)
return 0;
if ((r = sshbuf_get(input, &s4_req.version, 1)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get(input, &s4_req.command, 1)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get(input, &s4_req.dest_port, 2)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get(input, &s4_req.dest_addr, 4)) != 0) {
debug("channels %d: decode socks4: %s", c->self, ssh_err(r));
return -1;
}
have = sshbuf_len(input);
p = sshbuf_ptr(input);
if (memchr(p, '\0', have) == NULL) {
error("channel %d: decode socks4: user not nul terminated",
c->self);
return -1;
}
len = strlen(p);
debug2("channel %d: decode socks4: user %s/%d", c->self, p, len);
len++; /* trailing '\0' */
strlcpy(username, p, sizeof(username));
if ((r = sshbuf_consume(input, len)) != 0) {
fatal("%s: channel %d: consume: %s", __func__,
c->self, ssh_err(r));
}
free(c->path);
c->path = NULL;
if (need == 1) { /* SOCKS4: one string */
host = inet_ntoa(s4_req.dest_addr);
c->path = xstrdup(host);
} else { /* SOCKS4A: two strings */
have = sshbuf_len(input);
p = sshbuf_ptr(input);
if (memchr(p, '\0', have) == NULL) {
error("channel %d: decode socks4a: host not nul "
"terminated", c->self);
return -1;
}
len = strlen(p);
debug2("channel %d: decode socks4a: host %s/%d",
c->self, p, len);
len++; /* trailing '\0' */
if (len > NI_MAXHOST) {
error("channel %d: hostname \"%.100s\" too long",
c->self, p);
return -1;
}
c->path = xstrdup(p);
if ((r = sshbuf_consume(input, len)) != 0) {
fatal("%s: channel %d: consume: %s", __func__,
c->self, ssh_err(r));
}
}
c->host_port = ntohs(s4_req.dest_port);
debug2("channel %d: dynamic request: socks4 host %s port %u command %u",
c->self, c->path, c->host_port, s4_req.command);
if (s4_req.command != 1) {
debug("channel %d: cannot handle: %s cn %d",
c->self, need == 1 ? "SOCKS4" : "SOCKS4A", s4_req.command);
return -1;
}
s4_rsp.version = 0; /* vn: 0 for reply */
s4_rsp.command = 90; /* cd: req granted */
s4_rsp.dest_port = 0; /* ignored */
s4_rsp.dest_addr.s_addr = INADDR_ANY; /* ignored */
if ((r = sshbuf_put(output, &s4_rsp, sizeof(s4_rsp))) != 0) {
fatal("%s: channel %d: append reply: %s", __func__,
c->self, ssh_err(r));
}
return 1;
}
/* try to decode a socks5 header */
#define SSH_SOCKS5_AUTHDONE 0x1000
#define SSH_SOCKS5_NOAUTH 0x00
#define SSH_SOCKS5_IPV4 0x01
#define SSH_SOCKS5_DOMAIN 0x03
#define SSH_SOCKS5_IPV6 0x04
#define SSH_SOCKS5_CONNECT 0x01
#define SSH_SOCKS5_SUCCESS 0x00
static int
channel_decode_socks5(Channel *c, struct sshbuf *input, struct sshbuf *output)
{
/* XXX use get/put_u8 instead of trusting struct padding */
struct {
u_int8_t version;
u_int8_t command;
u_int8_t reserved;
u_int8_t atyp;
} s5_req, s5_rsp;
u_int16_t dest_port;
char dest_addr[255+1], ntop[INET6_ADDRSTRLEN];
const u_char *p;
u_int have, need, i, found, nmethods, addrlen, af;
int r;
debug2("channel %d: decode socks5", c->self);
p = sshbuf_ptr(input);
if (p[0] != 0x05)
return -1;
have = sshbuf_len(input);
if (!(c->flags & SSH_SOCKS5_AUTHDONE)) {
/* format: ver | nmethods | methods */
if (have < 2)
return 0;
nmethods = p[1];
if (have < nmethods + 2)
return 0;
/* look for method: "NO AUTHENTICATION REQUIRED" */
for (found = 0, i = 2; i < nmethods + 2; i++) {
if (p[i] == SSH_SOCKS5_NOAUTH) {
found = 1;
break;
}
}
if (!found) {
debug("channel %d: method SSH_SOCKS5_NOAUTH not found",
c->self);
return -1;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_consume(input, nmethods + 2)) != 0) {
fatal("%s: channel %d: consume: %s", __func__,
c->self, ssh_err(r));
}
/* version, method */
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(output, 0x05)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u8(output, SSH_SOCKS5_NOAUTH)) != 0) {
fatal("%s: channel %d: append reply: %s", __func__,
c->self, ssh_err(r));
}
c->flags |= SSH_SOCKS5_AUTHDONE;
debug2("channel %d: socks5 auth done", c->self);
return 0; /* need more */
}
debug2("channel %d: socks5 post auth", c->self);
if (have < sizeof(s5_req)+1)
return 0; /* need more */
memcpy(&s5_req, p, sizeof(s5_req));
if (s5_req.version != 0x05 ||
s5_req.command != SSH_SOCKS5_CONNECT ||
s5_req.reserved != 0x00) {
debug2("channel %d: only socks5 connect supported", c->self);
return -1;
}
switch (s5_req.atyp){
case SSH_SOCKS5_IPV4:
addrlen = 4;
af = AF_INET;
break;
case SSH_SOCKS5_DOMAIN:
addrlen = p[sizeof(s5_req)];
af = -1;
break;
case SSH_SOCKS5_IPV6:
addrlen = 16;
af = AF_INET6;
break;
default:
debug2("channel %d: bad socks5 atyp %d", c->self, s5_req.atyp);
return -1;
}
need = sizeof(s5_req) + addrlen + 2;
if (s5_req.atyp == SSH_SOCKS5_DOMAIN)
need++;
if (have < need)
return 0;
if ((r = sshbuf_consume(input, sizeof(s5_req))) != 0) {
fatal("%s: channel %d: consume: %s", __func__,
c->self, ssh_err(r));
}
if (s5_req.atyp == SSH_SOCKS5_DOMAIN) {
/* host string length */
if ((r = sshbuf_consume(input, 1)) != 0) {
fatal("%s: channel %d: consume: %s", __func__,
c->self, ssh_err(r));
}
}
if ((r = sshbuf_get(input, &dest_addr, addrlen)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get(input, &dest_port, 2)) != 0) {
debug("channel %d: parse addr/port: %s", c->self, ssh_err(r));
return -1;
}
dest_addr[addrlen] = '\0';
free(c->path);
c->path = NULL;
if (s5_req.atyp == SSH_SOCKS5_DOMAIN) {
if (addrlen >= NI_MAXHOST) {
error("channel %d: dynamic request: socks5 hostname "
"\"%.100s\" too long", c->self, dest_addr);
return -1;
}
c->path = xstrdup(dest_addr);
} else {
if (inet_ntop(af, dest_addr, ntop, sizeof(ntop)) == NULL)
return -1;
c->path = xstrdup(ntop);
}
c->host_port = ntohs(dest_port);
debug2("channel %d: dynamic request: socks5 host %s port %u command %u",
c->self, c->path, c->host_port, s5_req.command);
s5_rsp.version = 0x05;
s5_rsp.command = SSH_SOCKS5_SUCCESS;
s5_rsp.reserved = 0; /* ignored */
s5_rsp.atyp = SSH_SOCKS5_IPV4;
dest_port = 0; /* ignored */
if ((r = sshbuf_put(output, &s5_rsp, sizeof(s5_rsp))) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(output, ntohl(INADDR_ANY))) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put(output, &dest_port, sizeof(dest_port))) != 0)
fatal("%s: channel %d: append reply: %s", __func__,
c->self, ssh_err(r));
return 1;
}
Channel *
channel_connect_stdio_fwd(struct ssh *ssh,
const char *host_to_connect, u_short port_to_connect, int in, int out)
{
Channel *c;
debug("%s %s:%d", __func__, host_to_connect, port_to_connect);
c = channel_new(ssh, "stdio-forward", SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING, in, out,
-1, CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT,
0, "stdio-forward", /*nonblock*/0);
c->path = xstrdup(host_to_connect);
c->host_port = port_to_connect;
c->listening_port = 0;
c->force_drain = 1;
channel_register_fds(ssh, c, in, out, -1, 0, 1, 0);
port_open_helper(ssh, c, "direct-tcpip");
return c;
}
/* dynamic port forwarding */
static void
channel_pre_dynamic(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c,
fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
{
const u_char *p;
u_int have;
int ret;
have = sshbuf_len(c->input);
debug2("channel %d: pre_dynamic: have %d", c->self, have);
/* sshbuf_dump(c->input, stderr); */
/* check if the fixed size part of the packet is in buffer. */
if (have < 3) {
/* need more */
FD_SET(c->sock, readset);
return;
}
/* try to guess the protocol */
p = sshbuf_ptr(c->input);
/* XXX sshbuf_peek_u8? */
switch (p[0]) {
case 0x04:
ret = channel_decode_socks4(c, c->input, c->output);
break;
case 0x05:
ret = channel_decode_socks5(c, c->input, c->output);
break;
default:
ret = -1;
break;
}
if (ret < 0) {
chan_mark_dead(ssh, c);
} else if (ret == 0) {
debug2("channel %d: pre_dynamic: need more", c->self);
/* need more */
FD_SET(c->sock, readset);
if (sshbuf_len(c->output))
FD_SET(c->sock, writeset);
} else {
/* switch to the next state */
c->type = SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING;
port_open_helper(ssh, c, "direct-tcpip");
}
}
/* simulate read-error */
static void
rdynamic_close(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c)
{
c->type = SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN;
chan_read_failed(ssh, c);
sshbuf_reset(c->input);
chan_ibuf_empty(ssh, c);
sshbuf_reset(c->output);
chan_write_failed(ssh, c);
}
/* reverse dynamic port forwarding */
static void
channel_before_prepare_select_rdynamic(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c)
{
const u_char *p;
u_int have, len;
int r, ret;
have = sshbuf_len(c->output);
debug2("channel %d: pre_rdynamic: have %d", c->self, have);
/* sshbuf_dump(c->output, stderr); */
/* EOF received */
if (c->flags & CHAN_EOF_RCVD) {
if ((r = sshbuf_consume(c->output, have)) != 0) {
fatal("%s: channel %d: consume: %s",
__func__, c->self, ssh_err(r));
}
rdynamic_close(ssh, c);
return;
}
/* check if the fixed size part of the packet is in buffer. */
if (have < 3)
return;
/* try to guess the protocol */
p = sshbuf_ptr(c->output);
switch (p[0]) {
case 0x04:
/* switch input/output for reverse forwarding */
ret = channel_decode_socks4(c, c->output, c->input);
break;
case 0x05:
ret = channel_decode_socks5(c, c->output, c->input);
break;
default:
ret = -1;
break;
}
if (ret < 0) {
rdynamic_close(ssh, c);
} else if (ret == 0) {
debug2("channel %d: pre_rdynamic: need more", c->self);
/* send socks request to peer */
len = sshbuf_len(c->input);
if (len > 0 && len < c->remote_window) {
if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->remote_id)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_stringb(ssh, c->input)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) {
fatal("%s: channel %i: rdynamic: %s", __func__,
c->self, ssh_err(r));
}
if ((r = sshbuf_consume(c->input, len)) != 0) {
fatal("%s: channel %d: consume: %s",
__func__, c->self, ssh_err(r));
}
c->remote_window -= len;
}
} else if (rdynamic_connect_finish(ssh, c) < 0) {
/* the connect failed */
rdynamic_close(ssh, c);
}
}
/* This is our fake X11 server socket. */
static void
channel_post_x11_listener(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c,
fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
{
Channel *nc;
struct sockaddr_storage addr;
int r, newsock, oerrno, remote_port;
socklen_t addrlen;
char buf[16384], *remote_ipaddr;
if (!FD_ISSET(c->sock, readset))
return;
debug("X11 connection requested.");
addrlen = sizeof(addr);
newsock = accept(c->sock, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, &addrlen);
if (c->single_connection) {
oerrno = errno;
debug2("single_connection: closing X11 listener.");
channel_close_fd(ssh, &c->sock);
chan_mark_dead(ssh, c);
errno = oerrno;
}
if (newsock == -1) {
if (errno != EINTR && errno != EWOULDBLOCK &&
errno != ECONNABORTED)
error("accept: %.100s", strerror(errno));
if (errno == EMFILE || errno == ENFILE)
c->notbefore = monotime() + 1;
return;
}
set_nodelay(newsock);
remote_ipaddr = get_peer_ipaddr(newsock);
remote_port = get_peer_port(newsock);
snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "X11 connection from %.200s port %d",
remote_ipaddr, remote_port);
nc = channel_new(ssh, "accepted x11 socket",
SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING, newsock, newsock, -1,
c->local_window_max, c->local_maxpacket, 0, buf, 1);
open_preamble(ssh, __func__, nc, "x11");
if ((r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, remote_ipaddr)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, remote_port)) != 0) {
fatal("%s: channel %i: reply %s", __func__,
c->self, ssh_err(r));
}
if ((r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
fatal("%s: channel %i: send %s", __func__, c->self, ssh_err(r));
free(remote_ipaddr);
}
static void
port_open_helper(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c, char *rtype)
{
char *local_ipaddr = get_local_ipaddr(c->sock);
int local_port = c->sock == -1 ? 65536 : get_local_port(c->sock);
char *remote_ipaddr = get_peer_ipaddr(c->sock);
int remote_port = get_peer_port(c->sock);
int r;
if (remote_port == -1) {
/* Fake addr/port to appease peers that validate it (Tectia) */
free(remote_ipaddr);
remote_ipaddr = xstrdup("127.0.0.1");
remote_port = 65535;
}
free(c->remote_name);
xasprintf(&c->remote_name,
"%s: listening port %d for %.100s port %d, "
"connect from %.200s port %d to %.100s port %d",
rtype, c->listening_port, c->path, c->host_port,
remote_ipaddr, remote_port, local_ipaddr, local_port);
open_preamble(ssh, __func__, c, rtype);
if (strcmp(rtype, "direct-tcpip") == 0) {
/* target host, port */
if ((r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, c->path)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->host_port)) != 0) {
fatal("%s: channel %i: reply %s", __func__,
c->self, ssh_err(r));
}
} else if (strcmp(rtype, "direct-streamlocal@openssh.com") == 0) {
/* target path */
if ((r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, c->path)) != 0) {
fatal("%s: channel %i: reply %s", __func__,
c->self, ssh_err(r));
}
} else if (strcmp(rtype, "forwarded-streamlocal@openssh.com") == 0) {
/* listen path */
if ((r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, c->path)) != 0) {
fatal("%s: channel %i: reply %s", __func__,
c->self, ssh_err(r));
}
} else {
/* listen address, port */
if ((r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, c->path)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, local_port)) != 0) {
fatal("%s: channel %i: reply %s", __func__,
c->self, ssh_err(r));
}
}
if (strcmp(rtype, "forwarded-streamlocal@openssh.com") == 0) {
/* reserved for future owner/mode info */
if ((r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "")) != 0) {
fatal("%s: channel %i: reply %s", __func__,
c->self, ssh_err(r));
}
} else {
/* originator host and port */
if ((r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, remote_ipaddr)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, (u_int)remote_port)) != 0) {
fatal("%s: channel %i: reply %s", __func__,
c->self, ssh_err(r));
}
}
if ((r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
fatal("%s: channel %i: send %s", __func__, c->self, ssh_err(r));
free(remote_ipaddr);
free(local_ipaddr);
}
void
channel_set_x11_refuse_time(struct ssh *ssh, u_int refuse_time)
{
ssh->chanctxt->x11_refuse_time = refuse_time;
}
/*
* This socket is listening for connections to a forwarded TCP/IP port.
*/
static void
channel_post_port_listener(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c,
fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
{
Channel *nc;
struct sockaddr_storage addr;
int newsock, nextstate;
socklen_t addrlen;
char *rtype;
if (!FD_ISSET(c->sock, readset))
return;
debug("Connection to port %d forwarding to %.100s port %d requested.",
c->listening_port, c->path, c->host_port);
if (c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER) {
nextstate = SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING;
rtype = "forwarded-tcpip";
} else if (c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_RUNIX_LISTENER) {
nextstate = SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING;
rtype = "forwarded-streamlocal@openssh.com";
} else if (c->host_port == PORT_STREAMLOCAL) {
nextstate = SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING;
rtype = "direct-streamlocal@openssh.com";
} else if (c->host_port == 0) {
nextstate = SSH_CHANNEL_DYNAMIC;
rtype = "dynamic-tcpip";
} else {
nextstate = SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING;
rtype = "direct-tcpip";
}
addrlen = sizeof(addr);
newsock = accept(c->sock, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, &addrlen);
if (newsock == -1) {
if (errno != EINTR && errno != EWOULDBLOCK &&
errno != ECONNABORTED)
error("accept: %.100s", strerror(errno));
if (errno == EMFILE || errno == ENFILE)
c->notbefore = monotime() + 1;
return;
}
if (c->host_port != PORT_STREAMLOCAL)
set_nodelay(newsock);
nc = channel_new(ssh, rtype, nextstate, newsock, newsock, -1,
c->local_window_max, c->local_maxpacket, 0, rtype, 1);
nc->listening_port = c->listening_port;
nc->host_port = c->host_port;
if (c->path != NULL)
nc->path = xstrdup(c->path);
if (nextstate != SSH_CHANNEL_DYNAMIC)
port_open_helper(ssh, nc, rtype);
}
/*
* This is the authentication agent socket listening for connections from
* clients.
*/
static void
channel_post_auth_listener(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c,
fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
{
Channel *nc;
int r, newsock;
struct sockaddr_storage addr;
socklen_t addrlen;
if (!FD_ISSET(c->sock, readset))
return;
addrlen = sizeof(addr);
newsock = accept(c->sock, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, &addrlen);
if (newsock == -1) {
error("accept from auth socket: %.100s", strerror(errno));
if (errno == EMFILE || errno == ENFILE)
c->notbefore = monotime() + 1;
return;
}
nc = channel_new(ssh, "accepted auth socket",
SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING, newsock, newsock, -1,
c->local_window_max, c->local_maxpacket,
0, "accepted auth socket", 1);
open_preamble(ssh, __func__, nc, "auth-agent@openssh.com");
if ((r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
fatal("%s: channel %i: %s", __func__, c->self, ssh_err(r));
}
static void
channel_post_connecting(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c,
fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
{
int err = 0, sock, isopen, r;
socklen_t sz = sizeof(err);
if (!FD_ISSET(c->sock, writeset))
return;
if (!c->have_remote_id)
fatal(":%s: channel %d: no remote id", __func__, c->self);
/* for rdynamic the OPEN_CONFIRMATION has been sent already */
isopen = (c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_RDYNAMIC_FINISH);
if (getsockopt(c->sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_ERROR, &err, &sz) == -1) {
err = errno;
error("getsockopt SO_ERROR failed");
}
if (err == 0) {
debug("channel %d: connected to %s port %d",
c->self, c->connect_ctx.host, c->connect_ctx.port);
channel_connect_ctx_free(&c->connect_ctx);
c->type = SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN;
if (isopen) {
/* no message necessary */
} else {
if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh,
SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->remote_id)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->self)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->local_window)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->local_maxpacket))
!= 0)
fatal("%s: channel %i: confirm: %s", __func__,
c->self, ssh_err(r));
if ((r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
fatal("%s: channel %i: %s", __func__, c->self,
ssh_err(r));
}
} else {
debug("channel %d: connection failed: %s",
c->self, strerror(err));
/* Try next address, if any */
if ((sock = connect_next(&c->connect_ctx)) > 0) {
close(c->sock);
c->sock = c->rfd = c->wfd = sock;
channel_find_maxfd(ssh->chanctxt);
return;
}
/* Exhausted all addresses */
error("connect_to %.100s port %d: failed.",
c->connect_ctx.host, c->connect_ctx.port);
channel_connect_ctx_free(&c->connect_ctx);
if (isopen) {
rdynamic_close(ssh, c);
} else {
if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh,
SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->remote_id)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh,
SSH2_OPEN_CONNECT_FAILED)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, strerror(err))) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "")) != 0) {
fatal("%s: channel %i: failure: %s", __func__,
c->self, ssh_err(r));
}
if ((r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
fatal("%s: channel %i: %s", __func__, c->self,
ssh_err(r));
chan_mark_dead(ssh, c);
}
}
}
static int
channel_handle_rfd(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c,
fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
{
char buf[CHAN_RBUF];
ssize_t len;
int r, force;
force = c->isatty && c->detach_close && c->istate != CHAN_INPUT_CLOSED;
if (c->rfd == -1 || (!force && !FD_ISSET(c->rfd, readset)))
return 1;
errno = 0;
len = read(c->rfd, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (len == -1 && (errno == EINTR ||
((errno == EAGAIN || errno == EWOULDBLOCK) && !force)))
return 1;
#ifndef PTY_ZEROREAD
if (len <= 0) {
#else
if ((!c->isatty && len <= 0) ||
(c->isatty && (len < 0 || (len == 0 && errno != 0)))) {
#endif
debug2("channel %d: read<=0 rfd %d len %zd",
c->self, c->rfd, len);
if (c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN) {
debug2("channel %d: not open", c->self);
chan_mark_dead(ssh, c);
return -1;
} else {
chan_read_failed(ssh, c);
}
return -1;
}
if (c->input_filter != NULL) {
if (c->input_filter(ssh, c, buf, len) == -1) {
debug2("channel %d: filter stops", c->self);
chan_read_failed(ssh, c);
}
} else if (c->datagram) {
if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(c->input, buf, len)) != 0)
fatal("%s: channel %d: put datagram: %s", __func__,
c->self, ssh_err(r));
} else if ((r = sshbuf_put(c->input, buf, len)) != 0) {
fatal("%s: channel %d: put data: %s", __func__,
c->self, ssh_err(r));
}
return 1;
}
static int
channel_handle_wfd(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c,
fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
{
struct termios tio;
u_char *data = NULL, *buf; /* XXX const; need filter API change */
size_t dlen, olen = 0;
int r, len;
if (c->wfd == -1 || !FD_ISSET(c->wfd, writeset) ||
sshbuf_len(c->output) == 0)
return 1;
/* Send buffered output data to the socket. */
olen = sshbuf_len(c->output);
if (c->output_filter != NULL) {
if ((buf = c->output_filter(ssh, c, &data, &dlen)) == NULL) {
debug2("channel %d: filter stops", c->self);
if (c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN)
chan_mark_dead(ssh, c);
else
chan_write_failed(ssh, c);
return -1;
}
} else if (c->datagram) {
if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(c->output, &data, &dlen)) != 0)
fatal("%s: channel %d: get datagram: %s", __func__,
c->self, ssh_err(r));
buf = data;
} else {
buf = data = sshbuf_mutable_ptr(c->output);
dlen = sshbuf_len(c->output);
}
if (c->datagram) {
/* ignore truncated writes, datagrams might get lost */
len = write(c->wfd, buf, dlen);
free(data);
if (len == -1 && (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN ||
errno == EWOULDBLOCK))
return 1;
if (len <= 0)
goto write_fail;
goto out;
}
#ifdef _AIX
/* XXX: Later AIX versions can't push as much data to tty */
if (c->wfd_isatty)
dlen = MIN(dlen, 8*1024);
#endif
len = write(c->wfd, buf, dlen);
if (len == -1 &&
(errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN || errno == EWOULDBLOCK))
return 1;
if (len <= 0) {
write_fail:
if (c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN) {
debug2("channel %d: not open", c->self);
chan_mark_dead(ssh, c);
return -1;
} else {
chan_write_failed(ssh, c);
}
return -1;
}
#ifndef BROKEN_TCGETATTR_ICANON
if (c->isatty && dlen >= 1 && buf[0] != '\r') {
if (tcgetattr(c->wfd, &tio) == 0 &&
!(tio.c_lflag & ECHO) && (tio.c_lflag & ICANON)) {
/*
* Simulate echo to reduce the impact of
* traffic analysis. We need to match the
* size of a SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA message
* (4 byte channel id + buf)
*/
if ((r = sshpkt_msg_ignore(ssh, 4+len)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
fatal("%s: channel %d: ignore: %s",
__func__, c->self, ssh_err(r));
}
}
#endif /* BROKEN_TCGETATTR_ICANON */
if ((r = sshbuf_consume(c->output, len)) != 0) {
fatal("%s: channel %d: consume: %s",
__func__, c->self, ssh_err(r));
}
out:
c->local_consumed += olen - sshbuf_len(c->output);
return 1;
}
static int
channel_handle_efd_write(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c,
fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
{
int r;
ssize_t len;
if (!FD_ISSET(c->efd, writeset) || sshbuf_len(c->extended) == 0)
return 1;
len = write(c->efd, sshbuf_ptr(c->extended),
sshbuf_len(c->extended));
debug2("channel %d: written %zd to efd %d", c->self, len, c->efd);
if (len == -1 && (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN ||
errno == EWOULDBLOCK))
return 1;
if (len <= 0) {
debug2("channel %d: closing write-efd %d", c->self, c->efd);
channel_close_fd(ssh, &c->efd);
} else {
if ((r = sshbuf_consume(c->extended, len)) != 0) {
fatal("%s: channel %d: consume: %s",
__func__, c->self, ssh_err(r));
}
c->local_consumed += len;
}
return 1;
}
static int
channel_handle_efd_read(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c,
fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
{
char buf[CHAN_RBUF];
ssize_t len;
int r, force;
force = c->isatty && c->detach_close && c->istate != CHAN_INPUT_CLOSED;
if (c->efd == -1 || (!force && !FD_ISSET(c->efd, readset)))
return 1;
len = read(c->efd, buf, sizeof(buf));
debug2("channel %d: read %zd from efd %d", c->self, len, c->efd);
if (len == -1 && (errno == EINTR || ((errno == EAGAIN ||
errno == EWOULDBLOCK) && !force)))
return 1;
if (len <= 0) {
debug2("channel %d: closing read-efd %d",
c->self, c->efd);
channel_close_fd(ssh, &c->efd);
} else {
if (c->extended_usage == CHAN_EXTENDED_IGNORE) {
debug3("channel %d: discard efd",
c->self);
} else if ((r = sshbuf_put(c->extended, buf, len)) != 0) {
fatal("%s: channel %d: append: %s",
__func__, c->self, ssh_err(r));
}
}
return 1;
}
static int
channel_handle_efd(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c,
fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
{
if (c->efd == -1)
return 1;
/** XXX handle drain efd, too */
if (c->extended_usage == CHAN_EXTENDED_WRITE)
return channel_handle_efd_write(ssh, c, readset, writeset);
else if (c->extended_usage == CHAN_EXTENDED_READ ||
c->extended_usage == CHAN_EXTENDED_IGNORE)
return channel_handle_efd_read(ssh, c, readset, writeset);
return 1;
}
static int
channel_check_window(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c)
{
int r;
if (c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN &&
!(c->flags & (CHAN_CLOSE_SENT|CHAN_CLOSE_RCVD)) &&
((c->local_window_max - c->local_window >
c->local_maxpacket*3) ||
c->local_window < c->local_window_max/2) &&
c->local_consumed > 0) {
if (!c->have_remote_id)
fatal(":%s: channel %d: no remote id",
__func__, c->self);
if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh,
SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->remote_id)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->local_consumed)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) {
fatal("%s: channel %i: %s", __func__,
c->self, ssh_err(r));
}
debug2("channel %d: window %d sent adjust %d",
c->self, c->local_window,
c->local_consumed);
c->local_window += c->local_consumed;
c->local_consumed = 0;
}
return 1;
}
static void
channel_post_open(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c,
fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
{
channel_handle_rfd(ssh, c, readset, writeset);
channel_handle_wfd(ssh, c, readset, writeset);
channel_handle_efd(ssh, c, readset, writeset);
channel_check_window(ssh, c);
}
static u_int
read_mux(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c, u_int need)
{
char buf[CHAN_RBUF];
ssize_t len;
u_int rlen;
int r;
if (sshbuf_len(c->input) < need) {
rlen = need - sshbuf_len(c->input);
len = read(c->rfd, buf, MINIMUM(rlen, CHAN_RBUF));
if (len == -1 && (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN))
return sshbuf_len(c->input);
if (len <= 0) {
debug2("channel %d: ctl read<=0 rfd %d len %zd",
c->self, c->rfd, len);
chan_read_failed(ssh, c);
return 0;
} else if ((r = sshbuf_put(c->input, buf, len)) != 0) {
fatal("%s: channel %d: append: %s",
__func__, c->self, ssh_err(r));
}
}
return sshbuf_len(c->input);
}
static void
channel_post_mux_client_read(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c,
fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
{
u_int need;
if (c->rfd == -1 || !FD_ISSET(c->rfd, readset))
return;
if (c->istate != CHAN_INPUT_OPEN && c->istate != CHAN_INPUT_WAIT_DRAIN)
return;
if (c->mux_pause)
return;
/*
* Don't not read past the precise end of packets to
* avoid disrupting fd passing.
*/
if (read_mux(ssh, c, 4) < 4) /* read header */
return;
/* XXX sshbuf_peek_u32 */
need = PEEK_U32(sshbuf_ptr(c->input));
#define CHANNEL_MUX_MAX_PACKET (256 * 1024)
if (need > CHANNEL_MUX_MAX_PACKET) {
debug2("channel %d: packet too big %u > %u",
c->self, CHANNEL_MUX_MAX_PACKET, need);
chan_rcvd_oclose(ssh, c);
return;
}
if (read_mux(ssh, c, need + 4) < need + 4) /* read body */
return;
if (c->mux_rcb(ssh, c) != 0) {
debug("channel %d: mux_rcb failed", c->self);
chan_mark_dead(ssh, c);
return;
}
}
static void
channel_post_mux_client_write(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c,
fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
{
ssize_t len;
int r;
if (c->wfd == -1 || !FD_ISSET(c->wfd, writeset) ||
sshbuf_len(c->output) == 0)
return;
len = write(c->wfd, sshbuf_ptr(c->output), sshbuf_len(c->output));
if (len == -1 && (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN))
return;
if (len <= 0) {
chan_mark_dead(ssh, c);
return;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_consume(c->output, len)) != 0)
fatal("%s: channel %d: consume: %s", __func__,
c->self, ssh_err(r));
}
static void
channel_post_mux_client(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c,
fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
{
channel_post_mux_client_read(ssh, c, readset, writeset);
channel_post_mux_client_write(ssh, c, readset, writeset);
}
static void
channel_post_mux_listener(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c,
fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
{
Channel *nc;
struct sockaddr_storage addr;
socklen_t addrlen;
int newsock;
uid_t euid;
gid_t egid;
if (!FD_ISSET(c->sock, readset))
return;
debug("multiplexing control connection");
/*
* Accept connection on control socket
*/
memset(&addr, 0, sizeof(addr));
addrlen = sizeof(addr);
if ((newsock = accept(c->sock, (struct sockaddr*)&addr,
&addrlen)) == -1) {
error("%s accept: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
if (errno == EMFILE || errno == ENFILE)
c->notbefore = monotime() + 1;
return;
}
if (getpeereid(newsock, &euid, &egid) == -1) {
error("%s getpeereid failed: %s", __func__,
strerror(errno));
close(newsock);
return;
}
if ((euid != 0) && (getuid() != euid)) {
error("multiplex uid mismatch: peer euid %u != uid %u",
(u_int)euid, (u_int)getuid());
close(newsock);
return;
}
nc = channel_new(ssh, "multiplex client", SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_CLIENT,
newsock, newsock, -1, c->local_window_max,
c->local_maxpacket, 0, "mux-control", 1);
nc->mux_rcb = c->mux_rcb;
debug3("%s: new mux channel %d fd %d", __func__, nc->self, nc->sock);
/* establish state */
nc->mux_rcb(ssh, nc);
/* mux state transitions must not elicit protocol messages */
nc->flags |= CHAN_LOCAL;
}
static void
channel_handler_init(struct ssh_channels *sc)
{
chan_fn **pre, **post;
if ((pre = calloc(SSH_CHANNEL_MAX_TYPE, sizeof(*pre))) == NULL ||
(post = calloc(SSH_CHANNEL_MAX_TYPE, sizeof(*post))) == NULL)
fatal("%s: allocation failed", __func__);
pre[SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN] = &channel_pre_open;
pre[SSH_CHANNEL_X11_OPEN] = &channel_pre_x11_open;
pre[SSH_CHANNEL_PORT_LISTENER] = &channel_pre_listener;
pre[SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER] = &channel_pre_listener;
pre[SSH_CHANNEL_UNIX_LISTENER] = &channel_pre_listener;
pre[SSH_CHANNEL_RUNIX_LISTENER] = &channel_pre_listener;
pre[SSH_CHANNEL_X11_LISTENER] = &channel_pre_listener;
pre[SSH_CHANNEL_AUTH_SOCKET] = &channel_pre_listener;
pre[SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING] = &channel_pre_connecting;
pre[SSH_CHANNEL_DYNAMIC] = &channel_pre_dynamic;
pre[SSH_CHANNEL_RDYNAMIC_FINISH] = &channel_pre_connecting;
pre[SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_LISTENER] = &channel_pre_listener;
pre[SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_CLIENT] = &channel_pre_mux_client;
post[SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN] = &channel_post_open;
post[SSH_CHANNEL_PORT_LISTENER] = &channel_post_port_listener;
post[SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER] = &channel_post_port_listener;
post[SSH_CHANNEL_UNIX_LISTENER] = &channel_post_port_listener;
post[SSH_CHANNEL_RUNIX_LISTENER] = &channel_post_port_listener;
post[SSH_CHANNEL_X11_LISTENER] = &channel_post_x11_listener;
post[SSH_CHANNEL_AUTH_SOCKET] = &channel_post_auth_listener;
post[SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING] = &channel_post_connecting;
post[SSH_CHANNEL_DYNAMIC] = &channel_post_open;
post[SSH_CHANNEL_RDYNAMIC_FINISH] = &channel_post_connecting;
post[SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_LISTENER] = &channel_post_mux_listener;
post[SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_CLIENT] = &channel_post_mux_client;
sc->channel_pre = pre;
sc->channel_post = post;
}
/* gc dead channels */
static void
channel_garbage_collect(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c)
{
if (c == NULL)
return;
if (c->detach_user != NULL) {
if (!chan_is_dead(ssh, c, c->detach_close))
return;
debug2("channel %d: gc: notify user", c->self);
c->detach_user(ssh, c->self, NULL);
/* if we still have a callback */
if (c->detach_user != NULL)
return;
debug2("channel %d: gc: user detached", c->self);
}
if (!chan_is_dead(ssh, c, 1))
return;
debug2("channel %d: garbage collecting", c->self);
channel_free(ssh, c);
}
enum channel_table { CHAN_PRE, CHAN_POST };
static void
channel_handler(struct ssh *ssh, int table,
fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset, time_t *unpause_secs)
{
struct ssh_channels *sc = ssh->chanctxt;
chan_fn **ftab = table == CHAN_PRE ? sc->channel_pre : sc->channel_post;
u_int i, oalloc;
Channel *c;
time_t now;
now = monotime();
if (unpause_secs != NULL)
*unpause_secs = 0;
for (i = 0, oalloc = sc->channels_alloc; i < oalloc; i++) {
c = sc->channels[i];
if (c == NULL)
continue;
if (c->delayed) {
if (table == CHAN_PRE)
c->delayed = 0;
else
continue;
}
if (ftab[c->type] != NULL) {
/*
* Run handlers that are not paused.
*/
if (c->notbefore <= now)
(*ftab[c->type])(ssh, c, readset, writeset);
else if (unpause_secs != NULL) {
/*
* Collect the time that the earliest
* channel comes off pause.
*/
debug3("%s: chan %d: skip for %d more seconds",
__func__, c->self,
(int)(c->notbefore - now));
if (*unpause_secs == 0 ||
(c->notbefore - now) < *unpause_secs)
*unpause_secs = c->notbefore - now;
}
}
channel_garbage_collect(ssh, c);
}
if (unpause_secs != NULL && *unpause_secs != 0)
debug3("%s: first channel unpauses in %d seconds",
__func__, (int)*unpause_secs);
}
/*
* Create sockets before allocating the select bitmasks.
* This is necessary for things that need to happen after reading
* the network-input but before channel_prepare_select().
*/
static void
channel_before_prepare_select(struct ssh *ssh)
{
struct ssh_channels *sc = ssh->chanctxt;
Channel *c;
u_int i, oalloc;
for (i = 0, oalloc = sc->channels_alloc; i < oalloc; i++) {
c = sc->channels[i];
if (c == NULL)
continue;
if (c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_RDYNAMIC_OPEN)
channel_before_prepare_select_rdynamic(ssh, c);
}
}
/*
* Allocate/update select bitmasks and add any bits relevant to channels in
* select bitmasks.
*/
void
channel_prepare_select(struct ssh *ssh, fd_set **readsetp, fd_set **writesetp,
int *maxfdp, u_int *nallocp, time_t *minwait_secs)
{
u_int n, sz, nfdset;
channel_before_prepare_select(ssh); /* might update channel_max_fd */
n = MAXIMUM(*maxfdp, ssh->chanctxt->channel_max_fd);
nfdset = howmany(n+1, NFDBITS);
/* Explicitly test here, because xrealloc isn't always called */
if (nfdset && SIZE_MAX / nfdset < sizeof(fd_mask))
fatal("channel_prepare_select: max_fd (%d) is too large", n);
sz = nfdset * sizeof(fd_mask);
/* perhaps check sz < nalloc/2 and shrink? */
if (*readsetp == NULL || sz > *nallocp) {
*readsetp = xreallocarray(*readsetp, nfdset, sizeof(fd_mask));
*writesetp = xreallocarray(*writesetp, nfdset, sizeof(fd_mask));
*nallocp = sz;
}
*maxfdp = n;
memset(*readsetp, 0, sz);
memset(*writesetp, 0, sz);
if (!ssh_packet_is_rekeying(ssh))
channel_handler(ssh, CHAN_PRE, *readsetp, *writesetp,
minwait_secs);
}
/*
* After select, perform any appropriate operations for channels which have
* events pending.
*/
void
channel_after_select(struct ssh *ssh, fd_set *readset, fd_set *writeset)
{
channel_handler(ssh, CHAN_POST, readset, writeset, NULL);
}
/*
* Enqueue data for channels with open or draining c->input.
*/
static void
channel_output_poll_input_open(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c)
{
size_t len, plen;
const u_char *pkt;
int r;
if ((len = sshbuf_len(c->input)) == 0) {
if (c->istate == CHAN_INPUT_WAIT_DRAIN) {
/*
* input-buffer is empty and read-socket shutdown:
* tell peer, that we will not send more data:
* send IEOF.
* hack for extended data: delay EOF if EFD still
* in use.
*/
if (CHANNEL_EFD_INPUT_ACTIVE(c))
debug2("channel %d: "
"ibuf_empty delayed efd %d/(%zu)",
c->self, c->efd, sshbuf_len(c->extended));
else
chan_ibuf_empty(ssh, c);
}
return;
}
if (!c->have_remote_id)
fatal(":%s: channel %d: no remote id", __func__, c->self);
if (c->datagram) {
/* Check datagram will fit; drop if not */
if ((r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(c->input, &pkt, &plen)) != 0)
fatal("%s: channel %d: get datagram: %s", __func__,
c->self, ssh_err(r));
/*
* XXX this does tail-drop on the datagram queue which is
* usually suboptimal compared to head-drop. Better to have
* backpressure at read time? (i.e. read + discard)
*/
if (plen > c->remote_window || plen > c->remote_maxpacket) {
debug("channel %d: datagram too big", c->self);
return;
}
/* Enqueue it */
if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->remote_id)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, pkt, plen)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) {
fatal("%s: channel %i: datagram: %s", __func__,
c->self, ssh_err(r));
}
c->remote_window -= plen;
return;
}
/* Enqueue packet for buffered data. */
if (len > c->remote_window)
len = c->remote_window;
if (len > c->remote_maxpacket)
len = c->remote_maxpacket;
if (len == 0)
return;
if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->remote_id)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, sshbuf_ptr(c->input), len)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) {
fatal("%s: channel %i: data: %s", __func__,
c->self, ssh_err(r));
}
if ((r = sshbuf_consume(c->input, len)) != 0)
fatal("%s: channel %i: consume: %s", __func__,
c->self, ssh_err(r));
c->remote_window -= len;
}
/*
* Enqueue data for channels with open c->extended in read mode.
*/
static void
channel_output_poll_extended_read(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c)
{
size_t len;
int r;
if ((len = sshbuf_len(c->extended)) == 0)
return;
debug2("channel %d: rwin %u elen %zu euse %d", c->self,
c->remote_window, sshbuf_len(c->extended), c->extended_usage);
if (len > c->remote_window)
len = c->remote_window;
if (len > c->remote_maxpacket)
len = c->remote_maxpacket;
if (len == 0)
return;
if (!c->have_remote_id)
fatal(":%s: channel %d: no remote id", __func__, c->self);
if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->remote_id)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, SSH2_EXTENDED_DATA_STDERR)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, sshbuf_ptr(c->extended), len)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) {
fatal("%s: channel %i: data: %s", __func__,
c->self, ssh_err(r));
}
if ((r = sshbuf_consume(c->extended, len)) != 0)
fatal("%s: channel %i: consume: %s", __func__,
c->self, ssh_err(r));
c->remote_window -= len;
debug2("channel %d: sent ext data %zu", c->self, len);
}
/* If there is data to send to the connection, enqueue some of it now. */
void
channel_output_poll(struct ssh *ssh)
{
struct ssh_channels *sc = ssh->chanctxt;
Channel *c;
u_int i;
for (i = 0; i < sc->channels_alloc; i++) {
c = sc->channels[i];
if (c == NULL)
continue;
/*
* We are only interested in channels that can have buffered
* incoming data.
*/
if (c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN)
continue;
if ((c->flags & (CHAN_CLOSE_SENT|CHAN_CLOSE_RCVD))) {
/* XXX is this true? */
debug3("channel %d: will not send data after close",
c->self);
continue;
}
/* Get the amount of buffered data for this channel. */
if (c->istate == CHAN_INPUT_OPEN ||
c->istate == CHAN_INPUT_WAIT_DRAIN)
channel_output_poll_input_open(ssh, c);
/* Send extended data, i.e. stderr */
if (!(c->flags & CHAN_EOF_SENT) &&
c->extended_usage == CHAN_EXTENDED_READ)
channel_output_poll_extended_read(ssh, c);
}
}
/* -- mux proxy support */
/*
* When multiplexing channel messages for mux clients we have to deal
* with downstream messages from the mux client and upstream messages
* from the ssh server:
* 1) Handling downstream messages is straightforward and happens
* in channel_proxy_downstream():
* - We forward all messages (mostly) unmodified to the server.
* - However, in order to route messages from upstream to the correct
* downstream client, we have to replace the channel IDs used by the
* mux clients with a unique channel ID because the mux clients might
* use conflicting channel IDs.
* - so we inspect and change both SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN and
* SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION messages, create a local
* SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_PROXY channel and replace the mux clients ID
* with the newly allocated channel ID.
* 2) Upstream messages are received by matching SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_PROXY
* channels and processed by channel_proxy_upstream(). The local channel ID
* is then translated back to the original mux client ID.
* 3) In both cases we need to keep track of matching SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE
* messages so we can clean up SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_PROXY channels.
* 4) The SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_PROXY channels also need to closed when the
* downstream mux client are removed.
* 5) Handling SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN messages from the upstream server
* requires more work, because they are not addressed to a specific
* channel. E.g. client_request_forwarded_tcpip() needs to figure
* out whether the request is addressed to the local client or a
* specific downstream client based on the listen-address/port.
* 6) Agent and X11-Forwarding have a similar problem and are currently
* not supported as the matching session/channel cannot be identified
* easily.
*/
/*
* receive packets from downstream mux clients:
* channel callback fired on read from mux client, creates
* SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_PROXY channels and translates channel IDs
* on channel creation.
*/
int
channel_proxy_downstream(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *downstream)
{
Channel *c = NULL;
struct sshbuf *original = NULL, *modified = NULL;
const u_char *cp;
char *ctype = NULL, *listen_host = NULL;
u_char type;
size_t have;
int ret = -1, r;
u_int id, remote_id, listen_port;
/* sshbuf_dump(downstream->input, stderr); */
if ((r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(downstream->input, &cp, &have))
!= 0) {
error("%s: malformed message: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
return -1;
}
if (have < 2) {
error("%s: short message", __func__);
return -1;
}
type = cp[1];
/* skip padlen + type */
cp += 2;
have -= 2;
if (ssh_packet_log_type(type))
debug3("%s: channel %u: down->up: type %u", __func__,
downstream->self, type);
switch (type) {
case SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN:
if ((original = sshbuf_from(cp, have)) == NULL ||
(modified = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
error("%s: alloc", __func__);
goto out;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(original, &ctype, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(original, &id)) != 0) {
error("%s: parse error %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
goto out;
}
c = channel_new(ssh, "mux proxy", SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_PROXY,
-1, -1, -1, 0, 0, 0, ctype, 1);
c->mux_ctx = downstream; /* point to mux client */
c->mux_downstream_id = id; /* original downstream id */
if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(modified, ctype)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(modified, c->self)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_putb(modified, original)) != 0) {
error("%s: compose error %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
channel_free(ssh, c);
goto out;
}
break;
case SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION:
/*
* Almost the same as SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN, except then we
* need to parse 'remote_id' instead of 'ctype'.
*/
if ((original = sshbuf_from(cp, have)) == NULL ||
(modified = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
error("%s: alloc", __func__);
goto out;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(original, &remote_id)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(original, &id)) != 0) {
error("%s: parse error %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
goto out;
}
c = channel_new(ssh, "mux proxy", SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_PROXY,
-1, -1, -1, 0, 0, 0, "mux-down-connect", 1);
c->mux_ctx = downstream; /* point to mux client */
c->mux_downstream_id = id;
c->remote_id = remote_id;
c->have_remote_id = 1;
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(modified, remote_id)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(modified, c->self)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_putb(modified, original)) != 0) {
error("%s: compose error %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
channel_free(ssh, c);
goto out;
}
break;
case SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST:
if ((original = sshbuf_from(cp, have)) == NULL) {
error("%s: alloc", __func__);
goto out;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(original, &ctype, NULL)) != 0) {
error("%s: parse error %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
goto out;
}
if (strcmp(ctype, "tcpip-forward") != 0) {
error("%s: unsupported request %s", __func__, ctype);
goto out;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(original, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_cstring(original, &listen_host, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(original, &listen_port)) != 0) {
error("%s: parse error %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
goto out;
}
if (listen_port > 65535) {
error("%s: tcpip-forward for %s: bad port %u",
__func__, listen_host, listen_port);
goto out;
}
/* Record that connection to this host/port is permitted. */
permission_set_add(ssh, FORWARD_USER, FORWARD_LOCAL, "<mux>", -1,
listen_host, NULL, (int)listen_port, downstream);
listen_host = NULL;
break;
case SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE:
if (have < 4)
break;
remote_id = PEEK_U32(cp);
if ((c = channel_by_remote_id(ssh, remote_id)) != NULL) {
if (c->flags & CHAN_CLOSE_RCVD)
channel_free(ssh, c);
else
c->flags |= CHAN_CLOSE_SENT;
}
break;
}
if (modified) {
if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, type)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_putb(ssh, modified)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) {
error("%s: send %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
goto out;
}
} else {
if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, type)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put(ssh, cp, have)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) {
error("%s: send %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
goto out;
}
}
ret = 0;
out:
free(ctype);
free(listen_host);
sshbuf_free(original);
sshbuf_free(modified);
return ret;
}
/*
* receive packets from upstream server and de-multiplex packets
* to correct downstream:
* implemented as a helper for channel input handlers,
* replaces local (proxy) channel ID with downstream channel ID.
*/
int
channel_proxy_upstream(Channel *c, int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
{
struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
Channel *downstream;
const u_char *cp = NULL;
size_t len;
int r;
/*
* When receiving packets from the peer we need to check whether we
* need to forward the packets to the mux client. In this case we
* restore the original channel id and keep track of CLOSE messages,
* so we can cleanup the channel.
*/
if (c == NULL || c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_PROXY)
return 0;
if ((downstream = c->mux_ctx) == NULL)
return 0;
switch (type) {
case SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE:
case SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA:
case SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EOF:
case SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA:
case SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION:
case SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE:
case SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST:
case SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS:
case SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE:
case SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST:
break;
default:
debug2("%s: channel %u: unsupported type %u", __func__,
c->self, type);
return 0;
}
if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
error("%s: alloc reply", __func__);
goto out;
}
/* get remaining payload (after id) */
cp = sshpkt_ptr(ssh, &len);
if (cp == NULL) {
error("%s: no packet", __func__);
goto out;
}
/* translate id and send to muxclient */
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, 0)) != 0 || /* padlen */
(r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, type)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, c->mux_downstream_id)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put(b, cp, len)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_stringb(downstream->output, b)) != 0) {
error("%s: compose for muxclient %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
goto out;
}
/* sshbuf_dump(b, stderr); */
if (ssh_packet_log_type(type))
debug3("%s: channel %u: up->down: type %u", __func__, c->self,
type);
out:
/* update state */
switch (type) {
case SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION:
/* record remote_id for SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE */
if (cp && len > 4) {
c->remote_id = PEEK_U32(cp);
c->have_remote_id = 1;
}
break;
case SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE:
if (c->flags & CHAN_CLOSE_SENT)
channel_free(ssh, c);
else
c->flags |= CHAN_CLOSE_RCVD;
break;
}
sshbuf_free(b);
return 1;
}
/* -- protocol input */
/* Parse a channel ID from the current packet */
static int
channel_parse_id(struct ssh *ssh, const char *where, const char *what)
{
u_int32_t id;
int r;
if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &id)) != 0) {
error("%s: parse id: %s", where, ssh_err(r));
ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "Invalid %s message", what);
}
if (id > INT_MAX) {
error("%s: bad channel id %u: %s", where, id, ssh_err(r));
ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "Invalid %s channel id", what);
}
return (int)id;
}
/* Lookup a channel from an ID in the current packet */
static Channel *
channel_from_packet_id(struct ssh *ssh, const char *where, const char *what)
{
int id = channel_parse_id(ssh, where, what);
Channel *c;
if ((c = channel_lookup(ssh, id)) == NULL) {
ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh,
"%s packet referred to nonexistent channel %d", what, id);
}
return c;
}
int
channel_input_data(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
{
const u_char *data;
size_t data_len, win_len;
Channel *c = channel_from_packet_id(ssh, __func__, "data");
int r;
if (channel_proxy_upstream(c, type, seq, ssh))
return 0;
/* Ignore any data for non-open channels (might happen on close) */
if (c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN &&
c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_RDYNAMIC_OPEN &&
c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_RDYNAMIC_FINISH &&
c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_X11_OPEN)
return 0;
/* Get the data. */
if ((r = sshpkt_get_string_direct(ssh, &data, &data_len)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
fatal("%s: channel %d: get data: %s", __func__,
c->self, ssh_err(r));
win_len = data_len;
if (c->datagram)
win_len += 4; /* string length header */
/*
* The sending side reduces its window as it sends data, so we
* must 'fake' consumption of the data in order to ensure that window
* updates are sent back. Otherwise the connection might deadlock.
*/
if (c->ostate != CHAN_OUTPUT_OPEN) {
c->local_window -= win_len;
c->local_consumed += win_len;
return 0;
}
if (win_len > c->local_maxpacket) {
logit("channel %d: rcvd big packet %zu, maxpack %u",
c->self, win_len, c->local_maxpacket);
return 0;
}
if (win_len > c->local_window) {
logit("channel %d: rcvd too much data %zu, win %u",
c->self, win_len, c->local_window);
return 0;
}
c->local_window -= win_len;
if (c->datagram) {
if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(c->output, data, data_len)) != 0)
fatal("%s: channel %d: append datagram: %s",
__func__, c->self, ssh_err(r));
} else if ((r = sshbuf_put(c->output, data, data_len)) != 0)
fatal("%s: channel %d: append data: %s",
__func__, c->self, ssh_err(r));
return 0;
}
int
channel_input_extended_data(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
{
const u_char *data;
size_t data_len;
u_int32_t tcode;
Channel *c = channel_from_packet_id(ssh, __func__, "extended data");
int r;
if (channel_proxy_upstream(c, type, seq, ssh))
return 0;
if (c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN) {
logit("channel %d: ext data for non open", c->self);
return 0;
}
if (c->flags & CHAN_EOF_RCVD) {
if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_EXTEOF)
debug("channel %d: accepting ext data after eof",
c->self);
else
ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "Received extended_data "
"after EOF on channel %d.", c->self);
}
if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &tcode)) != 0) {
error("%s: parse tcode: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "Invalid extended_data message");
}
if (c->efd == -1 ||
c->extended_usage != CHAN_EXTENDED_WRITE ||
tcode != SSH2_EXTENDED_DATA_STDERR) {
logit("channel %d: bad ext data", c->self);
return 0;
}
if ((r = sshpkt_get_string_direct(ssh, &data, &data_len)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) {
error("%s: parse data: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "Invalid extended_data message");
}
if (data_len > c->local_window) {
logit("channel %d: rcvd too much extended_data %zu, win %u",
c->self, data_len, c->local_window);
return 0;
}
debug2("channel %d: rcvd ext data %zu", c->self, data_len);
/* XXX sshpkt_getb? */
if ((r = sshbuf_put(c->extended, data, data_len)) != 0)
error("%s: append: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
c->local_window -= data_len;
return 0;
}
int
channel_input_ieof(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
{
Channel *c = channel_from_packet_id(ssh, __func__, "ieof");
int r;
if ((r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) {
error("%s: parse data: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "Invalid ieof message");
}
if (channel_proxy_upstream(c, type, seq, ssh))
return 0;
chan_rcvd_ieof(ssh, c);
/* XXX force input close */
if (c->force_drain && c->istate == CHAN_INPUT_OPEN) {
debug("channel %d: FORCE input drain", c->self);
c->istate = CHAN_INPUT_WAIT_DRAIN;
if (sshbuf_len(c->input) == 0)
chan_ibuf_empty(ssh, c);
}
return 0;
}
int
channel_input_oclose(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
{
Channel *c = channel_from_packet_id(ssh, __func__, "oclose");
int r;
if (channel_proxy_upstream(c, type, seq, ssh))
return 0;
if ((r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) {
error("%s: parse data: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "Invalid oclose message");
}
chan_rcvd_oclose(ssh, c);
return 0;
}
int
channel_input_open_confirmation(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
{
Channel *c = channel_from_packet_id(ssh, __func__, "open confirmation");
u_int32_t remote_window, remote_maxpacket;
int r;
if (channel_proxy_upstream(c, type, seq, ssh))
return 0;
if (c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING)
ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "Received open confirmation for "
"non-opening channel %d.", c->self);
/*
* Record the remote channel number and mark that the channel
* is now open.
*/
if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &c->remote_id)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &remote_window)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &remote_maxpacket)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) {
error("%s: window/maxpacket: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "Invalid open confirmation message");
}
c->have_remote_id = 1;
c->remote_window = remote_window;
c->remote_maxpacket = remote_maxpacket;
c->type = SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN;
if (c->open_confirm) {
debug2("%s: channel %d: callback start", __func__, c->self);
c->open_confirm(ssh, c->self, 1, c->open_confirm_ctx);
debug2("%s: channel %d: callback done", __func__, c->self);
}
debug2("channel %d: open confirm rwindow %u rmax %u", c->self,
c->remote_window, c->remote_maxpacket);
return 0;
}
static char *
reason2txt(int reason)
{
switch (reason) {
case SSH2_OPEN_ADMINISTRATIVELY_PROHIBITED:
return "administratively prohibited";
case SSH2_OPEN_CONNECT_FAILED:
return "connect failed";
case SSH2_OPEN_UNKNOWN_CHANNEL_TYPE:
return "unknown channel type";
case SSH2_OPEN_RESOURCE_SHORTAGE:
return "resource shortage";
}
return "unknown reason";
}
int
channel_input_open_failure(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
{
Channel *c = channel_from_packet_id(ssh, __func__, "open failure");
u_int32_t reason;
char *msg = NULL;
int r;
if (channel_proxy_upstream(c, type, seq, ssh))
return 0;
if (c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING)
ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "Received open failure for "
"non-opening channel %d.", c->self);
if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &reason)) != 0) {
error("%s: reason: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "Invalid open failure message");
}
/* skip language */
if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &msg, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_get_string_direct(ssh, NULL, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) {
error("%s: message/lang: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "Invalid open failure message");
}
logit("channel %d: open failed: %s%s%s", c->self,
reason2txt(reason), msg ? ": ": "", msg ? msg : "");
free(msg);
if (c->open_confirm) {
debug2("%s: channel %d: callback start", __func__, c->self);
c->open_confirm(ssh, c->self, 0, c->open_confirm_ctx);
debug2("%s: channel %d: callback done", __func__, c->self);
}
/* Schedule the channel for cleanup/deletion. */
chan_mark_dead(ssh, c);
return 0;
}
int
channel_input_window_adjust(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
{
int id = channel_parse_id(ssh, __func__, "window adjust");
Channel *c;
u_int32_t adjust;
u_int new_rwin;
int r;
if ((c = channel_lookup(ssh, id)) == NULL) {
logit("Received window adjust for non-open channel %d.", id);
return 0;
}
if (channel_proxy_upstream(c, type, seq, ssh))
return 0;
if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &adjust)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) {
error("%s: adjust: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "Invalid window adjust message");
}
debug2("channel %d: rcvd adjust %u", c->self, adjust);
if ((new_rwin = c->remote_window + adjust) < c->remote_window) {
fatal("channel %d: adjust %u overflows remote window %u",
c->self, adjust, c->remote_window);
}
c->remote_window = new_rwin;
return 0;
}
int
channel_input_status_confirm(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
{
int id = channel_parse_id(ssh, __func__, "status confirm");
Channel *c;
struct channel_confirm *cc;
/* Reset keepalive timeout */
ssh_packet_set_alive_timeouts(ssh, 0);
debug2("%s: type %d id %d", __func__, type, id);
if ((c = channel_lookup(ssh, id)) == NULL) {
logit("%s: %d: unknown", __func__, id);
return 0;
}
if (channel_proxy_upstream(c, type, seq, ssh))
return 0;
if (sshpkt_get_end(ssh) != 0)
ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "Invalid status confirm message");
if ((cc = TAILQ_FIRST(&c->status_confirms)) == NULL)
return 0;
cc->cb(ssh, type, c, cc->ctx);
TAILQ_REMOVE(&c->status_confirms, cc, entry);
explicit_bzero(cc, sizeof(*cc));
free(cc);
return 0;
}
/* -- tcp forwarding */
void
channel_set_af(struct ssh *ssh, int af)
{
ssh->chanctxt->IPv4or6 = af;
}
/*
* Determine whether or not a port forward listens to loopback, the
* specified address or wildcard. On the client, a specified bind
* address will always override gateway_ports. On the server, a
* gateway_ports of 1 (``yes'') will override the client's specification
* and force a wildcard bind, whereas a value of 2 (``clientspecified'')
* will bind to whatever address the client asked for.
*
* Special-case listen_addrs are:
*
* "0.0.0.0" -> wildcard v4/v6 if SSH_OLD_FORWARD_ADDR
* "" (empty string), "*" -> wildcard v4/v6
* "localhost" -> loopback v4/v6
* "127.0.0.1" / "::1" -> accepted even if gateway_ports isn't set
*/
static const char *
channel_fwd_bind_addr(struct ssh *ssh, const char *listen_addr, int *wildcardp,
int is_client, struct ForwardOptions *fwd_opts)
{
const char *addr = NULL;
int wildcard = 0;
if (listen_addr == NULL) {
/* No address specified: default to gateway_ports setting */
if (fwd_opts->gateway_ports)
wildcard = 1;
} else if (fwd_opts->gateway_ports || is_client) {
if (((datafellows & SSH_OLD_FORWARD_ADDR) &&
strcmp(listen_addr, "0.0.0.0") == 0 && is_client == 0) ||
*listen_addr == '\0' || strcmp(listen_addr, "*") == 0 ||
(!is_client && fwd_opts->gateway_ports == 1)) {
wildcard = 1;
/*
* Notify client if they requested a specific listen
* address and it was overridden.
*/
if (*listen_addr != '\0' &&
strcmp(listen_addr, "0.0.0.0") != 0 &&
strcmp(listen_addr, "*") != 0) {
ssh_packet_send_debug(ssh,
"Forwarding listen address "
"\"%s\" overridden by server "
"GatewayPorts", listen_addr);
}
} else if (strcmp(listen_addr, "localhost") != 0 ||
strcmp(listen_addr, "127.0.0.1") == 0 ||
strcmp(listen_addr, "::1") == 0) {
- /* Accept localhost address when GatewayPorts=yes */
+ /*
+ * Accept explicit localhost address when
+ * GatewayPorts=yes. The "localhost" hostname is
+ * deliberately skipped here so it will listen on all
+ * available local address families.
+ */
addr = listen_addr;
}
} else if (strcmp(listen_addr, "127.0.0.1") == 0 ||
strcmp(listen_addr, "::1") == 0) {
/*
* If a specific IPv4/IPv6 localhost address has been
* requested then accept it even if gateway_ports is in
* effect. This allows the client to prefer IPv4 or IPv6.
*/
addr = listen_addr;
}
if (wildcardp != NULL)
*wildcardp = wildcard;
return addr;
}
static int
channel_setup_fwd_listener_tcpip(struct ssh *ssh, int type,
struct Forward *fwd, int *allocated_listen_port,
struct ForwardOptions *fwd_opts)
{
Channel *c;
int sock, r, success = 0, wildcard = 0, is_client;
struct addrinfo hints, *ai, *aitop;
const char *host, *addr;
char ntop[NI_MAXHOST], strport[NI_MAXSERV];
in_port_t *lport_p;
is_client = (type == SSH_CHANNEL_PORT_LISTENER);
if (is_client && fwd->connect_path != NULL) {
host = fwd->connect_path;
} else {
host = (type == SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER) ?
fwd->listen_host : fwd->connect_host;
if (host == NULL) {
error("No forward host name.");
return 0;
}
if (strlen(host) >= NI_MAXHOST) {
error("Forward host name too long.");
return 0;
}
}
/* Determine the bind address, cf. channel_fwd_bind_addr() comment */
addr = channel_fwd_bind_addr(ssh, fwd->listen_host, &wildcard,
is_client, fwd_opts);
debug3("%s: type %d wildcard %d addr %s", __func__,
type, wildcard, (addr == NULL) ? "NULL" : addr);
/*
* getaddrinfo returns a loopback address if the hostname is
* set to NULL and hints.ai_flags is not AI_PASSIVE
*/
memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
hints.ai_family = ssh->chanctxt->IPv4or6;
hints.ai_flags = wildcard ? AI_PASSIVE : 0;
hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%d", fwd->listen_port);
if ((r = getaddrinfo(addr, strport, &hints, &aitop)) != 0) {
if (addr == NULL) {
/* This really shouldn't happen */
ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "getaddrinfo: fatal error: %s",
ssh_gai_strerror(r));
} else {
error("%s: getaddrinfo(%.64s): %s", __func__, addr,
ssh_gai_strerror(r));
}
return 0;
}
if (allocated_listen_port != NULL)
*allocated_listen_port = 0;
for (ai = aitop; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) {
switch (ai->ai_family) {
case AF_INET:
lport_p = &((struct sockaddr_in *)ai->ai_addr)->
sin_port;
break;
case AF_INET6:
lport_p = &((struct sockaddr_in6 *)ai->ai_addr)->
sin6_port;
break;
default:
continue;
}
/*
* If allocating a port for -R forwards, then use the
* same port for all address families.
*/
if (type == SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER &&
fwd->listen_port == 0 && allocated_listen_port != NULL &&
*allocated_listen_port > 0)
*lport_p = htons(*allocated_listen_port);
if (getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen, ntop, sizeof(ntop),
strport, sizeof(strport),
NI_NUMERICHOST|NI_NUMERICSERV) != 0) {
error("%s: getnameinfo failed", __func__);
continue;
}
/* Create a port to listen for the host. */
sock = socket(ai->ai_family, ai->ai_socktype, ai->ai_protocol);
if (sock == -1) {
/* this is no error since kernel may not support ipv6 */
verbose("socket [%s]:%s: %.100s", ntop, strport,
strerror(errno));
continue;
}
set_reuseaddr(sock);
if (ai->ai_family == AF_INET6)
sock_set_v6only(sock);
debug("Local forwarding listening on %s port %s.",
ntop, strport);
/* Bind the socket to the address. */
if (bind(sock, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen) == -1) {
/*
* address can be in if use ipv6 address is
* already bound
*/
if (!ai->ai_next)
error("bind [%s]:%s: %.100s",
ntop, strport, strerror(errno));
else
verbose("bind [%s]:%s: %.100s",
ntop, strport, strerror(errno));
close(sock);
continue;
}
/* Start listening for connections on the socket. */
if (listen(sock, SSH_LISTEN_BACKLOG) == -1) {
error("listen: %.100s", strerror(errno));
error("listen [%s]:%s: %.100s", ntop, strport,
strerror(errno));
close(sock);
continue;
}
/*
* fwd->listen_port == 0 requests a dynamically allocated port -
* record what we got.
*/
if (type == SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER &&
fwd->listen_port == 0 &&
allocated_listen_port != NULL &&
*allocated_listen_port == 0) {
*allocated_listen_port = get_local_port(sock);
debug("Allocated listen port %d",
*allocated_listen_port);
}
/* Allocate a channel number for the socket. */
c = channel_new(ssh, "port listener", type, sock, sock, -1,
CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT,
0, "port listener", 1);
c->path = xstrdup(host);
c->host_port = fwd->connect_port;
c->listening_addr = addr == NULL ? NULL : xstrdup(addr);
if (fwd->listen_port == 0 && allocated_listen_port != NULL &&
!(datafellows & SSH_BUG_DYNAMIC_RPORT))
c->listening_port = *allocated_listen_port;
else
c->listening_port = fwd->listen_port;
success = 1;
}
if (success == 0)
error("%s: cannot listen to port: %d", __func__,
fwd->listen_port);
freeaddrinfo(aitop);
return success;
}
static int
channel_setup_fwd_listener_streamlocal(struct ssh *ssh, int type,
struct Forward *fwd, struct ForwardOptions *fwd_opts)
{
struct sockaddr_un sunaddr;
const char *path;
Channel *c;
int port, sock;
mode_t omask;
switch (type) {
case SSH_CHANNEL_UNIX_LISTENER:
if (fwd->connect_path != NULL) {
if (strlen(fwd->connect_path) > sizeof(sunaddr.sun_path)) {
error("Local connecting path too long: %s",
fwd->connect_path);
return 0;
}
path = fwd->connect_path;
port = PORT_STREAMLOCAL;
} else {
if (fwd->connect_host == NULL) {
error("No forward host name.");
return 0;
}
if (strlen(fwd->connect_host) >= NI_MAXHOST) {
error("Forward host name too long.");
return 0;
}
path = fwd->connect_host;
port = fwd->connect_port;
}
break;
case SSH_CHANNEL_RUNIX_LISTENER:
path = fwd->listen_path;
port = PORT_STREAMLOCAL;
break;
default:
error("%s: unexpected channel type %d", __func__, type);
return 0;
}
if (fwd->listen_path == NULL) {
error("No forward path name.");
return 0;
}
if (strlen(fwd->listen_path) > sizeof(sunaddr.sun_path)) {
error("Local listening path too long: %s", fwd->listen_path);
return 0;
}
debug3("%s: type %d path %s", __func__, type, fwd->listen_path);
/* Start a Unix domain listener. */
omask = umask(fwd_opts->streamlocal_bind_mask);
sock = unix_listener(fwd->listen_path, SSH_LISTEN_BACKLOG,
fwd_opts->streamlocal_bind_unlink);
umask(omask);
if (sock < 0)
return 0;
debug("Local forwarding listening on path %s.", fwd->listen_path);
/* Allocate a channel number for the socket. */
c = channel_new(ssh, "unix listener", type, sock, sock, -1,
CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT,
0, "unix listener", 1);
c->path = xstrdup(path);
c->host_port = port;
c->listening_port = PORT_STREAMLOCAL;
c->listening_addr = xstrdup(fwd->listen_path);
return 1;
}
static int
channel_cancel_rport_listener_tcpip(struct ssh *ssh,
const char *host, u_short port)
{
u_int i;
int found = 0;
for (i = 0; i < ssh->chanctxt->channels_alloc; i++) {
Channel *c = ssh->chanctxt->channels[i];
if (c == NULL || c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER)
continue;
if (strcmp(c->path, host) == 0 && c->listening_port == port) {
debug2("%s: close channel %d", __func__, i);
channel_free(ssh, c);
found = 1;
}
}
return found;
}
static int
channel_cancel_rport_listener_streamlocal(struct ssh *ssh, const char *path)
{
u_int i;
int found = 0;
for (i = 0; i < ssh->chanctxt->channels_alloc; i++) {
Channel *c = ssh->chanctxt->channels[i];
if (c == NULL || c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_RUNIX_LISTENER)
continue;
if (c->path == NULL)
continue;
if (strcmp(c->path, path) == 0) {
debug2("%s: close channel %d", __func__, i);
channel_free(ssh, c);
found = 1;
}
}
return found;
}
int
channel_cancel_rport_listener(struct ssh *ssh, struct Forward *fwd)
{
if (fwd->listen_path != NULL) {
return channel_cancel_rport_listener_streamlocal(ssh,
fwd->listen_path);
} else {
return channel_cancel_rport_listener_tcpip(ssh,
fwd->listen_host, fwd->listen_port);
}
}
static int
channel_cancel_lport_listener_tcpip(struct ssh *ssh,
const char *lhost, u_short lport, int cport,
struct ForwardOptions *fwd_opts)
{
u_int i;
int found = 0;
const char *addr = channel_fwd_bind_addr(ssh, lhost, NULL, 1, fwd_opts);
for (i = 0; i < ssh->chanctxt->channels_alloc; i++) {
Channel *c = ssh->chanctxt->channels[i];
if (c == NULL || c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_PORT_LISTENER)
continue;
if (c->listening_port != lport)
continue;
if (cport == CHANNEL_CANCEL_PORT_STATIC) {
/* skip dynamic forwardings */
if (c->host_port == 0)
continue;
} else {
if (c->host_port != cport)
continue;
}
if ((c->listening_addr == NULL && addr != NULL) ||
(c->listening_addr != NULL && addr == NULL))
continue;
if (addr == NULL || strcmp(c->listening_addr, addr) == 0) {
debug2("%s: close channel %d", __func__, i);
channel_free(ssh, c);
found = 1;
}
}
return found;
}
static int
channel_cancel_lport_listener_streamlocal(struct ssh *ssh, const char *path)
{
u_int i;
int found = 0;
if (path == NULL) {
error("%s: no path specified.", __func__);
return 0;
}
for (i = 0; i < ssh->chanctxt->channels_alloc; i++) {
Channel *c = ssh->chanctxt->channels[i];
if (c == NULL || c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_UNIX_LISTENER)
continue;
if (c->listening_addr == NULL)
continue;
if (strcmp(c->listening_addr, path) == 0) {
debug2("%s: close channel %d", __func__, i);
channel_free(ssh, c);
found = 1;
}
}
return found;
}
int
channel_cancel_lport_listener(struct ssh *ssh,
struct Forward *fwd, int cport, struct ForwardOptions *fwd_opts)
{
if (fwd->listen_path != NULL) {
return channel_cancel_lport_listener_streamlocal(ssh,
fwd->listen_path);
} else {
return channel_cancel_lport_listener_tcpip(ssh,
fwd->listen_host, fwd->listen_port, cport, fwd_opts);
}
}
/* protocol local port fwd, used by ssh */
int
channel_setup_local_fwd_listener(struct ssh *ssh,
struct Forward *fwd, struct ForwardOptions *fwd_opts)
{
if (fwd->listen_path != NULL) {
return channel_setup_fwd_listener_streamlocal(ssh,
SSH_CHANNEL_UNIX_LISTENER, fwd, fwd_opts);
} else {
return channel_setup_fwd_listener_tcpip(ssh,
SSH_CHANNEL_PORT_LISTENER, fwd, NULL, fwd_opts);
}
}
/* Matches a remote forwarding permission against a requested forwarding */
static int
remote_open_match(struct permission *allowed_open, struct Forward *fwd)
{
int ret;
char *lhost;
/* XXX add ACLs for streamlocal */
if (fwd->listen_path != NULL)
return 1;
if (fwd->listen_host == NULL || allowed_open->listen_host == NULL)
return 0;
if (allowed_open->listen_port != FWD_PERMIT_ANY_PORT &&
allowed_open->listen_port != fwd->listen_port)
return 0;
/* Match hostnames case-insensitively */
lhost = xstrdup(fwd->listen_host);
lowercase(lhost);
ret = match_pattern(lhost, allowed_open->listen_host);
free(lhost);
return ret;
}
/* Checks whether a requested remote forwarding is permitted */
static int
check_rfwd_permission(struct ssh *ssh, struct Forward *fwd)
{
struct ssh_channels *sc = ssh->chanctxt;
struct permission_set *pset = &sc->remote_perms;
u_int i, permit, permit_adm = 1;
struct permission *perm;
/* XXX apply GatewayPorts override before checking? */
permit = pset->all_permitted;
if (!permit) {
for (i = 0; i < pset->num_permitted_user; i++) {
perm = &pset->permitted_user[i];
if (remote_open_match(perm, fwd)) {
permit = 1;
break;
}
}
}
if (pset->num_permitted_admin > 0) {
permit_adm = 0;
for (i = 0; i < pset->num_permitted_admin; i++) {
perm = &pset->permitted_admin[i];
if (remote_open_match(perm, fwd)) {
permit_adm = 1;
break;
}
}
}
return permit && permit_adm;
}
/* protocol v2 remote port fwd, used by sshd */
int
channel_setup_remote_fwd_listener(struct ssh *ssh, struct Forward *fwd,
int *allocated_listen_port, struct ForwardOptions *fwd_opts)
{
if (!check_rfwd_permission(ssh, fwd)) {
ssh_packet_send_debug(ssh, "port forwarding refused");
if (fwd->listen_path != NULL)
/* XXX always allowed, see remote_open_match() */
logit("Received request from %.100s port %d to "
"remote forward to path \"%.100s\", "
"but the request was denied.",
ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh),
fwd->listen_path);
else if(fwd->listen_host != NULL)
logit("Received request from %.100s port %d to "
"remote forward to host %.100s port %d, "
"but the request was denied.",
ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh),
fwd->listen_host, fwd->listen_port );
else
logit("Received request from %.100s port %d to remote "
"forward, but the request was denied.",
ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh));
return 0;
}
if (fwd->listen_path != NULL) {
return channel_setup_fwd_listener_streamlocal(ssh,
SSH_CHANNEL_RUNIX_LISTENER, fwd, fwd_opts);
} else {
return channel_setup_fwd_listener_tcpip(ssh,
SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER, fwd, allocated_listen_port,
fwd_opts);
}
}
/*
* Translate the requested rfwd listen host to something usable for
* this server.
*/
static const char *
channel_rfwd_bind_host(const char *listen_host)
{
if (listen_host == NULL) {
return "localhost";
} else if (*listen_host == '\0' || strcmp(listen_host, "*") == 0) {
return "";
} else
return listen_host;
}
/*
* Initiate forwarding of connections to port "port" on remote host through
* the secure channel to host:port from local side.
* Returns handle (index) for updating the dynamic listen port with
* channel_update_permission().
*/
int
channel_request_remote_forwarding(struct ssh *ssh, struct Forward *fwd)
{
int r, success = 0, idx = -1;
char *host_to_connect, *listen_host, *listen_path;
int port_to_connect, listen_port;
/* Send the forward request to the remote side. */
if (fwd->listen_path != NULL) {
if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh,
"streamlocal-forward@openssh.com")) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, 1)) != 0 || /* want reply */
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, fwd->listen_path)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0 ||
(r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0)
fatal("%s: request streamlocal: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
} else {
if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "tcpip-forward")) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, 1)) != 0 || /* want reply */
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh,
channel_rfwd_bind_host(fwd->listen_host))) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, fwd->listen_port)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0 ||
(r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0)
fatal("%s: request tcpip-forward: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
}
/* Assume that server accepts the request */
success = 1;
if (success) {
/* Record that connection to this host/port is permitted. */
host_to_connect = listen_host = listen_path = NULL;
port_to_connect = listen_port = 0;
if (fwd->connect_path != NULL) {
host_to_connect = xstrdup(fwd->connect_path);
port_to_connect = PORT_STREAMLOCAL;
} else {
host_to_connect = xstrdup(fwd->connect_host);
port_to_connect = fwd->connect_port;
}
if (fwd->listen_path != NULL) {
listen_path = xstrdup(fwd->listen_path);
listen_port = PORT_STREAMLOCAL;
} else {
if (fwd->listen_host != NULL)
listen_host = xstrdup(fwd->listen_host);
listen_port = fwd->listen_port;
}
idx = permission_set_add(ssh, FORWARD_USER, FORWARD_LOCAL,
host_to_connect, port_to_connect,
listen_host, listen_path, listen_port, NULL);
}
return idx;
}
static int
open_match(struct permission *allowed_open, const char *requestedhost,
int requestedport)
{
if (allowed_open->host_to_connect == NULL)
return 0;
if (allowed_open->port_to_connect != FWD_PERMIT_ANY_PORT &&
allowed_open->port_to_connect != requestedport)
return 0;
if (strcmp(allowed_open->host_to_connect, FWD_PERMIT_ANY_HOST) != 0 &&
strcmp(allowed_open->host_to_connect, requestedhost) != 0)
return 0;
return 1;
}
/*
* Note that in the listen host/port case
* we don't support FWD_PERMIT_ANY_PORT and
* need to translate between the configured-host (listen_host)
* and what we've sent to the remote server (channel_rfwd_bind_host)
*/
static int
open_listen_match_tcpip(struct permission *allowed_open,
const char *requestedhost, u_short requestedport, int translate)
{
const char *allowed_host;
if (allowed_open->host_to_connect == NULL)
return 0;
if (allowed_open->listen_port != requestedport)
return 0;
if (!translate && allowed_open->listen_host == NULL &&
requestedhost == NULL)
return 1;
allowed_host = translate ?
channel_rfwd_bind_host(allowed_open->listen_host) :
allowed_open->listen_host;
if (allowed_host == NULL || requestedhost == NULL ||
strcmp(allowed_host, requestedhost) != 0)
return 0;
return 1;
}
static int
open_listen_match_streamlocal(struct permission *allowed_open,
const char *requestedpath)
{
if (allowed_open->host_to_connect == NULL)
return 0;
if (allowed_open->listen_port != PORT_STREAMLOCAL)
return 0;
if (allowed_open->listen_path == NULL ||
strcmp(allowed_open->listen_path, requestedpath) != 0)
return 0;
return 1;
}
/*
* Request cancellation of remote forwarding of connection host:port from
* local side.
*/
static int
channel_request_rforward_cancel_tcpip(struct ssh *ssh,
const char *host, u_short port)
{
struct ssh_channels *sc = ssh->chanctxt;
struct permission_set *pset = &sc->local_perms;
int r;
u_int i;
struct permission *perm;
for (i = 0; i < pset->num_permitted_user; i++) {
perm = &pset->permitted_user[i];
if (open_listen_match_tcpip(perm, host, port, 0))
break;
perm = NULL;
}
if (perm == NULL) {
debug("%s: requested forward not found", __func__);
return -1;
}
if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "cancel-tcpip-forward")) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, 0)) != 0 || /* want reply */
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, channel_rfwd_bind_host(host))) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, port)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
fatal("%s: send cancel: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
fwd_perm_clear(perm); /* unregister */
return 0;
}
/*
* Request cancellation of remote forwarding of Unix domain socket
* path from local side.
*/
static int
channel_request_rforward_cancel_streamlocal(struct ssh *ssh, const char *path)
{
struct ssh_channels *sc = ssh->chanctxt;
struct permission_set *pset = &sc->local_perms;
int r;
u_int i;
struct permission *perm;
for (i = 0; i < pset->num_permitted_user; i++) {
perm = &pset->permitted_user[i];
if (open_listen_match_streamlocal(perm, path))
break;
perm = NULL;
}
if (perm == NULL) {
debug("%s: requested forward not found", __func__);
return -1;
}
if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh,
"cancel-streamlocal-forward@openssh.com")) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, 0)) != 0 || /* want reply */
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, path)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
fatal("%s: send cancel: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
fwd_perm_clear(perm); /* unregister */
return 0;
}
/*
* Request cancellation of remote forwarding of a connection from local side.
*/
int
channel_request_rforward_cancel(struct ssh *ssh, struct Forward *fwd)
{
if (fwd->listen_path != NULL) {
return channel_request_rforward_cancel_streamlocal(ssh,
fwd->listen_path);
} else {
return channel_request_rforward_cancel_tcpip(ssh,
fwd->listen_host,
fwd->listen_port ? fwd->listen_port : fwd->allocated_port);
}
}
/*
* Permits opening to any host/port if permitted_user[] is empty. This is
* usually called by the server, because the user could connect to any port
* anyway, and the server has no way to know but to trust the client anyway.
*/
void
channel_permit_all(struct ssh *ssh, int where)
{
struct permission_set *pset = permission_set_get(ssh, where);
if (pset->num_permitted_user == 0)
pset->all_permitted = 1;
}
/*
* Permit the specified host/port for forwarding.
*/
void
channel_add_permission(struct ssh *ssh, int who, int where,
char *host, int port)
{
int local = where == FORWARD_LOCAL;
struct permission_set *pset = permission_set_get(ssh, where);
debug("allow %s forwarding to host %s port %d",
fwd_ident(who, where), host, port);
/*
* Remote forwards set listen_host/port, local forwards set
* host/port_to_connect.
*/
permission_set_add(ssh, who, where,
local ? host : 0, local ? port : 0,
local ? NULL : host, NULL, local ? 0 : port, NULL);
pset->all_permitted = 0;
}
/*
* Administratively disable forwarding.
*/
void
channel_disable_admin(struct ssh *ssh, int where)
{
channel_clear_permission(ssh, FORWARD_ADM, where);
permission_set_add(ssh, FORWARD_ADM, where,
NULL, 0, NULL, NULL, 0, NULL);
}
/*
* Clear a list of permitted opens.
*/
void
channel_clear_permission(struct ssh *ssh, int who, int where)
{
struct permission **permp;
u_int *npermp;
permission_set_get_array(ssh, who, where, &permp, &npermp);
*permp = xrecallocarray(*permp, *npermp, 0, sizeof(**permp));
*npermp = 0;
}
/*
* Update the listen port for a dynamic remote forward, after
* the actual 'newport' has been allocated. If 'newport' < 0 is
* passed then they entry will be invalidated.
*/
void
channel_update_permission(struct ssh *ssh, int idx, int newport)
{
struct permission_set *pset = &ssh->chanctxt->local_perms;
if (idx < 0 || (u_int)idx >= pset->num_permitted_user) {
debug("%s: index out of range: %d num_permitted_user %d",
__func__, idx, pset->num_permitted_user);
return;
}
debug("%s allowed port %d for forwarding to host %s port %d",
newport > 0 ? "Updating" : "Removing",
newport,
pset->permitted_user[idx].host_to_connect,
pset->permitted_user[idx].port_to_connect);
if (newport <= 0)
fwd_perm_clear(&pset->permitted_user[idx]);
else {
pset->permitted_user[idx].listen_port =
(datafellows & SSH_BUG_DYNAMIC_RPORT) ? 0 : newport;
}
}
/* returns port number, FWD_PERMIT_ANY_PORT or -1 on error */
int
permitopen_port(const char *p)
{
int port;
if (strcmp(p, "*") == 0)
return FWD_PERMIT_ANY_PORT;
if ((port = a2port(p)) > 0)
return port;
return -1;
}
/* Try to start non-blocking connect to next host in cctx list */
static int
connect_next(struct channel_connect *cctx)
{
int sock, saved_errno;
struct sockaddr_un *sunaddr;
char ntop[NI_MAXHOST];
char strport[MAXIMUM(NI_MAXSERV, sizeof(sunaddr->sun_path))];
for (; cctx->ai; cctx->ai = cctx->ai->ai_next) {
switch (cctx->ai->ai_family) {
case AF_UNIX:
/* unix:pathname instead of host:port */
sunaddr = (struct sockaddr_un *)cctx->ai->ai_addr;
strlcpy(ntop, "unix", sizeof(ntop));
strlcpy(strport, sunaddr->sun_path, sizeof(strport));
break;
case AF_INET:
case AF_INET6:
if (getnameinfo(cctx->ai->ai_addr, cctx->ai->ai_addrlen,
ntop, sizeof(ntop), strport, sizeof(strport),
NI_NUMERICHOST|NI_NUMERICSERV) != 0) {
error("connect_next: getnameinfo failed");
continue;
}
break;
default:
continue;
}
if ((sock = socket(cctx->ai->ai_family, cctx->ai->ai_socktype,
cctx->ai->ai_protocol)) == -1) {
if (cctx->ai->ai_next == NULL)
error("socket: %.100s", strerror(errno));
else
verbose("socket: %.100s", strerror(errno));
continue;
}
if (set_nonblock(sock) == -1)
fatal("%s: set_nonblock(%d)", __func__, sock);
if (connect(sock, cctx->ai->ai_addr,
cctx->ai->ai_addrlen) == -1 && errno != EINPROGRESS) {
debug("connect_next: host %.100s ([%.100s]:%s): "
"%.100s", cctx->host, ntop, strport,
strerror(errno));
saved_errno = errno;
close(sock);
errno = saved_errno;
continue; /* fail -- try next */
}
if (cctx->ai->ai_family != AF_UNIX)
set_nodelay(sock);
debug("connect_next: host %.100s ([%.100s]:%s) "
"in progress, fd=%d", cctx->host, ntop, strport, sock);
cctx->ai = cctx->ai->ai_next;
return sock;
}
return -1;
}
static void
channel_connect_ctx_free(struct channel_connect *cctx)
{
free(cctx->host);
if (cctx->aitop) {
if (cctx->aitop->ai_family == AF_UNIX)
free(cctx->aitop);
else
freeaddrinfo(cctx->aitop);
}
memset(cctx, 0, sizeof(*cctx));
}
/*
* Return connecting socket to remote host:port or local socket path,
* passing back the failure reason if appropriate.
*/
static int
connect_to_helper(struct ssh *ssh, const char *name, int port, int socktype,
char *ctype, char *rname, struct channel_connect *cctx,
int *reason, const char **errmsg)
{
struct addrinfo hints;
int gaierr;
int sock = -1;
char strport[NI_MAXSERV];
if (port == PORT_STREAMLOCAL) {
struct sockaddr_un *sunaddr;
struct addrinfo *ai;
if (strlen(name) > sizeof(sunaddr->sun_path)) {
error("%.100s: %.100s", name, strerror(ENAMETOOLONG));
return -1;
}
/*
* Fake up a struct addrinfo for AF_UNIX connections.
* channel_connect_ctx_free() must check ai_family
* and use free() not freeaddirinfo() for AF_UNIX.
*/
ai = xmalloc(sizeof(*ai) + sizeof(*sunaddr));
memset(ai, 0, sizeof(*ai) + sizeof(*sunaddr));
ai->ai_addr = (struct sockaddr *)(ai + 1);
ai->ai_addrlen = sizeof(*sunaddr);
ai->ai_family = AF_UNIX;
ai->ai_socktype = socktype;
ai->ai_protocol = PF_UNSPEC;
sunaddr = (struct sockaddr_un *)ai->ai_addr;
sunaddr->sun_family = AF_UNIX;
strlcpy(sunaddr->sun_path, name, sizeof(sunaddr->sun_path));
cctx->aitop = ai;
} else {
memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
hints.ai_family = ssh->chanctxt->IPv4or6;
hints.ai_socktype = socktype;
snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%d", port);
if ((gaierr = getaddrinfo(name, strport, &hints, &cctx->aitop))
!= 0) {
if (errmsg != NULL)
*errmsg = ssh_gai_strerror(gaierr);
if (reason != NULL)
*reason = SSH2_OPEN_CONNECT_FAILED;
error("connect_to %.100s: unknown host (%s)", name,
ssh_gai_strerror(gaierr));
return -1;
}
}
cctx->host = xstrdup(name);
cctx->port = port;
cctx->ai = cctx->aitop;
if ((sock = connect_next(cctx)) == -1) {
error("connect to %.100s port %d failed: %s",
name, port, strerror(errno));
return -1;
}
return sock;
}
/* Return CONNECTING channel to remote host:port or local socket path */
static Channel *
connect_to(struct ssh *ssh, const char *host, int port,
char *ctype, char *rname)
{
struct channel_connect cctx;
Channel *c;
int sock;
memset(&cctx, 0, sizeof(cctx));
sock = connect_to_helper(ssh, host, port, SOCK_STREAM, ctype, rname,
&cctx, NULL, NULL);
if (sock == -1) {
channel_connect_ctx_free(&cctx);
return NULL;
}
c = channel_new(ssh, ctype, SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING, sock, sock, -1,
CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT, 0, rname, 1);
c->host_port = port;
c->path = xstrdup(host);
c->connect_ctx = cctx;
return c;
}
/*
* returns either the newly connected channel or the downstream channel
* that needs to deal with this connection.
*/
Channel *
channel_connect_by_listen_address(struct ssh *ssh, const char *listen_host,
u_short listen_port, char *ctype, char *rname)
{
struct ssh_channels *sc = ssh->chanctxt;
struct permission_set *pset = &sc->local_perms;
u_int i;
struct permission *perm;
for (i = 0; i < pset->num_permitted_user; i++) {
perm = &pset->permitted_user[i];
if (open_listen_match_tcpip(perm,
listen_host, listen_port, 1)) {
if (perm->downstream)
return perm->downstream;
if (perm->port_to_connect == 0)
return rdynamic_connect_prepare(ssh,
ctype, rname);
return connect_to(ssh,
perm->host_to_connect, perm->port_to_connect,
ctype, rname);
}
}
error("WARNING: Server requests forwarding for unknown listen_port %d",
listen_port);
return NULL;
}
Channel *
channel_connect_by_listen_path(struct ssh *ssh, const char *path,
char *ctype, char *rname)
{
struct ssh_channels *sc = ssh->chanctxt;
struct permission_set *pset = &sc->local_perms;
u_int i;
struct permission *perm;
for (i = 0; i < pset->num_permitted_user; i++) {
perm = &pset->permitted_user[i];
if (open_listen_match_streamlocal(perm, path)) {
return connect_to(ssh,
perm->host_to_connect, perm->port_to_connect,
ctype, rname);
}
}
error("WARNING: Server requests forwarding for unknown path %.100s",
path);
return NULL;
}
/* Check if connecting to that port is permitted and connect. */
Channel *
channel_connect_to_port(struct ssh *ssh, const char *host, u_short port,
char *ctype, char *rname, int *reason, const char **errmsg)
{
struct ssh_channels *sc = ssh->chanctxt;
struct permission_set *pset = &sc->local_perms;
struct channel_connect cctx;
Channel *c;
u_int i, permit, permit_adm = 1;
int sock;
struct permission *perm;
permit = pset->all_permitted;
if (!permit) {
for (i = 0; i < pset->num_permitted_user; i++) {
perm = &pset->permitted_user[i];
if (open_match(perm, host, port)) {
permit = 1;
break;
}
}
}
if (pset->num_permitted_admin > 0) {
permit_adm = 0;
for (i = 0; i < pset->num_permitted_admin; i++) {
perm = &pset->permitted_admin[i];
if (open_match(perm, host, port)) {
permit_adm = 1;
break;
}
}
}
if (!permit || !permit_adm) {
logit("Received request from %.100s port %d to connect to "
"host %.100s port %d, but the request was denied.",
ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh), host, port);
if (reason != NULL)
*reason = SSH2_OPEN_ADMINISTRATIVELY_PROHIBITED;
return NULL;
}
memset(&cctx, 0, sizeof(cctx));
sock = connect_to_helper(ssh, host, port, SOCK_STREAM, ctype, rname,
&cctx, reason, errmsg);
if (sock == -1) {
channel_connect_ctx_free(&cctx);
return NULL;
}
c = channel_new(ssh, ctype, SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING, sock, sock, -1,
CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT, 0, rname, 1);
c->host_port = port;
c->path = xstrdup(host);
c->connect_ctx = cctx;
return c;
}
/* Check if connecting to that path is permitted and connect. */
Channel *
channel_connect_to_path(struct ssh *ssh, const char *path,
char *ctype, char *rname)
{
struct ssh_channels *sc = ssh->chanctxt;
struct permission_set *pset = &sc->local_perms;
u_int i, permit, permit_adm = 1;
struct permission *perm;
permit = pset->all_permitted;
if (!permit) {
for (i = 0; i < pset->num_permitted_user; i++) {
perm = &pset->permitted_user[i];
if (open_match(perm, path, PORT_STREAMLOCAL)) {
permit = 1;
break;
}
}
}
if (pset->num_permitted_admin > 0) {
permit_adm = 0;
for (i = 0; i < pset->num_permitted_admin; i++) {
perm = &pset->permitted_admin[i];
if (open_match(perm, path, PORT_STREAMLOCAL)) {
permit_adm = 1;
break;
}
}
}
if (!permit || !permit_adm) {
logit("Received request to connect to path %.100s, "
"but the request was denied.", path);
return NULL;
}
return connect_to(ssh, path, PORT_STREAMLOCAL, ctype, rname);
}
void
channel_send_window_changes(struct ssh *ssh)
{
struct ssh_channels *sc = ssh->chanctxt;
struct winsize ws;
int r;
u_int i;
for (i = 0; i < sc->channels_alloc; i++) {
if (sc->channels[i] == NULL || !sc->channels[i]->client_tty ||
sc->channels[i]->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN)
continue;
if (ioctl(sc->channels[i]->rfd, TIOCGWINSZ, &ws) == -1)
continue;
channel_request_start(ssh, i, "window-change", 0);
if ((r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, (u_int)ws.ws_col)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, (u_int)ws.ws_row)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, (u_int)ws.ws_xpixel)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, (u_int)ws.ws_ypixel)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
fatal("%s: channel %u: send window-change: %s",
__func__, i, ssh_err(r));
}
}
/* Return RDYNAMIC_OPEN channel: channel allows SOCKS, but is not connected */
static Channel *
rdynamic_connect_prepare(struct ssh *ssh, char *ctype, char *rname)
{
Channel *c;
int r;
c = channel_new(ssh, ctype, SSH_CHANNEL_RDYNAMIC_OPEN, -1, -1, -1,
CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT, 0, rname, 1);
c->host_port = 0;
c->path = NULL;
/*
* We need to open the channel before we have a FD,
* so that we can get SOCKS header from peer.
*/
if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->remote_id)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->self)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->local_window)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->local_maxpacket)) != 0) {
fatal("%s: channel %i: confirm: %s", __func__,
c->self, ssh_err(r));
}
return c;
}
/* Return CONNECTING socket to remote host:port or local socket path */
static int
rdynamic_connect_finish(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c)
{
struct channel_connect cctx;
int sock;
memset(&cctx, 0, sizeof(cctx));
sock = connect_to_helper(ssh, c->path, c->host_port, SOCK_STREAM, NULL,
NULL, &cctx, NULL, NULL);
if (sock == -1)
channel_connect_ctx_free(&cctx);
else {
/* similar to SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING but we've already sent the open */
c->type = SSH_CHANNEL_RDYNAMIC_FINISH;
c->connect_ctx = cctx;
channel_register_fds(ssh, c, sock, sock, -1, 0, 1, 0);
}
return sock;
}
/* -- X11 forwarding */
/*
* Creates an internet domain socket for listening for X11 connections.
* Returns 0 and a suitable display number for the DISPLAY variable
* stored in display_numberp , or -1 if an error occurs.
*/
int
x11_create_display_inet(struct ssh *ssh, int x11_display_offset,
int x11_use_localhost, int single_connection,
u_int *display_numberp, int **chanids)
{
Channel *nc = NULL;
int display_number, sock;
u_short port;
struct addrinfo hints, *ai, *aitop;
char strport[NI_MAXSERV];
int gaierr, n, num_socks = 0, socks[NUM_SOCKS];
if (chanids == NULL)
return -1;
for (display_number = x11_display_offset;
display_number < MAX_DISPLAYS;
display_number++) {
port = 6000 + display_number;
memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
hints.ai_family = ssh->chanctxt->IPv4or6;
hints.ai_flags = x11_use_localhost ? 0: AI_PASSIVE;
hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%d", port);
if ((gaierr = getaddrinfo(NULL, strport,
&hints, &aitop)) != 0) {
error("getaddrinfo: %.100s", ssh_gai_strerror(gaierr));
return -1;
}
for (ai = aitop; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) {
if (ai->ai_family != AF_INET &&
ai->ai_family != AF_INET6)
continue;
sock = socket(ai->ai_family, ai->ai_socktype,
ai->ai_protocol);
if (sock == -1) {
if ((errno != EINVAL) && (errno != EAFNOSUPPORT)
#ifdef EPFNOSUPPORT
&& (errno != EPFNOSUPPORT)
#endif
) {
error("socket: %.100s", strerror(errno));
freeaddrinfo(aitop);
return -1;
} else {
debug("x11_create_display_inet: Socket family %d not supported",
ai->ai_family);
continue;
}
}
if (ai->ai_family == AF_INET6)
sock_set_v6only(sock);
if (x11_use_localhost)
set_reuseaddr(sock);
if (bind(sock, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen) == -1) {
debug2("%s: bind port %d: %.100s", __func__,
port, strerror(errno));
close(sock);
for (n = 0; n < num_socks; n++)
close(socks[n]);
num_socks = 0;
break;
}
socks[num_socks++] = sock;
if (num_socks == NUM_SOCKS)
break;
}
freeaddrinfo(aitop);
if (num_socks > 0)
break;
}
if (display_number >= MAX_DISPLAYS) {
error("Failed to allocate internet-domain X11 display socket.");
return -1;
}
/* Start listening for connections on the socket. */
for (n = 0; n < num_socks; n++) {
sock = socks[n];
if (listen(sock, SSH_LISTEN_BACKLOG) == -1) {
error("listen: %.100s", strerror(errno));
close(sock);
return -1;
}
}
/* Allocate a channel for each socket. */
*chanids = xcalloc(num_socks + 1, sizeof(**chanids));
for (n = 0; n < num_socks; n++) {
sock = socks[n];
nc = channel_new(ssh, "x11 listener",
SSH_CHANNEL_X11_LISTENER, sock, sock, -1,
CHAN_X11_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_X11_PACKET_DEFAULT,
0, "X11 inet listener", 1);
nc->single_connection = single_connection;
(*chanids)[n] = nc->self;
}
(*chanids)[n] = -1;
/* Return the display number for the DISPLAY environment variable. */
*display_numberp = display_number;
return 0;
}
static int
connect_local_xsocket_path(const char *pathname)
{
int sock;
struct sockaddr_un addr;
sock = socket(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
if (sock == -1)
error("socket: %.100s", strerror(errno));
memset(&addr, 0, sizeof(addr));
addr.sun_family = AF_UNIX;
strlcpy(addr.sun_path, pathname, sizeof addr.sun_path);
if (connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, sizeof(addr)) == 0)
return sock;
close(sock);
error("connect %.100s: %.100s", addr.sun_path, strerror(errno));
return -1;
}
static int
connect_local_xsocket(u_int dnr)
{
char buf[1024];
snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, _PATH_UNIX_X, dnr);
return connect_local_xsocket_path(buf);
}
#ifdef __APPLE__
static int
is_path_to_xsocket(const char *display, char *path, size_t pathlen)
{
struct stat sbuf;
if (strlcpy(path, display, pathlen) >= pathlen) {
error("%s: display path too long", __func__);
return 0;
}
if (display[0] != '/')
return 0;
if (stat(path, &sbuf) == 0) {
return 1;
} else {
char *dot = strrchr(path, '.');
if (dot != NULL) {
*dot = '\0';
if (stat(path, &sbuf) == 0) {
return 1;
}
}
}
return 0;
}
#endif
int
x11_connect_display(struct ssh *ssh)
{
u_int display_number;
const char *display;
char buf[1024], *cp;
struct addrinfo hints, *ai, *aitop;
char strport[NI_MAXSERV];
int gaierr, sock = 0;
/* Try to open a socket for the local X server. */
display = getenv("DISPLAY");
if (!display) {
error("DISPLAY not set.");
return -1;
}
/*
* Now we decode the value of the DISPLAY variable and make a
* connection to the real X server.
*/
#ifdef __APPLE__
/* Check if display is a path to a socket (as set by launchd). */
{
char path[PATH_MAX];
if (is_path_to_xsocket(display, path, sizeof(path))) {
debug("x11_connect_display: $DISPLAY is launchd");
/* Create a socket. */
sock = connect_local_xsocket_path(path);
if (sock < 0)
return -1;
/* OK, we now have a connection to the display. */
return sock;
}
}
#endif
/*
* Check if it is a unix domain socket. Unix domain displays are in
* one of the following formats: unix:d[.s], :d[.s], ::d[.s]
*/
if (strncmp(display, "unix:", 5) == 0 ||
display[0] == ':') {
/* Connect to the unix domain socket. */
if (sscanf(strrchr(display, ':') + 1, "%u",
&display_number) != 1) {
error("Could not parse display number from DISPLAY: "
"%.100s", display);
return -1;
}
/* Create a socket. */
sock = connect_local_xsocket(display_number);
if (sock < 0)
return -1;
/* OK, we now have a connection to the display. */
return sock;
}
/*
* Connect to an inet socket. The DISPLAY value is supposedly
* hostname:d[.s], where hostname may also be numeric IP address.
*/
strlcpy(buf, display, sizeof(buf));
cp = strchr(buf, ':');
if (!cp) {
error("Could not find ':' in DISPLAY: %.100s", display);
return -1;
}
*cp = 0;
/*
* buf now contains the host name. But first we parse the
* display number.
*/
if (sscanf(cp + 1, "%u", &display_number) != 1) {
error("Could not parse display number from DISPLAY: %.100s",
display);
return -1;
}
/* Look up the host address */
memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
hints.ai_family = ssh->chanctxt->IPv4or6;
hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%u", 6000 + display_number);
if ((gaierr = getaddrinfo(buf, strport, &hints, &aitop)) != 0) {
error("%.100s: unknown host. (%s)", buf,
ssh_gai_strerror(gaierr));
return -1;
}
for (ai = aitop; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) {
/* Create a socket. */
sock = socket(ai->ai_family, ai->ai_socktype, ai->ai_protocol);
if (sock == -1) {
debug2("socket: %.100s", strerror(errno));
continue;
}
/* Connect it to the display. */
if (connect(sock, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen) == -1) {
debug2("connect %.100s port %u: %.100s", buf,
6000 + display_number, strerror(errno));
close(sock);
continue;
}
/* Success */
break;
}
freeaddrinfo(aitop);
if (!ai) {
error("connect %.100s port %u: %.100s", buf,
6000 + display_number, strerror(errno));
return -1;
}
set_nodelay(sock);
return sock;
}
/*
* Requests forwarding of X11 connections, generates fake authentication
* data, and enables authentication spoofing.
* This should be called in the client only.
*/
void
x11_request_forwarding_with_spoofing(struct ssh *ssh, int client_session_id,
const char *disp, const char *proto, const char *data, int want_reply)
{
struct ssh_channels *sc = ssh->chanctxt;
u_int data_len = (u_int) strlen(data) / 2;
u_int i, value;
const char *cp;
char *new_data;
int r, screen_number;
if (sc->x11_saved_display == NULL)
sc->x11_saved_display = xstrdup(disp);
else if (strcmp(disp, sc->x11_saved_display) != 0) {
error("x11_request_forwarding_with_spoofing: different "
"$DISPLAY already forwarded");
return;
}
cp = strchr(disp, ':');
if (cp)
cp = strchr(cp, '.');
if (cp)
screen_number = (u_int)strtonum(cp + 1, 0, 400, NULL);
else
screen_number = 0;
if (sc->x11_saved_proto == NULL) {
/* Save protocol name. */
sc->x11_saved_proto = xstrdup(proto);
/* Extract real authentication data. */
sc->x11_saved_data = xmalloc(data_len);
for (i = 0; i < data_len; i++) {
if (sscanf(data + 2 * i, "%2x", &value) != 1)
fatal("x11_request_forwarding: bad "
"authentication data: %.100s", data);
sc->x11_saved_data[i] = value;
}
sc->x11_saved_data_len = data_len;
/* Generate fake data of the same length. */
sc->x11_fake_data = xmalloc(data_len);
arc4random_buf(sc->x11_fake_data, data_len);
sc->x11_fake_data_len = data_len;
}
/* Convert the fake data into hex. */
new_data = tohex(sc->x11_fake_data, data_len);
/* Send the request packet. */
channel_request_start(ssh, client_session_id, "x11-req", want_reply);
if ((r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, 0)) != 0 || /* bool: single connection */
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, proto)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, new_data)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, screen_number)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0 ||
(r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0)
fatal("%s: send x11-req: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
free(new_data);
}
diff --git a/channels.h b/channels.h
index aa2a87c10edf..c8ae0d90464a 100644
--- a/channels.h
+++ b/channels.h
@@ -1,344 +1,352 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: channels.h,v 1.132 2018/10/04 00:10:11 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: channels.h,v 1.133 2020/01/25 22:49:38 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
* All rights reserved
*
* As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
* can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
* software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
* incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
* called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
*/
/*
* Copyright (c) 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#ifndef CHANNEL_H
#define CHANNEL_H
/* Definitions for channel types. */
#define SSH_CHANNEL_X11_LISTENER 1 /* Listening for inet X11 conn. */
#define SSH_CHANNEL_PORT_LISTENER 2 /* Listening on a port. */
#define SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING 3 /* waiting for confirmation */
#define SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN 4 /* normal open two-way channel */
#define SSH_CHANNEL_CLOSED 5 /* waiting for close confirmation */
#define SSH_CHANNEL_AUTH_SOCKET 6 /* authentication socket */
#define SSH_CHANNEL_X11_OPEN 7 /* reading first X11 packet */
#define SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL 10 /* larval session */
#define SSH_CHANNEL_RPORT_LISTENER 11 /* Listening to a R-style port */
#define SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING 12
#define SSH_CHANNEL_DYNAMIC 13
#define SSH_CHANNEL_ZOMBIE 14 /* Almost dead. */
#define SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_LISTENER 15 /* Listener for mux conn. */
#define SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_CLIENT 16 /* Conn. to mux slave */
#define SSH_CHANNEL_ABANDONED 17 /* Abandoned session, eg mux */
#define SSH_CHANNEL_UNIX_LISTENER 18 /* Listening on a domain socket. */
#define SSH_CHANNEL_RUNIX_LISTENER 19 /* Listening to a R-style domain socket. */
#define SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_PROXY 20 /* proxy channel for mux-slave */
#define SSH_CHANNEL_RDYNAMIC_OPEN 21 /* reverse SOCKS, parsing request */
#define SSH_CHANNEL_RDYNAMIC_FINISH 22 /* reverse SOCKS, finishing connect */
#define SSH_CHANNEL_MAX_TYPE 23
#define CHANNEL_CANCEL_PORT_STATIC -1
/* TCP forwarding */
#define FORWARD_DENY 0
#define FORWARD_REMOTE (1)
#define FORWARD_LOCAL (1<<1)
#define FORWARD_ALLOW (FORWARD_REMOTE|FORWARD_LOCAL)
#define FORWARD_ADM 0x100
#define FORWARD_USER 0x101
struct ssh;
struct Channel;
typedef struct Channel Channel;
struct fwd_perm_list;
typedef void channel_open_fn(struct ssh *, int, int, void *);
typedef void channel_callback_fn(struct ssh *, int, void *);
typedef int channel_infilter_fn(struct ssh *, struct Channel *, char *, int);
typedef void channel_filter_cleanup_fn(struct ssh *, int, void *);
typedef u_char *channel_outfilter_fn(struct ssh *, struct Channel *,
u_char **, size_t *);
/* Channel success/failure callbacks */
typedef void channel_confirm_cb(struct ssh *, int, struct Channel *, void *);
typedef void channel_confirm_abandon_cb(struct ssh *, struct Channel *, void *);
struct channel_confirm {
TAILQ_ENTRY(channel_confirm) entry;
channel_confirm_cb *cb;
channel_confirm_abandon_cb *abandon_cb;
void *ctx;
};
TAILQ_HEAD(channel_confirms, channel_confirm);
/* Context for non-blocking connects */
struct channel_connect {
char *host;
int port;
struct addrinfo *ai, *aitop;
};
/* Callbacks for mux channels back into client-specific code */
typedef int mux_callback_fn(struct ssh *, struct Channel *);
+/*
+ * NB. channel IDs on the wire and in c->remote_id are uint32, but local
+ * channel IDs (e.g. c->self) only ever use the int32 subset of this range,
+ * because we use local channel ID -1 for housekeeping. Remote channels have
+ * a dedicated "have_remote_id" flag to indicate their validity.
+ */
+
struct Channel {
int type; /* channel type/state */
+
int self; /* my own channel identifier */
uint32_t remote_id; /* channel identifier for remote peer */
int have_remote_id; /* non-zero if remote_id is valid */
u_int istate; /* input from channel (state of receive half) */
u_int ostate; /* output to channel (state of transmit half) */
int flags; /* close sent/rcvd */
int rfd; /* read fd */
int wfd; /* write fd */
int efd; /* extended fd */
int sock; /* sock fd */
int ctl_chan; /* control channel (multiplexed connections) */
int isatty; /* rfd is a tty */
#ifdef _AIX
int wfd_isatty; /* wfd is a tty */
#endif
int client_tty; /* (client) TTY has been requested */
int force_drain; /* force close on iEOF */
time_t notbefore; /* Pause IO until deadline (time_t) */
int delayed; /* post-select handlers for newly created
* channels are delayed until the first call
* to a matching pre-select handler.
* this way post-select handlers are not
* accidentally called if a FD gets reused */
struct sshbuf *input; /* data read from socket, to be sent over
* encrypted connection */
struct sshbuf *output; /* data received over encrypted connection for
* send on socket */
struct sshbuf *extended;
char *path;
/* path for unix domain sockets, or host name for forwards */
int listening_port; /* port being listened for forwards */
char *listening_addr; /* addr being listened for forwards */
int host_port; /* remote port to connect for forwards */
char *remote_name; /* remote hostname */
u_int remote_window;
u_int remote_maxpacket;
u_int local_window;
u_int local_window_max;
u_int local_consumed;
u_int local_maxpacket;
int extended_usage;
int single_connection;
char *ctype; /* type */
/* callback */
channel_open_fn *open_confirm;
void *open_confirm_ctx;
channel_callback_fn *detach_user;
int detach_close;
struct channel_confirms status_confirms;
/* filter */
channel_infilter_fn *input_filter;
channel_outfilter_fn *output_filter;
void *filter_ctx;
channel_filter_cleanup_fn *filter_cleanup;
/* keep boundaries */
int datagram;
/* non-blocking connect */
/* XXX make this a pointer so the structure can be opaque */
struct channel_connect connect_ctx;
/* multiplexing protocol hook, called for each packet received */
mux_callback_fn *mux_rcb;
void *mux_ctx;
int mux_pause;
int mux_downstream_id;
};
#define CHAN_EXTENDED_IGNORE 0
#define CHAN_EXTENDED_READ 1
#define CHAN_EXTENDED_WRITE 2
/* default window/packet sizes for tcp/x11-fwd-channel */
#define CHAN_SES_PACKET_DEFAULT (32*1024)
#define CHAN_SES_WINDOW_DEFAULT (64*CHAN_SES_PACKET_DEFAULT)
#define CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT (32*1024)
#define CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT (64*CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT)
#define CHAN_X11_PACKET_DEFAULT (16*1024)
#define CHAN_X11_WINDOW_DEFAULT (4*CHAN_X11_PACKET_DEFAULT)
/* possible input states */
#define CHAN_INPUT_OPEN 0
#define CHAN_INPUT_WAIT_DRAIN 1
#define CHAN_INPUT_WAIT_OCLOSE 2
#define CHAN_INPUT_CLOSED 3
/* possible output states */
#define CHAN_OUTPUT_OPEN 0
#define CHAN_OUTPUT_WAIT_DRAIN 1
#define CHAN_OUTPUT_WAIT_IEOF 2
#define CHAN_OUTPUT_CLOSED 3
#define CHAN_CLOSE_SENT 0x01
#define CHAN_CLOSE_RCVD 0x02
#define CHAN_EOF_SENT 0x04
#define CHAN_EOF_RCVD 0x08
#define CHAN_LOCAL 0x10
/* Read buffer size */
#define CHAN_RBUF (16*1024)
/* Hard limit on number of channels */
#define CHANNELS_MAX_CHANNELS (16*1024)
/* check whether 'efd' is still in use */
#define CHANNEL_EFD_INPUT_ACTIVE(c) \
(c->extended_usage == CHAN_EXTENDED_READ && \
(c->efd != -1 || \
sshbuf_len(c->extended) > 0))
#define CHANNEL_EFD_OUTPUT_ACTIVE(c) \
(c->extended_usage == CHAN_EXTENDED_WRITE && \
c->efd != -1 && (!(c->flags & (CHAN_EOF_RCVD|CHAN_CLOSE_RCVD)) || \
sshbuf_len(c->extended) > 0))
/* Add channel management structures to SSH transport instance */
void channel_init_channels(struct ssh *ssh);
/* channel management */
Channel *channel_by_id(struct ssh *, int);
Channel *channel_by_remote_id(struct ssh *, u_int);
Channel *channel_lookup(struct ssh *, int);
Channel *channel_new(struct ssh *, char *, int, int, int, int,
u_int, u_int, int, char *, int);
void channel_set_fds(struct ssh *, int, int, int, int, int,
int, int, u_int);
void channel_free(struct ssh *, Channel *);
void channel_free_all(struct ssh *);
void channel_stop_listening(struct ssh *);
void channel_send_open(struct ssh *, int);
void channel_request_start(struct ssh *, int, char *, int);
void channel_register_cleanup(struct ssh *, int,
channel_callback_fn *, int);
void channel_register_open_confirm(struct ssh *, int,
channel_open_fn *, void *);
void channel_register_filter(struct ssh *, int, channel_infilter_fn *,
channel_outfilter_fn *, channel_filter_cleanup_fn *, void *);
void channel_register_status_confirm(struct ssh *, int,
channel_confirm_cb *, channel_confirm_abandon_cb *, void *);
void channel_cancel_cleanup(struct ssh *, int);
int channel_close_fd(struct ssh *, int *);
void channel_send_window_changes(struct ssh *);
/* mux proxy support */
int channel_proxy_downstream(struct ssh *, Channel *mc);
int channel_proxy_upstream(Channel *, int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
/* protocol handler */
int channel_input_data(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
int channel_input_extended_data(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
int channel_input_ieof(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
int channel_input_oclose(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
int channel_input_open_confirmation(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
int channel_input_open_failure(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
int channel_input_port_open(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
int channel_input_window_adjust(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
int channel_input_status_confirm(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
/* file descriptor handling (read/write) */
void channel_prepare_select(struct ssh *, fd_set **, fd_set **, int *,
u_int*, time_t*);
void channel_after_select(struct ssh *, fd_set *, fd_set *);
void channel_output_poll(struct ssh *);
int channel_not_very_much_buffered_data(struct ssh *);
void channel_close_all(struct ssh *);
int channel_still_open(struct ssh *);
const char *channel_format_extended_usage(const Channel *);
char *channel_open_message(struct ssh *);
int channel_find_open(struct ssh *);
/* tcp forwarding */
struct Forward;
struct ForwardOptions;
void channel_set_af(struct ssh *, int af);
void channel_permit_all(struct ssh *, int);
void channel_add_permission(struct ssh *, int, int, char *, int);
void channel_clear_permission(struct ssh *, int, int);
void channel_disable_admin(struct ssh *, int);
void channel_update_permission(struct ssh *, int, int);
Channel *channel_connect_to_port(struct ssh *, const char *, u_short,
char *, char *, int *, const char **);
Channel *channel_connect_to_path(struct ssh *, const char *, char *, char *);
Channel *channel_connect_stdio_fwd(struct ssh *, const char*,
u_short, int, int);
Channel *channel_connect_by_listen_address(struct ssh *, const char *,
u_short, char *, char *);
Channel *channel_connect_by_listen_path(struct ssh *, const char *,
char *, char *);
int channel_request_remote_forwarding(struct ssh *, struct Forward *);
int channel_setup_local_fwd_listener(struct ssh *, struct Forward *,
struct ForwardOptions *);
int channel_request_rforward_cancel(struct ssh *, struct Forward *);
int channel_setup_remote_fwd_listener(struct ssh *, struct Forward *,
int *, struct ForwardOptions *);
int channel_cancel_rport_listener(struct ssh *, struct Forward *);
int channel_cancel_lport_listener(struct ssh *, struct Forward *,
int, struct ForwardOptions *);
int permitopen_port(const char *);
/* x11 forwarding */
void channel_set_x11_refuse_time(struct ssh *, u_int);
int x11_connect_display(struct ssh *);
int x11_create_display_inet(struct ssh *, int, int, int, u_int *, int **);
void x11_request_forwarding_with_spoofing(struct ssh *, int,
const char *, const char *, const char *, int);
/* channel close */
int chan_is_dead(struct ssh *, Channel *, int);
void chan_mark_dead(struct ssh *, Channel *);
/* channel events */
void chan_rcvd_oclose(struct ssh *, Channel *);
void chan_rcvd_eow(struct ssh *, Channel *);
void chan_read_failed(struct ssh *, Channel *);
void chan_ibuf_empty(struct ssh *, Channel *);
void chan_rcvd_ieof(struct ssh *, Channel *);
void chan_write_failed(struct ssh *, Channel *);
void chan_obuf_empty(struct ssh *, Channel *);
#endif
diff --git a/cipher.c b/cipher.c
index 25f98ba8ebfe..820bc6ace3e8 100644
--- a/cipher.c
+++ b/cipher.c
@@ -1,530 +1,541 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: cipher.c,v 1.113 2019/09/06 05:23:55 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: cipher.c,v 1.114 2020/01/23 10:24:29 dtucker Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
* All rights reserved
*
* As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
* can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
* software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
* incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
* called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
*
*
* Copyright (c) 1999 Niels Provos. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (c) 1999, 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include "cipher.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "sshbuf.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
#include "digest.h"
#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
#ifndef WITH_OPENSSL
#define EVP_CIPHER_CTX void
#endif
struct sshcipher_ctx {
int plaintext;
int encrypt;
EVP_CIPHER_CTX *evp;
struct chachapoly_ctx cp_ctx; /* XXX union with evp? */
struct aesctr_ctx ac_ctx; /* XXX union with evp? */
const struct sshcipher *cipher;
};
struct sshcipher {
char *name;
u_int block_size;
u_int key_len;
u_int iv_len; /* defaults to block_size */
u_int auth_len;
u_int flags;
#define CFLAG_CBC (1<<0)
#define CFLAG_CHACHAPOLY (1<<1)
#define CFLAG_AESCTR (1<<2)
#define CFLAG_NONE (1<<3)
#define CFLAG_INTERNAL CFLAG_NONE /* Don't use "none" for packets */
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
const EVP_CIPHER *(*evptype)(void);
#else
void *ignored;
#endif
};
static const struct sshcipher ciphers[] = {
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DES
{ "3des-cbc", 8, 24, 0, 0, CFLAG_CBC, EVP_des_ede3_cbc },
#endif
{ "aes128-cbc", 16, 16, 0, 0, CFLAG_CBC, EVP_aes_128_cbc },
{ "aes192-cbc", 16, 24, 0, 0, CFLAG_CBC, EVP_aes_192_cbc },
{ "aes256-cbc", 16, 32, 0, 0, CFLAG_CBC, EVP_aes_256_cbc },
{ "rijndael-cbc@lysator.liu.se",
16, 32, 0, 0, CFLAG_CBC, EVP_aes_256_cbc },
{ "aes128-ctr", 16, 16, 0, 0, 0, EVP_aes_128_ctr },
{ "aes192-ctr", 16, 24, 0, 0, 0, EVP_aes_192_ctr },
{ "aes256-ctr", 16, 32, 0, 0, 0, EVP_aes_256_ctr },
# ifdef OPENSSL_HAVE_EVPGCM
{ "aes128-gcm@openssh.com",
16, 16, 12, 16, 0, EVP_aes_128_gcm },
{ "aes256-gcm@openssh.com",
16, 32, 12, 16, 0, EVP_aes_256_gcm },
# endif /* OPENSSL_HAVE_EVPGCM */
#else
{ "aes128-ctr", 16, 16, 0, 0, CFLAG_AESCTR, NULL },
{ "aes192-ctr", 16, 24, 0, 0, CFLAG_AESCTR, NULL },
{ "aes256-ctr", 16, 32, 0, 0, CFLAG_AESCTR, NULL },
#endif
{ "chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com",
8, 64, 0, 16, CFLAG_CHACHAPOLY, NULL },
{ "none", 8, 0, 0, 0, CFLAG_NONE, NULL },
{ NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, NULL }
};
/*--*/
/* Returns a comma-separated list of supported ciphers. */
char *
cipher_alg_list(char sep, int auth_only)
{
char *tmp, *ret = NULL;
size_t nlen, rlen = 0;
const struct sshcipher *c;
for (c = ciphers; c->name != NULL; c++) {
if ((c->flags & CFLAG_INTERNAL) != 0)
continue;
if (auth_only && c->auth_len == 0)
continue;
if (ret != NULL)
ret[rlen++] = sep;
nlen = strlen(c->name);
if ((tmp = realloc(ret, rlen + nlen + 2)) == NULL) {
free(ret);
return NULL;
}
ret = tmp;
memcpy(ret + rlen, c->name, nlen + 1);
rlen += nlen;
}
return ret;
}
+const char *
+compression_alg_list(int compression)
+{
+#ifdef WITH_ZLIB
+ return compression ? "zlib@openssh.com,zlib,none" :
+ "none,zlib@openssh.com,zlib";
+#else
+ return "none";
+#endif
+}
+
u_int
cipher_blocksize(const struct sshcipher *c)
{
return (c->block_size);
}
u_int
cipher_keylen(const struct sshcipher *c)
{
return (c->key_len);
}
u_int
cipher_seclen(const struct sshcipher *c)
{
if (strcmp("3des-cbc", c->name) == 0)
return 14;
return cipher_keylen(c);
}
u_int
cipher_authlen(const struct sshcipher *c)
{
return (c->auth_len);
}
u_int
cipher_ivlen(const struct sshcipher *c)
{
/*
* Default is cipher block size, except for chacha20+poly1305 that
* needs no IV. XXX make iv_len == -1 default?
*/
return (c->iv_len != 0 || (c->flags & CFLAG_CHACHAPOLY) != 0) ?
c->iv_len : c->block_size;
}
u_int
cipher_is_cbc(const struct sshcipher *c)
{
return (c->flags & CFLAG_CBC) != 0;
}
u_int
cipher_ctx_is_plaintext(struct sshcipher_ctx *cc)
{
return cc->plaintext;
}
const struct sshcipher *
cipher_by_name(const char *name)
{
const struct sshcipher *c;
for (c = ciphers; c->name != NULL; c++)
if (strcmp(c->name, name) == 0)
return c;
return NULL;
}
#define CIPHER_SEP ","
int
ciphers_valid(const char *names)
{
const struct sshcipher *c;
char *cipher_list, *cp;
char *p;
if (names == NULL || strcmp(names, "") == 0)
return 0;
if ((cipher_list = cp = strdup(names)) == NULL)
return 0;
for ((p = strsep(&cp, CIPHER_SEP)); p && *p != '\0';
(p = strsep(&cp, CIPHER_SEP))) {
c = cipher_by_name(p);
if (c == NULL || (c->flags & CFLAG_INTERNAL) != 0) {
free(cipher_list);
return 0;
}
}
free(cipher_list);
return 1;
}
const char *
cipher_warning_message(const struct sshcipher_ctx *cc)
{
if (cc == NULL || cc->cipher == NULL)
return NULL;
/* XXX repurpose for CBC warning */
return NULL;
}
int
cipher_init(struct sshcipher_ctx **ccp, const struct sshcipher *cipher,
const u_char *key, u_int keylen, const u_char *iv, u_int ivlen,
int do_encrypt)
{
struct sshcipher_ctx *cc = NULL;
int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
const EVP_CIPHER *type;
int klen;
#endif
*ccp = NULL;
if ((cc = calloc(sizeof(*cc), 1)) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
cc->plaintext = (cipher->flags & CFLAG_NONE) != 0;
cc->encrypt = do_encrypt;
if (keylen < cipher->key_len ||
(iv != NULL && ivlen < cipher_ivlen(cipher))) {
ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
goto out;
}
cc->cipher = cipher;
if ((cc->cipher->flags & CFLAG_CHACHAPOLY) != 0) {
ret = chachapoly_init(&cc->cp_ctx, key, keylen);
goto out;
}
if ((cc->cipher->flags & CFLAG_NONE) != 0) {
ret = 0;
goto out;
}
#ifndef WITH_OPENSSL
if ((cc->cipher->flags & CFLAG_AESCTR) != 0) {
aesctr_keysetup(&cc->ac_ctx, key, 8 * keylen, 8 * ivlen);
aesctr_ivsetup(&cc->ac_ctx, iv);
ret = 0;
goto out;
}
ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
goto out;
#else /* WITH_OPENSSL */
type = (*cipher->evptype)();
if ((cc->evp = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new()) == NULL) {
ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
if (EVP_CipherInit(cc->evp, type, NULL, (u_char *)iv,
(do_encrypt == CIPHER_ENCRYPT)) == 0) {
ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
goto out;
}
if (cipher_authlen(cipher) &&
!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(cc->evp, EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_FIXED,
-1, (u_char *)iv)) {
ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
goto out;
}
klen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(cc->evp);
if (klen > 0 && keylen != (u_int)klen) {
if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length(cc->evp, keylen) == 0) {
ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
goto out;
}
}
if (EVP_CipherInit(cc->evp, NULL, (u_char *)key, NULL, -1) == 0) {
ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
goto out;
}
ret = 0;
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
out:
if (ret == 0) {
/* success */
*ccp = cc;
} else {
if (cc != NULL) {
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(cc->evp);
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
explicit_bzero(cc, sizeof(*cc));
free(cc);
}
}
return ret;
}
/*
* cipher_crypt() operates as following:
* Copy 'aadlen' bytes (without en/decryption) from 'src' to 'dest'.
* Theses bytes are treated as additional authenticated data for
* authenticated encryption modes.
* En/Decrypt 'len' bytes at offset 'aadlen' from 'src' to 'dest'.
* Use 'authlen' bytes at offset 'len'+'aadlen' as the authentication tag.
* This tag is written on encryption and verified on decryption.
* Both 'aadlen' and 'authlen' can be set to 0.
*/
int
cipher_crypt(struct sshcipher_ctx *cc, u_int seqnr, u_char *dest,
const u_char *src, u_int len, u_int aadlen, u_int authlen)
{
if ((cc->cipher->flags & CFLAG_CHACHAPOLY) != 0) {
return chachapoly_crypt(&cc->cp_ctx, seqnr, dest, src,
len, aadlen, authlen, cc->encrypt);
}
if ((cc->cipher->flags & CFLAG_NONE) != 0) {
memcpy(dest, src, aadlen + len);
return 0;
}
#ifndef WITH_OPENSSL
if ((cc->cipher->flags & CFLAG_AESCTR) != 0) {
if (aadlen)
memcpy(dest, src, aadlen);
aesctr_encrypt_bytes(&cc->ac_ctx, src + aadlen,
dest + aadlen, len);
return 0;
}
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
#else
if (authlen) {
u_char lastiv[1];
if (authlen != cipher_authlen(cc->cipher))
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
/* increment IV */
if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(cc->evp, EVP_CTRL_GCM_IV_GEN,
1, lastiv))
return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
/* set tag on decyption */
if (!cc->encrypt &&
!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(cc->evp, EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_TAG,
authlen, (u_char *)src + aadlen + len))
return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
}
if (aadlen) {
if (authlen &&
EVP_Cipher(cc->evp, NULL, (u_char *)src, aadlen) < 0)
return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
memcpy(dest, src, aadlen);
}
if (len % cc->cipher->block_size)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
if (EVP_Cipher(cc->evp, dest + aadlen, (u_char *)src + aadlen,
len) < 0)
return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
if (authlen) {
/* compute tag (on encrypt) or verify tag (on decrypt) */
if (EVP_Cipher(cc->evp, NULL, NULL, 0) < 0)
return cc->encrypt ?
SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR : SSH_ERR_MAC_INVALID;
if (cc->encrypt &&
!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(cc->evp, EVP_CTRL_GCM_GET_TAG,
authlen, dest + aadlen + len))
return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
}
return 0;
#endif
}
/* Extract the packet length, including any decryption necessary beforehand */
int
cipher_get_length(struct sshcipher_ctx *cc, u_int *plenp, u_int seqnr,
const u_char *cp, u_int len)
{
if ((cc->cipher->flags & CFLAG_CHACHAPOLY) != 0)
return chachapoly_get_length(&cc->cp_ctx, plenp, seqnr,
cp, len);
if (len < 4)
return SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE;
*plenp = PEEK_U32(cp);
return 0;
}
void
cipher_free(struct sshcipher_ctx *cc)
{
if (cc == NULL)
return;
if ((cc->cipher->flags & CFLAG_CHACHAPOLY) != 0)
explicit_bzero(&cc->cp_ctx, sizeof(cc->cp_ctx));
else if ((cc->cipher->flags & CFLAG_AESCTR) != 0)
explicit_bzero(&cc->ac_ctx, sizeof(cc->ac_ctx));
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(cc->evp);
cc->evp = NULL;
#endif
explicit_bzero(cc, sizeof(*cc));
free(cc);
}
/*
* Exports an IV from the sshcipher_ctx required to export the key
* state back from the unprivileged child to the privileged parent
* process.
*/
int
cipher_get_keyiv_len(const struct sshcipher_ctx *cc)
{
const struct sshcipher *c = cc->cipher;
if ((c->flags & CFLAG_CHACHAPOLY) != 0)
return 0;
else if ((c->flags & CFLAG_AESCTR) != 0)
return sizeof(cc->ac_ctx.ctr);
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
return EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(cc->evp);
#else
return 0;
#endif
}
int
cipher_get_keyiv(struct sshcipher_ctx *cc, u_char *iv, size_t len)
{
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
const struct sshcipher *c = cc->cipher;
int evplen;
#endif
if ((cc->cipher->flags & CFLAG_CHACHAPOLY) != 0) {
if (len != 0)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
return 0;
}
if ((cc->cipher->flags & CFLAG_AESCTR) != 0) {
if (len != sizeof(cc->ac_ctx.ctr))
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
memcpy(iv, cc->ac_ctx.ctr, len);
return 0;
}
if ((cc->cipher->flags & CFLAG_NONE) != 0)
return 0;
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
evplen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(cc->evp);
if (evplen == 0)
return 0;
else if (evplen < 0)
return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
if ((size_t)evplen != len)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
#ifndef OPENSSL_HAVE_EVPCTR
if (c->evptype == evp_aes_128_ctr)
ssh_aes_ctr_iv(cc->evp, 0, iv, len);
else
#endif
if (cipher_authlen(c)) {
if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(cc->evp, EVP_CTRL_GCM_IV_GEN,
len, iv))
return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
} else if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_iv(cc->evp, iv, len))
return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
#endif
return 0;
}
int
cipher_set_keyiv(struct sshcipher_ctx *cc, const u_char *iv, size_t len)
{
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
const struct sshcipher *c = cc->cipher;
int evplen = 0;
#endif
if ((cc->cipher->flags & CFLAG_CHACHAPOLY) != 0)
return 0;
if ((cc->cipher->flags & CFLAG_NONE) != 0)
return 0;
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
evplen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(cc->evp);
if (evplen <= 0)
return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
if ((size_t)evplen != len)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
#ifndef OPENSSL_HAVE_EVPCTR
/* XXX iv arg is const, but ssh_aes_ctr_iv isn't */
if (c->evptype == evp_aes_128_ctr)
ssh_aes_ctr_iv(cc->evp, 1, (u_char *)iv, evplen);
else
#endif
if (cipher_authlen(c)) {
/* XXX iv arg is const, but EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl isn't */
if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(cc->evp,
EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_FIXED, -1, (void *)iv))
return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
} else if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_iv(cc->evp, iv, evplen))
return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
#endif
return 0;
}
diff --git a/cipher.h b/cipher.h
index 5843aab49313..1a591cd7fd46 100644
--- a/cipher.h
+++ b/cipher.h
@@ -1,77 +1,78 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: cipher.h,v 1.54 2019/09/06 05:23:55 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: cipher.h,v 1.55 2020/01/23 10:24:29 dtucker Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
* All rights reserved
*
* As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
* can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
* software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
* incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
* called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
*
* Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#ifndef CIPHER_H
#define CIPHER_H
#include <sys/types.h>
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#endif
#include "cipher-chachapoly.h"
#include "cipher-aesctr.h"
#define CIPHER_ENCRYPT 1
#define CIPHER_DECRYPT 0
struct sshcipher;
struct sshcipher_ctx;
const struct sshcipher *cipher_by_name(const char *);
const char *cipher_warning_message(const struct sshcipher_ctx *);
int ciphers_valid(const char *);
char *cipher_alg_list(char, int);
+const char *compression_alg_list(int);
int cipher_init(struct sshcipher_ctx **, const struct sshcipher *,
const u_char *, u_int, const u_char *, u_int, int);
int cipher_crypt(struct sshcipher_ctx *, u_int, u_char *, const u_char *,
u_int, u_int, u_int);
int cipher_get_length(struct sshcipher_ctx *, u_int *, u_int,
const u_char *, u_int);
void cipher_free(struct sshcipher_ctx *);
u_int cipher_blocksize(const struct sshcipher *);
u_int cipher_keylen(const struct sshcipher *);
u_int cipher_seclen(const struct sshcipher *);
u_int cipher_authlen(const struct sshcipher *);
u_int cipher_ivlen(const struct sshcipher *);
u_int cipher_is_cbc(const struct sshcipher *);
u_int cipher_ctx_is_plaintext(struct sshcipher_ctx *);
int cipher_get_keyiv(struct sshcipher_ctx *, u_char *, size_t);
int cipher_set_keyiv(struct sshcipher_ctx *, const u_char *, size_t);
int cipher_get_keyiv_len(const struct sshcipher_ctx *);
#endif /* CIPHER_H */
diff --git a/clientloop.c b/clientloop.c
index b5a1f70385ff..ebd0dbca186f 100644
--- a/clientloop.c
+++ b/clientloop.c
@@ -1,2406 +1,2467 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: clientloop.c,v 1.327 2019/07/24 08:57:00 mestre Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: clientloop.c,v 1.340 2020/02/02 09:45:34 dtucker Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
* All rights reserved
* The main loop for the interactive session (client side).
*
* As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
* can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
* software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
* incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
* called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
*
*
* Copyright (c) 1999 Theo de Raadt. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*
*
* SSH2 support added by Markus Friedl.
* Copyright (c) 1999, 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/ioctl.h>
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H
# include <sys/stat.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
# include <sys/time.h>
#endif
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <ctype.h>
#include <errno.h>
#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
#include <paths.h>
#endif
#include <signal.h>
-#include <stdarg.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
#include <termios.h>
#include <pwd.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <limits.h>
#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "ssh.h"
#include "ssh2.h"
#include "packet.h"
#include "sshbuf.h"
#include "compat.h"
#include "channels.h"
#include "dispatch.h"
#include "sshkey.h"
#include "cipher.h"
#include "kex.h"
#include "myproposal.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "readconf.h"
#include "clientloop.h"
#include "sshconnect.h"
#include "authfd.h"
#include "atomicio.h"
#include "sshpty.h"
#include "match.h"
#include "msg.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
#include "hostfile.h"
/* import options */
extern Options options;
/* Flag indicating that stdin should be redirected from /dev/null. */
extern int stdin_null_flag;
/* Flag indicating that no shell has been requested */
extern int no_shell_flag;
/* Flag indicating that ssh should daemonise after authentication is complete */
extern int fork_after_authentication_flag;
/* Control socket */
extern int muxserver_sock; /* XXX use mux_client_cleanup() instead */
/*
* Name of the host we are connecting to. This is the name given on the
* command line, or the Hostname specified for the user-supplied name in a
* configuration file.
*/
extern char *host;
+/*
+ * If this field is not NULL, the ForwardAgent socket is this path and different
+ * instead of SSH_AUTH_SOCK.
+ */
+extern char *forward_agent_sock_path;
+
/*
* Flag to indicate that we have received a window change signal which has
* not yet been processed. This will cause a message indicating the new
* window size to be sent to the server a little later. This is volatile
* because this is updated in a signal handler.
*/
static volatile sig_atomic_t received_window_change_signal = 0;
static volatile sig_atomic_t received_signal = 0;
/* Flag indicating whether the user's terminal is in non-blocking mode. */
static int in_non_blocking_mode = 0;
/* Time when backgrounded control master using ControlPersist should exit */
static time_t control_persist_exit_time = 0;
/* Common data for the client loop code. */
volatile sig_atomic_t quit_pending; /* Set non-zero to quit the loop. */
static int last_was_cr; /* Last character was a newline. */
static int exit_status; /* Used to store the command exit status. */
static struct sshbuf *stderr_buffer; /* Used for final exit message. */
static int connection_in; /* Connection to server (input). */
static int connection_out; /* Connection to server (output). */
static int need_rekeying; /* Set to non-zero if rekeying is requested. */
static int session_closed; /* In SSH2: login session closed. */
static u_int x11_refuse_time; /* If >0, refuse x11 opens after this time. */
static void client_init_dispatch(struct ssh *ssh);
int session_ident = -1;
/* Track escape per proto2 channel */
struct escape_filter_ctx {
int escape_pending;
int escape_char;
};
/* Context for channel confirmation replies */
struct channel_reply_ctx {
const char *request_type;
int id;
enum confirm_action action;
};
/* Global request success/failure callbacks */
/* XXX move to struct ssh? */
struct global_confirm {
TAILQ_ENTRY(global_confirm) entry;
global_confirm_cb *cb;
void *ctx;
int ref_count;
};
TAILQ_HEAD(global_confirms, global_confirm);
static struct global_confirms global_confirms =
TAILQ_HEAD_INITIALIZER(global_confirms);
void ssh_process_session2_setup(int, int, int, struct sshbuf *);
/* Restores stdin to blocking mode. */
static void
leave_non_blocking(void)
{
if (in_non_blocking_mode) {
unset_nonblock(fileno(stdin));
in_non_blocking_mode = 0;
}
}
/*
* Signal handler for the window change signal (SIGWINCH). This just sets a
* flag indicating that the window has changed.
*/
/*ARGSUSED */
static void
window_change_handler(int sig)
{
received_window_change_signal = 1;
}
/*
* Signal handler for signals that cause the program to terminate. These
* signals must be trapped to restore terminal modes.
*/
/*ARGSUSED */
static void
signal_handler(int sig)
{
received_signal = sig;
quit_pending = 1;
}
/*
* Sets control_persist_exit_time to the absolute time when the
* backgrounded control master should exit due to expiry of the
* ControlPersist timeout. Sets it to 0 if we are not a backgrounded
* control master process, or if there is no ControlPersist timeout.
*/
static void
set_control_persist_exit_time(struct ssh *ssh)
{
if (muxserver_sock == -1 || !options.control_persist
|| options.control_persist_timeout == 0) {
/* not using a ControlPersist timeout */
control_persist_exit_time = 0;
} else if (channel_still_open(ssh)) {
/* some client connections are still open */
if (control_persist_exit_time > 0)
debug2("%s: cancel scheduled exit", __func__);
control_persist_exit_time = 0;
} else if (control_persist_exit_time <= 0) {
/* a client connection has recently closed */
control_persist_exit_time = monotime() +
(time_t)options.control_persist_timeout;
debug2("%s: schedule exit in %d seconds", __func__,
options.control_persist_timeout);
}
/* else we are already counting down to the timeout */
}
#define SSH_X11_VALID_DISPLAY_CHARS ":/.-_"
static int
client_x11_display_valid(const char *display)
{
size_t i, dlen;
if (display == NULL)
return 0;
dlen = strlen(display);
for (i = 0; i < dlen; i++) {
if (!isalnum((u_char)display[i]) &&
strchr(SSH_X11_VALID_DISPLAY_CHARS, display[i]) == NULL) {
debug("Invalid character '%c' in DISPLAY", display[i]);
return 0;
}
}
return 1;
}
#define SSH_X11_PROTO "MIT-MAGIC-COOKIE-1"
#define X11_TIMEOUT_SLACK 60
int
client_x11_get_proto(struct ssh *ssh, const char *display,
const char *xauth_path, u_int trusted, u_int timeout,
char **_proto, char **_data)
{
char *cmd, line[512], xdisplay[512];
char xauthfile[PATH_MAX], xauthdir[PATH_MAX];
static char proto[512], data[512];
FILE *f;
int got_data = 0, generated = 0, do_unlink = 0, r;
struct stat st;
u_int now, x11_timeout_real;
*_proto = proto;
*_data = data;
proto[0] = data[0] = xauthfile[0] = xauthdir[0] = '\0';
if (!client_x11_display_valid(display)) {
if (display != NULL)
logit("DISPLAY \"%s\" invalid; disabling X11 forwarding",
display);
return -1;
}
if (xauth_path != NULL && stat(xauth_path, &st) == -1) {
debug("No xauth program.");
xauth_path = NULL;
}
if (xauth_path != NULL) {
/*
* Handle FamilyLocal case where $DISPLAY does
* not match an authorization entry. For this we
* just try "xauth list unix:displaynum.screennum".
* XXX: "localhost" match to determine FamilyLocal
* is not perfect.
*/
if (strncmp(display, "localhost:", 10) == 0) {
if ((r = snprintf(xdisplay, sizeof(xdisplay), "unix:%s",
display + 10)) < 0 ||
(size_t)r >= sizeof(xdisplay)) {
error("%s: display name too long", __func__);
return -1;
}
display = xdisplay;
}
if (trusted == 0) {
/*
* Generate an untrusted X11 auth cookie.
*
* The authentication cookie should briefly outlive
* ssh's willingness to forward X11 connections to
* avoid nasty fail-open behaviour in the X server.
*/
mktemp_proto(xauthdir, sizeof(xauthdir));
if (mkdtemp(xauthdir) == NULL) {
error("%s: mkdtemp: %s",
__func__, strerror(errno));
return -1;
}
do_unlink = 1;
if ((r = snprintf(xauthfile, sizeof(xauthfile),
"%s/xauthfile", xauthdir)) < 0 ||
(size_t)r >= sizeof(xauthfile)) {
error("%s: xauthfile path too long", __func__);
rmdir(xauthdir);
return -1;
}
if (timeout == 0) {
/* auth doesn't time out */
xasprintf(&cmd, "%s -f %s generate %s %s "
"untrusted 2>%s",
xauth_path, xauthfile, display,
SSH_X11_PROTO, _PATH_DEVNULL);
} else {
/* Add some slack to requested expiry */
if (timeout < UINT_MAX - X11_TIMEOUT_SLACK)
x11_timeout_real = timeout +
X11_TIMEOUT_SLACK;
else {
/* Don't overflow on long timeouts */
x11_timeout_real = UINT_MAX;
}
xasprintf(&cmd, "%s -f %s generate %s %s "
"untrusted timeout %u 2>%s",
xauth_path, xauthfile, display,
SSH_X11_PROTO, x11_timeout_real,
_PATH_DEVNULL);
}
debug2("%s: xauth command: %s", __func__, cmd);
if (timeout != 0 && x11_refuse_time == 0) {
now = monotime() + 1;
if (UINT_MAX - timeout < now)
x11_refuse_time = UINT_MAX;
else
x11_refuse_time = now + timeout;
channel_set_x11_refuse_time(ssh,
x11_refuse_time);
}
if (system(cmd) == 0)
generated = 1;
free(cmd);
}
/*
* When in untrusted mode, we read the cookie only if it was
* successfully generated as an untrusted one in the step
* above.
*/
if (trusted || generated) {
xasprintf(&cmd,
"%s %s%s list %s 2>" _PATH_DEVNULL,
xauth_path,
generated ? "-f " : "" ,
generated ? xauthfile : "",
display);
debug2("x11_get_proto: %s", cmd);
f = popen(cmd, "r");
if (f && fgets(line, sizeof(line), f) &&
sscanf(line, "%*s %511s %511s", proto, data) == 2)
got_data = 1;
if (f)
pclose(f);
free(cmd);
}
}
if (do_unlink) {
unlink(xauthfile);
rmdir(xauthdir);
}
/* Don't fall back to fake X11 data for untrusted forwarding */
if (!trusted && !got_data) {
error("Warning: untrusted X11 forwarding setup failed: "
"xauth key data not generated");
return -1;
}
/*
* If we didn't get authentication data, just make up some
* data. The forwarding code will check the validity of the
* response anyway, and substitute this data. The X11
* server, however, will ignore this fake data and use
* whatever authentication mechanisms it was using otherwise
* for the local connection.
*/
if (!got_data) {
u_int8_t rnd[16];
u_int i;
logit("Warning: No xauth data; "
"using fake authentication data for X11 forwarding.");
strlcpy(proto, SSH_X11_PROTO, sizeof proto);
arc4random_buf(rnd, sizeof(rnd));
for (i = 0; i < sizeof(rnd); i++) {
snprintf(data + 2 * i, sizeof data - 2 * i, "%02x",
rnd[i]);
}
}
return 0;
}
/*
* Checks if the client window has changed, and sends a packet about it to
* the server if so. The actual change is detected elsewhere (by a software
* interrupt on Unix); this just checks the flag and sends a message if
* appropriate.
*/
static void
client_check_window_change(struct ssh *ssh)
{
if (!received_window_change_signal)
return;
/** XXX race */
received_window_change_signal = 0;
debug2("%s: changed", __func__);
channel_send_window_changes(ssh);
}
static int
client_global_request_reply(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
{
struct global_confirm *gc;
if ((gc = TAILQ_FIRST(&global_confirms)) == NULL)
return 0;
if (gc->cb != NULL)
gc->cb(ssh, type, seq, gc->ctx);
if (--gc->ref_count <= 0) {
TAILQ_REMOVE(&global_confirms, gc, entry);
explicit_bzero(gc, sizeof(*gc));
free(gc);
}
ssh_packet_set_alive_timeouts(ssh, 0);
return 0;
}
static void
server_alive_check(struct ssh *ssh)
{
int r;
if (ssh_packet_inc_alive_timeouts(ssh) > options.server_alive_count_max) {
logit("Timeout, server %s not responding.", host);
cleanup_exit(255);
}
if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "keepalive@openssh.com")) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, 1)) != 0 || /* boolean: want reply */
(r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
fatal("%s: send packet: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
/* Insert an empty placeholder to maintain ordering */
client_register_global_confirm(NULL, NULL);
}
/*
* Waits until the client can do something (some data becomes available on
* one of the file descriptors).
*/
static void
client_wait_until_can_do_something(struct ssh *ssh,
fd_set **readsetp, fd_set **writesetp,
int *maxfdp, u_int *nallocp, int rekeying)
{
struct timeval tv, *tvp;
int timeout_secs;
time_t minwait_secs = 0, server_alive_time = 0, now = monotime();
int r, ret;
/* Add any selections by the channel mechanism. */
channel_prepare_select(ssh, readsetp, writesetp, maxfdp,
nallocp, &minwait_secs);
/* channel_prepare_select could have closed the last channel */
if (session_closed && !channel_still_open(ssh) &&
!ssh_packet_have_data_to_write(ssh)) {
/* clear mask since we did not call select() */
memset(*readsetp, 0, *nallocp);
memset(*writesetp, 0, *nallocp);
return;
}
FD_SET(connection_in, *readsetp);
/* Select server connection if have data to write to the server. */
if (ssh_packet_have_data_to_write(ssh))
FD_SET(connection_out, *writesetp);
/*
* Wait for something to happen. This will suspend the process until
* some selected descriptor can be read, written, or has some other
* event pending, or a timeout expires.
*/
timeout_secs = INT_MAX; /* we use INT_MAX to mean no timeout */
if (options.server_alive_interval > 0) {
timeout_secs = options.server_alive_interval;
server_alive_time = now + options.server_alive_interval;
}
if (options.rekey_interval > 0 && !rekeying)
timeout_secs = MINIMUM(timeout_secs,
ssh_packet_get_rekey_timeout(ssh));
set_control_persist_exit_time(ssh);
if (control_persist_exit_time > 0) {
timeout_secs = MINIMUM(timeout_secs,
control_persist_exit_time - now);
if (timeout_secs < 0)
timeout_secs = 0;
}
if (minwait_secs != 0)
timeout_secs = MINIMUM(timeout_secs, (int)minwait_secs);
if (timeout_secs == INT_MAX)
tvp = NULL;
else {
tv.tv_sec = timeout_secs;
tv.tv_usec = 0;
tvp = &tv;
}
ret = select((*maxfdp)+1, *readsetp, *writesetp, NULL, tvp);
if (ret == -1) {
/*
* We have to clear the select masks, because we return.
* We have to return, because the mainloop checks for the flags
* set by the signal handlers.
*/
memset(*readsetp, 0, *nallocp);
memset(*writesetp, 0, *nallocp);
if (errno == EINTR)
return;
/* Note: we might still have data in the buffers. */
if ((r = sshbuf_putf(stderr_buffer,
"select: %s\r\n", strerror(errno))) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
quit_pending = 1;
} else if (ret == 0) {
/*
* Timeout. Could have been either keepalive or rekeying.
* Keepalive we check here, rekeying is checked in clientloop.
*/
if (server_alive_time != 0 && server_alive_time <= monotime())
server_alive_check(ssh);
}
}
static void
client_suspend_self(struct sshbuf *bin, struct sshbuf *bout, struct sshbuf *berr)
{
/* Flush stdout and stderr buffers. */
if (sshbuf_len(bout) > 0)
atomicio(vwrite, fileno(stdout), sshbuf_mutable_ptr(bout),
sshbuf_len(bout));
if (sshbuf_len(berr) > 0)
atomicio(vwrite, fileno(stderr), sshbuf_mutable_ptr(berr),
sshbuf_len(berr));
leave_raw_mode(options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_FORCE);
sshbuf_reset(bin);
sshbuf_reset(bout);
sshbuf_reset(berr);
/* Send the suspend signal to the program itself. */
kill(getpid(), SIGTSTP);
/* Reset window sizes in case they have changed */
received_window_change_signal = 1;
enter_raw_mode(options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_FORCE);
}
static void
client_process_net_input(struct ssh *ssh, fd_set *readset)
{
char buf[SSH_IOBUFSZ];
int r, len;
/*
* Read input from the server, and add any such data to the buffer of
* the packet subsystem.
*/
if (FD_ISSET(connection_in, readset)) {
/* Read as much as possible. */
len = read(connection_in, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (len == 0) {
/*
* Received EOF. The remote host has closed the
* connection.
*/
if ((r = sshbuf_putf(stderr_buffer,
"Connection to %.300s closed by remote host.\r\n",
host)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
quit_pending = 1;
return;
}
/*
* There is a kernel bug on Solaris that causes select to
* sometimes wake up even though there is no data available.
*/
if (len == -1 &&
(errno == EAGAIN || errno == EINTR || errno == EWOULDBLOCK))
len = 0;
if (len == -1) {
/*
* An error has encountered. Perhaps there is a
* network problem.
*/
if ((r = sshbuf_putf(stderr_buffer,
"Read from remote host %.300s: %.100s\r\n",
host, strerror(errno))) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
quit_pending = 1;
return;
}
ssh_packet_process_incoming(ssh, buf, len);
}
}
static void
client_status_confirm(struct ssh *ssh, int type, Channel *c, void *ctx)
{
struct channel_reply_ctx *cr = (struct channel_reply_ctx *)ctx;
char errmsg[256];
int r, tochan;
/*
* If a TTY was explicitly requested, then a failure to allocate
* one is fatal.
*/
if (cr->action == CONFIRM_TTY &&
(options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_FORCE ||
options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_YES))
cr->action = CONFIRM_CLOSE;
/* XXX suppress on mux _client_ quietmode */
tochan = options.log_level >= SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR &&
c->ctl_chan != -1 && c->extended_usage == CHAN_EXTENDED_WRITE;
if (type == SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS) {
debug2("%s request accepted on channel %d",
cr->request_type, c->self);
} else if (type == SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE) {
if (tochan) {
snprintf(errmsg, sizeof(errmsg),
"%s request failed\r\n", cr->request_type);
} else {
snprintf(errmsg, sizeof(errmsg),
"%s request failed on channel %d",
cr->request_type, c->self);
}
/* If error occurred on primary session channel, then exit */
if (cr->action == CONFIRM_CLOSE && c->self == session_ident)
fatal("%s", errmsg);
/*
* If error occurred on mux client, append to
* their stderr.
*/
if (tochan) {
if ((r = sshbuf_put(c->extended, errmsg,
strlen(errmsg))) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error %s", __func__,
ssh_err(r));
} else
error("%s", errmsg);
if (cr->action == CONFIRM_TTY) {
/*
* If a TTY allocation error occurred, then arrange
* for the correct TTY to leave raw mode.
*/
if (c->self == session_ident)
leave_raw_mode(0);
else
mux_tty_alloc_failed(ssh, c);
} else if (cr->action == CONFIRM_CLOSE) {
chan_read_failed(ssh, c);
chan_write_failed(ssh, c);
}
}
free(cr);
}
static void
client_abandon_status_confirm(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c, void *ctx)
{
free(ctx);
}
void
client_expect_confirm(struct ssh *ssh, int id, const char *request,
enum confirm_action action)
{
struct channel_reply_ctx *cr = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*cr));
cr->request_type = request;
cr->action = action;
channel_register_status_confirm(ssh, id, client_status_confirm,
client_abandon_status_confirm, cr);
}
void
client_register_global_confirm(global_confirm_cb *cb, void *ctx)
{
struct global_confirm *gc, *last_gc;
/* Coalesce identical callbacks */
last_gc = TAILQ_LAST(&global_confirms, global_confirms);
if (last_gc && last_gc->cb == cb && last_gc->ctx == ctx) {
if (++last_gc->ref_count >= INT_MAX)
fatal("%s: last_gc->ref_count = %d",
__func__, last_gc->ref_count);
return;
}
gc = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*gc));
gc->cb = cb;
gc->ctx = ctx;
gc->ref_count = 1;
TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&global_confirms, gc, entry);
}
static void
process_cmdline(struct ssh *ssh)
{
void (*handler)(int);
char *s, *cmd;
int ok, delete = 0, local = 0, remote = 0, dynamic = 0;
struct Forward fwd;
memset(&fwd, 0, sizeof(fwd));
leave_raw_mode(options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_FORCE);
- handler = signal(SIGINT, SIG_IGN);
+ handler = ssh_signal(SIGINT, SIG_IGN);
cmd = s = read_passphrase("\r\nssh> ", RP_ECHO);
if (s == NULL)
goto out;
while (isspace((u_char)*s))
s++;
if (*s == '-')
s++; /* Skip cmdline '-', if any */
if (*s == '\0')
goto out;
if (*s == 'h' || *s == 'H' || *s == '?') {
logit("Commands:");
logit(" -L[bind_address:]port:host:hostport "
"Request local forward");
logit(" -R[bind_address:]port:host:hostport "
"Request remote forward");
logit(" -D[bind_address:]port "
"Request dynamic forward");
logit(" -KL[bind_address:]port "
"Cancel local forward");
logit(" -KR[bind_address:]port "
"Cancel remote forward");
logit(" -KD[bind_address:]port "
"Cancel dynamic forward");
if (!options.permit_local_command)
goto out;
logit(" !args "
"Execute local command");
goto out;
}
if (*s == '!' && options.permit_local_command) {
s++;
ssh_local_cmd(s);
goto out;
}
if (*s == 'K') {
delete = 1;
s++;
}
if (*s == 'L')
local = 1;
else if (*s == 'R')
remote = 1;
else if (*s == 'D')
dynamic = 1;
else {
logit("Invalid command.");
goto out;
}
while (isspace((u_char)*++s))
;
/* XXX update list of forwards in options */
if (delete) {
/* We pass 1 for dynamicfwd to restrict to 1 or 2 fields. */
if (!parse_forward(&fwd, s, 1, 0)) {
logit("Bad forwarding close specification.");
goto out;
}
if (remote)
ok = channel_request_rforward_cancel(ssh, &fwd) == 0;
else if (dynamic)
ok = channel_cancel_lport_listener(ssh, &fwd,
0, &options.fwd_opts) > 0;
else
ok = channel_cancel_lport_listener(ssh, &fwd,
CHANNEL_CANCEL_PORT_STATIC,
&options.fwd_opts) > 0;
if (!ok) {
logit("Unknown port forwarding.");
goto out;
}
logit("Canceled forwarding.");
} else {
if (!parse_forward(&fwd, s, dynamic, remote)) {
logit("Bad forwarding specification.");
goto out;
}
if (local || dynamic) {
if (!channel_setup_local_fwd_listener(ssh, &fwd,
&options.fwd_opts)) {
logit("Port forwarding failed.");
goto out;
}
} else {
if (channel_request_remote_forwarding(ssh, &fwd) < 0) {
logit("Port forwarding failed.");
goto out;
}
}
logit("Forwarding port.");
}
out:
- signal(SIGINT, handler);
+ ssh_signal(SIGINT, handler);
enter_raw_mode(options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_FORCE);
free(cmd);
free(fwd.listen_host);
free(fwd.listen_path);
free(fwd.connect_host);
free(fwd.connect_path);
}
/* reasons to suppress output of an escape command in help output */
#define SUPPRESS_NEVER 0 /* never suppress, always show */
#define SUPPRESS_MUXCLIENT 1 /* don't show in mux client sessions */
#define SUPPRESS_MUXMASTER 2 /* don't show in mux master sessions */
#define SUPPRESS_SYSLOG 4 /* don't show when logging to syslog */
struct escape_help_text {
const char *cmd;
const char *text;
unsigned int flags;
};
static struct escape_help_text esc_txt[] = {
{".", "terminate session", SUPPRESS_MUXMASTER},
{".", "terminate connection (and any multiplexed sessions)",
SUPPRESS_MUXCLIENT},
{"B", "send a BREAK to the remote system", SUPPRESS_NEVER},
{"C", "open a command line", SUPPRESS_MUXCLIENT},
{"R", "request rekey", SUPPRESS_NEVER},
{"V/v", "decrease/increase verbosity (LogLevel)", SUPPRESS_MUXCLIENT},
{"^Z", "suspend ssh", SUPPRESS_MUXCLIENT},
{"#", "list forwarded connections", SUPPRESS_NEVER},
{"&", "background ssh (when waiting for connections to terminate)",
SUPPRESS_MUXCLIENT},
{"?", "this message", SUPPRESS_NEVER},
};
static void
print_escape_help(struct sshbuf *b, int escape_char, int mux_client,
int using_stderr)
{
unsigned int i, suppress_flags;
int r;
if ((r = sshbuf_putf(b,
"%c?\r\nSupported escape sequences:\r\n", escape_char)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
suppress_flags =
(mux_client ? SUPPRESS_MUXCLIENT : 0) |
(mux_client ? 0 : SUPPRESS_MUXMASTER) |
(using_stderr ? 0 : SUPPRESS_SYSLOG);
for (i = 0; i < sizeof(esc_txt)/sizeof(esc_txt[0]); i++) {
if (esc_txt[i].flags & suppress_flags)
continue;
if ((r = sshbuf_putf(b, " %c%-3s - %s\r\n",
escape_char, esc_txt[i].cmd, esc_txt[i].text)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
}
if ((r = sshbuf_putf(b,
" %c%c - send the escape character by typing it twice\r\n"
"(Note that escapes are only recognized immediately after "
"newline.)\r\n", escape_char, escape_char)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
}
/*
* Process the characters one by one.
*/
static int
process_escapes(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c,
struct sshbuf *bin, struct sshbuf *bout, struct sshbuf *berr,
char *buf, int len)
{
pid_t pid;
int r, bytes = 0;
u_int i;
u_char ch;
char *s;
struct escape_filter_ctx *efc = c->filter_ctx == NULL ?
NULL : (struct escape_filter_ctx *)c->filter_ctx;
if (c->filter_ctx == NULL)
return 0;
if (len <= 0)
return (0);
for (i = 0; i < (u_int)len; i++) {
/* Get one character at a time. */
ch = buf[i];
if (efc->escape_pending) {
/* We have previously seen an escape character. */
/* Clear the flag now. */
efc->escape_pending = 0;
/* Process the escaped character. */
switch (ch) {
case '.':
/* Terminate the connection. */
if ((r = sshbuf_putf(berr, "%c.\r\n",
efc->escape_char)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
if (c && c->ctl_chan != -1) {
chan_read_failed(ssh, c);
chan_write_failed(ssh, c);
if (c->detach_user) {
c->detach_user(ssh,
c->self, NULL);
}
c->type = SSH_CHANNEL_ABANDONED;
sshbuf_reset(c->input);
chan_ibuf_empty(ssh, c);
return 0;
} else
quit_pending = 1;
return -1;
case 'Z' - 64:
/* XXX support this for mux clients */
if (c && c->ctl_chan != -1) {
char b[16];
noescape:
if (ch == 'Z' - 64)
snprintf(b, sizeof b, "^Z");
else
snprintf(b, sizeof b, "%c", ch);
if ((r = sshbuf_putf(berr,
"%c%s escape not available to "
"multiplexed sessions\r\n",
efc->escape_char, b)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
continue;
}
/* Suspend the program. Inform the user */
if ((r = sshbuf_putf(berr,
"%c^Z [suspend ssh]\r\n",
efc->escape_char)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
/* Restore terminal modes and suspend. */
client_suspend_self(bin, bout, berr);
/* We have been continued. */
continue;
case 'B':
if ((r = sshbuf_putf(berr,
"%cB\r\n", efc->escape_char)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
channel_request_start(ssh, c->self, "break", 0);
if ((r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, 1000)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
fatal("%s: send packet: %s", __func__,
ssh_err(r));
continue;
case 'R':
if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_NOREKEY)
logit("Server does not "
"support re-keying");
else
need_rekeying = 1;
continue;
case 'V':
/* FALLTHROUGH */
case 'v':
if (c && c->ctl_chan != -1)
goto noescape;
if (!log_is_on_stderr()) {
if ((r = sshbuf_putf(berr,
"%c%c [Logging to syslog]\r\n",
efc->escape_char, ch)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
continue;
}
if (ch == 'V' && options.log_level >
SYSLOG_LEVEL_QUIET)
log_change_level(--options.log_level);
if (ch == 'v' && options.log_level <
SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3)
log_change_level(++options.log_level);
if ((r = sshbuf_putf(berr,
"%c%c [LogLevel %s]\r\n",
efc->escape_char, ch,
log_level_name(options.log_level))) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
continue;
case '&':
if (c && c->ctl_chan != -1)
goto noescape;
/*
* Detach the program (continue to serve
* connections, but put in background and no
* more new connections).
*/
/* Restore tty modes. */
leave_raw_mode(
options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_FORCE);
/* Stop listening for new connections. */
channel_stop_listening(ssh);
if ((r = sshbuf_putf(berr,
"%c& [backgrounded]\n", efc->escape_char))
!= 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
/* Fork into background. */
pid = fork();
if (pid == -1) {
error("fork: %.100s", strerror(errno));
continue;
}
if (pid != 0) { /* This is the parent. */
/* The parent just exits. */
exit(0);
}
/* The child continues serving connections. */
/* fake EOF on stdin */
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(bin, 4)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
return -1;
case '?':
print_escape_help(berr, efc->escape_char,
(c && c->ctl_chan != -1),
log_is_on_stderr());
continue;
case '#':
if ((r = sshbuf_putf(berr, "%c#\r\n",
efc->escape_char)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
s = channel_open_message(ssh);
if ((r = sshbuf_put(berr, s, strlen(s))) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
free(s);
continue;
case 'C':
if (c && c->ctl_chan != -1)
goto noescape;
process_cmdline(ssh);
continue;
default:
if (ch != efc->escape_char) {
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(bin,
efc->escape_char)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
bytes++;
}
/* Escaped characters fall through here */
break;
}
} else {
/*
* The previous character was not an escape char.
* Check if this is an escape.
*/
if (last_was_cr && ch == efc->escape_char) {
/*
* It is. Set the flag and continue to
* next character.
*/
efc->escape_pending = 1;
continue;
}
}
/*
* Normal character. Record whether it was a newline,
* and append it to the buffer.
*/
last_was_cr = (ch == '\r' || ch == '\n');
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(bin, ch)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
bytes++;
}
return bytes;
}
/*
* Get packets from the connection input buffer, and process them as long as
* there are packets available.
*
* Any unknown packets received during the actual
* session cause the session to terminate. This is
* intended to make debugging easier since no
* confirmations are sent. Any compatible protocol
* extensions must be negotiated during the
* preparatory phase.
*/
static void
client_process_buffered_input_packets(struct ssh *ssh)
{
ssh_dispatch_run_fatal(ssh, DISPATCH_NONBLOCK, &quit_pending);
}
/* scan buf[] for '~' before sending data to the peer */
/* Helper: allocate a new escape_filter_ctx and fill in its escape char */
void *
client_new_escape_filter_ctx(int escape_char)
{
struct escape_filter_ctx *ret;
ret = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*ret));
ret->escape_pending = 0;
ret->escape_char = escape_char;
return (void *)ret;
}
/* Free the escape filter context on channel free */
void
client_filter_cleanup(struct ssh *ssh, int cid, void *ctx)
{
free(ctx);
}
int
client_simple_escape_filter(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c, char *buf, int len)
{
if (c->extended_usage != CHAN_EXTENDED_WRITE)
return 0;
return process_escapes(ssh, c, c->input, c->output, c->extended,
buf, len);
}
static void
client_channel_closed(struct ssh *ssh, int id, void *arg)
{
channel_cancel_cleanup(ssh, id);
session_closed = 1;
leave_raw_mode(options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_FORCE);
}
/*
* Implements the interactive session with the server. This is called after
* the user has been authenticated, and a command has been started on the
* remote host. If escape_char != SSH_ESCAPECHAR_NONE, it is the character
* used as an escape character for terminating or suspending the session.
*/
int
client_loop(struct ssh *ssh, int have_pty, int escape_char_arg,
int ssh2_chan_id)
{
fd_set *readset = NULL, *writeset = NULL;
double start_time, total_time;
int r, max_fd = 0, max_fd2 = 0, len;
u_int64_t ibytes, obytes;
u_int nalloc = 0;
char buf[100];
debug("Entering interactive session.");
if (options.control_master &&
!option_clear_or_none(options.control_path)) {
debug("pledge: id");
if (pledge("stdio rpath wpath cpath unix inet dns recvfd sendfd proc exec id tty",
NULL) == -1)
fatal("%s pledge(): %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
} else if (options.forward_x11 || options.permit_local_command) {
debug("pledge: exec");
if (pledge("stdio rpath wpath cpath unix inet dns proc exec tty",
NULL) == -1)
fatal("%s pledge(): %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
} else if (options.update_hostkeys) {
debug("pledge: filesystem full");
if (pledge("stdio rpath wpath cpath unix inet dns proc tty",
NULL) == -1)
fatal("%s pledge(): %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
} else if (!option_clear_or_none(options.proxy_command) ||
fork_after_authentication_flag) {
debug("pledge: proc");
if (pledge("stdio cpath unix inet dns proc tty", NULL) == -1)
fatal("%s pledge(): %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
} else {
debug("pledge: network");
if (pledge("stdio unix inet dns proc tty", NULL) == -1)
fatal("%s pledge(): %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
}
start_time = monotime_double();
/* Initialize variables. */
last_was_cr = 1;
exit_status = -1;
connection_in = ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh);
connection_out = ssh_packet_get_connection_out(ssh);
max_fd = MAXIMUM(connection_in, connection_out);
quit_pending = 0;
/* Initialize buffer. */
if ((stderr_buffer = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
client_init_dispatch(ssh);
/*
* Set signal handlers, (e.g. to restore non-blocking mode)
* but don't overwrite SIG_IGN, matches behaviour from rsh(1)
*/
- if (signal(SIGHUP, SIG_IGN) != SIG_IGN)
- signal(SIGHUP, signal_handler);
- if (signal(SIGINT, SIG_IGN) != SIG_IGN)
- signal(SIGINT, signal_handler);
- if (signal(SIGQUIT, SIG_IGN) != SIG_IGN)
- signal(SIGQUIT, signal_handler);
- if (signal(SIGTERM, SIG_IGN) != SIG_IGN)
- signal(SIGTERM, signal_handler);
- signal(SIGWINCH, window_change_handler);
+ if (ssh_signal(SIGHUP, SIG_IGN) != SIG_IGN)
+ ssh_signal(SIGHUP, signal_handler);
+ if (ssh_signal(SIGINT, SIG_IGN) != SIG_IGN)
+ ssh_signal(SIGINT, signal_handler);
+ if (ssh_signal(SIGQUIT, SIG_IGN) != SIG_IGN)
+ ssh_signal(SIGQUIT, signal_handler);
+ if (ssh_signal(SIGTERM, SIG_IGN) != SIG_IGN)
+ ssh_signal(SIGTERM, signal_handler);
+ ssh_signal(SIGWINCH, window_change_handler);
if (have_pty)
enter_raw_mode(options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_FORCE);
session_ident = ssh2_chan_id;
if (session_ident != -1) {
if (escape_char_arg != SSH_ESCAPECHAR_NONE) {
channel_register_filter(ssh, session_ident,
client_simple_escape_filter, NULL,
client_filter_cleanup,
client_new_escape_filter_ctx(
escape_char_arg));
}
channel_register_cleanup(ssh, session_ident,
client_channel_closed, 0);
}
/* Main loop of the client for the interactive session mode. */
while (!quit_pending) {
/* Process buffered packets sent by the server. */
client_process_buffered_input_packets(ssh);
if (session_closed && !channel_still_open(ssh))
break;
if (ssh_packet_is_rekeying(ssh)) {
debug("rekeying in progress");
} else if (need_rekeying) {
/* manual rekey request */
debug("need rekeying");
if ((r = kex_start_rekex(ssh)) != 0)
fatal("%s: kex_start_rekex: %s", __func__,
ssh_err(r));
need_rekeying = 0;
} else {
/*
* Make packets from buffered channel data, and
* enqueue them for sending to the server.
*/
if (ssh_packet_not_very_much_data_to_write(ssh))
channel_output_poll(ssh);
/*
* Check if the window size has changed, and buffer a
* message about it to the server if so.
*/
client_check_window_change(ssh);
if (quit_pending)
break;
}
/*
* Wait until we have something to do (something becomes
* available on one of the descriptors).
*/
max_fd2 = max_fd;
client_wait_until_can_do_something(ssh, &readset, &writeset,
&max_fd2, &nalloc, ssh_packet_is_rekeying(ssh));
if (quit_pending)
break;
/* Do channel operations unless rekeying in progress. */
if (!ssh_packet_is_rekeying(ssh))
channel_after_select(ssh, readset, writeset);
/* Buffer input from the connection. */
client_process_net_input(ssh, readset);
if (quit_pending)
break;
/*
* Send as much buffered packet data as possible to the
* sender.
*/
- if (FD_ISSET(connection_out, writeset))
- ssh_packet_write_poll(ssh);
+ if (FD_ISSET(connection_out, writeset)) {
+ if ((r = ssh_packet_write_poll(ssh)) != 0) {
+ sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r,
+ "%s: ssh_packet_write_poll", __func__);
+ }
+ }
/*
* If we are a backgrounded control master, and the
* timeout has expired without any active client
* connections, then quit.
*/
if (control_persist_exit_time > 0) {
if (monotime() >= control_persist_exit_time) {
debug("ControlPersist timeout expired");
break;
}
}
}
free(readset);
free(writeset);
/* Terminate the session. */
/* Stop watching for window change. */
- signal(SIGWINCH, SIG_DFL);
+ ssh_signal(SIGWINCH, SIG_DFL);
if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, SSH2_DISCONNECT_BY_APPLICATION)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "disconnected by user")) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "")) != 0 || /* language tag */
(r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0 ||
(r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0)
fatal("%s: send disconnect: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
channel_free_all(ssh);
if (have_pty)
leave_raw_mode(options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_FORCE);
/* restore blocking io */
if (!isatty(fileno(stdin)))
unset_nonblock(fileno(stdin));
if (!isatty(fileno(stdout)))
unset_nonblock(fileno(stdout));
if (!isatty(fileno(stderr)))
unset_nonblock(fileno(stderr));
/*
* If there was no shell or command requested, there will be no remote
* exit status to be returned. In that case, clear error code if the
* connection was deliberately terminated at this end.
*/
if (no_shell_flag && received_signal == SIGTERM) {
received_signal = 0;
exit_status = 0;
}
if (received_signal) {
verbose("Killed by signal %d.", (int) received_signal);
cleanup_exit(0);
}
/*
* In interactive mode (with pseudo tty) display a message indicating
* that the connection has been closed.
*/
if (have_pty && options.log_level != SYSLOG_LEVEL_QUIET) {
if ((r = sshbuf_putf(stderr_buffer,
"Connection to %.64s closed.\r\n", host)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
}
/* Output any buffered data for stderr. */
if (sshbuf_len(stderr_buffer) > 0) {
len = atomicio(vwrite, fileno(stderr),
(u_char *)sshbuf_ptr(stderr_buffer),
sshbuf_len(stderr_buffer));
if (len < 0 || (u_int)len != sshbuf_len(stderr_buffer))
error("Write failed flushing stderr buffer.");
else if ((r = sshbuf_consume(stderr_buffer, len)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
}
/* Clear and free any buffers. */
explicit_bzero(buf, sizeof(buf));
sshbuf_free(stderr_buffer);
/* Report bytes transferred, and transfer rates. */
total_time = monotime_double() - start_time;
ssh_packet_get_bytes(ssh, &ibytes, &obytes);
verbose("Transferred: sent %llu, received %llu bytes, in %.1f seconds",
(unsigned long long)obytes, (unsigned long long)ibytes, total_time);
if (total_time > 0)
verbose("Bytes per second: sent %.1f, received %.1f",
obytes / total_time, ibytes / total_time);
/* Return the exit status of the program. */
debug("Exit status %d", exit_status);
return exit_status;
}
/*********/
static Channel *
client_request_forwarded_tcpip(struct ssh *ssh, const char *request_type,
int rchan, u_int rwindow, u_int rmaxpack)
{
Channel *c = NULL;
struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
char *listen_address, *originator_address;
u_int listen_port, originator_port;
int r;
/* Get rest of the packet */
if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &listen_address, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &listen_port)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &originator_address, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &originator_port)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
fatal("%s: parse packet: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
debug("%s: listen %s port %d, originator %s port %d", __func__,
listen_address, listen_port, originator_address, originator_port);
if (listen_port > 0xffff)
error("%s: invalid listen port", __func__);
else if (originator_port > 0xffff)
error("%s: invalid originator port", __func__);
else {
c = channel_connect_by_listen_address(ssh,
listen_address, listen_port, "forwarded-tcpip",
originator_address);
}
if (c != NULL && c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_CLIENT) {
if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
error("%s: alloc reply", __func__);
goto out;
}
/* reconstruct and send to muxclient */
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, 0)) != 0 || /* padlen */
(r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, request_type)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, rchan)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, rwindow)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, rmaxpack)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, listen_address)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, listen_port)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, originator_address)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, originator_port)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_stringb(c->output, b)) != 0) {
error("%s: compose for muxclient %s", __func__,
ssh_err(r));
goto out;
}
}
out:
sshbuf_free(b);
free(originator_address);
free(listen_address);
return c;
}
static Channel *
client_request_forwarded_streamlocal(struct ssh *ssh,
const char *request_type, int rchan)
{
Channel *c = NULL;
char *listen_path;
int r;
/* Get the remote path. */
if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &listen_path, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, NULL, NULL)) != 0 || /* reserved */
(r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
fatal("%s: parse packet: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
debug("%s: request: %s", __func__, listen_path);
c = channel_connect_by_listen_path(ssh, listen_path,
"forwarded-streamlocal@openssh.com", "forwarded-streamlocal");
free(listen_path);
return c;
}
static Channel *
client_request_x11(struct ssh *ssh, const char *request_type, int rchan)
{
Channel *c = NULL;
char *originator;
u_int originator_port;
int r, sock;
if (!options.forward_x11) {
error("Warning: ssh server tried X11 forwarding.");
error("Warning: this is probably a break-in attempt by a "
"malicious server.");
return NULL;
}
if (x11_refuse_time != 0 && (u_int)monotime() >= x11_refuse_time) {
verbose("Rejected X11 connection after ForwardX11Timeout "
"expired");
return NULL;
}
if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &originator, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &originator_port)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
fatal("%s: parse packet: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
/* XXX check permission */
/* XXX range check originator port? */
debug("client_request_x11: request from %s %u", originator,
originator_port);
free(originator);
sock = x11_connect_display(ssh);
if (sock < 0)
return NULL;
c = channel_new(ssh, "x11",
SSH_CHANNEL_X11_OPEN, sock, sock, -1,
CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_X11_PACKET_DEFAULT, 0, "x11", 1);
c->force_drain = 1;
return c;
}
static Channel *
client_request_agent(struct ssh *ssh, const char *request_type, int rchan)
{
Channel *c = NULL;
int r, sock;
if (!options.forward_agent) {
error("Warning: ssh server tried agent forwarding.");
error("Warning: this is probably a break-in attempt by a "
"malicious server.");
return NULL;
}
- if ((r = ssh_get_authentication_socket(&sock)) != 0) {
+ if (forward_agent_sock_path == NULL) {
+ r = ssh_get_authentication_socket(&sock);
+ } else {
+ r = ssh_get_authentication_socket_path(forward_agent_sock_path, &sock);
+ }
+ if (r != 0) {
if (r != SSH_ERR_AGENT_NOT_PRESENT)
debug("%s: ssh_get_authentication_socket: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
return NULL;
}
c = channel_new(ssh, "authentication agent connection",
SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN, sock, sock, -1,
CHAN_X11_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT, 0,
"authentication agent connection", 1);
c->force_drain = 1;
return c;
}
char *
client_request_tun_fwd(struct ssh *ssh, int tun_mode,
int local_tun, int remote_tun)
{
Channel *c;
int r, fd;
char *ifname = NULL;
if (tun_mode == SSH_TUNMODE_NO)
return 0;
debug("Requesting tun unit %d in mode %d", local_tun, tun_mode);
/* Open local tunnel device */
if ((fd = tun_open(local_tun, tun_mode, &ifname)) == -1) {
error("Tunnel device open failed.");
return NULL;
}
debug("Tunnel forwarding using interface %s", ifname);
c = channel_new(ssh, "tun", SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING, fd, fd, -1,
CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT, 0, "tun", 1);
c->datagram = 1;
#if defined(SSH_TUN_FILTER)
if (options.tun_open == SSH_TUNMODE_POINTOPOINT)
channel_register_filter(ssh, c->self, sys_tun_infilter,
sys_tun_outfilter, NULL, NULL);
#endif
if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "tun@openssh.com")) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->self)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->local_window_max)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->local_maxpacket)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, tun_mode)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, remote_tun)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: send reply", __func__);
return ifname;
}
/* XXXX move to generic input handler */
static int
client_input_channel_open(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
{
Channel *c = NULL;
char *ctype = NULL;
int r;
u_int rchan;
size_t len;
u_int rmaxpack, rwindow;
if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &ctype, &len)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &rchan)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &rwindow)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &rmaxpack)) != 0)
goto out;
debug("client_input_channel_open: ctype %s rchan %d win %d max %d",
ctype, rchan, rwindow, rmaxpack);
if (strcmp(ctype, "forwarded-tcpip") == 0) {
c = client_request_forwarded_tcpip(ssh, ctype, rchan, rwindow,
rmaxpack);
} else if (strcmp(ctype, "forwarded-streamlocal@openssh.com") == 0) {
c = client_request_forwarded_streamlocal(ssh, ctype, rchan);
} else if (strcmp(ctype, "x11") == 0) {
c = client_request_x11(ssh, ctype, rchan);
} else if (strcmp(ctype, "auth-agent@openssh.com") == 0) {
c = client_request_agent(ssh, ctype, rchan);
}
if (c != NULL && c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_CLIENT) {
debug3("proxied to downstream: %s", ctype);
} else if (c != NULL) {
debug("confirm %s", ctype);
c->remote_id = rchan;
c->have_remote_id = 1;
c->remote_window = rwindow;
c->remote_maxpacket = rmaxpack;
if (c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING) {
if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->remote_id)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->self)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->local_window)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->local_maxpacket)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: send reply", __func__);
}
} else {
debug("failure %s", ctype);
if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, rchan)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, SSH2_OPEN_ADMINISTRATIVELY_PROHIBITED)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "open failed")) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "")) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: send failure", __func__);
}
r = 0;
out:
free(ctype);
return r;
}
static int
client_input_channel_req(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
{
Channel *c = NULL;
char *rtype = NULL;
u_char reply;
u_int id, exitval;
int r, success = 0;
if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &id)) != 0)
return r;
if (id <= INT_MAX)
c = channel_lookup(ssh, id);
if (channel_proxy_upstream(c, type, seq, ssh))
return 0;
if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &rtype, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_get_u8(ssh, &reply)) != 0)
goto out;
debug("client_input_channel_req: channel %u rtype %s reply %d",
id, rtype, reply);
if (c == NULL) {
error("client_input_channel_req: channel %d: "
"unknown channel", id);
} else if (strcmp(rtype, "eow@openssh.com") == 0) {
if ((r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
goto out;
chan_rcvd_eow(ssh, c);
} else if (strcmp(rtype, "exit-status") == 0) {
if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &exitval)) != 0)
goto out;
if (c->ctl_chan != -1) {
mux_exit_message(ssh, c, exitval);
success = 1;
} else if ((int)id == session_ident) {
/* Record exit value of local session */
success = 1;
exit_status = exitval;
} else {
/* Probably for a mux channel that has already closed */
debug("%s: no sink for exit-status on channel %d",
__func__, id);
}
if ((r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
goto out;
}
if (reply && c != NULL && !(c->flags & CHAN_CLOSE_SENT)) {
if (!c->have_remote_id)
fatal("%s: channel %d: no remote_id",
__func__, c->self);
if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, success ?
SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS : SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->remote_id)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: send failure", __func__);
}
r = 0;
out:
free(rtype);
return r;
}
struct hostkeys_update_ctx {
/* The hostname and (optionally) IP address string for the server */
char *host_str, *ip_str;
/*
* Keys received from the server and a flag for each indicating
* whether they already exist in known_hosts.
* keys_seen is filled in by hostkeys_find() and later (for new
* keys) by client_global_hostkeys_private_confirm().
*/
struct sshkey **keys;
int *keys_seen;
size_t nkeys, nnew;
/*
* Keys that are in known_hosts, but were not present in the update
* from the server (i.e. scheduled to be deleted).
* Filled in by hostkeys_find().
*/
struct sshkey **old_keys;
size_t nold;
};
static void
hostkeys_update_ctx_free(struct hostkeys_update_ctx *ctx)
{
size_t i;
if (ctx == NULL)
return;
for (i = 0; i < ctx->nkeys; i++)
sshkey_free(ctx->keys[i]);
free(ctx->keys);
free(ctx->keys_seen);
for (i = 0; i < ctx->nold; i++)
sshkey_free(ctx->old_keys[i]);
free(ctx->old_keys);
free(ctx->host_str);
free(ctx->ip_str);
free(ctx);
}
static int
hostkeys_find(struct hostkey_foreach_line *l, void *_ctx)
{
struct hostkeys_update_ctx *ctx = (struct hostkeys_update_ctx *)_ctx;
size_t i;
struct sshkey **tmp;
if (l->status != HKF_STATUS_MATCHED || l->key == NULL)
return 0;
/* Mark off keys we've already seen for this host */
for (i = 0; i < ctx->nkeys; i++) {
if (sshkey_equal(l->key, ctx->keys[i])) {
debug3("%s: found %s key at %s:%ld", __func__,
sshkey_ssh_name(ctx->keys[i]), l->path, l->linenum);
ctx->keys_seen[i] = 1;
return 0;
}
}
/* This line contained a key that not offered by the server */
debug3("%s: deprecated %s key at %s:%ld", __func__,
sshkey_ssh_name(l->key), l->path, l->linenum);
if ((tmp = recallocarray(ctx->old_keys, ctx->nold, ctx->nold + 1,
sizeof(*ctx->old_keys))) == NULL)
fatal("%s: recallocarray failed nold = %zu",
__func__, ctx->nold);
ctx->old_keys = tmp;
ctx->old_keys[ctx->nold++] = l->key;
l->key = NULL;
return 0;
}
+static void
+hostkey_change_preamble(LogLevel loglevel)
+{
+ do_log2(loglevel, "The server has updated its host keys.");
+ do_log2(loglevel, "These changes were verified by the server's "
+ "existing trusted key.");
+}
+
static void
update_known_hosts(struct hostkeys_update_ctx *ctx)
{
- int r, was_raw = 0;
- LogLevel loglevel = options.update_hostkeys == SSH_UPDATE_HOSTKEYS_ASK ?
- SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO : SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE;
+ int r, was_raw = 0, first = 1;
+ int asking = options.update_hostkeys == SSH_UPDATE_HOSTKEYS_ASK;
+ LogLevel loglevel = asking ? SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO : SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE;
char *fp, *response;
size_t i;
+ struct stat sb;
for (i = 0; i < ctx->nkeys; i++) {
if (ctx->keys_seen[i] != 2)
continue;
if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(ctx->keys[i],
options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshkey_fingerprint failed", __func__);
+ if (first && asking)
+ hostkey_change_preamble(loglevel);
do_log2(loglevel, "Learned new hostkey: %s %s",
sshkey_type(ctx->keys[i]), fp);
+ first = 0;
free(fp);
}
for (i = 0; i < ctx->nold; i++) {
if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(ctx->old_keys[i],
options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshkey_fingerprint failed", __func__);
+ if (first && asking)
+ hostkey_change_preamble(loglevel);
do_log2(loglevel, "Deprecating obsolete hostkey: %s %s",
sshkey_type(ctx->old_keys[i]), fp);
+ first = 0;
free(fp);
}
if (options.update_hostkeys == SSH_UPDATE_HOSTKEYS_ASK) {
if (get_saved_tio() != NULL) {
leave_raw_mode(1);
was_raw = 1;
}
response = NULL;
for (i = 0; !quit_pending && i < 3; i++) {
free(response);
response = read_passphrase("Accept updated hostkeys? "
"(yes/no): ", RP_ECHO);
if (strcasecmp(response, "yes") == 0)
break;
else if (quit_pending || response == NULL ||
strcasecmp(response, "no") == 0) {
options.update_hostkeys = 0;
break;
} else {
do_log2(loglevel, "Please enter "
"\"yes\" or \"no\"");
}
}
if (quit_pending || i >= 3 || response == NULL)
options.update_hostkeys = 0;
free(response);
if (was_raw)
enter_raw_mode(1);
}
-
+ if (options.update_hostkeys == 0)
+ return;
/*
* Now that all the keys are verified, we can go ahead and replace
* them in known_hosts (assuming SSH_UPDATE_HOSTKEYS_ASK didn't
* cancel the operation).
*/
- if (options.update_hostkeys != 0 &&
- (r = hostfile_replace_entries(options.user_hostfiles[0],
- ctx->host_str, ctx->ip_str, ctx->keys, ctx->nkeys,
- options.hash_known_hosts, 0,
- options.fingerprint_hash)) != 0)
- error("%s: hostfile_replace_entries failed: %s",
- __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ for (i = 0; i < options.num_user_hostfiles; i++) {
+ /*
+ * NB. keys are only added to hostfiles[0], for the rest we
+ * just delete the hostname entries.
+ */
+ if (stat(options.user_hostfiles[i], &sb) != 0) {
+ if (errno == ENOENT) {
+ debug("%s: known hosts file %s does not exist",
+ __func__, strerror(errno));
+ } else {
+ error("%s: known hosts file %s inaccessible",
+ __func__, strerror(errno));
+ }
+ continue;
+ }
+ if ((r = hostfile_replace_entries(options.user_hostfiles[i],
+ ctx->host_str, ctx->ip_str,
+ i == 0 ? ctx->keys : NULL, i == 0 ? ctx->nkeys : 0,
+ options.hash_known_hosts, 0,
+ options.fingerprint_hash)) != 0) {
+ error("%s: hostfile_replace_entries failed for %s: %s",
+ __func__, options.user_hostfiles[i], ssh_err(r));
+ }
+ }
}
static void
client_global_hostkeys_private_confirm(struct ssh *ssh, int type,
u_int32_t seq, void *_ctx)
{
struct hostkeys_update_ctx *ctx = (struct hostkeys_update_ctx *)_ctx;
size_t i, ndone;
struct sshbuf *signdata;
int r, kexsigtype, use_kexsigtype;
const u_char *sig;
size_t siglen;
if (ctx->nnew == 0)
fatal("%s: ctx->nnew == 0", __func__); /* sanity */
if (type != SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS) {
error("Server failed to confirm ownership of "
"private host keys");
hostkeys_update_ctx_free(ctx);
return;
}
kexsigtype = sshkey_type_plain(
sshkey_type_from_name(ssh->kex->hostkey_alg));
if ((signdata = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
/* Don't want to accidentally accept an unbound signature */
if (ssh->kex->session_id_len == 0)
fatal("%s: ssh->kex->session_id_len == 0", __func__);
/*
* Expect a signature for each of the ctx->nnew private keys we
* haven't seen before. They will be in the same order as the
* ctx->keys where the corresponding ctx->keys_seen[i] == 0.
*/
for (ndone = i = 0; i < ctx->nkeys; i++) {
if (ctx->keys_seen[i])
continue;
/* Prepare data to be signed: session ID, unique string, key */
sshbuf_reset(signdata);
if ( (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(signdata,
"hostkeys-prove-00@openssh.com")) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_string(signdata, ssh->kex->session_id,
ssh->kex->session_id_len)) != 0 ||
(r = sshkey_puts(ctx->keys[i], signdata)) != 0)
fatal("%s: failed to prepare signature: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
/* Extract and verify signature */
if ((r = sshpkt_get_string_direct(ssh, &sig, &siglen)) != 0) {
error("%s: couldn't parse message: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
goto out;
}
/*
* For RSA keys, prefer to use the signature type negotiated
* during KEX to the default (SHA1).
*/
use_kexsigtype = kexsigtype == KEY_RSA &&
sshkey_type_plain(ctx->keys[i]->type) == KEY_RSA;
if ((r = sshkey_verify(ctx->keys[i], sig, siglen,
sshbuf_ptr(signdata), sshbuf_len(signdata),
- use_kexsigtype ? ssh->kex->hostkey_alg : NULL, 0)) != 0) {
+ use_kexsigtype ? ssh->kex->hostkey_alg : NULL, 0,
+ NULL)) != 0) {
error("%s: server gave bad signature for %s key %zu",
__func__, sshkey_type(ctx->keys[i]), i);
goto out;
}
/* Key is good. Mark it as 'seen' */
ctx->keys_seen[i] = 2;
ndone++;
}
if (ndone != ctx->nnew)
fatal("%s: ndone != ctx->nnew (%zu / %zu)", __func__,
ndone, ctx->nnew); /* Shouldn't happen */
if ((r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) {
error("%s: protocol error", __func__);
goto out;
}
/* Make the edits to known_hosts */
update_known_hosts(ctx);
out:
hostkeys_update_ctx_free(ctx);
}
/*
* Returns non-zero if the key is accepted by HostkeyAlgorithms.
* Made slightly less trivial by the multiple RSA signature algorithm names.
*/
static int
key_accepted_by_hostkeyalgs(const struct sshkey *key)
{
const char *ktype = sshkey_ssh_name(key);
- const char *hostkeyalgs = options.hostkeyalgorithms != NULL ?
- options.hostkeyalgorithms : KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG;
+ const char *hostkeyalgs = options.hostkeyalgorithms;
if (key == NULL || key->type == KEY_UNSPEC)
return 0;
if (key->type == KEY_RSA &&
(match_pattern_list("rsa-sha2-256", hostkeyalgs, 0) == 1 ||
match_pattern_list("rsa-sha2-512", hostkeyalgs, 0) == 1))
return 1;
return match_pattern_list(ktype, hostkeyalgs, 0) == 1;
}
/*
* Handle hostkeys-00@openssh.com global request to inform the client of all
* the server's hostkeys. The keys are checked against the user's
* HostkeyAlgorithms preference before they are accepted.
*/
static int
client_input_hostkeys(struct ssh *ssh)
{
const u_char *blob = NULL;
size_t i, len = 0;
struct sshbuf *buf = NULL;
struct sshkey *key = NULL, **tmp;
int r;
char *fp;
static int hostkeys_seen = 0; /* XXX use struct ssh */
extern struct sockaddr_storage hostaddr; /* XXX from ssh.c */
struct hostkeys_update_ctx *ctx = NULL;
if (hostkeys_seen)
fatal("%s: server already sent hostkeys", __func__);
if (options.update_hostkeys == SSH_UPDATE_HOSTKEYS_ASK &&
options.batch_mode)
return 1; /* won't ask in batchmode, so don't even try */
if (!options.update_hostkeys || options.num_user_hostfiles <= 0)
return 1;
ctx = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*ctx));
while (ssh_packet_remaining(ssh) > 0) {
sshkey_free(key);
key = NULL;
if ((r = sshpkt_get_string_direct(ssh, &blob, &len)) != 0) {
error("%s: couldn't parse message: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
goto out;
}
if ((r = sshkey_from_blob(blob, len, &key)) != 0) {
- error("%s: parse key: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
- goto out;
+ do_log2(r == SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN ?
+ SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1 : SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR,
+ "%s: parse key: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ continue;
}
fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, options.fingerprint_hash,
SSH_FP_DEFAULT);
debug3("%s: received %s key %s", __func__,
sshkey_type(key), fp);
free(fp);
if (!key_accepted_by_hostkeyalgs(key)) {
debug3("%s: %s key not permitted by HostkeyAlgorithms",
__func__, sshkey_ssh_name(key));
continue;
}
/* Skip certs */
if (sshkey_is_cert(key)) {
debug3("%s: %s key is a certificate; skipping",
__func__, sshkey_ssh_name(key));
continue;
}
/* Ensure keys are unique */
for (i = 0; i < ctx->nkeys; i++) {
if (sshkey_equal(key, ctx->keys[i])) {
error("%s: received duplicated %s host key",
__func__, sshkey_ssh_name(key));
goto out;
}
}
/* Key is good, record it */
if ((tmp = recallocarray(ctx->keys, ctx->nkeys, ctx->nkeys + 1,
sizeof(*ctx->keys))) == NULL)
fatal("%s: recallocarray failed nkeys = %zu",
__func__, ctx->nkeys);
ctx->keys = tmp;
ctx->keys[ctx->nkeys++] = key;
key = NULL;
}
if (ctx->nkeys == 0) {
debug("%s: server sent no hostkeys", __func__);
goto out;
}
if ((ctx->keys_seen = calloc(ctx->nkeys,
sizeof(*ctx->keys_seen))) == NULL)
fatal("%s: calloc failed", __func__);
get_hostfile_hostname_ipaddr(host,
options.check_host_ip ? (struct sockaddr *)&hostaddr : NULL,
options.port, &ctx->host_str,
options.check_host_ip ? &ctx->ip_str : NULL);
/* Find which keys we already know about. */
- if ((r = hostkeys_foreach(options.user_hostfiles[0], hostkeys_find,
- ctx, ctx->host_str, ctx->ip_str,
- HKF_WANT_PARSE_KEY|HKF_WANT_MATCH)) != 0) {
- error("%s: hostkeys_foreach failed: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
- goto out;
+ for (i = 0; i < options.num_user_hostfiles; i++) {
+ debug("%s: searching %s for %s / %s", __func__,
+ options.user_hostfiles[i], ctx->host_str,
+ ctx->ip_str ? ctx->ip_str : "(none)");
+ if ((r = hostkeys_foreach(options.user_hostfiles[i],
+ hostkeys_find, ctx, ctx->host_str, ctx->ip_str,
+ HKF_WANT_PARSE_KEY|HKF_WANT_MATCH)) != 0) {
+ if (r == SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR && errno == ENOENT) {
+ debug("%s: hostkeys file %s does not exist",
+ __func__, options.user_hostfiles[i]);
+ continue;
+ }
+ error("%s: hostkeys_foreach failed for %s: %s",
+ __func__, options.user_hostfiles[i], ssh_err(r));
+ goto out;
+ }
}
/* Figure out if we have any new keys to add */
ctx->nnew = 0;
for (i = 0; i < ctx->nkeys; i++) {
if (!ctx->keys_seen[i])
ctx->nnew++;
}
debug3("%s: %zu keys from server: %zu new, %zu retained. %zu to remove",
__func__, ctx->nkeys, ctx->nnew, ctx->nkeys - ctx->nnew, ctx->nold);
if (ctx->nnew == 0 && ctx->nold != 0) {
/* We have some keys to remove. Just do it. */
update_known_hosts(ctx);
} else if (ctx->nnew != 0) {
/*
* We have received hitherto-unseen keys from the server.
* Ask the server to confirm ownership of the private halves.
*/
debug3("%s: asking server to prove ownership for %zu keys",
__func__, ctx->nnew);
if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh,
"hostkeys-prove-00@openssh.com")) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, 1)) != 0) /* bool: want reply */
fatal("%s: cannot prepare packet: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new", __func__);
for (i = 0; i < ctx->nkeys; i++) {
if (ctx->keys_seen[i])
continue;
sshbuf_reset(buf);
if ((r = sshkey_putb(ctx->keys[i], buf)) != 0)
fatal("%s: sshkey_putb: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
if ((r = sshpkt_put_stringb(ssh, buf)) != 0)
fatal("%s: sshpkt_put_string: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
}
if ((r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
fatal("%s: sshpkt_send: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
client_register_global_confirm(
client_global_hostkeys_private_confirm, ctx);
ctx = NULL; /* will be freed in callback */
}
/* Success */
out:
hostkeys_update_ctx_free(ctx);
sshkey_free(key);
sshbuf_free(buf);
/*
* NB. Return success for all cases. The server doesn't need to know
* what the client does with its hosts file.
*/
return 1;
}
static int
client_input_global_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
{
char *rtype;
u_char want_reply;
int r, success = 0;
if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &rtype, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_get_u8(ssh, &want_reply)) != 0)
goto out;
debug("client_input_global_request: rtype %s want_reply %d",
rtype, want_reply);
if (strcmp(rtype, "hostkeys-00@openssh.com") == 0)
success = client_input_hostkeys(ssh);
if (want_reply) {
if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, success ? SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS :
SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0 ||
(r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0)
goto out;
}
r = 0;
out:
free(rtype);
return r;
}
void
client_session2_setup(struct ssh *ssh, int id, int want_tty, int want_subsystem,
const char *term, struct termios *tiop, int in_fd, struct sshbuf *cmd,
char **env)
{
int i, j, matched, len, r;
char *name, *val;
Channel *c = NULL;
debug2("%s: id %d", __func__, id);
if ((c = channel_lookup(ssh, id)) == NULL)
fatal("%s: channel %d: unknown channel", __func__, id);
ssh_packet_set_interactive(ssh, want_tty,
options.ip_qos_interactive, options.ip_qos_bulk);
if (want_tty) {
struct winsize ws;
/* Store window size in the packet. */
if (ioctl(in_fd, TIOCGWINSZ, &ws) == -1)
memset(&ws, 0, sizeof(ws));
channel_request_start(ssh, id, "pty-req", 1);
client_expect_confirm(ssh, id, "PTY allocation", CONFIRM_TTY);
if ((r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, term != NULL ? term : ""))
!= 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, (u_int)ws.ws_col)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, (u_int)ws.ws_row)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, (u_int)ws.ws_xpixel)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, (u_int)ws.ws_ypixel)) != 0)
fatal("%s: build packet: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
if (tiop == NULL)
tiop = get_saved_tio();
ssh_tty_make_modes(ssh, -1, tiop);
if ((r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
fatal("%s: send packet: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
/* XXX wait for reply */
c->client_tty = 1;
}
/* Transfer any environment variables from client to server */
if (options.num_send_env != 0 && env != NULL) {
debug("Sending environment.");
for (i = 0; env[i] != NULL; i++) {
/* Split */
name = xstrdup(env[i]);
if ((val = strchr(name, '=')) == NULL) {
free(name);
continue;
}
*val++ = '\0';
matched = 0;
for (j = 0; j < options.num_send_env; j++) {
if (match_pattern(name, options.send_env[j])) {
matched = 1;
break;
}
}
if (!matched) {
debug3("Ignored env %s", name);
free(name);
continue;
}
debug("Sending env %s = %s", name, val);
channel_request_start(ssh, id, "env", 0);
if ((r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, name)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, val)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) {
fatal("%s: send packet: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
}
free(name);
}
}
for (i = 0; i < options.num_setenv; i++) {
/* Split */
name = xstrdup(options.setenv[i]);
if ((val = strchr(name, '=')) == NULL) {
free(name);
continue;
}
*val++ = '\0';
debug("Setting env %s = %s", name, val);
channel_request_start(ssh, id, "env", 0);
if ((r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, name)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, val)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
fatal("%s: send packet: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
free(name);
}
len = sshbuf_len(cmd);
if (len > 0) {
if (len > 900)
len = 900;
if (want_subsystem) {
debug("Sending subsystem: %.*s",
len, (const u_char*)sshbuf_ptr(cmd));
channel_request_start(ssh, id, "subsystem", 1);
client_expect_confirm(ssh, id, "subsystem",
CONFIRM_CLOSE);
} else {
debug("Sending command: %.*s",
len, (const u_char*)sshbuf_ptr(cmd));
channel_request_start(ssh, id, "exec", 1);
client_expect_confirm(ssh, id, "exec", CONFIRM_CLOSE);
}
if ((r = sshpkt_put_stringb(ssh, cmd)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
fatal("%s: send command: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
} else {
channel_request_start(ssh, id, "shell", 1);
client_expect_confirm(ssh, id, "shell", CONFIRM_CLOSE);
if ((r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) {
fatal("%s: send shell request: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
}
}
}
static void
client_init_dispatch(struct ssh *ssh)
{
ssh_dispatch_init(ssh, &dispatch_protocol_error);
ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE, &channel_input_oclose);
ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA, &channel_input_data);
ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EOF, &channel_input_ieof);
ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA, &channel_input_extended_data);
ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN, &client_input_channel_open);
ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION, &channel_input_open_confirmation);
ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE, &channel_input_open_failure);
ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST, &client_input_channel_req);
ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST, &channel_input_window_adjust);
ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS, &channel_input_status_confirm);
ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE, &channel_input_status_confirm);
ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST, &client_input_global_request);
/* rekeying */
ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT, &kex_input_kexinit);
/* global request reply messages */
ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE, &client_global_request_reply);
ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS, &client_global_request_reply);
}
void
client_stop_mux(void)
{
if (options.control_path != NULL && muxserver_sock != -1)
unlink(options.control_path);
/*
* If we are in persist mode, or don't have a shell, signal that we
* should close when all active channels are closed.
*/
if (options.control_persist || no_shell_flag) {
session_closed = 1;
setproctitle("[stopped mux]");
}
}
/* client specific fatal cleanup */
void
cleanup_exit(int i)
{
leave_raw_mode(options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_FORCE);
leave_non_blocking();
if (options.control_path != NULL && muxserver_sock != -1)
unlink(options.control_path);
ssh_kill_proxy_command();
_exit(i);
}
diff --git a/config.h.in b/config.h.in
index 00fe91741767..b8b5a01aec7c 100644
--- a/config.h.in
+++ b/config.h.in
@@ -1,1990 +1,2025 @@
/* config.h.in. Generated from configure.ac by autoheader. */
/* Define if building universal (internal helper macro) */
#undef AC_APPLE_UNIVERSAL_BUILD
/* Define if you have a getaddrinfo that fails for the all-zeros IPv6 address
*/
#undef AIX_GETNAMEINFO_HACK
/* Define if your AIX loginfailed() function takes 4 arguments (AIX >= 5.2) */
#undef AIX_LOGINFAILED_4ARG
/* System only supports IPv4 audit records */
#undef AU_IPv4
/* Define if your resolver libs need this for getrrsetbyname */
#undef BIND_8_COMPAT
/* The system has incomplete BSM API */
#undef BROKEN_BSM_API
/* Define if cmsg_type is not passed correctly */
#undef BROKEN_CMSG_TYPE
/* getaddrinfo is broken (if present) */
#undef BROKEN_GETADDRINFO
/* getgroups(0,NULL) will return -1 */
#undef BROKEN_GETGROUPS
/* FreeBSD glob does not do what we need */
#undef BROKEN_GLOB
/* Define if you system's inet_ntoa is busted (e.g. Irix gcc issue) */
#undef BROKEN_INET_NTOA
/* Define if your struct dirent expects you to allocate extra space for d_name
*/
#undef BROKEN_ONE_BYTE_DIRENT_D_NAME
/* Can't do comparisons on readv */
#undef BROKEN_READV_COMPARISON
/* NetBSD read function is sometimes redirected, breaking atomicio comparisons
against it */
#undef BROKEN_READ_COMPARISON
/* Needed for NeXT */
#undef BROKEN_SAVED_UIDS
/* Define if your setregid() is broken */
#undef BROKEN_SETREGID
/* Define if your setresgid() is broken */
#undef BROKEN_SETRESGID
/* Define if your setresuid() is broken */
#undef BROKEN_SETRESUID
/* Define if your setreuid() is broken */
#undef BROKEN_SETREUID
/* LynxOS has broken setvbuf() implementation */
#undef BROKEN_SETVBUF
/* QNX shadow support is broken */
#undef BROKEN_SHADOW_EXPIRE
/* Define if your snprintf is busted */
#undef BROKEN_SNPRINTF
/* strndup broken, see APAR IY61211 */
#undef BROKEN_STRNDUP
/* strnlen broken, see APAR IY62551 */
#undef BROKEN_STRNLEN
/* strnvis detected broken */
#undef BROKEN_STRNVIS
/* tcgetattr with ICANON may hang */
#undef BROKEN_TCGETATTR_ICANON
/* updwtmpx is broken (if present) */
#undef BROKEN_UPDWTMPX
/* Define if you have BSD auth support */
#undef BSD_AUTH
/* Define if you want to specify the path to your lastlog file */
#undef CONF_LASTLOG_FILE
/* Define if you want to specify the path to your utmp file */
#undef CONF_UTMP_FILE
/* Define if you want to specify the path to your wtmpx file */
#undef CONF_WTMPX_FILE
/* Define if you want to specify the path to your wtmp file */
#undef CONF_WTMP_FILE
-/* Define if your platform needs to skip post auth file descriptor passing */
+/* Need to call setpgrp as root */
#undef DISABLE_FD_PASSING
/* Define if you don't want to use lastlog */
#undef DISABLE_LASTLOG
/* Define if you don't want to use your system's login() call */
#undef DISABLE_LOGIN
/* Define if you don't want to use pututline() etc. to write [uw]tmp */
#undef DISABLE_PUTUTLINE
/* Define if you don't want to use pututxline() etc. to write [uw]tmpx */
#undef DISABLE_PUTUTXLINE
/* Define if you want to disable shadow passwords */
#undef DISABLE_SHADOW
/* Define if you don't want to use utmp */
#undef DISABLE_UTMP
/* Define if you don't want to use utmpx */
#undef DISABLE_UTMPX
/* Define if you don't want to use wtmp */
#undef DISABLE_WTMP
/* Define if you don't want to use wtmpx */
#undef DISABLE_WTMPX
/* Enable for PKCS#11 support */
#undef ENABLE_PKCS11
+/* Enable for U2F/FIDO support */
+#undef ENABLE_SK
+
+/* Enable for built-in U2F/FIDO support */
+#undef ENABLE_SK_INTERNAL
+
/* define if fflush(NULL) does not work */
#undef FFLUSH_NULL_BUG
/* File names may not contain backslash characters */
#undef FILESYSTEM_NO_BACKSLASH
/* fsid_t has member val */
#undef FSID_HAS_VAL
/* fsid_t has member __val */
#undef FSID_HAS___VAL
/* getpgrp takes one arg */
#undef GETPGRP_VOID
/* Conflicting defs for getspnam */
#undef GETSPNAM_CONFLICTING_DEFS
/* Define if your system glob() function has the GLOB_ALTDIRFUNC extension */
#undef GLOB_HAS_ALTDIRFUNC
/* Define if your system glob() function has gl_matchc options in glob_t */
#undef GLOB_HAS_GL_MATCHC
/* Define if your system glob() function has gl_statv options in glob_t */
#undef GLOB_HAS_GL_STATV
/* Define this if you want GSSAPI support in the version 2 protocol */
#undef GSSAPI
/* Define if you want to use shadow password expire field */
#undef HAS_SHADOW_EXPIRE
/* Define if your system uses access rights style file descriptor passing */
#undef HAVE_ACCRIGHTS_IN_MSGHDR
/* Define if you have ut_addr in utmp.h */
#undef HAVE_ADDR_IN_UTMP
/* Define if you have ut_addr in utmpx.h */
#undef HAVE_ADDR_IN_UTMPX
/* Define if you have ut_addr_v6 in utmp.h */
#undef HAVE_ADDR_V6_IN_UTMP
/* Define if you have ut_addr_v6 in utmpx.h */
#undef HAVE_ADDR_V6_IN_UTMPX
/* Define to 1 if you have the `arc4random' function. */
#undef HAVE_ARC4RANDOM
/* Define to 1 if you have the `arc4random_buf' function. */
#undef HAVE_ARC4RANDOM_BUF
/* Define to 1 if you have the `arc4random_stir' function. */
#undef HAVE_ARC4RANDOM_STIR
/* Define to 1 if you have the `arc4random_uniform' function. */
#undef HAVE_ARC4RANDOM_UNIFORM
/* Define to 1 if you have the `asprintf' function. */
#undef HAVE_ASPRINTF
/* OpenBSD's gcc has bounded */
#undef HAVE_ATTRIBUTE__BOUNDED__
/* Have attribute nonnull */
#undef HAVE_ATTRIBUTE__NONNULL__
/* OpenBSD's gcc has sentinel */
#undef HAVE_ATTRIBUTE__SENTINEL__
/* Define to 1 if you have the `aug_get_machine' function. */
#undef HAVE_AUG_GET_MACHINE
/* Define to 1 if you have the `b64_ntop' function. */
#undef HAVE_B64_NTOP
/* Define to 1 if you have the `b64_pton' function. */
#undef HAVE_B64_PTON
/* Define if you have the basename function. */
#undef HAVE_BASENAME
/* Define to 1 if you have the `bcopy' function. */
#undef HAVE_BCOPY
/* Define to 1 if you have the `bcrypt_pbkdf' function. */
#undef HAVE_BCRYPT_PBKDF
/* Define to 1 if you have the `bindresvport_sa' function. */
#undef HAVE_BINDRESVPORT_SA
/* Define to 1 if you have the `blf_enc' function. */
#undef HAVE_BLF_ENC
/* Define to 1 if you have the <blf.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_BLF_H
/* Define to 1 if you have the `Blowfish_expand0state' function. */
#undef HAVE_BLOWFISH_EXPAND0STATE
/* Define to 1 if you have the `Blowfish_expandstate' function. */
#undef HAVE_BLOWFISH_EXPANDSTATE
/* Define to 1 if you have the `Blowfish_initstate' function. */
#undef HAVE_BLOWFISH_INITSTATE
/* Define to 1 if you have the `Blowfish_stream2word' function. */
#undef HAVE_BLOWFISH_STREAM2WORD
/* Define to 1 if you have the `BN_is_prime_ex' function. */
#undef HAVE_BN_IS_PRIME_EX
/* Define to 1 if you have the <bsd/libutil.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_BSD_LIBUTIL_H
/* Define to 1 if you have the <bsm/audit.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_BSM_AUDIT_H
/* Define to 1 if you have the <bstring.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_BSTRING_H
/* Define to 1 if you have the `bzero' function. */
#undef HAVE_BZERO
/* calloc(0, x) returns NULL */
#undef HAVE_CALLOC
/* Define to 1 if you have the `cap_rights_limit' function. */
#undef HAVE_CAP_RIGHTS_LIMIT
/* Define to 1 if you have the `clock' function. */
#undef HAVE_CLOCK
/* Have clock_gettime */
#undef HAVE_CLOCK_GETTIME
/* define if you have clock_t data type */
#undef HAVE_CLOCK_T
/* Define to 1 if you have the `closefrom' function. */
#undef HAVE_CLOSEFROM
/* Define if gai_strerror() returns const char * */
#undef HAVE_CONST_GAI_STRERROR_PROTO
/* Define if your system uses ancillary data style file descriptor passing */
#undef HAVE_CONTROL_IN_MSGHDR
/* Define to 1 if you have the `crypt' function. */
#undef HAVE_CRYPT
/* Define to 1 if you have the <crypto/sha2.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_CRYPTO_SHA2_H
/* Define to 1 if you have the <crypt.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_CRYPT_H
/* Define if you are on Cygwin */
#undef HAVE_CYGWIN
/* Define if your libraries define daemon() */
#undef HAVE_DAEMON
/* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `AI_NUMERICSERV', and to 0 if
you don't. */
#undef HAVE_DECL_AI_NUMERICSERV
/* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `authenticate', and to 0 if you
don't. */
#undef HAVE_DECL_AUTHENTICATE
/* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `bzero', and to 0 if you don't.
*/
#undef HAVE_DECL_BZERO
/* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `GLOB_NOMATCH', and to 0 if you
don't. */
#undef HAVE_DECL_GLOB_NOMATCH
/* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE',
and to 0 if you don't. */
#undef HAVE_DECL_GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE
/* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `howmany', and to 0 if you
don't. */
#undef HAVE_DECL_HOWMANY
/* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `h_errno', and to 0 if you
don't. */
#undef HAVE_DECL_H_ERRNO
/* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `loginfailed', and to 0 if you
don't. */
#undef HAVE_DECL_LOGINFAILED
/* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `loginrestrictions', and to 0 if
you don't. */
#undef HAVE_DECL_LOGINRESTRICTIONS
/* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `loginsuccess', and to 0 if you
don't. */
#undef HAVE_DECL_LOGINSUCCESS
/* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `MAXSYMLINKS', and to 0 if you
don't. */
#undef HAVE_DECL_MAXSYMLINKS
+/* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `memmem', and to 0 if you don't.
+ */
+#undef HAVE_DECL_MEMMEM
+
/* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `NFDBITS', and to 0 if you
don't. */
#undef HAVE_DECL_NFDBITS
/* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `offsetof', and to 0 if you
don't. */
#undef HAVE_DECL_OFFSETOF
/* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `O_NONBLOCK', and to 0 if you
don't. */
#undef HAVE_DECL_O_NONBLOCK
/* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `passwdexpired', and to 0 if you
don't. */
#undef HAVE_DECL_PASSWDEXPIRED
/* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `readv', and to 0 if you don't.
*/
#undef HAVE_DECL_READV
/* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `setauthdb', and to 0 if you
don't. */
#undef HAVE_DECL_SETAUTHDB
/* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `SHUT_RD', and to 0 if you
don't. */
#undef HAVE_DECL_SHUT_RD
+/* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `UINT32_MAX', and to 0 if you
+ don't. */
+#undef HAVE_DECL_UINT32_MAX
+
/* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `writev', and to 0 if you don't.
*/
#undef HAVE_DECL_WRITEV
/* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `_getlong', and to 0 if you
don't. */
#undef HAVE_DECL__GETLONG
/* Define to 1 if you have the declaration of `_getshort', and to 0 if you
don't. */
#undef HAVE_DECL__GETSHORT
/* Define to 1 if you have the `DES_crypt' function. */
#undef HAVE_DES_CRYPT
/* Define if you have /dev/ptmx */
#undef HAVE_DEV_PTMX
/* Define if you have /dev/ptc */
#undef HAVE_DEV_PTS_AND_PTC
/* Define to 1 if you have the `DH_get0_key' function. */
#undef HAVE_DH_GET0_KEY
/* Define to 1 if you have the `DH_get0_pqg' function. */
#undef HAVE_DH_GET0_PQG
/* Define to 1 if you have the `DH_set0_key' function. */
#undef HAVE_DH_SET0_KEY
/* Define to 1 if you have the `DH_set0_pqg' function. */
#undef HAVE_DH_SET0_PQG
/* Define to 1 if you have the `DH_set_length' function. */
#undef HAVE_DH_SET_LENGTH
/* Define to 1 if you have the <dirent.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_DIRENT_H
/* Define to 1 if you have the `dirfd' function. */
#undef HAVE_DIRFD
/* Define to 1 if you have the `dirname' function. */
#undef HAVE_DIRNAME
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `dlopen' function. */
+#undef HAVE_DLOPEN
+
/* Define to 1 if you have the `DSA_generate_parameters_ex' function. */
#undef HAVE_DSA_GENERATE_PARAMETERS_EX
/* Define to 1 if you have the `DSA_get0_key' function. */
#undef HAVE_DSA_GET0_KEY
/* Define to 1 if you have the `DSA_get0_pqg' function. */
#undef HAVE_DSA_GET0_PQG
/* Define to 1 if you have the `DSA_set0_key' function. */
#undef HAVE_DSA_SET0_KEY
/* Define to 1 if you have the `DSA_set0_pqg' function. */
#undef HAVE_DSA_SET0_PQG
/* Define to 1 if you have the `DSA_SIG_get0' function. */
#undef HAVE_DSA_SIG_GET0
/* Define to 1 if you have the `DSA_SIG_set0' function. */
#undef HAVE_DSA_SIG_SET0
/* Define to 1 if you have the `ECDSA_SIG_get0' function. */
#undef HAVE_ECDSA_SIG_GET0
/* Define to 1 if you have the `ECDSA_SIG_set0' function. */
#undef HAVE_ECDSA_SIG_SET0
/* Define to 1 if you have the `EC_KEY_METHOD_new' function. */
#undef HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW
/* Define to 1 if you have the <elf.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_ELF_H
/* Define to 1 if you have the `endgrent' function. */
#undef HAVE_ENDGRENT
/* Define to 1 if you have the <endian.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_ENDIAN_H
/* Define to 1 if you have the `endutent' function. */
#undef HAVE_ENDUTENT
/* Define to 1 if you have the `endutxent' function. */
#undef HAVE_ENDUTXENT
/* Define to 1 if you have the `err' function. */
#undef HAVE_ERR
/* Define to 1 if you have the `errx' function. */
#undef HAVE_ERRX
/* Define to 1 if you have the <err.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_ERR_H
/* Define if your system has /etc/default/login */
#undef HAVE_ETC_DEFAULT_LOGIN
/* Define to 1 if you have the `EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl' function. */
#undef HAVE_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_CTRL
/* Define to 1 if you have the `EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_iv' function. */
#undef HAVE_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_GET_IV
/* Define to 1 if you have the `EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv' function. */
#undef HAVE_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_IV
/* Define to 1 if you have the `EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst' function. */
#undef HAVE_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_IV_NOCONST
/* Define to 1 if you have the `EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_iv' function. */
#undef HAVE_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_SET_IV
/* Define to 1 if you have the `EVP_DigestFinal_ex' function. */
#undef HAVE_EVP_DIGESTFINAL_EX
/* Define to 1 if you have the `EVP_DigestInit_ex' function. */
#undef HAVE_EVP_DIGESTINIT_EX
/* Define to 1 if you have the `EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup' function. */
#undef HAVE_EVP_MD_CTX_CLEANUP
/* Define to 1 if you have the `EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex' function. */
#undef HAVE_EVP_MD_CTX_COPY_EX
/* Define to 1 if you have the `EVP_MD_CTX_free' function. */
#undef HAVE_EVP_MD_CTX_FREE
/* Define to 1 if you have the `EVP_MD_CTX_init' function. */
#undef HAVE_EVP_MD_CTX_INIT
/* Define to 1 if you have the `EVP_MD_CTX_new' function. */
#undef HAVE_EVP_MD_CTX_NEW
/* Define to 1 if you have the `EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA' function. */
#undef HAVE_EVP_PKEY_GET0_RSA
-/* Define to 1 if you have the `EVP_ripemd160' function. */
-#undef HAVE_EVP_RIPEMD160
-
/* Define to 1 if you have the `EVP_sha256' function. */
#undef HAVE_EVP_SHA256
/* Define to 1 if you have the `EVP_sha384' function. */
#undef HAVE_EVP_SHA384
/* Define to 1 if you have the `EVP_sha512' function. */
#undef HAVE_EVP_SHA512
/* Define if you have ut_exit in utmp.h */
#undef HAVE_EXIT_IN_UTMP
/* Define to 1 if you have the `explicit_bzero' function. */
#undef HAVE_EXPLICIT_BZERO
/* Define to 1 if you have the `fchmod' function. */
#undef HAVE_FCHMOD
/* Define to 1 if you have the `fchmodat' function. */
#undef HAVE_FCHMODAT
/* Define to 1 if you have the `fchown' function. */
#undef HAVE_FCHOWN
/* Define to 1 if you have the `fchownat' function. */
#undef HAVE_FCHOWNAT
/* Use F_CLOSEM fcntl for closefrom */
#undef HAVE_FCNTL_CLOSEM
/* Define to 1 if you have the <fcntl.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_FCNTL_H
/* Define to 1 if the system has the type `fd_mask'. */
#undef HAVE_FD_MASK
/* Define to 1 if you have the <features.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_FEATURES_H
/* Define to 1 if you have the <floatingpoint.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_FLOATINGPOINT_H
/* Define to 1 if you have the `flock' function. */
#undef HAVE_FLOCK
/* Define to 1 if you have the `fmt_scaled' function. */
#undef HAVE_FMT_SCALED
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `fnmatch' function. */
+#undef HAVE_FNMATCH
+
+/* Define to 1 if you have the <fnmatch.h> header file. */
+#undef HAVE_FNMATCH_H
+
/* Define to 1 if you have the `freeaddrinfo' function. */
#undef HAVE_FREEADDRINFO
/* Define to 1 if you have the `freezero' function. */
#undef HAVE_FREEZERO
/* Define to 1 if the system has the type `fsblkcnt_t'. */
#undef HAVE_FSBLKCNT_T
/* Define to 1 if the system has the type `fsfilcnt_t'. */
#undef HAVE_FSFILCNT_T
/* Define to 1 if you have the `fstatfs' function. */
#undef HAVE_FSTATFS
/* Define to 1 if you have the `fstatvfs' function. */
#undef HAVE_FSTATVFS
/* Define to 1 if you have the `futimes' function. */
#undef HAVE_FUTIMES
/* Define to 1 if you have the `gai_strerror' function. */
#undef HAVE_GAI_STRERROR
/* Define to 1 if you have the `getaddrinfo' function. */
#undef HAVE_GETADDRINFO
/* Define to 1 if you have the `getaudit' function. */
#undef HAVE_GETAUDIT
/* Define to 1 if you have the `getaudit_addr' function. */
#undef HAVE_GETAUDIT_ADDR
/* Define to 1 if you have the `getcwd' function. */
#undef HAVE_GETCWD
/* Define to 1 if you have the `getgrouplist' function. */
#undef HAVE_GETGROUPLIST
/* Define to 1 if you have the `getgrset' function. */
#undef HAVE_GETGRSET
/* Define to 1 if you have the `getlastlogxbyname' function. */
#undef HAVE_GETLASTLOGXBYNAME
/* Define to 1 if you have the `getline' function. */
#undef HAVE_GETLINE
/* Define to 1 if you have the `getluid' function. */
#undef HAVE_GETLUID
/* Define to 1 if you have the `getnameinfo' function. */
#undef HAVE_GETNAMEINFO
/* Define to 1 if you have the `getopt' function. */
#undef HAVE_GETOPT
/* Define to 1 if you have the <getopt.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_GETOPT_H
/* Define if your getopt(3) defines and uses optreset */
#undef HAVE_GETOPT_OPTRESET
/* Define if your libraries define getpagesize() */
#undef HAVE_GETPAGESIZE
/* Define to 1 if you have the `getpeereid' function. */
#undef HAVE_GETPEEREID
/* Define to 1 if you have the `getpeerucred' function. */
#undef HAVE_GETPEERUCRED
/* Define to 1 if you have the `getpgid' function. */
#undef HAVE_GETPGID
/* Define to 1 if you have the `getpgrp' function. */
#undef HAVE_GETPGRP
/* Define to 1 if you have the `getpwanam' function. */
#undef HAVE_GETPWANAM
/* Define to 1 if you have the `getrandom' function. */
#undef HAVE_GETRANDOM
/* Define to 1 if you have the `getrlimit' function. */
#undef HAVE_GETRLIMIT
/* Define if getrrsetbyname() exists */
#undef HAVE_GETRRSETBYNAME
/* Define to 1 if you have the `getseuserbyname' function. */
#undef HAVE_GETSEUSERBYNAME
/* Define to 1 if you have the `getsid' function. */
#undef HAVE_GETSID
/* Define to 1 if you have the `gettimeofday' function. */
#undef HAVE_GETTIMEOFDAY
/* Define to 1 if you have the `getttyent' function. */
#undef HAVE_GETTTYENT
/* Define to 1 if you have the `getutent' function. */
#undef HAVE_GETUTENT
/* Define to 1 if you have the `getutid' function. */
#undef HAVE_GETUTID
/* Define to 1 if you have the `getutline' function. */
#undef HAVE_GETUTLINE
/* Define to 1 if you have the `getutxent' function. */
#undef HAVE_GETUTXENT
/* Define to 1 if you have the `getutxid' function. */
#undef HAVE_GETUTXID
/* Define to 1 if you have the `getutxline' function. */
#undef HAVE_GETUTXLINE
/* Define to 1 if you have the `getutxuser' function. */
#undef HAVE_GETUTXUSER
/* Define to 1 if you have the `get_default_context_with_level' function. */
#undef HAVE_GET_DEFAULT_CONTEXT_WITH_LEVEL
/* Define to 1 if you have the `glob' function. */
#undef HAVE_GLOB
/* Define to 1 if you have the <glob.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_GLOB_H
/* Define to 1 if you have the `group_from_gid' function. */
#undef HAVE_GROUP_FROM_GID
/* Define to 1 if you have the <gssapi_generic.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_GSSAPI_GENERIC_H
/* Define to 1 if you have the <gssapi/gssapi_generic.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_GSSAPI_GSSAPI_GENERIC_H
/* Define to 1 if you have the <gssapi/gssapi.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_GSSAPI_GSSAPI_H
/* Define to 1 if you have the <gssapi/gssapi_krb5.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_GSSAPI_GSSAPI_KRB5_H
/* Define to 1 if you have the <gssapi.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_GSSAPI_H
/* Define to 1 if you have the <gssapi_krb5.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_GSSAPI_KRB5_H
/* Define if HEADER.ad exists in arpa/nameser.h */
#undef HAVE_HEADER_AD
/* Define to 1 if you have the `HMAC_CTX_init' function. */
#undef HAVE_HMAC_CTX_INIT
/* Define if you have ut_host in utmp.h */
#undef HAVE_HOST_IN_UTMP
/* Define if you have ut_host in utmpx.h */
#undef HAVE_HOST_IN_UTMPX
/* Define to 1 if you have the <iaf.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_IAF_H
/* Define to 1 if you have the <ia.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_IA_H
/* Define if you have ut_id in utmp.h */
#undef HAVE_ID_IN_UTMP
/* Define if you have ut_id in utmpx.h */
#undef HAVE_ID_IN_UTMPX
/* Define to 1 if you have the <ifaddrs.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_IFADDRS_H
/* Define to 1 if you have the `inet_aton' function. */
#undef HAVE_INET_ATON
/* Define to 1 if you have the `inet_ntoa' function. */
#undef HAVE_INET_NTOA
/* Define to 1 if you have the `inet_ntop' function. */
#undef HAVE_INET_NTOP
/* Define to 1 if you have the `innetgr' function. */
#undef HAVE_INNETGR
/* define if you have int64_t data type */
#undef HAVE_INT64_T
/* Define to 1 if the system has the type `intmax_t'. */
#undef HAVE_INTMAX_T
/* Define to 1 if you have the <inttypes.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_INTTYPES_H
/* define if you have intxx_t data type */
#undef HAVE_INTXX_T
/* Define to 1 if the system has the type `in_addr_t'. */
#undef HAVE_IN_ADDR_T
/* Define to 1 if the system has the type `in_port_t'. */
#undef HAVE_IN_PORT_T
/* Define if you have isblank(3C). */
#undef HAVE_ISBLANK
/* Define to 1 if you have the `krb5_cc_new_unique' function. */
#undef HAVE_KRB5_CC_NEW_UNIQUE
/* Define to 1 if you have the `krb5_free_error_message' function. */
#undef HAVE_KRB5_FREE_ERROR_MESSAGE
/* Define to 1 if you have the `krb5_get_error_message' function. */
#undef HAVE_KRB5_GET_ERROR_MESSAGE
/* Define to 1 if you have the <langinfo.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_LANGINFO_H
/* Define to 1 if you have the <lastlog.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_LASTLOG_H
/* Define if you want ldns support */
#undef HAVE_LDNS
/* Define to 1 if you have the <libaudit.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_LIBAUDIT_H
/* Define to 1 if you have the `bsm' library (-lbsm). */
#undef HAVE_LIBBSM
/* Define to 1 if you have the `crypt' library (-lcrypt). */
#undef HAVE_LIBCRYPT
/* Define to 1 if you have the `dl' library (-ldl). */
#undef HAVE_LIBDL
/* Define to 1 if you have the <libgen.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_LIBGEN_H
/* Define if system has libiaf that supports set_id */
#undef HAVE_LIBIAF
/* Define to 1 if you have the `network' library (-lnetwork). */
#undef HAVE_LIBNETWORK
/* Define to 1 if you have the `pam' library (-lpam). */
#undef HAVE_LIBPAM
/* Define to 1 if you have the <libproc.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_LIBPROC_H
/* Define to 1 if you have the `socket' library (-lsocket). */
#undef HAVE_LIBSOCKET
/* Define to 1 if you have the <libutil.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_LIBUTIL_H
/* Define to 1 if you have the `xnet' library (-lxnet). */
#undef HAVE_LIBXNET
/* Define to 1 if you have the `z' library (-lz). */
#undef HAVE_LIBZ
/* Define to 1 if you have the <limits.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_LIMITS_H
/* Define to 1 if you have the <linux/audit.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_LINUX_AUDIT_H
/* Define to 1 if you have the <linux/filter.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_LINUX_FILTER_H
/* Define to 1 if you have the <linux/if_tun.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_LINUX_IF_TUN_H
/* Define to 1 if you have the <linux/seccomp.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_LINUX_SECCOMP_H
/* Define to 1 if you have the `llabs' function. */
#undef HAVE_LLABS
/* Define to 1 if you have the <locale.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_LOCALE_H
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `localtime_r' function. */
+#undef HAVE_LOCALTIME_R
+
/* Define to 1 if you have the `login' function. */
#undef HAVE_LOGIN
/* Define to 1 if you have the <login_cap.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP_H
/* Define to 1 if you have the `login_getcapbool' function. */
#undef HAVE_LOGIN_GETCAPBOOL
/* Define to 1 if you have the <login.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_LOGIN_H
/* Define to 1 if you have the `logout' function. */
#undef HAVE_LOGOUT
/* Define to 1 if you have the `logwtmp' function. */
#undef HAVE_LOGWTMP
/* Define to 1 if the system has the type `long double'. */
#undef HAVE_LONG_DOUBLE
/* Define to 1 if the system has the type `long long'. */
#undef HAVE_LONG_LONG
/* Define to 1 if you have the <maillock.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_MAILLOCK_H
/* Define to 1 if your system has a GNU libc compatible `malloc' function, and
to 0 otherwise. */
#undef HAVE_MALLOC
/* Define to 1 if you have the `mblen' function. */
#undef HAVE_MBLEN
/* Define to 1 if you have the `mbtowc' function. */
#undef HAVE_MBTOWC
/* Define to 1 if you have the `md5_crypt' function. */
#undef HAVE_MD5_CRYPT
/* Define if you want to allow MD5 passwords */
#undef HAVE_MD5_PASSWORDS
/* Define to 1 if you have the `memmem' function. */
#undef HAVE_MEMMEM
/* Define to 1 if you have the `memmove' function. */
#undef HAVE_MEMMOVE
/* Define to 1 if you have the <memory.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_MEMORY_H
/* Define to 1 if you have the `memset_s' function. */
#undef HAVE_MEMSET_S
/* Define to 1 if you have the `mkdtemp' function. */
#undef HAVE_MKDTEMP
/* define if you have mode_t data type */
#undef HAVE_MODE_T
/* Some systems put nanosleep outside of libc */
#undef HAVE_NANOSLEEP
/* Define to 1 if you have the <ndir.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_NDIR_H
/* Define to 1 if you have the <netdb.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_NETDB_H
/* Define to 1 if you have the <netgroup.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_NETGROUP_H
/* Define to 1 if you have the <net/if_tun.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_NET_IF_TUN_H
/* Define to 1 if you have the <net/route.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_NET_ROUTE_H
/* Define if you are on NeXT */
#undef HAVE_NEXT
/* Define to 1 if you have the `ngetaddrinfo' function. */
#undef HAVE_NGETADDRINFO
/* Define to 1 if you have the `nl_langinfo' function. */
#undef HAVE_NL_LANGINFO
/* Define to 1 if you have the `nsleep' function. */
#undef HAVE_NSLEEP
/* Define to 1 if you have the `ogetaddrinfo' function. */
#undef HAVE_OGETADDRINFO
/* Define if you have an old version of PAM which takes only one argument to
pam_strerror */
#undef HAVE_OLD_PAM
/* Define to 1 if you have the `openlog_r' function. */
#undef HAVE_OPENLOG_R
/* Define to 1 if you have the `openpty' function. */
#undef HAVE_OPENPTY
/* as a macro */
#undef HAVE_OPENSSL_ADD_ALL_ALGORITHMS
/* Define to 1 if you have the `OPENSSL_init_crypto' function. */
#undef HAVE_OPENSSL_INIT_CRYPTO
/* Define to 1 if you have the `OpenSSL_version' function. */
#undef HAVE_OPENSSL_VERSION
/* Define to 1 if you have the `OpenSSL_version_num' function. */
#undef HAVE_OPENSSL_VERSION_NUM
/* Define if you have Digital Unix Security Integration Architecture */
#undef HAVE_OSF_SIA
/* Define to 1 if you have the `pam_getenvlist' function. */
#undef HAVE_PAM_GETENVLIST
/* Define to 1 if you have the <pam/pam_appl.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_PAM_PAM_APPL_H
/* Define to 1 if you have the `pam_putenv' function. */
#undef HAVE_PAM_PUTENV
/* Define to 1 if you have the <paths.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_PATHS_H
/* Define if you have ut_pid in utmp.h */
#undef HAVE_PID_IN_UTMP
/* define if you have pid_t data type */
#undef HAVE_PID_T
/* Define to 1 if you have the `pledge' function. */
#undef HAVE_PLEDGE
/* Define to 1 if you have the `poll' function. */
#undef HAVE_POLL
/* Define to 1 if you have the <poll.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_POLL_H
/* Define to 1 if you have the `prctl' function. */
#undef HAVE_PRCTL
/* Define to 1 if you have the `priv_basicset' function. */
#undef HAVE_PRIV_BASICSET
/* Define to 1 if you have the <priv.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_PRIV_H
/* Define if you have /proc/$pid/fd */
#undef HAVE_PROC_PID
/* Define to 1 if you have the `proc_pidinfo' function. */
#undef HAVE_PROC_PIDINFO
/* Define to 1 if you have the `pstat' function. */
#undef HAVE_PSTAT
/* Define to 1 if you have the <pty.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_PTY_H
/* Define to 1 if you have the `pututline' function. */
#undef HAVE_PUTUTLINE
/* Define to 1 if you have the `pututxline' function. */
#undef HAVE_PUTUTXLINE
/* Define to 1 if you have the `raise' function. */
#undef HAVE_RAISE
/* Define to 1 if you have the `readpassphrase' function. */
#undef HAVE_READPASSPHRASE
/* Define to 1 if you have the <readpassphrase.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_READPASSPHRASE_H
/* Define to 1 if your system has a GNU libc compatible `realloc' function,
and to 0 otherwise. */
#undef HAVE_REALLOC
/* Define to 1 if you have the `reallocarray' function. */
#undef HAVE_REALLOCARRAY
+/* Define to 1 if you have the `realpath' function. */
+#undef HAVE_REALPATH
+
/* Define to 1 if you have the `recallocarray' function. */
#undef HAVE_RECALLOCARRAY
/* Define to 1 if you have the `recvmsg' function. */
#undef HAVE_RECVMSG
/* sys/resource.h has RLIMIT_NPROC */
#undef HAVE_RLIMIT_NPROC
/* Define to 1 if you have the <rpc/types.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_RPC_TYPES_H
/* Define to 1 if you have the `rresvport_af' function. */
#undef HAVE_RRESVPORT_AF
/* Define to 1 if you have the `RSA_generate_key_ex' function. */
#undef HAVE_RSA_GENERATE_KEY_EX
/* Define to 1 if you have the `RSA_get0_crt_params' function. */
#undef HAVE_RSA_GET0_CRT_PARAMS
/* Define to 1 if you have the `RSA_get0_factors' function. */
#undef HAVE_RSA_GET0_FACTORS
/* Define to 1 if you have the `RSA_get0_key' function. */
#undef HAVE_RSA_GET0_KEY
/* Define to 1 if you have the `RSA_get_default_method' function. */
#undef HAVE_RSA_GET_DEFAULT_METHOD
/* Define to 1 if you have the `RSA_meth_dup' function. */
#undef HAVE_RSA_METH_DUP
/* Define to 1 if you have the `RSA_meth_free' function. */
#undef HAVE_RSA_METH_FREE
/* Define to 1 if you have the `RSA_meth_get_finish' function. */
#undef HAVE_RSA_METH_GET_FINISH
/* Define to 1 if you have the `RSA_meth_set1_name' function. */
#undef HAVE_RSA_METH_SET1_NAME
/* Define to 1 if you have the `RSA_meth_set_finish' function. */
#undef HAVE_RSA_METH_SET_FINISH
/* Define to 1 if you have the `RSA_meth_set_priv_dec' function. */
#undef HAVE_RSA_METH_SET_PRIV_DEC
/* Define to 1 if you have the `RSA_meth_set_priv_enc' function. */
#undef HAVE_RSA_METH_SET_PRIV_ENC
/* Define to 1 if you have the `RSA_set0_crt_params' function. */
#undef HAVE_RSA_SET0_CRT_PARAMS
/* Define to 1 if you have the `RSA_set0_factors' function. */
#undef HAVE_RSA_SET0_FACTORS
/* Define to 1 if you have the `RSA_set0_key' function. */
#undef HAVE_RSA_SET0_KEY
/* Define to 1 if you have the <sandbox.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_SANDBOX_H
/* Define to 1 if you have the `sandbox_init' function. */
#undef HAVE_SANDBOX_INIT
/* define if you have sa_family_t data type */
#undef HAVE_SA_FAMILY_T
/* Define to 1 if you have the `scan_scaled' function. */
#undef HAVE_SCAN_SCALED
/* Define if you have SecureWare-based protected password database */
#undef HAVE_SECUREWARE
/* Define to 1 if you have the <security/pam_appl.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_SECURITY_PAM_APPL_H
/* Define to 1 if you have the `sendmsg' function. */
#undef HAVE_SENDMSG
/* Define to 1 if you have the `setauthdb' function. */
#undef HAVE_SETAUTHDB
/* Define to 1 if you have the `setdtablesize' function. */
#undef HAVE_SETDTABLESIZE
/* Define to 1 if you have the `setegid' function. */
#undef HAVE_SETEGID
/* Define to 1 if you have the `setenv' function. */
#undef HAVE_SETENV
/* Define to 1 if you have the `seteuid' function. */
#undef HAVE_SETEUID
/* Define to 1 if you have the `setgroupent' function. */
#undef HAVE_SETGROUPENT
/* Define to 1 if you have the `setgroups' function. */
#undef HAVE_SETGROUPS
/* Define to 1 if you have the `setlinebuf' function. */
#undef HAVE_SETLINEBUF
/* Define to 1 if you have the `setlogin' function. */
#undef HAVE_SETLOGIN
/* Define to 1 if you have the `setluid' function. */
#undef HAVE_SETLUID
/* Define to 1 if you have the `setpassent' function. */
#undef HAVE_SETPASSENT
/* Define to 1 if you have the `setpcred' function. */
#undef HAVE_SETPCRED
/* Define to 1 if you have the `setpflags' function. */
#undef HAVE_SETPFLAGS
/* Define to 1 if you have the `setppriv' function. */
#undef HAVE_SETPPRIV
/* Define to 1 if you have the `setproctitle' function. */
#undef HAVE_SETPROCTITLE
/* Define to 1 if you have the `setregid' function. */
#undef HAVE_SETREGID
/* Define to 1 if you have the `setresgid' function. */
#undef HAVE_SETRESGID
/* Define to 1 if you have the `setresuid' function. */
#undef HAVE_SETRESUID
/* Define to 1 if you have the `setreuid' function. */
#undef HAVE_SETREUID
/* Define to 1 if you have the `setrlimit' function. */
#undef HAVE_SETRLIMIT
/* Define to 1 if you have the `setsid' function. */
#undef HAVE_SETSID
/* Define to 1 if you have the `setutent' function. */
#undef HAVE_SETUTENT
/* Define to 1 if you have the `setutxdb' function. */
#undef HAVE_SETUTXDB
/* Define to 1 if you have the `setutxent' function. */
#undef HAVE_SETUTXENT
/* Define to 1 if you have the `setvbuf' function. */
#undef HAVE_SETVBUF
/* Define to 1 if you have the `set_id' function. */
#undef HAVE_SET_ID
/* Define to 1 if you have the `SHA256Update' function. */
#undef HAVE_SHA256UPDATE
/* Define to 1 if you have the <sha2.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_SHA2_H
/* Define to 1 if you have the `SHA384Update' function. */
#undef HAVE_SHA384UPDATE
/* Define to 1 if you have the `SHA512Update' function. */
#undef HAVE_SHA512UPDATE
/* Define to 1 if you have the <shadow.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_SHADOW_H
/* Define to 1 if you have the `sigaction' function. */
#undef HAVE_SIGACTION
/* Define to 1 if you have the `sigvec' function. */
#undef HAVE_SIGVEC
/* Define to 1 if the system has the type `sig_atomic_t'. */
#undef HAVE_SIG_ATOMIC_T
/* define if you have size_t data type */
#undef HAVE_SIZE_T
/* Define to 1 if you have the `snprintf' function. */
#undef HAVE_SNPRINTF
/* Define to 1 if you have the `socketpair' function. */
#undef HAVE_SOCKETPAIR
/* Have PEERCRED socket option */
#undef HAVE_SO_PEERCRED
/* define if you have ssize_t data type */
#undef HAVE_SSIZE_T
/* Fields in struct sockaddr_storage */
#undef HAVE_SS_FAMILY_IN_SS
/* Define to 1 if you have the `statfs' function. */
#undef HAVE_STATFS
/* Define to 1 if you have the `statvfs' function. */
#undef HAVE_STATVFS
/* Define to 1 if you have the <stddef.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_STDDEF_H
/* Define to 1 if you have the <stdint.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_STDINT_H
/* Define to 1 if you have the <stdlib.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_STDLIB_H
/* Define to 1 if you have the `strcasestr' function. */
#undef HAVE_STRCASESTR
/* Define to 1 if you have the `strdup' function. */
#undef HAVE_STRDUP
/* Define to 1 if you have the `strerror' function. */
#undef HAVE_STRERROR
/* Define to 1 if you have the `strftime' function. */
#undef HAVE_STRFTIME
/* Silly mkstemp() */
#undef HAVE_STRICT_MKSTEMP
/* Define to 1 if you have the <strings.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_STRINGS_H
/* Define to 1 if you have the <string.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_STRING_H
/* Define to 1 if you have the `strlcat' function. */
#undef HAVE_STRLCAT
/* Define to 1 if you have the `strlcpy' function. */
#undef HAVE_STRLCPY
/* Define to 1 if you have the `strmode' function. */
#undef HAVE_STRMODE
/* Define to 1 if you have the `strndup' function. */
#undef HAVE_STRNDUP
/* Define to 1 if you have the `strnlen' function. */
#undef HAVE_STRNLEN
/* Define to 1 if you have the `strnvis' function. */
#undef HAVE_STRNVIS
/* Define to 1 if you have the `strptime' function. */
#undef HAVE_STRPTIME
/* Define to 1 if you have the `strsep' function. */
#undef HAVE_STRSEP
/* Define to 1 if you have the `strsignal' function. */
#undef HAVE_STRSIGNAL
/* Define to 1 if you have the `strtoll' function. */
#undef HAVE_STRTOLL
/* Define to 1 if you have the `strtonum' function. */
#undef HAVE_STRTONUM
/* Define to 1 if you have the `strtoul' function. */
#undef HAVE_STRTOUL
/* Define to 1 if you have the `strtoull' function. */
#undef HAVE_STRTOULL
/* define if you have struct addrinfo data type */
#undef HAVE_STRUCT_ADDRINFO
/* define if you have struct in6_addr data type */
#undef HAVE_STRUCT_IN6_ADDR
/* Define to 1 if `pw_change' is a member of `struct passwd'. */
#undef HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_CHANGE
/* Define to 1 if `pw_class' is a member of `struct passwd'. */
#undef HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_CLASS
/* Define to 1 if `pw_expire' is a member of `struct passwd'. */
#undef HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_EXPIRE
/* Define to 1 if `pw_gecos' is a member of `struct passwd'. */
#undef HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_GECOS
/* define if you have struct sockaddr_in6 data type */
#undef HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKADDR_IN6
/* Define to 1 if `sin6_scope_id' is a member of `struct sockaddr_in6'. */
#undef HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKADDR_IN6_SIN6_SCOPE_ID
/* define if you have struct sockaddr_storage data type */
#undef HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKADDR_STORAGE
+/* Define to 1 if `f_files' is a member of `struct statfs'. */
+#undef HAVE_STRUCT_STATFS_F_FILES
+
/* Define to 1 if `f_flags' is a member of `struct statfs'. */
#undef HAVE_STRUCT_STATFS_F_FLAGS
/* Define to 1 if `st_blksize' is a member of `struct stat'. */
#undef HAVE_STRUCT_STAT_ST_BLKSIZE
/* Define to 1 if `st_mtim' is a member of `struct stat'. */
#undef HAVE_STRUCT_STAT_ST_MTIM
/* Define to 1 if `st_mtime' is a member of `struct stat'. */
#undef HAVE_STRUCT_STAT_ST_MTIME
-/* Define to 1 if the system has the type `struct timespec'. */
+/* define if you have struct timespec */
#undef HAVE_STRUCT_TIMESPEC
/* define if you have struct timeval */
#undef HAVE_STRUCT_TIMEVAL
/* Define to 1 if you have the `swap32' function. */
#undef HAVE_SWAP32
/* Define to 1 if you have the `sysconf' function. */
#undef HAVE_SYSCONF
/* Define if you have syslen in utmpx.h */
#undef HAVE_SYSLEN_IN_UTMPX
/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/audit.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_SYS_AUDIT_H
/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/bitypes.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_SYS_BITYPES_H
/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/bsdtty.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_SYS_BSDTTY_H
/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/capsicum.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_SYS_CAPSICUM_H
/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/cdefs.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_SYS_CDEFS_H
/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/dir.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_SYS_DIR_H
/* Define if your system defines sys_errlist[] */
#undef HAVE_SYS_ERRLIST
/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/file.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_SYS_FILE_H
/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/label.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_SYS_LABEL_H
/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/mman.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_SYS_MMAN_H
/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/mount.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_SYS_MOUNT_H
/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/ndir.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_SYS_NDIR_H
/* Define if your system defines sys_nerr */
#undef HAVE_SYS_NERR
/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/poll.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_SYS_POLL_H
/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/prctl.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_SYS_PRCTL_H
/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/pstat.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_SYS_PSTAT_H
/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/ptms.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_SYS_PTMS_H
/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/ptrace.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_SYS_PTRACE_H
/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/random.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_SYS_RANDOM_H
/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/select.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_SYS_SELECT_H
/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/statvfs.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_SYS_STATVFS_H
/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/stat.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H
/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/stream.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_SYS_STREAM_H
/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/stropts.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_SYS_STROPTS_H
/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/strtio.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_SYS_STRTIO_H
/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/sysctl.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_SYS_SYSCTL_H
/* Force use of sys/syslog.h on Ultrix */
#undef HAVE_SYS_SYSLOG_H
/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/sysmacros.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_SYS_SYSMACROS_H
/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/timers.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_SYS_TIMERS_H
/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/time.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/types.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H
/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/un.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_SYS_UN_H
/* Define to 1 if you have the <sys/vfs.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_SYS_VFS_H
/* Define to 1 if you have the `tcgetpgrp' function. */
#undef HAVE_TCGETPGRP
/* Define to 1 if you have the `tcsendbreak' function. */
#undef HAVE_TCSENDBREAK
/* Define to 1 if you have the `time' function. */
#undef HAVE_TIME
/* Define to 1 if you have the <time.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_TIME_H
/* Define if you have ut_time in utmp.h */
#undef HAVE_TIME_IN_UTMP
/* Define if you have ut_time in utmpx.h */
#undef HAVE_TIME_IN_UTMPX
/* Define to 1 if you have the `timingsafe_bcmp' function. */
#undef HAVE_TIMINGSAFE_BCMP
/* Define to 1 if you have the <tmpdir.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_TMPDIR_H
/* Define to 1 if you have the `truncate' function. */
#undef HAVE_TRUNCATE
/* Define to 1 if you have the <ttyent.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_TTYENT_H
/* Define if you have ut_tv in utmp.h */
#undef HAVE_TV_IN_UTMP
/* Define if you have ut_tv in utmpx.h */
#undef HAVE_TV_IN_UTMPX
/* Define if you have ut_type in utmp.h */
#undef HAVE_TYPE_IN_UTMP
/* Define if you have ut_type in utmpx.h */
#undef HAVE_TYPE_IN_UTMPX
/* Define to 1 if you have the <ucred.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_UCRED_H
/* Define to 1 if the system has the type `uintmax_t'. */
#undef HAVE_UINTMAX_T
/* define if you have uintxx_t data type */
#undef HAVE_UINTXX_T
/* Define to 1 if you have the <unistd.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_UNISTD_H
/* Define to 1 if you have the `unsetenv' function. */
#undef HAVE_UNSETENV
/* Define to 1 if the system has the type `unsigned long long'. */
#undef HAVE_UNSIGNED_LONG_LONG
/* Define to 1 if you have the `updwtmp' function. */
#undef HAVE_UPDWTMP
/* Define to 1 if you have the `updwtmpx' function. */
#undef HAVE_UPDWTMPX
/* Define to 1 if you have the <usersec.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_USERSEC_H
/* Define to 1 if you have the `user_from_uid' function. */
#undef HAVE_USER_FROM_UID
/* Define to 1 if you have the `usleep' function. */
#undef HAVE_USLEEP
/* Define to 1 if you have the <util.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_UTIL_H
/* Define to 1 if you have the `utimensat' function. */
#undef HAVE_UTIMENSAT
/* Define to 1 if you have the `utimes' function. */
#undef HAVE_UTIMES
/* Define to 1 if you have the <utime.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_UTIME_H
/* Define to 1 if you have the `utmpname' function. */
#undef HAVE_UTMPNAME
/* Define to 1 if you have the `utmpxname' function. */
#undef HAVE_UTMPXNAME
/* Define to 1 if you have the <utmpx.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_UTMPX_H
/* Define to 1 if you have the <utmp.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_UTMP_H
/* define if you have u_char data type */
#undef HAVE_U_CHAR
/* define if you have u_int data type */
#undef HAVE_U_INT
/* define if you have u_int64_t data type */
#undef HAVE_U_INT64_T
/* define if you have u_intxx_t data type */
#undef HAVE_U_INTXX_T
/* Define to 1 if you have the `vasprintf' function. */
#undef HAVE_VASPRINTF
/* Define if va_copy exists */
#undef HAVE_VA_COPY
/* Define to 1 if you have the <vis.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_VIS_H
/* Define to 1 if you have the `vsnprintf' function. */
#undef HAVE_VSNPRINTF
/* Define to 1 if you have the `waitpid' function. */
#undef HAVE_WAITPID
/* Define to 1 if you have the `warn' function. */
#undef HAVE_WARN
/* Define to 1 if you have the <wchar.h> header file. */
#undef HAVE_WCHAR_H
/* Define to 1 if you have the `wcwidth' function. */
#undef HAVE_WCWIDTH
/* Define to 1 if you have the `_getlong' function. */
#undef HAVE__GETLONG
/* Define to 1 if you have the `_getpty' function. */
#undef HAVE__GETPTY
/* Define to 1 if you have the `_getshort' function. */
#undef HAVE__GETSHORT
/* Define if you have struct __res_state _res as an extern */
#undef HAVE__RES_EXTERN
/* Define to 1 if you have the `__b64_ntop' function. */
#undef HAVE___B64_NTOP
/* Define to 1 if you have the `__b64_pton' function. */
#undef HAVE___B64_PTON
/* Define if compiler implements __FUNCTION__ */
#undef HAVE___FUNCTION__
/* Define if libc defines __progname */
#undef HAVE___PROGNAME
/* Fields in struct sockaddr_storage */
#undef HAVE___SS_FAMILY_IN_SS
/* Define if __va_copy exists */
#undef HAVE___VA_COPY
/* Define if compiler implements __func__ */
#undef HAVE___func__
/* Define this if you are using the Heimdal version of Kerberos V5 */
#undef HEIMDAL
/* Define if you need to use IP address instead of hostname in $DISPLAY */
#undef IPADDR_IN_DISPLAY
/* Detect IPv4 in IPv6 mapped addresses and treat as IPv4 */
#undef IPV4_IN_IPV6
/* Define if your system choked on IP TOS setting */
#undef IP_TOS_IS_BROKEN
/* Define if you want Kerberos 5 support */
#undef KRB5
/* Define if pututxline updates lastlog too */
#undef LASTLOG_WRITE_PUTUTXLINE
/* Define to whatever link() returns for "not supported" if it doesn't return
EOPNOTSUPP. */
#undef LINK_OPNOTSUPP_ERRNO
/* Adjust Linux out-of-memory killer */
#undef LINUX_OOM_ADJUST
/* max value of long long calculated by configure */
#undef LLONG_MAX
/* min value of long long calculated by configure */
#undef LLONG_MIN
/* Account locked with pw(1) */
#undef LOCKED_PASSWD_PREFIX
/* String used in /etc/passwd to denote locked account */
#undef LOCKED_PASSWD_STRING
/* String used in /etc/passwd to denote locked account */
#undef LOCKED_PASSWD_SUBSTR
/* Some systems need a utmpx entry for /bin/login to work */
#undef LOGIN_NEEDS_UTMPX
/* Set this to your mail directory if you do not have _PATH_MAILDIR */
#undef MAIL_DIRECTORY
-/* Need setpgrp to acquire controlling tty */
+/* Need setpgrp to for controlling tty */
#undef NEED_SETPGRP
/* compiler does not accept __attribute__ on prototype args */
#undef NO_ATTRIBUTE_ON_PROTOTYPE_ARGS
/* compiler does not accept __attribute__ on return types */
#undef NO_ATTRIBUTE_ON_RETURN_TYPE
/* Define to disable UID restoration test */
#undef NO_UID_RESTORATION_TEST
/* Define if X11 doesn't support AF_UNIX sockets on that system */
#undef NO_X11_UNIX_SOCKETS
/* Define if EVP_DigestUpdate returns void */
#undef OPENSSL_EVP_DIGESTUPDATE_VOID
/* OpenSSL has ECC */
#undef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
/* libcrypto has NID_X9_62_prime256v1 */
#undef OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP256
/* libcrypto has NID_secp384r1 */
#undef OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP384
/* libcrypto has NID_secp521r1 */
#undef OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521
/* libcrypto has EVP AES CTR */
#undef OPENSSL_HAVE_EVPCTR
/* libcrypto has EVP AES GCM */
#undef OPENSSL_HAVE_EVPGCM
/* libcrypto is missing AES 192 and 256 bit functions */
#undef OPENSSL_LOBOTOMISED_AES
/* Define if you want the OpenSSL internally seeded PRNG only */
#undef OPENSSL_PRNG_ONLY
/* Define to the address where bug reports for this package should be sent. */
#undef PACKAGE_BUGREPORT
/* Define to the full name of this package. */
#undef PACKAGE_NAME
/* Define to the full name and version of this package. */
#undef PACKAGE_STRING
/* Define to the one symbol short name of this package. */
#undef PACKAGE_TARNAME
/* Define to the home page for this package. */
#undef PACKAGE_URL
/* Define to the version of this package. */
#undef PACKAGE_VERSION
/* Define if you are using Solaris-derived PAM which passes pam_messages to
the conversation function with an extra level of indirection */
#undef PAM_SUN_CODEBASE
/* Work around problematic Linux PAM modules handling of PAM_TTY */
#undef PAM_TTY_KLUDGE
/* must supply username to passwd */
#undef PASSWD_NEEDS_USERNAME
/* System dirs owned by bin (uid 2) */
#undef PLATFORM_SYS_DIR_UID
/* Port number of PRNGD/EGD random number socket */
#undef PRNGD_PORT
/* Location of PRNGD/EGD random number socket */
#undef PRNGD_SOCKET
/* read(1) can return 0 for a non-closed fd */
#undef PTY_ZEROREAD
/* Sandbox using capsicum */
#undef SANDBOX_CAPSICUM
/* Sandbox using Darwin sandbox_init(3) */
#undef SANDBOX_DARWIN
/* no privsep sandboxing */
#undef SANDBOX_NULL
/* Sandbox using pledge(2) */
#undef SANDBOX_PLEDGE
/* Sandbox using setrlimit(2) */
#undef SANDBOX_RLIMIT
/* Sandbox using seccomp filter */
#undef SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER
/* setrlimit RLIMIT_FSIZE works */
#undef SANDBOX_SKIP_RLIMIT_FSIZE
/* define if setrlimit RLIMIT_NOFILE breaks things */
#undef SANDBOX_SKIP_RLIMIT_NOFILE
/* Sandbox using Solaris/Illumos privileges */
#undef SANDBOX_SOLARIS
/* Sandbox using systrace(4) */
#undef SANDBOX_SYSTRACE
/* Specify the system call convention in use */
#undef SECCOMP_AUDIT_ARCH
/* Define if your platform breaks doing a seteuid before a setuid */
#undef SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID
/* The size of `int', as computed by sizeof. */
#undef SIZEOF_INT
/* The size of `long int', as computed by sizeof. */
#undef SIZEOF_LONG_INT
/* The size of `long long int', as computed by sizeof. */
#undef SIZEOF_LONG_LONG_INT
/* The size of `short int', as computed by sizeof. */
#undef SIZEOF_SHORT_INT
/* Define as const if snprintf() can declare const char *fmt */
#undef SNPRINTF_CONST
/* Define to a Set Process Title type if your system is supported by
bsd-setproctitle.c */
#undef SPT_TYPE
/* Define if sshd somehow reacquires a controlling TTY after setsid() */
#undef SSHD_ACQUIRES_CTTY
/* sshd PAM service name */
#undef SSHD_PAM_SERVICE
/* Define if pam_chauthtok wants real uid set to the unpriv'ed user */
#undef SSHPAM_CHAUTHTOK_NEEDS_RUID
/* Use audit debugging module */
#undef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
/* Windows is sensitive to read buffer size */
#undef SSH_IOBUFSZ
/* non-privileged user for privilege separation */
#undef SSH_PRIVSEP_USER
/* Use tunnel device compatibility to OpenBSD */
#undef SSH_TUN_COMPAT_AF
/* Open tunnel devices the FreeBSD way */
#undef SSH_TUN_FREEBSD
/* Open tunnel devices the Linux tun/tap way */
#undef SSH_TUN_LINUX
/* No layer 2 tunnel support */
#undef SSH_TUN_NO_L2
/* Open tunnel devices the OpenBSD way */
#undef SSH_TUN_OPENBSD
/* Prepend the address family to IP tunnel traffic */
#undef SSH_TUN_PREPEND_AF
/* Define to 1 if you have the ANSI C header files. */
#undef STDC_HEADERS
/* Define if you want a different $PATH for the superuser */
#undef SUPERUSER_PATH
/* syslog_r function is safe to use in in a signal handler */
#undef SYSLOG_R_SAFE_IN_SIGHAND
/* Support routing domains using Linux VRF */
#undef SYS_RDOMAIN_LINUX
+/* Define to 1 if you can safely include both <sys/time.h> and <time.h>. */
+#undef TIME_WITH_SYS_TIME
+
/* Support passwords > 8 chars */
#undef UNIXWARE_LONG_PASSWORDS
/* Specify default $PATH */
#undef USER_PATH
/* Define this if you want to use libkafs' AFS support */
#undef USE_AFS
/* Use BSM audit module */
#undef USE_BSM_AUDIT
/* Use btmp to log bad logins */
#undef USE_BTMP
/* Use libedit for sftp */
#undef USE_LIBEDIT
/* Use Linux audit module */
#undef USE_LINUX_AUDIT
/* Enable OpenSSL engine support */
#undef USE_OPENSSL_ENGINE
/* Define if you want to enable PAM support */
#undef USE_PAM
/* Use PIPES instead of a socketpair() */
#undef USE_PIPES
/* Define if you have Solaris privileges */
#undef USE_SOLARIS_PRIVS
/* Define if you have Solaris process contracts */
#undef USE_SOLARIS_PROCESS_CONTRACTS
/* Define if you have Solaris projects */
#undef USE_SOLARIS_PROJECTS
/* Define if you shouldn't strip 'tty' from your ttyname in [uw]tmp */
#undef WITH_ABBREV_NO_TTY
/* Define if you want to enable AIX4's authenticate function */
#undef WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE
/* Define if you have/want arrays (cluster-wide session management, not C
arrays) */
#undef WITH_IRIX_ARRAY
/* Define if you want IRIX audit trails */
#undef WITH_IRIX_AUDIT
/* Define if you want IRIX kernel jobs */
#undef WITH_IRIX_JOBS
/* Define if you want IRIX project management */
#undef WITH_IRIX_PROJECT
/* use libcrypto for cryptography */
#undef WITH_OPENSSL
/* Define if you want SELinux support. */
#undef WITH_SELINUX
+/* Enable zlib */
+#undef WITH_ZLIB
+
/* Define WORDS_BIGENDIAN to 1 if your processor stores words with the most
significant byte first (like Motorola and SPARC, unlike Intel). */
#if defined AC_APPLE_UNIVERSAL_BUILD
# if defined __BIG_ENDIAN__
# define WORDS_BIGENDIAN 1
# endif
#else
# ifndef WORDS_BIGENDIAN
# undef WORDS_BIGENDIAN
# endif
#endif
/* Define if xauth is found in your path */
#undef XAUTH_PATH
/* Enable large inode numbers on Mac OS X 10.5. */
#ifndef _DARWIN_USE_64_BIT_INODE
# define _DARWIN_USE_64_BIT_INODE 1
#endif
/* Number of bits in a file offset, on hosts where this is settable. */
#undef _FILE_OFFSET_BITS
/* Define for large files, on AIX-style hosts. */
#undef _LARGE_FILES
/* log for bad login attempts */
#undef _PATH_BTMP
/* Full path of your "passwd" program */
#undef _PATH_PASSWD_PROG
/* Specify location of ssh.pid */
#undef _PATH_SSH_PIDDIR
/* Define if we don't have struct __res_state in resolv.h */
#undef __res_state
/* Define to rpl_calloc if the replacement function should be used. */
#undef calloc
/* Define to `__inline__' or `__inline' if that's what the C compiler
calls it, or to nothing if 'inline' is not supported under any name. */
#ifndef __cplusplus
#undef inline
#endif
/* Define to rpl_malloc if the replacement function should be used. */
#undef malloc
/* Define to rpl_realloc if the replacement function should be used. */
#undef realloc
/* type to use in place of socklen_t if not defined */
#undef socklen_t
diff --git a/configure b/configure
index 1e67db268cd0..09db0a33566a 100755
--- a/configure
+++ b/configure
@@ -1,20824 +1,21326 @@
#! /bin/sh
# From configure.ac Revision: 1.583 .
# Guess values for system-dependent variables and create Makefiles.
# Generated by GNU Autoconf 2.69 for OpenSSH Portable.
#
# Report bugs to <openssh-unix-dev@mindrot.org>.
#
#
# Copyright (C) 1992-1996, 1998-2012 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
#
#
# This configure script is free software; the Free Software Foundation
# gives unlimited permission to copy, distribute and modify it.
## -------------------- ##
## M4sh Initialization. ##
## -------------------- ##
# Be more Bourne compatible
DUALCASE=1; export DUALCASE # for MKS sh
if test -n "${ZSH_VERSION+set}" && (emulate sh) >/dev/null 2>&1; then :
emulate sh
NULLCMD=:
# Pre-4.2 versions of Zsh do word splitting on ${1+"$@"}, which
# is contrary to our usage. Disable this feature.
alias -g '${1+"$@"}'='"$@"'
setopt NO_GLOB_SUBST
else
case `(set -o) 2>/dev/null` in #(
*posix*) :
set -o posix ;; #(
*) :
;;
esac
fi
as_nl='
'
export as_nl
# Printing a long string crashes Solaris 7 /usr/bin/printf.
as_echo='\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\'
as_echo=$as_echo$as_echo$as_echo$as_echo$as_echo
as_echo=$as_echo$as_echo$as_echo$as_echo$as_echo$as_echo
# Prefer a ksh shell builtin over an external printf program on Solaris,
# but without wasting forks for bash or zsh.
if test -z "$BASH_VERSION$ZSH_VERSION" \
&& (test "X`print -r -- $as_echo`" = "X$as_echo") 2>/dev/null; then
as_echo='print -r --'
as_echo_n='print -rn --'
elif (test "X`printf %s $as_echo`" = "X$as_echo") 2>/dev/null; then
as_echo='printf %s\n'
as_echo_n='printf %s'
else
if test "X`(/usr/ucb/echo -n -n $as_echo) 2>/dev/null`" = "X-n $as_echo"; then
as_echo_body='eval /usr/ucb/echo -n "$1$as_nl"'
as_echo_n='/usr/ucb/echo -n'
else
as_echo_body='eval expr "X$1" : "X\\(.*\\)"'
as_echo_n_body='eval
arg=$1;
case $arg in #(
*"$as_nl"*)
expr "X$arg" : "X\\(.*\\)$as_nl";
arg=`expr "X$arg" : ".*$as_nl\\(.*\\)"`;;
esac;
expr "X$arg" : "X\\(.*\\)" | tr -d "$as_nl"
'
export as_echo_n_body
as_echo_n='sh -c $as_echo_n_body as_echo'
fi
export as_echo_body
as_echo='sh -c $as_echo_body as_echo'
fi
# The user is always right.
if test "${PATH_SEPARATOR+set}" != set; then
PATH_SEPARATOR=:
(PATH='/bin;/bin'; FPATH=$PATH; sh -c :) >/dev/null 2>&1 && {
(PATH='/bin:/bin'; FPATH=$PATH; sh -c :) >/dev/null 2>&1 ||
PATH_SEPARATOR=';'
}
fi
# IFS
# We need space, tab and new line, in precisely that order. Quoting is
# there to prevent editors from complaining about space-tab.
# (If _AS_PATH_WALK were called with IFS unset, it would disable word
# splitting by setting IFS to empty value.)
IFS=" "" $as_nl"
# Find who we are. Look in the path if we contain no directory separator.
as_myself=
case $0 in #((
*[\\/]* ) as_myself=$0 ;;
*) as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
for as_dir in $PATH
do
IFS=$as_save_IFS
test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=.
test -r "$as_dir/$0" && as_myself=$as_dir/$0 && break
done
IFS=$as_save_IFS
;;
esac
# We did not find ourselves, most probably we were run as `sh COMMAND'
# in which case we are not to be found in the path.
if test "x$as_myself" = x; then
as_myself=$0
fi
if test ! -f "$as_myself"; then
$as_echo "$as_myself: error: cannot find myself; rerun with an absolute file name" >&2
exit 1
fi
# Unset variables that we do not need and which cause bugs (e.g. in
# pre-3.0 UWIN ksh). But do not cause bugs in bash 2.01; the "|| exit 1"
# suppresses any "Segmentation fault" message there. '((' could
# trigger a bug in pdksh 5.2.14.
for as_var in BASH_ENV ENV MAIL MAILPATH
do eval test x\${$as_var+set} = xset \
&& ( (unset $as_var) || exit 1) >/dev/null 2>&1 && unset $as_var || :
done
PS1='$ '
PS2='> '
PS4='+ '
# NLS nuisances.
LC_ALL=C
export LC_ALL
LANGUAGE=C
export LANGUAGE
# CDPATH.
(unset CDPATH) >/dev/null 2>&1 && unset CDPATH
# Use a proper internal environment variable to ensure we don't fall
# into an infinite loop, continuously re-executing ourselves.
if test x"${_as_can_reexec}" != xno && test "x$CONFIG_SHELL" != x; then
_as_can_reexec=no; export _as_can_reexec;
# We cannot yet assume a decent shell, so we have to provide a
# neutralization value for shells without unset; and this also
# works around shells that cannot unset nonexistent variables.
# Preserve -v and -x to the replacement shell.
BASH_ENV=/dev/null
ENV=/dev/null
(unset BASH_ENV) >/dev/null 2>&1 && unset BASH_ENV ENV
case $- in # ((((
*v*x* | *x*v* ) as_opts=-vx ;;
*v* ) as_opts=-v ;;
*x* ) as_opts=-x ;;
* ) as_opts= ;;
esac
exec $CONFIG_SHELL $as_opts "$as_myself" ${1+"$@"}
# Admittedly, this is quite paranoid, since all the known shells bail
# out after a failed `exec'.
$as_echo "$0: could not re-execute with $CONFIG_SHELL" >&2
as_fn_exit 255
fi
# We don't want this to propagate to other subprocesses.
{ _as_can_reexec=; unset _as_can_reexec;}
if test "x$CONFIG_SHELL" = x; then
as_bourne_compatible="if test -n \"\${ZSH_VERSION+set}\" && (emulate sh) >/dev/null 2>&1; then :
emulate sh
NULLCMD=:
# Pre-4.2 versions of Zsh do word splitting on \${1+\"\$@\"}, which
# is contrary to our usage. Disable this feature.
alias -g '\${1+\"\$@\"}'='\"\$@\"'
setopt NO_GLOB_SUBST
else
case \`(set -o) 2>/dev/null\` in #(
*posix*) :
set -o posix ;; #(
*) :
;;
esac
fi
"
as_required="as_fn_return () { (exit \$1); }
as_fn_success () { as_fn_return 0; }
as_fn_failure () { as_fn_return 1; }
as_fn_ret_success () { return 0; }
as_fn_ret_failure () { return 1; }
exitcode=0
as_fn_success || { exitcode=1; echo as_fn_success failed.; }
as_fn_failure && { exitcode=1; echo as_fn_failure succeeded.; }
as_fn_ret_success || { exitcode=1; echo as_fn_ret_success failed.; }
as_fn_ret_failure && { exitcode=1; echo as_fn_ret_failure succeeded.; }
if ( set x; as_fn_ret_success y && test x = \"\$1\" ); then :
else
exitcode=1; echo positional parameters were not saved.
fi
test x\$exitcode = x0 || exit 1
test -x / || exit 1"
as_suggested=" as_lineno_1=";as_suggested=$as_suggested$LINENO;as_suggested=$as_suggested" as_lineno_1a=\$LINENO
as_lineno_2=";as_suggested=$as_suggested$LINENO;as_suggested=$as_suggested" as_lineno_2a=\$LINENO
eval 'test \"x\$as_lineno_1'\$as_run'\" != \"x\$as_lineno_2'\$as_run'\" &&
test \"x\`expr \$as_lineno_1'\$as_run' + 1\`\" = \"x\$as_lineno_2'\$as_run'\"' || exit 1
test \$(( 1 + 1 )) = 2 || exit 1"
if (eval "$as_required") 2>/dev/null; then :
as_have_required=yes
else
as_have_required=no
fi
if test x$as_have_required = xyes && (eval "$as_suggested") 2>/dev/null; then :
else
as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
as_found=false
for as_dir in /bin$PATH_SEPARATOR/usr/bin$PATH_SEPARATOR$PATH
do
IFS=$as_save_IFS
test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=.
as_found=:
case $as_dir in #(
/*)
for as_base in sh bash ksh sh5; do
# Try only shells that exist, to save several forks.
as_shell=$as_dir/$as_base
if { test -f "$as_shell" || test -f "$as_shell.exe"; } &&
{ $as_echo "$as_bourne_compatible""$as_required" | as_run=a "$as_shell"; } 2>/dev/null; then :
CONFIG_SHELL=$as_shell as_have_required=yes
if { $as_echo "$as_bourne_compatible""$as_suggested" | as_run=a "$as_shell"; } 2>/dev/null; then :
break 2
fi
fi
done;;
esac
as_found=false
done
$as_found || { if { test -f "$SHELL" || test -f "$SHELL.exe"; } &&
{ $as_echo "$as_bourne_compatible""$as_required" | as_run=a "$SHELL"; } 2>/dev/null; then :
CONFIG_SHELL=$SHELL as_have_required=yes
fi; }
IFS=$as_save_IFS
if test "x$CONFIG_SHELL" != x; then :
export CONFIG_SHELL
# We cannot yet assume a decent shell, so we have to provide a
# neutralization value for shells without unset; and this also
# works around shells that cannot unset nonexistent variables.
# Preserve -v and -x to the replacement shell.
BASH_ENV=/dev/null
ENV=/dev/null
(unset BASH_ENV) >/dev/null 2>&1 && unset BASH_ENV ENV
case $- in # ((((
*v*x* | *x*v* ) as_opts=-vx ;;
*v* ) as_opts=-v ;;
*x* ) as_opts=-x ;;
* ) as_opts= ;;
esac
exec $CONFIG_SHELL $as_opts "$as_myself" ${1+"$@"}
# Admittedly, this is quite paranoid, since all the known shells bail
# out after a failed `exec'.
$as_echo "$0: could not re-execute with $CONFIG_SHELL" >&2
exit 255
fi
if test x$as_have_required = xno; then :
$as_echo "$0: This script requires a shell more modern than all"
$as_echo "$0: the shells that I found on your system."
if test x${ZSH_VERSION+set} = xset ; then
$as_echo "$0: In particular, zsh $ZSH_VERSION has bugs and should"
$as_echo "$0: be upgraded to zsh 4.3.4 or later."
else
$as_echo "$0: Please tell bug-autoconf@gnu.org and
$0: openssh-unix-dev@mindrot.org about your system,
$0: including any error possibly output before this
$0: message. Then install a modern shell, or manually run
$0: the script under such a shell if you do have one."
fi
exit 1
fi
fi
fi
SHELL=${CONFIG_SHELL-/bin/sh}
export SHELL
# Unset more variables known to interfere with behavior of common tools.
CLICOLOR_FORCE= GREP_OPTIONS=
unset CLICOLOR_FORCE GREP_OPTIONS
## --------------------- ##
## M4sh Shell Functions. ##
## --------------------- ##
# as_fn_unset VAR
# ---------------
# Portably unset VAR.
as_fn_unset ()
{
{ eval $1=; unset $1;}
}
as_unset=as_fn_unset
# as_fn_set_status STATUS
# -----------------------
# Set $? to STATUS, without forking.
as_fn_set_status ()
{
return $1
} # as_fn_set_status
# as_fn_exit STATUS
# -----------------
# Exit the shell with STATUS, even in a "trap 0" or "set -e" context.
as_fn_exit ()
{
set +e
as_fn_set_status $1
exit $1
} # as_fn_exit
# as_fn_mkdir_p
# -------------
# Create "$as_dir" as a directory, including parents if necessary.
as_fn_mkdir_p ()
{
case $as_dir in #(
-*) as_dir=./$as_dir;;
esac
test -d "$as_dir" || eval $as_mkdir_p || {
as_dirs=
while :; do
case $as_dir in #(
*\'*) as_qdir=`$as_echo "$as_dir" | sed "s/'/'\\\\\\\\''/g"`;; #'(
*) as_qdir=$as_dir;;
esac
as_dirs="'$as_qdir' $as_dirs"
as_dir=`$as_dirname -- "$as_dir" ||
$as_expr X"$as_dir" : 'X\(.*[^/]\)//*[^/][^/]*/*$' \| \
X"$as_dir" : 'X\(//\)[^/]' \| \
X"$as_dir" : 'X\(//\)$' \| \
X"$as_dir" : 'X\(/\)' \| . 2>/dev/null ||
$as_echo X"$as_dir" |
sed '/^X\(.*[^/]\)\/\/*[^/][^/]*\/*$/{
s//\1/
q
}
/^X\(\/\/\)[^/].*/{
s//\1/
q
}
/^X\(\/\/\)$/{
s//\1/
q
}
/^X\(\/\).*/{
s//\1/
q
}
s/.*/./; q'`
test -d "$as_dir" && break
done
test -z "$as_dirs" || eval "mkdir $as_dirs"
} || test -d "$as_dir" || as_fn_error $? "cannot create directory $as_dir"
} # as_fn_mkdir_p
# as_fn_executable_p FILE
# -----------------------
# Test if FILE is an executable regular file.
as_fn_executable_p ()
{
test -f "$1" && test -x "$1"
} # as_fn_executable_p
# as_fn_append VAR VALUE
# ----------------------
# Append the text in VALUE to the end of the definition contained in VAR. Take
# advantage of any shell optimizations that allow amortized linear growth over
# repeated appends, instead of the typical quadratic growth present in naive
# implementations.
if (eval "as_var=1; as_var+=2; test x\$as_var = x12") 2>/dev/null; then :
eval 'as_fn_append ()
{
eval $1+=\$2
}'
else
as_fn_append ()
{
eval $1=\$$1\$2
}
fi # as_fn_append
# as_fn_arith ARG...
# ------------------
# Perform arithmetic evaluation on the ARGs, and store the result in the
# global $as_val. Take advantage of shells that can avoid forks. The arguments
# must be portable across $(()) and expr.
if (eval "test \$(( 1 + 1 )) = 2") 2>/dev/null; then :
eval 'as_fn_arith ()
{
as_val=$(( $* ))
}'
else
as_fn_arith ()
{
as_val=`expr "$@" || test $? -eq 1`
}
fi # as_fn_arith
# as_fn_error STATUS ERROR [LINENO LOG_FD]
# ----------------------------------------
# Output "`basename $0`: error: ERROR" to stderr. If LINENO and LOG_FD are
# provided, also output the error to LOG_FD, referencing LINENO. Then exit the
# script with STATUS, using 1 if that was 0.
as_fn_error ()
{
as_status=$1; test $as_status -eq 0 && as_status=1
if test "$4"; then
as_lineno=${as_lineno-"$3"} as_lineno_stack=as_lineno_stack=$as_lineno_stack
$as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: error: $2" >&$4
fi
$as_echo "$as_me: error: $2" >&2
as_fn_exit $as_status
} # as_fn_error
if expr a : '\(a\)' >/dev/null 2>&1 &&
test "X`expr 00001 : '.*\(...\)'`" = X001; then
as_expr=expr
else
as_expr=false
fi
if (basename -- /) >/dev/null 2>&1 && test "X`basename -- / 2>&1`" = "X/"; then
as_basename=basename
else
as_basename=false
fi
if (as_dir=`dirname -- /` && test "X$as_dir" = X/) >/dev/null 2>&1; then
as_dirname=dirname
else
as_dirname=false
fi
as_me=`$as_basename -- "$0" ||
$as_expr X/"$0" : '.*/\([^/][^/]*\)/*$' \| \
X"$0" : 'X\(//\)$' \| \
X"$0" : 'X\(/\)' \| . 2>/dev/null ||
$as_echo X/"$0" |
sed '/^.*\/\([^/][^/]*\)\/*$/{
s//\1/
q
}
/^X\/\(\/\/\)$/{
s//\1/
q
}
/^X\/\(\/\).*/{
s//\1/
q
}
s/.*/./; q'`
# Avoid depending upon Character Ranges.
as_cr_letters='abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz'
as_cr_LETTERS='ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ'
as_cr_Letters=$as_cr_letters$as_cr_LETTERS
as_cr_digits='0123456789'
as_cr_alnum=$as_cr_Letters$as_cr_digits
as_lineno_1=$LINENO as_lineno_1a=$LINENO
as_lineno_2=$LINENO as_lineno_2a=$LINENO
eval 'test "x$as_lineno_1'$as_run'" != "x$as_lineno_2'$as_run'" &&
test "x`expr $as_lineno_1'$as_run' + 1`" = "x$as_lineno_2'$as_run'"' || {
# Blame Lee E. McMahon (1931-1989) for sed's syntax. :-)
sed -n '
p
/[$]LINENO/=
' <$as_myself |
sed '
s/[$]LINENO.*/&-/
t lineno
b
:lineno
N
:loop
s/[$]LINENO\([^'$as_cr_alnum'_].*\n\)\(.*\)/\2\1\2/
t loop
s/-\n.*//
' >$as_me.lineno &&
chmod +x "$as_me.lineno" ||
{ $as_echo "$as_me: error: cannot create $as_me.lineno; rerun with a POSIX shell" >&2; as_fn_exit 1; }
# If we had to re-execute with $CONFIG_SHELL, we're ensured to have
# already done that, so ensure we don't try to do so again and fall
# in an infinite loop. This has already happened in practice.
_as_can_reexec=no; export _as_can_reexec
# Don't try to exec as it changes $[0], causing all sort of problems
# (the dirname of $[0] is not the place where we might find the
# original and so on. Autoconf is especially sensitive to this).
. "./$as_me.lineno"
# Exit status is that of the last command.
exit
}
ECHO_C= ECHO_N= ECHO_T=
case `echo -n x` in #(((((
-n*)
case `echo 'xy\c'` in
*c*) ECHO_T=' ';; # ECHO_T is single tab character.
xy) ECHO_C='\c';;
*) echo `echo ksh88 bug on AIX 6.1` > /dev/null
ECHO_T=' ';;
esac;;
*)
ECHO_N='-n';;
esac
rm -f conf$$ conf$$.exe conf$$.file
if test -d conf$$.dir; then
rm -f conf$$.dir/conf$$.file
else
rm -f conf$$.dir
mkdir conf$$.dir 2>/dev/null
fi
if (echo >conf$$.file) 2>/dev/null; then
if ln -s conf$$.file conf$$ 2>/dev/null; then
as_ln_s='ln -s'
# ... but there are two gotchas:
# 1) On MSYS, both `ln -s file dir' and `ln file dir' fail.
# 2) DJGPP < 2.04 has no symlinks; `ln -s' creates a wrapper executable.
# In both cases, we have to default to `cp -pR'.
ln -s conf$$.file conf$$.dir 2>/dev/null && test ! -f conf$$.exe ||
as_ln_s='cp -pR'
elif ln conf$$.file conf$$ 2>/dev/null; then
as_ln_s=ln
else
as_ln_s='cp -pR'
fi
else
as_ln_s='cp -pR'
fi
rm -f conf$$ conf$$.exe conf$$.dir/conf$$.file conf$$.file
rmdir conf$$.dir 2>/dev/null
if mkdir -p . 2>/dev/null; then
as_mkdir_p='mkdir -p "$as_dir"'
else
test -d ./-p && rmdir ./-p
as_mkdir_p=false
fi
as_test_x='test -x'
as_executable_p=as_fn_executable_p
# Sed expression to map a string onto a valid CPP name.
as_tr_cpp="eval sed 'y%*$as_cr_letters%P$as_cr_LETTERS%;s%[^_$as_cr_alnum]%_%g'"
# Sed expression to map a string onto a valid variable name.
as_tr_sh="eval sed 'y%*+%pp%;s%[^_$as_cr_alnum]%_%g'"
test -n "$DJDIR" || exec 7<&0 </dev/null
exec 6>&1
# Name of the host.
# hostname on some systems (SVR3.2, old GNU/Linux) returns a bogus exit status,
# so uname gets run too.
ac_hostname=`(hostname || uname -n) 2>/dev/null | sed 1q`
#
# Initializations.
#
ac_default_prefix=/usr/local
ac_clean_files=
ac_config_libobj_dir=.
LIBOBJS=
cross_compiling=no
subdirs=
MFLAGS=
MAKEFLAGS=
# Identity of this package.
PACKAGE_NAME='OpenSSH'
PACKAGE_TARNAME='openssh'
PACKAGE_VERSION='Portable'
PACKAGE_STRING='OpenSSH Portable'
PACKAGE_BUGREPORT='openssh-unix-dev@mindrot.org'
PACKAGE_URL=''
ac_unique_file="ssh.c"
# Factoring default headers for most tests.
ac_includes_default="\
#include <stdio.h>
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H
# include <sys/types.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H
# include <sys/stat.h>
#endif
#ifdef STDC_HEADERS
# include <stdlib.h>
# include <stddef.h>
#else
# ifdef HAVE_STDLIB_H
# include <stdlib.h>
# endif
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_STRING_H
# if !defined STDC_HEADERS && defined HAVE_MEMORY_H
# include <memory.h>
# endif
# include <string.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_STRINGS_H
# include <strings.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_INTTYPES_H
# include <inttypes.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
# include <stdint.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_UNISTD_H
# include <unistd.h>
#endif"
ac_subst_vars='LTLIBOBJS
+CFLAGS_NOPIE
+LDFLAGS_NOPIE
DEPEND
UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHMS
TEST_MALLOC_OPTIONS
TEST_SSH_UTF8
TEST_SSH_IPV6
piddir
user_path
mansubdir
MANTYPE
XAUTH_PATH
STRIP_OPT
xauth_path
PRIVSEP_PATH
K5LIBS
GSSLIBS
KRB5CONF
SSHDLIBS
SSHLIBS
SSH_PRIVSEP_USER
+LIBFIDO2
COMMENT_OUT_ECC
TEST_SSH_ECC
+PICFLAG
LIBEDIT
PKGCONFIG
LDNSCONFIG
LIBOBJS
LD
PATH_PASSWD_PROG
STARTUP_SCRIPT_SHELL
MAKE_PACKAGE_SUPPORTED
PATH_USERADD_PROG
PATH_GROUPADD_PROG
MANFMT
TEST_SHELL
MANDOC
NROFF
GROFF
SH
TEST_MINUS_S_SH
ENT
SED
KILL
CAT
ac_ct_AR
AR
MKDIR_P
INSTALL_DATA
INSTALL_SCRIPT
INSTALL_PROGRAM
RANLIB
AWK
EGREP
GREP
CPP
host_os
host_vendor
host_cpu
host
build_os
build_vendor
build_cpu
build
OBJEXT
EXEEXT
ac_ct_CC
CPPFLAGS
LDFLAGS
CFLAGS
CC
target_alias
host_alias
build_alias
LIBS
ECHO_T
ECHO_N
ECHO_C
DEFS
mandir
localedir
libdir
psdir
pdfdir
dvidir
htmldir
infodir
docdir
oldincludedir
includedir
localstatedir
sharedstatedir
sysconfdir
datadir
datarootdir
libexecdir
sbindir
bindir
program_transform_name
prefix
exec_prefix
PACKAGE_URL
PACKAGE_BUGREPORT
PACKAGE_STRING
PACKAGE_VERSION
PACKAGE_TARNAME
PACKAGE_NAME
PATH_SEPARATOR
SHELL'
ac_subst_files=''
ac_user_opts='
enable_option_checking
enable_largefile
with_openssl
with_stackprotect
with_hardening
with_rpath
with_cflags
with_cflags_after
with_cppflags
with_ldflags
with_ldflags_after
with_libs
with_Werror
with_solaris_contracts
with_solaris_projects
with_solaris_privs
with_osfsia
with_zlib
with_zlib_version_check
with_ldns
with_libedit
with_audit
with_pie
enable_pkcs11
+enable_security_key
+with_security_key_builtin
with_ssl_dir
with_openssl_header_check
with_ssl_engine
with_prngd_port
with_prngd_socket
with_pam
with_pam_service
with_privsep_user
with_sandbox
with_selinux
with_kerberos5
with_privsep_path
with_xauth
enable_strip
with_maildir
with_mantype
with_md5_passwords
with_shadow
with_ipaddr_display
enable_etc_default_login
with_default_path
with_superuser_path
with_4in6
with_bsd_auth
with_pid_dir
enable_lastlog
enable_utmp
enable_utmpx
enable_wtmp
enable_wtmpx
enable_libutil
enable_pututline
enable_pututxline
with_lastlog
'
ac_precious_vars='build_alias
host_alias
target_alias
CC
CFLAGS
LDFLAGS
LIBS
CPPFLAGS
CPP'
# Initialize some variables set by options.
ac_init_help=
ac_init_version=false
ac_unrecognized_opts=
ac_unrecognized_sep=
# The variables have the same names as the options, with
# dashes changed to underlines.
cache_file=/dev/null
exec_prefix=NONE
no_create=
no_recursion=
prefix=NONE
program_prefix=NONE
program_suffix=NONE
program_transform_name=s,x,x,
silent=
site=
srcdir=
verbose=
x_includes=NONE
x_libraries=NONE
# Installation directory options.
# These are left unexpanded so users can "make install exec_prefix=/foo"
# and all the variables that are supposed to be based on exec_prefix
# by default will actually change.
# Use braces instead of parens because sh, perl, etc. also accept them.
# (The list follows the same order as the GNU Coding Standards.)
bindir='${exec_prefix}/bin'
sbindir='${exec_prefix}/sbin'
libexecdir='${exec_prefix}/libexec'
datarootdir='${prefix}/share'
datadir='${datarootdir}'
sysconfdir='${prefix}/etc'
sharedstatedir='${prefix}/com'
localstatedir='${prefix}/var'
includedir='${prefix}/include'
oldincludedir='/usr/include'
docdir='${datarootdir}/doc/${PACKAGE_TARNAME}'
infodir='${datarootdir}/info'
htmldir='${docdir}'
dvidir='${docdir}'
pdfdir='${docdir}'
psdir='${docdir}'
libdir='${exec_prefix}/lib'
localedir='${datarootdir}/locale'
mandir='${datarootdir}/man'
ac_prev=
ac_dashdash=
for ac_option
do
# If the previous option needs an argument, assign it.
if test -n "$ac_prev"; then
eval $ac_prev=\$ac_option
ac_prev=
continue
fi
case $ac_option in
*=?*) ac_optarg=`expr "X$ac_option" : '[^=]*=\(.*\)'` ;;
*=) ac_optarg= ;;
*) ac_optarg=yes ;;
esac
# Accept the important Cygnus configure options, so we can diagnose typos.
case $ac_dashdash$ac_option in
--)
ac_dashdash=yes ;;
-bindir | --bindir | --bindi | --bind | --bin | --bi)
ac_prev=bindir ;;
-bindir=* | --bindir=* | --bindi=* | --bind=* | --bin=* | --bi=*)
bindir=$ac_optarg ;;
-build | --build | --buil | --bui | --bu)
ac_prev=build_alias ;;
-build=* | --build=* | --buil=* | --bui=* | --bu=*)
build_alias=$ac_optarg ;;
-cache-file | --cache-file | --cache-fil | --cache-fi \
| --cache-f | --cache- | --cache | --cach | --cac | --ca | --c)
ac_prev=cache_file ;;
-cache-file=* | --cache-file=* | --cache-fil=* | --cache-fi=* \
| --cache-f=* | --cache-=* | --cache=* | --cach=* | --cac=* | --ca=* | --c=*)
cache_file=$ac_optarg ;;
--config-cache | -C)
cache_file=config.cache ;;
-datadir | --datadir | --datadi | --datad)
ac_prev=datadir ;;
-datadir=* | --datadir=* | --datadi=* | --datad=*)
datadir=$ac_optarg ;;
-datarootdir | --datarootdir | --datarootdi | --datarootd | --dataroot \
| --dataroo | --dataro | --datar)
ac_prev=datarootdir ;;
-datarootdir=* | --datarootdir=* | --datarootdi=* | --datarootd=* \
| --dataroot=* | --dataroo=* | --dataro=* | --datar=*)
datarootdir=$ac_optarg ;;
-disable-* | --disable-*)
ac_useropt=`expr "x$ac_option" : 'x-*disable-\(.*\)'`
# Reject names that are not valid shell variable names.
expr "x$ac_useropt" : ".*[^-+._$as_cr_alnum]" >/dev/null &&
as_fn_error $? "invalid feature name: $ac_useropt"
ac_useropt_orig=$ac_useropt
ac_useropt=`$as_echo "$ac_useropt" | sed 's/[-+.]/_/g'`
case $ac_user_opts in
*"
"enable_$ac_useropt"
"*) ;;
*) ac_unrecognized_opts="$ac_unrecognized_opts$ac_unrecognized_sep--disable-$ac_useropt_orig"
ac_unrecognized_sep=', ';;
esac
eval enable_$ac_useropt=no ;;
-docdir | --docdir | --docdi | --doc | --do)
ac_prev=docdir ;;
-docdir=* | --docdir=* | --docdi=* | --doc=* | --do=*)
docdir=$ac_optarg ;;
-dvidir | --dvidir | --dvidi | --dvid | --dvi | --dv)
ac_prev=dvidir ;;
-dvidir=* | --dvidir=* | --dvidi=* | --dvid=* | --dvi=* | --dv=*)
dvidir=$ac_optarg ;;
-enable-* | --enable-*)
ac_useropt=`expr "x$ac_option" : 'x-*enable-\([^=]*\)'`
# Reject names that are not valid shell variable names.
expr "x$ac_useropt" : ".*[^-+._$as_cr_alnum]" >/dev/null &&
as_fn_error $? "invalid feature name: $ac_useropt"
ac_useropt_orig=$ac_useropt
ac_useropt=`$as_echo "$ac_useropt" | sed 's/[-+.]/_/g'`
case $ac_user_opts in
*"
"enable_$ac_useropt"
"*) ;;
*) ac_unrecognized_opts="$ac_unrecognized_opts$ac_unrecognized_sep--enable-$ac_useropt_orig"
ac_unrecognized_sep=', ';;
esac
eval enable_$ac_useropt=\$ac_optarg ;;
-exec-prefix | --exec_prefix | --exec-prefix | --exec-prefi \
| --exec-pref | --exec-pre | --exec-pr | --exec-p | --exec- \
| --exec | --exe | --ex)
ac_prev=exec_prefix ;;
-exec-prefix=* | --exec_prefix=* | --exec-prefix=* | --exec-prefi=* \
| --exec-pref=* | --exec-pre=* | --exec-pr=* | --exec-p=* | --exec-=* \
| --exec=* | --exe=* | --ex=*)
exec_prefix=$ac_optarg ;;
-gas | --gas | --ga | --g)
# Obsolete; use --with-gas.
with_gas=yes ;;
-help | --help | --hel | --he | -h)
ac_init_help=long ;;
-help=r* | --help=r* | --hel=r* | --he=r* | -hr*)
ac_init_help=recursive ;;
-help=s* | --help=s* | --hel=s* | --he=s* | -hs*)
ac_init_help=short ;;
-host | --host | --hos | --ho)
ac_prev=host_alias ;;
-host=* | --host=* | --hos=* | --ho=*)
host_alias=$ac_optarg ;;
-htmldir | --htmldir | --htmldi | --htmld | --html | --htm | --ht)
ac_prev=htmldir ;;
-htmldir=* | --htmldir=* | --htmldi=* | --htmld=* | --html=* | --htm=* \
| --ht=*)
htmldir=$ac_optarg ;;
-includedir | --includedir | --includedi | --included | --include \
| --includ | --inclu | --incl | --inc)
ac_prev=includedir ;;
-includedir=* | --includedir=* | --includedi=* | --included=* | --include=* \
| --includ=* | --inclu=* | --incl=* | --inc=*)
includedir=$ac_optarg ;;
-infodir | --infodir | --infodi | --infod | --info | --inf)
ac_prev=infodir ;;
-infodir=* | --infodir=* | --infodi=* | --infod=* | --info=* | --inf=*)
infodir=$ac_optarg ;;
-libdir | --libdir | --libdi | --libd)
ac_prev=libdir ;;
-libdir=* | --libdir=* | --libdi=* | --libd=*)
libdir=$ac_optarg ;;
-libexecdir | --libexecdir | --libexecdi | --libexecd | --libexec \
| --libexe | --libex | --libe)
ac_prev=libexecdir ;;
-libexecdir=* | --libexecdir=* | --libexecdi=* | --libexecd=* | --libexec=* \
| --libexe=* | --libex=* | --libe=*)
libexecdir=$ac_optarg ;;
-localedir | --localedir | --localedi | --localed | --locale)
ac_prev=localedir ;;
-localedir=* | --localedir=* | --localedi=* | --localed=* | --locale=*)
localedir=$ac_optarg ;;
-localstatedir | --localstatedir | --localstatedi | --localstated \
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ac_prev=localstatedir ;;
-localstatedir=* | --localstatedir=* | --localstatedi=* | --localstated=* \
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localstatedir=$ac_optarg ;;
-mandir | --mandir | --mandi | --mand | --man | --ma | --m)
ac_prev=mandir ;;
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mandir=$ac_optarg ;;
-nfp | --nfp | --nf)
# Obsolete; use --without-fp.
with_fp=no ;;
-no-create | --no-create | --no-creat | --no-crea | --no-cre \
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no_create=yes ;;
-no-recursion | --no-recursion | --no-recursio | --no-recursi \
| --no-recurs | --no-recur | --no-recu | --no-rec | --no-re | --no-r)
no_recursion=yes ;;
-oldincludedir | --oldincludedir | --oldincludedi | --oldincluded \
| --oldinclude | --oldinclud | --oldinclu | --oldincl | --oldinc \
| --oldin | --oldi | --old | --ol | --o)
ac_prev=oldincludedir ;;
-oldincludedir=* | --oldincludedir=* | --oldincludedi=* | --oldincluded=* \
| --oldinclude=* | --oldinclud=* | --oldinclu=* | --oldincl=* | --oldinc=* \
| --oldin=* | --oldi=* | --old=* | --ol=* | --o=*)
oldincludedir=$ac_optarg ;;
-prefix | --prefix | --prefi | --pref | --pre | --pr | --p)
ac_prev=prefix ;;
-prefix=* | --prefix=* | --prefi=* | --pref=* | --pre=* | --pr=* | --p=*)
prefix=$ac_optarg ;;
-program-prefix | --program-prefix | --program-prefi | --program-pref \
| --program-pre | --program-pr | --program-p)
ac_prev=program_prefix ;;
-program-prefix=* | --program-prefix=* | --program-prefi=* \
| --program-pref=* | --program-pre=* | --program-pr=* | --program-p=*)
program_prefix=$ac_optarg ;;
-program-suffix | --program-suffix | --program-suffi | --program-suff \
| --program-suf | --program-su | --program-s)
ac_prev=program_suffix ;;
-program-suffix=* | --program-suffix=* | --program-suffi=* \
| --program-suff=* | --program-suf=* | --program-su=* | --program-s=*)
program_suffix=$ac_optarg ;;
-program-transform-name | --program-transform-name \
| --program-transform-nam | --program-transform-na \
| --program-transform-n | --program-transform- \
| --program-transform | --program-transfor \
| --program-transfo | --program-transf \
| --program-trans | --program-tran \
| --progr-tra | --program-tr | --program-t)
ac_prev=program_transform_name ;;
-program-transform-name=* | --program-transform-name=* \
| --program-transform-nam=* | --program-transform-na=* \
| --program-transform-n=* | --program-transform-=* \
| --program-transform=* | --program-transfor=* \
| --program-transfo=* | --program-transf=* \
| --program-trans=* | --program-tran=* \
| --progr-tra=* | --program-tr=* | --program-t=*)
program_transform_name=$ac_optarg ;;
-pdfdir | --pdfdir | --pdfdi | --pdfd | --pdf | --pd)
ac_prev=pdfdir ;;
-pdfdir=* | --pdfdir=* | --pdfdi=* | --pdfd=* | --pdf=* | --pd=*)
pdfdir=$ac_optarg ;;
-psdir | --psdir | --psdi | --psd | --ps)
ac_prev=psdir ;;
-psdir=* | --psdir=* | --psdi=* | --psd=* | --ps=*)
psdir=$ac_optarg ;;
-q | -quiet | --quiet | --quie | --qui | --qu | --q \
| -silent | --silent | --silen | --sile | --sil)
silent=yes ;;
-sbindir | --sbindir | --sbindi | --sbind | --sbin | --sbi | --sb)
ac_prev=sbindir ;;
-sbindir=* | --sbindir=* | --sbindi=* | --sbind=* | --sbin=* \
| --sbi=* | --sb=*)
sbindir=$ac_optarg ;;
-sharedstatedir | --sharedstatedir | --sharedstatedi \
| --sharedstated | --sharedstate | --sharedstat | --sharedsta \
| --sharedst | --shareds | --shared | --share | --shar \
| --sha | --sh)
ac_prev=sharedstatedir ;;
-sharedstatedir=* | --sharedstatedir=* | --sharedstatedi=* \
| --sharedstated=* | --sharedstate=* | --sharedstat=* | --sharedsta=* \
| --sharedst=* | --shareds=* | --shared=* | --share=* | --shar=* \
| --sha=* | --sh=*)
sharedstatedir=$ac_optarg ;;
-site | --site | --sit)
ac_prev=site ;;
-site=* | --site=* | --sit=*)
site=$ac_optarg ;;
-srcdir | --srcdir | --srcdi | --srcd | --src | --sr)
ac_prev=srcdir ;;
-srcdir=* | --srcdir=* | --srcdi=* | --srcd=* | --src=* | --sr=*)
srcdir=$ac_optarg ;;
-sysconfdir | --sysconfdir | --sysconfdi | --sysconfd | --sysconf \
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ac_prev=sysconfdir ;;
-sysconfdir=* | --sysconfdir=* | --sysconfdi=* | --sysconfd=* | --sysconf=* \
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sysconfdir=$ac_optarg ;;
-target | --target | --targe | --targ | --tar | --ta | --t)
ac_prev=target_alias ;;
-target=* | --target=* | --targe=* | --targ=* | --tar=* | --ta=* | --t=*)
target_alias=$ac_optarg ;;
-v | -verbose | --verbose | --verbos | --verbo | --verb)
verbose=yes ;;
-version | --version | --versio | --versi | --vers | -V)
ac_init_version=: ;;
-with-* | --with-*)
ac_useropt=`expr "x$ac_option" : 'x-*with-\([^=]*\)'`
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ac_useropt_orig=$ac_useropt
ac_useropt=`$as_echo "$ac_useropt" | sed 's/[-+.]/_/g'`
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"with_$ac_useropt"
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*) ac_unrecognized_opts="$ac_unrecognized_opts$ac_unrecognized_sep--with-$ac_useropt_orig"
ac_unrecognized_sep=', ';;
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eval with_$ac_useropt=\$ac_optarg ;;
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ac_useropt=`expr "x$ac_option" : 'x-*without-\(.*\)'`
# Reject names that are not valid shell variable names.
expr "x$ac_useropt" : ".*[^-+._$as_cr_alnum]" >/dev/null &&
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ac_useropt_orig=$ac_useropt
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eval with_$ac_useropt=no ;;
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# Obsolete; use --with-x.
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ac_prev=x_includes ;;
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x_includes=$ac_optarg ;;
-x-libraries | --x-libraries | --x-librarie | --x-librari \
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ac_prev=x_libraries ;;
-x-libraries=* | --x-libraries=* | --x-librarie=* | --x-librari=* \
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x_libraries=$ac_optarg ;;
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eval $ac_envvar=\$ac_optarg
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*)
# FIXME: should be removed in autoconf 3.0.
$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: you should use --build, --host, --target" >&2
expr "x$ac_option" : ".*[^-._$as_cr_alnum]" >/dev/null &&
$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: invalid host type: $ac_option" >&2
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as_fn_error $? "missing argument to $ac_option"
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fi
# Check all directory arguments for consistency.
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datadir sysconfdir sharedstatedir localstatedir includedir \
oldincludedir docdir infodir htmldir dvidir pdfdir psdir \
libdir localedir mandir
do
eval ac_val=\$$ac_var
# Remove trailing slashes.
case $ac_val in
*/ )
ac_val=`expr "X$ac_val" : 'X\(.*[^/]\)' \| "X$ac_val" : 'X\(.*\)'`
eval $ac_var=\$ac_val;;
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as_fn_error $? "expected an absolute directory name for --$ac_var: $ac_val"
done
# There might be people who depend on the old broken behavior: `$host'
# used to hold the argument of --host etc.
# FIXME: To remove some day.
build=$build_alias
host=$host_alias
target=$target_alias
# FIXME: To remove some day.
if test "x$host_alias" != x; then
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fi
fi
ac_tool_prefix=
test -n "$host_alias" && ac_tool_prefix=$host_alias-
test "$silent" = yes && exec 6>/dev/null
ac_pwd=`pwd` && test -n "$ac_pwd" &&
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ac_pwd_ls_di=`cd "$ac_pwd" && ls -di .` ||
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test "X$ac_ls_di" = "X$ac_pwd_ls_di" ||
as_fn_error $? "pwd does not report name of working directory"
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if test -z "$srcdir"; then
ac_srcdir_defaulted=yes
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ac_confdir=`$as_dirname -- "$as_myself" ||
$as_expr X"$as_myself" : 'X\(.*[^/]\)//*[^/][^/]*/*$' \| \
X"$as_myself" : 'X\(//\)[^/]' \| \
X"$as_myself" : 'X\(//\)$' \| \
X"$as_myself" : 'X\(/\)' \| . 2>/dev/null ||
$as_echo X"$as_myself" |
sed '/^X\(.*[^/]\)\/\/*[^/][^/]*\/*$/{
s//\1/
q
}
/^X\(\/\/\)[^/].*/{
s//\1/
q
}
/^X\(\/\/\)$/{
s//\1/
q
}
/^X\(\/\).*/{
s//\1/
q
}
s/.*/./; q'`
srcdir=$ac_confdir
if test ! -r "$srcdir/$ac_unique_file"; then
srcdir=..
fi
else
ac_srcdir_defaulted=no
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if test ! -r "$srcdir/$ac_unique_file"; then
test "$ac_srcdir_defaulted" = yes && srcdir="$ac_confdir or .."
as_fn_error $? "cannot find sources ($ac_unique_file) in $srcdir"
fi
ac_msg="sources are in $srcdir, but \`cd $srcdir' does not work"
ac_abs_confdir=`(
cd "$srcdir" && test -r "./$ac_unique_file" || as_fn_error $? "$ac_msg"
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if test "$ac_abs_confdir" = "$ac_pwd"; then
srcdir=.
fi
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# Double slashes in file names in object file debugging info
# mess up M-x gdb in Emacs.
case $srcdir in
*/) srcdir=`expr "X$srcdir" : 'X\(.*[^/]\)' \| "X$srcdir" : 'X\(.*\)'`;;
esac
for ac_var in $ac_precious_vars; do
eval ac_env_${ac_var}_set=\${${ac_var}+set}
eval ac_env_${ac_var}_value=\$${ac_var}
eval ac_cv_env_${ac_var}_set=\${${ac_var}+set}
eval ac_cv_env_${ac_var}_value=\$${ac_var}
done
#
# Report the --help message.
#
if test "$ac_init_help" = "long"; then
# Omit some internal or obsolete options to make the list less imposing.
# This message is too long to be a string in the A/UX 3.1 sh.
cat <<_ACEOF
\`configure' configures OpenSSH Portable to adapt to many kinds of systems.
Usage: $0 [OPTION]... [VAR=VALUE]...
To assign environment variables (e.g., CC, CFLAGS...), specify them as
VAR=VALUE. See below for descriptions of some of the useful variables.
Defaults for the options are specified in brackets.
Configuration:
-h, --help display this help and exit
--help=short display options specific to this package
--help=recursive display the short help of all the included packages
-V, --version display version information and exit
-q, --quiet, --silent do not print \`checking ...' messages
--cache-file=FILE cache test results in FILE [disabled]
-C, --config-cache alias for \`--cache-file=config.cache'
-n, --no-create do not create output files
--srcdir=DIR find the sources in DIR [configure dir or \`..']
Installation directories:
--prefix=PREFIX install architecture-independent files in PREFIX
[$ac_default_prefix]
--exec-prefix=EPREFIX install architecture-dependent files in EPREFIX
[PREFIX]
By default, \`make install' will install all the files in
\`$ac_default_prefix/bin', \`$ac_default_prefix/lib' etc. You can specify
an installation prefix other than \`$ac_default_prefix' using \`--prefix',
for instance \`--prefix=\$HOME'.
For better control, use the options below.
Fine tuning of the installation directories:
--bindir=DIR user executables [EPREFIX/bin]
--sbindir=DIR system admin executables [EPREFIX/sbin]
--libexecdir=DIR program executables [EPREFIX/libexec]
--sysconfdir=DIR read-only single-machine data [PREFIX/etc]
--sharedstatedir=DIR modifiable architecture-independent data [PREFIX/com]
--localstatedir=DIR modifiable single-machine data [PREFIX/var]
--libdir=DIR object code libraries [EPREFIX/lib]
--includedir=DIR C header files [PREFIX/include]
--oldincludedir=DIR C header files for non-gcc [/usr/include]
--datarootdir=DIR read-only arch.-independent data root [PREFIX/share]
--datadir=DIR read-only architecture-independent data [DATAROOTDIR]
--infodir=DIR info documentation [DATAROOTDIR/info]
--localedir=DIR locale-dependent data [DATAROOTDIR/locale]
--mandir=DIR man documentation [DATAROOTDIR/man]
--docdir=DIR documentation root [DATAROOTDIR/doc/openssh]
--htmldir=DIR html documentation [DOCDIR]
--dvidir=DIR dvi documentation [DOCDIR]
--pdfdir=DIR pdf documentation [DOCDIR]
--psdir=DIR ps documentation [DOCDIR]
_ACEOF
cat <<\_ACEOF
System types:
--build=BUILD configure for building on BUILD [guessed]
--host=HOST cross-compile to build programs to run on HOST [BUILD]
_ACEOF
fi
if test -n "$ac_init_help"; then
case $ac_init_help in
short | recursive ) echo "Configuration of OpenSSH Portable:";;
esac
cat <<\_ACEOF
Optional Features:
--disable-option-checking ignore unrecognized --enable/--with options
--disable-FEATURE do not include FEATURE (same as --enable-FEATURE=no)
--enable-FEATURE[=ARG] include FEATURE [ARG=yes]
--disable-largefile omit support for large files
--disable-pkcs11 disable PKCS#11 support code [no]
+ --disable-security-key disable U2F/FIDO support code no
--disable-strip Disable calling strip(1) on install
--disable-etc-default-login Disable using PATH from /etc/default/login no
--disable-lastlog disable use of lastlog even if detected no
--disable-utmp disable use of utmp even if detected no
--disable-utmpx disable use of utmpx even if detected no
--disable-wtmp disable use of wtmp even if detected no
--disable-wtmpx disable use of wtmpx even if detected no
--disable-libutil disable use of libutil (login() etc.) no
--disable-pututline disable use of pututline() etc. (uwtmp) no
--disable-pututxline disable use of pututxline() etc. (uwtmpx) no
Optional Packages:
--with-PACKAGE[=ARG] use PACKAGE [ARG=yes]
--without-PACKAGE do not use PACKAGE (same as --with-PACKAGE=no)
--without-openssl Disable use of OpenSSL; use only limited internal crypto **EXPERIMENTAL**
--without-stackprotect Don't use compiler's stack protection
--without-hardening Don't use toolchain hardening flags
--without-rpath Disable auto-added -R linker paths
--with-cflags Specify additional flags to pass to compiler
--with-cflags-after Specify additional flags to pass to compiler after configure
--with-cppflags Specify additional flags to pass to preprocessor
--with-ldflags Specify additional flags to pass to linker
--with-ldflags-after Specify additional flags to pass to linker after configure
--with-libs Specify additional libraries to link with
--with-Werror Build main code with -Werror
--with-solaris-contracts Enable Solaris process contracts (experimental)
--with-solaris-projects Enable Solaris projects (experimental)
--with-solaris-privs Enable Solaris/Illumos privileges (experimental)
--with-osfsia Enable Digital Unix SIA
--with-zlib=PATH Use zlib in PATH
--without-zlib-version-check Disable zlib version check
--with-ldns[=PATH] Use ldns for DNSSEC support (optionally in PATH)
--with-libedit[=PATH] Enable libedit support for sftp
--with-audit=module Enable audit support (modules=debug,bsm,linux)
--with-pie Build Position Independent Executables if possible
+ --with-security-key-builtin include builtin U2F/FIDO support
--with-ssl-dir=PATH Specify path to OpenSSL installation
--without-openssl-header-check Disable OpenSSL version consistency check
--with-ssl-engine Enable OpenSSL (hardware) ENGINE support
--with-prngd-port=PORT read entropy from PRNGD/EGD TCP localhost:PORT
--with-prngd-socket=FILE read entropy from PRNGD/EGD socket FILE (default=/var/run/egd-pool)
--with-pam Enable PAM support
--with-pam-service=name Specify PAM service name
--with-privsep-user=user Specify non-privileged user for privilege separation
--with-sandbox=style Specify privilege separation sandbox (no, capsicum, darwin, rlimit, seccomp_filter, systrace, pledge)
--with-selinux Enable SELinux support
--with-kerberos5=PATH Enable Kerberos 5 support
--with-privsep-path=xxx Path for privilege separation chroot (default=/var/empty)
--with-xauth=PATH Specify path to xauth program
--with-maildir=/path/to/mail Specify your system mail directory
--with-mantype=man|cat|doc Set man page type
--with-md5-passwords Enable use of MD5 passwords
--without-shadow Disable shadow password support
--with-ipaddr-display Use ip address instead of hostname in $DISPLAY
--with-default-path= Specify default $PATH environment for server
--with-superuser-path= Specify different path for super-user
--with-4in6 Check for and convert IPv4 in IPv6 mapped addresses
--with-bsd-auth Enable BSD auth support
--with-pid-dir=PATH Specify location of sshd.pid file
--with-lastlog=FILE|DIR specify lastlog location common locations
Some influential environment variables:
CC C compiler command
CFLAGS C compiler flags
LDFLAGS linker flags, e.g. -L<lib dir> if you have libraries in a
nonstandard directory <lib dir>
LIBS libraries to pass to the linker, e.g. -l<library>
CPPFLAGS (Objective) C/C++ preprocessor flags, e.g. -I<include dir> if
you have headers in a nonstandard directory <include dir>
CPP C preprocessor
Use these variables to override the choices made by `configure' or to help
it to find libraries and programs with nonstandard names/locations.
Report bugs to <openssh-unix-dev@mindrot.org>.
_ACEOF
ac_status=$?
fi
if test "$ac_init_help" = "recursive"; then
# If there are subdirs, report their specific --help.
for ac_dir in : $ac_subdirs_all; do test "x$ac_dir" = x: && continue
test -d "$ac_dir" ||
{ cd "$srcdir" && ac_pwd=`pwd` && srcdir=. && test -d "$ac_dir"; } ||
continue
ac_builddir=.
case "$ac_dir" in
.) ac_dir_suffix= ac_top_builddir_sub=. ac_top_build_prefix= ;;
*)
ac_dir_suffix=/`$as_echo "$ac_dir" | sed 's|^\.[\\/]||'`
# A ".." for each directory in $ac_dir_suffix.
ac_top_builddir_sub=`$as_echo "$ac_dir_suffix" | sed 's|/[^\\/]*|/..|g;s|/||'`
case $ac_top_builddir_sub in
"") ac_top_builddir_sub=. ac_top_build_prefix= ;;
*) ac_top_build_prefix=$ac_top_builddir_sub/ ;;
esac ;;
esac
ac_abs_top_builddir=$ac_pwd
ac_abs_builddir=$ac_pwd$ac_dir_suffix
# for backward compatibility:
ac_top_builddir=$ac_top_build_prefix
case $srcdir in
.) # We are building in place.
ac_srcdir=.
ac_top_srcdir=$ac_top_builddir_sub
ac_abs_top_srcdir=$ac_pwd ;;
[\\/]* | ?:[\\/]* ) # Absolute name.
ac_srcdir=$srcdir$ac_dir_suffix;
ac_top_srcdir=$srcdir
ac_abs_top_srcdir=$srcdir ;;
*) # Relative name.
ac_srcdir=$ac_top_build_prefix$srcdir$ac_dir_suffix
ac_top_srcdir=$ac_top_build_prefix$srcdir
ac_abs_top_srcdir=$ac_pwd/$srcdir ;;
esac
ac_abs_srcdir=$ac_abs_top_srcdir$ac_dir_suffix
cd "$ac_dir" || { ac_status=$?; continue; }
# Check for guested configure.
if test -f "$ac_srcdir/configure.gnu"; then
echo &&
$SHELL "$ac_srcdir/configure.gnu" --help=recursive
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echo &&
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$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: no configuration information is in $ac_dir" >&2
fi || ac_status=$?
cd "$ac_pwd" || { ac_status=$?; break; }
done
fi
test -n "$ac_init_help" && exit $ac_status
if $ac_init_version; then
cat <<\_ACEOF
OpenSSH configure Portable
generated by GNU Autoconf 2.69
Copyright (C) 2012 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
This configure script is free software; the Free Software Foundation
gives unlimited permission to copy, distribute and modify it.
_ACEOF
exit
fi
## ------------------------ ##
## Autoconf initialization. ##
## ------------------------ ##
# ac_fn_c_try_compile LINENO
# --------------------------
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ac_fn_c_try_compile ()
{
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rm -f conftest.$ac_objext
if { { ac_try="$ac_compile"
case "(($ac_try" in
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*) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
esac
eval ac_try_echo="\"\$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: $ac_try_echo\""
$as_echo "$ac_try_echo"; } >&5
(eval "$ac_compile") 2>conftest.err
ac_status=$?
if test -s conftest.err; then
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cat conftest.er1 >&5
mv -f conftest.er1 conftest.err
fi
$as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
test $ac_status = 0; } && {
test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
test ! -s conftest.err
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ac_retval=0
else
$as_echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
ac_retval=1
fi
eval $as_lineno_stack; ${as_lineno_stack:+:} unset as_lineno
as_fn_set_status $ac_retval
} # ac_fn_c_try_compile
# ac_fn_c_try_run LINENO
# ----------------------
# Try to link conftest.$ac_ext, and return whether this succeeded. Assumes
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ac_fn_c_try_run ()
{
as_lineno=${as_lineno-"$1"} as_lineno_stack=as_lineno_stack=$as_lineno_stack
if { { ac_try="$ac_link"
case "(($ac_try" in
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*) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
esac
eval ac_try_echo="\"\$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: $ac_try_echo\""
$as_echo "$ac_try_echo"; } >&5
(eval "$ac_link") 2>&5
ac_status=$?
$as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
test $ac_status = 0; } && { ac_try='./conftest$ac_exeext'
{ { case "(($ac_try" in
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*) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
esac
eval ac_try_echo="\"\$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: $ac_try_echo\""
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(eval "$ac_try") 2>&5
ac_status=$?
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ac_retval=$ac_status
fi
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eval $as_lineno_stack; ${as_lineno_stack:+:} unset as_lineno
as_fn_set_status $ac_retval
} # ac_fn_c_try_run
# ac_fn_c_try_cpp LINENO
# ----------------------
# Try to preprocess conftest.$ac_ext, and return whether this succeeded.
ac_fn_c_try_cpp ()
{
as_lineno=${as_lineno-"$1"} as_lineno_stack=as_lineno_stack=$as_lineno_stack
if { { ac_try="$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext"
case "(($ac_try" in
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*) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
esac
eval ac_try_echo="\"\$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: $ac_try_echo\""
$as_echo "$ac_try_echo"; } >&5
(eval "$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext") 2>conftest.err
ac_status=$?
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cat conftest.er1 >&5
mv -f conftest.er1 conftest.err
fi
$as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
test $ac_status = 0; } > conftest.i && {
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test ! -s conftest.err
}; then :
ac_retval=0
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$as_echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
ac_retval=1
fi
eval $as_lineno_stack; ${as_lineno_stack:+:} unset as_lineno
as_fn_set_status $ac_retval
} # ac_fn_c_try_cpp
# ac_fn_c_check_header_compile LINENO HEADER VAR INCLUDES
# -------------------------------------------------------
# Tests whether HEADER exists and can be compiled using the include files in
# INCLUDES, setting the cache variable VAR accordingly.
ac_fn_c_check_header_compile ()
{
as_lineno=${as_lineno-"$1"} as_lineno_stack=as_lineno_stack=$as_lineno_stack
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $2" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for $2... " >&6; }
if eval \${$3+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
$4
#include <$2>
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
eval "$3=yes"
else
eval "$3=no"
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
fi
eval ac_res=\$$3
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_res" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_res" >&6; }
eval $as_lineno_stack; ${as_lineno_stack:+:} unset as_lineno
} # ac_fn_c_check_header_compile
# ac_fn_c_check_decl LINENO SYMBOL VAR INCLUDES
# ---------------------------------------------
# Tests whether SYMBOL is declared in INCLUDES, setting cache variable VAR
# accordingly.
ac_fn_c_check_decl ()
{
as_lineno=${as_lineno-"$1"} as_lineno_stack=as_lineno_stack=$as_lineno_stack
as_decl_name=`echo $2|sed 's/ *(.*//'`
as_decl_use=`echo $2|sed -e 's/(/((/' -e 's/)/) 0&/' -e 's/,/) 0& (/g'`
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking whether $as_decl_name is declared" >&5
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if eval \${$3+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
$4
int
main ()
{
#ifndef $as_decl_name
#ifdef __cplusplus
(void) $as_decl_use;
#else
(void) $as_decl_name;
#endif
#endif
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
eval "$3=yes"
else
eval "$3=no"
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
fi
eval ac_res=\$$3
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_res" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_res" >&6; }
eval $as_lineno_stack; ${as_lineno_stack:+:} unset as_lineno
} # ac_fn_c_check_decl
# ac_fn_c_try_link LINENO
# -----------------------
# Try to link conftest.$ac_ext, and return whether this succeeded.
ac_fn_c_try_link ()
{
as_lineno=${as_lineno-"$1"} as_lineno_stack=as_lineno_stack=$as_lineno_stack
rm -f conftest.$ac_objext conftest$ac_exeext
if { { ac_try="$ac_link"
case "(($ac_try" in
*\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
*) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
esac
eval ac_try_echo="\"\$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: $ac_try_echo\""
$as_echo "$ac_try_echo"; } >&5
(eval "$ac_link") 2>conftest.err
ac_status=$?
if test -s conftest.err; then
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mv -f conftest.er1 conftest.err
fi
$as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
test $ac_status = 0; } && {
test -z "$ac_c_werror_flag" ||
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test -x conftest$ac_exeext
}; then :
ac_retval=0
else
$as_echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
ac_retval=1
fi
# Delete the IPA/IPO (Inter Procedural Analysis/Optimization) information
# created by the PGI compiler (conftest_ipa8_conftest.oo), as it would
# interfere with the next link command; also delete a directory that is
# left behind by Apple's compiler. We do this before executing the actions.
rm -rf conftest.dSYM conftest_ipa8_conftest.oo
eval $as_lineno_stack; ${as_lineno_stack:+:} unset as_lineno
as_fn_set_status $ac_retval
} # ac_fn_c_try_link
# ac_fn_c_check_header_mongrel LINENO HEADER VAR INCLUDES
# -------------------------------------------------------
# Tests whether HEADER exists, giving a warning if it cannot be compiled using
# the include files in INCLUDES and setting the cache variable VAR
# accordingly.
ac_fn_c_check_header_mongrel ()
{
as_lineno=${as_lineno-"$1"} as_lineno_stack=as_lineno_stack=$as_lineno_stack
if eval \${$3+:} false; then :
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $2" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for $2... " >&6; }
if eval \${$3+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
fi
eval ac_res=\$$3
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_res" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_res" >&6; }
else
# Is the header compilable?
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking $2 usability" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking $2 usability... " >&6; }
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
$4
#include <$2>
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
ac_header_compiler=yes
else
ac_header_compiler=no
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_header_compiler" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_header_compiler" >&6; }
# Is the header present?
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking $2 presence" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking $2 presence... " >&6; }
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <$2>
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_cpp "$LINENO"; then :
ac_header_preproc=yes
else
ac_header_preproc=no
fi
rm -f conftest.err conftest.i conftest.$ac_ext
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_header_preproc" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_header_preproc" >&6; }
# So? What about this header?
case $ac_header_compiler:$ac_header_preproc:$ac_c_preproc_warn_flag in #((
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{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: $2: accepted by the compiler, rejected by the preprocessor!" >&5
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{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: $2: proceeding with the compiler's result" >&5
$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: $2: proceeding with the compiler's result" >&2;}
;;
no:yes:* )
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: $2: present but cannot be compiled" >&5
$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: $2: present but cannot be compiled" >&2;}
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: $2: check for missing prerequisite headers?" >&5
$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: $2: check for missing prerequisite headers?" >&2;}
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: $2: see the Autoconf documentation" >&5
$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: $2: see the Autoconf documentation" >&2;}
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: $2: section \"Present But Cannot Be Compiled\"" >&5
$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: $2: section \"Present But Cannot Be Compiled\"" >&2;}
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: $2: proceeding with the compiler's result" >&5
$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: $2: proceeding with the compiler's result" >&2;}
( $as_echo "## ------------------------------------------- ##
## Report this to openssh-unix-dev@mindrot.org ##
## ------------------------------------------- ##"
) | sed "s/^/$as_me: WARNING: /" >&2
;;
esac
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $2" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for $2... " >&6; }
if eval \${$3+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
eval "$3=\$ac_header_compiler"
fi
eval ac_res=\$$3
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_res" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_res" >&6; }
fi
eval $as_lineno_stack; ${as_lineno_stack:+:} unset as_lineno
} # ac_fn_c_check_header_mongrel
# ac_fn_c_check_func LINENO FUNC VAR
# ----------------------------------
# Tests whether FUNC exists, setting the cache variable VAR accordingly
ac_fn_c_check_func ()
{
as_lineno=${as_lineno-"$1"} as_lineno_stack=as_lineno_stack=$as_lineno_stack
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $2" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for $2... " >&6; }
if eval \${$3+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
/* Define $2 to an innocuous variant, in case <limits.h> declares $2.
For example, HP-UX 11i <limits.h> declares gettimeofday. */
#define $2 innocuous_$2
/* System header to define __stub macros and hopefully few prototypes,
which can conflict with char $2 (); below.
Prefer <limits.h> to <assert.h> if __STDC__ is defined, since
<limits.h> exists even on freestanding compilers. */
#ifdef __STDC__
# include <limits.h>
#else
# include <assert.h>
#endif
#undef $2
/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C"
#endif
char $2 ();
/* The GNU C library defines this for functions which it implements
to always fail with ENOSYS. Some functions are actually named
something starting with __ and the normal name is an alias. */
#if defined __stub_$2 || defined __stub___$2
choke me
#endif
int
main ()
{
return $2 ();
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
eval "$3=yes"
else
eval "$3=no"
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
fi
eval ac_res=\$$3
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_res" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_res" >&6; }
eval $as_lineno_stack; ${as_lineno_stack:+:} unset as_lineno
} # ac_fn_c_check_func
# ac_fn_c_check_type LINENO TYPE VAR INCLUDES
# -------------------------------------------
# Tests whether TYPE exists after having included INCLUDES, setting cache
# variable VAR accordingly.
ac_fn_c_check_type ()
{
as_lineno=${as_lineno-"$1"} as_lineno_stack=as_lineno_stack=$as_lineno_stack
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $2" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for $2... " >&6; }
if eval \${$3+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
eval "$3=no"
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
$4
int
main ()
{
if (sizeof ($2))
return 0;
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
$4
int
main ()
{
if (sizeof (($2)))
return 0;
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
else
eval "$3=yes"
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
fi
eval ac_res=\$$3
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_res" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_res" >&6; }
eval $as_lineno_stack; ${as_lineno_stack:+:} unset as_lineno
} # ac_fn_c_check_type
# ac_fn_c_compute_int LINENO EXPR VAR INCLUDES
# --------------------------------------------
# Tries to find the compile-time value of EXPR in a program that includes
# INCLUDES, setting VAR accordingly. Returns whether the value could be
# computed
ac_fn_c_compute_int ()
{
as_lineno=${as_lineno-"$1"} as_lineno_stack=as_lineno_stack=$as_lineno_stack
if test "$cross_compiling" = yes; then
# Depending upon the size, compute the lo and hi bounds.
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
$4
int
main ()
{
static int test_array [1 - 2 * !(($2) >= 0)];
test_array [0] = 0;
return test_array [0];
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
ac_lo=0 ac_mid=0
while :; do
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
$4
int
main ()
{
static int test_array [1 - 2 * !(($2) <= $ac_mid)];
test_array [0] = 0;
return test_array [0];
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
ac_hi=$ac_mid; break
else
as_fn_arith $ac_mid + 1 && ac_lo=$as_val
if test $ac_lo -le $ac_mid; then
ac_lo= ac_hi=
break
fi
as_fn_arith 2 '*' $ac_mid + 1 && ac_mid=$as_val
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
done
else
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
$4
int
main ()
{
static int test_array [1 - 2 * !(($2) < 0)];
test_array [0] = 0;
return test_array [0];
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
ac_hi=-1 ac_mid=-1
while :; do
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
$4
int
main ()
{
static int test_array [1 - 2 * !(($2) >= $ac_mid)];
test_array [0] = 0;
return test_array [0];
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
ac_lo=$ac_mid; break
else
as_fn_arith '(' $ac_mid ')' - 1 && ac_hi=$as_val
if test $ac_mid -le $ac_hi; then
ac_lo= ac_hi=
break
fi
as_fn_arith 2 '*' $ac_mid && ac_mid=$as_val
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
done
else
ac_lo= ac_hi=
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
# Binary search between lo and hi bounds.
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as_fn_arith '(' $ac_hi - $ac_lo ')' / 2 + $ac_lo && ac_mid=$as_val
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
$4
int
main ()
{
static int test_array [1 - 2 * !(($2) <= $ac_mid)];
test_array [0] = 0;
return test_array [0];
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
ac_hi=$ac_mid
else
as_fn_arith '(' $ac_mid ')' + 1 && ac_lo=$as_val
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
done
case $ac_lo in #((
?*) eval "$3=\$ac_lo"; ac_retval=0 ;;
'') ac_retval=1 ;;
esac
else
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
$4
static long int longval () { return $2; }
static unsigned long int ulongval () { return $2; }
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
int
main ()
{
FILE *f = fopen ("conftest.val", "w");
if (! f)
return 1;
if (($2) < 0)
{
long int i = longval ();
if (i != ($2))
return 1;
fprintf (f, "%ld", i);
}
else
{
unsigned long int i = ulongval ();
if (i != ($2))
return 1;
fprintf (f, "%lu", i);
}
/* Do not output a trailing newline, as this causes \r\n confusion
on some platforms. */
return ferror (f) || fclose (f) != 0;
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_run "$LINENO"; then :
echo >>conftest.val; read $3 <conftest.val; ac_retval=0
else
ac_retval=1
fi
rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* gmon.out bb.out conftest$ac_exeext \
conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
rm -f conftest.val
fi
eval $as_lineno_stack; ${as_lineno_stack:+:} unset as_lineno
as_fn_set_status $ac_retval
} # ac_fn_c_compute_int
# ac_fn_c_check_member LINENO AGGR MEMBER VAR INCLUDES
# ----------------------------------------------------
# Tries to find if the field MEMBER exists in type AGGR, after including
# INCLUDES, setting cache variable VAR accordingly.
ac_fn_c_check_member ()
{
as_lineno=${as_lineno-"$1"} as_lineno_stack=as_lineno_stack=$as_lineno_stack
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $2.$3" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for $2.$3... " >&6; }
if eval \${$4+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
$5
int
main ()
{
static $2 ac_aggr;
if (ac_aggr.$3)
return 0;
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
eval "$4=yes"
else
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
$5
int
main ()
{
static $2 ac_aggr;
if (sizeof ac_aggr.$3)
return 0;
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
eval "$4=yes"
else
eval "$4=no"
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
fi
eval ac_res=\$$4
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_res" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_res" >&6; }
eval $as_lineno_stack; ${as_lineno_stack:+:} unset as_lineno
} # ac_fn_c_check_member
cat >config.log <<_ACEOF
This file contains any messages produced by compilers while
running configure, to aid debugging if configure makes a mistake.
It was created by OpenSSH $as_me Portable, which was
generated by GNU Autoconf 2.69. Invocation command line was
$ $0 $@
_ACEOF
exec 5>>config.log
{
cat <<_ASUNAME
## --------- ##
## Platform. ##
## --------- ##
hostname = `(hostname || uname -n) 2>/dev/null | sed 1q`
uname -m = `(uname -m) 2>/dev/null || echo unknown`
uname -r = `(uname -r) 2>/dev/null || echo unknown`
uname -s = `(uname -s) 2>/dev/null || echo unknown`
uname -v = `(uname -v) 2>/dev/null || echo unknown`
/usr/bin/uname -p = `(/usr/bin/uname -p) 2>/dev/null || echo unknown`
/bin/uname -X = `(/bin/uname -X) 2>/dev/null || echo unknown`
/bin/arch = `(/bin/arch) 2>/dev/null || echo unknown`
/usr/bin/arch -k = `(/usr/bin/arch -k) 2>/dev/null || echo unknown`
/usr/convex/getsysinfo = `(/usr/convex/getsysinfo) 2>/dev/null || echo unknown`
/usr/bin/hostinfo = `(/usr/bin/hostinfo) 2>/dev/null || echo unknown`
/bin/machine = `(/bin/machine) 2>/dev/null || echo unknown`
/usr/bin/oslevel = `(/usr/bin/oslevel) 2>/dev/null || echo unknown`
/bin/universe = `(/bin/universe) 2>/dev/null || echo unknown`
_ASUNAME
as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
for as_dir in $PATH
do
IFS=$as_save_IFS
test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=.
$as_echo "PATH: $as_dir"
done
IFS=$as_save_IFS
} >&5
cat >&5 <<_ACEOF
## ----------- ##
## Core tests. ##
## ----------- ##
_ACEOF
# Keep a trace of the command line.
# Strip out --no-create and --no-recursion so they do not pile up.
# Strip out --silent because we don't want to record it for future runs.
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ac_configure_args=
ac_configure_args0=
ac_configure_args1=
ac_must_keep_next=false
for ac_pass in 1 2
do
for ac_arg
do
case $ac_arg in
-no-create | --no-c* | -n | -no-recursion | --no-r*) continue ;;
-q | -quiet | --quiet | --quie | --qui | --qu | --q \
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continue ;;
*\'*)
ac_arg=`$as_echo "$ac_arg" | sed "s/'/'\\\\\\\\''/g"` ;;
esac
case $ac_pass in
1) as_fn_append ac_configure_args0 " '$ac_arg'" ;;
2)
as_fn_append ac_configure_args1 " '$ac_arg'"
if test $ac_must_keep_next = true; then
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case $ac_arg in
*=* | --config-cache | -C | -disable-* | --disable-* \
| -enable-* | --enable-* | -gas | --g* | -nfp | --nf* \
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case "$ac_configure_args0 " in
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;;
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as_fn_append ac_configure_args " '$ac_arg'"
;;
esac
done
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{ ac_configure_args0=; unset ac_configure_args0;}
{ ac_configure_args1=; unset ac_configure_args1;}
# When interrupted or exit'd, cleanup temporary files, and complete
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trap 'exit_status=$?
# Save into config.log some information that might help in debugging.
{
echo
$as_echo "## ---------------- ##
## Cache variables. ##
## ---------------- ##"
echo
# The following way of writing the cache mishandles newlines in values,
(
for ac_var in `(set) 2>&1 | sed -n '\''s/^\([a-zA-Z_][a-zA-Z0-9_]*\)=.*/\1/p'\''`; do
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case $ac_val in #(
*${as_nl}*)
case $ac_var in #(
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esac
case $ac_var in #(
_ | IFS | as_nl) ;; #(
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esac
done
(set) 2>&1 |
case $as_nl`(ac_space='\'' '\''; set) 2>&1` in #(
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sed -n \
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s/^\\([_$as_cr_alnum]*_cv_[_$as_cr_alnum]*\\)=\\(.*\\)/\\1='\''\\2'\''/p"
;; #(
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sed -n "/^[_$as_cr_alnum]*_cv_[_$as_cr_alnum]*=/p"
;;
esac |
sort
)
echo
$as_echo "## ----------------- ##
## Output variables. ##
## ----------------- ##"
echo
for ac_var in $ac_subst_vars
do
eval ac_val=\$$ac_var
case $ac_val in
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esac
$as_echo "$ac_var='\''$ac_val'\''"
done | sort
echo
if test -n "$ac_subst_files"; then
$as_echo "## ------------------- ##
## File substitutions. ##
## ------------------- ##"
echo
for ac_var in $ac_subst_files
do
eval ac_val=\$$ac_var
case $ac_val in
*\'\''*) ac_val=`$as_echo "$ac_val" | sed "s/'\''/'\''\\\\\\\\'\'''\''/g"`;;
esac
$as_echo "$ac_var='\''$ac_val'\''"
done | sort
echo
fi
if test -s confdefs.h; then
$as_echo "## ----------- ##
## confdefs.h. ##
## ----------- ##"
echo
cat confdefs.h
echo
fi
test "$ac_signal" != 0 &&
$as_echo "$as_me: caught signal $ac_signal"
$as_echo "$as_me: exit $exit_status"
} >&5
rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* &&
rm -f -r conftest* confdefs* conf$$* $ac_clean_files &&
exit $exit_status
' 0
for ac_signal in 1 2 13 15; do
trap 'ac_signal='$ac_signal'; as_fn_exit 1' $ac_signal
done
ac_signal=0
# confdefs.h avoids OS command line length limits that DEFS can exceed.
rm -f -r conftest* confdefs.h
$as_echo "/* confdefs.h */" > confdefs.h
# Predefined preprocessor variables.
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define PACKAGE_NAME "$PACKAGE_NAME"
_ACEOF
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define PACKAGE_TARNAME "$PACKAGE_TARNAME"
_ACEOF
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define PACKAGE_VERSION "$PACKAGE_VERSION"
_ACEOF
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define PACKAGE_STRING "$PACKAGE_STRING"
_ACEOF
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define PACKAGE_BUGREPORT "$PACKAGE_BUGREPORT"
_ACEOF
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define PACKAGE_URL "$PACKAGE_URL"
_ACEOF
# Let the site file select an alternate cache file if it wants to.
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ac_site_file1=NONE
ac_site_file2=NONE
if test -n "$CONFIG_SITE"; then
# We do not want a PATH search for config.site.
case $CONFIG_SITE in #((
-*) ac_site_file1=./$CONFIG_SITE;;
*/*) ac_site_file1=$CONFIG_SITE;;
*) ac_site_file1=./$CONFIG_SITE;;
esac
elif test "x$prefix" != xNONE; then
ac_site_file1=$prefix/share/config.site
ac_site_file2=$prefix/etc/config.site
else
ac_site_file1=$ac_default_prefix/share/config.site
ac_site_file2=$ac_default_prefix/etc/config.site
fi
for ac_site_file in "$ac_site_file1" "$ac_site_file2"
do
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if test /dev/null != "$ac_site_file" && test -r "$ac_site_file"; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: loading site script $ac_site_file" >&5
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sed 's/^/| /' "$ac_site_file" >&5
. "$ac_site_file" \
|| { { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: error: in \`$ac_pwd':" >&5
$as_echo "$as_me: error: in \`$ac_pwd':" >&2;}
as_fn_error $? "failed to load site script $ac_site_file
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fi
done
if test -r "$cache_file"; then
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{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: loading cache $cache_file" >&5
$as_echo "$as_me: loading cache $cache_file" >&6;}
case $cache_file in
[\\/]* | ?:[\\/]* ) . "$cache_file";;
*) . "./$cache_file";;
esac
fi
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: creating cache $cache_file" >&5
$as_echo "$as_me: creating cache $cache_file" >&6;}
>$cache_file
fi
# Check that the precious variables saved in the cache have kept the same
# value.
ac_cache_corrupted=false
for ac_var in $ac_precious_vars; do
eval ac_old_set=\$ac_cv_env_${ac_var}_set
eval ac_new_set=\$ac_env_${ac_var}_set
eval ac_old_val=\$ac_cv_env_${ac_var}_value
eval ac_new_val=\$ac_env_${ac_var}_value
case $ac_old_set,$ac_new_set in
set,)
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: error: \`$ac_var' was set to \`$ac_old_val' in the previous run" >&5
$as_echo "$as_me: error: \`$ac_var' was set to \`$ac_old_val' in the previous run" >&2;}
ac_cache_corrupted=: ;;
,set)
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: error: \`$ac_var' was not set in the previous run" >&5
$as_echo "$as_me: error: \`$ac_var' was not set in the previous run" >&2;}
ac_cache_corrupted=: ;;
,);;
*)
if test "x$ac_old_val" != "x$ac_new_val"; then
# differences in whitespace do not lead to failure.
ac_old_val_w=`echo x $ac_old_val`
ac_new_val_w=`echo x $ac_new_val`
if test "$ac_old_val_w" != "$ac_new_val_w"; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: error: \`$ac_var' has changed since the previous run:" >&5
$as_echo "$as_me: error: \`$ac_var' has changed since the previous run:" >&2;}
ac_cache_corrupted=:
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: warning: ignoring whitespace changes in \`$ac_var' since the previous run:" >&5
$as_echo "$as_me: warning: ignoring whitespace changes in \`$ac_var' since the previous run:" >&2;}
eval $ac_var=\$ac_old_val
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: former value: \`$ac_old_val'" >&5
$as_echo "$as_me: former value: \`$ac_old_val'" >&2;}
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: current value: \`$ac_new_val'" >&5
$as_echo "$as_me: current value: \`$ac_new_val'" >&2;}
fi;;
esac
# Pass precious variables to config.status.
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*) ac_arg=$ac_var=$ac_new_val ;;
esac
case " $ac_configure_args " in
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*) as_fn_append ac_configure_args " '$ac_arg'" ;;
esac
fi
done
if $ac_cache_corrupted; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: error: in \`$ac_pwd':" >&5
$as_echo "$as_me: error: in \`$ac_pwd':" >&2;}
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: error: changes in the environment can compromise the build" >&5
$as_echo "$as_me: error: changes in the environment can compromise the build" >&2;}
as_fn_error $? "run \`make distclean' and/or \`rm $cache_file' and start over" "$LINENO" 5
fi
## -------------------- ##
## Main body of script. ##
## -------------------- ##
ac_ext=c
ac_cpp='$CPP $CPPFLAGS'
ac_compile='$CC -c $CFLAGS $CPPFLAGS conftest.$ac_ext >&5'
ac_link='$CC -o conftest$ac_exeext $CFLAGS $CPPFLAGS $LDFLAGS conftest.$ac_ext $LIBS >&5'
ac_compiler_gnu=$ac_cv_c_compiler_gnu
ac_ext=c
ac_cpp='$CPP $CPPFLAGS'
ac_compile='$CC -c $CFLAGS $CPPFLAGS conftest.$ac_ext >&5'
ac_link='$CC -o conftest$ac_exeext $CFLAGS $CPPFLAGS $LDFLAGS conftest.$ac_ext $LIBS >&5'
ac_compiler_gnu=$ac_cv_c_compiler_gnu
ac_config_headers="$ac_config_headers config.h"
ac_ext=c
ac_cpp='$CPP $CPPFLAGS'
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{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5
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test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=.
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break 2
fi
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{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
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for ac_prog in cc gcc
do
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{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5
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if ${ac_cv_prog_ac_ct_CC+:} false; then :
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else
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as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
for as_dir in $PATH
do
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test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=.
for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
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break 2
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{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
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CC=""
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case $cross_compiling:$ac_tool_warned in
yes:)
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: using cross tools not prefixed with host triplet" >&5
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ac_tool_warned=yes ;;
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CC=$ac_ct_CC
fi
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test -z "$CC" && { { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: error: in \`$ac_pwd':" >&5
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# Provide some information about the compiler.
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set X $ac_compile
ac_compiler=$2
for ac_option in --version -v -V -qversion; do
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eval ac_try_echo="\"\$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: $ac_try_echo\""
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(eval "$ac_compiler $ac_option >&5") 2>conftest.err
ac_status=$?
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fi
rm -f conftest.er1 conftest.err
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cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
int
main ()
{
;
return 0;
}
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ac_clean_files_save=$ac_clean_files
ac_clean_files="$ac_clean_files a.out a.out.dSYM a.exe b.out"
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# of exeext.
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking whether the C compiler works" >&5
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ac_rmfiles=
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do
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rm -f $ac_rmfiles
if { { ac_try="$ac_link_default"
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;;
[ab].out )
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if test -z "$ac_file"; then :
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
$as_echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
{ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: error: in \`$ac_pwd':" >&5
$as_echo "$as_me: error: in \`$ac_pwd':" >&2;}
as_fn_error 77 "C compiler cannot create executables
See \`config.log' for more details" "$LINENO" 5; }
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for C compiler default output file name" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for C compiler default output file name... " >&6; }
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_file" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_file" >&6; }
ac_exeext=$ac_cv_exeext
rm -f -r a.out a.out.dSYM a.exe conftest$ac_cv_exeext b.out
ac_clean_files=$ac_clean_files_save
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for suffix of executables" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for suffix of executables... " >&6; }
if { { ac_try="$ac_link"
case "(($ac_try" in
*\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
*) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
esac
eval ac_try_echo="\"\$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: $ac_try_echo\""
$as_echo "$ac_try_echo"; } >&5
(eval "$ac_link") 2>&5
ac_status=$?
$as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
test $ac_status = 0; }; then :
# If both `conftest.exe' and `conftest' are `present' (well, observable)
# catch `conftest.exe'. For instance with Cygwin, `ls conftest' will
# work properly (i.e., refer to `conftest.exe'), while it won't with
# `rm'.
for ac_file in conftest.exe conftest conftest.*; do
test -f "$ac_file" || continue
case $ac_file in
*.$ac_ext | *.xcoff | *.tds | *.d | *.pdb | *.xSYM | *.bb | *.bbg | *.map | *.inf | *.dSYM | *.o | *.obj ) ;;
*.* ) ac_cv_exeext=`expr "$ac_file" : '[^.]*\(\..*\)'`
break;;
* ) break;;
esac
done
else
{ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: error: in \`$ac_pwd':" >&5
$as_echo "$as_me: error: in \`$ac_pwd':" >&2;}
as_fn_error $? "cannot compute suffix of executables: cannot compile and link
See \`config.log' for more details" "$LINENO" 5; }
fi
rm -f conftest conftest$ac_cv_exeext
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_exeext" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_cv_exeext" >&6; }
rm -f conftest.$ac_ext
EXEEXT=$ac_cv_exeext
ac_exeext=$EXEEXT
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <stdio.h>
int
main ()
{
FILE *f = fopen ("conftest.out", "w");
return ferror (f) || fclose (f) != 0;
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
ac_clean_files="$ac_clean_files conftest.out"
# Check that the compiler produces executables we can run. If not, either
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{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking whether we are cross compiling" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking whether we are cross compiling... " >&6; }
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{ { ac_try="$ac_link"
case "(($ac_try" in
*\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
*) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
esac
eval ac_try_echo="\"\$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: $ac_try_echo\""
$as_echo "$ac_try_echo"; } >&5
(eval "$ac_link") 2>&5
ac_status=$?
$as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
test $ac_status = 0; }
if { ac_try='./conftest$ac_cv_exeext'
{ { case "(($ac_try" in
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*) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
esac
eval ac_try_echo="\"\$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: $ac_try_echo\""
$as_echo "$ac_try_echo"; } >&5
(eval "$ac_try") 2>&5
ac_status=$?
$as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
test $ac_status = 0; }; }; then
cross_compiling=no
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if test "$cross_compiling" = maybe; then
cross_compiling=yes
else
{ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: error: in \`$ac_pwd':" >&5
$as_echo "$as_me: error: in \`$ac_pwd':" >&2;}
as_fn_error $? "cannot run C compiled programs.
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fi
fi
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $cross_compiling" >&5
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rm -f conftest.$ac_ext conftest$ac_cv_exeext conftest.out
ac_clean_files=$ac_clean_files_save
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for suffix of object files" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for suffix of object files... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_objext+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
int
main ()
{
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
rm -f conftest.o conftest.obj
if { { ac_try="$ac_compile"
case "(($ac_try" in
*\"* | *\`* | *\\*) ac_try_echo=\$ac_try;;
*) ac_try_echo=$ac_try;;
esac
eval ac_try_echo="\"\$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: $ac_try_echo\""
$as_echo "$ac_try_echo"; } >&5
(eval "$ac_compile") 2>&5
ac_status=$?
$as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
test $ac_status = 0; }; then :
for ac_file in conftest.o conftest.obj conftest.*; do
test -f "$ac_file" || continue;
case $ac_file in
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*) ac_cv_objext=`expr "$ac_file" : '.*\.\(.*\)'`
break;;
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done
else
$as_echo "$as_me: failed program was:" >&5
sed 's/^/| /' conftest.$ac_ext >&5
{ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: error: in \`$ac_pwd':" >&5
$as_echo "$as_me: error: in \`$ac_pwd':" >&2;}
as_fn_error $? "cannot compute suffix of object files: cannot compile
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fi
rm -f conftest.$ac_cv_objext conftest.$ac_ext
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_objext" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_cv_objext" >&6; }
OBJEXT=$ac_cv_objext
ac_objext=$OBJEXT
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking whether we are using the GNU C compiler" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking whether we are using the GNU C compiler... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_c_compiler_gnu+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
int
main ()
{
#ifndef __GNUC__
choke me
#endif
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
ac_compiler_gnu=yes
else
ac_compiler_gnu=no
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
ac_cv_c_compiler_gnu=$ac_compiler_gnu
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_c_compiler_gnu" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_cv_c_compiler_gnu" >&6; }
if test $ac_compiler_gnu = yes; then
GCC=yes
else
GCC=
fi
ac_test_CFLAGS=${CFLAGS+set}
ac_save_CFLAGS=$CFLAGS
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking whether $CC accepts -g" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking whether $CC accepts -g... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_prog_cc_g+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
ac_save_c_werror_flag=$ac_c_werror_flag
ac_c_werror_flag=yes
ac_cv_prog_cc_g=no
CFLAGS="-g"
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
int
main ()
{
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
ac_cv_prog_cc_g=yes
else
CFLAGS=""
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
int
main ()
{
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
else
ac_c_werror_flag=$ac_save_c_werror_flag
CFLAGS="-g"
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
int
main ()
{
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
ac_cv_prog_cc_g=yes
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
ac_c_werror_flag=$ac_save_c_werror_flag
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_prog_cc_g" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_cv_prog_cc_g" >&6; }
if test "$ac_test_CFLAGS" = set; then
CFLAGS=$ac_save_CFLAGS
elif test $ac_cv_prog_cc_g = yes; then
if test "$GCC" = yes; then
CFLAGS="-g -O2"
else
CFLAGS="-g"
fi
else
if test "$GCC" = yes; then
CFLAGS="-O2"
else
CFLAGS=
fi
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $CC option to accept ISO C89" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for $CC option to accept ISO C89... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_prog_cc_c89+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
ac_cv_prog_cc_c89=no
ac_save_CC=$CC
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <stdio.h>
struct stat;
/* Most of the following tests are stolen from RCS 5.7's src/conf.sh. */
struct buf { int x; };
FILE * (*rcsopen) (struct buf *, struct stat *, int);
static char *e (p, i)
char **p;
int i;
{
return p[i];
}
static char *f (char * (*g) (char **, int), char **p, ...)
{
char *s;
va_list v;
va_start (v,p);
s = g (p, va_arg (v,int));
va_end (v);
return s;
}
/* OSF 4.0 Compaq cc is some sort of almost-ANSI by default. It has
function prototypes and stuff, but not '\xHH' hex character constants.
These don't provoke an error unfortunately, instead are silently treated
as 'x'. The following induces an error, until -std is added to get
proper ANSI mode. Curiously '\x00'!='x' always comes out true, for an
array size at least. It's necessary to write '\x00'==0 to get something
that's true only with -std. */
int osf4_cc_array ['\x00' == 0 ? 1 : -1];
/* IBM C 6 for AIX is almost-ANSI by default, but it replaces macro parameters
inside strings and character constants. */
#define FOO(x) 'x'
int xlc6_cc_array[FOO(a) == 'x' ? 1 : -1];
int test (int i, double x);
struct s1 {int (*f) (int a);};
struct s2 {int (*f) (double a);};
int pairnames (int, char **, FILE *(*)(struct buf *, struct stat *, int), int, int);
int argc;
char **argv;
int
main ()
{
return f (e, argv, 0) != argv[0] || f (e, argv, 1) != argv[1];
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
for ac_arg in '' -qlanglvl=extc89 -qlanglvl=ansi -std \
-Ae "-Aa -D_HPUX_SOURCE" "-Xc -D__EXTENSIONS__"
do
CC="$ac_save_CC $ac_arg"
if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
ac_cv_prog_cc_c89=$ac_arg
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext
test "x$ac_cv_prog_cc_c89" != "xno" && break
done
rm -f conftest.$ac_ext
CC=$ac_save_CC
fi
# AC_CACHE_VAL
case "x$ac_cv_prog_cc_c89" in
x)
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: none needed" >&5
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xno)
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: unsupported" >&5
$as_echo "unsupported" >&6; } ;;
*)
CC="$CC $ac_cv_prog_cc_c89"
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_prog_cc_c89" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_cv_prog_cc_c89" >&6; } ;;
esac
if test "x$ac_cv_prog_cc_c89" != xno; then :
fi
ac_ext=c
ac_cpp='$CPP $CPPFLAGS'
ac_compile='$CC -c $CFLAGS $CPPFLAGS conftest.$ac_ext >&5'
ac_link='$CC -o conftest$ac_exeext $CFLAGS $CPPFLAGS $LDFLAGS conftest.$ac_ext $LIBS >&5'
ac_compiler_gnu=$ac_cv_c_compiler_gnu
ac_aux_dir=
for ac_dir in "$srcdir" "$srcdir/.." "$srcdir/../.."; do
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ac_aux_dir=$ac_dir
ac_install_sh="$ac_aux_dir/install-sh -c"
break
elif test -f "$ac_dir/install.sh"; then
ac_aux_dir=$ac_dir
ac_install_sh="$ac_aux_dir/install.sh -c"
break
elif test -f "$ac_dir/shtool"; then
ac_aux_dir=$ac_dir
ac_install_sh="$ac_aux_dir/shtool install -c"
break
fi
done
if test -z "$ac_aux_dir"; then
as_fn_error $? "cannot find install-sh, install.sh, or shtool in \"$srcdir\" \"$srcdir/..\" \"$srcdir/../..\"" "$LINENO" 5
fi
# These three variables are undocumented and unsupported,
# and are intended to be withdrawn in a future Autoconf release.
# They can cause serious problems if a builder's source tree is in a directory
# whose full name contains unusual characters.
ac_config_guess="$SHELL $ac_aux_dir/config.guess" # Please don't use this var.
ac_config_sub="$SHELL $ac_aux_dir/config.sub" # Please don't use this var.
ac_configure="$SHELL $ac_aux_dir/configure" # Please don't use this var.
# Make sure we can run config.sub.
$SHELL "$ac_aux_dir/config.sub" sun4 >/dev/null 2>&1 ||
as_fn_error $? "cannot run $SHELL $ac_aux_dir/config.sub" "$LINENO" 5
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking build system type" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking build system type... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_build+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
ac_build_alias=$build_alias
test "x$ac_build_alias" = x &&
ac_build_alias=`$SHELL "$ac_aux_dir/config.guess"`
test "x$ac_build_alias" = x &&
as_fn_error $? "cannot guess build type; you must specify one" "$LINENO" 5
ac_cv_build=`$SHELL "$ac_aux_dir/config.sub" $ac_build_alias` ||
as_fn_error $? "$SHELL $ac_aux_dir/config.sub $ac_build_alias failed" "$LINENO" 5
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_build" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_cv_build" >&6; }
case $ac_cv_build in
*-*-*) ;;
*) as_fn_error $? "invalid value of canonical build" "$LINENO" 5;;
esac
build=$ac_cv_build
ac_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS='-'
set x $ac_cv_build
shift
build_cpu=$1
build_vendor=$2
shift; shift
# Remember, the first character of IFS is used to create $*,
# except with old shells:
build_os=$*
IFS=$ac_save_IFS
case $build_os in *\ *) build_os=`echo "$build_os" | sed 's/ /-/g'`;; esac
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking host system type" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking host system type... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_host+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
if test "x$host_alias" = x; then
ac_cv_host=$ac_cv_build
else
ac_cv_host=`$SHELL "$ac_aux_dir/config.sub" $host_alias` ||
as_fn_error $? "$SHELL $ac_aux_dir/config.sub $host_alias failed" "$LINENO" 5
fi
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_host" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_cv_host" >&6; }
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*) as_fn_error $? "invalid value of canonical host" "$LINENO" 5;;
esac
host=$ac_cv_host
ac_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS='-'
set x $ac_cv_host
shift
host_cpu=$1
host_vendor=$2
shift; shift
# Remember, the first character of IFS is used to create $*,
# except with old shells:
host_os=$*
IFS=$ac_save_IFS
case $host_os in *\ *) host_os=`echo "$host_os" | sed 's/ /-/g'`;; esac
ac_ext=c
ac_cpp='$CPP $CPPFLAGS'
ac_compile='$CC -c $CFLAGS $CPPFLAGS conftest.$ac_ext >&5'
ac_link='$CC -o conftest$ac_exeext $CFLAGS $CPPFLAGS $LDFLAGS conftest.$ac_ext $LIBS >&5'
ac_compiler_gnu=$ac_cv_c_compiler_gnu
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking how to run the C preprocessor" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking how to run the C preprocessor... " >&6; }
# On Suns, sometimes $CPP names a directory.
if test -n "$CPP" && test -d "$CPP"; then
CPP=
fi
if test -z "$CPP"; then
if ${ac_cv_prog_CPP+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
# Double quotes because CPP needs to be expanded
for CPP in "$CC -E" "$CC -E -traditional-cpp" "/lib/cpp"
do
ac_preproc_ok=false
for ac_c_preproc_warn_flag in '' yes
do
# Use a header file that comes with gcc, so configuring glibc
# with a fresh cross-compiler works.
# Prefer <limits.h> to <assert.h> if __STDC__ is defined, since
# <limits.h> exists even on freestanding compilers.
# On the NeXT, cc -E runs the code through the compiler's parser,
# not just through cpp. "Syntax error" is here to catch this case.
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#ifdef __STDC__
# include <limits.h>
#else
# include <assert.h>
#endif
Syntax error
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_cpp "$LINENO"; then :
else
# Broken: fails on valid input.
continue
fi
rm -f conftest.err conftest.i conftest.$ac_ext
# OK, works on sane cases. Now check whether nonexistent headers
# can be detected and how.
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <ac_nonexistent.h>
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_cpp "$LINENO"; then :
# Broken: success on invalid input.
continue
else
# Passes both tests.
ac_preproc_ok=:
break
fi
rm -f conftest.err conftest.i conftest.$ac_ext
done
# Because of `break', _AC_PREPROC_IFELSE's cleaning code was skipped.
rm -f conftest.i conftest.err conftest.$ac_ext
if $ac_preproc_ok; then :
break
fi
done
ac_cv_prog_CPP=$CPP
fi
CPP=$ac_cv_prog_CPP
else
ac_cv_prog_CPP=$CPP
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $CPP" >&5
$as_echo "$CPP" >&6; }
ac_preproc_ok=false
for ac_c_preproc_warn_flag in '' yes
do
# Use a header file that comes with gcc, so configuring glibc
# with a fresh cross-compiler works.
# Prefer <limits.h> to <assert.h> if __STDC__ is defined, since
# <limits.h> exists even on freestanding compilers.
# On the NeXT, cc -E runs the code through the compiler's parser,
# not just through cpp. "Syntax error" is here to catch this case.
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#ifdef __STDC__
# include <limits.h>
#else
# include <assert.h>
#endif
Syntax error
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_cpp "$LINENO"; then :
else
# Broken: fails on valid input.
continue
fi
rm -f conftest.err conftest.i conftest.$ac_ext
# OK, works on sane cases. Now check whether nonexistent headers
# can be detected and how.
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <ac_nonexistent.h>
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_cpp "$LINENO"; then :
# Broken: success on invalid input.
continue
else
# Passes both tests.
ac_preproc_ok=:
break
fi
rm -f conftest.err conftest.i conftest.$ac_ext
done
# Because of `break', _AC_PREPROC_IFELSE's cleaning code was skipped.
rm -f conftest.i conftest.err conftest.$ac_ext
if $ac_preproc_ok; then :
else
{ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: error: in \`$ac_pwd':" >&5
$as_echo "$as_me: error: in \`$ac_pwd':" >&2;}
as_fn_error $? "C preprocessor \"$CPP\" fails sanity check
See \`config.log' for more details" "$LINENO" 5; }
fi
ac_ext=c
ac_cpp='$CPP $CPPFLAGS'
ac_compile='$CC -c $CFLAGS $CPPFLAGS conftest.$ac_ext >&5'
ac_link='$CC -o conftest$ac_exeext $CFLAGS $CPPFLAGS $LDFLAGS conftest.$ac_ext $LIBS >&5'
ac_compiler_gnu=$ac_cv_c_compiler_gnu
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for grep that handles long lines and -e" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for grep that handles long lines and -e... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_path_GREP+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
if test -z "$GREP"; then
ac_path_GREP_found=false
# Loop through the user's path and test for each of PROGNAME-LIST
as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
for as_dir in $PATH$PATH_SEPARATOR/usr/xpg4/bin
do
IFS=$as_save_IFS
test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=.
for ac_prog in grep ggrep; do
for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
ac_path_GREP="$as_dir/$ac_prog$ac_exec_ext"
as_fn_executable_p "$ac_path_GREP" || continue
# Check for GNU ac_path_GREP and select it if it is found.
# Check for GNU $ac_path_GREP
case `"$ac_path_GREP" --version 2>&1` in
*GNU*)
ac_cv_path_GREP="$ac_path_GREP" ac_path_GREP_found=:;;
*)
ac_count=0
$as_echo_n 0123456789 >"conftest.in"
while :
do
cat "conftest.in" "conftest.in" >"conftest.tmp"
mv "conftest.tmp" "conftest.in"
cp "conftest.in" "conftest.nl"
$as_echo 'GREP' >> "conftest.nl"
"$ac_path_GREP" -e 'GREP$' -e '-(cannot match)-' < "conftest.nl" >"conftest.out" 2>/dev/null || break
diff "conftest.out" "conftest.nl" >/dev/null 2>&1 || break
as_fn_arith $ac_count + 1 && ac_count=$as_val
if test $ac_count -gt ${ac_path_GREP_max-0}; then
# Best one so far, save it but keep looking for a better one
ac_cv_path_GREP="$ac_path_GREP"
ac_path_GREP_max=$ac_count
fi
# 10*(2^10) chars as input seems more than enough
test $ac_count -gt 10 && break
done
rm -f conftest.in conftest.tmp conftest.nl conftest.out;;
esac
$ac_path_GREP_found && break 3
done
done
done
IFS=$as_save_IFS
if test -z "$ac_cv_path_GREP"; then
as_fn_error $? "no acceptable grep could be found in $PATH$PATH_SEPARATOR/usr/xpg4/bin" "$LINENO" 5
fi
else
ac_cv_path_GREP=$GREP
fi
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_path_GREP" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_cv_path_GREP" >&6; }
GREP="$ac_cv_path_GREP"
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for egrep" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for egrep... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_path_EGREP+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
if echo a | $GREP -E '(a|b)' >/dev/null 2>&1
then ac_cv_path_EGREP="$GREP -E"
else
if test -z "$EGREP"; then
ac_path_EGREP_found=false
# Loop through the user's path and test for each of PROGNAME-LIST
as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
for as_dir in $PATH$PATH_SEPARATOR/usr/xpg4/bin
do
IFS=$as_save_IFS
test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=.
for ac_prog in egrep; do
for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
ac_path_EGREP="$as_dir/$ac_prog$ac_exec_ext"
as_fn_executable_p "$ac_path_EGREP" || continue
# Check for GNU ac_path_EGREP and select it if it is found.
# Check for GNU $ac_path_EGREP
case `"$ac_path_EGREP" --version 2>&1` in
*GNU*)
ac_cv_path_EGREP="$ac_path_EGREP" ac_path_EGREP_found=:;;
*)
ac_count=0
$as_echo_n 0123456789 >"conftest.in"
while :
do
cat "conftest.in" "conftest.in" >"conftest.tmp"
mv "conftest.tmp" "conftest.in"
cp "conftest.in" "conftest.nl"
$as_echo 'EGREP' >> "conftest.nl"
"$ac_path_EGREP" 'EGREP$' < "conftest.nl" >"conftest.out" 2>/dev/null || break
diff "conftest.out" "conftest.nl" >/dev/null 2>&1 || break
as_fn_arith $ac_count + 1 && ac_count=$as_val
if test $ac_count -gt ${ac_path_EGREP_max-0}; then
# Best one so far, save it but keep looking for a better one
ac_cv_path_EGREP="$ac_path_EGREP"
ac_path_EGREP_max=$ac_count
fi
# 10*(2^10) chars as input seems more than enough
test $ac_count -gt 10 && break
done
rm -f conftest.in conftest.tmp conftest.nl conftest.out;;
esac
$ac_path_EGREP_found && break 3
done
done
done
IFS=$as_save_IFS
if test -z "$ac_cv_path_EGREP"; then
as_fn_error $? "no acceptable egrep could be found in $PATH$PATH_SEPARATOR/usr/xpg4/bin" "$LINENO" 5
fi
else
ac_cv_path_EGREP=$EGREP
fi
fi
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_path_EGREP" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_cv_path_EGREP" >&6; }
EGREP="$ac_cv_path_EGREP"
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for ANSI C header files" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for ANSI C header files... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_header_stdc+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <float.h>
int
main ()
{
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
ac_cv_header_stdc=yes
else
ac_cv_header_stdc=no
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
if test $ac_cv_header_stdc = yes; then
# SunOS 4.x string.h does not declare mem*, contrary to ANSI.
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <string.h>
_ACEOF
if (eval "$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext") 2>&5 |
$EGREP "memchr" >/dev/null 2>&1; then :
else
ac_cv_header_stdc=no
fi
rm -f conftest*
fi
if test $ac_cv_header_stdc = yes; then
# ISC 2.0.2 stdlib.h does not declare free, contrary to ANSI.
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <stdlib.h>
_ACEOF
if (eval "$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext") 2>&5 |
$EGREP "free" >/dev/null 2>&1; then :
else
ac_cv_header_stdc=no
fi
rm -f conftest*
fi
if test $ac_cv_header_stdc = yes; then
# /bin/cc in Irix-4.0.5 gets non-ANSI ctype macros unless using -ansi.
if test "$cross_compiling" = yes; then :
:
else
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <ctype.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#if ((' ' & 0x0FF) == 0x020)
# define ISLOWER(c) ('a' <= (c) && (c) <= 'z')
# define TOUPPER(c) (ISLOWER(c) ? 'A' + ((c) - 'a') : (c))
#else
# define ISLOWER(c) \
(('a' <= (c) && (c) <= 'i') \
|| ('j' <= (c) && (c) <= 'r') \
|| ('s' <= (c) && (c) <= 'z'))
# define TOUPPER(c) (ISLOWER(c) ? ((c) | 0x40) : (c))
#endif
#define XOR(e, f) (((e) && !(f)) || (!(e) && (f)))
int
main ()
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < 256; i++)
if (XOR (islower (i), ISLOWER (i))
|| toupper (i) != TOUPPER (i))
return 2;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_run "$LINENO"; then :
else
ac_cv_header_stdc=no
fi
rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* gmon.out bb.out conftest$ac_exeext \
conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
fi
fi
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_header_stdc" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_cv_header_stdc" >&6; }
if test $ac_cv_header_stdc = yes; then
$as_echo "#define STDC_HEADERS 1" >>confdefs.h
fi
# On IRIX 5.3, sys/types and inttypes.h are conflicting.
for ac_header in sys/types.h sys/stat.h stdlib.h string.h memory.h strings.h \
inttypes.h stdint.h unistd.h
do :
as_ac_Header=`$as_echo "ac_cv_header_$ac_header" | $as_tr_sh`
ac_fn_c_check_header_compile "$LINENO" "$ac_header" "$as_ac_Header" "$ac_includes_default
"
if eval test \"x\$"$as_ac_Header"\" = x"yes"; then :
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define `$as_echo "HAVE_$ac_header" | $as_tr_cpp` 1
_ACEOF
fi
done
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking whether byte ordering is bigendian" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking whether byte ordering is bigendian... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_c_bigendian+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
ac_cv_c_bigendian=unknown
# See if we're dealing with a universal compiler.
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#ifndef __APPLE_CC__
not a universal capable compiler
#endif
typedef int dummy;
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
# Check for potential -arch flags. It is not universal unless
# there are at least two -arch flags with different values.
ac_arch=
ac_prev=
for ac_word in $CC $CFLAGS $CPPFLAGS $LDFLAGS; do
if test -n "$ac_prev"; then
case $ac_word in
i?86 | x86_64 | ppc | ppc64)
if test -z "$ac_arch" || test "$ac_arch" = "$ac_word"; then
ac_arch=$ac_word
else
ac_cv_c_bigendian=universal
break
fi
;;
esac
ac_prev=
elif test "x$ac_word" = "x-arch"; then
ac_prev=arch
fi
done
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
if test $ac_cv_c_bigendian = unknown; then
# See if sys/param.h defines the BYTE_ORDER macro.
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/param.h>
int
main ()
{
#if ! (defined BYTE_ORDER && defined BIG_ENDIAN \
&& defined LITTLE_ENDIAN && BYTE_ORDER && BIG_ENDIAN \
&& LITTLE_ENDIAN)
bogus endian macros
#endif
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
# It does; now see whether it defined to BIG_ENDIAN or not.
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/param.h>
int
main ()
{
#if BYTE_ORDER != BIG_ENDIAN
not big endian
#endif
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
ac_cv_c_bigendian=yes
else
ac_cv_c_bigendian=no
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
fi
if test $ac_cv_c_bigendian = unknown; then
# See if <limits.h> defines _LITTLE_ENDIAN or _BIG_ENDIAN (e.g., Solaris).
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <limits.h>
int
main ()
{
#if ! (defined _LITTLE_ENDIAN || defined _BIG_ENDIAN)
bogus endian macros
#endif
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
# It does; now see whether it defined to _BIG_ENDIAN or not.
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <limits.h>
int
main ()
{
#ifndef _BIG_ENDIAN
not big endian
#endif
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
ac_cv_c_bigendian=yes
else
ac_cv_c_bigendian=no
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
fi
if test $ac_cv_c_bigendian = unknown; then
# Compile a test program.
if test "$cross_compiling" = yes; then :
# Try to guess by grepping values from an object file.
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
short int ascii_mm[] =
{ 0x4249, 0x4765, 0x6E44, 0x6961, 0x6E53, 0x7953, 0 };
short int ascii_ii[] =
{ 0x694C, 0x5454, 0x656C, 0x6E45, 0x6944, 0x6E61, 0 };
int use_ascii (int i) {
return ascii_mm[i] + ascii_ii[i];
}
short int ebcdic_ii[] =
{ 0x89D3, 0xE3E3, 0x8593, 0x95C5, 0x89C4, 0x9581, 0 };
short int ebcdic_mm[] =
{ 0xC2C9, 0xC785, 0x95C4, 0x8981, 0x95E2, 0xA8E2, 0 };
int use_ebcdic (int i) {
return ebcdic_mm[i] + ebcdic_ii[i];
}
extern int foo;
int
main ()
{
return use_ascii (foo) == use_ebcdic (foo);
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
if grep BIGenDianSyS conftest.$ac_objext >/dev/null; then
ac_cv_c_bigendian=yes
fi
if grep LiTTleEnDian conftest.$ac_objext >/dev/null ; then
if test "$ac_cv_c_bigendian" = unknown; then
ac_cv_c_bigendian=no
else
# finding both strings is unlikely to happen, but who knows?
ac_cv_c_bigendian=unknown
fi
fi
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
else
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
$ac_includes_default
int
main ()
{
/* Are we little or big endian? From Harbison&Steele. */
union
{
long int l;
char c[sizeof (long int)];
} u;
u.l = 1;
return u.c[sizeof (long int) - 1] == 1;
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_run "$LINENO"; then :
ac_cv_c_bigendian=no
else
ac_cv_c_bigendian=yes
fi
rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* gmon.out bb.out conftest$ac_exeext \
conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
fi
fi
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_c_bigendian" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_cv_c_bigendian" >&6; }
case $ac_cv_c_bigendian in #(
yes)
$as_echo "#define WORDS_BIGENDIAN 1" >>confdefs.h
;; #(
no)
;; #(
universal)
$as_echo "#define AC_APPLE_UNIVERSAL_BUILD 1" >>confdefs.h
;; #(
*)
as_fn_error $? "unknown endianness
presetting ac_cv_c_bigendian=no (or yes) will help" "$LINENO" 5 ;;
esac
# Checks for programs.
for ac_prog in gawk mawk nawk awk
do
# Extract the first word of "$ac_prog", so it can be a program name with args.
set dummy $ac_prog; ac_word=$2
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_prog_AWK+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
if test -n "$AWK"; then
ac_cv_prog_AWK="$AWK" # Let the user override the test.
else
as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
for as_dir in $PATH
do
IFS=$as_save_IFS
test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=.
for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
if as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; then
ac_cv_prog_AWK="$ac_prog"
$as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5
break 2
fi
done
done
IFS=$as_save_IFS
fi
fi
AWK=$ac_cv_prog_AWK
if test -n "$AWK"; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $AWK" >&5
$as_echo "$AWK" >&6; }
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
fi
test -n "$AWK" && break
done
ac_ext=c
ac_cpp='$CPP $CPPFLAGS'
ac_compile='$CC -c $CFLAGS $CPPFLAGS conftest.$ac_ext >&5'
ac_link='$CC -o conftest$ac_exeext $CFLAGS $CPPFLAGS $LDFLAGS conftest.$ac_ext $LIBS >&5'
ac_compiler_gnu=$ac_cv_c_compiler_gnu
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking how to run the C preprocessor" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking how to run the C preprocessor... " >&6; }
# On Suns, sometimes $CPP names a directory.
if test -n "$CPP" && test -d "$CPP"; then
CPP=
fi
if test -z "$CPP"; then
if ${ac_cv_prog_CPP+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
# Double quotes because CPP needs to be expanded
for CPP in "$CC -E" "$CC -E -traditional-cpp" "/lib/cpp"
do
ac_preproc_ok=false
for ac_c_preproc_warn_flag in '' yes
do
# Use a header file that comes with gcc, so configuring glibc
# with a fresh cross-compiler works.
# Prefer <limits.h> to <assert.h> if __STDC__ is defined, since
# <limits.h> exists even on freestanding compilers.
# On the NeXT, cc -E runs the code through the compiler's parser,
# not just through cpp. "Syntax error" is here to catch this case.
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#ifdef __STDC__
# include <limits.h>
#else
# include <assert.h>
#endif
Syntax error
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_cpp "$LINENO"; then :
else
# Broken: fails on valid input.
continue
fi
rm -f conftest.err conftest.i conftest.$ac_ext
# OK, works on sane cases. Now check whether nonexistent headers
# can be detected and how.
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <ac_nonexistent.h>
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_cpp "$LINENO"; then :
# Broken: success on invalid input.
continue
else
# Passes both tests.
ac_preproc_ok=:
break
fi
rm -f conftest.err conftest.i conftest.$ac_ext
done
# Because of `break', _AC_PREPROC_IFELSE's cleaning code was skipped.
rm -f conftest.i conftest.err conftest.$ac_ext
if $ac_preproc_ok; then :
break
fi
done
ac_cv_prog_CPP=$CPP
fi
CPP=$ac_cv_prog_CPP
else
ac_cv_prog_CPP=$CPP
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $CPP" >&5
$as_echo "$CPP" >&6; }
ac_preproc_ok=false
for ac_c_preproc_warn_flag in '' yes
do
# Use a header file that comes with gcc, so configuring glibc
# with a fresh cross-compiler works.
# Prefer <limits.h> to <assert.h> if __STDC__ is defined, since
# <limits.h> exists even on freestanding compilers.
# On the NeXT, cc -E runs the code through the compiler's parser,
# not just through cpp. "Syntax error" is here to catch this case.
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#ifdef __STDC__
# include <limits.h>
#else
# include <assert.h>
#endif
Syntax error
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_cpp "$LINENO"; then :
else
# Broken: fails on valid input.
continue
fi
rm -f conftest.err conftest.i conftest.$ac_ext
# OK, works on sane cases. Now check whether nonexistent headers
# can be detected and how.
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <ac_nonexistent.h>
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_cpp "$LINENO"; then :
# Broken: success on invalid input.
continue
else
# Passes both tests.
ac_preproc_ok=:
break
fi
rm -f conftest.err conftest.i conftest.$ac_ext
done
# Because of `break', _AC_PREPROC_IFELSE's cleaning code was skipped.
rm -f conftest.i conftest.err conftest.$ac_ext
if $ac_preproc_ok; then :
else
{ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: error: in \`$ac_pwd':" >&5
$as_echo "$as_me: error: in \`$ac_pwd':" >&2;}
as_fn_error $? "C preprocessor \"$CPP\" fails sanity check
See \`config.log' for more details" "$LINENO" 5; }
fi
ac_ext=c
ac_cpp='$CPP $CPPFLAGS'
ac_compile='$CC -c $CFLAGS $CPPFLAGS conftest.$ac_ext >&5'
ac_link='$CC -o conftest$ac_exeext $CFLAGS $CPPFLAGS $LDFLAGS conftest.$ac_ext $LIBS >&5'
ac_compiler_gnu=$ac_cv_c_compiler_gnu
if test -n "$ac_tool_prefix"; then
# Extract the first word of "${ac_tool_prefix}ranlib", so it can be a program name with args.
set dummy ${ac_tool_prefix}ranlib; ac_word=$2
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_prog_RANLIB+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
if test -n "$RANLIB"; then
ac_cv_prog_RANLIB="$RANLIB" # Let the user override the test.
else
as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
for as_dir in $PATH
do
IFS=$as_save_IFS
test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=.
for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
if as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; then
ac_cv_prog_RANLIB="${ac_tool_prefix}ranlib"
$as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5
break 2
fi
done
done
IFS=$as_save_IFS
fi
fi
RANLIB=$ac_cv_prog_RANLIB
if test -n "$RANLIB"; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $RANLIB" >&5
$as_echo "$RANLIB" >&6; }
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
fi
fi
if test -z "$ac_cv_prog_RANLIB"; then
ac_ct_RANLIB=$RANLIB
# Extract the first word of "ranlib", so it can be a program name with args.
set dummy ranlib; ac_word=$2
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_prog_ac_ct_RANLIB+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
if test -n "$ac_ct_RANLIB"; then
ac_cv_prog_ac_ct_RANLIB="$ac_ct_RANLIB" # Let the user override the test.
else
as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
for as_dir in $PATH
do
IFS=$as_save_IFS
test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=.
for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
if as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; then
ac_cv_prog_ac_ct_RANLIB="ranlib"
$as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5
break 2
fi
done
done
IFS=$as_save_IFS
fi
fi
ac_ct_RANLIB=$ac_cv_prog_ac_ct_RANLIB
if test -n "$ac_ct_RANLIB"; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_ct_RANLIB" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_ct_RANLIB" >&6; }
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
fi
if test "x$ac_ct_RANLIB" = x; then
RANLIB=":"
else
case $cross_compiling:$ac_tool_warned in
yes:)
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: using cross tools not prefixed with host triplet" >&5
$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: using cross tools not prefixed with host triplet" >&2;}
ac_tool_warned=yes ;;
esac
RANLIB=$ac_ct_RANLIB
fi
else
RANLIB="$ac_cv_prog_RANLIB"
fi
# Find a good install program. We prefer a C program (faster),
# so one script is as good as another. But avoid the broken or
# incompatible versions:
# SysV /etc/install, /usr/sbin/install
# SunOS /usr/etc/install
# IRIX /sbin/install
# AIX /bin/install
# AmigaOS /C/install, which installs bootblocks on floppy discs
# AIX 4 /usr/bin/installbsd, which doesn't work without a -g flag
# AFS /usr/afsws/bin/install, which mishandles nonexistent args
# SVR4 /usr/ucb/install, which tries to use the nonexistent group "staff"
# OS/2's system install, which has a completely different semantic
# ./install, which can be erroneously created by make from ./install.sh.
# Reject install programs that cannot install multiple files.
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for a BSD-compatible install" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for a BSD-compatible install... " >&6; }
if test -z "$INSTALL"; then
if ${ac_cv_path_install+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
for as_dir in $PATH
do
IFS=$as_save_IFS
test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=.
# Account for people who put trailing slashes in PATH elements.
case $as_dir/ in #((
./ | .// | /[cC]/* | \
/etc/* | /usr/sbin/* | /usr/etc/* | /sbin/* | /usr/afsws/bin/* | \
?:[\\/]os2[\\/]install[\\/]* | ?:[\\/]OS2[\\/]INSTALL[\\/]* | \
/usr/ucb/* ) ;;
*)
# OSF1 and SCO ODT 3.0 have their own names for install.
# Don't use installbsd from OSF since it installs stuff as root
# by default.
for ac_prog in ginstall scoinst install; do
for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
if as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir/$ac_prog$ac_exec_ext"; then
if test $ac_prog = install &&
grep dspmsg "$as_dir/$ac_prog$ac_exec_ext" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
# AIX install. It has an incompatible calling convention.
:
elif test $ac_prog = install &&
grep pwplus "$as_dir/$ac_prog$ac_exec_ext" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
# program-specific install script used by HP pwplus--don't use.
:
else
rm -rf conftest.one conftest.two conftest.dir
echo one > conftest.one
echo two > conftest.two
mkdir conftest.dir
if "$as_dir/$ac_prog$ac_exec_ext" -c conftest.one conftest.two "`pwd`/conftest.dir" &&
test -s conftest.one && test -s conftest.two &&
test -s conftest.dir/conftest.one &&
test -s conftest.dir/conftest.two
then
ac_cv_path_install="$as_dir/$ac_prog$ac_exec_ext -c"
break 3
fi
fi
fi
done
done
;;
esac
done
IFS=$as_save_IFS
rm -rf conftest.one conftest.two conftest.dir
fi
if test "${ac_cv_path_install+set}" = set; then
INSTALL=$ac_cv_path_install
else
# As a last resort, use the slow shell script. Don't cache a
# value for INSTALL within a source directory, because that will
# break other packages using the cache if that directory is
# removed, or if the value is a relative name.
INSTALL=$ac_install_sh
fi
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $INSTALL" >&5
$as_echo "$INSTALL" >&6; }
# Use test -z because SunOS4 sh mishandles braces in ${var-val}.
# It thinks the first close brace ends the variable substitution.
test -z "$INSTALL_PROGRAM" && INSTALL_PROGRAM='${INSTALL}'
test -z "$INSTALL_SCRIPT" && INSTALL_SCRIPT='${INSTALL}'
test -z "$INSTALL_DATA" && INSTALL_DATA='${INSTALL} -m 644'
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for egrep" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for egrep... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_path_EGREP+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
if echo a | $GREP -E '(a|b)' >/dev/null 2>&1
then ac_cv_path_EGREP="$GREP -E"
else
if test -z "$EGREP"; then
ac_path_EGREP_found=false
# Loop through the user's path and test for each of PROGNAME-LIST
as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
for as_dir in $PATH$PATH_SEPARATOR/usr/xpg4/bin
do
IFS=$as_save_IFS
test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=.
for ac_prog in egrep; do
for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
ac_path_EGREP="$as_dir/$ac_prog$ac_exec_ext"
as_fn_executable_p "$ac_path_EGREP" || continue
# Check for GNU ac_path_EGREP and select it if it is found.
# Check for GNU $ac_path_EGREP
case `"$ac_path_EGREP" --version 2>&1` in
*GNU*)
ac_cv_path_EGREP="$ac_path_EGREP" ac_path_EGREP_found=:;;
*)
ac_count=0
$as_echo_n 0123456789 >"conftest.in"
while :
do
cat "conftest.in" "conftest.in" >"conftest.tmp"
mv "conftest.tmp" "conftest.in"
cp "conftest.in" "conftest.nl"
$as_echo 'EGREP' >> "conftest.nl"
"$ac_path_EGREP" 'EGREP$' < "conftest.nl" >"conftest.out" 2>/dev/null || break
diff "conftest.out" "conftest.nl" >/dev/null 2>&1 || break
as_fn_arith $ac_count + 1 && ac_count=$as_val
if test $ac_count -gt ${ac_path_EGREP_max-0}; then
# Best one so far, save it but keep looking for a better one
ac_cv_path_EGREP="$ac_path_EGREP"
ac_path_EGREP_max=$ac_count
fi
# 10*(2^10) chars as input seems more than enough
test $ac_count -gt 10 && break
done
rm -f conftest.in conftest.tmp conftest.nl conftest.out;;
esac
$ac_path_EGREP_found && break 3
done
done
done
IFS=$as_save_IFS
if test -z "$ac_cv_path_EGREP"; then
as_fn_error $? "no acceptable egrep could be found in $PATH$PATH_SEPARATOR/usr/xpg4/bin" "$LINENO" 5
fi
else
ac_cv_path_EGREP=$EGREP
fi
fi
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_path_EGREP" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_cv_path_EGREP" >&6; }
EGREP="$ac_cv_path_EGREP"
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for a thread-safe mkdir -p" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for a thread-safe mkdir -p... " >&6; }
if test -z "$MKDIR_P"; then
if ${ac_cv_path_mkdir+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
for as_dir in $PATH$PATH_SEPARATOR/opt/sfw/bin
do
IFS=$as_save_IFS
test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=.
for ac_prog in mkdir gmkdir; do
for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir/$ac_prog$ac_exec_ext" || continue
case `"$as_dir/$ac_prog$ac_exec_ext" --version 2>&1` in #(
'mkdir (GNU coreutils) '* | \
'mkdir (coreutils) '* | \
'mkdir (fileutils) '4.1*)
ac_cv_path_mkdir=$as_dir/$ac_prog$ac_exec_ext
break 3;;
esac
done
done
done
IFS=$as_save_IFS
fi
test -d ./--version && rmdir ./--version
if test "${ac_cv_path_mkdir+set}" = set; then
MKDIR_P="$ac_cv_path_mkdir -p"
else
# As a last resort, use the slow shell script. Don't cache a
# value for MKDIR_P within a source directory, because that will
# break other packages using the cache if that directory is
# removed, or if the value is a relative name.
MKDIR_P="$ac_install_sh -d"
fi
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $MKDIR_P" >&5
$as_echo "$MKDIR_P" >&6; }
if test -n "$ac_tool_prefix"; then
for ac_prog in ar
do
# Extract the first word of "$ac_tool_prefix$ac_prog", so it can be a program name with args.
set dummy $ac_tool_prefix$ac_prog; ac_word=$2
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_prog_AR+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
if test -n "$AR"; then
ac_cv_prog_AR="$AR" # Let the user override the test.
else
as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
for as_dir in $PATH
do
IFS=$as_save_IFS
test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=.
for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
if as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; then
ac_cv_prog_AR="$ac_tool_prefix$ac_prog"
$as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5
break 2
fi
done
done
IFS=$as_save_IFS
fi
fi
AR=$ac_cv_prog_AR
if test -n "$AR"; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $AR" >&5
$as_echo "$AR" >&6; }
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
fi
test -n "$AR" && break
done
fi
if test -z "$AR"; then
ac_ct_AR=$AR
for ac_prog in ar
do
# Extract the first word of "$ac_prog", so it can be a program name with args.
set dummy $ac_prog; ac_word=$2
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_prog_ac_ct_AR+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
if test -n "$ac_ct_AR"; then
ac_cv_prog_ac_ct_AR="$ac_ct_AR" # Let the user override the test.
else
as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
for as_dir in $PATH
do
IFS=$as_save_IFS
test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=.
for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
if as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; then
ac_cv_prog_ac_ct_AR="$ac_prog"
$as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5
break 2
fi
done
done
IFS=$as_save_IFS
fi
fi
ac_ct_AR=$ac_cv_prog_ac_ct_AR
if test -n "$ac_ct_AR"; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_ct_AR" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_ct_AR" >&6; }
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
fi
test -n "$ac_ct_AR" && break
done
if test "x$ac_ct_AR" = x; then
AR=""
else
case $cross_compiling:$ac_tool_warned in
yes:)
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: using cross tools not prefixed with host triplet" >&5
$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: using cross tools not prefixed with host triplet" >&2;}
ac_tool_warned=yes ;;
esac
AR=$ac_ct_AR
fi
fi
# Extract the first word of "cat", so it can be a program name with args.
set dummy cat; ac_word=$2
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_path_CAT+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
case $CAT in
[\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*)
ac_cv_path_CAT="$CAT" # Let the user override the test with a path.
;;
*)
as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
for as_dir in $PATH
do
IFS=$as_save_IFS
test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=.
for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
if as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; then
ac_cv_path_CAT="$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"
$as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5
break 2
fi
done
done
IFS=$as_save_IFS
;;
esac
fi
CAT=$ac_cv_path_CAT
if test -n "$CAT"; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $CAT" >&5
$as_echo "$CAT" >&6; }
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
fi
# Extract the first word of "kill", so it can be a program name with args.
set dummy kill; ac_word=$2
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_path_KILL+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
case $KILL in
[\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*)
ac_cv_path_KILL="$KILL" # Let the user override the test with a path.
;;
*)
as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
for as_dir in $PATH
do
IFS=$as_save_IFS
test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=.
for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
if as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; then
ac_cv_path_KILL="$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"
$as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5
break 2
fi
done
done
IFS=$as_save_IFS
;;
esac
fi
KILL=$ac_cv_path_KILL
if test -n "$KILL"; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $KILL" >&5
$as_echo "$KILL" >&6; }
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
fi
# Extract the first word of "sed", so it can be a program name with args.
set dummy sed; ac_word=$2
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_path_SED+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
case $SED in
[\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*)
ac_cv_path_SED="$SED" # Let the user override the test with a path.
;;
*)
as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
for as_dir in $PATH
do
IFS=$as_save_IFS
test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=.
for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
if as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; then
ac_cv_path_SED="$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"
$as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5
break 2
fi
done
done
IFS=$as_save_IFS
;;
esac
fi
SED=$ac_cv_path_SED
if test -n "$SED"; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $SED" >&5
$as_echo "$SED" >&6; }
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
fi
# Extract the first word of "ent", so it can be a program name with args.
set dummy ent; ac_word=$2
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_path_ENT+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
case $ENT in
[\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*)
ac_cv_path_ENT="$ENT" # Let the user override the test with a path.
;;
*)
as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
for as_dir in $PATH
do
IFS=$as_save_IFS
test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=.
for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
if as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; then
ac_cv_path_ENT="$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"
$as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5
break 2
fi
done
done
IFS=$as_save_IFS
;;
esac
fi
ENT=$ac_cv_path_ENT
if test -n "$ENT"; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ENT" >&5
$as_echo "$ENT" >&6; }
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
fi
# Extract the first word of "bash", so it can be a program name with args.
set dummy bash; ac_word=$2
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_path_TEST_MINUS_S_SH+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
case $TEST_MINUS_S_SH in
[\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*)
ac_cv_path_TEST_MINUS_S_SH="$TEST_MINUS_S_SH" # Let the user override the test with a path.
;;
*)
as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
for as_dir in $PATH
do
IFS=$as_save_IFS
test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=.
for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
if as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; then
ac_cv_path_TEST_MINUS_S_SH="$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"
$as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5
break 2
fi
done
done
IFS=$as_save_IFS
;;
esac
fi
TEST_MINUS_S_SH=$ac_cv_path_TEST_MINUS_S_SH
if test -n "$TEST_MINUS_S_SH"; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $TEST_MINUS_S_SH" >&5
$as_echo "$TEST_MINUS_S_SH" >&6; }
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
fi
# Extract the first word of "ksh", so it can be a program name with args.
set dummy ksh; ac_word=$2
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_path_TEST_MINUS_S_SH+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
case $TEST_MINUS_S_SH in
[\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*)
ac_cv_path_TEST_MINUS_S_SH="$TEST_MINUS_S_SH" # Let the user override the test with a path.
;;
*)
as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
for as_dir in $PATH
do
IFS=$as_save_IFS
test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=.
for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
if as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; then
ac_cv_path_TEST_MINUS_S_SH="$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"
$as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5
break 2
fi
done
done
IFS=$as_save_IFS
;;
esac
fi
TEST_MINUS_S_SH=$ac_cv_path_TEST_MINUS_S_SH
if test -n "$TEST_MINUS_S_SH"; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $TEST_MINUS_S_SH" >&5
$as_echo "$TEST_MINUS_S_SH" >&6; }
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
fi
# Extract the first word of "sh", so it can be a program name with args.
set dummy sh; ac_word=$2
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_path_TEST_MINUS_S_SH+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
case $TEST_MINUS_S_SH in
[\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*)
ac_cv_path_TEST_MINUS_S_SH="$TEST_MINUS_S_SH" # Let the user override the test with a path.
;;
*)
as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
for as_dir in $PATH
do
IFS=$as_save_IFS
test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=.
for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
if as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; then
ac_cv_path_TEST_MINUS_S_SH="$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"
$as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5
break 2
fi
done
done
IFS=$as_save_IFS
;;
esac
fi
TEST_MINUS_S_SH=$ac_cv_path_TEST_MINUS_S_SH
if test -n "$TEST_MINUS_S_SH"; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $TEST_MINUS_S_SH" >&5
$as_echo "$TEST_MINUS_S_SH" >&6; }
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
fi
# Extract the first word of "sh", so it can be a program name with args.
set dummy sh; ac_word=$2
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_path_SH+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
case $SH in
[\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*)
ac_cv_path_SH="$SH" # Let the user override the test with a path.
;;
*)
as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
for as_dir in $PATH
do
IFS=$as_save_IFS
test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=.
for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
if as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; then
ac_cv_path_SH="$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"
$as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5
break 2
fi
done
done
IFS=$as_save_IFS
;;
esac
fi
SH=$ac_cv_path_SH
if test -n "$SH"; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $SH" >&5
$as_echo "$SH" >&6; }
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
fi
# Extract the first word of "groff", so it can be a program name with args.
set dummy groff; ac_word=$2
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_path_GROFF+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
case $GROFF in
[\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*)
ac_cv_path_GROFF="$GROFF" # Let the user override the test with a path.
;;
*)
as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
for as_dir in $PATH
do
IFS=$as_save_IFS
test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=.
for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
if as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; then
ac_cv_path_GROFF="$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"
$as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5
break 2
fi
done
done
IFS=$as_save_IFS
;;
esac
fi
GROFF=$ac_cv_path_GROFF
if test -n "$GROFF"; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $GROFF" >&5
$as_echo "$GROFF" >&6; }
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
fi
# Extract the first word of "nroff awf", so it can be a program name with args.
set dummy nroff awf; ac_word=$2
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_path_NROFF+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
case $NROFF in
[\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*)
ac_cv_path_NROFF="$NROFF" # Let the user override the test with a path.
;;
*)
as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
for as_dir in $PATH
do
IFS=$as_save_IFS
test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=.
for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
if as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; then
ac_cv_path_NROFF="$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"
$as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5
break 2
fi
done
done
IFS=$as_save_IFS
;;
esac
fi
NROFF=$ac_cv_path_NROFF
if test -n "$NROFF"; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $NROFF" >&5
$as_echo "$NROFF" >&6; }
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
fi
# Extract the first word of "mandoc", so it can be a program name with args.
set dummy mandoc; ac_word=$2
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_path_MANDOC+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
case $MANDOC in
[\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*)
ac_cv_path_MANDOC="$MANDOC" # Let the user override the test with a path.
;;
*)
as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
for as_dir in $PATH
do
IFS=$as_save_IFS
test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=.
for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
if as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; then
ac_cv_path_MANDOC="$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"
$as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5
break 2
fi
done
done
IFS=$as_save_IFS
;;
esac
fi
MANDOC=$ac_cv_path_MANDOC
if test -n "$MANDOC"; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $MANDOC" >&5
$as_echo "$MANDOC" >&6; }
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
fi
TEST_SHELL=sh
if test "x$MANDOC" != "x" ; then
MANFMT="$MANDOC"
elif test "x$NROFF" != "x" ; then
MANFMT="$NROFF -mandoc"
elif test "x$GROFF" != "x" ; then
MANFMT="$GROFF -mandoc -Tascii"
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: no manpage formatter found" >&5
$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: no manpage formatter found" >&2;}
MANFMT="false"
fi
# Extract the first word of "groupadd", so it can be a program name with args.
set dummy groupadd; ac_word=$2
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_path_PATH_GROUPADD_PROG+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
case $PATH_GROUPADD_PROG in
[\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*)
ac_cv_path_PATH_GROUPADD_PROG="$PATH_GROUPADD_PROG" # Let the user override the test with a path.
;;
*)
as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
for as_dir in /usr/sbin${PATH_SEPARATOR}/etc
do
IFS=$as_save_IFS
test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=.
for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
if as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; then
ac_cv_path_PATH_GROUPADD_PROG="$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"
$as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5
break 2
fi
done
done
IFS=$as_save_IFS
test -z "$ac_cv_path_PATH_GROUPADD_PROG" && ac_cv_path_PATH_GROUPADD_PROG="groupadd"
;;
esac
fi
PATH_GROUPADD_PROG=$ac_cv_path_PATH_GROUPADD_PROG
if test -n "$PATH_GROUPADD_PROG"; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $PATH_GROUPADD_PROG" >&5
$as_echo "$PATH_GROUPADD_PROG" >&6; }
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
fi
# Extract the first word of "useradd", so it can be a program name with args.
set dummy useradd; ac_word=$2
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_path_PATH_USERADD_PROG+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
case $PATH_USERADD_PROG in
[\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*)
ac_cv_path_PATH_USERADD_PROG="$PATH_USERADD_PROG" # Let the user override the test with a path.
;;
*)
as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
for as_dir in /usr/sbin${PATH_SEPARATOR}/etc
do
IFS=$as_save_IFS
test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=.
for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
if as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; then
ac_cv_path_PATH_USERADD_PROG="$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"
$as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5
break 2
fi
done
done
IFS=$as_save_IFS
test -z "$ac_cv_path_PATH_USERADD_PROG" && ac_cv_path_PATH_USERADD_PROG="useradd"
;;
esac
fi
PATH_USERADD_PROG=$ac_cv_path_PATH_USERADD_PROG
if test -n "$PATH_USERADD_PROG"; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $PATH_USERADD_PROG" >&5
$as_echo "$PATH_USERADD_PROG" >&6; }
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
fi
# Extract the first word of "pkgmk", so it can be a program name with args.
set dummy pkgmk; ac_word=$2
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_prog_MAKE_PACKAGE_SUPPORTED+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
if test -n "$MAKE_PACKAGE_SUPPORTED"; then
ac_cv_prog_MAKE_PACKAGE_SUPPORTED="$MAKE_PACKAGE_SUPPORTED" # Let the user override the test.
else
as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
for as_dir in $PATH
do
IFS=$as_save_IFS
test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=.
for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
if as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; then
ac_cv_prog_MAKE_PACKAGE_SUPPORTED="yes"
$as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5
break 2
fi
done
done
IFS=$as_save_IFS
test -z "$ac_cv_prog_MAKE_PACKAGE_SUPPORTED" && ac_cv_prog_MAKE_PACKAGE_SUPPORTED="no"
fi
fi
MAKE_PACKAGE_SUPPORTED=$ac_cv_prog_MAKE_PACKAGE_SUPPORTED
if test -n "$MAKE_PACKAGE_SUPPORTED"; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $MAKE_PACKAGE_SUPPORTED" >&5
$as_echo "$MAKE_PACKAGE_SUPPORTED" >&6; }
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
fi
if test -x /sbin/sh; then
STARTUP_SCRIPT_SHELL=/sbin/sh
else
STARTUP_SCRIPT_SHELL=/bin/sh
fi
# System features
# Check whether --enable-largefile was given.
if test "${enable_largefile+set}" = set; then :
enableval=$enable_largefile;
fi
if test "$enable_largefile" != no; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for special C compiler options needed for large files" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for special C compiler options needed for large files... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_sys_largefile_CC+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
ac_cv_sys_largefile_CC=no
if test "$GCC" != yes; then
ac_save_CC=$CC
while :; do
# IRIX 6.2 and later do not support large files by default,
# so use the C compiler's -n32 option if that helps.
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <sys/types.h>
/* Check that off_t can represent 2**63 - 1 correctly.
We can't simply define LARGE_OFF_T to be 9223372036854775807,
since some C++ compilers masquerading as C compilers
incorrectly reject 9223372036854775807. */
#define LARGE_OFF_T (((off_t) 1 << 62) - 1 + ((off_t) 1 << 62))
int off_t_is_large[(LARGE_OFF_T % 2147483629 == 721
&& LARGE_OFF_T % 2147483647 == 1)
? 1 : -1];
int
main ()
{
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
break
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext
CC="$CC -n32"
if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
ac_cv_sys_largefile_CC=' -n32'; break
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext
break
done
CC=$ac_save_CC
rm -f conftest.$ac_ext
fi
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_sys_largefile_CC" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_cv_sys_largefile_CC" >&6; }
if test "$ac_cv_sys_largefile_CC" != no; then
CC=$CC$ac_cv_sys_largefile_CC
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for _FILE_OFFSET_BITS value needed for large files" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for _FILE_OFFSET_BITS value needed for large files... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_sys_file_offset_bits+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
while :; do
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <sys/types.h>
/* Check that off_t can represent 2**63 - 1 correctly.
We can't simply define LARGE_OFF_T to be 9223372036854775807,
since some C++ compilers masquerading as C compilers
incorrectly reject 9223372036854775807. */
#define LARGE_OFF_T (((off_t) 1 << 62) - 1 + ((off_t) 1 << 62))
int off_t_is_large[(LARGE_OFF_T % 2147483629 == 721
&& LARGE_OFF_T % 2147483647 == 1)
? 1 : -1];
int
main ()
{
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
ac_cv_sys_file_offset_bits=no; break
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#define _FILE_OFFSET_BITS 64
#include <sys/types.h>
/* Check that off_t can represent 2**63 - 1 correctly.
We can't simply define LARGE_OFF_T to be 9223372036854775807,
since some C++ compilers masquerading as C compilers
incorrectly reject 9223372036854775807. */
#define LARGE_OFF_T (((off_t) 1 << 62) - 1 + ((off_t) 1 << 62))
int off_t_is_large[(LARGE_OFF_T % 2147483629 == 721
&& LARGE_OFF_T % 2147483647 == 1)
? 1 : -1];
int
main ()
{
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
ac_cv_sys_file_offset_bits=64; break
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
ac_cv_sys_file_offset_bits=unknown
break
done
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_sys_file_offset_bits" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_cv_sys_file_offset_bits" >&6; }
case $ac_cv_sys_file_offset_bits in #(
no | unknown) ;;
*)
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define _FILE_OFFSET_BITS $ac_cv_sys_file_offset_bits
_ACEOF
;;
esac
rm -rf conftest*
if test $ac_cv_sys_file_offset_bits = unknown; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for _LARGE_FILES value needed for large files" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for _LARGE_FILES value needed for large files... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_sys_large_files+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
while :; do
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <sys/types.h>
/* Check that off_t can represent 2**63 - 1 correctly.
We can't simply define LARGE_OFF_T to be 9223372036854775807,
since some C++ compilers masquerading as C compilers
incorrectly reject 9223372036854775807. */
#define LARGE_OFF_T (((off_t) 1 << 62) - 1 + ((off_t) 1 << 62))
int off_t_is_large[(LARGE_OFF_T % 2147483629 == 721
&& LARGE_OFF_T % 2147483647 == 1)
? 1 : -1];
int
main ()
{
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
ac_cv_sys_large_files=no; break
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#define _LARGE_FILES 1
#include <sys/types.h>
/* Check that off_t can represent 2**63 - 1 correctly.
We can't simply define LARGE_OFF_T to be 9223372036854775807,
since some C++ compilers masquerading as C compilers
incorrectly reject 9223372036854775807. */
#define LARGE_OFF_T (((off_t) 1 << 62) - 1 + ((off_t) 1 << 62))
int off_t_is_large[(LARGE_OFF_T % 2147483629 == 721
&& LARGE_OFF_T % 2147483647 == 1)
? 1 : -1];
int
main ()
{
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
ac_cv_sys_large_files=1; break
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
ac_cv_sys_large_files=unknown
break
done
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_sys_large_files" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_cv_sys_large_files" >&6; }
case $ac_cv_sys_large_files in #(
no | unknown) ;;
*)
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define _LARGE_FILES $ac_cv_sys_large_files
_ACEOF
;;
esac
rm -rf conftest*
fi
fi
if test -z "$AR" ; then
as_fn_error $? "*** 'ar' missing, please install or fix your \$PATH ***" "$LINENO" 5
fi
# Extract the first word of "passwd", so it can be a program name with args.
set dummy passwd; ac_word=$2
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_path_PATH_PASSWD_PROG+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
case $PATH_PASSWD_PROG in
[\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*)
ac_cv_path_PATH_PASSWD_PROG="$PATH_PASSWD_PROG" # Let the user override the test with a path.
;;
*)
as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
for as_dir in $PATH
do
IFS=$as_save_IFS
test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=.
for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
if as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; then
ac_cv_path_PATH_PASSWD_PROG="$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"
$as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5
break 2
fi
done
done
IFS=$as_save_IFS
;;
esac
fi
PATH_PASSWD_PROG=$ac_cv_path_PATH_PASSWD_PROG
if test -n "$PATH_PASSWD_PROG"; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $PATH_PASSWD_PROG" >&5
$as_echo "$PATH_PASSWD_PROG" >&6; }
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
fi
if test ! -z "$PATH_PASSWD_PROG" ; then
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define _PATH_PASSWD_PROG "$PATH_PASSWD_PROG"
_ACEOF
fi
LD="$CC"
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for inline" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for inline... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_c_inline+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
ac_cv_c_inline=no
for ac_kw in inline __inline__ __inline; do
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#ifndef __cplusplus
typedef int foo_t;
static $ac_kw foo_t static_foo () {return 0; }
$ac_kw foo_t foo () {return 0; }
#endif
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
ac_cv_c_inline=$ac_kw
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
test "$ac_cv_c_inline" != no && break
done
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_c_inline" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_cv_c_inline" >&6; }
case $ac_cv_c_inline in
inline | yes) ;;
*)
case $ac_cv_c_inline in
no) ac_val=;;
*) ac_val=$ac_cv_c_inline;;
esac
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#ifndef __cplusplus
#define inline $ac_val
#endif
_ACEOF
;;
esac
ac_fn_c_check_decl "$LINENO" "LLONG_MAX" "ac_cv_have_decl_LLONG_MAX" "#include <limits.h>
"
if test "x$ac_cv_have_decl_LLONG_MAX" = xyes; then :
have_llong_max=1
fi
ac_fn_c_check_decl "$LINENO" "SYSTR_POLICY_KILL" "ac_cv_have_decl_SYSTR_POLICY_KILL" "
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/param.h>
#include <dev/systrace.h>
"
if test "x$ac_cv_have_decl_SYSTR_POLICY_KILL" = xyes; then :
have_systr_policy_kill=1
fi
ac_fn_c_check_decl "$LINENO" "RLIMIT_NPROC" "ac_cv_have_decl_RLIMIT_NPROC" "
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/resource.h>
"
if test "x$ac_cv_have_decl_RLIMIT_NPROC" = xyes; then :
$as_echo "#define HAVE_RLIMIT_NPROC /**/" >>confdefs.h
fi
ac_fn_c_check_decl "$LINENO" "PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS" "ac_cv_have_decl_PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS" "
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <linux/prctl.h>
"
if test "x$ac_cv_have_decl_PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS" = xyes; then :
have_linux_no_new_privs=1
fi
openssl=yes
# Check whether --with-openssl was given.
if test "${with_openssl+set}" = set; then :
withval=$with_openssl; if test "x$withval" = "xno" ; then
openssl=no
fi
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking whether OpenSSL will be used for cryptography" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking whether OpenSSL will be used for cryptography... " >&6; }
if test "x$openssl" = "xyes" ; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define WITH_OPENSSL 1
_ACEOF
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
fi
use_stack_protector=1
use_toolchain_hardening=1
# Check whether --with-stackprotect was given.
if test "${with_stackprotect+set}" = set; then :
withval=$with_stackprotect;
if test "x$withval" = "xno"; then
use_stack_protector=0
fi
fi
# Check whether --with-hardening was given.
if test "${with_hardening+set}" = set; then :
withval=$with_hardening;
if test "x$withval" = "xno"; then
use_toolchain_hardening=0
fi
fi
# We use -Werror for the tests only so that we catch warnings like "this is
# on by default" for things like -fPIE.
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if $CC supports -Werror" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking if $CC supports -Werror... " >&6; }
saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS"
CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -Werror"
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
int main(void) { return 0; }
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
WERROR="-Werror"
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
WERROR=""
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
if test "$GCC" = "yes" || test "$GCC" = "egcs"; then
{
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if $CC supports compile flag -pipe" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking if $CC supports compile flag -pipe... " >&6; }
saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS"
CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $WERROR -pipe"
_define_flag=""
test "x$_define_flag" = "x" && _define_flag="-pipe"
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdio.h>
int main(int argc, char **argv) {
/* Some math to catch -ftrapv problems in the toolchain */
int i = 123 * argc, j = 456 + argc, k = 789 - argc;
float l = i * 2.1;
double m = l / 0.5;
long long int n = argc * 12345LL, o = 12345LL * (long long int)argc;
printf("%d %d %d %f %f %lld %lld\n", i, j, k, l, m, n, o);
exit(0);
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
if $ac_cv_path_EGREP -i "unrecognized option|warning.*ignored" conftest.err >/dev/null
then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS $_define_flag"
fi
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
}
{
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if $CC supports compile flag -Wunknown-warning-option" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking if $CC supports compile flag -Wunknown-warning-option... " >&6; }
saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS"
CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $WERROR -Wunknown-warning-option"
_define_flag=""
test "x$_define_flag" = "x" && _define_flag="-Wunknown-warning-option"
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdio.h>
int main(int argc, char **argv) {
/* Some math to catch -ftrapv problems in the toolchain */
int i = 123 * argc, j = 456 + argc, k = 789 - argc;
float l = i * 2.1;
double m = l / 0.5;
long long int n = argc * 12345LL, o = 12345LL * (long long int)argc;
printf("%d %d %d %f %f %lld %lld\n", i, j, k, l, m, n, o);
exit(0);
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
if $ac_cv_path_EGREP -i "unrecognized option|warning.*ignored" conftest.err >/dev/null
then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS $_define_flag"
fi
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
}
{
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if $CC supports compile flag -Wno-error=format-truncation" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking if $CC supports compile flag -Wno-error=format-truncation... " >&6; }
saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS"
CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $WERROR -Wno-error=format-truncation"
_define_flag=""
test "x$_define_flag" = "x" && _define_flag="-Wno-error=format-truncation"
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdio.h>
int main(int argc, char **argv) {
/* Some math to catch -ftrapv problems in the toolchain */
int i = 123 * argc, j = 456 + argc, k = 789 - argc;
float l = i * 2.1;
double m = l / 0.5;
long long int n = argc * 12345LL, o = 12345LL * (long long int)argc;
printf("%d %d %d %f %f %lld %lld\n", i, j, k, l, m, n, o);
exit(0);
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
if $ac_cv_path_EGREP -i "unrecognized option|warning.*ignored" conftest.err >/dev/null
then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS $_define_flag"
fi
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
}
{
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if $CC supports compile flag -Qunused-arguments" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking if $CC supports compile flag -Qunused-arguments... " >&6; }
saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS"
CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $WERROR -Qunused-arguments"
_define_flag=""
test "x$_define_flag" = "x" && _define_flag="-Qunused-arguments"
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdio.h>
int main(int argc, char **argv) {
/* Some math to catch -ftrapv problems in the toolchain */
int i = 123 * argc, j = 456 + argc, k = 789 - argc;
float l = i * 2.1;
double m = l / 0.5;
long long int n = argc * 12345LL, o = 12345LL * (long long int)argc;
printf("%d %d %d %f %f %lld %lld\n", i, j, k, l, m, n, o);
exit(0);
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
if $ac_cv_path_EGREP -i "unrecognized option|warning.*ignored" conftest.err >/dev/null
then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS $_define_flag"
fi
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
}
{
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if $CC supports compile flag -Wall" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking if $CC supports compile flag -Wall... " >&6; }
saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS"
CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $WERROR -Wall"
_define_flag=""
test "x$_define_flag" = "x" && _define_flag="-Wall"
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdio.h>
int main(int argc, char **argv) {
/* Some math to catch -ftrapv problems in the toolchain */
int i = 123 * argc, j = 456 + argc, k = 789 - argc;
float l = i * 2.1;
double m = l / 0.5;
long long int n = argc * 12345LL, o = 12345LL * (long long int)argc;
printf("%d %d %d %f %f %lld %lld\n", i, j, k, l, m, n, o);
exit(0);
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
if $ac_cv_path_EGREP -i "unrecognized option|warning.*ignored" conftest.err >/dev/null
then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS $_define_flag"
fi
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
}
{
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if $CC supports compile flag -Wextra" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking if $CC supports compile flag -Wextra... " >&6; }
saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS"
CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $WERROR -Wextra"
_define_flag=""
test "x$_define_flag" = "x" && _define_flag="-Wextra"
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdio.h>
int main(int argc, char **argv) {
/* Some math to catch -ftrapv problems in the toolchain */
int i = 123 * argc, j = 456 + argc, k = 789 - argc;
float l = i * 2.1;
double m = l / 0.5;
long long int n = argc * 12345LL, o = 12345LL * (long long int)argc;
printf("%d %d %d %f %f %lld %lld\n", i, j, k, l, m, n, o);
exit(0);
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
if $ac_cv_path_EGREP -i "unrecognized option|warning.*ignored" conftest.err >/dev/null
then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS $_define_flag"
fi
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
}
{
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if $CC supports compile flag -Wpointer-arith" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking if $CC supports compile flag -Wpointer-arith... " >&6; }
saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS"
CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $WERROR -Wpointer-arith"
_define_flag=""
test "x$_define_flag" = "x" && _define_flag="-Wpointer-arith"
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdio.h>
int main(int argc, char **argv) {
/* Some math to catch -ftrapv problems in the toolchain */
int i = 123 * argc, j = 456 + argc, k = 789 - argc;
float l = i * 2.1;
double m = l / 0.5;
long long int n = argc * 12345LL, o = 12345LL * (long long int)argc;
printf("%d %d %d %f %f %lld %lld\n", i, j, k, l, m, n, o);
exit(0);
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
if $ac_cv_path_EGREP -i "unrecognized option|warning.*ignored" conftest.err >/dev/null
then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS $_define_flag"
fi
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
}
{
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if $CC supports compile flag -Wuninitialized" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking if $CC supports compile flag -Wuninitialized... " >&6; }
saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS"
CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $WERROR -Wuninitialized"
_define_flag=""
test "x$_define_flag" = "x" && _define_flag="-Wuninitialized"
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdio.h>
int main(int argc, char **argv) {
/* Some math to catch -ftrapv problems in the toolchain */
int i = 123 * argc, j = 456 + argc, k = 789 - argc;
float l = i * 2.1;
double m = l / 0.5;
long long int n = argc * 12345LL, o = 12345LL * (long long int)argc;
printf("%d %d %d %f %f %lld %lld\n", i, j, k, l, m, n, o);
exit(0);
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
if $ac_cv_path_EGREP -i "unrecognized option|warning.*ignored" conftest.err >/dev/null
then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS $_define_flag"
fi
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
}
{
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if $CC supports compile flag -Wsign-compare" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking if $CC supports compile flag -Wsign-compare... " >&6; }
saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS"
CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $WERROR -Wsign-compare"
_define_flag=""
test "x$_define_flag" = "x" && _define_flag="-Wsign-compare"
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdio.h>
int main(int argc, char **argv) {
/* Some math to catch -ftrapv problems in the toolchain */
int i = 123 * argc, j = 456 + argc, k = 789 - argc;
float l = i * 2.1;
double m = l / 0.5;
long long int n = argc * 12345LL, o = 12345LL * (long long int)argc;
printf("%d %d %d %f %f %lld %lld\n", i, j, k, l, m, n, o);
exit(0);
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
if $ac_cv_path_EGREP -i "unrecognized option|warning.*ignored" conftest.err >/dev/null
then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS $_define_flag"
fi
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
}
{
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if $CC supports compile flag -Wformat-security" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking if $CC supports compile flag -Wformat-security... " >&6; }
saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS"
CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $WERROR -Wformat-security"
_define_flag=""
test "x$_define_flag" = "x" && _define_flag="-Wformat-security"
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdio.h>
int main(int argc, char **argv) {
/* Some math to catch -ftrapv problems in the toolchain */
int i = 123 * argc, j = 456 + argc, k = 789 - argc;
float l = i * 2.1;
double m = l / 0.5;
long long int n = argc * 12345LL, o = 12345LL * (long long int)argc;
printf("%d %d %d %f %f %lld %lld\n", i, j, k, l, m, n, o);
exit(0);
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
if $ac_cv_path_EGREP -i "unrecognized option|warning.*ignored" conftest.err >/dev/null
then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS $_define_flag"
fi
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
}
{
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if $CC supports compile flag -Wsizeof-pointer-memaccess" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking if $CC supports compile flag -Wsizeof-pointer-memaccess... " >&6; }
saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS"
CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $WERROR -Wsizeof-pointer-memaccess"
_define_flag=""
test "x$_define_flag" = "x" && _define_flag="-Wsizeof-pointer-memaccess"
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdio.h>
int main(int argc, char **argv) {
/* Some math to catch -ftrapv problems in the toolchain */
int i = 123 * argc, j = 456 + argc, k = 789 - argc;
float l = i * 2.1;
double m = l / 0.5;
long long int n = argc * 12345LL, o = 12345LL * (long long int)argc;
printf("%d %d %d %f %f %lld %lld\n", i, j, k, l, m, n, o);
exit(0);
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
if $ac_cv_path_EGREP -i "unrecognized option|warning.*ignored" conftest.err >/dev/null
then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS $_define_flag"
fi
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
}
{
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if $CC supports compile flag -Wpointer-sign" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking if $CC supports compile flag -Wpointer-sign... " >&6; }
saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS"
CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $WERROR -Wpointer-sign"
_define_flag="-Wno-pointer-sign"
test "x$_define_flag" = "x" && _define_flag="-Wpointer-sign"
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdio.h>
int main(int argc, char **argv) {
/* Some math to catch -ftrapv problems in the toolchain */
int i = 123 * argc, j = 456 + argc, k = 789 - argc;
float l = i * 2.1;
double m = l / 0.5;
long long int n = argc * 12345LL, o = 12345LL * (long long int)argc;
printf("%d %d %d %f %f %lld %lld\n", i, j, k, l, m, n, o);
exit(0);
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
if $ac_cv_path_EGREP -i "unrecognized option|warning.*ignored" conftest.err >/dev/null
then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS $_define_flag"
fi
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
}
{
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if $CC supports compile flag -Wunused-result" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking if $CC supports compile flag -Wunused-result... " >&6; }
saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS"
CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $WERROR -Wunused-result"
_define_flag="-Wno-unused-result"
test "x$_define_flag" = "x" && _define_flag="-Wunused-result"
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdio.h>
int main(int argc, char **argv) {
/* Some math to catch -ftrapv problems in the toolchain */
int i = 123 * argc, j = 456 + argc, k = 789 - argc;
float l = i * 2.1;
double m = l / 0.5;
long long int n = argc * 12345LL, o = 12345LL * (long long int)argc;
printf("%d %d %d %f %f %lld %lld\n", i, j, k, l, m, n, o);
exit(0);
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
+if $ac_cv_path_EGREP -i "unrecognized option|warning.*ignored" conftest.err >/dev/null
+then
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+$as_echo "no" >&6; }
+ CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
+else
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
+$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
+ CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS $_define_flag"
+fi
+else
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+$as_echo "no" >&6; }
+ CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
+
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+}
+ {
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if $CC supports compile flag -Wimplicit-fallthrough" >&5
+$as_echo_n "checking if $CC supports compile flag -Wimplicit-fallthrough... " >&6; }
+ saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS"
+ CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $WERROR -Wimplicit-fallthrough"
+ _define_flag=""
+ test "x$_define_flag" = "x" && _define_flag="-Wimplicit-fallthrough"
+ cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+int main(int argc, char **argv) {
+ /* Some math to catch -ftrapv problems in the toolchain */
+ int i = 123 * argc, j = 456 + argc, k = 789 - argc;
+ float l = i * 2.1;
+ double m = l / 0.5;
+ long long int n = argc * 12345LL, o = 12345LL * (long long int)argc;
+ printf("%d %d %d %f %f %lld %lld\n", i, j, k, l, m, n, o);
+ exit(0);
+}
+
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
+
if $ac_cv_path_EGREP -i "unrecognized option|warning.*ignored" conftest.err >/dev/null
then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS $_define_flag"
fi
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
}
{
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if $CC supports compile flag -fno-strict-aliasing" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking if $CC supports compile flag -fno-strict-aliasing... " >&6; }
saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS"
CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $WERROR -fno-strict-aliasing"
_define_flag=""
test "x$_define_flag" = "x" && _define_flag="-fno-strict-aliasing"
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdio.h>
int main(int argc, char **argv) {
/* Some math to catch -ftrapv problems in the toolchain */
int i = 123 * argc, j = 456 + argc, k = 789 - argc;
float l = i * 2.1;
double m = l / 0.5;
long long int n = argc * 12345LL, o = 12345LL * (long long int)argc;
printf("%d %d %d %f %f %lld %lld\n", i, j, k, l, m, n, o);
exit(0);
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
if $ac_cv_path_EGREP -i "unrecognized option|warning.*ignored" conftest.err >/dev/null
then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS $_define_flag"
fi
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
}
if test "x$use_toolchain_hardening" = "x1"; then
{
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if $CC supports compile flag -mretpoline" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking if $CC supports compile flag -mretpoline... " >&6; }
saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS"
CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $WERROR -mretpoline"
_define_flag=""
test "x$_define_flag" = "x" && _define_flag="-mretpoline"
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdio.h>
int main(int argc, char **argv) {
/* Some math to catch -ftrapv problems in the toolchain */
int i = 123 * argc, j = 456 + argc, k = 789 - argc;
float l = i * 2.1;
double m = l / 0.5;
long long int n = argc * 12345LL, o = 12345LL * (long long int)argc;
printf("%d %d %d %f %f %lld %lld\n", i, j, k, l, m, n, o);
exit(0);
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
if $ac_cv_path_EGREP -i "unrecognized option|warning.*ignored" conftest.err >/dev/null
then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS $_define_flag"
fi
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
} # clang
{
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if $LD supports link flag -Wl,-z,retpolineplt" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking if $LD supports link flag -Wl,-z,retpolineplt... " >&6; }
saved_LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS"
LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS $WERROR -Wl,-z,retpolineplt"
_define_flag=""
test "x$_define_flag" = "x" && _define_flag="-Wl,-z,retpolineplt"
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdio.h>
int main(int argc, char **argv) {
/* Some math to catch -ftrapv problems in the toolchain */
int i = 123 * argc, j = 456 + argc, k = 789 - argc;
float l = i * 2.1;
double m = l / 0.5;
long long int n = argc * 12345LL, o = 12345LL * (long long int)argc;
long long p = n * o;
printf("%d %d %d %f %f %lld %lld %lld\n", i, j, k, l, m, n, o, p);
exit(0);
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
if $ac_cv_path_EGREP -i "unrecognized option|warning.*ignored" conftest.err >/dev/null
then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
LDFLAGS="$saved_LDFLAGS"
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
LDFLAGS="$saved_LDFLAGS $_define_flag"
fi
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
LDFLAGS="$saved_LDFLAGS"
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
}
{
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if $CC supports compile flag -D_FORTIFY_SOURCE=2" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking if $CC supports compile flag -D_FORTIFY_SOURCE=2... " >&6; }
saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS"
CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $WERROR -D_FORTIFY_SOURCE=2"
_define_flag=""
test "x$_define_flag" = "x" && _define_flag="-D_FORTIFY_SOURCE=2"
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdio.h>
int main(int argc, char **argv) {
/* Some math to catch -ftrapv problems in the toolchain */
int i = 123 * argc, j = 456 + argc, k = 789 - argc;
float l = i * 2.1;
double m = l / 0.5;
long long int n = argc * 12345LL, o = 12345LL * (long long int)argc;
printf("%d %d %d %f %f %lld %lld\n", i, j, k, l, m, n, o);
exit(0);
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
if $ac_cv_path_EGREP -i "unrecognized option|warning.*ignored" conftest.err >/dev/null
then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS $_define_flag"
fi
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
}
{
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if $LD supports link flag -Wl,-z,relro" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking if $LD supports link flag -Wl,-z,relro... " >&6; }
saved_LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS"
LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS $WERROR -Wl,-z,relro"
_define_flag=""
test "x$_define_flag" = "x" && _define_flag="-Wl,-z,relro"
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdio.h>
int main(int argc, char **argv) {
/* Some math to catch -ftrapv problems in the toolchain */
int i = 123 * argc, j = 456 + argc, k = 789 - argc;
float l = i * 2.1;
double m = l / 0.5;
long long int n = argc * 12345LL, o = 12345LL * (long long int)argc;
long long p = n * o;
printf("%d %d %d %f %f %lld %lld %lld\n", i, j, k, l, m, n, o, p);
exit(0);
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
if $ac_cv_path_EGREP -i "unrecognized option|warning.*ignored" conftest.err >/dev/null
then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
LDFLAGS="$saved_LDFLAGS"
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
LDFLAGS="$saved_LDFLAGS $_define_flag"
fi
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
LDFLAGS="$saved_LDFLAGS"
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
}
{
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if $LD supports link flag -Wl,-z,now" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking if $LD supports link flag -Wl,-z,now... " >&6; }
saved_LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS"
LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS $WERROR -Wl,-z,now"
_define_flag=""
test "x$_define_flag" = "x" && _define_flag="-Wl,-z,now"
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdio.h>
int main(int argc, char **argv) {
/* Some math to catch -ftrapv problems in the toolchain */
int i = 123 * argc, j = 456 + argc, k = 789 - argc;
float l = i * 2.1;
double m = l / 0.5;
long long int n = argc * 12345LL, o = 12345LL * (long long int)argc;
long long p = n * o;
printf("%d %d %d %f %f %lld %lld %lld\n", i, j, k, l, m, n, o, p);
exit(0);
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
if $ac_cv_path_EGREP -i "unrecognized option|warning.*ignored" conftest.err >/dev/null
then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
LDFLAGS="$saved_LDFLAGS"
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
LDFLAGS="$saved_LDFLAGS $_define_flag"
fi
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
LDFLAGS="$saved_LDFLAGS"
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
}
{
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if $LD supports link flag -Wl,-z,noexecstack" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking if $LD supports link flag -Wl,-z,noexecstack... " >&6; }
saved_LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS"
LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS $WERROR -Wl,-z,noexecstack"
_define_flag=""
test "x$_define_flag" = "x" && _define_flag="-Wl,-z,noexecstack"
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdio.h>
int main(int argc, char **argv) {
/* Some math to catch -ftrapv problems in the toolchain */
int i = 123 * argc, j = 456 + argc, k = 789 - argc;
float l = i * 2.1;
double m = l / 0.5;
long long int n = argc * 12345LL, o = 12345LL * (long long int)argc;
long long p = n * o;
printf("%d %d %d %f %f %lld %lld %lld\n", i, j, k, l, m, n, o, p);
exit(0);
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
if $ac_cv_path_EGREP -i "unrecognized option|warning.*ignored" conftest.err >/dev/null
then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
LDFLAGS="$saved_LDFLAGS"
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
LDFLAGS="$saved_LDFLAGS $_define_flag"
fi
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
LDFLAGS="$saved_LDFLAGS"
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
}
# NB. -ftrapv expects certain support functions to be present in
# the compiler library (libgcc or similar) to detect integer operations
# that can overflow. We must check that the result of enabling it
# actually links. The test program compiled/linked includes a number
# of integer operations that should exercise this.
{
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if $CC supports compile flag -ftrapv and linking succeeds" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking if $CC supports compile flag -ftrapv and linking succeeds... " >&6; }
saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS"
CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $WERROR -ftrapv"
_define_flag=""
test "x$_define_flag" = "x" && _define_flag="-ftrapv"
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdio.h>
int main(int argc, char **argv) {
/* Some math to catch -ftrapv problems in the toolchain */
int i = 123 * argc, j = 456 + argc, k = 789 - argc;
float l = i * 2.1;
double m = l / 0.5;
long long int n = argc * 12345LL, o = 12345LL * (long long int)argc;
long long int p = n * o;
printf("%d %d %d %f %f %lld %lld %lld\n", i, j, k, l, m, n, o, p);
exit(0);
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
if $ac_cv_path_EGREP -i "unrecognized option|warning.*ignored" conftest.err >/dev/null
then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS $_define_flag"
fi
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
}
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking gcc version" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking gcc version... " >&6; }
GCC_VER=`$CC -v 2>&1 | $AWK '/gcc version /{print $3}'`
case $GCC_VER in
1.*) no_attrib_nonnull=1 ;;
2.8* | 2.9*)
no_attrib_nonnull=1
;;
2.*) no_attrib_nonnull=1 ;;
*) ;;
esac
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $GCC_VER" >&5
$as_echo "$GCC_VER" >&6; }
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if $CC accepts -fno-builtin-memset" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking if $CC accepts -fno-builtin-memset... " >&6; }
saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS"
CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -fno-builtin-memset"
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <string.h>
int
main ()
{
char b[10]; memset(b, 0, sizeof(b));
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
# -fstack-protector-all doesn't always work for some GCC versions
# and/or platforms, so we test if we can. If it's not supported
# on a given platform gcc will emit a warning so we use -Werror.
if test "x$use_stack_protector" = "x1"; then
for t in -fstack-protector-strong -fstack-protector-all \
-fstack-protector; do
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if $CC supports $t" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking if $CC supports $t... " >&6; }
saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS"
saved_LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS"
CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $t -Werror"
LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS $t -Werror"
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
- #include <stdio.h>
+
+ #include <stdio.h>
+ int func (int t) {char b[100]; snprintf(b,sizeof b,"%d",t); return t;}
+
int
main ()
{
char x[256];
- snprintf(x, sizeof(x), "XXX");
+ snprintf(x, sizeof(x), "XXX%d", func(1));
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS $t"
LDFLAGS="$saved_LDFLAGS $t"
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if $t works" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking if $t works... " >&6; }
if test "$cross_compiling" = yes; then :
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: cross compiling: cannot test" >&5
$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: cross compiling: cannot test" >&2;}
break
else
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
- #include <stdio.h>
+
+ #include <stdio.h>
+ int func (int t) {char b[100]; snprintf(b,sizeof b,"%d",t); return t;}
+
int
main ()
{
char x[256];
- snprintf(x, sizeof(x), "XXX");
+ snprintf(x, sizeof(x), "XXX%d", func(1));
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_run "$LINENO"; then :
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
break
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
fi
rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* gmon.out bb.out conftest$ac_exeext \
conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
fi
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
LDFLAGS="$saved_LDFLAGS"
done
fi
if test -z "$have_llong_max"; then
# retry LLONG_MAX with -std=gnu99, needed on some Linuxes
unset ac_cv_have_decl_LLONG_MAX
saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS"
CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -std=gnu99"
ac_fn_c_check_decl "$LINENO" "LLONG_MAX" "ac_cv_have_decl_LLONG_MAX" "#include <limits.h>
"
if test "x$ac_cv_have_decl_LLONG_MAX" = xyes; then :
have_llong_max=1
else
CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
fi
fi
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if compiler allows __attribute__ on return types" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking if compiler allows __attribute__ on return types... " >&6; }
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <stdlib.h>
__attribute__((__unused__)) static void foo(void){return;}
int
main ()
{
exit(0);
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
$as_echo "#define NO_ATTRIBUTE_ON_RETURN_TYPE 1" >>confdefs.h
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if compiler allows __attribute__ prototype args" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking if compiler allows __attribute__ prototype args... " >&6; }
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <stdlib.h>
typedef void foo(const char *, ...) __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2)));
int
main ()
{
exit(0);
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
$as_echo "#define NO_ATTRIBUTE_ON_PROTOTYPE_ARGS 1" >>confdefs.h
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
if test "x$no_attrib_nonnull" != "x1" ; then
$as_echo "#define HAVE_ATTRIBUTE__NONNULL__ 1" >>confdefs.h
fi
# Check whether --with-rpath was given.
if test "${with_rpath+set}" = set; then :
withval=$with_rpath;
if test "x$withval" = "xno" ; then
rpath_opt=""
elif test "x$withval" = "xyes" ; then
rpath_opt="-R"
else
rpath_opt="$withval"
fi
fi
# Allow user to specify flags
# Check whether --with-cflags was given.
if test "${with_cflags+set}" = set; then :
withval=$with_cflags;
if test -n "$withval" && test "x$withval" != "xno" && \
test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then
CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $withval"
fi
fi
# Check whether --with-cflags-after was given.
if test "${with_cflags_after+set}" = set; then :
withval=$with_cflags_after;
if test -n "$withval" && test "x$withval" != "xno" && \
test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then
CFLAGS_AFTER="$withval"
fi
fi
# Check whether --with-cppflags was given.
if test "${with_cppflags+set}" = set; then :
withval=$with_cppflags;
if test -n "$withval" && test "x$withval" != "xno" && \
test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then
CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS $withval"
fi
fi
# Check whether --with-ldflags was given.
if test "${with_ldflags+set}" = set; then :
withval=$with_ldflags;
if test -n "$withval" && test "x$withval" != "xno" && \
test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then
LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS $withval"
fi
fi
# Check whether --with-ldflags-after was given.
if test "${with_ldflags_after+set}" = set; then :
withval=$with_ldflags_after;
if test -n "$withval" && test "x$withval" != "xno" && \
test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then
LDFLAGS_AFTER="$withval"
fi
fi
# Check whether --with-libs was given.
if test "${with_libs+set}" = set; then :
withval=$with_libs;
if test -n "$withval" && test "x$withval" != "xno" && \
test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then
LIBS="$LIBS $withval"
fi
fi
# Check whether --with-Werror was given.
if test "${with_Werror+set}" = set; then :
withval=$with_Werror;
if test -n "$withval" && test "x$withval" != "xno"; then
werror_flags="-Werror"
if test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then
werror_flags="$withval"
fi
fi
fi
for ac_header in \
blf.h \
bstring.h \
crypt.h \
crypto/sha2.h \
dirent.h \
endian.h \
elf.h \
err.h \
features.h \
fcntl.h \
floatingpoint.h \
+ fnmatch.h \
getopt.h \
glob.h \
ia.h \
iaf.h \
ifaddrs.h \
inttypes.h \
langinfo.h \
limits.h \
locale.h \
login.h \
maillock.h \
ndir.h \
net/if_tun.h \
netdb.h \
netgroup.h \
pam/pam_appl.h \
paths.h \
poll.h \
pty.h \
readpassphrase.h \
rpc/types.h \
security/pam_appl.h \
sha2.h \
shadow.h \
stddef.h \
stdint.h \
string.h \
strings.h \
sys/bitypes.h \
sys/bsdtty.h \
sys/cdefs.h \
sys/dir.h \
sys/file.h \
sys/mman.h \
sys/label.h \
sys/ndir.h \
sys/poll.h \
sys/prctl.h \
sys/pstat.h \
sys/ptrace.h \
sys/random.h \
sys/select.h \
sys/stat.h \
sys/stream.h \
sys/stropts.h \
sys/strtio.h \
sys/statvfs.h \
sys/sysmacros.h \
sys/time.h \
sys/timers.h \
sys/vfs.h \
time.h \
tmpdir.h \
ttyent.h \
ucred.h \
unistd.h \
usersec.h \
util.h \
utime.h \
utmp.h \
utmpx.h \
vis.h \
wchar.h \
do :
as_ac_Header=`$as_echo "ac_cv_header_$ac_header" | $as_tr_sh`
ac_fn_c_check_header_mongrel "$LINENO" "$ac_header" "$as_ac_Header" "$ac_includes_default"
if eval test \"x\$"$as_ac_Header"\" = x"yes"; then :
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define `$as_echo "HAVE_$ac_header" | $as_tr_cpp` 1
_ACEOF
fi
done
# On some platforms (eg SunOS4) sys/audit.h requires sys/[time|types|label.h]
# to be included first.
for ac_header in sys/audit.h
do :
ac_fn_c_check_header_compile "$LINENO" "sys/audit.h" "ac_cv_header_sys_audit_h" "
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
# include <sys/time.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H
# include <sys/types.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_LABEL_H
# include <sys/label.h>
#endif
"
if test "x$ac_cv_header_sys_audit_h" = xyes; then :
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define HAVE_SYS_AUDIT_H 1
_ACEOF
fi
done
# sys/capsicum.h requires sys/types.h
for ac_header in sys/capsicum.h
do :
ac_fn_c_check_header_compile "$LINENO" "sys/capsicum.h" "ac_cv_header_sys_capsicum_h" "
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H
# include <sys/types.h>
#endif
"
if test "x$ac_cv_header_sys_capsicum_h" = xyes; then :
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define HAVE_SYS_CAPSICUM_H 1
_ACEOF
fi
done
# net/route.h requires sys/socket.h and sys/types.h.
# sys/sysctl.h also requires sys/param.h
for ac_header in net/route.h sys/sysctl.h
do :
as_ac_Header=`$as_echo "ac_cv_header_$ac_header" | $as_tr_sh`
ac_fn_c_check_header_compile "$LINENO" "$ac_header" "$as_ac_Header" "
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H
# include <sys/types.h>
#endif
#include <sys/param.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
"
if eval test \"x\$"$as_ac_Header"\" = x"yes"; then :
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define `$as_echo "HAVE_$ac_header" | $as_tr_cpp` 1
_ACEOF
fi
done
# lastlog.h requires sys/time.h to be included first on Solaris
for ac_header in lastlog.h
do :
ac_fn_c_check_header_compile "$LINENO" "lastlog.h" "ac_cv_header_lastlog_h" "
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
# include <sys/time.h>
#endif
"
if test "x$ac_cv_header_lastlog_h" = xyes; then :
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define HAVE_LASTLOG_H 1
_ACEOF
fi
done
# sys/ptms.h requires sys/stream.h to be included first on Solaris
for ac_header in sys/ptms.h
do :
ac_fn_c_check_header_compile "$LINENO" "sys/ptms.h" "ac_cv_header_sys_ptms_h" "
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STREAM_H
# include <sys/stream.h>
#endif
"
if test "x$ac_cv_header_sys_ptms_h" = xyes; then :
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define HAVE_SYS_PTMS_H 1
_ACEOF
fi
done
# login_cap.h requires sys/types.h on NetBSD
for ac_header in login_cap.h
do :
ac_fn_c_check_header_compile "$LINENO" "login_cap.h" "ac_cv_header_login_cap_h" "
#include <sys/types.h>
"
if test "x$ac_cv_header_login_cap_h" = xyes; then :
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define HAVE_LOGIN_CAP_H 1
_ACEOF
fi
done
# older BSDs need sys/param.h before sys/mount.h
for ac_header in sys/mount.h
do :
ac_fn_c_check_header_compile "$LINENO" "sys/mount.h" "ac_cv_header_sys_mount_h" "
#include <sys/param.h>
"
if test "x$ac_cv_header_sys_mount_h" = xyes; then :
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define HAVE_SYS_MOUNT_H 1
_ACEOF
fi
done
# Android requires sys/socket.h to be included before sys/un.h
for ac_header in sys/un.h
do :
ac_fn_c_check_header_compile "$LINENO" "sys/un.h" "ac_cv_header_sys_un_h" "
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
"
if test "x$ac_cv_header_sys_un_h" = xyes; then :
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define HAVE_SYS_UN_H 1
_ACEOF
fi
done
# Messages for features tested for in target-specific section
SIA_MSG="no"
SPC_MSG="no"
SP_MSG="no"
SPP_MSG="no"
# Support for Solaris/Illumos privileges (this test is used by both
# the --with-solaris-privs option and --with-sandbox=solaris).
SOLARIS_PRIVS="no"
# Check for some target-specific stuff
case "$host" in
*-*-aix*)
# Some versions of VAC won't allow macro redefinitions at
# -qlanglevel=ansi, and autoconf 2.60 sometimes insists on using that
# particularly with older versions of vac or xlc.
# It also throws errors about null macro arguments, but these are
# not fatal.
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if compiler allows macro redefinitions" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking if compiler allows macro redefinitions... " >&6; }
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#define testmacro foo
#define testmacro bar
int
main ()
{
exit(0);
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
CC="`echo $CC | sed 's/-qlanglvl\=ansi//g'`"
CFLAGS="`echo $CFLAGS | sed 's/-qlanglvl\=ansi//g'`"
CPPFLAGS="`echo $CPPFLAGS | sed 's/-qlanglvl\=ansi//g'`"
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking how to specify blibpath for linker ($LD)" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking how to specify blibpath for linker ($LD)... " >&6; }
if (test -z "$blibpath"); then
blibpath="/usr/lib:/lib"
fi
saved_LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS"
if test "$GCC" = "yes"; then
flags="-Wl,-blibpath: -Wl,-rpath, -blibpath:"
else
flags="-blibpath: -Wl,-blibpath: -Wl,-rpath,"
fi
for tryflags in $flags ;do
if (test -z "$blibflags"); then
LDFLAGS="$saved_LDFLAGS $tryflags$blibpath"
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
int
main ()
{
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
blibflags=$tryflags
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
fi
done
if (test -z "$blibflags"); then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: not found" >&5
$as_echo "not found" >&6; }
as_fn_error $? "*** must be able to specify blibpath on AIX - check config.log" "$LINENO" 5
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $blibflags" >&5
$as_echo "$blibflags" >&6; }
fi
LDFLAGS="$saved_LDFLAGS"
ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "authenticate" "ac_cv_func_authenticate"
if test "x$ac_cv_func_authenticate" = xyes; then :
$as_echo "#define WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE 1" >>confdefs.h
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for authenticate in -ls" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for authenticate in -ls... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_lib_s_authenticate+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
LIBS="-ls $LIBS"
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C"
#endif
char authenticate ();
int
main ()
{
return authenticate ();
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
ac_cv_lib_s_authenticate=yes
else
ac_cv_lib_s_authenticate=no
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_s_authenticate" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_s_authenticate" >&6; }
if test "x$ac_cv_lib_s_authenticate" = xyes; then :
$as_echo "#define WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE 1" >>confdefs.h
LIBS="$LIBS -ls"
fi
fi
ac_fn_c_check_decl "$LINENO" "authenticate" "ac_cv_have_decl_authenticate" "#include <usersec.h>
"
if test "x$ac_cv_have_decl_authenticate" = xyes; then :
ac_have_decl=1
else
ac_have_decl=0
fi
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define HAVE_DECL_AUTHENTICATE $ac_have_decl
_ACEOF
ac_fn_c_check_decl "$LINENO" "loginrestrictions" "ac_cv_have_decl_loginrestrictions" "#include <usersec.h>
"
if test "x$ac_cv_have_decl_loginrestrictions" = xyes; then :
ac_have_decl=1
else
ac_have_decl=0
fi
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define HAVE_DECL_LOGINRESTRICTIONS $ac_have_decl
_ACEOF
ac_fn_c_check_decl "$LINENO" "loginsuccess" "ac_cv_have_decl_loginsuccess" "#include <usersec.h>
"
if test "x$ac_cv_have_decl_loginsuccess" = xyes; then :
ac_have_decl=1
else
ac_have_decl=0
fi
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define HAVE_DECL_LOGINSUCCESS $ac_have_decl
_ACEOF
ac_fn_c_check_decl "$LINENO" "passwdexpired" "ac_cv_have_decl_passwdexpired" "#include <usersec.h>
"
if test "x$ac_cv_have_decl_passwdexpired" = xyes; then :
ac_have_decl=1
else
ac_have_decl=0
fi
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define HAVE_DECL_PASSWDEXPIRED $ac_have_decl
_ACEOF
ac_fn_c_check_decl "$LINENO" "setauthdb" "ac_cv_have_decl_setauthdb" "#include <usersec.h>
"
if test "x$ac_cv_have_decl_setauthdb" = xyes; then :
ac_have_decl=1
else
ac_have_decl=0
fi
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define HAVE_DECL_SETAUTHDB $ac_have_decl
_ACEOF
ac_fn_c_check_decl "$LINENO" "loginfailed" "ac_cv_have_decl_loginfailed" "#include <usersec.h>
"
if test "x$ac_cv_have_decl_loginfailed" = xyes; then :
ac_have_decl=1
else
ac_have_decl=0
fi
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define HAVE_DECL_LOGINFAILED $ac_have_decl
_ACEOF
if test $ac_have_decl = 1; then :
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if loginfailed takes 4 arguments" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking if loginfailed takes 4 arguments... " >&6; }
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <usersec.h>
int
main ()
{
(void)loginfailed("user","host","tty",0);
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
$as_echo "#define AIX_LOGINFAILED_4ARG 1" >>confdefs.h
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
fi
for ac_func in getgrset setauthdb
do :
as_ac_var=`$as_echo "ac_cv_func_$ac_func" | $as_tr_sh`
ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "$ac_func" "$as_ac_var"
if eval test \"x\$"$as_ac_var"\" = x"yes"; then :
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define `$as_echo "HAVE_$ac_func" | $as_tr_cpp` 1
_ACEOF
fi
done
ac_fn_c_check_decl "$LINENO" "F_CLOSEM" "ac_cv_have_decl_F_CLOSEM" " #include <limits.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
"
if test "x$ac_cv_have_decl_F_CLOSEM" = xyes; then :
$as_echo "#define HAVE_FCNTL_CLOSEM 1" >>confdefs.h
fi
check_for_aix_broken_getaddrinfo=1
$as_echo "#define SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID 1" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define BROKEN_SETREUID 1" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define BROKEN_SETREGID 1" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define DISABLE_LASTLOG 1" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define LOGIN_NEEDS_UTMPX 1" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define SPT_TYPE SPT_REUSEARGV" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define SSHPAM_CHAUTHTOK_NEEDS_RUID 1" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define PTY_ZEROREAD 1" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define PLATFORM_SYS_DIR_UID 2" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define BROKEN_STRNDUP 1" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define BROKEN_STRNLEN 1" >>confdefs.h
;;
*-*-android*)
$as_echo "#define DISABLE_UTMP 1" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define DISABLE_WTMP 1" >>confdefs.h
;;
*-*-cygwin*)
check_for_libcrypt_later=1
LIBS="$LIBS /usr/lib/textreadmode.o"
$as_echo "#define HAVE_CYGWIN 1" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define USE_PIPES 1" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define NO_UID_RESTORATION_TEST 1" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define DISABLE_SHADOW 1" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define NO_X11_UNIX_SOCKETS 1" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define DISABLE_FD_PASSING 1" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define SSH_IOBUFSZ 65535" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define FILESYSTEM_NO_BACKSLASH 1" >>confdefs.h
# Cygwin defines optargs, optargs as declspec(dllimport) for historical
# reasons which cause compile warnings, so we disable those warnings.
{
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if $CC supports compile flag -Wno-attributes" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking if $CC supports compile flag -Wno-attributes... " >&6; }
saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS"
CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $WERROR -Wno-attributes"
_define_flag=""
test "x$_define_flag" = "x" && _define_flag="-Wno-attributes"
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdio.h>
int main(int argc, char **argv) {
/* Some math to catch -ftrapv problems in the toolchain */
int i = 123 * argc, j = 456 + argc, k = 789 - argc;
float l = i * 2.1;
double m = l / 0.5;
long long int n = argc * 12345LL, o = 12345LL * (long long int)argc;
printf("%d %d %d %f %f %lld %lld\n", i, j, k, l, m, n, o);
exit(0);
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
if $ac_cv_path_EGREP -i "unrecognized option|warning.*ignored" conftest.err >/dev/null
then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS $_define_flag"
fi
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
}
;;
*-*-dgux*)
$as_echo "#define IP_TOS_IS_BROKEN 1" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID 1" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define BROKEN_SETREUID 1" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define BROKEN_SETREGID 1" >>confdefs.h
;;
*-*-darwin*)
use_pie=auto
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if we have working getaddrinfo" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking if we have working getaddrinfo... " >&6; }
if test "$cross_compiling" = yes; then :
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: assume it is working" >&5
$as_echo "assume it is working" >&6; }
else
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <mach-o/dyld.h>
main() { if (NSVersionOfRunTimeLibrary("System") >= (60 << 16))
exit(0);
else
exit(1);
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_run "$LINENO"; then :
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: working" >&5
$as_echo "working" >&6; }
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: buggy" >&5
$as_echo "buggy" >&6; }
$as_echo "#define BROKEN_GETADDRINFO 1" >>confdefs.h
fi
rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* gmon.out bb.out conftest$ac_exeext \
conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
fi
$as_echo "#define SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID 1" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define BROKEN_SETREUID 1" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define BROKEN_SETREGID 1" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define BROKEN_GLOB 1" >>confdefs.h
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define BIND_8_COMPAT 1
_ACEOF
$as_echo "#define SSH_TUN_FREEBSD 1" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define SSH_TUN_COMPAT_AF 1" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define SSH_TUN_PREPEND_AF 1" >>confdefs.h
ac_fn_c_check_decl "$LINENO" "AU_IPv4" "ac_cv_have_decl_AU_IPv4" "$ac_includes_default"
if test "x$ac_cv_have_decl_AU_IPv4" = xyes; then :
else
$as_echo "#define AU_IPv4 0" >>confdefs.h
#include <bsm/audit.h>
$as_echo "#define LASTLOG_WRITE_PUTUTXLINE 1" >>confdefs.h
fi
$as_echo "#define SPT_TYPE SPT_REUSEARGV" >>confdefs.h
for ac_func in sandbox_init
do :
ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "sandbox_init" "ac_cv_func_sandbox_init"
if test "x$ac_cv_func_sandbox_init" = xyes; then :
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define HAVE_SANDBOX_INIT 1
_ACEOF
fi
done
for ac_header in sandbox.h
do :
ac_fn_c_check_header_mongrel "$LINENO" "sandbox.h" "ac_cv_header_sandbox_h" "$ac_includes_default"
if test "x$ac_cv_header_sandbox_h" = xyes; then :
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define HAVE_SANDBOX_H 1
_ACEOF
fi
done
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for sandbox_apply in -lsandbox" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for sandbox_apply in -lsandbox... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_lib_sandbox_sandbox_apply+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
LIBS="-lsandbox $LIBS"
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C"
#endif
char sandbox_apply ();
int
main ()
{
return sandbox_apply ();
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
ac_cv_lib_sandbox_sandbox_apply=yes
else
ac_cv_lib_sandbox_sandbox_apply=no
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_sandbox_sandbox_apply" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_sandbox_sandbox_apply" >&6; }
if test "x$ac_cv_lib_sandbox_sandbox_apply" = xyes; then :
SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -lsandbox"
fi
# proc_pidinfo()-based closefrom() replacement.
for ac_header in libproc.h
do :
ac_fn_c_check_header_mongrel "$LINENO" "libproc.h" "ac_cv_header_libproc_h" "$ac_includes_default"
if test "x$ac_cv_header_libproc_h" = xyes; then :
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define HAVE_LIBPROC_H 1
_ACEOF
fi
done
for ac_func in proc_pidinfo
do :
ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "proc_pidinfo" "ac_cv_func_proc_pidinfo"
if test "x$ac_cv_func_proc_pidinfo" = xyes; then :
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define HAVE_PROC_PIDINFO 1
_ACEOF
fi
done
;;
*-*-dragonfly*)
SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -lcrypt"
TEST_MALLOC_OPTIONS="AFGJPRX"
;;
*-*-haiku*)
LIBS="$LIBS -lbsd "
+ CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -D_BSD_SOURCE"
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for socket in -lnetwork" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for socket in -lnetwork... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_lib_network_socket+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
LIBS="-lnetwork $LIBS"
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C"
#endif
char socket ();
int
main ()
{
return socket ();
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
ac_cv_lib_network_socket=yes
else
ac_cv_lib_network_socket=no
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_network_socket" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_network_socket" >&6; }
if test "x$ac_cv_lib_network_socket" = xyes; then :
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define HAVE_LIBNETWORK 1
_ACEOF
LIBS="-lnetwork $LIBS"
fi
$as_echo "#define HAVE_U_INT64_T 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+$as_echo "#define DISABLE_UTMPX 1" >>confdefs.h
+
MANTYPE=man
;;
*-*-hpux*)
# first we define all of the options common to all HP-UX releases
CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -D_HPUX_SOURCE -D_XOPEN_SOURCE -D_XOPEN_SOURCE_EXTENDED=1"
IPADDR_IN_DISPLAY=yes
$as_echo "#define USE_PIPES 1" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define LOGIN_NEEDS_UTMPX 1" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define LOCKED_PASSWD_STRING \"*\"" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define SPT_TYPE SPT_PSTAT" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define PLATFORM_SYS_DIR_UID 2" >>confdefs.h
maildir="/var/mail"
LIBS="$LIBS -lsec"
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for t_error in -lxnet" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for t_error in -lxnet... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_lib_xnet_t_error+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
LIBS="-lxnet $LIBS"
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C"
#endif
char t_error ();
int
main ()
{
return t_error ();
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
ac_cv_lib_xnet_t_error=yes
else
ac_cv_lib_xnet_t_error=no
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_xnet_t_error" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_xnet_t_error" >&6; }
if test "x$ac_cv_lib_xnet_t_error" = xyes; then :
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define HAVE_LIBXNET 1
_ACEOF
LIBS="-lxnet $LIBS"
else
as_fn_error $? "*** -lxnet needed on HP-UX - check config.log ***" "$LINENO" 5
fi
# next, we define all of the options specific to major releases
case "$host" in
*-*-hpux10*)
if test -z "$GCC"; then
CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -Ae"
fi
;;
*-*-hpux11*)
$as_echo "#define PAM_SUN_CODEBASE 1" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define DISABLE_UTMP 1" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define USE_BTMP 1" >>confdefs.h
check_for_hpux_broken_getaddrinfo=1
check_for_conflicting_getspnam=1
;;
esac
# lastly, we define options specific to minor releases
case "$host" in
*-*-hpux10.26)
$as_echo "#define HAVE_SECUREWARE 1" >>confdefs.h
disable_ptmx_check=yes
LIBS="$LIBS -lsecpw"
;;
esac
;;
*-*-irix5*)
PATH="$PATH:/usr/etc"
$as_echo "#define BROKEN_INET_NTOA 1" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID 1" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define BROKEN_SETREUID 1" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define BROKEN_SETREGID 1" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define WITH_ABBREV_NO_TTY 1" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define LOCKED_PASSWD_STRING \"*LK*\"" >>confdefs.h
;;
*-*-irix6*)
PATH="$PATH:/usr/etc"
$as_echo "#define WITH_IRIX_ARRAY 1" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define WITH_IRIX_PROJECT 1" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define WITH_IRIX_AUDIT 1" >>confdefs.h
ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "jlimit_startjob" "ac_cv_func_jlimit_startjob"
if test "x$ac_cv_func_jlimit_startjob" = xyes; then :
$as_echo "#define WITH_IRIX_JOBS 1" >>confdefs.h
fi
$as_echo "#define BROKEN_INET_NTOA 1" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID 1" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define BROKEN_SETREUID 1" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define BROKEN_SETREGID 1" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define BROKEN_UPDWTMPX 1" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define WITH_ABBREV_NO_TTY 1" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define LOCKED_PASSWD_STRING \"*LK*\"" >>confdefs.h
;;
*-*-k*bsd*-gnu | *-*-kopensolaris*-gnu)
check_for_libcrypt_later=1
$as_echo "#define PAM_TTY_KLUDGE 1" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define LOCKED_PASSWD_PREFIX \"!\"" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define SPT_TYPE SPT_REUSEARGV" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define _PATH_BTMP \"/var/log/btmp\"" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define USE_BTMP 1" >>confdefs.h
;;
*-*-linux*)
no_dev_ptmx=1
use_pie=auto
check_for_libcrypt_later=1
check_for_openpty_ctty_bug=1
CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -D_XOPEN_SOURCE=600 -D_BSD_SOURCE -D_DEFAULT_SOURCE"
$as_echo "#define PAM_TTY_KLUDGE 1" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define LOCKED_PASSWD_PREFIX \"!\"" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define SPT_TYPE SPT_REUSEARGV" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define LINK_OPNOTSUPP_ERRNO EPERM" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define _PATH_BTMP \"/var/log/btmp\"" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define USE_BTMP 1" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define LINUX_OOM_ADJUST 1" >>confdefs.h
inet6_default_4in6=yes
case `uname -r` in
1.*|2.0.*)
$as_echo "#define BROKEN_CMSG_TYPE 1" >>confdefs.h
;;
esac
# tun(4) forwarding compat code
for ac_header in linux/if_tun.h
do :
ac_fn_c_check_header_mongrel "$LINENO" "linux/if_tun.h" "ac_cv_header_linux_if_tun_h" "$ac_includes_default"
if test "x$ac_cv_header_linux_if_tun_h" = xyes; then :
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define HAVE_LINUX_IF_TUN_H 1
_ACEOF
fi
done
if test "x$ac_cv_header_linux_if_tun_h" = "xyes" ; then
$as_echo "#define SSH_TUN_LINUX 1" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define SSH_TUN_COMPAT_AF 1" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define SSH_TUN_PREPEND_AF 1" >>confdefs.h
fi
ac_fn_c_check_header_compile "$LINENO" "linux/if.h" "ac_cv_header_linux_if_h" "
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H
# include <sys/types.h>
#endif
"
if test "x$ac_cv_header_linux_if_h" = xyes; then :
$as_echo "#define SYS_RDOMAIN_LINUX 1" >>confdefs.h
fi
for ac_header in linux/seccomp.h linux/filter.h linux/audit.h
do :
as_ac_Header=`$as_echo "ac_cv_header_$ac_header" | $as_tr_sh`
ac_fn_c_check_header_compile "$LINENO" "$ac_header" "$as_ac_Header" "#include <linux/types.h>
"
if eval test \"x\$"$as_ac_Header"\" = x"yes"; then :
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define `$as_echo "HAVE_$ac_header" | $as_tr_cpp` 1
_ACEOF
fi
done
# Obtain MIPS ABI
case "$host" in
mips*)
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#if _MIPS_SIM != _ABIO32
#error
#endif
int
main ()
{
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
mips_abi="o32"
else
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#if _MIPS_SIM != _ABIN32
#error
#endif
int
main ()
{
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
mips_abi="n32"
else
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#if _MIPS_SIM != _ABI64
#error
#endif
int
main ()
{
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
mips_abi="n64"
else
as_fn_error $? "unknown MIPS ABI" "$LINENO" 5
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
;;
esac
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for seccomp architecture" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for seccomp architecture... " >&6; }
seccomp_audit_arch=
case "$host" in
x86_64-*)
seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_X86_64
;;
i*86-*)
seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_I386
;;
arm*-*)
seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_ARM
;;
aarch64*-*)
seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_AARCH64
;;
s390x-*)
seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_S390X
;;
s390-*)
seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_S390
;;
powerpc64-*)
seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_PPC64
;;
powerpc64le-*)
seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_PPC64LE
;;
mips-*)
seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_MIPS
;;
mipsel-*)
seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_MIPSEL
;;
mips64-*)
case "$mips_abi" in
"n32")
seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_MIPS64N32
;;
"n64")
seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_MIPS64
;;
esac
;;
mips64el-*)
case "$mips_abi" in
"n32")
seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_MIPSEL64N32
;;
"n64")
seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_MIPSEL64
;;
esac
;;
esac
if test "x$seccomp_audit_arch" != "x" ; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: \"$seccomp_audit_arch\"" >&5
$as_echo "\"$seccomp_audit_arch\"" >&6; }
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define SECCOMP_AUDIT_ARCH $seccomp_audit_arch
_ACEOF
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: architecture not supported" >&5
$as_echo "architecture not supported" >&6; }
fi
;;
mips-sony-bsd|mips-sony-newsos4)
$as_echo "#define NEED_SETPGRP 1" >>confdefs.h
SONY=1
;;
*-*-netbsd*)
check_for_libcrypt_before=1
if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
rpath_opt="-R"
fi
CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -D_OPENBSD_SOURCE"
$as_echo "#define SSH_TUN_FREEBSD 1" >>confdefs.h
ac_fn_c_check_header_mongrel "$LINENO" "net/if_tap.h" "ac_cv_header_net_if_tap_h" "$ac_includes_default"
if test "x$ac_cv_header_net_if_tap_h" = xyes; then :
else
$as_echo "#define SSH_TUN_NO_L2 1" >>confdefs.h
fi
$as_echo "#define SSH_TUN_PREPEND_AF 1" >>confdefs.h
TEST_MALLOC_OPTIONS="AJRX"
$as_echo "#define BROKEN_READ_COMPARISON 1" >>confdefs.h
;;
*-*-freebsd*)
check_for_libcrypt_later=1
$as_echo "#define LOCKED_PASSWD_PREFIX \"*LOCKED*\"" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define SSH_TUN_FREEBSD 1" >>confdefs.h
ac_fn_c_check_header_mongrel "$LINENO" "net/if_tap.h" "ac_cv_header_net_if_tap_h" "$ac_includes_default"
if test "x$ac_cv_header_net_if_tap_h" = xyes; then :
else
$as_echo "#define SSH_TUN_NO_L2 1" >>confdefs.h
fi
$as_echo "#define BROKEN_GLOB 1" >>confdefs.h
TEST_MALLOC_OPTIONS="AJRX"
# Preauth crypto occasionally uses file descriptors for crypto offload
# and will crash if they cannot be opened.
$as_echo "#define SANDBOX_SKIP_RLIMIT_NOFILE 1" >>confdefs.h
;;
*-*-bsdi*)
$as_echo "#define SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID 1" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define BROKEN_SETREUID 1" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define BROKEN_SETREGID 1" >>confdefs.h
;;
*-next-*)
conf_lastlog_location="/usr/adm/lastlog"
conf_utmp_location=/etc/utmp
conf_wtmp_location=/usr/adm/wtmp
maildir=/usr/spool/mail
$as_echo "#define HAVE_NEXT 1" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define USE_PIPES 1" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define BROKEN_SAVED_UIDS 1" >>confdefs.h
;;
*-*-openbsd*)
use_pie=auto
$as_echo "#define HAVE_ATTRIBUTE__SENTINEL__ 1" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define HAVE_ATTRIBUTE__BOUNDED__ 1" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define SSH_TUN_OPENBSD 1" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define SYSLOG_R_SAFE_IN_SIGHAND 1" >>confdefs.h
TEST_MALLOC_OPTIONS="AFGJPRX"
;;
*-*-solaris*)
if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
rpath_opt="-R"
fi
$as_echo "#define PAM_SUN_CODEBASE 1" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define LOGIN_NEEDS_UTMPX 1" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define PAM_TTY_KLUDGE 1" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define SSHPAM_CHAUTHTOK_NEEDS_RUID 1" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define LOCKED_PASSWD_STRING \"*LK*\"" >>confdefs.h
# Pushing STREAMS modules will cause sshd to acquire a controlling tty.
$as_echo "#define SSHD_ACQUIRES_CTTY 1" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define PASSWD_NEEDS_USERNAME 1" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define BROKEN_TCGETATTR_ICANON 1" >>confdefs.h
external_path_file=/etc/default/login
# hardwire lastlog location (can't detect it on some versions)
conf_lastlog_location="/var/adm/lastlog"
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for obsolete utmp and wtmp in solaris2.x" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for obsolete utmp and wtmp in solaris2.x... " >&6; }
sol2ver=`echo "$host"| sed -e 's/.*[0-9]\.//'`
if test "$sol2ver" -ge 8; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
$as_echo "#define DISABLE_UTMP 1" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define DISABLE_WTMP 1" >>confdefs.h
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
fi
for ac_func in setpflags
do :
ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "setpflags" "ac_cv_func_setpflags"
if test "x$ac_cv_func_setpflags" = xyes; then :
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define HAVE_SETPFLAGS 1
_ACEOF
fi
done
for ac_func in setppriv
do :
ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "setppriv" "ac_cv_func_setppriv"
if test "x$ac_cv_func_setppriv" = xyes; then :
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define HAVE_SETPPRIV 1
_ACEOF
fi
done
for ac_func in priv_basicset
do :
ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "priv_basicset" "ac_cv_func_priv_basicset"
if test "x$ac_cv_func_priv_basicset" = xyes; then :
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define HAVE_PRIV_BASICSET 1
_ACEOF
fi
done
for ac_header in priv.h
do :
ac_fn_c_check_header_mongrel "$LINENO" "priv.h" "ac_cv_header_priv_h" "$ac_includes_default"
if test "x$ac_cv_header_priv_h" = xyes; then :
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define HAVE_PRIV_H 1
_ACEOF
fi
done
# Check whether --with-solaris-contracts was given.
if test "${with_solaris_contracts+set}" = set; then :
withval=$with_solaris_contracts;
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for ct_tmpl_activate in -lcontract" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for ct_tmpl_activate in -lcontract... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_lib_contract_ct_tmpl_activate+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
LIBS="-lcontract $LIBS"
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C"
#endif
char ct_tmpl_activate ();
int
main ()
{
return ct_tmpl_activate ();
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
ac_cv_lib_contract_ct_tmpl_activate=yes
else
ac_cv_lib_contract_ct_tmpl_activate=no
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_contract_ct_tmpl_activate" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_contract_ct_tmpl_activate" >&6; }
if test "x$ac_cv_lib_contract_ct_tmpl_activate" = xyes; then :
$as_echo "#define USE_SOLARIS_PROCESS_CONTRACTS 1" >>confdefs.h
LIBS="$LIBS -lcontract"
SPC_MSG="yes"
fi
fi
# Check whether --with-solaris-projects was given.
if test "${with_solaris_projects+set}" = set; then :
withval=$with_solaris_projects;
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for setproject in -lproject" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for setproject in -lproject... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_lib_project_setproject+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
LIBS="-lproject $LIBS"
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C"
#endif
char setproject ();
int
main ()
{
return setproject ();
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
ac_cv_lib_project_setproject=yes
else
ac_cv_lib_project_setproject=no
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_project_setproject" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_project_setproject" >&6; }
if test "x$ac_cv_lib_project_setproject" = xyes; then :
$as_echo "#define USE_SOLARIS_PROJECTS 1" >>confdefs.h
LIBS="$LIBS -lproject"
SP_MSG="yes"
fi
fi
# Check whether --with-solaris-privs was given.
if test "${with_solaris_privs+set}" = set; then :
withval=$with_solaris_privs;
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for Solaris/Illumos privilege support" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for Solaris/Illumos privilege support... " >&6; }
if test "x$ac_cv_func_setppriv" = "xyes" -a \
"x$ac_cv_header_priv_h" = "xyes" ; then
SOLARIS_PRIVS=yes
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: found" >&5
$as_echo "found" >&6; }
$as_echo "#define NO_UID_RESTORATION_TEST 1" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define USE_SOLARIS_PRIVS 1" >>confdefs.h
SPP_MSG="yes"
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: not found" >&5
$as_echo "not found" >&6; }
as_fn_error $? "*** must have support for Solaris privileges to use --with-solaris-privs" "$LINENO" 5
fi
fi
TEST_SHELL=$SHELL # let configure find us a capable shell
;;
*-*-sunos4*)
CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -DSUNOS4"
for ac_func in getpwanam
do :
ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "getpwanam" "ac_cv_func_getpwanam"
if test "x$ac_cv_func_getpwanam" = xyes; then :
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define HAVE_GETPWANAM 1
_ACEOF
fi
done
$as_echo "#define PAM_SUN_CODEBASE 1" >>confdefs.h
conf_utmp_location=/etc/utmp
conf_wtmp_location=/var/adm/wtmp
conf_lastlog_location=/var/adm/lastlog
$as_echo "#define USE_PIPES 1" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define DISABLE_UTMPX 1" >>confdefs.h
;;
*-ncr-sysv*)
LIBS="$LIBS -lc89"
$as_echo "#define USE_PIPES 1" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define SSHD_ACQUIRES_CTTY 1" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID 1" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define BROKEN_SETREUID 1" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define BROKEN_SETREGID 1" >>confdefs.h
;;
*-sni-sysv*)
# /usr/ucblib MUST NOT be searched on ReliantUNIX
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for dlsym in -ldl" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for dlsym in -ldl... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_lib_dl_dlsym+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
LIBS="-ldl $LIBS"
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C"
#endif
char dlsym ();
int
main ()
{
return dlsym ();
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
ac_cv_lib_dl_dlsym=yes
else
ac_cv_lib_dl_dlsym=no
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_dl_dlsym" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_dl_dlsym" >&6; }
if test "x$ac_cv_lib_dl_dlsym" = xyes; then :
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define HAVE_LIBDL 1
_ACEOF
LIBS="-ldl $LIBS"
fi
# -lresolv needs to be at the end of LIBS or DNS lookups break
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for res_query in -lresolv" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for res_query in -lresolv... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_lib_resolv_res_query+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
LIBS="-lresolv $LIBS"
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C"
#endif
char res_query ();
int
main ()
{
return res_query ();
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
ac_cv_lib_resolv_res_query=yes
else
ac_cv_lib_resolv_res_query=no
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_resolv_res_query" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_resolv_res_query" >&6; }
if test "x$ac_cv_lib_resolv_res_query" = xyes; then :
LIBS="$LIBS -lresolv"
fi
IPADDR_IN_DISPLAY=yes
$as_echo "#define USE_PIPES 1" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define IP_TOS_IS_BROKEN 1" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID 1" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define BROKEN_SETREUID 1" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define BROKEN_SETREGID 1" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define SSHD_ACQUIRES_CTTY 1" >>confdefs.h
external_path_file=/etc/default/login
# /usr/ucblib/libucb.a no longer needed on ReliantUNIX
# Attention: always take care to bind libsocket and libnsl before libc,
# otherwise you will find lots of "SIOCGPGRP errno 22" on syslog
;;
# UnixWare 1.x, UnixWare 2.x, and others based on code from Univel.
*-*-sysv4.2*)
$as_echo "#define USE_PIPES 1" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID 1" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define BROKEN_SETREUID 1" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define BROKEN_SETREGID 1" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define PASSWD_NEEDS_USERNAME 1" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define LOCKED_PASSWD_STRING \"*LK*\"" >>confdefs.h
TEST_SHELL=$SHELL # let configure find us a capable shell
;;
# UnixWare 7.x, OpenUNIX 8
*-*-sysv5*)
CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -Dvsnprintf=_xvsnprintf -Dsnprintf=_xsnprintf"
$as_echo "#define UNIXWARE_LONG_PASSWORDS 1" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define USE_PIPES 1" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID 1" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define BROKEN_GETADDRINFO 1" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define BROKEN_SETREUID 1" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define BROKEN_SETREGID 1" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define PASSWD_NEEDS_USERNAME 1" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define BROKEN_TCGETATTR_ICANON 1" >>confdefs.h
TEST_SHELL=$SHELL # let configure find us a capable shell
check_for_libcrypt_later=1
case "$host" in
*-*-sysv5SCO_SV*) # SCO OpenServer 6.x
maildir=/var/spool/mail
$as_echo "#define BROKEN_UPDWTMPX 1" >>confdefs.h
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for getluid in -lprot" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for getluid in -lprot... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_lib_prot_getluid+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
LIBS="-lprot $LIBS"
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C"
#endif
char getluid ();
int
main ()
{
return getluid ();
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
ac_cv_lib_prot_getluid=yes
else
ac_cv_lib_prot_getluid=no
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_prot_getluid" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_prot_getluid" >&6; }
if test "x$ac_cv_lib_prot_getluid" = xyes; then :
LIBS="$LIBS -lprot"
for ac_func in getluid setluid
do :
as_ac_var=`$as_echo "ac_cv_func_$ac_func" | $as_tr_sh`
ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "$ac_func" "$as_ac_var"
if eval test \"x\$"$as_ac_var"\" = x"yes"; then :
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define `$as_echo "HAVE_$ac_func" | $as_tr_cpp` 1
_ACEOF
fi
done
fi
;;
*) $as_echo "#define LOCKED_PASSWD_STRING \"*LK*\"" >>confdefs.h
;;
esac
;;
*-*-sysv*)
;;
# SCO UNIX and OEM versions of SCO UNIX
*-*-sco3.2v4*)
as_fn_error $? "\"This Platform is no longer supported.\"" "$LINENO" 5
;;
# SCO OpenServer 5.x
*-*-sco3.2v5*)
if test -z "$GCC"; then
CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -belf"
fi
LIBS="$LIBS -lprot -lx -ltinfo -lm"
no_dev_ptmx=1
$as_echo "#define USE_PIPES 1" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define HAVE_SECUREWARE 1" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define DISABLE_SHADOW 1" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define DISABLE_FD_PASSING 1" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID 1" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define BROKEN_GETADDRINFO 1" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define BROKEN_SETREUID 1" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define BROKEN_SETREGID 1" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define WITH_ABBREV_NO_TTY 1" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define BROKEN_UPDWTMPX 1" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define PASSWD_NEEDS_USERNAME 1" >>confdefs.h
for ac_func in getluid setluid
do :
as_ac_var=`$as_echo "ac_cv_func_$ac_func" | $as_tr_sh`
ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "$ac_func" "$as_ac_var"
if eval test \"x\$"$as_ac_var"\" = x"yes"; then :
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define `$as_echo "HAVE_$ac_func" | $as_tr_cpp` 1
_ACEOF
fi
done
MANTYPE=man
TEST_SHELL=$SHELL # let configure find us a capable shell
SKIP_DISABLE_LASTLOG_DEFINE=yes
;;
*-dec-osf*)
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for Digital Unix SIA" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for Digital Unix SIA... " >&6; }
no_osfsia=""
# Check whether --with-osfsia was given.
if test "${with_osfsia+set}" = set; then :
withval=$with_osfsia;
if test "x$withval" = "xno" ; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: disabled" >&5
$as_echo "disabled" >&6; }
no_osfsia=1
fi
fi
if test -z "$no_osfsia" ; then
if test -f /etc/sia/matrix.conf; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
$as_echo "#define HAVE_OSF_SIA 1" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define DISABLE_LOGIN 1" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define DISABLE_FD_PASSING 1" >>confdefs.h
LIBS="$LIBS -lsecurity -ldb -lm -laud"
SIA_MSG="yes"
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
$as_echo "#define LOCKED_PASSWD_SUBSTR \"Nologin\"" >>confdefs.h
fi
fi
$as_echo "#define BROKEN_GETADDRINFO 1" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID 1" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define BROKEN_SETREUID 1" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define BROKEN_SETREGID 1" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define BROKEN_READV_COMPARISON 1" >>confdefs.h
;;
*-*-nto-qnx*)
$as_echo "#define USE_PIPES 1" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define NO_X11_UNIX_SOCKETS 1" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define DISABLE_LASTLOG 1" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define SSHD_ACQUIRES_CTTY 1" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define BROKEN_SHADOW_EXPIRE 1" >>confdefs.h
enable_etc_default_login=no # has incompatible /etc/default/login
case "$host" in
*-*-nto-qnx6*)
$as_echo "#define DISABLE_FD_PASSING 1" >>confdefs.h
;;
esac
;;
*-*-ultrix*)
$as_echo "#define BROKEN_GETGROUPS 1" >>confdefs.h
- $as_echo "#define NEED_SETPGRP 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+$as_echo "#define NEED_SETPGRP 1" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define HAVE_SYS_SYSLOG_H 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+$as_echo "#define DISABLE_UTMPX 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+ # DISABLE_FD_PASSING so that we call setpgrp as root, otherwise we
+ # don't get a controlling tty.
+
+$as_echo "#define DISABLE_FD_PASSING 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+ # On Ultrix some headers are not protected against multiple includes,
+ # so we create wrappers and put it where the compiler will find it.
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: creating compat wrappers for headers" >&5
+$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: creating compat wrappers for headers" >&2;}
+ mkdir -p netinet
+ for header in netinet/ip.h netdb.h resolv.h; do
+ name=`echo $header | tr 'a-z/.' 'A-Z__'`
+ cat >$header <<EOD
+#ifndef _SSH_COMPAT_${name}
+#define _SSH_COMPAT_${name}
+#include "/usr/include/${header}"
+#endif
+EOD
+ done
;;
*-*-lynxos)
CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -D__NO_INCLUDE_WARN__"
$as_echo "#define BROKEN_SETVBUF 1" >>confdefs.h
;;
esac
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking compiler and flags for sanity" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking compiler and flags for sanity... " >&6; }
if test "$cross_compiling" = yes; then :
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: cross compiling: not checking compiler sanity" >&5
$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: cross compiling: not checking compiler sanity" >&2;}
else
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <stdio.h>
int
main ()
{
exit(0);
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_run "$LINENO"; then :
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
as_fn_error $? "*** compiler cannot create working executables, check config.log ***" "$LINENO" 5
fi
rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* gmon.out bb.out conftest$ac_exeext \
conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
fi
# Checks for libraries.
ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "setsockopt" "ac_cv_func_setsockopt"
if test "x$ac_cv_func_setsockopt" = xyes; then :
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for setsockopt in -lsocket" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for setsockopt in -lsocket... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_lib_socket_setsockopt+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
LIBS="-lsocket $LIBS"
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C"
#endif
char setsockopt ();
int
main ()
{
return setsockopt ();
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
ac_cv_lib_socket_setsockopt=yes
else
ac_cv_lib_socket_setsockopt=no
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_socket_setsockopt" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_socket_setsockopt" >&6; }
if test "x$ac_cv_lib_socket_setsockopt" = xyes; then :
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define HAVE_LIBSOCKET 1
_ACEOF
LIBS="-lsocket $LIBS"
fi
fi
for ac_func in dirname
do :
ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "dirname" "ac_cv_func_dirname"
if test "x$ac_cv_func_dirname" = xyes; then :
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define HAVE_DIRNAME 1
_ACEOF
for ac_header in libgen.h
do :
ac_fn_c_check_header_mongrel "$LINENO" "libgen.h" "ac_cv_header_libgen_h" "$ac_includes_default"
if test "x$ac_cv_header_libgen_h" = xyes; then :
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define HAVE_LIBGEN_H 1
_ACEOF
fi
done
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for dirname in -lgen" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for dirname in -lgen... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_lib_gen_dirname+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
LIBS="-lgen $LIBS"
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C"
#endif
char dirname ();
int
main ()
{
return dirname ();
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
ac_cv_lib_gen_dirname=yes
else
ac_cv_lib_gen_dirname=no
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_gen_dirname" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_gen_dirname" >&6; }
if test "x$ac_cv_lib_gen_dirname" = xyes; then :
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for broken dirname" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for broken dirname... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_have_broken_dirname+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
save_LIBS="$LIBS"
LIBS="$LIBS -lgen"
if test "$cross_compiling" = yes; then :
ac_cv_have_broken_dirname="no"
else
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <libgen.h>
#include <string.h>
int main(int argc, char **argv) {
char *s, buf[32];
strncpy(buf,"/etc", 32);
s = dirname(buf);
if (!s || strncmp(s, "/", 32) != 0) {
exit(1);
} else {
exit(0);
}
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_run "$LINENO"; then :
ac_cv_have_broken_dirname="no"
else
ac_cv_have_broken_dirname="yes"
fi
rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* gmon.out bb.out conftest$ac_exeext \
conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
fi
LIBS="$save_LIBS"
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_have_broken_dirname" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_cv_have_broken_dirname" >&6; }
if test "x$ac_cv_have_broken_dirname" = "xno" ; then
LIBS="$LIBS -lgen"
$as_echo "#define HAVE_DIRNAME 1" >>confdefs.h
for ac_header in libgen.h
do :
ac_fn_c_check_header_mongrel "$LINENO" "libgen.h" "ac_cv_header_libgen_h" "$ac_includes_default"
if test "x$ac_cv_header_libgen_h" = xyes; then :
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define HAVE_LIBGEN_H 1
_ACEOF
fi
done
fi
fi
fi
done
ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "getspnam" "ac_cv_func_getspnam"
if test "x$ac_cv_func_getspnam" = xyes; then :
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for getspnam in -lgen" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for getspnam in -lgen... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_lib_gen_getspnam+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
LIBS="-lgen $LIBS"
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C"
#endif
char getspnam ();
int
main ()
{
return getspnam ();
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
ac_cv_lib_gen_getspnam=yes
else
ac_cv_lib_gen_getspnam=no
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_gen_getspnam" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_gen_getspnam" >&6; }
if test "x$ac_cv_lib_gen_getspnam" = xyes; then :
LIBS="$LIBS -lgen"
fi
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for library containing basename" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for library containing basename... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_search_basename+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
ac_func_search_save_LIBS=$LIBS
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C"
#endif
char basename ();
int
main ()
{
return basename ();
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
for ac_lib in '' gen; do
if test -z "$ac_lib"; then
ac_res="none required"
else
ac_res=-l$ac_lib
LIBS="-l$ac_lib $ac_func_search_save_LIBS"
fi
if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
ac_cv_search_basename=$ac_res
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
conftest$ac_exeext
if ${ac_cv_search_basename+:} false; then :
break
fi
done
if ${ac_cv_search_basename+:} false; then :
else
ac_cv_search_basename=no
fi
rm conftest.$ac_ext
LIBS=$ac_func_search_save_LIBS
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_search_basename" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_cv_search_basename" >&6; }
ac_res=$ac_cv_search_basename
if test "$ac_res" != no; then :
test "$ac_res" = "none required" || LIBS="$ac_res $LIBS"
$as_echo "#define HAVE_BASENAME 1" >>confdefs.h
fi
+zlib=yes
# Check whether --with-zlib was given.
if test "${with_zlib+set}" = set; then :
withval=$with_zlib; if test "x$withval" = "xno" ; then
- as_fn_error $? "*** zlib is required ***" "$LINENO" 5
+ zlib=no
elif test "x$withval" != "xyes"; then
if test -d "$withval/lib"; then
if test -n "${rpath_opt}"; then
LDFLAGS="-L${withval}/lib ${rpath_opt}${withval}/lib ${LDFLAGS}"
else
LDFLAGS="-L${withval}/lib ${LDFLAGS}"
fi
else
if test -n "${rpath_opt}"; then
LDFLAGS="-L${withval} ${rpath_opt}${withval} ${LDFLAGS}"
else
LDFLAGS="-L${withval} ${LDFLAGS}"
fi
fi
if test -d "$withval/include"; then
CPPFLAGS="-I${withval}/include ${CPPFLAGS}"
else
CPPFLAGS="-I${withval} ${CPPFLAGS}"
fi
fi
fi
-ac_fn_c_check_header_mongrel "$LINENO" "zlib.h" "ac_cv_header_zlib_h" "$ac_includes_default"
+{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for zlib" >&5
+$as_echo_n "checking for zlib... " >&6; }
+if test "x${zlib}" = "xno"; then
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+$as_echo "no" >&6; }
+else
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
+$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
+
+$as_echo "#define WITH_ZLIB 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+ ac_fn_c_check_header_mongrel "$LINENO" "zlib.h" "ac_cv_header_zlib_h" "$ac_includes_default"
if test "x$ac_cv_header_zlib_h" = xyes; then :
else
as_fn_error $? "*** zlib.h missing - please install first or check config.log ***" "$LINENO" 5
fi
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for deflate in -lz" >&5
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for deflate in -lz" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for deflate in -lz... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_lib_z_deflate+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
LIBS="-lz $LIBS"
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C"
#endif
char deflate ();
int
main ()
{
return deflate ();
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
ac_cv_lib_z_deflate=yes
else
ac_cv_lib_z_deflate=no
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_z_deflate" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_z_deflate" >&6; }
if test "x$ac_cv_lib_z_deflate" = xyes; then :
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define HAVE_LIBZ 1
_ACEOF
LIBS="-lz $LIBS"
else
saved_CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS"
saved_LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS"
save_LIBS="$LIBS"
if test -n "${rpath_opt}"; then
LDFLAGS="-L/usr/local/lib ${rpath_opt}/usr/local/lib ${saved_LDFLAGS}"
else
LDFLAGS="-L/usr/local/lib ${saved_LDFLAGS}"
fi
CPPFLAGS="-I/usr/local/include ${saved_CPPFLAGS}"
LIBS="$LIBS -lz"
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C"
#endif
char deflate ();
int
main ()
{
return deflate ();
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
$as_echo "#define HAVE_LIBZ 1" >>confdefs.h
else
as_fn_error $? "*** zlib missing - please install first or check config.log ***" "$LINENO" 5
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
fi
# Check whether --with-zlib-version-check was given.
if test "${with_zlib_version_check+set}" = set; then :
withval=$with_zlib_version_check; if test "x$withval" = "xno" ; then
zlib_check_nonfatal=1
fi
fi
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for possibly buggy zlib" >&5
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for possibly buggy zlib" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for possibly buggy zlib... " >&6; }
-if test "$cross_compiling" = yes; then :
+ if test "$cross_compiling" = yes; then :
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: cross compiling: not checking zlib version" >&5
$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: cross compiling: not checking zlib version" >&2;}
else
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <zlib.h>
int
main ()
{
int a=0, b=0, c=0, d=0, n, v;
n = sscanf(ZLIB_VERSION, "%d.%d.%d.%d", &a, &b, &c, &d);
if (n != 3 && n != 4)
exit(1);
v = a*1000000 + b*10000 + c*100 + d;
fprintf(stderr, "found zlib version %s (%d)\n", ZLIB_VERSION, v);
/* 1.1.4 is OK */
if (a == 1 && b == 1 && c >= 4)
exit(0);
/* 1.2.3 and up are OK */
if (v >= 1020300)
exit(0);
exit(2);
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_run "$LINENO"; then :
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
if test -z "$zlib_check_nonfatal" ; then
as_fn_error $? "*** zlib too old - check config.log ***
Your reported zlib version has known security problems. It's possible your
vendor has fixed these problems without changing the version number. If you
are sure this is the case, you can disable the check by running
\"./configure --without-zlib-version-check\".
If you are in doubt, upgrade zlib to version 1.2.3 or greater.
See http://www.gzip.org/zlib/ for details." "$LINENO" 5
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: zlib version may have security problems" >&5
$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: zlib version may have security problems" >&2;}
fi
fi
rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* gmon.out bb.out conftest$ac_exeext \
conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
fi
+fi
ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "strcasecmp" "ac_cv_func_strcasecmp"
if test "x$ac_cv_func_strcasecmp" = xyes; then :
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for strcasecmp in -lresolv" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for strcasecmp in -lresolv... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_lib_resolv_strcasecmp+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
LIBS="-lresolv $LIBS"
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C"
#endif
char strcasecmp ();
int
main ()
{
return strcasecmp ();
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
ac_cv_lib_resolv_strcasecmp=yes
else
ac_cv_lib_resolv_strcasecmp=no
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_resolv_strcasecmp" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_resolv_strcasecmp" >&6; }
if test "x$ac_cv_lib_resolv_strcasecmp" = xyes; then :
LIBS="$LIBS -lresolv"
fi
fi
for ac_func in utimes
do :
ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "utimes" "ac_cv_func_utimes"
if test "x$ac_cv_func_utimes" = xyes; then :
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define HAVE_UTIMES 1
_ACEOF
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for utimes in -lc89" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for utimes in -lc89... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_lib_c89_utimes+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
LIBS="-lc89 $LIBS"
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C"
#endif
char utimes ();
int
main ()
{
return utimes ();
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
ac_cv_lib_c89_utimes=yes
else
ac_cv_lib_c89_utimes=no
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_c89_utimes" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_c89_utimes" >&6; }
if test "x$ac_cv_lib_c89_utimes" = xyes; then :
$as_echo "#define HAVE_UTIMES 1" >>confdefs.h
LIBS="$LIBS -lc89"
fi
fi
done
for ac_header in bsd/libutil.h libutil.h
do :
as_ac_Header=`$as_echo "ac_cv_header_$ac_header" | $as_tr_sh`
ac_fn_c_check_header_mongrel "$LINENO" "$ac_header" "$as_ac_Header" "$ac_includes_default"
if eval test \"x\$"$as_ac_Header"\" = x"yes"; then :
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define `$as_echo "HAVE_$ac_header" | $as_tr_cpp` 1
_ACEOF
fi
done
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for library containing fmt_scaled" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for library containing fmt_scaled... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_search_fmt_scaled+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
ac_func_search_save_LIBS=$LIBS
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C"
#endif
char fmt_scaled ();
int
main ()
{
return fmt_scaled ();
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
for ac_lib in '' util bsd; do
if test -z "$ac_lib"; then
ac_res="none required"
else
ac_res=-l$ac_lib
LIBS="-l$ac_lib $ac_func_search_save_LIBS"
fi
if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
ac_cv_search_fmt_scaled=$ac_res
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
conftest$ac_exeext
if ${ac_cv_search_fmt_scaled+:} false; then :
break
fi
done
if ${ac_cv_search_fmt_scaled+:} false; then :
else
ac_cv_search_fmt_scaled=no
fi
rm conftest.$ac_ext
LIBS=$ac_func_search_save_LIBS
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_search_fmt_scaled" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_cv_search_fmt_scaled" >&6; }
ac_res=$ac_cv_search_fmt_scaled
if test "$ac_res" != no; then :
test "$ac_res" = "none required" || LIBS="$ac_res $LIBS"
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for library containing scan_scaled" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for library containing scan_scaled... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_search_scan_scaled+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
ac_func_search_save_LIBS=$LIBS
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C"
#endif
char scan_scaled ();
int
main ()
{
return scan_scaled ();
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
for ac_lib in '' util bsd; do
if test -z "$ac_lib"; then
ac_res="none required"
else
ac_res=-l$ac_lib
LIBS="-l$ac_lib $ac_func_search_save_LIBS"
fi
if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
ac_cv_search_scan_scaled=$ac_res
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
conftest$ac_exeext
if ${ac_cv_search_scan_scaled+:} false; then :
break
fi
done
if ${ac_cv_search_scan_scaled+:} false; then :
else
ac_cv_search_scan_scaled=no
fi
rm conftest.$ac_ext
LIBS=$ac_func_search_save_LIBS
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_search_scan_scaled" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_cv_search_scan_scaled" >&6; }
ac_res=$ac_cv_search_scan_scaled
if test "$ac_res" != no; then :
test "$ac_res" = "none required" || LIBS="$ac_res $LIBS"
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for library containing login" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for library containing login... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_search_login+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
ac_func_search_save_LIBS=$LIBS
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C"
#endif
char login ();
int
main ()
{
return login ();
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
for ac_lib in '' util bsd; do
if test -z "$ac_lib"; then
ac_res="none required"
else
ac_res=-l$ac_lib
LIBS="-l$ac_lib $ac_func_search_save_LIBS"
fi
if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
ac_cv_search_login=$ac_res
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
conftest$ac_exeext
if ${ac_cv_search_login+:} false; then :
break
fi
done
if ${ac_cv_search_login+:} false; then :
else
ac_cv_search_login=no
fi
rm conftest.$ac_ext
LIBS=$ac_func_search_save_LIBS
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_search_login" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_cv_search_login" >&6; }
ac_res=$ac_cv_search_login
if test "$ac_res" != no; then :
test "$ac_res" = "none required" || LIBS="$ac_res $LIBS"
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for library containing logout" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for library containing logout... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_search_logout+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
ac_func_search_save_LIBS=$LIBS
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C"
#endif
char logout ();
int
main ()
{
return logout ();
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
for ac_lib in '' util bsd; do
if test -z "$ac_lib"; then
ac_res="none required"
else
ac_res=-l$ac_lib
LIBS="-l$ac_lib $ac_func_search_save_LIBS"
fi
if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
ac_cv_search_logout=$ac_res
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
conftest$ac_exeext
if ${ac_cv_search_logout+:} false; then :
break
fi
done
if ${ac_cv_search_logout+:} false; then :
else
ac_cv_search_logout=no
fi
rm conftest.$ac_ext
LIBS=$ac_func_search_save_LIBS
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_search_logout" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_cv_search_logout" >&6; }
ac_res=$ac_cv_search_logout
if test "$ac_res" != no; then :
test "$ac_res" = "none required" || LIBS="$ac_res $LIBS"
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for library containing logwtmp" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for library containing logwtmp... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_search_logwtmp+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
ac_func_search_save_LIBS=$LIBS
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C"
#endif
char logwtmp ();
int
main ()
{
return logwtmp ();
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
for ac_lib in '' util bsd; do
if test -z "$ac_lib"; then
ac_res="none required"
else
ac_res=-l$ac_lib
LIBS="-l$ac_lib $ac_func_search_save_LIBS"
fi
if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
ac_cv_search_logwtmp=$ac_res
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
conftest$ac_exeext
if ${ac_cv_search_logwtmp+:} false; then :
break
fi
done
if ${ac_cv_search_logwtmp+:} false; then :
else
ac_cv_search_logwtmp=no
fi
rm conftest.$ac_ext
LIBS=$ac_func_search_save_LIBS
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_search_logwtmp" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_cv_search_logwtmp" >&6; }
ac_res=$ac_cv_search_logwtmp
if test "$ac_res" != no; then :
test "$ac_res" = "none required" || LIBS="$ac_res $LIBS"
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for library containing openpty" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for library containing openpty... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_search_openpty+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
ac_func_search_save_LIBS=$LIBS
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C"
#endif
char openpty ();
int
main ()
{
return openpty ();
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
for ac_lib in '' util bsd; do
if test -z "$ac_lib"; then
ac_res="none required"
else
ac_res=-l$ac_lib
LIBS="-l$ac_lib $ac_func_search_save_LIBS"
fi
if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
ac_cv_search_openpty=$ac_res
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
conftest$ac_exeext
if ${ac_cv_search_openpty+:} false; then :
break
fi
done
if ${ac_cv_search_openpty+:} false; then :
else
ac_cv_search_openpty=no
fi
rm conftest.$ac_ext
LIBS=$ac_func_search_save_LIBS
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_search_openpty" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_cv_search_openpty" >&6; }
ac_res=$ac_cv_search_openpty
if test "$ac_res" != no; then :
test "$ac_res" = "none required" || LIBS="$ac_res $LIBS"
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for library containing updwtmp" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for library containing updwtmp... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_search_updwtmp+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
ac_func_search_save_LIBS=$LIBS
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C"
#endif
char updwtmp ();
int
main ()
{
return updwtmp ();
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
for ac_lib in '' util bsd; do
if test -z "$ac_lib"; then
ac_res="none required"
else
ac_res=-l$ac_lib
LIBS="-l$ac_lib $ac_func_search_save_LIBS"
fi
if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
ac_cv_search_updwtmp=$ac_res
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
conftest$ac_exeext
if ${ac_cv_search_updwtmp+:} false; then :
break
fi
done
if ${ac_cv_search_updwtmp+:} false; then :
else
ac_cv_search_updwtmp=no
fi
rm conftest.$ac_ext
LIBS=$ac_func_search_save_LIBS
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_search_updwtmp" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_cv_search_updwtmp" >&6; }
ac_res=$ac_cv_search_updwtmp
if test "$ac_res" != no; then :
test "$ac_res" = "none required" || LIBS="$ac_res $LIBS"
fi
for ac_func in fmt_scaled scan_scaled login logout openpty updwtmp logwtmp
do :
as_ac_var=`$as_echo "ac_cv_func_$ac_func" | $as_tr_sh`
ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "$ac_func" "$as_ac_var"
if eval test \"x\$"$as_ac_var"\" = x"yes"; then :
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define `$as_echo "HAVE_$ac_func" | $as_tr_cpp` 1
_ACEOF
fi
done
# On some platforms, inet_ntop and gethostbyname may be found in libresolv
# or libnsl.
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for library containing inet_ntop" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for library containing inet_ntop... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_search_inet_ntop+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
ac_func_search_save_LIBS=$LIBS
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C"
#endif
char inet_ntop ();
int
main ()
{
return inet_ntop ();
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
for ac_lib in '' resolv nsl; do
if test -z "$ac_lib"; then
ac_res="none required"
else
ac_res=-l$ac_lib
LIBS="-l$ac_lib $ac_func_search_save_LIBS"
fi
if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
ac_cv_search_inet_ntop=$ac_res
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
conftest$ac_exeext
if ${ac_cv_search_inet_ntop+:} false; then :
break
fi
done
if ${ac_cv_search_inet_ntop+:} false; then :
else
ac_cv_search_inet_ntop=no
fi
rm conftest.$ac_ext
LIBS=$ac_func_search_save_LIBS
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_search_inet_ntop" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_cv_search_inet_ntop" >&6; }
ac_res=$ac_cv_search_inet_ntop
if test "$ac_res" != no; then :
test "$ac_res" = "none required" || LIBS="$ac_res $LIBS"
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for library containing gethostbyname" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for library containing gethostbyname... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_search_gethostbyname+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
ac_func_search_save_LIBS=$LIBS
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C"
#endif
char gethostbyname ();
int
main ()
{
return gethostbyname ();
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
for ac_lib in '' resolv nsl; do
if test -z "$ac_lib"; then
ac_res="none required"
else
ac_res=-l$ac_lib
LIBS="-l$ac_lib $ac_func_search_save_LIBS"
fi
if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
ac_cv_search_gethostbyname=$ac_res
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
conftest$ac_exeext
if ${ac_cv_search_gethostbyname+:} false; then :
break
fi
done
if ${ac_cv_search_gethostbyname+:} false; then :
else
ac_cv_search_gethostbyname=no
fi
rm conftest.$ac_ext
LIBS=$ac_func_search_save_LIBS
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_search_gethostbyname" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_cv_search_gethostbyname" >&6; }
ac_res=$ac_cv_search_gethostbyname
if test "$ac_res" != no; then :
test "$ac_res" = "none required" || LIBS="$ac_res $LIBS"
fi
# "Particular Function Checks"
# see https://www.gnu.org/software/autoconf/manual/autoconf-2.69/html_node/Particular-Functions.html
for ac_func in strftime
do :
ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "strftime" "ac_cv_func_strftime"
if test "x$ac_cv_func_strftime" = xyes; then :
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define HAVE_STRFTIME 1
_ACEOF
else
# strftime is in -lintl on SCO UNIX.
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for strftime in -lintl" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for strftime in -lintl... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_lib_intl_strftime+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
LIBS="-lintl $LIBS"
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C"
#endif
char strftime ();
int
main ()
{
return strftime ();
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
ac_cv_lib_intl_strftime=yes
else
ac_cv_lib_intl_strftime=no
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_intl_strftime" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_intl_strftime" >&6; }
if test "x$ac_cv_lib_intl_strftime" = xyes; then :
$as_echo "#define HAVE_STRFTIME 1" >>confdefs.h
LIBS="-lintl $LIBS"
fi
fi
done
for ac_header in stdlib.h
do :
ac_fn_c_check_header_mongrel "$LINENO" "stdlib.h" "ac_cv_header_stdlib_h" "$ac_includes_default"
if test "x$ac_cv_header_stdlib_h" = xyes; then :
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define HAVE_STDLIB_H 1
_ACEOF
fi
done
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for GNU libc compatible malloc" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for GNU libc compatible malloc... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_func_malloc_0_nonnull+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
if test "$cross_compiling" = yes; then :
ac_cv_func_malloc_0_nonnull=no
else
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#if defined STDC_HEADERS || defined HAVE_STDLIB_H
# include <stdlib.h>
#else
char *malloc ();
#endif
int
main ()
{
return ! malloc (0);
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_run "$LINENO"; then :
ac_cv_func_malloc_0_nonnull=yes
else
ac_cv_func_malloc_0_nonnull=no
fi
rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* gmon.out bb.out conftest$ac_exeext \
conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
fi
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_func_malloc_0_nonnull" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_cv_func_malloc_0_nonnull" >&6; }
if test $ac_cv_func_malloc_0_nonnull = yes; then :
$as_echo "#define HAVE_MALLOC 1" >>confdefs.h
else
$as_echo "#define HAVE_MALLOC 0" >>confdefs.h
case " $LIBOBJS " in
*" malloc.$ac_objext "* ) ;;
*) LIBOBJS="$LIBOBJS malloc.$ac_objext"
;;
esac
$as_echo "#define malloc rpl_malloc" >>confdefs.h
fi
for ac_header in stdlib.h
do :
ac_fn_c_check_header_mongrel "$LINENO" "stdlib.h" "ac_cv_header_stdlib_h" "$ac_includes_default"
if test "x$ac_cv_header_stdlib_h" = xyes; then :
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define HAVE_STDLIB_H 1
_ACEOF
fi
done
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for GNU libc compatible realloc" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for GNU libc compatible realloc... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_func_realloc_0_nonnull+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
if test "$cross_compiling" = yes; then :
ac_cv_func_realloc_0_nonnull=no
else
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#if defined STDC_HEADERS || defined HAVE_STDLIB_H
# include <stdlib.h>
#else
char *realloc ();
#endif
int
main ()
{
return ! realloc (0, 0);
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_run "$LINENO"; then :
ac_cv_func_realloc_0_nonnull=yes
else
ac_cv_func_realloc_0_nonnull=no
fi
rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* gmon.out bb.out conftest$ac_exeext \
conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
fi
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_func_realloc_0_nonnull" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_cv_func_realloc_0_nonnull" >&6; }
if test $ac_cv_func_realloc_0_nonnull = yes; then :
$as_echo "#define HAVE_REALLOC 1" >>confdefs.h
else
$as_echo "#define HAVE_REALLOC 0" >>confdefs.h
case " $LIBOBJS " in
*" realloc.$ac_objext "* ) ;;
*) LIBOBJS="$LIBOBJS realloc.$ac_objext"
;;
esac
$as_echo "#define realloc rpl_realloc" >>confdefs.h
fi
# autoconf doesn't have AC_FUNC_CALLOC so fake it if malloc returns NULL;
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if calloc(0, N) returns non-null" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking if calloc(0, N) returns non-null... " >&6; }
if test "$cross_compiling" = yes; then :
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: cross compiling: assuming same as malloc" >&5
$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: cross compiling: assuming same as malloc" >&2;}
func_calloc_0_nonnull="$ac_cv_func_malloc_0_nonnull"
else
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <stdlib.h>
int
main ()
{
void *p = calloc(0, 1); exit(p == NULL);
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_run "$LINENO"; then :
func_calloc_0_nonnull=yes
else
func_calloc_0_nonnull=no
fi
rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* gmon.out bb.out conftest$ac_exeext \
conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $func_calloc_0_nonnull" >&5
$as_echo "$func_calloc_0_nonnull" >&6; }
if test "x$func_calloc_0_nonnull" = "xyes"; then
$as_echo "#define HAVE_CALLOC 1" >>confdefs.h
else
$as_echo "#define HAVE_CALLOC 0" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define calloc rpl_calloc" >>confdefs.h
fi
# Check for ALTDIRFUNC glob() extension
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for GLOB_ALTDIRFUNC support" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for GLOB_ALTDIRFUNC support... " >&6; }
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <glob.h>
#ifdef GLOB_ALTDIRFUNC
FOUNDIT
#endif
_ACEOF
if (eval "$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext") 2>&5 |
$EGREP "FOUNDIT" >/dev/null 2>&1; then :
$as_echo "#define GLOB_HAS_ALTDIRFUNC 1" >>confdefs.h
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
fi
rm -f conftest*
# Check for g.gl_matchc glob() extension
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for gl_matchc field in glob_t" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for gl_matchc field in glob_t... " >&6; }
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <glob.h>
int
main ()
{
glob_t g; g.gl_matchc = 1;
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
$as_echo "#define GLOB_HAS_GL_MATCHC 1" >>confdefs.h
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
# Check for g.gl_statv glob() extension
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for gl_statv and GLOB_KEEPSTAT extensions for glob" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for gl_statv and GLOB_KEEPSTAT extensions for glob... " >&6; }
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <glob.h>
int
main ()
{
#ifndef GLOB_KEEPSTAT
#error "glob does not support GLOB_KEEPSTAT extension"
#endif
glob_t g;
g.gl_statv = NULL;
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
$as_echo "#define GLOB_HAS_GL_STATV 1" >>confdefs.h
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
ac_fn_c_check_decl "$LINENO" "GLOB_NOMATCH" "ac_cv_have_decl_GLOB_NOMATCH" "#include <glob.h>
"
if test "x$ac_cv_have_decl_GLOB_NOMATCH" = xyes; then :
ac_have_decl=1
else
ac_have_decl=0
fi
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define HAVE_DECL_GLOB_NOMATCH $ac_have_decl
_ACEOF
ac_fn_c_check_decl "$LINENO" "VIS_ALL" "ac_cv_have_decl_VIS_ALL" "#include <vis.h>
"
if test "x$ac_cv_have_decl_VIS_ALL" = xyes; then :
else
$as_echo "#define BROKEN_STRNVIS 1" >>confdefs.h
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking whether struct dirent allocates space for d_name" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking whether struct dirent allocates space for d_name... " >&6; }
if test "$cross_compiling" = yes; then :
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: cross compiling: assuming BROKEN_ONE_BYTE_DIRENT_D_NAME" >&5
$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: cross compiling: assuming BROKEN_ONE_BYTE_DIRENT_D_NAME" >&2;}
$as_echo "#define BROKEN_ONE_BYTE_DIRENT_D_NAME 1" >>confdefs.h
else
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <dirent.h>
int
main ()
{
struct dirent d;
exit(sizeof(d.d_name)<=sizeof(char));
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_run "$LINENO"; then :
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
$as_echo "#define BROKEN_ONE_BYTE_DIRENT_D_NAME 1" >>confdefs.h
fi
rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* gmon.out bb.out conftest$ac_exeext \
conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for /proc/pid/fd directory" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for /proc/pid/fd directory... " >&6; }
if test -d "/proc/$$/fd" ; then
$as_echo "#define HAVE_PROC_PID 1" >>confdefs.h
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
fi
# Check whether user wants to use ldns
LDNS_MSG="no"
# Check whether --with-ldns was given.
if test "${with_ldns+set}" = set; then :
withval=$with_ldns;
ldns=""
if test "x$withval" = "xyes" ; then
if test -n "$ac_tool_prefix"; then
# Extract the first word of "${ac_tool_prefix}ldns-config", so it can be a program name with args.
set dummy ${ac_tool_prefix}ldns-config; ac_word=$2
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_path_LDNSCONFIG+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
case $LDNSCONFIG in
[\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*)
ac_cv_path_LDNSCONFIG="$LDNSCONFIG" # Let the user override the test with a path.
;;
*)
as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
for as_dir in $PATH
do
IFS=$as_save_IFS
test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=.
for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
if as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; then
ac_cv_path_LDNSCONFIG="$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"
$as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5
break 2
fi
done
done
IFS=$as_save_IFS
;;
esac
fi
LDNSCONFIG=$ac_cv_path_LDNSCONFIG
if test -n "$LDNSCONFIG"; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $LDNSCONFIG" >&5
$as_echo "$LDNSCONFIG" >&6; }
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
fi
fi
if test -z "$ac_cv_path_LDNSCONFIG"; then
ac_pt_LDNSCONFIG=$LDNSCONFIG
# Extract the first word of "ldns-config", so it can be a program name with args.
set dummy ldns-config; ac_word=$2
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_path_ac_pt_LDNSCONFIG+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
case $ac_pt_LDNSCONFIG in
[\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*)
ac_cv_path_ac_pt_LDNSCONFIG="$ac_pt_LDNSCONFIG" # Let the user override the test with a path.
;;
*)
as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
for as_dir in $PATH
do
IFS=$as_save_IFS
test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=.
for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
if as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; then
ac_cv_path_ac_pt_LDNSCONFIG="$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"
$as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5
break 2
fi
done
done
IFS=$as_save_IFS
;;
esac
fi
ac_pt_LDNSCONFIG=$ac_cv_path_ac_pt_LDNSCONFIG
if test -n "$ac_pt_LDNSCONFIG"; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_pt_LDNSCONFIG" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_pt_LDNSCONFIG" >&6; }
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
fi
if test "x$ac_pt_LDNSCONFIG" = x; then
LDNSCONFIG="no"
else
case $cross_compiling:$ac_tool_warned in
yes:)
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: using cross tools not prefixed with host triplet" >&5
$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: using cross tools not prefixed with host triplet" >&2;}
ac_tool_warned=yes ;;
esac
LDNSCONFIG=$ac_pt_LDNSCONFIG
fi
else
LDNSCONFIG="$ac_cv_path_LDNSCONFIG"
fi
if test "x$LDNSCONFIG" = "xno"; then
- CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -I${withval}/include"
- LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS -L${withval}/lib"
LIBS="-lldns $LIBS"
ldns=yes
else
LIBS="$LIBS `$LDNSCONFIG --libs`"
CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS `$LDNSCONFIG --cflags`"
ldns=yes
fi
elif test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -I${withval}/include"
LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS -L${withval}/lib"
LIBS="-lldns $LIBS"
ldns=yes
fi
# Verify that it works.
if test "x$ldns" = "xyes" ; then
$as_echo "#define HAVE_LDNS 1" >>confdefs.h
LDNS_MSG="yes"
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for ldns support" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for ldns support... " >&6; }
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
-#include <stdint.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
+# include <stdint.h>
+#endif
#include <ldns/ldns.h>
int main() { ldns_status status = ldns_verify_trusted(NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL); status=LDNS_STATUS_OK; exit(0); }
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
as_fn_error $? "** Incomplete or missing ldns libraries." "$LINENO" 5
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
fi
fi
# Check whether user wants libedit support
LIBEDIT_MSG="no"
# Check whether --with-libedit was given.
if test "${with_libedit+set}" = set; then :
withval=$with_libedit; if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
if test "x$withval" = "xyes" ; then
if test -n "$ac_tool_prefix"; then
# Extract the first word of "${ac_tool_prefix}pkg-config", so it can be a program name with args.
set dummy ${ac_tool_prefix}pkg-config; ac_word=$2
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_path_PKGCONFIG+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
case $PKGCONFIG in
[\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*)
ac_cv_path_PKGCONFIG="$PKGCONFIG" # Let the user override the test with a path.
;;
*)
as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
for as_dir in $PATH
do
IFS=$as_save_IFS
test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=.
for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
if as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; then
ac_cv_path_PKGCONFIG="$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"
$as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5
break 2
fi
done
done
IFS=$as_save_IFS
;;
esac
fi
PKGCONFIG=$ac_cv_path_PKGCONFIG
if test -n "$PKGCONFIG"; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $PKGCONFIG" >&5
$as_echo "$PKGCONFIG" >&6; }
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
fi
fi
if test -z "$ac_cv_path_PKGCONFIG"; then
ac_pt_PKGCONFIG=$PKGCONFIG
# Extract the first word of "pkg-config", so it can be a program name with args.
set dummy pkg-config; ac_word=$2
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_path_ac_pt_PKGCONFIG+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
case $ac_pt_PKGCONFIG in
[\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*)
ac_cv_path_ac_pt_PKGCONFIG="$ac_pt_PKGCONFIG" # Let the user override the test with a path.
;;
*)
as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
for as_dir in $PATH
do
IFS=$as_save_IFS
test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=.
for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
if as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; then
ac_cv_path_ac_pt_PKGCONFIG="$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"
$as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5
break 2
fi
done
done
IFS=$as_save_IFS
;;
esac
fi
ac_pt_PKGCONFIG=$ac_cv_path_ac_pt_PKGCONFIG
if test -n "$ac_pt_PKGCONFIG"; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_pt_PKGCONFIG" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_pt_PKGCONFIG" >&6; }
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
fi
if test "x$ac_pt_PKGCONFIG" = x; then
PKGCONFIG="no"
else
case $cross_compiling:$ac_tool_warned in
yes:)
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: using cross tools not prefixed with host triplet" >&5
$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: using cross tools not prefixed with host triplet" >&2;}
ac_tool_warned=yes ;;
esac
PKGCONFIG=$ac_pt_PKGCONFIG
fi
else
PKGCONFIG="$ac_cv_path_PKGCONFIG"
fi
if test "x$PKGCONFIG" != "xno"; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if $PKGCONFIG knows about libedit" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking if $PKGCONFIG knows about libedit... " >&6; }
if "$PKGCONFIG" libedit; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
use_pkgconfig_for_libedit=yes
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
fi
fi
else
CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -I${withval}/include"
if test -n "${rpath_opt}"; then
LDFLAGS="-L${withval}/lib ${rpath_opt}${withval}/lib ${LDFLAGS}"
else
LDFLAGS="-L${withval}/lib ${LDFLAGS}"
fi
fi
if test "x$use_pkgconfig_for_libedit" = "xyes"; then
LIBEDIT=`$PKGCONFIG --libs libedit`
CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS `$PKGCONFIG --cflags libedit`"
else
LIBEDIT="-ledit -lcurses"
fi
OTHERLIBS=`echo $LIBEDIT | sed 's/-ledit//'`
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for el_init in -ledit" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for el_init in -ledit... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_lib_edit_el_init+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
LIBS="-ledit $OTHERLIBS
$LIBS"
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C"
#endif
char el_init ();
int
main ()
{
return el_init ();
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
ac_cv_lib_edit_el_init=yes
else
ac_cv_lib_edit_el_init=no
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_edit_el_init" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_edit_el_init" >&6; }
if test "x$ac_cv_lib_edit_el_init" = xyes; then :
$as_echo "#define USE_LIBEDIT 1" >>confdefs.h
LIBEDIT_MSG="yes"
else
as_fn_error $? "libedit not found" "$LINENO" 5
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if libedit version is compatible" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking if libedit version is compatible... " >&6; }
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <histedit.h>
int
main ()
{
int i = H_SETSIZE;
el_init("", NULL, NULL, NULL);
exit(0);
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
as_fn_error $? "libedit version is not compatible" "$LINENO" 5
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
fi
fi
AUDIT_MODULE=none
# Check whether --with-audit was given.
if test "${with_audit+set}" = set; then :
withval=$with_audit;
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for supported audit module" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for supported audit module... " >&6; }
case "$withval" in
bsm)
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: bsm" >&5
$as_echo "bsm" >&6; }
AUDIT_MODULE=bsm
for ac_header in bsm/audit.h
do :
ac_fn_c_check_header_compile "$LINENO" "bsm/audit.h" "ac_cv_header_bsm_audit_h" "
#ifdef HAVE_TIME_H
# include <time.h>
#endif
"
if test "x$ac_cv_header_bsm_audit_h" = xyes; then :
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define HAVE_BSM_AUDIT_H 1
_ACEOF
else
as_fn_error $? "BSM enabled and bsm/audit.h not found" "$LINENO" 5
fi
done
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for getaudit in -lbsm" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for getaudit in -lbsm... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_lib_bsm_getaudit+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
LIBS="-lbsm $LIBS"
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C"
#endif
char getaudit ();
int
main ()
{
return getaudit ();
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
ac_cv_lib_bsm_getaudit=yes
else
ac_cv_lib_bsm_getaudit=no
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_bsm_getaudit" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_bsm_getaudit" >&6; }
if test "x$ac_cv_lib_bsm_getaudit" = xyes; then :
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define HAVE_LIBBSM 1
_ACEOF
LIBS="-lbsm $LIBS"
else
as_fn_error $? "BSM enabled and required library not found" "$LINENO" 5
fi
for ac_func in getaudit
do :
ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "getaudit" "ac_cv_func_getaudit"
if test "x$ac_cv_func_getaudit" = xyes; then :
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define HAVE_GETAUDIT 1
_ACEOF
else
as_fn_error $? "BSM enabled and required function not found" "$LINENO" 5
fi
done
# These are optional
for ac_func in getaudit_addr aug_get_machine
do :
as_ac_var=`$as_echo "ac_cv_func_$ac_func" | $as_tr_sh`
ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "$ac_func" "$as_ac_var"
if eval test \"x\$"$as_ac_var"\" = x"yes"; then :
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define `$as_echo "HAVE_$ac_func" | $as_tr_cpp` 1
_ACEOF
fi
done
$as_echo "#define USE_BSM_AUDIT 1" >>confdefs.h
if test "$sol2ver" -ge 11; then
SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -lscf"
$as_echo "#define BROKEN_BSM_API 1" >>confdefs.h
fi
;;
linux)
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: linux" >&5
$as_echo "linux" >&6; }
AUDIT_MODULE=linux
for ac_header in libaudit.h
do :
ac_fn_c_check_header_mongrel "$LINENO" "libaudit.h" "ac_cv_header_libaudit_h" "$ac_includes_default"
if test "x$ac_cv_header_libaudit_h" = xyes; then :
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define HAVE_LIBAUDIT_H 1
_ACEOF
fi
done
SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -laudit"
$as_echo "#define USE_LINUX_AUDIT 1" >>confdefs.h
;;
debug)
AUDIT_MODULE=debug
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: debug" >&5
$as_echo "debug" >&6; }
$as_echo "#define SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS 1" >>confdefs.h
;;
no)
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
;;
*)
as_fn_error $? "Unknown audit module $withval" "$LINENO" 5
;;
esac
fi
# Check whether --with-pie was given.
if test "${with_pie+set}" = set; then :
withval=$with_pie;
if test "x$withval" = "xno"; then
use_pie=no
fi
if test "x$withval" = "xyes"; then
use_pie=yes
fi
fi
if test "x$use_pie" = "x"; then
use_pie=no
fi
if test "x$use_toolchain_hardening" != "x1" && test "x$use_pie" = "xauto"; then
# Turn off automatic PIE when toolchain hardening is off.
use_pie=no
fi
if test "x$use_pie" = "xauto"; then
# Automatic PIE requires gcc >= 4.x
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for gcc >= 4.x" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for gcc >= 4.x... " >&6; }
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#if !defined(__GNUC__) || __GNUC__ < 4
#error gcc is too old
#endif
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
use_pie=no
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
fi
if test "x$use_pie" != "xno"; then
SAVED_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS"
SAVED_LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS"
{
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if $CC supports compile flag -fPIE" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking if $CC supports compile flag -fPIE... " >&6; }
saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS"
CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $WERROR -fPIE"
_define_flag=""
test "x$_define_flag" = "x" && _define_flag="-fPIE"
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdio.h>
int main(int argc, char **argv) {
/* Some math to catch -ftrapv problems in the toolchain */
int i = 123 * argc, j = 456 + argc, k = 789 - argc;
float l = i * 2.1;
double m = l / 0.5;
long long int n = argc * 12345LL, o = 12345LL * (long long int)argc;
printf("%d %d %d %f %f %lld %lld\n", i, j, k, l, m, n, o);
exit(0);
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
if $ac_cv_path_EGREP -i "unrecognized option|warning.*ignored" conftest.err >/dev/null
then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS $_define_flag"
fi
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
}
{
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if $LD supports link flag -pie" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking if $LD supports link flag -pie... " >&6; }
saved_LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS"
LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS $WERROR -pie"
_define_flag=""
test "x$_define_flag" = "x" && _define_flag="-pie"
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdio.h>
int main(int argc, char **argv) {
/* Some math to catch -ftrapv problems in the toolchain */
int i = 123 * argc, j = 456 + argc, k = 789 - argc;
float l = i * 2.1;
double m = l / 0.5;
long long int n = argc * 12345LL, o = 12345LL * (long long int)argc;
long long p = n * o;
printf("%d %d %d %f %f %lld %lld %lld\n", i, j, k, l, m, n, o, p);
exit(0);
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
if $ac_cv_path_EGREP -i "unrecognized option|warning.*ignored" conftest.err >/dev/null
then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
LDFLAGS="$saved_LDFLAGS"
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
LDFLAGS="$saved_LDFLAGS $_define_flag"
fi
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
LDFLAGS="$saved_LDFLAGS"
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
}
# We use both -fPIE and -pie or neither.
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking whether both -fPIE and -pie are supported" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking whether both -fPIE and -pie are supported... " >&6; }
if echo "x $CFLAGS" | grep ' -fPIE' >/dev/null 2>&1 && \
echo "x $LDFLAGS" | grep ' -pie' >/dev/null 2>&1 ; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
CFLAGS="$SAVED_CFLAGS"
LDFLAGS="$SAVED_LDFLAGS"
fi
fi
+{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking whether -fPIC is accepted" >&5
+$as_echo_n "checking whether -fPIC is accepted... " >&6; }
+SAVED_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS"
+CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -fPIC"
+cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+ #include <stdlib.h>
+int
+main ()
+{
+ exit(0);
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
+$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
+ PICFLAG="-fPIC";
+else
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+$as_echo "no" >&6; }
+ PICFLAG="";
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+CFLAGS="$SAVED_CFLAGS"
+
+
for ac_func in \
Blowfish_initstate \
Blowfish_expandstate \
Blowfish_expand0state \
Blowfish_stream2word \
SHA256Update \
SHA384Update \
SHA512Update \
asprintf \
b64_ntop \
__b64_ntop \
b64_pton \
__b64_pton \
bcopy \
bcrypt_pbkdf \
bindresvport_sa \
blf_enc \
bzero \
cap_rights_limit \
clock \
closefrom \
dirfd \
endgrent \
err \
errx \
explicit_bzero \
fchmod \
fchmodat \
fchown \
fchownat \
flock \
+ fnmatch \
freeaddrinfo \
freezero \
fstatfs \
fstatvfs \
futimes \
getaddrinfo \
getcwd \
getgrouplist \
getline \
getnameinfo \
getopt \
getpagesize \
getpeereid \
getpeerucred \
getpgid \
_getpty \
getrlimit \
getrandom \
getsid \
getttyent \
glob \
group_from_gid \
inet_aton \
inet_ntoa \
inet_ntop \
innetgr \
llabs \
+ localtime_r \
login_getcapbool \
md5_crypt \
memmem \
memmove \
memset_s \
mkdtemp \
ngetaddrinfo \
nsleep \
ogetaddrinfo \
openlog_r \
pledge \
poll \
prctl \
pstat \
raise \
readpassphrase \
reallocarray \
+ realpath \
recvmsg \
recallocarray \
rresvport_af \
sendmsg \
setdtablesize \
setegid \
setenv \
seteuid \
setgroupent \
setgroups \
setlinebuf \
setlogin \
setpassent\
setpcred \
setproctitle \
setregid \
setreuid \
setrlimit \
setsid \
setvbuf \
sigaction \
sigvec \
snprintf \
socketpair \
statfs \
statvfs \
strcasestr \
strdup \
strerror \
strlcat \
strlcpy \
strmode \
strndup \
strnlen \
strnvis \
strptime \
strsignal \
strtonum \
strtoll \
strtoul \
strtoull \
swap32 \
sysconf \
tcgetpgrp \
timingsafe_bcmp \
truncate \
unsetenv \
updwtmpx \
utimensat \
user_from_uid \
usleep \
vasprintf \
vsnprintf \
waitpid \
warn \
do :
as_ac_var=`$as_echo "ac_cv_func_$ac_func" | $as_tr_sh`
ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "$ac_func" "$as_ac_var"
if eval test \"x\$"$as_ac_var"\" = x"yes"; then :
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define `$as_echo "HAVE_$ac_func" | $as_tr_cpp` 1
_ACEOF
fi
done
ac_fn_c_check_decl "$LINENO" "bzero" "ac_cv_have_decl_bzero" "$ac_includes_default"
if test "x$ac_cv_have_decl_bzero" = xyes; then :
ac_have_decl=1
else
ac_have_decl=0
fi
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define HAVE_DECL_BZERO $ac_have_decl
_ACEOF
+ac_fn_c_check_decl "$LINENO" "memmem" "ac_cv_have_decl_memmem" "$ac_includes_default"
+if test "x$ac_cv_have_decl_memmem" = xyes; then :
+ ac_have_decl=1
+else
+ ac_have_decl=0
+fi
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_DECL_MEMMEM $ac_have_decl
+_ACEOF
for ac_func in mblen mbtowc nl_langinfo wcwidth
do :
as_ac_var=`$as_echo "ac_cv_func_$ac_func" | $as_tr_sh`
ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "$ac_func" "$as_ac_var"
if eval test \"x\$"$as_ac_var"\" = x"yes"; then :
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define `$as_echo "HAVE_$ac_func" | $as_tr_cpp` 1
_ACEOF
fi
done
TEST_SSH_UTF8=${TEST_SSH_UTF8:=yes}
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for utf8 locale support" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for utf8 locale support... " >&6; }
if test "$cross_compiling" = yes; then :
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: cross compiling: assuming yes" >&5
$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: cross compiling: assuming yes" >&2;}
else
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <locale.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
int
main ()
{
char *loc = setlocale(LC_CTYPE, "en_US.UTF-8");
if (loc != NULL)
exit(0);
exit(1);
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_run "$LINENO"; then :
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
TEST_SSH_UTF8=no
fi
rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* gmon.out bb.out conftest$ac_exeext \
conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
fi
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <ctype.h>
int
main ()
{
return (isblank('a'));
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
$as_echo "#define HAVE_ISBLANK 1" >>confdefs.h
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
disable_pkcs11=
# Check whether --enable-pkcs11 was given.
if test "${enable_pkcs11+set}" = set; then :
enableval=$enable_pkcs11;
if test "x$enableval" = "xno" ; then
disable_pkcs11=1
fi
fi
-# PKCS11 depends on OpenSSL.
-if test "x$openssl" = "xyes" && test "x$disable_pkcs11" = "x"; then
- # PKCS#11 support requires dlopen() and co
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for library containing dlopen" >&5
+disable_sk=
+# Check whether --enable-security-key was given.
+if test "${enable_security_key+set}" = set; then :
+ enableval=$enable_security_key;
+ if test "x$enableval" = "xno" ; then
+ disable_sk=1
+ fi
+
+
+fi
+
+enable_sk_internal=
+
+# Check whether --with-security-key-builtin was given.
+if test "${with_security_key_builtin+set}" = set; then :
+ withval=$with_security_key_builtin;
+ if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
+ enable_sk_internal=yes
+ fi
+
+
+fi
+
+test "x$disable_sk" != "x" && enable_sk_internal=""
+
+{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for library containing dlopen" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for library containing dlopen... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_search_dlopen+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
ac_func_search_save_LIBS=$LIBS
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C"
#endif
char dlopen ();
int
main ()
{
return dlopen ();
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
for ac_lib in '' dl; do
if test -z "$ac_lib"; then
ac_res="none required"
else
ac_res=-l$ac_lib
LIBS="-l$ac_lib $ac_func_search_save_LIBS"
fi
if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
ac_cv_search_dlopen=$ac_res
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
conftest$ac_exeext
if ${ac_cv_search_dlopen+:} false; then :
break
fi
done
if ${ac_cv_search_dlopen+:} false; then :
else
ac_cv_search_dlopen=no
fi
rm conftest.$ac_ext
LIBS=$ac_func_search_save_LIBS
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_search_dlopen" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_cv_search_dlopen" >&6; }
ac_res=$ac_cv_search_dlopen
if test "$ac_res" != no; then :
test "$ac_res" = "none required" || LIBS="$ac_res $LIBS"
- ac_fn_c_check_decl "$LINENO" "RTLD_NOW" "ac_cv_have_decl_RTLD_NOW" "#include <dlfcn.h>
-"
-if test "x$ac_cv_have_decl_RTLD_NOW" = xyes; then :
+fi
-$as_echo "#define ENABLE_PKCS11 /**/" >>confdefs.h
+for ac_func in dlopen
+do :
+ ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "dlopen" "ac_cv_func_dlopen"
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_dlopen" = xyes; then :
+ cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_DLOPEN 1
+_ACEOF
fi
+done
+ac_fn_c_check_decl "$LINENO" "RTLD_NOW" "ac_cv_have_decl_RTLD_NOW" "#include <dlfcn.h>
+"
+if test "x$ac_cv_have_decl_RTLD_NOW" = xyes; then :
fi
-fi
# IRIX has a const char return value for gai_strerror()
for ac_func in gai_strerror
do :
ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "gai_strerror" "ac_cv_func_gai_strerror"
if test "x$ac_cv_func_gai_strerror" = xyes; then :
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define HAVE_GAI_STRERROR 1
_ACEOF
$as_echo "#define HAVE_GAI_STRERROR 1" >>confdefs.h
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <netdb.h>
const char *gai_strerror(int);
int
main ()
{
char *str;
str = gai_strerror(0);
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
$as_echo "#define HAVE_CONST_GAI_STRERROR_PROTO 1" >>confdefs.h
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
fi
done
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for library containing nanosleep" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for library containing nanosleep... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_search_nanosleep+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
ac_func_search_save_LIBS=$LIBS
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C"
#endif
char nanosleep ();
int
main ()
{
return nanosleep ();
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
for ac_lib in '' rt posix4; do
if test -z "$ac_lib"; then
ac_res="none required"
else
ac_res=-l$ac_lib
LIBS="-l$ac_lib $ac_func_search_save_LIBS"
fi
if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
ac_cv_search_nanosleep=$ac_res
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
conftest$ac_exeext
if ${ac_cv_search_nanosleep+:} false; then :
break
fi
done
if ${ac_cv_search_nanosleep+:} false; then :
else
ac_cv_search_nanosleep=no
fi
rm conftest.$ac_ext
LIBS=$ac_func_search_save_LIBS
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_search_nanosleep" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_cv_search_nanosleep" >&6; }
ac_res=$ac_cv_search_nanosleep
if test "$ac_res" != no; then :
test "$ac_res" = "none required" || LIBS="$ac_res $LIBS"
$as_echo "#define HAVE_NANOSLEEP 1" >>confdefs.h
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for library containing clock_gettime" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for library containing clock_gettime... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_search_clock_gettime+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
ac_func_search_save_LIBS=$LIBS
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C"
#endif
char clock_gettime ();
int
main ()
{
return clock_gettime ();
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
for ac_lib in '' rt; do
if test -z "$ac_lib"; then
ac_res="none required"
else
ac_res=-l$ac_lib
LIBS="-l$ac_lib $ac_func_search_save_LIBS"
fi
if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
ac_cv_search_clock_gettime=$ac_res
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
conftest$ac_exeext
if ${ac_cv_search_clock_gettime+:} false; then :
break
fi
done
if ${ac_cv_search_clock_gettime+:} false; then :
else
ac_cv_search_clock_gettime=no
fi
rm conftest.$ac_ext
LIBS=$ac_func_search_save_LIBS
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_search_clock_gettime" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_cv_search_clock_gettime" >&6; }
ac_res=$ac_cv_search_clock_gettime
if test "$ac_res" != no; then :
test "$ac_res" = "none required" || LIBS="$ac_res $LIBS"
$as_echo "#define HAVE_CLOCK_GETTIME 1" >>confdefs.h
fi
ac_fn_c_check_decl "$LINENO" "strsep" "ac_cv_have_decl_strsep" "
#ifdef HAVE_STRING_H
# include <string.h>
#endif
"
if test "x$ac_cv_have_decl_strsep" = xyes; then :
for ac_func in strsep
do :
ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "strsep" "ac_cv_func_strsep"
if test "x$ac_cv_func_strsep" = xyes; then :
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define HAVE_STRSEP 1
_ACEOF
fi
done
fi
ac_fn_c_check_decl "$LINENO" "tcsendbreak" "ac_cv_have_decl_tcsendbreak" "#include <termios.h>
"
if test "x$ac_cv_have_decl_tcsendbreak" = xyes; then :
$as_echo "#define HAVE_TCSENDBREAK 1" >>confdefs.h
else
for ac_func in tcsendbreak
do :
ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "tcsendbreak" "ac_cv_func_tcsendbreak"
if test "x$ac_cv_func_tcsendbreak" = xyes; then :
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define HAVE_TCSENDBREAK 1
_ACEOF
fi
done
fi
ac_fn_c_check_decl "$LINENO" "h_errno" "ac_cv_have_decl_h_errno" "#include <netdb.h>
"
if test "x$ac_cv_have_decl_h_errno" = xyes; then :
ac_have_decl=1
else
ac_have_decl=0
fi
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define HAVE_DECL_H_ERRNO $ac_have_decl
_ACEOF
ac_fn_c_check_decl "$LINENO" "SHUT_RD" "ac_cv_have_decl_SHUT_RD" "
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
"
if test "x$ac_cv_have_decl_SHUT_RD" = xyes; then :
ac_have_decl=1
else
ac_have_decl=0
fi
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define HAVE_DECL_SHUT_RD $ac_have_decl
_ACEOF
ac_fn_c_check_decl "$LINENO" "O_NONBLOCK" "ac_cv_have_decl_O_NONBLOCK" "
#include <sys/types.h>
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H
# include <sys/stat.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_FCNTL_H
# include <fcntl.h>
#endif
"
if test "x$ac_cv_have_decl_O_NONBLOCK" = xyes; then :
ac_have_decl=1
else
ac_have_decl=0
fi
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define HAVE_DECL_O_NONBLOCK $ac_have_decl
_ACEOF
ac_fn_c_check_decl "$LINENO" "readv" "ac_cv_have_decl_readv" "
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/uio.h>
#include <unistd.h>
"
if test "x$ac_cv_have_decl_readv" = xyes; then :
ac_have_decl=1
else
ac_have_decl=0
fi
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define HAVE_DECL_READV $ac_have_decl
_ACEOF
ac_fn_c_check_decl "$LINENO" "writev" "ac_cv_have_decl_writev" "
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/uio.h>
#include <unistd.h>
"
if test "x$ac_cv_have_decl_writev" = xyes; then :
ac_have_decl=1
else
ac_have_decl=0
fi
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define HAVE_DECL_WRITEV $ac_have_decl
_ACEOF
ac_fn_c_check_decl "$LINENO" "MAXSYMLINKS" "ac_cv_have_decl_MAXSYMLINKS" "
#include <sys/param.h>
"
if test "x$ac_cv_have_decl_MAXSYMLINKS" = xyes; then :
ac_have_decl=1
else
ac_have_decl=0
fi
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define HAVE_DECL_MAXSYMLINKS $ac_have_decl
_ACEOF
ac_fn_c_check_decl "$LINENO" "offsetof" "ac_cv_have_decl_offsetof" "
#include <stddef.h>
"
if test "x$ac_cv_have_decl_offsetof" = xyes; then :
ac_have_decl=1
else
ac_have_decl=0
fi
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define HAVE_DECL_OFFSETOF $ac_have_decl
_ACEOF
# extra bits for select(2)
ac_fn_c_check_decl "$LINENO" "howmany" "ac_cv_have_decl_howmany" "
#include <sys/param.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SYSMACROS_H
#include <sys/sysmacros.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SELECT_H
#include <sys/select.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
#include <sys/time.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_UNISTD_H
#include <unistd.h>
#endif
"
if test "x$ac_cv_have_decl_howmany" = xyes; then :
ac_have_decl=1
else
ac_have_decl=0
fi
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define HAVE_DECL_HOWMANY $ac_have_decl
_ACEOF
ac_fn_c_check_decl "$LINENO" "NFDBITS" "ac_cv_have_decl_NFDBITS" "
#include <sys/param.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SYSMACROS_H
#include <sys/sysmacros.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SELECT_H
#include <sys/select.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
#include <sys/time.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_UNISTD_H
#include <unistd.h>
#endif
"
if test "x$ac_cv_have_decl_NFDBITS" = xyes; then :
ac_have_decl=1
else
ac_have_decl=0
fi
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define HAVE_DECL_NFDBITS $ac_have_decl
_ACEOF
ac_fn_c_check_type "$LINENO" "fd_mask" "ac_cv_type_fd_mask" "
#include <sys/param.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SELECT_H
#include <sys/select.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
#include <sys/time.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_UNISTD_H
#include <unistd.h>
#endif
"
if test "x$ac_cv_type_fd_mask" = xyes; then :
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define HAVE_FD_MASK 1
_ACEOF
fi
for ac_func in setresuid
do :
ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "setresuid" "ac_cv_func_setresuid"
if test "x$ac_cv_func_setresuid" = xyes; then :
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define HAVE_SETRESUID 1
_ACEOF
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if setresuid seems to work" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking if setresuid seems to work... " >&6; }
if test "$cross_compiling" = yes; then :
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: cross compiling: not checking setresuid" >&5
$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: cross compiling: not checking setresuid" >&2;}
else
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <errno.h>
int
main ()
{
errno=0;
setresuid(0,0,0);
if (errno==ENOSYS)
exit(1);
else
exit(0);
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_run "$LINENO"; then :
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
else
$as_echo "#define BROKEN_SETRESUID 1" >>confdefs.h
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: not implemented" >&5
$as_echo "not implemented" >&6; }
fi
rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* gmon.out bb.out conftest$ac_exeext \
conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
fi
fi
done
for ac_func in setresgid
do :
ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "setresgid" "ac_cv_func_setresgid"
if test "x$ac_cv_func_setresgid" = xyes; then :
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define HAVE_SETRESGID 1
_ACEOF
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if setresgid seems to work" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking if setresgid seems to work... " >&6; }
if test "$cross_compiling" = yes; then :
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: cross compiling: not checking setresuid" >&5
$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: cross compiling: not checking setresuid" >&2;}
else
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <errno.h>
int
main ()
{
errno=0;
setresgid(0,0,0);
if (errno==ENOSYS)
exit(1);
else
exit(0);
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_run "$LINENO"; then :
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
else
$as_echo "#define BROKEN_SETRESGID 1" >>confdefs.h
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: not implemented" >&5
$as_echo "not implemented" >&6; }
fi
rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* gmon.out bb.out conftest$ac_exeext \
conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
fi
fi
done
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for working fflush(NULL)" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for working fflush(NULL)... " >&6; }
if test "$cross_compiling" = yes; then :
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: cross compiling: assuming working" >&5
$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: cross compiling: assuming working" >&2;}
else
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <stdio.h>
int
main ()
{
fflush(NULL); exit(0);
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_run "$LINENO"; then :
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
$as_echo "#define FFLUSH_NULL_BUG 1" >>confdefs.h
fi
rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* gmon.out bb.out conftest$ac_exeext \
conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
fi
for ac_func in gettimeofday time
do :
as_ac_var=`$as_echo "ac_cv_func_$ac_func" | $as_tr_sh`
ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "$ac_func" "$as_ac_var"
if eval test \"x\$"$as_ac_var"\" = x"yes"; then :
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define `$as_echo "HAVE_$ac_func" | $as_tr_cpp` 1
_ACEOF
fi
done
for ac_func in endutent getutent getutid getutline pututline setutent
do :
as_ac_var=`$as_echo "ac_cv_func_$ac_func" | $as_tr_sh`
ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "$ac_func" "$as_ac_var"
if eval test \"x\$"$as_ac_var"\" = x"yes"; then :
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define `$as_echo "HAVE_$ac_func" | $as_tr_cpp` 1
_ACEOF
fi
done
for ac_func in utmpname
do :
ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "utmpname" "ac_cv_func_utmpname"
if test "x$ac_cv_func_utmpname" = xyes; then :
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define HAVE_UTMPNAME 1
_ACEOF
fi
done
for ac_func in endutxent getutxent getutxid getutxline getutxuser pututxline
do :
as_ac_var=`$as_echo "ac_cv_func_$ac_func" | $as_tr_sh`
ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "$ac_func" "$as_ac_var"
if eval test \"x\$"$as_ac_var"\" = x"yes"; then :
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define `$as_echo "HAVE_$ac_func" | $as_tr_cpp` 1
_ACEOF
fi
done
for ac_func in setutxdb setutxent utmpxname
do :
as_ac_var=`$as_echo "ac_cv_func_$ac_func" | $as_tr_sh`
ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "$ac_func" "$as_ac_var"
if eval test \"x\$"$as_ac_var"\" = x"yes"; then :
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define `$as_echo "HAVE_$ac_func" | $as_tr_cpp` 1
_ACEOF
fi
done
for ac_func in getlastlogxbyname
do :
ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "getlastlogxbyname" "ac_cv_func_getlastlogxbyname"
if test "x$ac_cv_func_getlastlogxbyname" = xyes; then :
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define HAVE_GETLASTLOGXBYNAME 1
_ACEOF
fi
done
ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "daemon" "ac_cv_func_daemon"
if test "x$ac_cv_func_daemon" = xyes; then :
$as_echo "#define HAVE_DAEMON 1" >>confdefs.h
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for daemon in -lbsd" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for daemon in -lbsd... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_lib_bsd_daemon+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
LIBS="-lbsd $LIBS"
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C"
#endif
char daemon ();
int
main ()
{
return daemon ();
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
ac_cv_lib_bsd_daemon=yes
else
ac_cv_lib_bsd_daemon=no
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_bsd_daemon" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_bsd_daemon" >&6; }
if test "x$ac_cv_lib_bsd_daemon" = xyes; then :
LIBS="$LIBS -lbsd"; $as_echo "#define HAVE_DAEMON 1" >>confdefs.h
fi
fi
ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "getpagesize" "ac_cv_func_getpagesize"
if test "x$ac_cv_func_getpagesize" = xyes; then :
$as_echo "#define HAVE_GETPAGESIZE 1" >>confdefs.h
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for getpagesize in -lucb" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for getpagesize in -lucb... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_lib_ucb_getpagesize+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
LIBS="-lucb $LIBS"
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C"
#endif
char getpagesize ();
int
main ()
{
return getpagesize ();
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
ac_cv_lib_ucb_getpagesize=yes
else
ac_cv_lib_ucb_getpagesize=no
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_ucb_getpagesize" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_ucb_getpagesize" >&6; }
if test "x$ac_cv_lib_ucb_getpagesize" = xyes; then :
LIBS="$LIBS -lucb"; $as_echo "#define HAVE_GETPAGESIZE 1" >>confdefs.h
fi
fi
# Check for broken snprintf
if test "x$ac_cv_func_snprintf" = "xyes" ; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking whether snprintf correctly terminates long strings" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking whether snprintf correctly terminates long strings... " >&6; }
if test "$cross_compiling" = yes; then :
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: cross compiling: Assuming working snprintf()" >&5
$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: cross compiling: Assuming working snprintf()" >&2;}
else
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <stdio.h>
int
main ()
{
char b[5];
snprintf(b,5,"123456789");
exit(b[4]!='\0');
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_run "$LINENO"; then :
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
$as_echo "#define BROKEN_SNPRINTF 1" >>confdefs.h
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: ****** Your snprintf() function is broken, complain to your vendor" >&5
$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: ****** Your snprintf() function is broken, complain to your vendor" >&2;}
fi
rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* gmon.out bb.out conftest$ac_exeext \
conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
fi
fi
if test "x$ac_cv_func_snprintf" = "xyes" ; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking whether snprintf understands %zu" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking whether snprintf understands %zu... " >&6; }
if test "$cross_compiling" = yes; then :
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: cross compiling: Assuming working snprintf()" >&5
$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: cross compiling: Assuming working snprintf()" >&2;}
else
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <stdio.h>
int
main ()
{
size_t a = 1, b = 2;
char z[128];
snprintf(z, sizeof z, "%zu%zu", a, b);
exit(strcmp(z, "12"));
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_run "$LINENO"; then :
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
$as_echo "#define BROKEN_SNPRINTF 1" >>confdefs.h
fi
rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* gmon.out bb.out conftest$ac_exeext \
conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
fi
fi
# We depend on vsnprintf returning the right thing on overflow: the
# number of characters it tried to create (as per SUSv3)
if test "x$ac_cv_func_vsnprintf" = "xyes" ; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking whether vsnprintf returns correct values on overflow" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking whether vsnprintf returns correct values on overflow... " >&6; }
if test "$cross_compiling" = yes; then :
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: cross compiling: Assuming working vsnprintf()" >&5
$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: cross compiling: Assuming working vsnprintf()" >&2;}
else
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
int x_snprintf(char *str, size_t count, const char *fmt, ...)
{
size_t ret;
va_list ap;
va_start(ap, fmt);
ret = vsnprintf(str, count, fmt, ap);
va_end(ap);
return ret;
}
int
main ()
{
char x[1];
if (x_snprintf(x, 1, "%s %d", "hello", 12345) != 11)
return 1;
if (x_snprintf(NULL, 0, "%s %d", "hello", 12345) != 11)
return 1;
return 0;
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_run "$LINENO"; then :
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
$as_echo "#define BROKEN_SNPRINTF 1" >>confdefs.h
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: ****** Your vsnprintf() function is broken, complain to your vendor" >&5
$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: ****** Your vsnprintf() function is broken, complain to your vendor" >&2;}
fi
rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* gmon.out bb.out conftest$ac_exeext \
conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
fi
fi
# On systems where [v]snprintf is broken, but is declared in stdio,
# check that the fmt argument is const char * or just char *.
# This is only useful for when BROKEN_SNPRINTF
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking whether snprintf can declare const char *fmt" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking whether snprintf can declare const char *fmt... " >&6; }
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <stdio.h>
int snprintf(char *a, size_t b, const char *c, ...) { return 0; }
int
main ()
{
snprintf(0, 0, 0);
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
$as_echo "#define SNPRINTF_CONST const" >>confdefs.h
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
$as_echo "#define SNPRINTF_CONST /* not const */" >>confdefs.h
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
# Check for missing getpeereid (or equiv) support
NO_PEERCHECK=""
if test "x$ac_cv_func_getpeereid" != "xyes" -a "x$ac_cv_func_getpeerucred" != "xyes"; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking whether system supports SO_PEERCRED getsockopt" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking whether system supports SO_PEERCRED getsockopt... " >&6; }
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
int
main ()
{
int i = SO_PEERCRED;
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
$as_echo "#define HAVE_SO_PEERCRED 1" >>confdefs.h
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
NO_PEERCHECK=1
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
fi
if test "x$ac_cv_func_mkdtemp" = "xyes" ; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for (overly) strict mkstemp" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for (overly) strict mkstemp... " >&6; }
if test "$cross_compiling" = yes; then :
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
$as_echo "#define HAVE_STRICT_MKSTEMP 1" >>confdefs.h
else
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <stdlib.h>
int
main ()
{
char template[]="conftest.mkstemp-test";
if (mkstemp(template) == -1)
exit(1);
unlink(template);
exit(0);
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_run "$LINENO"; then :
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
$as_echo "#define HAVE_STRICT_MKSTEMP 1" >>confdefs.h
fi
rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* gmon.out bb.out conftest$ac_exeext \
conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
fi
fi
if test ! -z "$check_for_openpty_ctty_bug"; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if openpty correctly handles controlling tty" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking if openpty correctly handles controlling tty... " >&6; }
if test "$cross_compiling" = yes; then :
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: cross-compiling, assuming yes" >&5
$as_echo "cross-compiling, assuming yes" >&6; }
else
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <stdio.h>
#include <sys/fcntl.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/wait.h>
int
main ()
{
pid_t pid;
int fd, ptyfd, ttyfd, status;
pid = fork();
if (pid < 0) { /* failed */
exit(1);
} else if (pid > 0) { /* parent */
waitpid(pid, &status, 0);
if (WIFEXITED(status))
exit(WEXITSTATUS(status));
else
exit(2);
} else { /* child */
close(0); close(1); close(2);
setsid();
openpty(&ptyfd, &ttyfd, NULL, NULL, NULL);
fd = open("/dev/tty", O_RDWR | O_NOCTTY);
if (fd >= 0)
exit(3); /* Acquired ctty: broken */
else
exit(0); /* Did not acquire ctty: OK */
}
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_run "$LINENO"; then :
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
$as_echo "#define SSHD_ACQUIRES_CTTY 1" >>confdefs.h
fi
rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* gmon.out bb.out conftest$ac_exeext \
conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
fi
fi
if test "x$ac_cv_func_getaddrinfo" = "xyes" && \
test "x$check_for_hpux_broken_getaddrinfo" = "x1"; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if getaddrinfo seems to work" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking if getaddrinfo seems to work... " >&6; }
if test "$cross_compiling" = yes; then :
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: cross-compiling, assuming yes" >&5
$as_echo "cross-compiling, assuming yes" >&6; }
else
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <stdio.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <netdb.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <netinet/in.h>
#define TEST_PORT "2222"
int
main ()
{
int err, sock;
struct addrinfo *gai_ai, *ai, hints;
char ntop[NI_MAXHOST], strport[NI_MAXSERV], *name = NULL;
memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
hints.ai_family = PF_UNSPEC;
hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
hints.ai_flags = AI_PASSIVE;
err = getaddrinfo(name, TEST_PORT, &hints, &gai_ai);
if (err != 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "getaddrinfo failed (%s)", gai_strerror(err));
exit(1);
}
for (ai = gai_ai; ai != NULL; ai = ai->ai_next) {
if (ai->ai_family != AF_INET6)
continue;
err = getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen, ntop,
sizeof(ntop), strport, sizeof(strport),
NI_NUMERICHOST|NI_NUMERICSERV);
if (err != 0) {
if (err == EAI_SYSTEM)
perror("getnameinfo EAI_SYSTEM");
else
fprintf(stderr, "getnameinfo failed: %s\n",
gai_strerror(err));
exit(2);
}
sock = socket(ai->ai_family, ai->ai_socktype, ai->ai_protocol);
if (sock < 0)
perror("socket");
if (bind(sock, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen) < 0) {
if (errno == EBADF)
exit(3);
}
}
exit(0);
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_run "$LINENO"; then :
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
$as_echo "#define BROKEN_GETADDRINFO 1" >>confdefs.h
fi
rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* gmon.out bb.out conftest$ac_exeext \
conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
fi
fi
if test "x$ac_cv_func_getaddrinfo" = "xyes" && \
test "x$check_for_aix_broken_getaddrinfo" = "x1"; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if getaddrinfo seems to work" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking if getaddrinfo seems to work... " >&6; }
if test "$cross_compiling" = yes; then :
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: cross-compiling, assuming no" >&5
$as_echo "cross-compiling, assuming no" >&6; }
else
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <stdio.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <netdb.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <netinet/in.h>
#define TEST_PORT "2222"
int
main ()
{
int err, sock;
struct addrinfo *gai_ai, *ai, hints;
char ntop[NI_MAXHOST], strport[NI_MAXSERV], *name = NULL;
memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
hints.ai_family = PF_UNSPEC;
hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
hints.ai_flags = AI_PASSIVE;
err = getaddrinfo(name, TEST_PORT, &hints, &gai_ai);
if (err != 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "getaddrinfo failed (%s)", gai_strerror(err));
exit(1);
}
for (ai = gai_ai; ai != NULL; ai = ai->ai_next) {
if (ai->ai_family != AF_INET && ai->ai_family != AF_INET6)
continue;
err = getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen, ntop,
sizeof(ntop), strport, sizeof(strport),
NI_NUMERICHOST|NI_NUMERICSERV);
if (ai->ai_family == AF_INET && err != 0) {
perror("getnameinfo");
exit(2);
}
}
exit(0);
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_run "$LINENO"; then :
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
$as_echo "#define AIX_GETNAMEINFO_HACK 1" >>confdefs.h
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
$as_echo "#define BROKEN_GETADDRINFO 1" >>confdefs.h
fi
rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* gmon.out bb.out conftest$ac_exeext \
conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
fi
fi
if test "x$ac_cv_func_getaddrinfo" = "xyes"; then
ac_fn_c_check_decl "$LINENO" "AI_NUMERICSERV" "ac_cv_have_decl_AI_NUMERICSERV" "#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <netdb.h>
"
if test "x$ac_cv_have_decl_AI_NUMERICSERV" = xyes; then :
ac_have_decl=1
else
ac_have_decl=0
fi
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define HAVE_DECL_AI_NUMERICSERV $ac_have_decl
_ACEOF
fi
if test "x$check_for_conflicting_getspnam" = "x1"; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for conflicting getspnam in shadow.h" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for conflicting getspnam in shadow.h... " >&6; }
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <shadow.h>
int
main ()
{
exit(0);
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
$as_echo "#define GETSPNAM_CONFLICTING_DEFS 1" >>confdefs.h
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
fi
if test "x$ac_cv_func_strnvis" = "xyes"; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for working strnvis" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for working strnvis... " >&6; }
if test "$cross_compiling" = yes; then :
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: cross compiling: assuming broken" >&5
$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: cross compiling: assuming broken" >&2;}
$as_echo "#define BROKEN_STRNVIS 1" >>confdefs.h
else
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <signal.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <vis.h>
static void sighandler(int sig) { _exit(1); }
int
main ()
{
char dst[16];
signal(SIGSEGV, sighandler);
if (strnvis(dst, "src", 4, 0) && strcmp(dst, "src") == 0)
exit(0);
exit(1)
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_run "$LINENO"; then :
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
$as_echo "#define BROKEN_STRNVIS 1" >>confdefs.h
fi
rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* gmon.out bb.out conftest$ac_exeext \
conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
fi
fi
for ac_func in getpgrp
do :
ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "getpgrp" "ac_cv_func_getpgrp"
if test "x$ac_cv_func_getpgrp" = xyes; then :
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define HAVE_GETPGRP 1
_ACEOF
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if getpgrp accepts zero args" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking if getpgrp accepts zero args... " >&6; }
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
$ac_includes_default
int
main ()
{
getpgrp();
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
$as_echo "#define GETPGRP_VOID 1" >>confdefs.h
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
$as_echo "#define GETPGRP_VOID 0" >>confdefs.h
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
fi
done
# Search for OpenSSL
saved_CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS"
saved_LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS"
# Check whether --with-ssl-dir was given.
if test "${with_ssl_dir+set}" = set; then :
withval=$with_ssl_dir;
if test "x$openssl" = "xno" ; then
as_fn_error $? "cannot use --with-ssl-dir when OpenSSL disabled" "$LINENO" 5
fi
if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
case "$withval" in
# Relative paths
./*|../*) withval="`pwd`/$withval"
esac
if test -d "$withval/lib"; then
if test -n "${rpath_opt}"; then
LDFLAGS="-L${withval}/lib ${rpath_opt}${withval}/lib ${LDFLAGS}"
else
LDFLAGS="-L${withval}/lib ${LDFLAGS}"
fi
elif test -d "$withval/lib64"; then
if test -n "${rpath_opt}"; then
LDFLAGS="-L${withval}/lib64 ${rpath_opt}${withval}/lib64 ${LDFLAGS}"
else
LDFLAGS="-L${withval}/lib64 ${LDFLAGS}"
fi
else
if test -n "${rpath_opt}"; then
LDFLAGS="-L${withval} ${rpath_opt}${withval} ${LDFLAGS}"
else
LDFLAGS="-L${withval} ${LDFLAGS}"
fi
fi
if test -d "$withval/include"; then
CPPFLAGS="-I${withval}/include ${CPPFLAGS}"
else
CPPFLAGS="-I${withval} ${CPPFLAGS}"
fi
fi
fi
# Check whether --with-openssl-header-check was given.
if test "${with_openssl_header_check+set}" = set; then :
withval=$with_openssl_header_check;
if test "x$withval" = "xno" ; then
openssl_check_nonfatal=1
fi
fi
openssl_engine=no
# Check whether --with-ssl-engine was given.
if test "${with_ssl_engine+set}" = set; then :
withval=$with_ssl_engine;
if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
if test "x$openssl" = "xno" ; then
as_fn_error $? "cannot use --with-ssl-engine when OpenSSL disabled" "$LINENO" 5
fi
openssl_engine=yes
fi
fi
if test "x$openssl" = "xyes" ; then
LIBS="-lcrypto $LIBS"
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C"
#endif
char RAND_add ();
int
main ()
{
return RAND_add ();
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
else
as_fn_error $? "*** working libcrypto not found, check config.log" "$LINENO" 5
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
ac_fn_c_check_header_mongrel "$LINENO" "openssl/opensslv.h" "ac_cv_header_openssl_opensslv_h" "$ac_includes_default"
if test "x$ac_cv_header_openssl_opensslv_h" = xyes; then :
else
as_fn_error $? "*** OpenSSL headers missing - please install first or check config.log ***" "$LINENO" 5
fi
# Determine OpenSSL header version
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking OpenSSL header version" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking OpenSSL header version... " >&6; }
if test "$cross_compiling" = yes; then :
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: cross compiling: not checking" >&5
$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: cross compiling: not checking" >&2;}
else
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <openssl/opensslv.h>
#define DATA "conftest.sslincver"
int
main ()
{
FILE *fd;
int rc;
fd = fopen(DATA,"w");
if(fd == NULL)
exit(1);
if ((rc = fprintf(fd, "%08lx (%s)\n",
(unsigned long)OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER,
OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT)) < 0)
exit(1);
exit(0);
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_run "$LINENO"; then :
ssl_header_ver=`cat conftest.sslincver`
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ssl_header_ver" >&5
$as_echo "$ssl_header_ver" >&6; }
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: not found" >&5
$as_echo "not found" >&6; }
as_fn_error $? "OpenSSL version header not found." "$LINENO" 5
fi
rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* gmon.out bb.out conftest$ac_exeext \
conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
fi
# Determining OpenSSL library version is version dependent.
for ac_func in OpenSSL_version OpenSSL_version_num
do :
as_ac_var=`$as_echo "ac_cv_func_$ac_func" | $as_tr_sh`
ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "$ac_func" "$as_ac_var"
if eval test \"x\$"$as_ac_var"\" = x"yes"; then :
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define `$as_echo "HAVE_$ac_func" | $as_tr_cpp` 1
_ACEOF
fi
done
# Determine OpenSSL library version
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking OpenSSL library version" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking OpenSSL library version... " >&6; }
if test "$cross_compiling" = yes; then :
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: cross compiling: not checking" >&5
$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: cross compiling: not checking" >&2;}
else
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <openssl/opensslv.h>
#include <openssl/crypto.h>
#define DATA "conftest.ssllibver"
int
main ()
{
FILE *fd;
int rc;
fd = fopen(DATA,"w");
if(fd == NULL)
exit(1);
#ifndef OPENSSL_VERSION
# define OPENSSL_VERSION SSLEAY_VERSION
#endif
#ifndef HAVE_OPENSSL_VERSION
# define OpenSSL_version SSLeay_version
#endif
#ifndef HAVE_OPENSSL_VERSION_NUM
# define OpenSSL_version_num SSLeay
#endif
if ((rc = fprintf(fd, "%08lx (%s)\n",
(unsigned long)OpenSSL_version_num(),
OpenSSL_version(OPENSSL_VERSION))) < 0)
exit(1);
exit(0);
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_run "$LINENO"; then :
ssl_library_ver=`cat conftest.ssllibver`
# Check version is supported.
case "$ssl_library_ver" in
10000*|0*)
as_fn_error $? "OpenSSL >= 1.0.1 required (have \"$ssl_library_ver\")" "$LINENO" 5
;;
100*) ;; # 1.0.x
101000[0123456]*)
# https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4613
as_fn_error $? "OpenSSL 1.1.x versions prior to 1.1.0g have a bug that breaks their use with OpenSSH (have \"$ssl_library_ver\")" "$LINENO" 5
;;
101*) ;; # 1.1.x
200*) ;; # LibreSSL
300*) ;; # OpenSSL development branch.
*)
as_fn_error $? "Unknown/unsupported OpenSSL version (\"$ssl_library_ver\")" "$LINENO" 5
;;
esac
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ssl_library_ver" >&5
$as_echo "$ssl_library_ver" >&6; }
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: not found" >&5
$as_echo "not found" >&6; }
as_fn_error $? "OpenSSL library not found." "$LINENO" 5
fi
rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* gmon.out bb.out conftest$ac_exeext \
conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
fi
# Sanity check OpenSSL headers
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking whether OpenSSL's headers match the library" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking whether OpenSSL's headers match the library... " >&6; }
if test "$cross_compiling" = yes; then :
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: cross compiling: not checking" >&5
$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: cross compiling: not checking" >&2;}
else
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <string.h>
#include <openssl/opensslv.h>
#include <openssl/crypto.h>
int
main ()
{
#ifndef HAVE_OPENSSL_VERSION_NUM
# define OpenSSL_version_num SSLeay
#endif
exit(OpenSSL_version_num() == OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER ? 0 : 1);
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_run "$LINENO"; then :
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
if test "x$openssl_check_nonfatal" = "x"; then
as_fn_error $? "Your OpenSSL headers do not match your
library. Check config.log for details.
If you are sure your installation is consistent, you can disable the check
by running \"./configure --without-openssl-header-check\".
Also see contrib/findssl.sh for help identifying header/library mismatches.
" "$LINENO" 5
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: Your OpenSSL headers do not match your
library. Check config.log for details.
Also see contrib/findssl.sh for help identifying header/library mismatches." >&5
$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: Your OpenSSL headers do not match your
library. Check config.log for details.
Also see contrib/findssl.sh for help identifying header/library mismatches." >&2;}
fi
fi
rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* gmon.out bb.out conftest$ac_exeext \
conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if programs using OpenSSL functions will link" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking if programs using OpenSSL functions will link... " >&6; }
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <openssl/err.h>
int
main ()
{
ERR_load_crypto_strings();
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
saved_LIBS="$LIBS"
LIBS="$LIBS -ldl"
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if programs using OpenSSL need -ldl" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking if programs using OpenSSL need -ldl... " >&6; }
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <openssl/err.h>
int
main ()
{
ERR_load_crypto_strings();
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
LIBS="$saved_LIBS"
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
for ac_func in \
BN_is_prime_ex \
DSA_generate_parameters_ex \
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl \
EVP_DigestFinal_ex \
EVP_DigestInit_ex \
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup \
EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex \
EVP_MD_CTX_init \
HMAC_CTX_init \
RSA_generate_key_ex \
RSA_get_default_method \
do :
as_ac_var=`$as_echo "ac_cv_func_$ac_func" | $as_tr_sh`
ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "$ac_func" "$as_ac_var"
if eval test \"x\$"$as_ac_var"\" = x"yes"; then :
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define `$as_echo "HAVE_$ac_func" | $as_tr_cpp` 1
_ACEOF
fi
done
# OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms may be a macro.
ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms" "ac_cv_func_OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms"
if test "x$ac_cv_func_OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms" = xyes; then :
$as_echo "#define HAVE_OPENSSL_ADD_ALL_ALGORITHMS 1" >>confdefs.h
else
ac_fn_c_check_decl "$LINENO" "OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms" "ac_cv_have_decl_OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms" "#include <openssl/evp.h>
"
if test "x$ac_cv_have_decl_OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms" = xyes; then :
$as_echo "#define HAVE_OPENSSL_ADD_ALL_ALGORITHMS 1" >>confdefs.h
fi
fi
# LibreSSL/OpenSSL 1.1x API
for ac_func in \
OPENSSL_init_crypto \
DH_get0_key \
DH_get0_pqg \
DH_set0_key \
DH_set_length \
DH_set0_pqg \
DSA_get0_key \
DSA_get0_pqg \
DSA_set0_key \
DSA_set0_pqg \
DSA_SIG_get0 \
DSA_SIG_set0 \
ECDSA_SIG_get0 \
ECDSA_SIG_set0 \
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv \
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst \
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_iv \
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_iv \
RSA_get0_crt_params \
RSA_get0_factors \
RSA_get0_key \
RSA_set0_crt_params \
RSA_set0_factors \
RSA_set0_key \
RSA_meth_free \
RSA_meth_dup \
RSA_meth_set1_name \
RSA_meth_get_finish \
RSA_meth_set_priv_enc \
RSA_meth_set_priv_dec \
RSA_meth_set_finish \
EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA \
EVP_MD_CTX_new \
EVP_MD_CTX_free \
do :
as_ac_var=`$as_echo "ac_cv_func_$ac_func" | $as_tr_sh`
ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "$ac_func" "$as_ac_var"
if eval test \"x\$"$as_ac_var"\" = x"yes"; then :
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define `$as_echo "HAVE_$ac_func" | $as_tr_cpp` 1
_ACEOF
fi
done
if test "x$openssl_engine" = "xyes" ; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for OpenSSL ENGINE support" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for OpenSSL ENGINE support... " >&6; }
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <openssl/engine.h>
int
main ()
{
ENGINE_load_builtin_engines();
ENGINE_register_all_complete();
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
$as_echo "#define USE_OPENSSL_ENGINE 1" >>confdefs.h
else
as_fn_error $? "OpenSSL ENGINE support not found" "$LINENO" 5
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
fi
# Check for OpenSSL without EVP_aes_{192,256}_cbc
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking whether OpenSSL has crippled AES support" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking whether OpenSSL has crippled AES support... " >&6; }
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <string.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
int
main ()
{
exit(EVP_aes_192_cbc() == NULL || EVP_aes_256_cbc() == NULL);
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
$as_echo "#define OPENSSL_LOBOTOMISED_AES 1" >>confdefs.h
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
# Check for OpenSSL with EVP_aes_*ctr
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking whether OpenSSL has AES CTR via EVP" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking whether OpenSSL has AES CTR via EVP... " >&6; }
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <string.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
int
main ()
{
exit(EVP_aes_128_ctr() == NULL ||
EVP_aes_192_cbc() == NULL ||
EVP_aes_256_cbc() == NULL);
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
$as_echo "#define OPENSSL_HAVE_EVPCTR 1" >>confdefs.h
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
# Check for OpenSSL with EVP_aes_*gcm
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking whether OpenSSL has AES GCM via EVP" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking whether OpenSSL has AES GCM via EVP... " >&6; }
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <string.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
int
main ()
{
exit(EVP_aes_128_gcm() == NULL ||
EVP_aes_256_gcm() == NULL ||
EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_FIXED == 0 ||
EVP_CTRL_GCM_IV_GEN == 0 ||
EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_TAG == 0 ||
EVP_CTRL_GCM_GET_TAG == 0 ||
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(NULL, 0, 0, NULL) == 0);
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
$as_echo "#define OPENSSL_HAVE_EVPGCM 1" >>confdefs.h
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
unsupported_algorithms="$unsupported_cipers \
aes128-gcm@openssh.com \
aes256-gcm@openssh.com"
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if EVP_DigestUpdate returns an int" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking if EVP_DigestUpdate returns an int... " >&6; }
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <string.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
int
main ()
{
if(EVP_DigestUpdate(NULL, NULL,0))
exit(0);
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
$as_echo "#define OPENSSL_EVP_DIGESTUPDATE_VOID 1" >>confdefs.h
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
# Some systems want crypt() from libcrypt, *not* the version in OpenSSL,
# because the system crypt() is more featureful.
if test "x$check_for_libcrypt_before" = "x1"; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for crypt in -lcrypt" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for crypt in -lcrypt... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_lib_crypt_crypt+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
LIBS="-lcrypt $LIBS"
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C"
#endif
char crypt ();
int
main ()
{
return crypt ();
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
ac_cv_lib_crypt_crypt=yes
else
ac_cv_lib_crypt_crypt=no
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_crypt_crypt" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_crypt_crypt" >&6; }
if test "x$ac_cv_lib_crypt_crypt" = xyes; then :
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define HAVE_LIBCRYPT 1
_ACEOF
LIBS="-lcrypt $LIBS"
fi
fi
# Some Linux systems (Slackware) need crypt() from libcrypt, *not* the
# version in OpenSSL.
if test "x$check_for_libcrypt_later" = "x1"; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for crypt in -lcrypt" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for crypt in -lcrypt... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_lib_crypt_crypt+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
LIBS="-lcrypt $LIBS"
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C"
#endif
char crypt ();
int
main ()
{
return crypt ();
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
ac_cv_lib_crypt_crypt=yes
else
ac_cv_lib_crypt_crypt=no
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_crypt_crypt" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_crypt_crypt" >&6; }
if test "x$ac_cv_lib_crypt_crypt" = xyes; then :
LIBS="$LIBS -lcrypt"
fi
fi
for ac_func in crypt DES_crypt
do :
as_ac_var=`$as_echo "ac_cv_func_$ac_func" | $as_tr_sh`
ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "$ac_func" "$as_ac_var"
if eval test \"x\$"$as_ac_var"\" = x"yes"; then :
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define `$as_echo "HAVE_$ac_func" | $as_tr_cpp` 1
_ACEOF
fi
done
# Check for SHA256, SHA384 and SHA512 support in OpenSSL
for ac_func in EVP_sha256 EVP_sha384 EVP_sha512
do :
as_ac_var=`$as_echo "ac_cv_func_$ac_func" | $as_tr_sh`
ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "$ac_func" "$as_ac_var"
if eval test \"x\$"$as_ac_var"\" = x"yes"; then :
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define `$as_echo "HAVE_$ac_func" | $as_tr_cpp` 1
_ACEOF
-fi
-done
-
-
- # Search for RIPE-MD support in OpenSSL
- for ac_func in EVP_ripemd160
-do :
- ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "EVP_ripemd160" "ac_cv_func_EVP_ripemd160"
-if test "x$ac_cv_func_EVP_ripemd160" = xyes; then :
- cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
-#define HAVE_EVP_RIPEMD160 1
-_ACEOF
-
-else
- unsupported_algorithms="$unsupported_algorithms \
- hmac-ripemd160 \
- hmac-ripemd160@openssh.com \
- hmac-ripemd160-etm@openssh.com"
-
-
fi
done
# Check complete ECC support in OpenSSL
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking whether OpenSSL has NID_X9_62_prime256v1" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking whether OpenSSL has NID_X9_62_prime256v1... " >&6; }
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <openssl/ec.h>
#include <openssl/ecdh.h>
#include <openssl/ecdsa.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/objects.h>
#include <openssl/opensslv.h>
int
main ()
{
EC_KEY *e = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(NID_X9_62_prime256v1);
const EVP_MD *m = EVP_sha256(); /* We need this too */
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
enable_nistp256=1
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking whether OpenSSL has NID_secp384r1" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking whether OpenSSL has NID_secp384r1... " >&6; }
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <openssl/ec.h>
#include <openssl/ecdh.h>
#include <openssl/ecdsa.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/objects.h>
#include <openssl/opensslv.h>
int
main ()
{
EC_KEY *e = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(NID_secp384r1);
const EVP_MD *m = EVP_sha384(); /* We need this too */
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
enable_nistp384=1
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking whether OpenSSL has NID_secp521r1" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking whether OpenSSL has NID_secp521r1... " >&6; }
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <openssl/ec.h>
#include <openssl/ecdh.h>
#include <openssl/ecdsa.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/objects.h>
#include <openssl/opensslv.h>
int
main ()
{
EC_KEY *e = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(NID_secp521r1);
const EVP_MD *m = EVP_sha512(); /* We need this too */
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if OpenSSL's NID_secp521r1 is functional" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking if OpenSSL's NID_secp521r1 is functional... " >&6; }
if test "$cross_compiling" = yes; then :
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: cross-compiling: assuming yes" >&5
$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: cross-compiling: assuming yes" >&2;}
enable_nistp521=1
else
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <openssl/ec.h>
#include <openssl/ecdh.h>
#include <openssl/ecdsa.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/objects.h>
#include <openssl/opensslv.h>
int
main ()
{
EC_KEY *e = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(NID_secp521r1);
const EVP_MD *m = EVP_sha512(); /* We need this too */
exit(e == NULL || m == NULL);
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_run "$LINENO"; then :
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
enable_nistp521=1
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
fi
rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* gmon.out bb.out conftest$ac_exeext \
conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
fi
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
COMMENT_OUT_ECC="#no ecc#"
TEST_SSH_ECC=no
if test x$enable_nistp256 = x1 || test x$enable_nistp384 = x1 || \
test x$enable_nistp521 = x1; then
$as_echo "#define OPENSSL_HAS_ECC 1" >>confdefs.h
for ac_func in EC_KEY_METHOD_new
do :
ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "EC_KEY_METHOD_new" "ac_cv_func_EC_KEY_METHOD_new"
if test "x$ac_cv_func_EC_KEY_METHOD_new" = xyes; then :
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW 1
_ACEOF
fi
done
+ openssl_ecc=yes
+ else
+ openssl_ecc=no
fi
if test x$enable_nistp256 = x1; then
$as_echo "#define OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP256 1" >>confdefs.h
TEST_SSH_ECC=yes
COMMENT_OUT_ECC=""
else
unsupported_algorithms="$unsupported_algorithms \
ecdsa-sha2-nistp256 \
ecdh-sha2-nistp256 \
ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com"
fi
if test x$enable_nistp384 = x1; then
$as_echo "#define OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP384 1" >>confdefs.h
TEST_SSH_ECC=yes
COMMENT_OUT_ECC=""
else
unsupported_algorithms="$unsupported_algorithms \
ecdsa-sha2-nistp384 \
ecdh-sha2-nistp384 \
ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com"
fi
if test x$enable_nistp521 = x1; then
$as_echo "#define OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521 1" >>confdefs.h
TEST_SSH_ECC=yes
COMMENT_OUT_ECC=""
else
unsupported_algorithms="$unsupported_algorithms \
ecdh-sha2-nistp521 \
ecdsa-sha2-nistp521 \
ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com"
fi
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for crypt in -lcrypt" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for crypt in -lcrypt... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_lib_crypt_crypt+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
LIBS="-lcrypt $LIBS"
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C"
#endif
char crypt ();
int
main ()
{
return crypt ();
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
ac_cv_lib_crypt_crypt=yes
else
ac_cv_lib_crypt_crypt=no
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_crypt_crypt" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_crypt_crypt" >&6; }
if test "x$ac_cv_lib_crypt_crypt" = xyes; then :
LIBS="$LIBS -lcrypt"
fi
for ac_func in crypt
do :
ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "crypt" "ac_cv_func_crypt"
if test "x$ac_cv_func_crypt" = xyes; then :
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define HAVE_CRYPT 1
_ACEOF
fi
done
fi
+# PKCS11/U2F depend on OpenSSL and dlopen().
+enable_pkcs11=yes
+enable_sk=yes
+if test "x$openssl" != "xyes" ; then
+ enable_pkcs11="disabled; missing libcrypto"
+ enable_sk="disabled; missing libcrypto"
+fi
+if test "x$openssl_ecc" != "xyes" ; then
+ enable_sk="disabled; OpenSSL has no ECC support"
+fi
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_dlopen" != "xyes" ; then
+ enable_pkcs11="disabled; missing dlopen(3)"
+ enable_sk="disabled; missing dlopen(3)"
+fi
+if test "x$ac_cv_have_decl_RTLD_NOW" != "xyes" ; then
+ enable_pkcs11="disabled; missing RTLD_NOW"
+ enable_sk="disabled; missing RTLD_NOW"
+fi
+if test ! -z "$disable_pkcs11" ; then
+ enable_pkcs11="disabled by user"
+fi
+if test ! -z "$disable_sk" ; then
+ enable_sk="disabled by user"
+fi
+
+{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking whether to enable PKCS11" >&5
+$as_echo_n "checking whether to enable PKCS11... " >&6; }
+if test "x$enable_pkcs11" = "xyes" ; then
+
+$as_echo "#define ENABLE_PKCS11 /**/" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $enable_pkcs11" >&5
+$as_echo "$enable_pkcs11" >&6; }
+
+{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking whether to enable U2F" >&5
+$as_echo_n "checking whether to enable U2F... " >&6; }
+if test "x$enable_sk" = "xyes" ; then
+
+$as_echo "#define ENABLE_SK /**/" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $enable_sk" >&5
+$as_echo "$enable_sk" >&6; }
+
+# Now check for built-in security key support.
+if test "x$enable_sk" = "xyes" -a "x$enable_sk_internal" = "xyes" ; then
+ if test -n "$ac_tool_prefix"; then
+ # Extract the first word of "${ac_tool_prefix}pkg-config", so it can be a program name with args.
+set dummy ${ac_tool_prefix}pkg-config; ac_word=$2
+{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5
+$as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; }
+if ${ac_cv_path_PKGCONFIG+:} false; then :
+ $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
+else
+ case $PKGCONFIG in
+ [\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*)
+ ac_cv_path_PKGCONFIG="$PKGCONFIG" # Let the user override the test with a path.
+ ;;
+ *)
+ as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
+for as_dir in $PATH
+do
+ IFS=$as_save_IFS
+ test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=.
+ for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
+ if as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; then
+ ac_cv_path_PKGCONFIG="$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"
+ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5
+ break 2
+ fi
+done
+ done
+IFS=$as_save_IFS
+
+ ;;
+esac
+fi
+PKGCONFIG=$ac_cv_path_PKGCONFIG
+if test -n "$PKGCONFIG"; then
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $PKGCONFIG" >&5
+$as_echo "$PKGCONFIG" >&6; }
+else
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+$as_echo "no" >&6; }
+fi
+
+
+fi
+if test -z "$ac_cv_path_PKGCONFIG"; then
+ ac_pt_PKGCONFIG=$PKGCONFIG
+ # Extract the first word of "pkg-config", so it can be a program name with args.
+set dummy pkg-config; ac_word=$2
+{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5
+$as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; }
+if ${ac_cv_path_ac_pt_PKGCONFIG+:} false; then :
+ $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
+else
+ case $ac_pt_PKGCONFIG in
+ [\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*)
+ ac_cv_path_ac_pt_PKGCONFIG="$ac_pt_PKGCONFIG" # Let the user override the test with a path.
+ ;;
+ *)
+ as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
+for as_dir in $PATH
+do
+ IFS=$as_save_IFS
+ test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=.
+ for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
+ if as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; then
+ ac_cv_path_ac_pt_PKGCONFIG="$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"
+ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5
+ break 2
+ fi
+done
+ done
+IFS=$as_save_IFS
+
+ ;;
+esac
+fi
+ac_pt_PKGCONFIG=$ac_cv_path_ac_pt_PKGCONFIG
+if test -n "$ac_pt_PKGCONFIG"; then
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_pt_PKGCONFIG" >&5
+$as_echo "$ac_pt_PKGCONFIG" >&6; }
+else
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+$as_echo "no" >&6; }
+fi
+
+ if test "x$ac_pt_PKGCONFIG" = x; then
+ PKGCONFIG="no"
+ else
+ case $cross_compiling:$ac_tool_warned in
+yes:)
+{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: using cross tools not prefixed with host triplet" >&5
+$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: using cross tools not prefixed with host triplet" >&2;}
+ac_tool_warned=yes ;;
+esac
+ PKGCONFIG=$ac_pt_PKGCONFIG
+ fi
+else
+ PKGCONFIG="$ac_cv_path_PKGCONFIG"
+fi
+
+ use_pkgconfig_for_libfido2=
+ if test "x$PKGCONFIG" != "xno"; then
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if $PKGCONFIG knows about libfido2" >&5
+$as_echo_n "checking if $PKGCONFIG knows about libfido2... " >&6; }
+ if "$PKGCONFIG" libfido2; then
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
+$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
+ use_pkgconfig_for_libfido2=yes
+ else
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+$as_echo "no" >&6; }
+ fi
+ fi
+ if test "x$use_pkgconfig_for_libfido2" = "xyes"; then
+ LIBFIDO2=`$PKGCONFIG --libs libfido2`
+ CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS `$PKGCONFIG --cflags libfido2`"
+ else
+ LIBFIDO2="-lfido2 -lcbor"
+ fi
+ OTHERLIBS=`echo $LIBFIDO2 | sed 's/-lfido2//'`
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for fido_init in -lfido2" >&5
+$as_echo_n "checking for fido_init in -lfido2... " >&6; }
+if ${ac_cv_lib_fido2_fido_init+:} false; then :
+ $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
+else
+ ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
+LIBS="-lfido2 $OTHERLIBS
+ $LIBS"
+cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
+ Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
+ builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
+#ifdef __cplusplus
+extern "C"
+#endif
+char fido_init ();
+int
+main ()
+{
+return fido_init ();
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
+ ac_cv_lib_fido2_fido_init=yes
+else
+ ac_cv_lib_fido2_fido_init=no
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
+ conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
+LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
+fi
+{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_fido2_fido_init" >&5
+$as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_fido2_fido_init" >&6; }
+if test "x$ac_cv_lib_fido2_fido_init" = xyes; then :
+
+
+
+$as_echo "#define ENABLE_SK_INTERNAL /**/" >>confdefs.h
+
+ enable_sk="built-in"
+
+fi
+
+fi
+
for ac_func in \
arc4random \
arc4random_buf \
arc4random_stir \
arc4random_uniform \
do :
as_ac_var=`$as_echo "ac_cv_func_$ac_func" | $as_tr_sh`
ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "$ac_func" "$as_ac_var"
if eval test \"x\$"$as_ac_var"\" = x"yes"; then :
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define `$as_echo "HAVE_$ac_func" | $as_tr_cpp` 1
_ACEOF
fi
done
saved_LIBS="$LIBS"
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for ia_openinfo in -liaf" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for ia_openinfo in -liaf... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_lib_iaf_ia_openinfo+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
LIBS="-liaf $LIBS"
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C"
#endif
char ia_openinfo ();
int
main ()
{
return ia_openinfo ();
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
ac_cv_lib_iaf_ia_openinfo=yes
else
ac_cv_lib_iaf_ia_openinfo=no
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_iaf_ia_openinfo" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_iaf_ia_openinfo" >&6; }
if test "x$ac_cv_lib_iaf_ia_openinfo" = xyes; then :
LIBS="$LIBS -liaf"
for ac_func in set_id
do :
ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "set_id" "ac_cv_func_set_id"
if test "x$ac_cv_func_set_id" = xyes; then :
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define HAVE_SET_ID 1
_ACEOF
SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -liaf"
$as_echo "#define HAVE_LIBIAF 1" >>confdefs.h
fi
done
fi
LIBS="$saved_LIBS"
### Configure cryptographic random number support
# Check whether OpenSSL seeds itself
if test "x$openssl" = "xyes" ; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking whether OpenSSL's PRNG is internally seeded" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking whether OpenSSL's PRNG is internally seeded... " >&6; }
if test "$cross_compiling" = yes; then :
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: cross compiling: assuming yes" >&5
$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: cross compiling: assuming yes" >&2;}
# This is safe, since we will fatal() at runtime if
# OpenSSL is not seeded correctly.
OPENSSL_SEEDS_ITSELF=yes
else
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <string.h>
#include <openssl/rand.h>
int
main ()
{
exit(RAND_status() == 1 ? 0 : 1);
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_run "$LINENO"; then :
OPENSSL_SEEDS_ITSELF=yes
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
fi
rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* gmon.out bb.out conftest$ac_exeext \
conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
fi
fi
# PRNGD TCP socket
# Check whether --with-prngd-port was given.
if test "${with_prngd_port+set}" = set; then :
withval=$with_prngd_port;
case "$withval" in
no)
withval=""
;;
[0-9]*)
;;
*)
as_fn_error $? "You must specify a numeric port number for --with-prngd-port" "$LINENO" 5
;;
esac
if test ! -z "$withval" ; then
PRNGD_PORT="$withval"
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define PRNGD_PORT $PRNGD_PORT
_ACEOF
fi
fi
# PRNGD Unix domain socket
# Check whether --with-prngd-socket was given.
if test "${with_prngd_socket+set}" = set; then :
withval=$with_prngd_socket;
case "$withval" in
yes)
withval="/var/run/egd-pool"
;;
no)
withval=""
;;
/*)
;;
*)
as_fn_error $? "You must specify an absolute path to the entropy socket" "$LINENO" 5
;;
esac
if test ! -z "$withval" ; then
if test ! -z "$PRNGD_PORT" ; then
as_fn_error $? "You may not specify both a PRNGD/EGD port and socket" "$LINENO" 5
fi
if test ! -r "$withval" ; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: Entropy socket is not readable" >&5
$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: Entropy socket is not readable" >&2;}
fi
PRNGD_SOCKET="$withval"
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define PRNGD_SOCKET "$PRNGD_SOCKET"
_ACEOF
fi
else
# Check for existing socket only if we don't have a random device already
if test "x$OPENSSL_SEEDS_ITSELF" != "xyes" ; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for PRNGD/EGD socket" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for PRNGD/EGD socket... " >&6; }
# Insert other locations here
for sock in /var/run/egd-pool /dev/egd-pool /etc/entropy; do
if test -r $sock && $TEST_MINUS_S_SH -c "test -S $sock -o -p $sock" ; then
PRNGD_SOCKET="$sock"
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define PRNGD_SOCKET "$PRNGD_SOCKET"
_ACEOF
break;
fi
done
if test ! -z "$PRNGD_SOCKET" ; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $PRNGD_SOCKET" >&5
$as_echo "$PRNGD_SOCKET" >&6; }
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: not found" >&5
$as_echo "not found" >&6; }
fi
fi
fi
# Which randomness source do we use?
if test ! -z "$PRNGD_PORT" ; then
RAND_MSG="PRNGd port $PRNGD_PORT"
elif test ! -z "$PRNGD_SOCKET" ; then
RAND_MSG="PRNGd socket $PRNGD_SOCKET"
elif test ! -z "$OPENSSL_SEEDS_ITSELF" ; then
$as_echo "#define OPENSSL_PRNG_ONLY 1" >>confdefs.h
RAND_MSG="OpenSSL internal ONLY"
elif test "x$openssl" = "xno" ; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: OpenSSH will use /dev/urandom as a source of random numbers. It will fail if this device is not supported or accessible" >&5
$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: OpenSSH will use /dev/urandom as a source of random numbers. It will fail if this device is not supported or accessible" >&2;}
else
as_fn_error $? "OpenSSH has no source of random numbers. Please configure OpenSSL with an entropy source or re-run configure using one of the --with-prngd-port or --with-prngd-socket options" "$LINENO" 5
fi
# Check for PAM libs
PAM_MSG="no"
# Check whether --with-pam was given.
if test "${with_pam+set}" = set; then :
withval=$with_pam;
if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
if test "x$ac_cv_header_security_pam_appl_h" != "xyes" && \
test "x$ac_cv_header_pam_pam_appl_h" != "xyes" ; then
as_fn_error $? "PAM headers not found" "$LINENO" 5
fi
saved_LIBS="$LIBS"
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for dlopen in -ldl" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for dlopen in -ldl... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_lib_dl_dlopen+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
LIBS="-ldl $LIBS"
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C"
#endif
char dlopen ();
int
main ()
{
return dlopen ();
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
ac_cv_lib_dl_dlopen=yes
else
ac_cv_lib_dl_dlopen=no
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_dl_dlopen" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_dl_dlopen" >&6; }
if test "x$ac_cv_lib_dl_dlopen" = xyes; then :
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define HAVE_LIBDL 1
_ACEOF
LIBS="-ldl $LIBS"
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for pam_set_item in -lpam" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for pam_set_item in -lpam... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_lib_pam_pam_set_item+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
LIBS="-lpam $LIBS"
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C"
#endif
char pam_set_item ();
int
main ()
{
return pam_set_item ();
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
ac_cv_lib_pam_pam_set_item=yes
else
ac_cv_lib_pam_pam_set_item=no
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_pam_pam_set_item" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_pam_pam_set_item" >&6; }
if test "x$ac_cv_lib_pam_pam_set_item" = xyes; then :
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define HAVE_LIBPAM 1
_ACEOF
LIBS="-lpam $LIBS"
else
as_fn_error $? "*** libpam missing" "$LINENO" 5
fi
for ac_func in pam_getenvlist
do :
ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "pam_getenvlist" "ac_cv_func_pam_getenvlist"
if test "x$ac_cv_func_pam_getenvlist" = xyes; then :
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define HAVE_PAM_GETENVLIST 1
_ACEOF
fi
done
for ac_func in pam_putenv
do :
ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "pam_putenv" "ac_cv_func_pam_putenv"
if test "x$ac_cv_func_pam_putenv" = xyes; then :
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define HAVE_PAM_PUTENV 1
_ACEOF
fi
done
LIBS="$saved_LIBS"
PAM_MSG="yes"
SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -lpam"
$as_echo "#define USE_PAM 1" >>confdefs.h
if test $ac_cv_lib_dl_dlopen = yes; then
case "$LIBS" in
*-ldl*)
# libdl already in LIBS
;;
*)
SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -ldl"
;;
esac
fi
fi
fi
# Check whether --with-pam-service was given.
if test "${with_pam_service+set}" = set; then :
withval=$with_pam_service;
if test "x$withval" != "xno" && \
test "x$withval" != "xyes" ; then
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define SSHD_PAM_SERVICE "$withval"
_ACEOF
fi
fi
# Check for older PAM
if test "x$PAM_MSG" = "xyes" ; then
# Check PAM strerror arguments (old PAM)
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking whether pam_strerror takes only one argument" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking whether pam_strerror takes only one argument... " >&6; }
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <stdlib.h>
#if defined(HAVE_SECURITY_PAM_APPL_H)
#include <security/pam_appl.h>
#elif defined (HAVE_PAM_PAM_APPL_H)
#include <pam/pam_appl.h>
#endif
int
main ()
{
(void)pam_strerror((pam_handle_t *)NULL, -1);
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
else
$as_echo "#define HAVE_OLD_PAM 1" >>confdefs.h
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
PAM_MSG="yes (old library)"
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
fi
case "$host" in
*-*-cygwin*)
SSH_PRIVSEP_USER=CYGWIN_SSH_PRIVSEP_USER
;;
*)
SSH_PRIVSEP_USER=sshd
;;
esac
# Check whether --with-privsep-user was given.
if test "${with_privsep_user+set}" = set; then :
withval=$with_privsep_user;
if test -n "$withval" && test "x$withval" != "xno" && \
test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then
SSH_PRIVSEP_USER=$withval
fi
fi
if test "x$SSH_PRIVSEP_USER" = "xCYGWIN_SSH_PRIVSEP_USER" ; then
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define SSH_PRIVSEP_USER CYGWIN_SSH_PRIVSEP_USER
_ACEOF
else
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define SSH_PRIVSEP_USER "$SSH_PRIVSEP_USER"
_ACEOF
fi
if test "x$have_linux_no_new_privs" = "x1" ; then
ac_fn_c_check_decl "$LINENO" "SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER" "ac_cv_have_decl_SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER" "
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <linux/seccomp.h>
"
if test "x$ac_cv_have_decl_SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER" = xyes; then :
have_seccomp_filter=1
fi
fi
if test "x$have_seccomp_filter" = "x1" ; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking kernel for seccomp_filter support" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking kernel for seccomp_filter support... " >&6; }
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <errno.h>
#include <elf.h>
#include <linux/audit.h>
#include <linux/seccomp.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <sys/prctl.h>
int
main ()
{
int i = $seccomp_audit_arch;
errno = 0;
prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, NULL, 0, 0);
exit(errno == EFAULT ? 0 : 1);
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
# Disable seccomp filter as a target
have_seccomp_filter=0
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
fi
# Decide which sandbox style to use
sandbox_arg=""
# Check whether --with-sandbox was given.
if test "${with_sandbox+set}" = set; then :
withval=$with_sandbox;
if test "x$withval" = "xyes" ; then
sandbox_arg=""
else
sandbox_arg="$withval"
fi
fi
# Some platforms (seems to be the ones that have a kernel poll(2)-type
# function with which they implement select(2)) use an extra file descriptor
# when calling select(2), which means we can't use the rlimit sandbox.
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if select works with descriptor rlimit" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking if select works with descriptor rlimit... " >&6; }
if test "$cross_compiling" = yes; then :
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: cross compiling: assuming yes" >&5
$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: cross compiling: assuming yes" >&2;}
select_works_with_rlimit=yes
else
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <sys/types.h>
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
# include <sys/time.h>
#endif
#include <sys/resource.h>
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SELECT_H
# include <sys/select.h>
#endif
#include <errno.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
int
main ()
{
struct rlimit rl_zero;
int fd, r;
fd_set fds;
struct timeval tv;
fd = open("/dev/null", O_RDONLY);
FD_ZERO(&fds);
FD_SET(fd, &fds);
rl_zero.rlim_cur = rl_zero.rlim_max = 0;
setrlimit(RLIMIT_FSIZE, &rl_zero);
setrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE, &rl_zero);
tv.tv_sec = 1;
tv.tv_usec = 0;
r = select(fd+1, &fds, NULL, NULL, &tv);
exit (r == -1 ? 1 : 0);
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_run "$LINENO"; then :
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
select_works_with_rlimit=yes
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
select_works_with_rlimit=no
fi
rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* gmon.out bb.out conftest$ac_exeext \
conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if setrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE,{0,0}) works" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking if setrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE,{0,0}) works... " >&6; }
if test "$cross_compiling" = yes; then :
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: cross compiling: assuming yes" >&5
$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: cross compiling: assuming yes" >&2;}
rlimit_nofile_zero_works=yes
else
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <sys/types.h>
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
# include <sys/time.h>
#endif
#include <sys/resource.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
int
main ()
{
struct rlimit rl_zero;
int r;
rl_zero.rlim_cur = rl_zero.rlim_max = 0;
r = setrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE, &rl_zero);
exit (r == -1 ? 1 : 0);
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_run "$LINENO"; then :
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
rlimit_nofile_zero_works=yes
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
rlimit_nofile_zero_works=no
fi
rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* gmon.out bb.out conftest$ac_exeext \
conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if setrlimit RLIMIT_FSIZE works" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking if setrlimit RLIMIT_FSIZE works... " >&6; }
if test "$cross_compiling" = yes; then :
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: cross compiling: assuming yes" >&5
$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: cross compiling: assuming yes" >&2;}
else
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/resource.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
int
main ()
{
struct rlimit rl_zero;
rl_zero.rlim_cur = rl_zero.rlim_max = 0;
exit(setrlimit(RLIMIT_FSIZE, &rl_zero) != 0);
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_run "$LINENO"; then :
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
$as_echo "#define SANDBOX_SKIP_RLIMIT_FSIZE 1" >>confdefs.h
fi
rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* gmon.out bb.out conftest$ac_exeext \
conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
fi
if test "x$sandbox_arg" = "xpledge" || \
( test -z "$sandbox_arg" && test "x$ac_cv_func_pledge" = "xyes" ) ; then
test "x$ac_cv_func_pledge" != "xyes" && \
as_fn_error $? "pledge sandbox requires pledge(2) support" "$LINENO" 5
SANDBOX_STYLE="pledge"
$as_echo "#define SANDBOX_PLEDGE 1" >>confdefs.h
elif test "x$sandbox_arg" = "xsystrace" || \
( test -z "$sandbox_arg" && test "x$have_systr_policy_kill" = "x1" ) ; then
test "x$have_systr_policy_kill" != "x1" && \
as_fn_error $? "systrace sandbox requires systrace headers and SYSTR_POLICY_KILL support" "$LINENO" 5
SANDBOX_STYLE="systrace"
$as_echo "#define SANDBOX_SYSTRACE 1" >>confdefs.h
elif test "x$sandbox_arg" = "xdarwin" || \
( test -z "$sandbox_arg" && test "x$ac_cv_func_sandbox_init" = "xyes" && \
test "x$ac_cv_header_sandbox_h" = "xyes") ; then
test "x$ac_cv_func_sandbox_init" != "xyes" -o \
"x$ac_cv_header_sandbox_h" != "xyes" && \
as_fn_error $? "Darwin seatbelt sandbox requires sandbox.h and sandbox_init function" "$LINENO" 5
SANDBOX_STYLE="darwin"
$as_echo "#define SANDBOX_DARWIN 1" >>confdefs.h
elif test "x$sandbox_arg" = "xseccomp_filter" || \
( test -z "$sandbox_arg" && \
test "x$have_seccomp_filter" = "x1" && \
test "x$ac_cv_header_elf_h" = "xyes" && \
test "x$ac_cv_header_linux_audit_h" = "xyes" && \
test "x$ac_cv_header_linux_filter_h" = "xyes" && \
test "x$seccomp_audit_arch" != "x" && \
test "x$have_linux_no_new_privs" = "x1" && \
test "x$ac_cv_func_prctl" = "xyes" ) ; then
test "x$seccomp_audit_arch" = "x" && \
as_fn_error $? "seccomp_filter sandbox not supported on $host" "$LINENO" 5
test "x$have_linux_no_new_privs" != "x1" && \
as_fn_error $? "seccomp_filter sandbox requires PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS" "$LINENO" 5
test "x$have_seccomp_filter" != "x1" && \
as_fn_error $? "seccomp_filter sandbox requires seccomp headers" "$LINENO" 5
test "x$ac_cv_func_prctl" != "xyes" && \
as_fn_error $? "seccomp_filter sandbox requires prctl function" "$LINENO" 5
SANDBOX_STYLE="seccomp_filter"
$as_echo "#define SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER 1" >>confdefs.h
elif test "x$sandbox_arg" = "xcapsicum" || \
( test -z "$sandbox_arg" && \
test "x$ac_cv_header_sys_capsicum_h" = "xyes" && \
test "x$ac_cv_func_cap_rights_limit" = "xyes") ; then
test "x$ac_cv_header_sys_capsicum_h" != "xyes" && \
as_fn_error $? "capsicum sandbox requires sys/capsicum.h header" "$LINENO" 5
test "x$ac_cv_func_cap_rights_limit" != "xyes" && \
as_fn_error $? "capsicum sandbox requires cap_rights_limit function" "$LINENO" 5
SANDBOX_STYLE="capsicum"
$as_echo "#define SANDBOX_CAPSICUM 1" >>confdefs.h
elif test "x$sandbox_arg" = "xrlimit" || \
( test -z "$sandbox_arg" && test "x$ac_cv_func_setrlimit" = "xyes" && \
test "x$select_works_with_rlimit" = "xyes" && \
test "x$rlimit_nofile_zero_works" = "xyes" ) ; then
test "x$ac_cv_func_setrlimit" != "xyes" && \
as_fn_error $? "rlimit sandbox requires setrlimit function" "$LINENO" 5
test "x$select_works_with_rlimit" != "xyes" && \
as_fn_error $? "rlimit sandbox requires select to work with rlimit" "$LINENO" 5
SANDBOX_STYLE="rlimit"
$as_echo "#define SANDBOX_RLIMIT 1" >>confdefs.h
elif test "x$sandbox_arg" = "xsolaris" || \
( test -z "$sandbox_arg" && test "x$SOLARIS_PRIVS" = "xyes" ) ; then
SANDBOX_STYLE="solaris"
$as_echo "#define SANDBOX_SOLARIS 1" >>confdefs.h
elif test -z "$sandbox_arg" || test "x$sandbox_arg" = "xno" || \
test "x$sandbox_arg" = "xnone" || test "x$sandbox_arg" = "xnull" ; then
SANDBOX_STYLE="none"
$as_echo "#define SANDBOX_NULL 1" >>confdefs.h
else
as_fn_error $? "unsupported --with-sandbox" "$LINENO" 5
fi
# Cheap hack to ensure NEWS-OS libraries are arranged right.
if test ! -z "$SONY" ; then
LIBS="$LIBS -liberty";
fi
# Check for long long datatypes
ac_fn_c_check_type "$LINENO" "long long" "ac_cv_type_long_long" "$ac_includes_default"
if test "x$ac_cv_type_long_long" = xyes; then :
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define HAVE_LONG_LONG 1
_ACEOF
fi
ac_fn_c_check_type "$LINENO" "unsigned long long" "ac_cv_type_unsigned_long_long" "$ac_includes_default"
if test "x$ac_cv_type_unsigned_long_long" = xyes; then :
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define HAVE_UNSIGNED_LONG_LONG 1
_ACEOF
fi
ac_fn_c_check_type "$LINENO" "long double" "ac_cv_type_long_double" "$ac_includes_default"
if test "x$ac_cv_type_long_double" = xyes; then :
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define HAVE_LONG_DOUBLE 1
_ACEOF
fi
# Check datatype sizes
# The cast to long int works around a bug in the HP C Compiler
# version HP92453-01 B.11.11.23709.GP, which incorrectly rejects
# declarations like `int a3[[(sizeof (unsigned char)) >= 0]];'.
# This bug is HP SR number 8606223364.
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking size of short int" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking size of short int... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_sizeof_short_int+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
if ac_fn_c_compute_int "$LINENO" "(long int) (sizeof (short int))" "ac_cv_sizeof_short_int" "$ac_includes_default"; then :
else
if test "$ac_cv_type_short_int" = yes; then
{ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: error: in \`$ac_pwd':" >&5
$as_echo "$as_me: error: in \`$ac_pwd':" >&2;}
as_fn_error 77 "cannot compute sizeof (short int)
See \`config.log' for more details" "$LINENO" 5; }
else
ac_cv_sizeof_short_int=0
fi
fi
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_sizeof_short_int" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_cv_sizeof_short_int" >&6; }
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define SIZEOF_SHORT_INT $ac_cv_sizeof_short_int
_ACEOF
# The cast to long int works around a bug in the HP C Compiler
# version HP92453-01 B.11.11.23709.GP, which incorrectly rejects
# declarations like `int a3[[(sizeof (unsigned char)) >= 0]];'.
# This bug is HP SR number 8606223364.
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking size of int" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking size of int... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_sizeof_int+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
if ac_fn_c_compute_int "$LINENO" "(long int) (sizeof (int))" "ac_cv_sizeof_int" "$ac_includes_default"; then :
else
if test "$ac_cv_type_int" = yes; then
{ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: error: in \`$ac_pwd':" >&5
$as_echo "$as_me: error: in \`$ac_pwd':" >&2;}
as_fn_error 77 "cannot compute sizeof (int)
See \`config.log' for more details" "$LINENO" 5; }
else
ac_cv_sizeof_int=0
fi
fi
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_sizeof_int" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_cv_sizeof_int" >&6; }
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define SIZEOF_INT $ac_cv_sizeof_int
_ACEOF
# The cast to long int works around a bug in the HP C Compiler
# version HP92453-01 B.11.11.23709.GP, which incorrectly rejects
# declarations like `int a3[[(sizeof (unsigned char)) >= 0]];'.
# This bug is HP SR number 8606223364.
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking size of long int" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking size of long int... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_sizeof_long_int+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
if ac_fn_c_compute_int "$LINENO" "(long int) (sizeof (long int))" "ac_cv_sizeof_long_int" "$ac_includes_default"; then :
else
if test "$ac_cv_type_long_int" = yes; then
{ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: error: in \`$ac_pwd':" >&5
$as_echo "$as_me: error: in \`$ac_pwd':" >&2;}
as_fn_error 77 "cannot compute sizeof (long int)
See \`config.log' for more details" "$LINENO" 5; }
else
ac_cv_sizeof_long_int=0
fi
fi
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_sizeof_long_int" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_cv_sizeof_long_int" >&6; }
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define SIZEOF_LONG_INT $ac_cv_sizeof_long_int
_ACEOF
# The cast to long int works around a bug in the HP C Compiler
# version HP92453-01 B.11.11.23709.GP, which incorrectly rejects
# declarations like `int a3[[(sizeof (unsigned char)) >= 0]];'.
# This bug is HP SR number 8606223364.
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking size of long long int" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking size of long long int... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_sizeof_long_long_int+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
if ac_fn_c_compute_int "$LINENO" "(long int) (sizeof (long long int))" "ac_cv_sizeof_long_long_int" "$ac_includes_default"; then :
else
if test "$ac_cv_type_long_long_int" = yes; then
{ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: error: in \`$ac_pwd':" >&5
$as_echo "$as_me: error: in \`$ac_pwd':" >&2;}
as_fn_error 77 "cannot compute sizeof (long long int)
See \`config.log' for more details" "$LINENO" 5; }
else
ac_cv_sizeof_long_long_int=0
fi
fi
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_sizeof_long_long_int" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_cv_sizeof_long_long_int" >&6; }
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define SIZEOF_LONG_LONG_INT $ac_cv_sizeof_long_long_int
_ACEOF
# Sanity check long long for some platforms (AIX)
if test "x$ac_cv_sizeof_long_long_int" = "x4" ; then
ac_cv_sizeof_long_long_int=0
fi
# compute LLONG_MIN and LLONG_MAX if we don't know them.
if test -z "$have_llong_max"; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for max value of long long" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for max value of long long... " >&6; }
if test "$cross_compiling" = yes; then :
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: cross compiling: not checking" >&5
$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: cross compiling: not checking" >&2;}
else
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <stdio.h>
/* Why is this so damn hard? */
#ifdef __GNUC__
# undef __GNUC__
#endif
#define __USE_ISOC99
#include <limits.h>
#define DATA "conftest.llminmax"
#define my_abs(a) ((a) < 0 ? ((a) * -1) : (a))
/*
* printf in libc on some platforms (eg old Tru64) does not understand %lld so
* we do this the hard way.
*/
static int
fprint_ll(FILE *f, long long n)
{
unsigned int i;
int l[sizeof(long long) * 8];
if (n < 0)
if (fprintf(f, "-") < 0)
return -1;
for (i = 0; n != 0; i++) {
l[i] = my_abs(n % 10);
n /= 10;
}
do {
if (fprintf(f, "%d", l[--i]) < 0)
return -1;
} while (i != 0);
if (fprintf(f, " ") < 0)
return -1;
return 0;
}
int
main ()
{
FILE *f;
long long i, llmin, llmax = 0;
if((f = fopen(DATA,"w")) == NULL)
exit(1);
#if defined(LLONG_MIN) && defined(LLONG_MAX)
fprintf(stderr, "Using system header for LLONG_MIN and LLONG_MAX\n");
llmin = LLONG_MIN;
llmax = LLONG_MAX;
#else
fprintf(stderr, "Calculating LLONG_MIN and LLONG_MAX\n");
/* This will work on one's complement and two's complement */
for (i = 1; i > llmax; i <<= 1, i++)
llmax = i;
llmin = llmax + 1LL; /* wrap */
#endif
/* Sanity check */
if (llmin + 1 < llmin || llmin - 1 < llmin || llmax + 1 > llmax
|| llmax - 1 > llmax || llmin == llmax || llmin == 0
|| llmax == 0 || llmax < LONG_MAX || llmin > LONG_MIN) {
fprintf(f, "unknown unknown\n");
exit(2);
}
if (fprint_ll(f, llmin) < 0)
exit(3);
if (fprint_ll(f, llmax) < 0)
exit(4);
if (fclose(f) < 0)
exit(5);
exit(0);
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_run "$LINENO"; then :
llong_min=`$AWK '{print $1}' conftest.llminmax`
llong_max=`$AWK '{print $2}' conftest.llminmax`
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $llong_max" >&5
$as_echo "$llong_max" >&6; }
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define LLONG_MAX ${llong_max}LL
_ACEOF
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for min value of long long" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for min value of long long... " >&6; }
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $llong_min" >&5
$as_echo "$llong_min" >&6; }
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define LLONG_MIN ${llong_min}LL
_ACEOF
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: not found" >&5
$as_echo "not found" >&6; }
fi
rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* gmon.out bb.out conftest$ac_exeext \
conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
fi
fi
+ac_fn_c_check_decl "$LINENO" "UINT32_MAX" "ac_cv_have_decl_UINT32_MAX" "
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_LIMITS_H
+# include <sys/limits.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_LIMITS_H
+# include <limits.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
+# include <stdint.h>
+#endif
+
+"
+if test "x$ac_cv_have_decl_UINT32_MAX" = xyes; then :
+ ac_have_decl=1
+else
+ ac_have_decl=0
+fi
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_DECL_UINT32_MAX $ac_have_decl
+_ACEOF
+
# More checks for data types
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for u_int type" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for u_int type... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_have_u_int+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <sys/types.h>
int
main ()
{
u_int a; a = 1;
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
ac_cv_have_u_int="yes"
else
ac_cv_have_u_int="no"
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_have_u_int" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_cv_have_u_int" >&6; }
if test "x$ac_cv_have_u_int" = "xyes" ; then
$as_echo "#define HAVE_U_INT 1" >>confdefs.h
have_u_int=1
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for intXX_t types" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for intXX_t types... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_have_intxx_t+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <sys/types.h>
int
main ()
{
int8_t a; int16_t b; int32_t c; a = b = c = 1;
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
ac_cv_have_intxx_t="yes"
else
ac_cv_have_intxx_t="no"
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_have_intxx_t" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_cv_have_intxx_t" >&6; }
if test "x$ac_cv_have_intxx_t" = "xyes" ; then
$as_echo "#define HAVE_INTXX_T 1" >>confdefs.h
have_intxx_t=1
fi
if (test -z "$have_intxx_t" && \
test "x$ac_cv_header_stdint_h" = "xyes")
then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for intXX_t types in stdint.h" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for intXX_t types in stdint.h... " >&6; }
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <stdint.h>
int
main ()
{
int8_t a; int16_t b; int32_t c; a = b = c = 1;
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
$as_echo "#define HAVE_INTXX_T 1" >>confdefs.h
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for int64_t type" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for int64_t type... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_have_int64_t+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <sys/types.h>
#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
# include <stdint.h>
#endif
#include <sys/socket.h>
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_BITYPES_H
# include <sys/bitypes.h>
#endif
int
main ()
{
int64_t a; a = 1;
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
ac_cv_have_int64_t="yes"
else
ac_cv_have_int64_t="no"
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_have_int64_t" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_cv_have_int64_t" >&6; }
if test "x$ac_cv_have_int64_t" = "xyes" ; then
$as_echo "#define HAVE_INT64_T 1" >>confdefs.h
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for u_intXX_t types" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for u_intXX_t types... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_have_u_intxx_t+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <sys/types.h>
int
main ()
{
u_int8_t a; u_int16_t b; u_int32_t c; a = b = c = 1;
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
ac_cv_have_u_intxx_t="yes"
else
ac_cv_have_u_intxx_t="no"
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_have_u_intxx_t" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_cv_have_u_intxx_t" >&6; }
if test "x$ac_cv_have_u_intxx_t" = "xyes" ; then
$as_echo "#define HAVE_U_INTXX_T 1" >>confdefs.h
have_u_intxx_t=1
fi
if test -z "$have_u_intxx_t" ; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for u_intXX_t types in sys/socket.h" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for u_intXX_t types in sys/socket.h... " >&6; }
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <sys/socket.h>
int
main ()
{
u_int8_t a; u_int16_t b; u_int32_t c; a = b = c = 1;
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
$as_echo "#define HAVE_U_INTXX_T 1" >>confdefs.h
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for u_int64_t types" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for u_int64_t types... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_have_u_int64_t+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <sys/types.h>
int
main ()
{
u_int64_t a; a = 1;
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
ac_cv_have_u_int64_t="yes"
else
ac_cv_have_u_int64_t="no"
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_have_u_int64_t" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_cv_have_u_int64_t" >&6; }
if test "x$ac_cv_have_u_int64_t" = "xyes" ; then
$as_echo "#define HAVE_U_INT64_T 1" >>confdefs.h
have_u_int64_t=1
fi
if (test -z "$have_u_int64_t" && \
test "x$ac_cv_header_sys_bitypes_h" = "xyes")
then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for u_int64_t type in sys/bitypes.h" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for u_int64_t type in sys/bitypes.h... " >&6; }
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <sys/bitypes.h>
int
main ()
{
u_int64_t a; a = 1
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
$as_echo "#define HAVE_U_INT64_T 1" >>confdefs.h
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
fi
if test -z "$have_u_intxx_t" ; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for uintXX_t types" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for uintXX_t types... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_have_uintxx_t+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <sys/types.h>
int
main ()
{
uint8_t a;
uint16_t b;
uint32_t c;
a = b = c = 1;
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
ac_cv_have_uintxx_t="yes"
else
ac_cv_have_uintxx_t="no"
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_have_uintxx_t" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_cv_have_uintxx_t" >&6; }
if test "x$ac_cv_have_uintxx_t" = "xyes" ; then
$as_echo "#define HAVE_UINTXX_T 1" >>confdefs.h
fi
fi
if (test -z "$have_uintxx_t" && \
test "x$ac_cv_header_stdint_h" = "xyes")
then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for uintXX_t types in stdint.h" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for uintXX_t types in stdint.h... " >&6; }
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <stdint.h>
int
main ()
{
uint8_t a; uint16_t b; uint32_t c; a = b = c = 1;
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
$as_echo "#define HAVE_UINTXX_T 1" >>confdefs.h
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
fi
if (test -z "$have_uintxx_t" && \
test "x$ac_cv_header_inttypes_h" = "xyes")
then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for uintXX_t types in inttypes.h" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for uintXX_t types in inttypes.h... " >&6; }
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <inttypes.h>
int
main ()
{
uint8_t a; uint16_t b; uint32_t c; a = b = c = 1;
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
$as_echo "#define HAVE_UINTXX_T 1" >>confdefs.h
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
fi
if (test -z "$have_u_intxx_t" || test -z "$have_intxx_t" && \
test "x$ac_cv_header_sys_bitypes_h" = "xyes")
then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for intXX_t and u_intXX_t types in sys/bitypes.h" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for intXX_t and u_intXX_t types in sys/bitypes.h... " >&6; }
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <sys/bitypes.h>
int
main ()
{
int8_t a; int16_t b; int32_t c;
u_int8_t e; u_int16_t f; u_int32_t g;
a = b = c = e = f = g = 1;
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
$as_echo "#define HAVE_U_INTXX_T 1" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define HAVE_INTXX_T 1" >>confdefs.h
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for u_char" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for u_char... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_have_u_char+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <sys/types.h>
int
main ()
{
u_char foo; foo = 125;
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
ac_cv_have_u_char="yes"
else
ac_cv_have_u_char="no"
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_have_u_char" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_cv_have_u_char" >&6; }
if test "x$ac_cv_have_u_char" = "xyes" ; then
$as_echo "#define HAVE_U_CHAR 1" >>confdefs.h
fi
ac_fn_c_check_type "$LINENO" "intmax_t" "ac_cv_type_intmax_t" "
#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <stdint.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
+# include <stdint.h>
+#endif
"
if test "x$ac_cv_type_intmax_t" = xyes; then :
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define HAVE_INTMAX_T 1
_ACEOF
fi
ac_fn_c_check_type "$LINENO" "uintmax_t" "ac_cv_type_uintmax_t" "
#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <stdint.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
+# include <stdint.h>
+#endif
"
if test "x$ac_cv_type_uintmax_t" = xyes; then :
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define HAVE_UINTMAX_T 1
_ACEOF
fi
ac_fn_c_check_type "$LINENO" "socklen_t" "ac_cv_type_socklen_t" "#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
"
if test "x$ac_cv_type_socklen_t" = xyes; then :
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for socklen_t equivalent" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for socklen_t equivalent... " >&6; }
if ${curl_cv_socklen_t_equiv+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
# Systems have either "struct sockaddr *" or
# "void *" as the second argument to getpeername
curl_cv_socklen_t_equiv=
for arg2 in "struct sockaddr" void; do
for t in int size_t unsigned long "unsigned long"; do
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
int getpeername (int, $arg2 *, $t *);
int
main ()
{
$t len;
getpeername(0,0,&len);
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
curl_cv_socklen_t_equiv="$t"
break
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
done
done
if test "x$curl_cv_socklen_t_equiv" = x; then
as_fn_error $? "Cannot find a type to use in place of socklen_t" "$LINENO" 5
fi
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $curl_cv_socklen_t_equiv" >&5
$as_echo "$curl_cv_socklen_t_equiv" >&6; }
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define socklen_t $curl_cv_socklen_t_equiv
_ACEOF
fi
ac_fn_c_check_type "$LINENO" "sig_atomic_t" "ac_cv_type_sig_atomic_t" "#include <signal.h>
"
if test "x$ac_cv_type_sig_atomic_t" = xyes; then :
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define HAVE_SIG_ATOMIC_T 1
_ACEOF
fi
ac_fn_c_check_type "$LINENO" "fsblkcnt_t" "ac_cv_type_fsblkcnt_t" "
#include <sys/types.h>
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_BITYPES_H
#include <sys/bitypes.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STATFS_H
#include <sys/statfs.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STATVFS_H
#include <sys/statvfs.h>
#endif
"
if test "x$ac_cv_type_fsblkcnt_t" = xyes; then :
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define HAVE_FSBLKCNT_T 1
_ACEOF
fi
ac_fn_c_check_type "$LINENO" "fsfilcnt_t" "ac_cv_type_fsfilcnt_t" "
#include <sys/types.h>
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_BITYPES_H
#include <sys/bitypes.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STATFS_H
#include <sys/statfs.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STATVFS_H
#include <sys/statvfs.h>
#endif
"
if test "x$ac_cv_type_fsfilcnt_t" = xyes; then :
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define HAVE_FSFILCNT_T 1
_ACEOF
fi
+ac_fn_c_check_member "$LINENO" "struct statfs" "f_files" "ac_cv_member_struct_statfs_f_files" "
+#include <sys/param.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_BITYPES_H
+#include <sys/bitypes.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STATFS_H
+#include <sys/statfs.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STATVFS_H
+#include <sys/statvfs.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_VFS_H
+#include <sys/vfs.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_MOUNT_H
+#include <sys/mount.h>
+#endif
+
+"
+if test "x$ac_cv_member_struct_statfs_f_files" = xyes; then :
+
+cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
+#define HAVE_STRUCT_STATFS_F_FILES 1
+_ACEOF
+
+
+fi
ac_fn_c_check_member "$LINENO" "struct statfs" "f_flags" "ac_cv_member_struct_statfs_f_flags" "
+#include <sys/param.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_BITYPES_H
#include <sys/bitypes.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STATFS_H
#include <sys/statfs.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STATVFS_H
#include <sys/statvfs.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_VFS_H
#include <sys/vfs.h>
#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_MOUNT_H
+#include <sys/mount.h>
+#endif
"
if test "x$ac_cv_member_struct_statfs_f_flags" = xyes; then :
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define HAVE_STRUCT_STATFS_F_FLAGS 1
_ACEOF
fi
ac_fn_c_check_type "$LINENO" "in_addr_t" "ac_cv_type_in_addr_t" "#include <sys/types.h>
#include <netinet/in.h>
"
if test "x$ac_cv_type_in_addr_t" = xyes; then :
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define HAVE_IN_ADDR_T 1
_ACEOF
fi
ac_fn_c_check_type "$LINENO" "in_port_t" "ac_cv_type_in_port_t" "#include <sys/types.h>
#include <netinet/in.h>
"
if test "x$ac_cv_type_in_port_t" = xyes; then :
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define HAVE_IN_PORT_T 1
_ACEOF
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for size_t" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for size_t... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_have_size_t+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <sys/types.h>
int
main ()
{
size_t foo; foo = 1235;
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
ac_cv_have_size_t="yes"
else
ac_cv_have_size_t="no"
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_have_size_t" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_cv_have_size_t" >&6; }
if test "x$ac_cv_have_size_t" = "xyes" ; then
$as_echo "#define HAVE_SIZE_T 1" >>confdefs.h
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for ssize_t" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for ssize_t... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_have_ssize_t+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <sys/types.h>
int
main ()
{
ssize_t foo; foo = 1235;
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
ac_cv_have_ssize_t="yes"
else
ac_cv_have_ssize_t="no"
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_have_ssize_t" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_cv_have_ssize_t" >&6; }
if test "x$ac_cv_have_ssize_t" = "xyes" ; then
$as_echo "#define HAVE_SSIZE_T 1" >>confdefs.h
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for clock_t" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for clock_t... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_have_clock_t+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <time.h>
int
main ()
{
clock_t foo; foo = 1235;
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
ac_cv_have_clock_t="yes"
else
ac_cv_have_clock_t="no"
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_have_clock_t" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_cv_have_clock_t" >&6; }
if test "x$ac_cv_have_clock_t" = "xyes" ; then
$as_echo "#define HAVE_CLOCK_T 1" >>confdefs.h
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for sa_family_t" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for sa_family_t... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_have_sa_family_t+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
int
main ()
{
sa_family_t foo; foo = 1235;
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
ac_cv_have_sa_family_t="yes"
else
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <netinet/in.h>
int
main ()
{
sa_family_t foo; foo = 1235;
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
ac_cv_have_sa_family_t="yes"
else
ac_cv_have_sa_family_t="no"
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_have_sa_family_t" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_cv_have_sa_family_t" >&6; }
if test "x$ac_cv_have_sa_family_t" = "xyes" ; then
$as_echo "#define HAVE_SA_FAMILY_T 1" >>confdefs.h
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for pid_t" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for pid_t... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_have_pid_t+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <sys/types.h>
int
main ()
{
pid_t foo; foo = 1235;
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
ac_cv_have_pid_t="yes"
else
ac_cv_have_pid_t="no"
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_have_pid_t" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_cv_have_pid_t" >&6; }
if test "x$ac_cv_have_pid_t" = "xyes" ; then
$as_echo "#define HAVE_PID_T 1" >>confdefs.h
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for mode_t" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for mode_t... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_have_mode_t+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <sys/types.h>
int
main ()
{
mode_t foo; foo = 1235;
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
ac_cv_have_mode_t="yes"
else
ac_cv_have_mode_t="no"
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_have_mode_t" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_cv_have_mode_t" >&6; }
if test "x$ac_cv_have_mode_t" = "xyes" ; then
$as_echo "#define HAVE_MODE_T 1" >>confdefs.h
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for struct sockaddr_storage" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for struct sockaddr_storage... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_have_struct_sockaddr_storage+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
int
main ()
{
struct sockaddr_storage s;
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
ac_cv_have_struct_sockaddr_storage="yes"
else
ac_cv_have_struct_sockaddr_storage="no"
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_have_struct_sockaddr_storage" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_cv_have_struct_sockaddr_storage" >&6; }
if test "x$ac_cv_have_struct_sockaddr_storage" = "xyes" ; then
$as_echo "#define HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKADDR_STORAGE 1" >>confdefs.h
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for struct sockaddr_in6" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for struct sockaddr_in6... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_have_struct_sockaddr_in6+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <netinet/in.h>
int
main ()
{
struct sockaddr_in6 s; s.sin6_family = 0;
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
ac_cv_have_struct_sockaddr_in6="yes"
else
ac_cv_have_struct_sockaddr_in6="no"
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_have_struct_sockaddr_in6" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_cv_have_struct_sockaddr_in6" >&6; }
if test "x$ac_cv_have_struct_sockaddr_in6" = "xyes" ; then
$as_echo "#define HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKADDR_IN6 1" >>confdefs.h
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for struct in6_addr" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for struct in6_addr... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_have_struct_in6_addr+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <netinet/in.h>
int
main ()
{
struct in6_addr s; s.s6_addr[0] = 0;
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
ac_cv_have_struct_in6_addr="yes"
else
ac_cv_have_struct_in6_addr="no"
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_have_struct_in6_addr" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_cv_have_struct_in6_addr" >&6; }
if test "x$ac_cv_have_struct_in6_addr" = "xyes" ; then
$as_echo "#define HAVE_STRUCT_IN6_ADDR 1" >>confdefs.h
ac_fn_c_check_member "$LINENO" "struct sockaddr_in6" "sin6_scope_id" "ac_cv_member_struct_sockaddr_in6_sin6_scope_id" "
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H
#include <sys/types.h>
#endif
#include <netinet/in.h>
"
if test "x$ac_cv_member_struct_sockaddr_in6_sin6_scope_id" = xyes; then :
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKADDR_IN6_SIN6_SCOPE_ID 1
_ACEOF
fi
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for struct addrinfo" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for struct addrinfo... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_have_struct_addrinfo+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <netdb.h>
int
main ()
{
struct addrinfo s; s.ai_flags = AI_PASSIVE;
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
ac_cv_have_struct_addrinfo="yes"
else
ac_cv_have_struct_addrinfo="no"
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_have_struct_addrinfo" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_cv_have_struct_addrinfo" >&6; }
if test "x$ac_cv_have_struct_addrinfo" = "xyes" ; then
$as_echo "#define HAVE_STRUCT_ADDRINFO 1" >>confdefs.h
fi
+{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking whether time.h and sys/time.h may both be included" >&5
+$as_echo_n "checking whether time.h and sys/time.h may both be included... " >&6; }
+if ${ac_cv_header_time+:} false; then :
+ $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
+else
+ cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/time.h>
+#include <time.h>
+
+int
+main ()
+{
+if ((struct tm *) 0)
+return 0;
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
+_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
+ ac_cv_header_time=yes
+else
+ ac_cv_header_time=no
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
+fi
+{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_header_time" >&5
+$as_echo "$ac_cv_header_time" >&6; }
+if test $ac_cv_header_time = yes; then
+
+$as_echo "#define TIME_WITH_SYS_TIME 1" >>confdefs.h
+
+fi
+
+
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for struct timeval" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for struct timeval... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_have_struct_timeval+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <sys/time.h>
int
main ()
{
struct timeval tv; tv.tv_sec = 1;
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
ac_cv_have_struct_timeval="yes"
else
ac_cv_have_struct_timeval="no"
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_have_struct_timeval" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_cv_have_struct_timeval" >&6; }
if test "x$ac_cv_have_struct_timeval" = "xyes" ; then
$as_echo "#define HAVE_STRUCT_TIMEVAL 1" >>confdefs.h
have_struct_timeval=1
fi
-ac_fn_c_check_type "$LINENO" "struct timespec" "ac_cv_type_struct_timespec" "$ac_includes_default"
-if test "x$ac_cv_type_struct_timespec" = xyes; then :
+{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for struct timespec" >&5
+$as_echo_n "checking for struct timespec... " >&6; }
+if ${ac_cv_have_struct_timespec+:} false; then :
+ $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
+else
-cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
-#define HAVE_STRUCT_TIMESPEC 1
+ cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
+/* end confdefs.h. */
+
+ #ifdef TIME_WITH_SYS_TIME
+ # include <sys/time.h>
+ # include <time.h>
+ #else
+ # ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
+ # include <sys/time.h>
+ # else
+ # include <time.h>
+ # endif
+ #endif
+
+int
+main ()
+{
+ struct timespec ts; ts.tv_sec = 1;
+ ;
+ return 0;
+}
_ACEOF
+if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
+ ac_cv_have_struct_timespec="yes"
+else
+ ac_cv_have_struct_timespec="no"
+fi
+rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
fi
+{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_have_struct_timespec" >&5
+$as_echo "$ac_cv_have_struct_timespec" >&6; }
+if test "x$ac_cv_have_struct_timespec" = "xyes" ; then
+
+$as_echo "#define HAVE_STRUCT_TIMESPEC 1" >>confdefs.h
+ have_struct_timespec=1
+fi
# We need int64_t or else certain parts of the compile will fail.
if test "x$ac_cv_have_int64_t" = "xno" && \
test "x$ac_cv_sizeof_long_int" != "x8" && \
test "x$ac_cv_sizeof_long_long_int" = "x0" ; then
echo "OpenSSH requires int64_t support. Contact your vendor or install"
echo "an alternative compiler (I.E., GCC) before continuing."
echo ""
exit 1;
else
if test "$cross_compiling" = yes; then :
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: cross compiling: Assuming working snprintf()" >&5
$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: cross compiling: Assuming working snprintf()" >&2;}
else
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#ifdef HAVE_SNPRINTF
main()
{
char buf[50];
char expected_out[50];
int mazsize = 50 ;
#if (SIZEOF_LONG_INT == 8)
long int num = 0x7fffffffffffffff;
#else
long long num = 0x7fffffffffffffffll;
#endif
strcpy(expected_out, "9223372036854775807");
snprintf(buf, mazsize, "%lld", num);
if(strcmp(buf, expected_out) != 0)
exit(1);
exit(0);
}
#else
main() { exit(0); }
#endif
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_run "$LINENO"; then :
true
else
$as_echo "#define BROKEN_SNPRINTF 1" >>confdefs.h
fi
rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* gmon.out bb.out conftest$ac_exeext \
conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
fi
fi
# look for field 'ut_host' in header 'utmp.h'
ossh_safe=`echo "utmp.h" | sed 'y%./+-%__p_%'`
ossh_varname="ossh_cv_$ossh_safe""_has_"ut_host
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for ut_host field in utmp.h" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for ut_host field in utmp.h... " >&6; }
if eval \${$ossh_varname+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <utmp.h>
_ACEOF
if (eval "$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext") 2>&5 |
$EGREP "ut_host" >/dev/null 2>&1; then :
eval "$ossh_varname=yes"
else
eval "$ossh_varname=no"
fi
rm -f conftest*
fi
ossh_result=`eval 'echo $'"$ossh_varname"`
if test -n "`echo $ossh_varname`"; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ossh_result" >&5
$as_echo "$ossh_result" >&6; }
if test "x$ossh_result" = "xyes"; then
$as_echo "#define HAVE_HOST_IN_UTMP 1" >>confdefs.h
fi
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
fi
# look for field 'ut_host' in header 'utmpx.h'
ossh_safe=`echo "utmpx.h" | sed 'y%./+-%__p_%'`
ossh_varname="ossh_cv_$ossh_safe""_has_"ut_host
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for ut_host field in utmpx.h" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for ut_host field in utmpx.h... " >&6; }
if eval \${$ossh_varname+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <utmpx.h>
_ACEOF
if (eval "$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext") 2>&5 |
$EGREP "ut_host" >/dev/null 2>&1; then :
eval "$ossh_varname=yes"
else
eval "$ossh_varname=no"
fi
rm -f conftest*
fi
ossh_result=`eval 'echo $'"$ossh_varname"`
if test -n "`echo $ossh_varname`"; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ossh_result" >&5
$as_echo "$ossh_result" >&6; }
if test "x$ossh_result" = "xyes"; then
$as_echo "#define HAVE_HOST_IN_UTMPX 1" >>confdefs.h
fi
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
fi
# look for field 'syslen' in header 'utmpx.h'
ossh_safe=`echo "utmpx.h" | sed 'y%./+-%__p_%'`
ossh_varname="ossh_cv_$ossh_safe""_has_"syslen
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for syslen field in utmpx.h" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for syslen field in utmpx.h... " >&6; }
if eval \${$ossh_varname+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <utmpx.h>
_ACEOF
if (eval "$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext") 2>&5 |
$EGREP "syslen" >/dev/null 2>&1; then :
eval "$ossh_varname=yes"
else
eval "$ossh_varname=no"
fi
rm -f conftest*
fi
ossh_result=`eval 'echo $'"$ossh_varname"`
if test -n "`echo $ossh_varname`"; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ossh_result" >&5
$as_echo "$ossh_result" >&6; }
if test "x$ossh_result" = "xyes"; then
$as_echo "#define HAVE_SYSLEN_IN_UTMPX 1" >>confdefs.h
fi
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
fi
# look for field 'ut_pid' in header 'utmp.h'
ossh_safe=`echo "utmp.h" | sed 'y%./+-%__p_%'`
ossh_varname="ossh_cv_$ossh_safe""_has_"ut_pid
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for ut_pid field in utmp.h" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for ut_pid field in utmp.h... " >&6; }
if eval \${$ossh_varname+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <utmp.h>
_ACEOF
if (eval "$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext") 2>&5 |
$EGREP "ut_pid" >/dev/null 2>&1; then :
eval "$ossh_varname=yes"
else
eval "$ossh_varname=no"
fi
rm -f conftest*
fi
ossh_result=`eval 'echo $'"$ossh_varname"`
if test -n "`echo $ossh_varname`"; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ossh_result" >&5
$as_echo "$ossh_result" >&6; }
if test "x$ossh_result" = "xyes"; then
$as_echo "#define HAVE_PID_IN_UTMP 1" >>confdefs.h
fi
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
fi
# look for field 'ut_type' in header 'utmp.h'
ossh_safe=`echo "utmp.h" | sed 'y%./+-%__p_%'`
ossh_varname="ossh_cv_$ossh_safe""_has_"ut_type
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for ut_type field in utmp.h" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for ut_type field in utmp.h... " >&6; }
if eval \${$ossh_varname+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <utmp.h>
_ACEOF
if (eval "$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext") 2>&5 |
$EGREP "ut_type" >/dev/null 2>&1; then :
eval "$ossh_varname=yes"
else
eval "$ossh_varname=no"
fi
rm -f conftest*
fi
ossh_result=`eval 'echo $'"$ossh_varname"`
if test -n "`echo $ossh_varname`"; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ossh_result" >&5
$as_echo "$ossh_result" >&6; }
if test "x$ossh_result" = "xyes"; then
$as_echo "#define HAVE_TYPE_IN_UTMP 1" >>confdefs.h
fi
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
fi
# look for field 'ut_type' in header 'utmpx.h'
ossh_safe=`echo "utmpx.h" | sed 'y%./+-%__p_%'`
ossh_varname="ossh_cv_$ossh_safe""_has_"ut_type
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for ut_type field in utmpx.h" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for ut_type field in utmpx.h... " >&6; }
if eval \${$ossh_varname+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <utmpx.h>
_ACEOF
if (eval "$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext") 2>&5 |
$EGREP "ut_type" >/dev/null 2>&1; then :
eval "$ossh_varname=yes"
else
eval "$ossh_varname=no"
fi
rm -f conftest*
fi
ossh_result=`eval 'echo $'"$ossh_varname"`
if test -n "`echo $ossh_varname`"; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ossh_result" >&5
$as_echo "$ossh_result" >&6; }
if test "x$ossh_result" = "xyes"; then
$as_echo "#define HAVE_TYPE_IN_UTMPX 1" >>confdefs.h
fi
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
fi
# look for field 'ut_tv' in header 'utmp.h'
ossh_safe=`echo "utmp.h" | sed 'y%./+-%__p_%'`
ossh_varname="ossh_cv_$ossh_safe""_has_"ut_tv
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for ut_tv field in utmp.h" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for ut_tv field in utmp.h... " >&6; }
if eval \${$ossh_varname+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <utmp.h>
_ACEOF
if (eval "$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext") 2>&5 |
$EGREP "ut_tv" >/dev/null 2>&1; then :
eval "$ossh_varname=yes"
else
eval "$ossh_varname=no"
fi
rm -f conftest*
fi
ossh_result=`eval 'echo $'"$ossh_varname"`
if test -n "`echo $ossh_varname`"; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ossh_result" >&5
$as_echo "$ossh_result" >&6; }
if test "x$ossh_result" = "xyes"; then
$as_echo "#define HAVE_TV_IN_UTMP 1" >>confdefs.h
fi
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
fi
# look for field 'ut_id' in header 'utmp.h'
ossh_safe=`echo "utmp.h" | sed 'y%./+-%__p_%'`
ossh_varname="ossh_cv_$ossh_safe""_has_"ut_id
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for ut_id field in utmp.h" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for ut_id field in utmp.h... " >&6; }
if eval \${$ossh_varname+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <utmp.h>
_ACEOF
if (eval "$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext") 2>&5 |
$EGREP "ut_id" >/dev/null 2>&1; then :
eval "$ossh_varname=yes"
else
eval "$ossh_varname=no"
fi
rm -f conftest*
fi
ossh_result=`eval 'echo $'"$ossh_varname"`
if test -n "`echo $ossh_varname`"; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ossh_result" >&5
$as_echo "$ossh_result" >&6; }
if test "x$ossh_result" = "xyes"; then
$as_echo "#define HAVE_ID_IN_UTMP 1" >>confdefs.h
fi
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
fi
# look for field 'ut_id' in header 'utmpx.h'
ossh_safe=`echo "utmpx.h" | sed 'y%./+-%__p_%'`
ossh_varname="ossh_cv_$ossh_safe""_has_"ut_id
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for ut_id field in utmpx.h" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for ut_id field in utmpx.h... " >&6; }
if eval \${$ossh_varname+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <utmpx.h>
_ACEOF
if (eval "$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext") 2>&5 |
$EGREP "ut_id" >/dev/null 2>&1; then :
eval "$ossh_varname=yes"
else
eval "$ossh_varname=no"
fi
rm -f conftest*
fi
ossh_result=`eval 'echo $'"$ossh_varname"`
if test -n "`echo $ossh_varname`"; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ossh_result" >&5
$as_echo "$ossh_result" >&6; }
if test "x$ossh_result" = "xyes"; then
$as_echo "#define HAVE_ID_IN_UTMPX 1" >>confdefs.h
fi
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
fi
# look for field 'ut_addr' in header 'utmp.h'
ossh_safe=`echo "utmp.h" | sed 'y%./+-%__p_%'`
ossh_varname="ossh_cv_$ossh_safe""_has_"ut_addr
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for ut_addr field in utmp.h" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for ut_addr field in utmp.h... " >&6; }
if eval \${$ossh_varname+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <utmp.h>
_ACEOF
if (eval "$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext") 2>&5 |
$EGREP "ut_addr" >/dev/null 2>&1; then :
eval "$ossh_varname=yes"
else
eval "$ossh_varname=no"
fi
rm -f conftest*
fi
ossh_result=`eval 'echo $'"$ossh_varname"`
if test -n "`echo $ossh_varname`"; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ossh_result" >&5
$as_echo "$ossh_result" >&6; }
if test "x$ossh_result" = "xyes"; then
$as_echo "#define HAVE_ADDR_IN_UTMP 1" >>confdefs.h
fi
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
fi
# look for field 'ut_addr' in header 'utmpx.h'
ossh_safe=`echo "utmpx.h" | sed 'y%./+-%__p_%'`
ossh_varname="ossh_cv_$ossh_safe""_has_"ut_addr
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for ut_addr field in utmpx.h" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for ut_addr field in utmpx.h... " >&6; }
if eval \${$ossh_varname+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <utmpx.h>
_ACEOF
if (eval "$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext") 2>&5 |
$EGREP "ut_addr" >/dev/null 2>&1; then :
eval "$ossh_varname=yes"
else
eval "$ossh_varname=no"
fi
rm -f conftest*
fi
ossh_result=`eval 'echo $'"$ossh_varname"`
if test -n "`echo $ossh_varname`"; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ossh_result" >&5
$as_echo "$ossh_result" >&6; }
if test "x$ossh_result" = "xyes"; then
$as_echo "#define HAVE_ADDR_IN_UTMPX 1" >>confdefs.h
fi
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
fi
# look for field 'ut_addr_v6' in header 'utmp.h'
ossh_safe=`echo "utmp.h" | sed 'y%./+-%__p_%'`
ossh_varname="ossh_cv_$ossh_safe""_has_"ut_addr_v6
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for ut_addr_v6 field in utmp.h" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for ut_addr_v6 field in utmp.h... " >&6; }
if eval \${$ossh_varname+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <utmp.h>
_ACEOF
if (eval "$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext") 2>&5 |
$EGREP "ut_addr_v6" >/dev/null 2>&1; then :
eval "$ossh_varname=yes"
else
eval "$ossh_varname=no"
fi
rm -f conftest*
fi
ossh_result=`eval 'echo $'"$ossh_varname"`
if test -n "`echo $ossh_varname`"; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ossh_result" >&5
$as_echo "$ossh_result" >&6; }
if test "x$ossh_result" = "xyes"; then
$as_echo "#define HAVE_ADDR_V6_IN_UTMP 1" >>confdefs.h
fi
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
fi
# look for field 'ut_addr_v6' in header 'utmpx.h'
ossh_safe=`echo "utmpx.h" | sed 'y%./+-%__p_%'`
ossh_varname="ossh_cv_$ossh_safe""_has_"ut_addr_v6
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for ut_addr_v6 field in utmpx.h" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for ut_addr_v6 field in utmpx.h... " >&6; }
if eval \${$ossh_varname+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <utmpx.h>
_ACEOF
if (eval "$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext") 2>&5 |
$EGREP "ut_addr_v6" >/dev/null 2>&1; then :
eval "$ossh_varname=yes"
else
eval "$ossh_varname=no"
fi
rm -f conftest*
fi
ossh_result=`eval 'echo $'"$ossh_varname"`
if test -n "`echo $ossh_varname`"; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ossh_result" >&5
$as_echo "$ossh_result" >&6; }
if test "x$ossh_result" = "xyes"; then
$as_echo "#define HAVE_ADDR_V6_IN_UTMPX 1" >>confdefs.h
fi
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
fi
# look for field 'ut_exit' in header 'utmp.h'
ossh_safe=`echo "utmp.h" | sed 'y%./+-%__p_%'`
ossh_varname="ossh_cv_$ossh_safe""_has_"ut_exit
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for ut_exit field in utmp.h" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for ut_exit field in utmp.h... " >&6; }
if eval \${$ossh_varname+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <utmp.h>
_ACEOF
if (eval "$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext") 2>&5 |
$EGREP "ut_exit" >/dev/null 2>&1; then :
eval "$ossh_varname=yes"
else
eval "$ossh_varname=no"
fi
rm -f conftest*
fi
ossh_result=`eval 'echo $'"$ossh_varname"`
if test -n "`echo $ossh_varname`"; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ossh_result" >&5
$as_echo "$ossh_result" >&6; }
if test "x$ossh_result" = "xyes"; then
$as_echo "#define HAVE_EXIT_IN_UTMP 1" >>confdefs.h
fi
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
fi
# look for field 'ut_time' in header 'utmp.h'
ossh_safe=`echo "utmp.h" | sed 'y%./+-%__p_%'`
ossh_varname="ossh_cv_$ossh_safe""_has_"ut_time
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for ut_time field in utmp.h" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for ut_time field in utmp.h... " >&6; }
if eval \${$ossh_varname+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <utmp.h>
_ACEOF
if (eval "$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext") 2>&5 |
$EGREP "ut_time" >/dev/null 2>&1; then :
eval "$ossh_varname=yes"
else
eval "$ossh_varname=no"
fi
rm -f conftest*
fi
ossh_result=`eval 'echo $'"$ossh_varname"`
if test -n "`echo $ossh_varname`"; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ossh_result" >&5
$as_echo "$ossh_result" >&6; }
if test "x$ossh_result" = "xyes"; then
$as_echo "#define HAVE_TIME_IN_UTMP 1" >>confdefs.h
fi
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
fi
# look for field 'ut_time' in header 'utmpx.h'
ossh_safe=`echo "utmpx.h" | sed 'y%./+-%__p_%'`
ossh_varname="ossh_cv_$ossh_safe""_has_"ut_time
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for ut_time field in utmpx.h" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for ut_time field in utmpx.h... " >&6; }
if eval \${$ossh_varname+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <utmpx.h>
_ACEOF
if (eval "$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext") 2>&5 |
$EGREP "ut_time" >/dev/null 2>&1; then :
eval "$ossh_varname=yes"
else
eval "$ossh_varname=no"
fi
rm -f conftest*
fi
ossh_result=`eval 'echo $'"$ossh_varname"`
if test -n "`echo $ossh_varname`"; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ossh_result" >&5
$as_echo "$ossh_result" >&6; }
if test "x$ossh_result" = "xyes"; then
$as_echo "#define HAVE_TIME_IN_UTMPX 1" >>confdefs.h
fi
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
fi
# look for field 'ut_tv' in header 'utmpx.h'
ossh_safe=`echo "utmpx.h" | sed 'y%./+-%__p_%'`
ossh_varname="ossh_cv_$ossh_safe""_has_"ut_tv
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for ut_tv field in utmpx.h" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for ut_tv field in utmpx.h... " >&6; }
if eval \${$ossh_varname+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <utmpx.h>
_ACEOF
if (eval "$ac_cpp conftest.$ac_ext") 2>&5 |
$EGREP "ut_tv" >/dev/null 2>&1; then :
eval "$ossh_varname=yes"
else
eval "$ossh_varname=no"
fi
rm -f conftest*
fi
ossh_result=`eval 'echo $'"$ossh_varname"`
if test -n "`echo $ossh_varname`"; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ossh_result" >&5
$as_echo "$ossh_result" >&6; }
if test "x$ossh_result" = "xyes"; then
$as_echo "#define HAVE_TV_IN_UTMPX 1" >>confdefs.h
fi
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
fi
ac_fn_c_check_member "$LINENO" "struct stat" "st_blksize" "ac_cv_member_struct_stat_st_blksize" "$ac_includes_default"
if test "x$ac_cv_member_struct_stat_st_blksize" = xyes; then :
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define HAVE_STRUCT_STAT_ST_BLKSIZE 1
_ACEOF
fi
ac_fn_c_check_member "$LINENO" "struct stat" "st_mtim" "ac_cv_member_struct_stat_st_mtim" "$ac_includes_default"
if test "x$ac_cv_member_struct_stat_st_mtim" = xyes; then :
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define HAVE_STRUCT_STAT_ST_MTIM 1
_ACEOF
fi
ac_fn_c_check_member "$LINENO" "struct stat" "st_mtime" "ac_cv_member_struct_stat_st_mtime" "$ac_includes_default"
if test "x$ac_cv_member_struct_stat_st_mtime" = xyes; then :
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define HAVE_STRUCT_STAT_ST_MTIME 1
_ACEOF
fi
ac_fn_c_check_member "$LINENO" "struct passwd" "pw_gecos" "ac_cv_member_struct_passwd_pw_gecos" "
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <pwd.h>
"
if test "x$ac_cv_member_struct_passwd_pw_gecos" = xyes; then :
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_GECOS 1
_ACEOF
fi
ac_fn_c_check_member "$LINENO" "struct passwd" "pw_class" "ac_cv_member_struct_passwd_pw_class" "
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <pwd.h>
"
if test "x$ac_cv_member_struct_passwd_pw_class" = xyes; then :
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_CLASS 1
_ACEOF
fi
ac_fn_c_check_member "$LINENO" "struct passwd" "pw_change" "ac_cv_member_struct_passwd_pw_change" "
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <pwd.h>
"
if test "x$ac_cv_member_struct_passwd_pw_change" = xyes; then :
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_CHANGE 1
_ACEOF
fi
ac_fn_c_check_member "$LINENO" "struct passwd" "pw_expire" "ac_cv_member_struct_passwd_pw_expire" "
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <pwd.h>
"
if test "x$ac_cv_member_struct_passwd_pw_expire" = xyes; then :
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_EXPIRE 1
_ACEOF
fi
ac_fn_c_check_member "$LINENO" "struct __res_state" "retrans" "ac_cv_member_struct___res_state_retrans" "
#include <stdio.h>
#if HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H
# include <sys/types.h>
#endif
#include <netinet/in.h>
#include <arpa/nameser.h>
#include <resolv.h>
"
if test "x$ac_cv_member_struct___res_state_retrans" = xyes; then :
else
$as_echo "#define __res_state state" >>confdefs.h
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for ss_family field in struct sockaddr_storage" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for ss_family field in struct sockaddr_storage... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_have_ss_family_in_struct_ss+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
int
main ()
{
struct sockaddr_storage s; s.ss_family = 1;
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
ac_cv_have_ss_family_in_struct_ss="yes"
else
ac_cv_have_ss_family_in_struct_ss="no"
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_have_ss_family_in_struct_ss" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_cv_have_ss_family_in_struct_ss" >&6; }
if test "x$ac_cv_have_ss_family_in_struct_ss" = "xyes" ; then
$as_echo "#define HAVE_SS_FAMILY_IN_SS 1" >>confdefs.h
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for __ss_family field in struct sockaddr_storage" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for __ss_family field in struct sockaddr_storage... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_have___ss_family_in_struct_ss+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
int
main ()
{
struct sockaddr_storage s; s.__ss_family = 1;
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
ac_cv_have___ss_family_in_struct_ss="yes"
else
ac_cv_have___ss_family_in_struct_ss="no"
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_have___ss_family_in_struct_ss" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_cv_have___ss_family_in_struct_ss" >&6; }
if test "x$ac_cv_have___ss_family_in_struct_ss" = "xyes" ; then
$as_echo "#define HAVE___SS_FAMILY_IN_SS 1" >>confdefs.h
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for msg_accrights field in struct msghdr" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for msg_accrights field in struct msghdr... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_have_accrights_in_msghdr+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <sys/uio.h>
int
main ()
{
#ifdef msg_accrights
#error "msg_accrights is a macro"
exit(1);
#endif
struct msghdr m;
m.msg_accrights = 0;
exit(0);
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
ac_cv_have_accrights_in_msghdr="yes"
else
ac_cv_have_accrights_in_msghdr="no"
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_have_accrights_in_msghdr" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_cv_have_accrights_in_msghdr" >&6; }
if test "x$ac_cv_have_accrights_in_msghdr" = "xyes" ; then
$as_echo "#define HAVE_ACCRIGHTS_IN_MSGHDR 1" >>confdefs.h
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if struct statvfs.f_fsid is integral type" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking if struct statvfs.f_fsid is integral type... " >&6; }
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <sys/param.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
# include <sys/time.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_MOUNT_H
#include <sys/mount.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STATVFS_H
#include <sys/statvfs.h>
#endif
int
main ()
{
struct statvfs s; s.f_fsid = 0;
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if fsid_t has member val" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking if fsid_t has member val... " >&6; }
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/statvfs.h>
int
main ()
{
fsid_t t; t.val[0] = 0;
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
$as_echo "#define FSID_HAS_VAL 1" >>confdefs.h
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if f_fsid has member __val" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking if f_fsid has member __val... " >&6; }
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/statvfs.h>
int
main ()
{
fsid_t t; t.__val[0] = 0;
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
$as_echo "#define FSID_HAS___VAL 1" >>confdefs.h
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for msg_control field in struct msghdr" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for msg_control field in struct msghdr... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_have_control_in_msghdr+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <sys/uio.h>
int
main ()
{
#ifdef msg_control
#error "msg_control is a macro"
exit(1);
#endif
struct msghdr m;
m.msg_control = 0;
exit(0);
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
ac_cv_have_control_in_msghdr="yes"
else
ac_cv_have_control_in_msghdr="no"
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_have_control_in_msghdr" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_cv_have_control_in_msghdr" >&6; }
if test "x$ac_cv_have_control_in_msghdr" = "xyes" ; then
$as_echo "#define HAVE_CONTROL_IN_MSGHDR 1" >>confdefs.h
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if libc defines __progname" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking if libc defines __progname... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_libc_defines___progname+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
int
main ()
{
extern char *__progname; printf("%s", __progname);
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
ac_cv_libc_defines___progname="yes"
else
ac_cv_libc_defines___progname="no"
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_libc_defines___progname" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_cv_libc_defines___progname" >&6; }
if test "x$ac_cv_libc_defines___progname" = "xyes" ; then
$as_echo "#define HAVE___PROGNAME 1" >>confdefs.h
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking whether $CC implements __FUNCTION__" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking whether $CC implements __FUNCTION__... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_cc_implements___FUNCTION__+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <stdio.h>
int
main ()
{
printf("%s", __FUNCTION__);
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
ac_cv_cc_implements___FUNCTION__="yes"
else
ac_cv_cc_implements___FUNCTION__="no"
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_cc_implements___FUNCTION__" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_cv_cc_implements___FUNCTION__" >&6; }
if test "x$ac_cv_cc_implements___FUNCTION__" = "xyes" ; then
$as_echo "#define HAVE___FUNCTION__ 1" >>confdefs.h
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking whether $CC implements __func__" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking whether $CC implements __func__... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_cc_implements___func__+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <stdio.h>
int
main ()
{
printf("%s", __func__);
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
ac_cv_cc_implements___func__="yes"
else
ac_cv_cc_implements___func__="no"
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_cc_implements___func__" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_cv_cc_implements___func__" >&6; }
if test "x$ac_cv_cc_implements___func__" = "xyes" ; then
$as_echo "#define HAVE___func__ 1" >>confdefs.h
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking whether va_copy exists" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking whether va_copy exists... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_have_va_copy+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <stdarg.h>
va_list x,y;
int
main ()
{
va_copy(x,y);
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
ac_cv_have_va_copy="yes"
else
ac_cv_have_va_copy="no"
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_have_va_copy" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_cv_have_va_copy" >&6; }
if test "x$ac_cv_have_va_copy" = "xyes" ; then
$as_echo "#define HAVE_VA_COPY 1" >>confdefs.h
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking whether __va_copy exists" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking whether __va_copy exists... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_have___va_copy+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <stdarg.h>
va_list x,y;
int
main ()
{
__va_copy(x,y);
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
ac_cv_have___va_copy="yes"
else
ac_cv_have___va_copy="no"
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_have___va_copy" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_cv_have___va_copy" >&6; }
if test "x$ac_cv_have___va_copy" = "xyes" ; then
$as_echo "#define HAVE___VA_COPY 1" >>confdefs.h
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking whether getopt has optreset support" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking whether getopt has optreset support... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_have_getopt_optreset+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <getopt.h>
int
main ()
{
extern int optreset; optreset = 0;
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
ac_cv_have_getopt_optreset="yes"
else
ac_cv_have_getopt_optreset="no"
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_have_getopt_optreset" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_cv_have_getopt_optreset" >&6; }
if test "x$ac_cv_have_getopt_optreset" = "xyes" ; then
$as_echo "#define HAVE_GETOPT_OPTRESET 1" >>confdefs.h
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if libc defines sys_errlist" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking if libc defines sys_errlist... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_libc_defines_sys_errlist+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
int
main ()
{
extern const char *const sys_errlist[]; printf("%s", sys_errlist[0]);
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
ac_cv_libc_defines_sys_errlist="yes"
else
ac_cv_libc_defines_sys_errlist="no"
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_libc_defines_sys_errlist" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_cv_libc_defines_sys_errlist" >&6; }
if test "x$ac_cv_libc_defines_sys_errlist" = "xyes" ; then
$as_echo "#define HAVE_SYS_ERRLIST 1" >>confdefs.h
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if libc defines sys_nerr" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking if libc defines sys_nerr... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_libc_defines_sys_nerr+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
int
main ()
{
extern int sys_nerr; printf("%i", sys_nerr);
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
ac_cv_libc_defines_sys_nerr="yes"
else
ac_cv_libc_defines_sys_nerr="no"
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_libc_defines_sys_nerr" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_cv_libc_defines_sys_nerr" >&6; }
if test "x$ac_cv_libc_defines_sys_nerr" = "xyes" ; then
$as_echo "#define HAVE_SYS_NERR 1" >>confdefs.h
fi
# Check libraries needed by DNS fingerprint support
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for library containing getrrsetbyname" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for library containing getrrsetbyname... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_search_getrrsetbyname+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
ac_func_search_save_LIBS=$LIBS
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C"
#endif
char getrrsetbyname ();
int
main ()
{
return getrrsetbyname ();
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
for ac_lib in '' resolv; do
if test -z "$ac_lib"; then
ac_res="none required"
else
ac_res=-l$ac_lib
LIBS="-l$ac_lib $ac_func_search_save_LIBS"
fi
if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
ac_cv_search_getrrsetbyname=$ac_res
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
conftest$ac_exeext
if ${ac_cv_search_getrrsetbyname+:} false; then :
break
fi
done
if ${ac_cv_search_getrrsetbyname+:} false; then :
else
ac_cv_search_getrrsetbyname=no
fi
rm conftest.$ac_ext
LIBS=$ac_func_search_save_LIBS
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_search_getrrsetbyname" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_cv_search_getrrsetbyname" >&6; }
ac_res=$ac_cv_search_getrrsetbyname
if test "$ac_res" != no; then :
test "$ac_res" = "none required" || LIBS="$ac_res $LIBS"
$as_echo "#define HAVE_GETRRSETBYNAME 1" >>confdefs.h
else
# Needed by our getrrsetbyname()
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for library containing res_query" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for library containing res_query... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_search_res_query+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
ac_func_search_save_LIBS=$LIBS
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C"
#endif
char res_query ();
int
main ()
{
return res_query ();
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
for ac_lib in '' resolv; do
if test -z "$ac_lib"; then
ac_res="none required"
else
ac_res=-l$ac_lib
LIBS="-l$ac_lib $ac_func_search_save_LIBS"
fi
if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
ac_cv_search_res_query=$ac_res
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
conftest$ac_exeext
if ${ac_cv_search_res_query+:} false; then :
break
fi
done
if ${ac_cv_search_res_query+:} false; then :
else
ac_cv_search_res_query=no
fi
rm conftest.$ac_ext
LIBS=$ac_func_search_save_LIBS
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_search_res_query" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_cv_search_res_query" >&6; }
ac_res=$ac_cv_search_res_query
if test "$ac_res" != no; then :
test "$ac_res" = "none required" || LIBS="$ac_res $LIBS"
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for library containing dn_expand" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for library containing dn_expand... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_search_dn_expand+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
ac_func_search_save_LIBS=$LIBS
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C"
#endif
char dn_expand ();
int
main ()
{
return dn_expand ();
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
for ac_lib in '' resolv; do
if test -z "$ac_lib"; then
ac_res="none required"
else
ac_res=-l$ac_lib
LIBS="-l$ac_lib $ac_func_search_save_LIBS"
fi
if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
ac_cv_search_dn_expand=$ac_res
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
conftest$ac_exeext
if ${ac_cv_search_dn_expand+:} false; then :
break
fi
done
if ${ac_cv_search_dn_expand+:} false; then :
else
ac_cv_search_dn_expand=no
fi
rm conftest.$ac_ext
LIBS=$ac_func_search_save_LIBS
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_search_dn_expand" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_cv_search_dn_expand" >&6; }
ac_res=$ac_cv_search_dn_expand
if test "$ac_res" != no; then :
test "$ac_res" = "none required" || LIBS="$ac_res $LIBS"
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if res_query will link" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking if res_query will link... " >&6; }
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <netinet/in.h>
#include <arpa/nameser.h>
#include <netdb.h>
#include <resolv.h>
int
main ()
{
res_query (0, 0, 0, 0, 0);
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
saved_LIBS="$LIBS"
LIBS="$LIBS -lresolv"
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for res_query in -lresolv" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for res_query in -lresolv... " >&6; }
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <netinet/in.h>
#include <arpa/nameser.h>
#include <netdb.h>
#include <resolv.h>
int
main ()
{
res_query (0, 0, 0, 0, 0);
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
else
LIBS="$saved_LIBS"
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
for ac_func in _getshort _getlong
do :
as_ac_var=`$as_echo "ac_cv_func_$ac_func" | $as_tr_sh`
ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "$ac_func" "$as_ac_var"
if eval test \"x\$"$as_ac_var"\" = x"yes"; then :
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define `$as_echo "HAVE_$ac_func" | $as_tr_cpp` 1
_ACEOF
fi
done
ac_fn_c_check_decl "$LINENO" "_getshort" "ac_cv_have_decl__getshort" "#include <sys/types.h>
#include <arpa/nameser.h>
"
if test "x$ac_cv_have_decl__getshort" = xyes; then :
ac_have_decl=1
else
ac_have_decl=0
fi
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define HAVE_DECL__GETSHORT $ac_have_decl
_ACEOF
ac_fn_c_check_decl "$LINENO" "_getlong" "ac_cv_have_decl__getlong" "#include <sys/types.h>
#include <arpa/nameser.h>
"
if test "x$ac_cv_have_decl__getlong" = xyes; then :
ac_have_decl=1
else
ac_have_decl=0
fi
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define HAVE_DECL__GETLONG $ac_have_decl
_ACEOF
ac_fn_c_check_member "$LINENO" "HEADER" "ad" "ac_cv_member_HEADER_ad" "#include <arpa/nameser.h>
"
if test "x$ac_cv_member_HEADER_ad" = xyes; then :
$as_echo "#define HAVE_HEADER_AD 1" >>confdefs.h
fi
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if struct __res_state _res is an extern" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking if struct __res_state _res is an extern... " >&6; }
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <stdio.h>
#if HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H
# include <sys/types.h>
#endif
#include <netinet/in.h>
#include <arpa/nameser.h>
#include <resolv.h>
extern struct __res_state _res;
int
main ()
{
struct __res_state *volatile p = &_res; /* force resolution of _res */
return 0;
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
$as_echo "#define HAVE__RES_EXTERN 1" >>confdefs.h
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
# Check whether user wants SELinux support
SELINUX_MSG="no"
LIBSELINUX=""
# Check whether --with-selinux was given.
if test "${with_selinux+set}" = set; then :
withval=$with_selinux; if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
save_LIBS="$LIBS"
$as_echo "#define WITH_SELINUX 1" >>confdefs.h
SELINUX_MSG="yes"
ac_fn_c_check_header_mongrel "$LINENO" "selinux/selinux.h" "ac_cv_header_selinux_selinux_h" "$ac_includes_default"
if test "x$ac_cv_header_selinux_selinux_h" = xyes; then :
else
as_fn_error $? "SELinux support requires selinux.h header" "$LINENO" 5
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for setexeccon in -lselinux" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for setexeccon in -lselinux... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_lib_selinux_setexeccon+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
LIBS="-lselinux $LIBS"
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C"
#endif
char setexeccon ();
int
main ()
{
return setexeccon ();
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
ac_cv_lib_selinux_setexeccon=yes
else
ac_cv_lib_selinux_setexeccon=no
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_selinux_setexeccon" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_selinux_setexeccon" >&6; }
if test "x$ac_cv_lib_selinux_setexeccon" = xyes; then :
LIBSELINUX="-lselinux"
LIBS="$LIBS -lselinux"
else
as_fn_error $? "SELinux support requires libselinux library" "$LINENO" 5
fi
SSHLIBS="$SSHLIBS $LIBSELINUX"
SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS $LIBSELINUX"
for ac_func in getseuserbyname get_default_context_with_level
do :
as_ac_var=`$as_echo "ac_cv_func_$ac_func" | $as_tr_sh`
ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "$ac_func" "$as_ac_var"
if eval test \"x\$"$as_ac_var"\" = x"yes"; then :
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define `$as_echo "HAVE_$ac_func" | $as_tr_cpp` 1
_ACEOF
fi
done
LIBS="$save_LIBS"
fi
fi
# Check whether user wants Kerberos 5 support
KRB5_MSG="no"
# Check whether --with-kerberos5 was given.
if test "${with_kerberos5+set}" = set; then :
withval=$with_kerberos5; if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
if test "x$withval" = "xyes" ; then
KRB5ROOT="/usr/local"
else
KRB5ROOT=${withval}
fi
$as_echo "#define KRB5 1" >>confdefs.h
KRB5_MSG="yes"
if test -n "$ac_tool_prefix"; then
# Extract the first word of "${ac_tool_prefix}krb5-config", so it can be a program name with args.
set dummy ${ac_tool_prefix}krb5-config; ac_word=$2
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_path_KRB5CONF+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
case $KRB5CONF in
[\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*)
ac_cv_path_KRB5CONF="$KRB5CONF" # Let the user override the test with a path.
;;
*)
as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
as_dummy="$KRB5ROOT/bin:$PATH"
for as_dir in $as_dummy
do
IFS=$as_save_IFS
test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=.
for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
if as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; then
ac_cv_path_KRB5CONF="$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"
$as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5
break 2
fi
done
done
IFS=$as_save_IFS
;;
esac
fi
KRB5CONF=$ac_cv_path_KRB5CONF
if test -n "$KRB5CONF"; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $KRB5CONF" >&5
$as_echo "$KRB5CONF" >&6; }
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
fi
fi
if test -z "$ac_cv_path_KRB5CONF"; then
ac_pt_KRB5CONF=$KRB5CONF
# Extract the first word of "krb5-config", so it can be a program name with args.
set dummy krb5-config; ac_word=$2
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_path_ac_pt_KRB5CONF+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
case $ac_pt_KRB5CONF in
[\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*)
ac_cv_path_ac_pt_KRB5CONF="$ac_pt_KRB5CONF" # Let the user override the test with a path.
;;
*)
as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
as_dummy="$KRB5ROOT/bin:$PATH"
for as_dir in $as_dummy
do
IFS=$as_save_IFS
test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=.
for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
if as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; then
ac_cv_path_ac_pt_KRB5CONF="$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"
$as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5
break 2
fi
done
done
IFS=$as_save_IFS
;;
esac
fi
ac_pt_KRB5CONF=$ac_cv_path_ac_pt_KRB5CONF
if test -n "$ac_pt_KRB5CONF"; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_pt_KRB5CONF" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_pt_KRB5CONF" >&6; }
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
fi
if test "x$ac_pt_KRB5CONF" = x; then
KRB5CONF="$KRB5ROOT/bin/krb5-config"
else
case $cross_compiling:$ac_tool_warned in
yes:)
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: using cross tools not prefixed with host triplet" >&5
$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: using cross tools not prefixed with host triplet" >&2;}
ac_tool_warned=yes ;;
esac
KRB5CONF=$ac_pt_KRB5CONF
fi
else
KRB5CONF="$ac_cv_path_KRB5CONF"
fi
if test -x $KRB5CONF ; then
K5CFLAGS="`$KRB5CONF --cflags`"
K5LIBS="`$KRB5CONF --libs`"
CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS $K5CFLAGS"
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for gssapi support" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for gssapi support... " >&6; }
if $KRB5CONF | grep gssapi >/dev/null ; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
$as_echo "#define GSSAPI 1" >>confdefs.h
GSSCFLAGS="`$KRB5CONF --cflags gssapi`"
GSSLIBS="`$KRB5CONF --libs gssapi`"
CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS $GSSCFLAGS"
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking whether we are using Heimdal" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking whether we are using Heimdal... " >&6; }
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <krb5.h>
int
main ()
{
char *tmp = heimdal_version;
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
$as_echo "#define HEIMDAL 1" >>confdefs.h
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
else
CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -I${KRB5ROOT}/include"
LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS -L${KRB5ROOT}/lib"
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking whether we are using Heimdal" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking whether we are using Heimdal... " >&6; }
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <krb5.h>
int
main ()
{
char *tmp = heimdal_version;
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
$as_echo "#define HEIMDAL 1" >>confdefs.h
K5LIBS="-lkrb5"
K5LIBS="$K5LIBS -lcom_err -lasn1"
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for net_write in -lroken" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for net_write in -lroken... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_lib_roken_net_write+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
LIBS="-lroken $LIBS"
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C"
#endif
char net_write ();
int
main ()
{
return net_write ();
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
ac_cv_lib_roken_net_write=yes
else
ac_cv_lib_roken_net_write=no
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_roken_net_write" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_roken_net_write" >&6; }
if test "x$ac_cv_lib_roken_net_write" = xyes; then :
K5LIBS="$K5LIBS -lroken"
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for des_cbc_encrypt in -ldes" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for des_cbc_encrypt in -ldes... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_lib_des_des_cbc_encrypt+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
LIBS="-ldes $LIBS"
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C"
#endif
char des_cbc_encrypt ();
int
main ()
{
return des_cbc_encrypt ();
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
ac_cv_lib_des_des_cbc_encrypt=yes
else
ac_cv_lib_des_des_cbc_encrypt=no
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_des_des_cbc_encrypt" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_des_des_cbc_encrypt" >&6; }
if test "x$ac_cv_lib_des_des_cbc_encrypt" = xyes; then :
K5LIBS="$K5LIBS -ldes"
fi
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
K5LIBS="-lkrb5 -lk5crypto -lcom_err"
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for library containing dn_expand" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for library containing dn_expand... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_search_dn_expand+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
ac_func_search_save_LIBS=$LIBS
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C"
#endif
char dn_expand ();
int
main ()
{
return dn_expand ();
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
for ac_lib in '' resolv; do
if test -z "$ac_lib"; then
ac_res="none required"
else
ac_res=-l$ac_lib
LIBS="-l$ac_lib $ac_func_search_save_LIBS"
fi
if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
ac_cv_search_dn_expand=$ac_res
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
conftest$ac_exeext
if ${ac_cv_search_dn_expand+:} false; then :
break
fi
done
if ${ac_cv_search_dn_expand+:} false; then :
else
ac_cv_search_dn_expand=no
fi
rm conftest.$ac_ext
LIBS=$ac_func_search_save_LIBS
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_search_dn_expand" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_cv_search_dn_expand" >&6; }
ac_res=$ac_cv_search_dn_expand
if test "$ac_res" != no; then :
test "$ac_res" = "none required" || LIBS="$ac_res $LIBS"
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for gss_init_sec_context in -lgssapi_krb5" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for gss_init_sec_context in -lgssapi_krb5... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_lib_gssapi_krb5_gss_init_sec_context+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
LIBS="-lgssapi_krb5 $LIBS"
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C"
#endif
char gss_init_sec_context ();
int
main ()
{
return gss_init_sec_context ();
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
ac_cv_lib_gssapi_krb5_gss_init_sec_context=yes
else
ac_cv_lib_gssapi_krb5_gss_init_sec_context=no
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_gssapi_krb5_gss_init_sec_context" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_gssapi_krb5_gss_init_sec_context" >&6; }
if test "x$ac_cv_lib_gssapi_krb5_gss_init_sec_context" = xyes; then :
$as_echo "#define GSSAPI 1" >>confdefs.h
GSSLIBS="-lgssapi_krb5"
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for gss_init_sec_context in -lgssapi" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for gss_init_sec_context in -lgssapi... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_lib_gssapi_gss_init_sec_context+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
LIBS="-lgssapi $LIBS"
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C"
#endif
char gss_init_sec_context ();
int
main ()
{
return gss_init_sec_context ();
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
ac_cv_lib_gssapi_gss_init_sec_context=yes
else
ac_cv_lib_gssapi_gss_init_sec_context=no
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_gssapi_gss_init_sec_context" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_gssapi_gss_init_sec_context" >&6; }
if test "x$ac_cv_lib_gssapi_gss_init_sec_context" = xyes; then :
$as_echo "#define GSSAPI 1" >>confdefs.h
GSSLIBS="-lgssapi"
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for gss_init_sec_context in -lgss" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for gss_init_sec_context in -lgss... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_lib_gss_gss_init_sec_context+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
ac_check_lib_save_LIBS=$LIBS
LIBS="-lgss $LIBS"
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C"
#endif
char gss_init_sec_context ();
int
main ()
{
return gss_init_sec_context ();
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
ac_cv_lib_gss_gss_init_sec_context=yes
else
ac_cv_lib_gss_gss_init_sec_context=no
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
conftest$ac_exeext conftest.$ac_ext
LIBS=$ac_check_lib_save_LIBS
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_lib_gss_gss_init_sec_context" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_cv_lib_gss_gss_init_sec_context" >&6; }
if test "x$ac_cv_lib_gss_gss_init_sec_context" = xyes; then :
$as_echo "#define GSSAPI 1" >>confdefs.h
GSSLIBS="-lgss"
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: Cannot find any suitable gss-api library - build may fail" >&5
$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: Cannot find any suitable gss-api library - build may fail" >&2;}
fi
fi
fi
ac_fn_c_check_header_mongrel "$LINENO" "gssapi.h" "ac_cv_header_gssapi_h" "$ac_includes_default"
if test "x$ac_cv_header_gssapi_h" = xyes; then :
else
unset ac_cv_header_gssapi_h
CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -I${KRB5ROOT}/include/gssapi"
for ac_header in gssapi.h
do :
ac_fn_c_check_header_mongrel "$LINENO" "gssapi.h" "ac_cv_header_gssapi_h" "$ac_includes_default"
if test "x$ac_cv_header_gssapi_h" = xyes; then :
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define HAVE_GSSAPI_H 1
_ACEOF
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: Cannot find any suitable gss-api header - build may fail" >&5
$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: Cannot find any suitable gss-api header - build may fail" >&2;}
fi
done
fi
oldCPP="$CPPFLAGS"
CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -I${KRB5ROOT}/include/gssapi"
ac_fn_c_check_header_mongrel "$LINENO" "gssapi_krb5.h" "ac_cv_header_gssapi_krb5_h" "$ac_includes_default"
if test "x$ac_cv_header_gssapi_krb5_h" = xyes; then :
else
CPPFLAGS="$oldCPP"
fi
fi
if test -n "${rpath_opt}" ; then
LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS ${rpath_opt}${KRB5ROOT}/lib"
fi
if test ! -z "$blibpath" ; then
blibpath="$blibpath:${KRB5ROOT}/lib"
fi
for ac_header in gssapi.h gssapi/gssapi.h
do :
as_ac_Header=`$as_echo "ac_cv_header_$ac_header" | $as_tr_sh`
ac_fn_c_check_header_mongrel "$LINENO" "$ac_header" "$as_ac_Header" "$ac_includes_default"
if eval test \"x\$"$as_ac_Header"\" = x"yes"; then :
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define `$as_echo "HAVE_$ac_header" | $as_tr_cpp` 1
_ACEOF
fi
done
for ac_header in gssapi_krb5.h gssapi/gssapi_krb5.h
do :
as_ac_Header=`$as_echo "ac_cv_header_$ac_header" | $as_tr_sh`
ac_fn_c_check_header_mongrel "$LINENO" "$ac_header" "$as_ac_Header" "$ac_includes_default"
if eval test \"x\$"$as_ac_Header"\" = x"yes"; then :
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define `$as_echo "HAVE_$ac_header" | $as_tr_cpp` 1
_ACEOF
fi
done
for ac_header in gssapi_generic.h gssapi/gssapi_generic.h
do :
as_ac_Header=`$as_echo "ac_cv_header_$ac_header" | $as_tr_sh`
ac_fn_c_check_header_mongrel "$LINENO" "$ac_header" "$as_ac_Header" "$ac_includes_default"
if eval test \"x\$"$as_ac_Header"\" = x"yes"; then :
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define `$as_echo "HAVE_$ac_header" | $as_tr_cpp` 1
_ACEOF
fi
done
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for library containing k_hasafs" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for library containing k_hasafs... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_search_k_hasafs+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
ac_func_search_save_LIBS=$LIBS
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
/* Override any GCC internal prototype to avoid an error.
Use char because int might match the return type of a GCC
builtin and then its argument prototype would still apply. */
#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C"
#endif
char k_hasafs ();
int
main ()
{
return k_hasafs ();
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
for ac_lib in '' kafs; do
if test -z "$ac_lib"; then
ac_res="none required"
else
ac_res=-l$ac_lib
LIBS="-l$ac_lib $ac_func_search_save_LIBS"
fi
if ac_fn_c_try_link "$LINENO"; then :
ac_cv_search_k_hasafs=$ac_res
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext \
conftest$ac_exeext
if ${ac_cv_search_k_hasafs+:} false; then :
break
fi
done
if ${ac_cv_search_k_hasafs+:} false; then :
else
ac_cv_search_k_hasafs=no
fi
rm conftest.$ac_ext
LIBS=$ac_func_search_save_LIBS
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_cv_search_k_hasafs" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_cv_search_k_hasafs" >&6; }
ac_res=$ac_cv_search_k_hasafs
if test "$ac_res" != no; then :
test "$ac_res" = "none required" || LIBS="$ac_res $LIBS"
$as_echo "#define USE_AFS 1" >>confdefs.h
fi
ac_fn_c_check_decl "$LINENO" "GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE" "ac_cv_have_decl_GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE" "
#ifdef HAVE_GSSAPI_H
# include <gssapi.h>
#elif defined(HAVE_GSSAPI_GSSAPI_H)
# include <gssapi/gssapi.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_GSSAPI_GENERIC_H
# include <gssapi_generic.h>
#elif defined(HAVE_GSSAPI_GSSAPI_GENERIC_H)
# include <gssapi/gssapi_generic.h>
#endif
"
if test "x$ac_cv_have_decl_GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE" = xyes; then :
ac_have_decl=1
else
ac_have_decl=0
fi
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define HAVE_DECL_GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE $ac_have_decl
_ACEOF
saved_LIBS="$LIBS"
LIBS="$LIBS $K5LIBS"
for ac_func in krb5_cc_new_unique krb5_get_error_message krb5_free_error_message
do :
as_ac_var=`$as_echo "ac_cv_func_$ac_func" | $as_tr_sh`
ac_fn_c_check_func "$LINENO" "$ac_func" "$as_ac_var"
if eval test \"x\$"$as_ac_var"\" = x"yes"; then :
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define `$as_echo "HAVE_$ac_func" | $as_tr_cpp` 1
_ACEOF
fi
done
LIBS="$saved_LIBS"
fi
fi
# Looking for programs, paths and files
PRIVSEP_PATH=/var/empty
# Check whether --with-privsep-path was given.
if test "${with_privsep_path+set}" = set; then :
withval=$with_privsep_path;
if test -n "$withval" && test "x$withval" != "xno" && \
test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then
PRIVSEP_PATH=$withval
fi
fi
# Check whether --with-xauth was given.
if test "${with_xauth+set}" = set; then :
withval=$with_xauth;
if test -n "$withval" && test "x$withval" != "xno" && \
test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then
xauth_path=$withval
fi
else
TestPath="$PATH"
TestPath="${TestPath}${PATH_SEPARATOR}/usr/X/bin"
TestPath="${TestPath}${PATH_SEPARATOR}/usr/bin/X11"
TestPath="${TestPath}${PATH_SEPARATOR}/usr/X11R6/bin"
TestPath="${TestPath}${PATH_SEPARATOR}/usr/openwin/bin"
# Extract the first word of "xauth", so it can be a program name with args.
set dummy xauth; ac_word=$2
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; }
if ${ac_cv_path_xauth_path+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
case $xauth_path in
[\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*)
ac_cv_path_xauth_path="$xauth_path" # Let the user override the test with a path.
;;
*)
as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
for as_dir in $TestPath
do
IFS=$as_save_IFS
test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=.
for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
if as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; then
ac_cv_path_xauth_path="$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"
$as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5
break 2
fi
done
done
IFS=$as_save_IFS
;;
esac
fi
xauth_path=$ac_cv_path_xauth_path
if test -n "$xauth_path"; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $xauth_path" >&5
$as_echo "$xauth_path" >&6; }
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
fi
if (test ! -z "$xauth_path" && test -x "/usr/openwin/bin/xauth") ; then
xauth_path="/usr/openwin/bin/xauth"
fi
fi
STRIP_OPT=-s
# Check whether --enable-strip was given.
if test "${enable_strip+set}" = set; then :
enableval=$enable_strip;
if test "x$enableval" = "xno" ; then
STRIP_OPT=
fi
fi
if test -z "$xauth_path" ; then
XAUTH_PATH="undefined"
else
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define XAUTH_PATH "$xauth_path"
_ACEOF
XAUTH_PATH=$xauth_path
fi
# Check for mail directory
# Check whether --with-maildir was given.
if test "${with_maildir+set}" = set; then :
withval=$with_maildir;
if test "X$withval" != X && test "x$withval" != xno && \
test "x${withval}" != xyes; then
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define MAIL_DIRECTORY "$withval"
_ACEOF
fi
else
if test "X$maildir" != "X"; then
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define MAIL_DIRECTORY "$maildir"
_ACEOF
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking Discovering system mail directory" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking Discovering system mail directory... " >&6; }
if test "$cross_compiling" = yes; then :
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: cross compiling: use --with-maildir=/path/to/mail" >&5
$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: cross compiling: use --with-maildir=/path/to/mail" >&2;}
else
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
#include <paths.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_MAILLOCK_H
#include <maillock.h>
#endif
#define DATA "conftest.maildir"
int
main ()
{
FILE *fd;
int rc;
fd = fopen(DATA,"w");
if(fd == NULL)
exit(1);
#if defined (_PATH_MAILDIR)
if ((rc = fprintf(fd ,"_PATH_MAILDIR:%s\n", _PATH_MAILDIR)) <0)
exit(1);
#elif defined (MAILDIR)
if ((rc = fprintf(fd ,"MAILDIR:%s\n", MAILDIR)) <0)
exit(1);
#elif defined (_PATH_MAIL)
if ((rc = fprintf(fd ,"_PATH_MAIL:%s\n", _PATH_MAIL)) <0)
exit(1);
#else
exit (2);
#endif
exit(0);
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_run "$LINENO"; then :
maildir_what=`awk -F: '{print $1}' conftest.maildir`
maildir=`awk -F: '{print $2}' conftest.maildir \
| sed 's|/$||'`
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: Using: $maildir from $maildir_what" >&5
$as_echo "Using: $maildir from $maildir_what" >&6; }
if test "x$maildir_what" != "x_PATH_MAILDIR"; then
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define MAIL_DIRECTORY "$maildir"
_ACEOF
fi
else
if test "X$ac_status" = "X2";then
# our test program didn't find it. Default to /var/spool/mail
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: Using: default value of /var/spool/mail" >&5
$as_echo "Using: default value of /var/spool/mail" >&6; }
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define MAIL_DIRECTORY "/var/spool/mail"
_ACEOF
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: *** not found ***" >&5
$as_echo "*** not found ***" >&6; }
fi
fi
rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* gmon.out bb.out conftest$ac_exeext \
conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
fi
fi
fi
# maildir
if test ! -z "$cross_compiling" && test "x$cross_compiling" = "xyes"; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: cross compiling: Disabling /dev/ptmx test" >&5
$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: cross compiling: Disabling /dev/ptmx test" >&2;}
disable_ptmx_check=yes
fi
if test -z "$no_dev_ptmx" ; then
if test "x$disable_ptmx_check" != "xyes" ; then
as_ac_File=`$as_echo "ac_cv_file_"/dev/ptmx"" | $as_tr_sh`
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for \"/dev/ptmx\"" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for \"/dev/ptmx\"... " >&6; }
if eval \${$as_ac_File+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
test "$cross_compiling" = yes &&
as_fn_error $? "cannot check for file existence when cross compiling" "$LINENO" 5
if test -r ""/dev/ptmx""; then
eval "$as_ac_File=yes"
else
eval "$as_ac_File=no"
fi
fi
eval ac_res=\$$as_ac_File
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_res" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_res" >&6; }
if eval test \"x\$"$as_ac_File"\" = x"yes"; then :
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define HAVE_DEV_PTMX 1
_ACEOF
have_dev_ptmx=1
fi
fi
fi
if test ! -z "$cross_compiling" && test "x$cross_compiling" != "xyes"; then
as_ac_File=`$as_echo "ac_cv_file_"/dev/ptc"" | $as_tr_sh`
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for \"/dev/ptc\"" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for \"/dev/ptc\"... " >&6; }
if eval \${$as_ac_File+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
test "$cross_compiling" = yes &&
as_fn_error $? "cannot check for file existence when cross compiling" "$LINENO" 5
if test -r ""/dev/ptc""; then
eval "$as_ac_File=yes"
else
eval "$as_ac_File=no"
fi
fi
eval ac_res=\$$as_ac_File
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_res" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_res" >&6; }
if eval test \"x\$"$as_ac_File"\" = x"yes"; then :
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define HAVE_DEV_PTS_AND_PTC 1
_ACEOF
have_dev_ptc=1
fi
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: cross compiling: Disabling /dev/ptc test" >&5
$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: cross compiling: Disabling /dev/ptc test" >&2;}
fi
# Options from here on. Some of these are preset by platform above
# Check whether --with-mantype was given.
if test "${with_mantype+set}" = set; then :
withval=$with_mantype;
case "$withval" in
man|cat|doc)
MANTYPE=$withval
;;
*)
as_fn_error $? "invalid man type: $withval" "$LINENO" 5
;;
esac
fi
if test -z "$MANTYPE"; then
if ${MANDOC} ${srcdir}/ssh.1 >/dev/null 2>&1; then
MANTYPE=doc
elif ${NROFF} -mdoc ${srcdir}/ssh.1 >/dev/null 2>&1; then
MANTYPE=doc
elif ${NROFF} -man ${srcdir}/ssh.1 >/dev/null 2>&1; then
MANTYPE=man
else
MANTYPE=cat
fi
fi
if test "$MANTYPE" = "doc"; then
mansubdir=man;
else
mansubdir=$MANTYPE;
fi
# Check whether to enable MD5 passwords
MD5_MSG="no"
# Check whether --with-md5-passwords was given.
if test "${with_md5_passwords+set}" = set; then :
withval=$with_md5_passwords;
if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
$as_echo "#define HAVE_MD5_PASSWORDS 1" >>confdefs.h
MD5_MSG="yes"
fi
fi
# Whether to disable shadow password support
# Check whether --with-shadow was given.
if test "${with_shadow+set}" = set; then :
withval=$with_shadow;
if test "x$withval" = "xno" ; then
$as_echo "#define DISABLE_SHADOW 1" >>confdefs.h
disable_shadow=yes
fi
fi
if test -z "$disable_shadow" ; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if the systems has expire shadow information" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking if the systems has expire shadow information... " >&6; }
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <shadow.h>
struct spwd sp;
int
main ()
{
sp.sp_expire = sp.sp_lstchg = sp.sp_inact = 0;
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
sp_expire_available=yes
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
if test "x$sp_expire_available" = "xyes" ; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
$as_echo "#define HAS_SHADOW_EXPIRE 1" >>confdefs.h
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
fi
fi
# Use ip address instead of hostname in $DISPLAY
if test ! -z "$IPADDR_IN_DISPLAY" ; then
DISPLAY_HACK_MSG="yes"
$as_echo "#define IPADDR_IN_DISPLAY 1" >>confdefs.h
else
DISPLAY_HACK_MSG="no"
# Check whether --with-ipaddr-display was given.
if test "${with_ipaddr_display+set}" = set; then :
withval=$with_ipaddr_display;
if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
$as_echo "#define IPADDR_IN_DISPLAY 1" >>confdefs.h
DISPLAY_HACK_MSG="yes"
fi
fi
fi
# check for /etc/default/login and use it if present.
# Check whether --enable-etc-default-login was given.
if test "${enable_etc_default_login+set}" = set; then :
enableval=$enable_etc_default_login; if test "x$enableval" = "xno"; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: /etc/default/login handling disabled" >&5
$as_echo "$as_me: /etc/default/login handling disabled" >&6;}
etc_default_login=no
else
etc_default_login=yes
fi
else
if test ! -z "$cross_compiling" && test "x$cross_compiling" = "xyes";
then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: cross compiling: not checking /etc/default/login" >&5
$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: cross compiling: not checking /etc/default/login" >&2;}
etc_default_login=no
else
etc_default_login=yes
fi
fi
if test "x$etc_default_login" != "xno"; then
as_ac_File=`$as_echo "ac_cv_file_"/etc/default/login"" | $as_tr_sh`
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for \"/etc/default/login\"" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking for \"/etc/default/login\"... " >&6; }
if eval \${$as_ac_File+:} false; then :
$as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
else
test "$cross_compiling" = yes &&
as_fn_error $? "cannot check for file existence when cross compiling" "$LINENO" 5
if test -r ""/etc/default/login""; then
eval "$as_ac_File=yes"
else
eval "$as_ac_File=no"
fi
fi
eval ac_res=\$$as_ac_File
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_res" >&5
$as_echo "$ac_res" >&6; }
if eval test \"x\$"$as_ac_File"\" = x"yes"; then :
external_path_file=/etc/default/login
fi
if test "x$external_path_file" = "x/etc/default/login"; then
$as_echo "#define HAVE_ETC_DEFAULT_LOGIN 1" >>confdefs.h
fi
fi
if test $ac_cv_func_login_getcapbool = "yes" && \
test $ac_cv_header_login_cap_h = "yes" ; then
external_path_file=/etc/login.conf
fi
# Whether to mess with the default path
SERVER_PATH_MSG="(default)"
# Check whether --with-default-path was given.
if test "${with_default_path+set}" = set; then :
withval=$with_default_path;
if test "x$external_path_file" = "x/etc/login.conf" ; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING:
--with-default-path=PATH has no effect on this system.
Edit /etc/login.conf instead." >&5
$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING:
--with-default-path=PATH has no effect on this system.
Edit /etc/login.conf instead." >&2;}
elif test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
if test ! -z "$external_path_file" ; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING:
--with-default-path=PATH will only be used if PATH is not defined in
$external_path_file ." >&5
$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING:
--with-default-path=PATH will only be used if PATH is not defined in
$external_path_file ." >&2;}
fi
user_path="$withval"
SERVER_PATH_MSG="$withval"
fi
else
if test "x$external_path_file" = "x/etc/login.conf" ; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: Make sure the path to scp is in /etc/login.conf" >&5
$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: Make sure the path to scp is in /etc/login.conf" >&2;}
else
if test ! -z "$external_path_file" ; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING:
If PATH is defined in $external_path_file, ensure the path to scp is included,
otherwise scp will not work." >&5
$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING:
If PATH is defined in $external_path_file, ensure the path to scp is included,
otherwise scp will not work." >&2;}
fi
if test "$cross_compiling" = yes; then :
user_path="/usr/bin:/bin:/usr/sbin:/sbin"
else
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
/* find out what STDPATH is */
#include <stdio.h>
#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
# include <paths.h>
#endif
#ifndef _PATH_STDPATH
# ifdef _PATH_USERPATH /* Irix */
# define _PATH_STDPATH _PATH_USERPATH
# else
# define _PATH_STDPATH "/usr/bin:/bin:/usr/sbin:/sbin"
# endif
#endif
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#define DATA "conftest.stdpath"
int
main ()
{
FILE *fd;
int rc;
fd = fopen(DATA,"w");
if(fd == NULL)
exit(1);
if ((rc = fprintf(fd,"%s", _PATH_STDPATH)) < 0)
exit(1);
exit(0);
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_run "$LINENO"; then :
user_path=`cat conftest.stdpath`
else
user_path="/usr/bin:/bin:/usr/sbin:/sbin"
fi
rm -f core *.core core.conftest.* gmon.out bb.out conftest$ac_exeext \
conftest.$ac_objext conftest.beam conftest.$ac_ext
fi
# make sure $bindir is in USER_PATH so scp will work
t_bindir="${bindir}"
while echo "${t_bindir}" | egrep '\$\{|NONE/' >/dev/null 2>&1; do
t_bindir=`eval echo ${t_bindir}`
case $t_bindir in
NONE/*) t_bindir=`echo $t_bindir | sed "s~NONE~$prefix~"` ;;
esac
case $t_bindir in
NONE/*) t_bindir=`echo $t_bindir | sed "s~NONE~$ac_default_prefix~"` ;;
esac
done
echo $user_path | grep ":$t_bindir" > /dev/null 2>&1
if test $? -ne 0 ; then
echo $user_path | grep "^$t_bindir" > /dev/null 2>&1
if test $? -ne 0 ; then
user_path=$user_path:$t_bindir
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: Adding $t_bindir to USER_PATH so scp will work" >&5
$as_echo "Adding $t_bindir to USER_PATH so scp will work" >&6; }
fi
fi
fi
fi
if test "x$external_path_file" != "x/etc/login.conf" ; then
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define USER_PATH "$user_path"
_ACEOF
fi
# Set superuser path separately to user path
# Check whether --with-superuser-path was given.
if test "${with_superuser_path+set}" = set; then :
withval=$with_superuser_path;
if test -n "$withval" && test "x$withval" != "xno" && \
test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define SUPERUSER_PATH "$withval"
_ACEOF
superuser_path=$withval
fi
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if we need to convert IPv4 in IPv6-mapped addresses" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking if we need to convert IPv4 in IPv6-mapped addresses... " >&6; }
IPV4_IN6_HACK_MSG="no"
# Check whether --with-4in6 was given.
if test "${with_4in6+set}" = set; then :
withval=$with_4in6;
if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
$as_echo "#define IPV4_IN_IPV6 1" >>confdefs.h
IPV4_IN6_HACK_MSG="yes"
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
fi
else
if test "x$inet6_default_4in6" = "xyes"; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes (default)" >&5
$as_echo "yes (default)" >&6; }
$as_echo "#define IPV4_IN_IPV6 1" >>confdefs.h
IPV4_IN6_HACK_MSG="yes"
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no (default)" >&5
$as_echo "no (default)" >&6; }
fi
fi
# Whether to enable BSD auth support
BSD_AUTH_MSG=no
# Check whether --with-bsd-auth was given.
if test "${with_bsd_auth+set}" = set; then :
withval=$with_bsd_auth;
if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
$as_echo "#define BSD_AUTH 1" >>confdefs.h
BSD_AUTH_MSG=yes
fi
fi
# Where to place sshd.pid
piddir=/var/run
# make sure the directory exists
if test ! -d $piddir ; then
piddir=`eval echo ${sysconfdir}`
case $piddir in
NONE/*) piddir=`echo $piddir | sed "s~NONE~$ac_default_prefix~"` ;;
esac
fi
# Check whether --with-pid-dir was given.
if test "${with_pid_dir+set}" = set; then :
withval=$with_pid_dir;
if test -n "$withval" && test "x$withval" != "xno" && \
test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then
piddir=$withval
if test ! -d $piddir ; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: ** no $piddir directory on this system **" >&5
$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: ** no $piddir directory on this system **" >&2;}
fi
fi
fi
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define _PATH_SSH_PIDDIR "$piddir"
_ACEOF
# Check whether --enable-lastlog was given.
if test "${enable_lastlog+set}" = set; then :
enableval=$enable_lastlog;
if test "x$enableval" = "xno" ; then
$as_echo "#define DISABLE_LASTLOG 1" >>confdefs.h
fi
fi
# Check whether --enable-utmp was given.
if test "${enable_utmp+set}" = set; then :
enableval=$enable_utmp;
if test "x$enableval" = "xno" ; then
$as_echo "#define DISABLE_UTMP 1" >>confdefs.h
fi
fi
# Check whether --enable-utmpx was given.
if test "${enable_utmpx+set}" = set; then :
enableval=$enable_utmpx;
if test "x$enableval" = "xno" ; then
$as_echo "#define DISABLE_UTMPX 1" >>confdefs.h
fi
fi
# Check whether --enable-wtmp was given.
if test "${enable_wtmp+set}" = set; then :
enableval=$enable_wtmp;
if test "x$enableval" = "xno" ; then
$as_echo "#define DISABLE_WTMP 1" >>confdefs.h
fi
fi
# Check whether --enable-wtmpx was given.
if test "${enable_wtmpx+set}" = set; then :
enableval=$enable_wtmpx;
if test "x$enableval" = "xno" ; then
$as_echo "#define DISABLE_WTMPX 1" >>confdefs.h
fi
fi
# Check whether --enable-libutil was given.
if test "${enable_libutil+set}" = set; then :
enableval=$enable_libutil;
if test "x$enableval" = "xno" ; then
$as_echo "#define DISABLE_LOGIN 1" >>confdefs.h
fi
fi
# Check whether --enable-pututline was given.
if test "${enable_pututline+set}" = set; then :
enableval=$enable_pututline;
if test "x$enableval" = "xno" ; then
$as_echo "#define DISABLE_PUTUTLINE 1" >>confdefs.h
fi
fi
# Check whether --enable-pututxline was given.
if test "${enable_pututxline+set}" = set; then :
enableval=$enable_pututxline;
if test "x$enableval" = "xno" ; then
$as_echo "#define DISABLE_PUTUTXLINE 1" >>confdefs.h
fi
fi
# Check whether --with-lastlog was given.
if test "${with_lastlog+set}" = set; then :
withval=$with_lastlog;
if test "x$withval" = "xno" ; then
$as_echo "#define DISABLE_LASTLOG 1" >>confdefs.h
elif test -n "$withval" && test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then
conf_lastlog_location=$withval
fi
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if your system defines LASTLOG_FILE" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking if your system defines LASTLOG_FILE... " >&6; }
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <utmp.h>
#ifdef HAVE_LASTLOG_H
# include <lastlog.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
# include <paths.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_H
# include <login.h>
#endif
int
main ()
{
char *lastlog = LASTLOG_FILE;
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if your system defines _PATH_LASTLOG" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking if your system defines _PATH_LASTLOG... " >&6; }
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <utmp.h>
#ifdef HAVE_LASTLOG_H
# include <lastlog.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
# include <paths.h>
#endif
int
main ()
{
char *lastlog = _PATH_LASTLOG;
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
system_lastlog_path=no
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
if test -z "$conf_lastlog_location"; then
if test x"$system_lastlog_path" = x"no" ; then
for f in /var/log/lastlog /usr/adm/lastlog /var/adm/lastlog /etc/security/lastlog ; do
if (test -d "$f" || test -f "$f") ; then
conf_lastlog_location=$f
fi
done
if test -z "$conf_lastlog_location"; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: ** Cannot find lastlog **" >&5
$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: ** Cannot find lastlog **" >&2;}
fi
fi
fi
if test -n "$conf_lastlog_location"; then
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define CONF_LASTLOG_FILE "$conf_lastlog_location"
_ACEOF
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if your system defines UTMP_FILE" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking if your system defines UTMP_FILE... " >&6; }
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <utmp.h>
#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
# include <paths.h>
#endif
int
main ()
{
char *utmp = UTMP_FILE;
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
system_utmp_path=no
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
if test -z "$conf_utmp_location"; then
if test x"$system_utmp_path" = x"no" ; then
for f in /etc/utmp /usr/adm/utmp /var/run/utmp; do
if test -f $f ; then
conf_utmp_location=$f
fi
done
if test -z "$conf_utmp_location"; then
$as_echo "#define DISABLE_UTMP 1" >>confdefs.h
fi
fi
fi
if test -n "$conf_utmp_location"; then
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define CONF_UTMP_FILE "$conf_utmp_location"
_ACEOF
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if your system defines WTMP_FILE" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking if your system defines WTMP_FILE... " >&6; }
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <utmp.h>
#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
# include <paths.h>
#endif
int
main ()
{
char *wtmp = WTMP_FILE;
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
system_wtmp_path=no
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
if test -z "$conf_wtmp_location"; then
if test x"$system_wtmp_path" = x"no" ; then
for f in /usr/adm/wtmp /var/log/wtmp; do
if test -f $f ; then
conf_wtmp_location=$f
fi
done
if test -z "$conf_wtmp_location"; then
$as_echo "#define DISABLE_WTMP 1" >>confdefs.h
fi
fi
fi
if test -n "$conf_wtmp_location"; then
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define CONF_WTMP_FILE "$conf_wtmp_location"
_ACEOF
fi
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking if your system defines WTMPX_FILE" >&5
$as_echo_n "checking if your system defines WTMPX_FILE... " >&6; }
cat confdefs.h - <<_ACEOF >conftest.$ac_ext
/* end confdefs.h. */
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <utmp.h>
#ifdef HAVE_UTMPX_H
#include <utmpx.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
# include <paths.h>
#endif
int
main ()
{
char *wtmpx = WTMPX_FILE;
;
return 0;
}
_ACEOF
if ac_fn_c_try_compile "$LINENO"; then :
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
$as_echo "no" >&6; }
system_wtmpx_path=no
fi
rm -f core conftest.err conftest.$ac_objext conftest.$ac_ext
if test -z "$conf_wtmpx_location"; then
if test x"$system_wtmpx_path" = x"no" ; then
$as_echo "#define DISABLE_WTMPX 1" >>confdefs.h
fi
else
cat >>confdefs.h <<_ACEOF
#define CONF_WTMPX_FILE "$conf_wtmpx_location"
_ACEOF
fi
if test ! -z "$blibpath" ; then
LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS $blibflags$blibpath"
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: Please check and edit blibpath in LDFLAGS in Makefile" >&5
$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: Please check and edit blibpath in LDFLAGS in Makefile" >&2;}
fi
ac_fn_c_check_member "$LINENO" "struct lastlog" "ll_line" "ac_cv_member_struct_lastlog_ll_line" "
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H
#include <sys/types.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_UTMP_H
#include <utmp.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_UTMPX_H
#include <utmpx.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_LASTLOG_H
#include <lastlog.h>
#endif
"
if test "x$ac_cv_member_struct_lastlog_ll_line" = xyes; then :
else
if test x$SKIP_DISABLE_LASTLOG_DEFINE != "xyes" ; then
$as_echo "#define DISABLE_LASTLOG 1" >>confdefs.h
fi
fi
ac_fn_c_check_member "$LINENO" "struct utmp" "ut_line" "ac_cv_member_struct_utmp_ut_line" "
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H
#include <sys/types.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_UTMP_H
#include <utmp.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_UTMPX_H
#include <utmpx.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_LASTLOG_H
#include <lastlog.h>
#endif
"
if test "x$ac_cv_member_struct_utmp_ut_line" = xyes; then :
else
$as_echo "#define DISABLE_UTMP 1" >>confdefs.h
$as_echo "#define DISABLE_WTMP 1" >>confdefs.h
fi
CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $werror_flags"
if test "x$ac_cv_func_getaddrinfo" != "xyes" ; then
TEST_SSH_IPV6=no
else
TEST_SSH_IPV6=yes
fi
ac_fn_c_check_decl "$LINENO" "BROKEN_GETADDRINFO" "ac_cv_have_decl_BROKEN_GETADDRINFO" "$ac_includes_default"
if test "x$ac_cv_have_decl_BROKEN_GETADDRINFO" = xyes; then :
TEST_SSH_IPV6=no
fi
TEST_SSH_IPV6=$TEST_SSH_IPV6
TEST_SSH_UTF8=$TEST_SSH_UTF8
TEST_MALLOC_OPTIONS=$TEST_MALLOC_OPTIONS
UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHMS=$unsupported_algorithms
DEPEND=$(cat $srcdir/.depend)
CFLAGS="${CFLAGS} ${CFLAGS_AFTER}"
LDFLAGS="${LDFLAGS} ${LDFLAGS_AFTER}"
+# Make a copy of CFLAGS/LDFLAGS without PIE options.
+LDFLAGS_NOPIE=`echo "$LDFLAGS" | sed 's/ -pie//'`
+CFLAGS_NOPIE=`echo "$CFLAGS" | sed 's/ -fPIE//'`
+
+
+
ac_config_files="$ac_config_files Makefile buildpkg.sh opensshd.init openssh.xml openbsd-compat/Makefile openbsd-compat/regress/Makefile survey.sh"
cat >confcache <<\_ACEOF
# This file is a shell script that caches the results of configure
# tests run on this system so they can be shared between configure
# scripts and configure runs, see configure's option --config-cache.
# It is not useful on other systems. If it contains results you don't
# want to keep, you may remove or edit it.
#
# config.status only pays attention to the cache file if you give it
# the --recheck option to rerun configure.
#
# `ac_cv_env_foo' variables (set or unset) will be overridden when
# loading this file, other *unset* `ac_cv_foo' will be assigned the
# following values.
_ACEOF
# The following way of writing the cache mishandles newlines in values,
# but we know of no workaround that is simple, portable, and efficient.
# So, we kill variables containing newlines.
# Ultrix sh set writes to stderr and can't be redirected directly,
# and sets the high bit in the cache file unless we assign to the vars.
(
for ac_var in `(set) 2>&1 | sed -n 's/^\([a-zA-Z_][a-zA-Z0-9_]*\)=.*/\1/p'`; do
eval ac_val=\$$ac_var
case $ac_val in #(
*${as_nl}*)
case $ac_var in #(
*_cv_*) { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: cache variable $ac_var contains a newline" >&5
$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: cache variable $ac_var contains a newline" >&2;} ;;
esac
case $ac_var in #(
_ | IFS | as_nl) ;; #(
BASH_ARGV | BASH_SOURCE) eval $ac_var= ;; #(
*) { eval $ac_var=; unset $ac_var;} ;;
esac ;;
esac
done
(set) 2>&1 |
case $as_nl`(ac_space=' '; set) 2>&1` in #(
*${as_nl}ac_space=\ *)
# `set' does not quote correctly, so add quotes: double-quote
# substitution turns \\\\ into \\, and sed turns \\ into \.
sed -n \
"s/'/'\\\\''/g;
s/^\\([_$as_cr_alnum]*_cv_[_$as_cr_alnum]*\\)=\\(.*\\)/\\1='\\2'/p"
;; #(
*)
# `set' quotes correctly as required by POSIX, so do not add quotes.
sed -n "/^[_$as_cr_alnum]*_cv_[_$as_cr_alnum]*=/p"
;;
esac |
sort
) |
sed '
/^ac_cv_env_/b end
t clear
:clear
s/^\([^=]*\)=\(.*[{}].*\)$/test "${\1+set}" = set || &/
t end
s/^\([^=]*\)=\(.*\)$/\1=${\1=\2}/
:end' >>confcache
if diff "$cache_file" confcache >/dev/null 2>&1; then :; else
if test -w "$cache_file"; then
if test "x$cache_file" != "x/dev/null"; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: updating cache $cache_file" >&5
$as_echo "$as_me: updating cache $cache_file" >&6;}
if test ! -f "$cache_file" || test -h "$cache_file"; then
cat confcache >"$cache_file"
else
case $cache_file in #(
*/* | ?:*)
mv -f confcache "$cache_file"$$ &&
mv -f "$cache_file"$$ "$cache_file" ;; #(
*)
mv -f confcache "$cache_file" ;;
esac
fi
fi
else
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: not updating unwritable cache $cache_file" >&5
$as_echo "$as_me: not updating unwritable cache $cache_file" >&6;}
fi
fi
rm -f confcache
test "x$prefix" = xNONE && prefix=$ac_default_prefix
# Let make expand exec_prefix.
test "x$exec_prefix" = xNONE && exec_prefix='${prefix}'
DEFS=-DHAVE_CONFIG_H
ac_libobjs=
ac_ltlibobjs=
U=
for ac_i in : $LIBOBJS; do test "x$ac_i" = x: && continue
# 1. Remove the extension, and $U if already installed.
ac_script='s/\$U\././;s/\.o$//;s/\.obj$//'
ac_i=`$as_echo "$ac_i" | sed "$ac_script"`
# 2. Prepend LIBOBJDIR. When used with automake>=1.10 LIBOBJDIR
# will be set to the directory where LIBOBJS objects are built.
as_fn_append ac_libobjs " \${LIBOBJDIR}$ac_i\$U.$ac_objext"
as_fn_append ac_ltlibobjs " \${LIBOBJDIR}$ac_i"'$U.lo'
done
LIBOBJS=$ac_libobjs
LTLIBOBJS=$ac_ltlibobjs
: "${CONFIG_STATUS=./config.status}"
ac_write_fail=0
ac_clean_files_save=$ac_clean_files
ac_clean_files="$ac_clean_files $CONFIG_STATUS"
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: creating $CONFIG_STATUS" >&5
$as_echo "$as_me: creating $CONFIG_STATUS" >&6;}
as_write_fail=0
cat >$CONFIG_STATUS <<_ASEOF || as_write_fail=1
#! $SHELL
# Generated by $as_me.
# Run this file to recreate the current configuration.
# Compiler output produced by configure, useful for debugging
# configure, is in config.log if it exists.
debug=false
ac_cs_recheck=false
ac_cs_silent=false
SHELL=\${CONFIG_SHELL-$SHELL}
export SHELL
_ASEOF
cat >>$CONFIG_STATUS <<\_ASEOF || as_write_fail=1
## -------------------- ##
## M4sh Initialization. ##
## -------------------- ##
# Be more Bourne compatible
DUALCASE=1; export DUALCASE # for MKS sh
if test -n "${ZSH_VERSION+set}" && (emulate sh) >/dev/null 2>&1; then :
emulate sh
NULLCMD=:
# Pre-4.2 versions of Zsh do word splitting on ${1+"$@"}, which
# is contrary to our usage. Disable this feature.
alias -g '${1+"$@"}'='"$@"'
setopt NO_GLOB_SUBST
else
case `(set -o) 2>/dev/null` in #(
*posix*) :
set -o posix ;; #(
*) :
;;
esac
fi
as_nl='
'
export as_nl
# Printing a long string crashes Solaris 7 /usr/bin/printf.
as_echo='\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\'
as_echo=$as_echo$as_echo$as_echo$as_echo$as_echo
as_echo=$as_echo$as_echo$as_echo$as_echo$as_echo$as_echo
# Prefer a ksh shell builtin over an external printf program on Solaris,
# but without wasting forks for bash or zsh.
if test -z "$BASH_VERSION$ZSH_VERSION" \
&& (test "X`print -r -- $as_echo`" = "X$as_echo") 2>/dev/null; then
as_echo='print -r --'
as_echo_n='print -rn --'
elif (test "X`printf %s $as_echo`" = "X$as_echo") 2>/dev/null; then
as_echo='printf %s\n'
as_echo_n='printf %s'
else
if test "X`(/usr/ucb/echo -n -n $as_echo) 2>/dev/null`" = "X-n $as_echo"; then
as_echo_body='eval /usr/ucb/echo -n "$1$as_nl"'
as_echo_n='/usr/ucb/echo -n'
else
as_echo_body='eval expr "X$1" : "X\\(.*\\)"'
as_echo_n_body='eval
arg=$1;
case $arg in #(
*"$as_nl"*)
expr "X$arg" : "X\\(.*\\)$as_nl";
arg=`expr "X$arg" : ".*$as_nl\\(.*\\)"`;;
esac;
expr "X$arg" : "X\\(.*\\)" | tr -d "$as_nl"
'
export as_echo_n_body
as_echo_n='sh -c $as_echo_n_body as_echo'
fi
export as_echo_body
as_echo='sh -c $as_echo_body as_echo'
fi
# The user is always right.
if test "${PATH_SEPARATOR+set}" != set; then
PATH_SEPARATOR=:
(PATH='/bin;/bin'; FPATH=$PATH; sh -c :) >/dev/null 2>&1 && {
(PATH='/bin:/bin'; FPATH=$PATH; sh -c :) >/dev/null 2>&1 ||
PATH_SEPARATOR=';'
}
fi
# IFS
# We need space, tab and new line, in precisely that order. Quoting is
# there to prevent editors from complaining about space-tab.
# (If _AS_PATH_WALK were called with IFS unset, it would disable word
# splitting by setting IFS to empty value.)
IFS=" "" $as_nl"
# Find who we are. Look in the path if we contain no directory separator.
as_myself=
case $0 in #((
*[\\/]* ) as_myself=$0 ;;
*) as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
for as_dir in $PATH
do
IFS=$as_save_IFS
test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=.
test -r "$as_dir/$0" && as_myself=$as_dir/$0 && break
done
IFS=$as_save_IFS
;;
esac
# We did not find ourselves, most probably we were run as `sh COMMAND'
# in which case we are not to be found in the path.
if test "x$as_myself" = x; then
as_myself=$0
fi
if test ! -f "$as_myself"; then
$as_echo "$as_myself: error: cannot find myself; rerun with an absolute file name" >&2
exit 1
fi
# Unset variables that we do not need and which cause bugs (e.g. in
# pre-3.0 UWIN ksh). But do not cause bugs in bash 2.01; the "|| exit 1"
# suppresses any "Segmentation fault" message there. '((' could
# trigger a bug in pdksh 5.2.14.
for as_var in BASH_ENV ENV MAIL MAILPATH
do eval test x\${$as_var+set} = xset \
&& ( (unset $as_var) || exit 1) >/dev/null 2>&1 && unset $as_var || :
done
PS1='$ '
PS2='> '
PS4='+ '
# NLS nuisances.
LC_ALL=C
export LC_ALL
LANGUAGE=C
export LANGUAGE
# CDPATH.
(unset CDPATH) >/dev/null 2>&1 && unset CDPATH
# as_fn_error STATUS ERROR [LINENO LOG_FD]
# ----------------------------------------
# Output "`basename $0`: error: ERROR" to stderr. If LINENO and LOG_FD are
# provided, also output the error to LOG_FD, referencing LINENO. Then exit the
# script with STATUS, using 1 if that was 0.
as_fn_error ()
{
as_status=$1; test $as_status -eq 0 && as_status=1
if test "$4"; then
as_lineno=${as_lineno-"$3"} as_lineno_stack=as_lineno_stack=$as_lineno_stack
$as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: error: $2" >&$4
fi
$as_echo "$as_me: error: $2" >&2
as_fn_exit $as_status
} # as_fn_error
# as_fn_set_status STATUS
# -----------------------
# Set $? to STATUS, without forking.
as_fn_set_status ()
{
return $1
} # as_fn_set_status
# as_fn_exit STATUS
# -----------------
# Exit the shell with STATUS, even in a "trap 0" or "set -e" context.
as_fn_exit ()
{
set +e
as_fn_set_status $1
exit $1
} # as_fn_exit
# as_fn_unset VAR
# ---------------
# Portably unset VAR.
as_fn_unset ()
{
{ eval $1=; unset $1;}
}
as_unset=as_fn_unset
# as_fn_append VAR VALUE
# ----------------------
# Append the text in VALUE to the end of the definition contained in VAR. Take
# advantage of any shell optimizations that allow amortized linear growth over
# repeated appends, instead of the typical quadratic growth present in naive
# implementations.
if (eval "as_var=1; as_var+=2; test x\$as_var = x12") 2>/dev/null; then :
eval 'as_fn_append ()
{
eval $1+=\$2
}'
else
as_fn_append ()
{
eval $1=\$$1\$2
}
fi # as_fn_append
# as_fn_arith ARG...
# ------------------
# Perform arithmetic evaluation on the ARGs, and store the result in the
# global $as_val. Take advantage of shells that can avoid forks. The arguments
# must be portable across $(()) and expr.
if (eval "test \$(( 1 + 1 )) = 2") 2>/dev/null; then :
eval 'as_fn_arith ()
{
as_val=$(( $* ))
}'
else
as_fn_arith ()
{
as_val=`expr "$@" || test $? -eq 1`
}
fi # as_fn_arith
if expr a : '\(a\)' >/dev/null 2>&1 &&
test "X`expr 00001 : '.*\(...\)'`" = X001; then
as_expr=expr
else
as_expr=false
fi
if (basename -- /) >/dev/null 2>&1 && test "X`basename -- / 2>&1`" = "X/"; then
as_basename=basename
else
as_basename=false
fi
if (as_dir=`dirname -- /` && test "X$as_dir" = X/) >/dev/null 2>&1; then
as_dirname=dirname
else
as_dirname=false
fi
as_me=`$as_basename -- "$0" ||
$as_expr X/"$0" : '.*/\([^/][^/]*\)/*$' \| \
X"$0" : 'X\(//\)$' \| \
X"$0" : 'X\(/\)' \| . 2>/dev/null ||
$as_echo X/"$0" |
sed '/^.*\/\([^/][^/]*\)\/*$/{
s//\1/
q
}
/^X\/\(\/\/\)$/{
s//\1/
q
}
/^X\/\(\/\).*/{
s//\1/
q
}
s/.*/./; q'`
# Avoid depending upon Character Ranges.
as_cr_letters='abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz'
as_cr_LETTERS='ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ'
as_cr_Letters=$as_cr_letters$as_cr_LETTERS
as_cr_digits='0123456789'
as_cr_alnum=$as_cr_Letters$as_cr_digits
ECHO_C= ECHO_N= ECHO_T=
case `echo -n x` in #(((((
-n*)
case `echo 'xy\c'` in
*c*) ECHO_T=' ';; # ECHO_T is single tab character.
xy) ECHO_C='\c';;
*) echo `echo ksh88 bug on AIX 6.1` > /dev/null
ECHO_T=' ';;
esac;;
*)
ECHO_N='-n';;
esac
rm -f conf$$ conf$$.exe conf$$.file
if test -d conf$$.dir; then
rm -f conf$$.dir/conf$$.file
else
rm -f conf$$.dir
mkdir conf$$.dir 2>/dev/null
fi
if (echo >conf$$.file) 2>/dev/null; then
if ln -s conf$$.file conf$$ 2>/dev/null; then
as_ln_s='ln -s'
# ... but there are two gotchas:
# 1) On MSYS, both `ln -s file dir' and `ln file dir' fail.
# 2) DJGPP < 2.04 has no symlinks; `ln -s' creates a wrapper executable.
# In both cases, we have to default to `cp -pR'.
ln -s conf$$.file conf$$.dir 2>/dev/null && test ! -f conf$$.exe ||
as_ln_s='cp -pR'
elif ln conf$$.file conf$$ 2>/dev/null; then
as_ln_s=ln
else
as_ln_s='cp -pR'
fi
else
as_ln_s='cp -pR'
fi
rm -f conf$$ conf$$.exe conf$$.dir/conf$$.file conf$$.file
rmdir conf$$.dir 2>/dev/null
# as_fn_mkdir_p
# -------------
# Create "$as_dir" as a directory, including parents if necessary.
as_fn_mkdir_p ()
{
case $as_dir in #(
-*) as_dir=./$as_dir;;
esac
test -d "$as_dir" || eval $as_mkdir_p || {
as_dirs=
while :; do
case $as_dir in #(
*\'*) as_qdir=`$as_echo "$as_dir" | sed "s/'/'\\\\\\\\''/g"`;; #'(
*) as_qdir=$as_dir;;
esac
as_dirs="'$as_qdir' $as_dirs"
as_dir=`$as_dirname -- "$as_dir" ||
$as_expr X"$as_dir" : 'X\(.*[^/]\)//*[^/][^/]*/*$' \| \
X"$as_dir" : 'X\(//\)[^/]' \| \
X"$as_dir" : 'X\(//\)$' \| \
X"$as_dir" : 'X\(/\)' \| . 2>/dev/null ||
$as_echo X"$as_dir" |
sed '/^X\(.*[^/]\)\/\/*[^/][^/]*\/*$/{
s//\1/
q
}
/^X\(\/\/\)[^/].*/{
s//\1/
q
}
/^X\(\/\/\)$/{
s//\1/
q
}
/^X\(\/\).*/{
s//\1/
q
}
s/.*/./; q'`
test -d "$as_dir" && break
done
test -z "$as_dirs" || eval "mkdir $as_dirs"
} || test -d "$as_dir" || as_fn_error $? "cannot create directory $as_dir"
} # as_fn_mkdir_p
if mkdir -p . 2>/dev/null; then
as_mkdir_p='mkdir -p "$as_dir"'
else
test -d ./-p && rmdir ./-p
as_mkdir_p=false
fi
# as_fn_executable_p FILE
# -----------------------
# Test if FILE is an executable regular file.
as_fn_executable_p ()
{
test -f "$1" && test -x "$1"
} # as_fn_executable_p
as_test_x='test -x'
as_executable_p=as_fn_executable_p
# Sed expression to map a string onto a valid CPP name.
as_tr_cpp="eval sed 'y%*$as_cr_letters%P$as_cr_LETTERS%;s%[^_$as_cr_alnum]%_%g'"
# Sed expression to map a string onto a valid variable name.
as_tr_sh="eval sed 'y%*+%pp%;s%[^_$as_cr_alnum]%_%g'"
exec 6>&1
## ----------------------------------- ##
## Main body of $CONFIG_STATUS script. ##
## ----------------------------------- ##
_ASEOF
test $as_write_fail = 0 && chmod +x $CONFIG_STATUS || ac_write_fail=1
cat >>$CONFIG_STATUS <<\_ACEOF || ac_write_fail=1
# Save the log message, to keep $0 and so on meaningful, and to
# report actual input values of CONFIG_FILES etc. instead of their
# values after options handling.
ac_log="
This file was extended by OpenSSH $as_me Portable, which was
generated by GNU Autoconf 2.69. Invocation command line was
CONFIG_FILES = $CONFIG_FILES
CONFIG_HEADERS = $CONFIG_HEADERS
CONFIG_LINKS = $CONFIG_LINKS
CONFIG_COMMANDS = $CONFIG_COMMANDS
$ $0 $@
on `(hostname || uname -n) 2>/dev/null | sed 1q`
"
_ACEOF
case $ac_config_files in *"
"*) set x $ac_config_files; shift; ac_config_files=$*;;
esac
case $ac_config_headers in *"
"*) set x $ac_config_headers; shift; ac_config_headers=$*;;
esac
cat >>$CONFIG_STATUS <<_ACEOF || ac_write_fail=1
# Files that config.status was made for.
config_files="$ac_config_files"
config_headers="$ac_config_headers"
_ACEOF
cat >>$CONFIG_STATUS <<\_ACEOF || ac_write_fail=1
ac_cs_usage="\
\`$as_me' instantiates files and other configuration actions
from templates according to the current configuration. Unless the files
and actions are specified as TAGs, all are instantiated by default.
Usage: $0 [OPTION]... [TAG]...
-h, --help print this help, then exit
-V, --version print version number and configuration settings, then exit
--config print configuration, then exit
-q, --quiet, --silent
do not print progress messages
-d, --debug don't remove temporary files
--recheck update $as_me by reconfiguring in the same conditions
--file=FILE[:TEMPLATE]
instantiate the configuration file FILE
--header=FILE[:TEMPLATE]
instantiate the configuration header FILE
Configuration files:
$config_files
Configuration headers:
$config_headers
Report bugs to <openssh-unix-dev@mindrot.org>."
_ACEOF
cat >>$CONFIG_STATUS <<_ACEOF || ac_write_fail=1
ac_cs_config="`$as_echo "$ac_configure_args" | sed 's/^ //; s/[\\""\`\$]/\\\\&/g'`"
ac_cs_version="\\
OpenSSH config.status Portable
configured by $0, generated by GNU Autoconf 2.69,
with options \\"\$ac_cs_config\\"
Copyright (C) 2012 Free Software Foundation, Inc.
This config.status script is free software; the Free Software Foundation
gives unlimited permission to copy, distribute and modify it."
ac_pwd='$ac_pwd'
srcdir='$srcdir'
INSTALL='$INSTALL'
MKDIR_P='$MKDIR_P'
AWK='$AWK'
test -n "\$AWK" || AWK=awk
_ACEOF
cat >>$CONFIG_STATUS <<\_ACEOF || ac_write_fail=1
# The default lists apply if the user does not specify any file.
ac_need_defaults=:
while test $# != 0
do
case $1 in
--*=?*)
ac_option=`expr "X$1" : 'X\([^=]*\)='`
ac_optarg=`expr "X$1" : 'X[^=]*=\(.*\)'`
ac_shift=:
;;
--*=)
ac_option=`expr "X$1" : 'X\([^=]*\)='`
ac_optarg=
ac_shift=:
;;
*)
ac_option=$1
ac_optarg=$2
ac_shift=shift
;;
esac
case $ac_option in
# Handling of the options.
-recheck | --recheck | --rechec | --reche | --rech | --rec | --re | --r)
ac_cs_recheck=: ;;
--version | --versio | --versi | --vers | --ver | --ve | --v | -V )
$as_echo "$ac_cs_version"; exit ;;
--config | --confi | --conf | --con | --co | --c )
$as_echo "$ac_cs_config"; exit ;;
--debug | --debu | --deb | --de | --d | -d )
debug=: ;;
--file | --fil | --fi | --f )
$ac_shift
case $ac_optarg in
*\'*) ac_optarg=`$as_echo "$ac_optarg" | sed "s/'/'\\\\\\\\''/g"` ;;
'') as_fn_error $? "missing file argument" ;;
esac
as_fn_append CONFIG_FILES " '$ac_optarg'"
ac_need_defaults=false;;
--header | --heade | --head | --hea )
$ac_shift
case $ac_optarg in
*\'*) ac_optarg=`$as_echo "$ac_optarg" | sed "s/'/'\\\\\\\\''/g"` ;;
esac
as_fn_append CONFIG_HEADERS " '$ac_optarg'"
ac_need_defaults=false;;
--he | --h)
# Conflict between --help and --header
as_fn_error $? "ambiguous option: \`$1'
Try \`$0 --help' for more information.";;
--help | --hel | -h )
$as_echo "$ac_cs_usage"; exit ;;
-q | -quiet | --quiet | --quie | --qui | --qu | --q \
| -silent | --silent | --silen | --sile | --sil | --si | --s)
ac_cs_silent=: ;;
# This is an error.
-*) as_fn_error $? "unrecognized option: \`$1'
Try \`$0 --help' for more information." ;;
*) as_fn_append ac_config_targets " $1"
ac_need_defaults=false ;;
esac
shift
done
ac_configure_extra_args=
if $ac_cs_silent; then
exec 6>/dev/null
ac_configure_extra_args="$ac_configure_extra_args --silent"
fi
_ACEOF
cat >>$CONFIG_STATUS <<_ACEOF || ac_write_fail=1
if \$ac_cs_recheck; then
set X $SHELL '$0' $ac_configure_args \$ac_configure_extra_args --no-create --no-recursion
shift
\$as_echo "running CONFIG_SHELL=$SHELL \$*" >&6
CONFIG_SHELL='$SHELL'
export CONFIG_SHELL
exec "\$@"
fi
_ACEOF
cat >>$CONFIG_STATUS <<\_ACEOF || ac_write_fail=1
exec 5>>config.log
{
echo
sed 'h;s/./-/g;s/^.../## /;s/...$/ ##/;p;x;p;x' <<_ASBOX
## Running $as_me. ##
_ASBOX
$as_echo "$ac_log"
} >&5
_ACEOF
cat >>$CONFIG_STATUS <<_ACEOF || ac_write_fail=1
_ACEOF
cat >>$CONFIG_STATUS <<\_ACEOF || ac_write_fail=1
# Handling of arguments.
for ac_config_target in $ac_config_targets
do
case $ac_config_target in
"config.h") CONFIG_HEADERS="$CONFIG_HEADERS config.h" ;;
"Makefile") CONFIG_FILES="$CONFIG_FILES Makefile" ;;
"buildpkg.sh") CONFIG_FILES="$CONFIG_FILES buildpkg.sh" ;;
"opensshd.init") CONFIG_FILES="$CONFIG_FILES opensshd.init" ;;
"openssh.xml") CONFIG_FILES="$CONFIG_FILES openssh.xml" ;;
"openbsd-compat/Makefile") CONFIG_FILES="$CONFIG_FILES openbsd-compat/Makefile" ;;
"openbsd-compat/regress/Makefile") CONFIG_FILES="$CONFIG_FILES openbsd-compat/regress/Makefile" ;;
"survey.sh") CONFIG_FILES="$CONFIG_FILES survey.sh" ;;
*) as_fn_error $? "invalid argument: \`$ac_config_target'" "$LINENO" 5;;
esac
done
# If the user did not use the arguments to specify the items to instantiate,
# then the envvar interface is used. Set only those that are not.
# We use the long form for the default assignment because of an extremely
# bizarre bug on SunOS 4.1.3.
if $ac_need_defaults; then
test "${CONFIG_FILES+set}" = set || CONFIG_FILES=$config_files
test "${CONFIG_HEADERS+set}" = set || CONFIG_HEADERS=$config_headers
fi
# Have a temporary directory for convenience. Make it in the build tree
# simply because there is no reason against having it here, and in addition,
# creating and moving files from /tmp can sometimes cause problems.
# Hook for its removal unless debugging.
# Note that there is a small window in which the directory will not be cleaned:
# after its creation but before its name has been assigned to `$tmp'.
$debug ||
{
tmp= ac_tmp=
trap 'exit_status=$?
: "${ac_tmp:=$tmp}"
{ test ! -d "$ac_tmp" || rm -fr "$ac_tmp"; } && exit $exit_status
' 0
trap 'as_fn_exit 1' 1 2 13 15
}
# Create a (secure) tmp directory for tmp files.
{
tmp=`(umask 077 && mktemp -d "./confXXXXXX") 2>/dev/null` &&
test -d "$tmp"
} ||
{
tmp=./conf$$-$RANDOM
(umask 077 && mkdir "$tmp")
} || as_fn_error $? "cannot create a temporary directory in ." "$LINENO" 5
ac_tmp=$tmp
# Set up the scripts for CONFIG_FILES section.
# No need to generate them if there are no CONFIG_FILES.
# This happens for instance with `./config.status config.h'.
if test -n "$CONFIG_FILES"; then
ac_cr=`echo X | tr X '\015'`
# On cygwin, bash can eat \r inside `` if the user requested igncr.
# But we know of no other shell where ac_cr would be empty at this
# point, so we can use a bashism as a fallback.
if test "x$ac_cr" = x; then
eval ac_cr=\$\'\\r\'
fi
ac_cs_awk_cr=`$AWK 'BEGIN { print "a\rb" }' </dev/null 2>/dev/null`
if test "$ac_cs_awk_cr" = "a${ac_cr}b"; then
ac_cs_awk_cr='\\r'
else
ac_cs_awk_cr=$ac_cr
fi
echo 'BEGIN {' >"$ac_tmp/subs1.awk" &&
_ACEOF
{
echo "cat >conf$$subs.awk <<_ACEOF" &&
echo "$ac_subst_vars" | sed 's/.*/&!$&$ac_delim/' &&
echo "_ACEOF"
} >conf$$subs.sh ||
as_fn_error $? "could not make $CONFIG_STATUS" "$LINENO" 5
ac_delim_num=`echo "$ac_subst_vars" | grep -c '^'`
ac_delim='%!_!# '
for ac_last_try in false false false false false :; do
. ./conf$$subs.sh ||
as_fn_error $? "could not make $CONFIG_STATUS" "$LINENO" 5
ac_delim_n=`sed -n "s/.*$ac_delim\$/X/p" conf$$subs.awk | grep -c X`
if test $ac_delim_n = $ac_delim_num; then
break
elif $ac_last_try; then
as_fn_error $? "could not make $CONFIG_STATUS" "$LINENO" 5
else
ac_delim="$ac_delim!$ac_delim _$ac_delim!! "
fi
done
rm -f conf$$subs.sh
cat >>$CONFIG_STATUS <<_ACEOF || ac_write_fail=1
cat >>"\$ac_tmp/subs1.awk" <<\\_ACAWK &&
_ACEOF
sed -n '
h
s/^/S["/; s/!.*/"]=/
p
g
s/^[^!]*!//
:repl
t repl
s/'"$ac_delim"'$//
t delim
:nl
h
s/\(.\{148\}\)..*/\1/
t more1
s/["\\]/\\&/g; s/^/"/; s/$/\\n"\\/
p
n
b repl
:more1
s/["\\]/\\&/g; s/^/"/; s/$/"\\/
p
g
s/.\{148\}//
t nl
:delim
h
s/\(.\{148\}\)..*/\1/
t more2
s/["\\]/\\&/g; s/^/"/; s/$/"/
p
b
:more2
s/["\\]/\\&/g; s/^/"/; s/$/"\\/
p
g
s/.\{148\}//
t delim
' <conf$$subs.awk | sed '
/^[^""]/{
N
s/\n//
}
' >>$CONFIG_STATUS || ac_write_fail=1
rm -f conf$$subs.awk
cat >>$CONFIG_STATUS <<_ACEOF || ac_write_fail=1
_ACAWK
cat >>"\$ac_tmp/subs1.awk" <<_ACAWK &&
for (key in S) S_is_set[key] = 1
FS = ""
}
{
line = $ 0
nfields = split(line, field, "@")
substed = 0
len = length(field[1])
for (i = 2; i < nfields; i++) {
key = field[i]
keylen = length(key)
if (S_is_set[key]) {
value = S[key]
line = substr(line, 1, len) "" value "" substr(line, len + keylen + 3)
len += length(value) + length(field[++i])
substed = 1
} else
len += 1 + keylen
}
print line
}
_ACAWK
_ACEOF
cat >>$CONFIG_STATUS <<\_ACEOF || ac_write_fail=1
if sed "s/$ac_cr//" < /dev/null > /dev/null 2>&1; then
sed "s/$ac_cr\$//; s/$ac_cr/$ac_cs_awk_cr/g"
else
cat
fi < "$ac_tmp/subs1.awk" > "$ac_tmp/subs.awk" \
|| as_fn_error $? "could not setup config files machinery" "$LINENO" 5
_ACEOF
# VPATH may cause trouble with some makes, so we remove sole $(srcdir),
# ${srcdir} and @srcdir@ entries from VPATH if srcdir is ".", strip leading and
# trailing colons and then remove the whole line if VPATH becomes empty
# (actually we leave an empty line to preserve line numbers).
if test "x$srcdir" = x.; then
ac_vpsub='/^[ ]*VPATH[ ]*=[ ]*/{
h
s///
s/^/:/
s/[ ]*$/:/
s/:\$(srcdir):/:/g
s/:\${srcdir}:/:/g
s/:@srcdir@:/:/g
s/^:*//
s/:*$//
x
s/\(=[ ]*\).*/\1/
G
s/\n//
s/^[^=]*=[ ]*$//
}'
fi
cat >>$CONFIG_STATUS <<\_ACEOF || ac_write_fail=1
fi # test -n "$CONFIG_FILES"
# Set up the scripts for CONFIG_HEADERS section.
# No need to generate them if there are no CONFIG_HEADERS.
# This happens for instance with `./config.status Makefile'.
if test -n "$CONFIG_HEADERS"; then
cat >"$ac_tmp/defines.awk" <<\_ACAWK ||
BEGIN {
_ACEOF
# Transform confdefs.h into an awk script `defines.awk', embedded as
# here-document in config.status, that substitutes the proper values into
# config.h.in to produce config.h.
# Create a delimiter string that does not exist in confdefs.h, to ease
# handling of long lines.
ac_delim='%!_!# '
for ac_last_try in false false :; do
ac_tt=`sed -n "/$ac_delim/p" confdefs.h`
if test -z "$ac_tt"; then
break
elif $ac_last_try; then
as_fn_error $? "could not make $CONFIG_HEADERS" "$LINENO" 5
else
ac_delim="$ac_delim!$ac_delim _$ac_delim!! "
fi
done
# For the awk script, D is an array of macro values keyed by name,
# likewise P contains macro parameters if any. Preserve backslash
# newline sequences.
ac_word_re=[_$as_cr_Letters][_$as_cr_alnum]*
sed -n '
s/.\{148\}/&'"$ac_delim"'/g
t rset
:rset
s/^[ ]*#[ ]*define[ ][ ]*/ /
t def
d
:def
s/\\$//
t bsnl
s/["\\]/\\&/g
s/^ \('"$ac_word_re"'\)\(([^()]*)\)[ ]*\(.*\)/P["\1"]="\2"\
D["\1"]=" \3"/p
s/^ \('"$ac_word_re"'\)[ ]*\(.*\)/D["\1"]=" \2"/p
d
:bsnl
s/["\\]/\\&/g
s/^ \('"$ac_word_re"'\)\(([^()]*)\)[ ]*\(.*\)/P["\1"]="\2"\
D["\1"]=" \3\\\\\\n"\\/p
t cont
s/^ \('"$ac_word_re"'\)[ ]*\(.*\)/D["\1"]=" \2\\\\\\n"\\/p
t cont
d
:cont
n
s/.\{148\}/&'"$ac_delim"'/g
t clear
:clear
s/\\$//
t bsnlc
s/["\\]/\\&/g; s/^/"/; s/$/"/p
d
:bsnlc
s/["\\]/\\&/g; s/^/"/; s/$/\\\\\\n"\\/p
b cont
' <confdefs.h | sed '
s/'"$ac_delim"'/"\\\
"/g' >>$CONFIG_STATUS || ac_write_fail=1
cat >>$CONFIG_STATUS <<_ACEOF || ac_write_fail=1
for (key in D) D_is_set[key] = 1
FS = ""
}
/^[\t ]*#[\t ]*(define|undef)[\t ]+$ac_word_re([\t (]|\$)/ {
line = \$ 0
split(line, arg, " ")
if (arg[1] == "#") {
defundef = arg[2]
mac1 = arg[3]
} else {
defundef = substr(arg[1], 2)
mac1 = arg[2]
}
split(mac1, mac2, "(") #)
macro = mac2[1]
prefix = substr(line, 1, index(line, defundef) - 1)
if (D_is_set[macro]) {
# Preserve the white space surrounding the "#".
print prefix "define", macro P[macro] D[macro]
next
} else {
# Replace #undef with comments. This is necessary, for example,
# in the case of _POSIX_SOURCE, which is predefined and required
# on some systems where configure will not decide to define it.
if (defundef == "undef") {
print "/*", prefix defundef, macro, "*/"
next
}
}
}
{ print }
_ACAWK
_ACEOF
cat >>$CONFIG_STATUS <<\_ACEOF || ac_write_fail=1
as_fn_error $? "could not setup config headers machinery" "$LINENO" 5
fi # test -n "$CONFIG_HEADERS"
eval set X " :F $CONFIG_FILES :H $CONFIG_HEADERS "
shift
for ac_tag
do
case $ac_tag in
:[FHLC]) ac_mode=$ac_tag; continue;;
esac
case $ac_mode$ac_tag in
:[FHL]*:*);;
:L* | :C*:*) as_fn_error $? "invalid tag \`$ac_tag'" "$LINENO" 5;;
:[FH]-) ac_tag=-:-;;
:[FH]*) ac_tag=$ac_tag:$ac_tag.in;;
esac
ac_save_IFS=$IFS
IFS=:
set x $ac_tag
IFS=$ac_save_IFS
shift
ac_file=$1
shift
case $ac_mode in
:L) ac_source=$1;;
:[FH])
ac_file_inputs=
for ac_f
do
case $ac_f in
-) ac_f="$ac_tmp/stdin";;
*) # Look for the file first in the build tree, then in the source tree
# (if the path is not absolute). The absolute path cannot be DOS-style,
# because $ac_f cannot contain `:'.
test -f "$ac_f" ||
case $ac_f in
[\\/$]*) false;;
*) test -f "$srcdir/$ac_f" && ac_f="$srcdir/$ac_f";;
esac ||
as_fn_error 1 "cannot find input file: \`$ac_f'" "$LINENO" 5;;
esac
case $ac_f in *\'*) ac_f=`$as_echo "$ac_f" | sed "s/'/'\\\\\\\\''/g"`;; esac
as_fn_append ac_file_inputs " '$ac_f'"
done
# Let's still pretend it is `configure' which instantiates (i.e., don't
# use $as_me), people would be surprised to read:
# /* config.h. Generated by config.status. */
configure_input='Generated from '`
$as_echo "$*" | sed 's|^[^:]*/||;s|:[^:]*/|, |g'
`' by configure.'
if test x"$ac_file" != x-; then
configure_input="$ac_file. $configure_input"
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: creating $ac_file" >&5
$as_echo "$as_me: creating $ac_file" >&6;}
fi
# Neutralize special characters interpreted by sed in replacement strings.
case $configure_input in #(
*\&* | *\|* | *\\* )
ac_sed_conf_input=`$as_echo "$configure_input" |
sed 's/[\\\\&|]/\\\\&/g'`;; #(
*) ac_sed_conf_input=$configure_input;;
esac
case $ac_tag in
*:-:* | *:-) cat >"$ac_tmp/stdin" \
|| as_fn_error $? "could not create $ac_file" "$LINENO" 5 ;;
esac
;;
esac
ac_dir=`$as_dirname -- "$ac_file" ||
$as_expr X"$ac_file" : 'X\(.*[^/]\)//*[^/][^/]*/*$' \| \
X"$ac_file" : 'X\(//\)[^/]' \| \
X"$ac_file" : 'X\(//\)$' \| \
X"$ac_file" : 'X\(/\)' \| . 2>/dev/null ||
$as_echo X"$ac_file" |
sed '/^X\(.*[^/]\)\/\/*[^/][^/]*\/*$/{
s//\1/
q
}
/^X\(\/\/\)[^/].*/{
s//\1/
q
}
/^X\(\/\/\)$/{
s//\1/
q
}
/^X\(\/\).*/{
s//\1/
q
}
s/.*/./; q'`
as_dir="$ac_dir"; as_fn_mkdir_p
ac_builddir=.
case "$ac_dir" in
.) ac_dir_suffix= ac_top_builddir_sub=. ac_top_build_prefix= ;;
*)
ac_dir_suffix=/`$as_echo "$ac_dir" | sed 's|^\.[\\/]||'`
# A ".." for each directory in $ac_dir_suffix.
ac_top_builddir_sub=`$as_echo "$ac_dir_suffix" | sed 's|/[^\\/]*|/..|g;s|/||'`
case $ac_top_builddir_sub in
"") ac_top_builddir_sub=. ac_top_build_prefix= ;;
*) ac_top_build_prefix=$ac_top_builddir_sub/ ;;
esac ;;
esac
ac_abs_top_builddir=$ac_pwd
ac_abs_builddir=$ac_pwd$ac_dir_suffix
# for backward compatibility:
ac_top_builddir=$ac_top_build_prefix
case $srcdir in
.) # We are building in place.
ac_srcdir=.
ac_top_srcdir=$ac_top_builddir_sub
ac_abs_top_srcdir=$ac_pwd ;;
[\\/]* | ?:[\\/]* ) # Absolute name.
ac_srcdir=$srcdir$ac_dir_suffix;
ac_top_srcdir=$srcdir
ac_abs_top_srcdir=$srcdir ;;
*) # Relative name.
ac_srcdir=$ac_top_build_prefix$srcdir$ac_dir_suffix
ac_top_srcdir=$ac_top_build_prefix$srcdir
ac_abs_top_srcdir=$ac_pwd/$srcdir ;;
esac
ac_abs_srcdir=$ac_abs_top_srcdir$ac_dir_suffix
case $ac_mode in
:F)
#
# CONFIG_FILE
#
case $INSTALL in
[\\/$]* | ?:[\\/]* ) ac_INSTALL=$INSTALL ;;
*) ac_INSTALL=$ac_top_build_prefix$INSTALL ;;
esac
ac_MKDIR_P=$MKDIR_P
case $MKDIR_P in
[\\/$]* | ?:[\\/]* ) ;;
*/*) ac_MKDIR_P=$ac_top_build_prefix$MKDIR_P ;;
esac
_ACEOF
cat >>$CONFIG_STATUS <<\_ACEOF || ac_write_fail=1
# If the template does not know about datarootdir, expand it.
# FIXME: This hack should be removed a few years after 2.60.
ac_datarootdir_hack=; ac_datarootdir_seen=
ac_sed_dataroot='
/datarootdir/ {
p
q
}
/@datadir@/p
/@docdir@/p
/@infodir@/p
/@localedir@/p
/@mandir@/p'
case `eval "sed -n \"\$ac_sed_dataroot\" $ac_file_inputs"` in
*datarootdir*) ac_datarootdir_seen=yes;;
*@datadir@*|*@docdir@*|*@infodir@*|*@localedir@*|*@mandir@*)
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: $ac_file_inputs seems to ignore the --datarootdir setting" >&5
$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: $ac_file_inputs seems to ignore the --datarootdir setting" >&2;}
_ACEOF
cat >>$CONFIG_STATUS <<_ACEOF || ac_write_fail=1
ac_datarootdir_hack='
s&@datadir@&$datadir&g
s&@docdir@&$docdir&g
s&@infodir@&$infodir&g
s&@localedir@&$localedir&g
s&@mandir@&$mandir&g
s&\\\${datarootdir}&$datarootdir&g' ;;
esac
_ACEOF
# Neutralize VPATH when `$srcdir' = `.'.
# Shell code in configure.ac might set extrasub.
# FIXME: do we really want to maintain this feature?
cat >>$CONFIG_STATUS <<_ACEOF || ac_write_fail=1
ac_sed_extra="$ac_vpsub
$extrasub
_ACEOF
cat >>$CONFIG_STATUS <<\_ACEOF || ac_write_fail=1
:t
/@[a-zA-Z_][a-zA-Z_0-9]*@/!b
s|@configure_input@|$ac_sed_conf_input|;t t
s&@top_builddir@&$ac_top_builddir_sub&;t t
s&@top_build_prefix@&$ac_top_build_prefix&;t t
s&@srcdir@&$ac_srcdir&;t t
s&@abs_srcdir@&$ac_abs_srcdir&;t t
s&@top_srcdir@&$ac_top_srcdir&;t t
s&@abs_top_srcdir@&$ac_abs_top_srcdir&;t t
s&@builddir@&$ac_builddir&;t t
s&@abs_builddir@&$ac_abs_builddir&;t t
s&@abs_top_builddir@&$ac_abs_top_builddir&;t t
s&@INSTALL@&$ac_INSTALL&;t t
s&@MKDIR_P@&$ac_MKDIR_P&;t t
$ac_datarootdir_hack
"
eval sed \"\$ac_sed_extra\" "$ac_file_inputs" | $AWK -f "$ac_tmp/subs.awk" \
>$ac_tmp/out || as_fn_error $? "could not create $ac_file" "$LINENO" 5
test -z "$ac_datarootdir_hack$ac_datarootdir_seen" &&
{ ac_out=`sed -n '/\${datarootdir}/p' "$ac_tmp/out"`; test -n "$ac_out"; } &&
{ ac_out=`sed -n '/^[ ]*datarootdir[ ]*:*=/p' \
"$ac_tmp/out"`; test -z "$ac_out"; } &&
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: $ac_file contains a reference to the variable \`datarootdir'
which seems to be undefined. Please make sure it is defined" >&5
$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: $ac_file contains a reference to the variable \`datarootdir'
which seems to be undefined. Please make sure it is defined" >&2;}
rm -f "$ac_tmp/stdin"
case $ac_file in
-) cat "$ac_tmp/out" && rm -f "$ac_tmp/out";;
*) rm -f "$ac_file" && mv "$ac_tmp/out" "$ac_file";;
esac \
|| as_fn_error $? "could not create $ac_file" "$LINENO" 5
;;
:H)
#
# CONFIG_HEADER
#
if test x"$ac_file" != x-; then
{
$as_echo "/* $configure_input */" \
&& eval '$AWK -f "$ac_tmp/defines.awk"' "$ac_file_inputs"
} >"$ac_tmp/config.h" \
|| as_fn_error $? "could not create $ac_file" "$LINENO" 5
if diff "$ac_file" "$ac_tmp/config.h" >/dev/null 2>&1; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: $ac_file is unchanged" >&5
$as_echo "$as_me: $ac_file is unchanged" >&6;}
else
rm -f "$ac_file"
mv "$ac_tmp/config.h" "$ac_file" \
|| as_fn_error $? "could not create $ac_file" "$LINENO" 5
fi
else
$as_echo "/* $configure_input */" \
&& eval '$AWK -f "$ac_tmp/defines.awk"' "$ac_file_inputs" \
|| as_fn_error $? "could not create -" "$LINENO" 5
fi
;;
esac
done # for ac_tag
as_fn_exit 0
_ACEOF
ac_clean_files=$ac_clean_files_save
test $ac_write_fail = 0 ||
as_fn_error $? "write failure creating $CONFIG_STATUS" "$LINENO" 5
# configure is writing to config.log, and then calls config.status.
# config.status does its own redirection, appending to config.log.
# Unfortunately, on DOS this fails, as config.log is still kept open
# by configure, so config.status won't be able to write to it; its
# output is simply discarded. So we exec the FD to /dev/null,
# effectively closing config.log, so it can be properly (re)opened and
# appended to by config.status. When coming back to configure, we
# need to make the FD available again.
if test "$no_create" != yes; then
ac_cs_success=:
ac_config_status_args=
test "$silent" = yes &&
ac_config_status_args="$ac_config_status_args --quiet"
exec 5>/dev/null
$SHELL $CONFIG_STATUS $ac_config_status_args || ac_cs_success=false
exec 5>>config.log
# Use ||, not &&, to avoid exiting from the if with $? = 1, which
# would make configure fail if this is the last instruction.
$ac_cs_success || as_fn_exit 1
fi
if test -n "$ac_unrecognized_opts" && test "$enable_option_checking" != no; then
{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: unrecognized options: $ac_unrecognized_opts" >&5
$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: unrecognized options: $ac_unrecognized_opts" >&2;}
fi
# Print summary of options
# Someone please show me a better way :)
A=`eval echo ${prefix}` ; A=`eval echo ${A}`
B=`eval echo ${bindir}` ; B=`eval echo ${B}`
C=`eval echo ${sbindir}` ; C=`eval echo ${C}`
D=`eval echo ${sysconfdir}` ; D=`eval echo ${D}`
E=`eval echo ${libexecdir}/ssh-askpass` ; E=`eval echo ${E}`
F=`eval echo ${mandir}/${mansubdir}X` ; F=`eval echo ${F}`
G=`eval echo ${piddir}` ; G=`eval echo ${G}`
H=`eval echo ${PRIVSEP_PATH}` ; H=`eval echo ${H}`
I=`eval echo ${user_path}` ; I=`eval echo ${I}`
J=`eval echo ${superuser_path}` ; J=`eval echo ${J}`
echo ""
echo "OpenSSH has been configured with the following options:"
echo " User binaries: $B"
echo " System binaries: $C"
echo " Configuration files: $D"
echo " Askpass program: $E"
echo " Manual pages: $F"
echo " PID file: $G"
echo " Privilege separation chroot path: $H"
if test "x$external_path_file" = "x/etc/login.conf" ; then
echo " At runtime, sshd will use the path defined in $external_path_file"
echo " Make sure the path to scp is present, otherwise scp will not work"
else
echo " sshd default user PATH: $I"
if test ! -z "$external_path_file"; then
echo " (If PATH is set in $external_path_file it will be used instead. If"
echo " used, ensure the path to scp is present, otherwise scp will not work.)"
fi
fi
if test ! -z "$superuser_path" ; then
echo " sshd superuser user PATH: $J"
fi
echo " Manpage format: $MANTYPE"
echo " PAM support: $PAM_MSG"
echo " OSF SIA support: $SIA_MSG"
echo " KerberosV support: $KRB5_MSG"
echo " SELinux support: $SELINUX_MSG"
echo " MD5 password support: $MD5_MSG"
echo " libedit support: $LIBEDIT_MSG"
echo " libldns support: $LDNS_MSG"
echo " Solaris process contract support: $SPC_MSG"
echo " Solaris project support: $SP_MSG"
echo " Solaris privilege support: $SPP_MSG"
echo " IP address in \$DISPLAY hack: $DISPLAY_HACK_MSG"
echo " Translate v4 in v6 hack: $IPV4_IN6_HACK_MSG"
echo " BSD Auth support: $BSD_AUTH_MSG"
echo " Random number source: $RAND_MSG"
echo " Privsep sandbox style: $SANDBOX_STYLE"
+echo " PKCS#11 support: $enable_pkcs11"
+echo " U2F/FIDO support: $enable_sk"
echo ""
echo " Host: ${host}"
echo " Compiler: ${CC}"
echo " Compiler flags: ${CFLAGS}"
echo "Preprocessor flags: ${CPPFLAGS}"
echo " Linker flags: ${LDFLAGS}"
echo " Libraries: ${LIBS}"
if test ! -z "${SSHDLIBS}"; then
echo " +for sshd: ${SSHDLIBS}"
fi
if test ! -z "${SSHLIBS}"; then
echo " +for ssh: ${SSHLIBS}"
fi
echo ""
if test "x$MAKE_PACKAGE_SUPPORTED" = "xyes" ; then
echo "SVR4 style packages are supported with \"make package\""
echo ""
fi
if test "x$PAM_MSG" = "xyes" ; then
echo "PAM is enabled. You may need to install a PAM control file "
echo "for sshd, otherwise password authentication may fail. "
echo "Example PAM control files can be found in the contrib/ "
echo "subdirectory"
echo ""
fi
if test ! -z "$NO_PEERCHECK" ; then
echo "WARNING: the operating system that you are using does not"
echo "appear to support getpeereid(), getpeerucred() or the"
echo "SO_PEERCRED getsockopt() option. These facilities are used to"
echo "enforce security checks to prevent unauthorised connections to"
echo "ssh-agent. Their absence increases the risk that a malicious"
echo "user can connect to your agent."
echo ""
fi
if test "$AUDIT_MODULE" = "bsm" ; then
echo "WARNING: BSM audit support is currently considered EXPERIMENTAL."
echo "See the Solaris section in README.platform for details."
fi
diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
index 3e93c0276993..b689db4b5c56 100644
--- a/configure.ac
+++ b/configure.ac
@@ -1,5276 +1,5449 @@
#
# Copyright (c) 1999-2004 Damien Miller
#
# Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
# purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
# copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
#
# THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
# WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
# MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
# ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
# WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
# ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
# OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
AC_INIT([OpenSSH], [Portable], [openssh-unix-dev@mindrot.org])
AC_REVISION($Revision: 1.583 $)
AC_CONFIG_SRCDIR([ssh.c])
AC_LANG([C])
AC_CONFIG_HEADER([config.h])
AC_PROG_CC([cc gcc])
AC_CANONICAL_HOST
AC_C_BIGENDIAN
# Checks for programs.
AC_PROG_AWK
AC_PROG_CPP
AC_PROG_RANLIB
AC_PROG_INSTALL
AC_PROG_EGREP
AC_PROG_MKDIR_P
AC_CHECK_TOOLS([AR], [ar])
AC_PATH_PROG([CAT], [cat])
AC_PATH_PROG([KILL], [kill])
AC_PATH_PROG([SED], [sed])
AC_PATH_PROG([ENT], [ent])
AC_SUBST([ENT])
AC_PATH_PROG([TEST_MINUS_S_SH], [bash])
AC_PATH_PROG([TEST_MINUS_S_SH], [ksh])
AC_PATH_PROG([TEST_MINUS_S_SH], [sh])
AC_PATH_PROG([SH], [sh])
AC_PATH_PROG([GROFF], [groff])
AC_PATH_PROG([NROFF], [nroff awf])
AC_PATH_PROG([MANDOC], [mandoc])
AC_SUBST([TEST_SHELL], [sh])
dnl select manpage formatter to be used to build "cat" format pages.
if test "x$MANDOC" != "x" ; then
MANFMT="$MANDOC"
elif test "x$NROFF" != "x" ; then
MANFMT="$NROFF -mandoc"
elif test "x$GROFF" != "x" ; then
MANFMT="$GROFF -mandoc -Tascii"
else
AC_MSG_WARN([no manpage formatter found])
MANFMT="false"
fi
AC_SUBST([MANFMT])
dnl for buildpkg.sh
AC_PATH_PROG([PATH_GROUPADD_PROG], [groupadd], [groupadd],
[/usr/sbin${PATH_SEPARATOR}/etc])
AC_PATH_PROG([PATH_USERADD_PROG], [useradd], [useradd],
[/usr/sbin${PATH_SEPARATOR}/etc])
AC_CHECK_PROG([MAKE_PACKAGE_SUPPORTED], [pkgmk], [yes], [no])
if test -x /sbin/sh; then
AC_SUBST([STARTUP_SCRIPT_SHELL], [/sbin/sh])
else
AC_SUBST([STARTUP_SCRIPT_SHELL], [/bin/sh])
fi
# System features
AC_SYS_LARGEFILE
if test -z "$AR" ; then
AC_MSG_ERROR([*** 'ar' missing, please install or fix your \$PATH ***])
fi
AC_PATH_PROG([PATH_PASSWD_PROG], [passwd])
if test ! -z "$PATH_PASSWD_PROG" ; then
AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([_PATH_PASSWD_PROG], ["$PATH_PASSWD_PROG"],
[Full path of your "passwd" program])
fi
dnl Since autoconf doesn't support it very well, we no longer allow users to
dnl override LD, however keeping the hook here for now in case there's a use
dnl use case we overlooked and someone needs to re-enable it. Unless a good
dnl reason is found we'll be removing this in future.
LD="$CC"
AC_SUBST([LD])
AC_C_INLINE
AC_CHECK_DECL([LLONG_MAX], [have_llong_max=1], , [#include <limits.h>])
AC_CHECK_DECL([SYSTR_POLICY_KILL], [have_systr_policy_kill=1], , [
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/param.h>
#include <dev/systrace.h>
])
AC_CHECK_DECL([RLIMIT_NPROC],
[AC_DEFINE([HAVE_RLIMIT_NPROC], [], [sys/resource.h has RLIMIT_NPROC])], , [
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/resource.h>
])
AC_CHECK_DECL([PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS], [have_linux_no_new_privs=1], , [
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <linux/prctl.h>
])
openssl=yes
AC_ARG_WITH([openssl],
[ --without-openssl Disable use of OpenSSL; use only limited internal crypto **EXPERIMENTAL** ],
[ if test "x$withval" = "xno" ; then
openssl=no
fi
]
)
AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether OpenSSL will be used for cryptography])
if test "x$openssl" = "xyes" ; then
AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([WITH_OPENSSL], [1], [use libcrypto for cryptography])
else
AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
fi
use_stack_protector=1
use_toolchain_hardening=1
AC_ARG_WITH([stackprotect],
[ --without-stackprotect Don't use compiler's stack protection], [
if test "x$withval" = "xno"; then
use_stack_protector=0
fi ])
AC_ARG_WITH([hardening],
[ --without-hardening Don't use toolchain hardening flags], [
if test "x$withval" = "xno"; then
use_toolchain_hardening=0
fi ])
# We use -Werror for the tests only so that we catch warnings like "this is
# on by default" for things like -fPIE.
AC_MSG_CHECKING([if $CC supports -Werror])
saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS"
CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -Werror"
AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_SOURCE([[int main(void) { return 0; }]])],
[ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
WERROR="-Werror"],
[ AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
WERROR="" ]
)
CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
if test "$GCC" = "yes" || test "$GCC" = "egcs"; then
OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-pipe])
OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-Wunknown-warning-option])
OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-Wno-error=format-truncation])
OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-Qunused-arguments])
OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-Wall])
OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-Wextra])
OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-Wpointer-arith])
OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-Wuninitialized])
OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-Wsign-compare])
OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-Wformat-security])
OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-Wsizeof-pointer-memaccess])
OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-Wpointer-sign], [-Wno-pointer-sign])
OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-Wunused-result], [-Wno-unused-result])
+ OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-Wimplicit-fallthrough])
OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-fno-strict-aliasing])
if test "x$use_toolchain_hardening" = "x1"; then
OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-mretpoline]) # clang
OSSH_CHECK_LDFLAG_LINK([-Wl,-z,retpolineplt])
OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-D_FORTIFY_SOURCE=2])
OSSH_CHECK_LDFLAG_LINK([-Wl,-z,relro])
OSSH_CHECK_LDFLAG_LINK([-Wl,-z,now])
OSSH_CHECK_LDFLAG_LINK([-Wl,-z,noexecstack])
# NB. -ftrapv expects certain support functions to be present in
# the compiler library (libgcc or similar) to detect integer operations
# that can overflow. We must check that the result of enabling it
# actually links. The test program compiled/linked includes a number
# of integer operations that should exercise this.
OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_LINK([-ftrapv])
fi
AC_MSG_CHECKING([gcc version])
GCC_VER=`$CC -v 2>&1 | $AWK '/gcc version /{print $3}'`
case $GCC_VER in
1.*) no_attrib_nonnull=1 ;;
2.8* | 2.9*)
no_attrib_nonnull=1
;;
2.*) no_attrib_nonnull=1 ;;
*) ;;
esac
AC_MSG_RESULT([$GCC_VER])
AC_MSG_CHECKING([if $CC accepts -fno-builtin-memset])
saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS"
CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -fno-builtin-memset"
AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include <string.h> ]],
[[ char b[10]; memset(b, 0, sizeof(b)); ]])],
[ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ],
[ AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS" ]
)
# -fstack-protector-all doesn't always work for some GCC versions
# and/or platforms, so we test if we can. If it's not supported
# on a given platform gcc will emit a warning so we use -Werror.
if test "x$use_stack_protector" = "x1"; then
for t in -fstack-protector-strong -fstack-protector-all \
-fstack-protector; do
AC_MSG_CHECKING([if $CC supports $t])
saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS"
saved_LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS"
CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $t -Werror"
LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS $t -Werror"
AC_LINK_IFELSE(
- [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include <stdio.h> ]],
+ [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
+ #include <stdio.h>
+ int func (int t) {char b[100]; snprintf(b,sizeof b,"%d",t); return t;}
+ ]],
[[
char x[256];
- snprintf(x, sizeof(x), "XXX");
+ snprintf(x, sizeof(x), "XXX%d", func(1));
]])],
[ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS $t"
LDFLAGS="$saved_LDFLAGS $t"
AC_MSG_CHECKING([if $t works])
AC_RUN_IFELSE(
- [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include <stdio.h> ]],
+ [AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
+ #include <stdio.h>
+ int func (int t) {char b[100]; snprintf(b,sizeof b,"%d",t); return t;}
+ ]],
[[
char x[256];
- snprintf(x, sizeof(x), "XXX");
+ snprintf(x, sizeof(x), "XXX%d", func(1));
]])],
[ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
break ],
[ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) ],
[ AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: cannot test])
break ]
)
],
[ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) ]
)
CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"
LDFLAGS="$saved_LDFLAGS"
done
fi
if test -z "$have_llong_max"; then
# retry LLONG_MAX with -std=gnu99, needed on some Linuxes
unset ac_cv_have_decl_LLONG_MAX
saved_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS"
CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -std=gnu99"
AC_CHECK_DECL([LLONG_MAX],
[have_llong_max=1],
[CFLAGS="$saved_CFLAGS"],
[#include <limits.h>]
)
fi
fi
AC_MSG_CHECKING([if compiler allows __attribute__ on return types])
AC_COMPILE_IFELSE(
[AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
#include <stdlib.h>
__attribute__((__unused__)) static void foo(void){return;}]],
[[ exit(0); ]])],
[ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ],
[ AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
AC_DEFINE(NO_ATTRIBUTE_ON_RETURN_TYPE, 1,
[compiler does not accept __attribute__ on return types]) ]
)
AC_MSG_CHECKING([if compiler allows __attribute__ prototype args])
AC_COMPILE_IFELSE(
[AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
#include <stdlib.h>
typedef void foo(const char *, ...) __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2)));]],
[[ exit(0); ]])],
[ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ],
[ AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
AC_DEFINE(NO_ATTRIBUTE_ON_PROTOTYPE_ARGS, 1,
[compiler does not accept __attribute__ on prototype args]) ]
)
if test "x$no_attrib_nonnull" != "x1" ; then
AC_DEFINE([HAVE_ATTRIBUTE__NONNULL__], [1], [Have attribute nonnull])
fi
AC_ARG_WITH([rpath],
[ --without-rpath Disable auto-added -R linker paths],
[
if test "x$withval" = "xno" ; then
rpath_opt=""
elif test "x$withval" = "xyes" ; then
rpath_opt="-R"
else
rpath_opt="$withval"
fi
]
)
# Allow user to specify flags
AC_ARG_WITH([cflags],
[ --with-cflags Specify additional flags to pass to compiler],
[
if test -n "$withval" && test "x$withval" != "xno" && \
test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then
CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $withval"
fi
]
)
AC_ARG_WITH([cflags-after],
[ --with-cflags-after Specify additional flags to pass to compiler after configure],
[
if test -n "$withval" && test "x$withval" != "xno" && \
test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then
CFLAGS_AFTER="$withval"
fi
]
)
AC_ARG_WITH([cppflags],
[ --with-cppflags Specify additional flags to pass to preprocessor] ,
[
if test -n "$withval" && test "x$withval" != "xno" && \
test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then
CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS $withval"
fi
]
)
AC_ARG_WITH([ldflags],
[ --with-ldflags Specify additional flags to pass to linker],
[
if test -n "$withval" && test "x$withval" != "xno" && \
test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then
LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS $withval"
fi
]
)
AC_ARG_WITH([ldflags-after],
[ --with-ldflags-after Specify additional flags to pass to linker after configure],
[
if test -n "$withval" && test "x$withval" != "xno" && \
test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then
LDFLAGS_AFTER="$withval"
fi
]
)
AC_ARG_WITH([libs],
[ --with-libs Specify additional libraries to link with],
[
if test -n "$withval" && test "x$withval" != "xno" && \
test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then
LIBS="$LIBS $withval"
fi
]
)
AC_ARG_WITH([Werror],
[ --with-Werror Build main code with -Werror],
[
if test -n "$withval" && test "x$withval" != "xno"; then
werror_flags="-Werror"
if test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then
werror_flags="$withval"
fi
fi
]
)
AC_CHECK_HEADERS([ \
blf.h \
bstring.h \
crypt.h \
crypto/sha2.h \
dirent.h \
endian.h \
elf.h \
err.h \
features.h \
fcntl.h \
floatingpoint.h \
+ fnmatch.h \
getopt.h \
glob.h \
ia.h \
iaf.h \
ifaddrs.h \
inttypes.h \
langinfo.h \
limits.h \
locale.h \
login.h \
maillock.h \
ndir.h \
net/if_tun.h \
netdb.h \
netgroup.h \
pam/pam_appl.h \
paths.h \
poll.h \
pty.h \
readpassphrase.h \
rpc/types.h \
security/pam_appl.h \
sha2.h \
shadow.h \
stddef.h \
stdint.h \
string.h \
strings.h \
sys/bitypes.h \
sys/bsdtty.h \
sys/cdefs.h \
sys/dir.h \
sys/file.h \
sys/mman.h \
sys/label.h \
sys/ndir.h \
sys/poll.h \
sys/prctl.h \
sys/pstat.h \
sys/ptrace.h \
sys/random.h \
sys/select.h \
sys/stat.h \
sys/stream.h \
sys/stropts.h \
sys/strtio.h \
sys/statvfs.h \
sys/sysmacros.h \
sys/time.h \
sys/timers.h \
sys/vfs.h \
time.h \
tmpdir.h \
ttyent.h \
ucred.h \
unistd.h \
usersec.h \
util.h \
utime.h \
utmp.h \
utmpx.h \
vis.h \
wchar.h \
])
# On some platforms (eg SunOS4) sys/audit.h requires sys/[time|types|label.h]
# to be included first.
AC_CHECK_HEADERS([sys/audit.h], [], [], [
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
# include <sys/time.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H
# include <sys/types.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_LABEL_H
# include <sys/label.h>
#endif
])
# sys/capsicum.h requires sys/types.h
AC_CHECK_HEADERS([sys/capsicum.h], [], [], [
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H
# include <sys/types.h>
#endif
])
# net/route.h requires sys/socket.h and sys/types.h.
# sys/sysctl.h also requires sys/param.h
AC_CHECK_HEADERS([net/route.h sys/sysctl.h], [], [], [
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H
# include <sys/types.h>
#endif
#include <sys/param.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
])
# lastlog.h requires sys/time.h to be included first on Solaris
AC_CHECK_HEADERS([lastlog.h], [], [], [
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
# include <sys/time.h>
#endif
])
# sys/ptms.h requires sys/stream.h to be included first on Solaris
AC_CHECK_HEADERS([sys/ptms.h], [], [], [
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STREAM_H
# include <sys/stream.h>
#endif
])
# login_cap.h requires sys/types.h on NetBSD
AC_CHECK_HEADERS([login_cap.h], [], [], [
#include <sys/types.h>
])
# older BSDs need sys/param.h before sys/mount.h
AC_CHECK_HEADERS([sys/mount.h], [], [], [
#include <sys/param.h>
])
# Android requires sys/socket.h to be included before sys/un.h
AC_CHECK_HEADERS([sys/un.h], [], [], [
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
])
# Messages for features tested for in target-specific section
SIA_MSG="no"
SPC_MSG="no"
SP_MSG="no"
SPP_MSG="no"
# Support for Solaris/Illumos privileges (this test is used by both
# the --with-solaris-privs option and --with-sandbox=solaris).
SOLARIS_PRIVS="no"
# Check for some target-specific stuff
case "$host" in
*-*-aix*)
# Some versions of VAC won't allow macro redefinitions at
# -qlanglevel=ansi, and autoconf 2.60 sometimes insists on using that
# particularly with older versions of vac or xlc.
# It also throws errors about null macro arguments, but these are
# not fatal.
AC_MSG_CHECKING([if compiler allows macro redefinitions])
AC_COMPILE_IFELSE(
[AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
#define testmacro foo
#define testmacro bar]],
[[ exit(0); ]])],
[ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ],
[ AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
CC="`echo $CC | sed 's/-qlanglvl\=ansi//g'`"
CFLAGS="`echo $CFLAGS | sed 's/-qlanglvl\=ansi//g'`"
CPPFLAGS="`echo $CPPFLAGS | sed 's/-qlanglvl\=ansi//g'`"
]
)
AC_MSG_CHECKING([how to specify blibpath for linker ($LD)])
if (test -z "$blibpath"); then
blibpath="/usr/lib:/lib"
fi
saved_LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS"
if test "$GCC" = "yes"; then
flags="-Wl,-blibpath: -Wl,-rpath, -blibpath:"
else
flags="-blibpath: -Wl,-blibpath: -Wl,-rpath,"
fi
for tryflags in $flags ;do
if (test -z "$blibflags"); then
LDFLAGS="$saved_LDFLAGS $tryflags$blibpath"
AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[]], [[]])],
[blibflags=$tryflags], [])
fi
done
if (test -z "$blibflags"); then
AC_MSG_RESULT([not found])
AC_MSG_ERROR([*** must be able to specify blibpath on AIX - check config.log])
else
AC_MSG_RESULT([$blibflags])
fi
LDFLAGS="$saved_LDFLAGS"
dnl Check for authenticate. Might be in libs.a on older AIXes
AC_CHECK_FUNC([authenticate], [AC_DEFINE([WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE], [1],
[Define if you want to enable AIX4's authenticate function])],
[AC_CHECK_LIB([s], [authenticate],
[ AC_DEFINE([WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE])
LIBS="$LIBS -ls"
])
])
dnl Check for various auth function declarations in headers.
AC_CHECK_DECLS([authenticate, loginrestrictions, loginsuccess,
passwdexpired, setauthdb], , , [#include <usersec.h>])
dnl Check if loginfailed is declared and takes 4 arguments (AIX >= 5.2)
AC_CHECK_DECLS([loginfailed],
[AC_MSG_CHECKING([if loginfailed takes 4 arguments])
AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include <usersec.h> ]],
[[ (void)loginfailed("user","host","tty",0); ]])],
[AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
AC_DEFINE([AIX_LOGINFAILED_4ARG], [1],
[Define if your AIX loginfailed() function
takes 4 arguments (AIX >= 5.2)])], [AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
])],
[],
[#include <usersec.h>]
)
AC_CHECK_FUNCS([getgrset setauthdb])
AC_CHECK_DECL([F_CLOSEM],
AC_DEFINE([HAVE_FCNTL_CLOSEM], [1], [Use F_CLOSEM fcntl for closefrom]),
[],
[ #include <limits.h>
#include <fcntl.h> ]
)
check_for_aix_broken_getaddrinfo=1
AC_DEFINE([SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID], [1],
[Define if your platform breaks doing a seteuid before a setuid])
AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREUID], [1], [Define if your setreuid() is broken])
AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREGID], [1], [Define if your setregid() is broken])
dnl AIX handles lastlog as part of its login message
AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_LASTLOG], [1], [Define if you don't want to use lastlog])
AC_DEFINE([LOGIN_NEEDS_UTMPX], [1],
[Some systems need a utmpx entry for /bin/login to work])
AC_DEFINE([SPT_TYPE], [SPT_REUSEARGV],
[Define to a Set Process Title type if your system is
supported by bsd-setproctitle.c])
AC_DEFINE([SSHPAM_CHAUTHTOK_NEEDS_RUID], [1],
[AIX 5.2 and 5.3 (and presumably newer) require this])
AC_DEFINE([PTY_ZEROREAD], [1], [read(1) can return 0 for a non-closed fd])
AC_DEFINE([PLATFORM_SYS_DIR_UID], 2, [System dirs owned by bin (uid 2)])
AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_STRNDUP], 1, [strndup broken, see APAR IY61211])
AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_STRNLEN], 1, [strnlen broken, see APAR IY62551])
;;
*-*-android*)
AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_UTMP], [1], [Define if you don't want to use utmp])
AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_WTMP], [1], [Define if you don't want to use wtmp])
;;
*-*-cygwin*)
check_for_libcrypt_later=1
LIBS="$LIBS /usr/lib/textreadmode.o"
AC_DEFINE([HAVE_CYGWIN], [1], [Define if you are on Cygwin])
AC_DEFINE([USE_PIPES], [1], [Use PIPES instead of a socketpair()])
AC_DEFINE([NO_UID_RESTORATION_TEST], [1],
[Define to disable UID restoration test])
AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_SHADOW], [1],
[Define if you want to disable shadow passwords])
AC_DEFINE([NO_X11_UNIX_SOCKETS], [1],
[Define if X11 doesn't support AF_UNIX sockets on that system])
AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_FD_PASSING], [1],
[Define if your platform needs to skip post auth
file descriptor passing])
AC_DEFINE([SSH_IOBUFSZ], [65535], [Windows is sensitive to read buffer size])
AC_DEFINE([FILESYSTEM_NO_BACKSLASH], [1], [File names may not contain backslash characters])
# Cygwin defines optargs, optargs as declspec(dllimport) for historical
# reasons which cause compile warnings, so we disable those warnings.
OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-Wno-attributes])
;;
*-*-dgux*)
AC_DEFINE([IP_TOS_IS_BROKEN], [1],
[Define if your system choked on IP TOS setting])
AC_DEFINE([SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID])
AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREUID])
AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREGID])
;;
*-*-darwin*)
use_pie=auto
AC_MSG_CHECKING([if we have working getaddrinfo])
AC_RUN_IFELSE([AC_LANG_SOURCE([[ #include <mach-o/dyld.h>
main() { if (NSVersionOfRunTimeLibrary("System") >= (60 << 16))
exit(0);
else
exit(1);
}
]])],
[AC_MSG_RESULT([working])],
[AC_MSG_RESULT([buggy])
AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_GETADDRINFO], [1],
[getaddrinfo is broken (if present)])
],
[AC_MSG_RESULT([assume it is working])])
AC_DEFINE([SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID])
AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREUID])
AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREGID])
AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_GLOB], [1], [OS X glob does not do what we expect])
AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([BIND_8_COMPAT], [1],
[Define if your resolver libs need this for getrrsetbyname])
AC_DEFINE([SSH_TUN_FREEBSD], [1], [Open tunnel devices the FreeBSD way])
AC_DEFINE([SSH_TUN_COMPAT_AF], [1],
[Use tunnel device compatibility to OpenBSD])
AC_DEFINE([SSH_TUN_PREPEND_AF], [1],
[Prepend the address family to IP tunnel traffic])
m4_pattern_allow([AU_IPv])
AC_CHECK_DECL([AU_IPv4], [],
AC_DEFINE([AU_IPv4], [0], [System only supports IPv4 audit records])
[#include <bsm/audit.h>]
AC_DEFINE([LASTLOG_WRITE_PUTUTXLINE], [1],
[Define if pututxline updates lastlog too])
)
AC_DEFINE([SPT_TYPE], [SPT_REUSEARGV],
[Define to a Set Process Title type if your system is
supported by bsd-setproctitle.c])
AC_CHECK_FUNCS([sandbox_init])
AC_CHECK_HEADERS([sandbox.h])
AC_CHECK_LIB([sandbox], [sandbox_apply], [
SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -lsandbox"
])
# proc_pidinfo()-based closefrom() replacement.
AC_CHECK_HEADERS([libproc.h])
AC_CHECK_FUNCS([proc_pidinfo])
;;
*-*-dragonfly*)
SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -lcrypt"
TEST_MALLOC_OPTIONS="AFGJPRX"
;;
*-*-haiku*)
LIBS="$LIBS -lbsd "
+ CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -D_BSD_SOURCE"
AC_CHECK_LIB([network], [socket])
AC_DEFINE([HAVE_U_INT64_T])
+ AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_UTMPX], [1], [no utmpx])
MANTYPE=man
;;
*-*-hpux*)
# first we define all of the options common to all HP-UX releases
CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -D_HPUX_SOURCE -D_XOPEN_SOURCE -D_XOPEN_SOURCE_EXTENDED=1"
IPADDR_IN_DISPLAY=yes
AC_DEFINE([USE_PIPES])
AC_DEFINE([LOGIN_NEEDS_UTMPX])
AC_DEFINE([LOCKED_PASSWD_STRING], ["*"],
[String used in /etc/passwd to denote locked account])
AC_DEFINE([SPT_TYPE], [SPT_PSTAT])
AC_DEFINE([PLATFORM_SYS_DIR_UID], 2, [System dirs owned by bin (uid 2)])
maildir="/var/mail"
LIBS="$LIBS -lsec"
AC_CHECK_LIB([xnet], [t_error], ,
[AC_MSG_ERROR([*** -lxnet needed on HP-UX - check config.log ***])])
# next, we define all of the options specific to major releases
case "$host" in
*-*-hpux10*)
if test -z "$GCC"; then
CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -Ae"
fi
;;
*-*-hpux11*)
AC_DEFINE([PAM_SUN_CODEBASE], [1],
[Define if you are using Solaris-derived PAM which
passes pam_messages to the conversation function
with an extra level of indirection])
AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_UTMP], [1],
[Define if you don't want to use utmp])
AC_DEFINE([USE_BTMP], [1], [Use btmp to log bad logins])
check_for_hpux_broken_getaddrinfo=1
check_for_conflicting_getspnam=1
;;
esac
# lastly, we define options specific to minor releases
case "$host" in
*-*-hpux10.26)
AC_DEFINE([HAVE_SECUREWARE], [1],
[Define if you have SecureWare-based
protected password database])
disable_ptmx_check=yes
LIBS="$LIBS -lsecpw"
;;
esac
;;
*-*-irix5*)
PATH="$PATH:/usr/etc"
AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_INET_NTOA], [1],
[Define if you system's inet_ntoa is busted
(e.g. Irix gcc issue)])
AC_DEFINE([SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID])
AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREUID])
AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREGID])
AC_DEFINE([WITH_ABBREV_NO_TTY], [1],
[Define if you shouldn't strip 'tty' from your
ttyname in [uw]tmp])
AC_DEFINE([LOCKED_PASSWD_STRING], ["*LK*"])
;;
*-*-irix6*)
PATH="$PATH:/usr/etc"
AC_DEFINE([WITH_IRIX_ARRAY], [1],
[Define if you have/want arrays
(cluster-wide session management, not C arrays)])
AC_DEFINE([WITH_IRIX_PROJECT], [1],
[Define if you want IRIX project management])
AC_DEFINE([WITH_IRIX_AUDIT], [1],
[Define if you want IRIX audit trails])
AC_CHECK_FUNC([jlimit_startjob], [AC_DEFINE([WITH_IRIX_JOBS], [1],
[Define if you want IRIX kernel jobs])])
AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_INET_NTOA])
AC_DEFINE([SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID])
AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREUID])
AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREGID])
AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_UPDWTMPX], [1], [updwtmpx is broken (if present)])
AC_DEFINE([WITH_ABBREV_NO_TTY])
AC_DEFINE([LOCKED_PASSWD_STRING], ["*LK*"])
;;
*-*-k*bsd*-gnu | *-*-kopensolaris*-gnu)
check_for_libcrypt_later=1
AC_DEFINE([PAM_TTY_KLUDGE])
AC_DEFINE([LOCKED_PASSWD_PREFIX], ["!"])
AC_DEFINE([SPT_TYPE], [SPT_REUSEARGV])
AC_DEFINE([_PATH_BTMP], ["/var/log/btmp"], [log for bad login attempts])
AC_DEFINE([USE_BTMP], [1], [Use btmp to log bad logins])
;;
*-*-linux*)
no_dev_ptmx=1
use_pie=auto
check_for_libcrypt_later=1
check_for_openpty_ctty_bug=1
dnl Target SUSv3/POSIX.1-2001 plus BSD specifics.
dnl _DEFAULT_SOURCE is the new name for _BSD_SOURCE
CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -D_XOPEN_SOURCE=600 -D_BSD_SOURCE -D_DEFAULT_SOURCE"
AC_DEFINE([PAM_TTY_KLUDGE], [1],
[Work around problematic Linux PAM modules handling of PAM_TTY])
AC_DEFINE([LOCKED_PASSWD_PREFIX], ["!"],
[String used in /etc/passwd to denote locked account])
AC_DEFINE([SPT_TYPE], [SPT_REUSEARGV])
AC_DEFINE([LINK_OPNOTSUPP_ERRNO], [EPERM],
[Define to whatever link() returns for "not supported"
if it doesn't return EOPNOTSUPP.])
AC_DEFINE([_PATH_BTMP], ["/var/log/btmp"], [log for bad login attempts])
AC_DEFINE([USE_BTMP])
AC_DEFINE([LINUX_OOM_ADJUST], [1], [Adjust Linux out-of-memory killer])
inet6_default_4in6=yes
case `uname -r` in
1.*|2.0.*)
AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_CMSG_TYPE], [1],
[Define if cmsg_type is not passed correctly])
;;
esac
# tun(4) forwarding compat code
AC_CHECK_HEADERS([linux/if_tun.h])
if test "x$ac_cv_header_linux_if_tun_h" = "xyes" ; then
AC_DEFINE([SSH_TUN_LINUX], [1],
[Open tunnel devices the Linux tun/tap way])
AC_DEFINE([SSH_TUN_COMPAT_AF], [1],
[Use tunnel device compatibility to OpenBSD])
AC_DEFINE([SSH_TUN_PREPEND_AF], [1],
[Prepend the address family to IP tunnel traffic])
fi
AC_CHECK_HEADER([linux/if.h],
AC_DEFINE([SYS_RDOMAIN_LINUX], [1],
[Support routing domains using Linux VRF]), [], [
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H
# include <sys/types.h>
#endif
])
AC_CHECK_HEADERS([linux/seccomp.h linux/filter.h linux/audit.h], [],
[], [#include <linux/types.h>])
# Obtain MIPS ABI
case "$host" in
mips*)
AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
#if _MIPS_SIM != _ABIO32
#error
#endif
]])],[mips_abi="o32"],[AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
#if _MIPS_SIM != _ABIN32
#error
#endif
]])],[mips_abi="n32"],[AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
#if _MIPS_SIM != _ABI64
#error
#endif
]])],[mips_abi="n64"],[AC_MSG_ERROR([unknown MIPS ABI])
])
])
])
;;
esac
AC_MSG_CHECKING([for seccomp architecture])
seccomp_audit_arch=
case "$host" in
x86_64-*)
seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_X86_64
;;
i*86-*)
seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_I386
;;
arm*-*)
seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_ARM
;;
aarch64*-*)
seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_AARCH64
;;
s390x-*)
seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_S390X
;;
s390-*)
seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_S390
;;
powerpc64-*)
seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_PPC64
;;
powerpc64le-*)
seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_PPC64LE
;;
mips-*)
seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_MIPS
;;
mipsel-*)
seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_MIPSEL
;;
mips64-*)
case "$mips_abi" in
"n32")
seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_MIPS64N32
;;
"n64")
seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_MIPS64
;;
esac
;;
mips64el-*)
case "$mips_abi" in
"n32")
seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_MIPSEL64N32
;;
"n64")
seccomp_audit_arch=AUDIT_ARCH_MIPSEL64
;;
esac
;;
esac
if test "x$seccomp_audit_arch" != "x" ; then
AC_MSG_RESULT(["$seccomp_audit_arch"])
AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([SECCOMP_AUDIT_ARCH], [$seccomp_audit_arch],
[Specify the system call convention in use])
else
AC_MSG_RESULT([architecture not supported])
fi
;;
mips-sony-bsd|mips-sony-newsos4)
AC_DEFINE([NEED_SETPGRP], [1], [Need setpgrp to acquire controlling tty])
SONY=1
;;
*-*-netbsd*)
check_for_libcrypt_before=1
if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
rpath_opt="-R"
fi
CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -D_OPENBSD_SOURCE"
AC_DEFINE([SSH_TUN_FREEBSD], [1], [Open tunnel devices the FreeBSD way])
AC_CHECK_HEADER([net/if_tap.h], ,
AC_DEFINE([SSH_TUN_NO_L2], [1], [No layer 2 tunnel support]))
AC_DEFINE([SSH_TUN_PREPEND_AF], [1],
[Prepend the address family to IP tunnel traffic])
TEST_MALLOC_OPTIONS="AJRX"
AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_READ_COMPARISON], [1],
[NetBSD read function is sometimes redirected, breaking atomicio comparisons against it])
;;
*-*-freebsd*)
check_for_libcrypt_later=1
AC_DEFINE([LOCKED_PASSWD_PREFIX], ["*LOCKED*"], [Account locked with pw(1)])
AC_DEFINE([SSH_TUN_FREEBSD], [1], [Open tunnel devices the FreeBSD way])
AC_CHECK_HEADER([net/if_tap.h], ,
AC_DEFINE([SSH_TUN_NO_L2], [1], [No layer 2 tunnel support]))
AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_GLOB], [1], [FreeBSD glob does not do what we need])
TEST_MALLOC_OPTIONS="AJRX"
# Preauth crypto occasionally uses file descriptors for crypto offload
# and will crash if they cannot be opened.
AC_DEFINE([SANDBOX_SKIP_RLIMIT_NOFILE], [1],
[define if setrlimit RLIMIT_NOFILE breaks things])
;;
*-*-bsdi*)
AC_DEFINE([SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID])
AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREUID])
AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREGID])
;;
*-next-*)
conf_lastlog_location="/usr/adm/lastlog"
conf_utmp_location=/etc/utmp
conf_wtmp_location=/usr/adm/wtmp
maildir=/usr/spool/mail
AC_DEFINE([HAVE_NEXT], [1], [Define if you are on NeXT])
AC_DEFINE([USE_PIPES])
AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SAVED_UIDS], [1], [Needed for NeXT])
;;
*-*-openbsd*)
use_pie=auto
AC_DEFINE([HAVE_ATTRIBUTE__SENTINEL__], [1], [OpenBSD's gcc has sentinel])
AC_DEFINE([HAVE_ATTRIBUTE__BOUNDED__], [1], [OpenBSD's gcc has bounded])
AC_DEFINE([SSH_TUN_OPENBSD], [1], [Open tunnel devices the OpenBSD way])
AC_DEFINE([SYSLOG_R_SAFE_IN_SIGHAND], [1],
[syslog_r function is safe to use in in a signal handler])
TEST_MALLOC_OPTIONS="AFGJPRX"
;;
*-*-solaris*)
if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
rpath_opt="-R"
fi
AC_DEFINE([PAM_SUN_CODEBASE])
AC_DEFINE([LOGIN_NEEDS_UTMPX])
AC_DEFINE([PAM_TTY_KLUDGE])
AC_DEFINE([SSHPAM_CHAUTHTOK_NEEDS_RUID], [1],
[Define if pam_chauthtok wants real uid set
to the unpriv'ed user])
AC_DEFINE([LOCKED_PASSWD_STRING], ["*LK*"])
# Pushing STREAMS modules will cause sshd to acquire a controlling tty.
AC_DEFINE([SSHD_ACQUIRES_CTTY], [1],
[Define if sshd somehow reacquires a controlling TTY
after setsid()])
AC_DEFINE([PASSWD_NEEDS_USERNAME], [1], [must supply username to passwd
in case the name is longer than 8 chars])
AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_TCGETATTR_ICANON], [1], [tcgetattr with ICANON may hang])
external_path_file=/etc/default/login
# hardwire lastlog location (can't detect it on some versions)
conf_lastlog_location="/var/adm/lastlog"
AC_MSG_CHECKING([for obsolete utmp and wtmp in solaris2.x])
sol2ver=`echo "$host"| sed -e 's/.*[[0-9]]\.//'`
if test "$sol2ver" -ge 8; then
AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_UTMP])
AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_WTMP], [1],
[Define if you don't want to use wtmp])
else
AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
fi
AC_CHECK_FUNCS([setpflags])
AC_CHECK_FUNCS([setppriv])
AC_CHECK_FUNCS([priv_basicset])
AC_CHECK_HEADERS([priv.h])
AC_ARG_WITH([solaris-contracts],
[ --with-solaris-contracts Enable Solaris process contracts (experimental)],
[
AC_CHECK_LIB([contract], [ct_tmpl_activate],
[ AC_DEFINE([USE_SOLARIS_PROCESS_CONTRACTS], [1],
[Define if you have Solaris process contracts])
LIBS="$LIBS -lcontract"
SPC_MSG="yes" ], )
],
)
AC_ARG_WITH([solaris-projects],
[ --with-solaris-projects Enable Solaris projects (experimental)],
[
AC_CHECK_LIB([project], [setproject],
[ AC_DEFINE([USE_SOLARIS_PROJECTS], [1],
[Define if you have Solaris projects])
LIBS="$LIBS -lproject"
SP_MSG="yes" ], )
],
)
AC_ARG_WITH([solaris-privs],
[ --with-solaris-privs Enable Solaris/Illumos privileges (experimental)],
[
AC_MSG_CHECKING([for Solaris/Illumos privilege support])
if test "x$ac_cv_func_setppriv" = "xyes" -a \
"x$ac_cv_header_priv_h" = "xyes" ; then
SOLARIS_PRIVS=yes
AC_MSG_RESULT([found])
AC_DEFINE([NO_UID_RESTORATION_TEST], [1],
[Define to disable UID restoration test])
AC_DEFINE([USE_SOLARIS_PRIVS], [1],
[Define if you have Solaris privileges])
SPP_MSG="yes"
else
AC_MSG_RESULT([not found])
AC_MSG_ERROR([*** must have support for Solaris privileges to use --with-solaris-privs])
fi
],
)
TEST_SHELL=$SHELL # let configure find us a capable shell
;;
*-*-sunos4*)
CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -DSUNOS4"
AC_CHECK_FUNCS([getpwanam])
AC_DEFINE([PAM_SUN_CODEBASE])
conf_utmp_location=/etc/utmp
conf_wtmp_location=/var/adm/wtmp
conf_lastlog_location=/var/adm/lastlog
AC_DEFINE([USE_PIPES])
AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_UTMPX], [1], [no utmpx])
;;
*-ncr-sysv*)
LIBS="$LIBS -lc89"
AC_DEFINE([USE_PIPES])
AC_DEFINE([SSHD_ACQUIRES_CTTY])
AC_DEFINE([SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID])
AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREUID])
AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREGID])
;;
*-sni-sysv*)
# /usr/ucblib MUST NOT be searched on ReliantUNIX
AC_CHECK_LIB([dl], [dlsym], ,)
# -lresolv needs to be at the end of LIBS or DNS lookups break
AC_CHECK_LIB([resolv], [res_query], [ LIBS="$LIBS -lresolv" ])
IPADDR_IN_DISPLAY=yes
AC_DEFINE([USE_PIPES])
AC_DEFINE([IP_TOS_IS_BROKEN])
AC_DEFINE([SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID])
AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREUID])
AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREGID])
AC_DEFINE([SSHD_ACQUIRES_CTTY])
external_path_file=/etc/default/login
# /usr/ucblib/libucb.a no longer needed on ReliantUNIX
# Attention: always take care to bind libsocket and libnsl before libc,
# otherwise you will find lots of "SIOCGPGRP errno 22" on syslog
;;
# UnixWare 1.x, UnixWare 2.x, and others based on code from Univel.
*-*-sysv4.2*)
AC_DEFINE([USE_PIPES])
AC_DEFINE([SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID])
AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREUID])
AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREGID])
AC_DEFINE([PASSWD_NEEDS_USERNAME], [1], [must supply username to passwd])
AC_DEFINE([LOCKED_PASSWD_STRING], ["*LK*"])
TEST_SHELL=$SHELL # let configure find us a capable shell
;;
# UnixWare 7.x, OpenUNIX 8
*-*-sysv5*)
CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -Dvsnprintf=_xvsnprintf -Dsnprintf=_xsnprintf"
AC_DEFINE([UNIXWARE_LONG_PASSWORDS], [1], [Support passwords > 8 chars])
AC_DEFINE([USE_PIPES])
AC_DEFINE([SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID])
AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_GETADDRINFO])
AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREUID])
AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREGID])
AC_DEFINE([PASSWD_NEEDS_USERNAME])
AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_TCGETATTR_ICANON])
TEST_SHELL=$SHELL # let configure find us a capable shell
check_for_libcrypt_later=1
case "$host" in
*-*-sysv5SCO_SV*) # SCO OpenServer 6.x
maildir=/var/spool/mail
AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_UPDWTMPX])
AC_CHECK_LIB([prot], [getluid], [ LIBS="$LIBS -lprot"
AC_CHECK_FUNCS([getluid setluid], , , [-lprot])
], , )
;;
*) AC_DEFINE([LOCKED_PASSWD_STRING], ["*LK*"])
;;
esac
;;
*-*-sysv*)
;;
# SCO UNIX and OEM versions of SCO UNIX
*-*-sco3.2v4*)
AC_MSG_ERROR("This Platform is no longer supported.")
;;
# SCO OpenServer 5.x
*-*-sco3.2v5*)
if test -z "$GCC"; then
CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -belf"
fi
LIBS="$LIBS -lprot -lx -ltinfo -lm"
no_dev_ptmx=1
AC_DEFINE([USE_PIPES])
AC_DEFINE([HAVE_SECUREWARE])
AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_SHADOW])
AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_FD_PASSING])
AC_DEFINE([SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID])
AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_GETADDRINFO])
AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREUID])
AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREGID])
AC_DEFINE([WITH_ABBREV_NO_TTY])
AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_UPDWTMPX])
AC_DEFINE([PASSWD_NEEDS_USERNAME])
AC_CHECK_FUNCS([getluid setluid])
MANTYPE=man
TEST_SHELL=$SHELL # let configure find us a capable shell
SKIP_DISABLE_LASTLOG_DEFINE=yes
;;
*-dec-osf*)
AC_MSG_CHECKING([for Digital Unix SIA])
no_osfsia=""
AC_ARG_WITH([osfsia],
[ --with-osfsia Enable Digital Unix SIA],
[
if test "x$withval" = "xno" ; then
AC_MSG_RESULT([disabled])
no_osfsia=1
fi
],
)
if test -z "$no_osfsia" ; then
if test -f /etc/sia/matrix.conf; then
AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
AC_DEFINE([HAVE_OSF_SIA], [1],
[Define if you have Digital Unix Security
Integration Architecture])
AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_LOGIN], [1],
[Define if you don't want to use your
system's login() call])
AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_FD_PASSING])
LIBS="$LIBS -lsecurity -ldb -lm -laud"
SIA_MSG="yes"
else
AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
AC_DEFINE([LOCKED_PASSWD_SUBSTR], ["Nologin"],
[String used in /etc/passwd to denote locked account])
fi
fi
AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_GETADDRINFO])
AC_DEFINE([SETEUID_BREAKS_SETUID])
AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREUID])
AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETREGID])
AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_READV_COMPARISON], [1], [Can't do comparisons on readv])
;;
*-*-nto-qnx*)
AC_DEFINE([USE_PIPES])
AC_DEFINE([NO_X11_UNIX_SOCKETS])
AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_LASTLOG])
AC_DEFINE([SSHD_ACQUIRES_CTTY])
AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SHADOW_EXPIRE], [1], [QNX shadow support is broken])
enable_etc_default_login=no # has incompatible /etc/default/login
case "$host" in
*-*-nto-qnx6*)
AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_FD_PASSING])
;;
esac
;;
*-*-ultrix*)
AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_GETGROUPS], [1], [getgroups(0,NULL) will return -1])
- AC_DEFINE([NEED_SETPGRP])
+ AC_DEFINE([NEED_SETPGRP], [1], [Need setpgrp to for controlling tty])
AC_DEFINE([HAVE_SYS_SYSLOG_H], [1], [Force use of sys/syslog.h on Ultrix])
+ AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_UTMPX], [1], [Disable utmpx])
+ # DISABLE_FD_PASSING so that we call setpgrp as root, otherwise we
+ # don't get a controlling tty.
+ AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_FD_PASSING], [1], [Need to call setpgrp as root])
+ # On Ultrix some headers are not protected against multiple includes,
+ # so we create wrappers and put it where the compiler will find it.
+ AC_MSG_WARN([creating compat wrappers for headers])
+ mkdir -p netinet
+ for header in netinet/ip.h netdb.h resolv.h; do
+ name=`echo $header | tr 'a-z/.' 'A-Z__'`
+ cat >$header <<EOD
+#ifndef _SSH_COMPAT_${name}
+#define _SSH_COMPAT_${name}
+#include "/usr/include/${header}"
+#endif
+EOD
+ done
;;
*-*-lynxos)
CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -D__NO_INCLUDE_WARN__"
AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETVBUF], [1],
[LynxOS has broken setvbuf() implementation])
;;
esac
AC_MSG_CHECKING([compiler and flags for sanity])
AC_RUN_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include <stdio.h> ]], [[ exit(0); ]])],
[ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ],
[
AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
AC_MSG_ERROR([*** compiler cannot create working executables, check config.log ***])
],
[ AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: not checking compiler sanity]) ]
)
dnl Checks for header files.
# Checks for libraries.
AC_CHECK_FUNC([setsockopt], , [AC_CHECK_LIB([socket], [setsockopt])])
dnl IRIX and Solaris 2.5.1 have dirname() in libgen
AC_CHECK_FUNCS([dirname], [AC_CHECK_HEADERS([libgen.h])] , [
AC_CHECK_LIB([gen], [dirname], [
AC_CACHE_CHECK([for broken dirname],
ac_cv_have_broken_dirname, [
save_LIBS="$LIBS"
LIBS="$LIBS -lgen"
AC_RUN_IFELSE(
[AC_LANG_SOURCE([[
#include <libgen.h>
#include <string.h>
int main(int argc, char **argv) {
char *s, buf[32];
strncpy(buf,"/etc", 32);
s = dirname(buf);
if (!s || strncmp(s, "/", 32) != 0) {
exit(1);
} else {
exit(0);
}
}
]])],
[ ac_cv_have_broken_dirname="no" ],
[ ac_cv_have_broken_dirname="yes" ],
[ ac_cv_have_broken_dirname="no" ],
)
LIBS="$save_LIBS"
])
if test "x$ac_cv_have_broken_dirname" = "xno" ; then
LIBS="$LIBS -lgen"
AC_DEFINE([HAVE_DIRNAME])
AC_CHECK_HEADERS([libgen.h])
fi
])
])
AC_CHECK_FUNC([getspnam], ,
[AC_CHECK_LIB([gen], [getspnam], [LIBS="$LIBS -lgen"])])
AC_SEARCH_LIBS([basename], [gen], [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_BASENAME], [1],
[Define if you have the basename function.])])
-dnl zlib is required
+dnl zlib defaults to enabled
+zlib=yes
AC_ARG_WITH([zlib],
[ --with-zlib=PATH Use zlib in PATH],
[ if test "x$withval" = "xno" ; then
- AC_MSG_ERROR([*** zlib is required ***])
+ zlib=no
elif test "x$withval" != "xyes"; then
if test -d "$withval/lib"; then
if test -n "${rpath_opt}"; then
LDFLAGS="-L${withval}/lib ${rpath_opt}${withval}/lib ${LDFLAGS}"
else
LDFLAGS="-L${withval}/lib ${LDFLAGS}"
fi
else
if test -n "${rpath_opt}"; then
LDFLAGS="-L${withval} ${rpath_opt}${withval} ${LDFLAGS}"
else
LDFLAGS="-L${withval} ${LDFLAGS}"
fi
fi
if test -d "$withval/include"; then
CPPFLAGS="-I${withval}/include ${CPPFLAGS}"
else
CPPFLAGS="-I${withval} ${CPPFLAGS}"
fi
fi ]
)
-AC_CHECK_HEADER([zlib.h], ,[AC_MSG_ERROR([*** zlib.h missing - please install first or check config.log ***])])
-AC_CHECK_LIB([z], [deflate], ,
+AC_MSG_CHECKING([for zlib])
+if test "x${zlib}" = "xno"; then
+ AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
+else
+ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
+ AC_DEFINE([WITH_ZLIB], [1], [Enable zlib])
+ AC_CHECK_HEADER([zlib.h], ,[AC_MSG_ERROR([*** zlib.h missing - please install first or check config.log ***])])
+ AC_CHECK_LIB([z], [deflate], ,
[
saved_CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS"
saved_LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS"
save_LIBS="$LIBS"
dnl Check default zlib install dir
if test -n "${rpath_opt}"; then
LDFLAGS="-L/usr/local/lib ${rpath_opt}/usr/local/lib ${saved_LDFLAGS}"
else
LDFLAGS="-L/usr/local/lib ${saved_LDFLAGS}"
fi
CPPFLAGS="-I/usr/local/include ${saved_CPPFLAGS}"
LIBS="$LIBS -lz"
AC_TRY_LINK_FUNC([deflate], [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_LIBZ])],
[
AC_MSG_ERROR([*** zlib missing - please install first or check config.log ***])
]
)
]
-)
+ )
-AC_ARG_WITH([zlib-version-check],
+ AC_ARG_WITH([zlib-version-check],
[ --without-zlib-version-check Disable zlib version check],
[ if test "x$withval" = "xno" ; then
zlib_check_nonfatal=1
fi
]
-)
+ )
-AC_MSG_CHECKING([for possibly buggy zlib])
-AC_RUN_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
+ AC_MSG_CHECKING([for possibly buggy zlib])
+ AC_RUN_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <zlib.h>
]],
[[
int a=0, b=0, c=0, d=0, n, v;
n = sscanf(ZLIB_VERSION, "%d.%d.%d.%d", &a, &b, &c, &d);
if (n != 3 && n != 4)
exit(1);
v = a*1000000 + b*10000 + c*100 + d;
fprintf(stderr, "found zlib version %s (%d)\n", ZLIB_VERSION, v);
/* 1.1.4 is OK */
if (a == 1 && b == 1 && c >= 4)
exit(0);
/* 1.2.3 and up are OK */
if (v >= 1020300)
exit(0);
exit(2);
]])],
AC_MSG_RESULT([no]),
[ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
if test -z "$zlib_check_nonfatal" ; then
AC_MSG_ERROR([*** zlib too old - check config.log ***
Your reported zlib version has known security problems. It's possible your
vendor has fixed these problems without changing the version number. If you
are sure this is the case, you can disable the check by running
"./configure --without-zlib-version-check".
If you are in doubt, upgrade zlib to version 1.2.3 or greater.
See http://www.gzip.org/zlib/ for details.])
else
AC_MSG_WARN([zlib version may have security problems])
fi
],
[ AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: not checking zlib version]) ]
-)
+ )
+fi
dnl UnixWare 2.x
AC_CHECK_FUNC([strcasecmp],
[], [ AC_CHECK_LIB([resolv], [strcasecmp], [LIBS="$LIBS -lresolv"]) ]
)
AC_CHECK_FUNCS([utimes],
[], [ AC_CHECK_LIB([c89], [utimes], [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_UTIMES])
LIBS="$LIBS -lc89"]) ]
)
dnl Checks for libutil functions
AC_CHECK_HEADERS([bsd/libutil.h libutil.h])
AC_SEARCH_LIBS([fmt_scaled], [util bsd])
AC_SEARCH_LIBS([scan_scaled], [util bsd])
AC_SEARCH_LIBS([login], [util bsd])
AC_SEARCH_LIBS([logout], [util bsd])
AC_SEARCH_LIBS([logwtmp], [util bsd])
AC_SEARCH_LIBS([openpty], [util bsd])
AC_SEARCH_LIBS([updwtmp], [util bsd])
AC_CHECK_FUNCS([fmt_scaled scan_scaled login logout openpty updwtmp logwtmp])
# On some platforms, inet_ntop and gethostbyname may be found in libresolv
# or libnsl.
AC_SEARCH_LIBS([inet_ntop], [resolv nsl])
AC_SEARCH_LIBS([gethostbyname], [resolv nsl])
# "Particular Function Checks"
# see https://www.gnu.org/software/autoconf/manual/autoconf-2.69/html_node/Particular-Functions.html
AC_FUNC_STRFTIME
AC_FUNC_MALLOC
AC_FUNC_REALLOC
# autoconf doesn't have AC_FUNC_CALLOC so fake it if malloc returns NULL;
AC_MSG_CHECKING([if calloc(0, N) returns non-null])
AC_RUN_IFELSE(
[AC_LANG_PROGRAM(
[[ #include <stdlib.h> ]],
[[ void *p = calloc(0, 1); exit(p == NULL); ]]
)],
[ func_calloc_0_nonnull=yes ],
[ func_calloc_0_nonnull=no ],
[ AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: assuming same as malloc])
func_calloc_0_nonnull="$ac_cv_func_malloc_0_nonnull"]
)
AC_MSG_RESULT([$func_calloc_0_nonnull])
if test "x$func_calloc_0_nonnull" = "xyes"; then
AC_DEFINE(HAVE_CALLOC, 1, [calloc(0, x) returns non-null])
else
AC_DEFINE(HAVE_CALLOC, 0, [calloc(0, x) returns NULL])
AC_DEFINE(calloc, rpl_calloc,
[Define to rpl_calloc if the replacement function should be used.])
fi
# Check for ALTDIRFUNC glob() extension
AC_MSG_CHECKING([for GLOB_ALTDIRFUNC support])
AC_EGREP_CPP([FOUNDIT],
[
#include <glob.h>
#ifdef GLOB_ALTDIRFUNC
FOUNDIT
#endif
],
[
AC_DEFINE([GLOB_HAS_ALTDIRFUNC], [1],
[Define if your system glob() function has
the GLOB_ALTDIRFUNC extension])
AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
],
[
AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
]
)
# Check for g.gl_matchc glob() extension
AC_MSG_CHECKING([for gl_matchc field in glob_t])
AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include <glob.h> ]],
[[ glob_t g; g.gl_matchc = 1; ]])],
[
AC_DEFINE([GLOB_HAS_GL_MATCHC], [1],
[Define if your system glob() function has
gl_matchc options in glob_t])
AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
], [
AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
])
# Check for g.gl_statv glob() extension
AC_MSG_CHECKING([for gl_statv and GLOB_KEEPSTAT extensions for glob])
AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include <glob.h> ]], [[
#ifndef GLOB_KEEPSTAT
#error "glob does not support GLOB_KEEPSTAT extension"
#endif
glob_t g;
g.gl_statv = NULL;
]])],
[
AC_DEFINE([GLOB_HAS_GL_STATV], [1],
[Define if your system glob() function has
gl_statv options in glob_t])
AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
], [
AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
])
AC_CHECK_DECLS([GLOB_NOMATCH], , , [#include <glob.h>])
AC_CHECK_DECL([VIS_ALL], ,
AC_DEFINE(BROKEN_STRNVIS, 1, [missing VIS_ALL]), [#include <vis.h>])
AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether struct dirent allocates space for d_name])
AC_RUN_IFELSE(
[AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <dirent.h>]],
[[
struct dirent d;
exit(sizeof(d.d_name)<=sizeof(char));
]])],
[AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])],
[
AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_ONE_BYTE_DIRENT_D_NAME], [1],
[Define if your struct dirent expects you to
allocate extra space for d_name])
],
[
AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: assuming BROKEN_ONE_BYTE_DIRENT_D_NAME])
AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_ONE_BYTE_DIRENT_D_NAME])
]
)
AC_MSG_CHECKING([for /proc/pid/fd directory])
if test -d "/proc/$$/fd" ; then
AC_DEFINE([HAVE_PROC_PID], [1], [Define if you have /proc/$pid/fd])
AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
else
AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
fi
# Check whether user wants to use ldns
LDNS_MSG="no"
AC_ARG_WITH(ldns,
[ --with-ldns[[=PATH]] Use ldns for DNSSEC support (optionally in PATH)],
[
ldns=""
if test "x$withval" = "xyes" ; then
AC_PATH_TOOL([LDNSCONFIG], [ldns-config], [no])
if test "x$LDNSCONFIG" = "xno"; then
- CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -I${withval}/include"
- LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS -L${withval}/lib"
LIBS="-lldns $LIBS"
ldns=yes
else
LIBS="$LIBS `$LDNSCONFIG --libs`"
CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS `$LDNSCONFIG --cflags`"
ldns=yes
fi
elif test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -I${withval}/include"
LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS -L${withval}/lib"
LIBS="-lldns $LIBS"
ldns=yes
fi
# Verify that it works.
if test "x$ldns" = "xyes" ; then
AC_DEFINE(HAVE_LDNS, 1, [Define if you want ldns support])
LDNS_MSG="yes"
AC_MSG_CHECKING([for ldns support])
AC_LINK_IFELSE(
[AC_LANG_SOURCE([[
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
-#include <stdint.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
+# include <stdint.h>
+#endif
#include <ldns/ldns.h>
int main() { ldns_status status = ldns_verify_trusted(NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL); status=LDNS_STATUS_OK; exit(0); }
]])
],
[AC_MSG_RESULT(yes)],
[
AC_MSG_RESULT(no)
AC_MSG_ERROR([** Incomplete or missing ldns libraries.])
])
fi
])
# Check whether user wants libedit support
LIBEDIT_MSG="no"
AC_ARG_WITH([libedit],
[ --with-libedit[[=PATH]] Enable libedit support for sftp],
[ if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
if test "x$withval" = "xyes" ; then
AC_PATH_TOOL([PKGCONFIG], [pkg-config], [no])
if test "x$PKGCONFIG" != "xno"; then
AC_MSG_CHECKING([if $PKGCONFIG knows about libedit])
if "$PKGCONFIG" libedit; then
AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
use_pkgconfig_for_libedit=yes
else
AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
fi
fi
else
CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -I${withval}/include"
if test -n "${rpath_opt}"; then
LDFLAGS="-L${withval}/lib ${rpath_opt}${withval}/lib ${LDFLAGS}"
else
LDFLAGS="-L${withval}/lib ${LDFLAGS}"
fi
fi
if test "x$use_pkgconfig_for_libedit" = "xyes"; then
LIBEDIT=`$PKGCONFIG --libs libedit`
CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS `$PKGCONFIG --cflags libedit`"
else
LIBEDIT="-ledit -lcurses"
fi
OTHERLIBS=`echo $LIBEDIT | sed 's/-ledit//'`
AC_CHECK_LIB([edit], [el_init],
[ AC_DEFINE([USE_LIBEDIT], [1], [Use libedit for sftp])
LIBEDIT_MSG="yes"
AC_SUBST([LIBEDIT])
],
[ AC_MSG_ERROR([libedit not found]) ],
[ $OTHERLIBS ]
)
AC_MSG_CHECKING([if libedit version is compatible])
AC_COMPILE_IFELSE(
[AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include <histedit.h> ]],
[[
int i = H_SETSIZE;
el_init("", NULL, NULL, NULL);
exit(0);
]])],
[ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ],
[ AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
AC_MSG_ERROR([libedit version is not compatible]) ]
)
fi ]
)
AUDIT_MODULE=none
AC_ARG_WITH([audit],
[ --with-audit=module Enable audit support (modules=debug,bsm,linux)],
[
AC_MSG_CHECKING([for supported audit module])
case "$withval" in
bsm)
AC_MSG_RESULT([bsm])
AUDIT_MODULE=bsm
dnl Checks for headers, libs and functions
AC_CHECK_HEADERS([bsm/audit.h], [],
[AC_MSG_ERROR([BSM enabled and bsm/audit.h not found])],
[
#ifdef HAVE_TIME_H
# include <time.h>
#endif
]
)
AC_CHECK_LIB([bsm], [getaudit], [],
[AC_MSG_ERROR([BSM enabled and required library not found])])
AC_CHECK_FUNCS([getaudit], [],
[AC_MSG_ERROR([BSM enabled and required function not found])])
# These are optional
AC_CHECK_FUNCS([getaudit_addr aug_get_machine])
AC_DEFINE([USE_BSM_AUDIT], [1], [Use BSM audit module])
if test "$sol2ver" -ge 11; then
SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -lscf"
AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_BSM_API], [1],
[The system has incomplete BSM API])
fi
;;
linux)
AC_MSG_RESULT([linux])
AUDIT_MODULE=linux
dnl Checks for headers, libs and functions
AC_CHECK_HEADERS([libaudit.h])
SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -laudit"
AC_DEFINE([USE_LINUX_AUDIT], [1], [Use Linux audit module])
;;
debug)
AUDIT_MODULE=debug
AC_MSG_RESULT([debug])
AC_DEFINE([SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS], [1], [Use audit debugging module])
;;
no)
AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
;;
*)
AC_MSG_ERROR([Unknown audit module $withval])
;;
esac ]
)
AC_ARG_WITH([pie],
[ --with-pie Build Position Independent Executables if possible], [
if test "x$withval" = "xno"; then
use_pie=no
fi
if test "x$withval" = "xyes"; then
use_pie=yes
fi
]
)
if test "x$use_pie" = "x"; then
use_pie=no
fi
if test "x$use_toolchain_hardening" != "x1" && test "x$use_pie" = "xauto"; then
# Turn off automatic PIE when toolchain hardening is off.
use_pie=no
fi
if test "x$use_pie" = "xauto"; then
# Automatic PIE requires gcc >= 4.x
AC_MSG_CHECKING([for gcc >= 4.x])
AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_SOURCE([[
#if !defined(__GNUC__) || __GNUC__ < 4
#error gcc is too old
#endif
]])],
[ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ],
[ AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
use_pie=no ]
)
fi
if test "x$use_pie" != "xno"; then
SAVED_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS"
SAVED_LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS"
OSSH_CHECK_CFLAG_COMPILE([-fPIE])
OSSH_CHECK_LDFLAG_LINK([-pie])
# We use both -fPIE and -pie or neither.
AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether both -fPIE and -pie are supported])
if echo "x $CFLAGS" | grep ' -fPIE' >/dev/null 2>&1 && \
echo "x $LDFLAGS" | grep ' -pie' >/dev/null 2>&1 ; then
AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
else
AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
CFLAGS="$SAVED_CFLAGS"
LDFLAGS="$SAVED_LDFLAGS"
fi
fi
+AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether -fPIC is accepted])
+SAVED_CFLAGS="$CFLAGS"
+CFLAGS="$CFLAGS -fPIC"
+AC_COMPILE_IFELSE(
+ [AC_LANG_PROGRAM( [[ #include <stdlib.h> ]], [[ exit(0); ]] )],
+ [AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
+ PICFLAG="-fPIC"; ],
+ [AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
+ PICFLAG=""; ])
+CFLAGS="$SAVED_CFLAGS"
+AC_SUBST([PICFLAG])
+
dnl Checks for library functions. Please keep in alphabetical order
AC_CHECK_FUNCS([ \
Blowfish_initstate \
Blowfish_expandstate \
Blowfish_expand0state \
Blowfish_stream2word \
SHA256Update \
SHA384Update \
SHA512Update \
asprintf \
b64_ntop \
__b64_ntop \
b64_pton \
__b64_pton \
bcopy \
bcrypt_pbkdf \
bindresvport_sa \
blf_enc \
bzero \
cap_rights_limit \
clock \
closefrom \
dirfd \
endgrent \
err \
errx \
explicit_bzero \
fchmod \
fchmodat \
fchown \
fchownat \
flock \
+ fnmatch \
freeaddrinfo \
freezero \
fstatfs \
fstatvfs \
futimes \
getaddrinfo \
getcwd \
getgrouplist \
getline \
getnameinfo \
getopt \
getpagesize \
getpeereid \
getpeerucred \
getpgid \
_getpty \
getrlimit \
getrandom \
getsid \
getttyent \
glob \
group_from_gid \
inet_aton \
inet_ntoa \
inet_ntop \
innetgr \
llabs \
+ localtime_r \
login_getcapbool \
md5_crypt \
memmem \
memmove \
memset_s \
mkdtemp \
ngetaddrinfo \
nsleep \
ogetaddrinfo \
openlog_r \
pledge \
poll \
prctl \
pstat \
raise \
readpassphrase \
reallocarray \
+ realpath \
recvmsg \
recallocarray \
rresvport_af \
sendmsg \
setdtablesize \
setegid \
setenv \
seteuid \
setgroupent \
setgroups \
setlinebuf \
setlogin \
setpassent\
setpcred \
setproctitle \
setregid \
setreuid \
setrlimit \
setsid \
setvbuf \
sigaction \
sigvec \
snprintf \
socketpair \
statfs \
statvfs \
strcasestr \
strdup \
strerror \
strlcat \
strlcpy \
strmode \
strndup \
strnlen \
strnvis \
strptime \
strsignal \
strtonum \
strtoll \
strtoul \
strtoull \
swap32 \
sysconf \
tcgetpgrp \
timingsafe_bcmp \
truncate \
unsetenv \
updwtmpx \
utimensat \
user_from_uid \
usleep \
vasprintf \
vsnprintf \
waitpid \
warn \
])
-AC_CHECK_DECLS([bzero])
+AC_CHECK_DECLS([bzero, memmem])
dnl Wide character support.
AC_CHECK_FUNCS([mblen mbtowc nl_langinfo wcwidth])
TEST_SSH_UTF8=${TEST_SSH_UTF8:=yes}
AC_MSG_CHECKING([for utf8 locale support])
AC_RUN_IFELSE(
[AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
#include <locale.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
]], [[
char *loc = setlocale(LC_CTYPE, "en_US.UTF-8");
if (loc != NULL)
exit(0);
exit(1);
]])],
AC_MSG_RESULT(yes),
[AC_MSG_RESULT(no)
TEST_SSH_UTF8=no],
AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: assuming yes])
)
AC_LINK_IFELSE(
[AC_LANG_PROGRAM(
[[ #include <ctype.h> ]],
[[ return (isblank('a')); ]])],
[AC_DEFINE([HAVE_ISBLANK], [1], [Define if you have isblank(3C).])
])
disable_pkcs11=
AC_ARG_ENABLE([pkcs11],
[ --disable-pkcs11 disable PKCS#11 support code [no]],
[
if test "x$enableval" = "xno" ; then
disable_pkcs11=1
fi
]
)
-# PKCS11 depends on OpenSSL.
-if test "x$openssl" = "xyes" && test "x$disable_pkcs11" = "x"; then
- # PKCS#11 support requires dlopen() and co
- AC_SEARCH_LIBS([dlopen], [dl],
- AC_CHECK_DECL([RTLD_NOW],
- AC_DEFINE([ENABLE_PKCS11], [], [Enable for PKCS#11 support]),
- [], [#include <dlfcn.h>]
- )
- )
-fi
+disable_sk=
+AC_ARG_ENABLE([security-key],
+ [ --disable-security-key disable U2F/FIDO support code [no]],
+ [
+ if test "x$enableval" = "xno" ; then
+ disable_sk=1
+ fi
+ ]
+)
+enable_sk_internal=
+AC_ARG_WITH([security-key-builtin],
+ [ --with-security-key-builtin include builtin U2F/FIDO support],
+ [
+ if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
+ enable_sk_internal=yes
+ fi
+ ]
+)
+test "x$disable_sk" != "x" && enable_sk_internal=""
+
+AC_SEARCH_LIBS([dlopen], [dl])
+AC_CHECK_FUNCS([dlopen])
+AC_CHECK_DECL([RTLD_NOW], [], [], [#include <dlfcn.h>])
# IRIX has a const char return value for gai_strerror()
AC_CHECK_FUNCS([gai_strerror], [
AC_DEFINE([HAVE_GAI_STRERROR])
AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <netdb.h>
const char *gai_strerror(int);
]], [[
char *str;
str = gai_strerror(0);
]])], [
AC_DEFINE([HAVE_CONST_GAI_STRERROR_PROTO], [1],
[Define if gai_strerror() returns const char *])], [])])
AC_SEARCH_LIBS([nanosleep], [rt posix4], [AC_DEFINE([HAVE_NANOSLEEP], [1],
[Some systems put nanosleep outside of libc])])
AC_SEARCH_LIBS([clock_gettime], [rt],
[AC_DEFINE([HAVE_CLOCK_GETTIME], [1], [Have clock_gettime])])
dnl Make sure prototypes are defined for these before using them.
AC_CHECK_DECL([strsep],
[AC_CHECK_FUNCS([strsep])],
[],
[
#ifdef HAVE_STRING_H
# include <string.h>
#endif
])
dnl tcsendbreak might be a macro
AC_CHECK_DECL([tcsendbreak],
[AC_DEFINE([HAVE_TCSENDBREAK])],
[AC_CHECK_FUNCS([tcsendbreak])],
[#include <termios.h>]
)
AC_CHECK_DECLS([h_errno], , ,[#include <netdb.h>])
AC_CHECK_DECLS([SHUT_RD], , ,
[
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
])
AC_CHECK_DECLS([O_NONBLOCK], , ,
[
#include <sys/types.h>
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H
# include <sys/stat.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_FCNTL_H
# include <fcntl.h>
#endif
])
AC_CHECK_DECLS([readv, writev], , , [
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/uio.h>
#include <unistd.h>
])
AC_CHECK_DECLS([MAXSYMLINKS], , , [
#include <sys/param.h>
])
AC_CHECK_DECLS([offsetof], , , [
#include <stddef.h>
])
# extra bits for select(2)
AC_CHECK_DECLS([howmany, NFDBITS], [], [], [[
#include <sys/param.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SYSMACROS_H
#include <sys/sysmacros.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SELECT_H
#include <sys/select.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
#include <sys/time.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_UNISTD_H
#include <unistd.h>
#endif
]])
AC_CHECK_TYPES([fd_mask], [], [], [[
#include <sys/param.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SELECT_H
#include <sys/select.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
#include <sys/time.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_UNISTD_H
#include <unistd.h>
#endif
]])
AC_CHECK_FUNCS([setresuid], [
dnl Some platorms have setresuid that isn't implemented, test for this
AC_MSG_CHECKING([if setresuid seems to work])
AC_RUN_IFELSE(
[AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <errno.h>
]], [[
errno=0;
setresuid(0,0,0);
if (errno==ENOSYS)
exit(1);
else
exit(0);
]])],
[AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])],
[AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETRESUID], [1],
[Define if your setresuid() is broken])
AC_MSG_RESULT([not implemented])],
[AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: not checking setresuid])]
)
])
AC_CHECK_FUNCS([setresgid], [
dnl Some platorms have setresgid that isn't implemented, test for this
AC_MSG_CHECKING([if setresgid seems to work])
AC_RUN_IFELSE(
[AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <errno.h>
]], [[
errno=0;
setresgid(0,0,0);
if (errno==ENOSYS)
exit(1);
else
exit(0);
]])],
[AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])],
[AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SETRESGID], [1],
[Define if your setresgid() is broken])
AC_MSG_RESULT([not implemented])],
[AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: not checking setresuid])]
)
])
AC_MSG_CHECKING([for working fflush(NULL)])
AC_RUN_IFELSE(
[AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[#include <stdio.h>]], [[fflush(NULL); exit(0);]])],
AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]),
[AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
AC_DEFINE([FFLUSH_NULL_BUG], [1],
[define if fflush(NULL) does not work])],
AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: assuming working])
)
dnl Checks for time functions
AC_CHECK_FUNCS([gettimeofday time])
dnl Checks for utmp functions
AC_CHECK_FUNCS([endutent getutent getutid getutline pututline setutent])
AC_CHECK_FUNCS([utmpname])
dnl Checks for utmpx functions
AC_CHECK_FUNCS([endutxent getutxent getutxid getutxline getutxuser pututxline])
AC_CHECK_FUNCS([setutxdb setutxent utmpxname])
dnl Checks for lastlog functions
AC_CHECK_FUNCS([getlastlogxbyname])
AC_CHECK_FUNC([daemon],
[AC_DEFINE([HAVE_DAEMON], [1], [Define if your libraries define daemon()])],
[AC_CHECK_LIB([bsd], [daemon],
[LIBS="$LIBS -lbsd"; AC_DEFINE([HAVE_DAEMON])])]
)
AC_CHECK_FUNC([getpagesize],
[AC_DEFINE([HAVE_GETPAGESIZE], [1],
[Define if your libraries define getpagesize()])],
[AC_CHECK_LIB([ucb], [getpagesize],
[LIBS="$LIBS -lucb"; AC_DEFINE([HAVE_GETPAGESIZE])])]
)
# Check for broken snprintf
if test "x$ac_cv_func_snprintf" = "xyes" ; then
AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether snprintf correctly terminates long strings])
AC_RUN_IFELSE(
[AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include <stdio.h> ]],
[[
char b[5];
snprintf(b,5,"123456789");
exit(b[4]!='\0');
]])],
[AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])],
[
AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SNPRINTF], [1],
[Define if your snprintf is busted])
AC_MSG_WARN([****** Your snprintf() function is broken, complain to your vendor])
],
[ AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: Assuming working snprintf()]) ]
)
fi
if test "x$ac_cv_func_snprintf" = "xyes" ; then
AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether snprintf understands %zu])
AC_RUN_IFELSE(
[AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <stdio.h>
]],
[[
size_t a = 1, b = 2;
char z[128];
snprintf(z, sizeof z, "%zu%zu", a, b);
exit(strcmp(z, "12"));
]])],
[AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])],
[
AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SNPRINTF], [1],
[snprintf does not understand %zu])
],
[ AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: Assuming working snprintf()]) ]
)
fi
# We depend on vsnprintf returning the right thing on overflow: the
# number of characters it tried to create (as per SUSv3)
if test "x$ac_cv_func_vsnprintf" = "xyes" ; then
AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether vsnprintf returns correct values on overflow])
AC_RUN_IFELSE(
[AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
int x_snprintf(char *str, size_t count, const char *fmt, ...)
{
size_t ret;
va_list ap;
va_start(ap, fmt);
ret = vsnprintf(str, count, fmt, ap);
va_end(ap);
return ret;
}
]], [[
char x[1];
if (x_snprintf(x, 1, "%s %d", "hello", 12345) != 11)
return 1;
if (x_snprintf(NULL, 0, "%s %d", "hello", 12345) != 11)
return 1;
return 0;
]])],
[AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])],
[
AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SNPRINTF], [1],
[Define if your snprintf is busted])
AC_MSG_WARN([****** Your vsnprintf() function is broken, complain to your vendor])
],
[ AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: Assuming working vsnprintf()]) ]
)
fi
# On systems where [v]snprintf is broken, but is declared in stdio,
# check that the fmt argument is const char * or just char *.
# This is only useful for when BROKEN_SNPRINTF
AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether snprintf can declare const char *fmt])
AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
#include <stdio.h>
int snprintf(char *a, size_t b, const char *c, ...) { return 0; }
]], [[
snprintf(0, 0, 0);
]])],
[AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
AC_DEFINE([SNPRINTF_CONST], [const],
[Define as const if snprintf() can declare const char *fmt])],
[AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
AC_DEFINE([SNPRINTF_CONST], [/* not const */])])
# Check for missing getpeereid (or equiv) support
NO_PEERCHECK=""
if test "x$ac_cv_func_getpeereid" != "xyes" -a "x$ac_cv_func_getpeerucred" != "xyes"; then
AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether system supports SO_PEERCRED getsockopt])
AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>]], [[int i = SO_PEERCRED;]])],
[ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
AC_DEFINE([HAVE_SO_PEERCRED], [1], [Have PEERCRED socket option])
], [AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
NO_PEERCHECK=1
])
fi
dnl see whether mkstemp() requires XXXXXX
if test "x$ac_cv_func_mkdtemp" = "xyes" ; then
AC_MSG_CHECKING([for (overly) strict mkstemp])
AC_RUN_IFELSE(
[AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
#include <stdlib.h>
]], [[
char template[]="conftest.mkstemp-test";
if (mkstemp(template) == -1)
exit(1);
unlink(template);
exit(0);
]])],
[
AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
],
[
AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
AC_DEFINE([HAVE_STRICT_MKSTEMP], [1], [Silly mkstemp()])
],
[
AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
AC_DEFINE([HAVE_STRICT_MKSTEMP])
]
)
fi
dnl make sure that openpty does not reacquire controlling terminal
if test ! -z "$check_for_openpty_ctty_bug"; then
AC_MSG_CHECKING([if openpty correctly handles controlling tty])
AC_RUN_IFELSE(
[AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
#include <stdio.h>
#include <sys/fcntl.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/wait.h>
]], [[
pid_t pid;
int fd, ptyfd, ttyfd, status;
pid = fork();
if (pid < 0) { /* failed */
exit(1);
} else if (pid > 0) { /* parent */
waitpid(pid, &status, 0);
if (WIFEXITED(status))
exit(WEXITSTATUS(status));
else
exit(2);
} else { /* child */
close(0); close(1); close(2);
setsid();
openpty(&ptyfd, &ttyfd, NULL, NULL, NULL);
fd = open("/dev/tty", O_RDWR | O_NOCTTY);
if (fd >= 0)
exit(3); /* Acquired ctty: broken */
else
exit(0); /* Did not acquire ctty: OK */
}
]])],
[
AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
],
[
AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
AC_DEFINE([SSHD_ACQUIRES_CTTY])
],
[
AC_MSG_RESULT([cross-compiling, assuming yes])
]
)
fi
if test "x$ac_cv_func_getaddrinfo" = "xyes" && \
test "x$check_for_hpux_broken_getaddrinfo" = "x1"; then
AC_MSG_CHECKING([if getaddrinfo seems to work])
AC_RUN_IFELSE(
[AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
#include <stdio.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <netdb.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <netinet/in.h>
#define TEST_PORT "2222"
]], [[
int err, sock;
struct addrinfo *gai_ai, *ai, hints;
char ntop[NI_MAXHOST], strport[NI_MAXSERV], *name = NULL;
memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
hints.ai_family = PF_UNSPEC;
hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
hints.ai_flags = AI_PASSIVE;
err = getaddrinfo(name, TEST_PORT, &hints, &gai_ai);
if (err != 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "getaddrinfo failed (%s)", gai_strerror(err));
exit(1);
}
for (ai = gai_ai; ai != NULL; ai = ai->ai_next) {
if (ai->ai_family != AF_INET6)
continue;
err = getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen, ntop,
sizeof(ntop), strport, sizeof(strport),
NI_NUMERICHOST|NI_NUMERICSERV);
if (err != 0) {
if (err == EAI_SYSTEM)
perror("getnameinfo EAI_SYSTEM");
else
fprintf(stderr, "getnameinfo failed: %s\n",
gai_strerror(err));
exit(2);
}
sock = socket(ai->ai_family, ai->ai_socktype, ai->ai_protocol);
if (sock < 0)
perror("socket");
if (bind(sock, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen) < 0) {
if (errno == EBADF)
exit(3);
}
}
exit(0);
]])],
[
AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
],
[
AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_GETADDRINFO])
],
[
AC_MSG_RESULT([cross-compiling, assuming yes])
]
)
fi
if test "x$ac_cv_func_getaddrinfo" = "xyes" && \
test "x$check_for_aix_broken_getaddrinfo" = "x1"; then
AC_MSG_CHECKING([if getaddrinfo seems to work])
AC_RUN_IFELSE(
[AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
#include <stdio.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <netdb.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <netinet/in.h>
#define TEST_PORT "2222"
]], [[
int err, sock;
struct addrinfo *gai_ai, *ai, hints;
char ntop[NI_MAXHOST], strport[NI_MAXSERV], *name = NULL;
memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
hints.ai_family = PF_UNSPEC;
hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
hints.ai_flags = AI_PASSIVE;
err = getaddrinfo(name, TEST_PORT, &hints, &gai_ai);
if (err != 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "getaddrinfo failed (%s)", gai_strerror(err));
exit(1);
}
for (ai = gai_ai; ai != NULL; ai = ai->ai_next) {
if (ai->ai_family != AF_INET && ai->ai_family != AF_INET6)
continue;
err = getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen, ntop,
sizeof(ntop), strport, sizeof(strport),
NI_NUMERICHOST|NI_NUMERICSERV);
if (ai->ai_family == AF_INET && err != 0) {
perror("getnameinfo");
exit(2);
}
}
exit(0);
]])],
[
AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
AC_DEFINE([AIX_GETNAMEINFO_HACK], [1],
[Define if you have a getaddrinfo that fails
for the all-zeros IPv6 address])
],
[
AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_GETADDRINFO])
],
[
AC_MSG_RESULT([cross-compiling, assuming no])
]
)
fi
if test "x$ac_cv_func_getaddrinfo" = "xyes"; then
AC_CHECK_DECLS(AI_NUMERICSERV, , ,
[#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <netdb.h>])
fi
if test "x$check_for_conflicting_getspnam" = "x1"; then
AC_MSG_CHECKING([for conflicting getspnam in shadow.h])
AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include <shadow.h> ]],
[[ exit(0); ]])],
[
AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
],
[
AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
AC_DEFINE([GETSPNAM_CONFLICTING_DEFS], [1],
[Conflicting defs for getspnam])
]
)
fi
dnl NetBSD added an strnvis and unfortunately made it incompatible with the
dnl existing one in OpenBSD and Linux's libbsd (the former having existed
dnl for over ten years). Despite this incompatibility being reported during
dnl development (see http://gnats.netbsd.org/44977) they still shipped it.
dnl Even more unfortunately FreeBSD and later MacOS picked up this incompatible
dnl implementation. Try to detect this mess, and assume the only safe option
dnl if we're cross compiling.
dnl
dnl OpenBSD, 2001: strnvis(char *dst, const char *src, size_t dlen, int flag);
dnl NetBSD: 2012, strnvis(char *dst, size_t dlen, const char *src, int flag);
if test "x$ac_cv_func_strnvis" = "xyes"; then
AC_MSG_CHECKING([for working strnvis])
AC_RUN_IFELSE(
[AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
#include <signal.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <vis.h>
static void sighandler(int sig) { _exit(1); }
]], [[
char dst[16];
signal(SIGSEGV, sighandler);
if (strnvis(dst, "src", 4, 0) && strcmp(dst, "src") == 0)
exit(0);
exit(1)
]])],
[AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])],
[AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_STRNVIS], [1], [strnvis detected broken])],
[AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: assuming broken])
AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_STRNVIS], [1], [strnvis assumed broken])]
)
fi
AC_CHECK_FUNCS([getpgrp],[
AC_MSG_CHECKING([if getpgrp accepts zero args])
AC_COMPILE_IFELSE(
[AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[$ac_includes_default]], [[ getpgrp(); ]])],
[ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
AC_DEFINE([GETPGRP_VOID], [1], [getpgrp takes zero args])],
[ AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
AC_DEFINE([GETPGRP_VOID], [0], [getpgrp takes one arg])]
)
])
# Search for OpenSSL
saved_CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS"
saved_LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS"
AC_ARG_WITH([ssl-dir],
[ --with-ssl-dir=PATH Specify path to OpenSSL installation ],
[
if test "x$openssl" = "xno" ; then
AC_MSG_ERROR([cannot use --with-ssl-dir when OpenSSL disabled])
fi
if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
case "$withval" in
# Relative paths
./*|../*) withval="`pwd`/$withval"
esac
if test -d "$withval/lib"; then
if test -n "${rpath_opt}"; then
LDFLAGS="-L${withval}/lib ${rpath_opt}${withval}/lib ${LDFLAGS}"
else
LDFLAGS="-L${withval}/lib ${LDFLAGS}"
fi
elif test -d "$withval/lib64"; then
if test -n "${rpath_opt}"; then
LDFLAGS="-L${withval}/lib64 ${rpath_opt}${withval}/lib64 ${LDFLAGS}"
else
LDFLAGS="-L${withval}/lib64 ${LDFLAGS}"
fi
else
if test -n "${rpath_opt}"; then
LDFLAGS="-L${withval} ${rpath_opt}${withval} ${LDFLAGS}"
else
LDFLAGS="-L${withval} ${LDFLAGS}"
fi
fi
if test -d "$withval/include"; then
CPPFLAGS="-I${withval}/include ${CPPFLAGS}"
else
CPPFLAGS="-I${withval} ${CPPFLAGS}"
fi
fi
]
)
AC_ARG_WITH([openssl-header-check],
[ --without-openssl-header-check Disable OpenSSL version consistency check],
[
if test "x$withval" = "xno" ; then
openssl_check_nonfatal=1
fi
]
)
openssl_engine=no
AC_ARG_WITH([ssl-engine],
[ --with-ssl-engine Enable OpenSSL (hardware) ENGINE support ],
[
if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
if test "x$openssl" = "xno" ; then
AC_MSG_ERROR([cannot use --with-ssl-engine when OpenSSL disabled])
fi
openssl_engine=yes
fi
]
)
if test "x$openssl" = "xyes" ; then
LIBS="-lcrypto $LIBS"
AC_TRY_LINK_FUNC([RAND_add], ,
[AC_MSG_ERROR([*** working libcrypto not found, check config.log])])
AC_CHECK_HEADER([openssl/opensslv.h], ,
[AC_MSG_ERROR([*** OpenSSL headers missing - please install first or check config.log ***])])
# Determine OpenSSL header version
AC_MSG_CHECKING([OpenSSL header version])
AC_RUN_IFELSE(
[AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <openssl/opensslv.h>
#define DATA "conftest.sslincver"
]], [[
FILE *fd;
int rc;
fd = fopen(DATA,"w");
if(fd == NULL)
exit(1);
if ((rc = fprintf(fd, "%08lx (%s)\n",
(unsigned long)OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER,
OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT)) < 0)
exit(1);
exit(0);
]])],
[
ssl_header_ver=`cat conftest.sslincver`
AC_MSG_RESULT([$ssl_header_ver])
],
[
AC_MSG_RESULT([not found])
AC_MSG_ERROR([OpenSSL version header not found.])
],
[
AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: not checking])
]
)
# Determining OpenSSL library version is version dependent.
AC_CHECK_FUNCS([OpenSSL_version OpenSSL_version_num])
# Determine OpenSSL library version
AC_MSG_CHECKING([OpenSSL library version])
AC_RUN_IFELSE(
[AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <openssl/opensslv.h>
#include <openssl/crypto.h>
#define DATA "conftest.ssllibver"
]], [[
FILE *fd;
int rc;
fd = fopen(DATA,"w");
if(fd == NULL)
exit(1);
#ifndef OPENSSL_VERSION
# define OPENSSL_VERSION SSLEAY_VERSION
#endif
#ifndef HAVE_OPENSSL_VERSION
# define OpenSSL_version SSLeay_version
#endif
#ifndef HAVE_OPENSSL_VERSION_NUM
# define OpenSSL_version_num SSLeay
#endif
if ((rc = fprintf(fd, "%08lx (%s)\n",
(unsigned long)OpenSSL_version_num(),
OpenSSL_version(OPENSSL_VERSION))) < 0)
exit(1);
exit(0);
]])],
[
ssl_library_ver=`cat conftest.ssllibver`
# Check version is supported.
case "$ssl_library_ver" in
10000*|0*)
AC_MSG_ERROR([OpenSSL >= 1.0.1 required (have "$ssl_library_ver")])
;;
100*) ;; # 1.0.x
101000[[0123456]]*)
# https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/4613
AC_MSG_ERROR([OpenSSL 1.1.x versions prior to 1.1.0g have a bug that breaks their use with OpenSSH (have "$ssl_library_ver")])
;;
101*) ;; # 1.1.x
200*) ;; # LibreSSL
300*) ;; # OpenSSL development branch.
*)
AC_MSG_ERROR([Unknown/unsupported OpenSSL version ("$ssl_library_ver")])
;;
esac
AC_MSG_RESULT([$ssl_library_ver])
],
[
AC_MSG_RESULT([not found])
AC_MSG_ERROR([OpenSSL library not found.])
],
[
AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: not checking])
]
)
# Sanity check OpenSSL headers
AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether OpenSSL's headers match the library])
AC_RUN_IFELSE(
[AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
#include <string.h>
#include <openssl/opensslv.h>
#include <openssl/crypto.h>
]], [[
#ifndef HAVE_OPENSSL_VERSION_NUM
# define OpenSSL_version_num SSLeay
#endif
exit(OpenSSL_version_num() == OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER ? 0 : 1);
]])],
[
AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
],
[
AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
if test "x$openssl_check_nonfatal" = "x"; then
AC_MSG_ERROR([Your OpenSSL headers do not match your
library. Check config.log for details.
If you are sure your installation is consistent, you can disable the check
by running "./configure --without-openssl-header-check".
Also see contrib/findssl.sh for help identifying header/library mismatches.
])
else
AC_MSG_WARN([Your OpenSSL headers do not match your
library. Check config.log for details.
Also see contrib/findssl.sh for help identifying header/library mismatches.])
fi
],
[
AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: not checking])
]
)
AC_MSG_CHECKING([if programs using OpenSSL functions will link])
AC_LINK_IFELSE(
[AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include <openssl/err.h> ]],
[[ ERR_load_crypto_strings(); ]])],
[
AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
],
[
AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
saved_LIBS="$LIBS"
LIBS="$LIBS -ldl"
AC_MSG_CHECKING([if programs using OpenSSL need -ldl])
AC_LINK_IFELSE(
[AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include <openssl/err.h> ]],
[[ ERR_load_crypto_strings(); ]])],
[
AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
],
[
AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
LIBS="$saved_LIBS"
]
)
]
)
AC_CHECK_FUNCS([ \
BN_is_prime_ex \
DSA_generate_parameters_ex \
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl \
EVP_DigestFinal_ex \
EVP_DigestInit_ex \
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup \
EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex \
EVP_MD_CTX_init \
HMAC_CTX_init \
RSA_generate_key_ex \
RSA_get_default_method \
])
# OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms may be a macro.
AC_CHECK_FUNC(OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms,
AC_DEFINE(HAVE_OPENSSL_ADD_ALL_ALGORITHMS, 1, [as a function]),
AC_CHECK_DECL(OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms,
AC_DEFINE(HAVE_OPENSSL_ADD_ALL_ALGORITHMS, 1, [as a macro]), ,
[[#include <openssl/evp.h>]]
)
)
# LibreSSL/OpenSSL 1.1x API
AC_CHECK_FUNCS([ \
OPENSSL_init_crypto \
DH_get0_key \
DH_get0_pqg \
DH_set0_key \
DH_set_length \
DH_set0_pqg \
DSA_get0_key \
DSA_get0_pqg \
DSA_set0_key \
DSA_set0_pqg \
DSA_SIG_get0 \
DSA_SIG_set0 \
ECDSA_SIG_get0 \
ECDSA_SIG_set0 \
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv \
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst \
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_iv \
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_iv \
RSA_get0_crt_params \
RSA_get0_factors \
RSA_get0_key \
RSA_set0_crt_params \
RSA_set0_factors \
RSA_set0_key \
RSA_meth_free \
RSA_meth_dup \
RSA_meth_set1_name \
RSA_meth_get_finish \
RSA_meth_set_priv_enc \
RSA_meth_set_priv_dec \
RSA_meth_set_finish \
EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA \
EVP_MD_CTX_new \
EVP_MD_CTX_free \
])
if test "x$openssl_engine" = "xyes" ; then
AC_MSG_CHECKING([for OpenSSL ENGINE support])
AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
#include <openssl/engine.h>
]], [[
ENGINE_load_builtin_engines();
ENGINE_register_all_complete();
]])],
[ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
AC_DEFINE([USE_OPENSSL_ENGINE], [1],
[Enable OpenSSL engine support])
], [ AC_MSG_ERROR([OpenSSL ENGINE support not found])
])
fi
# Check for OpenSSL without EVP_aes_{192,256}_cbc
AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether OpenSSL has crippled AES support])
AC_LINK_IFELSE(
[AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
#include <string.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
]], [[
exit(EVP_aes_192_cbc() == NULL || EVP_aes_256_cbc() == NULL);
]])],
[
AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
],
[
AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
AC_DEFINE([OPENSSL_LOBOTOMISED_AES], [1],
[libcrypto is missing AES 192 and 256 bit functions])
]
)
# Check for OpenSSL with EVP_aes_*ctr
AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether OpenSSL has AES CTR via EVP])
AC_LINK_IFELSE(
[AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
#include <string.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
]], [[
exit(EVP_aes_128_ctr() == NULL ||
EVP_aes_192_cbc() == NULL ||
EVP_aes_256_cbc() == NULL);
]])],
[
AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
AC_DEFINE([OPENSSL_HAVE_EVPCTR], [1],
[libcrypto has EVP AES CTR])
],
[
AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
]
)
# Check for OpenSSL with EVP_aes_*gcm
AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether OpenSSL has AES GCM via EVP])
AC_LINK_IFELSE(
[AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
#include <string.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
]], [[
exit(EVP_aes_128_gcm() == NULL ||
EVP_aes_256_gcm() == NULL ||
EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_FIXED == 0 ||
EVP_CTRL_GCM_IV_GEN == 0 ||
EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_TAG == 0 ||
EVP_CTRL_GCM_GET_TAG == 0 ||
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(NULL, 0, 0, NULL) == 0);
]])],
[
AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
AC_DEFINE([OPENSSL_HAVE_EVPGCM], [1],
[libcrypto has EVP AES GCM])
],
[
AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
unsupported_algorithms="$unsupported_cipers \
aes128-gcm@openssh.com \
aes256-gcm@openssh.com"
]
)
AC_MSG_CHECKING([if EVP_DigestUpdate returns an int])
AC_LINK_IFELSE(
[AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
#include <string.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
]], [[
if(EVP_DigestUpdate(NULL, NULL,0))
exit(0);
]])],
[
AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
],
[
AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
AC_DEFINE([OPENSSL_EVP_DIGESTUPDATE_VOID], [1],
[Define if EVP_DigestUpdate returns void])
]
)
# Some systems want crypt() from libcrypt, *not* the version in OpenSSL,
# because the system crypt() is more featureful.
if test "x$check_for_libcrypt_before" = "x1"; then
AC_CHECK_LIB([crypt], [crypt])
fi
# Some Linux systems (Slackware) need crypt() from libcrypt, *not* the
# version in OpenSSL.
if test "x$check_for_libcrypt_later" = "x1"; then
AC_CHECK_LIB([crypt], [crypt], [LIBS="$LIBS -lcrypt"])
fi
AC_CHECK_FUNCS([crypt DES_crypt])
# Check for SHA256, SHA384 and SHA512 support in OpenSSL
AC_CHECK_FUNCS([EVP_sha256 EVP_sha384 EVP_sha512])
- # Search for RIPE-MD support in OpenSSL
- AC_CHECK_FUNCS([EVP_ripemd160], ,
- [unsupported_algorithms="$unsupported_algorithms \
- hmac-ripemd160 \
- hmac-ripemd160@openssh.com \
- hmac-ripemd160-etm@openssh.com"
- ]
- )
-
# Check complete ECC support in OpenSSL
AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether OpenSSL has NID_X9_62_prime256v1])
AC_LINK_IFELSE(
[AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
#include <openssl/ec.h>
#include <openssl/ecdh.h>
#include <openssl/ecdsa.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/objects.h>
#include <openssl/opensslv.h>
]], [[
EC_KEY *e = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(NID_X9_62_prime256v1);
const EVP_MD *m = EVP_sha256(); /* We need this too */
]])],
[ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
enable_nistp256=1 ],
[ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) ]
)
AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether OpenSSL has NID_secp384r1])
AC_LINK_IFELSE(
[AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
#include <openssl/ec.h>
#include <openssl/ecdh.h>
#include <openssl/ecdsa.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/objects.h>
#include <openssl/opensslv.h>
]], [[
EC_KEY *e = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(NID_secp384r1);
const EVP_MD *m = EVP_sha384(); /* We need this too */
]])],
[ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
enable_nistp384=1 ],
[ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) ]
)
AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether OpenSSL has NID_secp521r1])
AC_LINK_IFELSE(
[AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
#include <openssl/ec.h>
#include <openssl/ecdh.h>
#include <openssl/ecdsa.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/objects.h>
#include <openssl/opensslv.h>
]], [[
EC_KEY *e = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(NID_secp521r1);
const EVP_MD *m = EVP_sha512(); /* We need this too */
]])],
[ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
AC_MSG_CHECKING([if OpenSSL's NID_secp521r1 is functional])
AC_RUN_IFELSE(
[AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
#include <openssl/ec.h>
#include <openssl/ecdh.h>
#include <openssl/ecdsa.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/objects.h>
#include <openssl/opensslv.h>
]],[[
EC_KEY *e = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(NID_secp521r1);
const EVP_MD *m = EVP_sha512(); /* We need this too */
exit(e == NULL || m == NULL);
]])],
[ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
enable_nistp521=1 ],
[ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) ],
[ AC_MSG_WARN([cross-compiling: assuming yes])
enable_nistp521=1 ]
)],
AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
)
COMMENT_OUT_ECC="#no ecc#"
TEST_SSH_ECC=no
if test x$enable_nistp256 = x1 || test x$enable_nistp384 = x1 || \
test x$enable_nistp521 = x1; then
AC_DEFINE(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC, [1], [OpenSSL has ECC])
AC_CHECK_FUNCS([EC_KEY_METHOD_new])
+ openssl_ecc=yes
+ else
+ openssl_ecc=no
fi
if test x$enable_nistp256 = x1; then
AC_DEFINE([OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP256], [1],
[libcrypto has NID_X9_62_prime256v1])
TEST_SSH_ECC=yes
COMMENT_OUT_ECC=""
else
unsupported_algorithms="$unsupported_algorithms \
ecdsa-sha2-nistp256 \
ecdh-sha2-nistp256 \
ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com"
fi
if test x$enable_nistp384 = x1; then
AC_DEFINE([OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP384], [1], [libcrypto has NID_secp384r1])
TEST_SSH_ECC=yes
COMMENT_OUT_ECC=""
else
unsupported_algorithms="$unsupported_algorithms \
ecdsa-sha2-nistp384 \
ecdh-sha2-nistp384 \
ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com"
fi
if test x$enable_nistp521 = x1; then
AC_DEFINE([OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521], [1], [libcrypto has NID_secp521r1])
TEST_SSH_ECC=yes
COMMENT_OUT_ECC=""
else
unsupported_algorithms="$unsupported_algorithms \
ecdh-sha2-nistp521 \
ecdsa-sha2-nistp521 \
ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com"
fi
AC_SUBST([TEST_SSH_ECC])
AC_SUBST([COMMENT_OUT_ECC])
else
AC_CHECK_LIB([crypt], [crypt], [LIBS="$LIBS -lcrypt"])
AC_CHECK_FUNCS([crypt])
fi
+# PKCS11/U2F depend on OpenSSL and dlopen().
+enable_pkcs11=yes
+enable_sk=yes
+if test "x$openssl" != "xyes" ; then
+ enable_pkcs11="disabled; missing libcrypto"
+ enable_sk="disabled; missing libcrypto"
+fi
+if test "x$openssl_ecc" != "xyes" ; then
+ enable_sk="disabled; OpenSSL has no ECC support"
+fi
+if test "x$ac_cv_func_dlopen" != "xyes" ; then
+ enable_pkcs11="disabled; missing dlopen(3)"
+ enable_sk="disabled; missing dlopen(3)"
+fi
+if test "x$ac_cv_have_decl_RTLD_NOW" != "xyes" ; then
+ enable_pkcs11="disabled; missing RTLD_NOW"
+ enable_sk="disabled; missing RTLD_NOW"
+fi
+if test ! -z "$disable_pkcs11" ; then
+ enable_pkcs11="disabled by user"
+fi
+if test ! -z "$disable_sk" ; then
+ enable_sk="disabled by user"
+fi
+
+AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether to enable PKCS11])
+if test "x$enable_pkcs11" = "xyes" ; then
+ AC_DEFINE([ENABLE_PKCS11], [], [Enable for PKCS#11 support])
+fi
+AC_MSG_RESULT([$enable_pkcs11])
+
+AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether to enable U2F])
+if test "x$enable_sk" = "xyes" ; then
+ AC_DEFINE([ENABLE_SK], [], [Enable for U2F/FIDO support])
+fi
+AC_MSG_RESULT([$enable_sk])
+
+# Now check for built-in security key support.
+if test "x$enable_sk" = "xyes" -a "x$enable_sk_internal" = "xyes" ; then
+ AC_PATH_TOOL([PKGCONFIG], [pkg-config], [no])
+ use_pkgconfig_for_libfido2=
+ if test "x$PKGCONFIG" != "xno"; then
+ AC_MSG_CHECKING([if $PKGCONFIG knows about libfido2])
+ if "$PKGCONFIG" libfido2; then
+ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
+ use_pkgconfig_for_libfido2=yes
+ else
+ AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
+ fi
+ fi
+ if test "x$use_pkgconfig_for_libfido2" = "xyes"; then
+ LIBFIDO2=`$PKGCONFIG --libs libfido2`
+ CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS `$PKGCONFIG --cflags libfido2`"
+ else
+ LIBFIDO2="-lfido2 -lcbor"
+ fi
+ OTHERLIBS=`echo $LIBFIDO2 | sed 's/-lfido2//'`
+ AC_CHECK_LIB([fido2], [fido_init],
+ [
+ AC_SUBST([LIBFIDO2])
+ AC_DEFINE([ENABLE_SK_INTERNAL], [],
+ [Enable for built-in U2F/FIDO support])
+ enable_sk="built-in"
+ ], [ ],
+ [ $OTHERLIBS ]
+ )
+fi
+
AC_CHECK_FUNCS([ \
arc4random \
arc4random_buf \
arc4random_stir \
arc4random_uniform \
])
saved_LIBS="$LIBS"
AC_CHECK_LIB([iaf], [ia_openinfo], [
LIBS="$LIBS -liaf"
AC_CHECK_FUNCS([set_id], [SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -liaf"
AC_DEFINE([HAVE_LIBIAF], [1],
[Define if system has libiaf that supports set_id])
])
])
LIBS="$saved_LIBS"
### Configure cryptographic random number support
# Check whether OpenSSL seeds itself
if test "x$openssl" = "xyes" ; then
AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether OpenSSL's PRNG is internally seeded])
AC_RUN_IFELSE(
[AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
#include <string.h>
#include <openssl/rand.h>
]], [[
exit(RAND_status() == 1 ? 0 : 1);
]])],
[
OPENSSL_SEEDS_ITSELF=yes
AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
],
[
AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
],
[
AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: assuming yes])
# This is safe, since we will fatal() at runtime if
# OpenSSL is not seeded correctly.
OPENSSL_SEEDS_ITSELF=yes
]
)
fi
# PRNGD TCP socket
AC_ARG_WITH([prngd-port],
[ --with-prngd-port=PORT read entropy from PRNGD/EGD TCP localhost:PORT],
[
case "$withval" in
no)
withval=""
;;
[[0-9]]*)
;;
*)
AC_MSG_ERROR([You must specify a numeric port number for --with-prngd-port])
;;
esac
if test ! -z "$withval" ; then
PRNGD_PORT="$withval"
AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([PRNGD_PORT], [$PRNGD_PORT],
[Port number of PRNGD/EGD random number socket])
fi
]
)
# PRNGD Unix domain socket
AC_ARG_WITH([prngd-socket],
[ --with-prngd-socket=FILE read entropy from PRNGD/EGD socket FILE (default=/var/run/egd-pool)],
[
case "$withval" in
yes)
withval="/var/run/egd-pool"
;;
no)
withval=""
;;
/*)
;;
*)
AC_MSG_ERROR([You must specify an absolute path to the entropy socket])
;;
esac
if test ! -z "$withval" ; then
if test ! -z "$PRNGD_PORT" ; then
AC_MSG_ERROR([You may not specify both a PRNGD/EGD port and socket])
fi
if test ! -r "$withval" ; then
AC_MSG_WARN([Entropy socket is not readable])
fi
PRNGD_SOCKET="$withval"
AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([PRNGD_SOCKET], ["$PRNGD_SOCKET"],
[Location of PRNGD/EGD random number socket])
fi
],
[
# Check for existing socket only if we don't have a random device already
if test "x$OPENSSL_SEEDS_ITSELF" != "xyes" ; then
AC_MSG_CHECKING([for PRNGD/EGD socket])
# Insert other locations here
for sock in /var/run/egd-pool /dev/egd-pool /etc/entropy; do
if test -r $sock && $TEST_MINUS_S_SH -c "test -S $sock -o -p $sock" ; then
PRNGD_SOCKET="$sock"
AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([PRNGD_SOCKET], ["$PRNGD_SOCKET"])
break;
fi
done
if test ! -z "$PRNGD_SOCKET" ; then
AC_MSG_RESULT([$PRNGD_SOCKET])
else
AC_MSG_RESULT([not found])
fi
fi
]
)
# Which randomness source do we use?
if test ! -z "$PRNGD_PORT" ; then
RAND_MSG="PRNGd port $PRNGD_PORT"
elif test ! -z "$PRNGD_SOCKET" ; then
RAND_MSG="PRNGd socket $PRNGD_SOCKET"
elif test ! -z "$OPENSSL_SEEDS_ITSELF" ; then
AC_DEFINE([OPENSSL_PRNG_ONLY], [1],
[Define if you want the OpenSSL internally seeded PRNG only])
RAND_MSG="OpenSSL internal ONLY"
elif test "x$openssl" = "xno" ; then
AC_MSG_WARN([OpenSSH will use /dev/urandom as a source of random numbers. It will fail if this device is not supported or accessible])
else
AC_MSG_ERROR([OpenSSH has no source of random numbers. Please configure OpenSSL with an entropy source or re-run configure using one of the --with-prngd-port or --with-prngd-socket options])
fi
# Check for PAM libs
PAM_MSG="no"
AC_ARG_WITH([pam],
[ --with-pam Enable PAM support ],
[
if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
if test "x$ac_cv_header_security_pam_appl_h" != "xyes" && \
test "x$ac_cv_header_pam_pam_appl_h" != "xyes" ; then
AC_MSG_ERROR([PAM headers not found])
fi
saved_LIBS="$LIBS"
AC_CHECK_LIB([dl], [dlopen], , )
AC_CHECK_LIB([pam], [pam_set_item], , [AC_MSG_ERROR([*** libpam missing])])
AC_CHECK_FUNCS([pam_getenvlist])
AC_CHECK_FUNCS([pam_putenv])
LIBS="$saved_LIBS"
PAM_MSG="yes"
SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -lpam"
AC_DEFINE([USE_PAM], [1],
[Define if you want to enable PAM support])
if test $ac_cv_lib_dl_dlopen = yes; then
case "$LIBS" in
*-ldl*)
# libdl already in LIBS
;;
*)
SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS -ldl"
;;
esac
fi
fi
]
)
AC_ARG_WITH([pam-service],
[ --with-pam-service=name Specify PAM service name ],
[
if test "x$withval" != "xno" && \
test "x$withval" != "xyes" ; then
AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([SSHD_PAM_SERVICE],
["$withval"], [sshd PAM service name])
fi
]
)
# Check for older PAM
if test "x$PAM_MSG" = "xyes" ; then
# Check PAM strerror arguments (old PAM)
AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether pam_strerror takes only one argument])
AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
#include <stdlib.h>
#if defined(HAVE_SECURITY_PAM_APPL_H)
#include <security/pam_appl.h>
#elif defined (HAVE_PAM_PAM_APPL_H)
#include <pam/pam_appl.h>
#endif
]], [[
(void)pam_strerror((pam_handle_t *)NULL, -1);
]])], [AC_MSG_RESULT([no])], [
AC_DEFINE([HAVE_OLD_PAM], [1],
[Define if you have an old version of PAM
which takes only one argument to pam_strerror])
AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
PAM_MSG="yes (old library)"
])
fi
case "$host" in
*-*-cygwin*)
SSH_PRIVSEP_USER=CYGWIN_SSH_PRIVSEP_USER
;;
*)
SSH_PRIVSEP_USER=sshd
;;
esac
AC_ARG_WITH([privsep-user],
[ --with-privsep-user=user Specify non-privileged user for privilege separation],
[
if test -n "$withval" && test "x$withval" != "xno" && \
test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then
SSH_PRIVSEP_USER=$withval
fi
]
)
if test "x$SSH_PRIVSEP_USER" = "xCYGWIN_SSH_PRIVSEP_USER" ; then
AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([SSH_PRIVSEP_USER], [CYGWIN_SSH_PRIVSEP_USER],
[Cygwin function to fetch non-privileged user for privilege separation])
else
AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([SSH_PRIVSEP_USER], ["$SSH_PRIVSEP_USER"],
[non-privileged user for privilege separation])
fi
AC_SUBST([SSH_PRIVSEP_USER])
if test "x$have_linux_no_new_privs" = "x1" ; then
AC_CHECK_DECL([SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER], [have_seccomp_filter=1], , [
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <linux/seccomp.h>
])
fi
if test "x$have_seccomp_filter" = "x1" ; then
AC_MSG_CHECKING([kernel for seccomp_filter support])
AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
#include <errno.h>
#include <elf.h>
#include <linux/audit.h>
#include <linux/seccomp.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <sys/prctl.h>
]],
[[ int i = $seccomp_audit_arch;
errno = 0;
prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, NULL, 0, 0);
exit(errno == EFAULT ? 0 : 1); ]])],
[ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ], [
AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
# Disable seccomp filter as a target
have_seccomp_filter=0
]
)
fi
# Decide which sandbox style to use
sandbox_arg=""
AC_ARG_WITH([sandbox],
[ --with-sandbox=style Specify privilege separation sandbox (no, capsicum, darwin, rlimit, seccomp_filter, systrace, pledge)],
[
if test "x$withval" = "xyes" ; then
sandbox_arg=""
else
sandbox_arg="$withval"
fi
]
)
# Some platforms (seems to be the ones that have a kernel poll(2)-type
# function with which they implement select(2)) use an extra file descriptor
# when calling select(2), which means we can't use the rlimit sandbox.
AC_MSG_CHECKING([if select works with descriptor rlimit])
AC_RUN_IFELSE(
[AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
#include <sys/types.h>
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
# include <sys/time.h>
#endif
#include <sys/resource.h>
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SELECT_H
# include <sys/select.h>
#endif
#include <errno.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
]],[[
struct rlimit rl_zero;
int fd, r;
fd_set fds;
struct timeval tv;
fd = open("/dev/null", O_RDONLY);
FD_ZERO(&fds);
FD_SET(fd, &fds);
rl_zero.rlim_cur = rl_zero.rlim_max = 0;
setrlimit(RLIMIT_FSIZE, &rl_zero);
setrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE, &rl_zero);
tv.tv_sec = 1;
tv.tv_usec = 0;
r = select(fd+1, &fds, NULL, NULL, &tv);
exit (r == -1 ? 1 : 0);
]])],
[AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
select_works_with_rlimit=yes],
[AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
select_works_with_rlimit=no],
[AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: assuming yes])
select_works_with_rlimit=yes]
)
AC_MSG_CHECKING([if setrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE,{0,0}) works])
AC_RUN_IFELSE(
[AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
#include <sys/types.h>
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
# include <sys/time.h>
#endif
#include <sys/resource.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
]],[[
struct rlimit rl_zero;
int r;
rl_zero.rlim_cur = rl_zero.rlim_max = 0;
r = setrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE, &rl_zero);
exit (r == -1 ? 1 : 0);
]])],
[AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
rlimit_nofile_zero_works=yes],
[AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
rlimit_nofile_zero_works=no],
[AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: assuming yes])
rlimit_nofile_zero_works=yes]
)
AC_MSG_CHECKING([if setrlimit RLIMIT_FSIZE works])
AC_RUN_IFELSE(
[AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/resource.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
]],[[
struct rlimit rl_zero;
rl_zero.rlim_cur = rl_zero.rlim_max = 0;
exit(setrlimit(RLIMIT_FSIZE, &rl_zero) != 0);
]])],
[AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])],
[AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
AC_DEFINE(SANDBOX_SKIP_RLIMIT_FSIZE, 1,
[setrlimit RLIMIT_FSIZE works])],
[AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: assuming yes])]
)
if test "x$sandbox_arg" = "xpledge" || \
( test -z "$sandbox_arg" && test "x$ac_cv_func_pledge" = "xyes" ) ; then
test "x$ac_cv_func_pledge" != "xyes" && \
AC_MSG_ERROR([pledge sandbox requires pledge(2) support])
SANDBOX_STYLE="pledge"
AC_DEFINE([SANDBOX_PLEDGE], [1], [Sandbox using pledge(2)])
elif test "x$sandbox_arg" = "xsystrace" || \
( test -z "$sandbox_arg" && test "x$have_systr_policy_kill" = "x1" ) ; then
test "x$have_systr_policy_kill" != "x1" && \
AC_MSG_ERROR([systrace sandbox requires systrace headers and SYSTR_POLICY_KILL support])
SANDBOX_STYLE="systrace"
AC_DEFINE([SANDBOX_SYSTRACE], [1], [Sandbox using systrace(4)])
elif test "x$sandbox_arg" = "xdarwin" || \
( test -z "$sandbox_arg" && test "x$ac_cv_func_sandbox_init" = "xyes" && \
test "x$ac_cv_header_sandbox_h" = "xyes") ; then
test "x$ac_cv_func_sandbox_init" != "xyes" -o \
"x$ac_cv_header_sandbox_h" != "xyes" && \
AC_MSG_ERROR([Darwin seatbelt sandbox requires sandbox.h and sandbox_init function])
SANDBOX_STYLE="darwin"
AC_DEFINE([SANDBOX_DARWIN], [1], [Sandbox using Darwin sandbox_init(3)])
elif test "x$sandbox_arg" = "xseccomp_filter" || \
( test -z "$sandbox_arg" && \
test "x$have_seccomp_filter" = "x1" && \
test "x$ac_cv_header_elf_h" = "xyes" && \
test "x$ac_cv_header_linux_audit_h" = "xyes" && \
test "x$ac_cv_header_linux_filter_h" = "xyes" && \
test "x$seccomp_audit_arch" != "x" && \
test "x$have_linux_no_new_privs" = "x1" && \
test "x$ac_cv_func_prctl" = "xyes" ) ; then
test "x$seccomp_audit_arch" = "x" && \
AC_MSG_ERROR([seccomp_filter sandbox not supported on $host])
test "x$have_linux_no_new_privs" != "x1" && \
AC_MSG_ERROR([seccomp_filter sandbox requires PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS])
test "x$have_seccomp_filter" != "x1" && \
AC_MSG_ERROR([seccomp_filter sandbox requires seccomp headers])
test "x$ac_cv_func_prctl" != "xyes" && \
AC_MSG_ERROR([seccomp_filter sandbox requires prctl function])
SANDBOX_STYLE="seccomp_filter"
AC_DEFINE([SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER], [1], [Sandbox using seccomp filter])
elif test "x$sandbox_arg" = "xcapsicum" || \
( test -z "$sandbox_arg" && \
test "x$ac_cv_header_sys_capsicum_h" = "xyes" && \
test "x$ac_cv_func_cap_rights_limit" = "xyes") ; then
test "x$ac_cv_header_sys_capsicum_h" != "xyes" && \
AC_MSG_ERROR([capsicum sandbox requires sys/capsicum.h header])
test "x$ac_cv_func_cap_rights_limit" != "xyes" && \
AC_MSG_ERROR([capsicum sandbox requires cap_rights_limit function])
SANDBOX_STYLE="capsicum"
AC_DEFINE([SANDBOX_CAPSICUM], [1], [Sandbox using capsicum])
elif test "x$sandbox_arg" = "xrlimit" || \
( test -z "$sandbox_arg" && test "x$ac_cv_func_setrlimit" = "xyes" && \
test "x$select_works_with_rlimit" = "xyes" && \
test "x$rlimit_nofile_zero_works" = "xyes" ) ; then
test "x$ac_cv_func_setrlimit" != "xyes" && \
AC_MSG_ERROR([rlimit sandbox requires setrlimit function])
test "x$select_works_with_rlimit" != "xyes" && \
AC_MSG_ERROR([rlimit sandbox requires select to work with rlimit])
SANDBOX_STYLE="rlimit"
AC_DEFINE([SANDBOX_RLIMIT], [1], [Sandbox using setrlimit(2)])
elif test "x$sandbox_arg" = "xsolaris" || \
( test -z "$sandbox_arg" && test "x$SOLARIS_PRIVS" = "xyes" ) ; then
SANDBOX_STYLE="solaris"
AC_DEFINE([SANDBOX_SOLARIS], [1], [Sandbox using Solaris/Illumos privileges])
elif test -z "$sandbox_arg" || test "x$sandbox_arg" = "xno" || \
test "x$sandbox_arg" = "xnone" || test "x$sandbox_arg" = "xnull" ; then
SANDBOX_STYLE="none"
AC_DEFINE([SANDBOX_NULL], [1], [no privsep sandboxing])
else
AC_MSG_ERROR([unsupported --with-sandbox])
fi
# Cheap hack to ensure NEWS-OS libraries are arranged right.
if test ! -z "$SONY" ; then
LIBS="$LIBS -liberty";
fi
# Check for long long datatypes
AC_CHECK_TYPES([long long, unsigned long long, long double])
# Check datatype sizes
AC_CHECK_SIZEOF([short int])
AC_CHECK_SIZEOF([int])
AC_CHECK_SIZEOF([long int])
AC_CHECK_SIZEOF([long long int])
# Sanity check long long for some platforms (AIX)
if test "x$ac_cv_sizeof_long_long_int" = "x4" ; then
ac_cv_sizeof_long_long_int=0
fi
# compute LLONG_MIN and LLONG_MAX if we don't know them.
if test -z "$have_llong_max"; then
AC_MSG_CHECKING([for max value of long long])
AC_RUN_IFELSE(
[AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
#include <stdio.h>
/* Why is this so damn hard? */
#ifdef __GNUC__
# undef __GNUC__
#endif
#define __USE_ISOC99
#include <limits.h>
#define DATA "conftest.llminmax"
#define my_abs(a) ((a) < 0 ? ((a) * -1) : (a))
/*
* printf in libc on some platforms (eg old Tru64) does not understand %lld so
* we do this the hard way.
*/
static int
fprint_ll(FILE *f, long long n)
{
unsigned int i;
int l[sizeof(long long) * 8];
if (n < 0)
if (fprintf(f, "-") < 0)
return -1;
for (i = 0; n != 0; i++) {
l[i] = my_abs(n % 10);
n /= 10;
}
do {
if (fprintf(f, "%d", l[--i]) < 0)
return -1;
} while (i != 0);
if (fprintf(f, " ") < 0)
return -1;
return 0;
}
]], [[
FILE *f;
long long i, llmin, llmax = 0;
if((f = fopen(DATA,"w")) == NULL)
exit(1);
#if defined(LLONG_MIN) && defined(LLONG_MAX)
fprintf(stderr, "Using system header for LLONG_MIN and LLONG_MAX\n");
llmin = LLONG_MIN;
llmax = LLONG_MAX;
#else
fprintf(stderr, "Calculating LLONG_MIN and LLONG_MAX\n");
/* This will work on one's complement and two's complement */
for (i = 1; i > llmax; i <<= 1, i++)
llmax = i;
llmin = llmax + 1LL; /* wrap */
#endif
/* Sanity check */
if (llmin + 1 < llmin || llmin - 1 < llmin || llmax + 1 > llmax
|| llmax - 1 > llmax || llmin == llmax || llmin == 0
|| llmax == 0 || llmax < LONG_MAX || llmin > LONG_MIN) {
fprintf(f, "unknown unknown\n");
exit(2);
}
if (fprint_ll(f, llmin) < 0)
exit(3);
if (fprint_ll(f, llmax) < 0)
exit(4);
if (fclose(f) < 0)
exit(5);
exit(0);
]])],
[
llong_min=`$AWK '{print $1}' conftest.llminmax`
llong_max=`$AWK '{print $2}' conftest.llminmax`
AC_MSG_RESULT([$llong_max])
AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([LLONG_MAX], [${llong_max}LL],
[max value of long long calculated by configure])
AC_MSG_CHECKING([for min value of long long])
AC_MSG_RESULT([$llong_min])
AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([LLONG_MIN], [${llong_min}LL],
[min value of long long calculated by configure])
],
[
AC_MSG_RESULT([not found])
],
[
AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: not checking])
]
)
fi
+AC_CHECK_DECLS([UINT32_MAX], , , [[
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_LIMITS_H
+# include <sys/limits.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_LIMITS_H
+# include <limits.h>
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
+# include <stdint.h>
+#endif
+]])
# More checks for data types
AC_CACHE_CHECK([for u_int type], ac_cv_have_u_int, [
AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include <sys/types.h> ]],
[[ u_int a; a = 1;]])],
[ ac_cv_have_u_int="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have_u_int="no"
])
])
if test "x$ac_cv_have_u_int" = "xyes" ; then
AC_DEFINE([HAVE_U_INT], [1], [define if you have u_int data type])
have_u_int=1
fi
AC_CACHE_CHECK([for intXX_t types], ac_cv_have_intxx_t, [
AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include <sys/types.h> ]],
[[ int8_t a; int16_t b; int32_t c; a = b = c = 1;]])],
[ ac_cv_have_intxx_t="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have_intxx_t="no"
])
])
if test "x$ac_cv_have_intxx_t" = "xyes" ; then
AC_DEFINE([HAVE_INTXX_T], [1], [define if you have intxx_t data type])
have_intxx_t=1
fi
if (test -z "$have_intxx_t" && \
test "x$ac_cv_header_stdint_h" = "xyes")
then
AC_MSG_CHECKING([for intXX_t types in stdint.h])
AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include <stdint.h> ]],
[[ int8_t a; int16_t b; int32_t c; a = b = c = 1;]])],
[
AC_DEFINE([HAVE_INTXX_T])
AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
])
fi
AC_CACHE_CHECK([for int64_t type], ac_cv_have_int64_t, [
AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
#include <sys/types.h>
#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
# include <stdint.h>
#endif
#include <sys/socket.h>
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_BITYPES_H
# include <sys/bitypes.h>
#endif
]], [[
int64_t a; a = 1;
]])],
[ ac_cv_have_int64_t="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have_int64_t="no"
])
])
if test "x$ac_cv_have_int64_t" = "xyes" ; then
AC_DEFINE([HAVE_INT64_T], [1], [define if you have int64_t data type])
fi
AC_CACHE_CHECK([for u_intXX_t types], ac_cv_have_u_intxx_t, [
AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include <sys/types.h> ]],
[[ u_int8_t a; u_int16_t b; u_int32_t c; a = b = c = 1;]])],
[ ac_cv_have_u_intxx_t="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have_u_intxx_t="no"
])
])
if test "x$ac_cv_have_u_intxx_t" = "xyes" ; then
AC_DEFINE([HAVE_U_INTXX_T], [1], [define if you have u_intxx_t data type])
have_u_intxx_t=1
fi
if test -z "$have_u_intxx_t" ; then
AC_MSG_CHECKING([for u_intXX_t types in sys/socket.h])
AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include <sys/socket.h> ]],
[[ u_int8_t a; u_int16_t b; u_int32_t c; a = b = c = 1;]])],
[
AC_DEFINE([HAVE_U_INTXX_T])
AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
])
fi
AC_CACHE_CHECK([for u_int64_t types], ac_cv_have_u_int64_t, [
AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include <sys/types.h> ]],
[[ u_int64_t a; a = 1;]])],
[ ac_cv_have_u_int64_t="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have_u_int64_t="no"
])
])
if test "x$ac_cv_have_u_int64_t" = "xyes" ; then
AC_DEFINE([HAVE_U_INT64_T], [1], [define if you have u_int64_t data type])
have_u_int64_t=1
fi
if (test -z "$have_u_int64_t" && \
test "x$ac_cv_header_sys_bitypes_h" = "xyes")
then
AC_MSG_CHECKING([for u_int64_t type in sys/bitypes.h])
AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include <sys/bitypes.h> ]],
[[ u_int64_t a; a = 1]])],
[
AC_DEFINE([HAVE_U_INT64_T])
AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
])
fi
if test -z "$have_u_intxx_t" ; then
AC_CACHE_CHECK([for uintXX_t types], ac_cv_have_uintxx_t, [
AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
#include <sys/types.h>
]], [[
uint8_t a;
uint16_t b;
uint32_t c;
a = b = c = 1;
]])],
[ ac_cv_have_uintxx_t="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have_uintxx_t="no"
])
])
if test "x$ac_cv_have_uintxx_t" = "xyes" ; then
AC_DEFINE([HAVE_UINTXX_T], [1],
[define if you have uintxx_t data type])
fi
fi
if (test -z "$have_uintxx_t" && \
test "x$ac_cv_header_stdint_h" = "xyes")
then
AC_MSG_CHECKING([for uintXX_t types in stdint.h])
AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include <stdint.h> ]],
[[ uint8_t a; uint16_t b; uint32_t c; a = b = c = 1;]])],
[
AC_DEFINE([HAVE_UINTXX_T])
AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
])
fi
if (test -z "$have_uintxx_t" && \
test "x$ac_cv_header_inttypes_h" = "xyes")
then
AC_MSG_CHECKING([for uintXX_t types in inttypes.h])
AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include <inttypes.h> ]],
[[ uint8_t a; uint16_t b; uint32_t c; a = b = c = 1;]])],
[
AC_DEFINE([HAVE_UINTXX_T])
AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
])
fi
if (test -z "$have_u_intxx_t" || test -z "$have_intxx_t" && \
test "x$ac_cv_header_sys_bitypes_h" = "xyes")
then
AC_MSG_CHECKING([for intXX_t and u_intXX_t types in sys/bitypes.h])
AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
#include <sys/bitypes.h>
]], [[
int8_t a; int16_t b; int32_t c;
u_int8_t e; u_int16_t f; u_int32_t g;
a = b = c = e = f = g = 1;
]])],
[
AC_DEFINE([HAVE_U_INTXX_T])
AC_DEFINE([HAVE_INTXX_T])
AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
], [AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
])
fi
AC_CACHE_CHECK([for u_char], ac_cv_have_u_char, [
AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include <sys/types.h> ]],
[[ u_char foo; foo = 125; ]])],
[ ac_cv_have_u_char="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have_u_char="no"
])
])
if test "x$ac_cv_have_u_char" = "xyes" ; then
AC_DEFINE([HAVE_U_CHAR], [1], [define if you have u_char data type])
fi
AC_CHECK_TYPES([intmax_t, uintmax_t], , , [
#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <stdint.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
+# include <stdint.h>
+#endif
])
TYPE_SOCKLEN_T
AC_CHECK_TYPES([sig_atomic_t], , , [#include <signal.h>])
AC_CHECK_TYPES([fsblkcnt_t, fsfilcnt_t], , , [
#include <sys/types.h>
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_BITYPES_H
#include <sys/bitypes.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STATFS_H
#include <sys/statfs.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STATVFS_H
#include <sys/statvfs.h>
#endif
])
-AC_CHECK_MEMBERS([struct statfs.f_flags], [], [], [[
+AC_CHECK_MEMBERS([struct statfs.f_files, struct statfs.f_flags], [], [], [[
+#include <sys/param.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_BITYPES_H
#include <sys/bitypes.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STATFS_H
#include <sys/statfs.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STATVFS_H
#include <sys/statvfs.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_VFS_H
#include <sys/vfs.h>
#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_MOUNT_H
+#include <sys/mount.h>
+#endif
]])
AC_CHECK_TYPES([in_addr_t, in_port_t], , ,
[#include <sys/types.h>
#include <netinet/in.h>])
AC_CACHE_CHECK([for size_t], ac_cv_have_size_t, [
AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include <sys/types.h> ]],
[[ size_t foo; foo = 1235; ]])],
[ ac_cv_have_size_t="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have_size_t="no"
])
])
if test "x$ac_cv_have_size_t" = "xyes" ; then
AC_DEFINE([HAVE_SIZE_T], [1], [define if you have size_t data type])
fi
AC_CACHE_CHECK([for ssize_t], ac_cv_have_ssize_t, [
AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include <sys/types.h> ]],
[[ ssize_t foo; foo = 1235; ]])],
[ ac_cv_have_ssize_t="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have_ssize_t="no"
])
])
if test "x$ac_cv_have_ssize_t" = "xyes" ; then
AC_DEFINE([HAVE_SSIZE_T], [1], [define if you have ssize_t data type])
fi
AC_CACHE_CHECK([for clock_t], ac_cv_have_clock_t, [
AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include <time.h> ]],
[[ clock_t foo; foo = 1235; ]])],
[ ac_cv_have_clock_t="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have_clock_t="no"
])
])
if test "x$ac_cv_have_clock_t" = "xyes" ; then
AC_DEFINE([HAVE_CLOCK_T], [1], [define if you have clock_t data type])
fi
AC_CACHE_CHECK([for sa_family_t], ac_cv_have_sa_family_t, [
AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
]], [[ sa_family_t foo; foo = 1235; ]])],
[ ac_cv_have_sa_family_t="yes" ],
[ AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <netinet/in.h>
]], [[ sa_family_t foo; foo = 1235; ]])],
[ ac_cv_have_sa_family_t="yes" ],
[ ac_cv_have_sa_family_t="no" ]
)
])
])
if test "x$ac_cv_have_sa_family_t" = "xyes" ; then
AC_DEFINE([HAVE_SA_FAMILY_T], [1],
[define if you have sa_family_t data type])
fi
AC_CACHE_CHECK([for pid_t], ac_cv_have_pid_t, [
AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include <sys/types.h> ]],
[[ pid_t foo; foo = 1235; ]])],
[ ac_cv_have_pid_t="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have_pid_t="no"
])
])
if test "x$ac_cv_have_pid_t" = "xyes" ; then
AC_DEFINE([HAVE_PID_T], [1], [define if you have pid_t data type])
fi
AC_CACHE_CHECK([for mode_t], ac_cv_have_mode_t, [
AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include <sys/types.h> ]],
[[ mode_t foo; foo = 1235; ]])],
[ ac_cv_have_mode_t="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have_mode_t="no"
])
])
if test "x$ac_cv_have_mode_t" = "xyes" ; then
AC_DEFINE([HAVE_MODE_T], [1], [define if you have mode_t data type])
fi
AC_CACHE_CHECK([for struct sockaddr_storage], ac_cv_have_struct_sockaddr_storage, [
AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
]], [[ struct sockaddr_storage s; ]])],
[ ac_cv_have_struct_sockaddr_storage="yes" ],
[ ac_cv_have_struct_sockaddr_storage="no"
])
])
if test "x$ac_cv_have_struct_sockaddr_storage" = "xyes" ; then
AC_DEFINE([HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKADDR_STORAGE], [1],
[define if you have struct sockaddr_storage data type])
fi
AC_CACHE_CHECK([for struct sockaddr_in6], ac_cv_have_struct_sockaddr_in6, [
AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <netinet/in.h>
]], [[ struct sockaddr_in6 s; s.sin6_family = 0; ]])],
[ ac_cv_have_struct_sockaddr_in6="yes" ],
[ ac_cv_have_struct_sockaddr_in6="no"
])
])
if test "x$ac_cv_have_struct_sockaddr_in6" = "xyes" ; then
AC_DEFINE([HAVE_STRUCT_SOCKADDR_IN6], [1],
[define if you have struct sockaddr_in6 data type])
fi
AC_CACHE_CHECK([for struct in6_addr], ac_cv_have_struct_in6_addr, [
AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <netinet/in.h>
]], [[ struct in6_addr s; s.s6_addr[0] = 0; ]])],
[ ac_cv_have_struct_in6_addr="yes" ],
[ ac_cv_have_struct_in6_addr="no"
])
])
if test "x$ac_cv_have_struct_in6_addr" = "xyes" ; then
AC_DEFINE([HAVE_STRUCT_IN6_ADDR], [1],
[define if you have struct in6_addr data type])
dnl Now check for sin6_scope_id
AC_CHECK_MEMBERS([struct sockaddr_in6.sin6_scope_id], , ,
[
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H
#include <sys/types.h>
#endif
#include <netinet/in.h>
])
fi
AC_CACHE_CHECK([for struct addrinfo], ac_cv_have_struct_addrinfo, [
AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <netdb.h>
]], [[ struct addrinfo s; s.ai_flags = AI_PASSIVE; ]])],
[ ac_cv_have_struct_addrinfo="yes" ],
[ ac_cv_have_struct_addrinfo="no"
])
])
if test "x$ac_cv_have_struct_addrinfo" = "xyes" ; then
AC_DEFINE([HAVE_STRUCT_ADDRINFO], [1],
[define if you have struct addrinfo data type])
fi
+AC_HEADER_TIME
+
AC_CACHE_CHECK([for struct timeval], ac_cv_have_struct_timeval, [
AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include <sys/time.h> ]],
[[ struct timeval tv; tv.tv_sec = 1;]])],
[ ac_cv_have_struct_timeval="yes" ],
[ ac_cv_have_struct_timeval="no"
])
])
if test "x$ac_cv_have_struct_timeval" = "xyes" ; then
AC_DEFINE([HAVE_STRUCT_TIMEVAL], [1], [define if you have struct timeval])
have_struct_timeval=1
fi
-AC_CHECK_TYPES([struct timespec])
+AC_CACHE_CHECK([for struct timespec], ac_cv_have_struct_timespec, [
+ AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
+ #ifdef TIME_WITH_SYS_TIME
+ # include <sys/time.h>
+ # include <time.h>
+ #else
+ # ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
+ # include <sys/time.h>
+ # else
+ # include <time.h>
+ # endif
+ #endif
+ ]],
+ [[ struct timespec ts; ts.tv_sec = 1;]])],
+ [ ac_cv_have_struct_timespec="yes" ],
+ [ ac_cv_have_struct_timespec="no"
+ ])
+])
+if test "x$ac_cv_have_struct_timespec" = "xyes" ; then
+ AC_DEFINE([HAVE_STRUCT_TIMESPEC], [1], [define if you have struct timespec])
+ have_struct_timespec=1
+fi
# We need int64_t or else certain parts of the compile will fail.
if test "x$ac_cv_have_int64_t" = "xno" && \
test "x$ac_cv_sizeof_long_int" != "x8" && \
test "x$ac_cv_sizeof_long_long_int" = "x0" ; then
echo "OpenSSH requires int64_t support. Contact your vendor or install"
echo "an alternative compiler (I.E., GCC) before continuing."
echo ""
exit 1;
else
dnl test snprintf (broken on SCO w/gcc)
AC_RUN_IFELSE(
[AC_LANG_SOURCE([[
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#ifdef HAVE_SNPRINTF
main()
{
char buf[50];
char expected_out[50];
int mazsize = 50 ;
#if (SIZEOF_LONG_INT == 8)
long int num = 0x7fffffffffffffff;
#else
long long num = 0x7fffffffffffffffll;
#endif
strcpy(expected_out, "9223372036854775807");
snprintf(buf, mazsize, "%lld", num);
if(strcmp(buf, expected_out) != 0)
exit(1);
exit(0);
}
#else
main() { exit(0); }
#endif
]])], [ true ], [ AC_DEFINE([BROKEN_SNPRINTF]) ],
AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: Assuming working snprintf()])
)
fi
dnl Checks for structure members
OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD([ut_host], [utmp.h], [HAVE_HOST_IN_UTMP])
OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD([ut_host], [utmpx.h], [HAVE_HOST_IN_UTMPX])
OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD([syslen], [utmpx.h], [HAVE_SYSLEN_IN_UTMPX])
OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD([ut_pid], [utmp.h], [HAVE_PID_IN_UTMP])
OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD([ut_type], [utmp.h], [HAVE_TYPE_IN_UTMP])
OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD([ut_type], [utmpx.h], [HAVE_TYPE_IN_UTMPX])
OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD([ut_tv], [utmp.h], [HAVE_TV_IN_UTMP])
OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD([ut_id], [utmp.h], [HAVE_ID_IN_UTMP])
OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD([ut_id], [utmpx.h], [HAVE_ID_IN_UTMPX])
OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD([ut_addr], [utmp.h], [HAVE_ADDR_IN_UTMP])
OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD([ut_addr], [utmpx.h], [HAVE_ADDR_IN_UTMPX])
OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD([ut_addr_v6], [utmp.h], [HAVE_ADDR_V6_IN_UTMP])
OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD([ut_addr_v6], [utmpx.h], [HAVE_ADDR_V6_IN_UTMPX])
OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD([ut_exit], [utmp.h], [HAVE_EXIT_IN_UTMP])
OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD([ut_time], [utmp.h], [HAVE_TIME_IN_UTMP])
OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD([ut_time], [utmpx.h], [HAVE_TIME_IN_UTMPX])
OSSH_CHECK_HEADER_FOR_FIELD([ut_tv], [utmpx.h], [HAVE_TV_IN_UTMPX])
AC_CHECK_MEMBERS([struct stat.st_blksize])
AC_CHECK_MEMBERS([struct stat.st_mtim])
AC_CHECK_MEMBERS([struct stat.st_mtime])
AC_CHECK_MEMBERS([struct passwd.pw_gecos, struct passwd.pw_class,
struct passwd.pw_change, struct passwd.pw_expire],
[], [], [[
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <pwd.h>
]])
AC_CHECK_MEMBER([struct __res_state.retrans], [], [AC_DEFINE([__res_state], [state],
[Define if we don't have struct __res_state in resolv.h])],
[[
#include <stdio.h>
#if HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H
# include <sys/types.h>
#endif
#include <netinet/in.h>
#include <arpa/nameser.h>
#include <resolv.h>
]])
AC_CACHE_CHECK([for ss_family field in struct sockaddr_storage],
ac_cv_have_ss_family_in_struct_ss, [
AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
]], [[ struct sockaddr_storage s; s.ss_family = 1; ]])],
[ ac_cv_have_ss_family_in_struct_ss="yes" ],
[ ac_cv_have_ss_family_in_struct_ss="no" ])
])
if test "x$ac_cv_have_ss_family_in_struct_ss" = "xyes" ; then
AC_DEFINE([HAVE_SS_FAMILY_IN_SS], [1], [Fields in struct sockaddr_storage])
fi
AC_CACHE_CHECK([for __ss_family field in struct sockaddr_storage],
ac_cv_have___ss_family_in_struct_ss, [
AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
]], [[ struct sockaddr_storage s; s.__ss_family = 1; ]])],
[ ac_cv_have___ss_family_in_struct_ss="yes" ],
[ ac_cv_have___ss_family_in_struct_ss="no"
])
])
if test "x$ac_cv_have___ss_family_in_struct_ss" = "xyes" ; then
AC_DEFINE([HAVE___SS_FAMILY_IN_SS], [1],
[Fields in struct sockaddr_storage])
fi
dnl make sure we're using the real structure members and not defines
AC_CACHE_CHECK([for msg_accrights field in struct msghdr],
ac_cv_have_accrights_in_msghdr, [
AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <sys/uio.h>
]], [[
#ifdef msg_accrights
#error "msg_accrights is a macro"
exit(1);
#endif
struct msghdr m;
m.msg_accrights = 0;
exit(0);
]])],
[ ac_cv_have_accrights_in_msghdr="yes" ],
[ ac_cv_have_accrights_in_msghdr="no" ]
)
])
if test "x$ac_cv_have_accrights_in_msghdr" = "xyes" ; then
AC_DEFINE([HAVE_ACCRIGHTS_IN_MSGHDR], [1],
[Define if your system uses access rights style
file descriptor passing])
fi
AC_MSG_CHECKING([if struct statvfs.f_fsid is integral type])
AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
#include <sys/param.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
# include <sys/time.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_MOUNT_H
#include <sys/mount.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STATVFS_H
#include <sys/statvfs.h>
#endif
]], [[ struct statvfs s; s.f_fsid = 0; ]])],
[ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ],
[ AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
AC_MSG_CHECKING([if fsid_t has member val])
AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/statvfs.h>
]], [[ fsid_t t; t.val[0] = 0; ]])],
[ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
AC_DEFINE([FSID_HAS_VAL], [1], [fsid_t has member val]) ],
[ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) ])
AC_MSG_CHECKING([if f_fsid has member __val])
AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/statvfs.h>
]], [[ fsid_t t; t.__val[0] = 0; ]])],
[ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
AC_DEFINE([FSID_HAS___VAL], [1], [fsid_t has member __val]) ],
[ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) ])
])
AC_CACHE_CHECK([for msg_control field in struct msghdr],
ac_cv_have_control_in_msghdr, [
AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <sys/uio.h>
]], [[
#ifdef msg_control
#error "msg_control is a macro"
exit(1);
#endif
struct msghdr m;
m.msg_control = 0;
exit(0);
]])],
[ ac_cv_have_control_in_msghdr="yes" ],
[ ac_cv_have_control_in_msghdr="no" ]
)
])
if test "x$ac_cv_have_control_in_msghdr" = "xyes" ; then
AC_DEFINE([HAVE_CONTROL_IN_MSGHDR], [1],
[Define if your system uses ancillary data style
file descriptor passing])
fi
AC_CACHE_CHECK([if libc defines __progname], ac_cv_libc_defines___progname, [
AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[]],
[[ extern char *__progname; printf("%s", __progname); ]])],
[ ac_cv_libc_defines___progname="yes" ],
[ ac_cv_libc_defines___progname="no"
])
])
if test "x$ac_cv_libc_defines___progname" = "xyes" ; then
AC_DEFINE([HAVE___PROGNAME], [1], [Define if libc defines __progname])
fi
AC_CACHE_CHECK([whether $CC implements __FUNCTION__], ac_cv_cc_implements___FUNCTION__, [
AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include <stdio.h> ]],
[[ printf("%s", __FUNCTION__); ]])],
[ ac_cv_cc_implements___FUNCTION__="yes" ],
[ ac_cv_cc_implements___FUNCTION__="no"
])
])
if test "x$ac_cv_cc_implements___FUNCTION__" = "xyes" ; then
AC_DEFINE([HAVE___FUNCTION__], [1],
[Define if compiler implements __FUNCTION__])
fi
AC_CACHE_CHECK([whether $CC implements __func__], ac_cv_cc_implements___func__, [
AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include <stdio.h> ]],
[[ printf("%s", __func__); ]])],
[ ac_cv_cc_implements___func__="yes" ],
[ ac_cv_cc_implements___func__="no"
])
])
if test "x$ac_cv_cc_implements___func__" = "xyes" ; then
AC_DEFINE([HAVE___func__], [1], [Define if compiler implements __func__])
fi
AC_CACHE_CHECK([whether va_copy exists], ac_cv_have_va_copy, [
AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
#include <stdarg.h>
va_list x,y;
]], [[ va_copy(x,y); ]])],
[ ac_cv_have_va_copy="yes" ],
[ ac_cv_have_va_copy="no"
])
])
if test "x$ac_cv_have_va_copy" = "xyes" ; then
AC_DEFINE([HAVE_VA_COPY], [1], [Define if va_copy exists])
fi
AC_CACHE_CHECK([whether __va_copy exists], ac_cv_have___va_copy, [
AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
#include <stdarg.h>
va_list x,y;
]], [[ __va_copy(x,y); ]])],
[ ac_cv_have___va_copy="yes" ], [ ac_cv_have___va_copy="no"
])
])
if test "x$ac_cv_have___va_copy" = "xyes" ; then
AC_DEFINE([HAVE___VA_COPY], [1], [Define if __va_copy exists])
fi
AC_CACHE_CHECK([whether getopt has optreset support],
ac_cv_have_getopt_optreset, [
AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include <getopt.h> ]],
[[ extern int optreset; optreset = 0; ]])],
[ ac_cv_have_getopt_optreset="yes" ],
[ ac_cv_have_getopt_optreset="no"
])
])
if test "x$ac_cv_have_getopt_optreset" = "xyes" ; then
AC_DEFINE([HAVE_GETOPT_OPTRESET], [1],
[Define if your getopt(3) defines and uses optreset])
fi
AC_CACHE_CHECK([if libc defines sys_errlist], ac_cv_libc_defines_sys_errlist, [
AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[]],
[[ extern const char *const sys_errlist[]; printf("%s", sys_errlist[0]);]])],
[ ac_cv_libc_defines_sys_errlist="yes" ],
[ ac_cv_libc_defines_sys_errlist="no"
])
])
if test "x$ac_cv_libc_defines_sys_errlist" = "xyes" ; then
AC_DEFINE([HAVE_SYS_ERRLIST], [1],
[Define if your system defines sys_errlist[]])
fi
AC_CACHE_CHECK([if libc defines sys_nerr], ac_cv_libc_defines_sys_nerr, [
AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[]],
[[ extern int sys_nerr; printf("%i", sys_nerr);]])],
[ ac_cv_libc_defines_sys_nerr="yes" ],
[ ac_cv_libc_defines_sys_nerr="no"
])
])
if test "x$ac_cv_libc_defines_sys_nerr" = "xyes" ; then
AC_DEFINE([HAVE_SYS_NERR], [1], [Define if your system defines sys_nerr])
fi
# Check libraries needed by DNS fingerprint support
AC_SEARCH_LIBS([getrrsetbyname], [resolv],
[AC_DEFINE([HAVE_GETRRSETBYNAME], [1],
[Define if getrrsetbyname() exists])],
[
# Needed by our getrrsetbyname()
AC_SEARCH_LIBS([res_query], [resolv])
AC_SEARCH_LIBS([dn_expand], [resolv])
AC_MSG_CHECKING([if res_query will link])
AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <netinet/in.h>
#include <arpa/nameser.h>
#include <netdb.h>
#include <resolv.h>
]], [[
res_query (0, 0, 0, 0, 0);
]])],
AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]),
[AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
saved_LIBS="$LIBS"
LIBS="$LIBS -lresolv"
AC_MSG_CHECKING([for res_query in -lresolv])
AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <netinet/in.h>
#include <arpa/nameser.h>
#include <netdb.h>
#include <resolv.h>
]], [[
res_query (0, 0, 0, 0, 0);
]])],
[AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])],
[LIBS="$saved_LIBS"
AC_MSG_RESULT([no])])
])
AC_CHECK_FUNCS([_getshort _getlong])
AC_CHECK_DECLS([_getshort, _getlong], , ,
[#include <sys/types.h>
#include <arpa/nameser.h>])
AC_CHECK_MEMBER([HEADER.ad],
[AC_DEFINE([HAVE_HEADER_AD], [1],
[Define if HEADER.ad exists in arpa/nameser.h])], ,
[#include <arpa/nameser.h>])
])
AC_MSG_CHECKING([if struct __res_state _res is an extern])
AC_LINK_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
#include <stdio.h>
#if HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H
# include <sys/types.h>
#endif
#include <netinet/in.h>
#include <arpa/nameser.h>
#include <resolv.h>
extern struct __res_state _res;
]], [[
struct __res_state *volatile p = &_res; /* force resolution of _res */
return 0;
]],)],
[AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
AC_DEFINE([HAVE__RES_EXTERN], [1],
[Define if you have struct __res_state _res as an extern])
],
[ AC_MSG_RESULT([no]) ]
)
# Check whether user wants SELinux support
SELINUX_MSG="no"
LIBSELINUX=""
AC_ARG_WITH([selinux],
[ --with-selinux Enable SELinux support],
[ if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
save_LIBS="$LIBS"
AC_DEFINE([WITH_SELINUX], [1],
[Define if you want SELinux support.])
SELINUX_MSG="yes"
AC_CHECK_HEADER([selinux/selinux.h], ,
AC_MSG_ERROR([SELinux support requires selinux.h header]))
AC_CHECK_LIB([selinux], [setexeccon],
[ LIBSELINUX="-lselinux"
LIBS="$LIBS -lselinux"
],
AC_MSG_ERROR([SELinux support requires libselinux library]))
SSHLIBS="$SSHLIBS $LIBSELINUX"
SSHDLIBS="$SSHDLIBS $LIBSELINUX"
AC_CHECK_FUNCS([getseuserbyname get_default_context_with_level])
LIBS="$save_LIBS"
fi ]
)
AC_SUBST([SSHLIBS])
AC_SUBST([SSHDLIBS])
# Check whether user wants Kerberos 5 support
KRB5_MSG="no"
AC_ARG_WITH([kerberos5],
[ --with-kerberos5=PATH Enable Kerberos 5 support],
[ if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
if test "x$withval" = "xyes" ; then
KRB5ROOT="/usr/local"
else
KRB5ROOT=${withval}
fi
AC_DEFINE([KRB5], [1], [Define if you want Kerberos 5 support])
KRB5_MSG="yes"
AC_PATH_TOOL([KRB5CONF], [krb5-config],
[$KRB5ROOT/bin/krb5-config],
[$KRB5ROOT/bin:$PATH])
if test -x $KRB5CONF ; then
K5CFLAGS="`$KRB5CONF --cflags`"
K5LIBS="`$KRB5CONF --libs`"
CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS $K5CFLAGS"
AC_MSG_CHECKING([for gssapi support])
if $KRB5CONF | grep gssapi >/dev/null ; then
AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
AC_DEFINE([GSSAPI], [1],
[Define this if you want GSSAPI
support in the version 2 protocol])
GSSCFLAGS="`$KRB5CONF --cflags gssapi`"
GSSLIBS="`$KRB5CONF --libs gssapi`"
CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS $GSSCFLAGS"
else
AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
fi
AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether we are using Heimdal])
AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include <krb5.h>
]], [[ char *tmp = heimdal_version; ]])],
[ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
AC_DEFINE([HEIMDAL], [1],
[Define this if you are using the Heimdal
version of Kerberos V5]) ],
[AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
])
else
CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -I${KRB5ROOT}/include"
LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS -L${KRB5ROOT}/lib"
AC_MSG_CHECKING([whether we are using Heimdal])
AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[ #include <krb5.h>
]], [[ char *tmp = heimdal_version; ]])],
[ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
AC_DEFINE([HEIMDAL])
K5LIBS="-lkrb5"
K5LIBS="$K5LIBS -lcom_err -lasn1"
AC_CHECK_LIB([roken], [net_write],
[K5LIBS="$K5LIBS -lroken"])
AC_CHECK_LIB([des], [des_cbc_encrypt],
[K5LIBS="$K5LIBS -ldes"])
], [ AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
K5LIBS="-lkrb5 -lk5crypto -lcom_err"
])
AC_SEARCH_LIBS([dn_expand], [resolv])
AC_CHECK_LIB([gssapi_krb5], [gss_init_sec_context],
[ AC_DEFINE([GSSAPI])
GSSLIBS="-lgssapi_krb5" ],
[ AC_CHECK_LIB([gssapi], [gss_init_sec_context],
[ AC_DEFINE([GSSAPI])
GSSLIBS="-lgssapi" ],
[ AC_CHECK_LIB([gss], [gss_init_sec_context],
[ AC_DEFINE([GSSAPI])
GSSLIBS="-lgss" ],
AC_MSG_WARN([Cannot find any suitable gss-api library - build may fail]))
])
])
AC_CHECK_HEADER([gssapi.h], ,
[ unset ac_cv_header_gssapi_h
CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -I${KRB5ROOT}/include/gssapi"
AC_CHECK_HEADERS([gssapi.h], ,
AC_MSG_WARN([Cannot find any suitable gss-api header - build may fail])
)
]
)
oldCPP="$CPPFLAGS"
CPPFLAGS="$CPPFLAGS -I${KRB5ROOT}/include/gssapi"
AC_CHECK_HEADER([gssapi_krb5.h], ,
[ CPPFLAGS="$oldCPP" ])
fi
if test -n "${rpath_opt}" ; then
LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS ${rpath_opt}${KRB5ROOT}/lib"
fi
if test ! -z "$blibpath" ; then
blibpath="$blibpath:${KRB5ROOT}/lib"
fi
AC_CHECK_HEADERS([gssapi.h gssapi/gssapi.h])
AC_CHECK_HEADERS([gssapi_krb5.h gssapi/gssapi_krb5.h])
AC_CHECK_HEADERS([gssapi_generic.h gssapi/gssapi_generic.h])
AC_SEARCH_LIBS([k_hasafs], [kafs], [AC_DEFINE([USE_AFS], [1],
[Define this if you want to use libkafs' AFS support])])
AC_CHECK_DECLS([GSS_C_NT_HOSTBASED_SERVICE], [], [], [[
#ifdef HAVE_GSSAPI_H
# include <gssapi.h>
#elif defined(HAVE_GSSAPI_GSSAPI_H)
# include <gssapi/gssapi.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_GSSAPI_GENERIC_H
# include <gssapi_generic.h>
#elif defined(HAVE_GSSAPI_GSSAPI_GENERIC_H)
# include <gssapi/gssapi_generic.h>
#endif
]])
saved_LIBS="$LIBS"
LIBS="$LIBS $K5LIBS"
AC_CHECK_FUNCS([krb5_cc_new_unique krb5_get_error_message krb5_free_error_message])
LIBS="$saved_LIBS"
fi
]
)
AC_SUBST([GSSLIBS])
AC_SUBST([K5LIBS])
# Looking for programs, paths and files
PRIVSEP_PATH=/var/empty
AC_ARG_WITH([privsep-path],
[ --with-privsep-path=xxx Path for privilege separation chroot (default=/var/empty)],
[
if test -n "$withval" && test "x$withval" != "xno" && \
test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then
PRIVSEP_PATH=$withval
fi
]
)
AC_SUBST([PRIVSEP_PATH])
AC_ARG_WITH([xauth],
[ --with-xauth=PATH Specify path to xauth program ],
[
if test -n "$withval" && test "x$withval" != "xno" && \
test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then
xauth_path=$withval
fi
],
[
TestPath="$PATH"
TestPath="${TestPath}${PATH_SEPARATOR}/usr/X/bin"
TestPath="${TestPath}${PATH_SEPARATOR}/usr/bin/X11"
TestPath="${TestPath}${PATH_SEPARATOR}/usr/X11R6/bin"
TestPath="${TestPath}${PATH_SEPARATOR}/usr/openwin/bin"
AC_PATH_PROG([xauth_path], [xauth], , [$TestPath])
if (test ! -z "$xauth_path" && test -x "/usr/openwin/bin/xauth") ; then
xauth_path="/usr/openwin/bin/xauth"
fi
]
)
STRIP_OPT=-s
AC_ARG_ENABLE([strip],
[ --disable-strip Disable calling strip(1) on install],
[
if test "x$enableval" = "xno" ; then
STRIP_OPT=
fi
]
)
AC_SUBST([STRIP_OPT])
if test -z "$xauth_path" ; then
XAUTH_PATH="undefined"
AC_SUBST([XAUTH_PATH])
else
AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([XAUTH_PATH], ["$xauth_path"],
[Define if xauth is found in your path])
XAUTH_PATH=$xauth_path
AC_SUBST([XAUTH_PATH])
fi
dnl # --with-maildir=/path/to/mail gets top priority.
dnl # if maildir is set in the platform case statement above we use that.
dnl # Otherwise we run a program to get the dir from system headers.
dnl # We first look for _PATH_MAILDIR then MAILDIR then _PATH_MAIL
dnl # If we find _PATH_MAILDIR we do nothing because that is what
dnl # session.c expects anyway. Otherwise we set to the value found
dnl # stripping any trailing slash. If for some strage reason our program
dnl # does not find what it needs, we default to /var/spool/mail.
# Check for mail directory
AC_ARG_WITH([maildir],
[ --with-maildir=/path/to/mail Specify your system mail directory],
[
if test "X$withval" != X && test "x$withval" != xno && \
test "x${withval}" != xyes; then
AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([MAIL_DIRECTORY], ["$withval"],
[Set this to your mail directory if you do not have _PATH_MAILDIR])
fi
],[
if test "X$maildir" != "X"; then
AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([MAIL_DIRECTORY], ["$maildir"])
else
AC_MSG_CHECKING([Discovering system mail directory])
AC_RUN_IFELSE(
[AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
#include <paths.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_MAILLOCK_H
#include <maillock.h>
#endif
#define DATA "conftest.maildir"
]], [[
FILE *fd;
int rc;
fd = fopen(DATA,"w");
if(fd == NULL)
exit(1);
#if defined (_PATH_MAILDIR)
if ((rc = fprintf(fd ,"_PATH_MAILDIR:%s\n", _PATH_MAILDIR)) <0)
exit(1);
#elif defined (MAILDIR)
if ((rc = fprintf(fd ,"MAILDIR:%s\n", MAILDIR)) <0)
exit(1);
#elif defined (_PATH_MAIL)
if ((rc = fprintf(fd ,"_PATH_MAIL:%s\n", _PATH_MAIL)) <0)
exit(1);
#else
exit (2);
#endif
exit(0);
]])],
[
maildir_what=`awk -F: '{print $1}' conftest.maildir`
maildir=`awk -F: '{print $2}' conftest.maildir \
| sed 's|/$||'`
AC_MSG_RESULT([Using: $maildir from $maildir_what])
if test "x$maildir_what" != "x_PATH_MAILDIR"; then
AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([MAIL_DIRECTORY], ["$maildir"])
fi
],
[
if test "X$ac_status" = "X2";then
# our test program didn't find it. Default to /var/spool/mail
AC_MSG_RESULT([Using: default value of /var/spool/mail])
AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([MAIL_DIRECTORY], ["/var/spool/mail"])
else
AC_MSG_RESULT([*** not found ***])
fi
],
[
AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: use --with-maildir=/path/to/mail])
]
)
fi
]
) # maildir
if test ! -z "$cross_compiling" && test "x$cross_compiling" = "xyes"; then
AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: Disabling /dev/ptmx test])
disable_ptmx_check=yes
fi
if test -z "$no_dev_ptmx" ; then
if test "x$disable_ptmx_check" != "xyes" ; then
AC_CHECK_FILE(["/dev/ptmx"],
[
AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([HAVE_DEV_PTMX], [1],
[Define if you have /dev/ptmx])
have_dev_ptmx=1
]
)
fi
fi
if test ! -z "$cross_compiling" && test "x$cross_compiling" != "xyes"; then
AC_CHECK_FILE(["/dev/ptc"],
[
AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([HAVE_DEV_PTS_AND_PTC], [1],
[Define if you have /dev/ptc])
have_dev_ptc=1
]
)
else
AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: Disabling /dev/ptc test])
fi
# Options from here on. Some of these are preset by platform above
AC_ARG_WITH([mantype],
[ --with-mantype=man|cat|doc Set man page type],
[
case "$withval" in
man|cat|doc)
MANTYPE=$withval
;;
*)
AC_MSG_ERROR([invalid man type: $withval])
;;
esac
]
)
if test -z "$MANTYPE"; then
if ${MANDOC} ${srcdir}/ssh.1 >/dev/null 2>&1; then
MANTYPE=doc
elif ${NROFF} -mdoc ${srcdir}/ssh.1 >/dev/null 2>&1; then
MANTYPE=doc
elif ${NROFF} -man ${srcdir}/ssh.1 >/dev/null 2>&1; then
MANTYPE=man
else
MANTYPE=cat
fi
fi
AC_SUBST([MANTYPE])
if test "$MANTYPE" = "doc"; then
mansubdir=man;
else
mansubdir=$MANTYPE;
fi
AC_SUBST([mansubdir])
# Check whether to enable MD5 passwords
MD5_MSG="no"
AC_ARG_WITH([md5-passwords],
[ --with-md5-passwords Enable use of MD5 passwords],
[
if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
AC_DEFINE([HAVE_MD5_PASSWORDS], [1],
[Define if you want to allow MD5 passwords])
MD5_MSG="yes"
fi
]
)
# Whether to disable shadow password support
AC_ARG_WITH([shadow],
[ --without-shadow Disable shadow password support],
[
if test "x$withval" = "xno" ; then
AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_SHADOW])
disable_shadow=yes
fi
]
)
if test -z "$disable_shadow" ; then
AC_MSG_CHECKING([if the systems has expire shadow information])
AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <shadow.h>
struct spwd sp;
]], [[ sp.sp_expire = sp.sp_lstchg = sp.sp_inact = 0; ]])],
[ sp_expire_available=yes ], [
])
if test "x$sp_expire_available" = "xyes" ; then
AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
AC_DEFINE([HAS_SHADOW_EXPIRE], [1],
[Define if you want to use shadow password expire field])
else
AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
fi
fi
# Use ip address instead of hostname in $DISPLAY
if test ! -z "$IPADDR_IN_DISPLAY" ; then
DISPLAY_HACK_MSG="yes"
AC_DEFINE([IPADDR_IN_DISPLAY], [1],
[Define if you need to use IP address
instead of hostname in $DISPLAY])
else
DISPLAY_HACK_MSG="no"
AC_ARG_WITH([ipaddr-display],
[ --with-ipaddr-display Use ip address instead of hostname in $DISPLAY],
[
if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
AC_DEFINE([IPADDR_IN_DISPLAY])
DISPLAY_HACK_MSG="yes"
fi
]
)
fi
# check for /etc/default/login and use it if present.
AC_ARG_ENABLE([etc-default-login],
[ --disable-etc-default-login Disable using PATH from /etc/default/login [no]],
[ if test "x$enableval" = "xno"; then
AC_MSG_NOTICE([/etc/default/login handling disabled])
etc_default_login=no
else
etc_default_login=yes
fi ],
[ if test ! -z "$cross_compiling" && test "x$cross_compiling" = "xyes";
then
AC_MSG_WARN([cross compiling: not checking /etc/default/login])
etc_default_login=no
else
etc_default_login=yes
fi ]
)
if test "x$etc_default_login" != "xno"; then
AC_CHECK_FILE(["/etc/default/login"],
[ external_path_file=/etc/default/login ])
if test "x$external_path_file" = "x/etc/default/login"; then
AC_DEFINE([HAVE_ETC_DEFAULT_LOGIN], [1],
[Define if your system has /etc/default/login])
fi
fi
dnl BSD systems use /etc/login.conf so --with-default-path= has no effect
if test $ac_cv_func_login_getcapbool = "yes" && \
test $ac_cv_header_login_cap_h = "yes" ; then
external_path_file=/etc/login.conf
fi
# Whether to mess with the default path
SERVER_PATH_MSG="(default)"
AC_ARG_WITH([default-path],
[ --with-default-path= Specify default $PATH environment for server],
[
if test "x$external_path_file" = "x/etc/login.conf" ; then
AC_MSG_WARN([
--with-default-path=PATH has no effect on this system.
Edit /etc/login.conf instead.])
elif test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
if test ! -z "$external_path_file" ; then
AC_MSG_WARN([
--with-default-path=PATH will only be used if PATH is not defined in
$external_path_file .])
fi
user_path="$withval"
SERVER_PATH_MSG="$withval"
fi
],
[ if test "x$external_path_file" = "x/etc/login.conf" ; then
AC_MSG_WARN([Make sure the path to scp is in /etc/login.conf])
else
if test ! -z "$external_path_file" ; then
AC_MSG_WARN([
If PATH is defined in $external_path_file, ensure the path to scp is included,
otherwise scp will not work.])
fi
AC_RUN_IFELSE(
[AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
/* find out what STDPATH is */
#include <stdio.h>
#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
# include <paths.h>
#endif
#ifndef _PATH_STDPATH
# ifdef _PATH_USERPATH /* Irix */
# define _PATH_STDPATH _PATH_USERPATH
# else
# define _PATH_STDPATH "/usr/bin:/bin:/usr/sbin:/sbin"
# endif
#endif
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#define DATA "conftest.stdpath"
]], [[
FILE *fd;
int rc;
fd = fopen(DATA,"w");
if(fd == NULL)
exit(1);
if ((rc = fprintf(fd,"%s", _PATH_STDPATH)) < 0)
exit(1);
exit(0);
]])],
[ user_path=`cat conftest.stdpath` ],
[ user_path="/usr/bin:/bin:/usr/sbin:/sbin" ],
[ user_path="/usr/bin:/bin:/usr/sbin:/sbin" ]
)
# make sure $bindir is in USER_PATH so scp will work
t_bindir="${bindir}"
while echo "${t_bindir}" | egrep '\$\{|NONE/' >/dev/null 2>&1; do
t_bindir=`eval echo ${t_bindir}`
case $t_bindir in
NONE/*) t_bindir=`echo $t_bindir | sed "s~NONE~$prefix~"` ;;
esac
case $t_bindir in
NONE/*) t_bindir=`echo $t_bindir | sed "s~NONE~$ac_default_prefix~"` ;;
esac
done
echo $user_path | grep ":$t_bindir" > /dev/null 2>&1
if test $? -ne 0 ; then
echo $user_path | grep "^$t_bindir" > /dev/null 2>&1
if test $? -ne 0 ; then
user_path=$user_path:$t_bindir
AC_MSG_RESULT([Adding $t_bindir to USER_PATH so scp will work])
fi
fi
fi ]
)
if test "x$external_path_file" != "x/etc/login.conf" ; then
AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([USER_PATH], ["$user_path"], [Specify default $PATH])
AC_SUBST([user_path])
fi
# Set superuser path separately to user path
AC_ARG_WITH([superuser-path],
[ --with-superuser-path= Specify different path for super-user],
[
if test -n "$withval" && test "x$withval" != "xno" && \
test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then
AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([SUPERUSER_PATH], ["$withval"],
[Define if you want a different $PATH
for the superuser])
superuser_path=$withval
fi
]
)
AC_MSG_CHECKING([if we need to convert IPv4 in IPv6-mapped addresses])
IPV4_IN6_HACK_MSG="no"
AC_ARG_WITH(4in6,
[ --with-4in6 Check for and convert IPv4 in IPv6 mapped addresses],
[
if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
AC_MSG_RESULT([yes])
AC_DEFINE([IPV4_IN_IPV6], [1],
[Detect IPv4 in IPv6 mapped addresses
and treat as IPv4])
IPV4_IN6_HACK_MSG="yes"
else
AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
fi
], [
if test "x$inet6_default_4in6" = "xyes"; then
AC_MSG_RESULT([yes (default)])
AC_DEFINE([IPV4_IN_IPV6])
IPV4_IN6_HACK_MSG="yes"
else
AC_MSG_RESULT([no (default)])
fi
]
)
# Whether to enable BSD auth support
BSD_AUTH_MSG=no
AC_ARG_WITH([bsd-auth],
[ --with-bsd-auth Enable BSD auth support],
[
if test "x$withval" != "xno" ; then
AC_DEFINE([BSD_AUTH], [1],
[Define if you have BSD auth support])
BSD_AUTH_MSG=yes
fi
]
)
# Where to place sshd.pid
piddir=/var/run
# make sure the directory exists
if test ! -d $piddir ; then
piddir=`eval echo ${sysconfdir}`
case $piddir in
NONE/*) piddir=`echo $piddir | sed "s~NONE~$ac_default_prefix~"` ;;
esac
fi
AC_ARG_WITH([pid-dir],
[ --with-pid-dir=PATH Specify location of sshd.pid file],
[
if test -n "$withval" && test "x$withval" != "xno" && \
test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then
piddir=$withval
if test ! -d $piddir ; then
AC_MSG_WARN([** no $piddir directory on this system **])
fi
fi
]
)
AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([_PATH_SSH_PIDDIR], ["$piddir"],
[Specify location of ssh.pid])
AC_SUBST([piddir])
dnl allow user to disable some login recording features
AC_ARG_ENABLE([lastlog],
[ --disable-lastlog disable use of lastlog even if detected [no]],
[
if test "x$enableval" = "xno" ; then
AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_LASTLOG])
fi
]
)
AC_ARG_ENABLE([utmp],
[ --disable-utmp disable use of utmp even if detected [no]],
[
if test "x$enableval" = "xno" ; then
AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_UTMP])
fi
]
)
AC_ARG_ENABLE([utmpx],
[ --disable-utmpx disable use of utmpx even if detected [no]],
[
if test "x$enableval" = "xno" ; then
AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_UTMPX], [1],
[Define if you don't want to use utmpx])
fi
]
)
AC_ARG_ENABLE([wtmp],
[ --disable-wtmp disable use of wtmp even if detected [no]],
[
if test "x$enableval" = "xno" ; then
AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_WTMP])
fi
]
)
AC_ARG_ENABLE([wtmpx],
[ --disable-wtmpx disable use of wtmpx even if detected [no]],
[
if test "x$enableval" = "xno" ; then
AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_WTMPX], [1],
[Define if you don't want to use wtmpx])
fi
]
)
AC_ARG_ENABLE([libutil],
[ --disable-libutil disable use of libutil (login() etc.) [no]],
[
if test "x$enableval" = "xno" ; then
AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_LOGIN])
fi
]
)
AC_ARG_ENABLE([pututline],
[ --disable-pututline disable use of pututline() etc. ([uw]tmp) [no]],
[
if test "x$enableval" = "xno" ; then
AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_PUTUTLINE], [1],
[Define if you don't want to use pututline()
etc. to write [uw]tmp])
fi
]
)
AC_ARG_ENABLE([pututxline],
[ --disable-pututxline disable use of pututxline() etc. ([uw]tmpx) [no]],
[
if test "x$enableval" = "xno" ; then
AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_PUTUTXLINE], [1],
[Define if you don't want to use pututxline()
etc. to write [uw]tmpx])
fi
]
)
AC_ARG_WITH([lastlog],
[ --with-lastlog=FILE|DIR specify lastlog location [common locations]],
[
if test "x$withval" = "xno" ; then
AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_LASTLOG])
elif test -n "$withval" && test "x${withval}" != "xyes"; then
conf_lastlog_location=$withval
fi
]
)
dnl lastlog, [uw]tmpx? detection
dnl NOTE: set the paths in the platform section to avoid the
dnl need for command-line parameters
dnl lastlog and [uw]tmp are subject to a file search if all else fails
dnl lastlog detection
dnl NOTE: the code itself will detect if lastlog is a directory
AC_MSG_CHECKING([if your system defines LASTLOG_FILE])
AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <utmp.h>
#ifdef HAVE_LASTLOG_H
# include <lastlog.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
# include <paths.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_H
# include <login.h>
#endif
]], [[ char *lastlog = LASTLOG_FILE; ]])],
[ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ],
[
AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
AC_MSG_CHECKING([if your system defines _PATH_LASTLOG])
AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <utmp.h>
#ifdef HAVE_LASTLOG_H
# include <lastlog.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
# include <paths.h>
#endif
]], [[ char *lastlog = _PATH_LASTLOG; ]])],
[ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ],
[
AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
system_lastlog_path=no
])
])
if test -z "$conf_lastlog_location"; then
if test x"$system_lastlog_path" = x"no" ; then
for f in /var/log/lastlog /usr/adm/lastlog /var/adm/lastlog /etc/security/lastlog ; do
if (test -d "$f" || test -f "$f") ; then
conf_lastlog_location=$f
fi
done
if test -z "$conf_lastlog_location"; then
AC_MSG_WARN([** Cannot find lastlog **])
dnl Don't define DISABLE_LASTLOG - that means we don't try wtmp/wtmpx
fi
fi
fi
if test -n "$conf_lastlog_location"; then
AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([CONF_LASTLOG_FILE], ["$conf_lastlog_location"],
[Define if you want to specify the path to your lastlog file])
fi
dnl utmp detection
AC_MSG_CHECKING([if your system defines UTMP_FILE])
AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <utmp.h>
#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
# include <paths.h>
#endif
]], [[ char *utmp = UTMP_FILE; ]])],
[ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ],
[ AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
system_utmp_path=no
])
if test -z "$conf_utmp_location"; then
if test x"$system_utmp_path" = x"no" ; then
for f in /etc/utmp /usr/adm/utmp /var/run/utmp; do
if test -f $f ; then
conf_utmp_location=$f
fi
done
if test -z "$conf_utmp_location"; then
AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_UTMP])
fi
fi
fi
if test -n "$conf_utmp_location"; then
AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([CONF_UTMP_FILE], ["$conf_utmp_location"],
[Define if you want to specify the path to your utmp file])
fi
dnl wtmp detection
AC_MSG_CHECKING([if your system defines WTMP_FILE])
AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <utmp.h>
#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
# include <paths.h>
#endif
]], [[ char *wtmp = WTMP_FILE; ]])],
[ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ],
[ AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
system_wtmp_path=no
])
if test -z "$conf_wtmp_location"; then
if test x"$system_wtmp_path" = x"no" ; then
for f in /usr/adm/wtmp /var/log/wtmp; do
if test -f $f ; then
conf_wtmp_location=$f
fi
done
if test -z "$conf_wtmp_location"; then
AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_WTMP])
fi
fi
fi
if test -n "$conf_wtmp_location"; then
AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([CONF_WTMP_FILE], ["$conf_wtmp_location"],
[Define if you want to specify the path to your wtmp file])
fi
dnl wtmpx detection
AC_MSG_CHECKING([if your system defines WTMPX_FILE])
AC_COMPILE_IFELSE([AC_LANG_PROGRAM([[
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <utmp.h>
#ifdef HAVE_UTMPX_H
#include <utmpx.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
# include <paths.h>
#endif
]], [[ char *wtmpx = WTMPX_FILE; ]])],
[ AC_MSG_RESULT([yes]) ],
[ AC_MSG_RESULT([no])
system_wtmpx_path=no
])
if test -z "$conf_wtmpx_location"; then
if test x"$system_wtmpx_path" = x"no" ; then
AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_WTMPX])
fi
else
AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED([CONF_WTMPX_FILE], ["$conf_wtmpx_location"],
[Define if you want to specify the path to your wtmpx file])
fi
if test ! -z "$blibpath" ; then
LDFLAGS="$LDFLAGS $blibflags$blibpath"
AC_MSG_WARN([Please check and edit blibpath in LDFLAGS in Makefile])
fi
AC_CHECK_MEMBER([struct lastlog.ll_line], [], [
if test x$SKIP_DISABLE_LASTLOG_DEFINE != "xyes" ; then
AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_LASTLOG])
fi
], [
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H
#include <sys/types.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_UTMP_H
#include <utmp.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_UTMPX_H
#include <utmpx.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_LASTLOG_H
#include <lastlog.h>
#endif
])
AC_CHECK_MEMBER([struct utmp.ut_line], [], [
AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_UTMP])
AC_DEFINE([DISABLE_WTMP])
], [
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TYPES_H
#include <sys/types.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_UTMP_H
#include <utmp.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_UTMPX_H
#include <utmpx.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_LASTLOG_H
#include <lastlog.h>
#endif
])
dnl Adding -Werror to CFLAGS early prevents configure tests from running.
dnl Add now.
CFLAGS="$CFLAGS $werror_flags"
if test "x$ac_cv_func_getaddrinfo" != "xyes" ; then
TEST_SSH_IPV6=no
else
TEST_SSH_IPV6=yes
fi
AC_CHECK_DECL([BROKEN_GETADDRINFO], [TEST_SSH_IPV6=no])
AC_SUBST([TEST_SSH_IPV6], [$TEST_SSH_IPV6])
AC_SUBST([TEST_SSH_UTF8], [$TEST_SSH_UTF8])
AC_SUBST([TEST_MALLOC_OPTIONS], [$TEST_MALLOC_OPTIONS])
AC_SUBST([UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHMS], [$unsupported_algorithms])
AC_SUBST([DEPEND], [$(cat $srcdir/.depend)])
CFLAGS="${CFLAGS} ${CFLAGS_AFTER}"
LDFLAGS="${LDFLAGS} ${LDFLAGS_AFTER}"
+# Make a copy of CFLAGS/LDFLAGS without PIE options.
+LDFLAGS_NOPIE=`echo "$LDFLAGS" | sed 's/ -pie//'`
+CFLAGS_NOPIE=`echo "$CFLAGS" | sed 's/ -fPIE//'`
+AC_SUBST([LDFLAGS_NOPIE])
+AC_SUBST([CFLAGS_NOPIE])
+
AC_EXEEXT
AC_CONFIG_FILES([Makefile buildpkg.sh opensshd.init openssh.xml \
openbsd-compat/Makefile openbsd-compat/regress/Makefile \
survey.sh])
AC_OUTPUT
# Print summary of options
# Someone please show me a better way :)
A=`eval echo ${prefix}` ; A=`eval echo ${A}`
B=`eval echo ${bindir}` ; B=`eval echo ${B}`
C=`eval echo ${sbindir}` ; C=`eval echo ${C}`
D=`eval echo ${sysconfdir}` ; D=`eval echo ${D}`
E=`eval echo ${libexecdir}/ssh-askpass` ; E=`eval echo ${E}`
F=`eval echo ${mandir}/${mansubdir}X` ; F=`eval echo ${F}`
G=`eval echo ${piddir}` ; G=`eval echo ${G}`
H=`eval echo ${PRIVSEP_PATH}` ; H=`eval echo ${H}`
I=`eval echo ${user_path}` ; I=`eval echo ${I}`
J=`eval echo ${superuser_path}` ; J=`eval echo ${J}`
echo ""
echo "OpenSSH has been configured with the following options:"
echo " User binaries: $B"
echo " System binaries: $C"
echo " Configuration files: $D"
echo " Askpass program: $E"
echo " Manual pages: $F"
echo " PID file: $G"
echo " Privilege separation chroot path: $H"
if test "x$external_path_file" = "x/etc/login.conf" ; then
echo " At runtime, sshd will use the path defined in $external_path_file"
echo " Make sure the path to scp is present, otherwise scp will not work"
else
echo " sshd default user PATH: $I"
if test ! -z "$external_path_file"; then
echo " (If PATH is set in $external_path_file it will be used instead. If"
echo " used, ensure the path to scp is present, otherwise scp will not work.)"
fi
fi
if test ! -z "$superuser_path" ; then
echo " sshd superuser user PATH: $J"
fi
echo " Manpage format: $MANTYPE"
echo " PAM support: $PAM_MSG"
echo " OSF SIA support: $SIA_MSG"
echo " KerberosV support: $KRB5_MSG"
echo " SELinux support: $SELINUX_MSG"
echo " MD5 password support: $MD5_MSG"
echo " libedit support: $LIBEDIT_MSG"
echo " libldns support: $LDNS_MSG"
echo " Solaris process contract support: $SPC_MSG"
echo " Solaris project support: $SP_MSG"
echo " Solaris privilege support: $SPP_MSG"
echo " IP address in \$DISPLAY hack: $DISPLAY_HACK_MSG"
echo " Translate v4 in v6 hack: $IPV4_IN6_HACK_MSG"
echo " BSD Auth support: $BSD_AUTH_MSG"
echo " Random number source: $RAND_MSG"
echo " Privsep sandbox style: $SANDBOX_STYLE"
+echo " PKCS#11 support: $enable_pkcs11"
+echo " U2F/FIDO support: $enable_sk"
echo ""
echo " Host: ${host}"
echo " Compiler: ${CC}"
echo " Compiler flags: ${CFLAGS}"
echo "Preprocessor flags: ${CPPFLAGS}"
echo " Linker flags: ${LDFLAGS}"
echo " Libraries: ${LIBS}"
if test ! -z "${SSHDLIBS}"; then
echo " +for sshd: ${SSHDLIBS}"
fi
if test ! -z "${SSHLIBS}"; then
echo " +for ssh: ${SSHLIBS}"
fi
echo ""
if test "x$MAKE_PACKAGE_SUPPORTED" = "xyes" ; then
echo "SVR4 style packages are supported with \"make package\""
echo ""
fi
if test "x$PAM_MSG" = "xyes" ; then
echo "PAM is enabled. You may need to install a PAM control file "
echo "for sshd, otherwise password authentication may fail. "
echo "Example PAM control files can be found in the contrib/ "
echo "subdirectory"
echo ""
fi
if test ! -z "$NO_PEERCHECK" ; then
echo "WARNING: the operating system that you are using does not"
echo "appear to support getpeereid(), getpeerucred() or the"
echo "SO_PEERCRED getsockopt() option. These facilities are used to"
echo "enforce security checks to prevent unauthorised connections to"
echo "ssh-agent. Their absence increases the risk that a malicious"
echo "user can connect to your agent."
echo ""
fi
if test "$AUDIT_MODULE" = "bsm" ; then
echo "WARNING: BSM audit support is currently considered EXPERIMENTAL."
echo "See the Solaris section in README.platform for details."
fi
diff --git a/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c b/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c
index 535a692749e9..bc83a2d670f4 100644
--- a/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c
+++ b/contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass2.c
@@ -1,225 +1,254 @@
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000-2002 Damien Miller. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
/* GTK2 support by Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com> */
/*
* This is a simple GNOME SSH passphrase grabber. To use it, set the
* environment variable SSH_ASKPASS to point to the location of
* gnome-ssh-askpass before calling "ssh-add < /dev/null".
*
* There is only two run-time options: if you set the environment variable
* "GNOME_SSH_ASKPASS_GRAB_SERVER=true" then gnome-ssh-askpass will grab
* the X server. If you set "GNOME_SSH_ASKPASS_GRAB_POINTER=true", then the
* pointer will be grabbed too. These may have some benefit to security if
* you don't trust your X server. We grab the keyboard always.
*/
#define GRAB_TRIES 16
#define GRAB_WAIT 250 /* milliseconds */
+#define PROMPT_ENTRY 0
+#define PROMPT_CONFIRM 1
+#define PROMPT_NONE 2
+
/*
* Compile with:
*
* cc -Wall `pkg-config --cflags gtk+-2.0` \
* gnome-ssh-askpass2.c -o gnome-ssh-askpass \
* `pkg-config --libs gtk+-2.0`
*
*/
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <X11/Xlib.h>
#include <gtk/gtk.h>
#include <gdk/gdkx.h>
static void
report_failed_grab (GtkWidget *parent_window, const char *what)
{
GtkWidget *err;
err = gtk_message_dialog_new(GTK_WINDOW(parent_window), 0,
GTK_MESSAGE_ERROR,
GTK_BUTTONS_CLOSE,
"Could not grab %s. "
"A malicious client may be eavesdropping "
"on your session.", what);
gtk_window_set_position(GTK_WINDOW(err), GTK_WIN_POS_CENTER);
gtk_dialog_run(GTK_DIALOG(err));
gtk_widget_destroy(err);
}
static void
ok_dialog(GtkWidget *entry, gpointer dialog)
{
g_return_if_fail(GTK_IS_DIALOG(dialog));
gtk_dialog_response(GTK_DIALOG(dialog), GTK_RESPONSE_OK);
}
static int
-passphrase_dialog(char *message)
+passphrase_dialog(char *message, int prompt_type)
{
const char *failed;
char *passphrase, *local;
int result, grab_tries, grab_server, grab_pointer;
+ int buttons, default_response;
GtkWidget *parent_window, *dialog, *entry;
GdkGrabStatus status;
grab_server = (getenv("GNOME_SSH_ASKPASS_GRAB_SERVER") != NULL);
grab_pointer = (getenv("GNOME_SSH_ASKPASS_GRAB_POINTER") != NULL);
grab_tries = 0;
/* Create an invisible parent window so that GtkDialog doesn't
* complain. */
parent_window = gtk_window_new(GTK_WINDOW_TOPLEVEL);
+ switch (prompt_type) {
+ case PROMPT_CONFIRM:
+ buttons = GTK_BUTTONS_YES_NO;
+ default_response = GTK_RESPONSE_YES;
+ break;
+ case PROMPT_NONE:
+ buttons = GTK_BUTTONS_CLOSE;
+ default_response = GTK_RESPONSE_CLOSE;
+ break;
+ default:
+ buttons = GTK_BUTTONS_OK_CANCEL;
+ default_response = GTK_RESPONSE_OK;
+ break;
+ }
+
dialog = gtk_message_dialog_new(GTK_WINDOW(parent_window), 0,
- GTK_MESSAGE_QUESTION,
- GTK_BUTTONS_OK_CANCEL,
- "%s",
- message);
-
- entry = gtk_entry_new();
- gtk_box_pack_start(
- GTK_BOX(gtk_dialog_get_content_area(GTK_DIALOG(dialog))), entry,
- FALSE, FALSE, 0);
- gtk_entry_set_visibility(GTK_ENTRY(entry), FALSE);
- gtk_widget_grab_focus(entry);
- gtk_widget_show(entry);
+ GTK_MESSAGE_QUESTION, buttons, "%s", message);
gtk_window_set_title(GTK_WINDOW(dialog), "OpenSSH");
gtk_window_set_position (GTK_WINDOW(dialog), GTK_WIN_POS_CENTER);
gtk_window_set_keep_above(GTK_WINDOW(dialog), TRUE);
-
- /* Make <enter> close dialog */
- gtk_dialog_set_default_response(GTK_DIALOG(dialog), GTK_RESPONSE_OK);
- g_signal_connect(G_OBJECT(entry), "activate",
- G_CALLBACK(ok_dialog), dialog);
-
+ gtk_dialog_set_default_response(GTK_DIALOG(dialog), default_response);
gtk_window_set_keep_above(GTK_WINDOW(dialog), TRUE);
+ if (prompt_type == PROMPT_ENTRY) {
+ entry = gtk_entry_new();
+ gtk_box_pack_start(
+ GTK_BOX(gtk_dialog_get_content_area(GTK_DIALOG(dialog))),
+ entry, FALSE, FALSE, 0);
+ gtk_entry_set_visibility(GTK_ENTRY(entry), FALSE);
+ gtk_widget_grab_focus(entry);
+ gtk_widget_show(entry);
+ /* Make <enter> close dialog */
+ g_signal_connect(G_OBJECT(entry), "activate",
+ G_CALLBACK(ok_dialog), dialog);
+ }
+
/* Grab focus */
gtk_widget_show_now(dialog);
if (grab_pointer) {
for(;;) {
status = gdk_pointer_grab(
(gtk_widget_get_window(GTK_WIDGET(dialog))), TRUE,
0, NULL, NULL, GDK_CURRENT_TIME);
if (status == GDK_GRAB_SUCCESS)
break;
usleep(GRAB_WAIT * 1000);
if (++grab_tries > GRAB_TRIES) {
failed = "mouse";
goto nograb;
}
}
}
for(;;) {
status = gdk_keyboard_grab(
gtk_widget_get_window(GTK_WIDGET(dialog)), FALSE,
GDK_CURRENT_TIME);
if (status == GDK_GRAB_SUCCESS)
break;
usleep(GRAB_WAIT * 1000);
if (++grab_tries > GRAB_TRIES) {
failed = "keyboard";
goto nograbkb;
}
}
if (grab_server) {
gdk_x11_grab_server();
}
result = gtk_dialog_run(GTK_DIALOG(dialog));
/* Ungrab */
if (grab_server)
XUngrabServer(gdk_x11_get_default_xdisplay());
if (grab_pointer)
gdk_pointer_ungrab(GDK_CURRENT_TIME);
gdk_keyboard_ungrab(GDK_CURRENT_TIME);
gdk_flush();
/* Report passphrase if user selected OK */
- passphrase = g_strdup(gtk_entry_get_text(GTK_ENTRY(entry)));
- if (result == GTK_RESPONSE_OK) {
- local = g_locale_from_utf8(passphrase, strlen(passphrase),
- NULL, NULL, NULL);
- if (local != NULL) {
- puts(local);
- memset(local, '\0', strlen(local));
- g_free(local);
- } else {
- puts(passphrase);
+ if (prompt_type == PROMPT_ENTRY) {
+ passphrase = g_strdup(gtk_entry_get_text(GTK_ENTRY(entry)));
+ if (result == GTK_RESPONSE_OK) {
+ local = g_locale_from_utf8(passphrase,
+ strlen(passphrase), NULL, NULL, NULL);
+ if (local != NULL) {
+ puts(local);
+ memset(local, '\0', strlen(local));
+ g_free(local);
+ } else {
+ puts(passphrase);
+ }
}
+ /* Zero passphrase in memory */
+ memset(passphrase, '\b', strlen(passphrase));
+ gtk_entry_set_text(GTK_ENTRY(entry), passphrase);
+ memset(passphrase, '\0', strlen(passphrase));
+ g_free(passphrase);
}
-
- /* Zero passphrase in memory */
- memset(passphrase, '\b', strlen(passphrase));
- gtk_entry_set_text(GTK_ENTRY(entry), passphrase);
- memset(passphrase, '\0', strlen(passphrase));
- g_free(passphrase);
-
+
gtk_widget_destroy(dialog);
- return (result == GTK_RESPONSE_OK ? 0 : -1);
+ if (result != GTK_RESPONSE_OK && result != GTK_RESPONSE_YES)
+ return -1;
+ return 0;
- /* At least one grab failed - ungrab what we got, and report
- the failure to the user. Note that XGrabServer() cannot
- fail. */
nograbkb:
+ /*
+ * At least one grab failed - ungrab what we got, and report
+ * the failure to the user. Note that XGrabServer() cannot
+ * fail.
+ */
gdk_pointer_ungrab(GDK_CURRENT_TIME);
nograb:
if (grab_server)
XUngrabServer(gdk_x11_get_default_xdisplay());
gtk_widget_destroy(dialog);
report_failed_grab(parent_window, failed);
return (-1);
}
int
main(int argc, char **argv)
{
- char *message;
- int result;
+ char *message, *prompt_mode;
+ int result, prompt_type = PROMPT_ENTRY;
gtk_init(&argc, &argv);
if (argc > 1) {
message = g_strjoinv(" ", argv + 1);
} else {
message = g_strdup("Enter your OpenSSH passphrase:");
}
+ if ((prompt_mode = getenv("SSH_ASKPASS_PROMPT")) != NULL) {
+ if (strcasecmp(prompt_mode, "confirm") == 0)
+ prompt_type = PROMPT_CONFIRM;
+ else if (strcasecmp(prompt_mode, "none") == 0)
+ prompt_type = PROMPT_NONE;
+ }
+
setvbuf(stdout, 0, _IONBF, 0);
- result = passphrase_dialog(message);
+ result = passphrase_dialog(message, prompt_type);
g_free(message);
return (result);
}
diff --git a/contrib/redhat/openssh.spec b/contrib/redhat/openssh.spec
index a440a11c269c..54dc39610273 100644
--- a/contrib/redhat/openssh.spec
+++ b/contrib/redhat/openssh.spec
@@ -1,843 +1,843 @@
-%define ver 8.1p1
+%define ver 8.2p1
%define rel 1%{?dist}
# OpenSSH privilege separation requires a user & group ID
%define sshd_uid 74
%define sshd_gid 74
# Version of ssh-askpass
%define aversion 1.2.4.1
# Do we want to disable building of x11-askpass? (1=yes 0=no)
%define no_x11_askpass 0
# Do we want to disable building of gnome-askpass? (1=yes 0=no)
%define no_gnome_askpass 0
# Do we want to link against a static libcrypto? (1=yes 0=no)
%define static_libcrypto 0
# Do we want smartcard support (1=yes 0=no)
%define scard 0
# Use GTK2 instead of GNOME in gnome-ssh-askpass
%define gtk2 1
# Use build6x options for older RHEL builds
# RHEL 7 not yet supported
%if 0%{?rhel} > 6
%define build6x 0
%else
%define build6x 1
%endif
%if 0%{?fedora} >= 26
%define compat_openssl 1
%else
%define compat_openssl 0
%endif
# Do we want kerberos5 support (1=yes 0=no)
%define kerberos5 1
# Reserve options to override askpass settings with:
# rpm -ba|--rebuild --define 'skip_xxx 1'
%{?skip_x11_askpass:%define no_x11_askpass 1}
%{?skip_gnome_askpass:%define no_gnome_askpass 1}
# Add option to build without GTK2 for older platforms with only GTK+.
# RedHat <= 7.2 and Red Hat Advanced Server 2.1 are examples.
# rpm -ba|--rebuild --define 'no_gtk2 1'
%{?no_gtk2:%define gtk2 0}
# Is this a build for RHL 6.x or earlier?
%{?build_6x:%define build6x 1}
# If this is RHL 6.x, the default configuration has sysconfdir in /usr/etc.
%if %{build6x}
%define _sysconfdir /etc
%endif
# Options for static OpenSSL link:
# rpm -ba|--rebuild --define "static_openssl 1"
%{?static_openssl:%define static_libcrypto 1}
# Options for Smartcard support: (needs libsectok and openssl-engine)
# rpm -ba|--rebuild --define "smartcard 1"
%{?smartcard:%define scard 1}
# Is this a build for the rescue CD (without PAM, with MD5)? (1=yes 0=no)
%define rescue 0
%{?build_rescue:%define rescue 1}
# Turn off some stuff for resuce builds
%if %{rescue}
%define kerberos5 0
%endif
Summary: The OpenSSH implementation of SSH protocol version 2.
Name: openssh
Version: %{ver}
%if %{rescue}
Release: %{rel}rescue
%else
Release: %{rel}
%endif
URL: https://www.openssh.com/portable.html
Source0: https://ftp.openbsd.org/pub/OpenBSD/OpenSSH/portable/openssh-%{version}.tar.gz
Source1: http://www.jmknoble.net/software/x11-ssh-askpass/x11-ssh-askpass-%{aversion}.tar.gz
License: BSD
Group: Applications/Internet
BuildRoot: %{_tmppath}/%{name}-%{version}-buildroot
Obsoletes: ssh
%if %{build6x}
PreReq: initscripts >= 5.00
%else
Requires: initscripts >= 5.20
%endif
BuildRequires: perl
%if %{compat_openssl}
BuildRequires: compat-openssl10-devel
%else
BuildRequires: openssl-devel >= 1.0.1
BuildRequires: openssl-devel < 1.1
%endif
BuildRequires: /bin/login
%if ! %{build6x}
BuildRequires: glibc-devel, pam
%else
BuildRequires: /usr/include/security/pam_appl.h
%endif
%if ! %{no_x11_askpass}
BuildRequires: /usr/include/X11/Xlib.h
# Xt development tools
BuildRequires: libXt-devel
# Provides xmkmf
BuildRequires: imake
# Rely on relatively recent gtk
BuildRequires: gtk2-devel
%endif
%if ! %{no_gnome_askpass}
BuildRequires: pkgconfig
%endif
%if %{kerberos5}
BuildRequires: krb5-devel
BuildRequires: krb5-libs
%endif
%package clients
Summary: OpenSSH clients.
Requires: openssh = %{version}-%{release}
Group: Applications/Internet
Obsoletes: ssh-clients
%package server
Summary: The OpenSSH server daemon.
Group: System Environment/Daemons
Obsoletes: ssh-server
Requires: openssh = %{version}-%{release}, chkconfig >= 0.9
%if ! %{build6x}
Requires: /etc/pam.d/system-auth
%endif
%package askpass
Summary: A passphrase dialog for OpenSSH and X.
Group: Applications/Internet
Requires: openssh = %{version}-%{release}
Obsoletes: ssh-extras
%package askpass-gnome
Summary: A passphrase dialog for OpenSSH, X, and GNOME.
Group: Applications/Internet
Requires: openssh = %{version}-%{release}
Obsoletes: ssh-extras
%description
SSH (Secure SHell) is a program for logging into and executing
commands on a remote machine. SSH is intended to replace rlogin and
rsh, and to provide secure encrypted communications between two
untrusted hosts over an insecure network. X11 connections and
arbitrary TCP/IP ports can also be forwarded over the secure channel.
OpenSSH is OpenBSD's version of the last free version of SSH, bringing
it up to date in terms of security and features, as well as removing
all patented algorithms to separate libraries.
This package includes the core files necessary for both the OpenSSH
client and server. To make this package useful, you should also
install openssh-clients, openssh-server, or both.
%description clients
OpenSSH is a free version of SSH (Secure SHell), a program for logging
into and executing commands on a remote machine. This package includes
the clients necessary to make encrypted connections to SSH servers.
You'll also need to install the openssh package on OpenSSH clients.
%description server
OpenSSH is a free version of SSH (Secure SHell), a program for logging
into and executing commands on a remote machine. This package contains
the secure shell daemon (sshd). The sshd daemon allows SSH clients to
securely connect to your SSH server. You also need to have the openssh
package installed.
%description askpass
OpenSSH is a free version of SSH (Secure SHell), a program for logging
into and executing commands on a remote machine. This package contains
an X11 passphrase dialog for OpenSSH.
%description askpass-gnome
OpenSSH is a free version of SSH (Secure SHell), a program for logging
into and executing commands on a remote machine. This package contains
an X11 passphrase dialog for OpenSSH and the GNOME GUI desktop
environment.
%prep
%if ! %{no_x11_askpass}
%setup -q -a 1
%else
%setup -q
%endif
%build
%if %{rescue}
CFLAGS="$RPM_OPT_FLAGS -Os"; export CFLAGS
%endif
%configure \
--sysconfdir=%{_sysconfdir}/ssh \
--libexecdir=%{_libexecdir}/openssh \
--datadir=%{_datadir}/openssh \
--with-default-path=/usr/local/bin:/bin:/usr/bin \
--with-superuser-path=/usr/local/sbin:/usr/local/bin:/sbin:/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin \
--with-privsep-path=%{_var}/empty/sshd \
--with-md5-passwords \
--mandir=%{_mandir} \
--with-mantype=man \
--disable-strip \
%if %{scard}
--with-smartcard \
%endif
%if %{rescue}
--without-pam \
%else
--with-pam \
%endif
%if %{kerberos5}
--with-kerberos5=$K5DIR \
%endif
%if %{static_libcrypto}
perl -pi -e "s|-lcrypto|%{_libdir}/libcrypto.a|g" Makefile
%endif
make
%if ! %{no_x11_askpass}
pushd x11-ssh-askpass-%{aversion}
%configure --libexecdir=%{_libexecdir}/openssh
xmkmf -a
make
popd
%endif
# Define a variable to toggle gnome1/gtk2 building. This is necessary
# because RPM doesn't handle nested %if statements.
%if %{gtk2}
gtk2=yes
%else
gtk2=no
%endif
%if ! %{no_gnome_askpass}
pushd contrib
if [ $gtk2 = yes ] ; then
make gnome-ssh-askpass2
mv gnome-ssh-askpass2 gnome-ssh-askpass
else
make gnome-ssh-askpass1
mv gnome-ssh-askpass1 gnome-ssh-askpass
fi
popd
%endif
%install
rm -rf $RPM_BUILD_ROOT
mkdir -p -m755 $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_sysconfdir}/ssh
mkdir -p -m755 $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_libexecdir}/openssh
mkdir -p -m755 $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_var}/empty/sshd
make install DESTDIR=$RPM_BUILD_ROOT
install -d $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/pam.d/
install -d $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/rc.d/init.d
install -d $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_libexecdir}/openssh
%if %{build6x}
install -m644 contrib/redhat/sshd.pam.old $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/pam.d/sshd
%else
install -m644 contrib/redhat/sshd.pam $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/pam.d/sshd
%endif
install -m755 contrib/redhat/sshd.init $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/rc.d/init.d/sshd
%if ! %{no_x11_askpass}
install x11-ssh-askpass-%{aversion}/x11-ssh-askpass $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_libexecdir}/openssh/x11-ssh-askpass
ln -s x11-ssh-askpass $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_libexecdir}/openssh/ssh-askpass
%endif
%if ! %{no_gnome_askpass}
install contrib/gnome-ssh-askpass $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_libexecdir}/openssh/gnome-ssh-askpass
%endif
%if ! %{scard}
rm -f $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/usr/share/openssh/Ssh.bin
%endif
%if ! %{no_gnome_askpass}
install -m 755 -d $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_sysconfdir}/profile.d/
install -m 755 contrib/redhat/gnome-ssh-askpass.csh $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_sysconfdir}/profile.d/
install -m 755 contrib/redhat/gnome-ssh-askpass.sh $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_sysconfdir}/profile.d/
%endif
perl -pi -e "s|$RPM_BUILD_ROOT||g" $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_mandir}/man*/*
%clean
rm -rf $RPM_BUILD_ROOT
%triggerun server -- ssh-server
if [ "$1" != 0 -a -r /var/run/sshd.pid ] ; then
touch /var/run/sshd.restart
fi
%triggerun server -- openssh-server < 2.5.0p1
# Count the number of HostKey and HostDsaKey statements we have.
gawk 'BEGIN {IGNORECASE=1}
/^hostkey/ || /^hostdsakey/ {sawhostkey = sawhostkey + 1}
END {exit sawhostkey}' /etc/ssh/sshd_config
# And if we only found one, we know the client was relying on the old default
# behavior, which loaded the the SSH2 DSA host key when HostDsaKey wasn't
# specified. Now that HostKey is used for both SSH1 and SSH2 keys, specifying
# one nullifies the default, which would have loaded both.
if [ $? -eq 1 ] ; then
echo HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key >> /etc/ssh/sshd_config
echo HostKey /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key >> /etc/ssh/sshd_config
fi
%triggerpostun server -- ssh-server
if [ "$1" != 0 ] ; then
/sbin/chkconfig --add sshd
if test -f /var/run/sshd.restart ; then
rm -f /var/run/sshd.restart
/sbin/service sshd start > /dev/null 2>&1 || :
fi
fi
%pre server
%{_sbindir}/groupadd -r -g %{sshd_gid} sshd 2>/dev/null || :
%{_sbindir}/useradd -d /var/empty/sshd -s /bin/false -u %{sshd_uid} \
-g sshd -M -r sshd 2>/dev/null || :
%post server
/sbin/chkconfig --add sshd
%postun server
/sbin/service sshd condrestart > /dev/null 2>&1 || :
%preun server
if [ "$1" = 0 ]
then
/sbin/service sshd stop > /dev/null 2>&1 || :
/sbin/chkconfig --del sshd
fi
%files
%defattr(-,root,root)
%doc CREDITS ChangeLog INSTALL LICENCE OVERVIEW README* PROTOCOL* TODO
%attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/scp
%attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man1/scp.1*
%attr(0755,root,root) %dir %{_sysconfdir}/ssh
%attr(0600,root,root) %config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/ssh/moduli
%if ! %{rescue}
%attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/ssh-keygen
%attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man1/ssh-keygen.1*
%attr(0755,root,root) %dir %{_libexecdir}/openssh
%attr(4711,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/openssh/ssh-keysign
%attr(0755,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/openssh/ssh-pkcs11-helper
%attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man8/ssh-keysign.8*
%attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man8/ssh-pkcs11-helper.8*
%endif
%if %{scard}
%attr(0755,root,root) %dir %{_datadir}/openssh
%attr(0644,root,root) %{_datadir}/openssh/Ssh.bin
%endif
%files clients
%defattr(-,root,root)
%attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/ssh
%attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man1/ssh.1*
%attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man5/ssh_config.5*
%attr(0644,root,root) %config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/ssh/ssh_config
%if ! %{rescue}
%attr(2755,root,nobody) %{_bindir}/ssh-agent
%attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/ssh-add
%attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/ssh-keyscan
%attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/sftp
%attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man1/ssh-agent.1*
%attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man1/ssh-add.1*
%attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man1/ssh-keyscan.1*
%attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man1/sftp.1*
%endif
%if ! %{rescue}
%files server
%defattr(-,root,root)
%dir %attr(0111,root,root) %{_var}/empty/sshd
%attr(0755,root,root) %{_sbindir}/sshd
%attr(0755,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/openssh/sftp-server
%attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man8/sshd.8*
%attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man5/moduli.5*
%attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man5/sshd_config.5*
%attr(0644,root,root) %{_mandir}/man8/sftp-server.8*
%attr(0755,root,root) %dir %{_sysconfdir}/ssh
%attr(0600,root,root) %config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/ssh/sshd_config
%attr(0600,root,root) %config(noreplace) /etc/pam.d/sshd
%attr(0755,root,root) %config /etc/rc.d/init.d/sshd
%endif
%if ! %{no_x11_askpass}
%files askpass
%defattr(-,root,root)
%doc x11-ssh-askpass-%{aversion}/README
%doc x11-ssh-askpass-%{aversion}/ChangeLog
%doc x11-ssh-askpass-%{aversion}/SshAskpass*.ad
%{_libexecdir}/openssh/ssh-askpass
%attr(0755,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/openssh/x11-ssh-askpass
%endif
%if ! %{no_gnome_askpass}
%files askpass-gnome
%defattr(-,root,root)
%attr(0755,root,root) %config %{_sysconfdir}/profile.d/gnome-ssh-askpass.*
%attr(0755,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/openssh/gnome-ssh-askpass
%endif
%changelog
* Sat Feb 10 2018 Darren Tucker <dtucker@dtucker.net>
- Update openssl-devel dependency to match current requirements.
- Handle Fedora >=6 openssl 1.0 compat libs.
- Remove SSH1 from description.
- Don't strip binaries at build time so that debuginfo package can be
created.
* Sun Nov 16 2014 Nico Kadel-Garcia <nakdel@gmail.com>
- Add '--mandir' and '--with-mantype' for RHEL 5 compatibility
- Add 'dist' option to 'ver' so package names reflect OS at build time
- Always include x11-ssh-askpass tarball in SRPM
- Add openssh-x11-aspass BuildRequires for libXT-devel, imake, gtk2-devel
- Discard 'K5DIR' reporting, not usable inside 'mock' for RHEL 5 compatibility
- Discard obsolete '--with-rsh' configure option
- Update openssl-devel dependency to 0.9.8f, as found in autoconf
* Wed Jul 14 2010 Tim Rice <tim@multitalents.net>
- test for skip_x11_askpass (line 77) should have been for no_x11_askpass
* Mon Jun 2 2003 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
- Remove noip6 option. This may be controlled at run-time in client config
file using new AddressFamily directive
* Mon May 12 2003 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
- Don't install profile.d scripts when not building with GNOME/GTK askpass
(patch from bet@rahul.net)
* Tue Oct 01 2002 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
- Install ssh-agent setgid nobody to prevent ptrace() key theft attacks
* Mon Sep 30 2002 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
- Use contrib/ Makefile for building askpass programs
* Fri Jun 21 2002 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
- Merge in spec changes from seba@iq.pl (Sebastian Pachuta)
- Add new {ssh,sshd}_config.5 manpages
- Add new ssh-keysign program and remove setuid from ssh client
* Fri May 10 2002 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
- Merge in spec changes from RedHat, reorgansie a little
- Add Privsep user, group and directory
* Thu Mar 7 2002 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com> 3.1p1-2
- bump and grind (through the build system)
* Thu Mar 7 2002 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com> 3.1p1-1
- require sharutils for building (mindrot #137)
- require db1-devel only when building for 6.x (#55105), which probably won't
work anyway (3.1 requires OpenSSL 0.9.6 to build), but what the heck
- require pam-devel by file (not by package name) again
- add Markus's patch to compile with OpenSSL 0.9.5a (from
http://bugzilla.mindrot.org/show_bug.cgi?id=141) and apply it if we're
building for 6.x
* Thu Mar 7 2002 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com> 3.1p1-0
- update to 3.1p1
* Tue Mar 5 2002 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com> SNAP-20020305
- update to SNAP-20020305
- drop debug patch, fixed upstream
* Wed Feb 20 2002 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com> SNAP-20020220
- update to SNAP-20020220 for testing purposes (you've been warned, if there's
anything to be warned about, gss patches won't apply, I don't mind)
* Wed Feb 13 2002 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com> 3.0.2p1-3
- add patches from Simon Wilkinson and Nicolas Williams for GSSAPI key
exchange, authentication, and named key support
* Wed Jan 23 2002 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com> 3.0.2p1-2
- remove dependency on db1-devel, which has just been swallowed up whole
by gnome-libs-devel
* Sat Dec 29 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
- adjust build dependencies so that build6x actually works right (fix
from Hugo van der Kooij)
* Tue Dec 4 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com> 3.0.2p1-1
- update to 3.0.2p1
* Fri Nov 16 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com> 3.0.1p1-1
- update to 3.0.1p1
* Tue Nov 13 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
- update to current CVS (not for use in distribution)
* Thu Nov 8 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com> 3.0p1-1
- merge some of Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org> changes from the upstream
3.0p1 spec file and init script
* Wed Nov 7 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
- update to 3.0p1
- update to x11-ssh-askpass 1.2.4.1
- change build dependency on a file from pam-devel to the pam-devel package
- replace primes with moduli
* Thu Sep 27 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com> 2.9p2-9
- incorporate fix from Markus Friedl's advisory for IP-based authorization bugs
* Thu Sep 13 2001 Bernhard Rosenkraenzer <bero@redhat.com> 2.9p2-8
- Merge changes to rescue build from current sysadmin survival cd
* Thu Sep 6 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com> 2.9p2-7
- fix scp's server's reporting of file sizes, and build with the proper
preprocessor define to get large-file capable open(), stat(), etc.
(sftp has been doing this correctly all along) (#51827)
- configure without --with-ipv4-default on RHL 7.x and newer (#45987,#52247)
- pull cvs patch to fix support for /etc/nologin for non-PAM logins (#47298)
- mark profile.d scriptlets as config files (#42337)
- refer to Jason Stone's mail for zsh workaround for exit-hanging quasi-bug
- change a couple of log() statements to debug() statements (#50751)
- pull cvs patch to add -t flag to sshd (#28611)
- clear fd_sets correctly (one bit per FD, not one byte per FD) (#43221)
* Mon Aug 20 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com> 2.9p2-6
- add db1-devel as a BuildPrerequisite (noted by Hans Ecke)
* Thu Aug 16 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
- pull cvs patch to fix remote port forwarding with protocol 2
* Thu Aug 9 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
- pull cvs patch to add session initialization to no-pty sessions
- pull cvs patch to not cut off challengeresponse auth needlessly
- refuse to do X11 forwarding if xauth isn't there, handy if you enable
it by default on a system that doesn't have X installed (#49263)
* Wed Aug 8 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
- don't apply patches to code we don't intend to build (spotted by Matt Galgoci)
* Mon Aug 6 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
- pass OPTIONS correctly to initlog (#50151)
* Wed Jul 25 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
- switch to x11-ssh-askpass 1.2.2
* Wed Jul 11 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
- rebuild in new environment
* Mon Jun 25 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
- disable the gssapi patch
* Mon Jun 18 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
- update to 2.9p2
- refresh to a new version of the gssapi patch
* Thu Jun 7 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
- change Copyright: BSD to License: BSD
- add Markus Friedl's unverified patch for the cookie file deletion problem
so that we can verify it
- drop patch to check if xauth is present (was folded into cookie patch)
- don't apply gssapi patches for the errata candidate
- clear supplemental groups list at startup
* Fri May 25 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
- fix an error parsing the new default sshd_config
- add a fix from Markus Friedl (via openssh-unix-dev) for ssh-keygen not
dealing with comments right
* Thu May 24 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
- add in Simon Wilkinson's GSSAPI patch to give it some testing in-house,
to be removed before the next beta cycle because it's a big departure
from the upstream version
* Thu May 3 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
- finish marking strings in the init script for translation
- modify init script to source /etc/sysconfig/sshd and pass $OPTIONS to sshd
at startup (change merged from openssh.com init script, originally by
Pekka Savola)
- refuse to do X11 forwarding if xauth isn't there, handy if you enable
it by default on a system that doesn't have X installed
* Wed May 2 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
- update to 2.9
- drop various patches that came from or went upstream or to or from CVS
* Wed Apr 18 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
- only require initscripts 5.00 on 6.2 (reported by Peter Bieringer)
* Sun Apr 8 2001 Preston Brown <pbrown@redhat.com>
- remove explicit openssl requirement, fixes builddistro issue
- make initscript stop() function wait until sshd really dead to avoid
races in condrestart
* Mon Apr 2 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
- mention that challengereponse supports PAM, so disabling password doesn't
limit users to pubkey and rsa auth (#34378)
- bypass the daemon() function in the init script and call initlog directly,
because daemon() won't start a daemon it detects is already running (like
open connections)
- require the version of openssl we had when we were built
* Fri Mar 23 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
- make do_pam_setcred() smart enough to know when to establish creds and
when to reinitialize them
- add in a couple of other fixes from Damien for inclusion in the errata
* Thu Mar 22 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
- update to 2.5.2p2
- call setcred() again after initgroups, because the "creds" could actually
be group memberships
* Tue Mar 20 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
- update to 2.5.2p1 (includes endianness fixes in the rijndael implementation)
- don't enable challenge-response by default until we find a way to not
have too many userauth requests (we may make up to six pubkey and up to
three password attempts as it is)
- remove build dependency on rsh to match openssh.com's packages more closely
* Sat Mar 3 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
- remove dependency on openssl -- would need to be too precise
* Fri Mar 2 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
- rebuild in new environment
* Mon Feb 26 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
- Revert the patch to move pam_open_session.
- Init script and spec file changes from Pekka Savola. (#28750)
- Patch sftp to recognize '-o protocol' arguments. (#29540)
* Thu Feb 22 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
- Chuck the closing patch.
- Add a trigger to add host keys for protocol 2 to the config file, now that
configuration file syntax requires us to specify it with HostKey if we
specify any other HostKey values, which we do.
* Tue Feb 20 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
- Redo patch to move pam_open_session after the server setuid()s to the user.
- Rework the nopam patch to use be picked up by autoconf.
* Mon Feb 19 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
- Update for 2.5.1p1.
- Add init script mods from Pekka Savola.
- Tweak the init script to match the CVS contrib script more closely.
- Redo patch to ssh-add to try to adding both identity and id_dsa to also try
adding id_rsa.
* Fri Feb 16 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
- Update for 2.5.0p1.
- Use $RPM_OPT_FLAGS instead of -O when building gnome-ssh-askpass
- Resync with parts of Damien Miller's openssh.spec from CVS, including
update of x11 askpass to 1.2.0.
- Only require openssl (don't prereq) because we generate keys in the init
script now.
* Tue Feb 13 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
- Don't open a PAM session until we've forked and become the user (#25690).
- Apply Andrew Bartlett's patch for letting pam_authenticate() know which
host the user is attempting a login from.
- Resync with parts of Damien Miller's openssh.spec from CVS.
- Don't expose KbdInt responses in debug messages (from CVS).
- Detect and handle errors in rsa_{public,private}_decrypt (from CVS).
* Wed Feb 7 2001 Trond Eivind Glomsrxd <teg@redhat.com>
- i18n-tweak to initscript.
* Tue Jan 23 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
- More gettextizing.
- Close all files after going into daemon mode (needs more testing).
- Extract patch from CVS to handle auth banners (in the client).
- Extract patch from CVS to handle compat weirdness.
* Fri Jan 19 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
- Finish with the gettextizing.
* Thu Jan 18 2001 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
- Fix a bug in auth2-pam.c (#23877)
- Gettextize the init script.
* Wed Dec 20 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
- Incorporate a switch for using PAM configs for 6.x, just in case.
* Tue Dec 5 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
- Incorporate Bero's changes for a build specifically for rescue CDs.
* Wed Nov 29 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
- Don't treat pam_setcred() failure as fatal unless pam_authenticate() has
succeeded, to allow public-key authentication after a failure with "none"
authentication. (#21268)
* Tue Nov 28 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
- Update to x11-askpass 1.1.1. (#21301)
- Don't second-guess fixpaths, which causes paths to get fixed twice. (#21290)
* Mon Nov 27 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
- Merge multiple PAM text messages into subsequent prompts when possible when
doing keyboard-interactive authentication.
* Sun Nov 26 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
- Disable the built-in MD5 password support. We're using PAM.
- Take a crack at doing keyboard-interactive authentication with PAM, and
enable use of it in the default client configuration so that the client
will try it when the server disallows password authentication.
- Build with debugging flags. Build root policies strip all binaries anyway.
* Tue Nov 21 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
- Use DESTDIR instead of %%makeinstall.
- Remove /usr/X11R6/bin from the path-fixing patch.
* Mon Nov 20 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
- Add the primes file from the latest snapshot to the main package (#20884).
- Add the dev package to the prereq list (#19984).
- Remove the default path and mimic login's behavior in the server itself.
* Fri Nov 17 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
- Resync with conditional options in Damien Miller's .spec file for an errata.
- Change libexecdir from %%{_libexecdir}/ssh to %%{_libexecdir}/openssh.
* Tue Nov 7 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
- Update to OpenSSH 2.3.0p1.
- Update to x11-askpass 1.1.0.
- Enable keyboard-interactive authentication.
* Mon Oct 30 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
- Update to ssh-askpass-x11 1.0.3.
- Change authentication related messages to be private (#19966).
* Tue Oct 10 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
- Patch ssh-keygen to be able to list signatures for DSA public key files
it generates.
* Thu Oct 5 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
- Add BuildRequires on /usr/include/security/pam_appl.h to be sure we always
build PAM authentication in.
- Try setting SSH_ASKPASS if gnome-ssh-askpass is installed.
- Clean out no-longer-used patches.
- Patch ssh-add to try to add both identity and id_dsa, and to error only
when neither exists.
* Mon Oct 2 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
- Update x11-askpass to 1.0.2. (#17835)
- Add BuildRequiress for /bin/login and /usr/bin/rsh so that configure will
always find them in the right place. (#17909)
- Set the default path to be the same as the one supplied by /bin/login, but
add /usr/X11R6/bin. (#17909)
- Try to handle obsoletion of ssh-server more cleanly. Package names
are different, but init script name isn't. (#17865)
* Wed Sep 6 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
- Update to 2.2.0p1. (#17835)
- Tweak the init script to allow proper restarting. (#18023)
* Wed Aug 23 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
- Update to 20000823 snapshot.
- Change subpackage requirements from %%{version} to %%{version}-%%{release}
- Back out the pipe patch.
* Mon Jul 17 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
- Update to 2.1.1p4, which includes fixes for config file parsing problems.
- Move the init script back.
- Add Damien's quick fix for wackiness.
* Wed Jul 12 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
- Update to 2.1.1p3, which includes fixes for X11 forwarding and strtok().
* Thu Jul 6 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
- Move condrestart to server postun.
- Move key generation to init script.
- Actually use the right patch for moving the key generation to the init script.
- Clean up the init script a bit.
* Wed Jul 5 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
- Fix X11 forwarding, from mail post by Chan Shih-Ping Richard.
* Sun Jul 2 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
- Update to 2.1.1p2.
- Use of strtok() considered harmful.
* Sat Jul 1 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
- Get the build root out of the man pages.
* Thu Jun 29 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
- Add and use condrestart support in the init script.
- Add newer initscripts as a prereq.
* Tue Jun 27 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
- Build in new environment (release 2)
- Move -clients subpackage to Applications/Internet group
* Fri Jun 9 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
- Update to 2.2.1p1
* Sat Jun 3 2000 Nalin Dahyabhai <nalin@redhat.com>
- Patch to build with neither RSA nor RSAref.
- Miscellaneous FHS-compliance tweaks.
- Fix for possibly-compressed man pages.
* Wed Mar 15 2000 Damien Miller <djm@ibs.com.au>
- Updated for new location
- Updated for new gnome-ssh-askpass build
* Sun Dec 26 1999 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
- Added Jim Knoble's <jmknoble@pobox.com> askpass
* Mon Nov 15 1999 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
- Split subpackages further based on patch from jim knoble <jmknoble@pobox.com>
* Sat Nov 13 1999 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
- Added 'Obsoletes' directives
* Tue Nov 09 1999 Damien Miller <djm@ibs.com.au>
- Use make install
- Subpackages
* Mon Nov 08 1999 Damien Miller <djm@ibs.com.au>
- Added links for slogin
- Fixed perms on manpages
* Sat Oct 30 1999 Damien Miller <djm@ibs.com.au>
- Renamed init script
* Fri Oct 29 1999 Damien Miller <djm@ibs.com.au>
- Back to old binary names
* Thu Oct 28 1999 Damien Miller <djm@ibs.com.au>
- Use autoconf
- New binary names
* Wed Oct 27 1999 Damien Miller <djm@ibs.com.au>
- Initial RPMification, based on Jan "Yenya" Kasprzak's <kas@fi.muni.cz> spec.
diff --git a/contrib/ssh-copy-id.1 b/contrib/ssh-copy-id.1
index 8850cceda0a9..ae75c79a5793 100644
--- a/contrib/ssh-copy-id.1
+++ b/contrib/ssh-copy-id.1
@@ -1,191 +1,191 @@
.ig \" -*- nroff -*-
Copyright (c) 1999-2013 hands.com Ltd. <http://hands.com/>
Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
are met:
1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
(INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
..
.Dd $Mdocdate: June 17 2010 $
.Dt SSH-COPY-ID 1
.Os
.Sh NAME
.Nm ssh-copy-id
.Nd use locally available keys to authorise logins on a remote machine
.Sh SYNOPSIS
.Nm
.Op Fl f
.Op Fl n
.Op Fl i Op Ar identity_file
.Op Fl p Ar port
.Op Fl o Ar ssh_option
.Op Ar user Ns @ Ns
.Ar hostname
.Nm
.Fl h | Fl ?
.br
.Sh DESCRIPTION
.Nm
is a script that uses
.Xr ssh 1
to log into a remote machine (presumably using a login password,
so password authentication should be enabled, unless you've done some
clever use of multiple identities). It assembles a list of one or more
fingerprints (as described below) and tries to log in with each key, to
see if any of them are already installed (of course, if you are not using
.Xr ssh-agent 1
this may result in you being repeatedly prompted for pass-phrases).
It then assembles a list of those that failed to log in, and using ssh,
enables logins with those keys on the remote server. By default it adds
the keys by appending them to the remote user's
.Pa ~/.ssh/authorized_keys
(creating the file, and directory, if necessary). It is also capable
of detecting if the remote system is a NetScreen, and using its
.Ql set ssh pka-dsa key ...
command instead.
.Pp
The options are as follows:
.Bl -tag -width Ds
.It Fl i Ar identity_file
Use only the key(s) contained in
.Ar identity_file
(rather than looking for identities via
.Xr ssh-add 1
or in the
.Ic default_ID_file ) .
If the filename does not end in
.Pa .pub
this is added. If the filename is omitted, the
.Ic default_ID_file
is used.
.Pp
Note that this can be used to ensure that the keys copied have the
comment one prefers and/or extra options applied, by ensuring that the
key file has these set as preferred before the copy is attempted.
.It Fl f
Forced mode: doesn't check if the keys are present on the remote server.
This means that it does not need the private key. Of course, this can result
in more than one copy of the key being installed on the remote system.
.It Fl n
do a dry-run. Instead of installing keys on the remote system simply
prints the key(s) that would have been installed.
.It Fl h , Fl ?
Print Usage summary
.It Fl p Ar port , Fl o Ar ssh_option
These two options are simply passed through untouched, along with their
argument, to allow one to set the port or other
.Xr ssh 1
options, respectively.
.Pp
Rather than specifying these as command line options, it is often better to use (per-host) settings in
.Xr ssh 1 Ns 's
configuration file:
.Xr ssh_config 5 .
.El
.Pp
Default behaviour without
.Fl i ,
is to check if
.Ql ssh-add -L
provides any output, and if so those keys are used. Note that this results in
the comment on the key being the filename that was given to
.Xr ssh-add 1
when the key was loaded into your
.Xr ssh-agent 1
rather than the comment contained in that file, which is a bit of a shame.
Otherwise, if
.Xr ssh-add 1
provides no keys contents of the
.Ic default_ID_file
will be used.
.Pp
The
.Ic default_ID_file
is the most recent file that matches:
.Pa ~/.ssh/id*.pub ,
(excluding those that match
.Pa ~/.ssh/*-cert.pub )
so if you create a key that is not the one you want
.Nm
to use, just use
.Xr touch 1
on your preferred key's
.Pa .pub
file to reinstate it as the most recent.
.Pp
.Sh EXAMPLES
If you have already installed keys from one system on a lot of remote
hosts, and you then create a new key, on a new client machine, say,
it can be difficult to keep track of which systems on which you've
installed the new key. One way of dealing with this is to load both
the new key and old key(s) into your
.Xr ssh-agent 1 .
Load the new key first, without the
.Fl c
option, then load one or more old keys into the agent, possibly by
ssh-ing to the client machine that has that old key, using the
.Fl A
option to allow agent forwarding:
.Pp
.D1 user@newclient$ ssh-add
.D1 user@newclient$ ssh -A old.client
.D1 user@oldl$ ssh-add -c
.D1 No ... prompt for pass-phrase ...
.D1 user@old$ logoff
.D1 user@newclient$ ssh someserver
.Pp
now, if the new key is installed on the server, you'll be allowed in
unprompted, whereas if you only have the old key(s) enabled, you'll be
asked for confirmation, which is your cue to log back out and run
.Pp
.D1 user@newclient$ ssh-copy-id -i someserver
.Pp
The reason you might want to specify the -i option in this case is to
ensure that the comment on the installed key is the one from the
.Pa .pub
-file, rather than just the filename that was loaded into you agent.
+file, rather than just the filename that was loaded into your agent.
It also ensures that only the id you intended is installed, rather than
all the keys that you have in your
.Xr ssh-agent 1 .
Of course, you can specify another id, or use the contents of the
.Xr ssh-agent 1
as you prefer.
.Pp
Having mentioned
.Xr ssh-add 1 Ns 's
.Fl c
option, you might consider using this whenever using agent forwarding
to avoid your key being hijacked, but it is much better to instead use
.Xr ssh 1 Ns 's
.Ar ProxyCommand
and
.Fl W
option,
to bounce through remote servers while always doing direct end-to-end
authentication. This way the middle hop(s) don't get access to your
.Xr ssh-agent 1 .
A web search for
.Ql ssh proxycommand nc
should prove enlightening (N.B. the modern approach is to use the
.Fl W
option, rather than
.Xr nc 1 ) .
.Sh "SEE ALSO"
.Xr ssh 1 ,
.Xr ssh-agent 1 ,
.Xr sshd 8
diff --git a/contrib/suse/openssh.spec b/contrib/suse/openssh.spec
index 8c081acc0447..4c318001eff0 100644
--- a/contrib/suse/openssh.spec
+++ b/contrib/suse/openssh.spec
@@ -1,241 +1,241 @@
# Default values for additional components
%define build_x11_askpass 1
# Define the UID/GID to use for privilege separation
%define sshd_gid 65
%define sshd_uid 71
# The version of x11-ssh-askpass to use
%define xversion 1.2.4.1
# Allow the ability to override defaults with -D skip_xxx=1
%{?skip_x11_askpass:%define build_x11_askpass 0}
Summary: OpenSSH, a free Secure Shell (SSH) protocol implementation
Name: openssh
-Version: 8.1p1
+Version: 8.2p1
URL: https://www.openssh.com/
Release: 1
Source0: openssh-%{version}.tar.gz
Source1: x11-ssh-askpass-%{xversion}.tar.gz
License: BSD
Group: Productivity/Networking/SSH
BuildRoot: %{_tmppath}/openssh-%{version}-buildroot
PreReq: openssl
Obsoletes: ssh
Provides: ssh
#
# (Build[ing] Prereq[uisites] only work for RPM 2.95 and newer.)
# building prerequisites -- stuff for
# OpenSSL (openssl-devel),
# and Gnome (glibdev, gtkdev, and gnlibsd)
#
BuildPrereq: openssl
BuildPrereq: zlib-devel
#BuildPrereq: glibdev
#BuildPrereq: gtkdev
#BuildPrereq: gnlibsd
%package askpass
Summary: A passphrase dialog for OpenSSH and the X window System.
Group: Productivity/Networking/SSH
Requires: openssh = %{version}
Obsoletes: ssh-extras
Provides: openssh:${_libdir}/ssh/ssh-askpass
%if %{build_x11_askpass}
BuildPrereq: XFree86-devel
%endif
%description
Ssh (Secure Shell) is a program for logging into a remote machine and for
executing commands in a remote machine. It is intended to replace
rlogin and rsh, and provide secure encrypted communications between
two untrusted hosts over an insecure network. X11 connections and
arbitrary TCP/IP ports can also be forwarded over the secure channel.
OpenSSH is OpenBSD's rework of the last free version of SSH, bringing it
up to date in terms of security and features, as well as removing all
patented algorithms to separate libraries (OpenSSL).
This package includes all files necessary for both the OpenSSH
client and server.
%description askpass
Ssh (Secure Shell) is a program for logging into a remote machine and for
executing commands in a remote machine. It is intended to replace
rlogin and rsh, and provide secure encrypted communications between
two untrusted hosts over an insecure network. X11 connections and
arbitrary TCP/IP ports can also be forwarded over the secure channel.
OpenSSH is OpenBSD's rework of the last free version of SSH, bringing it
up to date in terms of security and features, as well as removing all
patented algorithms to separate libraries (OpenSSL).
This package contains an X Window System passphrase dialog for OpenSSH.
%changelog
* Wed Oct 26 2005 Iain Morgan <imorgan@nas.nasa.gov>
- Removed accidental inclusion of --without-zlib-version-check
* Tue Oct 25 2005 Iain Morgan <imorgan@nas.nasa.gov>
- Overhaul to deal with newer versions of SuSE and OpenSSH
* Mon Jun 12 2000 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
- Glob manpages to catch compressed files
* Wed Mar 15 2000 Damien Miller <djm@ibs.com.au>
- Updated for new location
- Updated for new gnome-ssh-askpass build
* Sun Dec 26 1999 Chris Saia <csaia@wtower.com>
- Made symlink to gnome-ssh-askpass called ssh-askpass
* Wed Nov 24 1999 Chris Saia <csaia@wtower.com>
- Removed patches that included /etc/pam.d/sshd, /sbin/init.d/rc.sshd, and
/var/adm/fillup-templates/rc.config.sshd, since Damien merged these into
his released tarfile
- Changed permissions on ssh_config in the install procedure to 644 from 600
even though it was correct in the %files section and thus right in the RPMs
- Postinstall script for the server now only prints "Generating SSH host
key..." if we need to actually do this, in order to eliminate a confusing
message if an SSH host key is already in place
- Marked all manual pages as %doc(umentation)
* Mon Nov 22 1999 Chris Saia <csaia@wtower.com>
- Added flag to configure daemon with TCP Wrappers support
- Added building prerequisites (works in RPM 3.0 and newer)
* Thu Nov 18 1999 Chris Saia <csaia@wtower.com>
- Made this package correct for SuSE.
- Changed instances of pam_pwdb.so to pam_unix.so, since it works more properly
with SuSE, and lib_pwdb.so isn't installed by default.
* Mon Nov 15 1999 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
- Split subpackages further based on patch from jim knoble <jmknoble@pobox.com>
* Sat Nov 13 1999 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
- Added 'Obsoletes' directives
* Tue Nov 09 1999 Damien Miller <djm@ibs.com.au>
- Use make install
- Subpackages
* Mon Nov 08 1999 Damien Miller <djm@ibs.com.au>
- Added links for slogin
- Fixed perms on manpages
* Sat Oct 30 1999 Damien Miller <djm@ibs.com.au>
- Renamed init script
* Fri Oct 29 1999 Damien Miller <djm@ibs.com.au>
- Back to old binary names
* Thu Oct 28 1999 Damien Miller <djm@ibs.com.au>
- Use autoconf
- New binary names
* Wed Oct 27 1999 Damien Miller <djm@ibs.com.au>
- Initial RPMification, based on Jan "Yenya" Kasprzak's <kas@fi.muni.cz> spec.
%prep
%if %{build_x11_askpass}
%setup -q -a 1
%else
%setup -q
%endif
%build
CFLAGS="$RPM_OPT_FLAGS" \
%configure --prefix=/usr \
--sysconfdir=%{_sysconfdir}/ssh \
--mandir=%{_mandir} \
--with-privsep-path=/var/lib/empty \
--with-pam \
--libexecdir=%{_libdir}/ssh
make
%if %{build_x11_askpass}
cd x11-ssh-askpass-%{xversion}
%configure --mandir=/usr/X11R6/man \
--libexecdir=%{_libdir}/ssh
xmkmf -a
make
cd ..
%endif
%install
rm -rf $RPM_BUILD_ROOT
make install DESTDIR=$RPM_BUILD_ROOT/
install -d $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/pam.d/
install -d $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/init.d/
install -d $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/var/adm/fillup-templates
install -m644 contrib/sshd.pam.generic $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/pam.d/sshd
install -m744 contrib/suse/rc.sshd $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/etc/init.d/sshd
install -m744 contrib/suse/sysconfig.ssh \
$RPM_BUILD_ROOT/var/adm/fillup-templates
%if %{build_x11_askpass}
cd x11-ssh-askpass-%{xversion}
make install install.man BINDIR=%{_libdir}/ssh DESTDIR=$RPM_BUILD_ROOT/
rm -f $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/usr/share/Ssh.bin
%endif
%clean
rm -rf $RPM_BUILD_ROOT
%pre
/usr/sbin/groupadd -g %{sshd_gid} -o -r sshd 2> /dev/null || :
/usr/sbin/useradd -r -o -g sshd -u %{sshd_uid} -s /bin/false -c "SSH Privilege Separation User" -d /var/lib/sshd sshd 2> /dev/null || :
%post
/usr/bin/ssh-keygen -A
%{fillup_and_insserv -n -y ssh sshd}
%run_permissions
%verifyscript
%verify_permissions -e /etc/ssh/sshd_config -e /etc/ssh/ssh_config -e /usr/bin/ssh
%preun
%stop_on_removal sshd
%postun
%restart_on_update sshd
%{insserv_cleanup}
%files
%defattr(-,root,root)
%doc ChangeLog OVERVIEW README* PROTOCOL*
%doc TODO CREDITS LICENCE
%attr(0755,root,root) %dir %{_sysconfdir}/ssh
%attr(0644,root,root) %config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/ssh/ssh_config
%attr(0600,root,root) %config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/ssh/sshd_config
%attr(0600,root,root) %config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/ssh/moduli
%attr(0644,root,root) %config(noreplace) /etc/pam.d/sshd
%attr(0755,root,root) %config /etc/init.d/sshd
%attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/ssh-keygen
%attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/scp
%attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/ssh
%attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/ssh-agent
%attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/ssh-add
%attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/ssh-keyscan
%attr(0755,root,root) %{_bindir}/sftp
%attr(0755,root,root) %{_sbindir}/sshd
%attr(0755,root,root) %dir %{_libdir}/ssh
%attr(0755,root,root) %{_libdir}/ssh/sftp-server
%attr(4711,root,root) %{_libdir}/ssh/ssh-keysign
%attr(0755,root,root) %{_libdir}/ssh/ssh-pkcs11-helper
%attr(0644,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man1/scp.1*
%attr(0644,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man1/sftp.1*
%attr(0644,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man1/ssh.1*
%attr(0644,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man1/ssh-add.1*
%attr(0644,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man1/ssh-agent.1*
%attr(0644,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man1/ssh-keygen.1*
%attr(0644,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man1/ssh-keyscan.1*
%attr(0644,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man5/moduli.5*
%attr(0644,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man5/ssh_config.5*
%attr(0644,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man5/sshd_config.5*
%attr(0644,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man8/sftp-server.8*
%attr(0644,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man8/ssh-keysign.8*
%attr(0644,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man8/ssh-pkcs11-helper.8*
%attr(0644,root,root) %doc %{_mandir}/man8/sshd.8*
%attr(0644,root,root) /var/adm/fillup-templates/sysconfig.ssh
%if %{build_x11_askpass}
%files askpass
%defattr(-,root,root)
%doc x11-ssh-askpass-%{xversion}/README
%doc x11-ssh-askpass-%{xversion}/ChangeLog
%doc x11-ssh-askpass-%{xversion}/SshAskpass*.ad
%attr(0755,root,root) %{_libdir}/ssh/ssh-askpass
%attr(0755,root,root) %{_libdir}/ssh/x11-ssh-askpass
%attr(0644,root,root) %doc /usr/X11R6/man/man1/ssh-askpass.1x*
%attr(0644,root,root) %doc /usr/X11R6/man/man1/x11-ssh-askpass.1x*
%attr(0644,root,root) %config /usr/X11R6/lib/X11/app-defaults/SshAskpass
%endif
diff --git a/defines.h b/defines.h
index 7855fbf90b0f..a347a44ff0df 100644
--- a/defines.h
+++ b/defines.h
@@ -1,882 +1,894 @@
/*
* Copyright (c) 1999-2003 Damien Miller. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#ifndef _DEFINES_H
#define _DEFINES_H
/* Constants */
#if defined(HAVE_DECL_SHUT_RD) && HAVE_DECL_SHUT_RD == 0
enum
{
SHUT_RD = 0, /* No more receptions. */
SHUT_WR, /* No more transmissions. */
SHUT_RDWR /* No more receptions or transmissions. */
};
# define SHUT_RD SHUT_RD
# define SHUT_WR SHUT_WR
# define SHUT_RDWR SHUT_RDWR
#endif
/*
* Cygwin doesn't really have a notion of reserved ports. It is still
* is useful on the client side so for compatibility it defines as 1024 via
* netinet/in.h inside an enum. We * don't actually want that restriction
* so we want to set that to zero, but we can't do it direct in config.h
* because it'll cause a conflicting definition the first time we include
* netinet/in.h.
*/
#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN
#define IPPORT_RESERVED 0
#endif
/*
* Definitions for IP type of service (ip_tos)
*/
#include <netinet/in_systm.h>
#include <netinet/ip.h>
#ifndef IPTOS_LOWDELAY
# define IPTOS_LOWDELAY 0x10
# define IPTOS_THROUGHPUT 0x08
# define IPTOS_RELIABILITY 0x04
# define IPTOS_LOWCOST 0x02
# define IPTOS_MINCOST IPTOS_LOWCOST
#endif /* IPTOS_LOWDELAY */
/*
* Definitions for DiffServ Codepoints as per RFC2474
*/
#ifndef IPTOS_DSCP_AF11
# define IPTOS_DSCP_AF11 0x28
# define IPTOS_DSCP_AF12 0x30
# define IPTOS_DSCP_AF13 0x38
# define IPTOS_DSCP_AF21 0x48
# define IPTOS_DSCP_AF22 0x50
# define IPTOS_DSCP_AF23 0x58
# define IPTOS_DSCP_AF31 0x68
# define IPTOS_DSCP_AF32 0x70
# define IPTOS_DSCP_AF33 0x78
# define IPTOS_DSCP_AF41 0x88
# define IPTOS_DSCP_AF42 0x90
# define IPTOS_DSCP_AF43 0x98
# define IPTOS_DSCP_EF 0xb8
#endif /* IPTOS_DSCP_AF11 */
#ifndef IPTOS_DSCP_CS0
# define IPTOS_DSCP_CS0 0x00
# define IPTOS_DSCP_CS1 0x20
# define IPTOS_DSCP_CS2 0x40
# define IPTOS_DSCP_CS3 0x60
# define IPTOS_DSCP_CS4 0x80
# define IPTOS_DSCP_CS5 0xa0
# define IPTOS_DSCP_CS6 0xc0
# define IPTOS_DSCP_CS7 0xe0
#endif /* IPTOS_DSCP_CS0 */
#ifndef IPTOS_DSCP_EF
# define IPTOS_DSCP_EF 0xb8
#endif /* IPTOS_DSCP_EF */
+#ifndef IPTOS_DSCP_LE
+# define IPTOS_DSCP_LE 0x01
+#endif /* IPTOS_DSCP_LE */
#ifndef IPTOS_PREC_CRITIC_ECP
# define IPTOS_PREC_CRITIC_ECP 0xa0
#endif
#ifndef IPTOS_PREC_INTERNETCONTROL
# define IPTOS_PREC_INTERNETCONTROL 0xc0
#endif
#ifndef IPTOS_PREC_NETCONTROL
# define IPTOS_PREC_NETCONTROL 0xe0
#endif
#ifndef PATH_MAX
# ifdef _POSIX_PATH_MAX
# define PATH_MAX _POSIX_PATH_MAX
# endif
#endif
#ifndef MAXPATHLEN
# ifdef PATH_MAX
# define MAXPATHLEN PATH_MAX
# else /* PATH_MAX */
# define MAXPATHLEN 64
# endif /* PATH_MAX */
#endif /* MAXPATHLEN */
#ifndef HOST_NAME_MAX
# include "netdb.h" /* for MAXHOSTNAMELEN */
# if defined(_POSIX_HOST_NAME_MAX)
# define HOST_NAME_MAX _POSIX_HOST_NAME_MAX
# elif defined(MAXHOSTNAMELEN)
# define HOST_NAME_MAX MAXHOSTNAMELEN
# else
# define HOST_NAME_MAX 255
# endif
#endif /* HOST_NAME_MAX */
#if defined(HAVE_DECL_MAXSYMLINKS) && HAVE_DECL_MAXSYMLINKS == 0
# define MAXSYMLINKS 5
#endif
#ifndef STDIN_FILENO
# define STDIN_FILENO 0
#endif
#ifndef STDOUT_FILENO
# define STDOUT_FILENO 1
#endif
#ifndef STDERR_FILENO
# define STDERR_FILENO 2
#endif
#ifndef NGROUPS_MAX /* Disable groupaccess if NGROUP_MAX is not set */
#ifdef NGROUPS
#define NGROUPS_MAX NGROUPS
#else
#define NGROUPS_MAX 0
#endif
#endif
#if defined(HAVE_DECL_O_NONBLOCK) && HAVE_DECL_O_NONBLOCK == 0
# define O_NONBLOCK 00004 /* Non Blocking Open */
#endif
#ifndef S_IFSOCK
# define S_IFSOCK 0
#endif /* S_IFSOCK */
#ifndef S_ISDIR
# define S_ISDIR(mode) (((mode) & (_S_IFMT)) == (_S_IFDIR))
#endif /* S_ISDIR */
#ifndef S_ISREG
# define S_ISREG(mode) (((mode) & (_S_IFMT)) == (_S_IFREG))
#endif /* S_ISREG */
#ifndef S_ISLNK
# define S_ISLNK(mode) (((mode) & S_IFMT) == S_IFLNK)
#endif /* S_ISLNK */
#ifndef S_IXUSR
# define S_IXUSR 0000100 /* execute/search permission, */
# define S_IXGRP 0000010 /* execute/search permission, */
# define S_IXOTH 0000001 /* execute/search permission, */
# define _S_IWUSR 0000200 /* write permission, */
# define S_IWUSR _S_IWUSR /* write permission, owner */
# define S_IWGRP 0000020 /* write permission, group */
# define S_IWOTH 0000002 /* write permission, other */
# define S_IRUSR 0000400 /* read permission, owner */
# define S_IRGRP 0000040 /* read permission, group */
# define S_IROTH 0000004 /* read permission, other */
# define S_IRWXU 0000700 /* read, write, execute */
# define S_IRWXG 0000070 /* read, write, execute */
# define S_IRWXO 0000007 /* read, write, execute */
#endif /* S_IXUSR */
#if !defined(MAP_ANON) && defined(MAP_ANONYMOUS)
#define MAP_ANON MAP_ANONYMOUS
#endif
#ifndef MAP_FAILED
# define MAP_FAILED ((void *)-1)
#endif
/*
SCO Open Server 3 has INADDR_LOOPBACK defined in rpc/rpc.h but
including rpc/rpc.h breaks Solaris 6
*/
#ifndef INADDR_LOOPBACK
#define INADDR_LOOPBACK ((u_long)0x7f000001)
#endif
/* Types */
/* If sys/types.h does not supply intXX_t, supply them ourselves */
/* (or die trying) */
#ifndef HAVE_U_INT
typedef unsigned int u_int;
#endif
#ifndef HAVE_INTXX_T
typedef signed char int8_t;
# if (SIZEOF_SHORT_INT == 2)
typedef short int int16_t;
# else
# error "16 bit int type not found."
# endif
# if (SIZEOF_INT == 4)
typedef int int32_t;
# else
# error "32 bit int type not found."
# endif
#endif
/* If sys/types.h does not supply u_intXX_t, supply them ourselves */
#ifndef HAVE_U_INTXX_T
# ifdef HAVE_UINTXX_T
typedef uint8_t u_int8_t;
typedef uint16_t u_int16_t;
typedef uint32_t u_int32_t;
# define HAVE_U_INTXX_T 1
# else
typedef unsigned char u_int8_t;
# if (SIZEOF_SHORT_INT == 2)
typedef unsigned short int u_int16_t;
# else
# error "16 bit int type not found."
# endif
# if (SIZEOF_INT == 4)
typedef unsigned int u_int32_t;
# else
# error "32 bit int type not found."
# endif
# endif
#define __BIT_TYPES_DEFINED__
#endif
+#ifndef UINT32_MAX
+# if defined(HAVE_DECL_UINT32_MAX) && (HAVE_DECL_UINT32_MAX == 0)
+# if (SIZEOF_INT == 4)
+# define UINT32_MAX UINT_MAX
+# endif
+# endif
+#endif
+
/* 64-bit types */
#ifndef HAVE_INT64_T
# if (SIZEOF_LONG_INT == 8)
typedef long int int64_t;
# else
# if (SIZEOF_LONG_LONG_INT == 8)
typedef long long int int64_t;
# endif
# endif
#endif
#ifndef HAVE_U_INT64_T
# if (SIZEOF_LONG_INT == 8)
typedef unsigned long int u_int64_t;
# else
# if (SIZEOF_LONG_LONG_INT == 8)
typedef unsigned long long int u_int64_t;
# endif
# endif
#endif
#ifndef HAVE_UINTXX_T
typedef u_int8_t uint8_t;
typedef u_int16_t uint16_t;
typedef u_int32_t uint32_t;
typedef u_int64_t uint64_t;
#endif
#ifndef HAVE_INTMAX_T
typedef long long intmax_t;
#endif
#ifndef HAVE_UINTMAX_T
typedef unsigned long long uintmax_t;
#endif
#ifndef HAVE_U_CHAR
typedef unsigned char u_char;
# define HAVE_U_CHAR
#endif /* HAVE_U_CHAR */
#ifndef ULLONG_MAX
# define ULLONG_MAX ((unsigned long long)-1)
#endif
#ifndef SIZE_T_MAX
#define SIZE_T_MAX ULONG_MAX
#endif /* SIZE_T_MAX */
#ifndef HAVE_SIZE_T
typedef unsigned int size_t;
# define HAVE_SIZE_T
# define SIZE_T_MAX UINT_MAX
#endif /* HAVE_SIZE_T */
#ifndef SIZE_MAX
#define SIZE_MAX SIZE_T_MAX
#endif
#ifndef INT32_MAX
# if (SIZEOF_INT == 4)
# define INT32_MAX INT_MAX
# elif (SIZEOF_LONG == 4)
# define INT32_MAX LONG_MAX
# else
# error "need INT32_MAX"
# endif
#endif
#ifndef INT64_MAX
# if (SIZEOF_INT == 8)
# define INT64_MAX INT_MAX
# elif (SIZEOF_LONG == 8)
# define INT64_MAX LONG_MAX
# elif (SIZEOF_LONG_LONG_INT == 8)
# define INT64_MAX LLONG_MAX
# else
# error "need INT64_MAX"
# endif
#endif
#ifndef HAVE_SSIZE_T
typedef int ssize_t;
+#define SSIZE_MAX INT_MAX
# define HAVE_SSIZE_T
#endif /* HAVE_SSIZE_T */
#ifndef HAVE_CLOCK_T
typedef long clock_t;
# define HAVE_CLOCK_T
#endif /* HAVE_CLOCK_T */
#ifndef HAVE_SA_FAMILY_T
typedef int sa_family_t;
# define HAVE_SA_FAMILY_T
#endif /* HAVE_SA_FAMILY_T */
#ifndef HAVE_PID_T
typedef int pid_t;
# define HAVE_PID_T
#endif /* HAVE_PID_T */
#ifndef HAVE_SIG_ATOMIC_T
typedef int sig_atomic_t;
# define HAVE_SIG_ATOMIC_T
#endif /* HAVE_SIG_ATOMIC_T */
#ifndef HAVE_MODE_T
typedef int mode_t;
# define HAVE_MODE_T
#endif /* HAVE_MODE_T */
#if !defined(HAVE_SS_FAMILY_IN_SS) && defined(HAVE___SS_FAMILY_IN_SS)
# define ss_family __ss_family
#endif /* !defined(HAVE_SS_FAMILY_IN_SS) && defined(HAVE_SA_FAMILY_IN_SS) */
#ifndef HAVE_SYS_UN_H
struct sockaddr_un {
short sun_family; /* AF_UNIX */
char sun_path[108]; /* path name (gag) */
};
#endif /* HAVE_SYS_UN_H */
#ifndef HAVE_IN_ADDR_T
typedef u_int32_t in_addr_t;
#endif
#ifndef HAVE_IN_PORT_T
typedef u_int16_t in_port_t;
#endif
#if defined(BROKEN_SYS_TERMIO_H) && !defined(_STRUCT_WINSIZE)
#define _STRUCT_WINSIZE
struct winsize {
unsigned short ws_row; /* rows, in characters */
unsigned short ws_col; /* columns, in character */
unsigned short ws_xpixel; /* horizontal size, pixels */
unsigned short ws_ypixel; /* vertical size, pixels */
};
#endif
/* bits needed for select that may not be in the system headers */
#ifndef HAVE_FD_MASK
typedef unsigned long int fd_mask;
#endif
#if defined(HAVE_DECL_NFDBITS) && HAVE_DECL_NFDBITS == 0
# define NFDBITS (8 * sizeof(unsigned long))
#endif
#if defined(HAVE_DECL_HOWMANY) && HAVE_DECL_HOWMANY == 0
# define howmany(x,y) (((x)+((y)-1))/(y))
#endif
/* Paths */
#ifndef _PATH_BSHELL
# define _PATH_BSHELL "/bin/sh"
#endif
#ifdef USER_PATH
# ifdef _PATH_STDPATH
# undef _PATH_STDPATH
# endif
# define _PATH_STDPATH USER_PATH
#endif
#ifndef _PATH_STDPATH
# define _PATH_STDPATH "/usr/bin:/bin:/usr/sbin:/sbin"
#endif
#ifndef SUPERUSER_PATH
# define SUPERUSER_PATH _PATH_STDPATH
#endif
#ifndef _PATH_DEVNULL
# define _PATH_DEVNULL "/dev/null"
#endif
/* user may have set a different path */
#if defined(_PATH_MAILDIR) && defined(MAIL_DIRECTORY)
# undef _PATH_MAILDIR
#endif /* defined(_PATH_MAILDIR) && defined(MAIL_DIRECTORY) */
#ifdef MAIL_DIRECTORY
# define _PATH_MAILDIR MAIL_DIRECTORY
#endif
#ifndef _PATH_NOLOGIN
# define _PATH_NOLOGIN "/etc/nologin"
#endif
/* Define this to be the path of the xauth program. */
#ifdef XAUTH_PATH
#define _PATH_XAUTH XAUTH_PATH
#endif /* XAUTH_PATH */
/* derived from XF4/xc/lib/dps/Xlibnet.h */
#ifndef X_UNIX_PATH
# ifdef __hpux
# define X_UNIX_PATH "/var/spool/sockets/X11/%u"
# else
# define X_UNIX_PATH "/tmp/.X11-unix/X%u"
# endif
#endif /* X_UNIX_PATH */
#define _PATH_UNIX_X X_UNIX_PATH
#ifndef _PATH_TTY
# define _PATH_TTY "/dev/tty"
#endif
/* Macros */
#if defined(HAVE_LOGIN_GETCAPBOOL) && defined(HAVE_LOGIN_CAP_H)
# define HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
#endif
#ifndef MAX
# define MAX(a,b) (((a)>(b))?(a):(b))
# define MIN(a,b) (((a)<(b))?(a):(b))
#endif
#ifndef roundup
# define roundup(x, y) ((((x)+((y)-1))/(y))*(y))
#endif
#ifndef timersub
#define timersub(a, b, result) \
do { \
(result)->tv_sec = (a)->tv_sec - (b)->tv_sec; \
(result)->tv_usec = (a)->tv_usec - (b)->tv_usec; \
if ((result)->tv_usec < 0) { \
--(result)->tv_sec; \
(result)->tv_usec += 1000000; \
} \
} while (0)
#endif
#ifndef TIMEVAL_TO_TIMESPEC
#define TIMEVAL_TO_TIMESPEC(tv, ts) { \
(ts)->tv_sec = (tv)->tv_sec; \
(ts)->tv_nsec = (tv)->tv_usec * 1000; \
}
#endif
#ifndef TIMESPEC_TO_TIMEVAL
#define TIMESPEC_TO_TIMEVAL(tv, ts) { \
(tv)->tv_sec = (ts)->tv_sec; \
(tv)->tv_usec = (ts)->tv_nsec / 1000; \
}
#endif
#ifndef timespeccmp
#define timespeccmp(tsp, usp, cmp) \
(((tsp)->tv_sec == (usp)->tv_sec) ? \
((tsp)->tv_nsec cmp (usp)->tv_nsec) : \
((tsp)->tv_sec cmp (usp)->tv_sec))
#endif
#ifndef __P
# define __P(x) x
#endif
#if !defined(IN6_IS_ADDR_V4MAPPED)
# define IN6_IS_ADDR_V4MAPPED(a) \
((((u_int32_t *) (a))[0] == 0) && (((u_int32_t *) (a))[1] == 0) && \
(((u_int32_t *) (a))[2] == htonl (0xffff)))
#endif /* !defined(IN6_IS_ADDR_V4MAPPED) */
#if !defined(__GNUC__) || (__GNUC__ < 2)
# define __attribute__(x)
#endif /* !defined(__GNUC__) || (__GNUC__ < 2) */
#if !defined(HAVE_ATTRIBUTE__SENTINEL__) && !defined(__sentinel__)
# define __sentinel__
#endif
#if !defined(HAVE_ATTRIBUTE__BOUNDED__) && !defined(__bounded__)
# define __bounded__(x, y, z)
#endif
#if !defined(HAVE_ATTRIBUTE__NONNULL__) && !defined(__nonnull__)
# define __nonnull__(x)
#endif
#ifndef OSSH_ALIGNBYTES
#define OSSH_ALIGNBYTES (sizeof(int) - 1)
#endif
#ifndef __CMSG_ALIGN
#define __CMSG_ALIGN(p) (((u_int)(p) + OSSH_ALIGNBYTES) &~ OSSH_ALIGNBYTES)
#endif
/* Length of the contents of a control message of length len */
#ifndef CMSG_LEN
#define CMSG_LEN(len) (__CMSG_ALIGN(sizeof(struct cmsghdr)) + (len))
#endif
/* Length of the space taken up by a padded control message of length len */
#ifndef CMSG_SPACE
#define CMSG_SPACE(len) (__CMSG_ALIGN(sizeof(struct cmsghdr)) + __CMSG_ALIGN(len))
#endif
/* given pointer to struct cmsghdr, return pointer to data */
#ifndef CMSG_DATA
#define CMSG_DATA(cmsg) ((u_char *)(cmsg) + __CMSG_ALIGN(sizeof(struct cmsghdr)))
#endif /* CMSG_DATA */
/*
* RFC 2292 requires to check msg_controllen, in case that the kernel returns
* an empty list for some reasons.
*/
#ifndef CMSG_FIRSTHDR
#define CMSG_FIRSTHDR(mhdr) \
((mhdr)->msg_controllen >= sizeof(struct cmsghdr) ? \
(struct cmsghdr *)(mhdr)->msg_control : \
(struct cmsghdr *)NULL)
#endif /* CMSG_FIRSTHDR */
#if defined(HAVE_DECL_OFFSETOF) && HAVE_DECL_OFFSETOF == 0
# define offsetof(type, member) ((size_t) &((type *)0)->member)
#endif
/* Set up BSD-style BYTE_ORDER definition if it isn't there already */
/* XXX: doesn't try to cope with strange byte orders (PDP_ENDIAN) */
#ifndef BYTE_ORDER
# ifndef LITTLE_ENDIAN
# define LITTLE_ENDIAN 1234
# endif /* LITTLE_ENDIAN */
# ifndef BIG_ENDIAN
# define BIG_ENDIAN 4321
# endif /* BIG_ENDIAN */
# ifdef WORDS_BIGENDIAN
# define BYTE_ORDER BIG_ENDIAN
# else /* WORDS_BIGENDIAN */
# define BYTE_ORDER LITTLE_ENDIAN
# endif /* WORDS_BIGENDIAN */
#endif /* BYTE_ORDER */
/* Function replacement / compatibility hacks */
#if !defined(HAVE_GETADDRINFO) && (defined(HAVE_OGETADDRINFO) || defined(HAVE_NGETADDRINFO))
# define HAVE_GETADDRINFO
#endif
#ifndef HAVE_GETOPT_OPTRESET
# undef getopt
# undef opterr
# undef optind
# undef optopt
# undef optreset
# undef optarg
# define getopt(ac, av, o) BSDgetopt(ac, av, o)
# define opterr BSDopterr
# define optind BSDoptind
# define optopt BSDoptopt
# define optreset BSDoptreset
# define optarg BSDoptarg
#endif
#if defined(BROKEN_GETADDRINFO) && defined(HAVE_GETADDRINFO)
# undef HAVE_GETADDRINFO
#endif
#if defined(BROKEN_GETADDRINFO) && defined(HAVE_FREEADDRINFO)
# undef HAVE_FREEADDRINFO
#endif
#if defined(BROKEN_GETADDRINFO) && defined(HAVE_GAI_STRERROR)
# undef HAVE_GAI_STRERROR
#endif
#if defined(HAVE_GETADDRINFO)
# if defined(HAVE_DECL_AI_NUMERICSERV) && HAVE_DECL_AI_NUMERICSERV == 0
# define AI_NUMERICSERV 0
# endif
#endif
#if defined(BROKEN_UPDWTMPX) && defined(HAVE_UPDWTMPX)
# undef HAVE_UPDWTMPX
#endif
#if defined(BROKEN_SHADOW_EXPIRE) && defined(HAS_SHADOW_EXPIRE)
# undef HAS_SHADOW_EXPIRE
#endif
#if defined(HAVE_OPENLOG_R) && defined(SYSLOG_DATA_INIT) && \
defined(SYSLOG_R_SAFE_IN_SIGHAND)
# define DO_LOG_SAFE_IN_SIGHAND
#endif
#if !defined(HAVE_MEMMOVE) && defined(HAVE_BCOPY)
# define memmove(s1, s2, n) bcopy((s2), (s1), (n))
#endif /* !defined(HAVE_MEMMOVE) && defined(HAVE_BCOPY) */
#ifndef GETPGRP_VOID
# include <unistd.h>
# define getpgrp() getpgrp(0)
#endif
#ifdef USE_BSM_AUDIT
# define SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
# define CUSTOM_SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
#endif
#ifdef USE_LINUX_AUDIT
# define SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
# define CUSTOM_SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
#endif
#if !defined(HAVE___func__) && defined(HAVE___FUNCTION__)
# define __func__ __FUNCTION__
#elif !defined(HAVE___func__)
# define __func__ ""
#endif
#if defined(KRB5) && !defined(HEIMDAL)
# define krb5_get_err_text(context,code) error_message(code)
#endif
/* Maximum number of file descriptors available */
#ifdef HAVE_SYSCONF
# define SSH_SYSFDMAX sysconf(_SC_OPEN_MAX)
#else
# define SSH_SYSFDMAX 10000
#endif
#ifdef FSID_HAS_VAL
/* encode f_fsid into a 64 bit value */
#define FSID_TO_ULONG(f) \
((((u_int64_t)(f).val[0] & 0xffffffffUL) << 32) | \
((f).val[1] & 0xffffffffUL))
#elif defined(FSID_HAS___VAL)
#define FSID_TO_ULONG(f) \
((((u_int64_t)(f).__val[0] & 0xffffffffUL) << 32) | \
((f).__val[1] & 0xffffffffUL))
#else
# define FSID_TO_ULONG(f) ((f))
#endif
#if defined(__Lynx__)
/*
* LynxOS defines these in param.h which we do not want to include since
* it will also pull in a bunch of kernel definitions.
*/
# define ALIGNBYTES (sizeof(int) - 1)
# define ALIGN(p) (((unsigned)p + ALIGNBYTES) & ~ALIGNBYTES)
/* Missing prototypes on LynxOS */
int snprintf (char *, size_t, const char *, ...);
int mkstemp (char *);
char *crypt (const char *, const char *);
int seteuid (uid_t);
int setegid (gid_t);
char *mkdtemp (char *);
int rresvport_af (int *, sa_family_t);
int innetgr (const char *, const char *, const char *, const char *);
#endif
/*
* Define this to use pipes instead of socketpairs for communicating with the
* client program. Socketpairs do not seem to work on all systems.
*
* configure.ac sets this for a few OS's which are known to have problems
* but you may need to set it yourself
*/
/* #define USE_PIPES 1 */
/**
** login recorder definitions
**/
/* FIXME: put default paths back in */
#ifndef UTMP_FILE
# ifdef _PATH_UTMP
# define UTMP_FILE _PATH_UTMP
# else
# ifdef CONF_UTMP_FILE
# define UTMP_FILE CONF_UTMP_FILE
# endif
# endif
#endif
#ifndef WTMP_FILE
# ifdef _PATH_WTMP
# define WTMP_FILE _PATH_WTMP
# else
# ifdef CONF_WTMP_FILE
# define WTMP_FILE CONF_WTMP_FILE
# endif
# endif
#endif
/* pick up the user's location for lastlog if given */
#ifndef LASTLOG_FILE
# ifdef _PATH_LASTLOG
# define LASTLOG_FILE _PATH_LASTLOG
# else
# ifdef CONF_LASTLOG_FILE
# define LASTLOG_FILE CONF_LASTLOG_FILE
# endif
# endif
#endif
#if defined(HAVE_SHADOW_H) && !defined(DISABLE_SHADOW)
# define USE_SHADOW
#endif
/* The login() library function in libutil is first choice */
#if defined(HAVE_LOGIN) && !defined(DISABLE_LOGIN)
# define USE_LOGIN
#else
/* Simply select your favourite login types. */
/* Can't do if-else because some systems use several... <sigh> */
# if !defined(DISABLE_UTMPX)
# define USE_UTMPX
# endif
# if defined(UTMP_FILE) && !defined(DISABLE_UTMP)
# define USE_UTMP
# endif
# if defined(WTMPX_FILE) && !defined(DISABLE_WTMPX)
# define USE_WTMPX
# endif
# if defined(WTMP_FILE) && !defined(DISABLE_WTMP)
# define USE_WTMP
# endif
#endif
#ifndef UT_LINESIZE
# define UT_LINESIZE 8
#endif
/* I hope that the presence of LASTLOG_FILE is enough to detect this */
#if defined(LASTLOG_FILE) && !defined(DISABLE_LASTLOG)
# define USE_LASTLOG
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_OSF_SIA
# ifdef USE_SHADOW
# undef USE_SHADOW
# endif
# define CUSTOM_SYS_AUTH_PASSWD 1
#endif
#if defined(HAVE_LIBIAF) && defined(HAVE_SET_ID) && !defined(HAVE_SECUREWARE)
# define CUSTOM_SYS_AUTH_PASSWD 1
#endif
#if defined(HAVE_LIBIAF) && defined(HAVE_SET_ID) && !defined(BROKEN_LIBIAF)
# define USE_LIBIAF
#endif
/* HP-UX 11.11 */
#ifdef BTMP_FILE
# define _PATH_BTMP BTMP_FILE
#endif
#if defined(USE_BTMP) && defined(_PATH_BTMP)
# define CUSTOM_FAILED_LOGIN
#endif
/** end of login recorder definitions */
#ifdef BROKEN_GETGROUPS
# define getgroups(a,b) ((a)==0 && (b)==NULL ? NGROUPS_MAX : getgroups((a),(b)))
#endif
#if defined(HAVE_MMAP) && defined(BROKEN_MMAP)
# undef HAVE_MMAP
#endif
#ifndef IOV_MAX
# if defined(_XOPEN_IOV_MAX)
# define IOV_MAX _XOPEN_IOV_MAX
# elif defined(DEF_IOV_MAX)
# define IOV_MAX DEF_IOV_MAX
# else
# define IOV_MAX 16
# endif
#endif
#ifndef EWOULDBLOCK
# define EWOULDBLOCK EAGAIN
#endif
#ifndef INET6_ADDRSTRLEN /* for non IPv6 machines */
#define INET6_ADDRSTRLEN 46
#endif
#ifndef SSH_IOBUFSZ
# define SSH_IOBUFSZ 8192
#endif
/*
* We want functions in openbsd-compat, if enabled, to override system ones.
* We no-op out the weak symbol definition rather than remove it to reduce
* future sync problems. Some compilers (eg Unixware) do not allow an
* empty statement, so we use a bogus function declaration.
*/
#define DEF_WEAK(x) void __ssh_compat_weak_##x(void)
/*
* Platforms that have arc4random_uniform() and not arc4random_stir()
* shouldn't need the latter.
*/
#if defined(HAVE_ARC4RANDOM) && defined(HAVE_ARC4RANDOM_UNIFORM) && \
!defined(HAVE_ARC4RANDOM_STIR)
# define arc4random_stir()
#endif
#ifndef HAVE_VA_COPY
# ifdef HAVE___VA_COPY
# define va_copy(dest, src) __va_copy(dest, src)
# else
# define va_copy(dest, src) (dest) = (src)
# endif
#endif
#ifndef __predict_true
# if defined(__GNUC__) && \
((__GNUC__ > (2)) || (__GNUC__ == (2) && __GNUC_MINOR__ >= (96)))
# define __predict_true(exp) __builtin_expect(((exp) != 0), 1)
# define __predict_false(exp) __builtin_expect(((exp) != 0), 0)
# else
# define __predict_true(exp) ((exp) != 0)
# define __predict_false(exp) ((exp) != 0)
# endif /* gcc version */
#endif /* __predict_true */
#if defined(HAVE_GLOB_H) && defined(GLOB_HAS_ALTDIRFUNC) && \
defined(GLOB_HAS_GL_MATCHC) && defined(GLOB_HAS_GL_STATV) && \
defined(HAVE_DECL_GLOB_NOMATCH) && HAVE_DECL_GLOB_NOMATCH != 0 && \
!defined(BROKEN_GLOB)
# define USE_SYSTEM_GLOB
#endif
#endif /* _DEFINES_H */
diff --git a/digest-openssl.c b/digest-openssl.c
index 11efbf7c07cb..dbbea4251854 100644
--- a/digest-openssl.c
+++ b/digest-openssl.c
@@ -1,210 +1,207 @@
/* $OpenBSD: digest-openssl.c,v 1.7 2017/05/08 22:57:38 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2013 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
*
* Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
* copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
* WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
* ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
* WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
* ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
* OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <limits.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
#include "sshbuf.h"
#include "digest.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
-#ifndef HAVE_EVP_RIPEMD160
-# define EVP_ripemd160 NULL
-#endif
#ifndef HAVE_EVP_SHA256
# define EVP_sha256 NULL
#endif
#ifndef HAVE_EVP_SHA384
# define EVP_sha384 NULL
#endif
#ifndef HAVE_EVP_SHA512
# define EVP_sha512 NULL
#endif
struct ssh_digest_ctx {
int alg;
EVP_MD_CTX *mdctx;
};
struct ssh_digest {
int id;
const char *name;
size_t digest_len;
const EVP_MD *(*mdfunc)(void);
};
/* NB. Indexed directly by algorithm number */
const struct ssh_digest digests[] = {
{ SSH_DIGEST_MD5, "MD5", 16, EVP_md5 },
{ SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, "SHA1", 20, EVP_sha1 },
{ SSH_DIGEST_SHA256, "SHA256", 32, EVP_sha256 },
{ SSH_DIGEST_SHA384, "SHA384", 48, EVP_sha384 },
{ SSH_DIGEST_SHA512, "SHA512", 64, EVP_sha512 },
{ -1, NULL, 0, NULL },
};
static const struct ssh_digest *
ssh_digest_by_alg(int alg)
{
if (alg < 0 || alg >= SSH_DIGEST_MAX)
return NULL;
if (digests[alg].id != alg) /* sanity */
return NULL;
if (digests[alg].mdfunc == NULL)
return NULL;
return &(digests[alg]);
}
int
ssh_digest_alg_by_name(const char *name)
{
int alg;
for (alg = 0; digests[alg].id != -1; alg++) {
if (strcasecmp(name, digests[alg].name) == 0)
return digests[alg].id;
}
return -1;
}
const char *
ssh_digest_alg_name(int alg)
{
const struct ssh_digest *digest = ssh_digest_by_alg(alg);
return digest == NULL ? NULL : digest->name;
}
size_t
ssh_digest_bytes(int alg)
{
const struct ssh_digest *digest = ssh_digest_by_alg(alg);
return digest == NULL ? 0 : digest->digest_len;
}
size_t
ssh_digest_blocksize(struct ssh_digest_ctx *ctx)
{
return EVP_MD_CTX_block_size(ctx->mdctx);
}
struct ssh_digest_ctx *
ssh_digest_start(int alg)
{
const struct ssh_digest *digest = ssh_digest_by_alg(alg);
struct ssh_digest_ctx *ret;
if (digest == NULL || ((ret = calloc(1, sizeof(*ret))) == NULL))
return NULL;
ret->alg = alg;
if ((ret->mdctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new()) == NULL) {
free(ret);
return NULL;
}
if (EVP_DigestInit_ex(ret->mdctx, digest->mdfunc(), NULL) != 1) {
ssh_digest_free(ret);
return NULL;
}
return ret;
}
int
ssh_digest_copy_state(struct ssh_digest_ctx *from, struct ssh_digest_ctx *to)
{
if (from->alg != to->alg)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
/* we have bcopy-style order while openssl has memcpy-style */
if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(to->mdctx, from->mdctx))
return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
return 0;
}
int
ssh_digest_update(struct ssh_digest_ctx *ctx, const void *m, size_t mlen)
{
if (EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx->mdctx, m, mlen) != 1)
return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
return 0;
}
int
ssh_digest_update_buffer(struct ssh_digest_ctx *ctx, const struct sshbuf *b)
{
return ssh_digest_update(ctx, sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b));
}
int
ssh_digest_final(struct ssh_digest_ctx *ctx, u_char *d, size_t dlen)
{
const struct ssh_digest *digest = ssh_digest_by_alg(ctx->alg);
u_int l = dlen;
if (digest == NULL || dlen > UINT_MAX)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
if (dlen < digest->digest_len) /* No truncation allowed */
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
if (EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx->mdctx, d, &l) != 1)
return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
if (l != digest->digest_len) /* sanity */
return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
return 0;
}
void
ssh_digest_free(struct ssh_digest_ctx *ctx)
{
if (ctx == NULL)
return;
EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx->mdctx);
freezero(ctx, sizeof(*ctx));
}
int
ssh_digest_memory(int alg, const void *m, size_t mlen, u_char *d, size_t dlen)
{
const struct ssh_digest *digest = ssh_digest_by_alg(alg);
u_int mdlen;
if (digest == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
if (dlen > UINT_MAX)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
if (dlen < digest->digest_len)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
mdlen = dlen;
if (!EVP_Digest(m, mlen, d, &mdlen, digest->mdfunc(), NULL))
return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
return 0;
}
int
ssh_digest_buffer(int alg, const struct sshbuf *b, u_char *d, size_t dlen)
{
return ssh_digest_memory(alg, sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b), d, dlen);
}
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
diff --git a/entropy.c b/entropy.c
index 5de68016b02d..19ddeeafae3b 100644
--- a/entropy.c
+++ b/entropy.c
@@ -1,266 +1,266 @@
/*
* Copyright (c) 2001 Damien Miller. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#define RANDOM_SEED_SIZE 48
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_UN_H
# include <sys/un.h>
#endif
#include <netinet/in.h>
#include <arpa/inet.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <signal.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <stddef.h> /* for offsetof */
#include <openssl/rand.h>
#include <openssl/crypto.h>
#include <openssl/err.h>
#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
#include "ssh.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "atomicio.h"
#include "pathnames.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "sshbuf.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
/*
* Portable OpenSSH PRNG seeding:
* If OpenSSL has not "internally seeded" itself (e.g. pulled data from
* /dev/random), then collect RANDOM_SEED_SIZE bytes of randomness from
* PRNGd.
*/
#ifndef OPENSSL_PRNG_ONLY
/*
* Collect 'len' bytes of entropy into 'buf' from PRNGD/EGD daemon
* listening either on 'tcp_port', or via Unix domain socket at *
* 'socket_path'.
* Either a non-zero tcp_port or a non-null socket_path must be
* supplied.
* Returns 0 on success, -1 on error
*/
int
get_random_bytes_prngd(unsigned char *buf, int len,
unsigned short tcp_port, char *socket_path)
{
int fd, addr_len, rval, errors;
u_char msg[2];
struct sockaddr_storage addr;
struct sockaddr_in *addr_in = (struct sockaddr_in *)&addr;
struct sockaddr_un *addr_un = (struct sockaddr_un *)&addr;
- mysig_t old_sigpipe;
+ sshsig_t old_sigpipe;
/* Sanity checks */
if (socket_path == NULL && tcp_port == 0)
fatal("You must specify a port or a socket");
if (socket_path != NULL &&
strlen(socket_path) >= sizeof(addr_un->sun_path))
fatal("Random pool path is too long");
if (len <= 0 || len > 255)
fatal("Too many bytes (%d) to read from PRNGD", len);
memset(&addr, '\0', sizeof(addr));
if (tcp_port != 0) {
addr_in->sin_family = AF_INET;
addr_in->sin_addr.s_addr = htonl(INADDR_LOOPBACK);
addr_in->sin_port = htons(tcp_port);
addr_len = sizeof(*addr_in);
} else {
addr_un->sun_family = AF_UNIX;
strlcpy(addr_un->sun_path, socket_path,
sizeof(addr_un->sun_path));
addr_len = offsetof(struct sockaddr_un, sun_path) +
strlen(socket_path) + 1;
}
- old_sigpipe = signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN);
+ old_sigpipe = ssh_signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN);
errors = 0;
rval = -1;
reopen:
fd = socket(addr.ss_family, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
if (fd == -1) {
error("Couldn't create socket: %s", strerror(errno));
goto done;
}
if (connect(fd, (struct sockaddr*)&addr, addr_len) == -1) {
if (tcp_port != 0) {
error("Couldn't connect to PRNGD port %d: %s",
tcp_port, strerror(errno));
} else {
error("Couldn't connect to PRNGD socket \"%s\": %s",
addr_un->sun_path, strerror(errno));
}
goto done;
}
/* Send blocking read request to PRNGD */
msg[0] = 0x02;
msg[1] = len;
if (atomicio(vwrite, fd, msg, sizeof(msg)) != sizeof(msg)) {
if (errno == EPIPE && errors < 10) {
close(fd);
errors++;
goto reopen;
}
error("Couldn't write to PRNGD socket: %s",
strerror(errno));
goto done;
}
if (atomicio(read, fd, buf, len) != (size_t)len) {
if (errno == EPIPE && errors < 10) {
close(fd);
errors++;
goto reopen;
}
error("Couldn't read from PRNGD socket: %s",
strerror(errno));
goto done;
}
rval = 0;
done:
- signal(SIGPIPE, old_sigpipe);
+ ssh_signal(SIGPIPE, old_sigpipe);
if (fd != -1)
close(fd);
return rval;
}
static int
seed_from_prngd(unsigned char *buf, size_t bytes)
{
#ifdef PRNGD_PORT
debug("trying egd/prngd port %d", PRNGD_PORT);
if (get_random_bytes_prngd(buf, bytes, PRNGD_PORT, NULL) == 0)
return 0;
#endif
#ifdef PRNGD_SOCKET
debug("trying egd/prngd socket %s", PRNGD_SOCKET);
if (get_random_bytes_prngd(buf, bytes, 0, PRNGD_SOCKET) == 0)
return 0;
#endif
return -1;
}
void
rexec_send_rng_seed(struct sshbuf *m)
{
u_char buf[RANDOM_SEED_SIZE];
size_t len = sizeof(buf);
int r;
if (RAND_bytes(buf, sizeof(buf)) <= 0) {
error("Couldn't obtain random bytes (error %ld)",
ERR_get_error());
len = 0;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(m, buf, len)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
explicit_bzero(buf, sizeof(buf));
}
void
rexec_recv_rng_seed(struct sshbuf *m)
{
const u_char *buf = NULL;
size_t len = 0;
int r;
if ((r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(m, &buf, &len)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
debug3("rexec_recv_rng_seed: seeding rng with %lu bytes",
(unsigned long)len);
RAND_add(buf, len, len);
}
#endif /* OPENSSL_PRNG_ONLY */
void
seed_rng(void)
{
unsigned char buf[RANDOM_SEED_SIZE];
/* Initialise libcrypto */
ssh_libcrypto_init();
if (!ssh_compatible_openssl(OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER,
OpenSSL_version_num()))
fatal("OpenSSL version mismatch. Built against %lx, you "
"have %lx", (u_long)OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER,
OpenSSL_version_num());
#ifndef OPENSSL_PRNG_ONLY
if (RAND_status() == 1)
debug3("RNG is ready, skipping seeding");
else {
if (seed_from_prngd(buf, sizeof(buf)) == -1)
fatal("Could not obtain seed from PRNGd");
RAND_add(buf, sizeof(buf), sizeof(buf));
}
#endif /* OPENSSL_PRNG_ONLY */
if (RAND_status() != 1)
fatal("PRNG is not seeded");
/* Ensure arc4random() is primed */
arc4random_buf(buf, sizeof(buf));
explicit_bzero(buf, sizeof(buf));
}
#else /* WITH_OPENSSL */
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
/* Actual initialisation is handled in arc4random() */
void
seed_rng(void)
{
unsigned char buf[RANDOM_SEED_SIZE];
/* Ensure arc4random() is primed */
arc4random_buf(buf, sizeof(buf));
explicit_bzero(buf, sizeof(buf));
}
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
diff --git a/hash.c b/hash.c
index 5875d41fafa7..fb81e4786945 100644
--- a/hash.c
+++ b/hash.c
@@ -1,27 +1,45 @@
/* $OpenBSD: hash.c,v 1.4 2017/12/14 21:07:39 naddy Exp $ */
-/* $OpenBSD: hash.c,v 1.5 2018/01/13 00:24:09 naddy Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: hash.c,v 1.6 2019/11/29 00:11:21 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Public domain. Author: Christian Weisgerber <naddy@openbsd.org>
* API compatible reimplementation of function from nacl
*/
+#include "includes.h"
+
#include "crypto_api.h"
#include <stdarg.h>
-#include "digest.h"
-#include "log.h"
-#include "ssherr.h"
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
int
crypto_hash_sha512(unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in,
unsigned long long inlen)
{
- int r;
- if ((r = ssh_digest_memory(SSH_DIGEST_SHA512, in, inlen, out,
- crypto_hash_sha512_BYTES)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ if (!EVP_Digest(in, inlen, out, NULL, EVP_sha512(), NULL))
+ return -1;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+#else
+# ifdef HAVE_SHA2_H
+# include <sha2.h>
+# endif
+
+int
+crypto_hash_sha512(unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in,
+ unsigned long long inlen)
+{
+
+ SHA2_CTX ctx;
+
+ SHA512Init(&ctx);
+ SHA512Update(&ctx, in, inlen);
+ SHA512Final(out, &ctx);
return 0;
}
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
diff --git a/hostfile.c b/hostfile.c
index 96ab880d42cd..4a0349a60a39 100644
--- a/hostfile.c
+++ b/hostfile.c
@@ -1,832 +1,833 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: hostfile.c,v 1.76 2019/07/07 01:05:00 dtucker Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: hostfile.c,v 1.77 2020/01/25 00:21:08 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
* All rights reserved
* Functions for manipulating the known hosts files.
*
* As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
* can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
* software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
* incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
* called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
*
*
* Copyright (c) 1999, 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (c) 1999 Niels Provos. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <netinet/in.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <resolv.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "match.h"
#include "sshkey.h"
#include "hostfile.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
#include "digest.h"
#include "hmac.h"
struct hostkeys {
struct hostkey_entry *entries;
u_int num_entries;
};
/* XXX hmac is too easy to dictionary attack; use bcrypt? */
static int
extract_salt(const char *s, u_int l, u_char *salt, size_t salt_len)
{
char *p, *b64salt;
u_int b64len;
int ret;
if (l < sizeof(HASH_MAGIC) - 1) {
debug2("extract_salt: string too short");
return (-1);
}
if (strncmp(s, HASH_MAGIC, sizeof(HASH_MAGIC) - 1) != 0) {
debug2("extract_salt: invalid magic identifier");
return (-1);
}
s += sizeof(HASH_MAGIC) - 1;
l -= sizeof(HASH_MAGIC) - 1;
if ((p = memchr(s, HASH_DELIM, l)) == NULL) {
debug2("extract_salt: missing salt termination character");
return (-1);
}
b64len = p - s;
/* Sanity check */
if (b64len == 0 || b64len > 1024) {
debug2("extract_salt: bad encoded salt length %u", b64len);
return (-1);
}
b64salt = xmalloc(1 + b64len);
memcpy(b64salt, s, b64len);
b64salt[b64len] = '\0';
ret = __b64_pton(b64salt, salt, salt_len);
free(b64salt);
if (ret == -1) {
debug2("extract_salt: salt decode error");
return (-1);
}
if (ret != (int)ssh_hmac_bytes(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1)) {
debug2("extract_salt: expected salt len %zd, got %d",
ssh_hmac_bytes(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1), ret);
return (-1);
}
return (0);
}
char *
host_hash(const char *host, const char *name_from_hostfile, u_int src_len)
{
struct ssh_hmac_ctx *ctx;
u_char salt[256], result[256];
char uu_salt[512], uu_result[512];
static char encoded[1024];
u_int len;
len = ssh_digest_bytes(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1);
if (name_from_hostfile == NULL) {
/* Create new salt */
arc4random_buf(salt, len);
} else {
/* Extract salt from known host entry */
if (extract_salt(name_from_hostfile, src_len, salt,
sizeof(salt)) == -1)
return (NULL);
}
if ((ctx = ssh_hmac_start(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1)) == NULL ||
ssh_hmac_init(ctx, salt, len) < 0 ||
ssh_hmac_update(ctx, host, strlen(host)) < 0 ||
ssh_hmac_final(ctx, result, sizeof(result)))
fatal("%s: ssh_hmac failed", __func__);
ssh_hmac_free(ctx);
if (__b64_ntop(salt, len, uu_salt, sizeof(uu_salt)) == -1 ||
__b64_ntop(result, len, uu_result, sizeof(uu_result)) == -1)
fatal("%s: __b64_ntop failed", __func__);
snprintf(encoded, sizeof(encoded), "%s%s%c%s", HASH_MAGIC, uu_salt,
HASH_DELIM, uu_result);
return (encoded);
}
/*
* Parses an RSA (number of bits, e, n) or DSA key from a string. Moves the
* pointer over the key. Skips any whitespace at the beginning and at end.
*/
int
hostfile_read_key(char **cpp, u_int *bitsp, struct sshkey *ret)
{
char *cp;
/* Skip leading whitespace. */
for (cp = *cpp; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++)
;
if (sshkey_read(ret, &cp) != 0)
return 0;
/* Skip trailing whitespace. */
for (; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++)
;
/* Return results. */
*cpp = cp;
if (bitsp != NULL)
*bitsp = sshkey_size(ret);
return 1;
}
static HostkeyMarker
check_markers(char **cpp)
{
char marker[32], *sp, *cp = *cpp;
int ret = MRK_NONE;
while (*cp == '@') {
/* Only one marker is allowed */
if (ret != MRK_NONE)
return MRK_ERROR;
/* Markers are terminated by whitespace */
if ((sp = strchr(cp, ' ')) == NULL &&
(sp = strchr(cp, '\t')) == NULL)
return MRK_ERROR;
/* Extract marker for comparison */
if (sp <= cp + 1 || sp >= cp + sizeof(marker))
return MRK_ERROR;
memcpy(marker, cp, sp - cp);
marker[sp - cp] = '\0';
if (strcmp(marker, CA_MARKER) == 0)
ret = MRK_CA;
else if (strcmp(marker, REVOKE_MARKER) == 0)
ret = MRK_REVOKE;
else
return MRK_ERROR;
/* Skip past marker and any whitespace that follows it */
cp = sp;
for (; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++)
;
}
*cpp = cp;
return ret;
}
struct hostkeys *
init_hostkeys(void)
{
struct hostkeys *ret = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*ret));
ret->entries = NULL;
return ret;
}
struct load_callback_ctx {
const char *host;
u_long num_loaded;
struct hostkeys *hostkeys;
};
static int
record_hostkey(struct hostkey_foreach_line *l, void *_ctx)
{
struct load_callback_ctx *ctx = (struct load_callback_ctx *)_ctx;
struct hostkeys *hostkeys = ctx->hostkeys;
struct hostkey_entry *tmp;
if (l->status == HKF_STATUS_INVALID) {
/* XXX make this verbose() in the future */
debug("%s:%ld: parse error in hostkeys file",
l->path, l->linenum);
return 0;
}
debug3("%s: found %skey type %s in file %s:%lu", __func__,
l->marker == MRK_NONE ? "" :
(l->marker == MRK_CA ? "ca " : "revoked "),
sshkey_type(l->key), l->path, l->linenum);
if ((tmp = recallocarray(hostkeys->entries, hostkeys->num_entries,
hostkeys->num_entries + 1, sizeof(*hostkeys->entries))) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
hostkeys->entries = tmp;
hostkeys->entries[hostkeys->num_entries].host = xstrdup(ctx->host);
hostkeys->entries[hostkeys->num_entries].file = xstrdup(l->path);
hostkeys->entries[hostkeys->num_entries].line = l->linenum;
hostkeys->entries[hostkeys->num_entries].key = l->key;
l->key = NULL; /* steal it */
hostkeys->entries[hostkeys->num_entries].marker = l->marker;
hostkeys->num_entries++;
ctx->num_loaded++;
return 0;
}
void
load_hostkeys(struct hostkeys *hostkeys, const char *host, const char *path)
{
int r;
struct load_callback_ctx ctx;
ctx.host = host;
ctx.num_loaded = 0;
ctx.hostkeys = hostkeys;
if ((r = hostkeys_foreach(path, record_hostkey, &ctx, host, NULL,
HKF_WANT_MATCH|HKF_WANT_PARSE_KEY)) != 0) {
if (r != SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR && errno != ENOENT)
debug("%s: hostkeys_foreach failed for %s: %s",
__func__, path, ssh_err(r));
}
if (ctx.num_loaded != 0)
debug3("%s: loaded %lu keys from %s", __func__,
ctx.num_loaded, host);
}
void
free_hostkeys(struct hostkeys *hostkeys)
{
u_int i;
for (i = 0; i < hostkeys->num_entries; i++) {
free(hostkeys->entries[i].host);
free(hostkeys->entries[i].file);
sshkey_free(hostkeys->entries[i].key);
explicit_bzero(hostkeys->entries + i, sizeof(*hostkeys->entries));
}
free(hostkeys->entries);
explicit_bzero(hostkeys, sizeof(*hostkeys));
free(hostkeys);
}
static int
check_key_not_revoked(struct hostkeys *hostkeys, struct sshkey *k)
{
int is_cert = sshkey_is_cert(k);
u_int i;
for (i = 0; i < hostkeys->num_entries; i++) {
if (hostkeys->entries[i].marker != MRK_REVOKE)
continue;
if (sshkey_equal_public(k, hostkeys->entries[i].key))
return -1;
if (is_cert &&
sshkey_equal_public(k->cert->signature_key,
hostkeys->entries[i].key))
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
/*
* Match keys against a specified key, or look one up by key type.
*
* If looking for a keytype (key == NULL) and one is found then return
* HOST_FOUND, otherwise HOST_NEW.
*
* If looking for a key (key != NULL):
* 1. If the key is a cert and a matching CA is found, return HOST_OK
* 2. If the key is not a cert and a matching key is found, return HOST_OK
* 3. If no key matches but a key with a different type is found, then
* return HOST_CHANGED
* 4. If no matching keys are found, then return HOST_NEW.
*
* Finally, check any found key is not revoked.
*/
static HostStatus
check_hostkeys_by_key_or_type(struct hostkeys *hostkeys,
struct sshkey *k, int keytype, const struct hostkey_entry **found)
{
u_int i;
HostStatus end_return = HOST_NEW;
int want_cert = sshkey_is_cert(k);
HostkeyMarker want_marker = want_cert ? MRK_CA : MRK_NONE;
if (found != NULL)
*found = NULL;
for (i = 0; i < hostkeys->num_entries; i++) {
if (hostkeys->entries[i].marker != want_marker)
continue;
if (k == NULL) {
if (hostkeys->entries[i].key->type != keytype)
continue;
end_return = HOST_FOUND;
if (found != NULL)
*found = hostkeys->entries + i;
k = hostkeys->entries[i].key;
break;
}
if (want_cert) {
if (sshkey_equal_public(k->cert->signature_key,
hostkeys->entries[i].key)) {
/* A matching CA exists */
end_return = HOST_OK;
if (found != NULL)
*found = hostkeys->entries + i;
break;
}
} else {
if (sshkey_equal(k, hostkeys->entries[i].key)) {
end_return = HOST_OK;
if (found != NULL)
*found = hostkeys->entries + i;
break;
}
/* A non-maching key exists */
end_return = HOST_CHANGED;
if (found != NULL)
*found = hostkeys->entries + i;
}
}
if (check_key_not_revoked(hostkeys, k) != 0) {
end_return = HOST_REVOKED;
if (found != NULL)
*found = NULL;
}
return end_return;
}
HostStatus
check_key_in_hostkeys(struct hostkeys *hostkeys, struct sshkey *key,
const struct hostkey_entry **found)
{
if (key == NULL)
fatal("no key to look up");
return check_hostkeys_by_key_or_type(hostkeys, key, 0, found);
}
int
lookup_key_in_hostkeys_by_type(struct hostkeys *hostkeys, int keytype,
const struct hostkey_entry **found)
{
return (check_hostkeys_by_key_or_type(hostkeys, NULL, keytype,
found) == HOST_FOUND);
}
static int
write_host_entry(FILE *f, const char *host, const char *ip,
const struct sshkey *key, int store_hash)
{
int r, success = 0;
char *hashed_host = NULL, *lhost;
lhost = xstrdup(host);
lowercase(lhost);
if (store_hash) {
if ((hashed_host = host_hash(lhost, NULL, 0)) == NULL) {
error("%s: host_hash failed", __func__);
free(lhost);
return 0;
}
fprintf(f, "%s ", hashed_host);
} else if (ip != NULL)
fprintf(f, "%s,%s ", lhost, ip);
else {
fprintf(f, "%s ", lhost);
}
free(lhost);
if ((r = sshkey_write(key, f)) == 0)
success = 1;
else
error("%s: sshkey_write failed: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
fputc('\n', f);
return success;
}
/*
* Appends an entry to the host file. Returns false if the entry could not
* be appended.
*/
int
add_host_to_hostfile(const char *filename, const char *host,
const struct sshkey *key, int store_hash)
{
FILE *f;
int success;
if (key == NULL)
return 1; /* XXX ? */
f = fopen(filename, "a");
if (!f)
return 0;
success = write_host_entry(f, host, NULL, key, store_hash);
fclose(f);
return success;
}
struct host_delete_ctx {
FILE *out;
int quiet;
const char *host;
int *skip_keys; /* XXX split for host/ip? might want to ensure both */
struct sshkey * const *keys;
size_t nkeys;
int modified;
};
static int
host_delete(struct hostkey_foreach_line *l, void *_ctx)
{
struct host_delete_ctx *ctx = (struct host_delete_ctx *)_ctx;
int loglevel = ctx->quiet ? SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1 : SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE;
size_t i;
if (l->status == HKF_STATUS_MATCHED) {
if (l->marker != MRK_NONE) {
/* Don't remove CA and revocation lines */
fprintf(ctx->out, "%s\n", l->line);
return 0;
}
/*
* If this line contains one of the keys that we will be
* adding later, then don't change it and mark the key for
* skipping.
*/
for (i = 0; i < ctx->nkeys; i++) {
if (sshkey_equal(ctx->keys[i], l->key)) {
ctx->skip_keys[i] = 1;
fprintf(ctx->out, "%s\n", l->line);
debug3("%s: %s key already at %s:%ld", __func__,
sshkey_type(l->key), l->path, l->linenum);
return 0;
}
}
/*
* Hostname matches and has no CA/revoke marker, delete it
* by *not* writing the line to ctx->out.
*/
do_log2(loglevel, "%s%s%s:%ld: Removed %s key for host %s",
ctx->quiet ? __func__ : "", ctx->quiet ? ": " : "",
l->path, l->linenum, sshkey_type(l->key), ctx->host);
ctx->modified = 1;
return 0;
}
/* Retain non-matching hosts and invalid lines when deleting */
if (l->status == HKF_STATUS_INVALID) {
do_log2(loglevel, "%s%s%s:%ld: invalid known_hosts entry",
ctx->quiet ? __func__ : "", ctx->quiet ? ": " : "",
l->path, l->linenum);
}
fprintf(ctx->out, "%s\n", l->line);
return 0;
}
int
hostfile_replace_entries(const char *filename, const char *host, const char *ip,
struct sshkey **keys, size_t nkeys, int store_hash, int quiet, int hash_alg)
{
int r, fd, oerrno = 0;
int loglevel = quiet ? SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1 : SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE;
struct host_delete_ctx ctx;
char *fp, *temp = NULL, *back = NULL;
mode_t omask;
size_t i;
omask = umask(077);
memset(&ctx, 0, sizeof(ctx));
ctx.host = host;
ctx.quiet = quiet;
if ((ctx.skip_keys = calloc(nkeys, sizeof(*ctx.skip_keys))) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
ctx.keys = keys;
ctx.nkeys = nkeys;
ctx.modified = 0;
/*
* Prepare temporary file for in-place deletion.
*/
if ((r = asprintf(&temp, "%s.XXXXXXXXXXX", filename)) == -1 ||
(r = asprintf(&back, "%s.old", filename)) == -1) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto fail;
}
if ((fd = mkstemp(temp)) == -1) {
oerrno = errno;
error("%s: mkstemp: %s", __func__, strerror(oerrno));
r = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
goto fail;
}
if ((ctx.out = fdopen(fd, "w")) == NULL) {
oerrno = errno;
close(fd);
error("%s: fdopen: %s", __func__, strerror(oerrno));
r = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
goto fail;
}
/* Remove all entries for the specified host from the file */
if ((r = hostkeys_foreach(filename, host_delete, &ctx, host, ip,
HKF_WANT_PARSE_KEY)) != 0) {
+ oerrno = errno;
error("%s: hostkeys_foreach failed: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
goto fail;
}
/* Add the requested keys */
for (i = 0; i < nkeys; i++) {
if (ctx.skip_keys[i])
continue;
if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(keys[i], hash_alg,
SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto fail;
}
do_log2(loglevel, "%s%sAdding new key for %s to %s: %s %s",
quiet ? __func__ : "", quiet ? ": " : "", host, filename,
sshkey_ssh_name(keys[i]), fp);
free(fp);
if (!write_host_entry(ctx.out, host, ip, keys[i], store_hash)) {
r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
goto fail;
}
ctx.modified = 1;
}
fclose(ctx.out);
ctx.out = NULL;
if (ctx.modified) {
/* Backup the original file and replace it with the temporary */
if (unlink(back) == -1 && errno != ENOENT) {
oerrno = errno;
error("%s: unlink %.100s: %s", __func__,
back, strerror(errno));
r = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
goto fail;
}
if (link(filename, back) == -1) {
oerrno = errno;
error("%s: link %.100s to %.100s: %s", __func__,
filename, back, strerror(errno));
r = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
goto fail;
}
if (rename(temp, filename) == -1) {
oerrno = errno;
error("%s: rename \"%s\" to \"%s\": %s", __func__,
temp, filename, strerror(errno));
r = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
goto fail;
}
} else {
/* No changes made; just delete the temporary file */
if (unlink(temp) != 0)
error("%s: unlink \"%s\": %s", __func__,
temp, strerror(errno));
}
/* success */
r = 0;
fail:
if (temp != NULL && r != 0)
unlink(temp);
free(temp);
free(back);
if (ctx.out != NULL)
fclose(ctx.out);
free(ctx.skip_keys);
umask(omask);
if (r == SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR)
errno = oerrno;
return r;
}
static int
match_maybe_hashed(const char *host, const char *names, int *was_hashed)
{
int hashed = *names == HASH_DELIM;
const char *hashed_host;
size_t nlen = strlen(names);
if (was_hashed != NULL)
*was_hashed = hashed;
if (hashed) {
if ((hashed_host = host_hash(host, names, nlen)) == NULL)
return -1;
return nlen == strlen(hashed_host) &&
strncmp(hashed_host, names, nlen) == 0;
}
return match_hostname(host, names) == 1;
}
int
hostkeys_foreach(const char *path, hostkeys_foreach_fn *callback, void *ctx,
const char *host, const char *ip, u_int options)
{
FILE *f;
char *line = NULL, ktype[128];
u_long linenum = 0;
char *cp, *cp2;
u_int kbits;
int hashed;
int s, r = 0;
struct hostkey_foreach_line lineinfo;
size_t linesize = 0, l;
memset(&lineinfo, 0, sizeof(lineinfo));
if (host == NULL && (options & HKF_WANT_MATCH) != 0)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
if ((f = fopen(path, "r")) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
debug3("%s: reading file \"%s\"", __func__, path);
while (getline(&line, &linesize, f) != -1) {
linenum++;
line[strcspn(line, "\n")] = '\0';
free(lineinfo.line);
sshkey_free(lineinfo.key);
memset(&lineinfo, 0, sizeof(lineinfo));
lineinfo.path = path;
lineinfo.linenum = linenum;
lineinfo.line = xstrdup(line);
lineinfo.marker = MRK_NONE;
lineinfo.status = HKF_STATUS_OK;
lineinfo.keytype = KEY_UNSPEC;
/* Skip any leading whitespace, comments and empty lines. */
for (cp = line; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++)
;
if (!*cp || *cp == '#' || *cp == '\n') {
if ((options & HKF_WANT_MATCH) == 0) {
lineinfo.status = HKF_STATUS_COMMENT;
if ((r = callback(&lineinfo, ctx)) != 0)
break;
}
continue;
}
if ((lineinfo.marker = check_markers(&cp)) == MRK_ERROR) {
verbose("%s: invalid marker at %s:%lu",
__func__, path, linenum);
if ((options & HKF_WANT_MATCH) == 0)
goto bad;
continue;
}
/* Find the end of the host name portion. */
for (cp2 = cp; *cp2 && *cp2 != ' ' && *cp2 != '\t'; cp2++)
;
lineinfo.hosts = cp;
*cp2++ = '\0';
/* Check if the host name matches. */
if (host != NULL) {
if ((s = match_maybe_hashed(host, lineinfo.hosts,
&hashed)) == -1) {
debug2("%s: %s:%ld: bad host hash \"%.32s\"",
__func__, path, linenum, lineinfo.hosts);
goto bad;
}
if (s == 1) {
lineinfo.status = HKF_STATUS_MATCHED;
lineinfo.match |= HKF_MATCH_HOST |
(hashed ? HKF_MATCH_HOST_HASHED : 0);
}
/* Try matching IP address if supplied */
if (ip != NULL) {
if ((s = match_maybe_hashed(ip, lineinfo.hosts,
&hashed)) == -1) {
debug2("%s: %s:%ld: bad ip hash "
"\"%.32s\"", __func__, path,
linenum, lineinfo.hosts);
goto bad;
}
if (s == 1) {
lineinfo.status = HKF_STATUS_MATCHED;
lineinfo.match |= HKF_MATCH_IP |
(hashed ? HKF_MATCH_IP_HASHED : 0);
}
}
/*
* Skip this line if host matching requested and
* neither host nor address matched.
*/
if ((options & HKF_WANT_MATCH) != 0 &&
lineinfo.status != HKF_STATUS_MATCHED)
continue;
}
/* Got a match. Skip host name and any following whitespace */
for (; *cp2 == ' ' || *cp2 == '\t'; cp2++)
;
if (*cp2 == '\0' || *cp2 == '#') {
debug2("%s:%ld: truncated before key type",
path, linenum);
goto bad;
}
lineinfo.rawkey = cp = cp2;
if ((options & HKF_WANT_PARSE_KEY) != 0) {
/*
* Extract the key from the line. This will skip
* any leading whitespace. Ignore badly formatted
* lines.
*/
if ((lineinfo.key = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL) {
error("%s: sshkey_new failed", __func__);
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
break;
}
if (!hostfile_read_key(&cp, &kbits, lineinfo.key)) {
goto bad;
}
lineinfo.keytype = lineinfo.key->type;
lineinfo.comment = cp;
} else {
/* Extract and parse key type */
l = strcspn(lineinfo.rawkey, " \t");
if (l <= 1 || l >= sizeof(ktype) ||
lineinfo.rawkey[l] == '\0')
goto bad;
memcpy(ktype, lineinfo.rawkey, l);
ktype[l] = '\0';
lineinfo.keytype = sshkey_type_from_name(ktype);
/*
* Assume legacy RSA1 if the first component is a short
* decimal number.
*/
if (lineinfo.keytype == KEY_UNSPEC && l < 8 &&
strspn(ktype, "0123456789") == l)
goto bad;
/*
* Check that something other than whitespace follows
* the key type. This won't catch all corruption, but
* it does catch trivial truncation.
*/
cp2 += l; /* Skip past key type */
for (; *cp2 == ' ' || *cp2 == '\t'; cp2++)
;
if (*cp2 == '\0' || *cp2 == '#') {
debug2("%s:%ld: truncated after key type",
path, linenum);
lineinfo.keytype = KEY_UNSPEC;
}
if (lineinfo.keytype == KEY_UNSPEC) {
bad:
sshkey_free(lineinfo.key);
lineinfo.key = NULL;
lineinfo.status = HKF_STATUS_INVALID;
if ((r = callback(&lineinfo, ctx)) != 0)
break;
continue;
}
}
if ((r = callback(&lineinfo, ctx)) != 0)
break;
}
sshkey_free(lineinfo.key);
free(lineinfo.line);
free(line);
fclose(f);
return r;
}
diff --git a/kex.c b/kex.c
index 49d701568c28..ce85f043958e 100644
--- a/kex.c
+++ b/kex.c
@@ -1,1366 +1,1371 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: kex.c,v 1.155 2019/10/08 22:40:39 dtucker Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: kex.c,v 1.156 2020/01/23 10:24:29 dtucker Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <signal.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <unistd.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_POLL_H
#include <poll.h>
+#endif
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
#include <openssl/crypto.h>
#include <openssl/dh.h>
#endif
#include "ssh.h"
#include "ssh2.h"
#include "atomicio.h"
#include "version.h"
#include "packet.h"
#include "compat.h"
#include "cipher.h"
#include "sshkey.h"
#include "kex.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "mac.h"
#include "match.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "dispatch.h"
#include "monitor.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
#include "sshbuf.h"
#include "digest.h"
/* prototype */
static int kex_choose_conf(struct ssh *);
static int kex_input_newkeys(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
static const char *proposal_names[PROPOSAL_MAX] = {
"KEX algorithms",
"host key algorithms",
"ciphers ctos",
"ciphers stoc",
"MACs ctos",
"MACs stoc",
"compression ctos",
"compression stoc",
"languages ctos",
"languages stoc",
};
struct kexalg {
char *name;
u_int type;
int ec_nid;
int hash_alg;
};
static const struct kexalg kexalgs[] = {
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
{ KEX_DH1, KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1 },
{ KEX_DH14_SHA1, KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1 },
{ KEX_DH14_SHA256, KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA256, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256 },
{ KEX_DH16_SHA512, KEX_DH_GRP16_SHA512, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA512 },
{ KEX_DH18_SHA512, KEX_DH_GRP18_SHA512, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA512 },
{ KEX_DHGEX_SHA1, KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1 },
#ifdef HAVE_EVP_SHA256
{ KEX_DHGEX_SHA256, KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256 },
#endif /* HAVE_EVP_SHA256 */
#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
{ KEX_ECDH_SHA2_NISTP256, KEX_ECDH_SHA2,
NID_X9_62_prime256v1, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256 },
{ KEX_ECDH_SHA2_NISTP384, KEX_ECDH_SHA2, NID_secp384r1,
SSH_DIGEST_SHA384 },
# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521
{ KEX_ECDH_SHA2_NISTP521, KEX_ECDH_SHA2, NID_secp521r1,
SSH_DIGEST_SHA512 },
# endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521 */
#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
#if defined(HAVE_EVP_SHA256) || !defined(WITH_OPENSSL)
{ KEX_CURVE25519_SHA256, KEX_C25519_SHA256, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256 },
{ KEX_CURVE25519_SHA256_OLD, KEX_C25519_SHA256, 0, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256 },
{ KEX_SNTRUP4591761X25519_SHA512, KEX_KEM_SNTRUP4591761X25519_SHA512, 0,
SSH_DIGEST_SHA512 },
#endif /* HAVE_EVP_SHA256 || !WITH_OPENSSL */
{ NULL, 0, -1, -1},
};
char *
kex_alg_list(char sep)
{
char *ret = NULL, *tmp;
size_t nlen, rlen = 0;
const struct kexalg *k;
for (k = kexalgs; k->name != NULL; k++) {
if (ret != NULL)
ret[rlen++] = sep;
nlen = strlen(k->name);
if ((tmp = realloc(ret, rlen + nlen + 2)) == NULL) {
free(ret);
return NULL;
}
ret = tmp;
memcpy(ret + rlen, k->name, nlen + 1);
rlen += nlen;
}
return ret;
}
static const struct kexalg *
kex_alg_by_name(const char *name)
{
const struct kexalg *k;
for (k = kexalgs; k->name != NULL; k++) {
if (strcmp(k->name, name) == 0)
return k;
}
return NULL;
}
/* Validate KEX method name list */
int
kex_names_valid(const char *names)
{
char *s, *cp, *p;
if (names == NULL || strcmp(names, "") == 0)
return 0;
if ((s = cp = strdup(names)) == NULL)
return 0;
for ((p = strsep(&cp, ",")); p && *p != '\0';
(p = strsep(&cp, ","))) {
if (kex_alg_by_name(p) == NULL) {
error("Unsupported KEX algorithm \"%.100s\"", p);
free(s);
return 0;
}
}
debug3("kex names ok: [%s]", names);
free(s);
return 1;
}
/*
* Concatenate algorithm names, avoiding duplicates in the process.
* Caller must free returned string.
*/
char *
kex_names_cat(const char *a, const char *b)
{
char *ret = NULL, *tmp = NULL, *cp, *p, *m;
size_t len;
if (a == NULL || *a == '\0')
return strdup(b);
if (b == NULL || *b == '\0')
return strdup(a);
if (strlen(b) > 1024*1024)
return NULL;
len = strlen(a) + strlen(b) + 2;
if ((tmp = cp = strdup(b)) == NULL ||
(ret = calloc(1, len)) == NULL) {
free(tmp);
return NULL;
}
strlcpy(ret, a, len);
for ((p = strsep(&cp, ",")); p && *p != '\0'; (p = strsep(&cp, ","))) {
if ((m = match_list(ret, p, NULL)) != NULL) {
free(m);
continue; /* Algorithm already present */
}
if (strlcat(ret, ",", len) >= len ||
strlcat(ret, p, len) >= len) {
free(tmp);
free(ret);
return NULL; /* Shouldn't happen */
}
}
free(tmp);
return ret;
}
/*
* Assemble a list of algorithms from a default list and a string from a
* configuration file. The user-provided string may begin with '+' to
* indicate that it should be appended to the default, '-' that the
* specified names should be removed, or '^' that they should be placed
* at the head.
*/
int
kex_assemble_names(char **listp, const char *def, const char *all)
{
char *cp, *tmp, *patterns;
char *list = NULL, *ret = NULL, *matching = NULL, *opatterns = NULL;
int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
if (listp == NULL || def == NULL || all == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
if (*listp == NULL || **listp == '\0') {
if ((*listp = strdup(def)) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
return 0;
}
list = *listp;
*listp = NULL;
if (*list == '+') {
/* Append names to default list */
if ((tmp = kex_names_cat(def, list + 1)) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto fail;
}
free(list);
list = tmp;
} else if (*list == '-') {
/* Remove names from default list */
if ((*listp = match_filter_blacklist(def, list + 1)) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto fail;
}
free(list);
/* filtering has already been done */
return 0;
} else if (*list == '^') {
/* Place names at head of default list */
if ((tmp = kex_names_cat(list + 1, def)) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto fail;
}
free(list);
list = tmp;
} else {
/* Explicit list, overrides default - just use "list" as is */
}
/*
* The supplied names may be a pattern-list. For the -list case,
* the patterns are applied above. For the +list and explicit list
* cases we need to do it now.
*/
ret = NULL;
if ((patterns = opatterns = strdup(list)) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto fail;
}
/* Apply positive (i.e. non-negated) patterns from the list */
while ((cp = strsep(&patterns, ",")) != NULL) {
if (*cp == '!') {
/* negated matches are not supported here */
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
goto fail;
}
free(matching);
if ((matching = match_filter_whitelist(all, cp)) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto fail;
}
if ((tmp = kex_names_cat(ret, matching)) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto fail;
}
free(ret);
ret = tmp;
}
if (ret == NULL || *ret == '\0') {
/* An empty name-list is an error */
/* XXX better error code? */
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
goto fail;
}
/* success */
*listp = ret;
ret = NULL;
r = 0;
fail:
free(matching);
free(opatterns);
free(list);
free(ret);
return r;
}
/* put algorithm proposal into buffer */
int
kex_prop2buf(struct sshbuf *b, char *proposal[PROPOSAL_MAX])
{
u_int i;
int r;
sshbuf_reset(b);
/*
* add a dummy cookie, the cookie will be overwritten by
* kex_send_kexinit(), each time a kexinit is set
*/
for (i = 0; i < KEX_COOKIE_LEN; i++) {
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, 0)) != 0)
return r;
}
for (i = 0; i < PROPOSAL_MAX; i++) {
if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, proposal[i])) != 0)
return r;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, 0)) != 0 || /* first_kex_packet_follows */
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, 0)) != 0) /* uint32 reserved */
return r;
return 0;
}
/* parse buffer and return algorithm proposal */
int
kex_buf2prop(struct sshbuf *raw, int *first_kex_follows, char ***propp)
{
struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
u_char v;
u_int i;
char **proposal = NULL;
int r;
*propp = NULL;
if ((proposal = calloc(PROPOSAL_MAX, sizeof(char *))) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
if ((b = sshbuf_fromb(raw)) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_consume(b, KEX_COOKIE_LEN)) != 0) { /* skip cookie */
error("%s: consume cookie: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
goto out;
}
/* extract kex init proposal strings */
for (i = 0; i < PROPOSAL_MAX; i++) {
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &(proposal[i]), NULL)) != 0) {
error("%s: parse proposal %u: %s", __func__,
i, ssh_err(r));
goto out;
}
debug2("%s: %s", proposal_names[i], proposal[i]);
}
/* first kex follows / reserved */
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(b, &v)) != 0 || /* first_kex_follows */
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &i)) != 0) { /* reserved */
error("%s: parse: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
goto out;
}
if (first_kex_follows != NULL)
*first_kex_follows = v;
debug2("first_kex_follows %d ", v);
debug2("reserved %u ", i);
r = 0;
*propp = proposal;
out:
if (r != 0 && proposal != NULL)
kex_prop_free(proposal);
sshbuf_free(b);
return r;
}
void
kex_prop_free(char **proposal)
{
u_int i;
if (proposal == NULL)
return;
for (i = 0; i < PROPOSAL_MAX; i++)
free(proposal[i]);
free(proposal);
}
/* ARGSUSED */
static int
kex_protocol_error(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
{
int r;
error("kex protocol error: type %d seq %u", type, seq);
if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, seq)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
return r;
return 0;
}
static void
kex_reset_dispatch(struct ssh *ssh)
{
ssh_dispatch_range(ssh, SSH2_MSG_TRANSPORT_MIN,
SSH2_MSG_TRANSPORT_MAX, &kex_protocol_error);
}
static int
kex_send_ext_info(struct ssh *ssh)
{
int r;
char *algs;
debug("Sending SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO");
if ((algs = sshkey_alg_list(0, 1, 1, ',')) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
/* XXX filter algs list by allowed pubkey/hostbased types */
if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, 1)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "server-sig-algs")) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, algs)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) {
error("%s: compose: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
goto out;
}
/* success */
r = 0;
out:
free(algs);
return r;
}
int
kex_send_newkeys(struct ssh *ssh)
{
int r;
kex_reset_dispatch(ssh);
if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
return r;
debug("SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS sent");
ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS, &kex_input_newkeys);
if (ssh->kex->ext_info_c && (ssh->kex->flags & KEX_INITIAL) != 0)
if ((r = kex_send_ext_info(ssh)) != 0)
return r;
debug("expecting SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS");
return 0;
}
int
kex_input_ext_info(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
{
struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
u_int32_t i, ninfo;
char *name;
u_char *val;
size_t vlen;
int r;
debug("SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO received");
ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO, &kex_protocol_error);
if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &ninfo)) != 0)
return r;
for (i = 0; i < ninfo; i++) {
if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &name, NULL)) != 0)
return r;
if ((r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &val, &vlen)) != 0) {
free(name);
return r;
}
if (strcmp(name, "server-sig-algs") == 0) {
/* Ensure no \0 lurking in value */
if (memchr(val, '\0', vlen) != NULL) {
error("%s: nul byte in %s", __func__, name);
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
}
debug("%s: %s=<%s>", __func__, name, val);
kex->server_sig_algs = val;
val = NULL;
} else
debug("%s: %s (unrecognised)", __func__, name);
free(name);
free(val);
}
return sshpkt_get_end(ssh);
}
static int
kex_input_newkeys(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
{
struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
int r;
debug("SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS received");
ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS, &kex_protocol_error);
ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT, &kex_input_kexinit);
if ((r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
return r;
if ((r = ssh_set_newkeys(ssh, MODE_IN)) != 0)
return r;
kex->done = 1;
kex->flags &= ~KEX_INITIAL;
sshbuf_reset(kex->peer);
/* sshbuf_reset(kex->my); */
kex->flags &= ~KEX_INIT_SENT;
free(kex->name);
kex->name = NULL;
return 0;
}
int
kex_send_kexinit(struct ssh *ssh)
{
u_char *cookie;
struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
int r;
if (kex == NULL) {
error("%s: no hex", __func__);
return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
if (kex->flags & KEX_INIT_SENT)
return 0;
kex->done = 0;
/* generate a random cookie */
if (sshbuf_len(kex->my) < KEX_COOKIE_LEN) {
error("%s: bad kex length: %zu < %d", __func__,
sshbuf_len(kex->my), KEX_COOKIE_LEN);
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
}
if ((cookie = sshbuf_mutable_ptr(kex->my)) == NULL) {
error("%s: buffer error", __func__);
return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
arc4random_buf(cookie, KEX_COOKIE_LEN);
if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_putb(ssh, kex->my)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) {
error("%s: compose reply: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
return r;
}
debug("SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT sent");
kex->flags |= KEX_INIT_SENT;
return 0;
}
/* ARGSUSED */
int
kex_input_kexinit(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
{
struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
const u_char *ptr;
u_int i;
size_t dlen;
int r;
debug("SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT received");
if (kex == NULL) {
error("%s: no hex", __func__);
return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT, NULL);
ptr = sshpkt_ptr(ssh, &dlen);
if ((r = sshbuf_put(kex->peer, ptr, dlen)) != 0)
return r;
/* discard packet */
for (i = 0; i < KEX_COOKIE_LEN; i++) {
if ((r = sshpkt_get_u8(ssh, NULL)) != 0) {
error("%s: discard cookie: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
return r;
}
}
for (i = 0; i < PROPOSAL_MAX; i++) {
if ((r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, NULL, NULL)) != 0) {
error("%s: discard proposal: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
return r;
}
}
/*
* XXX RFC4253 sec 7: "each side MAY guess" - currently no supported
* KEX method has the server move first, but a server might be using
* a custom method or one that we otherwise don't support. We should
* be prepared to remember first_kex_follows here so we can eat a
* packet later.
* XXX2 - RFC4253 is kind of ambiguous on what first_kex_follows means
* for cases where the server *doesn't* go first. I guess we should
* ignore it when it is set for these cases, which is what we do now.
*/
if ((r = sshpkt_get_u8(ssh, NULL)) != 0 || /* first_kex_follows */
(r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, NULL)) != 0 || /* reserved */
(r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
return r;
if (!(kex->flags & KEX_INIT_SENT))
if ((r = kex_send_kexinit(ssh)) != 0)
return r;
if ((r = kex_choose_conf(ssh)) != 0)
return r;
if (kex->kex_type < KEX_MAX && kex->kex[kex->kex_type] != NULL)
return (kex->kex[kex->kex_type])(ssh);
error("%s: unknown kex type %u", __func__, kex->kex_type);
return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
struct kex *
kex_new(void)
{
struct kex *kex;
if ((kex = calloc(1, sizeof(*kex))) == NULL ||
(kex->peer = sshbuf_new()) == NULL ||
(kex->my = sshbuf_new()) == NULL ||
(kex->client_version = sshbuf_new()) == NULL ||
(kex->server_version = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
kex_free(kex);
return NULL;
}
return kex;
}
void
kex_free_newkeys(struct newkeys *newkeys)
{
if (newkeys == NULL)
return;
if (newkeys->enc.key) {
explicit_bzero(newkeys->enc.key, newkeys->enc.key_len);
free(newkeys->enc.key);
newkeys->enc.key = NULL;
}
if (newkeys->enc.iv) {
explicit_bzero(newkeys->enc.iv, newkeys->enc.iv_len);
free(newkeys->enc.iv);
newkeys->enc.iv = NULL;
}
free(newkeys->enc.name);
explicit_bzero(&newkeys->enc, sizeof(newkeys->enc));
free(newkeys->comp.name);
explicit_bzero(&newkeys->comp, sizeof(newkeys->comp));
mac_clear(&newkeys->mac);
if (newkeys->mac.key) {
explicit_bzero(newkeys->mac.key, newkeys->mac.key_len);
free(newkeys->mac.key);
newkeys->mac.key = NULL;
}
free(newkeys->mac.name);
explicit_bzero(&newkeys->mac, sizeof(newkeys->mac));
explicit_bzero(newkeys, sizeof(*newkeys));
free(newkeys);
}
void
kex_free(struct kex *kex)
{
u_int mode;
if (kex == NULL)
return;
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
DH_free(kex->dh);
#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
EC_KEY_free(kex->ec_client_key);
#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
for (mode = 0; mode < MODE_MAX; mode++) {
kex_free_newkeys(kex->newkeys[mode]);
kex->newkeys[mode] = NULL;
}
sshbuf_free(kex->peer);
sshbuf_free(kex->my);
sshbuf_free(kex->client_version);
sshbuf_free(kex->server_version);
sshbuf_free(kex->client_pub);
free(kex->session_id);
free(kex->failed_choice);
free(kex->hostkey_alg);
free(kex->name);
free(kex);
}
int
kex_ready(struct ssh *ssh, char *proposal[PROPOSAL_MAX])
{
int r;
if ((r = kex_prop2buf(ssh->kex->my, proposal)) != 0)
return r;
ssh->kex->flags = KEX_INITIAL;
kex_reset_dispatch(ssh);
ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT, &kex_input_kexinit);
return 0;
}
int
kex_setup(struct ssh *ssh, char *proposal[PROPOSAL_MAX])
{
int r;
if ((r = kex_ready(ssh, proposal)) != 0)
return r;
if ((r = kex_send_kexinit(ssh)) != 0) { /* we start */
kex_free(ssh->kex);
ssh->kex = NULL;
return r;
}
return 0;
}
/*
* Request key re-exchange, returns 0 on success or a ssherr.h error
* code otherwise. Must not be called if KEX is incomplete or in-progress.
*/
int
kex_start_rekex(struct ssh *ssh)
{
if (ssh->kex == NULL) {
error("%s: no kex", __func__);
return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
if (ssh->kex->done == 0) {
error("%s: requested twice", __func__);
return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
ssh->kex->done = 0;
return kex_send_kexinit(ssh);
}
static int
choose_enc(struct sshenc *enc, char *client, char *server)
{
char *name = match_list(client, server, NULL);
if (name == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_NO_CIPHER_ALG_MATCH;
if ((enc->cipher = cipher_by_name(name)) == NULL) {
error("%s: unsupported cipher %s", __func__, name);
free(name);
return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
enc->name = name;
enc->enabled = 0;
enc->iv = NULL;
enc->iv_len = cipher_ivlen(enc->cipher);
enc->key = NULL;
enc->key_len = cipher_keylen(enc->cipher);
enc->block_size = cipher_blocksize(enc->cipher);
return 0;
}
static int
choose_mac(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshmac *mac, char *client, char *server)
{
char *name = match_list(client, server, NULL);
if (name == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_NO_MAC_ALG_MATCH;
if (mac_setup(mac, name) < 0) {
error("%s: unsupported MAC %s", __func__, name);
free(name);
return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
mac->name = name;
mac->key = NULL;
mac->enabled = 0;
return 0;
}
static int
choose_comp(struct sshcomp *comp, char *client, char *server)
{
char *name = match_list(client, server, NULL);
if (name == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_NO_COMPRESS_ALG_MATCH;
+#ifdef WITH_ZLIB
if (strcmp(name, "zlib@openssh.com") == 0) {
comp->type = COMP_DELAYED;
} else if (strcmp(name, "zlib") == 0) {
comp->type = COMP_ZLIB;
- } else if (strcmp(name, "none") == 0) {
+ } else
+#endif /* WITH_ZLIB */
+ if (strcmp(name, "none") == 0) {
comp->type = COMP_NONE;
} else {
error("%s: unsupported compression scheme %s", __func__, name);
free(name);
return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
comp->name = name;
return 0;
}
static int
choose_kex(struct kex *k, char *client, char *server)
{
const struct kexalg *kexalg;
k->name = match_list(client, server, NULL);
debug("kex: algorithm: %s", k->name ? k->name : "(no match)");
if (k->name == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_NO_KEX_ALG_MATCH;
if ((kexalg = kex_alg_by_name(k->name)) == NULL) {
error("%s: unsupported KEX method %s", __func__, k->name);
return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
k->kex_type = kexalg->type;
k->hash_alg = kexalg->hash_alg;
k->ec_nid = kexalg->ec_nid;
return 0;
}
static int
choose_hostkeyalg(struct kex *k, char *client, char *server)
{
k->hostkey_alg = match_list(client, server, NULL);
debug("kex: host key algorithm: %s",
k->hostkey_alg ? k->hostkey_alg : "(no match)");
if (k->hostkey_alg == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_NO_HOSTKEY_ALG_MATCH;
k->hostkey_type = sshkey_type_from_name(k->hostkey_alg);
if (k->hostkey_type == KEY_UNSPEC) {
error("%s: unsupported hostkey algorithm %s", __func__,
k->hostkey_alg);
return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
k->hostkey_nid = sshkey_ecdsa_nid_from_name(k->hostkey_alg);
return 0;
}
static int
proposals_match(char *my[PROPOSAL_MAX], char *peer[PROPOSAL_MAX])
{
static int check[] = {
PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS, PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS, -1
};
int *idx;
char *p;
for (idx = &check[0]; *idx != -1; idx++) {
if ((p = strchr(my[*idx], ',')) != NULL)
*p = '\0';
if ((p = strchr(peer[*idx], ',')) != NULL)
*p = '\0';
if (strcmp(my[*idx], peer[*idx]) != 0) {
debug2("proposal mismatch: my %s peer %s",
my[*idx], peer[*idx]);
return (0);
}
}
debug2("proposals match");
return (1);
}
static int
kex_choose_conf(struct ssh *ssh)
{
struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
struct newkeys *newkeys;
char **my = NULL, **peer = NULL;
char **cprop, **sprop;
int nenc, nmac, ncomp;
u_int mode, ctos, need, dh_need, authlen;
int r, first_kex_follows;
debug2("local %s KEXINIT proposal", kex->server ? "server" : "client");
if ((r = kex_buf2prop(kex->my, NULL, &my)) != 0)
goto out;
debug2("peer %s KEXINIT proposal", kex->server ? "client" : "server");
if ((r = kex_buf2prop(kex->peer, &first_kex_follows, &peer)) != 0)
goto out;
if (kex->server) {
cprop=peer;
sprop=my;
} else {
cprop=my;
sprop=peer;
}
/* Check whether client supports ext_info_c */
if (kex->server && (kex->flags & KEX_INITIAL)) {
char *ext;
ext = match_list("ext-info-c", peer[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS], NULL);
kex->ext_info_c = (ext != NULL);
free(ext);
}
/* Algorithm Negotiation */
if ((r = choose_kex(kex, cprop[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS],
sprop[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS])) != 0) {
kex->failed_choice = peer[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS];
peer[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = NULL;
goto out;
}
if ((r = choose_hostkeyalg(kex, cprop[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS],
sprop[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS])) != 0) {
kex->failed_choice = peer[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS];
peer[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = NULL;
goto out;
}
for (mode = 0; mode < MODE_MAX; mode++) {
if ((newkeys = calloc(1, sizeof(*newkeys))) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
kex->newkeys[mode] = newkeys;
ctos = (!kex->server && mode == MODE_OUT) ||
(kex->server && mode == MODE_IN);
nenc = ctos ? PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS : PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC;
nmac = ctos ? PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_CTOS : PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_STOC;
ncomp = ctos ? PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_CTOS : PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_STOC;
if ((r = choose_enc(&newkeys->enc, cprop[nenc],
sprop[nenc])) != 0) {
kex->failed_choice = peer[nenc];
peer[nenc] = NULL;
goto out;
}
authlen = cipher_authlen(newkeys->enc.cipher);
/* ignore mac for authenticated encryption */
if (authlen == 0 &&
(r = choose_mac(ssh, &newkeys->mac, cprop[nmac],
sprop[nmac])) != 0) {
kex->failed_choice = peer[nmac];
peer[nmac] = NULL;
goto out;
}
if ((r = choose_comp(&newkeys->comp, cprop[ncomp],
sprop[ncomp])) != 0) {
kex->failed_choice = peer[ncomp];
peer[ncomp] = NULL;
goto out;
}
debug("kex: %s cipher: %s MAC: %s compression: %s",
ctos ? "client->server" : "server->client",
newkeys->enc.name,
authlen == 0 ? newkeys->mac.name : "<implicit>",
newkeys->comp.name);
}
need = dh_need = 0;
for (mode = 0; mode < MODE_MAX; mode++) {
newkeys = kex->newkeys[mode];
need = MAXIMUM(need, newkeys->enc.key_len);
need = MAXIMUM(need, newkeys->enc.block_size);
need = MAXIMUM(need, newkeys->enc.iv_len);
need = MAXIMUM(need, newkeys->mac.key_len);
dh_need = MAXIMUM(dh_need, cipher_seclen(newkeys->enc.cipher));
dh_need = MAXIMUM(dh_need, newkeys->enc.block_size);
dh_need = MAXIMUM(dh_need, newkeys->enc.iv_len);
dh_need = MAXIMUM(dh_need, newkeys->mac.key_len);
}
/* XXX need runden? */
kex->we_need = need;
kex->dh_need = dh_need;
/* ignore the next message if the proposals do not match */
if (first_kex_follows && !proposals_match(my, peer))
ssh->dispatch_skip_packets = 1;
r = 0;
out:
kex_prop_free(my);
kex_prop_free(peer);
return r;
}
static int
derive_key(struct ssh *ssh, int id, u_int need, u_char *hash, u_int hashlen,
const struct sshbuf *shared_secret, u_char **keyp)
{
struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
struct ssh_digest_ctx *hashctx = NULL;
char c = id;
u_int have;
size_t mdsz;
u_char *digest;
int r;
if ((mdsz = ssh_digest_bytes(kex->hash_alg)) == 0)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
if ((digest = calloc(1, ROUNDUP(need, mdsz))) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
/* K1 = HASH(K || H || "A" || session_id) */
if ((hashctx = ssh_digest_start(kex->hash_alg)) == NULL ||
ssh_digest_update_buffer(hashctx, shared_secret) != 0 ||
ssh_digest_update(hashctx, hash, hashlen) != 0 ||
ssh_digest_update(hashctx, &c, 1) != 0 ||
ssh_digest_update(hashctx, kex->session_id,
kex->session_id_len) != 0 ||
ssh_digest_final(hashctx, digest, mdsz) != 0) {
r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
error("%s: KEX hash failed", __func__);
goto out;
}
ssh_digest_free(hashctx);
hashctx = NULL;
/*
* expand key:
* Kn = HASH(K || H || K1 || K2 || ... || Kn-1)
* Key = K1 || K2 || ... || Kn
*/
for (have = mdsz; need > have; have += mdsz) {
if ((hashctx = ssh_digest_start(kex->hash_alg)) == NULL ||
ssh_digest_update_buffer(hashctx, shared_secret) != 0 ||
ssh_digest_update(hashctx, hash, hashlen) != 0 ||
ssh_digest_update(hashctx, digest, have) != 0 ||
ssh_digest_final(hashctx, digest + have, mdsz) != 0) {
error("%s: KDF failed", __func__);
r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
goto out;
}
ssh_digest_free(hashctx);
hashctx = NULL;
}
#ifdef DEBUG_KEX
fprintf(stderr, "key '%c'== ", c);
dump_digest("key", digest, need);
#endif
*keyp = digest;
digest = NULL;
r = 0;
out:
free(digest);
ssh_digest_free(hashctx);
return r;
}
#define NKEYS 6
int
kex_derive_keys(struct ssh *ssh, u_char *hash, u_int hashlen,
const struct sshbuf *shared_secret)
{
struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
u_char *keys[NKEYS];
u_int i, j, mode, ctos;
int r;
/* save initial hash as session id */
if (kex->session_id == NULL) {
kex->session_id_len = hashlen;
kex->session_id = malloc(kex->session_id_len);
if (kex->session_id == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
memcpy(kex->session_id, hash, kex->session_id_len);
}
for (i = 0; i < NKEYS; i++) {
if ((r = derive_key(ssh, 'A'+i, kex->we_need, hash, hashlen,
shared_secret, &keys[i])) != 0) {
for (j = 0; j < i; j++)
free(keys[j]);
return r;
}
}
for (mode = 0; mode < MODE_MAX; mode++) {
ctos = (!kex->server && mode == MODE_OUT) ||
(kex->server && mode == MODE_IN);
kex->newkeys[mode]->enc.iv = keys[ctos ? 0 : 1];
kex->newkeys[mode]->enc.key = keys[ctos ? 2 : 3];
kex->newkeys[mode]->mac.key = keys[ctos ? 4 : 5];
}
return 0;
}
int
kex_load_hostkey(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshkey **prvp, struct sshkey **pubp)
{
struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
*pubp = NULL;
*prvp = NULL;
if (kex->load_host_public_key == NULL ||
kex->load_host_private_key == NULL) {
error("%s: missing hostkey loader", __func__);
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
}
*pubp = kex->load_host_public_key(kex->hostkey_type,
kex->hostkey_nid, ssh);
*prvp = kex->load_host_private_key(kex->hostkey_type,
kex->hostkey_nid, ssh);
if (*pubp == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_NO_HOSTKEY_LOADED;
return 0;
}
int
kex_verify_host_key(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshkey *server_host_key)
{
struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
if (kex->verify_host_key == NULL) {
error("%s: missing hostkey verifier", __func__);
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
}
if (server_host_key->type != kex->hostkey_type ||
(kex->hostkey_type == KEY_ECDSA &&
server_host_key->ecdsa_nid != kex->hostkey_nid))
return SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH;
if (kex->verify_host_key(server_host_key, ssh) == -1)
return SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
return 0;
}
#if defined(DEBUG_KEX) || defined(DEBUG_KEXDH) || defined(DEBUG_KEXECDH)
void
dump_digest(const char *msg, const u_char *digest, int len)
{
fprintf(stderr, "%s\n", msg);
sshbuf_dump_data(digest, len, stderr);
}
#endif
/*
* Send a plaintext error message to the peer, suffixed by \r\n.
* Only used during banner exchange, and there only for the server.
*/
static void
send_error(struct ssh *ssh, char *msg)
{
char *crnl = "\r\n";
if (!ssh->kex->server)
return;
if (atomicio(vwrite, ssh_packet_get_connection_out(ssh),
msg, strlen(msg)) != strlen(msg) ||
atomicio(vwrite, ssh_packet_get_connection_out(ssh),
crnl, strlen(crnl)) != strlen(crnl))
error("%s: write: %.100s", __func__, strerror(errno));
}
/*
* Sends our identification string and waits for the peer's. Will block for
* up to timeout_ms (or indefinitely if timeout_ms <= 0).
* Returns on 0 success or a ssherr.h code on failure.
*/
int
kex_exchange_identification(struct ssh *ssh, int timeout_ms,
const char *version_addendum)
{
int remote_major, remote_minor, mismatch;
size_t len, i, n;
int r, expect_nl;
u_char c;
struct sshbuf *our_version = ssh->kex->server ?
ssh->kex->server_version : ssh->kex->client_version;
struct sshbuf *peer_version = ssh->kex->server ?
ssh->kex->client_version : ssh->kex->server_version;
char *our_version_string = NULL, *peer_version_string = NULL;
char *cp, *remote_version = NULL;
/* Prepare and send our banner */
sshbuf_reset(our_version);
if (version_addendum != NULL && *version_addendum == '\0')
version_addendum = NULL;
if ((r = sshbuf_putf(our_version, "SSH-%d.%d-%.100s%s%s\r\n",
PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2, PROTOCOL_MINOR_2, SSH_VERSION,
version_addendum == NULL ? "" : " ",
version_addendum == NULL ? "" : version_addendum)) != 0) {
error("%s: sshbuf_putf: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
goto out;
}
if (atomicio(vwrite, ssh_packet_get_connection_out(ssh),
sshbuf_mutable_ptr(our_version),
sshbuf_len(our_version)) != sshbuf_len(our_version)) {
error("%s: write: %.100s", __func__, strerror(errno));
r = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
goto out;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_consume_end(our_version, 2)) != 0) { /* trim \r\n */
error("%s: sshbuf_consume_end: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
goto out;
}
our_version_string = sshbuf_dup_string(our_version);
if (our_version_string == NULL) {
error("%s: sshbuf_dup_string failed", __func__);
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
debug("Local version string %.100s", our_version_string);
/* Read other side's version identification. */
for (n = 0; ; n++) {
if (n >= SSH_MAX_PRE_BANNER_LINES) {
send_error(ssh, "No SSH identification string "
"received.");
error("%s: No SSH version received in first %u lines "
"from server", __func__, SSH_MAX_PRE_BANNER_LINES);
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
sshbuf_reset(peer_version);
expect_nl = 0;
for (i = 0; ; i++) {
if (timeout_ms > 0) {
r = waitrfd(ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh),
&timeout_ms);
if (r == -1 && errno == ETIMEDOUT) {
send_error(ssh, "Timed out waiting "
"for SSH identification string.");
error("Connection timed out during "
"banner exchange");
r = SSH_ERR_CONN_TIMEOUT;
goto out;
} else if (r == -1) {
error("%s: %s",
__func__, strerror(errno));
r = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
goto out;
}
}
len = atomicio(read, ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh),
&c, 1);
if (len != 1 && errno == EPIPE) {
error("%s: Connection closed by remote host",
__func__);
r = SSH_ERR_CONN_CLOSED;
goto out;
} else if (len != 1) {
error("%s: read: %.100s",
__func__, strerror(errno));
r = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
goto out;
}
if (c == '\r') {
expect_nl = 1;
continue;
}
if (c == '\n')
break;
if (c == '\0' || expect_nl) {
error("%s: banner line contains invalid "
"characters", __func__);
goto invalid;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(peer_version, c)) != 0) {
error("%s: sshbuf_put: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
goto out;
}
if (sshbuf_len(peer_version) > SSH_MAX_BANNER_LEN) {
error("%s: banner line too long", __func__);
goto invalid;
}
}
/* Is this an actual protocol banner? */
if (sshbuf_len(peer_version) > 4 &&
memcmp(sshbuf_ptr(peer_version), "SSH-", 4) == 0)
break;
/* If not, then just log the line and continue */
if ((cp = sshbuf_dup_string(peer_version)) == NULL) {
error("%s: sshbuf_dup_string failed", __func__);
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
/* Do not accept lines before the SSH ident from a client */
if (ssh->kex->server) {
error("%s: client sent invalid protocol identifier "
"\"%.256s\"", __func__, cp);
free(cp);
goto invalid;
}
debug("%s: banner line %zu: %s", __func__, n, cp);
free(cp);
}
peer_version_string = sshbuf_dup_string(peer_version);
if (peer_version_string == NULL)
error("%s: sshbuf_dup_string failed", __func__);
/* XXX must be same size for sscanf */
if ((remote_version = calloc(1, sshbuf_len(peer_version))) == NULL) {
error("%s: calloc failed", __func__);
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
/*
* Check that the versions match. In future this might accept
* several versions and set appropriate flags to handle them.
*/
if (sscanf(peer_version_string, "SSH-%d.%d-%[^\n]\n",
&remote_major, &remote_minor, remote_version) != 3) {
error("Bad remote protocol version identification: '%.100s'",
peer_version_string);
invalid:
send_error(ssh, "Invalid SSH identification string.");
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
debug("Remote protocol version %d.%d, remote software version %.100s",
remote_major, remote_minor, remote_version);
ssh->compat = compat_datafellows(remote_version);
mismatch = 0;
switch (remote_major) {
case 2:
break;
case 1:
if (remote_minor != 99)
mismatch = 1;
break;
default:
mismatch = 1;
break;
}
if (mismatch) {
error("Protocol major versions differ: %d vs. %d",
PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2, remote_major);
send_error(ssh, "Protocol major versions differ.");
r = SSH_ERR_NO_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
goto out;
}
if (ssh->kex->server && (ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_PROBE) != 0) {
logit("probed from %s port %d with %s. Don't panic.",
ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh),
peer_version_string);
r = SSH_ERR_CONN_CLOSED; /* XXX */
goto out;
}
if (ssh->kex->server && (ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_SCANNER) != 0) {
logit("scanned from %s port %d with %s. Don't panic.",
ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh),
peer_version_string);
r = SSH_ERR_CONN_CLOSED; /* XXX */
goto out;
}
if ((ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5) != 0) {
logit("Remote version \"%.100s\" uses unsafe RSA signature "
"scheme; disabling use of RSA keys", remote_version);
}
/* success */
r = 0;
out:
free(our_version_string);
free(peer_version_string);
free(remote_version);
return r;
}
diff --git a/kexgen.c b/kexgen.c
index bb996b504d3a..69348b964df8 100644
--- a/kexgen.c
+++ b/kexgen.c
@@ -1,340 +1,340 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: kexgen.c,v 1.3 2019/09/06 05:23:55 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: kexgen.c,v 1.4 2019/11/25 00:51:37 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2019 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <signal.h>
#include "sshkey.h"
#include "kex.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "packet.h"
#include "ssh2.h"
#include "sshbuf.h"
#include "digest.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
static int input_kex_gen_init(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
static int input_kex_gen_reply(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh);
static int
kex_gen_hash(
int hash_alg,
const struct sshbuf *client_version,
const struct sshbuf *server_version,
const struct sshbuf *client_kexinit,
const struct sshbuf *server_kexinit,
const struct sshbuf *server_host_key_blob,
const struct sshbuf *client_pub,
const struct sshbuf *server_pub,
const struct sshbuf *shared_secret,
u_char *hash, size_t *hashlen)
{
struct sshbuf *b;
int r;
if (*hashlen < ssh_digest_bytes(hash_alg))
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(b, client_version)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_stringb(b, server_version)) != 0 ||
/* kexinit messages: fake header: len+SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT */
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, sshbuf_len(client_kexinit) + 1)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_putb(b, client_kexinit)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, sshbuf_len(server_kexinit) + 1)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_putb(b, server_kexinit)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_stringb(b, server_host_key_blob)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_stringb(b, client_pub)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_stringb(b, server_pub)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_putb(b, shared_secret)) != 0) {
sshbuf_free(b);
return r;
}
#ifdef DEBUG_KEX
sshbuf_dump(b, stderr);
#endif
if (ssh_digest_buffer(hash_alg, b, hash, *hashlen) != 0) {
sshbuf_free(b);
return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
}
sshbuf_free(b);
*hashlen = ssh_digest_bytes(hash_alg);
#ifdef DEBUG_KEX
dump_digest("hash", hash, *hashlen);
#endif
return 0;
}
int
kex_gen_client(struct ssh *ssh)
{
struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
int r;
switch (kex->kex_type) {
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
case KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1:
case KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1:
case KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA256:
case KEX_DH_GRP16_SHA512:
case KEX_DH_GRP18_SHA512:
r = kex_dh_keypair(kex);
break;
case KEX_ECDH_SHA2:
r = kex_ecdh_keypair(kex);
break;
#endif
case KEX_C25519_SHA256:
r = kex_c25519_keypair(kex);
break;
case KEX_KEM_SNTRUP4591761X25519_SHA512:
r = kex_kem_sntrup4591761x25519_keypair(kex);
break;
default:
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
break;
}
if (r != 0)
return r;
if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEX_ECDH_INIT)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_stringb(ssh, kex->client_pub)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
return r;
debug("expecting SSH2_MSG_KEX_ECDH_REPLY");
ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEX_ECDH_REPLY, &input_kex_gen_reply);
return 0;
}
static int
input_kex_gen_reply(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
{
struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
struct sshkey *server_host_key = NULL;
struct sshbuf *shared_secret = NULL;
struct sshbuf *server_blob = NULL;
struct sshbuf *tmp = NULL, *server_host_key_blob = NULL;
u_char *signature = NULL;
u_char hash[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
size_t slen, hashlen;
int r;
/* hostkey */
if ((r = sshpkt_getb_froms(ssh, &server_host_key_blob)) != 0)
goto out;
/* sshkey_fromb() consumes its buffer, so make a copy */
if ((tmp = sshbuf_fromb(server_host_key_blob)) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
if ((r = sshkey_fromb(tmp, &server_host_key)) != 0)
goto out;
if ((r = kex_verify_host_key(ssh, server_host_key)) != 0)
goto out;
/* Q_S, server public key */
/* signed H */
if ((r = sshpkt_getb_froms(ssh, &server_blob)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &signature, &slen)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
goto out;
/* compute shared secret */
switch (kex->kex_type) {
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
case KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1:
case KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1:
case KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA256:
case KEX_DH_GRP16_SHA512:
case KEX_DH_GRP18_SHA512:
r = kex_dh_dec(kex, server_blob, &shared_secret);
break;
case KEX_ECDH_SHA2:
r = kex_ecdh_dec(kex, server_blob, &shared_secret);
break;
#endif
case KEX_C25519_SHA256:
r = kex_c25519_dec(kex, server_blob, &shared_secret);
break;
case KEX_KEM_SNTRUP4591761X25519_SHA512:
r = kex_kem_sntrup4591761x25519_dec(kex, server_blob,
&shared_secret);
break;
default:
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
break;
}
if (r !=0 )
goto out;
/* calc and verify H */
hashlen = sizeof(hash);
if ((r = kex_gen_hash(
kex->hash_alg,
kex->client_version,
kex->server_version,
kex->my,
kex->peer,
server_host_key_blob,
kex->client_pub,
server_blob,
shared_secret,
hash, &hashlen)) != 0)
goto out;
if ((r = sshkey_verify(server_host_key, signature, slen, hash, hashlen,
- kex->hostkey_alg, ssh->compat)) != 0)
+ kex->hostkey_alg, ssh->compat, NULL)) != 0)
goto out;
if ((r = kex_derive_keys(ssh, hash, hashlen, shared_secret)) == 0)
r = kex_send_newkeys(ssh);
out:
explicit_bzero(hash, sizeof(hash));
explicit_bzero(kex->c25519_client_key, sizeof(kex->c25519_client_key));
explicit_bzero(kex->sntrup4591761_client_key,
sizeof(kex->sntrup4591761_client_key));
sshbuf_free(server_host_key_blob);
free(signature);
sshbuf_free(tmp);
sshkey_free(server_host_key);
sshbuf_free(server_blob);
sshbuf_free(shared_secret);
sshbuf_free(kex->client_pub);
kex->client_pub = NULL;
return r;
}
int
kex_gen_server(struct ssh *ssh)
{
debug("expecting SSH2_MSG_KEX_ECDH_INIT");
ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEX_ECDH_INIT, &input_kex_gen_init);
return 0;
}
static int
input_kex_gen_init(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
{
struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
struct sshkey *server_host_private, *server_host_public;
struct sshbuf *shared_secret = NULL;
struct sshbuf *server_pubkey = NULL;
struct sshbuf *client_pubkey = NULL;
struct sshbuf *server_host_key_blob = NULL;
u_char *signature = NULL, hash[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
size_t slen, hashlen;
int r;
if ((r = kex_load_hostkey(ssh, &server_host_private,
&server_host_public)) != 0)
goto out;
if ((r = sshpkt_getb_froms(ssh, &client_pubkey)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
goto out;
/* compute shared secret */
switch (kex->kex_type) {
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
case KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1:
case KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1:
case KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA256:
case KEX_DH_GRP16_SHA512:
case KEX_DH_GRP18_SHA512:
r = kex_dh_enc(kex, client_pubkey, &server_pubkey,
&shared_secret);
break;
case KEX_ECDH_SHA2:
r = kex_ecdh_enc(kex, client_pubkey, &server_pubkey,
&shared_secret);
break;
#endif
case KEX_C25519_SHA256:
r = kex_c25519_enc(kex, client_pubkey, &server_pubkey,
&shared_secret);
break;
case KEX_KEM_SNTRUP4591761X25519_SHA512:
r = kex_kem_sntrup4591761x25519_enc(kex, client_pubkey,
&server_pubkey, &shared_secret);
break;
default:
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
break;
}
if (r !=0 )
goto out;
/* calc H */
if ((server_host_key_blob = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
if ((r = sshkey_putb(server_host_public, server_host_key_blob)) != 0)
goto out;
hashlen = sizeof(hash);
if ((r = kex_gen_hash(
kex->hash_alg,
kex->client_version,
kex->server_version,
kex->peer,
kex->my,
server_host_key_blob,
client_pubkey,
server_pubkey,
shared_secret,
hash, &hashlen)) != 0)
goto out;
/* sign H */
if ((r = kex->sign(ssh, server_host_private, server_host_public,
&signature, &slen, hash, hashlen, kex->hostkey_alg)) != 0)
goto out;
/* send server hostkey, ECDH pubkey 'Q_S' and signed H */
if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEX_ECDH_REPLY)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_stringb(ssh, server_host_key_blob)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_stringb(ssh, server_pubkey)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, signature, slen)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
goto out;
if ((r = kex_derive_keys(ssh, hash, hashlen, shared_secret)) == 0)
r = kex_send_newkeys(ssh);
out:
explicit_bzero(hash, sizeof(hash));
sshbuf_free(server_host_key_blob);
free(signature);
sshbuf_free(shared_secret);
sshbuf_free(client_pubkey);
sshbuf_free(server_pubkey);
return r;
}
diff --git a/kexgexc.c b/kexgexc.c
index 1c65b8a18016..323a659b77c5 100644
--- a/kexgexc.c
+++ b/kexgexc.c
@@ -1,219 +1,219 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: kexgexc.c,v 1.34 2019/01/23 00:30:41 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: kexgexc.c,v 1.35 2019/11/25 00:51:37 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000 Niels Provos. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <openssl/dh.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <signal.h>
#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
#include "sshkey.h"
#include "cipher.h"
#include "digest.h"
#include "kex.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "packet.h"
#include "dh.h"
#include "ssh2.h"
#include "compat.h"
#include "dispatch.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
#include "sshbuf.h"
#include "misc.h"
static int input_kex_dh_gex_group(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
static int input_kex_dh_gex_reply(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
int
kexgex_client(struct ssh *ssh)
{
struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
int r;
u_int nbits;
nbits = dh_estimate(kex->dh_need * 8);
kex->min = DH_GRP_MIN;
kex->max = DH_GRP_MAX;
kex->nbits = nbits;
if (datafellows & SSH_BUG_DHGEX_LARGE)
kex->nbits = MINIMUM(kex->nbits, 4096);
/* New GEX request */
if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, kex->min)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, kex->nbits)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, kex->max)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
goto out;
debug("SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REQUEST(%u<%u<%u) sent",
kex->min, kex->nbits, kex->max);
#ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH
fprintf(stderr, "\nmin = %d, nbits = %d, max = %d\n",
kex->min, kex->nbits, kex->max);
#endif
ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_GROUP,
&input_kex_dh_gex_group);
r = 0;
out:
return r;
}
static int
input_kex_dh_gex_group(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
{
struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
BIGNUM *p = NULL, *g = NULL;
const BIGNUM *pub_key;
int r, bits;
debug("got SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_GROUP");
if ((r = sshpkt_get_bignum2(ssh, &p)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_get_bignum2(ssh, &g)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
goto out;
if ((bits = BN_num_bits(p)) < 0 ||
(u_int)bits < kex->min || (u_int)bits > kex->max) {
r = SSH_ERR_DH_GEX_OUT_OF_RANGE;
goto out;
}
if ((kex->dh = dh_new_group(g, p)) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
p = g = NULL; /* belong to kex->dh now */
/* generate and send 'e', client DH public key */
if ((r = dh_gen_key(kex->dh, kex->we_need * 8)) != 0)
goto out;
DH_get0_key(kex->dh, &pub_key, NULL);
if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_INIT)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_bignum2(ssh, pub_key)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
goto out;
debug("SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_INIT sent");
#ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH
DHparams_print_fp(stderr, kex->dh);
fprintf(stderr, "pub= ");
BN_print_fp(stderr, pub_key);
fprintf(stderr, "\n");
#endif
ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_GROUP, NULL);
ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REPLY, &input_kex_dh_gex_reply);
r = 0;
out:
BN_clear_free(p);
BN_clear_free(g);
return r;
}
static int
input_kex_dh_gex_reply(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
{
struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
BIGNUM *dh_server_pub = NULL;
const BIGNUM *pub_key, *dh_p, *dh_g;
struct sshbuf *shared_secret = NULL;
struct sshbuf *tmp = NULL, *server_host_key_blob = NULL;
struct sshkey *server_host_key = NULL;
u_char *signature = NULL;
u_char hash[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
size_t slen, hashlen;
int r;
debug("got SSH2_MSG_KEX_DH_GEX_REPLY");
/* key, cert */
if ((r = sshpkt_getb_froms(ssh, &server_host_key_blob)) != 0)
goto out;
/* sshkey_fromb() consumes its buffer, so make a copy */
if ((tmp = sshbuf_fromb(server_host_key_blob)) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
if ((r = sshkey_fromb(tmp, &server_host_key)) != 0 ||
(r = kex_verify_host_key(ssh, server_host_key)) != 0)
goto out;
/* DH parameter f, server public DH key, signed H */
if ((r = sshpkt_get_bignum2(ssh, &dh_server_pub)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &signature, &slen)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
goto out;
if ((shared_secret = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
if ((r = kex_dh_compute_key(kex, dh_server_pub, shared_secret)) != 0)
goto out;
if (ssh->compat & SSH_OLD_DHGEX)
kex->min = kex->max = -1;
/* calc and verify H */
DH_get0_key(kex->dh, &pub_key, NULL);
DH_get0_pqg(kex->dh, &dh_p, NULL, &dh_g);
hashlen = sizeof(hash);
if ((r = kexgex_hash(
kex->hash_alg,
kex->client_version,
kex->server_version,
kex->my,
kex->peer,
server_host_key_blob,
kex->min, kex->nbits, kex->max,
dh_p, dh_g,
pub_key,
dh_server_pub,
sshbuf_ptr(shared_secret), sshbuf_len(shared_secret),
hash, &hashlen)) != 0)
goto out;
if ((r = sshkey_verify(server_host_key, signature, slen, hash,
- hashlen, kex->hostkey_alg, ssh->compat)) != 0)
+ hashlen, kex->hostkey_alg, ssh->compat, NULL)) != 0)
goto out;
if ((r = kex_derive_keys(ssh, hash, hashlen, shared_secret)) == 0)
r = kex_send_newkeys(ssh);
out:
explicit_bzero(hash, sizeof(hash));
DH_free(kex->dh);
kex->dh = NULL;
BN_clear_free(dh_server_pub);
sshbuf_free(shared_secret);
sshkey_free(server_host_key);
sshbuf_free(tmp);
sshbuf_free(server_host_key_blob);
free(signature);
return r;
}
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
diff --git a/krl.c b/krl.c
index a7f6909556fe..03476dedd4e1 100644
--- a/krl.c
+++ b/krl.c
@@ -1,1367 +1,1357 @@
/*
* Copyright (c) 2012 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
*
* Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
* copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
* WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
* ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
* WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
* ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
* OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
*/
-/* $OpenBSD: krl.c,v 1.44 2019/09/06 04:53:27 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: krl.c,v 1.47 2020/01/25 23:02:13 djm Exp $ */
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <openbsd-compat/sys-tree.h>
#include <openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <limits.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <time.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include "sshbuf.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
#include "sshkey.h"
#include "authfile.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "digest.h"
#include "bitmap.h"
#include "krl.h"
/* #define DEBUG_KRL */
#ifdef DEBUG_KRL
# define KRL_DBG(x) debug3 x
#else
# define KRL_DBG(x)
#endif
/*
* Trees of revoked serial numbers, key IDs and keys. This allows
* quick searching, querying and producing lists in canonical order.
*/
/* Tree of serial numbers. XXX make smarter: really need a real sparse bitmap */
struct revoked_serial {
u_int64_t lo, hi;
RB_ENTRY(revoked_serial) tree_entry;
};
static int serial_cmp(struct revoked_serial *a, struct revoked_serial *b);
RB_HEAD(revoked_serial_tree, revoked_serial);
RB_GENERATE_STATIC(revoked_serial_tree, revoked_serial, tree_entry, serial_cmp);
/* Tree of key IDs */
struct revoked_key_id {
char *key_id;
RB_ENTRY(revoked_key_id) tree_entry;
};
static int key_id_cmp(struct revoked_key_id *a, struct revoked_key_id *b);
RB_HEAD(revoked_key_id_tree, revoked_key_id);
RB_GENERATE_STATIC(revoked_key_id_tree, revoked_key_id, tree_entry, key_id_cmp);
/* Tree of blobs (used for keys and fingerprints) */
struct revoked_blob {
u_char *blob;
size_t len;
RB_ENTRY(revoked_blob) tree_entry;
};
static int blob_cmp(struct revoked_blob *a, struct revoked_blob *b);
RB_HEAD(revoked_blob_tree, revoked_blob);
RB_GENERATE_STATIC(revoked_blob_tree, revoked_blob, tree_entry, blob_cmp);
/* Tracks revoked certs for a single CA */
struct revoked_certs {
struct sshkey *ca_key;
struct revoked_serial_tree revoked_serials;
struct revoked_key_id_tree revoked_key_ids;
TAILQ_ENTRY(revoked_certs) entry;
};
TAILQ_HEAD(revoked_certs_list, revoked_certs);
struct ssh_krl {
u_int64_t krl_version;
u_int64_t generated_date;
u_int64_t flags;
char *comment;
struct revoked_blob_tree revoked_keys;
struct revoked_blob_tree revoked_sha1s;
struct revoked_blob_tree revoked_sha256s;
struct revoked_certs_list revoked_certs;
};
/* Return equal if a and b overlap */
static int
serial_cmp(struct revoked_serial *a, struct revoked_serial *b)
{
if (a->hi >= b->lo && a->lo <= b->hi)
return 0;
return a->lo < b->lo ? -1 : 1;
}
static int
key_id_cmp(struct revoked_key_id *a, struct revoked_key_id *b)
{
return strcmp(a->key_id, b->key_id);
}
static int
blob_cmp(struct revoked_blob *a, struct revoked_blob *b)
{
int r;
if (a->len != b->len) {
if ((r = memcmp(a->blob, b->blob, MINIMUM(a->len, b->len))) != 0)
return r;
return a->len > b->len ? 1 : -1;
} else
return memcmp(a->blob, b->blob, a->len);
}
struct ssh_krl *
ssh_krl_init(void)
{
struct ssh_krl *krl;
if ((krl = calloc(1, sizeof(*krl))) == NULL)
return NULL;
RB_INIT(&krl->revoked_keys);
RB_INIT(&krl->revoked_sha1s);
RB_INIT(&krl->revoked_sha256s);
TAILQ_INIT(&krl->revoked_certs);
return krl;
}
static void
revoked_certs_free(struct revoked_certs *rc)
{
struct revoked_serial *rs, *trs;
struct revoked_key_id *rki, *trki;
RB_FOREACH_SAFE(rs, revoked_serial_tree, &rc->revoked_serials, trs) {
RB_REMOVE(revoked_serial_tree, &rc->revoked_serials, rs);
free(rs);
}
RB_FOREACH_SAFE(rki, revoked_key_id_tree, &rc->revoked_key_ids, trki) {
RB_REMOVE(revoked_key_id_tree, &rc->revoked_key_ids, rki);
free(rki->key_id);
free(rki);
}
sshkey_free(rc->ca_key);
}
void
ssh_krl_free(struct ssh_krl *krl)
{
struct revoked_blob *rb, *trb;
struct revoked_certs *rc, *trc;
if (krl == NULL)
return;
free(krl->comment);
RB_FOREACH_SAFE(rb, revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_keys, trb) {
RB_REMOVE(revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_keys, rb);
free(rb->blob);
free(rb);
}
RB_FOREACH_SAFE(rb, revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_sha1s, trb) {
RB_REMOVE(revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_sha1s, rb);
free(rb->blob);
free(rb);
}
RB_FOREACH_SAFE(rb, revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_sha256s, trb) {
RB_REMOVE(revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_sha256s, rb);
free(rb->blob);
free(rb);
}
TAILQ_FOREACH_SAFE(rc, &krl->revoked_certs, entry, trc) {
TAILQ_REMOVE(&krl->revoked_certs, rc, entry);
revoked_certs_free(rc);
}
}
void
ssh_krl_set_version(struct ssh_krl *krl, u_int64_t version)
{
krl->krl_version = version;
}
int
ssh_krl_set_comment(struct ssh_krl *krl, const char *comment)
{
free(krl->comment);
if ((krl->comment = strdup(comment)) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
return 0;
}
/*
* Find the revoked_certs struct for a CA key. If allow_create is set then
* create a new one in the tree if one did not exist already.
*/
static int
revoked_certs_for_ca_key(struct ssh_krl *krl, const struct sshkey *ca_key,
struct revoked_certs **rcp, int allow_create)
{
struct revoked_certs *rc;
int r;
*rcp = NULL;
TAILQ_FOREACH(rc, &krl->revoked_certs, entry) {
if ((ca_key == NULL && rc->ca_key == NULL) ||
sshkey_equal(rc->ca_key, ca_key)) {
*rcp = rc;
return 0;
}
}
if (!allow_create)
return 0;
/* If this CA doesn't exist in the list then add it now */
if ((rc = calloc(1, sizeof(*rc))) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
if (ca_key == NULL)
rc->ca_key = NULL;
else if ((r = sshkey_from_private(ca_key, &rc->ca_key)) != 0) {
free(rc);
return r;
}
RB_INIT(&rc->revoked_serials);
RB_INIT(&rc->revoked_key_ids);
TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&krl->revoked_certs, rc, entry);
KRL_DBG(("%s: new CA %s", __func__,
ca_key == NULL ? "*" : sshkey_type(ca_key)));
*rcp = rc;
return 0;
}
static int
insert_serial_range(struct revoked_serial_tree *rt, u_int64_t lo, u_int64_t hi)
{
struct revoked_serial rs, *ers, *crs, *irs;
KRL_DBG(("%s: insert %llu:%llu", __func__, lo, hi));
memset(&rs, 0, sizeof(rs));
rs.lo = lo;
rs.hi = hi;
ers = RB_NFIND(revoked_serial_tree, rt, &rs);
if (ers == NULL || serial_cmp(ers, &rs) != 0) {
/* No entry matches. Just insert */
if ((irs = malloc(sizeof(rs))) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
memcpy(irs, &rs, sizeof(*irs));
ers = RB_INSERT(revoked_serial_tree, rt, irs);
if (ers != NULL) {
KRL_DBG(("%s: bad: ers != NULL", __func__));
/* Shouldn't happen */
free(irs);
return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
ers = irs;
} else {
KRL_DBG(("%s: overlap found %llu:%llu", __func__,
ers->lo, ers->hi));
/*
* The inserted entry overlaps an existing one. Grow the
* existing entry.
*/
if (ers->lo > lo)
ers->lo = lo;
if (ers->hi < hi)
ers->hi = hi;
}
/*
* The inserted or revised range might overlap or abut adjacent ones;
* coalesce as necessary.
*/
/* Check predecessors */
while ((crs = RB_PREV(revoked_serial_tree, rt, ers)) != NULL) {
KRL_DBG(("%s: pred %llu:%llu", __func__, crs->lo, crs->hi));
if (ers->lo != 0 && crs->hi < ers->lo - 1)
break;
/* This entry overlaps. */
if (crs->lo < ers->lo) {
ers->lo = crs->lo;
KRL_DBG(("%s: pred extend %llu:%llu", __func__,
ers->lo, ers->hi));
}
RB_REMOVE(revoked_serial_tree, rt, crs);
free(crs);
}
/* Check successors */
while ((crs = RB_NEXT(revoked_serial_tree, rt, ers)) != NULL) {
KRL_DBG(("%s: succ %llu:%llu", __func__, crs->lo, crs->hi));
if (ers->hi != (u_int64_t)-1 && crs->lo > ers->hi + 1)
break;
/* This entry overlaps. */
if (crs->hi > ers->hi) {
ers->hi = crs->hi;
KRL_DBG(("%s: succ extend %llu:%llu", __func__,
ers->lo, ers->hi));
}
RB_REMOVE(revoked_serial_tree, rt, crs);
free(crs);
}
KRL_DBG(("%s: done, final %llu:%llu", __func__, ers->lo, ers->hi));
return 0;
}
int
ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_serial(struct ssh_krl *krl, const struct sshkey *ca_key,
u_int64_t serial)
{
return ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_serial_range(krl, ca_key, serial, serial);
}
int
ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_serial_range(struct ssh_krl *krl,
const struct sshkey *ca_key, u_int64_t lo, u_int64_t hi)
{
struct revoked_certs *rc;
int r;
if (lo > hi || lo == 0)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
if ((r = revoked_certs_for_ca_key(krl, ca_key, &rc, 1)) != 0)
return r;
return insert_serial_range(&rc->revoked_serials, lo, hi);
}
int
ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_key_id(struct ssh_krl *krl, const struct sshkey *ca_key,
const char *key_id)
{
struct revoked_key_id *rki, *erki;
struct revoked_certs *rc;
int r;
if ((r = revoked_certs_for_ca_key(krl, ca_key, &rc, 1)) != 0)
return r;
KRL_DBG(("%s: revoke %s", __func__, key_id));
if ((rki = calloc(1, sizeof(*rki))) == NULL ||
(rki->key_id = strdup(key_id)) == NULL) {
free(rki);
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
}
erki = RB_INSERT(revoked_key_id_tree, &rc->revoked_key_ids, rki);
if (erki != NULL) {
free(rki->key_id);
free(rki);
}
return 0;
}
/* Convert "key" to a public key blob without any certificate information */
static int
plain_key_blob(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **blob, size_t *blen)
{
struct sshkey *kcopy;
int r;
if ((r = sshkey_from_private(key, &kcopy)) != 0)
return r;
if (sshkey_is_cert(kcopy)) {
if ((r = sshkey_drop_cert(kcopy)) != 0) {
sshkey_free(kcopy);
return r;
}
}
r = sshkey_to_blob(kcopy, blob, blen);
sshkey_free(kcopy);
return r;
}
/* Revoke a key blob. Ownership of blob is transferred to the tree */
static int
revoke_blob(struct revoked_blob_tree *rbt, u_char *blob, size_t len)
{
struct revoked_blob *rb, *erb;
if ((rb = calloc(1, sizeof(*rb))) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
rb->blob = blob;
rb->len = len;
erb = RB_INSERT(revoked_blob_tree, rbt, rb);
if (erb != NULL) {
free(rb->blob);
free(rb);
}
return 0;
}
int
ssh_krl_revoke_key_explicit(struct ssh_krl *krl, const struct sshkey *key)
{
u_char *blob;
size_t len;
int r;
debug3("%s: revoke type %s", __func__, sshkey_type(key));
if ((r = plain_key_blob(key, &blob, &len)) != 0)
return r;
return revoke_blob(&krl->revoked_keys, blob, len);
}
static int
revoke_by_hash(struct revoked_blob_tree *target, const u_char *p, size_t len)
{
u_char *blob;
int r;
/* need to copy hash, as revoke_blob steals ownership */
if ((blob = malloc(len)) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
memcpy(blob, p, len);
if ((r = revoke_blob(target, blob, len)) != 0) {
free(blob);
return r;
}
return 0;
}
int
ssh_krl_revoke_key_sha1(struct ssh_krl *krl, const u_char *p, size_t len)
{
debug3("%s: revoke by sha1", __func__);
if (len != 20)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
return revoke_by_hash(&krl->revoked_sha1s, p, len);
}
int
ssh_krl_revoke_key_sha256(struct ssh_krl *krl, const u_char *p, size_t len)
{
debug3("%s: revoke by sha256", __func__);
if (len != 32)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
return revoke_by_hash(&krl->revoked_sha256s, p, len);
}
int
ssh_krl_revoke_key(struct ssh_krl *krl, const struct sshkey *key)
{
/* XXX replace with SHA256? */
if (!sshkey_is_cert(key))
return ssh_krl_revoke_key_explicit(krl, key);
if (key->cert->serial == 0) {
return ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_key_id(krl,
key->cert->signature_key,
key->cert->key_id);
} else {
return ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_serial(krl,
key->cert->signature_key,
key->cert->serial);
}
}
/*
* Select the most compact section type to emit next in a KRL based on
* the current section type, the run length of contiguous revoked serial
* numbers and the gaps from the last and to the next revoked serial.
* Applies a mostly-accurate bit cost model to select the section type
* that will minimise the size of the resultant KRL.
*/
static int
choose_next_state(int current_state, u_int64_t contig, int final,
u_int64_t last_gap, u_int64_t next_gap, int *force_new_section)
{
int new_state;
u_int64_t cost, cost_list, cost_range, cost_bitmap, cost_bitmap_restart;
/*
* Avoid unsigned overflows.
* The limits are high enough to avoid confusing the calculations.
*/
contig = MINIMUM(contig, 1ULL<<31);
last_gap = MINIMUM(last_gap, 1ULL<<31);
next_gap = MINIMUM(next_gap, 1ULL<<31);
/*
* Calculate the cost to switch from the current state to candidates.
* NB. range sections only ever contain a single range, so their
* switching cost is independent of the current_state.
*/
cost_list = cost_bitmap = cost_bitmap_restart = 0;
cost_range = 8;
switch (current_state) {
case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_LIST:
cost_bitmap_restart = cost_bitmap = 8 + 64;
break;
case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_BITMAP:
cost_list = 8;
cost_bitmap_restart = 8 + 64;
break;
case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_RANGE:
case 0:
cost_bitmap_restart = cost_bitmap = 8 + 64;
cost_list = 8;
}
/* Estimate base cost in bits of each section type */
cost_list += 64 * contig + (final ? 0 : 8+64);
cost_range += (2 * 64) + (final ? 0 : 8+64);
cost_bitmap += last_gap + contig + (final ? 0 : MINIMUM(next_gap, 8+64));
cost_bitmap_restart += contig + (final ? 0 : MINIMUM(next_gap, 8+64));
/* Convert to byte costs for actual comparison */
cost_list = (cost_list + 7) / 8;
cost_bitmap = (cost_bitmap + 7) / 8;
cost_bitmap_restart = (cost_bitmap_restart + 7) / 8;
cost_range = (cost_range + 7) / 8;
/* Now pick the best choice */
*force_new_section = 0;
new_state = KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_BITMAP;
cost = cost_bitmap;
if (cost_range < cost) {
new_state = KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_RANGE;
cost = cost_range;
}
if (cost_list < cost) {
new_state = KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_LIST;
cost = cost_list;
}
if (cost_bitmap_restart < cost) {
new_state = KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_BITMAP;
*force_new_section = 1;
cost = cost_bitmap_restart;
}
KRL_DBG(("%s: contig %llu last_gap %llu next_gap %llu final %d, costs:"
"list %llu range %llu bitmap %llu new bitmap %llu, "
"selected 0x%02x%s", __func__, (long long unsigned)contig,
(long long unsigned)last_gap, (long long unsigned)next_gap, final,
(long long unsigned)cost_list, (long long unsigned)cost_range,
(long long unsigned)cost_bitmap,
(long long unsigned)cost_bitmap_restart, new_state,
*force_new_section ? " restart" : ""));
return new_state;
}
static int
put_bitmap(struct sshbuf *buf, struct bitmap *bitmap)
{
size_t len;
u_char *blob;
int r;
len = bitmap_nbytes(bitmap);
if ((blob = malloc(len)) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
if (bitmap_to_string(bitmap, blob, len) != 0) {
free(blob);
return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
r = sshbuf_put_bignum2_bytes(buf, blob, len);
free(blob);
return r;
}
/* Generate a KRL_SECTION_CERTIFICATES KRL section */
static int
revoked_certs_generate(struct revoked_certs *rc, struct sshbuf *buf)
{
int final, force_new_sect, r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
u_int64_t i, contig, gap, last = 0, bitmap_start = 0;
struct revoked_serial *rs, *nrs;
struct revoked_key_id *rki;
int next_state, state = 0;
struct sshbuf *sect;
struct bitmap *bitmap = NULL;
if ((sect = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
/* Store the header: optional CA scope key, reserved */
if (rc->ca_key == NULL) {
if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(buf, NULL, 0)) != 0)
goto out;
} else {
if ((r = sshkey_puts(rc->ca_key, buf)) != 0)
goto out;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(buf, NULL, 0)) != 0)
goto out;
/* Store the revoked serials. */
for (rs = RB_MIN(revoked_serial_tree, &rc->revoked_serials);
rs != NULL;
rs = RB_NEXT(revoked_serial_tree, &rc->revoked_serials, rs)) {
KRL_DBG(("%s: serial %llu:%llu state 0x%02x", __func__,
(long long unsigned)rs->lo, (long long unsigned)rs->hi,
state));
/* Check contiguous length and gap to next section (if any) */
nrs = RB_NEXT(revoked_serial_tree, &rc->revoked_serials, rs);
final = nrs == NULL;
gap = nrs == NULL ? 0 : nrs->lo - rs->hi;
contig = 1 + (rs->hi - rs->lo);
/* Choose next state based on these */
next_state = choose_next_state(state, contig, final,
state == 0 ? 0 : rs->lo - last, gap, &force_new_sect);
/*
* If the current section is a range section or has a different
* type to the next section, then finish it off now.
*/
if (state != 0 && (force_new_sect || next_state != state ||
state == KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_RANGE)) {
KRL_DBG(("%s: finish state 0x%02x", __func__, state));
switch (state) {
case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_LIST:
case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_RANGE:
break;
case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_BITMAP:
if ((r = put_bitmap(sect, bitmap)) != 0)
goto out;
bitmap_free(bitmap);
bitmap = NULL;
break;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf, state)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_stringb(buf, sect)) != 0)
goto out;
sshbuf_reset(sect);
}
/* If we are starting a new section then prepare it now */
if (next_state != state || force_new_sect) {
KRL_DBG(("%s: start state 0x%02x", __func__,
next_state));
state = next_state;
sshbuf_reset(sect);
switch (state) {
case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_LIST:
case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_RANGE:
break;
case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_BITMAP:
if ((bitmap = bitmap_new()) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
bitmap_start = rs->lo;
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u64(sect,
bitmap_start)) != 0)
goto out;
break;
}
}
/* Perform section-specific processing */
switch (state) {
case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_LIST:
for (i = 0; i < contig; i++) {
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u64(sect, rs->lo + i)) != 0)
goto out;
}
break;
case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_RANGE:
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u64(sect, rs->lo)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u64(sect, rs->hi)) != 0)
goto out;
break;
case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_BITMAP:
if (rs->lo - bitmap_start > INT_MAX) {
error("%s: insane bitmap gap", __func__);
goto out;
}
for (i = 0; i < contig; i++) {
if (bitmap_set_bit(bitmap,
rs->lo + i - bitmap_start) != 0) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
}
break;
}
last = rs->hi;
}
/* Flush the remaining section, if any */
if (state != 0) {
KRL_DBG(("%s: serial final flush for state 0x%02x",
__func__, state));
switch (state) {
case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_LIST:
case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_RANGE:
break;
case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_BITMAP:
if ((r = put_bitmap(sect, bitmap)) != 0)
goto out;
bitmap_free(bitmap);
bitmap = NULL;
break;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf, state)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_stringb(buf, sect)) != 0)
goto out;
}
KRL_DBG(("%s: serial done ", __func__));
/* Now output a section for any revocations by key ID */
sshbuf_reset(sect);
RB_FOREACH(rki, revoked_key_id_tree, &rc->revoked_key_ids) {
KRL_DBG(("%s: key ID %s", __func__, rki->key_id));
if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(sect, rki->key_id)) != 0)
goto out;
}
if (sshbuf_len(sect) != 0) {
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf, KRL_SECTION_CERT_KEY_ID)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_stringb(buf, sect)) != 0)
goto out;
}
r = 0;
out:
bitmap_free(bitmap);
sshbuf_free(sect);
return r;
}
int
ssh_krl_to_blob(struct ssh_krl *krl, struct sshbuf *buf,
struct sshkey **sign_keys, u_int nsign_keys)
{
int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
struct revoked_certs *rc;
struct revoked_blob *rb;
struct sshbuf *sect;
u_char *sblob = NULL;
size_t slen, i;
if (krl->generated_date == 0)
krl->generated_date = time(NULL);
if ((sect = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
/* Store the header */
if ((r = sshbuf_put(buf, KRL_MAGIC, sizeof(KRL_MAGIC) - 1)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(buf, KRL_FORMAT_VERSION)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u64(buf, krl->krl_version)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u64(buf, krl->generated_date)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u64(buf, krl->flags)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_string(buf, NULL, 0)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(buf, krl->comment)) != 0)
goto out;
/* Store sections for revoked certificates */
TAILQ_FOREACH(rc, &krl->revoked_certs, entry) {
sshbuf_reset(sect);
if ((r = revoked_certs_generate(rc, sect)) != 0)
goto out;
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf, KRL_SECTION_CERTIFICATES)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_stringb(buf, sect)) != 0)
goto out;
}
/* Finally, output sections for revocations by public key/hash */
sshbuf_reset(sect);
RB_FOREACH(rb, revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_keys) {
KRL_DBG(("%s: key len %zu ", __func__, rb->len));
if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(sect, rb->blob, rb->len)) != 0)
goto out;
}
if (sshbuf_len(sect) != 0) {
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf, KRL_SECTION_EXPLICIT_KEY)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_stringb(buf, sect)) != 0)
goto out;
}
sshbuf_reset(sect);
RB_FOREACH(rb, revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_sha1s) {
KRL_DBG(("%s: hash len %zu ", __func__, rb->len));
if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(sect, rb->blob, rb->len)) != 0)
goto out;
}
if (sshbuf_len(sect) != 0) {
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf,
KRL_SECTION_FINGERPRINT_SHA1)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_stringb(buf, sect)) != 0)
goto out;
}
sshbuf_reset(sect);
RB_FOREACH(rb, revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_sha256s) {
KRL_DBG(("%s: hash len %zu ", __func__, rb->len));
if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(sect, rb->blob, rb->len)) != 0)
goto out;
}
if (sshbuf_len(sect) != 0) {
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf,
KRL_SECTION_FINGERPRINT_SHA256)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_stringb(buf, sect)) != 0)
goto out;
}
for (i = 0; i < nsign_keys; i++) {
KRL_DBG(("%s: signature key %s", __func__,
sshkey_ssh_name(sign_keys[i])));
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf, KRL_SECTION_SIGNATURE)) != 0 ||
(r = sshkey_puts(sign_keys[i], buf)) != 0)
goto out;
if ((r = sshkey_sign(sign_keys[i], &sblob, &slen,
- sshbuf_ptr(buf), sshbuf_len(buf), NULL, 0)) != 0)
+ sshbuf_ptr(buf), sshbuf_len(buf), NULL, NULL, 0)) != 0)
goto out;
KRL_DBG(("%s: signature sig len %zu", __func__, slen));
if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(buf, sblob, slen)) != 0)
goto out;
}
r = 0;
out:
free(sblob);
sshbuf_free(sect);
return r;
}
static void
format_timestamp(u_int64_t timestamp, char *ts, size_t nts)
{
time_t t;
struct tm *tm;
t = timestamp;
tm = localtime(&t);
if (tm == NULL)
strlcpy(ts, "<INVALID>", nts);
else {
*ts = '\0';
strftime(ts, nts, "%Y%m%dT%H%M%S", tm);
}
}
static int
parse_revoked_certs(struct sshbuf *buf, struct ssh_krl *krl)
{
int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
u_char type;
const u_char *blob;
size_t blen, nbits;
struct sshbuf *subsect = NULL;
u_int64_t serial, serial_lo, serial_hi;
struct bitmap *bitmap = NULL;
char *key_id = NULL;
struct sshkey *ca_key = NULL;
if ((subsect = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
/* Header: key, reserved */
if ((r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(buf, &blob, &blen)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_skip_string(buf)) != 0)
goto out;
if (blen != 0 && (r = sshkey_from_blob(blob, blen, &ca_key)) != 0)
goto out;
while (sshbuf_len(buf) > 0) {
sshbuf_free(subsect);
subsect = NULL;
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(buf, &type)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_froms(buf, &subsect)) != 0)
goto out;
KRL_DBG(("%s: subsection type 0x%02x", __func__, type));
/* sshbuf_dump(subsect, stderr); */
switch (type) {
case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_LIST:
while (sshbuf_len(subsect) > 0) {
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u64(subsect, &serial)) != 0)
goto out;
if ((r = ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_serial(krl,
ca_key, serial)) != 0)
goto out;
}
break;
case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_RANGE:
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u64(subsect, &serial_lo)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u64(subsect, &serial_hi)) != 0)
goto out;
if ((r = ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_serial_range(krl,
ca_key, serial_lo, serial_hi)) != 0)
goto out;
break;
case KRL_SECTION_CERT_SERIAL_BITMAP:
if ((bitmap = bitmap_new()) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u64(subsect, &serial_lo)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_bignum2_bytes_direct(subsect,
&blob, &blen)) != 0)
goto out;
if (bitmap_from_string(bitmap, blob, blen) != 0) {
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
nbits = bitmap_nbits(bitmap);
for (serial = 0; serial < (u_int64_t)nbits; serial++) {
if (serial > 0 && serial_lo + serial == 0) {
error("%s: bitmap wraps u64", __func__);
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
if (!bitmap_test_bit(bitmap, serial))
continue;
if ((r = ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_serial(krl,
ca_key, serial_lo + serial)) != 0)
goto out;
}
bitmap_free(bitmap);
bitmap = NULL;
break;
case KRL_SECTION_CERT_KEY_ID:
while (sshbuf_len(subsect) > 0) {
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(subsect,
&key_id, NULL)) != 0)
goto out;
if ((r = ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_key_id(krl,
ca_key, key_id)) != 0)
goto out;
free(key_id);
key_id = NULL;
}
break;
default:
error("Unsupported KRL certificate section %u", type);
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
if (sshbuf_len(subsect) > 0) {
error("KRL certificate section contains unparsed data");
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
}
r = 0;
out:
if (bitmap != NULL)
bitmap_free(bitmap);
free(key_id);
sshkey_free(ca_key);
sshbuf_free(subsect);
return r;
}
static int
blob_section(struct sshbuf *sect, struct revoked_blob_tree *target_tree,
size_t expected_len)
{
u_char *rdata = NULL;
size_t rlen = 0;
int r;
while (sshbuf_len(sect) > 0) {
if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(sect, &rdata, &rlen)) != 0)
return r;
if (expected_len != 0 && rlen != expected_len) {
error("%s: bad length", __func__);
free(rdata);
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
}
if ((r = revoke_blob(target_tree, rdata, rlen)) != 0) {
free(rdata);
return r;
}
}
return 0;
}
/* Attempt to parse a KRL, checking its signature (if any) with sign_ca_keys. */
int
ssh_krl_from_blob(struct sshbuf *buf, struct ssh_krl **krlp,
const struct sshkey **sign_ca_keys, size_t nsign_ca_keys)
{
struct sshbuf *copy = NULL, *sect = NULL;
struct ssh_krl *krl = NULL;
char timestamp[64];
int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR, sig_seen;
struct sshkey *key = NULL, **ca_used = NULL, **tmp_ca_used;
u_char type;
const u_char *blob;
size_t i, j, sig_off, sects_off, blen, nca_used;
u_int format_version;
nca_used = 0;
*krlp = NULL;
if (sshbuf_len(buf) < sizeof(KRL_MAGIC) - 1 ||
memcmp(sshbuf_ptr(buf), KRL_MAGIC, sizeof(KRL_MAGIC) - 1) != 0) {
debug3("%s: not a KRL", __func__);
return SSH_ERR_KRL_BAD_MAGIC;
}
/* Take a copy of the KRL buffer so we can verify its signature later */
if ((copy = sshbuf_fromb(buf)) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_consume(copy, sizeof(KRL_MAGIC) - 1)) != 0)
goto out;
if ((krl = ssh_krl_init()) == NULL) {
error("%s: alloc failed", __func__);
goto out;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(copy, &format_version)) != 0)
goto out;
if (format_version != KRL_FORMAT_VERSION) {
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u64(copy, &krl->krl_version)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u64(copy, &krl->generated_date)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u64(copy, &krl->flags)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_skip_string(copy)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_cstring(copy, &krl->comment, NULL)) != 0)
goto out;
format_timestamp(krl->generated_date, timestamp, sizeof(timestamp));
debug("KRL version %llu generated at %s%s%s",
(long long unsigned)krl->krl_version, timestamp,
*krl->comment ? ": " : "", krl->comment);
/*
* 1st pass: verify signatures, if any. This is done to avoid
* detailed parsing of data whose provenance is unverified.
*/
sig_seen = 0;
if (sshbuf_len(buf) < sshbuf_len(copy)) {
/* Shouldn't happen */
r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
goto out;
}
sects_off = sshbuf_len(buf) - sshbuf_len(copy);
while (sshbuf_len(copy) > 0) {
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(copy, &type)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(copy, &blob, &blen)) != 0)
goto out;
KRL_DBG(("%s: first pass, section 0x%02x", __func__, type));
if (type != KRL_SECTION_SIGNATURE) {
if (sig_seen) {
error("KRL contains non-signature section "
"after signature");
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
/* Not interested for now. */
continue;
}
sig_seen = 1;
/* First string component is the signing key */
if ((r = sshkey_from_blob(blob, blen, &key)) != 0) {
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
if (sshbuf_len(buf) < sshbuf_len(copy)) {
/* Shouldn't happen */
r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
goto out;
}
sig_off = sshbuf_len(buf) - sshbuf_len(copy);
/* Second string component is the signature itself */
if ((r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(copy, &blob, &blen)) != 0) {
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
/* Check signature over entire KRL up to this point */
if ((r = sshkey_verify(key, blob, blen,
- sshbuf_ptr(buf), sig_off, NULL, 0)) != 0)
+ sshbuf_ptr(buf), sig_off, NULL, 0, NULL)) != 0)
goto out;
/* Check if this key has already signed this KRL */
for (i = 0; i < nca_used; i++) {
if (sshkey_equal(ca_used[i], key)) {
error("KRL signed more than once with "
"the same key");
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
}
/* Record keys used to sign the KRL */
tmp_ca_used = recallocarray(ca_used, nca_used, nca_used + 1,
sizeof(*ca_used));
if (tmp_ca_used == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
ca_used = tmp_ca_used;
ca_used[nca_used++] = key;
key = NULL;
}
if (sshbuf_len(copy) != 0) {
/* Shouldn't happen */
r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
goto out;
}
/*
* 2nd pass: parse and load the KRL, skipping the header to the point
* where the section start.
*/
sshbuf_free(copy);
if ((copy = sshbuf_fromb(buf)) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_consume(copy, sects_off)) != 0)
goto out;
while (sshbuf_len(copy) > 0) {
sshbuf_free(sect);
sect = NULL;
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(copy, &type)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_froms(copy, &sect)) != 0)
goto out;
KRL_DBG(("%s: second pass, section 0x%02x", __func__, type));
switch (type) {
case KRL_SECTION_CERTIFICATES:
if ((r = parse_revoked_certs(sect, krl)) != 0)
goto out;
break;
case KRL_SECTION_EXPLICIT_KEY:
if ((r = blob_section(sect,
&krl->revoked_keys, 0)) != 0)
goto out;
break;
case KRL_SECTION_FINGERPRINT_SHA1:
if ((r = blob_section(sect,
&krl->revoked_sha1s, 20)) != 0)
goto out;
break;
case KRL_SECTION_FINGERPRINT_SHA256:
if ((r = blob_section(sect,
&krl->revoked_sha256s, 32)) != 0)
goto out;
break;
case KRL_SECTION_SIGNATURE:
/* Handled above, but still need to stay in synch */
sshbuf_free(sect);
sect = NULL;
if ((r = sshbuf_skip_string(copy)) != 0)
goto out;
break;
default:
error("Unsupported KRL section %u", type);
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
if (sect != NULL && sshbuf_len(sect) > 0) {
error("KRL section contains unparsed data");
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
}
/* Check that the key(s) used to sign the KRL weren't revoked */
sig_seen = 0;
for (i = 0; i < nca_used; i++) {
if (ssh_krl_check_key(krl, ca_used[i]) == 0)
sig_seen = 1;
else {
sshkey_free(ca_used[i]);
ca_used[i] = NULL;
}
}
if (nca_used && !sig_seen) {
error("All keys used to sign KRL were revoked");
r = SSH_ERR_KEY_REVOKED;
goto out;
}
/* If we have CA keys, then verify that one was used to sign the KRL */
if (sig_seen && nsign_ca_keys != 0) {
sig_seen = 0;
for (i = 0; !sig_seen && i < nsign_ca_keys; i++) {
for (j = 0; j < nca_used; j++) {
if (ca_used[j] == NULL)
continue;
if (sshkey_equal(ca_used[j], sign_ca_keys[i])) {
sig_seen = 1;
break;
}
}
}
if (!sig_seen) {
r = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
error("KRL not signed with any trusted key");
goto out;
}
}
*krlp = krl;
r = 0;
out:
if (r != 0)
ssh_krl_free(krl);
for (i = 0; i < nca_used; i++)
sshkey_free(ca_used[i]);
free(ca_used);
sshkey_free(key);
sshbuf_free(copy);
sshbuf_free(sect);
return r;
}
/* Checks certificate serial number and key ID revocation */
static int
is_cert_revoked(const struct sshkey *key, struct revoked_certs *rc)
{
struct revoked_serial rs, *ers;
struct revoked_key_id rki, *erki;
/* Check revocation by cert key ID */
memset(&rki, 0, sizeof(rki));
rki.key_id = key->cert->key_id;
erki = RB_FIND(revoked_key_id_tree, &rc->revoked_key_ids, &rki);
if (erki != NULL) {
KRL_DBG(("%s: revoked by key ID", __func__));
return SSH_ERR_KEY_REVOKED;
}
/*
* Zero serials numbers are ignored (it's the default when the
* CA doesn't specify one).
*/
if (key->cert->serial == 0)
return 0;
memset(&rs, 0, sizeof(rs));
rs.lo = rs.hi = key->cert->serial;
ers = RB_FIND(revoked_serial_tree, &rc->revoked_serials, &rs);
if (ers != NULL) {
KRL_DBG(("%s: revoked serial %llu matched %llu:%llu", __func__,
key->cert->serial, ers->lo, ers->hi));
return SSH_ERR_KEY_REVOKED;
}
return 0;
}
/* Checks whether a given key/cert is revoked. Does not check its CA */
static int
is_key_revoked(struct ssh_krl *krl, const struct sshkey *key)
{
struct revoked_blob rb, *erb;
struct revoked_certs *rc;
int r;
/* Check explicitly revoked hashes first */
memset(&rb, 0, sizeof(rb));
if ((r = sshkey_fingerprint_raw(key, SSH_DIGEST_SHA1,
&rb.blob, &rb.len)) != 0)
return r;
erb = RB_FIND(revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_sha1s, &rb);
free(rb.blob);
if (erb != NULL) {
KRL_DBG(("%s: revoked by key SHA1", __func__));
return SSH_ERR_KEY_REVOKED;
}
memset(&rb, 0, sizeof(rb));
if ((r = sshkey_fingerprint_raw(key, SSH_DIGEST_SHA256,
&rb.blob, &rb.len)) != 0)
return r;
erb = RB_FIND(revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_sha256s, &rb);
free(rb.blob);
if (erb != NULL) {
KRL_DBG(("%s: revoked by key SHA256", __func__));
return SSH_ERR_KEY_REVOKED;
}
/* Next, explicit keys */
memset(&rb, 0, sizeof(rb));
if ((r = plain_key_blob(key, &rb.blob, &rb.len)) != 0)
return r;
erb = RB_FIND(revoked_blob_tree, &krl->revoked_keys, &rb);
free(rb.blob);
if (erb != NULL) {
KRL_DBG(("%s: revoked by explicit key", __func__));
return SSH_ERR_KEY_REVOKED;
}
if (!sshkey_is_cert(key))
return 0;
/* Check cert revocation for the specified CA */
if ((r = revoked_certs_for_ca_key(krl, key->cert->signature_key,
&rc, 0)) != 0)
return r;
if (rc != NULL) {
if ((r = is_cert_revoked(key, rc)) != 0)
return r;
}
/* Check cert revocation for the wildcard CA */
if ((r = revoked_certs_for_ca_key(krl, NULL, &rc, 0)) != 0)
return r;
if (rc != NULL) {
if ((r = is_cert_revoked(key, rc)) != 0)
return r;
}
KRL_DBG(("%s: %llu no match", __func__, key->cert->serial));
return 0;
}
int
ssh_krl_check_key(struct ssh_krl *krl, const struct sshkey *key)
{
int r;
KRL_DBG(("%s: checking key", __func__));
if ((r = is_key_revoked(krl, key)) != 0)
return r;
if (sshkey_is_cert(key)) {
debug2("%s: checking CA key", __func__);
if ((r = is_key_revoked(krl, key->cert->signature_key)) != 0)
return r;
}
KRL_DBG(("%s: key okay", __func__));
return 0;
}
int
ssh_krl_file_contains_key(const char *path, const struct sshkey *key)
{
struct sshbuf *krlbuf = NULL;
struct ssh_krl *krl = NULL;
- int oerrno = 0, r, fd;
+ int oerrno = 0, r;
if (path == NULL)
return 0;
-
- if ((krlbuf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
- return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
- if ((fd = open(path, O_RDONLY)) == -1) {
- r = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
- oerrno = errno;
- goto out;
- }
- if ((r = sshkey_load_file(fd, krlbuf)) != 0) {
+ if ((r = sshbuf_load_file(path, &krlbuf)) != 0) {
oerrno = errno;
goto out;
}
if ((r = ssh_krl_from_blob(krlbuf, &krl, NULL, 0)) != 0)
goto out;
debug2("%s: checking KRL %s", __func__, path);
r = ssh_krl_check_key(krl, key);
out:
- if (fd != -1)
- close(fd);
sshbuf_free(krlbuf);
ssh_krl_free(krl);
if (r != 0)
errno = oerrno;
return r;
}
diff --git a/match.c b/match.c
index 25c866a43c8f..3a8fa9d78d5c 100644
--- a/match.c
+++ b/match.c
@@ -1,363 +1,364 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: match.c,v 1.40 2019/10/04 04:13:39 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: match.c,v 1.41 2019/11/13 04:47:52 deraadt Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
* All rights reserved
* Simple pattern matching, with '*' and '?' as wildcards.
*
* As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
* can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
* software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
* incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
* called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
*/
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <ctype.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "match.h"
#include "misc.h"
/*
* Returns true if the given string matches the pattern (which may contain ?
* and * as wildcards), and zero if it does not match.
*/
int
match_pattern(const char *s, const char *pattern)
{
for (;;) {
/* If at end of pattern, accept if also at end of string. */
if (!*pattern)
return !*s;
if (*pattern == '*') {
/* Skip the asterisk. */
pattern++;
/* If at end of pattern, accept immediately. */
if (!*pattern)
return 1;
/* If next character in pattern is known, optimize. */
if (*pattern != '?' && *pattern != '*') {
/*
* Look instances of the next character in
* pattern, and try to match starting from
* those.
*/
for (; *s; s++)
if (*s == *pattern &&
match_pattern(s + 1, pattern + 1))
return 1;
/* Failed. */
return 0;
}
/*
* Move ahead one character at a time and try to
* match at each position.
*/
for (; *s; s++)
if (match_pattern(s, pattern))
return 1;
/* Failed. */
return 0;
}
/*
* There must be at least one more character in the string.
* If we are at the end, fail.
*/
if (!*s)
return 0;
/* Check if the next character of the string is acceptable. */
if (*pattern != '?' && *pattern != *s)
return 0;
/* Move to the next character, both in string and in pattern. */
s++;
pattern++;
}
/* NOTREACHED */
}
/*
* Tries to match the string against the
* comma-separated sequence of subpatterns (each possibly preceded by ! to
* indicate negation). Returns -1 if negation matches, 1 if there is
* a positive match, 0 if there is no match at all.
*/
int
match_pattern_list(const char *string, const char *pattern, int dolower)
{
char sub[1024];
int negated;
int got_positive;
u_int i, subi, len = strlen(pattern);
got_positive = 0;
for (i = 0; i < len;) {
/* Check if the subpattern is negated. */
if (pattern[i] == '!') {
negated = 1;
i++;
} else
negated = 0;
/*
* Extract the subpattern up to a comma or end. Convert the
* subpattern to lowercase.
*/
for (subi = 0;
i < len && subi < sizeof(sub) - 1 && pattern[i] != ',';
subi++, i++)
sub[subi] = dolower && isupper((u_char)pattern[i]) ?
tolower((u_char)pattern[i]) : pattern[i];
/* If subpattern too long, return failure (no match). */
if (subi >= sizeof(sub) - 1)
return 0;
/* If the subpattern was terminated by a comma, then skip it. */
if (i < len && pattern[i] == ',')
i++;
/* Null-terminate the subpattern. */
sub[subi] = '\0';
/* Try to match the subpattern against the string. */
if (match_pattern(string, sub)) {
if (negated)
return -1; /* Negative */
else
got_positive = 1; /* Positive */
}
}
/*
* Return success if got a positive match. If there was a negative
* match, we have already returned -1 and never get here.
*/
return got_positive;
}
/* Match a list representing users or groups. */
int
match_usergroup_pattern_list(const char *string, const char *pattern)
{
#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN
/* Windows usernames may be Unicode and are not case sensitive */
return cygwin_ug_match_pattern_list(string, pattern);
#else
- /* Case insensitive match */
+ /* Case sensitive match */
return match_pattern_list(string, pattern, 0);
#endif
}
/*
* Tries to match the host name (which must be in all lowercase) against the
* comma-separated sequence of subpatterns (each possibly preceded by ! to
* indicate negation). Returns -1 if negation matches, 1 if there is
* a positive match, 0 if there is no match at all.
*/
int
match_hostname(const char *host, const char *pattern)
{
char *hostcopy = xstrdup(host);
int r;
lowercase(hostcopy);
r = match_pattern_list(hostcopy, pattern, 1);
free(hostcopy);
return r;
}
/*
* returns 0 if we get a negative match for the hostname or the ip
* or if we get no match at all. returns -1 on error, or 1 on
* successful match.
*/
int
match_host_and_ip(const char *host, const char *ipaddr,
const char *patterns)
{
int mhost, mip;
if ((mip = addr_match_list(ipaddr, patterns)) == -2)
return -1; /* error in ipaddr match */
else if (host == NULL || ipaddr == NULL || mip == -1)
return 0; /* negative ip address match, or testing pattern */
/* negative hostname match */
if ((mhost = match_hostname(host, patterns)) == -1)
return 0;
/* no match at all */
if (mhost == 0 && mip == 0)
return 0;
return 1;
}
/*
* Match user, user@host_or_ip, user@host_or_ip_list against pattern.
* If user, host and ipaddr are all NULL then validate pattern/
* Returns -1 on invalid pattern, 0 on no match, 1 on match.
*/
int
match_user(const char *user, const char *host, const char *ipaddr,
const char *pattern)
{
char *p, *pat;
int ret;
/* test mode */
if (user == NULL && host == NULL && ipaddr == NULL) {
if ((p = strchr(pattern, '@')) != NULL &&
match_host_and_ip(NULL, NULL, p + 1) < 0)
return -1;
return 0;
}
if ((p = strchr(pattern, '@')) == NULL)
return match_pattern(user, pattern);
pat = xstrdup(pattern);
p = strchr(pat, '@');
*p++ = '\0';
if ((ret = match_pattern(user, pat)) == 1)
ret = match_host_and_ip(host, ipaddr, p);
free(pat);
return ret;
}
/*
* Returns first item from client-list that is also supported by server-list,
* caller must free the returned string.
*/
#define MAX_PROP 40
#define SEP ","
char *
match_list(const char *client, const char *server, u_int *next)
{
char *sproposals[MAX_PROP];
char *c, *s, *p, *ret, *cp, *sp;
int i, j, nproposals;
c = cp = xstrdup(client);
s = sp = xstrdup(server);
for ((p = strsep(&sp, SEP)), i=0; p && *p != '\0';
(p = strsep(&sp, SEP)), i++) {
if (i < MAX_PROP)
sproposals[i] = p;
else
break;
}
nproposals = i;
for ((p = strsep(&cp, SEP)), i=0; p && *p != '\0';
(p = strsep(&cp, SEP)), i++) {
for (j = 0; j < nproposals; j++) {
if (strcmp(p, sproposals[j]) == 0) {
ret = xstrdup(p);
if (next != NULL)
*next = (cp == NULL) ?
strlen(c) : (u_int)(cp - c);
free(c);
free(s);
return ret;
}
}
}
if (next != NULL)
*next = strlen(c);
free(c);
free(s);
return NULL;
}
/*
* Filter proposal using pattern-list filter.
* "blacklist" determines sense of filter:
* non-zero indicates that items matching filter should be excluded.
* zero indicates that only items matching filter should be included.
* returns NULL on allocation error, otherwise caller must free result.
*/
static char *
filter_list(const char *proposal, const char *filter, int blacklist)
{
size_t len = strlen(proposal) + 1;
char *fix_prop = malloc(len);
char *orig_prop = strdup(proposal);
char *cp, *tmp;
int r;
if (fix_prop == NULL || orig_prop == NULL) {
free(orig_prop);
free(fix_prop);
return NULL;
}
tmp = orig_prop;
*fix_prop = '\0';
while ((cp = strsep(&tmp, ",")) != NULL) {
r = match_pattern_list(cp, filter, 0);
if ((blacklist && r != 1) || (!blacklist && r == 1)) {
if (*fix_prop != '\0')
strlcat(fix_prop, ",", len);
strlcat(fix_prop, cp, len);
}
}
free(orig_prop);
return fix_prop;
}
/*
* Filters a comma-separated list of strings, excluding any entry matching
* the 'filter' pattern list. Caller must free returned string.
*/
char *
match_filter_blacklist(const char *proposal, const char *filter)
{
return filter_list(proposal, filter, 1);
}
/*
* Filters a comma-separated list of strings, including only entries matching
* the 'filter' pattern list. Caller must free returned string.
*/
char *
match_filter_whitelist(const char *proposal, const char *filter)
{
return filter_list(proposal, filter, 0);
}
diff --git a/misc.c b/misc.c
index 88833d7ff246..3a31d5c1807e 100644
--- a/misc.c
+++ b/misc.c
@@ -1,2211 +1,2268 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: misc.c,v 1.142 2019/09/03 08:32:11 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: misc.c,v 1.146 2020/01/28 01:49:36 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (c) 2005,2006 Damien Miller. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/ioctl.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <sys/time.h>
#include <sys/wait.h>
#include <sys/un.h>
#include <limits.h>
#ifdef HAVE_LIBGEN_H
# include <libgen.h>
#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_POLL_H
#include <poll.h>
+#endif
#include <signal.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <time.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <netinet/in.h>
#include <netinet/in_systm.h>
#include <netinet/ip.h>
#include <netinet/tcp.h>
#include <arpa/inet.h>
#include <ctype.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <netdb.h>
#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
# include <paths.h>
#include <pwd.h>
#endif
#ifdef SSH_TUN_OPENBSD
#include <net/if.h>
#endif
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "ssh.h"
#include "sshbuf.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
#include "platform.h"
/* remove newline at end of string */
char *
chop(char *s)
{
char *t = s;
while (*t) {
if (*t == '\n' || *t == '\r') {
*t = '\0';
return s;
}
t++;
}
return s;
}
/* set/unset filedescriptor to non-blocking */
int
set_nonblock(int fd)
{
int val;
val = fcntl(fd, F_GETFL);
if (val == -1) {
error("fcntl(%d, F_GETFL): %s", fd, strerror(errno));
return (-1);
}
if (val & O_NONBLOCK) {
debug3("fd %d is O_NONBLOCK", fd);
return (0);
}
debug2("fd %d setting O_NONBLOCK", fd);
val |= O_NONBLOCK;
if (fcntl(fd, F_SETFL, val) == -1) {
debug("fcntl(%d, F_SETFL, O_NONBLOCK): %s", fd,
strerror(errno));
return (-1);
}
return (0);
}
int
unset_nonblock(int fd)
{
int val;
val = fcntl(fd, F_GETFL);
if (val == -1) {
error("fcntl(%d, F_GETFL): %s", fd, strerror(errno));
return (-1);
}
if (!(val & O_NONBLOCK)) {
debug3("fd %d is not O_NONBLOCK", fd);
return (0);
}
debug("fd %d clearing O_NONBLOCK", fd);
val &= ~O_NONBLOCK;
if (fcntl(fd, F_SETFL, val) == -1) {
debug("fcntl(%d, F_SETFL, ~O_NONBLOCK): %s",
fd, strerror(errno));
return (-1);
}
return (0);
}
const char *
ssh_gai_strerror(int gaierr)
{
if (gaierr == EAI_SYSTEM && errno != 0)
return strerror(errno);
return gai_strerror(gaierr);
}
/* disable nagle on socket */
void
set_nodelay(int fd)
{
int opt;
socklen_t optlen;
optlen = sizeof opt;
if (getsockopt(fd, IPPROTO_TCP, TCP_NODELAY, &opt, &optlen) == -1) {
debug("getsockopt TCP_NODELAY: %.100s", strerror(errno));
return;
}
if (opt == 1) {
debug2("fd %d is TCP_NODELAY", fd);
return;
}
opt = 1;
debug2("fd %d setting TCP_NODELAY", fd);
if (setsockopt(fd, IPPROTO_TCP, TCP_NODELAY, &opt, sizeof opt) == -1)
error("setsockopt TCP_NODELAY: %.100s", strerror(errno));
}
/* Allow local port reuse in TIME_WAIT */
int
set_reuseaddr(int fd)
{
int on = 1;
if (setsockopt(fd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR, &on, sizeof(on)) == -1) {
error("setsockopt SO_REUSEADDR fd %d: %s", fd, strerror(errno));
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
/* Get/set routing domain */
char *
get_rdomain(int fd)
{
#if defined(HAVE_SYS_GET_RDOMAIN)
return sys_get_rdomain(fd);
#elif defined(__OpenBSD__)
int rtable;
char *ret;
socklen_t len = sizeof(rtable);
if (getsockopt(fd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_RTABLE, &rtable, &len) == -1) {
error("Failed to get routing domain for fd %d: %s",
fd, strerror(errno));
return NULL;
}
xasprintf(&ret, "%d", rtable);
return ret;
#else /* defined(__OpenBSD__) */
return NULL;
#endif
}
int
set_rdomain(int fd, const char *name)
{
#if defined(HAVE_SYS_SET_RDOMAIN)
return sys_set_rdomain(fd, name);
#elif defined(__OpenBSD__)
int rtable;
const char *errstr;
if (name == NULL)
return 0; /* default table */
rtable = (int)strtonum(name, 0, 255, &errstr);
if (errstr != NULL) {
/* Shouldn't happen */
error("Invalid routing domain \"%s\": %s", name, errstr);
return -1;
}
if (setsockopt(fd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_RTABLE,
&rtable, sizeof(rtable)) == -1) {
error("Failed to set routing domain %d on fd %d: %s",
rtable, fd, strerror(errno));
return -1;
}
return 0;
#else /* defined(__OpenBSD__) */
error("Setting routing domain is not supported on this platform");
return -1;
#endif
}
/*
- * Wait up to *timeoutp milliseconds for fd to be readable. Updates
+ * Wait up to *timeoutp milliseconds for events on fd. Updates
* *timeoutp with time remaining.
* Returns 0 if fd ready or -1 on timeout or error (see errno).
*/
-int
-waitrfd(int fd, int *timeoutp)
+static int
+waitfd(int fd, int *timeoutp, short events)
{
struct pollfd pfd;
struct timeval t_start;
int oerrno, r;
monotime_tv(&t_start);
pfd.fd = fd;
- pfd.events = POLLIN;
+ pfd.events = events;
for (; *timeoutp >= 0;) {
r = poll(&pfd, 1, *timeoutp);
oerrno = errno;
ms_subtract_diff(&t_start, timeoutp);
errno = oerrno;
if (r > 0)
return 0;
else if (r == -1 && errno != EAGAIN)
return -1;
else if (r == 0)
break;
}
/* timeout */
errno = ETIMEDOUT;
return -1;
}
+/*
+ * Wait up to *timeoutp milliseconds for fd to be readable. Updates
+ * *timeoutp with time remaining.
+ * Returns 0 if fd ready or -1 on timeout or error (see errno).
+ */
+int
+waitrfd(int fd, int *timeoutp) {
+ return waitfd(fd, timeoutp, POLLIN);
+}
+
/*
* Attempt a non-blocking connect(2) to the specified address, waiting up to
* *timeoutp milliseconds for the connection to complete. If the timeout is
* <=0, then wait indefinitely.
*
* Returns 0 on success or -1 on failure.
*/
int
timeout_connect(int sockfd, const struct sockaddr *serv_addr,
socklen_t addrlen, int *timeoutp)
{
int optval = 0;
socklen_t optlen = sizeof(optval);
/* No timeout: just do a blocking connect() */
if (timeoutp == NULL || *timeoutp <= 0)
return connect(sockfd, serv_addr, addrlen);
set_nonblock(sockfd);
if (connect(sockfd, serv_addr, addrlen) == 0) {
/* Succeeded already? */
unset_nonblock(sockfd);
return 0;
} else if (errno != EINPROGRESS)
return -1;
- if (waitrfd(sockfd, timeoutp) == -1)
+ if (waitfd(sockfd, timeoutp, POLLIN | POLLOUT) == -1)
return -1;
/* Completed or failed */
if (getsockopt(sockfd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_ERROR, &optval, &optlen) == -1) {
debug("getsockopt: %s", strerror(errno));
return -1;
}
if (optval != 0) {
errno = optval;
return -1;
}
unset_nonblock(sockfd);
return 0;
}
/* Characters considered whitespace in strsep calls. */
#define WHITESPACE " \t\r\n"
#define QUOTE "\""
/* return next token in configuration line */
static char *
strdelim_internal(char **s, int split_equals)
{
char *old;
int wspace = 0;
if (*s == NULL)
return NULL;
old = *s;
*s = strpbrk(*s,
split_equals ? WHITESPACE QUOTE "=" : WHITESPACE QUOTE);
if (*s == NULL)
return (old);
if (*s[0] == '\"') {
memmove(*s, *s + 1, strlen(*s)); /* move nul too */
/* Find matching quote */
if ((*s = strpbrk(*s, QUOTE)) == NULL) {
return (NULL); /* no matching quote */
} else {
*s[0] = '\0';
*s += strspn(*s + 1, WHITESPACE) + 1;
return (old);
}
}
/* Allow only one '=' to be skipped */
if (split_equals && *s[0] == '=')
wspace = 1;
*s[0] = '\0';
/* Skip any extra whitespace after first token */
*s += strspn(*s + 1, WHITESPACE) + 1;
if (split_equals && *s[0] == '=' && !wspace)
*s += strspn(*s + 1, WHITESPACE) + 1;
return (old);
}
/*
* Return next token in configuration line; splts on whitespace or a
* single '=' character.
*/
char *
strdelim(char **s)
{
return strdelim_internal(s, 1);
}
/*
* Return next token in configuration line; splts on whitespace only.
*/
char *
strdelimw(char **s)
{
return strdelim_internal(s, 0);
}
struct passwd *
pwcopy(struct passwd *pw)
{
struct passwd *copy = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*copy));
copy->pw_name = xstrdup(pw->pw_name);
copy->pw_passwd = xstrdup(pw->pw_passwd);
#ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_GECOS
copy->pw_gecos = xstrdup(pw->pw_gecos);
#endif
copy->pw_uid = pw->pw_uid;
copy->pw_gid = pw->pw_gid;
#ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_EXPIRE
copy->pw_expire = pw->pw_expire;
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_CHANGE
copy->pw_change = pw->pw_change;
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_CLASS
copy->pw_class = xstrdup(pw->pw_class);
#endif
copy->pw_dir = xstrdup(pw->pw_dir);
copy->pw_shell = xstrdup(pw->pw_shell);
return copy;
}
/*
* Convert ASCII string to TCP/IP port number.
* Port must be >=0 and <=65535.
* Return -1 if invalid.
*/
int
a2port(const char *s)
{
struct servent *se;
long long port;
const char *errstr;
port = strtonum(s, 0, 65535, &errstr);
if (errstr == NULL)
return (int)port;
if ((se = getservbyname(s, "tcp")) != NULL)
return ntohs(se->s_port);
return -1;
}
int
a2tun(const char *s, int *remote)
{
const char *errstr = NULL;
char *sp, *ep;
int tun;
if (remote != NULL) {
*remote = SSH_TUNID_ANY;
sp = xstrdup(s);
if ((ep = strchr(sp, ':')) == NULL) {
free(sp);
return (a2tun(s, NULL));
}
ep[0] = '\0'; ep++;
*remote = a2tun(ep, NULL);
tun = a2tun(sp, NULL);
free(sp);
return (*remote == SSH_TUNID_ERR ? *remote : tun);
}
if (strcasecmp(s, "any") == 0)
return (SSH_TUNID_ANY);
tun = strtonum(s, 0, SSH_TUNID_MAX, &errstr);
if (errstr != NULL)
return (SSH_TUNID_ERR);
return (tun);
}
#define SECONDS 1
#define MINUTES (SECONDS * 60)
#define HOURS (MINUTES * 60)
#define DAYS (HOURS * 24)
#define WEEKS (DAYS * 7)
/*
* Convert a time string into seconds; format is
* a sequence of:
* time[qualifier]
*
* Valid time qualifiers are:
* <none> seconds
* s|S seconds
* m|M minutes
* h|H hours
* d|D days
* w|W weeks
*
* Examples:
* 90m 90 minutes
* 1h30m 90 minutes
* 2d 2 days
* 1w 1 week
*
* Return -1 if time string is invalid.
*/
long
convtime(const char *s)
{
long total, secs, multiplier = 1;
const char *p;
char *endp;
errno = 0;
total = 0;
p = s;
if (p == NULL || *p == '\0')
return -1;
while (*p) {
secs = strtol(p, &endp, 10);
if (p == endp ||
(errno == ERANGE && (secs == LONG_MIN || secs == LONG_MAX)) ||
secs < 0)
return -1;
switch (*endp++) {
case '\0':
endp--;
break;
case 's':
case 'S':
break;
case 'm':
case 'M':
multiplier = MINUTES;
break;
case 'h':
case 'H':
multiplier = HOURS;
break;
case 'd':
case 'D':
multiplier = DAYS;
break;
case 'w':
case 'W':
multiplier = WEEKS;
break;
default:
return -1;
}
if (secs >= LONG_MAX / multiplier)
return -1;
secs *= multiplier;
if (total >= LONG_MAX - secs)
return -1;
total += secs;
if (total < 0)
return -1;
p = endp;
}
return total;
}
/*
* Returns a standardized host+port identifier string.
* Caller must free returned string.
*/
char *
put_host_port(const char *host, u_short port)
{
char *hoststr;
if (port == 0 || port == SSH_DEFAULT_PORT)
return(xstrdup(host));
if (asprintf(&hoststr, "[%s]:%d", host, (int)port) == -1)
fatal("put_host_port: asprintf: %s", strerror(errno));
debug3("put_host_port: %s", hoststr);
return hoststr;
}
/*
* Search for next delimiter between hostnames/addresses and ports.
* Argument may be modified (for termination).
* Returns *cp if parsing succeeds.
* *cp is set to the start of the next field, if one was found.
* The delimiter char, if present, is stored in delim.
* If this is the last field, *cp is set to NULL.
*/
char *
hpdelim2(char **cp, char *delim)
{
char *s, *old;
if (cp == NULL || *cp == NULL)
return NULL;
old = s = *cp;
if (*s == '[') {
if ((s = strchr(s, ']')) == NULL)
return NULL;
else
s++;
} else if ((s = strpbrk(s, ":/")) == NULL)
s = *cp + strlen(*cp); /* skip to end (see first case below) */
switch (*s) {
case '\0':
*cp = NULL; /* no more fields*/
break;
case ':':
case '/':
if (delim != NULL)
*delim = *s;
*s = '\0'; /* terminate */
*cp = s + 1;
break;
default:
return NULL;
}
return old;
}
char *
hpdelim(char **cp)
{
return hpdelim2(cp, NULL);
}
char *
cleanhostname(char *host)
{
if (*host == '[' && host[strlen(host) - 1] == ']') {
host[strlen(host) - 1] = '\0';
return (host + 1);
} else
return host;
}
char *
colon(char *cp)
{
int flag = 0;
if (*cp == ':') /* Leading colon is part of file name. */
return NULL;
if (*cp == '[')
flag = 1;
for (; *cp; ++cp) {
if (*cp == '@' && *(cp+1) == '[')
flag = 1;
if (*cp == ']' && *(cp+1) == ':' && flag)
return (cp+1);
if (*cp == ':' && !flag)
return (cp);
if (*cp == '/')
return NULL;
}
return NULL;
}
/*
* Parse a [user@]host:[path] string.
* Caller must free returned user, host and path.
* Any of the pointer return arguments may be NULL (useful for syntax checking).
* If user was not specified then *userp will be set to NULL.
* If host was not specified then *hostp will be set to NULL.
* If path was not specified then *pathp will be set to ".".
* Returns 0 on success, -1 on failure.
*/
int
parse_user_host_path(const char *s, char **userp, char **hostp, char **pathp)
{
char *user = NULL, *host = NULL, *path = NULL;
char *sdup, *tmp;
int ret = -1;
if (userp != NULL)
*userp = NULL;
if (hostp != NULL)
*hostp = NULL;
if (pathp != NULL)
*pathp = NULL;
sdup = xstrdup(s);
/* Check for remote syntax: [user@]host:[path] */
if ((tmp = colon(sdup)) == NULL)
goto out;
/* Extract optional path */
*tmp++ = '\0';
if (*tmp == '\0')
tmp = ".";
path = xstrdup(tmp);
/* Extract optional user and mandatory host */
tmp = strrchr(sdup, '@');
if (tmp != NULL) {
*tmp++ = '\0';
host = xstrdup(cleanhostname(tmp));
if (*sdup != '\0')
user = xstrdup(sdup);
} else {
host = xstrdup(cleanhostname(sdup));
user = NULL;
}
/* Success */
if (userp != NULL) {
*userp = user;
user = NULL;
}
if (hostp != NULL) {
*hostp = host;
host = NULL;
}
if (pathp != NULL) {
*pathp = path;
path = NULL;
}
ret = 0;
out:
free(sdup);
free(user);
free(host);
free(path);
return ret;
}
/*
* Parse a [user@]host[:port] string.
* Caller must free returned user and host.
* Any of the pointer return arguments may be NULL (useful for syntax checking).
* If user was not specified then *userp will be set to NULL.
* If port was not specified then *portp will be -1.
* Returns 0 on success, -1 on failure.
*/
int
parse_user_host_port(const char *s, char **userp, char **hostp, int *portp)
{
char *sdup, *cp, *tmp;
char *user = NULL, *host = NULL;
int port = -1, ret = -1;
if (userp != NULL)
*userp = NULL;
if (hostp != NULL)
*hostp = NULL;
if (portp != NULL)
*portp = -1;
if ((sdup = tmp = strdup(s)) == NULL)
return -1;
/* Extract optional username */
if ((cp = strrchr(tmp, '@')) != NULL) {
*cp = '\0';
if (*tmp == '\0')
goto out;
if ((user = strdup(tmp)) == NULL)
goto out;
tmp = cp + 1;
}
/* Extract mandatory hostname */
if ((cp = hpdelim(&tmp)) == NULL || *cp == '\0')
goto out;
host = xstrdup(cleanhostname(cp));
/* Convert and verify optional port */
if (tmp != NULL && *tmp != '\0') {
if ((port = a2port(tmp)) <= 0)
goto out;
}
/* Success */
if (userp != NULL) {
*userp = user;
user = NULL;
}
if (hostp != NULL) {
*hostp = host;
host = NULL;
}
if (portp != NULL)
*portp = port;
ret = 0;
out:
free(sdup);
free(user);
free(host);
return ret;
}
/*
* Converts a two-byte hex string to decimal.
* Returns the decimal value or -1 for invalid input.
*/
static int
hexchar(const char *s)
{
unsigned char result[2];
int i;
for (i = 0; i < 2; i++) {
if (s[i] >= '0' && s[i] <= '9')
result[i] = (unsigned char)(s[i] - '0');
else if (s[i] >= 'a' && s[i] <= 'f')
result[i] = (unsigned char)(s[i] - 'a') + 10;
else if (s[i] >= 'A' && s[i] <= 'F')
result[i] = (unsigned char)(s[i] - 'A') + 10;
else
return -1;
}
return (result[0] << 4) | result[1];
}
/*
* Decode an url-encoded string.
* Returns a newly allocated string on success or NULL on failure.
*/
static char *
urldecode(const char *src)
{
char *ret, *dst;
int ch;
ret = xmalloc(strlen(src) + 1);
for (dst = ret; *src != '\0'; src++) {
switch (*src) {
case '+':
*dst++ = ' ';
break;
case '%':
if (!isxdigit((unsigned char)src[1]) ||
!isxdigit((unsigned char)src[2]) ||
(ch = hexchar(src + 1)) == -1) {
free(ret);
return NULL;
}
*dst++ = ch;
src += 2;
break;
default:
*dst++ = *src;
break;
}
}
*dst = '\0';
return ret;
}
/*
* Parse an (scp|ssh|sftp)://[user@]host[:port][/path] URI.
* See https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-secsh-scp-sftp-ssh-uri-04
* Either user or path may be url-encoded (but not host or port).
* Caller must free returned user, host and path.
* Any of the pointer return arguments may be NULL (useful for syntax checking)
* but the scheme must always be specified.
* If user was not specified then *userp will be set to NULL.
* If port was not specified then *portp will be -1.
* If path was not specified then *pathp will be set to NULL.
* Returns 0 on success, 1 if non-uri/wrong scheme, -1 on error/invalid uri.
*/
int
parse_uri(const char *scheme, const char *uri, char **userp, char **hostp,
int *portp, char **pathp)
{
char *uridup, *cp, *tmp, ch;
char *user = NULL, *host = NULL, *path = NULL;
int port = -1, ret = -1;
size_t len;
len = strlen(scheme);
if (strncmp(uri, scheme, len) != 0 || strncmp(uri + len, "://", 3) != 0)
return 1;
uri += len + 3;
if (userp != NULL)
*userp = NULL;
if (hostp != NULL)
*hostp = NULL;
if (portp != NULL)
*portp = -1;
if (pathp != NULL)
*pathp = NULL;
uridup = tmp = xstrdup(uri);
/* Extract optional ssh-info (username + connection params) */
if ((cp = strchr(tmp, '@')) != NULL) {
char *delim;
*cp = '\0';
/* Extract username and connection params */
if ((delim = strchr(tmp, ';')) != NULL) {
/* Just ignore connection params for now */
*delim = '\0';
}
if (*tmp == '\0') {
/* Empty username */
goto out;
}
if ((user = urldecode(tmp)) == NULL)
goto out;
tmp = cp + 1;
}
/* Extract mandatory hostname */
if ((cp = hpdelim2(&tmp, &ch)) == NULL || *cp == '\0')
goto out;
host = xstrdup(cleanhostname(cp));
if (!valid_domain(host, 0, NULL))
goto out;
if (tmp != NULL && *tmp != '\0') {
if (ch == ':') {
/* Convert and verify port. */
if ((cp = strchr(tmp, '/')) != NULL)
*cp = '\0';
if ((port = a2port(tmp)) <= 0)
goto out;
tmp = cp ? cp + 1 : NULL;
}
if (tmp != NULL && *tmp != '\0') {
/* Extract optional path */
if ((path = urldecode(tmp)) == NULL)
goto out;
}
}
/* Success */
if (userp != NULL) {
*userp = user;
user = NULL;
}
if (hostp != NULL) {
*hostp = host;
host = NULL;
}
if (portp != NULL)
*portp = port;
if (pathp != NULL) {
*pathp = path;
path = NULL;
}
ret = 0;
out:
free(uridup);
free(user);
free(host);
free(path);
return ret;
}
/* function to assist building execv() arguments */
void
addargs(arglist *args, char *fmt, ...)
{
va_list ap;
char *cp;
u_int nalloc;
int r;
va_start(ap, fmt);
r = vasprintf(&cp, fmt, ap);
va_end(ap);
if (r == -1)
fatal("addargs: argument too long");
nalloc = args->nalloc;
if (args->list == NULL) {
nalloc = 32;
args->num = 0;
} else if (args->num+2 >= nalloc)
nalloc *= 2;
args->list = xrecallocarray(args->list, args->nalloc, nalloc, sizeof(char *));
args->nalloc = nalloc;
args->list[args->num++] = cp;
args->list[args->num] = NULL;
}
void
replacearg(arglist *args, u_int which, char *fmt, ...)
{
va_list ap;
char *cp;
int r;
va_start(ap, fmt);
r = vasprintf(&cp, fmt, ap);
va_end(ap);
if (r == -1)
fatal("replacearg: argument too long");
if (which >= args->num)
fatal("replacearg: tried to replace invalid arg %d >= %d",
which, args->num);
free(args->list[which]);
args->list[which] = cp;
}
void
freeargs(arglist *args)
{
u_int i;
if (args->list != NULL) {
for (i = 0; i < args->num; i++)
free(args->list[i]);
free(args->list);
args->nalloc = args->num = 0;
args->list = NULL;
}
}
/*
* Expands tildes in the file name. Returns data allocated by xmalloc.
* Warning: this calls getpw*.
*/
char *
tilde_expand_filename(const char *filename, uid_t uid)
{
const char *path, *sep;
char user[128], *ret;
struct passwd *pw;
u_int len, slash;
if (*filename != '~')
return (xstrdup(filename));
filename++;
path = strchr(filename, '/');
if (path != NULL && path > filename) { /* ~user/path */
slash = path - filename;
if (slash > sizeof(user) - 1)
fatal("tilde_expand_filename: ~username too long");
memcpy(user, filename, slash);
user[slash] = '\0';
if ((pw = getpwnam(user)) == NULL)
fatal("tilde_expand_filename: No such user %s", user);
} else if ((pw = getpwuid(uid)) == NULL) /* ~/path */
fatal("tilde_expand_filename: No such uid %ld", (long)uid);
/* Make sure directory has a trailing '/' */
len = strlen(pw->pw_dir);
if (len == 0 || pw->pw_dir[len - 1] != '/')
sep = "/";
else
sep = "";
/* Skip leading '/' from specified path */
if (path != NULL)
filename = path + 1;
if (xasprintf(&ret, "%s%s%s", pw->pw_dir, sep, filename) >= PATH_MAX)
fatal("tilde_expand_filename: Path too long");
return (ret);
}
/*
* Expand a string with a set of %[char] escapes. A number of escapes may be
* specified as (char *escape_chars, char *replacement) pairs. The list must
* be terminated by a NULL escape_char. Returns replaced string in memory
* allocated by xmalloc.
*/
char *
percent_expand(const char *string, ...)
{
#define EXPAND_MAX_KEYS 16
u_int num_keys, i;
struct {
const char *key;
const char *repl;
} keys[EXPAND_MAX_KEYS];
struct sshbuf *buf;
va_list ap;
int r;
char *ret;
if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
/* Gather keys */
va_start(ap, string);
for (num_keys = 0; num_keys < EXPAND_MAX_KEYS; num_keys++) {
keys[num_keys].key = va_arg(ap, char *);
if (keys[num_keys].key == NULL)
break;
keys[num_keys].repl = va_arg(ap, char *);
if (keys[num_keys].repl == NULL)
fatal("%s: NULL replacement", __func__);
}
if (num_keys == EXPAND_MAX_KEYS && va_arg(ap, char *) != NULL)
fatal("%s: too many keys", __func__);
va_end(ap);
/* Expand string */
for (i = 0; *string != '\0'; string++) {
if (*string != '%') {
append:
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf, *string)) != 0) {
fatal("%s: sshbuf_put_u8: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
}
continue;
}
string++;
/* %% case */
if (*string == '%')
goto append;
if (*string == '\0')
fatal("%s: invalid format", __func__);
for (i = 0; i < num_keys; i++) {
if (strchr(keys[i].key, *string) != NULL) {
if ((r = sshbuf_put(buf, keys[i].repl,
strlen(keys[i].repl))) != 0) {
fatal("%s: sshbuf_put: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
}
break;
}
}
if (i >= num_keys)
fatal("%s: unknown key %%%c", __func__, *string);
}
if ((ret = sshbuf_dup_string(buf)) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_dup_string failed", __func__);
sshbuf_free(buf);
return ret;
#undef EXPAND_MAX_KEYS
}
int
tun_open(int tun, int mode, char **ifname)
{
#if defined(CUSTOM_SYS_TUN_OPEN)
return (sys_tun_open(tun, mode, ifname));
#elif defined(SSH_TUN_OPENBSD)
struct ifreq ifr;
char name[100];
int fd = -1, sock;
const char *tunbase = "tun";
if (ifname != NULL)
*ifname = NULL;
if (mode == SSH_TUNMODE_ETHERNET)
tunbase = "tap";
/* Open the tunnel device */
if (tun <= SSH_TUNID_MAX) {
snprintf(name, sizeof(name), "/dev/%s%d", tunbase, tun);
fd = open(name, O_RDWR);
} else if (tun == SSH_TUNID_ANY) {
for (tun = 100; tun >= 0; tun--) {
snprintf(name, sizeof(name), "/dev/%s%d",
tunbase, tun);
if ((fd = open(name, O_RDWR)) >= 0)
break;
}
} else {
debug("%s: invalid tunnel %u", __func__, tun);
return -1;
}
if (fd == -1) {
debug("%s: %s open: %s", __func__, name, strerror(errno));
return -1;
}
debug("%s: %s mode %d fd %d", __func__, name, mode, fd);
/* Bring interface up if it is not already */
snprintf(ifr.ifr_name, sizeof(ifr.ifr_name), "%s%d", tunbase, tun);
if ((sock = socket(PF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0)) == -1)
goto failed;
if (ioctl(sock, SIOCGIFFLAGS, &ifr) == -1) {
debug("%s: get interface %s flags: %s", __func__,
ifr.ifr_name, strerror(errno));
goto failed;
}
if (!(ifr.ifr_flags & IFF_UP)) {
ifr.ifr_flags |= IFF_UP;
if (ioctl(sock, SIOCSIFFLAGS, &ifr) == -1) {
debug("%s: activate interface %s: %s", __func__,
ifr.ifr_name, strerror(errno));
goto failed;
}
}
if (ifname != NULL)
*ifname = xstrdup(ifr.ifr_name);
close(sock);
return fd;
failed:
if (fd >= 0)
close(fd);
if (sock >= 0)
close(sock);
return -1;
#else
error("Tunnel interfaces are not supported on this platform");
return (-1);
#endif
}
void
sanitise_stdfd(void)
{
int nullfd, dupfd;
if ((nullfd = dupfd = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDWR)) == -1) {
fprintf(stderr, "Couldn't open /dev/null: %s\n",
strerror(errno));
exit(1);
}
while (++dupfd <= STDERR_FILENO) {
/* Only populate closed fds. */
if (fcntl(dupfd, F_GETFL) == -1 && errno == EBADF) {
if (dup2(nullfd, dupfd) == -1) {
fprintf(stderr, "dup2: %s\n", strerror(errno));
exit(1);
}
}
}
if (nullfd > STDERR_FILENO)
close(nullfd);
}
char *
tohex(const void *vp, size_t l)
{
const u_char *p = (const u_char *)vp;
char b[3], *r;
size_t i, hl;
if (l > 65536)
return xstrdup("tohex: length > 65536");
hl = l * 2 + 1;
r = xcalloc(1, hl);
for (i = 0; i < l; i++) {
snprintf(b, sizeof(b), "%02x", p[i]);
strlcat(r, b, hl);
}
return (r);
}
+/*
+ * Extend string *sp by the specified format. If *sp is not NULL (or empty),
+ * then the separator 'sep' will be prepended before the formatted arguments.
+ * Extended strings are heap allocated.
+ */
+void
+xextendf(char **sp, const char *sep, const char *fmt, ...)
+{
+ va_list ap;
+ char *tmp1, *tmp2;
+
+ va_start(ap, fmt);
+ xvasprintf(&tmp1, fmt, ap);
+ va_end(ap);
+
+ if (*sp == NULL || **sp == '\0') {
+ free(*sp);
+ *sp = tmp1;
+ return;
+ }
+ xasprintf(&tmp2, "%s%s%s", *sp, sep == NULL ? "" : sep, tmp1);
+ free(tmp1);
+ free(*sp);
+ *sp = tmp2;
+}
+
+
u_int64_t
get_u64(const void *vp)
{
const u_char *p = (const u_char *)vp;
u_int64_t v;
v = (u_int64_t)p[0] << 56;
v |= (u_int64_t)p[1] << 48;
v |= (u_int64_t)p[2] << 40;
v |= (u_int64_t)p[3] << 32;
v |= (u_int64_t)p[4] << 24;
v |= (u_int64_t)p[5] << 16;
v |= (u_int64_t)p[6] << 8;
v |= (u_int64_t)p[7];
return (v);
}
u_int32_t
get_u32(const void *vp)
{
const u_char *p = (const u_char *)vp;
u_int32_t v;
v = (u_int32_t)p[0] << 24;
v |= (u_int32_t)p[1] << 16;
v |= (u_int32_t)p[2] << 8;
v |= (u_int32_t)p[3];
return (v);
}
u_int32_t
get_u32_le(const void *vp)
{
const u_char *p = (const u_char *)vp;
u_int32_t v;
v = (u_int32_t)p[0];
v |= (u_int32_t)p[1] << 8;
v |= (u_int32_t)p[2] << 16;
v |= (u_int32_t)p[3] << 24;
return (v);
}
u_int16_t
get_u16(const void *vp)
{
const u_char *p = (const u_char *)vp;
u_int16_t v;
v = (u_int16_t)p[0] << 8;
v |= (u_int16_t)p[1];
return (v);
}
void
put_u64(void *vp, u_int64_t v)
{
u_char *p = (u_char *)vp;
p[0] = (u_char)(v >> 56) & 0xff;
p[1] = (u_char)(v >> 48) & 0xff;
p[2] = (u_char)(v >> 40) & 0xff;
p[3] = (u_char)(v >> 32) & 0xff;
p[4] = (u_char)(v >> 24) & 0xff;
p[5] = (u_char)(v >> 16) & 0xff;
p[6] = (u_char)(v >> 8) & 0xff;
p[7] = (u_char)v & 0xff;
}
void
put_u32(void *vp, u_int32_t v)
{
u_char *p = (u_char *)vp;
p[0] = (u_char)(v >> 24) & 0xff;
p[1] = (u_char)(v >> 16) & 0xff;
p[2] = (u_char)(v >> 8) & 0xff;
p[3] = (u_char)v & 0xff;
}
void
put_u32_le(void *vp, u_int32_t v)
{
u_char *p = (u_char *)vp;
p[0] = (u_char)v & 0xff;
p[1] = (u_char)(v >> 8) & 0xff;
p[2] = (u_char)(v >> 16) & 0xff;
p[3] = (u_char)(v >> 24) & 0xff;
}
void
put_u16(void *vp, u_int16_t v)
{
u_char *p = (u_char *)vp;
p[0] = (u_char)(v >> 8) & 0xff;
p[1] = (u_char)v & 0xff;
}
void
ms_subtract_diff(struct timeval *start, int *ms)
{
struct timeval diff, finish;
monotime_tv(&finish);
timersub(&finish, start, &diff);
*ms -= (diff.tv_sec * 1000) + (diff.tv_usec / 1000);
}
void
ms_to_timeval(struct timeval *tv, int ms)
{
if (ms < 0)
ms = 0;
tv->tv_sec = ms / 1000;
tv->tv_usec = (ms % 1000) * 1000;
}
void
monotime_ts(struct timespec *ts)
{
struct timeval tv;
#if defined(HAVE_CLOCK_GETTIME) && (defined(CLOCK_BOOTTIME) || \
defined(CLOCK_MONOTONIC) || defined(CLOCK_REALTIME))
static int gettime_failed = 0;
if (!gettime_failed) {
# ifdef CLOCK_BOOTTIME
if (clock_gettime(CLOCK_BOOTTIME, ts) == 0)
return;
# endif /* CLOCK_BOOTTIME */
# ifdef CLOCK_MONOTONIC
if (clock_gettime(CLOCK_MONOTONIC, ts) == 0)
return;
# endif /* CLOCK_MONOTONIC */
# ifdef CLOCK_REALTIME
/* Not monotonic, but we're almost out of options here. */
if (clock_gettime(CLOCK_REALTIME, ts) == 0)
return;
# endif /* CLOCK_REALTIME */
debug3("clock_gettime: %s", strerror(errno));
gettime_failed = 1;
}
#endif /* HAVE_CLOCK_GETTIME && (BOOTTIME || MONOTONIC || REALTIME) */
gettimeofday(&tv, NULL);
ts->tv_sec = tv.tv_sec;
ts->tv_nsec = (long)tv.tv_usec * 1000;
}
void
monotime_tv(struct timeval *tv)
{
struct timespec ts;
monotime_ts(&ts);
tv->tv_sec = ts.tv_sec;
tv->tv_usec = ts.tv_nsec / 1000;
}
time_t
monotime(void)
{
struct timespec ts;
monotime_ts(&ts);
return ts.tv_sec;
}
double
monotime_double(void)
{
struct timespec ts;
monotime_ts(&ts);
return ts.tv_sec + ((double)ts.tv_nsec / 1000000000);
}
void
bandwidth_limit_init(struct bwlimit *bw, u_int64_t kbps, size_t buflen)
{
bw->buflen = buflen;
bw->rate = kbps;
bw->thresh = buflen;
bw->lamt = 0;
timerclear(&bw->bwstart);
timerclear(&bw->bwend);
}
/* Callback from read/write loop to insert bandwidth-limiting delays */
void
bandwidth_limit(struct bwlimit *bw, size_t read_len)
{
u_int64_t waitlen;
struct timespec ts, rm;
bw->lamt += read_len;
if (!timerisset(&bw->bwstart)) {
monotime_tv(&bw->bwstart);
return;
}
if (bw->lamt < bw->thresh)
return;
monotime_tv(&bw->bwend);
timersub(&bw->bwend, &bw->bwstart, &bw->bwend);
if (!timerisset(&bw->bwend))
return;
bw->lamt *= 8;
waitlen = (double)1000000L * bw->lamt / bw->rate;
bw->bwstart.tv_sec = waitlen / 1000000L;
bw->bwstart.tv_usec = waitlen % 1000000L;
if (timercmp(&bw->bwstart, &bw->bwend, >)) {
timersub(&bw->bwstart, &bw->bwend, &bw->bwend);
/* Adjust the wait time */
if (bw->bwend.tv_sec) {
bw->thresh /= 2;
if (bw->thresh < bw->buflen / 4)
bw->thresh = bw->buflen / 4;
} else if (bw->bwend.tv_usec < 10000) {
bw->thresh *= 2;
if (bw->thresh > bw->buflen * 8)
bw->thresh = bw->buflen * 8;
}
TIMEVAL_TO_TIMESPEC(&bw->bwend, &ts);
while (nanosleep(&ts, &rm) == -1) {
if (errno != EINTR)
break;
ts = rm;
}
}
bw->lamt = 0;
monotime_tv(&bw->bwstart);
}
/* Make a template filename for mk[sd]temp() */
void
mktemp_proto(char *s, size_t len)
{
const char *tmpdir;
int r;
if ((tmpdir = getenv("TMPDIR")) != NULL) {
r = snprintf(s, len, "%s/ssh-XXXXXXXXXXXX", tmpdir);
if (r > 0 && (size_t)r < len)
return;
}
r = snprintf(s, len, "/tmp/ssh-XXXXXXXXXXXX");
if (r < 0 || (size_t)r >= len)
fatal("%s: template string too short", __func__);
}
static const struct {
const char *name;
int value;
} ipqos[] = {
{ "none", INT_MAX }, /* can't use 0 here; that's CS0 */
{ "af11", IPTOS_DSCP_AF11 },
{ "af12", IPTOS_DSCP_AF12 },
{ "af13", IPTOS_DSCP_AF13 },
{ "af21", IPTOS_DSCP_AF21 },
{ "af22", IPTOS_DSCP_AF22 },
{ "af23", IPTOS_DSCP_AF23 },
{ "af31", IPTOS_DSCP_AF31 },
{ "af32", IPTOS_DSCP_AF32 },
{ "af33", IPTOS_DSCP_AF33 },
{ "af41", IPTOS_DSCP_AF41 },
{ "af42", IPTOS_DSCP_AF42 },
{ "af43", IPTOS_DSCP_AF43 },
{ "cs0", IPTOS_DSCP_CS0 },
{ "cs1", IPTOS_DSCP_CS1 },
{ "cs2", IPTOS_DSCP_CS2 },
{ "cs3", IPTOS_DSCP_CS3 },
{ "cs4", IPTOS_DSCP_CS4 },
{ "cs5", IPTOS_DSCP_CS5 },
{ "cs6", IPTOS_DSCP_CS6 },
{ "cs7", IPTOS_DSCP_CS7 },
{ "ef", IPTOS_DSCP_EF },
+ { "le", IPTOS_DSCP_LE },
{ "lowdelay", IPTOS_LOWDELAY },
{ "throughput", IPTOS_THROUGHPUT },
{ "reliability", IPTOS_RELIABILITY },
{ NULL, -1 }
};
int
parse_ipqos(const char *cp)
{
u_int i;
char *ep;
long val;
if (cp == NULL)
return -1;
for (i = 0; ipqos[i].name != NULL; i++) {
if (strcasecmp(cp, ipqos[i].name) == 0)
return ipqos[i].value;
}
/* Try parsing as an integer */
val = strtol(cp, &ep, 0);
if (*cp == '\0' || *ep != '\0' || val < 0 || val > 255)
return -1;
return val;
}
const char *
iptos2str(int iptos)
{
int i;
static char iptos_str[sizeof "0xff"];
for (i = 0; ipqos[i].name != NULL; i++) {
if (ipqos[i].value == iptos)
return ipqos[i].name;
}
snprintf(iptos_str, sizeof iptos_str, "0x%02x", iptos);
return iptos_str;
}
void
lowercase(char *s)
{
for (; *s; s++)
*s = tolower((u_char)*s);
}
int
unix_listener(const char *path, int backlog, int unlink_first)
{
struct sockaddr_un sunaddr;
int saved_errno, sock;
memset(&sunaddr, 0, sizeof(sunaddr));
sunaddr.sun_family = AF_UNIX;
if (strlcpy(sunaddr.sun_path, path,
sizeof(sunaddr.sun_path)) >= sizeof(sunaddr.sun_path)) {
error("%s: path \"%s\" too long for Unix domain socket",
__func__, path);
errno = ENAMETOOLONG;
return -1;
}
sock = socket(PF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
if (sock == -1) {
saved_errno = errno;
error("%s: socket: %.100s", __func__, strerror(errno));
errno = saved_errno;
return -1;
}
if (unlink_first == 1) {
if (unlink(path) != 0 && errno != ENOENT)
error("unlink(%s): %.100s", path, strerror(errno));
}
if (bind(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&sunaddr, sizeof(sunaddr)) == -1) {
saved_errno = errno;
error("%s: cannot bind to path %s: %s",
__func__, path, strerror(errno));
close(sock);
errno = saved_errno;
return -1;
}
if (listen(sock, backlog) == -1) {
saved_errno = errno;
error("%s: cannot listen on path %s: %s",
__func__, path, strerror(errno));
close(sock);
unlink(path);
errno = saved_errno;
return -1;
}
return sock;
}
void
sock_set_v6only(int s)
{
#if defined(IPV6_V6ONLY) && !defined(__OpenBSD__)
int on = 1;
debug3("%s: set socket %d IPV6_V6ONLY", __func__, s);
if (setsockopt(s, IPPROTO_IPV6, IPV6_V6ONLY, &on, sizeof(on)) == -1)
error("setsockopt IPV6_V6ONLY: %s", strerror(errno));
#endif
}
/*
* Compares two strings that maybe be NULL. Returns non-zero if strings
* are both NULL or are identical, returns zero otherwise.
*/
static int
strcmp_maybe_null(const char *a, const char *b)
{
if ((a == NULL && b != NULL) || (a != NULL && b == NULL))
return 0;
if (a != NULL && strcmp(a, b) != 0)
return 0;
return 1;
}
/*
* Compare two forwards, returning non-zero if they are identical or
* zero otherwise.
*/
int
forward_equals(const struct Forward *a, const struct Forward *b)
{
if (strcmp_maybe_null(a->listen_host, b->listen_host) == 0)
return 0;
if (a->listen_port != b->listen_port)
return 0;
if (strcmp_maybe_null(a->listen_path, b->listen_path) == 0)
return 0;
if (strcmp_maybe_null(a->connect_host, b->connect_host) == 0)
return 0;
if (a->connect_port != b->connect_port)
return 0;
if (strcmp_maybe_null(a->connect_path, b->connect_path) == 0)
return 0;
/* allocated_port and handle are not checked */
return 1;
}
/* returns 1 if process is already daemonized, 0 otherwise */
int
daemonized(void)
{
int fd;
if ((fd = open(_PATH_TTY, O_RDONLY | O_NOCTTY)) >= 0) {
close(fd);
return 0; /* have controlling terminal */
}
if (getppid() != 1)
return 0; /* parent is not init */
if (getsid(0) != getpid())
return 0; /* not session leader */
debug3("already daemonized");
return 1;
}
/*
* Splits 's' into an argument vector. Handles quoted string and basic
* escape characters (\\, \", \'). Caller must free the argument vector
* and its members.
*/
int
argv_split(const char *s, int *argcp, char ***argvp)
{
int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
int argc = 0, quote, i, j;
char *arg, **argv = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*argv));
*argvp = NULL;
*argcp = 0;
for (i = 0; s[i] != '\0'; i++) {
/* Skip leading whitespace */
if (s[i] == ' ' || s[i] == '\t')
continue;
/* Start of a token */
quote = 0;
if (s[i] == '\\' &&
(s[i + 1] == '\'' || s[i + 1] == '\"' || s[i + 1] == '\\'))
i++;
else if (s[i] == '\'' || s[i] == '"')
quote = s[i++];
argv = xreallocarray(argv, (argc + 2), sizeof(*argv));
arg = argv[argc++] = xcalloc(1, strlen(s + i) + 1);
argv[argc] = NULL;
/* Copy the token in, removing escapes */
for (j = 0; s[i] != '\0'; i++) {
if (s[i] == '\\') {
if (s[i + 1] == '\'' ||
s[i + 1] == '\"' ||
s[i + 1] == '\\') {
i++; /* Skip '\' */
arg[j++] = s[i];
} else {
/* Unrecognised escape */
arg[j++] = s[i];
}
} else if (quote == 0 && (s[i] == ' ' || s[i] == '\t'))
break; /* done */
else if (quote != 0 && s[i] == quote)
break; /* done */
else
arg[j++] = s[i];
}
if (s[i] == '\0') {
if (quote != 0) {
/* Ran out of string looking for close quote */
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
break;
}
}
/* Success */
*argcp = argc;
*argvp = argv;
argc = 0;
argv = NULL;
r = 0;
out:
if (argc != 0 && argv != NULL) {
for (i = 0; i < argc; i++)
free(argv[i]);
free(argv);
}
return r;
}
/*
* Reassemble an argument vector into a string, quoting and escaping as
* necessary. Caller must free returned string.
*/
char *
argv_assemble(int argc, char **argv)
{
int i, j, ws, r;
char c, *ret;
struct sshbuf *buf, *arg;
if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL || (arg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
for (i = 0; i < argc; i++) {
ws = 0;
sshbuf_reset(arg);
for (j = 0; argv[i][j] != '\0'; j++) {
r = 0;
c = argv[i][j];
switch (c) {
case ' ':
case '\t':
ws = 1;
r = sshbuf_put_u8(arg, c);
break;
case '\\':
case '\'':
case '"':
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(arg, '\\')) != 0)
break;
/* FALLTHROUGH */
default:
r = sshbuf_put_u8(arg, c);
break;
}
if (r != 0)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_put_u8: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
}
if ((i != 0 && (r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf, ' ')) != 0) ||
(ws != 0 && (r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf, '"')) != 0) ||
(r = sshbuf_putb(buf, arg)) != 0 ||
(ws != 0 && (r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf, '"')) != 0))
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
}
if ((ret = malloc(sshbuf_len(buf) + 1)) == NULL)
fatal("%s: malloc failed", __func__);
memcpy(ret, sshbuf_ptr(buf), sshbuf_len(buf));
ret[sshbuf_len(buf)] = '\0';
sshbuf_free(buf);
sshbuf_free(arg);
return ret;
}
/* Returns 0 if pid exited cleanly, non-zero otherwise */
int
exited_cleanly(pid_t pid, const char *tag, const char *cmd, int quiet)
{
int status;
while (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) == -1) {
if (errno != EINTR) {
error("%s: waitpid: %s", tag, strerror(errno));
return -1;
}
}
if (WIFSIGNALED(status)) {
error("%s %s exited on signal %d", tag, cmd, WTERMSIG(status));
return -1;
} else if (WEXITSTATUS(status) != 0) {
do_log2(quiet ? SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1 : SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO,
"%s %s failed, status %d", tag, cmd, WEXITSTATUS(status));
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
/*
* Check a given path for security. This is defined as all components
* of the path to the file must be owned by either the owner of
* of the file or root and no directories must be group or world writable.
*
* XXX Should any specific check be done for sym links ?
*
* Takes a file name, its stat information (preferably from fstat() to
* avoid races), the uid of the expected owner, their home directory and an
* error buffer plus max size as arguments.
*
* Returns 0 on success and -1 on failure
*/
int
safe_path(const char *name, struct stat *stp, const char *pw_dir,
uid_t uid, char *err, size_t errlen)
{
char buf[PATH_MAX], homedir[PATH_MAX];
char *cp;
int comparehome = 0;
struct stat st;
if (realpath(name, buf) == NULL) {
snprintf(err, errlen, "realpath %s failed: %s", name,
strerror(errno));
return -1;
}
if (pw_dir != NULL && realpath(pw_dir, homedir) != NULL)
comparehome = 1;
if (!S_ISREG(stp->st_mode)) {
snprintf(err, errlen, "%s is not a regular file", buf);
return -1;
}
if ((!platform_sys_dir_uid(stp->st_uid) && stp->st_uid != uid) ||
(stp->st_mode & 022) != 0) {
snprintf(err, errlen, "bad ownership or modes for file %s",
buf);
return -1;
}
/* for each component of the canonical path, walking upwards */
for (;;) {
if ((cp = dirname(buf)) == NULL) {
snprintf(err, errlen, "dirname() failed");
return -1;
}
strlcpy(buf, cp, sizeof(buf));
if (stat(buf, &st) == -1 ||
(!platform_sys_dir_uid(st.st_uid) && st.st_uid != uid) ||
(st.st_mode & 022) != 0) {
snprintf(err, errlen,
"bad ownership or modes for directory %s", buf);
return -1;
}
/* If are past the homedir then we can stop */
if (comparehome && strcmp(homedir, buf) == 0)
break;
/*
* dirname should always complete with a "/" path,
* but we can be paranoid and check for "." too
*/
if ((strcmp("/", buf) == 0) || (strcmp(".", buf) == 0))
break;
}
return 0;
}
/*
* Version of safe_path() that accepts an open file descriptor to
* avoid races.
*
* Returns 0 on success and -1 on failure
*/
int
safe_path_fd(int fd, const char *file, struct passwd *pw,
char *err, size_t errlen)
{
struct stat st;
/* check the open file to avoid races */
if (fstat(fd, &st) == -1) {
snprintf(err, errlen, "cannot stat file %s: %s",
file, strerror(errno));
return -1;
}
return safe_path(file, &st, pw->pw_dir, pw->pw_uid, err, errlen);
}
/*
* Sets the value of the given variable in the environment. If the variable
* already exists, its value is overridden.
*/
void
child_set_env(char ***envp, u_int *envsizep, const char *name,
const char *value)
{
char **env;
u_int envsize;
u_int i, namelen;
if (strchr(name, '=') != NULL) {
error("Invalid environment variable \"%.100s\"", name);
return;
}
/*
* If we're passed an uninitialized list, allocate a single null
* entry before continuing.
*/
if (*envp == NULL && *envsizep == 0) {
*envp = xmalloc(sizeof(char *));
*envp[0] = NULL;
*envsizep = 1;
}
/*
* Find the slot where the value should be stored. If the variable
* already exists, we reuse the slot; otherwise we append a new slot
* at the end of the array, expanding if necessary.
*/
env = *envp;
namelen = strlen(name);
for (i = 0; env[i]; i++)
if (strncmp(env[i], name, namelen) == 0 && env[i][namelen] == '=')
break;
if (env[i]) {
/* Reuse the slot. */
free(env[i]);
} else {
/* New variable. Expand if necessary. */
envsize = *envsizep;
if (i >= envsize - 1) {
if (envsize >= 1000)
fatal("child_set_env: too many env vars");
envsize += 50;
env = (*envp) = xreallocarray(env, envsize, sizeof(char *));
*envsizep = envsize;
}
/* Need to set the NULL pointer at end of array beyond the new slot. */
env[i + 1] = NULL;
}
/* Allocate space and format the variable in the appropriate slot. */
/* XXX xasprintf */
env[i] = xmalloc(strlen(name) + 1 + strlen(value) + 1);
snprintf(env[i], strlen(name) + 1 + strlen(value) + 1, "%s=%s", name, value);
}
/*
* Check and optionally lowercase a domain name, also removes trailing '.'
* Returns 1 on success and 0 on failure, storing an error message in errstr.
*/
int
valid_domain(char *name, int makelower, const char **errstr)
{
size_t i, l = strlen(name);
u_char c, last = '\0';
static char errbuf[256];
if (l == 0) {
strlcpy(errbuf, "empty domain name", sizeof(errbuf));
goto bad;
}
if (!isalpha((u_char)name[0]) && !isdigit((u_char)name[0])) {
snprintf(errbuf, sizeof(errbuf), "domain name \"%.100s\" "
"starts with invalid character", name);
goto bad;
}
for (i = 0; i < l; i++) {
c = tolower((u_char)name[i]);
if (makelower)
name[i] = (char)c;
if (last == '.' && c == '.') {
snprintf(errbuf, sizeof(errbuf), "domain name "
"\"%.100s\" contains consecutive separators", name);
goto bad;
}
if (c != '.' && c != '-' && !isalnum(c) &&
c != '_') /* technically invalid, but common */ {
snprintf(errbuf, sizeof(errbuf), "domain name "
"\"%.100s\" contains invalid characters", name);
goto bad;
}
last = c;
}
if (name[l - 1] == '.')
name[l - 1] = '\0';
if (errstr != NULL)
*errstr = NULL;
return 1;
bad:
if (errstr != NULL)
*errstr = errbuf;
return 0;
}
/*
* Verify that a environment variable name (not including initial '$') is
* valid; consisting of one or more alphanumeric or underscore characters only.
* Returns 1 on valid, 0 otherwise.
*/
int
valid_env_name(const char *name)
{
const char *cp;
if (name[0] == '\0')
return 0;
for (cp = name; *cp != '\0'; cp++) {
if (!isalnum((u_char)*cp) && *cp != '_')
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
const char *
atoi_err(const char *nptr, int *val)
{
const char *errstr = NULL;
long long num;
if (nptr == NULL || *nptr == '\0')
return "missing";
num = strtonum(nptr, 0, INT_MAX, &errstr);
if (errstr == NULL)
*val = (int)num;
return errstr;
}
int
parse_absolute_time(const char *s, uint64_t *tp)
{
struct tm tm;
time_t tt;
char buf[32], *fmt;
*tp = 0;
/*
* POSIX strptime says "The application shall ensure that there
* is white-space or other non-alphanumeric characters between
* any two conversion specifications" so arrange things this way.
*/
switch (strlen(s)) {
case 8: /* YYYYMMDD */
fmt = "%Y-%m-%d";
snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%.4s-%.2s-%.2s", s, s + 4, s + 6);
break;
case 12: /* YYYYMMDDHHMM */
fmt = "%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M";
snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%.4s-%.2s-%.2sT%.2s:%.2s",
s, s + 4, s + 6, s + 8, s + 10);
break;
case 14: /* YYYYMMDDHHMMSS */
fmt = "%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S";
snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%.4s-%.2s-%.2sT%.2s:%.2s:%.2s",
s, s + 4, s + 6, s + 8, s + 10, s + 12);
break;
default:
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
}
memset(&tm, 0, sizeof(tm));
if (strptime(buf, fmt, &tm) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
if ((tt = mktime(&tm)) < 0)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
/* success */
*tp = (uint64_t)tt;
return 0;
}
void
format_absolute_time(uint64_t t, char *buf, size_t len)
{
time_t tt = t > INT_MAX ? INT_MAX : t; /* XXX revisit in 2038 :P */
struct tm tm;
localtime_r(&tt, &tm);
strftime(buf, len, "%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S", &tm);
}
/* check if path is absolute */
int
path_absolute(const char *path)
{
return (*path == '/') ? 1 : 0;
}
void
skip_space(char **cpp)
{
char *cp;
for (cp = *cpp; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++)
;
*cpp = cp;
}
/* authorized_key-style options parsing helpers */
/*
* Match flag 'opt' in *optsp, and if allow_negate is set then also match
* 'no-opt'. Returns -1 if option not matched, 1 if option matches or 0
* if negated option matches.
* If the option or negated option matches, then *optsp is updated to
* point to the first character after the option.
*/
int
opt_flag(const char *opt, int allow_negate, const char **optsp)
{
size_t opt_len = strlen(opt);
const char *opts = *optsp;
int negate = 0;
if (allow_negate && strncasecmp(opts, "no-", 3) == 0) {
opts += 3;
negate = 1;
}
if (strncasecmp(opts, opt, opt_len) == 0) {
*optsp = opts + opt_len;
return negate ? 0 : 1;
}
return -1;
}
char *
opt_dequote(const char **sp, const char **errstrp)
{
const char *s = *sp;
char *ret;
size_t i;
*errstrp = NULL;
if (*s != '"') {
*errstrp = "missing start quote";
return NULL;
}
s++;
if ((ret = malloc(strlen((s)) + 1)) == NULL) {
*errstrp = "memory allocation failed";
return NULL;
}
for (i = 0; *s != '\0' && *s != '"';) {
if (s[0] == '\\' && s[1] == '"')
s++;
ret[i++] = *s++;
}
if (*s == '\0') {
*errstrp = "missing end quote";
free(ret);
return NULL;
}
ret[i] = '\0';
s++;
*sp = s;
return ret;
}
int
opt_match(const char **opts, const char *term)
{
if (strncasecmp((*opts), term, strlen(term)) == 0 &&
(*opts)[strlen(term)] == '=') {
*opts += strlen(term) + 1;
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
+sshsig_t
+ssh_signal(int signum, sshsig_t handler)
+{
+ struct sigaction sa, osa;
+
+ /* mask all other signals while in handler */
+ bzero(&sa, sizeof(sa));
+ sa.sa_handler = handler;
+ sigfillset(&sa.sa_mask);
+ if (signum != SIGALRM)
+ sa.sa_flags = SA_RESTART;
+ if (sigaction(signum, &sa, &osa) == -1) {
+ debug3("sigaction(%s): %s", strsignal(signum), strerror(errno));
+ return SIG_ERR;
+ }
+ return osa.sa_handler;
+}
diff --git a/misc.h b/misc.h
index bcc34f980424..4a05db2da482 100644
--- a/misc.h
+++ b/misc.h
@@ -1,188 +1,197 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: misc.h,v 1.81 2019/09/03 08:32:11 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: misc.h,v 1.84 2020/01/24 23:54:40 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
* All rights reserved
*
* As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
* can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
* software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
* incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
* called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
*/
#ifndef _MISC_H
#define _MISC_H
#include <sys/time.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
/* Data structure for representing a forwarding request. */
struct Forward {
char *listen_host; /* Host (address) to listen on. */
int listen_port; /* Port to forward. */
char *listen_path; /* Path to bind domain socket. */
char *connect_host; /* Host to connect. */
int connect_port; /* Port to connect on connect_host. */
char *connect_path; /* Path to connect domain socket. */
int allocated_port; /* Dynamically allocated listen port */
int handle; /* Handle for dynamic listen ports */
};
int forward_equals(const struct Forward *, const struct Forward *);
int daemonized(void);
/* Common server and client forwarding options. */
struct ForwardOptions {
int gateway_ports; /* Allow remote connects to forwarded ports. */
mode_t streamlocal_bind_mask; /* umask for streamlocal binds */
int streamlocal_bind_unlink; /* unlink socket before bind */
};
/* misc.c */
char *chop(char *);
void skip_space(char **);
char *strdelim(char **);
char *strdelimw(char **);
int set_nonblock(int);
int unset_nonblock(int);
void set_nodelay(int);
int set_reuseaddr(int);
char *get_rdomain(int);
int set_rdomain(int, const char *);
int waitrfd(int, int *);
int timeout_connect(int, const struct sockaddr *, socklen_t, int *);
int a2port(const char *);
int a2tun(const char *, int *);
char *put_host_port(const char *, u_short);
char *hpdelim2(char **, char *);
char *hpdelim(char **);
char *cleanhostname(char *);
char *colon(char *);
int parse_user_host_path(const char *, char **, char **, char **);
int parse_user_host_port(const char *, char **, char **, int *);
int parse_uri(const char *, const char *, char **, char **, int *, char **);
long convtime(const char *);
char *tilde_expand_filename(const char *, uid_t);
char *percent_expand(const char *, ...) __attribute__((__sentinel__));
char *tohex(const void *, size_t);
+void xextendf(char **s, const char *sep, const char *fmt, ...)
+ __attribute__((__format__ (printf, 3, 4))) __attribute__((__nonnull__ (3)));
void sanitise_stdfd(void);
void ms_subtract_diff(struct timeval *, int *);
void ms_to_timeval(struct timeval *, int);
void monotime_ts(struct timespec *);
void monotime_tv(struct timeval *);
time_t monotime(void);
double monotime_double(void);
void lowercase(char *s);
int unix_listener(const char *, int, int);
int valid_domain(char *, int, const char **);
int valid_env_name(const char *);
const char *atoi_err(const char *, int *);
int parse_absolute_time(const char *, uint64_t *);
void format_absolute_time(uint64_t, char *, size_t);
int path_absolute(const char *);
void sock_set_v6only(int);
struct passwd *pwcopy(struct passwd *);
const char *ssh_gai_strerror(int);
typedef struct arglist arglist;
struct arglist {
char **list;
u_int num;
u_int nalloc;
};
void addargs(arglist *, char *, ...)
__attribute__((format(printf, 2, 3)));
void replacearg(arglist *, u_int, char *, ...)
__attribute__((format(printf, 3, 4)));
void freeargs(arglist *);
int tun_open(int, int, char **);
/* Common definitions for ssh tunnel device forwarding */
#define SSH_TUNMODE_NO 0x00
#define SSH_TUNMODE_POINTOPOINT 0x01
#define SSH_TUNMODE_ETHERNET 0x02
#define SSH_TUNMODE_DEFAULT SSH_TUNMODE_POINTOPOINT
#define SSH_TUNMODE_YES (SSH_TUNMODE_POINTOPOINT|SSH_TUNMODE_ETHERNET)
#define SSH_TUNID_ANY 0x7fffffff
#define SSH_TUNID_ERR (SSH_TUNID_ANY - 1)
#define SSH_TUNID_MAX (SSH_TUNID_ANY - 2)
/* Fake port to indicate that host field is really a path. */
#define PORT_STREAMLOCAL -2
/* Functions to extract or store big-endian words of various sizes */
u_int64_t get_u64(const void *)
__attribute__((__bounded__( __minbytes__, 1, 8)));
u_int32_t get_u32(const void *)
__attribute__((__bounded__( __minbytes__, 1, 4)));
u_int16_t get_u16(const void *)
__attribute__((__bounded__( __minbytes__, 1, 2)));
void put_u64(void *, u_int64_t)
__attribute__((__bounded__( __minbytes__, 1, 8)));
void put_u32(void *, u_int32_t)
__attribute__((__bounded__( __minbytes__, 1, 4)));
void put_u16(void *, u_int16_t)
__attribute__((__bounded__( __minbytes__, 1, 2)));
/* Little-endian store/load, used by umac.c */
u_int32_t get_u32_le(const void *)
__attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__, 1, 4)));
void put_u32_le(void *, u_int32_t)
__attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__, 1, 4)));
struct bwlimit {
size_t buflen;
u_int64_t rate; /* desired rate in kbit/s */
u_int64_t thresh; /* threshold after which we'll check timers */
u_int64_t lamt; /* amount written in last timer interval */
struct timeval bwstart, bwend;
};
void bandwidth_limit_init(struct bwlimit *, u_int64_t, size_t);
void bandwidth_limit(struct bwlimit *, size_t);
int parse_ipqos(const char *);
const char *iptos2str(int);
void mktemp_proto(char *, size_t);
void child_set_env(char ***envp, u_int *envsizep, const char *name,
const char *value);
int argv_split(const char *, int *, char ***);
char *argv_assemble(int, char **argv);
int exited_cleanly(pid_t, const char *, const char *, int);
struct stat;
int safe_path(const char *, struct stat *, const char *, uid_t,
char *, size_t);
int safe_path_fd(int, const char *, struct passwd *,
char *err, size_t errlen);
/* authorized_key-style options parsing helpers */
int opt_flag(const char *opt, int allow_negate, const char **optsp);
char *opt_dequote(const char **sp, const char **errstrp);
int opt_match(const char **opts, const char *term);
/* readpass.c */
#define RP_ECHO 0x0001
#define RP_ALLOW_STDIN 0x0002
#define RP_ALLOW_EOF 0x0004
#define RP_USE_ASKPASS 0x0008
+struct notifier_ctx;
+
char *read_passphrase(const char *, int);
int ask_permission(const char *, ...) __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2)));
+struct notifier_ctx *notify_start(int, const char *, ...)
+ __attribute__((format(printf, 2, 3)));
+void notify_complete(struct notifier_ctx *);
#define MINIMUM(a, b) (((a) < (b)) ? (a) : (b))
#define MAXIMUM(a, b) (((a) > (b)) ? (a) : (b))
#define ROUNDUP(x, y) ((((x)+((y)-1))/(y))*(y))
+typedef void (*sshsig_t)(int);
+sshsig_t ssh_signal(int, sshsig_t);
#endif /* _MISC_H */
diff --git a/moduli b/moduli
index a6c13d8c2bcc..1e2cd34f24ff 100644
--- a/moduli
+++ b/moduli
@@ -1,452 +1,406 @@
-# $OpenBSD: moduli,v 1.24 2019/04/26 08:37:16 dtucker Exp $
+# $OpenBSD: moduli,v 1.25 2019/10/22 07:06:35 dtucker Exp $
# Time Type Tests Tries Size Generator Modulus
-20181031113618 2 6 100 2047 2 F13B549CC6FE8517551E48FAEBA8D93EAC29403838E22ED862927B8AC9A9ABBA96AB7E306F0A01B75C0E960AB9DEA0F8519BAA2F13E541E194604848CBC9DEC51165E7A45897104B4A9C54C7337270A8B1B7F53B9DC203744ED2C634889C879E713BEA519452AE800B390FFBABF40B992AF659947D3ED78AA04DDF51C84D7B0824978643683F2153C99F682E30A25683CE180948F62E2CC1EFA1513CB16E74117334356E4E365132BB37BA41B4B79F148F26842A61F12D42B149F3FAB0041CB7DF7F53742544FA4E956D314B140F49786E23A5446C1F5CD55CB59D845774C6D6EF1CE5B7426F351FE906C69D23720BCFC5E250DE2786ACEBEC823E1DE0BE8103
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diff --git a/moduli.c b/moduli.c
index 4f6f8da8dad5..8dd36b1cf231 100644
--- a/moduli.c
+++ b/moduli.c
@@ -1,817 +1,813 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: moduli.c,v 1.36 2019/10/04 03:26:58 dtucker Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: moduli.c,v 1.37 2019/11/15 06:00:20 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright 1994 Phil Karn <karn@qualcomm.com>
* Copyright 1996-1998, 2003 William Allen Simpson <wsimpson@greendragon.com>
* Copyright 2000 Niels Provos <provos@citi.umich.edu>
* All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
/*
* Two-step process to generate safe primes for DHGEX
*
* Sieve candidates for "safe" primes,
* suitable for use as Diffie-Hellman moduli;
* that is, where q = (p-1)/2 is also prime.
*
* First step: generate candidate primes (memory intensive)
* Second step: test primes' safety (processor intensive)
*/
#include "includes.h"
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <openssl/bn.h>
#include <openssl/dh.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <time.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <limits.h>
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "dh.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
/*
* File output defines
*/
/* need line long enough for largest moduli plus headers */
#define QLINESIZE (100+8192)
/*
* Size: decimal.
* Specifies the number of the most significant bit (0 to M).
* WARNING: internally, usually 1 to N.
*/
#define QSIZE_MINIMUM (511)
/*
* Prime sieving defines
*/
/* Constant: assuming 8 bit bytes and 32 bit words */
#define SHIFT_BIT (3)
#define SHIFT_BYTE (2)
#define SHIFT_WORD (SHIFT_BIT+SHIFT_BYTE)
#define SHIFT_MEGABYTE (20)
#define SHIFT_MEGAWORD (SHIFT_MEGABYTE-SHIFT_BYTE)
/*
* Using virtual memory can cause thrashing. This should be the largest
* number that is supported without a large amount of disk activity --
* that would increase the run time from hours to days or weeks!
*/
#define LARGE_MINIMUM (8UL) /* megabytes */
/*
* Do not increase this number beyond the unsigned integer bit size.
* Due to a multiple of 4, it must be LESS than 128 (yielding 2**30 bits).
*/
#define LARGE_MAXIMUM (127UL) /* megabytes */
/*
* Constant: when used with 32-bit integers, the largest sieve prime
* has to be less than 2**32.
*/
#define SMALL_MAXIMUM (0xffffffffUL)
/* Constant: can sieve all primes less than 2**32, as 65537**2 > 2**32-1. */
#define TINY_NUMBER (1UL<<16)
/* Ensure enough bit space for testing 2*q. */
#define TEST_MAXIMUM (1UL<<16)
#define TEST_MINIMUM (QSIZE_MINIMUM + 1)
/* real TEST_MINIMUM (1UL << (SHIFT_WORD - TEST_POWER)) */
#define TEST_POWER (3) /* 2**n, n < SHIFT_WORD */
/* bit operations on 32-bit words */
#define BIT_CLEAR(a,n) ((a)[(n)>>SHIFT_WORD] &= ~(1L << ((n) & 31)))
#define BIT_SET(a,n) ((a)[(n)>>SHIFT_WORD] |= (1L << ((n) & 31)))
#define BIT_TEST(a,n) ((a)[(n)>>SHIFT_WORD] & (1L << ((n) & 31)))
/*
* Prime testing defines
*/
/* Minimum number of primality tests to perform */
#define TRIAL_MINIMUM (4)
/*
* Sieving data (XXX - move to struct)
*/
/* sieve 2**16 */
static u_int32_t *TinySieve, tinybits;
/* sieve 2**30 in 2**16 parts */
static u_int32_t *SmallSieve, smallbits, smallbase;
/* sieve relative to the initial value */
static u_int32_t *LargeSieve, largewords, largetries, largenumbers;
static u_int32_t largebits, largememory; /* megabytes */
static BIGNUM *largebase;
int gen_candidates(FILE *, u_int32_t, u_int32_t, BIGNUM *);
int prime_test(FILE *, FILE *, u_int32_t, u_int32_t, char *, unsigned long,
unsigned long);
/*
* print moduli out in consistent form,
*/
static int
qfileout(FILE * ofile, u_int32_t otype, u_int32_t otests, u_int32_t otries,
u_int32_t osize, u_int32_t ogenerator, BIGNUM * omodulus)
{
struct tm *gtm;
time_t time_now;
int res;
time(&time_now);
gtm = gmtime(&time_now);
if (gtm == NULL)
return -1;
res = fprintf(ofile, "%04d%02d%02d%02d%02d%02d %u %u %u %u %x ",
gtm->tm_year + 1900, gtm->tm_mon + 1, gtm->tm_mday,
gtm->tm_hour, gtm->tm_min, gtm->tm_sec,
otype, otests, otries, osize, ogenerator);
if (res < 0)
return (-1);
if (BN_print_fp(ofile, omodulus) < 1)
return (-1);
res = fprintf(ofile, "\n");
fflush(ofile);
return (res > 0 ? 0 : -1);
}
/*
** Sieve p's and q's with small factors
*/
static void
sieve_large(u_int32_t s)
{
u_int32_t r, u;
debug3("sieve_large %u", s);
largetries++;
/* r = largebase mod s */
r = BN_mod_word(largebase, s);
if (r == 0)
u = 0; /* s divides into largebase exactly */
else
u = s - r; /* largebase+u is first entry divisible by s */
if (u < largebits * 2) {
/*
* The sieve omits p's and q's divisible by 2, so ensure that
* largebase+u is odd. Then, step through the sieve in
* increments of 2*s
*/
if (u & 0x1)
u += s; /* Make largebase+u odd, and u even */
/* Mark all multiples of 2*s */
for (u /= 2; u < largebits; u += s)
BIT_SET(LargeSieve, u);
}
/* r = p mod s */
r = (2 * r + 1) % s;
if (r == 0)
u = 0; /* s divides p exactly */
else
u = s - r; /* p+u is first entry divisible by s */
if (u < largebits * 4) {
/*
* The sieve omits p's divisible by 4, so ensure that
* largebase+u is not. Then, step through the sieve in
* increments of 4*s
*/
while (u & 0x3) {
if (SMALL_MAXIMUM - u < s)
return;
u += s;
}
/* Mark all multiples of 4*s */
for (u /= 4; u < largebits; u += s)
BIT_SET(LargeSieve, u);
}
}
/*
* list candidates for Sophie-Germain primes (where q = (p-1)/2)
* to standard output.
* The list is checked against small known primes (less than 2**30).
*/
int
gen_candidates(FILE *out, u_int32_t memory, u_int32_t power, BIGNUM *start)
{
BIGNUM *q;
u_int32_t j, r, s, t;
u_int32_t smallwords = TINY_NUMBER >> 6;
u_int32_t tinywords = TINY_NUMBER >> 6;
time_t time_start, time_stop;
u_int32_t i;
int ret = 0;
largememory = memory;
if (memory != 0 &&
(memory < LARGE_MINIMUM || memory > LARGE_MAXIMUM)) {
error("Invalid memory amount (min %ld, max %ld)",
LARGE_MINIMUM, LARGE_MAXIMUM);
return (-1);
}
/*
* Set power to the length in bits of the prime to be generated.
* This is changed to 1 less than the desired safe prime moduli p.
*/
if (power > TEST_MAXIMUM) {
error("Too many bits: %u > %lu", power, TEST_MAXIMUM);
return (-1);
} else if (power < TEST_MINIMUM) {
error("Too few bits: %u < %u", power, TEST_MINIMUM);
return (-1);
}
power--; /* decrement before squaring */
/*
* The density of ordinary primes is on the order of 1/bits, so the
* density of safe primes should be about (1/bits)**2. Set test range
* to something well above bits**2 to be reasonably sure (but not
* guaranteed) of catching at least one safe prime.
*/
largewords = ((power * power) >> (SHIFT_WORD - TEST_POWER));
/*
* Need idea of how much memory is available. We don't have to use all
* of it.
*/
if (largememory > LARGE_MAXIMUM) {
logit("Limited memory: %u MB; limit %lu MB",
largememory, LARGE_MAXIMUM);
largememory = LARGE_MAXIMUM;
}
if (largewords <= (largememory << SHIFT_MEGAWORD)) {
logit("Increased memory: %u MB; need %u bytes",
largememory, (largewords << SHIFT_BYTE));
largewords = (largememory << SHIFT_MEGAWORD);
} else if (largememory > 0) {
logit("Decreased memory: %u MB; want %u bytes",
largememory, (largewords << SHIFT_BYTE));
largewords = (largememory << SHIFT_MEGAWORD);
}
TinySieve = xcalloc(tinywords, sizeof(u_int32_t));
tinybits = tinywords << SHIFT_WORD;
SmallSieve = xcalloc(smallwords, sizeof(u_int32_t));
smallbits = smallwords << SHIFT_WORD;
/*
* dynamically determine available memory
*/
while ((LargeSieve = calloc(largewords, sizeof(u_int32_t))) == NULL)
largewords -= (1L << (SHIFT_MEGAWORD - 2)); /* 1/4 MB chunks */
largebits = largewords << SHIFT_WORD;
largenumbers = largebits * 2; /* even numbers excluded */
/* validation check: count the number of primes tried */
largetries = 0;
if ((q = BN_new()) == NULL)
fatal("BN_new failed");
/*
* Generate random starting point for subprime search, or use
* specified parameter.
*/
if ((largebase = BN_new()) == NULL)
fatal("BN_new failed");
if (start == NULL) {
if (BN_rand(largebase, power, 1, 1) == 0)
fatal("BN_rand failed");
} else {
if (BN_copy(largebase, start) == NULL)
fatal("BN_copy: failed");
}
/* ensure odd */
if (BN_set_bit(largebase, 0) == 0)
fatal("BN_set_bit: failed");
time(&time_start);
logit("%.24s Sieve next %u plus %u-bit", ctime(&time_start),
largenumbers, power);
debug2("start point: 0x%s", BN_bn2hex(largebase));
/*
* TinySieve
*/
for (i = 0; i < tinybits; i++) {
if (BIT_TEST(TinySieve, i))
continue; /* 2*i+3 is composite */
/* The next tiny prime */
t = 2 * i + 3;
/* Mark all multiples of t */
for (j = i + t; j < tinybits; j += t)
BIT_SET(TinySieve, j);
sieve_large(t);
}
/*
* Start the small block search at the next possible prime. To avoid
* fencepost errors, the last pass is skipped.
*/
for (smallbase = TINY_NUMBER + 3;
smallbase < (SMALL_MAXIMUM - TINY_NUMBER);
smallbase += TINY_NUMBER) {
for (i = 0; i < tinybits; i++) {
if (BIT_TEST(TinySieve, i))
continue; /* 2*i+3 is composite */
/* The next tiny prime */
t = 2 * i + 3;
r = smallbase % t;
if (r == 0) {
s = 0; /* t divides into smallbase exactly */
} else {
/* smallbase+s is first entry divisible by t */
s = t - r;
}
/*
* The sieve omits even numbers, so ensure that
* smallbase+s is odd. Then, step through the sieve
* in increments of 2*t
*/
if (s & 1)
s += t; /* Make smallbase+s odd, and s even */
/* Mark all multiples of 2*t */
for (s /= 2; s < smallbits; s += t)
BIT_SET(SmallSieve, s);
}
/*
* SmallSieve
*/
for (i = 0; i < smallbits; i++) {
if (BIT_TEST(SmallSieve, i))
continue; /* 2*i+smallbase is composite */
/* The next small prime */
sieve_large((2 * i) + smallbase);
}
memset(SmallSieve, 0, smallwords << SHIFT_BYTE);
}
time(&time_stop);
logit("%.24s Sieved with %u small primes in %lld seconds",
ctime(&time_stop), largetries, (long long)(time_stop - time_start));
for (j = r = 0; j < largebits; j++) {
if (BIT_TEST(LargeSieve, j))
continue; /* Definitely composite, skip */
debug2("test q = largebase+%u", 2 * j);
if (BN_set_word(q, 2 * j) == 0)
fatal("BN_set_word failed");
if (BN_add(q, q, largebase) == 0)
fatal("BN_add failed");
if (qfileout(out, MODULI_TYPE_SOPHIE_GERMAIN,
MODULI_TESTS_SIEVE, largetries,
(power - 1) /* MSB */, (0), q) == -1) {
ret = -1;
break;
}
r++; /* count q */
}
time(&time_stop);
free(LargeSieve);
free(SmallSieve);
free(TinySieve);
logit("%.24s Found %u candidates", ctime(&time_stop), r);
return (ret);
}
static void
write_checkpoint(char *cpfile, u_int32_t lineno)
{
FILE *fp;
char tmp[PATH_MAX];
int r;
r = snprintf(tmp, sizeof(tmp), "%s.XXXXXXXXXX", cpfile);
if (r < 0 || r >= PATH_MAX) {
logit("write_checkpoint: temp pathname too long");
return;
}
if ((r = mkstemp(tmp)) == -1) {
logit("mkstemp(%s): %s", tmp, strerror(errno));
return;
}
if ((fp = fdopen(r, "w")) == NULL) {
logit("write_checkpoint: fdopen: %s", strerror(errno));
unlink(tmp);
close(r);
return;
}
if (fprintf(fp, "%lu\n", (unsigned long)lineno) > 0 && fclose(fp) == 0
&& rename(tmp, cpfile) == 0)
debug3("wrote checkpoint line %lu to '%s'",
(unsigned long)lineno, cpfile);
else
logit("failed to write to checkpoint file '%s': %s", cpfile,
strerror(errno));
}
static unsigned long
read_checkpoint(char *cpfile)
{
FILE *fp;
unsigned long lineno = 0;
if ((fp = fopen(cpfile, "r")) == NULL)
return 0;
if (fscanf(fp, "%lu\n", &lineno) < 1)
logit("Failed to load checkpoint from '%s'", cpfile);
else
logit("Loaded checkpoint from '%s' line %lu", cpfile, lineno);
fclose(fp);
return lineno;
}
static unsigned long
count_lines(FILE *f)
{
unsigned long count = 0;
char lp[QLINESIZE + 1];
if (fseek(f, 0, SEEK_SET) != 0) {
debug("input file is not seekable");
return ULONG_MAX;
}
while (fgets(lp, QLINESIZE + 1, f) != NULL)
count++;
rewind(f);
debug("input file has %lu lines", count);
return count;
}
static char *
fmt_time(time_t seconds)
{
int day, hr, min;
static char buf[128];
min = (seconds / 60) % 60;
hr = (seconds / 60 / 60) % 24;
day = seconds / 60 / 60 / 24;
if (day > 0)
snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%dd %d:%02d", day, hr, min);
else
snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%d:%02d", hr, min);
return buf;
}
static void
print_progress(unsigned long start_lineno, unsigned long current_lineno,
unsigned long end_lineno)
{
static time_t time_start, time_prev;
time_t time_now, elapsed;
unsigned long num_to_process, processed, remaining, percent, eta;
double time_per_line;
char *eta_str;
time_now = monotime();
if (time_start == 0) {
time_start = time_prev = time_now;
return;
}
/* print progress after 1m then once per 5m */
if (time_now - time_prev < 5 * 60)
return;
time_prev = time_now;
elapsed = time_now - time_start;
processed = current_lineno - start_lineno;
remaining = end_lineno - current_lineno;
num_to_process = end_lineno - start_lineno;
time_per_line = (double)elapsed / processed;
/* if we don't know how many we're processing just report count+time */
time(&time_now);
if (end_lineno == ULONG_MAX) {
logit("%.24s processed %lu in %s", ctime(&time_now),
processed, fmt_time(elapsed));
return;
}
percent = 100 * processed / num_to_process;
eta = time_per_line * remaining;
eta_str = xstrdup(fmt_time(eta));
logit("%.24s processed %lu of %lu (%lu%%) in %s, ETA %s",
ctime(&time_now), processed, num_to_process, percent,
fmt_time(elapsed), eta_str);
free(eta_str);
}
/*
* perform a Miller-Rabin primality test
* on the list of candidates
* (checking both q and p)
* The result is a list of so-call "safe" primes
*/
int
prime_test(FILE *in, FILE *out, u_int32_t trials, u_int32_t generator_wanted,
char *checkpoint_file, unsigned long start_lineno, unsigned long num_lines)
{
BIGNUM *q, *p, *a;
- BN_CTX *ctx;
char *cp, *lp;
u_int32_t count_in = 0, count_out = 0, count_possible = 0;
u_int32_t generator_known, in_tests, in_tries, in_type, in_size;
unsigned long last_processed = 0, end_lineno;
time_t time_start, time_stop;
int res, is_prime;
if (trials < TRIAL_MINIMUM) {
error("Minimum primality trials is %d", TRIAL_MINIMUM);
return (-1);
}
if (num_lines == 0)
end_lineno = count_lines(in);
else
end_lineno = start_lineno + num_lines;
time(&time_start);
if ((p = BN_new()) == NULL)
fatal("BN_new failed");
if ((q = BN_new()) == NULL)
fatal("BN_new failed");
- if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("BN_CTX_new failed");
debug2("%.24s Final %u Miller-Rabin trials (%x generator)",
ctime(&time_start), trials, generator_wanted);
if (checkpoint_file != NULL)
last_processed = read_checkpoint(checkpoint_file);
last_processed = start_lineno = MAXIMUM(last_processed, start_lineno);
if (end_lineno == ULONG_MAX)
debug("process from line %lu from pipe", last_processed);
else
debug("process from line %lu to line %lu", last_processed,
end_lineno);
res = 0;
lp = xmalloc(QLINESIZE + 1);
while (fgets(lp, QLINESIZE + 1, in) != NULL && count_in < end_lineno) {
count_in++;
if (count_in <= last_processed) {
debug3("skipping line %u, before checkpoint or "
"specified start line", count_in);
continue;
}
if (checkpoint_file != NULL)
write_checkpoint(checkpoint_file, count_in);
print_progress(start_lineno, count_in, end_lineno);
if (strlen(lp) < 14 || *lp == '!' || *lp == '#') {
debug2("%10u: comment or short line", count_in);
continue;
}
/* XXX - fragile parser */
/* time */
cp = &lp[14]; /* (skip) */
/* type */
in_type = strtoul(cp, &cp, 10);
/* tests */
in_tests = strtoul(cp, &cp, 10);
if (in_tests & MODULI_TESTS_COMPOSITE) {
debug2("%10u: known composite", count_in);
continue;
}
/* tries */
in_tries = strtoul(cp, &cp, 10);
/* size (most significant bit) */
in_size = strtoul(cp, &cp, 10);
/* generator (hex) */
generator_known = strtoul(cp, &cp, 16);
/* Skip white space */
cp += strspn(cp, " ");
/* modulus (hex) */
switch (in_type) {
case MODULI_TYPE_SOPHIE_GERMAIN:
debug2("%10u: (%u) Sophie-Germain", count_in, in_type);
a = q;
if (BN_hex2bn(&a, cp) == 0)
fatal("BN_hex2bn failed");
/* p = 2*q + 1 */
if (BN_lshift(p, q, 1) == 0)
fatal("BN_lshift failed");
if (BN_add_word(p, 1) == 0)
fatal("BN_add_word failed");
in_size += 1;
generator_known = 0;
break;
case MODULI_TYPE_UNSTRUCTURED:
case MODULI_TYPE_SAFE:
case MODULI_TYPE_SCHNORR:
case MODULI_TYPE_STRONG:
case MODULI_TYPE_UNKNOWN:
debug2("%10u: (%u)", count_in, in_type);
a = p;
if (BN_hex2bn(&a, cp) == 0)
fatal("BN_hex2bn failed");
/* q = (p-1) / 2 */
if (BN_rshift(q, p, 1) == 0)
fatal("BN_rshift failed");
break;
default:
debug2("Unknown prime type");
break;
}
/*
* due to earlier inconsistencies in interpretation, check
* the proposed bit size.
*/
if ((u_int32_t)BN_num_bits(p) != (in_size + 1)) {
debug2("%10u: bit size %u mismatch", count_in, in_size);
continue;
}
if (in_size < QSIZE_MINIMUM) {
debug2("%10u: bit size %u too short", count_in, in_size);
continue;
}
if (in_tests & MODULI_TESTS_MILLER_RABIN)
in_tries += trials;
else
in_tries = trials;
/*
* guess unknown generator
*/
if (generator_known == 0) {
if (BN_mod_word(p, 24) == 11)
generator_known = 2;
else {
u_int32_t r = BN_mod_word(p, 10);
if (r == 3 || r == 7)
generator_known = 5;
}
}
/*
* skip tests when desired generator doesn't match
*/
if (generator_wanted > 0 &&
generator_wanted != generator_known) {
debug2("%10u: generator %d != %d",
count_in, generator_known, generator_wanted);
continue;
}
/*
* Primes with no known generator are useless for DH, so
* skip those.
*/
if (generator_known == 0) {
debug2("%10u: no known generator", count_in);
continue;
}
count_possible++;
/*
* The (1/4)^N performance bound on Miller-Rabin is
* extremely pessimistic, so don't spend a lot of time
* really verifying that q is prime until after we know
* that p is also prime. A single pass will weed out the
* vast majority of composite q's.
*/
- is_prime = BN_is_prime_ex(q, 1, ctx, NULL);
+ is_prime = BN_is_prime_ex(q, 1, NULL, NULL);
if (is_prime < 0)
fatal("BN_is_prime_ex failed");
if (is_prime == 0) {
debug("%10u: q failed first possible prime test",
count_in);
continue;
}
/*
* q is possibly prime, so go ahead and really make sure
* that p is prime. If it is, then we can go back and do
* the same for q. If p is composite, chances are that
* will show up on the first Rabin-Miller iteration so it
* doesn't hurt to specify a high iteration count.
*/
- is_prime = BN_is_prime_ex(p, trials, ctx, NULL);
+ is_prime = BN_is_prime_ex(p, trials, NULL, NULL);
if (is_prime < 0)
fatal("BN_is_prime_ex failed");
if (is_prime == 0) {
debug("%10u: p is not prime", count_in);
continue;
}
debug("%10u: p is almost certainly prime", count_in);
/* recheck q more rigorously */
- is_prime = BN_is_prime_ex(q, trials - 1, ctx, NULL);
+ is_prime = BN_is_prime_ex(q, trials - 1, NULL, NULL);
if (is_prime < 0)
fatal("BN_is_prime_ex failed");
if (is_prime == 0) {
debug("%10u: q is not prime", count_in);
continue;
}
debug("%10u: q is almost certainly prime", count_in);
if (qfileout(out, MODULI_TYPE_SAFE,
in_tests | MODULI_TESTS_MILLER_RABIN,
in_tries, in_size, generator_known, p)) {
res = -1;
break;
}
count_out++;
}
time(&time_stop);
free(lp);
BN_free(p);
BN_free(q);
- BN_CTX_free(ctx);
if (checkpoint_file != NULL)
unlink(checkpoint_file);
logit("%.24s Found %u safe primes of %u candidates in %ld seconds",
ctime(&time_stop), count_out, count_possible,
(long) (time_stop - time_start));
return (res);
}
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
diff --git a/monitor.c b/monitor.c
index 00af44f98ba9..2ce89fe901cd 100644
--- a/monitor.c
+++ b/monitor.c
@@ -1,1899 +1,1925 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: monitor.c,v 1.199 2019/10/07 23:10:38 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: monitor.c,v 1.208 2020/02/06 22:30:54 naddy Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright 2002 Niels Provos <provos@citi.umich.edu>
* Copyright 2002 Markus Friedl <markus@openbsd.org>
* All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <sys/wait.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <limits.h>
#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
#include <paths.h>
#endif
#include <pwd.h>
#include <signal.h>
#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
# include <stdint.h>
#endif
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#ifdef HAVE_POLL_H
#include <poll.h>
#else
# ifdef HAVE_SYS_POLL_H
# include <sys/poll.h>
# endif
#endif
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
#include <openssl/dh.h>
#endif
#include "openbsd-compat/sys-tree.h"
#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
#include "atomicio.h"
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "ssh.h"
#include "sshkey.h"
#include "sshbuf.h"
#include "hostfile.h"
#include "auth.h"
#include "cipher.h"
#include "kex.h"
#include "dh.h"
#include "auth-pam.h"
#include "packet.h"
#include "auth-options.h"
#include "sshpty.h"
#include "channels.h"
#include "session.h"
#include "sshlogin.h"
#include "canohost.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "servconf.h"
#include "monitor.h"
#ifdef GSSAPI
#include "ssh-gss.h"
#endif
#include "monitor_wrap.h"
#include "monitor_fdpass.h"
#include "compat.h"
#include "ssh2.h"
#include "authfd.h"
#include "match.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
+#include "sk-api.h"
#ifdef GSSAPI
static Gssctxt *gsscontext = NULL;
#endif
/* Imports */
extern ServerOptions options;
extern u_int utmp_len;
extern u_char session_id[];
extern struct sshbuf *loginmsg;
extern struct sshauthopt *auth_opts; /* XXX move to permanent ssh->authctxt? */
/* State exported from the child */
static struct sshbuf *child_state;
/* Functions on the monitor that answer unprivileged requests */
int mm_answer_moduli(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
int mm_answer_sign(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
int mm_answer_pwnamallow(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
int mm_answer_auth2_read_banner(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
int mm_answer_authserv(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
int mm_answer_authpassword(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
int mm_answer_bsdauthquery(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
int mm_answer_bsdauthrespond(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
int mm_answer_skeyquery(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
int mm_answer_skeyrespond(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
int mm_answer_keyallowed(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
int mm_answer_keyverify(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
int mm_answer_pty(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
int mm_answer_pty_cleanup(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
int mm_answer_term(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
int mm_answer_rsa_keyallowed(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
int mm_answer_rsa_challenge(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
int mm_answer_rsa_response(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
int mm_answer_sesskey(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
int mm_answer_sessid(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
#ifdef USE_PAM
int mm_answer_pam_start(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
int mm_answer_pam_account(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
int mm_answer_pam_init_ctx(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
int mm_answer_pam_query(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
int mm_answer_pam_respond(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
int mm_answer_pam_free_ctx(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
#endif
#ifdef GSSAPI
int mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
int mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
int mm_answer_gss_userok(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
int mm_answer_gss_checkmic(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
#endif
#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
int mm_answer_audit_event(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
int mm_answer_audit_command(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
#endif
static Authctxt *authctxt;
/* local state for key verify */
static u_char *key_blob = NULL;
static size_t key_bloblen = 0;
static int key_blobtype = MM_NOKEY;
static struct sshauthopt *key_opts = NULL;
static char *hostbased_cuser = NULL;
static char *hostbased_chost = NULL;
static char *auth_method = "unknown";
static char *auth_submethod = NULL;
static u_int session_id2_len = 0;
static u_char *session_id2 = NULL;
static pid_t monitor_child_pid;
struct mon_table {
enum monitor_reqtype type;
int flags;
int (*f)(struct ssh *, int, struct sshbuf *);
};
#define MON_ISAUTH 0x0004 /* Required for Authentication */
#define MON_AUTHDECIDE 0x0008 /* Decides Authentication */
#define MON_ONCE 0x0010 /* Disable after calling */
#define MON_ALOG 0x0020 /* Log auth attempt without authenticating */
#define MON_AUTH (MON_ISAUTH|MON_AUTHDECIDE)
#define MON_PERMIT 0x1000 /* Request is permitted */
static int monitor_read(struct ssh *, struct monitor *, struct mon_table *,
struct mon_table **);
static int monitor_read_log(struct monitor *);
struct mon_table mon_dispatch_proto20[] = {
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
{MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_moduli},
#endif
{MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_sign},
{MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pwnamallow},
{MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_authserv},
{MONITOR_REQ_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_auth2_read_banner},
{MONITOR_REQ_AUTHPASSWORD, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_authpassword},
#ifdef USE_PAM
{MONITOR_REQ_PAM_START, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pam_start},
{MONITOR_REQ_PAM_ACCOUNT, 0, mm_answer_pam_account},
{MONITOR_REQ_PAM_INIT_CTX, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pam_init_ctx},
{MONITOR_REQ_PAM_QUERY, 0, mm_answer_pam_query},
{MONITOR_REQ_PAM_RESPOND, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_pam_respond},
{MONITOR_REQ_PAM_FREE_CTX, MON_ONCE|MON_AUTHDECIDE, mm_answer_pam_free_ctx},
#endif
#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
{MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_event},
#endif
#ifdef BSD_AUTH
{MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHQUERY, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_bsdauthquery},
{MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHRESPOND, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_bsdauthrespond},
#endif
{MONITOR_REQ_KEYALLOWED, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_keyallowed},
{MONITOR_REQ_KEYVERIFY, MON_AUTH, mm_answer_keyverify},
#ifdef GSSAPI
{MONITOR_REQ_GSSSETUP, MON_ISAUTH, mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx},
{MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, 0, mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx},
{MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, MON_ONCE|MON_AUTHDECIDE, mm_answer_gss_userok},
{MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, MON_ONCE, mm_answer_gss_checkmic},
#endif
{0, 0, NULL}
};
struct mon_table mon_dispatch_postauth20[] = {
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
{MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 0, mm_answer_moduli},
#endif
{MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 0, mm_answer_sign},
{MONITOR_REQ_PTY, 0, mm_answer_pty},
{MONITOR_REQ_PTYCLEANUP, 0, mm_answer_pty_cleanup},
{MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 0, mm_answer_term},
#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
{MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_event},
{MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND, MON_PERMIT, mm_answer_audit_command},
#endif
{0, 0, NULL}
};
struct mon_table *mon_dispatch;
/* Specifies if a certain message is allowed at the moment */
static void
monitor_permit(struct mon_table *ent, enum monitor_reqtype type, int permit)
{
while (ent->f != NULL) {
if (ent->type == type) {
ent->flags &= ~MON_PERMIT;
ent->flags |= permit ? MON_PERMIT : 0;
return;
}
ent++;
}
}
static void
monitor_permit_authentications(int permit)
{
struct mon_table *ent = mon_dispatch;
while (ent->f != NULL) {
if (ent->flags & MON_AUTH) {
ent->flags &= ~MON_PERMIT;
ent->flags |= permit ? MON_PERMIT : 0;
}
ent++;
}
}
void
monitor_child_preauth(struct ssh *ssh, struct monitor *pmonitor)
{
struct mon_table *ent;
int authenticated = 0, partial = 0;
debug3("preauth child monitor started");
if (pmonitor->m_recvfd >= 0)
close(pmonitor->m_recvfd);
if (pmonitor->m_log_sendfd >= 0)
close(pmonitor->m_log_sendfd);
pmonitor->m_log_sendfd = pmonitor->m_recvfd = -1;
authctxt = (Authctxt *)ssh->authctxt;
memset(authctxt, 0, sizeof(*authctxt));
ssh->authctxt = authctxt;
authctxt->loginmsg = loginmsg;
mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_proto20;
/* Permit requests for moduli and signatures */
monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 1);
monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 1);
/* The first few requests do not require asynchronous access */
while (!authenticated) {
partial = 0;
auth_method = "unknown";
auth_submethod = NULL;
auth2_authctxt_reset_info(authctxt);
authenticated = (monitor_read(ssh, pmonitor,
mon_dispatch, &ent) == 1);
/* Special handling for multiple required authentications */
if (options.num_auth_methods != 0) {
if (authenticated &&
!auth2_update_methods_lists(authctxt,
auth_method, auth_submethod)) {
debug3("%s: method %s: partial", __func__,
auth_method);
authenticated = 0;
partial = 1;
}
}
if (authenticated) {
if (!(ent->flags & MON_AUTHDECIDE))
fatal("%s: unexpected authentication from %d",
__func__, ent->type);
if (authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0 &&
!auth_root_allowed(ssh, auth_method))
authenticated = 0;
#ifdef USE_PAM
/* PAM needs to perform account checks after auth */
if (options.use_pam && authenticated) {
struct sshbuf *m;
if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed",
__func__);
mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_sendfd,
MONITOR_REQ_PAM_ACCOUNT, m);
authenticated = mm_answer_pam_account(
ssh, pmonitor->m_sendfd, m);
sshbuf_free(m);
}
#endif
}
if (ent->flags & (MON_AUTHDECIDE|MON_ALOG)) {
auth_log(ssh, authenticated, partial,
auth_method, auth_submethod);
if (!partial && !authenticated)
authctxt->failures++;
if (authenticated || partial) {
auth2_update_session_info(authctxt,
auth_method, auth_submethod);
}
}
}
if (!authctxt->valid)
fatal("%s: authenticated invalid user", __func__);
if (strcmp(auth_method, "unknown") == 0)
fatal("%s: authentication method name unknown", __func__);
debug("%s: %s has been authenticated by privileged process",
__func__, authctxt->user);
ssh->authctxt = NULL;
ssh_packet_set_log_preamble(ssh, "user %s", authctxt->user);
mm_get_keystate(ssh, pmonitor);
/* Drain any buffered messages from the child */
while (pmonitor->m_log_recvfd != -1 && monitor_read_log(pmonitor) == 0)
;
if (pmonitor->m_recvfd >= 0)
close(pmonitor->m_recvfd);
if (pmonitor->m_log_sendfd >= 0)
close(pmonitor->m_log_sendfd);
pmonitor->m_sendfd = pmonitor->m_log_recvfd = -1;
}
static void
monitor_set_child_handler(pid_t pid)
{
monitor_child_pid = pid;
}
static void
monitor_child_handler(int sig)
{
kill(monitor_child_pid, sig);
}
void
monitor_child_postauth(struct ssh *ssh, struct monitor *pmonitor)
{
close(pmonitor->m_recvfd);
pmonitor->m_recvfd = -1;
monitor_set_child_handler(pmonitor->m_pid);
- signal(SIGHUP, &monitor_child_handler);
- signal(SIGTERM, &monitor_child_handler);
- signal(SIGINT, &monitor_child_handler);
+ ssh_signal(SIGHUP, &monitor_child_handler);
+ ssh_signal(SIGTERM, &monitor_child_handler);
+ ssh_signal(SIGINT, &monitor_child_handler);
#ifdef SIGXFSZ
- signal(SIGXFSZ, SIG_IGN);
+ ssh_signal(SIGXFSZ, SIG_IGN);
#endif
mon_dispatch = mon_dispatch_postauth20;
/* Permit requests for moduli and signatures */
monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, 1);
monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, 1);
monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_TERM, 1);
if (auth_opts->permit_pty_flag) {
monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PTY, 1);
monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PTYCLEANUP, 1);
}
for (;;)
monitor_read(ssh, pmonitor, mon_dispatch, NULL);
}
static int
monitor_read_log(struct monitor *pmonitor)
{
struct sshbuf *logmsg;
u_int len, level;
char *msg;
u_char *p;
int r;
if ((logmsg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new", __func__);
/* Read length */
if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(logmsg, 4, &p)) != 0)
fatal("%s: reserve: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
if (atomicio(read, pmonitor->m_log_recvfd, p, 4) != 4) {
if (errno == EPIPE) {
sshbuf_free(logmsg);
debug("%s: child log fd closed", __func__);
close(pmonitor->m_log_recvfd);
pmonitor->m_log_recvfd = -1;
return -1;
}
fatal("%s: log fd read: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
}
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(logmsg, &len)) != 0)
fatal("%s: get len: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
if (len <= 4 || len > 8192)
fatal("%s: invalid log message length %u", __func__, len);
/* Read severity, message */
sshbuf_reset(logmsg);
if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(logmsg, len, &p)) != 0)
fatal("%s: reserve: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
if (atomicio(read, pmonitor->m_log_recvfd, p, len) != len)
fatal("%s: log fd read: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(logmsg, &level)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_cstring(logmsg, &msg, NULL)) != 0)
fatal("%s: decode: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
/* Log it */
if (log_level_name(level) == NULL)
fatal("%s: invalid log level %u (corrupted message?)",
__func__, level);
do_log2(level, "%s [preauth]", msg);
sshbuf_free(logmsg);
free(msg);
return 0;
}
static int
monitor_read(struct ssh *ssh, struct monitor *pmonitor, struct mon_table *ent,
struct mon_table **pent)
{
struct sshbuf *m;
int r, ret;
u_char type;
struct pollfd pfd[2];
for (;;) {
memset(&pfd, 0, sizeof(pfd));
pfd[0].fd = pmonitor->m_sendfd;
pfd[0].events = POLLIN;
pfd[1].fd = pmonitor->m_log_recvfd;
pfd[1].events = pfd[1].fd == -1 ? 0 : POLLIN;
if (poll(pfd, pfd[1].fd == -1 ? 1 : 2, -1) == -1) {
if (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN)
continue;
fatal("%s: poll: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
}
if (pfd[1].revents) {
/*
* Drain all log messages before processing next
* monitor request.
*/
monitor_read_log(pmonitor);
continue;
}
if (pfd[0].revents)
break; /* Continues below */
}
if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new", __func__);
mm_request_receive(pmonitor->m_sendfd, m);
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(m, &type)) != 0)
fatal("%s: decode: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
debug3("%s: checking request %d", __func__, type);
while (ent->f != NULL) {
if (ent->type == type)
break;
ent++;
}
if (ent->f != NULL) {
if (!(ent->flags & MON_PERMIT))
fatal("%s: unpermitted request %d", __func__,
type);
ret = (*ent->f)(ssh, pmonitor->m_sendfd, m);
sshbuf_free(m);
/* The child may use this request only once, disable it */
if (ent->flags & MON_ONCE) {
debug2("%s: %d used once, disabling now", __func__,
type);
ent->flags &= ~MON_PERMIT;
}
if (pent != NULL)
*pent = ent;
return ret;
}
fatal("%s: unsupported request: %d", __func__, type);
/* NOTREACHED */
return (-1);
}
/* allowed key state */
static int
-monitor_allowed_key(u_char *blob, u_int bloblen)
+monitor_allowed_key(const u_char *blob, u_int bloblen)
{
/* make sure key is allowed */
if (key_blob == NULL || key_bloblen != bloblen ||
timingsafe_bcmp(key_blob, blob, key_bloblen))
return (0);
return (1);
}
static void
monitor_reset_key_state(void)
{
/* reset state */
free(key_blob);
free(hostbased_cuser);
free(hostbased_chost);
sshauthopt_free(key_opts);
key_blob = NULL;
key_bloblen = 0;
key_blobtype = MM_NOKEY;
key_opts = NULL;
hostbased_cuser = NULL;
hostbased_chost = NULL;
}
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
int
mm_answer_moduli(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
{
DH *dh;
const BIGNUM *dh_p, *dh_g;
int r;
u_int min, want, max;
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &min)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &want)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &max)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
debug3("%s: got parameters: %d %d %d",
__func__, min, want, max);
/* We need to check here, too, in case the child got corrupted */
if (max < min || want < min || max < want)
fatal("%s: bad parameters: %d %d %d",
__func__, min, want, max);
sshbuf_reset(m);
dh = choose_dh(min, want, max);
if (dh == NULL) {
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(m, 0)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
return (0);
} else {
/* Send first bignum */
DH_get0_pqg(dh, &dh_p, NULL, &dh_g);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(m, 1)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(m, dh_p)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(m, dh_g)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
DH_free(dh);
}
mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_MODULI, m);
return (0);
}
#endif
int
mm_answer_sign(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
{
extern int auth_sock; /* XXX move to state struct? */
struct sshkey *key;
struct sshbuf *sigbuf = NULL;
u_char *p = NULL, *signature = NULL;
char *alg = NULL;
size_t datlen, siglen, alglen;
int r, is_proof = 0;
u_int keyid, compat;
const char proof_req[] = "hostkeys-prove-00@openssh.com";
debug3("%s", __func__);
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &keyid)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_string(m, &p, &datlen)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &alg, &alglen)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &compat)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
if (keyid > INT_MAX)
fatal("%s: invalid key ID", __func__);
/*
* Supported KEX types use SHA1 (20 bytes), SHA256 (32 bytes),
* SHA384 (48 bytes) and SHA512 (64 bytes).
*
* Otherwise, verify the signature request is for a hostkey
* proof.
*
* XXX perform similar check for KEX signature requests too?
* it's not trivial, since what is signed is the hash, rather
* than the full kex structure...
*/
if (datlen != 20 && datlen != 32 && datlen != 48 && datlen != 64) {
/*
* Construct expected hostkey proof and compare it to what
* the client sent us.
*/
if (session_id2_len == 0) /* hostkeys is never first */
fatal("%s: bad data length: %zu", __func__, datlen);
if ((key = get_hostkey_public_by_index(keyid, ssh)) == NULL)
fatal("%s: no hostkey for index %d", __func__, keyid);
if ((sigbuf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new", __func__);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(sigbuf, proof_req)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_string(sigbuf, session_id2,
session_id2_len)) != 0 ||
(r = sshkey_puts(key, sigbuf)) != 0)
fatal("%s: couldn't prepare private key "
"proof buffer: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
if (datlen != sshbuf_len(sigbuf) ||
memcmp(p, sshbuf_ptr(sigbuf), sshbuf_len(sigbuf)) != 0)
fatal("%s: bad data length: %zu, hostkey proof len %zu",
__func__, datlen, sshbuf_len(sigbuf));
sshbuf_free(sigbuf);
is_proof = 1;
}
/* save session id, it will be passed on the first call */
if (session_id2_len == 0) {
session_id2_len = datlen;
session_id2 = xmalloc(session_id2_len);
memcpy(session_id2, p, session_id2_len);
}
if ((key = get_hostkey_by_index(keyid)) != NULL) {
if ((r = sshkey_sign(key, &signature, &siglen, p, datlen, alg,
- compat)) != 0)
+ options.sk_provider, compat)) != 0)
fatal("%s: sshkey_sign failed: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
} else if ((key = get_hostkey_public_by_index(keyid, ssh)) != NULL &&
auth_sock > 0) {
if ((r = ssh_agent_sign(auth_sock, key, &signature, &siglen,
p, datlen, alg, compat)) != 0) {
fatal("%s: ssh_agent_sign failed: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
}
} else
fatal("%s: no hostkey from index %d", __func__, keyid);
debug3("%s: %s signature %p(%zu)", __func__,
is_proof ? "hostkey proof" : "KEX", signature, siglen);
sshbuf_reset(m);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(m, signature, siglen)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
free(alg);
free(p);
free(signature);
mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_SIGN, m);
/* Turn on permissions for getpwnam */
monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, 1);
return (0);
}
/* Retrieves the password entry and also checks if the user is permitted */
int
mm_answer_pwnamallow(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
{
char *username;
struct passwd *pwent;
int r, allowed = 0;
u_int i;
debug3("%s", __func__);
if (authctxt->attempt++ != 0)
fatal("%s: multiple attempts for getpwnam", __func__);
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &username, NULL)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
pwent = getpwnamallow(ssh, username);
authctxt->user = xstrdup(username);
setproctitle("%s [priv]", pwent ? username : "unknown");
free(username);
sshbuf_reset(m);
if (pwent == NULL) {
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(m, 0)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
authctxt->pw = fakepw();
goto out;
}
allowed = 1;
authctxt->pw = pwent;
authctxt->valid = 1;
/* XXX don't sent pwent to unpriv; send fake class/dir/shell too */
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(m, 1)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_string(m, pwent, sizeof(*pwent))) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_name)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, "*")) != 0 ||
#ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_GECOS
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_gecos)) != 0 ||
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_CLASS
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_class)) != 0 ||
#endif
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_dir)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, pwent->pw_shell)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
out:
ssh_packet_set_log_preamble(ssh, "%suser %s",
authctxt->valid ? "authenticating" : "invalid ", authctxt->user);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(m, &options, sizeof(options))) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
#define M_CP_STROPT(x) do { \
if (options.x != NULL) { \
if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, options.x)) != 0) \
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", \
__func__, ssh_err(r)); \
} \
} while (0)
#define M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(x, nx) do { \
for (i = 0; i < options.nx; i++) { \
if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, options.x[i])) != 0) \
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", \
__func__, ssh_err(r)); \
} \
} while (0)
/* See comment in servconf.h */
COPY_MATCH_STRING_OPTS();
#undef M_CP_STROPT
#undef M_CP_STRARRAYOPT
/* Create valid auth method lists */
if (auth2_setup_methods_lists(authctxt) != 0) {
/*
* The monitor will continue long enough to let the child
* run to it's packet_disconnect(), but it must not allow any
* authentication to succeed.
*/
debug("%s: no valid authentication method lists", __func__);
}
debug3("%s: sending MONITOR_ANS_PWNAM: %d", __func__, allowed);
mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PWNAM, m);
/* Allow service/style information on the auth context */
monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV, 1);
monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, 1);
#ifdef USE_PAM
if (options.use_pam)
monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_START, 1);
#endif
return (0);
}
int mm_answer_auth2_read_banner(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
{
char *banner;
int r;
sshbuf_reset(m);
banner = auth2_read_banner();
if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, banner != NULL ? banner : "")) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, m);
free(banner);
return (0);
}
int
mm_answer_authserv(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
{
int r;
monitor_permit_authentications(1);
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &authctxt->service, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &authctxt->style, NULL)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
debug3("%s: service=%s, style=%s",
__func__, authctxt->service, authctxt->style);
if (strlen(authctxt->style) == 0) {
free(authctxt->style);
authctxt->style = NULL;
}
return (0);
}
/*
* Check that the key type appears in the supplied pattern list, ignoring
* mismatches in the signature algorithm. (Signature algorithm checks are
* performed in the unprivileged authentication code).
* Returns 1 on success, 0 otherwise.
*/
static int
key_base_type_match(const char *method, const struct sshkey *key,
const char *list)
{
char *s, *l, *ol = xstrdup(list);
int found = 0;
l = ol;
for ((s = strsep(&l, ",")); s && *s != '\0'; (s = strsep(&l, ","))) {
if (sshkey_type_from_name(s) == key->type) {
found = 1;
break;
}
}
if (!found) {
error("%s key type %s is not in permitted list %s", method,
sshkey_ssh_name(key), list);
}
free(ol);
return found;
}
int
mm_answer_authpassword(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
{
static int call_count;
char *passwd;
int r, authenticated;
size_t plen;
if (!options.password_authentication)
fatal("%s: password authentication not enabled", __func__);
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &passwd, &plen)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
/* Only authenticate if the context is valid */
authenticated = options.password_authentication &&
auth_password(ssh, passwd);
explicit_bzero(passwd, plen);
free(passwd);
sshbuf_reset(m);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, authenticated)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
#ifdef USE_PAM
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, sshpam_get_maxtries_reached())) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
#endif
debug3("%s: sending result %d", __func__, authenticated);
mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_AUTHPASSWORD, m);
call_count++;
if (plen == 0 && call_count == 1)
auth_method = "none";
else
auth_method = "password";
/* Causes monitor loop to terminate if authenticated */
return (authenticated);
}
#ifdef BSD_AUTH
int
mm_answer_bsdauthquery(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
{
char *name, *infotxt;
u_int numprompts, *echo_on, success;
char **prompts;
int r;
if (!options.kbd_interactive_authentication)
fatal("%s: kbd-int authentication not enabled", __func__);
success = bsdauth_query(authctxt, &name, &infotxt, &numprompts,
&prompts, &echo_on) < 0 ? 0 : 1;
sshbuf_reset(m);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, success)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
if (success) {
if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, prompts[0])) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
}
debug3("%s: sending challenge success: %u", __func__, success);
mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_BSDAUTHQUERY, m);
if (success) {
free(name);
free(infotxt);
free(prompts);
free(echo_on);
}
return (0);
}
int
mm_answer_bsdauthrespond(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
{
char *response;
int r, authok;
if (!options.kbd_interactive_authentication)
fatal("%s: kbd-int authentication not enabled", __func__);
if (authctxt->as == NULL)
fatal("%s: no bsd auth session", __func__);
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &response, NULL)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
authok = options.challenge_response_authentication &&
auth_userresponse(authctxt->as, response, 0);
authctxt->as = NULL;
debug3("%s: <%s> = <%d>", __func__, response, authok);
free(response);
sshbuf_reset(m);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, authok)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
debug3("%s: sending authenticated: %d", __func__, authok);
mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_BSDAUTHRESPOND, m);
auth_method = "keyboard-interactive";
auth_submethod = "bsdauth";
return (authok != 0);
}
#endif
#ifdef USE_PAM
int
mm_answer_pam_start(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
{
if (!options.use_pam)
fatal("UsePAM not set, but ended up in %s anyway", __func__);
start_pam(ssh);
monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_ACCOUNT, 1);
if (options.kbd_interactive_authentication)
monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_INIT_CTX, 1);
return (0);
}
int
mm_answer_pam_account(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
{
u_int ret;
int r;
if (!options.use_pam)
fatal("%s: PAM not enabled", __func__);
ret = do_pam_account();
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, ret)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, loginmsg)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_ACCOUNT, m);
return (ret);
}
static void *sshpam_ctxt, *sshpam_authok;
extern KbdintDevice sshpam_device;
int
mm_answer_pam_init_ctx(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
{
u_int ok = 0;
int r;
debug3("%s", __func__);
if (!options.kbd_interactive_authentication)
fatal("%s: kbd-int authentication not enabled", __func__);
if (sshpam_ctxt != NULL)
fatal("%s: already called", __func__);
sshpam_ctxt = (sshpam_device.init_ctx)(authctxt);
sshpam_authok = NULL;
sshbuf_reset(m);
if (sshpam_ctxt != NULL) {
monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_FREE_CTX, 1);
monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_QUERY, 1);
ok = 1;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, ok)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_INIT_CTX, m);
return (0);
}
int
mm_answer_pam_query(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
{
char *name = NULL, *info = NULL, **prompts = NULL;
u_int i, num = 0, *echo_on = 0;
int r, ret;
debug3("%s", __func__);
sshpam_authok = NULL;
if (sshpam_ctxt == NULL)
fatal("%s: no context", __func__);
ret = (sshpam_device.query)(sshpam_ctxt, &name, &info,
&num, &prompts, &echo_on);
if (ret == 0 && num == 0)
sshpam_authok = sshpam_ctxt;
if (num > 1 || name == NULL || info == NULL)
fatal("sshpam_device.query failed");
monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_RESPOND, 1);
sshbuf_reset(m);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, ret)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, name)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, info)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, sshpam_get_maxtries_reached())) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, num)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
free(name);
free(info);
for (i = 0; i < num; ++i) {
if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, prompts[i])) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, echo_on[i])) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
free(prompts[i]);
}
free(prompts);
free(echo_on);
auth_method = "keyboard-interactive";
auth_submethod = "pam";
mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_QUERY, m);
return (0);
}
int
mm_answer_pam_respond(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
{
char **resp;
u_int i, num;
int r, ret;
debug3("%s", __func__);
if (sshpam_ctxt == NULL)
fatal("%s: no context", __func__);
sshpam_authok = NULL;
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &num)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
if (num > 0) {
resp = xcalloc(num, sizeof(char *));
for (i = 0; i < num; ++i) {
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &(resp[i]), NULL)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
}
ret = (sshpam_device.respond)(sshpam_ctxt, num, resp);
for (i = 0; i < num; ++i)
free(resp[i]);
free(resp);
} else {
ret = (sshpam_device.respond)(sshpam_ctxt, num, NULL);
}
sshbuf_reset(m);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, ret)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_RESPOND, m);
auth_method = "keyboard-interactive";
auth_submethod = "pam";
if (ret == 0)
sshpam_authok = sshpam_ctxt;
return (0);
}
int
mm_answer_pam_free_ctx(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
{
int r = sshpam_authok != NULL && sshpam_authok == sshpam_ctxt;
debug3("%s", __func__);
if (sshpam_ctxt == NULL)
fatal("%s: no context", __func__);
(sshpam_device.free_ctx)(sshpam_ctxt);
sshpam_ctxt = sshpam_authok = NULL;
sshbuf_reset(m);
mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_FREE_CTX, m);
/* Allow another attempt */
monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_INIT_CTX, 1);
auth_method = "keyboard-interactive";
auth_submethod = "pam";
return r;
}
#endif
int
mm_answer_keyallowed(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
{
struct sshkey *key = NULL;
char *cuser, *chost;
u_int pubkey_auth_attempt;
enum mm_keytype type = 0;
int r, allowed = 0;
struct sshauthopt *opts = NULL;
debug3("%s entering", __func__);
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &type)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &cuser, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &chost, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshkey_froms(m, &key)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &pubkey_auth_attempt)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
debug3("%s: key_from_blob: %p", __func__, key);
if (key != NULL && authctxt->valid) {
/* These should not make it past the privsep child */
if (sshkey_type_plain(key->type) == KEY_RSA &&
(datafellows & SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5) != 0)
fatal("%s: passed a SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5 key", __func__);
switch (type) {
case MM_USERKEY:
auth_method = "publickey";
if (!options.pubkey_authentication)
break;
if (auth2_key_already_used(authctxt, key))
break;
if (!key_base_type_match(auth_method, key,
options.pubkey_key_types))
break;
allowed = user_key_allowed(ssh, authctxt->pw, key,
pubkey_auth_attempt, &opts);
break;
case MM_HOSTKEY:
auth_method = "hostbased";
if (!options.hostbased_authentication)
break;
if (auth2_key_already_used(authctxt, key))
break;
if (!key_base_type_match(auth_method, key,
options.hostbased_key_types))
break;
allowed = hostbased_key_allowed(ssh, authctxt->pw,
cuser, chost, key);
auth2_record_info(authctxt,
"client user \"%.100s\", client host \"%.100s\"",
cuser, chost);
break;
default:
fatal("%s: unknown key type %d", __func__, type);
break;
}
}
debug3("%s: %s authentication%s: %s key is %s", __func__,
auth_method, pubkey_auth_attempt ? "" : " test",
(key == NULL || !authctxt->valid) ? "invalid" : sshkey_type(key),
allowed ? "allowed" : "not allowed");
auth2_record_key(authctxt, 0, key);
/* clear temporarily storage (used by verify) */
monitor_reset_key_state();
if (allowed) {
/* Save temporarily for comparison in verify */
if ((r = sshkey_to_blob(key, &key_blob, &key_bloblen)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
key_blobtype = type;
key_opts = opts;
hostbased_cuser = cuser;
hostbased_chost = chost;
} else {
/* Log failed attempt */
auth_log(ssh, 0, 0, auth_method, NULL);
free(cuser);
free(chost);
}
sshkey_free(key);
sshbuf_reset(m);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, allowed)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
if (opts != NULL && (r = sshauthopt_serialise(opts, m, 1)) != 0)
fatal("%s: sshauthopt_serialise: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_KEYALLOWED, m);
if (!allowed)
sshauthopt_free(opts);
return (0);
}
static int
-monitor_valid_userblob(u_char *data, u_int datalen)
+monitor_valid_userblob(const u_char *data, u_int datalen)
{
struct sshbuf *b;
const u_char *p;
char *userstyle, *cp;
size_t len;
u_char type;
int r, fail = 0;
- if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: sshbuf_new", __func__);
- if ((r = sshbuf_put(b, data, datalen)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ if ((b = sshbuf_from(data, datalen)) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: sshbuf_from", __func__);
if (datafellows & SSH_OLD_SESSIONID) {
p = sshbuf_ptr(b);
len = sshbuf_len(b);
if ((session_id2 == NULL) ||
(len < session_id2_len) ||
(timingsafe_bcmp(p, session_id2, session_id2_len) != 0))
fail++;
if ((r = sshbuf_consume(b, session_id2_len)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
} else {
if ((r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(b, &p, &len)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
if ((session_id2 == NULL) ||
(len != session_id2_len) ||
(timingsafe_bcmp(p, session_id2, session_id2_len) != 0))
fail++;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(b, &type)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
if (type != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)
fail++;
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &cp, NULL)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
xasprintf(&userstyle, "%s%s%s", authctxt->user,
authctxt->style ? ":" : "",
authctxt->style ? authctxt->style : "");
if (strcmp(userstyle, cp) != 0) {
logit("wrong user name passed to monitor: "
"expected %s != %.100s", userstyle, cp);
fail++;
}
free(userstyle);
free(cp);
if ((r = sshbuf_skip_string(b)) != 0 || /* service */
(r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &cp, NULL)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
if (strcmp("publickey", cp) != 0)
fail++;
free(cp);
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(b, &type)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
if (type == 0)
fail++;
if ((r = sshbuf_skip_string(b)) != 0 || /* pkalg */
(r = sshbuf_skip_string(b)) != 0) /* pkblob */
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
if (sshbuf_len(b) != 0)
fail++;
sshbuf_free(b);
return (fail == 0);
}
static int
-monitor_valid_hostbasedblob(u_char *data, u_int datalen, char *cuser,
- char *chost)
+monitor_valid_hostbasedblob(const u_char *data, u_int datalen,
+ const char *cuser, const char *chost)
{
struct sshbuf *b;
const u_char *p;
char *cp, *userstyle;
size_t len;
int r, fail = 0;
u_char type;
- if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+ if ((b = sshbuf_from(data, datalen)) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new", __func__);
- if ((r = sshbuf_put(b, data, datalen)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(b, &p, &len)) != 0)
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(b, &p, &len)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
if ((session_id2 == NULL) ||
(len != session_id2_len) ||
(timingsafe_bcmp(p, session_id2, session_id2_len) != 0))
fail++;
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(b, &type)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
if (type != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)
fail++;
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &cp, NULL)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
xasprintf(&userstyle, "%s%s%s", authctxt->user,
authctxt->style ? ":" : "",
authctxt->style ? authctxt->style : "");
if (strcmp(userstyle, cp) != 0) {
logit("wrong user name passed to monitor: "
"expected %s != %.100s", userstyle, cp);
fail++;
}
free(userstyle);
free(cp);
if ((r = sshbuf_skip_string(b)) != 0 || /* service */
(r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &cp, NULL)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
if (strcmp(cp, "hostbased") != 0)
fail++;
free(cp);
if ((r = sshbuf_skip_string(b)) != 0 || /* pkalg */
(r = sshbuf_skip_string(b)) != 0) /* pkblob */
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
/* verify client host, strip trailing dot if necessary */
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &cp, NULL)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
if (((len = strlen(cp)) > 0) && cp[len - 1] == '.')
cp[len - 1] = '\0';
if (strcmp(cp, chost) != 0)
fail++;
free(cp);
/* verify client user */
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &cp, NULL)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
if (strcmp(cp, cuser) != 0)
fail++;
free(cp);
if (sshbuf_len(b) != 0)
fail++;
sshbuf_free(b);
return (fail == 0);
}
int
mm_answer_keyverify(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
{
struct sshkey *key;
- u_char *signature, *data, *blob;
- char *sigalg;
+ const u_char *signature, *data, *blob;
+ char *sigalg = NULL, *fp = NULL;
size_t signaturelen, datalen, bloblen;
- int r, ret, valid_data = 0, encoded_ret;
+ int r, ret, req_presence = 0, valid_data = 0, encoded_ret;
+ struct sshkey_sig_details *sig_details = NULL;
- if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(m, &blob, &bloblen)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshbuf_get_string(m, &signature, &signaturelen)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshbuf_get_string(m, &data, &datalen)) != 0 ||
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(m, &blob, &bloblen)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(m, &signature, &signaturelen)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(m, &data, &datalen)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &sigalg, NULL)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
if (hostbased_cuser == NULL || hostbased_chost == NULL ||
!monitor_allowed_key(blob, bloblen))
fatal("%s: bad key, not previously allowed", __func__);
/* Empty signature algorithm means NULL. */
if (*sigalg == '\0') {
free(sigalg);
sigalg = NULL;
}
/* XXX use sshkey_froms here; need to change key_blob, etc. */
if ((r = sshkey_from_blob(blob, bloblen, &key)) != 0)
fatal("%s: bad public key blob: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
switch (key_blobtype) {
case MM_USERKEY:
valid_data = monitor_valid_userblob(data, datalen);
auth_method = "publickey";
break;
case MM_HOSTKEY:
valid_data = monitor_valid_hostbasedblob(data, datalen,
hostbased_cuser, hostbased_chost);
auth_method = "hostbased";
break;
default:
valid_data = 0;
break;
}
if (!valid_data)
fatal("%s: bad signature data blob", __func__);
+ if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, options.fingerprint_hash,
+ SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: sshkey_fingerprint failed", __func__);
+
ret = sshkey_verify(key, signature, signaturelen, data, datalen,
- sigalg, ssh->compat);
- debug3("%s: %s %p signature %s", __func__, auth_method, key,
- (ret == 0) ? "verified" : "unverified");
+ sigalg, ssh->compat, &sig_details);
+ debug3("%s: %s %p signature %s%s%s", __func__, auth_method, key,
+ (ret == 0) ? "verified" : "unverified",
+ (ret != 0) ? ": " : "", (ret != 0) ? ssh_err(ret) : "");
+
+ if (ret == 0 && key_blobtype == MM_USERKEY && sig_details != NULL) {
+ req_presence = (options.pubkey_auth_options &
+ PUBKEYAUTH_TOUCH_REQUIRED) ||
+ !key_opts->no_require_user_presence;
+ if (req_presence &&
+ (sig_details->sk_flags & SSH_SK_USER_PRESENCE_REQD) == 0) {
+ error("public key %s %s signature for %s%s from %.128s "
+ "port %d rejected: user presence "
+ "(authenticator touch) requirement not met ",
+ sshkey_type(key), fp,
+ authctxt->valid ? "" : "invalid user ",
+ authctxt->user, ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh),
+ ssh_remote_port(ssh));
+ ret = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
+ }
+ }
auth2_record_key(authctxt, ret == 0, key);
- free(blob);
- free(signature);
- free(data);
- free(sigalg);
-
if (key_blobtype == MM_USERKEY)
auth_activate_options(ssh, key_opts);
monitor_reset_key_state();
- sshkey_free(key);
sshbuf_reset(m);
/* encode ret != 0 as positive integer, since we're sending u32 */
encoded_ret = (ret != 0);
- if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, encoded_ret)) != 0)
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, encoded_ret)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_u8(m, sig_details != NULL)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ if (sig_details != NULL) {
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, sig_details->sk_counter)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_u8(m, sig_details->sk_flags)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ }
+ sshkey_sig_details_free(sig_details);
mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_KEYVERIFY, m);
+ free(sigalg);
+ free(fp);
+ sshkey_free(key);
+
return ret == 0;
}
static void
mm_record_login(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, struct passwd *pw)
{
socklen_t fromlen;
struct sockaddr_storage from;
/*
* Get IP address of client. If the connection is not a socket, let
* the address be 0.0.0.0.
*/
memset(&from, 0, sizeof(from));
fromlen = sizeof(from);
if (ssh_packet_connection_is_on_socket(ssh)) {
if (getpeername(ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh),
(struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen) == -1) {
debug("getpeername: %.100s", strerror(errno));
cleanup_exit(255);
}
}
/* Record that there was a login on that tty from the remote host. */
record_login(s->pid, s->tty, pw->pw_name, pw->pw_uid,
session_get_remote_name_or_ip(ssh, utmp_len, options.use_dns),
(struct sockaddr *)&from, fromlen);
}
static void
mm_session_close(Session *s)
{
debug3("%s: session %d pid %ld", __func__, s->self, (long)s->pid);
if (s->ttyfd != -1) {
debug3("%s: tty %s ptyfd %d", __func__, s->tty, s->ptyfd);
session_pty_cleanup2(s);
}
session_unused(s->self);
}
int
mm_answer_pty(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
{
extern struct monitor *pmonitor;
Session *s;
int r, res, fd0;
debug3("%s entering", __func__);
sshbuf_reset(m);
s = session_new();
if (s == NULL)
goto error;
s->authctxt = authctxt;
s->pw = authctxt->pw;
s->pid = pmonitor->m_pid;
res = pty_allocate(&s->ptyfd, &s->ttyfd, s->tty, sizeof(s->tty));
if (res == 0)
goto error;
pty_setowner(authctxt->pw, s->tty);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, 1)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, s->tty)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
/* We need to trick ttyslot */
if (dup2(s->ttyfd, 0) == -1)
fatal("%s: dup2", __func__);
mm_record_login(ssh, s, authctxt->pw);
/* Now we can close the file descriptor again */
close(0);
/* send messages generated by record_login */
if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, loginmsg)) != 0)
fatal("%s: put login message: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
sshbuf_reset(loginmsg);
mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PTY, m);
if (mm_send_fd(sock, s->ptyfd) == -1 ||
mm_send_fd(sock, s->ttyfd) == -1)
fatal("%s: send fds failed", __func__);
/* make sure nothing uses fd 0 */
if ((fd0 = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDONLY)) == -1)
fatal("%s: open(/dev/null): %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
if (fd0 != 0)
error("%s: fd0 %d != 0", __func__, fd0);
/* slave is not needed */
close(s->ttyfd);
s->ttyfd = s->ptyfd;
/* no need to dup() because nobody closes ptyfd */
s->ptymaster = s->ptyfd;
debug3("%s: tty %s ptyfd %d", __func__, s->tty, s->ttyfd);
return (0);
error:
if (s != NULL)
mm_session_close(s);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, 0)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_PTY, m);
return (0);
}
int
mm_answer_pty_cleanup(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
{
Session *s;
char *tty;
int r;
debug3("%s entering", __func__);
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &tty, NULL)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
if ((s = session_by_tty(tty)) != NULL)
mm_session_close(s);
sshbuf_reset(m);
free(tty);
return (0);
}
int
mm_answer_term(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *req)
{
extern struct monitor *pmonitor;
int res, status;
debug3("%s: tearing down sessions", __func__);
/* The child is terminating */
session_destroy_all(ssh, &mm_session_close);
#ifdef USE_PAM
if (options.use_pam)
sshpam_cleanup();
#endif
while (waitpid(pmonitor->m_pid, &status, 0) == -1)
if (errno != EINTR)
exit(1);
res = WIFEXITED(status) ? WEXITSTATUS(status) : 1;
/* Terminate process */
exit(res);
}
#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
/* Report that an audit event occurred */
int
mm_answer_audit_event(struct ssh *ssh, int socket, struct sshbuf *m)
{
u_int n;
ssh_audit_event_t event;
int r;
debug3("%s entering", __func__);
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &n)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
event = (ssh_audit_event_t)n;
switch (event) {
case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_PUBKEY:
case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_HOSTBASED:
case SSH_AUTH_FAIL_GSSAPI:
case SSH_LOGIN_EXCEED_MAXTRIES:
case SSH_LOGIN_ROOT_DENIED:
case SSH_CONNECTION_CLOSE:
case SSH_INVALID_USER:
audit_event(ssh, event);
break;
default:
fatal("Audit event type %d not permitted", event);
}
return (0);
}
int
mm_answer_audit_command(struct ssh *ssh, int socket, struct sshbuf *m)
{
char *cmd;
int r;
debug3("%s entering", __func__);
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &cmd, NULL)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
/* sanity check command, if so how? */
audit_run_command(cmd);
free(cmd);
return (0);
}
#endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
void
monitor_clear_keystate(struct ssh *ssh, struct monitor *pmonitor)
{
ssh_clear_newkeys(ssh, MODE_IN);
ssh_clear_newkeys(ssh, MODE_OUT);
sshbuf_free(child_state);
child_state = NULL;
}
void
monitor_apply_keystate(struct ssh *ssh, struct monitor *pmonitor)
{
struct kex *kex;
int r;
debug3("%s: packet_set_state", __func__);
if ((r = ssh_packet_set_state(ssh, child_state)) != 0)
fatal("%s: packet_set_state: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
sshbuf_free(child_state);
child_state = NULL;
if ((kex = ssh->kex) != NULL) {
/* XXX set callbacks */
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1] = kex_gen_server;
kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1] = kex_gen_server;
kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA256] = kex_gen_server;
kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP16_SHA512] = kex_gen_server;
kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP18_SHA512] = kex_gen_server;
kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_server;
kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_server;
# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kex_gen_server;
# endif
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kex_gen_server;
kex->kex[KEX_KEM_SNTRUP4591761X25519_SHA512] = kex_gen_server;
kex->load_host_public_key=&get_hostkey_public_by_type;
kex->load_host_private_key=&get_hostkey_private_by_type;
kex->host_key_index=&get_hostkey_index;
kex->sign = sshd_hostkey_sign;
}
}
/* This function requries careful sanity checking */
void
mm_get_keystate(struct ssh *ssh, struct monitor *pmonitor)
{
debug3("%s: Waiting for new keys", __func__);
if ((child_state = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_sendfd, MONITOR_REQ_KEYEXPORT,
child_state);
debug3("%s: GOT new keys", __func__);
}
/* XXX */
#define FD_CLOSEONEXEC(x) do { \
if (fcntl(x, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC) == -1) \
fatal("fcntl(%d, F_SETFD)", x); \
} while (0)
static void
monitor_openfds(struct monitor *mon, int do_logfds)
{
int pair[2];
#ifdef SO_ZEROIZE
int on = 1;
#endif
if (socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0, pair) == -1)
fatal("%s: socketpair: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
#ifdef SO_ZEROIZE
if (setsockopt(pair[0], SOL_SOCKET, SO_ZEROIZE, &on, sizeof(on)) == -1)
error("setsockopt SO_ZEROIZE(0): %.100s", strerror(errno));
if (setsockopt(pair[1], SOL_SOCKET, SO_ZEROIZE, &on, sizeof(on)) == -1)
error("setsockopt SO_ZEROIZE(1): %.100s", strerror(errno));
#endif
FD_CLOSEONEXEC(pair[0]);
FD_CLOSEONEXEC(pair[1]);
mon->m_recvfd = pair[0];
mon->m_sendfd = pair[1];
if (do_logfds) {
if (pipe(pair) == -1)
fatal("%s: pipe: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
FD_CLOSEONEXEC(pair[0]);
FD_CLOSEONEXEC(pair[1]);
mon->m_log_recvfd = pair[0];
mon->m_log_sendfd = pair[1];
} else
mon->m_log_recvfd = mon->m_log_sendfd = -1;
}
#define MM_MEMSIZE 65536
struct monitor *
monitor_init(void)
{
struct monitor *mon;
mon = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*mon));
monitor_openfds(mon, 1);
return mon;
}
void
monitor_reinit(struct monitor *mon)
{
monitor_openfds(mon, 0);
}
#ifdef GSSAPI
int
mm_answer_gss_setup_ctx(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
{
gss_OID_desc goid;
OM_uint32 major;
size_t len;
u_char *p;
int r;
if (!options.gss_authentication)
fatal("%s: GSSAPI authentication not enabled", __func__);
if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(m, &p, &len)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
goid.elements = p;
goid.length = len;
major = ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(&gsscontext, &goid);
free(goid.elements);
sshbuf_reset(m);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, major)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSETUP, m);
/* Now we have a context, enable the step */
monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, 1);
return (0);
}
int
mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
{
gss_buffer_desc in;
gss_buffer_desc out = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
OM_uint32 major, minor;
OM_uint32 flags = 0; /* GSI needs this */
int r;
if (!options.gss_authentication)
fatal("%s: GSSAPI authentication not enabled", __func__);
if ((r = ssh_gssapi_get_buffer_desc(m, &in)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
major = ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(gsscontext, &in, &out, &flags);
free(in.value);
sshbuf_reset(m);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, major)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_string(m, out.value, out.length)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, flags)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSTEP, m);
gss_release_buffer(&minor, &out);
if (major == GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, 0);
monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, 1);
monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, 1);
}
return (0);
}
int
mm_answer_gss_checkmic(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
{
gss_buffer_desc gssbuf, mic;
OM_uint32 ret;
int r;
if (!options.gss_authentication)
fatal("%s: GSSAPI authentication not enabled", __func__);
if ((r = ssh_gssapi_get_buffer_desc(m, &gssbuf)) != 0 ||
(r = ssh_gssapi_get_buffer_desc(m, &mic)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
ret = ssh_gssapi_checkmic(gsscontext, &gssbuf, &mic);
free(gssbuf.value);
free(mic.value);
sshbuf_reset(m);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, ret)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_GSSCHECKMIC, m);
if (!GSS_ERROR(ret))
monitor_permit(mon_dispatch, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, 1);
return (0);
}
int
mm_answer_gss_userok(struct ssh *ssh, int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
{
int r, authenticated;
const char *displayname;
if (!options.gss_authentication)
fatal("%s: GSSAPI authentication not enabled", __func__);
authenticated = authctxt->valid && ssh_gssapi_userok(authctxt->user);
sshbuf_reset(m);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, authenticated)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
debug3("%s: sending result %d", __func__, authenticated);
mm_request_send(sock, MONITOR_ANS_GSSUSEROK, m);
auth_method = "gssapi-with-mic";
if ((displayname = ssh_gssapi_displayname()) != NULL)
auth2_record_info(authctxt, "%s", displayname);
/* Monitor loop will terminate if authenticated */
return (authenticated);
}
#endif /* GSSAPI */
diff --git a/monitor_wrap.c b/monitor_wrap.c
index 4169b760432a..001a8fa1c99a 100644
--- a/monitor_wrap.c
+++ b/monitor_wrap.c
@@ -1,1000 +1,1015 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: monitor_wrap.c,v 1.113 2019/06/28 13:35:04 deraadt Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: monitor_wrap.c,v 1.117 2019/12/15 18:57:30 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright 2002 Niels Provos <provos@citi.umich.edu>
* Copyright 2002 Markus Friedl <markus@openbsd.org>
* All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/uio.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <pwd.h>
#include <signal.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
#include <openssl/bn.h>
#include <openssl/dh.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#endif
#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "ssh.h"
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
#include "dh.h"
#endif
#include "sshbuf.h"
#include "sshkey.h"
#include "cipher.h"
#include "kex.h"
#include "hostfile.h"
#include "auth.h"
#include "auth-options.h"
#include "packet.h"
#include "mac.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "auth-pam.h"
#include "monitor.h"
#ifdef GSSAPI
#include "ssh-gss.h"
#endif
#include "monitor_wrap.h"
#include "atomicio.h"
#include "monitor_fdpass.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "channels.h"
#include "session.h"
#include "servconf.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
/* Imports */
extern struct monitor *pmonitor;
extern struct sshbuf *loginmsg;
extern ServerOptions options;
void
mm_log_handler(LogLevel level, const char *msg, void *ctx)
{
struct sshbuf *log_msg;
struct monitor *mon = (struct monitor *)ctx;
int r;
size_t len;
if (mon->m_log_sendfd == -1)
fatal("%s: no log channel", __func__);
if ((log_msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(log_msg, 0)) != 0 || /* length; filled below */
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(log_msg, level)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(log_msg, msg)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
if ((len = sshbuf_len(log_msg)) < 4 || len > 0xffffffff)
fatal("%s: bad length %zu", __func__, len);
POKE_U32(sshbuf_mutable_ptr(log_msg), len - 4);
if (atomicio(vwrite, mon->m_log_sendfd,
sshbuf_mutable_ptr(log_msg), len) != len)
fatal("%s: write: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
sshbuf_free(log_msg);
}
int
mm_is_monitor(void)
{
/*
* m_pid is only set in the privileged part, and
* points to the unprivileged child.
*/
return (pmonitor && pmonitor->m_pid > 0);
}
void
mm_request_send(int sock, enum monitor_reqtype type, struct sshbuf *m)
{
size_t mlen = sshbuf_len(m);
u_char buf[5];
debug3("%s entering: type %d", __func__, type);
if (mlen >= 0xffffffff)
fatal("%s: bad length %zu", __func__, mlen);
POKE_U32(buf, mlen + 1);
buf[4] = (u_char) type; /* 1st byte of payload is mesg-type */
if (atomicio(vwrite, sock, buf, sizeof(buf)) != sizeof(buf))
fatal("%s: write: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
if (atomicio(vwrite, sock, sshbuf_mutable_ptr(m), mlen) != mlen)
fatal("%s: write: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
}
void
mm_request_receive(int sock, struct sshbuf *m)
{
u_char buf[4], *p = NULL;
u_int msg_len;
int r;
debug3("%s entering", __func__);
if (atomicio(read, sock, buf, sizeof(buf)) != sizeof(buf)) {
if (errno == EPIPE)
cleanup_exit(255);
fatal("%s: read: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
}
msg_len = PEEK_U32(buf);
if (msg_len > 256 * 1024)
fatal("%s: read: bad msg_len %d", __func__, msg_len);
sshbuf_reset(m);
if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(m, msg_len, &p)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
if (atomicio(read, sock, p, msg_len) != msg_len)
fatal("%s: read: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
}
void
mm_request_receive_expect(int sock, enum monitor_reqtype type, struct sshbuf *m)
{
u_char rtype;
int r;
debug3("%s entering: type %d", __func__, type);
mm_request_receive(sock, m);
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(m, &rtype)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
if (rtype != type)
fatal("%s: read: rtype %d != type %d", __func__,
rtype, type);
}
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
DH *
mm_choose_dh(int min, int nbits, int max)
{
BIGNUM *p, *g;
int r;
u_char success = 0;
struct sshbuf *m;
if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, min)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, nbits)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, max)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_MODULI, m);
debug3("%s: waiting for MONITOR_ANS_MODULI", __func__);
mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_MODULI, m);
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(m, &success)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
if (success == 0)
fatal("%s: MONITOR_ANS_MODULI failed", __func__);
if ((r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(m, &p)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(m, &g)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
debug3("%s: remaining %zu", __func__, sshbuf_len(m));
sshbuf_free(m);
return (dh_new_group(g, p));
}
#endif
int
mm_sshkey_sign(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
- const u_char *data, size_t datalen, const char *hostkey_alg, u_int compat)
+ const u_char *data, size_t datalen, const char *hostkey_alg,
+ const char *sk_provider, u_int compat)
{
struct kex *kex = *pmonitor->m_pkex;
struct sshbuf *m;
u_int ndx = kex->host_key_index(key, 0, ssh);
int r;
debug3("%s entering", __func__);
-
if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, ndx)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_string(m, data, datalen)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, hostkey_alg)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, compat)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_SIGN, m);
debug3("%s: waiting for MONITOR_ANS_SIGN", __func__);
mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_SIGN, m);
if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(m, sigp, lenp)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
sshbuf_free(m);
return (0);
}
struct passwd *
mm_getpwnamallow(struct ssh *ssh, const char *username)
{
struct sshbuf *m;
struct passwd *pw;
size_t len;
u_int i;
ServerOptions *newopts;
int r;
u_char ok;
const u_char *p;
debug3("%s entering", __func__);
if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, username)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_PWNAM, m);
debug3("%s: waiting for MONITOR_ANS_PWNAM", __func__);
mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_PWNAM, m);
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(m, &ok)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
if (ok == 0) {
pw = NULL;
goto out;
}
/* XXX don't like passing struct passwd like this */
pw = xcalloc(sizeof(*pw), 1);
if ((r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(m, &p, &len)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
if (len != sizeof(*pw))
fatal("%s: struct passwd size mismatch", __func__);
memcpy(pw, p, sizeof(*pw));
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &pw->pw_name, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &pw->pw_passwd, NULL)) != 0 ||
#ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_GECOS
(r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &pw->pw_gecos, NULL)) != 0 ||
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_PASSWD_PW_CLASS
(r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &pw->pw_class, NULL)) != 0 ||
#endif
(r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &pw->pw_dir, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &pw->pw_shell, NULL)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
out:
/* copy options block as a Match directive may have changed some */
if ((r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(m, &p, &len)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
if (len != sizeof(*newopts))
fatal("%s: option block size mismatch", __func__);
newopts = xcalloc(sizeof(*newopts), 1);
memcpy(newopts, p, sizeof(*newopts));
#define M_CP_STROPT(x) do { \
if (newopts->x != NULL) { \
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, \
&newopts->x, NULL)) != 0) \
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", \
__func__, ssh_err(r)); \
} \
} while (0)
#define M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(x, nx) do { \
newopts->x = newopts->nx == 0 ? \
NULL : xcalloc(newopts->nx, sizeof(*newopts->x)); \
for (i = 0; i < newopts->nx; i++) { \
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, \
&newopts->x[i], NULL)) != 0) \
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", \
__func__, ssh_err(r)); \
} \
} while (0)
/* See comment in servconf.h */
COPY_MATCH_STRING_OPTS();
#undef M_CP_STROPT
#undef M_CP_STRARRAYOPT
copy_set_server_options(&options, newopts, 1);
log_change_level(options.log_level);
process_permitopen(ssh, &options);
free(newopts);
sshbuf_free(m);
return (pw);
}
char *
mm_auth2_read_banner(void)
{
struct sshbuf *m;
char *banner;
int r;
debug3("%s entering", __func__);
if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, m);
sshbuf_reset(m);
mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd,
MONITOR_ANS_AUTH2_READ_BANNER, m);
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &banner, NULL)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
sshbuf_free(m);
/* treat empty banner as missing banner */
if (strlen(banner) == 0) {
free(banner);
banner = NULL;
}
return (banner);
}
/* Inform the privileged process about service and style */
void
mm_inform_authserv(char *service, char *style)
{
struct sshbuf *m;
int r;
debug3("%s entering", __func__);
if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, service)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, style ? style : "")) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHSERV, m);
sshbuf_free(m);
}
/* Do the password authentication */
int
mm_auth_password(struct ssh *ssh, char *password)
{
struct sshbuf *m;
int r, authenticated = 0;
#ifdef USE_PAM
u_int maxtries = 0;
#endif
debug3("%s entering", __func__);
if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, password)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUTHPASSWORD, m);
debug3("%s: waiting for MONITOR_ANS_AUTHPASSWORD", __func__);
mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd,
MONITOR_ANS_AUTHPASSWORD, m);
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &authenticated)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
#ifdef USE_PAM
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &maxtries)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
if (maxtries > INT_MAX)
fatal("%s: bad maxtries %u", __func__, maxtries);
sshpam_set_maxtries_reached(maxtries);
#endif
sshbuf_free(m);
debug3("%s: user %sauthenticated",
__func__, authenticated ? "" : "not ");
return (authenticated);
}
int
mm_user_key_allowed(struct ssh *ssh, struct passwd *pw, struct sshkey *key,
int pubkey_auth_attempt, struct sshauthopt **authoptp)
{
return (mm_key_allowed(MM_USERKEY, NULL, NULL, key,
pubkey_auth_attempt, authoptp));
}
int
mm_hostbased_key_allowed(struct ssh *ssh, struct passwd *pw,
const char *user, const char *host, struct sshkey *key)
{
return (mm_key_allowed(MM_HOSTKEY, user, host, key, 0, NULL));
}
int
mm_key_allowed(enum mm_keytype type, const char *user, const char *host,
struct sshkey *key, int pubkey_auth_attempt, struct sshauthopt **authoptp)
{
struct sshbuf *m;
int r, allowed = 0;
struct sshauthopt *opts = NULL;
debug3("%s entering", __func__);
if (authoptp != NULL)
*authoptp = NULL;
if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, type)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, user ? user : "")) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, host ? host : "")) != 0 ||
(r = sshkey_puts(key, m)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, pubkey_auth_attempt)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_KEYALLOWED, m);
debug3("%s: waiting for MONITOR_ANS_KEYALLOWED", __func__);
mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd,
MONITOR_ANS_KEYALLOWED, m);
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &allowed)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
if (allowed && type == MM_USERKEY) {
if ((r = sshauthopt_deserialise(m, &opts)) != 0)
fatal("%s: sshauthopt_deserialise: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
}
sshbuf_free(m);
if (authoptp != NULL) {
*authoptp = opts;
opts = NULL;
}
sshauthopt_free(opts);
return allowed;
}
/*
* This key verify needs to send the key type along, because the
* privileged parent makes the decision if the key is allowed
* for authentication.
*/
int
mm_sshkey_verify(const struct sshkey *key, const u_char *sig, size_t siglen,
- const u_char *data, size_t datalen, const char *sigalg, u_int compat)
+ const u_char *data, size_t datalen, const char *sigalg, u_int compat,
+ struct sshkey_sig_details **sig_detailsp)
{
struct sshbuf *m;
u_int encoded_ret = 0;
int r;
+ u_char sig_details_present, flags;
+ u_int counter;
debug3("%s entering", __func__);
-
+ if (sig_detailsp != NULL)
+ *sig_detailsp = NULL;
if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
if ((r = sshkey_puts(key, m)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_string(m, sig, siglen)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_string(m, data, datalen)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, sigalg == NULL ? "" : sigalg)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_KEYVERIFY, m);
debug3("%s: waiting for MONITOR_ANS_KEYVERIFY", __func__);
mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd,
MONITOR_ANS_KEYVERIFY, m);
- if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &encoded_ret)) != 0)
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &encoded_ret)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_u8(m, &sig_details_present)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ if (sig_details_present && encoded_ret == 0) {
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &counter)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_u8(m, &flags)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ if (sig_detailsp != NULL) {
+ *sig_detailsp = xcalloc(1, sizeof(**sig_detailsp));
+ (*sig_detailsp)->sk_counter = counter;
+ (*sig_detailsp)->sk_flags = flags;
+ }
+ }
sshbuf_free(m);
if (encoded_ret != 0)
return SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
return 0;
}
void
mm_send_keystate(struct ssh *ssh, struct monitor *monitor)
{
struct sshbuf *m;
int r;
if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
if ((r = ssh_packet_get_state(ssh, m)) != 0)
fatal("%s: get_state failed: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
mm_request_send(monitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_KEYEXPORT, m);
debug3("%s: Finished sending state", __func__);
sshbuf_free(m);
}
int
mm_pty_allocate(int *ptyfd, int *ttyfd, char *namebuf, size_t namebuflen)
{
struct sshbuf *m;
char *p, *msg;
int success = 0, tmp1 = -1, tmp2 = -1, r;
/* Kludge: ensure there are fds free to receive the pty/tty */
if ((tmp1 = dup(pmonitor->m_recvfd)) == -1 ||
(tmp2 = dup(pmonitor->m_recvfd)) == -1) {
error("%s: cannot allocate fds for pty", __func__);
if (tmp1 > 0)
close(tmp1);
if (tmp2 > 0)
close(tmp2);
return 0;
}
close(tmp1);
close(tmp2);
if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_PTY, m);
debug3("%s: waiting for MONITOR_ANS_PTY", __func__);
mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_PTY, m);
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &success)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
if (success == 0) {
debug3("%s: pty alloc failed", __func__);
sshbuf_free(m);
return (0);
}
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &p, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &msg, NULL)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
sshbuf_free(m);
strlcpy(namebuf, p, namebuflen); /* Possible truncation */
free(p);
if ((r = sshbuf_put(loginmsg, msg, strlen(msg))) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
free(msg);
if ((*ptyfd = mm_receive_fd(pmonitor->m_recvfd)) == -1 ||
(*ttyfd = mm_receive_fd(pmonitor->m_recvfd)) == -1)
fatal("%s: receive fds failed", __func__);
/* Success */
return (1);
}
void
mm_session_pty_cleanup2(Session *s)
{
struct sshbuf *m;
int r;
if (s->ttyfd == -1)
return;
if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, s->tty)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_PTYCLEANUP, m);
sshbuf_free(m);
/* closed dup'ed master */
if (s->ptymaster != -1 && close(s->ptymaster) == -1)
error("close(s->ptymaster/%d): %s",
s->ptymaster, strerror(errno));
/* unlink pty from session */
s->ttyfd = -1;
}
#ifdef USE_PAM
void
mm_start_pam(struct ssh *ssh)
{
struct sshbuf *m;
debug3("%s entering", __func__);
if (!options.use_pam)
fatal("UsePAM=no, but ended up in %s anyway", __func__);
if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_START, m);
sshbuf_free(m);
}
u_int
mm_do_pam_account(void)
{
struct sshbuf *m;
u_int ret;
char *msg;
size_t msglen;
int r;
debug3("%s entering", __func__);
if (!options.use_pam)
fatal("UsePAM=no, but ended up in %s anyway", __func__);
if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_ACCOUNT, m);
mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd,
MONITOR_ANS_PAM_ACCOUNT, m);
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &ret)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &msg, &msglen)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put(loginmsg, msg, msglen)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
free(msg);
sshbuf_free(m);
debug3("%s returning %d", __func__, ret);
return (ret);
}
void *
mm_sshpam_init_ctx(Authctxt *authctxt)
{
struct sshbuf *m;
int r, success;
debug3("%s", __func__);
if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_INIT_CTX, m);
debug3("%s: waiting for MONITOR_ANS_PAM_INIT_CTX", __func__);
mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd,
MONITOR_ANS_PAM_INIT_CTX, m);
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &success)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
if (success == 0) {
debug3("%s: pam_init_ctx failed", __func__);
sshbuf_free(m);
return (NULL);
}
sshbuf_free(m);
return (authctxt);
}
int
mm_sshpam_query(void *ctx, char **name, char **info,
u_int *num, char ***prompts, u_int **echo_on)
{
struct sshbuf *m;
u_int i, n;
int r, ret;
debug3("%s", __func__);
if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_QUERY, m);
debug3("%s: waiting for MONITOR_ANS_PAM_QUERY", __func__);
mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_PAM_QUERY, m);
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &ret)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, name, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, info, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &n)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, num)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
debug3("%s: pam_query returned %d", __func__, ret);
sshpam_set_maxtries_reached(n);
if (*num > PAM_MAX_NUM_MSG)
fatal("%s: received %u PAM messages, expected <= %u",
__func__, *num, PAM_MAX_NUM_MSG);
*prompts = xcalloc((*num + 1), sizeof(char *));
*echo_on = xcalloc((*num + 1), sizeof(u_int));
for (i = 0; i < *num; ++i) {
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &((*prompts)[i]), NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &((*echo_on)[i]))) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
}
sshbuf_free(m);
return (ret);
}
int
mm_sshpam_respond(void *ctx, u_int num, char **resp)
{
struct sshbuf *m;
u_int n, i;
int r, ret;
debug3("%s", __func__);
if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, num)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
for (i = 0; i < num; ++i) {
if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, resp[i])) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
}
mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_RESPOND, m);
debug3("%s: waiting for MONITOR_ANS_PAM_RESPOND", __func__);
mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd,
MONITOR_ANS_PAM_RESPOND, m);
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &n)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
ret = (int)n; /* XXX */
debug3("%s: pam_respond returned %d", __func__, ret);
sshbuf_free(m);
return (ret);
}
void
mm_sshpam_free_ctx(void *ctxtp)
{
struct sshbuf *m;
debug3("%s", __func__);
if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_PAM_FREE_CTX, m);
debug3("%s: waiting for MONITOR_ANS_PAM_FREE_CTX", __func__);
mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd,
MONITOR_ANS_PAM_FREE_CTX, m);
sshbuf_free(m);
}
#endif /* USE_PAM */
/* Request process termination */
void
mm_terminate(void)
{
struct sshbuf *m;
if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_TERM, m);
sshbuf_free(m);
}
static void
mm_chall_setup(char **name, char **infotxt, u_int *numprompts,
char ***prompts, u_int **echo_on)
{
*name = xstrdup("");
*infotxt = xstrdup("");
*numprompts = 1;
*prompts = xcalloc(*numprompts, sizeof(char *));
*echo_on = xcalloc(*numprompts, sizeof(u_int));
(*echo_on)[0] = 0;
}
int
mm_bsdauth_query(void *ctx, char **name, char **infotxt,
u_int *numprompts, char ***prompts, u_int **echo_on)
{
struct sshbuf *m;
u_int success;
char *challenge;
int r;
debug3("%s: entering", __func__);
if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHQUERY, m);
mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd,
MONITOR_ANS_BSDAUTHQUERY, m);
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &success)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
if (success == 0) {
debug3("%s: no challenge", __func__);
sshbuf_free(m);
return (-1);
}
/* Get the challenge, and format the response */
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &challenge, NULL)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
sshbuf_free(m);
mm_chall_setup(name, infotxt, numprompts, prompts, echo_on);
(*prompts)[0] = challenge;
debug3("%s: received challenge: %s", __func__, challenge);
return (0);
}
int
mm_bsdauth_respond(void *ctx, u_int numresponses, char **responses)
{
struct sshbuf *m;
int r, authok;
debug3("%s: entering", __func__);
if (numresponses != 1)
return (-1);
if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, responses[0])) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_BSDAUTHRESPOND, m);
mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd,
MONITOR_ANS_BSDAUTHRESPOND, m);
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &authok)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
sshbuf_free(m);
return ((authok == 0) ? -1 : 0);
}
#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
void
mm_audit_event(struct ssh *ssh, ssh_audit_event_t event)
{
struct sshbuf *m;
int r;
debug3("%s entering", __func__);
if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, event)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_EVENT, m);
sshbuf_free(m);
}
void
mm_audit_run_command(const char *command)
{
struct sshbuf *m;
int r;
debug3("%s entering command %s", __func__, command);
if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, command)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_AUDIT_COMMAND, m);
sshbuf_free(m);
}
#endif /* SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS */
#ifdef GSSAPI
OM_uint32
mm_ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **ctx, gss_OID goid)
{
struct sshbuf *m;
OM_uint32 major;
int r;
/* Client doesn't get to see the context */
*ctx = NULL;
if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(m, goid->elements, goid->length)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSETUP, m);
mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSETUP, m);
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &major)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
sshbuf_free(m);
return (major);
}
OM_uint32
mm_ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_desc *in,
gss_buffer_desc *out, OM_uint32 *flagsp)
{
struct sshbuf *m;
OM_uint32 major;
u_int flags;
int r;
if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(m, in->value, in->length)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_GSSSTEP, m);
mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_ANS_GSSSTEP, m);
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &major)) != 0 ||
(r = ssh_gssapi_get_buffer_desc(m, out)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
if (flagsp != NULL) {
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &flags)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
*flagsp = flags;
}
sshbuf_free(m);
return (major);
}
OM_uint32
mm_ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *ctx, gss_buffer_t gssbuf, gss_buffer_t gssmic)
{
struct sshbuf *m;
OM_uint32 major;
int r;
if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(m, gssbuf->value, gssbuf->length)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_string(m, gssmic->value, gssmic->length)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_GSSCHECKMIC, m);
mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd,
MONITOR_ANS_GSSCHECKMIC, m);
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &major)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
sshbuf_free(m);
return(major);
}
int
mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user)
{
struct sshbuf *m;
int r, authenticated = 0;
if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
mm_request_send(pmonitor->m_recvfd, MONITOR_REQ_GSSUSEROK, m);
mm_request_receive_expect(pmonitor->m_recvfd,
MONITOR_ANS_GSSUSEROK, m);
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &authenticated)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
sshbuf_free(m);
debug3("%s: user %sauthenticated",__func__, authenticated ? "" : "not ");
return (authenticated);
}
#endif /* GSSAPI */
diff --git a/monitor_wrap.h b/monitor_wrap.h
index 191277f3afb5..23ab096aa6de 100644
--- a/monitor_wrap.h
+++ b/monitor_wrap.h
@@ -1,100 +1,101 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: monitor_wrap.h,v 1.42 2019/09/06 05:23:55 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: monitor_wrap.h,v 1.44 2019/11/25 00:51:37 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright 2002 Niels Provos <provos@citi.umich.edu>
* All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#ifndef _MM_WRAP_H_
#define _MM_WRAP_H_
extern int use_privsep;
#define PRIVSEP(x) (use_privsep ? mm_##x : x)
enum mm_keytype { MM_NOKEY, MM_HOSTKEY, MM_USERKEY };
struct ssh;
struct monitor;
struct Authctxt;
struct sshkey;
struct sshauthopt;
+struct sshkey_sig_details;
void mm_log_handler(LogLevel, const char *, void *);
int mm_is_monitor(void);
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
DH *mm_choose_dh(int, int, int);
#endif
int mm_sshkey_sign(struct ssh *, struct sshkey *, u_char **, size_t *,
- const u_char *, size_t, const char *, u_int compat);
+ const u_char *, size_t, const char *, const char *, u_int compat);
void mm_inform_authserv(char *, char *);
struct passwd *mm_getpwnamallow(struct ssh *, const char *);
char *mm_auth2_read_banner(void);
int mm_auth_password(struct ssh *, char *);
int mm_key_allowed(enum mm_keytype, const char *, const char *, struct sshkey *,
int, struct sshauthopt **);
int mm_user_key_allowed(struct ssh *, struct passwd *, struct sshkey *, int,
struct sshauthopt **);
int mm_hostbased_key_allowed(struct ssh *, struct passwd *, const char *,
const char *, struct sshkey *);
int mm_sshkey_verify(const struct sshkey *, const u_char *, size_t,
- const u_char *, size_t, const char *, u_int);
+ const u_char *, size_t, const char *, u_int, struct sshkey_sig_details **);
#ifdef GSSAPI
OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_server_ctx(Gssctxt **, gss_OID);
OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx(Gssctxt *,
gss_buffer_desc *, gss_buffer_desc *, OM_uint32 *);
int mm_ssh_gssapi_userok(char *user);
OM_uint32 mm_ssh_gssapi_checkmic(Gssctxt *, gss_buffer_t, gss_buffer_t);
#endif
#ifdef USE_PAM
void mm_start_pam(struct ssh *ssh);
u_int mm_do_pam_account(void);
void *mm_sshpam_init_ctx(struct Authctxt *);
int mm_sshpam_query(void *, char **, char **, u_int *, char ***, u_int **);
int mm_sshpam_respond(void *, u_int, char **);
void mm_sshpam_free_ctx(void *);
#endif
#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
#include "audit.h"
void mm_audit_event(struct ssh *, ssh_audit_event_t);
void mm_audit_run_command(const char *);
#endif
struct Session;
void mm_terminate(void);
int mm_pty_allocate(int *, int *, char *, size_t);
void mm_session_pty_cleanup2(struct Session *);
/* Key export functions */
struct newkeys *mm_newkeys_from_blob(u_char *, int);
int mm_newkeys_to_blob(int, u_char **, u_int *);
void mm_send_keystate(struct ssh *, struct monitor*);
/* bsdauth */
int mm_bsdauth_query(void *, char **, char **, u_int *, char ***, u_int **);
int mm_bsdauth_respond(void *, u_int, char **);
#endif /* _MM_WRAP_H_ */
diff --git a/msg.c b/msg.c
index 1bd20f3d305b..99c25cd25271 100644
--- a/msg.c
+++ b/msg.c
@@ -1,94 +1,94 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: msg.c,v 1.17 2018/07/09 21:59:10 markus Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: msg.c,v 1.18 2020/01/22 04:49:16 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2002 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/uio.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include "sshbuf.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "atomicio.h"
#include "msg.h"
#include "misc.h"
int
ssh_msg_send(int fd, u_char type, struct sshbuf *m)
{
u_char buf[5];
u_int mlen = sshbuf_len(m);
- debug3("ssh_msg_send: type %u", (unsigned int)type & 0xff);
+ debug3("%s: type %u", __func__, (unsigned int)type & 0xff);
put_u32(buf, mlen + 1);
buf[4] = type; /* 1st byte of payload is mesg-type */
if (atomicio(vwrite, fd, buf, sizeof(buf)) != sizeof(buf)) {
- error("ssh_msg_send: write");
+ error("%s: write: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
return (-1);
}
if (atomicio(vwrite, fd, sshbuf_mutable_ptr(m), mlen) != mlen) {
- error("ssh_msg_send: write");
+ error("%s: write: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
return (-1);
}
return (0);
}
int
ssh_msg_recv(int fd, struct sshbuf *m)
{
u_char buf[4], *p;
u_int msg_len;
int r;
debug3("ssh_msg_recv entering");
if (atomicio(read, fd, buf, sizeof(buf)) != sizeof(buf)) {
if (errno != EPIPE)
- error("ssh_msg_recv: read: header");
+ error("%s: read header: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
return (-1);
}
msg_len = get_u32(buf);
if (msg_len > 256 * 1024) {
- error("ssh_msg_recv: read: bad msg_len %u", msg_len);
+ error("%s: read: bad msg_len %u", __func__, msg_len);
return (-1);
}
sshbuf_reset(m);
if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(m, msg_len, &p)) != 0) {
error("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
return -1;
}
if (atomicio(read, fd, p, msg_len) != msg_len) {
- error("ssh_msg_recv: read: %s", strerror(errno));
+ error("%s: read: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
return (-1);
}
return (0);
}
diff --git a/mux.c b/mux.c
index f3ea11cdc32c..5efc849c4b3c 100644
--- a/mux.c
+++ b/mux.c
@@ -1,2401 +1,2401 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: mux.c,v 1.80 2019/06/28 13:35:04 deraadt Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: mux.c,v 1.81 2020/01/23 07:10:22 dtucker Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2002-2008 Damien Miller <djm@openbsd.org>
*
* Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
* copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
* WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
* ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
* WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
* ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
* OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
*/
/* ssh session multiplexing support */
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <sys/un.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <signal.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <stddef.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
#include <paths.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_POLL_H
#include <poll.h>
#else
# ifdef HAVE_SYS_POLL_H
# include <sys/poll.h>
# endif
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_UTIL_H
# include <util.h>
#endif
#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "ssh.h"
#include "ssh2.h"
#include "pathnames.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "match.h"
#include "sshbuf.h"
#include "channels.h"
#include "msg.h"
#include "packet.h"
#include "monitor_fdpass.h"
#include "sshpty.h"
#include "sshkey.h"
#include "readconf.h"
#include "clientloop.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
/* from ssh.c */
extern int tty_flag;
extern Options options;
extern int stdin_null_flag;
extern char *host;
extern int subsystem_flag;
extern struct sshbuf *command;
extern volatile sig_atomic_t quit_pending;
/* Context for session open confirmation callback */
struct mux_session_confirm_ctx {
u_int want_tty;
u_int want_subsys;
u_int want_x_fwd;
u_int want_agent_fwd;
struct sshbuf *cmd;
char *term;
struct termios tio;
char **env;
u_int rid;
};
/* Context for stdio fwd open confirmation callback */
struct mux_stdio_confirm_ctx {
u_int rid;
};
/* Context for global channel callback */
struct mux_channel_confirm_ctx {
u_int cid; /* channel id */
u_int rid; /* request id */
int fid; /* forward id */
};
/* fd to control socket */
int muxserver_sock = -1;
/* client request id */
u_int muxclient_request_id = 0;
/* Multiplexing control command */
u_int muxclient_command = 0;
/* Set when signalled. */
static volatile sig_atomic_t muxclient_terminate = 0;
/* PID of multiplex server */
static u_int muxserver_pid = 0;
static Channel *mux_listener_channel = NULL;
struct mux_master_state {
int hello_rcvd;
};
/* mux protocol messages */
#define MUX_MSG_HELLO 0x00000001
#define MUX_C_NEW_SESSION 0x10000002
#define MUX_C_ALIVE_CHECK 0x10000004
#define MUX_C_TERMINATE 0x10000005
#define MUX_C_OPEN_FWD 0x10000006
#define MUX_C_CLOSE_FWD 0x10000007
#define MUX_C_NEW_STDIO_FWD 0x10000008
#define MUX_C_STOP_LISTENING 0x10000009
#define MUX_C_PROXY 0x1000000f
#define MUX_S_OK 0x80000001
#define MUX_S_PERMISSION_DENIED 0x80000002
#define MUX_S_FAILURE 0x80000003
#define MUX_S_EXIT_MESSAGE 0x80000004
#define MUX_S_ALIVE 0x80000005
#define MUX_S_SESSION_OPENED 0x80000006
#define MUX_S_REMOTE_PORT 0x80000007
#define MUX_S_TTY_ALLOC_FAIL 0x80000008
#define MUX_S_PROXY 0x8000000f
/* type codes for MUX_C_OPEN_FWD and MUX_C_CLOSE_FWD */
#define MUX_FWD_LOCAL 1
#define MUX_FWD_REMOTE 2
#define MUX_FWD_DYNAMIC 3
static void mux_session_confirm(struct ssh *, int, int, void *);
static void mux_stdio_confirm(struct ssh *, int, int, void *);
static int mux_master_process_hello(struct ssh *, u_int,
Channel *, struct sshbuf *, struct sshbuf *);
static int mux_master_process_new_session(struct ssh *, u_int,
Channel *, struct sshbuf *, struct sshbuf *);
static int mux_master_process_alive_check(struct ssh *, u_int,
Channel *, struct sshbuf *, struct sshbuf *);
static int mux_master_process_terminate(struct ssh *, u_int,
Channel *, struct sshbuf *, struct sshbuf *);
static int mux_master_process_open_fwd(struct ssh *, u_int,
Channel *, struct sshbuf *, struct sshbuf *);
static int mux_master_process_close_fwd(struct ssh *, u_int,
Channel *, struct sshbuf *, struct sshbuf *);
static int mux_master_process_stdio_fwd(struct ssh *, u_int,
Channel *, struct sshbuf *, struct sshbuf *);
static int mux_master_process_stop_listening(struct ssh *, u_int,
Channel *, struct sshbuf *, struct sshbuf *);
static int mux_master_process_proxy(struct ssh *, u_int,
Channel *, struct sshbuf *, struct sshbuf *);
static const struct {
u_int type;
int (*handler)(struct ssh *, u_int, Channel *,
struct sshbuf *, struct sshbuf *);
} mux_master_handlers[] = {
{ MUX_MSG_HELLO, mux_master_process_hello },
{ MUX_C_NEW_SESSION, mux_master_process_new_session },
{ MUX_C_ALIVE_CHECK, mux_master_process_alive_check },
{ MUX_C_TERMINATE, mux_master_process_terminate },
{ MUX_C_OPEN_FWD, mux_master_process_open_fwd },
{ MUX_C_CLOSE_FWD, mux_master_process_close_fwd },
{ MUX_C_NEW_STDIO_FWD, mux_master_process_stdio_fwd },
{ MUX_C_STOP_LISTENING, mux_master_process_stop_listening },
{ MUX_C_PROXY, mux_master_process_proxy },
{ 0, NULL }
};
/* Cleanup callback fired on closure of mux slave _session_ channel */
/* ARGSUSED */
static void
mux_master_session_cleanup_cb(struct ssh *ssh, int cid, void *unused)
{
Channel *cc, *c = channel_by_id(ssh, cid);
debug3("%s: entering for channel %d", __func__, cid);
if (c == NULL)
fatal("%s: channel_by_id(%i) == NULL", __func__, cid);
if (c->ctl_chan != -1) {
if ((cc = channel_by_id(ssh, c->ctl_chan)) == NULL)
fatal("%s: channel %d missing control channel %d",
__func__, c->self, c->ctl_chan);
c->ctl_chan = -1;
cc->remote_id = 0;
cc->have_remote_id = 0;
chan_rcvd_oclose(ssh, cc);
}
channel_cancel_cleanup(ssh, c->self);
}
/* Cleanup callback fired on closure of mux slave _control_ channel */
/* ARGSUSED */
static void
mux_master_control_cleanup_cb(struct ssh *ssh, int cid, void *unused)
{
Channel *sc, *c = channel_by_id(ssh, cid);
debug3("%s: entering for channel %d", __func__, cid);
if (c == NULL)
fatal("%s: channel_by_id(%i) == NULL", __func__, cid);
if (c->have_remote_id) {
if ((sc = channel_by_id(ssh, c->remote_id)) == NULL)
fatal("%s: channel %d missing session channel %u",
__func__, c->self, c->remote_id);
c->remote_id = 0;
c->have_remote_id = 0;
sc->ctl_chan = -1;
if (sc->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN &&
sc->type != SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING) {
debug2("%s: channel %d: not open", __func__, sc->self);
chan_mark_dead(ssh, sc);
} else {
if (sc->istate == CHAN_INPUT_OPEN)
chan_read_failed(ssh, sc);
if (sc->ostate == CHAN_OUTPUT_OPEN)
chan_write_failed(ssh, sc);
}
}
channel_cancel_cleanup(ssh, c->self);
}
/* Check mux client environment variables before passing them to mux master. */
static int
env_permitted(char *env)
{
int i, ret;
char name[1024], *cp;
if ((cp = strchr(env, '=')) == NULL || cp == env)
return 0;
ret = snprintf(name, sizeof(name), "%.*s", (int)(cp - env), env);
if (ret <= 0 || (size_t)ret >= sizeof(name)) {
error("%s: name '%.100s...' too long", __func__, env);
return 0;
}
for (i = 0; i < options.num_send_env; i++)
if (match_pattern(name, options.send_env[i]))
return 1;
return 0;
}
/* Mux master protocol message handlers */
static int
mux_master_process_hello(struct ssh *ssh, u_int rid,
Channel *c, struct sshbuf *m, struct sshbuf *reply)
{
u_int ver;
struct mux_master_state *state = (struct mux_master_state *)c->mux_ctx;
int r;
if (state == NULL)
fatal("%s: channel %d: c->mux_ctx == NULL", __func__, c->self);
if (state->hello_rcvd) {
error("%s: HELLO received twice", __func__);
return -1;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &ver)) != 0) {
error("%s: malformed message: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
return -1;
}
if (ver != SSHMUX_VER) {
error("%s: unsupported multiplexing protocol version %u "
"(expected %u)", __func__, ver, SSHMUX_VER);
return -1;
}
debug2("%s: channel %d slave version %u", __func__, c->self, ver);
/* No extensions are presently defined */
while (sshbuf_len(m) > 0) {
char *name = NULL;
size_t value_len = 0;
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &name, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(m, NULL, &value_len)) != 0) {
error("%s: malformed extension: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
return -1;
}
debug2("%s: Unrecognised extension \"%s\" length %zu",
__func__, name, value_len);
free(name);
}
state->hello_rcvd = 1;
return 0;
}
/* Enqueue a "ok" response to the reply buffer */
static void
reply_ok(struct sshbuf *reply, u_int rid)
{
int r;
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(reply, MUX_S_OK)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(reply, rid)) != 0)
fatal("%s: reply: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
}
/* Enqueue an error response to the reply buffer */
static void
reply_error(struct sshbuf *reply, u_int type, u_int rid, const char *msg)
{
int r;
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(reply, type)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(reply, rid)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(reply, msg)) != 0)
fatal("%s: reply: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
}
static int
mux_master_process_new_session(struct ssh *ssh, u_int rid,
Channel *c, struct sshbuf *m, struct sshbuf *reply)
{
Channel *nc;
struct mux_session_confirm_ctx *cctx;
char *cmd, *cp;
u_int i, j, env_len, escape_char, window, packetmax;
int r, new_fd[3];
/* Reply for SSHMUX_COMMAND_OPEN */
cctx = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*cctx));
cctx->term = NULL;
cctx->rid = rid;
cmd = NULL;
cctx->env = NULL;
env_len = 0;
if ((r = sshbuf_skip_string(m)) != 0 || /* reserved */
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &cctx->want_tty)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &cctx->want_x_fwd)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &cctx->want_agent_fwd)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &cctx->want_subsys)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &escape_char)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &cctx->term, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &cmd, NULL)) != 0) {
malf:
free(cmd);
for (j = 0; j < env_len; j++)
free(cctx->env[j]);
free(cctx->env);
free(cctx->term);
free(cctx);
error("%s: malformed message", __func__);
return -1;
}
#define MUX_MAX_ENV_VARS 4096
while (sshbuf_len(m) > 0) {
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &cp, NULL)) != 0)
goto malf;
if (!env_permitted(cp)) {
free(cp);
continue;
}
cctx->env = xreallocarray(cctx->env, env_len + 2,
sizeof(*cctx->env));
cctx->env[env_len++] = cp;
cctx->env[env_len] = NULL;
if (env_len > MUX_MAX_ENV_VARS) {
error("%s: >%d environment variables received, "
"ignoring additional", __func__, MUX_MAX_ENV_VARS);
break;
}
}
debug2("%s: channel %d: request tty %d, X %d, agent %d, subsys %d, "
"term \"%s\", cmd \"%s\", env %u", __func__, c->self,
cctx->want_tty, cctx->want_x_fwd, cctx->want_agent_fwd,
cctx->want_subsys, cctx->term, cmd, env_len);
if ((cctx->cmd = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new", __func__);
if ((r = sshbuf_put(cctx->cmd, cmd, strlen(cmd))) != 0)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_put: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
free(cmd);
cmd = NULL;
/* Gather fds from client */
for(i = 0; i < 3; i++) {
if ((new_fd[i] = mm_receive_fd(c->sock)) == -1) {
error("%s: failed to receive fd %d from slave",
__func__, i);
for (j = 0; j < i; j++)
close(new_fd[j]);
for (j = 0; j < env_len; j++)
free(cctx->env[j]);
free(cctx->env);
free(cctx->term);
sshbuf_free(cctx->cmd);
free(cctx);
reply_error(reply, MUX_S_FAILURE, rid,
"did not receive file descriptors");
return -1;
}
}
debug3("%s: got fds stdin %d, stdout %d, stderr %d", __func__,
new_fd[0], new_fd[1], new_fd[2]);
/* XXX support multiple child sessions in future */
if (c->have_remote_id) {
debug2("%s: session already open", __func__);
reply_error(reply, MUX_S_FAILURE, rid,
"Multiple sessions not supported");
cleanup:
close(new_fd[0]);
close(new_fd[1]);
close(new_fd[2]);
free(cctx->term);
if (env_len != 0) {
for (i = 0; i < env_len; i++)
free(cctx->env[i]);
free(cctx->env);
}
sshbuf_free(cctx->cmd);
free(cctx);
return 0;
}
if (options.control_master == SSHCTL_MASTER_ASK ||
options.control_master == SSHCTL_MASTER_AUTO_ASK) {
if (!ask_permission("Allow shared connection to %s? ", host)) {
debug2("%s: session refused by user", __func__);
reply_error(reply, MUX_S_PERMISSION_DENIED, rid,
"Permission denied");
goto cleanup;
}
}
/* Try to pick up ttymodes from client before it goes raw */
if (cctx->want_tty && tcgetattr(new_fd[0], &cctx->tio) == -1)
error("%s: tcgetattr: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
/* enable nonblocking unless tty */
if (!isatty(new_fd[0]))
set_nonblock(new_fd[0]);
if (!isatty(new_fd[1]))
set_nonblock(new_fd[1]);
if (!isatty(new_fd[2]))
set_nonblock(new_fd[2]);
window = CHAN_SES_WINDOW_DEFAULT;
packetmax = CHAN_SES_PACKET_DEFAULT;
if (cctx->want_tty) {
window >>= 1;
packetmax >>= 1;
}
nc = channel_new(ssh, "session", SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING,
new_fd[0], new_fd[1], new_fd[2], window, packetmax,
CHAN_EXTENDED_WRITE, "client-session", /*nonblock*/0);
nc->ctl_chan = c->self; /* link session -> control channel */
c->remote_id = nc->self; /* link control -> session channel */
c->have_remote_id = 1;
if (cctx->want_tty && escape_char != 0xffffffff) {
channel_register_filter(ssh, nc->self,
client_simple_escape_filter, NULL,
client_filter_cleanup,
client_new_escape_filter_ctx((int)escape_char));
}
debug2("%s: channel_new: %d linked to control channel %d",
__func__, nc->self, nc->ctl_chan);
channel_send_open(ssh, nc->self);
channel_register_open_confirm(ssh, nc->self, mux_session_confirm, cctx);
c->mux_pause = 1; /* stop handling messages until open_confirm done */
channel_register_cleanup(ssh, nc->self,
mux_master_session_cleanup_cb, 1);
/* reply is deferred, sent by mux_session_confirm */
return 0;
}
static int
mux_master_process_alive_check(struct ssh *ssh, u_int rid,
Channel *c, struct sshbuf *m, struct sshbuf *reply)
{
int r;
debug2("%s: channel %d: alive check", __func__, c->self);
/* prepare reply */
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(reply, MUX_S_ALIVE)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(reply, rid)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(reply, (u_int)getpid())) != 0)
fatal("%s: reply: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
return 0;
}
static int
mux_master_process_terminate(struct ssh *ssh, u_int rid,
Channel *c, struct sshbuf *m, struct sshbuf *reply)
{
debug2("%s: channel %d: terminate request", __func__, c->self);
if (options.control_master == SSHCTL_MASTER_ASK ||
options.control_master == SSHCTL_MASTER_AUTO_ASK) {
if (!ask_permission("Terminate shared connection to %s? ",
host)) {
debug2("%s: termination refused by user", __func__);
reply_error(reply, MUX_S_PERMISSION_DENIED, rid,
"Permission denied");
return 0;
}
}
quit_pending = 1;
reply_ok(reply, rid);
/* XXX exit happens too soon - message never makes it to client */
return 0;
}
static char *
format_forward(u_int ftype, struct Forward *fwd)
{
char *ret;
switch (ftype) {
case MUX_FWD_LOCAL:
xasprintf(&ret, "local forward %.200s:%d -> %.200s:%d",
(fwd->listen_path != NULL) ? fwd->listen_path :
(fwd->listen_host == NULL) ?
(options.fwd_opts.gateway_ports ? "*" : "LOCALHOST") :
fwd->listen_host, fwd->listen_port,
(fwd->connect_path != NULL) ? fwd->connect_path :
fwd->connect_host, fwd->connect_port);
break;
case MUX_FWD_DYNAMIC:
xasprintf(&ret, "dynamic forward %.200s:%d -> *",
(fwd->listen_host == NULL) ?
(options.fwd_opts.gateway_ports ? "*" : "LOCALHOST") :
fwd->listen_host, fwd->listen_port);
break;
case MUX_FWD_REMOTE:
xasprintf(&ret, "remote forward %.200s:%d -> %.200s:%d",
(fwd->listen_path != NULL) ? fwd->listen_path :
(fwd->listen_host == NULL) ?
"LOCALHOST" : fwd->listen_host,
fwd->listen_port,
(fwd->connect_path != NULL) ? fwd->connect_path :
fwd->connect_host, fwd->connect_port);
break;
default:
fatal("%s: unknown forward type %u", __func__, ftype);
}
return ret;
}
static int
compare_host(const char *a, const char *b)
{
if (a == NULL && b == NULL)
return 1;
if (a == NULL || b == NULL)
return 0;
return strcmp(a, b) == 0;
}
static int
compare_forward(struct Forward *a, struct Forward *b)
{
if (!compare_host(a->listen_host, b->listen_host))
return 0;
if (!compare_host(a->listen_path, b->listen_path))
return 0;
if (a->listen_port != b->listen_port)
return 0;
if (!compare_host(a->connect_host, b->connect_host))
return 0;
if (!compare_host(a->connect_path, b->connect_path))
return 0;
if (a->connect_port != b->connect_port)
return 0;
return 1;
}
static void
mux_confirm_remote_forward(struct ssh *ssh, int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
{
struct mux_channel_confirm_ctx *fctx = ctxt;
char *failmsg = NULL;
struct Forward *rfwd;
Channel *c;
struct sshbuf *out;
u_int port;
int r;
if ((c = channel_by_id(ssh, fctx->cid)) == NULL) {
/* no channel for reply */
error("%s: unknown channel", __func__);
return;
}
if ((out = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new", __func__);
if (fctx->fid >= options.num_remote_forwards ||
(options.remote_forwards[fctx->fid].connect_path == NULL &&
options.remote_forwards[fctx->fid].connect_host == NULL)) {
xasprintf(&failmsg, "unknown forwarding id %d", fctx->fid);
goto fail;
}
rfwd = &options.remote_forwards[fctx->fid];
debug("%s: %s for: listen %d, connect %s:%d", __func__,
type == SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS ? "success" : "failure",
rfwd->listen_port, rfwd->connect_path ? rfwd->connect_path :
rfwd->connect_host, rfwd->connect_port);
if (type == SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS) {
if (rfwd->listen_port == 0) {
if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &port)) != 0)
fatal("%s: packet error: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
if (port > 65535) {
fatal("Invalid allocated port %u for "
"mux remote forward to %s:%d", port,
rfwd->connect_host, rfwd->connect_port);
}
rfwd->allocated_port = (int)port;
debug("Allocated port %u for mux remote forward"
" to %s:%d", rfwd->allocated_port,
rfwd->connect_host, rfwd->connect_port);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(out,
MUX_S_REMOTE_PORT)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(out, fctx->rid)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(out,
rfwd->allocated_port)) != 0)
fatal("%s: reply: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
channel_update_permission(ssh, rfwd->handle,
rfwd->allocated_port);
} else {
reply_ok(out, fctx->rid);
}
goto out;
} else {
if (rfwd->listen_port == 0)
channel_update_permission(ssh, rfwd->handle, -1);
if (rfwd->listen_path != NULL)
xasprintf(&failmsg, "remote port forwarding failed for "
"listen path %s", rfwd->listen_path);
else
xasprintf(&failmsg, "remote port forwarding failed for "
"listen port %d", rfwd->listen_port);
debug2("%s: clearing registered forwarding for listen %d, "
"connect %s:%d", __func__, rfwd->listen_port,
rfwd->connect_path ? rfwd->connect_path :
rfwd->connect_host, rfwd->connect_port);
free(rfwd->listen_host);
free(rfwd->listen_path);
free(rfwd->connect_host);
free(rfwd->connect_path);
memset(rfwd, 0, sizeof(*rfwd));
}
fail:
error("%s: %s", __func__, failmsg);
reply_error(out, MUX_S_FAILURE, fctx->rid, failmsg);
free(failmsg);
out:
if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(c->output, out)) != 0)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_put_stringb: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
sshbuf_free(out);
if (c->mux_pause <= 0)
fatal("%s: mux_pause %d", __func__, c->mux_pause);
c->mux_pause = 0; /* start processing messages again */
}
static int
mux_master_process_open_fwd(struct ssh *ssh, u_int rid,
Channel *c, struct sshbuf *m, struct sshbuf *reply)
{
struct Forward fwd;
char *fwd_desc = NULL;
char *listen_addr, *connect_addr;
u_int ftype;
u_int lport, cport;
int r, i, ret = 0, freefwd = 1;
memset(&fwd, 0, sizeof(fwd));
/* XXX - lport/cport check redundant */
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &ftype)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &listen_addr, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &lport)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &connect_addr, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &cport)) != 0 ||
(lport != (u_int)PORT_STREAMLOCAL && lport > 65535) ||
(cport != (u_int)PORT_STREAMLOCAL && cport > 65535)) {
error("%s: malformed message", __func__);
ret = -1;
goto out;
}
if (*listen_addr == '\0') {
free(listen_addr);
listen_addr = NULL;
}
if (*connect_addr == '\0') {
free(connect_addr);
connect_addr = NULL;
}
memset(&fwd, 0, sizeof(fwd));
fwd.listen_port = lport;
if (fwd.listen_port == PORT_STREAMLOCAL)
fwd.listen_path = listen_addr;
else
fwd.listen_host = listen_addr;
fwd.connect_port = cport;
if (fwd.connect_port == PORT_STREAMLOCAL)
fwd.connect_path = connect_addr;
else
fwd.connect_host = connect_addr;
debug2("%s: channel %d: request %s", __func__, c->self,
(fwd_desc = format_forward(ftype, &fwd)));
if (ftype != MUX_FWD_LOCAL && ftype != MUX_FWD_REMOTE &&
ftype != MUX_FWD_DYNAMIC) {
logit("%s: invalid forwarding type %u", __func__, ftype);
invalid:
free(listen_addr);
free(connect_addr);
reply_error(reply, MUX_S_FAILURE, rid,
"Invalid forwarding request");
return 0;
}
if (ftype == MUX_FWD_DYNAMIC && fwd.listen_path) {
logit("%s: streamlocal and dynamic forwards "
"are mutually exclusive", __func__);
goto invalid;
}
if (fwd.listen_port != PORT_STREAMLOCAL && fwd.listen_port >= 65536) {
logit("%s: invalid listen port %u", __func__,
fwd.listen_port);
goto invalid;
}
if ((fwd.connect_port != PORT_STREAMLOCAL &&
fwd.connect_port >= 65536) ||
(ftype != MUX_FWD_DYNAMIC && ftype != MUX_FWD_REMOTE &&
fwd.connect_port == 0)) {
logit("%s: invalid connect port %u", __func__,
fwd.connect_port);
goto invalid;
}
if (ftype != MUX_FWD_DYNAMIC && fwd.connect_host == NULL &&
fwd.connect_path == NULL) {
logit("%s: missing connect host", __func__);
goto invalid;
}
/* Skip forwards that have already been requested */
switch (ftype) {
case MUX_FWD_LOCAL:
case MUX_FWD_DYNAMIC:
for (i = 0; i < options.num_local_forwards; i++) {
if (compare_forward(&fwd,
options.local_forwards + i)) {
exists:
debug2("%s: found existing forwarding",
__func__);
reply_ok(reply, rid);
goto out;
}
}
break;
case MUX_FWD_REMOTE:
for (i = 0; i < options.num_remote_forwards; i++) {
if (!compare_forward(&fwd, options.remote_forwards + i))
continue;
if (fwd.listen_port != 0)
goto exists;
debug2("%s: found allocated port", __func__);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(reply,
MUX_S_REMOTE_PORT)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(reply, rid)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(reply,
options.remote_forwards[i].allocated_port)) != 0)
fatal("%s: reply: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
goto out;
}
break;
}
if (options.control_master == SSHCTL_MASTER_ASK ||
options.control_master == SSHCTL_MASTER_AUTO_ASK) {
if (!ask_permission("Open %s on %s?", fwd_desc, host)) {
debug2("%s: forwarding refused by user", __func__);
reply_error(reply, MUX_S_PERMISSION_DENIED, rid,
"Permission denied");
goto out;
}
}
if (ftype == MUX_FWD_LOCAL || ftype == MUX_FWD_DYNAMIC) {
if (!channel_setup_local_fwd_listener(ssh, &fwd,
&options.fwd_opts)) {
fail:
logit("%s: requested %s failed", __func__, fwd_desc);
reply_error(reply, MUX_S_FAILURE, rid,
"Port forwarding failed");
goto out;
}
add_local_forward(&options, &fwd);
freefwd = 0;
} else {
struct mux_channel_confirm_ctx *fctx;
fwd.handle = channel_request_remote_forwarding(ssh, &fwd);
if (fwd.handle < 0)
goto fail;
add_remote_forward(&options, &fwd);
fctx = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*fctx));
fctx->cid = c->self;
fctx->rid = rid;
fctx->fid = options.num_remote_forwards - 1;
client_register_global_confirm(mux_confirm_remote_forward,
fctx);
freefwd = 0;
c->mux_pause = 1; /* wait for mux_confirm_remote_forward */
/* delayed reply in mux_confirm_remote_forward */
goto out;
}
reply_ok(reply, rid);
out:
free(fwd_desc);
if (freefwd) {
free(fwd.listen_host);
free(fwd.listen_path);
free(fwd.connect_host);
free(fwd.connect_path);
}
return ret;
}
static int
mux_master_process_close_fwd(struct ssh *ssh, u_int rid,
Channel *c, struct sshbuf *m, struct sshbuf *reply)
{
struct Forward fwd, *found_fwd;
char *fwd_desc = NULL;
const char *error_reason = NULL;
char *listen_addr = NULL, *connect_addr = NULL;
u_int ftype;
int r, i, ret = 0;
u_int lport, cport;
memset(&fwd, 0, sizeof(fwd));
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &ftype)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &listen_addr, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &lport)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &connect_addr, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &cport)) != 0 ||
(lport != (u_int)PORT_STREAMLOCAL && lport > 65535) ||
(cport != (u_int)PORT_STREAMLOCAL && cport > 65535)) {
error("%s: malformed message", __func__);
ret = -1;
goto out;
}
if (*listen_addr == '\0') {
free(listen_addr);
listen_addr = NULL;
}
if (*connect_addr == '\0') {
free(connect_addr);
connect_addr = NULL;
}
memset(&fwd, 0, sizeof(fwd));
fwd.listen_port = lport;
if (fwd.listen_port == PORT_STREAMLOCAL)
fwd.listen_path = listen_addr;
else
fwd.listen_host = listen_addr;
fwd.connect_port = cport;
if (fwd.connect_port == PORT_STREAMLOCAL)
fwd.connect_path = connect_addr;
else
fwd.connect_host = connect_addr;
debug2("%s: channel %d: request cancel %s", __func__, c->self,
(fwd_desc = format_forward(ftype, &fwd)));
/* make sure this has been requested */
found_fwd = NULL;
switch (ftype) {
case MUX_FWD_LOCAL:
case MUX_FWD_DYNAMIC:
for (i = 0; i < options.num_local_forwards; i++) {
if (compare_forward(&fwd,
options.local_forwards + i)) {
found_fwd = options.local_forwards + i;
break;
}
}
break;
case MUX_FWD_REMOTE:
for (i = 0; i < options.num_remote_forwards; i++) {
if (compare_forward(&fwd,
options.remote_forwards + i)) {
found_fwd = options.remote_forwards + i;
break;
}
}
break;
}
if (found_fwd == NULL)
error_reason = "port not forwarded";
else if (ftype == MUX_FWD_REMOTE) {
/*
* This shouldn't fail unless we confused the host/port
* between options.remote_forwards and permitted_opens.
* However, for dynamic allocated listen ports we need
* to use the actual listen port.
*/
if (channel_request_rforward_cancel(ssh, found_fwd) == -1)
error_reason = "port not in permitted opens";
} else { /* local and dynamic forwards */
/* Ditto */
if (channel_cancel_lport_listener(ssh, &fwd, fwd.connect_port,
&options.fwd_opts) == -1)
error_reason = "port not found";
}
if (error_reason != NULL)
reply_error(reply, MUX_S_FAILURE, rid, error_reason);
else {
reply_ok(reply, rid);
free(found_fwd->listen_host);
free(found_fwd->listen_path);
free(found_fwd->connect_host);
free(found_fwd->connect_path);
found_fwd->listen_host = found_fwd->connect_host = NULL;
found_fwd->listen_path = found_fwd->connect_path = NULL;
found_fwd->listen_port = found_fwd->connect_port = 0;
}
out:
free(fwd_desc);
free(listen_addr);
free(connect_addr);
return ret;
}
static int
mux_master_process_stdio_fwd(struct ssh *ssh, u_int rid,
Channel *c, struct sshbuf *m, struct sshbuf *reply)
{
Channel *nc;
char *chost = NULL;
u_int cport, i, j;
int r, new_fd[2];
struct mux_stdio_confirm_ctx *cctx;
if ((r = sshbuf_skip_string(m)) != 0 || /* reserved */
(r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &chost, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &cport)) != 0) {
free(chost);
error("%s: malformed message", __func__);
return -1;
}
debug2("%s: channel %d: request stdio fwd to %s:%u",
__func__, c->self, chost, cport);
/* Gather fds from client */
for(i = 0; i < 2; i++) {
if ((new_fd[i] = mm_receive_fd(c->sock)) == -1) {
error("%s: failed to receive fd %d from slave",
__func__, i);
for (j = 0; j < i; j++)
close(new_fd[j]);
free(chost);
/* prepare reply */
reply_error(reply, MUX_S_FAILURE, rid,
"did not receive file descriptors");
return -1;
}
}
debug3("%s: got fds stdin %d, stdout %d", __func__,
new_fd[0], new_fd[1]);
/* XXX support multiple child sessions in future */
if (c->have_remote_id) {
debug2("%s: session already open", __func__);
reply_error(reply, MUX_S_FAILURE, rid,
"Multiple sessions not supported");
cleanup:
close(new_fd[0]);
close(new_fd[1]);
free(chost);
return 0;
}
if (options.control_master == SSHCTL_MASTER_ASK ||
options.control_master == SSHCTL_MASTER_AUTO_ASK) {
if (!ask_permission("Allow forward to %s:%u? ",
chost, cport)) {
debug2("%s: stdio fwd refused by user", __func__);
reply_error(reply, MUX_S_PERMISSION_DENIED, rid,
"Permission denied");
goto cleanup;
}
}
/* enable nonblocking unless tty */
if (!isatty(new_fd[0]))
set_nonblock(new_fd[0]);
if (!isatty(new_fd[1]))
set_nonblock(new_fd[1]);
nc = channel_connect_stdio_fwd(ssh, chost, cport, new_fd[0], new_fd[1]);
free(chost);
nc->ctl_chan = c->self; /* link session -> control channel */
c->remote_id = nc->self; /* link control -> session channel */
c->have_remote_id = 1;
debug2("%s: channel_new: %d linked to control channel %d",
__func__, nc->self, nc->ctl_chan);
channel_register_cleanup(ssh, nc->self,
mux_master_session_cleanup_cb, 1);
cctx = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*cctx));
cctx->rid = rid;
channel_register_open_confirm(ssh, nc->self, mux_stdio_confirm, cctx);
c->mux_pause = 1; /* stop handling messages until open_confirm done */
/* reply is deferred, sent by mux_session_confirm */
return 0;
}
/* Callback on open confirmation in mux master for a mux stdio fwd session. */
static void
mux_stdio_confirm(struct ssh *ssh, int id, int success, void *arg)
{
struct mux_stdio_confirm_ctx *cctx = arg;
Channel *c, *cc;
struct sshbuf *reply;
int r;
if (cctx == NULL)
fatal("%s: cctx == NULL", __func__);
if ((c = channel_by_id(ssh, id)) == NULL)
fatal("%s: no channel for id %d", __func__, id);
if ((cc = channel_by_id(ssh, c->ctl_chan)) == NULL)
fatal("%s: channel %d lacks control channel %d", __func__,
id, c->ctl_chan);
if ((reply = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new", __func__);
if (!success) {
debug3("%s: sending failure reply", __func__);
reply_error(reply, MUX_S_FAILURE, cctx->rid,
"Session open refused by peer");
/* prepare reply */
goto done;
}
debug3("%s: sending success reply", __func__);
/* prepare reply */
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(reply, MUX_S_SESSION_OPENED)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(reply, cctx->rid)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(reply, c->self)) != 0)
fatal("%s: reply: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
done:
/* Send reply */
if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(cc->output, reply)) != 0)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_put_stringb: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
sshbuf_free(reply);
if (cc->mux_pause <= 0)
fatal("%s: mux_pause %d", __func__, cc->mux_pause);
cc->mux_pause = 0; /* start processing messages again */
c->open_confirm_ctx = NULL;
free(cctx);
}
static int
mux_master_process_stop_listening(struct ssh *ssh, u_int rid,
Channel *c, struct sshbuf *m, struct sshbuf *reply)
{
debug("%s: channel %d: stop listening", __func__, c->self);
if (options.control_master == SSHCTL_MASTER_ASK ||
options.control_master == SSHCTL_MASTER_AUTO_ASK) {
if (!ask_permission("Disable further multiplexing on shared "
"connection to %s? ", host)) {
debug2("%s: stop listen refused by user", __func__);
reply_error(reply, MUX_S_PERMISSION_DENIED, rid,
"Permission denied");
return 0;
}
}
if (mux_listener_channel != NULL) {
channel_free(ssh, mux_listener_channel);
client_stop_mux();
free(options.control_path);
options.control_path = NULL;
mux_listener_channel = NULL;
muxserver_sock = -1;
}
reply_ok(reply, rid);
return 0;
}
static int
mux_master_process_proxy(struct ssh *ssh, u_int rid,
Channel *c, struct sshbuf *m, struct sshbuf *reply)
{
int r;
debug("%s: channel %d: proxy request", __func__, c->self);
c->mux_rcb = channel_proxy_downstream;
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(reply, MUX_S_PROXY)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(reply, rid)) != 0)
fatal("%s: reply: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
return 0;
}
/* Channel callbacks fired on read/write from mux slave fd */
static int
mux_master_read_cb(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c)
{
struct mux_master_state *state = (struct mux_master_state *)c->mux_ctx;
struct sshbuf *in = NULL, *out = NULL;
u_int type, rid, i;
int r, ret = -1;
if ((out = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new", __func__);
/* Setup ctx and */
if (c->mux_ctx == NULL) {
state = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*state));
c->mux_ctx = state;
channel_register_cleanup(ssh, c->self,
mux_master_control_cleanup_cb, 0);
/* Send hello */
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(out, MUX_MSG_HELLO)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(out, SSHMUX_VER)) != 0)
fatal("%s: reply: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
/* no extensions */
if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(c->output, out)) != 0)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_put_stringb: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
debug3("%s: channel %d: hello sent", __func__, c->self);
ret = 0;
goto out;
}
/* Channel code ensures that we receive whole packets */
if ((r = sshbuf_froms(c->input, &in)) != 0) {
malf:
error("%s: malformed message", __func__);
goto out;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(in, &type)) != 0)
goto malf;
debug3("%s: channel %d packet type 0x%08x len %zu",
__func__, c->self, type, sshbuf_len(in));
if (type == MUX_MSG_HELLO)
rid = 0;
else {
if (!state->hello_rcvd) {
error("%s: expected MUX_MSG_HELLO(0x%08x), "
"received 0x%08x", __func__, MUX_MSG_HELLO, type);
goto out;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(in, &rid)) != 0)
goto malf;
}
for (i = 0; mux_master_handlers[i].handler != NULL; i++) {
if (type == mux_master_handlers[i].type) {
ret = mux_master_handlers[i].handler(ssh, rid,
c, in, out);
break;
}
}
if (mux_master_handlers[i].handler == NULL) {
error("%s: unsupported mux message 0x%08x", __func__, type);
reply_error(out, MUX_S_FAILURE, rid, "unsupported request");
ret = 0;
}
/* Enqueue reply packet */
if (sshbuf_len(out) != 0) {
if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(c->output, out)) != 0)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_put_stringb: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
}
out:
sshbuf_free(in);
sshbuf_free(out);
return ret;
}
void
mux_exit_message(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c, int exitval)
{
struct sshbuf *m;
Channel *mux_chan;
int r;
debug3("%s: channel %d: exit message, exitval %d", __func__, c->self,
exitval);
if ((mux_chan = channel_by_id(ssh, c->ctl_chan)) == NULL)
fatal("%s: channel %d missing mux channel %d",
__func__, c->self, c->ctl_chan);
/* Append exit message packet to control socket output queue */
if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new", __func__);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, MUX_S_EXIT_MESSAGE)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, c->self)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, exitval)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_stringb(mux_chan->output, m)) != 0)
fatal("%s: reply: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
sshbuf_free(m);
}
void
mux_tty_alloc_failed(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c)
{
struct sshbuf *m;
Channel *mux_chan;
int r;
debug3("%s: channel %d: TTY alloc failed", __func__, c->self);
if ((mux_chan = channel_by_id(ssh, c->ctl_chan)) == NULL)
fatal("%s: channel %d missing mux channel %d",
__func__, c->self, c->ctl_chan);
/* Append exit message packet to control socket output queue */
if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new", __func__);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, MUX_S_TTY_ALLOC_FAIL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, c->self)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_stringb(mux_chan->output, m)) != 0)
fatal("%s: reply: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
sshbuf_free(m);
}
/* Prepare a mux master to listen on a Unix domain socket. */
void
muxserver_listen(struct ssh *ssh)
{
mode_t old_umask;
char *orig_control_path = options.control_path;
char rbuf[16+1];
u_int i, r;
int oerrno;
if (options.control_path == NULL ||
options.control_master == SSHCTL_MASTER_NO)
return;
debug("setting up multiplex master socket");
/*
* Use a temporary path before listen so we can pseudo-atomically
* establish the listening socket in its final location to avoid
* other processes racing in between bind() and listen() and hitting
* an unready socket.
*/
for (i = 0; i < sizeof(rbuf) - 1; i++) {
r = arc4random_uniform(26+26+10);
rbuf[i] = (r < 26) ? 'a' + r :
(r < 26*2) ? 'A' + r - 26 :
'0' + r - 26 - 26;
}
rbuf[sizeof(rbuf) - 1] = '\0';
options.control_path = NULL;
xasprintf(&options.control_path, "%s.%s", orig_control_path, rbuf);
debug3("%s: temporary control path %s", __func__, options.control_path);
old_umask = umask(0177);
muxserver_sock = unix_listener(options.control_path, 64, 0);
oerrno = errno;
umask(old_umask);
if (muxserver_sock < 0) {
if (oerrno == EINVAL || oerrno == EADDRINUSE) {
error("ControlSocket %s already exists, "
"disabling multiplexing", options.control_path);
disable_mux_master:
if (muxserver_sock != -1) {
close(muxserver_sock);
muxserver_sock = -1;
}
free(orig_control_path);
free(options.control_path);
options.control_path = NULL;
options.control_master = SSHCTL_MASTER_NO;
return;
} else {
/* unix_listener() logs the error */
cleanup_exit(255);
}
}
/* Now atomically "move" the mux socket into position */
if (link(options.control_path, orig_control_path) != 0) {
if (errno != EEXIST) {
fatal("%s: link mux listener %s => %s: %s", __func__,
options.control_path, orig_control_path,
strerror(errno));
}
error("ControlSocket %s already exists, disabling multiplexing",
orig_control_path);
unlink(options.control_path);
goto disable_mux_master;
}
unlink(options.control_path);
free(options.control_path);
options.control_path = orig_control_path;
set_nonblock(muxserver_sock);
mux_listener_channel = channel_new(ssh, "mux listener",
SSH_CHANNEL_MUX_LISTENER, muxserver_sock, muxserver_sock, -1,
CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT,
0, options.control_path, 1);
mux_listener_channel->mux_rcb = mux_master_read_cb;
debug3("%s: mux listener channel %d fd %d", __func__,
mux_listener_channel->self, mux_listener_channel->sock);
}
/* Callback on open confirmation in mux master for a mux client session. */
static void
mux_session_confirm(struct ssh *ssh, int id, int success, void *arg)
{
struct mux_session_confirm_ctx *cctx = arg;
const char *display;
Channel *c, *cc;
int i, r;
struct sshbuf *reply;
if (cctx == NULL)
fatal("%s: cctx == NULL", __func__);
if ((c = channel_by_id(ssh, id)) == NULL)
fatal("%s: no channel for id %d", __func__, id);
if ((cc = channel_by_id(ssh, c->ctl_chan)) == NULL)
fatal("%s: channel %d lacks control channel %d", __func__,
id, c->ctl_chan);
if ((reply = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new", __func__);
if (!success) {
debug3("%s: sending failure reply", __func__);
reply_error(reply, MUX_S_FAILURE, cctx->rid,
"Session open refused by peer");
goto done;
}
display = getenv("DISPLAY");
if (cctx->want_x_fwd && options.forward_x11 && display != NULL) {
char *proto, *data;
/* Get reasonable local authentication information. */
if (client_x11_get_proto(ssh, display, options.xauth_location,
options.forward_x11_trusted, options.forward_x11_timeout,
&proto, &data) == 0) {
/* Request forwarding with authentication spoofing. */
debug("Requesting X11 forwarding with authentication "
"spoofing.");
x11_request_forwarding_with_spoofing(ssh, id,
display, proto, data, 1);
/* XXX exit_on_forward_failure */
client_expect_confirm(ssh, id, "X11 forwarding",
CONFIRM_WARN);
}
}
if (cctx->want_agent_fwd && options.forward_agent) {
debug("Requesting authentication agent forwarding.");
channel_request_start(ssh, id, "auth-agent-req@openssh.com", 0);
if ((r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
fatal("%s: packet error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
}
client_session2_setup(ssh, id, cctx->want_tty, cctx->want_subsys,
cctx->term, &cctx->tio, c->rfd, cctx->cmd, cctx->env);
debug3("%s: sending success reply", __func__);
/* prepare reply */
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(reply, MUX_S_SESSION_OPENED)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(reply, cctx->rid)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(reply, c->self)) != 0)
fatal("%s: reply: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
done:
/* Send reply */
if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(cc->output, reply)) != 0)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_put_stringb: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
sshbuf_free(reply);
if (cc->mux_pause <= 0)
fatal("%s: mux_pause %d", __func__, cc->mux_pause);
cc->mux_pause = 0; /* start processing messages again */
c->open_confirm_ctx = NULL;
sshbuf_free(cctx->cmd);
free(cctx->term);
if (cctx->env != NULL) {
for (i = 0; cctx->env[i] != NULL; i++)
free(cctx->env[i]);
free(cctx->env);
}
free(cctx);
}
/* ** Multiplexing client support */
/* Exit signal handler */
static void
control_client_sighandler(int signo)
{
muxclient_terminate = signo;
}
/*
* Relay signal handler - used to pass some signals from mux client to
* mux master.
*/
static void
control_client_sigrelay(int signo)
{
int save_errno = errno;
if (muxserver_pid > 1)
kill(muxserver_pid, signo);
errno = save_errno;
}
static int
mux_client_read(int fd, struct sshbuf *b, size_t need)
{
size_t have;
ssize_t len;
u_char *p;
struct pollfd pfd;
int r;
pfd.fd = fd;
pfd.events = POLLIN;
if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(b, need, &p)) != 0)
fatal("%s: reserve: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
for (have = 0; have < need; ) {
if (muxclient_terminate) {
errno = EINTR;
return -1;
}
len = read(fd, p + have, need - have);
if (len == -1) {
switch (errno) {
#if defined(EWOULDBLOCK) && (EWOULDBLOCK != EAGAIN)
case EWOULDBLOCK:
#endif
case EAGAIN:
(void)poll(&pfd, 1, -1);
/* FALLTHROUGH */
case EINTR:
continue;
default:
return -1;
}
}
if (len == 0) {
errno = EPIPE;
return -1;
}
have += (size_t)len;
}
return 0;
}
static int
mux_client_write_packet(int fd, struct sshbuf *m)
{
struct sshbuf *queue;
u_int have, need;
int r, oerrno, len;
const u_char *ptr;
struct pollfd pfd;
pfd.fd = fd;
pfd.events = POLLOUT;
if ((queue = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new", __func__);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(queue, m)) != 0)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_put_stringb: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
need = sshbuf_len(queue);
ptr = sshbuf_ptr(queue);
for (have = 0; have < need; ) {
if (muxclient_terminate) {
sshbuf_free(queue);
errno = EINTR;
return -1;
}
len = write(fd, ptr + have, need - have);
if (len == -1) {
switch (errno) {
#if defined(EWOULDBLOCK) && (EWOULDBLOCK != EAGAIN)
case EWOULDBLOCK:
#endif
case EAGAIN:
(void)poll(&pfd, 1, -1);
/* FALLTHROUGH */
case EINTR:
continue;
default:
oerrno = errno;
sshbuf_free(queue);
errno = oerrno;
return -1;
}
}
if (len == 0) {
sshbuf_free(queue);
errno = EPIPE;
return -1;
}
have += (u_int)len;
}
sshbuf_free(queue);
return 0;
}
static int
mux_client_read_packet(int fd, struct sshbuf *m)
{
struct sshbuf *queue;
size_t need, have;
const u_char *ptr;
int r, oerrno;
if ((queue = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new", __func__);
if (mux_client_read(fd, queue, 4) != 0) {
if ((oerrno = errno) == EPIPE)
debug3("%s: read header failed: %s", __func__,
strerror(errno));
sshbuf_free(queue);
errno = oerrno;
return -1;
}
need = PEEK_U32(sshbuf_ptr(queue));
if (mux_client_read(fd, queue, need) != 0) {
oerrno = errno;
debug3("%s: read body failed: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
sshbuf_free(queue);
errno = oerrno;
return -1;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(queue, &ptr, &have)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put(m, ptr, have)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
sshbuf_free(queue);
return 0;
}
static int
mux_client_hello_exchange(int fd)
{
struct sshbuf *m;
u_int type, ver;
int r, ret = -1;
if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new", __func__);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, MUX_MSG_HELLO)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, SSHMUX_VER)) != 0)
fatal("%s: hello: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
/* no extensions */
if (mux_client_write_packet(fd, m) != 0) {
debug("%s: write packet: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
goto out;
}
sshbuf_reset(m);
/* Read their HELLO */
if (mux_client_read_packet(fd, m) != 0) {
debug("%s: read packet failed", __func__);
goto out;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &type)) != 0)
fatal("%s: decode type: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
if (type != MUX_MSG_HELLO) {
error("%s: expected HELLO (%u) received %u",
__func__, MUX_MSG_HELLO, type);
goto out;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &ver)) != 0)
fatal("%s: decode version: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
if (ver != SSHMUX_VER) {
error("Unsupported multiplexing protocol version %d "
"(expected %d)", ver, SSHMUX_VER);
goto out;
}
debug2("%s: master version %u", __func__, ver);
/* No extensions are presently defined */
while (sshbuf_len(m) > 0) {
char *name = NULL;
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &name, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_skip_string(m)) != 0) { /* value */
error("%s: malformed extension: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
goto out;
}
debug2("Unrecognised master extension \"%s\"", name);
free(name);
}
/* success */
ret = 0;
out:
sshbuf_free(m);
return ret;
}
static u_int
mux_client_request_alive(int fd)
{
struct sshbuf *m;
char *e;
u_int pid, type, rid;
int r;
debug3("%s: entering", __func__);
if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new", __func__);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, MUX_C_ALIVE_CHECK)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, muxclient_request_id)) != 0)
fatal("%s: request: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
if (mux_client_write_packet(fd, m) != 0)
fatal("%s: write packet: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
sshbuf_reset(m);
/* Read their reply */
if (mux_client_read_packet(fd, m) != 0) {
sshbuf_free(m);
return 0;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &type)) != 0)
fatal("%s: decode type: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
if (type != MUX_S_ALIVE) {
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &e, NULL)) != 0)
fatal("%s: decode error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
fatal("%s: master returned error: %s", __func__, e);
}
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &rid)) != 0)
fatal("%s: decode remote ID: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
if (rid != muxclient_request_id)
fatal("%s: out of sequence reply: my id %u theirs %u",
__func__, muxclient_request_id, rid);
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &pid)) != 0)
fatal("%s: decode PID: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
sshbuf_free(m);
debug3("%s: done pid = %u", __func__, pid);
muxclient_request_id++;
return pid;
}
static void
mux_client_request_terminate(int fd)
{
struct sshbuf *m;
char *e;
u_int type, rid;
int r;
debug3("%s: entering", __func__);
if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new", __func__);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, MUX_C_TERMINATE)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, muxclient_request_id)) != 0)
fatal("%s: request: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
if (mux_client_write_packet(fd, m) != 0)
fatal("%s: write packet: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
sshbuf_reset(m);
/* Read their reply */
if (mux_client_read_packet(fd, m) != 0) {
/* Remote end exited already */
if (errno == EPIPE) {
sshbuf_free(m);
return;
}
fatal("%s: read from master failed: %s",
__func__, strerror(errno));
}
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &type)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &rid)) != 0)
fatal("%s: decode: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
if (rid != muxclient_request_id)
fatal("%s: out of sequence reply: my id %u theirs %u",
__func__, muxclient_request_id, rid);
switch (type) {
case MUX_S_OK:
break;
case MUX_S_PERMISSION_DENIED:
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &e, NULL)) != 0)
fatal("%s: decode error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
fatal("Master refused termination request: %s", e);
case MUX_S_FAILURE:
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &e, NULL)) != 0)
fatal("%s: decode error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
fatal("%s: termination request failed: %s", __func__, e);
default:
fatal("%s: unexpected response from master 0x%08x",
__func__, type);
}
sshbuf_free(m);
muxclient_request_id++;
}
static int
mux_client_forward(int fd, int cancel_flag, u_int ftype, struct Forward *fwd)
{
struct sshbuf *m;
char *e, *fwd_desc;
const char *lhost, *chost;
u_int type, rid;
int r;
fwd_desc = format_forward(ftype, fwd);
debug("Requesting %s %s",
cancel_flag ? "cancellation of" : "forwarding of", fwd_desc);
free(fwd_desc);
type = cancel_flag ? MUX_C_CLOSE_FWD : MUX_C_OPEN_FWD;
if (fwd->listen_path != NULL)
lhost = fwd->listen_path;
else if (fwd->listen_host == NULL)
lhost = "";
else if (*fwd->listen_host == '\0')
lhost = "*";
else
lhost = fwd->listen_host;
if (fwd->connect_path != NULL)
chost = fwd->connect_path;
else if (fwd->connect_host == NULL)
chost = "";
else
chost = fwd->connect_host;
if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new", __func__);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, type)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, muxclient_request_id)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, ftype)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, lhost)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, fwd->listen_port)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, chost)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, fwd->connect_port)) != 0)
fatal("%s: request: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
if (mux_client_write_packet(fd, m) != 0)
fatal("%s: write packet: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
sshbuf_reset(m);
/* Read their reply */
if (mux_client_read_packet(fd, m) != 0) {
sshbuf_free(m);
return -1;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &type)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &rid)) != 0)
fatal("%s: decode: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
if (rid != muxclient_request_id)
fatal("%s: out of sequence reply: my id %u theirs %u",
__func__, muxclient_request_id, rid);
switch (type) {
case MUX_S_OK:
break;
case MUX_S_REMOTE_PORT:
if (cancel_flag)
fatal("%s: got MUX_S_REMOTE_PORT for cancel", __func__);
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &fwd->allocated_port)) != 0)
fatal("%s: decode port: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
verbose("Allocated port %u for remote forward to %s:%d",
fwd->allocated_port,
fwd->connect_host ? fwd->connect_host : "",
fwd->connect_port);
if (muxclient_command == SSHMUX_COMMAND_FORWARD)
fprintf(stdout, "%i\n", fwd->allocated_port);
break;
case MUX_S_PERMISSION_DENIED:
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &e, NULL)) != 0)
fatal("%s: decode error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
sshbuf_free(m);
error("Master refused forwarding request: %s", e);
return -1;
case MUX_S_FAILURE:
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &e, NULL)) != 0)
fatal("%s: decode error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
sshbuf_free(m);
error("%s: forwarding request failed: %s", __func__, e);
return -1;
default:
fatal("%s: unexpected response from master 0x%08x",
__func__, type);
}
sshbuf_free(m);
muxclient_request_id++;
return 0;
}
static int
mux_client_forwards(int fd, int cancel_flag)
{
int i, ret = 0;
debug3("%s: %s forwardings: %d local, %d remote", __func__,
cancel_flag ? "cancel" : "request",
options.num_local_forwards, options.num_remote_forwards);
/* XXX ExitOnForwardingFailure */
for (i = 0; i < options.num_local_forwards; i++) {
if (mux_client_forward(fd, cancel_flag,
options.local_forwards[i].connect_port == 0 ?
MUX_FWD_DYNAMIC : MUX_FWD_LOCAL,
options.local_forwards + i) != 0)
ret = -1;
}
for (i = 0; i < options.num_remote_forwards; i++) {
if (mux_client_forward(fd, cancel_flag, MUX_FWD_REMOTE,
options.remote_forwards + i) != 0)
ret = -1;
}
return ret;
}
static int
mux_client_request_session(int fd)
{
struct sshbuf *m;
char *e;
const char *term;
u_int echar, rid, sid, esid, exitval, type, exitval_seen;
extern char **environ;
int r, i, devnull, rawmode;
debug3("%s: entering", __func__);
if ((muxserver_pid = mux_client_request_alive(fd)) == 0) {
error("%s: master alive request failed", __func__);
return -1;
}
- signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN);
+ ssh_signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN);
if (stdin_null_flag) {
if ((devnull = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDONLY)) == -1)
fatal("open(/dev/null): %s", strerror(errno));
if (dup2(devnull, STDIN_FILENO) == -1)
fatal("dup2: %s", strerror(errno));
if (devnull > STDERR_FILENO)
close(devnull);
}
if ((term = getenv("TERM")) == NULL)
term = "";
echar = 0xffffffff;
if (options.escape_char != SSH_ESCAPECHAR_NONE)
echar = (u_int)options.escape_char;
if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new", __func__);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, MUX_C_NEW_SESSION)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, muxclient_request_id)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_string(m, NULL, 0)) != 0 || /* reserved */
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, tty_flag)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, options.forward_x11)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, options.forward_agent)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, subsystem_flag)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, echar)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, term)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, command)) != 0)
fatal("%s: request: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
/* Pass environment */
if (options.num_send_env > 0 && environ != NULL) {
for (i = 0; environ[i] != NULL; i++) {
if (!env_permitted(environ[i]))
continue;
if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, environ[i])) != 0)
fatal("%s: request: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
}
}
for (i = 0; i < options.num_setenv; i++) {
if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, options.setenv[i])) != 0)
fatal("%s: request: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
}
if (mux_client_write_packet(fd, m) != 0)
fatal("%s: write packet: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
/* Send the stdio file descriptors */
if (mm_send_fd(fd, STDIN_FILENO) == -1 ||
mm_send_fd(fd, STDOUT_FILENO) == -1 ||
mm_send_fd(fd, STDERR_FILENO) == -1)
fatal("%s: send fds failed", __func__);
debug3("%s: session request sent", __func__);
/* Read their reply */
sshbuf_reset(m);
if (mux_client_read_packet(fd, m) != 0) {
error("%s: read from master failed: %s",
__func__, strerror(errno));
sshbuf_free(m);
return -1;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &type)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &rid)) != 0)
fatal("%s: decode: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
if (rid != muxclient_request_id)
fatal("%s: out of sequence reply: my id %u theirs %u",
__func__, muxclient_request_id, rid);
switch (type) {
case MUX_S_SESSION_OPENED:
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &sid)) != 0)
fatal("%s: decode ID: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
break;
case MUX_S_PERMISSION_DENIED:
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &e, NULL)) != 0)
fatal("%s: decode error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
error("Master refused session request: %s", e);
sshbuf_free(m);
return -1;
case MUX_S_FAILURE:
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &e, NULL)) != 0)
fatal("%s: decode error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
error("%s: session request failed: %s", __func__, e);
sshbuf_free(m);
return -1;
default:
sshbuf_free(m);
error("%s: unexpected response from master 0x%08x",
__func__, type);
return -1;
}
muxclient_request_id++;
if (pledge("stdio proc tty", NULL) == -1)
fatal("%s pledge(): %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
platform_pledge_mux();
- signal(SIGHUP, control_client_sighandler);
- signal(SIGINT, control_client_sighandler);
- signal(SIGTERM, control_client_sighandler);
- signal(SIGWINCH, control_client_sigrelay);
+ ssh_signal(SIGHUP, control_client_sighandler);
+ ssh_signal(SIGINT, control_client_sighandler);
+ ssh_signal(SIGTERM, control_client_sighandler);
+ ssh_signal(SIGWINCH, control_client_sigrelay);
rawmode = tty_flag;
if (tty_flag)
enter_raw_mode(options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_FORCE);
/*
* Stick around until the controlee closes the client_fd.
* Before it does, it is expected to write an exit message.
* This process must read the value and wait for the closure of
* the client_fd; if this one closes early, the multiplex master will
* terminate early too (possibly losing data).
*/
for (exitval = 255, exitval_seen = 0;;) {
sshbuf_reset(m);
if (mux_client_read_packet(fd, m) != 0)
break;
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &type)) != 0)
fatal("%s: decode type: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
switch (type) {
case MUX_S_TTY_ALLOC_FAIL:
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &esid)) != 0)
fatal("%s: decode ID: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
if (esid != sid)
fatal("%s: tty alloc fail on unknown session: "
"my id %u theirs %u",
__func__, sid, esid);
leave_raw_mode(options.request_tty ==
REQUEST_TTY_FORCE);
rawmode = 0;
continue;
case MUX_S_EXIT_MESSAGE:
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &esid)) != 0)
fatal("%s: decode ID: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
if (esid != sid)
fatal("%s: exit on unknown session: "
"my id %u theirs %u",
__func__, sid, esid);
if (exitval_seen)
fatal("%s: exitval sent twice", __func__);
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &exitval)) != 0)
fatal("%s: decode exit value: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
exitval_seen = 1;
continue;
default:
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &e, NULL)) != 0)
fatal("%s: decode error: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
fatal("%s: master returned error: %s", __func__, e);
}
}
close(fd);
if (rawmode)
leave_raw_mode(options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_FORCE);
if (muxclient_terminate) {
debug2("Exiting on signal: %s", strsignal(muxclient_terminate));
exitval = 255;
} else if (!exitval_seen) {
debug2("Control master terminated unexpectedly");
exitval = 255;
} else
debug2("Received exit status from master %d", exitval);
if (tty_flag && options.log_level != SYSLOG_LEVEL_QUIET)
fprintf(stderr, "Shared connection to %s closed.\r\n", host);
exit(exitval);
}
static int
mux_client_proxy(int fd)
{
struct sshbuf *m;
char *e;
u_int type, rid;
int r;
if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new", __func__);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, MUX_C_PROXY)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, muxclient_request_id)) != 0)
fatal("%s: request: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
if (mux_client_write_packet(fd, m) != 0)
fatal("%s: write packet: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
sshbuf_reset(m);
/* Read their reply */
if (mux_client_read_packet(fd, m) != 0) {
sshbuf_free(m);
return 0;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &type)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &rid)) != 0)
fatal("%s: decode: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
if (rid != muxclient_request_id)
fatal("%s: out of sequence reply: my id %u theirs %u",
__func__, muxclient_request_id, rid);
if (type != MUX_S_PROXY) {
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &e, NULL)) != 0)
fatal("%s: decode error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
fatal("%s: master returned error: %s", __func__, e);
}
sshbuf_free(m);
debug3("%s: done", __func__);
muxclient_request_id++;
return 0;
}
static int
mux_client_request_stdio_fwd(int fd)
{
struct sshbuf *m;
char *e;
u_int type, rid, sid;
int r, devnull;
debug3("%s: entering", __func__);
if ((muxserver_pid = mux_client_request_alive(fd)) == 0) {
error("%s: master alive request failed", __func__);
return -1;
}
- signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN);
+ ssh_signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN);
if (stdin_null_flag) {
if ((devnull = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDONLY)) == -1)
fatal("open(/dev/null): %s", strerror(errno));
if (dup2(devnull, STDIN_FILENO) == -1)
fatal("dup2: %s", strerror(errno));
if (devnull > STDERR_FILENO)
close(devnull);
}
if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new", __func__);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, MUX_C_NEW_STDIO_FWD)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, muxclient_request_id)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_string(m, NULL, 0)) != 0 || /* reserved */
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, options.stdio_forward_host)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, options.stdio_forward_port)) != 0)
fatal("%s: request: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
if (mux_client_write_packet(fd, m) != 0)
fatal("%s: write packet: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
/* Send the stdio file descriptors */
if (mm_send_fd(fd, STDIN_FILENO) == -1 ||
mm_send_fd(fd, STDOUT_FILENO) == -1)
fatal("%s: send fds failed", __func__);
if (pledge("stdio proc tty", NULL) == -1)
fatal("%s pledge(): %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
platform_pledge_mux();
debug3("%s: stdio forward request sent", __func__);
/* Read their reply */
sshbuf_reset(m);
if (mux_client_read_packet(fd, m) != 0) {
error("%s: read from master failed: %s",
__func__, strerror(errno));
sshbuf_free(m);
return -1;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &type)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &rid)) != 0)
fatal("%s: decode: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
if (rid != muxclient_request_id)
fatal("%s: out of sequence reply: my id %u theirs %u",
__func__, muxclient_request_id, rid);
switch (type) {
case MUX_S_SESSION_OPENED:
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &sid)) != 0)
fatal("%s: decode ID: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
debug("%s: master session id: %u", __func__, sid);
break;
case MUX_S_PERMISSION_DENIED:
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &e, NULL)) != 0)
fatal("%s: decode error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
sshbuf_free(m);
fatal("Master refused stdio forwarding request: %s", e);
case MUX_S_FAILURE:
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &e, NULL)) != 0)
fatal("%s: decode error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
sshbuf_free(m);
fatal("Stdio forwarding request failed: %s", e);
default:
sshbuf_free(m);
error("%s: unexpected response from master 0x%08x",
__func__, type);
return -1;
}
muxclient_request_id++;
- signal(SIGHUP, control_client_sighandler);
- signal(SIGINT, control_client_sighandler);
- signal(SIGTERM, control_client_sighandler);
- signal(SIGWINCH, control_client_sigrelay);
+ ssh_signal(SIGHUP, control_client_sighandler);
+ ssh_signal(SIGINT, control_client_sighandler);
+ ssh_signal(SIGTERM, control_client_sighandler);
+ ssh_signal(SIGWINCH, control_client_sigrelay);
/*
* Stick around until the controlee closes the client_fd.
*/
sshbuf_reset(m);
if (mux_client_read_packet(fd, m) != 0) {
if (errno == EPIPE ||
(errno == EINTR && muxclient_terminate != 0))
return 0;
fatal("%s: mux_client_read_packet: %s",
__func__, strerror(errno));
}
fatal("%s: master returned unexpected message %u", __func__, type);
}
static void
mux_client_request_stop_listening(int fd)
{
struct sshbuf *m;
char *e;
u_int type, rid;
int r;
debug3("%s: entering", __func__);
if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new", __func__);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, MUX_C_STOP_LISTENING)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, muxclient_request_id)) != 0)
fatal("%s: request: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
if (mux_client_write_packet(fd, m) != 0)
fatal("%s: write packet: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
sshbuf_reset(m);
/* Read their reply */
if (mux_client_read_packet(fd, m) != 0)
fatal("%s: read from master failed: %s",
__func__, strerror(errno));
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &type)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &rid)) != 0)
fatal("%s: decode: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
if (rid != muxclient_request_id)
fatal("%s: out of sequence reply: my id %u theirs %u",
__func__, muxclient_request_id, rid);
switch (type) {
case MUX_S_OK:
break;
case MUX_S_PERMISSION_DENIED:
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &e, NULL)) != 0)
fatal("%s: decode error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
fatal("Master refused stop listening request: %s", e);
case MUX_S_FAILURE:
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &e, NULL)) != 0)
fatal("%s: decode error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
fatal("%s: stop listening request failed: %s", __func__, e);
default:
fatal("%s: unexpected response from master 0x%08x",
__func__, type);
}
sshbuf_free(m);
muxclient_request_id++;
}
/* Multiplex client main loop. */
int
muxclient(const char *path)
{
struct sockaddr_un addr;
int sock;
u_int pid;
if (muxclient_command == 0) {
if (options.stdio_forward_host != NULL)
muxclient_command = SSHMUX_COMMAND_STDIO_FWD;
else
muxclient_command = SSHMUX_COMMAND_OPEN;
}
switch (options.control_master) {
case SSHCTL_MASTER_AUTO:
case SSHCTL_MASTER_AUTO_ASK:
debug("auto-mux: Trying existing master");
/* FALLTHROUGH */
case SSHCTL_MASTER_NO:
break;
default:
return -1;
}
memset(&addr, '\0', sizeof(addr));
addr.sun_family = AF_UNIX;
if (strlcpy(addr.sun_path, path,
sizeof(addr.sun_path)) >= sizeof(addr.sun_path))
fatal("ControlPath too long ('%s' >= %u bytes)", path,
(unsigned int)sizeof(addr.sun_path));
if ((sock = socket(PF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0)) == -1)
fatal("%s socket(): %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
if (connect(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, sizeof(addr)) == -1) {
switch (muxclient_command) {
case SSHMUX_COMMAND_OPEN:
case SSHMUX_COMMAND_STDIO_FWD:
break;
default:
fatal("Control socket connect(%.100s): %s", path,
strerror(errno));
}
if (errno == ECONNREFUSED &&
options.control_master != SSHCTL_MASTER_NO) {
debug("Stale control socket %.100s, unlinking", path);
unlink(path);
} else if (errno == ENOENT) {
debug("Control socket \"%.100s\" does not exist", path);
} else {
error("Control socket connect(%.100s): %s", path,
strerror(errno));
}
close(sock);
return -1;
}
set_nonblock(sock);
if (mux_client_hello_exchange(sock) != 0) {
error("%s: master hello exchange failed", __func__);
close(sock);
return -1;
}
switch (muxclient_command) {
case SSHMUX_COMMAND_ALIVE_CHECK:
if ((pid = mux_client_request_alive(sock)) == 0)
fatal("%s: master alive check failed", __func__);
fprintf(stderr, "Master running (pid=%u)\r\n", pid);
exit(0);
case SSHMUX_COMMAND_TERMINATE:
mux_client_request_terminate(sock);
if (options.log_level != SYSLOG_LEVEL_QUIET)
fprintf(stderr, "Exit request sent.\r\n");
exit(0);
case SSHMUX_COMMAND_FORWARD:
if (mux_client_forwards(sock, 0) != 0)
fatal("%s: master forward request failed", __func__);
exit(0);
case SSHMUX_COMMAND_OPEN:
if (mux_client_forwards(sock, 0) != 0) {
error("%s: master forward request failed", __func__);
return -1;
}
mux_client_request_session(sock);
return -1;
case SSHMUX_COMMAND_STDIO_FWD:
mux_client_request_stdio_fwd(sock);
exit(0);
case SSHMUX_COMMAND_STOP:
mux_client_request_stop_listening(sock);
if (options.log_level != SYSLOG_LEVEL_QUIET)
fprintf(stderr, "Stop listening request sent.\r\n");
exit(0);
case SSHMUX_COMMAND_CANCEL_FWD:
if (mux_client_forwards(sock, 1) != 0)
error("%s: master cancel forward request failed",
__func__);
exit(0);
case SSHMUX_COMMAND_PROXY:
mux_client_proxy(sock);
return (sock);
default:
fatal("unrecognised muxclient_command %d", muxclient_command);
}
}
diff --git a/myproposal.h b/myproposal.h
index 34bd10c9f065..5312e60581ce 100644
--- a/myproposal.h
+++ b/myproposal.h
@@ -1,202 +1,117 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: myproposal.h,v 1.58 2019/02/23 08:20:43 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: myproposal.h,v 1.67 2020/01/24 00:28:57 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
-#include <openssl/opensslv.h>
-
-/* conditional algorithm support */
-
-#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
-#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521
-# define KEX_ECDH_METHODS \
+#define KEX_SERVER_KEX \
+ "curve25519-sha256," \
+ "curve25519-sha256@libssh.org," \
"ecdh-sha2-nistp256," \
"ecdh-sha2-nistp384," \
- "ecdh-sha2-nistp521,"
-# define HOSTKEY_ECDSA_CERT_METHODS \
- "ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com," \
- "ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com," \
- "ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com,"
-# define HOSTKEY_ECDSA_METHODS \
- "ecdsa-sha2-nistp256," \
- "ecdsa-sha2-nistp384," \
- "ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,"
-#else
-# define KEX_ECDH_METHODS \
- "ecdh-sha2-nistp256," \
- "ecdh-sha2-nistp384,"
-# define HOSTKEY_ECDSA_CERT_METHODS \
- "ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com," \
- "ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com,"
-# define HOSTKEY_ECDSA_METHODS \
- "ecdsa-sha2-nistp256," \
- "ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,"
-#endif
-#else
-# define KEX_ECDH_METHODS
-# define HOSTKEY_ECDSA_CERT_METHODS
-# define HOSTKEY_ECDSA_METHODS
-#endif
-
-#ifdef OPENSSL_HAVE_EVPGCM
-# define AESGCM_CIPHER_MODES \
- ",aes128-gcm@openssh.com,aes256-gcm@openssh.com"
-#else
-# define AESGCM_CIPHER_MODES
-#endif
-
-#ifdef HAVE_EVP_SHA256
-# define KEX_SHA2_METHODS \
+ "ecdh-sha2-nistp521," \
"diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256," \
"diffie-hellman-group16-sha512," \
- "diffie-hellman-group18-sha512,"
-# define KEX_SHA2_GROUP14 \
- "diffie-hellman-group14-sha256,"
-#define SHA2_HMAC_MODES \
- "hmac-sha2-256," \
- "hmac-sha2-512,"
-#else
-# define KEX_SHA2_METHODS
-# define KEX_SHA2_GROUP14
-# define SHA2_HMAC_MODES
-#endif
-
-#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
-# ifdef HAVE_EVP_SHA256
-# define KEX_CURVE25519_METHODS \
- "curve25519-sha256," \
- "curve25519-sha256@libssh.org,"
-# else
-# define KEX_CURVE25519_METHODS ""
-# endif
-#define KEX_SERVER_KEX \
- KEX_CURVE25519_METHODS \
- KEX_ECDH_METHODS \
- KEX_SHA2_METHODS \
- KEX_SHA2_GROUP14 \
- "diffie-hellman-group14-sha1"
+ "diffie-hellman-group18-sha512," \
+ "diffie-hellman-group14-sha256"
#define KEX_CLIENT_KEX KEX_SERVER_KEX
#define KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG \
- HOSTKEY_ECDSA_CERT_METHODS \
+ "ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com," \
+ "ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com," \
+ "ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com," \
+ "sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com," \
"ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com," \
+ "sk-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com," \
"rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com," \
"rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com," \
"ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com," \
- HOSTKEY_ECDSA_METHODS \
+ "ecdsa-sha2-nistp256," \
+ "ecdsa-sha2-nistp384," \
+ "ecdsa-sha2-nistp521," \
+ "sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com," \
"ssh-ed25519," \
+ "sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com," \
"rsa-sha2-512," \
"rsa-sha2-256," \
"ssh-rsa"
-/* the actual algorithms */
-
-#define KEX_SERVER_ENCRYPT \
+#define KEX_SERVER_ENCRYPT \
"chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com," \
- "aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr" \
- AESGCM_CIPHER_MODES
+ "aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr," \
+ "aes128-gcm@openssh.com,aes256-gcm@openssh.com"
#define KEX_CLIENT_ENCRYPT KEX_SERVER_ENCRYPT
-#define KEX_SERVER_MAC \
+#define KEX_SERVER_MAC \
"umac-64-etm@openssh.com," \
"umac-128-etm@openssh.com," \
"hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com," \
"hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com," \
"hmac-sha1-etm@openssh.com," \
"umac-64@openssh.com," \
"umac-128@openssh.com," \
"hmac-sha2-256," \
"hmac-sha2-512," \
"hmac-sha1"
#define KEX_CLIENT_MAC KEX_SERVER_MAC
/* Not a KEX value, but here so all the algorithm defaults are together */
#define SSH_ALLOWED_CA_SIGALGS \
- HOSTKEY_ECDSA_METHODS \
+ "ecdsa-sha2-nistp256," \
+ "ecdsa-sha2-nistp384," \
+ "ecdsa-sha2-nistp521," \
+ "sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com," \
"ssh-ed25519," \
+ "sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com," \
"rsa-sha2-512," \
- "rsa-sha2-256," \
- "ssh-rsa"
-
-#else /* WITH_OPENSSL */
-
-#define KEX_SERVER_KEX \
- "curve25519-sha256," \
- "curve25519-sha256@libssh.org"
-#define KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG \
- "ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com," \
- "ssh-ed25519"
-#define KEX_SERVER_ENCRYPT \
- "chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com," \
- "aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr"
-#define KEX_SERVER_MAC \
- "umac-64-etm@openssh.com," \
- "umac-128-etm@openssh.com," \
- "hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com," \
- "hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com," \
- "hmac-sha1-etm@openssh.com," \
- "umac-64@openssh.com," \
- "umac-128@openssh.com," \
- "hmac-sha2-256," \
- "hmac-sha2-512," \
- "hmac-sha1"
-
-#define KEX_CLIENT_KEX KEX_SERVER_KEX
-#define KEX_CLIENT_ENCRYPT KEX_SERVER_ENCRYPT
-#define KEX_CLIENT_MAC KEX_SERVER_MAC
-
-#define SSH_ALLOWED_CA_SIGALGS "ssh-ed25519"
-
-#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+ "rsa-sha2-256"
#define KEX_DEFAULT_COMP "none,zlib@openssh.com"
#define KEX_DEFAULT_LANG ""
#define KEX_CLIENT \
KEX_CLIENT_KEX, \
KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG, \
KEX_CLIENT_ENCRYPT, \
KEX_CLIENT_ENCRYPT, \
KEX_CLIENT_MAC, \
KEX_CLIENT_MAC, \
KEX_DEFAULT_COMP, \
KEX_DEFAULT_COMP, \
KEX_DEFAULT_LANG, \
KEX_DEFAULT_LANG
#define KEX_SERVER \
KEX_SERVER_KEX, \
KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG, \
KEX_SERVER_ENCRYPT, \
KEX_SERVER_ENCRYPT, \
KEX_SERVER_MAC, \
KEX_SERVER_MAC, \
KEX_DEFAULT_COMP, \
KEX_DEFAULT_COMP, \
KEX_DEFAULT_LANG, \
KEX_DEFAULT_LANG
-
diff --git a/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in b/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in
index 1162dc55053d..3eb188f0b600 100644
--- a/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in
+++ b/openbsd-compat/Makefile.in
@@ -1,115 +1,118 @@
sysconfdir=@sysconfdir@
piddir=@piddir@
srcdir=@srcdir@
top_srcdir=@top_srcdir@
VPATH=@srcdir@
CC=@CC@
LD=@LD@
CFLAGS=@CFLAGS@
+CFLAGS_NOPIE=@CFLAGS_NOPIE@
CPPFLAGS=-I. -I.. -I$(srcdir) -I$(srcdir)/.. @CPPFLAGS@ @DEFS@
+PICFLAG=@PICFLAG@
LIBS=@LIBS@
AR=@AR@
RANLIB=@RANLIB@
INSTALL=@INSTALL@
LDFLAGS=-L. @LDFLAGS@
+LDFLAGS_NOPIE=-L. -Lopenbsd-compat/ @LDFLAGS_NOPIE@
OPENBSD=base64.o \
basename.o \
bcrypt_pbkdf.o \
bcrypt_pbkdf.o \
bindresvport.o \
blowfish.o \
daemon.o \
dirname.o \
explicit_bzero.o \
fmt_scaled.o \
freezero.o \
+ fnmatch.o \
getcwd.o \
getgrouplist.o \
getopt_long.o \
getrrsetbyname.o \
glob.o \
inet_aton.o \
inet_ntoa.o \
inet_ntop.o \
md5.o \
memmem.o \
mktemp.o \
pwcache.o \
readpassphrase.o \
reallocarray.o \
recallocarray.o \
- rmd160.o \
rresvport.o \
setenv.o \
setproctitle.o \
sha1.o \
sha2.o \
sigact.o \
strcasestr.o \
strlcat.o \
strlcpy.o \
strmode.o \
strndup.o \
strnlen.o \
strptime.o \
strsep.o \
strtoll.o \
strtonum.o \
strtoull.o \
strtoul.o \
timingsafe_bcmp.o \
vis.o
COMPAT= arc4random.o \
bsd-asprintf.o \
bsd-closefrom.o \
bsd-cygwin_util.o \
bsd-err.o \
bsd-flock.o \
bsd-getline.o \
bsd-getpagesize.o \
bsd-getpeereid.o \
bsd-malloc.o \
bsd-misc.o \
bsd-nextstep.o \
bsd-openpty.o \
bsd-poll.o \
bsd-setres_id.o \
bsd-signal.o \
bsd-snprintf.o \
bsd-statvfs.o \
bsd-waitpid.o \
fake-rfc2553.o \
getrrsetbyname-ldns.o \
kludge-fd_set.o \
openssl-compat.o \
libressl-api-compat.o \
xcrypt.o
PORTS= port-aix.o \
port-irix.o \
port-linux.o \
port-solaris.o \
port-net.o \
port-uw.o
.c.o:
- $(CC) $(CFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS) -c $<
+ $(CC) $(CFLAGS_NOPIE) $(PICFLAG) $(CPPFLAGS) -c $<
all: libopenbsd-compat.a
$(COMPAT): ../config.h
$(OPENBSD): ../config.h
$(PORTS): ../config.h
libopenbsd-compat.a: $(COMPAT) $(OPENBSD) $(PORTS)
$(AR) rv $@ $(COMPAT) $(OPENBSD) $(PORTS)
$(RANLIB) $@
clean:
rm -f *.o *.a core
distclean: clean
rm -f Makefile *~
diff --git a/openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.c b/openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.c
index 7a26ee40c500..829e0c075cbc 100644
--- a/openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.c
+++ b/openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.c
@@ -1,428 +1,438 @@
/*
* Copyright (c) 1999-2004 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
*
* Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
* copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
* WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
* ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
* WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
* ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
* OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SELECT_H
# include <sys/select.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
# include <sys/time.h>
#endif
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <signal.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <time.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#ifndef HAVE___PROGNAME
char *__progname;
#endif
/*
* NB. duplicate __progname in case it is an alias for argv[0]
* Otherwise it may get clobbered by setproctitle()
*/
char *ssh_get_progname(char *argv0)
{
char *p, *q;
#ifdef HAVE___PROGNAME
extern char *__progname;
p = __progname;
#else
if (argv0 == NULL)
return ("unknown"); /* XXX */
p = strrchr(argv0, '/');
if (p == NULL)
p = argv0;
else
p++;
#endif
if ((q = strdup(p)) == NULL) {
perror("strdup");
exit(1);
}
return q;
}
#ifndef HAVE_SETLOGIN
int setlogin(const char *name)
{
return (0);
}
#endif /* !HAVE_SETLOGIN */
#ifndef HAVE_INNETGR
int innetgr(const char *netgroup, const char *host,
const char *user, const char *domain)
{
return (0);
}
#endif /* HAVE_INNETGR */
#if !defined(HAVE_SETEUID) && defined(HAVE_SETREUID)
int seteuid(uid_t euid)
{
return (setreuid(-1, euid));
}
#endif /* !defined(HAVE_SETEUID) && defined(HAVE_SETREUID) */
#if !defined(HAVE_SETEGID) && defined(HAVE_SETRESGID)
int setegid(uid_t egid)
{
return(setresgid(-1, egid, -1));
}
#endif /* !defined(HAVE_SETEGID) && defined(HAVE_SETRESGID) */
#if !defined(HAVE_STRERROR) && defined(HAVE_SYS_ERRLIST) && defined(HAVE_SYS_NERR)
const char *strerror(int e)
{
extern int sys_nerr;
extern char *sys_errlist[];
if ((e >= 0) && (e < sys_nerr))
return (sys_errlist[e]);
return ("unlisted error");
}
#endif
#ifndef HAVE_UTIMES
int utimes(char *filename, struct timeval *tvp)
{
struct utimbuf ub;
ub.actime = tvp[0].tv_sec;
ub.modtime = tvp[1].tv_sec;
return (utime(filename, &ub));
}
#endif
#ifndef HAVE_UTIMENSAT
/*
* A limited implementation of utimensat() that only implements the
* functionality used by OpenSSH, currently only AT_FDCWD and
* AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW.
*/
int
utimensat(int fd, const char *path, const struct timespec times[2],
int flag)
{
struct timeval tv[2];
int ret, oflags = O_WRONLY;
tv[0].tv_sec = times[0].tv_sec;
tv[0].tv_usec = times[0].tv_nsec / 1000;
tv[1].tv_sec = times[1].tv_sec;
tv[1].tv_usec = times[1].tv_nsec / 1000;
if (fd != AT_FDCWD) {
errno = ENOSYS;
return -1;
}
# ifndef HAVE_FUTIMES
return utimes(path, tv);
# else
# ifdef O_NOFOLLOW
if (flag & AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW)
oflags |= O_NOFOLLOW;
# endif /* O_NOFOLLOW */
if ((fd = open(path, oflags)) == -1)
return -1;
ret = futimes(fd, tv);
close(fd);
return ret;
# endif
}
#endif
#ifndef HAVE_FCHOWNAT
/*
* A limited implementation of fchownat() that only implements the
* functionality used by OpenSSH, currently only AT_FDCWD and
* AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW.
*/
int
fchownat(int fd, const char *path, uid_t owner, gid_t group, int flag)
{
int ret, oflags = O_WRONLY;
if (fd != AT_FDCWD) {
errno = ENOSYS;
return -1;
}
# ifndef HAVE_FCHOWN
return chown(path, owner, group);
# else
# ifdef O_NOFOLLOW
if (flag & AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW)
oflags |= O_NOFOLLOW;
# endif /* O_NOFOLLOW */
if ((fd = open(path, oflags)) == -1)
return -1;
ret = fchown(fd, owner, group);
close(fd);
return ret;
# endif
}
#endif
#ifndef HAVE_FCHMODAT
/*
* A limited implementation of fchmodat() that only implements the
* functionality used by OpenSSH, currently only AT_FDCWD and
* AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW.
*/
int
fchmodat(int fd, const char *path, mode_t mode, int flag)
{
int ret, oflags = O_WRONLY;
if (fd != AT_FDCWD) {
errno = ENOSYS;
return -1;
}
# ifndef HAVE_FCHMOD
return chmod(path, mode);
# else
# ifdef O_NOFOLLOW
if (flag & AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW)
oflags |= O_NOFOLLOW;
# endif /* O_NOFOLLOW */
if ((fd = open(path, oflags)) == -1)
return -1;
ret = fchmod(fd, mode);
close(fd);
return ret;
# endif
}
#endif
#ifndef HAVE_TRUNCATE
int truncate(const char *path, off_t length)
{
int fd, ret, saverrno;
fd = open(path, O_WRONLY);
if (fd < 0)
return (-1);
ret = ftruncate(fd, length);
saverrno = errno;
close(fd);
if (ret == -1)
errno = saverrno;
return(ret);
}
#endif /* HAVE_TRUNCATE */
#if !defined(HAVE_NANOSLEEP) && !defined(HAVE_NSLEEP)
int nanosleep(const struct timespec *req, struct timespec *rem)
{
int rc, saverrno;
extern int errno;
struct timeval tstart, tstop, tremain, time2wait;
TIMESPEC_TO_TIMEVAL(&time2wait, req)
(void) gettimeofday(&tstart, NULL);
rc = select(0, NULL, NULL, NULL, &time2wait);
if (rc == -1) {
saverrno = errno;
(void) gettimeofday (&tstop, NULL);
errno = saverrno;
tremain.tv_sec = time2wait.tv_sec -
(tstop.tv_sec - tstart.tv_sec);
tremain.tv_usec = time2wait.tv_usec -
(tstop.tv_usec - tstart.tv_usec);
tremain.tv_sec += tremain.tv_usec / 1000000L;
tremain.tv_usec %= 1000000L;
} else {
tremain.tv_sec = 0;
tremain.tv_usec = 0;
}
if (rem != NULL)
TIMEVAL_TO_TIMESPEC(&tremain, rem)
return(rc);
}
#endif
#if !defined(HAVE_USLEEP)
int usleep(unsigned int useconds)
{
struct timespec ts;
ts.tv_sec = useconds / 1000000;
ts.tv_nsec = (useconds % 1000000) * 1000;
return nanosleep(&ts, NULL);
}
#endif
#ifndef HAVE_TCGETPGRP
pid_t
tcgetpgrp(int fd)
{
int ctty_pgrp;
if (ioctl(fd, TIOCGPGRP, &ctty_pgrp) == -1)
return(-1);
else
return(ctty_pgrp);
}
#endif /* HAVE_TCGETPGRP */
#ifndef HAVE_TCSENDBREAK
int
tcsendbreak(int fd, int duration)
{
# if defined(TIOCSBRK) && defined(TIOCCBRK)
struct timeval sleepytime;
sleepytime.tv_sec = 0;
sleepytime.tv_usec = 400000;
if (ioctl(fd, TIOCSBRK, 0) == -1)
return (-1);
(void)select(0, 0, 0, 0, &sleepytime);
if (ioctl(fd, TIOCCBRK, 0) == -1)
return (-1);
return (0);
# else
return -1;
# endif
}
#endif /* HAVE_TCSENDBREAK */
#ifndef HAVE_STRDUP
char *
strdup(const char *str)
{
size_t len;
char *cp;
len = strlen(str) + 1;
cp = malloc(len);
if (cp != NULL)
return(memcpy(cp, str, len));
return NULL;
}
#endif
#ifndef HAVE_ISBLANK
int
isblank(int c)
{
return (c == ' ' || c == '\t');
}
#endif
#ifndef HAVE_GETPGID
pid_t
getpgid(pid_t pid)
{
#if defined(HAVE_GETPGRP) && !defined(GETPGRP_VOID) && GETPGRP_VOID == 0
return getpgrp(pid);
#elif defined(HAVE_GETPGRP)
if (pid == 0)
return getpgrp();
#endif
errno = ESRCH;
return -1;
}
#endif
#ifndef HAVE_PLEDGE
int
pledge(const char *promises, const char *paths[])
{
return 0;
}
#endif
#ifndef HAVE_MBTOWC
/* a mbtowc that only supports ASCII */
int
mbtowc(wchar_t *pwc, const char *s, size_t n)
{
if (s == NULL || *s == '\0')
return 0; /* ASCII is not state-dependent */
if (*s < 0 || *s > 0x7f || n < 1) {
errno = EOPNOTSUPP;
return -1;
}
if (pwc != NULL)
*pwc = *s;
return 1;
}
#endif
#ifndef HAVE_LLABS
long long
llabs(long long j)
{
return (j < 0 ? -j : j);
}
#endif
#ifndef HAVE_BZERO
void
bzero(void *b, size_t n)
{
(void)memset(b, 0, n);
}
#endif
#ifndef HAVE_RAISE
int
raise(int sig)
{
kill(getpid(), sig);
}
#endif
#ifndef HAVE_GETSID
pid_t
getsid(pid_t pid)
{
errno = ENOSYS;
return -1;
}
#endif
#ifdef FFLUSH_NULL_BUG
#undef fflush
int _ssh_compat_fflush(FILE *f)
{
int r1, r2;
if (f == NULL) {
r1 = fflush(stdout);
r2 = fflush(stderr);
if (r1 == -1 || r2 == -1)
return -1;
return 0;
}
return fflush(f);
}
#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_LOCALTIME_R
+struct tm *
+localtime_r(const time_t *timep, struct tm *result)
+{
+ struct tm *tm = localtime(timep);
+ *result = *tm;
+ return result;
+}
+#endif
diff --git a/openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h b/openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h
index cb158cd5c16b..3a7dd6f4c30e 100644
--- a/openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h
+++ b/openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.h
@@ -1,180 +1,191 @@
/*
* Copyright (c) 1999-2004 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
*
* Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
* copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
* WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
* ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
* WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
* ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
* OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
*/
#ifndef _BSD_MISC_H
#define _BSD_MISC_H
#include "includes.h"
char *ssh_get_progname(char *);
#ifndef HAVE_SETSID
#define setsid() setpgrp(0, getpid())
#endif /* !HAVE_SETSID */
#ifndef HAVE_SETENV
int setenv(const char *, const char *, int);
#endif /* !HAVE_SETENV */
#ifndef HAVE_SETLOGIN
int setlogin(const char *);
#endif /* !HAVE_SETLOGIN */
#ifndef HAVE_INNETGR
int innetgr(const char *, const char *, const char *, const char *);
#endif /* HAVE_INNETGR */
#if !defined(HAVE_SETEUID) && defined(HAVE_SETREUID)
int seteuid(uid_t);
#endif /* !defined(HAVE_SETEUID) && defined(HAVE_SETREUID) */
#if !defined(HAVE_SETEGID) && defined(HAVE_SETRESGID)
int setegid(uid_t);
#endif /* !defined(HAVE_SETEGID) && defined(HAVE_SETRESGID) */
#if !defined(HAVE_STRERROR) && defined(HAVE_SYS_ERRLIST) && defined(HAVE_SYS_NERR)
const char *strerror(int);
#endif
#if !defined(HAVE_SETLINEBUF)
#define setlinebuf(a) (setvbuf((a), NULL, _IOLBF, 0))
#endif
#ifndef HAVE_UTIMES
#ifndef HAVE_STRUCT_TIMEVAL
struct timeval {
long tv_sec;
long tv_usec;
}
#endif /* HAVE_STRUCT_TIMEVAL */
int utimes(char *, struct timeval *);
#endif /* HAVE_UTIMES */
-#ifndef HAVE_UTIMENSAT
-/* start with the high bits and work down to minimise risk of overlap */
-# ifndef AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW
-# define AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW 0x80000000
-# endif
-int utimensat(int, const char *, const struct timespec[2], int);
-#endif
-
#ifndef AT_FDCWD
# define AT_FDCWD (-2)
#endif
#ifndef HAVE_FCHMODAT
int fchmodat(int, const char *, mode_t, int);
#endif
#ifndef HAVE_FCHOWNAT
int fchownat(int, const char *, uid_t, gid_t, int);
#endif
#ifndef HAVE_TRUNCATE
int truncate (const char *, off_t);
#endif /* HAVE_TRUNCATE */
-#if !defined(HAVE_NANOSLEEP) && !defined(HAVE_NSLEEP)
#ifndef HAVE_STRUCT_TIMESPEC
struct timespec {
time_t tv_sec;
long tv_nsec;
};
-#endif
+#endif /* !HAVE_STRUCT_TIMESPEC */
+
+#if !defined(HAVE_NANOSLEEP) && !defined(HAVE_NSLEEP)
+# include <time.h>
int nanosleep(const struct timespec *, struct timespec *);
#endif
+#ifndef HAVE_UTIMENSAT
+# include <time.h>
+/* start with the high bits and work down to minimise risk of overlap */
+# ifndef AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW
+# define AT_SYMLINK_NOFOLLOW 0x80000000
+# endif
+int utimensat(int, const char *, const struct timespec[2], int);
+#endif /* !HAVE_UTIMENSAT */
+
#ifndef HAVE_USLEEP
int usleep(unsigned int useconds);
#endif
#ifndef HAVE_TCGETPGRP
pid_t tcgetpgrp(int);
#endif
#ifndef HAVE_TCSENDBREAK
int tcsendbreak(int, int);
#endif
#ifndef HAVE_UNSETENV
int unsetenv(const char *);
#endif
#ifndef HAVE_ISBLANK
int isblank(int);
#endif
#ifndef HAVE_GETPGID
pid_t getpgid(pid_t);
#endif
#ifndef HAVE_ENDGRENT
# define endgrent() do { } while(0)
#endif
#ifndef HAVE_KRB5_GET_ERROR_MESSAGE
# define krb5_get_error_message krb5_get_err_text
#endif
#ifndef HAVE_KRB5_FREE_ERROR_MESSAGE
# define krb5_free_error_message(a,b) do { } while(0)
#endif
#ifndef HAVE_PLEDGE
int pledge(const char *promises, const char *paths[]);
#endif
/* bsd-err.h */
#ifndef HAVE_ERR
void err(int, const char *, ...) __attribute__((format(printf, 2, 3)));
#endif
#ifndef HAVE_ERRX
void errx(int, const char *, ...) __attribute__((format(printf, 2, 3)));
#endif
#ifndef HAVE_WARN
void warn(const char *, ...) __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2)));
#endif
#ifndef HAVE_LLABS
long long llabs(long long);
#endif
#if defined(HAVE_DECL_BZERO) && HAVE_DECL_BZERO == 0
void bzero(void *, size_t);
#endif
#ifndef HAVE_RAISE
int raise(int);
#endif
#ifndef HAVE_GETSID
pid_t getsid(pid_t);
#endif
#ifndef HAVE_FLOCK
# define LOCK_SH 0x01
# define LOCK_EX 0x02
# define LOCK_NB 0x04
# define LOCK_UN 0x08
int flock(int, int);
#endif
#ifdef FFLUSH_NULL_BUG
# define fflush(x) (_ssh_compat_fflush(x))
#endif
+#ifndef HAVE_LOCALTIME_R
+struct tm *localtime_r(const time_t *, struct tm *);
+#endif
+
+#ifndef HAVE_REALPATH
+#define realpath(x, y) (sftp_realpath((x), (y)))
+#endif
+
#endif /* _BSD_MISC_H */
diff --git a/openbsd-compat/bsd-openpty.c b/openbsd-compat/bsd-openpty.c
index 123a9be5650d..1ab41f42b634 100644
--- a/openbsd-compat/bsd-openpty.c
+++ b/openbsd-compat/bsd-openpty.c
@@ -1,204 +1,206 @@
/*
* Please note: this implementation of openpty() is far from complete.
* it is just enough for portable OpenSSH's needs.
*/
/*
* Copyright (c) 2004 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
*
* Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
* copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
* WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
* ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
* WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
* ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
* OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
*/
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
* All rights reserved
* Allocating a pseudo-terminal, and making it the controlling tty.
*
* As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
* can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
* software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
* incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
* called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
*/
#include "includes.h"
#if !defined(HAVE_OPENPTY)
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H
# include <sys/stat.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_IOCTL_H
# include <sys/ioctl.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_FCNTL_H
# include <fcntl.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_UTIL_H
# include <util.h>
#endif /* HAVE_UTIL_H */
#ifdef HAVE_PTY_H
# include <pty.h>
#endif
#if defined(HAVE_DEV_PTMX) && defined(HAVE_SYS_STROPTS_H)
# include <sys/stropts.h>
#endif
#include <signal.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <unistd.h>
+#include "misc.h"
+
#ifndef O_NOCTTY
#define O_NOCTTY 0
#endif
int
openpty(int *amaster, int *aslave, char *name, struct termios *termp,
struct winsize *winp)
{
#if defined(HAVE__GETPTY)
/*
* _getpty(3) exists in SGI Irix 4.x, 5.x & 6.x -- it generates more
* pty's automagically when needed
*/
char *slave;
if ((slave = _getpty(amaster, O_RDWR, 0622, 0)) == NULL)
return (-1);
/* Open the slave side. */
if ((*aslave = open(slave, O_RDWR | O_NOCTTY)) == -1) {
close(*amaster);
return (-1);
}
return (0);
#elif defined(HAVE_DEV_PTMX)
/*
* This code is used e.g. on Solaris 2.x. (Note that Solaris 2.3
* also has bsd-style ptys, but they simply do not work.)
*/
int ptm;
char *pts;
- mysig_t old_signal;
+ sshsig_t old_signal;
if ((ptm = open("/dev/ptmx", O_RDWR | O_NOCTTY)) == -1)
return (-1);
/* XXX: need to close ptm on error? */
- old_signal = signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL);
+ old_signal = ssh_signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL);
if (grantpt(ptm) < 0)
return (-1);
- signal(SIGCHLD, old_signal);
+ ssh_signal(SIGCHLD, old_signal);
if (unlockpt(ptm) < 0)
return (-1);
if ((pts = ptsname(ptm)) == NULL)
return (-1);
*amaster = ptm;
/* Open the slave side. */
if ((*aslave = open(pts, O_RDWR | O_NOCTTY)) == -1) {
close(*amaster);
return (-1);
}
# if defined(I_FIND) && defined(__SVR4)
/*
* If the streams modules have already been pushed then there
* is no more work to do here.
*/
if (ioctl(*aslave, I_FIND, "ptem") != 0)
return 0;
# endif
/*
* Try to push the appropriate streams modules, as described
* in Solaris pts(7).
*/
ioctl(*aslave, I_PUSH, "ptem");
ioctl(*aslave, I_PUSH, "ldterm");
# ifndef __hpux
ioctl(*aslave, I_PUSH, "ttcompat");
# endif /* __hpux */
return (0);
#elif defined(HAVE_DEV_PTS_AND_PTC)
/* AIX-style pty code. */
const char *ttname;
if ((*amaster = open("/dev/ptc", O_RDWR | O_NOCTTY)) == -1)
return (-1);
if ((ttname = ttyname(*amaster)) == NULL)
return (-1);
if ((*aslave = open(ttname, O_RDWR | O_NOCTTY)) == -1) {
close(*amaster);
return (-1);
}
return (0);
#else
/* BSD-style pty code. */
char ptbuf[64], ttbuf[64];
int i;
const char *ptymajors = "pqrstuvwxyzabcdefghijklmno"
"ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZ";
const char *ptyminors = "0123456789abcdef";
int num_minors = strlen(ptyminors);
int num_ptys = strlen(ptymajors) * num_minors;
struct termios tio;
for (i = 0; i < num_ptys; i++) {
snprintf(ptbuf, sizeof(ptbuf), "/dev/pty%c%c",
ptymajors[i / num_minors], ptyminors[i % num_minors]);
snprintf(ttbuf, sizeof(ttbuf), "/dev/tty%c%c",
ptymajors[i / num_minors], ptyminors[i % num_minors]);
if ((*amaster = open(ptbuf, O_RDWR | O_NOCTTY)) == -1) {
/* Try SCO style naming */
snprintf(ptbuf, sizeof(ptbuf), "/dev/ptyp%d", i);
snprintf(ttbuf, sizeof(ttbuf), "/dev/ttyp%d", i);
if ((*amaster = open(ptbuf, O_RDWR | O_NOCTTY)) == -1)
continue;
}
/* Open the slave side. */
if ((*aslave = open(ttbuf, O_RDWR | O_NOCTTY)) == -1) {
close(*amaster);
return (-1);
}
/* set tty modes to a sane state for broken clients */
if (tcgetattr(*amaster, &tio) != -1) {
tio.c_lflag |= (ECHO | ISIG | ICANON);
tio.c_oflag |= (OPOST | ONLCR);
tio.c_iflag |= ICRNL;
tcsetattr(*amaster, TCSANOW, &tio);
}
return (0);
}
return (-1);
#endif
}
#endif /* !defined(HAVE_OPENPTY) */
diff --git a/openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.c b/openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.c
index 0b816a3a635c..38d5e972e9e4 100644
--- a/openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.c
+++ b/openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.c
@@ -1,63 +1,35 @@
/*
* Copyright (c) 1999-2004 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
*
* Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
* copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
* WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
* ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
* WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
* ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
* OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include <signal.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include "openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h"
-#undef signal
-
-mysig_t
-mysignal(int sig, mysig_t act)
-{
-#ifdef HAVE_SIGACTION
- struct sigaction sa, osa;
-
- if (sigaction(sig, NULL, &osa) == -1)
- return (mysig_t) -1;
- if (osa.sa_handler != act) {
- memset(&sa, 0, sizeof(sa));
- sigemptyset(&sa.sa_mask);
- sa.sa_flags = 0;
-#ifdef SA_INTERRUPT
- if (sig == SIGALRM)
- sa.sa_flags |= SA_INTERRUPT;
-#endif
- sa.sa_handler = act;
- if (sigaction(sig, &sa, NULL) == -1)
- return (mysig_t) -1;
- }
- return (osa.sa_handler);
-#else
- return (signal(sig, act));
-#endif
-}
-
#if !defined(HAVE_STRSIGNAL)
char *strsignal(int sig)
{
static char buf[16];
(void)snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%d", sig);
return buf;
}
#endif
diff --git a/openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h b/openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h
index 4cb8cb7a0b92..8d8c4441968d 100644
--- a/openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h
+++ b/openbsd-compat/bsd-signal.h
@@ -1,39 +1,36 @@
/*
* Copyright (c) 1999-2004 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
*
* Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
* copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
* WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
* ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
* WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
* ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
* OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
*/
#ifndef _BSD_SIGNAL_H
#define _BSD_SIGNAL_H
#include "includes.h"
+#include <signal.h>
+
#ifndef _NSIG
# ifdef NSIG
# define _NSIG NSIG
# else
# define _NSIG 128
# endif
#endif
-/* wrapper for signal interface */
-typedef void (*mysig_t)(int);
-mysig_t mysignal(int sig, mysig_t act);
-#define signal(a,b) mysignal(a,b)
-
#if !defined(HAVE_STRSIGNAL)
char *strsignal(int);
#endif
#endif /* _BSD_SIGNAL_H */
diff --git a/openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.c b/openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.c
index e3bd87d985a3..10d8764392c2 100644
--- a/openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.c
+++ b/openbsd-compat/bsd-statvfs.c
@@ -1,88 +1,94 @@
/*
* Copyright (c) 2008,2014 Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
*
* Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
* copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
* WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
* ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
* WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF MIND, USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER
* IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING
* OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#if !defined(HAVE_STATVFS) || !defined(HAVE_FSTATVFS)
#include <sys/param.h>
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_MOUNT_H
# include <sys/mount.h>
#endif
#include <errno.h>
#ifndef MNAMELEN
# define MNAMELEN 32
#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_STATFS_F_FILES
+# define HAVE_STRUCT_STATFS
+#endif
+
+#ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_STATFS
static void
copy_statfs_to_statvfs(struct statvfs *to, struct statfs *from)
{
to->f_bsize = from->f_bsize;
to->f_frsize = from->f_bsize; /* no exact equivalent */
to->f_blocks = from->f_blocks;
to->f_bfree = from->f_bfree;
to->f_bavail = from->f_bavail;
to->f_files = from->f_files;
to->f_ffree = from->f_ffree;
to->f_favail = from->f_ffree; /* no exact equivalent */
to->f_fsid = 0; /* XXX fix me */
#ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_STATFS_F_FLAGS
to->f_flag = from->f_flags;
#else
to->f_flag = 0;
#endif
to->f_namemax = MNAMELEN;
}
+#endif
# ifndef HAVE_STATVFS
int statvfs(const char *path, struct statvfs *buf)
{
-# ifdef HAVE_STATFS
+# if defined(HAVE_STATFS) && defined(HAVE_STRUCT_STATFS)
struct statfs fs;
memset(&fs, 0, sizeof(fs));
if (statfs(path, &fs) == -1)
return -1;
copy_statfs_to_statvfs(buf, &fs);
return 0;
# else
errno = ENOSYS;
return -1;
# endif
}
# endif
# ifndef HAVE_FSTATVFS
int fstatvfs(int fd, struct statvfs *buf)
{
-# ifdef HAVE_FSTATFS
+# if defined(HAVE_FSTATFS) && defined(HAVE_STRUCT_STATFS)
struct statfs fs;
memset(&fs, 0, sizeof(fs));
if (fstatfs(fd, &fs) == -1)
return -1;
copy_statfs_to_statvfs(buf, &fs);
return 0;
# else
errno = ENOSYS;
return -1;
# endif
}
# endif
#endif
diff --git a/openbsd-compat/fnmatch.c b/openbsd-compat/fnmatch.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..da841d203d38
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openbsd-compat/fnmatch.c
@@ -0,0 +1,495 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: fnmatch.c,v 1.21 2016/03/01 20:29:03 millert Exp $ */
+
+/* Copyright (c) 2011, VMware, Inc.
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions are met:
+ * * Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * * Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * * Neither the name of the VMware, Inc. nor the names of its contributors
+ * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
+ * without specific prior written permission.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS "AS IS"
+ * AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL VMWARE, INC. OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES
+ * (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND
+ * ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2008, 2016 Todd C. Miller <millert@openbsd.org>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+/* Authored by William A. Rowe Jr. <wrowe; apache.org, vmware.com>, April 2011
+ *
+ * Derived from The Open Group Base Specifications Issue 7, IEEE Std 1003.1-2008
+ * as described in;
+ * http://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/9699919799/functions/fnmatch.html
+ *
+ * Filename pattern matches defined in section 2.13, "Pattern Matching Notation"
+ * from chapter 2. "Shell Command Language"
+ * http://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/9699919799/utilities/V3_chap02.html#tag_18_13
+ * where; 1. A bracket expression starting with an unquoted <circumflex> '^'
+ * character CONTINUES to specify a non-matching list; 2. an explicit <period> '.'
+ * in a bracket expression matching list, e.g. "[.abc]" does NOT match a leading
+ * <period> in a filename; 3. a <left-square-bracket> '[' which does not introduce
+ * a valid bracket expression is treated as an ordinary character; 4. a differing
+ * number of consecutive slashes within pattern and string will NOT match;
+ * 5. a trailing '\' in FNM_ESCAPE mode is treated as an ordinary '\' character.
+ *
+ * Bracket expansion defined in section 9.3.5, "RE Bracket Expression",
+ * from chapter 9, "Regular Expressions"
+ * http://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/9699919799/basedefs/V1_chap09.html#tag_09_03_05
+ * with no support for collating symbols, equivalence class expressions or
+ * character class expressions. A partial range expression with a leading
+ * hyphen following a valid range expression will match only the ordinary
+ * <hyphen> and the ending character (e.g. "[a-m-z]" will match characters
+ * 'a' through 'm', a <hyphen> '-', or a 'z').
+ *
+ * Supports BSD extensions FNM_LEADING_DIR to match pattern to the end of one
+ * path segment of string, and FNM_CASEFOLD to ignore alpha case.
+ *
+ * NOTE: Only POSIX/C single byte locales are correctly supported at this time.
+ * Notably, non-POSIX locales with FNM_CASEFOLD produce undefined results,
+ * particularly in ranges of mixed case (e.g. "[A-z]") or spanning alpha and
+ * nonalpha characters within a range.
+ *
+ * XXX comments below indicate porting required for multi-byte character sets
+ * and non-POSIX locale collation orders; requires mbr* APIs to track shift
+ * state of pattern and string (rewinding pattern and string repeatedly).
+ *
+ * Certain parts of the code assume 0x00-0x3F are unique with any MBCS (e.g.
+ * UTF-8, SHIFT-JIS, etc). Any implementation allowing '\' as an alternate
+ * path delimiter must be aware that 0x5C is NOT unique within SHIFT-JIS.
+ */
+
+/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/gen/fnmatch.c */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+#ifndef HAVE_FNMATCH
+
+#include <fnmatch.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <ctype.h>
+
+#include "charclass.h"
+
+#define RANGE_MATCH 1
+#define RANGE_NOMATCH 0
+#define RANGE_ERROR (-1)
+
+static int
+classmatch(const char *pattern, char test, int foldcase, const char **ep)
+{
+ const char * const mismatch = pattern;
+ const char *colon;
+ struct cclass *cc;
+ int rval = RANGE_NOMATCH;
+ size_t len;
+
+ if (pattern[0] != '[' || pattern[1] != ':') {
+ *ep = mismatch;
+ return RANGE_ERROR;
+ }
+ pattern += 2;
+
+ if ((colon = strchr(pattern, ':')) == NULL || colon[1] != ']') {
+ *ep = mismatch;
+ return RANGE_ERROR;
+ }
+ *ep = colon + 2;
+ len = (size_t)(colon - pattern);
+
+ if (foldcase && strncmp(pattern, "upper:]", 7) == 0)
+ pattern = "lower:]";
+ for (cc = cclasses; cc->name != NULL; cc++) {
+ if (!strncmp(pattern, cc->name, len) && cc->name[len] == '\0') {
+ if (cc->isctype((unsigned char)test))
+ rval = RANGE_MATCH;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ if (cc->name == NULL) {
+ /* invalid character class, treat as normal text */
+ *ep = mismatch;
+ rval = RANGE_ERROR;
+ }
+ return rval;
+}
+
+/* Most MBCS/collation/case issues handled here. Wildcard '*' is not handled.
+ * EOS '\0' and the FNM_PATHNAME '/' delimiters are not advanced over,
+ * however the "\/" sequence is advanced to '/'.
+ *
+ * Both pattern and string are **char to support pointer increment of arbitrary
+ * multibyte characters for the given locale, in a later iteration of this code
+ */
+static int fnmatch_ch(const char **pattern, const char **string, int flags)
+{
+ const char * const mismatch = *pattern;
+ const int nocase = !!(flags & FNM_CASEFOLD);
+ const int escape = !(flags & FNM_NOESCAPE);
+ const int slash = !!(flags & FNM_PATHNAME);
+ int result = FNM_NOMATCH;
+ const char *startch;
+ int negate;
+
+ if (**pattern == '[') {
+ ++*pattern;
+
+ /* Handle negation, either leading ! or ^ operators */
+ negate = (**pattern == '!') || (**pattern == '^');
+ if (negate)
+ ++*pattern;
+
+ /* ']' is an ordinary char at the start of the range pattern */
+ if (**pattern == ']')
+ goto leadingclosebrace;
+
+ while (**pattern) {
+ if (**pattern == ']') {
+ ++*pattern;
+ /* XXX: Fix for MBCS character width */
+ ++*string;
+ return (result ^ negate);
+ }
+
+ if (escape && (**pattern == '\\')) {
+ ++*pattern;
+
+ /* Patterns must terminate with ']', not EOS */
+ if (!**pattern)
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /* Patterns must terminate with ']' not '/' */
+ if (slash && (**pattern == '/'))
+ break;
+
+ /* Match character classes. */
+ switch (classmatch(*pattern, **string, nocase, pattern)) {
+ case RANGE_MATCH:
+ result = 0;
+ continue;
+ case RANGE_NOMATCH:
+ /* Valid character class but no match. */
+ continue;
+ default:
+ /* Not a valid character class. */
+ break;
+ }
+ if (!**pattern)
+ break;
+
+leadingclosebrace:
+ /* Look at only well-formed range patterns;
+ * "x-]" is not allowed unless escaped ("x-\]")
+ * XXX: Fix for locale/MBCS character width
+ */
+ if (((*pattern)[1] == '-') && ((*pattern)[2] != ']')) {
+ startch = *pattern;
+ *pattern += (escape && ((*pattern)[2] == '\\')) ? 3 : 2;
+
+ /*
+ * NOT a properly balanced [expr] pattern, EOS
+ * terminated or ranges containing a slash in
+ * FNM_PATHNAME mode pattern fall out to to the
+ * rewind and test '[' literal code path.
+ */
+ if (!**pattern || (slash && (**pattern == '/')))
+ break;
+
+ /* XXX: handle locale/MBCS comparison, advance by MBCS char width */
+ if ((**string >= *startch) && (**string <= **pattern))
+ result = 0;
+ else if (nocase &&
+ (isupper((unsigned char)**string) ||
+ isupper((unsigned char)*startch) ||
+ isupper((unsigned char)**pattern)) &&
+ (tolower((unsigned char)**string) >=
+ tolower((unsigned char)*startch)) &&
+ (tolower((unsigned char)**string) <=
+ tolower((unsigned char)**pattern)))
+ result = 0;
+
+ ++*pattern;
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ /* XXX: handle locale/MBCS comparison, advance by MBCS char width */
+ if ((**string == **pattern))
+ result = 0;
+ else if (nocase && (isupper((unsigned char)**string) ||
+ isupper((unsigned char)**pattern)) &&
+ (tolower((unsigned char)**string) ==
+ tolower((unsigned char)**pattern)))
+ result = 0;
+
+ ++*pattern;
+ }
+ /*
+ * NOT a properly balanced [expr] pattern;
+ * Rewind and reset result to test '[' literal
+ */
+ *pattern = mismatch;
+ result = FNM_NOMATCH;
+ } else if (**pattern == '?') {
+ /* Optimize '?' match before unescaping **pattern */
+ if (!**string || (slash && (**string == '/')))
+ return FNM_NOMATCH;
+ result = 0;
+ goto fnmatch_ch_success;
+ } else if (escape && (**pattern == '\\') && (*pattern)[1]) {
+ ++*pattern;
+ }
+
+ /* XXX: handle locale/MBCS comparison, advance by the MBCS char width */
+ if (**string == **pattern)
+ result = 0;
+ else if (nocase && (isupper((unsigned char)**string) ||
+ isupper((unsigned char)**pattern)) &&
+ (tolower((unsigned char)**string) ==
+ tolower((unsigned char)**pattern)))
+ result = 0;
+
+ /* Refuse to advance over trailing slash or NULs */
+ if (**string == '\0' || **pattern == '\0' ||
+ (slash && ((**string == '/') || (**pattern == '/'))))
+ return result;
+
+fnmatch_ch_success:
+ ++*pattern;
+ ++*string;
+ return result;
+}
+
+
+int fnmatch(const char *pattern, const char *string, int flags)
+{
+ static const char dummystring[2] = {' ', 0};
+ const int escape = !(flags & FNM_NOESCAPE);
+ const int slash = !!(flags & FNM_PATHNAME);
+ const int leading_dir = !!(flags & FNM_LEADING_DIR);
+ const char *dummyptr, *matchptr, *strendseg;
+ int wild;
+ /* For '*' wild processing only; surpress 'used before initialization'
+ * warnings with dummy initialization values;
+ */
+ const char *strstartseg = NULL;
+ const char *mismatch = NULL;
+ int matchlen = 0;
+
+ if (*pattern == '*')
+ goto firstsegment;
+
+ while (*pattern && *string) {
+ /*
+ * Pre-decode "\/" which has no special significance, and
+ * match balanced slashes, starting a new segment pattern.
+ */
+ if (slash && escape && (*pattern == '\\') && (pattern[1] == '/'))
+ ++pattern;
+ if (slash && (*pattern == '/') && (*string == '/')) {
+ ++pattern;
+ ++string;
+ }
+
+firstsegment:
+ /*
+ * At the beginning of each segment, validate leading period
+ * behavior.
+ */
+ if ((flags & FNM_PERIOD) && (*string == '.')) {
+ if (*pattern == '.')
+ ++pattern;
+ else if (escape && (*pattern == '\\') && (pattern[1] == '.'))
+ pattern += 2;
+ else
+ return FNM_NOMATCH;
+ ++string;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Determine the end of string segment. Presumes '/'
+ * character is unique, not composite in any MBCS encoding
+ */
+ if (slash) {
+ strendseg = strchr(string, '/');
+ if (!strendseg)
+ strendseg = strchr(string, '\0');
+ } else {
+ strendseg = strchr(string, '\0');
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Allow pattern '*' to be consumed even with no remaining
+ * string to match.
+ */
+ while (*pattern) {
+ if ((string > strendseg) ||
+ ((string == strendseg) && (*pattern != '*')))
+ break;
+
+ if (slash && ((*pattern == '/') ||
+ (escape && (*pattern == '\\') && (pattern[1] == '/'))))
+ break;
+
+ /*
+ * Reduce groups of '*' and '?' to n '?' matches
+ * followed by one '*' test for simplicity.
+ */
+ for (wild = 0; (*pattern == '*') || (*pattern == '?'); ++pattern) {
+ if (*pattern == '*') {
+ wild = 1;
+ } else if (string < strendseg) { /* && (*pattern == '?') */
+ /* XXX: Advance 1 char for MBCS locale */
+ ++string;
+ }
+ else { /* (string >= strendseg) && (*pattern == '?') */
+ return FNM_NOMATCH;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (wild) {
+ strstartseg = string;
+ mismatch = pattern;
+
+ /*
+ * Count fixed (non '*') char matches remaining
+ * in pattern * excluding '/' (or "\/") and '*'.
+ */
+ for (matchptr = pattern, matchlen = 0; 1; ++matchlen) {
+ if ((*matchptr == '\0') ||
+ (slash && ((*matchptr == '/') ||
+ (escape && (*matchptr == '\\') &&
+ (matchptr[1] == '/'))))) {
+ /* Compare precisely this many
+ * trailing string chars, the
+ * resulting match needs no
+ * wildcard loop.
+ */
+ /* XXX: Adjust for MBCS */
+ if (string + matchlen > strendseg)
+ return FNM_NOMATCH;
+
+ string = strendseg - matchlen;
+ wild = 0;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (*matchptr == '*') {
+ /*
+ * Ensure at least this many
+ * trailing string chars remain
+ * for the first comparison.
+ */
+ /* XXX: Adjust for MBCS */
+ if (string + matchlen > strendseg)
+ return FNM_NOMATCH;
+
+ /*
+ * Begin first wild comparison
+ * at the current position.
+ */
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Skip forward in pattern by a single
+ * character match Use a dummy
+ * fnmatch_ch() test to count one
+ * "[range]" escape.
+ */
+ /* XXX: Adjust for MBCS */
+ if (escape && (*matchptr == '\\') &&
+ matchptr[1]) {
+ matchptr += 2;
+ } else if (*matchptr == '[') {
+ dummyptr = dummystring;
+ fnmatch_ch(&matchptr, &dummyptr,
+ flags);
+ } else {
+ ++matchptr;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Incrementally match string against the pattern. */
+ while (*pattern && (string < strendseg)) {
+ /* Success; begin a new wild pattern search. */
+ if (*pattern == '*')
+ break;
+
+ if (slash && ((*string == '/') ||
+ (*pattern == '/') || (escape &&
+ (*pattern == '\\') && (pattern[1] == '/'))))
+ break;
+
+ /*
+ * Compare ch's (the pattern is advanced over
+ * "\/" to the '/', but slashes will mismatch,
+ * and are not consumed).
+ */
+ if (!fnmatch_ch(&pattern, &string, flags))
+ continue;
+
+ /*
+ * Failed to match, loop against next char
+ * offset of string segment until not enough
+ * string chars remain to match the fixed
+ * pattern.
+ */
+ if (wild) {
+ /* XXX: Advance 1 char for MBCS locale */
+ string = ++strstartseg;
+ if (string + matchlen > strendseg)
+ return FNM_NOMATCH;
+
+ pattern = mismatch;
+ continue;
+ } else
+ return FNM_NOMATCH;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (*string && !((slash || leading_dir) && (*string == '/')))
+ return FNM_NOMATCH;
+
+ if (*pattern && !(slash && ((*pattern == '/') ||
+ (escape && (*pattern == '\\') && (pattern[1] == '/')))))
+ return FNM_NOMATCH;
+
+ if (leading_dir && !*pattern && *string == '/')
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* Where both pattern and string are at EOS, declare success. */
+ if (!*string && !*pattern)
+ return 0;
+
+ /* Pattern didn't match to the end of string. */
+ return FNM_NOMATCH;
+}
+#endif /* HAVE_FNMATCH */
diff --git a/openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h b/openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..d3bc4a8634f1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/openbsd-compat/fnmatch.h
@@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: fnmatch.h,v 1.8 2005/12/13 00:35:22 millert Exp $ */
+/* $NetBSD: fnmatch.h,v 1.5 1994/10/26 00:55:53 cgd Exp $ */
+
+/*-
+ * Copyright (c) 1992, 1993
+ * The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ * 3. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors
+ * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
+ * without specific prior written permission.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
+ * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
+ * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
+ * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
+ * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
+ * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
+ * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
+ * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
+ * SUCH DAMAGE.
+ *
+ * @(#)fnmatch.h 8.1 (Berkeley) 6/2/93
+ */
+
+/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: include/fnmatch.h */
+
+#ifndef HAVE_FNMATCH_H
+/* Ensure we define FNM_CASEFOLD */
+#define __BSD_VISIBLE 1
+
+#ifndef _FNMATCH_H_
+#define _FNMATCH_H_
+
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_CDEFS_H
+#include <sys/cdefs.h>
+#endif
+
+#define FNM_NOMATCH 1 /* Match failed. */
+#define FNM_NOSYS 2 /* Function not supported (unused). */
+
+#define FNM_NOESCAPE 0x01 /* Disable backslash escaping. */
+#define FNM_PATHNAME 0x02 /* Slash must be matched by slash. */
+#define FNM_PERIOD 0x04 /* Period must be matched by period. */
+#if __BSD_VISIBLE
+#define FNM_LEADING_DIR 0x08 /* Ignore /<tail> after Imatch. */
+#define FNM_CASEFOLD 0x10 /* Case insensitive search. */
+#define FNM_IGNORECASE FNM_CASEFOLD
+#define FNM_FILE_NAME FNM_PATHNAME
+#endif
+
+/* __BEGIN_DECLS */
+int fnmatch(const char *, const char *, int);
+/* __END_DECLS */
+
+#endif /* !_FNMATCH_H_ */
+#endif /* ! HAVE_FNMATCH_H */
diff --git a/openbsd-compat/glob.c b/openbsd-compat/glob.c
index 7c97e67f557c..1e346a8f6679 100644
--- a/openbsd-compat/glob.c
+++ b/openbsd-compat/glob.c
@@ -1,1066 +1,1075 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: glob.c,v 1.38 2011/09/22 06:27:29 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: glob.c,v 1.48 2019/02/04 16:45:40 millert Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 1989, 1993
* The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved.
*
* This code is derived from software contributed to Berkeley by
* Guido van Rossum.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
* 3. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors
* may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
* without specific prior written permission.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/gen/glob.c */
/*
* glob(3) -- a superset of the one defined in POSIX 1003.2.
*
* The [!...] convention to negate a range is supported (SysV, Posix, ksh).
*
* Optional extra services, controlled by flags not defined by POSIX:
*
* GLOB_QUOTE:
* Escaping convention: \ inhibits any special meaning the following
* character might have (except \ at end of string is retained).
* GLOB_MAGCHAR:
* Set in gl_flags if pattern contained a globbing character.
* GLOB_NOMAGIC:
* Same as GLOB_NOCHECK, but it will only append pattern if it did
* not contain any magic characters. [Used in csh style globbing]
* GLOB_ALTDIRFUNC:
* Use alternately specified directory access functions.
* GLOB_TILDE:
* expand ~user/foo to the /home/dir/of/user/foo
* GLOB_BRACE:
* expand {1,2}{a,b} to 1a 1b 2a 2b
* gl_matchc:
* Number of matches in the current invocation of glob.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include "glob.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <dirent.h>
#include <ctype.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <limits.h>
#include <pwd.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
+#include <stdint.h>
+#endif
#include <string.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#if !defined(HAVE_GLOB) || !defined(GLOB_HAS_ALTDIRFUNC) || \
!defined(GLOB_HAS_GL_MATCHC) || !defined(GLOB_HAS_GL_STATV) || \
!defined(HAVE_DECL_GLOB_NOMATCH) || HAVE_DECL_GLOB_NOMATCH == 0 || \
defined(BROKEN_GLOB)
#include "charclass.h"
#define DOLLAR '$'
#define DOT '.'
#define EOS '\0'
#define LBRACKET '['
#define NOT '!'
#define QUESTION '?'
#define QUOTE '\\'
#define RANGE '-'
#define RBRACKET ']'
#define SEP '/'
#define STAR '*'
#define TILDE '~'
#define UNDERSCORE '_'
#define LBRACE '{'
#define RBRACE '}'
#define SLASH '/'
#define COMMA ','
#ifndef DEBUG
#define M_QUOTE 0x8000
#define M_PROTECT 0x4000
#define M_MASK 0xffff
#define M_ASCII 0x00ff
typedef u_short Char;
#else
#define M_QUOTE 0x80
#define M_PROTECT 0x40
#define M_MASK 0xff
#define M_ASCII 0x7f
typedef char Char;
#endif
#define CHAR(c) ((Char)((c)&M_ASCII))
#define META(c) ((Char)((c)|M_QUOTE))
#define M_ALL META('*')
#define M_END META(']')
#define M_NOT META('!')
#define M_ONE META('?')
#define M_RNG META('-')
#define M_SET META('[')
#define M_CLASS META(':')
#define ismeta(c) (((c)&M_QUOTE) != 0)
#define GLOB_LIMIT_MALLOC 65536
-#define GLOB_LIMIT_STAT 128
+#define GLOB_LIMIT_STAT 2048
#define GLOB_LIMIT_READDIR 16384
-/* Limit of recursion during matching attempts. */
-#define GLOB_LIMIT_RECUR 64
-
struct glob_lim {
size_t glim_malloc;
size_t glim_stat;
size_t glim_readdir;
};
struct glob_path_stat {
char *gps_path;
struct stat *gps_stat;
};
static int compare(const void *, const void *);
static int compare_gps(const void *, const void *);
-static int g_Ctoc(const Char *, char *, u_int);
+static int g_Ctoc(const Char *, char *, size_t);
static int g_lstat(Char *, struct stat *, glob_t *);
static DIR *g_opendir(Char *, glob_t *);
static Char *g_strchr(const Char *, int);
static int g_strncmp(const Char *, const char *, size_t);
static int g_stat(Char *, struct stat *, glob_t *);
static int glob0(const Char *, glob_t *, struct glob_lim *);
static int glob1(Char *, Char *, glob_t *, struct glob_lim *);
static int glob2(Char *, Char *, Char *, Char *, Char *, Char *,
glob_t *, struct glob_lim *);
static int glob3(Char *, Char *, Char *, Char *, Char *,
Char *, Char *, glob_t *, struct glob_lim *);
static int globextend(const Char *, glob_t *, struct glob_lim *,
struct stat *);
static const Char *
globtilde(const Char *, Char *, size_t, glob_t *);
static int globexp1(const Char *, glob_t *, struct glob_lim *);
static int globexp2(const Char *, const Char *, glob_t *,
struct glob_lim *);
-static int match(Char *, Char *, Char *, int);
+static int match(Char *, Char *, Char *);
#ifdef DEBUG
static void qprintf(const char *, Char *);
#endif
int
glob(const char *pattern, int flags, int (*errfunc)(const char *, int),
glob_t *pglob)
{
const u_char *patnext;
int c;
- Char *bufnext, *bufend, patbuf[MAXPATHLEN];
+ Char *bufnext, *bufend, patbuf[PATH_MAX];
struct glob_lim limit = { 0, 0, 0 };
- if (strnlen(pattern, PATH_MAX) == PATH_MAX)
- return(GLOB_NOMATCH);
-
patnext = (u_char *) pattern;
if (!(flags & GLOB_APPEND)) {
pglob->gl_pathc = 0;
pglob->gl_pathv = NULL;
pglob->gl_statv = NULL;
if (!(flags & GLOB_DOOFFS))
pglob->gl_offs = 0;
}
pglob->gl_flags = flags & ~GLOB_MAGCHAR;
pglob->gl_errfunc = errfunc;
pglob->gl_matchc = 0;
- if (pglob->gl_offs < 0 || pglob->gl_pathc < 0 ||
- pglob->gl_offs >= INT_MAX || pglob->gl_pathc >= INT_MAX ||
- pglob->gl_pathc >= INT_MAX - pglob->gl_offs - 1)
+ if (strnlen(pattern, PATH_MAX) == PATH_MAX)
+ return(GLOB_NOMATCH);
+
+ if (pglob->gl_offs >= SSIZE_MAX || pglob->gl_pathc >= SSIZE_MAX ||
+ pglob->gl_pathc >= SSIZE_MAX - pglob->gl_offs - 1)
return GLOB_NOSPACE;
bufnext = patbuf;
- bufend = bufnext + MAXPATHLEN - 1;
+ bufend = bufnext + PATH_MAX - 1;
if (flags & GLOB_NOESCAPE)
while (bufnext < bufend && (c = *patnext++) != EOS)
*bufnext++ = c;
else {
/* Protect the quoted characters. */
while (bufnext < bufend && (c = *patnext++) != EOS)
if (c == QUOTE) {
if ((c = *patnext++) == EOS) {
c = QUOTE;
--patnext;
}
*bufnext++ = c | M_PROTECT;
} else
*bufnext++ = c;
}
*bufnext = EOS;
if (flags & GLOB_BRACE)
return globexp1(patbuf, pglob, &limit);
else
return glob0(patbuf, pglob, &limit);
}
/*
* Expand recursively a glob {} pattern. When there is no more expansion
* invoke the standard globbing routine to glob the rest of the magic
* characters
*/
static int
globexp1(const Char *pattern, glob_t *pglob, struct glob_lim *limitp)
{
const Char* ptr = pattern;
/* Protect a single {}, for find(1), like csh */
if (pattern[0] == LBRACE && pattern[1] == RBRACE && pattern[2] == EOS)
return glob0(pattern, pglob, limitp);
if ((ptr = (const Char *) g_strchr(ptr, LBRACE)) != NULL)
return globexp2(ptr, pattern, pglob, limitp);
return glob0(pattern, pglob, limitp);
}
/*
* Recursive brace globbing helper. Tries to expand a single brace.
* If it succeeds then it invokes globexp1 with the new pattern.
* If it fails then it tries to glob the rest of the pattern and returns.
*/
static int
globexp2(const Char *ptr, const Char *pattern, glob_t *pglob,
struct glob_lim *limitp)
{
int i, rv;
Char *lm, *ls;
const Char *pe, *pm, *pl;
- Char patbuf[MAXPATHLEN];
+ Char patbuf[PATH_MAX];
/* copy part up to the brace */
for (lm = patbuf, pm = pattern; pm != ptr; *lm++ = *pm++)
;
*lm = EOS;
ls = lm;
/* Find the balanced brace */
for (i = 0, pe = ++ptr; *pe; pe++)
if (*pe == LBRACKET) {
/* Ignore everything between [] */
for (pm = pe++; *pe != RBRACKET && *pe != EOS; pe++)
;
if (*pe == EOS) {
/*
* We could not find a matching RBRACKET.
* Ignore and just look for RBRACE
*/
pe = pm;
}
} else if (*pe == LBRACE)
i++;
else if (*pe == RBRACE) {
if (i == 0)
break;
i--;
}
/* Non matching braces; just glob the pattern */
if (i != 0 || *pe == EOS)
return glob0(patbuf, pglob, limitp);
for (i = 0, pl = pm = ptr; pm <= pe; pm++) {
switch (*pm) {
case LBRACKET:
/* Ignore everything between [] */
for (pl = pm++; *pm != RBRACKET && *pm != EOS; pm++)
;
if (*pm == EOS) {
/*
* We could not find a matching RBRACKET.
* Ignore and just look for RBRACE
*/
pm = pl;
}
break;
case LBRACE:
i++;
break;
case RBRACE:
if (i) {
i--;
break;
}
/* FALLTHROUGH */
case COMMA:
if (i && *pm == COMMA)
break;
else {
/* Append the current string */
for (lm = ls; (pl < pm); *lm++ = *pl++)
;
/*
* Append the rest of the pattern after the
* closing brace
*/
for (pl = pe + 1; (*lm++ = *pl++) != EOS; )
;
/* Expand the current pattern */
#ifdef DEBUG
qprintf("globexp2:", patbuf);
#endif
rv = globexp1(patbuf, pglob, limitp);
if (rv && rv != GLOB_NOMATCH)
return rv;
/* move after the comma, to the next string */
pl = pm + 1;
}
break;
default:
break;
}
}
return 0;
}
/*
* expand tilde from the passwd file.
*/
static const Char *
globtilde(const Char *pattern, Char *patbuf, size_t patbuf_len, glob_t *pglob)
{
struct passwd *pwd;
char *h;
const Char *p;
Char *b, *eb;
if (*pattern != TILDE || !(pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_TILDE))
return pattern;
/* Copy up to the end of the string or / */
eb = &patbuf[patbuf_len - 1];
for (p = pattern + 1, h = (char *) patbuf;
h < (char *)eb && *p && *p != SLASH; *h++ = *p++)
;
*h = EOS;
#if 0
if (h == (char *)eb)
return what;
#endif
if (((char *) patbuf)[0] == EOS) {
/*
* handle a plain ~ or ~/ by expanding $HOME
* first and then trying the password file
*/
#if 0
if (issetugid() != 0 || (h = getenv("HOME")) == NULL) {
#endif
if ((getuid() != geteuid()) || (h = getenv("HOME")) == NULL) {
if ((pwd = getpwuid(getuid())) == NULL)
return pattern;
else
h = pwd->pw_dir;
}
} else {
/*
* Expand a ~user
*/
if ((pwd = getpwnam((char*) patbuf)) == NULL)
return pattern;
else
h = pwd->pw_dir;
}
/* Copy the home directory */
for (b = patbuf; b < eb && *h; *b++ = *h++)
;
/* Append the rest of the pattern */
while (b < eb && (*b++ = *p++) != EOS)
;
*b = EOS;
return patbuf;
}
static int
g_strncmp(const Char *s1, const char *s2, size_t n)
{
int rv = 0;
while (n--) {
rv = *(Char *)s1 - *(const unsigned char *)s2++;
if (rv)
break;
if (*s1++ == '\0')
break;
}
return rv;
}
static int
g_charclass(const Char **patternp, Char **bufnextp)
{
const Char *pattern = *patternp + 1;
Char *bufnext = *bufnextp;
const Char *colon;
struct cclass *cc;
size_t len;
if ((colon = g_strchr(pattern, ':')) == NULL || colon[1] != ']')
return 1; /* not a character class */
len = (size_t)(colon - pattern);
for (cc = cclasses; cc->name != NULL; cc++) {
if (!g_strncmp(pattern, cc->name, len) && cc->name[len] == '\0')
break;
}
if (cc->name == NULL)
return -1; /* invalid character class */
*bufnext++ = M_CLASS;
*bufnext++ = (Char)(cc - &cclasses[0]);
*bufnextp = bufnext;
*patternp += len + 3;
return 0;
}
/*
* The main glob() routine: compiles the pattern (optionally processing
* quotes), calls glob1() to do the real pattern matching, and finally
* sorts the list (unless unsorted operation is requested). Returns 0
* if things went well, nonzero if errors occurred. It is not an error
* to find no matches.
*/
static int
glob0(const Char *pattern, glob_t *pglob, struct glob_lim *limitp)
{
const Char *qpatnext;
- int c, err, oldpathc;
- Char *bufnext, patbuf[MAXPATHLEN];
+ int c, err;
+ size_t oldpathc;
+ Char *bufnext, patbuf[PATH_MAX];
- qpatnext = globtilde(pattern, patbuf, MAXPATHLEN, pglob);
+ qpatnext = globtilde(pattern, patbuf, PATH_MAX, pglob);
oldpathc = pglob->gl_pathc;
bufnext = patbuf;
/* We don't need to check for buffer overflow any more. */
while ((c = *qpatnext++) != EOS) {
switch (c) {
case LBRACKET:
c = *qpatnext;
if (c == NOT)
++qpatnext;
if (*qpatnext == EOS ||
g_strchr(qpatnext+1, RBRACKET) == NULL) {
*bufnext++ = LBRACKET;
if (c == NOT)
--qpatnext;
break;
}
*bufnext++ = M_SET;
if (c == NOT)
*bufnext++ = M_NOT;
c = *qpatnext++;
do {
if (c == LBRACKET && *qpatnext == ':') {
do {
err = g_charclass(&qpatnext,
&bufnext);
if (err)
break;
c = *qpatnext++;
} while (c == LBRACKET && *qpatnext == ':');
if (err == -1 &&
!(pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_NOCHECK))
return GLOB_NOMATCH;
if (c == RBRACKET)
break;
}
*bufnext++ = CHAR(c);
if (*qpatnext == RANGE &&
(c = qpatnext[1]) != RBRACKET) {
*bufnext++ = M_RNG;
*bufnext++ = CHAR(c);
qpatnext += 2;
}
} while ((c = *qpatnext++) != RBRACKET);
pglob->gl_flags |= GLOB_MAGCHAR;
*bufnext++ = M_END;
break;
case QUESTION:
pglob->gl_flags |= GLOB_MAGCHAR;
*bufnext++ = M_ONE;
break;
case STAR:
pglob->gl_flags |= GLOB_MAGCHAR;
/* collapse adjacent stars to one,
* to avoid exponential behavior
*/
if (bufnext == patbuf || bufnext[-1] != M_ALL)
*bufnext++ = M_ALL;
break;
default:
*bufnext++ = CHAR(c);
break;
}
}
*bufnext = EOS;
#ifdef DEBUG
qprintf("glob0:", patbuf);
#endif
- if ((err = glob1(patbuf, patbuf+MAXPATHLEN-1, pglob, limitp)) != 0)
+ if ((err = glob1(patbuf, patbuf+PATH_MAX-1, pglob, limitp)) != 0)
return(err);
/*
* If there was no match we are going to append the pattern
* if GLOB_NOCHECK was specified or if GLOB_NOMAGIC was specified
* and the pattern did not contain any magic characters
* GLOB_NOMAGIC is there just for compatibility with csh.
*/
if (pglob->gl_pathc == oldpathc) {
if ((pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_NOCHECK) ||
((pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_NOMAGIC) &&
!(pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_MAGCHAR)))
return(globextend(pattern, pglob, limitp, NULL));
else
return(GLOB_NOMATCH);
}
if (!(pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_NOSORT)) {
if ((pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_KEEPSTAT)) {
/* Keep the paths and stat info synced during sort */
struct glob_path_stat *path_stat;
- int i;
- int n = pglob->gl_pathc - oldpathc;
- int o = pglob->gl_offs + oldpathc;
+ size_t i;
+ size_t n = pglob->gl_pathc - oldpathc;
+ size_t o = pglob->gl_offs + oldpathc;
if ((path_stat = calloc(n, sizeof(*path_stat))) == NULL)
return GLOB_NOSPACE;
for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
path_stat[i].gps_path = pglob->gl_pathv[o + i];
path_stat[i].gps_stat = pglob->gl_statv[o + i];
}
qsort(path_stat, n, sizeof(*path_stat), compare_gps);
for (i = 0; i < n; i++) {
pglob->gl_pathv[o + i] = path_stat[i].gps_path;
pglob->gl_statv[o + i] = path_stat[i].gps_stat;
}
free(path_stat);
} else {
qsort(pglob->gl_pathv + pglob->gl_offs + oldpathc,
pglob->gl_pathc - oldpathc, sizeof(char *),
compare);
}
}
return(0);
}
static int
compare(const void *p, const void *q)
{
return(strcmp(*(char **)p, *(char **)q));
}
static int
compare_gps(const void *_p, const void *_q)
{
const struct glob_path_stat *p = (const struct glob_path_stat *)_p;
const struct glob_path_stat *q = (const struct glob_path_stat *)_q;
return(strcmp(p->gps_path, q->gps_path));
}
static int
glob1(Char *pattern, Char *pattern_last, glob_t *pglob, struct glob_lim *limitp)
{
- Char pathbuf[MAXPATHLEN];
+ Char pathbuf[PATH_MAX];
/* A null pathname is invalid -- POSIX 1003.1 sect. 2.4. */
if (*pattern == EOS)
return(0);
- return(glob2(pathbuf, pathbuf+MAXPATHLEN-1,
- pathbuf, pathbuf+MAXPATHLEN-1,
+ return(glob2(pathbuf, pathbuf+PATH_MAX-1,
+ pathbuf, pathbuf+PATH_MAX-1,
pattern, pattern_last, pglob, limitp));
}
/*
* The functions glob2 and glob3 are mutually recursive; there is one level
* of recursion for each segment in the pattern that contains one or more
* meta characters.
*/
static int
glob2(Char *pathbuf, Char *pathbuf_last, Char *pathend, Char *pathend_last,
Char *pattern, Char *pattern_last, glob_t *pglob, struct glob_lim *limitp)
{
struct stat sb;
Char *p, *q;
int anymeta;
/*
* Loop over pattern segments until end of pattern or until
* segment with meta character found.
*/
for (anymeta = 0;;) {
if (*pattern == EOS) { /* End of pattern? */
*pathend = EOS;
- if (g_lstat(pathbuf, &sb, pglob))
- return(0);
if ((pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_LIMIT) &&
limitp->glim_stat++ >= GLOB_LIMIT_STAT) {
errno = 0;
*pathend++ = SEP;
*pathend = EOS;
return(GLOB_NOSPACE);
}
+ if (g_lstat(pathbuf, &sb, pglob))
+ return(0);
if (((pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_MARK) &&
pathend[-1] != SEP) && (S_ISDIR(sb.st_mode) ||
(S_ISLNK(sb.st_mode) &&
(g_stat(pathbuf, &sb, pglob) == 0) &&
S_ISDIR(sb.st_mode)))) {
if (pathend+1 > pathend_last)
return (1);
*pathend++ = SEP;
*pathend = EOS;
}
++pglob->gl_matchc;
return(globextend(pathbuf, pglob, limitp, &sb));
}
/* Find end of next segment, copy tentatively to pathend. */
q = pathend;
p = pattern;
while (*p != EOS && *p != SEP) {
if (ismeta(*p))
anymeta = 1;
if (q+1 > pathend_last)
return (1);
*q++ = *p++;
}
if (!anymeta) { /* No expansion, do next segment. */
pathend = q;
pattern = p;
while (*pattern == SEP) {
if (pathend+1 > pathend_last)
return (1);
*pathend++ = *pattern++;
}
} else
/* Need expansion, recurse. */
return(glob3(pathbuf, pathbuf_last, pathend,
pathend_last, pattern, p, pattern_last,
pglob, limitp));
}
/* NOTREACHED */
}
static int
glob3(Char *pathbuf, Char *pathbuf_last, Char *pathend, Char *pathend_last,
Char *pattern, Char *restpattern, Char *restpattern_last, glob_t *pglob,
struct glob_lim *limitp)
{
struct dirent *dp;
DIR *dirp;
int err;
- char buf[MAXPATHLEN];
+ char buf[PATH_MAX];
/*
* The readdirfunc declaration can't be prototyped, because it is
* assigned, below, to two functions which are prototyped in glob.h
* and dirent.h as taking pointers to differently typed opaque
* structures.
*/
struct dirent *(*readdirfunc)(void *);
if (pathend > pathend_last)
return (1);
*pathend = EOS;
errno = 0;
if ((dirp = g_opendir(pathbuf, pglob)) == NULL) {
/* TODO: don't call for ENOENT or ENOTDIR? */
if (pglob->gl_errfunc) {
if (g_Ctoc(pathbuf, buf, sizeof(buf)))
return(GLOB_ABORTED);
if (pglob->gl_errfunc(buf, errno) ||
pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_ERR)
return(GLOB_ABORTED);
}
return(0);
}
err = 0;
/* Search directory for matching names. */
if (pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_ALTDIRFUNC)
readdirfunc = pglob->gl_readdir;
else
readdirfunc = (struct dirent *(*)(void *))readdir;
while ((dp = (*readdirfunc)(dirp))) {
u_char *sc;
Char *dc;
if ((pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_LIMIT) &&
limitp->glim_readdir++ >= GLOB_LIMIT_READDIR) {
errno = 0;
*pathend++ = SEP;
*pathend = EOS;
err = GLOB_NOSPACE;
break;
}
/* Initial DOT must be matched literally. */
if (dp->d_name[0] == DOT && *pattern != DOT)
continue;
dc = pathend;
sc = (u_char *) dp->d_name;
while (dc < pathend_last && (*dc++ = *sc++) != EOS)
;
if (dc >= pathend_last) {
*dc = EOS;
err = 1;
break;
}
- if (!match(pathend, pattern, restpattern, GLOB_LIMIT_RECUR)) {
+ if (!match(pathend, pattern, restpattern)) {
*pathend = EOS;
continue;
}
err = glob2(pathbuf, pathbuf_last, --dc, pathend_last,
restpattern, restpattern_last, pglob, limitp);
if (err)
break;
}
if (pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_ALTDIRFUNC)
(*pglob->gl_closedir)(dirp);
else
closedir(dirp);
return(err);
}
/*
* Extend the gl_pathv member of a glob_t structure to accommodate a new item,
* add the new item, and update gl_pathc.
*
* This assumes the BSD realloc, which only copies the block when its size
* crosses a power-of-two boundary; for v7 realloc, this would cause quadratic
* behavior.
*
* Return 0 if new item added, error code if memory couldn't be allocated.
*
* Invariant of the glob_t structure:
* Either gl_pathc is zero and gl_pathv is NULL; or gl_pathc > 0 and
* gl_pathv points to (gl_offs + gl_pathc + 1) items.
*/
static int
globextend(const Char *path, glob_t *pglob, struct glob_lim *limitp,
struct stat *sb)
{
char **pathv;
- ssize_t i;
- size_t newn, len;
+ size_t i, newn, len;
char *copy = NULL;
const Char *p;
struct stat **statv;
newn = 2 + pglob->gl_pathc + pglob->gl_offs;
- if (pglob->gl_offs >= INT_MAX ||
- pglob->gl_pathc >= INT_MAX ||
- newn >= INT_MAX ||
+ if (pglob->gl_offs >= SSIZE_MAX ||
+ pglob->gl_pathc >= SSIZE_MAX ||
+ newn >= SSIZE_MAX ||
SIZE_MAX / sizeof(*pathv) <= newn ||
SIZE_MAX / sizeof(*statv) <= newn) {
nospace:
- for (i = pglob->gl_offs; i < (ssize_t)(newn - 2); i++) {
+ for (i = pglob->gl_offs; i < newn - 2; i++) {
if (pglob->gl_pathv && pglob->gl_pathv[i])
free(pglob->gl_pathv[i]);
if ((pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_KEEPSTAT) != 0 &&
pglob->gl_pathv && pglob->gl_pathv[i])
free(pglob->gl_statv[i]);
}
- if (pglob->gl_pathv) {
- free(pglob->gl_pathv);
- pglob->gl_pathv = NULL;
- }
- if (pglob->gl_statv) {
- free(pglob->gl_statv);
- pglob->gl_statv = NULL;
- }
+ free(pglob->gl_pathv);
+ pglob->gl_pathv = NULL;
+ free(pglob->gl_statv);
+ pglob->gl_statv = NULL;
return(GLOB_NOSPACE);
}
- pathv = realloc(pglob->gl_pathv, newn * sizeof(*pathv));
+ pathv = reallocarray(pglob->gl_pathv, newn, sizeof(*pathv));
if (pathv == NULL)
goto nospace;
if (pglob->gl_pathv == NULL && pglob->gl_offs > 0) {
/* first time around -- clear initial gl_offs items */
pathv += pglob->gl_offs;
for (i = pglob->gl_offs; --i >= 0; )
*--pathv = NULL;
}
pglob->gl_pathv = pathv;
if ((pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_KEEPSTAT) != 0) {
- statv = realloc(pglob->gl_statv, newn * sizeof(*statv));
+ statv = reallocarray(pglob->gl_statv, newn, sizeof(*statv));
if (statv == NULL)
goto nospace;
if (pglob->gl_statv == NULL && pglob->gl_offs > 0) {
/* first time around -- clear initial gl_offs items */
statv += pglob->gl_offs;
for (i = pglob->gl_offs; --i >= 0; )
*--statv = NULL;
}
pglob->gl_statv = statv;
if (sb == NULL)
statv[pglob->gl_offs + pglob->gl_pathc] = NULL;
else {
limitp->glim_malloc += sizeof(**statv);
if ((pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_LIMIT) &&
limitp->glim_malloc >= GLOB_LIMIT_MALLOC) {
errno = 0;
return(GLOB_NOSPACE);
}
if ((statv[pglob->gl_offs + pglob->gl_pathc] =
malloc(sizeof(**statv))) == NULL)
goto copy_error;
memcpy(statv[pglob->gl_offs + pglob->gl_pathc], sb,
sizeof(*sb));
}
statv[pglob->gl_offs + pglob->gl_pathc + 1] = NULL;
}
for (p = path; *p++;)
;
len = (size_t)(p - path);
limitp->glim_malloc += len;
if ((copy = malloc(len)) != NULL) {
if (g_Ctoc(path, copy, len)) {
free(copy);
return(GLOB_NOSPACE);
}
pathv[pglob->gl_offs + pglob->gl_pathc++] = copy;
}
pathv[pglob->gl_offs + pglob->gl_pathc] = NULL;
if ((pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_LIMIT) &&
(newn * sizeof(*pathv)) + limitp->glim_malloc >
GLOB_LIMIT_MALLOC) {
errno = 0;
return(GLOB_NOSPACE);
}
copy_error:
return(copy == NULL ? GLOB_NOSPACE : 0);
}
/*
* pattern matching function for filenames. Each occurrence of the *
- * pattern causes a recursion level.
+ * pattern causes an iteration.
+ *
+ * Note, this function differs from the original as per the discussion
+ * here: https://research.swtch.com/glob
+ *
+ * Basically we removed the recursion and made it use the algorithm
+ * from Russ Cox to not go quadratic on cases like a file called
+ * ("a" x 100) . "x" matched against a pattern like "a*a*a*a*a*a*a*y".
*/
static int
-match(Char *name, Char *pat, Char *patend, int recur)
+match(Char *name, Char *pat, Char *patend)
{
int ok, negate_range;
Char c, k;
+ Char *nextp = NULL;
+ Char *nextn = NULL;
- if (recur-- == 0)
- return(GLOB_NOSPACE);
-
+loop:
while (pat < patend) {
c = *pat++;
switch (c & M_MASK) {
case M_ALL:
while (pat < patend && (*pat & M_MASK) == M_ALL)
pat++; /* eat consecutive '*' */
if (pat == patend)
return(1);
- do {
- if (match(name, pat, patend, recur))
- return(1);
- } while (*name++ != EOS);
- return(0);
+ if (*name == EOS)
+ return(0);
+ nextn = name + 1;
+ nextp = pat - 1;
+ break;
case M_ONE:
if (*name++ == EOS)
- return(0);
+ goto fail;
break;
case M_SET:
ok = 0;
if ((k = *name++) == EOS)
- return(0);
+ goto fail;
if ((negate_range = ((*pat & M_MASK) == M_NOT)) != EOS)
++pat;
while (((c = *pat++) & M_MASK) != M_END) {
if ((c & M_MASK) == M_CLASS) {
Char idx = *pat & M_MASK;
if (idx < NCCLASSES &&
cclasses[idx].isctype(k))
ok = 1;
++pat;
}
if ((*pat & M_MASK) == M_RNG) {
if (c <= k && k <= pat[1])
ok = 1;
pat += 2;
} else if (c == k)
ok = 1;
}
if (ok == negate_range)
- return(0);
+ goto fail;
break;
default:
if (*name++ != c)
- return(0);
+ goto fail;
break;
}
}
- return(*name == EOS);
+ if (*name == EOS)
+ return(1);
+
+fail:
+ if (nextn) {
+ pat = nextp;
+ name = nextn;
+ goto loop;
+ }
+ return(0);
}
/* Free allocated data belonging to a glob_t structure. */
void
globfree(glob_t *pglob)
{
- int i;
+ size_t i;
char **pp;
if (pglob->gl_pathv != NULL) {
pp = pglob->gl_pathv + pglob->gl_offs;
for (i = pglob->gl_pathc; i--; ++pp)
- if (*pp)
- free(*pp);
+ free(*pp);
free(pglob->gl_pathv);
pglob->gl_pathv = NULL;
}
if (pglob->gl_statv != NULL) {
for (i = 0; i < pglob->gl_pathc; i++) {
- if (pglob->gl_statv[i] != NULL)
- free(pglob->gl_statv[i]);
+ free(pglob->gl_statv[i]);
}
free(pglob->gl_statv);
pglob->gl_statv = NULL;
}
}
static DIR *
g_opendir(Char *str, glob_t *pglob)
{
- char buf[MAXPATHLEN];
+ char buf[PATH_MAX];
if (!*str)
strlcpy(buf, ".", sizeof buf);
else {
if (g_Ctoc(str, buf, sizeof(buf)))
return(NULL);
}
if (pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_ALTDIRFUNC)
return((*pglob->gl_opendir)(buf));
return(opendir(buf));
}
static int
g_lstat(Char *fn, struct stat *sb, glob_t *pglob)
{
- char buf[MAXPATHLEN];
+ char buf[PATH_MAX];
if (g_Ctoc(fn, buf, sizeof(buf)))
return(-1);
if (pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_ALTDIRFUNC)
return((*pglob->gl_lstat)(buf, sb));
return(lstat(buf, sb));
}
static int
g_stat(Char *fn, struct stat *sb, glob_t *pglob)
{
- char buf[MAXPATHLEN];
+ char buf[PATH_MAX];
if (g_Ctoc(fn, buf, sizeof(buf)))
return(-1);
if (pglob->gl_flags & GLOB_ALTDIRFUNC)
return((*pglob->gl_stat)(buf, sb));
return(stat(buf, sb));
}
static Char *
g_strchr(const Char *str, int ch)
{
do {
if (*str == ch)
return ((Char *)str);
} while (*str++);
return (NULL);
}
static int
-g_Ctoc(const Char *str, char *buf, u_int len)
+g_Ctoc(const Char *str, char *buf, size_t len)
{
while (len--) {
if ((*buf++ = *str++) == EOS)
return (0);
}
return (1);
}
#ifdef DEBUG
static void
qprintf(const char *str, Char *s)
{
Char *p;
(void)printf("%s:\n", str);
for (p = s; *p; p++)
(void)printf("%c", CHAR(*p));
(void)printf("\n");
for (p = s; *p; p++)
(void)printf("%c", *p & M_PROTECT ? '"' : ' ');
(void)printf("\n");
for (p = s; *p; p++)
(void)printf("%c", ismeta(*p) ? '_' : ' ');
(void)printf("\n");
}
#endif
#endif /* !defined(HAVE_GLOB) || !defined(GLOB_HAS_ALTDIRFUNC) ||
!defined(GLOB_HAS_GL_MATCHC) || !defined(GLOB_HAS_GL_STATV) */
diff --git a/openbsd-compat/glob.h b/openbsd-compat/glob.h
index f069a05dc656..1692d36cc25a 100644
--- a/openbsd-compat/glob.h
+++ b/openbsd-compat/glob.h
@@ -1,107 +1,108 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: glob.h,v 1.11 2010/09/24 13:32:55 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: glob.h,v 1.14 2019/02/04 16:45:40 millert Exp $ */
/* $NetBSD: glob.h,v 1.5 1994/10/26 00:55:56 cgd Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 1989, 1993
* The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved.
*
* This code is derived from software contributed to Berkeley by
* Guido van Rossum.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
* 3. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors
* may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
* without specific prior written permission.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
*
* @(#)glob.h 8.1 (Berkeley) 6/2/93
*/
/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: include/glob.h */
#if !defined(HAVE_GLOB_H) || !defined(GLOB_HAS_ALTDIRFUNC) || \
!defined(GLOB_HAS_GL_MATCHC) || !defined(GLOB_HAS_GL_STATV) || \
!defined(HAVE_DECL_GLOB_NOMATCH) || HAVE_DECL_GLOB_NOMATCH == 0 || \
defined(BROKEN_GLOB)
#ifndef _COMPAT_GLOB_H_
#define _COMPAT_GLOB_H_
#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
# define glob_t _ssh_compat_glob_t
# define glob(a, b, c, d) _ssh__compat_glob(a, b, c, d)
# define globfree(a) _ssh__compat_globfree(a)
struct stat;
typedef struct {
- int gl_pathc; /* Count of total paths so far. */
- int gl_matchc; /* Count of paths matching pattern. */
- int gl_offs; /* Reserved at beginning of gl_pathv. */
+ size_t gl_pathc; /* Count of total paths so far. */
+ size_t gl_matchc; /* Count of paths matching pattern. */
+ size_t gl_offs; /* Reserved at beginning of gl_pathv. */
int gl_flags; /* Copy of flags parameter to glob. */
char **gl_pathv; /* List of paths matching pattern. */
struct stat **gl_statv; /* Stat entries corresponding to gl_pathv */
/* Copy of errfunc parameter to glob. */
int (*gl_errfunc)(const char *, int);
/*
* Alternate filesystem access methods for glob; replacement
* versions of closedir(3), readdir(3), opendir(3), stat(2)
* and lstat(2).
*/
void (*gl_closedir)(void *);
struct dirent *(*gl_readdir)(void *);
void *(*gl_opendir)(const char *);
int (*gl_lstat)(const char *, struct stat *);
int (*gl_stat)(const char *, struct stat *);
} glob_t;
#define GLOB_APPEND 0x0001 /* Append to output from previous call. */
#define GLOB_DOOFFS 0x0002 /* Use gl_offs. */
#define GLOB_ERR 0x0004 /* Return on error. */
#define GLOB_MARK 0x0008 /* Append / to matching directories. */
#define GLOB_NOCHECK 0x0010 /* Return pattern itself if nothing matches. */
#define GLOB_NOSORT 0x0020 /* Don't sort. */
#define GLOB_NOESCAPE 0x1000 /* Disable backslash escaping. */
#define GLOB_NOSPACE (-1) /* Malloc call failed. */
#define GLOB_ABORTED (-2) /* Unignored error. */
#define GLOB_NOMATCH (-3) /* No match and GLOB_NOCHECK not set. */
#define GLOB_NOSYS (-4) /* Function not supported. */
#define GLOB_ALTDIRFUNC 0x0040 /* Use alternately specified directory funcs. */
#define GLOB_BRACE 0x0080 /* Expand braces ala csh. */
#define GLOB_MAGCHAR 0x0100 /* Pattern had globbing characters. */
#define GLOB_NOMAGIC 0x0200 /* GLOB_NOCHECK without magic chars (csh). */
#define GLOB_QUOTE 0x0400 /* Quote special chars with \. */
#define GLOB_TILDE 0x0800 /* Expand tilde names from the passwd file. */
#define GLOB_LIMIT 0x2000 /* Limit pattern match output to ARG_MAX */
#define GLOB_KEEPSTAT 0x4000 /* Retain stat data for paths in gl_statv. */
#define GLOB_ABEND GLOB_ABORTED /* backward compatibility */
int glob(const char *, int, int (*)(const char *, int), glob_t *);
void globfree(glob_t *);
#endif /* !_GLOB_H_ */
#endif /* !defined(HAVE_GLOB_H) || !defined(GLOB_HAS_ALTDIRFUNC) ||
!defined(GLOB_HAS_GL_MATCHC) || !defined(GLOH_HAS_GL_STATV) */
diff --git a/openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h b/openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h
index fda6706f815f..4a16702ef751 100644
--- a/openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h
+++ b/openbsd-compat/openbsd-compat.h
@@ -1,357 +1,361 @@
/*
* Copyright (c) 1999-2003 Damien Miller. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (c) 2003 Ben Lindstrom. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (c) 2002 Tim Rice. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#ifndef _OPENBSD_COMPAT_H
#define _OPENBSD_COMPAT_H
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <pwd.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <stddef.h> /* for wchar_t */
/* OpenBSD function replacements */
#include "base64.h"
#include "sigact.h"
#include "readpassphrase.h"
#include "vis.h"
#include "getrrsetbyname.h"
#include "sha1.h"
#include "sha2.h"
-#include "rmd160.h"
#include "md5.h"
#include "blf.h"
+#include "fnmatch.h"
#ifndef HAVE_BASENAME
char *basename(const char *path);
#endif
#ifndef HAVE_BINDRESVPORT_SA
int bindresvport_sa(int sd, struct sockaddr *sa);
#endif
#ifndef HAVE_CLOSEFROM
void closefrom(int);
#endif
#ifndef HAVE_GETLINE
#include <stdio.h>
ssize_t getline(char **, size_t *, FILE *);
#endif
#ifndef HAVE_GETPAGESIZE
int getpagesize(void);
#endif
#ifndef HAVE_GETCWD
char *getcwd(char *pt, size_t size);
#endif
-#ifdef HAVE_MEMMEM
+#if defined(HAVE_DECL_MEMMEM) && HAVE_DECL_MEMMEM == 0
void *memmem(const void *, size_t, const void *, size_t);
#endif
#ifndef HAVE_REALLOCARRAY
void *reallocarray(void *, size_t, size_t);
#endif
#ifndef HAVE_RECALLOCARRAY
void *recallocarray(void *, size_t, size_t, size_t);
#endif
#ifndef HAVE_RRESVPORT_AF
int rresvport_af(int *alport, sa_family_t af);
#endif
#ifndef HAVE_STRLCPY
size_t strlcpy(char *dst, const char *src, size_t siz);
#endif
#ifndef HAVE_STRLCAT
size_t strlcat(char *dst, const char *src, size_t siz);
#endif
#ifndef HAVE_STRCASESTR
char *strcasestr(const char *, const char *);
#endif
#ifndef HAVE_STRNLEN
size_t strnlen(const char *, size_t);
#endif
#ifndef HAVE_STRNDUP
char *strndup(const char *s, size_t n);
#endif
#ifndef HAVE_SETENV
int setenv(register const char *name, register const char *value, int rewrite);
#endif
#ifndef HAVE_STRMODE
void strmode(int mode, char *p);
#endif
#ifndef HAVE_STRPTIME
#include <time.h>
char *strptime(const char *buf, const char *fmt, struct tm *tm);
#endif
#if !defined(HAVE_MKDTEMP) || defined(HAVE_STRICT_MKSTEMP)
int mkstemps(char *path, int slen);
int mkstemp(char *path);
char *mkdtemp(char *path);
#endif
#ifndef HAVE_DAEMON
int daemon(int nochdir, int noclose);
#endif
#ifndef HAVE_DIRNAME
char *dirname(const char *path);
#endif
#ifndef HAVE_FMT_SCALED
#define FMT_SCALED_STRSIZE 7
int fmt_scaled(long long number, char *result);
#endif
#ifndef HAVE_SCAN_SCALED
int scan_scaled(char *, long long *);
#endif
#if defined(BROKEN_INET_NTOA) || !defined(HAVE_INET_NTOA)
char *inet_ntoa(struct in_addr in);
#endif
#ifndef HAVE_INET_NTOP
const char *inet_ntop(int af, const void *src, char *dst, socklen_t size);
#endif
#ifndef HAVE_INET_ATON
int inet_aton(const char *cp, struct in_addr *addr);
#endif
#ifndef HAVE_STRSEP
char *strsep(char **stringp, const char *delim);
#endif
#ifndef HAVE_SETPROCTITLE
void setproctitle(const char *fmt, ...);
void compat_init_setproctitle(int argc, char *argv[]);
#endif
#ifndef HAVE_GETGROUPLIST
int getgrouplist(const char *, gid_t, gid_t *, int *);
#endif
#if !defined(HAVE_GETOPT) || !defined(HAVE_GETOPT_OPTRESET)
int BSDgetopt(int argc, char * const *argv, const char *opts);
#include "openbsd-compat/getopt.h"
#endif
#if ((defined(HAVE_DECL_READV) && HAVE_DECL_READV == 0) || \
(defined(HAVE_DECL_WRITEV) && HAVE_DECL_WRITEV == 0))
# include <sys/types.h>
# include <sys/uio.h>
# if defined(HAVE_DECL_READV) && HAVE_DECL_READV == 0
int readv(int, struct iovec *, int);
# endif
# if defined(HAVE_DECL_WRITEV) && HAVE_DECL_WRITEV == 0
int writev(int, struct iovec *, int);
# endif
#endif
/* Home grown routines */
#include "bsd-misc.h"
#include "bsd-setres_id.h"
#include "bsd-signal.h"
#include "bsd-statvfs.h"
#include "bsd-waitpid.h"
#include "bsd-poll.h"
#ifndef HAVE_GETPEEREID
int getpeereid(int , uid_t *, gid_t *);
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_ARC4RANDOM
# ifndef HAVE_ARC4RANDOM_STIR
# define arc4random_stir()
# endif
#else
unsigned int arc4random(void);
void arc4random_stir(void);
#endif /* !HAVE_ARC4RANDOM */
#ifndef HAVE_ARC4RANDOM_BUF
void arc4random_buf(void *, size_t);
#endif
#ifndef HAVE_ARC4RANDOM_UNIFORM
u_int32_t arc4random_uniform(u_int32_t);
#endif
#ifndef HAVE_ASPRINTF
int asprintf(char **, const char *, ...);
#endif
#ifndef HAVE_OPENPTY
# include <sys/ioctl.h> /* for struct winsize */
int openpty(int *, int *, char *, struct termios *, struct winsize *);
#endif /* HAVE_OPENPTY */
#ifndef HAVE_SNPRINTF
int snprintf(char *, size_t, SNPRINTF_CONST char *, ...);
#endif
#ifndef HAVE_STRTOLL
long long strtoll(const char *, char **, int);
#endif
#ifndef HAVE_STRTOUL
unsigned long strtoul(const char *, char **, int);
#endif
#ifndef HAVE_STRTOULL
unsigned long long strtoull(const char *, char **, int);
#endif
#ifndef HAVE_STRTONUM
long long strtonum(const char *, long long, long long, const char **);
#endif
/* multibyte character support */
#ifndef HAVE_MBLEN
# define mblen(x, y) (1)
#endif
#ifndef HAVE_WCWIDTH
# define wcwidth(x) (((x) >= 0x20 && (x) <= 0x7e) ? 1 : -1)
/* force our no-op nl_langinfo and mbtowc */
# undef HAVE_NL_LANGINFO
# undef HAVE_MBTOWC
# undef HAVE_LANGINFO_H
#endif
#ifndef HAVE_NL_LANGINFO
# define nl_langinfo(x) ""
#endif
#ifndef HAVE_MBTOWC
int mbtowc(wchar_t *, const char*, size_t);
#endif
#if !defined(HAVE_VASPRINTF) || !defined(HAVE_VSNPRINTF)
# include <stdarg.h>
#endif
/*
* Some platforms unconditionally undefine va_copy() so we define VA_COPY()
* instead. This is known to be the case on at least some configurations of
* AIX with the xlc compiler.
*/
#ifndef VA_COPY
# ifdef HAVE_VA_COPY
# define VA_COPY(dest, src) va_copy(dest, src)
# else
# ifdef HAVE___VA_COPY
# define VA_COPY(dest, src) __va_copy(dest, src)
# else
# define VA_COPY(dest, src) (dest) = (src)
# endif
# endif
#endif
#ifndef HAVE_VASPRINTF
int vasprintf(char **, const char *, va_list);
#endif
#ifndef HAVE_VSNPRINTF
int vsnprintf(char *, size_t, const char *, va_list);
#endif
#ifndef HAVE_USER_FROM_UID
char *user_from_uid(uid_t, int);
#endif
#ifndef HAVE_GROUP_FROM_GID
char *group_from_gid(gid_t, int);
#endif
#ifndef HAVE_TIMINGSAFE_BCMP
int timingsafe_bcmp(const void *, const void *, size_t);
#endif
#ifndef HAVE_BCRYPT_PBKDF
int bcrypt_pbkdf(const char *, size_t, const u_int8_t *, size_t,
u_int8_t *, size_t, unsigned int);
#endif
#ifndef HAVE_EXPLICIT_BZERO
void explicit_bzero(void *p, size_t n);
#endif
#ifndef HAVE_FREEZERO
void freezero(void *, size_t);
#endif
+#ifndef HAVE_LOCALTIME_R
+struct tm *localtime_r(const time_t *, struct tm *);
+#endif
+
char *xcrypt(const char *password, const char *salt);
char *shadow_pw(struct passwd *pw);
/* rfc2553 socket API replacements */
#include "fake-rfc2553.h"
/* Routines for a single OS platform */
#include "bsd-cygwin_util.h"
#include "port-aix.h"
#include "port-irix.h"
#include "port-linux.h"
#include "port-solaris.h"
#include "port-net.h"
#include "port-uw.h"
/* _FORTIFY_SOURCE breaks FD_ISSET(n)/FD_SET(n) for n > FD_SETSIZE. Avoid. */
#if defined(HAVE_FEATURES_H) && defined(_FORTIFY_SOURCE)
# include <features.h>
# if defined(__GNU_LIBRARY__) && defined(__GLIBC_PREREQ)
# if __GLIBC_PREREQ(2, 15) && (_FORTIFY_SOURCE > 0)
# include <sys/socket.h> /* Ensure include guard is defined */
# undef FD_SET
# undef FD_ISSET
# define FD_SET(n, set) kludge_FD_SET(n, set)
# define FD_ISSET(n, set) kludge_FD_ISSET(n, set)
void kludge_FD_SET(int, fd_set *);
int kludge_FD_ISSET(int, fd_set *);
# endif /* __GLIBC_PREREQ(2, 15) && (_FORTIFY_SOURCE > 0) */
# endif /* __GNU_LIBRARY__ && __GLIBC_PREREQ */
#endif /* HAVE_FEATURES_H && _FORTIFY_SOURCE */
#endif /* _OPENBSD_COMPAT_H */
diff --git a/openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h b/openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h
index 917bc6f7c278..abdcb8763e52 100644
--- a/openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h
+++ b/openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h
@@ -1,233 +1,227 @@
/*
* Copyright (c) 2005 Darren Tucker <dtucker@zip.com.au>
*
* Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
* copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
* WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
* ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
* WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF MIND, USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER
* IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING
* OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
*/
#ifndef _OPENSSL_COMPAT_H
#define _OPENSSL_COMPAT_H
#include "includes.h"
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
#include <openssl/opensslv.h>
#include <openssl/crypto.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/rsa.h>
#include <openssl/dsa.h>
#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
#include <openssl/ecdsa.h>
#endif
#include <openssl/dh.h>
int ssh_compatible_openssl(long, long);
void ssh_libcrypto_init(void);
#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x1000100fL)
# error OpenSSL 1.0.1 or greater is required
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_VERSION
# define OPENSSL_VERSION SSLEAY_VERSION
#endif
#ifndef HAVE_OPENSSL_VERSION
# define OpenSSL_version(x) SSLeay_version(x)
#endif
#ifndef HAVE_OPENSSL_VERSION_NUM
# define OpenSSL_version_num SSLeay
#endif
#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10000001L
# define LIBCRYPTO_EVP_INL_TYPE unsigned int
#else
# define LIBCRYPTO_EVP_INL_TYPE size_t
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS
# define OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS 16384
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_DSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS
# define OPENSSL_DSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS 10000
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_HAVE_EVPCTR
# define EVP_aes_128_ctr evp_aes_128_ctr
# define EVP_aes_192_ctr evp_aes_128_ctr
# define EVP_aes_256_ctr evp_aes_128_ctr
const EVP_CIPHER *evp_aes_128_ctr(void);
void ssh_aes_ctr_iv(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *, int, u_char *, size_t);
#endif
/* Avoid some #ifdef. Code that uses these is unreachable without GCM */
#if !defined(OPENSSL_HAVE_EVPGCM) && !defined(EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_FIXED)
# define EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_FIXED -1
# define EVP_CTRL_GCM_IV_GEN -1
# define EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_TAG -1
# define EVP_CTRL_GCM_GET_TAG -1
#endif
/* Replace missing EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl() with something that returns failure */
#ifndef HAVE_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_CTRL
# ifdef OPENSSL_HAVE_EVPGCM
# error AES-GCM enabled without EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl /* shouldn't happen */
# else
# define EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(a,b,c,d) (0)
# endif
#endif
-#if defined(HAVE_EVP_RIPEMD160)
-# if defined(OPENSSL_NO_RIPEMD) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_RMD160)
-# undef HAVE_EVP_RIPEMD160
-# endif
-#endif
-
/* LibreSSL/OpenSSL 1.1x API compat */
#ifndef HAVE_DSA_GET0_PQG
void DSA_get0_pqg(const DSA *d, const BIGNUM **p, const BIGNUM **q,
const BIGNUM **g);
#endif /* HAVE_DSA_GET0_PQG */
#ifndef HAVE_DSA_SET0_PQG
int DSA_set0_pqg(DSA *d, BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *q, BIGNUM *g);
#endif /* HAVE_DSA_SET0_PQG */
#ifndef HAVE_DSA_GET0_KEY
void DSA_get0_key(const DSA *d, const BIGNUM **pub_key,
const BIGNUM **priv_key);
#endif /* HAVE_DSA_GET0_KEY */
#ifndef HAVE_DSA_SET0_KEY
int DSA_set0_key(DSA *d, BIGNUM *pub_key, BIGNUM *priv_key);
#endif /* HAVE_DSA_SET0_KEY */
#ifndef HAVE_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_GET_IV
int EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_iv(const EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx,
unsigned char *iv, size_t len);
#endif /* HAVE_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_GET_IV */
#ifndef HAVE_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_SET_IV
int EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_iv(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx,
const unsigned char *iv, size_t len);
#endif /* HAVE_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_SET_IV */
#ifndef HAVE_RSA_GET0_KEY
void RSA_get0_key(const RSA *r, const BIGNUM **n, const BIGNUM **e,
const BIGNUM **d);
#endif /* HAVE_RSA_GET0_KEY */
#ifndef HAVE_RSA_SET0_KEY
int RSA_set0_key(RSA *r, BIGNUM *n, BIGNUM *e, BIGNUM *d);
#endif /* HAVE_RSA_SET0_KEY */
#ifndef HAVE_RSA_GET0_CRT_PARAMS
void RSA_get0_crt_params(const RSA *r, const BIGNUM **dmp1, const BIGNUM **dmq1,
const BIGNUM **iqmp);
#endif /* HAVE_RSA_GET0_CRT_PARAMS */
#ifndef HAVE_RSA_SET0_CRT_PARAMS
int RSA_set0_crt_params(RSA *r, BIGNUM *dmp1, BIGNUM *dmq1, BIGNUM *iqmp);
#endif /* HAVE_RSA_SET0_CRT_PARAMS */
#ifndef HAVE_RSA_GET0_FACTORS
void RSA_get0_factors(const RSA *r, const BIGNUM **p, const BIGNUM **q);
#endif /* HAVE_RSA_GET0_FACTORS */
#ifndef HAVE_RSA_SET0_FACTORS
int RSA_set0_factors(RSA *r, BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *q);
#endif /* HAVE_RSA_SET0_FACTORS */
#ifndef DSA_SIG_GET0
void DSA_SIG_get0(const DSA_SIG *sig, const BIGNUM **pr, const BIGNUM **ps);
#endif /* DSA_SIG_GET0 */
#ifndef DSA_SIG_SET0
int DSA_SIG_set0(DSA_SIG *sig, BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *s);
#endif /* DSA_SIG_SET0 */
#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
#ifndef HAVE_ECDSA_SIG_GET0
void ECDSA_SIG_get0(const ECDSA_SIG *sig, const BIGNUM **pr, const BIGNUM **ps);
#endif /* HAVE_ECDSA_SIG_GET0 */
#ifndef HAVE_ECDSA_SIG_SET0
int ECDSA_SIG_set0(ECDSA_SIG *sig, BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *s);
#endif /* HAVE_ECDSA_SIG_SET0 */
#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
#ifndef HAVE_DH_GET0_PQG
void DH_get0_pqg(const DH *dh, const BIGNUM **p, const BIGNUM **q,
const BIGNUM **g);
#endif /* HAVE_DH_GET0_PQG */
#ifndef HAVE_DH_SET0_PQG
int DH_set0_pqg(DH *dh, BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *q, BIGNUM *g);
#endif /* HAVE_DH_SET0_PQG */
#ifndef HAVE_DH_GET0_KEY
void DH_get0_key(const DH *dh, const BIGNUM **pub_key, const BIGNUM **priv_key);
#endif /* HAVE_DH_GET0_KEY */
#ifndef HAVE_DH_SET0_KEY
int DH_set0_key(DH *dh, BIGNUM *pub_key, BIGNUM *priv_key);
#endif /* HAVE_DH_SET0_KEY */
#ifndef HAVE_DH_SET_LENGTH
int DH_set_length(DH *dh, long length);
#endif /* HAVE_DH_SET_LENGTH */
#ifndef HAVE_RSA_METH_FREE
void RSA_meth_free(RSA_METHOD *meth);
#endif /* HAVE_RSA_METH_FREE */
#ifndef HAVE_RSA_METH_DUP
RSA_METHOD *RSA_meth_dup(const RSA_METHOD *meth);
#endif /* HAVE_RSA_METH_DUP */
#ifndef HAVE_RSA_METH_SET1_NAME
int RSA_meth_set1_name(RSA_METHOD *meth, const char *name);
#endif /* HAVE_RSA_METH_SET1_NAME */
#ifndef HAVE_RSA_METH_GET_FINISH
int (*RSA_meth_get_finish(const RSA_METHOD *meth))(RSA *rsa);
#endif /* HAVE_RSA_METH_GET_FINISH */
#ifndef HAVE_RSA_METH_SET_PRIV_ENC
int RSA_meth_set_priv_enc(RSA_METHOD *meth, int (*priv_enc)(int flen,
const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding));
#endif /* HAVE_RSA_METH_SET_PRIV_ENC */
#ifndef HAVE_RSA_METH_SET_PRIV_DEC
int RSA_meth_set_priv_dec(RSA_METHOD *meth, int (*priv_dec)(int flen,
const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding));
#endif /* HAVE_RSA_METH_SET_PRIV_DEC */
#ifndef HAVE_RSA_METH_SET_FINISH
int RSA_meth_set_finish(RSA_METHOD *meth, int (*finish)(RSA *rsa));
#endif /* HAVE_RSA_METH_SET_FINISH */
#ifndef HAVE_EVP_PKEY_GET0_RSA
RSA *EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(EVP_PKEY *pkey);
#endif /* HAVE_EVP_PKEY_GET0_RSA */
#ifndef HAVE_EVP_MD_CTX_new
EVP_MD_CTX *EVP_MD_CTX_new(void);
#endif /* HAVE_EVP_MD_CTX_new */
#ifndef HAVE_EVP_MD_CTX_free
void EVP_MD_CTX_free(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx);
#endif /* HAVE_EVP_MD_CTX_free */
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
#endif /* _OPENSSL_COMPAT_H */
diff --git a/openbsd-compat/port-aix.c b/openbsd-compat/port-aix.c
index fc80dc39f96f..e1ad3f1174af 100644
--- a/openbsd-compat/port-aix.c
+++ b/openbsd-compat/port-aix.c
@@ -1,481 +1,481 @@
/*
*
* Copyright (c) 2001 Gert Doering. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (c) 2003,2004,2005,2006 Darren Tucker. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*
*/
#include "includes.h"
+#ifdef _AIX
+
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "sshbuf.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
#include "sshkey.h"
#include "hostfile.h"
#include "auth.h"
#include "ssh.h"
#include "ssh_api.h"
#include "log.h"
-#ifdef _AIX
-
#include <errno.h>
#if defined(HAVE_NETDB_H)
# include <netdb.h>
#endif
#include <uinfo.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#ifdef WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE
# include <login.h>
# include <userpw.h>
# if defined(HAVE_SYS_AUDIT_H) && defined(AIX_LOGINFAILED_4ARG)
# include <sys/audit.h>
# endif
# include <usersec.h>
#endif
#include "port-aix.h"
static char *lastlogin_msg = NULL;
# ifdef HAVE_SETAUTHDB
static char old_registry[REGISTRY_SIZE] = "";
# endif
/*
* AIX has a "usrinfo" area where logname and other stuff is stored -
* a few applications actually use this and die if it's not set
*
* NOTE: TTY= should be set, but since no one uses it and it's hard to
* acquire due to privsep code. We will just drop support.
*/
void
aix_usrinfo(struct passwd *pw)
{
u_int i;
size_t len;
char *cp;
len = sizeof("LOGNAME= NAME= ") + (2 * strlen(pw->pw_name));
cp = xmalloc(len);
i = snprintf(cp, len, "LOGNAME=%s%cNAME=%s%c", pw->pw_name, '\0',
pw->pw_name, '\0');
if (usrinfo(SETUINFO, cp, i) == -1)
fatal("Couldn't set usrinfo: %s", strerror(errno));
debug3("AIX/UsrInfo: set len %d", i);
free(cp);
}
# ifdef WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE
/*
* Remove embedded newlines in string (if any).
* Used before logging messages returned by AIX authentication functions
* so the message is logged on one line.
*/
void
aix_remove_embedded_newlines(char *p)
{
if (p == NULL)
return;
for (; *p; p++) {
if (*p == '\n')
*p = ' ';
}
/* Remove trailing whitespace */
if (*--p == ' ')
*p = '\0';
}
/*
* Test specifically for the case where SYSTEM == NONE and AUTH1 contains
* anything other than NONE or SYSTEM, which indicates that the admin has
* configured the account for purely AUTH1-type authentication.
*
* Since authenticate() doesn't check AUTH1, and sshd can't sanely support
* AUTH1 itself, in such a case authenticate() will allow access without
* authentation, which is almost certainly not what the admin intends.
*
* (The native tools, eg login, will process the AUTH1 list in addition to
* the SYSTEM list by using ckuserID(), however ckuserID() and AUTH1 methods
* have been deprecated since AIX 4.2.x and would be very difficult for sshd
* to support.
*
* Returns 0 if an unsupportable combination is found, 1 otherwise.
*/
static int
aix_valid_authentications(const char *user)
{
char *auth1, *sys, *p;
int valid = 1;
if (getuserattr((char *)user, S_AUTHSYSTEM, &sys, SEC_CHAR) != 0) {
logit("Can't retrieve attribute SYSTEM for %s: %.100s",
user, strerror(errno));
return 0;
}
debug3("AIX SYSTEM attribute %s", sys);
if (strcmp(sys, "NONE") != 0)
return 1; /* not "NONE", so is OK */
if (getuserattr((char *)user, S_AUTH1, &auth1, SEC_LIST) != 0) {
logit("Can't retrieve attribute auth1 for %s: %.100s",
user, strerror(errno));
return 0;
}
p = auth1;
/* A SEC_LIST is concatenated strings, ending with two NULs. */
while (p[0] != '\0' && p[1] != '\0') {
debug3("AIX auth1 attribute list member %s", p);
if (strcmp(p, "NONE") != 0 && strcmp(p, "SYSTEM")) {
logit("Account %s has unsupported auth1 value '%s'",
user, p);
valid = 0;
}
p += strlen(p) + 1;
}
return (valid);
}
/*
* Do authentication via AIX's authenticate routine. We loop until the
* reenter parameter is 0, but normally authenticate is called only once.
*
* Note: this function returns 1 on success, whereas AIX's authenticate()
* returns 0.
*/
int
sys_auth_passwd(struct ssh *ssh, const char *password)
{
Authctxt *ctxt = ssh->authctxt;
char *authmsg = NULL, *msg = NULL, *name = ctxt->pw->pw_name;
int r, authsuccess = 0, expired, reenter, result;
do {
result = authenticate((char *)name, (char *)password, &reenter,
&authmsg);
aix_remove_embedded_newlines(authmsg);
debug3("AIX/authenticate result %d, authmsg %.100s", result,
authmsg);
} while (reenter);
if (!aix_valid_authentications(name))
result = -1;
if (result == 0) {
authsuccess = 1;
/*
* Record successful login. We don't have a pty yet, so just
* label the line as "ssh"
*/
aix_setauthdb(name);
/*
* Check if the user's password is expired.
*/
expired = passwdexpired(name, &msg);
if (msg && *msg) {
if ((r = sshbuf_put(ctxt->loginmsg,
msg, strlen(msg))) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
aix_remove_embedded_newlines(msg);
}
debug3("AIX/passwdexpired returned %d msg %.100s", expired, msg);
switch (expired) {
case 0: /* password not expired */
break;
case 1: /* expired, password change required */
ctxt->force_pwchange = 1;
break;
default: /* user can't change(2) or other error (-1) */
logit("Password can't be changed for user %s: %.100s",
name, msg);
free(msg);
authsuccess = 0;
}
aix_restoreauthdb();
}
free(authmsg);
return authsuccess;
}
/*
* Check if specified account is permitted to log in.
* Returns 1 if login is allowed, 0 if not allowed.
*/
int
sys_auth_allowed_user(struct passwd *pw, struct sshbuf *loginmsg)
{
char *msg = NULL;
int r, result, permitted = 0;
struct stat st;
/*
* Don't perform checks for root account (PermitRootLogin controls
* logins via ssh) or if running as non-root user (since
* loginrestrictions will always fail due to insufficient privilege).
*/
if (pw->pw_uid == 0 || geteuid() != 0) {
debug3("%s: not checking", __func__);
return 1;
}
result = loginrestrictions(pw->pw_name, S_RLOGIN, NULL, &msg);
if (result == 0)
permitted = 1;
/*
* If restricted because /etc/nologin exists, the login will be denied
* in session.c after the nologin message is sent, so allow for now
* and do not append the returned message.
*/
if (result == -1 && errno == EPERM && stat(_PATH_NOLOGIN, &st) == 0)
permitted = 1;
else if (msg != NULL) {
if ((r = sshbuf_put(loginmsg, msg, strlen(msg))) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
}
if (msg == NULL)
msg = xstrdup("(none)");
aix_remove_embedded_newlines(msg);
debug3("AIX/loginrestrictions returned %d msg %.100s", result, msg);
if (!permitted)
logit("Login restricted for %s: %.100s", pw->pw_name, msg);
free(msg);
return permitted;
}
int
sys_auth_record_login(const char *user, const char *host, const char *ttynm,
struct sshbuf *loginmsg)
{
char *msg = NULL;
int success = 0;
aix_setauthdb(user);
if (loginsuccess((char *)user, (char *)host, (char *)ttynm, &msg) == 0) {
success = 1;
if (msg != NULL) {
debug("AIX/loginsuccess: msg %s", msg);
if (lastlogin_msg == NULL)
lastlogin_msg = msg;
}
}
aix_restoreauthdb();
return (success);
}
char *
sys_auth_get_lastlogin_msg(const char *user, uid_t uid)
{
char *msg = lastlogin_msg;
lastlogin_msg = NULL;
return msg;
}
# ifdef CUSTOM_FAILED_LOGIN
/*
* record_failed_login: generic "login failed" interface function
*/
void
record_failed_login(struct ssh *ssh, const char *user, const char *hostname,
const char *ttyname)
{
if (geteuid() != 0)
return;
aix_setauthdb(user);
# ifdef AIX_LOGINFAILED_4ARG
loginfailed((char *)user, (char *)hostname, (char *)ttyname,
AUDIT_FAIL_AUTH);
# else
loginfailed((char *)user, (char *)hostname, (char *)ttyname);
# endif
aix_restoreauthdb();
}
# endif /* CUSTOM_FAILED_LOGIN */
/*
* If we have setauthdb, retrieve the password registry for the user's
* account then feed it to setauthdb. This will mean that subsequent AIX auth
* functions will only use the specified loadable module. If we don't have
* setauthdb this is a no-op.
*/
void
aix_setauthdb(const char *user)
{
# ifdef HAVE_SETAUTHDB
char *registry;
if (setuserdb(S_READ) == -1) {
debug3("%s: Could not open userdb to read", __func__);
return;
}
if (getuserattr((char *)user, S_REGISTRY, &registry, SEC_CHAR) == 0) {
if (setauthdb(registry, old_registry) == 0)
debug3("AIX/setauthdb set registry '%s'", registry);
else
debug3("AIX/setauthdb set registry '%s' failed: %s",
registry, strerror(errno));
} else
debug3("%s: Could not read S_REGISTRY for user: %s", __func__,
strerror(errno));
enduserdb();
# endif /* HAVE_SETAUTHDB */
}
/*
* Restore the user's registry settings from old_registry.
* Note that if the first aix_setauthdb fails, setauthdb("") is still safe
* (it restores the system default behaviour). If we don't have setauthdb,
* this is a no-op.
*/
void
aix_restoreauthdb(void)
{
# ifdef HAVE_SETAUTHDB
if (setauthdb(old_registry, NULL) == 0)
debug3("%s: restoring old registry '%s'", __func__,
old_registry);
else
debug3("%s: failed to restore old registry %s", __func__,
old_registry);
# endif /* HAVE_SETAUTHDB */
}
# endif /* WITH_AIXAUTHENTICATE */
# ifdef USE_AIX_KRB_NAME
/*
* aix_krb5_get_principal_name: returns the user's kerberos client principal name if
* configured, otherwise NULL. Caller must free returned string.
*/
char *
aix_krb5_get_principal_name(char *pw_name)
{
char *authname = NULL, *authdomain = NULL, *principal = NULL;
setuserdb(S_READ);
if (getuserattr(pw_name, S_AUTHDOMAIN, &authdomain, SEC_CHAR) != 0)
debug("AIX getuserattr S_AUTHDOMAIN: %s", strerror(errno));
if (getuserattr(pw_name, S_AUTHNAME, &authname, SEC_CHAR) != 0)
debug("AIX getuserattr S_AUTHNAME: %s", strerror(errno));
if (authdomain != NULL)
xasprintf(&principal, "%s@%s", authname ? authname : pw_name, authdomain);
else if (authname != NULL)
principal = xstrdup(authname);
enduserdb();
return principal;
}
# endif /* USE_AIX_KRB_NAME */
# if defined(AIX_GETNAMEINFO_HACK) && !defined(BROKEN_ADDRINFO)
# undef getnameinfo
/*
* For some reason, AIX's getnameinfo will refuse to resolve the all-zeros
* IPv6 address into its textual representation ("::"), so we wrap it
* with a function that will.
*/
int
sshaix_getnameinfo(const struct sockaddr *sa, size_t salen, char *host,
size_t hostlen, char *serv, size_t servlen, int flags)
{
struct sockaddr_in6 *sa6;
u_int32_t *a6;
if (flags & (NI_NUMERICHOST|NI_NUMERICSERV) &&
sa->sa_family == AF_INET6) {
sa6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)sa;
a6 = sa6->sin6_addr.u6_addr.u6_addr32;
if (a6[0] == 0 && a6[1] == 0 && a6[2] == 0 && a6[3] == 0) {
strlcpy(host, "::", hostlen);
snprintf(serv, servlen, "%d", sa6->sin6_port);
return 0;
}
}
return getnameinfo(sa, salen, host, hostlen, serv, servlen, flags);
}
# endif /* AIX_GETNAMEINFO_HACK */
# if defined(USE_GETGRSET)
# include <stdlib.h>
int
getgrouplist(const char *user, gid_t pgid, gid_t *groups, int *grpcnt)
{
char *cp, *grplist, *grp;
gid_t gid;
int ret = 0, ngroups = 0, maxgroups;
long l;
maxgroups = *grpcnt;
if ((cp = grplist = getgrset(user)) == NULL)
return -1;
/* handle zero-length case */
if (maxgroups <= 0) {
*grpcnt = 0;
return -1;
}
/* copy primary group */
groups[ngroups++] = pgid;
/* copy each entry from getgrset into group list */
while ((grp = strsep(&grplist, ",")) != NULL) {
l = strtol(grp, NULL, 10);
if (ngroups >= maxgroups || l == LONG_MIN || l == LONG_MAX) {
ret = -1;
goto out;
}
gid = (gid_t)l;
if (gid == pgid)
continue; /* we have already added primary gid */
groups[ngroups++] = gid;
}
out:
free(cp);
*grpcnt = ngroups;
return ret;
}
# endif /* USE_GETGRSET */
#endif /* _AIX */
diff --git a/openbsd-compat/port-net.c b/openbsd-compat/port-net.c
index bb535626ffe0..617bffcebe8a 100644
--- a/openbsd-compat/port-net.c
+++ b/openbsd-compat/port-net.c
@@ -1,374 +1,374 @@
/*
* Copyright (c) 2005 Reyk Floeter <reyk@openbsd.org>
*
* Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
* copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
* WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
* ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
* WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
* ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
* OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/ioctl.h>
#include <netinet/in.h>
#include <arpa/inet.h>
#include <netinet/ip.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "sshbuf.h"
#include "channels.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
/*
* This file contains various portability code for network support,
* including tun/tap forwarding and routing domains.
*/
#if defined(SYS_RDOMAIN_LINUX) || defined(SSH_TUN_LINUX)
#include <linux/if.h>
#endif
#if defined(SYS_RDOMAIN_LINUX)
char *
sys_get_rdomain(int fd)
{
char dev[IFNAMSIZ + 1];
socklen_t len = sizeof(dev) - 1;
if (getsockopt(fd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_BINDTODEVICE, dev, &len) == -1) {
error("%s: cannot determine VRF for fd=%d : %s",
__func__, fd, strerror(errno));
return NULL;
}
dev[len] = '\0';
return strdup(dev);
}
int
sys_set_rdomain(int fd, const char *name)
{
if (setsockopt(fd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_BINDTODEVICE,
name, strlen(name)) == -1) {
error("%s: setsockopt(%d, SO_BINDTODEVICE, %s): %s",
__func__, fd, name, strerror(errno));
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
int
sys_valid_rdomain(const char *name)
{
int fd;
/*
* This is a pretty crappy way to test. It would be better to
* check whether "name" represents a VRF device, but apparently
* that requires an rtnetlink transaction.
*/
if ((fd = socket(AF_INET, SOCK_STREAM, 0)) == -1)
return 0;
if (setsockopt(fd, SOL_SOCKET, SO_BINDTODEVICE,
name, strlen(name)) == -1) {
close(fd);
return 0;
}
close(fd);
return 1;
}
#elif defined(SYS_RDOMAIN_XXX)
/* XXX examples */
char *
sys_get_rdomain(int fd)
{
return NULL;
}
int
sys_set_rdomain(int fd, const char *name)
{
return -1;
}
int
valid_rdomain(const char *name)
{
return 0;
}
void
sys_set_process_rdomain(const char *name)
{
fatal("%s: not supported", __func__);
}
#endif /* defined(SYS_RDOMAIN_XXX) */
/*
* This is the portable version of the SSH tunnel forwarding, it
* uses some preprocessor definitions for various platform-specific
* settings.
*
* SSH_TUN_LINUX Use the (newer) Linux tun/tap device
* SSH_TUN_FREEBSD Use the FreeBSD tun/tap device
* SSH_TUN_COMPAT_AF Translate the OpenBSD address family
* SSH_TUN_PREPEND_AF Prepend/remove the address family
*/
/*
* System-specific tunnel open function
*/
#if defined(SSH_TUN_LINUX)
#include <linux/if_tun.h>
+#define TUN_CTRL_DEV "/dev/net/tun"
int
sys_tun_open(int tun, int mode, char **ifname)
{
struct ifreq ifr;
int fd = -1;
const char *name = NULL;
if (ifname != NULL)
*ifname = NULL;
-
- if ((fd = open("/dev/net/tun", O_RDWR)) == -1) {
- debug("%s: failed to open tunnel control interface: %s",
- __func__, strerror(errno));
+ if ((fd = open(TUN_CTRL_DEV, O_RDWR)) == -1) {
+ debug("%s: failed to open tunnel control device \"%s\": %s",
+ __func__, TUN_CTRL_DEV, strerror(errno));
return (-1);
}
bzero(&ifr, sizeof(ifr));
if (mode == SSH_TUNMODE_ETHERNET) {
ifr.ifr_flags = IFF_TAP;
name = "tap%d";
} else {
ifr.ifr_flags = IFF_TUN;
name = "tun%d";
}
ifr.ifr_flags |= IFF_NO_PI;
if (tun != SSH_TUNID_ANY) {
if (tun > SSH_TUNID_MAX) {
debug("%s: invalid tunnel id %x: %s", __func__,
tun, strerror(errno));
goto failed;
}
snprintf(ifr.ifr_name, sizeof(ifr.ifr_name), name, tun);
}
if (ioctl(fd, TUNSETIFF, &ifr) == -1) {
debug("%s: failed to configure tunnel (mode %d): %s", __func__,
mode, strerror(errno));
goto failed;
}
if (tun == SSH_TUNID_ANY)
debug("%s: tunnel mode %d fd %d", __func__, mode, fd);
else
debug("%s: %s mode %d fd %d", __func__, ifr.ifr_name, mode, fd);
if (ifname != NULL && (*ifname = strdup(ifr.ifr_name)) == NULL)
goto failed;
return (fd);
failed:
close(fd);
return (-1);
}
#endif /* SSH_TUN_LINUX */
#ifdef SSH_TUN_FREEBSD
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <net/if.h>
#ifdef HAVE_NET_IF_TUN_H
#include <net/if_tun.h>
#endif
int
sys_tun_open(int tun, int mode, char **ifname)
{
struct ifreq ifr;
char name[100];
int fd = -1, sock, flag;
const char *tunbase = "tun";
if (ifname != NULL)
*ifname = NULL;
if (mode == SSH_TUNMODE_ETHERNET) {
#ifdef SSH_TUN_NO_L2
debug("%s: no layer 2 tunnelling support", __func__);
return (-1);
#else
tunbase = "tap";
#endif
}
/* Open the tunnel device */
if (tun <= SSH_TUNID_MAX) {
snprintf(name, sizeof(name), "/dev/%s%d", tunbase, tun);
fd = open(name, O_RDWR);
} else if (tun == SSH_TUNID_ANY) {
for (tun = 100; tun >= 0; tun--) {
snprintf(name, sizeof(name), "/dev/%s%d",
tunbase, tun);
if ((fd = open(name, O_RDWR)) >= 0)
break;
}
} else {
debug("%s: invalid tunnel %u\n", __func__, tun);
return (-1);
}
if (fd < 0) {
debug("%s: %s open failed: %s", __func__, name,
strerror(errno));
return (-1);
}
/* Turn on tunnel headers */
flag = 1;
#if defined(TUNSIFHEAD) && !defined(SSH_TUN_PREPEND_AF)
if (mode != SSH_TUNMODE_ETHERNET &&
ioctl(fd, TUNSIFHEAD, &flag) == -1) {
debug("%s: ioctl(%d, TUNSIFHEAD, 1): %s", __func__, fd,
strerror(errno));
close(fd);
}
#endif
debug("%s: %s mode %d fd %d", __func__, name, mode, fd);
/* Set the tunnel device operation mode */
snprintf(ifr.ifr_name, sizeof(ifr.ifr_name), "%s%d", tunbase, tun);
if ((sock = socket(PF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0)) == -1)
goto failed;
if (ioctl(sock, SIOCGIFFLAGS, &ifr) == -1)
goto failed;
if ((ifr.ifr_flags & IFF_UP) == 0) {
ifr.ifr_flags |= IFF_UP;
if (ioctl(sock, SIOCSIFFLAGS, &ifr) == -1)
goto failed;
}
if (ifname != NULL && (*ifname = strdup(ifr.ifr_name)) == NULL)
goto failed;
close(sock);
return (fd);
failed:
if (fd >= 0)
close(fd);
if (sock >= 0)
close(sock);
debug("%s: failed to set %s mode %d: %s", __func__, name,
mode, strerror(errno));
return (-1);
}
#endif /* SSH_TUN_FREEBSD */
/*
* System-specific channel filters
*/
#if defined(SSH_TUN_FILTER)
/*
* The tunnel forwarding protocol prepends the address family of forwarded
* IP packets using OpenBSD's numbers.
*/
#define OPENBSD_AF_INET 2
#define OPENBSD_AF_INET6 24
int
sys_tun_infilter(struct ssh *ssh, struct Channel *c, char *buf, int _len)
{
int r;
size_t len;
char *ptr = buf;
#if defined(SSH_TUN_PREPEND_AF)
char rbuf[CHAN_RBUF];
struct ip iph;
#endif
#if defined(SSH_TUN_PREPEND_AF) || defined(SSH_TUN_COMPAT_AF)
u_int32_t af;
#endif
/* XXX update channel input filter API to use unsigned length */
if (_len < 0)
return -1;
len = _len;
#if defined(SSH_TUN_PREPEND_AF)
if (len <= sizeof(iph) || len > sizeof(rbuf) - 4)
return -1;
/* Determine address family from packet IP header. */
memcpy(&iph, buf, sizeof(iph));
af = iph.ip_v == 6 ? OPENBSD_AF_INET6 : OPENBSD_AF_INET;
/* Prepend address family to packet using OpenBSD constants */
memcpy(rbuf + 4, buf, len);
len += 4;
POKE_U32(rbuf, af);
ptr = rbuf;
#elif defined(SSH_TUN_COMPAT_AF)
/* Convert existing address family header to OpenBSD value */
if (len <= 4)
return -1;
af = PEEK_U32(buf);
/* Put it back */
POKE_U32(buf, af == AF_INET6 ? OPENBSD_AF_INET6 : OPENBSD_AF_INET);
#endif
if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(c->input, ptr, len)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
return (0);
}
u_char *
sys_tun_outfilter(struct ssh *ssh, struct Channel *c,
u_char **data, size_t *dlen)
{
u_char *buf;
u_int32_t af;
int r;
/* XXX new API is incompatible with this signature. */
if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(c->output, data, dlen)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
if (*dlen < sizeof(af))
return (NULL);
buf = *data;
#if defined(SSH_TUN_PREPEND_AF)
/* skip address family */
*dlen -= sizeof(af);
buf = *data + sizeof(af);
#elif defined(SSH_TUN_COMPAT_AF)
/* translate address family */
af = (PEEK_U32(buf) == OPENBSD_AF_INET6) ? AF_INET6 : AF_INET;
POKE_U32(buf, af);
#endif
return (buf);
}
#endif /* SSH_TUN_FILTER */
diff --git a/openbsd-compat/rmd160.c b/openbsd-compat/rmd160.c
deleted file mode 100644
index e915141a5715..000000000000
--- a/openbsd-compat/rmd160.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,378 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
- * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
- * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
- * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
- * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
- * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
- * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
- * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- */
-/*
- * Preneel, Bosselaers, Dobbertin, "The Cryptographic Hash Function RIPEMD-160",
- * RSA Laboratories, CryptoBytes, Volume 3, Number 2, Autumn 1997,
- * ftp://ftp.rsasecurity.com/pub/cryptobytes/crypto3n2.pdf
- */
-
-#include "includes.h"
-
-#ifndef WITH_OPENSSL
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#ifdef HAVE_ENDIAN_H
-#include <endian.h>
-#endif
-#include <string.h>
-#include <rmd160.h>
-
-#define PUT_64BIT_LE(cp, value) do { \
- (cp)[7] = (value) >> 56; \
- (cp)[6] = (value) >> 48; \
- (cp)[5] = (value) >> 40; \
- (cp)[4] = (value) >> 32; \
- (cp)[3] = (value) >> 24; \
- (cp)[2] = (value) >> 16; \
- (cp)[1] = (value) >> 8; \
- (cp)[0] = (value); } while (0)
-
-#define PUT_32BIT_LE(cp, value) do { \
- (cp)[3] = (value) >> 24; \
- (cp)[2] = (value) >> 16; \
- (cp)[1] = (value) >> 8; \
- (cp)[0] = (value); } while (0)
-
-#define H0 0x67452301U
-#define H1 0xEFCDAB89U
-#define H2 0x98BADCFEU
-#define H3 0x10325476U
-#define H4 0xC3D2E1F0U
-
-#define K0 0x00000000U
-#define K1 0x5A827999U
-#define K2 0x6ED9EBA1U
-#define K3 0x8F1BBCDCU
-#define K4 0xA953FD4EU
-
-#define KK0 0x50A28BE6U
-#define KK1 0x5C4DD124U
-#define KK2 0x6D703EF3U
-#define KK3 0x7A6D76E9U
-#define KK4 0x00000000U
-
-/* rotate x left n bits. */
-#define ROL(n, x) (((x) << (n)) | ((x) >> (32-(n))))
-
-#define F0(x, y, z) ((x) ^ (y) ^ (z))
-#define F1(x, y, z) (((x) & (y)) | ((~x) & (z)))
-#define F2(x, y, z) (((x) | (~y)) ^ (z))
-#define F3(x, y, z) (((x) & (z)) | ((y) & (~z)))
-#define F4(x, y, z) ((x) ^ ((y) | (~z)))
-
-#define R(a, b, c, d, e, Fj, Kj, sj, rj) \
- do { \
- a = ROL(sj, a + Fj(b,c,d) + X(rj) + Kj) + e; \
- c = ROL(10, c); \
- } while(0)
-
-#define X(i) x[i]
-
-static u_int8_t PADDING[RMD160_BLOCK_LENGTH] = {
- 0x80, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
- 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
- 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0
-};
-
-void
-RMD160Init(RMD160_CTX *ctx)
-{
- ctx->count = 0;
- ctx->state[0] = H0;
- ctx->state[1] = H1;
- ctx->state[2] = H2;
- ctx->state[3] = H3;
- ctx->state[4] = H4;
-}
-
-void
-RMD160Update(RMD160_CTX *ctx, const u_int8_t *input, size_t len)
-{
- size_t have, off, need;
-
- have = (ctx->count / 8) % RMD160_BLOCK_LENGTH;
- need = RMD160_BLOCK_LENGTH - have;
- ctx->count += 8 * len;
- off = 0;
-
- if (len >= need) {
- if (have) {
- memcpy(ctx->buffer + have, input, need);
- RMD160Transform(ctx->state, ctx->buffer);
- off = need;
- have = 0;
- }
- /* now the buffer is empty */
- while (off + RMD160_BLOCK_LENGTH <= len) {
- RMD160Transform(ctx->state, input+off);
- off += RMD160_BLOCK_LENGTH;
- }
- }
- if (off < len)
- memcpy(ctx->buffer + have, input+off, len-off);
-}
-
-void
-RMD160Pad(RMD160_CTX *ctx)
-{
- u_int8_t size[8];
- size_t padlen;
-
- PUT_64BIT_LE(size, ctx->count);
-
- /*
- * pad to RMD160_BLOCK_LENGTH byte blocks, at least one byte from
- * PADDING plus 8 bytes for the size
- */
- padlen = RMD160_BLOCK_LENGTH - ((ctx->count / 8) % RMD160_BLOCK_LENGTH);
- if (padlen < 1 + 8)
- padlen += RMD160_BLOCK_LENGTH;
- RMD160Update(ctx, PADDING, padlen - 8); /* padlen - 8 <= 64 */
- RMD160Update(ctx, size, 8);
-}
-
-void
-RMD160Final(u_int8_t digest[RMD160_DIGEST_LENGTH], RMD160_CTX *ctx)
-{
- int i;
-
- RMD160Pad(ctx);
- for (i = 0; i < 5; i++)
- PUT_32BIT_LE(digest + i*4, ctx->state[i]);
- memset(ctx, 0, sizeof (*ctx));
-}
-
-void
-RMD160Transform(u_int32_t state[5], const u_int8_t block[RMD160_BLOCK_LENGTH])
-{
- u_int32_t a, b, c, d, e, aa, bb, cc, dd, ee, t, x[16];
-
-#if BYTE_ORDER == LITTLE_ENDIAN
- memcpy(x, block, RMD160_BLOCK_LENGTH);
-#else
- int i;
-
- for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
- x[i] = (u_int32_t)(
- (u_int32_t)(block[i*4 + 0]) |
- (u_int32_t)(block[i*4 + 1]) << 8 |
- (u_int32_t)(block[i*4 + 2]) << 16 |
- (u_int32_t)(block[i*4 + 3]) << 24);
-#endif
-
- a = state[0];
- b = state[1];
- c = state[2];
- d = state[3];
- e = state[4];
-
- /* Round 1 */
- R(a, b, c, d, e, F0, K0, 11, 0);
- R(e, a, b, c, d, F0, K0, 14, 1);
- R(d, e, a, b, c, F0, K0, 15, 2);
- R(c, d, e, a, b, F0, K0, 12, 3);
- R(b, c, d, e, a, F0, K0, 5, 4);
- R(a, b, c, d, e, F0, K0, 8, 5);
- R(e, a, b, c, d, F0, K0, 7, 6);
- R(d, e, a, b, c, F0, K0, 9, 7);
- R(c, d, e, a, b, F0, K0, 11, 8);
- R(b, c, d, e, a, F0, K0, 13, 9);
- R(a, b, c, d, e, F0, K0, 14, 10);
- R(e, a, b, c, d, F0, K0, 15, 11);
- R(d, e, a, b, c, F0, K0, 6, 12);
- R(c, d, e, a, b, F0, K0, 7, 13);
- R(b, c, d, e, a, F0, K0, 9, 14);
- R(a, b, c, d, e, F0, K0, 8, 15); /* #15 */
- /* Round 2 */
- R(e, a, b, c, d, F1, K1, 7, 7);
- R(d, e, a, b, c, F1, K1, 6, 4);
- R(c, d, e, a, b, F1, K1, 8, 13);
- R(b, c, d, e, a, F1, K1, 13, 1);
- R(a, b, c, d, e, F1, K1, 11, 10);
- R(e, a, b, c, d, F1, K1, 9, 6);
- R(d, e, a, b, c, F1, K1, 7, 15);
- R(c, d, e, a, b, F1, K1, 15, 3);
- R(b, c, d, e, a, F1, K1, 7, 12);
- R(a, b, c, d, e, F1, K1, 12, 0);
- R(e, a, b, c, d, F1, K1, 15, 9);
- R(d, e, a, b, c, F1, K1, 9, 5);
- R(c, d, e, a, b, F1, K1, 11, 2);
- R(b, c, d, e, a, F1, K1, 7, 14);
- R(a, b, c, d, e, F1, K1, 13, 11);
- R(e, a, b, c, d, F1, K1, 12, 8); /* #31 */
- /* Round 3 */
- R(d, e, a, b, c, F2, K2, 11, 3);
- R(c, d, e, a, b, F2, K2, 13, 10);
- R(b, c, d, e, a, F2, K2, 6, 14);
- R(a, b, c, d, e, F2, K2, 7, 4);
- R(e, a, b, c, d, F2, K2, 14, 9);
- R(d, e, a, b, c, F2, K2, 9, 15);
- R(c, d, e, a, b, F2, K2, 13, 8);
- R(b, c, d, e, a, F2, K2, 15, 1);
- R(a, b, c, d, e, F2, K2, 14, 2);
- R(e, a, b, c, d, F2, K2, 8, 7);
- R(d, e, a, b, c, F2, K2, 13, 0);
- R(c, d, e, a, b, F2, K2, 6, 6);
- R(b, c, d, e, a, F2, K2, 5, 13);
- R(a, b, c, d, e, F2, K2, 12, 11);
- R(e, a, b, c, d, F2, K2, 7, 5);
- R(d, e, a, b, c, F2, K2, 5, 12); /* #47 */
- /* Round 4 */
- R(c, d, e, a, b, F3, K3, 11, 1);
- R(b, c, d, e, a, F3, K3, 12, 9);
- R(a, b, c, d, e, F3, K3, 14, 11);
- R(e, a, b, c, d, F3, K3, 15, 10);
- R(d, e, a, b, c, F3, K3, 14, 0);
- R(c, d, e, a, b, F3, K3, 15, 8);
- R(b, c, d, e, a, F3, K3, 9, 12);
- R(a, b, c, d, e, F3, K3, 8, 4);
- R(e, a, b, c, d, F3, K3, 9, 13);
- R(d, e, a, b, c, F3, K3, 14, 3);
- R(c, d, e, a, b, F3, K3, 5, 7);
- R(b, c, d, e, a, F3, K3, 6, 15);
- R(a, b, c, d, e, F3, K3, 8, 14);
- R(e, a, b, c, d, F3, K3, 6, 5);
- R(d, e, a, b, c, F3, K3, 5, 6);
- R(c, d, e, a, b, F3, K3, 12, 2); /* #63 */
- /* Round 5 */
- R(b, c, d, e, a, F4, K4, 9, 4);
- R(a, b, c, d, e, F4, K4, 15, 0);
- R(e, a, b, c, d, F4, K4, 5, 5);
- R(d, e, a, b, c, F4, K4, 11, 9);
- R(c, d, e, a, b, F4, K4, 6, 7);
- R(b, c, d, e, a, F4, K4, 8, 12);
- R(a, b, c, d, e, F4, K4, 13, 2);
- R(e, a, b, c, d, F4, K4, 12, 10);
- R(d, e, a, b, c, F4, K4, 5, 14);
- R(c, d, e, a, b, F4, K4, 12, 1);
- R(b, c, d, e, a, F4, K4, 13, 3);
- R(a, b, c, d, e, F4, K4, 14, 8);
- R(e, a, b, c, d, F4, K4, 11, 11);
- R(d, e, a, b, c, F4, K4, 8, 6);
- R(c, d, e, a, b, F4, K4, 5, 15);
- R(b, c, d, e, a, F4, K4, 6, 13); /* #79 */
-
- aa = a ; bb = b; cc = c; dd = d; ee = e;
-
- a = state[0];
- b = state[1];
- c = state[2];
- d = state[3];
- e = state[4];
-
- /* Parallel round 1 */
- R(a, b, c, d, e, F4, KK0, 8, 5);
- R(e, a, b, c, d, F4, KK0, 9, 14);
- R(d, e, a, b, c, F4, KK0, 9, 7);
- R(c, d, e, a, b, F4, KK0, 11, 0);
- R(b, c, d, e, a, F4, KK0, 13, 9);
- R(a, b, c, d, e, F4, KK0, 15, 2);
- R(e, a, b, c, d, F4, KK0, 15, 11);
- R(d, e, a, b, c, F4, KK0, 5, 4);
- R(c, d, e, a, b, F4, KK0, 7, 13);
- R(b, c, d, e, a, F4, KK0, 7, 6);
- R(a, b, c, d, e, F4, KK0, 8, 15);
- R(e, a, b, c, d, F4, KK0, 11, 8);
- R(d, e, a, b, c, F4, KK0, 14, 1);
- R(c, d, e, a, b, F4, KK0, 14, 10);
- R(b, c, d, e, a, F4, KK0, 12, 3);
- R(a, b, c, d, e, F4, KK0, 6, 12); /* #15 */
- /* Parallel round 2 */
- R(e, a, b, c, d, F3, KK1, 9, 6);
- R(d, e, a, b, c, F3, KK1, 13, 11);
- R(c, d, e, a, b, F3, KK1, 15, 3);
- R(b, c, d, e, a, F3, KK1, 7, 7);
- R(a, b, c, d, e, F3, KK1, 12, 0);
- R(e, a, b, c, d, F3, KK1, 8, 13);
- R(d, e, a, b, c, F3, KK1, 9, 5);
- R(c, d, e, a, b, F3, KK1, 11, 10);
- R(b, c, d, e, a, F3, KK1, 7, 14);
- R(a, b, c, d, e, F3, KK1, 7, 15);
- R(e, a, b, c, d, F3, KK1, 12, 8);
- R(d, e, a, b, c, F3, KK1, 7, 12);
- R(c, d, e, a, b, F3, KK1, 6, 4);
- R(b, c, d, e, a, F3, KK1, 15, 9);
- R(a, b, c, d, e, F3, KK1, 13, 1);
- R(e, a, b, c, d, F3, KK1, 11, 2); /* #31 */
- /* Parallel round 3 */
- R(d, e, a, b, c, F2, KK2, 9, 15);
- R(c, d, e, a, b, F2, KK2, 7, 5);
- R(b, c, d, e, a, F2, KK2, 15, 1);
- R(a, b, c, d, e, F2, KK2, 11, 3);
- R(e, a, b, c, d, F2, KK2, 8, 7);
- R(d, e, a, b, c, F2, KK2, 6, 14);
- R(c, d, e, a, b, F2, KK2, 6, 6);
- R(b, c, d, e, a, F2, KK2, 14, 9);
- R(a, b, c, d, e, F2, KK2, 12, 11);
- R(e, a, b, c, d, F2, KK2, 13, 8);
- R(d, e, a, b, c, F2, KK2, 5, 12);
- R(c, d, e, a, b, F2, KK2, 14, 2);
- R(b, c, d, e, a, F2, KK2, 13, 10);
- R(a, b, c, d, e, F2, KK2, 13, 0);
- R(e, a, b, c, d, F2, KK2, 7, 4);
- R(d, e, a, b, c, F2, KK2, 5, 13); /* #47 */
- /* Parallel round 4 */
- R(c, d, e, a, b, F1, KK3, 15, 8);
- R(b, c, d, e, a, F1, KK3, 5, 6);
- R(a, b, c, d, e, F1, KK3, 8, 4);
- R(e, a, b, c, d, F1, KK3, 11, 1);
- R(d, e, a, b, c, F1, KK3, 14, 3);
- R(c, d, e, a, b, F1, KK3, 14, 11);
- R(b, c, d, e, a, F1, KK3, 6, 15);
- R(a, b, c, d, e, F1, KK3, 14, 0);
- R(e, a, b, c, d, F1, KK3, 6, 5);
- R(d, e, a, b, c, F1, KK3, 9, 12);
- R(c, d, e, a, b, F1, KK3, 12, 2);
- R(b, c, d, e, a, F1, KK3, 9, 13);
- R(a, b, c, d, e, F1, KK3, 12, 9);
- R(e, a, b, c, d, F1, KK3, 5, 7);
- R(d, e, a, b, c, F1, KK3, 15, 10);
- R(c, d, e, a, b, F1, KK3, 8, 14); /* #63 */
- /* Parallel round 5 */
- R(b, c, d, e, a, F0, KK4, 8, 12);
- R(a, b, c, d, e, F0, KK4, 5, 15);
- R(e, a, b, c, d, F0, KK4, 12, 10);
- R(d, e, a, b, c, F0, KK4, 9, 4);
- R(c, d, e, a, b, F0, KK4, 12, 1);
- R(b, c, d, e, a, F0, KK4, 5, 5);
- R(a, b, c, d, e, F0, KK4, 14, 8);
- R(e, a, b, c, d, F0, KK4, 6, 7);
- R(d, e, a, b, c, F0, KK4, 8, 6);
- R(c, d, e, a, b, F0, KK4, 13, 2);
- R(b, c, d, e, a, F0, KK4, 6, 13);
- R(a, b, c, d, e, F0, KK4, 5, 14);
- R(e, a, b, c, d, F0, KK4, 15, 0);
- R(d, e, a, b, c, F0, KK4, 13, 3);
- R(c, d, e, a, b, F0, KK4, 11, 9);
- R(b, c, d, e, a, F0, KK4, 11, 11); /* #79 */
-
- t = state[1] + cc + d;
- state[1] = state[2] + dd + e;
- state[2] = state[3] + ee + a;
- state[3] = state[4] + aa + b;
- state[4] = state[0] + bb + c;
- state[0] = t;
-}
-
-#endif /* !WITH_OPENSSL */
diff --git a/openbsd-compat/rmd160.h b/openbsd-compat/rmd160.h
deleted file mode 100644
index 99c1dcdc060a..000000000000
--- a/openbsd-compat/rmd160.h
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,61 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: rmd160.h,v 1.17 2012/12/05 23:19:57 deraadt Exp $ */
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
- *
- * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
- * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
- * are met:
- * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
- * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
- * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
- *
- * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
- * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
- * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
- * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
- * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
- * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
- * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
- * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
- * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
- * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
- */
-#ifndef _RMD160_H
-#define _RMD160_H
-
-#ifndef WITH_OPENSSL
-
-#define RMD160_BLOCK_LENGTH 64
-#define RMD160_DIGEST_LENGTH 20
-#define RMD160_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH (RMD160_DIGEST_LENGTH * 2 + 1)
-
-/* RMD160 context. */
-typedef struct RMD160Context {
- u_int32_t state[5]; /* state */
- u_int64_t count; /* number of bits, mod 2^64 */
- u_int8_t buffer[RMD160_BLOCK_LENGTH]; /* input buffer */
-} RMD160_CTX;
-
-void RMD160Init(RMD160_CTX *);
-void RMD160Transform(u_int32_t [5], const u_int8_t [RMD160_BLOCK_LENGTH])
- __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,1,5)))
- __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,2,RMD160_BLOCK_LENGTH)));
-void RMD160Update(RMD160_CTX *, const u_int8_t *, size_t)
- __attribute__((__bounded__(__string__,2,3)));
-void RMD160Pad(RMD160_CTX *);
-void RMD160Final(u_int8_t [RMD160_DIGEST_LENGTH], RMD160_CTX *)
- __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,1,RMD160_DIGEST_LENGTH)));
-char *RMD160End(RMD160_CTX *, char *)
- __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,2,RMD160_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH)));
-char *RMD160File(const char *, char *)
- __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,2,RMD160_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH)));
-char *RMD160FileChunk(const char *, char *, off_t, off_t)
- __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,2,RMD160_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH)));
-char *RMD160Data(const u_int8_t *, size_t, char *)
- __attribute__((__bounded__(__string__,1,2)))
- __attribute__((__bounded__(__minbytes__,3,RMD160_DIGEST_STRING_LENGTH)));
-
-#endif /* !WITH_OPENSSL */
-#endif /* _RMD160_H */
diff --git a/openbsd-compat/sha2.c b/openbsd-compat/sha2.c
index e63324c99826..e36cc24ef617 100644
--- a/openbsd-compat/sha2.c
+++ b/openbsd-compat/sha2.c
@@ -1,1010 +1,1010 @@
/* $OpenBSD: sha2.c,v 1.28 2019/07/23 12:35:22 dtucker Exp $ */
/*
* FILE: sha2.c
* AUTHOR: Aaron D. Gifford <me@aarongifford.com>
*
* Copyright (c) 2000-2001, Aaron D. Gifford
* All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
* 3. Neither the name of the copyright holder nor the names of contributors
* may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
* without specific prior written permission.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR AND CONTRIBUTOR(S) ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTOR(S) BE LIABLE
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
*
* $From: sha2.c,v 1.1 2001/11/08 00:01:51 adg Exp adg $
*/
/* OPENBSD ORIGINAL: lib/libc/hash/sha2.c */
#include "includes.h"
#if !defined(HAVE_SHA256UPDATE) || !defined(HAVE_SHA384UPDATE) || \
!defined(HAVE_SHA512UPDATE)
/* no-op out, similar to DEF_WEAK but only needed here */
-#define MAKE_CLONE(x, y) void __ssh_compat_make_clone_##x_##y(void);
+#define MAKE_CLONE(x, y) void __ssh_compat_make_clone_##x_##y(void)
#include <string.h>
#include <sha2.h>
/*
* UNROLLED TRANSFORM LOOP NOTE:
* You can define SHA2_UNROLL_TRANSFORM to use the unrolled transform
* loop version for the hash transform rounds (defined using macros
* later in this file). Either define on the command line, for example:
*
* cc -DSHA2_UNROLL_TRANSFORM -o sha2 sha2.c sha2prog.c
*
* or define below:
*
* #define SHA2_UNROLL_TRANSFORM
*
*/
#ifndef SHA2_SMALL
#if defined(__amd64__) || defined(__i386__)
#define SHA2_UNROLL_TRANSFORM
#endif
#endif
/*** SHA-224/256/384/512 Machine Architecture Definitions *****************/
/*
* BYTE_ORDER NOTE:
*
* Please make sure that your system defines BYTE_ORDER. If your
* architecture is little-endian, make sure it also defines
* LITTLE_ENDIAN and that the two (BYTE_ORDER and LITTLE_ENDIAN) are
* equivalent.
*
* If your system does not define the above, then you can do so by
* hand like this:
*
* #define LITTLE_ENDIAN 1234
* #define BIG_ENDIAN 4321
*
* And for little-endian machines, add:
*
* #define BYTE_ORDER LITTLE_ENDIAN
*
* Or for big-endian machines:
*
* #define BYTE_ORDER BIG_ENDIAN
*
* The FreeBSD machine this was written on defines BYTE_ORDER
* appropriately by including <sys/types.h> (which in turn includes
* <machine/endian.h> where the appropriate definitions are actually
* made).
*/
#if !defined(BYTE_ORDER) || (BYTE_ORDER != LITTLE_ENDIAN && BYTE_ORDER != BIG_ENDIAN)
#error Define BYTE_ORDER to be equal to either LITTLE_ENDIAN or BIG_ENDIAN
#endif
/*** SHA-224/256/384/512 Various Length Definitions ***********************/
/* NOTE: Most of these are in sha2.h */
#define SHA224_SHORT_BLOCK_LENGTH (SHA224_BLOCK_LENGTH - 8)
#define SHA256_SHORT_BLOCK_LENGTH (SHA256_BLOCK_LENGTH - 8)
#define SHA384_SHORT_BLOCK_LENGTH (SHA384_BLOCK_LENGTH - 16)
#define SHA512_SHORT_BLOCK_LENGTH (SHA512_BLOCK_LENGTH - 16)
/*** ENDIAN SPECIFIC COPY MACROS **************************************/
#define BE_8_TO_32(dst, cp) do { \
(dst) = (u_int32_t)(cp)[3] | ((u_int32_t)(cp)[2] << 8) | \
((u_int32_t)(cp)[1] << 16) | ((u_int32_t)(cp)[0] << 24); \
} while(0)
#define BE_8_TO_64(dst, cp) do { \
(dst) = (u_int64_t)(cp)[7] | ((u_int64_t)(cp)[6] << 8) | \
((u_int64_t)(cp)[5] << 16) | ((u_int64_t)(cp)[4] << 24) | \
((u_int64_t)(cp)[3] << 32) | ((u_int64_t)(cp)[2] << 40) | \
((u_int64_t)(cp)[1] << 48) | ((u_int64_t)(cp)[0] << 56); \
} while (0)
#define BE_64_TO_8(cp, src) do { \
(cp)[0] = (src) >> 56; \
(cp)[1] = (src) >> 48; \
(cp)[2] = (src) >> 40; \
(cp)[3] = (src) >> 32; \
(cp)[4] = (src) >> 24; \
(cp)[5] = (src) >> 16; \
(cp)[6] = (src) >> 8; \
(cp)[7] = (src); \
} while (0)
#define BE_32_TO_8(cp, src) do { \
(cp)[0] = (src) >> 24; \
(cp)[1] = (src) >> 16; \
(cp)[2] = (src) >> 8; \
(cp)[3] = (src); \
} while (0)
/*
* Macro for incrementally adding the unsigned 64-bit integer n to the
* unsigned 128-bit integer (represented using a two-element array of
* 64-bit words):
*/
#define ADDINC128(w,n) do { \
(w)[0] += (u_int64_t)(n); \
if ((w)[0] < (n)) { \
(w)[1]++; \
} \
} while (0)
/*** THE SIX LOGICAL FUNCTIONS ****************************************/
/*
* Bit shifting and rotation (used by the six SHA-XYZ logical functions:
*
* NOTE: The naming of R and S appears backwards here (R is a SHIFT and
* S is a ROTATION) because the SHA-224/256/384/512 description document
* (see http://csrc.nist.gov/cryptval/shs/sha256-384-512.pdf) uses this
* same "backwards" definition.
*/
/* Shift-right (used in SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512): */
#define R(b,x) ((x) >> (b))
/* 32-bit Rotate-right (used in SHA-224 and SHA-256): */
#define S32(b,x) (((x) >> (b)) | ((x) << (32 - (b))))
/* 64-bit Rotate-right (used in SHA-384 and SHA-512): */
#define S64(b,x) (((x) >> (b)) | ((x) << (64 - (b))))
/* Two of six logical functions used in SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512: */
#define Ch(x,y,z) (((x) & (y)) ^ ((~(x)) & (z)))
#define Maj(x,y,z) (((x) & (y)) ^ ((x) & (z)) ^ ((y) & (z)))
/* Four of six logical functions used in SHA-224 and SHA-256: */
#define Sigma0_256(x) (S32(2, (x)) ^ S32(13, (x)) ^ S32(22, (x)))
#define Sigma1_256(x) (S32(6, (x)) ^ S32(11, (x)) ^ S32(25, (x)))
#define sigma0_256(x) (S32(7, (x)) ^ S32(18, (x)) ^ R(3 , (x)))
#define sigma1_256(x) (S32(17, (x)) ^ S32(19, (x)) ^ R(10, (x)))
/* Four of six logical functions used in SHA-384 and SHA-512: */
#define Sigma0_512(x) (S64(28, (x)) ^ S64(34, (x)) ^ S64(39, (x)))
#define Sigma1_512(x) (S64(14, (x)) ^ S64(18, (x)) ^ S64(41, (x)))
#define sigma0_512(x) (S64( 1, (x)) ^ S64( 8, (x)) ^ R( 7, (x)))
#define sigma1_512(x) (S64(19, (x)) ^ S64(61, (x)) ^ R( 6, (x)))
/*** SHA-XYZ INITIAL HASH VALUES AND CONSTANTS ************************/
/* Hash constant words K for SHA-224 and SHA-256: */
static const u_int32_t K256[64] = {
0x428a2f98UL, 0x71374491UL, 0xb5c0fbcfUL, 0xe9b5dba5UL,
0x3956c25bUL, 0x59f111f1UL, 0x923f82a4UL, 0xab1c5ed5UL,
0xd807aa98UL, 0x12835b01UL, 0x243185beUL, 0x550c7dc3UL,
0x72be5d74UL, 0x80deb1feUL, 0x9bdc06a7UL, 0xc19bf174UL,
0xe49b69c1UL, 0xefbe4786UL, 0x0fc19dc6UL, 0x240ca1ccUL,
0x2de92c6fUL, 0x4a7484aaUL, 0x5cb0a9dcUL, 0x76f988daUL,
0x983e5152UL, 0xa831c66dUL, 0xb00327c8UL, 0xbf597fc7UL,
0xc6e00bf3UL, 0xd5a79147UL, 0x06ca6351UL, 0x14292967UL,
0x27b70a85UL, 0x2e1b2138UL, 0x4d2c6dfcUL, 0x53380d13UL,
0x650a7354UL, 0x766a0abbUL, 0x81c2c92eUL, 0x92722c85UL,
0xa2bfe8a1UL, 0xa81a664bUL, 0xc24b8b70UL, 0xc76c51a3UL,
0xd192e819UL, 0xd6990624UL, 0xf40e3585UL, 0x106aa070UL,
0x19a4c116UL, 0x1e376c08UL, 0x2748774cUL, 0x34b0bcb5UL,
0x391c0cb3UL, 0x4ed8aa4aUL, 0x5b9cca4fUL, 0x682e6ff3UL,
0x748f82eeUL, 0x78a5636fUL, 0x84c87814UL, 0x8cc70208UL,
0x90befffaUL, 0xa4506cebUL, 0xbef9a3f7UL, 0xc67178f2UL
};
/* Initial hash value H for SHA-256: */
static const u_int32_t sha256_initial_hash_value[8] = {
0x6a09e667UL,
0xbb67ae85UL,
0x3c6ef372UL,
0xa54ff53aUL,
0x510e527fUL,
0x9b05688cUL,
0x1f83d9abUL,
0x5be0cd19UL
};
/* Hash constant words K for SHA-384 and SHA-512: */
static const u_int64_t K512[80] = {
0x428a2f98d728ae22ULL, 0x7137449123ef65cdULL,
0xb5c0fbcfec4d3b2fULL, 0xe9b5dba58189dbbcULL,
0x3956c25bf348b538ULL, 0x59f111f1b605d019ULL,
0x923f82a4af194f9bULL, 0xab1c5ed5da6d8118ULL,
0xd807aa98a3030242ULL, 0x12835b0145706fbeULL,
0x243185be4ee4b28cULL, 0x550c7dc3d5ffb4e2ULL,
0x72be5d74f27b896fULL, 0x80deb1fe3b1696b1ULL,
0x9bdc06a725c71235ULL, 0xc19bf174cf692694ULL,
0xe49b69c19ef14ad2ULL, 0xefbe4786384f25e3ULL,
0x0fc19dc68b8cd5b5ULL, 0x240ca1cc77ac9c65ULL,
0x2de92c6f592b0275ULL, 0x4a7484aa6ea6e483ULL,
0x5cb0a9dcbd41fbd4ULL, 0x76f988da831153b5ULL,
0x983e5152ee66dfabULL, 0xa831c66d2db43210ULL,
0xb00327c898fb213fULL, 0xbf597fc7beef0ee4ULL,
0xc6e00bf33da88fc2ULL, 0xd5a79147930aa725ULL,
0x06ca6351e003826fULL, 0x142929670a0e6e70ULL,
0x27b70a8546d22ffcULL, 0x2e1b21385c26c926ULL,
0x4d2c6dfc5ac42aedULL, 0x53380d139d95b3dfULL,
0x650a73548baf63deULL, 0x766a0abb3c77b2a8ULL,
0x81c2c92e47edaee6ULL, 0x92722c851482353bULL,
0xa2bfe8a14cf10364ULL, 0xa81a664bbc423001ULL,
0xc24b8b70d0f89791ULL, 0xc76c51a30654be30ULL,
0xd192e819d6ef5218ULL, 0xd69906245565a910ULL,
0xf40e35855771202aULL, 0x106aa07032bbd1b8ULL,
0x19a4c116b8d2d0c8ULL, 0x1e376c085141ab53ULL,
0x2748774cdf8eeb99ULL, 0x34b0bcb5e19b48a8ULL,
0x391c0cb3c5c95a63ULL, 0x4ed8aa4ae3418acbULL,
0x5b9cca4f7763e373ULL, 0x682e6ff3d6b2b8a3ULL,
0x748f82ee5defb2fcULL, 0x78a5636f43172f60ULL,
0x84c87814a1f0ab72ULL, 0x8cc702081a6439ecULL,
0x90befffa23631e28ULL, 0xa4506cebde82bde9ULL,
0xbef9a3f7b2c67915ULL, 0xc67178f2e372532bULL,
0xca273eceea26619cULL, 0xd186b8c721c0c207ULL,
0xeada7dd6cde0eb1eULL, 0xf57d4f7fee6ed178ULL,
0x06f067aa72176fbaULL, 0x0a637dc5a2c898a6ULL,
0x113f9804bef90daeULL, 0x1b710b35131c471bULL,
0x28db77f523047d84ULL, 0x32caab7b40c72493ULL,
0x3c9ebe0a15c9bebcULL, 0x431d67c49c100d4cULL,
0x4cc5d4becb3e42b6ULL, 0x597f299cfc657e2aULL,
0x5fcb6fab3ad6faecULL, 0x6c44198c4a475817ULL
};
/* Initial hash value H for SHA-512 */
static const u_int64_t sha512_initial_hash_value[8] = {
0x6a09e667f3bcc908ULL,
0xbb67ae8584caa73bULL,
0x3c6ef372fe94f82bULL,
0xa54ff53a5f1d36f1ULL,
0x510e527fade682d1ULL,
0x9b05688c2b3e6c1fULL,
0x1f83d9abfb41bd6bULL,
0x5be0cd19137e2179ULL
};
#if !defined(SHA2_SMALL)
#if 0
/* Initial hash value H for SHA-224: */
static const u_int32_t sha224_initial_hash_value[8] = {
0xc1059ed8UL,
0x367cd507UL,
0x3070dd17UL,
0xf70e5939UL,
0xffc00b31UL,
0x68581511UL,
0x64f98fa7UL,
0xbefa4fa4UL
};
#endif /* 0 */
/* Initial hash value H for SHA-384 */
static const u_int64_t sha384_initial_hash_value[8] = {
0xcbbb9d5dc1059ed8ULL,
0x629a292a367cd507ULL,
0x9159015a3070dd17ULL,
0x152fecd8f70e5939ULL,
0x67332667ffc00b31ULL,
0x8eb44a8768581511ULL,
0xdb0c2e0d64f98fa7ULL,
0x47b5481dbefa4fa4ULL
};
#if 0
/* Initial hash value H for SHA-512-256 */
static const u_int64_t sha512_256_initial_hash_value[8] = {
0x22312194fc2bf72cULL,
0x9f555fa3c84c64c2ULL,
0x2393b86b6f53b151ULL,
0x963877195940eabdULL,
0x96283ee2a88effe3ULL,
0xbe5e1e2553863992ULL,
0x2b0199fc2c85b8aaULL,
0x0eb72ddc81c52ca2ULL
};
/*** SHA-224: *********************************************************/
void
SHA224Init(SHA2_CTX *context)
{
memcpy(context->state.st32, sha224_initial_hash_value,
sizeof(sha224_initial_hash_value));
memset(context->buffer, 0, sizeof(context->buffer));
context->bitcount[0] = 0;
}
DEF_WEAK(SHA224Init);
MAKE_CLONE(SHA224Transform, SHA256Transform);
MAKE_CLONE(SHA224Update, SHA256Update);
MAKE_CLONE(SHA224Pad, SHA256Pad);
DEF_WEAK(SHA224Transform);
DEF_WEAK(SHA224Update);
DEF_WEAK(SHA224Pad);
void
SHA224Final(u_int8_t digest[SHA224_DIGEST_LENGTH], SHA2_CTX *context)
{
SHA224Pad(context);
#if BYTE_ORDER == LITTLE_ENDIAN
int i;
/* Convert TO host byte order */
for (i = 0; i < 7; i++)
BE_32_TO_8(digest + i * 4, context->state.st32[i]);
#else
memcpy(digest, context->state.st32, SHA224_DIGEST_LENGTH);
#endif
explicit_bzero(context, sizeof(*context));
}
DEF_WEAK(SHA224Final);
#endif /* !defined(SHA2_SMALL) */
#endif /* 0 */
/*** SHA-256: *********************************************************/
void
SHA256Init(SHA2_CTX *context)
{
memcpy(context->state.st32, sha256_initial_hash_value,
sizeof(sha256_initial_hash_value));
memset(context->buffer, 0, sizeof(context->buffer));
context->bitcount[0] = 0;
}
DEF_WEAK(SHA256Init);
#ifdef SHA2_UNROLL_TRANSFORM
/* Unrolled SHA-256 round macros: */
#define ROUND256_0_TO_15(a,b,c,d,e,f,g,h) do { \
BE_8_TO_32(W256[j], data); \
data += 4; \
T1 = (h) + Sigma1_256((e)) + Ch((e), (f), (g)) + K256[j] + W256[j]; \
(d) += T1; \
(h) = T1 + Sigma0_256((a)) + Maj((a), (b), (c)); \
j++; \
} while(0)
#define ROUND256(a,b,c,d,e,f,g,h) do { \
s0 = W256[(j+1)&0x0f]; \
s0 = sigma0_256(s0); \
s1 = W256[(j+14)&0x0f]; \
s1 = sigma1_256(s1); \
T1 = (h) + Sigma1_256((e)) + Ch((e), (f), (g)) + K256[j] + \
(W256[j&0x0f] += s1 + W256[(j+9)&0x0f] + s0); \
(d) += T1; \
(h) = T1 + Sigma0_256((a)) + Maj((a), (b), (c)); \
j++; \
} while(0)
void
SHA256Transform(u_int32_t state[8], const u_int8_t data[SHA256_BLOCK_LENGTH])
{
u_int32_t a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, s0, s1;
u_int32_t T1, W256[16];
int j;
/* Initialize registers with the prev. intermediate value */
a = state[0];
b = state[1];
c = state[2];
d = state[3];
e = state[4];
f = state[5];
g = state[6];
h = state[7];
j = 0;
do {
/* Rounds 0 to 15 (unrolled): */
ROUND256_0_TO_15(a,b,c,d,e,f,g,h);
ROUND256_0_TO_15(h,a,b,c,d,e,f,g);
ROUND256_0_TO_15(g,h,a,b,c,d,e,f);
ROUND256_0_TO_15(f,g,h,a,b,c,d,e);
ROUND256_0_TO_15(e,f,g,h,a,b,c,d);
ROUND256_0_TO_15(d,e,f,g,h,a,b,c);
ROUND256_0_TO_15(c,d,e,f,g,h,a,b);
ROUND256_0_TO_15(b,c,d,e,f,g,h,a);
} while (j < 16);
/* Now for the remaining rounds up to 63: */
do {
ROUND256(a,b,c,d,e,f,g,h);
ROUND256(h,a,b,c,d,e,f,g);
ROUND256(g,h,a,b,c,d,e,f);
ROUND256(f,g,h,a,b,c,d,e);
ROUND256(e,f,g,h,a,b,c,d);
ROUND256(d,e,f,g,h,a,b,c);
ROUND256(c,d,e,f,g,h,a,b);
ROUND256(b,c,d,e,f,g,h,a);
} while (j < 64);
/* Compute the current intermediate hash value */
state[0] += a;
state[1] += b;
state[2] += c;
state[3] += d;
state[4] += e;
state[5] += f;
state[6] += g;
state[7] += h;
/* Clean up */
a = b = c = d = e = f = g = h = T1 = 0;
}
#else /* SHA2_UNROLL_TRANSFORM */
void
SHA256Transform(u_int32_t state[8], const u_int8_t data[SHA256_BLOCK_LENGTH])
{
u_int32_t a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, s0, s1;
u_int32_t T1, T2, W256[16];
int j;
/* Initialize registers with the prev. intermediate value */
a = state[0];
b = state[1];
c = state[2];
d = state[3];
e = state[4];
f = state[5];
g = state[6];
h = state[7];
j = 0;
do {
BE_8_TO_32(W256[j], data);
data += 4;
/* Apply the SHA-256 compression function to update a..h */
T1 = h + Sigma1_256(e) + Ch(e, f, g) + K256[j] + W256[j];
T2 = Sigma0_256(a) + Maj(a, b, c);
h = g;
g = f;
f = e;
e = d + T1;
d = c;
c = b;
b = a;
a = T1 + T2;
j++;
} while (j < 16);
do {
/* Part of the message block expansion: */
s0 = W256[(j+1)&0x0f];
s0 = sigma0_256(s0);
s1 = W256[(j+14)&0x0f];
s1 = sigma1_256(s1);
/* Apply the SHA-256 compression function to update a..h */
T1 = h + Sigma1_256(e) + Ch(e, f, g) + K256[j] +
(W256[j&0x0f] += s1 + W256[(j+9)&0x0f] + s0);
T2 = Sigma0_256(a) + Maj(a, b, c);
h = g;
g = f;
f = e;
e = d + T1;
d = c;
c = b;
b = a;
a = T1 + T2;
j++;
} while (j < 64);
/* Compute the current intermediate hash value */
state[0] += a;
state[1] += b;
state[2] += c;
state[3] += d;
state[4] += e;
state[5] += f;
state[6] += g;
state[7] += h;
/* Clean up */
a = b = c = d = e = f = g = h = T1 = T2 = 0;
}
#endif /* SHA2_UNROLL_TRANSFORM */
DEF_WEAK(SHA256Transform);
void
SHA256Update(SHA2_CTX *context, const u_int8_t *data, size_t len)
{
u_int64_t freespace, usedspace;
/* Calling with no data is valid (we do nothing) */
if (len == 0)
return;
usedspace = (context->bitcount[0] >> 3) % SHA256_BLOCK_LENGTH;
if (usedspace > 0) {
/* Calculate how much free space is available in the buffer */
freespace = SHA256_BLOCK_LENGTH - usedspace;
if (len >= freespace) {
/* Fill the buffer completely and process it */
memcpy(&context->buffer[usedspace], data, freespace);
context->bitcount[0] += freespace << 3;
len -= freespace;
data += freespace;
SHA256Transform(context->state.st32, context->buffer);
} else {
/* The buffer is not yet full */
memcpy(&context->buffer[usedspace], data, len);
context->bitcount[0] += (u_int64_t)len << 3;
/* Clean up: */
usedspace = freespace = 0;
return;
}
}
while (len >= SHA256_BLOCK_LENGTH) {
/* Process as many complete blocks as we can */
SHA256Transform(context->state.st32, data);
context->bitcount[0] += SHA256_BLOCK_LENGTH << 3;
len -= SHA256_BLOCK_LENGTH;
data += SHA256_BLOCK_LENGTH;
}
if (len > 0) {
/* There's left-overs, so save 'em */
memcpy(context->buffer, data, len);
context->bitcount[0] += len << 3;
}
/* Clean up: */
usedspace = freespace = 0;
}
DEF_WEAK(SHA256Update);
void
SHA256Pad(SHA2_CTX *context)
{
unsigned int usedspace;
usedspace = (context->bitcount[0] >> 3) % SHA256_BLOCK_LENGTH;
if (usedspace > 0) {
/* Begin padding with a 1 bit: */
context->buffer[usedspace++] = 0x80;
if (usedspace <= SHA256_SHORT_BLOCK_LENGTH) {
/* Set-up for the last transform: */
memset(&context->buffer[usedspace], 0,
SHA256_SHORT_BLOCK_LENGTH - usedspace);
} else {
if (usedspace < SHA256_BLOCK_LENGTH) {
memset(&context->buffer[usedspace], 0,
SHA256_BLOCK_LENGTH - usedspace);
}
/* Do second-to-last transform: */
SHA256Transform(context->state.st32, context->buffer);
/* Prepare for last transform: */
memset(context->buffer, 0, SHA256_SHORT_BLOCK_LENGTH);
}
} else {
/* Set-up for the last transform: */
memset(context->buffer, 0, SHA256_SHORT_BLOCK_LENGTH);
/* Begin padding with a 1 bit: */
*context->buffer = 0x80;
}
/* Store the length of input data (in bits) in big endian format: */
BE_64_TO_8(&context->buffer[SHA256_SHORT_BLOCK_LENGTH],
context->bitcount[0]);
/* Final transform: */
SHA256Transform(context->state.st32, context->buffer);
/* Clean up: */
usedspace = 0;
}
DEF_WEAK(SHA256Pad);
void
SHA256Final(u_int8_t digest[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH], SHA2_CTX *context)
{
SHA256Pad(context);
#if BYTE_ORDER == LITTLE_ENDIAN
int i;
/* Convert TO host byte order */
for (i = 0; i < 8; i++)
BE_32_TO_8(digest + i * 4, context->state.st32[i]);
#else
memcpy(digest, context->state.st32, SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH);
#endif
explicit_bzero(context, sizeof(*context));
}
DEF_WEAK(SHA256Final);
/*** SHA-512: *********************************************************/
void
SHA512Init(SHA2_CTX *context)
{
memcpy(context->state.st64, sha512_initial_hash_value,
sizeof(sha512_initial_hash_value));
memset(context->buffer, 0, sizeof(context->buffer));
context->bitcount[0] = context->bitcount[1] = 0;
}
DEF_WEAK(SHA512Init);
#ifdef SHA2_UNROLL_TRANSFORM
/* Unrolled SHA-512 round macros: */
#define ROUND512_0_TO_15(a,b,c,d,e,f,g,h) do { \
BE_8_TO_64(W512[j], data); \
data += 8; \
T1 = (h) + Sigma1_512((e)) + Ch((e), (f), (g)) + K512[j] + W512[j]; \
(d) += T1; \
(h) = T1 + Sigma0_512((a)) + Maj((a), (b), (c)); \
j++; \
} while(0)
#define ROUND512(a,b,c,d,e,f,g,h) do { \
s0 = W512[(j+1)&0x0f]; \
s0 = sigma0_512(s0); \
s1 = W512[(j+14)&0x0f]; \
s1 = sigma1_512(s1); \
T1 = (h) + Sigma1_512((e)) + Ch((e), (f), (g)) + K512[j] + \
(W512[j&0x0f] += s1 + W512[(j+9)&0x0f] + s0); \
(d) += T1; \
(h) = T1 + Sigma0_512((a)) + Maj((a), (b), (c)); \
j++; \
} while(0)
void
SHA512Transform(u_int64_t state[8], const u_int8_t data[SHA512_BLOCK_LENGTH])
{
u_int64_t a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, s0, s1;
u_int64_t T1, W512[16];
int j;
/* Initialize registers with the prev. intermediate value */
a = state[0];
b = state[1];
c = state[2];
d = state[3];
e = state[4];
f = state[5];
g = state[6];
h = state[7];
j = 0;
do {
/* Rounds 0 to 15 (unrolled): */
ROUND512_0_TO_15(a,b,c,d,e,f,g,h);
ROUND512_0_TO_15(h,a,b,c,d,e,f,g);
ROUND512_0_TO_15(g,h,a,b,c,d,e,f);
ROUND512_0_TO_15(f,g,h,a,b,c,d,e);
ROUND512_0_TO_15(e,f,g,h,a,b,c,d);
ROUND512_0_TO_15(d,e,f,g,h,a,b,c);
ROUND512_0_TO_15(c,d,e,f,g,h,a,b);
ROUND512_0_TO_15(b,c,d,e,f,g,h,a);
} while (j < 16);
/* Now for the remaining rounds up to 79: */
do {
ROUND512(a,b,c,d,e,f,g,h);
ROUND512(h,a,b,c,d,e,f,g);
ROUND512(g,h,a,b,c,d,e,f);
ROUND512(f,g,h,a,b,c,d,e);
ROUND512(e,f,g,h,a,b,c,d);
ROUND512(d,e,f,g,h,a,b,c);
ROUND512(c,d,e,f,g,h,a,b);
ROUND512(b,c,d,e,f,g,h,a);
} while (j < 80);
/* Compute the current intermediate hash value */
state[0] += a;
state[1] += b;
state[2] += c;
state[3] += d;
state[4] += e;
state[5] += f;
state[6] += g;
state[7] += h;
/* Clean up */
a = b = c = d = e = f = g = h = T1 = 0;
}
#else /* SHA2_UNROLL_TRANSFORM */
void
SHA512Transform(u_int64_t state[8], const u_int8_t data[SHA512_BLOCK_LENGTH])
{
u_int64_t a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h, s0, s1;
u_int64_t T1, T2, W512[16];
int j;
/* Initialize registers with the prev. intermediate value */
a = state[0];
b = state[1];
c = state[2];
d = state[3];
e = state[4];
f = state[5];
g = state[6];
h = state[7];
j = 0;
do {
BE_8_TO_64(W512[j], data);
data += 8;
/* Apply the SHA-512 compression function to update a..h */
T1 = h + Sigma1_512(e) + Ch(e, f, g) + K512[j] + W512[j];
T2 = Sigma0_512(a) + Maj(a, b, c);
h = g;
g = f;
f = e;
e = d + T1;
d = c;
c = b;
b = a;
a = T1 + T2;
j++;
} while (j < 16);
do {
/* Part of the message block expansion: */
s0 = W512[(j+1)&0x0f];
s0 = sigma0_512(s0);
s1 = W512[(j+14)&0x0f];
s1 = sigma1_512(s1);
/* Apply the SHA-512 compression function to update a..h */
T1 = h + Sigma1_512(e) + Ch(e, f, g) + K512[j] +
(W512[j&0x0f] += s1 + W512[(j+9)&0x0f] + s0);
T2 = Sigma0_512(a) + Maj(a, b, c);
h = g;
g = f;
f = e;
e = d + T1;
d = c;
c = b;
b = a;
a = T1 + T2;
j++;
} while (j < 80);
/* Compute the current intermediate hash value */
state[0] += a;
state[1] += b;
state[2] += c;
state[3] += d;
state[4] += e;
state[5] += f;
state[6] += g;
state[7] += h;
/* Clean up */
a = b = c = d = e = f = g = h = T1 = T2 = 0;
}
#endif /* SHA2_UNROLL_TRANSFORM */
DEF_WEAK(SHA512Transform);
void
SHA512Update(SHA2_CTX *context, const u_int8_t *data, size_t len)
{
size_t freespace, usedspace;
/* Calling with no data is valid (we do nothing) */
if (len == 0)
return;
usedspace = (context->bitcount[0] >> 3) % SHA512_BLOCK_LENGTH;
if (usedspace > 0) {
/* Calculate how much free space is available in the buffer */
freespace = SHA512_BLOCK_LENGTH - usedspace;
if (len >= freespace) {
/* Fill the buffer completely and process it */
memcpy(&context->buffer[usedspace], data, freespace);
ADDINC128(context->bitcount, freespace << 3);
len -= freespace;
data += freespace;
SHA512Transform(context->state.st64, context->buffer);
} else {
/* The buffer is not yet full */
memcpy(&context->buffer[usedspace], data, len);
ADDINC128(context->bitcount, len << 3);
/* Clean up: */
usedspace = freespace = 0;
return;
}
}
while (len >= SHA512_BLOCK_LENGTH) {
/* Process as many complete blocks as we can */
SHA512Transform(context->state.st64, data);
ADDINC128(context->bitcount, SHA512_BLOCK_LENGTH << 3);
len -= SHA512_BLOCK_LENGTH;
data += SHA512_BLOCK_LENGTH;
}
if (len > 0) {
/* There's left-overs, so save 'em */
memcpy(context->buffer, data, len);
ADDINC128(context->bitcount, len << 3);
}
/* Clean up: */
usedspace = freespace = 0;
}
DEF_WEAK(SHA512Update);
void
SHA512Pad(SHA2_CTX *context)
{
unsigned int usedspace;
usedspace = (context->bitcount[0] >> 3) % SHA512_BLOCK_LENGTH;
if (usedspace > 0) {
/* Begin padding with a 1 bit: */
context->buffer[usedspace++] = 0x80;
if (usedspace <= SHA512_SHORT_BLOCK_LENGTH) {
/* Set-up for the last transform: */
memset(&context->buffer[usedspace], 0, SHA512_SHORT_BLOCK_LENGTH - usedspace);
} else {
if (usedspace < SHA512_BLOCK_LENGTH) {
memset(&context->buffer[usedspace], 0, SHA512_BLOCK_LENGTH - usedspace);
}
/* Do second-to-last transform: */
SHA512Transform(context->state.st64, context->buffer);
/* And set-up for the last transform: */
memset(context->buffer, 0, SHA512_BLOCK_LENGTH - 2);
}
} else {
/* Prepare for final transform: */
memset(context->buffer, 0, SHA512_SHORT_BLOCK_LENGTH);
/* Begin padding with a 1 bit: */
*context->buffer = 0x80;
}
/* Store the length of input data (in bits) in big endian format: */
BE_64_TO_8(&context->buffer[SHA512_SHORT_BLOCK_LENGTH],
context->bitcount[1]);
BE_64_TO_8(&context->buffer[SHA512_SHORT_BLOCK_LENGTH + 8],
context->bitcount[0]);
/* Final transform: */
SHA512Transform(context->state.st64, context->buffer);
/* Clean up: */
usedspace = 0;
}
DEF_WEAK(SHA512Pad);
void
SHA512Final(u_int8_t digest[SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH], SHA2_CTX *context)
{
SHA512Pad(context);
#if BYTE_ORDER == LITTLE_ENDIAN
int i;
/* Convert TO host byte order */
for (i = 0; i < 8; i++)
BE_64_TO_8(digest + i * 8, context->state.st64[i]);
#else
memcpy(digest, context->state.st64, SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH);
#endif
explicit_bzero(context, sizeof(*context));
}
DEF_WEAK(SHA512Final);
#if !defined(SHA2_SMALL)
/*** SHA-384: *********************************************************/
void
SHA384Init(SHA2_CTX *context)
{
memcpy(context->state.st64, sha384_initial_hash_value,
sizeof(sha384_initial_hash_value));
memset(context->buffer, 0, sizeof(context->buffer));
context->bitcount[0] = context->bitcount[1] = 0;
}
DEF_WEAK(SHA384Init);
MAKE_CLONE(SHA384Transform, SHA512Transform);
MAKE_CLONE(SHA384Update, SHA512Update);
MAKE_CLONE(SHA384Pad, SHA512Pad);
DEF_WEAK(SHA384Transform);
DEF_WEAK(SHA384Update);
DEF_WEAK(SHA384Pad);
/* Equivalent of MAKE_CLONE (which is a no-op) for SHA384 funcs */
void
SHA384Transform(u_int64_t state[8], const u_int8_t data[SHA512_BLOCK_LENGTH])
{
SHA512Transform(state, data);
}
void
SHA384Update(SHA2_CTX *context, const u_int8_t *data, size_t len)
{
SHA512Update(context, data, len);
}
void
SHA384Pad(SHA2_CTX *context)
{
SHA512Pad(context);
}
void
SHA384Final(u_int8_t digest[SHA384_DIGEST_LENGTH], SHA2_CTX *context)
{
SHA384Pad(context);
#if BYTE_ORDER == LITTLE_ENDIAN
int i;
/* Convert TO host byte order */
for (i = 0; i < 6; i++)
BE_64_TO_8(digest + i * 8, context->state.st64[i]);
#else
memcpy(digest, context->state.st64, SHA384_DIGEST_LENGTH);
#endif
/* Zero out state data */
explicit_bzero(context, sizeof(*context));
}
DEF_WEAK(SHA384Final);
#if 0
/*** SHA-512/256: *********************************************************/
void
SHA512_256Init(SHA2_CTX *context)
{
memcpy(context->state.st64, sha512_256_initial_hash_value,
sizeof(sha512_256_initial_hash_value));
memset(context->buffer, 0, sizeof(context->buffer));
context->bitcount[0] = context->bitcount[1] = 0;
}
DEF_WEAK(SHA512_256Init);
MAKE_CLONE(SHA512_256Transform, SHA512Transform);
MAKE_CLONE(SHA512_256Update, SHA512Update);
MAKE_CLONE(SHA512_256Pad, SHA512Pad);
DEF_WEAK(SHA512_256Transform);
DEF_WEAK(SHA512_256Update);
DEF_WEAK(SHA512_256Pad);
void
SHA512_256Final(u_int8_t digest[SHA512_256_DIGEST_LENGTH], SHA2_CTX *context)
{
SHA512_256Pad(context);
#if BYTE_ORDER == LITTLE_ENDIAN
int i;
/* Convert TO host byte order */
for (i = 0; i < 4; i++)
BE_64_TO_8(digest + i * 8, context->state.st64[i]);
#else
memcpy(digest, context->state.st64, SHA512_256_DIGEST_LENGTH);
#endif
/* Zero out state data */
explicit_bzero(context, sizeof(*context));
}
DEF_WEAK(SHA512_256Final);
#endif /* !defined(SHA2_SMALL) */
#endif /* 0 */
#endif /* HAVE_SHA{256,384,512}UPDATE */
diff --git a/packet.c b/packet.c
index 817da43b5a7f..6d3e9172db6c 100644
--- a/packet.c
+++ b/packet.c
@@ -1,2703 +1,2742 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: packet.c,v 1.286 2019/06/28 13:35:04 deraadt Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: packet.c,v 1.290 2020/01/30 07:20:05 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
* All rights reserved
* This file contains code implementing the packet protocol and communication
* with the other side. This same code is used both on client and server side.
*
* As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
* can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
* software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
* incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
* called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
*
*
* SSH2 packet format added by Markus Friedl.
* Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
#include <sys/socket.h>
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
# include <sys/time.h>
#endif
#include <netinet/in.h>
#include <netinet/ip.h>
#include <arpa/inet.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <netdb.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <limits.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_POLL_H
#include <poll.h>
+#endif
#include <signal.h>
#include <time.h>
/*
* Explicitly include OpenSSL before zlib as some versions of OpenSSL have
* "free_func" in their headers, which zlib typedefs.
*/
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
# include <openssl/bn.h>
# include <openssl/evp.h>
# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
# include <openssl/ec.h>
# endif
#endif
+#ifdef WITH_ZLIB
#include <zlib.h>
+#endif
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "compat.h"
#include "ssh2.h"
#include "cipher.h"
#include "sshkey.h"
#include "kex.h"
#include "digest.h"
#include "mac.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "canohost.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "channels.h"
#include "ssh.h"
#include "packet.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
#include "sshbuf.h"
#ifdef PACKET_DEBUG
#define DBG(x) x
#else
#define DBG(x)
#endif
#define PACKET_MAX_SIZE (256 * 1024)
struct packet_state {
u_int32_t seqnr;
u_int32_t packets;
u_int64_t blocks;
u_int64_t bytes;
};
struct packet {
TAILQ_ENTRY(packet) next;
u_char type;
struct sshbuf *payload;
};
struct session_state {
/*
* This variable contains the file descriptors used for
* communicating with the other side. connection_in is used for
* reading; connection_out for writing. These can be the same
* descriptor, in which case it is assumed to be a socket.
*/
int connection_in;
int connection_out;
/* Protocol flags for the remote side. */
u_int remote_protocol_flags;
/* Encryption context for receiving data. Only used for decryption. */
struct sshcipher_ctx *receive_context;
/* Encryption context for sending data. Only used for encryption. */
struct sshcipher_ctx *send_context;
/* Buffer for raw input data from the socket. */
struct sshbuf *input;
/* Buffer for raw output data going to the socket. */
struct sshbuf *output;
/* Buffer for the partial outgoing packet being constructed. */
struct sshbuf *outgoing_packet;
/* Buffer for the incoming packet currently being processed. */
struct sshbuf *incoming_packet;
/* Scratch buffer for packet compression/decompression. */
struct sshbuf *compression_buffer;
+#ifdef WITH_ZLIB
/* Incoming/outgoing compression dictionaries */
z_stream compression_in_stream;
z_stream compression_out_stream;
+#endif
int compression_in_started;
int compression_out_started;
int compression_in_failures;
int compression_out_failures;
/* default maximum packet size */
u_int max_packet_size;
/* Flag indicating whether this module has been initialized. */
int initialized;
/* Set to true if the connection is interactive. */
int interactive_mode;
/* Set to true if we are the server side. */
int server_side;
/* Set to true if we are authenticated. */
int after_authentication;
int keep_alive_timeouts;
/* The maximum time that we will wait to send or receive a packet */
int packet_timeout_ms;
/* Session key information for Encryption and MAC */
struct newkeys *newkeys[MODE_MAX];
struct packet_state p_read, p_send;
/* Volume-based rekeying */
u_int64_t max_blocks_in, max_blocks_out, rekey_limit;
/* Time-based rekeying */
u_int32_t rekey_interval; /* how often in seconds */
time_t rekey_time; /* time of last rekeying */
/* roundup current message to extra_pad bytes */
u_char extra_pad;
/* XXX discard incoming data after MAC error */
u_int packet_discard;
size_t packet_discard_mac_already;
struct sshmac *packet_discard_mac;
/* Used in packet_read_poll2() */
u_int packlen;
/* Used in packet_send2 */
int rekeying;
/* Used in ssh_packet_send_mux() */
int mux;
/* Used in packet_set_interactive */
int set_interactive_called;
/* Used in packet_set_maxsize */
int set_maxsize_called;
/* One-off warning about weak ciphers */
int cipher_warning_done;
/* Hook for fuzzing inbound packets */
ssh_packet_hook_fn *hook_in;
void *hook_in_ctx;
TAILQ_HEAD(, packet) outgoing;
};
struct ssh *
ssh_alloc_session_state(void)
{
struct ssh *ssh = NULL;
struct session_state *state = NULL;
if ((ssh = calloc(1, sizeof(*ssh))) == NULL ||
(state = calloc(1, sizeof(*state))) == NULL ||
(ssh->kex = kex_new()) == NULL ||
(state->input = sshbuf_new()) == NULL ||
(state->output = sshbuf_new()) == NULL ||
(state->outgoing_packet = sshbuf_new()) == NULL ||
(state->incoming_packet = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
goto fail;
TAILQ_INIT(&state->outgoing);
TAILQ_INIT(&ssh->private_keys);
TAILQ_INIT(&ssh->public_keys);
state->connection_in = -1;
state->connection_out = -1;
state->max_packet_size = 32768;
state->packet_timeout_ms = -1;
state->p_send.packets = state->p_read.packets = 0;
state->initialized = 1;
/*
* ssh_packet_send2() needs to queue packets until
* we've done the initial key exchange.
*/
state->rekeying = 1;
ssh->state = state;
return ssh;
fail:
if (ssh) {
kex_free(ssh->kex);
free(ssh);
}
if (state) {
sshbuf_free(state->input);
sshbuf_free(state->output);
sshbuf_free(state->incoming_packet);
sshbuf_free(state->outgoing_packet);
free(state);
}
return NULL;
}
void
ssh_packet_set_input_hook(struct ssh *ssh, ssh_packet_hook_fn *hook, void *ctx)
{
ssh->state->hook_in = hook;
ssh->state->hook_in_ctx = ctx;
}
/* Returns nonzero if rekeying is in progress */
int
ssh_packet_is_rekeying(struct ssh *ssh)
{
return ssh->state->rekeying || ssh->kex->done == 0;
}
/*
* Sets the descriptors used for communication.
*/
struct ssh *
ssh_packet_set_connection(struct ssh *ssh, int fd_in, int fd_out)
{
struct session_state *state;
const struct sshcipher *none = cipher_by_name("none");
int r;
if (none == NULL) {
error("%s: cannot load cipher 'none'", __func__);
return NULL;
}
if (ssh == NULL)
ssh = ssh_alloc_session_state();
if (ssh == NULL) {
error("%s: could not allocate state", __func__);
return NULL;
}
state = ssh->state;
state->connection_in = fd_in;
state->connection_out = fd_out;
if ((r = cipher_init(&state->send_context, none,
(const u_char *)"", 0, NULL, 0, CIPHER_ENCRYPT)) != 0 ||
(r = cipher_init(&state->receive_context, none,
(const u_char *)"", 0, NULL, 0, CIPHER_DECRYPT)) != 0) {
error("%s: cipher_init failed: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
free(ssh); /* XXX need ssh_free_session_state? */
return NULL;
}
state->newkeys[MODE_IN] = state->newkeys[MODE_OUT] = NULL;
/*
* Cache the IP address of the remote connection for use in error
* messages that might be generated after the connection has closed.
*/
(void)ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh);
return ssh;
}
void
ssh_packet_set_timeout(struct ssh *ssh, int timeout, int count)
{
struct session_state *state = ssh->state;
if (timeout <= 0 || count <= 0) {
state->packet_timeout_ms = -1;
return;
}
if ((INT_MAX / 1000) / count < timeout)
state->packet_timeout_ms = INT_MAX;
else
state->packet_timeout_ms = timeout * count * 1000;
}
void
ssh_packet_set_mux(struct ssh *ssh)
{
ssh->state->mux = 1;
ssh->state->rekeying = 0;
}
int
ssh_packet_get_mux(struct ssh *ssh)
{
return ssh->state->mux;
}
int
ssh_packet_set_log_preamble(struct ssh *ssh, const char *fmt, ...)
{
va_list args;
int r;
free(ssh->log_preamble);
if (fmt == NULL)
ssh->log_preamble = NULL;
else {
va_start(args, fmt);
r = vasprintf(&ssh->log_preamble, fmt, args);
va_end(args);
if (r < 0 || ssh->log_preamble == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
}
return 0;
}
int
ssh_packet_stop_discard(struct ssh *ssh)
{
struct session_state *state = ssh->state;
int r;
if (state->packet_discard_mac) {
char buf[1024];
size_t dlen = PACKET_MAX_SIZE;
if (dlen > state->packet_discard_mac_already)
dlen -= state->packet_discard_mac_already;
memset(buf, 'a', sizeof(buf));
while (sshbuf_len(state->incoming_packet) < dlen)
if ((r = sshbuf_put(state->incoming_packet, buf,
sizeof(buf))) != 0)
return r;
(void) mac_compute(state->packet_discard_mac,
state->p_read.seqnr,
sshbuf_ptr(state->incoming_packet), dlen,
NULL, 0);
}
logit("Finished discarding for %.200s port %d",
ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh));
return SSH_ERR_MAC_INVALID;
}
static int
ssh_packet_start_discard(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshenc *enc,
struct sshmac *mac, size_t mac_already, u_int discard)
{
struct session_state *state = ssh->state;
int r;
if (enc == NULL || !cipher_is_cbc(enc->cipher) || (mac && mac->etm)) {
if ((r = sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "Packet corrupt")) != 0)
return r;
return SSH_ERR_MAC_INVALID;
}
/*
* Record number of bytes over which the mac has already
* been computed in order to minimize timing attacks.
*/
if (mac && mac->enabled) {
state->packet_discard_mac = mac;
state->packet_discard_mac_already = mac_already;
}
if (sshbuf_len(state->input) >= discard)
return ssh_packet_stop_discard(ssh);
state->packet_discard = discard - sshbuf_len(state->input);
return 0;
}
/* Returns 1 if remote host is connected via socket, 0 if not. */
int
ssh_packet_connection_is_on_socket(struct ssh *ssh)
{
struct session_state *state;
struct sockaddr_storage from, to;
socklen_t fromlen, tolen;
if (ssh == NULL || ssh->state == NULL)
return 0;
state = ssh->state;
if (state->connection_in == -1 || state->connection_out == -1)
return 0;
/* filedescriptors in and out are the same, so it's a socket */
if (state->connection_in == state->connection_out)
return 1;
fromlen = sizeof(from);
memset(&from, 0, sizeof(from));
if (getpeername(state->connection_in, (struct sockaddr *)&from,
&fromlen) == -1)
return 0;
tolen = sizeof(to);
memset(&to, 0, sizeof(to));
if (getpeername(state->connection_out, (struct sockaddr *)&to,
&tolen) == -1)
return 0;
if (fromlen != tolen || memcmp(&from, &to, fromlen) != 0)
return 0;
if (from.ss_family != AF_INET && from.ss_family != AF_INET6)
return 0;
return 1;
}
void
ssh_packet_get_bytes(struct ssh *ssh, u_int64_t *ibytes, u_int64_t *obytes)
{
if (ibytes)
*ibytes = ssh->state->p_read.bytes;
if (obytes)
*obytes = ssh->state->p_send.bytes;
}
int
ssh_packet_connection_af(struct ssh *ssh)
{
struct sockaddr_storage to;
socklen_t tolen = sizeof(to);
memset(&to, 0, sizeof(to));
if (getsockname(ssh->state->connection_out, (struct sockaddr *)&to,
&tolen) == -1)
return 0;
#ifdef IPV4_IN_IPV6
if (to.ss_family == AF_INET6 &&
IN6_IS_ADDR_V4MAPPED(&((struct sockaddr_in6 *)&to)->sin6_addr))
return AF_INET;
#endif
return to.ss_family;
}
/* Sets the connection into non-blocking mode. */
void
ssh_packet_set_nonblocking(struct ssh *ssh)
{
/* Set the socket into non-blocking mode. */
set_nonblock(ssh->state->connection_in);
if (ssh->state->connection_out != ssh->state->connection_in)
set_nonblock(ssh->state->connection_out);
}
/* Returns the socket used for reading. */
int
ssh_packet_get_connection_in(struct ssh *ssh)
{
return ssh->state->connection_in;
}
/* Returns the descriptor used for writing. */
int
ssh_packet_get_connection_out(struct ssh *ssh)
{
return ssh->state->connection_out;
}
/*
* Returns the IP-address of the remote host as a string. The returned
* string must not be freed.
*/
const char *
ssh_remote_ipaddr(struct ssh *ssh)
{
int sock;
/* Check whether we have cached the ipaddr. */
if (ssh->remote_ipaddr == NULL) {
if (ssh_packet_connection_is_on_socket(ssh)) {
sock = ssh->state->connection_in;
ssh->remote_ipaddr = get_peer_ipaddr(sock);
ssh->remote_port = get_peer_port(sock);
ssh->local_ipaddr = get_local_ipaddr(sock);
ssh->local_port = get_local_port(sock);
} else {
- ssh->remote_ipaddr = strdup("UNKNOWN");
+ ssh->remote_ipaddr = xstrdup("UNKNOWN");
ssh->remote_port = 65535;
- ssh->local_ipaddr = strdup("UNKNOWN");
+ ssh->local_ipaddr = xstrdup("UNKNOWN");
ssh->local_port = 65535;
}
}
return ssh->remote_ipaddr;
}
/* Returns the port number of the remote host. */
int
ssh_remote_port(struct ssh *ssh)
{
(void)ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh); /* Will lookup and cache. */
return ssh->remote_port;
}
/*
* Returns the IP-address of the local host as a string. The returned
* string must not be freed.
*/
const char *
ssh_local_ipaddr(struct ssh *ssh)
{
(void)ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh); /* Will lookup and cache. */
return ssh->local_ipaddr;
}
/* Returns the port number of the local host. */
int
ssh_local_port(struct ssh *ssh)
{
(void)ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh); /* Will lookup and cache. */
return ssh->local_port;
}
/* Returns the routing domain of the input socket, or NULL if unavailable */
const char *
ssh_packet_rdomain_in(struct ssh *ssh)
{
if (ssh->rdomain_in != NULL)
return ssh->rdomain_in;
if (!ssh_packet_connection_is_on_socket(ssh))
return NULL;
ssh->rdomain_in = get_rdomain(ssh->state->connection_in);
return ssh->rdomain_in;
}
/* Closes the connection and clears and frees internal data structures. */
static void
ssh_packet_close_internal(struct ssh *ssh, int do_close)
{
struct session_state *state = ssh->state;
u_int mode;
if (!state->initialized)
return;
state->initialized = 0;
if (do_close) {
if (state->connection_in == state->connection_out) {
close(state->connection_out);
} else {
close(state->connection_in);
close(state->connection_out);
}
}
sshbuf_free(state->input);
sshbuf_free(state->output);
sshbuf_free(state->outgoing_packet);
sshbuf_free(state->incoming_packet);
for (mode = 0; mode < MODE_MAX; mode++) {
kex_free_newkeys(state->newkeys[mode]); /* current keys */
state->newkeys[mode] = NULL;
ssh_clear_newkeys(ssh, mode); /* next keys */
}
+#ifdef WITH_ZLIB
/* compression state is in shared mem, so we can only release it once */
if (do_close && state->compression_buffer) {
sshbuf_free(state->compression_buffer);
if (state->compression_out_started) {
z_streamp stream = &state->compression_out_stream;
debug("compress outgoing: "
"raw data %llu, compressed %llu, factor %.2f",
(unsigned long long)stream->total_in,
(unsigned long long)stream->total_out,
stream->total_in == 0 ? 0.0 :
(double) stream->total_out / stream->total_in);
if (state->compression_out_failures == 0)
deflateEnd(stream);
}
if (state->compression_in_started) {
z_streamp stream = &state->compression_in_stream;
debug("compress incoming: "
"raw data %llu, compressed %llu, factor %.2f",
(unsigned long long)stream->total_out,
(unsigned long long)stream->total_in,
stream->total_out == 0 ? 0.0 :
(double) stream->total_in / stream->total_out);
if (state->compression_in_failures == 0)
inflateEnd(stream);
}
}
+#endif /* WITH_ZLIB */
cipher_free(state->send_context);
cipher_free(state->receive_context);
state->send_context = state->receive_context = NULL;
if (do_close) {
free(ssh->local_ipaddr);
ssh->local_ipaddr = NULL;
free(ssh->remote_ipaddr);
ssh->remote_ipaddr = NULL;
free(ssh->state);
ssh->state = NULL;
}
}
void
ssh_packet_close(struct ssh *ssh)
{
ssh_packet_close_internal(ssh, 1);
}
void
ssh_packet_clear_keys(struct ssh *ssh)
{
ssh_packet_close_internal(ssh, 0);
}
/* Sets remote side protocol flags. */
void
ssh_packet_set_protocol_flags(struct ssh *ssh, u_int protocol_flags)
{
ssh->state->remote_protocol_flags = protocol_flags;
}
/* Returns the remote protocol flags set earlier by the above function. */
u_int
ssh_packet_get_protocol_flags(struct ssh *ssh)
{
return ssh->state->remote_protocol_flags;
}
/*
* Starts packet compression from the next packet on in both directions.
* Level is compression level 1 (fastest) - 9 (slow, best) as in gzip.
*/
static int
ssh_packet_init_compression(struct ssh *ssh)
{
if (!ssh->state->compression_buffer &&
((ssh->state->compression_buffer = sshbuf_new()) == NULL))
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
return 0;
}
+#ifdef WITH_ZLIB
static int
start_compression_out(struct ssh *ssh, int level)
{
if (level < 1 || level > 9)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
debug("Enabling compression at level %d.", level);
if (ssh->state->compression_out_started == 1)
deflateEnd(&ssh->state->compression_out_stream);
switch (deflateInit(&ssh->state->compression_out_stream, level)) {
case Z_OK:
ssh->state->compression_out_started = 1;
break;
case Z_MEM_ERROR:
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
default:
return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
return 0;
}
static int
start_compression_in(struct ssh *ssh)
{
if (ssh->state->compression_in_started == 1)
inflateEnd(&ssh->state->compression_in_stream);
switch (inflateInit(&ssh->state->compression_in_stream)) {
case Z_OK:
ssh->state->compression_in_started = 1;
break;
case Z_MEM_ERROR:
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
default:
return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
return 0;
}
/* XXX remove need for separate compression buffer */
static int
compress_buffer(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshbuf *in, struct sshbuf *out)
{
u_char buf[4096];
int r, status;
if (ssh->state->compression_out_started != 1)
return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
/* This case is not handled below. */
if (sshbuf_len(in) == 0)
return 0;
/* Input is the contents of the input buffer. */
if ((ssh->state->compression_out_stream.next_in =
sshbuf_mutable_ptr(in)) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
ssh->state->compression_out_stream.avail_in = sshbuf_len(in);
/* Loop compressing until deflate() returns with avail_out != 0. */
do {
/* Set up fixed-size output buffer. */
ssh->state->compression_out_stream.next_out = buf;
ssh->state->compression_out_stream.avail_out = sizeof(buf);
/* Compress as much data into the buffer as possible. */
status = deflate(&ssh->state->compression_out_stream,
Z_PARTIAL_FLUSH);
switch (status) {
case Z_MEM_ERROR:
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
case Z_OK:
/* Append compressed data to output_buffer. */
if ((r = sshbuf_put(out, buf, sizeof(buf) -
ssh->state->compression_out_stream.avail_out)) != 0)
return r;
break;
case Z_STREAM_ERROR:
default:
ssh->state->compression_out_failures++;
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
}
} while (ssh->state->compression_out_stream.avail_out == 0);
return 0;
}
static int
uncompress_buffer(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshbuf *in, struct sshbuf *out)
{
u_char buf[4096];
int r, status;
if (ssh->state->compression_in_started != 1)
return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
if ((ssh->state->compression_in_stream.next_in =
sshbuf_mutable_ptr(in)) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
ssh->state->compression_in_stream.avail_in = sshbuf_len(in);
for (;;) {
/* Set up fixed-size output buffer. */
ssh->state->compression_in_stream.next_out = buf;
ssh->state->compression_in_stream.avail_out = sizeof(buf);
status = inflate(&ssh->state->compression_in_stream,
Z_PARTIAL_FLUSH);
switch (status) {
case Z_OK:
if ((r = sshbuf_put(out, buf, sizeof(buf) -
ssh->state->compression_in_stream.avail_out)) != 0)
return r;
break;
case Z_BUF_ERROR:
/*
* Comments in zlib.h say that we should keep calling
* inflate() until we get an error. This appears to
* be the error that we get.
*/
return 0;
case Z_DATA_ERROR:
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
case Z_MEM_ERROR:
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
case Z_STREAM_ERROR:
default:
ssh->state->compression_in_failures++;
return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
}
/* NOTREACHED */
}
+#else /* WITH_ZLIB */
+
+static int
+start_compression_out(struct ssh *ssh, int level)
+{
+ return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+}
+
+static int
+start_compression_in(struct ssh *ssh)
+{
+ return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+}
+
+static int
+compress_buffer(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshbuf *in, struct sshbuf *out)
+{
+ return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+}
+
+static int
+uncompress_buffer(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshbuf *in, struct sshbuf *out)
+{
+ return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+}
+#endif /* WITH_ZLIB */
+
void
ssh_clear_newkeys(struct ssh *ssh, int mode)
{
if (ssh->kex && ssh->kex->newkeys[mode]) {
kex_free_newkeys(ssh->kex->newkeys[mode]);
ssh->kex->newkeys[mode] = NULL;
}
}
int
ssh_set_newkeys(struct ssh *ssh, int mode)
{
struct session_state *state = ssh->state;
struct sshenc *enc;
struct sshmac *mac;
struct sshcomp *comp;
struct sshcipher_ctx **ccp;
struct packet_state *ps;
u_int64_t *max_blocks;
const char *wmsg;
int r, crypt_type;
const char *dir = mode == MODE_OUT ? "out" : "in";
debug2("set_newkeys: mode %d", mode);
if (mode == MODE_OUT) {
ccp = &state->send_context;
crypt_type = CIPHER_ENCRYPT;
ps = &state->p_send;
max_blocks = &state->max_blocks_out;
} else {
ccp = &state->receive_context;
crypt_type = CIPHER_DECRYPT;
ps = &state->p_read;
max_blocks = &state->max_blocks_in;
}
if (state->newkeys[mode] != NULL) {
debug("%s: rekeying %s, input %llu bytes %llu blocks, "
"output %llu bytes %llu blocks", __func__, dir,
(unsigned long long)state->p_read.bytes,
(unsigned long long)state->p_read.blocks,
(unsigned long long)state->p_send.bytes,
(unsigned long long)state->p_send.blocks);
kex_free_newkeys(state->newkeys[mode]);
state->newkeys[mode] = NULL;
}
/* note that both bytes and the seqnr are not reset */
ps->packets = ps->blocks = 0;
/* move newkeys from kex to state */
if ((state->newkeys[mode] = ssh->kex->newkeys[mode]) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
ssh->kex->newkeys[mode] = NULL;
enc = &state->newkeys[mode]->enc;
mac = &state->newkeys[mode]->mac;
comp = &state->newkeys[mode]->comp;
if (cipher_authlen(enc->cipher) == 0) {
if ((r = mac_init(mac)) != 0)
return r;
}
mac->enabled = 1;
DBG(debug("%s: cipher_init_context: %s", __func__, dir));
cipher_free(*ccp);
*ccp = NULL;
if ((r = cipher_init(ccp, enc->cipher, enc->key, enc->key_len,
enc->iv, enc->iv_len, crypt_type)) != 0)
return r;
if (!state->cipher_warning_done &&
(wmsg = cipher_warning_message(*ccp)) != NULL) {
error("Warning: %s", wmsg);
state->cipher_warning_done = 1;
}
/* Deleting the keys does not gain extra security */
/* explicit_bzero(enc->iv, enc->block_size);
explicit_bzero(enc->key, enc->key_len);
explicit_bzero(mac->key, mac->key_len); */
if ((comp->type == COMP_ZLIB ||
(comp->type == COMP_DELAYED &&
state->after_authentication)) && comp->enabled == 0) {
if ((r = ssh_packet_init_compression(ssh)) < 0)
return r;
if (mode == MODE_OUT) {
if ((r = start_compression_out(ssh, 6)) != 0)
return r;
} else {
if ((r = start_compression_in(ssh)) != 0)
return r;
}
comp->enabled = 1;
}
/*
* The 2^(blocksize*2) limit is too expensive for 3DES,
* so enforce a 1GB limit for small blocksizes.
* See RFC4344 section 3.2.
*/
if (enc->block_size >= 16)
*max_blocks = (u_int64_t)1 << (enc->block_size*2);
else
*max_blocks = ((u_int64_t)1 << 30) / enc->block_size;
if (state->rekey_limit)
*max_blocks = MINIMUM(*max_blocks,
state->rekey_limit / enc->block_size);
debug("rekey %s after %llu blocks", dir,
(unsigned long long)*max_blocks);
return 0;
}
#define MAX_PACKETS (1U<<31)
static int
ssh_packet_need_rekeying(struct ssh *ssh, u_int outbound_packet_len)
{
struct session_state *state = ssh->state;
u_int32_t out_blocks;
/* XXX client can't cope with rekeying pre-auth */
if (!state->after_authentication)
return 0;
/* Haven't keyed yet or KEX in progress. */
if (ssh_packet_is_rekeying(ssh))
return 0;
/* Peer can't rekey */
if (ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_NOREKEY)
return 0;
/*
* Permit one packet in or out per rekey - this allows us to
* make progress when rekey limits are very small.
*/
if (state->p_send.packets == 0 && state->p_read.packets == 0)
return 0;
/* Time-based rekeying */
if (state->rekey_interval != 0 &&
(int64_t)state->rekey_time + state->rekey_interval <= monotime())
return 1;
/*
* Always rekey when MAX_PACKETS sent in either direction
* As per RFC4344 section 3.1 we do this after 2^31 packets.
*/
if (state->p_send.packets > MAX_PACKETS ||
state->p_read.packets > MAX_PACKETS)
return 1;
/* Rekey after (cipher-specific) maximum blocks */
out_blocks = ROUNDUP(outbound_packet_len,
state->newkeys[MODE_OUT]->enc.block_size);
return (state->max_blocks_out &&
(state->p_send.blocks + out_blocks > state->max_blocks_out)) ||
(state->max_blocks_in &&
(state->p_read.blocks > state->max_blocks_in));
}
/*
* Delayed compression for SSH2 is enabled after authentication:
* This happens on the server side after a SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS is sent,
* and on the client side after a SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS is received.
*/
static int
ssh_packet_enable_delayed_compress(struct ssh *ssh)
{
struct session_state *state = ssh->state;
struct sshcomp *comp = NULL;
int r, mode;
/*
* Remember that we are past the authentication step, so rekeying
* with COMP_DELAYED will turn on compression immediately.
*/
state->after_authentication = 1;
for (mode = 0; mode < MODE_MAX; mode++) {
/* protocol error: USERAUTH_SUCCESS received before NEWKEYS */
if (state->newkeys[mode] == NULL)
continue;
comp = &state->newkeys[mode]->comp;
if (comp && !comp->enabled && comp->type == COMP_DELAYED) {
if ((r = ssh_packet_init_compression(ssh)) != 0)
return r;
if (mode == MODE_OUT) {
if ((r = start_compression_out(ssh, 6)) != 0)
return r;
} else {
if ((r = start_compression_in(ssh)) != 0)
return r;
}
comp->enabled = 1;
}
}
return 0;
}
/* Used to mute debug logging for noisy packet types */
int
ssh_packet_log_type(u_char type)
{
switch (type) {
case SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA:
case SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA:
case SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST:
return 0;
default:
return 1;
}
}
/*
* Finalize packet in SSH2 format (compress, mac, encrypt, enqueue)
*/
int
ssh_packet_send2_wrapped(struct ssh *ssh)
{
struct session_state *state = ssh->state;
u_char type, *cp, macbuf[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
u_char tmp, padlen, pad = 0;
u_int authlen = 0, aadlen = 0;
u_int len;
struct sshenc *enc = NULL;
struct sshmac *mac = NULL;
struct sshcomp *comp = NULL;
int r, block_size;
if (state->newkeys[MODE_OUT] != NULL) {
enc = &state->newkeys[MODE_OUT]->enc;
mac = &state->newkeys[MODE_OUT]->mac;
comp = &state->newkeys[MODE_OUT]->comp;
/* disable mac for authenticated encryption */
if ((authlen = cipher_authlen(enc->cipher)) != 0)
mac = NULL;
}
block_size = enc ? enc->block_size : 8;
aadlen = (mac && mac->enabled && mac->etm) || authlen ? 4 : 0;
type = (sshbuf_ptr(state->outgoing_packet))[5];
if (ssh_packet_log_type(type))
debug3("send packet: type %u", type);
#ifdef PACKET_DEBUG
fprintf(stderr, "plain: ");
sshbuf_dump(state->outgoing_packet, stderr);
#endif
if (comp && comp->enabled) {
len = sshbuf_len(state->outgoing_packet);
/* skip header, compress only payload */
if ((r = sshbuf_consume(state->outgoing_packet, 5)) != 0)
goto out;
sshbuf_reset(state->compression_buffer);
if ((r = compress_buffer(ssh, state->outgoing_packet,
state->compression_buffer)) != 0)
goto out;
sshbuf_reset(state->outgoing_packet);
if ((r = sshbuf_put(state->outgoing_packet,
"\0\0\0\0\0", 5)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_putb(state->outgoing_packet,
state->compression_buffer)) != 0)
goto out;
DBG(debug("compression: raw %d compressed %zd", len,
sshbuf_len(state->outgoing_packet)));
}
/* sizeof (packet_len + pad_len + payload) */
len = sshbuf_len(state->outgoing_packet);
/*
* calc size of padding, alloc space, get random data,
* minimum padding is 4 bytes
*/
len -= aadlen; /* packet length is not encrypted for EtM modes */
padlen = block_size - (len % block_size);
if (padlen < 4)
padlen += block_size;
if (state->extra_pad) {
tmp = state->extra_pad;
state->extra_pad =
ROUNDUP(state->extra_pad, block_size);
/* check if roundup overflowed */
if (state->extra_pad < tmp)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
tmp = (len + padlen) % state->extra_pad;
/* Check whether pad calculation below will underflow */
if (tmp > state->extra_pad)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
pad = state->extra_pad - tmp;
DBG(debug3("%s: adding %d (len %d padlen %d extra_pad %d)",
__func__, pad, len, padlen, state->extra_pad));
tmp = padlen;
padlen += pad;
/* Check whether padlen calculation overflowed */
if (padlen < tmp)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT; /* overflow */
state->extra_pad = 0;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(state->outgoing_packet, padlen, &cp)) != 0)
goto out;
if (enc && !cipher_ctx_is_plaintext(state->send_context)) {
/* random padding */
arc4random_buf(cp, padlen);
} else {
/* clear padding */
explicit_bzero(cp, padlen);
}
/* sizeof (packet_len + pad_len + payload + padding) */
len = sshbuf_len(state->outgoing_packet);
cp = sshbuf_mutable_ptr(state->outgoing_packet);
if (cp == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
goto out;
}
/* packet_length includes payload, padding and padding length field */
POKE_U32(cp, len - 4);
cp[4] = padlen;
DBG(debug("send: len %d (includes padlen %d, aadlen %d)",
len, padlen, aadlen));
/* compute MAC over seqnr and packet(length fields, payload, padding) */
if (mac && mac->enabled && !mac->etm) {
if ((r = mac_compute(mac, state->p_send.seqnr,
sshbuf_ptr(state->outgoing_packet), len,
macbuf, sizeof(macbuf))) != 0)
goto out;
DBG(debug("done calc MAC out #%d", state->p_send.seqnr));
}
/* encrypt packet and append to output buffer. */
if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(state->output,
sshbuf_len(state->outgoing_packet) + authlen, &cp)) != 0)
goto out;
if ((r = cipher_crypt(state->send_context, state->p_send.seqnr, cp,
sshbuf_ptr(state->outgoing_packet),
len - aadlen, aadlen, authlen)) != 0)
goto out;
/* append unencrypted MAC */
if (mac && mac->enabled) {
if (mac->etm) {
/* EtM: compute mac over aadlen + cipher text */
if ((r = mac_compute(mac, state->p_send.seqnr,
cp, len, macbuf, sizeof(macbuf))) != 0)
goto out;
DBG(debug("done calc MAC(EtM) out #%d",
state->p_send.seqnr));
}
if ((r = sshbuf_put(state->output, macbuf, mac->mac_len)) != 0)
goto out;
}
#ifdef PACKET_DEBUG
fprintf(stderr, "encrypted: ");
sshbuf_dump(state->output, stderr);
#endif
/* increment sequence number for outgoing packets */
if (++state->p_send.seqnr == 0)
logit("outgoing seqnr wraps around");
if (++state->p_send.packets == 0)
if (!(ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_NOREKEY))
return SSH_ERR_NEED_REKEY;
state->p_send.blocks += len / block_size;
state->p_send.bytes += len;
sshbuf_reset(state->outgoing_packet);
if (type == SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS)
r = ssh_set_newkeys(ssh, MODE_OUT);
else if (type == SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS && state->server_side)
r = ssh_packet_enable_delayed_compress(ssh);
else
r = 0;
out:
return r;
}
/* returns non-zero if the specified packet type is usec by KEX */
static int
ssh_packet_type_is_kex(u_char type)
{
return
type >= SSH2_MSG_TRANSPORT_MIN &&
type <= SSH2_MSG_TRANSPORT_MAX &&
type != SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_REQUEST &&
type != SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_ACCEPT &&
type != SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO;
}
int
ssh_packet_send2(struct ssh *ssh)
{
struct session_state *state = ssh->state;
struct packet *p;
u_char type;
int r, need_rekey;
if (sshbuf_len(state->outgoing_packet) < 6)
return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
type = sshbuf_ptr(state->outgoing_packet)[5];
need_rekey = !ssh_packet_type_is_kex(type) &&
ssh_packet_need_rekeying(ssh, sshbuf_len(state->outgoing_packet));
/*
* During rekeying we can only send key exchange messages.
* Queue everything else.
*/
if ((need_rekey || state->rekeying) && !ssh_packet_type_is_kex(type)) {
if (need_rekey)
debug3("%s: rekex triggered", __func__);
debug("enqueue packet: %u", type);
p = calloc(1, sizeof(*p));
if (p == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
p->type = type;
p->payload = state->outgoing_packet;
TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&state->outgoing, p, next);
state->outgoing_packet = sshbuf_new();
if (state->outgoing_packet == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
if (need_rekey) {
/*
* This packet triggered a rekey, so send the
* KEXINIT now.
* NB. reenters this function via kex_start_rekex().
*/
return kex_start_rekex(ssh);
}
return 0;
}
/* rekeying starts with sending KEXINIT */
if (type == SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT)
state->rekeying = 1;
if ((r = ssh_packet_send2_wrapped(ssh)) != 0)
return r;
/* after a NEWKEYS message we can send the complete queue */
if (type == SSH2_MSG_NEWKEYS) {
state->rekeying = 0;
state->rekey_time = monotime();
while ((p = TAILQ_FIRST(&state->outgoing))) {
type = p->type;
/*
* If this packet triggers a rekex, then skip the
* remaining packets in the queue for now.
* NB. re-enters this function via kex_start_rekex.
*/
if (ssh_packet_need_rekeying(ssh,
sshbuf_len(p->payload))) {
debug3("%s: queued packet triggered rekex",
__func__);
return kex_start_rekex(ssh);
}
debug("dequeue packet: %u", type);
sshbuf_free(state->outgoing_packet);
state->outgoing_packet = p->payload;
TAILQ_REMOVE(&state->outgoing, p, next);
memset(p, 0, sizeof(*p));
free(p);
if ((r = ssh_packet_send2_wrapped(ssh)) != 0)
return r;
}
}
return 0;
}
/*
* Waits until a packet has been received, and returns its type. Note that
* no other data is processed until this returns, so this function should not
* be used during the interactive session.
*/
int
ssh_packet_read_seqnr(struct ssh *ssh, u_char *typep, u_int32_t *seqnr_p)
{
struct session_state *state = ssh->state;
int len, r, ms_remain;
fd_set *setp;
char buf[8192];
struct timeval timeout, start, *timeoutp = NULL;
DBG(debug("packet_read()"));
setp = calloc(howmany(state->connection_in + 1,
NFDBITS), sizeof(fd_mask));
if (setp == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
/*
* Since we are blocking, ensure that all written packets have
* been sent.
*/
if ((r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0)
goto out;
/* Stay in the loop until we have received a complete packet. */
for (;;) {
/* Try to read a packet from the buffer. */
r = ssh_packet_read_poll_seqnr(ssh, typep, seqnr_p);
if (r != 0)
break;
/* If we got a packet, return it. */
if (*typep != SSH_MSG_NONE)
break;
/*
* Otherwise, wait for some data to arrive, add it to the
* buffer, and try again.
*/
memset(setp, 0, howmany(state->connection_in + 1,
NFDBITS) * sizeof(fd_mask));
FD_SET(state->connection_in, setp);
if (state->packet_timeout_ms > 0) {
ms_remain = state->packet_timeout_ms;
timeoutp = &timeout;
}
/* Wait for some data to arrive. */
for (;;) {
if (state->packet_timeout_ms != -1) {
ms_to_timeval(&timeout, ms_remain);
monotime_tv(&start);
}
if ((r = select(state->connection_in + 1, setp,
NULL, NULL, timeoutp)) >= 0)
break;
if (errno != EAGAIN && errno != EINTR &&
errno != EWOULDBLOCK) {
r = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
goto out;
}
if (state->packet_timeout_ms == -1)
continue;
ms_subtract_diff(&start, &ms_remain);
if (ms_remain <= 0) {
r = 0;
break;
}
}
if (r == 0) {
r = SSH_ERR_CONN_TIMEOUT;
goto out;
}
/* Read data from the socket. */
len = read(state->connection_in, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (len == 0) {
r = SSH_ERR_CONN_CLOSED;
goto out;
}
if (len == -1) {
r = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
goto out;
}
/* Append it to the buffer. */
if ((r = ssh_packet_process_incoming(ssh, buf, len)) != 0)
goto out;
}
out:
free(setp);
return r;
}
int
ssh_packet_read(struct ssh *ssh)
{
u_char type;
int r;
if ((r = ssh_packet_read_seqnr(ssh, &type, NULL)) != 0)
fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
return type;
}
/*
* Waits until a packet has been received, verifies that its type matches
* that given, and gives a fatal error and exits if there is a mismatch.
*/
int
ssh_packet_read_expect(struct ssh *ssh, u_int expected_type)
{
int r;
u_char type;
if ((r = ssh_packet_read_seqnr(ssh, &type, NULL)) != 0)
return r;
if (type != expected_type) {
if ((r = sshpkt_disconnect(ssh,
"Protocol error: expected packet type %d, got %d",
expected_type, type)) != 0)
return r;
return SSH_ERR_PROTOCOL_ERROR;
}
return 0;
}
static int
ssh_packet_read_poll2_mux(struct ssh *ssh, u_char *typep, u_int32_t *seqnr_p)
{
struct session_state *state = ssh->state;
const u_char *cp;
size_t need;
int r;
if (ssh->kex)
return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
*typep = SSH_MSG_NONE;
cp = sshbuf_ptr(state->input);
if (state->packlen == 0) {
if (sshbuf_len(state->input) < 4 + 1)
return 0; /* packet is incomplete */
state->packlen = PEEK_U32(cp);
if (state->packlen < 4 + 1 ||
state->packlen > PACKET_MAX_SIZE)
return SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE;
}
need = state->packlen + 4;
if (sshbuf_len(state->input) < need)
return 0; /* packet is incomplete */
sshbuf_reset(state->incoming_packet);
if ((r = sshbuf_put(state->incoming_packet, cp + 4,
state->packlen)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_consume(state->input, need)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u8(state->incoming_packet, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u8(state->incoming_packet, typep)) != 0)
return r;
if (ssh_packet_log_type(*typep))
debug3("%s: type %u", __func__, *typep);
/* sshbuf_dump(state->incoming_packet, stderr); */
/* reset for next packet */
state->packlen = 0;
return r;
}
int
ssh_packet_read_poll2(struct ssh *ssh, u_char *typep, u_int32_t *seqnr_p)
{
struct session_state *state = ssh->state;
u_int padlen, need;
u_char *cp;
u_int maclen, aadlen = 0, authlen = 0, block_size;
struct sshenc *enc = NULL;
struct sshmac *mac = NULL;
struct sshcomp *comp = NULL;
int r;
if (state->mux)
return ssh_packet_read_poll2_mux(ssh, typep, seqnr_p);
*typep = SSH_MSG_NONE;
if (state->packet_discard)
return 0;
if (state->newkeys[MODE_IN] != NULL) {
enc = &state->newkeys[MODE_IN]->enc;
mac = &state->newkeys[MODE_IN]->mac;
comp = &state->newkeys[MODE_IN]->comp;
/* disable mac for authenticated encryption */
if ((authlen = cipher_authlen(enc->cipher)) != 0)
mac = NULL;
}
maclen = mac && mac->enabled ? mac->mac_len : 0;
block_size = enc ? enc->block_size : 8;
aadlen = (mac && mac->enabled && mac->etm) || authlen ? 4 : 0;
if (aadlen && state->packlen == 0) {
if (cipher_get_length(state->receive_context,
&state->packlen, state->p_read.seqnr,
sshbuf_ptr(state->input), sshbuf_len(state->input)) != 0)
return 0;
if (state->packlen < 1 + 4 ||
state->packlen > PACKET_MAX_SIZE) {
#ifdef PACKET_DEBUG
sshbuf_dump(state->input, stderr);
#endif
logit("Bad packet length %u.", state->packlen);
if ((r = sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "Packet corrupt")) != 0)
return r;
return SSH_ERR_CONN_CORRUPT;
}
sshbuf_reset(state->incoming_packet);
} else if (state->packlen == 0) {
/*
* check if input size is less than the cipher block size,
* decrypt first block and extract length of incoming packet
*/
if (sshbuf_len(state->input) < block_size)
return 0;
sshbuf_reset(state->incoming_packet);
if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(state->incoming_packet, block_size,
&cp)) != 0)
goto out;
if ((r = cipher_crypt(state->receive_context,
state->p_send.seqnr, cp, sshbuf_ptr(state->input),
block_size, 0, 0)) != 0)
goto out;
state->packlen = PEEK_U32(sshbuf_ptr(state->incoming_packet));
if (state->packlen < 1 + 4 ||
state->packlen > PACKET_MAX_SIZE) {
#ifdef PACKET_DEBUG
fprintf(stderr, "input: \n");
sshbuf_dump(state->input, stderr);
fprintf(stderr, "incoming_packet: \n");
sshbuf_dump(state->incoming_packet, stderr);
#endif
logit("Bad packet length %u.", state->packlen);
return ssh_packet_start_discard(ssh, enc, mac, 0,
PACKET_MAX_SIZE);
}
if ((r = sshbuf_consume(state->input, block_size)) != 0)
goto out;
}
DBG(debug("input: packet len %u", state->packlen+4));
if (aadlen) {
/* only the payload is encrypted */
need = state->packlen;
} else {
/*
* the payload size and the payload are encrypted, but we
* have a partial packet of block_size bytes
*/
need = 4 + state->packlen - block_size;
}
DBG(debug("partial packet: block %d, need %d, maclen %d, authlen %d,"
" aadlen %d", block_size, need, maclen, authlen, aadlen));
if (need % block_size != 0) {
logit("padding error: need %d block %d mod %d",
need, block_size, need % block_size);
return ssh_packet_start_discard(ssh, enc, mac, 0,
PACKET_MAX_SIZE - block_size);
}
/*
* check if the entire packet has been received and
* decrypt into incoming_packet:
* 'aadlen' bytes are unencrypted, but authenticated.
* 'need' bytes are encrypted, followed by either
* 'authlen' bytes of authentication tag or
* 'maclen' bytes of message authentication code.
*/
if (sshbuf_len(state->input) < aadlen + need + authlen + maclen)
return 0; /* packet is incomplete */
#ifdef PACKET_DEBUG
fprintf(stderr, "read_poll enc/full: ");
sshbuf_dump(state->input, stderr);
#endif
/* EtM: check mac over encrypted input */
if (mac && mac->enabled && mac->etm) {
if ((r = mac_check(mac, state->p_read.seqnr,
sshbuf_ptr(state->input), aadlen + need,
sshbuf_ptr(state->input) + aadlen + need + authlen,
maclen)) != 0) {
if (r == SSH_ERR_MAC_INVALID)
logit("Corrupted MAC on input.");
goto out;
}
}
if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(state->incoming_packet, aadlen + need,
&cp)) != 0)
goto out;
if ((r = cipher_crypt(state->receive_context, state->p_read.seqnr, cp,
sshbuf_ptr(state->input), need, aadlen, authlen)) != 0)
goto out;
if ((r = sshbuf_consume(state->input, aadlen + need + authlen)) != 0)
goto out;
if (mac && mac->enabled) {
/* Not EtM: check MAC over cleartext */
if (!mac->etm && (r = mac_check(mac, state->p_read.seqnr,
sshbuf_ptr(state->incoming_packet),
sshbuf_len(state->incoming_packet),
sshbuf_ptr(state->input), maclen)) != 0) {
if (r != SSH_ERR_MAC_INVALID)
goto out;
logit("Corrupted MAC on input.");
if (need + block_size > PACKET_MAX_SIZE)
return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
return ssh_packet_start_discard(ssh, enc, mac,
sshbuf_len(state->incoming_packet),
PACKET_MAX_SIZE - need - block_size);
}
/* Remove MAC from input buffer */
DBG(debug("MAC #%d ok", state->p_read.seqnr));
if ((r = sshbuf_consume(state->input, mac->mac_len)) != 0)
goto out;
}
if (seqnr_p != NULL)
*seqnr_p = state->p_read.seqnr;
if (++state->p_read.seqnr == 0)
logit("incoming seqnr wraps around");
if (++state->p_read.packets == 0)
if (!(ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_NOREKEY))
return SSH_ERR_NEED_REKEY;
state->p_read.blocks += (state->packlen + 4) / block_size;
state->p_read.bytes += state->packlen + 4;
/* get padlen */
padlen = sshbuf_ptr(state->incoming_packet)[4];
DBG(debug("input: padlen %d", padlen));
if (padlen < 4) {
if ((r = sshpkt_disconnect(ssh,
"Corrupted padlen %d on input.", padlen)) != 0 ||
(r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0)
return r;
return SSH_ERR_CONN_CORRUPT;
}
/* skip packet size + padlen, discard padding */
if ((r = sshbuf_consume(state->incoming_packet, 4 + 1)) != 0 ||
((r = sshbuf_consume_end(state->incoming_packet, padlen)) != 0))
goto out;
DBG(debug("input: len before de-compress %zd",
sshbuf_len(state->incoming_packet)));
if (comp && comp->enabled) {
sshbuf_reset(state->compression_buffer);
if ((r = uncompress_buffer(ssh, state->incoming_packet,
state->compression_buffer)) != 0)
goto out;
sshbuf_reset(state->incoming_packet);
if ((r = sshbuf_putb(state->incoming_packet,
state->compression_buffer)) != 0)
goto out;
DBG(debug("input: len after de-compress %zd",
sshbuf_len(state->incoming_packet)));
}
/*
* get packet type, implies consume.
* return length of payload (without type field)
*/
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(state->incoming_packet, typep)) != 0)
goto out;
if (ssh_packet_log_type(*typep))
debug3("receive packet: type %u", *typep);
if (*typep < SSH2_MSG_MIN || *typep >= SSH2_MSG_LOCAL_MIN) {
if ((r = sshpkt_disconnect(ssh,
"Invalid ssh2 packet type: %d", *typep)) != 0 ||
(r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0)
return r;
return SSH_ERR_PROTOCOL_ERROR;
}
if (state->hook_in != NULL &&
(r = state->hook_in(ssh, state->incoming_packet, typep,
state->hook_in_ctx)) != 0)
return r;
if (*typep == SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS && !state->server_side)
r = ssh_packet_enable_delayed_compress(ssh);
else
r = 0;
#ifdef PACKET_DEBUG
fprintf(stderr, "read/plain[%d]:\r\n", *typep);
sshbuf_dump(state->incoming_packet, stderr);
#endif
/* reset for next packet */
state->packlen = 0;
/* do we need to rekey? */
if (ssh_packet_need_rekeying(ssh, 0)) {
debug3("%s: rekex triggered", __func__);
if ((r = kex_start_rekex(ssh)) != 0)
return r;
}
out:
return r;
}
int
ssh_packet_read_poll_seqnr(struct ssh *ssh, u_char *typep, u_int32_t *seqnr_p)
{
struct session_state *state = ssh->state;
u_int reason, seqnr;
int r;
u_char *msg;
for (;;) {
msg = NULL;
r = ssh_packet_read_poll2(ssh, typep, seqnr_p);
if (r != 0)
return r;
if (*typep) {
state->keep_alive_timeouts = 0;
DBG(debug("received packet type %d", *typep));
}
switch (*typep) {
case SSH2_MSG_IGNORE:
debug3("Received SSH2_MSG_IGNORE");
break;
case SSH2_MSG_DEBUG:
if ((r = sshpkt_get_u8(ssh, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &msg, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, NULL, NULL)) != 0) {
free(msg);
return r;
}
debug("Remote: %.900s", msg);
free(msg);
break;
case SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT:
if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &reason)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &msg, NULL)) != 0)
return r;
/* Ignore normal client exit notifications */
do_log2(ssh->state->server_side &&
reason == SSH2_DISCONNECT_BY_APPLICATION ?
SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO : SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR,
"Received disconnect from %s port %d:"
"%u: %.400s", ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh),
ssh_remote_port(ssh), reason, msg);
free(msg);
return SSH_ERR_DISCONNECTED;
case SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED:
if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &seqnr)) != 0)
return r;
debug("Received SSH2_MSG_UNIMPLEMENTED for %u",
seqnr);
break;
default:
return 0;
}
}
}
/*
* Buffers the given amount of input characters. This is intended to be used
* together with packet_read_poll.
*/
int
ssh_packet_process_incoming(struct ssh *ssh, const char *buf, u_int len)
{
struct session_state *state = ssh->state;
int r;
if (state->packet_discard) {
state->keep_alive_timeouts = 0; /* ?? */
if (len >= state->packet_discard) {
if ((r = ssh_packet_stop_discard(ssh)) != 0)
return r;
}
state->packet_discard -= len;
return 0;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_put(ssh->state->input, buf, len)) != 0)
return r;
return 0;
}
int
ssh_packet_remaining(struct ssh *ssh)
{
return sshbuf_len(ssh->state->incoming_packet);
}
/*
* Sends a diagnostic message from the server to the client. This message
* can be sent at any time (but not while constructing another message). The
* message is printed immediately, but only if the client is being executed
* in verbose mode. These messages are primarily intended to ease debugging
* authentication problems. The length of the formatted message must not
* exceed 1024 bytes. This will automatically call ssh_packet_write_wait.
*/
void
ssh_packet_send_debug(struct ssh *ssh, const char *fmt,...)
{
char buf[1024];
va_list args;
int r;
if ((ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_DEBUG))
return;
va_start(args, fmt);
vsnprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), fmt, args);
va_end(args);
debug3("sending debug message: %s", buf);
if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_DEBUG)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, 0)) != 0 || /* always display */
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, buf)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "")) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0 ||
(r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0)
fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
}
void
sshpkt_fmt_connection_id(struct ssh *ssh, char *s, size_t l)
{
snprintf(s, l, "%.200s%s%s port %d",
ssh->log_preamble ? ssh->log_preamble : "",
ssh->log_preamble ? " " : "",
ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh));
}
/*
* Pretty-print connection-terminating errors and exit.
*/
static void
sshpkt_vfatal(struct ssh *ssh, int r, const char *fmt, va_list ap)
{
char *tag = NULL, remote_id[512];
+ int oerrno = errno;
sshpkt_fmt_connection_id(ssh, remote_id, sizeof(remote_id));
switch (r) {
case SSH_ERR_CONN_CLOSED:
ssh_packet_clear_keys(ssh);
logdie("Connection closed by %s", remote_id);
case SSH_ERR_CONN_TIMEOUT:
ssh_packet_clear_keys(ssh);
logdie("Connection %s %s timed out",
ssh->state->server_side ? "from" : "to", remote_id);
case SSH_ERR_DISCONNECTED:
ssh_packet_clear_keys(ssh);
logdie("Disconnected from %s", remote_id);
case SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR:
if (errno == ECONNRESET) {
ssh_packet_clear_keys(ssh);
logdie("Connection reset by %s", remote_id);
}
/* FALLTHROUGH */
case SSH_ERR_NO_CIPHER_ALG_MATCH:
case SSH_ERR_NO_MAC_ALG_MATCH:
case SSH_ERR_NO_COMPRESS_ALG_MATCH:
case SSH_ERR_NO_KEX_ALG_MATCH:
case SSH_ERR_NO_HOSTKEY_ALG_MATCH:
if (ssh && ssh->kex && ssh->kex->failed_choice) {
ssh_packet_clear_keys(ssh);
+ errno = oerrno;
logdie("Unable to negotiate with %s: %s. "
"Their offer: %s", remote_id, ssh_err(r),
ssh->kex->failed_choice);
}
/* FALLTHROUGH */
default:
if (vasprintf(&tag, fmt, ap) == -1) {
ssh_packet_clear_keys(ssh);
logdie("%s: could not allocate failure message",
__func__);
}
ssh_packet_clear_keys(ssh);
+ errno = oerrno;
logdie("%s%sConnection %s %s: %s",
tag != NULL ? tag : "", tag != NULL ? ": " : "",
ssh->state->server_side ? "from" : "to",
remote_id, ssh_err(r));
}
}
void
sshpkt_fatal(struct ssh *ssh, int r, const char *fmt, ...)
{
va_list ap;
va_start(ap, fmt);
sshpkt_vfatal(ssh, r, fmt, ap);
/* NOTREACHED */
va_end(ap);
logdie("%s: should have exited", __func__);
}
/*
* Logs the error plus constructs and sends a disconnect packet, closes the
* connection, and exits. This function never returns. The error message
* should not contain a newline. The length of the formatted message must
* not exceed 1024 bytes.
*/
void
ssh_packet_disconnect(struct ssh *ssh, const char *fmt,...)
{
char buf[1024], remote_id[512];
va_list args;
static int disconnecting = 0;
int r;
if (disconnecting) /* Guard against recursive invocations. */
fatal("packet_disconnect called recursively.");
disconnecting = 1;
/*
* Format the message. Note that the caller must make sure the
* message is of limited size.
*/
sshpkt_fmt_connection_id(ssh, remote_id, sizeof(remote_id));
va_start(args, fmt);
vsnprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), fmt, args);
va_end(args);
/* Display the error locally */
logit("Disconnecting %s: %.100s", remote_id, buf);
/*
* Send the disconnect message to the other side, and wait
* for it to get sent.
*/
if ((r = sshpkt_disconnect(ssh, "%s", buf)) != 0)
sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s", __func__);
if ((r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0)
sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s", __func__);
/* Close the connection. */
ssh_packet_close(ssh);
cleanup_exit(255);
}
/*
* Checks if there is any buffered output, and tries to write some of
* the output.
*/
int
ssh_packet_write_poll(struct ssh *ssh)
{
struct session_state *state = ssh->state;
int len = sshbuf_len(state->output);
int r;
if (len > 0) {
len = write(state->connection_out,
sshbuf_ptr(state->output), len);
if (len == -1) {
if (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN ||
errno == EWOULDBLOCK)
return 0;
return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
}
if (len == 0)
return SSH_ERR_CONN_CLOSED;
if ((r = sshbuf_consume(state->output, len)) != 0)
return r;
}
return 0;
}
/*
* Calls packet_write_poll repeatedly until all pending output data has been
* written.
*/
int
ssh_packet_write_wait(struct ssh *ssh)
{
fd_set *setp;
int ret, r, ms_remain = 0;
struct timeval start, timeout, *timeoutp = NULL;
struct session_state *state = ssh->state;
setp = calloc(howmany(state->connection_out + 1,
NFDBITS), sizeof(fd_mask));
if (setp == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
if ((r = ssh_packet_write_poll(ssh)) != 0) {
free(setp);
return r;
}
while (ssh_packet_have_data_to_write(ssh)) {
memset(setp, 0, howmany(state->connection_out + 1,
NFDBITS) * sizeof(fd_mask));
FD_SET(state->connection_out, setp);
if (state->packet_timeout_ms > 0) {
ms_remain = state->packet_timeout_ms;
timeoutp = &timeout;
}
for (;;) {
if (state->packet_timeout_ms != -1) {
ms_to_timeval(&timeout, ms_remain);
monotime_tv(&start);
}
if ((ret = select(state->connection_out + 1,
NULL, setp, NULL, timeoutp)) >= 0)
break;
if (errno != EAGAIN && errno != EINTR &&
errno != EWOULDBLOCK)
break;
if (state->packet_timeout_ms == -1)
continue;
ms_subtract_diff(&start, &ms_remain);
if (ms_remain <= 0) {
ret = 0;
break;
}
}
if (ret == 0) {
free(setp);
return SSH_ERR_CONN_TIMEOUT;
}
if ((r = ssh_packet_write_poll(ssh)) != 0) {
free(setp);
return r;
}
}
free(setp);
return 0;
}
/* Returns true if there is buffered data to write to the connection. */
int
ssh_packet_have_data_to_write(struct ssh *ssh)
{
return sshbuf_len(ssh->state->output) != 0;
}
/* Returns true if there is not too much data to write to the connection. */
int
ssh_packet_not_very_much_data_to_write(struct ssh *ssh)
{
if (ssh->state->interactive_mode)
return sshbuf_len(ssh->state->output) < 16384;
else
return sshbuf_len(ssh->state->output) < 128 * 1024;
}
void
ssh_packet_set_tos(struct ssh *ssh, int tos)
{
#ifndef IP_TOS_IS_BROKEN
if (!ssh_packet_connection_is_on_socket(ssh) || tos == INT_MAX)
return;
switch (ssh_packet_connection_af(ssh)) {
# ifdef IP_TOS
case AF_INET:
debug3("%s: set IP_TOS 0x%02x", __func__, tos);
if (setsockopt(ssh->state->connection_in,
IPPROTO_IP, IP_TOS, &tos, sizeof(tos)) == -1)
error("setsockopt IP_TOS %d: %.100s:",
tos, strerror(errno));
break;
# endif /* IP_TOS */
# ifdef IPV6_TCLASS
case AF_INET6:
debug3("%s: set IPV6_TCLASS 0x%02x", __func__, tos);
if (setsockopt(ssh->state->connection_in,
IPPROTO_IPV6, IPV6_TCLASS, &tos, sizeof(tos)) == -1)
error("setsockopt IPV6_TCLASS %d: %.100s:",
tos, strerror(errno));
break;
# endif /* IPV6_TCLASS */
}
#endif /* IP_TOS_IS_BROKEN */
}
/* Informs that the current session is interactive. Sets IP flags for that. */
void
ssh_packet_set_interactive(struct ssh *ssh, int interactive, int qos_interactive, int qos_bulk)
{
struct session_state *state = ssh->state;
if (state->set_interactive_called)
return;
state->set_interactive_called = 1;
/* Record that we are in interactive mode. */
state->interactive_mode = interactive;
/* Only set socket options if using a socket. */
if (!ssh_packet_connection_is_on_socket(ssh))
return;
set_nodelay(state->connection_in);
ssh_packet_set_tos(ssh, interactive ? qos_interactive :
qos_bulk);
}
/* Returns true if the current connection is interactive. */
int
ssh_packet_is_interactive(struct ssh *ssh)
{
return ssh->state->interactive_mode;
}
int
ssh_packet_set_maxsize(struct ssh *ssh, u_int s)
{
struct session_state *state = ssh->state;
if (state->set_maxsize_called) {
logit("packet_set_maxsize: called twice: old %d new %d",
state->max_packet_size, s);
return -1;
}
if (s < 4 * 1024 || s > 1024 * 1024) {
logit("packet_set_maxsize: bad size %d", s);
return -1;
}
state->set_maxsize_called = 1;
debug("packet_set_maxsize: setting to %d", s);
state->max_packet_size = s;
return s;
}
int
ssh_packet_inc_alive_timeouts(struct ssh *ssh)
{
return ++ssh->state->keep_alive_timeouts;
}
void
ssh_packet_set_alive_timeouts(struct ssh *ssh, int ka)
{
ssh->state->keep_alive_timeouts = ka;
}
u_int
ssh_packet_get_maxsize(struct ssh *ssh)
{
return ssh->state->max_packet_size;
}
void
ssh_packet_set_rekey_limits(struct ssh *ssh, u_int64_t bytes, u_int32_t seconds)
{
debug3("rekey after %llu bytes, %u seconds", (unsigned long long)bytes,
(unsigned int)seconds);
ssh->state->rekey_limit = bytes;
ssh->state->rekey_interval = seconds;
}
time_t
ssh_packet_get_rekey_timeout(struct ssh *ssh)
{
time_t seconds;
seconds = ssh->state->rekey_time + ssh->state->rekey_interval -
monotime();
return (seconds <= 0 ? 1 : seconds);
}
void
ssh_packet_set_server(struct ssh *ssh)
{
ssh->state->server_side = 1;
ssh->kex->server = 1; /* XXX unify? */
}
void
ssh_packet_set_authenticated(struct ssh *ssh)
{
ssh->state->after_authentication = 1;
}
void *
ssh_packet_get_input(struct ssh *ssh)
{
return (void *)ssh->state->input;
}
void *
ssh_packet_get_output(struct ssh *ssh)
{
return (void *)ssh->state->output;
}
/* Reset after_authentication and reset compression in post-auth privsep */
static int
ssh_packet_set_postauth(struct ssh *ssh)
{
int r;
debug("%s: called", __func__);
/* This was set in net child, but is not visible in user child */
ssh->state->after_authentication = 1;
ssh->state->rekeying = 0;
if ((r = ssh_packet_enable_delayed_compress(ssh)) != 0)
return r;
return 0;
}
/* Packet state (de-)serialization for privsep */
/* turn kex into a blob for packet state serialization */
static int
kex_to_blob(struct sshbuf *m, struct kex *kex)
{
int r;
if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(m, kex->session_id,
kex->session_id_len)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, kex->we_need)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(m, kex->hostkey_alg)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, kex->hostkey_type)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, kex->hostkey_nid)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, kex->kex_type)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, kex->my)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, kex->peer)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, kex->client_version)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, kex->server_version)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, kex->flags)) != 0)
return r;
return 0;
}
/* turn key exchange results into a blob for packet state serialization */
static int
newkeys_to_blob(struct sshbuf *m, struct ssh *ssh, int mode)
{
struct sshbuf *b;
struct sshcipher_ctx *cc;
struct sshcomp *comp;
struct sshenc *enc;
struct sshmac *mac;
struct newkeys *newkey;
int r;
if ((newkey = ssh->state->newkeys[mode]) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
enc = &newkey->enc;
mac = &newkey->mac;
comp = &newkey->comp;
cc = (mode == MODE_OUT) ? ssh->state->send_context :
ssh->state->receive_context;
if ((r = cipher_get_keyiv(cc, enc->iv, enc->iv_len)) != 0)
return r;
if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, enc->name)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, enc->enabled)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, enc->block_size)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_string(b, enc->key, enc->key_len)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_string(b, enc->iv, enc->iv_len)) != 0)
goto out;
if (cipher_authlen(enc->cipher) == 0) {
if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, mac->name)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, mac->enabled)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_string(b, mac->key, mac->key_len)) != 0)
goto out;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, comp->type)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, comp->name)) != 0)
goto out;
r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, b);
out:
sshbuf_free(b);
return r;
}
/* serialize packet state into a blob */
int
ssh_packet_get_state(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshbuf *m)
{
struct session_state *state = ssh->state;
int r;
if ((r = kex_to_blob(m, ssh->kex)) != 0 ||
(r = newkeys_to_blob(m, ssh, MODE_OUT)) != 0 ||
(r = newkeys_to_blob(m, ssh, MODE_IN)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u64(m, state->rekey_limit)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, state->rekey_interval)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, state->p_send.seqnr)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u64(m, state->p_send.blocks)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, state->p_send.packets)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u64(m, state->p_send.bytes)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, state->p_read.seqnr)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u64(m, state->p_read.blocks)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(m, state->p_read.packets)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u64(m, state->p_read.bytes)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, state->input)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, state->output)) != 0)
return r;
return 0;
}
/* restore key exchange results from blob for packet state de-serialization */
static int
newkeys_from_blob(struct sshbuf *m, struct ssh *ssh, int mode)
{
struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
struct sshcomp *comp;
struct sshenc *enc;
struct sshmac *mac;
struct newkeys *newkey = NULL;
size_t keylen, ivlen, maclen;
int r;
if ((newkey = calloc(1, sizeof(*newkey))) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_froms(m, &b)) != 0)
goto out;
#ifdef DEBUG_PK
sshbuf_dump(b, stderr);
#endif
enc = &newkey->enc;
mac = &newkey->mac;
comp = &newkey->comp;
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &enc->name, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, (u_int *)&enc->enabled)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &enc->block_size)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_string(b, &enc->key, &keylen)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_string(b, &enc->iv, &ivlen)) != 0)
goto out;
if ((enc->cipher = cipher_by_name(enc->name)) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
if (cipher_authlen(enc->cipher) == 0) {
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &mac->name, NULL)) != 0)
goto out;
if ((r = mac_setup(mac, mac->name)) != 0)
goto out;
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, (u_int *)&mac->enabled)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_string(b, &mac->key, &maclen)) != 0)
goto out;
if (maclen > mac->key_len) {
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
mac->key_len = maclen;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &comp->type)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &comp->name, NULL)) != 0)
goto out;
if (sshbuf_len(b) != 0) {
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
enc->key_len = keylen;
enc->iv_len = ivlen;
ssh->kex->newkeys[mode] = newkey;
newkey = NULL;
r = 0;
out:
free(newkey);
sshbuf_free(b);
return r;
}
/* restore kex from blob for packet state de-serialization */
static int
kex_from_blob(struct sshbuf *m, struct kex **kexp)
{
struct kex *kex;
int r;
if ((kex = kex_new()) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(m, &kex->session_id, &kex->session_id_len)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &kex->we_need)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_cstring(m, &kex->hostkey_alg, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, (u_int *)&kex->hostkey_type)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, (u_int *)&kex->hostkey_nid)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &kex->kex_type)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_stringb(m, kex->my)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_stringb(m, kex->peer)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_stringb(m, kex->client_version)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_stringb(m, kex->server_version)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &kex->flags)) != 0)
goto out;
kex->server = 1;
kex->done = 1;
r = 0;
out:
if (r != 0 || kexp == NULL) {
kex_free(kex);
if (kexp != NULL)
*kexp = NULL;
} else {
kex_free(*kexp);
*kexp = kex;
}
return r;
}
/*
* Restore packet state from content of blob 'm' (de-serialization).
* Note that 'm' will be partially consumed on parsing or any other errors.
*/
int
ssh_packet_set_state(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshbuf *m)
{
struct session_state *state = ssh->state;
const u_char *input, *output;
size_t ilen, olen;
int r;
if ((r = kex_from_blob(m, &ssh->kex)) != 0 ||
(r = newkeys_from_blob(m, ssh, MODE_OUT)) != 0 ||
(r = newkeys_from_blob(m, ssh, MODE_IN)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u64(m, &state->rekey_limit)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &state->rekey_interval)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &state->p_send.seqnr)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u64(m, &state->p_send.blocks)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &state->p_send.packets)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u64(m, &state->p_send.bytes)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &state->p_read.seqnr)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u64(m, &state->p_read.blocks)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(m, &state->p_read.packets)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u64(m, &state->p_read.bytes)) != 0)
return r;
/*
* We set the time here so that in post-auth privsep slave we
* count from the completion of the authentication.
*/
state->rekey_time = monotime();
/* XXX ssh_set_newkeys overrides p_read.packets? XXX */
if ((r = ssh_set_newkeys(ssh, MODE_IN)) != 0 ||
(r = ssh_set_newkeys(ssh, MODE_OUT)) != 0)
return r;
if ((r = ssh_packet_set_postauth(ssh)) != 0)
return r;
sshbuf_reset(state->input);
sshbuf_reset(state->output);
if ((r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(m, &input, &ilen)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(m, &output, &olen)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put(state->input, input, ilen)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put(state->output, output, olen)) != 0)
return r;
if (sshbuf_len(m))
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
debug3("%s: done", __func__);
return 0;
}
/* NEW API */
/* put data to the outgoing packet */
int
sshpkt_put(struct ssh *ssh, const void *v, size_t len)
{
return sshbuf_put(ssh->state->outgoing_packet, v, len);
}
int
sshpkt_putb(struct ssh *ssh, const struct sshbuf *b)
{
return sshbuf_putb(ssh->state->outgoing_packet, b);
}
int
sshpkt_put_u8(struct ssh *ssh, u_char val)
{
return sshbuf_put_u8(ssh->state->outgoing_packet, val);
}
int
sshpkt_put_u32(struct ssh *ssh, u_int32_t val)
{
return sshbuf_put_u32(ssh->state->outgoing_packet, val);
}
int
sshpkt_put_u64(struct ssh *ssh, u_int64_t val)
{
return sshbuf_put_u64(ssh->state->outgoing_packet, val);
}
int
sshpkt_put_string(struct ssh *ssh, const void *v, size_t len)
{
return sshbuf_put_string(ssh->state->outgoing_packet, v, len);
}
int
sshpkt_put_cstring(struct ssh *ssh, const void *v)
{
return sshbuf_put_cstring(ssh->state->outgoing_packet, v);
}
int
sshpkt_put_stringb(struct ssh *ssh, const struct sshbuf *v)
{
return sshbuf_put_stringb(ssh->state->outgoing_packet, v);
}
int
sshpkt_getb_froms(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshbuf **valp)
{
return sshbuf_froms(ssh->state->incoming_packet, valp);
}
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
int
sshpkt_put_ec(struct ssh *ssh, const EC_POINT *v, const EC_GROUP *g)
{
return sshbuf_put_ec(ssh->state->outgoing_packet, v, g);
}
#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
int
sshpkt_put_bignum2(struct ssh *ssh, const BIGNUM *v)
{
return sshbuf_put_bignum2(ssh->state->outgoing_packet, v);
}
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
/* fetch data from the incoming packet */
int
sshpkt_get(struct ssh *ssh, void *valp, size_t len)
{
return sshbuf_get(ssh->state->incoming_packet, valp, len);
}
int
sshpkt_get_u8(struct ssh *ssh, u_char *valp)
{
return sshbuf_get_u8(ssh->state->incoming_packet, valp);
}
int
sshpkt_get_u32(struct ssh *ssh, u_int32_t *valp)
{
return sshbuf_get_u32(ssh->state->incoming_packet, valp);
}
int
sshpkt_get_u64(struct ssh *ssh, u_int64_t *valp)
{
return sshbuf_get_u64(ssh->state->incoming_packet, valp);
}
int
sshpkt_get_string(struct ssh *ssh, u_char **valp, size_t *lenp)
{
return sshbuf_get_string(ssh->state->incoming_packet, valp, lenp);
}
int
sshpkt_get_string_direct(struct ssh *ssh, const u_char **valp, size_t *lenp)
{
return sshbuf_get_string_direct(ssh->state->incoming_packet, valp, lenp);
}
int
sshpkt_peek_string_direct(struct ssh *ssh, const u_char **valp, size_t *lenp)
{
return sshbuf_peek_string_direct(ssh->state->incoming_packet, valp, lenp);
}
int
sshpkt_get_cstring(struct ssh *ssh, char **valp, size_t *lenp)
{
return sshbuf_get_cstring(ssh->state->incoming_packet, valp, lenp);
}
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
int
sshpkt_get_ec(struct ssh *ssh, EC_POINT *v, const EC_GROUP *g)
{
return sshbuf_get_ec(ssh->state->incoming_packet, v, g);
}
#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
int
sshpkt_get_bignum2(struct ssh *ssh, BIGNUM **valp)
{
return sshbuf_get_bignum2(ssh->state->incoming_packet, valp);
}
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
int
sshpkt_get_end(struct ssh *ssh)
{
if (sshbuf_len(ssh->state->incoming_packet) > 0)
return SSH_ERR_UNEXPECTED_TRAILING_DATA;
return 0;
}
const u_char *
sshpkt_ptr(struct ssh *ssh, size_t *lenp)
{
if (lenp != NULL)
*lenp = sshbuf_len(ssh->state->incoming_packet);
return sshbuf_ptr(ssh->state->incoming_packet);
}
/* start a new packet */
int
sshpkt_start(struct ssh *ssh, u_char type)
{
u_char buf[6]; /* u32 packet length, u8 pad len, u8 type */
DBG(debug("packet_start[%d]", type));
memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
buf[sizeof(buf) - 1] = type;
sshbuf_reset(ssh->state->outgoing_packet);
return sshbuf_put(ssh->state->outgoing_packet, buf, sizeof(buf));
}
static int
ssh_packet_send_mux(struct ssh *ssh)
{
struct session_state *state = ssh->state;
u_char type, *cp;
size_t len;
int r;
if (ssh->kex)
return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
len = sshbuf_len(state->outgoing_packet);
if (len < 6)
return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
cp = sshbuf_mutable_ptr(state->outgoing_packet);
type = cp[5];
if (ssh_packet_log_type(type))
debug3("%s: type %u", __func__, type);
/* drop everything, but the connection protocol */
if (type >= SSH2_MSG_CONNECTION_MIN &&
type <= SSH2_MSG_CONNECTION_MAX) {
POKE_U32(cp, len - 4);
if ((r = sshbuf_putb(state->output,
state->outgoing_packet)) != 0)
return r;
/* sshbuf_dump(state->output, stderr); */
}
sshbuf_reset(state->outgoing_packet);
return 0;
}
/*
* 9.2. Ignored Data Message
*
* byte SSH_MSG_IGNORE
* string data
*
* All implementations MUST understand (and ignore) this message at any
* time (after receiving the protocol version). No implementation is
* required to send them. This message can be used as an additional
* protection measure against advanced traffic analysis techniques.
*/
int
sshpkt_msg_ignore(struct ssh *ssh, u_int nbytes)
{
u_int32_t rnd = 0;
int r;
u_int i;
if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_IGNORE)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, nbytes)) != 0)
return r;
for (i = 0; i < nbytes; i++) {
if (i % 4 == 0)
rnd = arc4random();
if ((r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, (u_char)rnd & 0xff)) != 0)
return r;
rnd >>= 8;
}
return 0;
}
/* send it */
int
sshpkt_send(struct ssh *ssh)
{
if (ssh->state && ssh->state->mux)
return ssh_packet_send_mux(ssh);
return ssh_packet_send2(ssh);
}
int
sshpkt_disconnect(struct ssh *ssh, const char *fmt,...)
{
char buf[1024];
va_list args;
int r;
va_start(args, fmt);
vsnprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), fmt, args);
va_end(args);
if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_DISCONNECT)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, SSH2_DISCONNECT_PROTOCOL_ERROR)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, buf)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "")) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
return r;
return 0;
}
/* roundup current message to pad bytes */
int
sshpkt_add_padding(struct ssh *ssh, u_char pad)
{
ssh->state->extra_pad = pad;
return 0;
}
diff --git a/pathnames.h b/pathnames.h
index cb44caa4d384..f7ca5a75a0d2 100644
--- a/pathnames.h
+++ b/pathnames.h
@@ -1,172 +1,179 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: pathnames.h,v 1.28 2018/02/23 15:58:37 markus Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: pathnames.h,v 1.31 2019/11/12 19:33:08 markus Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
* All rights reserved
*
* As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
* can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
* software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
* incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
* called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
*/
#define ETCDIR "/etc"
#ifndef SSHDIR
#define SSHDIR ETCDIR "/ssh"
#endif
#ifndef _PATH_SSH_PIDDIR
#define _PATH_SSH_PIDDIR "/var/run"
#endif
/*
* System-wide file containing host keys of known hosts. This file should be
* world-readable.
*/
#define _PATH_SSH_SYSTEM_HOSTFILE SSHDIR "/ssh_known_hosts"
/* backward compat for protocol 2 */
#define _PATH_SSH_SYSTEM_HOSTFILE2 SSHDIR "/ssh_known_hosts2"
/*
* Of these, ssh_host_key must be readable only by root, whereas ssh_config
* should be world-readable.
*/
#define _PATH_SERVER_CONFIG_FILE SSHDIR "/sshd_config"
#define _PATH_HOST_CONFIG_FILE SSHDIR "/ssh_config"
#define _PATH_HOST_DSA_KEY_FILE SSHDIR "/ssh_host_dsa_key"
#define _PATH_HOST_ECDSA_KEY_FILE SSHDIR "/ssh_host_ecdsa_key"
#define _PATH_HOST_ED25519_KEY_FILE SSHDIR "/ssh_host_ed25519_key"
#define _PATH_HOST_XMSS_KEY_FILE SSHDIR "/ssh_host_xmss_key"
#define _PATH_HOST_RSA_KEY_FILE SSHDIR "/ssh_host_rsa_key"
#define _PATH_DH_MODULI SSHDIR "/moduli"
#ifndef _PATH_SSH_PROGRAM
#define _PATH_SSH_PROGRAM "/usr/bin/ssh"
#endif
/*
* The process id of the daemon listening for connections is saved here to
* make it easier to kill the correct daemon when necessary.
*/
#define _PATH_SSH_DAEMON_PID_FILE _PATH_SSH_PIDDIR "/sshd.pid"
/*
* The directory in user's home directory in which the files reside. The
* directory should be world-readable (though not all files are).
*/
#define _PATH_SSH_USER_DIR ".ssh"
/*
* Per-user file containing host keys of known hosts. This file need not be
* readable by anyone except the user him/herself, though this does not
* contain anything particularly secret.
*/
#define _PATH_SSH_USER_HOSTFILE "~/" _PATH_SSH_USER_DIR "/known_hosts"
/* backward compat for protocol 2 */
#define _PATH_SSH_USER_HOSTFILE2 "~/" _PATH_SSH_USER_DIR "/known_hosts2"
/*
* Name of the default file containing client-side authentication key. This
* file should only be readable by the user him/herself.
*/
#define _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_DSA _PATH_SSH_USER_DIR "/id_dsa"
#define _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_ECDSA _PATH_SSH_USER_DIR "/id_ecdsa"
#define _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_RSA _PATH_SSH_USER_DIR "/id_rsa"
#define _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_ED25519 _PATH_SSH_USER_DIR "/id_ed25519"
#define _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_XMSS _PATH_SSH_USER_DIR "/id_xmss"
+#define _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_ECDSA_SK _PATH_SSH_USER_DIR "/id_ecdsa_sk"
+#define _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_ED25519_SK _PATH_SSH_USER_DIR "/id_ed25519_sk"
/*
* Configuration file in user's home directory. This file need not be
* readable by anyone but the user him/herself, but does not contain anything
* particularly secret. If the user's home directory resides on an NFS
* volume where root is mapped to nobody, this may need to be world-readable.
*/
#define _PATH_SSH_USER_CONFFILE _PATH_SSH_USER_DIR "/config"
/*
* File containing a list of those rsa keys that permit logging in as this
* user. This file need not be readable by anyone but the user him/herself,
* but does not contain anything particularly secret. If the user's home
* directory resides on an NFS volume where root is mapped to nobody, this
* may need to be world-readable. (This file is read by the daemon which is
* running as root.)
*/
#define _PATH_SSH_USER_PERMITTED_KEYS _PATH_SSH_USER_DIR "/authorized_keys"
/* backward compat for protocol v2 */
#define _PATH_SSH_USER_PERMITTED_KEYS2 _PATH_SSH_USER_DIR "/authorized_keys2"
/*
* Per-user and system-wide ssh "rc" files. These files are executed with
* /bin/sh before starting the shell or command if they exist. They will be
* passed "proto cookie" as arguments if X11 forwarding with spoofing is in
* use. xauth will be run if neither of these exists.
*/
#define _PATH_SSH_USER_RC _PATH_SSH_USER_DIR "/rc"
#define _PATH_SSH_SYSTEM_RC SSHDIR "/sshrc"
/*
* Ssh-only version of /etc/hosts.equiv. Additionally, the daemon may use
* ~/.rhosts and /etc/hosts.equiv if rhosts authentication is enabled.
*/
#define _PATH_SSH_HOSTS_EQUIV SSHDIR "/shosts.equiv"
#define _PATH_RHOSTS_EQUIV "/etc/hosts.equiv"
/*
* Default location of askpass
*/
#ifndef _PATH_SSH_ASKPASS_DEFAULT
#define _PATH_SSH_ASKPASS_DEFAULT "/usr/X11R6/bin/ssh-askpass"
#endif
/* Location of ssh-keysign for hostbased authentication */
#ifndef _PATH_SSH_KEY_SIGN
#define _PATH_SSH_KEY_SIGN "/usr/libexec/ssh-keysign"
#endif
/* Location of ssh-pkcs11-helper to support keys in tokens */
#ifndef _PATH_SSH_PKCS11_HELPER
#define _PATH_SSH_PKCS11_HELPER "/usr/libexec/ssh-pkcs11-helper"
#endif
+/* Location of ssh-sk-helper to support keys in security keys */
+#ifndef _PATH_SSH_SK_HELPER
+#define _PATH_SSH_SK_HELPER "/usr/libexec/ssh-sk-helper"
+#endif
+
/* xauth for X11 forwarding */
#ifndef _PATH_XAUTH
#define _PATH_XAUTH "/usr/X11R6/bin/xauth"
#endif
/* UNIX domain socket for X11 server; displaynum will replace %u */
#ifndef _PATH_UNIX_X
#define _PATH_UNIX_X "/tmp/.X11-unix/X%u"
#endif
/* for scp */
#ifndef _PATH_CP
#define _PATH_CP "cp"
#endif
/* for sftp */
#ifndef _PATH_SFTP_SERVER
#define _PATH_SFTP_SERVER "/usr/libexec/sftp-server"
#endif
/* chroot directory for unprivileged user when UsePrivilegeSeparation=yes */
#ifndef _PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR
#define _PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR "/var/empty"
#endif
/* for passwd change */
#ifndef _PATH_PASSWD_PROG
#define _PATH_PASSWD_PROG "/usr/bin/passwd"
#endif
#ifndef _PATH_LS
#define _PATH_LS "ls"
#endif
/* Askpass program define */
#ifndef ASKPASS_PROGRAM
#define ASKPASS_PROGRAM "/usr/lib/ssh/ssh-askpass"
#endif /* ASKPASS_PROGRAM */
diff --git a/progressmeter.c b/progressmeter.c
index 0e58eddecd1d..8baf798f1813 100644
--- a/progressmeter.c
+++ b/progressmeter.c
@@ -1,298 +1,296 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: progressmeter.c,v 1.48 2019/05/03 06:06:30 dtucker Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: progressmeter.c,v 1.50 2020/01/23 07:10:22 dtucker Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2003 Nils Nordman. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/ioctl.h>
#include <sys/uio.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <signal.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <time.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include "progressmeter.h"
#include "atomicio.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "utf8.h"
#define DEFAULT_WINSIZE 80
#define MAX_WINSIZE 512
#define PADDING 1 /* padding between the progress indicators */
#define UPDATE_INTERVAL 1 /* update the progress meter every second */
#define STALL_TIME 5 /* we're stalled after this many seconds */
/* determines whether we can output to the terminal */
static int can_output(void);
/* formats and inserts the specified size into the given buffer */
static void format_size(char *, int, off_t);
static void format_rate(char *, int, off_t);
/* window resizing */
static void sig_winch(int);
static void setscreensize(void);
/* signal handler for updating the progress meter */
static void sig_alarm(int);
static double start; /* start progress */
static double last_update; /* last progress update */
static const char *file; /* name of the file being transferred */
static off_t start_pos; /* initial position of transfer */
static off_t end_pos; /* ending position of transfer */
static off_t cur_pos; /* transfer position as of last refresh */
static volatile off_t *counter; /* progress counter */
static long stalled; /* how long we have been stalled */
static int bytes_per_second; /* current speed in bytes per second */
static int win_size; /* terminal window size */
static volatile sig_atomic_t win_resized; /* for window resizing */
static volatile sig_atomic_t alarm_fired;
/* units for format_size */
static const char unit[] = " KMGT";
static int
can_output(void)
{
return (getpgrp() == tcgetpgrp(STDOUT_FILENO));
}
static void
format_rate(char *buf, int size, off_t bytes)
{
int i;
bytes *= 100;
for (i = 0; bytes >= 100*1000 && unit[i] != 'T'; i++)
bytes = (bytes + 512) / 1024;
if (i == 0) {
i++;
bytes = (bytes + 512) / 1024;
}
snprintf(buf, size, "%3lld.%1lld%c%s",
(long long) (bytes + 5) / 100,
(long long) (bytes + 5) / 10 % 10,
unit[i],
i ? "B" : " ");
}
static void
format_size(char *buf, int size, off_t bytes)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; bytes >= 10000 && unit[i] != 'T'; i++)
bytes = (bytes + 512) / 1024;
snprintf(buf, size, "%4lld%c%s",
(long long) bytes,
unit[i],
i ? "B" : " ");
}
void
refresh_progress_meter(int force_update)
{
char buf[MAX_WINSIZE + 1];
off_t transferred;
double elapsed, now;
int percent;
off_t bytes_left;
int cur_speed;
int hours, minutes, seconds;
int file_len;
if ((!force_update && !alarm_fired && !win_resized) || !can_output())
return;
alarm_fired = 0;
if (win_resized) {
setscreensize();
win_resized = 0;
}
transferred = *counter - (cur_pos ? cur_pos : start_pos);
cur_pos = *counter;
now = monotime_double();
bytes_left = end_pos - cur_pos;
if (bytes_left > 0)
elapsed = now - last_update;
else {
elapsed = now - start;
/* Calculate true total speed when done */
transferred = end_pos - start_pos;
bytes_per_second = 0;
}
/* calculate speed */
if (elapsed != 0)
cur_speed = (transferred / elapsed);
else
cur_speed = transferred;
#define AGE_FACTOR 0.9
if (bytes_per_second != 0) {
bytes_per_second = (bytes_per_second * AGE_FACTOR) +
(cur_speed * (1.0 - AGE_FACTOR));
} else
bytes_per_second = cur_speed;
/* filename */
buf[0] = '\0';
file_len = win_size - 36;
if (file_len > 0) {
buf[0] = '\r';
snmprintf(buf+1, sizeof(buf)-1, &file_len, "%-*s",
file_len, file);
}
/* percent of transfer done */
if (end_pos == 0 || cur_pos == end_pos)
percent = 100;
else
percent = ((float)cur_pos / end_pos) * 100;
snprintf(buf + strlen(buf), win_size - strlen(buf),
" %3d%% ", percent);
/* amount transferred */
format_size(buf + strlen(buf), win_size - strlen(buf),
cur_pos);
strlcat(buf, " ", win_size);
/* bandwidth usage */
format_rate(buf + strlen(buf), win_size - strlen(buf),
(off_t)bytes_per_second);
strlcat(buf, "/s ", win_size);
/* ETA */
if (!transferred)
stalled += elapsed;
else
stalled = 0;
if (stalled >= STALL_TIME)
strlcat(buf, "- stalled -", win_size);
else if (bytes_per_second == 0 && bytes_left)
strlcat(buf, " --:-- ETA", win_size);
else {
if (bytes_left > 0)
seconds = bytes_left / bytes_per_second;
else
seconds = elapsed;
hours = seconds / 3600;
seconds -= hours * 3600;
minutes = seconds / 60;
seconds -= minutes * 60;
if (hours != 0)
snprintf(buf + strlen(buf), win_size - strlen(buf),
"%d:%02d:%02d", hours, minutes, seconds);
else
snprintf(buf + strlen(buf), win_size - strlen(buf),
" %02d:%02d", minutes, seconds);
if (bytes_left > 0)
strlcat(buf, " ETA", win_size);
else
strlcat(buf, " ", win_size);
}
atomicio(vwrite, STDOUT_FILENO, buf, win_size - 1);
last_update = now;
}
/*ARGSUSED*/
static void
sig_alarm(int ignore)
{
- signal(SIGALRM, sig_alarm);
alarm_fired = 1;
alarm(UPDATE_INTERVAL);
}
void
start_progress_meter(const char *f, off_t filesize, off_t *ctr)
{
start = last_update = monotime_double();
file = f;
start_pos = *ctr;
end_pos = filesize;
cur_pos = 0;
counter = ctr;
stalled = 0;
bytes_per_second = 0;
setscreensize();
refresh_progress_meter(1);
- signal(SIGALRM, sig_alarm);
- signal(SIGWINCH, sig_winch);
+ ssh_signal(SIGALRM, sig_alarm);
+ ssh_signal(SIGWINCH, sig_winch);
alarm(UPDATE_INTERVAL);
}
void
stop_progress_meter(void)
{
alarm(0);
if (!can_output())
return;
/* Ensure we complete the progress */
if (cur_pos != end_pos)
refresh_progress_meter(1);
atomicio(vwrite, STDOUT_FILENO, "\n", 1);
}
/*ARGSUSED*/
static void
sig_winch(int sig)
{
- signal(SIGWINCH, sig_winch);
win_resized = 1;
}
static void
setscreensize(void)
{
struct winsize winsize;
if (ioctl(STDOUT_FILENO, TIOCGWINSZ, &winsize) != -1 &&
winsize.ws_col != 0) {
if (winsize.ws_col > MAX_WINSIZE)
win_size = MAX_WINSIZE;
else
win_size = winsize.ws_col;
} else
win_size = DEFAULT_WINSIZE;
win_size += 1; /* trailing \0 */
}
diff --git a/readconf.c b/readconf.c
index f78b4d6fef57..f3cac6b3a89d 100644
--- a/readconf.c
+++ b/readconf.c
@@ -1,2779 +1,2863 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: readconf.c,v 1.309 2019/09/06 14:45:34 naddy Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: readconf.c,v 1.326 2020/02/06 22:46:31 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
* All rights reserved
* Functions for reading the configuration files.
*
* As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
* can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
* software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
* incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
* called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <sys/wait.h>
#include <sys/un.h>
#include <netinet/in.h>
#include <netinet/in_systm.h>
#include <netinet/ip.h>
#include <arpa/inet.h>
#include <ctype.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <limits.h>
#include <netdb.h>
#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
# include <paths.h>
#endif
#include <pwd.h>
#include <signal.h>
-#include <stdarg.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#ifdef USE_SYSTEM_GLOB
# include <glob.h>
#else
# include "openbsd-compat/glob.h"
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_UTIL_H
#include <util.h>
#endif
#if defined(HAVE_STRNVIS) && defined(HAVE_VIS_H) && !defined(BROKEN_STRNVIS)
# include <vis.h>
#endif
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "ssh.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
#include "compat.h"
#include "cipher.h"
#include "pathnames.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "sshkey.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "readconf.h"
#include "match.h"
#include "kex.h"
#include "mac.h"
#include "uidswap.h"
#include "myproposal.h"
#include "digest.h"
/* Format of the configuration file:
# Configuration data is parsed as follows:
# 1. command line options
# 2. user-specific file
# 3. system-wide file
# Any configuration value is only changed the first time it is set.
# Thus, host-specific definitions should be at the beginning of the
# configuration file, and defaults at the end.
# Host-specific declarations. These may override anything above. A single
# host may match multiple declarations; these are processed in the order
# that they are given in.
Host *.ngs.fi ngs.fi
User foo
Host fake.com
Hostname another.host.name.real.org
User blaah
Port 34289
ForwardX11 no
ForwardAgent no
Host books.com
RemoteForward 9999 shadows.cs.hut.fi:9999
Ciphers 3des-cbc
Host fascist.blob.com
Port 23123
User tylonen
PasswordAuthentication no
Host puukko.hut.fi
User t35124p
ProxyCommand ssh-proxy %h %p
Host *.fr
PublicKeyAuthentication no
Host *.su
Ciphers aes128-ctr
PasswordAuthentication no
Host vpn.fake.com
Tunnel yes
TunnelDevice 3
# Defaults for various options
Host *
ForwardAgent no
ForwardX11 no
PasswordAuthentication yes
- RSAAuthentication yes
- RhostsRSAAuthentication yes
StrictHostKeyChecking yes
TcpKeepAlive no
IdentityFile ~/.ssh/identity
Port 22
EscapeChar ~
*/
static int read_config_file_depth(const char *filename, struct passwd *pw,
const char *host, const char *original_host, Options *options,
int flags, int *activep, int *want_final_pass, int depth);
static int process_config_line_depth(Options *options, struct passwd *pw,
const char *host, const char *original_host, char *line,
const char *filename, int linenum, int *activep, int flags,
int *want_final_pass, int depth);
/* Keyword tokens. */
typedef enum {
oBadOption,
oHost, oMatch, oInclude,
oForwardAgent, oForwardX11, oForwardX11Trusted, oForwardX11Timeout,
oGatewayPorts, oExitOnForwardFailure,
- oPasswordAuthentication, oRSAAuthentication,
+ oPasswordAuthentication,
oChallengeResponseAuthentication, oXAuthLocation,
- oIdentityFile, oHostname, oPort, oCipher, oRemoteForward, oLocalForward,
+ oIdentityFile, oHostname, oPort, oRemoteForward, oLocalForward,
oCertificateFile, oAddKeysToAgent, oIdentityAgent,
- oUser, oEscapeChar, oRhostsRSAAuthentication, oProxyCommand,
+ oUser, oEscapeChar, oProxyCommand,
oGlobalKnownHostsFile, oUserKnownHostsFile, oConnectionAttempts,
oBatchMode, oCheckHostIP, oStrictHostKeyChecking, oCompression,
- oCompressionLevel, oTCPKeepAlive, oNumberOfPasswordPrompts,
- oUsePrivilegedPort, oLogFacility, oLogLevel, oCiphers, oMacs,
+ oTCPKeepAlive, oNumberOfPasswordPrompts,
+ oLogFacility, oLogLevel, oCiphers, oMacs,
oPubkeyAuthentication,
oKbdInteractiveAuthentication, oKbdInteractiveDevices, oHostKeyAlias,
oDynamicForward, oPreferredAuthentications, oHostbasedAuthentication,
oHostKeyAlgorithms, oBindAddress, oBindInterface, oPKCS11Provider,
oClearAllForwardings, oNoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost,
oEnableSSHKeysign, oRekeyLimit, oVerifyHostKeyDNS, oConnectTimeout,
oAddressFamily, oGssAuthentication, oGssDelegateCreds,
oServerAliveInterval, oServerAliveCountMax, oIdentitiesOnly,
oSendEnv, oSetEnv, oControlPath, oControlMaster, oControlPersist,
oHashKnownHosts,
oTunnel, oTunnelDevice,
oLocalCommand, oPermitLocalCommand, oRemoteCommand,
oVisualHostKey,
oKexAlgorithms, oIPQoS, oRequestTTY, oIgnoreUnknown, oProxyUseFdpass,
oCanonicalDomains, oCanonicalizeHostname, oCanonicalizeMaxDots,
oCanonicalizeFallbackLocal, oCanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs,
oStreamLocalBindMask, oStreamLocalBindUnlink, oRevokedHostKeys,
oFingerprintHash, oUpdateHostkeys, oHostbasedKeyTypes,
oPubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes, oCASignatureAlgorithms, oProxyJump,
+ oSecurityKeyProvider,
oIgnore, oIgnoredUnknownOption, oDeprecated, oUnsupported
} OpCodes;
/* Textual representations of the tokens. */
static struct {
const char *name;
OpCodes opcode;
} keywords[] = {
/* Deprecated options */
{ "protocol", oIgnore }, /* NB. silently ignored */
{ "cipher", oDeprecated },
{ "fallbacktorsh", oDeprecated },
{ "globalknownhostsfile2", oDeprecated },
{ "rhostsauthentication", oDeprecated },
{ "userknownhostsfile2", oDeprecated },
{ "useroaming", oDeprecated },
{ "usersh", oDeprecated },
{ "useprivilegedport", oDeprecated },
/* Unsupported options */
{ "afstokenpassing", oUnsupported },
{ "kerberosauthentication", oUnsupported },
{ "kerberostgtpassing", oUnsupported },
+ { "rsaauthentication", oUnsupported },
+ { "rhostsrsaauthentication", oUnsupported },
+ { "compressionlevel", oUnsupported },
/* Sometimes-unsupported options */
#if defined(GSSAPI)
{ "gssapiauthentication", oGssAuthentication },
{ "gssapidelegatecredentials", oGssDelegateCreds },
# else
{ "gssapiauthentication", oUnsupported },
{ "gssapidelegatecredentials", oUnsupported },
#endif
#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
{ "pkcs11provider", oPKCS11Provider },
{ "smartcarddevice", oPKCS11Provider },
# else
{ "smartcarddevice", oUnsupported },
{ "pkcs11provider", oUnsupported },
#endif
- { "rsaauthentication", oUnsupported },
- { "rhostsrsaauthentication", oUnsupported },
- { "compressionlevel", oUnsupported },
{ "forwardagent", oForwardAgent },
{ "forwardx11", oForwardX11 },
{ "forwardx11trusted", oForwardX11Trusted },
{ "forwardx11timeout", oForwardX11Timeout },
{ "exitonforwardfailure", oExitOnForwardFailure },
{ "xauthlocation", oXAuthLocation },
{ "gatewayports", oGatewayPorts },
{ "passwordauthentication", oPasswordAuthentication },
{ "kbdinteractiveauthentication", oKbdInteractiveAuthentication },
{ "kbdinteractivedevices", oKbdInteractiveDevices },
{ "pubkeyauthentication", oPubkeyAuthentication },
{ "dsaauthentication", oPubkeyAuthentication }, /* alias */
{ "hostbasedauthentication", oHostbasedAuthentication },
{ "challengeresponseauthentication", oChallengeResponseAuthentication },
{ "skeyauthentication", oUnsupported },
{ "tisauthentication", oChallengeResponseAuthentication }, /* alias */
{ "identityfile", oIdentityFile },
{ "identityfile2", oIdentityFile }, /* obsolete */
{ "identitiesonly", oIdentitiesOnly },
{ "certificatefile", oCertificateFile },
{ "addkeystoagent", oAddKeysToAgent },
{ "identityagent", oIdentityAgent },
{ "hostname", oHostname },
{ "hostkeyalias", oHostKeyAlias },
{ "proxycommand", oProxyCommand },
{ "port", oPort },
{ "ciphers", oCiphers },
{ "macs", oMacs },
{ "remoteforward", oRemoteForward },
{ "localforward", oLocalForward },
{ "user", oUser },
{ "host", oHost },
{ "match", oMatch },
{ "escapechar", oEscapeChar },
{ "globalknownhostsfile", oGlobalKnownHostsFile },
{ "userknownhostsfile", oUserKnownHostsFile },
{ "connectionattempts", oConnectionAttempts },
{ "batchmode", oBatchMode },
{ "checkhostip", oCheckHostIP },
{ "stricthostkeychecking", oStrictHostKeyChecking },
{ "compression", oCompression },
{ "tcpkeepalive", oTCPKeepAlive },
{ "keepalive", oTCPKeepAlive }, /* obsolete */
{ "numberofpasswordprompts", oNumberOfPasswordPrompts },
{ "syslogfacility", oLogFacility },
{ "loglevel", oLogLevel },
{ "dynamicforward", oDynamicForward },
{ "preferredauthentications", oPreferredAuthentications },
{ "hostkeyalgorithms", oHostKeyAlgorithms },
{ "casignaturealgorithms", oCASignatureAlgorithms },
{ "bindaddress", oBindAddress },
{ "bindinterface", oBindInterface },
{ "clearallforwardings", oClearAllForwardings },
{ "enablesshkeysign", oEnableSSHKeysign },
{ "verifyhostkeydns", oVerifyHostKeyDNS },
{ "nohostauthenticationforlocalhost", oNoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost },
{ "rekeylimit", oRekeyLimit },
{ "connecttimeout", oConnectTimeout },
{ "addressfamily", oAddressFamily },
{ "serveraliveinterval", oServerAliveInterval },
{ "serveralivecountmax", oServerAliveCountMax },
{ "sendenv", oSendEnv },
{ "setenv", oSetEnv },
{ "controlpath", oControlPath },
{ "controlmaster", oControlMaster },
{ "controlpersist", oControlPersist },
{ "hashknownhosts", oHashKnownHosts },
{ "include", oInclude },
{ "tunnel", oTunnel },
{ "tunneldevice", oTunnelDevice },
{ "localcommand", oLocalCommand },
{ "permitlocalcommand", oPermitLocalCommand },
{ "remotecommand", oRemoteCommand },
{ "visualhostkey", oVisualHostKey },
{ "kexalgorithms", oKexAlgorithms },
{ "ipqos", oIPQoS },
{ "requesttty", oRequestTTY },
{ "proxyusefdpass", oProxyUseFdpass },
{ "canonicaldomains", oCanonicalDomains },
{ "canonicalizefallbacklocal", oCanonicalizeFallbackLocal },
{ "canonicalizehostname", oCanonicalizeHostname },
{ "canonicalizemaxdots", oCanonicalizeMaxDots },
{ "canonicalizepermittedcnames", oCanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs },
{ "streamlocalbindmask", oStreamLocalBindMask },
{ "streamlocalbindunlink", oStreamLocalBindUnlink },
{ "revokedhostkeys", oRevokedHostKeys },
{ "fingerprinthash", oFingerprintHash },
{ "updatehostkeys", oUpdateHostkeys },
{ "hostbasedkeytypes", oHostbasedKeyTypes },
{ "pubkeyacceptedkeytypes", oPubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes },
{ "ignoreunknown", oIgnoreUnknown },
{ "proxyjump", oProxyJump },
+ { "securitykeyprovider", oSecurityKeyProvider },
{ NULL, oBadOption }
};
+static char *kex_default_pk_alg_filtered;
+
+const char *
+kex_default_pk_alg(void)
+{
+ if (kex_default_pk_alg_filtered == NULL)
+ fatal("kex_default_pk_alg not initialized.");
+ return kex_default_pk_alg_filtered;
+}
+
/*
* Adds a local TCP/IP port forward to options. Never returns if there is an
* error.
*/
void
add_local_forward(Options *options, const struct Forward *newfwd)
{
struct Forward *fwd;
int i;
/* Don't add duplicates */
for (i = 0; i < options->num_local_forwards; i++) {
if (forward_equals(newfwd, options->local_forwards + i))
return;
}
options->local_forwards = xreallocarray(options->local_forwards,
options->num_local_forwards + 1,
sizeof(*options->local_forwards));
fwd = &options->local_forwards[options->num_local_forwards++];
fwd->listen_host = newfwd->listen_host;
fwd->listen_port = newfwd->listen_port;
fwd->listen_path = newfwd->listen_path;
fwd->connect_host = newfwd->connect_host;
fwd->connect_port = newfwd->connect_port;
fwd->connect_path = newfwd->connect_path;
}
/*
* Adds a remote TCP/IP port forward to options. Never returns if there is
* an error.
*/
void
add_remote_forward(Options *options, const struct Forward *newfwd)
{
struct Forward *fwd;
int i;
/* Don't add duplicates */
for (i = 0; i < options->num_remote_forwards; i++) {
if (forward_equals(newfwd, options->remote_forwards + i))
return;
}
options->remote_forwards = xreallocarray(options->remote_forwards,
options->num_remote_forwards + 1,
sizeof(*options->remote_forwards));
fwd = &options->remote_forwards[options->num_remote_forwards++];
fwd->listen_host = newfwd->listen_host;
fwd->listen_port = newfwd->listen_port;
fwd->listen_path = newfwd->listen_path;
fwd->connect_host = newfwd->connect_host;
fwd->connect_port = newfwd->connect_port;
fwd->connect_path = newfwd->connect_path;
fwd->handle = newfwd->handle;
fwd->allocated_port = 0;
}
static void
clear_forwardings(Options *options)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < options->num_local_forwards; i++) {
free(options->local_forwards[i].listen_host);
free(options->local_forwards[i].listen_path);
free(options->local_forwards[i].connect_host);
free(options->local_forwards[i].connect_path);
}
if (options->num_local_forwards > 0) {
free(options->local_forwards);
options->local_forwards = NULL;
}
options->num_local_forwards = 0;
for (i = 0; i < options->num_remote_forwards; i++) {
free(options->remote_forwards[i].listen_host);
free(options->remote_forwards[i].listen_path);
free(options->remote_forwards[i].connect_host);
free(options->remote_forwards[i].connect_path);
}
if (options->num_remote_forwards > 0) {
free(options->remote_forwards);
options->remote_forwards = NULL;
}
options->num_remote_forwards = 0;
options->tun_open = SSH_TUNMODE_NO;
}
void
add_certificate_file(Options *options, const char *path, int userprovided)
{
int i;
if (options->num_certificate_files >= SSH_MAX_CERTIFICATE_FILES)
fatal("Too many certificate files specified (max %d)",
SSH_MAX_CERTIFICATE_FILES);
/* Avoid registering duplicates */
for (i = 0; i < options->num_certificate_files; i++) {
if (options->certificate_file_userprovided[i] == userprovided &&
strcmp(options->certificate_files[i], path) == 0) {
debug2("%s: ignoring duplicate key %s", __func__, path);
return;
}
}
options->certificate_file_userprovided[options->num_certificate_files] =
userprovided;
options->certificate_files[options->num_certificate_files++] =
xstrdup(path);
}
void
add_identity_file(Options *options, const char *dir, const char *filename,
int userprovided)
{
char *path;
int i;
if (options->num_identity_files >= SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES)
fatal("Too many identity files specified (max %d)",
SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES);
if (dir == NULL) /* no dir, filename is absolute */
path = xstrdup(filename);
else if (xasprintf(&path, "%s%s", dir, filename) >= PATH_MAX)
fatal("Identity file path %s too long", path);
/* Avoid registering duplicates */
for (i = 0; i < options->num_identity_files; i++) {
if (options->identity_file_userprovided[i] == userprovided &&
strcmp(options->identity_files[i], path) == 0) {
debug2("%s: ignoring duplicate key %s", __func__, path);
free(path);
return;
}
}
options->identity_file_userprovided[options->num_identity_files] =
userprovided;
options->identity_files[options->num_identity_files++] = path;
}
int
default_ssh_port(void)
{
static int port;
struct servent *sp;
if (port == 0) {
sp = getservbyname(SSH_SERVICE_NAME, "tcp");
port = sp ? ntohs(sp->s_port) : SSH_DEFAULT_PORT;
}
return port;
}
/*
* Execute a command in a shell.
* Return its exit status or -1 on abnormal exit.
*/
static int
execute_in_shell(const char *cmd)
{
char *shell;
pid_t pid;
int devnull, status;
if ((shell = getenv("SHELL")) == NULL)
shell = _PATH_BSHELL;
if (access(shell, X_OK) == -1) {
fatal("Shell \"%s\" is not executable: %s",
shell, strerror(errno));
}
/* Need this to redirect subprocess stdin/out */
if ((devnull = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDWR)) == -1)
fatal("open(/dev/null): %s", strerror(errno));
debug("Executing command: '%.500s'", cmd);
/* Fork and execute the command. */
if ((pid = fork()) == 0) {
char *argv[4];
/* Redirect child stdin and stdout. Leave stderr */
if (dup2(devnull, STDIN_FILENO) == -1)
fatal("dup2: %s", strerror(errno));
if (dup2(devnull, STDOUT_FILENO) == -1)
fatal("dup2: %s", strerror(errno));
if (devnull > STDERR_FILENO)
close(devnull);
closefrom(STDERR_FILENO + 1);
argv[0] = shell;
argv[1] = "-c";
argv[2] = xstrdup(cmd);
argv[3] = NULL;
execv(argv[0], argv);
error("Unable to execute '%.100s': %s", cmd, strerror(errno));
/* Die with signal to make this error apparent to parent. */
- signal(SIGTERM, SIG_DFL);
+ ssh_signal(SIGTERM, SIG_DFL);
kill(getpid(), SIGTERM);
_exit(1);
}
/* Parent. */
if (pid == -1)
fatal("%s: fork: %.100s", __func__, strerror(errno));
close(devnull);
while (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) == -1) {
if (errno != EINTR && errno != EAGAIN)
fatal("%s: waitpid: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
}
if (!WIFEXITED(status)) {
error("command '%.100s' exited abnormally", cmd);
return -1;
}
debug3("command returned status %d", WEXITSTATUS(status));
return WEXITSTATUS(status);
}
/*
* Parse and execute a Match directive.
*/
static int
match_cfg_line(Options *options, char **condition, struct passwd *pw,
const char *host_arg, const char *original_host, int final_pass,
int *want_final_pass, const char *filename, int linenum)
{
char *arg, *oattrib, *attrib, *cmd, *cp = *condition, *host, *criteria;
const char *ruser;
int r, port, this_result, result = 1, attributes = 0, negate;
char thishost[NI_MAXHOST], shorthost[NI_MAXHOST], portstr[NI_MAXSERV];
char uidstr[32];
/*
* Configuration is likely to be incomplete at this point so we
* must be prepared to use default values.
*/
port = options->port <= 0 ? default_ssh_port() : options->port;
ruser = options->user == NULL ? pw->pw_name : options->user;
if (final_pass) {
host = xstrdup(options->hostname);
} else if (options->hostname != NULL) {
/* NB. Please keep in sync with ssh.c:main() */
host = percent_expand(options->hostname,
"h", host_arg, (char *)NULL);
} else {
host = xstrdup(host_arg);
}
debug2("checking match for '%s' host %s originally %s",
cp, host, original_host);
while ((oattrib = attrib = strdelim(&cp)) && *attrib != '\0') {
criteria = NULL;
this_result = 1;
if ((negate = attrib[0] == '!'))
attrib++;
/* criteria "all" and "canonical" have no argument */
if (strcasecmp(attrib, "all") == 0) {
if (attributes > 1 ||
((arg = strdelim(&cp)) != NULL && *arg != '\0')) {
error("%.200s line %d: '%s' cannot be combined "
"with other Match attributes",
filename, linenum, oattrib);
result = -1;
goto out;
}
if (result)
result = negate ? 0 : 1;
goto out;
}
attributes++;
if (strcasecmp(attrib, "canonical") == 0 ||
strcasecmp(attrib, "final") == 0) {
/*
* If the config requests "Match final" then remember
* this so we can perform a second pass later.
*/
if (strcasecmp(attrib, "final") == 0 &&
want_final_pass != NULL)
*want_final_pass = 1;
r = !!final_pass; /* force bitmask member to boolean */
if (r == (negate ? 1 : 0))
this_result = result = 0;
debug3("%.200s line %d: %smatched '%s'",
filename, linenum,
this_result ? "" : "not ", oattrib);
continue;
}
/* All other criteria require an argument */
if ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) == NULL || *arg == '\0') {
error("Missing Match criteria for %s", attrib);
result = -1;
goto out;
}
if (strcasecmp(attrib, "host") == 0) {
criteria = xstrdup(host);
r = match_hostname(host, arg) == 1;
if (r == (negate ? 1 : 0))
this_result = result = 0;
} else if (strcasecmp(attrib, "originalhost") == 0) {
criteria = xstrdup(original_host);
r = match_hostname(original_host, arg) == 1;
if (r == (negate ? 1 : 0))
this_result = result = 0;
} else if (strcasecmp(attrib, "user") == 0) {
criteria = xstrdup(ruser);
r = match_pattern_list(ruser, arg, 0) == 1;
if (r == (negate ? 1 : 0))
this_result = result = 0;
} else if (strcasecmp(attrib, "localuser") == 0) {
criteria = xstrdup(pw->pw_name);
r = match_pattern_list(pw->pw_name, arg, 0) == 1;
if (r == (negate ? 1 : 0))
this_result = result = 0;
} else if (strcasecmp(attrib, "exec") == 0) {
if (gethostname(thishost, sizeof(thishost)) == -1)
fatal("gethostname: %s", strerror(errno));
strlcpy(shorthost, thishost, sizeof(shorthost));
shorthost[strcspn(thishost, ".")] = '\0';
snprintf(portstr, sizeof(portstr), "%d", port);
snprintf(uidstr, sizeof(uidstr), "%llu",
(unsigned long long)pw->pw_uid);
cmd = percent_expand(arg,
"L", shorthost,
"d", pw->pw_dir,
"h", host,
"l", thishost,
"n", original_host,
"p", portstr,
"r", ruser,
"u", pw->pw_name,
"i", uidstr,
(char *)NULL);
if (result != 1) {
/* skip execution if prior predicate failed */
debug3("%.200s line %d: skipped exec "
"\"%.100s\"", filename, linenum, cmd);
free(cmd);
continue;
}
r = execute_in_shell(cmd);
if (r == -1) {
fatal("%.200s line %d: match exec "
"'%.100s' error", filename,
linenum, cmd);
}
criteria = xstrdup(cmd);
free(cmd);
/* Force exit status to boolean */
r = r == 0;
if (r == (negate ? 1 : 0))
this_result = result = 0;
} else {
error("Unsupported Match attribute %s", attrib);
result = -1;
goto out;
}
debug3("%.200s line %d: %smatched '%s \"%.100s\"' ",
filename, linenum, this_result ? "": "not ",
oattrib, criteria);
free(criteria);
}
if (attributes == 0) {
error("One or more attributes required for Match");
result = -1;
goto out;
}
out:
if (result != -1)
debug2("match %sfound", result ? "" : "not ");
*condition = cp;
free(host);
return result;
}
/* Remove environment variable by pattern */
static void
rm_env(Options *options, const char *arg, const char *filename, int linenum)
{
int i, j;
char *cp;
/* Remove an environment variable */
for (i = 0; i < options->num_send_env; ) {
cp = xstrdup(options->send_env[i]);
if (!match_pattern(cp, arg + 1)) {
free(cp);
i++;
continue;
}
debug3("%s line %d: removing environment %s",
filename, linenum, cp);
free(cp);
free(options->send_env[i]);
options->send_env[i] = NULL;
for (j = i; j < options->num_send_env - 1; j++) {
options->send_env[j] = options->send_env[j + 1];
options->send_env[j + 1] = NULL;
}
options->num_send_env--;
/* NB. don't increment i */
}
}
/*
* Returns the number of the token pointed to by cp or oBadOption.
*/
static OpCodes
parse_token(const char *cp, const char *filename, int linenum,
const char *ignored_unknown)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; keywords[i].name; i++)
if (strcmp(cp, keywords[i].name) == 0)
return keywords[i].opcode;
if (ignored_unknown != NULL &&
match_pattern_list(cp, ignored_unknown, 1) == 1)
return oIgnoredUnknownOption;
error("%s: line %d: Bad configuration option: %s",
filename, linenum, cp);
return oBadOption;
}
/* Multistate option parsing */
struct multistate {
char *key;
int value;
};
static const struct multistate multistate_flag[] = {
{ "true", 1 },
{ "false", 0 },
{ "yes", 1 },
{ "no", 0 },
{ NULL, -1 }
};
static const struct multistate multistate_yesnoask[] = {
{ "true", 1 },
{ "false", 0 },
{ "yes", 1 },
{ "no", 0 },
{ "ask", 2 },
{ NULL, -1 }
};
static const struct multistate multistate_strict_hostkey[] = {
{ "true", SSH_STRICT_HOSTKEY_YES },
{ "false", SSH_STRICT_HOSTKEY_OFF },
{ "yes", SSH_STRICT_HOSTKEY_YES },
{ "no", SSH_STRICT_HOSTKEY_OFF },
{ "ask", SSH_STRICT_HOSTKEY_ASK },
{ "off", SSH_STRICT_HOSTKEY_OFF },
{ "accept-new", SSH_STRICT_HOSTKEY_NEW },
{ NULL, -1 }
};
static const struct multistate multistate_yesnoaskconfirm[] = {
{ "true", 1 },
{ "false", 0 },
{ "yes", 1 },
{ "no", 0 },
{ "ask", 2 },
{ "confirm", 3 },
{ NULL, -1 }
};
static const struct multistate multistate_addressfamily[] = {
{ "inet", AF_INET },
{ "inet6", AF_INET6 },
{ "any", AF_UNSPEC },
{ NULL, -1 }
};
static const struct multistate multistate_controlmaster[] = {
{ "true", SSHCTL_MASTER_YES },
{ "yes", SSHCTL_MASTER_YES },
{ "false", SSHCTL_MASTER_NO },
{ "no", SSHCTL_MASTER_NO },
{ "auto", SSHCTL_MASTER_AUTO },
{ "ask", SSHCTL_MASTER_ASK },
{ "autoask", SSHCTL_MASTER_AUTO_ASK },
{ NULL, -1 }
};
static const struct multistate multistate_tunnel[] = {
{ "ethernet", SSH_TUNMODE_ETHERNET },
{ "point-to-point", SSH_TUNMODE_POINTOPOINT },
{ "true", SSH_TUNMODE_DEFAULT },
{ "yes", SSH_TUNMODE_DEFAULT },
{ "false", SSH_TUNMODE_NO },
{ "no", SSH_TUNMODE_NO },
{ NULL, -1 }
};
static const struct multistate multistate_requesttty[] = {
{ "true", REQUEST_TTY_YES },
{ "yes", REQUEST_TTY_YES },
{ "false", REQUEST_TTY_NO },
{ "no", REQUEST_TTY_NO },
{ "force", REQUEST_TTY_FORCE },
{ "auto", REQUEST_TTY_AUTO },
{ NULL, -1 }
};
static const struct multistate multistate_canonicalizehostname[] = {
{ "true", SSH_CANONICALISE_YES },
{ "false", SSH_CANONICALISE_NO },
{ "yes", SSH_CANONICALISE_YES },
{ "no", SSH_CANONICALISE_NO },
{ "always", SSH_CANONICALISE_ALWAYS },
{ NULL, -1 }
};
+static const struct multistate multistate_compression[] = {
+#ifdef WITH_ZLIB
+ { "yes", COMP_ZLIB },
+#endif
+ { "no", COMP_NONE },
+ { NULL, -1 }
+};
/*
* Processes a single option line as used in the configuration files. This
* only sets those values that have not already been set.
*/
int
process_config_line(Options *options, struct passwd *pw, const char *host,
const char *original_host, char *line, const char *filename,
int linenum, int *activep, int flags)
{
return process_config_line_depth(options, pw, host, original_host,
line, filename, linenum, activep, flags, NULL, 0);
}
#define WHITESPACE " \t\r\n"
static int
process_config_line_depth(Options *options, struct passwd *pw, const char *host,
const char *original_host, char *line, const char *filename,
int linenum, int *activep, int flags, int *want_final_pass, int depth)
{
char *s, **charptr, *endofnumber, *keyword, *arg, *arg2;
char **cpptr, fwdarg[256];
u_int i, *uintptr, max_entries = 0;
int r, oactive, negated, opcode, *intptr, value, value2, cmdline = 0;
int remotefwd, dynamicfwd;
LogLevel *log_level_ptr;
SyslogFacility *log_facility_ptr;
long long val64;
size_t len;
struct Forward fwd;
const struct multistate *multistate_ptr;
struct allowed_cname *cname;
glob_t gl;
const char *errstr;
if (activep == NULL) { /* We are processing a command line directive */
cmdline = 1;
activep = &cmdline;
}
/* Strip trailing whitespace. Allow \f (form feed) at EOL only */
if ((len = strlen(line)) == 0)
return 0;
for (len--; len > 0; len--) {
if (strchr(WHITESPACE "\f", line[len]) == NULL)
break;
line[len] = '\0';
}
s = line;
/* Get the keyword. (Each line is supposed to begin with a keyword). */
if ((keyword = strdelim(&s)) == NULL)
return 0;
/* Ignore leading whitespace. */
if (*keyword == '\0')
keyword = strdelim(&s);
if (keyword == NULL || !*keyword || *keyword == '\n' || *keyword == '#')
return 0;
/* Match lowercase keyword */
lowercase(keyword);
opcode = parse_token(keyword, filename, linenum,
options->ignored_unknown);
switch (opcode) {
case oBadOption:
/* don't panic, but count bad options */
return -1;
case oIgnore:
return 0;
case oIgnoredUnknownOption:
debug("%s line %d: Ignored unknown option \"%s\"",
filename, linenum, keyword);
return 0;
case oConnectTimeout:
intptr = &options->connection_timeout;
parse_time:
arg = strdelim(&s);
if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
fatal("%s line %d: missing time value.",
filename, linenum);
if (strcmp(arg, "none") == 0)
value = -1;
else if ((value = convtime(arg)) == -1)
fatal("%s line %d: invalid time value.",
filename, linenum);
if (*activep && *intptr == -1)
*intptr = value;
break;
case oForwardAgent:
intptr = &options->forward_agent;
+
+ arg = strdelim(&s);
+ if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
+ fatal("%s line %d: missing argument.",
+ filename, linenum);
+
+ value = -1;
+ multistate_ptr = multistate_flag;
+ for (i = 0; multistate_ptr[i].key != NULL; i++) {
+ if (strcasecmp(arg, multistate_ptr[i].key) == 0) {
+ value = multistate_ptr[i].value;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ if (value != -1) {
+ if (*activep && *intptr == -1)
+ *intptr = value;
+ break;
+ }
+ /* ForwardAgent wasn't 'yes' or 'no', assume a path */
+ if (*activep && *intptr == -1)
+ *intptr = 1;
+
+ charptr = &options->forward_agent_sock_path;
+ goto parse_agent_path;
+
+ case oForwardX11:
+ intptr = &options->forward_x11;
parse_flag:
multistate_ptr = multistate_flag;
parse_multistate:
arg = strdelim(&s);
if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
fatal("%s line %d: missing argument.",
filename, linenum);
value = -1;
for (i = 0; multistate_ptr[i].key != NULL; i++) {
if (strcasecmp(arg, multistate_ptr[i].key) == 0) {
value = multistate_ptr[i].value;
break;
}
}
if (value == -1)
fatal("%s line %d: unsupported option \"%s\".",
filename, linenum, arg);
if (*activep && *intptr == -1)
*intptr = value;
break;
- case oForwardX11:
- intptr = &options->forward_x11;
- goto parse_flag;
-
case oForwardX11Trusted:
intptr = &options->forward_x11_trusted;
goto parse_flag;
case oForwardX11Timeout:
intptr = &options->forward_x11_timeout;
goto parse_time;
case oGatewayPorts:
intptr = &options->fwd_opts.gateway_ports;
goto parse_flag;
case oExitOnForwardFailure:
intptr = &options->exit_on_forward_failure;
goto parse_flag;
case oPasswordAuthentication:
intptr = &options->password_authentication;
goto parse_flag;
case oKbdInteractiveAuthentication:
intptr = &options->kbd_interactive_authentication;
goto parse_flag;
case oKbdInteractiveDevices:
charptr = &options->kbd_interactive_devices;
goto parse_string;
case oPubkeyAuthentication:
intptr = &options->pubkey_authentication;
goto parse_flag;
case oHostbasedAuthentication:
intptr = &options->hostbased_authentication;
goto parse_flag;
case oChallengeResponseAuthentication:
intptr = &options->challenge_response_authentication;
goto parse_flag;
case oGssAuthentication:
intptr = &options->gss_authentication;
goto parse_flag;
case oGssDelegateCreds:
intptr = &options->gss_deleg_creds;
goto parse_flag;
case oBatchMode:
intptr = &options->batch_mode;
goto parse_flag;
case oCheckHostIP:
intptr = &options->check_host_ip;
goto parse_flag;
case oVerifyHostKeyDNS:
intptr = &options->verify_host_key_dns;
multistate_ptr = multistate_yesnoask;
goto parse_multistate;
case oStrictHostKeyChecking:
intptr = &options->strict_host_key_checking;
multistate_ptr = multistate_strict_hostkey;
goto parse_multistate;
case oCompression:
intptr = &options->compression;
- goto parse_flag;
+ multistate_ptr = multistate_compression;
+ goto parse_multistate;
case oTCPKeepAlive:
intptr = &options->tcp_keep_alive;
goto parse_flag;
case oNoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost:
intptr = &options->no_host_authentication_for_localhost;
goto parse_flag;
case oNumberOfPasswordPrompts:
intptr = &options->number_of_password_prompts;
goto parse_int;
case oRekeyLimit:
arg = strdelim(&s);
if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename,
linenum);
if (strcmp(arg, "default") == 0) {
val64 = 0;
} else {
if (scan_scaled(arg, &val64) == -1)
fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad number '%s': %s",
filename, linenum, arg, strerror(errno));
if (val64 != 0 && val64 < 16)
fatal("%.200s line %d: RekeyLimit too small",
filename, linenum);
}
if (*activep && options->rekey_limit == -1)
options->rekey_limit = val64;
if (s != NULL) { /* optional rekey interval present */
if (strcmp(s, "none") == 0) {
(void)strdelim(&s); /* discard */
break;
}
intptr = &options->rekey_interval;
goto parse_time;
}
break;
case oIdentityFile:
arg = strdelim(&s);
if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum);
if (*activep) {
intptr = &options->num_identity_files;
if (*intptr >= SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES)
fatal("%.200s line %d: Too many identity files specified (max %d).",
filename, linenum, SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES);
add_identity_file(options, NULL,
arg, flags & SSHCONF_USERCONF);
}
break;
case oCertificateFile:
arg = strdelim(&s);
if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.",
filename, linenum);
if (*activep) {
intptr = &options->num_certificate_files;
if (*intptr >= SSH_MAX_CERTIFICATE_FILES) {
fatal("%.200s line %d: Too many certificate "
"files specified (max %d).",
filename, linenum,
SSH_MAX_CERTIFICATE_FILES);
}
add_certificate_file(options, arg,
flags & SSHCONF_USERCONF);
}
break;
case oXAuthLocation:
charptr=&options->xauth_location;
goto parse_string;
case oUser:
charptr = &options->user;
parse_string:
arg = strdelim(&s);
if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.",
filename, linenum);
if (*activep && *charptr == NULL)
*charptr = xstrdup(arg);
break;
case oGlobalKnownHostsFile:
cpptr = (char **)&options->system_hostfiles;
uintptr = &options->num_system_hostfiles;
max_entries = SSH_MAX_HOSTS_FILES;
parse_char_array:
if (*activep && *uintptr == 0) {
while ((arg = strdelim(&s)) != NULL && *arg != '\0') {
if ((*uintptr) >= max_entries)
fatal("%s line %d: "
"too many authorized keys files.",
filename, linenum);
cpptr[(*uintptr)++] = xstrdup(arg);
}
}
return 0;
case oUserKnownHostsFile:
cpptr = (char **)&options->user_hostfiles;
uintptr = &options->num_user_hostfiles;
max_entries = SSH_MAX_HOSTS_FILES;
goto parse_char_array;
case oHostname:
charptr = &options->hostname;
goto parse_string;
case oHostKeyAlias:
charptr = &options->host_key_alias;
goto parse_string;
case oPreferredAuthentications:
charptr = &options->preferred_authentications;
goto parse_string;
case oBindAddress:
charptr = &options->bind_address;
goto parse_string;
case oBindInterface:
charptr = &options->bind_interface;
goto parse_string;
case oPKCS11Provider:
charptr = &options->pkcs11_provider;
goto parse_string;
+ case oSecurityKeyProvider:
+ charptr = &options->sk_provider;
+ goto parse_string;
+
case oProxyCommand:
charptr = &options->proxy_command;
/* Ignore ProxyCommand if ProxyJump already specified */
if (options->jump_host != NULL)
charptr = &options->jump_host; /* Skip below */
parse_command:
if (s == NULL)
fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum);
len = strspn(s, WHITESPACE "=");
if (*activep && *charptr == NULL)
*charptr = xstrdup(s + len);
return 0;
case oProxyJump:
if (s == NULL) {
fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.",
filename, linenum);
}
len = strspn(s, WHITESPACE "=");
if (parse_jump(s + len, options, *activep) == -1) {
fatal("%.200s line %d: Invalid ProxyJump \"%s\"",
filename, linenum, s + len);
}
return 0;
case oPort:
arg = strdelim(&s);
if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.",
filename, linenum);
value = a2port(arg);
if (value <= 0)
fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad port '%s'.",
filename, linenum, arg);
if (*activep && options->port == -1)
options->port = value;
break;
case oConnectionAttempts:
intptr = &options->connection_attempts;
parse_int:
arg = strdelim(&s);
if ((errstr = atoi_err(arg, &value)) != NULL)
fatal("%s line %d: integer value %s.",
filename, linenum, errstr);
if (*activep && *intptr == -1)
*intptr = value;
break;
case oCiphers:
arg = strdelim(&s);
if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum);
if (*arg != '-' &&
!ciphers_valid(*arg == '+' || *arg == '^' ? arg + 1 : arg))
fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad SSH2 cipher spec '%s'.",
filename, linenum, arg ? arg : "<NONE>");
if (*activep && options->ciphers == NULL)
options->ciphers = xstrdup(arg);
break;
case oMacs:
arg = strdelim(&s);
if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum);
if (*arg != '-' &&
!mac_valid(*arg == '+' || *arg == '^' ? arg + 1 : arg))
fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad SSH2 MAC spec '%s'.",
filename, linenum, arg ? arg : "<NONE>");
if (*activep && options->macs == NULL)
options->macs = xstrdup(arg);
break;
case oKexAlgorithms:
arg = strdelim(&s);
if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.",
filename, linenum);
if (*arg != '-' &&
!kex_names_valid(*arg == '+' || *arg == '^' ?
arg + 1 : arg))
fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad SSH2 KexAlgorithms '%s'.",
filename, linenum, arg ? arg : "<NONE>");
if (*activep && options->kex_algorithms == NULL)
options->kex_algorithms = xstrdup(arg);
break;
case oHostKeyAlgorithms:
charptr = &options->hostkeyalgorithms;
parse_keytypes:
arg = strdelim(&s);
if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.",
filename, linenum);
if (*arg != '-' &&
!sshkey_names_valid2(*arg == '+' || *arg == '^' ?
arg + 1 : arg, 1))
fatal("%s line %d: Bad key types '%s'.",
filename, linenum, arg ? arg : "<NONE>");
if (*activep && *charptr == NULL)
*charptr = xstrdup(arg);
break;
case oCASignatureAlgorithms:
charptr = &options->ca_sign_algorithms;
goto parse_keytypes;
case oLogLevel:
log_level_ptr = &options->log_level;
arg = strdelim(&s);
value = log_level_number(arg);
if (value == SYSLOG_LEVEL_NOT_SET)
fatal("%.200s line %d: unsupported log level '%s'",
filename, linenum, arg ? arg : "<NONE>");
if (*activep && *log_level_ptr == SYSLOG_LEVEL_NOT_SET)
*log_level_ptr = (LogLevel) value;
break;
case oLogFacility:
log_facility_ptr = &options->log_facility;
arg = strdelim(&s);
value = log_facility_number(arg);
if (value == SYSLOG_FACILITY_NOT_SET)
fatal("%.200s line %d: unsupported log facility '%s'",
filename, linenum, arg ? arg : "<NONE>");
if (*log_facility_ptr == -1)
*log_facility_ptr = (SyslogFacility) value;
break;
case oLocalForward:
case oRemoteForward:
case oDynamicForward:
arg = strdelim(&s);
if (arg == NULL || *arg == '\0')
fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing port argument.",
filename, linenum);
remotefwd = (opcode == oRemoteForward);
dynamicfwd = (opcode == oDynamicForward);
if (!dynamicfwd) {
arg2 = strdelim(&s);
if (arg2 == NULL || *arg2 == '\0') {
if (remotefwd)
dynamicfwd = 1;
else
fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing target "
"argument.", filename, linenum);
} else {
/* construct a string for parse_forward */
snprintf(fwdarg, sizeof(fwdarg), "%s:%s", arg,
arg2);
}
}
if (dynamicfwd)
strlcpy(fwdarg, arg, sizeof(fwdarg));
if (parse_forward(&fwd, fwdarg, dynamicfwd, remotefwd) == 0)
fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad forwarding specification.",
filename, linenum);
if (*activep) {
if (remotefwd) {
add_remote_forward(options, &fwd);
} else {
add_local_forward(options, &fwd);
}
}
break;
case oClearAllForwardings:
intptr = &options->clear_forwardings;
goto parse_flag;
case oHost:
if (cmdline)
fatal("Host directive not supported as a command-line "
"option");
*activep = 0;
arg2 = NULL;
while ((arg = strdelim(&s)) != NULL && *arg != '\0') {
if ((flags & SSHCONF_NEVERMATCH) != 0)
break;
negated = *arg == '!';
if (negated)
arg++;
if (match_pattern(host, arg)) {
if (negated) {
debug("%.200s line %d: Skipping Host "
"block because of negated match "
"for %.100s", filename, linenum,
arg);
*activep = 0;
break;
}
if (!*activep)
arg2 = arg; /* logged below */
*activep = 1;
}
}
if (*activep)
debug("%.200s line %d: Applying options for %.100s",
filename, linenum, arg2);
/* Avoid garbage check below, as strdelim is done. */
return 0;
case oMatch:
if (cmdline)
fatal("Host directive not supported as a command-line "
"option");
value = match_cfg_line(options, &s, pw, host, original_host,
flags & SSHCONF_FINAL, want_final_pass,
filename, linenum);
if (value < 0)
fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad Match condition", filename,
linenum);
*activep = (flags & SSHCONF_NEVERMATCH) ? 0 : value;
break;
case oEscapeChar:
intptr = &options->escape_char;
arg = strdelim(&s);
if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum);
if (strcmp(arg, "none") == 0)
value = SSH_ESCAPECHAR_NONE;
else if (arg[1] == '\0')
value = (u_char) arg[0];
else if (arg[0] == '^' && arg[2] == 0 &&
(u_char) arg[1] >= 64 && (u_char) arg[1] < 128)
value = (u_char) arg[1] & 31;
else {
fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad escape character.",
filename, linenum);
/* NOTREACHED */
value = 0; /* Avoid compiler warning. */
}
if (*activep && *intptr == -1)
*intptr = value;
break;
case oAddressFamily:
intptr = &options->address_family;
multistate_ptr = multistate_addressfamily;
goto parse_multistate;
case oEnableSSHKeysign:
intptr = &options->enable_ssh_keysign;
goto parse_flag;
case oIdentitiesOnly:
intptr = &options->identities_only;
goto parse_flag;
case oServerAliveInterval:
intptr = &options->server_alive_interval;
goto parse_time;
case oServerAliveCountMax:
intptr = &options->server_alive_count_max;
goto parse_int;
case oSendEnv:
while ((arg = strdelim(&s)) != NULL && *arg != '\0') {
if (strchr(arg, '=') != NULL)
fatal("%s line %d: Invalid environment name.",
filename, linenum);
if (!*activep)
continue;
if (*arg == '-') {
/* Removing an env var */
rm_env(options, arg, filename, linenum);
continue;
} else {
/* Adding an env var */
if (options->num_send_env >= INT_MAX)
fatal("%s line %d: too many send env.",
filename, linenum);
options->send_env = xrecallocarray(
options->send_env, options->num_send_env,
options->num_send_env + 1,
sizeof(*options->send_env));
options->send_env[options->num_send_env++] =
xstrdup(arg);
}
}
break;
case oSetEnv:
value = options->num_setenv;
while ((arg = strdelimw(&s)) != NULL && *arg != '\0') {
if (strchr(arg, '=') == NULL)
fatal("%s line %d: Invalid SetEnv.",
filename, linenum);
if (!*activep || value != 0)
continue;
/* Adding a setenv var */
if (options->num_setenv >= INT_MAX)
fatal("%s line %d: too many SetEnv.",
filename, linenum);
options->setenv = xrecallocarray(
options->setenv, options->num_setenv,
options->num_setenv + 1, sizeof(*options->setenv));
options->setenv[options->num_setenv++] = xstrdup(arg);
}
break;
case oControlPath:
charptr = &options->control_path;
goto parse_string;
case oControlMaster:
intptr = &options->control_master;
multistate_ptr = multistate_controlmaster;
goto parse_multistate;
case oControlPersist:
/* no/false/yes/true, or a time spec */
intptr = &options->control_persist;
arg = strdelim(&s);
if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing ControlPersist"
" argument.", filename, linenum);
value = 0;
value2 = 0; /* timeout */
if (strcmp(arg, "no") == 0 || strcmp(arg, "false") == 0)
value = 0;
else if (strcmp(arg, "yes") == 0 || strcmp(arg, "true") == 0)
value = 1;
else if ((value2 = convtime(arg)) >= 0)
value = 1;
else
fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad ControlPersist argument.",
filename, linenum);
if (*activep && *intptr == -1) {
*intptr = value;
options->control_persist_timeout = value2;
}
break;
case oHashKnownHosts:
intptr = &options->hash_known_hosts;
goto parse_flag;
case oTunnel:
intptr = &options->tun_open;
multistate_ptr = multistate_tunnel;
goto parse_multistate;
case oTunnelDevice:
arg = strdelim(&s);
if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum);
value = a2tun(arg, &value2);
if (value == SSH_TUNID_ERR)
fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad tun device.", filename, linenum);
if (*activep) {
options->tun_local = value;
options->tun_remote = value2;
}
break;
case oLocalCommand:
charptr = &options->local_command;
goto parse_command;
case oPermitLocalCommand:
intptr = &options->permit_local_command;
goto parse_flag;
case oRemoteCommand:
charptr = &options->remote_command;
goto parse_command;
case oVisualHostKey:
intptr = &options->visual_host_key;
goto parse_flag;
case oInclude:
if (cmdline)
fatal("Include directive not supported as a "
"command-line option");
value = 0;
while ((arg = strdelim(&s)) != NULL && *arg != '\0') {
/*
* Ensure all paths are anchored. User configuration
* files may begin with '~/' but system configurations
* must not. If the path is relative, then treat it
* as living in ~/.ssh for user configurations or
* /etc/ssh for system ones.
*/
if (*arg == '~' && (flags & SSHCONF_USERCONF) == 0)
fatal("%.200s line %d: bad include path %s.",
filename, linenum, arg);
if (!path_absolute(arg) && *arg != '~') {
xasprintf(&arg2, "%s/%s",
(flags & SSHCONF_USERCONF) ?
"~/" _PATH_SSH_USER_DIR : SSHDIR, arg);
} else
arg2 = xstrdup(arg);
memset(&gl, 0, sizeof(gl));
r = glob(arg2, GLOB_TILDE, NULL, &gl);
if (r == GLOB_NOMATCH) {
debug("%.200s line %d: include %s matched no "
"files",filename, linenum, arg2);
free(arg2);
continue;
- } else if (r != 0 || gl.gl_pathc < 0)
+ } else if (r != 0)
fatal("%.200s line %d: glob failed for %s.",
filename, linenum, arg2);
free(arg2);
oactive = *activep;
- for (i = 0; i < (u_int)gl.gl_pathc; i++) {
+ for (i = 0; i < gl.gl_pathc; i++) {
debug3("%.200s line %d: Including file %s "
"depth %d%s", filename, linenum,
gl.gl_pathv[i], depth,
oactive ? "" : " (parse only)");
r = read_config_file_depth(gl.gl_pathv[i],
pw, host, original_host, options,
flags | SSHCONF_CHECKPERM |
(oactive ? 0 : SSHCONF_NEVERMATCH),
activep, want_final_pass, depth + 1);
if (r != 1 && errno != ENOENT) {
fatal("Can't open user config file "
"%.100s: %.100s", gl.gl_pathv[i],
strerror(errno));
}
/*
* don't let Match in includes clobber the
* containing file's Match state.
*/
*activep = oactive;
if (r != 1)
value = -1;
}
globfree(&gl);
}
if (value != 0)
return value;
break;
case oIPQoS:
arg = strdelim(&s);
if ((value = parse_ipqos(arg)) == -1)
fatal("%s line %d: Bad IPQoS value: %s",
filename, linenum, arg);
arg = strdelim(&s);
if (arg == NULL)
value2 = value;
else if ((value2 = parse_ipqos(arg)) == -1)
fatal("%s line %d: Bad IPQoS value: %s",
filename, linenum, arg);
if (*activep) {
options->ip_qos_interactive = value;
options->ip_qos_bulk = value2;
}
break;
case oRequestTTY:
intptr = &options->request_tty;
multistate_ptr = multistate_requesttty;
goto parse_multistate;
case oIgnoreUnknown:
charptr = &options->ignored_unknown;
goto parse_string;
case oProxyUseFdpass:
intptr = &options->proxy_use_fdpass;
goto parse_flag;
case oCanonicalDomains:
value = options->num_canonical_domains != 0;
while ((arg = strdelim(&s)) != NULL && *arg != '\0') {
if (!valid_domain(arg, 1, &errstr)) {
fatal("%s line %d: %s", filename, linenum,
errstr);
}
if (!*activep || value)
continue;
if (options->num_canonical_domains >= MAX_CANON_DOMAINS)
fatal("%s line %d: too many hostname suffixes.",
filename, linenum);
options->canonical_domains[
options->num_canonical_domains++] = xstrdup(arg);
}
break;
case oCanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs:
value = options->num_permitted_cnames != 0;
while ((arg = strdelim(&s)) != NULL && *arg != '\0') {
/* Either '*' for everything or 'list:list' */
if (strcmp(arg, "*") == 0)
arg2 = arg;
else {
lowercase(arg);
if ((arg2 = strchr(arg, ':')) == NULL ||
arg2[1] == '\0') {
fatal("%s line %d: "
"Invalid permitted CNAME \"%s\"",
filename, linenum, arg);
}
*arg2 = '\0';
arg2++;
}
if (!*activep || value)
continue;
if (options->num_permitted_cnames >= MAX_CANON_DOMAINS)
fatal("%s line %d: too many permitted CNAMEs.",
filename, linenum);
cname = options->permitted_cnames +
options->num_permitted_cnames++;
cname->source_list = xstrdup(arg);
cname->target_list = xstrdup(arg2);
}
break;
case oCanonicalizeHostname:
intptr = &options->canonicalize_hostname;
multistate_ptr = multistate_canonicalizehostname;
goto parse_multistate;
case oCanonicalizeMaxDots:
intptr = &options->canonicalize_max_dots;
goto parse_int;
case oCanonicalizeFallbackLocal:
intptr = &options->canonicalize_fallback_local;
goto parse_flag;
case oStreamLocalBindMask:
arg = strdelim(&s);
if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing StreamLocalBindMask argument.", filename, linenum);
/* Parse mode in octal format */
value = strtol(arg, &endofnumber, 8);
if (arg == endofnumber || value < 0 || value > 0777)
fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad mask.", filename, linenum);
options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_mask = (mode_t)value;
break;
case oStreamLocalBindUnlink:
intptr = &options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_unlink;
goto parse_flag;
case oRevokedHostKeys:
charptr = &options->revoked_host_keys;
goto parse_string;
case oFingerprintHash:
intptr = &options->fingerprint_hash;
arg = strdelim(&s);
if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.",
filename, linenum);
if ((value = ssh_digest_alg_by_name(arg)) == -1)
fatal("%.200s line %d: Invalid hash algorithm \"%s\".",
filename, linenum, arg);
if (*activep && *intptr == -1)
*intptr = value;
break;
case oUpdateHostkeys:
intptr = &options->update_hostkeys;
multistate_ptr = multistate_yesnoask;
goto parse_multistate;
case oHostbasedKeyTypes:
charptr = &options->hostbased_key_types;
goto parse_keytypes;
case oPubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes:
charptr = &options->pubkey_key_types;
goto parse_keytypes;
case oAddKeysToAgent:
intptr = &options->add_keys_to_agent;
multistate_ptr = multistate_yesnoaskconfirm;
goto parse_multistate;
case oIdentityAgent:
charptr = &options->identity_agent;
arg = strdelim(&s);
if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.",
filename, linenum);
+ parse_agent_path:
/* Extra validation if the string represents an env var. */
if (arg[0] == '$' && !valid_env_name(arg + 1)) {
fatal("%.200s line %d: Invalid environment name %s.",
filename, linenum, arg);
}
if (*activep && *charptr == NULL)
*charptr = xstrdup(arg);
break;
case oDeprecated:
debug("%s line %d: Deprecated option \"%s\"",
filename, linenum, keyword);
return 0;
case oUnsupported:
error("%s line %d: Unsupported option \"%s\"",
filename, linenum, keyword);
return 0;
default:
fatal("%s: Unimplemented opcode %d", __func__, opcode);
}
/* Check that there is no garbage at end of line. */
if ((arg = strdelim(&s)) != NULL && *arg != '\0') {
fatal("%.200s line %d: garbage at end of line; \"%.200s\".",
filename, linenum, arg);
}
return 0;
}
/*
* Reads the config file and modifies the options accordingly. Options
* should already be initialized before this call. This never returns if
* there is an error. If the file does not exist, this returns 0.
*/
int
read_config_file(const char *filename, struct passwd *pw, const char *host,
const char *original_host, Options *options, int flags,
int *want_final_pass)
{
int active = 1;
return read_config_file_depth(filename, pw, host, original_host,
options, flags, &active, want_final_pass, 0);
}
#define READCONF_MAX_DEPTH 16
static int
read_config_file_depth(const char *filename, struct passwd *pw,
const char *host, const char *original_host, Options *options,
int flags, int *activep, int *want_final_pass, int depth)
{
FILE *f;
char *line = NULL;
size_t linesize = 0;
int linenum;
int bad_options = 0;
if (depth < 0 || depth > READCONF_MAX_DEPTH)
fatal("Too many recursive configuration includes");
if ((f = fopen(filename, "r")) == NULL)
return 0;
if (flags & SSHCONF_CHECKPERM) {
struct stat sb;
if (fstat(fileno(f), &sb) == -1)
fatal("fstat %s: %s", filename, strerror(errno));
if (((sb.st_uid != 0 && sb.st_uid != getuid()) ||
(sb.st_mode & 022) != 0))
fatal("Bad owner or permissions on %s", filename);
}
debug("Reading configuration data %.200s", filename);
/*
* Mark that we are now processing the options. This flag is turned
* on/off by Host specifications.
*/
linenum = 0;
while (getline(&line, &linesize, f) != -1) {
/* Update line number counter. */
linenum++;
if (process_config_line_depth(options, pw, host, original_host,
line, filename, linenum, activep, flags, want_final_pass,
depth) != 0)
bad_options++;
}
free(line);
fclose(f);
if (bad_options > 0)
fatal("%s: terminating, %d bad configuration options",
filename, bad_options);
return 1;
}
/* Returns 1 if a string option is unset or set to "none" or 0 otherwise. */
int
option_clear_or_none(const char *o)
{
return o == NULL || strcasecmp(o, "none") == 0;
}
/*
* Initializes options to special values that indicate that they have not yet
* been set. Read_config_file will only set options with this value. Options
* are processed in the following order: command line, user config file,
* system config file. Last, fill_default_options is called.
*/
void
initialize_options(Options * options)
{
memset(options, 'X', sizeof(*options));
options->forward_agent = -1;
+ options->forward_agent_sock_path = NULL;
options->forward_x11 = -1;
options->forward_x11_trusted = -1;
options->forward_x11_timeout = -1;
options->stdio_forward_host = NULL;
options->stdio_forward_port = 0;
options->clear_forwardings = -1;
options->exit_on_forward_failure = -1;
options->xauth_location = NULL;
options->fwd_opts.gateway_ports = -1;
options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_mask = (mode_t)-1;
options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_unlink = -1;
options->pubkey_authentication = -1;
options->challenge_response_authentication = -1;
options->gss_authentication = -1;
options->gss_deleg_creds = -1;
options->password_authentication = -1;
options->kbd_interactive_authentication = -1;
options->kbd_interactive_devices = NULL;
options->hostbased_authentication = -1;
options->batch_mode = -1;
options->check_host_ip = -1;
options->strict_host_key_checking = -1;
options->compression = -1;
options->tcp_keep_alive = -1;
options->port = -1;
options->address_family = -1;
options->connection_attempts = -1;
options->connection_timeout = -1;
options->number_of_password_prompts = -1;
options->ciphers = NULL;
options->macs = NULL;
options->kex_algorithms = NULL;
options->hostkeyalgorithms = NULL;
options->ca_sign_algorithms = NULL;
options->num_identity_files = 0;
options->num_certificate_files = 0;
options->hostname = NULL;
options->host_key_alias = NULL;
options->proxy_command = NULL;
options->jump_user = NULL;
options->jump_host = NULL;
options->jump_port = -1;
options->jump_extra = NULL;
options->user = NULL;
options->escape_char = -1;
options->num_system_hostfiles = 0;
options->num_user_hostfiles = 0;
options->local_forwards = NULL;
options->num_local_forwards = 0;
options->remote_forwards = NULL;
options->num_remote_forwards = 0;
options->log_facility = SYSLOG_FACILITY_NOT_SET;
options->log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_NOT_SET;
options->preferred_authentications = NULL;
options->bind_address = NULL;
options->bind_interface = NULL;
options->pkcs11_provider = NULL;
+ options->sk_provider = NULL;
options->enable_ssh_keysign = - 1;
options->no_host_authentication_for_localhost = - 1;
options->identities_only = - 1;
options->rekey_limit = - 1;
options->rekey_interval = -1;
options->verify_host_key_dns = -1;
options->server_alive_interval = -1;
options->server_alive_count_max = -1;
options->send_env = NULL;
options->num_send_env = 0;
options->setenv = NULL;
options->num_setenv = 0;
options->control_path = NULL;
options->control_master = -1;
options->control_persist = -1;
options->control_persist_timeout = 0;
options->hash_known_hosts = -1;
options->tun_open = -1;
options->tun_local = -1;
options->tun_remote = -1;
options->local_command = NULL;
options->permit_local_command = -1;
options->remote_command = NULL;
options->add_keys_to_agent = -1;
options->identity_agent = NULL;
options->visual_host_key = -1;
options->ip_qos_interactive = -1;
options->ip_qos_bulk = -1;
options->request_tty = -1;
options->proxy_use_fdpass = -1;
options->ignored_unknown = NULL;
options->num_canonical_domains = 0;
options->num_permitted_cnames = 0;
options->canonicalize_max_dots = -1;
options->canonicalize_fallback_local = -1;
options->canonicalize_hostname = -1;
options->revoked_host_keys = NULL;
options->fingerprint_hash = -1;
options->update_hostkeys = -1;
options->hostbased_key_types = NULL;
options->pubkey_key_types = NULL;
}
/*
* A petite version of fill_default_options() that just fills the options
* needed for hostname canonicalization to proceed.
*/
void
fill_default_options_for_canonicalization(Options *options)
{
if (options->canonicalize_max_dots == -1)
options->canonicalize_max_dots = 1;
if (options->canonicalize_fallback_local == -1)
options->canonicalize_fallback_local = 1;
if (options->canonicalize_hostname == -1)
options->canonicalize_hostname = SSH_CANONICALISE_NO;
}
/*
* Called after processing other sources of option data, this fills those
* options for which no value has been specified with their default values.
*/
void
fill_default_options(Options * options)
{
char *all_cipher, *all_mac, *all_kex, *all_key, *all_sig;
+ char *def_cipher, *def_mac, *def_kex, *def_key, *def_sig;
int r;
if (options->forward_agent == -1)
options->forward_agent = 0;
if (options->forward_x11 == -1)
options->forward_x11 = 0;
if (options->forward_x11_trusted == -1)
options->forward_x11_trusted = 0;
if (options->forward_x11_timeout == -1)
options->forward_x11_timeout = 1200;
/*
* stdio forwarding (-W) changes the default for these but we defer
* setting the values so they can be overridden.
*/
if (options->exit_on_forward_failure == -1)
options->exit_on_forward_failure =
options->stdio_forward_host != NULL ? 1 : 0;
if (options->clear_forwardings == -1)
options->clear_forwardings =
options->stdio_forward_host != NULL ? 1 : 0;
if (options->clear_forwardings == 1)
clear_forwardings(options);
if (options->xauth_location == NULL)
options->xauth_location = _PATH_XAUTH;
if (options->fwd_opts.gateway_ports == -1)
options->fwd_opts.gateway_ports = 0;
if (options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_mask == (mode_t)-1)
options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_mask = 0177;
if (options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_unlink == -1)
options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_unlink = 0;
if (options->pubkey_authentication == -1)
options->pubkey_authentication = 1;
if (options->challenge_response_authentication == -1)
options->challenge_response_authentication = 1;
if (options->gss_authentication == -1)
options->gss_authentication = 0;
if (options->gss_deleg_creds == -1)
options->gss_deleg_creds = 0;
if (options->password_authentication == -1)
options->password_authentication = 1;
if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1)
options->kbd_interactive_authentication = 1;
if (options->hostbased_authentication == -1)
options->hostbased_authentication = 0;
if (options->batch_mode == -1)
options->batch_mode = 0;
if (options->check_host_ip == -1)
options->check_host_ip = 1;
if (options->strict_host_key_checking == -1)
options->strict_host_key_checking = SSH_STRICT_HOSTKEY_ASK;
if (options->compression == -1)
options->compression = 0;
if (options->tcp_keep_alive == -1)
options->tcp_keep_alive = 1;
if (options->port == -1)
options->port = 0; /* Filled in ssh_connect. */
if (options->address_family == -1)
options->address_family = AF_UNSPEC;
if (options->connection_attempts == -1)
options->connection_attempts = 1;
if (options->number_of_password_prompts == -1)
options->number_of_password_prompts = 3;
/* options->hostkeyalgorithms, default set in myproposals.h */
if (options->add_keys_to_agent == -1)
options->add_keys_to_agent = 0;
if (options->num_identity_files == 0) {
add_identity_file(options, "~/", _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_RSA, 0);
add_identity_file(options, "~/", _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_DSA, 0);
#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
add_identity_file(options, "~/", _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_ECDSA, 0);
+ add_identity_file(options, "~/",
+ _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_ECDSA_SK, 0);
#endif
add_identity_file(options, "~/",
_PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_ED25519, 0);
+ add_identity_file(options, "~/",
+ _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_ED25519_SK, 0);
add_identity_file(options, "~/", _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_XMSS, 0);
}
if (options->escape_char == -1)
options->escape_char = '~';
if (options->num_system_hostfiles == 0) {
options->system_hostfiles[options->num_system_hostfiles++] =
xstrdup(_PATH_SSH_SYSTEM_HOSTFILE);
options->system_hostfiles[options->num_system_hostfiles++] =
xstrdup(_PATH_SSH_SYSTEM_HOSTFILE2);
}
+ if (options->update_hostkeys == -1)
+ options->update_hostkeys = SSH_UPDATE_HOSTKEYS_NO;
if (options->num_user_hostfiles == 0) {
options->user_hostfiles[options->num_user_hostfiles++] =
xstrdup(_PATH_SSH_USER_HOSTFILE);
options->user_hostfiles[options->num_user_hostfiles++] =
xstrdup(_PATH_SSH_USER_HOSTFILE2);
}
if (options->log_level == SYSLOG_LEVEL_NOT_SET)
options->log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO;
if (options->log_facility == SYSLOG_FACILITY_NOT_SET)
options->log_facility = SYSLOG_FACILITY_USER;
if (options->no_host_authentication_for_localhost == - 1)
options->no_host_authentication_for_localhost = 0;
if (options->identities_only == -1)
options->identities_only = 0;
if (options->enable_ssh_keysign == -1)
options->enable_ssh_keysign = 0;
if (options->rekey_limit == -1)
options->rekey_limit = 0;
if (options->rekey_interval == -1)
options->rekey_interval = 0;
if (options->verify_host_key_dns == -1)
options->verify_host_key_dns = 0;
if (options->server_alive_interval == -1)
options->server_alive_interval = 0;
if (options->server_alive_count_max == -1)
options->server_alive_count_max = 3;
if (options->control_master == -1)
options->control_master = 0;
if (options->control_persist == -1) {
options->control_persist = 0;
options->control_persist_timeout = 0;
}
if (options->hash_known_hosts == -1)
options->hash_known_hosts = 0;
if (options->tun_open == -1)
options->tun_open = SSH_TUNMODE_NO;
if (options->tun_local == -1)
options->tun_local = SSH_TUNID_ANY;
if (options->tun_remote == -1)
options->tun_remote = SSH_TUNID_ANY;
if (options->permit_local_command == -1)
options->permit_local_command = 0;
if (options->visual_host_key == -1)
options->visual_host_key = 0;
if (options->ip_qos_interactive == -1)
options->ip_qos_interactive = IPTOS_DSCP_AF21;
if (options->ip_qos_bulk == -1)
options->ip_qos_bulk = IPTOS_DSCP_CS1;
if (options->request_tty == -1)
options->request_tty = REQUEST_TTY_AUTO;
if (options->proxy_use_fdpass == -1)
options->proxy_use_fdpass = 0;
if (options->canonicalize_max_dots == -1)
options->canonicalize_max_dots = 1;
if (options->canonicalize_fallback_local == -1)
options->canonicalize_fallback_local = 1;
if (options->canonicalize_hostname == -1)
options->canonicalize_hostname = SSH_CANONICALISE_NO;
if (options->fingerprint_hash == -1)
options->fingerprint_hash = SSH_FP_HASH_DEFAULT;
- if (options->update_hostkeys == -1)
- options->update_hostkeys = 0;
+#ifdef ENABLE_SK_INTERNAL
+ if (options->sk_provider == NULL)
+ options->sk_provider = xstrdup("internal");
+#else
+ if (options->sk_provider == NULL)
+ options->sk_provider = xstrdup("$SSH_SK_PROVIDER");
+#endif
/* Expand KEX name lists */
all_cipher = cipher_alg_list(',', 0);
all_mac = mac_alg_list(',');
all_kex = kex_alg_list(',');
all_key = sshkey_alg_list(0, 0, 1, ',');
all_sig = sshkey_alg_list(0, 1, 1, ',');
+ /* remove unsupported algos from default lists */
+ def_cipher = match_filter_whitelist(KEX_CLIENT_ENCRYPT, all_cipher);
+ def_mac = match_filter_whitelist(KEX_CLIENT_MAC, all_mac);
+ def_kex = match_filter_whitelist(KEX_CLIENT_KEX, all_kex);
+ def_key = match_filter_whitelist(KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG, all_key);
+ def_sig = match_filter_whitelist(SSH_ALLOWED_CA_SIGALGS, all_sig);
#define ASSEMBLE(what, defaults, all) \
do { \
if ((r = kex_assemble_names(&options->what, \
defaults, all)) != 0) \
fatal("%s: %s: %s", __func__, #what, ssh_err(r)); \
} while (0)
- ASSEMBLE(ciphers, KEX_CLIENT_ENCRYPT, all_cipher);
- ASSEMBLE(macs, KEX_CLIENT_MAC, all_mac);
- ASSEMBLE(kex_algorithms, KEX_CLIENT_KEX, all_kex);
- ASSEMBLE(hostbased_key_types, KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG, all_key);
- ASSEMBLE(pubkey_key_types, KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG, all_key);
- ASSEMBLE(ca_sign_algorithms, SSH_ALLOWED_CA_SIGALGS, all_sig);
+ ASSEMBLE(ciphers, def_cipher, all_cipher);
+ ASSEMBLE(macs, def_mac, all_mac);
+ ASSEMBLE(kex_algorithms, def_kex, all_kex);
+ ASSEMBLE(hostbased_key_types, def_key, all_key);
+ ASSEMBLE(pubkey_key_types, def_key, all_key);
+ ASSEMBLE(ca_sign_algorithms, def_sig, all_sig);
#undef ASSEMBLE
free(all_cipher);
free(all_mac);
free(all_kex);
free(all_key);
free(all_sig);
+ free(def_cipher);
+ free(def_mac);
+ free(def_kex);
+ kex_default_pk_alg_filtered = def_key; /* save for later use */
+ free(def_sig);
#define CLEAR_ON_NONE(v) \
do { \
if (option_clear_or_none(v)) { \
free(v); \
v = NULL; \
} \
} while(0)
CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->local_command);
CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->remote_command);
CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->proxy_command);
CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->control_path);
CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->revoked_host_keys);
CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->pkcs11_provider);
+ CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->sk_provider);
if (options->jump_host != NULL &&
strcmp(options->jump_host, "none") == 0 &&
options->jump_port == 0 && options->jump_user == NULL) {
free(options->jump_host);
options->jump_host = NULL;
}
/* options->identity_agent distinguishes NULL from 'none' */
/* options->user will be set in the main program if appropriate */
/* options->hostname will be set in the main program if appropriate */
/* options->host_key_alias should not be set by default */
/* options->preferred_authentications will be set in ssh */
}
struct fwdarg {
char *arg;
int ispath;
};
/*
* parse_fwd_field
* parses the next field in a port forwarding specification.
* sets fwd to the parsed field and advances p past the colon
* or sets it to NULL at end of string.
* returns 0 on success, else non-zero.
*/
static int
parse_fwd_field(char **p, struct fwdarg *fwd)
{
char *ep, *cp = *p;
int ispath = 0;
if (*cp == '\0') {
*p = NULL;
return -1; /* end of string */
}
/*
* A field escaped with square brackets is used literally.
* XXX - allow ']' to be escaped via backslash?
*/
if (*cp == '[') {
/* find matching ']' */
for (ep = cp + 1; *ep != ']' && *ep != '\0'; ep++) {
if (*ep == '/')
ispath = 1;
}
/* no matching ']' or not at end of field. */
if (ep[0] != ']' || (ep[1] != ':' && ep[1] != '\0'))
return -1;
/* NUL terminate the field and advance p past the colon */
*ep++ = '\0';
if (*ep != '\0')
*ep++ = '\0';
fwd->arg = cp + 1;
fwd->ispath = ispath;
*p = ep;
return 0;
}
for (cp = *p; *cp != '\0'; cp++) {
switch (*cp) {
case '\\':
memmove(cp, cp + 1, strlen(cp + 1) + 1);
if (*cp == '\0')
return -1;
break;
case '/':
ispath = 1;
break;
case ':':
*cp++ = '\0';
goto done;
}
}
done:
fwd->arg = *p;
fwd->ispath = ispath;
*p = cp;
return 0;
}
/*
* parse_forward
* parses a string containing a port forwarding specification of the form:
* dynamicfwd == 0
* [listenhost:]listenport|listenpath:connecthost:connectport|connectpath
* listenpath:connectpath
* dynamicfwd == 1
* [listenhost:]listenport
* returns number of arguments parsed or zero on error
*/
int
parse_forward(struct Forward *fwd, const char *fwdspec, int dynamicfwd, int remotefwd)
{
struct fwdarg fwdargs[4];
char *p, *cp;
int i;
memset(fwd, 0, sizeof(*fwd));
memset(fwdargs, 0, sizeof(fwdargs));
cp = p = xstrdup(fwdspec);
/* skip leading spaces */
while (isspace((u_char)*cp))
cp++;
for (i = 0; i < 4; ++i) {
if (parse_fwd_field(&cp, &fwdargs[i]) != 0)
break;
}
/* Check for trailing garbage */
if (cp != NULL && *cp != '\0') {
i = 0; /* failure */
}
switch (i) {
case 1:
if (fwdargs[0].ispath) {
fwd->listen_path = xstrdup(fwdargs[0].arg);
fwd->listen_port = PORT_STREAMLOCAL;
} else {
fwd->listen_host = NULL;
fwd->listen_port = a2port(fwdargs[0].arg);
}
fwd->connect_host = xstrdup("socks");
break;
case 2:
if (fwdargs[0].ispath && fwdargs[1].ispath) {
fwd->listen_path = xstrdup(fwdargs[0].arg);
fwd->listen_port = PORT_STREAMLOCAL;
fwd->connect_path = xstrdup(fwdargs[1].arg);
fwd->connect_port = PORT_STREAMLOCAL;
} else if (fwdargs[1].ispath) {
fwd->listen_host = NULL;
fwd->listen_port = a2port(fwdargs[0].arg);
fwd->connect_path = xstrdup(fwdargs[1].arg);
fwd->connect_port = PORT_STREAMLOCAL;
} else {
fwd->listen_host = xstrdup(fwdargs[0].arg);
fwd->listen_port = a2port(fwdargs[1].arg);
fwd->connect_host = xstrdup("socks");
}
break;
case 3:
if (fwdargs[0].ispath) {
fwd->listen_path = xstrdup(fwdargs[0].arg);
fwd->listen_port = PORT_STREAMLOCAL;
fwd->connect_host = xstrdup(fwdargs[1].arg);
fwd->connect_port = a2port(fwdargs[2].arg);
} else if (fwdargs[2].ispath) {
fwd->listen_host = xstrdup(fwdargs[0].arg);
fwd->listen_port = a2port(fwdargs[1].arg);
fwd->connect_path = xstrdup(fwdargs[2].arg);
fwd->connect_port = PORT_STREAMLOCAL;
} else {
fwd->listen_host = NULL;
fwd->listen_port = a2port(fwdargs[0].arg);
fwd->connect_host = xstrdup(fwdargs[1].arg);
fwd->connect_port = a2port(fwdargs[2].arg);
}
break;
case 4:
fwd->listen_host = xstrdup(fwdargs[0].arg);
fwd->listen_port = a2port(fwdargs[1].arg);
fwd->connect_host = xstrdup(fwdargs[2].arg);
fwd->connect_port = a2port(fwdargs[3].arg);
break;
default:
i = 0; /* failure */
}
free(p);
if (dynamicfwd) {
if (!(i == 1 || i == 2))
goto fail_free;
} else {
if (!(i == 3 || i == 4)) {
if (fwd->connect_path == NULL &&
fwd->listen_path == NULL)
goto fail_free;
}
if (fwd->connect_port <= 0 && fwd->connect_path == NULL)
goto fail_free;
}
if ((fwd->listen_port < 0 && fwd->listen_path == NULL) ||
(!remotefwd && fwd->listen_port == 0))
goto fail_free;
if (fwd->connect_host != NULL &&
strlen(fwd->connect_host) >= NI_MAXHOST)
goto fail_free;
/* XXX - if connecting to a remote socket, max sun len may not match this host */
if (fwd->connect_path != NULL &&
strlen(fwd->connect_path) >= PATH_MAX_SUN)
goto fail_free;
if (fwd->listen_host != NULL &&
strlen(fwd->listen_host) >= NI_MAXHOST)
goto fail_free;
if (fwd->listen_path != NULL &&
strlen(fwd->listen_path) >= PATH_MAX_SUN)
goto fail_free;
return (i);
fail_free:
free(fwd->connect_host);
fwd->connect_host = NULL;
free(fwd->connect_path);
fwd->connect_path = NULL;
free(fwd->listen_host);
fwd->listen_host = NULL;
free(fwd->listen_path);
fwd->listen_path = NULL;
return (0);
}
int
parse_jump(const char *s, Options *o, int active)
{
char *orig, *sdup, *cp;
char *host = NULL, *user = NULL;
int ret = -1, port = -1, first;
active &= o->proxy_command == NULL && o->jump_host == NULL;
orig = sdup = xstrdup(s);
first = active;
do {
if (strcasecmp(s, "none") == 0)
break;
if ((cp = strrchr(sdup, ',')) == NULL)
cp = sdup; /* last */
else
*cp++ = '\0';
if (first) {
/* First argument and configuration is active */
if (parse_ssh_uri(cp, &user, &host, &port) == -1 ||
parse_user_host_port(cp, &user, &host, &port) != 0)
goto out;
} else {
/* Subsequent argument or inactive configuration */
if (parse_ssh_uri(cp, NULL, NULL, NULL) == -1 ||
parse_user_host_port(cp, NULL, NULL, NULL) != 0)
goto out;
}
first = 0; /* only check syntax for subsequent hosts */
} while (cp != sdup);
/* success */
if (active) {
if (strcasecmp(s, "none") == 0) {
o->jump_host = xstrdup("none");
o->jump_port = 0;
} else {
o->jump_user = user;
o->jump_host = host;
o->jump_port = port;
o->proxy_command = xstrdup("none");
user = host = NULL;
if ((cp = strrchr(s, ',')) != NULL && cp != s) {
o->jump_extra = xstrdup(s);
o->jump_extra[cp - s] = '\0';
}
}
}
ret = 0;
out:
free(orig);
free(user);
free(host);
return ret;
}
int
parse_ssh_uri(const char *uri, char **userp, char **hostp, int *portp)
{
char *path;
int r;
r = parse_uri("ssh", uri, userp, hostp, portp, &path);
if (r == 0 && path != NULL)
r = -1; /* path not allowed */
return r;
}
/* XXX the following is a near-vebatim copy from servconf.c; refactor */
static const char *
fmt_multistate_int(int val, const struct multistate *m)
{
u_int i;
for (i = 0; m[i].key != NULL; i++) {
if (m[i].value == val)
return m[i].key;
}
return "UNKNOWN";
}
static const char *
fmt_intarg(OpCodes code, int val)
{
if (val == -1)
return "unset";
switch (code) {
case oAddressFamily:
return fmt_multistate_int(val, multistate_addressfamily);
case oVerifyHostKeyDNS:
case oUpdateHostkeys:
return fmt_multistate_int(val, multistate_yesnoask);
case oStrictHostKeyChecking:
return fmt_multistate_int(val, multistate_strict_hostkey);
case oControlMaster:
return fmt_multistate_int(val, multistate_controlmaster);
case oTunnel:
return fmt_multistate_int(val, multistate_tunnel);
case oRequestTTY:
return fmt_multistate_int(val, multistate_requesttty);
case oCanonicalizeHostname:
return fmt_multistate_int(val, multistate_canonicalizehostname);
case oAddKeysToAgent:
return fmt_multistate_int(val, multistate_yesnoaskconfirm);
case oFingerprintHash:
return ssh_digest_alg_name(val);
default:
switch (val) {
case 0:
return "no";
case 1:
return "yes";
default:
return "UNKNOWN";
}
}
}
static const char *
lookup_opcode_name(OpCodes code)
{
u_int i;
for (i = 0; keywords[i].name != NULL; i++)
if (keywords[i].opcode == code)
return(keywords[i].name);
return "UNKNOWN";
}
static void
dump_cfg_int(OpCodes code, int val)
{
printf("%s %d\n", lookup_opcode_name(code), val);
}
static void
dump_cfg_fmtint(OpCodes code, int val)
{
printf("%s %s\n", lookup_opcode_name(code), fmt_intarg(code, val));
}
static void
dump_cfg_string(OpCodes code, const char *val)
{
if (val == NULL)
return;
printf("%s %s\n", lookup_opcode_name(code), val);
}
static void
dump_cfg_strarray(OpCodes code, u_int count, char **vals)
{
u_int i;
for (i = 0; i < count; i++)
printf("%s %s\n", lookup_opcode_name(code), vals[i]);
}
static void
dump_cfg_strarray_oneline(OpCodes code, u_int count, char **vals)
{
u_int i;
printf("%s", lookup_opcode_name(code));
for (i = 0; i < count; i++)
printf(" %s", vals[i]);
printf("\n");
}
static void
dump_cfg_forwards(OpCodes code, u_int count, const struct Forward *fwds)
{
const struct Forward *fwd;
u_int i;
/* oDynamicForward */
for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
fwd = &fwds[i];
if (code == oDynamicForward && fwd->connect_host != NULL &&
strcmp(fwd->connect_host, "socks") != 0)
continue;
if (code == oLocalForward && fwd->connect_host != NULL &&
strcmp(fwd->connect_host, "socks") == 0)
continue;
printf("%s", lookup_opcode_name(code));
if (fwd->listen_port == PORT_STREAMLOCAL)
printf(" %s", fwd->listen_path);
else if (fwd->listen_host == NULL)
printf(" %d", fwd->listen_port);
else {
printf(" [%s]:%d",
fwd->listen_host, fwd->listen_port);
}
if (code != oDynamicForward) {
if (fwd->connect_port == PORT_STREAMLOCAL)
printf(" %s", fwd->connect_path);
else if (fwd->connect_host == NULL)
printf(" %d", fwd->connect_port);
else {
printf(" [%s]:%d",
fwd->connect_host, fwd->connect_port);
}
}
printf("\n");
}
}
void
dump_client_config(Options *o, const char *host)
{
- int i;
+ int i, r;
char buf[8], *all_key;
- /* This is normally prepared in ssh_kex2 */
+ /*
+ * Expand HostKeyAlgorithms name lists. This isn't handled in
+ * fill_default_options() like the other algorithm lists because
+ * the host key algorithms are by default dynamically chosen based
+ * on the host's keys found in known_hosts.
+ */
all_key = sshkey_alg_list(0, 0, 1, ',');
- if (kex_assemble_names( &o->hostkeyalgorithms,
- KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG, all_key) != 0)
- fatal("%s: kex_assemble_names failed", __func__);
+ if ((r = kex_assemble_names(&o->hostkeyalgorithms, kex_default_pk_alg(),
+ all_key)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: expand HostKeyAlgorithms: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
free(all_key);
/* Most interesting options first: user, host, port */
dump_cfg_string(oUser, o->user);
dump_cfg_string(oHostname, host);
dump_cfg_int(oPort, o->port);
/* Flag options */
dump_cfg_fmtint(oAddKeysToAgent, o->add_keys_to_agent);
dump_cfg_fmtint(oAddressFamily, o->address_family);
dump_cfg_fmtint(oBatchMode, o->batch_mode);
dump_cfg_fmtint(oCanonicalizeFallbackLocal, o->canonicalize_fallback_local);
dump_cfg_fmtint(oCanonicalizeHostname, o->canonicalize_hostname);
dump_cfg_fmtint(oChallengeResponseAuthentication, o->challenge_response_authentication);
dump_cfg_fmtint(oCheckHostIP, o->check_host_ip);
dump_cfg_fmtint(oCompression, o->compression);
dump_cfg_fmtint(oControlMaster, o->control_master);
dump_cfg_fmtint(oEnableSSHKeysign, o->enable_ssh_keysign);
dump_cfg_fmtint(oClearAllForwardings, o->clear_forwardings);
dump_cfg_fmtint(oExitOnForwardFailure, o->exit_on_forward_failure);
dump_cfg_fmtint(oFingerprintHash, o->fingerprint_hash);
- dump_cfg_fmtint(oForwardAgent, o->forward_agent);
dump_cfg_fmtint(oForwardX11, o->forward_x11);
dump_cfg_fmtint(oForwardX11Trusted, o->forward_x11_trusted);
dump_cfg_fmtint(oGatewayPorts, o->fwd_opts.gateway_ports);
#ifdef GSSAPI
dump_cfg_fmtint(oGssAuthentication, o->gss_authentication);
dump_cfg_fmtint(oGssDelegateCreds, o->gss_deleg_creds);
#endif /* GSSAPI */
dump_cfg_fmtint(oHashKnownHosts, o->hash_known_hosts);
dump_cfg_fmtint(oHostbasedAuthentication, o->hostbased_authentication);
dump_cfg_fmtint(oIdentitiesOnly, o->identities_only);
dump_cfg_fmtint(oKbdInteractiveAuthentication, o->kbd_interactive_authentication);
dump_cfg_fmtint(oNoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost, o->no_host_authentication_for_localhost);
dump_cfg_fmtint(oPasswordAuthentication, o->password_authentication);
dump_cfg_fmtint(oPermitLocalCommand, o->permit_local_command);
dump_cfg_fmtint(oProxyUseFdpass, o->proxy_use_fdpass);
dump_cfg_fmtint(oPubkeyAuthentication, o->pubkey_authentication);
dump_cfg_fmtint(oRequestTTY, o->request_tty);
dump_cfg_fmtint(oStreamLocalBindUnlink, o->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_unlink);
dump_cfg_fmtint(oStrictHostKeyChecking, o->strict_host_key_checking);
dump_cfg_fmtint(oTCPKeepAlive, o->tcp_keep_alive);
dump_cfg_fmtint(oTunnel, o->tun_open);
dump_cfg_fmtint(oVerifyHostKeyDNS, o->verify_host_key_dns);
dump_cfg_fmtint(oVisualHostKey, o->visual_host_key);
dump_cfg_fmtint(oUpdateHostkeys, o->update_hostkeys);
/* Integer options */
dump_cfg_int(oCanonicalizeMaxDots, o->canonicalize_max_dots);
dump_cfg_int(oConnectionAttempts, o->connection_attempts);
dump_cfg_int(oForwardX11Timeout, o->forward_x11_timeout);
dump_cfg_int(oNumberOfPasswordPrompts, o->number_of_password_prompts);
dump_cfg_int(oServerAliveCountMax, o->server_alive_count_max);
dump_cfg_int(oServerAliveInterval, o->server_alive_interval);
/* String options */
dump_cfg_string(oBindAddress, o->bind_address);
dump_cfg_string(oBindInterface, o->bind_interface);
- dump_cfg_string(oCiphers, o->ciphers ? o->ciphers : KEX_CLIENT_ENCRYPT);
+ dump_cfg_string(oCiphers, o->ciphers);
dump_cfg_string(oControlPath, o->control_path);
dump_cfg_string(oHostKeyAlgorithms, o->hostkeyalgorithms);
dump_cfg_string(oHostKeyAlias, o->host_key_alias);
dump_cfg_string(oHostbasedKeyTypes, o->hostbased_key_types);
dump_cfg_string(oIdentityAgent, o->identity_agent);
dump_cfg_string(oIgnoreUnknown, o->ignored_unknown);
dump_cfg_string(oKbdInteractiveDevices, o->kbd_interactive_devices);
- dump_cfg_string(oKexAlgorithms, o->kex_algorithms ? o->kex_algorithms : KEX_CLIENT_KEX);
- dump_cfg_string(oCASignatureAlgorithms, o->ca_sign_algorithms ? o->ca_sign_algorithms : SSH_ALLOWED_CA_SIGALGS);
+ dump_cfg_string(oKexAlgorithms, o->kex_algorithms);
+ dump_cfg_string(oCASignatureAlgorithms, o->ca_sign_algorithms);
dump_cfg_string(oLocalCommand, o->local_command);
dump_cfg_string(oRemoteCommand, o->remote_command);
dump_cfg_string(oLogLevel, log_level_name(o->log_level));
- dump_cfg_string(oMacs, o->macs ? o->macs : KEX_CLIENT_MAC);
+ dump_cfg_string(oMacs, o->macs);
#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
dump_cfg_string(oPKCS11Provider, o->pkcs11_provider);
#endif
+ dump_cfg_string(oSecurityKeyProvider, o->sk_provider);
dump_cfg_string(oPreferredAuthentications, o->preferred_authentications);
dump_cfg_string(oPubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes, o->pubkey_key_types);
dump_cfg_string(oRevokedHostKeys, o->revoked_host_keys);
dump_cfg_string(oXAuthLocation, o->xauth_location);
/* Forwards */
dump_cfg_forwards(oDynamicForward, o->num_local_forwards, o->local_forwards);
dump_cfg_forwards(oLocalForward, o->num_local_forwards, o->local_forwards);
dump_cfg_forwards(oRemoteForward, o->num_remote_forwards, o->remote_forwards);
/* String array options */
dump_cfg_strarray(oIdentityFile, o->num_identity_files, o->identity_files);
dump_cfg_strarray_oneline(oCanonicalDomains, o->num_canonical_domains, o->canonical_domains);
dump_cfg_strarray(oCertificateFile, o->num_certificate_files, o->certificate_files);
dump_cfg_strarray_oneline(oGlobalKnownHostsFile, o->num_system_hostfiles, o->system_hostfiles);
dump_cfg_strarray_oneline(oUserKnownHostsFile, o->num_user_hostfiles, o->user_hostfiles);
dump_cfg_strarray(oSendEnv, o->num_send_env, o->send_env);
dump_cfg_strarray(oSetEnv, o->num_setenv, o->setenv);
/* Special cases */
+ /* oForwardAgent */
+ if (o->forward_agent_sock_path == NULL)
+ dump_cfg_fmtint(oForwardAgent, o->forward_agent);
+ else
+ dump_cfg_string(oForwardAgent, o->forward_agent_sock_path);
+
/* oConnectTimeout */
if (o->connection_timeout == -1)
printf("connecttimeout none\n");
else
dump_cfg_int(oConnectTimeout, o->connection_timeout);
/* oTunnelDevice */
printf("tunneldevice");
if (o->tun_local == SSH_TUNID_ANY)
printf(" any");
else
printf(" %d", o->tun_local);
if (o->tun_remote == SSH_TUNID_ANY)
printf(":any");
else
printf(":%d", o->tun_remote);
printf("\n");
/* oCanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs */
if ( o->num_permitted_cnames > 0) {
printf("canonicalizePermittedcnames");
for (i = 0; i < o->num_permitted_cnames; i++) {
printf(" %s:%s", o->permitted_cnames[i].source_list,
o->permitted_cnames[i].target_list);
}
printf("\n");
}
/* oControlPersist */
if (o->control_persist == 0 || o->control_persist_timeout == 0)
dump_cfg_fmtint(oControlPersist, o->control_persist);
else
dump_cfg_int(oControlPersist, o->control_persist_timeout);
/* oEscapeChar */
if (o->escape_char == SSH_ESCAPECHAR_NONE)
printf("escapechar none\n");
else {
vis(buf, o->escape_char, VIS_WHITE, 0);
printf("escapechar %s\n", buf);
}
/* oIPQoS */
printf("ipqos %s ", iptos2str(o->ip_qos_interactive));
printf("%s\n", iptos2str(o->ip_qos_bulk));
/* oRekeyLimit */
printf("rekeylimit %llu %d\n",
(unsigned long long)o->rekey_limit, o->rekey_interval);
/* oStreamLocalBindMask */
printf("streamlocalbindmask 0%o\n",
o->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_mask);
/* oLogFacility */
printf("syslogfacility %s\n", log_facility_name(o->log_facility));
/* oProxyCommand / oProxyJump */
if (o->jump_host == NULL)
dump_cfg_string(oProxyCommand, o->proxy_command);
else {
/* Check for numeric addresses */
i = strchr(o->jump_host, ':') != NULL ||
strspn(o->jump_host, "1234567890.") == strlen(o->jump_host);
snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%d", o->jump_port);
printf("proxyjump %s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s\n",
/* optional additional jump spec */
o->jump_extra == NULL ? "" : o->jump_extra,
o->jump_extra == NULL ? "" : ",",
/* optional user */
o->jump_user == NULL ? "" : o->jump_user,
o->jump_user == NULL ? "" : "@",
/* opening [ if hostname is numeric */
i ? "[" : "",
/* mandatory hostname */
o->jump_host,
/* closing ] if hostname is numeric */
i ? "]" : "",
/* optional port number */
o->jump_port <= 0 ? "" : ":",
o->jump_port <= 0 ? "" : buf);
}
}
diff --git a/readconf.h b/readconf.h
index 8e36bf32adb3..feedb3d202c3 100644
--- a/readconf.h
+++ b/readconf.h
@@ -1,219 +1,222 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: readconf.h,v 1.129 2018/11/23 05:08:07 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: readconf.h,v 1.132 2020/01/23 02:46:49 dtucker Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
* All rights reserved
* Functions for reading the configuration file.
*
* As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
* can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
* software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
* incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
* called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
*/
#ifndef READCONF_H
#define READCONF_H
/* Data structure for representing option data. */
#define SSH_MAX_HOSTS_FILES 32
#define MAX_CANON_DOMAINS 32
#define PATH_MAX_SUN (sizeof((struct sockaddr_un *)0)->sun_path)
struct allowed_cname {
char *source_list;
char *target_list;
};
typedef struct {
int forward_agent; /* Forward authentication agent. */
+ char *forward_agent_sock_path; /* Optional path of the agent. */
int forward_x11; /* Forward X11 display. */
int forward_x11_timeout; /* Expiration for Cookies */
int forward_x11_trusted; /* Trust Forward X11 display. */
int exit_on_forward_failure; /* Exit if bind(2) fails for -L/-R */
char *xauth_location; /* Location for xauth program */
struct ForwardOptions fwd_opts; /* forwarding options */
int pubkey_authentication; /* Try ssh2 pubkey authentication. */
int hostbased_authentication; /* ssh2's rhosts_rsa */
int challenge_response_authentication;
/* Try S/Key or TIS, authentication. */
int gss_authentication; /* Try GSS authentication */
int gss_deleg_creds; /* Delegate GSS credentials */
int password_authentication; /* Try password
* authentication. */
int kbd_interactive_authentication; /* Try keyboard-interactive auth. */
char *kbd_interactive_devices; /* Keyboard-interactive auth devices. */
int batch_mode; /* Batch mode: do not ask for passwords. */
int check_host_ip; /* Also keep track of keys for IP address */
int strict_host_key_checking; /* Strict host key checking. */
int compression; /* Compress packets in both directions. */
int tcp_keep_alive; /* Set SO_KEEPALIVE. */
int ip_qos_interactive; /* IP ToS/DSCP/class for interactive */
int ip_qos_bulk; /* IP ToS/DSCP/class for bulk traffic */
SyslogFacility log_facility; /* Facility for system logging. */
LogLevel log_level; /* Level for logging. */
int port; /* Port to connect. */
int address_family;
int connection_attempts; /* Max attempts (seconds) before
* giving up */
int connection_timeout; /* Max time (seconds) before
* aborting connection attempt */
int number_of_password_prompts; /* Max number of password
* prompts. */
char *ciphers; /* SSH2 ciphers in order of preference. */
char *macs; /* SSH2 macs in order of preference. */
char *hostkeyalgorithms; /* SSH2 server key types in order of preference. */
char *kex_algorithms; /* SSH2 kex methods in order of preference. */
char *ca_sign_algorithms; /* Allowed CA signature algorithms */
char *hostname; /* Real host to connect. */
char *host_key_alias; /* hostname alias for .ssh/known_hosts */
char *proxy_command; /* Proxy command for connecting the host. */
char *user; /* User to log in as. */
int escape_char; /* Escape character; -2 = none */
u_int num_system_hostfiles; /* Paths for /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts */
char *system_hostfiles[SSH_MAX_HOSTS_FILES];
u_int num_user_hostfiles; /* Path for $HOME/.ssh/known_hosts */
char *user_hostfiles[SSH_MAX_HOSTS_FILES];
char *preferred_authentications;
char *bind_address; /* local socket address for connection to sshd */
char *bind_interface; /* local interface for bind address */
char *pkcs11_provider; /* PKCS#11 provider */
+ char *sk_provider; /* Security key provider */
int verify_host_key_dns; /* Verify host key using DNS */
int num_identity_files; /* Number of files for RSA/DSA identities. */
char *identity_files[SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES];
int identity_file_userprovided[SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES];
struct sshkey *identity_keys[SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES];
int num_certificate_files; /* Number of extra certificates for ssh. */
char *certificate_files[SSH_MAX_CERTIFICATE_FILES];
int certificate_file_userprovided[SSH_MAX_CERTIFICATE_FILES];
struct sshkey *certificates[SSH_MAX_CERTIFICATE_FILES];
int add_keys_to_agent;
char *identity_agent; /* Optional path to ssh-agent socket */
/* Local TCP/IP forward requests. */
int num_local_forwards;
struct Forward *local_forwards;
/* Remote TCP/IP forward requests. */
int num_remote_forwards;
struct Forward *remote_forwards;
int clear_forwardings;
/* stdio forwarding (-W) host and port */
char *stdio_forward_host;
int stdio_forward_port;
int enable_ssh_keysign;
int64_t rekey_limit;
int rekey_interval;
int no_host_authentication_for_localhost;
int identities_only;
int server_alive_interval;
int server_alive_count_max;
int num_send_env;
char **send_env;
int num_setenv;
char **setenv;
char *control_path;
int control_master;
int control_persist; /* ControlPersist flag */
int control_persist_timeout; /* ControlPersist timeout (seconds) */
int hash_known_hosts;
int tun_open; /* tun(4) */
int tun_local; /* force tun device (optional) */
int tun_remote; /* force tun device (optional) */
char *local_command;
int permit_local_command;
char *remote_command;
int visual_host_key;
int request_tty;
int proxy_use_fdpass;
int num_canonical_domains;
char *canonical_domains[MAX_CANON_DOMAINS];
int canonicalize_hostname;
int canonicalize_max_dots;
int canonicalize_fallback_local;
int num_permitted_cnames;
struct allowed_cname permitted_cnames[MAX_CANON_DOMAINS];
char *revoked_host_keys;
int fingerprint_hash;
int update_hostkeys; /* one of SSH_UPDATE_HOSTKEYS_* */
char *hostbased_key_types;
char *pubkey_key_types;
char *jump_user;
char *jump_host;
int jump_port;
char *jump_extra;
char *ignored_unknown; /* Pattern list of unknown tokens to ignore */
} Options;
#define SSH_CANONICALISE_NO 0
#define SSH_CANONICALISE_YES 1
#define SSH_CANONICALISE_ALWAYS 2
#define SSHCTL_MASTER_NO 0
#define SSHCTL_MASTER_YES 1
#define SSHCTL_MASTER_AUTO 2
#define SSHCTL_MASTER_ASK 3
#define SSHCTL_MASTER_AUTO_ASK 4
#define REQUEST_TTY_AUTO 0
#define REQUEST_TTY_NO 1
#define REQUEST_TTY_YES 2
#define REQUEST_TTY_FORCE 3
#define SSHCONF_CHECKPERM 1 /* check permissions on config file */
#define SSHCONF_USERCONF 2 /* user provided config file not system */
#define SSHCONF_FINAL 4 /* Final pass over config, after canon. */
#define SSHCONF_NEVERMATCH 8 /* Match/Host never matches; internal only */
#define SSH_UPDATE_HOSTKEYS_NO 0
#define SSH_UPDATE_HOSTKEYS_YES 1
#define SSH_UPDATE_HOSTKEYS_ASK 2
#define SSH_STRICT_HOSTKEY_OFF 0
#define SSH_STRICT_HOSTKEY_NEW 1
#define SSH_STRICT_HOSTKEY_YES 2
#define SSH_STRICT_HOSTKEY_ASK 3
+const char *kex_default_pk_alg(void);
void initialize_options(Options *);
void fill_default_options(Options *);
void fill_default_options_for_canonicalization(Options *);
int process_config_line(Options *, struct passwd *, const char *,
const char *, char *, const char *, int, int *, int);
int read_config_file(const char *, struct passwd *, const char *,
const char *, Options *, int, int *);
int parse_forward(struct Forward *, const char *, int, int);
int parse_jump(const char *, Options *, int);
int parse_ssh_uri(const char *, char **, char **, int *);
int default_ssh_port(void);
int option_clear_or_none(const char *);
void dump_client_config(Options *o, const char *host);
void add_local_forward(Options *, const struct Forward *);
void add_remote_forward(Options *, const struct Forward *);
void add_identity_file(Options *, const char *, const char *, int);
void add_certificate_file(Options *, const char *, int);
#endif /* READCONF_H */
diff --git a/readpass.c b/readpass.c
index 7e52cae9c540..974d67f0bfa6 100644
--- a/readpass.c
+++ b/readpass.c
@@ -1,199 +1,294 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: readpass.c,v 1.54 2019/06/28 13:35:04 deraadt Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: readpass.c,v 1.61 2020/01/23 07:10:22 dtucker Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/wait.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
# include <paths.h>
#endif
#include <signal.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "pathnames.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "ssh.h"
#include "uidswap.h"
static char *
-ssh_askpass(char *askpass, const char *msg)
+ssh_askpass(char *askpass, const char *msg, const char *env_hint)
{
pid_t pid, ret;
size_t len;
char *pass;
int p[2], status;
char buf[1024];
void (*osigchld)(int);
if (fflush(stdout) != 0)
- error("ssh_askpass: fflush: %s", strerror(errno));
+ error("%s: fflush: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
if (askpass == NULL)
fatal("internal error: askpass undefined");
if (pipe(p) == -1) {
- error("ssh_askpass: pipe: %s", strerror(errno));
+ error("%s: pipe: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
return NULL;
}
- osigchld = signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL);
+ osigchld = ssh_signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL);
if ((pid = fork()) == -1) {
- error("ssh_askpass: fork: %s", strerror(errno));
- signal(SIGCHLD, osigchld);
+ error("%s: fork: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+ ssh_signal(SIGCHLD, osigchld);
return NULL;
}
if (pid == 0) {
close(p[0]);
if (dup2(p[1], STDOUT_FILENO) == -1)
- fatal("ssh_askpass: dup2: %s", strerror(errno));
+ fatal("%s: dup2: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+ if (env_hint != NULL)
+ setenv("SSH_ASKPASS_PROMPT", env_hint, 1);
execlp(askpass, askpass, msg, (char *)NULL);
- fatal("ssh_askpass: exec(%s): %s", askpass, strerror(errno));
+ fatal("%s: exec(%s): %s", __func__, askpass, strerror(errno));
}
close(p[1]);
len = 0;
do {
ssize_t r = read(p[0], buf + len, sizeof(buf) - 1 - len);
if (r == -1 && errno == EINTR)
continue;
if (r <= 0)
break;
len += r;
} while (sizeof(buf) - 1 - len > 0);
buf[len] = '\0';
close(p[0]);
while ((ret = waitpid(pid, &status, 0)) == -1)
if (errno != EINTR)
break;
- signal(SIGCHLD, osigchld);
+ ssh_signal(SIGCHLD, osigchld);
if (ret == -1 || !WIFEXITED(status) || WEXITSTATUS(status) != 0) {
explicit_bzero(buf, sizeof(buf));
return NULL;
}
buf[strcspn(buf, "\r\n")] = '\0';
pass = xstrdup(buf);
explicit_bzero(buf, sizeof(buf));
return pass;
}
+/* private/internal read_passphrase flags */
+#define RP_ASK_PERMISSION 0x8000 /* pass hint to askpass for confirm UI */
+
/*
* Reads a passphrase from /dev/tty with echo turned off/on. Returns the
* passphrase (allocated with xmalloc). Exits if EOF is encountered. If
* RP_ALLOW_STDIN is set, the passphrase will be read from stdin if no
* tty is available
*/
char *
read_passphrase(const char *prompt, int flags)
{
char cr = '\r', *askpass = NULL, *ret, buf[1024];
int rppflags, use_askpass = 0, ttyfd;
+ const char *askpass_hint = NULL;
rppflags = (flags & RP_ECHO) ? RPP_ECHO_ON : RPP_ECHO_OFF;
if (flags & RP_USE_ASKPASS)
use_askpass = 1;
else if (flags & RP_ALLOW_STDIN) {
if (!isatty(STDIN_FILENO)) {
debug("read_passphrase: stdin is not a tty");
use_askpass = 1;
}
} else {
rppflags |= RPP_REQUIRE_TTY;
ttyfd = open(_PATH_TTY, O_RDWR);
if (ttyfd >= 0) {
/*
* If we're on a tty, ensure that show the prompt at
* the beginning of the line. This will hopefully
* clobber any password characters the user has
* optimistically typed before echo is disabled.
*/
(void)write(ttyfd, &cr, 1);
close(ttyfd);
} else {
debug("read_passphrase: can't open %s: %s", _PATH_TTY,
strerror(errno));
use_askpass = 1;
}
}
if ((flags & RP_USE_ASKPASS) && getenv("DISPLAY") == NULL)
return (flags & RP_ALLOW_EOF) ? NULL : xstrdup("");
if (use_askpass && getenv("DISPLAY")) {
if (getenv(SSH_ASKPASS_ENV))
askpass = getenv(SSH_ASKPASS_ENV);
else
askpass = _PATH_SSH_ASKPASS_DEFAULT;
- if ((ret = ssh_askpass(askpass, prompt)) == NULL)
+ if ((flags & RP_ASK_PERMISSION) != 0)
+ askpass_hint = "confirm";
+ if ((ret = ssh_askpass(askpass, prompt, askpass_hint)) == NULL)
if (!(flags & RP_ALLOW_EOF))
return xstrdup("");
return ret;
}
if (readpassphrase(prompt, buf, sizeof buf, rppflags) == NULL) {
if (flags & RP_ALLOW_EOF)
return NULL;
return xstrdup("");
}
ret = xstrdup(buf);
explicit_bzero(buf, sizeof(buf));
return ret;
}
int
ask_permission(const char *fmt, ...)
{
va_list args;
char *p, prompt[1024];
int allowed = 0;
va_start(args, fmt);
vsnprintf(prompt, sizeof(prompt), fmt, args);
va_end(args);
- p = read_passphrase(prompt, RP_USE_ASKPASS|RP_ALLOW_EOF);
+ p = read_passphrase(prompt,
+ RP_USE_ASKPASS|RP_ALLOW_EOF|RP_ASK_PERMISSION);
if (p != NULL) {
/*
* Accept empty responses and responses consisting
* of the word "yes" as affirmative.
*/
if (*p == '\0' || *p == '\n' ||
strcasecmp(p, "yes") == 0)
allowed = 1;
free(p);
}
return (allowed);
}
+
+struct notifier_ctx {
+ pid_t pid;
+ void (*osigchld)(int);
+};
+
+struct notifier_ctx *
+notify_start(int force_askpass, const char *fmt, ...)
+{
+ va_list args;
+ char *prompt = NULL;
+ int devnull;
+ pid_t pid;
+ void (*osigchld)(int);
+ const char *askpass;
+ struct notifier_ctx *ret;
+
+ va_start(args, fmt);
+ xvasprintf(&prompt, fmt, args);
+ va_end(args);
+
+ if (fflush(NULL) != 0)
+ error("%s: fflush: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+ if (!force_askpass && isatty(STDERR_FILENO)) {
+ (void)write(STDERR_FILENO, "\r", 1);
+ (void)write(STDERR_FILENO, prompt, strlen(prompt));
+ (void)write(STDERR_FILENO, "\r\n", 2);
+ free(prompt);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ if ((askpass = getenv("SSH_ASKPASS")) == NULL)
+ askpass = _PATH_SSH_ASKPASS_DEFAULT;
+ if (getenv("DISPLAY") == NULL || *askpass == '\0') {
+ debug3("%s: cannot notify", __func__);
+ free(prompt);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ osigchld = ssh_signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL);
+ if ((pid = fork()) == -1) {
+ error("%s: fork: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+ ssh_signal(SIGCHLD, osigchld);
+ free(prompt);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ if (pid == 0) {
+ if ((devnull = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDWR)) == -1)
+ fatal("%s: open %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+ if (dup2(devnull, STDIN_FILENO) == -1 ||
+ dup2(devnull, STDOUT_FILENO) == -1)
+ fatal("%s: dup2: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+ closefrom(STDERR_FILENO + 1);
+ setenv("SSH_ASKPASS_PROMPT", "none", 1); /* hint to UI */
+ execlp(askpass, askpass, prompt, (char *)NULL);
+ error("%s: exec(%s): %s", __func__, askpass, strerror(errno));
+ _exit(1);
+ /* NOTREACHED */
+ }
+ if ((ret = calloc(1, sizeof(*ret))) == NULL) {
+ kill(pid, SIGTERM);
+ fatal("%s: calloc failed", __func__);
+ }
+ ret->pid = pid;
+ ret->osigchld = osigchld;
+ free(prompt);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+void
+notify_complete(struct notifier_ctx *ctx)
+{
+ int ret;
+
+ if (ctx == NULL || ctx->pid <= 0) {
+ free(ctx);
+ return;
+ }
+ kill(ctx->pid, SIGTERM);
+ while ((ret = waitpid(ctx->pid, NULL, 0)) == -1) {
+ if (errno != EINTR)
+ break;
+ }
+ if (ret == -1)
+ fatal("%s: waitpid: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+ ssh_signal(SIGCHLD, ctx->osigchld);
+ free(ctx);
+}
diff --git a/regress/Makefile b/regress/Makefile
index 34c47e8cbe64..774c10d41334 100644
--- a/regress/Makefile
+++ b/regress/Makefile
@@ -1,260 +1,261 @@
-# $OpenBSD: Makefile,v 1.104 2019/09/03 08:37:45 djm Exp $
+# $OpenBSD: Makefile,v 1.106 2020/01/31 23:25:08 djm Exp $
tests: prep file-tests t-exec unit
REGRESS_TARGETS= t1 t2 t3 t4 t5 t6 t7 t8 t9 t10 t11 t12
# File based tests
file-tests: $(REGRESS_TARGETS)
# Interop tests are not run by default
interop interop-tests: t-exec-interop
prep:
test "x${USE_VALGRIND}" = "x" || mkdir -p $(OBJ)/valgrind-out
clean:
for F in $(CLEANFILES); do rm -f $(OBJ)$$F; done
rm -rf $(OBJ).putty
distclean: clean
LTESTS= connect \
proxy-connect \
connect-privsep \
connect-uri \
proto-version \
proto-mismatch \
exit-status \
envpass \
transfer \
banner \
rekey \
dhgex \
stderr-data \
stderr-after-eof \
broken-pipe \
try-ciphers \
yes-head \
login-timeout \
agent \
agent-getpeereid \
agent-timeout \
agent-ptrace \
keyscan \
keygen-change \
keygen-convert \
keygen-moduli \
key-options \
scp \
scp-uri \
sftp \
sftp-chroot \
sftp-cmds \
sftp-badcmds \
sftp-batch \
sftp-glob \
sftp-perm \
sftp-uri \
reconfigure \
dynamic-forward \
forwarding \
multiplex \
reexec \
brokenkeys \
sshcfgparse \
cfgparse \
cfgmatch \
cfgmatchlisten \
addrmatch \
localcommand \
forcecommand \
portnum \
keytype \
kextype \
cert-hostkey \
cert-userkey \
host-expand \
keys-command \
forward-control \
integrity \
krl \
multipubkey \
limit-keytype \
hostkey-agent \
keygen-knownhosts \
hostkey-rotate \
principals-command \
cert-file \
cfginclude \
+ servcfginclude \
allow-deny-users \
authinfo \
sshsig
INTEROP_TESTS= putty-transfer putty-ciphers putty-kex conch-ciphers
#INTEROP_TESTS+=ssh-com ssh-com-client ssh-com-keygen ssh-com-sftp
EXTRA_TESTS= agent-pkcs11
#EXTRA_TESTS+= cipher-speed
USERNAME= ${LOGNAME}
CLEANFILES= *.core actual agent-key.* authorized_keys_${USERNAME} \
authorized_keys_${USERNAME}.* \
authorized_principals_${USERNAME} \
banner.in banner.out cert_host_key* cert_user_key* \
copy.1 copy.2 data ed25519-agent ed25519-agent* \
ed25519-agent.pub ed25519 ed25519.pub empty.in \
expect failed-regress.log failed-ssh.log failed-sshd.log \
hkr.* host.ecdsa-sha2-nistp256 host.ecdsa-sha2-nistp384 \
host.ecdsa-sha2-nistp521 host.ssh-dss host.ssh-ed25519 \
host.ssh-rsa host_ca_key* host_krl_* host_revoked_* key.* \
key.dsa-* key.ecdsa-* key.ed25519-512 \
key.ed25519-512.pub key.rsa-* keys-command-args kh.* \
known_hosts known_hosts-cert known_hosts.* krl-* ls.copy \
modpipe netcat no_identity_config \
pidfile putty.rsa2 ready regress.log remote_pid \
revoked-* rsa rsa-agent rsa-agent.pub rsa.pub rsa_ssh2_cr.prv \
rsa_ssh2_crnl.prv scp-ssh-wrapper.exe \
scp-ssh-wrapper.scp setuid-allowed sftp-server.log \
sftp-server.sh sftp.log ssh-log-wrapper.sh ssh.log \
ssh-rsa_oldfmt \
ssh_config ssh_config.* ssh_proxy ssh_proxy_bak \
ssh_proxy_envpass sshd.log sshd_config sshd_config_minimal \
- sshd_config.orig sshd_proxy sshd_proxy.* sshd_proxy_bak \
+ sshd_config.* sshd_proxy sshd_proxy.* sshd_proxy_bak \
sshd_proxy_orig t10.out t10.out.pub t12.out t12.out.pub \
t2.out t3.out t6.out1 t6.out2 t7.out t7.out.pub \
t8.out t8.out.pub t9.out t9.out.pub testdata \
user_*key* user_ca* user_key*
# Enable all malloc(3) randomisations and checks
TEST_ENV= "MALLOC_OPTIONS=CFGJRSUX"
TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN?=ssh-keygen
CPPFLAGS=-I..
t1:
${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -if ${.CURDIR}/rsa_ssh2.prv | diff - ${.CURDIR}/rsa_openssh.prv
tr '\n' '\r' <${.CURDIR}/rsa_ssh2.prv > ${.OBJDIR}/rsa_ssh2_cr.prv
${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -if ${.OBJDIR}/rsa_ssh2_cr.prv | diff - ${.CURDIR}/rsa_openssh.prv
awk '{print $$0 "\r"}' ${.CURDIR}/rsa_ssh2.prv > ${.OBJDIR}/rsa_ssh2_crnl.prv
${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -if ${.OBJDIR}/rsa_ssh2_crnl.prv | diff - ${.CURDIR}/rsa_openssh.prv
t2:
cat ${.CURDIR}/rsa_openssh.prv > $(OBJ)/t2.out
chmod 600 $(OBJ)/t2.out
${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -yf $(OBJ)/t2.out | diff - ${.CURDIR}/rsa_openssh.pub
t3:
${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -ef ${.CURDIR}/rsa_openssh.pub >$(OBJ)/t3.out
${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -if $(OBJ)/t3.out | diff - ${.CURDIR}/rsa_openssh.pub
t4:
${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -E md5 -lf ${.CURDIR}/rsa_openssh.pub |\
awk '{print $$2}' | diff - ${.CURDIR}/t4.ok
t5:
${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -Bf ${.CURDIR}/rsa_openssh.pub |\
awk '{print $$2}' | diff - ${.CURDIR}/t5.ok
t6:
${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -if ${.CURDIR}/dsa_ssh2.prv > $(OBJ)/t6.out1
${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -if ${.CURDIR}/dsa_ssh2.pub > $(OBJ)/t6.out2
chmod 600 $(OBJ)/t6.out1
${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -yf $(OBJ)/t6.out1 | diff - $(OBJ)/t6.out2
$(OBJ)/t7.out:
${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -q -t rsa -N '' -f $@
t7: $(OBJ)/t7.out
${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -lf $(OBJ)/t7.out > /dev/null
${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -Bf $(OBJ)/t7.out > /dev/null
$(OBJ)/t8.out:
${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -q -t dsa -N '' -f $@
t8: $(OBJ)/t8.out
${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -lf $(OBJ)/t8.out > /dev/null
${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -Bf $(OBJ)/t8.out > /dev/null
$(OBJ)/t9.out:
test "${TEST_SSH_ECC}" != yes || \
${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -q -t ecdsa -N '' -f $@
t9: $(OBJ)/t9.out
test "${TEST_SSH_ECC}" != yes || \
${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -lf $(OBJ)/t9.out > /dev/null
test "${TEST_SSH_ECC}" != yes || \
${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -Bf $(OBJ)/t9.out > /dev/null
$(OBJ)/t10.out:
${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -q -t ed25519 -N '' -f $@
t10: $(OBJ)/t10.out
${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -lf $(OBJ)/t10.out > /dev/null
${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -Bf $(OBJ)/t10.out > /dev/null
t11:
${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -E sha256 -lf ${.CURDIR}/rsa_openssh.pub |\
awk '{print $$2}' | diff - ${.CURDIR}/t11.ok
$(OBJ)/t12.out:
${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -q -t ed25519 -N '' -C 'test-comment-1234' -f $@
t12: $(OBJ)/t12.out
${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN} -lf $(OBJ)/t12.out.pub | grep test-comment-1234 >/dev/null
t-exec: ${LTESTS:=.sh}
@if [ "x$?" = "x" ]; then exit 0; fi; \
for TEST in ""$?; do \
skip=no; \
for t in ""$${SKIP_LTESTS}; do \
if [ "x$${t}.sh" = "x$${TEST}" ]; then skip=yes; fi; \
done; \
if [ "x$${skip}" = "xno" ]; then \
echo "run test $${TEST}" ... 1>&2; \
(env SUDO="${SUDO}" TEST_ENV=${TEST_ENV} ${TEST_SHELL} ${.CURDIR}/test-exec.sh ${.OBJDIR} ${.CURDIR}/$${TEST}) || exit $$?; \
else \
echo skip test $${TEST} 1>&2; \
fi; \
done
t-exec-interop: ${INTEROP_TESTS:=.sh}
@if [ "x$?" = "x" ]; then exit 0; fi; \
for TEST in ""$?; do \
echo "run test $${TEST}" ... 1>&2; \
(env SUDO="${SUDO}" TEST_ENV=${TEST_ENV} ${TEST_SHELL} ${.CURDIR}/test-exec.sh ${.OBJDIR} ${.CURDIR}/$${TEST}) || exit $$?; \
done
t-extra: ${EXTRA_TESTS:=.sh}
@if [ "x$?" = "x" ]; then exit 0; fi; \
for TEST in ""$?; do \
echo "run test $${TEST}" ... 1>&2; \
(env SUDO="${SUDO}" TEST_ENV=${TEST_ENV} ${TEST_SHELL} ${.CURDIR}/test-exec.sh ${.OBJDIR} ${.CURDIR}/$${TEST}) || exit $$?; \
done
# Not run by default
interop: ${INTEROP_TARGETS}
# Unit tests, built by top-level Makefile
unit:
set -e ; if test -z "${SKIP_UNIT}" ; then \
V="" ; \
test "x${USE_VALGRIND}" = "x" || \
V=${.CURDIR}/valgrind-unit.sh ; \
$$V ${.OBJDIR}/unittests/sshbuf/test_sshbuf ; \
$$V ${.OBJDIR}/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey \
-d ${.CURDIR}/unittests/sshkey/testdata ; \
$$V ${.OBJDIR}/unittests/bitmap/test_bitmap ; \
$$V ${.OBJDIR}/unittests/conversion/test_conversion ; \
$$V ${.OBJDIR}/unittests/kex/test_kex ; \
$$V ${.OBJDIR}/unittests/hostkeys/test_hostkeys \
-d ${.CURDIR}/unittests/hostkeys/testdata ; \
$$V ${.OBJDIR}/unittests/match/test_match ; \
if test "x${TEST_SSH_UTF8}" = "xyes" ; then \
$$V ${.OBJDIR}/unittests/utf8/test_utf8 ; \
fi \
fi
diff --git a/regress/agent-getpeereid.sh b/regress/agent-getpeereid.sh
index 769c29e8da47..524340816fd3 100644
--- a/regress/agent-getpeereid.sh
+++ b/regress/agent-getpeereid.sh
@@ -1,57 +1,57 @@
-# $OpenBSD: agent-getpeereid.sh,v 1.10 2018/02/09 03:40:22 dtucker Exp $
+# $OpenBSD: agent-getpeereid.sh,v 1.11 2019/11/26 23:43:10 djm Exp $
# Placed in the Public Domain.
tid="disallow agent attach from other uid"
UNPRIV=nobody
ASOCK=${OBJ}/agent
SSH_AUTH_SOCK=/nonexistent
if config_defined HAVE_GETPEEREID HAVE_GETPEERUCRED HAVE_SO_PEERCRED ; then
:
else
echo "skipped (not supported on this platform)"
exit 0
fi
case "x$SUDO" in
xsudo) sudo=1;;
xdoas) ;;
x)
echo "need SUDO to switch to uid $UNPRIV"
echo SKIPPED
exit 0 ;;
*)
echo "unsupported $SUDO - "doas" and "sudo" are allowed"
exit 0 ;;
esac
trace "start agent"
-eval `${SSHAGENT} -s -a ${ASOCK}` > /dev/null
+eval `${SSHAGENT} ${EXTRA_AGENT_ARGS} -s -a ${ASOCK}` > /dev/null
r=$?
if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then
fail "could not start ssh-agent: exit code $r"
else
chmod 644 ${SSH_AUTH_SOCK}
${SSHADD} -l > /dev/null 2>&1
r=$?
if [ $r -ne 1 ]; then
fail "ssh-add failed with $r != 1"
fi
if test -z "$sudo" ; then
# doas
${SUDO} -n -u ${UNPRIV} ${SSHADD} -l 2>/dev/null
else
# sudo
< /dev/null ${SUDO} -S -u ${UNPRIV} ${SSHADD} -l 2>/dev/null
fi
r=$?
if [ $r -lt 2 ]; then
fail "ssh-add did not fail for ${UNPRIV}: $r < 2"
fi
trace "kill agent"
${SSHAGENT} -k > /dev/null
fi
rm -f ${OBJ}/agent
diff --git a/regress/agent-pkcs11.sh b/regress/agent-pkcs11.sh
index 5205d906712c..fbbaea5186db 100644
--- a/regress/agent-pkcs11.sh
+++ b/regress/agent-pkcs11.sh
@@ -1,124 +1,124 @@
-# $OpenBSD: agent-pkcs11.sh,v 1.6 2019/01/21 09:13:41 djm Exp $
+# $OpenBSD: agent-pkcs11.sh,v 1.7 2019/11/26 23:43:10 djm Exp $
# Placed in the Public Domain.
tid="pkcs11 agent test"
try_token_libs() {
for _lib in "$@" ; do
if test -f "$_lib" ; then
verbose "Using token library $_lib"
TEST_SSH_PKCS11="$_lib"
return
fi
done
echo "skipped: Unable to find PKCS#11 token library"
exit 0
}
try_token_libs \
/usr/local/lib/softhsm/libsofthsm2.so \
/usr/lib64/pkcs11/libsofthsm2.so \
/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/softhsm/libsofthsm2.so
TEST_SSH_PIN=1234
TEST_SSH_SOPIN=12345678
if [ "x$TEST_SSH_SSHPKCS11HELPER" != "x" ]; then
SSH_PKCS11_HELPER="${TEST_SSH_SSHPKCS11HELPER}"
export SSH_PKCS11_HELPER
fi
test -f "$TEST_SSH_PKCS11" || fatal "$TEST_SSH_PKCS11 does not exist"
# setup environment for softhsm2 token
DIR=$OBJ/SOFTHSM
rm -rf $DIR
TOKEN=$DIR/tokendir
mkdir -p $TOKEN
SOFTHSM2_CONF=$DIR/softhsm2.conf
export SOFTHSM2_CONF
cat > $SOFTHSM2_CONF << EOF
# SoftHSM v2 configuration file
directories.tokendir = ${TOKEN}
objectstore.backend = file
# ERROR, WARNING, INFO, DEBUG
log.level = DEBUG
# If CKF_REMOVABLE_DEVICE flag should be set
slots.removable = false
EOF
out=$(softhsm2-util --init-token --free --label token-slot-0 --pin "$TEST_SSH_PIN" --so-pin "$TEST_SSH_SOPIN")
slot=$(echo -- $out | sed 's/.* //')
# prevent ssh-agent from calling ssh-askpass
SSH_ASKPASS=/usr/bin/true
export SSH_ASKPASS
unset DISPLAY
# start command w/o tty, so ssh-add accepts pin from stdin
notty() {
perl -e 'use POSIX; POSIX::setsid();
if (fork) { wait; exit($? >> 8); } else { exec(@ARGV) }' "$@"
}
trace "generating keys"
RSA=${DIR}/RSA
EC=${DIR}/EC
openssl genpkey -algorithm rsa > $RSA
openssl pkcs8 -nocrypt -in $RSA |\
softhsm2-util --slot "$slot" --label 01 --id 01 --pin "$TEST_SSH_PIN" --import /dev/stdin
openssl genpkey \
-genparam \
-algorithm ec \
-pkeyopt ec_paramgen_curve:prime256v1 |\
openssl genpkey \
-paramfile /dev/stdin > $EC
openssl pkcs8 -nocrypt -in $EC |\
softhsm2-util --slot "$slot" --label 02 --id 02 --pin "$TEST_SSH_PIN" --import /dev/stdin
trace "start agent"
-eval `${SSHAGENT} -s` > /dev/null
+eval `${SSHAGENT} ${EXTRA_AGENT_ARGS} -s` > /dev/null
r=$?
if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then
fail "could not start ssh-agent: exit code $r"
else
trace "add pkcs11 key to agent"
echo ${TEST_SSH_PIN} | notty ${SSHADD} -s ${TEST_SSH_PKCS11} > /dev/null 2>&1
r=$?
if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then
fail "ssh-add -s failed: exit code $r"
fi
trace "pkcs11 list via agent"
${SSHADD} -l > /dev/null 2>&1
r=$?
if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then
fail "ssh-add -l failed: exit code $r"
fi
for k in $RSA $EC; do
trace "testing $k"
chmod 600 $k
ssh-keygen -y -f $k > $k.pub
pub=$(cat $k.pub)
${SSHADD} -L | grep -q "$pub" || fail "key $k missing in ssh-add -L"
${SSHADD} -T $k.pub || fail "ssh-add -T with $k failed"
# add to authorized keys
cat $k.pub > $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
trace "pkcs11 connect via agent ($k)"
${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost exit 5
r=$?
if [ $r -ne 5 ]; then
fail "ssh connect failed (exit code $r)"
fi
done
trace "remove pkcs11 keys"
echo ${TEST_SSH_PIN} | notty ${SSHADD} -e ${TEST_SSH_PKCS11} > /dev/null 2>&1
r=$?
if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then
fail "ssh-add -e failed: exit code $r"
fi
trace "kill agent"
${SSHAGENT} -k > /dev/null
fi
diff --git a/regress/agent-ptrace.sh b/regress/agent-ptrace.sh
index 2d795ee32043..9cd68d7ec84e 100644
--- a/regress/agent-ptrace.sh
+++ b/regress/agent-ptrace.sh
@@ -1,66 +1,66 @@
# $OpenBSD: agent-ptrace.sh,v 1.3 2015/09/11 04:55:01 djm Exp $
# Placed in the Public Domain.
tid="disallow agent ptrace attach"
if have_prog uname ; then
case `uname` in
AIX|CYGWIN*|OSF1)
echo "skipped (not supported on this platform)"
exit 0
;;
esac
fi
if [ "x$USER" = "xroot" ]; then
echo "Skipped: running as root"
exit 0
fi
if have_prog gdb ; then
: ok
else
echo "skipped (gdb not found)"
exit 0
fi
if $OBJ/setuid-allowed ${SSHAGENT} ; then
: ok
else
echo "skipped (${SSHAGENT} is mounted on a no-setuid filesystem)"
exit 0
fi
if test -z "$SUDO" ; then
echo "skipped (SUDO not set)"
exit 0
else
$SUDO chown 0 ${SSHAGENT}
$SUDO chgrp 0 ${SSHAGENT}
$SUDO chmod 2755 ${SSHAGENT}
fi
trace "start agent"
-eval `${SSHAGENT} -s` > /dev/null
+eval `${SSHAGENT} ${EXTRA_AGENT_ARGS} -s` > /dev/null
r=$?
if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then
fail "could not start ssh-agent: exit code $r"
else
# ls -l ${SSH_AUTH_SOCK}
gdb ${SSHAGENT} ${SSH_AGENT_PID} > ${OBJ}/gdb.out 2>&1 << EOF
quit
EOF
r=$?
if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then
fail "gdb failed: exit code $r"
fi
egrep 'ptrace: Operation not permitted.|procfs:.*Permission denied.|ttrace.*Permission denied.|procfs:.*: Invalid argument.|Unable to access task ' >/dev/null ${OBJ}/gdb.out
r=$?
rm -f ${OBJ}/gdb.out
if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then
fail "ptrace succeeded?: exit code $r"
fi
trace "kill agent"
${SSHAGENT} -k > /dev/null
fi
diff --git a/regress/agent-timeout.sh b/regress/agent-timeout.sh
index 311c7bcba801..6dec09285908 100644
--- a/regress/agent-timeout.sh
+++ b/regress/agent-timeout.sh
@@ -1,38 +1,38 @@
-# $OpenBSD: agent-timeout.sh,v 1.5 2019/09/03 08:37:06 djm Exp $
+# $OpenBSD: agent-timeout.sh,v 1.6 2019/11/26 23:43:10 djm Exp $
# Placed in the Public Domain.
tid="agent timeout test"
SSHAGENT_TIMEOUT=10
trace "start agent"
-eval `${SSHAGENT} -s` > /dev/null
+eval `${SSHAGENT} -s ${EXTRA_AGENT_ARGS}` > /dev/null
r=$?
if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then
fail "could not start ssh-agent: exit code $r"
else
trace "add keys with timeout"
keys=0
for t in ${SSH_KEYTYPES}; do
${SSHADD} -kt ${SSHAGENT_TIMEOUT} $OBJ/$t > /dev/null 2>&1
if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
fail "ssh-add did succeed exit code 0"
fi
keys=$((${keys} + 1))
done
n=`${SSHADD} -l 2> /dev/null | wc -l`
trace "agent has $n keys"
if [ $n -ne $keys ]; then
fail "ssh-add -l did not return $keys keys: $n"
fi
trace "sleeping 2*${SSHAGENT_TIMEOUT} seconds"
sleep ${SSHAGENT_TIMEOUT}
sleep ${SSHAGENT_TIMEOUT}
${SSHADD} -l 2> /dev/null | grep 'The agent has no identities.' >/dev/null
if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
fail "ssh-add -l still returns keys after timeout"
fi
trace "kill agent"
${SSHAGENT} -k > /dev/null
fi
diff --git a/regress/agent.sh b/regress/agent.sh
index 48fa12b0e2ec..39403653c34d 100644
--- a/regress/agent.sh
+++ b/regress/agent.sh
@@ -1,123 +1,164 @@
-# $OpenBSD: agent.sh,v 1.15 2019/07/23 07:39:43 dtucker Exp $
+# $OpenBSD: agent.sh,v 1.17 2019/12/21 02:33:07 djm Exp $
# Placed in the Public Domain.
tid="simple agent test"
SSH_AUTH_SOCK=/nonexistent ${SSHADD} -l > /dev/null 2>&1
if [ $? -ne 2 ]; then
fail "ssh-add -l did not fail with exit code 2"
fi
-trace "start agent"
-eval `${SSHAGENT} -s` > /dev/null
+trace "start agent, args ${EXTRA_AGENT_ARGS} -s"
+eval `${SSHAGENT} ${EXTRA_AGENT_ARGS} -s` > /dev/null
r=$?
if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then
fatal "could not start ssh-agent: exit code $r"
fi
+eval `${SSHAGENT} ${EXTRA_AGENT_ARGS} -s | sed 's/SSH_/FW_SSH_/g'` > /dev/null
+r=$?
+if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then
+ fatal "could not start second ssh-agent: exit code $r"
+fi
+
${SSHADD} -l > /dev/null 2>&1
if [ $? -ne 1 ]; then
fail "ssh-add -l did not fail with exit code 1"
fi
rm -f $OBJ/user_ca_key $OBJ/user_ca_key.pub
${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t ed25519 -f $OBJ/user_ca_key \
|| fatal "ssh-keygen failed"
trace "overwrite authorized keys"
printf '' > $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
for t in ${SSH_KEYTYPES}; do
# generate user key for agent
rm -f $OBJ/$t-agent $OBJ/$t-agent.pub*
${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t $t -f $OBJ/$t-agent ||\
fatal "ssh-keygen for $t-agent failed"
# Make a certificate for each too.
${SSHKEYGEN} -qs $OBJ/user_ca_key -I "$t cert" \
-n estragon $OBJ/$t-agent.pub || fatal "ca sign failed"
# add to authorized keys
cat $OBJ/$t-agent.pub >> $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
- # add privat key to agent
- ${SSHADD} $OBJ/$t-agent > /dev/null 2>&1
+ # add private key to agent
+ ${SSHADD} $OBJ/$t-agent #> /dev/null 2>&1
+ if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
+ fail "ssh-add failed exit code $?"
+ fi
+ # add private key to second agent
+ SSH_AUTH_SOCK=$FW_SSH_AUTH_SOCK ${SSHADD} $OBJ/$t-agent #> /dev/null 2>&1
if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
- fail "ssh-add did succeed exit code 0"
+ fail "ssh-add failed exit code $?"
fi
# Remove private key to ensure that we aren't accidentally using it.
rm -f $OBJ/$t-agent
done
# Remove explicit identity directives from ssh_proxy
mv $OBJ/ssh_proxy $OBJ/ssh_proxy_bak
grep -vi identityfile $OBJ/ssh_proxy_bak > $OBJ/ssh_proxy
${SSHADD} -l > /dev/null 2>&1
r=$?
if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then
fail "ssh-add -l failed: exit code $r"
fi
# the same for full pubkey output
${SSHADD} -L > /dev/null 2>&1
r=$?
if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then
fail "ssh-add -L failed: exit code $r"
fi
trace "simple connect via agent"
${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost exit 52
r=$?
if [ $r -ne 52 ]; then
fail "ssh connect with failed (exit code $r)"
fi
for t in ${SSH_KEYTYPES}; do
trace "connect via agent using $t key"
if [ "$t" = "ssh-dss" ]; then
echo "PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes +ssh-dss" >> $OBJ/ssh_proxy
echo "PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes +ssh-dss" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy
fi
${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy -i $OBJ/$t-agent.pub -oIdentitiesOnly=yes \
somehost exit 52
r=$?
if [ $r -ne 52 ]; then
fail "ssh connect with failed (exit code $r)"
fi
done
trace "agent forwarding"
${SSH} -A -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost ${SSHADD} -l > /dev/null 2>&1
r=$?
if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then
fail "ssh-add -l via agent fwd failed (exit code $r)"
fi
+${SSH} "-oForwardAgent=$SSH_AUTH_SOCK" -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost ${SSHADD} -l > /dev/null 2>&1
+r=$?
+if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then
+ fail "ssh-add -l via agent path fwd failed (exit code $r)"
+fi
${SSH} -A -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost \
"${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost exit 52"
r=$?
if [ $r -ne 52 ]; then
fail "agent fwd failed (exit code $r)"
fi
+trace "agent forwarding different agent"
+${SSH} "-oForwardAgent=$FW_SSH_AUTH_SOCK" -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost ${SSHADD} -l > /dev/null 2>&1
+r=$?
+if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then
+ fail "ssh-add -l via agent path fwd of different agent failed (exit code $r)"
+fi
+${SSH} '-oForwardAgent=$FW_SSH_AUTH_SOCK' -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost ${SSHADD} -l > /dev/null 2>&1
+r=$?
+if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then
+ fail "ssh-add -l via agent path env fwd of different agent failed (exit code $r)"
+fi
+
+# Remove keys from forwarded agent, ssh-add on remote machine should now fail.
+SSH_AUTH_SOCK=$FW_SSH_AUTH_SOCK ${SSHADD} -D > /dev/null 2>&1
+r=$?
+if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then
+ fail "ssh-add -D failed: exit code $r"
+fi
+${SSH} '-oForwardAgent=$FW_SSH_AUTH_SOCK' -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost ${SSHADD} -l > /dev/null 2>&1
+r=$?
+if [ $r -ne 1 ]; then
+ fail "ssh-add -l with different agent did not fail with exit code 1 (exit code $r)"
+fi
+
(printf 'cert-authority,principals="estragon" '; cat $OBJ/user_ca_key.pub) \
> $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
for t in ${SSH_KEYTYPES}; do
if [ "$t" != "ssh-dss" ]; then
trace "connect via agent using $t key"
${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy -i $OBJ/$t-agent.pub \
-oCertificateFile=$OBJ/$t-agent-cert.pub \
-oIdentitiesOnly=yes somehost exit 52
r=$?
if [ $r -ne 52 ]; then
fail "ssh connect with failed (exit code $r)"
fi
fi
done
trace "delete all agent keys"
${SSHADD} -D > /dev/null 2>&1
r=$?
if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then
fail "ssh-add -D failed: exit code $r"
fi
trace "kill agent"
${SSHAGENT} -k > /dev/null
+SSH_AGENT_PID=$FW_SSH_AGENT_PID ${SSHAGENT} -k > /dev/null
diff --git a/regress/cert-file.sh b/regress/cert-file.sh
index 1157a3582e5f..94e672a99b6c 100644
--- a/regress/cert-file.sh
+++ b/regress/cert-file.sh
@@ -1,166 +1,166 @@
-# $OpenBSD: cert-file.sh,v 1.7 2018/04/10 00:14:10 djm Exp $
+# $OpenBSD: cert-file.sh,v 1.8 2019/11/26 23:43:10 djm Exp $
# Placed in the Public Domain.
tid="ssh with certificates"
rm -f $OBJ/user_ca_key* $OBJ/user_key*
rm -f $OBJ/cert_user_key*
# Create a CA key
${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t ed25519 -f $OBJ/user_ca_key1 ||\
fatal "ssh-keygen failed"
${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t ed25519 -f $OBJ/user_ca_key2 ||\
fatal "ssh-keygen failed"
# Make some keys and certificates.
${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t ed25519 -f $OBJ/user_key1 || \
fatal "ssh-keygen failed"
${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t ed25519 -f $OBJ/user_key2 || \
fatal "ssh-keygen failed"
${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t ed25519 -f $OBJ/user_key3 || \
fatal "ssh-keygen failed"
${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t ed25519 -f $OBJ/user_key4 || \
fatal "ssh-keygen failed"
${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t ed25519 -f $OBJ/user_key5 || \
fatal "ssh-keygen failed"
# Move the certificate to a different address to better control
# when it is offered.
${SSHKEYGEN} -q -s $OBJ/user_ca_key1 -I "regress user key for $USER" \
-z $$ -n ${USER} $OBJ/user_key1 ||
fatal "couldn't sign user_key1 with user_ca_key1"
mv $OBJ/user_key1-cert.pub $OBJ/cert_user_key1_1.pub
${SSHKEYGEN} -q -s $OBJ/user_ca_key2 -I "regress user key for $USER" \
-z $$ -n ${USER} $OBJ/user_key1 ||
fatal "couldn't sign user_key1 with user_ca_key2"
mv $OBJ/user_key1-cert.pub $OBJ/cert_user_key1_2.pub
${SSHKEYGEN} -q -s $OBJ/user_ca_key1 -I "regress user key for $USER" \
-z $$ -n ${USER} $OBJ/user_key3 ||
fatal "couldn't sign user_key3 with user_ca_key1"
rm $OBJ/user_key3.pub # to test use of private key w/o public half.
${SSHKEYGEN} -q -s $OBJ/user_ca_key1 -I "regress user key for $USER" \
-z $$ -n ${USER} $OBJ/user_key4 ||
fatal "couldn't sign user_key4 with user_ca_key1"
rm $OBJ/user_key4 $OBJ/user_key4.pub # to test no matching pub/private key case.
trace 'try with identity files'
opts="-F $OBJ/ssh_proxy -oIdentitiesOnly=yes"
opts2="$opts -i $OBJ/user_key1 -i $OBJ/user_key2"
echo "cert-authority $(cat $OBJ/user_ca_key1.pub)" > $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
# Make a clean config that doesn't have any pre-added identities.
cat $OBJ/ssh_proxy | grep -v IdentityFile > $OBJ/no_identity_config
# XXX: verify that certificate used was what we expect. Needs exposure of
# keys via environment variable or similar.
# Key with no .pub should work - finding the equivalent *-cert.pub.
verbose "identity cert with no plain public file"
${SSH} -F $OBJ/no_identity_config -oIdentitiesOnly=yes \
-i $OBJ/user_key3 somehost exit 52
[ $? -ne 52 ] && fail "ssh failed"
# CertificateFile matching private key with no .pub file should work.
verbose "CertificateFile with no plain public file"
${SSH} -F $OBJ/no_identity_config -oIdentitiesOnly=yes \
-oCertificateFile=$OBJ/user_key3-cert.pub \
-i $OBJ/user_key3 somehost exit 52
[ $? -ne 52 ] && fail "ssh failed"
# Just keys should fail
verbose "plain keys"
${SSH} $opts2 somehost exit 52
r=$?
if [ $r -eq 52 ]; then
fail "ssh succeeded with no certs"
fi
# Keys with untrusted cert should fail.
verbose "untrusted cert"
opts3="$opts2 -oCertificateFile=$OBJ/cert_user_key1_2.pub"
${SSH} $opts3 somehost exit 52
r=$?
if [ $r -eq 52 ]; then
fail "ssh succeeded with bad cert"
fi
# Good cert with bad key should fail.
verbose "good cert, bad key"
opts3="$opts -i $OBJ/user_key2"
opts3="$opts3 -oCertificateFile=$OBJ/cert_user_key1_1.pub"
${SSH} $opts3 somehost exit 52
r=$?
if [ $r -eq 52 ]; then
fail "ssh succeeded with no matching key"
fi
# Keys with one trusted cert, should succeed.
verbose "single trusted"
opts3="$opts2 -oCertificateFile=$OBJ/cert_user_key1_1.pub"
${SSH} $opts3 somehost exit 52
r=$?
if [ $r -ne 52 ]; then
fail "ssh failed with trusted cert and key"
fi
# Multiple certs and keys, with one trusted cert, should succeed.
verbose "multiple trusted"
opts3="$opts2 -oCertificateFile=$OBJ/cert_user_key1_2.pub"
opts3="$opts3 -oCertificateFile=$OBJ/cert_user_key1_1.pub"
${SSH} $opts3 somehost exit 52
r=$?
if [ $r -ne 52 ]; then
fail "ssh failed with multiple certs"
fi
#next, using an agent in combination with the keys
SSH_AUTH_SOCK=/nonexistent ${SSHADD} -l > /dev/null 2>&1
if [ $? -ne 2 ]; then
fatal "ssh-add -l did not fail with exit code 2"
fi
trace "start agent"
-eval `${SSHAGENT} -s` > /dev/null
+eval `${SSHAGENT} ${EXTRA_AGENT_ARGS} -s` > /dev/null
r=$?
if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then
fatal "could not start ssh-agent: exit code $r"
fi
# add private keys to agent
${SSHADD} -k $OBJ/user_key2 > /dev/null 2>&1
if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
fatal "ssh-add did not succeed with exit code 0"
fi
${SSHADD} -k $OBJ/user_key1 > /dev/null 2>&1
if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
fatal "ssh-add did not succeed with exit code 0"
fi
# try ssh with the agent and certificates
opts="-F $OBJ/ssh_proxy"
# with no certificates, should fail
${SSH} $opts somehost exit 52
if [ $? -eq 52 ]; then
fail "ssh connect with agent in succeeded with no cert"
fi
#with an untrusted certificate, should fail
opts="$opts -oCertificateFile=$OBJ/cert_user_key1_2.pub"
${SSH} $opts somehost exit 52
if [ $? -eq 52 ]; then
fail "ssh connect with agent in succeeded with bad cert"
fi
#with an additional trusted certificate, should succeed
opts="$opts -oCertificateFile=$OBJ/cert_user_key1_1.pub"
${SSH} $opts somehost exit 52
if [ $? -ne 52 ]; then
fail "ssh connect with agent in failed with good cert"
fi
trace "kill agent"
${SSHAGENT} -k > /dev/null
#cleanup
rm -f $OBJ/user_ca_key* $OBJ/user_key*
rm -f $OBJ/cert_user_key*
diff --git a/regress/cert-hostkey.sh b/regress/cert-hostkey.sh
index 86ea62504061..097bf846346c 100644
--- a/regress/cert-hostkey.sh
+++ b/regress/cert-hostkey.sh
@@ -1,325 +1,325 @@
-# $OpenBSD: cert-hostkey.sh,v 1.18 2019/07/25 08:28:15 dtucker Exp $
+# $OpenBSD: cert-hostkey.sh,v 1.23 2020/01/03 03:02:26 djm Exp $
# Placed in the Public Domain.
tid="certified host keys"
rm -f $OBJ/known_hosts-cert* $OBJ/host_ca_key* $OBJ/host_revoked_*
rm -f $OBJ/cert_host_key* $OBJ/host_krl_*
# Allow all hostkey/pubkey types, prefer certs for the client
rsa=0
types=""
-for i in `$SSH -Q key`; do
+for i in `$SSH -Q key | maybe_filter_sk`; do
if [ -z "$types" ]; then
types="$i"
continue
fi
case "$i" in
# Special treatment for RSA keys.
*rsa*cert*)
types="rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com,$i,$types"
types="rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com,$types";;
*rsa*)
rsa=1
types="$types,rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256,$i";;
# Prefer certificate to plain keys.
*cert*) types="$i,$types";;
*) types="$types,$i";;
esac
done
(
echo "HostKeyAlgorithms ${types}"
echo "PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes *"
) >> $OBJ/ssh_proxy
cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak
(
echo "HostKeyAlgorithms *"
echo "PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes *"
) >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak
HOSTS='localhost-with-alias,127.0.0.1,::1'
kh_ca() {
for k in "$@" ; do
printf "@cert-authority $HOSTS "
cat $OBJ/$k || fatal "couldn't cat $k"
done
}
kh_revoke() {
for k in "$@" ; do
printf "@revoked * "
cat $OBJ/$k || fatal "couldn't cat $k"
done
}
# Create a CA key and add it to known hosts. Ed25519 chosen for speed.
# RSA for testing RSA/SHA2 signatures if supported.
ktype2=ed25519
[ "x$rsa" = "x1" ] && ktype2=rsa
${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t ed25519 -f $OBJ/host_ca_key ||\
fail "ssh-keygen of host_ca_key failed"
${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t $ktype2 -f $OBJ/host_ca_key2 ||\
fail "ssh-keygen of host_ca_key failed"
kh_ca host_ca_key.pub host_ca_key2.pub > $OBJ/known_hosts-cert.orig
cp $OBJ/known_hosts-cert.orig $OBJ/known_hosts-cert
# Plain text revocation files
touch $OBJ/host_revoked_empty
touch $OBJ/host_revoked_plain
touch $OBJ/host_revoked_cert
cat $OBJ/host_ca_key.pub $OBJ/host_ca_key2.pub > $OBJ/host_revoked_ca
-PLAIN_TYPES=`$SSH -Q key-plain | sed 's/^ssh-dss/ssh-dsa/g;s/^ssh-//'`
+PLAIN_TYPES=`echo "$SSH_KEYTYPES" | sed 's/^ssh-dss/ssh-dsa/g;s/^ssh-//'`
if echo "$PLAIN_TYPES" | grep '^rsa$' >/dev/null 2>&1 ; then
PLAIN_TYPES="$PLAIN_TYPES rsa-sha2-256 rsa-sha2-512"
fi
# Prepare certificate, plain key and CA KRLs
${SSHKEYGEN} -kf $OBJ/host_krl_empty || fatal "KRL init failed"
${SSHKEYGEN} -kf $OBJ/host_krl_plain || fatal "KRL init failed"
${SSHKEYGEN} -kf $OBJ/host_krl_cert || fatal "KRL init failed"
${SSHKEYGEN} -kf $OBJ/host_krl_ca $OBJ/host_ca_key.pub $OBJ/host_ca_key2.pub \
|| fatal "KRL init failed"
# Generate and sign host keys
serial=1
for ktype in $PLAIN_TYPES ; do
verbose "$tid: sign host ${ktype} cert"
# Generate and sign a host key
${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t ${ktype} \
-f $OBJ/cert_host_key_${ktype} || \
fatal "ssh-keygen of cert_host_key_${ktype} failed"
${SSHKEYGEN} -ukf $OBJ/host_krl_plain \
$OBJ/cert_host_key_${ktype}.pub || fatal "KRL update failed"
cat $OBJ/cert_host_key_${ktype}.pub >> $OBJ/host_revoked_plain
case $ktype in
rsa-sha2-*) tflag="-t $ktype"; ca="$OBJ/host_ca_key2" ;;
*) tflag=""; ca="$OBJ/host_ca_key" ;;
esac
${SSHKEYGEN} -h -q -s $ca -z $serial $tflag \
-I "regress host key for $USER" \
-n $HOSTS $OBJ/cert_host_key_${ktype} ||
fatal "couldn't sign cert_host_key_${ktype}"
${SSHKEYGEN} -ukf $OBJ/host_krl_cert \
$OBJ/cert_host_key_${ktype}-cert.pub || \
fatal "KRL update failed"
cat $OBJ/cert_host_key_${ktype}-cert.pub >> $OBJ/host_revoked_cert
serial=`expr $serial + 1`
done
attempt_connect() {
_ident="$1"
_expect_success="$2"
shift; shift
verbose "$tid: $_ident expect success $_expect_success"
cp $OBJ/known_hosts-cert.orig $OBJ/known_hosts-cert
${SSH} -oUserKnownHostsFile=$OBJ/known_hosts-cert \
-oGlobalKnownHostsFile=$OBJ/known_hosts-cert \
"$@" -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true
_r=$?
if [ "x$_expect_success" = "xyes" ] ; then
if [ $_r -ne 0 ]; then
fail "ssh cert connect $_ident failed"
fi
else
if [ $_r -eq 0 ]; then
fail "ssh cert connect $_ident succeeded unexpectedly"
fi
fi
}
# Basic connect and revocation tests.
-for privsep in yes sandbox ; do
+for privsep in yes ; do
for ktype in $PLAIN_TYPES ; do
verbose "$tid: host ${ktype} cert connect privsep $privsep"
(
cat $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak
echo HostKey $OBJ/cert_host_key_${ktype}
echo HostCertificate $OBJ/cert_host_key_${ktype}-cert.pub
echo UsePrivilegeSeparation $privsep
) > $OBJ/sshd_proxy
# test name expect success
attempt_connect "$ktype basic connect" "yes"
attempt_connect "$ktype empty KRL" "yes" \
-oRevokedHostKeys=$OBJ/host_krl_empty
attempt_connect "$ktype KRL w/ plain key revoked" "no" \
-oRevokedHostKeys=$OBJ/host_krl_plain
attempt_connect "$ktype KRL w/ cert revoked" "no" \
-oRevokedHostKeys=$OBJ/host_krl_cert
attempt_connect "$ktype KRL w/ CA revoked" "no" \
-oRevokedHostKeys=$OBJ/host_krl_ca
attempt_connect "$ktype empty plaintext revocation" "yes" \
-oRevokedHostKeys=$OBJ/host_revoked_empty
attempt_connect "$ktype plain key plaintext revocation" "no" \
-oRevokedHostKeys=$OBJ/host_revoked_plain
attempt_connect "$ktype cert plaintext revocation" "no" \
-oRevokedHostKeys=$OBJ/host_revoked_cert
attempt_connect "$ktype CA plaintext revocation" "no" \
-oRevokedHostKeys=$OBJ/host_revoked_ca
done
done
# Revoked certificates with key present
kh_ca host_ca_key.pub host_ca_key2.pub > $OBJ/known_hosts-cert.orig
for ktype in $PLAIN_TYPES ; do
test -f "$OBJ/cert_host_key_${ktype}.pub" || fatal "no pubkey"
kh_revoke cert_host_key_${ktype}.pub >> $OBJ/known_hosts-cert.orig
done
cp $OBJ/known_hosts-cert.orig $OBJ/known_hosts-cert
-for privsep in yes sandbox ; do
+for privsep in yes ; do
for ktype in $PLAIN_TYPES ; do
verbose "$tid: host ${ktype} revoked cert privsep $privsep"
(
cat $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak
echo HostKey $OBJ/cert_host_key_${ktype}
echo HostCertificate $OBJ/cert_host_key_${ktype}-cert.pub
echo UsePrivilegeSeparation $privsep
) > $OBJ/sshd_proxy
cp $OBJ/known_hosts-cert.orig $OBJ/known_hosts-cert
${SSH} -oUserKnownHostsFile=$OBJ/known_hosts-cert \
-oGlobalKnownHostsFile=$OBJ/known_hosts-cert \
-F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1
if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
fail "ssh cert connect succeeded unexpectedly"
fi
done
done
# Revoked CA
kh_ca host_ca_key.pub host_ca_key2.pub > $OBJ/known_hosts-cert.orig
kh_revoke host_ca_key.pub host_ca_key2.pub >> $OBJ/known_hosts-cert.orig
cp $OBJ/known_hosts-cert.orig $OBJ/known_hosts-cert
for ktype in $PLAIN_TYPES ; do
verbose "$tid: host ${ktype} revoked cert"
(
cat $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak
echo HostKey $OBJ/cert_host_key_${ktype}
echo HostCertificate $OBJ/cert_host_key_${ktype}-cert.pub
) > $OBJ/sshd_proxy
cp $OBJ/known_hosts-cert.orig $OBJ/known_hosts-cert
${SSH} -oUserKnownHostsFile=$OBJ/known_hosts-cert \
-oGlobalKnownHostsFile=$OBJ/known_hosts-cert \
-F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1
if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
fail "ssh cert connect succeeded unexpectedly"
fi
done
# Create a CA key and add it to known hosts
kh_ca host_ca_key.pub host_ca_key2.pub > $OBJ/known_hosts-cert.orig
cp $OBJ/known_hosts-cert.orig $OBJ/known_hosts-cert
test_one() {
ident=$1
result=$2
sign_opts=$3
for kt in $PLAIN_TYPES; do
case $ktype in
rsa-sha2-*) tflag="-t $ktype"; ca="$OBJ/host_ca_key2" ;;
*) tflag=""; ca="$OBJ/host_ca_key" ;;
esac
${SSHKEYGEN} -q -s $ca $tflag -I "regress host key for $USER" \
$sign_opts $OBJ/cert_host_key_${kt} ||
fatal "couldn't sign cert_host_key_${kt}"
(
cat $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak
echo HostKey $OBJ/cert_host_key_${kt}
echo HostCertificate $OBJ/cert_host_key_${kt}-cert.pub
) > $OBJ/sshd_proxy
cp $OBJ/known_hosts-cert.orig $OBJ/known_hosts-cert
${SSH} -oUserKnownHostsFile=$OBJ/known_hosts-cert \
-oGlobalKnownHostsFile=$OBJ/known_hosts-cert \
-F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1
rc=$?
if [ "x$result" = "xsuccess" ] ; then
if [ $rc -ne 0 ]; then
fail "ssh cert connect $ident failed unexpectedly"
fi
else
if [ $rc -eq 0 ]; then
fail "ssh cert connect $ident succeeded unexpectedly"
fi
fi
done
}
test_one "user-certificate" failure "-n $HOSTS"
test_one "empty principals" success "-h"
test_one "wrong principals" failure "-h -n foo"
-test_one "cert not yet valid" failure "-h -V20200101:20300101"
+test_one "cert not yet valid" failure "-h -V20300101:20320101"
test_one "cert expired" failure "-h -V19800101:19900101"
test_one "cert valid interval" success "-h -V-1w:+2w"
test_one "cert has constraints" failure "-h -Oforce-command=false"
# Check downgrade of cert to raw key when no CA found
for ktype in $PLAIN_TYPES ; do
rm -f $OBJ/known_hosts-cert $OBJ/cert_host_key*
verbose "$tid: host ${ktype} ${v} cert downgrade to raw key"
# Generate and sign a host key
${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t ${ktype} -f $OBJ/cert_host_key_${ktype} || \
fail "ssh-keygen of cert_host_key_${ktype} failed"
case $ktype in
rsa-sha2-*) tflag="-t $ktype"; ca="$OBJ/host_ca_key2" ;;
*) tflag=""; ca="$OBJ/host_ca_key" ;;
esac
${SSHKEYGEN} -h -q $tflag -s $ca $tflag \
-I "regress host key for $USER" \
-n $HOSTS $OBJ/cert_host_key_${ktype} ||
fatal "couldn't sign cert_host_key_${ktype}"
(
printf "$HOSTS "
cat $OBJ/cert_host_key_${ktype}.pub
) > $OBJ/known_hosts-cert
(
cat $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak
echo HostKey $OBJ/cert_host_key_${ktype}
echo HostCertificate $OBJ/cert_host_key_${ktype}-cert.pub
) > $OBJ/sshd_proxy
${SSH} -oUserKnownHostsFile=$OBJ/known_hosts-cert \
-oGlobalKnownHostsFile=$OBJ/known_hosts-cert \
-F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true
if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
fail "ssh cert connect failed"
fi
done
# Wrong certificate
kh_ca host_ca_key.pub host_ca_key2.pub > $OBJ/known_hosts-cert.orig
cp $OBJ/known_hosts-cert.orig $OBJ/known_hosts-cert
for kt in $PLAIN_TYPES ; do
verbose "$tid: host ${kt} connect wrong cert"
rm -f $OBJ/cert_host_key*
# Self-sign key
${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t ${kt} -f $OBJ/cert_host_key_${kt} || \
fail "ssh-keygen of cert_host_key_${kt} failed"
case $kt in
rsa-sha2-*) tflag="-t $kt" ;;
*) tflag="" ;;
esac
${SSHKEYGEN} $tflag -h -q -s $OBJ/cert_host_key_${kt} \
-I "regress host key for $USER" \
-n $HOSTS $OBJ/cert_host_key_${kt} ||
fatal "couldn't sign cert_host_key_${kt}"
(
cat $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak
echo HostKey $OBJ/cert_host_key_${kt}
echo HostCertificate $OBJ/cert_host_key_${kt}-cert.pub
) > $OBJ/sshd_proxy
cp $OBJ/known_hosts-cert.orig $OBJ/known_hosts-cert
${SSH} -oUserKnownHostsFile=$OBJ/known_hosts-cert \
-oGlobalKnownHostsFile=$OBJ/known_hosts-cert \
-F $OBJ/ssh_proxy -q somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1
if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
fail "ssh cert connect $ident succeeded unexpectedly"
fi
done
rm -f $OBJ/known_hosts-cert* $OBJ/host_ca_key* $OBJ/cert_host_key*
diff --git a/regress/cert-userkey.sh b/regress/cert-userkey.sh
index 38c14a698092..91596fa789c0 100644
--- a/regress/cert-userkey.sh
+++ b/regress/cert-userkey.sh
@@ -1,402 +1,404 @@
-# $OpenBSD: cert-userkey.sh,v 1.21 2019/07/25 08:28:15 dtucker Exp $
+# $OpenBSD: cert-userkey.sh,v 1.25 2020/01/03 03:02:26 djm Exp $
# Placed in the Public Domain.
tid="certified user keys"
rm -f $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER $OBJ/user_ca_key* $OBJ/cert_user_key*
cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak
cp $OBJ/ssh_proxy $OBJ/ssh_proxy_bak
-PLAIN_TYPES=`$SSH -Q key-plain | sed 's/^ssh-dss/ssh-dsa/;s/^ssh-//'`
+PLAIN_TYPES=`$SSH -Q key-plain | maybe_filter_sk | sed 's/^ssh-dss/ssh-dsa/;s/^ssh-//'`
EXTRA_TYPES=""
rsa=""
if echo "$PLAIN_TYPES" | grep '^rsa$' >/dev/null 2>&1 ; then
rsa=rsa
PLAIN_TYPES="$PLAIN_TYPES rsa-sha2-256 rsa-sha2-512"
fi
kname() {
- case $ktype in
- rsa-sha2-*) n="$ktype" ;;
+ case $1 in
+ rsa-sha2-*) n="$1" ;;
+ sk-ecdsa-*) n="sk-ecdsa" ;;
+ sk-ssh-ed25519*) n="sk-ssh-ed25519" ;;
# subshell because some seds will add a newline
*) n=$(echo $1 | sed 's/^dsa/ssh-dss/;s/^rsa/ssh-rsa/;s/^ed/ssh-ed/') ;;
esac
if [ -z "$rsa" ]; then
echo "$n*,ssh-ed25519*"
else
echo "$n*,ssh-rsa*,ssh-ed25519*"
fi
}
# Create a CA key
if [ ! -z "$rsa" ]; then
catype=rsa
else
catype=ed25519
fi
${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t $catype -f $OBJ/user_ca_key ||\
fail "ssh-keygen of user_ca_key failed"
# Generate and sign user keys
for ktype in $PLAIN_TYPES $EXTRA_TYPES ; do
verbose "$tid: sign user ${ktype} cert"
${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t ${ktype} \
-f $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} || \
fatal "ssh-keygen of cert_user_key_${ktype} failed"
# Generate RSA/SHA2 certs for rsa-sha2* keys.
case $ktype in
rsa-sha2-*) tflag="-t $ktype" ;;
*) tflag="" ;;
esac
${SSHKEYGEN} -q -s $OBJ/user_ca_key -z $$ \
-I "regress user key for $USER" \
-n ${USER},mekmitasdigoat $tflag $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} || \
fatal "couldn't sign cert_user_key_${ktype}"
done
# Test explicitly-specified principals
for ktype in $EXTRA_TYPES $PLAIN_TYPES ; do
t=$(kname $ktype)
- for privsep in yes sandbox ; do
+ for privsep in yes ; do
_prefix="${ktype} privsep $privsep"
# Setup for AuthorizedPrincipalsFile
rm -f $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
(
cat $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak
echo "UsePrivilegeSeparation $privsep"
echo "AuthorizedPrincipalsFile " \
"$OBJ/authorized_principals_%u"
echo "TrustedUserCAKeys $OBJ/user_ca_key.pub"
echo "PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes ${t}"
) > $OBJ/sshd_proxy
(
cat $OBJ/ssh_proxy_bak
echo "PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes ${t}"
) > $OBJ/ssh_proxy
# Missing authorized_principals
verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} missing authorized_principals"
rm -f $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER
${SSH} -i $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} \
-F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1
if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
fail "ssh cert connect succeeded unexpectedly"
fi
# Empty authorized_principals
verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} empty authorized_principals"
echo > $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER
${SSH} -i $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} \
-F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1
if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
fail "ssh cert connect succeeded unexpectedly"
fi
# Wrong authorized_principals
verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} wrong authorized_principals"
echo gregorsamsa > $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER
${SSH} -i $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} \
-F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1
if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
fail "ssh cert connect succeeded unexpectedly"
fi
# Correct authorized_principals
verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} correct authorized_principals"
echo mekmitasdigoat > $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER
${SSH} -i $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} \
-F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1
if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
fail "ssh cert connect failed"
fi
# authorized_principals with bad key option
verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} authorized_principals bad key opt"
echo 'blah mekmitasdigoat' > $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER
${SSH} -i $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} \
-F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1
if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
fail "ssh cert connect succeeded unexpectedly"
fi
# authorized_principals with command=false
verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} authorized_principals command=false"
echo 'command="false" mekmitasdigoat' > \
$OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER
${SSH} -i $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} \
-F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1
if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
fail "ssh cert connect succeeded unexpectedly"
fi
# authorized_principals with command=true
verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} authorized_principals command=true"
echo 'command="true" mekmitasdigoat' > \
$OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER
${SSH} -i $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} \
-F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost false >/dev/null 2>&1
if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
fail "ssh cert connect failed"
fi
# Setup for principals= key option
rm -f $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER
(
cat $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak
echo "UsePrivilegeSeparation $privsep"
echo "PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes ${t}"
) > $OBJ/sshd_proxy
(
cat $OBJ/ssh_proxy_bak
echo "PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes ${t}"
) > $OBJ/ssh_proxy
# Wrong principals list
verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} wrong principals key option"
(
printf 'cert-authority,principals="gregorsamsa" '
cat $OBJ/user_ca_key.pub
) > $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
${SSH} -i $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} \
-F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1
if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
fail "ssh cert connect succeeded unexpectedly"
fi
# Correct principals list
verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} correct principals key option"
(
printf 'cert-authority,principals="mekmitasdigoat" '
cat $OBJ/user_ca_key.pub
) > $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
${SSH} -i $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} \
-F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1
if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
fail "ssh cert connect failed"
fi
done
done
basic_tests() {
auth=$1
if test "x$auth" = "xauthorized_keys" ; then
# Add CA to authorized_keys
(
printf 'cert-authority '
cat $OBJ/user_ca_key.pub
) > $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
else
echo > $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
extra_sshd="TrustedUserCAKeys $OBJ/user_ca_key.pub"
fi
for ktype in $PLAIN_TYPES ; do
t=$(kname $ktype)
- for privsep in yes no ; do
+ for privsep in yes ; do
_prefix="${ktype} privsep $privsep $auth"
# Simple connect
verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} connect"
(
cat $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak
echo "UsePrivilegeSeparation $privsep"
echo "PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes ${t}"
echo "$extra_sshd"
) > $OBJ/sshd_proxy
(
cat $OBJ/ssh_proxy_bak
echo "PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes ${t}"
) > $OBJ/ssh_proxy
${SSH} -i $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} \
-F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true
if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
fail "ssh cert connect failed"
fi
# Revoked keys
verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} revoked key"
(
cat $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak
echo "UsePrivilegeSeparation $privsep"
echo "RevokedKeys $OBJ/cert_user_key_revoked"
echo "PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes ${t}"
echo "$extra_sshd"
) > $OBJ/sshd_proxy
cp $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype}.pub \
$OBJ/cert_user_key_revoked
${SSH} -i $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} \
-F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1
if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
fail "ssh cert connect succeeded unexpecedly"
fi
verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} revoked via KRL"
rm $OBJ/cert_user_key_revoked
${SSHKEYGEN} -kqf $OBJ/cert_user_key_revoked \
$OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype}.pub
${SSH} -i $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} \
-F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1
if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
fail "ssh cert connect succeeded unexpecedly"
fi
verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} empty KRL"
${SSHKEYGEN} -kqf $OBJ/cert_user_key_revoked
${SSH} -i $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} \
-F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1
if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
fail "ssh cert connect failed"
fi
done
# Revoked CA
verbose "$tid: ${ktype} $auth revoked CA key"
(
cat $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak
echo "RevokedKeys $OBJ/user_ca_key.pub"
echo "PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes ${t}"
echo "$extra_sshd"
) > $OBJ/sshd_proxy
${SSH} -i $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy \
somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1
if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
fail "ssh cert connect succeeded unexpecedly"
fi
done
verbose "$tid: $auth CA does not authenticate"
(
cat $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak
echo "PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes ${t}"
echo "$extra_sshd"
) > $OBJ/sshd_proxy
verbose "$tid: ensure CA key does not authenticate user"
${SSH} -i $OBJ/user_ca_key \
-F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1
if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
fail "ssh cert connect with CA key succeeded unexpectedly"
fi
}
basic_tests authorized_keys
basic_tests TrustedUserCAKeys
test_one() {
ident=$1
result=$2
sign_opts=$3
auth_choice=$4
auth_opt=$5
if test "x$auth_choice" = "x" ; then
auth_choice="authorized_keys TrustedUserCAKeys"
fi
for auth in $auth_choice ; do
for ktype in $rsa ed25519 ; do
cat $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak > $OBJ/sshd_proxy
if test "x$auth" = "xauthorized_keys" ; then
# Add CA to authorized_keys
(
printf "cert-authority${auth_opt} "
cat $OBJ/user_ca_key.pub
) > $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
else
echo > $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
echo "TrustedUserCAKeys $OBJ/user_ca_key.pub" \
>> $OBJ/sshd_proxy
echo "PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes ${t}*" \
>> $OBJ/sshd_proxy
if test "x$auth_opt" != "x" ; then
echo $auth_opt >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy
fi
fi
verbose "$tid: $ident auth $auth expect $result $ktype"
${SSHKEYGEN} -q -s $OBJ/user_ca_key \
-I "regress user key for $USER" \
$sign_opts $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} ||
fail "couldn't sign cert_user_key_${ktype}"
${SSH} -i $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} \
-F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1
rc=$?
if [ "x$result" = "xsuccess" ] ; then
if [ $rc -ne 0 ]; then
fail "$ident failed unexpectedly"
fi
else
if [ $rc -eq 0 ]; then
fail "$ident succeeded unexpectedly"
fi
fi
done
done
}
test_one "correct principal" success "-n ${USER}"
test_one "host-certificate" failure "-n ${USER} -h"
test_one "wrong principals" failure "-n foo"
-test_one "cert not yet valid" failure "-n ${USER} -V20200101:20300101"
+test_one "cert not yet valid" failure "-n ${USER} -V20300101:20320101"
test_one "cert expired" failure "-n ${USER} -V19800101:19900101"
test_one "cert valid interval" success "-n ${USER} -V-1w:+2w"
test_one "wrong source-address" failure "-n ${USER} -Osource-address=10.0.0.0/8"
test_one "force-command" failure "-n ${USER} -Oforce-command=false"
# Behaviour is different here: TrustedUserCAKeys doesn't allow empty principals
test_one "empty principals" success "" authorized_keys
test_one "empty principals" failure "" TrustedUserCAKeys
# Check explicitly-specified principals: an empty principals list in the cert
# should always be refused.
# AuthorizedPrincipalsFile
rm -f $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
echo mekmitasdigoat > $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER
test_one "AuthorizedPrincipalsFile principals" success "-n mekmitasdigoat" \
TrustedUserCAKeys "AuthorizedPrincipalsFile $OBJ/authorized_principals_%u"
test_one "AuthorizedPrincipalsFile no principals" failure "" \
TrustedUserCAKeys "AuthorizedPrincipalsFile $OBJ/authorized_principals_%u"
# principals= key option
rm -f $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER
test_one "principals key option principals" success "-n mekmitasdigoat" \
authorized_keys ',principals="mekmitasdigoat"'
test_one "principals key option no principals" failure "" \
authorized_keys ',principals="mekmitasdigoat"'
# command= options vs. force-command in key
test_one "force-command match true" success \
"-n ${USER} -Oforce-command=true" \
authorized_keys ',command="true"'
test_one "force-command match true" failure \
"-n ${USER} -Oforce-command=false" \
authorized_keys ',command="false"'
test_one "force-command mismatch 1" failure \
"-n ${USER} -Oforce-command=false" \
authorized_keys ',command="true"'
test_one "force-command mismatch 2" failure \
"-n ${USER} -Oforce-command=true" \
authorized_keys ',command="false"'
# Wrong certificate
cat $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak > $OBJ/sshd_proxy
for ktype in $PLAIN_TYPES ; do
t=$(kname $ktype)
# Self-sign
${SSHKEYGEN} -q -s $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} -I \
"regress user key for $USER" \
-n $USER $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} ||
fatal "couldn't sign cert_user_key_${ktype}"
verbose "$tid: user ${ktype} connect wrong cert"
${SSH} -i $OBJ/cert_user_key_${ktype} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy \
somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1
if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
fail "ssh cert connect $ident succeeded unexpectedly"
fi
done
rm -f $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER $OBJ/user_ca_key* $OBJ/cert_user_key*
rm -f $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER
diff --git a/regress/connect.sh b/regress/connect.sh
index 1b344b6034e9..46f12b7b3c92 100644
--- a/regress/connect.sh
+++ b/regress/connect.sh
@@ -1,11 +1,18 @@
-# $OpenBSD: connect.sh,v 1.6 2017/04/30 23:34:55 djm Exp $
+# $OpenBSD: connect.sh,v 1.8 2020/01/25 02:57:53 dtucker Exp $
# Placed in the Public Domain.
tid="simple connect"
start_sshd
+trace "direct connect"
${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config somehost true
if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
- fail "ssh connect with failed"
+ fail "ssh direct connect failed"
+fi
+
+trace "proxy connect"
+${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -o "proxycommand $NC %h %p" somehost true
+if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
+ fail "ssh proxycommand connect failed"
fi
diff --git a/regress/hostkey-agent.sh b/regress/hostkey-agent.sh
index 811b6b9ab25a..d6736e246501 100644
--- a/regress/hostkey-agent.sh
+++ b/regress/hostkey-agent.sh
@@ -1,53 +1,53 @@
-# $OpenBSD: hostkey-agent.sh,v 1.7 2017/04/30 23:34:55 djm Exp $
+# $OpenBSD: hostkey-agent.sh,v 1.11 2019/12/16 02:39:05 djm Exp $
# Placed in the Public Domain.
tid="hostkey agent"
rm -f $OBJ/agent-key.* $OBJ/ssh_proxy.orig $OBJ/known_hosts.orig
trace "start agent"
-eval `${SSHAGENT} -s` > /dev/null
+eval `${SSHAGENT} ${EXTRA_AGENT_ARGS} -s` > /dev/null
r=$?
[ $r -ne 0 ] && fatal "could not start ssh-agent: exit code $r"
grep -vi 'hostkey' $OBJ/sshd_proxy > $OBJ/sshd_proxy.orig
echo "HostKeyAgent $SSH_AUTH_SOCK" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy.orig
trace "load hostkeys"
-for k in `${SSH} -Q key-plain` ; do
+for k in $SSH_KEYTYPES ; do
${SSHKEYGEN} -qt $k -f $OBJ/agent-key.$k -N '' || fatal "ssh-keygen $k"
(
printf 'localhost-with-alias,127.0.0.1,::1 '
cat $OBJ/agent-key.$k.pub
) >> $OBJ/known_hosts.orig
${SSHADD} $OBJ/agent-key.$k >/dev/null 2>&1 || \
fatal "couldn't load key $OBJ/agent-key.$k"
echo "Hostkey $OBJ/agent-key.${k}" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy.orig
# Remove private key so the server can't use it.
rm $OBJ/agent-key.$k || fatal "couldn't rm $OBJ/agent-key.$k"
done
cp $OBJ/known_hosts.orig $OBJ/known_hosts
unset SSH_AUTH_SOCK
-for ps in no yes; do
- for k in `${SSH} -Q key-plain` ; do
+for ps in yes; do
+ for k in $SSH_KEYTYPES ; do
verbose "key type $k privsep=$ps"
cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy.orig $OBJ/sshd_proxy
echo "UsePrivilegeSeparation $ps" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy
echo "HostKeyAlgorithms $k" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy
opts="-oHostKeyAlgorithms=$k -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy"
cp $OBJ/known_hosts.orig $OBJ/known_hosts
SSH_CONNECTION=`${SSH} $opts host 'echo $SSH_CONNECTION'`
if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
fail "privsep=$ps failed"
fi
if [ "$SSH_CONNECTION" != "UNKNOWN 65535 UNKNOWN 65535" ]; then
fail "bad SSH_CONNECTION key type $k privsep=$ps"
fi
done
done
trace "kill agent"
${SSHAGENT} -k > /dev/null
diff --git a/regress/hostkey-rotate.sh b/regress/hostkey-rotate.sh
index cc6bd9cf6f79..c3e100c3eb10 100644
--- a/regress/hostkey-rotate.sh
+++ b/regress/hostkey-rotate.sh
@@ -1,124 +1,121 @@
-# $OpenBSD: hostkey-rotate.sh,v 1.6 2019/08/30 05:08:28 dtucker Exp $
+# $OpenBSD: hostkey-rotate.sh,v 1.8 2019/11/26 23:43:10 djm Exp $
# Placed in the Public Domain.
tid="hostkey rotate"
-# Need full names here since they are used in HostKeyAlgorithms
-HOSTKEY_TYPES="`${SSH} -Q key-plain`"
-
rm -f $OBJ/hkr.* $OBJ/ssh_proxy.orig
grep -vi 'hostkey' $OBJ/sshd_proxy > $OBJ/sshd_proxy.orig
echo "UpdateHostkeys=yes" >> $OBJ/ssh_proxy
rm $OBJ/known_hosts
# The "primary" key type is ed25519 since it's supported even when built
# without OpenSSL. The secondary is RSA if it's supported.
primary="ssh-ed25519"
secondary="$primary"
trace "prepare hostkeys"
nkeys=0
all_algs=""
-for k in $HOSTKEY_TYPES; do
+for k in $SSH_HOSTKEY_TYPES; do
${SSHKEYGEN} -qt $k -f $OBJ/hkr.$k -N '' || fatal "ssh-keygen $k"
echo "Hostkey $OBJ/hkr.${k}" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy.orig
nkeys=`expr $nkeys + 1`
test "x$all_algs" = "x" || all_algs="${all_algs},"
all_algs="${all_algs}$k"
case "$k" in
ssh-rsa) secondary="ssh-rsa" ;;
esac
done
dossh() {
# All ssh should succeed in this test
${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy "$@" x true || fail "ssh $@ failed"
}
expect_nkeys() {
_expected=$1
_message=$2
_n=`wc -l $OBJ/known_hosts | awk '{ print $1 }'` || fatal "wc failed"
[ "x$_n" = "x$_expected" ] || fail "$_message (got $_n wanted $_expected)"
}
check_key_present() {
_type=$1
_kfile=$2
test "x$_kfile" = "x" && _kfile="$OBJ/hkr.${_type}.pub"
_kpub=`awk "/$_type /"' { print $2 }' < $_kfile` || \
fatal "awk failed"
fgrep "$_kpub" $OBJ/known_hosts > /dev/null
}
cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy.orig $OBJ/sshd_proxy
# Connect to sshd with StrictHostkeyChecking=no
verbose "learn hostkey with StrictHostKeyChecking=no"
>$OBJ/known_hosts
dossh -oHostKeyAlgorithms=$primary -oStrictHostKeyChecking=no
# Verify no additional keys learned
expect_nkeys 1 "unstrict connect keys"
check_key_present $primary || fail "unstrict didn't learn key"
# Connect to sshd as usual
verbose "learn additional hostkeys"
dossh -oStrictHostKeyChecking=yes -oHostKeyAlgorithms=$all_algs
# Check that other keys learned
expect_nkeys $nkeys "learn hostkeys"
-for k in $HOSTKEY_TYPES; do
+for k in $SSH_HOSTKEY_TYPES; do
check_key_present $k || fail "didn't learn keytype $k"
done
# Check each key type
-for k in $HOSTKEY_TYPES; do
+for k in $SSH_HOSTKEY_TYPES; do
verbose "learn additional hostkeys, type=$k"
dossh -oStrictHostKeyChecking=yes -oHostKeyAlgorithms=$k,$all_algs
expect_nkeys $nkeys "learn hostkeys $k"
check_key_present $k || fail "didn't learn $k correctly"
done
# Change one hostkey (non primary) and relearn
if [ "$primary" != "$secondary" ]; then
verbose "learn changed non-primary hostkey type=${secondary}"
mv $OBJ/hkr.${secondary}.pub $OBJ/hkr.${secondary}.pub.old
rm -f $OBJ/hkr.${secondary}
${SSHKEYGEN} -qt ${secondary} -f $OBJ/hkr.${secondary} -N '' || \
fatal "ssh-keygen $secondary"
dossh -oStrictHostKeyChecking=yes -oHostKeyAlgorithms=$all_algs
# Check that the key was replaced
expect_nkeys $nkeys "learn hostkeys"
check_key_present ${secondary} $OBJ/hkr.${secondary}.pub.old && \
fail "old key present"
check_key_present ${secondary} || fail "didn't learn changed key"
fi
# Add new hostkey (primary type) to sshd and connect
verbose "learn new primary hostkey"
${SSHKEYGEN} -qt ${primary} -f $OBJ/hkr.${primary}-new -N '' || fatal "ssh-keygen ed25519"
( cat $OBJ/sshd_proxy.orig ; echo HostKey $OBJ/hkr.${primary}-new ) \
> $OBJ/sshd_proxy
# Check new hostkey added
dossh -oStrictHostKeyChecking=yes -oHostKeyAlgorithms=${primary},$all_algs
expect_nkeys `expr $nkeys + 1` "learn hostkeys"
check_key_present ${primary} || fail "current key missing"
check_key_present ${primary} $OBJ/hkr.${primary}-new.pub || fail "new key missing"
# Remove old hostkey (primary type) from sshd
verbose "rotate primary hostkey"
cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy.orig $OBJ/sshd_proxy
mv $OBJ/hkr.${primary}.pub $OBJ/hkr.${primary}.pub.old
mv $OBJ/hkr.${primary}-new.pub $OBJ/hkr.${primary}.pub
mv $OBJ/hkr.${primary}-new $OBJ/hkr.${primary}
# Check old hostkey removed
dossh -oStrictHostKeyChecking=yes -oHostKeyAlgorithms=${primary},$all_algs
expect_nkeys $nkeys "learn hostkeys"
check_key_present ${primary} $OBJ/hkr.${primary}.pub.old && fail "old key present"
check_key_present ${primary} || fail "didn't learn changed key"
# Connect again, forcing rotated key
verbose "check rotate primary hostkey"
dossh -oStrictHostKeyChecking=yes -oHostKeyAlgorithms=${primary}
expect_nkeys 1 "learn hostkeys"
check_key_present ${primary} || fail "didn't learn changed key"
diff --git a/regress/integrity.sh b/regress/integrity.sh
index 5ba6bf6ab0b0..bc030cb74f35 100644
--- a/regress/integrity.sh
+++ b/regress/integrity.sh
@@ -1,76 +1,76 @@
-# $OpenBSD: integrity.sh,v 1.23 2017/04/30 23:34:55 djm Exp $
+# $OpenBSD: integrity.sh,v 1.24 2020/01/21 08:06:27 djm Exp $
# Placed in the Public Domain.
tid="integrity"
cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak
# start at byte 2900 (i.e. after kex) and corrupt at different offsets
tries=10
startoffset=2900
macs=`${SSH} -Q mac`
# The following are not MACs, but ciphers with integrated integrity. They are
# handled specially below.
macs="$macs `${SSH} -Q cipher-auth`"
# avoid DH group exchange as the extra traffic makes it harder to get the
# offset into the stream right.
#echo "KexAlgorithms -diffie-hellman-group*" \
# >> $OBJ/ssh_proxy
# sshd-command for proxy (see test-exec.sh)
-cmd="$SUDO sh ${SRC}/sshd-log-wrapper.sh ${TEST_SSHD_LOGFILE} ${SSHD} -i -f $OBJ/sshd_proxy"
+cmd="$SUDO env SSH_SK_HELPER="$SSH_SK_HELPER" sh ${SRC}/sshd-log-wrapper.sh ${TEST_SSHD_LOGFILE} ${SSHD} -i -f $OBJ/sshd_proxy"
for m in $macs; do
trace "test $tid: mac $m"
elen=0
epad=0
emac=0
etmo=0
ecnt=0
skip=0
for off in `jot $tries $startoffset`; do
skip=`expr $skip - 1`
if [ $skip -gt 0 ]; then
# avoid modifying the high bytes of the length
continue
fi
cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak $OBJ/sshd_proxy
# modify output from sshd at offset $off
pxy="proxycommand=$cmd | $OBJ/modpipe -wm xor:$off:1"
if ${SSH} -Q cipher-auth | grep "^${m}\$" >/dev/null 2>&1 ; then
echo "Ciphers=$m" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy
macopt="-c $m"
else
echo "Ciphers=aes128-ctr" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy
echo "MACs=$m" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy
macopt="-m $m -c aes128-ctr"
fi
verbose "test $tid: $m @$off"
${SSH} $macopt -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy -o "$pxy" \
-oServerAliveInterval=1 -oServerAliveCountMax=30 \
999.999.999.999 'printf "%4096s" " "' >/dev/null
if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
fail "ssh -m $m succeeds with bit-flip at $off"
fi
ecnt=`expr $ecnt + 1`
out=$(egrep -v "^debug" $TEST_SSH_LOGFILE | tail -2 | \
tr -s '\r\n' '.')
case "$out" in
Bad?packet*) elen=`expr $elen + 1`; skip=3;;
Corrupted?MAC* | *message?authentication?code?incorrect*)
emac=`expr $emac + 1`; skip=0;;
padding*) epad=`expr $epad + 1`; skip=0;;
*Timeout,?server*)
etmo=`expr $etmo + 1`; skip=0;;
*) fail "unexpected error mac $m at $off: $out";;
esac
done
verbose "test $tid: $ecnt errors: mac $emac padding $epad length $elen timeout $etmo"
if [ $emac -eq 0 ]; then
fail "$m: no mac errors"
fi
expect=`expr $ecnt - $epad - $elen - $etmo`
if [ $emac -ne $expect ]; then
fail "$m: expected $expect mac errors, got $emac"
fi
done
diff --git a/regress/keygen-change.sh b/regress/keygen-change.sh
index 8b8acd52fb9f..3863e33b5287 100644
--- a/regress/keygen-change.sh
+++ b/regress/keygen-change.sh
@@ -1,25 +1,22 @@
-# $OpenBSD: keygen-change.sh,v 1.6 2017/04/30 23:34:55 djm Exp $
+# $OpenBSD: keygen-change.sh,v 1.9 2019/12/16 02:39:05 djm Exp $
# Placed in the Public Domain.
tid="change passphrase for key"
S1="secret1"
S2="2secret"
-KEYTYPES=`${SSH} -Q key-plain`
-
-for t in $KEYTYPES; do
- # generate user key for agent
+for t in $SSH_KEYTYPES; do
trace "generating $t key"
rm -f $OBJ/$t-key
${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N ${S1} -t $t -f $OBJ/$t-key
if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
${SSHKEYGEN} -p -P ${S1} -N ${S2} -f $OBJ/$t-key > /dev/null
if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
fail "ssh-keygen -p failed for $t-key"
fi
else
fail "ssh-keygen for $t-key failed"
fi
rm -f $OBJ/$t-key $OBJ/$t-key.pub
done
diff --git a/regress/keygen-moduli.sh b/regress/keygen-moduli.sh
index a8eccfb69295..8be53f92f852 100644
--- a/regress/keygen-moduli.sh
+++ b/regress/keygen-moduli.sh
@@ -1,27 +1,27 @@
-# $OpenBSD: keygen-moduli.sh,v 1.3 2019/07/23 08:19:29 dtucker Exp $
+# $OpenBSD: keygen-moduli.sh,v 1.4 2020/01/02 13:25:38 dtucker Exp $
# Placed in the Public Domain.
tid="keygen moduli"
dhgex=0
for kex in `${SSH} -Q kex`; do
case $kex in
diffie-hellman-group*) dhgex=1 ;;
esac
done
# Try "start at the beginning and stop after 1", "skip 1 then stop after 1"
# and "skip 2 and run to the end with checkpointing". Since our test data
# file has 3 lines, these should always result in 1 line of output.
if [ "x$dhgex" = "x1" ]; then
- for i in "-J1" "-j1 -J1" "-j2 -K $OBJ/moduli.ckpt"; do
+ for i in "-O lines=1" "-O start-line=1 -O lines=1" "-O start-line=2 -O checkpoint=$OBJ/moduli.ckpt"; do
trace "keygen $i"
rm -f $OBJ/moduli.out $OBJ/moduli.ckpt
- ${SSHKEYGEN} -T $OBJ/moduli.out -f ${SRC}/moduli.in $i 2>/dev/null || \
+ ${SSHKEYGEN} -M screen -f ${SRC}/moduli.in $i $OBJ/moduli.out 2>/dev/null || \
fail "keygen screen failed $i"
lines=`wc -l <$OBJ/moduli.out`
test "$lines" -eq "1" || fail "expected 1 line, got $lines"
done
fi
rm -f $OBJ/moduli.out $OBJ/moduli.ckpt
diff --git a/regress/keyscan.sh b/regress/keyscan.sh
index 8940d24b6391..75a14ee0eecb 100644
--- a/regress/keyscan.sh
+++ b/regress/keyscan.sh
@@ -1,26 +1,25 @@
-# $OpenBSD: keyscan.sh,v 1.9 2019/01/28 03:50:39 dtucker Exp $
+# $OpenBSD: keyscan.sh,v 1.13 2020/01/22 07:31:27 dtucker Exp $
# Placed in the Public Domain.
tid="keyscan"
-KEYTYPES=`${SSH} -Q key-plain`
-for i in $KEYTYPES; do
+for i in $SSH_KEYTYPES; do
if [ -z "$algs" ]; then
algs="$i"
else
algs="$algs,$i"
fi
done
echo "HostKeyAlgorithms $algs" >> $OBJ/sshd_config
start_sshd
-for t in $KEYTYPES; do
+for t in $SSH_KEYTYPES; do
trace "keyscan type $t"
- ${SSHKEYSCAN} -t $t -p $PORT 127.0.0.1 127.0.0.1 127.0.0.1 \
+ ${SSHKEYSCAN} -t $t -T 15 -p $PORT 127.0.0.1 127.0.0.1 127.0.0.1 \
> /dev/null 2>&1
r=$?
if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then
fail "ssh-keyscan -t $t failed with: $r"
fi
done
diff --git a/regress/keytype.sh b/regress/keytype.sh
index 13095088ec08..20a8ceaf2253 100644
--- a/regress/keytype.sh
+++ b/regress/keytype.sh
@@ -1,70 +1,83 @@
-# $OpenBSD: keytype.sh,v 1.8 2019/07/23 13:49:14 dtucker Exp $
+# $OpenBSD: keytype.sh,v 1.10 2019/12/16 02:39:05 djm Exp $
# Placed in the Public Domain.
tid="login with different key types"
cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak
cp $OBJ/ssh_proxy $OBJ/ssh_proxy_bak
# Construct list of key types based on what the built binaries support.
ktypes=""
for i in ${SSH_KEYTYPES}; do
case "$i" in
ssh-dss) ktypes="$ktypes dsa-1024" ;;
ssh-rsa) ktypes="$ktypes rsa-2048 rsa-3072" ;;
ssh-ed25519) ktypes="$ktypes ed25519-512" ;;
ecdsa-sha2-nistp256) ktypes="$ktypes ecdsa-256" ;;
ecdsa-sha2-nistp384) ktypes="$ktypes ecdsa-384" ;;
ecdsa-sha2-nistp521) ktypes="$ktypes ecdsa-521" ;;
+ sk-ssh-ed25519*) ktypes="$ktypes ed25519-sk" ;;
+ sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256*) ktypes="$ktypes ecdsa-sk" ;;
esac
done
for kt in $ktypes; do
rm -f $OBJ/key.$kt
- bits=`echo ${kt} | awk -F- '{print $2}'`
- type=`echo ${kt} | awk -F- '{print $1}'`
+ xbits=`echo ${kt} | awk -F- '{print $2}'`
+ xtype=`echo ${kt} | awk -F- '{print $1}'`
+ case "$kt" in
+ *sk) type="$kt"; bits="n/a"; bits_arg="";;
+ *) type=$xtype; bits=$xbits; bits_arg="-b $bits";;
+ esac
verbose "keygen $type, $bits bits"
- ${SSHKEYGEN} -b $bits -q -N '' -t $type -f $OBJ/key.$kt ||\
+ ${SSHKEYGEN} $bits_arg -q -N '' -t $type -f $OBJ/key.$kt || \
fail "ssh-keygen for type $type, $bits bits failed"
done
+kname_to_ktype() {
+ case $1 in
+ dsa-1024) echo ssh-dss;;
+ ecdsa-256) echo ecdsa-sha2-nistp256;;
+ ecdsa-384) echo ecdsa-sha2-nistp384;;
+ ecdsa-521) echo ecdsa-sha2-nistp521;;
+ ed25519-512) echo ssh-ed25519;;
+ rsa-*) echo rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256,ssh-rsa;;
+ ed25519-sk) echo sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com;;
+ ecdsa-sk) echo sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com;;
+ esac
+}
+
tries="1 2 3"
for ut in $ktypes; do
- htypes=$ut
+ user_type=`kname_to_ktype "$ut"`
+ htypes="$ut"
#htypes=$ktypes
for ht in $htypes; do
- case $ht in
- dsa-1024) t=ssh-dss;;
- ecdsa-256) t=ecdsa-sha2-nistp256;;
- ecdsa-384) t=ecdsa-sha2-nistp384;;
- ecdsa-521) t=ecdsa-sha2-nistp521;;
- ed25519-512) t=ssh-ed25519;;
- rsa-*) t=rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256,ssh-rsa;;
- esac
+ host_type=`kname_to_ktype "$ht"`
trace "ssh connect, userkey $ut, hostkey $ht"
(
grep -v HostKey $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak
echo HostKey $OBJ/key.$ht
- echo PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes $t
- echo HostKeyAlgorithms $t
+ echo PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes $user_type
+ echo HostKeyAlgorithms $host_type
) > $OBJ/sshd_proxy
(
grep -v IdentityFile $OBJ/ssh_proxy_bak
echo IdentityFile $OBJ/key.$ut
- echo PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes $t
- echo HostKeyAlgorithms $t
+ echo PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes $user_type
+ echo HostKeyAlgorithms $host_type
) > $OBJ/ssh_proxy
(
printf 'localhost-with-alias,127.0.0.1,::1 '
cat $OBJ/key.$ht.pub
) > $OBJ/known_hosts
cat $OBJ/key.$ut.pub > $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
for i in $tries; do
verbose "userkey $ut, hostkey ${ht}"
${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy 999.999.999.999 true
if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
fail "ssh userkey $ut, hostkey $ht failed"
fi
done
done
done
diff --git a/regress/krl.sh b/regress/krl.sh
index e18d0ec7f679..c381225ed7cd 100644
--- a/regress/krl.sh
+++ b/regress/krl.sh
@@ -1,211 +1,217 @@
-# $OpenBSD: krl.sh,v 1.8 2019/07/25 09:17:35 dtucker Exp $
+# $OpenBSD: krl.sh,v 1.11 2019/12/16 02:39:05 djm Exp $
# Placed in the Public Domain.
tid="key revocation lists"
# Use ed25519 by default since it's fast and it's supported when building
# w/out OpenSSL. Populate ktype[2-4] with the other types if supported.
-ktype1=ed25519; ktype2=ed25519; ktype3=ed25519; ktype4=ed25519
-for t in `${SSH} -Q key-plain`; do
+ktype1=ed25519; ktype2=ed25519; ktype3=ed25519;
+ktype4=ed25519; ktype5=ed25519; ktype6=ed25519;
+for t in $SSH_KEYTYPES; do
case "$t" in
ecdsa*) ktype2=ecdsa ;;
ssh-rsa) ktype3=rsa ;;
ssh-dss) ktype4=dsa ;;
+ sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com) ktype5=ed25519-sk ;;
+ sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com) ktype6=ecdsa-sk ;;
esac
done
# Do most testing with ssh-keygen; it uses the same verification code as sshd.
# Old keys will interfere with ssh-keygen.
rm -f $OBJ/revoked-* $OBJ/krl-*
# Generate a CA key
$SSHKEYGEN -t $ktype1 -f $OBJ/revoked-ca -C "" -N "" > /dev/null ||
fatal "$SSHKEYGEN CA failed"
$SSHKEYGEN -t $ktype2 -f $OBJ/revoked-ca2 -C "" -N "" > /dev/null ||
fatal "$SSHKEYGEN CA2 failed"
# A specification that revokes some certificates by serial numbers
# The serial pattern is chosen to ensure the KRL includes list, range and
# bitmap sections.
cat << EOF >> $OBJ/revoked-serials
serial: 1-4
serial: 10
serial: 15
serial: 30
serial: 50
+serial: 90
serial: 999
# The following sum to 500-799
serial: 500
serial: 501
serial: 502
serial: 503-600
serial: 700-797
serial: 798
serial: 799
serial: 599-701
# Some multiple consecutive serial number ranges
serial: 10000-20000
serial: 30000-40000
EOF
# A specification that revokes some certificated by key ID.
touch $OBJ/revoked-keyid
-for n in 1 2 3 4 10 15 30 50 `jot 500 300` 999 1000 1001 1002; do
+for n in 1 2 3 4 10 15 30 50 90 `jot 500 300` 999 1000 1001 1002; do
test "x$n" = "x499" && continue
# Fill in by-ID revocation spec.
echo "id: revoked $n" >> $OBJ/revoked-keyid
done
keygen() {
N=$1
f=$OBJ/revoked-`printf "%04d" $N`
# Vary the keytype. We use mostly ed25519 since this is fast and well
# supported.
keytype=$ktype1
case $N in
- 2 | 10 | 510 | 1001) keytype=$ktype2 ;;
- 4 | 30 | 520 | 1002) keytype=$ktype3 ;;
- 8 | 50 | 530 | 1003) keytype=$ktype4 ;;
+ 2 | 10 | 510 | 1001) keytype=$ktype2 ;;
+ 4 | 30 | 520 | 1002) keytype=$ktype3 ;;
+ 8 | 50 | 530 | 1003) keytype=$ktype4 ;;
+ 16 | 70 | 540 | 1004) keytype=$ktype5 ;;
+ 32 | 90 | 550 | 1005) keytype=$ktype6 ;;
esac
$SSHKEYGEN -t $keytype -f $f -C "" -N "" > /dev/null \
|| fatal "$SSHKEYGEN failed"
# Sign cert
$SSHKEYGEN -s $OBJ/revoked-ca -z $n -I "revoked $N" $f >/dev/null 2>&1 \
|| fatal "$SSHKEYGEN sign failed"
echo $f
}
# Generate some keys.
verbose "$tid: generating test keys"
-REVOKED_SERIALS="1 4 10 50 500 510 520 799 999"
+REVOKED_SERIALS="1 4 10 50 90 500 510 520 550 799 999"
for n in $REVOKED_SERIALS ; do
f=`keygen $n`
RKEYS="$RKEYS ${f}.pub"
RCERTS="$RCERTS ${f}-cert.pub"
done
UNREVOKED_SERIALS="5 9 14 16 29 49 51 499 800 1010 1011"
UNREVOKED=""
for n in $UNREVOKED_SERIALS ; do
f=`keygen $n`
UKEYS="$UKEYS ${f}.pub"
UCERTS="$UCERTS ${f}-cert.pub"
done
# Specifications that revoke keys by hash.
touch $OBJ/revoked-sha1 $OBJ/revoked-sha256 $OBJ/revoked-hash
for rkey in $RKEYS; do
(printf "sha1: "; cat $rkey) >> $OBJ/revoked-sha1
(printf "sha256: "; cat $rkey) >> $OBJ/revoked-sha256
(printf "hash: "; $SSHKEYGEN -lf $rkey | \
awk '{ print $2 }') >> $OBJ/revoked-hash
done
genkrls() {
OPTS=$1
$SSHKEYGEN $OPTS -kf $OBJ/krl-empty - </dev/null \
>/dev/null || fatal "$SSHKEYGEN KRL failed"
$SSHKEYGEN $OPTS -kf $OBJ/krl-keys $RKEYS \
>/dev/null || fatal "$SSHKEYGEN KRL failed"
$SSHKEYGEN $OPTS -kf $OBJ/krl-cert $RCERTS \
>/dev/null || fatal "$SSHKEYGEN KRL failed"
$SSHKEYGEN $OPTS -kf $OBJ/krl-all $RKEYS $RCERTS \
>/dev/null || fatal "$SSHKEYGEN KRL failed"
$SSHKEYGEN $OPTS -kf $OBJ/krl-ca $OBJ/revoked-ca.pub \
>/dev/null || fatal "$SSHKEYGEN KRL failed"
$SSHKEYGEN $OPTS -kf $OBJ/krl-sha1 $OBJ/revoked-sha1 \
>/dev/null 2>&1 || fatal "$SSHKEYGEN KRL failed"
$SSHKEYGEN $OPTS -kf $OBJ/krl-sha256 $OBJ/revoked-sha256 \
>/dev/null 2>&1 || fatal "$SSHKEYGEN KRL failed"
$SSHKEYGEN $OPTS -kf $OBJ/krl-hash $OBJ/revoked-hash \
>/dev/null 2>&1 || fatal "$SSHKEYGEN KRL failed"
# This should fail as KRLs from serial/key-id spec need the CA specified.
$SSHKEYGEN $OPTS -kf $OBJ/krl-serial $OBJ/revoked-serials \
>/dev/null 2>&1 && fatal "$SSHKEYGEN KRL succeeded unexpectedly"
$SSHKEYGEN $OPTS -kf $OBJ/krl-keyid $OBJ/revoked-keyid \
>/dev/null 2>&1 && fatal "$SSHKEYGEN KRL succeeded unexpectedly"
# These should succeed; they specify an explicit CA key.
$SSHKEYGEN $OPTS -kf $OBJ/krl-serial -s $OBJ/revoked-ca \
$OBJ/revoked-serials >/dev/null || fatal "$SSHKEYGEN KRL failed"
$SSHKEYGEN $OPTS -kf $OBJ/krl-keyid -s $OBJ/revoked-ca.pub \
$OBJ/revoked-keyid >/dev/null || fatal "$SSHKEYGEN KRL failed"
# These should succeed; they specify an wildcard CA key.
$SSHKEYGEN $OPTS -kf $OBJ/krl-serial-wild -s NONE $OBJ/revoked-serials \
>/dev/null || fatal "$SSHKEYGEN KRL failed"
$SSHKEYGEN $OPTS -kf $OBJ/krl-keyid-wild -s NONE $OBJ/revoked-keyid \
>/dev/null || fatal "$SSHKEYGEN KRL failed"
# Revoke the same serials with the second CA key to ensure a multi-CA
# KRL is generated.
$SSHKEYGEN $OPTS -kf $OBJ/krl-serial -u -s $OBJ/revoked-ca2 \
$OBJ/revoked-serials >/dev/null || fatal "$SSHKEYGEN KRL failed"
}
## XXX dump with trace and grep for set cert serials
## XXX test ranges near (u64)-1, etc.
verbose "$tid: generating KRLs"
genkrls
check_krl() {
KEY=$1
KRL=$2
EXPECT_REVOKED=$3
TAG=$4
$SSHKEYGEN -Qf $KRL $KEY >/dev/null
result=$?
if test "x$EXPECT_REVOKED" = "xy" -a $result -eq 0 ; then
fatal "key $KEY not revoked by KRL $KRL: $TAG"
elif test "x$EXPECT_REVOKED" = "xn" -a $result -ne 0 ; then
fatal "key $KEY unexpectedly revoked by KRL $KRL: $TAG"
fi
}
test_rev() {
FILES=$1
TAG=$2
KEYS_RESULT=$3
ALL_RESULT=$4
HASH_RESULT=$5
SERIAL_RESULT=$6
KEYID_RESULT=$7
CERTS_RESULT=$8
CA_RESULT=$9
SERIAL_WRESULT=$10
KEYID_WRESULT=$11
verbose "$tid: checking revocations for $TAG"
for f in $FILES ; do
check_krl $f $OBJ/krl-empty no "$TAG"
check_krl $f $OBJ/krl-keys $KEYS_RESULT "$TAG"
check_krl $f $OBJ/krl-all $ALL_RESULT "$TAG"
check_krl $f $OBJ/krl-sha1 $HASH_RESULT "$TAG"
check_krl $f $OBJ/krl-sha256 $HASH_RESULT "$TAG"
check_krl $f $OBJ/krl-hash $HASH_RESULT "$TAG"
check_krl $f $OBJ/krl-serial $SERIAL_RESULT "$TAG"
check_krl $f $OBJ/krl-keyid $KEYID_RESULT "$TAG"
check_krl $f $OBJ/krl-cert $CERTS_RESULT "$TAG"
check_krl $f $OBJ/krl-ca $CA_RESULT "$TAG"
check_krl $f $OBJ/krl-serial-wild $SERIAL_WRESULT "$TAG"
check_krl $f $OBJ/krl-keyid-wild $KEYID_WRESULT "$TAG"
done
}
test_all() {
# wildcard
# keys all hash sr# ID cert CA srl ID
test_rev "$RKEYS" "revoked keys" y y y n n n n n n
test_rev "$UKEYS" "unrevoked keys" n n n n n n n n n
test_rev "$RCERTS" "revoked certs" y y y y y y y y y
test_rev "$UCERTS" "unrevoked certs" n n n n n n y n n
}
test_all
# Check update. Results should be identical.
verbose "$tid: testing KRL update"
for f in $OBJ/krl-keys $OBJ/krl-cert $OBJ/krl-all \
$OBJ/krl-ca $OBJ/krl-serial $OBJ/krl-keyid \
$OBJ/krl-serial-wild $OBJ/krl-keyid-wild; do
cp -f $OBJ/krl-empty $f
genkrls -u
done
test_all
diff --git a/regress/limit-keytype.sh b/regress/limit-keytype.sh
index 5c30af0063a6..010a88cd7f29 100644
--- a/regress/limit-keytype.sh
+++ b/regress/limit-keytype.sh
@@ -1,122 +1,133 @@
-# $OpenBSD: limit-keytype.sh,v 1.6 2019/07/26 04:22:21 dtucker Exp $
+# $OpenBSD: limit-keytype.sh,v 1.9 2019/12/16 02:39:05 djm Exp $
# Placed in the Public Domain.
tid="restrict pubkey type"
+# XXX sk-* keys aren't actually tested ATM.
+
rm -f $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER $OBJ/user_ca_key* $OBJ/user_key*
rm -f $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER $OBJ/cert_user_key*
mv $OBJ/sshd_proxy $OBJ/sshd_proxy.orig
mv $OBJ/ssh_proxy $OBJ/ssh_proxy.orig
-ktype1=ed25519; ktype2=$ktype1; ktype3=$ktype1; ktype4=$ktype1
-for t in `${SSH} -Q key-plain`; do
+ktype1=ed25519; ktype2=ed25519; ktype3=ed25519;
+ktype4=ed25519; ktype5=ed25519; ktype6=ed25519;
+for t in $SSH_KEYTYPES ; do
case "$t" in
ssh-rsa) ktype2=rsa ;;
ecdsa*) ktype3=ecdsa ;; # unused
ssh-dss) ktype4=dsa ;;
+ sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com) ktype5=ed25519-sk ;;
+ sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com) ktype6=ecdsa-sk ;;
esac
done
# Create a CA key
${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t $ktype1 -f $OBJ/user_ca_key ||\
fatal "ssh-keygen failed"
# Make some keys and a certificate.
${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t $ktype1 -f $OBJ/user_key1 || \
fatal "ssh-keygen failed"
${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t $ktype2 -f $OBJ/user_key2 || \
fatal "ssh-keygen failed"
${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t $ktype2 -f $OBJ/user_key3 || \
fatal "ssh-keygen failed"
${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t $ktype4 -f $OBJ/user_key4 || \
fatal "ssh-keygen failed"
+${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t $ktype5 -f $OBJ/user_key5 || \
+ fatal "ssh-keygen failed"
+${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t $ktype6 -f $OBJ/user_key6 || \
+ fatal "ssh-keygen failed"
${SSHKEYGEN} -q -s $OBJ/user_ca_key -I "regress user key for $USER" \
-z $$ -n ${USER},mekmitasdigoat $OBJ/user_key3 ||
fatal "couldn't sign user_key1"
# Copy the private key alongside the cert to allow better control of when
# it is offered.
mv $OBJ/user_key3-cert.pub $OBJ/cert_user_key3.pub
grep -v IdentityFile $OBJ/ssh_proxy.orig > $OBJ/ssh_proxy
opts="-oProtocol=2 -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy -oIdentitiesOnly=yes"
certopts="$opts -i $OBJ/user_key3 -oCertificateFile=$OBJ/cert_user_key3.pub"
echo mekmitasdigoat > $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER
cat $OBJ/user_key1.pub > $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
cat $OBJ/user_key2.pub >> $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
prepare_config() {
(
grep -v "Protocol" $OBJ/sshd_proxy.orig
echo "Protocol 2"
echo "AuthenticationMethods publickey"
echo "TrustedUserCAKeys $OBJ/user_ca_key.pub"
echo "AuthorizedPrincipalsFile $OBJ/authorized_principals_%u"
for x in "$@" ; do
echo "$x"
done
) > $OBJ/sshd_proxy
}
# Return the required parameter for PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes corresponding to
# the supplied key type.
keytype() {
case "$1" in
ecdsa) printf "ecdsa-sha2-*" ;;
ed25519) printf "ssh-ed25519" ;;
dsa) printf "ssh-dss" ;;
rsa) printf "rsa-sha2-256,rsa-sha2-512,ssh-rsa" ;;
+ sk-ecdsa) printf "sk-ecdsa-*" ;;
+ sk-ssh-ed25519) printf "sk-ssh-ed25519-*" ;;
esac
}
prepare_config
# Check we can log in with all key types.
${SSH} $certopts proxy true || fatal "cert failed"
${SSH} $opts -i $OBJ/user_key1 proxy true || fatal "key1 failed"
${SSH} $opts -i $OBJ/user_key2 proxy true || fatal "key2 failed"
# Allow plain Ed25519 and RSA. The certificate should fail.
verbose "allow $ktype2,$ktype1"
prepare_config \
"PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes `keytype $ktype2`,`keytype $ktype1`"
${SSH} $certopts proxy true && fatal "cert succeeded"
${SSH} $opts -i $OBJ/user_key1 proxy true || fatal "key1 failed"
${SSH} $opts -i $OBJ/user_key2 proxy true || fatal "key2 failed"
# Allow Ed25519 only.
verbose "allow $ktype1"
prepare_config "PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes `keytype $ktype1`"
${SSH} $certopts proxy true && fatal "cert succeeded"
${SSH} $opts -i $OBJ/user_key1 proxy true || fatal "key1 failed"
if [ "$ktype1" != "$ktype2" ]; then
${SSH} $opts -i $OBJ/user_key2 proxy true && fatal "key2 succeeded"
fi
# Allow all certs. Plain keys should fail.
verbose "allow cert only"
prepare_config "PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes *-cert-v01@openssh.com"
${SSH} $certopts proxy true || fatal "cert failed"
${SSH} $opts -i $OBJ/user_key1 proxy true && fatal "key1 succeeded"
${SSH} $opts -i $OBJ/user_key2 proxy true && fatal "key2 succeeded"
# Allow RSA in main config, Ed25519 for non-existent user.
verbose "match w/ no match"
prepare_config "PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes `keytype $ktype2`" \
"Match user x$USER" "PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes +`keytype $ktype1`"
${SSH} $certopts proxy true && fatal "cert succeeded"
if [ "$ktype1" != "$ktype2" ]; then
${SSH} $opts -i $OBJ/user_key1 proxy true && fatal "key1 succeeded"
fi
${SSH} $opts -i $OBJ/user_key2 proxy true || fatal "key2 failed"
# Allow only DSA in main config, Ed25519 for user.
verbose "match w/ matching"
prepare_config "PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes `keytype $ktype4`" \
"Match user $USER" "PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes +`keytype $ktype1`"
${SSH} $certopts proxy true || fatal "cert failed"
${SSH} $opts -i $OBJ/user_key1 proxy true || fatal "key1 failed"
${SSH} $opts -i $OBJ/user_key4 proxy true && fatal "key4 succeeded"
diff --git a/regress/misc/Makefile b/regress/misc/Makefile
index 14c0c279f7ac..cf95f265ce47 100644
--- a/regress/misc/Makefile
+++ b/regress/misc/Makefile
@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@
-SUBDIR= kexfuzz
+SUBDIR= kexfuzz sk-dummy
.include <bsd.subdir.mk>
diff --git a/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/Makefile b/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/Makefile
index 85179ac4ed57..64fbdbab162b 100644
--- a/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/Makefile
+++ b/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/Makefile
@@ -1,33 +1,38 @@
# NB. libssh and libopenbsd-compat should be built with the same sanitizer opts.
CXX=clang++-6.0
FUZZ_FLAGS=-fsanitize=address,undefined -fsanitize-coverage=edge,trace-pc
FUZZ_LIBS=-lFuzzer
-CXXFLAGS=-O2 -g -Wall -Wextra -I ../../.. $(FUZZ_FLAGS)
+CXXFLAGS=-O2 -g -Wall -Wextra -Wno-unused-parameter -I ../../.. $(FUZZ_FLAGS)
LDFLAGS=-L ../../.. -L ../../../openbsd-compat -g $(FUZZ_FLAGS)
-LIBS=-lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lcrypto $(FUZZ_LIBS)
+LIBS=-lssh -lopenbsd-compat -lcrypto -lfido2 -lcbor $(FUZZ_LIBS)
+COMMON_OBJS=ssh-sk-null.o
-TARGETS=pubkey_fuzz sig_fuzz authopt_fuzz sshsig_fuzz sshsigopt_fuzz
+TARGETS=pubkey_fuzz sig_fuzz authopt_fuzz sshsig_fuzz \
+ sshsigopt_fuzz privkey_fuzz
all: $(TARGETS)
.cc.o:
$(CXX) $(CXXFLAGS) -c $< -o $@
-pubkey_fuzz: pubkey_fuzz.o
- $(CXX) -o $@ pubkey_fuzz.o $(LDFLAGS) $(LIBS)
+pubkey_fuzz: pubkey_fuzz.o $(COMMON_OBJS)
+ $(CXX) -o $@ pubkey_fuzz.o $(COMMON_OBJS) $(LDFLAGS) $(LIBS)
-sig_fuzz: sig_fuzz.o
- $(CXX) -o $@ sig_fuzz.o $(LDFLAGS) $(LIBS)
+sig_fuzz: sig_fuzz.o $(COMMON_OBJS)
+ $(CXX) -o $@ sig_fuzz.o $(COMMON_OBJS) $(LDFLAGS) $(LIBS)
-authopt_fuzz: authopt_fuzz.o
- $(CXX) -o $@ authopt_fuzz.o ../../../auth-options.o $(LDFLAGS) $(LIBS)
+authopt_fuzz: authopt_fuzz.o $(COMMON_OBJS)
+ $(CXX) -o $@ authopt_fuzz.o $(COMMON_OBJS) ../../../auth-options.o $(LDFLAGS) $(LIBS)
-sshsig_fuzz: sshsig_fuzz.o
- $(CXX) -o $@ sshsig_fuzz.o ../../../sshsig.o $(LDFLAGS) $(LIBS)
+sshsig_fuzz: sshsig_fuzz.o $(COMMON_OBJS)
+ $(CXX) -o $@ sshsig_fuzz.o $(COMMON_OBJS) ../../../sshsig.o $(LDFLAGS) $(LIBS)
-sshsigopt_fuzz: sshsigopt_fuzz.o
- $(CXX) -o $@ sshsigopt_fuzz.o ../../../sshsig.o $(LDFLAGS) $(LIBS)
+sshsigopt_fuzz: sshsigopt_fuzz.o $(COMMON_OBJS)
+ $(CXX) -o $@ sshsigopt_fuzz.o $(COMMON_OBJS) ../../../sshsig.o $(LDFLAGS) $(LIBS)
+
+privkey_fuzz: privkey_fuzz.o $(COMMON_OBJS)
+ $(CXX) -o $@ privkey_fuzz.o $(COMMON_OBJS) $(LDFLAGS) $(LIBS)
clean:
-rm -f *.o $(TARGETS)
diff --git a/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/privkey_fuzz.cc b/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/privkey_fuzz.cc
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..ff0b0f7769dc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/privkey_fuzz.cc
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+#include <stddef.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdint.h>
+
+extern "C" {
+
+#include "sshkey.h"
+#include "sshbuf.h"
+
+int LLVMFuzzerTestOneInput(const uint8_t* data, size_t size)
+{
+ struct sshkey *k = NULL;
+ struct sshbuf *b = sshbuf_from(data, size);
+ int r = sshkey_private_deserialize(b, &k);
+ if (r == 0) sshkey_free(k);
+ sshbuf_free(b);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+} // extern
+
diff --git a/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/sig_fuzz.cc b/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/sig_fuzz.cc
index dd1fda091f49..b32502ba023f 100644
--- a/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/sig_fuzz.cc
+++ b/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/sig_fuzz.cc
@@ -1,50 +1,62 @@
// cc_fuzz_target test for public key parsing.
#include <stddef.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdint.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
extern "C" {
#include "includes.h"
#include "sshkey.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
static struct sshkey *generate_or_die(int type, unsigned bits) {
int r;
struct sshkey *ret;
if ((r = sshkey_generate(type, bits, &ret)) != 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "generate(%d, %u): %s", type, bits, ssh_err(r));
abort();
}
return ret;
}
int LLVMFuzzerTestOneInput(const uint8_t* sig, size_t slen)
{
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
static struct sshkey *rsa = generate_or_die(KEY_RSA, 2048);
static struct sshkey *dsa = generate_or_die(KEY_DSA, 1024);
static struct sshkey *ecdsa256 = generate_or_die(KEY_ECDSA, 256);
static struct sshkey *ecdsa384 = generate_or_die(KEY_ECDSA, 384);
static struct sshkey *ecdsa521 = generate_or_die(KEY_ECDSA, 521);
#endif
+ struct sshkey_sig_details *details = NULL;
static struct sshkey *ed25519 = generate_or_die(KEY_ED25519, 0);
static const char *data = "If everyone started announcing his nose had "
"run away, I don’t know how it would all end";
static const size_t dlen = strlen(data);
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
- sshkey_verify(rsa, sig, slen, (const u_char *)data, dlen, NULL, 0);
- sshkey_verify(dsa, sig, slen, (const u_char *)data, dlen, NULL, 0);
- sshkey_verify(ecdsa256, sig, slen, (const u_char *)data, dlen, NULL, 0);
- sshkey_verify(ecdsa384, sig, slen, (const u_char *)data, dlen, NULL, 0);
- sshkey_verify(ecdsa521, sig, slen, (const u_char *)data, dlen, NULL, 0);
+ sshkey_verify(rsa, sig, slen, (const u_char *)data, dlen, NULL, 0, &details);
+ sshkey_sig_details_free(details);
+ details = NULL;
+ sshkey_verify(dsa, sig, slen, (const u_char *)data, dlen, NULL, 0, &details);
+ sshkey_sig_details_free(details);
+ details = NULL;
+ sshkey_verify(ecdsa256, sig, slen, (const u_char *)data, dlen, NULL, 0, &details);
+ sshkey_sig_details_free(details);
+ details = NULL;
+ sshkey_verify(ecdsa384, sig, slen, (const u_char *)data, dlen, NULL, 0, &details);
+ sshkey_sig_details_free(details);
+ details = NULL;
+ sshkey_verify(ecdsa521, sig, slen, (const u_char *)data, dlen, NULL, 0, &details);
+ sshkey_sig_details_free(details);
+ details = NULL;
#endif
- sshkey_verify(ed25519, sig, slen, (const u_char *)data, dlen, NULL, 0);
+ sshkey_verify(ed25519, sig, slen, (const u_char *)data, dlen, NULL, 0, &details);
+ sshkey_sig_details_free(details);
return 0;
}
} // extern
diff --git a/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/ssh-sk-null.cc b/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/ssh-sk-null.cc
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..199af11217e8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/ssh-sk-null.cc
@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+/* $OpenBSD$ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2019 Google LLC
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+extern "C" {
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#include "ssherr.h"
+#include "ssh-sk.h"
+
+int
+sshsk_enroll(int type, const char *provider_path, const char *device,
+ const char *application, const char *userid, uint8_t flags,
+ const char *pin, struct sshbuf *challenge_buf,
+ struct sshkey **keyp, struct sshbuf *attest)
+{
+ return SSH_ERR_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED;
+}
+
+int
+sshsk_sign(const char *provider_path, struct sshkey *key,
+ u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp, const u_char *data, size_t datalen,
+ u_int compat, const char *pin)
+{
+ return SSH_ERR_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED;
+}
+
+int
+sshsk_load_resident(const char *provider_path, const char *device,
+ const char *pin, struct sshkey ***keysp, size_t *nkeysp)
+{
+ return SSH_ERR_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED;
+}
+
+};
diff --git a/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/sshsig_fuzz.cc b/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/sshsig_fuzz.cc
index fe09ccb8737a..02211a096b24 100644
--- a/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/sshsig_fuzz.cc
+++ b/regress/misc/fuzz-harness/sshsig_fuzz.cc
@@ -1,35 +1,37 @@
// cc_fuzz_target test for sshsig verification.
#include <stddef.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdint.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
extern "C" {
#include "includes.h"
#include "sshkey.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
#include "sshbuf.h"
#include "sshsig.h"
#include "log.h"
int LLVMFuzzerTestOneInput(const uint8_t* sig, size_t slen)
{
static const char *data = "If everyone started announcing his nose had "
"run away, I don’t know how it would all end";
struct sshbuf *signature = sshbuf_from(sig, slen);
struct sshbuf *message = sshbuf_from(data, strlen(data));
struct sshkey *k = NULL;
+ struct sshkey_sig_details *details = NULL;
extern char *__progname;
log_init(__progname, SYSLOG_LEVEL_QUIET, SYSLOG_FACILITY_USER, 1);
- sshsig_verifyb(signature, message, "castle", &k);
+ sshsig_verifyb(signature, message, "castle", &k, &details);
+ sshkey_sig_details_free(details);
sshkey_free(k);
sshbuf_free(signature);
sshbuf_free(message);
return 0;
}
} // extern
diff --git a/regress/misc/kexfuzz/Makefile b/regress/misc/kexfuzz/Makefile
index 20802cb87038..9eb86931cab1 100644
--- a/regress/misc/kexfuzz/Makefile
+++ b/regress/misc/kexfuzz/Makefile
@@ -1,97 +1,101 @@
-# $OpenBSD: Makefile,v 1.4 2019/01/21 12:50:12 djm Exp $
+# $OpenBSD: Makefile,v 1.7 2020/01/26 00:09:50 djm Exp $
.include <bsd.own.mk>
.include <bsd.obj.mk>
# XXX detect from ssh binary?
SSH1?= no
OPENSSL?= yes
PROG= kexfuzz
SRCS= kexfuzz.c
SSHREL=../../../../../usr.bin/ssh
.PATH: ${.CURDIR}/${SSHREL}
# From usr.bin/ssh
SRCS+=sshbuf-getput-basic.c sshbuf-getput-crypto.c sshbuf-misc.c sshbuf.c
SRCS+=atomicio.c sshkey.c authfile.c cipher.c log.c ssh-rsa.c ssh-dss.c
SRCS+=ssh-ecdsa.c ssh-ed25519.c mac.c umac.c umac128.c hmac.c misc.c
SRCS+=ssherr.c uidswap.c cleanup.c xmalloc.c match.c krl.c fatal.c
SRCS+=addrmatch.c bitmap.c packet.c dispatch.c canohost.c ssh_api.c
SRCS+=compat.c ed25519.c hash.c ge25519.c fe25519.c sc25519.c verify.c
SRCS+=cipher-chachapoly.c chacha.c poly1305.c
+SRCS+=sshbuf-io.c ssh-ecdsa-sk.c ssh-ed25519-sk.c msg.c ssh-sk-client.c
SRCS+= kex.c
SRCS+= dh.c
SRCS+= kexdh.c
SRCS+= kexecdh.c
SRCS+= kexgex.c
SRCS+= kexgexc.c
SRCS+= kexgexs.c
SRCS+= kexc25519.c
SRCS+= smult_curve25519_ref.c
SRCS+= kexgen.c
SRCS+= kexsntrup4591761x25519.c
SRCS+= sntrup4591761.c
SRCS+=digest-openssl.c
#SRCS+=digest-libc.c
NOMAN= 1
.if (${OPENSSL:L} == "yes")
CFLAGS+= -DWITH_OPENSSL
.else
# SSH v.1 requires OpenSSL.
SSH1= no
.endif
.if (${SSH1:L} == "yes")
CFLAGS+= -DWITH_SSH1
.endif
+LDADD+= -lfido2 -lcbor -lusbhid
+DPADD+= ${LIBFIDO2} ${LIBCBOR} ${LIBUSBHID}
+
# enable warnings
WARNINGS=Yes
DEBUG=-g
CFLAGS+= -fstack-protector-all
CDIAGFLAGS= -Wall
CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wextra
CDIAGFLAGS+= -Werror
CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wchar-subscripts
CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wcomment
CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wformat
CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wformat-security
CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wimplicit
CDIAGFLAGS+= -Winline
CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wmissing-declarations
CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wmissing-prototypes
CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wparentheses
CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wpointer-arith
CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wreturn-type
CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wshadow
CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wsign-compare
CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wstrict-aliasing
CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wstrict-prototypes
CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wswitch
CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wtrigraphs
CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wuninitialized
CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wunused
CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wno-unused-parameter
.if ${COMPILER_VERSION:L} != "gcc3"
CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wold-style-definition
.endif
CFLAGS+=-I${.CURDIR}/${SSHREL}
LDADD+= -lutil -lz
DPADD+= ${LIBUTIL} ${LIBZ}
.if (${OPENSSL:L} == "yes")
LDADD+= -lcrypto
DPADD+= ${LIBCRYPTO}
.endif
.include <bsd.prog.mk>
diff --git a/regress/misc/kexfuzz/kexfuzz.c b/regress/misc/kexfuzz/kexfuzz.c
index 7051e87b1acc..56697c9189e5 100644
--- a/regress/misc/kexfuzz/kexfuzz.c
+++ b/regress/misc/kexfuzz/kexfuzz.c
@@ -1,457 +1,453 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: kexfuzz.c,v 1.5 2019/01/21 12:50:12 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: kexfuzz.c,v 1.6 2020/01/26 00:09:50 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Fuzz harness for KEX code
*
* Placed in the public domain
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/param.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
# include <stdint.h>
#endif
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#ifdef HAVE_ERR_H
# include <err.h>
#endif
#include "ssherr.h"
#include "ssh_api.h"
#include "sshbuf.h"
#include "packet.h"
#include "myproposal.h"
#include "authfile.h"
#include "log.h"
void kex_tests(void);
static int do_debug = 0;
enum direction { S2C, C2S };
struct hook_ctx {
struct ssh *client, *server, *server2;
int *c2s, *s2c;
int trigger_direction, packet_index;
const char *dump_path;
struct sshbuf *replace_data;
};
static int
packet_hook(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshbuf *packet, u_char *typep, void *_ctx)
{
struct hook_ctx *ctx = (struct hook_ctx *)_ctx;
int mydirection = ssh == ctx->client ? S2C : C2S;
int *packet_count = mydirection == S2C ? ctx->s2c : ctx->c2s;
FILE *dumpfile;
int r;
if (do_debug) {
printf("%s packet %d type %u:\n",
mydirection == S2C ? "s2c" : "c2s",
*packet_count, *typep);
sshbuf_dump(packet, stdout);
}
if (mydirection == ctx->trigger_direction &&
ctx->packet_index == *packet_count) {
if (ctx->replace_data != NULL) {
sshbuf_reset(packet);
/* Type is first byte of packet */
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(ctx->replace_data,
typep)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_putb(packet, ctx->replace_data)) != 0)
return r;
if (do_debug) {
printf("***** replaced packet type %u\n",
*typep);
sshbuf_dump(packet, stdout);
}
} else if (ctx->dump_path != NULL) {
if ((dumpfile = fopen(ctx->dump_path, "w+")) == NULL)
err(1, "fopen %s", ctx->dump_path);
/* Write { type, packet } */
if (fwrite(typep, 1, 1, dumpfile) != 1)
err(1, "fwrite type %s", ctx->dump_path);
if (sshbuf_len(packet) != 0 &&
fwrite(sshbuf_ptr(packet), sshbuf_len(packet),
1, dumpfile) != 1)
err(1, "fwrite body %s", ctx->dump_path);
if (do_debug) {
printf("***** dumped packet type %u len %zu\n",
*typep, sshbuf_len(packet));
}
fclose(dumpfile);
/* No point in continuing */
exit(0);
}
}
(*packet_count)++;
return 0;
}
static int
do_send_and_receive(struct ssh *from, struct ssh *to)
{
u_char type;
size_t len;
const u_char *buf;
int r;
for (;;) {
if ((r = ssh_packet_next(from, &type)) != 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "ssh_packet_next: %s\n", ssh_err(r));
return r;
}
if (type != 0)
return 0;
buf = ssh_output_ptr(from, &len);
if (len == 0)
return 0;
if ((r = ssh_input_append(to, buf, len)) != 0) {
debug("ssh_input_append: %s", ssh_err(r));
return r;
}
if ((r = ssh_output_consume(from, len)) != 0) {
debug("ssh_output_consume: %s", ssh_err(r));
return r;
}
}
}
/* Minimal test_helper.c scaffholding to make this standalone */
const char *in_test = NULL;
#define TEST_START(a) \
do { \
in_test = (a); \
if (do_debug) \
fprintf(stderr, "test %s starting\n", in_test); \
} while (0)
#define TEST_DONE() \
do { \
if (do_debug) \
fprintf(stderr, "test %s done\n", \
in_test ? in_test : "???"); \
in_test = NULL; \
} while(0)
#define ASSERT_INT_EQ(a, b) \
do { \
if ((int)(a) != (int)(b)) { \
fprintf(stderr, "%s %s:%d " \
"%s (%d) != expected %s (%d)\n", \
in_test ? in_test : "(none)", \
__func__, __LINE__, #a, (int)(a), #b, (int)(b)); \
exit(2); \
} \
} while (0)
#define ASSERT_INT_GE(a, b) \
do { \
if ((int)(a) < (int)(b)) { \
fprintf(stderr, "%s %s:%d " \
"%s (%d) < expected %s (%d)\n", \
in_test ? in_test : "(none)", \
__func__, __LINE__, #a, (int)(a), #b, (int)(b)); \
exit(2); \
} \
} while (0)
#define ASSERT_PTR_NE(a, b) \
do { \
if ((a) == (b)) { \
fprintf(stderr, "%s %s:%d " \
"%s (%p) != expected %s (%p)\n", \
in_test ? in_test : "(none)", \
__func__, __LINE__, #a, (a), #b, (b)); \
exit(2); \
} \
} while (0)
static void
run_kex(struct ssh *client, struct ssh *server)
{
int r = 0;
while (!server->kex->done || !client->kex->done) {
if ((r = do_send_and_receive(server, client)) != 0) {
debug("do_send_and_receive S2C: %s", ssh_err(r));
break;
}
if ((r = do_send_and_receive(client, server)) != 0) {
debug("do_send_and_receive C2S: %s", ssh_err(r));
break;
}
}
if (do_debug)
printf("done: %s\n", ssh_err(r));
ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, 0);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(server->kex->done, 1);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(client->kex->done, 1);
}
static void
do_kex_with_key(const char *kex, struct sshkey *prvkey, int *c2s, int *s2c,
int direction, int packet_index,
const char *dump_path, struct sshbuf *replace_data)
{
struct ssh *client = NULL, *server = NULL, *server2 = NULL;
struct sshkey *pubkey = NULL;
struct sshbuf *state;
struct kex_params kex_params;
char *myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAX] = { KEX_CLIENT };
char *keyname = NULL;
struct hook_ctx hook_ctx;
TEST_START("sshkey_from_private");
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_from_private(prvkey, &pubkey), 0);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("ssh_init");
memcpy(kex_params.proposal, myproposal, sizeof(myproposal));
if (kex != NULL)
kex_params.proposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = strdup(kex);
keyname = strdup(sshkey_ssh_name(prvkey));
ASSERT_PTR_NE(keyname, NULL);
kex_params.proposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = keyname;
ASSERT_INT_EQ(ssh_init(&client, 0, &kex_params), 0);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(ssh_init(&server, 1, &kex_params), 0);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(ssh_init(&server2, 1, NULL), 0);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(client, NULL);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(server, NULL);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(server2, NULL);
TEST_DONE();
hook_ctx.c2s = c2s;
hook_ctx.s2c = s2c;
hook_ctx.trigger_direction = direction;
hook_ctx.packet_index = packet_index;
hook_ctx.dump_path = dump_path;
hook_ctx.replace_data = replace_data;
hook_ctx.client = client;
hook_ctx.server = server;
hook_ctx.server2 = server2;
ssh_packet_set_input_hook(client, packet_hook, &hook_ctx);
ssh_packet_set_input_hook(server, packet_hook, &hook_ctx);
ssh_packet_set_input_hook(server2, packet_hook, &hook_ctx);
TEST_START("ssh_add_hostkey");
ASSERT_INT_EQ(ssh_add_hostkey(server, prvkey), 0);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(ssh_add_hostkey(client, pubkey), 0);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("kex");
run_kex(client, server);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("rekeying client");
ASSERT_INT_EQ(kex_send_kexinit(client), 0);
run_kex(client, server);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("rekeying server");
ASSERT_INT_EQ(kex_send_kexinit(server), 0);
run_kex(client, server);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("ssh_packet_get_state");
state = sshbuf_new();
ASSERT_PTR_NE(state, NULL);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(ssh_packet_get_state(server, state), 0);
ASSERT_INT_GE(sshbuf_len(state), 1);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("ssh_packet_set_state");
ASSERT_INT_EQ(ssh_add_hostkey(server2, prvkey), 0);
kex_free(server2->kex); /* XXX or should ssh_packet_set_state()? */
ASSERT_INT_EQ(ssh_packet_set_state(server2, state), 0);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_len(state), 0);
sshbuf_free(state);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(server2->kex, NULL);
/* XXX we need to set the callbacks */
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
server2->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1] = kex_gen_server;
server2->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1] = kex_gen_server;
server2->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA256] = kex_gen_server;
server2->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP16_SHA512] = kex_gen_server;
server2->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP18_SHA512] = kex_gen_server;
server2->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_server;
server2->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_server;
# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
server2->kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kex_gen_server;
# endif
#endif
server2->kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kex_gen_server;
server2->kex->load_host_public_key = server->kex->load_host_public_key;
server2->kex->load_host_private_key = server->kex->load_host_private_key;
server2->kex->sign = server->kex->sign;
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("rekeying server2");
ASSERT_INT_EQ(kex_send_kexinit(server2), 0);
run_kex(client, server2);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(kex_send_kexinit(client), 0);
run_kex(client, server2);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("cleanup");
sshkey_free(pubkey);
ssh_free(client);
ssh_free(server);
ssh_free(server2);
free(keyname);
TEST_DONE();
}
static void
usage(void)
{
fprintf(stderr,
"Usage: kexfuzz [-hcdrv] [-D direction] [-f data_file]\n"
" [-K kex_alg] [-k private_key] [-i packet_index]\n"
"\n"
"Options:\n"
" -h Display this help\n"
" -c Count packets sent during KEX\n"
" -d Dump mode: record KEX packet to data file\n"
" -r Replace mode: replace packet with data file\n"
" -v Turn on verbose logging\n"
" -D S2C|C2S Packet direction for replacement or dump\n"
" -f data_file Path to data file for replacement or dump\n"
" -K kex_alg Name of KEX algorithm to test (see below)\n"
" -k private_key Path to private key file\n"
" -i packet_index Index of packet to replace or dump (from 0)\n"
"\n"
"Available KEX algorithms: %s\n", kex_alg_list(' '));
}
static void
badusage(const char *bad)
{
fprintf(stderr, "Invalid options\n");
fprintf(stderr, "%s\n", bad);
usage();
exit(1);
}
int
main(int argc, char **argv)
{
int ch, fd, r;
int count_flag = 0, dump_flag = 0, replace_flag = 0;
int packet_index = -1, direction = -1;
int s2c = 0, c2s = 0; /* packet counts */
const char *kex = NULL, *kpath = NULL, *data_path = NULL;
struct sshkey *key = NULL;
struct sshbuf *replace_data = NULL;
setvbuf(stdout, NULL, _IONBF, 0);
while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "hcdrvD:f:K:k:i:")) != -1) {
switch (ch) {
case 'h':
usage();
return 0;
case 'c':
count_flag = 1;
break;
case 'd':
dump_flag = 1;
break;
case 'r':
replace_flag = 1;
break;
case 'v':
do_debug = 1;
break;
case 'D':
if (strcasecmp(optarg, "s2c") == 0)
direction = S2C;
else if (strcasecmp(optarg, "c2s") == 0)
direction = C2S;
else
badusage("Invalid direction (-D)");
break;
case 'f':
data_path = optarg;
break;
case 'K':
kex = optarg;
break;
case 'k':
kpath = optarg;
break;
case 'i':
packet_index = atoi(optarg);
if (packet_index < 0)
badusage("Invalid packet index");
break;
default:
badusage("unsupported flag");
}
}
argc -= optind;
argv += optind;
log_init(argv[0], do_debug ? SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3 : SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO,
SYSLOG_FACILITY_USER, 1);
/* Must select a single mode */
if ((count_flag + dump_flag + replace_flag) != 1)
badusage("Must select one mode: -c, -d or -r");
/* KEX type is mandatory */
if (kex == NULL || !kex_names_valid(kex) || strchr(kex, ',') != NULL)
badusage("Missing or invalid kex type (-K flag)");
/* Valid key is mandatory */
if (kpath == NULL)
badusage("Missing private key (-k flag)");
if ((fd = open(kpath, O_RDONLY)) == -1)
err(1, "open %s", kpath);
if ((r = sshkey_load_private_type_fd(fd, KEY_UNSPEC, NULL,
&key, NULL)) != 0)
errx(1, "Unable to load key %s: %s", kpath, ssh_err(r));
close(fd);
/* XXX check that it is a private key */
/* XXX support certificates */
if (key == NULL || key->type == KEY_UNSPEC)
badusage("Invalid key file (-k flag)");
/* Replace (fuzz) mode */
if (replace_flag) {
if (packet_index == -1 || direction == -1 || data_path == NULL)
badusage("Replace (-r) mode must specify direction "
"(-D) packet index (-i) and data path (-f)");
- if ((fd = open(data_path, O_RDONLY)) == -1)
- err(1, "open %s", data_path);
- replace_data = sshbuf_new();
- if ((r = sshkey_load_file(fd, replace_data)) != 0)
+ if ((r = sshbuf_load_file(data_path, &replace_data)) != 0)
errx(1, "read %s: %s", data_path, ssh_err(r));
- close(fd);
}
/* Dump mode */
if (dump_flag) {
if (packet_index == -1 || direction == -1 || data_path == NULL)
badusage("Dump (-d) mode must specify direction "
"(-D), packet index (-i) and data path (-f)");
}
/* Count mode needs no further flags */
do_kex_with_key(kex, key, &c2s, &s2c,
direction, packet_index,
dump_flag ? data_path : NULL,
replace_flag ? replace_data : NULL);
sshkey_free(key);
sshbuf_free(replace_data);
if (count_flag) {
printf("S2C: %d\n", s2c);
printf("C2S: %d\n", c2s);
}
return 0;
}
diff --git a/regress/misc/sk-dummy/fatal.c b/regress/misc/sk-dummy/fatal.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..7cdc74b97b57
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/misc/sk-dummy/fatal.c
@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+/* public domain */
+
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+void fatal(char *fmt, ...);
+
+void
+fatal(char *fmt, ...)
+{
+ va_list ap;
+
+ va_start(ap, fmt);
+ vfprintf(stderr, fmt, ap);
+ va_end(ap);
+ fputc('\n', stderr);
+ _exit(1);
+}
diff --git a/regress/misc/sk-dummy/sk-dummy.c b/regress/misc/sk-dummy/sk-dummy.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..dca158ded6fc
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/misc/sk-dummy/sk-dummy.c
@@ -0,0 +1,526 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2019 Markus Friedl
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
+#include <stdint.h>
+#endif
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stddef.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+
+#include "crypto_api.h"
+#include "sk-api.h"
+
+#include <openssl/opensslv.h>
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/ec.h>
+#include <openssl/ecdsa.h>
+#include <openssl/pem.h>
+
+/* #define SK_DEBUG 1 */
+
+/* Compatibility with OpenSSH 1.0.x */
+#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L)
+#define ECDSA_SIG_get0(sig, pr, ps) \
+ do { \
+ (*pr) = sig->r; \
+ (*ps) = sig->s; \
+ } while (0)
+#endif
+
+#if SSH_SK_VERSION_MAJOR != 0x00040000
+# error SK API has changed, sk-dummy.c needs an update
+#endif
+
+static void skdebug(const char *func, const char *fmt, ...)
+ __attribute__((__format__ (printf, 2, 3)));
+
+static void
+skdebug(const char *func, const char *fmt, ...)
+{
+#if defined(SK_DEBUG)
+ va_list ap;
+
+ va_start(ap, fmt);
+ fprintf(stderr, "sk-dummy %s: ", func);
+ vfprintf(stderr, fmt, ap);
+ fputc('\n', stderr);
+ va_end(ap);
+#else
+ (void)func; /* XXX */
+ (void)fmt; /* XXX */
+#endif
+}
+
+uint32_t
+sk_api_version(void)
+{
+ return SSH_SK_VERSION_MAJOR;
+}
+
+static int
+pack_key_ecdsa(struct sk_enroll_response *response)
+{
+#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
+ EC_KEY *key = NULL;
+ const EC_GROUP *g;
+ const EC_POINT *q;
+ int ret = -1;
+ long privlen;
+ BIO *bio = NULL;
+ char *privptr;
+
+ response->public_key = NULL;
+ response->public_key_len = 0;
+ response->key_handle = NULL;
+ response->key_handle_len = 0;
+
+ if ((key = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(NID_X9_62_prime256v1)) == NULL) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (EC_KEY_generate_key(key) != 1) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "EC_KEY_generate_key");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ EC_KEY_set_asn1_flag(key, OPENSSL_EC_NAMED_CURVE);
+ if ((bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem())) == NULL ||
+ (g = EC_KEY_get0_group(key)) == NULL ||
+ (q = EC_KEY_get0_public_key(key)) == NULL) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "couldn't get key parameters");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ response->public_key_len = EC_POINT_point2oct(g, q,
+ POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, NULL, 0, NULL);
+ if (response->public_key_len == 0 || response->public_key_len > 2048) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "bad pubkey length %zu",
+ response->public_key_len);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((response->public_key = malloc(response->public_key_len)) == NULL) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "malloc pubkey failed");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (EC_POINT_point2oct(g, q, POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
+ response->public_key, response->public_key_len, NULL) == 0) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "EC_POINT_point2oct failed");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ /* Key handle contains PEM encoded private key */
+ if (!PEM_write_bio_ECPrivateKey(bio, key, NULL, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL)) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "PEM_write_bio_ECPrivateKey failed");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((privlen = BIO_get_mem_data(bio, &privptr)) <= 0) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "BIO_get_mem_data failed");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((response->key_handle = malloc(privlen)) == NULL) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "malloc key_handle failed");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ response->key_handle_len = (size_t)privlen;
+ memcpy(response->key_handle, privptr, response->key_handle_len);
+ /* success */
+ ret = 0;
+ out:
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ if (response->public_key != NULL) {
+ memset(response->public_key, 0,
+ response->public_key_len);
+ free(response->public_key);
+ response->public_key = NULL;
+ }
+ if (response->key_handle != NULL) {
+ memset(response->key_handle, 0,
+ response->key_handle_len);
+ free(response->key_handle);
+ response->key_handle = NULL;
+ }
+ }
+ BIO_free(bio);
+ EC_KEY_free(key);
+ return ret;
+#else
+ return -1;
+#endif
+}
+
+static int
+pack_key_ed25519(struct sk_enroll_response *response)
+{
+ int ret = -1;
+ u_char pk[crypto_sign_ed25519_PUBLICKEYBYTES];
+ u_char sk[crypto_sign_ed25519_SECRETKEYBYTES];
+
+ response->public_key = NULL;
+ response->public_key_len = 0;
+ response->key_handle = NULL;
+ response->key_handle_len = 0;
+
+ memset(pk, 0, sizeof(pk));
+ memset(sk, 0, sizeof(sk));
+ crypto_sign_ed25519_keypair(pk, sk);
+
+ response->public_key_len = sizeof(pk);
+ if ((response->public_key = malloc(response->public_key_len)) == NULL) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "malloc pubkey failed");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ memcpy(response->public_key, pk, sizeof(pk));
+ /* Key handle contains sk */
+ response->key_handle_len = sizeof(sk);
+ if ((response->key_handle = malloc(response->key_handle_len)) == NULL) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "malloc key_handle failed");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ memcpy(response->key_handle, sk, sizeof(sk));
+ /* success */
+ ret = 0;
+ out:
+ if (ret != 0)
+ free(response->public_key);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int
+check_options(struct sk_option **options)
+{
+ size_t i;
+
+ if (options == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ for (i = 0; options[i] != NULL; i++) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "requested unsupported option %s",
+ options[i]->name);
+ if (options[i]->required) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "unknown required option");
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int
+sk_enroll(uint32_t alg, const uint8_t *challenge, size_t challenge_len,
+ const char *application, uint8_t flags, const char *pin,
+ struct sk_option **options, struct sk_enroll_response **enroll_response)
+{
+ struct sk_enroll_response *response = NULL;
+ int ret = SSH_SK_ERR_GENERAL;
+
+ (void)flags; /* XXX; unused */
+
+ if (enroll_response == NULL) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "enroll_response == NULL");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ *enroll_response = NULL;
+ if (check_options(options) != 0)
+ goto out; /* error already logged */
+ if ((response = calloc(1, sizeof(*response))) == NULL) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "calloc response failed");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ switch(alg) {
+ case SSH_SK_ECDSA:
+ if (pack_key_ecdsa(response) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ break;
+ case SSH_SK_ED25519:
+ if (pack_key_ed25519(response) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ break;
+ default:
+ skdebug(__func__, "unsupported key type %d", alg);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ /* Have to return something here */
+ if ((response->signature = calloc(1, 1)) == NULL) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "calloc signature failed");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ response->signature_len = 0;
+
+ *enroll_response = response;
+ response = NULL;
+ ret = 0;
+ out:
+ if (response != NULL) {
+ free(response->public_key);
+ free(response->key_handle);
+ free(response->signature);
+ free(response->attestation_cert);
+ free(response);
+ }
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static void
+dump(const char *preamble, const void *sv, size_t l)
+{
+#ifdef SK_DEBUG
+ const u_char *s = (const u_char *)sv;
+ size_t i;
+
+ fprintf(stderr, "%s (len %zu):\n", preamble, l);
+ for (i = 0; i < l; i++) {
+ if (i % 16 == 0)
+ fprintf(stderr, "%04zu: ", i);
+ fprintf(stderr, "%02x", s[i]);
+ if (i % 16 == 15 || i == l - 1)
+ fprintf(stderr, "\n");
+ }
+#endif
+}
+
+static int
+sig_ecdsa(const uint8_t *message, size_t message_len,
+ const char *application, uint32_t counter, uint8_t flags,
+ const uint8_t *key_handle, size_t key_handle_len,
+ struct sk_sign_response *response)
+{
+#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
+ ECDSA_SIG *sig = NULL;
+ const BIGNUM *sig_r, *sig_s;
+ int ret = -1;
+ BIO *bio = NULL;
+ EVP_PKEY *pk = NULL;
+ EC_KEY *ec = NULL;
+ SHA256_CTX ctx;
+ uint8_t apphash[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+ uint8_t sighash[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+ uint8_t countbuf[4];
+
+ /* Decode EC_KEY from key handle */
+ if ((bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem())) == NULL ||
+ BIO_write(bio, key_handle, key_handle_len) != (int)key_handle_len) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "BIO setup failed");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((pk = PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey(bio, NULL, NULL, "")) == NULL) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey failed");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (EVP_PKEY_base_id(pk) != EVP_PKEY_EC) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "Not an EC key: %d", EVP_PKEY_base_id(pk));
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((ec = EVP_PKEY_get1_EC_KEY(pk)) == NULL) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "EVP_PKEY_get1_EC_KEY failed");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ /* Expect message to be pre-hashed */
+ if (message_len != SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "bad message len %zu", message_len);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ /* Prepare data to be signed */
+ dump("message", message, message_len);
+ SHA256_Init(&ctx);
+ SHA256_Update(&ctx, application, strlen(application));
+ SHA256_Final(apphash, &ctx);
+ dump("apphash", apphash, sizeof(apphash));
+ countbuf[0] = (counter >> 24) & 0xff;
+ countbuf[1] = (counter >> 16) & 0xff;
+ countbuf[2] = (counter >> 8) & 0xff;
+ countbuf[3] = counter & 0xff;
+ dump("countbuf", countbuf, sizeof(countbuf));
+ dump("flags", &flags, sizeof(flags));
+ SHA256_Init(&ctx);
+ SHA256_Update(&ctx, apphash, sizeof(apphash));
+ SHA256_Update(&ctx, &flags, sizeof(flags));
+ SHA256_Update(&ctx, countbuf, sizeof(countbuf));
+ SHA256_Update(&ctx, message, message_len);
+ SHA256_Final(sighash, &ctx);
+ dump("sighash", sighash, sizeof(sighash));
+ /* create and encode signature */
+ if ((sig = ECDSA_do_sign(sighash, sizeof(sighash), ec)) == NULL) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "ECDSA_do_sign failed");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ ECDSA_SIG_get0(sig, &sig_r, &sig_s);
+ response->sig_r_len = BN_num_bytes(sig_r);
+ response->sig_s_len = BN_num_bytes(sig_s);
+ if ((response->sig_r = calloc(1, response->sig_r_len)) == NULL ||
+ (response->sig_s = calloc(1, response->sig_s_len)) == NULL) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "calloc signature failed");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ BN_bn2bin(sig_r, response->sig_r);
+ BN_bn2bin(sig_s, response->sig_s);
+ ret = 0;
+ out:
+ explicit_bzero(&ctx, sizeof(ctx));
+ explicit_bzero(&apphash, sizeof(apphash));
+ explicit_bzero(&sighash, sizeof(sighash));
+ ECDSA_SIG_free(sig);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ free(response->sig_r);
+ free(response->sig_s);
+ response->sig_r = NULL;
+ response->sig_s = NULL;
+ }
+ BIO_free(bio);
+ EC_KEY_free(ec);
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pk);
+ return ret;
+#else
+ return -1;
+#endif
+}
+
+static int
+sig_ed25519(const uint8_t *message, size_t message_len,
+ const char *application, uint32_t counter, uint8_t flags,
+ const uint8_t *key_handle, size_t key_handle_len,
+ struct sk_sign_response *response)
+{
+ size_t o;
+ int ret = -1;
+ SHA256_CTX ctx;
+ uint8_t apphash[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+ uint8_t signbuf[sizeof(apphash) + sizeof(flags) +
+ sizeof(counter) + SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+ uint8_t sig[crypto_sign_ed25519_BYTES + sizeof(signbuf)];
+ unsigned long long smlen;
+
+ if (key_handle_len != crypto_sign_ed25519_SECRETKEYBYTES) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "bad key handle length %zu", key_handle_len);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ /* Expect message to be pre-hashed */
+ if (message_len != SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "bad message len %zu", message_len);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ /* Prepare data to be signed */
+ dump("message", message, message_len);
+ SHA256_Init(&ctx);
+ SHA256_Update(&ctx, application, strlen(application));
+ SHA256_Final(apphash, &ctx);
+ dump("apphash", apphash, sizeof(apphash));
+
+ memcpy(signbuf, apphash, sizeof(apphash));
+ o = sizeof(apphash);
+ signbuf[o++] = flags;
+ signbuf[o++] = (counter >> 24) & 0xff;
+ signbuf[o++] = (counter >> 16) & 0xff;
+ signbuf[o++] = (counter >> 8) & 0xff;
+ signbuf[o++] = counter & 0xff;
+ memcpy(signbuf + o, message, message_len);
+ o += message_len;
+ if (o != sizeof(signbuf)) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "bad sign buf len %zu, expected %zu",
+ o, sizeof(signbuf));
+ goto out;
+ }
+ dump("signbuf", signbuf, sizeof(signbuf));
+ /* create and encode signature */
+ smlen = sizeof(signbuf);
+ if (crypto_sign_ed25519(sig, &smlen, signbuf, sizeof(signbuf),
+ key_handle) != 0) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "crypto_sign_ed25519 failed");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (smlen <= sizeof(signbuf)) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "bad sign smlen %llu, expected min %zu",
+ smlen, sizeof(signbuf) + 1);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ response->sig_r_len = (size_t)(smlen - sizeof(signbuf));
+ if ((response->sig_r = calloc(1, response->sig_r_len)) == NULL) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "calloc signature failed");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ memcpy(response->sig_r, sig, response->sig_r_len);
+ dump("sig_r", response->sig_r, response->sig_r_len);
+ ret = 0;
+ out:
+ explicit_bzero(&ctx, sizeof(ctx));
+ explicit_bzero(&apphash, sizeof(apphash));
+ explicit_bzero(&signbuf, sizeof(signbuf));
+ explicit_bzero(&sig, sizeof(sig));
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ free(response->sig_r);
+ response->sig_r = NULL;
+ }
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int
+sk_sign(uint32_t alg, const uint8_t *message, size_t message_len,
+ const char *application, const uint8_t *key_handle, size_t key_handle_len,
+ uint8_t flags, const char *pin, struct sk_option **options,
+ struct sk_sign_response **sign_response)
+{
+ struct sk_sign_response *response = NULL;
+ int ret = SSH_SK_ERR_GENERAL;
+
+ if (sign_response == NULL) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "sign_response == NULL");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ *sign_response = NULL;
+ if (check_options(options) != 0)
+ goto out; /* error already logged */
+ if ((response = calloc(1, sizeof(*response))) == NULL) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "calloc response failed");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ response->flags = flags;
+ response->counter = 0x12345678;
+ switch(alg) {
+ case SSH_SK_ECDSA:
+ if (sig_ecdsa(message, message_len, application,
+ response->counter, flags, key_handle, key_handle_len,
+ response) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ break;
+ case SSH_SK_ED25519:
+ if (sig_ed25519(message, message_len, application,
+ response->counter, flags, key_handle, key_handle_len,
+ response) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ break;
+ default:
+ skdebug(__func__, "unsupported key type %d", alg);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ *sign_response = response;
+ response = NULL;
+ ret = 0;
+ out:
+ if (response != NULL) {
+ free(response->sig_r);
+ free(response->sig_s);
+ free(response);
+ }
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int
+sk_load_resident_keys(const char *pin, struct sk_option **options,
+ struct sk_resident_key ***rks, size_t *nrks)
+{
+ return SSH_SK_ERR_UNSUPPORTED;
+}
diff --git a/regress/multiplex.sh b/regress/multiplex.sh
index b5e604dba9ba..817ddbfa819b 100644
--- a/regress/multiplex.sh
+++ b/regress/multiplex.sh
@@ -1,199 +1,197 @@
-# $OpenBSD: multiplex.sh,v 1.30 2019/07/05 04:03:13 dtucker Exp $
+# $OpenBSD: multiplex.sh,v 1.32 2020/01/25 02:57:53 dtucker Exp $
# Placed in the Public Domain.
make_tmpdir
CTL=${SSH_REGRESS_TMP}/ctl-sock
tid="connection multiplexing"
-NC=$OBJ/netcat
-
trace "will use ProxyCommand $proxycmd"
if config_defined DISABLE_FD_PASSING ; then
echo "skipped (not supported on this platform)"
exit 0
fi
P=3301 # test port
wait_for_mux_master_ready()
{
- for i in 1 2 3 4 5; do
+ for i in 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9; do
${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -Ocheck otherhost \
>/dev/null 2>&1 && return 0
sleep $i
done
fatal "mux master never becomes ready"
}
start_sshd
start_mux_master()
{
trace "start master, fork to background"
${SSH} -Nn2 -MS$CTL -F $OBJ/ssh_config -oSendEnv="_XXX_TEST" somehost \
-E $TEST_REGRESS_LOGFILE 2>&1 &
# NB. $SSH_PID will be killed by test-exec.sh:cleanup on fatal errors.
SSH_PID=$!
wait_for_mux_master_ready
}
start_mux_master
verbose "test $tid: envpass"
trace "env passing over multiplexed connection"
_XXX_TEST=blah ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -oSendEnv="_XXX_TEST" -S$CTL otherhost sh << 'EOF'
test X"$_XXX_TEST" = X"blah"
EOF
if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
fail "environment not found"
fi
verbose "test $tid: transfer"
rm -f ${COPY}
trace "ssh transfer over multiplexed connection and check result"
${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S$CTL otherhost cat ${DATA} > ${COPY}
test -f ${COPY} || fail "ssh -Sctl: failed copy ${DATA}"
cmp ${DATA} ${COPY} || fail "ssh -Sctl: corrupted copy of ${DATA}"
rm -f ${COPY}
trace "ssh transfer over multiplexed connection and check result"
${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL otherhost cat ${DATA} > ${COPY}
test -f ${COPY} || fail "ssh -S ctl: failed copy ${DATA}"
cmp ${DATA} ${COPY} || fail "ssh -S ctl: corrupted copy of ${DATA}"
rm -f ${COPY}
trace "sftp transfer over multiplexed connection and check result"
echo "get ${DATA} ${COPY}" | \
${SFTP} -S ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -oControlPath=$CTL otherhost >>$TEST_REGRESS_LOGFILE 2>&1
test -f ${COPY} || fail "sftp: failed copy ${DATA}"
cmp ${DATA} ${COPY} || fail "sftp: corrupted copy of ${DATA}"
rm -f ${COPY}
trace "scp transfer over multiplexed connection and check result"
${SCP} -S ${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -oControlPath=$CTL otherhost:${DATA} ${COPY} >>$TEST_REGRESS_LOGFILE 2>&1
test -f ${COPY} || fail "scp: failed copy ${DATA}"
cmp ${DATA} ${COPY} || fail "scp: corrupted copy of ${DATA}"
rm -f ${COPY}
verbose "test $tid: forward"
trace "forward over TCP/IP and check result"
$NC -N -l 127.0.0.1 $((${PORT} + 1)) < ${DATA} > /dev/null &
netcat_pid=$!
${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -Oforward -L127.0.0.1:$((${PORT} + 2)):127.0.0.1:$((${PORT} + 1)) otherhost >>$TEST_SSH_LOGFILE 2>&1
sleep 1 # XXX remove once race fixed
$NC 127.0.0.1 $((${PORT} + 2)) < /dev/null > ${COPY}
cmp ${DATA} ${COPY} || fail "ssh: corrupted copy of ${DATA}"
kill $netcat_pid 2>/dev/null
rm -f ${COPY} $OBJ/unix-[123].fwd
trace "forward over UNIX and check result"
$NC -N -Ul $OBJ/unix-1.fwd < ${DATA} > /dev/null &
netcat_pid=$!
${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -Oforward -L$OBJ/unix-2.fwd:$OBJ/unix-1.fwd otherhost >>$TEST_SSH_LOGFILE 2>&1
${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -Oforward -R$OBJ/unix-3.fwd:$OBJ/unix-2.fwd otherhost >>$TEST_SSH_LOGFILE 2>&1
sleep 1 # XXX remove once race fixed
$NC -U $OBJ/unix-3.fwd < /dev/null > ${COPY}
cmp ${DATA} ${COPY} || fail "ssh: corrupted copy of ${DATA}"
kill $netcat_pid 2>/dev/null
rm -f ${COPY} $OBJ/unix-[123].fwd
for s in 0 1 4 5 44; do
trace "exit status $s over multiplexed connection"
verbose "test $tid: status $s"
${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL otherhost exit $s
r=$?
if [ $r -ne $s ]; then
fail "exit code mismatch: $r != $s"
fi
# same with early close of stdout/err
trace "exit status $s with early close over multiplexed connection"
${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -n otherhost \
exec sh -c \'"sleep 2; exec > /dev/null 2>&1; sleep 3; exit $s"\'
r=$?
if [ $r -ne $s ]; then
fail "exit code (with sleep) mismatch: $r != $s"
fi
done
verbose "test $tid: cmd check"
${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -Ocheck otherhost >>$TEST_REGRESS_LOGFILE 2>&1 \
|| fail "check command failed"
verbose "test $tid: cmd forward local (TCP)"
${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -Oforward -L $P:localhost:$PORT otherhost \
|| fail "request local forward failed"
sleep 1 # XXX remove once race fixed
${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -p$P otherhost true \
|| fail "connect to local forward port failed"
${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -Ocancel -L $P:localhost:$PORT otherhost \
|| fail "cancel local forward failed"
${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -p$P otherhost true \
&& fail "local forward port still listening"
verbose "test $tid: cmd forward remote (TCP)"
${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -Oforward -R $P:localhost:$PORT otherhost \
|| fail "request remote forward failed"
sleep 1 # XXX remove once race fixed
${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -p$P otherhost true \
|| fail "connect to remote forwarded port failed"
${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -Ocancel -R $P:localhost:$PORT otherhost \
|| fail "cancel remote forward failed"
${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -p$P otherhost true \
&& fail "remote forward port still listening"
verbose "test $tid: cmd forward local (UNIX)"
${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -Oforward -L $OBJ/unix-1.fwd:localhost:$PORT otherhost \
|| fail "request local forward failed"
sleep 1 # XXX remove once race fixed
echo "" | $NC -U $OBJ/unix-1.fwd | \
grep "Invalid SSH identification string" >/dev/null 2>&1 \
|| fail "connect to local forward path failed"
${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -Ocancel -L $OBJ/unix-1.fwd:localhost:$PORT otherhost \
|| fail "cancel local forward failed"
N=$(echo "xyzzy" | $NC -U $OBJ/unix-1.fwd 2>&1 | grep "xyzzy" | wc -l)
test ${N} -eq 0 || fail "local forward path still listening"
rm -f $OBJ/unix-1.fwd
verbose "test $tid: cmd forward remote (UNIX)"
${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -Oforward -R $OBJ/unix-1.fwd:localhost:$PORT otherhost \
|| fail "request remote forward failed"
sleep 1 # XXX remove once race fixed
echo "" | $NC -U $OBJ/unix-1.fwd | \
grep "Invalid SSH identification string" >/dev/null 2>&1 \
|| fail "connect to remote forwarded path failed"
${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -Ocancel -R $OBJ/unix-1.fwd:localhost:$PORT otherhost \
|| fail "cancel remote forward failed"
N=$(echo "xyzzy" | $NC -U $OBJ/unix-1.fwd 2>&1 | grep "xyzzy" | wc -l)
test ${N} -eq 0 || fail "remote forward path still listening"
rm -f $OBJ/unix-1.fwd
verbose "test $tid: cmd exit"
${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -Oexit otherhost >>$TEST_REGRESS_LOGFILE 2>&1 \
|| fail "send exit command failed"
# Wait for master to exit
wait $SSH_PID
kill -0 $SSH_PID >/dev/null 2>&1 && fail "exit command failed"
# Restart master and test -O stop command with master using -N
verbose "test $tid: cmd stop"
trace "restart master, fork to background"
start_mux_master
# start a long-running command then immediately request a stop
${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL otherhost "sleep 10; exit 0" \
>>$TEST_REGRESS_LOGFILE 2>&1 &
SLEEP_PID=$!
${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_config -S $CTL -Ostop otherhost >>$TEST_REGRESS_LOGFILE 2>&1 \
|| fail "send stop command failed"
# wait until both long-running command and master have exited.
wait $SLEEP_PID
[ $! != 0 ] || fail "waiting for concurrent command"
wait $SSH_PID
[ $! != 0 ] || fail "waiting for master stop"
kill -0 $SSH_PID >/dev/null 2>&1 && fatal "stop command failed"
SSH_PID="" # Already gone, so don't kill in cleanup
diff --git a/regress/multipubkey.sh b/regress/multipubkey.sh
index 4d443ec45da3..9b2273353181 100644
--- a/regress/multipubkey.sh
+++ b/regress/multipubkey.sh
@@ -1,66 +1,66 @@
-# $OpenBSD: multipubkey.sh,v 1.2 2018/10/31 11:09:27 dtucker Exp $
+# $OpenBSD: multipubkey.sh,v 1.3 2019/12/11 18:47:14 djm Exp $
# Placed in the Public Domain.
tid="multiple pubkey"
rm -f $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER $OBJ/user_ca_key* $OBJ/user_key*
rm -f $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER $OBJ/cert_user_key*
mv $OBJ/sshd_proxy $OBJ/sshd_proxy.orig
mv $OBJ/ssh_proxy $OBJ/ssh_proxy.orig
# Create a CA key
${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t ed25519 -f $OBJ/user_ca_key ||\
fatal "ssh-keygen failed"
# Make some keys and a certificate.
${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t ed25519 -f $OBJ/user_key1 || \
fatal "ssh-keygen failed"
${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t ed25519 -f $OBJ/user_key2 || \
fatal "ssh-keygen failed"
${SSHKEYGEN} -q -s $OBJ/user_ca_key -I "regress user key for $USER" \
-z $$ -n ${USER},mekmitasdigoat $OBJ/user_key1 ||
fail "couldn't sign user_key1"
# Copy the private key alongside the cert to allow better control of when
# it is offered.
mv $OBJ/user_key1-cert.pub $OBJ/cert_user_key1.pub
cp -p $OBJ/user_key1 $OBJ/cert_user_key1
grep -v IdentityFile $OBJ/ssh_proxy.orig > $OBJ/ssh_proxy
opts="-oProtocol=2 -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy -oIdentitiesOnly=yes"
opts="$opts -i $OBJ/cert_user_key1 -i $OBJ/user_key1 -i $OBJ/user_key2"
-for privsep in yes sandbox ; do
+for privsep in yes ; do
(
grep -v "Protocol" $OBJ/sshd_proxy.orig
echo "Protocol 2"
echo "UsePrivilegeSeparation $privsep"
echo "AuthenticationMethods publickey,publickey"
echo "TrustedUserCAKeys $OBJ/user_ca_key.pub"
echo "AuthorizedPrincipalsFile $OBJ/authorized_principals_%u"
) > $OBJ/sshd_proxy
# Single key should fail.
rm -f $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER
cat $OBJ/user_key1.pub > $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
${SSH} $opts proxy true && fail "ssh succeeded with key"
# Single key with same-public cert should fail.
echo mekmitasdigoat > $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER
cat $OBJ/user_key1.pub > $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
${SSH} $opts proxy true && fail "ssh succeeded with key+cert"
# Multiple plain keys should succeed.
rm -f $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER
cat $OBJ/user_key1.pub $OBJ/user_key2.pub > \
$OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
${SSH} $opts proxy true || fail "ssh failed with multiple keys"
# Cert and different key should succeed
# Key and different-public cert should succeed.
echo mekmitasdigoat > $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER
cat $OBJ/user_key2.pub > $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
${SSH} $opts proxy true || fail "ssh failed with key/cert"
done
diff --git a/regress/netcat.c b/regress/netcat.c
index 56bd09de5485..2d86818e2c84 100644
--- a/regress/netcat.c
+++ b/regress/netcat.c
@@ -1,1664 +1,1668 @@
/* $OpenBSD: netcat.c,v 1.126 2014/10/30 16:08:31 tedu Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2001 Eric Jackson <ericj@monkey.org>
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
*
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
* 3. The name of the author may not be used to endorse or promote products
* derived from this software without specific prior written permission.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
/*
* Re-written nc(1) for OpenBSD. Original implementation by
* *Hobbit* <hobbit@avian.org>.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <sys/time.h>
#include <sys/uio.h>
#include <sys/un.h>
#include <netinet/in.h>
#include <netinet/tcp.h>
#include <netinet/ip.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <netdb.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <limits.h>
#include "atomicio.h"
#ifdef HAVE_POLL_H
#include <poll.h>
#else
# ifdef HAVE_SYS_POLL_H
# include <sys/poll.h>
# endif
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_ERR_H
# include <err.h>
#endif
/* Telnet options from arpa/telnet.h */
#define IAC 255
#define DONT 254
#define DO 253
#define WONT 252
#define WILL 251
#ifndef SUN_LEN
#define SUN_LEN(su) \
(sizeof(*(su)) - sizeof((su)->sun_path) + strlen((su)->sun_path))
#endif
#define PORT_MAX 65535
#define PORT_MAX_LEN 6
#define UNIX_DG_TMP_SOCKET_SIZE 19
#define POLL_STDIN 0
#define POLL_NETOUT 1
#define POLL_NETIN 2
#define POLL_STDOUT 3
#define BUFSIZE 16384
/* Command Line Options */
int dflag; /* detached, no stdin */
int Fflag; /* fdpass sock to stdout */
unsigned int iflag; /* Interval Flag */
int kflag; /* More than one connect */
int lflag; /* Bind to local port */
int Nflag; /* shutdown() network socket */
int nflag; /* Don't do name look up */
char *Pflag; /* Proxy username */
char *pflag; /* Localport flag */
int rflag; /* Random ports flag */
char *sflag; /* Source Address */
int tflag; /* Telnet Emulation */
int uflag; /* UDP - Default to TCP */
int vflag; /* Verbosity */
int xflag; /* Socks proxy */
int zflag; /* Port Scan Flag */
int Dflag; /* sodebug */
int Iflag; /* TCP receive buffer size */
int Oflag; /* TCP send buffer size */
int Sflag; /* TCP MD5 signature option */
int Tflag = -1; /* IP Type of Service */
int rtableid = -1;
int timeout = -1;
int family = AF_UNSPEC;
char *portlist[PORT_MAX+1];
char *unix_dg_tmp_socket;
void atelnet(int, unsigned char *, unsigned int);
void build_ports(char *);
void help(void);
int local_listen(char *, char *, struct addrinfo);
void readwrite(int);
void fdpass(int nfd) __attribute__((noreturn));
int remote_connect(const char *, const char *, struct addrinfo);
int timeout_connect(int, const struct sockaddr *, socklen_t);
int socks_connect(const char *, const char *, struct addrinfo,
const char *, const char *, struct addrinfo, int, const char *);
int udptest(int);
int unix_bind(char *);
int unix_connect(char *);
int unix_listen(char *);
void set_common_sockopts(int);
int map_tos(char *, int *);
void report_connect(const struct sockaddr *, socklen_t);
void usage(int);
ssize_t drainbuf(int, unsigned char *, size_t *);
ssize_t fillbuf(int, unsigned char *, size_t *);
int
main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
int ch, s, ret, socksv;
char *host, *uport;
struct addrinfo hints;
struct servent *sv;
socklen_t len;
struct sockaddr_storage cliaddr;
char *proxy = NULL;
const char *errstr, *proxyhost = "", *proxyport = NULL;
struct addrinfo proxyhints;
char unix_dg_tmp_socket_buf[UNIX_DG_TMP_SOCKET_SIZE];
ret = 1;
s = 0;
socksv = 5;
host = NULL;
uport = NULL;
sv = NULL;
while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv,
"46DdFhI:i:klNnO:P:p:rSs:tT:UuV:vw:X:x:z")) != -1) {
switch (ch) {
case '4':
family = AF_INET;
break;
case '6':
family = AF_INET6;
break;
case 'U':
family = AF_UNIX;
break;
case 'X':
if (strcasecmp(optarg, "connect") == 0)
socksv = -1; /* HTTP proxy CONNECT */
else if (strcmp(optarg, "4") == 0)
socksv = 4; /* SOCKS v.4 */
else if (strcmp(optarg, "5") == 0)
socksv = 5; /* SOCKS v.5 */
else
errx(1, "unsupported proxy protocol");
break;
case 'd':
dflag = 1;
break;
case 'F':
Fflag = 1;
break;
case 'h':
help();
break;
case 'i':
iflag = strtonum(optarg, 0, UINT_MAX, &errstr);
if (errstr)
errx(1, "interval %s: %s", errstr, optarg);
break;
case 'k':
kflag = 1;
break;
case 'l':
lflag = 1;
break;
case 'N':
Nflag = 1;
break;
case 'n':
nflag = 1;
break;
case 'P':
Pflag = optarg;
break;
case 'p':
pflag = optarg;
break;
case 'r':
rflag = 1;
break;
case 's':
sflag = optarg;
break;
case 't':
tflag = 1;
break;
case 'u':
uflag = 1;
break;
#ifdef SO_RTABLE
case 'V':
rtableid = (int)strtonum(optarg, 0,
RT_TABLEID_MAX, &errstr);
if (errstr)
errx(1, "rtable %s: %s", errstr, optarg);
break;
#endif
case 'v':
vflag = 1;
break;
case 'w':
timeout = strtonum(optarg, 0, INT_MAX / 1000, &errstr);
if (errstr)
errx(1, "timeout %s: %s", errstr, optarg);
timeout *= 1000;
break;
case 'x':
xflag = 1;
if ((proxy = strdup(optarg)) == NULL)
errx(1, "strdup");
break;
case 'z':
zflag = 1;
break;
case 'D':
Dflag = 1;
break;
case 'I':
Iflag = strtonum(optarg, 1, 65536 << 14, &errstr);
if (errstr != NULL)
errx(1, "TCP receive window %s: %s",
errstr, optarg);
break;
case 'O':
Oflag = strtonum(optarg, 1, 65536 << 14, &errstr);
if (errstr != NULL)
errx(1, "TCP send window %s: %s",
errstr, optarg);
break;
case 'S':
Sflag = 1;
break;
case 'T':
errstr = NULL;
errno = 0;
if (map_tos(optarg, &Tflag))
break;
if (strlen(optarg) > 1 && optarg[0] == '0' &&
optarg[1] == 'x')
Tflag = (int)strtol(optarg, NULL, 16);
else
Tflag = (int)strtonum(optarg, 0, 255,
&errstr);
if (Tflag < 0 || Tflag > 255 || errstr || errno)
errx(1, "illegal tos value %s", optarg);
break;
default:
usage(1);
}
}
argc -= optind;
argv += optind;
/* Cruft to make sure options are clean, and used properly. */
if (argv[0] && !argv[1] && family == AF_UNIX) {
host = argv[0];
uport = NULL;
} else if (argv[0] && !argv[1]) {
if (!lflag)
usage(1);
uport = argv[0];
host = NULL;
} else if (argv[0] && argv[1]) {
host = argv[0];
uport = argv[1];
} else
usage(1);
if (lflag && sflag)
errx(1, "cannot use -s and -l");
if (lflag && pflag)
errx(1, "cannot use -p and -l");
if (lflag && zflag)
errx(1, "cannot use -z and -l");
if (!lflag && kflag)
errx(1, "must use -l with -k");
/* Get name of temporary socket for unix datagram client */
if ((family == AF_UNIX) && uflag && !lflag) {
if (sflag) {
unix_dg_tmp_socket = sflag;
} else {
strlcpy(unix_dg_tmp_socket_buf, "/tmp/nc.XXXXXXXXXX",
UNIX_DG_TMP_SOCKET_SIZE);
if (mktemp(unix_dg_tmp_socket_buf) == NULL)
err(1, "mktemp");
unix_dg_tmp_socket = unix_dg_tmp_socket_buf;
}
}
/* Initialize addrinfo structure. */
if (family != AF_UNIX) {
memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(struct addrinfo));
hints.ai_family = family;
hints.ai_socktype = uflag ? SOCK_DGRAM : SOCK_STREAM;
hints.ai_protocol = uflag ? IPPROTO_UDP : IPPROTO_TCP;
if (nflag)
hints.ai_flags |= AI_NUMERICHOST;
}
if (xflag) {
if (uflag)
errx(1, "no proxy support for UDP mode");
if (lflag)
errx(1, "no proxy support for listen");
if (family == AF_UNIX)
errx(1, "no proxy support for unix sockets");
/* XXX IPv6 transport to proxy would probably work */
if (family == AF_INET6)
errx(1, "no proxy support for IPv6");
if (sflag)
errx(1, "no proxy support for local source address");
proxyhost = strsep(&proxy, ":");
proxyport = proxy;
memset(&proxyhints, 0, sizeof(struct addrinfo));
proxyhints.ai_family = family;
proxyhints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
proxyhints.ai_protocol = IPPROTO_TCP;
if (nflag)
proxyhints.ai_flags |= AI_NUMERICHOST;
}
if (lflag) {
int connfd;
ret = 0;
if (family == AF_UNIX) {
if (uflag)
s = unix_bind(host);
else
s = unix_listen(host);
}
/* Allow only one connection at a time, but stay alive. */
for (;;) {
if (family != AF_UNIX)
s = local_listen(host, uport, hints);
if (s < 0)
err(1, "local_listen");
/*
* For UDP and -k, don't connect the socket, let it
* receive datagrams from multiple socket pairs.
*/
if (uflag && kflag)
readwrite(s);
/*
* For UDP and not -k, we will use recvfrom() initially
* to wait for a caller, then use the regular functions
* to talk to the caller.
*/
else if (uflag && !kflag) {
int rv, plen;
char buf[16384];
struct sockaddr_storage z;
len = sizeof(z);
plen = 2048;
rv = recvfrom(s, buf, plen, MSG_PEEK,
(struct sockaddr *)&z, &len);
if (rv < 0)
err(1, "recvfrom");
rv = connect(s, (struct sockaddr *)&z, len);
if (rv < 0)
err(1, "connect");
if (vflag)
report_connect((struct sockaddr *)&z, len);
readwrite(s);
} else {
len = sizeof(cliaddr);
connfd = accept(s, (struct sockaddr *)&cliaddr,
&len);
if (connfd == -1) {
/* For now, all errnos are fatal */
err(1, "accept");
}
if (vflag)
report_connect((struct sockaddr *)&cliaddr, len);
readwrite(connfd);
close(connfd);
}
if (family != AF_UNIX)
close(s);
else if (uflag) {
if (connect(s, NULL, 0) < 0)
err(1, "connect");
}
if (!kflag)
break;
}
} else if (family == AF_UNIX) {
ret = 0;
if ((s = unix_connect(host)) > 0 && !zflag) {
readwrite(s);
close(s);
} else
ret = 1;
if (uflag)
unlink(unix_dg_tmp_socket);
exit(ret);
} else {
int i = 0;
/* Construct the portlist[] array. */
build_ports(uport);
/* Cycle through portlist, connecting to each port. */
for (i = 0; portlist[i] != NULL; i++) {
if (s)
close(s);
if (xflag)
s = socks_connect(host, portlist[i], hints,
proxyhost, proxyport, proxyhints, socksv,
Pflag);
else
s = remote_connect(host, portlist[i], hints);
if (s < 0)
continue;
ret = 0;
if (vflag || zflag) {
/* For UDP, make sure we are connected. */
if (uflag) {
if (udptest(s) == -1) {
ret = 1;
continue;
}
}
/* Don't look up port if -n. */
if (nflag)
sv = NULL;
else {
sv = getservbyport(
ntohs(atoi(portlist[i])),
uflag ? "udp" : "tcp");
}
fprintf(stderr,
"Connection to %s %s port [%s/%s] "
"succeeded!\n", host, portlist[i],
uflag ? "udp" : "tcp",
sv ? sv->s_name : "*");
}
if (Fflag)
fdpass(s);
else if (!zflag)
readwrite(s);
}
}
if (s)
close(s);
exit(ret);
}
/*
* unix_bind()
* Returns a unix socket bound to the given path
*/
int
unix_bind(char *path)
{
struct sockaddr_un sun_sa;
int s;
/* Create unix domain socket. */
if ((s = socket(AF_UNIX, uflag ? SOCK_DGRAM : SOCK_STREAM,
0)) < 0)
return (-1);
memset(&sun_sa, 0, sizeof(struct sockaddr_un));
sun_sa.sun_family = AF_UNIX;
if (strlcpy(sun_sa.sun_path, path, sizeof(sun_sa.sun_path)) >=
sizeof(sun_sa.sun_path)) {
close(s);
errno = ENAMETOOLONG;
return (-1);
}
if (bind(s, (struct sockaddr *)&sun_sa, SUN_LEN(&sun_sa)) < 0) {
close(s);
return (-1);
}
return (s);
}
/*
* unix_connect()
* Returns a socket connected to a local unix socket. Returns -1 on failure.
*/
int
unix_connect(char *path)
{
struct sockaddr_un sun_sa;
int s;
if (uflag) {
if ((s = unix_bind(unix_dg_tmp_socket)) < 0)
return (-1);
} else {
if ((s = socket(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0)) < 0)
return (-1);
}
(void)fcntl(s, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC);
memset(&sun_sa, 0, sizeof(struct sockaddr_un));
sun_sa.sun_family = AF_UNIX;
if (strlcpy(sun_sa.sun_path, path, sizeof(sun_sa.sun_path)) >=
sizeof(sun_sa.sun_path)) {
close(s);
errno = ENAMETOOLONG;
return (-1);
}
if (connect(s, (struct sockaddr *)&sun_sa, SUN_LEN(&sun_sa)) < 0) {
close(s);
return (-1);
}
return (s);
}
/*
* unix_listen()
* Create a unix domain socket, and listen on it.
*/
int
unix_listen(char *path)
{
int s;
if ((s = unix_bind(path)) < 0)
return (-1);
if (listen(s, 5) < 0) {
close(s);
return (-1);
}
return (s);
}
/*
* remote_connect()
* Returns a socket connected to a remote host. Properly binds to a local
* port or source address if needed. Returns -1 on failure.
*/
int
remote_connect(const char *host, const char *port, struct addrinfo hints)
{
struct addrinfo *res, *res0;
int s, error;
#if defined(SO_RTABLE) || defined(SO_BINDANY)
int on = 1;
#endif
if ((error = getaddrinfo(host, port, &hints, &res)))
errx(1, "getaddrinfo: %s", gai_strerror(error));
res0 = res;
do {
if ((s = socket(res0->ai_family, res0->ai_socktype,
res0->ai_protocol)) < 0)
continue;
#ifdef SO_RTABLE
if (rtableid >= 0 && (setsockopt(s, SOL_SOCKET, SO_RTABLE,
&rtableid, sizeof(rtableid)) == -1))
err(1, "setsockopt SO_RTABLE");
#endif
/* Bind to a local port or source address if specified. */
if (sflag || pflag) {
struct addrinfo ahints, *ares;
#ifdef SO_BINDANY
/* try SO_BINDANY, but don't insist */
setsockopt(s, SOL_SOCKET, SO_BINDANY, &on, sizeof(on));
#endif
memset(&ahints, 0, sizeof(struct addrinfo));
ahints.ai_family = res0->ai_family;
ahints.ai_socktype = uflag ? SOCK_DGRAM : SOCK_STREAM;
ahints.ai_protocol = uflag ? IPPROTO_UDP : IPPROTO_TCP;
ahints.ai_flags = AI_PASSIVE;
if ((error = getaddrinfo(sflag, pflag, &ahints, &ares)))
errx(1, "getaddrinfo: %s", gai_strerror(error));
if (bind(s, (struct sockaddr *)ares->ai_addr,
ares->ai_addrlen) < 0)
err(1, "bind failed");
freeaddrinfo(ares);
}
set_common_sockopts(s);
if (timeout_connect(s, res0->ai_addr, res0->ai_addrlen) == 0)
break;
else if (vflag)
warn("connect to %s port %s (%s) failed", host, port,
uflag ? "udp" : "tcp");
close(s);
s = -1;
} while ((res0 = res0->ai_next) != NULL);
freeaddrinfo(res);
return (s);
}
int
timeout_connect(int s, const struct sockaddr *name, socklen_t namelen)
{
struct pollfd pfd;
socklen_t optlen;
int flags = 0, optval;
int ret;
if (timeout != -1) {
flags = fcntl(s, F_GETFL, 0);
if (fcntl(s, F_SETFL, flags | O_NONBLOCK) == -1)
err(1, "set non-blocking mode");
}
if ((ret = connect(s, name, namelen)) != 0 && errno == EINPROGRESS) {
pfd.fd = s;
pfd.events = POLLOUT;
if ((ret = poll(&pfd, 1, timeout)) == 1) {
optlen = sizeof(optval);
if ((ret = getsockopt(s, SOL_SOCKET, SO_ERROR,
&optval, &optlen)) == 0) {
errno = optval;
ret = optval == 0 ? 0 : -1;
}
} else if (ret == 0) {
errno = ETIMEDOUT;
ret = -1;
} else
err(1, "poll failed");
}
if (timeout != -1 && fcntl(s, F_SETFL, flags) == -1)
err(1, "restoring flags");
return (ret);
}
/*
* local_listen()
* Returns a socket listening on a local port, binds to specified source
* address. Returns -1 on failure.
*/
int
local_listen(char *host, char *port, struct addrinfo hints)
{
struct addrinfo *res, *res0;
int s, ret, x = 1;
int error;
/* Allow nodename to be null. */
hints.ai_flags |= AI_PASSIVE;
/*
* In the case of binding to a wildcard address
* default to binding to an ipv4 address.
*/
if (host == NULL && hints.ai_family == AF_UNSPEC)
hints.ai_family = AF_INET;
if ((error = getaddrinfo(host, port, &hints, &res)))
errx(1, "getaddrinfo: %s", gai_strerror(error));
res0 = res;
do {
if ((s = socket(res0->ai_family, res0->ai_socktype,
res0->ai_protocol)) < 0)
continue;
#ifdef SO_RTABLE
if (rtableid >= 0 && (setsockopt(s, SOL_SOCKET, SO_RTABLE,
&rtableid, sizeof(rtableid)) == -1))
err(1, "setsockopt SO_RTABLE");
#endif
#ifdef SO_REUSEPORT
ret = setsockopt(s, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEPORT, &x, sizeof(x));
if (ret == -1)
err(1, "setsockopt SO_REUSEPORT");
#endif
#ifdef SO_REUSEADDR
ret = setsockopt(s, SOL_SOCKET, SO_REUSEADDR, &x, sizeof(x));
if (ret == -1)
err(1, "setsockopt SO_REUSEADDR");
#endif
set_common_sockopts(s);
if (bind(s, (struct sockaddr *)res0->ai_addr,
res0->ai_addrlen) == 0)
break;
close(s);
s = -1;
} while ((res0 = res0->ai_next) != NULL);
if (!uflag && s != -1) {
if (listen(s, 1) < 0)
err(1, "listen");
}
freeaddrinfo(res);
return (s);
}
/*
* readwrite()
* Loop that polls on the network file descriptor and stdin.
*/
void
readwrite(int net_fd)
{
struct pollfd pfd[4];
int stdin_fd = STDIN_FILENO;
int stdout_fd = STDOUT_FILENO;
unsigned char netinbuf[BUFSIZE];
size_t netinbufpos = 0;
unsigned char stdinbuf[BUFSIZE];
size_t stdinbufpos = 0;
int n, num_fds;
ssize_t ret;
/* don't read from stdin if requested */
if (dflag)
stdin_fd = -1;
/* stdin */
pfd[POLL_STDIN].fd = stdin_fd;
pfd[POLL_STDIN].events = POLLIN;
/* network out */
pfd[POLL_NETOUT].fd = net_fd;
pfd[POLL_NETOUT].events = 0;
/* network in */
pfd[POLL_NETIN].fd = net_fd;
pfd[POLL_NETIN].events = POLLIN;
/* stdout */
pfd[POLL_STDOUT].fd = stdout_fd;
pfd[POLL_STDOUT].events = 0;
while (1) {
/* both inputs are gone, buffers are empty, we are done */
if (pfd[POLL_STDIN].fd == -1 && pfd[POLL_NETIN].fd == -1
&& stdinbufpos == 0 && netinbufpos == 0) {
close(net_fd);
return;
}
/* both outputs are gone, we can't continue */
if (pfd[POLL_NETOUT].fd == -1 && pfd[POLL_STDOUT].fd == -1) {
close(net_fd);
return;
}
/* listen and net in gone, queues empty, done */
if (lflag && pfd[POLL_NETIN].fd == -1
&& stdinbufpos == 0 && netinbufpos == 0) {
close(net_fd);
return;
}
/* help says -i is for "wait between lines sent". We read and
* write arbitrary amounts of data, and we don't want to start
* scanning for newlines, so this is as good as it gets */
if (iflag)
sleep(iflag);
/* poll */
num_fds = poll(pfd, 4, timeout);
/* treat poll errors */
if (num_fds == -1) {
close(net_fd);
err(1, "polling error");
}
/* timeout happened */
if (num_fds == 0)
return;
/* treat socket error conditions */
for (n = 0; n < 4; n++) {
if (pfd[n].revents & (POLLERR|POLLNVAL)) {
pfd[n].fd = -1;
}
}
/* reading is possible after HUP */
if (pfd[POLL_STDIN].events & POLLIN &&
pfd[POLL_STDIN].revents & POLLHUP &&
! (pfd[POLL_STDIN].revents & POLLIN))
pfd[POLL_STDIN].fd = -1;
if (pfd[POLL_NETIN].events & POLLIN &&
pfd[POLL_NETIN].revents & POLLHUP &&
! (pfd[POLL_NETIN].revents & POLLIN))
pfd[POLL_NETIN].fd = -1;
if (pfd[POLL_NETOUT].revents & POLLHUP) {
if (Nflag)
shutdown(pfd[POLL_NETOUT].fd, SHUT_WR);
pfd[POLL_NETOUT].fd = -1;
}
/* if HUP, stop watching stdout */
if (pfd[POLL_STDOUT].revents & POLLHUP)
pfd[POLL_STDOUT].fd = -1;
/* if no net out, stop watching stdin */
if (pfd[POLL_NETOUT].fd == -1)
pfd[POLL_STDIN].fd = -1;
/* if no stdout, stop watching net in */
if (pfd[POLL_STDOUT].fd == -1) {
if (pfd[POLL_NETIN].fd != -1)
shutdown(pfd[POLL_NETIN].fd, SHUT_RD);
pfd[POLL_NETIN].fd = -1;
}
/* try to read from stdin */
if (pfd[POLL_STDIN].revents & POLLIN && stdinbufpos < BUFSIZE) {
ret = fillbuf(pfd[POLL_STDIN].fd, stdinbuf,
&stdinbufpos);
/* error or eof on stdin - remove from pfd */
if (ret == 0 || ret == -1)
pfd[POLL_STDIN].fd = -1;
/* read something - poll net out */
if (stdinbufpos > 0)
pfd[POLL_NETOUT].events = POLLOUT;
/* filled buffer - remove self from polling */
if (stdinbufpos == BUFSIZE)
pfd[POLL_STDIN].events = 0;
}
/* try to write to network */
if (pfd[POLL_NETOUT].revents & POLLOUT && stdinbufpos > 0) {
ret = drainbuf(pfd[POLL_NETOUT].fd, stdinbuf,
&stdinbufpos);
if (ret == -1)
pfd[POLL_NETOUT].fd = -1;
/* buffer empty - remove self from polling */
if (stdinbufpos == 0)
pfd[POLL_NETOUT].events = 0;
/* buffer no longer full - poll stdin again */
if (stdinbufpos < BUFSIZE)
pfd[POLL_STDIN].events = POLLIN;
}
/* try to read from network */
if (pfd[POLL_NETIN].revents & POLLIN && netinbufpos < BUFSIZE) {
ret = fillbuf(pfd[POLL_NETIN].fd, netinbuf,
&netinbufpos);
if (ret == -1)
pfd[POLL_NETIN].fd = -1;
/* eof on net in - remove from pfd */
if (ret == 0) {
shutdown(pfd[POLL_NETIN].fd, SHUT_RD);
pfd[POLL_NETIN].fd = -1;
}
/* read something - poll stdout */
if (netinbufpos > 0)
pfd[POLL_STDOUT].events = POLLOUT;
/* filled buffer - remove self from polling */
if (netinbufpos == BUFSIZE)
pfd[POLL_NETIN].events = 0;
/* handle telnet */
if (tflag)
atelnet(pfd[POLL_NETIN].fd, netinbuf,
netinbufpos);
}
/* try to write to stdout */
if (pfd[POLL_STDOUT].revents & POLLOUT && netinbufpos > 0) {
ret = drainbuf(pfd[POLL_STDOUT].fd, netinbuf,
&netinbufpos);
if (ret == -1)
pfd[POLL_STDOUT].fd = -1;
/* buffer empty - remove self from polling */
if (netinbufpos == 0)
pfd[POLL_STDOUT].events = 0;
/* buffer no longer full - poll net in again */
if (netinbufpos < BUFSIZE)
pfd[POLL_NETIN].events = POLLIN;
}
/* stdin gone and queue empty? */
if (pfd[POLL_STDIN].fd == -1 && stdinbufpos == 0) {
if (pfd[POLL_NETOUT].fd != -1 && Nflag)
shutdown(pfd[POLL_NETOUT].fd, SHUT_WR);
pfd[POLL_NETOUT].fd = -1;
}
/* net in gone and queue empty? */
if (pfd[POLL_NETIN].fd == -1 && netinbufpos == 0) {
pfd[POLL_STDOUT].fd = -1;
}
}
}
ssize_t
drainbuf(int fd, unsigned char *buf, size_t *bufpos)
{
ssize_t n;
ssize_t adjust;
n = write(fd, buf, *bufpos);
/* don't treat EAGAIN, EINTR as error */
if (n == -1 && (errno == EAGAIN || errno == EINTR))
n = -2;
if (n <= 0)
return n;
/* adjust buffer */
adjust = *bufpos - n;
if (adjust > 0)
memmove(buf, buf + n, adjust);
*bufpos -= n;
return n;
}
ssize_t
fillbuf(int fd, unsigned char *buf, size_t *bufpos)
{
size_t num = BUFSIZE - *bufpos;
ssize_t n;
n = read(fd, buf + *bufpos, num);
/* don't treat EAGAIN, EINTR as error */
if (n == -1 && (errno == EAGAIN || errno == EINTR))
n = -2;
if (n <= 0)
return n;
*bufpos += n;
return n;
}
/*
* fdpass()
* Pass the connected file descriptor to stdout and exit.
*/
void
fdpass(int nfd)
{
#if defined(HAVE_SENDMSG) && (defined(HAVE_ACCRIGHTS_IN_MSGHDR) || defined(HAVE_CONTROL_IN_MSGHDR))
struct msghdr msg;
#ifndef HAVE_ACCRIGHTS_IN_MSGHDR
union {
struct cmsghdr hdr;
char buf[CMSG_SPACE(sizeof(int))];
} cmsgbuf;
struct cmsghdr *cmsg;
#endif
struct iovec vec;
char ch = '\0';
struct pollfd pfd;
ssize_t r;
memset(&msg, 0, sizeof(msg));
#ifdef HAVE_ACCRIGHTS_IN_MSGHDR
msg.msg_accrights = (caddr_t)&nfd;
msg.msg_accrightslen = sizeof(nfd);
#else
memset(&cmsgbuf, 0, sizeof(cmsgbuf));
msg.msg_control = (caddr_t)&cmsgbuf.buf;
msg.msg_controllen = sizeof(cmsgbuf.buf);
cmsg = CMSG_FIRSTHDR(&msg);
cmsg->cmsg_len = CMSG_LEN(sizeof(int));
cmsg->cmsg_level = SOL_SOCKET;
cmsg->cmsg_type = SCM_RIGHTS;
*(int *)CMSG_DATA(cmsg) = nfd;
#endif
vec.iov_base = &ch;
vec.iov_len = 1;
msg.msg_iov = &vec;
msg.msg_iovlen = 1;
bzero(&pfd, sizeof(pfd));
pfd.fd = STDOUT_FILENO;
for (;;) {
r = sendmsg(STDOUT_FILENO, &msg, 0);
if (r == -1) {
if (errno == EAGAIN || errno == EINTR) {
pfd.events = POLLOUT;
if (poll(&pfd, 1, -1) == -1)
err(1, "poll");
continue;
}
err(1, "sendmsg");
} else if (r == -1)
errx(1, "sendmsg: unexpected return value %zd", r);
else
break;
}
exit(0);
#else
errx(1, "%s: file descriptor passing not supported", __func__);
#endif
}
/* Deal with RFC 854 WILL/WONT DO/DONT negotiation. */
void
atelnet(int nfd, unsigned char *buf, unsigned int size)
{
unsigned char *p, *end;
unsigned char obuf[4];
if (size < 3)
return;
end = buf + size - 2;
for (p = buf; p < end; p++) {
if (*p != IAC)
continue;
obuf[0] = IAC;
p++;
if ((*p == WILL) || (*p == WONT))
obuf[1] = DONT;
else if ((*p == DO) || (*p == DONT))
obuf[1] = WONT;
else
continue;
p++;
obuf[2] = *p;
if (atomicio(vwrite, nfd, obuf, 3) != 3)
warn("Write Error!");
}
}
/*
* build_ports()
* Build an array of ports in portlist[], listing each port
* that we should try to connect to.
*/
void
build_ports(char *p)
{
const char *errstr;
char *n;
int hi, lo, cp;
int x = 0;
if ((n = strchr(p, '-')) != NULL) {
*n = '\0';
n++;
/* Make sure the ports are in order: lowest->highest. */
hi = strtonum(n, 1, PORT_MAX, &errstr);
if (errstr)
errx(1, "port number %s: %s", errstr, n);
lo = strtonum(p, 1, PORT_MAX, &errstr);
if (errstr)
errx(1, "port number %s: %s", errstr, p);
if (lo > hi) {
cp = hi;
hi = lo;
lo = cp;
}
/* Load ports sequentially. */
for (cp = lo; cp <= hi; cp++) {
portlist[x] = calloc(1, PORT_MAX_LEN);
if (portlist[x] == NULL)
errx(1, "calloc");
snprintf(portlist[x], PORT_MAX_LEN, "%d", cp);
x++;
}
/* Randomly swap ports. */
if (rflag) {
int y;
char *c;
for (x = 0; x <= (hi - lo); x++) {
y = (arc4random() & 0xFFFF) % (hi - lo);
c = portlist[x];
portlist[x] = portlist[y];
portlist[y] = c;
}
}
} else {
hi = strtonum(p, 1, PORT_MAX, &errstr);
if (errstr)
errx(1, "port number %s: %s", errstr, p);
portlist[0] = strdup(p);
if (portlist[0] == NULL)
errx(1, "strdup");
}
}
/*
* udptest()
* Do a few writes to see if the UDP port is there.
* Fails once PF state table is full.
*/
int
udptest(int s)
{
int i, ret;
for (i = 0; i <= 3; i++) {
if (write(s, "X", 1) == 1)
ret = 1;
else
ret = -1;
}
return (ret);
}
void
set_common_sockopts(int s)
{
int x = 1;
#ifdef TCP_MD5SIG
if (Sflag) {
if (setsockopt(s, IPPROTO_TCP, TCP_MD5SIG,
&x, sizeof(x)) == -1)
err(1, "setsockopt");
}
#endif
if (Dflag) {
if (setsockopt(s, SOL_SOCKET, SO_DEBUG,
&x, sizeof(x)) == -1)
err(1, "setsockopt");
}
+#ifdef IP_TOS
if (Tflag != -1) {
if (setsockopt(s, IPPROTO_IP, IP_TOS,
&Tflag, sizeof(Tflag)) == -1)
err(1, "set IP ToS");
}
+#endif
if (Iflag) {
if (setsockopt(s, SOL_SOCKET, SO_RCVBUF,
&Iflag, sizeof(Iflag)) == -1)
err(1, "set TCP receive buffer size");
}
if (Oflag) {
if (setsockopt(s, SOL_SOCKET, SO_SNDBUF,
&Oflag, sizeof(Oflag)) == -1)
err(1, "set TCP send buffer size");
}
}
int
map_tos(char *s, int *val)
{
+#ifdef IP_TOS
/* DiffServ Codepoints and other TOS mappings */
const struct toskeywords {
const char *keyword;
int val;
} *t, toskeywords[] = {
{ "af11", IPTOS_DSCP_AF11 },
{ "af12", IPTOS_DSCP_AF12 },
{ "af13", IPTOS_DSCP_AF13 },
{ "af21", IPTOS_DSCP_AF21 },
{ "af22", IPTOS_DSCP_AF22 },
{ "af23", IPTOS_DSCP_AF23 },
{ "af31", IPTOS_DSCP_AF31 },
{ "af32", IPTOS_DSCP_AF32 },
{ "af33", IPTOS_DSCP_AF33 },
{ "af41", IPTOS_DSCP_AF41 },
{ "af42", IPTOS_DSCP_AF42 },
{ "af43", IPTOS_DSCP_AF43 },
{ "critical", IPTOS_PREC_CRITIC_ECP },
{ "cs0", IPTOS_DSCP_CS0 },
{ "cs1", IPTOS_DSCP_CS1 },
{ "cs2", IPTOS_DSCP_CS2 },
{ "cs3", IPTOS_DSCP_CS3 },
{ "cs4", IPTOS_DSCP_CS4 },
{ "cs5", IPTOS_DSCP_CS5 },
{ "cs6", IPTOS_DSCP_CS6 },
{ "cs7", IPTOS_DSCP_CS7 },
{ "ef", IPTOS_DSCP_EF },
{ "inetcontrol", IPTOS_PREC_INTERNETCONTROL },
{ "lowdelay", IPTOS_LOWDELAY },
{ "netcontrol", IPTOS_PREC_NETCONTROL },
{ "reliability", IPTOS_RELIABILITY },
{ "throughput", IPTOS_THROUGHPUT },
{ NULL, -1 },
};
for (t = toskeywords; t->keyword != NULL; t++) {
if (strcmp(s, t->keyword) == 0) {
*val = t->val;
return (1);
}
}
+#endif
return (0);
}
void
report_connect(const struct sockaddr *sa, socklen_t salen)
{
char remote_host[NI_MAXHOST];
char remote_port[NI_MAXSERV];
int herr;
int flags = NI_NUMERICSERV;
if (nflag)
flags |= NI_NUMERICHOST;
if ((herr = getnameinfo(sa, salen,
remote_host, sizeof(remote_host),
remote_port, sizeof(remote_port),
flags)) != 0) {
if (herr == EAI_SYSTEM)
err(1, "getnameinfo");
else
errx(1, "getnameinfo: %s", gai_strerror(herr));
}
fprintf(stderr,
"Connection from %s %s "
"received!\n", remote_host, remote_port);
}
void
help(void)
{
usage(0);
fprintf(stderr, "\tCommand Summary:\n\
\t-4 Use IPv4\n\
\t-6 Use IPv6\n\
\t-D Enable the debug socket option\n\
\t-d Detach from stdin\n\
\t-F Pass socket fd\n\
\t-h This help text\n\
\t-I length TCP receive buffer length\n\
\t-i secs\t Delay interval for lines sent, ports scanned\n\
\t-k Keep inbound sockets open for multiple connects\n\
\t-l Listen mode, for inbound connects\n\
\t-N Shutdown the network socket after EOF on stdin\n\
\t-n Suppress name/port resolutions\n\
\t-O length TCP send buffer length\n\
\t-P proxyuser\tUsername for proxy authentication\n\
\t-p port\t Specify local port for remote connects\n\
\t-r Randomize remote ports\n\
\t-S Enable the TCP MD5 signature option\n\
\t-s addr\t Local source address\n\
\t-T toskeyword\tSet IP Type of Service\n\
\t-t Answer TELNET negotiation\n\
\t-U Use UNIX domain socket\n\
\t-u UDP mode\n\
\t-V rtable Specify alternate routing table\n\
\t-v Verbose\n\
\t-w secs\t Timeout for connects and final net reads\n\
\t-X proto Proxy protocol: \"4\", \"5\" (SOCKS) or \"connect\"\n\
\t-x addr[:port]\tSpecify proxy address and port\n\
\t-z Zero-I/O mode [used for scanning]\n\
Port numbers can be individual or ranges: lo-hi [inclusive]\n");
exit(1);
}
void
usage(int ret)
{
fprintf(stderr,
"usage: nc [-46DdFhklNnrStUuvz] [-I length] [-i interval] [-O length]\n"
"\t [-P proxy_username] [-p source_port] [-s source] [-T ToS]\n"
"\t [-V rtable] [-w timeout] [-X proxy_protocol]\n"
"\t [-x proxy_address[:port]] [destination] [port]\n");
if (ret)
exit(1);
}
/* *** src/usr.bin/nc/socks.c *** */
/* $OpenBSD: socks.c,v 1.20 2012/03/08 09:56:28 espie Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 1999 Niklas Hallqvist. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (c) 2004, 2005 Damien Miller. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <netinet/in.h>
#include <arpa/inet.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <netdb.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <resolv.h>
#define SOCKS_PORT "1080"
#define HTTP_PROXY_PORT "3128"
#define HTTP_MAXHDRS 64
#define SOCKS_V5 5
#define SOCKS_V4 4
#define SOCKS_NOAUTH 0
#define SOCKS_NOMETHOD 0xff
#define SOCKS_CONNECT 1
#define SOCKS_IPV4 1
#define SOCKS_DOMAIN 3
#define SOCKS_IPV6 4
int remote_connect(const char *, const char *, struct addrinfo);
int socks_connect(const char *, const char *, struct addrinfo,
const char *, const char *, struct addrinfo, int,
const char *);
static int
decode_addrport(const char *h, const char *p, struct sockaddr *addr,
socklen_t addrlen, int v4only, int numeric)
{
int r;
struct addrinfo hints, *res;
bzero(&hints, sizeof(hints));
hints.ai_family = v4only ? PF_INET : PF_UNSPEC;
hints.ai_flags = numeric ? AI_NUMERICHOST : 0;
hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
r = getaddrinfo(h, p, &hints, &res);
/* Don't fatal when attempting to convert a numeric address */
if (r != 0) {
if (!numeric) {
errx(1, "getaddrinfo(\"%.64s\", \"%.64s\"): %s", h, p,
gai_strerror(r));
}
return (-1);
}
if (addrlen < res->ai_addrlen) {
freeaddrinfo(res);
errx(1, "internal error: addrlen < res->ai_addrlen");
}
memcpy(addr, res->ai_addr, res->ai_addrlen);
freeaddrinfo(res);
return (0);
}
static int
proxy_read_line(int fd, char *buf, size_t bufsz)
{
size_t off;
for(off = 0;;) {
if (off >= bufsz)
errx(1, "proxy read too long");
if (atomicio(read, fd, buf + off, 1) != 1)
err(1, "proxy read");
/* Skip CR */
if (buf[off] == '\r')
continue;
if (buf[off] == '\n') {
buf[off] = '\0';
break;
}
off++;
}
return (off);
}
static const char *
getproxypass(const char *proxyuser, const char *proxyhost)
{
char prompt[512];
static char pw[256];
snprintf(prompt, sizeof(prompt), "Proxy password for %s@%s: ",
proxyuser, proxyhost);
if (readpassphrase(prompt, pw, sizeof(pw), RPP_REQUIRE_TTY) == NULL)
errx(1, "Unable to read proxy passphrase");
return (pw);
}
int
socks_connect(const char *host, const char *port,
struct addrinfo hints __attribute__ ((__unused__)),
const char *proxyhost, const char *proxyport, struct addrinfo proxyhints,
int socksv, const char *proxyuser)
{
int proxyfd, r, authretry = 0;
size_t hlen, wlen = 0;
unsigned char buf[1024];
size_t cnt;
struct sockaddr_storage addr;
struct sockaddr_in *in4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)&addr;
struct sockaddr_in6 *in6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)&addr;
in_port_t serverport;
const char *proxypass = NULL;
if (proxyport == NULL)
proxyport = (socksv == -1) ? HTTP_PROXY_PORT : SOCKS_PORT;
/* Abuse API to lookup port */
if (decode_addrport("0.0.0.0", port, (struct sockaddr *)&addr,
sizeof(addr), 1, 1) == -1)
errx(1, "unknown port \"%.64s\"", port);
serverport = in4->sin_port;
again:
if (authretry++ > 3)
errx(1, "Too many authentication failures");
proxyfd = remote_connect(proxyhost, proxyport, proxyhints);
if (proxyfd < 0)
return (-1);
if (socksv == 5) {
if (decode_addrport(host, port, (struct sockaddr *)&addr,
sizeof(addr), 0, 1) == -1)
addr.ss_family = 0; /* used in switch below */
/* Version 5, one method: no authentication */
buf[0] = SOCKS_V5;
buf[1] = 1;
buf[2] = SOCKS_NOAUTH;
cnt = atomicio(vwrite, proxyfd, buf, 3);
if (cnt != 3)
err(1, "write failed (%zu/3)", cnt);
cnt = atomicio(read, proxyfd, buf, 2);
if (cnt != 2)
err(1, "read failed (%zu/3)", cnt);
if (buf[1] == SOCKS_NOMETHOD)
errx(1, "authentication method negotiation failed");
switch (addr.ss_family) {
case 0:
/* Version 5, connect: domain name */
/* Max domain name length is 255 bytes */
hlen = strlen(host);
if (hlen > 255)
errx(1, "host name too long for SOCKS5");
buf[0] = SOCKS_V5;
buf[1] = SOCKS_CONNECT;
buf[2] = 0;
buf[3] = SOCKS_DOMAIN;
buf[4] = hlen;
memcpy(buf + 5, host, hlen);
memcpy(buf + 5 + hlen, &serverport, sizeof serverport);
wlen = 7 + hlen;
break;
case AF_INET:
/* Version 5, connect: IPv4 address */
buf[0] = SOCKS_V5;
buf[1] = SOCKS_CONNECT;
buf[2] = 0;
buf[3] = SOCKS_IPV4;
memcpy(buf + 4, &in4->sin_addr, sizeof in4->sin_addr);
memcpy(buf + 8, &in4->sin_port, sizeof in4->sin_port);
wlen = 10;
break;
case AF_INET6:
/* Version 5, connect: IPv6 address */
buf[0] = SOCKS_V5;
buf[1] = SOCKS_CONNECT;
buf[2] = 0;
buf[3] = SOCKS_IPV6;
memcpy(buf + 4, &in6->sin6_addr, sizeof in6->sin6_addr);
memcpy(buf + 20, &in6->sin6_port,
sizeof in6->sin6_port);
wlen = 22;
break;
default:
errx(1, "internal error: silly AF");
}
cnt = atomicio(vwrite, proxyfd, buf, wlen);
if (cnt != wlen)
err(1, "write failed (%zu/%zu)", cnt, wlen);
cnt = atomicio(read, proxyfd, buf, 4);
if (cnt != 4)
err(1, "read failed (%zu/4)", cnt);
if (buf[1] != 0)
errx(1, "connection failed, SOCKS error %d", buf[1]);
switch (buf[3]) {
case SOCKS_IPV4:
cnt = atomicio(read, proxyfd, buf + 4, 6);
if (cnt != 6)
err(1, "read failed (%zu/6)", cnt);
break;
case SOCKS_IPV6:
cnt = atomicio(read, proxyfd, buf + 4, 18);
if (cnt != 18)
err(1, "read failed (%zu/18)", cnt);
break;
default:
errx(1, "connection failed, unsupported address type");
}
} else if (socksv == 4) {
/* This will exit on lookup failure */
decode_addrport(host, port, (struct sockaddr *)&addr,
sizeof(addr), 1, 0);
/* Version 4 */
buf[0] = SOCKS_V4;
buf[1] = SOCKS_CONNECT; /* connect */
memcpy(buf + 2, &in4->sin_port, sizeof in4->sin_port);
memcpy(buf + 4, &in4->sin_addr, sizeof in4->sin_addr);
buf[8] = 0; /* empty username */
wlen = 9;
cnt = atomicio(vwrite, proxyfd, buf, wlen);
if (cnt != wlen)
err(1, "write failed (%zu/%zu)", cnt, wlen);
cnt = atomicio(read, proxyfd, buf, 8);
if (cnt != 8)
err(1, "read failed (%zu/8)", cnt);
if (buf[1] != 90)
errx(1, "connection failed, SOCKS error %d", buf[1]);
} else if (socksv == -1) {
/* HTTP proxy CONNECT */
/* Disallow bad chars in hostname */
if (strcspn(host, "\r\n\t []:") != strlen(host))
errx(1, "Invalid hostname");
/* Try to be sane about numeric IPv6 addresses */
if (strchr(host, ':') != NULL) {
r = snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf),
"CONNECT [%s]:%d HTTP/1.0\r\n",
host, ntohs(serverport));
} else {
r = snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf),
"CONNECT %s:%d HTTP/1.0\r\n",
host, ntohs(serverport));
}
if (r == -1 || (size_t)r >= sizeof(buf))
errx(1, "hostname too long");
r = strlen(buf);
cnt = atomicio(vwrite, proxyfd, buf, r);
if (cnt != (size_t)r)
err(1, "write failed (%zu/%d)", cnt, r);
if (authretry > 1) {
char resp[1024];
proxypass = getproxypass(proxyuser, proxyhost);
r = snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s:%s",
proxyuser, proxypass);
if (r == -1 || (size_t)r >= sizeof(buf) ||
b64_ntop(buf, strlen(buf), resp,
sizeof(resp)) == -1)
errx(1, "Proxy username/password too long");
r = snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "Proxy-Authorization: "
"Basic %s\r\n", resp);
if (r == -1 || (size_t)r >= sizeof(buf))
errx(1, "Proxy auth response too long");
r = strlen(buf);
if ((cnt = atomicio(vwrite, proxyfd, buf, r)) != (size_t)r)
err(1, "write failed (%zu/%d)", cnt, r);
}
/* Terminate headers */
if ((r = atomicio(vwrite, proxyfd, "\r\n", 2)) != 2)
err(1, "write failed (2/%d)", r);
/* Read status reply */
proxy_read_line(proxyfd, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (proxyuser != NULL &&
strncmp(buf, "HTTP/1.0 407 ", 12) == 0) {
if (authretry > 1) {
fprintf(stderr, "Proxy authentication "
"failed\n");
}
close(proxyfd);
goto again;
} else if (strncmp(buf, "HTTP/1.0 200 ", 12) != 0 &&
strncmp(buf, "HTTP/1.1 200 ", 12) != 0)
errx(1, "Proxy error: \"%s\"", buf);
/* Headers continue until we hit an empty line */
for (r = 0; r < HTTP_MAXHDRS; r++) {
proxy_read_line(proxyfd, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (*buf == '\0')
break;
}
if (*buf != '\0')
errx(1, "Too many proxy headers received");
} else
errx(1, "Unknown proxy protocol %d", socksv);
return (proxyfd);
}
diff --git a/regress/principals-command.sh b/regress/principals-command.sh
index 7d380325bb26..5e535c133464 100644
--- a/regress/principals-command.sh
+++ b/regress/principals-command.sh
@@ -1,174 +1,174 @@
-# $OpenBSD: principals-command.sh,v 1.7 2019/09/06 04:24:06 dtucker Exp $
+# $OpenBSD: principals-command.sh,v 1.11 2019/12/16 02:39:05 djm Exp $
# Placed in the Public Domain.
tid="authorized principals command"
rm -f $OBJ/user_ca_key* $OBJ/cert_user_key*
cp $OBJ/sshd_proxy $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak
if [ -z "$SUDO" -a ! -w /var/run ]; then
echo "skipped (SUDO not set)"
echo "need SUDO to create file in /var/run, test won't work without"
exit 0
fi
-case "`${SSH} -Q key-plain`" in
+case "$SSH_KEYTYPES" in
*ssh-rsa*) userkeytype=rsa ;;
*) userkeytype=ed25519 ;;
esac
SERIAL=$$
# Create a CA key and a user certificate.
${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t ed25519 -f $OBJ/user_ca_key || \
fatal "ssh-keygen of user_ca_key failed"
${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t ${userkeytype} -f $OBJ/cert_user_key || \
fatal "ssh-keygen of cert_user_key failed"
${SSHKEYGEN} -q -s $OBJ/user_ca_key -I "Joanne User" \
-z $$ -n ${USER},mekmitasdigoat $OBJ/cert_user_key || \
fatal "couldn't sign cert_user_key"
CERT_BODY=`cat $OBJ/cert_user_key-cert.pub | awk '{ print $2 }'`
CA_BODY=`cat $OBJ/user_ca_key.pub | awk '{ print $2 }'`
CERT_FP=`${SSHKEYGEN} -lf $OBJ/cert_user_key-cert.pub | awk '{ print $2 }'`
CA_FP=`${SSHKEYGEN} -lf $OBJ/user_ca_key.pub | awk '{ print $2 }'`
# Establish a AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand in /var/run where it will have
# acceptable directory permissions.
PRINCIPALS_COMMAND="/var/run/principals_command_${LOGNAME}.$$"
trap "$SUDO rm -f ${PRINCIPALS_COMMAND}" 0
cat << _EOF | $SUDO sh -c "cat > '$PRINCIPALS_COMMAND'"
#!/bin/sh
test "x\$1" != "x${LOGNAME}" && exit 1
test "x\$2" != "xssh-${userkeytype}-cert-v01@openssh.com" && exit 1
test "x\$3" != "xssh-ed25519" && exit 1
test "x\$4" != "xJoanne User" && exit 1
test "x\$5" != "x${SERIAL}" && exit 1
test "x\$6" != "x${CA_FP}" && exit 1
test "x\$7" != "x${CERT_FP}" && exit 1
test "x\$8" != "x${CERT_BODY}" && exit 1
test "x\$9" != "x${CA_BODY}" && exit 1
test -f "$OBJ/authorized_principals_${LOGNAME}" &&
exec cat "$OBJ/authorized_principals_${LOGNAME}"
_EOF
test $? -eq 0 || fatal "couldn't prepare principals command"
$SUDO chmod 0755 "$PRINCIPALS_COMMAND"
if ! $OBJ/check-perm -m keys-command $PRINCIPALS_COMMAND ; then
echo "skipping: $PRINCIPALS_COMMAND is unsuitable as " \
"AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand"
$SUDO rm -f $PRINCIPALS_COMMAND
exit 0
fi
if [ -x $PRINCIPALS_COMMAND ]; then
# Test explicitly-specified principals
- for privsep in yes sandbox ; do
+ for privsep in yes ; do
_prefix="privsep $privsep"
# Setup for AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand
rm -f $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
(
cat $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak
echo "UsePrivilegeSeparation $privsep"
echo "AuthorizedKeysFile none"
echo "AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand $PRINCIPALS_COMMAND" \
"%u %t %T %i %s %F %f %k %K"
echo "AuthorizedPrincipalsCommandUser ${LOGNAME}"
echo "TrustedUserCAKeys $OBJ/user_ca_key.pub"
) > $OBJ/sshd_proxy
# XXX test missing command
# XXX test failing command
# Empty authorized_principals
verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} empty authorized_principals"
echo > $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER
${SSH} -i $OBJ/cert_user_key \
-F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1
if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
fail "ssh cert connect succeeded unexpectedly"
fi
# Wrong authorized_principals
verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} wrong authorized_principals"
echo gregorsamsa > $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER
${SSH} -i $OBJ/cert_user_key \
-F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1
if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
fail "ssh cert connect succeeded unexpectedly"
fi
# Correct authorized_principals
verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} correct authorized_principals"
echo mekmitasdigoat > $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER
${SSH} -i $OBJ/cert_user_key \
-F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1
if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
fail "ssh cert connect failed"
fi
# authorized_principals with bad key option
verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} authorized_principals bad key opt"
echo 'blah mekmitasdigoat' > $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER
${SSH} -i $OBJ/cert_user_key \
-F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1
if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
fail "ssh cert connect succeeded unexpectedly"
fi
# authorized_principals with command=false
verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} authorized_principals command=false"
echo 'command="false" mekmitasdigoat' > \
$OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER
${SSH} -i $OBJ/cert_user_key \
-F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1
if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
fail "ssh cert connect succeeded unexpectedly"
fi
# authorized_principals with command=true
verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} authorized_principals command=true"
echo 'command="true" mekmitasdigoat' > \
$OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER
${SSH} -i $OBJ/cert_user_key \
-F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost false >/dev/null 2>&1
if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
fail "ssh cert connect failed"
fi
# Setup for principals= key option
rm -f $OBJ/authorized_principals_$USER
(
cat $OBJ/sshd_proxy_bak
echo "UsePrivilegeSeparation $privsep"
) > $OBJ/sshd_proxy
# Wrong principals list
verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} wrong principals key option"
(
printf 'cert-authority,principals="gregorsamsa" '
cat $OBJ/user_ca_key.pub
) > $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
${SSH} -i $OBJ/cert_user_key \
-F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1
if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then
fail "ssh cert connect succeeded unexpectedly"
fi
# Correct principals list
verbose "$tid: ${_prefix} correct principals key option"
(
printf 'cert-authority,principals="mekmitasdigoat" '
cat $OBJ/user_ca_key.pub
) > $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
${SSH} -i $OBJ/cert_user_key \
-F $OBJ/ssh_proxy somehost true >/dev/null 2>&1
if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
fail "ssh cert connect failed"
fi
done
else
echo "SKIPPED: $PRINCIPALS_COMMAND not executable " \
"(/var/run mounted noexec?)"
fi
diff --git a/regress/proxy-connect.sh b/regress/proxy-connect.sh
index 39bbd3c96e76..8847fe0c664b 100644
--- a/regress/proxy-connect.sh
+++ b/regress/proxy-connect.sh
@@ -1,21 +1,27 @@
-# $OpenBSD: proxy-connect.sh,v 1.11 2017/09/26 22:39:25 dtucker Exp $
+# $OpenBSD: proxy-connect.sh,v 1.12 2020/01/23 11:19:12 dtucker Exp $
# Placed in the Public Domain.
tid="proxy connect"
-for c in no yes; do
+if [ "`${SSH} -Q compression`" = "none" ]; then
+ comp="no"
+else
+ comp="no yes"
+fi
+
+for c in $comp; do
verbose "plain username comp=$c"
opts="-oCompression=$c -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy"
SSH_CONNECTION=`${SSH} $opts 999.999.999.999 'echo $SSH_CONNECTION'`
if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
fail "ssh proxyconnect comp=$c failed"
fi
if [ "$SSH_CONNECTION" != "UNKNOWN 65535 UNKNOWN 65535" ]; then
fail "bad SSH_CONNECTION comp=$c: " \
"$SSH_CONNECTION"
fi
done
verbose "username with style"
${SSH} -F $OBJ/ssh_proxy ${USER}:style@999.999.999.999 true || \
fail "ssh proxyconnect failed"
diff --git a/regress/putty-ciphers.sh b/regress/putty-ciphers.sh
index 191a2bda8d35..708c288d73ae 100644
--- a/regress/putty-ciphers.sh
+++ b/regress/putty-ciphers.sh
@@ -1,26 +1,26 @@
-# $OpenBSD: putty-ciphers.sh,v 1.6 2017/05/08 01:52:49 djm Exp $
+# $OpenBSD: putty-ciphers.sh,v 1.7 2020/01/23 03:35:07 dtucker Exp $
# Placed in the Public Domain.
tid="putty ciphers"
if test "x$REGRESS_INTEROP_PUTTY" != "xyes" ; then
echo "putty interop tests not enabled"
exit 0
fi
-for c in aes 3des aes128-ctr aes192-ctr aes256-ctr ; do
+for c in aes 3des aes128-ctr aes192-ctr aes256-ctr chacha20 ; do
verbose "$tid: cipher $c"
cp ${OBJ}/.putty/sessions/localhost_proxy \
${OBJ}/.putty/sessions/cipher_$c
echo "Cipher=$c" >> ${OBJ}/.putty/sessions/cipher_$c
rm -f ${COPY}
env HOME=$PWD ${PLINK} -load cipher_$c -batch -i ${OBJ}/putty.rsa2 \
cat ${DATA} > ${COPY}
if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
fail "ssh cat $DATA failed"
fi
cmp ${DATA} ${COPY} || fail "corrupted copy"
done
rm -f ${COPY}
diff --git a/regress/putty-kex.sh b/regress/putty-kex.sh
index 71c09701b2c8..686d0e1af2e5 100644
--- a/regress/putty-kex.sh
+++ b/regress/putty-kex.sh
@@ -1,22 +1,22 @@
-# $OpenBSD: putty-kex.sh,v 1.4 2016/11/25 03:02:01 dtucker Exp $
+# $OpenBSD: putty-kex.sh,v 1.5 2020/01/23 03:24:38 dtucker Exp $
# Placed in the Public Domain.
tid="putty KEX"
if test "x$REGRESS_INTEROP_PUTTY" != "xyes" ; then
echo "putty interop tests not enabled"
exit 0
fi
-for k in dh-gex-sha1 dh-group1-sha1 dh-group14-sha1 ; do
+for k in dh-gex-sha1 dh-group1-sha1 dh-group14-sha1 ecdh ; do
verbose "$tid: kex $k"
cp ${OBJ}/.putty/sessions/localhost_proxy \
${OBJ}/.putty/sessions/kex_$k
echo "KEX=$k" >> ${OBJ}/.putty/sessions/kex_$k
env HOME=$PWD ${PLINK} -load kex_$k -batch -i ${OBJ}/putty.rsa2 true
if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
fail "KEX $k failed"
fi
done
diff --git a/regress/putty-transfer.sh b/regress/putty-transfer.sh
index 4928d4533f6b..14b41022f8a6 100644
--- a/regress/putty-transfer.sh
+++ b/regress/putty-transfer.sh
@@ -1,38 +1,44 @@
-# $OpenBSD: putty-transfer.sh,v 1.6 2018/02/23 03:03:00 djm Exp $
+# $OpenBSD: putty-transfer.sh,v 1.7 2020/01/23 11:19:12 dtucker Exp $
# Placed in the Public Domain.
tid="putty transfer data"
if test "x$REGRESS_INTEROP_PUTTY" != "xyes" ; then
echo "putty interop tests not enabled"
exit 0
fi
-for c in 0 1 ; do
+if [ "`${SSH} -Q compression`" = "none" ]; then
+ comp="0"
+else
+ comp="0 1"
+fi
+
+for c in $comp; do
verbose "$tid: compression $c"
rm -f ${COPY}
cp ${OBJ}/.putty/sessions/localhost_proxy \
${OBJ}/.putty/sessions/compression_$c
echo "Compression=$c" >> ${OBJ}/.putty/sessions/kex_$k
env HOME=$PWD ${PLINK} -load compression_$c -batch \
-i ${OBJ}/putty.rsa2 cat ${DATA} > ${COPY}
if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
fail "ssh cat $DATA failed"
fi
cmp ${DATA} ${COPY} || fail "corrupted copy"
for s in 10 100 1k 32k 64k 128k 256k; do
trace "compression $c dd-size ${s}"
rm -f ${COPY}
dd if=$DATA obs=${s} 2> /dev/null | \
env HOME=$PWD ${PLINK} -load compression_$c \
-batch -i ${OBJ}/putty.rsa2 \
"cat > ${COPY}"
if [ $? -ne 0 ]; then
fail "ssh cat $DATA failed"
fi
cmp $DATA ${COPY} || fail "corrupted copy"
done
done
rm -f ${COPY}
diff --git a/regress/servcfginclude.sh b/regress/servcfginclude.sh
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..b25c8faa8509
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/servcfginclude.sh
@@ -0,0 +1,154 @@
+# Placed in the Public Domain.
+
+tid="server config include"
+
+cat > $OBJ/sshd_config.i << _EOF
+HostKey $OBJ/host.ssh-ed25519
+Match host a
+ Banner /aa
+
+Match host b
+ Banner /bb
+ Include $OBJ/sshd_config.i.*
+
+Match host c
+ Include $OBJ/sshd_config.i.*
+ Banner /cc
+
+Match host m
+ Include $OBJ/sshd_config.i.*
+
+Match Host d
+ Banner /dd
+
+Match Host e
+ Banner /ee
+ Include $OBJ/sshd_config.i.*
+
+Match Host f
+ Include $OBJ/sshd_config.i.*
+ Banner /ff
+
+Match Host n
+ Include $OBJ/sshd_config.i.*
+_EOF
+
+cat > $OBJ/sshd_config.i.0 << _EOF
+Match host xxxxxx
+_EOF
+
+cat > $OBJ/sshd_config.i.1 << _EOF
+Match host a
+ Banner /aaa
+
+Match host b
+ Banner /bbb
+
+Match host c
+ Banner /ccc
+
+Match Host d
+ Banner /ddd
+
+Match Host e
+ Banner /eee
+
+Match Host f
+ Banner /fff
+_EOF
+
+cat > $OBJ/sshd_config.i.2 << _EOF
+Match host a
+ Banner /aaaa
+
+Match host b
+ Banner /bbbb
+
+Match host c
+ Banner /cccc
+
+Match Host d
+ Banner /dddd
+
+Match Host e
+ Banner /eeee
+
+Match Host f
+ Banner /ffff
+
+Match all
+ Banner /xxxx
+_EOF
+
+trial() {
+ _host="$1"
+ _exp="$2"
+ _desc="$3"
+ test -z "$_desc" && _desc="test match"
+ trace "$_desc host=$_host expect=$_exp"
+ ${SUDO} ${REAL_SSHD} -f $OBJ/sshd_config.i -T \
+ -C "host=$_host,user=test,addr=127.0.0.1" > $OBJ/sshd_config.out ||
+ fatal "ssh config parse failed: $_desc host=$_host expect=$_exp"
+ _got=`grep -i '^banner ' $OBJ/sshd_config.out | awk '{print $2}'`
+ if test "x$_exp" != "x$_got" ; then
+ fail "$desc_ host $_host include fail: expected $_exp got $_got"
+ fi
+}
+
+trial a /aa
+trial b /bb
+trial c /ccc
+trial d /dd
+trial e /ee
+trial f /fff
+trial m /xxxx
+trial n /xxxx
+trial x none
+
+# Prepare an included config with an error.
+
+cat > $OBJ/sshd_config.i.3 << _EOF
+Banner xxxx
+ Junk
+_EOF
+
+trace "disallow invalid config host=a"
+${SUDO} ${REAL_SSHD} -f $OBJ/sshd_config.i \
+ -C "host=a,user=test,addr=127.0.0.1" 2>/dev/null && \
+ fail "sshd include allowed invalid config"
+
+trace "disallow invalid config host=x"
+${SUDO} ${REAL_SSHD} -f $OBJ/sshd_config.i \
+ -C "host=x,user=test,addr=127.0.0.1" 2>/dev/null && \
+ fail "sshd include allowed invalid config"
+
+rm -f $OBJ/sshd_config.i.*
+
+# Ensure that a missing include is not fatal.
+cat > $OBJ/sshd_config.i << _EOF
+HostKey $OBJ/host.ssh-ed25519
+Include $OBJ/sshd_config.i.*
+Banner /aa
+_EOF
+
+trial a /aa "missing include non-fatal"
+
+# Ensure that Match/Host in an included config does not affect parent.
+cat > $OBJ/sshd_config.i.x << _EOF
+Match host x
+_EOF
+
+trial a /aa "included file does not affect match state"
+
+# Ensure the empty include directive is not accepted
+cat > $OBJ/sshd_config.i.x << _EOF
+Include
+_EOF
+
+trace "disallow invalid with no argument"
+${SUDO} ${REAL_SSHD} -f $OBJ/sshd_config.i.x \
+ -C "host=x,user=test,addr=127.0.0.1" 2>/dev/null && \
+ fail "sshd allowed Include with no argument"
+
+# cleanup
+rm -f $OBJ/sshd_config.i $OBJ/sshd_config.i.* $OBJ/sshd_config.out
diff --git a/regress/ssh2putty.sh b/regress/ssh2putty.sh
index bcf83afe9e9e..dcb975d952f6 100755
--- a/regress/ssh2putty.sh
+++ b/regress/ssh2putty.sh
@@ -1,34 +1,34 @@
#!/bin/sh
-# $OpenBSD: ssh2putty.sh,v 1.3 2015/05/08 07:26:13 djm Exp $
+# $OpenBSD: ssh2putty.sh,v 1.5 2019/11/21 05:18:47 tb Exp $
if test "x$1" = "x" -o "x$2" = "x" -o "x$3" = "x" ; then
echo "Usage: ssh2putty hostname port ssh-private-key"
exit 1
fi
HOST=$1
PORT=$2
KEYFILE=$3
# XXX - support DSA keys too
if grep "BEGIN RSA PRIVATE KEY" $KEYFILE >/dev/null 2>&1 ; then
:
else
echo "Unsupported private key format"
exit 1
fi
public_exponent=`
openssl rsa -noout -text -in $KEYFILE | grep ^publicExponent |
sed 's/.*(//;s/).*//'
`
test $? -ne 0 && exit 1
modulus=`
openssl rsa -noout -modulus -in $KEYFILE | grep ^Modulus= |
sed 's/^Modulus=/0x/' | tr A-Z a-z
`
test $? -ne 0 && exit 1
echo "rsa2@$PORT:$HOST $public_exponent,$modulus"
diff --git a/regress/sshcfgparse.sh b/regress/sshcfgparse.sh
index 2c00b64efc0a..fc72a0a71843 100644
--- a/regress/sshcfgparse.sh
+++ b/regress/sshcfgparse.sh
@@ -1,98 +1,108 @@
-# $OpenBSD: sshcfgparse.sh,v 1.5 2019/07/23 13:32:48 dtucker Exp $
+# $OpenBSD: sshcfgparse.sh,v 1.6 2019/12/21 02:33:07 djm Exp $
# Placed in the Public Domain.
tid="ssh config parse"
dsa=0
for t in $SSH_KEYTYPES; do
case "$t" in
ssh-dss) dsa=1 ;;
esac
done
expect_result_present() {
_str="$1" ; shift
for _expect in "$@" ; do
echo "$f" | tr ',' '\n' | grep "^$_expect\$" >/dev/null
if test $? -ne 0 ; then
fail "missing expected \"$_expect\" from \"$_str\""
fi
done
}
expect_result_absent() {
_str="$1" ; shift
for _expect in "$@" ; do
echo "$f" | tr ',' '\n' | grep "^$_expect\$" >/dev/null
if test $? -eq 0 ; then
fail "unexpected \"$_expect\" present in \"$_str\""
fi
done
}
verbose "reparse minimal config"
(${SSH} -G -F $OBJ/ssh_config somehost >$OBJ/ssh_config.1 &&
${SSH} -G -F $OBJ/ssh_config.1 somehost >$OBJ/ssh_config.2 &&
diff $OBJ/ssh_config.1 $OBJ/ssh_config.2) || fail "reparse minimal config"
verbose "ssh -W opts"
f=`${SSH} -GF $OBJ/ssh_config host | awk '/exitonforwardfailure/{print $2}'`
test "$f" = "no" || fail "exitonforwardfailure default"
f=`${SSH} -GF $OBJ/ssh_config -W a:1 h | awk '/exitonforwardfailure/{print $2}'`
test "$f" = "yes" || fail "exitonforwardfailure enable"
f=`${SSH} -GF $OBJ/ssh_config -W a:1 -o exitonforwardfailure=no h | \
awk '/exitonforwardfailure/{print $2}'`
test "$f" = "no" || fail "exitonforwardfailure override"
f=`${SSH} -GF $OBJ/ssh_config host | awk '/clearallforwardings/{print $2}'`
test "$f" = "no" || fail "clearallforwardings default"
f=`${SSH} -GF $OBJ/ssh_config -W a:1 h | awk '/clearallforwardings/{print $2}'`
test "$f" = "yes" || fail "clearallforwardings enable"
f=`${SSH} -GF $OBJ/ssh_config -W a:1 -o clearallforwardings=no h | \
awk '/clearallforwardings/{print $2}'`
test "$f" = "no" || fail "clearallforwardings override"
verbose "user first match"
user=`awk '$1=="User" {print $2}' $OBJ/ssh_config`
f=`${SSH} -GF $OBJ/ssh_config host | awk '/^user /{print $2}'`
test "$f" = "$user" || fail "user from config, expected '$user' got '$f'"
f=`${SSH} -GF $OBJ/ssh_config -o user=foo -l bar baz@host | awk '/^user /{print $2}'`
test "$f" = "foo" || fail "user first match -oUser, expected 'foo' got '$f' "
f=`${SSH} -GF $OBJ/ssh_config -lbar baz@host user=foo baz@host | awk '/^user /{print $2}'`
test "$f" = "bar" || fail "user first match -l, expected 'bar' got '$f'"
f=`${SSH} -GF $OBJ/ssh_config baz@host -o user=foo -l bar baz@host | awk '/^user /{print $2}'`
test "$f" = "baz" || fail "user first match user@host, expected 'baz' got '$f'"
verbose "pubkeyacceptedkeytypes"
# Default set
f=`${SSH} -GF none host | awk '/^pubkeyacceptedkeytypes /{print $2}'`
expect_result_present "$f" "ssh-ed25519" "ssh-ed25519-cert-v01.*"
expect_result_absent "$f" "ssh-dss"
# Explicit override
f=`${SSH} -GF none -opubkeyacceptedkeytypes=ssh-ed25519 host | \
awk '/^pubkeyacceptedkeytypes /{print $2}'`
expect_result_present "$f" "ssh-ed25519"
expect_result_absent "$f" "ssh-ed25519-cert-v01.*" "ssh-dss"
# Removal from default set
f=`${SSH} -GF none -opubkeyacceptedkeytypes=-ssh-ed25519-cert* host | \
awk '/^pubkeyacceptedkeytypes /{print $2}'`
expect_result_present "$f" "ssh-ed25519"
expect_result_absent "$f" "ssh-ed25519-cert-v01.*" "ssh-dss"
f=`${SSH} -GF none -opubkeyacceptedkeytypes=-ssh-ed25519 host | \
awk '/^pubkeyacceptedkeytypes /{print $2}'`
expect_result_present "$f" "ssh-ed25519-cert-v01.*"
expect_result_absent "$f" "ssh-ed25519" "ssh-dss"
# Append to default set.
# This is not tested when built !WITH_OPENSSL
if [ "$dsa" = "1" ]; then
f=`${SSH} -GF none -opubkeyacceptedkeytypes=+ssh-dss-cert* host | \
awk '/^pubkeyacceptedkeytypes /{print $2}'`
expect_result_present "$f" "ssh-ed25519" "ssh-dss-cert-v01.*"
expect_result_absent "$f" "ssh-dss"
f=`${SSH} -GF none -opubkeyacceptedkeytypes=+ssh-dss host | \
awk '/^pubkeyacceptedkeytypes /{print $2}'`
expect_result_present "$f" "ssh-ed25519" "ssh-ed25519-cert-v01.*" "ssh-dss"
expect_result_absent "$f" "ssh-dss-cert-v01.*"
fi
+verbose "agentforwarding"
+f=`${SSH} -GF none host | awk '/^forwardagent /{print$2}'`
+expect_result_present "$f" "no"
+f=`${SSH} -GF none -oforwardagent=no host | awk '/^forwardagent /{print$2}'`
+expect_result_present "$f" "no"
+f=`${SSH} -GF none -oforwardagent=yes host | awk '/^forwardagent /{print$2}'`
+expect_result_present "$f" "yes"
+f=`${SSH} -GF none '-oforwardagent=SSH_AUTH_SOCK.forward' host | awk '/^forwardagent /{print$2}'`
+expect_result_present "$f" "SSH_AUTH_SOCK.forward"
+
# cleanup
rm -f $OBJ/ssh_config.[012]
diff --git a/regress/sshsig.sh b/regress/sshsig.sh
index eb99486ae68c..da362c179772 100644
--- a/regress/sshsig.sh
+++ b/regress/sshsig.sh
@@ -1,196 +1,196 @@
-# $OpenBSD: sshsig.sh,v 1.2 2019/10/04 03:39:19 djm Exp $
+# $OpenBSD: sshsig.sh,v 1.3 2019/11/26 23:43:10 djm Exp $
# Placed in the Public Domain.
tid="sshsig"
DATA2=$OBJ/${DATANAME}.2
cat ${DATA} ${DATA} > ${DATA2}
rm -f $OBJ/sshsig-*.sig $OBJ/wrong-key* $OBJ/sigca-key*
sig_namespace="test-$$"
sig_principal="user-$$@example.com"
# Make a "wrong key"
${SSHKEYGEN} -t ed25519 -f $OBJ/wrong-key -C "wrong trousers, Grommit" -N '' \
|| fatal "couldn't generate key"
WRONG=$OBJ/wrong-key.pub
# Make a CA key.
${SSHKEYGEN} -t ed25519 -f $OBJ/sigca-key -C "CA" -N '' \
|| fatal "couldn't generate key"
CA_PRIV=$OBJ/sigca-key
CA_PUB=$OBJ/sigca-key.pub
trace "start agent"
-eval `${SSHAGENT} -s` > /dev/null
+eval `${SSHAGENT} ${EXTRA_AGENT_ARGS} -s` > /dev/null
r=$?
if [ $r -ne 0 ]; then
fatal "could not start ssh-agent: exit code $r"
fi
SIGNKEYS="$SSH_KEYTYPES"
verbose "$tid: make certificates"
for t in $SSH_KEYTYPES ; do
${SSHKEYGEN} -q -s $CA_PRIV -z $$ \
-I "regress signature key for $USER" \
-n $sig_principal $OBJ/${t} || \
fatal "couldn't sign ${t}"
SIGNKEYS="$SIGNKEYS ${t}-cert.pub"
done
for t in $SIGNKEYS; do
verbose "$tid: check signature for $t"
keybase=`basename $t .pub`
privkey=${OBJ}/`basename $t -cert.pub`
sigfile=${OBJ}/sshsig-${keybase}.sig
sigfile_agent=${OBJ}/sshsig-agent-${keybase}.sig
pubkey=${OBJ}/${keybase}.pub
${SSHKEYGEN} -vvv -Y sign -f ${OBJ}/$t -n $sig_namespace \
< $DATA > $sigfile 2>/dev/null || fail "sign using $t failed"
(printf "$sig_principal " ; cat $pubkey) > $OBJ/allowed_signers
${SSHKEYGEN} -vvv -Y verify -s $sigfile -n $sig_namespace \
-I $sig_principal -f $OBJ/allowed_signers \
< $DATA >/dev/null 2>&1 || \
fail "failed signature for $t key"
(printf "$sig_principal namespaces=\"$sig_namespace,whatever\" ";
cat $pubkey) > $OBJ/allowed_signers
${SSHKEYGEN} -vvv -Y verify -s $sigfile -n $sig_namespace \
-I $sig_principal -f $OBJ/allowed_signers \
< $DATA >/dev/null 2>&1 || \
fail "failed signature for $t key w/ limited namespace"
# Invalid option
(printf "$sig_principal octopus " ; cat $pubkey) > $OBJ/allowed_signers
${SSHKEYGEN} -vvv -Y verify -s $sigfile -n $sig_namespace \
-I $sig_principal -f $OBJ/allowed_signers \
< $DATA >/dev/null 2>&1 && \
fail "accepted signature for $t key with bad signers option"
# Wrong key trusted.
(printf "$sig_principal " ; cat $WRONG) > $OBJ/allowed_signers
${SSHKEYGEN} -vvv -Y verify -s $sigfile -n $sig_namespace \
-I $sig_principal -f $OBJ/allowed_signers \
< $DATA >/dev/null 2>&1 && \
fail "accepted signature for $t key with wrong key trusted"
# incorrect data
(printf "$sig_principal " ; cat $pubkey) > $OBJ/allowed_signers
${SSHKEYGEN} -vvv -Y verify -s $sigfile -n $sig_namespace \
-I $sig_principal -f $OBJ/allowed_signers \
< $DATA2 >/dev/null 2>&1 && \
fail "passed signature for wrong data with $t key"
# wrong principal in signers
(printf "josef.k@example.com " ; cat $pubkey) > $OBJ/allowed_signers
${SSHKEYGEN} -vvv -Y verify -s $sigfile -n $sig_namespace \
-I $sig_principal -f $OBJ/allowed_signers \
< $DATA >/dev/null 2>&1 && \
fail "accepted signature for $t key with wrong principal"
# wrong namespace
(printf "$sig_principal " ; cat $pubkey) > $OBJ/allowed_signers
${SSHKEYGEN} -vvv -Y verify -s $sigfile -n COWS_COWS_COWS \
-I $sig_principal -f $OBJ/allowed_signers \
< $DATA >/dev/null 2>&1 && \
fail "accepted signature for $t key with wrong namespace"
# namespace excluded by option
(printf "$sig_principal namespaces=\"whatever\" " ;
cat $pubkey) > $OBJ/allowed_signers
${SSHKEYGEN} -vvv -Y verify -s $sigfile -n $sig_namespace \
-I $sig_principal -f $OBJ/allowed_signers \
< $DATA >/dev/null 2>&1 && \
fail "accepted signature for $t key with excluded namespace"
# public key in revoked keys file
cat $pubkey > $OBJ/revoked_keys
(printf "$sig_principal namespaces=\"whatever\" " ;
cat $pubkey) > $OBJ/allowed_signers
${SSHKEYGEN} -vvv -Y verify -s $sigfile -n $sig_namespace \
-I $sig_principal -f $OBJ/allowed_signers \
-r $OBJ/revoked_keys \
< $DATA >/dev/null 2>&1 && \
fail "accepted signature for $t key, but key is in revoked_keys"
# public key not revoked, but other are present in revoked_keysfile
cat $WRONG > $OBJ/revoked_keys
(printf "$sig_principal " ; cat $pubkey) > $OBJ/allowed_signers
${SSHKEYGEN} -vvv -Y verify -s $sigfile -n $sig_namespace \
-I $sig_principal -f $OBJ/allowed_signers \
-r $OBJ/revoked_keys \
< $DATA >/dev/null 2>&1 || \
fail "couldn't verify signature for $t key, but key not in revoked_keys"
# check-novalidate with valid data
${SSHKEYGEN} -vvv -Y check-novalidate -s $sigfile -n $sig_namespace \
< $DATA >/dev/null 2>&1 || \
fail "failed to check valid signature for $t key"
# check-novalidate with invalid data
${SSHKEYGEN} -vvv -Y check-novalidate -s $sigfile -n $sig_namespace \
< $DATA2 >/dev/null 2>&1 && \
fail "sucessfully checked signature for $t key with invalid data"
# Check signing keys using ssh-agent.
${SSHADD} -D >/dev/null 2>&1 # Remove all previously-loaded keys.
${SSHADD} ${privkey} > /dev/null 2>&1 || fail "ssh-add failed"
# Move private key to ensure agent key is used
mv ${privkey} ${privkey}.tmp
${SSHKEYGEN} -vvv -Y sign -f $pubkey -n $sig_namespace \
< $DATA > $sigfile_agent 2>/dev/null || \
fail "ssh-agent based sign using $pubkey failed"
${SSHKEYGEN} -vvv -Y check-novalidate -s $sigfile_agent \
-n $sig_namespace < $DATA >/dev/null 2>&1 || \
fail "failed to check valid signature for $t key"
# Move private key back
mv ${privkey}.tmp ${privkey}
# Remaining tests are for certificates only.
case "$keybase" in
*-cert) ;;
*) continue ;;
esac
# correct CA key
(printf "$sig_principal cert-authority " ;
cat $CA_PUB) > $OBJ/allowed_signers
${SSHKEYGEN} -vvv -Y verify -s $sigfile -n $sig_namespace \
-I $sig_principal -f $OBJ/allowed_signers \
< $DATA >/dev/null 2>&1 || \
fail "failed signature for $t cert"
# signing key listed as cert-authority
(printf "$sig_principal cert-authority" ;
cat $pubkey) > $OBJ/allowed_signers
${SSHKEYGEN} -vvv -Y verify -s $sigfile -n $sig_namespace \
-I $sig_principal -f $OBJ/allowed_signers \
< $DATA >/dev/null 2>&1 && \
fail "accepted signature with $t key listed as CA"
# CA key not flagged cert-authority
(printf "$sig_principal " ; cat $CA_PUB) > $OBJ/allowed_signers
${SSHKEYGEN} -vvv -Y verify -s $sigfile -n $sig_namespace \
-I $sig_principal -f $OBJ/allowed_signers \
< $DATA >/dev/null 2>&1 && \
fail "accepted signature for $t cert with CA not marked"
# mismatch between cert principal and file
(printf "josef.k@example.com cert-authority" ;
cat $CA_PUB) > $OBJ/allowed_signers
${SSHKEYGEN} -vvv -Y verify -s $sigfile -n $sig_namespace \
-I $sig_principal -f $OBJ/allowed_signers \
< $DATA >/dev/null 2>&1 && \
fail "accepted signature for $t cert with wrong principal"
done
trace "kill agent"
${SSHAGENT} -k > /dev/null
diff --git a/regress/test-exec.sh b/regress/test-exec.sh
index 508b93284a28..f5e3ee6f53c5 100644
--- a/regress/test-exec.sh
+++ b/regress/test-exec.sh
@@ -1,624 +1,688 @@
-# $OpenBSD: test-exec.sh,v 1.66 2019/07/05 04:12:46 dtucker Exp $
+# $OpenBSD: test-exec.sh,v 1.75 2020/01/31 23:25:08 djm Exp $
# Placed in the Public Domain.
#SUDO=sudo
# Unbreak GNU head(1)
_POSIX2_VERSION=199209
export _POSIX2_VERSION
case `uname -s 2>/dev/null` in
OSF1*)
BIN_SH=xpg4
export BIN_SH
;;
CYGWIN*)
os=cygwin
;;
esac
if [ ! -z "$TEST_SSH_PORT" ]; then
PORT="$TEST_SSH_PORT"
else
PORT=4242
fi
if [ -x /usr/ucb/whoami ]; then
USER=`/usr/ucb/whoami`
elif whoami >/dev/null 2>&1; then
USER=`whoami`
elif logname >/dev/null 2>&1; then
USER=`logname`
else
USER=`id -un`
fi
OBJ=$1
if [ "x$OBJ" = "x" ]; then
echo '$OBJ not defined'
exit 2
fi
if [ ! -d $OBJ ]; then
echo "not a directory: $OBJ"
exit 2
fi
SCRIPT=$2
if [ "x$SCRIPT" = "x" ]; then
echo '$SCRIPT not defined'
exit 2
fi
if [ ! -f $SCRIPT ]; then
echo "not a file: $SCRIPT"
exit 2
fi
if $TEST_SHELL -n $SCRIPT; then
true
else
echo "syntax error in $SCRIPT"
exit 2
fi
unset SSH_AUTH_SOCK
SRC=`dirname ${SCRIPT}`
# defaults
SSH=ssh
SSHD=sshd
SSHAGENT=ssh-agent
SSHADD=ssh-add
SSHKEYGEN=ssh-keygen
SSHKEYSCAN=ssh-keyscan
SFTP=sftp
SFTPSERVER=/usr/libexec/openssh/sftp-server
SCP=scp
# Set by make_tmpdir() on demand (below).
SSH_REGRESS_TMP=
# Interop testing
PLINK=plink
PUTTYGEN=puttygen
CONCH=conch
+# Tools used by multiple tests
+NC=$OBJ/netcat
+
if [ "x$TEST_SSH_SSH" != "x" ]; then
SSH="${TEST_SSH_SSH}"
fi
if [ "x$TEST_SSH_SSHD" != "x" ]; then
SSHD="${TEST_SSH_SSHD}"
fi
if [ "x$TEST_SSH_SSHAGENT" != "x" ]; then
SSHAGENT="${TEST_SSH_SSHAGENT}"
fi
if [ "x$TEST_SSH_SSHADD" != "x" ]; then
SSHADD="${TEST_SSH_SSHADD}"
fi
if [ "x$TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN" != "x" ]; then
SSHKEYGEN="${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYGEN}"
fi
if [ "x$TEST_SSH_SSHKEYSCAN" != "x" ]; then
SSHKEYSCAN="${TEST_SSH_SSHKEYSCAN}"
fi
if [ "x$TEST_SSH_SFTP" != "x" ]; then
SFTP="${TEST_SSH_SFTP}"
fi
if [ "x$TEST_SSH_SFTPSERVER" != "x" ]; then
SFTPSERVER="${TEST_SSH_SFTPSERVER}"
fi
if [ "x$TEST_SSH_SCP" != "x" ]; then
SCP="${TEST_SSH_SCP}"
fi
if [ "x$TEST_SSH_PLINK" != "x" ]; then
# Find real binary, if it exists
case "${TEST_SSH_PLINK}" in
/*) PLINK="${TEST_SSH_PLINK}" ;;
*) PLINK=`which ${TEST_SSH_PLINK} 2>/dev/null` ;;
esac
fi
if [ "x$TEST_SSH_PUTTYGEN" != "x" ]; then
# Find real binary, if it exists
case "${TEST_SSH_PUTTYGEN}" in
/*) PUTTYGEN="${TEST_SSH_PUTTYGEN}" ;;
*) PUTTYGEN=`which ${TEST_SSH_PUTTYGEN} 2>/dev/null` ;;
esac
fi
if [ "x$TEST_SSH_CONCH" != "x" ]; then
# Find real binary, if it exists
case "${TEST_SSH_CONCH}" in
/*) CONCH="${TEST_SSH_CONCH}" ;;
*) CONCH=`which ${TEST_SSH_CONCH} 2>/dev/null` ;;
esac
fi
+if [ "x$TEST_SSH_PKCS11_HELPER" != "x" ]; then
+ SSH_PKCS11_HELPER="${TEST_SSH_PKCS11_HELPER}"
+fi
+if [ "x$TEST_SSH_SK_HELPER" != "x" ]; then
+ SSH_SK_HELPER="${TEST_SSH_SK_HELPER}"
+fi
# Path to sshd must be absolute for rexec
case "$SSHD" in
/*) ;;
*) SSHD=`which $SSHD` ;;
esac
case "$SSHAGENT" in
/*) ;;
*) SSHAGENT=`which $SSHAGENT` ;;
esac
# Record the actual binaries used.
SSH_BIN=${SSH}
SSHD_BIN=${SSHD}
SSHAGENT_BIN=${SSHAGENT}
SSHADD_BIN=${SSHADD}
SSHKEYGEN_BIN=${SSHKEYGEN}
SSHKEYSCAN_BIN=${SSHKEYSCAN}
SFTP_BIN=${SFTP}
SFTPSERVER_BIN=${SFTPSERVER}
SCP_BIN=${SCP}
if [ "x$USE_VALGRIND" != "x" ]; then
rm -rf $OBJ/valgrind-out $OBJ/valgrind-vgdb
mkdir -p $OBJ/valgrind-out $OBJ/valgrind-vgdb
# When using sudo ensure low-priv tests can write pipes and logs.
if [ "x$SUDO" != "x" ]; then
chmod 777 $OBJ/valgrind-out $OBJ/valgrind-vgdb
fi
VG_TEST=`basename $SCRIPT .sh`
# Some tests are difficult to fix.
case "$VG_TEST" in
reexec)
VG_SKIP=1 ;;
sftp-chroot)
if [ "x${SUDO}" != "x" ]; then
VG_SKIP=1
fi ;;
esac
if [ x"$VG_SKIP" = "x" ]; then
VG_LEAK="--leak-check=no"
if [ x"$VALGRIND_CHECK_LEAKS" != "x" ]; then
VG_LEAK="--leak-check=full"
fi
VG_IGNORE="/bin/*,/sbin/*,/usr/*,/var/*"
VG_LOG="$OBJ/valgrind-out/${VG_TEST}."
VG_OPTS="--track-origins=yes $VG_LEAK"
VG_OPTS="$VG_OPTS --trace-children=yes"
VG_OPTS="$VG_OPTS --trace-children-skip=${VG_IGNORE}"
VG_OPTS="$VG_OPTS --vgdb-prefix=$OBJ/valgrind-vgdb/"
VG_PATH="valgrind"
if [ "x$VALGRIND_PATH" != "x" ]; then
VG_PATH="$VALGRIND_PATH"
fi
VG="$VG_PATH $VG_OPTS"
SSH="$VG --log-file=${VG_LOG}ssh.%p $SSH"
SSHD="$VG --log-file=${VG_LOG}sshd.%p $SSHD"
SSHAGENT="$VG --log-file=${VG_LOG}ssh-agent.%p $SSHAGENT"
SSHADD="$VG --log-file=${VG_LOG}ssh-add.%p $SSHADD"
SSHKEYGEN="$VG --log-file=${VG_LOG}ssh-keygen.%p $SSHKEYGEN"
SSHKEYSCAN="$VG --log-file=${VG_LOG}ssh-keyscan.%p $SSHKEYSCAN"
SFTP="$VG --log-file=${VG_LOG}sftp.%p ${SFTP}"
SCP="$VG --log-file=${VG_LOG}scp.%p $SCP"
cat > $OBJ/valgrind-sftp-server.sh << EOF
#!/bin/sh
exec $VG --log-file=${VG_LOG}sftp-server.%p $SFTPSERVER "\$@"
EOF
chmod a+rx $OBJ/valgrind-sftp-server.sh
SFTPSERVER="$OBJ/valgrind-sftp-server.sh"
fi
fi
# Logfiles.
# SSH_LOGFILE should be the debug output of ssh(1) only
# SSHD_LOGFILE should be the debug output of sshd(8) only
# REGRESS_LOGFILE is the output of the test itself stdout and stderr
if [ "x$TEST_SSH_LOGFILE" = "x" ]; then
TEST_SSH_LOGFILE=$OBJ/ssh.log
fi
if [ "x$TEST_SSHD_LOGFILE" = "x" ]; then
TEST_SSHD_LOGFILE=$OBJ/sshd.log
fi
if [ "x$TEST_REGRESS_LOGFILE" = "x" ]; then
TEST_REGRESS_LOGFILE=$OBJ/regress.log
fi
# truncate logfiles
>$TEST_SSH_LOGFILE
>$TEST_SSHD_LOGFILE
>$TEST_REGRESS_LOGFILE
# Create wrapper ssh with logging. We can't just specify "SSH=ssh -E..."
# because sftp and scp don't handle spaces in arguments.
SSHLOGWRAP=$OBJ/ssh-log-wrapper.sh
echo "#!/bin/sh" > $SSHLOGWRAP
echo "exec ${SSH} -E${TEST_SSH_LOGFILE} "'"$@"' >>$SSHLOGWRAP
chmod a+rx $OBJ/ssh-log-wrapper.sh
REAL_SSH="$SSH"
+REAL_SSHD="$SSHD"
SSH="$SSHLOGWRAP"
# Some test data. We make a copy because some tests will overwrite it.
# The tests may assume that $DATA exists and is writable and $COPY does
# not exist. Tests requiring larger data files can call increase_datafile_size
# [kbytes] to ensure the file is at least that large.
DATANAME=data
DATA=$OBJ/${DATANAME}
cat ${SSHAGENT_BIN} >${DATA}
chmod u+w ${DATA}
COPY=$OBJ/copy
rm -f ${COPY}
increase_datafile_size()
{
while [ `du -k ${DATA} | cut -f1` -lt $1 ]; do
cat ${SSHAGENT_BIN} >>${DATA}
done
}
# these should be used in tests
export SSH SSHD SSHAGENT SSHADD SSHKEYGEN SSHKEYSCAN SFTP SFTPSERVER SCP
+export SSH_PKCS11_HELPER SSH_SK_HELPER
#echo $SSH $SSHD $SSHAGENT $SSHADD $SSHKEYGEN $SSHKEYSCAN $SFTP $SFTPSERVER $SCP
# Portable specific functions
have_prog()
{
saved_IFS="$IFS"
IFS=":"
for i in $PATH
do
if [ -x $i/$1 ]; then
IFS="$saved_IFS"
return 0
fi
done
IFS="$saved_IFS"
return 1
}
jot() {
awk "BEGIN { for (i = $2; i < $2 + $1; i++) { printf \"%d\n\", i } exit }"
}
# Check whether preprocessor symbols are defined in config.h.
config_defined ()
{
str=$1
while test "x$2" != "x" ; do
str="$str|$2"
shift
done
egrep "^#define.*($str)" ${BUILDDIR}/config.h >/dev/null 2>&1
}
md5 () {
if have_prog md5sum; then
md5sum
elif have_prog openssl; then
openssl md5
elif have_prog cksum; then
cksum
elif have_prog sum; then
sum
else
wc -c
fi
}
# End of portable specific functions
stop_sshd ()
{
if [ -f $PIDFILE ]; then
pid=`$SUDO cat $PIDFILE`
if [ "X$pid" = "X" ]; then
echo no sshd running
else
if [ $pid -lt 2 ]; then
echo bad pid for sshd: $pid
else
$SUDO kill $pid
trace "wait for sshd to exit"
i=0;
while [ -f $PIDFILE -a $i -lt 5 ]; do
i=`expr $i + 1`
sleep $i
done
if test -f $PIDFILE; then
if $SUDO kill -0 $pid; then
echo "sshd didn't exit " \
"port $PORT pid $pid"
else
echo "sshd died without cleanup"
fi
exit 1
fi
fi
fi
fi
}
make_tmpdir ()
{
SSH_REGRESS_TMP="$($OBJ/mkdtemp openssh-XXXXXXXX)" || \
fatal "failed to create temporary directory"
}
# helper
cleanup ()
{
if [ "x$SSH_PID" != "x" ]; then
if [ $SSH_PID -lt 2 ]; then
echo bad pid for ssh: $SSH_PID
else
kill $SSH_PID
fi
fi
if [ "x$SSH_REGRESS_TMP" != "x" ]; then
rm -rf "$SSH_REGRESS_TMP"
fi
stop_sshd
}
start_debug_log ()
{
echo "trace: $@" >$TEST_REGRESS_LOGFILE
echo "trace: $@" >$TEST_SSH_LOGFILE
echo "trace: $@" >$TEST_SSHD_LOGFILE
}
save_debug_log ()
{
echo $@ >>$TEST_REGRESS_LOGFILE
echo $@ >>$TEST_SSH_LOGFILE
echo $@ >>$TEST_SSHD_LOGFILE
(cat $TEST_REGRESS_LOGFILE; echo) >>$OBJ/failed-regress.log
(cat $TEST_SSH_LOGFILE; echo) >>$OBJ/failed-ssh.log
(cat $TEST_SSHD_LOGFILE; echo) >>$OBJ/failed-sshd.log
}
trace ()
{
start_debug_log $@
if [ "X$TEST_SSH_TRACE" = "Xyes" ]; then
echo "$@"
fi
}
verbose ()
{
start_debug_log $@
if [ "X$TEST_SSH_QUIET" != "Xyes" ]; then
echo "$@"
fi
}
warn ()
{
echo "WARNING: $@" >>$TEST_SSH_LOGFILE
echo "WARNING: $@"
}
fail ()
{
save_debug_log "FAIL: $@"
RESULT=1
echo "$@"
if test "x$TEST_SSH_FAIL_FATAL" != "x" ; then
cleanup
exit $RESULT
fi
}
fatal ()
{
save_debug_log "FATAL: $@"
printf "FATAL: "
fail "$@"
cleanup
exit $RESULT
}
RESULT=0
PIDFILE=$OBJ/pidfile
trap fatal 3 2
# create server config
cat << EOF > $OBJ/sshd_config
StrictModes no
Port $PORT
AddressFamily inet
ListenAddress 127.0.0.1
#ListenAddress ::1
PidFile $PIDFILE
AuthorizedKeysFile $OBJ/authorized_keys_%u
LogLevel DEBUG3
AcceptEnv _XXX_TEST_*
AcceptEnv _XXX_TEST
Subsystem sftp $SFTPSERVER
EOF
# This may be necessary if /usr/src and/or /usr/obj are group-writable,
# but if you aren't careful with permissions then the unit tests could
# be abused to locally escalate privileges.
if [ ! -z "$TEST_SSH_UNSAFE_PERMISSIONS" ]; then
echo "StrictModes no" >> $OBJ/sshd_config
+else
+ # check and warn if excessive permissions are likely to cause failures.
+ unsafe=""
+ dir="${OBJ}"
+ while test ${dir} != "/"; do
+ if test -d "${dir}" && ! test -h "${dir}"; then
+ perms=`ls -ld ${dir}`
+ case "${perms}" in
+ ?????w????*|????????w?*) unsafe="${unsafe} ${dir}" ;;
+ esac
+ fi
+ dir=`dirname ${dir}`
+ done
+ if ! test -z "${unsafe}"; then
+ cat <<EOD
+
+WARNING: Unsafe (group or world writable) directory permissions found:
+${unsafe}
+
+These could be abused to locally escalate privileges. If you are
+sure that this is not a risk (eg there are no other users), you can
+bypass this check by setting TEST_SSH_UNSAFE_PERMISSIONS=1
+
+EOD
+ fi
fi
if [ ! -z "$TEST_SSH_SSHD_CONFOPTS" ]; then
trace "adding sshd_config option $TEST_SSH_SSHD_CONFOPTS"
echo "$TEST_SSH_SSHD_CONFOPTS" >> $OBJ/sshd_config
fi
# server config for proxy connects
cp $OBJ/sshd_config $OBJ/sshd_proxy
# allow group-writable directories in proxy-mode
echo 'StrictModes no' >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy
# create client config
cat << EOF > $OBJ/ssh_config
Host *
Hostname 127.0.0.1
HostKeyAlias localhost-with-alias
Port $PORT
User $USER
GlobalKnownHostsFile $OBJ/known_hosts
UserKnownHostsFile $OBJ/known_hosts
PubkeyAuthentication yes
ChallengeResponseAuthentication no
HostbasedAuthentication no
PasswordAuthentication no
BatchMode yes
StrictHostKeyChecking yes
LogLevel DEBUG3
EOF
if [ ! -z "$TEST_SSH_SSH_CONFOPTS" ]; then
trace "adding ssh_config option $TEST_SSH_SSH_CONFOPTS"
echo "$TEST_SSH_SSH_CONFOPTS" >> $OBJ/ssh_config
fi
rm -f $OBJ/known_hosts $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
-SSH_KEYTYPES=`$SSH -Q key-plain`
+SSH_SK_PROVIDER=
+if [ -f "${SRC}/misc/sk-dummy/obj/sk-dummy.so" ] ; then
+ SSH_SK_PROVIDER="${SRC}/misc/sk-dummy/obj/sk-dummy.so"
+elif [ -f "${SRC}/misc/sk-dummy/sk-dummy.so" ] ; then
+ SSH_SK_PROVIDER="${SRC}/misc/sk-dummy/sk-dummy.so"
+fi
+export SSH_SK_PROVIDER
+
+if ! test -z "$SSH_SK_PROVIDER"; then
+ EXTRA_AGENT_ARGS='-P/*' # XXX want realpath(1)...
+ echo "SecurityKeyProvider $SSH_SK_PROVIDER" >> $OBJ/ssh_config
+ echo "SecurityKeyProvider $SSH_SK_PROVIDER" >> $OBJ/sshd_config
+ echo "SecurityKeyProvider $SSH_SK_PROVIDER" >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+fi
+export EXTRA_AGENT_ARGS
+
+maybe_filter_sk() {
+ if test -z "$SSH_SK_PROVIDER" ; then
+ grep -v ^sk
+ else
+ cat
+ fi
+}
+SSH_KEYTYPES=`$SSH -Q key-plain | maybe_filter_sk`
+SSH_HOSTKEY_TYPES=`$SSH -Q key-plain | maybe_filter_sk`
+
for t in ${SSH_KEYTYPES}; do
# generate user key
trace "generating key type $t"
if [ ! -f $OBJ/$t ] || [ ${SSHKEYGEN_BIN} -nt $OBJ/$t ]; then
rm -f $OBJ/$t
${SSHKEYGEN} -q -N '' -t $t -f $OBJ/$t ||\
fail "ssh-keygen for $t failed"
fi
+ # setup authorized keys
+ cat $OBJ/$t.pub >> $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
+ echo IdentityFile $OBJ/$t >> $OBJ/ssh_config
+done
+
+for t in ${SSH_HOSTKEY_TYPES}; do
# known hosts file for client
(
printf 'localhost-with-alias,127.0.0.1,::1 '
cat $OBJ/$t.pub
) >> $OBJ/known_hosts
- # setup authorized keys
- cat $OBJ/$t.pub >> $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
- echo IdentityFile $OBJ/$t >> $OBJ/ssh_config
-
# use key as host key, too
$SUDO cp $OBJ/$t $OBJ/host.$t
echo HostKey $OBJ/host.$t >> $OBJ/sshd_config
# don't use SUDO for proxy connect
echo HostKey $OBJ/$t >> $OBJ/sshd_proxy
done
chmod 644 $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
# Activate Twisted Conch tests if the binary is present
REGRESS_INTEROP_CONCH=no
if test -x "$CONCH" ; then
REGRESS_INTEROP_CONCH=yes
fi
# If PuTTY is present and we are running a PuTTY test, prepare keys and
# configuration
REGRESS_INTEROP_PUTTY=no
if test -x "$PUTTYGEN" -a -x "$PLINK" ; then
REGRESS_INTEROP_PUTTY=yes
fi
case "$SCRIPT" in
*putty*) ;;
*) REGRESS_INTEROP_PUTTY=no ;;
esac
if test "$REGRESS_INTEROP_PUTTY" = "yes" ; then
mkdir -p ${OBJ}/.putty
# Add a PuTTY key to authorized_keys
rm -f ${OBJ}/putty.rsa2
if ! puttygen -t rsa -o ${OBJ}/putty.rsa2 \
--random-device=/dev/urandom \
--new-passphrase /dev/null < /dev/null > /dev/null; then
echo "Your installed version of PuTTY is too old to support --new-passphrase; trying without (may require manual interaction) ..." >&2
puttygen -t rsa -o ${OBJ}/putty.rsa2 < /dev/null > /dev/null
fi
puttygen -O public-openssh ${OBJ}/putty.rsa2 \
>> $OBJ/authorized_keys_$USER
# Convert rsa2 host key to PuTTY format
cp $OBJ/ssh-rsa $OBJ/ssh-rsa_oldfmt
${SSHKEYGEN} -p -N '' -m PEM -f $OBJ/ssh-rsa_oldfmt >/dev/null
${SRC}/ssh2putty.sh 127.0.0.1 $PORT $OBJ/ssh-rsa_oldfmt > \
${OBJ}/.putty/sshhostkeys
${SRC}/ssh2putty.sh 127.0.0.1 22 $OBJ/ssh-rsa_oldfmt >> \
${OBJ}/.putty/sshhostkeys
rm -f $OBJ/ssh-rsa_oldfmt
# Setup proxied session
mkdir -p ${OBJ}/.putty/sessions
rm -f ${OBJ}/.putty/sessions/localhost_proxy
echo "Protocol=ssh" >> ${OBJ}/.putty/sessions/localhost_proxy
echo "HostName=127.0.0.1" >> ${OBJ}/.putty/sessions/localhost_proxy
echo "PortNumber=$PORT" >> ${OBJ}/.putty/sessions/localhost_proxy
echo "ProxyMethod=5" >> ${OBJ}/.putty/sessions/localhost_proxy
echo "ProxyTelnetCommand=sh ${SRC}/sshd-log-wrapper.sh ${TEST_SSHD_LOGFILE} ${SSHD} -i -f $OBJ/sshd_proxy" >> ${OBJ}/.putty/sessions/localhost_proxy
echo "ProxyLocalhost=1" >> ${OBJ}/.putty/sessions/localhost_proxy
PUTTYDIR=${OBJ}/.putty
export PUTTYDIR
REGRESS_INTEROP_PUTTY=yes
fi
# create a proxy version of the client config
(
cat $OBJ/ssh_config
- echo proxycommand ${SUDO} sh ${SRC}/sshd-log-wrapper.sh ${TEST_SSHD_LOGFILE} ${SSHD} -i -f $OBJ/sshd_proxy
+ echo proxycommand ${SUDO} env SSH_SK_HELPER=\"$SSH_SK_HELPER\" sh ${SRC}/sshd-log-wrapper.sh ${TEST_SSHD_LOGFILE} ${SSHD} -i -f $OBJ/sshd_proxy
) > $OBJ/ssh_proxy
# check proxy config
${SSHD} -t -f $OBJ/sshd_proxy || fatal "sshd_proxy broken"
start_sshd ()
{
# start sshd
$SUDO ${SSHD} -f $OBJ/sshd_config "$@" -t || fatal "sshd_config broken"
- $SUDO ${SSHD} -f $OBJ/sshd_config "$@" -E$TEST_SSHD_LOGFILE
+ $SUDO env SSH_SK_HELPER="$SSH_SK_HELPER" \
+ ${SSHD} -f $OBJ/sshd_config "$@" -E$TEST_SSHD_LOGFILE
trace "wait for sshd"
i=0;
while [ ! -f $PIDFILE -a $i -lt 10 ]; do
i=`expr $i + 1`
sleep $i
done
test -f $PIDFILE || fatal "no sshd running on port $PORT"
}
# source test body
. $SCRIPT
# kill sshd
cleanup
if [ "x$USE_VALGRIND" != "x" ]; then
# wait for any running process to complete
wait; sleep 1
VG_RESULTS=$(find $OBJ/valgrind-out -type f -print)
VG_RESULT_COUNT=0
VG_FAIL_COUNT=0
for i in $VG_RESULTS; do
if grep "ERROR SUMMARY" $i >/dev/null; then
VG_RESULT_COUNT=$(($VG_RESULT_COUNT + 1))
if ! grep "ERROR SUMMARY: 0 errors" $i >/dev/null; then
VG_FAIL_COUNT=$(($VG_FAIL_COUNT + 1))
RESULT=1
verbose valgrind failure $i
cat $i
fi
fi
done
if [ x"$VG_SKIP" != "x" ]; then
verbose valgrind skipped
else
verbose valgrind results $VG_RESULT_COUNT failures $VG_FAIL_COUNT
fi
fi
if [ $RESULT -eq 0 ]; then
verbose ok $tid
else
echo failed $tid
fi
exit $RESULT
diff --git a/regress/unittests/Makefile.inc b/regress/unittests/Makefile.inc
index 428ef6836981..370224aa5e36 100644
--- a/regress/unittests/Makefile.inc
+++ b/regress/unittests/Makefile.inc
@@ -1,86 +1,89 @@
-# $OpenBSD: Makefile.inc,v 1.13 2018/10/17 23:28:05 djm Exp $
+# $OpenBSD: Makefile.inc,v 1.14 2019/11/25 10:32:35 djm Exp $
REGRESS_FAIL_EARLY?= yes
.include <bsd.own.mk>
.include <bsd.obj.mk>
# User-settable options
UNITTEST_FAST?= no # Skip slow tests (e.g. less intensive fuzzing).
UNITTEST_SLOW?= no # Include slower tests (e.g. more intensive fuzzing).
UNITTEST_VERBOSE?= no # Verbose test output (inc. per-test names).
MALLOC_OPTIONS?= CFGJRSUX
TEST_ENV?= MALLOC_OPTIONS=${MALLOC_OPTIONS}
# XXX detect from ssh binary?
OPENSSL?= yes
.if (${OPENSSL:L} == "yes")
CFLAGS+= -DWITH_OPENSSL
.endif
# enable warnings
WARNINGS=Yes
DEBUG=-g
CFLAGS+= -fstack-protector-all
CDIAGFLAGS= -Wall
CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wextra
CDIAGFLAGS+= -Werror
CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wchar-subscripts
CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wcomment
CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wformat
CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wformat-security
CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wimplicit
CDIAGFLAGS+= -Winline
CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wmissing-declarations
CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wmissing-prototypes
CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wparentheses
CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wpointer-arith
CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wreturn-type
CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wshadow
CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wsign-compare
CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wstrict-aliasing
CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wstrict-prototypes
CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wswitch
CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wtrigraphs
CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wuninitialized
CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wunused
CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wno-unused-parameter
.if ${COMPILER_VERSION:L} != "gcc3"
CDIAGFLAGS+= -Wold-style-definition
.endif
SSHREL=../../../../../usr.bin/ssh
CFLAGS+=-I${.CURDIR}/../test_helper -I${.CURDIR}/${SSHREL}
.if exists(${.CURDIR}/../test_helper/${__objdir})
LDADD+=-L${.CURDIR}/../test_helper/${__objdir} -ltest_helper
DPADD+=${.CURDIR}/../test_helper/${__objdir}/libtest_helper.a
.else
LDADD+=-L${.CURDIR}/../test_helper -ltest_helper
DPADD+=${.CURDIR}/../test_helper/libtest_helper.a
.endif
.PATH: ${.CURDIR}/${SSHREL}
LDADD+= -lutil
DPADD+= ${LIBUTIL}
.if (${OPENSSL:L} == "yes")
LDADD+= -lcrypto
DPADD+= ${LIBCRYPTO}
.endif
+LDADD+= -lfido2 -lcbor -lusbhid
+DPADD+= ${LIBFIDO2} ${LIBCBOR} ${LIBUSBHID}
+
UNITTEST_ARGS?=
.if (${UNITTEST_VERBOSE:L} != "no")
UNITTEST_ARGS+= -v
.endif
.if (${UNITTEST_FAST:L} != "no")
UNITTEST_ARGS+= -f
.elif (${UNITTEST_SLOW:L} != "no")
UNITTEST_ARGS+= -F
.endif
diff --git a/regress/unittests/hostkeys/Makefile b/regress/unittests/hostkeys/Makefile
index 3368851225c5..c0a8931352de 100644
--- a/regress/unittests/hostkeys/Makefile
+++ b/regress/unittests/hostkeys/Makefile
@@ -1,23 +1,24 @@
-# $OpenBSD: Makefile,v 1.4 2017/12/21 00:41:22 djm Exp $
+# $OpenBSD: Makefile,v 1.7 2020/01/26 00:09:50 djm Exp $
PROG=test_hostkeys
SRCS=tests.c test_iterate.c
# From usr.bin/ssh
SRCS+=sshbuf-getput-basic.c sshbuf-getput-crypto.c sshbuf-misc.c sshbuf.c
-SRCS+=atomicio.c sshkey.c authfile.c cipher.c log.c ssh-rsa.c ssh-dss.c
-SRCS+=ssh-ecdsa.c ssh-ed25519.c mac.c umac.c umac128.c hmac.c misc.c
+SRCS+=sshbuf-io.c atomicio.c sshkey.c authfile.c cipher.c log.c ssh-rsa.c
+SRCS+=ssh-dss.c ssh-ecdsa.c ssh-ed25519.c mac.c umac.c umac128.c hmac.c misc.c
SRCS+=ssherr.c uidswap.c cleanup.c xmalloc.c match.c krl.c fatal.c
SRCS+=addrmatch.c bitmap.c hostfile.c
SRCS+=ed25519.c hash.c ge25519.c fe25519.c sc25519.c verify.c
-SRCS+=cipher-chachapoly.c chacha.c poly1305.c
+SRCS+=cipher-chachapoly.c chacha.c poly1305.c ssh-ecdsa-sk.c ssh-sk.c
+SRCS+=ssh-ed25519-sk.c sk-usbhid.c
SRCS+=digest-openssl.c
#SRCS+=digest-libc.c
REGRESS_TARGETS=run-regress-${PROG}
run-regress-${PROG}: ${PROG}
env ${TEST_ENV} ./${PROG} -d ${.CURDIR}/testdata
.include <bsd.regress.mk>
diff --git a/regress/unittests/kex/Makefile b/regress/unittests/kex/Makefile
index 7b4c644e5fb1..648006c7897d 100644
--- a/regress/unittests/kex/Makefile
+++ b/regress/unittests/kex/Makefile
@@ -1,38 +1,39 @@
-# $OpenBSD: Makefile,v 1.6 2019/01/21 12:35:20 djm Exp $
+# $OpenBSD: Makefile,v 1.9 2020/01/26 00:09:50 djm Exp $
PROG=test_kex
SRCS=tests.c test_kex.c
# From usr.bin/ssh
SRCS+=sshbuf-getput-basic.c sshbuf-getput-crypto.c sshbuf-misc.c sshbuf.c
-SRCS+=atomicio.c sshkey.c authfile.c cipher.c log.c ssh-rsa.c ssh-dss.c
-SRCS+=ssh-ecdsa.c ssh-ed25519.c mac.c umac.c umac128.c hmac.c misc.c
+SRCS+=sshbuf-io.c atomicio.c sshkey.c authfile.c cipher.c log.c ssh-rsa.c
+SRCS+=ssh-dss.c ssh-ecdsa.c ssh-ed25519.c mac.c umac.c umac128.c hmac.c misc.c
SRCS+=ssherr.c uidswap.c cleanup.c xmalloc.c match.c krl.c fatal.c
SRCS+=addrmatch.c bitmap.c packet.c dispatch.c canohost.c ssh_api.c
SRCS+=compat.c ed25519.c hash.c ge25519.c fe25519.c sc25519.c verify.c
-SRCS+=cipher-chachapoly.c chacha.c poly1305.c
+SRCS+=cipher-chachapoly.c chacha.c poly1305.c ssh-ecdsa-sk.c ssh-sk.c
+SRCS+=ssh-ed25519-sk.c sk-usbhid.c
SRCS+= kex.c
SRCS+= dh.c
SRCS+= kexdh.c
SRCS+= kexecdh.c
SRCS+= kexgex.c
SRCS+= kexgexc.c
SRCS+= kexgexs.c
SRCS+= kexc25519.c
SRCS+= smult_curve25519_ref.c
SRCS+= kexgen.c
SRCS+= kexsntrup4591761x25519.c
SRCS+= sntrup4591761.c
SRCS+=digest-openssl.c
#SRCS+=digest-libc.c
REGRESS_TARGETS=run-regress-${PROG}
run-regress-${PROG}: ${PROG}
env ${TEST_ENV} ./${PROG}
.include <bsd.regress.mk>
LDADD+=-lz
diff --git a/regress/unittests/misc/tests.c b/regress/unittests/misc/tests.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..ed775ebbd9d2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/regress/unittests/misc/tests.c
@@ -0,0 +1,79 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: tests.c,v 1.1 2019/04/28 22:53:26 dtucker Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Regress test for misc helper functions.
+ *
+ * Placed in the public domain.
+ */
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/param.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdint.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include "test_helper.h"
+
+#include "misc.h"
+
+void
+tests(void)
+{
+ int port;
+ char *user, *host, *path;
+
+ TEST_START("misc_parse_user_host_path");
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(parse_user_host_path("someuser@some.host:some/path",
+ &user, &host, &path), 0);
+ ASSERT_STRING_EQ(user, "someuser");
+ ASSERT_STRING_EQ(host, "some.host");
+ ASSERT_STRING_EQ(path, "some/path");
+ free(user); free(host); free(path);
+ TEST_DONE();
+
+ TEST_START("misc_parse_user_ipv4_path");
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(parse_user_host_path("someuser@1.22.33.144:some/path",
+ &user, &host, &path), 0);
+ ASSERT_STRING_EQ(user, "someuser");
+ ASSERT_STRING_EQ(host, "1.22.33.144");
+ ASSERT_STRING_EQ(path, "some/path");
+ free(user); free(host); free(path);
+ TEST_DONE();
+
+ TEST_START("misc_parse_user_[ipv4]_path");
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(parse_user_host_path("someuser@[1.22.33.144]:some/path",
+ &user, &host, &path), 0);
+ ASSERT_STRING_EQ(user, "someuser");
+ ASSERT_STRING_EQ(host, "1.22.33.144");
+ ASSERT_STRING_EQ(path, "some/path");
+ free(user); free(host); free(path);
+ TEST_DONE();
+
+ TEST_START("misc_parse_user_[ipv4]_nopath");
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(parse_user_host_path("someuser@[1.22.33.144]:",
+ &user, &host, &path), 0);
+ ASSERT_STRING_EQ(user, "someuser");
+ ASSERT_STRING_EQ(host, "1.22.33.144");
+ ASSERT_STRING_EQ(path, ".");
+ free(user); free(host); free(path);
+ TEST_DONE();
+
+ TEST_START("misc_parse_user_ipv6_path");
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(parse_user_host_path("someuser@[::1]:some/path",
+ &user, &host, &path), 0);
+ ASSERT_STRING_EQ(user, "someuser");
+ ASSERT_STRING_EQ(host, "::1");
+ ASSERT_STRING_EQ(path, "some/path");
+ free(user); free(host); free(path);
+ TEST_DONE();
+
+ TEST_START("misc_parse_uri");
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(parse_uri("ssh", "ssh://someuser@some.host:22/some/path",
+ &user, &host, &port, &path), 0);
+ ASSERT_STRING_EQ(user, "someuser");
+ ASSERT_STRING_EQ(host, "some.host");
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(port, 22);
+ ASSERT_STRING_EQ(path, "some/path");
+ free(user); free(host); free(path);
+ TEST_DONE();
+}
diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshbuf/Makefile b/regress/unittests/sshbuf/Makefile
index 0e8e9fd1010e..5f6c4426a7b0 100644
--- a/regress/unittests/sshbuf/Makefile
+++ b/regress/unittests/sshbuf/Makefile
@@ -1,21 +1,21 @@
-# $OpenBSD: Makefile,v 1.7 2018/10/17 23:28:05 djm Exp $
+# $OpenBSD: Makefile,v 1.8 2020/01/26 00:09:50 djm Exp $
-.include <bsd.regress.mk>
+# $OpenBSD: Makefile,v 1.8 2020/01/26 00:09:50 djm Exp $
PROG=test_sshbuf
SRCS=tests.c
SRCS+=test_sshbuf.c
SRCS+=test_sshbuf_getput_basic.c
SRCS+=test_sshbuf_getput_crypto.c
SRCS+=test_sshbuf_misc.c
SRCS+=test_sshbuf_fuzz.c
SRCS+=test_sshbuf_getput_fuzz.c
SRCS+=test_sshbuf_fixed.c
# From usr.bin/ssh
SRCS+=sshbuf-getput-basic.c sshbuf-getput-crypto.c sshbuf-misc.c sshbuf.c
-SRCS+=atomicio.c
+SRCS+=sshbuf-io.c atomicio.c misc.c xmalloc.c log.c fatal.c ssherr.c cleanup.c
run-regress-${PROG}: ${PROG}
env ${TEST_ENV} ./${PROG} ${UNITTEST_ARGS}
diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/Makefile b/regress/unittests/sshkey/Makefile
index aa731df1c2d4..78b2cf0ce576 100644
--- a/regress/unittests/sshkey/Makefile
+++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/Makefile
@@ -1,24 +1,25 @@
-# $OpenBSD: Makefile,v 1.6 2018/10/17 23:28:05 djm Exp $
+# $OpenBSD: Makefile,v 1.9 2020/01/26 00:09:50 djm Exp $
PROG=test_sshkey
SRCS=tests.c test_sshkey.c test_file.c test_fuzz.c common.c
# From usr.bin/ssh
SRCS+=sshbuf-getput-basic.c sshbuf-getput-crypto.c sshbuf-misc.c sshbuf.c
-SRCS+=atomicio.c sshkey.c authfile.c cipher.c log.c ssh-rsa.c ssh-dss.c
-SRCS+=ssh-ecdsa.c ssh-ed25519.c mac.c umac.c umac128.c hmac.c misc.c
+SRCS+=sshbuf-io.c atomicio.c sshkey.c authfile.c cipher.c log.c ssh-rsa.c
+SRCS+=ssh-dss.c ssh-ecdsa.c ssh-ed25519.c mac.c umac.c umac128.c hmac.c misc.c
SRCS+=ssherr.c uidswap.c cleanup.c xmalloc.c match.c krl.c fatal.c
SRCS+=addrmatch.c bitmap.c
SRCS+=ed25519.c hash.c ge25519.c fe25519.c sc25519.c verify.c
-SRCS+=cipher-chachapoly.c chacha.c poly1305.c
+SRCS+=cipher-chachapoly.c chacha.c poly1305.c ssh-ecdsa-sk.c ssh-sk.c
+SRCS+=ssh-ed25519-sk.c sk-usbhid.c
SRCS+=digest-openssl.c
#SRCS+=digest-libc.c
REGRESS_TARGETS=run-regress-${PROG}
run-regress-${PROG}: ${PROG}
env ${TEST_ENV} ./${PROG} ${UNITTEST_ARGS} -d ${.CURDIR}/testdata
.include <bsd.regress.mk>
diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/common.c b/regress/unittests/sshkey/common.c
index e21638093520..effea578c094 100644
--- a/regress/unittests/sshkey/common.c
+++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/common.c
@@ -1,167 +1,164 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: common.c,v 1.3 2018/09/13 09:03:20 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: common.c,v 1.4 2020/01/26 00:09:50 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Helpers for key API tests
*
* Placed in the public domain
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/param.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
#include <stdint.h>
#endif
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
#include <openssl/bn.h>
#include <openssl/rsa.h>
#include <openssl/dsa.h>
#include <openssl/objects.h>
#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP256
# include <openssl/ec.h>
#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP256 */
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
#include "../test_helper/test_helper.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
#include "authfile.h"
#include "sshkey.h"
#include "sshbuf.h"
#include "common.h"
struct sshbuf *
load_file(const char *name)
{
- int fd;
- struct sshbuf *ret;
+ struct sshbuf *ret = NULL;
- ASSERT_PTR_NE(ret = sshbuf_new(), NULL);
- ASSERT_INT_NE(fd = open(test_data_file(name), O_RDONLY), -1);
- ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_file(fd, ret), 0);
- close(fd);
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_load_file(test_data_file(name), &ret), 0);
+ ASSERT_PTR_NE(ret, NULL);
return ret;
}
struct sshbuf *
load_text_file(const char *name)
{
struct sshbuf *ret = load_file(name);
const u_char *p;
/* Trim whitespace at EOL */
for (p = sshbuf_ptr(ret); sshbuf_len(ret) > 0;) {
if (p[sshbuf_len(ret) - 1] == '\r' ||
p[sshbuf_len(ret) - 1] == '\t' ||
p[sshbuf_len(ret) - 1] == ' ' ||
p[sshbuf_len(ret) - 1] == '\n')
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_consume_end(ret, 1), 0);
else
break;
}
/* \0 terminate */
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u8(ret, 0), 0);
return ret;
}
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
BIGNUM *
load_bignum(const char *name)
{
BIGNUM *ret = NULL;
struct sshbuf *buf;
buf = load_text_file(name);
ASSERT_INT_NE(BN_hex2bn(&ret, (const char *)sshbuf_ptr(buf)), 0);
sshbuf_free(buf);
return ret;
}
const BIGNUM *
rsa_n(struct sshkey *k)
{
const BIGNUM *n = NULL;
ASSERT_PTR_NE(k, NULL);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(k->rsa, NULL);
RSA_get0_key(k->rsa, &n, NULL, NULL);
return n;
}
const BIGNUM *
rsa_e(struct sshkey *k)
{
const BIGNUM *e = NULL;
ASSERT_PTR_NE(k, NULL);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(k->rsa, NULL);
RSA_get0_key(k->rsa, NULL, &e, NULL);
return e;
}
const BIGNUM *
rsa_p(struct sshkey *k)
{
const BIGNUM *p = NULL;
ASSERT_PTR_NE(k, NULL);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(k->rsa, NULL);
RSA_get0_factors(k->rsa, &p, NULL);
return p;
}
const BIGNUM *
rsa_q(struct sshkey *k)
{
const BIGNUM *q = NULL;
ASSERT_PTR_NE(k, NULL);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(k->rsa, NULL);
RSA_get0_factors(k->rsa, NULL, &q);
return q;
}
const BIGNUM *
dsa_g(struct sshkey *k)
{
const BIGNUM *g = NULL;
ASSERT_PTR_NE(k, NULL);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(k->dsa, NULL);
DSA_get0_pqg(k->dsa, NULL, NULL, &g);
return g;
}
const BIGNUM *
dsa_pub_key(struct sshkey *k)
{
const BIGNUM *pub_key = NULL;
ASSERT_PTR_NE(k, NULL);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(k->dsa, NULL);
DSA_get0_key(k->dsa, &pub_key, NULL);
return pub_key;
}
const BIGNUM *
dsa_priv_key(struct sshkey *k)
{
const BIGNUM *priv_key = NULL;
ASSERT_PTR_NE(k, NULL);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(k->dsa, NULL);
DSA_get0_key(k->dsa, NULL, &priv_key);
return priv_key;
}
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_fuzz.c b/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_fuzz.c
index 1323f89974a7..359811893170 100644
--- a/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_fuzz.c
+++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_fuzz.c
@@ -1,389 +1,390 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: test_fuzz.c,v 1.9 2018/10/17 23:28:05 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: test_fuzz.c,v 1.11 2019/11/25 10:32:35 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Fuzz tests for key parsing
*
* Placed in the public domain
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/param.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
#include <stdint.h>
#endif
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <openssl/bn.h>
#include <openssl/rsa.h>
#include <openssl/dsa.h>
#include <openssl/objects.h>
#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP256
# include <openssl/ec.h>
#endif
#include "../test_helper/test_helper.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
#include "authfile.h"
#include "sshkey.h"
#include "sshbuf.h"
#include "common.h"
void sshkey_fuzz_tests(void);
static void
onerror(void *fuzz)
{
fprintf(stderr, "Failed during fuzz:\n");
fuzz_dump((struct fuzz *)fuzz);
}
static void
public_fuzz(struct sshkey *k)
{
struct sshkey *k1;
struct sshbuf *buf;
struct fuzz *fuzz;
u_int fuzzers = FUZZ_1_BIT_FLIP | FUZZ_1_BYTE_FLIP |
FUZZ_TRUNCATE_START | FUZZ_TRUNCATE_END;
if (test_is_fast())
fuzzers &= ~FUZZ_1_BIT_FLIP;
if (test_is_slow())
fuzzers |= FUZZ_2_BIT_FLIP | FUZZ_2_BYTE_FLIP;
ASSERT_PTR_NE(buf = sshbuf_new(), NULL);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_putb(k, buf), 0);
fuzz = fuzz_begin(fuzzers, sshbuf_mutable_ptr(buf), sshbuf_len(buf));
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_from_blob(sshbuf_ptr(buf), sshbuf_len(buf),
&k1), 0);
sshkey_free(k1);
sshbuf_free(buf);
TEST_ONERROR(onerror, fuzz);
for(; !fuzz_done(fuzz); fuzz_next(fuzz)) {
if (sshkey_from_blob(fuzz_ptr(fuzz), fuzz_len(fuzz), &k1) == 0)
sshkey_free(k1);
}
fuzz_cleanup(fuzz);
}
static void
sig_fuzz(struct sshkey *k, const char *sig_alg)
{
struct fuzz *fuzz;
u_char *sig, c[] = "some junk to be signed";
size_t l;
u_int fuzzers = FUZZ_1_BIT_FLIP | FUZZ_1_BYTE_FLIP | FUZZ_2_BYTE_FLIP |
FUZZ_TRUNCATE_START | FUZZ_TRUNCATE_END;
if (test_is_fast())
fuzzers &= ~FUZZ_2_BYTE_FLIP;
if (test_is_slow())
fuzzers |= FUZZ_2_BIT_FLIP;
- ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_sign(k, &sig, &l, c, sizeof(c), sig_alg, 0), 0);
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_sign(k, &sig, &l, c, sizeof(c),
+ sig_alg, NULL, 0), 0);
ASSERT_SIZE_T_GT(l, 0);
fuzz = fuzz_begin(fuzzers, sig, l);
- ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_verify(k, sig, l, c, sizeof(c), NULL, 0), 0);
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_verify(k, sig, l, c, sizeof(c), NULL, 0, NULL), 0);
free(sig);
TEST_ONERROR(onerror, fuzz);
for(; !fuzz_done(fuzz); fuzz_next(fuzz)) {
/* Ensure 1-bit difference at least */
if (fuzz_matches_original(fuzz))
continue;
ASSERT_INT_NE(sshkey_verify(k, fuzz_ptr(fuzz), fuzz_len(fuzz),
- c, sizeof(c), NULL, 0), 0);
+ c, sizeof(c), NULL, 0, NULL), 0);
}
fuzz_cleanup(fuzz);
}
#define NUM_FAST_BASE64_TESTS 1024
void
sshkey_fuzz_tests(void)
{
struct sshkey *k1;
struct sshbuf *buf, *fuzzed;
struct fuzz *fuzz;
int r, i;
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
TEST_START("fuzz RSA private");
buf = load_file("rsa_1");
fuzz = fuzz_begin(FUZZ_BASE64, sshbuf_mutable_ptr(buf),
sshbuf_len(buf));
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", &k1, NULL), 0);
sshkey_free(k1);
sshbuf_free(buf);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(fuzzed = sshbuf_new(), NULL);
TEST_ONERROR(onerror, fuzz);
for(i = 0; !fuzz_done(fuzz); i++, fuzz_next(fuzz)) {
r = sshbuf_put(fuzzed, fuzz_ptr(fuzz), fuzz_len(fuzz));
ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, 0);
if (sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(fuzzed, "", &k1, NULL) == 0)
sshkey_free(k1);
sshbuf_reset(fuzzed);
if (test_is_fast() && i >= NUM_FAST_BASE64_TESTS)
break;
}
sshbuf_free(fuzzed);
fuzz_cleanup(fuzz);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("fuzz RSA new-format private");
buf = load_file("rsa_n");
fuzz = fuzz_begin(FUZZ_BASE64, sshbuf_mutable_ptr(buf),
sshbuf_len(buf));
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", &k1, NULL), 0);
sshkey_free(k1);
sshbuf_free(buf);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(fuzzed = sshbuf_new(), NULL);
TEST_ONERROR(onerror, fuzz);
for(i = 0; !fuzz_done(fuzz); i++, fuzz_next(fuzz)) {
r = sshbuf_put(fuzzed, fuzz_ptr(fuzz), fuzz_len(fuzz));
ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, 0);
if (sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(fuzzed, "", &k1, NULL) == 0)
sshkey_free(k1);
sshbuf_reset(fuzzed);
if (test_is_fast() && i >= NUM_FAST_BASE64_TESTS)
break;
}
sshbuf_free(fuzzed);
fuzz_cleanup(fuzz);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("fuzz DSA private");
buf = load_file("dsa_1");
fuzz = fuzz_begin(FUZZ_BASE64, sshbuf_mutable_ptr(buf),
sshbuf_len(buf));
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", &k1, NULL), 0);
sshkey_free(k1);
sshbuf_free(buf);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(fuzzed = sshbuf_new(), NULL);
TEST_ONERROR(onerror, fuzz);
for(i = 0; !fuzz_done(fuzz); i++, fuzz_next(fuzz)) {
r = sshbuf_put(fuzzed, fuzz_ptr(fuzz), fuzz_len(fuzz));
ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, 0);
if (sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(fuzzed, "", &k1, NULL) == 0)
sshkey_free(k1);
sshbuf_reset(fuzzed);
if (test_is_fast() && i >= NUM_FAST_BASE64_TESTS)
break;
}
sshbuf_free(fuzzed);
fuzz_cleanup(fuzz);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("fuzz DSA new-format private");
buf = load_file("dsa_n");
fuzz = fuzz_begin(FUZZ_BASE64, sshbuf_mutable_ptr(buf),
sshbuf_len(buf));
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", &k1, NULL), 0);
sshkey_free(k1);
sshbuf_free(buf);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(fuzzed = sshbuf_new(), NULL);
TEST_ONERROR(onerror, fuzz);
for(i = 0; !fuzz_done(fuzz); i++, fuzz_next(fuzz)) {
r = sshbuf_put(fuzzed, fuzz_ptr(fuzz), fuzz_len(fuzz));
ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, 0);
if (sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(fuzzed, "", &k1, NULL) == 0)
sshkey_free(k1);
sshbuf_reset(fuzzed);
if (test_is_fast() && i >= NUM_FAST_BASE64_TESTS)
break;
}
sshbuf_free(fuzzed);
fuzz_cleanup(fuzz);
TEST_DONE();
#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
TEST_START("fuzz ECDSA private");
buf = load_file("ecdsa_1");
fuzz = fuzz_begin(FUZZ_BASE64, sshbuf_mutable_ptr(buf),
sshbuf_len(buf));
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", &k1, NULL), 0);
sshkey_free(k1);
sshbuf_free(buf);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(fuzzed = sshbuf_new(), NULL);
TEST_ONERROR(onerror, fuzz);
for(i = 0; !fuzz_done(fuzz); i++, fuzz_next(fuzz)) {
r = sshbuf_put(fuzzed, fuzz_ptr(fuzz), fuzz_len(fuzz));
ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, 0);
if (sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(fuzzed, "", &k1, NULL) == 0)
sshkey_free(k1);
sshbuf_reset(fuzzed);
if (test_is_fast() && i >= NUM_FAST_BASE64_TESTS)
break;
}
sshbuf_free(fuzzed);
fuzz_cleanup(fuzz);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("fuzz ECDSA new-format private");
buf = load_file("ecdsa_n");
fuzz = fuzz_begin(FUZZ_BASE64, sshbuf_mutable_ptr(buf),
sshbuf_len(buf));
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", &k1, NULL), 0);
sshkey_free(k1);
sshbuf_free(buf);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(fuzzed = sshbuf_new(), NULL);
TEST_ONERROR(onerror, fuzz);
for(i = 0; !fuzz_done(fuzz); i++, fuzz_next(fuzz)) {
r = sshbuf_put(fuzzed, fuzz_ptr(fuzz), fuzz_len(fuzz));
ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, 0);
if (sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(fuzzed, "", &k1, NULL) == 0)
sshkey_free(k1);
sshbuf_reset(fuzzed);
if (test_is_fast() && i >= NUM_FAST_BASE64_TESTS)
break;
}
sshbuf_free(fuzzed);
fuzz_cleanup(fuzz);
TEST_DONE();
#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
TEST_START("fuzz Ed25519 private");
buf = load_file("ed25519_1");
fuzz = fuzz_begin(FUZZ_BASE64, sshbuf_mutable_ptr(buf),
sshbuf_len(buf));
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", &k1, NULL), 0);
sshkey_free(k1);
sshbuf_free(buf);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(fuzzed = sshbuf_new(), NULL);
TEST_ONERROR(onerror, fuzz);
for(i = 0; !fuzz_done(fuzz); i++, fuzz_next(fuzz)) {
r = sshbuf_put(fuzzed, fuzz_ptr(fuzz), fuzz_len(fuzz));
ASSERT_INT_EQ(r, 0);
if (sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(fuzzed, "", &k1, NULL) == 0)
sshkey_free(k1);
sshbuf_reset(fuzzed);
if (test_is_fast() && i >= NUM_FAST_BASE64_TESTS)
break;
}
sshbuf_free(fuzzed);
fuzz_cleanup(fuzz);
TEST_DONE();
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
TEST_START("fuzz RSA public");
buf = load_file("rsa_1");
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", &k1, NULL), 0);
sshbuf_free(buf);
public_fuzz(k1);
sshkey_free(k1);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("fuzz RSA cert");
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_cert(test_data_file("rsa_1"), &k1), 0);
public_fuzz(k1);
sshkey_free(k1);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("fuzz DSA public");
buf = load_file("dsa_1");
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", &k1, NULL), 0);
sshbuf_free(buf);
public_fuzz(k1);
sshkey_free(k1);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("fuzz DSA cert");
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_cert(test_data_file("dsa_1"), &k1), 0);
public_fuzz(k1);
sshkey_free(k1);
TEST_DONE();
#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
TEST_START("fuzz ECDSA public");
buf = load_file("ecdsa_1");
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", &k1, NULL), 0);
sshbuf_free(buf);
public_fuzz(k1);
sshkey_free(k1);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("fuzz ECDSA cert");
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_cert(test_data_file("ecdsa_1"), &k1), 0);
public_fuzz(k1);
sshkey_free(k1);
TEST_DONE();
#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
TEST_START("fuzz Ed25519 public");
buf = load_file("ed25519_1");
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", &k1, NULL), 0);
sshbuf_free(buf);
public_fuzz(k1);
sshkey_free(k1);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("fuzz Ed25519 cert");
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_cert(test_data_file("ed25519_1"), &k1), 0);
public_fuzz(k1);
sshkey_free(k1);
TEST_DONE();
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
TEST_START("fuzz RSA sig");
buf = load_file("rsa_1");
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", &k1, NULL), 0);
sshbuf_free(buf);
sig_fuzz(k1, "ssh-rsa");
sshkey_free(k1);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("fuzz RSA SHA256 sig");
buf = load_file("rsa_1");
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", &k1, NULL), 0);
sshbuf_free(buf);
sig_fuzz(k1, "rsa-sha2-256");
sshkey_free(k1);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("fuzz RSA SHA512 sig");
buf = load_file("rsa_1");
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", &k1, NULL), 0);
sshbuf_free(buf);
sig_fuzz(k1, "rsa-sha2-512");
sshkey_free(k1);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("fuzz DSA sig");
buf = load_file("dsa_1");
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", &k1, NULL), 0);
sshbuf_free(buf);
sig_fuzz(k1, NULL);
sshkey_free(k1);
TEST_DONE();
#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
TEST_START("fuzz ECDSA sig");
buf = load_file("ecdsa_1");
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", &k1, NULL), 0);
sshbuf_free(buf);
sig_fuzz(k1, NULL);
sshkey_free(k1);
TEST_DONE();
#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
TEST_START("fuzz Ed25519 sig");
buf = load_file("ed25519_1");
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(buf, "", &k1, NULL), 0);
sshbuf_free(buf);
sig_fuzz(k1, NULL);
sshkey_free(k1);
TEST_DONE();
/* XXX fuzz decoded new-format blobs too */
/* XXX fuzz XMSS too */
}
diff --git a/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey.c b/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey.c
index 42395b8db6a3..025bb98159ca 100644
--- a/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey.c
+++ b/regress/unittests/sshkey/test_sshkey.c
@@ -1,526 +1,526 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: test_sshkey.c,v 1.18 2019/06/21 04:21:45 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: test_sshkey.c,v 1.20 2019/11/25 10:32:35 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Regress test for sshkey.h key management API
*
* Placed in the public domain
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/param.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
#include <stdint.h>
#endif
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <openssl/bn.h>
#include <openssl/rsa.h>
#include <openssl/dsa.h>
#if defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC) && defined(OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP256)
# include <openssl/ec.h>
#endif
#include "../test_helper/test_helper.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
#include "sshbuf.h"
#define SSHBUF_INTERNAL 1 /* access internals for testing */
#include "sshkey.h"
#include "authfile.h"
#include "common.h"
#include "ssh2.h"
void sshkey_tests(void);
static void
put_opt(struct sshbuf *b, const char *name, const char *value)
{
struct sshbuf *sect;
sect = sshbuf_new();
ASSERT_PTR_NE(sect, NULL);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_cstring(b, name), 0);
if (value != NULL)
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_cstring(sect, value), 0);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_stringb(b, sect), 0);
sshbuf_free(sect);
}
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
static void
build_cert(struct sshbuf *b, struct sshkey *k, const char *type,
struct sshkey *sign_key, struct sshkey *ca_key,
const char *sig_alg)
{
struct sshbuf *ca_buf, *pk, *principals, *critopts, *exts;
u_char *sigblob;
size_t siglen;
ca_buf = sshbuf_new();
ASSERT_PTR_NE(ca_buf, NULL);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_putb(ca_key, ca_buf), 0);
/*
* Get the public key serialisation by rendering the key and skipping
* the type string. This is a bit of a hack :/
*/
pk = sshbuf_new();
ASSERT_PTR_NE(pk, NULL);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_putb_plain(k, pk), 0);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_skip_string(pk), 0);
principals = sshbuf_new();
ASSERT_PTR_NE(principals, NULL);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_cstring(principals, "gsamsa"), 0);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_cstring(principals, "gregor"), 0);
critopts = sshbuf_new();
ASSERT_PTR_NE(critopts, NULL);
put_opt(critopts, "force-command", "/usr/local/bin/nethack");
put_opt(critopts, "source-address", "192.168.0.0/24,127.0.0.1,::1");
exts = sshbuf_new();
ASSERT_PTR_NE(exts, NULL);
put_opt(critopts, "permit-X11-forwarding", NULL);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_cstring(b, type), 0);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_cstring(b, "noncenoncenonce!"), 0); /* nonce */
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_putb(b, pk), 0); /* public key serialisation */
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u64(b, 1234), 0); /* serial */
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u32(b, SSH2_CERT_TYPE_USER), 0); /* type */
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_cstring(b, "gregor"), 0); /* key ID */
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_stringb(b, principals), 0); /* principals */
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u64(b, 0), 0); /* start */
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_u64(b, 0xffffffffffffffffULL), 0); /* end */
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_stringb(b, critopts), 0); /* options */
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_stringb(b, exts), 0); /* extensions */
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_string(b, NULL, 0), 0); /* reserved */
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_stringb(b, ca_buf), 0); /* signature key */
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_sign(sign_key, &sigblob, &siglen,
- sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b), sig_alg, 0), 0);
+ sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b), sig_alg, NULL, 0), 0);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshbuf_put_string(b, sigblob, siglen), 0); /* signature */
free(sigblob);
sshbuf_free(ca_buf);
sshbuf_free(exts);
sshbuf_free(critopts);
sshbuf_free(principals);
sshbuf_free(pk);
}
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
static void
signature_test(struct sshkey *k, struct sshkey *bad, const char *sig_alg,
const u_char *d, size_t l)
{
size_t len;
u_char *sig;
- ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_sign(k, &sig, &len, d, l, sig_alg, 0), 0);
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_sign(k, &sig, &len, d, l, sig_alg, NULL, 0), 0);
ASSERT_SIZE_T_GT(len, 8);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(sig, NULL);
- ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_verify(k, sig, len, d, l, NULL, 0), 0);
- ASSERT_INT_NE(sshkey_verify(bad, sig, len, d, l, NULL, 0), 0);
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_verify(k, sig, len, d, l, NULL, 0, NULL), 0);
+ ASSERT_INT_NE(sshkey_verify(bad, sig, len, d, l, NULL, 0, NULL), 0);
/* Fuzz test is more comprehensive, this is just a smoke test */
sig[len - 5] ^= 0x10;
- ASSERT_INT_NE(sshkey_verify(k, sig, len, d, l, NULL, 0), 0);
+ ASSERT_INT_NE(sshkey_verify(k, sig, len, d, l, NULL, 0, NULL), 0);
free(sig);
}
static void
banana(u_char *s, size_t l)
{
size_t o;
const u_char the_banana[] = { 'b', 'a', 'n', 'a', 'n', 'a' };
for (o = 0; o < l; o += sizeof(the_banana)) {
if (l - o < sizeof(the_banana)) {
memcpy(s + o, "nanananana", l - o);
break;
}
memcpy(s + o, banana, sizeof(the_banana));
}
}
static void
signature_tests(struct sshkey *k, struct sshkey *bad, const char *sig_alg)
{
u_char i, buf[2049];
size_t lens[] = {
1, 2, 7, 8, 9, 15, 16, 17, 31, 32, 33, 127, 128, 129,
255, 256, 257, 1023, 1024, 1025, 2047, 2048, 2049
};
for (i = 0; i < (sizeof(lens)/sizeof(lens[0])); i++) {
test_subtest_info("%s key, banana length %zu",
sshkey_type(k), lens[i]);
banana(buf, lens[i]);
signature_test(k, bad, sig_alg, buf, lens[i]);
}
}
static struct sshkey *
get_private(const char *n)
{
struct sshbuf *b;
struct sshkey *ret;
b = load_file(n);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(b, "", &ret, NULL), 0);
sshbuf_free(b);
return ret;
}
void
sshkey_tests(void)
{
struct sshkey *k1, *k2, *k3, *kf;
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
struct sshkey *k4, *kr, *kd;
#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
struct sshkey *ke;
#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
struct sshbuf *b;
TEST_START("new invalid");
k1 = sshkey_new(-42);
ASSERT_PTR_EQ(k1, NULL);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("new/free KEY_UNSPEC");
k1 = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1, NULL);
sshkey_free(k1);
TEST_DONE();
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
TEST_START("new/free KEY_RSA");
k1 = sshkey_new(KEY_RSA);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1, NULL);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->rsa, NULL);
sshkey_free(k1);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("new/free KEY_DSA");
k1 = sshkey_new(KEY_DSA);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1, NULL);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->dsa, NULL);
sshkey_free(k1);
TEST_DONE();
#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
TEST_START("new/free KEY_ECDSA");
k1 = sshkey_new(KEY_ECDSA);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1, NULL);
ASSERT_PTR_EQ(k1->ecdsa, NULL); /* Can't allocate without NID */
sshkey_free(k1);
TEST_DONE();
#endif
TEST_START("new/free KEY_ED25519");
k1 = sshkey_new(KEY_ED25519);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1, NULL);
/* These should be blank until key loaded or generated */
ASSERT_PTR_EQ(k1->ed25519_sk, NULL);
ASSERT_PTR_EQ(k1->ed25519_pk, NULL);
sshkey_free(k1);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("generate KEY_RSA too small modulus");
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_generate(KEY_RSA, 128, &k1),
SSH_ERR_KEY_LENGTH);
ASSERT_PTR_EQ(k1, NULL);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("generate KEY_RSA too large modulus");
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_generate(KEY_RSA, 1 << 20, &k1),
SSH_ERR_KEY_LENGTH);
ASSERT_PTR_EQ(k1, NULL);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("generate KEY_DSA wrong bits");
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_generate(KEY_DSA, 2048, &k1),
SSH_ERR_KEY_LENGTH);
ASSERT_PTR_EQ(k1, NULL);
sshkey_free(k1);
TEST_DONE();
#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
TEST_START("generate KEY_ECDSA wrong bits");
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_generate(KEY_ECDSA, 42, &k1),
SSH_ERR_KEY_LENGTH);
ASSERT_PTR_EQ(k1, NULL);
sshkey_free(k1);
TEST_DONE();
#endif
TEST_START("generate KEY_RSA");
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_generate(KEY_RSA, 767, &kr),
SSH_ERR_KEY_LENGTH);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_generate(KEY_RSA, 1024, &kr), 0);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(kr, NULL);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(kr->rsa, NULL);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(rsa_n(kr), NULL);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(rsa_e(kr), NULL);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(rsa_p(kr), NULL);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(BN_num_bits(rsa_n(kr)), 1024);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("generate KEY_DSA");
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_generate(KEY_DSA, 1024, &kd), 0);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(kd, NULL);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(kd->dsa, NULL);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(dsa_g(kd), NULL);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(dsa_priv_key(kd), NULL);
TEST_DONE();
#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
TEST_START("generate KEY_ECDSA");
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_generate(KEY_ECDSA, 256, &ke), 0);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(ke, NULL);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(ke->ecdsa, NULL);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ke->ecdsa), NULL);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(EC_KEY_get0_private_key(ke->ecdsa), NULL);
TEST_DONE();
#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
TEST_START("generate KEY_ED25519");
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_generate(KEY_ED25519, 256, &kf), 0);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(kf, NULL);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(kf->type, KEY_ED25519);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(kf->ed25519_pk, NULL);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(kf->ed25519_sk, NULL);
TEST_DONE();
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
TEST_START("demote KEY_RSA");
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_from_private(kr, &k1), 0);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1, NULL);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(kr, k1);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(k1->type, KEY_RSA);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->rsa, NULL);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(rsa_n(k1), NULL);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(rsa_e(k1), NULL);
ASSERT_PTR_EQ(rsa_p(k1), NULL);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("equal KEY_RSA/demoted KEY_RSA");
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(kr, k1), 1);
sshkey_free(k1);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("demote KEY_DSA");
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_from_private(kd, &k1), 0);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1, NULL);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(kd, k1);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(k1->type, KEY_DSA);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->dsa, NULL);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(dsa_g(k1), NULL);
ASSERT_PTR_EQ(dsa_priv_key(k1), NULL);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("equal KEY_DSA/demoted KEY_DSA");
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(kd, k1), 1);
sshkey_free(k1);
TEST_DONE();
#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
TEST_START("demote KEY_ECDSA");
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_from_private(ke, &k1), 0);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1, NULL);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(ke, k1);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(k1->type, KEY_ECDSA);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->ecdsa, NULL);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(k1->ecdsa_nid, ke->ecdsa_nid);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(EC_KEY_get0_public_key(ke->ecdsa), NULL);
ASSERT_PTR_EQ(EC_KEY_get0_private_key(k1->ecdsa), NULL);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("equal KEY_ECDSA/demoted KEY_ECDSA");
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(ke, k1), 1);
sshkey_free(k1);
TEST_DONE();
#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
TEST_START("demote KEY_ED25519");
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_from_private(kf, &k1), 0);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1, NULL);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(kf, k1);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(k1->type, KEY_ED25519);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->ed25519_pk, NULL);
ASSERT_PTR_EQ(k1->ed25519_sk, NULL);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("equal KEY_ED25519/demoted KEY_ED25519");
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(kf, k1), 1);
sshkey_free(k1);
TEST_DONE();
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
TEST_START("equal mismatched key types");
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(kd, kr), 0);
#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(kd, ke), 0);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(kr, ke), 0);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(ke, kf), 0);
#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(kd, kf), 0);
TEST_DONE();
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
TEST_START("equal different keys");
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_generate(KEY_RSA, 1024, &k1), 0);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(kr, k1), 0);
sshkey_free(k1);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_generate(KEY_DSA, 1024, &k1), 0);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(kd, k1), 0);
sshkey_free(k1);
#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_generate(KEY_ECDSA, 256, &k1), 0);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(ke, k1), 0);
sshkey_free(k1);
#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_generate(KEY_ED25519, 256, &k1), 0);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_equal(kf, k1), 0);
sshkey_free(k1);
TEST_DONE();
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
sshkey_free(kr);
sshkey_free(kd);
#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
sshkey_free(ke);
#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
sshkey_free(kf);
TEST_START("certify key");
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_public(test_data_file("ed25519_1.pub"),
&k1, NULL), 0);
k2 = get_private("ed25519_2");
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_to_certified(k1), 0);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->cert, NULL);
k1->cert->type = SSH2_CERT_TYPE_USER;
k1->cert->serial = 1234;
k1->cert->key_id = strdup("estragon");
ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->cert->key_id, NULL);
k1->cert->principals = calloc(4, sizeof(*k1->cert->principals));
ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->cert->principals, NULL);
k1->cert->principals[0] = strdup("estragon");
k1->cert->principals[1] = strdup("vladimir");
k1->cert->principals[2] = strdup("pozzo");
k1->cert->principals[3] = strdup("lucky");
ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->cert->principals[0], NULL);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->cert->principals[1], NULL);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->cert->principals[2], NULL);
ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->cert->principals[3], NULL);
k1->cert->nprincipals = 4;
k1->cert->valid_after = 0;
k1->cert->valid_before = (u_int64_t)-1;
sshbuf_free(k1->cert->critical);
k1->cert->critical = sshbuf_new();
ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->cert->critical, NULL);
sshbuf_free(k1->cert->extensions);
k1->cert->extensions = sshbuf_new();
ASSERT_PTR_NE(k1->cert->extensions, NULL);
put_opt(k1->cert->critical, "force-command", "/usr/bin/true");
put_opt(k1->cert->critical, "source-address", "127.0.0.1");
put_opt(k1->cert->extensions, "permit-X11-forwarding", NULL);
put_opt(k1->cert->extensions, "permit-agent-forwarding", NULL);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_from_private(k2, &k1->cert->signature_key), 0);
- ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_certify(k1, k2, NULL), 0);
+ ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_certify(k1, k2, NULL, NULL), 0);
b = sshbuf_new();
ASSERT_PTR_NE(b, NULL);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_putb(k1, b), 0);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_from_blob(sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b), &k3), 0);
sshkey_free(k1);
sshkey_free(k2);
sshkey_free(k3);
sshbuf_reset(b);
TEST_DONE();
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
TEST_START("sign and verify RSA");
k1 = get_private("rsa_1");
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_public(test_data_file("rsa_2.pub"), &k2,
NULL), 0);
signature_tests(k1, k2, "ssh-rsa");
sshkey_free(k1);
sshkey_free(k2);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("sign and verify RSA-SHA256");
k1 = get_private("rsa_1");
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_public(test_data_file("rsa_2.pub"), &k2,
NULL), 0);
signature_tests(k1, k2, "rsa-sha2-256");
sshkey_free(k1);
sshkey_free(k2);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("sign and verify RSA-SHA512");
k1 = get_private("rsa_1");
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_public(test_data_file("rsa_2.pub"), &k2,
NULL), 0);
signature_tests(k1, k2, "rsa-sha2-512");
sshkey_free(k1);
sshkey_free(k2);
TEST_DONE();
TEST_START("sign and verify DSA");
k1 = get_private("dsa_1");
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_public(test_data_file("dsa_2.pub"), &k2,
NULL), 0);
signature_tests(k1, k2, NULL);
sshkey_free(k1);
sshkey_free(k2);
TEST_DONE();
#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
TEST_START("sign and verify ECDSA");
k1 = get_private("ecdsa_1");
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_public(test_data_file("ecdsa_2.pub"), &k2,
NULL), 0);
signature_tests(k1, k2, NULL);
sshkey_free(k1);
sshkey_free(k2);
TEST_DONE();
#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
TEST_START("sign and verify ED25519");
k1 = get_private("ed25519_1");
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_public(test_data_file("ed25519_2.pub"), &k2,
NULL), 0);
signature_tests(k1, k2, NULL);
sshkey_free(k1);
sshkey_free(k2);
TEST_DONE();
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
TEST_START("nested certificate");
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_cert(test_data_file("rsa_1"), &k1), 0);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_load_public(test_data_file("rsa_1.pub"), &k2,
NULL), 0);
k3 = get_private("rsa_1");
build_cert(b, k2, "ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com", k3, k1, NULL);
ASSERT_INT_EQ(sshkey_from_blob(sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b), &k4),
SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_INVALID_SIGN_KEY);
ASSERT_PTR_EQ(k4, NULL);
sshkey_free(k1);
sshkey_free(k2);
sshkey_free(k3);
sshbuf_free(b);
TEST_DONE();
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
}
diff --git a/sandbox-darwin.c b/sandbox-darwin.c
index a61de74951a0..59b4d286eea5 100644
--- a/sandbox-darwin.c
+++ b/sandbox-darwin.c
@@ -1,99 +1,99 @@
/*
* Copyright (c) 2011 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
*
* Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
* copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
* WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
* ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
* WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
* ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
* OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#ifdef SANDBOX_DARWIN
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sandbox.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include "log.h"
-#include "sandbox.h"
+#include "ssh-sandbox.h"
#include "monitor.h"
#include "xmalloc.h"
/* Darwin/OS X sandbox */
struct ssh_sandbox {
pid_t child_pid;
};
struct ssh_sandbox *
ssh_sandbox_init(struct monitor *monitor)
{
struct ssh_sandbox *box;
/*
* Strictly, we don't need to maintain any state here but we need
* to return non-NULL to satisfy the API.
*/
debug3("%s: preparing Darwin sandbox", __func__);
box = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*box));
box->child_pid = 0;
return box;
}
void
ssh_sandbox_child(struct ssh_sandbox *box)
{
char *errmsg;
struct rlimit rl_zero;
debug3("%s: starting Darwin sandbox", __func__);
if (sandbox_init(kSBXProfilePureComputation, SANDBOX_NAMED,
&errmsg) == -1)
fatal("%s: sandbox_init: %s", __func__, errmsg);
/*
* The kSBXProfilePureComputation still allows sockets, so
* we must disable these using rlimit.
*/
rl_zero.rlim_cur = rl_zero.rlim_max = 0;
if (setrlimit(RLIMIT_FSIZE, &rl_zero) == -1)
fatal("%s: setrlimit(RLIMIT_FSIZE, { 0, 0 }): %s",
__func__, strerror(errno));
if (setrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE, &rl_zero) == -1)
fatal("%s: setrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE, { 0, 0 }): %s",
__func__, strerror(errno));
if (setrlimit(RLIMIT_NPROC, &rl_zero) == -1)
fatal("%s: setrlimit(RLIMIT_NPROC, { 0, 0 }): %s",
__func__, strerror(errno));
}
void
ssh_sandbox_parent_finish(struct ssh_sandbox *box)
{
free(box);
debug3("%s: finished", __func__);
}
void
ssh_sandbox_parent_preauth(struct ssh_sandbox *box, pid_t child_pid)
{
box->child_pid = child_pid;
}
#endif /* SANDBOX_DARWIN */
diff --git a/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c b/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
index b5cda70bbbaf..f80981faf21c 100644
--- a/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
+++ b/sandbox-seccomp-filter.c
@@ -1,413 +1,428 @@
/*
* Copyright (c) 2012 Will Drewry <wad@dataspill.org>
*
* Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
* copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
* WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
* ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
* WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
* ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
* OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
*/
/*
* Uncomment the SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER_DEBUG macro below to help diagnose
* filter breakage during development. *Do not* use this in production,
* as it relies on making library calls that are unsafe in signal context.
*
* Instead, live systems the auditctl(8) may be used to monitor failures.
* E.g.
* auditctl -a task,always -F uid=<privsep uid>
*/
/* #define SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER_DEBUG 1 */
/* XXX it should be possible to do logging via the log socket safely */
#ifdef SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER_DEBUG
/* Use the kernel headers in case of an older toolchain. */
# include <asm/siginfo.h>
# define __have_siginfo_t 1
# define __have_sigval_t 1
# define __have_sigevent_t 1
#endif /* SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER_DEBUG */
#include "includes.h"
#ifdef SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/resource.h>
#include <sys/prctl.h>
#include <sys/mman.h>
#include <linux/net.h>
#include <linux/audit.h>
#include <linux/filter.h>
#include <linux/seccomp.h>
#include <elf.h>
#include <asm/unistd.h>
#ifdef __s390__
#include <asm/zcrypt.h>
#endif
#include <errno.h>
#include <signal.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <stddef.h> /* for offsetof */
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include "log.h"
#include "ssh-sandbox.h"
#include "xmalloc.h"
/* Linux seccomp_filter sandbox */
#define SECCOMP_FILTER_FAIL SECCOMP_RET_KILL
/* Use a signal handler to emit violations when debugging */
#ifdef SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER_DEBUG
# undef SECCOMP_FILTER_FAIL
# define SECCOMP_FILTER_FAIL SECCOMP_RET_TRAP
#endif /* SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER_DEBUG */
#if __BYTE_ORDER == __LITTLE_ENDIAN
# define ARG_LO_OFFSET 0
# define ARG_HI_OFFSET sizeof(uint32_t)
#elif __BYTE_ORDER == __BIG_ENDIAN
# define ARG_LO_OFFSET sizeof(uint32_t)
# define ARG_HI_OFFSET 0
#else
#error "Unknown endianness"
#endif
/* Simple helpers to avoid manual errors (but larger BPF programs). */
#define SC_DENY(_nr, _errno) \
BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, (_nr), 0, 1), \
BPF_STMT(BPF_RET+BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ERRNO|(_errno))
#define SC_ALLOW(_nr) \
BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, (_nr), 0, 1), \
BPF_STMT(BPF_RET+BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW)
#define SC_ALLOW_ARG(_nr, _arg_nr, _arg_val) \
BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, (_nr), 0, 6), \
/* load and test syscall argument, low word */ \
BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_W+BPF_ABS, \
offsetof(struct seccomp_data, args[(_arg_nr)]) + ARG_LO_OFFSET), \
BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, \
((_arg_val) & 0xFFFFFFFF), 0, 3), \
/* load and test syscall argument, high word */ \
BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_W+BPF_ABS, \
offsetof(struct seccomp_data, args[(_arg_nr)]) + ARG_HI_OFFSET), \
BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, \
(((uint32_t)((uint64_t)(_arg_val) >> 32)) & 0xFFFFFFFF), 0, 1), \
BPF_STMT(BPF_RET+BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW), \
/* reload syscall number; all rules expect it in accumulator */ \
BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_W+BPF_ABS, \
offsetof(struct seccomp_data, nr))
/* Allow if syscall argument contains only values in mask */
#define SC_ALLOW_ARG_MASK(_nr, _arg_nr, _arg_mask) \
BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, (_nr), 0, 8), \
/* load, mask and test syscall argument, low word */ \
BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_W+BPF_ABS, \
offsetof(struct seccomp_data, args[(_arg_nr)]) + ARG_LO_OFFSET), \
BPF_STMT(BPF_ALU+BPF_AND+BPF_K, ~((_arg_mask) & 0xFFFFFFFF)), \
BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, 0, 0, 4), \
/* load, mask and test syscall argument, high word */ \
BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_W+BPF_ABS, \
offsetof(struct seccomp_data, args[(_arg_nr)]) + ARG_HI_OFFSET), \
BPF_STMT(BPF_ALU+BPF_AND+BPF_K, \
~(((uint32_t)((uint64_t)(_arg_mask) >> 32)) & 0xFFFFFFFF)), \
BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, 0, 0, 1), \
BPF_STMT(BPF_RET+BPF_K, SECCOMP_RET_ALLOW), \
/* reload syscall number; all rules expect it in accumulator */ \
BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_W+BPF_ABS, \
offsetof(struct seccomp_data, nr))
/* Syscall filtering set for preauth. */
static const struct sock_filter preauth_insns[] = {
/* Ensure the syscall arch convention is as expected. */
BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_W+BPF_ABS,
offsetof(struct seccomp_data, arch)),
BPF_JUMP(BPF_JMP+BPF_JEQ+BPF_K, SECCOMP_AUDIT_ARCH, 1, 0),
BPF_STMT(BPF_RET+BPF_K, SECCOMP_FILTER_FAIL),
/* Load the syscall number for checking. */
BPF_STMT(BPF_LD+BPF_W+BPF_ABS,
offsetof(struct seccomp_data, nr)),
/* Syscalls to non-fatally deny */
#ifdef __NR_lstat
SC_DENY(__NR_lstat, EACCES),
#endif
#ifdef __NR_lstat64
SC_DENY(__NR_lstat64, EACCES),
#endif
#ifdef __NR_fstat
SC_DENY(__NR_fstat, EACCES),
#endif
#ifdef __NR_fstat64
SC_DENY(__NR_fstat64, EACCES),
#endif
#ifdef __NR_open
SC_DENY(__NR_open, EACCES),
#endif
#ifdef __NR_openat
SC_DENY(__NR_openat, EACCES),
#endif
#ifdef __NR_newfstatat
SC_DENY(__NR_newfstatat, EACCES),
#endif
#ifdef __NR_stat
SC_DENY(__NR_stat, EACCES),
#endif
#ifdef __NR_stat64
SC_DENY(__NR_stat64, EACCES),
#endif
#ifdef __NR_shmget
SC_DENY(__NR_shmget, EACCES),
#endif
#ifdef __NR_shmat
SC_DENY(__NR_shmat, EACCES),
#endif
#ifdef __NR_shmdt
SC_DENY(__NR_shmdt, EACCES),
#endif
+#ifdef __NR_ipc
+ SC_DENY(__NR_ipc, EACCES),
+#endif
/* Syscalls to permit */
#ifdef __NR_brk
SC_ALLOW(__NR_brk),
#endif
#ifdef __NR_clock_gettime
SC_ALLOW(__NR_clock_gettime),
#endif
+#ifdef __NR_clock_gettime64
+ SC_ALLOW(__NR_clock_gettime64),
+#endif
#ifdef __NR_close
SC_ALLOW(__NR_close),
#endif
#ifdef __NR_exit
SC_ALLOW(__NR_exit),
#endif
#ifdef __NR_exit_group
SC_ALLOW(__NR_exit_group),
#endif
#ifdef __NR_futex
SC_ALLOW(__NR_futex),
#endif
#ifdef __NR_geteuid
SC_ALLOW(__NR_geteuid),
#endif
#ifdef __NR_geteuid32
SC_ALLOW(__NR_geteuid32),
#endif
#ifdef __NR_getpgid
SC_ALLOW(__NR_getpgid),
#endif
#ifdef __NR_getpid
SC_ALLOW(__NR_getpid),
#endif
#ifdef __NR_getrandom
SC_ALLOW(__NR_getrandom),
#endif
#ifdef __NR_gettimeofday
SC_ALLOW(__NR_gettimeofday),
#endif
#ifdef __NR_getuid
SC_ALLOW(__NR_getuid),
#endif
#ifdef __NR_getuid32
SC_ALLOW(__NR_getuid32),
#endif
#ifdef __NR_madvise
SC_ALLOW(__NR_madvise),
#endif
#ifdef __NR_mmap
SC_ALLOW_ARG_MASK(__NR_mmap, 2, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE|PROT_NONE),
#endif
#ifdef __NR_mmap2
SC_ALLOW_ARG_MASK(__NR_mmap2, 2, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE|PROT_NONE),
#endif
#ifdef __NR_mprotect
SC_ALLOW_ARG_MASK(__NR_mprotect, 2, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE|PROT_NONE),
#endif
#ifdef __NR_mremap
SC_ALLOW(__NR_mremap),
#endif
#ifdef __NR_munmap
SC_ALLOW(__NR_munmap),
#endif
#ifdef __NR_nanosleep
SC_ALLOW(__NR_nanosleep),
#endif
+#ifdef __NR_clock_nanosleep
+ SC_ALLOW(__NR_clock_nanosleep),
+#endif
+#ifdef __NR_clock_nanosleep_time64
+ SC_ALLOW(__NR_clock_nanosleep_time64),
+#endif
+#ifdef __NR_clock_gettime64
+ SC_ALLOW(__NR_clock_gettime64),
+#endif
#ifdef __NR__newselect
SC_ALLOW(__NR__newselect),
#endif
#ifdef __NR_poll
SC_ALLOW(__NR_poll),
#endif
#ifdef __NR_pselect6
SC_ALLOW(__NR_pselect6),
#endif
#ifdef __NR_read
SC_ALLOW(__NR_read),
#endif
#ifdef __NR_rt_sigprocmask
SC_ALLOW(__NR_rt_sigprocmask),
#endif
#ifdef __NR_select
SC_ALLOW(__NR_select),
#endif
#ifdef __NR_shutdown
SC_ALLOW(__NR_shutdown),
#endif
#ifdef __NR_sigprocmask
SC_ALLOW(__NR_sigprocmask),
#endif
#ifdef __NR_time
SC_ALLOW(__NR_time),
#endif
#ifdef __NR_write
SC_ALLOW(__NR_write),
#endif
#ifdef __NR_socketcall
SC_ALLOW_ARG(__NR_socketcall, 0, SYS_SHUTDOWN),
SC_DENY(__NR_socketcall, EACCES),
#endif
#if defined(__NR_ioctl) && defined(__s390__)
/* Allow ioctls for ICA crypto card on s390 */
SC_ALLOW_ARG(__NR_ioctl, 1, Z90STAT_STATUS_MASK),
SC_ALLOW_ARG(__NR_ioctl, 1, ICARSAMODEXPO),
SC_ALLOW_ARG(__NR_ioctl, 1, ICARSACRT),
SC_ALLOW_ARG(__NR_ioctl, 1, ZSECSENDCPRB),
/* Allow ioctls for EP11 crypto card on s390 */
SC_ALLOW_ARG(__NR_ioctl, 1, ZSENDEP11CPRB),
#endif
#if defined(__x86_64__) && defined(__ILP32__) && defined(__X32_SYSCALL_BIT)
/*
* On Linux x32, the clock_gettime VDSO falls back to the
* x86-64 syscall under some circumstances, e.g.
* https://bugs.debian.org/849923
*/
SC_ALLOW(__NR_clock_gettime & ~__X32_SYSCALL_BIT),
#endif
/* Default deny */
BPF_STMT(BPF_RET+BPF_K, SECCOMP_FILTER_FAIL),
};
static const struct sock_fprog preauth_program = {
.len = (unsigned short)(sizeof(preauth_insns)/sizeof(preauth_insns[0])),
.filter = (struct sock_filter *)preauth_insns,
};
struct ssh_sandbox {
pid_t child_pid;
};
struct ssh_sandbox *
ssh_sandbox_init(struct monitor *monitor)
{
struct ssh_sandbox *box;
/*
* Strictly, we don't need to maintain any state here but we need
* to return non-NULL to satisfy the API.
*/
debug3("%s: preparing seccomp filter sandbox", __func__);
box = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*box));
box->child_pid = 0;
return box;
}
#ifdef SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER_DEBUG
extern struct monitor *pmonitor;
void mm_log_handler(LogLevel level, const char *msg, void *ctx);
static void
ssh_sandbox_violation(int signum, siginfo_t *info, void *void_context)
{
char msg[256];
snprintf(msg, sizeof(msg),
"%s: unexpected system call (arch:0x%x,syscall:%d @ %p)",
__func__, info->si_arch, info->si_syscall, info->si_call_addr);
mm_log_handler(SYSLOG_LEVEL_FATAL, msg, pmonitor);
_exit(1);
}
static void
ssh_sandbox_child_debugging(void)
{
struct sigaction act;
sigset_t mask;
debug3("%s: installing SIGSYS handler", __func__);
memset(&act, 0, sizeof(act));
sigemptyset(&mask);
sigaddset(&mask, SIGSYS);
act.sa_sigaction = &ssh_sandbox_violation;
act.sa_flags = SA_SIGINFO;
if (sigaction(SIGSYS, &act, NULL) == -1)
fatal("%s: sigaction(SIGSYS): %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
if (sigprocmask(SIG_UNBLOCK, &mask, NULL) == -1)
fatal("%s: sigprocmask(SIGSYS): %s",
__func__, strerror(errno));
}
#endif /* SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER_DEBUG */
void
ssh_sandbox_child(struct ssh_sandbox *box)
{
struct rlimit rl_zero;
int nnp_failed = 0;
/* Set rlimits for completeness if possible. */
rl_zero.rlim_cur = rl_zero.rlim_max = 0;
if (setrlimit(RLIMIT_FSIZE, &rl_zero) == -1)
fatal("%s: setrlimit(RLIMIT_FSIZE, { 0, 0 }): %s",
__func__, strerror(errno));
if (setrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE, &rl_zero) == -1)
fatal("%s: setrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE, { 0, 0 }): %s",
__func__, strerror(errno));
if (setrlimit(RLIMIT_NPROC, &rl_zero) == -1)
fatal("%s: setrlimit(RLIMIT_NPROC, { 0, 0 }): %s",
__func__, strerror(errno));
#ifdef SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER_DEBUG
ssh_sandbox_child_debugging();
#endif /* SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER_DEBUG */
debug3("%s: setting PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS", __func__);
if (prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS, 1, 0, 0, 0) == -1) {
debug("%s: prctl(PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS): %s",
__func__, strerror(errno));
nnp_failed = 1;
}
debug3("%s: attaching seccomp filter program", __func__);
if (prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, &preauth_program) == -1)
debug("%s: prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP): %s",
__func__, strerror(errno));
else if (nnp_failed)
fatal("%s: SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER activated but "
"PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS failed", __func__);
}
void
ssh_sandbox_parent_finish(struct ssh_sandbox *box)
{
free(box);
debug3("%s: finished", __func__);
}
void
ssh_sandbox_parent_preauth(struct ssh_sandbox *box, pid_t child_pid)
{
box->child_pid = child_pid;
}
#endif /* SANDBOX_SECCOMP_FILTER */
diff --git a/sandbox-systrace.c b/sandbox-systrace.c
index 93e63b8e02a1..e61d581aedba 100644
--- a/sandbox-systrace.c
+++ b/sandbox-systrace.c
@@ -1,218 +1,218 @@
/* $OpenBSD: sandbox-systrace.c,v 1.18 2015/10/02 01:39:26 deraadt Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2011 Damien Miller <djm@mindrot.org>
*
* Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
* copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
* WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
* ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
* WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
* ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
* OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#ifdef SANDBOX_SYSTRACE
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/ioctl.h>
#include <sys/syscall.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <sys/wait.h>
#include <dev/systrace.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <limits.h>
#include <signal.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include "atomicio.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "ssh-sandbox.h"
#include "xmalloc.h"
struct sandbox_policy {
int syscall;
int action;
};
/* Permitted syscalls in preauth. Unlisted syscalls get SYSTR_POLICY_KILL */
static const struct sandbox_policy preauth_policy[] = {
{ SYS_exit, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT },
#ifdef SYS_kbind
{ SYS_kbind, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT },
#endif
{ SYS_getpid, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT },
{ SYS_getpgid, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT },
{ SYS_clock_gettime, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT },
{ SYS_gettimeofday, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT },
{ SYS_nanosleep, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT },
{ SYS_sigprocmask, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT },
#ifdef SYS_getentropy
/* OpenBSD 5.6 and newer use getentropy(2) to seed arc4random(3). */
{ SYS_getentropy, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT },
#else
/* Previous releases used sysctl(3)'s kern.arnd variable. */
{ SYS___sysctl, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT },
#endif
#ifdef SYS_sendsyslog
{ SYS_sendsyslog, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT },
#endif
{ SYS_madvise, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT },
{ SYS_mmap, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT },
{ SYS_mprotect, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT },
{ SYS_mquery, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT },
{ SYS_munmap, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT },
{ SYS_poll, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT },
{ SYS_select, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT },
{ SYS_read, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT },
{ SYS_write, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT },
{ SYS_shutdown, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT },
{ SYS_close, SYSTR_POLICY_PERMIT },
{ SYS_open, SYSTR_POLICY_NEVER },
{ -1, -1 }
};
struct ssh_sandbox {
int systrace_fd;
pid_t child_pid;
void (*osigchld)(int);
};
struct ssh_sandbox *
ssh_sandbox_init(struct monitor *monitor)
{
struct ssh_sandbox *box;
debug3("%s: preparing systrace sandbox", __func__);
box = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*box));
box->systrace_fd = -1;
box->child_pid = 0;
- box->osigchld = signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_IGN);
+ box->osigchld = ssh_signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_IGN);
return box;
}
void
ssh_sandbox_child(struct ssh_sandbox *box)
{
debug3("%s: ready", __func__);
- signal(SIGCHLD, box->osigchld);
+ ssh_signal(SIGCHLD, box->osigchld);
if (kill(getpid(), SIGSTOP) != 0)
fatal("%s: kill(%d, SIGSTOP)", __func__, getpid());
debug3("%s: started", __func__);
}
static void
ssh_sandbox_parent(struct ssh_sandbox *box, pid_t child_pid,
const struct sandbox_policy *allowed_syscalls)
{
int dev_systrace, i, j, found, status;
pid_t pid;
struct systrace_policy policy;
/* Wait for the child to send itself a SIGSTOP */
debug3("%s: wait for child %ld", __func__, (long)child_pid);
do {
pid = waitpid(child_pid, &status, WUNTRACED);
} while (pid == -1 && errno == EINTR);
- signal(SIGCHLD, box->osigchld);
+ ssh_signal(SIGCHLD, box->osigchld);
if (!WIFSTOPPED(status)) {
if (WIFSIGNALED(status))
fatal("%s: child terminated with signal %d",
__func__, WTERMSIG(status));
if (WIFEXITED(status))
fatal("%s: child exited with status %d",
__func__, WEXITSTATUS(status));
fatal("%s: child not stopped", __func__);
}
debug3("%s: child %ld stopped", __func__, (long)child_pid);
box->child_pid = child_pid;
/* Set up systracing of child */
if ((dev_systrace = open("/dev/systrace", O_RDONLY)) == -1)
fatal("%s: open(\"/dev/systrace\"): %s", __func__,
strerror(errno));
if (ioctl(dev_systrace, STRIOCCLONE, &box->systrace_fd) == -1)
fatal("%s: ioctl(STRIOCCLONE, %d): %s", __func__,
dev_systrace, strerror(errno));
close(dev_systrace);
debug3("%s: systrace attach, fd=%d", __func__, box->systrace_fd);
if (ioctl(box->systrace_fd, STRIOCATTACH, &child_pid) == -1)
fatal("%s: ioctl(%d, STRIOCATTACH, %d): %s", __func__,
box->systrace_fd, child_pid, strerror(errno));
/* Allocate and assign policy */
memset(&policy, 0, sizeof(policy));
policy.strp_op = SYSTR_POLICY_NEW;
policy.strp_maxents = SYS_MAXSYSCALL;
if (ioctl(box->systrace_fd, STRIOCPOLICY, &policy) == -1)
fatal("%s: ioctl(%d, STRIOCPOLICY (new)): %s", __func__,
box->systrace_fd, strerror(errno));
policy.strp_op = SYSTR_POLICY_ASSIGN;
policy.strp_pid = box->child_pid;
if (ioctl(box->systrace_fd, STRIOCPOLICY, &policy) == -1)
fatal("%s: ioctl(%d, STRIOCPOLICY (assign)): %s",
__func__, box->systrace_fd, strerror(errno));
/* Set per-syscall policy */
for (i = 0; i < SYS_MAXSYSCALL; i++) {
found = 0;
for (j = 0; allowed_syscalls[j].syscall != -1; j++) {
if (allowed_syscalls[j].syscall == i) {
found = 1;
break;
}
}
policy.strp_op = SYSTR_POLICY_MODIFY;
policy.strp_code = i;
policy.strp_policy = found ?
allowed_syscalls[j].action : SYSTR_POLICY_KILL;
if (found)
debug3("%s: policy: enable syscall %d", __func__, i);
if (ioctl(box->systrace_fd, STRIOCPOLICY, &policy) == -1)
fatal("%s: ioctl(%d, STRIOCPOLICY (modify)): %s",
__func__, box->systrace_fd, strerror(errno));
}
/* Signal the child to start running */
debug3("%s: start child %ld", __func__, (long)child_pid);
if (kill(box->child_pid, SIGCONT) != 0)
fatal("%s: kill(%d, SIGCONT)", __func__, box->child_pid);
}
void
ssh_sandbox_parent_finish(struct ssh_sandbox *box)
{
/* Closing this before the child exits will terminate it */
close(box->systrace_fd);
free(box);
debug3("%s: finished", __func__);
}
void
ssh_sandbox_parent_preauth(struct ssh_sandbox *box, pid_t child_pid)
{
ssh_sandbox_parent(box, child_pid, preauth_policy);
}
#endif /* SANDBOX_SYSTRACE */
diff --git a/scp.0 b/scp.0
index ce4b88b01953..7775eb1e585a 100644
--- a/scp.0
+++ b/scp.0
@@ -1,182 +1,182 @@
SCP(1) General Commands Manual SCP(1)
NAME
- scp M-bM-^@M-^S secure copy (remote file copy program)
+ scp M-bM-^@M-^S OpenSSH secure file copy
SYNOPSIS
scp [-346BCpqrTv] [-c cipher] [-F ssh_config] [-i identity_file]
[-J destination] [-l limit] [-o ssh_option] [-P port] [-S program]
source ... target
DESCRIPTION
scp copies files between hosts on a network. It uses ssh(1) for data
transfer, and uses the same authentication and provides the same security
as ssh(1). scp will ask for passwords or passphrases if they are needed
for authentication.
The source and target may be specified as a local pathname, a remote host
with optional path in the form [user@]host:[path], or a URI in the form
scp://[user@]host[:port][/path]. Local file names can be made explicit
using absolute or relative pathnames to avoid scp treating file names
containing M-bM-^@M-^X:M-bM-^@M-^Y as host specifiers.
When copying between two remote hosts, if the URI format is used, a port
may only be specified on the target if the -3 option is used.
The options are as follows:
-3 Copies between two remote hosts are transferred through the local
host. Without this option the data is copied directly between
the two remote hosts. Note that this option disables the
progress meter.
-4 Forces scp to use IPv4 addresses only.
-6 Forces scp to use IPv6 addresses only.
-B Selects batch mode (prevents asking for passwords or
passphrases).
-C Compression enable. Passes the -C flag to ssh(1) to enable
compression.
-c cipher
Selects the cipher to use for encrypting the data transfer. This
option is directly passed to ssh(1).
-F ssh_config
Specifies an alternative per-user configuration file for ssh.
This option is directly passed to ssh(1).
-i identity_file
Selects the file from which the identity (private key) for public
key authentication is read. This option is directly passed to
ssh(1).
-J destination
Connect to the target host by first making an scp connection to
the jump host described by destination and then establishing a
TCP forwarding to the ultimate destination from there. Multiple
jump hops may be specified separated by comma characters. This
is a shortcut to specify a ProxyJump configuration directive.
This option is directly passed to ssh(1).
-l limit
Limits the used bandwidth, specified in Kbit/s.
-o ssh_option
Can be used to pass options to ssh in the format used in
ssh_config(5). This is useful for specifying options for which
there is no separate scp command-line flag. For full details of
the options listed below, and their possible values, see
ssh_config(5).
AddressFamily
BatchMode
BindAddress
BindInterface
CanonicalDomains
CanonicalizeFallbackLocal
CanonicalizeHostname
CanonicalizeMaxDots
CanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs
CASignatureAlgorithms
CertificateFile
ChallengeResponseAuthentication
CheckHostIP
Ciphers
Compression
ConnectionAttempts
ConnectTimeout
ControlMaster
ControlPath
ControlPersist
GlobalKnownHostsFile
GSSAPIAuthentication
GSSAPIDelegateCredentials
HashKnownHosts
Host
HostbasedAuthentication
HostbasedKeyTypes
HostKeyAlgorithms
HostKeyAlias
Hostname
IdentitiesOnly
IdentityAgent
IdentityFile
IPQoS
KbdInteractiveAuthentication
KbdInteractiveDevices
KexAlgorithms
LogLevel
MACs
NoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost
NumberOfPasswordPrompts
PasswordAuthentication
PKCS11Provider
Port
PreferredAuthentications
ProxyCommand
ProxyJump
PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes
PubkeyAuthentication
RekeyLimit
SendEnv
ServerAliveInterval
ServerAliveCountMax
SetEnv
StrictHostKeyChecking
TCPKeepAlive
UpdateHostKeys
User
UserKnownHostsFile
VerifyHostKeyDNS
-P port
Specifies the port to connect to on the remote host. Note that
this option is written with a capital M-bM-^@M-^XPM-bM-^@M-^Y, because -p is already
reserved for preserving the times and modes of the file.
-p Preserves modification times, access times, and modes from the
original file.
-q Quiet mode: disables the progress meter as well as warning and
diagnostic messages from ssh(1).
-r Recursively copy entire directories. Note that scp follows
symbolic links encountered in the tree traversal.
-S program
Name of program to use for the encrypted connection. The program
must understand ssh(1) options.
-T Disable strict filename checking. By default when copying files
from a remote host to a local directory scp checks that the
received filenames match those requested on the command-line to
prevent the remote end from sending unexpected or unwanted files.
Because of differences in how various operating systems and
shells interpret filename wildcards, these checks may cause
wanted files to be rejected. This option disables these checks
at the expense of fully trusting that the server will not send
unexpected filenames.
-v Verbose mode. Causes scp and ssh(1) to print debugging messages
about their progress. This is helpful in debugging connection,
authentication, and configuration problems.
EXIT STATUS
The scp utility exitsM-BM- 0 on success, andM-BM- >0 if an error occurs.
SEE ALSO
sftp(1), ssh(1), ssh-add(1), ssh-agent(1), ssh-keygen(1), ssh_config(5),
sshd(8)
HISTORY
scp is based on the rcp program in BSD source code from the Regents of
the University of California.
AUTHORS
Timo Rinne <tri@iki.fi>
Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
-OpenBSD 6.6 June 12, 2019 OpenBSD 6.6
+OpenBSD 6.6 November 30, 2019 OpenBSD 6.6
diff --git a/scp.1 b/scp.1
index dee7fcead956..9c3a85366490 100644
--- a/scp.1
+++ b/scp.1
@@ -1,262 +1,262 @@
.\"
.\" scp.1
.\"
.\" Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
.\"
.\" Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
.\" All rights reserved
.\"
.\" Created: Sun May 7 00:14:37 1995 ylo
.\"
-.\" $OpenBSD: scp.1,v 1.86 2019/06/12 11:31:50 jmc Exp $
+.\" $OpenBSD: scp.1,v 1.87 2019/11/30 07:07:59 jmc Exp $
.\"
-.Dd $Mdocdate: June 12 2019 $
+.Dd $Mdocdate: November 30 2019 $
.Dt SCP 1
.Os
.Sh NAME
.Nm scp
-.Nd secure copy (remote file copy program)
+.Nd OpenSSH secure file copy
.Sh SYNOPSIS
.Nm scp
.Op Fl 346BCpqrTv
.Op Fl c Ar cipher
.Op Fl F Ar ssh_config
.Op Fl i Ar identity_file
.Op Fl J Ar destination
.Op Fl l Ar limit
.Op Fl o Ar ssh_option
.Op Fl P Ar port
.Op Fl S Ar program
.Ar source ... target
.Sh DESCRIPTION
.Nm
copies files between hosts on a network.
It uses
.Xr ssh 1
for data transfer, and uses the same authentication and provides the
same security as
.Xr ssh 1 .
.Nm
will ask for passwords or passphrases if they are needed for
authentication.
.Pp
The
.Ar source
and
.Ar target
may be specified as a local pathname, a remote host with optional path
in the form
.Sm off
.Oo user @ Oc host : Op path ,
.Sm on
or a URI in the form
.Sm off
.No scp:// Oo user @ Oc host Oo : port Oc Op / path .
.Sm on
Local file names can be made explicit using absolute or relative pathnames
to avoid
.Nm
treating file names containing
.Sq :\&
as host specifiers.
.Pp
When copying between two remote hosts, if the URI format is used, a
.Ar port
may only be specified on the
.Ar target
if the
.Fl 3
option is used.
.Pp
The options are as follows:
.Bl -tag -width Ds
.It Fl 3
Copies between two remote hosts are transferred through the local host.
Without this option the data is copied directly between the two remote
hosts.
Note that this option disables the progress meter.
.It Fl 4
Forces
.Nm
to use IPv4 addresses only.
.It Fl 6
Forces
.Nm
to use IPv6 addresses only.
.It Fl B
Selects batch mode (prevents asking for passwords or passphrases).
.It Fl C
Compression enable.
Passes the
.Fl C
flag to
.Xr ssh 1
to enable compression.
.It Fl c Ar cipher
Selects the cipher to use for encrypting the data transfer.
This option is directly passed to
.Xr ssh 1 .
.It Fl F Ar ssh_config
Specifies an alternative
per-user configuration file for
.Nm ssh .
This option is directly passed to
.Xr ssh 1 .
.It Fl i Ar identity_file
Selects the file from which the identity (private key) for public key
authentication is read.
This option is directly passed to
.Xr ssh 1 .
.It Fl J Ar destination
Connect to the target host by first making an
.Nm
connection to the jump host described by
.Ar destination
and then establishing a TCP forwarding to the ultimate destination from
there.
Multiple jump hops may be specified separated by comma characters.
This is a shortcut to specify a
.Cm ProxyJump
configuration directive.
This option is directly passed to
.Xr ssh 1 .
.It Fl l Ar limit
Limits the used bandwidth, specified in Kbit/s.
.It Fl o Ar ssh_option
Can be used to pass options to
.Nm ssh
in the format used in
.Xr ssh_config 5 .
This is useful for specifying options
for which there is no separate
.Nm scp
command-line flag.
For full details of the options listed below, and their possible values, see
.Xr ssh_config 5 .
.Pp
.Bl -tag -width Ds -offset indent -compact
.It AddressFamily
.It BatchMode
.It BindAddress
.It BindInterface
.It CanonicalDomains
.It CanonicalizeFallbackLocal
.It CanonicalizeHostname
.It CanonicalizeMaxDots
.It CanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs
.It CASignatureAlgorithms
.It CertificateFile
.It ChallengeResponseAuthentication
.It CheckHostIP
.It Ciphers
.It Compression
.It ConnectionAttempts
.It ConnectTimeout
.It ControlMaster
.It ControlPath
.It ControlPersist
.It GlobalKnownHostsFile
.It GSSAPIAuthentication
.It GSSAPIDelegateCredentials
.It HashKnownHosts
.It Host
.It HostbasedAuthentication
.It HostbasedKeyTypes
.It HostKeyAlgorithms
.It HostKeyAlias
.It Hostname
.It IdentitiesOnly
.It IdentityAgent
.It IdentityFile
.It IPQoS
.It KbdInteractiveAuthentication
.It KbdInteractiveDevices
.It KexAlgorithms
.It LogLevel
.It MACs
.It NoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost
.It NumberOfPasswordPrompts
.It PasswordAuthentication
.It PKCS11Provider
.It Port
.It PreferredAuthentications
.It ProxyCommand
.It ProxyJump
.It PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes
.It PubkeyAuthentication
.It RekeyLimit
.It SendEnv
.It ServerAliveInterval
.It ServerAliveCountMax
.It SetEnv
.It StrictHostKeyChecking
.It TCPKeepAlive
.It UpdateHostKeys
.It User
.It UserKnownHostsFile
.It VerifyHostKeyDNS
.El
.It Fl P Ar port
Specifies the port to connect to on the remote host.
Note that this option is written with a capital
.Sq P ,
because
.Fl p
is already reserved for preserving the times and modes of the file.
.It Fl p
Preserves modification times, access times, and modes from the
original file.
.It Fl q
Quiet mode: disables the progress meter as well as warning and diagnostic
messages from
.Xr ssh 1 .
.It Fl r
Recursively copy entire directories.
Note that
.Nm
follows symbolic links encountered in the tree traversal.
.It Fl S Ar program
Name of
.Ar program
to use for the encrypted connection.
The program must understand
.Xr ssh 1
options.
.It Fl T
Disable strict filename checking.
By default when copying files from a remote host to a local directory
.Nm
checks that the received filenames match those requested on the command-line
to prevent the remote end from sending unexpected or unwanted files.
Because of differences in how various operating systems and shells interpret
filename wildcards, these checks may cause wanted files to be rejected.
This option disables these checks at the expense of fully trusting that
the server will not send unexpected filenames.
.It Fl v
Verbose mode.
Causes
.Nm
and
.Xr ssh 1
to print debugging messages about their progress.
This is helpful in
debugging connection, authentication, and configuration problems.
.El
.Sh EXIT STATUS
.Ex -std scp
.Sh SEE ALSO
.Xr sftp 1 ,
.Xr ssh 1 ,
.Xr ssh-add 1 ,
.Xr ssh-agent 1 ,
.Xr ssh-keygen 1 ,
.Xr ssh_config 5 ,
.Xr sshd 8
.Sh HISTORY
.Nm
is based on the rcp program in
.Bx
source code from the Regents of the University of California.
.Sh AUTHORS
.An Timo Rinne Aq Mt tri@iki.fi
.An Tatu Ylonen Aq Mt ylo@cs.hut.fi
diff --git a/scp.c b/scp.c
index 0348d0673bff..6901e0c941cc 100644
--- a/scp.c
+++ b/scp.c
@@ -1,1710 +1,1712 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: scp.c,v 1.206 2019/09/09 02:31:19 dtucker Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: scp.c,v 1.207 2020/01/23 07:10:22 dtucker Exp $ */
/*
* scp - secure remote copy. This is basically patched BSD rcp which
* uses ssh to do the data transfer (instead of using rcmd).
*
* NOTE: This version should NOT be suid root. (This uses ssh to
* do the transfer and ssh has the necessary privileges.)
*
* 1995 Timo Rinne <tri@iki.fi>, Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
*
* As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
* can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
* software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
* incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
* called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
*/
/*
* Copyright (c) 1999 Theo de Raadt. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (c) 1999 Aaron Campbell. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
/*
* Parts from:
*
* Copyright (c) 1983, 1990, 1992, 1993, 1995
* The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
* 3. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors
* may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software
* without specific prior written permission.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
* ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE
* FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL
* DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS
* OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
*
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H
# include <sys/stat.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_POLL_H
#include <poll.h>
#else
# ifdef HAVE_SYS_POLL_H
# include <sys/poll.h>
# endif
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
# include <sys/time.h>
#endif
#include <sys/wait.h>
#include <sys/uio.h>
#include <ctype.h>
#include <dirent.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_FNMATCH_H
#include <fnmatch.h>
+#endif
#include <limits.h>
#include <locale.h>
#include <pwd.h>
#include <signal.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
# include <stdint.h>
#endif
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <time.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#if defined(HAVE_STRNVIS) && defined(HAVE_VIS_H) && !defined(BROKEN_STRNVIS)
#include <vis.h>
#endif
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "ssh.h"
#include "atomicio.h"
#include "pathnames.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "progressmeter.h"
#include "utf8.h"
extern char *__progname;
#define COPY_BUFLEN 16384
int do_cmd(char *host, char *remuser, int port, char *cmd, int *fdin, int *fdout);
int do_cmd2(char *host, char *remuser, int port, char *cmd, int fdin, int fdout);
/* Struct for addargs */
arglist args;
arglist remote_remote_args;
/* Bandwidth limit */
long long limit_kbps = 0;
struct bwlimit bwlimit;
/* Name of current file being transferred. */
char *curfile;
/* This is set to non-zero to enable verbose mode. */
int verbose_mode = 0;
/* This is set to zero if the progressmeter is not desired. */
int showprogress = 1;
/*
* This is set to non-zero if remote-remote copy should be piped
* through this process.
*/
int throughlocal = 0;
/* Non-standard port to use for the ssh connection or -1. */
int sshport = -1;
/* This is the program to execute for the secured connection. ("ssh" or -S) */
char *ssh_program = _PATH_SSH_PROGRAM;
/* This is used to store the pid of ssh_program */
pid_t do_cmd_pid = -1;
static void
killchild(int signo)
{
if (do_cmd_pid > 1) {
kill(do_cmd_pid, signo ? signo : SIGTERM);
waitpid(do_cmd_pid, NULL, 0);
}
if (signo)
_exit(1);
exit(1);
}
static void
suspchild(int signo)
{
int status;
if (do_cmd_pid > 1) {
kill(do_cmd_pid, signo);
while (waitpid(do_cmd_pid, &status, WUNTRACED) == -1 &&
errno == EINTR)
;
kill(getpid(), SIGSTOP);
}
}
static int
do_local_cmd(arglist *a)
{
u_int i;
int status;
pid_t pid;
if (a->num == 0)
fatal("do_local_cmd: no arguments");
if (verbose_mode) {
fprintf(stderr, "Executing:");
for (i = 0; i < a->num; i++)
fmprintf(stderr, " %s", a->list[i]);
fprintf(stderr, "\n");
}
if ((pid = fork()) == -1)
fatal("do_local_cmd: fork: %s", strerror(errno));
if (pid == 0) {
execvp(a->list[0], a->list);
perror(a->list[0]);
exit(1);
}
do_cmd_pid = pid;
- signal(SIGTERM, killchild);
- signal(SIGINT, killchild);
- signal(SIGHUP, killchild);
+ ssh_signal(SIGTERM, killchild);
+ ssh_signal(SIGINT, killchild);
+ ssh_signal(SIGHUP, killchild);
while (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) == -1)
if (errno != EINTR)
fatal("do_local_cmd: waitpid: %s", strerror(errno));
do_cmd_pid = -1;
if (!WIFEXITED(status) || WEXITSTATUS(status) != 0)
return (-1);
return (0);
}
/*
* This function executes the given command as the specified user on the
* given host. This returns < 0 if execution fails, and >= 0 otherwise. This
* assigns the input and output file descriptors on success.
*/
int
do_cmd(char *host, char *remuser, int port, char *cmd, int *fdin, int *fdout)
{
int pin[2], pout[2], reserved[2];
if (verbose_mode)
fmprintf(stderr,
"Executing: program %s host %s, user %s, command %s\n",
ssh_program, host,
remuser ? remuser : "(unspecified)", cmd);
if (port == -1)
port = sshport;
/*
* Reserve two descriptors so that the real pipes won't get
* descriptors 0 and 1 because that will screw up dup2 below.
*/
if (pipe(reserved) == -1)
fatal("pipe: %s", strerror(errno));
/* Create a socket pair for communicating with ssh. */
if (pipe(pin) == -1)
fatal("pipe: %s", strerror(errno));
if (pipe(pout) == -1)
fatal("pipe: %s", strerror(errno));
/* Free the reserved descriptors. */
close(reserved[0]);
close(reserved[1]);
- signal(SIGTSTP, suspchild);
- signal(SIGTTIN, suspchild);
- signal(SIGTTOU, suspchild);
+ ssh_signal(SIGTSTP, suspchild);
+ ssh_signal(SIGTTIN, suspchild);
+ ssh_signal(SIGTTOU, suspchild);
/* Fork a child to execute the command on the remote host using ssh. */
do_cmd_pid = fork();
if (do_cmd_pid == 0) {
/* Child. */
close(pin[1]);
close(pout[0]);
dup2(pin[0], 0);
dup2(pout[1], 1);
close(pin[0]);
close(pout[1]);
replacearg(&args, 0, "%s", ssh_program);
if (port != -1) {
addargs(&args, "-p");
addargs(&args, "%d", port);
}
if (remuser != NULL) {
addargs(&args, "-l");
addargs(&args, "%s", remuser);
}
addargs(&args, "--");
addargs(&args, "%s", host);
addargs(&args, "%s", cmd);
execvp(ssh_program, args.list);
perror(ssh_program);
exit(1);
} else if (do_cmd_pid == -1) {
fatal("fork: %s", strerror(errno));
}
/* Parent. Close the other side, and return the local side. */
close(pin[0]);
*fdout = pin[1];
close(pout[1]);
*fdin = pout[0];
- signal(SIGTERM, killchild);
- signal(SIGINT, killchild);
- signal(SIGHUP, killchild);
+ ssh_signal(SIGTERM, killchild);
+ ssh_signal(SIGINT, killchild);
+ ssh_signal(SIGHUP, killchild);
return 0;
}
/*
* This function executes a command similar to do_cmd(), but expects the
* input and output descriptors to be setup by a previous call to do_cmd().
* This way the input and output of two commands can be connected.
*/
int
do_cmd2(char *host, char *remuser, int port, char *cmd, int fdin, int fdout)
{
pid_t pid;
int status;
if (verbose_mode)
fmprintf(stderr,
"Executing: 2nd program %s host %s, user %s, command %s\n",
ssh_program, host,
remuser ? remuser : "(unspecified)", cmd);
if (port == -1)
port = sshport;
/* Fork a child to execute the command on the remote host using ssh. */
pid = fork();
if (pid == 0) {
dup2(fdin, 0);
dup2(fdout, 1);
replacearg(&args, 0, "%s", ssh_program);
if (port != -1) {
addargs(&args, "-p");
addargs(&args, "%d", port);
}
if (remuser != NULL) {
addargs(&args, "-l");
addargs(&args, "%s", remuser);
}
addargs(&args, "--");
addargs(&args, "%s", host);
addargs(&args, "%s", cmd);
execvp(ssh_program, args.list);
perror(ssh_program);
exit(1);
} else if (pid == -1) {
fatal("fork: %s", strerror(errno));
}
while (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) == -1)
if (errno != EINTR)
fatal("do_cmd2: waitpid: %s", strerror(errno));
return 0;
}
typedef struct {
size_t cnt;
char *buf;
} BUF;
BUF *allocbuf(BUF *, int, int);
void lostconn(int);
int okname(char *);
void run_err(const char *,...);
void verifydir(char *);
struct passwd *pwd;
uid_t userid;
int errs, remin, remout;
int Tflag, pflag, iamremote, iamrecursive, targetshouldbedirectory;
#define CMDNEEDS 64
char cmd[CMDNEEDS]; /* must hold "rcp -r -p -d\0" */
int response(void);
void rsource(char *, struct stat *);
void sink(int, char *[], const char *);
void source(int, char *[]);
void tolocal(int, char *[]);
void toremote(int, char *[]);
void usage(void);
int
main(int argc, char **argv)
{
int ch, fflag, tflag, status, n;
char **newargv;
const char *errstr;
extern char *optarg;
extern int optind;
/* Ensure that fds 0, 1 and 2 are open or directed to /dev/null */
sanitise_stdfd();
seed_rng();
msetlocale();
/* Copy argv, because we modify it */
newargv = xcalloc(MAXIMUM(argc + 1, 1), sizeof(*newargv));
for (n = 0; n < argc; n++)
newargv[n] = xstrdup(argv[n]);
argv = newargv;
__progname = ssh_get_progname(argv[0]);
memset(&args, '\0', sizeof(args));
memset(&remote_remote_args, '\0', sizeof(remote_remote_args));
args.list = remote_remote_args.list = NULL;
addargs(&args, "%s", ssh_program);
addargs(&args, "-x");
addargs(&args, "-oForwardAgent=no");
addargs(&args, "-oPermitLocalCommand=no");
addargs(&args, "-oClearAllForwardings=yes");
addargs(&args, "-oRemoteCommand=none");
addargs(&args, "-oRequestTTY=no");
fflag = Tflag = tflag = 0;
while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv,
"dfl:prtTvBCc:i:P:q12346S:o:F:J:")) != -1) {
switch (ch) {
/* User-visible flags. */
case '1':
fatal("SSH protocol v.1 is no longer supported");
break;
case '2':
/* Ignored */
break;
case '4':
case '6':
case 'C':
addargs(&args, "-%c", ch);
addargs(&remote_remote_args, "-%c", ch);
break;
case '3':
throughlocal = 1;
break;
case 'o':
case 'c':
case 'i':
case 'F':
case 'J':
addargs(&remote_remote_args, "-%c", ch);
addargs(&remote_remote_args, "%s", optarg);
addargs(&args, "-%c", ch);
addargs(&args, "%s", optarg);
break;
case 'P':
sshport = a2port(optarg);
if (sshport <= 0)
fatal("bad port \"%s\"\n", optarg);
break;
case 'B':
addargs(&remote_remote_args, "-oBatchmode=yes");
addargs(&args, "-oBatchmode=yes");
break;
case 'l':
limit_kbps = strtonum(optarg, 1, 100 * 1024 * 1024,
&errstr);
if (errstr != NULL)
usage();
limit_kbps *= 1024; /* kbps */
bandwidth_limit_init(&bwlimit, limit_kbps, COPY_BUFLEN);
break;
case 'p':
pflag = 1;
break;
case 'r':
iamrecursive = 1;
break;
case 'S':
ssh_program = xstrdup(optarg);
break;
case 'v':
addargs(&args, "-v");
addargs(&remote_remote_args, "-v");
verbose_mode = 1;
break;
case 'q':
addargs(&args, "-q");
addargs(&remote_remote_args, "-q");
showprogress = 0;
break;
/* Server options. */
case 'd':
targetshouldbedirectory = 1;
break;
case 'f': /* "from" */
iamremote = 1;
fflag = 1;
break;
case 't': /* "to" */
iamremote = 1;
tflag = 1;
#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN
setmode(0, O_BINARY);
#endif
break;
case 'T':
Tflag = 1;
break;
default:
usage();
}
}
argc -= optind;
argv += optind;
if ((pwd = getpwuid(userid = getuid())) == NULL)
fatal("unknown user %u", (u_int) userid);
if (!isatty(STDOUT_FILENO))
showprogress = 0;
if (pflag) {
/* Cannot pledge: -p allows setuid/setgid files... */
} else {
if (pledge("stdio rpath wpath cpath fattr tty proc exec",
NULL) == -1) {
perror("pledge");
exit(1);
}
}
remin = STDIN_FILENO;
remout = STDOUT_FILENO;
if (fflag) {
/* Follow "protocol", send data. */
(void) response();
source(argc, argv);
exit(errs != 0);
}
if (tflag) {
/* Receive data. */
sink(argc, argv, NULL);
exit(errs != 0);
}
if (argc < 2)
usage();
if (argc > 2)
targetshouldbedirectory = 1;
remin = remout = -1;
do_cmd_pid = -1;
/* Command to be executed on remote system using "ssh". */
(void) snprintf(cmd, sizeof cmd, "scp%s%s%s%s",
verbose_mode ? " -v" : "",
iamrecursive ? " -r" : "", pflag ? " -p" : "",
targetshouldbedirectory ? " -d" : "");
- (void) signal(SIGPIPE, lostconn);
+ (void) ssh_signal(SIGPIPE, lostconn);
if (colon(argv[argc - 1])) /* Dest is remote host. */
toremote(argc, argv);
else {
if (targetshouldbedirectory)
verifydir(argv[argc - 1]);
tolocal(argc, argv); /* Dest is local host. */
}
/*
* Finally check the exit status of the ssh process, if one was forked
* and no error has occurred yet
*/
if (do_cmd_pid != -1 && errs == 0) {
if (remin != -1)
(void) close(remin);
if (remout != -1)
(void) close(remout);
if (waitpid(do_cmd_pid, &status, 0) == -1)
errs = 1;
else {
if (!WIFEXITED(status) || WEXITSTATUS(status) != 0)
errs = 1;
}
}
exit(errs != 0);
}
/* Callback from atomicio6 to update progress meter and limit bandwidth */
static int
scpio(void *_cnt, size_t s)
{
off_t *cnt = (off_t *)_cnt;
*cnt += s;
refresh_progress_meter(0);
if (limit_kbps > 0)
bandwidth_limit(&bwlimit, s);
return 0;
}
static int
do_times(int fd, int verb, const struct stat *sb)
{
/* strlen(2^64) == 20; strlen(10^6) == 7 */
char buf[(20 + 7 + 2) * 2 + 2];
(void)snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "T%llu 0 %llu 0\n",
(unsigned long long) (sb->st_mtime < 0 ? 0 : sb->st_mtime),
(unsigned long long) (sb->st_atime < 0 ? 0 : sb->st_atime));
if (verb) {
fprintf(stderr, "File mtime %lld atime %lld\n",
(long long)sb->st_mtime, (long long)sb->st_atime);
fprintf(stderr, "Sending file timestamps: %s", buf);
}
(void) atomicio(vwrite, fd, buf, strlen(buf));
return (response());
}
static int
parse_scp_uri(const char *uri, char **userp, char **hostp, int *portp,
char **pathp)
{
int r;
r = parse_uri("scp", uri, userp, hostp, portp, pathp);
if (r == 0 && *pathp == NULL)
*pathp = xstrdup(".");
return r;
}
/* Appends a string to an array; returns 0 on success, -1 on alloc failure */
static int
append(char *cp, char ***ap, size_t *np)
{
char **tmp;
if ((tmp = reallocarray(*ap, *np + 1, sizeof(*tmp))) == NULL)
return -1;
tmp[(*np)] = cp;
(*np)++;
*ap = tmp;
return 0;
}
/*
* Finds the start and end of the first brace pair in the pattern.
* returns 0 on success or -1 for invalid patterns.
*/
static int
find_brace(const char *pattern, int *startp, int *endp)
{
int i;
int in_bracket, brace_level;
*startp = *endp = -1;
in_bracket = brace_level = 0;
for (i = 0; i < INT_MAX && *endp < 0 && pattern[i] != '\0'; i++) {
switch (pattern[i]) {
case '\\':
/* skip next character */
if (pattern[i + 1] != '\0')
i++;
break;
case '[':
in_bracket = 1;
break;
case ']':
in_bracket = 0;
break;
case '{':
if (in_bracket)
break;
if (pattern[i + 1] == '}') {
/* Protect a single {}, for find(1), like csh */
i++; /* skip */
break;
}
if (*startp == -1)
*startp = i;
brace_level++;
break;
case '}':
if (in_bracket)
break;
if (*startp < 0) {
/* Unbalanced brace */
return -1;
}
if (--brace_level <= 0)
*endp = i;
break;
}
}
/* unbalanced brackets/braces */
if (*endp < 0 && (*startp >= 0 || in_bracket))
return -1;
return 0;
}
/*
* Assembles and records a successfully-expanded pattern, returns -1 on
* alloc failure.
*/
static int
emit_expansion(const char *pattern, int brace_start, int brace_end,
int sel_start, int sel_end, char ***patternsp, size_t *npatternsp)
{
char *cp;
int o = 0, tail_len = strlen(pattern + brace_end + 1);
if ((cp = malloc(brace_start + (sel_end - sel_start) +
tail_len + 1)) == NULL)
return -1;
/* Pattern before initial brace */
if (brace_start > 0) {
memcpy(cp, pattern, brace_start);
o = brace_start;
}
/* Current braced selection */
if (sel_end - sel_start > 0) {
memcpy(cp + o, pattern + sel_start,
sel_end - sel_start);
o += sel_end - sel_start;
}
/* Remainder of pattern after closing brace */
if (tail_len > 0) {
memcpy(cp + o, pattern + brace_end + 1, tail_len);
o += tail_len;
}
cp[o] = '\0';
if (append(cp, patternsp, npatternsp) != 0) {
free(cp);
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
/*
* Expand the first encountered brace in pattern, appending the expanded
* patterns it yielded to the *patternsp array.
*
* Returns 0 on success or -1 on allocation failure.
*
* Signals whether expansion was performed via *expanded and whether
* pattern was invalid via *invalid.
*/
static int
brace_expand_one(const char *pattern, char ***patternsp, size_t *npatternsp,
int *expanded, int *invalid)
{
int i;
int in_bracket, brace_start, brace_end, brace_level;
int sel_start, sel_end;
*invalid = *expanded = 0;
if (find_brace(pattern, &brace_start, &brace_end) != 0) {
*invalid = 1;
return 0;
} else if (brace_start == -1)
return 0;
in_bracket = brace_level = 0;
for (i = sel_start = brace_start + 1; i < brace_end; i++) {
switch (pattern[i]) {
case '{':
if (in_bracket)
break;
brace_level++;
break;
case '}':
if (in_bracket)
break;
brace_level--;
break;
case '[':
in_bracket = 1;
break;
case ']':
in_bracket = 0;
break;
case '\\':
if (i < brace_end - 1)
i++; /* skip */
break;
}
if (pattern[i] == ',' || i == brace_end - 1) {
if (in_bracket || brace_level > 0)
continue;
/* End of a selection, emit an expanded pattern */
/* Adjust end index for last selection */
sel_end = (i == brace_end - 1) ? brace_end : i;
if (emit_expansion(pattern, brace_start, brace_end,
sel_start, sel_end, patternsp, npatternsp) != 0)
return -1;
/* move on to the next selection */
sel_start = i + 1;
continue;
}
}
if (in_bracket || brace_level > 0) {
*invalid = 1;
return 0;
}
/* success */
*expanded = 1;
return 0;
}
/* Expand braces from pattern. Returns 0 on success, -1 on failure */
static int
brace_expand(const char *pattern, char ***patternsp, size_t *npatternsp)
{
char *cp, *cp2, **active = NULL, **done = NULL;
size_t i, nactive = 0, ndone = 0;
int ret = -1, invalid = 0, expanded = 0;
*patternsp = NULL;
*npatternsp = 0;
/* Start the worklist with the original pattern */
if ((cp = strdup(pattern)) == NULL)
return -1;
if (append(cp, &active, &nactive) != 0) {
free(cp);
return -1;
}
while (nactive > 0) {
cp = active[nactive - 1];
nactive--;
if (brace_expand_one(cp, &active, &nactive,
&expanded, &invalid) == -1) {
free(cp);
goto fail;
}
if (invalid)
fatal("%s: invalid brace pattern \"%s\"", __func__, cp);
if (expanded) {
/*
* Current entry expanded to new entries on the
* active list; discard the progenitor pattern.
*/
free(cp);
continue;
}
/*
* Pattern did not expand; append the finename component to
* the completed list
*/
if ((cp2 = strrchr(cp, '/')) != NULL)
*cp2++ = '\0';
else
cp2 = cp;
if (append(xstrdup(cp2), &done, &ndone) != 0) {
free(cp);
goto fail;
}
free(cp);
}
/* success */
*patternsp = done;
*npatternsp = ndone;
done = NULL;
ndone = 0;
ret = 0;
fail:
for (i = 0; i < nactive; i++)
free(active[i]);
free(active);
for (i = 0; i < ndone; i++)
free(done[i]);
free(done);
return ret;
}
void
toremote(int argc, char **argv)
{
char *suser = NULL, *host = NULL, *src = NULL;
char *bp, *tuser, *thost, *targ;
int sport = -1, tport = -1;
arglist alist;
int i, r;
u_int j;
memset(&alist, '\0', sizeof(alist));
alist.list = NULL;
/* Parse target */
r = parse_scp_uri(argv[argc - 1], &tuser, &thost, &tport, &targ);
if (r == -1) {
fmprintf(stderr, "%s: invalid uri\n", argv[argc - 1]);
++errs;
goto out;
}
if (r != 0) {
if (parse_user_host_path(argv[argc - 1], &tuser, &thost,
&targ) == -1) {
fmprintf(stderr, "%s: invalid target\n", argv[argc - 1]);
++errs;
goto out;
}
}
if (tuser != NULL && !okname(tuser)) {
++errs;
goto out;
}
/* Parse source files */
for (i = 0; i < argc - 1; i++) {
free(suser);
free(host);
free(src);
r = parse_scp_uri(argv[i], &suser, &host, &sport, &src);
if (r == -1) {
fmprintf(stderr, "%s: invalid uri\n", argv[i]);
++errs;
continue;
}
if (r != 0) {
parse_user_host_path(argv[i], &suser, &host, &src);
}
if (suser != NULL && !okname(suser)) {
++errs;
continue;
}
if (host && throughlocal) { /* extended remote to remote */
xasprintf(&bp, "%s -f %s%s", cmd,
*src == '-' ? "-- " : "", src);
if (do_cmd(host, suser, sport, bp, &remin, &remout) < 0)
exit(1);
free(bp);
xasprintf(&bp, "%s -t %s%s", cmd,
*targ == '-' ? "-- " : "", targ);
if (do_cmd2(thost, tuser, tport, bp, remin, remout) < 0)
exit(1);
free(bp);
(void) close(remin);
(void) close(remout);
remin = remout = -1;
} else if (host) { /* standard remote to remote */
if (tport != -1 && tport != SSH_DEFAULT_PORT) {
/* This would require the remote support URIs */
fatal("target port not supported with two "
"remote hosts without the -3 option");
}
freeargs(&alist);
addargs(&alist, "%s", ssh_program);
addargs(&alist, "-x");
addargs(&alist, "-oClearAllForwardings=yes");
addargs(&alist, "-n");
for (j = 0; j < remote_remote_args.num; j++) {
addargs(&alist, "%s",
remote_remote_args.list[j]);
}
if (sport != -1) {
addargs(&alist, "-p");
addargs(&alist, "%d", sport);
}
if (suser) {
addargs(&alist, "-l");
addargs(&alist, "%s", suser);
}
addargs(&alist, "--");
addargs(&alist, "%s", host);
addargs(&alist, "%s", cmd);
addargs(&alist, "%s", src);
addargs(&alist, "%s%s%s:%s",
tuser ? tuser : "", tuser ? "@" : "",
thost, targ);
if (do_local_cmd(&alist) != 0)
errs = 1;
} else { /* local to remote */
if (remin == -1) {
xasprintf(&bp, "%s -t %s%s", cmd,
*targ == '-' ? "-- " : "", targ);
if (do_cmd(thost, tuser, tport, bp, &remin,
&remout) < 0)
exit(1);
if (response() < 0)
exit(1);
free(bp);
}
source(1, argv + i);
}
}
out:
free(tuser);
free(thost);
free(targ);
free(suser);
free(host);
free(src);
}
void
tolocal(int argc, char **argv)
{
char *bp, *host = NULL, *src = NULL, *suser = NULL;
arglist alist;
int i, r, sport = -1;
memset(&alist, '\0', sizeof(alist));
alist.list = NULL;
for (i = 0; i < argc - 1; i++) {
free(suser);
free(host);
free(src);
r = parse_scp_uri(argv[i], &suser, &host, &sport, &src);
if (r == -1) {
fmprintf(stderr, "%s: invalid uri\n", argv[i]);
++errs;
continue;
}
if (r != 0)
parse_user_host_path(argv[i], &suser, &host, &src);
if (suser != NULL && !okname(suser)) {
++errs;
continue;
}
if (!host) { /* Local to local. */
freeargs(&alist);
addargs(&alist, "%s", _PATH_CP);
if (iamrecursive)
addargs(&alist, "-r");
if (pflag)
addargs(&alist, "-p");
addargs(&alist, "--");
addargs(&alist, "%s", argv[i]);
addargs(&alist, "%s", argv[argc-1]);
if (do_local_cmd(&alist))
++errs;
continue;
}
/* Remote to local. */
xasprintf(&bp, "%s -f %s%s",
cmd, *src == '-' ? "-- " : "", src);
if (do_cmd(host, suser, sport, bp, &remin, &remout) < 0) {
free(bp);
++errs;
continue;
}
free(bp);
sink(1, argv + argc - 1, src);
(void) close(remin);
remin = remout = -1;
}
free(suser);
free(host);
free(src);
}
void
source(int argc, char **argv)
{
struct stat stb;
static BUF buffer;
BUF *bp;
off_t i, statbytes;
size_t amt, nr;
int fd = -1, haderr, indx;
char *last, *name, buf[PATH_MAX + 128], encname[PATH_MAX];
int len;
for (indx = 0; indx < argc; ++indx) {
name = argv[indx];
statbytes = 0;
len = strlen(name);
while (len > 1 && name[len-1] == '/')
name[--len] = '\0';
if ((fd = open(name, O_RDONLY|O_NONBLOCK, 0)) == -1)
goto syserr;
if (strchr(name, '\n') != NULL) {
strnvis(encname, name, sizeof(encname), VIS_NL);
name = encname;
}
if (fstat(fd, &stb) == -1) {
syserr: run_err("%s: %s", name, strerror(errno));
goto next;
}
if (stb.st_size < 0) {
run_err("%s: %s", name, "Negative file size");
goto next;
}
unset_nonblock(fd);
switch (stb.st_mode & S_IFMT) {
case S_IFREG:
break;
case S_IFDIR:
if (iamrecursive) {
rsource(name, &stb);
goto next;
}
/* FALLTHROUGH */
default:
run_err("%s: not a regular file", name);
goto next;
}
if ((last = strrchr(name, '/')) == NULL)
last = name;
else
++last;
curfile = last;
if (pflag) {
if (do_times(remout, verbose_mode, &stb) < 0)
goto next;
}
#define FILEMODEMASK (S_ISUID|S_ISGID|S_IRWXU|S_IRWXG|S_IRWXO)
snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "C%04o %lld %s\n",
(u_int) (stb.st_mode & FILEMODEMASK),
(long long)stb.st_size, last);
if (verbose_mode)
fmprintf(stderr, "Sending file modes: %s", buf);
(void) atomicio(vwrite, remout, buf, strlen(buf));
if (response() < 0)
goto next;
if ((bp = allocbuf(&buffer, fd, COPY_BUFLEN)) == NULL) {
next: if (fd != -1) {
(void) close(fd);
fd = -1;
}
continue;
}
if (showprogress)
start_progress_meter(curfile, stb.st_size, &statbytes);
set_nonblock(remout);
for (haderr = i = 0; i < stb.st_size; i += bp->cnt) {
amt = bp->cnt;
if (i + (off_t)amt > stb.st_size)
amt = stb.st_size - i;
if (!haderr) {
if ((nr = atomicio(read, fd,
bp->buf, amt)) != amt) {
haderr = errno;
memset(bp->buf + nr, 0, amt - nr);
}
}
/* Keep writing after error to retain sync */
if (haderr) {
(void)atomicio(vwrite, remout, bp->buf, amt);
memset(bp->buf, 0, amt);
continue;
}
if (atomicio6(vwrite, remout, bp->buf, amt, scpio,
&statbytes) != amt)
haderr = errno;
}
unset_nonblock(remout);
if (fd != -1) {
if (close(fd) == -1 && !haderr)
haderr = errno;
fd = -1;
}
if (!haderr)
(void) atomicio(vwrite, remout, "", 1);
else
run_err("%s: %s", name, strerror(haderr));
(void) response();
if (showprogress)
stop_progress_meter();
}
}
void
rsource(char *name, struct stat *statp)
{
DIR *dirp;
struct dirent *dp;
char *last, *vect[1], path[PATH_MAX];
if (!(dirp = opendir(name))) {
run_err("%s: %s", name, strerror(errno));
return;
}
last = strrchr(name, '/');
if (last == NULL)
last = name;
else
last++;
if (pflag) {
if (do_times(remout, verbose_mode, statp) < 0) {
closedir(dirp);
return;
}
}
(void) snprintf(path, sizeof path, "D%04o %d %.1024s\n",
(u_int) (statp->st_mode & FILEMODEMASK), 0, last);
if (verbose_mode)
fmprintf(stderr, "Entering directory: %s", path);
(void) atomicio(vwrite, remout, path, strlen(path));
if (response() < 0) {
closedir(dirp);
return;
}
while ((dp = readdir(dirp)) != NULL) {
if (dp->d_ino == 0)
continue;
if (!strcmp(dp->d_name, ".") || !strcmp(dp->d_name, ".."))
continue;
if (strlen(name) + 1 + strlen(dp->d_name) >= sizeof(path) - 1) {
run_err("%s/%s: name too long", name, dp->d_name);
continue;
}
(void) snprintf(path, sizeof path, "%s/%s", name, dp->d_name);
vect[0] = path;
source(1, vect);
}
(void) closedir(dirp);
(void) atomicio(vwrite, remout, "E\n", 2);
(void) response();
}
#define TYPE_OVERFLOW(type, val) \
((sizeof(type) == 4 && (val) > INT32_MAX) || \
(sizeof(type) == 8 && (val) > INT64_MAX) || \
(sizeof(type) != 4 && sizeof(type) != 8))
void
sink(int argc, char **argv, const char *src)
{
static BUF buffer;
struct stat stb;
enum {
YES, NO, DISPLAYED
} wrerr;
BUF *bp;
off_t i;
size_t j, count;
int amt, exists, first, ofd;
mode_t mode, omode, mask;
off_t size, statbytes;
unsigned long long ull;
int setimes, targisdir, wrerrno = 0;
char ch, *cp, *np, *targ, *why, *vect[1], buf[2048], visbuf[2048];
char **patterns = NULL;
size_t n, npatterns = 0;
struct timeval tv[2];
#define atime tv[0]
#define mtime tv[1]
#define SCREWUP(str) { why = str; goto screwup; }
if (TYPE_OVERFLOW(time_t, 0) || TYPE_OVERFLOW(off_t, 0))
SCREWUP("Unexpected off_t/time_t size");
setimes = targisdir = 0;
mask = umask(0);
if (!pflag)
(void) umask(mask);
if (argc != 1) {
run_err("ambiguous target");
exit(1);
}
targ = *argv;
if (targetshouldbedirectory)
verifydir(targ);
(void) atomicio(vwrite, remout, "", 1);
if (stat(targ, &stb) == 0 && S_ISDIR(stb.st_mode))
targisdir = 1;
if (src != NULL && !iamrecursive && !Tflag) {
/*
* Prepare to try to restrict incoming filenames to match
* the requested destination file glob.
*/
if (brace_expand(src, &patterns, &npatterns) != 0)
fatal("%s: could not expand pattern", __func__);
}
for (first = 1;; first = 0) {
cp = buf;
if (atomicio(read, remin, cp, 1) != 1)
goto done;
if (*cp++ == '\n')
SCREWUP("unexpected <newline>");
do {
if (atomicio(read, remin, &ch, sizeof(ch)) != sizeof(ch))
SCREWUP("lost connection");
*cp++ = ch;
} while (cp < &buf[sizeof(buf) - 1] && ch != '\n');
*cp = 0;
if (verbose_mode)
fmprintf(stderr, "Sink: %s", buf);
if (buf[0] == '\01' || buf[0] == '\02') {
if (iamremote == 0) {
(void) snmprintf(visbuf, sizeof(visbuf),
NULL, "%s", buf + 1);
(void) atomicio(vwrite, STDERR_FILENO,
visbuf, strlen(visbuf));
}
if (buf[0] == '\02')
exit(1);
++errs;
continue;
}
if (buf[0] == 'E') {
(void) atomicio(vwrite, remout, "", 1);
goto done;
}
if (ch == '\n')
*--cp = 0;
cp = buf;
if (*cp == 'T') {
setimes++;
cp++;
if (!isdigit((unsigned char)*cp))
SCREWUP("mtime.sec not present");
ull = strtoull(cp, &cp, 10);
if (!cp || *cp++ != ' ')
SCREWUP("mtime.sec not delimited");
if (TYPE_OVERFLOW(time_t, ull))
setimes = 0; /* out of range */
mtime.tv_sec = ull;
mtime.tv_usec = strtol(cp, &cp, 10);
if (!cp || *cp++ != ' ' || mtime.tv_usec < 0 ||
mtime.tv_usec > 999999)
SCREWUP("mtime.usec not delimited");
if (!isdigit((unsigned char)*cp))
SCREWUP("atime.sec not present");
ull = strtoull(cp, &cp, 10);
if (!cp || *cp++ != ' ')
SCREWUP("atime.sec not delimited");
if (TYPE_OVERFLOW(time_t, ull))
setimes = 0; /* out of range */
atime.tv_sec = ull;
atime.tv_usec = strtol(cp, &cp, 10);
if (!cp || *cp++ != '\0' || atime.tv_usec < 0 ||
atime.tv_usec > 999999)
SCREWUP("atime.usec not delimited");
(void) atomicio(vwrite, remout, "", 1);
continue;
}
if (*cp != 'C' && *cp != 'D') {
/*
* Check for the case "rcp remote:foo\* local:bar".
* In this case, the line "No match." can be returned
* by the shell before the rcp command on the remote is
* executed so the ^Aerror_message convention isn't
* followed.
*/
if (first) {
run_err("%s", cp);
exit(1);
}
SCREWUP("expected control record");
}
mode = 0;
for (++cp; cp < buf + 5; cp++) {
if (*cp < '0' || *cp > '7')
SCREWUP("bad mode");
mode = (mode << 3) | (*cp - '0');
}
if (!pflag)
mode &= ~mask;
if (*cp++ != ' ')
SCREWUP("mode not delimited");
if (!isdigit((unsigned char)*cp))
SCREWUP("size not present");
ull = strtoull(cp, &cp, 10);
if (!cp || *cp++ != ' ')
SCREWUP("size not delimited");
if (TYPE_OVERFLOW(off_t, ull))
SCREWUP("size out of range");
size = (off_t)ull;
if (*cp == '\0' || strchr(cp, '/') != NULL ||
strcmp(cp, ".") == 0 || strcmp(cp, "..") == 0) {
run_err("error: unexpected filename: %s", cp);
exit(1);
}
if (npatterns > 0) {
for (n = 0; n < npatterns; n++) {
if (fnmatch(patterns[n], cp, 0) == 0)
break;
}
if (n >= npatterns)
SCREWUP("filename does not match request");
}
if (targisdir) {
static char *namebuf;
static size_t cursize;
size_t need;
need = strlen(targ) + strlen(cp) + 250;
if (need > cursize) {
free(namebuf);
namebuf = xmalloc(need);
cursize = need;
}
(void) snprintf(namebuf, need, "%s%s%s", targ,
strcmp(targ, "/") ? "/" : "", cp);
np = namebuf;
} else
np = targ;
curfile = cp;
exists = stat(np, &stb) == 0;
if (buf[0] == 'D') {
int mod_flag = pflag;
if (!iamrecursive)
SCREWUP("received directory without -r");
if (exists) {
if (!S_ISDIR(stb.st_mode)) {
errno = ENOTDIR;
goto bad;
}
if (pflag)
(void) chmod(np, mode);
} else {
/* Handle copying from a read-only
directory */
mod_flag = 1;
if (mkdir(np, mode | S_IRWXU) == -1)
goto bad;
}
vect[0] = xstrdup(np);
sink(1, vect, src);
if (setimes) {
setimes = 0;
if (utimes(vect[0], tv) == -1)
run_err("%s: set times: %s",
vect[0], strerror(errno));
}
if (mod_flag)
(void) chmod(vect[0], mode);
free(vect[0]);
continue;
}
omode = mode;
mode |= S_IWUSR;
if ((ofd = open(np, O_WRONLY|O_CREAT, mode)) == -1) {
bad: run_err("%s: %s", np, strerror(errno));
continue;
}
(void) atomicio(vwrite, remout, "", 1);
if ((bp = allocbuf(&buffer, ofd, COPY_BUFLEN)) == NULL) {
(void) close(ofd);
continue;
}
cp = bp->buf;
wrerr = NO;
statbytes = 0;
if (showprogress)
start_progress_meter(curfile, size, &statbytes);
set_nonblock(remin);
for (count = i = 0; i < size; i += bp->cnt) {
amt = bp->cnt;
if (i + amt > size)
amt = size - i;
count += amt;
do {
j = atomicio6(read, remin, cp, amt,
scpio, &statbytes);
if (j == 0) {
run_err("%s", j != EPIPE ?
strerror(errno) :
"dropped connection");
exit(1);
}
amt -= j;
cp += j;
} while (amt > 0);
if (count == bp->cnt) {
/* Keep reading so we stay sync'd up. */
if (wrerr == NO) {
if (atomicio(vwrite, ofd, bp->buf,
count) != count) {
wrerr = YES;
wrerrno = errno;
}
}
count = 0;
cp = bp->buf;
}
}
unset_nonblock(remin);
if (count != 0 && wrerr == NO &&
atomicio(vwrite, ofd, bp->buf, count) != count) {
wrerr = YES;
wrerrno = errno;
}
if (wrerr == NO && (!exists || S_ISREG(stb.st_mode)) &&
ftruncate(ofd, size) != 0) {
run_err("%s: truncate: %s", np, strerror(errno));
wrerr = DISPLAYED;
}
if (pflag) {
if (exists || omode != mode)
#ifdef HAVE_FCHMOD
if (fchmod(ofd, omode)) {
#else /* HAVE_FCHMOD */
if (chmod(np, omode)) {
#endif /* HAVE_FCHMOD */
run_err("%s: set mode: %s",
np, strerror(errno));
wrerr = DISPLAYED;
}
} else {
if (!exists && omode != mode)
#ifdef HAVE_FCHMOD
if (fchmod(ofd, omode & ~mask)) {
#else /* HAVE_FCHMOD */
if (chmod(np, omode & ~mask)) {
#endif /* HAVE_FCHMOD */
run_err("%s: set mode: %s",
np, strerror(errno));
wrerr = DISPLAYED;
}
}
if (close(ofd) == -1) {
wrerr = YES;
wrerrno = errno;
}
(void) response();
if (showprogress)
stop_progress_meter();
if (setimes && wrerr == NO) {
setimes = 0;
if (utimes(np, tv) == -1) {
run_err("%s: set times: %s",
np, strerror(errno));
wrerr = DISPLAYED;
}
}
switch (wrerr) {
case YES:
run_err("%s: %s", np, strerror(wrerrno));
break;
case NO:
(void) atomicio(vwrite, remout, "", 1);
break;
case DISPLAYED:
break;
}
}
done:
for (n = 0; n < npatterns; n++)
free(patterns[n]);
free(patterns);
return;
screwup:
for (n = 0; n < npatterns; n++)
free(patterns[n]);
free(patterns);
run_err("protocol error: %s", why);
exit(1);
}
int
response(void)
{
char ch, *cp, resp, rbuf[2048], visbuf[2048];
if (atomicio(read, remin, &resp, sizeof(resp)) != sizeof(resp))
lostconn(0);
cp = rbuf;
switch (resp) {
case 0: /* ok */
return (0);
default:
*cp++ = resp;
/* FALLTHROUGH */
case 1: /* error, followed by error msg */
case 2: /* fatal error, "" */
do {
if (atomicio(read, remin, &ch, sizeof(ch)) != sizeof(ch))
lostconn(0);
*cp++ = ch;
} while (cp < &rbuf[sizeof(rbuf) - 1] && ch != '\n');
if (!iamremote) {
cp[-1] = '\0';
(void) snmprintf(visbuf, sizeof(visbuf),
NULL, "%s\n", rbuf);
(void) atomicio(vwrite, STDERR_FILENO,
visbuf, strlen(visbuf));
}
++errs;
if (resp == 1)
return (-1);
exit(1);
}
/* NOTREACHED */
}
void
usage(void)
{
(void) fprintf(stderr,
"usage: scp [-346BCpqrTv] [-c cipher] [-F ssh_config] [-i identity_file]\n"
" [-J destination] [-l limit] [-o ssh_option] [-P port]\n"
" [-S program] source ... target\n");
exit(1);
}
void
run_err(const char *fmt,...)
{
static FILE *fp;
va_list ap;
++errs;
if (fp != NULL || (remout != -1 && (fp = fdopen(remout, "w")))) {
(void) fprintf(fp, "%c", 0x01);
(void) fprintf(fp, "scp: ");
va_start(ap, fmt);
(void) vfprintf(fp, fmt, ap);
va_end(ap);
(void) fprintf(fp, "\n");
(void) fflush(fp);
}
if (!iamremote) {
va_start(ap, fmt);
vfmprintf(stderr, fmt, ap);
va_end(ap);
fprintf(stderr, "\n");
}
}
void
verifydir(char *cp)
{
struct stat stb;
if (!stat(cp, &stb)) {
if (S_ISDIR(stb.st_mode))
return;
errno = ENOTDIR;
}
run_err("%s: %s", cp, strerror(errno));
killchild(0);
}
int
okname(char *cp0)
{
int c;
char *cp;
cp = cp0;
do {
c = (int)*cp;
if (c & 0200)
goto bad;
if (!isalpha(c) && !isdigit((unsigned char)c)) {
switch (c) {
case '\'':
case '"':
case '`':
case ' ':
case '#':
goto bad;
default:
break;
}
}
} while (*++cp);
return (1);
bad: fmprintf(stderr, "%s: invalid user name\n", cp0);
return (0);
}
BUF *
allocbuf(BUF *bp, int fd, int blksize)
{
size_t size;
#ifdef HAVE_STRUCT_STAT_ST_BLKSIZE
struct stat stb;
if (fstat(fd, &stb) == -1) {
run_err("fstat: %s", strerror(errno));
return (0);
}
size = ROUNDUP(stb.st_blksize, blksize);
if (size == 0)
size = blksize;
#else /* HAVE_STRUCT_STAT_ST_BLKSIZE */
size = blksize;
#endif /* HAVE_STRUCT_STAT_ST_BLKSIZE */
if (bp->cnt >= size)
return (bp);
bp->buf = xrecallocarray(bp->buf, bp->cnt, size, 1);
bp->cnt = size;
return (bp);
}
void
lostconn(int signo)
{
if (!iamremote)
(void)write(STDERR_FILENO, "lost connection\n", 16);
if (signo)
_exit(1);
else
exit(1);
}
diff --git a/servconf.c b/servconf.c
index e76f9c39e548..70f5f73f0519 100644
--- a/servconf.c
+++ b/servconf.c
@@ -1,2714 +1,2908 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: servconf.c,v 1.352 2019/09/06 14:45:34 naddy Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: servconf.c,v 1.360 2020/01/31 22:42:45 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
* All rights reserved
*
* As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
* can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
* software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
* incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
* called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SYSCTL_H
#include <sys/sysctl.h>
#endif
#include <netinet/in.h>
#include <netinet/in_systm.h>
#include <netinet/ip.h>
#ifdef HAVE_NET_ROUTE_H
#include <net/route.h>
#endif
#include <ctype.h>
#include <netdb.h>
#include <pwd.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <signal.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <limits.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <errno.h>
#ifdef HAVE_UTIL_H
#include <util.h>
#endif
+#ifdef USE_SYSTEM_GLOB
+# include <glob.h>
+#else
+# include "openbsd-compat/glob.h"
+#endif
#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "ssh.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "sshbuf.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "servconf.h"
#include "compat.h"
#include "pathnames.h"
#include "cipher.h"
#include "sshkey.h"
#include "kex.h"
#include "mac.h"
#include "match.h"
#include "channels.h"
#include "groupaccess.h"
#include "canohost.h"
#include "packet.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
#include "hostfile.h"
#include "auth.h"
#include "myproposal.h"
#include "digest.h"
static void add_listen_addr(ServerOptions *, const char *,
const char *, int);
static void add_one_listen_addr(ServerOptions *, const char *,
const char *, int);
+void parse_server_config_depth(ServerOptions *options, const char *filename,
+ struct sshbuf *conf, struct include_list *includes,
+ struct connection_info *connectinfo, int flags, int *activep, int depth);
/* Use of privilege separation or not */
extern int use_privsep;
extern struct sshbuf *cfg;
/* Initializes the server options to their default values. */
void
initialize_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
{
memset(options, 0, sizeof(*options));
/* Portable-specific options */
options->use_pam = -1;
/* Standard Options */
options->num_ports = 0;
options->ports_from_cmdline = 0;
options->queued_listen_addrs = NULL;
options->num_queued_listens = 0;
options->listen_addrs = NULL;
options->num_listen_addrs = 0;
options->address_family = -1;
options->routing_domain = NULL;
options->num_host_key_files = 0;
options->num_host_cert_files = 0;
options->host_key_agent = NULL;
options->pid_file = NULL;
options->login_grace_time = -1;
options->permit_root_login = PERMIT_NOT_SET;
options->ignore_rhosts = -1;
options->ignore_user_known_hosts = -1;
options->print_motd = -1;
options->print_lastlog = -1;
options->x11_forwarding = -1;
options->x11_display_offset = -1;
options->x11_use_localhost = -1;
options->permit_tty = -1;
options->permit_user_rc = -1;
options->xauth_location = NULL;
options->strict_modes = -1;
options->tcp_keep_alive = -1;
options->log_facility = SYSLOG_FACILITY_NOT_SET;
options->log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_NOT_SET;
options->hostbased_authentication = -1;
options->hostbased_uses_name_from_packet_only = -1;
options->hostbased_key_types = NULL;
options->hostkeyalgorithms = NULL;
options->pubkey_authentication = -1;
+ options->pubkey_auth_options = -1;
options->pubkey_key_types = NULL;
options->kerberos_authentication = -1;
options->kerberos_or_local_passwd = -1;
options->kerberos_ticket_cleanup = -1;
options->kerberos_get_afs_token = -1;
options->gss_authentication=-1;
options->gss_cleanup_creds = -1;
options->gss_strict_acceptor = -1;
options->password_authentication = -1;
options->kbd_interactive_authentication = -1;
options->challenge_response_authentication = -1;
options->permit_empty_passwd = -1;
options->permit_user_env = -1;
options->permit_user_env_whitelist = NULL;
options->compression = -1;
options->rekey_limit = -1;
options->rekey_interval = -1;
options->allow_tcp_forwarding = -1;
options->allow_streamlocal_forwarding = -1;
options->allow_agent_forwarding = -1;
options->num_allow_users = 0;
options->num_deny_users = 0;
options->num_allow_groups = 0;
options->num_deny_groups = 0;
options->ciphers = NULL;
options->macs = NULL;
options->kex_algorithms = NULL;
options->ca_sign_algorithms = NULL;
options->fwd_opts.gateway_ports = -1;
options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_mask = (mode_t)-1;
options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_unlink = -1;
options->num_subsystems = 0;
options->max_startups_begin = -1;
options->max_startups_rate = -1;
options->max_startups = -1;
options->max_authtries = -1;
options->max_sessions = -1;
options->banner = NULL;
options->use_dns = -1;
options->client_alive_interval = -1;
options->client_alive_count_max = -1;
options->num_authkeys_files = 0;
options->num_accept_env = 0;
options->num_setenv = 0;
options->permit_tun = -1;
options->permitted_opens = NULL;
options->permitted_listens = NULL;
options->adm_forced_command = NULL;
options->chroot_directory = NULL;
options->authorized_keys_command = NULL;
options->authorized_keys_command_user = NULL;
options->revoked_keys_file = NULL;
+ options->sk_provider = NULL;
options->trusted_user_ca_keys = NULL;
options->authorized_principals_file = NULL;
options->authorized_principals_command = NULL;
options->authorized_principals_command_user = NULL;
options->ip_qos_interactive = -1;
options->ip_qos_bulk = -1;
options->version_addendum = NULL;
options->fingerprint_hash = -1;
options->disable_forwarding = -1;
options->expose_userauth_info = -1;
}
/* Returns 1 if a string option is unset or set to "none" or 0 otherwise. */
static int
option_clear_or_none(const char *o)
{
return o == NULL || strcasecmp(o, "none") == 0;
}
static void
assemble_algorithms(ServerOptions *o)
{
char *all_cipher, *all_mac, *all_kex, *all_key, *all_sig;
+ char *def_cipher, *def_mac, *def_kex, *def_key, *def_sig;
int r;
all_cipher = cipher_alg_list(',', 0);
all_mac = mac_alg_list(',');
all_kex = kex_alg_list(',');
all_key = sshkey_alg_list(0, 0, 1, ',');
all_sig = sshkey_alg_list(0, 1, 1, ',');
+ /* remove unsupported algos from default lists */
+ def_cipher = match_filter_whitelist(KEX_SERVER_ENCRYPT, all_cipher);
+ def_mac = match_filter_whitelist(KEX_SERVER_MAC, all_mac);
+ def_kex = match_filter_whitelist(KEX_SERVER_KEX, all_kex);
+ def_key = match_filter_whitelist(KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG, all_key);
+ def_sig = match_filter_whitelist(SSH_ALLOWED_CA_SIGALGS, all_sig);
#define ASSEMBLE(what, defaults, all) \
do { \
if ((r = kex_assemble_names(&o->what, defaults, all)) != 0) \
fatal("%s: %s: %s", __func__, #what, ssh_err(r)); \
} while (0)
- ASSEMBLE(ciphers, KEX_SERVER_ENCRYPT, all_cipher);
- ASSEMBLE(macs, KEX_SERVER_MAC, all_mac);
- ASSEMBLE(kex_algorithms, KEX_SERVER_KEX, all_kex);
- ASSEMBLE(hostkeyalgorithms, KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG, all_key);
- ASSEMBLE(hostbased_key_types, KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG, all_key);
- ASSEMBLE(pubkey_key_types, KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG, all_key);
- ASSEMBLE(ca_sign_algorithms, SSH_ALLOWED_CA_SIGALGS, all_sig);
+ ASSEMBLE(ciphers, def_cipher, all_cipher);
+ ASSEMBLE(macs, def_mac, all_mac);
+ ASSEMBLE(kex_algorithms, def_kex, all_kex);
+ ASSEMBLE(hostkeyalgorithms, def_key, all_key);
+ ASSEMBLE(hostbased_key_types, def_key, all_key);
+ ASSEMBLE(pubkey_key_types, def_key, all_key);
+ ASSEMBLE(ca_sign_algorithms, def_sig, all_sig);
#undef ASSEMBLE
free(all_cipher);
free(all_mac);
free(all_kex);
free(all_key);
free(all_sig);
+ free(def_cipher);
+ free(def_mac);
+ free(def_kex);
+ free(def_key);
+ free(def_sig);
}
static void
array_append2(const char *file, const int line, const char *directive,
char ***array, int **iarray, u_int *lp, const char *s, int i)
{
if (*lp >= INT_MAX)
fatal("%s line %d: Too many %s entries", file, line, directive);
if (iarray != NULL) {
*iarray = xrecallocarray(*iarray, *lp, *lp + 1,
sizeof(**iarray));
(*iarray)[*lp] = i;
}
*array = xrecallocarray(*array, *lp, *lp + 1, sizeof(**array));
(*array)[*lp] = xstrdup(s);
(*lp)++;
}
static void
array_append(const char *file, const int line, const char *directive,
char ***array, u_int *lp, const char *s)
{
array_append2(file, line, directive, array, NULL, lp, s, 0);
}
void
servconf_add_hostkey(const char *file, const int line,
ServerOptions *options, const char *path, int userprovided)
{
char *apath = derelativise_path(path);
array_append2(file, line, "HostKey",
&options->host_key_files, &options->host_key_file_userprovided,
&options->num_host_key_files, apath, userprovided);
free(apath);
}
void
servconf_add_hostcert(const char *file, const int line,
ServerOptions *options, const char *path)
{
char *apath = derelativise_path(path);
array_append(file, line, "HostCertificate",
&options->host_cert_files, &options->num_host_cert_files, apath);
free(apath);
}
void
fill_default_server_options(ServerOptions *options)
{
u_int i;
/* Portable-specific options */
if (options->use_pam == -1)
options->use_pam = 0;
/* Standard Options */
if (options->num_host_key_files == 0) {
/* fill default hostkeys for protocols */
servconf_add_hostkey("[default]", 0, options,
_PATH_HOST_RSA_KEY_FILE, 0);
#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
servconf_add_hostkey("[default]", 0, options,
_PATH_HOST_ECDSA_KEY_FILE, 0);
#endif
servconf_add_hostkey("[default]", 0, options,
_PATH_HOST_ED25519_KEY_FILE, 0);
#ifdef WITH_XMSS
servconf_add_hostkey("[default]", 0, options,
_PATH_HOST_XMSS_KEY_FILE, 0);
#endif /* WITH_XMSS */
}
/* No certificates by default */
if (options->num_ports == 0)
options->ports[options->num_ports++] = SSH_DEFAULT_PORT;
if (options->address_family == -1)
options->address_family = AF_UNSPEC;
if (options->listen_addrs == NULL)
add_listen_addr(options, NULL, NULL, 0);
if (options->pid_file == NULL)
options->pid_file = xstrdup(_PATH_SSH_DAEMON_PID_FILE);
if (options->login_grace_time == -1)
options->login_grace_time = 120;
if (options->permit_root_login == PERMIT_NOT_SET)
options->permit_root_login = PERMIT_NO_PASSWD;
if (options->ignore_rhosts == -1)
options->ignore_rhosts = 1;
if (options->ignore_user_known_hosts == -1)
options->ignore_user_known_hosts = 0;
if (options->print_motd == -1)
options->print_motd = 1;
if (options->print_lastlog == -1)
options->print_lastlog = 1;
if (options->x11_forwarding == -1)
options->x11_forwarding = 0;
if (options->x11_display_offset == -1)
options->x11_display_offset = 10;
if (options->x11_use_localhost == -1)
options->x11_use_localhost = 1;
if (options->xauth_location == NULL)
options->xauth_location = xstrdup(_PATH_XAUTH);
if (options->permit_tty == -1)
options->permit_tty = 1;
if (options->permit_user_rc == -1)
options->permit_user_rc = 1;
if (options->strict_modes == -1)
options->strict_modes = 1;
if (options->tcp_keep_alive == -1)
options->tcp_keep_alive = 1;
if (options->log_facility == SYSLOG_FACILITY_NOT_SET)
options->log_facility = SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH;
if (options->log_level == SYSLOG_LEVEL_NOT_SET)
options->log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO;
if (options->hostbased_authentication == -1)
options->hostbased_authentication = 0;
if (options->hostbased_uses_name_from_packet_only == -1)
options->hostbased_uses_name_from_packet_only = 0;
if (options->pubkey_authentication == -1)
options->pubkey_authentication = 1;
+ if (options->pubkey_auth_options == -1)
+ options->pubkey_auth_options = 0;
if (options->kerberos_authentication == -1)
options->kerberos_authentication = 0;
if (options->kerberos_or_local_passwd == -1)
options->kerberos_or_local_passwd = 1;
if (options->kerberos_ticket_cleanup == -1)
options->kerberos_ticket_cleanup = 1;
if (options->kerberos_get_afs_token == -1)
options->kerberos_get_afs_token = 0;
if (options->gss_authentication == -1)
options->gss_authentication = 0;
if (options->gss_cleanup_creds == -1)
options->gss_cleanup_creds = 1;
if (options->gss_strict_acceptor == -1)
options->gss_strict_acceptor = 1;
if (options->password_authentication == -1)
options->password_authentication = 1;
if (options->kbd_interactive_authentication == -1)
options->kbd_interactive_authentication = 0;
if (options->challenge_response_authentication == -1)
options->challenge_response_authentication = 1;
if (options->permit_empty_passwd == -1)
options->permit_empty_passwd = 0;
if (options->permit_user_env == -1) {
options->permit_user_env = 0;
options->permit_user_env_whitelist = NULL;
}
if (options->compression == -1)
+#ifdef WITH_ZLIB
options->compression = COMP_DELAYED;
+#else
+ options->compression = COMP_NONE;
+#endif
+
if (options->rekey_limit == -1)
options->rekey_limit = 0;
if (options->rekey_interval == -1)
options->rekey_interval = 0;
if (options->allow_tcp_forwarding == -1)
options->allow_tcp_forwarding = FORWARD_ALLOW;
if (options->allow_streamlocal_forwarding == -1)
options->allow_streamlocal_forwarding = FORWARD_ALLOW;
if (options->allow_agent_forwarding == -1)
options->allow_agent_forwarding = 1;
if (options->fwd_opts.gateway_ports == -1)
options->fwd_opts.gateway_ports = 0;
if (options->max_startups == -1)
options->max_startups = 100;
if (options->max_startups_rate == -1)
options->max_startups_rate = 30; /* 30% */
if (options->max_startups_begin == -1)
options->max_startups_begin = 10;
if (options->max_authtries == -1)
options->max_authtries = DEFAULT_AUTH_FAIL_MAX;
if (options->max_sessions == -1)
options->max_sessions = DEFAULT_SESSIONS_MAX;
if (options->use_dns == -1)
options->use_dns = 0;
if (options->client_alive_interval == -1)
options->client_alive_interval = 0;
if (options->client_alive_count_max == -1)
options->client_alive_count_max = 3;
if (options->num_authkeys_files == 0) {
array_append("[default]", 0, "AuthorizedKeysFiles",
&options->authorized_keys_files,
&options->num_authkeys_files,
_PATH_SSH_USER_PERMITTED_KEYS);
array_append("[default]", 0, "AuthorizedKeysFiles",
&options->authorized_keys_files,
&options->num_authkeys_files,
_PATH_SSH_USER_PERMITTED_KEYS2);
}
if (options->permit_tun == -1)
options->permit_tun = SSH_TUNMODE_NO;
if (options->ip_qos_interactive == -1)
options->ip_qos_interactive = IPTOS_DSCP_AF21;
if (options->ip_qos_bulk == -1)
options->ip_qos_bulk = IPTOS_DSCP_CS1;
if (options->version_addendum == NULL)
options->version_addendum = xstrdup("");
if (options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_mask == (mode_t)-1)
options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_mask = 0177;
if (options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_unlink == -1)
options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_unlink = 0;
if (options->fingerprint_hash == -1)
options->fingerprint_hash = SSH_FP_HASH_DEFAULT;
if (options->disable_forwarding == -1)
options->disable_forwarding = 0;
if (options->expose_userauth_info == -1)
options->expose_userauth_info = 0;
+ if (options->sk_provider == NULL)
+ options->sk_provider = xstrdup("internal");
assemble_algorithms(options);
/* Turn privilege separation and sandboxing on by default */
if (use_privsep == -1)
use_privsep = PRIVSEP_ON;
#define CLEAR_ON_NONE(v) \
do { \
if (option_clear_or_none(v)) { \
free(v); \
v = NULL; \
} \
} while(0)
CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->pid_file);
CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->xauth_location);
CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->banner);
CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->trusted_user_ca_keys);
CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->revoked_keys_file);
+ CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->sk_provider);
CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->authorized_principals_file);
CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->adm_forced_command);
CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->chroot_directory);
CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->routing_domain);
+ CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->host_key_agent);
for (i = 0; i < options->num_host_key_files; i++)
CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->host_key_files[i]);
for (i = 0; i < options->num_host_cert_files; i++)
CLEAR_ON_NONE(options->host_cert_files[i]);
#undef CLEAR_ON_NONE
/* Similar handling for AuthenticationMethods=any */
if (options->num_auth_methods == 1 &&
strcmp(options->auth_methods[0], "any") == 0) {
free(options->auth_methods[0]);
options->auth_methods[0] = NULL;
options->num_auth_methods = 0;
}
#ifndef HAVE_MMAP
if (use_privsep && options->compression == 1) {
error("This platform does not support both privilege "
"separation and compression");
error("Compression disabled");
options->compression = 0;
}
#endif
}
/* Keyword tokens. */
typedef enum {
sBadOption, /* == unknown option */
/* Portable-specific options */
sUsePAM,
/* Standard Options */
sPort, sHostKeyFile, sLoginGraceTime,
sPermitRootLogin, sLogFacility, sLogLevel,
sRhostsRSAAuthentication, sRSAAuthentication,
sKerberosAuthentication, sKerberosOrLocalPasswd, sKerberosTicketCleanup,
sKerberosGetAFSToken, sChallengeResponseAuthentication,
sPasswordAuthentication, sKbdInteractiveAuthentication,
sListenAddress, sAddressFamily,
sPrintMotd, sPrintLastLog, sIgnoreRhosts,
sX11Forwarding, sX11DisplayOffset, sX11UseLocalhost,
sPermitTTY, sStrictModes, sEmptyPasswd, sTCPKeepAlive,
sPermitUserEnvironment, sAllowTcpForwarding, sCompression,
sRekeyLimit, sAllowUsers, sDenyUsers, sAllowGroups, sDenyGroups,
sIgnoreUserKnownHosts, sCiphers, sMacs, sPidFile,
sGatewayPorts, sPubkeyAuthentication, sPubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes,
sXAuthLocation, sSubsystem, sMaxStartups, sMaxAuthTries, sMaxSessions,
sBanner, sUseDNS, sHostbasedAuthentication,
sHostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly, sHostbasedAcceptedKeyTypes,
sHostKeyAlgorithms,
sClientAliveInterval, sClientAliveCountMax, sAuthorizedKeysFile,
sGssAuthentication, sGssCleanupCreds, sGssStrictAcceptor,
sAcceptEnv, sSetEnv, sPermitTunnel,
sMatch, sPermitOpen, sPermitListen, sForceCommand, sChrootDirectory,
sUsePrivilegeSeparation, sAllowAgentForwarding,
- sHostCertificate,
+ sHostCertificate, sInclude,
sRevokedKeys, sTrustedUserCAKeys, sAuthorizedPrincipalsFile,
sAuthorizedPrincipalsCommand, sAuthorizedPrincipalsCommandUser,
sKexAlgorithms, sCASignatureAlgorithms, sIPQoS, sVersionAddendum,
sAuthorizedKeysCommand, sAuthorizedKeysCommandUser,
sAuthenticationMethods, sHostKeyAgent, sPermitUserRC,
sStreamLocalBindMask, sStreamLocalBindUnlink,
sAllowStreamLocalForwarding, sFingerprintHash, sDisableForwarding,
- sExposeAuthInfo, sRDomain,
+ sExposeAuthInfo, sRDomain, sPubkeyAuthOptions, sSecurityKeyProvider,
sDeprecated, sIgnore, sUnsupported
} ServerOpCodes;
-#define SSHCFG_GLOBAL 0x01 /* allowed in main section of sshd_config */
-#define SSHCFG_MATCH 0x02 /* allowed inside a Match section */
-#define SSHCFG_ALL (SSHCFG_GLOBAL|SSHCFG_MATCH)
+#define SSHCFG_GLOBAL 0x01 /* allowed in main section of config */
+#define SSHCFG_MATCH 0x02 /* allowed inside a Match section */
+#define SSHCFG_ALL (SSHCFG_GLOBAL|SSHCFG_MATCH)
+#define SSHCFG_NEVERMATCH 0x04 /* Match never matches; internal only */
/* Textual representation of the tokens. */
static struct {
const char *name;
ServerOpCodes opcode;
u_int flags;
} keywords[] = {
/* Portable-specific options */
#ifdef USE_PAM
{ "usepam", sUsePAM, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
#else
{ "usepam", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
#endif
{ "pamauthenticationviakbdint", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
/* Standard Options */
{ "port", sPort, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
{ "hostkey", sHostKeyFile, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
{ "hostdsakey", sHostKeyFile, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, /* alias */
{ "hostkeyagent", sHostKeyAgent, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
{ "pidfile", sPidFile, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
{ "serverkeybits", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
{ "logingracetime", sLoginGraceTime, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
{ "keyregenerationinterval", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
{ "permitrootlogin", sPermitRootLogin, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "syslogfacility", sLogFacility, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
{ "loglevel", sLogLevel, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "rhostsauthentication", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
{ "rhostsrsaauthentication", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "hostbasedauthentication", sHostbasedAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "hostbasedusesnamefrompacketonly", sHostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "hostbasedacceptedkeytypes", sHostbasedAcceptedKeyTypes, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "hostkeyalgorithms", sHostKeyAlgorithms, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
{ "rsaauthentication", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "pubkeyauthentication", sPubkeyAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "pubkeyacceptedkeytypes", sPubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ { "pubkeyauthoptions", sPubkeyAuthOptions, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "dsaauthentication", sPubkeyAuthentication, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, /* alias */
#ifdef KRB5
{ "kerberosauthentication", sKerberosAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "kerberosorlocalpasswd", sKerberosOrLocalPasswd, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
{ "kerberosticketcleanup", sKerberosTicketCleanup, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
#ifdef USE_AFS
{ "kerberosgetafstoken", sKerberosGetAFSToken, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
#else
{ "kerberosgetafstoken", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
#endif
#else
{ "kerberosauthentication", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "kerberosorlocalpasswd", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
{ "kerberosticketcleanup", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
{ "kerberosgetafstoken", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
#endif
{ "kerberostgtpassing", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
{ "afstokenpassing", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
#ifdef GSSAPI
{ "gssapiauthentication", sGssAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "gssapicleanupcredentials", sGssCleanupCreds, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
{ "gssapistrictacceptorcheck", sGssStrictAcceptor, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
#else
{ "gssapiauthentication", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "gssapicleanupcredentials", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
{ "gssapistrictacceptorcheck", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
#endif
{ "passwordauthentication", sPasswordAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "kbdinteractiveauthentication", sKbdInteractiveAuthentication, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "challengeresponseauthentication", sChallengeResponseAuthentication, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
{ "skeyauthentication", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
{ "checkmail", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
{ "listenaddress", sListenAddress, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
{ "addressfamily", sAddressFamily, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
{ "printmotd", sPrintMotd, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
#ifdef DISABLE_LASTLOG
{ "printlastlog", sUnsupported, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
#else
{ "printlastlog", sPrintLastLog, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
#endif
{ "ignorerhosts", sIgnoreRhosts, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
{ "ignoreuserknownhosts", sIgnoreUserKnownHosts, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
{ "x11forwarding", sX11Forwarding, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "x11displayoffset", sX11DisplayOffset, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "x11uselocalhost", sX11UseLocalhost, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "xauthlocation", sXAuthLocation, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
{ "strictmodes", sStrictModes, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
{ "permitemptypasswords", sEmptyPasswd, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "permituserenvironment", sPermitUserEnvironment, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
{ "uselogin", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
{ "compression", sCompression, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
{ "rekeylimit", sRekeyLimit, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "tcpkeepalive", sTCPKeepAlive, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
{ "keepalive", sTCPKeepAlive, SSHCFG_GLOBAL }, /* obsolete alias */
{ "allowtcpforwarding", sAllowTcpForwarding, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "allowagentforwarding", sAllowAgentForwarding, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "allowusers", sAllowUsers, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "denyusers", sDenyUsers, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "allowgroups", sAllowGroups, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "denygroups", sDenyGroups, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "ciphers", sCiphers, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
{ "macs", sMacs, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
{ "protocol", sIgnore, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
{ "gatewayports", sGatewayPorts, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "subsystem", sSubsystem, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
{ "maxstartups", sMaxStartups, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
{ "maxauthtries", sMaxAuthTries, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "maxsessions", sMaxSessions, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "banner", sBanner, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "usedns", sUseDNS, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
{ "verifyreversemapping", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
{ "reversemappingcheck", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
{ "clientaliveinterval", sClientAliveInterval, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "clientalivecountmax", sClientAliveCountMax, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "authorizedkeysfile", sAuthorizedKeysFile, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "authorizedkeysfile2", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "useprivilegeseparation", sDeprecated, SSHCFG_GLOBAL},
{ "acceptenv", sAcceptEnv, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "setenv", sSetEnv, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "permittunnel", sPermitTunnel, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "permittty", sPermitTTY, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "permituserrc", sPermitUserRC, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "match", sMatch, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "permitopen", sPermitOpen, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "permitlisten", sPermitListen, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "forcecommand", sForceCommand, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "chrootdirectory", sChrootDirectory, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "hostcertificate", sHostCertificate, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
{ "revokedkeys", sRevokedKeys, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "trustedusercakeys", sTrustedUserCAKeys, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "authorizedprincipalsfile", sAuthorizedPrincipalsFile, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "kexalgorithms", sKexAlgorithms, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
+ { "include", sInclude, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "ipqos", sIPQoS, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "authorizedkeyscommand", sAuthorizedKeysCommand, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "authorizedkeyscommanduser", sAuthorizedKeysCommandUser, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "authorizedprincipalscommand", sAuthorizedPrincipalsCommand, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "authorizedprincipalscommanduser", sAuthorizedPrincipalsCommandUser, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "versionaddendum", sVersionAddendum, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
{ "authenticationmethods", sAuthenticationMethods, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "streamlocalbindmask", sStreamLocalBindMask, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "streamlocalbindunlink", sStreamLocalBindUnlink, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "allowstreamlocalforwarding", sAllowStreamLocalForwarding, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "fingerprinthash", sFingerprintHash, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
{ "disableforwarding", sDisableForwarding, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "exposeauthinfo", sExposeAuthInfo, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "rdomain", sRDomain, SSHCFG_ALL },
{ "casignaturealgorithms", sCASignatureAlgorithms, SSHCFG_ALL },
+ { "securitykeyprovider", sSecurityKeyProvider, SSHCFG_GLOBAL },
{ NULL, sBadOption, 0 }
};
static struct {
int val;
char *text;
} tunmode_desc[] = {
{ SSH_TUNMODE_NO, "no" },
{ SSH_TUNMODE_POINTOPOINT, "point-to-point" },
{ SSH_TUNMODE_ETHERNET, "ethernet" },
{ SSH_TUNMODE_YES, "yes" },
{ -1, NULL }
};
/* Returns an opcode name from its number */
static const char *
lookup_opcode_name(ServerOpCodes code)
{
u_int i;
for (i = 0; keywords[i].name != NULL; i++)
if (keywords[i].opcode == code)
return(keywords[i].name);
return "UNKNOWN";
}
/*
* Returns the number of the token pointed to by cp or sBadOption.
*/
static ServerOpCodes
parse_token(const char *cp, const char *filename,
int linenum, u_int *flags)
{
u_int i;
for (i = 0; keywords[i].name; i++)
if (strcasecmp(cp, keywords[i].name) == 0) {
*flags = keywords[i].flags;
return keywords[i].opcode;
}
error("%s: line %d: Bad configuration option: %s",
filename, linenum, cp);
return sBadOption;
}
char *
derelativise_path(const char *path)
{
char *expanded, *ret, cwd[PATH_MAX];
if (strcasecmp(path, "none") == 0)
return xstrdup("none");
expanded = tilde_expand_filename(path, getuid());
if (path_absolute(expanded))
return expanded;
if (getcwd(cwd, sizeof(cwd)) == NULL)
fatal("%s: getcwd: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
xasprintf(&ret, "%s/%s", cwd, expanded);
free(expanded);
return ret;
}
static void
add_listen_addr(ServerOptions *options, const char *addr,
const char *rdomain, int port)
{
u_int i;
if (port > 0)
add_one_listen_addr(options, addr, rdomain, port);
else {
for (i = 0; i < options->num_ports; i++) {
add_one_listen_addr(options, addr, rdomain,
options->ports[i]);
}
}
}
static void
add_one_listen_addr(ServerOptions *options, const char *addr,
const char *rdomain, int port)
{
struct addrinfo hints, *ai, *aitop;
char strport[NI_MAXSERV];
int gaierr;
u_int i;
/* Find listen_addrs entry for this rdomain */
for (i = 0; i < options->num_listen_addrs; i++) {
if (rdomain == NULL && options->listen_addrs[i].rdomain == NULL)
break;
if (rdomain == NULL || options->listen_addrs[i].rdomain == NULL)
continue;
if (strcmp(rdomain, options->listen_addrs[i].rdomain) == 0)
break;
}
if (i >= options->num_listen_addrs) {
/* No entry for this rdomain; allocate one */
if (i >= INT_MAX)
fatal("%s: too many listen addresses", __func__);
options->listen_addrs = xrecallocarray(options->listen_addrs,
options->num_listen_addrs, options->num_listen_addrs + 1,
sizeof(*options->listen_addrs));
i = options->num_listen_addrs++;
if (rdomain != NULL)
options->listen_addrs[i].rdomain = xstrdup(rdomain);
}
/* options->listen_addrs[i] points to the addresses for this rdomain */
memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
hints.ai_family = options->address_family;
hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
hints.ai_flags = (addr == NULL) ? AI_PASSIVE : 0;
snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%d", port);
if ((gaierr = getaddrinfo(addr, strport, &hints, &aitop)) != 0)
fatal("bad addr or host: %s (%s)",
addr ? addr : "<NULL>",
ssh_gai_strerror(gaierr));
for (ai = aitop; ai->ai_next; ai = ai->ai_next)
;
ai->ai_next = options->listen_addrs[i].addrs;
options->listen_addrs[i].addrs = aitop;
}
/* Returns nonzero if the routing domain name is valid */
static int
valid_rdomain(const char *name)
{
#if defined(HAVE_SYS_VALID_RDOMAIN)
return sys_valid_rdomain(name);
#elif defined(__OpenBSD__)
const char *errstr;
long long num;
struct rt_tableinfo info;
int mib[6];
size_t miblen = sizeof(mib);
if (name == NULL)
return 1;
num = strtonum(name, 0, 255, &errstr);
if (errstr != NULL)
return 0;
/* Check whether the table actually exists */
memset(mib, 0, sizeof(mib));
mib[0] = CTL_NET;
mib[1] = PF_ROUTE;
mib[4] = NET_RT_TABLE;
mib[5] = (int)num;
if (sysctl(mib, 6, &info, &miblen, NULL, 0) == -1)
return 0;
return 1;
#else /* defined(__OpenBSD__) */
error("Routing domains are not supported on this platform");
return 0;
#endif
}
/*
* Queue a ListenAddress to be processed once we have all of the Ports
* and AddressFamily options.
*/
static void
queue_listen_addr(ServerOptions *options, const char *addr,
const char *rdomain, int port)
{
struct queued_listenaddr *qla;
options->queued_listen_addrs = xrecallocarray(
options->queued_listen_addrs,
options->num_queued_listens, options->num_queued_listens + 1,
sizeof(*options->queued_listen_addrs));
qla = &options->queued_listen_addrs[options->num_queued_listens++];
qla->addr = xstrdup(addr);
qla->port = port;
qla->rdomain = rdomain == NULL ? NULL : xstrdup(rdomain);
}
/*
* Process queued (text) ListenAddress entries.
*/
static void
process_queued_listen_addrs(ServerOptions *options)
{
u_int i;
struct queued_listenaddr *qla;
if (options->num_ports == 0)
options->ports[options->num_ports++] = SSH_DEFAULT_PORT;
if (options->address_family == -1)
options->address_family = AF_UNSPEC;
for (i = 0; i < options->num_queued_listens; i++) {
qla = &options->queued_listen_addrs[i];
add_listen_addr(options, qla->addr, qla->rdomain, qla->port);
free(qla->addr);
free(qla->rdomain);
}
free(options->queued_listen_addrs);
options->queued_listen_addrs = NULL;
options->num_queued_listens = 0;
}
/*
* Inform channels layer of permitopen options for a single forwarding
* direction (local/remote).
*/
static void
process_permitopen_list(struct ssh *ssh, ServerOpCodes opcode,
char **opens, u_int num_opens)
{
u_int i;
int port;
char *host, *arg, *oarg, ch;
int where = opcode == sPermitOpen ? FORWARD_LOCAL : FORWARD_REMOTE;
const char *what = lookup_opcode_name(opcode);
channel_clear_permission(ssh, FORWARD_ADM, where);
if (num_opens == 0)
return; /* permit any */
/* handle keywords: "any" / "none" */
if (num_opens == 1 && strcmp(opens[0], "any") == 0)
return;
if (num_opens == 1 && strcmp(opens[0], "none") == 0) {
channel_disable_admin(ssh, where);
return;
}
/* Otherwise treat it as a list of permitted host:port */
for (i = 0; i < num_opens; i++) {
oarg = arg = xstrdup(opens[i]);
ch = '\0';
host = hpdelim2(&arg, &ch);
if (host == NULL || ch == '/')
fatal("%s: missing host in %s", __func__, what);
host = cleanhostname(host);
if (arg == NULL || ((port = permitopen_port(arg)) < 0))
fatal("%s: bad port number in %s", __func__, what);
/* Send it to channels layer */
channel_add_permission(ssh, FORWARD_ADM,
where, host, port);
free(oarg);
}
}
/*
* Inform channels layer of permitopen options from configuration.
*/
void
process_permitopen(struct ssh *ssh, ServerOptions *options)
{
process_permitopen_list(ssh, sPermitOpen,
options->permitted_opens, options->num_permitted_opens);
process_permitopen_list(ssh, sPermitListen,
options->permitted_listens,
options->num_permitted_listens);
}
struct connection_info *
get_connection_info(struct ssh *ssh, int populate, int use_dns)
{
static struct connection_info ci;
if (ssh == NULL || !populate)
return &ci;
ci.host = auth_get_canonical_hostname(ssh, use_dns);
ci.address = ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh);
ci.laddress = ssh_local_ipaddr(ssh);
ci.lport = ssh_local_port(ssh);
ci.rdomain = ssh_packet_rdomain_in(ssh);
return &ci;
}
/*
* The strategy for the Match blocks is that the config file is parsed twice.
*
* The first time is at startup. activep is initialized to 1 and the
* directives in the global context are processed and acted on. Hitting a
* Match directive unsets activep and the directives inside the block are
* checked for syntax only.
*
* The second time is after a connection has been established but before
* authentication. activep is initialized to 2 and global config directives
* are ignored since they have already been processed. If the criteria in a
* Match block is met, activep is set and the subsequent directives
* processed and actioned until EOF or another Match block unsets it. Any
* options set are copied into the main server config.
*
* Potential additions/improvements:
* - Add Match support for pre-kex directives, eg. Ciphers.
*
* - Add a Tag directive (idea from David Leonard) ala pf, eg:
* Match Address 192.168.0.*
* Tag trusted
* Match Group wheel
* Tag trusted
* Match Tag trusted
* AllowTcpForwarding yes
* GatewayPorts clientspecified
* [...]
*
* - Add a PermittedChannelRequests directive
* Match Group shell
* PermittedChannelRequests session,forwarded-tcpip
*/
static int
match_cfg_line_group(const char *grps, int line, const char *user)
{
int result = 0;
struct passwd *pw;
if (user == NULL)
goto out;
if ((pw = getpwnam(user)) == NULL) {
debug("Can't match group at line %d because user %.100s does "
"not exist", line, user);
} else if (ga_init(pw->pw_name, pw->pw_gid) == 0) {
debug("Can't Match group because user %.100s not in any group "
"at line %d", user, line);
} else if (ga_match_pattern_list(grps) != 1) {
debug("user %.100s does not match group list %.100s at line %d",
user, grps, line);
} else {
debug("user %.100s matched group list %.100s at line %d", user,
grps, line);
result = 1;
}
out:
ga_free();
return result;
}
static void
match_test_missing_fatal(const char *criteria, const char *attrib)
{
fatal("'Match %s' in configuration but '%s' not in connection "
"test specification.", criteria, attrib);
}
/*
* All of the attributes on a single Match line are ANDed together, so we need
* to check every attribute and set the result to zero if any attribute does
* not match.
*/
static int
match_cfg_line(char **condition, int line, struct connection_info *ci)
{
int result = 1, attributes = 0, port;
char *arg, *attrib, *cp = *condition;
if (ci == NULL)
debug3("checking syntax for 'Match %s'", cp);
else
debug3("checking match for '%s' user %s host %s addr %s "
"laddr %s lport %d", cp, ci->user ? ci->user : "(null)",
ci->host ? ci->host : "(null)",
ci->address ? ci->address : "(null)",
ci->laddress ? ci->laddress : "(null)", ci->lport);
while ((attrib = strdelim(&cp)) && *attrib != '\0') {
attributes++;
if (strcasecmp(attrib, "all") == 0) {
if (attributes != 1 ||
((arg = strdelim(&cp)) != NULL && *arg != '\0')) {
error("'all' cannot be combined with other "
"Match attributes");
return -1;
}
*condition = cp;
return 1;
}
if ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) == NULL || *arg == '\0') {
error("Missing Match criteria for %s", attrib);
return -1;
}
if (strcasecmp(attrib, "user") == 0) {
if (ci == NULL || (ci->test && ci->user == NULL)) {
result = 0;
continue;
}
if (ci->user == NULL)
match_test_missing_fatal("User", "user");
if (match_usergroup_pattern_list(ci->user, arg) != 1)
result = 0;
else
debug("user %.100s matched 'User %.100s' at "
"line %d", ci->user, arg, line);
} else if (strcasecmp(attrib, "group") == 0) {
if (ci == NULL || (ci->test && ci->user == NULL)) {
result = 0;
continue;
}
if (ci->user == NULL)
match_test_missing_fatal("Group", "user");
switch (match_cfg_line_group(arg, line, ci->user)) {
case -1:
return -1;
case 0:
result = 0;
}
} else if (strcasecmp(attrib, "host") == 0) {
if (ci == NULL || (ci->test && ci->host == NULL)) {
result = 0;
continue;
}
if (ci->host == NULL)
match_test_missing_fatal("Host", "host");
if (match_hostname(ci->host, arg) != 1)
result = 0;
else
debug("connection from %.100s matched 'Host "
"%.100s' at line %d", ci->host, arg, line);
} else if (strcasecmp(attrib, "address") == 0) {
if (ci == NULL || (ci->test && ci->address == NULL)) {
result = 0;
continue;
}
if (ci->address == NULL)
match_test_missing_fatal("Address", "addr");
switch (addr_match_list(ci->address, arg)) {
case 1:
debug("connection from %.100s matched 'Address "
"%.100s' at line %d", ci->address, arg, line);
break;
case 0:
case -1:
result = 0;
break;
case -2:
return -1;
}
} else if (strcasecmp(attrib, "localaddress") == 0){
if (ci == NULL || (ci->test && ci->laddress == NULL)) {
result = 0;
continue;
}
if (ci->laddress == NULL)
match_test_missing_fatal("LocalAddress",
"laddr");
switch (addr_match_list(ci->laddress, arg)) {
case 1:
debug("connection from %.100s matched "
"'LocalAddress %.100s' at line %d",
ci->laddress, arg, line);
break;
case 0:
case -1:
result = 0;
break;
case -2:
return -1;
}
} else if (strcasecmp(attrib, "localport") == 0) {
if ((port = a2port(arg)) == -1) {
error("Invalid LocalPort '%s' on Match line",
arg);
return -1;
}
if (ci == NULL || (ci->test && ci->lport == -1)) {
result = 0;
continue;
}
if (ci->lport == 0)
match_test_missing_fatal("LocalPort", "lport");
/* TODO support port lists */
if (port == ci->lport)
debug("connection from %.100s matched "
"'LocalPort %d' at line %d",
ci->laddress, port, line);
else
result = 0;
} else if (strcasecmp(attrib, "rdomain") == 0) {
if (ci == NULL || (ci->test && ci->rdomain == NULL)) {
result = 0;
continue;
}
if (ci->rdomain == NULL)
match_test_missing_fatal("RDomain", "rdomain");
if (match_pattern_list(ci->rdomain, arg, 0) != 1)
result = 0;
else
debug("user %.100s matched 'RDomain %.100s' at "
"line %d", ci->rdomain, arg, line);
} else {
error("Unsupported Match attribute %s", attrib);
return -1;
}
}
if (attributes == 0) {
error("One or more attributes required for Match");
return -1;
}
if (ci != NULL)
debug3("match %sfound", result ? "" : "not ");
*condition = cp;
return result;
}
#define WHITESPACE " \t\r\n"
/* Multistate option parsing */
struct multistate {
char *key;
int value;
};
static const struct multistate multistate_flag[] = {
{ "yes", 1 },
{ "no", 0 },
{ NULL, -1 }
};
static const struct multistate multistate_addressfamily[] = {
{ "inet", AF_INET },
{ "inet6", AF_INET6 },
{ "any", AF_UNSPEC },
{ NULL, -1 }
};
static const struct multistate multistate_permitrootlogin[] = {
{ "without-password", PERMIT_NO_PASSWD },
{ "prohibit-password", PERMIT_NO_PASSWD },
{ "forced-commands-only", PERMIT_FORCED_ONLY },
{ "yes", PERMIT_YES },
{ "no", PERMIT_NO },
{ NULL, -1 }
};
static const struct multistate multistate_compression[] = {
+#ifdef WITH_ZLIB
{ "yes", COMP_DELAYED },
{ "delayed", COMP_DELAYED },
+#endif
{ "no", COMP_NONE },
{ NULL, -1 }
};
static const struct multistate multistate_gatewayports[] = {
{ "clientspecified", 2 },
{ "yes", 1 },
{ "no", 0 },
{ NULL, -1 }
};
static const struct multistate multistate_tcpfwd[] = {
{ "yes", FORWARD_ALLOW },
{ "all", FORWARD_ALLOW },
{ "no", FORWARD_DENY },
{ "remote", FORWARD_REMOTE },
{ "local", FORWARD_LOCAL },
{ NULL, -1 }
};
-int
-process_server_config_line(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
+static int
+process_server_config_line_depth(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
const char *filename, int linenum, int *activep,
- struct connection_info *connectinfo)
+ struct connection_info *connectinfo, int inc_flags, int depth,
+ struct include_list *includes)
{
char ch, *cp, ***chararrayptr, **charptr, *arg, *arg2, *p;
- int cmdline = 0, *intptr, value, value2, n, port;
+ int cmdline = 0, *intptr, value, value2, n, port, oactive, r, found;
SyslogFacility *log_facility_ptr;
LogLevel *log_level_ptr;
ServerOpCodes opcode;
u_int i, *uintptr, uvalue, flags = 0;
size_t len;
long long val64;
const struct multistate *multistate_ptr;
const char *errstr;
+ struct include_item *item;
+ glob_t gbuf;
/* Strip trailing whitespace. Allow \f (form feed) at EOL only */
if ((len = strlen(line)) == 0)
return 0;
for (len--; len > 0; len--) {
if (strchr(WHITESPACE "\f", line[len]) == NULL)
break;
line[len] = '\0';
}
cp = line;
if ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) == NULL)
return 0;
/* Ignore leading whitespace */
if (*arg == '\0')
arg = strdelim(&cp);
if (!arg || !*arg || *arg == '#')
return 0;
intptr = NULL;
charptr = NULL;
opcode = parse_token(arg, filename, linenum, &flags);
if (activep == NULL) { /* We are processing a command line directive */
cmdline = 1;
activep = &cmdline;
}
- if (*activep && opcode != sMatch)
+ if (*activep && opcode != sMatch && opcode != sInclude)
debug3("%s:%d setting %s %s", filename, linenum, arg, cp);
if (*activep == 0 && !(flags & SSHCFG_MATCH)) {
if (connectinfo == NULL) {
fatal("%s line %d: Directive '%s' is not allowed "
"within a Match block", filename, linenum, arg);
} else { /* this is a directive we have already processed */
while (arg)
arg = strdelim(&cp);
return 0;
}
}
switch (opcode) {
/* Portable-specific options */
case sUsePAM:
intptr = &options->use_pam;
goto parse_flag;
/* Standard Options */
case sBadOption:
return -1;
case sPort:
/* ignore ports from configfile if cmdline specifies ports */
if (options->ports_from_cmdline)
return 0;
if (options->num_ports >= MAX_PORTS)
fatal("%s line %d: too many ports.",
filename, linenum);
arg = strdelim(&cp);
if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
fatal("%s line %d: missing port number.",
filename, linenum);
options->ports[options->num_ports++] = a2port(arg);
if (options->ports[options->num_ports-1] <= 0)
fatal("%s line %d: Badly formatted port number.",
filename, linenum);
break;
case sLoginGraceTime:
intptr = &options->login_grace_time;
parse_time:
arg = strdelim(&cp);
if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
fatal("%s line %d: missing time value.",
filename, linenum);
if ((value = convtime(arg)) == -1)
fatal("%s line %d: invalid time value.",
filename, linenum);
if (*activep && *intptr == -1)
*intptr = value;
break;
case sListenAddress:
arg = strdelim(&cp);
if (arg == NULL || *arg == '\0')
fatal("%s line %d: missing address",
filename, linenum);
/* check for bare IPv6 address: no "[]" and 2 or more ":" */
if (strchr(arg, '[') == NULL && (p = strchr(arg, ':')) != NULL
&& strchr(p+1, ':') != NULL) {
port = 0;
p = arg;
} else {
arg2 = NULL;
ch = '\0';
p = hpdelim2(&arg, &ch);
if (p == NULL || ch == '/')
fatal("%s line %d: bad address:port usage",
filename, linenum);
p = cleanhostname(p);
if (arg == NULL)
port = 0;
else if ((port = a2port(arg)) <= 0)
fatal("%s line %d: bad port number",
filename, linenum);
}
/* Optional routing table */
arg2 = NULL;
if ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) != NULL) {
if (strcmp(arg, "rdomain") != 0 ||
(arg2 = strdelim(&cp)) == NULL)
fatal("%s line %d: bad ListenAddress syntax",
filename, linenum);
if (!valid_rdomain(arg2))
fatal("%s line %d: bad routing domain",
filename, linenum);
}
queue_listen_addr(options, p, arg2, port);
break;
case sAddressFamily:
intptr = &options->address_family;
multistate_ptr = multistate_addressfamily;
parse_multistate:
arg = strdelim(&cp);
if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
fatal("%s line %d: missing argument.",
filename, linenum);
value = -1;
for (i = 0; multistate_ptr[i].key != NULL; i++) {
if (strcasecmp(arg, multistate_ptr[i].key) == 0) {
value = multistate_ptr[i].value;
break;
}
}
if (value == -1)
fatal("%s line %d: unsupported option \"%s\".",
filename, linenum, arg);
if (*activep && *intptr == -1)
*intptr = value;
break;
case sHostKeyFile:
arg = strdelim(&cp);
if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
fatal("%s line %d: missing file name.",
filename, linenum);
if (*activep) {
servconf_add_hostkey(filename, linenum,
options, arg, 1);
}
break;
case sHostKeyAgent:
charptr = &options->host_key_agent;
arg = strdelim(&cp);
if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
fatal("%s line %d: missing socket name.",
filename, linenum);
if (*activep && *charptr == NULL)
*charptr = !strcmp(arg, SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME) ?
xstrdup(arg) : derelativise_path(arg);
break;
case sHostCertificate:
arg = strdelim(&cp);
if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
fatal("%s line %d: missing file name.",
filename, linenum);
if (*activep)
servconf_add_hostcert(filename, linenum, options, arg);
break;
case sPidFile:
charptr = &options->pid_file;
parse_filename:
arg = strdelim(&cp);
if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
fatal("%s line %d: missing file name.",
filename, linenum);
if (*activep && *charptr == NULL) {
*charptr = derelativise_path(arg);
/* increase optional counter */
if (intptr != NULL)
*intptr = *intptr + 1;
}
break;
case sPermitRootLogin:
intptr = &options->permit_root_login;
multistate_ptr = multistate_permitrootlogin;
goto parse_multistate;
case sIgnoreRhosts:
intptr = &options->ignore_rhosts;
parse_flag:
multistate_ptr = multistate_flag;
goto parse_multistate;
case sIgnoreUserKnownHosts:
intptr = &options->ignore_user_known_hosts;
goto parse_flag;
case sHostbasedAuthentication:
intptr = &options->hostbased_authentication;
goto parse_flag;
case sHostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly:
intptr = &options->hostbased_uses_name_from_packet_only;
goto parse_flag;
case sHostbasedAcceptedKeyTypes:
charptr = &options->hostbased_key_types;
parse_keytypes:
arg = strdelim(&cp);
if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
fatal("%s line %d: Missing argument.",
filename, linenum);
if (*arg != '-' &&
!sshkey_names_valid2(*arg == '+' || *arg == '^' ?
arg + 1 : arg, 1))
fatal("%s line %d: Bad key types '%s'.",
filename, linenum, arg ? arg : "<NONE>");
if (*activep && *charptr == NULL)
*charptr = xstrdup(arg);
break;
case sHostKeyAlgorithms:
charptr = &options->hostkeyalgorithms;
goto parse_keytypes;
case sCASignatureAlgorithms:
charptr = &options->ca_sign_algorithms;
goto parse_keytypes;
case sPubkeyAuthentication:
intptr = &options->pubkey_authentication;
goto parse_flag;
case sPubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes:
charptr = &options->pubkey_key_types;
goto parse_keytypes;
+ case sPubkeyAuthOptions:
+ intptr = &options->pubkey_auth_options;
+ value = 0;
+ while ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) && *arg != '\0') {
+ if (strcasecmp(arg, "none") == 0)
+ continue;
+ if (strcasecmp(arg, "touch-required") == 0)
+ value |= PUBKEYAUTH_TOUCH_REQUIRED;
+ else {
+ fatal("%s line %d: unsupported "
+ "PubkeyAuthOptions option %s",
+ filename, linenum, arg);
+ }
+ }
+ if (*activep && *intptr == -1)
+ *intptr = value;
+ break;
+
case sKerberosAuthentication:
intptr = &options->kerberos_authentication;
goto parse_flag;
case sKerberosOrLocalPasswd:
intptr = &options->kerberos_or_local_passwd;
goto parse_flag;
case sKerberosTicketCleanup:
intptr = &options->kerberos_ticket_cleanup;
goto parse_flag;
case sKerberosGetAFSToken:
intptr = &options->kerberos_get_afs_token;
goto parse_flag;
case sGssAuthentication:
intptr = &options->gss_authentication;
goto parse_flag;
case sGssCleanupCreds:
intptr = &options->gss_cleanup_creds;
goto parse_flag;
case sGssStrictAcceptor:
intptr = &options->gss_strict_acceptor;
goto parse_flag;
case sPasswordAuthentication:
intptr = &options->password_authentication;
goto parse_flag;
case sKbdInteractiveAuthentication:
intptr = &options->kbd_interactive_authentication;
goto parse_flag;
case sChallengeResponseAuthentication:
intptr = &options->challenge_response_authentication;
goto parse_flag;
case sPrintMotd:
intptr = &options->print_motd;
goto parse_flag;
case sPrintLastLog:
intptr = &options->print_lastlog;
goto parse_flag;
case sX11Forwarding:
intptr = &options->x11_forwarding;
goto parse_flag;
case sX11DisplayOffset:
intptr = &options->x11_display_offset;
parse_int:
arg = strdelim(&cp);
if ((errstr = atoi_err(arg, &value)) != NULL)
fatal("%s line %d: integer value %s.",
filename, linenum, errstr);
if (*activep && *intptr == -1)
*intptr = value;
break;
case sX11UseLocalhost:
intptr = &options->x11_use_localhost;
goto parse_flag;
case sXAuthLocation:
charptr = &options->xauth_location;
goto parse_filename;
case sPermitTTY:
intptr = &options->permit_tty;
goto parse_flag;
case sPermitUserRC:
intptr = &options->permit_user_rc;
goto parse_flag;
case sStrictModes:
intptr = &options->strict_modes;
goto parse_flag;
case sTCPKeepAlive:
intptr = &options->tcp_keep_alive;
goto parse_flag;
case sEmptyPasswd:
intptr = &options->permit_empty_passwd;
goto parse_flag;
case sPermitUserEnvironment:
intptr = &options->permit_user_env;
charptr = &options->permit_user_env_whitelist;
arg = strdelim(&cp);
if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
fatal("%s line %d: missing argument.",
filename, linenum);
value = 0;
p = NULL;
if (strcmp(arg, "yes") == 0)
value = 1;
else if (strcmp(arg, "no") == 0)
value = 0;
else {
/* Pattern-list specified */
value = 1;
p = xstrdup(arg);
}
if (*activep && *intptr == -1) {
*intptr = value;
*charptr = p;
p = NULL;
}
free(p);
break;
case sCompression:
intptr = &options->compression;
multistate_ptr = multistate_compression;
goto parse_multistate;
case sRekeyLimit:
arg = strdelim(&cp);
if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename,
linenum);
if (strcmp(arg, "default") == 0) {
val64 = 0;
} else {
if (scan_scaled(arg, &val64) == -1)
fatal("%.200s line %d: Bad number '%s': %s",
filename, linenum, arg, strerror(errno));
if (val64 != 0 && val64 < 16)
fatal("%.200s line %d: RekeyLimit too small",
filename, linenum);
}
if (*activep && options->rekey_limit == -1)
options->rekey_limit = val64;
if (cp != NULL) { /* optional rekey interval present */
if (strcmp(cp, "none") == 0) {
(void)strdelim(&cp); /* discard */
break;
}
intptr = &options->rekey_interval;
goto parse_time;
}
break;
case sGatewayPorts:
intptr = &options->fwd_opts.gateway_ports;
multistate_ptr = multistate_gatewayports;
goto parse_multistate;
case sUseDNS:
intptr = &options->use_dns;
goto parse_flag;
case sLogFacility:
log_facility_ptr = &options->log_facility;
arg = strdelim(&cp);
value = log_facility_number(arg);
if (value == SYSLOG_FACILITY_NOT_SET)
fatal("%.200s line %d: unsupported log facility '%s'",
filename, linenum, arg ? arg : "<NONE>");
if (*log_facility_ptr == -1)
*log_facility_ptr = (SyslogFacility) value;
break;
case sLogLevel:
log_level_ptr = &options->log_level;
arg = strdelim(&cp);
value = log_level_number(arg);
if (value == SYSLOG_LEVEL_NOT_SET)
fatal("%.200s line %d: unsupported log level '%s'",
filename, linenum, arg ? arg : "<NONE>");
if (*activep && *log_level_ptr == -1)
*log_level_ptr = (LogLevel) value;
break;
case sAllowTcpForwarding:
intptr = &options->allow_tcp_forwarding;
multistate_ptr = multistate_tcpfwd;
goto parse_multistate;
case sAllowStreamLocalForwarding:
intptr = &options->allow_streamlocal_forwarding;
multistate_ptr = multistate_tcpfwd;
goto parse_multistate;
case sAllowAgentForwarding:
intptr = &options->allow_agent_forwarding;
goto parse_flag;
case sDisableForwarding:
intptr = &options->disable_forwarding;
goto parse_flag;
case sAllowUsers:
while ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) && *arg != '\0') {
if (match_user(NULL, NULL, NULL, arg) == -1)
fatal("%s line %d: invalid AllowUsers pattern: "
"\"%.100s\"", filename, linenum, arg);
if (!*activep)
continue;
array_append(filename, linenum, "AllowUsers",
&options->allow_users, &options->num_allow_users,
arg);
}
break;
case sDenyUsers:
while ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) && *arg != '\0') {
if (match_user(NULL, NULL, NULL, arg) == -1)
fatal("%s line %d: invalid DenyUsers pattern: "
"\"%.100s\"", filename, linenum, arg);
if (!*activep)
continue;
array_append(filename, linenum, "DenyUsers",
&options->deny_users, &options->num_deny_users,
arg);
}
break;
case sAllowGroups:
while ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) && *arg != '\0') {
if (!*activep)
continue;
array_append(filename, linenum, "AllowGroups",
&options->allow_groups, &options->num_allow_groups,
arg);
}
break;
case sDenyGroups:
while ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) && *arg != '\0') {
if (!*activep)
continue;
array_append(filename, linenum, "DenyGroups",
&options->deny_groups, &options->num_deny_groups,
arg);
}
break;
case sCiphers:
arg = strdelim(&cp);
if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
fatal("%s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum);
if (*arg != '-' &&
!ciphers_valid(*arg == '+' || *arg == '^' ? arg + 1 : arg))
fatal("%s line %d: Bad SSH2 cipher spec '%s'.",
filename, linenum, arg ? arg : "<NONE>");
if (options->ciphers == NULL)
options->ciphers = xstrdup(arg);
break;
case sMacs:
arg = strdelim(&cp);
if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
fatal("%s line %d: Missing argument.", filename, linenum);
if (*arg != '-' &&
!mac_valid(*arg == '+' || *arg == '^' ? arg + 1 : arg))
fatal("%s line %d: Bad SSH2 mac spec '%s'.",
filename, linenum, arg ? arg : "<NONE>");
if (options->macs == NULL)
options->macs = xstrdup(arg);
break;
case sKexAlgorithms:
arg = strdelim(&cp);
if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
fatal("%s line %d: Missing argument.",
filename, linenum);
if (*arg != '-' &&
!kex_names_valid(*arg == '+' || *arg == '^' ?
arg + 1 : arg))
fatal("%s line %d: Bad SSH2 KexAlgorithms '%s'.",
filename, linenum, arg ? arg : "<NONE>");
if (options->kex_algorithms == NULL)
options->kex_algorithms = xstrdup(arg);
break;
case sSubsystem:
if (options->num_subsystems >= MAX_SUBSYSTEMS) {
fatal("%s line %d: too many subsystems defined.",
filename, linenum);
}
arg = strdelim(&cp);
if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
fatal("%s line %d: Missing subsystem name.",
filename, linenum);
if (!*activep) {
arg = strdelim(&cp);
break;
}
for (i = 0; i < options->num_subsystems; i++)
if (strcmp(arg, options->subsystem_name[i]) == 0)
fatal("%s line %d: Subsystem '%s' already defined.",
filename, linenum, arg);
options->subsystem_name[options->num_subsystems] = xstrdup(arg);
arg = strdelim(&cp);
if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
fatal("%s line %d: Missing subsystem command.",
filename, linenum);
options->subsystem_command[options->num_subsystems] = xstrdup(arg);
/* Collect arguments (separate to executable) */
p = xstrdup(arg);
len = strlen(p) + 1;
while ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) != NULL && *arg != '\0') {
len += 1 + strlen(arg);
p = xreallocarray(p, 1, len);
strlcat(p, " ", len);
strlcat(p, arg, len);
}
options->subsystem_args[options->num_subsystems] = p;
options->num_subsystems++;
break;
case sMaxStartups:
arg = strdelim(&cp);
if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
fatal("%s line %d: Missing MaxStartups spec.",
filename, linenum);
if ((n = sscanf(arg, "%d:%d:%d",
&options->max_startups_begin,
&options->max_startups_rate,
&options->max_startups)) == 3) {
if (options->max_startups_begin >
options->max_startups ||
options->max_startups_rate > 100 ||
options->max_startups_rate < 1)
fatal("%s line %d: Illegal MaxStartups spec.",
filename, linenum);
} else if (n != 1)
fatal("%s line %d: Illegal MaxStartups spec.",
filename, linenum);
else
options->max_startups = options->max_startups_begin;
break;
case sMaxAuthTries:
intptr = &options->max_authtries;
goto parse_int;
case sMaxSessions:
intptr = &options->max_sessions;
goto parse_int;
case sBanner:
charptr = &options->banner;
goto parse_filename;
/*
* These options can contain %X options expanded at
* connect time, so that you can specify paths like:
*
* AuthorizedKeysFile /etc/ssh_keys/%u
*/
case sAuthorizedKeysFile:
if (*activep && options->num_authkeys_files == 0) {
while ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) && *arg != '\0') {
arg = tilde_expand_filename(arg, getuid());
array_append(filename, linenum,
"AuthorizedKeysFile",
&options->authorized_keys_files,
&options->num_authkeys_files, arg);
free(arg);
}
}
return 0;
case sAuthorizedPrincipalsFile:
charptr = &options->authorized_principals_file;
arg = strdelim(&cp);
if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
fatal("%s line %d: missing file name.",
filename, linenum);
if (*activep && *charptr == NULL) {
*charptr = tilde_expand_filename(arg, getuid());
/* increase optional counter */
if (intptr != NULL)
*intptr = *intptr + 1;
}
break;
case sClientAliveInterval:
intptr = &options->client_alive_interval;
goto parse_time;
case sClientAliveCountMax:
intptr = &options->client_alive_count_max;
goto parse_int;
case sAcceptEnv:
while ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) && *arg != '\0') {
if (strchr(arg, '=') != NULL)
fatal("%s line %d: Invalid environment name.",
filename, linenum);
if (!*activep)
continue;
array_append(filename, linenum, "AcceptEnv",
&options->accept_env, &options->num_accept_env,
arg);
}
break;
case sSetEnv:
uvalue = options->num_setenv;
while ((arg = strdelimw(&cp)) && *arg != '\0') {
if (strchr(arg, '=') == NULL)
fatal("%s line %d: Invalid environment.",
filename, linenum);
if (!*activep || uvalue != 0)
continue;
array_append(filename, linenum, "SetEnv",
&options->setenv, &options->num_setenv, arg);
}
break;
case sPermitTunnel:
intptr = &options->permit_tun;
arg = strdelim(&cp);
if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
fatal("%s line %d: Missing yes/point-to-point/"
"ethernet/no argument.", filename, linenum);
value = -1;
for (i = 0; tunmode_desc[i].val != -1; i++)
if (strcmp(tunmode_desc[i].text, arg) == 0) {
value = tunmode_desc[i].val;
break;
}
if (value == -1)
fatal("%s line %d: Bad yes/point-to-point/ethernet/"
"no argument: %s", filename, linenum, arg);
if (*activep && *intptr == -1)
*intptr = value;
break;
+ case sInclude:
+ if (cmdline) {
+ fatal("Include directive not supported as a "
+ "command-line option");
+ }
+ value = 0;
+ while ((arg2 = strdelim(&cp)) != NULL && *arg2 != '\0') {
+ value++;
+ found = 0;
+ if (*arg2 != '/' && *arg2 != '~') {
+ xasprintf(&arg, "%s/%s", SSHDIR, arg);
+ } else
+ arg = xstrdup(arg2);
+
+ /*
+ * Don't let included files clobber the containing
+ * file's Match state.
+ */
+ oactive = *activep;
+
+ /* consult cache of include files */
+ TAILQ_FOREACH(item, includes, entry) {
+ if (strcmp(item->selector, arg) != 0)
+ continue;
+ if (item->filename != NULL) {
+ parse_server_config_depth(options,
+ item->filename, item->contents,
+ includes, connectinfo,
+ (oactive ? 0 : SSHCFG_NEVERMATCH),
+ activep, depth + 1);
+ }
+ found = 1;
+ *activep = oactive;
+ }
+ if (found != 0) {
+ free(arg);
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ /* requested glob was not in cache */
+ debug2("%s line %d: new include %s",
+ filename, linenum, arg);
+ if ((r = glob(arg, 0, NULL, &gbuf)) != 0) {
+ if (r != GLOB_NOMATCH) {
+ fatal("%s line %d: include \"%s\" "
+ "glob failed", filename,
+ linenum, arg);
+ }
+ /*
+ * If no entry matched then record a
+ * placeholder to skip later glob calls.
+ */
+ debug2("%s line %d: no match for %s",
+ filename, linenum, arg);
+ item = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*item));
+ item->selector = strdup(arg);
+ TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(includes,
+ item, entry);
+ }
+ if (gbuf.gl_pathc > INT_MAX)
+ fatal("%s: too many glob results", __func__);
+ for (n = 0; n < (int)gbuf.gl_pathc; n++) {
+ debug2("%s line %d: including %s",
+ filename, linenum, gbuf.gl_pathv[n]);
+ item = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*item));
+ item->selector = strdup(arg);
+ item->filename = strdup(gbuf.gl_pathv[n]);
+ if ((item->contents = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
+ fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed",
+ __func__);
+ }
+ load_server_config(item->filename,
+ item->contents);
+ parse_server_config_depth(options,
+ item->filename, item->contents,
+ includes, connectinfo,
+ (oactive ? 0 : SSHCFG_NEVERMATCH),
+ activep, depth + 1);
+ *activep = oactive;
+ TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(includes, item, entry);
+ }
+ globfree(&gbuf);
+ free(arg);
+ }
+ if (value == 0) {
+ fatal("%s line %d: Include missing filename argument",
+ filename, linenum);
+ }
+ break;
+
case sMatch:
if (cmdline)
fatal("Match directive not supported as a command-line "
"option");
value = match_cfg_line(&cp, linenum, connectinfo);
if (value < 0)
fatal("%s line %d: Bad Match condition", filename,
linenum);
- *activep = value;
+ *activep = (inc_flags & SSHCFG_NEVERMATCH) ? 0 : value;
break;
case sPermitListen:
case sPermitOpen:
if (opcode == sPermitListen) {
uintptr = &options->num_permitted_listens;
chararrayptr = &options->permitted_listens;
} else {
uintptr = &options->num_permitted_opens;
chararrayptr = &options->permitted_opens;
}
arg = strdelim(&cp);
if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
fatal("%s line %d: missing %s specification",
filename, linenum, lookup_opcode_name(opcode));
uvalue = *uintptr; /* modified later */
if (strcmp(arg, "any") == 0 || strcmp(arg, "none") == 0) {
if (*activep && uvalue == 0) {
*uintptr = 1;
*chararrayptr = xcalloc(1,
sizeof(**chararrayptr));
(*chararrayptr)[0] = xstrdup(arg);
}
break;
}
for (; arg != NULL && *arg != '\0'; arg = strdelim(&cp)) {
if (opcode == sPermitListen &&
strchr(arg, ':') == NULL) {
/*
* Allow bare port number for PermitListen
* to indicate a wildcard listen host.
*/
xasprintf(&arg2, "*:%s", arg);
} else {
arg2 = xstrdup(arg);
ch = '\0';
p = hpdelim2(&arg, &ch);
if (p == NULL || ch == '/') {
fatal("%s line %d: missing host in %s",
filename, linenum,
lookup_opcode_name(opcode));
}
p = cleanhostname(p);
}
if (arg == NULL ||
((port = permitopen_port(arg)) < 0)) {
fatal("%s line %d: bad port number in %s",
filename, linenum,
lookup_opcode_name(opcode));
}
if (*activep && uvalue == 0) {
array_append(filename, linenum,
lookup_opcode_name(opcode),
chararrayptr, uintptr, arg2);
}
free(arg2);
}
break;
case sForceCommand:
if (cp == NULL || *cp == '\0')
fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename,
linenum);
len = strspn(cp, WHITESPACE);
if (*activep && options->adm_forced_command == NULL)
options->adm_forced_command = xstrdup(cp + len);
return 0;
case sChrootDirectory:
charptr = &options->chroot_directory;
arg = strdelim(&cp);
if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
fatal("%s line %d: missing file name.",
filename, linenum);
if (*activep && *charptr == NULL)
*charptr = xstrdup(arg);
break;
case sTrustedUserCAKeys:
charptr = &options->trusted_user_ca_keys;
goto parse_filename;
case sRevokedKeys:
charptr = &options->revoked_keys_file;
goto parse_filename;
+ case sSecurityKeyProvider:
+ charptr = &options->sk_provider;
+ arg = strdelim(&cp);
+ if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
+ fatal("%s line %d: missing file name.",
+ filename, linenum);
+ if (*activep && *charptr == NULL) {
+ *charptr = strcasecmp(arg, "internal") == 0 ?
+ xstrdup(arg) : derelativise_path(arg);
+ /* increase optional counter */
+ if (intptr != NULL)
+ *intptr = *intptr + 1;
+ }
+ break;
+
case sIPQoS:
arg = strdelim(&cp);
if ((value = parse_ipqos(arg)) == -1)
fatal("%s line %d: Bad IPQoS value: %s",
filename, linenum, arg);
arg = strdelim(&cp);
if (arg == NULL)
value2 = value;
else if ((value2 = parse_ipqos(arg)) == -1)
fatal("%s line %d: Bad IPQoS value: %s",
filename, linenum, arg);
if (*activep) {
options->ip_qos_interactive = value;
options->ip_qos_bulk = value2;
}
break;
case sVersionAddendum:
if (cp == NULL || *cp == '\0')
fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename,
linenum);
len = strspn(cp, WHITESPACE);
if (*activep && options->version_addendum == NULL) {
if (strcasecmp(cp + len, "none") == 0)
options->version_addendum = xstrdup("");
else if (strchr(cp + len, '\r') != NULL)
fatal("%.200s line %d: Invalid argument",
filename, linenum);
else
options->version_addendum = xstrdup(cp + len);
}
return 0;
case sAuthorizedKeysCommand:
if (cp == NULL)
fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename,
linenum);
len = strspn(cp, WHITESPACE);
if (*activep && options->authorized_keys_command == NULL) {
if (cp[len] != '/' && strcasecmp(cp + len, "none") != 0)
fatal("%.200s line %d: AuthorizedKeysCommand "
"must be an absolute path",
filename, linenum);
options->authorized_keys_command = xstrdup(cp + len);
}
return 0;
case sAuthorizedKeysCommandUser:
charptr = &options->authorized_keys_command_user;
arg = strdelim(&cp);
if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
fatal("%s line %d: missing AuthorizedKeysCommandUser "
"argument.", filename, linenum);
if (*activep && *charptr == NULL)
*charptr = xstrdup(arg);
break;
case sAuthorizedPrincipalsCommand:
if (cp == NULL)
fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.", filename,
linenum);
len = strspn(cp, WHITESPACE);
if (*activep &&
options->authorized_principals_command == NULL) {
if (cp[len] != '/' && strcasecmp(cp + len, "none") != 0)
fatal("%.200s line %d: "
"AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand must be "
"an absolute path", filename, linenum);
options->authorized_principals_command =
xstrdup(cp + len);
}
return 0;
case sAuthorizedPrincipalsCommandUser:
charptr = &options->authorized_principals_command_user;
arg = strdelim(&cp);
if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
fatal("%s line %d: missing "
"AuthorizedPrincipalsCommandUser argument.",
filename, linenum);
if (*activep && *charptr == NULL)
*charptr = xstrdup(arg);
break;
case sAuthenticationMethods:
if (options->num_auth_methods == 0) {
value = 0; /* seen "any" pseudo-method */
value2 = 0; /* successfully parsed any method */
while ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) && *arg != '\0') {
if (strcmp(arg, "any") == 0) {
if (options->num_auth_methods > 0) {
fatal("%s line %d: \"any\" "
"must appear alone in "
"AuthenticationMethods",
filename, linenum);
}
value = 1;
} else if (value) {
fatal("%s line %d: \"any\" must appear "
"alone in AuthenticationMethods",
filename, linenum);
} else if (auth2_methods_valid(arg, 0) != 0) {
fatal("%s line %d: invalid "
"authentication method list.",
filename, linenum);
}
value2 = 1;
if (!*activep)
continue;
array_append(filename, linenum,
"AuthenticationMethods",
&options->auth_methods,
&options->num_auth_methods, arg);
}
if (value2 == 0) {
fatal("%s line %d: no AuthenticationMethods "
"specified", filename, linenum);
}
}
return 0;
case sStreamLocalBindMask:
arg = strdelim(&cp);
if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
fatal("%s line %d: missing StreamLocalBindMask "
"argument.", filename, linenum);
/* Parse mode in octal format */
value = strtol(arg, &p, 8);
if (arg == p || value < 0 || value > 0777)
fatal("%s line %d: Bad mask.", filename, linenum);
if (*activep)
options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_mask = (mode_t)value;
break;
case sStreamLocalBindUnlink:
intptr = &options->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_unlink;
goto parse_flag;
case sFingerprintHash:
arg = strdelim(&cp);
if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.",
filename, linenum);
if ((value = ssh_digest_alg_by_name(arg)) == -1)
fatal("%.200s line %d: Invalid hash algorithm \"%s\".",
filename, linenum, arg);
if (*activep)
options->fingerprint_hash = value;
break;
case sExposeAuthInfo:
intptr = &options->expose_userauth_info;
goto parse_flag;
case sRDomain:
charptr = &options->routing_domain;
arg = strdelim(&cp);
if (!arg || *arg == '\0')
fatal("%.200s line %d: Missing argument.",
filename, linenum);
if (strcasecmp(arg, "none") != 0 && strcmp(arg, "%D") != 0 &&
!valid_rdomain(arg))
fatal("%s line %d: bad routing domain",
filename, linenum);
if (*activep && *charptr == NULL)
*charptr = xstrdup(arg);
break;
case sDeprecated:
case sIgnore:
case sUnsupported:
do_log2(opcode == sIgnore ?
SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG2 : SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO,
"%s line %d: %s option %s", filename, linenum,
opcode == sUnsupported ? "Unsupported" : "Deprecated", arg);
while (arg)
arg = strdelim(&cp);
break;
default:
fatal("%s line %d: Missing handler for opcode %s (%d)",
filename, linenum, arg, opcode);
}
if ((arg = strdelim(&cp)) != NULL && *arg != '\0')
fatal("%s line %d: garbage at end of line; \"%.200s\".",
filename, linenum, arg);
return 0;
}
+int
+process_server_config_line(ServerOptions *options, char *line,
+ const char *filename, int linenum, int *activep,
+ struct connection_info *connectinfo, struct include_list *includes)
+{
+ return process_server_config_line_depth(options, line, filename,
+ linenum, activep, connectinfo, 0, 0, includes);
+}
+
+
/* Reads the server configuration file. */
void
load_server_config(const char *filename, struct sshbuf *conf)
{
char *line = NULL, *cp;
size_t linesize = 0;
FILE *f;
int r, lineno = 0;
debug2("%s: filename %s", __func__, filename);
if ((f = fopen(filename, "r")) == NULL) {
perror(filename);
exit(1);
}
sshbuf_reset(conf);
while (getline(&line, &linesize, f) != -1) {
lineno++;
/*
* Trim out comments and strip whitespace
* NB - preserve newlines, they are needed to reproduce
* line numbers later for error messages
*/
if ((cp = strchr(line, '#')) != NULL)
memcpy(cp, "\n", 2);
cp = line + strspn(line, " \t\r");
if ((r = sshbuf_put(conf, cp, strlen(cp))) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
}
free(line);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(conf, 0)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
fclose(f);
debug2("%s: done config len = %zu", __func__, sshbuf_len(conf));
}
void
parse_server_match_config(ServerOptions *options,
- struct connection_info *connectinfo)
+ struct include_list *includes, struct connection_info *connectinfo)
{
ServerOptions mo;
initialize_server_options(&mo);
- parse_server_config(&mo, "reprocess config", cfg, connectinfo);
+ parse_server_config(&mo, "reprocess config", cfg, includes,
+ connectinfo);
copy_set_server_options(options, &mo, 0);
}
int parse_server_match_testspec(struct connection_info *ci, char *spec)
{
char *p;
while ((p = strsep(&spec, ",")) && *p != '\0') {
if (strncmp(p, "addr=", 5) == 0) {
ci->address = xstrdup(p + 5);
} else if (strncmp(p, "host=", 5) == 0) {
ci->host = xstrdup(p + 5);
} else if (strncmp(p, "user=", 5) == 0) {
ci->user = xstrdup(p + 5);
} else if (strncmp(p, "laddr=", 6) == 0) {
ci->laddress = xstrdup(p + 6);
} else if (strncmp(p, "rdomain=", 8) == 0) {
ci->rdomain = xstrdup(p + 8);
} else if (strncmp(p, "lport=", 6) == 0) {
ci->lport = a2port(p + 6);
if (ci->lport == -1) {
fprintf(stderr, "Invalid port '%s' in test mode"
" specification %s\n", p+6, p);
return -1;
}
} else {
fprintf(stderr, "Invalid test mode specification %s\n",
p);
return -1;
}
}
return 0;
}
/*
* Copy any supported values that are set.
*
* If the preauth flag is set, we do not bother copying the string or
* array values that are not used pre-authentication, because any that we
* do use must be explicitly sent in mm_getpwnamallow().
*/
void
copy_set_server_options(ServerOptions *dst, ServerOptions *src, int preauth)
{
#define M_CP_INTOPT(n) do {\
if (src->n != -1) \
dst->n = src->n; \
} while (0)
M_CP_INTOPT(password_authentication);
M_CP_INTOPT(gss_authentication);
M_CP_INTOPT(pubkey_authentication);
+ M_CP_INTOPT(pubkey_auth_options);
M_CP_INTOPT(kerberos_authentication);
M_CP_INTOPT(hostbased_authentication);
M_CP_INTOPT(hostbased_uses_name_from_packet_only);
M_CP_INTOPT(kbd_interactive_authentication);
M_CP_INTOPT(permit_root_login);
M_CP_INTOPT(permit_empty_passwd);
M_CP_INTOPT(allow_tcp_forwarding);
M_CP_INTOPT(allow_streamlocal_forwarding);
M_CP_INTOPT(allow_agent_forwarding);
M_CP_INTOPT(disable_forwarding);
M_CP_INTOPT(expose_userauth_info);
M_CP_INTOPT(permit_tun);
M_CP_INTOPT(fwd_opts.gateway_ports);
M_CP_INTOPT(fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_unlink);
M_CP_INTOPT(x11_display_offset);
M_CP_INTOPT(x11_forwarding);
M_CP_INTOPT(x11_use_localhost);
M_CP_INTOPT(permit_tty);
M_CP_INTOPT(permit_user_rc);
M_CP_INTOPT(max_sessions);
M_CP_INTOPT(max_authtries);
M_CP_INTOPT(client_alive_count_max);
M_CP_INTOPT(client_alive_interval);
M_CP_INTOPT(ip_qos_interactive);
M_CP_INTOPT(ip_qos_bulk);
M_CP_INTOPT(rekey_limit);
M_CP_INTOPT(rekey_interval);
M_CP_INTOPT(log_level);
/*
* The bind_mask is a mode_t that may be unsigned, so we can't use
* M_CP_INTOPT - it does a signed comparison that causes compiler
* warnings.
*/
if (src->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_mask != (mode_t)-1) {
dst->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_mask =
src->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_mask;
}
/* M_CP_STROPT and M_CP_STRARRAYOPT should not appear before here */
#define M_CP_STROPT(n) do {\
if (src->n != NULL && dst->n != src->n) { \
free(dst->n); \
dst->n = src->n; \
} \
} while(0)
#define M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(s, num_s) do {\
u_int i; \
if (src->num_s != 0) { \
for (i = 0; i < dst->num_s; i++) \
free(dst->s[i]); \
free(dst->s); \
dst->s = xcalloc(src->num_s, sizeof(*dst->s)); \
for (i = 0; i < src->num_s; i++) \
dst->s[i] = xstrdup(src->s[i]); \
dst->num_s = src->num_s; \
} \
} while(0)
/* See comment in servconf.h */
COPY_MATCH_STRING_OPTS();
/* Arguments that accept '+...' need to be expanded */
assemble_algorithms(dst);
/*
* The only things that should be below this point are string options
* which are only used after authentication.
*/
if (preauth)
return;
/* These options may be "none" to clear a global setting */
M_CP_STROPT(adm_forced_command);
if (option_clear_or_none(dst->adm_forced_command)) {
free(dst->adm_forced_command);
dst->adm_forced_command = NULL;
}
M_CP_STROPT(chroot_directory);
if (option_clear_or_none(dst->chroot_directory)) {
free(dst->chroot_directory);
dst->chroot_directory = NULL;
}
}
#undef M_CP_INTOPT
#undef M_CP_STROPT
#undef M_CP_STRARRAYOPT
+#define SERVCONF_MAX_DEPTH 16
void
-parse_server_config(ServerOptions *options, const char *filename,
- struct sshbuf *conf, struct connection_info *connectinfo)
+parse_server_config_depth(ServerOptions *options, const char *filename,
+ struct sshbuf *conf, struct include_list *includes,
+ struct connection_info *connectinfo, int flags, int *activep, int depth)
{
- int active, linenum, bad_options = 0;
+ int linenum, bad_options = 0;
char *cp, *obuf, *cbuf;
+ if (depth < 0 || depth > SERVCONF_MAX_DEPTH)
+ fatal("Too many recursive configuration includes");
+
debug2("%s: config %s len %zu", __func__, filename, sshbuf_len(conf));
if ((obuf = cbuf = sshbuf_dup_string(conf)) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_dup_string failed", __func__);
- active = connectinfo ? 0 : 1;
linenum = 1;
while ((cp = strsep(&cbuf, "\n")) != NULL) {
- if (process_server_config_line(options, cp, filename,
- linenum++, &active, connectinfo) != 0)
+ if (process_server_config_line_depth(options, cp,
+ filename, linenum++, activep, connectinfo, flags,
+ depth, includes) != 0)
bad_options++;
}
free(obuf);
if (bad_options > 0)
fatal("%s: terminating, %d bad configuration options",
filename, bad_options);
process_queued_listen_addrs(options);
}
+void
+parse_server_config(ServerOptions *options, const char *filename,
+ struct sshbuf *conf, struct include_list *includes,
+ struct connection_info *connectinfo)
+{
+ int active = connectinfo ? 0 : 1;
+ parse_server_config_depth(options, filename, conf, includes,
+ connectinfo, 0, &active, 0);
+}
+
static const char *
fmt_multistate_int(int val, const struct multistate *m)
{
u_int i;
for (i = 0; m[i].key != NULL; i++) {
if (m[i].value == val)
return m[i].key;
}
return "UNKNOWN";
}
static const char *
fmt_intarg(ServerOpCodes code, int val)
{
if (val == -1)
return "unset";
switch (code) {
case sAddressFamily:
return fmt_multistate_int(val, multistate_addressfamily);
case sPermitRootLogin:
return fmt_multistate_int(val, multistate_permitrootlogin);
case sGatewayPorts:
return fmt_multistate_int(val, multistate_gatewayports);
case sCompression:
return fmt_multistate_int(val, multistate_compression);
case sAllowTcpForwarding:
return fmt_multistate_int(val, multistate_tcpfwd);
case sAllowStreamLocalForwarding:
return fmt_multistate_int(val, multistate_tcpfwd);
case sFingerprintHash:
return ssh_digest_alg_name(val);
default:
switch (val) {
case 0:
return "no";
case 1:
return "yes";
default:
return "UNKNOWN";
}
}
}
static void
dump_cfg_int(ServerOpCodes code, int val)
{
printf("%s %d\n", lookup_opcode_name(code), val);
}
static void
dump_cfg_oct(ServerOpCodes code, int val)
{
printf("%s 0%o\n", lookup_opcode_name(code), val);
}
static void
dump_cfg_fmtint(ServerOpCodes code, int val)
{
printf("%s %s\n", lookup_opcode_name(code), fmt_intarg(code, val));
}
static void
dump_cfg_string(ServerOpCodes code, const char *val)
{
printf("%s %s\n", lookup_opcode_name(code),
val == NULL ? "none" : val);
}
static void
dump_cfg_strarray(ServerOpCodes code, u_int count, char **vals)
{
u_int i;
for (i = 0; i < count; i++)
printf("%s %s\n", lookup_opcode_name(code), vals[i]);
}
static void
dump_cfg_strarray_oneline(ServerOpCodes code, u_int count, char **vals)
{
u_int i;
if (count <= 0 && code != sAuthenticationMethods)
return;
printf("%s", lookup_opcode_name(code));
for (i = 0; i < count; i++)
printf(" %s", vals[i]);
if (code == sAuthenticationMethods && count == 0)
printf(" any");
printf("\n");
}
static char *
format_listen_addrs(struct listenaddr *la)
{
int r;
struct addrinfo *ai;
char addr[NI_MAXHOST], port[NI_MAXSERV];
char *laddr1 = xstrdup(""), *laddr2 = NULL;
/*
* ListenAddress must be after Port. add_one_listen_addr pushes
* addresses onto a stack, so to maintain ordering we need to
* print these in reverse order.
*/
for (ai = la->addrs; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) {
if ((r = getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen, addr,
sizeof(addr), port, sizeof(port),
NI_NUMERICHOST|NI_NUMERICSERV)) != 0) {
error("getnameinfo: %.100s", ssh_gai_strerror(r));
continue;
}
laddr2 = laddr1;
if (ai->ai_family == AF_INET6) {
xasprintf(&laddr1, "listenaddress [%s]:%s%s%s\n%s",
addr, port,
la->rdomain == NULL ? "" : " rdomain ",
la->rdomain == NULL ? "" : la->rdomain,
laddr2);
} else {
xasprintf(&laddr1, "listenaddress %s:%s%s%s\n%s",
addr, port,
la->rdomain == NULL ? "" : " rdomain ",
la->rdomain == NULL ? "" : la->rdomain,
laddr2);
}
free(laddr2);
}
return laddr1;
}
void
dump_config(ServerOptions *o)
{
char *s;
u_int i;
/* these are usually at the top of the config */
for (i = 0; i < o->num_ports; i++)
printf("port %d\n", o->ports[i]);
dump_cfg_fmtint(sAddressFamily, o->address_family);
for (i = 0; i < o->num_listen_addrs; i++) {
s = format_listen_addrs(&o->listen_addrs[i]);
printf("%s", s);
free(s);
}
/* integer arguments */
#ifdef USE_PAM
dump_cfg_fmtint(sUsePAM, o->use_pam);
#endif
dump_cfg_int(sLoginGraceTime, o->login_grace_time);
dump_cfg_int(sX11DisplayOffset, o->x11_display_offset);
dump_cfg_int(sMaxAuthTries, o->max_authtries);
dump_cfg_int(sMaxSessions, o->max_sessions);
dump_cfg_int(sClientAliveInterval, o->client_alive_interval);
dump_cfg_int(sClientAliveCountMax, o->client_alive_count_max);
dump_cfg_oct(sStreamLocalBindMask, o->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_mask);
/* formatted integer arguments */
dump_cfg_fmtint(sPermitRootLogin, o->permit_root_login);
dump_cfg_fmtint(sIgnoreRhosts, o->ignore_rhosts);
dump_cfg_fmtint(sIgnoreUserKnownHosts, o->ignore_user_known_hosts);
dump_cfg_fmtint(sHostbasedAuthentication, o->hostbased_authentication);
dump_cfg_fmtint(sHostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly,
o->hostbased_uses_name_from_packet_only);
dump_cfg_fmtint(sPubkeyAuthentication, o->pubkey_authentication);
#ifdef KRB5
dump_cfg_fmtint(sKerberosAuthentication, o->kerberos_authentication);
dump_cfg_fmtint(sKerberosOrLocalPasswd, o->kerberos_or_local_passwd);
dump_cfg_fmtint(sKerberosTicketCleanup, o->kerberos_ticket_cleanup);
# ifdef USE_AFS
dump_cfg_fmtint(sKerberosGetAFSToken, o->kerberos_get_afs_token);
# endif
#endif
#ifdef GSSAPI
dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssAuthentication, o->gss_authentication);
dump_cfg_fmtint(sGssCleanupCreds, o->gss_cleanup_creds);
#endif
dump_cfg_fmtint(sPasswordAuthentication, o->password_authentication);
dump_cfg_fmtint(sKbdInteractiveAuthentication,
o->kbd_interactive_authentication);
dump_cfg_fmtint(sChallengeResponseAuthentication,
o->challenge_response_authentication);
dump_cfg_fmtint(sPrintMotd, o->print_motd);
#ifndef DISABLE_LASTLOG
dump_cfg_fmtint(sPrintLastLog, o->print_lastlog);
#endif
dump_cfg_fmtint(sX11Forwarding, o->x11_forwarding);
dump_cfg_fmtint(sX11UseLocalhost, o->x11_use_localhost);
dump_cfg_fmtint(sPermitTTY, o->permit_tty);
dump_cfg_fmtint(sPermitUserRC, o->permit_user_rc);
dump_cfg_fmtint(sStrictModes, o->strict_modes);
dump_cfg_fmtint(sTCPKeepAlive, o->tcp_keep_alive);
dump_cfg_fmtint(sEmptyPasswd, o->permit_empty_passwd);
dump_cfg_fmtint(sCompression, o->compression);
dump_cfg_fmtint(sGatewayPorts, o->fwd_opts.gateway_ports);
dump_cfg_fmtint(sUseDNS, o->use_dns);
dump_cfg_fmtint(sAllowTcpForwarding, o->allow_tcp_forwarding);
dump_cfg_fmtint(sAllowAgentForwarding, o->allow_agent_forwarding);
dump_cfg_fmtint(sDisableForwarding, o->disable_forwarding);
dump_cfg_fmtint(sAllowStreamLocalForwarding, o->allow_streamlocal_forwarding);
dump_cfg_fmtint(sStreamLocalBindUnlink, o->fwd_opts.streamlocal_bind_unlink);
dump_cfg_fmtint(sFingerprintHash, o->fingerprint_hash);
dump_cfg_fmtint(sExposeAuthInfo, o->expose_userauth_info);
/* string arguments */
dump_cfg_string(sPidFile, o->pid_file);
dump_cfg_string(sXAuthLocation, o->xauth_location);
- dump_cfg_string(sCiphers, o->ciphers ? o->ciphers : KEX_SERVER_ENCRYPT);
- dump_cfg_string(sMacs, o->macs ? o->macs : KEX_SERVER_MAC);
+ dump_cfg_string(sCiphers, o->ciphers);
+ dump_cfg_string(sMacs, o->macs);
dump_cfg_string(sBanner, o->banner);
dump_cfg_string(sForceCommand, o->adm_forced_command);
dump_cfg_string(sChrootDirectory, o->chroot_directory);
dump_cfg_string(sTrustedUserCAKeys, o->trusted_user_ca_keys);
dump_cfg_string(sRevokedKeys, o->revoked_keys_file);
+ dump_cfg_string(sSecurityKeyProvider, o->sk_provider);
dump_cfg_string(sAuthorizedPrincipalsFile,
o->authorized_principals_file);
dump_cfg_string(sVersionAddendum, *o->version_addendum == '\0'
? "none" : o->version_addendum);
dump_cfg_string(sAuthorizedKeysCommand, o->authorized_keys_command);
dump_cfg_string(sAuthorizedKeysCommandUser, o->authorized_keys_command_user);
dump_cfg_string(sAuthorizedPrincipalsCommand, o->authorized_principals_command);
dump_cfg_string(sAuthorizedPrincipalsCommandUser, o->authorized_principals_command_user);
dump_cfg_string(sHostKeyAgent, o->host_key_agent);
- dump_cfg_string(sKexAlgorithms,
- o->kex_algorithms ? o->kex_algorithms : KEX_SERVER_KEX);
- dump_cfg_string(sCASignatureAlgorithms, o->ca_sign_algorithms ?
- o->ca_sign_algorithms : SSH_ALLOWED_CA_SIGALGS);
- dump_cfg_string(sHostbasedAcceptedKeyTypes, o->hostbased_key_types ?
- o->hostbased_key_types : KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG);
- dump_cfg_string(sHostKeyAlgorithms, o->hostkeyalgorithms ?
- o->hostkeyalgorithms : KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG);
- dump_cfg_string(sPubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes, o->pubkey_key_types ?
- o->pubkey_key_types : KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG);
+ dump_cfg_string(sKexAlgorithms, o->kex_algorithms);
+ dump_cfg_string(sCASignatureAlgorithms, o->ca_sign_algorithms);
+ dump_cfg_string(sHostbasedAcceptedKeyTypes, o->hostbased_key_types);
+ dump_cfg_string(sHostKeyAlgorithms, o->hostkeyalgorithms);
+ dump_cfg_string(sPubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes, o->pubkey_key_types);
dump_cfg_string(sRDomain, o->routing_domain);
/* string arguments requiring a lookup */
dump_cfg_string(sLogLevel, log_level_name(o->log_level));
dump_cfg_string(sLogFacility, log_facility_name(o->log_facility));
/* string array arguments */
dump_cfg_strarray_oneline(sAuthorizedKeysFile, o->num_authkeys_files,
o->authorized_keys_files);
dump_cfg_strarray(sHostKeyFile, o->num_host_key_files,
o->host_key_files);
dump_cfg_strarray(sHostCertificate, o->num_host_cert_files,
o->host_cert_files);
dump_cfg_strarray(sAllowUsers, o->num_allow_users, o->allow_users);
dump_cfg_strarray(sDenyUsers, o->num_deny_users, o->deny_users);
dump_cfg_strarray(sAllowGroups, o->num_allow_groups, o->allow_groups);
dump_cfg_strarray(sDenyGroups, o->num_deny_groups, o->deny_groups);
dump_cfg_strarray(sAcceptEnv, o->num_accept_env, o->accept_env);
dump_cfg_strarray(sSetEnv, o->num_setenv, o->setenv);
dump_cfg_strarray_oneline(sAuthenticationMethods,
o->num_auth_methods, o->auth_methods);
/* other arguments */
for (i = 0; i < o->num_subsystems; i++)
printf("subsystem %s %s\n", o->subsystem_name[i],
o->subsystem_args[i]);
printf("maxstartups %d:%d:%d\n", o->max_startups_begin,
o->max_startups_rate, o->max_startups);
s = NULL;
for (i = 0; tunmode_desc[i].val != -1; i++) {
if (tunmode_desc[i].val == o->permit_tun) {
s = tunmode_desc[i].text;
break;
}
}
dump_cfg_string(sPermitTunnel, s);
printf("ipqos %s ", iptos2str(o->ip_qos_interactive));
printf("%s\n", iptos2str(o->ip_qos_bulk));
printf("rekeylimit %llu %d\n", (unsigned long long)o->rekey_limit,
o->rekey_interval);
printf("permitopen");
if (o->num_permitted_opens == 0)
printf(" any");
else {
for (i = 0; i < o->num_permitted_opens; i++)
printf(" %s", o->permitted_opens[i]);
}
printf("\n");
printf("permitlisten");
if (o->num_permitted_listens == 0)
printf(" any");
else {
for (i = 0; i < o->num_permitted_listens; i++)
printf(" %s", o->permitted_listens[i]);
}
printf("\n");
if (o->permit_user_env_whitelist == NULL) {
dump_cfg_fmtint(sPermitUserEnvironment, o->permit_user_env);
} else {
printf("permituserenvironment %s\n",
o->permit_user_env_whitelist);
}
+ printf("pubkeyauthoptions");
+ if (o->pubkey_auth_options == 0)
+ printf(" none");
+ if (o->pubkey_auth_options & PUBKEYAUTH_TOUCH_REQUIRED)
+ printf(" touch-required");
+ printf("\n");
}
diff --git a/servconf.h b/servconf.h
index 5483da0511d8..4202a2d0293c 100644
--- a/servconf.h
+++ b/servconf.h
@@ -1,283 +1,300 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: servconf.h,v 1.140 2019/04/18 18:56:16 dtucker Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: servconf.h,v 1.143 2020/01/31 22:42:45 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
* All rights reserved
* Definitions for server configuration data and for the functions reading it.
*
* As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
* can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
* software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
* incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
* called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
*/
#ifndef SERVCONF_H
#define SERVCONF_H
+#include <openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h>
+
#define MAX_PORTS 256 /* Max # ports. */
#define MAX_SUBSYSTEMS 256 /* Max # subsystems. */
/* permit_root_login */
#define PERMIT_NOT_SET -1
#define PERMIT_NO 0
#define PERMIT_FORCED_ONLY 1
#define PERMIT_NO_PASSWD 2
#define PERMIT_YES 3
/* use_privsep */
#define PRIVSEP_OFF 0
#define PRIVSEP_ON 1
#define PRIVSEP_NOSANDBOX 2
/* PermitOpen */
#define PERMITOPEN_ANY 0
#define PERMITOPEN_NONE -2
#define DEFAULT_AUTH_FAIL_MAX 6 /* Default for MaxAuthTries */
#define DEFAULT_SESSIONS_MAX 10 /* Default for MaxSessions */
/* Magic name for internal sftp-server */
#define INTERNAL_SFTP_NAME "internal-sftp"
+/* PubkeyAuthOptions flags */
+#define PUBKEYAUTH_TOUCH_REQUIRED 1
+
struct ssh;
struct fwd_perm_list;
/*
* Used to store addresses from ListenAddr directives. These may be
* incomplete, as they may specify addresses that need to be merged
* with any ports requested by ListenPort.
*/
struct queued_listenaddr {
char *addr;
int port; /* <=0 if unspecified */
char *rdomain;
};
/* Resolved listen addresses, grouped by optional routing domain */
struct listenaddr {
char *rdomain;
struct addrinfo *addrs;
};
typedef struct {
u_int num_ports;
u_int ports_from_cmdline;
int ports[MAX_PORTS]; /* Port number to listen on. */
struct queued_listenaddr *queued_listen_addrs;
u_int num_queued_listens;
struct listenaddr *listen_addrs;
u_int num_listen_addrs;
int address_family; /* Address family used by the server. */
char *routing_domain; /* Bind session to routing domain */
char **host_key_files; /* Files containing host keys. */
int *host_key_file_userprovided; /* Key was specified by user. */
u_int num_host_key_files; /* Number of files for host keys. */
char **host_cert_files; /* Files containing host certs. */
u_int num_host_cert_files; /* Number of files for host certs. */
char *host_key_agent; /* ssh-agent socket for host keys. */
char *pid_file; /* Where to put our pid */
int login_grace_time; /* Disconnect if no auth in this time
* (sec). */
int permit_root_login; /* PERMIT_*, see above */
int ignore_rhosts; /* Ignore .rhosts and .shosts. */
int ignore_user_known_hosts; /* Ignore ~/.ssh/known_hosts
* for RhostsRsaAuth */
int print_motd; /* If true, print /etc/motd. */
int print_lastlog; /* If true, print lastlog */
int x11_forwarding; /* If true, permit inet (spoofing) X11 fwd. */
int x11_display_offset; /* What DISPLAY number to start
* searching at */
int x11_use_localhost; /* If true, use localhost for fake X11 server. */
char *xauth_location; /* Location of xauth program */
int permit_tty; /* If false, deny pty allocation */
int permit_user_rc; /* If false, deny ~/.ssh/rc execution */
int strict_modes; /* If true, require string home dir modes. */
int tcp_keep_alive; /* If true, set SO_KEEPALIVE. */
int ip_qos_interactive; /* IP ToS/DSCP/class for interactive */
int ip_qos_bulk; /* IP ToS/DSCP/class for bulk traffic */
char *ciphers; /* Supported SSH2 ciphers. */
char *macs; /* Supported SSH2 macs. */
char *kex_algorithms; /* SSH2 kex methods in order of preference. */
struct ForwardOptions fwd_opts; /* forwarding options */
SyslogFacility log_facility; /* Facility for system logging. */
LogLevel log_level; /* Level for system logging. */
int hostbased_authentication; /* If true, permit ssh2 hostbased auth */
int hostbased_uses_name_from_packet_only; /* experimental */
char *hostbased_key_types; /* Key types allowed for hostbased */
char *hostkeyalgorithms; /* SSH2 server key types */
char *ca_sign_algorithms; /* Allowed CA signature algorithms */
int pubkey_authentication; /* If true, permit ssh2 pubkey authentication. */
char *pubkey_key_types; /* Key types allowed for public key */
+ int pubkey_auth_options; /* -1 or mask of PUBKEYAUTH_* flags */
int kerberos_authentication; /* If true, permit Kerberos
* authentication. */
int kerberos_or_local_passwd; /* If true, permit kerberos
* and any other password
* authentication mechanism,
* such as SecurID or
* /etc/passwd */
int kerberos_ticket_cleanup; /* If true, destroy ticket
* file on logout. */
int kerberos_get_afs_token; /* If true, try to get AFS token if
* authenticated with Kerberos. */
int gss_authentication; /* If true, permit GSSAPI authentication */
int gss_cleanup_creds; /* If true, destroy cred cache on logout */
int gss_strict_acceptor; /* If true, restrict the GSSAPI acceptor name */
int password_authentication; /* If true, permit password
* authentication. */
int kbd_interactive_authentication; /* If true, permit */
int challenge_response_authentication;
int permit_empty_passwd; /* If false, do not permit empty
* passwords. */
int permit_user_env; /* If true, read ~/.ssh/environment */
char *permit_user_env_whitelist; /* pattern-list whitelist */
int compression; /* If true, compression is allowed */
int allow_tcp_forwarding; /* One of FORWARD_* */
int allow_streamlocal_forwarding; /* One of FORWARD_* */
int allow_agent_forwarding;
int disable_forwarding;
u_int num_allow_users;
char **allow_users;
u_int num_deny_users;
char **deny_users;
u_int num_allow_groups;
char **allow_groups;
u_int num_deny_groups;
char **deny_groups;
u_int num_subsystems;
char *subsystem_name[MAX_SUBSYSTEMS];
char *subsystem_command[MAX_SUBSYSTEMS];
char *subsystem_args[MAX_SUBSYSTEMS];
u_int num_accept_env;
char **accept_env;
u_int num_setenv;
char **setenv;
int max_startups_begin;
int max_startups_rate;
int max_startups;
int max_authtries;
int max_sessions;
char *banner; /* SSH-2 banner message */
int use_dns;
int client_alive_interval; /*
* poke the client this often to
* see if it's still there
*/
int client_alive_count_max; /*
* If the client is unresponsive
* for this many intervals above,
* disconnect the session
*/
u_int num_authkeys_files; /* Files containing public keys */
char **authorized_keys_files;
char *adm_forced_command;
int use_pam; /* Enable auth via PAM */
int permit_tun;
char **permitted_opens; /* May also be one of PERMITOPEN_* */
u_int num_permitted_opens;
char **permitted_listens; /* May also be one of PERMITOPEN_* */
u_int num_permitted_listens;
char *chroot_directory;
char *revoked_keys_file;
char *trusted_user_ca_keys;
char *authorized_keys_command;
char *authorized_keys_command_user;
char *authorized_principals_file;
char *authorized_principals_command;
char *authorized_principals_command_user;
int64_t rekey_limit;
int rekey_interval;
char *version_addendum; /* Appended to SSH banner */
u_int num_auth_methods;
char **auth_methods;
int fingerprint_hash;
int expose_userauth_info;
u_int64_t timing_secret;
+ char *sk_provider;
} ServerOptions;
/* Information about the incoming connection as used by Match */
struct connection_info {
const char *user;
const char *host; /* possibly resolved hostname */
const char *address; /* remote address */
const char *laddress; /* local address */
int lport; /* local port */
const char *rdomain; /* routing domain if available */
int test; /* test mode, allow some attributes to be
* unspecified */
};
+/* List of included files for re-exec from the parsed configuration */
+struct include_item {
+ char *selector;
+ char *filename;
+ struct sshbuf *contents;
+ TAILQ_ENTRY(include_item) entry;
+};
+TAILQ_HEAD(include_list, include_item);
+
/*
* These are string config options that must be copied between the
* Match sub-config and the main config, and must be sent from the
* privsep slave to the privsep master. We use a macro to ensure all
* the options are copied and the copies are done in the correct order.
*
* NB. an option must appear in servconf.c:copy_set_server_options() or
* COPY_MATCH_STRING_OPTS here but never both.
*/
#define COPY_MATCH_STRING_OPTS() do { \
M_CP_STROPT(banner); \
M_CP_STROPT(trusted_user_ca_keys); \
M_CP_STROPT(revoked_keys_file); \
M_CP_STROPT(authorized_keys_command); \
M_CP_STROPT(authorized_keys_command_user); \
M_CP_STROPT(authorized_principals_file); \
M_CP_STROPT(authorized_principals_command); \
M_CP_STROPT(authorized_principals_command_user); \
M_CP_STROPT(hostbased_key_types); \
M_CP_STROPT(pubkey_key_types); \
M_CP_STROPT(ca_sign_algorithms); \
M_CP_STROPT(routing_domain); \
M_CP_STROPT(permit_user_env_whitelist); \
M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(authorized_keys_files, num_authkeys_files); \
M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(allow_users, num_allow_users); \
M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(deny_users, num_deny_users); \
M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(allow_groups, num_allow_groups); \
M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(deny_groups, num_deny_groups); \
M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(accept_env, num_accept_env); \
M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(auth_methods, num_auth_methods); \
M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(permitted_opens, num_permitted_opens); \
M_CP_STRARRAYOPT(permitted_listens, num_permitted_listens); \
} while (0)
struct connection_info *get_connection_info(struct ssh *, int, int);
void initialize_server_options(ServerOptions *);
void fill_default_server_options(ServerOptions *);
int process_server_config_line(ServerOptions *, char *, const char *, int,
- int *, struct connection_info *);
+ int *, struct connection_info *, struct include_list *includes);
void process_permitopen(struct ssh *ssh, ServerOptions *options);
void load_server_config(const char *, struct sshbuf *);
void parse_server_config(ServerOptions *, const char *, struct sshbuf *,
- struct connection_info *);
-void parse_server_match_config(ServerOptions *, struct connection_info *);
+ struct include_list *includes, struct connection_info *);
+void parse_server_match_config(ServerOptions *,
+ struct include_list *includes, struct connection_info *);
int parse_server_match_testspec(struct connection_info *, char *);
int server_match_spec_complete(struct connection_info *);
void copy_set_server_options(ServerOptions *, ServerOptions *, int);
void dump_config(ServerOptions *);
char *derelativise_path(const char *);
void servconf_add_hostkey(const char *, const int,
ServerOptions *, const char *path, int);
void servconf_add_hostcert(const char *, const int,
ServerOptions *, const char *path);
#endif /* SERVCONF_H */
diff --git a/serverloop.c b/serverloop.c
index ea468c954a59..340b19a5a48a 100644
--- a/serverloop.c
+++ b/serverloop.c
@@ -1,982 +1,982 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: serverloop.c,v 1.216 2019/06/28 13:35:04 deraadt Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: serverloop.c,v 1.222 2020/01/30 07:21:38 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
* All rights reserved
* Server main loop for handling the interactive session.
*
* As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
* can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
* software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
* incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
* called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
*
* SSH2 support by Markus Friedl.
* Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/wait.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
# include <sys/time.h>
#endif
#include <netinet/in.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <pwd.h>
#include <limits.h>
#include <signal.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <termios.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "packet.h"
#include "sshbuf.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "servconf.h"
#include "canohost.h"
#include "sshpty.h"
#include "channels.h"
#include "compat.h"
#include "ssh2.h"
#include "sshkey.h"
#include "cipher.h"
#include "kex.h"
#include "hostfile.h"
#include "auth.h"
#include "session.h"
#include "dispatch.h"
#include "auth-options.h"
#include "serverloop.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
extern ServerOptions options;
/* XXX */
extern Authctxt *the_authctxt;
extern struct sshauthopt *auth_opts;
extern int use_privsep;
static int no_more_sessions = 0; /* Disallow further sessions. */
/*
* This SIGCHLD kludge is used to detect when the child exits. The server
* will exit after that, as soon as forwarded connections have terminated.
*/
static volatile sig_atomic_t child_terminated = 0; /* The child has terminated. */
/* Cleanup on signals (!use_privsep case only) */
static volatile sig_atomic_t received_sigterm = 0;
/* prototypes */
static void server_init_dispatch(struct ssh *);
/* requested tunnel forwarding interface(s), shared with session.c */
char *tun_fwd_ifnames = NULL;
/* returns 1 if bind to specified port by specified user is permitted */
static int
bind_permitted(int port, uid_t uid)
{
if (use_privsep)
return 1; /* allow system to decide */
if (port < IPPORT_RESERVED && uid != 0)
return 0;
return 1;
}
/*
* we write to this pipe if a SIGCHLD is caught in order to avoid
* the race between select() and child_terminated
*/
static int notify_pipe[2];
static void
notify_setup(void)
{
if (pipe(notify_pipe) == -1) {
error("pipe(notify_pipe) failed %s", strerror(errno));
} else if ((fcntl(notify_pipe[0], F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC) == -1) ||
(fcntl(notify_pipe[1], F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC) == -1)) {
error("fcntl(notify_pipe, F_SETFD) failed %s", strerror(errno));
close(notify_pipe[0]);
close(notify_pipe[1]);
} else {
set_nonblock(notify_pipe[0]);
set_nonblock(notify_pipe[1]);
return;
}
notify_pipe[0] = -1; /* read end */
notify_pipe[1] = -1; /* write end */
}
static void
notify_parent(void)
{
if (notify_pipe[1] != -1)
(void)write(notify_pipe[1], "", 1);
}
static void
notify_prepare(fd_set *readset)
{
if (notify_pipe[0] != -1)
FD_SET(notify_pipe[0], readset);
}
static void
notify_done(fd_set *readset)
{
char c;
if (notify_pipe[0] != -1 && FD_ISSET(notify_pipe[0], readset))
while (read(notify_pipe[0], &c, 1) != -1)
debug2("%s: reading", __func__);
}
/*ARGSUSED*/
static void
sigchld_handler(int sig)
{
int save_errno = errno;
child_terminated = 1;
notify_parent();
errno = save_errno;
}
/*ARGSUSED*/
static void
sigterm_handler(int sig)
{
received_sigterm = sig;
}
static void
client_alive_check(struct ssh *ssh)
{
char remote_id[512];
int r, channel_id;
/* timeout, check to see how many we have had */
- if (ssh_packet_inc_alive_timeouts(ssh) >
+ if (options.client_alive_count_max > 0 &&
+ ssh_packet_inc_alive_timeouts(ssh) >
options.client_alive_count_max) {
sshpkt_fmt_connection_id(ssh, remote_id, sizeof(remote_id));
logit("Timeout, client not responding from %s", remote_id);
cleanup_exit(255);
}
/*
* send a bogus global/channel request with "wantreply",
* we should get back a failure
*/
if ((channel_id = channel_find_open(ssh)) == -1) {
if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "keepalive@openssh.com"))
!= 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, 1)) != 0) /* boolean: want reply */
fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
} else {
channel_request_start(ssh, channel_id,
"keepalive@openssh.com", 1);
}
if ((r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
}
/*
* Sleep in select() until we can do something. This will initialize the
* select masks. Upon return, the masks will indicate which descriptors
* have data or can accept data. Optionally, a maximum time can be specified
* for the duration of the wait (0 = infinite).
*/
static void
wait_until_can_do_something(struct ssh *ssh,
int connection_in, int connection_out,
fd_set **readsetp, fd_set **writesetp, int *maxfdp,
u_int *nallocp, u_int64_t max_time_ms)
{
struct timeval tv, *tvp;
int ret;
time_t minwait_secs = 0;
int client_alive_scheduled = 0;
/* time we last heard from the client OR sent a keepalive */
static time_t last_client_time;
/* Allocate and update select() masks for channel descriptors. */
channel_prepare_select(ssh, readsetp, writesetp, maxfdp,
nallocp, &minwait_secs);
/* XXX need proper deadline system for rekey/client alive */
if (minwait_secs != 0)
max_time_ms = MINIMUM(max_time_ms, (u_int)minwait_secs * 1000);
/*
* if using client_alive, set the max timeout accordingly,
* and indicate that this particular timeout was for client
* alive by setting the client_alive_scheduled flag.
*
* this could be randomized somewhat to make traffic
* analysis more difficult, but we're not doing it yet.
*/
if (options.client_alive_interval) {
uint64_t keepalive_ms =
(uint64_t)options.client_alive_interval * 1000;
if (max_time_ms == 0 || max_time_ms > keepalive_ms) {
max_time_ms = keepalive_ms;
client_alive_scheduled = 1;
}
}
#if 0
/* wrong: bad condition XXX */
if (channel_not_very_much_buffered_data())
#endif
FD_SET(connection_in, *readsetp);
notify_prepare(*readsetp);
/*
* If we have buffered packet data going to the client, mark that
* descriptor.
*/
if (ssh_packet_have_data_to_write(ssh))
FD_SET(connection_out, *writesetp);
/*
* If child has terminated and there is enough buffer space to read
* from it, then read as much as is available and exit.
*/
if (child_terminated && ssh_packet_not_very_much_data_to_write(ssh))
if (max_time_ms == 0 || client_alive_scheduled)
max_time_ms = 100;
if (max_time_ms == 0)
tvp = NULL;
else {
tv.tv_sec = max_time_ms / 1000;
tv.tv_usec = 1000 * (max_time_ms % 1000);
tvp = &tv;
}
/* Wait for something to happen, or the timeout to expire. */
ret = select((*maxfdp)+1, *readsetp, *writesetp, NULL, tvp);
if (ret == -1) {
memset(*readsetp, 0, *nallocp);
memset(*writesetp, 0, *nallocp);
if (errno != EINTR)
error("select: %.100s", strerror(errno));
} else if (client_alive_scheduled) {
time_t now = monotime();
/*
* If the select timed out, or returned for some other reason
* but we haven't heard from the client in time, send keepalive.
*/
if (ret == 0 || (last_client_time != 0 && last_client_time +
options.client_alive_interval <= now)) {
client_alive_check(ssh);
last_client_time = now;
} else if (FD_ISSET(connection_in, *readsetp)) {
last_client_time = now;
}
}
notify_done(*readsetp);
}
/*
* Processes input from the client and the program. Input data is stored
* in buffers and processed later.
*/
static int
process_input(struct ssh *ssh, fd_set *readset, int connection_in)
{
int r, len;
char buf[16384];
/* Read and buffer any input data from the client. */
if (FD_ISSET(connection_in, readset)) {
len = read(connection_in, buf, sizeof(buf));
if (len == 0) {
verbose("Connection closed by %.100s port %d",
ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh));
return -1;
} else if (len == -1) {
if (errno != EINTR && errno != EAGAIN &&
errno != EWOULDBLOCK) {
verbose("Read error from remote host "
"%.100s port %d: %.100s",
ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh),
ssh_remote_port(ssh), strerror(errno));
cleanup_exit(255);
}
} else {
/* Buffer any received data. */
if ((r = ssh_packet_process_incoming(ssh, buf, len))
!= 0)
fatal("%s: ssh_packet_process_incoming: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
}
}
return 0;
}
/*
* Sends data from internal buffers to client program stdin.
*/
static void
process_output(struct ssh *ssh, fd_set *writeset, int connection_out)
{
int r;
/* Send any buffered packet data to the client. */
if (FD_ISSET(connection_out, writeset)) {
- if ((r = ssh_packet_write_poll(ssh)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: ssh_packet_write_poll: %s",
- __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ if ((r = ssh_packet_write_poll(ssh)) != 0) {
+ sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: ssh_packet_write_poll",
+ __func__);
+ }
}
}
static void
process_buffered_input_packets(struct ssh *ssh)
{
ssh_dispatch_run_fatal(ssh, DISPATCH_NONBLOCK, NULL);
}
static void
collect_children(struct ssh *ssh)
{
pid_t pid;
sigset_t oset, nset;
int status;
/* block SIGCHLD while we check for dead children */
sigemptyset(&nset);
sigaddset(&nset, SIGCHLD);
sigprocmask(SIG_BLOCK, &nset, &oset);
if (child_terminated) {
debug("Received SIGCHLD.");
while ((pid = waitpid(-1, &status, WNOHANG)) > 0 ||
(pid == -1 && errno == EINTR))
if (pid > 0)
session_close_by_pid(ssh, pid, status);
child_terminated = 0;
}
sigprocmask(SIG_SETMASK, &oset, NULL);
}
void
server_loop2(struct ssh *ssh, Authctxt *authctxt)
{
fd_set *readset = NULL, *writeset = NULL;
int max_fd;
u_int nalloc = 0, connection_in, connection_out;
u_int64_t rekey_timeout_ms = 0;
debug("Entering interactive session for SSH2.");
- signal(SIGCHLD, sigchld_handler);
+ ssh_signal(SIGCHLD, sigchld_handler);
child_terminated = 0;
connection_in = ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh);
connection_out = ssh_packet_get_connection_out(ssh);
if (!use_privsep) {
- signal(SIGTERM, sigterm_handler);
- signal(SIGINT, sigterm_handler);
- signal(SIGQUIT, sigterm_handler);
+ ssh_signal(SIGTERM, sigterm_handler);
+ ssh_signal(SIGINT, sigterm_handler);
+ ssh_signal(SIGQUIT, sigterm_handler);
}
notify_setup();
max_fd = MAXIMUM(connection_in, connection_out);
max_fd = MAXIMUM(max_fd, notify_pipe[0]);
server_init_dispatch(ssh);
for (;;) {
process_buffered_input_packets(ssh);
if (!ssh_packet_is_rekeying(ssh) &&
ssh_packet_not_very_much_data_to_write(ssh))
channel_output_poll(ssh);
if (options.rekey_interval > 0 &&
!ssh_packet_is_rekeying(ssh)) {
rekey_timeout_ms = ssh_packet_get_rekey_timeout(ssh) *
1000;
} else {
rekey_timeout_ms = 0;
}
wait_until_can_do_something(ssh, connection_in, connection_out,
&readset, &writeset, &max_fd, &nalloc, rekey_timeout_ms);
if (received_sigterm) {
logit("Exiting on signal %d", (int)received_sigterm);
/* Clean up sessions, utmp, etc. */
cleanup_exit(255);
}
collect_children(ssh);
if (!ssh_packet_is_rekeying(ssh))
channel_after_select(ssh, readset, writeset);
if (process_input(ssh, readset, connection_in) < 0)
break;
process_output(ssh, writeset, connection_out);
}
collect_children(ssh);
free(readset);
free(writeset);
/* free all channels, no more reads and writes */
channel_free_all(ssh);
/* free remaining sessions, e.g. remove wtmp entries */
session_destroy_all(ssh, NULL);
}
static int
server_input_keep_alive(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
{
debug("Got %d/%u for keepalive", type, seq);
/*
* reset timeout, since we got a sane answer from the client.
* even if this was generated by something other than
* the bogus CHANNEL_REQUEST we send for keepalives.
*/
ssh_packet_set_alive_timeouts(ssh, 0);
return 0;
}
static Channel *
server_request_direct_tcpip(struct ssh *ssh, int *reason, const char **errmsg)
{
Channel *c = NULL;
char *target = NULL, *originator = NULL;
u_int target_port = 0, originator_port = 0;
int r;
if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &target, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &target_port)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &originator, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &originator_port)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: parse packet", __func__);
if (target_port > 0xFFFF) {
error("%s: invalid target port", __func__);
*reason = SSH2_OPEN_ADMINISTRATIVELY_PROHIBITED;
goto out;
}
if (originator_port > 0xFFFF) {
error("%s: invalid originator port", __func__);
*reason = SSH2_OPEN_ADMINISTRATIVELY_PROHIBITED;
goto out;
}
debug("%s: originator %s port %u, target %s port %u", __func__,
originator, originator_port, target, target_port);
/* XXX fine grained permissions */
if ((options.allow_tcp_forwarding & FORWARD_LOCAL) != 0 &&
auth_opts->permit_port_forwarding_flag &&
!options.disable_forwarding) {
c = channel_connect_to_port(ssh, target, target_port,
"direct-tcpip", "direct-tcpip", reason, errmsg);
} else {
logit("refused local port forward: "
"originator %s port %d, target %s port %d",
originator, originator_port, target, target_port);
if (reason != NULL)
*reason = SSH2_OPEN_ADMINISTRATIVELY_PROHIBITED;
}
out:
free(originator);
free(target);
return c;
}
static Channel *
server_request_direct_streamlocal(struct ssh *ssh)
{
Channel *c = NULL;
char *target = NULL, *originator = NULL;
u_int originator_port = 0;
struct passwd *pw = the_authctxt->pw;
int r;
if (pw == NULL || !the_authctxt->valid)
fatal("%s: no/invalid user", __func__);
if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &target, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &originator, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &originator_port)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: parse packet", __func__);
if (originator_port > 0xFFFF) {
error("%s: invalid originator port", __func__);
goto out;
}
debug("%s: originator %s port %d, target %s", __func__,
originator, originator_port, target);
/* XXX fine grained permissions */
if ((options.allow_streamlocal_forwarding & FORWARD_LOCAL) != 0 &&
auth_opts->permit_port_forwarding_flag &&
!options.disable_forwarding && (pw->pw_uid == 0 || use_privsep)) {
c = channel_connect_to_path(ssh, target,
"direct-streamlocal@openssh.com", "direct-streamlocal");
} else {
logit("refused streamlocal port forward: "
"originator %s port %d, target %s",
originator, originator_port, target);
}
out:
free(originator);
free(target);
return c;
}
static Channel *
server_request_tun(struct ssh *ssh)
{
Channel *c = NULL;
u_int mode, tun;
int r, sock;
char *tmp, *ifname = NULL;
if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &mode)) != 0)
sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: parse mode", __func__);
switch (mode) {
case SSH_TUNMODE_POINTOPOINT:
case SSH_TUNMODE_ETHERNET:
break;
default:
ssh_packet_send_debug(ssh, "Unsupported tunnel device mode.");
return NULL;
}
if ((options.permit_tun & mode) == 0) {
ssh_packet_send_debug(ssh, "Server has rejected tunnel device "
"forwarding");
return NULL;
}
if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &tun)) != 0)
sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: parse device", __func__);
if (tun > INT_MAX) {
debug("%s: invalid tun", __func__);
goto done;
}
if (auth_opts->force_tun_device != -1) {
if (tun != SSH_TUNID_ANY &&
auth_opts->force_tun_device != (int)tun)
goto done;
tun = auth_opts->force_tun_device;
}
sock = tun_open(tun, mode, &ifname);
if (sock < 0)
goto done;
debug("Tunnel forwarding using interface %s", ifname);
c = channel_new(ssh, "tun", SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN, sock, sock, -1,
CHAN_TCP_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_TCP_PACKET_DEFAULT, 0, "tun", 1);
c->datagram = 1;
#if defined(SSH_TUN_FILTER)
if (mode == SSH_TUNMODE_POINTOPOINT)
channel_register_filter(ssh, c->self, sys_tun_infilter,
sys_tun_outfilter, NULL, NULL);
#endif
/*
* Update the list of names exposed to the session
* XXX remove these if the tunnels are closed (won't matter
* much if they are already in the environment though)
*/
tmp = tun_fwd_ifnames;
xasprintf(&tun_fwd_ifnames, "%s%s%s",
tun_fwd_ifnames == NULL ? "" : tun_fwd_ifnames,
tun_fwd_ifnames == NULL ? "" : ",",
ifname);
free(tmp);
free(ifname);
done:
if (c == NULL)
ssh_packet_send_debug(ssh, "Failed to open the tunnel device.");
return c;
}
static Channel *
server_request_session(struct ssh *ssh)
{
Channel *c;
int r;
debug("input_session_request");
if ((r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: parse packet", __func__);
if (no_more_sessions) {
ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "Possible attack: attempt to open a "
"session after additional sessions disabled");
}
/*
* A server session has no fd to read or write until a
* CHANNEL_REQUEST for a shell is made, so we set the type to
* SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL. Additionally, a callback for handling all
* CHANNEL_REQUEST messages is registered.
*/
c = channel_new(ssh, "session", SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL,
-1, -1, -1, /*window size*/0, CHAN_SES_PACKET_DEFAULT,
0, "server-session", 1);
if (session_open(the_authctxt, c->self) != 1) {
debug("session open failed, free channel %d", c->self);
channel_free(ssh, c);
return NULL;
}
channel_register_cleanup(ssh, c->self, session_close_by_channel, 0);
return c;
}
static int
server_input_channel_open(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
{
Channel *c = NULL;
char *ctype = NULL;
const char *errmsg = NULL;
int r, reason = SSH2_OPEN_CONNECT_FAILED;
u_int rchan = 0, rmaxpack = 0, rwindow = 0;
if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &ctype, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &rchan)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &rwindow)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &rmaxpack)) != 0)
sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: parse packet", __func__);
debug("%s: ctype %s rchan %u win %u max %u", __func__,
ctype, rchan, rwindow, rmaxpack);
- if (rchan > INT_MAX) {
- error("%s: invalid remote channel ID", __func__);
- } else if (strcmp(ctype, "session") == 0) {
+ if (strcmp(ctype, "session") == 0) {
c = server_request_session(ssh);
} else if (strcmp(ctype, "direct-tcpip") == 0) {
c = server_request_direct_tcpip(ssh, &reason, &errmsg);
} else if (strcmp(ctype, "direct-streamlocal@openssh.com") == 0) {
c = server_request_direct_streamlocal(ssh);
} else if (strcmp(ctype, "tun@openssh.com") == 0) {
c = server_request_tun(ssh);
}
if (c != NULL) {
debug("%s: confirm %s", __func__, ctype);
- c->remote_id = (int)rchan;
+ c->remote_id = rchan;
c->have_remote_id = 1;
c->remote_window = rwindow;
c->remote_maxpacket = rmaxpack;
if (c->type != SSH_CHANNEL_CONNECTING) {
if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->remote_id)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->self)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->local_window)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->local_maxpacket)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) {
sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r,
"%s: send open confirm", __func__);
}
}
} else {
debug("%s: failure %s", __func__, ctype);
if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, rchan)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, reason)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, errmsg ? errmsg : "open failed")) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "")) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) {
sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r,
"%s: send open failure", __func__);
}
}
free(ctype);
return 0;
}
static int
server_input_hostkeys_prove(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshbuf **respp)
{
struct sshbuf *resp = NULL;
struct sshbuf *sigbuf = NULL;
struct sshkey *key = NULL, *key_pub = NULL, *key_prv = NULL;
int r, ndx, kexsigtype, use_kexsigtype, success = 0;
const u_char *blob;
u_char *sig = 0;
size_t blen, slen;
if ((resp = sshbuf_new()) == NULL || (sigbuf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new", __func__);
kexsigtype = sshkey_type_plain(
sshkey_type_from_name(ssh->kex->hostkey_alg));
while (ssh_packet_remaining(ssh) > 0) {
sshkey_free(key);
key = NULL;
if ((r = sshpkt_get_string_direct(ssh, &blob, &blen)) != 0 ||
(r = sshkey_from_blob(blob, blen, &key)) != 0) {
error("%s: couldn't parse key: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
goto out;
}
/*
* Better check that this is actually one of our hostkeys
* before attempting to sign anything with it.
*/
if ((ndx = ssh->kex->host_key_index(key, 1, ssh)) == -1) {
error("%s: unknown host %s key",
__func__, sshkey_type(key));
goto out;
}
/*
* XXX refactor: make kex->sign just use an index rather
* than passing in public and private keys
*/
if ((key_prv = get_hostkey_by_index(ndx)) == NULL &&
(key_pub = get_hostkey_public_by_index(ndx, ssh)) == NULL) {
error("%s: can't retrieve hostkey %d", __func__, ndx);
goto out;
}
sshbuf_reset(sigbuf);
free(sig);
sig = NULL;
/*
* For RSA keys, prefer to use the signature type negotiated
* during KEX to the default (SHA1).
*/
use_kexsigtype = kexsigtype == KEY_RSA &&
sshkey_type_plain(key->type) == KEY_RSA;
if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(sigbuf,
"hostkeys-prove-00@openssh.com")) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_string(sigbuf,
ssh->kex->session_id, ssh->kex->session_id_len)) != 0 ||
(r = sshkey_puts(key, sigbuf)) != 0 ||
(r = ssh->kex->sign(ssh, key_prv, key_pub, &sig, &slen,
sshbuf_ptr(sigbuf), sshbuf_len(sigbuf),
use_kexsigtype ? ssh->kex->hostkey_alg : NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_string(resp, sig, slen)) != 0) {
error("%s: couldn't prepare signature: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
goto out;
}
}
/* Success */
*respp = resp;
resp = NULL; /* don't free it */
success = 1;
out:
free(sig);
sshbuf_free(resp);
sshbuf_free(sigbuf);
sshkey_free(key);
return success;
}
static int
server_input_global_request(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
{
char *rtype = NULL;
u_char want_reply = 0;
int r, success = 0, allocated_listen_port = 0;
u_int port = 0;
struct sshbuf *resp = NULL;
struct passwd *pw = the_authctxt->pw;
struct Forward fwd;
memset(&fwd, 0, sizeof(fwd));
if (pw == NULL || !the_authctxt->valid)
fatal("%s: no/invalid user", __func__);
if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &rtype, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_get_u8(ssh, &want_reply)) != 0)
sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: parse packet", __func__);
debug("%s: rtype %s want_reply %d", __func__, rtype, want_reply);
/* -R style forwarding */
if (strcmp(rtype, "tcpip-forward") == 0) {
if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &fwd.listen_host, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &port)) != 0)
sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: parse tcpip-forward", __func__);
debug("%s: tcpip-forward listen %s port %u", __func__,
fwd.listen_host, port);
if (port <= INT_MAX)
fwd.listen_port = (int)port;
/* check permissions */
if (port > INT_MAX ||
(options.allow_tcp_forwarding & FORWARD_REMOTE) == 0 ||
!auth_opts->permit_port_forwarding_flag ||
options.disable_forwarding ||
(!want_reply && fwd.listen_port == 0) ||
(fwd.listen_port != 0 &&
!bind_permitted(fwd.listen_port, pw->pw_uid))) {
success = 0;
ssh_packet_send_debug(ssh, "Server has disabled port forwarding.");
} else {
/* Start listening on the port */
success = channel_setup_remote_fwd_listener(ssh, &fwd,
&allocated_listen_port, &options.fwd_opts);
}
if ((resp = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new", __func__);
if (allocated_listen_port != 0 &&
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(resp, allocated_listen_port)) != 0)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_put_u32: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
} else if (strcmp(rtype, "cancel-tcpip-forward") == 0) {
if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &fwd.listen_host, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &port)) != 0)
sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: parse cancel-tcpip-forward", __func__);
debug("%s: cancel-tcpip-forward addr %s port %d", __func__,
fwd.listen_host, port);
if (port <= INT_MAX) {
fwd.listen_port = (int)port;
success = channel_cancel_rport_listener(ssh, &fwd);
}
} else if (strcmp(rtype, "streamlocal-forward@openssh.com") == 0) {
if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &fwd.listen_path, NULL)) != 0)
sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: parse streamlocal-forward@openssh.com", __func__);
debug("%s: streamlocal-forward listen path %s", __func__,
fwd.listen_path);
/* check permissions */
if ((options.allow_streamlocal_forwarding & FORWARD_REMOTE) == 0
|| !auth_opts->permit_port_forwarding_flag ||
options.disable_forwarding ||
(pw->pw_uid != 0 && !use_privsep)) {
success = 0;
ssh_packet_send_debug(ssh, "Server has disabled "
"streamlocal forwarding.");
} else {
/* Start listening on the socket */
success = channel_setup_remote_fwd_listener(ssh,
&fwd, NULL, &options.fwd_opts);
}
} else if (strcmp(rtype, "cancel-streamlocal-forward@openssh.com") == 0) {
if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &fwd.listen_path, NULL)) != 0)
sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: parse cancel-streamlocal-forward@openssh.com", __func__);
debug("%s: cancel-streamlocal-forward path %s", __func__,
fwd.listen_path);
success = channel_cancel_rport_listener(ssh, &fwd);
} else if (strcmp(rtype, "no-more-sessions@openssh.com") == 0) {
no_more_sessions = 1;
success = 1;
} else if (strcmp(rtype, "hostkeys-prove-00@openssh.com") == 0) {
success = server_input_hostkeys_prove(ssh, &resp);
}
/* XXX sshpkt_get_end() */
if (want_reply) {
if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, success ?
SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS : SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE)) != 0 ||
(success && resp != NULL && (r = sshpkt_putb(ssh, resp)) != 0) ||
(r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0 ||
(r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0)
sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: send reply", __func__);
}
free(fwd.listen_host);
free(fwd.listen_path);
free(rtype);
sshbuf_free(resp);
return 0;
}
static int
server_input_channel_req(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
{
Channel *c;
int r, success = 0;
char *rtype = NULL;
u_char want_reply = 0;
u_int id = 0;
if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &id)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &rtype, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_get_u8(ssh, &want_reply)) != 0)
sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: parse packet", __func__);
debug("server_input_channel_req: channel %u request %s reply %d",
id, rtype, want_reply);
if (id >= INT_MAX || (c = channel_lookup(ssh, (int)id)) == NULL) {
ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "%s: unknown channel %d",
__func__, id);
}
if (!strcmp(rtype, "eow@openssh.com")) {
if ((r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: parse packet", __func__);
chan_rcvd_eow(ssh, c);
} else if ((c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL ||
c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_OPEN) && strcmp(c->ctype, "session") == 0)
success = session_input_channel_req(ssh, c, rtype);
if (want_reply && !(c->flags & CHAN_CLOSE_SENT)) {
if (!c->have_remote_id)
fatal("%s: channel %d: no remote_id",
__func__, c->self);
if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, success ?
SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS : SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, c->remote_id)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: send reply", __func__);
}
free(rtype);
return 0;
}
static void
server_init_dispatch(struct ssh *ssh)
{
debug("server_init_dispatch");
ssh_dispatch_init(ssh, &dispatch_protocol_error);
ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_CLOSE, &channel_input_oclose);
ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_DATA, &channel_input_data);
ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EOF, &channel_input_ieof);
ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_EXTENDED_DATA, &channel_input_extended_data);
ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN, &server_input_channel_open);
ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_CONFIRMATION, &channel_input_open_confirmation);
ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_OPEN_FAILURE, &channel_input_open_failure);
ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_REQUEST, &server_input_channel_req);
ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_WINDOW_ADJUST, &channel_input_window_adjust);
ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST, &server_input_global_request);
/* client_alive */
ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_SUCCESS, &server_input_keep_alive);
ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_CHANNEL_FAILURE, &server_input_keep_alive);
ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS, &server_input_keep_alive);
ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE, &server_input_keep_alive);
/* rekeying */
ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT, &kex_input_kexinit);
}
diff --git a/session.c b/session.c
index 8f5d7e0a4ec3..8c0e54f795d3 100644
--- a/session.c
+++ b/session.c
@@ -1,2719 +1,2723 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: session.c,v 1.316 2019/06/28 13:35:04 deraadt Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: session.c,v 1.318 2020/01/23 07:10:22 dtucker Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
* All rights reserved
*
* As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
* can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
* software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
* incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
* called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
*
* SSH2 support by Markus Friedl.
* Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/param.h>
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H
# include <sys/stat.h>
#endif
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <sys/un.h>
#include <sys/wait.h>
#include <arpa/inet.h>
#include <ctype.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <grp.h>
#include <netdb.h>
#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
#include <paths.h>
#endif
#include <pwd.h>
#include <signal.h>
-#include <stdarg.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <limits.h>
#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "ssh.h"
#include "ssh2.h"
#include "sshpty.h"
#include "packet.h"
#include "sshbuf.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
#include "match.h"
#include "uidswap.h"
#include "compat.h"
#include "channels.h"
#include "sshkey.h"
#include "cipher.h"
#ifdef GSSAPI
#include "ssh-gss.h"
#endif
#include "hostfile.h"
#include "auth.h"
#include "auth-options.h"
#include "authfd.h"
#include "pathnames.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "servconf.h"
#include "sshlogin.h"
#include "serverloop.h"
#include "canohost.h"
#include "session.h"
#include "kex.h"
#include "monitor_wrap.h"
#include "sftp.h"
#include "atomicio.h"
#if defined(KRB5) && defined(USE_AFS)
#include <kafs.h>
#endif
#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
#include <selinux/selinux.h>
#endif
#define IS_INTERNAL_SFTP(c) \
(!strncmp(c, INTERNAL_SFTP_NAME, sizeof(INTERNAL_SFTP_NAME) - 1) && \
(c[sizeof(INTERNAL_SFTP_NAME) - 1] == '\0' || \
c[sizeof(INTERNAL_SFTP_NAME) - 1] == ' ' || \
c[sizeof(INTERNAL_SFTP_NAME) - 1] == '\t'))
/* func */
Session *session_new(void);
void session_set_fds(struct ssh *, Session *, int, int, int, int, int);
void session_pty_cleanup(Session *);
void session_proctitle(Session *);
int session_setup_x11fwd(struct ssh *, Session *);
int do_exec_pty(struct ssh *, Session *, const char *);
int do_exec_no_pty(struct ssh *, Session *, const char *);
int do_exec(struct ssh *, Session *, const char *);
void do_login(struct ssh *, Session *, const char *);
void do_child(struct ssh *, Session *, const char *);
void do_motd(void);
int check_quietlogin(Session *, const char *);
static void do_authenticated2(struct ssh *, Authctxt *);
static int session_pty_req(struct ssh *, Session *);
/* import */
extern ServerOptions options;
extern char *__progname;
extern int debug_flag;
extern u_int utmp_len;
extern int startup_pipe;
extern void destroy_sensitive_data(void);
extern struct sshbuf *loginmsg;
extern struct sshauthopt *auth_opts;
extern char *tun_fwd_ifnames; /* serverloop.c */
/* original command from peer. */
const char *original_command = NULL;
/* data */
static int sessions_first_unused = -1;
static int sessions_nalloc = 0;
static Session *sessions = NULL;
#define SUBSYSTEM_NONE 0
#define SUBSYSTEM_EXT 1
#define SUBSYSTEM_INT_SFTP 2
#define SUBSYSTEM_INT_SFTP_ERROR 3
#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
login_cap_t *lc;
#endif
static int is_child = 0;
static int in_chroot = 0;
/* File containing userauth info, if ExposeAuthInfo set */
static char *auth_info_file = NULL;
/* Name and directory of socket for authentication agent forwarding. */
static char *auth_sock_name = NULL;
static char *auth_sock_dir = NULL;
/* removes the agent forwarding socket */
static void
auth_sock_cleanup_proc(struct passwd *pw)
{
if (auth_sock_name != NULL) {
temporarily_use_uid(pw);
unlink(auth_sock_name);
rmdir(auth_sock_dir);
auth_sock_name = NULL;
restore_uid();
}
}
static int
auth_input_request_forwarding(struct ssh *ssh, struct passwd * pw)
{
Channel *nc;
int sock = -1;
if (auth_sock_name != NULL) {
error("authentication forwarding requested twice.");
return 0;
}
/* Temporarily drop privileged uid for mkdir/bind. */
temporarily_use_uid(pw);
/* Allocate a buffer for the socket name, and format the name. */
auth_sock_dir = xstrdup("/tmp/ssh-XXXXXXXXXX");
/* Create private directory for socket */
if (mkdtemp(auth_sock_dir) == NULL) {
ssh_packet_send_debug(ssh, "Agent forwarding disabled: "
"mkdtemp() failed: %.100s", strerror(errno));
restore_uid();
free(auth_sock_dir);
auth_sock_dir = NULL;
goto authsock_err;
}
xasprintf(&auth_sock_name, "%s/agent.%ld",
auth_sock_dir, (long) getpid());
/* Start a Unix listener on auth_sock_name. */
sock = unix_listener(auth_sock_name, SSH_LISTEN_BACKLOG, 0);
/* Restore the privileged uid. */
restore_uid();
/* Check for socket/bind/listen failure. */
if (sock < 0)
goto authsock_err;
/* Allocate a channel for the authentication agent socket. */
nc = channel_new(ssh, "auth socket",
SSH_CHANNEL_AUTH_SOCKET, sock, sock, -1,
CHAN_X11_WINDOW_DEFAULT, CHAN_X11_PACKET_DEFAULT,
0, "auth socket", 1);
nc->path = xstrdup(auth_sock_name);
return 1;
authsock_err:
free(auth_sock_name);
if (auth_sock_dir != NULL) {
temporarily_use_uid(pw);
rmdir(auth_sock_dir);
restore_uid();
free(auth_sock_dir);
}
if (sock != -1)
close(sock);
auth_sock_name = NULL;
auth_sock_dir = NULL;
return 0;
}
static void
display_loginmsg(void)
{
int r;
if (sshbuf_len(loginmsg) == 0)
return;
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(loginmsg, 0)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
printf("%s", (char *)sshbuf_ptr(loginmsg));
sshbuf_reset(loginmsg);
}
static void
prepare_auth_info_file(struct passwd *pw, struct sshbuf *info)
{
int fd = -1, success = 0;
if (!options.expose_userauth_info || info == NULL)
return;
temporarily_use_uid(pw);
auth_info_file = xstrdup("/tmp/sshauth.XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX");
if ((fd = mkstemp(auth_info_file)) == -1) {
error("%s: mkstemp: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
goto out;
}
if (atomicio(vwrite, fd, sshbuf_mutable_ptr(info),
sshbuf_len(info)) != sshbuf_len(info)) {
error("%s: write: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
goto out;
}
if (close(fd) != 0) {
error("%s: close: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
goto out;
}
success = 1;
out:
if (!success) {
if (fd != -1)
close(fd);
free(auth_info_file);
auth_info_file = NULL;
}
restore_uid();
}
static void
set_fwdpermit_from_authopts(struct ssh *ssh, const struct sshauthopt *opts)
{
char *tmp, *cp, *host;
int port;
size_t i;
if ((options.allow_tcp_forwarding & FORWARD_LOCAL) != 0) {
channel_clear_permission(ssh, FORWARD_USER, FORWARD_LOCAL);
for (i = 0; i < auth_opts->npermitopen; i++) {
tmp = cp = xstrdup(auth_opts->permitopen[i]);
/* This shouldn't fail as it has already been checked */
if ((host = hpdelim(&cp)) == NULL)
fatal("%s: internal error: hpdelim", __func__);
host = cleanhostname(host);
if (cp == NULL || (port = permitopen_port(cp)) < 0)
fatal("%s: internal error: permitopen port",
__func__);
channel_add_permission(ssh,
FORWARD_USER, FORWARD_LOCAL, host, port);
free(tmp);
}
}
if ((options.allow_tcp_forwarding & FORWARD_REMOTE) != 0) {
channel_clear_permission(ssh, FORWARD_USER, FORWARD_REMOTE);
for (i = 0; i < auth_opts->npermitlisten; i++) {
tmp = cp = xstrdup(auth_opts->permitlisten[i]);
/* This shouldn't fail as it has already been checked */
if ((host = hpdelim(&cp)) == NULL)
fatal("%s: internal error: hpdelim", __func__);
host = cleanhostname(host);
if (cp == NULL || (port = permitopen_port(cp)) < 0)
fatal("%s: internal error: permitlisten port",
__func__);
channel_add_permission(ssh,
FORWARD_USER, FORWARD_REMOTE, host, port);
free(tmp);
}
}
}
void
do_authenticated(struct ssh *ssh, Authctxt *authctxt)
{
setproctitle("%s", authctxt->pw->pw_name);
auth_log_authopts("active", auth_opts, 0);
/* setup the channel layer */
/* XXX - streamlocal? */
set_fwdpermit_from_authopts(ssh, auth_opts);
if (!auth_opts->permit_port_forwarding_flag ||
options.disable_forwarding) {
channel_disable_admin(ssh, FORWARD_LOCAL);
channel_disable_admin(ssh, FORWARD_REMOTE);
} else {
if ((options.allow_tcp_forwarding & FORWARD_LOCAL) == 0)
channel_disable_admin(ssh, FORWARD_LOCAL);
else
channel_permit_all(ssh, FORWARD_LOCAL);
if ((options.allow_tcp_forwarding & FORWARD_REMOTE) == 0)
channel_disable_admin(ssh, FORWARD_REMOTE);
else
channel_permit_all(ssh, FORWARD_REMOTE);
}
auth_debug_send(ssh);
prepare_auth_info_file(authctxt->pw, authctxt->session_info);
do_authenticated2(ssh, authctxt);
do_cleanup(ssh, authctxt);
}
/* Check untrusted xauth strings for metacharacters */
static int
xauth_valid_string(const char *s)
{
size_t i;
for (i = 0; s[i] != '\0'; i++) {
if (!isalnum((u_char)s[i]) &&
s[i] != '.' && s[i] != ':' && s[i] != '/' &&
s[i] != '-' && s[i] != '_')
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
#define USE_PIPES 1
/*
* This is called to fork and execute a command when we have no tty. This
* will call do_child from the child, and server_loop from the parent after
* setting up file descriptors and such.
*/
int
do_exec_no_pty(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *command)
{
pid_t pid;
#ifdef USE_PIPES
int pin[2], pout[2], perr[2];
if (s == NULL)
fatal("do_exec_no_pty: no session");
/* Allocate pipes for communicating with the program. */
if (pipe(pin) == -1) {
error("%s: pipe in: %.100s", __func__, strerror(errno));
return -1;
}
if (pipe(pout) == -1) {
error("%s: pipe out: %.100s", __func__, strerror(errno));
close(pin[0]);
close(pin[1]);
return -1;
}
if (pipe(perr) == -1) {
error("%s: pipe err: %.100s", __func__,
strerror(errno));
close(pin[0]);
close(pin[1]);
close(pout[0]);
close(pout[1]);
return -1;
}
#else
int inout[2], err[2];
if (s == NULL)
fatal("do_exec_no_pty: no session");
/* Uses socket pairs to communicate with the program. */
if (socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0, inout) == -1) {
error("%s: socketpair #1: %.100s", __func__, strerror(errno));
return -1;
}
if (socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0, err) == -1) {
error("%s: socketpair #2: %.100s", __func__,
strerror(errno));
close(inout[0]);
close(inout[1]);
return -1;
}
#endif
session_proctitle(s);
/* Fork the child. */
switch ((pid = fork())) {
case -1:
error("%s: fork: %.100s", __func__, strerror(errno));
#ifdef USE_PIPES
close(pin[0]);
close(pin[1]);
close(pout[0]);
close(pout[1]);
close(perr[0]);
close(perr[1]);
#else
close(inout[0]);
close(inout[1]);
close(err[0]);
close(err[1]);
#endif
return -1;
case 0:
is_child = 1;
/*
* Create a new session and process group since the 4.4BSD
* setlogin() affects the entire process group.
*/
if (setsid() == -1)
error("setsid failed: %.100s", strerror(errno));
#ifdef USE_PIPES
/*
* Redirect stdin. We close the parent side of the socket
* pair, and make the child side the standard input.
*/
close(pin[1]);
if (dup2(pin[0], 0) == -1)
perror("dup2 stdin");
close(pin[0]);
/* Redirect stdout. */
close(pout[0]);
if (dup2(pout[1], 1) == -1)
perror("dup2 stdout");
close(pout[1]);
/* Redirect stderr. */
close(perr[0]);
if (dup2(perr[1], 2) == -1)
perror("dup2 stderr");
close(perr[1]);
#else
/*
* Redirect stdin, stdout, and stderr. Stdin and stdout will
* use the same socket, as some programs (particularly rdist)
* seem to depend on it.
*/
close(inout[1]);
close(err[1]);
if (dup2(inout[0], 0) == -1) /* stdin */
perror("dup2 stdin");
if (dup2(inout[0], 1) == -1) /* stdout (same as stdin) */
perror("dup2 stdout");
close(inout[0]);
if (dup2(err[0], 2) == -1) /* stderr */
perror("dup2 stderr");
close(err[0]);
#endif
/* Do processing for the child (exec command etc). */
do_child(ssh, s, command);
/* NOTREACHED */
default:
break;
}
#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN
cygwin_set_impersonation_token(INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE);
#endif
s->pid = pid;
/* Set interactive/non-interactive mode. */
ssh_packet_set_interactive(ssh, s->display != NULL,
options.ip_qos_interactive, options.ip_qos_bulk);
/*
* Clear loginmsg, since it's the child's responsibility to display
* it to the user, otherwise multiple sessions may accumulate
* multiple copies of the login messages.
*/
sshbuf_reset(loginmsg);
#ifdef USE_PIPES
/* We are the parent. Close the child sides of the pipes. */
close(pin[0]);
close(pout[1]);
close(perr[1]);
session_set_fds(ssh, s, pin[1], pout[0], perr[0],
s->is_subsystem, 0);
#else
/* We are the parent. Close the child sides of the socket pairs. */
close(inout[0]);
close(err[0]);
/*
* Enter the interactive session. Note: server_loop must be able to
* handle the case that fdin and fdout are the same.
*/
session_set_fds(ssh, s, inout[1], inout[1], err[1],
s->is_subsystem, 0);
#endif
return 0;
}
/*
* This is called to fork and execute a command when we have a tty. This
* will call do_child from the child, and server_loop from the parent after
* setting up file descriptors, controlling tty, updating wtmp, utmp,
* lastlog, and other such operations.
*/
int
do_exec_pty(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *command)
{
int fdout, ptyfd, ttyfd, ptymaster;
pid_t pid;
if (s == NULL)
fatal("do_exec_pty: no session");
ptyfd = s->ptyfd;
ttyfd = s->ttyfd;
/*
* Create another descriptor of the pty master side for use as the
* standard input. We could use the original descriptor, but this
* simplifies code in server_loop. The descriptor is bidirectional.
* Do this before forking (and cleanup in the child) so as to
* detect and gracefully fail out-of-fd conditions.
*/
if ((fdout = dup(ptyfd)) == -1) {
error("%s: dup #1: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
close(ttyfd);
close(ptyfd);
return -1;
}
/* we keep a reference to the pty master */
if ((ptymaster = dup(ptyfd)) == -1) {
error("%s: dup #2: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
close(ttyfd);
close(ptyfd);
close(fdout);
return -1;
}
/* Fork the child. */
switch ((pid = fork())) {
case -1:
error("%s: fork: %.100s", __func__, strerror(errno));
close(fdout);
close(ptymaster);
close(ttyfd);
close(ptyfd);
return -1;
case 0:
is_child = 1;
close(fdout);
close(ptymaster);
/* Close the master side of the pseudo tty. */
close(ptyfd);
/* Make the pseudo tty our controlling tty. */
pty_make_controlling_tty(&ttyfd, s->tty);
/* Redirect stdin/stdout/stderr from the pseudo tty. */
if (dup2(ttyfd, 0) == -1)
error("dup2 stdin: %s", strerror(errno));
if (dup2(ttyfd, 1) == -1)
error("dup2 stdout: %s", strerror(errno));
if (dup2(ttyfd, 2) == -1)
error("dup2 stderr: %s", strerror(errno));
/* Close the extra descriptor for the pseudo tty. */
close(ttyfd);
/* record login, etc. similar to login(1) */
#ifndef HAVE_OSF_SIA
do_login(ssh, s, command);
#endif
/*
* Do common processing for the child, such as execing
* the command.
*/
do_child(ssh, s, command);
/* NOTREACHED */
default:
break;
}
#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN
cygwin_set_impersonation_token(INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE);
#endif
s->pid = pid;
/* Parent. Close the slave side of the pseudo tty. */
close(ttyfd);
/* Enter interactive session. */
s->ptymaster = ptymaster;
ssh_packet_set_interactive(ssh, 1,
options.ip_qos_interactive, options.ip_qos_bulk);
session_set_fds(ssh, s, ptyfd, fdout, -1, 1, 1);
return 0;
}
/*
* This is called to fork and execute a command. If another command is
* to be forced, execute that instead.
*/
int
do_exec(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *command)
{
int ret;
const char *forced = NULL, *tty = NULL;
char session_type[1024];
if (options.adm_forced_command) {
original_command = command;
command = options.adm_forced_command;
forced = "(config)";
} else if (auth_opts->force_command != NULL) {
original_command = command;
command = auth_opts->force_command;
forced = "(key-option)";
}
s->forced = 0;
if (forced != NULL) {
s->forced = 1;
if (IS_INTERNAL_SFTP(command)) {
s->is_subsystem = s->is_subsystem ?
SUBSYSTEM_INT_SFTP : SUBSYSTEM_INT_SFTP_ERROR;
} else if (s->is_subsystem)
s->is_subsystem = SUBSYSTEM_EXT;
snprintf(session_type, sizeof(session_type),
"forced-command %s '%.900s'", forced, command);
} else if (s->is_subsystem) {
snprintf(session_type, sizeof(session_type),
"subsystem '%.900s'", s->subsys);
} else if (command == NULL) {
snprintf(session_type, sizeof(session_type), "shell");
} else {
/* NB. we don't log unforced commands to preserve privacy */
snprintf(session_type, sizeof(session_type), "command");
}
if (s->ttyfd != -1) {
tty = s->tty;
if (strncmp(tty, "/dev/", 5) == 0)
tty += 5;
}
verbose("Starting session: %s%s%s for %s from %.200s port %d id %d",
session_type,
tty == NULL ? "" : " on ",
tty == NULL ? "" : tty,
s->pw->pw_name,
ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh),
ssh_remote_port(ssh),
s->self);
#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
if (command != NULL)
PRIVSEP(audit_run_command(command));
else if (s->ttyfd == -1) {
char *shell = s->pw->pw_shell;
if (shell[0] == '\0') /* empty shell means /bin/sh */
shell =_PATH_BSHELL;
PRIVSEP(audit_run_command(shell));
}
#endif
if (s->ttyfd != -1)
ret = do_exec_pty(ssh, s, command);
else
ret = do_exec_no_pty(ssh, s, command);
original_command = NULL;
/*
* Clear loginmsg: it's the child's responsibility to display
* it to the user, otherwise multiple sessions may accumulate
* multiple copies of the login messages.
*/
sshbuf_reset(loginmsg);
return ret;
}
/* administrative, login(1)-like work */
void
do_login(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *command)
{
socklen_t fromlen;
struct sockaddr_storage from;
struct passwd * pw = s->pw;
pid_t pid = getpid();
/*
* Get IP address of client. If the connection is not a socket, let
* the address be 0.0.0.0.
*/
memset(&from, 0, sizeof(from));
fromlen = sizeof(from);
if (ssh_packet_connection_is_on_socket(ssh)) {
if (getpeername(ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh),
(struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen) == -1) {
debug("getpeername: %.100s", strerror(errno));
cleanup_exit(255);
}
}
/* Record that there was a login on that tty from the remote host. */
if (!use_privsep)
record_login(pid, s->tty, pw->pw_name, pw->pw_uid,
session_get_remote_name_or_ip(ssh, utmp_len,
options.use_dns),
(struct sockaddr *)&from, fromlen);
#ifdef USE_PAM
/*
* If password change is needed, do it now.
* This needs to occur before the ~/.hushlogin check.
*/
if (options.use_pam && !use_privsep && s->authctxt->force_pwchange) {
display_loginmsg();
do_pam_chauthtok();
s->authctxt->force_pwchange = 0;
/* XXX - signal [net] parent to enable forwardings */
}
#endif
if (check_quietlogin(s, command))
return;
display_loginmsg();
do_motd();
}
/*
* Display the message of the day.
*/
void
do_motd(void)
{
FILE *f;
char buf[256];
if (options.print_motd) {
#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
f = fopen(login_getcapstr(lc, "welcome", "/etc/motd",
"/etc/motd"), "r");
#else
f = fopen("/etc/motd", "r");
#endif
if (f) {
while (fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), f))
fputs(buf, stdout);
fclose(f);
}
}
}
/*
* Check for quiet login, either .hushlogin or command given.
*/
int
check_quietlogin(Session *s, const char *command)
{
char buf[256];
struct passwd *pw = s->pw;
struct stat st;
/* Return 1 if .hushlogin exists or a command given. */
if (command != NULL)
return 1;
snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%.200s/.hushlogin", pw->pw_dir);
#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
if (login_getcapbool(lc, "hushlogin", 0) || stat(buf, &st) >= 0)
return 1;
#else
if (stat(buf, &st) >= 0)
return 1;
#endif
return 0;
}
/*
* Reads environment variables from the given file and adds/overrides them
* into the environment. If the file does not exist, this does nothing.
* Otherwise, it must consist of empty lines, comments (line starts with '#')
* and assignments of the form name=value. No other forms are allowed.
* If whitelist is not NULL, then it is interpreted as a pattern list and
* only variable names that match it will be accepted.
*/
static void
read_environment_file(char ***env, u_int *envsize,
const char *filename, const char *whitelist)
{
FILE *f;
char *line = NULL, *cp, *value;
size_t linesize = 0;
u_int lineno = 0;
f = fopen(filename, "r");
if (!f)
return;
while (getline(&line, &linesize, f) != -1) {
if (++lineno > 1000)
fatal("Too many lines in environment file %s", filename);
for (cp = line; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++)
;
if (!*cp || *cp == '#' || *cp == '\n')
continue;
cp[strcspn(cp, "\n")] = '\0';
value = strchr(cp, '=');
if (value == NULL) {
fprintf(stderr, "Bad line %u in %.100s\n", lineno,
filename);
continue;
}
/*
* Replace the equals sign by nul, and advance value to
* the value string.
*/
*value = '\0';
value++;
if (whitelist != NULL &&
match_pattern_list(cp, whitelist, 0) != 1)
continue;
child_set_env(env, envsize, cp, value);
}
free(line);
fclose(f);
}
#ifdef HAVE_ETC_DEFAULT_LOGIN
/*
* Return named variable from specified environment, or NULL if not present.
*/
static char *
child_get_env(char **env, const char *name)
{
int i;
size_t len;
len = strlen(name);
for (i=0; env[i] != NULL; i++)
if (strncmp(name, env[i], len) == 0 && env[i][len] == '=')
return(env[i] + len + 1);
return NULL;
}
/*
* Read /etc/default/login.
* We pick up the PATH (or SUPATH for root) and UMASK.
*/
static void
read_etc_default_login(char ***env, u_int *envsize, uid_t uid)
{
char **tmpenv = NULL, *var;
u_int i, tmpenvsize = 0;
u_long mask;
/*
* We don't want to copy the whole file to the child's environment,
* so we use a temporary environment and copy the variables we're
* interested in.
*/
read_environment_file(&tmpenv, &tmpenvsize, "/etc/default/login",
options.permit_user_env_whitelist);
if (tmpenv == NULL)
return;
if (uid == 0)
var = child_get_env(tmpenv, "SUPATH");
else
var = child_get_env(tmpenv, "PATH");
if (var != NULL)
child_set_env(env, envsize, "PATH", var);
if ((var = child_get_env(tmpenv, "UMASK")) != NULL)
if (sscanf(var, "%5lo", &mask) == 1)
umask((mode_t)mask);
for (i = 0; tmpenv[i] != NULL; i++)
free(tmpenv[i]);
free(tmpenv);
}
#endif /* HAVE_ETC_DEFAULT_LOGIN */
+#if defined(USE_PAM) || defined(HAVE_CYGWIN)
static void
copy_environment_blacklist(char **source, char ***env, u_int *envsize,
const char *blacklist)
{
char *var_name, *var_val;
int i;
if (source == NULL)
return;
for(i = 0; source[i] != NULL; i++) {
var_name = xstrdup(source[i]);
if ((var_val = strstr(var_name, "=")) == NULL) {
free(var_name);
continue;
}
*var_val++ = '\0';
if (blacklist == NULL ||
match_pattern_list(var_name, blacklist, 0) != 1) {
debug3("Copy environment: %s=%s", var_name, var_val);
child_set_env(env, envsize, var_name, var_val);
}
free(var_name);
}
}
+#endif /* defined(USE_PAM) || defined(HAVE_CYGWIN) */
-void
+#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN
+static void
copy_environment(char **source, char ***env, u_int *envsize)
{
copy_environment_blacklist(source, env, envsize, NULL);
}
+#endif
static char **
do_setup_env(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *shell)
{
char buf[256];
size_t n;
u_int i, envsize;
char *ocp, *cp, *value, **env, *laddr;
struct passwd *pw = s->pw;
#if !defined (HAVE_LOGIN_CAP) && !defined (HAVE_CYGWIN)
char *path = NULL;
#endif
/* Initialize the environment. */
envsize = 100;
env = xcalloc(envsize, sizeof(char *));
env[0] = NULL;
#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN
/*
* The Windows environment contains some setting which are
* important for a running system. They must not be dropped.
*/
{
char **p;
p = fetch_windows_environment();
copy_environment(p, &env, &envsize);
free_windows_environment(p);
}
#endif
#ifdef GSSAPI
/* Allow any GSSAPI methods that we've used to alter
* the childs environment as they see fit
*/
ssh_gssapi_do_child(&env, &envsize);
#endif
/* Set basic environment. */
for (i = 0; i < s->num_env; i++)
child_set_env(&env, &envsize, s->env[i].name, s->env[i].val);
child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "USER", pw->pw_name);
child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "LOGNAME", pw->pw_name);
#ifdef _AIX
child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "LOGIN", pw->pw_name);
#endif
child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "HOME", pw->pw_dir);
#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
if (setusercontext(lc, pw, pw->pw_uid, LOGIN_SETPATH) < 0)
child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "PATH", _PATH_STDPATH);
else
child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "PATH", getenv("PATH"));
#else /* HAVE_LOGIN_CAP */
# ifndef HAVE_CYGWIN
/*
* There's no standard path on Windows. The path contains
* important components pointing to the system directories,
* needed for loading shared libraries. So the path better
* remains intact here.
*/
# ifdef HAVE_ETC_DEFAULT_LOGIN
read_etc_default_login(&env, &envsize, pw->pw_uid);
path = child_get_env(env, "PATH");
# endif /* HAVE_ETC_DEFAULT_LOGIN */
if (path == NULL || *path == '\0') {
child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "PATH",
s->pw->pw_uid == 0 ? SUPERUSER_PATH : _PATH_STDPATH);
}
# endif /* HAVE_CYGWIN */
#endif /* HAVE_LOGIN_CAP */
if (!options.use_pam) {
snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%.200s/%.50s",
_PATH_MAILDIR, pw->pw_name);
child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "MAIL", buf);
}
/* Normal systems set SHELL by default. */
child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "SHELL", shell);
if (getenv("TZ"))
child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "TZ", getenv("TZ"));
if (s->term)
child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "TERM", s->term);
if (s->display)
child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "DISPLAY", s->display);
/*
* Since we clear KRB5CCNAME at startup, if it's set now then it
* must have been set by a native authentication method (eg AIX or
* SIA), so copy it to the child.
*/
{
char *cp;
if ((cp = getenv("KRB5CCNAME")) != NULL)
child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "KRB5CCNAME", cp);
}
#ifdef _AIX
{
char *cp;
if ((cp = getenv("AUTHSTATE")) != NULL)
child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "AUTHSTATE", cp);
read_environment_file(&env, &envsize, "/etc/environment",
options.permit_user_env_whitelist);
}
#endif
#ifdef KRB5
if (s->authctxt->krb5_ccname)
child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "KRB5CCNAME",
s->authctxt->krb5_ccname);
#endif
if (auth_sock_name != NULL)
child_set_env(&env, &envsize, SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME,
auth_sock_name);
/* Set custom environment options from pubkey authentication. */
if (options.permit_user_env) {
for (n = 0 ; n < auth_opts->nenv; n++) {
ocp = xstrdup(auth_opts->env[n]);
cp = strchr(ocp, '=');
if (*cp == '=') {
*cp = '\0';
/* Apply PermitUserEnvironment whitelist */
if (options.permit_user_env_whitelist == NULL ||
match_pattern_list(ocp,
options.permit_user_env_whitelist, 0) == 1)
child_set_env(&env, &envsize,
ocp, cp + 1);
}
free(ocp);
}
}
/* read $HOME/.ssh/environment. */
if (options.permit_user_env) {
snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%.200s/.ssh/environment",
pw->pw_dir);
read_environment_file(&env, &envsize, buf,
options.permit_user_env_whitelist);
}
#ifdef USE_PAM
/*
* Pull in any environment variables that may have
* been set by PAM.
*/
if (options.use_pam) {
char **p;
/*
* Don't allow PAM-internal env vars to leak
* back into the session environment.
*/
#define PAM_ENV_BLACKLIST "SSH_AUTH_INFO*,SSH_CONNECTION*"
p = fetch_pam_child_environment();
copy_environment_blacklist(p, &env, &envsize,
PAM_ENV_BLACKLIST);
free_pam_environment(p);
p = fetch_pam_environment();
copy_environment_blacklist(p, &env, &envsize,
PAM_ENV_BLACKLIST);
free_pam_environment(p);
}
#endif /* USE_PAM */
/* Environment specified by admin */
for (i = 0; i < options.num_setenv; i++) {
cp = xstrdup(options.setenv[i]);
if ((value = strchr(cp, '=')) == NULL) {
/* shouldn't happen; vars are checked in servconf.c */
fatal("Invalid config SetEnv: %s", options.setenv[i]);
}
*value++ = '\0';
child_set_env(&env, &envsize, cp, value);
}
/* SSH_CLIENT deprecated */
snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%.50s %d %d",
ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh),
ssh_local_port(ssh));
child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "SSH_CLIENT", buf);
laddr = get_local_ipaddr(ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh));
snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%.50s %d %.50s %d",
ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh),
laddr, ssh_local_port(ssh));
free(laddr);
child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "SSH_CONNECTION", buf);
if (tun_fwd_ifnames != NULL)
child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "SSH_TUNNEL", tun_fwd_ifnames);
if (auth_info_file != NULL)
child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "SSH_USER_AUTH", auth_info_file);
if (s->ttyfd != -1)
child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "SSH_TTY", s->tty);
if (original_command)
child_set_env(&env, &envsize, "SSH_ORIGINAL_COMMAND",
original_command);
if (debug_flag) {
/* dump the environment */
fprintf(stderr, "Environment:\n");
for (i = 0; env[i]; i++)
fprintf(stderr, " %.200s\n", env[i]);
}
return env;
}
/*
* Run $HOME/.ssh/rc, /etc/ssh/sshrc, or xauth (whichever is found
* first in this order).
*/
static void
do_rc_files(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *shell)
{
FILE *f = NULL;
char cmd[1024];
int do_xauth;
struct stat st;
do_xauth =
s->display != NULL && s->auth_proto != NULL && s->auth_data != NULL;
/* ignore _PATH_SSH_USER_RC for subsystems and admin forced commands */
if (!s->is_subsystem && options.adm_forced_command == NULL &&
auth_opts->permit_user_rc && options.permit_user_rc &&
stat(_PATH_SSH_USER_RC, &st) >= 0) {
snprintf(cmd, sizeof cmd, "%s -c '%s %s'",
shell, _PATH_BSHELL, _PATH_SSH_USER_RC);
if (debug_flag)
fprintf(stderr, "Running %s\n", cmd);
f = popen(cmd, "w");
if (f) {
if (do_xauth)
fprintf(f, "%s %s\n", s->auth_proto,
s->auth_data);
pclose(f);
} else
fprintf(stderr, "Could not run %s\n",
_PATH_SSH_USER_RC);
} else if (stat(_PATH_SSH_SYSTEM_RC, &st) >= 0) {
if (debug_flag)
fprintf(stderr, "Running %s %s\n", _PATH_BSHELL,
_PATH_SSH_SYSTEM_RC);
f = popen(_PATH_BSHELL " " _PATH_SSH_SYSTEM_RC, "w");
if (f) {
if (do_xauth)
fprintf(f, "%s %s\n", s->auth_proto,
s->auth_data);
pclose(f);
} else
fprintf(stderr, "Could not run %s\n",
_PATH_SSH_SYSTEM_RC);
} else if (do_xauth && options.xauth_location != NULL) {
/* Add authority data to .Xauthority if appropriate. */
if (debug_flag) {
fprintf(stderr,
"Running %.500s remove %.100s\n",
options.xauth_location, s->auth_display);
fprintf(stderr,
"%.500s add %.100s %.100s %.100s\n",
options.xauth_location, s->auth_display,
s->auth_proto, s->auth_data);
}
snprintf(cmd, sizeof cmd, "%s -q -",
options.xauth_location);
f = popen(cmd, "w");
if (f) {
fprintf(f, "remove %s\n",
s->auth_display);
fprintf(f, "add %s %s %s\n",
s->auth_display, s->auth_proto,
s->auth_data);
pclose(f);
} else {
fprintf(stderr, "Could not run %s\n",
cmd);
}
}
}
static void
do_nologin(struct passwd *pw)
{
FILE *f = NULL;
char buf[1024], *nl, *def_nl = _PATH_NOLOGIN;
struct stat sb;
#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
if (login_getcapbool(lc, "ignorenologin", 0) || pw->pw_uid == 0)
return;
nl = login_getcapstr(lc, "nologin", def_nl, def_nl);
#else
if (pw->pw_uid == 0)
return;
nl = def_nl;
#endif
if (stat(nl, &sb) == -1) {
if (nl != def_nl)
free(nl);
return;
}
/* /etc/nologin exists. Print its contents if we can and exit. */
logit("User %.100s not allowed because %s exists", pw->pw_name, nl);
if ((f = fopen(nl, "r")) != NULL) {
while (fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), f))
fputs(buf, stderr);
fclose(f);
}
exit(254);
}
/*
* Chroot into a directory after checking it for safety: all path components
* must be root-owned directories with strict permissions.
*/
static void
safely_chroot(const char *path, uid_t uid)
{
const char *cp;
char component[PATH_MAX];
struct stat st;
if (!path_absolute(path))
fatal("chroot path does not begin at root");
if (strlen(path) >= sizeof(component))
fatal("chroot path too long");
/*
* Descend the path, checking that each component is a
* root-owned directory with strict permissions.
*/
for (cp = path; cp != NULL;) {
if ((cp = strchr(cp, '/')) == NULL)
strlcpy(component, path, sizeof(component));
else {
cp++;
memcpy(component, path, cp - path);
component[cp - path] = '\0';
}
debug3("%s: checking '%s'", __func__, component);
if (stat(component, &st) != 0)
fatal("%s: stat(\"%s\"): %s", __func__,
component, strerror(errno));
if (st.st_uid != 0 || (st.st_mode & 022) != 0)
fatal("bad ownership or modes for chroot "
"directory %s\"%s\"",
cp == NULL ? "" : "component ", component);
if (!S_ISDIR(st.st_mode))
fatal("chroot path %s\"%s\" is not a directory",
cp == NULL ? "" : "component ", component);
}
if (chdir(path) == -1)
fatal("Unable to chdir to chroot path \"%s\": "
"%s", path, strerror(errno));
if (chroot(path) == -1)
fatal("chroot(\"%s\"): %s", path, strerror(errno));
if (chdir("/") == -1)
fatal("%s: chdir(/) after chroot: %s",
__func__, strerror(errno));
verbose("Changed root directory to \"%s\"", path);
}
/* Set login name, uid, gid, and groups. */
void
do_setusercontext(struct passwd *pw)
{
char uidstr[32], *chroot_path, *tmp;
platform_setusercontext(pw);
if (platform_privileged_uidswap()) {
#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
if (setusercontext(lc, pw, pw->pw_uid,
(LOGIN_SETALL & ~(LOGIN_SETPATH|LOGIN_SETUSER))) < 0) {
perror("unable to set user context");
exit(1);
}
#else
if (setlogin(pw->pw_name) < 0)
error("setlogin failed: %s", strerror(errno));
if (setgid(pw->pw_gid) < 0) {
perror("setgid");
exit(1);
}
/* Initialize the group list. */
if (initgroups(pw->pw_name, pw->pw_gid) < 0) {
perror("initgroups");
exit(1);
}
endgrent();
#endif
platform_setusercontext_post_groups(pw);
if (!in_chroot && options.chroot_directory != NULL &&
strcasecmp(options.chroot_directory, "none") != 0) {
tmp = tilde_expand_filename(options.chroot_directory,
pw->pw_uid);
snprintf(uidstr, sizeof(uidstr), "%llu",
(unsigned long long)pw->pw_uid);
chroot_path = percent_expand(tmp, "h", pw->pw_dir,
"u", pw->pw_name, "U", uidstr, (char *)NULL);
safely_chroot(chroot_path, pw->pw_uid);
free(tmp);
free(chroot_path);
/* Make sure we don't attempt to chroot again */
free(options.chroot_directory);
options.chroot_directory = NULL;
in_chroot = 1;
}
#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
if (setusercontext(lc, pw, pw->pw_uid, LOGIN_SETUSER) < 0) {
perror("unable to set user context (setuser)");
exit(1);
}
/*
* FreeBSD's setusercontext() will not apply the user's
* own umask setting unless running with the user's UID.
*/
(void) setusercontext(lc, pw, pw->pw_uid, LOGIN_SETUMASK);
#else
# ifdef USE_LIBIAF
/*
* In a chroot environment, the set_id() will always fail;
* typically because of the lack of necessary authentication
* services and runtime such as ./usr/lib/libiaf.so,
* ./usr/lib/libpam.so.1, and ./etc/passwd We skip it in the
* internal sftp chroot case. We'll lose auditing and ACLs but
* permanently_set_uid will take care of the rest.
*/
if (!in_chroot && set_id(pw->pw_name) != 0)
fatal("set_id(%s) Failed", pw->pw_name);
# endif /* USE_LIBIAF */
/* Permanently switch to the desired uid. */
permanently_set_uid(pw);
#endif
} else if (options.chroot_directory != NULL &&
strcasecmp(options.chroot_directory, "none") != 0) {
fatal("server lacks privileges to chroot to ChrootDirectory");
}
if (getuid() != pw->pw_uid || geteuid() != pw->pw_uid)
fatal("Failed to set uids to %u.", (u_int) pw->pw_uid);
}
static void
do_pwchange(Session *s)
{
fflush(NULL);
fprintf(stderr, "WARNING: Your password has expired.\n");
if (s->ttyfd != -1) {
fprintf(stderr,
"You must change your password now and login again!\n");
#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
setexeccon(NULL);
#endif
#ifdef PASSWD_NEEDS_USERNAME
execl(_PATH_PASSWD_PROG, "passwd", s->pw->pw_name,
(char *)NULL);
#else
execl(_PATH_PASSWD_PROG, "passwd", (char *)NULL);
#endif
perror("passwd");
} else {
fprintf(stderr,
"Password change required but no TTY available.\n");
}
exit(1);
}
static void
child_close_fds(struct ssh *ssh)
{
extern int auth_sock;
if (auth_sock != -1) {
close(auth_sock);
auth_sock = -1;
}
if (ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh) ==
ssh_packet_get_connection_out(ssh))
close(ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh));
else {
close(ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh));
close(ssh_packet_get_connection_out(ssh));
}
/*
* Close all descriptors related to channels. They will still remain
* open in the parent.
*/
/* XXX better use close-on-exec? -markus */
channel_close_all(ssh);
/*
* Close any extra file descriptors. Note that there may still be
* descriptors left by system functions. They will be closed later.
*/
endpwent();
/*
* Close any extra open file descriptors so that we don't have them
* hanging around in clients. Note that we want to do this after
* initgroups, because at least on Solaris 2.3 it leaves file
* descriptors open.
*/
closefrom(STDERR_FILENO + 1);
}
/*
* Performs common processing for the child, such as setting up the
* environment, closing extra file descriptors, setting the user and group
* ids, and executing the command or shell.
*/
#define ARGV_MAX 10
void
do_child(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, const char *command)
{
extern char **environ;
char **env, *argv[ARGV_MAX], remote_id[512];
const char *shell, *shell0;
struct passwd *pw = s->pw;
int r = 0;
sshpkt_fmt_connection_id(ssh, remote_id, sizeof(remote_id));
/* remove hostkey from the child's memory */
destroy_sensitive_data();
ssh_packet_clear_keys(ssh);
/* Force a password change */
if (s->authctxt->force_pwchange) {
do_setusercontext(pw);
child_close_fds(ssh);
do_pwchange(s);
exit(1);
}
/*
* Login(1) does this as well, and it needs uid 0 for the "-h"
* switch, so we let login(1) to this for us.
*/
#ifdef HAVE_OSF_SIA
session_setup_sia(pw, s->ttyfd == -1 ? NULL : s->tty);
if (!check_quietlogin(s, command))
do_motd();
#else /* HAVE_OSF_SIA */
/* When PAM is enabled we rely on it to do the nologin check */
if (!options.use_pam)
do_nologin(pw);
do_setusercontext(pw);
/*
* PAM session modules in do_setusercontext may have
* generated messages, so if this in an interactive
* login then display them too.
*/
if (!check_quietlogin(s, command))
display_loginmsg();
#endif /* HAVE_OSF_SIA */
#ifdef USE_PAM
if (options.use_pam && !is_pam_session_open()) {
debug3("PAM session not opened, exiting");
display_loginmsg();
exit(254);
}
#endif
/*
* Get the shell from the password data. An empty shell field is
* legal, and means /bin/sh.
*/
shell = (pw->pw_shell[0] == '\0') ? _PATH_BSHELL : pw->pw_shell;
/*
* Make sure $SHELL points to the shell from the password file,
* even if shell is overridden from login.conf
*/
env = do_setup_env(ssh, s, shell);
#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
shell = login_getcapstr(lc, "shell", (char *)shell, (char *)shell);
#endif
/*
* Close the connection descriptors; note that this is the child, and
* the server will still have the socket open, and it is important
* that we do not shutdown it. Note that the descriptors cannot be
* closed before building the environment, as we call
* ssh_remote_ipaddr there.
*/
child_close_fds(ssh);
/*
* Must take new environment into use so that .ssh/rc,
* /etc/ssh/sshrc and xauth are run in the proper environment.
*/
environ = env;
#if defined(KRB5) && defined(USE_AFS)
/*
* At this point, we check to see if AFS is active and if we have
* a valid Kerberos 5 TGT. If so, it seems like a good idea to see
* if we can (and need to) extend the ticket into an AFS token. If
* we don't do this, we run into potential problems if the user's
* home directory is in AFS and it's not world-readable.
*/
if (options.kerberos_get_afs_token && k_hasafs() &&
(s->authctxt->krb5_ctx != NULL)) {
char cell[64];
debug("Getting AFS token");
k_setpag();
if (k_afs_cell_of_file(pw->pw_dir, cell, sizeof(cell)) == 0)
krb5_afslog(s->authctxt->krb5_ctx,
s->authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache, cell, NULL);
krb5_afslog_home(s->authctxt->krb5_ctx,
s->authctxt->krb5_fwd_ccache, NULL, NULL, pw->pw_dir);
}
#endif
/* Change current directory to the user's home directory. */
if (chdir(pw->pw_dir) == -1) {
/* Suppress missing homedir warning for chroot case */
#ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP
r = login_getcapbool(lc, "requirehome", 0);
#endif
if (r || !in_chroot) {
fprintf(stderr, "Could not chdir to home "
"directory %s: %s\n", pw->pw_dir,
strerror(errno));
}
if (r)
exit(1);
}
closefrom(STDERR_FILENO + 1);
do_rc_files(ssh, s, shell);
/* restore SIGPIPE for child */
- signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_DFL);
+ ssh_signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_DFL);
if (s->is_subsystem == SUBSYSTEM_INT_SFTP_ERROR) {
error("Connection from %s: refusing non-sftp session",
remote_id);
printf("This service allows sftp connections only.\n");
fflush(NULL);
exit(1);
} else if (s->is_subsystem == SUBSYSTEM_INT_SFTP) {
extern int optind, optreset;
int i;
char *p, *args;
setproctitle("%s@%s", s->pw->pw_name, INTERNAL_SFTP_NAME);
args = xstrdup(command ? command : "sftp-server");
for (i = 0, (p = strtok(args, " ")); p; (p = strtok(NULL, " ")))
if (i < ARGV_MAX - 1)
argv[i++] = p;
argv[i] = NULL;
optind = optreset = 1;
__progname = argv[0];
#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
ssh_selinux_change_context("sftpd_t");
#endif
exit(sftp_server_main(i, argv, s->pw));
}
fflush(NULL);
/* Get the last component of the shell name. */
if ((shell0 = strrchr(shell, '/')) != NULL)
shell0++;
else
shell0 = shell;
/*
* If we have no command, execute the shell. In this case, the shell
* name to be passed in argv[0] is preceded by '-' to indicate that
* this is a login shell.
*/
if (!command) {
char argv0[256];
/* Start the shell. Set initial character to '-'. */
argv0[0] = '-';
if (strlcpy(argv0 + 1, shell0, sizeof(argv0) - 1)
>= sizeof(argv0) - 1) {
errno = EINVAL;
perror(shell);
exit(1);
}
/* Execute the shell. */
argv[0] = argv0;
argv[1] = NULL;
execve(shell, argv, env);
/* Executing the shell failed. */
perror(shell);
exit(1);
}
/*
* Execute the command using the user's shell. This uses the -c
* option to execute the command.
*/
argv[0] = (char *) shell0;
argv[1] = "-c";
argv[2] = (char *) command;
argv[3] = NULL;
execve(shell, argv, env);
perror(shell);
exit(1);
}
void
session_unused(int id)
{
debug3("%s: session id %d unused", __func__, id);
if (id >= options.max_sessions ||
id >= sessions_nalloc) {
fatal("%s: insane session id %d (max %d nalloc %d)",
__func__, id, options.max_sessions, sessions_nalloc);
}
memset(&sessions[id], 0, sizeof(*sessions));
sessions[id].self = id;
sessions[id].used = 0;
sessions[id].chanid = -1;
sessions[id].ptyfd = -1;
sessions[id].ttyfd = -1;
sessions[id].ptymaster = -1;
sessions[id].x11_chanids = NULL;
sessions[id].next_unused = sessions_first_unused;
sessions_first_unused = id;
}
Session *
session_new(void)
{
Session *s, *tmp;
if (sessions_first_unused == -1) {
if (sessions_nalloc >= options.max_sessions)
return NULL;
debug2("%s: allocate (allocated %d max %d)",
__func__, sessions_nalloc, options.max_sessions);
tmp = xrecallocarray(sessions, sessions_nalloc,
sessions_nalloc + 1, sizeof(*sessions));
if (tmp == NULL) {
error("%s: cannot allocate %d sessions",
__func__, sessions_nalloc + 1);
return NULL;
}
sessions = tmp;
session_unused(sessions_nalloc++);
}
if (sessions_first_unused >= sessions_nalloc ||
sessions_first_unused < 0) {
fatal("%s: insane first_unused %d max %d nalloc %d",
__func__, sessions_first_unused, options.max_sessions,
sessions_nalloc);
}
s = &sessions[sessions_first_unused];
if (s->used) {
fatal("%s: session %d already used",
__func__, sessions_first_unused);
}
sessions_first_unused = s->next_unused;
s->used = 1;
s->next_unused = -1;
debug("session_new: session %d", s->self);
return s;
}
static void
session_dump(void)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < sessions_nalloc; i++) {
Session *s = &sessions[i];
debug("dump: used %d next_unused %d session %d %p "
"channel %d pid %ld",
s->used,
s->next_unused,
s->self,
s,
s->chanid,
(long)s->pid);
}
}
int
session_open(Authctxt *authctxt, int chanid)
{
Session *s = session_new();
debug("session_open: channel %d", chanid);
if (s == NULL) {
error("no more sessions");
return 0;
}
s->authctxt = authctxt;
s->pw = authctxt->pw;
if (s->pw == NULL || !authctxt->valid)
fatal("no user for session %d", s->self);
debug("session_open: session %d: link with channel %d", s->self, chanid);
s->chanid = chanid;
return 1;
}
Session *
session_by_tty(char *tty)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < sessions_nalloc; i++) {
Session *s = &sessions[i];
if (s->used && s->ttyfd != -1 && strcmp(s->tty, tty) == 0) {
debug("session_by_tty: session %d tty %s", i, tty);
return s;
}
}
debug("session_by_tty: unknown tty %.100s", tty);
session_dump();
return NULL;
}
static Session *
session_by_channel(int id)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < sessions_nalloc; i++) {
Session *s = &sessions[i];
if (s->used && s->chanid == id) {
debug("session_by_channel: session %d channel %d",
i, id);
return s;
}
}
debug("session_by_channel: unknown channel %d", id);
session_dump();
return NULL;
}
static Session *
session_by_x11_channel(int id)
{
int i, j;
for (i = 0; i < sessions_nalloc; i++) {
Session *s = &sessions[i];
if (s->x11_chanids == NULL || !s->used)
continue;
for (j = 0; s->x11_chanids[j] != -1; j++) {
if (s->x11_chanids[j] == id) {
debug("session_by_x11_channel: session %d "
"channel %d", s->self, id);
return s;
}
}
}
debug("session_by_x11_channel: unknown channel %d", id);
session_dump();
return NULL;
}
static Session *
session_by_pid(pid_t pid)
{
int i;
debug("session_by_pid: pid %ld", (long)pid);
for (i = 0; i < sessions_nalloc; i++) {
Session *s = &sessions[i];
if (s->used && s->pid == pid)
return s;
}
error("session_by_pid: unknown pid %ld", (long)pid);
session_dump();
return NULL;
}
static int
session_window_change_req(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s)
{
int r;
if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &s->col)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &s->row)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &s->xpixel)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &s->ypixel)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: parse packet", __func__);
pty_change_window_size(s->ptyfd, s->row, s->col, s->xpixel, s->ypixel);
return 1;
}
static int
session_pty_req(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s)
{
int r;
if (!auth_opts->permit_pty_flag || !options.permit_tty) {
debug("Allocating a pty not permitted for this connection.");
return 0;
}
if (s->ttyfd != -1) {
ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "Protocol error: you already have a pty.");
return 0;
}
if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &s->term, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &s->col)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &s->row)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &s->xpixel)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &s->ypixel)) != 0)
sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: parse packet", __func__);
if (strcmp(s->term, "") == 0) {
free(s->term);
s->term = NULL;
}
/* Allocate a pty and open it. */
debug("Allocating pty.");
if (!PRIVSEP(pty_allocate(&s->ptyfd, &s->ttyfd, s->tty,
sizeof(s->tty)))) {
free(s->term);
s->term = NULL;
s->ptyfd = -1;
s->ttyfd = -1;
error("session_pty_req: session %d alloc failed", s->self);
return 0;
}
debug("session_pty_req: session %d alloc %s", s->self, s->tty);
ssh_tty_parse_modes(ssh, s->ttyfd);
if ((r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: parse packet", __func__);
if (!use_privsep)
pty_setowner(s->pw, s->tty);
/* Set window size from the packet. */
pty_change_window_size(s->ptyfd, s->row, s->col, s->xpixel, s->ypixel);
session_proctitle(s);
return 1;
}
static int
session_subsystem_req(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s)
{
struct stat st;
int r, success = 0;
char *prog, *cmd;
u_int i;
if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &s->subsys, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: parse packet", __func__);
debug2("subsystem request for %.100s by user %s", s->subsys,
s->pw->pw_name);
for (i = 0; i < options.num_subsystems; i++) {
if (strcmp(s->subsys, options.subsystem_name[i]) == 0) {
prog = options.subsystem_command[i];
cmd = options.subsystem_args[i];
if (strcmp(INTERNAL_SFTP_NAME, prog) == 0) {
s->is_subsystem = SUBSYSTEM_INT_SFTP;
debug("subsystem: %s", prog);
} else {
if (stat(prog, &st) == -1)
debug("subsystem: cannot stat %s: %s",
prog, strerror(errno));
s->is_subsystem = SUBSYSTEM_EXT;
debug("subsystem: exec() %s", cmd);
}
success = do_exec(ssh, s, cmd) == 0;
break;
}
}
if (!success)
logit("subsystem request for %.100s by user %s failed, "
"subsystem not found", s->subsys, s->pw->pw_name);
return success;
}
static int
session_x11_req(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s)
{
int r, success;
u_char single_connection = 0;
if (s->auth_proto != NULL || s->auth_data != NULL) {
error("session_x11_req: session %d: "
"x11 forwarding already active", s->self);
return 0;
}
if ((r = sshpkt_get_u8(ssh, &single_connection)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &s->auth_proto, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &s->auth_data, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &s->screen)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: parse packet", __func__);
s->single_connection = single_connection;
if (xauth_valid_string(s->auth_proto) &&
xauth_valid_string(s->auth_data))
success = session_setup_x11fwd(ssh, s);
else {
success = 0;
error("Invalid X11 forwarding data");
}
if (!success) {
free(s->auth_proto);
free(s->auth_data);
s->auth_proto = NULL;
s->auth_data = NULL;
}
return success;
}
static int
session_shell_req(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s)
{
int r;
if ((r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: parse packet", __func__);
return do_exec(ssh, s, NULL) == 0;
}
static int
session_exec_req(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s)
{
u_int success;
int r;
char *command = NULL;
if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &command, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: parse packet", __func__);
success = do_exec(ssh, s, command) == 0;
free(command);
return success;
}
static int
session_break_req(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s)
{
int r;
if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, NULL)) != 0 || /* ignore */
(r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: parse packet", __func__);
if (s->ptymaster == -1 || tcsendbreak(s->ptymaster, 0) == -1)
return 0;
return 1;
}
static int
session_env_req(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s)
{
char *name, *val;
u_int i;
int r;
if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &name, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &val, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: parse packet", __func__);
/* Don't set too many environment variables */
if (s->num_env > 128) {
debug2("Ignoring env request %s: too many env vars", name);
goto fail;
}
for (i = 0; i < options.num_accept_env; i++) {
if (match_pattern(name, options.accept_env[i])) {
debug2("Setting env %d: %s=%s", s->num_env, name, val);
s->env = xrecallocarray(s->env, s->num_env,
s->num_env + 1, sizeof(*s->env));
s->env[s->num_env].name = name;
s->env[s->num_env].val = val;
s->num_env++;
return (1);
}
}
debug2("Ignoring env request %s: disallowed name", name);
fail:
free(name);
free(val);
return (0);
}
/*
* Conversion of signals from ssh channel request names.
* Subset of signals from RFC 4254 section 6.10C, with SIGINFO as
* local extension.
*/
static int
name2sig(char *name)
{
#define SSH_SIG(x) if (strcmp(name, #x) == 0) return SIG ## x
SSH_SIG(HUP);
SSH_SIG(INT);
SSH_SIG(KILL);
SSH_SIG(QUIT);
SSH_SIG(TERM);
SSH_SIG(USR1);
SSH_SIG(USR2);
#undef SSH_SIG
#ifdef SIGINFO
if (strcmp(name, "INFO@openssh.com") == 0)
return SIGINFO;
#endif
return -1;
}
static int
session_signal_req(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s)
{
char *signame = NULL;
int r, sig, success = 0;
if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &signame, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) {
error("%s: parse packet: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
goto out;
}
if ((sig = name2sig(signame)) == -1) {
error("%s: unsupported signal \"%s\"", __func__, signame);
goto out;
}
if (s->pid <= 0) {
error("%s: no pid for session %d", __func__, s->self);
goto out;
}
if (s->forced || s->is_subsystem) {
error("%s: refusing to send signal %s to %s session", __func__,
signame, s->forced ? "forced-command" : "subsystem");
goto out;
}
if (!use_privsep || mm_is_monitor()) {
error("%s: session signalling requires privilege separation",
__func__);
goto out;
}
debug("%s: signal %s, killpg(%ld, %d)", __func__, signame,
(long)s->pid, sig);
temporarily_use_uid(s->pw);
r = killpg(s->pid, sig);
restore_uid();
if (r != 0) {
error("%s: killpg(%ld, %d): %s", __func__, (long)s->pid,
sig, strerror(errno));
goto out;
}
/* success */
success = 1;
out:
free(signame);
return success;
}
static int
session_auth_agent_req(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s)
{
static int called = 0;
int r;
if ((r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: parse packet", __func__);
if (!auth_opts->permit_agent_forwarding_flag ||
!options.allow_agent_forwarding) {
debug("%s: agent forwarding disabled", __func__);
return 0;
}
if (called) {
return 0;
} else {
called = 1;
return auth_input_request_forwarding(ssh, s->pw);
}
}
int
session_input_channel_req(struct ssh *ssh, Channel *c, const char *rtype)
{
int success = 0;
Session *s;
if ((s = session_by_channel(c->self)) == NULL) {
logit("%s: no session %d req %.100s", __func__, c->self, rtype);
return 0;
}
debug("%s: session %d req %s", __func__, s->self, rtype);
/*
* a session is in LARVAL state until a shell, a command
* or a subsystem is executed
*/
if (c->type == SSH_CHANNEL_LARVAL) {
if (strcmp(rtype, "shell") == 0) {
success = session_shell_req(ssh, s);
} else if (strcmp(rtype, "exec") == 0) {
success = session_exec_req(ssh, s);
} else if (strcmp(rtype, "pty-req") == 0) {
success = session_pty_req(ssh, s);
} else if (strcmp(rtype, "x11-req") == 0) {
success = session_x11_req(ssh, s);
} else if (strcmp(rtype, "auth-agent-req@openssh.com") == 0) {
success = session_auth_agent_req(ssh, s);
} else if (strcmp(rtype, "subsystem") == 0) {
success = session_subsystem_req(ssh, s);
} else if (strcmp(rtype, "env") == 0) {
success = session_env_req(ssh, s);
}
}
if (strcmp(rtype, "window-change") == 0) {
success = session_window_change_req(ssh, s);
} else if (strcmp(rtype, "break") == 0) {
success = session_break_req(ssh, s);
} else if (strcmp(rtype, "signal") == 0) {
success = session_signal_req(ssh, s);
}
return success;
}
void
session_set_fds(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s,
int fdin, int fdout, int fderr, int ignore_fderr, int is_tty)
{
/*
* now that have a child and a pipe to the child,
* we can activate our channel and register the fd's
*/
if (s->chanid == -1)
fatal("no channel for session %d", s->self);
channel_set_fds(ssh, s->chanid,
fdout, fdin, fderr,
ignore_fderr ? CHAN_EXTENDED_IGNORE : CHAN_EXTENDED_READ,
1, is_tty, CHAN_SES_WINDOW_DEFAULT);
}
/*
* Function to perform pty cleanup. Also called if we get aborted abnormally
* (e.g., due to a dropped connection).
*/
void
session_pty_cleanup2(Session *s)
{
if (s == NULL) {
error("%s: no session", __func__);
return;
}
if (s->ttyfd == -1)
return;
debug("%s: session %d release %s", __func__, s->self, s->tty);
/* Record that the user has logged out. */
if (s->pid != 0)
record_logout(s->pid, s->tty, s->pw->pw_name);
/* Release the pseudo-tty. */
if (getuid() == 0)
pty_release(s->tty);
/*
* Close the server side of the socket pairs. We must do this after
* the pty cleanup, so that another process doesn't get this pty
* while we're still cleaning up.
*/
if (s->ptymaster != -1 && close(s->ptymaster) == -1)
error("close(s->ptymaster/%d): %s",
s->ptymaster, strerror(errno));
/* unlink pty from session */
s->ttyfd = -1;
}
void
session_pty_cleanup(Session *s)
{
PRIVSEP(session_pty_cleanup2(s));
}
static char *
sig2name(int sig)
{
#define SSH_SIG(x) if (sig == SIG ## x) return #x
SSH_SIG(ABRT);
SSH_SIG(ALRM);
SSH_SIG(FPE);
SSH_SIG(HUP);
SSH_SIG(ILL);
SSH_SIG(INT);
SSH_SIG(KILL);
SSH_SIG(PIPE);
SSH_SIG(QUIT);
SSH_SIG(SEGV);
SSH_SIG(TERM);
SSH_SIG(USR1);
SSH_SIG(USR2);
#undef SSH_SIG
return "SIG@openssh.com";
}
static void
session_close_x11(struct ssh *ssh, int id)
{
Channel *c;
if ((c = channel_by_id(ssh, id)) == NULL) {
debug("%s: x11 channel %d missing", __func__, id);
} else {
/* Detach X11 listener */
debug("%s: detach x11 channel %d", __func__, id);
channel_cancel_cleanup(ssh, id);
if (c->ostate != CHAN_OUTPUT_CLOSED)
chan_mark_dead(ssh, c);
}
}
static void
session_close_single_x11(struct ssh *ssh, int id, void *arg)
{
Session *s;
u_int i;
debug3("%s: channel %d", __func__, id);
channel_cancel_cleanup(ssh, id);
if ((s = session_by_x11_channel(id)) == NULL)
fatal("%s: no x11 channel %d", __func__, id);
for (i = 0; s->x11_chanids[i] != -1; i++) {
debug("%s: session %d: closing channel %d",
__func__, s->self, s->x11_chanids[i]);
/*
* The channel "id" is already closing, but make sure we
* close all of its siblings.
*/
if (s->x11_chanids[i] != id)
session_close_x11(ssh, s->x11_chanids[i]);
}
free(s->x11_chanids);
s->x11_chanids = NULL;
free(s->display);
s->display = NULL;
free(s->auth_proto);
s->auth_proto = NULL;
free(s->auth_data);
s->auth_data = NULL;
free(s->auth_display);
s->auth_display = NULL;
}
static void
session_exit_message(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s, int status)
{
Channel *c;
int r;
if ((c = channel_lookup(ssh, s->chanid)) == NULL)
fatal("%s: session %d: no channel %d",
__func__, s->self, s->chanid);
debug("%s: session %d channel %d pid %ld",
__func__, s->self, s->chanid, (long)s->pid);
if (WIFEXITED(status)) {
channel_request_start(ssh, s->chanid, "exit-status", 0);
if ((r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, WEXITSTATUS(status))) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: exit reply", __func__);
} else if (WIFSIGNALED(status)) {
channel_request_start(ssh, s->chanid, "exit-signal", 0);
#ifndef WCOREDUMP
# define WCOREDUMP(x) (0)
#endif
if ((r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, sig2name(WTERMSIG(status)))) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, WCOREDUMP(status)? 1 : 0)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "")) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "")) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: exit reply", __func__);
} else {
/* Some weird exit cause. Just exit. */
ssh_packet_disconnect(ssh, "wait returned status %04x.", status);
}
/* disconnect channel */
debug("%s: release channel %d", __func__, s->chanid);
/*
* Adjust cleanup callback attachment to send close messages when
* the channel gets EOF. The session will be then be closed
* by session_close_by_channel when the childs close their fds.
*/
channel_register_cleanup(ssh, c->self, session_close_by_channel, 1);
/*
* emulate a write failure with 'chan_write_failed', nobody will be
* interested in data we write.
* Note that we must not call 'chan_read_failed', since there could
* be some more data waiting in the pipe.
*/
if (c->ostate != CHAN_OUTPUT_CLOSED)
chan_write_failed(ssh, c);
}
void
session_close(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s)
{
u_int i;
verbose("Close session: user %s from %.200s port %d id %d",
s->pw->pw_name,
ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh),
ssh_remote_port(ssh),
s->self);
if (s->ttyfd != -1)
session_pty_cleanup(s);
free(s->term);
free(s->display);
free(s->x11_chanids);
free(s->auth_display);
free(s->auth_data);
free(s->auth_proto);
free(s->subsys);
if (s->env != NULL) {
for (i = 0; i < s->num_env; i++) {
free(s->env[i].name);
free(s->env[i].val);
}
free(s->env);
}
session_proctitle(s);
session_unused(s->self);
}
void
session_close_by_pid(struct ssh *ssh, pid_t pid, int status)
{
Session *s = session_by_pid(pid);
if (s == NULL) {
debug("%s: no session for pid %ld", __func__, (long)pid);
return;
}
if (s->chanid != -1)
session_exit_message(ssh, s, status);
if (s->ttyfd != -1)
session_pty_cleanup(s);
s->pid = 0;
}
/*
* this is called when a channel dies before
* the session 'child' itself dies
*/
void
session_close_by_channel(struct ssh *ssh, int id, void *arg)
{
Session *s = session_by_channel(id);
u_int i;
if (s == NULL) {
debug("%s: no session for id %d", __func__, id);
return;
}
debug("%s: channel %d child %ld", __func__, id, (long)s->pid);
if (s->pid != 0) {
debug("%s: channel %d: has child, ttyfd %d",
__func__, id, s->ttyfd);
/*
* delay detach of session, but release pty, since
* the fd's to the child are already closed
*/
if (s->ttyfd != -1)
session_pty_cleanup(s);
return;
}
/* detach by removing callback */
channel_cancel_cleanup(ssh, s->chanid);
/* Close any X11 listeners associated with this session */
if (s->x11_chanids != NULL) {
for (i = 0; s->x11_chanids[i] != -1; i++) {
session_close_x11(ssh, s->x11_chanids[i]);
s->x11_chanids[i] = -1;
}
}
s->chanid = -1;
session_close(ssh, s);
}
void
session_destroy_all(struct ssh *ssh, void (*closefunc)(Session *))
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < sessions_nalloc; i++) {
Session *s = &sessions[i];
if (s->used) {
if (closefunc != NULL)
closefunc(s);
else
session_close(ssh, s);
}
}
}
static char *
session_tty_list(void)
{
static char buf[1024];
int i;
char *cp;
buf[0] = '\0';
for (i = 0; i < sessions_nalloc; i++) {
Session *s = &sessions[i];
if (s->used && s->ttyfd != -1) {
if (strncmp(s->tty, "/dev/", 5) != 0) {
cp = strrchr(s->tty, '/');
cp = (cp == NULL) ? s->tty : cp + 1;
} else
cp = s->tty + 5;
if (buf[0] != '\0')
strlcat(buf, ",", sizeof buf);
strlcat(buf, cp, sizeof buf);
}
}
if (buf[0] == '\0')
strlcpy(buf, "notty", sizeof buf);
return buf;
}
void
session_proctitle(Session *s)
{
if (s->pw == NULL)
error("no user for session %d", s->self);
else
setproctitle("%s@%s", s->pw->pw_name, session_tty_list());
}
int
session_setup_x11fwd(struct ssh *ssh, Session *s)
{
struct stat st;
char display[512], auth_display[512];
char hostname[NI_MAXHOST];
u_int i;
if (!auth_opts->permit_x11_forwarding_flag) {
ssh_packet_send_debug(ssh, "X11 forwarding disabled by key options.");
return 0;
}
if (!options.x11_forwarding) {
debug("X11 forwarding disabled in server configuration file.");
return 0;
}
if (options.xauth_location == NULL ||
(stat(options.xauth_location, &st) == -1)) {
ssh_packet_send_debug(ssh, "No xauth program; cannot forward X11.");
return 0;
}
if (s->display != NULL) {
debug("X11 display already set.");
return 0;
}
if (x11_create_display_inet(ssh, options.x11_display_offset,
options.x11_use_localhost, s->single_connection,
&s->display_number, &s->x11_chanids) == -1) {
debug("x11_create_display_inet failed.");
return 0;
}
for (i = 0; s->x11_chanids[i] != -1; i++) {
channel_register_cleanup(ssh, s->x11_chanids[i],
session_close_single_x11, 0);
}
/* Set up a suitable value for the DISPLAY variable. */
if (gethostname(hostname, sizeof(hostname)) == -1)
fatal("gethostname: %.100s", strerror(errno));
/*
* auth_display must be used as the displayname when the
* authorization entry is added with xauth(1). This will be
* different than the DISPLAY string for localhost displays.
*/
if (options.x11_use_localhost) {
snprintf(display, sizeof display, "localhost:%u.%u",
s->display_number, s->screen);
snprintf(auth_display, sizeof auth_display, "unix:%u.%u",
s->display_number, s->screen);
s->display = xstrdup(display);
s->auth_display = xstrdup(auth_display);
} else {
#ifdef IPADDR_IN_DISPLAY
struct hostent *he;
struct in_addr my_addr;
he = gethostbyname(hostname);
if (he == NULL) {
error("Can't get IP address for X11 DISPLAY.");
ssh_packet_send_debug(ssh, "Can't get IP address for X11 DISPLAY.");
return 0;
}
memcpy(&my_addr, he->h_addr_list[0], sizeof(struct in_addr));
snprintf(display, sizeof display, "%.50s:%u.%u", inet_ntoa(my_addr),
s->display_number, s->screen);
#else
snprintf(display, sizeof display, "%.400s:%u.%u", hostname,
s->display_number, s->screen);
#endif
s->display = xstrdup(display);
s->auth_display = xstrdup(display);
}
return 1;
}
static void
do_authenticated2(struct ssh *ssh, Authctxt *authctxt)
{
server_loop2(ssh, authctxt);
}
void
do_cleanup(struct ssh *ssh, Authctxt *authctxt)
{
static int called = 0;
debug("do_cleanup");
/* no cleanup if we're in the child for login shell */
if (is_child)
return;
/* avoid double cleanup */
if (called)
return;
called = 1;
if (authctxt == NULL)
return;
#ifdef USE_PAM
if (options.use_pam) {
sshpam_cleanup();
sshpam_thread_cleanup();
}
#endif
if (!authctxt->authenticated)
return;
#ifdef KRB5
if (options.kerberos_ticket_cleanup &&
authctxt->krb5_ctx)
krb5_cleanup_proc(authctxt);
#endif
#ifdef GSSAPI
if (options.gss_cleanup_creds)
ssh_gssapi_cleanup_creds();
#endif
/* remove agent socket */
auth_sock_cleanup_proc(authctxt->pw);
/* remove userauth info */
if (auth_info_file != NULL) {
temporarily_use_uid(authctxt->pw);
unlink(auth_info_file);
restore_uid();
free(auth_info_file);
auth_info_file = NULL;
}
/*
* Cleanup ptys/utmp only if privsep is disabled,
* or if running in monitor.
*/
if (!use_privsep || mm_is_monitor())
session_destroy_all(ssh, session_pty_cleanup2);
}
/* Return a name for the remote host that fits inside utmp_size */
const char *
session_get_remote_name_or_ip(struct ssh *ssh, u_int utmp_size, int use_dns)
{
const char *remote = "";
if (utmp_size > 0)
remote = auth_get_canonical_hostname(ssh, use_dns);
if (utmp_size == 0 || strlen(remote) > utmp_size)
remote = ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh);
return remote;
}
diff --git a/sftp-glob.c b/sftp-glob.c
index c196c51e569f..f573f98f01ec 100644
--- a/sftp-glob.c
+++ b/sftp-glob.c
@@ -1,149 +1,150 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: sftp-glob.c,v 1.28 2019/10/02 00:42:30 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: sftp-glob.c,v 1.29 2019/11/13 04:47:52 deraadt Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Damien Miller <djm@openbsd.org>
*
* Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
* copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
* WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
* ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
* WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
* ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
* OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H
# include <sys/stat.h>
#endif
#include <dirent.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "sftp.h"
#include "sftp-common.h"
#include "sftp-client.h"
int remote_glob(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, int,
int (*)(const char *, int), glob_t *);
struct SFTP_OPENDIR {
SFTP_DIRENT **dir;
int offset;
};
static struct {
struct sftp_conn *conn;
} cur;
static void *
fudge_opendir(const char *path)
{
struct SFTP_OPENDIR *r;
r = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*r));
if (do_readdir(cur.conn, (char *)path, &r->dir)) {
free(r);
return(NULL);
}
r->offset = 0;
return((void *)r);
}
static struct dirent *
fudge_readdir(struct SFTP_OPENDIR *od)
{
/* Solaris needs sizeof(dirent) + path length (see below) */
static char buf[sizeof(struct dirent) + MAXPATHLEN];
struct dirent *ret = (struct dirent *)buf;
#ifdef __GNU_LIBRARY__
static int inum = 1;
#endif /* __GNU_LIBRARY__ */
if (od->dir[od->offset] == NULL)
return(NULL);
memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
/*
* Solaris defines dirent->d_name as a one byte array and expects
* you to hack around it.
*/
#ifdef BROKEN_ONE_BYTE_DIRENT_D_NAME
strlcpy(ret->d_name, od->dir[od->offset++]->filename, MAXPATHLEN);
#else
strlcpy(ret->d_name, od->dir[od->offset++]->filename,
sizeof(ret->d_name));
#endif
#ifdef __GNU_LIBRARY__
/*
* Idiot glibc uses extensions to struct dirent for readdir with
* ALTDIRFUNCs. Not that this is documented anywhere but the
* source... Fake an inode number to appease it.
*/
ret->d_ino = inum++;
if (!inum)
inum = 1;
#endif /* __GNU_LIBRARY__ */
return(ret);
}
static void
fudge_closedir(struct SFTP_OPENDIR *od)
{
free_sftp_dirents(od->dir);
free(od);
}
static int
fudge_lstat(const char *path, struct stat *st)
{
Attrib *a;
if (!(a = do_lstat(cur.conn, (char *)path, 1)))
return(-1);
attrib_to_stat(a, st);
return(0);
}
static int
fudge_stat(const char *path, struct stat *st)
{
Attrib *a;
if (!(a = do_stat(cur.conn, (char *)path, 1)))
return(-1);
attrib_to_stat(a, st);
return(0);
}
int
remote_glob(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *pattern, int flags,
int (*errfunc)(const char *, int), glob_t *pglob)
{
pglob->gl_opendir = fudge_opendir;
pglob->gl_readdir = (struct dirent *(*)(void *))fudge_readdir;
pglob->gl_closedir = (void (*)(void *))fudge_closedir;
pglob->gl_lstat = fudge_lstat;
pglob->gl_stat = fudge_stat;
memset(&cur, 0, sizeof(cur));
cur.conn = conn;
return(glob(pattern, flags | GLOB_ALTDIRFUNC, errfunc, pglob));
}
diff --git a/sftp-server.0 b/sftp-server.0
index e070f6a37827..ef485773db3a 100644
--- a/sftp-server.0
+++ b/sftp-server.0
@@ -1,96 +1,96 @@
SFTP-SERVER(8) System Manager's Manual SFTP-SERVER(8)
NAME
- sftp-server M-bM-^@M-^S SFTP server subsystem
+ sftp-server M-bM-^@M-^S OpenSSH SFTP server subsystem
SYNOPSIS
sftp-server [-ehR] [-d start_directory] [-f log_facility] [-l log_level]
[-P blacklisted_requests] [-p whitelisted_requests]
[-u umask]
sftp-server -Q protocol_feature
DESCRIPTION
sftp-server is a program that speaks the server side of SFTP protocol to
stdout and expects client requests from stdin. sftp-server is not
intended to be called directly, but from sshd(8) using the Subsystem
option.
Command-line flags to sftp-server should be specified in the Subsystem
declaration. See sshd_config(5) for more information.
Valid options are:
-d start_directory
specifies an alternate starting directory for users. The
pathname may contain the following tokens that are expanded at
runtime: %% is replaced by a literal '%', %d is replaced by the
home directory of the user being authenticated, and %u is
replaced by the username of that user. The default is to use the
user's home directory. This option is useful in conjunction with
the sshd_config(5) ChrootDirectory option.
-e Causes sftp-server to print logging information to stderr instead
of syslog for debugging.
-f log_facility
Specifies the facility code that is used when logging messages
from sftp-server. The possible values are: DAEMON, USER, AUTH,
LOCAL0, LOCAL1, LOCAL2, LOCAL3, LOCAL4, LOCAL5, LOCAL6, LOCAL7.
The default is AUTH.
-h Displays sftp-server usage information.
-l log_level
Specifies which messages will be logged by sftp-server. The
possible values are: QUIET, FATAL, ERROR, INFO, VERBOSE, DEBUG,
DEBUG1, DEBUG2, and DEBUG3. INFO and VERBOSE log transactions
that sftp-server performs on behalf of the client. DEBUG and
DEBUG1 are equivalent. DEBUG2 and DEBUG3 each specify higher
levels of debugging output. The default is ERROR.
-P blacklisted_requests
Specify a comma-separated list of SFTP protocol requests that are
banned by the server. sftp-server will reply to any blacklisted
request with a failure. The -Q flag can be used to determine the
supported request types. If both a blacklist and a whitelist are
specified, then the blacklist is applied before the whitelist.
-p whitelisted_requests
Specify a comma-separated list of SFTP protocol requests that are
permitted by the server. All request types that are not on the
whitelist will be logged and replied to with a failure message.
Care must be taken when using this feature to ensure that
requests made implicitly by SFTP clients are permitted.
-Q protocol_feature
Query protocol features supported by sftp-server. At present the
only feature that may be queried is M-bM-^@M-^\requestsM-bM-^@M-^], which may be used
for black or whitelisting (flags -P and -p respectively).
-R Places this instance of sftp-server into a read-only mode.
Attempts to open files for writing, as well as other operations
that change the state of the filesystem, will be denied.
-u umask
Sets an explicit umask(2) to be applied to newly-created files
and directories, instead of the user's default mask.
On some systems, sftp-server must be able to access /dev/log for logging
to work, and use of sftp-server in a chroot configuration therefore
requires that syslogd(8) establish a logging socket inside the chroot
directory.
SEE ALSO
sftp(1), ssh(1), sshd_config(5), sshd(8)
T. Ylonen and S. Lehtinen, SSH File Transfer Protocol, draft-ietf-secsh-
filexfer-02.txt, October 2001, work in progress material.
HISTORY
sftp-server first appeared in OpenBSD 2.8.
AUTHORS
Markus Friedl <markus@openbsd.org>
-OpenBSD 6.6 December 11, 2014 OpenBSD 6.6
+OpenBSD 6.6 November 30, 2019 OpenBSD 6.6
diff --git a/sftp-server.8 b/sftp-server.8
index c117398e8583..4a55dab2618c 100644
--- a/sftp-server.8
+++ b/sftp-server.8
@@ -1,170 +1,170 @@
-.\" $OpenBSD: sftp-server.8,v 1.27 2014/12/11 04:16:14 djm Exp $
+.\" $OpenBSD: sftp-server.8,v 1.28 2019/11/30 07:07:59 jmc Exp $
.\"
.\" Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
.\"
.\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
.\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
.\" are met:
.\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
.\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
.\" documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
.\"
.\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
.\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
.\" OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
.\" IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
.\" INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
.\" NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
.\" DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
.\" THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
.\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
.\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
.\"
-.Dd $Mdocdate: December 11 2014 $
+.Dd $Mdocdate: November 30 2019 $
.Dt SFTP-SERVER 8
.Os
.Sh NAME
.Nm sftp-server
-.Nd SFTP server subsystem
+.Nd OpenSSH SFTP server subsystem
.Sh SYNOPSIS
.Nm sftp-server
.Bk -words
.Op Fl ehR
.Op Fl d Ar start_directory
.Op Fl f Ar log_facility
.Op Fl l Ar log_level
.Op Fl P Ar blacklisted_requests
.Op Fl p Ar whitelisted_requests
.Op Fl u Ar umask
.Ek
.Nm
.Fl Q Ar protocol_feature
.Sh DESCRIPTION
.Nm
is a program that speaks the server side of SFTP protocol
to stdout and expects client requests from stdin.
.Nm
is not intended to be called directly, but from
.Xr sshd 8
using the
.Cm Subsystem
option.
.Pp
Command-line flags to
.Nm
should be specified in the
.Cm Subsystem
declaration.
See
.Xr sshd_config 5
for more information.
.Pp
Valid options are:
.Bl -tag -width Ds
.It Fl d Ar start_directory
specifies an alternate starting directory for users.
The pathname may contain the following tokens that are expanded at runtime:
%% is replaced by a literal '%',
%d is replaced by the home directory of the user being authenticated,
and %u is replaced by the username of that user.
The default is to use the user's home directory.
This option is useful in conjunction with the
.Xr sshd_config 5
.Cm ChrootDirectory
option.
.It Fl e
Causes
.Nm
to print logging information to stderr instead of syslog for debugging.
.It Fl f Ar log_facility
Specifies the facility code that is used when logging messages from
.Nm .
The possible values are: DAEMON, USER, AUTH, LOCAL0, LOCAL1, LOCAL2,
LOCAL3, LOCAL4, LOCAL5, LOCAL6, LOCAL7.
The default is AUTH.
.It Fl h
Displays
.Nm
usage information.
.It Fl l Ar log_level
Specifies which messages will be logged by
.Nm .
The possible values are:
QUIET, FATAL, ERROR, INFO, VERBOSE, DEBUG, DEBUG1, DEBUG2, and DEBUG3.
INFO and VERBOSE log transactions that
.Nm
performs on behalf of the client.
DEBUG and DEBUG1 are equivalent.
DEBUG2 and DEBUG3 each specify higher levels of debugging output.
The default is ERROR.
.It Fl P Ar blacklisted_requests
Specify a comma-separated list of SFTP protocol requests that are banned by
the server.
.Nm
will reply to any blacklisted request with a failure.
The
.Fl Q
flag can be used to determine the supported request types.
If both a blacklist and a whitelist are specified, then the blacklist is
applied before the whitelist.
.It Fl p Ar whitelisted_requests
Specify a comma-separated list of SFTP protocol requests that are permitted
by the server.
All request types that are not on the whitelist will be logged and replied
to with a failure message.
.Pp
Care must be taken when using this feature to ensure that requests made
implicitly by SFTP clients are permitted.
.It Fl Q Ar protocol_feature
Query protocol features supported by
.Nm .
At present the only feature that may be queried is
.Dq requests ,
which may be used for black or whitelisting (flags
.Fl P
and
.Fl p
respectively).
.It Fl R
Places this instance of
.Nm
into a read-only mode.
Attempts to open files for writing, as well as other operations that change
the state of the filesystem, will be denied.
.It Fl u Ar umask
Sets an explicit
.Xr umask 2
to be applied to newly-created files and directories, instead of the
user's default mask.
.El
.Pp
On some systems,
.Nm
must be able to access
.Pa /dev/log
for logging to work, and use of
.Nm
in a chroot configuration therefore requires that
.Xr syslogd 8
establish a logging socket inside the chroot directory.
.Sh SEE ALSO
.Xr sftp 1 ,
.Xr ssh 1 ,
.Xr sshd_config 5 ,
.Xr sshd 8
.Rs
.%A T. Ylonen
.%A S. Lehtinen
.%T "SSH File Transfer Protocol"
.%N draft-ietf-secsh-filexfer-02.txt
.%D October 2001
.%O work in progress material
.Re
.Sh HISTORY
.Nm
first appeared in
.Ox 2.8 .
.Sh AUTHORS
.An Markus Friedl Aq Mt markus@openbsd.org
diff --git a/sftp.0 b/sftp.0
index 05db3541c05a..6d0405758f22 100644
--- a/sftp.0
+++ b/sftp.0
@@ -1,396 +1,396 @@
SFTP(1) General Commands Manual SFTP(1)
NAME
- sftp M-bM-^@M-^S secure file transfer program
+ sftp M-bM-^@M-^S OpenSSH secure file transfer
SYNOPSIS
sftp [-46aCfpqrv] [-B buffer_size] [-b batchfile] [-c cipher]
[-D sftp_server_path] [-F ssh_config] [-i identity_file]
[-J destination] [-l limit] [-o ssh_option] [-P port]
[-R num_requests] [-S program] [-s subsystem | sftp_server]
destination
DESCRIPTION
sftp is a file transfer program, similar to ftp(1), which performs all
operations over an encrypted ssh(1) transport. It may also use many
features of ssh, such as public key authentication and compression.
The destination may be specified either as [user@]host[:path] or as a URI
in the form sftp://[user@]host[:port][/path].
If the destination includes a path and it is not a directory, sftp will
retrieve files automatically if a non-interactive authentication method
is used; otherwise it will do so after successful interactive
authentication.
If no path is specified, or if the path is a directory, sftp will log in
to the specified host and enter interactive command mode, changing to the
remote directory if one was specified. An optional trailing slash can be
used to force the path to be interpreted as a directory.
Since the destination formats use colon characters to delimit host names
from path names or port numbers, IPv6 addresses must be enclosed in
square brackets to avoid ambiguity.
The options are as follows:
-4 Forces sftp to use IPv4 addresses only.
-6 Forces sftp to use IPv6 addresses only.
-a Attempt to continue interrupted transfers rather than overwriting
existing partial or complete copies of files. If the partial
contents differ from those being transferred, then the resultant
file is likely to be corrupt.
-B buffer_size
Specify the size of the buffer that sftp uses when transferring
files. Larger buffers require fewer round trips at the cost of
higher memory consumption. The default is 32768 bytes.
-b batchfile
Batch mode reads a series of commands from an input batchfile
instead of stdin. Since it lacks user interaction it should be
used in conjunction with non-interactive authentication to
obviate the need to enter a password at connection time (see
sshd(8) and ssh-keygen(1) for details).
A batchfile of M-bM-^@M-^X-M-bM-^@M-^Y may be used to indicate standard input. sftp
will abort if any of the following commands fail: get, put,
reget, reput, rename, ln, rm, mkdir, chdir, ls, lchdir, chmod,
chown, chgrp, lpwd, df, symlink, and lmkdir.
Termination on error can be suppressed on a command by command
basis by prefixing the command with a M-bM-^@M-^X-M-bM-^@M-^Y character (for example,
-rm /tmp/blah*). Echo of the command may be suppressed by
prefixing the command with a M-bM-^@M-^X@M-bM-^@M-^Y character. These two prefixes
may be combined in any order, for example -@ls /bsd.
-C Enables compression (via ssh's -C flag).
-c cipher
Selects the cipher to use for encrypting the data transfers.
This option is directly passed to ssh(1).
-D sftp_server_path
Connect directly to a local sftp server (rather than via ssh(1)).
This option may be useful in debugging the client and server.
-F ssh_config
Specifies an alternative per-user configuration file for ssh(1).
This option is directly passed to ssh(1).
-f Requests that files be flushed to disk immediately after
transfer. When uploading files, this feature is only enabled if
the server implements the "fsync@openssh.com" extension.
-i identity_file
Selects the file from which the identity (private key) for public
key authentication is read. This option is directly passed to
ssh(1).
-J destination
Connect to the target host by first making an sftp connection to
the jump host described by destination and then establishing a
TCP forwarding to the ultimate destination from there. Multiple
jump hops may be specified separated by comma characters. This
is a shortcut to specify a ProxyJump configuration directive.
This option is directly passed to ssh(1).
-l limit
Limits the used bandwidth, specified in Kbit/s.
-o ssh_option
Can be used to pass options to ssh in the format used in
ssh_config(5). This is useful for specifying options for which
there is no separate sftp command-line flag. For example, to
specify an alternate port use: sftp -oPort=24. For full details
of the options listed below, and their possible values, see
ssh_config(5).
AddressFamily
BatchMode
BindAddress
BindInterface
CanonicalDomains
CanonicalizeFallbackLocal
CanonicalizeHostname
CanonicalizeMaxDots
CanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs
CASignatureAlgorithms
CertificateFile
ChallengeResponseAuthentication
CheckHostIP
Ciphers
Compression
ConnectionAttempts
ConnectTimeout
ControlMaster
ControlPath
ControlPersist
GlobalKnownHostsFile
GSSAPIAuthentication
GSSAPIDelegateCredentials
HashKnownHosts
Host
HostbasedAuthentication
HostbasedKeyTypes
HostKeyAlgorithms
HostKeyAlias
Hostname
IdentitiesOnly
IdentityAgent
IdentityFile
IPQoS
KbdInteractiveAuthentication
KbdInteractiveDevices
KexAlgorithms
LogLevel
MACs
NoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost
NumberOfPasswordPrompts
PasswordAuthentication
PKCS11Provider
Port
PreferredAuthentications
ProxyCommand
ProxyJump
PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes
PubkeyAuthentication
RekeyLimit
SendEnv
ServerAliveInterval
ServerAliveCountMax
SetEnv
StrictHostKeyChecking
TCPKeepAlive
UpdateHostKeys
User
UserKnownHostsFile
VerifyHostKeyDNS
-P port
Specifies the port to connect to on the remote host.
-p Preserves modification times, access times, and modes from the
original files transferred.
-q Quiet mode: disables the progress meter as well as warning and
diagnostic messages from ssh(1).
-R num_requests
Specify how many requests may be outstanding at any one time.
Increasing this may slightly improve file transfer speed but will
increase memory usage. The default is 64 outstanding requests.
-r Recursively copy entire directories when uploading and
downloading. Note that sftp does not follow symbolic links
encountered in the tree traversal.
-S program
Name of the program to use for the encrypted connection. The
program must understand ssh(1) options.
-s subsystem | sftp_server
Specifies the SSH2 subsystem or the path for an sftp server on
the remote host. A path is useful when the remote sshd(8) does
not have an sftp subsystem configured.
-v Raise logging level. This option is also passed to ssh.
INTERACTIVE COMMANDS
Once in interactive mode, sftp understands a set of commands similar to
those of ftp(1). Commands are case insensitive. Pathnames that contain
spaces must be enclosed in quotes. Any special characters contained
within pathnames that are recognized by glob(3) must be escaped with
backslashes (M-bM-^@M-^X\M-bM-^@M-^Y).
bye Quit sftp.
cd [path]
Change remote directory to path. If path is not specified, then
change directory to the one the session started in.
chgrp [-h] grp path
Change group of file path to grp. If the -h flag is specified,
then symlinks will not be followed. path may contain glob(7)
characters and may match multiple files. grp must be a numeric
GID.
chmod [-h] mode path
Change permissions of file path to mode. If the -h flag is
specified, then symlinks will not be followed. path may contain
glob(7) characters and may match multiple files.
chown [-h] own path
Change owner of file path to own. If the -h flag is specified,
then symlinks will not be followed. path may contain glob(7)
characters and may match multiple files. own must be a numeric
UID.
df [-hi] [path]
Display usage information for the filesystem holding the current
directory (or path if specified). If the -h flag is specified,
the capacity information will be displayed using "human-readable"
suffixes. The -i flag requests display of inode information in
addition to capacity information. This command is only supported
on servers that implement the M-bM-^@M-^\statvfs@openssh.comM-bM-^@M-^] extension.
exit Quit sftp.
get [-afpR] remote-path [local-path]
Retrieve the remote-path and store it on the local machine. If
the local path name is not specified, it is given the same name
it has on the remote machine. remote-path may contain glob(7)
characters and may match multiple files. If it does and
local-path is specified, then local-path must specify a
directory.
If the -a flag is specified, then attempt to resume partial
transfers of existing files. Note that resumption assumes that
any partial copy of the local file matches the remote copy. If
the remote file contents differ from the partial local copy then
the resultant file is likely to be corrupt.
If the -f flag is specified, then fsync(2) will be called after
the file transfer has completed to flush the file to disk.
If the -p flag is specified, then full file permissions and
access times are copied too.
If the -R flag is specified then directories will be copied
recursively. Note that sftp does not follow symbolic links when
performing recursive transfers.
help Display help text.
lcd [path]
Change local directory to path. If path is not specified, then
change directory to the local user's home directory.
lls [ls-options [path]]
Display local directory listing of either path or current
directory if path is not specified. ls-options may contain any
flags supported by the local system's ls(1) command. path may
contain glob(7) characters and may match multiple files.
lmkdir path
Create local directory specified by path.
ln [-s] oldpath newpath
Create a link from oldpath to newpath. If the -s flag is
specified the created link is a symbolic link, otherwise it is a
hard link.
lpwd Print local working directory.
ls [-1afhlnrSt] [path]
Display a remote directory listing of either path or the current
directory if path is not specified. path may contain glob(7)
characters and may match multiple files.
The following flags are recognized and alter the behaviour of ls
accordingly:
-1 Produce single columnar output.
-a List files beginning with a dot (M-bM-^@M-^X.M-bM-^@M-^Y).
-f Do not sort the listing. The default sort order is
lexicographical.
-h When used with a long format option, use unit suffixes:
Byte, Kilobyte, Megabyte, Gigabyte, Terabyte, Petabyte,
and Exabyte in order to reduce the number of digits to
four or fewer using powers of 2 for sizes (K=1024,
M=1048576, etc.).
-l Display additional details including permissions and
ownership information.
-n Produce a long listing with user and group information
presented numerically.
-r Reverse the sort order of the listing.
-S Sort the listing by file size.
-t Sort the listing by last modification time.
lumask umask
Set local umask to umask.
mkdir path
Create remote directory specified by path.
progress
Toggle display of progress meter.
put [-afpR] local-path [remote-path]
Upload local-path and store it on the remote machine. If the
remote path name is not specified, it is given the same name it
has on the local machine. local-path may contain glob(7)
characters and may match multiple files. If it does and
remote-path is specified, then remote-path must specify a
directory.
If the -a flag is specified, then attempt to resume partial
transfers of existing files. Note that resumption assumes that
any partial copy of the remote file matches the local copy. If
the local file contents differ from the remote local copy then
the resultant file is likely to be corrupt.
If the -f flag is specified, then a request will be sent to the
server to call fsync(2) after the file has been transferred.
Note that this is only supported by servers that implement the
"fsync@openssh.com" extension.
If the -p flag is specified, then full file permissions and
access times are copied too.
If the -R flag is specified then directories will be copied
recursively. Note that sftp does not follow symbolic links when
performing recursive transfers.
pwd Display remote working directory.
quit Quit sftp.
reget [-fpR] remote-path [local-path]
Resume download of remote-path. Equivalent to get with the -a
flag set.
reput [-fpR] local-path [remote-path]
Resume upload of local-path. Equivalent to put with the -a flag
set.
rename oldpath newpath
Rename remote file from oldpath to newpath.
rm path
Delete remote file specified by path.
rmdir path
Remove remote directory specified by path.
symlink oldpath newpath
Create a symbolic link from oldpath to newpath.
version
Display the sftp protocol version.
!command
Execute command in local shell.
! Escape to local shell.
? Synonym for help.
SEE ALSO
ftp(1), ls(1), scp(1), ssh(1), ssh-add(1), ssh-keygen(1), ssh_config(5),
glob(7), sftp-server(8), sshd(8)
T. Ylonen and S. Lehtinen, SSH File Transfer Protocol, draft-ietf-secsh-
filexfer-00.txt, January 2001, work in progress material.
-OpenBSD 6.6 June 19, 2019 OpenBSD 6.6
+OpenBSD 6.6 November 30, 2019 OpenBSD 6.6
diff --git a/sftp.1 b/sftp.1
index a52c1cff3a7a..6d69472e1e90 100644
--- a/sftp.1
+++ b/sftp.1
@@ -1,681 +1,681 @@
-.\" $OpenBSD: sftp.1,v 1.127 2019/06/19 20:12:44 jmc Exp $
+.\" $OpenBSD: sftp.1,v 1.128 2019/11/30 07:07:59 jmc Exp $
.\"
.\" Copyright (c) 2001 Damien Miller. All rights reserved.
.\"
.\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
.\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
.\" are met:
.\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
.\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
.\" documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
.\"
.\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
.\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
.\" OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
.\" IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
.\" INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
.\" NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
.\" DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
.\" THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
.\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
.\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
.\"
-.Dd $Mdocdate: June 19 2019 $
+.Dd $Mdocdate: November 30 2019 $
.Dt SFTP 1
.Os
.Sh NAME
.Nm sftp
-.Nd secure file transfer program
+.Nd OpenSSH secure file transfer
.Sh SYNOPSIS
.Nm sftp
.Op Fl 46aCfpqrv
.Op Fl B Ar buffer_size
.Op Fl b Ar batchfile
.Op Fl c Ar cipher
.Op Fl D Ar sftp_server_path
.Op Fl F Ar ssh_config
.Op Fl i Ar identity_file
.Op Fl J Ar destination
.Op Fl l Ar limit
.Op Fl o Ar ssh_option
.Op Fl P Ar port
.Op Fl R Ar num_requests
.Op Fl S Ar program
.Op Fl s Ar subsystem | sftp_server
.Ar destination
.Sh DESCRIPTION
.Nm
is a file transfer program, similar to
.Xr ftp 1 ,
which performs all operations over an encrypted
.Xr ssh 1
transport.
It may also use many features of ssh, such as public key authentication and
compression.
.Pp
The
.Ar destination
may be specified either as
.Sm off
.Oo user @ Oc host Op : path
.Sm on
or as a URI in the form
.Sm off
.No sftp:// Oo user @ Oc host Oo : port Oc Op / path .
.Sm on
.Pp
If the
.Ar destination
includes a
.Ar path
and it is not a directory,
.Nm
will retrieve files automatically if a non-interactive
authentication method is used; otherwise it will do so after
successful interactive authentication.
.Pp
If no
.Ar path
is specified, or if the
.Ar path
is a directory,
.Nm
will log in to the specified
.Ar host
and enter interactive command mode, changing to the remote directory
if one was specified.
An optional trailing slash can be used to force the
.Ar path
to be interpreted as a directory.
.Pp
Since the destination formats use colon characters to delimit host
names from path names or port numbers, IPv6 addresses must be
enclosed in square brackets to avoid ambiguity.
.Pp
The options are as follows:
.Bl -tag -width Ds
.It Fl 4
Forces
.Nm
to use IPv4 addresses only.
.It Fl 6
Forces
.Nm
to use IPv6 addresses only.
.It Fl a
Attempt to continue interrupted transfers rather than overwriting
existing partial or complete copies of files.
If the partial contents differ from those being transferred,
then the resultant file is likely to be corrupt.
.It Fl B Ar buffer_size
Specify the size of the buffer that
.Nm
uses when transferring files.
Larger buffers require fewer round trips at the cost of higher
memory consumption.
The default is 32768 bytes.
.It Fl b Ar batchfile
Batch mode reads a series of commands from an input
.Ar batchfile
instead of
.Em stdin .
Since it lacks user interaction it should be used in conjunction with
non-interactive authentication to obviate the need to enter a password
at connection time (see
.Xr sshd 8
and
.Xr ssh-keygen 1
for details).
.Pp
A
.Ar batchfile
of
.Sq \-
may be used to indicate standard input.
.Nm
will abort if any of the following
commands fail:
.Ic get , put , reget , reput , rename , ln ,
.Ic rm , mkdir , chdir , ls ,
.Ic lchdir , chmod , chown ,
.Ic chgrp , lpwd , df , symlink ,
and
.Ic lmkdir .
.Pp
Termination on error can be suppressed on a command by command basis by
prefixing the command with a
.Sq \-
character (for example,
.Ic -rm /tmp/blah* ) .
Echo of the command may be suppressed by prefixing the command with a
.Sq @
character.
These two prefixes may be combined in any order, for example
.Ic -@ls /bsd .
.It Fl C
Enables compression (via ssh's
.Fl C
flag).
.It Fl c Ar cipher
Selects the cipher to use for encrypting the data transfers.
This option is directly passed to
.Xr ssh 1 .
.It Fl D Ar sftp_server_path
Connect directly to a local sftp server
(rather than via
.Xr ssh 1 ) .
This option may be useful in debugging the client and server.
.It Fl F Ar ssh_config
Specifies an alternative
per-user configuration file for
.Xr ssh 1 .
This option is directly passed to
.Xr ssh 1 .
.It Fl f
Requests that files be flushed to disk immediately after transfer.
When uploading files, this feature is only enabled if the server
implements the "fsync@openssh.com" extension.
.It Fl i Ar identity_file
Selects the file from which the identity (private key) for public key
authentication is read.
This option is directly passed to
.Xr ssh 1 .
.It Fl J Ar destination
Connect to the target host by first making an
.Nm
connection to the jump host described by
.Ar destination
and then establishing a TCP forwarding to the ultimate destination from
there.
Multiple jump hops may be specified separated by comma characters.
This is a shortcut to specify a
.Cm ProxyJump
configuration directive.
This option is directly passed to
.Xr ssh 1 .
.It Fl l Ar limit
Limits the used bandwidth, specified in Kbit/s.
.It Fl o Ar ssh_option
Can be used to pass options to
.Nm ssh
in the format used in
.Xr ssh_config 5 .
This is useful for specifying options
for which there is no separate
.Nm sftp
command-line flag.
For example, to specify an alternate port use:
.Ic sftp -oPort=24 .
For full details of the options listed below, and their possible values, see
.Xr ssh_config 5 .
.Pp
.Bl -tag -width Ds -offset indent -compact
.It AddressFamily
.It BatchMode
.It BindAddress
.It BindInterface
.It CanonicalDomains
.It CanonicalizeFallbackLocal
.It CanonicalizeHostname
.It CanonicalizeMaxDots
.It CanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs
.It CASignatureAlgorithms
.It CertificateFile
.It ChallengeResponseAuthentication
.It CheckHostIP
.It Ciphers
.It Compression
.It ConnectionAttempts
.It ConnectTimeout
.It ControlMaster
.It ControlPath
.It ControlPersist
.It GlobalKnownHostsFile
.It GSSAPIAuthentication
.It GSSAPIDelegateCredentials
.It HashKnownHosts
.It Host
.It HostbasedAuthentication
.It HostbasedKeyTypes
.It HostKeyAlgorithms
.It HostKeyAlias
.It Hostname
.It IdentitiesOnly
.It IdentityAgent
.It IdentityFile
.It IPQoS
.It KbdInteractiveAuthentication
.It KbdInteractiveDevices
.It KexAlgorithms
.It LogLevel
.It MACs
.It NoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost
.It NumberOfPasswordPrompts
.It PasswordAuthentication
.It PKCS11Provider
.It Port
.It PreferredAuthentications
.It ProxyCommand
.It ProxyJump
.It PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes
.It PubkeyAuthentication
.It RekeyLimit
.It SendEnv
.It ServerAliveInterval
.It ServerAliveCountMax
.It SetEnv
.It StrictHostKeyChecking
.It TCPKeepAlive
.It UpdateHostKeys
.It User
.It UserKnownHostsFile
.It VerifyHostKeyDNS
.El
.It Fl P Ar port
Specifies the port to connect to on the remote host.
.It Fl p
Preserves modification times, access times, and modes from the
original files transferred.
.It Fl q
Quiet mode: disables the progress meter as well as warning and
diagnostic messages from
.Xr ssh 1 .
.It Fl R Ar num_requests
Specify how many requests may be outstanding at any one time.
Increasing this may slightly improve file transfer speed
but will increase memory usage.
The default is 64 outstanding requests.
.It Fl r
Recursively copy entire directories when uploading and downloading.
Note that
.Nm
does not follow symbolic links encountered in the tree traversal.
.It Fl S Ar program
Name of the
.Ar program
to use for the encrypted connection.
The program must understand
.Xr ssh 1
options.
.It Fl s Ar subsystem | sftp_server
Specifies the SSH2 subsystem or the path for an sftp server
on the remote host.
A path is useful when the remote
.Xr sshd 8
does not have an sftp subsystem configured.
.It Fl v
Raise logging level.
This option is also passed to ssh.
.El
.Sh INTERACTIVE COMMANDS
Once in interactive mode,
.Nm
understands a set of commands similar to those of
.Xr ftp 1 .
Commands are case insensitive.
Pathnames that contain spaces must be enclosed in quotes.
Any special characters contained within pathnames that are recognized by
.Xr glob 3
must be escaped with backslashes
.Pq Sq \e .
.Bl -tag -width Ds
.It Ic bye
Quit
.Nm sftp .
.It Ic cd Op Ar path
Change remote directory to
.Ar path .
If
.Ar path
is not specified, then change directory to the one the session started in.
.It Xo Ic chgrp
.Op Fl h
.Ar grp
.Ar path
.Xc
Change group of file
.Ar path
to
.Ar grp .
If the
.Fl h
flag is specified, then symlinks will not be followed.
.Ar path
may contain
.Xr glob 7
characters and may match multiple files.
.Ar grp
must be a numeric GID.
.It Xo Ic chmod
.Op Fl h
.Ar mode
.Ar path
.Xc
Change permissions of file
.Ar path
to
.Ar mode .
If the
.Fl h
flag is specified, then symlinks will not be followed.
.Ar path
may contain
.Xr glob 7
characters and may match multiple files.
.It Xo Ic chown
.Op Fl h
.Ar own
.Ar path
.Xc
Change owner of file
.Ar path
to
.Ar own .
If the
.Fl h
flag is specified, then symlinks will not be followed.
.Ar path
may contain
.Xr glob 7
characters and may match multiple files.
.Ar own
must be a numeric UID.
.It Xo Ic df
.Op Fl hi
.Op Ar path
.Xc
Display usage information for the filesystem holding the current directory
(or
.Ar path
if specified).
If the
.Fl h
flag is specified, the capacity information will be displayed using
"human-readable" suffixes.
The
.Fl i
flag requests display of inode information in addition to capacity information.
This command is only supported on servers that implement the
.Dq statvfs@openssh.com
extension.
.It Ic exit
Quit
.Nm sftp .
.It Xo Ic get
.Op Fl afpR
.Ar remote-path
.Op Ar local-path
.Xc
Retrieve the
.Ar remote-path
and store it on the local machine.
If the local
path name is not specified, it is given the same name it has on the
remote machine.
.Ar remote-path
may contain
.Xr glob 7
characters and may match multiple files.
If it does and
.Ar local-path
is specified, then
.Ar local-path
must specify a directory.
.Pp
If the
.Fl a
flag is specified, then attempt to resume partial transfers of existing files.
Note that resumption assumes that any partial copy of the local file matches
the remote copy.
If the remote file contents differ from the partial local copy then the
resultant file is likely to be corrupt.
.Pp
If the
.Fl f
flag is specified, then
.Xr fsync 2
will be called after the file transfer has completed to flush the file
to disk.
.Pp
If the
.Fl p
.\" undocumented redundant alias
.\" or
.\" .Fl P
flag is specified, then full file permissions and access times are
copied too.
.Pp
If the
.Fl R
.\" undocumented redundant alias
.\" or
.\" .Fl r
flag is specified then directories will be copied recursively.
Note that
.Nm
does not follow symbolic links when performing recursive transfers.
.It Ic help
Display help text.
.It Ic lcd Op Ar path
Change local directory to
.Ar path .
If
.Ar path
is not specified, then change directory to the local user's home directory.
.It Ic lls Op Ar ls-options Op Ar path
Display local directory listing of either
.Ar path
or current directory if
.Ar path
is not specified.
.Ar ls-options
may contain any flags supported by the local system's
.Xr ls 1
command.
.Ar path
may contain
.Xr glob 7
characters and may match multiple files.
.It Ic lmkdir Ar path
Create local directory specified by
.Ar path .
.It Xo Ic ln
.Op Fl s
.Ar oldpath
.Ar newpath
.Xc
Create a link from
.Ar oldpath
to
.Ar newpath .
If the
.Fl s
flag is specified the created link is a symbolic link, otherwise it is
a hard link.
.It Ic lpwd
Print local working directory.
.It Xo Ic ls
.Op Fl 1afhlnrSt
.Op Ar path
.Xc
Display a remote directory listing of either
.Ar path
or the current directory if
.Ar path
is not specified.
.Ar path
may contain
.Xr glob 7
characters and may match multiple files.
.Pp
The following flags are recognized and alter the behaviour of
.Ic ls
accordingly:
.Bl -tag -width Ds
.It Fl 1
Produce single columnar output.
.It Fl a
List files beginning with a dot
.Pq Sq \&. .
.It Fl f
Do not sort the listing.
The default sort order is lexicographical.
.It Fl h
When used with a long format option, use unit suffixes: Byte, Kilobyte,
Megabyte, Gigabyte, Terabyte, Petabyte, and Exabyte in order to reduce
the number of digits to four or fewer using powers of 2 for sizes (K=1024,
M=1048576, etc.).
.It Fl l
Display additional details including permissions
and ownership information.
.It Fl n
Produce a long listing with user and group information presented
numerically.
.It Fl r
Reverse the sort order of the listing.
.It Fl S
Sort the listing by file size.
.It Fl t
Sort the listing by last modification time.
.El
.It Ic lumask Ar umask
Set local umask to
.Ar umask .
.It Ic mkdir Ar path
Create remote directory specified by
.Ar path .
.It Ic progress
Toggle display of progress meter.
.It Xo Ic put
.Op Fl afpR
.Ar local-path
.Op Ar remote-path
.Xc
Upload
.Ar local-path
and store it on the remote machine.
If the remote path name is not specified, it is given the same name it has
on the local machine.
.Ar local-path
may contain
.Xr glob 7
characters and may match multiple files.
If it does and
.Ar remote-path
is specified, then
.Ar remote-path
must specify a directory.
.Pp
If the
.Fl a
flag is specified, then attempt to resume partial
transfers of existing files.
Note that resumption assumes that any partial copy of the remote file
matches the local copy.
If the local file contents differ from the remote local copy then
the resultant file is likely to be corrupt.
.Pp
If the
.Fl f
flag is specified, then a request will be sent to the server to call
.Xr fsync 2
after the file has been transferred.
Note that this is only supported by servers that implement
the "fsync@openssh.com" extension.
.Pp
If the
.Fl p
.\" undocumented redundant alias
.\" or
.\" .Fl P
flag is specified, then full file permissions and access times are
copied too.
.Pp
If the
.Fl R
.\" undocumented redundant alias
.\" or
.\" .Fl r
flag is specified then directories will be copied recursively.
Note that
.Nm
does not follow symbolic links when performing recursive transfers.
.It Ic pwd
Display remote working directory.
.It Ic quit
Quit
.Nm sftp .
.It Xo Ic reget
.Op Fl fpR
.Ar remote-path
.Op Ar local-path
.Xc
Resume download of
.Ar remote-path .
Equivalent to
.Ic get
with the
.Fl a
flag set.
.It Xo Ic reput
.Op Fl fpR
.Ar local-path
.Op Ar remote-path
.Xc
Resume upload of
.Ar local-path .
Equivalent to
.Ic put
with the
.Fl a
flag set.
.It Ic rename Ar oldpath Ar newpath
Rename remote file from
.Ar oldpath
to
.Ar newpath .
.It Ic rm Ar path
Delete remote file specified by
.Ar path .
.It Ic rmdir Ar path
Remove remote directory specified by
.Ar path .
.It Ic symlink Ar oldpath Ar newpath
Create a symbolic link from
.Ar oldpath
to
.Ar newpath .
.It Ic version
Display the
.Nm
protocol version.
.It Ic \&! Ns Ar command
Execute
.Ar command
in local shell.
.It Ic \&!
Escape to local shell.
.It Ic \&?
Synonym for help.
.El
.Sh SEE ALSO
.Xr ftp 1 ,
.Xr ls 1 ,
.Xr scp 1 ,
.Xr ssh 1 ,
.Xr ssh-add 1 ,
.Xr ssh-keygen 1 ,
.Xr ssh_config 5 ,
.Xr glob 7 ,
.Xr sftp-server 8 ,
.Xr sshd 8
.Rs
.%A T. Ylonen
.%A S. Lehtinen
.%T "SSH File Transfer Protocol"
.%N draft-ietf-secsh-filexfer-00.txt
.%D January 2001
.%O work in progress material
.Re
diff --git a/sftp.c b/sftp.c
index b66037f165df..ff14d3c29985 100644
--- a/sftp.c
+++ b/sftp.c
@@ -1,2604 +1,2607 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: sftp.c,v 1.195 2019/10/02 00:42:30 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: sftp.c,v 1.197 2020/01/23 07:10:22 dtucker Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2001-2004 Damien Miller <djm@openbsd.org>
*
* Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
* copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
* WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
* ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
* WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
* ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
* OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/ioctl.h>
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H
# include <sys/stat.h>
#endif
#include <sys/param.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <sys/wait.h>
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STATVFS_H
#include <sys/statvfs.h>
#endif
#include <ctype.h>
#include <errno.h>
#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
# include <paths.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_LIBGEN_H
#include <libgen.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_LOCALE_H
# include <locale.h>
#endif
#ifdef USE_LIBEDIT
#include <histedit.h>
#else
typedef void EditLine;
#endif
#include <limits.h>
#include <signal.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#ifdef HAVE_UTIL_H
# include <util.h>
#endif
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "pathnames.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "utf8.h"
#include "sftp.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
#include "sshbuf.h"
#include "sftp-common.h"
#include "sftp-client.h"
#define DEFAULT_COPY_BUFLEN 32768 /* Size of buffer for up/download */
#define DEFAULT_NUM_REQUESTS 64 /* # concurrent outstanding requests */
/* File to read commands from */
FILE* infile;
/* Are we in batchfile mode? */
int batchmode = 0;
/* PID of ssh transport process */
static volatile pid_t sshpid = -1;
/* Suppress diagnositic messages */
int quiet = 0;
/* This is set to 0 if the progressmeter is not desired. */
int showprogress = 1;
/* When this option is set, we always recursively download/upload directories */
int global_rflag = 0;
/* When this option is set, we resume download or upload if possible */
int global_aflag = 0;
/* When this option is set, the file transfers will always preserve times */
int global_pflag = 0;
/* When this option is set, transfers will have fsync() called on each file */
int global_fflag = 0;
/* SIGINT received during command processing */
volatile sig_atomic_t interrupted = 0;
/* I wish qsort() took a separate ctx for the comparison function...*/
int sort_flag;
glob_t *sort_glob;
/* Context used for commandline completion */
struct complete_ctx {
struct sftp_conn *conn;
char **remote_pathp;
};
int remote_glob(struct sftp_conn *, const char *, int,
int (*)(const char *, int), glob_t *); /* proto for sftp-glob.c */
extern char *__progname;
/* Separators for interactive commands */
#define WHITESPACE " \t\r\n"
/* ls flags */
#define LS_LONG_VIEW 0x0001 /* Full view ala ls -l */
#define LS_SHORT_VIEW 0x0002 /* Single row view ala ls -1 */
#define LS_NUMERIC_VIEW 0x0004 /* Long view with numeric uid/gid */
#define LS_NAME_SORT 0x0008 /* Sort by name (default) */
#define LS_TIME_SORT 0x0010 /* Sort by mtime */
#define LS_SIZE_SORT 0x0020 /* Sort by file size */
#define LS_REVERSE_SORT 0x0040 /* Reverse sort order */
#define LS_SHOW_ALL 0x0080 /* Don't skip filenames starting with '.' */
#define LS_SI_UNITS 0x0100 /* Display sizes as K, M, G, etc. */
#define VIEW_FLAGS (LS_LONG_VIEW|LS_SHORT_VIEW|LS_NUMERIC_VIEW|LS_SI_UNITS)
#define SORT_FLAGS (LS_NAME_SORT|LS_TIME_SORT|LS_SIZE_SORT)
/* Commands for interactive mode */
enum sftp_command {
I_CHDIR = 1,
I_CHGRP,
I_CHMOD,
I_CHOWN,
I_DF,
I_GET,
I_HELP,
I_LCHDIR,
I_LINK,
I_LLS,
I_LMKDIR,
I_LPWD,
I_LS,
I_LUMASK,
I_MKDIR,
I_PUT,
I_PWD,
I_QUIT,
I_REGET,
I_RENAME,
I_REPUT,
I_RM,
I_RMDIR,
I_SHELL,
I_SYMLINK,
I_VERSION,
I_PROGRESS,
};
struct CMD {
const char *c;
const int n;
const int t;
};
/* Type of completion */
#define NOARGS 0
#define REMOTE 1
#define LOCAL 2
static const struct CMD cmds[] = {
{ "bye", I_QUIT, NOARGS },
{ "cd", I_CHDIR, REMOTE },
{ "chdir", I_CHDIR, REMOTE },
{ "chgrp", I_CHGRP, REMOTE },
{ "chmod", I_CHMOD, REMOTE },
{ "chown", I_CHOWN, REMOTE },
{ "df", I_DF, REMOTE },
{ "dir", I_LS, REMOTE },
{ "exit", I_QUIT, NOARGS },
{ "get", I_GET, REMOTE },
{ "help", I_HELP, NOARGS },
{ "lcd", I_LCHDIR, LOCAL },
{ "lchdir", I_LCHDIR, LOCAL },
{ "lls", I_LLS, LOCAL },
{ "lmkdir", I_LMKDIR, LOCAL },
{ "ln", I_LINK, REMOTE },
{ "lpwd", I_LPWD, LOCAL },
{ "ls", I_LS, REMOTE },
{ "lumask", I_LUMASK, NOARGS },
{ "mkdir", I_MKDIR, REMOTE },
{ "mget", I_GET, REMOTE },
{ "mput", I_PUT, LOCAL },
{ "progress", I_PROGRESS, NOARGS },
{ "put", I_PUT, LOCAL },
{ "pwd", I_PWD, REMOTE },
{ "quit", I_QUIT, NOARGS },
{ "reget", I_REGET, REMOTE },
{ "rename", I_RENAME, REMOTE },
{ "reput", I_REPUT, LOCAL },
{ "rm", I_RM, REMOTE },
{ "rmdir", I_RMDIR, REMOTE },
{ "symlink", I_SYMLINK, REMOTE },
{ "version", I_VERSION, NOARGS },
{ "!", I_SHELL, NOARGS },
{ "?", I_HELP, NOARGS },
{ NULL, -1, -1 }
};
/* ARGSUSED */
static void
killchild(int signo)
{
- if (sshpid > 1) {
- kill(sshpid, SIGTERM);
- waitpid(sshpid, NULL, 0);
+ pid_t pid;
+
+ pid = sshpid;
+ if (pid > 1) {
+ kill(pid, SIGTERM);
+ waitpid(pid, NULL, 0);
}
_exit(1);
}
/* ARGSUSED */
static void
suspchild(int signo)
{
if (sshpid > 1) {
kill(sshpid, signo);
while (waitpid(sshpid, NULL, WUNTRACED) == -1 && errno == EINTR)
continue;
}
kill(getpid(), SIGSTOP);
}
/* ARGSUSED */
static void
cmd_interrupt(int signo)
{
const char msg[] = "\rInterrupt \n";
int olderrno = errno;
(void)write(STDERR_FILENO, msg, sizeof(msg) - 1);
interrupted = 1;
errno = olderrno;
}
/*ARGSUSED*/
static void
sigchld_handler(int sig)
{
int save_errno = errno;
pid_t pid;
const char msg[] = "\rConnection closed. \n";
/* Report if ssh transport process dies. */
while ((pid = waitpid(sshpid, NULL, WNOHANG)) == -1 && errno == EINTR)
continue;
if (pid == sshpid) {
(void)write(STDERR_FILENO, msg, sizeof(msg) - 1);
sshpid = -1;
}
errno = save_errno;
}
static void
help(void)
{
printf("Available commands:\n"
"bye Quit sftp\n"
"cd path Change remote directory to 'path'\n"
"chgrp [-h] grp path Change group of file 'path' to 'grp'\n"
"chmod [-h] mode path Change permissions of file 'path' to 'mode'\n"
"chown [-h] own path Change owner of file 'path' to 'own'\n"
"df [-hi] [path] Display statistics for current directory or\n"
" filesystem containing 'path'\n"
"exit Quit sftp\n"
"get [-afpR] remote [local] Download file\n"
"help Display this help text\n"
"lcd path Change local directory to 'path'\n"
"lls [ls-options [path]] Display local directory listing\n"
"lmkdir path Create local directory\n"
"ln [-s] oldpath newpath Link remote file (-s for symlink)\n"
"lpwd Print local working directory\n"
"ls [-1afhlnrSt] [path] Display remote directory listing\n"
"lumask umask Set local umask to 'umask'\n"
"mkdir path Create remote directory\n"
"progress Toggle display of progress meter\n"
"put [-afpR] local [remote] Upload file\n"
"pwd Display remote working directory\n"
"quit Quit sftp\n"
"reget [-fpR] remote [local] Resume download file\n"
"rename oldpath newpath Rename remote file\n"
"reput [-fpR] local [remote] Resume upload file\n"
"rm path Delete remote file\n"
"rmdir path Remove remote directory\n"
"symlink oldpath newpath Symlink remote file\n"
"version Show SFTP version\n"
"!command Execute 'command' in local shell\n"
"! Escape to local shell\n"
"? Synonym for help\n");
}
static void
local_do_shell(const char *args)
{
int status;
char *shell;
pid_t pid;
if (!*args)
args = NULL;
if ((shell = getenv("SHELL")) == NULL || *shell == '\0')
shell = _PATH_BSHELL;
if ((pid = fork()) == -1)
fatal("Couldn't fork: %s", strerror(errno));
if (pid == 0) {
/* XXX: child has pipe fds to ssh subproc open - issue? */
if (args) {
debug3("Executing %s -c \"%s\"", shell, args);
execl(shell, shell, "-c", args, (char *)NULL);
} else {
debug3("Executing %s", shell);
execl(shell, shell, (char *)NULL);
}
fprintf(stderr, "Couldn't execute \"%s\": %s\n", shell,
strerror(errno));
_exit(1);
}
while (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) == -1)
if (errno != EINTR)
fatal("Couldn't wait for child: %s", strerror(errno));
if (!WIFEXITED(status))
error("Shell exited abnormally");
else if (WEXITSTATUS(status))
error("Shell exited with status %d", WEXITSTATUS(status));
}
static void
local_do_ls(const char *args)
{
if (!args || !*args)
local_do_shell(_PATH_LS);
else {
int len = strlen(_PATH_LS " ") + strlen(args) + 1;
char *buf = xmalloc(len);
/* XXX: quoting - rip quoting code from ftp? */
snprintf(buf, len, _PATH_LS " %s", args);
local_do_shell(buf);
free(buf);
}
}
/* Strip one path (usually the pwd) from the start of another */
static char *
path_strip(const char *path, const char *strip)
{
size_t len;
if (strip == NULL)
return (xstrdup(path));
len = strlen(strip);
if (strncmp(path, strip, len) == 0) {
if (strip[len - 1] != '/' && path[len] == '/')
len++;
return (xstrdup(path + len));
}
return (xstrdup(path));
}
static char *
make_absolute(char *p, const char *pwd)
{
char *abs_str;
/* Derelativise */
if (p && !path_absolute(p)) {
abs_str = path_append(pwd, p);
free(p);
return(abs_str);
} else
return(p);
}
static int
parse_getput_flags(const char *cmd, char **argv, int argc,
int *aflag, int *fflag, int *pflag, int *rflag)
{
extern int opterr, optind, optopt, optreset;
int ch;
optind = optreset = 1;
opterr = 0;
*aflag = *fflag = *rflag = *pflag = 0;
while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "afPpRr")) != -1) {
switch (ch) {
case 'a':
*aflag = 1;
break;
case 'f':
*fflag = 1;
break;
case 'p':
case 'P':
*pflag = 1;
break;
case 'r':
case 'R':
*rflag = 1;
break;
default:
error("%s: Invalid flag -%c", cmd, optopt);
return -1;
}
}
return optind;
}
static int
parse_link_flags(const char *cmd, char **argv, int argc, int *sflag)
{
extern int opterr, optind, optopt, optreset;
int ch;
optind = optreset = 1;
opterr = 0;
*sflag = 0;
while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "s")) != -1) {
switch (ch) {
case 's':
*sflag = 1;
break;
default:
error("%s: Invalid flag -%c", cmd, optopt);
return -1;
}
}
return optind;
}
static int
parse_rename_flags(const char *cmd, char **argv, int argc, int *lflag)
{
extern int opterr, optind, optopt, optreset;
int ch;
optind = optreset = 1;
opterr = 0;
*lflag = 0;
while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "l")) != -1) {
switch (ch) {
case 'l':
*lflag = 1;
break;
default:
error("%s: Invalid flag -%c", cmd, optopt);
return -1;
}
}
return optind;
}
static int
parse_ls_flags(char **argv, int argc, int *lflag)
{
extern int opterr, optind, optopt, optreset;
int ch;
optind = optreset = 1;
opterr = 0;
*lflag = LS_NAME_SORT;
while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "1Safhlnrt")) != -1) {
switch (ch) {
case '1':
*lflag &= ~VIEW_FLAGS;
*lflag |= LS_SHORT_VIEW;
break;
case 'S':
*lflag &= ~SORT_FLAGS;
*lflag |= LS_SIZE_SORT;
break;
case 'a':
*lflag |= LS_SHOW_ALL;
break;
case 'f':
*lflag &= ~SORT_FLAGS;
break;
case 'h':
*lflag |= LS_SI_UNITS;
break;
case 'l':
*lflag &= ~LS_SHORT_VIEW;
*lflag |= LS_LONG_VIEW;
break;
case 'n':
*lflag &= ~LS_SHORT_VIEW;
*lflag |= LS_NUMERIC_VIEW|LS_LONG_VIEW;
break;
case 'r':
*lflag |= LS_REVERSE_SORT;
break;
case 't':
*lflag &= ~SORT_FLAGS;
*lflag |= LS_TIME_SORT;
break;
default:
error("ls: Invalid flag -%c", optopt);
return -1;
}
}
return optind;
}
static int
parse_df_flags(const char *cmd, char **argv, int argc, int *hflag, int *iflag)
{
extern int opterr, optind, optopt, optreset;
int ch;
optind = optreset = 1;
opterr = 0;
*hflag = *iflag = 0;
while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "hi")) != -1) {
switch (ch) {
case 'h':
*hflag = 1;
break;
case 'i':
*iflag = 1;
break;
default:
error("%s: Invalid flag -%c", cmd, optopt);
return -1;
}
}
return optind;
}
static int
parse_ch_flags(const char *cmd, char **argv, int argc, int *hflag)
{
extern int opterr, optind, optopt, optreset;
int ch;
optind = optreset = 1;
opterr = 0;
*hflag = 0;
while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "h")) != -1) {
switch (ch) {
case 'h':
*hflag = 1;
break;
default:
error("%s: Invalid flag -%c", cmd, optopt);
return -1;
}
}
return optind;
}
static int
parse_no_flags(const char *cmd, char **argv, int argc)
{
extern int opterr, optind, optopt, optreset;
int ch;
optind = optreset = 1;
opterr = 0;
while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "")) != -1) {
switch (ch) {
default:
error("%s: Invalid flag -%c", cmd, optopt);
return -1;
}
}
return optind;
}
static int
is_dir(const char *path)
{
struct stat sb;
/* XXX: report errors? */
if (stat(path, &sb) == -1)
return(0);
return(S_ISDIR(sb.st_mode));
}
static int
remote_is_dir(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path)
{
Attrib *a;
/* XXX: report errors? */
if ((a = do_stat(conn, path, 1)) == NULL)
return(0);
if (!(a->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS))
return(0);
return(S_ISDIR(a->perm));
}
/* Check whether path returned from glob(..., GLOB_MARK, ...) is a directory */
static int
pathname_is_dir(const char *pathname)
{
size_t l = strlen(pathname);
return l > 0 && pathname[l - 1] == '/';
}
static int
process_get(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *src, const char *dst,
const char *pwd, int pflag, int rflag, int resume, int fflag)
{
char *abs_src = NULL;
char *abs_dst = NULL;
glob_t g;
char *filename, *tmp=NULL;
int i, r, err = 0;
abs_src = xstrdup(src);
abs_src = make_absolute(abs_src, pwd);
memset(&g, 0, sizeof(g));
debug3("Looking up %s", abs_src);
if ((r = remote_glob(conn, abs_src, GLOB_MARK, NULL, &g)) != 0) {
if (r == GLOB_NOSPACE) {
error("Too many matches for \"%s\".", abs_src);
} else {
error("File \"%s\" not found.", abs_src);
}
err = -1;
goto out;
}
/*
* If multiple matches then dst must be a directory or
* unspecified.
*/
if (g.gl_matchc > 1 && dst != NULL && !is_dir(dst)) {
error("Multiple source paths, but destination "
"\"%s\" is not a directory", dst);
err = -1;
goto out;
}
for (i = 0; g.gl_pathv[i] && !interrupted; i++) {
tmp = xstrdup(g.gl_pathv[i]);
if ((filename = basename(tmp)) == NULL) {
error("basename %s: %s", tmp, strerror(errno));
free(tmp);
err = -1;
goto out;
}
if (g.gl_matchc == 1 && dst) {
if (is_dir(dst)) {
abs_dst = path_append(dst, filename);
} else {
abs_dst = xstrdup(dst);
}
} else if (dst) {
abs_dst = path_append(dst, filename);
} else {
abs_dst = xstrdup(filename);
}
free(tmp);
resume |= global_aflag;
if (!quiet && resume)
mprintf("Resuming %s to %s\n",
g.gl_pathv[i], abs_dst);
else if (!quiet && !resume)
mprintf("Fetching %s to %s\n",
g.gl_pathv[i], abs_dst);
if (pathname_is_dir(g.gl_pathv[i]) && (rflag || global_rflag)) {
if (download_dir(conn, g.gl_pathv[i], abs_dst, NULL,
pflag || global_pflag, 1, resume,
fflag || global_fflag) == -1)
err = -1;
} else {
if (do_download(conn, g.gl_pathv[i], abs_dst, NULL,
pflag || global_pflag, resume,
fflag || global_fflag) == -1)
err = -1;
}
free(abs_dst);
abs_dst = NULL;
}
out:
free(abs_src);
globfree(&g);
return(err);
}
static int
process_put(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *src, const char *dst,
const char *pwd, int pflag, int rflag, int resume, int fflag)
{
char *tmp_dst = NULL;
char *abs_dst = NULL;
char *tmp = NULL, *filename = NULL;
glob_t g;
int err = 0;
int i, dst_is_dir = 1;
struct stat sb;
if (dst) {
tmp_dst = xstrdup(dst);
tmp_dst = make_absolute(tmp_dst, pwd);
}
memset(&g, 0, sizeof(g));
debug3("Looking up %s", src);
if (glob(src, GLOB_NOCHECK | GLOB_MARK, NULL, &g)) {
error("File \"%s\" not found.", src);
err = -1;
goto out;
}
/* If we aren't fetching to pwd then stash this status for later */
if (tmp_dst != NULL)
dst_is_dir = remote_is_dir(conn, tmp_dst);
/* If multiple matches, dst may be directory or unspecified */
if (g.gl_matchc > 1 && tmp_dst && !dst_is_dir) {
error("Multiple paths match, but destination "
"\"%s\" is not a directory", tmp_dst);
err = -1;
goto out;
}
for (i = 0; g.gl_pathv[i] && !interrupted; i++) {
if (stat(g.gl_pathv[i], &sb) == -1) {
err = -1;
error("stat %s: %s", g.gl_pathv[i], strerror(errno));
continue;
}
tmp = xstrdup(g.gl_pathv[i]);
if ((filename = basename(tmp)) == NULL) {
error("basename %s: %s", tmp, strerror(errno));
free(tmp);
err = -1;
goto out;
}
if (g.gl_matchc == 1 && tmp_dst) {
/* If directory specified, append filename */
if (dst_is_dir)
abs_dst = path_append(tmp_dst, filename);
else
abs_dst = xstrdup(tmp_dst);
} else if (tmp_dst) {
abs_dst = path_append(tmp_dst, filename);
} else {
abs_dst = make_absolute(xstrdup(filename), pwd);
}
free(tmp);
resume |= global_aflag;
if (!quiet && resume)
mprintf("Resuming upload of %s to %s\n",
g.gl_pathv[i], abs_dst);
else if (!quiet && !resume)
mprintf("Uploading %s to %s\n",
g.gl_pathv[i], abs_dst);
if (pathname_is_dir(g.gl_pathv[i]) && (rflag || global_rflag)) {
if (upload_dir(conn, g.gl_pathv[i], abs_dst,
pflag || global_pflag, 1, resume,
fflag || global_fflag) == -1)
err = -1;
} else {
if (do_upload(conn, g.gl_pathv[i], abs_dst,
pflag || global_pflag, resume,
fflag || global_fflag) == -1)
err = -1;
}
}
out:
free(abs_dst);
free(tmp_dst);
globfree(&g);
return(err);
}
static int
sdirent_comp(const void *aa, const void *bb)
{
SFTP_DIRENT *a = *(SFTP_DIRENT **)aa;
SFTP_DIRENT *b = *(SFTP_DIRENT **)bb;
int rmul = sort_flag & LS_REVERSE_SORT ? -1 : 1;
#define NCMP(a,b) (a == b ? 0 : (a < b ? 1 : -1))
if (sort_flag & LS_NAME_SORT)
return (rmul * strcmp(a->filename, b->filename));
else if (sort_flag & LS_TIME_SORT)
return (rmul * NCMP(a->a.mtime, b->a.mtime));
else if (sort_flag & LS_SIZE_SORT)
return (rmul * NCMP(a->a.size, b->a.size));
fatal("Unknown ls sort type");
}
/* sftp ls.1 replacement for directories */
static int
do_ls_dir(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path,
const char *strip_path, int lflag)
{
int n;
u_int c = 1, colspace = 0, columns = 1;
SFTP_DIRENT **d;
if ((n = do_readdir(conn, path, &d)) != 0)
return (n);
if (!(lflag & LS_SHORT_VIEW)) {
u_int m = 0, width = 80;
struct winsize ws;
char *tmp;
/* Count entries for sort and find longest filename */
for (n = 0; d[n] != NULL; n++) {
if (d[n]->filename[0] != '.' || (lflag & LS_SHOW_ALL))
m = MAXIMUM(m, strlen(d[n]->filename));
}
/* Add any subpath that also needs to be counted */
tmp = path_strip(path, strip_path);
m += strlen(tmp);
free(tmp);
if (ioctl(fileno(stdin), TIOCGWINSZ, &ws) != -1)
width = ws.ws_col;
columns = width / (m + 2);
columns = MAXIMUM(columns, 1);
colspace = width / columns;
colspace = MINIMUM(colspace, width);
}
if (lflag & SORT_FLAGS) {
for (n = 0; d[n] != NULL; n++)
; /* count entries */
sort_flag = lflag & (SORT_FLAGS|LS_REVERSE_SORT);
qsort(d, n, sizeof(*d), sdirent_comp);
}
for (n = 0; d[n] != NULL && !interrupted; n++) {
char *tmp, *fname;
if (d[n]->filename[0] == '.' && !(lflag & LS_SHOW_ALL))
continue;
tmp = path_append(path, d[n]->filename);
fname = path_strip(tmp, strip_path);
free(tmp);
if (lflag & LS_LONG_VIEW) {
if (lflag & (LS_NUMERIC_VIEW|LS_SI_UNITS)) {
char *lname;
struct stat sb;
memset(&sb, 0, sizeof(sb));
attrib_to_stat(&d[n]->a, &sb);
lname = ls_file(fname, &sb, 1,
(lflag & LS_SI_UNITS));
mprintf("%s\n", lname);
free(lname);
} else
mprintf("%s\n", d[n]->longname);
} else {
mprintf("%-*s", colspace, fname);
if (c >= columns) {
printf("\n");
c = 1;
} else
c++;
}
free(fname);
}
if (!(lflag & LS_LONG_VIEW) && (c != 1))
printf("\n");
free_sftp_dirents(d);
return (0);
}
static int
sglob_comp(const void *aa, const void *bb)
{
u_int a = *(const u_int *)aa;
u_int b = *(const u_int *)bb;
const char *ap = sort_glob->gl_pathv[a];
const char *bp = sort_glob->gl_pathv[b];
const struct stat *as = sort_glob->gl_statv[a];
const struct stat *bs = sort_glob->gl_statv[b];
int rmul = sort_flag & LS_REVERSE_SORT ? -1 : 1;
#define NCMP(a,b) (a == b ? 0 : (a < b ? 1 : -1))
if (sort_flag & LS_NAME_SORT)
return (rmul * strcmp(ap, bp));
else if (sort_flag & LS_TIME_SORT) {
#if defined(HAVE_STRUCT_STAT_ST_MTIM)
return (rmul * timespeccmp(&as->st_mtim, &bs->st_mtim, <));
#elif defined(HAVE_STRUCT_STAT_ST_MTIME)
return (rmul * NCMP(as->st_mtime, bs->st_mtime));
#else
return rmul * 1;
#endif
} else if (sort_flag & LS_SIZE_SORT)
return (rmul * NCMP(as->st_size, bs->st_size));
fatal("Unknown ls sort type");
}
/* sftp ls.1 replacement which handles path globs */
static int
do_globbed_ls(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path,
const char *strip_path, int lflag)
{
char *fname, *lname;
glob_t g;
int err, r;
struct winsize ws;
u_int i, j, nentries, *indices = NULL, c = 1;
u_int colspace = 0, columns = 1, m = 0, width = 80;
memset(&g, 0, sizeof(g));
if ((r = remote_glob(conn, path,
GLOB_MARK|GLOB_NOCHECK|GLOB_BRACE|GLOB_KEEPSTAT|GLOB_NOSORT,
NULL, &g)) != 0 ||
(g.gl_pathc && !g.gl_matchc)) {
if (g.gl_pathc)
globfree(&g);
if (r == GLOB_NOSPACE) {
error("Can't ls: Too many matches for \"%s\"", path);
} else {
error("Can't ls: \"%s\" not found", path);
}
return -1;
}
if (interrupted)
goto out;
/*
* If the glob returns a single match and it is a directory,
* then just list its contents.
*/
if (g.gl_matchc == 1 && g.gl_statv[0] != NULL &&
S_ISDIR(g.gl_statv[0]->st_mode)) {
err = do_ls_dir(conn, g.gl_pathv[0], strip_path, lflag);
globfree(&g);
return err;
}
if (ioctl(fileno(stdin), TIOCGWINSZ, &ws) != -1)
width = ws.ws_col;
if (!(lflag & LS_SHORT_VIEW)) {
/* Count entries for sort and find longest filename */
for (i = 0; g.gl_pathv[i]; i++)
m = MAXIMUM(m, strlen(g.gl_pathv[i]));
columns = width / (m + 2);
columns = MAXIMUM(columns, 1);
colspace = width / columns;
}
/*
* Sorting: rather than mess with the contents of glob_t, prepare
* an array of indices into it and sort that. For the usual
* unsorted case, the indices are just the identity 1=1, 2=2, etc.
*/
for (nentries = 0; g.gl_pathv[nentries] != NULL; nentries++)
; /* count entries */
indices = calloc(nentries, sizeof(*indices));
for (i = 0; i < nentries; i++)
indices[i] = i;
if (lflag & SORT_FLAGS) {
sort_glob = &g;
sort_flag = lflag & (SORT_FLAGS|LS_REVERSE_SORT);
qsort(indices, nentries, sizeof(*indices), sglob_comp);
sort_glob = NULL;
}
for (j = 0; j < nentries && !interrupted; j++) {
i = indices[j];
fname = path_strip(g.gl_pathv[i], strip_path);
if (lflag & LS_LONG_VIEW) {
if (g.gl_statv[i] == NULL) {
error("no stat information for %s", fname);
continue;
}
lname = ls_file(fname, g.gl_statv[i], 1,
(lflag & LS_SI_UNITS));
mprintf("%s\n", lname);
free(lname);
} else {
mprintf("%-*s", colspace, fname);
if (c >= columns) {
printf("\n");
c = 1;
} else
c++;
}
free(fname);
}
if (!(lflag & LS_LONG_VIEW) && (c != 1))
printf("\n");
out:
if (g.gl_pathc)
globfree(&g);
free(indices);
return 0;
}
static int
do_df(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *path, int hflag, int iflag)
{
struct sftp_statvfs st;
char s_used[FMT_SCALED_STRSIZE], s_avail[FMT_SCALED_STRSIZE];
char s_root[FMT_SCALED_STRSIZE], s_total[FMT_SCALED_STRSIZE];
char s_icapacity[16], s_dcapacity[16];
if (do_statvfs(conn, path, &st, 1) == -1)
return -1;
if (st.f_files == 0)
strlcpy(s_icapacity, "ERR", sizeof(s_icapacity));
else {
snprintf(s_icapacity, sizeof(s_icapacity), "%3llu%%",
(unsigned long long)(100 * (st.f_files - st.f_ffree) /
st.f_files));
}
if (st.f_blocks == 0)
strlcpy(s_dcapacity, "ERR", sizeof(s_dcapacity));
else {
snprintf(s_dcapacity, sizeof(s_dcapacity), "%3llu%%",
(unsigned long long)(100 * (st.f_blocks - st.f_bfree) /
st.f_blocks));
}
if (iflag) {
printf(" Inodes Used Avail "
"(root) %%Capacity\n");
printf("%11llu %11llu %11llu %11llu %s\n",
(unsigned long long)st.f_files,
(unsigned long long)(st.f_files - st.f_ffree),
(unsigned long long)st.f_favail,
(unsigned long long)st.f_ffree, s_icapacity);
} else if (hflag) {
strlcpy(s_used, "error", sizeof(s_used));
strlcpy(s_avail, "error", sizeof(s_avail));
strlcpy(s_root, "error", sizeof(s_root));
strlcpy(s_total, "error", sizeof(s_total));
fmt_scaled((st.f_blocks - st.f_bfree) * st.f_frsize, s_used);
fmt_scaled(st.f_bavail * st.f_frsize, s_avail);
fmt_scaled(st.f_bfree * st.f_frsize, s_root);
fmt_scaled(st.f_blocks * st.f_frsize, s_total);
printf(" Size Used Avail (root) %%Capacity\n");
printf("%7sB %7sB %7sB %7sB %s\n",
s_total, s_used, s_avail, s_root, s_dcapacity);
} else {
printf(" Size Used Avail "
"(root) %%Capacity\n");
printf("%12llu %12llu %12llu %12llu %s\n",
(unsigned long long)(st.f_frsize * st.f_blocks / 1024),
(unsigned long long)(st.f_frsize *
(st.f_blocks - st.f_bfree) / 1024),
(unsigned long long)(st.f_frsize * st.f_bavail / 1024),
(unsigned long long)(st.f_frsize * st.f_bfree / 1024),
s_dcapacity);
}
return 0;
}
/*
* Undo escaping of glob sequences in place. Used to undo extra escaping
* applied in makeargv() when the string is destined for a function that
* does not glob it.
*/
static void
undo_glob_escape(char *s)
{
size_t i, j;
for (i = j = 0;;) {
if (s[i] == '\0') {
s[j] = '\0';
return;
}
if (s[i] != '\\') {
s[j++] = s[i++];
continue;
}
/* s[i] == '\\' */
++i;
switch (s[i]) {
case '?':
case '[':
case '*':
case '\\':
s[j++] = s[i++];
break;
case '\0':
s[j++] = '\\';
s[j] = '\0';
return;
default:
s[j++] = '\\';
s[j++] = s[i++];
break;
}
}
}
/*
* Split a string into an argument vector using sh(1)-style quoting,
* comment and escaping rules, but with some tweaks to handle glob(3)
* wildcards.
* The "sloppy" flag allows for recovery from missing terminating quote, for
* use in parsing incomplete commandlines during tab autocompletion.
*
* Returns NULL on error or a NULL-terminated array of arguments.
*
* If "lastquote" is not NULL, the quoting character used for the last
* argument is placed in *lastquote ("\0", "'" or "\"").
*
* If "terminated" is not NULL, *terminated will be set to 1 when the
* last argument's quote has been properly terminated or 0 otherwise.
* This parameter is only of use if "sloppy" is set.
*/
#define MAXARGS 128
#define MAXARGLEN 8192
static char **
makeargv(const char *arg, int *argcp, int sloppy, char *lastquote,
u_int *terminated)
{
int argc, quot;
size_t i, j;
static char argvs[MAXARGLEN];
static char *argv[MAXARGS + 1];
enum { MA_START, MA_SQUOTE, MA_DQUOTE, MA_UNQUOTED } state, q;
*argcp = argc = 0;
if (strlen(arg) > sizeof(argvs) - 1) {
args_too_longs:
error("string too long");
return NULL;
}
if (terminated != NULL)
*terminated = 1;
if (lastquote != NULL)
*lastquote = '\0';
state = MA_START;
i = j = 0;
for (;;) {
if ((size_t)argc >= sizeof(argv) / sizeof(*argv)){
error("Too many arguments.");
return NULL;
}
if (isspace((unsigned char)arg[i])) {
if (state == MA_UNQUOTED) {
/* Terminate current argument */
argvs[j++] = '\0';
argc++;
state = MA_START;
} else if (state != MA_START)
argvs[j++] = arg[i];
} else if (arg[i] == '"' || arg[i] == '\'') {
q = arg[i] == '"' ? MA_DQUOTE : MA_SQUOTE;
if (state == MA_START) {
argv[argc] = argvs + j;
state = q;
if (lastquote != NULL)
*lastquote = arg[i];
} else if (state == MA_UNQUOTED)
state = q;
else if (state == q)
state = MA_UNQUOTED;
else
argvs[j++] = arg[i];
} else if (arg[i] == '\\') {
if (state == MA_SQUOTE || state == MA_DQUOTE) {
quot = state == MA_SQUOTE ? '\'' : '"';
/* Unescape quote we are in */
/* XXX support \n and friends? */
if (arg[i + 1] == quot) {
i++;
argvs[j++] = arg[i];
} else if (arg[i + 1] == '?' ||
arg[i + 1] == '[' || arg[i + 1] == '*') {
/*
* Special case for sftp: append
* double-escaped glob sequence -
* glob will undo one level of
* escaping. NB. string can grow here.
*/
if (j >= sizeof(argvs) - 5)
goto args_too_longs;
argvs[j++] = '\\';
argvs[j++] = arg[i++];
argvs[j++] = '\\';
argvs[j++] = arg[i];
} else {
argvs[j++] = arg[i++];
argvs[j++] = arg[i];
}
} else {
if (state == MA_START) {
argv[argc] = argvs + j;
state = MA_UNQUOTED;
if (lastquote != NULL)
*lastquote = '\0';
}
if (arg[i + 1] == '?' || arg[i + 1] == '[' ||
arg[i + 1] == '*' || arg[i + 1] == '\\') {
/*
* Special case for sftp: append
* escaped glob sequence -
* glob will undo one level of
* escaping.
*/
argvs[j++] = arg[i++];
argvs[j++] = arg[i];
} else {
/* Unescape everything */
/* XXX support \n and friends? */
i++;
argvs[j++] = arg[i];
}
}
} else if (arg[i] == '#') {
if (state == MA_SQUOTE || state == MA_DQUOTE)
argvs[j++] = arg[i];
else
goto string_done;
} else if (arg[i] == '\0') {
if (state == MA_SQUOTE || state == MA_DQUOTE) {
if (sloppy) {
state = MA_UNQUOTED;
if (terminated != NULL)
*terminated = 0;
goto string_done;
}
error("Unterminated quoted argument");
return NULL;
}
string_done:
if (state == MA_UNQUOTED) {
argvs[j++] = '\0';
argc++;
}
break;
} else {
if (state == MA_START) {
argv[argc] = argvs + j;
state = MA_UNQUOTED;
if (lastquote != NULL)
*lastquote = '\0';
}
if ((state == MA_SQUOTE || state == MA_DQUOTE) &&
(arg[i] == '?' || arg[i] == '[' || arg[i] == '*')) {
/*
* Special case for sftp: escape quoted
* glob(3) wildcards. NB. string can grow
* here.
*/
if (j >= sizeof(argvs) - 3)
goto args_too_longs;
argvs[j++] = '\\';
argvs[j++] = arg[i];
} else
argvs[j++] = arg[i];
}
i++;
}
*argcp = argc;
return argv;
}
static int
parse_args(const char **cpp, int *ignore_errors, int *disable_echo, int *aflag,
int *fflag, int *hflag, int *iflag, int *lflag, int *pflag,
int *rflag, int *sflag,
unsigned long *n_arg, char **path1, char **path2)
{
const char *cmd, *cp = *cpp;
char *cp2, **argv;
int base = 0;
long l;
int path1_mandatory = 0, i, cmdnum, optidx, argc;
/* Skip leading whitespace */
cp = cp + strspn(cp, WHITESPACE);
/*
* Check for leading '-' (disable error processing) and '@' (suppress
* command echo)
*/
*ignore_errors = 0;
*disable_echo = 0;
for (;*cp != '\0'; cp++) {
if (*cp == '-') {
*ignore_errors = 1;
} else if (*cp == '@') {
*disable_echo = 1;
} else {
/* all other characters terminate prefix processing */
break;
}
}
cp = cp + strspn(cp, WHITESPACE);
/* Ignore blank lines and lines which begin with comment '#' char */
if (*cp == '\0' || *cp == '#')
return (0);
if ((argv = makeargv(cp, &argc, 0, NULL, NULL)) == NULL)
return -1;
/* Figure out which command we have */
for (i = 0; cmds[i].c != NULL; i++) {
if (argv[0] != NULL && strcasecmp(cmds[i].c, argv[0]) == 0)
break;
}
cmdnum = cmds[i].n;
cmd = cmds[i].c;
/* Special case */
if (*cp == '!') {
cp++;
cmdnum = I_SHELL;
} else if (cmdnum == -1) {
error("Invalid command.");
return -1;
}
/* Get arguments and parse flags */
*aflag = *fflag = *hflag = *iflag = *lflag = *pflag = 0;
*rflag = *sflag = 0;
*path1 = *path2 = NULL;
optidx = 1;
switch (cmdnum) {
case I_GET:
case I_REGET:
case I_REPUT:
case I_PUT:
if ((optidx = parse_getput_flags(cmd, argv, argc,
aflag, fflag, pflag, rflag)) == -1)
return -1;
/* Get first pathname (mandatory) */
if (argc - optidx < 1) {
error("You must specify at least one path after a "
"%s command.", cmd);
return -1;
}
*path1 = xstrdup(argv[optidx]);
/* Get second pathname (optional) */
if (argc - optidx > 1) {
*path2 = xstrdup(argv[optidx + 1]);
/* Destination is not globbed */
undo_glob_escape(*path2);
}
break;
case I_LINK:
if ((optidx = parse_link_flags(cmd, argv, argc, sflag)) == -1)
return -1;
goto parse_two_paths;
case I_RENAME:
if ((optidx = parse_rename_flags(cmd, argv, argc, lflag)) == -1)
return -1;
goto parse_two_paths;
case I_SYMLINK:
if ((optidx = parse_no_flags(cmd, argv, argc)) == -1)
return -1;
parse_two_paths:
if (argc - optidx < 2) {
error("You must specify two paths after a %s "
"command.", cmd);
return -1;
}
*path1 = xstrdup(argv[optidx]);
*path2 = xstrdup(argv[optidx + 1]);
/* Paths are not globbed */
undo_glob_escape(*path1);
undo_glob_escape(*path2);
break;
case I_RM:
case I_MKDIR:
case I_RMDIR:
case I_LMKDIR:
path1_mandatory = 1;
/* FALLTHROUGH */
case I_CHDIR:
case I_LCHDIR:
if ((optidx = parse_no_flags(cmd, argv, argc)) == -1)
return -1;
/* Get pathname (mandatory) */
if (argc - optidx < 1) {
if (!path1_mandatory)
break; /* return a NULL path1 */
error("You must specify a path after a %s command.",
cmd);
return -1;
}
*path1 = xstrdup(argv[optidx]);
/* Only "rm" globs */
if (cmdnum != I_RM)
undo_glob_escape(*path1);
break;
case I_DF:
if ((optidx = parse_df_flags(cmd, argv, argc, hflag,
iflag)) == -1)
return -1;
/* Default to current directory if no path specified */
if (argc - optidx < 1)
*path1 = NULL;
else {
*path1 = xstrdup(argv[optidx]);
undo_glob_escape(*path1);
}
break;
case I_LS:
if ((optidx = parse_ls_flags(argv, argc, lflag)) == -1)
return(-1);
/* Path is optional */
if (argc - optidx > 0)
*path1 = xstrdup(argv[optidx]);
break;
case I_LLS:
/* Skip ls command and following whitespace */
cp = cp + strlen(cmd) + strspn(cp, WHITESPACE);
case I_SHELL:
/* Uses the rest of the line */
break;
case I_LUMASK:
case I_CHMOD:
base = 8;
/* FALLTHROUGH */
case I_CHOWN:
case I_CHGRP:
if ((optidx = parse_ch_flags(cmd, argv, argc, hflag)) == -1)
return -1;
/* Get numeric arg (mandatory) */
if (argc - optidx < 1)
goto need_num_arg;
errno = 0;
l = strtol(argv[optidx], &cp2, base);
if (cp2 == argv[optidx] || *cp2 != '\0' ||
((l == LONG_MIN || l == LONG_MAX) && errno == ERANGE) ||
l < 0) {
need_num_arg:
error("You must supply a numeric argument "
"to the %s command.", cmd);
return -1;
}
*n_arg = l;
if (cmdnum == I_LUMASK)
break;
/* Get pathname (mandatory) */
if (argc - optidx < 2) {
error("You must specify a path after a %s command.",
cmd);
return -1;
}
*path1 = xstrdup(argv[optidx + 1]);
break;
case I_QUIT:
case I_PWD:
case I_LPWD:
case I_HELP:
case I_VERSION:
case I_PROGRESS:
if ((optidx = parse_no_flags(cmd, argv, argc)) == -1)
return -1;
break;
default:
fatal("Command not implemented");
}
*cpp = cp;
return(cmdnum);
}
static int
parse_dispatch_command(struct sftp_conn *conn, const char *cmd, char **pwd,
const char *startdir, int err_abort, int echo_command)
{
const char *ocmd = cmd;
char *path1, *path2, *tmp;
int ignore_errors = 0, disable_echo = 1;
int aflag = 0, fflag = 0, hflag = 0, iflag = 0;
int lflag = 0, pflag = 0, rflag = 0, sflag = 0;
int cmdnum, i;
unsigned long n_arg = 0;
Attrib a, *aa;
char path_buf[PATH_MAX];
int err = 0;
glob_t g;
path1 = path2 = NULL;
cmdnum = parse_args(&cmd, &ignore_errors, &disable_echo, &aflag, &fflag,
&hflag, &iflag, &lflag, &pflag, &rflag, &sflag, &n_arg,
&path1, &path2);
if (ignore_errors != 0)
err_abort = 0;
if (echo_command && !disable_echo)
mprintf("sftp> %s\n", ocmd);
memset(&g, 0, sizeof(g));
/* Perform command */
switch (cmdnum) {
case 0:
/* Blank line */
break;
case -1:
/* Unrecognized command */
err = -1;
break;
case I_REGET:
aflag = 1;
/* FALLTHROUGH */
case I_GET:
err = process_get(conn, path1, path2, *pwd, pflag,
rflag, aflag, fflag);
break;
case I_REPUT:
aflag = 1;
/* FALLTHROUGH */
case I_PUT:
err = process_put(conn, path1, path2, *pwd, pflag,
rflag, aflag, fflag);
break;
case I_RENAME:
path1 = make_absolute(path1, *pwd);
path2 = make_absolute(path2, *pwd);
err = do_rename(conn, path1, path2, lflag);
break;
case I_SYMLINK:
sflag = 1;
/* FALLTHROUGH */
case I_LINK:
if (!sflag)
path1 = make_absolute(path1, *pwd);
path2 = make_absolute(path2, *pwd);
err = (sflag ? do_symlink : do_hardlink)(conn, path1, path2);
break;
case I_RM:
path1 = make_absolute(path1, *pwd);
remote_glob(conn, path1, GLOB_NOCHECK, NULL, &g);
for (i = 0; g.gl_pathv[i] && !interrupted; i++) {
if (!quiet)
mprintf("Removing %s\n", g.gl_pathv[i]);
err = do_rm(conn, g.gl_pathv[i]);
if (err != 0 && err_abort)
break;
}
break;
case I_MKDIR:
path1 = make_absolute(path1, *pwd);
attrib_clear(&a);
a.flags |= SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS;
a.perm = 0777;
err = do_mkdir(conn, path1, &a, 1);
break;
case I_RMDIR:
path1 = make_absolute(path1, *pwd);
err = do_rmdir(conn, path1);
break;
case I_CHDIR:
if (path1 == NULL || *path1 == '\0')
path1 = xstrdup(startdir);
path1 = make_absolute(path1, *pwd);
if ((tmp = do_realpath(conn, path1)) == NULL) {
err = 1;
break;
}
if ((aa = do_stat(conn, tmp, 0)) == NULL) {
free(tmp);
err = 1;
break;
}
if (!(aa->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS)) {
error("Can't change directory: Can't check target");
free(tmp);
err = 1;
break;
}
if (!S_ISDIR(aa->perm)) {
error("Can't change directory: \"%s\" is not "
"a directory", tmp);
free(tmp);
err = 1;
break;
}
free(*pwd);
*pwd = tmp;
break;
case I_LS:
if (!path1) {
do_ls_dir(conn, *pwd, *pwd, lflag);
break;
}
/* Strip pwd off beginning of non-absolute paths */
tmp = NULL;
if (!path_absolute(path1))
tmp = *pwd;
path1 = make_absolute(path1, *pwd);
err = do_globbed_ls(conn, path1, tmp, lflag);
break;
case I_DF:
/* Default to current directory if no path specified */
if (path1 == NULL)
path1 = xstrdup(*pwd);
path1 = make_absolute(path1, *pwd);
err = do_df(conn, path1, hflag, iflag);
break;
case I_LCHDIR:
if (path1 == NULL || *path1 == '\0')
path1 = xstrdup("~");
tmp = tilde_expand_filename(path1, getuid());
free(path1);
path1 = tmp;
if (chdir(path1) == -1) {
error("Couldn't change local directory to "
"\"%s\": %s", path1, strerror(errno));
err = 1;
}
break;
case I_LMKDIR:
if (mkdir(path1, 0777) == -1) {
error("Couldn't create local directory "
"\"%s\": %s", path1, strerror(errno));
err = 1;
}
break;
case I_LLS:
local_do_ls(cmd);
break;
case I_SHELL:
local_do_shell(cmd);
break;
case I_LUMASK:
umask(n_arg);
printf("Local umask: %03lo\n", n_arg);
break;
case I_CHMOD:
path1 = make_absolute(path1, *pwd);
attrib_clear(&a);
a.flags |= SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_PERMISSIONS;
a.perm = n_arg;
remote_glob(conn, path1, GLOB_NOCHECK, NULL, &g);
for (i = 0; g.gl_pathv[i] && !interrupted; i++) {
if (!quiet)
mprintf("Changing mode on %s\n",
g.gl_pathv[i]);
err = (hflag ? do_lsetstat : do_setstat)(conn,
g.gl_pathv[i], &a);
if (err != 0 && err_abort)
break;
}
break;
case I_CHOWN:
case I_CHGRP:
path1 = make_absolute(path1, *pwd);
remote_glob(conn, path1, GLOB_NOCHECK, NULL, &g);
for (i = 0; g.gl_pathv[i] && !interrupted; i++) {
if (!(aa = (hflag ? do_lstat : do_stat)(conn,
g.gl_pathv[i], 0))) {
if (err_abort) {
err = -1;
break;
} else
continue;
}
if (!(aa->flags & SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_UIDGID)) {
error("Can't get current ownership of "
"remote file \"%s\"", g.gl_pathv[i]);
if (err_abort) {
err = -1;
break;
} else
continue;
}
aa->flags &= SSH2_FILEXFER_ATTR_UIDGID;
if (cmdnum == I_CHOWN) {
if (!quiet)
mprintf("Changing owner on %s\n",
g.gl_pathv[i]);
aa->uid = n_arg;
} else {
if (!quiet)
mprintf("Changing group on %s\n",
g.gl_pathv[i]);
aa->gid = n_arg;
}
err = (hflag ? do_lsetstat : do_setstat)(conn,
g.gl_pathv[i], aa);
if (err != 0 && err_abort)
break;
}
break;
case I_PWD:
mprintf("Remote working directory: %s\n", *pwd);
break;
case I_LPWD:
if (!getcwd(path_buf, sizeof(path_buf))) {
error("Couldn't get local cwd: %s", strerror(errno));
err = -1;
break;
}
mprintf("Local working directory: %s\n", path_buf);
break;
case I_QUIT:
/* Processed below */
break;
case I_HELP:
help();
break;
case I_VERSION:
printf("SFTP protocol version %u\n", sftp_proto_version(conn));
break;
case I_PROGRESS:
showprogress = !showprogress;
if (showprogress)
printf("Progress meter enabled\n");
else
printf("Progress meter disabled\n");
break;
default:
fatal("%d is not implemented", cmdnum);
}
if (g.gl_pathc)
globfree(&g);
free(path1);
free(path2);
/* If an unignored error occurs in batch mode we should abort. */
if (err_abort && err != 0)
return (-1);
else if (cmdnum == I_QUIT)
return (1);
return (0);
}
#ifdef USE_LIBEDIT
static char *
prompt(EditLine *el)
{
return ("sftp> ");
}
/* Display entries in 'list' after skipping the first 'len' chars */
static void
complete_display(char **list, u_int len)
{
u_int y, m = 0, width = 80, columns = 1, colspace = 0, llen;
struct winsize ws;
char *tmp;
/* Count entries for sort and find longest */
for (y = 0; list[y]; y++)
m = MAXIMUM(m, strlen(list[y]));
if (ioctl(fileno(stdin), TIOCGWINSZ, &ws) != -1)
width = ws.ws_col;
m = m > len ? m - len : 0;
columns = width / (m + 2);
columns = MAXIMUM(columns, 1);
colspace = width / columns;
colspace = MINIMUM(colspace, width);
printf("\n");
m = 1;
for (y = 0; list[y]; y++) {
llen = strlen(list[y]);
tmp = llen > len ? list[y] + len : "";
mprintf("%-*s", colspace, tmp);
if (m >= columns) {
printf("\n");
m = 1;
} else
m++;
}
printf("\n");
}
/*
* Given a "list" of words that begin with a common prefix of "word",
* attempt to find an autocompletion to extends "word" by the next
* characters common to all entries in "list".
*/
static char *
complete_ambiguous(const char *word, char **list, size_t count)
{
if (word == NULL)
return NULL;
if (count > 0) {
u_int y, matchlen = strlen(list[0]);
/* Find length of common stem */
for (y = 1; list[y]; y++) {
u_int x;
for (x = 0; x < matchlen; x++)
if (list[0][x] != list[y][x])
break;
matchlen = x;
}
if (matchlen > strlen(word)) {
char *tmp = xstrdup(list[0]);
tmp[matchlen] = '\0';
return tmp;
}
}
return xstrdup(word);
}
/* Autocomplete a sftp command */
static int
complete_cmd_parse(EditLine *el, char *cmd, int lastarg, char quote,
int terminated)
{
u_int y, count = 0, cmdlen, tmplen;
char *tmp, **list, argterm[3];
const LineInfo *lf;
list = xcalloc((sizeof(cmds) / sizeof(*cmds)) + 1, sizeof(char *));
/* No command specified: display all available commands */
if (cmd == NULL) {
for (y = 0; cmds[y].c; y++)
list[count++] = xstrdup(cmds[y].c);
list[count] = NULL;
complete_display(list, 0);
for (y = 0; list[y] != NULL; y++)
free(list[y]);
free(list);
return count;
}
/* Prepare subset of commands that start with "cmd" */
cmdlen = strlen(cmd);
for (y = 0; cmds[y].c; y++) {
if (!strncasecmp(cmd, cmds[y].c, cmdlen))
list[count++] = xstrdup(cmds[y].c);
}
list[count] = NULL;
if (count == 0) {
free(list);
return 0;
}
/* Complete ambiguous command */
tmp = complete_ambiguous(cmd, list, count);
if (count > 1)
complete_display(list, 0);
for (y = 0; list[y]; y++)
free(list[y]);
free(list);
if (tmp != NULL) {
tmplen = strlen(tmp);
cmdlen = strlen(cmd);
/* If cmd may be extended then do so */
if (tmplen > cmdlen)
if (el_insertstr(el, tmp + cmdlen) == -1)
fatal("el_insertstr failed.");
lf = el_line(el);
/* Terminate argument cleanly */
if (count == 1) {
y = 0;
if (!terminated)
argterm[y++] = quote;
if (lastarg || *(lf->cursor) != ' ')
argterm[y++] = ' ';
argterm[y] = '\0';
if (y > 0 && el_insertstr(el, argterm) == -1)
fatal("el_insertstr failed.");
}
free(tmp);
}
return count;
}
/*
* Determine whether a particular sftp command's arguments (if any)
* represent local or remote files.
*/
static int
complete_is_remote(char *cmd) {
int i;
if (cmd == NULL)
return -1;
for (i = 0; cmds[i].c; i++) {
if (!strncasecmp(cmd, cmds[i].c, strlen(cmds[i].c)))
return cmds[i].t;
}
return -1;
}
/* Autocomplete a filename "file" */
static int
complete_match(EditLine *el, struct sftp_conn *conn, char *remote_path,
char *file, int remote, int lastarg, char quote, int terminated)
{
glob_t g;
char *tmp, *tmp2, ins[8];
u_int i, hadglob, pwdlen, len, tmplen, filelen, cesc, isesc, isabs;
int clen;
const LineInfo *lf;
/* Glob from "file" location */
if (file == NULL)
tmp = xstrdup("*");
else
xasprintf(&tmp, "%s*", file);
/* Check if the path is absolute. */
isabs = path_absolute(tmp);
memset(&g, 0, sizeof(g));
if (remote != LOCAL) {
tmp = make_absolute(tmp, remote_path);
remote_glob(conn, tmp, GLOB_DOOFFS|GLOB_MARK, NULL, &g);
} else
glob(tmp, GLOB_DOOFFS|GLOB_MARK, NULL, &g);
/* Determine length of pwd so we can trim completion display */
for (hadglob = tmplen = pwdlen = 0; tmp[tmplen] != 0; tmplen++) {
/* Terminate counting on first unescaped glob metacharacter */
if (tmp[tmplen] == '*' || tmp[tmplen] == '?') {
if (tmp[tmplen] != '*' || tmp[tmplen + 1] != '\0')
hadglob = 1;
break;
}
if (tmp[tmplen] == '\\' && tmp[tmplen + 1] != '\0')
tmplen++;
if (tmp[tmplen] == '/')
pwdlen = tmplen + 1; /* track last seen '/' */
}
free(tmp);
tmp = NULL;
if (g.gl_matchc == 0)
goto out;
if (g.gl_matchc > 1)
complete_display(g.gl_pathv, pwdlen);
/* Don't try to extend globs */
if (file == NULL || hadglob)
goto out;
tmp2 = complete_ambiguous(file, g.gl_pathv, g.gl_matchc);
tmp = path_strip(tmp2, isabs ? NULL : remote_path);
free(tmp2);
if (tmp == NULL)
goto out;
tmplen = strlen(tmp);
filelen = strlen(file);
/* Count the number of escaped characters in the input string. */
cesc = isesc = 0;
for (i = 0; i < filelen; i++) {
if (!isesc && file[i] == '\\' && i + 1 < filelen){
isesc = 1;
cesc++;
} else
isesc = 0;
}
if (tmplen > (filelen - cesc)) {
tmp2 = tmp + filelen - cesc;
len = strlen(tmp2);
/* quote argument on way out */
for (i = 0; i < len; i += clen) {
if ((clen = mblen(tmp2 + i, len - i)) < 0 ||
(size_t)clen > sizeof(ins) - 2)
fatal("invalid multibyte character");
ins[0] = '\\';
memcpy(ins + 1, tmp2 + i, clen);
ins[clen + 1] = '\0';
switch (tmp2[i]) {
case '\'':
case '"':
case '\\':
case '\t':
case '[':
case ' ':
case '#':
case '*':
if (quote == '\0' || tmp2[i] == quote) {
if (el_insertstr(el, ins) == -1)
fatal("el_insertstr "
"failed.");
break;
}
/* FALLTHROUGH */
default:
if (el_insertstr(el, ins + 1) == -1)
fatal("el_insertstr failed.");
break;
}
}
}
lf = el_line(el);
if (g.gl_matchc == 1) {
i = 0;
if (!terminated && quote != '\0')
ins[i++] = quote;
if (*(lf->cursor - 1) != '/' &&
(lastarg || *(lf->cursor) != ' '))
ins[i++] = ' ';
ins[i] = '\0';
if (i > 0 && el_insertstr(el, ins) == -1)
fatal("el_insertstr failed.");
}
free(tmp);
out:
globfree(&g);
return g.gl_matchc;
}
/* tab-completion hook function, called via libedit */
static unsigned char
complete(EditLine *el, int ch)
{
char **argv, *line, quote;
int argc, carg;
u_int cursor, len, terminated, ret = CC_ERROR;
const LineInfo *lf;
struct complete_ctx *complete_ctx;
lf = el_line(el);
if (el_get(el, EL_CLIENTDATA, (void**)&complete_ctx) != 0)
fatal("%s: el_get failed", __func__);
/* Figure out which argument the cursor points to */
cursor = lf->cursor - lf->buffer;
line = xmalloc(cursor + 1);
memcpy(line, lf->buffer, cursor);
line[cursor] = '\0';
argv = makeargv(line, &carg, 1, &quote, &terminated);
free(line);
/* Get all the arguments on the line */
len = lf->lastchar - lf->buffer;
line = xmalloc(len + 1);
memcpy(line, lf->buffer, len);
line[len] = '\0';
argv = makeargv(line, &argc, 1, NULL, NULL);
/* Ensure cursor is at EOL or a argument boundary */
if (line[cursor] != ' ' && line[cursor] != '\0' &&
line[cursor] != '\n') {
free(line);
return ret;
}
if (carg == 0) {
/* Show all available commands */
complete_cmd_parse(el, NULL, argc == carg, '\0', 1);
ret = CC_REDISPLAY;
} else if (carg == 1 && cursor > 0 && line[cursor - 1] != ' ') {
/* Handle the command parsing */
if (complete_cmd_parse(el, argv[0], argc == carg,
quote, terminated) != 0)
ret = CC_REDISPLAY;
} else if (carg >= 1) {
/* Handle file parsing */
int remote = complete_is_remote(argv[0]);
char *filematch = NULL;
if (carg > 1 && line[cursor-1] != ' ')
filematch = argv[carg - 1];
if (remote != 0 &&
complete_match(el, complete_ctx->conn,
*complete_ctx->remote_pathp, filematch,
remote, carg == argc, quote, terminated) != 0)
ret = CC_REDISPLAY;
}
free(line);
return ret;
}
#endif /* USE_LIBEDIT */
static int
interactive_loop(struct sftp_conn *conn, char *file1, char *file2)
{
char *remote_path;
char *dir = NULL, *startdir = NULL;
char cmd[2048];
int err, interactive;
EditLine *el = NULL;
#ifdef USE_LIBEDIT
History *hl = NULL;
HistEvent hev;
extern char *__progname;
struct complete_ctx complete_ctx;
if (!batchmode && isatty(STDIN_FILENO)) {
if ((el = el_init(__progname, stdin, stdout, stderr)) == NULL)
fatal("Couldn't initialise editline");
if ((hl = history_init()) == NULL)
fatal("Couldn't initialise editline history");
history(hl, &hev, H_SETSIZE, 100);
el_set(el, EL_HIST, history, hl);
el_set(el, EL_PROMPT, prompt);
el_set(el, EL_EDITOR, "emacs");
el_set(el, EL_TERMINAL, NULL);
el_set(el, EL_SIGNAL, 1);
el_source(el, NULL);
/* Tab Completion */
el_set(el, EL_ADDFN, "ftp-complete",
"Context sensitive argument completion", complete);
complete_ctx.conn = conn;
complete_ctx.remote_pathp = &remote_path;
el_set(el, EL_CLIENTDATA, (void*)&complete_ctx);
el_set(el, EL_BIND, "^I", "ftp-complete", NULL);
/* enable ctrl-left-arrow and ctrl-right-arrow */
el_set(el, EL_BIND, "\\e[1;5C", "em-next-word", NULL);
el_set(el, EL_BIND, "\\e\\e[C", "em-next-word", NULL);
el_set(el, EL_BIND, "\\e[1;5D", "ed-prev-word", NULL);
el_set(el, EL_BIND, "\\e\\e[D", "ed-prev-word", NULL);
/* make ^w match ksh behaviour */
el_set(el, EL_BIND, "^w", "ed-delete-prev-word", NULL);
}
#endif /* USE_LIBEDIT */
remote_path = do_realpath(conn, ".");
if (remote_path == NULL)
fatal("Need cwd");
startdir = xstrdup(remote_path);
if (file1 != NULL) {
dir = xstrdup(file1);
dir = make_absolute(dir, remote_path);
if (remote_is_dir(conn, dir) && file2 == NULL) {
if (!quiet)
mprintf("Changing to: %s\n", dir);
snprintf(cmd, sizeof cmd, "cd \"%s\"", dir);
if (parse_dispatch_command(conn, cmd,
&remote_path, startdir, 1, 0) != 0) {
free(dir);
free(startdir);
free(remote_path);
free(conn);
return (-1);
}
} else {
/* XXX this is wrong wrt quoting */
snprintf(cmd, sizeof cmd, "get%s %s%s%s",
global_aflag ? " -a" : "", dir,
file2 == NULL ? "" : " ",
file2 == NULL ? "" : file2);
err = parse_dispatch_command(conn, cmd,
&remote_path, startdir, 1, 0);
free(dir);
free(startdir);
free(remote_path);
free(conn);
return (err);
}
free(dir);
}
setvbuf(stdout, NULL, _IOLBF, 0);
setvbuf(infile, NULL, _IOLBF, 0);
interactive = !batchmode && isatty(STDIN_FILENO);
err = 0;
for (;;) {
- signal(SIGINT, SIG_IGN);
+ ssh_signal(SIGINT, SIG_IGN);
if (el == NULL) {
if (interactive)
printf("sftp> ");
if (fgets(cmd, sizeof(cmd), infile) == NULL) {
if (interactive)
printf("\n");
break;
}
} else {
#ifdef USE_LIBEDIT
const char *line;
int count = 0;
if ((line = el_gets(el, &count)) == NULL ||
count <= 0) {
printf("\n");
break;
}
history(hl, &hev, H_ENTER, line);
if (strlcpy(cmd, line, sizeof(cmd)) >= sizeof(cmd)) {
fprintf(stderr, "Error: input line too long\n");
continue;
}
#endif /* USE_LIBEDIT */
}
cmd[strcspn(cmd, "\n")] = '\0';
/* Handle user interrupts gracefully during commands */
interrupted = 0;
- signal(SIGINT, cmd_interrupt);
+ ssh_signal(SIGINT, cmd_interrupt);
err = parse_dispatch_command(conn, cmd, &remote_path,
startdir, batchmode, !interactive && el == NULL);
if (err != 0)
break;
}
- signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL);
+ ssh_signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL);
free(remote_path);
free(startdir);
free(conn);
#ifdef USE_LIBEDIT
if (el != NULL)
el_end(el);
#endif /* USE_LIBEDIT */
/* err == 1 signifies normal "quit" exit */
return (err >= 0 ? 0 : -1);
}
static void
connect_to_server(char *path, char **args, int *in, int *out)
{
int c_in, c_out;
#ifdef USE_PIPES
int pin[2], pout[2];
if ((pipe(pin) == -1) || (pipe(pout) == -1))
fatal("pipe: %s", strerror(errno));
*in = pin[0];
*out = pout[1];
c_in = pout[0];
c_out = pin[1];
#else /* USE_PIPES */
int inout[2];
if (socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0, inout) == -1)
fatal("socketpair: %s", strerror(errno));
*in = *out = inout[0];
c_in = c_out = inout[1];
#endif /* USE_PIPES */
if ((sshpid = fork()) == -1)
fatal("fork: %s", strerror(errno));
else if (sshpid == 0) {
if ((dup2(c_in, STDIN_FILENO) == -1) ||
(dup2(c_out, STDOUT_FILENO) == -1)) {
fprintf(stderr, "dup2: %s\n", strerror(errno));
_exit(1);
}
close(*in);
close(*out);
close(c_in);
close(c_out);
/*
* The underlying ssh is in the same process group, so we must
* ignore SIGINT if we want to gracefully abort commands,
* otherwise the signal will make it to the ssh process and
* kill it too. Contrawise, since sftp sends SIGTERMs to the
* underlying ssh, it must *not* ignore that signal.
*/
- signal(SIGINT, SIG_IGN);
- signal(SIGTERM, SIG_DFL);
+ ssh_signal(SIGINT, SIG_IGN);
+ ssh_signal(SIGTERM, SIG_DFL);
execvp(path, args);
fprintf(stderr, "exec: %s: %s\n", path, strerror(errno));
_exit(1);
}
- signal(SIGTERM, killchild);
- signal(SIGINT, killchild);
- signal(SIGHUP, killchild);
- signal(SIGTSTP, suspchild);
- signal(SIGTTIN, suspchild);
- signal(SIGTTOU, suspchild);
- signal(SIGCHLD, sigchld_handler);
+ ssh_signal(SIGTERM, killchild);
+ ssh_signal(SIGINT, killchild);
+ ssh_signal(SIGHUP, killchild);
+ ssh_signal(SIGTSTP, suspchild);
+ ssh_signal(SIGTTIN, suspchild);
+ ssh_signal(SIGTTOU, suspchild);
+ ssh_signal(SIGCHLD, sigchld_handler);
close(c_in);
close(c_out);
}
static void
usage(void)
{
extern char *__progname;
fprintf(stderr,
"usage: %s [-46aCfpqrv] [-B buffer_size] [-b batchfile] [-c cipher]\n"
" [-D sftp_server_path] [-F ssh_config] [-i identity_file]\n"
" [-J destination] [-l limit] [-o ssh_option] [-P port]\n"
" [-R num_requests] [-S program] [-s subsystem | sftp_server]\n"
" destination\n",
__progname);
exit(1);
}
int
main(int argc, char **argv)
{
int in, out, ch, err, tmp, port = -1;
char *host = NULL, *user, *cp, *file2 = NULL;
int debug_level = 0, sshver = 2;
char *file1 = NULL, *sftp_server = NULL;
char *ssh_program = _PATH_SSH_PROGRAM, *sftp_direct = NULL;
const char *errstr;
LogLevel ll = SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO;
arglist args;
extern int optind;
extern char *optarg;
struct sftp_conn *conn;
size_t copy_buffer_len = DEFAULT_COPY_BUFLEN;
size_t num_requests = DEFAULT_NUM_REQUESTS;
long long limit_kbps = 0;
/* Ensure that fds 0, 1 and 2 are open or directed to /dev/null */
sanitise_stdfd();
msetlocale();
seed_rng();
__progname = ssh_get_progname(argv[0]);
memset(&args, '\0', sizeof(args));
args.list = NULL;
addargs(&args, "%s", ssh_program);
addargs(&args, "-oForwardX11 no");
addargs(&args, "-oForwardAgent no");
addargs(&args, "-oPermitLocalCommand no");
addargs(&args, "-oClearAllForwardings yes");
ll = SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO;
infile = stdin;
while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv,
"1246afhpqrvCc:D:i:l:o:s:S:b:B:F:J:P:R:")) != -1) {
switch (ch) {
/* Passed through to ssh(1) */
case '4':
case '6':
case 'C':
addargs(&args, "-%c", ch);
break;
/* Passed through to ssh(1) with argument */
case 'F':
case 'J':
case 'c':
case 'i':
case 'o':
addargs(&args, "-%c", ch);
addargs(&args, "%s", optarg);
break;
case 'q':
ll = SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR;
quiet = 1;
showprogress = 0;
addargs(&args, "-%c", ch);
break;
case 'P':
port = a2port(optarg);
if (port <= 0)
fatal("Bad port \"%s\"\n", optarg);
break;
case 'v':
if (debug_level < 3) {
addargs(&args, "-v");
ll = SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1 + debug_level;
}
debug_level++;
break;
case '1':
sshver = 1;
if (sftp_server == NULL)
sftp_server = _PATH_SFTP_SERVER;
break;
case '2':
sshver = 2;
break;
case 'a':
global_aflag = 1;
break;
case 'B':
copy_buffer_len = strtol(optarg, &cp, 10);
if (copy_buffer_len == 0 || *cp != '\0')
fatal("Invalid buffer size \"%s\"", optarg);
break;
case 'b':
if (batchmode)
fatal("Batch file already specified.");
/* Allow "-" as stdin */
if (strcmp(optarg, "-") != 0 &&
(infile = fopen(optarg, "r")) == NULL)
fatal("%s (%s).", strerror(errno), optarg);
showprogress = 0;
quiet = batchmode = 1;
addargs(&args, "-obatchmode yes");
break;
case 'f':
global_fflag = 1;
break;
case 'p':
global_pflag = 1;
break;
case 'D':
sftp_direct = optarg;
break;
case 'l':
limit_kbps = strtonum(optarg, 1, 100 * 1024 * 1024,
&errstr);
if (errstr != NULL)
usage();
limit_kbps *= 1024; /* kbps */
break;
case 'r':
global_rflag = 1;
break;
case 'R':
num_requests = strtol(optarg, &cp, 10);
if (num_requests == 0 || *cp != '\0')
fatal("Invalid number of requests \"%s\"",
optarg);
break;
case 's':
sftp_server = optarg;
break;
case 'S':
ssh_program = optarg;
replacearg(&args, 0, "%s", ssh_program);
break;
case 'h':
default:
usage();
}
}
if (!isatty(STDERR_FILENO))
showprogress = 0;
log_init(argv[0], ll, SYSLOG_FACILITY_USER, 1);
if (sftp_direct == NULL) {
if (optind == argc || argc > (optind + 2))
usage();
argv += optind;
switch (parse_uri("sftp", *argv, &user, &host, &tmp, &file1)) {
case -1:
usage();
break;
case 0:
if (tmp != -1)
port = tmp;
break;
default:
/* Try with user, host and path. */
if (parse_user_host_path(*argv, &user, &host,
&file1) == 0)
break;
/* Try with user and host. */
if (parse_user_host_port(*argv, &user, &host, NULL)
== 0)
break;
/* Treat as a plain hostname. */
host = xstrdup(*argv);
host = cleanhostname(host);
break;
}
file2 = *(argv + 1);
if (!*host) {
fprintf(stderr, "Missing hostname\n");
usage();
}
if (port != -1)
addargs(&args, "-oPort %d", port);
if (user != NULL) {
addargs(&args, "-l");
addargs(&args, "%s", user);
}
addargs(&args, "-oProtocol %d", sshver);
/* no subsystem if the server-spec contains a '/' */
if (sftp_server == NULL || strchr(sftp_server, '/') == NULL)
addargs(&args, "-s");
addargs(&args, "--");
addargs(&args, "%s", host);
addargs(&args, "%s", (sftp_server != NULL ?
sftp_server : "sftp"));
connect_to_server(ssh_program, args.list, &in, &out);
} else {
args.list = NULL;
addargs(&args, "sftp-server");
connect_to_server(sftp_direct, args.list, &in, &out);
}
freeargs(&args);
conn = do_init(in, out, copy_buffer_len, num_requests, limit_kbps);
if (conn == NULL)
fatal("Couldn't initialise connection to server");
if (!quiet) {
if (sftp_direct == NULL)
fprintf(stderr, "Connected to %s.\n", host);
else
fprintf(stderr, "Attached to %s.\n", sftp_direct);
}
err = interactive_loop(conn, file1, file2);
#if !defined(USE_PIPES)
shutdown(in, SHUT_RDWR);
shutdown(out, SHUT_RDWR);
#endif
close(in);
close(out);
if (batchmode)
fclose(infile);
while (waitpid(sshpid, NULL, 0) == -1 && sshpid > 1)
if (errno != EINTR)
fatal("Couldn't wait for ssh process: %s",
strerror(errno));
exit(err == 0 ? 0 : 1);
}
diff --git a/sk-api.h b/sk-api.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..170fd4470b0f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/sk-api.h
@@ -0,0 +1,95 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: sk-api.h,v 1.8 2020/01/25 23:13:09 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2019 Google LLC
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#ifndef _SK_API_H
+#define _SK_API_H 1
+
+#include <stddef.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
+#include <stdint.h>
+#endif
+
+/* Flags */
+#define SSH_SK_USER_PRESENCE_REQD 0x01
+#define SSH_SK_USER_VERIFICATION_REQD 0x04
+#define SSH_SK_RESIDENT_KEY 0x20
+
+/* Algs */
+#define SSH_SK_ECDSA 0x00
+#define SSH_SK_ED25519 0x01
+
+/* Error codes */
+#define SSH_SK_ERR_GENERAL -1
+#define SSH_SK_ERR_UNSUPPORTED -2
+#define SSH_SK_ERR_PIN_REQUIRED -3
+#define SSH_SK_ERR_DEVICE_NOT_FOUND -4
+
+struct sk_enroll_response {
+ uint8_t *public_key;
+ size_t public_key_len;
+ uint8_t *key_handle;
+ size_t key_handle_len;
+ uint8_t *signature;
+ size_t signature_len;
+ uint8_t *attestation_cert;
+ size_t attestation_cert_len;
+};
+
+struct sk_sign_response {
+ uint8_t flags;
+ uint32_t counter;
+ uint8_t *sig_r;
+ size_t sig_r_len;
+ uint8_t *sig_s;
+ size_t sig_s_len;
+};
+
+struct sk_resident_key {
+ uint32_t alg;
+ size_t slot;
+ char *application;
+ struct sk_enroll_response key;
+};
+
+struct sk_option {
+ char *name;
+ char *value;
+ uint8_t required;
+};
+
+#define SSH_SK_VERSION_MAJOR 0x00040000 /* current API version */
+#define SSH_SK_VERSION_MAJOR_MASK 0xffff0000
+
+/* Return the version of the middleware API */
+uint32_t sk_api_version(void);
+
+/* Enroll a U2F key (private key generation) */
+int sk_enroll(uint32_t alg, const uint8_t *challenge, size_t challenge_len,
+ const char *application, uint8_t flags, const char *pin,
+ struct sk_option **options, struct sk_enroll_response **enroll_response);
+
+/* Sign a challenge */
+int sk_sign(uint32_t alg, const uint8_t *message, size_t message_len,
+ const char *application, const uint8_t *key_handle, size_t key_handle_len,
+ uint8_t flags, const char *pin, struct sk_option **options,
+ struct sk_sign_response **sign_response);
+
+/* Enumerate all resident keys */
+int sk_load_resident_keys(const char *pin, struct sk_option **options,
+ struct sk_resident_key ***rks, size_t *nrks);
+
+#endif /* _SK_API_H */
diff --git a/sk-usbhid.c b/sk-usbhid.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..ad83054ad164
--- /dev/null
+++ b/sk-usbhid.c
@@ -0,0 +1,1024 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2019 Markus Friedl
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#ifdef ENABLE_SK_INTERNAL
+
+#include <stdint.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stddef.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+#include <openssl/opensslv.h>
+#include <openssl/crypto.h>
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/ec.h>
+#include <openssl/ecdsa.h>
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+
+#include <fido.h>
+#include <fido/credman.h>
+
+#ifndef SK_STANDALONE
+# include "log.h"
+# include "xmalloc.h"
+/*
+ * If building as part of OpenSSH, then rename exported functions.
+ * This must be done before including sk-api.h.
+ */
+# define sk_api_version ssh_sk_api_version
+# define sk_enroll ssh_sk_enroll
+# define sk_sign ssh_sk_sign
+# define sk_load_resident_keys ssh_sk_load_resident_keys
+#endif /* !SK_STANDALONE */
+
+#include "sk-api.h"
+
+/* #define SK_DEBUG 1 */
+
+#define MAX_FIDO_DEVICES 256
+
+/* Compatibility with OpenSSH 1.0.x */
+#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L)
+#define ECDSA_SIG_get0(sig, pr, ps) \
+ do { \
+ (*pr) = sig->r; \
+ (*ps) = sig->s; \
+ } while (0)
+#endif
+
+/* Return the version of the middleware API */
+uint32_t sk_api_version(void);
+
+/* Enroll a U2F key (private key generation) */
+int sk_enroll(uint32_t alg, const uint8_t *challenge, size_t challenge_len,
+ const char *application, uint8_t flags, const char *pin,
+ struct sk_option **options, struct sk_enroll_response **enroll_response);
+
+/* Sign a challenge */
+int sk_sign(uint32_t alg, const uint8_t *message, size_t message_len,
+ const char *application, const uint8_t *key_handle, size_t key_handle_len,
+ uint8_t flags, const char *pin, struct sk_option **options,
+ struct sk_sign_response **sign_response);
+
+/* Load resident keys */
+int sk_load_resident_keys(const char *pin, struct sk_option **options,
+ struct sk_resident_key ***rks, size_t *nrks);
+
+static void skdebug(const char *func, const char *fmt, ...)
+ __attribute__((__format__ (printf, 2, 3)));
+
+static void
+skdebug(const char *func, const char *fmt, ...)
+{
+#if !defined(SK_STANDALONE)
+ char *msg;
+ va_list ap;
+
+ va_start(ap, fmt);
+ xvasprintf(&msg, fmt, ap);
+ va_end(ap);
+ debug("%s: %s", func, msg);
+ free(msg);
+#elif defined(SK_DEBUG)
+ va_list ap;
+
+ va_start(ap, fmt);
+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: ", func);
+ vfprintf(stderr, fmt, ap);
+ fputc('\n', stderr);
+ va_end(ap);
+#else
+ (void)func; /* XXX */
+ (void)fmt; /* XXX */
+#endif
+}
+
+uint32_t
+sk_api_version(void)
+{
+ return SSH_SK_VERSION_MAJOR;
+}
+
+/* Select the first identified FIDO device attached to the system */
+static char *
+pick_first_device(void)
+{
+ char *ret = NULL;
+ fido_dev_info_t *devlist = NULL;
+ size_t olen = 0;
+ int r;
+ const fido_dev_info_t *di;
+
+ if ((devlist = fido_dev_info_new(1)) == NULL) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "fido_dev_info_new failed");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((r = fido_dev_info_manifest(devlist, 1, &olen)) != FIDO_OK) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "fido_dev_info_manifest failed: %s",
+ fido_strerr(r));
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (olen != 1) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "fido_dev_info_manifest bad len %zu", olen);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ di = fido_dev_info_ptr(devlist, 0);
+ if ((ret = strdup(fido_dev_info_path(di))) == NULL) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "fido_dev_info_path failed");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ out:
+ fido_dev_info_free(&devlist, 1);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/* Check if the specified key handle exists on a given device. */
+static int
+try_device(fido_dev_t *dev, const uint8_t *message, size_t message_len,
+ const char *application, const uint8_t *key_handle, size_t key_handle_len)
+{
+ fido_assert_t *assert = NULL;
+ int r = FIDO_ERR_INTERNAL;
+
+ if ((assert = fido_assert_new()) == NULL) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "fido_assert_new failed");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((r = fido_assert_set_clientdata_hash(assert, message,
+ message_len)) != FIDO_OK) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "fido_assert_set_clientdata_hash: %s",
+ fido_strerr(r));
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((r = fido_assert_set_rp(assert, application)) != FIDO_OK) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "fido_assert_set_rp: %s", fido_strerr(r));
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((r = fido_assert_allow_cred(assert, key_handle,
+ key_handle_len)) != FIDO_OK) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "fido_assert_allow_cred: %s", fido_strerr(r));
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((r = fido_assert_set_up(assert, FIDO_OPT_FALSE)) != FIDO_OK) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "fido_assert_up: %s", fido_strerr(r));
+ goto out;
+ }
+ r = fido_dev_get_assert(dev, assert, NULL);
+ skdebug(__func__, "fido_dev_get_assert: %s", fido_strerr(r));
+ if (r == FIDO_ERR_USER_PRESENCE_REQUIRED) {
+ /* U2F tokens may return this */
+ r = FIDO_OK;
+ }
+ out:
+ fido_assert_free(&assert);
+
+ return r != FIDO_OK ? -1 : 0;
+}
+
+/* Iterate over configured devices looking for a specific key handle */
+static fido_dev_t *
+find_device(const char *path, const uint8_t *message, size_t message_len,
+ const char *application, const uint8_t *key_handle, size_t key_handle_len)
+{
+ fido_dev_info_t *devlist = NULL;
+ fido_dev_t *dev = NULL;
+ size_t devlist_len = 0, i;
+ int r;
+
+ if (path != NULL) {
+ if ((dev = fido_dev_new()) == NULL) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "fido_dev_new failed");
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ if ((r = fido_dev_open(dev, path)) != FIDO_OK) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "fido_dev_open failed");
+ fido_dev_free(&dev);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ return dev;
+ }
+
+ if ((devlist = fido_dev_info_new(MAX_FIDO_DEVICES)) == NULL) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "fido_dev_info_new failed");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((r = fido_dev_info_manifest(devlist, MAX_FIDO_DEVICES,
+ &devlist_len)) != FIDO_OK) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "fido_dev_info_manifest: %s", fido_strerr(r));
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ skdebug(__func__, "found %zu device(s)", devlist_len);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < devlist_len; i++) {
+ const fido_dev_info_t *di = fido_dev_info_ptr(devlist, i);
+
+ if (di == NULL) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "fido_dev_info_ptr %zu failed", i);
+ continue;
+ }
+ if ((path = fido_dev_info_path(di)) == NULL) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "fido_dev_info_path %zu failed", i);
+ continue;
+ }
+ skdebug(__func__, "trying device %zu: %s", i, path);
+ if ((dev = fido_dev_new()) == NULL) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "fido_dev_new failed");
+ continue;
+ }
+ if ((r = fido_dev_open(dev, path)) != FIDO_OK) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "fido_dev_open failed");
+ fido_dev_free(&dev);
+ continue;
+ }
+ if (try_device(dev, message, message_len, application,
+ key_handle, key_handle_len) == 0) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "found key");
+ break;
+ }
+ fido_dev_close(dev);
+ fido_dev_free(&dev);
+ }
+
+ out:
+ if (devlist != NULL)
+ fido_dev_info_free(&devlist, MAX_FIDO_DEVICES);
+
+ return dev;
+}
+
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+/*
+ * The key returned via fido_cred_pubkey_ptr() is in affine coordinates,
+ * but the API expects a SEC1 octet string.
+ */
+static int
+pack_public_key_ecdsa(const fido_cred_t *cred,
+ struct sk_enroll_response *response)
+{
+ const uint8_t *ptr;
+ BIGNUM *x = NULL, *y = NULL;
+ EC_POINT *q = NULL;
+ EC_GROUP *g = NULL;
+ int ret = -1;
+
+ response->public_key = NULL;
+ response->public_key_len = 0;
+
+ if ((x = BN_new()) == NULL ||
+ (y = BN_new()) == NULL ||
+ (g = EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(NID_X9_62_prime256v1)) == NULL ||
+ (q = EC_POINT_new(g)) == NULL) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "libcrypto setup failed");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((ptr = fido_cred_pubkey_ptr(cred)) == NULL) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "fido_cred_pubkey_ptr failed");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (fido_cred_pubkey_len(cred) != 64) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "bad fido_cred_pubkey_len %zu",
+ fido_cred_pubkey_len(cred));
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (BN_bin2bn(ptr, 32, x) == NULL ||
+ BN_bin2bn(ptr + 32, 32, y) == NULL) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "BN_bin2bn failed");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp(g, q, x, y, NULL) != 1) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp failed");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ response->public_key_len = EC_POINT_point2oct(g, q,
+ POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, NULL, 0, NULL);
+ if (response->public_key_len == 0 || response->public_key_len > 2048) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "bad pubkey length %zu",
+ response->public_key_len);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((response->public_key = malloc(response->public_key_len)) == NULL) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "malloc pubkey failed");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (EC_POINT_point2oct(g, q, POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
+ response->public_key, response->public_key_len, NULL) == 0) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "EC_POINT_point2oct failed");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ /* success */
+ ret = 0;
+ out:
+ if (ret != 0 && response->public_key != NULL) {
+ memset(response->public_key, 0, response->public_key_len);
+ free(response->public_key);
+ response->public_key = NULL;
+ }
+ EC_POINT_free(q);
+ EC_GROUP_free(g);
+ BN_clear_free(x);
+ BN_clear_free(y);
+ return ret;
+}
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+
+static int
+pack_public_key_ed25519(const fido_cred_t *cred,
+ struct sk_enroll_response *response)
+{
+ const uint8_t *ptr;
+ size_t len;
+ int ret = -1;
+
+ response->public_key = NULL;
+ response->public_key_len = 0;
+
+ if ((len = fido_cred_pubkey_len(cred)) != 32) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "bad fido_cred_pubkey_len len %zu", len);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((ptr = fido_cred_pubkey_ptr(cred)) == NULL) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "fido_cred_pubkey_ptr failed");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ response->public_key_len = len;
+ if ((response->public_key = malloc(response->public_key_len)) == NULL) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "malloc pubkey failed");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ memcpy(response->public_key, ptr, len);
+ ret = 0;
+ out:
+ if (ret != 0)
+ free(response->public_key);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int
+pack_public_key(uint32_t alg, const fido_cred_t *cred,
+ struct sk_enroll_response *response)
+{
+ switch(alg) {
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+ case SSH_SK_ECDSA:
+ return pack_public_key_ecdsa(cred, response);
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+ case SSH_SK_ED25519:
+ return pack_public_key_ed25519(cred, response);
+ default:
+ return -1;
+ }
+}
+
+static int
+fidoerr_to_skerr(int fidoerr)
+{
+ switch (fidoerr) {
+ case FIDO_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_OPTION:
+ case FIDO_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHM:
+ return SSH_SK_ERR_UNSUPPORTED;
+ case FIDO_ERR_PIN_REQUIRED:
+ case FIDO_ERR_PIN_INVALID:
+ return SSH_SK_ERR_PIN_REQUIRED;
+ default:
+ return -1;
+ }
+}
+
+static int
+check_enroll_options(struct sk_option **options, char **devicep,
+ uint8_t *user_id, size_t user_id_len)
+{
+ size_t i;
+
+ if (options == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ for (i = 0; options[i] != NULL; i++) {
+ if (strcmp(options[i]->name, "device") == 0) {
+ if ((*devicep = strdup(options[i]->value)) == NULL) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "strdup device failed");
+ return -1;
+ }
+ skdebug(__func__, "requested device %s", *devicep);
+ } else if (strcmp(options[i]->name, "user") == 0) {
+ if (strlcpy(user_id, options[i]->value, user_id_len) >=
+ user_id_len) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "user too long");
+ return -1;
+ }
+ skdebug(__func__, "requested user %s",
+ (char *)user_id);
+ } else {
+ skdebug(__func__, "requested unsupported option %s",
+ options[i]->name);
+ if (options[i]->required) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "unknown required option");
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int
+sk_enroll(uint32_t alg, const uint8_t *challenge, size_t challenge_len,
+ const char *application, uint8_t flags, const char *pin,
+ struct sk_option **options, struct sk_enroll_response **enroll_response)
+{
+ fido_cred_t *cred = NULL;
+ fido_dev_t *dev = NULL;
+ const uint8_t *ptr;
+ uint8_t user_id[32];
+ struct sk_enroll_response *response = NULL;
+ size_t len;
+ int cose_alg;
+ int ret = SSH_SK_ERR_GENERAL;
+ int r;
+ char *device = NULL;
+
+#ifdef SK_DEBUG
+ fido_init(FIDO_DEBUG);
+#endif
+ if (enroll_response == NULL) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "enroll_response == NULL");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ memset(user_id, 0, sizeof(user_id));
+ if (check_enroll_options(options, &device,
+ user_id, sizeof(user_id)) != 0)
+ goto out; /* error already logged */
+
+ *enroll_response = NULL;
+ switch(alg) {
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+ case SSH_SK_ECDSA:
+ cose_alg = COSE_ES256;
+ break;
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+ case SSH_SK_ED25519:
+ cose_alg = COSE_EDDSA;
+ break;
+ default:
+ skdebug(__func__, "unsupported key type %d", alg);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (device == NULL && (device = pick_first_device()) == NULL) {
+ ret = SSH_SK_ERR_DEVICE_NOT_FOUND;
+ skdebug(__func__, "pick_first_device failed");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ skdebug(__func__, "using device %s", device);
+ if ((cred = fido_cred_new()) == NULL) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "fido_cred_new failed");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((r = fido_cred_set_type(cred, cose_alg)) != FIDO_OK) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "fido_cred_set_type: %s", fido_strerr(r));
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((r = fido_cred_set_clientdata_hash(cred, challenge,
+ challenge_len)) != FIDO_OK) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "fido_cred_set_clientdata_hash: %s",
+ fido_strerr(r));
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((r = fido_cred_set_rk(cred, (flags & SSH_SK_RESIDENT_KEY) != 0 ?
+ FIDO_OPT_TRUE : FIDO_OPT_OMIT)) != FIDO_OK) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "fido_cred_set_rk: %s", fido_strerr(r));
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((r = fido_cred_set_user(cred, user_id, sizeof(user_id),
+ "openssh", "openssh", NULL)) != FIDO_OK) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "fido_cred_set_user: %s", fido_strerr(r));
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((r = fido_cred_set_rp(cred, application, NULL)) != FIDO_OK) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "fido_cred_set_rp: %s", fido_strerr(r));
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((dev = fido_dev_new()) == NULL) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "fido_dev_new failed");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((r = fido_dev_open(dev, device)) != FIDO_OK) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "fido_dev_open: %s", fido_strerr(r));
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((r = fido_dev_make_cred(dev, cred, pin)) != FIDO_OK) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "fido_dev_make_cred: %s", fido_strerr(r));
+ ret = fidoerr_to_skerr(r);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (fido_cred_x5c_ptr(cred) != NULL) {
+ if ((r = fido_cred_verify(cred)) != FIDO_OK) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "fido_cred_verify: %s",
+ fido_strerr(r));
+ goto out;
+ }
+ } else {
+ skdebug(__func__, "self-attested credential");
+ if ((r = fido_cred_verify_self(cred)) != FIDO_OK) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "fido_cred_verify_self: %s",
+ fido_strerr(r));
+ goto out;
+ }
+ }
+ if ((response = calloc(1, sizeof(*response))) == NULL) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "calloc response failed");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (pack_public_key(alg, cred, response) != 0) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "pack_public_key failed");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((ptr = fido_cred_id_ptr(cred)) != NULL) {
+ len = fido_cred_id_len(cred);
+ if ((response->key_handle = calloc(1, len)) == NULL) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "calloc key handle failed");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ memcpy(response->key_handle, ptr, len);
+ response->key_handle_len = len;
+ }
+ if ((ptr = fido_cred_sig_ptr(cred)) != NULL) {
+ len = fido_cred_sig_len(cred);
+ if ((response->signature = calloc(1, len)) == NULL) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "calloc signature failed");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ memcpy(response->signature, ptr, len);
+ response->signature_len = len;
+ }
+ if ((ptr = fido_cred_x5c_ptr(cred)) != NULL) {
+ len = fido_cred_x5c_len(cred);
+ debug3("%s: attestation cert len=%zu", __func__, len);
+ if ((response->attestation_cert = calloc(1, len)) == NULL) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "calloc attestation cert failed");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ memcpy(response->attestation_cert, ptr, len);
+ response->attestation_cert_len = len;
+ }
+ *enroll_response = response;
+ response = NULL;
+ ret = 0;
+ out:
+ free(device);
+ if (response != NULL) {
+ free(response->public_key);
+ free(response->key_handle);
+ free(response->signature);
+ free(response->attestation_cert);
+ free(response);
+ }
+ if (dev != NULL) {
+ fido_dev_close(dev);
+ fido_dev_free(&dev);
+ }
+ if (cred != NULL) {
+ fido_cred_free(&cred);
+ }
+ return ret;
+}
+
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+static int
+pack_sig_ecdsa(fido_assert_t *assert, struct sk_sign_response *response)
+{
+ ECDSA_SIG *sig = NULL;
+ const BIGNUM *sig_r, *sig_s;
+ const unsigned char *cp;
+ size_t sig_len;
+ int ret = -1;
+
+ cp = fido_assert_sig_ptr(assert, 0);
+ sig_len = fido_assert_sig_len(assert, 0);
+ if ((sig = d2i_ECDSA_SIG(NULL, &cp, sig_len)) == NULL) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "d2i_ECDSA_SIG failed");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ ECDSA_SIG_get0(sig, &sig_r, &sig_s);
+ response->sig_r_len = BN_num_bytes(sig_r);
+ response->sig_s_len = BN_num_bytes(sig_s);
+ if ((response->sig_r = calloc(1, response->sig_r_len)) == NULL ||
+ (response->sig_s = calloc(1, response->sig_s_len)) == NULL) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "calloc signature failed");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ BN_bn2bin(sig_r, response->sig_r);
+ BN_bn2bin(sig_s, response->sig_s);
+ ret = 0;
+ out:
+ ECDSA_SIG_free(sig);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ free(response->sig_r);
+ free(response->sig_s);
+ response->sig_r = NULL;
+ response->sig_s = NULL;
+ }
+ return ret;
+}
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+
+static int
+pack_sig_ed25519(fido_assert_t *assert, struct sk_sign_response *response)
+{
+ const unsigned char *ptr;
+ size_t len;
+ int ret = -1;
+
+ ptr = fido_assert_sig_ptr(assert, 0);
+ len = fido_assert_sig_len(assert, 0);
+ if (len != 64) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "bad length %zu", len);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ response->sig_r_len = len;
+ if ((response->sig_r = calloc(1, response->sig_r_len)) == NULL) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "calloc signature failed");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ memcpy(response->sig_r, ptr, len);
+ ret = 0;
+ out:
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ free(response->sig_r);
+ response->sig_r = NULL;
+ }
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int
+pack_sig(uint32_t alg, fido_assert_t *assert,
+ struct sk_sign_response *response)
+{
+ switch(alg) {
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+ case SSH_SK_ECDSA:
+ return pack_sig_ecdsa(assert, response);
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+ case SSH_SK_ED25519:
+ return pack_sig_ed25519(assert, response);
+ default:
+ return -1;
+ }
+}
+
+/* Checks sk_options for sk_sign() and sk_load_resident_keys() */
+static int
+check_sign_load_resident_options(struct sk_option **options, char **devicep)
+{
+ size_t i;
+
+ if (options == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ for (i = 0; options[i] != NULL; i++) {
+ if (strcmp(options[i]->name, "device") == 0) {
+ if ((*devicep = strdup(options[i]->value)) == NULL) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "strdup device failed");
+ return -1;
+ }
+ skdebug(__func__, "requested device %s", *devicep);
+ } else {
+ skdebug(__func__, "requested unsupported option %s",
+ options[i]->name);
+ if (options[i]->required) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "unknown required option");
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int
+sk_sign(uint32_t alg, const uint8_t *message, size_t message_len,
+ const char *application,
+ const uint8_t *key_handle, size_t key_handle_len,
+ uint8_t flags, const char *pin, struct sk_option **options,
+ struct sk_sign_response **sign_response)
+{
+ fido_assert_t *assert = NULL;
+ char *device = NULL;
+ fido_dev_t *dev = NULL;
+ struct sk_sign_response *response = NULL;
+ int ret = SSH_SK_ERR_GENERAL;
+ int r;
+
+#ifdef SK_DEBUG
+ fido_init(FIDO_DEBUG);
+#endif
+
+ if (sign_response == NULL) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "sign_response == NULL");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ *sign_response = NULL;
+ if (check_sign_load_resident_options(options, &device) != 0)
+ goto out; /* error already logged */
+ if ((dev = find_device(device, message, message_len,
+ application, key_handle, key_handle_len)) == NULL) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "couldn't find device for key handle");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((assert = fido_assert_new()) == NULL) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "fido_assert_new failed");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((r = fido_assert_set_clientdata_hash(assert, message,
+ message_len)) != FIDO_OK) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "fido_assert_set_clientdata_hash: %s",
+ fido_strerr(r));
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((r = fido_assert_set_rp(assert, application)) != FIDO_OK) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "fido_assert_set_rp: %s", fido_strerr(r));
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((r = fido_assert_allow_cred(assert, key_handle,
+ key_handle_len)) != FIDO_OK) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "fido_assert_allow_cred: %s", fido_strerr(r));
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((r = fido_assert_set_up(assert,
+ (flags & SSH_SK_USER_PRESENCE_REQD) ?
+ FIDO_OPT_TRUE : FIDO_OPT_FALSE)) != FIDO_OK) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "fido_assert_set_up: %s", fido_strerr(r));
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((r = fido_dev_get_assert(dev, assert, NULL)) != FIDO_OK) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "fido_dev_get_assert: %s", fido_strerr(r));
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((response = calloc(1, sizeof(*response))) == NULL) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "calloc response failed");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ response->flags = fido_assert_flags(assert, 0);
+ response->counter = fido_assert_sigcount(assert, 0);
+ if (pack_sig(alg, assert, response) != 0) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "pack_sig failed");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ *sign_response = response;
+ response = NULL;
+ ret = 0;
+ out:
+ free(device);
+ if (response != NULL) {
+ free(response->sig_r);
+ free(response->sig_s);
+ free(response);
+ }
+ if (dev != NULL) {
+ fido_dev_close(dev);
+ fido_dev_free(&dev);
+ }
+ if (assert != NULL) {
+ fido_assert_free(&assert);
+ }
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int
+read_rks(const char *devpath, const char *pin,
+ struct sk_resident_key ***rksp, size_t *nrksp)
+{
+ int ret = SSH_SK_ERR_GENERAL, r = -1;
+ fido_dev_t *dev = NULL;
+ fido_credman_metadata_t *metadata = NULL;
+ fido_credman_rp_t *rp = NULL;
+ fido_credman_rk_t *rk = NULL;
+ size_t i, j, nrp, nrk;
+ const fido_cred_t *cred;
+ struct sk_resident_key *srk = NULL, **tmp;
+
+ if ((dev = fido_dev_new()) == NULL) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "fido_dev_new failed");
+ return ret;
+ }
+ if ((r = fido_dev_open(dev, devpath)) != FIDO_OK) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "fido_dev_open %s failed: %s",
+ devpath, fido_strerr(r));
+ fido_dev_free(&dev);
+ return ret;
+ }
+ if ((metadata = fido_credman_metadata_new()) == NULL) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "alloc failed");
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if ((r = fido_credman_get_dev_metadata(dev, metadata, pin)) != 0) {
+ if (r == FIDO_ERR_INVALID_COMMAND) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "device %s does not support "
+ "resident keys", devpath);
+ ret = 0;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ skdebug(__func__, "get metadata for %s failed: %s",
+ devpath, fido_strerr(r));
+ ret = fidoerr_to_skerr(r);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ skdebug(__func__, "existing %llu, remaining %llu",
+ (unsigned long long)fido_credman_rk_existing(metadata),
+ (unsigned long long)fido_credman_rk_remaining(metadata));
+ if ((rp = fido_credman_rp_new()) == NULL) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "alloc rp failed");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((r = fido_credman_get_dev_rp(dev, rp, pin)) != 0) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "get RPs for %s failed: %s",
+ devpath, fido_strerr(r));
+ goto out;
+ }
+ nrp = fido_credman_rp_count(rp);
+ skdebug(__func__, "Device %s has resident keys for %zu RPs",
+ devpath, nrp);
+
+ /* Iterate over RP IDs that have resident keys */
+ for (i = 0; i < nrp; i++) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "rp %zu: name=\"%s\" id=\"%s\" hashlen=%zu",
+ i, fido_credman_rp_name(rp, i), fido_credman_rp_id(rp, i),
+ fido_credman_rp_id_hash_len(rp, i));
+
+ /* Skip non-SSH RP IDs */
+ if (strncasecmp(fido_credman_rp_id(rp, i), "ssh:", 4) != 0)
+ continue;
+
+ fido_credman_rk_free(&rk);
+ if ((rk = fido_credman_rk_new()) == NULL) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "alloc rk failed");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((r = fido_credman_get_dev_rk(dev, fido_credman_rp_id(rp, i),
+ rk, pin)) != 0) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "get RKs for %s slot %zu failed: %s",
+ devpath, i, fido_strerr(r));
+ goto out;
+ }
+ nrk = fido_credman_rk_count(rk);
+ skdebug(__func__, "RP \"%s\" has %zu resident keys",
+ fido_credman_rp_id(rp, i), nrk);
+
+ /* Iterate over resident keys for this RP ID */
+ for (j = 0; j < nrk; j++) {
+ if ((cred = fido_credman_rk(rk, j)) == NULL) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "no RK in slot %zu", j);
+ continue;
+ }
+ skdebug(__func__, "Device %s RP \"%s\" slot %zu: "
+ "type %d", devpath, fido_credman_rp_id(rp, i), j,
+ fido_cred_type(cred));
+
+ /* build response entry */
+ if ((srk = calloc(1, sizeof(*srk))) == NULL ||
+ (srk->key.key_handle = calloc(1,
+ fido_cred_id_len(cred))) == NULL ||
+ (srk->application = strdup(fido_credman_rp_id(rp,
+ i))) == NULL) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "alloc sk_resident_key");
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ srk->key.key_handle_len = fido_cred_id_len(cred);
+ memcpy(srk->key.key_handle,
+ fido_cred_id_ptr(cred),
+ srk->key.key_handle_len);
+
+ switch (fido_cred_type(cred)) {
+ case COSE_ES256:
+ srk->alg = SSH_SK_ECDSA;
+ break;
+ case COSE_EDDSA:
+ srk->alg = SSH_SK_ED25519;
+ break;
+ default:
+ skdebug(__func__, "unsupported key type %d",
+ fido_cred_type(cred));
+ goto out; /* XXX free rk and continue */
+ }
+
+ if ((r = pack_public_key(srk->alg, cred,
+ &srk->key)) != 0) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "pack public key failed");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ /* append */
+ if ((tmp = recallocarray(*rksp, *nrksp, (*nrksp) + 1,
+ sizeof(**rksp))) == NULL) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "alloc rksp");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ *rksp = tmp;
+ (*rksp)[(*nrksp)++] = srk;
+ srk = NULL;
+ }
+ }
+ /* Success */
+ ret = 0;
+ out:
+ if (srk != NULL) {
+ free(srk->application);
+ freezero(srk->key.public_key, srk->key.public_key_len);
+ freezero(srk->key.key_handle, srk->key.key_handle_len);
+ freezero(srk, sizeof(*srk));
+ }
+ fido_credman_rp_free(&rp);
+ fido_credman_rk_free(&rk);
+ fido_dev_close(dev);
+ fido_dev_free(&dev);
+ fido_credman_metadata_free(&metadata);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int
+sk_load_resident_keys(const char *pin, struct sk_option **options,
+ struct sk_resident_key ***rksp, size_t *nrksp)
+{
+ int ret = SSH_SK_ERR_GENERAL, r = -1;
+ fido_dev_info_t *devlist = NULL;
+ size_t i, ndev = 0, nrks = 0;
+ const fido_dev_info_t *di;
+ struct sk_resident_key **rks = NULL;
+ char *device = NULL;
+ *rksp = NULL;
+ *nrksp = 0;
+
+ if (check_sign_load_resident_options(options, &device) != 0)
+ goto out; /* error already logged */
+ if (device != NULL) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "trying %s", device);
+ if ((r = read_rks(device, pin, &rks, &nrks)) != 0) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "read_rks failed for %s", device);
+ ret = r;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ } else {
+ /* Try all devices */
+ if ((devlist = fido_dev_info_new(MAX_FIDO_DEVICES)) == NULL) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "fido_dev_info_new failed");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((r = fido_dev_info_manifest(devlist,
+ MAX_FIDO_DEVICES, &ndev)) != FIDO_OK) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "fido_dev_info_manifest failed: %s",
+ fido_strerr(r));
+ goto out;
+ }
+ for (i = 0; i < ndev; i++) {
+ if ((di = fido_dev_info_ptr(devlist, i)) == NULL) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "no dev info at %zu", i);
+ continue;
+ }
+ skdebug(__func__, "trying %s", fido_dev_info_path(di));
+ if ((r = read_rks(fido_dev_info_path(di), pin,
+ &rks, &nrks)) != 0) {
+ skdebug(__func__, "read_rks failed for %s",
+ fido_dev_info_path(di));
+ /* remember last error */
+ ret = r;
+ continue;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ /* success, unless we have no keys but a specific error */
+ if (nrks > 0 || ret == SSH_SK_ERR_GENERAL)
+ ret = 0;
+ *rksp = rks;
+ *nrksp = nrks;
+ rks = NULL;
+ nrks = 0;
+ out:
+ free(device);
+ for (i = 0; i < nrks; i++) {
+ free(rks[i]->application);
+ freezero(rks[i]->key.public_key, rks[i]->key.public_key_len);
+ freezero(rks[i]->key.key_handle, rks[i]->key.key_handle_len);
+ freezero(rks[i], sizeof(*rks[i]));
+ }
+ free(rks);
+ fido_dev_info_free(&devlist, MAX_FIDO_DEVICES);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+#endif /* ENABLE_SK_INTERNAL */
diff --git a/ssh-add.0 b/ssh-add.0
index 0c4358253008..36a7ac6ab2c4 100644
--- a/ssh-add.0
+++ b/ssh-add.0
@@ -1,133 +1,144 @@
SSH-ADD(1) General Commands Manual SSH-ADD(1)
NAME
- ssh-add M-bM-^@M-^S adds private key identities to the authentication agent
+ ssh-add M-bM-^@M-^S adds private key identities to the OpenSSH authentication agent
SYNOPSIS
- ssh-add [-cDdkLlqvXx] [-E fingerprint_hash] [-t life] [file ...]
+ ssh-add [-cDdKkLlqvXx] [-E fingerprint_hash] [-S provider] [-t life]
+ [file ...]
ssh-add -s pkcs11
ssh-add -e pkcs11
ssh-add -T pubkey ...
DESCRIPTION
ssh-add adds private key identities to the authentication agent,
ssh-agent(1). When run without arguments, it adds the files
- ~/.ssh/id_rsa, ~/.ssh/id_dsa, ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa, and ~/.ssh/id_ed25519.
- After loading a private key, ssh-add will try to load corresponding
- certificate information from the filename obtained by appending -cert.pub
- to the name of the private key file. Alternative file names can be given
- on the command line.
+ ~/.ssh/id_rsa, ~/.ssh/id_dsa, ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa, ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa_sk,
+ ~/.ssh/id_ed25519, and ~/.ssh/id_ed25519_sk. After loading a private
+ key, ssh-add will try to load corresponding certificate information from
+ the filename obtained by appending -cert.pub to the name of the private
+ key file. Alternative file names can be given on the command line.
If any file requires a passphrase, ssh-add asks for the passphrase from
the user. The passphrase is read from the user's tty. ssh-add retries
the last passphrase if multiple identity files are given.
The authentication agent must be running and the SSH_AUTH_SOCK
environment variable must contain the name of its socket for ssh-add to
work.
The options are as follows:
-c Indicates that added identities should be subject to confirmation
before being used for authentication. Confirmation is performed
by ssh-askpass(1). Successful confirmation is signaled by a zero
exit status from ssh-askpass(1), rather than text entered into
the requester.
-D Deletes all identities from the agent.
-d Instead of adding identities, removes identities from the agent.
If ssh-add has been run without arguments, the keys for the
default identities and their corresponding certificates will be
removed. Otherwise, the argument list will be interpreted as a
list of paths to public key files to specify keys and
certificates to be removed from the agent. If no public key is
found at a given path, ssh-add will append .pub and retry.
-E fingerprint_hash
Specifies the hash algorithm used when displaying key
fingerprints. Valid options are: M-bM-^@M-^\md5M-bM-^@M-^] and M-bM-^@M-^\sha256M-bM-^@M-^]. The
default is M-bM-^@M-^\sha256M-bM-^@M-^].
-e pkcs11
Remove keys provided by the PKCS#11 shared library pkcs11.
+ -K Load resident keys from a FIDO authenticator.
+
-k When loading keys into or deleting keys from the agent, process
plain private keys only and skip certificates.
-L Lists public key parameters of all identities currently
represented by the agent.
-l Lists fingerprints of all identities currently represented by the
agent.
-q Be quiet after a successful operation.
+ -S provider
+ Specifies a path to a library that will be used when adding FIDO
+ authenticator-hosted keys, overriding the default of using the
+ internal USB HID support.
+
-s pkcs11
Add keys provided by the PKCS#11 shared library pkcs11.
-T pubkey ...
Tests whether the private keys that correspond to the specified
pubkey files are usable by performing sign and verify operations
on each.
-t life
Set a maximum lifetime when adding identities to an agent. The
lifetime may be specified in seconds or in a time format
specified in sshd_config(5).
-v Verbose mode. Causes ssh-add to print debugging messages about
its progress. This is helpful in debugging problems. Multiple
-v options increase the verbosity. The maximum is 3.
-X Unlock the agent.
-x Lock the agent with a password.
ENVIRONMENT
DISPLAY and SSH_ASKPASS
If ssh-add needs a passphrase, it will read the passphrase from
the current terminal if it was run from a terminal. If ssh-add
does not have a terminal associated with it but DISPLAY and
SSH_ASKPASS are set, it will execute the program specified by
SSH_ASKPASS (by default M-bM-^@M-^\ssh-askpassM-bM-^@M-^]) and open an X11 window to
read the passphrase. This is particularly useful when calling
ssh-add from a .xsession or related script. (Note that on some
machines it may be necessary to redirect the input from /dev/null
to make this work.)
SSH_AUTH_SOCK
Identifies the path of a UNIX-domain socket used to communicate
with the agent.
+ SSH_SK_PROVIDER
+ Specifies a path to a library that will be used when loading any
+ FIDO authenticator-hosted keys, overriding the default of using
+ the built-in USB HID support.
+
FILES
~/.ssh/id_dsa
- Contains the DSA authentication identity of the user.
-
~/.ssh/id_ecdsa
- Contains the ECDSA authentication identity of the user.
-
+ ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa_sk
~/.ssh/id_ed25519
- Contains the Ed25519 authentication identity of the user.
-
+ ~/.ssh/id_ed25519_sk
~/.ssh/id_rsa
- Contains the RSA authentication identity of the user.
+ Contains the DSA, ECDSA, authenticator-hosted ECDSA, Ed25519,
+ authenticator-hosted Ed25519 or RSA authentication identity of
+ the user.
Identity files should not be readable by anyone but the user. Note that
ssh-add ignores identity files if they are accessible by others.
EXIT STATUS
Exit status is 0 on success, 1 if the specified command fails, and 2 if
ssh-add is unable to contact the authentication agent.
SEE ALSO
ssh(1), ssh-agent(1), ssh-askpass(1), ssh-keygen(1), sshd(8)
AUTHORS
OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free ssh 1.2.12 release by
Tatu Ylonen. Aaron Campbell, Bob Beck, Markus Friedl, Niels Provos, Theo
de Raadt and Dug Song removed many bugs, re-added newer features and
created OpenSSH. Markus Friedl contributed the support for SSH protocol
versions 1.5 and 2.0.
-OpenBSD 6.6 January 21, 2019 OpenBSD 6.6
+OpenBSD 6.6 February 7, 2020 OpenBSD 6.6
diff --git a/ssh-add.1 b/ssh-add.1
index d4e1c603be6d..58d42138ed1f 100644
--- a/ssh-add.1
+++ b/ssh-add.1
@@ -1,228 +1,241 @@
-.\" $OpenBSD: ssh-add.1,v 1.69 2019/01/21 12:53:35 djm Exp $
+.\" $OpenBSD: ssh-add.1,v 1.79 2020/02/07 03:57:31 djm Exp $
.\"
.\" Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
.\" Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
.\" All rights reserved
.\"
.\" As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
.\" can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
.\" software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
.\" incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
.\" called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
.\"
.\"
.\" Copyright (c) 1999,2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
.\" Copyright (c) 1999 Aaron Campbell. All rights reserved.
.\" Copyright (c) 1999 Theo de Raadt. All rights reserved.
.\"
.\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
.\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
.\" are met:
.\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
.\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
.\" documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
.\"
.\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
.\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
.\" OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
.\" IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
.\" INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
.\" NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
.\" DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
.\" THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
.\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
.\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
.\"
-.Dd $Mdocdate: January 21 2019 $
+.Dd $Mdocdate: February 7 2020 $
.Dt SSH-ADD 1
.Os
.Sh NAME
.Nm ssh-add
-.Nd adds private key identities to the authentication agent
+.Nd adds private key identities to the OpenSSH authentication agent
.Sh SYNOPSIS
.Nm ssh-add
-.Op Fl cDdkLlqvXx
+.Op Fl cDdKkLlqvXx
.Op Fl E Ar fingerprint_hash
+.Op Fl S Ar provider
.Op Fl t Ar life
.Op Ar
.Nm ssh-add
.Fl s Ar pkcs11
.Nm ssh-add
.Fl e Ar pkcs11
.Nm ssh-add
.Fl T
.Ar pubkey ...
.Sh DESCRIPTION
.Nm
adds private key identities to the authentication agent,
.Xr ssh-agent 1 .
When run without arguments, it adds the files
.Pa ~/.ssh/id_rsa ,
.Pa ~/.ssh/id_dsa ,
.Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa ,
+.Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa_sk ,
+.Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519 ,
and
-.Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519 .
+.Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519_sk .
After loading a private key,
.Nm
will try to load corresponding certificate information from the
filename obtained by appending
.Pa -cert.pub
to the name of the private key file.
Alternative file names can be given on the command line.
.Pp
If any file requires a passphrase,
.Nm
asks for the passphrase from the user.
The passphrase is read from the user's tty.
.Nm
retries the last passphrase if multiple identity files are given.
.Pp
The authentication agent must be running and the
.Ev SSH_AUTH_SOCK
environment variable must contain the name of its socket for
.Nm
to work.
.Pp
The options are as follows:
.Bl -tag -width Ds
.It Fl c
Indicates that added identities should be subject to confirmation before
being used for authentication.
Confirmation is performed by
.Xr ssh-askpass 1 .
Successful confirmation is signaled by a zero exit status from
.Xr ssh-askpass 1 ,
rather than text entered into the requester.
.It Fl D
Deletes all identities from the agent.
.It Fl d
Instead of adding identities, removes identities from the agent.
If
.Nm
has been run without arguments, the keys for the default identities and
their corresponding certificates will be removed.
Otherwise, the argument list will be interpreted as a list of paths to
public key files to specify keys and certificates to be removed from the agent.
If no public key is found at a given path,
.Nm
will append
.Pa .pub
and retry.
.It Fl E Ar fingerprint_hash
Specifies the hash algorithm used when displaying key fingerprints.
Valid options are:
.Dq md5
and
.Dq sha256 .
The default is
.Dq sha256 .
.It Fl e Ar pkcs11
Remove keys provided by the PKCS#11 shared library
.Ar pkcs11 .
+.It Fl K
+Load resident keys from a FIDO authenticator.
.It Fl k
When loading keys into or deleting keys from the agent, process plain private
keys only and skip certificates.
.It Fl L
Lists public key parameters of all identities currently represented
by the agent.
.It Fl l
Lists fingerprints of all identities currently represented by the agent.
.It Fl q
Be quiet after a successful operation.
+.It Fl S Ar provider
+Specifies a path to a library that will be used when adding
+FIDO authenticator-hosted keys, overriding the default of using the
+internal USB HID support.
.It Fl s Ar pkcs11
Add keys provided by the PKCS#11 shared library
.Ar pkcs11 .
.It Fl T Ar pubkey ...
Tests whether the private keys that correspond to the specified
.Ar pubkey
files are usable by performing sign and verify operations on each.
.It Fl t Ar life
Set a maximum lifetime when adding identities to an agent.
The lifetime may be specified in seconds or in a time format
specified in
.Xr sshd_config 5 .
.It Fl v
Verbose mode.
Causes
.Nm
to print debugging messages about its progress.
This is helpful in debugging problems.
Multiple
.Fl v
options increase the verbosity.
The maximum is 3.
.It Fl X
Unlock the agent.
.It Fl x
Lock the agent with a password.
.El
.Sh ENVIRONMENT
.Bl -tag -width Ds
.It Ev "DISPLAY" and "SSH_ASKPASS"
If
.Nm
needs a passphrase, it will read the passphrase from the current
terminal if it was run from a terminal.
If
.Nm
does not have a terminal associated with it but
.Ev DISPLAY
and
.Ev SSH_ASKPASS
are set, it will execute the program specified by
.Ev SSH_ASKPASS
(by default
.Dq ssh-askpass )
and open an X11 window to read the passphrase.
This is particularly useful when calling
.Nm
from a
.Pa .xsession
or related script.
(Note that on some machines it
may be necessary to redirect the input from
.Pa /dev/null
to make this work.)
.It Ev SSH_AUTH_SOCK
Identifies the path of a
.Ux Ns -domain
socket used to communicate with the agent.
+.It Ev SSH_SK_PROVIDER
+Specifies a path to a library that will be used when loading any
+FIDO authenticator-hosted keys, overriding the default of using
+the built-in USB HID support.
.El
.Sh FILES
-.Bl -tag -width Ds
+.Bl -tag -width Ds -compact
.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_dsa
-Contains the DSA authentication identity of the user.
.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa
-Contains the ECDSA authentication identity of the user.
+.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa_sk
.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519
-Contains the Ed25519 authentication identity of the user.
+.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519_sk
.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_rsa
-Contains the RSA authentication identity of the user.
+Contains the DSA, ECDSA, authenticator-hosted ECDSA, Ed25519,
+authenticator-hosted Ed25519 or RSA authentication identity of the user.
.El
.Pp
Identity files should not be readable by anyone but the user.
Note that
.Nm
ignores identity files if they are accessible by others.
.Sh EXIT STATUS
Exit status is 0 on success, 1 if the specified command fails,
and 2 if
.Nm
is unable to contact the authentication agent.
.Sh SEE ALSO
.Xr ssh 1 ,
.Xr ssh-agent 1 ,
.Xr ssh-askpass 1 ,
.Xr ssh-keygen 1 ,
.Xr sshd 8
.Sh AUTHORS
OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free
ssh 1.2.12 release by Tatu Ylonen.
Aaron Campbell, Bob Beck, Markus Friedl, Niels Provos,
Theo de Raadt and Dug Song
removed many bugs, re-added newer features and
created OpenSSH.
Markus Friedl contributed the support for SSH
protocol versions 1.5 and 2.0.
diff --git a/ssh-add.c b/ssh-add.c
index ebfb8a32b596..8057eb1fe14e 100644
--- a/ssh-add.c
+++ b/ssh-add.c
@@ -1,754 +1,824 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: ssh-add.c,v 1.141 2019/09/06 05:23:55 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh-add.c,v 1.152 2020/02/06 22:30:54 naddy Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
* All rights reserved
* Adds an identity to the authentication server, or removes an identity.
*
* As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
* can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
* software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
* incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
* called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
*
* SSH2 implementation,
* Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
# include <openssl/evp.h>
# include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
#endif
#include <errno.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <pwd.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <limits.h>
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "ssh.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "sshkey.h"
#include "sshbuf.h"
#include "authfd.h"
#include "authfile.h"
#include "pathnames.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
#include "digest.h"
+#include "ssh-sk.h"
/* argv0 */
extern char *__progname;
/* Default files to add */
static char *default_files[] = {
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
_PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_RSA,
_PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_DSA,
#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
_PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_ECDSA,
+ _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_ECDSA_SK,
#endif
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
_PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_ED25519,
+ _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_ED25519_SK,
_PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_XMSS,
NULL
};
static int fingerprint_hash = SSH_FP_HASH_DEFAULT;
/* Default lifetime (0 == forever) */
static int lifetime = 0;
/* User has to confirm key use */
static int confirm = 0;
/* Maximum number of signatures (XMSS) */
static u_int maxsign = 0;
static u_int minleft = 0;
/* we keep a cache of one passphrase */
static char *pass = NULL;
static void
clear_pass(void)
{
if (pass) {
explicit_bzero(pass, strlen(pass));
free(pass);
pass = NULL;
}
}
static int
delete_file(int agent_fd, const char *filename, int key_only, int qflag)
{
struct sshkey *public, *cert = NULL;
char *certpath = NULL, *comment = NULL;
int r, ret = -1;
if ((r = sshkey_load_public(filename, &public, &comment)) != 0) {
printf("Bad key file %s: %s\n", filename, ssh_err(r));
return -1;
}
if ((r = ssh_remove_identity(agent_fd, public)) == 0) {
if (!qflag) {
fprintf(stderr, "Identity removed: %s (%s)\n",
filename, comment);
}
ret = 0;
} else
fprintf(stderr, "Could not remove identity \"%s\": %s\n",
filename, ssh_err(r));
if (key_only)
goto out;
/* Now try to delete the corresponding certificate too */
free(comment);
comment = NULL;
xasprintf(&certpath, "%s-cert.pub", filename);
if ((r = sshkey_load_public(certpath, &cert, &comment)) != 0) {
if (r != SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR || errno != ENOENT)
error("Failed to load certificate \"%s\": %s",
certpath, ssh_err(r));
goto out;
}
if (!sshkey_equal_public(cert, public))
fatal("Certificate %s does not match private key %s",
certpath, filename);
if ((r = ssh_remove_identity(agent_fd, cert)) == 0) {
if (!qflag) {
fprintf(stderr, "Identity removed: %s (%s)\n",
certpath, comment);
}
ret = 0;
} else
fprintf(stderr, "Could not remove identity \"%s\": %s\n",
certpath, ssh_err(r));
out:
sshkey_free(cert);
sshkey_free(public);
free(certpath);
free(comment);
return ret;
}
/* Send a request to remove all identities. */
static int
delete_all(int agent_fd, int qflag)
{
int ret = -1;
/*
* Since the agent might be forwarded, old or non-OpenSSH, when asked
* to remove all keys, attempt to remove both protocol v.1 and v.2
* keys.
*/
if (ssh_remove_all_identities(agent_fd, 2) == 0)
ret = 0;
/* ignore error-code for ssh1 */
ssh_remove_all_identities(agent_fd, 1);
if (ret != 0)
fprintf(stderr, "Failed to remove all identities.\n");
else if (!qflag)
fprintf(stderr, "All identities removed.\n");
return ret;
}
static int
-add_file(int agent_fd, const char *filename, int key_only, int qflag)
+add_file(int agent_fd, const char *filename, int key_only, int qflag,
+ const char *skprovider)
{
struct sshkey *private, *cert;
char *comment = NULL;
char msg[1024], *certpath = NULL;
int r, fd, ret = -1;
size_t i;
u_int32_t left;
struct sshbuf *keyblob;
struct ssh_identitylist *idlist;
if (strcmp(filename, "-") == 0) {
fd = STDIN_FILENO;
filename = "(stdin)";
} else if ((fd = open(filename, O_RDONLY)) == -1) {
perror(filename);
return -1;
}
/*
* Since we'll try to load a keyfile multiple times, permission errors
* will occur multiple times, so check perms first and bail if wrong.
*/
if (fd != STDIN_FILENO) {
if (sshkey_perm_ok(fd, filename) != 0) {
close(fd);
return -1;
}
}
- if ((keyblob = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
- if ((r = sshkey_load_file(fd, keyblob)) != 0) {
+ if ((r = sshbuf_load_fd(fd, &keyblob)) != 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "Error loading key \"%s\": %s\n",
filename, ssh_err(r));
sshbuf_free(keyblob);
close(fd);
return -1;
}
close(fd);
/* At first, try empty passphrase */
if ((r = sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(keyblob, "", &private,
&comment)) != 0 && r != SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE) {
fprintf(stderr, "Error loading key \"%s\": %s\n",
filename, ssh_err(r));
goto fail_load;
}
/* try last */
if (private == NULL && pass != NULL) {
if ((r = sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(keyblob, pass, &private,
&comment)) != 0 && r != SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE) {
fprintf(stderr, "Error loading key \"%s\": %s\n",
filename, ssh_err(r));
goto fail_load;
}
}
if (private == NULL) {
/* clear passphrase since it did not work */
clear_pass();
snprintf(msg, sizeof msg, "Enter passphrase for %s%s: ",
filename, confirm ? " (will confirm each use)" : "");
for (;;) {
pass = read_passphrase(msg, RP_ALLOW_STDIN);
if (strcmp(pass, "") == 0)
goto fail_load;
if ((r = sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(keyblob, pass,
&private, &comment)) == 0)
break;
else if (r != SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE) {
fprintf(stderr,
"Error loading key \"%s\": %s\n",
filename, ssh_err(r));
fail_load:
clear_pass();
sshbuf_free(keyblob);
return -1;
}
clear_pass();
snprintf(msg, sizeof msg,
"Bad passphrase, try again for %s%s: ", filename,
confirm ? " (will confirm each use)" : "");
}
}
if (comment == NULL || *comment == '\0')
comment = xstrdup(filename);
sshbuf_free(keyblob);
/* For XMSS */
if ((r = sshkey_set_filename(private, filename)) != 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "Could not add filename to private key: %s (%s)\n",
filename, comment);
goto out;
}
if (maxsign && minleft &&
(r = ssh_fetch_identitylist(agent_fd, &idlist)) == 0) {
for (i = 0; i < idlist->nkeys; i++) {
if (!sshkey_equal_public(idlist->keys[i], private))
continue;
left = sshkey_signatures_left(idlist->keys[i]);
if (left < minleft) {
fprintf(stderr,
"Only %d signatures left.\n", left);
break;
}
fprintf(stderr, "Skipping update: ");
if (left == minleft) {
fprintf(stderr,
"required signatures left (%d).\n", left);
} else {
fprintf(stderr,
"more signatures left (%d) than"
" required (%d).\n", left, minleft);
}
ssh_free_identitylist(idlist);
goto out;
}
ssh_free_identitylist(idlist);
}
+ if (!sshkey_is_sk(private))
+ skprovider = NULL; /* Don't send constraint for other keys */
+ else if (skprovider == NULL) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Cannot load authenticator-hosted key %s "
+ "without provider\n", filename);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
if ((r = ssh_add_identity_constrained(agent_fd, private, comment,
- lifetime, confirm, maxsign)) == 0) {
+ lifetime, confirm, maxsign, skprovider)) == 0) {
ret = 0;
if (!qflag) {
fprintf(stderr, "Identity added: %s (%s)\n",
filename, comment);
if (lifetime != 0) {
fprintf(stderr,
"Lifetime set to %d seconds\n", lifetime);
}
if (confirm != 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "The user must confirm "
"each use of the key\n");
}
}
} else {
fprintf(stderr, "Could not add identity \"%s\": %s\n",
filename, ssh_err(r));
}
/* Skip trying to load the cert if requested */
if (key_only)
goto out;
/* Now try to add the certificate flavour too */
xasprintf(&certpath, "%s-cert.pub", filename);
if ((r = sshkey_load_public(certpath, &cert, NULL)) != 0) {
if (r != SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR || errno != ENOENT)
error("Failed to load certificate \"%s\": %s",
certpath, ssh_err(r));
goto out;
}
if (!sshkey_equal_public(cert, private)) {
error("Certificate %s does not match private key %s",
certpath, filename);
sshkey_free(cert);
goto out;
}
/* Graft with private bits */
if ((r = sshkey_to_certified(private)) != 0) {
error("%s: sshkey_to_certified: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
sshkey_free(cert);
goto out;
}
if ((r = sshkey_cert_copy(cert, private)) != 0) {
error("%s: sshkey_cert_copy: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
sshkey_free(cert);
goto out;
}
sshkey_free(cert);
if ((r = ssh_add_identity_constrained(agent_fd, private, comment,
- lifetime, confirm, maxsign)) != 0) {
+ lifetime, confirm, maxsign, skprovider)) != 0) {
error("Certificate %s (%s) add failed: %s", certpath,
private->cert->key_id, ssh_err(r));
goto out;
}
/* success */
if (!qflag) {
fprintf(stderr, "Certificate added: %s (%s)\n", certpath,
private->cert->key_id);
if (lifetime != 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "Lifetime set to %d seconds\n",
lifetime);
}
if (confirm != 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "The user must confirm each use "
"of the key\n");
}
}
out:
free(certpath);
free(comment);
sshkey_free(private);
return ret;
}
static int
update_card(int agent_fd, int add, const char *id, int qflag)
{
char *pin = NULL;
int r, ret = -1;
if (add) {
if ((pin = read_passphrase("Enter passphrase for PKCS#11: ",
RP_ALLOW_STDIN)) == NULL)
return -1;
}
if ((r = ssh_update_card(agent_fd, add, id, pin == NULL ? "" : pin,
lifetime, confirm)) == 0) {
ret = 0;
if (!qflag) {
fprintf(stderr, "Card %s: %s\n",
add ? "added" : "removed", id);
}
} else {
fprintf(stderr, "Could not %s card \"%s\": %s\n",
add ? "add" : "remove", id, ssh_err(r));
ret = -1;
}
free(pin);
return ret;
}
static int
test_key(int agent_fd, const char *filename)
{
struct sshkey *key = NULL;
u_char *sig = NULL;
size_t slen = 0;
int r, ret = -1;
char data[1024];
if ((r = sshkey_load_public(filename, &key, NULL)) != 0) {
error("Couldn't read public key %s: %s", filename, ssh_err(r));
return -1;
}
arc4random_buf(data, sizeof(data));
if ((r = ssh_agent_sign(agent_fd, key, &sig, &slen, data, sizeof(data),
NULL, 0)) != 0) {
error("Agent signature failed for %s: %s",
filename, ssh_err(r));
goto done;
}
if ((r = sshkey_verify(key, sig, slen, data, sizeof(data),
- NULL, 0)) != 0) {
+ NULL, 0, NULL)) != 0) {
error("Signature verification failed for %s: %s",
filename, ssh_err(r));
goto done;
}
/* success */
ret = 0;
done:
free(sig);
sshkey_free(key);
return ret;
}
static int
list_identities(int agent_fd, int do_fp)
{
char *fp;
int r;
struct ssh_identitylist *idlist;
u_int32_t left;
size_t i;
if ((r = ssh_fetch_identitylist(agent_fd, &idlist)) != 0) {
if (r != SSH_ERR_AGENT_NO_IDENTITIES)
fprintf(stderr, "error fetching identities: %s\n",
ssh_err(r));
else
printf("The agent has no identities.\n");
return -1;
}
for (i = 0; i < idlist->nkeys; i++) {
if (do_fp) {
fp = sshkey_fingerprint(idlist->keys[i],
fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT);
printf("%u %s %s (%s)\n", sshkey_size(idlist->keys[i]),
fp == NULL ? "(null)" : fp, idlist->comments[i],
sshkey_type(idlist->keys[i]));
free(fp);
} else {
if ((r = sshkey_write(idlist->keys[i], stdout)) != 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "sshkey_write: %s\n",
ssh_err(r));
continue;
}
fprintf(stdout, " %s", idlist->comments[i]);
left = sshkey_signatures_left(idlist->keys[i]);
if (left > 0)
fprintf(stdout,
" [signatures left %d]", left);
fprintf(stdout, "\n");
}
}
ssh_free_identitylist(idlist);
return 0;
}
static int
lock_agent(int agent_fd, int lock)
{
char prompt[100], *p1, *p2;
int r, passok = 1, ret = -1;
strlcpy(prompt, "Enter lock password: ", sizeof(prompt));
p1 = read_passphrase(prompt, RP_ALLOW_STDIN);
if (lock) {
strlcpy(prompt, "Again: ", sizeof prompt);
p2 = read_passphrase(prompt, RP_ALLOW_STDIN);
if (strcmp(p1, p2) != 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "Passwords do not match.\n");
passok = 0;
}
explicit_bzero(p2, strlen(p2));
free(p2);
}
if (passok) {
if ((r = ssh_lock_agent(agent_fd, lock, p1)) == 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "Agent %slocked.\n", lock ? "" : "un");
ret = 0;
} else {
fprintf(stderr, "Failed to %slock agent: %s\n",
lock ? "" : "un", ssh_err(r));
}
}
explicit_bzero(p1, strlen(p1));
free(p1);
return (ret);
}
static int
-do_file(int agent_fd, int deleting, int key_only, char *file, int qflag)
+load_resident_keys(int agent_fd, const char *skprovider, int qflag)
+{
+ struct sshkey **keys;
+ size_t nkeys, i;
+ int r, ok = 0;
+ char *fp;
+
+ pass = read_passphrase("Enter PIN for authenticator: ", RP_ALLOW_STDIN);
+ if ((r = sshsk_load_resident(skprovider, NULL, pass,
+ &keys, &nkeys)) != 0) {
+ error("Unable to load resident keys: %s", ssh_err(r));
+ return r;
+ }
+ for (i = 0; i < nkeys; i++) {
+ if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(keys[i],
+ fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: sshkey_fingerprint failed", __func__);
+ if ((r = ssh_add_identity_constrained(agent_fd, keys[i], "",
+ lifetime, confirm, maxsign, skprovider)) != 0) {
+ error("Unable to add key %s %s",
+ sshkey_type(keys[i]), fp);
+ free(fp);
+ ok = r;
+ continue;
+ }
+ if (ok == 0)
+ ok = 1;
+ if (!qflag) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Resident identity added: %s %s\n",
+ sshkey_type(keys[i]), fp);
+ if (lifetime != 0) {
+ fprintf(stderr,
+ "Lifetime set to %d seconds\n", lifetime);
+ }
+ if (confirm != 0) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "The user must confirm "
+ "each use of the key\n");
+ }
+ }
+ free(fp);
+ sshkey_free(keys[i]);
+ }
+ free(keys);
+ if (nkeys == 0)
+ return SSH_ERR_KEY_NOT_FOUND;
+ return ok == 1 ? 0 : ok;
+}
+
+static int
+do_file(int agent_fd, int deleting, int key_only, char *file, int qflag,
+ const char *skprovider)
{
if (deleting) {
if (delete_file(agent_fd, file, key_only, qflag) == -1)
return -1;
} else {
- if (add_file(agent_fd, file, key_only, qflag) == -1)
+ if (add_file(agent_fd, file, key_only, qflag, skprovider) == -1)
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
static void
usage(void)
{
- fprintf(stderr, "usage: %s [options] [file ...]\n", __progname);
- fprintf(stderr, "Options:\n");
- fprintf(stderr, " -l List fingerprints of all identities.\n");
- fprintf(stderr, " -E hash Specify hash algorithm used for fingerprints.\n");
- fprintf(stderr, " -L List public key parameters of all identities.\n");
- fprintf(stderr, " -k Load only keys and not certificates.\n");
- fprintf(stderr, " -c Require confirmation to sign using identities\n");
- fprintf(stderr, " -m minleft Maxsign is only changed if less than minleft are left (for XMSS)\n");
- fprintf(stderr, " -M maxsign Maximum number of signatures allowed (for XMSS)\n");
- fprintf(stderr, " -t life Set lifetime (in seconds) when adding identities.\n");
- fprintf(stderr, " -d Delete identity.\n");
- fprintf(stderr, " -D Delete all identities.\n");
- fprintf(stderr, " -x Lock agent.\n");
- fprintf(stderr, " -X Unlock agent.\n");
- fprintf(stderr, " -s pkcs11 Add keys from PKCS#11 provider.\n");
- fprintf(stderr, " -e pkcs11 Remove keys provided by PKCS#11 provider.\n");
- fprintf(stderr, " -T pubkey Test if ssh-agent can access matching private key.\n");
- fprintf(stderr, " -q Be quiet after a successful operation.\n");
- fprintf(stderr, " -v Be more verbose.\n");
+ fprintf(stderr,
+"usage: ssh-add [-cDdKkLlqvXx] [-E fingerprint_hash] [-S provider] [-t life]\n"
+#ifdef WITH_XMSS
+" [-M maxsign] [-m minleft]\n"
+#endif
+" [file ...]\n"
+" ssh-add -s pkcs11\n"
+" ssh-add -e pkcs11\n"
+" ssh-add -T pubkey ...\n"
+ );
}
int
main(int argc, char **argv)
{
extern char *optarg;
extern int optind;
int agent_fd;
- char *pkcs11provider = NULL;
- int r, i, ch, deleting = 0, ret = 0, key_only = 0;
+ char *pkcs11provider = NULL, *skprovider = NULL;
+ int r, i, ch, deleting = 0, ret = 0, key_only = 0, do_download = 0;
int xflag = 0, lflag = 0, Dflag = 0, qflag = 0, Tflag = 0;
SyslogFacility log_facility = SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH;
LogLevel log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO;
/* Ensure that fds 0, 1 and 2 are open or directed to /dev/null */
sanitise_stdfd();
__progname = ssh_get_progname(argv[0]);
seed_rng();
log_init(__progname, log_level, log_facility, 1);
setvbuf(stdout, NULL, _IOLBF, 0);
/* First, get a connection to the authentication agent. */
switch (r = ssh_get_authentication_socket(&agent_fd)) {
case 0:
break;
case SSH_ERR_AGENT_NOT_PRESENT:
fprintf(stderr, "Could not open a connection to your "
"authentication agent.\n");
exit(2);
default:
fprintf(stderr, "Error connecting to agent: %s\n", ssh_err(r));
exit(2);
}
- while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "vklLcdDTxXE:e:M:m:qs:t:")) != -1) {
+ skprovider = getenv("SSH_SK_PROVIDER");
+
+ while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "vkKlLcdDTxXE:e:M:m:qs:S:t:")) != -1) {
switch (ch) {
case 'v':
if (log_level == SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO)
log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1;
else if (log_level < SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3)
log_level++;
break;
case 'E':
fingerprint_hash = ssh_digest_alg_by_name(optarg);
if (fingerprint_hash == -1)
fatal("Invalid hash algorithm \"%s\"", optarg);
break;
case 'k':
key_only = 1;
break;
+ case 'K':
+ do_download = 1;
+ break;
case 'l':
case 'L':
if (lflag != 0)
fatal("-%c flag already specified", lflag);
lflag = ch;
break;
case 'x':
case 'X':
if (xflag != 0)
fatal("-%c flag already specified", xflag);
xflag = ch;
break;
case 'c':
confirm = 1;
break;
case 'm':
minleft = (int)strtonum(optarg, 1, UINT_MAX, NULL);
if (minleft == 0) {
usage();
ret = 1;
goto done;
}
break;
case 'M':
maxsign = (int)strtonum(optarg, 1, UINT_MAX, NULL);
if (maxsign == 0) {
usage();
ret = 1;
goto done;
}
break;
case 'd':
deleting = 1;
break;
case 'D':
Dflag = 1;
break;
case 's':
pkcs11provider = optarg;
break;
+ case 'S':
+ skprovider = optarg;
+ break;
case 'e':
deleting = 1;
pkcs11provider = optarg;
break;
case 't':
if ((lifetime = convtime(optarg)) == -1) {
fprintf(stderr, "Invalid lifetime\n");
ret = 1;
goto done;
}
break;
case 'q':
qflag = 1;
break;
case 'T':
Tflag = 1;
break;
default:
usage();
ret = 1;
goto done;
}
}
log_init(__progname, log_level, log_facility, 1);
if ((xflag != 0) + (lflag != 0) + (Dflag != 0) > 1)
fatal("Invalid combination of actions");
else if (xflag) {
if (lock_agent(agent_fd, xflag == 'x' ? 1 : 0) == -1)
ret = 1;
goto done;
} else if (lflag) {
if (list_identities(agent_fd, lflag == 'l' ? 1 : 0) == -1)
ret = 1;
goto done;
} else if (Dflag) {
if (delete_all(agent_fd, qflag) == -1)
ret = 1;
goto done;
}
+#ifdef ENABLE_SK_INTERNAL
+ if (skprovider == NULL)
+ skprovider = "internal";
+#endif
+
argc -= optind;
argv += optind;
if (Tflag) {
if (argc <= 0)
fatal("no keys to test");
for (r = i = 0; i < argc; i++)
r |= test_key(agent_fd, argv[i]);
ret = r == 0 ? 0 : 1;
goto done;
}
if (pkcs11provider != NULL) {
if (update_card(agent_fd, !deleting, pkcs11provider,
qflag) == -1)
ret = 1;
goto done;
}
+ if (do_download) {
+ if (skprovider == NULL)
+ fatal("Cannot download keys without provider");
+ if (load_resident_keys(agent_fd, skprovider, qflag) != 0)
+ ret = 1;
+ goto done;
+ }
if (argc == 0) {
char buf[PATH_MAX];
struct passwd *pw;
struct stat st;
int count = 0;
if ((pw = getpwuid(getuid())) == NULL) {
fprintf(stderr, "No user found with uid %u\n",
(u_int)getuid());
ret = 1;
goto done;
}
for (i = 0; default_files[i]; i++) {
snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s/%s", pw->pw_dir,
default_files[i]);
if (stat(buf, &st) == -1)
continue;
if (do_file(agent_fd, deleting, key_only, buf,
- qflag) == -1)
+ qflag, skprovider) == -1)
ret = 1;
else
count++;
}
if (count == 0)
ret = 1;
} else {
for (i = 0; i < argc; i++) {
if (do_file(agent_fd, deleting, key_only,
- argv[i], qflag) == -1)
+ argv[i], qflag, skprovider) == -1)
ret = 1;
}
}
- clear_pass();
-
done:
+ clear_pass();
ssh_close_authentication_socket(agent_fd);
return ret;
}
diff --git a/ssh-agent.0 b/ssh-agent.0
index 1ef2702f6d4d..c5fe8b15328c 100644
--- a/ssh-agent.0
+++ b/ssh-agent.0
@@ -1,120 +1,117 @@
SSH-AGENT(1) General Commands Manual SSH-AGENT(1)
NAME
- ssh-agent M-bM-^@M-^S authentication agent
+ ssh-agent M-bM-^@M-^S OpenSSH authentication agent
SYNOPSIS
ssh-agent [-c | -s] [-Dd] [-a bind_address] [-E fingerprint_hash]
- [-P pkcs11_whitelist] [-t life] [command [arg ...]]
+ [-P provider_whitelist] [-t life] [command [arg ...]]
ssh-agent [-c | -s] -k
DESCRIPTION
ssh-agent is a program to hold private keys used for public key
- authentication (RSA, DSA, ECDSA, Ed25519). ssh-agent is usually started
- in the beginning of an X-session or a login session, and all other
- windows or programs are started as clients to the ssh-agent program.
- Through use of environment variables the agent can be located and
- automatically used for authentication when logging in to other machines
- using ssh(1).
-
- The agent initially does not have any private keys. Keys are added using
- ssh(1) (see AddKeysToAgent in ssh_config(5) for details) or ssh-add(1).
- Multiple identities may be stored in ssh-agent concurrently and ssh(1)
- will automatically use them if present. ssh-add(1) is also used to
- remove keys from ssh-agent and to query the keys that are held in one.
+ authentication. Through use of environment variables the agent can be
+ located and automatically used for authentication when logging in to
+ other machines using ssh(1).
The options are as follows:
-a bind_address
Bind the agent to the UNIX-domain socket bind_address. The
default is $TMPDIR/ssh-XXXXXXXXXX/agent.<ppid>.
-c Generate C-shell commands on stdout. This is the default if
SHELL looks like it's a csh style of shell.
-D Foreground mode. When this option is specified ssh-agent will
not fork.
-d Debug mode. When this option is specified ssh-agent will not
fork and will write debug information to standard error.
-E fingerprint_hash
Specifies the hash algorithm used when displaying key
fingerprints. Valid options are: M-bM-^@M-^\md5M-bM-^@M-^] and M-bM-^@M-^\sha256M-bM-^@M-^]. The
default is M-bM-^@M-^\sha256M-bM-^@M-^].
-k Kill the current agent (given by the SSH_AGENT_PID environment
variable).
- -P pkcs11_whitelist
- Specify a pattern-list of acceptable paths for PKCS#11 shared
- libraries that may be added using the -s option to ssh-add(1).
- The default is to allow loading PKCS#11 libraries from
- M-bM-^@M-^\/usr/lib/*,/usr/local/lib/*M-bM-^@M-^]. PKCS#11 libraries that do not
- match the whitelist will be refused. See PATTERNS in
- ssh_config(5) for a description of pattern-list syntax.
+ -P provider_whitelist
+ Specify a pattern-list of acceptable paths for PKCS#11 and FIDO
+ authenticator shared libraries that may be used with the -S or -s
+ options to ssh-add(1). Libraries that do not match the whitelist
+ will be refused. See PATTERNS in ssh_config(5) for a description
+ of pattern-list syntax. The default whitelist is
+ M-bM-^@M-^\/usr/lib/*,/usr/local/lib/*M-bM-^@M-^].
-s Generate Bourne shell commands on stdout. This is the default if
SHELL does not look like it's a csh style of shell.
-t life
Set a default value for the maximum lifetime of identities added
to the agent. The lifetime may be specified in seconds or in a
time format specified in sshd_config(5). A lifetime specified
for an identity with ssh-add(1) overrides this value. Without
this option the default maximum lifetime is forever.
- If a command line is given, this is executed as a subprocess of the
- agent. When the command dies, so does the agent.
+ command [arg ...]
+ If a command (and optional arguments) is given, this is executed
+ as a subprocess of the agent. The agent exits automatically when
+ the command given on the command line terminates.
- The idea is that the agent is run in the user's local PC, laptop, or
- terminal. Authentication data need not be stored on any other machine,
- and authentication passphrases never go over the network. However, the
- connection to the agent is forwarded over SSH remote logins, and the user
- can thus use the privileges given by the identities anywhere in the
- network in a secure way.
+ There are two main ways to get an agent set up. The first is at the
+ start of an X session, where all other windows or programs are started as
+ children of the ssh-agent program. The agent starts a command under
+ which its environment variables are exported, for example ssh-agent xterm
+ &. When the command terminates, so does the agent.
- There are two main ways to get an agent set up: The first is that the
- agent starts a new subcommand into which some environment variables are
- exported, eg ssh-agent xterm &. The second is that the agent prints the
- needed shell commands (either sh(1) or csh(1) syntax can be generated)
- which can be evaluated in the calling shell, eg eval `ssh-agent -s` for
- Bourne-type shells such as sh(1) or ksh(1) and eval `ssh-agent -c` for
- csh(1) and derivatives.
+ The second method is used for a login session. When ssh-agent is
+ started, it prints the shell commands required to set its environment
+ variables, which in turn can be evaluated in the calling shell, for
+ example eval `ssh-agent -s`.
- Later ssh(1) looks at these variables and uses them to establish a
- connection to the agent.
+ In both cases, ssh(1) looks at these environment variables and uses them
+ to establish a connection to the agent.
- The agent will never send a private key over its request channel.
- Instead, operations that require a private key will be performed by the
- agent, and the result will be returned to the requester. This way,
- private keys are not exposed to clients using the agent.
+ The agent initially does not have any private keys. Keys are added using
+ ssh-add(1) or by ssh(1) when AddKeysToAgent is set in ssh_config(5).
+ Multiple identities may be stored in ssh-agent concurrently and ssh(1)
+ will automatically use them if present. ssh-add(1) is also used to
+ remove keys from ssh-agent and to query the keys that are held in one.
- A UNIX-domain socket is created and the name of this socket is stored in
- the SSH_AUTH_SOCK environment variable. The socket is made accessible
- only to the current user. This method is easily abused by root or
- another instance of the same user.
+ Connections to ssh-agent may be forwarded from further remote hosts using
+ the -A option to ssh(1) (but see the caveats documented therein),
+ avoiding the need for authentication data to be stored on other machines.
+ Authentication passphrases and private keys never go over the network:
+ the connection to the agent is forwarded over SSH remote connections and
+ the result is returned to the requester, allowing the user access to
+ their identities anywhere in the network in a secure fashion.
- The SSH_AGENT_PID environment variable holds the agent's process ID.
+ENVIRONMENT
+ SSH_AGENT_PID When ssh-agent starts, it stores the name of the agent's
+ process ID (PID) in this variable.
- The agent exits automatically when the command given on the command line
- terminates.
+ SSH_AUTH_SOCK When ssh-agent starts, it creates a UNIX-domain socket and
+ stores its pathname in this variable. It is accessible
+ only to the current user, but is easily abused by root or
+ another instance of the same user.
FILES
$TMPDIR/ssh-XXXXXXXXXX/agent.<ppid>
UNIX-domain sockets used to contain the connection to the
authentication agent. These sockets should only be readable by
the owner. The sockets should get automatically removed when the
agent exits.
SEE ALSO
- ssh(1), ssh-add(1), ssh-keygen(1), sshd(8)
+ ssh(1), ssh-add(1), ssh-keygen(1), ssh_config(5), sshd(8)
AUTHORS
OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free ssh 1.2.12 release by
Tatu Ylonen. Aaron Campbell, Bob Beck, Markus Friedl, Niels Provos, Theo
de Raadt and Dug Song removed many bugs, re-added newer features and
created OpenSSH. Markus Friedl contributed the support for SSH protocol
versions 1.5 and 2.0.
-OpenBSD 6.6 November 30, 2016 OpenBSD 6.6
+OpenBSD 6.6 December 21, 2019 OpenBSD 6.6
diff --git a/ssh-agent.1 b/ssh-agent.1
index 83b2b41c846c..fff0db6bc07c 100644
--- a/ssh-agent.1
+++ b/ssh-agent.1
@@ -1,231 +1,227 @@
-.\" $OpenBSD: ssh-agent.1,v 1.64 2016/11/30 06:54:26 jmc Exp $
+.\" $OpenBSD: ssh-agent.1,v 1.70 2019/12/21 20:22:34 naddy Exp $
.\"
.\" Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
.\" Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
.\" All rights reserved
.\"
.\" As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
.\" can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
.\" software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
.\" incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
.\" called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
.\"
.\" Copyright (c) 1999,2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
.\" Copyright (c) 1999 Aaron Campbell. All rights reserved.
.\" Copyright (c) 1999 Theo de Raadt. All rights reserved.
.\"
.\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
.\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
.\" are met:
.\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
.\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
.\" documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
.\"
.\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
.\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
.\" OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
.\" IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
.\" INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
.\" NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
.\" DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
.\" THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
.\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
.\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
.\"
-.Dd $Mdocdate: November 30 2016 $
+.Dd $Mdocdate: December 21 2019 $
.Dt SSH-AGENT 1
.Os
.Sh NAME
.Nm ssh-agent
-.Nd authentication agent
+.Nd OpenSSH authentication agent
.Sh SYNOPSIS
.Nm ssh-agent
.Op Fl c | s
.Op Fl \&Dd
.Op Fl a Ar bind_address
.Op Fl E Ar fingerprint_hash
-.Op Fl P Ar pkcs11_whitelist
+.Op Fl P Ar provider_whitelist
.Op Fl t Ar life
.Op Ar command Op Ar arg ...
.Nm ssh-agent
.Op Fl c | s
.Fl k
.Sh DESCRIPTION
.Nm
-is a program to hold private keys used for public key authentication
-(RSA, DSA, ECDSA, Ed25519).
-.Nm
-is usually started in the beginning of an X-session or a login session, and
-all other windows or programs are started as clients to the ssh-agent
-program.
+is a program to hold private keys used for public key authentication.
Through use of environment variables the agent can be located
and automatically used for authentication when logging in to other
machines using
.Xr ssh 1 .
.Pp
-The agent initially does not have any private keys.
-Keys are added using
-.Xr ssh 1
-(see
-.Cm AddKeysToAgent
-in
-.Xr ssh_config 5
-for details)
-or
-.Xr ssh-add 1 .
-Multiple identities may be stored in
-.Nm
-concurrently and
-.Xr ssh 1
-will automatically use them if present.
-.Xr ssh-add 1
-is also used to remove keys from
-.Nm
-and to query the keys that are held in one.
-.Pp
The options are as follows:
.Bl -tag -width Ds
.It Fl a Ar bind_address
Bind the agent to the
.Ux Ns -domain
socket
.Ar bind_address .
The default is
.Pa $TMPDIR/ssh-XXXXXXXXXX/agent.\*(Ltppid\*(Gt .
.It Fl c
Generate C-shell commands on
.Dv stdout .
This is the default if
.Ev SHELL
looks like it's a csh style of shell.
.It Fl D
Foreground mode.
When this option is specified
.Nm
will not fork.
.It Fl d
Debug mode.
When this option is specified
.Nm
will not fork and will write debug information to standard error.
.It Fl E Ar fingerprint_hash
Specifies the hash algorithm used when displaying key fingerprints.
Valid options are:
.Dq md5
and
.Dq sha256 .
The default is
.Dq sha256 .
.It Fl k
Kill the current agent (given by the
.Ev SSH_AGENT_PID
environment variable).
-.It Fl P Ar pkcs11_whitelist
-Specify a pattern-list of acceptable paths for PKCS#11 shared libraries
-that may be added using the
+.It Fl P Ar provider_whitelist
+Specify a pattern-list of acceptable paths for PKCS#11 and FIDO authenticator
+shared libraries that may be used with the
+.Fl S
+or
.Fl s
-option to
+options to
.Xr ssh-add 1 .
-The default is to allow loading PKCS#11 libraries from
-.Dq /usr/lib/*,/usr/local/lib/* .
-PKCS#11 libraries that do not match the whitelist will be refused.
+Libraries that do not match the whitelist will be refused.
See PATTERNS in
.Xr ssh_config 5
for a description of pattern-list syntax.
+The default whitelist is
+.Dq /usr/lib/*,/usr/local/lib/* .
.It Fl s
Generate Bourne shell commands on
.Dv stdout .
This is the default if
.Ev SHELL
does not look like it's a csh style of shell.
.It Fl t Ar life
Set a default value for the maximum lifetime of identities added to the agent.
The lifetime may be specified in seconds or in a time format specified in
.Xr sshd_config 5 .
A lifetime specified for an identity with
.Xr ssh-add 1
overrides this value.
Without this option the default maximum lifetime is forever.
+.It Ar command Op Ar arg ...
+If a command (and optional arguments) is given,
+this is executed as a subprocess of the agent.
+The agent exits automatically when the command given on the command
+line terminates.
.El
.Pp
-If a command line is given, this is executed as a subprocess of the agent.
-When the command dies, so does the agent.
-.Pp
-The idea is that the agent is run in the user's local PC, laptop, or
-terminal.
-Authentication data need not be stored on any other
-machine, and authentication passphrases never go over the network.
-However, the connection to the agent is forwarded over SSH
-remote logins, and the user can thus use the privileges given by the
-identities anywhere in the network in a secure way.
-.Pp
-There are two main ways to get an agent set up:
-The first is that the agent starts a new subcommand into which some environment
-variables are exported, eg
+There are two main ways to get an agent set up.
+The first is at the start of an X session,
+where all other windows or programs are started as children of the
+.Nm
+program.
+The agent starts a command under which its environment
+variables are exported, for example
.Cm ssh-agent xterm & .
-The second is that the agent prints the needed shell commands (either
-.Xr sh 1
-or
-.Xr csh 1
-syntax can be generated) which can be evaluated in the calling shell, eg
-.Cm eval `ssh-agent -s`
-for Bourne-type shells such as
-.Xr sh 1
-or
-.Xr ksh 1
-and
-.Cm eval `ssh-agent -c`
-for
-.Xr csh 1
-and derivatives.
+When the command terminates, so does the agent.
+.Pp
+The second method is used for a login session.
+When
+.Nm
+is started,
+it prints the shell commands required to set its environment variables,
+which in turn can be evaluated in the calling shell, for example
+.Cm eval `ssh-agent -s` .
.Pp
-Later
+In both cases,
.Xr ssh 1
-looks at these variables and uses them to establish a connection to the agent.
+looks at these environment variables and uses them to establish a connection to the agent.
.Pp
-The agent will never send a private key over its request channel.
-Instead, operations that require a private key will be performed
-by the agent, and the result will be returned to the requester.
-This way, private keys are not exposed to clients using the agent.
+The agent initially does not have any private keys.
+Keys are added using
+.Xr ssh-add 1
+or by
+.Xr ssh 1
+when
+.Cm AddKeysToAgent
+is set in
+.Xr ssh_config 5 .
+Multiple identities may be stored in
+.Nm
+concurrently and
+.Xr ssh 1
+will automatically use them if present.
+.Xr ssh-add 1
+is also used to remove keys from
+.Nm
+and to query the keys that are held in one.
.Pp
-A
+Connections to
+.Nm
+may be forwarded from further remote hosts using the
+.Fl A
+option to
+.Xr ssh 1
+(but see the caveats documented therein),
+avoiding the need for authentication data to be stored on other machines.
+Authentication passphrases and private keys never go over the network:
+the connection to the agent is forwarded over SSH remote connections
+and the result is returned to the requester,
+allowing the user access to their identities anywhere in the network
+in a secure fashion.
+.Sh ENVIRONMENT
+.Bl -tag -width "SSH_AGENT_PID"
+.It Ev SSH_AGENT_PID
+When
+.Nm
+starts, it stores the name of the agent's process ID (PID) in this variable.
+.It Ev SSH_AUTH_SOCK
+When
+.Nm
+starts, it creates a
.Ux Ns -domain
-socket is created and the name of this socket is stored in the
-.Ev SSH_AUTH_SOCK
-environment
-variable.
-The socket is made accessible only to the current user.
-This method is easily abused by root or another instance of the same
-user.
-.Pp
-The
-.Ev SSH_AGENT_PID
-environment variable holds the agent's process ID.
-.Pp
-The agent exits automatically when the command given on the command
-line terminates.
+socket and stores its pathname in this variable.
+It is accessible only to the current user,
+but is easily abused by root or another instance of the same user.
+.El
.Sh FILES
.Bl -tag -width Ds
.It Pa $TMPDIR/ssh-XXXXXXXXXX/agent.<ppid>
.Ux Ns -domain
sockets used to contain the connection to the authentication agent.
These sockets should only be readable by the owner.
The sockets should get automatically removed when the agent exits.
.El
.Sh SEE ALSO
.Xr ssh 1 ,
.Xr ssh-add 1 ,
.Xr ssh-keygen 1 ,
+.Xr ssh_config 5 ,
.Xr sshd 8
.Sh AUTHORS
.An -nosplit
OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free ssh 1.2.12 release by
.An Tatu Ylonen .
.An Aaron Campbell , Bob Beck , Markus Friedl , Niels Provos , Theo de Raadt
and
.An Dug Song
removed many bugs, re-added newer features and created OpenSSH.
.An Markus Friedl
contributed the support for SSH protocol versions 1.5 and 2.0.
diff --git a/ssh-agent.c b/ssh-agent.c
index 9c6680a2504c..7eb6f0dc5236 100644
--- a/ssh-agent.c
+++ b/ssh-agent.c
@@ -1,1356 +1,1450 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: ssh-agent.c,v 1.237 2019/06/28 13:35:04 deraadt Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh-agent.c,v 1.255 2020/02/06 22:30:54 naddy Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
* All rights reserved
* The authentication agent program.
*
* As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
* can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
* software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
* incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
* called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
*
* Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/param.h>
#include <sys/resource.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <sys/wait.h>
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
# include <sys/time.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_UN_H
# include <sys/un.h>
#endif
#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
#endif
#include <errno.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <limits.h>
#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
# include <paths.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_POLL_H
# include <poll.h>
#endif
#include <signal.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <time.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#ifdef HAVE_UTIL_H
# include <util.h>
#endif
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "ssh.h"
#include "sshbuf.h"
#include "sshkey.h"
#include "authfd.h"
#include "compat.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "digest.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
#include "match.h"
-
-#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
+#include "msg.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
+#include "pathnames.h"
#include "ssh-pkcs11.h"
-#endif
+#include "sk-api.h"
-#ifndef DEFAULT_PKCS11_WHITELIST
-# define DEFAULT_PKCS11_WHITELIST "/usr/lib*/*,/usr/local/lib*/*"
+#ifndef DEFAULT_PROVIDER_WHITELIST
+# define DEFAULT_PROVIDER_WHITELIST "/usr/lib*/*,/usr/local/lib*/*"
#endif
/* Maximum accepted message length */
#define AGENT_MAX_LEN (256*1024)
/* Maximum bytes to read from client socket */
#define AGENT_RBUF_LEN (4096)
typedef enum {
AUTH_UNUSED,
AUTH_SOCKET,
AUTH_CONNECTION
} sock_type;
typedef struct {
int fd;
sock_type type;
struct sshbuf *input;
struct sshbuf *output;
struct sshbuf *request;
} SocketEntry;
u_int sockets_alloc = 0;
SocketEntry *sockets = NULL;
typedef struct identity {
TAILQ_ENTRY(identity) next;
struct sshkey *key;
char *comment;
char *provider;
time_t death;
u_int confirm;
+ char *sk_provider;
} Identity;
struct idtable {
int nentries;
TAILQ_HEAD(idqueue, identity) idlist;
};
/* private key table */
struct idtable *idtab;
int max_fd = 0;
/* pid of shell == parent of agent */
pid_t parent_pid = -1;
time_t parent_alive_interval = 0;
/* pid of process for which cleanup_socket is applicable */
pid_t cleanup_pid = 0;
/* pathname and directory for AUTH_SOCKET */
char socket_name[PATH_MAX];
char socket_dir[PATH_MAX];
-/* PKCS#11 path whitelist */
-static char *pkcs11_whitelist;
+/* PKCS#11/Security key path whitelist */
+static char *provider_whitelist;
/* locking */
#define LOCK_SIZE 32
#define LOCK_SALT_SIZE 16
#define LOCK_ROUNDS 1
int locked = 0;
u_char lock_pwhash[LOCK_SIZE];
u_char lock_salt[LOCK_SALT_SIZE];
extern char *__progname;
/* Default lifetime in seconds (0 == forever) */
static long lifetime = 0;
static int fingerprint_hash = SSH_FP_HASH_DEFAULT;
static void
close_socket(SocketEntry *e)
{
close(e->fd);
e->fd = -1;
e->type = AUTH_UNUSED;
sshbuf_free(e->input);
sshbuf_free(e->output);
sshbuf_free(e->request);
}
static void
idtab_init(void)
{
idtab = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*idtab));
TAILQ_INIT(&idtab->idlist);
idtab->nentries = 0;
}
static void
free_identity(Identity *id)
{
sshkey_free(id->key);
free(id->provider);
free(id->comment);
+ free(id->sk_provider);
free(id);
}
/* return matching private key for given public key */
static Identity *
lookup_identity(struct sshkey *key)
{
Identity *id;
TAILQ_FOREACH(id, &idtab->idlist, next) {
if (sshkey_equal(key, id->key))
return (id);
}
return (NULL);
}
/* Check confirmation of keysign request */
static int
confirm_key(Identity *id)
{
char *p;
int ret = -1;
p = sshkey_fingerprint(id->key, fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT);
if (p != NULL &&
ask_permission("Allow use of key %s?\nKey fingerprint %s.",
id->comment, p))
ret = 0;
free(p);
return (ret);
}
static void
send_status(SocketEntry *e, int success)
{
int r;
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(e->output, 1)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u8(e->output, success ?
SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS : SSH_AGENT_FAILURE)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
}
/* send list of supported public keys to 'client' */
static void
process_request_identities(SocketEntry *e)
{
Identity *id;
struct sshbuf *msg;
int r;
if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_AGENT_IDENTITIES_ANSWER)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, idtab->nentries)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
TAILQ_FOREACH(id, &idtab->idlist, next) {
if ((r = sshkey_puts_opts(id->key, msg, SSHKEY_SERIALIZE_INFO))
!= 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, id->comment)) != 0) {
error("%s: put key/comment: %s", __func__,
ssh_err(r));
continue;
}
}
if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(e->output, msg)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
sshbuf_free(msg);
}
static char *
agent_decode_alg(struct sshkey *key, u_int flags)
{
if (key->type == KEY_RSA) {
if (flags & SSH_AGENT_RSA_SHA2_256)
return "rsa-sha2-256";
else if (flags & SSH_AGENT_RSA_SHA2_512)
return "rsa-sha2-512";
} else if (key->type == KEY_RSA_CERT) {
if (flags & SSH_AGENT_RSA_SHA2_256)
return "rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com";
else if (flags & SSH_AGENT_RSA_SHA2_512)
return "rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com";
}
return NULL;
}
/* ssh2 only */
static void
process_sign_request2(SocketEntry *e)
{
const u_char *data;
u_char *signature = NULL;
size_t dlen, slen = 0;
u_int compat = 0, flags;
int r, ok = -1;
+ char *fp = NULL;
struct sshbuf *msg;
struct sshkey *key = NULL;
struct identity *id;
+ struct notifier_ctx *notifier = NULL;
if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
if ((r = sshkey_froms(e->request, &key)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(e->request, &data, &dlen)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(e->request, &flags)) != 0) {
error("%s: couldn't parse request: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
goto send;
}
if ((id = lookup_identity(key)) == NULL) {
verbose("%s: %s key not found", __func__, sshkey_type(key));
goto send;
}
if (id->confirm && confirm_key(id) != 0) {
verbose("%s: user refused key", __func__);
goto send;
}
+ if (sshkey_is_sk(id->key) &&
+ (id->key->sk_flags & SSH_SK_USER_PRESENCE_REQD)) {
+ if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_HASH_DEFAULT,
+ SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: fingerprint failed", __func__);
+ notifier = notify_start(0,
+ "Confirm user presence for key %s %s",
+ sshkey_type(id->key), fp);
+ }
if ((r = sshkey_sign(id->key, &signature, &slen,
- data, dlen, agent_decode_alg(key, flags), compat)) != 0) {
+ data, dlen, agent_decode_alg(key, flags),
+ id->sk_provider, compat)) != 0) {
error("%s: sshkey_sign: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
goto send;
}
/* Success */
ok = 0;
send:
+ notify_complete(notifier);
sshkey_free(key);
+ free(fp);
if (ok == 0) {
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_AGENT_SIGN_RESPONSE)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_string(msg, signature, slen)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
} else if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH_AGENT_FAILURE)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(e->output, msg)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
sshbuf_free(msg);
free(signature);
}
/* shared */
static void
process_remove_identity(SocketEntry *e)
{
int r, success = 0;
struct sshkey *key = NULL;
Identity *id;
if ((r = sshkey_froms(e->request, &key)) != 0) {
error("%s: get key: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
goto done;
}
if ((id = lookup_identity(key)) == NULL) {
debug("%s: key not found", __func__);
goto done;
}
/* We have this key, free it. */
if (idtab->nentries < 1)
fatal("%s: internal error: nentries %d",
__func__, idtab->nentries);
TAILQ_REMOVE(&idtab->idlist, id, next);
free_identity(id);
idtab->nentries--;
sshkey_free(key);
success = 1;
done:
send_status(e, success);
}
static void
process_remove_all_identities(SocketEntry *e)
{
Identity *id;
/* Loop over all identities and clear the keys. */
for (id = TAILQ_FIRST(&idtab->idlist); id;
id = TAILQ_FIRST(&idtab->idlist)) {
TAILQ_REMOVE(&idtab->idlist, id, next);
free_identity(id);
}
/* Mark that there are no identities. */
idtab->nentries = 0;
/* Send success. */
send_status(e, 1);
}
/* removes expired keys and returns number of seconds until the next expiry */
static time_t
reaper(void)
{
time_t deadline = 0, now = monotime();
Identity *id, *nxt;
for (id = TAILQ_FIRST(&idtab->idlist); id; id = nxt) {
nxt = TAILQ_NEXT(id, next);
if (id->death == 0)
continue;
if (now >= id->death) {
debug("expiring key '%s'", id->comment);
TAILQ_REMOVE(&idtab->idlist, id, next);
free_identity(id);
idtab->nentries--;
} else
deadline = (deadline == 0) ? id->death :
MINIMUM(deadline, id->death);
}
if (deadline == 0 || deadline <= now)
return 0;
else
return (deadline - now);
}
static void
process_add_identity(SocketEntry *e)
{
Identity *id;
int success = 0, confirm = 0;
u_int seconds, maxsign;
- char *comment = NULL;
+ char *fp, *comment = NULL, *ext_name = NULL, *sk_provider = NULL;
+ char canonical_provider[PATH_MAX];
time_t death = 0;
struct sshkey *k = NULL;
u_char ctype;
int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
if ((r = sshkey_private_deserialize(e->request, &k)) != 0 ||
k == NULL ||
(r = sshbuf_get_cstring(e->request, &comment, NULL)) != 0) {
error("%s: decode private key: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
goto err;
}
- if ((r = sshkey_shield_private(k)) != 0) {
- error("%s: shield private key: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
- goto err;
- }
while (sshbuf_len(e->request)) {
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(e->request, &ctype)) != 0) {
error("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
goto err;
}
switch (ctype) {
case SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_LIFETIME:
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(e->request, &seconds)) != 0) {
error("%s: bad lifetime constraint: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
goto err;
}
death = monotime() + seconds;
break;
case SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_CONFIRM:
confirm = 1;
break;
case SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_MAXSIGN:
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(e->request, &maxsign)) != 0) {
error("%s: bad maxsign constraint: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
goto err;
}
if ((r = sshkey_enable_maxsign(k, maxsign)) != 0) {
error("%s: cannot enable maxsign: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
goto err;
}
break;
+ case SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_EXTENSION:
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(e->request,
+ &ext_name, NULL)) != 0) {
+ error("%s: cannot parse extension: %s",
+ __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ goto err;
+ }
+ debug("%s: constraint ext %s", __func__, ext_name);
+ if (strcmp(ext_name, "sk-provider@openssh.com") == 0) {
+ if (sk_provider != NULL) {
+ error("%s already set", ext_name);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(e->request,
+ &sk_provider, NULL)) != 0) {
+ error("%s: cannot parse %s: %s",
+ __func__, ext_name, ssh_err(r));
+ goto err;
+ }
+ } else {
+ error("%s: unsupported constraint \"%s\"",
+ __func__, ext_name);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ free(ext_name);
+ break;
default:
error("%s: Unknown constraint %d", __func__, ctype);
err:
+ free(sk_provider);
+ free(ext_name);
sshbuf_reset(e->request);
free(comment);
sshkey_free(k);
goto send;
}
}
+ if (sk_provider != NULL) {
+ if (!sshkey_is_sk(k)) {
+ error("Cannot add provider: %s is not an "
+ "authenticator-hosted key", sshkey_type(k));
+ free(sk_provider);
+ goto send;
+ }
+ if (strcasecmp(sk_provider, "internal") == 0) {
+ debug("%s: internal provider", __func__);
+ } else {
+ if (realpath(sk_provider, canonical_provider) == NULL) {
+ verbose("failed provider \"%.100s\": "
+ "realpath: %s", sk_provider,
+ strerror(errno));
+ free(sk_provider);
+ goto send;
+ }
+ free(sk_provider);
+ sk_provider = xstrdup(canonical_provider);
+ if (match_pattern_list(sk_provider,
+ provider_whitelist, 0) != 1) {
+ error("Refusing add key: "
+ "provider %s not whitelisted", sk_provider);
+ free(sk_provider);
+ goto send;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ if ((r = sshkey_shield_private(k)) != 0) {
+ error("%s: shield private key: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ goto err;
+ }
success = 1;
if (lifetime && !death)
death = monotime() + lifetime;
if ((id = lookup_identity(k)) == NULL) {
id = xcalloc(1, sizeof(Identity));
TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&idtab->idlist, id, next);
/* Increment the number of identities. */
idtab->nentries++;
} else {
/* key state might have been updated */
sshkey_free(id->key);
free(id->comment);
+ free(id->sk_provider);
}
id->key = k;
id->comment = comment;
id->death = death;
id->confirm = confirm;
+ id->sk_provider = sk_provider;
+
+ if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(k, SSH_FP_HASH_DEFAULT,
+ SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: sshkey_fingerprint failed", __func__);
+ debug("%s: add %s %s \"%.100s\" (life: %u) (confirm: %u) "
+ "(provider: %s)", __func__, sshkey_ssh_name(k), fp, comment,
+ seconds, confirm, sk_provider == NULL ? "none" : sk_provider);
+ free(fp);
send:
send_status(e, success);
}
/* XXX todo: encrypt sensitive data with passphrase */
static void
process_lock_agent(SocketEntry *e, int lock)
{
int r, success = 0, delay;
char *passwd;
u_char passwdhash[LOCK_SIZE];
static u_int fail_count = 0;
size_t pwlen;
/*
* This is deliberately fatal: the user has requested that we lock,
* but we can't parse their request properly. The only safe thing to
* do is abort.
*/
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(e->request, &passwd, &pwlen)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
if (pwlen == 0) {
debug("empty password not supported");
} else if (locked && !lock) {
if (bcrypt_pbkdf(passwd, pwlen, lock_salt, sizeof(lock_salt),
passwdhash, sizeof(passwdhash), LOCK_ROUNDS) < 0)
fatal("bcrypt_pbkdf");
if (timingsafe_bcmp(passwdhash, lock_pwhash, LOCK_SIZE) == 0) {
debug("agent unlocked");
locked = 0;
fail_count = 0;
explicit_bzero(lock_pwhash, sizeof(lock_pwhash));
success = 1;
} else {
/* delay in 0.1s increments up to 10s */
if (fail_count < 100)
fail_count++;
delay = 100000 * fail_count;
debug("unlock failed, delaying %0.1lf seconds",
(double)delay/1000000);
usleep(delay);
}
explicit_bzero(passwdhash, sizeof(passwdhash));
} else if (!locked && lock) {
debug("agent locked");
locked = 1;
arc4random_buf(lock_salt, sizeof(lock_salt));
if (bcrypt_pbkdf(passwd, pwlen, lock_salt, sizeof(lock_salt),
lock_pwhash, sizeof(lock_pwhash), LOCK_ROUNDS) < 0)
fatal("bcrypt_pbkdf");
success = 1;
}
explicit_bzero(passwd, pwlen);
free(passwd);
send_status(e, success);
}
static void
no_identities(SocketEntry *e)
{
struct sshbuf *msg;
int r;
if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_AGENT_IDENTITIES_ANSWER)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, 0)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_stringb(e->output, msg)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
sshbuf_free(msg);
}
#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
static void
process_add_smartcard_key(SocketEntry *e)
{
char *provider = NULL, *pin = NULL, canonical_provider[PATH_MAX];
+ char **comments = NULL;
int r, i, count = 0, success = 0, confirm = 0;
u_int seconds;
time_t death = 0;
u_char type;
struct sshkey **keys = NULL, *k;
Identity *id;
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(e->request, &provider, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_cstring(e->request, &pin, NULL)) != 0) {
error("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
goto send;
}
while (sshbuf_len(e->request)) {
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(e->request, &type)) != 0) {
error("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
goto send;
}
switch (type) {
case SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_LIFETIME:
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(e->request, &seconds)) != 0) {
error("%s: buffer error: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
goto send;
}
death = monotime() + seconds;
break;
case SSH_AGENT_CONSTRAIN_CONFIRM:
confirm = 1;
break;
default:
error("%s: Unknown constraint type %d", __func__, type);
goto send;
}
}
if (realpath(provider, canonical_provider) == NULL) {
verbose("failed PKCS#11 add of \"%.100s\": realpath: %s",
provider, strerror(errno));
goto send;
}
- if (match_pattern_list(canonical_provider, pkcs11_whitelist, 0) != 1) {
+ if (match_pattern_list(canonical_provider, provider_whitelist, 0) != 1) {
verbose("refusing PKCS#11 add of \"%.100s\": "
"provider not whitelisted", canonical_provider);
goto send;
}
debug("%s: add %.100s", __func__, canonical_provider);
if (lifetime && !death)
death = monotime() + lifetime;
- count = pkcs11_add_provider(canonical_provider, pin, &keys);
+ count = pkcs11_add_provider(canonical_provider, pin, &keys, &comments);
for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
k = keys[i];
if (lookup_identity(k) == NULL) {
id = xcalloc(1, sizeof(Identity));
id->key = k;
+ keys[i] = NULL; /* transferred */
id->provider = xstrdup(canonical_provider);
- id->comment = xstrdup(canonical_provider); /* XXX */
+ if (*comments[i] != '\0') {
+ id->comment = comments[i];
+ comments[i] = NULL; /* transferred */
+ } else {
+ id->comment = xstrdup(canonical_provider);
+ }
id->death = death;
id->confirm = confirm;
TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&idtab->idlist, id, next);
idtab->nentries++;
success = 1;
- } else {
- sshkey_free(k);
}
- keys[i] = NULL;
+ sshkey_free(keys[i]);
+ free(comments[i]);
}
send:
free(pin);
free(provider);
free(keys);
+ free(comments);
send_status(e, success);
}
static void
process_remove_smartcard_key(SocketEntry *e)
{
char *provider = NULL, *pin = NULL, canonical_provider[PATH_MAX];
int r, success = 0;
Identity *id, *nxt;
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(e->request, &provider, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_cstring(e->request, &pin, NULL)) != 0) {
error("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
goto send;
}
free(pin);
if (realpath(provider, canonical_provider) == NULL) {
verbose("failed PKCS#11 add of \"%.100s\": realpath: %s",
provider, strerror(errno));
goto send;
}
debug("%s: remove %.100s", __func__, canonical_provider);
for (id = TAILQ_FIRST(&idtab->idlist); id; id = nxt) {
nxt = TAILQ_NEXT(id, next);
/* Skip file--based keys */
if (id->provider == NULL)
continue;
if (!strcmp(canonical_provider, id->provider)) {
TAILQ_REMOVE(&idtab->idlist, id, next);
free_identity(id);
idtab->nentries--;
}
}
if (pkcs11_del_provider(canonical_provider) == 0)
success = 1;
else
error("%s: pkcs11_del_provider failed", __func__);
send:
free(provider);
send_status(e, success);
}
#endif /* ENABLE_PKCS11 */
/* dispatch incoming messages */
static int
process_message(u_int socknum)
{
u_int msg_len;
u_char type;
const u_char *cp;
int r;
SocketEntry *e;
if (socknum >= sockets_alloc) {
fatal("%s: socket number %u >= allocated %u",
__func__, socknum, sockets_alloc);
}
e = &sockets[socknum];
if (sshbuf_len(e->input) < 5)
return 0; /* Incomplete message header. */
cp = sshbuf_ptr(e->input);
msg_len = PEEK_U32(cp);
if (msg_len > AGENT_MAX_LEN) {
debug("%s: socket %u (fd=%d) message too long %u > %u",
__func__, socknum, e->fd, msg_len, AGENT_MAX_LEN);
return -1;
}
if (sshbuf_len(e->input) < msg_len + 4)
return 0; /* Incomplete message body. */
/* move the current input to e->request */
sshbuf_reset(e->request);
if ((r = sshbuf_get_stringb(e->input, e->request)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u8(e->request, &type)) != 0) {
if (r == SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE ||
r == SSH_ERR_STRING_TOO_LARGE) {
debug("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
return -1;
}
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
}
debug("%s: socket %u (fd=%d) type %d", __func__, socknum, e->fd, type);
/* check whether agent is locked */
if (locked && type != SSH_AGENTC_UNLOCK) {
sshbuf_reset(e->request);
switch (type) {
case SSH2_AGENTC_REQUEST_IDENTITIES:
/* send empty lists */
no_identities(e);
break;
default:
/* send a fail message for all other request types */
send_status(e, 0);
}
return 0;
}
switch (type) {
case SSH_AGENTC_LOCK:
case SSH_AGENTC_UNLOCK:
process_lock_agent(e, type == SSH_AGENTC_LOCK);
break;
case SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_ALL_RSA_IDENTITIES:
process_remove_all_identities(e); /* safe for !WITH_SSH1 */
break;
/* ssh2 */
case SSH2_AGENTC_SIGN_REQUEST:
process_sign_request2(e);
break;
case SSH2_AGENTC_REQUEST_IDENTITIES:
process_request_identities(e);
break;
case SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_IDENTITY:
case SSH2_AGENTC_ADD_ID_CONSTRAINED:
process_add_identity(e);
break;
case SSH2_AGENTC_REMOVE_IDENTITY:
process_remove_identity(e);
break;
case SSH2_AGENTC_REMOVE_ALL_IDENTITIES:
process_remove_all_identities(e);
break;
#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
case SSH_AGENTC_ADD_SMARTCARD_KEY:
case SSH_AGENTC_ADD_SMARTCARD_KEY_CONSTRAINED:
process_add_smartcard_key(e);
break;
case SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_SMARTCARD_KEY:
process_remove_smartcard_key(e);
break;
#endif /* ENABLE_PKCS11 */
default:
/* Unknown message. Respond with failure. */
error("Unknown message %d", type);
sshbuf_reset(e->request);
send_status(e, 0);
break;
}
return 0;
}
static void
new_socket(sock_type type, int fd)
{
u_int i, old_alloc, new_alloc;
set_nonblock(fd);
if (fd > max_fd)
max_fd = fd;
for (i = 0; i < sockets_alloc; i++)
if (sockets[i].type == AUTH_UNUSED) {
sockets[i].fd = fd;
if ((sockets[i].input = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
if ((sockets[i].output = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
if ((sockets[i].request = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
sockets[i].type = type;
return;
}
old_alloc = sockets_alloc;
new_alloc = sockets_alloc + 10;
sockets = xreallocarray(sockets, new_alloc, sizeof(sockets[0]));
for (i = old_alloc; i < new_alloc; i++)
sockets[i].type = AUTH_UNUSED;
sockets_alloc = new_alloc;
sockets[old_alloc].fd = fd;
if ((sockets[old_alloc].input = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
if ((sockets[old_alloc].output = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
if ((sockets[old_alloc].request = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
sockets[old_alloc].type = type;
}
static int
handle_socket_read(u_int socknum)
{
struct sockaddr_un sunaddr;
socklen_t slen;
uid_t euid;
gid_t egid;
int fd;
slen = sizeof(sunaddr);
fd = accept(sockets[socknum].fd, (struct sockaddr *)&sunaddr, &slen);
if (fd == -1) {
error("accept from AUTH_SOCKET: %s", strerror(errno));
return -1;
}
if (getpeereid(fd, &euid, &egid) == -1) {
error("getpeereid %d failed: %s", fd, strerror(errno));
close(fd);
return -1;
}
if ((euid != 0) && (getuid() != euid)) {
error("uid mismatch: peer euid %u != uid %u",
(u_int) euid, (u_int) getuid());
close(fd);
return -1;
}
new_socket(AUTH_CONNECTION, fd);
return 0;
}
static int
handle_conn_read(u_int socknum)
{
char buf[AGENT_RBUF_LEN];
ssize_t len;
int r;
if ((len = read(sockets[socknum].fd, buf, sizeof(buf))) <= 0) {
if (len == -1) {
if (errno == EAGAIN || errno == EINTR)
return 0;
error("%s: read error on socket %u (fd %d): %s",
__func__, socknum, sockets[socknum].fd,
strerror(errno));
}
return -1;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_put(sockets[socknum].input, buf, len)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
explicit_bzero(buf, sizeof(buf));
process_message(socknum);
return 0;
}
static int
handle_conn_write(u_int socknum)
{
ssize_t len;
int r;
if (sshbuf_len(sockets[socknum].output) == 0)
return 0; /* shouldn't happen */
if ((len = write(sockets[socknum].fd,
sshbuf_ptr(sockets[socknum].output),
sshbuf_len(sockets[socknum].output))) <= 0) {
if (len == -1) {
if (errno == EAGAIN || errno == EINTR)
return 0;
error("%s: read error on socket %u (fd %d): %s",
__func__, socknum, sockets[socknum].fd,
strerror(errno));
}
return -1;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_consume(sockets[socknum].output, len)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
return 0;
}
static void
after_poll(struct pollfd *pfd, size_t npfd, u_int maxfds)
{
size_t i;
u_int socknum, activefds = npfd;
for (i = 0; i < npfd; i++) {
if (pfd[i].revents == 0)
continue;
/* Find sockets entry */
for (socknum = 0; socknum < sockets_alloc; socknum++) {
if (sockets[socknum].type != AUTH_SOCKET &&
sockets[socknum].type != AUTH_CONNECTION)
continue;
if (pfd[i].fd == sockets[socknum].fd)
break;
}
if (socknum >= sockets_alloc) {
error("%s: no socket for fd %d", __func__, pfd[i].fd);
continue;
}
/* Process events */
switch (sockets[socknum].type) {
case AUTH_SOCKET:
if ((pfd[i].revents & (POLLIN|POLLERR)) == 0)
break;
if (npfd > maxfds) {
debug3("out of fds (active %u >= limit %u); "
"skipping accept", activefds, maxfds);
break;
}
if (handle_socket_read(socknum) == 0)
activefds++;
break;
case AUTH_CONNECTION:
if ((pfd[i].revents & (POLLIN|POLLERR)) != 0 &&
handle_conn_read(socknum) != 0) {
goto close_sock;
}
if ((pfd[i].revents & (POLLOUT|POLLHUP)) != 0 &&
handle_conn_write(socknum) != 0) {
close_sock:
if (activefds == 0)
fatal("activefds == 0 at close_sock");
close_socket(&sockets[socknum]);
activefds--;
break;
}
break;
default:
break;
}
}
}
static int
prepare_poll(struct pollfd **pfdp, size_t *npfdp, int *timeoutp, u_int maxfds)
{
struct pollfd *pfd = *pfdp;
size_t i, j, npfd = 0;
time_t deadline;
int r;
/* Count active sockets */
for (i = 0; i < sockets_alloc; i++) {
switch (sockets[i].type) {
case AUTH_SOCKET:
case AUTH_CONNECTION:
npfd++;
break;
case AUTH_UNUSED:
break;
default:
fatal("Unknown socket type %d", sockets[i].type);
break;
}
}
if (npfd != *npfdp &&
(pfd = recallocarray(pfd, *npfdp, npfd, sizeof(*pfd))) == NULL)
fatal("%s: recallocarray failed", __func__);
*pfdp = pfd;
*npfdp = npfd;
for (i = j = 0; i < sockets_alloc; i++) {
switch (sockets[i].type) {
case AUTH_SOCKET:
if (npfd > maxfds) {
debug3("out of fds (active %zu >= limit %u); "
"skipping arming listener", npfd, maxfds);
break;
}
pfd[j].fd = sockets[i].fd;
pfd[j].revents = 0;
pfd[j].events = POLLIN;
j++;
break;
case AUTH_CONNECTION:
pfd[j].fd = sockets[i].fd;
pfd[j].revents = 0;
/*
* Only prepare to read if we can handle a full-size
* input read buffer and enqueue a max size reply..
*/
if ((r = sshbuf_check_reserve(sockets[i].input,
AGENT_RBUF_LEN)) == 0 &&
(r = sshbuf_check_reserve(sockets[i].output,
AGENT_MAX_LEN)) == 0)
pfd[j].events = POLLIN;
else if (r != SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE) {
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
}
if (sshbuf_len(sockets[i].output) > 0)
pfd[j].events |= POLLOUT;
j++;
break;
default:
break;
}
}
deadline = reaper();
if (parent_alive_interval != 0)
deadline = (deadline == 0) ? parent_alive_interval :
MINIMUM(deadline, parent_alive_interval);
if (deadline == 0) {
*timeoutp = -1; /* INFTIM */
} else {
if (deadline > INT_MAX / 1000)
*timeoutp = INT_MAX / 1000;
else
*timeoutp = deadline * 1000;
}
return (1);
}
static void
cleanup_socket(void)
{
if (cleanup_pid != 0 && getpid() != cleanup_pid)
return;
debug("%s: cleanup", __func__);
if (socket_name[0])
unlink(socket_name);
if (socket_dir[0])
rmdir(socket_dir);
}
void
cleanup_exit(int i)
{
cleanup_socket();
_exit(i);
}
/*ARGSUSED*/
static void
cleanup_handler(int sig)
{
cleanup_socket();
#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
pkcs11_terminate();
#endif
_exit(2);
}
static void
check_parent_exists(void)
{
/*
* If our parent has exited then getppid() will return (pid_t)1,
* so testing for that should be safe.
*/
if (parent_pid != -1 && getppid() != parent_pid) {
/* printf("Parent has died - Authentication agent exiting.\n"); */
cleanup_socket();
_exit(2);
}
}
static void
usage(void)
{
fprintf(stderr,
"usage: ssh-agent [-c | -s] [-Dd] [-a bind_address] [-E fingerprint_hash]\n"
- " [-P pkcs11_whitelist] [-t life] [command [arg ...]]\n"
+ " [-P provider_whitelist] [-t life] [command [arg ...]]\n"
" ssh-agent [-c | -s] -k\n");
exit(1);
}
int
main(int ac, char **av)
{
int c_flag = 0, d_flag = 0, D_flag = 0, k_flag = 0, s_flag = 0;
int sock, fd, ch, result, saved_errno;
char *shell, *format, *pidstr, *agentsocket = NULL;
#ifdef HAVE_SETRLIMIT
struct rlimit rlim;
#endif
extern int optind;
extern char *optarg;
pid_t pid;
char pidstrbuf[1 + 3 * sizeof pid];
size_t len;
mode_t prev_mask;
int timeout = -1; /* INFTIM */
struct pollfd *pfd = NULL;
size_t npfd = 0;
u_int maxfds;
/* Ensure that fds 0, 1 and 2 are open or directed to /dev/null */
sanitise_stdfd();
/* drop */
setegid(getgid());
setgid(getgid());
platform_disable_tracing(0); /* strict=no */
+#ifdef RLIMIT_NOFILE
if (getrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE, &rlim) == -1)
fatal("%s: getrlimit: %s", __progname, strerror(errno));
+#endif
__progname = ssh_get_progname(av[0]);
seed_rng();
while ((ch = getopt(ac, av, "cDdksE:a:P:t:")) != -1) {
switch (ch) {
case 'E':
fingerprint_hash = ssh_digest_alg_by_name(optarg);
if (fingerprint_hash == -1)
fatal("Invalid hash algorithm \"%s\"", optarg);
break;
case 'c':
if (s_flag)
usage();
c_flag++;
break;
case 'k':
k_flag++;
break;
case 'P':
- if (pkcs11_whitelist != NULL)
+ if (provider_whitelist != NULL)
fatal("-P option already specified");
- pkcs11_whitelist = xstrdup(optarg);
+ provider_whitelist = xstrdup(optarg);
break;
case 's':
if (c_flag)
usage();
s_flag++;
break;
case 'd':
if (d_flag || D_flag)
usage();
d_flag++;
break;
case 'D':
if (d_flag || D_flag)
usage();
D_flag++;
break;
case 'a':
agentsocket = optarg;
break;
case 't':
if ((lifetime = convtime(optarg)) == -1) {
fprintf(stderr, "Invalid lifetime\n");
usage();
}
break;
default:
usage();
}
}
ac -= optind;
av += optind;
if (ac > 0 && (c_flag || k_flag || s_flag || d_flag || D_flag))
usage();
- if (pkcs11_whitelist == NULL)
- pkcs11_whitelist = xstrdup(DEFAULT_PKCS11_WHITELIST);
+ if (provider_whitelist == NULL)
+ provider_whitelist = xstrdup(DEFAULT_PROVIDER_WHITELIST);
if (ac == 0 && !c_flag && !s_flag) {
shell = getenv("SHELL");
if (shell != NULL && (len = strlen(shell)) > 2 &&
strncmp(shell + len - 3, "csh", 3) == 0)
c_flag = 1;
}
if (k_flag) {
const char *errstr = NULL;
pidstr = getenv(SSH_AGENTPID_ENV_NAME);
if (pidstr == NULL) {
fprintf(stderr, "%s not set, cannot kill agent\n",
SSH_AGENTPID_ENV_NAME);
exit(1);
}
pid = (int)strtonum(pidstr, 2, INT_MAX, &errstr);
if (errstr) {
fprintf(stderr,
"%s=\"%s\", which is not a good PID: %s\n",
SSH_AGENTPID_ENV_NAME, pidstr, errstr);
exit(1);
}
if (kill(pid, SIGTERM) == -1) {
perror("kill");
exit(1);
}
format = c_flag ? "unsetenv %s;\n" : "unset %s;\n";
printf(format, SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME);
printf(format, SSH_AGENTPID_ENV_NAME);
printf("echo Agent pid %ld killed;\n", (long)pid);
exit(0);
}
/*
* Minimum file descriptors:
* stdio (3) + listener (1) + syslog (1 maybe) + connection (1) +
* a few spare for libc / stack protectors / sanitisers, etc.
*/
#define SSH_AGENT_MIN_FDS (3+1+1+1+4)
if (rlim.rlim_cur < SSH_AGENT_MIN_FDS)
fatal("%s: file descriptor rlimit %lld too low (minimum %u)",
__progname, (long long)rlim.rlim_cur, SSH_AGENT_MIN_FDS);
maxfds = rlim.rlim_cur - SSH_AGENT_MIN_FDS;
parent_pid = getpid();
if (agentsocket == NULL) {
/* Create private directory for agent socket */
mktemp_proto(socket_dir, sizeof(socket_dir));
if (mkdtemp(socket_dir) == NULL) {
perror("mkdtemp: private socket dir");
exit(1);
}
snprintf(socket_name, sizeof socket_name, "%s/agent.%ld", socket_dir,
(long)parent_pid);
} else {
/* Try to use specified agent socket */
socket_dir[0] = '\0';
strlcpy(socket_name, agentsocket, sizeof socket_name);
}
/*
* Create socket early so it will exist before command gets run from
* the parent.
*/
prev_mask = umask(0177);
sock = unix_listener(socket_name, SSH_LISTEN_BACKLOG, 0);
if (sock < 0) {
/* XXX - unix_listener() calls error() not perror() */
*socket_name = '\0'; /* Don't unlink any existing file */
cleanup_exit(1);
}
umask(prev_mask);
/*
* Fork, and have the parent execute the command, if any, or present
* the socket data. The child continues as the authentication agent.
*/
if (D_flag || d_flag) {
log_init(__progname,
d_flag ? SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3 : SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO,
SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH, 1);
format = c_flag ? "setenv %s %s;\n" : "%s=%s; export %s;\n";
printf(format, SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME, socket_name,
SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME);
printf("echo Agent pid %ld;\n", (long)parent_pid);
fflush(stdout);
goto skip;
}
pid = fork();
if (pid == -1) {
perror("fork");
cleanup_exit(1);
}
if (pid != 0) { /* Parent - execute the given command. */
close(sock);
snprintf(pidstrbuf, sizeof pidstrbuf, "%ld", (long)pid);
if (ac == 0) {
format = c_flag ? "setenv %s %s;\n" : "%s=%s; export %s;\n";
printf(format, SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME, socket_name,
SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME);
printf(format, SSH_AGENTPID_ENV_NAME, pidstrbuf,
SSH_AGENTPID_ENV_NAME);
printf("echo Agent pid %ld;\n", (long)pid);
exit(0);
}
if (setenv(SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME, socket_name, 1) == -1 ||
setenv(SSH_AGENTPID_ENV_NAME, pidstrbuf, 1) == -1) {
perror("setenv");
exit(1);
}
execvp(av[0], av);
perror(av[0]);
exit(1);
}
/* child */
log_init(__progname, SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO, SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH, 0);
if (setsid() == -1) {
error("setsid: %s", strerror(errno));
cleanup_exit(1);
}
(void)chdir("/");
if ((fd = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDWR, 0)) != -1) {
/* XXX might close listen socket */
(void)dup2(fd, STDIN_FILENO);
(void)dup2(fd, STDOUT_FILENO);
(void)dup2(fd, STDERR_FILENO);
if (fd > 2)
close(fd);
}
#ifdef HAVE_SETRLIMIT
/* deny core dumps, since memory contains unencrypted private keys */
rlim.rlim_cur = rlim.rlim_max = 0;
if (setrlimit(RLIMIT_CORE, &rlim) == -1) {
error("setrlimit RLIMIT_CORE: %s", strerror(errno));
cleanup_exit(1);
}
#endif
skip:
cleanup_pid = getpid();
#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
pkcs11_init(0);
#endif
new_socket(AUTH_SOCKET, sock);
if (ac > 0)
parent_alive_interval = 10;
idtab_init();
- signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN);
- signal(SIGINT, (d_flag | D_flag) ? cleanup_handler : SIG_IGN);
- signal(SIGHUP, cleanup_handler);
- signal(SIGTERM, cleanup_handler);
+ ssh_signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN);
+ ssh_signal(SIGINT, (d_flag | D_flag) ? cleanup_handler : SIG_IGN);
+ ssh_signal(SIGHUP, cleanup_handler);
+ ssh_signal(SIGTERM, cleanup_handler);
if (pledge("stdio rpath cpath unix id proc exec", NULL) == -1)
fatal("%s: pledge: %s", __progname, strerror(errno));
platform_pledge_agent();
while (1) {
prepare_poll(&pfd, &npfd, &timeout, maxfds);
result = poll(pfd, npfd, timeout);
saved_errno = errno;
if (parent_alive_interval != 0)
check_parent_exists();
(void) reaper(); /* remove expired keys */
if (result == -1) {
if (saved_errno == EINTR)
continue;
fatal("poll: %s", strerror(saved_errno));
} else if (result > 0)
after_poll(pfd, npfd, maxfds);
}
/* NOTREACHED */
}
diff --git a/ssh-ecdsa-sk.c b/ssh-ecdsa-sk.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..981d60d740fe
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ssh-ecdsa-sk.c
@@ -0,0 +1,209 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh-ecdsa-sk.c,v 1.5 2019/11/26 03:04:27 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2010 Damien Miller. All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2019 Google Inc. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+ * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
+ * OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
+ * IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
+ * INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+ * DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+ * THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+ * (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
+ * THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ */
+
+/* #define DEBUG_SK 1 */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+#include <openssl/bn.h>
+#include <openssl/ec.h>
+#include <openssl/ecdsa.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#endif
+
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdio.h> /* needed for DEBUG_SK only */
+
+#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
+
+#include "sshbuf.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
+#include "digest.h"
+#define SSHKEY_INTERNAL
+#include "sshkey.h"
+
+/* ARGSUSED */
+int
+ssh_ecdsa_sk_verify(const struct sshkey *key,
+ const u_char *signature, size_t signaturelen,
+ const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat,
+ struct sshkey_sig_details **detailsp)
+{
+#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
+ ECDSA_SIG *sig = NULL;
+ BIGNUM *sig_r = NULL, *sig_s = NULL;
+ u_char sig_flags;
+ u_char msghash[32], apphash[32], sighash[32];
+ u_int sig_counter;
+ int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ struct sshbuf *b = NULL, *sigbuf = NULL, *original_signed = NULL;
+ char *ktype = NULL;
+ struct sshkey_sig_details *details = NULL;
+#ifdef DEBUG_SK
+ char *tmp = NULL;
+#endif
+
+ if (detailsp != NULL)
+ *detailsp = NULL;
+ if (key == NULL || key->ecdsa == NULL ||
+ sshkey_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_ECDSA_SK ||
+ signature == NULL || signaturelen == 0)
+ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+
+ if (key->ecdsa_nid != NID_X9_62_prime256v1)
+ return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+
+ /* fetch signature */
+ if ((b = sshbuf_from(signature, signaturelen)) == NULL)
+ return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ if (sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &ktype, NULL) != 0 ||
+ sshbuf_froms(b, &sigbuf) != 0 ||
+ sshbuf_get_u8(b, &sig_flags) != 0 ||
+ sshbuf_get_u32(b, &sig_counter) != 0) {
+ ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (strcmp(sshkey_ssh_name_plain(key), ktype) != 0) {
+ ret = SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (sshbuf_len(b) != 0) {
+ ret = SSH_ERR_UNEXPECTED_TRAILING_DATA;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /* parse signature */
+ if (sshbuf_get_bignum2(sigbuf, &sig_r) != 0 ||
+ sshbuf_get_bignum2(sigbuf, &sig_s) != 0) {
+ ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((sig = ECDSA_SIG_new()) == NULL) {
+ ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (!ECDSA_SIG_set0(sig, sig_r, sig_s)) {
+ ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ goto out;
+ }
+#ifdef DEBUG_SK
+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: data: (len %zu)\n", __func__, datalen);
+ /* sshbuf_dump_data(data, datalen, stderr); */
+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: sig_r: %s\n", __func__, (tmp = BN_bn2hex(sig_r)));
+ free(tmp);
+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: sig_s: %s\n", __func__, (tmp = BN_bn2hex(sig_s)));
+ free(tmp);
+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: sig_flags = 0x%02x, sig_counter = %u\n",
+ __func__, sig_flags, sig_counter);
+#endif
+ sig_r = sig_s = NULL; /* transferred */
+
+ if (sshbuf_len(sigbuf) != 0) {
+ ret = SSH_ERR_UNEXPECTED_TRAILING_DATA;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /* Reconstruct data that was supposedly signed */
+ if ((original_signed = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
+ ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((ret = ssh_digest_memory(SSH_DIGEST_SHA256, data, datalen,
+ msghash, sizeof(msghash))) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ /* Application value is hashed before signature */
+ if ((ret = ssh_digest_memory(SSH_DIGEST_SHA256, key->sk_application,
+ strlen(key->sk_application), apphash, sizeof(apphash))) != 0)
+ goto out;
+#ifdef DEBUG_SK
+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: hashed application:\n", __func__);
+ sshbuf_dump_data(apphash, sizeof(apphash), stderr);
+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: hashed message:\n", __func__);
+ sshbuf_dump_data(msghash, sizeof(msghash), stderr);
+#endif
+ if ((ret = sshbuf_put(original_signed,
+ apphash, sizeof(apphash))) != 0 ||
+ (ret = sshbuf_put_u8(original_signed, sig_flags)) != 0 ||
+ (ret = sshbuf_put_u32(original_signed, sig_counter)) != 0 ||
+ (ret = sshbuf_put(original_signed, msghash, sizeof(msghash))) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ /* Signature is over H(original_signed) */
+ if ((ret = ssh_digest_buffer(SSH_DIGEST_SHA256, original_signed,
+ sighash, sizeof(sighash))) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ if ((details = calloc(1, sizeof(*details))) == NULL) {
+ ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ details->sk_counter = sig_counter;
+ details->sk_flags = sig_flags;
+#ifdef DEBUG_SK
+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: signed buf:\n", __func__);
+ sshbuf_dump(original_signed, stderr);
+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: signed hash:\n", __func__);
+ sshbuf_dump_data(sighash, sizeof(sighash), stderr);
+#endif
+
+ /* Verify it */
+ switch (ECDSA_do_verify(sighash, sizeof(sighash), sig, key->ecdsa)) {
+ case 1:
+ ret = 0;
+ break;
+ case 0:
+ ret = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
+ goto out;
+ default:
+ ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ /* success */
+ if (detailsp != NULL) {
+ *detailsp = details;
+ details = NULL;
+ }
+ out:
+ explicit_bzero(&sig_flags, sizeof(sig_flags));
+ explicit_bzero(&sig_counter, sizeof(sig_counter));
+ explicit_bzero(msghash, sizeof(msghash));
+ explicit_bzero(sighash, sizeof(msghash));
+ explicit_bzero(apphash, sizeof(apphash));
+ sshkey_sig_details_free(details);
+ sshbuf_free(original_signed);
+ sshbuf_free(sigbuf);
+ sshbuf_free(b);
+ ECDSA_SIG_free(sig);
+ BN_clear_free(sig_r);
+ BN_clear_free(sig_s);
+ free(ktype);
+ return ret;
+#else
+ return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+#endif
+}
diff --git a/ssh-ed25519-sk.c b/ssh-ed25519-sk.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..b6f28c09a22f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ssh-ed25519-sk.c
@@ -0,0 +1,166 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh-ed25519-sk.c,v 1.4 2019/11/26 03:04:27 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2019 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+/* #define DEBUG_SK 1 */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#define SSHKEY_INTERNAL
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+
+#include "crypto_api.h"
+
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+
+#include "log.h"
+#include "sshbuf.h"
+#include "sshkey.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
+#include "ssh.h"
+#include "digest.h"
+
+int
+ssh_ed25519_sk_verify(const struct sshkey *key,
+ const u_char *signature, size_t signaturelen,
+ const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat,
+ struct sshkey_sig_details **detailsp)
+{
+ struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
+ struct sshbuf *encoded = NULL;
+ char *ktype = NULL;
+ const u_char *sigblob;
+ const u_char *sm;
+ u_char *m = NULL;
+ u_char apphash[32];
+ u_char msghash[32];
+ u_char sig_flags;
+ u_int sig_counter;
+ size_t len;
+ unsigned long long smlen = 0, mlen = 0;
+ int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ int ret;
+ struct sshkey_sig_details *details = NULL;
+
+ if (detailsp != NULL)
+ *detailsp = NULL;
+
+ if (key == NULL ||
+ sshkey_type_plain(key->type) != KEY_ED25519_SK ||
+ key->ed25519_pk == NULL ||
+ signature == NULL || signaturelen == 0)
+ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+
+ if ((b = sshbuf_from(signature, signaturelen)) == NULL)
+ return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ if (sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &ktype, NULL) != 0 ||
+ sshbuf_get_string_direct(b, &sigblob, &len) != 0 ||
+ sshbuf_get_u8(b, &sig_flags) != 0 ||
+ sshbuf_get_u32(b, &sig_counter) != 0) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+#ifdef DEBUG_SK
+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: data:\n", __func__);
+ /* sshbuf_dump_data(data, datalen, stderr); */
+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: sigblob:\n", __func__);
+ sshbuf_dump_data(sigblob, len, stderr);
+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: sig_flags = 0x%02x, sig_counter = %u\n",
+ __func__, sig_flags, sig_counter);
+#endif
+ if (strcmp(sshkey_ssh_name_plain(key), ktype) != 0) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (sshbuf_len(b) != 0) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_UNEXPECTED_TRAILING_DATA;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (len > crypto_sign_ed25519_BYTES) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (ssh_digest_memory(SSH_DIGEST_SHA256, key->sk_application,
+ strlen(key->sk_application), apphash, sizeof(apphash)) != 0 ||
+ ssh_digest_memory(SSH_DIGEST_SHA256, data, datalen,
+ msghash, sizeof(msghash)) != 0) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+#ifdef DEBUG_SK
+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: hashed application:\n", __func__);
+ sshbuf_dump_data(apphash, sizeof(apphash), stderr);
+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: hashed message:\n", __func__);
+ sshbuf_dump_data(msghash, sizeof(msghash), stderr);
+#endif
+ if ((details = calloc(1, sizeof(*details))) == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ details->sk_counter = sig_counter;
+ details->sk_flags = sig_flags;
+ if ((encoded = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (sshbuf_put(encoded, sigblob, len) != 0 ||
+ sshbuf_put(encoded, apphash, sizeof(apphash)) != 0 ||
+ sshbuf_put_u8(encoded, sig_flags) != 0 ||
+ sshbuf_put_u32(encoded, sig_counter) != 0 ||
+ sshbuf_put(encoded, msghash, sizeof(msghash)) != 0) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+#ifdef DEBUG_SK
+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: signed buf:\n", __func__);
+ sshbuf_dump(encoded, stderr);
+#endif
+ sm = sshbuf_ptr(encoded);
+ smlen = sshbuf_len(encoded);
+ mlen = smlen;
+ if ((m = malloc(smlen)) == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((ret = crypto_sign_ed25519_open(m, &mlen, sm, smlen,
+ key->ed25519_pk)) != 0) {
+ debug2("%s: crypto_sign_ed25519_open failed: %d",
+ __func__, ret);
+ }
+ if (ret != 0 || mlen != smlen - len) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ /* XXX compare 'm' and 'sm + len' ? */
+ /* success */
+ r = 0;
+ if (detailsp != NULL) {
+ *detailsp = details;
+ details = NULL;
+ }
+ out:
+ if (m != NULL) {
+ explicit_bzero(m, smlen); /* NB mlen may be invalid if r != 0 */
+ free(m);
+ }
+ sshkey_sig_details_free(details);
+ sshbuf_free(b);
+ sshbuf_free(encoded);
+ free(ktype);
+ return r;
+}
diff --git a/ssh-keygen.0 b/ssh-keygen.0
index b68736c1110d..703739004950 100644
--- a/ssh-keygen.0
+++ b/ssh-keygen.0
@@ -1,694 +1,789 @@
SSH-KEYGEN(1) General Commands Manual SSH-KEYGEN(1)
NAME
- ssh-keygen M-bM-^@M-^S authentication key generation, management and conversion
+ ssh-keygen M-bM-^@M-^S OpenSSH authentication key utility
SYNOPSIS
ssh-keygen [-q] [-b bits] [-C comment] [-f output_keyfile] [-m format]
- [-N new_passphrase] [-t dsa | ecdsa | ed25519 | rsa]
+ [-t dsa | ecdsa | ecdsa-sk | ed25519 | ed25519-sk | rsa]
+ [-N new_passphrase] [-O option] [-w provider]
ssh-keygen -p [-f keyfile] [-m format] [-N new_passphrase]
[-P old_passphrase]
ssh-keygen -i [-f input_keyfile] [-m key_format]
ssh-keygen -e [-f input_keyfile] [-m key_format]
ssh-keygen -y [-f input_keyfile]
ssh-keygen -c [-C comment] [-f keyfile] [-P passphrase]
ssh-keygen -l [-v] [-E fingerprint_hash] [-f input_keyfile]
ssh-keygen -B [-f input_keyfile]
ssh-keygen -D pkcs11
ssh-keygen -F hostname [-lv] [-f known_hosts_file]
ssh-keygen -H [-f known_hosts_file]
+ ssh-keygen -K [-w provider]
ssh-keygen -R hostname [-f known_hosts_file]
ssh-keygen -r hostname [-g] [-f input_keyfile]
- ssh-keygen -G output_file [-v] [-b bits] [-M memory] [-S start_point]
- ssh-keygen -f input_file -T output_file [-v] [-a rounds] [-J num_lines]
- [-j start_line] [-K checkpt] [-W generator]
+ ssh-keygen -M generate [-O option] output_file
+ ssh-keygen -M screen [-f input_file] [-O option] output_file
ssh-keygen -I certificate_identity -s ca_key [-hU] [-D pkcs11_provider]
[-n principals] [-O option] [-V validity_interval]
[-z serial_number] file ...
ssh-keygen -L [-f input_keyfile]
ssh-keygen -A [-f prefix_path]
ssh-keygen -k -f krl_file [-u] [-s ca_public] [-z version_number]
file ...
ssh-keygen -Q -f krl_file file ...
+ ssh-keygen -Y find-principals -s signature_file -f allowed_signers_file
ssh-keygen -Y check-novalidate -n namespace -s signature_file
ssh-keygen -Y sign -f key_file -n namespace file ...
ssh-keygen -Y verify -f allowed_signers_file -I signer_identity
-n namespace -s signature_file [-r revocation_file]
DESCRIPTION
ssh-keygen generates, manages and converts authentication keys for
ssh(1). ssh-keygen can create keys for use by SSH protocol version 2.
The type of key to be generated is specified with the -t option. If
invoked without any arguments, ssh-keygen will generate an RSA key.
ssh-keygen is also used to generate groups for use in Diffie-Hellman
group exchange (DH-GEX). See the MODULI GENERATION section for details.
Finally, ssh-keygen can be used to generate and update Key Revocation
Lists, and to test whether given keys have been revoked by one. See the
KEY REVOCATION LISTS section for details.
Normally each user wishing to use SSH with public key authentication runs
this once to create the authentication key in ~/.ssh/id_dsa,
- ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa, ~/.ssh/id_ed25519 or ~/.ssh/id_rsa. Additionally, the
- system administrator may use this to generate host keys, as seen in
- /etc/rc.
+ ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa, ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa_sk, ~/.ssh/id_ed25519,
+ ~/.ssh/id_ed25519_sk or ~/.ssh/id_rsa. Additionally, the system
+ administrator may use this to generate host keys, as seen in /etc/rc.
Normally this program generates the key and asks for a file in which to
store the private key. The public key is stored in a file with the same
name but M-bM-^@M-^\.pubM-bM-^@M-^] appended. The program also asks for a passphrase. The
passphrase may be empty to indicate no passphrase (host keys must have an
empty passphrase), or it may be a string of arbitrary length. A
passphrase is similar to a password, except it can be a phrase with a
series of words, punctuation, numbers, whitespace, or any string of
characters you want. Good passphrases are 10-30 characters long, are not
simple sentences or otherwise easily guessable (English prose has only
1-2 bits of entropy per character, and provides very bad passphrases),
and contain a mix of upper and lowercase letters, numbers, and non-
alphanumeric characters. The passphrase can be changed later by using
the -p option.
There is no way to recover a lost passphrase. If the passphrase is lost
or forgotten, a new key must be generated and the corresponding public
key copied to other machines.
ssh-keygen will by default write keys in an OpenSSH-specific format.
This format is preferred as it offers better protection for keys at rest
as well as allowing storage of key comments within the private key file
itself. The key comment may be useful to help identify the key. The
comment is initialized to M-bM-^@M-^\user@hostM-bM-^@M-^] when the key is created, but can be
changed using the -c option.
It is still possible for ssh-keygen to write the previously-used PEM
format private keys using the -m flag. This may be used when generating
new keys, and existing new-format keys may be converted using this option
in conjunction with the -p (change passphrase) flag.
After a key is generated, instructions below detail where the keys should
be placed to be activated.
The options are as follows:
-A For each of the key types (rsa, dsa, ecdsa and ed25519) for which
host keys do not exist, generate the host keys with the default
key file path, an empty passphrase, default bits for the key
type, and default comment. If -f has also been specified, its
argument is used as a prefix to the default path for the
resulting host key files. This is used by /etc/rc to generate
new host keys.
-a rounds
When saving a private key, this option specifies the number of
KDF (key derivation function) rounds used. Higher numbers result
in slower passphrase verification and increased resistance to
brute-force password cracking (should the keys be stolen).
- When screening DH-GEX candidates (using the -T command), this
- option specifies the number of primality tests to perform.
-
-B Show the bubblebabble digest of specified private or public key
file.
-b bits
Specifies the number of bits in the key to create. For RSA keys,
the minimum size is 1024 bits and the default is 3072 bits.
Generally, 3072 bits is considered sufficient. DSA keys must be
exactly 1024 bits as specified by FIPS 186-2. For ECDSA keys,
the -b flag determines the key length by selecting from one of
three elliptic curve sizes: 256, 384 or 521 bits. Attempting to
use bit lengths other than these three values for ECDSA keys will
- fail. Ed25519 keys have a fixed length and the -b flag will be
- ignored.
+ fail. ECDSA-SK, Ed25519 and Ed25519-SK keys have a fixed length
+ and the -b flag will be ignored.
-C comment
Provides a new comment.
-c Requests changing the comment in the private and public key
files. The program will prompt for the file containing the
private keys, for the passphrase if the key has one, and for the
new comment.
-D pkcs11
Download the public keys provided by the PKCS#11 shared library
pkcs11. When used in combination with -s, this option indicates
that a CA key resides in a PKCS#11 token (see the CERTIFICATES
section for details).
-E fingerprint_hash
Specifies the hash algorithm used when displaying key
fingerprints. Valid options are: M-bM-^@M-^\md5M-bM-^@M-^] and M-bM-^@M-^\sha256M-bM-^@M-^]. The
default is M-bM-^@M-^\sha256M-bM-^@M-^].
-e This option will read a private or public OpenSSH key file and
print to stdout a public key in one of the formats specified by
the -m option. The default export format is M-bM-^@M-^\RFC4716M-bM-^@M-^]. This
option allows exporting OpenSSH keys for use by other programs,
including several commercial SSH implementations.
-F hostname | [hostname]:port
Search for the specified hostname (with optional port number) in
a known_hosts file, listing any occurrences found. This option
is useful to find hashed host names or addresses and may also be
used in conjunction with the -H option to print found keys in a
hashed format.
-f filename
Specifies the filename of the key file.
- -G output_file
- Generate candidate primes for DH-GEX. These primes must be
- screened for safety (using the -T option) before use.
-
-g Use generic DNS format when printing fingerprint resource records
using the -r command.
-H Hash a known_hosts file. This replaces all hostnames and
addresses with hashed representations within the specified file;
the original content is moved to a file with a .old suffix.
These hashes may be used normally by ssh and sshd, but they do
not reveal identifying information should the file's contents be
disclosed. This option will not modify existing hashed hostnames
and is therefore safe to use on files that mix hashed and non-
hashed names.
-h When signing a key, create a host certificate instead of a user
certificate. Please see the CERTIFICATES section for details.
-I certificate_identity
Specify the key identity when signing a public key. Please see
the CERTIFICATES section for details.
-i This option will read an unencrypted private (or public) key file
in the format specified by the -m option and print an OpenSSH
compatible private (or public) key to stdout. This option allows
importing keys from other software, including several commercial
SSH implementations. The default import format is M-bM-^@M-^\RFC4716M-bM-^@M-^].
- -J num_lines
- Exit after screening the specified number of lines while
- performing DH candidate screening using the -T option.
-
- -j start_line
- Start screening at the specified line number while performing DH
- candidate screening using the -T option.
-
- -K checkpt
- Write the last line processed to the file checkpt while
- performing DH candidate screening using the -T option. This will
- be used to skip lines in the input file that have already been
- processed if the job is restarted.
+ -K Download resident keys from a FIDO authenticator. Public and
+ private key files will be written to the current directory for
+ each downloaded key.
-k Generate a KRL file. In this mode, ssh-keygen will generate a
KRL file at the location specified via the -f flag that revokes
every key or certificate presented on the command line.
Keys/certificates to be revoked may be specified by public key
file or using the format described in the KEY REVOCATION LISTS
section.
-L Prints the contents of one or more certificates.
-l Show fingerprint of specified public key file. For RSA and DSA
keys ssh-keygen tries to find the matching public key file and
prints its fingerprint. If combined with -v, a visual ASCII art
representation of the key is supplied with the fingerprint.
- -M memory
- Specify the amount of memory to use (in megabytes) when
- generating candidate moduli for DH-GEX.
+ -M generate
+ Generate candidate Diffie-Hellman Group Exchange (DH-GEX)
+ parameters for eventual use by the
+ M-bM-^@M-^Xdiffie-hellman-group-exchange-*M-bM-^@M-^Y key exchange methods. The
+ numbers generated by this operation must be further screened
+ before use. See the MODULI GENERATION section for more
+ information.
+
+ -M screen
+ Screen candidate parameters for Diffie-Hellman Group Exchange.
+ This will accept a list of candidate numbers and test that they
+ are safe (Sophie Germain) primes with acceptable group
+ generators. The results of this operation may be added to the
+ /etc/moduli file. See the MODULI GENERATION section for more
+ information.
-m key_format
Specify a key format for key generation, the -i (import), -e
(export) conversion options, and the -p change passphrase
operation. The latter may be used to convert between OpenSSH
private key and PEM private key formats. The supported key
formats are: M-bM-^@M-^\RFC4716M-bM-^@M-^] (RFC 4716/SSH2 public or private key),
M-bM-^@M-^\PKCS8M-bM-^@M-^] (PKCS8 public or private key) or M-bM-^@M-^\PEMM-bM-^@M-^] (PEM public key).
By default OpenSSH will write newly-generated private keys in its
own format, but when converting public keys for export the
default format is M-bM-^@M-^\RFC4716M-bM-^@M-^]. Setting a format of M-bM-^@M-^\PEMM-bM-^@M-^] when
generating or updating a supported private key type will cause
the key to be stored in the legacy PEM private key format.
-N new_passphrase
Provides the new passphrase.
-n principals
Specify one or more principals (user or host names) to be
included in a certificate when signing a key. Multiple
principals may be specified, separated by commas. Please see the
CERTIFICATES section for details.
-O option
- Specify a certificate option when signing a key. This option may
- be specified multiple times. See also the CERTIFICATES section
- for further details.
-
- At present, no standard options are valid for host keys. The
- options that are valid for user certificates are:
-
- clear Clear all enabled permissions. This is useful for
- clearing the default set of permissions so permissions
- may be added individually.
-
- critical:name[=contents]
- extension:name[=contents]
- Includes an arbitrary certificate critical option or
- extension. The specified name should include a domain
- suffix, e.g. M-bM-^@M-^\name@example.comM-bM-^@M-^]. If contents is
- specified then it is included as the contents of the
- extension/option encoded as a string, otherwise the
- extension/option is created with no contents (usually
- indicating a flag). Extensions may be ignored by a
- client or server that does not recognise them, whereas
- unknown critical options will cause the certificate to be
- refused.
-
- force-command=command
- Forces the execution of command instead of any shell or
- command specified by the user when the certificate is
- used for authentication.
-
- no-agent-forwarding
- Disable ssh-agent(1) forwarding (permitted by default).
-
- no-port-forwarding
- Disable port forwarding (permitted by default).
-
- no-pty Disable PTY allocation (permitted by default).
-
- no-user-rc
- Disable execution of ~/.ssh/rc by sshd(8) (permitted by
- default).
-
- no-x11-forwarding
- Disable X11 forwarding (permitted by default).
-
- permit-agent-forwarding
- Allows ssh-agent(1) forwarding.
-
- permit-port-forwarding
- Allows port forwarding.
-
- permit-pty
- Allows PTY allocation.
-
- permit-user-rc
- Allows execution of ~/.ssh/rc by sshd(8).
-
- permit-X11-forwarding
- Allows X11 forwarding.
-
- source-address=address_list
- Restrict the source addresses from which the certificate
- is considered valid. The address_list is a comma-
- separated list of one or more address/netmask pairs in
- CIDR format.
+ Specify a key/value option. These are specific to the operation
+ that ssh-keygen has been requested to perform.
+
+ When signing certificates, one of the options listed in the
+ CERTIFICATES section may be specified here.
+
+ When performing moduli generation or screening, one of the
+ options listed in the MODULI GENERATION section may be specified.
+
+ When generating a key that will be hosted on a FIDO
+ authenticator, this flag may be used to specify key-specific
+ options. Those supported at present are:
+
+ application
+ Override the default FIDO application/origin string of
+ M-bM-^@M-^\ssh:M-bM-^@M-^]. This may be useful when generating host or
+ domain-specific resident keys. The specified application
+ string must begin with M-bM-^@M-^\ssh:M-bM-^@M-^].
+
+ challenge=path
+ Specifies a path to a challenge string that will be
+ passed to the FIDO token during key generation. The
+ challenge string may be used as part of an out-of-band
+ protocol for key enrollment (a random challenge is used
+ by default).
+
+ device Explicitly specify a fido(4) device to use, rather than
+ letting the token middleware select one.
+
+ no-touch-required
+ Indicate that the generated private key should not
+ require touch events (user presence) when making
+ signatures. Note that sshd(8) will refuse such
+ signatures by default, unless overridden via an
+ authorized_keys option.
+
+ resident
+ Indicate that the key should be stored on the FIDO
+ authenticator itself. Resident keys may be supported on
+ FIDO2 tokens and typically require that a PIN be set on
+ the token prior to generation. Resident keys may be
+ loaded off the token using ssh-add(1).
+
+ user A username to be associated with a resident key,
+ overriding the empty default username. Specifying a
+ username may be useful when generating multiple resident
+ keys for the same application name.
+
+ write-attestation=path
+ May be used at key generation time to record the
+ attestation certificate returned from FIDO tokens during
+ key generation. By default this information is
+ discarded.
+
+ The -O option may be specified multiple times.
-P passphrase
Provides the (old) passphrase.
-p Requests changing the passphrase of a private key file instead of
creating a new private key. The program will prompt for the file
containing the private key, for the old passphrase, and twice for
the new passphrase.
-Q Test whether keys have been revoked in a KRL.
-q Silence ssh-keygen.
-R hostname | [hostname]:port
Removes all keys belonging to the specified hostname (with
optional port number) from a known_hosts file. This option is
useful to delete hashed hosts (see the -H option above).
-r hostname
Print the SSHFP fingerprint resource record named hostname for
the specified public key file.
- -S start
- Specify start point (in hex) when generating candidate moduli for
- DH-GEX.
-
-s ca_key
Certify (sign) a public key using the specified CA key. Please
see the CERTIFICATES section for details.
When generating a KRL, -s specifies a path to a CA public key
file used to revoke certificates directly by key ID or serial
number. See the KEY REVOCATION LISTS section for details.
- -T output_file
- Test DH group exchange candidate primes (generated using the -G
- option) for safety.
-
- -t dsa | ecdsa | ed25519 | rsa
+ -t dsa | ecdsa | ecdsa-sk | ed25519 | ed25519-sk | rsa
Specifies the type of key to create. The possible values are
- M-bM-^@M-^\dsaM-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\ecdsaM-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\ed25519M-bM-^@M-^], or M-bM-^@M-^\rsaM-bM-^@M-^].
+ M-bM-^@M-^\dsaM-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\ecdsaM-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\ecdsa-skM-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\ed25519M-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\ed25519-skM-bM-^@M-^], or M-bM-^@M-^\rsaM-bM-^@M-^].
This flag may also be used to specify the desired signature type
when signing certificates using an RSA CA key. The available RSA
signature variants are M-bM-^@M-^\ssh-rsaM-bM-^@M-^] (SHA1 signatures, not
recommended), M-bM-^@M-^\rsa-sha2-256M-bM-^@M-^], and M-bM-^@M-^\rsa-sha2-512M-bM-^@M-^] (the default).
-U When used in combination with -s, this option indicates that a CA
key resides in a ssh-agent(1). See the CERTIFICATES section for
more information.
-u Update a KRL. When specified with -k, keys listed via the
command line are added to the existing KRL rather than a new KRL
being created.
-V validity_interval
Specify a validity interval when signing a certificate. A
validity interval may consist of a single time, indicating that
the certificate is valid beginning now and expiring at that time,
or may consist of two times separated by a colon to indicate an
explicit time interval.
The start time may be specified as the string M-bM-^@M-^\alwaysM-bM-^@M-^] to
indicate the certificate has no specified start time, a date in
YYYYMMDD format, a time in YYYYMMDDHHMM[SS] format, a relative
time (to the current time) consisting of a minus sign followed by
an interval in the format described in the TIME FORMATS section
of sshd_config(5).
The end time may be specified as a YYYYMMDD date, a
YYYYMMDDHHMM[SS] time, a relative time starting with a plus
character or the string M-bM-^@M-^\foreverM-bM-^@M-^] to indicate that the
certificate has no expirty date.
For example: M-bM-^@M-^\+52w1dM-bM-^@M-^] (valid from now to 52 weeks and one day
from now), M-bM-^@M-^\-4w:+4wM-bM-^@M-^] (valid from four weeks ago to four weeks
from now), M-bM-^@M-^\20100101123000:20110101123000M-bM-^@M-^] (valid from 12:30 PM,
January 1st, 2010 to 12:30 PM, January 1st, 2011), M-bM-^@M-^\-1d:20110101M-bM-^@M-^]
(valid from yesterday to midnight, January 1st, 2011).
M-bM-^@M-^\-1m:foreverM-bM-^@M-^] (valid from one minute ago and never expiring).
-v Verbose mode. Causes ssh-keygen to print debugging messages
about its progress. This is helpful for debugging moduli
generation. Multiple -v options increase the verbosity. The
maximum is 3.
- -W generator
- Specify desired generator when testing candidate moduli for DH-
- GEX.
+ -w provider
+ Specifies a path to a library that will be used when creating
+ FIDO authenticator-hosted keys, overriding the default of using
+ the internal USB HID support.
- -y This option will read a private OpenSSH format file and print an
- OpenSSH public key to stdout.
+ -Y find-principals
+ Find the principal(s) associated with the public key of a
+ signature, provided using the -s flag in an authorized signers
+ file provided using the -f flag. The format of the allowed
+ signers file is documented in the ALLOWED SIGNERS section below.
+ If one or more matching principals are found, they are returned
+ on standard output.
+
+ -Y check-novalidate
+ Checks that a signature generated using ssh-keygen -Y sign has a
+ valid structure. This does not validate if a signature comes
+ from an authorized signer. When testing a signature, ssh-keygen
+ accepts a message on standard input and a signature namespace
+ using -n. A file containing the corresponding signature must
+ also be supplied using the -s flag. Successful testing of the
+ signature is signalled by ssh-keygen returning a zero exit
+ status.
-Y sign
Cryptographically sign a file or some data using a SSH key. When
signing, ssh-keygen accepts zero or more files to sign on the
command-line - if no files are specified then ssh-keygen will
sign data presented on standard input. Signatures are written to
the path of the input file with M-bM-^@M-^\.sigM-bM-^@M-^] appended, or to standard
output if the message to be signed was read from standard input.
The key used for signing is specified using the -f option and may
refer to either a private key, or a public key with the private
half available via ssh-agent(1). An additional signature
namespace, used to prevent signature confusion across different
domains of use (e.g. file signing vs email signing) must be
provided via the -n flag. Namespaces are arbitrary strings, and
may include: M-bM-^@M-^\fileM-bM-^@M-^] for file signing, M-bM-^@M-^\emailM-bM-^@M-^] for email signing.
For custom uses, it is recommended to use names following a
NAMESPACE@YOUR.DOMAIN pattern to generate unambiguous namespaces.
-Y verify
Request to verify a signature generated using ssh-keygen -Y sign
as described above. When verifying a signature, ssh-keygen
accepts a message on standard input and a signature namespace
using -n. A file containing the corresponding signature must
also be supplied using the -s flag, along with the identity of
the signer using -I and a list of allowed signers via the -f
flag. The format of the allowed signers file is documented in
the ALLOWED SIGNERS section below. A file containing revoked
keys can be passed using the -r flag. The revocation file may be
a KRL or a one-per-line list of public keys. Successful
verification by an authorized signer is signalled by ssh-keygen
+ returning a zero exit status.
- -Y check-novalidate
- Checks that a signature generated using ssh-keygen -Y sign has a
- valid structure. This does not validate if a signature comes
- from an authorized signer. When testing a signature, ssh-keygen
- accepts a message on standard input and a signature namespace
- using -n. A file containing the corresponding signature must
- also be supplied using the -s flag. Successful testing of the
- signature is signalled by ssh-keygen returning a zero exit
- status.
+ -y This option will read a private OpenSSH format file and print an
+ OpenSSH public key to stdout.
-z serial_number
Specifies a serial number to be embedded in the certificate to
distinguish this certificate from others from the same CA. If
the serial_number is prefixed with a M-bM-^@M-^X+M-bM-^@M-^Y character, then the
serial number will be incremented for each certificate signed on
a single command-line. The default serial number is zero.
When generating a KRL, the -z flag is used to specify a KRL
version number.
MODULI GENERATION
ssh-keygen may be used to generate groups for the Diffie-Hellman Group
Exchange (DH-GEX) protocol. Generating these groups is a two-step
process: first, candidate primes are generated using a fast, but memory
intensive process. These candidate primes are then tested for
suitability (a CPU-intensive process).
- Generation of primes is performed using the -G option. The desired
- length of the primes may be specified by the -b option. For example:
+ Generation of primes is performed using the -M generate option. The
+ desired length of the primes may be specified by the -O bits option. For
+ example:
- # ssh-keygen -G moduli-2048.candidates -b 2048
+ # ssh-keygen -M generate -O bits=2048 moduli-2048.candidates
By default, the search for primes begins at a random point in the desired
- length range. This may be overridden using the -S option, which
+ length range. This may be overridden using the -O start option, which
specifies a different start point (in hex).
Once a set of candidates have been generated, they must be screened for
- suitability. This may be performed using the -T option. In this mode
- ssh-keygen will read candidates from standard input (or a file specified
- using the -f option). For example:
+ suitability. This may be performed using the -M screen option. In this
+ mode ssh-keygen will read candidates from standard input (or a file
+ specified using the -f option). For example:
- # ssh-keygen -T moduli-2048 -f moduli-2048.candidates
+ # ssh-keygen -M screen -f moduli-2048.candidates moduli-2048
By default, each candidate will be subjected to 100 primality tests.
- This may be overridden using the -a option. The DH generator value will
- be chosen automatically for the prime under consideration. If a specific
- generator is desired, it may be requested using the -W option. Valid
- generator values are 2, 3, and 5.
+ This may be overridden using the -O prime-tests option. The DH generator
+ value will be chosen automatically for the prime under consideration. If
+ a specific generator is desired, it may be requested using the -O
+ generator option. Valid generator values are 2, 3, and 5.
Screened DH groups may be installed in /etc/moduli. It is important that
this file contains moduli of a range of bit lengths and that both ends of
a connection share common moduli.
+ A number of options are available for moduli generation and screening via
+ the -O flag:
+
+ lines=number
+ Exit after screening the specified number of lines while
+ performing DH candidate screening.
+
+ start-line=line-number
+ Start screening at the specified line number while performing DH
+ candidate screening.
+
+ checkpoint=filename
+ Write the last line processed to the specified file while
+ performing DH candidate screening. This will be used to skip
+ lines in the input file that have already been processed if the
+ job is restarted.
+
+ memory=mbytes
+ Specify the amount of memory to use (in megabytes) when
+ generating candidate moduli for DH-GEX.
+
+ start=hex-value
+ Specify start point (in hex) when generating candidate moduli for
+ DH-GEX.
+
+ generator=value
+ Specify desired generator (in decimal) when testing candidate
+ moduli for DH-GEX.
+
CERTIFICATES
ssh-keygen supports signing of keys to produce certificates that may be
used for user or host authentication. Certificates consist of a public
key, some identity information, zero or more principal (user or host)
names and a set of options that are signed by a Certification Authority
(CA) key. Clients or servers may then trust only the CA key and verify
its signature on a certificate rather than trusting many user/host keys.
Note that OpenSSH certificates are a different, and much simpler, format
to the X.509 certificates used in ssl(8).
ssh-keygen supports two types of certificates: user and host. User
certificates authenticate users to servers, whereas host certificates
authenticate server hosts to users. To generate a user certificate:
$ ssh-keygen -s /path/to/ca_key -I key_id /path/to/user_key.pub
The resultant certificate will be placed in /path/to/user_key-cert.pub.
A host certificate requires the -h option:
$ ssh-keygen -s /path/to/ca_key -I key_id -h /path/to/host_key.pub
The host certificate will be output to /path/to/host_key-cert.pub.
It is possible to sign using a CA key stored in a PKCS#11 token by
providing the token library using -D and identifying the CA key by
providing its public half as an argument to -s:
$ ssh-keygen -s ca_key.pub -D libpkcs11.so -I key_id user_key.pub
Similarly, it is possible for the CA key to be hosted in a ssh-agent(1).
This is indicated by the -U flag and, again, the CA key must be
identified by its public half.
$ ssh-keygen -Us ca_key.pub -I key_id user_key.pub
In all cases, key_id is a "key identifier" that is logged by the server
when the certificate is used for authentication.
Certificates may be limited to be valid for a set of principal
(user/host) names. By default, generated certificates are valid for all
users or hosts. To generate a certificate for a specified set of
principals:
$ ssh-keygen -s ca_key -I key_id -n user1,user2 user_key.pub
$ ssh-keygen -s ca_key -I key_id -h -n host.domain host_key.pub
Additional limitations on the validity and use of user certificates may
be specified through certificate options. A certificate option may
disable features of the SSH session, may be valid only when presented
from particular source addresses or may force the use of a specific
- command. For a list of valid certificate options, see the documentation
- for the -O option above.
+ command.
+
+ The options that are valid for user certificates are:
+
+ clear Clear all enabled permissions. This is useful for clearing the
+ default set of permissions so permissions may be added
+ individually.
+
+ critical:name[=contents]
+ extension:name[=contents]
+ Includes an arbitrary certificate critical option or extension.
+ The specified name should include a domain suffix, e.g.
+ M-bM-^@M-^\name@example.comM-bM-^@M-^]. If contents is specified then it is included
+ as the contents of the extension/option encoded as a string,
+ otherwise the extension/option is created with no contents
+ (usually indicating a flag). Extensions may be ignored by a
+ client or server that does not recognise them, whereas unknown
+ critical options will cause the certificate to be refused.
+
+ force-command=command
+ Forces the execution of command instead of any shell or command
+ specified by the user when the certificate is used for
+ authentication.
+
+ no-agent-forwarding
+ Disable ssh-agent(1) forwarding (permitted by default).
+
+ no-port-forwarding
+ Disable port forwarding (permitted by default).
+
+ no-pty Disable PTY allocation (permitted by default).
+
+ no-user-rc
+ Disable execution of ~/.ssh/rc by sshd(8) (permitted by default).
+
+ no-x11-forwarding
+ Disable X11 forwarding (permitted by default).
+
+ permit-agent-forwarding
+ Allows ssh-agent(1) forwarding.
+
+ permit-port-forwarding
+ Allows port forwarding.
+
+ permit-pty
+ Allows PTY allocation.
+
+ permit-user-rc
+ Allows execution of ~/.ssh/rc by sshd(8).
+
+ permit-X11-forwarding
+ Allows X11 forwarding.
+
+ no-touch-required
+ Do not require signatures made using this key require
+ demonstration of user presence (e.g. by having the user touch the
+ authenticator). This option only makes sense for the FIDO
+ authenticator algorithms ecdsa-sk and ed25519-sk.
+
+ source-address=address_list
+ Restrict the source addresses from which the certificate is
+ considered valid. The address_list is a comma-separated list of
+ one or more address/netmask pairs in CIDR format.
+
+ At present, no standard options are valid for host keys.
Finally, certificates may be defined with a validity lifetime. The -V
option allows specification of certificate start and end times. A
certificate that is presented at a time outside this range will not be
considered valid. By default, certificates are valid from UNIX Epoch to
the distant future.
For certificates to be used for user or host authentication, the CA
public key must be trusted by sshd(8) or ssh(1). Please refer to those
manual pages for details.
KEY REVOCATION LISTS
ssh-keygen is able to manage OpenSSH format Key Revocation Lists (KRLs).
These binary files specify keys or certificates to be revoked using a
compact format, taking as little as one bit per certificate if they are
being revoked by serial number.
KRLs may be generated using the -k flag. This option reads one or more
files from the command line and generates a new KRL. The files may
either contain a KRL specification (see below) or public keys, listed one
per line. Plain public keys are revoked by listing their hash or
contents in the KRL and certificates revoked by serial number or key ID
(if the serial is zero or not available).
Revoking keys using a KRL specification offers explicit control over the
types of record used to revoke keys and may be used to directly revoke
certificates by serial number or key ID without having the complete
original certificate on hand. A KRL specification consists of lines
containing one of the following directives followed by a colon and some
directive-specific information.
serial: serial_number[-serial_number]
Revokes a certificate with the specified serial number. Serial
numbers are 64-bit values, not including zero and may be
expressed in decimal, hex or octal. If two serial numbers are
specified separated by a hyphen, then the range of serial numbers
including and between each is revoked. The CA key must have been
specified on the ssh-keygen command line using the -s option.
id: key_id
Revokes a certificate with the specified key ID string. The CA
key must have been specified on the ssh-keygen command line using
the -s option.
key: public_key
Revokes the specified key. If a certificate is listed, then it
is revoked as a plain public key.
sha1: public_key
Revokes the specified key by including its SHA1 hash in the KRL.
sha256: public_key
Revokes the specified key by including its SHA256 hash in the
KRL. KRLs that revoke keys by SHA256 hash are not supported by
OpenSSH versions prior to 7.9.
hash: fingerprint
Revokes a key using a fingerprint hash, as obtained from a
sshd(8) authentication log message or the ssh-keygen -l flag.
Only SHA256 fingerprints are supported here and resultant KRLs
are not supported by OpenSSH versions prior to 7.9.
KRLs may be updated using the -u flag in addition to -k. When this
option is specified, keys listed via the command line are merged into the
KRL, adding to those already there.
It is also possible, given a KRL, to test whether it revokes a particular
key (or keys). The -Q flag will query an existing KRL, testing each key
specified on the command line. If any key listed on the command line has
been revoked (or an error encountered) then ssh-keygen will exit with a
non-zero exit status. A zero exit status will only be returned if no key
was revoked.
ALLOWED SIGNERS
When verifying signatures, ssh-keygen uses a simple list of identities
and keys to determine whether a signature comes from an authorized
source. This "allowed signers" file uses a format patterned after the
AUTHORIZED_KEYS FILE FORMAT described in sshd(8). Each line of the file
contains the following space-separated fields: principals, options,
keytype, base64-encoded key. Empty lines and lines starting with a M-bM-^@M-^X#M-bM-^@M-^Y
are ignored as comments.
The principals field is a pattern-list (See PATTERNS in ssh_config(5))
consisting of one or more comma-separated USER@DOMAIN identity patterns
that are accepted for signing. When verifying, the identity presented
- via the -I -option must match a principals pattern in order for the
+ via the -I option must match a principals pattern in order for the
corresponding key to be considered acceptable for verification.
The options (if present) consist of comma-separated option
specifications. No spaces are permitted, except within double quotes.
The following option specifications are supported (note that option
keywords are case-insensitive):
cert-authority
Indicates that this key is accepted as a certificate authority
(CA) and that certificates signed by this CA may be accepted for
verification.
namespaces="namespace-list"
Specifies a pattern-list of namespaces that are accepted for this
key. If this option is present, the signature namespace embedded
in the signature object and presented on the verification
command-line must match the specified list before the key will be
considered acceptable.
When verifying signatures made by certificates, the expected principal
name must match both the principals pattern in the allowed signers file
and the principals embedded in the certificate itself.
An example allowed signers file:
# Comments allowed at start of line
user1@example.com,user2@example.com ssh-rsa AAAAX1...
# A certificate authority, trusted for all principals in a domain.
*@example.com cert-authority ssh-ed25519 AAAB4...
# A key that is accepted only for file signing.
user2@example.com namespaces="file" ssh-ed25519 AAA41...
+ENVIRONMENT
+ SSH_SK_PROVIDER
+ Specifies a path to a library that will be used when loading any
+ FIDO authenticator-hosted keys, overriding the default of using
+ the built-in USB HID support.
+
FILES
~/.ssh/id_dsa
~/.ssh/id_ecdsa
+ ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa_sk
~/.ssh/id_ed25519
+ ~/.ssh/id_ed25519_sk
~/.ssh/id_rsa
- Contains the DSA, ECDSA, Ed25519 or RSA authentication identity
- of the user. This file should not be readable by anyone but the
+ Contains the DSA, ECDSA, authenticator-hosted ECDSA, Ed25519,
+ authenticator-hosted Ed25519 or RSA authentication identity of
+ the user. This file should not be readable by anyone but the
user. It is possible to specify a passphrase when generating the
key; that passphrase will be used to encrypt the private part of
this file using 128-bit AES. This file is not automatically
accessed by ssh-keygen but it is offered as the default file for
the private key. ssh(1) will read this file when a login attempt
is made.
~/.ssh/id_dsa.pub
~/.ssh/id_ecdsa.pub
+ ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa_sk.pub
~/.ssh/id_ed25519.pub
+ ~/.ssh/id_ed25519_sk.pub
~/.ssh/id_rsa.pub
- Contains the DSA, ECDSA, Ed25519 or RSA public key for
+ Contains the DSA, ECDSA, authenticator-hosted ECDSA, Ed25519,
+ authenticator-hosted Ed25519 or RSA public key for
authentication. The contents of this file should be added to
~/.ssh/authorized_keys on all machines where the user wishes to
log in using public key authentication. There is no need to keep
the contents of this file secret.
/etc/moduli
Contains Diffie-Hellman groups used for DH-GEX. The file format
is described in moduli(5).
SEE ALSO
ssh(1), ssh-add(1), ssh-agent(1), moduli(5), sshd(8)
The Secure Shell (SSH) Public Key File Format, RFC 4716, 2006.
AUTHORS
OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free ssh 1.2.12 release by
Tatu Ylonen. Aaron Campbell, Bob Beck, Markus Friedl, Niels Provos, Theo
de Raadt and Dug Song removed many bugs, re-added newer features and
created OpenSSH. Markus Friedl contributed the support for SSH protocol
versions 1.5 and 2.0.
-OpenBSD 6.6 October 3, 2019 OpenBSD 6.6
+OpenBSD 6.6 February 7, 2020 OpenBSD 6.6
diff --git a/ssh-keygen.1 b/ssh-keygen.1
index 957d2f0f07dd..7af56429785f 100644
--- a/ssh-keygen.1
+++ b/ssh-keygen.1
@@ -1,1076 +1,1181 @@
-.\" $OpenBSD: ssh-keygen.1,v 1.171 2019/10/03 17:07:50 jmc Exp $
+.\" $OpenBSD: ssh-keygen.1,v 1.201 2020/02/07 03:57:31 djm Exp $
.\"
.\" Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
.\" Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
.\" All rights reserved
.\"
.\" As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
.\" can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
.\" software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
.\" incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
.\" called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
.\"
.\"
.\" Copyright (c) 1999,2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
.\" Copyright (c) 1999 Aaron Campbell. All rights reserved.
.\" Copyright (c) 1999 Theo de Raadt. All rights reserved.
.\"
.\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
.\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
.\" are met:
.\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
.\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
.\" documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
.\"
.\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
.\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
.\" OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
.\" IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
.\" INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
.\" NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
.\" DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
.\" THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
.\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
.\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
.\"
-.Dd $Mdocdate: October 3 2019 $
+.Dd $Mdocdate: February 7 2020 $
.Dt SSH-KEYGEN 1
.Os
.Sh NAME
.Nm ssh-keygen
-.Nd authentication key generation, management and conversion
+.Nd OpenSSH authentication key utility
.Sh SYNOPSIS
.Nm ssh-keygen
.Op Fl q
.Op Fl b Ar bits
.Op Fl C Ar comment
.Op Fl f Ar output_keyfile
.Op Fl m Ar format
+.Op Fl t Cm dsa | ecdsa | ecdsa-sk | ed25519 | ed25519-sk | rsa
.Op Fl N Ar new_passphrase
-.Op Fl t Cm dsa | ecdsa | ed25519 | rsa
+.Op Fl O Ar option
+.Op Fl w Ar provider
.Nm ssh-keygen
.Fl p
.Op Fl f Ar keyfile
.Op Fl m Ar format
.Op Fl N Ar new_passphrase
.Op Fl P Ar old_passphrase
.Nm ssh-keygen
.Fl i
.Op Fl f Ar input_keyfile
.Op Fl m Ar key_format
.Nm ssh-keygen
.Fl e
.Op Fl f Ar input_keyfile
.Op Fl m Ar key_format
.Nm ssh-keygen
.Fl y
.Op Fl f Ar input_keyfile
.Nm ssh-keygen
.Fl c
.Op Fl C Ar comment
.Op Fl f Ar keyfile
.Op Fl P Ar passphrase
.Nm ssh-keygen
.Fl l
.Op Fl v
.Op Fl E Ar fingerprint_hash
.Op Fl f Ar input_keyfile
.Nm ssh-keygen
.Fl B
.Op Fl f Ar input_keyfile
.Nm ssh-keygen
.Fl D Ar pkcs11
.Nm ssh-keygen
.Fl F Ar hostname
.Op Fl lv
.Op Fl f Ar known_hosts_file
.Nm ssh-keygen
.Fl H
.Op Fl f Ar known_hosts_file
.Nm ssh-keygen
+.Fl K
+.Op Fl w Ar provider
+.Nm ssh-keygen
.Fl R Ar hostname
.Op Fl f Ar known_hosts_file
.Nm ssh-keygen
.Fl r Ar hostname
.Op Fl g
.Op Fl f Ar input_keyfile
.Nm ssh-keygen
-.Fl G Ar output_file
-.Op Fl v
-.Op Fl b Ar bits
-.Op Fl M Ar memory
-.Op Fl S Ar start_point
+.Fl M Cm generate
+.Op Fl O Ar option
+.Ar output_file
.Nm ssh-keygen
-.Fl f Ar input_file
-.Fl T Ar output_file
-.Op Fl v
-.Op Fl a Ar rounds
-.Op Fl J Ar num_lines
-.Op Fl j Ar start_line
-.Op Fl K Ar checkpt
-.Op Fl W Ar generator
+.Fl M Cm screen
+.Op Fl f Ar input_file
+.Op Fl O Ar option
+.Ar output_file
.Nm ssh-keygen
.Fl I Ar certificate_identity
.Fl s Ar ca_key
.Op Fl hU
.Op Fl D Ar pkcs11_provider
.Op Fl n Ar principals
.Op Fl O Ar option
.Op Fl V Ar validity_interval
.Op Fl z Ar serial_number
.Ar
.Nm ssh-keygen
.Fl L
.Op Fl f Ar input_keyfile
.Nm ssh-keygen
.Fl A
.Op Fl f Ar prefix_path
.Nm ssh-keygen
.Fl k
.Fl f Ar krl_file
.Op Fl u
.Op Fl s Ar ca_public
.Op Fl z Ar version_number
.Ar
.Nm ssh-keygen
.Fl Q
.Fl f Ar krl_file
.Ar
.Nm ssh-keygen
+.Fl Y Cm find-principals
+.Fl s Ar signature_file
+.Fl f Ar allowed_signers_file
+.Nm ssh-keygen
.Fl Y Cm check-novalidate
.Fl n Ar namespace
.Fl s Ar signature_file
.Nm ssh-keygen
.Fl Y Cm sign
.Fl f Ar key_file
.Fl n Ar namespace
.Ar
.Nm ssh-keygen
.Fl Y Cm verify
.Fl f Ar allowed_signers_file
.Fl I Ar signer_identity
.Fl n Ar namespace
.Fl s Ar signature_file
.Op Fl r Ar revocation_file
.Sh DESCRIPTION
.Nm
generates, manages and converts authentication keys for
.Xr ssh 1 .
.Nm
can create keys for use by SSH protocol version 2.
.Pp
The type of key to be generated is specified with the
.Fl t
option.
If invoked without any arguments,
.Nm
will generate an RSA key.
.Pp
.Nm
is also used to generate groups for use in Diffie-Hellman group
exchange (DH-GEX).
See the
.Sx MODULI GENERATION
section for details.
.Pp
Finally,
.Nm
can be used to generate and update Key Revocation Lists, and to test whether
given keys have been revoked by one.
See the
.Sx KEY REVOCATION LISTS
section for details.
.Pp
Normally each user wishing to use SSH
with public key authentication runs this once to create the authentication
key in
.Pa ~/.ssh/id_dsa ,
.Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa ,
-.Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519
+.Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa_sk ,
+.Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519 ,
+.Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519_sk
or
.Pa ~/.ssh/id_rsa .
Additionally, the system administrator may use this to generate host keys,
as seen in
.Pa /etc/rc .
.Pp
Normally this program generates the key and asks for a file in which
to store the private key.
The public key is stored in a file with the same name but
.Dq .pub
appended.
The program also asks for a passphrase.
The passphrase may be empty to indicate no passphrase
(host keys must have an empty passphrase), or it may be a string of
arbitrary length.
A passphrase is similar to a password, except it can be a phrase with a
series of words, punctuation, numbers, whitespace, or any string of
characters you want.
Good passphrases are 10-30 characters long, are
not simple sentences or otherwise easily guessable (English
prose has only 1-2 bits of entropy per character, and provides very bad
passphrases), and contain a mix of upper and lowercase letters,
numbers, and non-alphanumeric characters.
The passphrase can be changed later by using the
.Fl p
option.
.Pp
There is no way to recover a lost passphrase.
If the passphrase is lost or forgotten, a new key must be generated
and the corresponding public key copied to other machines.
.Pp
.Nm
will by default write keys in an OpenSSH-specific format.
This format is preferred as it offers better protection for
keys at rest as well as allowing storage of key comments within
the private key file itself.
The key comment may be useful to help identify the key.
The comment is initialized to
.Dq user@host
when the key is created, but can be changed using the
.Fl c
option.
.Pp
It is still possible for
.Nm
to write the previously-used PEM format private keys using the
.Fl m
flag.
This may be used when generating new keys, and existing new-format
keys may be converted using this option in conjunction with the
.Fl p
(change passphrase) flag.
.Pp
After a key is generated, instructions below detail where the keys
should be placed to be activated.
.Pp
The options are as follows:
.Bl -tag -width Ds
.It Fl A
For each of the key types (rsa, dsa, ecdsa and ed25519)
for which host keys
do not exist, generate the host keys with the default key file path,
an empty passphrase, default bits for the key type, and default comment.
If
.Fl f
has also been specified, its argument is used as a prefix to the
default path for the resulting host key files.
This is used by
.Pa /etc/rc
to generate new host keys.
.It Fl a Ar rounds
When saving a private key, this option specifies the number of KDF
(key derivation function) rounds used.
Higher numbers result in slower passphrase verification and increased
resistance to brute-force password cracking (should the keys be stolen).
-.Pp
-When screening DH-GEX candidates (using the
-.Fl T
-command),
-this option specifies the number of primality tests to perform.
.It Fl B
Show the bubblebabble digest of specified private or public key file.
.It Fl b Ar bits
Specifies the number of bits in the key to create.
For RSA keys, the minimum size is 1024 bits and the default is 3072 bits.
Generally, 3072 bits is considered sufficient.
DSA keys must be exactly 1024 bits as specified by FIPS 186-2.
For ECDSA keys, the
.Fl b
flag determines the key length by selecting from one of three elliptic
curve sizes: 256, 384 or 521 bits.
Attempting to use bit lengths other than these three values for ECDSA keys
will fail.
-Ed25519 keys have a fixed length and the
+ECDSA-SK, Ed25519 and Ed25519-SK keys have a fixed length and the
.Fl b
flag will be ignored.
.It Fl C Ar comment
Provides a new comment.
.It Fl c
Requests changing the comment in the private and public key files.
The program will prompt for the file containing the private keys, for
the passphrase if the key has one, and for the new comment.
.It Fl D Ar pkcs11
Download the public keys provided by the PKCS#11 shared library
.Ar pkcs11 .
When used in combination with
.Fl s ,
this option indicates that a CA key resides in a PKCS#11 token (see the
.Sx CERTIFICATES
section for details).
.It Fl E Ar fingerprint_hash
Specifies the hash algorithm used when displaying key fingerprints.
Valid options are:
.Dq md5
and
.Dq sha256 .
The default is
.Dq sha256 .
.It Fl e
This option will read a private or public OpenSSH key file and
print to stdout a public key in one of the formats specified by the
.Fl m
option.
The default export format is
.Dq RFC4716 .
This option allows exporting OpenSSH keys for use by other programs, including
several commercial SSH implementations.
.It Fl F Ar hostname | [hostname]:port
Search for the specified
.Ar hostname
(with optional port number)
in a
.Pa known_hosts
file, listing any occurrences found.
This option is useful to find hashed host names or addresses and may also be
used in conjunction with the
.Fl H
option to print found keys in a hashed format.
.It Fl f Ar filename
Specifies the filename of the key file.
-.It Fl G Ar output_file
-Generate candidate primes for DH-GEX.
-These primes must be screened for
-safety (using the
-.Fl T
-option) before use.
.It Fl g
Use generic DNS format when printing fingerprint resource records using the
.Fl r
command.
.It Fl H
Hash a
.Pa known_hosts
file.
This replaces all hostnames and addresses with hashed representations
within the specified file; the original content is moved to a file with
a .old suffix.
These hashes may be used normally by
.Nm ssh
and
.Nm sshd ,
but they do not reveal identifying information should the file's contents
be disclosed.
This option will not modify existing hashed hostnames and is therefore safe
to use on files that mix hashed and non-hashed names.
.It Fl h
When signing a key, create a host certificate instead of a user
certificate.
Please see the
.Sx CERTIFICATES
section for details.
.It Fl I Ar certificate_identity
Specify the key identity when signing a public key.
Please see the
.Sx CERTIFICATES
section for details.
.It Fl i
This option will read an unencrypted private (or public) key file
in the format specified by the
.Fl m
option and print an OpenSSH compatible private
(or public) key to stdout.
This option allows importing keys from other software, including several
commercial SSH implementations.
The default import format is
.Dq RFC4716 .
-.It Fl J Ar num_lines
-Exit after screening the specified number of lines
-while performing DH candidate screening using the
-.Fl T
-option.
-.It Fl j Ar start_line
-Start screening at the specified line number
-while performing DH candidate screening using the
-.Fl T
-option.
-.It Fl K Ar checkpt
-Write the last line processed to the file
-.Ar checkpt
-while performing DH candidate screening using the
-.Fl T
-option.
-This will be used to skip lines in the input file that have already been
-processed if the job is restarted.
+.It Fl K
+Download resident keys from a FIDO authenticator.
+Public and private key files will be written to the current directory for
+each downloaded key.
.It Fl k
Generate a KRL file.
In this mode,
.Nm
will generate a KRL file at the location specified via the
.Fl f
flag that revokes every key or certificate presented on the command line.
Keys/certificates to be revoked may be specified by public key file or
using the format described in the
.Sx KEY REVOCATION LISTS
section.
.It Fl L
Prints the contents of one or more certificates.
.It Fl l
Show fingerprint of specified public key file.
For RSA and DSA keys
.Nm
tries to find the matching public key file and prints its fingerprint.
If combined with
.Fl v ,
a visual ASCII art representation of the key is supplied with the
fingerprint.
-.It Fl M Ar memory
-Specify the amount of memory to use (in megabytes) when generating
-candidate moduli for DH-GEX.
+.It Fl M Cm generate
+Generate candidate Diffie-Hellman Group Exchange (DH-GEX) parameters for
+eventual use by the
+.Sq diffie-hellman-group-exchange-*
+key exchange methods.
+The numbers generated by this operation must be further screened before
+use.
+See the
+.Sx MODULI GENERATION
+section for more information.
+.It Fl M Cm screen
+Screen candidate parameters for Diffie-Hellman Group Exchange.
+This will accept a list of candidate numbers and test that they are
+safe (Sophie Germain) primes with acceptable group generators.
+The results of this operation may be added to the
+.Pa /etc/moduli
+file.
+See the
+.Sx MODULI GENERATION
+section for more information.
.It Fl m Ar key_format
Specify a key format for key generation, the
.Fl i
(import),
.Fl e
(export) conversion options, and the
.Fl p
change passphrase operation.
The latter may be used to convert between OpenSSH private key and PEM
private key formats.
The supported key formats are:
.Dq RFC4716
(RFC 4716/SSH2 public or private key),
.Dq PKCS8
(PKCS8 public or private key)
or
.Dq PEM
(PEM public key).
By default OpenSSH will write newly-generated private keys in its own
format, but when converting public keys for export the default format is
.Dq RFC4716 .
Setting a format of
.Dq PEM
when generating or updating a supported private key type will cause the
key to be stored in the legacy PEM private key format.
.It Fl N Ar new_passphrase
Provides the new passphrase.
.It Fl n Ar principals
Specify one or more principals (user or host names) to be included in
a certificate when signing a key.
Multiple principals may be specified, separated by commas.
Please see the
.Sx CERTIFICATES
section for details.
.It Fl O Ar option
-Specify a certificate option when signing a key.
-This option may be specified multiple times.
-See also the
-.Sx CERTIFICATES
-section for further details.
-.Pp
-At present, no standard options are valid for host keys.
-The options that are valid for user certificates are:
-.Pp
-.Bl -tag -width Ds -compact
-.It Ic clear
-Clear all enabled permissions.
-This is useful for clearing the default set of permissions so permissions may
-be added individually.
-.Pp
-.It Ic critical : Ns Ar name Ns Op Ns = Ns Ar contents
-.It Ic extension : Ns Ar name Ns Op Ns = Ns Ar contents
-Includes an arbitrary certificate critical option or extension.
-The specified
-.Ar name
-should include a domain suffix, e.g.\&
-.Dq name@example.com .
-If
-.Ar contents
-is specified then it is included as the contents of the extension/option
-encoded as a string, otherwise the extension/option is created with no
-contents (usually indicating a flag).
-Extensions may be ignored by a client or server that does not recognise them,
-whereas unknown critical options will cause the certificate to be refused.
-.Pp
-.It Ic force-command Ns = Ns Ar command
-Forces the execution of
-.Ar command
-instead of any shell or command specified by the user when
-the certificate is used for authentication.
-.Pp
-.It Ic no-agent-forwarding
-Disable
-.Xr ssh-agent 1
-forwarding (permitted by default).
+Specify a key/value option.
+These are specific to the operation that
+.Nm
+has been requested to perform.
.Pp
-.It Ic no-port-forwarding
-Disable port forwarding (permitted by default).
+When signing certificates, one of the options listed in the
+.Sx CERTIFICATES
+section may be specified here.
.Pp
-.It Ic no-pty
-Disable PTY allocation (permitted by default).
+When performing moduli generation or screening, one of the options
+listed in the
+.Sx MODULI GENERATION
+section may be specified.
.Pp
-.It Ic no-user-rc
-Disable execution of
-.Pa ~/.ssh/rc
-by
+When generating a key that will be hosted on a FIDO authenticator,
+this flag may be used to specify key-specific options.
+Those supported at present are:
+.Bl -tag -width Ds
+.It Cm application
+Override the default FIDO application/origin string of
+.Dq ssh: .
+This may be useful when generating host or domain-specific resident keys.
+The specified application string must begin with
+.Dq ssh: .
+.It Cm challenge Ns = Ns Ar path
+Specifies a path to a challenge string that will be passed to the
+FIDO token during key generation.
+The challenge string may be used as part of an out-of-band
+protocol for key enrollment
+(a random challenge is used by default).
+.It Cm device
+Explicitly specify a
+.Xr fido 4
+device to use, rather than letting the token middleware select one.
+.It Cm no-touch-required
+Indicate that the generated private key should not require touch
+events (user presence) when making signatures.
+Note that
.Xr sshd 8
-(permitted by default).
-.Pp
-.It Ic no-x11-forwarding
-Disable X11 forwarding (permitted by default).
-.Pp
-.It Ic permit-agent-forwarding
-Allows
-.Xr ssh-agent 1
-forwarding.
-.Pp
-.It Ic permit-port-forwarding
-Allows port forwarding.
-.Pp
-.It Ic permit-pty
-Allows PTY allocation.
-.Pp
-.It Ic permit-user-rc
-Allows execution of
-.Pa ~/.ssh/rc
-by
-.Xr sshd 8 .
-.Pp
-.It Ic permit-X11-forwarding
-Allows X11 forwarding.
+will refuse such signatures by default, unless overridden via
+an authorized_keys option.
+.It Cm resident
+Indicate that the key should be stored on the FIDO authenticator itself.
+Resident keys may be supported on FIDO2 tokens and typically require that
+a PIN be set on the token prior to generation.
+Resident keys may be loaded off the token using
+.Xr ssh-add 1 .
+.It Cm user
+A username to be associated with a resident key,
+overriding the empty default username.
+Specifying a username may be useful when generating multiple resident keys
+for the same application name.
+.It Cm write-attestation Ns = Ns Ar path
+May be used at key generation time to record the attestation certificate
+returned from FIDO tokens during key generation.
+By default this information is discarded.
+.El
.Pp
-.It Ic source-address Ns = Ns Ar address_list
-Restrict the source addresses from which the certificate is considered valid.
The
-.Ar address_list
-is a comma-separated list of one or more address/netmask pairs in CIDR
-format.
-.El
+.Fl O
+option may be specified multiple times.
.It Fl P Ar passphrase
Provides the (old) passphrase.
.It Fl p
Requests changing the passphrase of a private key file instead of
creating a new private key.
The program will prompt for the file
containing the private key, for the old passphrase, and twice for the
new passphrase.
.It Fl Q
Test whether keys have been revoked in a KRL.
.It Fl q
Silence
.Nm ssh-keygen .
.It Fl R Ar hostname | [hostname]:port
Removes all keys belonging to the specified
.Ar hostname
(with optional port number)
from a
.Pa known_hosts
file.
This option is useful to delete hashed hosts (see the
.Fl H
option above).
.It Fl r Ar hostname
Print the SSHFP fingerprint resource record named
.Ar hostname
for the specified public key file.
-.It Fl S Ar start
-Specify start point (in hex) when generating candidate moduli for DH-GEX.
.It Fl s Ar ca_key
Certify (sign) a public key using the specified CA key.
Please see the
.Sx CERTIFICATES
section for details.
.Pp
When generating a KRL,
.Fl s
specifies a path to a CA public key file used to revoke certificates directly
by key ID or serial number.
See the
.Sx KEY REVOCATION LISTS
section for details.
-.It Fl T Ar output_file
-Test DH group exchange candidate primes (generated using the
-.Fl G
-option) for safety.
-.It Fl t Cm dsa | ecdsa | ed25519 | rsa
+.It Fl t Cm dsa | ecdsa | ecdsa-sk | ed25519 | ed25519-sk | rsa
Specifies the type of key to create.
The possible values are
.Dq dsa ,
.Dq ecdsa ,
+.Dq ecdsa-sk ,
.Dq ed25519 ,
+.Dq ed25519-sk ,
or
.Dq rsa .
.Pp
This flag may also be used to specify the desired signature type when
signing certificates using an RSA CA key.
The available RSA signature variants are
.Dq ssh-rsa
(SHA1 signatures, not recommended),
.Dq rsa-sha2-256 ,
and
.Dq rsa-sha2-512
(the default).
.It Fl U
When used in combination with
.Fl s ,
this option indicates that a CA key resides in a
.Xr ssh-agent 1 .
See the
.Sx CERTIFICATES
section for more information.
.It Fl u
Update a KRL.
When specified with
.Fl k ,
keys listed via the command line are added to the existing KRL rather than
a new KRL being created.
.It Fl V Ar validity_interval
Specify a validity interval when signing a certificate.
A validity interval may consist of a single time, indicating that the
certificate is valid beginning now and expiring at that time, or may consist
of two times separated by a colon to indicate an explicit time interval.
.Pp
The start time may be specified as the string
.Dq always
to indicate the certificate has no specified start time,
a date in YYYYMMDD format, a time in YYYYMMDDHHMM[SS] format,
a relative time (to the current time) consisting of a minus sign followed by
an interval in the format described in the
TIME FORMATS section of
.Xr sshd_config 5 .
.Pp
The end time may be specified as a YYYYMMDD date, a YYYYMMDDHHMM[SS] time,
a relative time starting with a plus character or the string
.Dq forever
to indicate that the certificate has no expirty date.
.Pp
For example:
.Dq +52w1d
(valid from now to 52 weeks and one day from now),
.Dq -4w:+4w
(valid from four weeks ago to four weeks from now),
.Dq 20100101123000:20110101123000
(valid from 12:30 PM, January 1st, 2010 to 12:30 PM, January 1st, 2011),
.Dq -1d:20110101
(valid from yesterday to midnight, January 1st, 2011).
.Dq -1m:forever
(valid from one minute ago and never expiring).
.It Fl v
Verbose mode.
Causes
.Nm
to print debugging messages about its progress.
This is helpful for debugging moduli generation.
Multiple
.Fl v
options increase the verbosity.
The maximum is 3.
-.It Fl W Ar generator
-Specify desired generator when testing candidate moduli for DH-GEX.
-.It Fl y
-This option will read a private
-OpenSSH format file and print an OpenSSH public key to stdout.
+.It Fl w Ar provider
+Specifies a path to a library that will be used when creating
+FIDO authenticator-hosted keys, overriding the default of using
+the internal USB HID support.
+.It Fl Y Cm find-principals
+Find the principal(s) associated with the public key of a signature,
+provided using the
+.Fl s
+flag in an authorized signers file provided using the
+.Fl f
+flag.
+The format of the allowed signers file is documented in the
+.Sx ALLOWED SIGNERS
+section below.
+If one or more matching principals are found, they are returned on
+standard output.
+.It Fl Y Cm check-novalidate
+Checks that a signature generated using
+.Nm
+.Fl Y Cm sign
+has a valid structure.
+This does not validate if a signature comes from an authorized signer.
+When testing a signature,
+.Nm
+accepts a message on standard input and a signature namespace using
+.Fl n .
+A file containing the corresponding signature must also be supplied using the
+.Fl s
+flag.
+Successful testing of the signature is signalled by
+.Nm
+returning a zero exit status.
.It Fl Y Cm sign
Cryptographically sign a file or some data using a SSH key.
When signing,
.Nm
accepts zero or more files to sign on the command-line - if no files
are specified then
.Nm
will sign data presented on standard input.
Signatures are written to the path of the input file with
.Dq .sig
appended, or to standard output if the message to be signed was read from
standard input.
.Pp
The key used for signing is specified using the
.Fl f
option and may refer to either a private key, or a public key with the private
half available via
.Xr ssh-agent 1 .
An additional signature namespace, used to prevent signature confusion across
different domains of use (e.g. file signing vs email signing) must be provided
via the
.Fl n
flag.
Namespaces are arbitrary strings, and may include:
.Dq file
for file signing,
.Dq email
for email signing.
For custom uses, it is recommended to use names following a
NAMESPACE@YOUR.DOMAIN pattern to generate unambiguous namespaces.
.It Fl Y Cm verify
Request to verify a signature generated using
.Nm
.Fl Y Cm sign
as described above.
When verifying a signature,
.Nm
accepts a message on standard input and a signature namespace using
.Fl n .
A file containing the corresponding signature must also be supplied using the
.Fl s
flag, along with the identity of the signer using
.Fl I
and a list of allowed signers via the
.Fl f
flag.
The format of the allowed signers file is documented in the
.Sx ALLOWED SIGNERS
section below.
A file containing revoked keys can be passed using the
.Fl r
flag.
The revocation file may be a KRL or a one-per-line list of public keys.
Successful verification by an authorized signer is signalled by
.Nm
-.It Fl Y Cm check-novalidate
-Checks that a signature generated using
-.Nm
-.Fl Y Cm sign
-has a valid structure.
-This does not validate if a signature comes from an authorized signer.
-When testing a signature,
-.Nm
-accepts a message on standard input and a signature namespace using
-.Fl n .
-A file containing the corresponding signature must also be supplied using the
-.Fl s
-flag.
-Successful testing of the signature is signalled by
-.Nm
returning a zero exit status.
+.It Fl y
+This option will read a private
+OpenSSH format file and print an OpenSSH public key to stdout.
.It Fl z Ar serial_number
Specifies a serial number to be embedded in the certificate to distinguish
this certificate from others from the same CA.
If the
.Ar serial_number
is prefixed with a
.Sq +
character, then the serial number will be incremented for each certificate
signed on a single command-line.
The default serial number is zero.
.Pp
When generating a KRL, the
.Fl z
flag is used to specify a KRL version number.
.El
.Sh MODULI GENERATION
.Nm
may be used to generate groups for the Diffie-Hellman Group Exchange
(DH-GEX) protocol.
Generating these groups is a two-step process: first, candidate
primes are generated using a fast, but memory intensive process.
These candidate primes are then tested for suitability (a CPU-intensive
process).
.Pp
Generation of primes is performed using the
-.Fl G
+.Fl M Cm generate
option.
The desired length of the primes may be specified by the
-.Fl b
+.Fl O Cm bits
option.
For example:
.Pp
-.Dl # ssh-keygen -G moduli-2048.candidates -b 2048
+.Dl # ssh-keygen -M generate -O bits=2048 moduli-2048.candidates
.Pp
By default, the search for primes begins at a random point in the
desired length range.
This may be overridden using the
-.Fl S
+.Fl O Cm start
option, which specifies a different start point (in hex).
.Pp
Once a set of candidates have been generated, they must be screened for
suitability.
This may be performed using the
-.Fl T
+.Fl M Cm screen
option.
In this mode
.Nm
will read candidates from standard input (or a file specified using the
.Fl f
option).
For example:
.Pp
-.Dl # ssh-keygen -T moduli-2048 -f moduli-2048.candidates
+.Dl # ssh-keygen -M screen -f moduli-2048.candidates moduli-2048
.Pp
By default, each candidate will be subjected to 100 primality tests.
This may be overridden using the
-.Fl a
+.Fl O Cm prime-tests
option.
The DH generator value will be chosen automatically for the
prime under consideration.
If a specific generator is desired, it may be requested using the
-.Fl W
+.Fl O Cm generator
option.
Valid generator values are 2, 3, and 5.
.Pp
Screened DH groups may be installed in
.Pa /etc/moduli .
It is important that this file contains moduli of a range of bit lengths and
that both ends of a connection share common moduli.
+.Pp
+A number of options are available for moduli generation and screening via the
+.Fl O
+flag:
+.Bl -tag -width Ds
+.It Ic lines Ns = Ns Ar number
+Exit after screening the specified number of lines while performing DH
+candidate screening.
+.It Ic start-line Ns = Ns Ar line-number
+Start screening at the specified line number while performing DH candidate
+screening.
+.It Ic checkpoint Ns = Ns Ar filename
+Write the last line processed to the specified file while performing DH
+candidate screening.
+This will be used to skip lines in the input file that have already been
+processed if the job is restarted.
+.It Ic memory Ns = Ns Ar mbytes
+Specify the amount of memory to use (in megabytes) when generating
+candidate moduli for DH-GEX.
+.It Ic start Ns = Ns Ar hex-value
+Specify start point (in hex) when generating candidate moduli for DH-GEX.
+.It Ic generator Ns = Ns Ar value
+Specify desired generator (in decimal) when testing candidate moduli for DH-GEX.
+.El
.Sh CERTIFICATES
.Nm
supports signing of keys to produce certificates that may be used for
user or host authentication.
Certificates consist of a public key, some identity information, zero or
more principal (user or host) names and a set of options that
are signed by a Certification Authority (CA) key.
Clients or servers may then trust only the CA key and verify its signature
on a certificate rather than trusting many user/host keys.
Note that OpenSSH certificates are a different, and much simpler, format to
the X.509 certificates used in
.Xr ssl 8 .
.Pp
.Nm
supports two types of certificates: user and host.
User certificates authenticate users to servers, whereas host certificates
authenticate server hosts to users.
To generate a user certificate:
.Pp
.Dl $ ssh-keygen -s /path/to/ca_key -I key_id /path/to/user_key.pub
.Pp
The resultant certificate will be placed in
.Pa /path/to/user_key-cert.pub .
A host certificate requires the
.Fl h
option:
.Pp
.Dl $ ssh-keygen -s /path/to/ca_key -I key_id -h /path/to/host_key.pub
.Pp
The host certificate will be output to
.Pa /path/to/host_key-cert.pub .
.Pp
It is possible to sign using a CA key stored in a PKCS#11 token by
providing the token library using
.Fl D
and identifying the CA key by providing its public half as an argument
to
.Fl s :
.Pp
.Dl $ ssh-keygen -s ca_key.pub -D libpkcs11.so -I key_id user_key.pub
.Pp
Similarly, it is possible for the CA key to be hosted in a
.Xr ssh-agent 1 .
This is indicated by the
.Fl U
flag and, again, the CA key must be identified by its public half.
.Pp
.Dl $ ssh-keygen -Us ca_key.pub -I key_id user_key.pub
.Pp
In all cases,
.Ar key_id
is a "key identifier" that is logged by the server when the certificate
is used for authentication.
.Pp
Certificates may be limited to be valid for a set of principal (user/host)
names.
By default, generated certificates are valid for all users or hosts.
To generate a certificate for a specified set of principals:
.Pp
.Dl $ ssh-keygen -s ca_key -I key_id -n user1,user2 user_key.pub
.Dl "$ ssh-keygen -s ca_key -I key_id -h -n host.domain host_key.pub"
.Pp
Additional limitations on the validity and use of user certificates may
be specified through certificate options.
A certificate option may disable features of the SSH session, may be
valid only when presented from particular source addresses or may
force the use of a specific command.
-For a list of valid certificate options, see the documentation for the
-.Fl O
-option above.
+.Pp
+The options that are valid for user certificates are:
+.Pp
+.Bl -tag -width Ds -compact
+.It Ic clear
+Clear all enabled permissions.
+This is useful for clearing the default set of permissions so permissions may
+be added individually.
+.Pp
+.It Ic critical : Ns Ar name Ns Op Ns = Ns Ar contents
+.It Ic extension : Ns Ar name Ns Op Ns = Ns Ar contents
+Includes an arbitrary certificate critical option or extension.
+The specified
+.Ar name
+should include a domain suffix, e.g.\&
+.Dq name@example.com .
+If
+.Ar contents
+is specified then it is included as the contents of the extension/option
+encoded as a string, otherwise the extension/option is created with no
+contents (usually indicating a flag).
+Extensions may be ignored by a client or server that does not recognise them,
+whereas unknown critical options will cause the certificate to be refused.
+.Pp
+.It Ic force-command Ns = Ns Ar command
+Forces the execution of
+.Ar command
+instead of any shell or command specified by the user when
+the certificate is used for authentication.
+.Pp
+.It Ic no-agent-forwarding
+Disable
+.Xr ssh-agent 1
+forwarding (permitted by default).
+.Pp
+.It Ic no-port-forwarding
+Disable port forwarding (permitted by default).
+.Pp
+.It Ic no-pty
+Disable PTY allocation (permitted by default).
+.Pp
+.It Ic no-user-rc
+Disable execution of
+.Pa ~/.ssh/rc
+by
+.Xr sshd 8
+(permitted by default).
+.Pp
+.It Ic no-x11-forwarding
+Disable X11 forwarding (permitted by default).
+.Pp
+.It Ic permit-agent-forwarding
+Allows
+.Xr ssh-agent 1
+forwarding.
+.Pp
+.It Ic permit-port-forwarding
+Allows port forwarding.
+.Pp
+.It Ic permit-pty
+Allows PTY allocation.
+.Pp
+.It Ic permit-user-rc
+Allows execution of
+.Pa ~/.ssh/rc
+by
+.Xr sshd 8 .
+.Pp
+.It Ic permit-X11-forwarding
+Allows X11 forwarding.
+.Pp
+.It Ic no-touch-required
+Do not require signatures made using this key require demonstration
+of user presence (e.g. by having the user touch the authenticator).
+This option only makes sense for the FIDO authenticator algorithms
+.Cm ecdsa-sk
+and
+.Cm ed25519-sk .
+.Pp
+.It Ic source-address Ns = Ns Ar address_list
+Restrict the source addresses from which the certificate is considered valid.
+The
+.Ar address_list
+is a comma-separated list of one or more address/netmask pairs in CIDR
+format.
+.El
+.Pp
+At present, no standard options are valid for host keys.
.Pp
Finally, certificates may be defined with a validity lifetime.
The
.Fl V
option allows specification of certificate start and end times.
A certificate that is presented at a time outside this range will not be
considered valid.
By default, certificates are valid from
.Ux
Epoch to the distant future.
.Pp
For certificates to be used for user or host authentication, the CA
public key must be trusted by
.Xr sshd 8
or
.Xr ssh 1 .
Please refer to those manual pages for details.
.Sh KEY REVOCATION LISTS
.Nm
is able to manage OpenSSH format Key Revocation Lists (KRLs).
These binary files specify keys or certificates to be revoked using a
compact format, taking as little as one bit per certificate if they are being
revoked by serial number.
.Pp
KRLs may be generated using the
.Fl k
flag.
This option reads one or more files from the command line and generates a new
KRL.
The files may either contain a KRL specification (see below) or public keys,
listed one per line.
Plain public keys are revoked by listing their hash or contents in the KRL and
certificates revoked by serial number or key ID (if the serial is zero or
not available).
.Pp
Revoking keys using a KRL specification offers explicit control over the
types of record used to revoke keys and may be used to directly revoke
certificates by serial number or key ID without having the complete original
certificate on hand.
A KRL specification consists of lines containing one of the following directives
followed by a colon and some directive-specific information.
.Bl -tag -width Ds
.It Cm serial : Ar serial_number Ns Op - Ns Ar serial_number
Revokes a certificate with the specified serial number.
Serial numbers are 64-bit values, not including zero and may be expressed
in decimal, hex or octal.
If two serial numbers are specified separated by a hyphen, then the range
of serial numbers including and between each is revoked.
The CA key must have been specified on the
.Nm
command line using the
.Fl s
option.
.It Cm id : Ar key_id
Revokes a certificate with the specified key ID string.
The CA key must have been specified on the
.Nm
command line using the
.Fl s
option.
.It Cm key : Ar public_key
Revokes the specified key.
If a certificate is listed, then it is revoked as a plain public key.
.It Cm sha1 : Ar public_key
Revokes the specified key by including its SHA1 hash in the KRL.
.It Cm sha256 : Ar public_key
Revokes the specified key by including its SHA256 hash in the KRL.
KRLs that revoke keys by SHA256 hash are not supported by OpenSSH versions
prior to 7.9.
.It Cm hash : Ar fingerprint
Revokes a key using a fingerprint hash, as obtained from a
.Xr sshd 8
authentication log message or the
.Nm
.Fl l
flag.
Only SHA256 fingerprints are supported here and resultant KRLs are
not supported by OpenSSH versions prior to 7.9.
.El
.Pp
KRLs may be updated using the
.Fl u
flag in addition to
.Fl k .
When this option is specified, keys listed via the command line are merged into
the KRL, adding to those already there.
.Pp
It is also possible, given a KRL, to test whether it revokes a particular key
(or keys).
The
.Fl Q
flag will query an existing KRL, testing each key specified on the command line.
If any key listed on the command line has been revoked (or an error encountered)
then
.Nm
will exit with a non-zero exit status.
A zero exit status will only be returned if no key was revoked.
.Sh ALLOWED SIGNERS
When verifying signatures,
.Nm
uses a simple list of identities and keys to determine whether a signature
comes from an authorized source.
This "allowed signers" file uses a format patterned after the
AUTHORIZED_KEYS FILE FORMAT described in
.Xr sshd 8 .
Each line of the file contains the following space-separated fields:
principals, options, keytype, base64-encoded key.
Empty lines and lines starting with a
.Ql #
are ignored as comments.
.Pp
The principals field is a pattern-list (See PATTERNS in
.Xr ssh_config 5 )
consisting of one or more comma-separated USER@DOMAIN identity patterns
that are accepted for signing.
When verifying, the identity presented via the
-.Fl I option
-must match a principals pattern in order for the corresponding key to be
+.Fl I
+option must match a principals pattern in order for the corresponding key to be
considered acceptable for verification.
.Pp
The options (if present) consist of comma-separated option specifications.
No spaces are permitted, except within double quotes.
The following option specifications are supported (note that option keywords
are case-insensitive):
.Bl -tag -width Ds
.It Cm cert-authority
Indicates that this key is accepted as a certificate authority (CA) and
that certificates signed by this CA may be accepted for verification.
.It Cm namespaces="namespace-list"
Specifies a pattern-list of namespaces that are accepted for this key.
If this option is present, the signature namespace embedded in the
signature object and presented on the verification command-line must
match the specified list before the key will be considered acceptable.
.El
.Pp
When verifying signatures made by certificates, the expected principal
name must match both the principals pattern in the allowed signers file and
the principals embedded in the certificate itself.
.Pp
An example allowed signers file:
.Bd -literal -offset 3n
# Comments allowed at start of line
user1@example.com,user2@example.com ssh-rsa AAAAX1...
# A certificate authority, trusted for all principals in a domain.
*@example.com cert-authority ssh-ed25519 AAAB4...
# A key that is accepted only for file signing.
user2@example.com namespaces="file" ssh-ed25519 AAA41...
.Ed
+.Sh ENVIRONMENT
+.Bl -tag -width Ds
+.It Ev SSH_SK_PROVIDER
+Specifies a path to a library that will be used when loading any
+FIDO authenticator-hosted keys, overriding the default of using
+the built-in USB HID support.
+.El
.Sh FILES
.Bl -tag -width Ds -compact
.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_dsa
.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa
+.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa_sk
.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519
+.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519_sk
.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_rsa
-Contains the DSA, ECDSA, Ed25519 or RSA
-authentication identity of the user.
+Contains the DSA, ECDSA, authenticator-hosted ECDSA, Ed25519,
+authenticator-hosted Ed25519 or RSA authentication identity of the user.
This file should not be readable by anyone but the user.
It is possible to
specify a passphrase when generating the key; that passphrase will be
used to encrypt the private part of this file using 128-bit AES.
This file is not automatically accessed by
.Nm
but it is offered as the default file for the private key.
.Xr ssh 1
will read this file when a login attempt is made.
.Pp
.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_dsa.pub
.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa.pub
+.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa_sk.pub
.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519.pub
+.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519_sk.pub
.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_rsa.pub
-Contains the DSA, ECDSA, Ed25519 or RSA
-public key for authentication.
+Contains the DSA, ECDSA, authenticator-hosted ECDSA, Ed25519,
+authenticator-hosted Ed25519 or RSA public key for authentication.
The contents of this file should be added to
.Pa ~/.ssh/authorized_keys
on all machines
where the user wishes to log in using public key authentication.
There is no need to keep the contents of this file secret.
.Pp
.It Pa /etc/moduli
Contains Diffie-Hellman groups used for DH-GEX.
The file format is described in
.Xr moduli 5 .
.El
.Sh SEE ALSO
.Xr ssh 1 ,
.Xr ssh-add 1 ,
.Xr ssh-agent 1 ,
.Xr moduli 5 ,
.Xr sshd 8
.Rs
.%R RFC 4716
.%T "The Secure Shell (SSH) Public Key File Format"
.%D 2006
.Re
.Sh AUTHORS
OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free
ssh 1.2.12 release by Tatu Ylonen.
Aaron Campbell, Bob Beck, Markus Friedl, Niels Provos,
Theo de Raadt and Dug Song
removed many bugs, re-added newer features and
created OpenSSH.
Markus Friedl contributed the support for SSH
protocol versions 1.5 and 2.0.
diff --git a/ssh-keygen.c b/ssh-keygen.c
index 8c829cad6004..0d6ed1fff2c5 100644
--- a/ssh-keygen.c
+++ b/ssh-keygen.c
@@ -1,3335 +1,3713 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: ssh-keygen.c,v 1.355 2019/10/03 17:07:50 jmc Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh-keygen.c,v 1.398 2020/02/07 03:27:54 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1994 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
* All rights reserved
* Identity and host key generation and maintenance.
*
* As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
* can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
* software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
* incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
* called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/pem.h>
#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
# include <stdint.h>
#endif
#include <errno.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <netdb.h>
#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
# include <paths.h>
#endif
#include <pwd.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <limits.h>
#include <locale.h>
#include <time.h>
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "sshkey.h"
#include "authfile.h"
#include "sshbuf.h"
#include "pathnames.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "match.h"
#include "hostfile.h"
#include "dns.h"
#include "ssh.h"
#include "ssh2.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
#include "ssh-pkcs11.h"
#include "atomicio.h"
#include "krl.h"
#include "digest.h"
#include "utf8.h"
#include "authfd.h"
#include "sshsig.h"
+#include "ssh-sk.h"
+#include "sk-api.h" /* XXX for SSH_SK_USER_PRESENCE_REQD; remove */
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
# define DEFAULT_KEY_TYPE_NAME "rsa"
#else
# define DEFAULT_KEY_TYPE_NAME "ed25519"
#endif
/*
* Default number of bits in the RSA, DSA and ECDSA keys. These value can be
* overridden on the command line.
*
* These values, with the exception of DSA, provide security equivalent to at
* least 128 bits of security according to NIST Special Publication 800-57:
* Recommendation for Key Management Part 1 rev 4 section 5.6.1.
* For DSA it (and FIPS-186-4 section 4.2) specifies that the only size for
* which a 160bit hash is acceptable is 1kbit, and since ssh-dss specifies only
* SHA1 we limit the DSA key size 1k bits.
*/
#define DEFAULT_BITS 3072
#define DEFAULT_BITS_DSA 1024
#define DEFAULT_BITS_ECDSA 256
static int quiet = 0;
/* Flag indicating that we just want to see the key fingerprint */
static int print_fingerprint = 0;
static int print_bubblebabble = 0;
/* Hash algorithm to use for fingerprints. */
static int fingerprint_hash = SSH_FP_HASH_DEFAULT;
/* The identity file name, given on the command line or entered by the user. */
static char identity_file[PATH_MAX];
static int have_identity = 0;
/* This is set to the passphrase if given on the command line. */
static char *identity_passphrase = NULL;
/* This is set to the new passphrase if given on the command line. */
static char *identity_new_passphrase = NULL;
/* Key type when certifying */
static u_int cert_key_type = SSH2_CERT_TYPE_USER;
/* "key ID" of signed key */
static char *cert_key_id = NULL;
/* Comma-separated list of principal names for certifying keys */
static char *cert_principals = NULL;
/* Validity period for certificates */
static u_int64_t cert_valid_from = 0;
static u_int64_t cert_valid_to = ~0ULL;
/* Certificate options */
-#define CERTOPT_X_FWD (1)
-#define CERTOPT_AGENT_FWD (1<<1)
-#define CERTOPT_PORT_FWD (1<<2)
-#define CERTOPT_PTY (1<<3)
-#define CERTOPT_USER_RC (1<<4)
+#define CERTOPT_X_FWD (1)
+#define CERTOPT_AGENT_FWD (1<<1)
+#define CERTOPT_PORT_FWD (1<<2)
+#define CERTOPT_PTY (1<<3)
+#define CERTOPT_USER_RC (1<<4)
+#define CERTOPT_NO_REQUIRE_USER_PRESENCE (1<<5)
#define CERTOPT_DEFAULT (CERTOPT_X_FWD|CERTOPT_AGENT_FWD| \
CERTOPT_PORT_FWD|CERTOPT_PTY|CERTOPT_USER_RC)
static u_int32_t certflags_flags = CERTOPT_DEFAULT;
static char *certflags_command = NULL;
static char *certflags_src_addr = NULL;
/* Arbitrary extensions specified by user */
struct cert_userext {
char *key;
char *val;
int crit;
};
static struct cert_userext *cert_userext;
static size_t ncert_userext;
/* Conversion to/from various formats */
enum {
FMT_RFC4716,
FMT_PKCS8,
FMT_PEM
} convert_format = FMT_RFC4716;
static char *key_type_name = NULL;
/* Load key from this PKCS#11 provider */
static char *pkcs11provider = NULL;
+/* FIDO/U2F provider to use */
+static char *sk_provider = NULL;
+
/* Format for writing private keys */
static int private_key_format = SSHKEY_PRIVATE_OPENSSH;
/* Cipher for new-format private keys */
static char *openssh_format_cipher = NULL;
-/*
- * Number of KDF rounds to derive new format keys /
- * number of primality trials when screening moduli.
- */
+/* Number of KDF rounds to derive new format keys. */
static int rounds = 0;
/* argv0 */
extern char *__progname;
static char hostname[NI_MAXHOST];
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
/* moduli.c */
int gen_candidates(FILE *, u_int32_t, u_int32_t, BIGNUM *);
int prime_test(FILE *, FILE *, u_int32_t, u_int32_t, char *, unsigned long,
unsigned long);
#endif
static void
type_bits_valid(int type, const char *name, u_int32_t *bitsp)
{
if (type == KEY_UNSPEC)
fatal("unknown key type %s", key_type_name);
if (*bitsp == 0) {
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
u_int nid;
switch(type) {
case KEY_DSA:
*bitsp = DEFAULT_BITS_DSA;
break;
case KEY_ECDSA:
if (name != NULL &&
(nid = sshkey_ecdsa_nid_from_name(name)) > 0)
*bitsp = sshkey_curve_nid_to_bits(nid);
if (*bitsp == 0)
*bitsp = DEFAULT_BITS_ECDSA;
break;
case KEY_RSA:
*bitsp = DEFAULT_BITS;
break;
}
#endif
}
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
switch (type) {
case KEY_DSA:
if (*bitsp != 1024)
fatal("Invalid DSA key length: must be 1024 bits");
break;
case KEY_RSA:
if (*bitsp < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE)
fatal("Invalid RSA key length: minimum is %d bits",
SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE);
else if (*bitsp > OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS)
fatal("Invalid RSA key length: maximum is %d bits",
OPENSSL_RSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS);
break;
case KEY_ECDSA:
if (sshkey_ecdsa_bits_to_nid(*bitsp) == -1)
fatal("Invalid ECDSA key length: valid lengths are "
#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521
"256, 384 or 521 bits");
#else
"256 or 384 bits");
#endif
}
#endif
}
/*
* Checks whether a file exists and, if so, asks the user whether they wish
* to overwrite it.
* Returns nonzero if the file does not already exist or if the user agrees to
* overwrite, or zero otherwise.
*/
static int
confirm_overwrite(const char *filename)
{
char yesno[3];
struct stat st;
if (stat(filename, &st) != 0)
return 1;
printf("%s already exists.\n", filename);
printf("Overwrite (y/n)? ");
fflush(stdout);
if (fgets(yesno, sizeof(yesno), stdin) == NULL)
return 0;
if (yesno[0] != 'y' && yesno[0] != 'Y')
return 0;
return 1;
}
static void
ask_filename(struct passwd *pw, const char *prompt)
{
char buf[1024];
char *name = NULL;
if (key_type_name == NULL)
name = _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_RSA;
else {
switch (sshkey_type_from_name(key_type_name)) {
case KEY_DSA_CERT:
case KEY_DSA:
name = _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_DSA;
break;
#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
case KEY_ECDSA_CERT:
case KEY_ECDSA:
name = _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_ECDSA;
break;
+ case KEY_ECDSA_SK_CERT:
+ case KEY_ECDSA_SK:
+ name = _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_ECDSA_SK;
+ break;
#endif
case KEY_RSA_CERT:
case KEY_RSA:
name = _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_RSA;
break;
case KEY_ED25519:
case KEY_ED25519_CERT:
name = _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_ED25519;
break;
+ case KEY_ED25519_SK:
+ case KEY_ED25519_SK_CERT:
+ name = _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_ED25519_SK;
+ break;
case KEY_XMSS:
case KEY_XMSS_CERT:
name = _PATH_SSH_CLIENT_ID_XMSS;
break;
default:
fatal("bad key type");
}
}
snprintf(identity_file, sizeof(identity_file),
"%s/%s", pw->pw_dir, name);
printf("%s (%s): ", prompt, identity_file);
fflush(stdout);
if (fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), stdin) == NULL)
exit(1);
buf[strcspn(buf, "\n")] = '\0';
if (strcmp(buf, "") != 0)
strlcpy(identity_file, buf, sizeof(identity_file));
have_identity = 1;
}
static struct sshkey *
load_identity(const char *filename, char **commentp)
{
char *pass;
struct sshkey *prv;
int r;
if (commentp != NULL)
*commentp = NULL;
if ((r = sshkey_load_private(filename, "", &prv, commentp)) == 0)
return prv;
if (r != SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE)
fatal("Load key \"%s\": %s", filename, ssh_err(r));
if (identity_passphrase)
pass = xstrdup(identity_passphrase);
else
pass = read_passphrase("Enter passphrase: ", RP_ALLOW_STDIN);
r = sshkey_load_private(filename, pass, &prv, commentp);
explicit_bzero(pass, strlen(pass));
free(pass);
if (r != 0)
fatal("Load key \"%s\": %s", filename, ssh_err(r));
return prv;
}
#define SSH_COM_PUBLIC_BEGIN "---- BEGIN SSH2 PUBLIC KEY ----"
#define SSH_COM_PUBLIC_END "---- END SSH2 PUBLIC KEY ----"
#define SSH_COM_PRIVATE_BEGIN "---- BEGIN SSH2 ENCRYPTED PRIVATE KEY ----"
#define SSH_COM_PRIVATE_KEY_MAGIC 0x3f6ff9eb
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
static void
do_convert_to_ssh2(struct passwd *pw, struct sshkey *k)
{
struct sshbuf *b;
char comment[61], *b64;
int r;
if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
if ((r = sshkey_putb(k, b)) != 0)
fatal("key_to_blob failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
if ((b64 = sshbuf_dtob64_string(b, 1)) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_dtob64_string failed", __func__);
/* Comment + surrounds must fit into 72 chars (RFC 4716 sec 3.3) */
snprintf(comment, sizeof(comment),
"%u-bit %s, converted by %s@%s from OpenSSH",
sshkey_size(k), sshkey_type(k),
pw->pw_name, hostname);
sshkey_free(k);
sshbuf_free(b);
fprintf(stdout, "%s\n", SSH_COM_PUBLIC_BEGIN);
fprintf(stdout, "Comment: \"%s\"\n%s", comment, b64);
fprintf(stdout, "%s\n", SSH_COM_PUBLIC_END);
free(b64);
exit(0);
}
static void
do_convert_to_pkcs8(struct sshkey *k)
{
switch (sshkey_type_plain(k->type)) {
case KEY_RSA:
if (!PEM_write_RSA_PUBKEY(stdout, k->rsa))
fatal("PEM_write_RSA_PUBKEY failed");
break;
case KEY_DSA:
if (!PEM_write_DSA_PUBKEY(stdout, k->dsa))
fatal("PEM_write_DSA_PUBKEY failed");
break;
#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
case KEY_ECDSA:
if (!PEM_write_EC_PUBKEY(stdout, k->ecdsa))
fatal("PEM_write_EC_PUBKEY failed");
break;
#endif
default:
fatal("%s: unsupported key type %s", __func__, sshkey_type(k));
}
exit(0);
}
static void
do_convert_to_pem(struct sshkey *k)
{
switch (sshkey_type_plain(k->type)) {
case KEY_RSA:
if (!PEM_write_RSAPublicKey(stdout, k->rsa))
fatal("PEM_write_RSAPublicKey failed");
break;
+ case KEY_DSA:
+ if (!PEM_write_DSA_PUBKEY(stdout, k->dsa))
+ fatal("PEM_write_DSA_PUBKEY failed");
+ break;
+#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
+ case KEY_ECDSA:
+ if (!PEM_write_EC_PUBKEY(stdout, k->ecdsa))
+ fatal("PEM_write_EC_PUBKEY failed");
+ break;
+#endif
default:
fatal("%s: unsupported key type %s", __func__, sshkey_type(k));
}
exit(0);
}
static void
do_convert_to(struct passwd *pw)
{
struct sshkey *k;
struct stat st;
int r;
if (!have_identity)
ask_filename(pw, "Enter file in which the key is");
if (stat(identity_file, &st) == -1)
fatal("%s: %s: %s", __progname, identity_file, strerror(errno));
if ((r = sshkey_load_public(identity_file, &k, NULL)) != 0)
k = load_identity(identity_file, NULL);
switch (convert_format) {
case FMT_RFC4716:
do_convert_to_ssh2(pw, k);
break;
case FMT_PKCS8:
do_convert_to_pkcs8(k);
break;
case FMT_PEM:
do_convert_to_pem(k);
break;
default:
fatal("%s: unknown key format %d", __func__, convert_format);
}
exit(0);
}
/*
* This is almost exactly the bignum1 encoding, but with 32 bit for length
* instead of 16.
*/
static void
buffer_get_bignum_bits(struct sshbuf *b, BIGNUM *value)
{
u_int bytes, bignum_bits;
int r;
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &bignum_bits)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
bytes = (bignum_bits + 7) / 8;
if (sshbuf_len(b) < bytes)
fatal("%s: input buffer too small: need %d have %zu",
__func__, bytes, sshbuf_len(b));
if (BN_bin2bn(sshbuf_ptr(b), bytes, value) == NULL)
fatal("%s: BN_bin2bn failed", __func__);
if ((r = sshbuf_consume(b, bytes)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
}
static struct sshkey *
do_convert_private_ssh2(struct sshbuf *b)
{
struct sshkey *key = NULL;
char *type, *cipher;
u_char e1, e2, e3, *sig = NULL, data[] = "abcde12345";
int r, rlen, ktype;
u_int magic, i1, i2, i3, i4;
size_t slen;
u_long e;
BIGNUM *dsa_p = NULL, *dsa_q = NULL, *dsa_g = NULL;
BIGNUM *dsa_pub_key = NULL, *dsa_priv_key = NULL;
BIGNUM *rsa_n = NULL, *rsa_e = NULL, *rsa_d = NULL;
BIGNUM *rsa_p = NULL, *rsa_q = NULL, *rsa_iqmp = NULL;
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &magic)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
if (magic != SSH_COM_PRIVATE_KEY_MAGIC) {
error("bad magic 0x%x != 0x%x", magic,
SSH_COM_PRIVATE_KEY_MAGIC);
return NULL;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &i1)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &type, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &cipher, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &i2)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &i3)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &i4)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
debug("ignore (%d %d %d %d)", i1, i2, i3, i4);
if (strcmp(cipher, "none") != 0) {
error("unsupported cipher %s", cipher);
free(cipher);
free(type);
return NULL;
}
free(cipher);
if (strstr(type, "dsa")) {
ktype = KEY_DSA;
} else if (strstr(type, "rsa")) {
ktype = KEY_RSA;
} else {
free(type);
return NULL;
}
if ((key = sshkey_new(ktype)) == NULL)
fatal("sshkey_new failed");
free(type);
switch (key->type) {
case KEY_DSA:
if ((dsa_p = BN_new()) == NULL ||
(dsa_q = BN_new()) == NULL ||
(dsa_g = BN_new()) == NULL ||
(dsa_pub_key = BN_new()) == NULL ||
(dsa_priv_key = BN_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: BN_new", __func__);
buffer_get_bignum_bits(b, dsa_p);
buffer_get_bignum_bits(b, dsa_g);
buffer_get_bignum_bits(b, dsa_q);
buffer_get_bignum_bits(b, dsa_pub_key);
buffer_get_bignum_bits(b, dsa_priv_key);
if (!DSA_set0_pqg(key->dsa, dsa_p, dsa_q, dsa_g))
fatal("%s: DSA_set0_pqg failed", __func__);
dsa_p = dsa_q = dsa_g = NULL; /* transferred */
if (!DSA_set0_key(key->dsa, dsa_pub_key, dsa_priv_key))
fatal("%s: DSA_set0_key failed", __func__);
dsa_pub_key = dsa_priv_key = NULL; /* transferred */
break;
case KEY_RSA:
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(b, &e1)) != 0 ||
(e1 < 30 && (r = sshbuf_get_u8(b, &e2)) != 0) ||
(e1 < 30 && (r = sshbuf_get_u8(b, &e3)) != 0))
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
e = e1;
debug("e %lx", e);
if (e < 30) {
e <<= 8;
e += e2;
debug("e %lx", e);
e <<= 8;
e += e3;
debug("e %lx", e);
}
if ((rsa_e = BN_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: BN_new", __func__);
if (!BN_set_word(rsa_e, e)) {
BN_clear_free(rsa_e);
sshkey_free(key);
return NULL;
}
if ((rsa_n = BN_new()) == NULL ||
(rsa_d = BN_new()) == NULL ||
(rsa_p = BN_new()) == NULL ||
(rsa_q = BN_new()) == NULL ||
(rsa_iqmp = BN_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: BN_new", __func__);
buffer_get_bignum_bits(b, rsa_d);
buffer_get_bignum_bits(b, rsa_n);
buffer_get_bignum_bits(b, rsa_iqmp);
buffer_get_bignum_bits(b, rsa_q);
buffer_get_bignum_bits(b, rsa_p);
if (!RSA_set0_key(key->rsa, rsa_n, rsa_e, rsa_d))
fatal("%s: RSA_set0_key failed", __func__);
rsa_n = rsa_e = rsa_d = NULL; /* transferred */
if (!RSA_set0_factors(key->rsa, rsa_p, rsa_q))
fatal("%s: RSA_set0_factors failed", __func__);
rsa_p = rsa_q = NULL; /* transferred */
if ((r = ssh_rsa_complete_crt_parameters(key, rsa_iqmp)) != 0)
fatal("generate RSA parameters failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
BN_clear_free(rsa_iqmp);
break;
}
rlen = sshbuf_len(b);
if (rlen != 0)
error("%s: remaining bytes in key blob %d", __func__, rlen);
/* try the key */
- if (sshkey_sign(key, &sig, &slen, data, sizeof(data), NULL, 0) != 0 ||
- sshkey_verify(key, sig, slen, data, sizeof(data), NULL, 0) != 0) {
+ if (sshkey_sign(key, &sig, &slen, data, sizeof(data),
+ NULL, NULL, 0) != 0 ||
+ sshkey_verify(key, sig, slen, data, sizeof(data),
+ NULL, 0, NULL) != 0) {
sshkey_free(key);
free(sig);
return NULL;
}
free(sig);
return key;
}
static int
get_line(FILE *fp, char *line, size_t len)
{
int c;
size_t pos = 0;
line[0] = '\0';
while ((c = fgetc(fp)) != EOF) {
if (pos >= len - 1)
fatal("input line too long.");
switch (c) {
case '\r':
c = fgetc(fp);
if (c != EOF && c != '\n' && ungetc(c, fp) == EOF)
fatal("unget: %s", strerror(errno));
return pos;
case '\n':
return pos;
}
line[pos++] = c;
line[pos] = '\0';
}
/* We reached EOF */
return -1;
}
static void
do_convert_from_ssh2(struct passwd *pw, struct sshkey **k, int *private)
{
int r, blen, escaped = 0;
u_int len;
char line[1024];
struct sshbuf *buf;
char encoded[8096];
FILE *fp;
if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("sshbuf_new failed");
if ((fp = fopen(identity_file, "r")) == NULL)
fatal("%s: %s: %s", __progname, identity_file, strerror(errno));
encoded[0] = '\0';
while ((blen = get_line(fp, line, sizeof(line))) != -1) {
if (blen > 0 && line[blen - 1] == '\\')
escaped++;
if (strncmp(line, "----", 4) == 0 ||
strstr(line, ": ") != NULL) {
if (strstr(line, SSH_COM_PRIVATE_BEGIN) != NULL)
*private = 1;
if (strstr(line, " END ") != NULL) {
break;
}
/* fprintf(stderr, "ignore: %s", line); */
continue;
}
if (escaped) {
escaped--;
/* fprintf(stderr, "escaped: %s", line); */
continue;
}
strlcat(encoded, line, sizeof(encoded));
}
len = strlen(encoded);
if (((len % 4) == 3) &&
(encoded[len-1] == '=') &&
(encoded[len-2] == '=') &&
(encoded[len-3] == '='))
encoded[len-3] = '\0';
if ((r = sshbuf_b64tod(buf, encoded)) != 0)
fatal("%s: base64 decoding failed: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
if (*private)
*k = do_convert_private_ssh2(buf);
else if ((r = sshkey_fromb(buf, k)) != 0)
fatal("decode blob failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
+ sshbuf_free(buf);
fclose(fp);
}
static void
do_convert_from_pkcs8(struct sshkey **k, int *private)
{
EVP_PKEY *pubkey;
FILE *fp;
if ((fp = fopen(identity_file, "r")) == NULL)
fatal("%s: %s: %s", __progname, identity_file, strerror(errno));
if ((pubkey = PEM_read_PUBKEY(fp, NULL, NULL, NULL)) == NULL) {
fatal("%s: %s is not a recognised public key format", __func__,
identity_file);
}
fclose(fp);
switch (EVP_PKEY_base_id(pubkey)) {
case EVP_PKEY_RSA:
if ((*k = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL)
fatal("sshkey_new failed");
(*k)->type = KEY_RSA;
(*k)->rsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(pubkey);
break;
case EVP_PKEY_DSA:
if ((*k = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL)
fatal("sshkey_new failed");
(*k)->type = KEY_DSA;
(*k)->dsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_DSA(pubkey);
break;
#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
case EVP_PKEY_EC:
if ((*k = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL)
fatal("sshkey_new failed");
(*k)->type = KEY_ECDSA;
(*k)->ecdsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_EC_KEY(pubkey);
(*k)->ecdsa_nid = sshkey_ecdsa_key_to_nid((*k)->ecdsa);
break;
#endif
default:
fatal("%s: unsupported pubkey type %d", __func__,
EVP_PKEY_base_id(pubkey));
}
EVP_PKEY_free(pubkey);
return;
}
static void
do_convert_from_pem(struct sshkey **k, int *private)
{
FILE *fp;
RSA *rsa;
if ((fp = fopen(identity_file, "r")) == NULL)
fatal("%s: %s: %s", __progname, identity_file, strerror(errno));
if ((rsa = PEM_read_RSAPublicKey(fp, NULL, NULL, NULL)) != NULL) {
if ((*k = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL)
fatal("sshkey_new failed");
(*k)->type = KEY_RSA;
(*k)->rsa = rsa;
fclose(fp);
return;
}
fatal("%s: unrecognised raw private key format", __func__);
}
static void
do_convert_from(struct passwd *pw)
{
struct sshkey *k = NULL;
int r, private = 0, ok = 0;
struct stat st;
if (!have_identity)
ask_filename(pw, "Enter file in which the key is");
if (stat(identity_file, &st) == -1)
fatal("%s: %s: %s", __progname, identity_file, strerror(errno));
switch (convert_format) {
case FMT_RFC4716:
do_convert_from_ssh2(pw, &k, &private);
break;
case FMT_PKCS8:
do_convert_from_pkcs8(&k, &private);
break;
case FMT_PEM:
do_convert_from_pem(&k, &private);
break;
default:
fatal("%s: unknown key format %d", __func__, convert_format);
}
if (!private) {
if ((r = sshkey_write(k, stdout)) == 0)
ok = 1;
if (ok)
fprintf(stdout, "\n");
} else {
switch (k->type) {
case KEY_DSA:
ok = PEM_write_DSAPrivateKey(stdout, k->dsa, NULL,
NULL, 0, NULL, NULL);
break;
#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
case KEY_ECDSA:
ok = PEM_write_ECPrivateKey(stdout, k->ecdsa, NULL,
NULL, 0, NULL, NULL);
break;
#endif
case KEY_RSA:
ok = PEM_write_RSAPrivateKey(stdout, k->rsa, NULL,
NULL, 0, NULL, NULL);
break;
default:
fatal("%s: unsupported key type %s", __func__,
sshkey_type(k));
}
}
if (!ok)
fatal("key write failed");
sshkey_free(k);
exit(0);
}
#endif
static void
do_print_public(struct passwd *pw)
{
struct sshkey *prv;
struct stat st;
int r;
char *comment = NULL;
if (!have_identity)
ask_filename(pw, "Enter file in which the key is");
if (stat(identity_file, &st) == -1)
fatal("%s: %s", identity_file, strerror(errno));
prv = load_identity(identity_file, &comment);
if ((r = sshkey_write(prv, stdout)) != 0)
error("sshkey_write failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
sshkey_free(prv);
if (comment != NULL && *comment != '\0')
fprintf(stdout, " %s", comment);
fprintf(stdout, "\n");
free(comment);
exit(0);
}
static void
do_download(struct passwd *pw)
{
#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
struct sshkey **keys = NULL;
int i, nkeys;
enum sshkey_fp_rep rep;
int fptype;
- char *fp, *ra;
+ char *fp, *ra, **comments = NULL;
fptype = print_bubblebabble ? SSH_DIGEST_SHA1 : fingerprint_hash;
rep = print_bubblebabble ? SSH_FP_BUBBLEBABBLE : SSH_FP_DEFAULT;
pkcs11_init(1);
- nkeys = pkcs11_add_provider(pkcs11provider, NULL, &keys);
+ nkeys = pkcs11_add_provider(pkcs11provider, NULL, &keys, &comments);
if (nkeys <= 0)
fatal("cannot read public key from pkcs11");
for (i = 0; i < nkeys; i++) {
if (print_fingerprint) {
fp = sshkey_fingerprint(keys[i], fptype, rep);
ra = sshkey_fingerprint(keys[i], fingerprint_hash,
SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
if (fp == NULL || ra == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshkey_fingerprint fail", __func__);
printf("%u %s %s (PKCS11 key)\n", sshkey_size(keys[i]),
fp, sshkey_type(keys[i]));
if (log_level_get() >= SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE)
printf("%s\n", ra);
free(ra);
free(fp);
} else {
(void) sshkey_write(keys[i], stdout); /* XXX check */
- fprintf(stdout, "\n");
+ fprintf(stdout, "%s%s\n",
+ *(comments[i]) == '\0' ? "" : " ", comments[i]);
}
+ free(comments[i]);
sshkey_free(keys[i]);
}
+ free(comments);
free(keys);
pkcs11_terminate();
exit(0);
#else
fatal("no pkcs11 support");
#endif /* ENABLE_PKCS11 */
}
static struct sshkey *
try_read_key(char **cpp)
{
struct sshkey *ret;
int r;
if ((ret = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL)
fatal("sshkey_new failed");
if ((r = sshkey_read(ret, cpp)) == 0)
return ret;
/* Not a key */
sshkey_free(ret);
return NULL;
}
static void
fingerprint_one_key(const struct sshkey *public, const char *comment)
{
char *fp = NULL, *ra = NULL;
enum sshkey_fp_rep rep;
int fptype;
fptype = print_bubblebabble ? SSH_DIGEST_SHA1 : fingerprint_hash;
rep = print_bubblebabble ? SSH_FP_BUBBLEBABBLE : SSH_FP_DEFAULT;
fp = sshkey_fingerprint(public, fptype, rep);
ra = sshkey_fingerprint(public, fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
if (fp == NULL || ra == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshkey_fingerprint failed", __func__);
mprintf("%u %s %s (%s)\n", sshkey_size(public), fp,
comment ? comment : "no comment", sshkey_type(public));
if (log_level_get() >= SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE)
printf("%s\n", ra);
free(ra);
free(fp);
}
static void
fingerprint_private(const char *path)
{
struct stat st;
char *comment = NULL;
struct sshkey *public = NULL;
int r;
if (stat(identity_file, &st) == -1)
fatal("%s: %s", path, strerror(errno));
if ((r = sshkey_load_public(path, &public, &comment)) != 0) {
debug("load public \"%s\": %s", path, ssh_err(r));
if ((r = sshkey_load_private(path, NULL,
&public, &comment)) != 0) {
debug("load private \"%s\": %s", path, ssh_err(r));
fatal("%s is not a key file.", path);
}
}
fingerprint_one_key(public, comment);
sshkey_free(public);
free(comment);
}
static void
do_fingerprint(struct passwd *pw)
{
FILE *f;
struct sshkey *public = NULL;
char *comment = NULL, *cp, *ep, *line = NULL;
size_t linesize = 0;
int i, invalid = 1;
const char *path;
u_long lnum = 0;
if (!have_identity)
ask_filename(pw, "Enter file in which the key is");
path = identity_file;
if (strcmp(identity_file, "-") == 0) {
f = stdin;
path = "(stdin)";
} else if ((f = fopen(path, "r")) == NULL)
fatal("%s: %s: %s", __progname, path, strerror(errno));
while (getline(&line, &linesize, f) != -1) {
lnum++;
cp = line;
cp[strcspn(cp, "\n")] = '\0';
/* Trim leading space and comments */
cp = line + strspn(line, " \t");
if (*cp == '#' || *cp == '\0')
continue;
/*
* Input may be plain keys, private keys, authorized_keys
* or known_hosts.
*/
/*
* Try private keys first. Assume a key is private if
* "SSH PRIVATE KEY" appears on the first line and we're
* not reading from stdin (XXX support private keys on stdin).
*/
if (lnum == 1 && strcmp(identity_file, "-") != 0 &&
strstr(cp, "PRIVATE KEY") != NULL) {
free(line);
fclose(f);
fingerprint_private(path);
exit(0);
}
/*
* If it's not a private key, then this must be prepared to
* accept a public key prefixed with a hostname or options.
* Try a bare key first, otherwise skip the leading stuff.
*/
if ((public = try_read_key(&cp)) == NULL) {
i = strtol(cp, &ep, 10);
if (i == 0 || ep == NULL ||
(*ep != ' ' && *ep != '\t')) {
int quoted = 0;
comment = cp;
for (; *cp && (quoted || (*cp != ' ' &&
*cp != '\t')); cp++) {
if (*cp == '\\' && cp[1] == '"')
cp++; /* Skip both */
else if (*cp == '"')
quoted = !quoted;
}
if (!*cp)
continue;
*cp++ = '\0';
}
}
/* Retry after parsing leading hostname/key options */
if (public == NULL && (public = try_read_key(&cp)) == NULL) {
debug("%s:%lu: not a public key", path, lnum);
continue;
}
/* Find trailing comment, if any */
for (; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++)
;
if (*cp != '\0' && *cp != '#')
comment = cp;
fingerprint_one_key(public, comment);
sshkey_free(public);
invalid = 0; /* One good key in the file is sufficient */
}
fclose(f);
free(line);
if (invalid)
fatal("%s is not a public key file.", path);
exit(0);
}
static void
do_gen_all_hostkeys(struct passwd *pw)
{
struct {
char *key_type;
char *key_type_display;
char *path;
} key_types[] = {
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
{ "rsa", "RSA" ,_PATH_HOST_RSA_KEY_FILE },
{ "dsa", "DSA", _PATH_HOST_DSA_KEY_FILE },
#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
{ "ecdsa", "ECDSA",_PATH_HOST_ECDSA_KEY_FILE },
#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
{ "ed25519", "ED25519",_PATH_HOST_ED25519_KEY_FILE },
#ifdef WITH_XMSS
{ "xmss", "XMSS",_PATH_HOST_XMSS_KEY_FILE },
#endif /* WITH_XMSS */
{ NULL, NULL, NULL }
};
u_int32_t bits = 0;
int first = 0;
struct stat st;
struct sshkey *private, *public;
char comment[1024], *prv_tmp, *pub_tmp, *prv_file, *pub_file;
int i, type, fd, r;
FILE *f;
for (i = 0; key_types[i].key_type; i++) {
public = private = NULL;
prv_tmp = pub_tmp = prv_file = pub_file = NULL;
xasprintf(&prv_file, "%s%s",
identity_file, key_types[i].path);
/* Check whether private key exists and is not zero-length */
if (stat(prv_file, &st) == 0) {
if (st.st_size != 0)
goto next;
} else if (errno != ENOENT) {
error("Could not stat %s: %s", key_types[i].path,
strerror(errno));
goto failnext;
}
/*
* Private key doesn't exist or is invalid; proceed with
* key generation.
*/
xasprintf(&prv_tmp, "%s%s.XXXXXXXXXX",
identity_file, key_types[i].path);
xasprintf(&pub_tmp, "%s%s.pub.XXXXXXXXXX",
identity_file, key_types[i].path);
xasprintf(&pub_file, "%s%s.pub",
identity_file, key_types[i].path);
if (first == 0) {
first = 1;
printf("%s: generating new host keys: ", __progname);
}
printf("%s ", key_types[i].key_type_display);
fflush(stdout);
type = sshkey_type_from_name(key_types[i].key_type);
if ((fd = mkstemp(prv_tmp)) == -1) {
error("Could not save your public key in %s: %s",
prv_tmp, strerror(errno));
goto failnext;
}
close(fd); /* just using mkstemp() to generate/reserve a name */
bits = 0;
type_bits_valid(type, NULL, &bits);
if ((r = sshkey_generate(type, bits, &private)) != 0) {
error("sshkey_generate failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
goto failnext;
}
if ((r = sshkey_from_private(private, &public)) != 0)
fatal("sshkey_from_private failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
snprintf(comment, sizeof comment, "%s@%s", pw->pw_name,
hostname);
if ((r = sshkey_save_private(private, prv_tmp, "",
comment, private_key_format, openssh_format_cipher,
rounds)) != 0) {
error("Saving key \"%s\" failed: %s",
prv_tmp, ssh_err(r));
goto failnext;
}
if ((fd = mkstemp(pub_tmp)) == -1) {
error("Could not save your public key in %s: %s",
pub_tmp, strerror(errno));
goto failnext;
}
(void)fchmod(fd, 0644);
f = fdopen(fd, "w");
if (f == NULL) {
error("fdopen %s failed: %s", pub_tmp, strerror(errno));
close(fd);
goto failnext;
}
if ((r = sshkey_write(public, f)) != 0) {
error("write key failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
fclose(f);
goto failnext;
}
fprintf(f, " %s\n", comment);
if (ferror(f) != 0) {
error("write key failed: %s", strerror(errno));
fclose(f);
goto failnext;
}
if (fclose(f) != 0) {
error("key close failed: %s", strerror(errno));
goto failnext;
}
/* Rename temporary files to their permanent locations. */
if (rename(pub_tmp, pub_file) != 0) {
error("Unable to move %s into position: %s",
pub_file, strerror(errno));
goto failnext;
}
if (rename(prv_tmp, prv_file) != 0) {
error("Unable to move %s into position: %s",
key_types[i].path, strerror(errno));
failnext:
first = 0;
goto next;
}
next:
sshkey_free(private);
sshkey_free(public);
free(prv_tmp);
free(pub_tmp);
free(prv_file);
free(pub_file);
}
if (first != 0)
printf("\n");
}
struct known_hosts_ctx {
const char *host; /* Hostname searched for in find/delete case */
FILE *out; /* Output file, stdout for find_hosts case */
int has_unhashed; /* When hashing, original had unhashed hosts */
int found_key; /* For find/delete, host was found */
int invalid; /* File contained invalid items; don't delete */
int hash_hosts; /* Hash hostnames as we go */
int find_host; /* Search for specific hostname */
int delete_host; /* Delete host from known_hosts */
};
static int
known_hosts_hash(struct hostkey_foreach_line *l, void *_ctx)
{
struct known_hosts_ctx *ctx = (struct known_hosts_ctx *)_ctx;
char *hashed, *cp, *hosts, *ohosts;
int has_wild = l->hosts && strcspn(l->hosts, "*?!") != strlen(l->hosts);
int was_hashed = l->hosts && l->hosts[0] == HASH_DELIM;
switch (l->status) {
case HKF_STATUS_OK:
case HKF_STATUS_MATCHED:
/*
* Don't hash hosts already already hashed, with wildcard
* characters or a CA/revocation marker.
*/
if (was_hashed || has_wild || l->marker != MRK_NONE) {
fprintf(ctx->out, "%s\n", l->line);
if (has_wild && !ctx->find_host) {
logit("%s:%lu: ignoring host name "
"with wildcard: %.64s", l->path,
l->linenum, l->hosts);
}
return 0;
}
/*
* Split any comma-separated hostnames from the host list,
* hash and store separately.
*/
ohosts = hosts = xstrdup(l->hosts);
while ((cp = strsep(&hosts, ",")) != NULL && *cp != '\0') {
lowercase(cp);
if ((hashed = host_hash(cp, NULL, 0)) == NULL)
fatal("hash_host failed");
fprintf(ctx->out, "%s %s\n", hashed, l->rawkey);
ctx->has_unhashed = 1;
}
free(ohosts);
return 0;
case HKF_STATUS_INVALID:
/* Retain invalid lines, but mark file as invalid. */
ctx->invalid = 1;
logit("%s:%lu: invalid line", l->path, l->linenum);
/* FALLTHROUGH */
default:
fprintf(ctx->out, "%s\n", l->line);
return 0;
}
/* NOTREACHED */
return -1;
}
static int
known_hosts_find_delete(struct hostkey_foreach_line *l, void *_ctx)
{
struct known_hosts_ctx *ctx = (struct known_hosts_ctx *)_ctx;
enum sshkey_fp_rep rep;
int fptype;
char *fp = NULL, *ra = NULL;
fptype = print_bubblebabble ? SSH_DIGEST_SHA1 : fingerprint_hash;
rep = print_bubblebabble ? SSH_FP_BUBBLEBABBLE : SSH_FP_DEFAULT;
if (l->status == HKF_STATUS_MATCHED) {
if (ctx->delete_host) {
if (l->marker != MRK_NONE) {
/* Don't remove CA and revocation lines */
fprintf(ctx->out, "%s\n", l->line);
} else {
/*
* Hostname matches and has no CA/revoke
* marker, delete it by *not* writing the
* line to ctx->out.
*/
ctx->found_key = 1;
if (!quiet)
printf("# Host %s found: line %lu\n",
ctx->host, l->linenum);
}
return 0;
} else if (ctx->find_host) {
ctx->found_key = 1;
if (!quiet) {
printf("# Host %s found: line %lu %s\n",
ctx->host,
l->linenum, l->marker == MRK_CA ? "CA" :
(l->marker == MRK_REVOKE ? "REVOKED" : ""));
}
if (ctx->hash_hosts)
known_hosts_hash(l, ctx);
else if (print_fingerprint) {
fp = sshkey_fingerprint(l->key, fptype, rep);
ra = sshkey_fingerprint(l->key,
fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
if (fp == NULL || ra == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshkey_fingerprint failed",
__func__);
- mprintf("%s %s %s %s\n", ctx->host,
- sshkey_type(l->key), fp, l->comment);
+ mprintf("%s %s %s%s%s\n", ctx->host,
+ sshkey_type(l->key), fp,
+ l->comment[0] ? " " : "",
+ l->comment);
if (log_level_get() >= SYSLOG_LEVEL_VERBOSE)
printf("%s\n", ra);
free(ra);
free(fp);
} else
fprintf(ctx->out, "%s\n", l->line);
return 0;
}
} else if (ctx->delete_host) {
/* Retain non-matching hosts when deleting */
if (l->status == HKF_STATUS_INVALID) {
ctx->invalid = 1;
logit("%s:%lu: invalid line", l->path, l->linenum);
}
fprintf(ctx->out, "%s\n", l->line);
}
return 0;
}
static void
do_known_hosts(struct passwd *pw, const char *name, int find_host,
int delete_host, int hash_hosts)
{
char *cp, tmp[PATH_MAX], old[PATH_MAX];
int r, fd, oerrno, inplace = 0;
struct known_hosts_ctx ctx;
u_int foreach_options;
if (!have_identity) {
cp = tilde_expand_filename(_PATH_SSH_USER_HOSTFILE, pw->pw_uid);
if (strlcpy(identity_file, cp, sizeof(identity_file)) >=
sizeof(identity_file))
fatal("Specified known hosts path too long");
free(cp);
have_identity = 1;
}
memset(&ctx, 0, sizeof(ctx));
ctx.out = stdout;
ctx.host = name;
ctx.hash_hosts = hash_hosts;
ctx.find_host = find_host;
ctx.delete_host = delete_host;
/*
* Find hosts goes to stdout, hash and deletions happen in-place
* A corner case is ssh-keygen -HF foo, which should go to stdout
*/
if (!find_host && (hash_hosts || delete_host)) {
if (strlcpy(tmp, identity_file, sizeof(tmp)) >= sizeof(tmp) ||
strlcat(tmp, ".XXXXXXXXXX", sizeof(tmp)) >= sizeof(tmp) ||
strlcpy(old, identity_file, sizeof(old)) >= sizeof(old) ||
strlcat(old, ".old", sizeof(old)) >= sizeof(old))
fatal("known_hosts path too long");
umask(077);
if ((fd = mkstemp(tmp)) == -1)
fatal("mkstemp: %s", strerror(errno));
if ((ctx.out = fdopen(fd, "w")) == NULL) {
oerrno = errno;
unlink(tmp);
fatal("fdopen: %s", strerror(oerrno));
}
inplace = 1;
}
/* XXX support identity_file == "-" for stdin */
foreach_options = find_host ? HKF_WANT_MATCH : 0;
foreach_options |= print_fingerprint ? HKF_WANT_PARSE_KEY : 0;
if ((r = hostkeys_foreach(identity_file, (find_host || !hash_hosts) ?
known_hosts_find_delete : known_hosts_hash, &ctx, name, NULL,
foreach_options)) != 0) {
if (inplace)
unlink(tmp);
fatal("%s: hostkeys_foreach failed: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
}
if (inplace)
fclose(ctx.out);
if (ctx.invalid) {
error("%s is not a valid known_hosts file.", identity_file);
if (inplace) {
error("Not replacing existing known_hosts "
"file because of errors");
unlink(tmp);
}
exit(1);
} else if (delete_host && !ctx.found_key) {
logit("Host %s not found in %s", name, identity_file);
if (inplace)
unlink(tmp);
} else if (inplace) {
/* Backup existing file */
if (unlink(old) == -1 && errno != ENOENT)
fatal("unlink %.100s: %s", old, strerror(errno));
if (link(identity_file, old) == -1)
fatal("link %.100s to %.100s: %s", identity_file, old,
strerror(errno));
/* Move new one into place */
if (rename(tmp, identity_file) == -1) {
error("rename\"%s\" to \"%s\": %s", tmp, identity_file,
strerror(errno));
unlink(tmp);
unlink(old);
exit(1);
}
printf("%s updated.\n", identity_file);
printf("Original contents retained as %s\n", old);
if (ctx.has_unhashed) {
logit("WARNING: %s contains unhashed entries", old);
logit("Delete this file to ensure privacy "
"of hostnames");
}
}
exit (find_host && !ctx.found_key);
}
/*
* Perform changing a passphrase. The argument is the passwd structure
* for the current user.
*/
static void
do_change_passphrase(struct passwd *pw)
{
char *comment;
char *old_passphrase, *passphrase1, *passphrase2;
struct stat st;
struct sshkey *private;
int r;
if (!have_identity)
ask_filename(pw, "Enter file in which the key is");
if (stat(identity_file, &st) == -1)
fatal("%s: %s", identity_file, strerror(errno));
/* Try to load the file with empty passphrase. */
r = sshkey_load_private(identity_file, "", &private, &comment);
if (r == SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE) {
if (identity_passphrase)
old_passphrase = xstrdup(identity_passphrase);
else
old_passphrase =
read_passphrase("Enter old passphrase: ",
RP_ALLOW_STDIN);
r = sshkey_load_private(identity_file, old_passphrase,
&private, &comment);
explicit_bzero(old_passphrase, strlen(old_passphrase));
free(old_passphrase);
if (r != 0)
goto badkey;
} else if (r != 0) {
badkey:
fatal("Failed to load key %s: %s", identity_file, ssh_err(r));
}
if (comment)
mprintf("Key has comment '%s'\n", comment);
/* Ask the new passphrase (twice). */
if (identity_new_passphrase) {
passphrase1 = xstrdup(identity_new_passphrase);
passphrase2 = NULL;
} else {
passphrase1 =
read_passphrase("Enter new passphrase (empty for no "
"passphrase): ", RP_ALLOW_STDIN);
passphrase2 = read_passphrase("Enter same passphrase again: ",
RP_ALLOW_STDIN);
/* Verify that they are the same. */
if (strcmp(passphrase1, passphrase2) != 0) {
explicit_bzero(passphrase1, strlen(passphrase1));
explicit_bzero(passphrase2, strlen(passphrase2));
free(passphrase1);
free(passphrase2);
printf("Pass phrases do not match. Try again.\n");
exit(1);
}
/* Destroy the other copy. */
explicit_bzero(passphrase2, strlen(passphrase2));
free(passphrase2);
}
/* Save the file using the new passphrase. */
if ((r = sshkey_save_private(private, identity_file, passphrase1,
comment, private_key_format, openssh_format_cipher, rounds)) != 0) {
error("Saving key \"%s\" failed: %s.",
identity_file, ssh_err(r));
explicit_bzero(passphrase1, strlen(passphrase1));
free(passphrase1);
sshkey_free(private);
free(comment);
exit(1);
}
/* Destroy the passphrase and the copy of the key in memory. */
explicit_bzero(passphrase1, strlen(passphrase1));
free(passphrase1);
sshkey_free(private); /* Destroys contents */
free(comment);
printf("Your identification has been saved with the new passphrase.\n");
exit(0);
}
/*
* Print the SSHFP RR.
*/
static int
do_print_resource_record(struct passwd *pw, char *fname, char *hname,
int print_generic)
{
struct sshkey *public;
char *comment = NULL;
struct stat st;
int r;
if (fname == NULL)
fatal("%s: no filename", __func__);
if (stat(fname, &st) == -1) {
if (errno == ENOENT)
return 0;
fatal("%s: %s", fname, strerror(errno));
}
if ((r = sshkey_load_public(fname, &public, &comment)) != 0)
fatal("Failed to read v2 public key from \"%s\": %s.",
fname, ssh_err(r));
export_dns_rr(hname, public, stdout, print_generic);
sshkey_free(public);
free(comment);
return 1;
}
/*
* Change the comment of a private key file.
*/
static void
do_change_comment(struct passwd *pw, const char *identity_comment)
{
char new_comment[1024], *comment, *passphrase;
struct sshkey *private;
struct sshkey *public;
struct stat st;
FILE *f;
int r, fd;
if (!have_identity)
ask_filename(pw, "Enter file in which the key is");
if (stat(identity_file, &st) == -1)
fatal("%s: %s", identity_file, strerror(errno));
if ((r = sshkey_load_private(identity_file, "",
&private, &comment)) == 0)
passphrase = xstrdup("");
else if (r != SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE)
fatal("Cannot load private key \"%s\": %s.",
identity_file, ssh_err(r));
else {
if (identity_passphrase)
passphrase = xstrdup(identity_passphrase);
else if (identity_new_passphrase)
passphrase = xstrdup(identity_new_passphrase);
else
passphrase = read_passphrase("Enter passphrase: ",
RP_ALLOW_STDIN);
/* Try to load using the passphrase. */
if ((r = sshkey_load_private(identity_file, passphrase,
&private, &comment)) != 0) {
explicit_bzero(passphrase, strlen(passphrase));
free(passphrase);
fatal("Cannot load private key \"%s\": %s.",
identity_file, ssh_err(r));
}
}
if (private->type != KEY_ED25519 && private->type != KEY_XMSS &&
private_key_format != SSHKEY_PRIVATE_OPENSSH) {
error("Comments are only supported for keys stored in "
"the new format (-o).");
explicit_bzero(passphrase, strlen(passphrase));
sshkey_free(private);
exit(1);
}
if (comment)
printf("Old comment: %s\n", comment);
else
printf("No existing comment\n");
if (identity_comment) {
strlcpy(new_comment, identity_comment, sizeof(new_comment));
} else {
printf("New comment: ");
fflush(stdout);
if (!fgets(new_comment, sizeof(new_comment), stdin)) {
explicit_bzero(passphrase, strlen(passphrase));
sshkey_free(private);
exit(1);
}
new_comment[strcspn(new_comment, "\n")] = '\0';
}
if (comment != NULL && strcmp(comment, new_comment) == 0) {
printf("No change to comment\n");
free(passphrase);
sshkey_free(private);
free(comment);
exit(0);
}
/* Save the file using the new passphrase. */
if ((r = sshkey_save_private(private, identity_file, passphrase,
new_comment, private_key_format, openssh_format_cipher,
rounds)) != 0) {
error("Saving key \"%s\" failed: %s",
identity_file, ssh_err(r));
explicit_bzero(passphrase, strlen(passphrase));
free(passphrase);
sshkey_free(private);
free(comment);
exit(1);
}
explicit_bzero(passphrase, strlen(passphrase));
free(passphrase);
if ((r = sshkey_from_private(private, &public)) != 0)
fatal("sshkey_from_private failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
sshkey_free(private);
strlcat(identity_file, ".pub", sizeof(identity_file));
fd = open(identity_file, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC, 0644);
if (fd == -1)
fatal("Could not save your public key in %s", identity_file);
f = fdopen(fd, "w");
if (f == NULL)
fatal("fdopen %s failed: %s", identity_file, strerror(errno));
if ((r = sshkey_write(public, f)) != 0)
fatal("write key failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
sshkey_free(public);
fprintf(f, " %s\n", new_comment);
fclose(f);
free(comment);
if (strlen(new_comment) > 0)
printf("Comment '%s' applied\n", new_comment);
else
printf("Comment removed\n");
exit(0);
}
static void
add_flag_option(struct sshbuf *c, const char *name)
{
int r;
debug3("%s: %s", __func__, name);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(c, name)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_string(c, NULL, 0)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
}
static void
add_string_option(struct sshbuf *c, const char *name, const char *value)
{
struct sshbuf *b;
int r;
debug3("%s: %s=%s", __func__, name, value);
if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, value)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(c, name)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_stringb(c, b)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
sshbuf_free(b);
}
#define OPTIONS_CRITICAL 1
#define OPTIONS_EXTENSIONS 2
static void
prepare_options_buf(struct sshbuf *c, int which)
{
size_t i;
sshbuf_reset(c);
if ((which & OPTIONS_CRITICAL) != 0 &&
certflags_command != NULL)
add_string_option(c, "force-command", certflags_command);
if ((which & OPTIONS_EXTENSIONS) != 0 &&
(certflags_flags & CERTOPT_X_FWD) != 0)
add_flag_option(c, "permit-X11-forwarding");
if ((which & OPTIONS_EXTENSIONS) != 0 &&
(certflags_flags & CERTOPT_AGENT_FWD) != 0)
add_flag_option(c, "permit-agent-forwarding");
if ((which & OPTIONS_EXTENSIONS) != 0 &&
(certflags_flags & CERTOPT_PORT_FWD) != 0)
add_flag_option(c, "permit-port-forwarding");
if ((which & OPTIONS_EXTENSIONS) != 0 &&
(certflags_flags & CERTOPT_PTY) != 0)
add_flag_option(c, "permit-pty");
if ((which & OPTIONS_EXTENSIONS) != 0 &&
(certflags_flags & CERTOPT_USER_RC) != 0)
add_flag_option(c, "permit-user-rc");
+ if ((which & OPTIONS_CRITICAL) != 0 &&
+ (certflags_flags & CERTOPT_NO_REQUIRE_USER_PRESENCE) != 0)
+ add_flag_option(c, "no-touch-required");
if ((which & OPTIONS_CRITICAL) != 0 &&
certflags_src_addr != NULL)
add_string_option(c, "source-address", certflags_src_addr);
for (i = 0; i < ncert_userext; i++) {
if ((cert_userext[i].crit && (which & OPTIONS_EXTENSIONS)) ||
(!cert_userext[i].crit && (which & OPTIONS_CRITICAL)))
continue;
if (cert_userext[i].val == NULL)
add_flag_option(c, cert_userext[i].key);
else {
add_string_option(c, cert_userext[i].key,
cert_userext[i].val);
}
}
}
static struct sshkey *
load_pkcs11_key(char *path)
{
#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
struct sshkey **keys = NULL, *public, *private = NULL;
int r, i, nkeys;
if ((r = sshkey_load_public(path, &public, NULL)) != 0)
fatal("Couldn't load CA public key \"%s\": %s",
path, ssh_err(r));
- nkeys = pkcs11_add_provider(pkcs11provider, identity_passphrase, &keys);
+ nkeys = pkcs11_add_provider(pkcs11provider, identity_passphrase,
+ &keys, NULL);
debug3("%s: %d keys", __func__, nkeys);
if (nkeys <= 0)
fatal("cannot read public key from pkcs11");
for (i = 0; i < nkeys; i++) {
if (sshkey_equal_public(public, keys[i])) {
private = keys[i];
continue;
}
sshkey_free(keys[i]);
}
free(keys);
sshkey_free(public);
return private;
#else
fatal("no pkcs11 support");
#endif /* ENABLE_PKCS11 */
}
/* Signer for sshkey_certify_custom that uses the agent */
static int
agent_signer(struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
const u_char *data, size_t datalen,
- const char *alg, u_int compat, void *ctx)
+ const char *alg, const char *provider, u_int compat, void *ctx)
{
int *agent_fdp = (int *)ctx;
return ssh_agent_sign(*agent_fdp, key, sigp, lenp,
data, datalen, alg, compat);
}
static void
do_ca_sign(struct passwd *pw, const char *ca_key_path, int prefer_agent,
unsigned long long cert_serial, int cert_serial_autoinc,
int argc, char **argv)
{
int r, i, fd, found, agent_fd = -1;
u_int n;
struct sshkey *ca, *public;
- char valid[64], *otmp, *tmp, *cp, *out, *comment, **plist = NULL;
+ char valid[64], *otmp, *tmp, *cp, *out, *comment;
+ char *ca_fp = NULL, **plist = NULL;
FILE *f;
struct ssh_identitylist *agent_ids;
size_t j;
+ struct notifier_ctx *notifier = NULL;
#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
pkcs11_init(1);
#endif
tmp = tilde_expand_filename(ca_key_path, pw->pw_uid);
if (pkcs11provider != NULL) {
/* If a PKCS#11 token was specified then try to use it */
if ((ca = load_pkcs11_key(tmp)) == NULL)
fatal("No PKCS#11 key matching %s found", ca_key_path);
} else if (prefer_agent) {
/*
* Agent signature requested. Try to use agent after making
* sure the public key specified is actually present in the
* agent.
*/
if ((r = sshkey_load_public(tmp, &ca, NULL)) != 0)
fatal("Cannot load CA public key %s: %s",
tmp, ssh_err(r));
if ((r = ssh_get_authentication_socket(&agent_fd)) != 0)
fatal("Cannot use public key for CA signature: %s",
ssh_err(r));
if ((r = ssh_fetch_identitylist(agent_fd, &agent_ids)) != 0)
fatal("Retrieve agent key list: %s", ssh_err(r));
found = 0;
for (j = 0; j < agent_ids->nkeys; j++) {
if (sshkey_equal(ca, agent_ids->keys[j])) {
found = 1;
break;
}
}
if (!found)
fatal("CA key %s not found in agent", tmp);
ssh_free_identitylist(agent_ids);
ca->flags |= SSHKEY_FLAG_EXT;
} else {
/* CA key is assumed to be a private key on the filesystem */
ca = load_identity(tmp, NULL);
}
free(tmp);
- if (key_type_name != NULL &&
- sshkey_type_from_name(key_type_name) != ca->type) {
- fatal("CA key type %s doesn't match specified %s",
- sshkey_ssh_name(ca), key_type_name);
+ if (key_type_name != NULL) {
+ if (sshkey_type_from_name(key_type_name) != ca->type) {
+ fatal("CA key type %s doesn't match specified %s",
+ sshkey_ssh_name(ca), key_type_name);
+ }
+ } else if (ca->type == KEY_RSA) {
+ /* Default to a good signature algorithm */
+ key_type_name = "rsa-sha2-512";
}
+ ca_fp = sshkey_fingerprint(ca, fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT);
for (i = 0; i < argc; i++) {
/* Split list of principals */
n = 0;
if (cert_principals != NULL) {
otmp = tmp = xstrdup(cert_principals);
plist = NULL;
for (; (cp = strsep(&tmp, ",")) != NULL; n++) {
plist = xreallocarray(plist, n + 1, sizeof(*plist));
if (*(plist[n] = xstrdup(cp)) == '\0')
fatal("Empty principal name");
}
free(otmp);
}
if (n > SSHKEY_CERT_MAX_PRINCIPALS)
fatal("Too many certificate principals specified");
tmp = tilde_expand_filename(argv[i], pw->pw_uid);
if ((r = sshkey_load_public(tmp, &public, &comment)) != 0)
fatal("%s: unable to open \"%s\": %s",
__func__, tmp, ssh_err(r));
- if (public->type != KEY_RSA && public->type != KEY_DSA &&
- public->type != KEY_ECDSA && public->type != KEY_ED25519 &&
- public->type != KEY_XMSS)
+ if (sshkey_is_cert(public))
fatal("%s: key \"%s\" type %s cannot be certified",
__func__, tmp, sshkey_type(public));
/* Prepare certificate to sign */
if ((r = sshkey_to_certified(public)) != 0)
fatal("Could not upgrade key %s to certificate: %s",
tmp, ssh_err(r));
public->cert->type = cert_key_type;
public->cert->serial = (u_int64_t)cert_serial;
public->cert->key_id = xstrdup(cert_key_id);
public->cert->nprincipals = n;
public->cert->principals = plist;
public->cert->valid_after = cert_valid_from;
public->cert->valid_before = cert_valid_to;
prepare_options_buf(public->cert->critical, OPTIONS_CRITICAL);
prepare_options_buf(public->cert->extensions,
OPTIONS_EXTENSIONS);
if ((r = sshkey_from_private(ca,
&public->cert->signature_key)) != 0)
fatal("sshkey_from_private (ca key): %s", ssh_err(r));
if (agent_fd != -1 && (ca->flags & SSHKEY_FLAG_EXT) != 0) {
if ((r = sshkey_certify_custom(public, ca,
- key_type_name, agent_signer, &agent_fd)) != 0)
+ key_type_name, sk_provider, agent_signer,
+ &agent_fd)) != 0)
fatal("Couldn't certify key %s via agent: %s",
tmp, ssh_err(r));
} else {
- if ((sshkey_certify(public, ca, key_type_name)) != 0)
+ if (sshkey_is_sk(ca) &&
+ (ca->sk_flags & SSH_SK_USER_PRESENCE_REQD)) {
+ notifier = notify_start(0,
+ "Confirm user presence for key %s %s",
+ sshkey_type(ca), ca_fp);
+ }
+ r = sshkey_certify(public, ca, key_type_name,
+ sk_provider);
+ notify_complete(notifier);
+ if (r != 0)
fatal("Couldn't certify key %s: %s",
tmp, ssh_err(r));
}
if ((cp = strrchr(tmp, '.')) != NULL && strcmp(cp, ".pub") == 0)
*cp = '\0';
xasprintf(&out, "%s-cert.pub", tmp);
free(tmp);
if ((fd = open(out, O_WRONLY|O_CREAT|O_TRUNC, 0644)) == -1)
fatal("Could not open \"%s\" for writing: %s", out,
strerror(errno));
if ((f = fdopen(fd, "w")) == NULL)
fatal("%s: fdopen: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
if ((r = sshkey_write(public, f)) != 0)
fatal("Could not write certified key to %s: %s",
out, ssh_err(r));
fprintf(f, " %s\n", comment);
fclose(f);
if (!quiet) {
sshkey_format_cert_validity(public->cert,
valid, sizeof(valid));
logit("Signed %s key %s: id \"%s\" serial %llu%s%s "
"valid %s", sshkey_cert_type(public),
out, public->cert->key_id,
(unsigned long long)public->cert->serial,
cert_principals != NULL ? " for " : "",
cert_principals != NULL ? cert_principals : "",
valid);
}
sshkey_free(public);
free(out);
if (cert_serial_autoinc)
cert_serial++;
}
+ free(ca_fp);
#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
pkcs11_terminate();
#endif
exit(0);
}
static u_int64_t
parse_relative_time(const char *s, time_t now)
{
int64_t mul, secs;
mul = *s == '-' ? -1 : 1;
if ((secs = convtime(s + 1)) == -1)
fatal("Invalid relative certificate time %s", s);
if (mul == -1 && secs > now)
fatal("Certificate time %s cannot be represented", s);
return now + (u_int64_t)(secs * mul);
}
static void
parse_cert_times(char *timespec)
{
char *from, *to;
time_t now = time(NULL);
int64_t secs;
/* +timespec relative to now */
if (*timespec == '+' && strchr(timespec, ':') == NULL) {
if ((secs = convtime(timespec + 1)) == -1)
fatal("Invalid relative certificate life %s", timespec);
cert_valid_to = now + secs;
/*
* Backdate certificate one minute to avoid problems on hosts
* with poorly-synchronised clocks.
*/
cert_valid_from = ((now - 59)/ 60) * 60;
return;
}
/*
* from:to, where
* from := [+-]timespec | YYYYMMDD | YYYYMMDDHHMMSS | "always"
* to := [+-]timespec | YYYYMMDD | YYYYMMDDHHMMSS | "forever"
*/
from = xstrdup(timespec);
to = strchr(from, ':');
if (to == NULL || from == to || *(to + 1) == '\0')
fatal("Invalid certificate life specification %s", timespec);
*to++ = '\0';
if (*from == '-' || *from == '+')
cert_valid_from = parse_relative_time(from, now);
else if (strcmp(from, "always") == 0)
cert_valid_from = 0;
else if (parse_absolute_time(from, &cert_valid_from) != 0)
fatal("Invalid from time \"%s\"", from);
if (*to == '-' || *to == '+')
cert_valid_to = parse_relative_time(to, now);
else if (strcmp(to, "forever") == 0)
cert_valid_to = ~(u_int64_t)0;
else if (parse_absolute_time(to, &cert_valid_to) != 0)
fatal("Invalid to time \"%s\"", to);
if (cert_valid_to <= cert_valid_from)
fatal("Empty certificate validity interval");
free(from);
}
static void
add_cert_option(char *opt)
{
char *val, *cp;
int iscrit = 0;
if (strcasecmp(opt, "clear") == 0)
certflags_flags = 0;
else if (strcasecmp(opt, "no-x11-forwarding") == 0)
certflags_flags &= ~CERTOPT_X_FWD;
else if (strcasecmp(opt, "permit-x11-forwarding") == 0)
certflags_flags |= CERTOPT_X_FWD;
else if (strcasecmp(opt, "no-agent-forwarding") == 0)
certflags_flags &= ~CERTOPT_AGENT_FWD;
else if (strcasecmp(opt, "permit-agent-forwarding") == 0)
certflags_flags |= CERTOPT_AGENT_FWD;
else if (strcasecmp(opt, "no-port-forwarding") == 0)
certflags_flags &= ~CERTOPT_PORT_FWD;
else if (strcasecmp(opt, "permit-port-forwarding") == 0)
certflags_flags |= CERTOPT_PORT_FWD;
else if (strcasecmp(opt, "no-pty") == 0)
certflags_flags &= ~CERTOPT_PTY;
else if (strcasecmp(opt, "permit-pty") == 0)
certflags_flags |= CERTOPT_PTY;
else if (strcasecmp(opt, "no-user-rc") == 0)
certflags_flags &= ~CERTOPT_USER_RC;
else if (strcasecmp(opt, "permit-user-rc") == 0)
certflags_flags |= CERTOPT_USER_RC;
+ else if (strcasecmp(opt, "touch-required") == 0)
+ certflags_flags &= ~CERTOPT_NO_REQUIRE_USER_PRESENCE;
+ else if (strcasecmp(opt, "no-touch-required") == 0)
+ certflags_flags |= CERTOPT_NO_REQUIRE_USER_PRESENCE;
else if (strncasecmp(opt, "force-command=", 14) == 0) {
val = opt + 14;
if (*val == '\0')
fatal("Empty force-command option");
if (certflags_command != NULL)
fatal("force-command already specified");
certflags_command = xstrdup(val);
} else if (strncasecmp(opt, "source-address=", 15) == 0) {
val = opt + 15;
if (*val == '\0')
fatal("Empty source-address option");
if (certflags_src_addr != NULL)
fatal("source-address already specified");
if (addr_match_cidr_list(NULL, val) != 0)
fatal("Invalid source-address list");
certflags_src_addr = xstrdup(val);
} else if (strncasecmp(opt, "extension:", 10) == 0 ||
(iscrit = (strncasecmp(opt, "critical:", 9) == 0))) {
val = xstrdup(strchr(opt, ':') + 1);
if ((cp = strchr(val, '=')) != NULL)
*cp++ = '\0';
cert_userext = xreallocarray(cert_userext, ncert_userext + 1,
sizeof(*cert_userext));
cert_userext[ncert_userext].key = val;
cert_userext[ncert_userext].val = cp == NULL ?
NULL : xstrdup(cp);
cert_userext[ncert_userext].crit = iscrit;
ncert_userext++;
} else
fatal("Unsupported certificate option \"%s\"", opt);
}
static void
show_options(struct sshbuf *optbuf, int in_critical)
{
char *name, *arg;
struct sshbuf *options, *option = NULL;
int r;
if ((options = sshbuf_fromb(optbuf)) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_fromb failed", __func__);
while (sshbuf_len(options) != 0) {
sshbuf_free(option);
option = NULL;
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(options, &name, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_froms(options, &option)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
printf(" %s", name);
if (!in_critical &&
(strcmp(name, "permit-X11-forwarding") == 0 ||
strcmp(name, "permit-agent-forwarding") == 0 ||
strcmp(name, "permit-port-forwarding") == 0 ||
strcmp(name, "permit-pty") == 0 ||
- strcmp(name, "permit-user-rc") == 0))
+ strcmp(name, "permit-user-rc") == 0 ||
+ strcmp(name, "no-touch-required") == 0)) {
printf("\n");
- else if (in_critical &&
+ } else if (in_critical &&
(strcmp(name, "force-command") == 0 ||
strcmp(name, "source-address") == 0)) {
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(option, &arg, NULL)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
printf(" %s\n", arg);
free(arg);
} else {
printf(" UNKNOWN OPTION (len %zu)\n",
sshbuf_len(option));
sshbuf_reset(option);
}
free(name);
if (sshbuf_len(option) != 0)
fatal("Option corrupt: extra data at end");
}
sshbuf_free(option);
sshbuf_free(options);
}
static void
print_cert(struct sshkey *key)
{
char valid[64], *key_fp, *ca_fp;
u_int i;
key_fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT);
ca_fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key->cert->signature_key,
fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT);
if (key_fp == NULL || ca_fp == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshkey_fingerprint fail", __func__);
sshkey_format_cert_validity(key->cert, valid, sizeof(valid));
printf(" Type: %s %s certificate\n", sshkey_ssh_name(key),
sshkey_cert_type(key));
printf(" Public key: %s %s\n", sshkey_type(key), key_fp);
printf(" Signing CA: %s %s (using %s)\n",
sshkey_type(key->cert->signature_key), ca_fp,
key->cert->signature_type);
printf(" Key ID: \"%s\"\n", key->cert->key_id);
printf(" Serial: %llu\n", (unsigned long long)key->cert->serial);
printf(" Valid: %s\n", valid);
printf(" Principals: ");
if (key->cert->nprincipals == 0)
printf("(none)\n");
else {
for (i = 0; i < key->cert->nprincipals; i++)
printf("\n %s",
key->cert->principals[i]);
printf("\n");
}
printf(" Critical Options: ");
if (sshbuf_len(key->cert->critical) == 0)
printf("(none)\n");
else {
printf("\n");
show_options(key->cert->critical, 1);
}
printf(" Extensions: ");
if (sshbuf_len(key->cert->extensions) == 0)
printf("(none)\n");
else {
printf("\n");
show_options(key->cert->extensions, 0);
}
}
static void
do_show_cert(struct passwd *pw)
{
struct sshkey *key = NULL;
struct stat st;
int r, is_stdin = 0, ok = 0;
FILE *f;
char *cp, *line = NULL;
const char *path;
size_t linesize = 0;
u_long lnum = 0;
if (!have_identity)
ask_filename(pw, "Enter file in which the key is");
if (strcmp(identity_file, "-") != 0 && stat(identity_file, &st) == -1)
fatal("%s: %s: %s", __progname, identity_file, strerror(errno));
path = identity_file;
if (strcmp(path, "-") == 0) {
f = stdin;
path = "(stdin)";
is_stdin = 1;
} else if ((f = fopen(identity_file, "r")) == NULL)
fatal("fopen %s: %s", identity_file, strerror(errno));
while (getline(&line, &linesize, f) != -1) {
lnum++;
sshkey_free(key);
key = NULL;
/* Trim leading space and comments */
cp = line + strspn(line, " \t");
if (*cp == '#' || *cp == '\0')
continue;
if ((key = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL)
fatal("sshkey_new");
if ((r = sshkey_read(key, &cp)) != 0) {
error("%s:%lu: invalid key: %s", path,
lnum, ssh_err(r));
continue;
}
if (!sshkey_is_cert(key)) {
error("%s:%lu is not a certificate", path, lnum);
continue;
}
ok = 1;
if (!is_stdin && lnum == 1)
printf("%s:\n", path);
else
printf("%s:%lu:\n", path, lnum);
print_cert(key);
}
free(line);
sshkey_free(key);
fclose(f);
exit(ok ? 0 : 1);
}
static void
load_krl(const char *path, struct ssh_krl **krlp)
{
struct sshbuf *krlbuf;
- int r, fd;
+ int r;
- if ((krlbuf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("sshbuf_new failed");
- if ((fd = open(path, O_RDONLY)) == -1)
- fatal("open %s: %s", path, strerror(errno));
- if ((r = sshkey_load_file(fd, krlbuf)) != 0)
+ if ((r = sshbuf_load_file(path, &krlbuf)) != 0)
fatal("Unable to load KRL: %s", ssh_err(r));
- close(fd);
/* XXX check sigs */
if ((r = ssh_krl_from_blob(krlbuf, krlp, NULL, 0)) != 0 ||
*krlp == NULL)
fatal("Invalid KRL file: %s", ssh_err(r));
sshbuf_free(krlbuf);
}
static void
hash_to_blob(const char *cp, u_char **blobp, size_t *lenp,
const char *file, u_long lnum)
{
char *tmp;
size_t tlen;
struct sshbuf *b;
int r;
if (strncmp(cp, "SHA256:", 7) != 0)
fatal("%s:%lu: unsupported hash algorithm", file, lnum);
cp += 7;
/*
* OpenSSH base64 hashes omit trailing '='
* characters; put them back for decode.
*/
tlen = strlen(cp);
tmp = xmalloc(tlen + 4 + 1);
strlcpy(tmp, cp, tlen + 1);
while ((tlen % 4) != 0) {
tmp[tlen++] = '=';
tmp[tlen] = '\0';
}
if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
if ((r = sshbuf_b64tod(b, tmp)) != 0)
fatal("%s:%lu: decode hash failed: %s", file, lnum, ssh_err(r));
free(tmp);
*lenp = sshbuf_len(b);
*blobp = xmalloc(*lenp);
memcpy(*blobp, sshbuf_ptr(b), *lenp);
sshbuf_free(b);
}
static void
update_krl_from_file(struct passwd *pw, const char *file, int wild_ca,
const struct sshkey *ca, struct ssh_krl *krl)
{
struct sshkey *key = NULL;
u_long lnum = 0;
char *path, *cp, *ep, *line = NULL;
u_char *blob = NULL;
size_t blen = 0, linesize = 0;
unsigned long long serial, serial2;
int i, was_explicit_key, was_sha1, was_sha256, was_hash, r;
FILE *krl_spec;
path = tilde_expand_filename(file, pw->pw_uid);
if (strcmp(path, "-") == 0) {
krl_spec = stdin;
free(path);
path = xstrdup("(standard input)");
} else if ((krl_spec = fopen(path, "r")) == NULL)
fatal("fopen %s: %s", path, strerror(errno));
if (!quiet)
printf("Revoking from %s\n", path);
while (getline(&line, &linesize, krl_spec) != -1) {
lnum++;
was_explicit_key = was_sha1 = was_sha256 = was_hash = 0;
cp = line + strspn(line, " \t");
/* Trim trailing space, comments and strip \n */
for (i = 0, r = -1; cp[i] != '\0'; i++) {
if (cp[i] == '#' || cp[i] == '\n') {
cp[i] = '\0';
break;
}
if (cp[i] == ' ' || cp[i] == '\t') {
/* Remember the start of a span of whitespace */
if (r == -1)
r = i;
} else
r = -1;
}
if (r != -1)
cp[r] = '\0';
if (*cp == '\0')
continue;
if (strncasecmp(cp, "serial:", 7) == 0) {
if (ca == NULL && !wild_ca) {
fatal("revoking certificates by serial number "
"requires specification of a CA key");
}
cp += 7;
cp = cp + strspn(cp, " \t");
errno = 0;
serial = strtoull(cp, &ep, 0);
if (*cp == '\0' || (*ep != '\0' && *ep != '-'))
fatal("%s:%lu: invalid serial \"%s\"",
path, lnum, cp);
if (errno == ERANGE && serial == ULLONG_MAX)
fatal("%s:%lu: serial out of range",
path, lnum);
serial2 = serial;
if (*ep == '-') {
cp = ep + 1;
errno = 0;
serial2 = strtoull(cp, &ep, 0);
if (*cp == '\0' || *ep != '\0')
fatal("%s:%lu: invalid serial \"%s\"",
path, lnum, cp);
if (errno == ERANGE && serial2 == ULLONG_MAX)
fatal("%s:%lu: serial out of range",
path, lnum);
if (serial2 <= serial)
fatal("%s:%lu: invalid serial range "
"%llu:%llu", path, lnum,
(unsigned long long)serial,
(unsigned long long)serial2);
}
if (ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_serial_range(krl,
ca, serial, serial2) != 0) {
fatal("%s: revoke serial failed",
__func__);
}
} else if (strncasecmp(cp, "id:", 3) == 0) {
if (ca == NULL && !wild_ca) {
fatal("revoking certificates by key ID "
"requires specification of a CA key");
}
cp += 3;
cp = cp + strspn(cp, " \t");
if (ssh_krl_revoke_cert_by_key_id(krl, ca, cp) != 0)
fatal("%s: revoke key ID failed", __func__);
} else if (strncasecmp(cp, "hash:", 5) == 0) {
cp += 5;
cp = cp + strspn(cp, " \t");
hash_to_blob(cp, &blob, &blen, file, lnum);
r = ssh_krl_revoke_key_sha256(krl, blob, blen);
} else {
if (strncasecmp(cp, "key:", 4) == 0) {
cp += 4;
cp = cp + strspn(cp, " \t");
was_explicit_key = 1;
} else if (strncasecmp(cp, "sha1:", 5) == 0) {
cp += 5;
cp = cp + strspn(cp, " \t");
was_sha1 = 1;
} else if (strncasecmp(cp, "sha256:", 7) == 0) {
cp += 7;
cp = cp + strspn(cp, " \t");
was_sha256 = 1;
/*
* Just try to process the line as a key.
* Parsing will fail if it isn't.
*/
}
if ((key = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL)
fatal("sshkey_new");
if ((r = sshkey_read(key, &cp)) != 0)
fatal("%s:%lu: invalid key: %s",
path, lnum, ssh_err(r));
if (was_explicit_key)
r = ssh_krl_revoke_key_explicit(krl, key);
else if (was_sha1) {
if (sshkey_fingerprint_raw(key,
SSH_DIGEST_SHA1, &blob, &blen) != 0) {
fatal("%s:%lu: fingerprint failed",
file, lnum);
}
r = ssh_krl_revoke_key_sha1(krl, blob, blen);
} else if (was_sha256) {
if (sshkey_fingerprint_raw(key,
SSH_DIGEST_SHA256, &blob, &blen) != 0) {
fatal("%s:%lu: fingerprint failed",
file, lnum);
}
r = ssh_krl_revoke_key_sha256(krl, blob, blen);
} else
r = ssh_krl_revoke_key(krl, key);
if (r != 0)
fatal("%s: revoke key failed: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
freezero(blob, blen);
blob = NULL;
blen = 0;
sshkey_free(key);
}
}
if (strcmp(path, "-") != 0)
fclose(krl_spec);
free(line);
free(path);
}
static void
do_gen_krl(struct passwd *pw, int updating, const char *ca_key_path,
unsigned long long krl_version, const char *krl_comment,
int argc, char **argv)
{
struct ssh_krl *krl;
struct stat sb;
struct sshkey *ca = NULL;
- int fd, i, r, wild_ca = 0;
+ int i, r, wild_ca = 0;
char *tmp;
struct sshbuf *kbuf;
if (*identity_file == '\0')
fatal("KRL generation requires an output file");
if (stat(identity_file, &sb) == -1) {
if (errno != ENOENT)
fatal("Cannot access KRL \"%s\": %s",
identity_file, strerror(errno));
if (updating)
fatal("KRL \"%s\" does not exist", identity_file);
}
if (ca_key_path != NULL) {
if (strcasecmp(ca_key_path, "none") == 0)
wild_ca = 1;
else {
tmp = tilde_expand_filename(ca_key_path, pw->pw_uid);
if ((r = sshkey_load_public(tmp, &ca, NULL)) != 0)
fatal("Cannot load CA public key %s: %s",
tmp, ssh_err(r));
free(tmp);
}
}
if (updating)
load_krl(identity_file, &krl);
else if ((krl = ssh_krl_init()) == NULL)
fatal("couldn't create KRL");
if (krl_version != 0)
ssh_krl_set_version(krl, krl_version);
if (krl_comment != NULL)
ssh_krl_set_comment(krl, krl_comment);
for (i = 0; i < argc; i++)
update_krl_from_file(pw, argv[i], wild_ca, ca, krl);
if ((kbuf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("sshbuf_new failed");
if (ssh_krl_to_blob(krl, kbuf, NULL, 0) != 0)
fatal("Couldn't generate KRL");
- if ((fd = open(identity_file, O_WRONLY|O_CREAT|O_TRUNC, 0644)) == -1)
- fatal("open %s: %s", identity_file, strerror(errno));
- if (atomicio(vwrite, fd, sshbuf_mutable_ptr(kbuf), sshbuf_len(kbuf)) !=
- sshbuf_len(kbuf))
+ if ((r = sshbuf_write_file(identity_file, kbuf)) != 0)
fatal("write %s: %s", identity_file, strerror(errno));
- close(fd);
sshbuf_free(kbuf);
ssh_krl_free(krl);
sshkey_free(ca);
}
static void
do_check_krl(struct passwd *pw, int argc, char **argv)
{
int i, r, ret = 0;
char *comment;
struct ssh_krl *krl;
struct sshkey *k;
if (*identity_file == '\0')
fatal("KRL checking requires an input file");
load_krl(identity_file, &krl);
for (i = 0; i < argc; i++) {
if ((r = sshkey_load_public(argv[i], &k, &comment)) != 0)
fatal("Cannot load public key %s: %s",
argv[i], ssh_err(r));
r = ssh_krl_check_key(krl, k);
printf("%s%s%s%s: %s\n", argv[i],
*comment ? " (" : "", comment, *comment ? ")" : "",
r == 0 ? "ok" : "REVOKED");
if (r != 0)
ret = 1;
sshkey_free(k);
free(comment);
}
ssh_krl_free(krl);
exit(ret);
}
static struct sshkey *
load_sign_key(const char *keypath, const struct sshkey *pubkey)
{
size_t i, slen, plen = strlen(keypath);
char *privpath = xstrdup(keypath);
const char *suffixes[] = { "-cert.pub", ".pub", NULL };
struct sshkey *ret = NULL, *privkey = NULL;
int r;
/*
* If passed a public key filename, then try to locate the correponding
* private key. This lets us specify certificates on the command-line
* and have ssh-keygen find the appropriate private key.
*/
for (i = 0; suffixes[i]; i++) {
slen = strlen(suffixes[i]);
if (plen <= slen ||
strcmp(privpath + plen - slen, suffixes[i]) != 0)
continue;
privpath[plen - slen] = '\0';
debug("%s: %s looks like a public key, using private key "
"path %s instead", __func__, keypath, privpath);
}
if ((privkey = load_identity(privpath, NULL)) == NULL) {
error("Couldn't load identity %s", keypath);
goto done;
}
if (!sshkey_equal_public(pubkey, privkey)) {
error("Public key %s doesn't match private %s",
keypath, privpath);
goto done;
}
if (sshkey_is_cert(pubkey) && !sshkey_is_cert(privkey)) {
/*
* Graft the certificate onto the private key to make
* it capable of signing.
*/
if ((r = sshkey_to_certified(privkey)) != 0) {
error("%s: sshkey_to_certified: %s", __func__,
ssh_err(r));
goto done;
}
if ((r = sshkey_cert_copy(pubkey, privkey)) != 0) {
error("%s: sshkey_cert_copy: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
goto done;
}
}
/* success */
ret = privkey;
privkey = NULL;
done:
sshkey_free(privkey);
free(privpath);
return ret;
}
static int
sign_one(struct sshkey *signkey, const char *filename, int fd,
const char *sig_namespace, sshsig_signer *signer, void *signer_ctx)
{
struct sshbuf *sigbuf = NULL, *abuf = NULL;
int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR, wfd = -1, oerrno;
- char *wfile = NULL;
- char *asig = NULL;
+ char *wfile = NULL, *asig = NULL, *fp = NULL;
if (!quiet) {
if (fd == STDIN_FILENO)
fprintf(stderr, "Signing data on standard input\n");
else
fprintf(stderr, "Signing file %s\n", filename);
}
- if ((r = sshsig_sign_fd(signkey, NULL, fd, sig_namespace,
+ if (signer == NULL && sshkey_is_sk(signkey) &&
+ (signkey->sk_flags & SSH_SK_USER_PRESENCE_REQD)) {
+ if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(signkey, fingerprint_hash,
+ SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: sshkey_fingerprint failed", __func__);
+ fprintf(stderr, "Confirm user presence for key %s %s\n",
+ sshkey_type(signkey), fp);
+ free(fp);
+ }
+ if ((r = sshsig_sign_fd(signkey, NULL, sk_provider, fd, sig_namespace,
&sigbuf, signer, signer_ctx)) != 0) {
error("Signing %s failed: %s", filename, ssh_err(r));
goto out;
}
if ((r = sshsig_armor(sigbuf, &abuf)) != 0) {
error("%s: sshsig_armor: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
goto out;
}
if ((asig = sshbuf_dup_string(abuf)) == NULL) {
error("%s: buffer error", __func__);
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
if (fd == STDIN_FILENO) {
fputs(asig, stdout);
fflush(stdout);
} else {
xasprintf(&wfile, "%s.sig", filename);
if (confirm_overwrite(wfile)) {
if ((wfd = open(wfile, O_WRONLY|O_CREAT|O_TRUNC,
0666)) == -1) {
oerrno = errno;
error("Cannot open %s: %s",
wfile, strerror(errno));
errno = oerrno;
r = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
goto out;
}
if (atomicio(vwrite, wfd, asig,
strlen(asig)) != strlen(asig)) {
oerrno = errno;
error("Cannot write to %s: %s",
wfile, strerror(errno));
errno = oerrno;
r = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
goto out;
}
if (!quiet) {
fprintf(stderr, "Write signature to %s\n",
wfile);
}
}
}
/* success */
r = 0;
out:
free(wfile);
free(asig);
sshbuf_free(abuf);
sshbuf_free(sigbuf);
if (wfd != -1)
close(wfd);
return r;
}
static int
-sign(const char *keypath, const char *sig_namespace, int argc, char **argv)
+sig_sign(const char *keypath, const char *sig_namespace, int argc, char **argv)
{
int i, fd = -1, r, ret = -1;
int agent_fd = -1;
struct sshkey *pubkey = NULL, *privkey = NULL, *signkey = NULL;
sshsig_signer *signer = NULL;
/* Check file arguments. */
for (i = 0; i < argc; i++) {
if (strcmp(argv[i], "-") != 0)
continue;
if (i > 0 || argc > 1)
fatal("Cannot sign mix of paths and standard input");
}
if ((r = sshkey_load_public(keypath, &pubkey, NULL)) != 0) {
error("Couldn't load public key %s: %s", keypath, ssh_err(r));
goto done;
}
if ((r = ssh_get_authentication_socket(&agent_fd)) != 0)
debug("Couldn't get agent socket: %s", ssh_err(r));
else {
if ((r = ssh_agent_has_key(agent_fd, pubkey)) == 0)
signer = agent_signer;
else
debug("Couldn't find key in agent: %s", ssh_err(r));
}
if (signer == NULL) {
/* Not using agent - try to load private key */
if ((privkey = load_sign_key(keypath, pubkey)) == NULL)
goto done;
signkey = privkey;
} else {
/* Will use key in agent */
signkey = pubkey;
}
if (argc == 0) {
if ((r = sign_one(signkey, "(stdin)", STDIN_FILENO,
sig_namespace, signer, &agent_fd)) != 0)
goto done;
} else {
for (i = 0; i < argc; i++) {
if (strcmp(argv[i], "-") == 0)
fd = STDIN_FILENO;
else if ((fd = open(argv[i], O_RDONLY)) == -1) {
error("Cannot open %s for signing: %s",
argv[i], strerror(errno));
goto done;
}
if ((r = sign_one(signkey, argv[i], fd, sig_namespace,
signer, &agent_fd)) != 0)
goto done;
if (fd != STDIN_FILENO)
close(fd);
fd = -1;
}
}
ret = 0;
done:
if (fd != -1 && fd != STDIN_FILENO)
close(fd);
sshkey_free(pubkey);
sshkey_free(privkey);
return ret;
}
static int
-verify(const char *signature, const char *sig_namespace, const char *principal,
- const char *allowed_keys, const char *revoked_keys)
+sig_verify(const char *signature, const char *sig_namespace,
+ const char *principal, const char *allowed_keys, const char *revoked_keys)
{
- int r, ret = -1, sigfd = -1;
+ int r, ret = -1;
struct sshbuf *sigbuf = NULL, *abuf = NULL;
struct sshkey *sign_key = NULL;
char *fp = NULL;
+ struct sshkey_sig_details *sig_details = NULL;
- if ((abuf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: sshbuf_new() failed", __func__);
-
- if ((sigfd = open(signature, O_RDONLY)) < 0) {
- error("Couldn't open signature file %s", signature);
- goto done;
- }
-
- if ((r = sshkey_load_file(sigfd, abuf)) != 0) {
+ memset(&sig_details, 0, sizeof(sig_details));
+ if ((r = sshbuf_load_file(signature, &abuf)) != 0) {
error("Couldn't read signature file: %s", ssh_err(r));
goto done;
}
+
if ((r = sshsig_dearmor(abuf, &sigbuf)) != 0) {
error("%s: sshsig_armor: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
- return r;
+ goto done;
}
if ((r = sshsig_verify_fd(sigbuf, STDIN_FILENO, sig_namespace,
- &sign_key)) != 0)
+ &sign_key, &sig_details)) != 0)
goto done; /* sshsig_verify() prints error */
if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(sign_key, fingerprint_hash,
SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshkey_fingerprint failed", __func__);
debug("Valid (unverified) signature from key %s", fp);
+ if (sig_details != NULL) {
+ debug2("%s: signature details: counter = %u, flags = 0x%02x",
+ __func__, sig_details->sk_counter, sig_details->sk_flags);
+ }
free(fp);
fp = NULL;
if (revoked_keys != NULL) {
if ((r = sshkey_check_revoked(sign_key, revoked_keys)) != 0) {
debug3("sshkey_check_revoked failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
goto done;
}
}
if (allowed_keys != NULL &&
(r = sshsig_check_allowed_keys(allowed_keys, sign_key,
principal, sig_namespace)) != 0) {
debug3("sshsig_check_allowed_keys failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
goto done;
}
/* success */
ret = 0;
done:
if (!quiet) {
if (ret == 0) {
if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(sign_key, fingerprint_hash,
SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) {
fatal("%s: sshkey_fingerprint failed",
__func__);
}
if (principal == NULL) {
printf("Good \"%s\" signature with %s key %s\n",
sig_namespace, sshkey_type(sign_key), fp);
} else {
printf("Good \"%s\" signature for %s with %s key %s\n",
sig_namespace, principal,
sshkey_type(sign_key), fp);
}
} else {
printf("Could not verify signature.\n");
}
}
- if (sigfd != -1)
- close(sigfd);
sshbuf_free(sigbuf);
sshbuf_free(abuf);
sshkey_free(sign_key);
+ sshkey_sig_details_free(sig_details);
free(fp);
return ret;
}
+static int
+sig_find_principals(const char *signature, const char *allowed_keys) {
+ int r, ret = -1;
+ struct sshbuf *sigbuf = NULL, *abuf = NULL;
+ struct sshkey *sign_key = NULL;
+ char *principals = NULL, *cp, *tmp;
+
+ if ((r = sshbuf_load_file(signature, &abuf)) != 0) {
+ error("Couldn't read signature file: %s", ssh_err(r));
+ goto done;
+ }
+ if ((r = sshsig_dearmor(abuf, &sigbuf)) != 0) {
+ error("%s: sshsig_armor: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ goto done;
+ }
+ if ((r = sshsig_get_pubkey(sigbuf, &sign_key)) != 0) {
+ error("%s: sshsig_get_pubkey: %s",
+ __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ goto done;
+ }
+ if ((r = sshsig_find_principals(allowed_keys, sign_key,
+ &principals)) != 0) {
+ error("%s: sshsig_get_principal: %s",
+ __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ goto done;
+ }
+ ret = 0;
+done:
+ if (ret == 0 ) {
+ /* Emit matching principals one per line */
+ tmp = principals;
+ while ((cp = strsep(&tmp, ",")) != NULL && *cp != '\0')
+ puts(cp);
+ } else {
+ fprintf(stderr, "No principal matched.\n");
+ }
+ sshbuf_free(sigbuf);
+ sshbuf_free(abuf);
+ sshkey_free(sign_key);
+ free(principals);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static void
+do_moduli_gen(const char *out_file, char **opts, size_t nopts)
+{
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+ /* Moduli generation/screening */
+ u_int32_t memory = 0;
+ BIGNUM *start = NULL;
+ int moduli_bits = 0;
+ FILE *out;
+ size_t i;
+ const char *errstr;
+
+ /* Parse options */
+ for (i = 0; i < nopts; i++) {
+ if (strncmp(opts[i], "memory=", 7) == 0) {
+ memory = (u_int32_t)strtonum(opts[i]+7, 1,
+ UINT_MAX, &errstr);
+ if (errstr) {
+ fatal("Memory limit is %s: %s",
+ errstr, opts[i]+7);
+ }
+ } else if (strncmp(opts[i], "start=", 6) == 0) {
+ /* XXX - also compare length against bits */
+ if (BN_hex2bn(&start, opts[i]+6) == 0)
+ fatal("Invalid start point.");
+ } else if (strncmp(opts[i], "bits=", 5) == 0) {
+ moduli_bits = (int)strtonum(opts[i]+5, 1,
+ INT_MAX, &errstr);
+ if (errstr) {
+ fatal("Invalid number: %s (%s)",
+ opts[i]+12, errstr);
+ }
+ } else {
+ fatal("Option \"%s\" is unsupported for moduli "
+ "generation", opts[i]);
+ }
+ }
+
+ if ((out = fopen(out_file, "w")) == NULL) {
+ fatal("Couldn't open modulus candidate file \"%s\": %s",
+ out_file, strerror(errno));
+ }
+ setvbuf(out, NULL, _IOLBF, 0);
+
+ if (moduli_bits == 0)
+ moduli_bits = DEFAULT_BITS;
+ if (gen_candidates(out, memory, moduli_bits, start) != 0)
+ fatal("modulus candidate generation failed");
+#else /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+ fatal("Moduli generation is not supported");
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+}
+
+static void
+do_moduli_screen(const char *out_file, char **opts, size_t nopts)
+{
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+ /* Moduli generation/screening */
+ char *checkpoint = NULL;
+ u_int32_t generator_wanted = 0;
+ unsigned long start_lineno = 0, lines_to_process = 0;
+ int prime_tests = 0;
+ FILE *out, *in = stdin;
+ size_t i;
+ const char *errstr;
+
+ /* Parse options */
+ for (i = 0; i < nopts; i++) {
+ if (strncmp(opts[i], "lines=", 6) == 0) {
+ lines_to_process = strtoul(opts[i]+6, NULL, 10);
+ } else if (strncmp(opts[i], "start-line=", 11) == 0) {
+ start_lineno = strtoul(opts[i]+11, NULL, 10);
+ } else if (strncmp(opts[i], "checkpoint=", 11) == 0) {
+ checkpoint = xstrdup(opts[i]+11);
+ } else if (strncmp(opts[i], "generator=", 10) == 0) {
+ generator_wanted = (u_int32_t)strtonum(
+ opts[i]+10, 1, UINT_MAX, &errstr);
+ if (errstr != NULL) {
+ fatal("Generator invalid: %s (%s)",
+ opts[i]+10, errstr);
+ }
+ } else if (strncmp(opts[i], "prime-tests=", 12) == 0) {
+ prime_tests = (int)strtonum(opts[i]+12, 1,
+ INT_MAX, &errstr);
+ if (errstr) {
+ fatal("Invalid number: %s (%s)",
+ opts[i]+12, errstr);
+ }
+ } else {
+ fatal("Option \"%s\" is unsupported for moduli "
+ "screening", opts[i]);
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (have_identity && strcmp(identity_file, "-") != 0) {
+ if ((in = fopen(identity_file, "r")) == NULL) {
+ fatal("Couldn't open modulus candidate "
+ "file \"%s\": %s", identity_file,
+ strerror(errno));
+ }
+ }
+
+ if ((out = fopen(out_file, "a")) == NULL) {
+ fatal("Couldn't open moduli file \"%s\": %s",
+ out_file, strerror(errno));
+ }
+ setvbuf(out, NULL, _IOLBF, 0);
+ if (prime_test(in, out, prime_tests == 0 ? 100 : prime_tests,
+ generator_wanted, checkpoint,
+ start_lineno, lines_to_process) != 0)
+ fatal("modulus screening failed");
+#else /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+ fatal("Moduli screening is not supported");
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+}
+
+static char *
+private_key_passphrase(void)
+{
+ char *passphrase1, *passphrase2;
+
+ /* Ask for a passphrase (twice). */
+ if (identity_passphrase)
+ passphrase1 = xstrdup(identity_passphrase);
+ else if (identity_new_passphrase)
+ passphrase1 = xstrdup(identity_new_passphrase);
+ else {
+passphrase_again:
+ passphrase1 =
+ read_passphrase("Enter passphrase (empty for no "
+ "passphrase): ", RP_ALLOW_STDIN);
+ passphrase2 = read_passphrase("Enter same passphrase again: ",
+ RP_ALLOW_STDIN);
+ if (strcmp(passphrase1, passphrase2) != 0) {
+ /*
+ * The passphrases do not match. Clear them and
+ * retry.
+ */
+ freezero(passphrase1, strlen(passphrase1));
+ freezero(passphrase2, strlen(passphrase2));
+ printf("Passphrases do not match. Try again.\n");
+ goto passphrase_again;
+ }
+ /* Clear the other copy of the passphrase. */
+ freezero(passphrase2, strlen(passphrase2));
+ }
+ return passphrase1;
+}
+
+static const char *
+skip_ssh_url_preamble(const char *s)
+{
+ if (strncmp(s, "ssh://", 6) == 0)
+ return s + 6;
+ else if (strncmp(s, "ssh:", 4) == 0)
+ return s + 4;
+ return s;
+}
+
+static int
+do_download_sk(const char *skprovider, const char *device)
+{
+ struct sshkey **keys;
+ size_t nkeys, i;
+ int r, ok = -1;
+ char *fp, *pin, *pass = NULL, *path, *pubpath;
+ const char *ext;
+
+ if (skprovider == NULL)
+ fatal("Cannot download keys without provider");
+
+ pin = read_passphrase("Enter PIN for authenticator: ", RP_ALLOW_STDIN);
+ if ((r = sshsk_load_resident(skprovider, device, pin,
+ &keys, &nkeys)) != 0) {
+ freezero(pin, strlen(pin));
+ error("Unable to load resident keys: %s", ssh_err(r));
+ return -1;
+ }
+ if (nkeys == 0)
+ logit("No keys to download");
+ freezero(pin, strlen(pin));
+
+ for (i = 0; i < nkeys; i++) {
+ if (keys[i]->type != KEY_ECDSA_SK &&
+ keys[i]->type != KEY_ED25519_SK) {
+ error("Unsupported key type %s (%d)",
+ sshkey_type(keys[i]), keys[i]->type);
+ continue;
+ }
+ if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(keys[i],
+ fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: sshkey_fingerprint failed", __func__);
+ debug("%s: key %zu: %s %s %s (flags 0x%02x)", __func__, i,
+ sshkey_type(keys[i]), fp, keys[i]->sk_application,
+ keys[i]->sk_flags);
+ ext = skip_ssh_url_preamble(keys[i]->sk_application);
+ xasprintf(&path, "id_%s_rk%s%s",
+ keys[i]->type == KEY_ECDSA_SK ? "ecdsa_sk" : "ed25519_sk",
+ *ext == '\0' ? "" : "_", ext);
+
+ /* If the file already exists, ask the user to confirm. */
+ if (!confirm_overwrite(path)) {
+ free(path);
+ break;
+ }
+
+ /* Save the key with the application string as the comment */
+ if (pass == NULL)
+ pass = private_key_passphrase();
+ if ((r = sshkey_save_private(keys[i], path, pass,
+ keys[i]->sk_application, private_key_format,
+ openssh_format_cipher, rounds)) != 0) {
+ error("Saving key \"%s\" failed: %s",
+ path, ssh_err(r));
+ free(path);
+ break;
+ }
+ if (!quiet) {
+ printf("Saved %s key%s%s to %s\n",
+ sshkey_type(keys[i]),
+ *ext != '\0' ? " " : "",
+ *ext != '\0' ? keys[i]->sk_application : "",
+ path);
+ }
+
+ /* Save public key too */
+ xasprintf(&pubpath, "%s.pub", path);
+ free(path);
+ if ((r = sshkey_save_public(keys[i], pubpath,
+ keys[i]->sk_application)) != 0) {
+ free(pubpath);
+ error("Saving public key \"%s\" failed: %s",
+ pubpath, ssh_err(r));
+ break;
+ }
+ free(pubpath);
+ }
+
+ if (i >= nkeys)
+ ok = 0; /* success */
+ if (pass != NULL)
+ freezero(pass, strlen(pass));
+ for (i = 0; i < nkeys; i++)
+ sshkey_free(keys[i]);
+ free(keys);
+ return ok ? 0 : -1;
+}
+
static void
usage(void)
{
fprintf(stderr,
"usage: ssh-keygen [-q] [-b bits] [-C comment] [-f output_keyfile] [-m format]\n"
- " [-N new_passphrase] [-t dsa | ecdsa | ed25519 | rsa]\n"
+ " [-t dsa | ecdsa | ecdsa-sk | ed25519 | ed25519-sk | rsa]\n"
+ " [-N new_passphrase] [-O option] [-w provider]\n"
" ssh-keygen -p [-f keyfile] [-m format] [-N new_passphrase]\n"
" [-P old_passphrase]\n"
" ssh-keygen -i [-f input_keyfile] [-m key_format]\n"
" ssh-keygen -e [-f input_keyfile] [-m key_format]\n"
" ssh-keygen -y [-f input_keyfile]\n"
" ssh-keygen -c [-C comment] [-f keyfile] [-P passphrase]\n"
" ssh-keygen -l [-v] [-E fingerprint_hash] [-f input_keyfile]\n"
" ssh-keygen -B [-f input_keyfile]\n");
#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
fprintf(stderr,
" ssh-keygen -D pkcs11\n");
#endif
fprintf(stderr,
" ssh-keygen -F hostname [-lv] [-f known_hosts_file]\n"
" ssh-keygen -H [-f known_hosts_file]\n"
+ " ssh-keygen -K [-w provider]\n"
" ssh-keygen -R hostname [-f known_hosts_file]\n"
" ssh-keygen -r hostname [-g] [-f input_keyfile]\n"
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
- " ssh-keygen -G output_file [-v] [-b bits] [-M memory] [-S start_point]\n"
- " ssh-keygen -f input_file -T output_file [-v] [-a rounds] [-J num_lines]\n"
- " [-j start_line] [-K checkpt] [-W generator]\n"
+ " ssh-keygen -M generate [-O option] output_file\n"
+ " ssh-keygen -M screen [-f input_file] [-O option] output_file\n"
#endif
" ssh-keygen -I certificate_identity -s ca_key [-hU] [-D pkcs11_provider]\n"
" [-n principals] [-O option] [-V validity_interval]\n"
" [-z serial_number] file ...\n"
" ssh-keygen -L [-f input_keyfile]\n"
" ssh-keygen -A [-f prefix_path]\n"
" ssh-keygen -k -f krl_file [-u] [-s ca_public] [-z version_number]\n"
" file ...\n"
" ssh-keygen -Q -f krl_file file ...\n"
+ " ssh-keygen -Y find-principals -s signature_file -f allowed_signers_file\n"
" ssh-keygen -Y check-novalidate -n namespace -s signature_file\n"
" ssh-keygen -Y sign -f key_file -n namespace file ...\n"
" ssh-keygen -Y verify -f allowed_signers_file -I signer_identity\n"
" -n namespace -s signature_file [-r revocation_file]\n");
exit(1);
}
/*
* Main program for key management.
*/
int
main(int argc, char **argv)
{
- char dotsshdir[PATH_MAX], comment[1024], *passphrase1, *passphrase2;
+ char dotsshdir[PATH_MAX], comment[1024], *passphrase;
char *rr_hostname = NULL, *ep, *fp, *ra;
struct sshkey *private, *public;
struct passwd *pw;
struct stat st;
- int r, opt, type, fd;
+ int r, opt, type;
int change_passphrase = 0, change_comment = 0, show_cert = 0;
int find_host = 0, delete_host = 0, hash_hosts = 0;
int gen_all_hostkeys = 0, gen_krl = 0, update_krl = 0, check_krl = 0;
int prefer_agent = 0, convert_to = 0, convert_from = 0;
int print_public = 0, print_generic = 0, cert_serial_autoinc = 0;
+ int do_gen_candidates = 0, do_screen_candidates = 0, download_sk = 0;
unsigned long long cert_serial = 0;
- char *identity_comment = NULL, *ca_key_path = NULL;
+ char *identity_comment = NULL, *ca_key_path = NULL, **opts = NULL;
+ char *sk_application = NULL, *sk_device = NULL, *sk_user = NULL;
+ char *sk_attestaion_path = NULL;
+ struct sshbuf *challenge = NULL, *attest = NULL;
+ size_t i, nopts = 0;
u_int32_t bits = 0;
- FILE *f;
+ uint8_t sk_flags = SSH_SK_USER_PRESENCE_REQD;
const char *errstr;
int log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO;
char *sign_op = NULL;
-#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
- /* Moduli generation/screening */
- char out_file[PATH_MAX], *checkpoint = NULL;
- u_int32_t memory = 0, generator_wanted = 0;
- int do_gen_candidates = 0, do_screen_candidates = 0;
- unsigned long start_lineno = 0, lines_to_process = 0;
- BIGNUM *start = NULL;
-#endif
extern int optind;
extern char *optarg;
/* Ensure that fds 0, 1 and 2 are open or directed to /dev/null */
sanitise_stdfd();
__progname = ssh_get_progname(argv[0]);
seed_rng();
log_init(argv[0], SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO, SYSLOG_FACILITY_USER, 1);
msetlocale();
/* we need this for the home * directory. */
pw = getpwuid(getuid());
if (!pw)
fatal("No user exists for uid %lu", (u_long)getuid());
if (gethostname(hostname, sizeof(hostname)) == -1)
fatal("gethostname: %s", strerror(errno));
- /* Remaining characters: dw */
- while ((opt = getopt(argc, argv, "ABHLQUXceghiklopquvxy"
- "C:D:E:F:G:I:J:K:M:N:O:P:R:S:T:V:W:Y:Z:"
- "a:b:f:g:j:m:n:r:s:t:z:")) != -1) {
+ sk_provider = getenv("SSH_SK_PROVIDER");
+
+ /* Remaining characters: dGjJSTWx */
+ while ((opt = getopt(argc, argv, "ABHKLQUXceghiklopquvy"
+ "C:D:E:F:I:M:N:O:P:R:V:Y:Z:"
+ "a:b:f:g:m:n:r:s:t:w:z:")) != -1) {
switch (opt) {
case 'A':
gen_all_hostkeys = 1;
break;
case 'b':
bits = (u_int32_t)strtonum(optarg, 1, UINT32_MAX,
&errstr);
if (errstr)
fatal("Bits has bad value %s (%s)",
optarg, errstr);
break;
case 'E':
fingerprint_hash = ssh_digest_alg_by_name(optarg);
if (fingerprint_hash == -1)
fatal("Invalid hash algorithm \"%s\"", optarg);
break;
case 'F':
find_host = 1;
rr_hostname = optarg;
break;
case 'H':
hash_hosts = 1;
break;
case 'I':
cert_key_id = optarg;
break;
case 'R':
delete_host = 1;
rr_hostname = optarg;
break;
case 'L':
show_cert = 1;
break;
case 'l':
print_fingerprint = 1;
break;
case 'B':
print_bubblebabble = 1;
break;
case 'm':
if (strcasecmp(optarg, "RFC4716") == 0 ||
strcasecmp(optarg, "ssh2") == 0) {
convert_format = FMT_RFC4716;
break;
}
if (strcasecmp(optarg, "PKCS8") == 0) {
convert_format = FMT_PKCS8;
private_key_format = SSHKEY_PRIVATE_PKCS8;
break;
}
if (strcasecmp(optarg, "PEM") == 0) {
convert_format = FMT_PEM;
private_key_format = SSHKEY_PRIVATE_PEM;
break;
}
fatal("Unsupported conversion format \"%s\"", optarg);
case 'n':
cert_principals = optarg;
break;
case 'o':
/* no-op; new format is already the default */
break;
case 'p':
change_passphrase = 1;
break;
case 'c':
change_comment = 1;
break;
case 'f':
if (strlcpy(identity_file, optarg,
sizeof(identity_file)) >= sizeof(identity_file))
fatal("Identity filename too long");
have_identity = 1;
break;
case 'g':
print_generic = 1;
break;
+ case 'K':
+ download_sk = 1;
+ break;
case 'P':
identity_passphrase = optarg;
break;
case 'N':
identity_new_passphrase = optarg;
break;
case 'Q':
check_krl = 1;
break;
case 'O':
- add_cert_option(optarg);
+ opts = xrecallocarray(opts, nopts, nopts + 1,
+ sizeof(*opts));
+ opts[nopts++] = xstrdup(optarg);
break;
case 'Z':
openssh_format_cipher = optarg;
break;
case 'C':
identity_comment = optarg;
break;
case 'q':
quiet = 1;
break;
case 'e':
- case 'x':
/* export key */
convert_to = 1;
break;
case 'h':
cert_key_type = SSH2_CERT_TYPE_HOST;
certflags_flags = 0;
break;
case 'k':
gen_krl = 1;
break;
case 'i':
case 'X':
/* import key */
convert_from = 1;
break;
case 'y':
print_public = 1;
break;
case 's':
ca_key_path = optarg;
break;
case 't':
key_type_name = optarg;
break;
case 'D':
pkcs11provider = optarg;
break;
case 'U':
prefer_agent = 1;
break;
case 'u':
update_krl = 1;
break;
case 'v':
if (log_level == SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO)
log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1;
else {
if (log_level >= SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1 &&
log_level < SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3)
log_level++;
}
break;
case 'r':
rr_hostname = optarg;
break;
case 'a':
rounds = (int)strtonum(optarg, 1, INT_MAX, &errstr);
if (errstr)
fatal("Invalid number: %s (%s)",
optarg, errstr);
break;
case 'V':
parse_cert_times(optarg);
break;
case 'Y':
sign_op = optarg;
break;
+ case 'w':
+ sk_provider = optarg;
+ break;
case 'z':
errno = 0;
if (*optarg == '+') {
cert_serial_autoinc = 1;
optarg++;
}
cert_serial = strtoull(optarg, &ep, 10);
if (*optarg < '0' || *optarg > '9' || *ep != '\0' ||
(errno == ERANGE && cert_serial == ULLONG_MAX))
fatal("Invalid serial number \"%s\"", optarg);
break;
-#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
- /* Moduli generation/screening */
- case 'G':
- do_gen_candidates = 1;
- if (strlcpy(out_file, optarg, sizeof(out_file)) >=
- sizeof(out_file))
- fatal("Output filename too long");
- break;
- case 'J':
- lines_to_process = strtoul(optarg, NULL, 10);
- break;
- case 'j':
- start_lineno = strtoul(optarg, NULL, 10);
- break;
- case 'K':
- if (strlen(optarg) >= PATH_MAX)
- fatal("Checkpoint filename too long");
- checkpoint = xstrdup(optarg);
- break;
case 'M':
- memory = (u_int32_t)strtonum(optarg, 1, UINT_MAX,
- &errstr);
- if (errstr)
- fatal("Memory limit is %s: %s", errstr, optarg);
+ if (strcmp(optarg, "generate") == 0)
+ do_gen_candidates = 1;
+ else if (strcmp(optarg, "screen") == 0)
+ do_screen_candidates = 1;
+ else
+ fatal("Unsupported moduli option %s", optarg);
break;
- case 'S':
- /* XXX - also compare length against bits */
- if (BN_hex2bn(&start, optarg) == 0)
- fatal("Invalid start point.");
- break;
- case 'T':
- do_screen_candidates = 1;
- if (strlcpy(out_file, optarg, sizeof(out_file)) >=
- sizeof(out_file))
- fatal("Output filename too long");
- break;
- case 'W':
- generator_wanted = (u_int32_t)strtonum(optarg, 1,
- UINT_MAX, &errstr);
- if (errstr != NULL)
- fatal("Desired generator invalid: %s (%s)",
- optarg, errstr);
- break;
-#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
case '?':
default:
usage();
}
}
+#ifdef ENABLE_SK_INTERNAL
+ if (sk_provider == NULL)
+ sk_provider = "internal";
+#endif
+
/* reinit */
log_init(argv[0], log_level, SYSLOG_FACILITY_USER, 1);
argv += optind;
argc -= optind;
if (sign_op != NULL) {
- if (cert_principals == NULL || *cert_principals == '\0') {
- error("Too few arguments for sign/verify: "
- "missing namespace");
- exit(1);
- }
- if (strncmp(sign_op, "sign", 4) == 0) {
+ if (strncmp(sign_op, "find-principals", 15) == 0) {
+ if (ca_key_path == NULL) {
+ error("Too few arguments for find-principals:"
+ "missing signature file");
+ exit(1);
+ }
+ if (!have_identity) {
+ error("Too few arguments for find-principals:"
+ "missing allowed keys file");
+ exit(1);
+ }
+ return sig_find_principals(ca_key_path, identity_file);
+ } else if (strncmp(sign_op, "sign", 4) == 0) {
+ if (cert_principals == NULL ||
+ *cert_principals == '\0') {
+ error("Too few arguments for sign: "
+ "missing namespace");
+ exit(1);
+ }
if (!have_identity) {
error("Too few arguments for sign: "
"missing key");
exit(1);
}
- return sign(identity_file, cert_principals, argc, argv);
+ return sig_sign(identity_file, cert_principals,
+ argc, argv);
} else if (strncmp(sign_op, "check-novalidate", 16) == 0) {
if (ca_key_path == NULL) {
error("Too few arguments for check-novalidate: "
"missing signature file");
exit(1);
}
- return verify(ca_key_path, cert_principals,
- NULL, NULL, NULL);
+ return sig_verify(ca_key_path, cert_principals,
+ NULL, NULL, NULL);
} else if (strncmp(sign_op, "verify", 6) == 0) {
+ if (cert_principals == NULL ||
+ *cert_principals == '\0') {
+ error("Too few arguments for verify: "
+ "missing namespace");
+ exit(1);
+ }
if (ca_key_path == NULL) {
error("Too few arguments for verify: "
"missing signature file");
exit(1);
}
if (!have_identity) {
error("Too few arguments for sign: "
"missing allowed keys file");
exit(1);
}
if (cert_key_id == NULL) {
error("Too few arguments for verify: "
"missing principal ID");
exit(1);
}
- return verify(ca_key_path, cert_principals,
+ return sig_verify(ca_key_path, cert_principals,
cert_key_id, identity_file, rr_hostname);
}
+ error("Unsupported operation for -Y: \"%s\"", sign_op);
usage();
/* NOTREACHED */
}
if (ca_key_path != NULL) {
if (argc < 1 && !gen_krl) {
error("Too few arguments.");
usage();
}
- } else if (argc > 0 && !gen_krl && !check_krl) {
+ } else if (argc > 0 && !gen_krl && !check_krl &&
+ !do_gen_candidates && !do_screen_candidates) {
error("Too many arguments.");
usage();
}
if (change_passphrase && change_comment) {
error("Can only have one of -p and -c.");
usage();
}
if (print_fingerprint && (delete_host || hash_hosts)) {
error("Cannot use -l with -H or -R.");
usage();
}
if (gen_krl) {
do_gen_krl(pw, update_krl, ca_key_path,
cert_serial, identity_comment, argc, argv);
return (0);
}
if (check_krl) {
do_check_krl(pw, argc, argv);
return (0);
}
if (ca_key_path != NULL) {
if (cert_key_id == NULL)
fatal("Must specify key id (-I) when certifying");
+ for (i = 0; i < nopts; i++)
+ add_cert_option(opts[i]);
do_ca_sign(pw, ca_key_path, prefer_agent,
cert_serial, cert_serial_autoinc, argc, argv);
}
if (show_cert)
do_show_cert(pw);
if (delete_host || hash_hosts || find_host) {
do_known_hosts(pw, rr_hostname, find_host,
delete_host, hash_hosts);
}
if (pkcs11provider != NULL)
do_download(pw);
+ if (download_sk) {
+ for (i = 0; i < nopts; i++) {
+ if (strncasecmp(opts[i], "device=", 7) == 0) {
+ sk_device = xstrdup(opts[i] + 7);
+ } else {
+ fatal("Option \"%s\" is unsupported for "
+ "FIDO authenticator download", opts[i]);
+ }
+ }
+ return do_download_sk(sk_provider, sk_device);
+ }
if (print_fingerprint || print_bubblebabble)
do_fingerprint(pw);
if (change_passphrase)
do_change_passphrase(pw);
if (change_comment)
do_change_comment(pw, identity_comment);
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
if (convert_to)
do_convert_to(pw);
if (convert_from)
do_convert_from(pw);
#else /* WITH_OPENSSL */
if (convert_to || convert_from)
fatal("key conversion disabled at compile time");
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
if (print_public)
do_print_public(pw);
if (rr_hostname != NULL) {
unsigned int n = 0;
if (have_identity) {
n = do_print_resource_record(pw, identity_file,
rr_hostname, print_generic);
if (n == 0)
fatal("%s: %s", identity_file, strerror(errno));
exit(0);
} else {
n += do_print_resource_record(pw,
_PATH_HOST_RSA_KEY_FILE, rr_hostname,
print_generic);
n += do_print_resource_record(pw,
_PATH_HOST_DSA_KEY_FILE, rr_hostname,
print_generic);
n += do_print_resource_record(pw,
_PATH_HOST_ECDSA_KEY_FILE, rr_hostname,
print_generic);
n += do_print_resource_record(pw,
_PATH_HOST_ED25519_KEY_FILE, rr_hostname,
print_generic);
n += do_print_resource_record(pw,
_PATH_HOST_XMSS_KEY_FILE, rr_hostname,
print_generic);
if (n == 0)
fatal("no keys found.");
exit(0);
}
}
-#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+ if (do_gen_candidates || do_screen_candidates) {
+ if (argc <= 0)
+ fatal("No output file specified");
+ else if (argc > 1)
+ fatal("Too many output files specified");
+ }
if (do_gen_candidates) {
- FILE *out = fopen(out_file, "w");
-
- if (out == NULL) {
- error("Couldn't open modulus candidate file \"%s\": %s",
- out_file, strerror(errno));
- return (1);
- }
- if (bits == 0)
- bits = DEFAULT_BITS;
- if (gen_candidates(out, memory, bits, start) != 0)
- fatal("modulus candidate generation failed");
-
- return (0);
+ do_moduli_gen(argv[0], opts, nopts);
+ return 0;
}
-
if (do_screen_candidates) {
- FILE *in;
- FILE *out = fopen(out_file, "a");
-
- if (have_identity && strcmp(identity_file, "-") != 0) {
- if ((in = fopen(identity_file, "r")) == NULL) {
- fatal("Couldn't open modulus candidate "
- "file \"%s\": %s", identity_file,
- strerror(errno));
- }
- } else
- in = stdin;
-
- if (out == NULL) {
- fatal("Couldn't open moduli file \"%s\": %s",
- out_file, strerror(errno));
- }
- if (prime_test(in, out, rounds == 0 ? 100 : rounds,
- generator_wanted, checkpoint,
- start_lineno, lines_to_process) != 0)
- fatal("modulus screening failed");
- return (0);
+ do_moduli_screen(argv[0], opts, nopts);
+ return 0;
}
-#endif
if (gen_all_hostkeys) {
do_gen_all_hostkeys(pw);
return (0);
}
if (key_type_name == NULL)
key_type_name = DEFAULT_KEY_TYPE_NAME;
type = sshkey_type_from_name(key_type_name);
type_bits_valid(type, key_type_name, &bits);
if (!quiet)
printf("Generating public/private %s key pair.\n",
key_type_name);
- if ((r = sshkey_generate(type, bits, &private)) != 0)
- fatal("sshkey_generate failed");
+ switch (type) {
+ case KEY_ECDSA_SK:
+ case KEY_ED25519_SK:
+ for (i = 0; i < nopts; i++) {
+ if (strcasecmp(opts[i], "no-touch-required") == 0) {
+ sk_flags &= ~SSH_SK_USER_PRESENCE_REQD;
+ } else if (strcasecmp(opts[i], "resident") == 0) {
+ sk_flags |= SSH_SK_RESIDENT_KEY;
+ } else if (strncasecmp(opts[i], "device=", 7) == 0) {
+ sk_device = xstrdup(opts[i] + 7);
+ } else if (strncasecmp(opts[i], "user=", 5) == 0) {
+ sk_user = xstrdup(opts[i] + 5);
+ } else if (strncasecmp(opts[i], "challenge=", 10) == 0) {
+ if ((r = sshbuf_load_file(opts[i] + 10,
+ &challenge)) != 0) {
+ fatal("Unable to load FIDO enrollment "
+ "challenge \"%s\": %s",
+ opts[i] + 10, ssh_err(r));
+ }
+ } else if (strncasecmp(opts[i],
+ "write-attestation=", 18) == 0) {
+ sk_attestaion_path = opts[i] + 18;
+ } else if (strncasecmp(opts[i],
+ "application=", 12) == 0) {
+ sk_application = xstrdup(opts[i] + 12);
+ if (strncmp(sk_application, "ssh:", 4) != 0) {
+ fatal("FIDO application string must "
+ "begin with \"ssh:\"");
+ }
+ } else {
+ fatal("Option \"%s\" is unsupported for "
+ "FIDO authenticator enrollment", opts[i]);
+ }
+ }
+ if (!quiet) {
+ printf("You may need to touch your authenticator "
+ "to authorize key generation.\n");
+ }
+ passphrase = NULL;
+ if ((attest = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+ fatal("sshbuf_new failed");
+ for (i = 0 ; ; i++) {
+ fflush(stdout);
+ r = sshsk_enroll(type, sk_provider, sk_device,
+ sk_application == NULL ? "ssh:" : sk_application,
+ sk_user, sk_flags, passphrase, challenge,
+ &private, attest);
+ if (r == 0)
+ break;
+ if (r != SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE)
+ fatal("Key enrollment failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
+ else if (i > 0)
+ error("PIN incorrect");
+ if (passphrase != NULL) {
+ freezero(passphrase, strlen(passphrase));
+ passphrase = NULL;
+ }
+ if (i >= 3)
+ fatal("Too many incorrect PINs");
+ passphrase = read_passphrase("Enter PIN for "
+ "authenticator: ", RP_ALLOW_STDIN);
+ }
+ if (passphrase != NULL) {
+ freezero(passphrase, strlen(passphrase));
+ passphrase = NULL;
+ }
+ break;
+ default:
+ if ((r = sshkey_generate(type, bits, &private)) != 0)
+ fatal("sshkey_generate failed");
+ break;
+ }
if ((r = sshkey_from_private(private, &public)) != 0)
fatal("sshkey_from_private failed: %s\n", ssh_err(r));
if (!have_identity)
ask_filename(pw, "Enter file in which to save the key");
/* Create ~/.ssh directory if it doesn't already exist. */
snprintf(dotsshdir, sizeof dotsshdir, "%s/%s",
pw->pw_dir, _PATH_SSH_USER_DIR);
if (strstr(identity_file, dotsshdir) != NULL) {
if (stat(dotsshdir, &st) == -1) {
if (errno != ENOENT) {
error("Could not stat %s: %s", dotsshdir,
strerror(errno));
} else if (mkdir(dotsshdir, 0700) == -1) {
error("Could not create directory '%s': %s",
dotsshdir, strerror(errno));
} else if (!quiet)
printf("Created directory '%s'.\n", dotsshdir);
}
}
/* If the file already exists, ask the user to confirm. */
if (!confirm_overwrite(identity_file))
exit(1);
- /* Ask for a passphrase (twice). */
- if (identity_passphrase)
- passphrase1 = xstrdup(identity_passphrase);
- else if (identity_new_passphrase)
- passphrase1 = xstrdup(identity_new_passphrase);
- else {
-passphrase_again:
- passphrase1 =
- read_passphrase("Enter passphrase (empty for no "
- "passphrase): ", RP_ALLOW_STDIN);
- passphrase2 = read_passphrase("Enter same passphrase again: ",
- RP_ALLOW_STDIN);
- if (strcmp(passphrase1, passphrase2) != 0) {
- /*
- * The passphrases do not match. Clear them and
- * retry.
- */
- explicit_bzero(passphrase1, strlen(passphrase1));
- explicit_bzero(passphrase2, strlen(passphrase2));
- free(passphrase1);
- free(passphrase2);
- printf("Passphrases do not match. Try again.\n");
- goto passphrase_again;
- }
- /* Clear the other copy of the passphrase. */
- explicit_bzero(passphrase2, strlen(passphrase2));
- free(passphrase2);
- }
+ /* Determine the passphrase for the private key */
+ passphrase = private_key_passphrase();
if (identity_comment) {
strlcpy(comment, identity_comment, sizeof(comment));
} else {
/* Create default comment field for the passphrase. */
snprintf(comment, sizeof comment, "%s@%s", pw->pw_name, hostname);
}
/* Save the key with the given passphrase and comment. */
- if ((r = sshkey_save_private(private, identity_file, passphrase1,
+ if ((r = sshkey_save_private(private, identity_file, passphrase,
comment, private_key_format, openssh_format_cipher, rounds)) != 0) {
error("Saving key \"%s\" failed: %s",
identity_file, ssh_err(r));
- explicit_bzero(passphrase1, strlen(passphrase1));
- free(passphrase1);
+ freezero(passphrase, strlen(passphrase));
exit(1);
}
- /* Clear the passphrase. */
- explicit_bzero(passphrase1, strlen(passphrase1));
- free(passphrase1);
-
- /* Clear the private key and the random number generator. */
+ freezero(passphrase, strlen(passphrase));
sshkey_free(private);
- if (!quiet)
- printf("Your identification has been saved in %s.\n", identity_file);
+ if (!quiet) {
+ printf("Your identification has been saved in %s\n",
+ identity_file);
+ }
strlcat(identity_file, ".pub", sizeof(identity_file));
- if ((fd = open(identity_file, O_WRONLY|O_CREAT|O_TRUNC, 0644)) == -1)
+ if ((r = sshkey_save_public(public, identity_file, comment)) != 0) {
fatal("Unable to save public key to %s: %s",
identity_file, strerror(errno));
- if ((f = fdopen(fd, "w")) == NULL)
- fatal("fdopen %s failed: %s", identity_file, strerror(errno));
- if ((r = sshkey_write(public, f)) != 0)
- error("write key failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
- fprintf(f, " %s\n", comment);
- if (ferror(f) || fclose(f) != 0)
- fatal("write public failed: %s", strerror(errno));
+ }
if (!quiet) {
fp = sshkey_fingerprint(public, fingerprint_hash,
SSH_FP_DEFAULT);
ra = sshkey_fingerprint(public, fingerprint_hash,
SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
if (fp == NULL || ra == NULL)
fatal("sshkey_fingerprint failed");
- printf("Your public key has been saved in %s.\n",
+ printf("Your public key has been saved in %s\n",
identity_file);
printf("The key fingerprint is:\n");
printf("%s %s\n", fp, comment);
printf("The key's randomart image is:\n");
printf("%s\n", ra);
free(ra);
free(fp);
}
+ if (sk_attestaion_path != NULL) {
+ if (attest == NULL || sshbuf_len(attest) == 0) {
+ fatal("Enrollment did not return attestation "
+ "certificate");
+ }
+ if ((r = sshbuf_write_file(sk_attestaion_path, attest)) != 0) {
+ fatal("Unable to write attestation certificate "
+ "\"%s\": %s", sk_attestaion_path, ssh_err(r));
+ }
+ if (!quiet) {
+ printf("Your FIDO attestation certificate has been "
+ "saved in %s\n", sk_attestaion_path);
+ }
+ }
+ sshbuf_free(attest);
sshkey_free(public);
+
exit(0);
}
diff --git a/ssh-keyscan.0 b/ssh-keyscan.0
index 02475f9a33e7..9fc324620288 100644
--- a/ssh-keyscan.0
+++ b/ssh-keyscan.0
@@ -1,96 +1,96 @@
SSH-KEYSCAN(1) General Commands Manual SSH-KEYSCAN(1)
NAME
- ssh-keyscan M-bM-^@M-^S gather SSH public keys
+ ssh-keyscan M-bM-^@M-^S gather SSH public keys from servers
SYNOPSIS
ssh-keyscan [-46cDHv] [-f file] [-p port] [-T timeout] [-t type]
[host | addrlist namelist]
DESCRIPTION
ssh-keyscan is a utility for gathering the public SSH host keys of a
number of hosts. It was designed to aid in building and verifying
ssh_known_hosts files, the format of which is documented in sshd(8).
ssh-keyscan provides a minimal interface suitable for use by shell and
perl scripts.
ssh-keyscan uses non-blocking socket I/O to contact as many hosts as
possible in parallel, so it is very efficient. The keys from a domain of
1,000 hosts can be collected in tens of seconds, even when some of those
hosts are down or do not run sshd(8). For scanning, one does not need
login access to the machines that are being scanned, nor does the
scanning process involve any encryption.
The options are as follows:
-4 Force ssh-keyscan to use IPv4 addresses only.
-6 Force ssh-keyscan to use IPv6 addresses only.
-c Request certificates from target hosts instead of plain keys.
-D Print keys found as SSHFP DNS records. The default is to print
keys in a format usable as a ssh(1) known_hosts file.
-f file
Read hosts or M-bM-^@M-^\addrlist namelistM-bM-^@M-^] pairs from file, one per line.
If M-bM-^@M-^X-M-bM-^@M-^Y is supplied instead of a filename, ssh-keyscan will read
from the standard input. Input is expected in the format:
1.2.3.4,1.2.4.4 name.my.domain,name,n.my.domain,n,1.2.3.4,1.2.4.4
-H Hash all hostnames and addresses in the output. Hashed names may
be used normally by ssh(1) and sshd(8), but they do not reveal
identifying information should the file's contents be disclosed.
-p port
Connect to port on the remote host.
-T timeout
Set the timeout for connection attempts. If timeout seconds have
elapsed since a connection was initiated to a host or since the
last time anything was read from that host, the connection is
closed and the host in question considered unavailable. The
default is 5 seconds.
-t type
Specify the type of the key to fetch from the scanned hosts. The
possible values are M-bM-^@M-^\dsaM-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\ecdsaM-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\ed25519M-bM-^@M-^], or M-bM-^@M-^\rsaM-bM-^@M-^].
Multiple values may be specified by separating them with commas.
The default is to fetch M-bM-^@M-^\rsaM-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\ecdsaM-bM-^@M-^], and M-bM-^@M-^\ed25519M-bM-^@M-^] keys.
-v Verbose mode: print debugging messages about progress.
If an ssh_known_hosts file is constructed using ssh-keyscan without
verifying the keys, users will be vulnerable to man in the middle
attacks. On the other hand, if the security model allows such a risk,
ssh-keyscan can help in the detection of tampered keyfiles or man in the
middle attacks which have begun after the ssh_known_hosts file was
created.
FILES
/etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts
EXAMPLES
Print the RSA host key for machine hostname:
$ ssh-keyscan -t rsa hostname
Find all hosts from the file ssh_hosts which have new or different keys
from those in the sorted file ssh_known_hosts:
$ ssh-keyscan -t rsa,dsa,ecdsa,ed25519 -f ssh_hosts | \
sort -u - ssh_known_hosts | diff ssh_known_hosts -
SEE ALSO
ssh(1), sshd(8)
Using DNS to Securely Publish Secure Shell (SSH) Key Fingerprints, RFC
4255, 2006.
AUTHORS
David Mazieres <dm@lcs.mit.edu> wrote the initial version, and Wayne
Davison <wayned@users.sourceforge.net> added support for protocol version
2.
-OpenBSD 6.6 March 5, 2018 OpenBSD 6.6
+OpenBSD 6.6 November 30, 2019 OpenBSD 6.6
diff --git a/ssh-keyscan.1 b/ssh-keyscan.1
index f3d7a4078f53..f9df75d42f1a 100644
--- a/ssh-keyscan.1
+++ b/ssh-keyscan.1
@@ -1,158 +1,158 @@
-.\" $OpenBSD: ssh-keyscan.1,v 1.44 2018/03/05 07:03:18 jmc Exp $
+.\" $OpenBSD: ssh-keyscan.1,v 1.45 2019/11/30 07:07:59 jmc Exp $
.\"
.\" Copyright 1995, 1996 by David Mazieres <dm@lcs.mit.edu>.
.\"
.\" Modification and redistribution in source and binary forms is
.\" permitted provided that due credit is given to the author and the
.\" OpenBSD project by leaving this copyright notice intact.
.\"
-.Dd $Mdocdate: March 5 2018 $
+.Dd $Mdocdate: November 30 2019 $
.Dt SSH-KEYSCAN 1
.Os
.Sh NAME
.Nm ssh-keyscan
-.Nd gather SSH public keys
+.Nd gather SSH public keys from servers
.Sh SYNOPSIS
.Nm ssh-keyscan
.Op Fl 46cDHv
.Op Fl f Ar file
.Op Fl p Ar port
.Op Fl T Ar timeout
.Op Fl t Ar type
.Op Ar host | addrlist namelist
.Sh DESCRIPTION
.Nm
is a utility for gathering the public SSH host keys of a number of
hosts.
It was designed to aid in building and verifying
.Pa ssh_known_hosts
files,
the format of which is documented in
.Xr sshd 8 .
.Nm
provides a minimal interface suitable for use by shell and perl
scripts.
.Pp
.Nm
uses non-blocking socket I/O to contact as many hosts as possible in
parallel, so it is very efficient.
The keys from a domain of 1,000
hosts can be collected in tens of seconds, even when some of those
hosts are down or do not run
.Xr sshd 8 .
For scanning, one does not need
login access to the machines that are being scanned, nor does the
scanning process involve any encryption.
.Pp
The options are as follows:
.Bl -tag -width Ds
.It Fl 4
Force
.Nm
to use IPv4 addresses only.
.It Fl 6
Force
.Nm
to use IPv6 addresses only.
.It Fl c
Request certificates from target hosts instead of plain keys.
.It Fl D
Print keys found as SSHFP DNS records.
The default is to print keys in a format usable as a
.Xr ssh 1
.Pa known_hosts
file.
.It Fl f Ar file
Read hosts or
.Dq addrlist namelist
pairs from
.Ar file ,
one per line.
If
.Sq -
is supplied instead of a filename,
.Nm
will read from the standard input.
Input is expected in the format:
.Bd -literal
1.2.3.4,1.2.4.4 name.my.domain,name,n.my.domain,n,1.2.3.4,1.2.4.4
.Ed
.It Fl H
Hash all hostnames and addresses in the output.
Hashed names may be used normally by
.Xr ssh 1
and
.Xr sshd 8 ,
but they do not reveal identifying information should the file's contents
be disclosed.
.It Fl p Ar port
Connect to
.Ar port
on the remote host.
.It Fl T Ar timeout
Set the timeout for connection attempts.
If
.Ar timeout
seconds have elapsed since a connection was initiated to a host or since the
last time anything was read from that host, the connection is
closed and the host in question considered unavailable.
The default is 5 seconds.
.It Fl t Ar type
Specify the type of the key to fetch from the scanned hosts.
The possible values are
.Dq dsa ,
.Dq ecdsa ,
.Dq ed25519 ,
or
.Dq rsa .
Multiple values may be specified by separating them with commas.
The default is to fetch
.Dq rsa ,
.Dq ecdsa ,
and
.Dq ed25519
keys.
.It Fl v
Verbose mode:
print debugging messages about progress.
.El
.Pp
If an ssh_known_hosts file is constructed using
.Nm
without verifying the keys, users will be vulnerable to
.Em man in the middle
attacks.
On the other hand, if the security model allows such a risk,
.Nm
can help in the detection of tampered keyfiles or man in the middle
attacks which have begun after the ssh_known_hosts file was created.
.Sh FILES
.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts
.Sh EXAMPLES
Print the RSA host key for machine
.Ar hostname :
.Pp
.Dl $ ssh-keyscan -t rsa hostname
.Pp
Find all hosts from the file
.Pa ssh_hosts
which have new or different keys from those in the sorted file
.Pa ssh_known_hosts :
.Bd -literal -offset indent
$ ssh-keyscan -t rsa,dsa,ecdsa,ed25519 -f ssh_hosts | \e
sort -u - ssh_known_hosts | diff ssh_known_hosts -
.Ed
.Sh SEE ALSO
.Xr ssh 1 ,
.Xr sshd 8
.Rs
.%D 2006
.%R RFC 4255
.%T Using DNS to Securely Publish Secure Shell (SSH) Key Fingerprints
.Re
.Sh AUTHORS
.An -nosplit
.An David Mazieres Aq Mt dm@lcs.mit.edu
wrote the initial version, and
.An Wayne Davison Aq Mt wayned@users.sourceforge.net
added support for protocol version 2.
diff --git a/ssh-keyscan.c b/ssh-keyscan.c
index 5de0508d0e4e..a5e6440764b3 100644
--- a/ssh-keyscan.c
+++ b/ssh-keyscan.c
@@ -1,816 +1,834 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: ssh-keyscan.c,v 1.130 2019/09/06 05:23:55 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh-keyscan.c,v 1.131 2019/12/15 19:47:10 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright 1995, 1996 by David Mazieres <dm@lcs.mit.edu>.
*
* Modification and redistribution in source and binary forms is
* permitted provided that due credit is given to the author and the
* OpenBSD project by leaving this copyright notice intact.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
#include <sys/resource.h>
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
# include <sys/time.h>
#endif
#include <netinet/in.h>
#include <arpa/inet.h>
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
#include <openssl/bn.h>
#endif
#include <netdb.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <signal.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "ssh.h"
#include "sshbuf.h"
#include "sshkey.h"
#include "cipher.h"
#include "kex.h"
#include "compat.h"
#include "myproposal.h"
#include "packet.h"
#include "dispatch.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "atomicio.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "hostfile.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
#include "ssh_api.h"
#include "dns.h"
/* Flag indicating whether IPv4 or IPv6. This can be set on the command line.
Default value is AF_UNSPEC means both IPv4 and IPv6. */
int IPv4or6 = AF_UNSPEC;
int ssh_port = SSH_DEFAULT_PORT;
#define KT_DSA (1)
#define KT_RSA (1<<1)
#define KT_ECDSA (1<<2)
#define KT_ED25519 (1<<3)
#define KT_XMSS (1<<4)
+#define KT_ECDSA_SK (1<<5)
+#define KT_ED25519_SK (1<<6)
#define KT_MIN KT_DSA
-#define KT_MAX KT_XMSS
+#define KT_MAX KT_ED25519_SK
int get_cert = 0;
-int get_keytypes = KT_RSA|KT_ECDSA|KT_ED25519;
+int get_keytypes = KT_RSA|KT_ECDSA|KT_ED25519|KT_ECDSA_SK|KT_ED25519_SK;
int hash_hosts = 0; /* Hash hostname on output */
int print_sshfp = 0; /* Print SSHFP records instead of known_hosts */
int found_one = 0; /* Successfully found a key */
#define MAXMAXFD 256
/* The number of seconds after which to give up on a TCP connection */
int timeout = 5;
int maxfd;
#define MAXCON (maxfd - 10)
extern char *__progname;
fd_set *read_wait;
size_t read_wait_nfdset;
int ncon;
/*
* Keep a connection structure for each file descriptor. The state
* associated with file descriptor n is held in fdcon[n].
*/
typedef struct Connection {
u_char c_status; /* State of connection on this file desc. */
#define CS_UNUSED 0 /* File descriptor unused */
#define CS_CON 1 /* Waiting to connect/read greeting */
#define CS_SIZE 2 /* Waiting to read initial packet size */
#define CS_KEYS 3 /* Waiting to read public key packet */
int c_fd; /* Quick lookup: c->c_fd == c - fdcon */
int c_plen; /* Packet length field for ssh packet */
int c_len; /* Total bytes which must be read. */
int c_off; /* Length of data read so far. */
int c_keytype; /* Only one of KT_* */
sig_atomic_t c_done; /* SSH2 done */
char *c_namebase; /* Address to free for c_name and c_namelist */
char *c_name; /* Hostname of connection for errors */
char *c_namelist; /* Pointer to other possible addresses */
char *c_output_name; /* Hostname of connection for output */
char *c_data; /* Data read from this fd */
struct ssh *c_ssh; /* SSH-connection */
struct timeval c_tv; /* Time at which connection gets aborted */
TAILQ_ENTRY(Connection) c_link; /* List of connections in timeout order. */
} con;
TAILQ_HEAD(conlist, Connection) tq; /* Timeout Queue */
con *fdcon;
static void keyprint(con *c, struct sshkey *key);
static int
fdlim_get(int hard)
{
#if defined(HAVE_GETRLIMIT) && defined(RLIMIT_NOFILE)
struct rlimit rlfd;
if (getrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE, &rlfd) == -1)
return (-1);
if ((hard ? rlfd.rlim_max : rlfd.rlim_cur) == RLIM_INFINITY)
return SSH_SYSFDMAX;
else
return hard ? rlfd.rlim_max : rlfd.rlim_cur;
#else
return SSH_SYSFDMAX;
#endif
}
static int
fdlim_set(int lim)
{
#if defined(HAVE_SETRLIMIT) && defined(RLIMIT_NOFILE)
struct rlimit rlfd;
#endif
if (lim <= 0)
return (-1);
#if defined(HAVE_SETRLIMIT) && defined(RLIMIT_NOFILE)
if (getrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE, &rlfd) == -1)
return (-1);
rlfd.rlim_cur = lim;
if (setrlimit(RLIMIT_NOFILE, &rlfd) == -1)
return (-1);
#elif defined (HAVE_SETDTABLESIZE)
setdtablesize(lim);
#endif
return (0);
}
/*
* This is an strsep function that returns a null field for adjacent
* separators. This is the same as the 4.4BSD strsep, but different from the
* one in the GNU libc.
*/
static char *
xstrsep(char **str, const char *delim)
{
char *s, *e;
if (!**str)
return (NULL);
s = *str;
e = s + strcspn(s, delim);
if (*e != '\0')
*e++ = '\0';
*str = e;
return (s);
}
/*
* Get the next non-null token (like GNU strsep). Strsep() will return a
* null token for two adjacent separators, so we may have to loop.
*/
static char *
strnnsep(char **stringp, char *delim)
{
char *tok;
do {
tok = xstrsep(stringp, delim);
} while (tok && *tok == '\0');
return (tok);
}
static int
key_print_wrapper(struct sshkey *hostkey, struct ssh *ssh)
{
con *c;
if ((c = ssh_get_app_data(ssh)) != NULL)
keyprint(c, hostkey);
/* always abort key exchange */
return -1;
}
static int
ssh2_capable(int remote_major, int remote_minor)
{
switch (remote_major) {
case 1:
if (remote_minor == 99)
return 1;
break;
case 2:
return 1;
default:
break;
}
return 0;
}
static void
keygrab_ssh2(con *c)
{
char *myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAX] = { KEX_CLIENT };
int r;
switch (c->c_keytype) {
case KT_DSA:
myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = get_cert ?
"ssh-dss-cert-v01@openssh.com" : "ssh-dss";
break;
case KT_RSA:
myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = get_cert ?
"rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com,"
"rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com,"
"ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com" :
"rsa-sha2-512,"
"rsa-sha2-256,"
"ssh-rsa";
break;
case KT_ED25519:
myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = get_cert ?
"ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com" : "ssh-ed25519";
break;
case KT_XMSS:
myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = get_cert ?
"ssh-xmss-cert-v01@openssh.com" : "ssh-xmss@openssh.com";
break;
case KT_ECDSA:
myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = get_cert ?
"ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,"
"ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com,"
"ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com" :
"ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,"
"ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,"
"ecdsa-sha2-nistp521";
break;
+ case KT_ECDSA_SK:
+ myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = get_cert ?
+ "sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com" :
+ "sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com";
+ break;
+ case KT_ED25519_SK:
+ myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = get_cert ?
+ "sk-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com" :
+ "sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com";
+ break;
default:
fatal("unknown key type %d", c->c_keytype);
break;
}
if ((r = kex_setup(c->c_ssh, myproposal)) != 0) {
free(c->c_ssh);
fprintf(stderr, "kex_setup: %s\n", ssh_err(r));
exit(1);
}
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
c->c_ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1] = kex_gen_client;
c->c_ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1] = kex_gen_client;
c->c_ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA256] = kex_gen_client;
c->c_ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP16_SHA512] = kex_gen_client;
c->c_ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP18_SHA512] = kex_gen_client;
c->c_ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_client;
c->c_ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_client;
# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
c->c_ssh->kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kex_gen_client;
# endif
#endif
c->c_ssh->kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kex_gen_client;
c->c_ssh->kex->kex[KEX_KEM_SNTRUP4591761X25519_SHA512] = kex_gen_client;
ssh_set_verify_host_key_callback(c->c_ssh, key_print_wrapper);
/*
* do the key-exchange until an error occurs or until
* the key_print_wrapper() callback sets c_done.
*/
ssh_dispatch_run(c->c_ssh, DISPATCH_BLOCK, &c->c_done);
}
static void
keyprint_one(const char *host, struct sshkey *key)
{
char *hostport;
const char *known_host, *hashed;
found_one = 1;
if (print_sshfp) {
export_dns_rr(host, key, stdout, 0);
return;
}
hostport = put_host_port(host, ssh_port);
lowercase(hostport);
if (hash_hosts && (hashed = host_hash(host, NULL, 0)) == NULL)
fatal("host_hash failed");
known_host = hash_hosts ? hashed : hostport;
if (!get_cert)
fprintf(stdout, "%s ", known_host);
sshkey_write(key, stdout);
fputs("\n", stdout);
free(hostport);
}
static void
keyprint(con *c, struct sshkey *key)
{
char *hosts = c->c_output_name ? c->c_output_name : c->c_name;
char *host, *ohosts;
if (key == NULL)
return;
if (get_cert || (!hash_hosts && ssh_port == SSH_DEFAULT_PORT)) {
keyprint_one(hosts, key);
return;
}
ohosts = hosts = xstrdup(hosts);
while ((host = strsep(&hosts, ",")) != NULL)
keyprint_one(host, key);
free(ohosts);
}
static int
tcpconnect(char *host)
{
struct addrinfo hints, *ai, *aitop;
char strport[NI_MAXSERV];
int gaierr, s = -1;
snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%d", ssh_port);
memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
hints.ai_family = IPv4or6;
hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
if ((gaierr = getaddrinfo(host, strport, &hints, &aitop)) != 0) {
error("getaddrinfo %s: %s", host, ssh_gai_strerror(gaierr));
return -1;
}
for (ai = aitop; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) {
s = socket(ai->ai_family, ai->ai_socktype, ai->ai_protocol);
if (s == -1) {
error("socket: %s", strerror(errno));
continue;
}
if (set_nonblock(s) == -1)
fatal("%s: set_nonblock(%d)", __func__, s);
if (connect(s, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen) == -1 &&
errno != EINPROGRESS)
error("connect (`%s'): %s", host, strerror(errno));
else
break;
close(s);
s = -1;
}
freeaddrinfo(aitop);
return s;
}
static int
conalloc(char *iname, char *oname, int keytype)
{
char *namebase, *name, *namelist;
int s;
namebase = namelist = xstrdup(iname);
do {
name = xstrsep(&namelist, ",");
if (!name) {
free(namebase);
return (-1);
}
} while ((s = tcpconnect(name)) < 0);
if (s >= maxfd)
fatal("conalloc: fdno %d too high", s);
if (fdcon[s].c_status)
fatal("conalloc: attempt to reuse fdno %d", s);
debug3("%s: oname %s kt %d", __func__, oname, keytype);
fdcon[s].c_fd = s;
fdcon[s].c_status = CS_CON;
fdcon[s].c_namebase = namebase;
fdcon[s].c_name = name;
fdcon[s].c_namelist = namelist;
fdcon[s].c_output_name = xstrdup(oname);
fdcon[s].c_data = (char *) &fdcon[s].c_plen;
fdcon[s].c_len = 4;
fdcon[s].c_off = 0;
fdcon[s].c_keytype = keytype;
monotime_tv(&fdcon[s].c_tv);
fdcon[s].c_tv.tv_sec += timeout;
TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&tq, &fdcon[s], c_link);
FD_SET(s, read_wait);
ncon++;
return (s);
}
static void
confree(int s)
{
if (s >= maxfd || fdcon[s].c_status == CS_UNUSED)
fatal("confree: attempt to free bad fdno %d", s);
free(fdcon[s].c_namebase);
free(fdcon[s].c_output_name);
if (fdcon[s].c_status == CS_KEYS)
free(fdcon[s].c_data);
fdcon[s].c_status = CS_UNUSED;
fdcon[s].c_keytype = 0;
if (fdcon[s].c_ssh) {
ssh_packet_close(fdcon[s].c_ssh);
free(fdcon[s].c_ssh);
fdcon[s].c_ssh = NULL;
} else
close(s);
TAILQ_REMOVE(&tq, &fdcon[s], c_link);
FD_CLR(s, read_wait);
ncon--;
}
static void
contouch(int s)
{
TAILQ_REMOVE(&tq, &fdcon[s], c_link);
monotime_tv(&fdcon[s].c_tv);
fdcon[s].c_tv.tv_sec += timeout;
TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&tq, &fdcon[s], c_link);
}
static int
conrecycle(int s)
{
con *c = &fdcon[s];
int ret;
ret = conalloc(c->c_namelist, c->c_output_name, c->c_keytype);
confree(s);
return (ret);
}
static void
congreet(int s)
{
int n = 0, remote_major = 0, remote_minor = 0;
char buf[256], *cp;
char remote_version[sizeof buf];
size_t bufsiz;
con *c = &fdcon[s];
/* send client banner */
n = snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "SSH-%d.%d-OpenSSH-keyscan\r\n",
PROTOCOL_MAJOR_2, PROTOCOL_MINOR_2);
if (n < 0 || (size_t)n >= sizeof(buf)) {
error("snprintf: buffer too small");
confree(s);
return;
}
if (atomicio(vwrite, s, buf, n) != (size_t)n) {
error("write (%s): %s", c->c_name, strerror(errno));
confree(s);
return;
}
for (;;) {
memset(buf, '\0', sizeof(buf));
bufsiz = sizeof(buf);
cp = buf;
while (bufsiz-- &&
(n = atomicio(read, s, cp, 1)) == 1 && *cp != '\n') {
if (*cp == '\r')
*cp = '\n';
cp++;
}
if (n != 1 || strncmp(buf, "SSH-", 4) == 0)
break;
}
if (n == 0) {
switch (errno) {
case EPIPE:
error("%s: Connection closed by remote host", c->c_name);
break;
case ECONNREFUSED:
break;
default:
error("read (%s): %s", c->c_name, strerror(errno));
break;
}
conrecycle(s);
return;
}
if (*cp != '\n' && *cp != '\r') {
error("%s: bad greeting", c->c_name);
confree(s);
return;
}
*cp = '\0';
if ((c->c_ssh = ssh_packet_set_connection(NULL, s, s)) == NULL)
fatal("ssh_packet_set_connection failed");
ssh_packet_set_timeout(c->c_ssh, timeout, 1);
ssh_set_app_data(c->c_ssh, c); /* back link */
if (sscanf(buf, "SSH-%d.%d-%[^\n]\n",
&remote_major, &remote_minor, remote_version) == 3)
c->c_ssh->compat = compat_datafellows(remote_version);
else
c->c_ssh->compat = 0;
if (!ssh2_capable(remote_major, remote_minor)) {
debug("%s doesn't support ssh2", c->c_name);
confree(s);
return;
}
fprintf(stderr, "%c %s:%d %s\n", print_sshfp ? ';' : '#',
c->c_name, ssh_port, chop(buf));
keygrab_ssh2(c);
confree(s);
}
static void
conread(int s)
{
con *c = &fdcon[s];
size_t n;
if (c->c_status == CS_CON) {
congreet(s);
return;
}
n = atomicio(read, s, c->c_data + c->c_off, c->c_len - c->c_off);
if (n == 0) {
error("read (%s): %s", c->c_name, strerror(errno));
confree(s);
return;
}
c->c_off += n;
if (c->c_off == c->c_len)
switch (c->c_status) {
case CS_SIZE:
c->c_plen = htonl(c->c_plen);
c->c_len = c->c_plen + 8 - (c->c_plen & 7);
c->c_off = 0;
c->c_data = xmalloc(c->c_len);
c->c_status = CS_KEYS;
break;
default:
fatal("conread: invalid status %d", c->c_status);
break;
}
contouch(s);
}
static void
conloop(void)
{
struct timeval seltime, now;
fd_set *r, *e;
con *c;
int i;
monotime_tv(&now);
c = TAILQ_FIRST(&tq);
if (c && (c->c_tv.tv_sec > now.tv_sec ||
(c->c_tv.tv_sec == now.tv_sec && c->c_tv.tv_usec > now.tv_usec))) {
seltime = c->c_tv;
seltime.tv_sec -= now.tv_sec;
seltime.tv_usec -= now.tv_usec;
if (seltime.tv_usec < 0) {
seltime.tv_usec += 1000000;
seltime.tv_sec--;
}
} else
timerclear(&seltime);
r = xcalloc(read_wait_nfdset, sizeof(fd_mask));
e = xcalloc(read_wait_nfdset, sizeof(fd_mask));
memcpy(r, read_wait, read_wait_nfdset * sizeof(fd_mask));
memcpy(e, read_wait, read_wait_nfdset * sizeof(fd_mask));
while (select(maxfd, r, NULL, e, &seltime) == -1 &&
(errno == EAGAIN || errno == EINTR || errno == EWOULDBLOCK))
;
for (i = 0; i < maxfd; i++) {
if (FD_ISSET(i, e)) {
error("%s: exception!", fdcon[i].c_name);
confree(i);
} else if (FD_ISSET(i, r))
conread(i);
}
free(r);
free(e);
c = TAILQ_FIRST(&tq);
while (c && (c->c_tv.tv_sec < now.tv_sec ||
(c->c_tv.tv_sec == now.tv_sec && c->c_tv.tv_usec < now.tv_usec))) {
int s = c->c_fd;
c = TAILQ_NEXT(c, c_link);
conrecycle(s);
}
}
static void
do_host(char *host)
{
char *name = strnnsep(&host, " \t\n");
int j;
if (name == NULL)
return;
for (j = KT_MIN; j <= KT_MAX; j *= 2) {
if (get_keytypes & j) {
while (ncon >= MAXCON)
conloop();
conalloc(name, *host ? host : name, j);
}
}
}
void
fatal(const char *fmt,...)
{
va_list args;
va_start(args, fmt);
do_log(SYSLOG_LEVEL_FATAL, fmt, args);
va_end(args);
exit(255);
}
static void
usage(void)
{
fprintf(stderr,
"usage: %s [-46cDHv] [-f file] [-p port] [-T timeout] [-t type]\n"
"\t\t [host | addrlist namelist]\n",
__progname);
exit(1);
}
int
main(int argc, char **argv)
{
int debug_flag = 0, log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO;
int opt, fopt_count = 0, j;
char *tname, *cp, *line = NULL;
size_t linesize = 0;
FILE *fp;
extern int optind;
extern char *optarg;
__progname = ssh_get_progname(argv[0]);
seed_rng();
TAILQ_INIT(&tq);
/* Ensure that fds 0, 1 and 2 are open or directed to /dev/null */
sanitise_stdfd();
if (argc <= 1)
usage();
while ((opt = getopt(argc, argv, "cDHv46p:T:t:f:")) != -1) {
switch (opt) {
case 'H':
hash_hosts = 1;
break;
case 'c':
get_cert = 1;
break;
case 'D':
print_sshfp = 1;
break;
case 'p':
ssh_port = a2port(optarg);
if (ssh_port <= 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "Bad port '%s'\n", optarg);
exit(1);
}
break;
case 'T':
timeout = convtime(optarg);
if (timeout == -1 || timeout == 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "Bad timeout '%s'\n", optarg);
usage();
}
break;
case 'v':
if (!debug_flag) {
debug_flag = 1;
log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1;
}
else if (log_level < SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3)
log_level++;
else
fatal("Too high debugging level.");
break;
case 'f':
if (strcmp(optarg, "-") == 0)
optarg = NULL;
argv[fopt_count++] = optarg;
break;
case 't':
get_keytypes = 0;
tname = strtok(optarg, ",");
while (tname) {
int type = sshkey_type_from_name(tname);
switch (type) {
case KEY_DSA:
get_keytypes |= KT_DSA;
break;
case KEY_ECDSA:
get_keytypes |= KT_ECDSA;
break;
case KEY_RSA:
get_keytypes |= KT_RSA;
break;
case KEY_ED25519:
get_keytypes |= KT_ED25519;
break;
case KEY_XMSS:
get_keytypes |= KT_XMSS;
break;
+ case KEY_ED25519_SK:
+ get_keytypes |= KT_ED25519_SK;
+ break;
+ case KEY_ECDSA_SK:
+ get_keytypes |= KT_ECDSA_SK;
+ break;
case KEY_UNSPEC:
default:
fatal("Unknown key type \"%s\"", tname);
}
tname = strtok(NULL, ",");
}
break;
case '4':
IPv4or6 = AF_INET;
break;
case '6':
IPv4or6 = AF_INET6;
break;
case '?':
default:
usage();
}
}
if (optind == argc && !fopt_count)
usage();
log_init("ssh-keyscan", log_level, SYSLOG_FACILITY_USER, 1);
maxfd = fdlim_get(1);
if (maxfd < 0)
fatal("%s: fdlim_get: bad value", __progname);
if (maxfd > MAXMAXFD)
maxfd = MAXMAXFD;
if (MAXCON <= 0)
fatal("%s: not enough file descriptors", __progname);
if (maxfd > fdlim_get(0))
fdlim_set(maxfd);
fdcon = xcalloc(maxfd, sizeof(con));
read_wait_nfdset = howmany(maxfd, NFDBITS);
read_wait = xcalloc(read_wait_nfdset, sizeof(fd_mask));
for (j = 0; j < fopt_count; j++) {
if (argv[j] == NULL)
fp = stdin;
else if ((fp = fopen(argv[j], "r")) == NULL)
fatal("%s: %s: %s", __progname, argv[j],
strerror(errno));
while (getline(&line, &linesize, fp) != -1) {
/* Chomp off trailing whitespace and comments */
if ((cp = strchr(line, '#')) == NULL)
cp = line + strlen(line) - 1;
while (cp >= line) {
if (*cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t' ||
*cp == '\n' || *cp == '#')
*cp-- = '\0';
else
break;
}
/* Skip empty lines */
if (*line == '\0')
continue;
do_host(line);
}
if (ferror(fp))
fatal("%s: %s: %s", __progname, argv[j],
strerror(errno));
fclose(fp);
}
free(line);
while (optind < argc)
do_host(argv[optind++]);
while (ncon > 0)
conloop();
return found_one ? 0 : 1;
}
diff --git a/ssh-keysign.0 b/ssh-keysign.0
index 87c0c30e9504..87e7f1a7235a 100644
--- a/ssh-keysign.0
+++ b/ssh-keysign.0
@@ -1,52 +1,52 @@
SSH-KEYSIGN(8) System Manager's Manual SSH-KEYSIGN(8)
NAME
- ssh-keysign M-bM-^@M-^S ssh helper program for host-based authentication
+ ssh-keysign M-bM-^@M-^S OpenSSH helper for host-based authentication
SYNOPSIS
ssh-keysign
DESCRIPTION
ssh-keysign is used by ssh(1) to access the local host keys and generate
the digital signature required during host-based authentication.
ssh-keysign is disabled by default and can only be enabled in the global
client configuration file /etc/ssh/ssh_config by setting EnableSSHKeysign
to M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^].
ssh-keysign is not intended to be invoked by the user, but from ssh(1).
See ssh(1) and sshd(8) for more information about host-based
authentication.
FILES
/etc/ssh/ssh_config
Controls whether ssh-keysign is enabled.
/etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key
/etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key
/etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key
/etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key
These files contain the private parts of the host keys used to
generate the digital signature. They should be owned by root,
readable only by root, and not accessible to others. Since they
are readable only by root, ssh-keysign must be set-uid root if
host-based authentication is used.
/etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key-cert.pub
/etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key-cert.pub
/etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key-cert.pub
/etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key-cert.pub
If these files exist they are assumed to contain public
certificate information corresponding with the private keys
above.
SEE ALSO
ssh(1), ssh-keygen(1), ssh_config(5), sshd(8)
HISTORY
ssh-keysign first appeared in OpenBSD 3.2.
AUTHORS
Markus Friedl <markus@openbsd.org>
-OpenBSD 6.6 February 17, 2016 OpenBSD 6.6
+OpenBSD 6.6 November 30, 2019 OpenBSD 6.6
diff --git a/ssh-keysign.8 b/ssh-keysign.8
index 19b0dbc533c8..73b62397c10b 100644
--- a/ssh-keysign.8
+++ b/ssh-keysign.8
@@ -1,93 +1,93 @@
-.\" $OpenBSD: ssh-keysign.8,v 1.15 2016/02/17 07:38:19 jmc Exp $
+.\" $OpenBSD: ssh-keysign.8,v 1.16 2019/11/30 07:07:59 jmc Exp $
.\"
.\" Copyright (c) 2002 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
.\"
.\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
.\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
.\" are met:
.\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
.\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
.\" documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
.\"
.\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
.\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
.\" OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
.\" IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
.\" INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
.\" NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
.\" DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
.\" THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
.\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
.\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
.\"
-.Dd $Mdocdate: February 17 2016 $
+.Dd $Mdocdate: November 30 2019 $
.Dt SSH-KEYSIGN 8
.Os
.Sh NAME
.Nm ssh-keysign
-.Nd ssh helper program for host-based authentication
+.Nd OpenSSH helper for host-based authentication
.Sh SYNOPSIS
.Nm
.Sh DESCRIPTION
.Nm
is used by
.Xr ssh 1
to access the local host keys and generate the digital signature
required during host-based authentication.
.Pp
.Nm
is disabled by default and can only be enabled in the
global client configuration file
.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_config
by setting
.Cm EnableSSHKeysign
to
.Dq yes .
.Pp
.Nm
is not intended to be invoked by the user, but from
.Xr ssh 1 .
See
.Xr ssh 1
and
.Xr sshd 8
for more information about host-based authentication.
.Sh FILES
.Bl -tag -width Ds -compact
.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_config
Controls whether
.Nm
is enabled.
.Pp
.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key
.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key
.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key
.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key
These files contain the private parts of the host keys used to
generate the digital signature.
They should be owned by root, readable only by root, and not
accessible to others.
Since they are readable only by root,
.Nm
must be set-uid root if host-based authentication is used.
.Pp
.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key-cert.pub
.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key-cert.pub
.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key-cert.pub
.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key-cert.pub
If these files exist they are assumed to contain public certificate
information corresponding with the private keys above.
.El
.Sh SEE ALSO
.Xr ssh 1 ,
.Xr ssh-keygen 1 ,
.Xr ssh_config 5 ,
.Xr sshd 8
.Sh HISTORY
.Nm
first appeared in
.Ox 3.2 .
.Sh AUTHORS
.An Markus Friedl Aq Mt markus@openbsd.org
diff --git a/ssh-keysign.c b/ssh-keysign.c
index 6cfd5b46c707..3e3ea3e1481d 100644
--- a/ssh-keysign.c
+++ b/ssh-keysign.c
@@ -1,293 +1,293 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: ssh-keysign.c,v 1.61 2019/10/02 00:42:30 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh-keysign.c,v 1.63 2019/11/18 16:10:05 naddy Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2002 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include <fcntl.h>
#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
#include <paths.h>
#endif
#include <pwd.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <errno.h>
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/rand.h>
#include <openssl/rsa.h>
#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
#endif
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "sshkey.h"
#include "ssh.h"
#include "ssh2.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "sshbuf.h"
#include "authfile.h"
#include "msg.h"
#include "canohost.h"
#include "pathnames.h"
#include "readconf.h"
#include "uidswap.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
extern char *__progname;
static int
valid_request(struct passwd *pw, char *host, struct sshkey **ret,
u_char *data, size_t datalen)
{
struct sshbuf *b;
struct sshkey *key = NULL;
u_char type, *pkblob;
char *p;
size_t blen, len;
char *pkalg, *luser;
int r, pktype, fail;
if (ret != NULL)
*ret = NULL;
fail = 0;
if ((b = sshbuf_from(data, datalen)) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_from failed", __func__);
/* session id, currently limited to SHA1 (20 bytes) or SHA256 (32) */
if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(b, NULL, &len)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
if (len != 20 && len != 32)
fail++;
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(b, &type)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
if (type != SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)
fail++;
/* server user */
if ((r = sshbuf_skip_string(b)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
/* service */
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &p, NULL)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
if (strcmp("ssh-connection", p) != 0)
fail++;
free(p);
/* method */
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &p, NULL)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
if (strcmp("hostbased", p) != 0)
fail++;
free(p);
/* pubkey */
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &pkalg, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_string(b, &pkblob, &blen)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
pktype = sshkey_type_from_name(pkalg);
if (pktype == KEY_UNSPEC)
fail++;
else if ((r = sshkey_from_blob(pkblob, blen, &key)) != 0) {
error("%s: bad key blob: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
fail++;
} else if (key->type != pktype)
fail++;
free(pkalg);
free(pkblob);
/* client host name, handle trailing dot */
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &p, &len)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
debug2("%s: check expect chost %s got %s", __func__, host, p);
if (strlen(host) != len - 1)
fail++;
else if (p[len - 1] != '.')
fail++;
else if (strncasecmp(host, p, len - 1) != 0)
fail++;
free(p);
/* local user */
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &luser, NULL)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
if (strcmp(pw->pw_name, luser) != 0)
fail++;
free(luser);
/* end of message */
if (sshbuf_len(b) != 0)
fail++;
sshbuf_free(b);
debug3("%s: fail %d", __func__, fail);
if (fail)
sshkey_free(key);
else if (ret != NULL)
*ret = key;
return (fail ? -1 : 0);
}
int
main(int argc, char **argv)
{
struct sshbuf *b;
Options options;
#define NUM_KEYTYPES 5
struct sshkey *keys[NUM_KEYTYPES], *key = NULL;
struct passwd *pw;
int r, key_fd[NUM_KEYTYPES], i, found, version = 2, fd;
u_char *signature, *data, rver;
char *host, *fp;
size_t slen, dlen;
if (pledge("stdio rpath getpw dns id", NULL) != 0)
fatal("%s: pledge: %s", __progname, strerror(errno));
/* Ensure that stdin and stdout are connected */
if ((fd = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDWR)) < 2)
exit(1);
/* Leave /dev/null fd iff it is attached to stderr */
if (fd > 2)
close(fd);
i = 0;
/* XXX This really needs to read sshd_config for the paths */
key_fd[i++] = open(_PATH_HOST_DSA_KEY_FILE, O_RDONLY);
key_fd[i++] = open(_PATH_HOST_ECDSA_KEY_FILE, O_RDONLY);
key_fd[i++] = open(_PATH_HOST_ED25519_KEY_FILE, O_RDONLY);
key_fd[i++] = open(_PATH_HOST_XMSS_KEY_FILE, O_RDONLY);
key_fd[i++] = open(_PATH_HOST_RSA_KEY_FILE, O_RDONLY);
if ((pw = getpwuid(getuid())) == NULL)
fatal("getpwuid failed");
pw = pwcopy(pw);
permanently_set_uid(pw);
seed_rng();
#ifdef DEBUG_SSH_KEYSIGN
log_init("ssh-keysign", SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3, SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH, 0);
#endif
/* verify that ssh-keysign is enabled by the admin */
initialize_options(&options);
(void)read_config_file(_PATH_HOST_CONFIG_FILE, pw, "", "",
&options, 0, NULL);
fill_default_options(&options);
if (options.enable_ssh_keysign != 1)
fatal("ssh-keysign not enabled in %s",
_PATH_HOST_CONFIG_FILE);
for (i = found = 0; i < NUM_KEYTYPES; i++) {
if (key_fd[i] != -1)
found = 1;
}
if (found == 0)
fatal("could not open any host key");
found = 0;
for (i = 0; i < NUM_KEYTYPES; i++) {
keys[i] = NULL;
if (key_fd[i] == -1)
continue;
r = sshkey_load_private_type_fd(key_fd[i], KEY_UNSPEC,
NULL, &key, NULL);
close(key_fd[i]);
if (r != 0)
debug("parse key %d: %s", i, ssh_err(r));
else if (key != NULL) {
keys[i] = key;
found = 1;
}
}
if (!found)
fatal("no hostkey found");
if (pledge("stdio dns", NULL) != 0)
fatal("%s: pledge: %s", __progname, strerror(errno));
if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __progname);
if (ssh_msg_recv(STDIN_FILENO, b) < 0)
fatal("ssh_msg_recv failed");
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(b, &rver)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __progname, ssh_err(r));
if (rver != version)
fatal("bad version: received %d, expected %d", rver, version);
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, (u_int *)&fd)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __progname, ssh_err(r));
if (fd < 0 || fd == STDIN_FILENO || fd == STDOUT_FILENO)
fatal("bad fd = %d", fd);
if ((host = get_local_name(fd)) == NULL)
fatal("cannot get local name for fd");
if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(b, &data, &dlen)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __progname, ssh_err(r));
if (valid_request(pw, host, &key, data, dlen) < 0)
fatal("not a valid request");
free(host);
found = 0;
for (i = 0; i < NUM_KEYTYPES; i++) {
if (keys[i] != NULL &&
sshkey_equal_public(key, keys[i])) {
found = 1;
break;
}
}
if (!found) {
if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, options.fingerprint_hash,
SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshkey_fingerprint failed", __progname);
fatal("no matching hostkey found for key %s %s",
sshkey_type(key), fp ? fp : "");
}
- if ((r = sshkey_sign(keys[i], &signature, &slen, data, dlen, NULL, 0))
- != 0)
+ if ((r = sshkey_sign(keys[i], &signature, &slen, data, dlen,
+ NULL, NULL, 0)) != 0)
fatal("sshkey_sign failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
free(data);
/* send reply */
sshbuf_reset(b);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(b, signature, slen)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __progname, ssh_err(r));
if (ssh_msg_send(STDOUT_FILENO, version, b) == -1)
fatal("ssh_msg_send failed");
return (0);
}
diff --git a/ssh-pkcs11-client.c b/ssh-pkcs11-client.c
index e7860de89815..8a0ffef5dfb8 100644
--- a/ssh-pkcs11-client.c
+++ b/ssh-pkcs11-client.c
@@ -1,384 +1,392 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: ssh-pkcs11-client.c,v 1.15 2019/01/21 12:53:35 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh-pkcs11-client.c,v 1.16 2020/01/25 00:03:36 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2010 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (c) 2014 Pedro Martelletto. All rights reserved.
*
* Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
* copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
* WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
* ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
* WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
* ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
* OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
#include <sys/types.h>
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
# include <sys/time.h>
#endif
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <openssl/ecdsa.h>
#include <openssl/rsa.h>
#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
#include "pathnames.h"
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "sshbuf.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "sshkey.h"
#include "authfd.h"
#include "atomicio.h"
#include "ssh-pkcs11.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
/* borrows code from sftp-server and ssh-agent */
static int fd = -1;
static pid_t pid = -1;
static void
send_msg(struct sshbuf *m)
{
u_char buf[4];
size_t mlen = sshbuf_len(m);
int r;
POKE_U32(buf, mlen);
if (atomicio(vwrite, fd, buf, 4) != 4 ||
atomicio(vwrite, fd, sshbuf_mutable_ptr(m),
sshbuf_len(m)) != sshbuf_len(m))
error("write to helper failed");
if ((r = sshbuf_consume(m, mlen)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
}
static int
recv_msg(struct sshbuf *m)
{
u_int l, len;
u_char c, buf[1024];
int r;
if ((len = atomicio(read, fd, buf, 4)) != 4) {
error("read from helper failed: %u", len);
return (0); /* XXX */
}
len = PEEK_U32(buf);
if (len > 256 * 1024)
fatal("response too long: %u", len);
/* read len bytes into m */
sshbuf_reset(m);
while (len > 0) {
l = len;
if (l > sizeof(buf))
l = sizeof(buf);
if (atomicio(read, fd, buf, l) != l) {
error("response from helper failed.");
return (0); /* XXX */
}
if ((r = sshbuf_put(m, buf, l)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
len -= l;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(m, &c)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
return c;
}
int
pkcs11_init(int interactive)
{
return (0);
}
void
pkcs11_terminate(void)
{
if (fd >= 0)
close(fd);
}
static int
rsa_encrypt(int flen, const u_char *from, u_char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
{
struct sshkey *key = NULL;
struct sshbuf *msg = NULL;
u_char *blob = NULL, *signature = NULL;
size_t blen, slen = 0;
int r, ret = -1;
if (padding != RSA_PKCS1_PADDING)
goto fail;
key = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC);
if (key == NULL) {
error("%s: sshkey_new failed", __func__);
goto fail;
}
key->type = KEY_RSA;
RSA_up_ref(rsa);
key->rsa = rsa;
if ((r = sshkey_to_blob(key, &blob, &blen)) != 0) {
error("%s: sshkey_to_blob: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
goto fail;
}
if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_AGENTC_SIGN_REQUEST)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_string(msg, blob, blen)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_string(msg, from, flen)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, 0)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
send_msg(msg);
sshbuf_reset(msg);
if (recv_msg(msg) == SSH2_AGENT_SIGN_RESPONSE) {
if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(msg, &signature, &slen)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
if (slen <= (size_t)RSA_size(rsa)) {
memcpy(to, signature, slen);
ret = slen;
}
free(signature);
}
fail:
free(blob);
sshkey_free(key);
sshbuf_free(msg);
return (ret);
}
#ifdef HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW
static ECDSA_SIG *
ecdsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len, const BIGNUM *inv,
const BIGNUM *rp, EC_KEY *ec)
{
struct sshkey *key = NULL;
struct sshbuf *msg = NULL;
ECDSA_SIG *ret = NULL;
const u_char *cp;
u_char *blob = NULL, *signature = NULL;
size_t blen, slen = 0;
int r, nid;
nid = sshkey_ecdsa_key_to_nid(ec);
if (nid < 0) {
error("%s: couldn't get curve nid", __func__);
goto fail;
}
key = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC);
if (key == NULL) {
error("%s: sshkey_new failed", __func__);
goto fail;
}
key->ecdsa = ec;
key->ecdsa_nid = nid;
key->type = KEY_ECDSA;
EC_KEY_up_ref(ec);
if ((r = sshkey_to_blob(key, &blob, &blen)) != 0) {
error("%s: sshkey_to_blob: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
goto fail;
}
if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_AGENTC_SIGN_REQUEST)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_string(msg, blob, blen)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_string(msg, dgst, dgst_len)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, 0)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
send_msg(msg);
sshbuf_reset(msg);
if (recv_msg(msg) == SSH2_AGENT_SIGN_RESPONSE) {
if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(msg, &signature, &slen)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
cp = signature;
ret = d2i_ECDSA_SIG(NULL, &cp, slen);
free(signature);
}
fail:
free(blob);
sshkey_free(key);
sshbuf_free(msg);
return (ret);
}
#endif /* HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW */
static RSA_METHOD *helper_rsa;
#ifdef HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW
static EC_KEY_METHOD *helper_ecdsa;
#endif /* HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW */
/* redirect private key crypto operations to the ssh-pkcs11-helper */
static void
wrap_key(struct sshkey *k)
{
if (k->type == KEY_RSA)
RSA_set_method(k->rsa, helper_rsa);
#ifdef HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW
else if (k->type == KEY_ECDSA)
EC_KEY_set_method(k->ecdsa, helper_ecdsa);
#endif /* HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW */
else
fatal("%s: unknown key type", __func__);
}
static int
pkcs11_start_helper_methods(void)
{
if (helper_rsa != NULL)
return (0);
#ifdef HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW
int (*orig_sign)(int, const unsigned char *, int, unsigned char *,
unsigned int *, const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, EC_KEY *) = NULL;
if (helper_ecdsa != NULL)
return (0);
helper_ecdsa = EC_KEY_METHOD_new(EC_KEY_OpenSSL());
if (helper_ecdsa == NULL)
return (-1);
EC_KEY_METHOD_get_sign(helper_ecdsa, &orig_sign, NULL, NULL);
EC_KEY_METHOD_set_sign(helper_ecdsa, orig_sign, NULL, ecdsa_do_sign);
#endif /* HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW */
if ((helper_rsa = RSA_meth_dup(RSA_get_default_method())) == NULL)
fatal("%s: RSA_meth_dup failed", __func__);
if (!RSA_meth_set1_name(helper_rsa, "ssh-pkcs11-helper") ||
!RSA_meth_set_priv_enc(helper_rsa, rsa_encrypt))
fatal("%s: failed to prepare method", __func__);
return (0);
}
static int
pkcs11_start_helper(void)
{
int pair[2];
char *helper, *verbosity = NULL;
if (log_level_get() >= SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1)
verbosity = "-vvv";
if (pkcs11_start_helper_methods() == -1) {
error("pkcs11_start_helper_methods failed");
return (-1);
}
if (socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0, pair) == -1) {
error("socketpair: %s", strerror(errno));
return (-1);
}
if ((pid = fork()) == -1) {
error("fork: %s", strerror(errno));
return (-1);
} else if (pid == 0) {
if ((dup2(pair[1], STDIN_FILENO) == -1) ||
(dup2(pair[1], STDOUT_FILENO) == -1)) {
fprintf(stderr, "dup2: %s\n", strerror(errno));
_exit(1);
}
close(pair[0]);
close(pair[1]);
helper = getenv("SSH_PKCS11_HELPER");
if (helper == NULL || strlen(helper) == 0)
helper = _PATH_SSH_PKCS11_HELPER;
debug("%s: starting %s %s", __func__, helper,
verbosity == NULL ? "" : verbosity);
execlp(helper, helper, verbosity, (char *)NULL);
fprintf(stderr, "exec: %s: %s\n", helper, strerror(errno));
_exit(1);
}
close(pair[1]);
fd = pair[0];
return (0);
}
int
-pkcs11_add_provider(char *name, char *pin, struct sshkey ***keysp)
+pkcs11_add_provider(char *name, char *pin, struct sshkey ***keysp,
+ char ***labelsp)
{
struct sshkey *k;
int r, type;
u_char *blob;
+ char *label;
size_t blen;
u_int nkeys, i;
struct sshbuf *msg;
if (fd < 0 && pkcs11_start_helper() < 0)
return (-1);
if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH_AGENTC_ADD_SMARTCARD_KEY)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, name)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, pin)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
send_msg(msg);
sshbuf_reset(msg);
type = recv_msg(msg);
if (type == SSH2_AGENT_IDENTITIES_ANSWER) {
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &nkeys)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
*keysp = xcalloc(nkeys, sizeof(struct sshkey *));
+ if (labelsp)
+ *labelsp = xcalloc(nkeys, sizeof(char *));
for (i = 0; i < nkeys; i++) {
/* XXX clean up properly instead of fatal() */
if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(msg, &blob, &blen)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshbuf_skip_string(msg)) != 0)
+ (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(msg, &label, NULL)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
if ((r = sshkey_from_blob(blob, blen, &k)) != 0)
fatal("%s: bad key: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
wrap_key(k);
(*keysp)[i] = k;
+ if (labelsp)
+ (*labelsp)[i] = label;
+ else
+ free(label);
free(blob);
}
} else if (type == SSH2_AGENT_FAILURE) {
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(msg, &nkeys)) != 0)
nkeys = -1;
} else {
nkeys = -1;
}
sshbuf_free(msg);
return (nkeys);
}
int
pkcs11_del_provider(char *name)
{
int r, ret = -1;
struct sshbuf *msg;
if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_SMARTCARD_KEY)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, name)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, "")) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
send_msg(msg);
sshbuf_reset(msg);
if (recv_msg(msg) == SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS)
ret = 0;
sshbuf_free(msg);
return (ret);
}
#endif /* ENABLE_PKCS11 */
diff --git a/ssh-pkcs11-helper.0 b/ssh-pkcs11-helper.0
index 88afa8a91816..4516bc12090b 100644
--- a/ssh-pkcs11-helper.0
+++ b/ssh-pkcs11-helper.0
@@ -1,35 +1,35 @@
SSH-PKCS11-HELPER(8) System Manager's Manual SSH-PKCS11-HELPER(8)
NAME
- ssh-pkcs11-helper M-bM-^@M-^S ssh-agent helper program for PKCS#11 support
+ ssh-pkcs11-helper M-bM-^@M-^S OpenSSH helper for PKCS#11 support
SYNOPSIS
ssh-pkcs11-helper [-v]
DESCRIPTION
ssh-pkcs11-helper is used by ssh-agent(1) to access keys provided by a
PKCS#11 token.
ssh-pkcs11-helper is not intended to be invoked by the user, but from
ssh-agent(1).
A single option is supported:
-v Verbose mode. Causes ssh-pkcs11-helper to print debugging
messages about its progress. This is helpful in debugging
problems. Multiple -v options increase the verbosity. The
maximum is 3.
Note that ssh-agent(1) will automatically pass the -v flag to
ssh-pkcs11-helper when it has itself been placed in debug mode.
SEE ALSO
ssh(1), ssh-add(1), ssh-agent(1)
HISTORY
ssh-pkcs11-helper first appeared in OpenBSD 4.7.
AUTHORS
Markus Friedl <markus@openbsd.org>
-OpenBSD 6.6 January 21, 2019 OpenBSD 6.6
+OpenBSD 6.6 November 30, 2019 OpenBSD 6.6
diff --git a/ssh-pkcs11-helper.8 b/ssh-pkcs11-helper.8
index ba5c30fa0525..6a592b1f36e3 100644
--- a/ssh-pkcs11-helper.8
+++ b/ssh-pkcs11-helper.8
@@ -1,66 +1,66 @@
-.\" $OpenBSD: ssh-pkcs11-helper.8,v 1.5 2019/01/21 12:53:35 djm Exp $
+.\" $OpenBSD: ssh-pkcs11-helper.8,v 1.6 2019/11/30 07:07:59 jmc Exp $
.\"
.\" Copyright (c) 2010 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
.\"
.\" Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
.\" purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
.\" copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
.\"
.\" THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
.\" WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
.\" MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
.\" ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
.\" WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
.\" ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
.\" OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
.\"
-.Dd $Mdocdate: January 21 2019 $
+.Dd $Mdocdate: November 30 2019 $
.Dt SSH-PKCS11-HELPER 8
.Os
.Sh NAME
.Nm ssh-pkcs11-helper
-.Nd ssh-agent helper program for PKCS#11 support
+.Nd OpenSSH helper for PKCS#11 support
.Sh SYNOPSIS
.Nm
.Op Fl v
.Sh DESCRIPTION
.Nm
is used by
.Xr ssh-agent 1
to access keys provided by a PKCS#11 token.
.Pp
.Nm
is not intended to be invoked by the user, but from
.Xr ssh-agent 1 .
.Pp
A single option is supported:
.Bl -tag -width Ds
.It Fl v
Verbose mode.
Causes
.Nm
to print debugging messages about its progress.
This is helpful in debugging problems.
Multiple
.Fl v
options increase the verbosity.
The maximum is 3.
.Pp
Note that
.Xr ssh-agent 1
will automatically pass the
.Fl v
flag to
.Nm
when it has itself been placed in debug mode.
.El
.Sh SEE ALSO
.Xr ssh 1 ,
.Xr ssh-add 1 ,
.Xr ssh-agent 1
.Sh HISTORY
.Nm
first appeared in
.Ox 4.7 .
.Sh AUTHORS
.An Markus Friedl Aq Mt markus@openbsd.org
diff --git a/ssh-pkcs11-helper.c b/ssh-pkcs11-helper.c
index 3bcc2440b2fa..17220d624607 100644
--- a/ssh-pkcs11-helper.c
+++ b/ssh-pkcs11-helper.c
@@ -1,455 +1,462 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: ssh-pkcs11-helper.c,v 1.21 2019/09/06 05:23:55 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh-pkcs11-helper.c,v 1.22 2020/01/25 00:03:36 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2010 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
* Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
* copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
* WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
* ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
* WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
* ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
* OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
# include <sys/time.h>
#endif
#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <errno.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_POLL_H
#include <poll.h>
+#endif
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "sshbuf.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "sshkey.h"
#include "authfd.h"
#include "ssh-pkcs11.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
/* borrows code from sftp-server and ssh-agent */
struct pkcs11_keyinfo {
struct sshkey *key;
- char *providername;
+ char *providername, *label;
TAILQ_ENTRY(pkcs11_keyinfo) next;
};
TAILQ_HEAD(, pkcs11_keyinfo) pkcs11_keylist;
#define MAX_MSG_LENGTH 10240 /*XXX*/
/* input and output queue */
struct sshbuf *iqueue;
struct sshbuf *oqueue;
static void
-add_key(struct sshkey *k, char *name)
+add_key(struct sshkey *k, char *name, char *label)
{
struct pkcs11_keyinfo *ki;
ki = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*ki));
ki->providername = xstrdup(name);
ki->key = k;
+ ki->label = xstrdup(label);
TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&pkcs11_keylist, ki, next);
}
static void
del_keys_by_name(char *name)
{
struct pkcs11_keyinfo *ki, *nxt;
for (ki = TAILQ_FIRST(&pkcs11_keylist); ki; ki = nxt) {
nxt = TAILQ_NEXT(ki, next);
if (!strcmp(ki->providername, name)) {
TAILQ_REMOVE(&pkcs11_keylist, ki, next);
free(ki->providername);
+ free(ki->label);
sshkey_free(ki->key);
free(ki);
}
}
}
/* lookup matching 'private' key */
static struct sshkey *
lookup_key(struct sshkey *k)
{
struct pkcs11_keyinfo *ki;
TAILQ_FOREACH(ki, &pkcs11_keylist, next) {
- debug("check %p %s", ki, ki->providername);
+ debug("check %p %s %s", ki, ki->providername, ki->label);
if (sshkey_equal(k, ki->key))
return (ki->key);
}
return (NULL);
}
static void
send_msg(struct sshbuf *m)
{
int r;
if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(oqueue, m)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
}
static void
process_add(void)
{
char *name, *pin;
struct sshkey **keys = NULL;
int r, i, nkeys;
u_char *blob;
size_t blen;
struct sshbuf *msg;
+ char **labels = NULL;
if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &name, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &pin, NULL)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
- if ((nkeys = pkcs11_add_provider(name, pin, &keys)) > 0) {
+ if ((nkeys = pkcs11_add_provider(name, pin, &keys, &labels)) > 0) {
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg,
SSH2_AGENT_IDENTITIES_ANSWER)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, nkeys)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
for (i = 0; i < nkeys; i++) {
if ((r = sshkey_to_blob(keys[i], &blob, &blen)) != 0) {
debug("%s: sshkey_to_blob: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
continue;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(msg, blob, blen)) != 0 ||
- (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, name)) != 0)
+ (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(msg, labels[i])) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
free(blob);
- add_key(keys[i], name);
+ add_key(keys[i], name, labels[i]);
+ free(labels[i]);
}
} else {
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH_AGENT_FAILURE)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(msg, -nkeys)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
}
- free(keys);
+ free(labels);
+ free(keys); /* keys themselves are transferred to pkcs11_keylist */
free(pin);
free(name);
send_msg(msg);
sshbuf_free(msg);
}
static void
process_del(void)
{
char *name, *pin;
struct sshbuf *msg;
int r;
if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &name, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_cstring(iqueue, &pin, NULL)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
del_keys_by_name(name);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, pkcs11_del_provider(name) == 0 ?
SSH_AGENT_SUCCESS : SSH_AGENT_FAILURE)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
free(pin);
free(name);
send_msg(msg);
sshbuf_free(msg);
}
static void
process_sign(void)
{
u_char *blob, *data, *signature = NULL;
size_t blen, dlen, slen = 0;
int r, ok = -1;
struct sshkey *key, *found;
struct sshbuf *msg;
/* XXX support SHA2 signature flags */
if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(iqueue, &blob, &blen)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_string(iqueue, &data, &dlen)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(iqueue, NULL)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
if ((r = sshkey_from_blob(blob, blen, &key)) != 0)
error("%s: sshkey_from_blob: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
else {
if ((found = lookup_key(key)) != NULL) {
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
int ret;
if (key->type == KEY_RSA) {
slen = RSA_size(key->rsa);
signature = xmalloc(slen);
ret = RSA_private_encrypt(dlen, data, signature,
found->rsa, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING);
if (ret != -1) {
slen = ret;
ok = 0;
}
#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
} else if (key->type == KEY_ECDSA) {
u_int xslen = ECDSA_size(key->ecdsa);
signature = xmalloc(xslen);
/* "The parameter type is ignored." */
ret = ECDSA_sign(-1, data, dlen, signature,
&xslen, found->ecdsa);
if (ret != 0)
ok = 0;
else
error("%s: ECDSA_sign"
" returns %d", __func__, ret);
slen = xslen;
#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
} else
error("%s: don't know how to sign with key "
"type %d", __func__, (int)key->type);
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
}
sshkey_free(key);
}
if ((msg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
if (ok == 0) {
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_AGENT_SIGN_RESPONSE)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_string(msg, signature, slen)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
} else {
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(msg, SSH2_AGENT_FAILURE)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
}
free(data);
free(blob);
free(signature);
send_msg(msg);
sshbuf_free(msg);
}
static void
process(void)
{
u_int msg_len;
u_int buf_len;
u_int consumed;
u_char type;
const u_char *cp;
int r;
buf_len = sshbuf_len(iqueue);
if (buf_len < 5)
return; /* Incomplete message. */
cp = sshbuf_ptr(iqueue);
msg_len = get_u32(cp);
if (msg_len > MAX_MSG_LENGTH) {
error("bad message len %d", msg_len);
cleanup_exit(11);
}
if (buf_len < msg_len + 4)
return;
if ((r = sshbuf_consume(iqueue, 4)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u8(iqueue, &type)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
buf_len -= 4;
switch (type) {
case SSH_AGENTC_ADD_SMARTCARD_KEY:
debug("process_add");
process_add();
break;
case SSH_AGENTC_REMOVE_SMARTCARD_KEY:
debug("process_del");
process_del();
break;
case SSH2_AGENTC_SIGN_REQUEST:
debug("process_sign");
process_sign();
break;
default:
error("Unknown message %d", type);
break;
}
/* discard the remaining bytes from the current packet */
if (buf_len < sshbuf_len(iqueue)) {
error("iqueue grew unexpectedly");
cleanup_exit(255);
}
consumed = buf_len - sshbuf_len(iqueue);
if (msg_len < consumed) {
error("msg_len %d < consumed %d", msg_len, consumed);
cleanup_exit(255);
}
if (msg_len > consumed) {
if ((r = sshbuf_consume(iqueue, msg_len - consumed)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
}
}
void
cleanup_exit(int i)
{
/* XXX */
_exit(i);
}
int
main(int argc, char **argv)
{
int r, ch, in, out, max, log_stderr = 0;
ssize_t len;
SyslogFacility log_facility = SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH;
LogLevel log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR;
char buf[4*4096];
extern char *__progname;
struct pollfd pfd[2];
__progname = ssh_get_progname(argv[0]);
seed_rng();
TAILQ_INIT(&pkcs11_keylist);
log_init(__progname, log_level, log_facility, log_stderr);
while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "v")) != -1) {
switch (ch) {
case 'v':
log_stderr = 1;
if (log_level == SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR)
log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1;
else if (log_level < SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3)
log_level++;
break;
default:
fprintf(stderr, "usage: %s [-v]\n", __progname);
exit(1);
}
}
log_init(__progname, log_level, log_facility, log_stderr);
pkcs11_init(0);
in = STDIN_FILENO;
out = STDOUT_FILENO;
max = 0;
if (in > max)
max = in;
if (out > max)
max = out;
if ((iqueue = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
if ((oqueue = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
while (1) {
memset(pfd, 0, sizeof(pfd));
pfd[0].fd = in;
pfd[1].fd = out;
/*
* Ensure that we can read a full buffer and handle
* the worst-case length packet it can generate,
* otherwise apply backpressure by stopping reads.
*/
if ((r = sshbuf_check_reserve(iqueue, sizeof(buf))) == 0 &&
(r = sshbuf_check_reserve(oqueue, MAX_MSG_LENGTH)) == 0)
pfd[0].events = POLLIN;
else if (r != SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
if (sshbuf_len(oqueue) > 0)
pfd[1].events = POLLOUT;
if ((r = poll(pfd, 2, -1 /* INFTIM */)) <= 0) {
if (r == 0 || errno == EINTR)
continue;
fatal("poll: %s", strerror(errno));
}
/* copy stdin to iqueue */
if ((pfd[0].revents & (POLLIN|POLLERR)) != 0) {
len = read(in, buf, sizeof buf);
if (len == 0) {
debug("read eof");
cleanup_exit(0);
} else if (len < 0) {
error("read: %s", strerror(errno));
cleanup_exit(1);
} else if ((r = sshbuf_put(iqueue, buf, len)) != 0) {
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
}
}
/* send oqueue to stdout */
if ((pfd[1].revents & (POLLOUT|POLLHUP)) != 0) {
len = write(out, sshbuf_ptr(oqueue),
sshbuf_len(oqueue));
if (len < 0) {
error("write: %s", strerror(errno));
cleanup_exit(1);
} else if ((r = sshbuf_consume(oqueue, len)) != 0) {
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
}
}
/*
* Process requests from client if we can fit the results
* into the output buffer, otherwise stop processing input
* and let the output queue drain.
*/
if ((r = sshbuf_check_reserve(oqueue, MAX_MSG_LENGTH)) == 0)
process();
else if (r != SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
}
}
#else /* WITH_OPENSSL */
void
cleanup_exit(int i)
{
_exit(i);
}
int
main(int argc, char **argv)
{
fprintf(stderr, "PKCS#11 code is not enabled\n");
return 1;
}
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
#else /* ENABLE_PKCS11 */
int
main(int argc, char **argv)
{
extern char *__progname;
__progname = ssh_get_progname(argv[0]);
log_init(__progname, SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR, SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH, 0);
fatal("PKCS#11 support disabled at compile time");
}
#endif /* ENABLE_PKCS11 */
diff --git a/ssh-pkcs11.c b/ssh-pkcs11.c
index 09f1ea347cfa..a302c79c0c18 100644
--- a/ssh-pkcs11.c
+++ b/ssh-pkcs11.c
@@ -1,1820 +1,1856 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: ssh-pkcs11.c,v 1.46 2019/10/01 10:22:53 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh-pkcs11.c,v 1.47 2020/01/25 00:03:36 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2010 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (c) 2014 Pedro Martelletto. All rights reserved.
*
* Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
* copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
* WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
* ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
* WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
* ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
* OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
# include <sys/time.h>
#endif
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <ctype.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <dlfcn.h>
#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
#include <openssl/ecdsa.h>
#include <openssl/x509.h>
#include <openssl/err.h>
#define CRYPTOKI_COMPAT
#include "pkcs11.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "sshkey.h"
#include "ssh-pkcs11.h"
#include "xmalloc.h"
struct pkcs11_slotinfo {
CK_TOKEN_INFO token;
CK_SESSION_HANDLE session;
int logged_in;
};
struct pkcs11_provider {
char *name;
void *handle;
CK_FUNCTION_LIST *function_list;
CK_INFO info;
CK_ULONG nslots;
CK_SLOT_ID *slotlist;
struct pkcs11_slotinfo *slotinfo;
int valid;
int refcount;
TAILQ_ENTRY(pkcs11_provider) next;
};
TAILQ_HEAD(, pkcs11_provider) pkcs11_providers;
struct pkcs11_key {
struct pkcs11_provider *provider;
CK_ULONG slotidx;
char *keyid;
int keyid_len;
};
int pkcs11_interactive = 0;
#ifdef HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW
static void
ossl_error(const char *msg)
{
unsigned long e;
error("%s: %s", __func__, msg);
while ((e = ERR_get_error()) != 0)
error("%s: libcrypto error: %.100s", __func__,
ERR_error_string(e, NULL));
}
#endif /* HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW */
int
pkcs11_init(int interactive)
{
pkcs11_interactive = interactive;
TAILQ_INIT(&pkcs11_providers);
return (0);
}
/*
* finalize a provider shared library, it's no longer usable.
* however, there might still be keys referencing this provider,
* so the actual freeing of memory is handled by pkcs11_provider_unref().
* this is called when a provider gets unregistered.
*/
static void
pkcs11_provider_finalize(struct pkcs11_provider *p)
{
CK_RV rv;
CK_ULONG i;
debug("pkcs11_provider_finalize: %p refcount %d valid %d",
p, p->refcount, p->valid);
if (!p->valid)
return;
for (i = 0; i < p->nslots; i++) {
if (p->slotinfo[i].session &&
(rv = p->function_list->C_CloseSession(
p->slotinfo[i].session)) != CKR_OK)
error("C_CloseSession failed: %lu", rv);
}
if ((rv = p->function_list->C_Finalize(NULL)) != CKR_OK)
error("C_Finalize failed: %lu", rv);
p->valid = 0;
p->function_list = NULL;
dlclose(p->handle);
}
/*
* remove a reference to the provider.
* called when a key gets destroyed or when the provider is unregistered.
*/
static void
pkcs11_provider_unref(struct pkcs11_provider *p)
{
debug("pkcs11_provider_unref: %p refcount %d", p, p->refcount);
if (--p->refcount <= 0) {
if (p->valid)
error("pkcs11_provider_unref: %p still valid", p);
free(p->name);
free(p->slotlist);
free(p->slotinfo);
free(p);
}
}
/* unregister all providers, keys might still point to the providers */
void
pkcs11_terminate(void)
{
struct pkcs11_provider *p;
while ((p = TAILQ_FIRST(&pkcs11_providers)) != NULL) {
TAILQ_REMOVE(&pkcs11_providers, p, next);
pkcs11_provider_finalize(p);
pkcs11_provider_unref(p);
}
}
/* lookup provider by name */
static struct pkcs11_provider *
pkcs11_provider_lookup(char *provider_id)
{
struct pkcs11_provider *p;
TAILQ_FOREACH(p, &pkcs11_providers, next) {
debug("check %p %s", p, p->name);
if (!strcmp(provider_id, p->name))
return (p);
}
return (NULL);
}
/* unregister provider by name */
int
pkcs11_del_provider(char *provider_id)
{
struct pkcs11_provider *p;
if ((p = pkcs11_provider_lookup(provider_id)) != NULL) {
TAILQ_REMOVE(&pkcs11_providers, p, next);
pkcs11_provider_finalize(p);
pkcs11_provider_unref(p);
return (0);
}
return (-1);
}
static RSA_METHOD *rsa_method;
static int rsa_idx = 0;
#ifdef HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW
static EC_KEY_METHOD *ec_key_method;
static int ec_key_idx = 0;
#endif
/* release a wrapped object */
static void
pkcs11_k11_free(void *parent, void *ptr, CRYPTO_EX_DATA *ad, int idx,
long argl, void *argp)
{
struct pkcs11_key *k11 = ptr;
debug("%s: parent %p ptr %p idx %d", __func__, parent, ptr, idx);
if (k11 == NULL)
return;
if (k11->provider)
pkcs11_provider_unref(k11->provider);
free(k11->keyid);
free(k11);
}
/* find a single 'obj' for given attributes */
static int
pkcs11_find(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx, CK_ATTRIBUTE *attr,
CK_ULONG nattr, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE *obj)
{
CK_FUNCTION_LIST *f;
CK_SESSION_HANDLE session;
CK_ULONG nfound = 0;
CK_RV rv;
int ret = -1;
f = p->function_list;
session = p->slotinfo[slotidx].session;
if ((rv = f->C_FindObjectsInit(session, attr, nattr)) != CKR_OK) {
error("C_FindObjectsInit failed (nattr %lu): %lu", nattr, rv);
return (-1);
}
if ((rv = f->C_FindObjects(session, obj, 1, &nfound)) != CKR_OK ||
nfound != 1) {
debug("C_FindObjects failed (nfound %lu nattr %lu): %lu",
nfound, nattr, rv);
} else
ret = 0;
if ((rv = f->C_FindObjectsFinal(session)) != CKR_OK)
error("C_FindObjectsFinal failed: %lu", rv);
return (ret);
}
static int
pkcs11_login_slot(struct pkcs11_provider *provider, struct pkcs11_slotinfo *si,
CK_USER_TYPE type)
{
char *pin = NULL, prompt[1024];
CK_RV rv;
if (provider == NULL || si == NULL || !provider->valid) {
error("no pkcs11 (valid) provider found");
return (-1);
}
if (!pkcs11_interactive) {
error("need pin entry%s",
(si->token.flags & CKF_PROTECTED_AUTHENTICATION_PATH) ?
" on reader keypad" : "");
return (-1);
}
if (si->token.flags & CKF_PROTECTED_AUTHENTICATION_PATH)
verbose("Deferring PIN entry to reader keypad.");
else {
snprintf(prompt, sizeof(prompt), "Enter PIN for '%s': ",
si->token.label);
if ((pin = read_passphrase(prompt, RP_ALLOW_EOF)) == NULL) {
debug("%s: no pin specified", __func__);
return (-1); /* bail out */
}
}
rv = provider->function_list->C_Login(si->session, type, (u_char *)pin,
(pin != NULL) ? strlen(pin) : 0);
if (pin != NULL)
freezero(pin, strlen(pin));
if (rv != CKR_OK && rv != CKR_USER_ALREADY_LOGGED_IN) {
error("C_Login failed: %lu", rv);
return (-1);
}
si->logged_in = 1;
return (0);
}
static int
pkcs11_login(struct pkcs11_key *k11, CK_USER_TYPE type)
{
if (k11 == NULL || k11->provider == NULL || !k11->provider->valid) {
error("no pkcs11 (valid) provider found");
return (-1);
}
return pkcs11_login_slot(k11->provider,
&k11->provider->slotinfo[k11->slotidx], type);
}
static int
pkcs11_check_obj_bool_attrib(struct pkcs11_key *k11, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE obj,
CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE type, int *val)
{
struct pkcs11_slotinfo *si;
CK_FUNCTION_LIST *f;
CK_BBOOL flag = 0;
CK_ATTRIBUTE attr;
CK_RV rv;
*val = 0;
if (!k11->provider || !k11->provider->valid) {
error("no pkcs11 (valid) provider found");
return (-1);
}
f = k11->provider->function_list;
si = &k11->provider->slotinfo[k11->slotidx];
attr.type = type;
attr.pValue = &flag;
attr.ulValueLen = sizeof(flag);
rv = f->C_GetAttributeValue(si->session, obj, &attr, 1);
if (rv != CKR_OK) {
error("C_GetAttributeValue failed: %lu", rv);
return (-1);
}
*val = flag != 0;
debug("%s: provider %p slot %lu object %lu: attrib %lu = %d",
__func__, k11->provider, k11->slotidx, obj, type, *val);
return (0);
}
static int
pkcs11_get_key(struct pkcs11_key *k11, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mech_type)
{
struct pkcs11_slotinfo *si;
CK_FUNCTION_LIST *f;
CK_OBJECT_HANDLE obj;
CK_RV rv;
CK_OBJECT_CLASS private_key_class;
CK_BBOOL true_val;
CK_MECHANISM mech;
CK_ATTRIBUTE key_filter[3];
int always_auth = 0;
int did_login = 0;
if (!k11->provider || !k11->provider->valid) {
error("no pkcs11 (valid) provider found");
return (-1);
}
f = k11->provider->function_list;
si = &k11->provider->slotinfo[k11->slotidx];
if ((si->token.flags & CKF_LOGIN_REQUIRED) && !si->logged_in) {
if (pkcs11_login(k11, CKU_USER) < 0) {
error("login failed");
return (-1);
}
did_login = 1;
}
memset(&key_filter, 0, sizeof(key_filter));
private_key_class = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY;
key_filter[0].type = CKA_CLASS;
key_filter[0].pValue = &private_key_class;
key_filter[0].ulValueLen = sizeof(private_key_class);
key_filter[1].type = CKA_ID;
key_filter[1].pValue = k11->keyid;
key_filter[1].ulValueLen = k11->keyid_len;
true_val = CK_TRUE;
key_filter[2].type = CKA_SIGN;
key_filter[2].pValue = &true_val;
key_filter[2].ulValueLen = sizeof(true_val);
/* try to find object w/CKA_SIGN first, retry w/o */
if (pkcs11_find(k11->provider, k11->slotidx, key_filter, 3, &obj) < 0 &&
pkcs11_find(k11->provider, k11->slotidx, key_filter, 2, &obj) < 0) {
error("cannot find private key");
return (-1);
}
memset(&mech, 0, sizeof(mech));
mech.mechanism = mech_type;
mech.pParameter = NULL_PTR;
mech.ulParameterLen = 0;
if ((rv = f->C_SignInit(si->session, &mech, obj)) != CKR_OK) {
error("C_SignInit failed: %lu", rv);
return (-1);
}
pkcs11_check_obj_bool_attrib(k11, obj, CKA_ALWAYS_AUTHENTICATE,
&always_auth); /* ignore errors here */
if (always_auth && !did_login) {
debug("%s: always-auth key", __func__);
if (pkcs11_login(k11, CKU_CONTEXT_SPECIFIC) < 0) {
error("login failed for always-auth key");
return (-1);
}
}
return (0);
}
/* openssl callback doing the actual signing operation */
static int
pkcs11_rsa_private_encrypt(int flen, const u_char *from, u_char *to, RSA *rsa,
int padding)
{
struct pkcs11_key *k11;
struct pkcs11_slotinfo *si;
CK_FUNCTION_LIST *f;
CK_ULONG tlen = 0;
CK_RV rv;
int rval = -1;
if ((k11 = RSA_get_ex_data(rsa, rsa_idx)) == NULL) {
error("RSA_get_ex_data failed for rsa %p", rsa);
return (-1);
}
if (pkcs11_get_key(k11, CKM_RSA_PKCS) == -1) {
error("pkcs11_get_key failed");
return (-1);
}
f = k11->provider->function_list;
si = &k11->provider->slotinfo[k11->slotidx];
tlen = RSA_size(rsa);
/* XXX handle CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL */
rv = f->C_Sign(si->session, (CK_BYTE *)from, flen, to, &tlen);
if (rv == CKR_OK)
rval = tlen;
else
error("C_Sign failed: %lu", rv);
return (rval);
}
static int
pkcs11_rsa_private_decrypt(int flen, const u_char *from, u_char *to, RSA *rsa,
int padding)
{
return (-1);
}
static int
pkcs11_rsa_start_wrapper(void)
{
if (rsa_method != NULL)
return (0);
rsa_method = RSA_meth_dup(RSA_get_default_method());
if (rsa_method == NULL)
return (-1);
rsa_idx = RSA_get_ex_new_index(0, "ssh-pkcs11-rsa",
NULL, NULL, pkcs11_k11_free);
if (rsa_idx == -1)
return (-1);
if (!RSA_meth_set1_name(rsa_method, "pkcs11") ||
!RSA_meth_set_priv_enc(rsa_method, pkcs11_rsa_private_encrypt) ||
!RSA_meth_set_priv_dec(rsa_method, pkcs11_rsa_private_decrypt)) {
error("%s: setup pkcs11 method failed", __func__);
return (-1);
}
return (0);
}
/* redirect private key operations for rsa key to pkcs11 token */
static int
pkcs11_rsa_wrap(struct pkcs11_provider *provider, CK_ULONG slotidx,
CK_ATTRIBUTE *keyid_attrib, RSA *rsa)
{
struct pkcs11_key *k11;
if (pkcs11_rsa_start_wrapper() == -1)
return (-1);
k11 = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*k11));
k11->provider = provider;
provider->refcount++; /* provider referenced by RSA key */
k11->slotidx = slotidx;
/* identify key object on smartcard */
k11->keyid_len = keyid_attrib->ulValueLen;
if (k11->keyid_len > 0) {
k11->keyid = xmalloc(k11->keyid_len);
memcpy(k11->keyid, keyid_attrib->pValue, k11->keyid_len);
}
RSA_set_method(rsa, rsa_method);
RSA_set_ex_data(rsa, rsa_idx, k11);
return (0);
}
#ifdef HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW
/* openssl callback doing the actual signing operation */
static ECDSA_SIG *
ecdsa_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len, const BIGNUM *inv,
const BIGNUM *rp, EC_KEY *ec)
{
struct pkcs11_key *k11;
struct pkcs11_slotinfo *si;
CK_FUNCTION_LIST *f;
CK_ULONG siglen = 0, bnlen;
CK_RV rv;
ECDSA_SIG *ret = NULL;
u_char *sig;
BIGNUM *r = NULL, *s = NULL;
if ((k11 = EC_KEY_get_ex_data(ec, ec_key_idx)) == NULL) {
ossl_error("EC_KEY_get_key_method_data failed for ec");
return (NULL);
}
if (pkcs11_get_key(k11, CKM_ECDSA) == -1) {
error("pkcs11_get_key failed");
return (NULL);
}
f = k11->provider->function_list;
si = &k11->provider->slotinfo[k11->slotidx];
siglen = ECDSA_size(ec);
sig = xmalloc(siglen);
/* XXX handle CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL */
rv = f->C_Sign(si->session, (CK_BYTE *)dgst, dgst_len, sig, &siglen);
if (rv != CKR_OK) {
error("C_Sign failed: %lu", rv);
goto done;
}
if (siglen < 64 || siglen > 132 || siglen % 2) {
ossl_error("d2i_ECDSA_SIG failed");
goto done;
}
bnlen = siglen/2;
if ((ret = ECDSA_SIG_new()) == NULL) {
error("ECDSA_SIG_new failed");
goto done;
}
if ((r = BN_bin2bn(sig, bnlen, NULL)) == NULL ||
(s = BN_bin2bn(sig+bnlen, bnlen, NULL)) == NULL) {
ossl_error("d2i_ECDSA_SIG failed");
ECDSA_SIG_free(ret);
ret = NULL;
goto done;
}
if (!ECDSA_SIG_set0(ret, r, s)) {
error("%s: ECDSA_SIG_set0 failed", __func__);
ECDSA_SIG_free(ret);
ret = NULL;
goto done;
}
r = s = NULL; /* now owned by ret */
/* success */
done:
BN_free(r);
BN_free(s);
free(sig);
return (ret);
}
static int
pkcs11_ecdsa_start_wrapper(void)
{
int (*orig_sign)(int, const unsigned char *, int, unsigned char *,
unsigned int *, const BIGNUM *, const BIGNUM *, EC_KEY *) = NULL;
if (ec_key_method != NULL)
return (0);
ec_key_idx = EC_KEY_get_ex_new_index(0, "ssh-pkcs11-ecdsa",
NULL, NULL, pkcs11_k11_free);
if (ec_key_idx == -1)
return (-1);
ec_key_method = EC_KEY_METHOD_new(EC_KEY_OpenSSL());
if (ec_key_method == NULL)
return (-1);
EC_KEY_METHOD_get_sign(ec_key_method, &orig_sign, NULL, NULL);
EC_KEY_METHOD_set_sign(ec_key_method, orig_sign, NULL, ecdsa_do_sign);
return (0);
}
static int
pkcs11_ecdsa_wrap(struct pkcs11_provider *provider, CK_ULONG slotidx,
CK_ATTRIBUTE *keyid_attrib, EC_KEY *ec)
{
struct pkcs11_key *k11;
if (pkcs11_ecdsa_start_wrapper() == -1)
return (-1);
k11 = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*k11));
k11->provider = provider;
provider->refcount++; /* provider referenced by ECDSA key */
k11->slotidx = slotidx;
/* identify key object on smartcard */
k11->keyid_len = keyid_attrib->ulValueLen;
k11->keyid = xmalloc(k11->keyid_len);
memcpy(k11->keyid, keyid_attrib->pValue, k11->keyid_len);
EC_KEY_set_method(ec, ec_key_method);
EC_KEY_set_ex_data(ec, ec_key_idx, k11);
return (0);
}
#endif /* HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW */
/* remove trailing spaces */
static void
rmspace(u_char *buf, size_t len)
{
size_t i;
if (!len)
return;
for (i = len - 1; i > 0; i--)
if (i == len - 1 || buf[i] == ' ')
buf[i] = '\0';
else
break;
}
/*
* open a pkcs11 session and login if required.
* if pin == NULL we delay login until key use
*/
static int
pkcs11_open_session(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx, char *pin,
CK_ULONG user)
{
struct pkcs11_slotinfo *si;
CK_FUNCTION_LIST *f;
CK_RV rv;
CK_SESSION_HANDLE session;
int login_required, ret;
f = p->function_list;
si = &p->slotinfo[slotidx];
login_required = si->token.flags & CKF_LOGIN_REQUIRED;
/* fail early before opening session */
if (login_required && !pkcs11_interactive &&
(pin == NULL || strlen(pin) == 0)) {
error("pin required");
return (-SSH_PKCS11_ERR_PIN_REQUIRED);
}
if ((rv = f->C_OpenSession(p->slotlist[slotidx], CKF_RW_SESSION|
CKF_SERIAL_SESSION, NULL, NULL, &session)) != CKR_OK) {
error("C_OpenSession failed: %lu", rv);
return (-1);
}
if (login_required && pin != NULL && strlen(pin) != 0) {
rv = f->C_Login(session, user, (u_char *)pin, strlen(pin));
if (rv != CKR_OK && rv != CKR_USER_ALREADY_LOGGED_IN) {
error("C_Login failed: %lu", rv);
ret = (rv == CKR_PIN_LOCKED) ?
-SSH_PKCS11_ERR_PIN_LOCKED :
-SSH_PKCS11_ERR_LOGIN_FAIL;
if ((rv = f->C_CloseSession(session)) != CKR_OK)
error("C_CloseSession failed: %lu", rv);
return (ret);
}
si->logged_in = 1;
}
si->session = session;
return (0);
}
static int
pkcs11_key_included(struct sshkey ***keysp, int *nkeys, struct sshkey *key)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < *nkeys; i++)
if (sshkey_equal(key, (*keysp)[i]))
return (1);
return (0);
}
#ifdef HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW
static struct sshkey *
pkcs11_fetch_ecdsa_pubkey(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx,
CK_OBJECT_HANDLE *obj)
{
CK_ATTRIBUTE key_attr[3];
CK_SESSION_HANDLE session;
CK_FUNCTION_LIST *f = NULL;
CK_RV rv;
ASN1_OCTET_STRING *octet = NULL;
EC_KEY *ec = NULL;
EC_GROUP *group = NULL;
struct sshkey *key = NULL;
const unsigned char *attrp = NULL;
int i;
int nid;
memset(&key_attr, 0, sizeof(key_attr));
key_attr[0].type = CKA_ID;
key_attr[1].type = CKA_EC_POINT;
key_attr[2].type = CKA_EC_PARAMS;
session = p->slotinfo[slotidx].session;
f = p->function_list;
/* figure out size of the attributes */
rv = f->C_GetAttributeValue(session, *obj, key_attr, 3);
if (rv != CKR_OK) {
error("C_GetAttributeValue failed: %lu", rv);
return (NULL);
}
/*
* Allow CKA_ID (always first attribute) to be empty, but
* ensure that none of the others are zero length.
* XXX assumes CKA_ID is always first.
*/
if (key_attr[1].ulValueLen == 0 ||
key_attr[2].ulValueLen == 0) {
error("invalid attribute length");
return (NULL);
}
/* allocate buffers for attributes */
for (i = 0; i < 3; i++)
if (key_attr[i].ulValueLen > 0)
key_attr[i].pValue = xcalloc(1, key_attr[i].ulValueLen);
/* retrieve ID, public point and curve parameters of EC key */
rv = f->C_GetAttributeValue(session, *obj, key_attr, 3);
if (rv != CKR_OK) {
error("C_GetAttributeValue failed: %lu", rv);
goto fail;
}
ec = EC_KEY_new();
if (ec == NULL) {
error("EC_KEY_new failed");
goto fail;
}
attrp = key_attr[2].pValue;
group = d2i_ECPKParameters(NULL, &attrp, key_attr[2].ulValueLen);
if (group == NULL) {
ossl_error("d2i_ECPKParameters failed");
goto fail;
}
if (EC_KEY_set_group(ec, group) == 0) {
ossl_error("EC_KEY_set_group failed");
goto fail;
}
if (key_attr[1].ulValueLen <= 2) {
error("CKA_EC_POINT too small");
goto fail;
}
attrp = key_attr[1].pValue;
octet = d2i_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(NULL, &attrp, key_attr[1].ulValueLen);
if (octet == NULL) {
ossl_error("d2i_ASN1_OCTET_STRING failed");
goto fail;
}
attrp = octet->data;
if (o2i_ECPublicKey(&ec, &attrp, octet->length) == NULL) {
ossl_error("o2i_ECPublicKey failed");
goto fail;
}
nid = sshkey_ecdsa_key_to_nid(ec);
if (nid < 0) {
error("couldn't get curve nid");
goto fail;
}
if (pkcs11_ecdsa_wrap(p, slotidx, &key_attr[0], ec))
goto fail;
key = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC);
if (key == NULL) {
error("sshkey_new failed");
goto fail;
}
key->ecdsa = ec;
key->ecdsa_nid = nid;
key->type = KEY_ECDSA;
key->flags |= SSHKEY_FLAG_EXT;
ec = NULL; /* now owned by key */
fail:
for (i = 0; i < 3; i++)
free(key_attr[i].pValue);
if (ec)
EC_KEY_free(ec);
if (group)
EC_GROUP_free(group);
if (octet)
ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(octet);
return (key);
}
#endif /* HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW */
static struct sshkey *
pkcs11_fetch_rsa_pubkey(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx,
CK_OBJECT_HANDLE *obj)
{
CK_ATTRIBUTE key_attr[3];
CK_SESSION_HANDLE session;
CK_FUNCTION_LIST *f = NULL;
CK_RV rv;
RSA *rsa = NULL;
BIGNUM *rsa_n, *rsa_e;
struct sshkey *key = NULL;
int i;
memset(&key_attr, 0, sizeof(key_attr));
key_attr[0].type = CKA_ID;
key_attr[1].type = CKA_MODULUS;
key_attr[2].type = CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT;
session = p->slotinfo[slotidx].session;
f = p->function_list;
/* figure out size of the attributes */
rv = f->C_GetAttributeValue(session, *obj, key_attr, 3);
if (rv != CKR_OK) {
error("C_GetAttributeValue failed: %lu", rv);
return (NULL);
}
/*
* Allow CKA_ID (always first attribute) to be empty, but
* ensure that none of the others are zero length.
* XXX assumes CKA_ID is always first.
*/
if (key_attr[1].ulValueLen == 0 ||
key_attr[2].ulValueLen == 0) {
error("invalid attribute length");
return (NULL);
}
/* allocate buffers for attributes */
for (i = 0; i < 3; i++)
if (key_attr[i].ulValueLen > 0)
key_attr[i].pValue = xcalloc(1, key_attr[i].ulValueLen);
/* retrieve ID, modulus and public exponent of RSA key */
rv = f->C_GetAttributeValue(session, *obj, key_attr, 3);
if (rv != CKR_OK) {
error("C_GetAttributeValue failed: %lu", rv);
goto fail;
}
rsa = RSA_new();
if (rsa == NULL) {
error("RSA_new failed");
goto fail;
}
rsa_n = BN_bin2bn(key_attr[1].pValue, key_attr[1].ulValueLen, NULL);
rsa_e = BN_bin2bn(key_attr[2].pValue, key_attr[2].ulValueLen, NULL);
if (rsa_n == NULL || rsa_e == NULL) {
error("BN_bin2bn failed");
goto fail;
}
if (!RSA_set0_key(rsa, rsa_n, rsa_e, NULL))
fatal("%s: set key", __func__);
rsa_n = rsa_e = NULL; /* transferred */
if (pkcs11_rsa_wrap(p, slotidx, &key_attr[0], rsa))
goto fail;
key = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC);
if (key == NULL) {
error("sshkey_new failed");
goto fail;
}
key->rsa = rsa;
key->type = KEY_RSA;
key->flags |= SSHKEY_FLAG_EXT;
rsa = NULL; /* now owned by key */
fail:
for (i = 0; i < 3; i++)
free(key_attr[i].pValue);
RSA_free(rsa);
return (key);
}
-static struct sshkey *
+static int
pkcs11_fetch_x509_pubkey(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx,
- CK_OBJECT_HANDLE *obj)
+ CK_OBJECT_HANDLE *obj, struct sshkey **keyp, char **labelp)
{
CK_ATTRIBUTE cert_attr[3];
CK_SESSION_HANDLE session;
CK_FUNCTION_LIST *f = NULL;
CK_RV rv;
X509 *x509 = NULL;
+ X509_NAME *x509_name = NULL;
EVP_PKEY *evp;
RSA *rsa = NULL;
#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
EC_KEY *ec = NULL;
#endif
struct sshkey *key = NULL;
int i;
#ifdef HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW
int nid;
#endif
- const u_char *cp;
+ const u_char *cp;
+ char *subject = NULL;
+
+ *keyp = NULL;
+ *labelp = NULL;
memset(&cert_attr, 0, sizeof(cert_attr));
cert_attr[0].type = CKA_ID;
cert_attr[1].type = CKA_SUBJECT;
cert_attr[2].type = CKA_VALUE;
session = p->slotinfo[slotidx].session;
f = p->function_list;
/* figure out size of the attributes */
rv = f->C_GetAttributeValue(session, *obj, cert_attr, 3);
if (rv != CKR_OK) {
error("C_GetAttributeValue failed: %lu", rv);
- return (NULL);
+ return -1;
}
/*
* Allow CKA_ID (always first attribute) to be empty, but
* ensure that none of the others are zero length.
* XXX assumes CKA_ID is always first.
*/
if (cert_attr[1].ulValueLen == 0 ||
cert_attr[2].ulValueLen == 0) {
error("invalid attribute length");
- return (NULL);
+ return -1;
}
/* allocate buffers for attributes */
for (i = 0; i < 3; i++)
if (cert_attr[i].ulValueLen > 0)
cert_attr[i].pValue = xcalloc(1, cert_attr[i].ulValueLen);
/* retrieve ID, subject and value of certificate */
rv = f->C_GetAttributeValue(session, *obj, cert_attr, 3);
if (rv != CKR_OK) {
error("C_GetAttributeValue failed: %lu", rv);
- goto fail;
+ goto out;
}
- x509 = X509_new();
- if (x509 == NULL) {
- error("x509_new failed");
- goto fail;
- }
+ /* Decode DER-encoded cert subject */
+ cp = cert_attr[2].pValue;
+ if ((x509_name = d2i_X509_NAME(NULL, &cp,
+ cert_attr[1].ulValueLen)) == NULL ||
+ (subject = X509_NAME_oneline(x509_name, NULL, 0)) == NULL)
+ subject = xstrdup("invalid subject");
+ X509_NAME_free(x509_name);
cp = cert_attr[2].pValue;
- if (d2i_X509(&x509, &cp, cert_attr[2].ulValueLen) == NULL) {
+ if ((x509 = d2i_X509(NULL, &cp, cert_attr[2].ulValueLen)) == NULL) {
error("d2i_x509 failed");
- goto fail;
+ goto out;
}
- evp = X509_get_pubkey(x509);
- if (evp == NULL) {
+ if ((evp = X509_get_pubkey(x509)) == NULL) {
error("X509_get_pubkey failed");
- goto fail;
+ goto out;
}
if (EVP_PKEY_base_id(evp) == EVP_PKEY_RSA) {
if (EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(evp) == NULL) {
error("invalid x509; no rsa key");
- goto fail;
+ goto out;
}
if ((rsa = RSAPublicKey_dup(EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(evp))) == NULL) {
error("RSAPublicKey_dup failed");
- goto fail;
+ goto out;
}
if (pkcs11_rsa_wrap(p, slotidx, &cert_attr[0], rsa))
- goto fail;
+ goto out;
key = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC);
if (key == NULL) {
error("sshkey_new failed");
- goto fail;
+ goto out;
}
key->rsa = rsa;
key->type = KEY_RSA;
key->flags |= SSHKEY_FLAG_EXT;
rsa = NULL; /* now owned by key */
#ifdef HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW
} else if (EVP_PKEY_base_id(evp) == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
if (EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(evp) == NULL) {
error("invalid x509; no ec key");
- goto fail;
+ goto out;
}
if ((ec = EC_KEY_dup(EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(evp))) == NULL) {
error("EC_KEY_dup failed");
- goto fail;
+ goto out;
}
nid = sshkey_ecdsa_key_to_nid(ec);
if (nid < 0) {
error("couldn't get curve nid");
- goto fail;
+ goto out;
}
if (pkcs11_ecdsa_wrap(p, slotidx, &cert_attr[0], ec))
- goto fail;
+ goto out;
key = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC);
if (key == NULL) {
error("sshkey_new failed");
- goto fail;
+ goto out;
}
key->ecdsa = ec;
key->ecdsa_nid = nid;
key->type = KEY_ECDSA;
key->flags |= SSHKEY_FLAG_EXT;
ec = NULL; /* now owned by key */
#endif /* HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW */
- } else
+ } else {
error("unknown certificate key type");
-
-fail:
+ goto out;
+ }
+ out:
for (i = 0; i < 3; i++)
free(cert_attr[i].pValue);
X509_free(x509);
RSA_free(rsa);
#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
EC_KEY_free(ec);
#endif
-
- return (key);
+ if (key == NULL) {
+ free(subject);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ /* success */
+ *keyp = key;
+ *labelp = subject;
+ return 0;
}
#if 0
static int
have_rsa_key(const RSA *rsa)
{
const BIGNUM *rsa_n, *rsa_e;
RSA_get0_key(rsa, &rsa_n, &rsa_e, NULL);
return rsa_n != NULL && rsa_e != NULL;
}
#endif
/*
* lookup certificates for token in slot identified by slotidx,
* add 'wrapped' public keys to the 'keysp' array and increment nkeys.
* keysp points to an (possibly empty) array with *nkeys keys.
*/
static int
pkcs11_fetch_certs(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx,
- struct sshkey ***keysp, int *nkeys)
+ struct sshkey ***keysp, char ***labelsp, int *nkeys)
{
struct sshkey *key = NULL;
CK_OBJECT_CLASS key_class;
CK_ATTRIBUTE key_attr[1];
CK_SESSION_HANDLE session;
CK_FUNCTION_LIST *f = NULL;
CK_RV rv;
CK_OBJECT_HANDLE obj;
CK_ULONG n = 0;
int ret = -1;
+ char *label;
memset(&key_attr, 0, sizeof(key_attr));
memset(&obj, 0, sizeof(obj));
key_class = CKO_CERTIFICATE;
key_attr[0].type = CKA_CLASS;
key_attr[0].pValue = &key_class;
key_attr[0].ulValueLen = sizeof(key_class);
session = p->slotinfo[slotidx].session;
f = p->function_list;
rv = f->C_FindObjectsInit(session, key_attr, 1);
if (rv != CKR_OK) {
error("C_FindObjectsInit failed: %lu", rv);
goto fail;
}
while (1) {
CK_CERTIFICATE_TYPE ck_cert_type;
rv = f->C_FindObjects(session, &obj, 1, &n);
if (rv != CKR_OK) {
error("C_FindObjects failed: %lu", rv);
goto fail;
}
if (n == 0)
break;
memset(&ck_cert_type, 0, sizeof(ck_cert_type));
memset(&key_attr, 0, sizeof(key_attr));
key_attr[0].type = CKA_CERTIFICATE_TYPE;
key_attr[0].pValue = &ck_cert_type;
key_attr[0].ulValueLen = sizeof(ck_cert_type);
rv = f->C_GetAttributeValue(session, obj, key_attr, 1);
if (rv != CKR_OK) {
error("C_GetAttributeValue failed: %lu", rv);
goto fail;
}
+ key = NULL;
+ label = NULL;
switch (ck_cert_type) {
case CKC_X_509:
- key = pkcs11_fetch_x509_pubkey(p, slotidx, &obj);
+ if (pkcs11_fetch_x509_pubkey(p, slotidx, &obj,
+ &key, &label) != 0) {
+ error("failed to fetch key");
+ continue;
+ }
break;
default:
- /* XXX print key type? */
- key = NULL;
- error("skipping unsupported certificate type");
- }
-
- if (key == NULL) {
- error("failed to fetch key");
+ error("skipping unsupported certificate type %lu",
+ ck_cert_type);
continue;
}
if (pkcs11_key_included(keysp, nkeys, key)) {
sshkey_free(key);
} else {
/* expand key array and add key */
*keysp = xrecallocarray(*keysp, *nkeys,
*nkeys + 1, sizeof(struct sshkey *));
(*keysp)[*nkeys] = key;
+ if (labelsp != NULL) {
+ *labelsp = xrecallocarray(*labelsp, *nkeys,
+ *nkeys + 1, sizeof(char *));
+ (*labelsp)[*nkeys] = xstrdup((char *)label);
+ }
*nkeys = *nkeys + 1;
debug("have %d keys", *nkeys);
}
}
ret = 0;
fail:
rv = f->C_FindObjectsFinal(session);
if (rv != CKR_OK) {
error("C_FindObjectsFinal failed: %lu", rv);
ret = -1;
}
return (ret);
}
/*
* lookup public keys for token in slot identified by slotidx,
* add 'wrapped' public keys to the 'keysp' array and increment nkeys.
* keysp points to an (possibly empty) array with *nkeys keys.
*/
static int
pkcs11_fetch_keys(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx,
- struct sshkey ***keysp, int *nkeys)
+ struct sshkey ***keysp, char ***labelsp, int *nkeys)
{
struct sshkey *key = NULL;
CK_OBJECT_CLASS key_class;
- CK_ATTRIBUTE key_attr[1];
+ CK_ATTRIBUTE key_attr[2];
CK_SESSION_HANDLE session;
CK_FUNCTION_LIST *f = NULL;
CK_RV rv;
CK_OBJECT_HANDLE obj;
CK_ULONG n = 0;
int ret = -1;
memset(&key_attr, 0, sizeof(key_attr));
memset(&obj, 0, sizeof(obj));
key_class = CKO_PUBLIC_KEY;
key_attr[0].type = CKA_CLASS;
key_attr[0].pValue = &key_class;
key_attr[0].ulValueLen = sizeof(key_class);
session = p->slotinfo[slotidx].session;
f = p->function_list;
rv = f->C_FindObjectsInit(session, key_attr, 1);
if (rv != CKR_OK) {
error("C_FindObjectsInit failed: %lu", rv);
goto fail;
}
while (1) {
CK_KEY_TYPE ck_key_type;
+ CK_UTF8CHAR label[256];
rv = f->C_FindObjects(session, &obj, 1, &n);
if (rv != CKR_OK) {
error("C_FindObjects failed: %lu", rv);
goto fail;
}
if (n == 0)
break;
memset(&ck_key_type, 0, sizeof(ck_key_type));
memset(&key_attr, 0, sizeof(key_attr));
key_attr[0].type = CKA_KEY_TYPE;
key_attr[0].pValue = &ck_key_type;
key_attr[0].ulValueLen = sizeof(ck_key_type);
+ key_attr[1].type = CKA_LABEL;
+ key_attr[1].pValue = &label;
+ key_attr[1].ulValueLen = sizeof(label) - 1;
- rv = f->C_GetAttributeValue(session, obj, key_attr, 1);
+ rv = f->C_GetAttributeValue(session, obj, key_attr, 2);
if (rv != CKR_OK) {
error("C_GetAttributeValue failed: %lu", rv);
goto fail;
}
+ label[key_attr[1].ulValueLen] = '\0';
+
switch (ck_key_type) {
case CKK_RSA:
key = pkcs11_fetch_rsa_pubkey(p, slotidx, &obj);
break;
#ifdef HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW
case CKK_ECDSA:
key = pkcs11_fetch_ecdsa_pubkey(p, slotidx, &obj);
break;
#endif /* HAVE_EC_KEY_METHOD_NEW */
default:
/* XXX print key type? */
key = NULL;
error("skipping unsupported key type");
}
if (key == NULL) {
error("failed to fetch key");
continue;
}
if (pkcs11_key_included(keysp, nkeys, key)) {
sshkey_free(key);
} else {
/* expand key array and add key */
*keysp = xrecallocarray(*keysp, *nkeys,
*nkeys + 1, sizeof(struct sshkey *));
(*keysp)[*nkeys] = key;
+ if (labelsp != NULL) {
+ *labelsp = xrecallocarray(*labelsp, *nkeys,
+ *nkeys + 1, sizeof(char *));
+ (*labelsp)[*nkeys] = xstrdup((char *)label);
+ }
*nkeys = *nkeys + 1;
debug("have %d keys", *nkeys);
}
}
ret = 0;
fail:
rv = f->C_FindObjectsFinal(session);
if (rv != CKR_OK) {
error("C_FindObjectsFinal failed: %lu", rv);
ret = -1;
}
return (ret);
}
#ifdef WITH_PKCS11_KEYGEN
#define FILL_ATTR(attr, idx, typ, val, len) \
{ (attr[idx]).type=(typ); (attr[idx]).pValue=(val); (attr[idx]).ulValueLen=len; idx++; }
static struct sshkey *
pkcs11_rsa_generate_private_key(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx,
char *label, CK_ULONG bits, CK_BYTE keyid, u_int32_t *err)
{
struct pkcs11_slotinfo *si;
char *plabel = label ? label : "";
int npub = 0, npriv = 0;
CK_RV rv;
CK_FUNCTION_LIST *f;
CK_SESSION_HANDLE session;
CK_BBOOL true_val = CK_TRUE, false_val = CK_FALSE;
CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pubKey, privKey;
CK_ATTRIBUTE tpub[16], tpriv[16];
CK_MECHANISM mech = {
CKM_RSA_PKCS_KEY_PAIR_GEN, NULL_PTR, 0
};
CK_BYTE pubExponent[] = {
0x01, 0x00, 0x01 /* RSA_F4 in bytes */
};
pubkey_filter[0].pValue = &pubkey_class;
cert_filter[0].pValue = &cert_class;
*err = 0;
FILL_ATTR(tpub, npub, CKA_TOKEN, &true_val, sizeof(true_val));
FILL_ATTR(tpub, npub, CKA_LABEL, plabel, strlen(plabel));
FILL_ATTR(tpub, npub, CKA_ENCRYPT, &false_val, sizeof(false_val));
FILL_ATTR(tpub, npub, CKA_VERIFY, &true_val, sizeof(true_val));
FILL_ATTR(tpub, npub, CKA_VERIFY_RECOVER, &false_val,
sizeof(false_val));
FILL_ATTR(tpub, npub, CKA_WRAP, &false_val, sizeof(false_val));
FILL_ATTR(tpub, npub, CKA_DERIVE, &false_val, sizeof(false_val));
FILL_ATTR(tpub, npub, CKA_MODULUS_BITS, &bits, sizeof(bits));
FILL_ATTR(tpub, npub, CKA_PUBLIC_EXPONENT, pubExponent,
sizeof(pubExponent));
FILL_ATTR(tpub, npub, CKA_ID, &keyid, sizeof(keyid));
FILL_ATTR(tpriv, npriv, CKA_TOKEN, &true_val, sizeof(true_val));
FILL_ATTR(tpriv, npriv, CKA_LABEL, plabel, strlen(plabel));
FILL_ATTR(tpriv, npriv, CKA_PRIVATE, &true_val, sizeof(true_val));
FILL_ATTR(tpriv, npriv, CKA_SENSITIVE, &true_val, sizeof(true_val));
FILL_ATTR(tpriv, npriv, CKA_DECRYPT, &false_val, sizeof(false_val));
FILL_ATTR(tpriv, npriv, CKA_SIGN, &true_val, sizeof(true_val));
FILL_ATTR(tpriv, npriv, CKA_SIGN_RECOVER, &false_val,
sizeof(false_val));
FILL_ATTR(tpriv, npriv, CKA_UNWRAP, &false_val, sizeof(false_val));
FILL_ATTR(tpriv, npriv, CKA_DERIVE, &false_val, sizeof(false_val));
FILL_ATTR(tpriv, npriv, CKA_ID, &keyid, sizeof(keyid));
f = p->function_list;
si = &p->slotinfo[slotidx];
session = si->session;
if ((rv = f->C_GenerateKeyPair(session, &mech, tpub, npub, tpriv, npriv,
&pubKey, &privKey)) != CKR_OK) {
error("%s: key generation failed: error 0x%lx", __func__, rv);
*err = rv;
return NULL;
}
return pkcs11_fetch_rsa_pubkey(p, slotidx, &pubKey);
}
static int
pkcs11_decode_hex(const char *hex, unsigned char **dest, size_t *rlen)
{
size_t i, len;
char ptr[3];
if (dest)
*dest = NULL;
if (rlen)
*rlen = 0;
if ((len = strlen(hex)) % 2)
return -1;
len /= 2;
*dest = xmalloc(len);
ptr[2] = '\0';
for (i = 0; i < len; i++) {
ptr[0] = hex[2 * i];
ptr[1] = hex[(2 * i) + 1];
if (!isxdigit(ptr[0]) || !isxdigit(ptr[1]))
return -1;
(*dest)[i] = (unsigned char)strtoul(ptr, NULL, 16);
}
if (rlen)
*rlen = len;
return 0;
}
static struct ec_curve_info {
const char *name;
const char *oid;
const char *oid_encoded;
size_t size;
} ec_curve_infos[] = {
{"prime256v1", "1.2.840.10045.3.1.7", "06082A8648CE3D030107", 256},
{"secp384r1", "1.3.132.0.34", "06052B81040022", 384},
{"secp521r1", "1.3.132.0.35", "06052B81040023", 521},
{NULL, NULL, NULL, 0},
};
static struct sshkey *
pkcs11_ecdsa_generate_private_key(struct pkcs11_provider *p, CK_ULONG slotidx,
char *label, CK_ULONG bits, CK_BYTE keyid, u_int32_t *err)
{
struct pkcs11_slotinfo *si;
char *plabel = label ? label : "";
int i;
size_t ecparams_size;
unsigned char *ecparams = NULL;
int npub = 0, npriv = 0;
CK_RV rv;
CK_FUNCTION_LIST *f;
CK_SESSION_HANDLE session;
CK_BBOOL true_val = CK_TRUE, false_val = CK_FALSE;
CK_OBJECT_HANDLE pubKey, privKey;
CK_MECHANISM mech = {
CKM_EC_KEY_PAIR_GEN, NULL_PTR, 0
};
CK_ATTRIBUTE tpub[16], tpriv[16];
*err = 0;
for (i = 0; ec_curve_infos[i].name; i++) {
if (ec_curve_infos[i].size == bits)
break;
}
if (!ec_curve_infos[i].name) {
error("%s: invalid key size %lu", __func__, bits);
return NULL;
}
if (pkcs11_decode_hex(ec_curve_infos[i].oid_encoded, &ecparams,
&ecparams_size) == -1) {
error("%s: invalid oid", __func__);
return NULL;
}
FILL_ATTR(tpub, npub, CKA_TOKEN, &true_val, sizeof(true_val));
FILL_ATTR(tpub, npub, CKA_LABEL, plabel, strlen(plabel));
FILL_ATTR(tpub, npub, CKA_ENCRYPT, &false_val, sizeof(false_val));
FILL_ATTR(tpub, npub, CKA_VERIFY, &true_val, sizeof(true_val));
FILL_ATTR(tpub, npub, CKA_VERIFY_RECOVER, &false_val,
sizeof(false_val));
FILL_ATTR(tpub, npub, CKA_WRAP, &false_val, sizeof(false_val));
FILL_ATTR(tpub, npub, CKA_DERIVE, &false_val, sizeof(false_val));
FILL_ATTR(tpub, npub, CKA_EC_PARAMS, ecparams, ecparams_size);
FILL_ATTR(tpub, npub, CKA_ID, &keyid, sizeof(keyid));
FILL_ATTR(tpriv, npriv, CKA_TOKEN, &true_val, sizeof(true_val));
FILL_ATTR(tpriv, npriv, CKA_LABEL, plabel, strlen(plabel));
FILL_ATTR(tpriv, npriv, CKA_PRIVATE, &true_val, sizeof(true_val));
FILL_ATTR(tpriv, npriv, CKA_SENSITIVE, &true_val, sizeof(true_val));
FILL_ATTR(tpriv, npriv, CKA_DECRYPT, &false_val, sizeof(false_val));
FILL_ATTR(tpriv, npriv, CKA_SIGN, &true_val, sizeof(true_val));
FILL_ATTR(tpriv, npriv, CKA_SIGN_RECOVER, &false_val,
sizeof(false_val));
FILL_ATTR(tpriv, npriv, CKA_UNWRAP, &false_val, sizeof(false_val));
FILL_ATTR(tpriv, npriv, CKA_DERIVE, &false_val, sizeof(false_val));
FILL_ATTR(tpriv, npriv, CKA_ID, &keyid, sizeof(keyid));
f = p->function_list;
si = &p->slotinfo[slotidx];
session = si->session;
if ((rv = f->C_GenerateKeyPair(session, &mech, tpub, npub, tpriv, npriv,
&pubKey, &privKey)) != CKR_OK) {
error("%s: key generation failed: error 0x%lx", __func__, rv);
*err = rv;
return NULL;
}
return pkcs11_fetch_ecdsa_pubkey(p, slotidx, &pubKey);
}
#endif /* WITH_PKCS11_KEYGEN */
/*
* register a new provider, fails if provider already exists. if
* keyp is provided, fetch keys.
*/
static int
-pkcs11_register_provider(char *provider_id, char *pin, struct sshkey ***keyp,
+pkcs11_register_provider(char *provider_id, char *pin,
+ struct sshkey ***keyp, char ***labelsp,
struct pkcs11_provider **providerp, CK_ULONG user)
{
int nkeys, need_finalize = 0;
int ret = -1;
struct pkcs11_provider *p = NULL;
void *handle = NULL;
CK_RV (*getfunctionlist)(CK_FUNCTION_LIST **);
CK_RV rv;
CK_FUNCTION_LIST *f = NULL;
CK_TOKEN_INFO *token;
CK_ULONG i;
if (providerp == NULL)
goto fail;
*providerp = NULL;
if (keyp != NULL)
*keyp = NULL;
+ if (labelsp != NULL)
+ *labelsp = NULL;
if (pkcs11_provider_lookup(provider_id) != NULL) {
debug("%s: provider already registered: %s",
__func__, provider_id);
goto fail;
}
/* open shared pkcs11-library */
if ((handle = dlopen(provider_id, RTLD_NOW)) == NULL) {
error("dlopen %s failed: %s", provider_id, dlerror());
goto fail;
}
if ((getfunctionlist = dlsym(handle, "C_GetFunctionList")) == NULL) {
error("dlsym(C_GetFunctionList) failed: %s", dlerror());
goto fail;
}
p = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*p));
p->name = xstrdup(provider_id);
p->handle = handle;
/* setup the pkcs11 callbacks */
if ((rv = (*getfunctionlist)(&f)) != CKR_OK) {
error("C_GetFunctionList for provider %s failed: %lu",
provider_id, rv);
goto fail;
}
p->function_list = f;
if ((rv = f->C_Initialize(NULL)) != CKR_OK) {
error("C_Initialize for provider %s failed: %lu",
provider_id, rv);
goto fail;
}
need_finalize = 1;
if ((rv = f->C_GetInfo(&p->info)) != CKR_OK) {
error("C_GetInfo for provider %s failed: %lu",
provider_id, rv);
goto fail;
}
rmspace(p->info.manufacturerID, sizeof(p->info.manufacturerID));
rmspace(p->info.libraryDescription, sizeof(p->info.libraryDescription));
debug("provider %s: manufacturerID <%s> cryptokiVersion %d.%d"
" libraryDescription <%s> libraryVersion %d.%d",
provider_id,
p->info.manufacturerID,
p->info.cryptokiVersion.major,
p->info.cryptokiVersion.minor,
p->info.libraryDescription,
p->info.libraryVersion.major,
p->info.libraryVersion.minor);
if ((rv = f->C_GetSlotList(CK_TRUE, NULL, &p->nslots)) != CKR_OK) {
error("C_GetSlotList failed: %lu", rv);
goto fail;
}
if (p->nslots == 0) {
debug("%s: provider %s returned no slots", __func__,
provider_id);
ret = -SSH_PKCS11_ERR_NO_SLOTS;
goto fail;
}
p->slotlist = xcalloc(p->nslots, sizeof(CK_SLOT_ID));
if ((rv = f->C_GetSlotList(CK_TRUE, p->slotlist, &p->nslots))
!= CKR_OK) {
error("C_GetSlotList for provider %s failed: %lu",
provider_id, rv);
goto fail;
}
p->slotinfo = xcalloc(p->nslots, sizeof(struct pkcs11_slotinfo));
p->valid = 1;
nkeys = 0;
for (i = 0; i < p->nslots; i++) {
token = &p->slotinfo[i].token;
if ((rv = f->C_GetTokenInfo(p->slotlist[i], token))
!= CKR_OK) {
error("C_GetTokenInfo for provider %s slot %lu "
"failed: %lu", provider_id, (unsigned long)i, rv);
continue;
}
if ((token->flags & CKF_TOKEN_INITIALIZED) == 0) {
debug2("%s: ignoring uninitialised token in "
"provider %s slot %lu", __func__,
provider_id, (unsigned long)i);
continue;
}
rmspace(token->label, sizeof(token->label));
rmspace(token->manufacturerID, sizeof(token->manufacturerID));
rmspace(token->model, sizeof(token->model));
rmspace(token->serialNumber, sizeof(token->serialNumber));
debug("provider %s slot %lu: label <%s> manufacturerID <%s> "
"model <%s> serial <%s> flags 0x%lx",
provider_id, (unsigned long)i,
token->label, token->manufacturerID, token->model,
token->serialNumber, token->flags);
/*
* open session, login with pin and retrieve public
* keys (if keyp is provided)
*/
if ((ret = pkcs11_open_session(p, i, pin, user)) != 0 ||
keyp == NULL)
continue;
- pkcs11_fetch_keys(p, i, keyp, &nkeys);
- pkcs11_fetch_certs(p, i, keyp, &nkeys);
+ pkcs11_fetch_keys(p, i, keyp, labelsp, &nkeys);
+ pkcs11_fetch_certs(p, i, keyp, labelsp, &nkeys);
if (nkeys == 0 && !p->slotinfo[i].logged_in &&
pkcs11_interactive) {
/*
* Some tokens require login before they will
* expose keys.
*/
if (pkcs11_login_slot(p, &p->slotinfo[i],
CKU_USER) < 0) {
error("login failed");
continue;
}
- pkcs11_fetch_keys(p, i, keyp, &nkeys);
- pkcs11_fetch_certs(p, i, keyp, &nkeys);
+ pkcs11_fetch_keys(p, i, keyp, labelsp, &nkeys);
+ pkcs11_fetch_certs(p, i, keyp, labelsp, &nkeys);
}
}
/* now owned by caller */
*providerp = p;
TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&pkcs11_providers, p, next);
p->refcount++; /* add to provider list */
return (nkeys);
fail:
if (need_finalize && (rv = f->C_Finalize(NULL)) != CKR_OK)
error("C_Finalize for provider %s failed: %lu",
provider_id, rv);
if (p) {
free(p->name);
free(p->slotlist);
free(p->slotinfo);
free(p);
}
if (handle)
dlclose(handle);
return (ret);
}
/*
* register a new provider and get number of keys hold by the token,
* fails if provider already exists
*/
int
-pkcs11_add_provider(char *provider_id, char *pin, struct sshkey ***keyp)
+pkcs11_add_provider(char *provider_id, char *pin, struct sshkey ***keyp,
+ char ***labelsp)
{
struct pkcs11_provider *p = NULL;
int nkeys;
- nkeys = pkcs11_register_provider(provider_id, pin, keyp, &p, CKU_USER);
+ nkeys = pkcs11_register_provider(provider_id, pin, keyp, labelsp,
+ &p, CKU_USER);
/* no keys found or some other error, de-register provider */
if (nkeys <= 0 && p != NULL) {
TAILQ_REMOVE(&pkcs11_providers, p, next);
pkcs11_provider_finalize(p);
pkcs11_provider_unref(p);
}
if (nkeys == 0)
debug("%s: provider %s returned no keys", __func__,
provider_id);
return (nkeys);
}
#ifdef WITH_PKCS11_KEYGEN
struct sshkey *
pkcs11_gakp(char *provider_id, char *pin, unsigned int slotidx, char *label,
unsigned int type, unsigned int bits, unsigned char keyid, u_int32_t *err)
{
struct pkcs11_provider *p = NULL;
struct pkcs11_slotinfo *si;
CK_FUNCTION_LIST *f;
CK_SESSION_HANDLE session;
struct sshkey *k = NULL;
int ret = -1, reset_pin = 0, reset_provider = 0;
CK_RV rv;
*err = 0;
if ((p = pkcs11_provider_lookup(provider_id)) != NULL)
debug("%s: provider \"%s\" available", __func__, provider_id);
- else if ((ret = pkcs11_register_provider(provider_id, pin, NULL, &p,
- CKU_SO)) < 0) {
+ else if ((ret = pkcs11_register_provider(provider_id, pin, NULL, NULL,
+ &p, CKU_SO)) < 0) {
debug("%s: could not register provider %s", __func__,
provider_id);
goto out;
} else
reset_provider = 1;
f = p->function_list;
si = &p->slotinfo[slotidx];
session = si->session;
if ((rv = f->C_SetOperationState(session , pin, strlen(pin),
CK_INVALID_HANDLE, CK_INVALID_HANDLE)) != CKR_OK) {
debug("%s: could not supply SO pin: %lu", __func__, rv);
reset_pin = 0;
} else
reset_pin = 1;
switch (type) {
case KEY_RSA:
if ((k = pkcs11_rsa_generate_private_key(p, slotidx, label,
bits, keyid, err)) == NULL) {
debug("%s: failed to generate RSA key", __func__);
goto out;
}
break;
case KEY_ECDSA:
if ((k = pkcs11_ecdsa_generate_private_key(p, slotidx, label,
bits, keyid, err)) == NULL) {
debug("%s: failed to generate ECDSA key", __func__);
goto out;
}
break;
default:
*err = SSH_PKCS11_ERR_GENERIC;
debug("%s: unknown type %d", __func__, type);
goto out;
}
out:
if (reset_pin)
f->C_SetOperationState(session , NULL, 0, CK_INVALID_HANDLE,
CK_INVALID_HANDLE);
if (reset_provider)
pkcs11_del_provider(provider_id);
return (k);
}
struct sshkey *
pkcs11_destroy_keypair(char *provider_id, char *pin, unsigned long slotidx,
unsigned char keyid, u_int32_t *err)
{
struct pkcs11_provider *p = NULL;
struct pkcs11_slotinfo *si;
struct sshkey *k = NULL;
int reset_pin = 0, reset_provider = 0;
CK_ULONG nattrs;
CK_FUNCTION_LIST *f;
CK_SESSION_HANDLE session;
CK_ATTRIBUTE attrs[16];
CK_OBJECT_CLASS key_class;
CK_KEY_TYPE key_type;
CK_OBJECT_HANDLE obj = CK_INVALID_HANDLE;
CK_RV rv;
*err = 0;
if ((p = pkcs11_provider_lookup(provider_id)) != NULL) {
debug("%s: using provider \"%s\"", __func__, provider_id);
- } else if (pkcs11_register_provider(provider_id, pin, NULL, &p,
+ } else if (pkcs11_register_provider(provider_id, pin, NULL, NULL, &p,
CKU_SO) < 0) {
debug("%s: could not register provider %s", __func__,
provider_id);
goto out;
} else
reset_provider = 1;
f = p->function_list;
si = &p->slotinfo[slotidx];
session = si->session;
if ((rv = f->C_SetOperationState(session , pin, strlen(pin),
CK_INVALID_HANDLE, CK_INVALID_HANDLE)) != CKR_OK) {
debug("%s: could not supply SO pin: %lu", __func__, rv);
reset_pin = 0;
} else
reset_pin = 1;
/* private key */
nattrs = 0;
key_class = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY;
FILL_ATTR(attrs, nattrs, CKA_CLASS, &key_class, sizeof(key_class));
FILL_ATTR(attrs, nattrs, CKA_ID, &keyid, sizeof(keyid));
if (pkcs11_find(p, slotidx, attrs, nattrs, &obj) == 0 &&
obj != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) {
if ((rv = f->C_DestroyObject(session, obj)) != CKR_OK) {
debug("%s: could not destroy private key 0x%hhx",
__func__, keyid);
*err = rv;
goto out;
}
}
/* public key */
nattrs = 0;
key_class = CKO_PUBLIC_KEY;
FILL_ATTR(attrs, nattrs, CKA_CLASS, &key_class, sizeof(key_class));
FILL_ATTR(attrs, nattrs, CKA_ID, &keyid, sizeof(keyid));
if (pkcs11_find(p, slotidx, attrs, nattrs, &obj) == 0 &&
obj != CK_INVALID_HANDLE) {
/* get key type */
nattrs = 0;
FILL_ATTR(attrs, nattrs, CKA_KEY_TYPE, &key_type,
sizeof(key_type));
rv = f->C_GetAttributeValue(session, obj, attrs, nattrs);
if (rv != CKR_OK) {
debug("%s: could not get key type of public key 0x%hhx",
__func__, keyid);
*err = rv;
key_type = -1;
}
if (key_type == CKK_RSA)
k = pkcs11_fetch_rsa_pubkey(p, slotidx, &obj);
else if (key_type == CKK_ECDSA)
k = pkcs11_fetch_ecdsa_pubkey(p, slotidx, &obj);
if ((rv = f->C_DestroyObject(session, obj)) != CKR_OK) {
debug("%s: could not destroy public key 0x%hhx",
__func__, keyid);
*err = rv;
goto out;
}
}
out:
if (reset_pin)
f->C_SetOperationState(session , NULL, 0, CK_INVALID_HANDLE,
CK_INVALID_HANDLE);
if (reset_provider)
pkcs11_del_provider(provider_id);
return (k);
}
#endif /* WITH_PKCS11_KEYGEN */
#else /* ENABLE_PKCS11 */
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include "log.h"
#include "sshkey.h"
int
pkcs11_init(int interactive)
{
error("%s: dlopen() not supported", __func__);
return (-1);
}
int
pkcs11_add_provider(char *provider_id, char *pin, struct sshkey ***keyp)
{
error("%s: dlopen() not supported", __func__);
return (-1);
}
void
pkcs11_terminate(void)
{
error("%s: dlopen() not supported", __func__);
}
#endif /* ENABLE_PKCS11 */
diff --git a/ssh-pkcs11.h b/ssh-pkcs11.h
index b9038450da8c..81f1d7c5d392 100644
--- a/ssh-pkcs11.h
+++ b/ssh-pkcs11.h
@@ -1,40 +1,40 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: ssh-pkcs11.h,v 1.5 2019/01/20 22:51:37 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh-pkcs11.h,v 1.6 2020/01/25 00:03:36 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2010 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
* Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
* copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
* WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
* ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
* WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
* ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
* OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
*/
/* Errors for pkcs11_add_provider() */
#define SSH_PKCS11_ERR_GENERIC 1
#define SSH_PKCS11_ERR_LOGIN_FAIL 2
#define SSH_PKCS11_ERR_NO_SLOTS 3
#define SSH_PKCS11_ERR_PIN_REQUIRED 4
#define SSH_PKCS11_ERR_PIN_LOCKED 5
int pkcs11_init(int);
void pkcs11_terminate(void);
-int pkcs11_add_provider(char *, char *, struct sshkey ***);
+int pkcs11_add_provider(char *, char *, struct sshkey ***, char ***);
int pkcs11_del_provider(char *);
#ifdef WITH_PKCS11_KEYGEN
struct sshkey *
pkcs11_gakp(char *, char *, unsigned int, char *, unsigned int,
unsigned int, unsigned char, u_int32_t *);
struct sshkey *
pkcs11_destroy_keypair(char *, char *, unsigned long, unsigned char,
u_int32_t *);
#endif
#if !defined(WITH_OPENSSL) && defined(ENABLE_PKCS11)
#undef ENABLE_PKCS11
#endif
diff --git a/ssh-sk-client.c b/ssh-sk-client.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..8d7e6c305133
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ssh-sk-client.c
@@ -0,0 +1,449 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh-sk-client.c,v 1.7 2020/01/23 07:10:22 dtucker Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2019 Google LLC
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <sys/wait.h>
+
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#include "log.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
+#include "sshbuf.h"
+#include "sshkey.h"
+#include "msg.h"
+#include "digest.h"
+#include "pathnames.h"
+#include "ssh-sk.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+
+/* #define DEBUG_SK 1 */
+
+static int
+start_helper(int *fdp, pid_t *pidp, void (**osigchldp)(int))
+{
+ void (*osigchld)(int);
+ int oerrno, pair[2], r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ pid_t pid;
+ char *helper, *verbosity = NULL;
+
+ *fdp = -1;
+ *pidp = 0;
+ *osigchldp = SIG_DFL;
+
+ helper = getenv("SSH_SK_HELPER");
+ if (helper == NULL || strlen(helper) == 0)
+ helper = _PATH_SSH_SK_HELPER;
+ if (access(helper, X_OK) != 0) {
+ oerrno = errno;
+ error("%s: helper \"%s\" unusable: %s", __func__, helper,
+ strerror(errno));
+ errno = oerrno;
+ return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
+ }
+#ifdef DEBUG_SK
+ verbosity = "-vvv";
+#endif
+
+ /* Start helper */
+ if (socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0, pair) == -1) {
+ error("socketpair: %s", strerror(errno));
+ return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
+ }
+ osigchld = ssh_signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL);
+ if ((pid = fork()) == -1) {
+ oerrno = errno;
+ error("fork: %s", strerror(errno));
+ close(pair[0]);
+ close(pair[1]);
+ ssh_signal(SIGCHLD, osigchld);
+ errno = oerrno;
+ return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
+ }
+ if (pid == 0) {
+ if ((dup2(pair[1], STDIN_FILENO) == -1) ||
+ (dup2(pair[1], STDOUT_FILENO) == -1)) {
+ error("%s: dup2: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ _exit(1);
+ }
+ close(pair[0]);
+ close(pair[1]);
+ closefrom(STDERR_FILENO + 1);
+ debug("%s: starting %s %s", __func__, helper,
+ verbosity == NULL ? "" : verbosity);
+ execlp(helper, helper, verbosity, (char *)NULL);
+ error("%s: execlp: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+ _exit(1);
+ }
+ close(pair[1]);
+
+ /* success */
+ debug3("%s: started pid=%ld", __func__, (long)pid);
+ *fdp = pair[0];
+ *pidp = pid;
+ *osigchldp = osigchld;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+reap_helper(pid_t pid)
+{
+ int status, oerrno;
+
+ debug3("%s: pid=%ld", __func__, (long)pid);
+
+ errno = 0;
+ while (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) == -1) {
+ if (errno == EINTR) {
+ errno = 0;
+ continue;
+ }
+ oerrno = errno;
+ error("%s: waitpid: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
+ errno = oerrno;
+ return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
+ }
+ if (!WIFEXITED(status)) {
+ error("%s: helper exited abnormally", __func__);
+ return SSH_ERR_AGENT_FAILURE;
+ } else if (WEXITSTATUS(status) != 0) {
+ error("%s: helper exited with non-zero exit status", __func__);
+ return SSH_ERR_AGENT_FAILURE;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+client_converse(struct sshbuf *msg, struct sshbuf **respp, u_int type)
+{
+ int oerrno, fd, r2, ll, r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ u_int rtype, rerr;
+ pid_t pid;
+ u_char version;
+ void (*osigchld)(int);
+ struct sshbuf *req = NULL, *resp = NULL;
+ *respp = NULL;
+
+ if ((r = start_helper(&fd, &pid, &osigchld)) != 0)
+ return r;
+
+ if ((req = sshbuf_new()) == NULL || (resp = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ /* Request preamble: type, log_on_stderr, log_level */
+ ll = log_level_get();
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(req, type)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_u8(req, log_is_on_stderr() != 0)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_u32(req, ll < 0 ? 0 : ll)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_putb(req, msg)) != 0) {
+ error("%s: build: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((r = ssh_msg_send(fd, SSH_SK_HELPER_VERSION, req)) != 0) {
+ error("%s: send: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((r = ssh_msg_recv(fd, resp)) != 0) {
+ error("%s: receive: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(resp, &version)) != 0) {
+ error("%s: parse version: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (version != SSH_SK_HELPER_VERSION) {
+ error("%s: unsupported version: got %u, expected %u",
+ __func__, version, SSH_SK_HELPER_VERSION);
+ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(resp, &rtype)) != 0) {
+ error("%s: parse message type: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (rtype == SSH_SK_HELPER_ERROR) {
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(resp, &rerr)) != 0) {
+ error("%s: parse error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ goto out;
+ }
+ debug("%s: helper returned error -%u", __func__, rerr);
+ /* OpenSSH error values are negative; encoded as -err on wire */
+ if (rerr == 0 || rerr >= INT_MAX)
+ r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ else
+ r = -(int)rerr;
+ goto out;
+ } else if (rtype != type) {
+ error("%s: helper returned incorrect message type %u, "
+ "expecting %u", __func__, rtype, type);
+ r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ /* success */
+ r = 0;
+ out:
+ oerrno = errno;
+ close(fd);
+ if ((r2 = reap_helper(pid)) != 0) {
+ if (r == 0) {
+ r = r2;
+ oerrno = errno;
+ }
+ }
+ if (r == 0) {
+ *respp = resp;
+ resp = NULL;
+ }
+ sshbuf_free(req);
+ sshbuf_free(resp);
+ ssh_signal(SIGCHLD, osigchld);
+ errno = oerrno;
+ return r;
+
+}
+
+int
+sshsk_sign(const char *provider, struct sshkey *key,
+ u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp, const u_char *data, size_t datalen,
+ u_int compat, const char *pin)
+{
+ int oerrno, r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ char *fp = NULL;
+ struct sshbuf *kbuf = NULL, *req = NULL, *resp = NULL;
+
+ *sigp = NULL;
+ *lenp = 0;
+
+#ifndef ENABLE_SK
+ return SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN;
+#endif
+
+ if ((kbuf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL ||
+ (req = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if ((r = sshkey_private_serialize(key, kbuf)) != 0) {
+ error("%s: serialize private key: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(req, kbuf)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(req, provider)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_string(req, data, datalen)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(req, NULL)) != 0 || /* alg */
+ (r = sshbuf_put_u32(req, compat)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(req, pin)) != 0) {
+ error("%s: compose: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, SSH_FP_HASH_DEFAULT,
+ SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) {
+ error("%s: sshkey_fingerprint failed", __func__);
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((r = client_converse(req, &resp, SSH_SK_HELPER_SIGN)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(resp, sigp, lenp)) != 0) {
+ error("%s: parse signature: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (sshbuf_len(resp) != 0) {
+ error("%s: trailing data in response", __func__);
+ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ /* success */
+ r = 0;
+ out:
+ oerrno = errno;
+ if (r != 0) {
+ freezero(*sigp, *lenp);
+ *sigp = NULL;
+ *lenp = 0;
+ }
+ sshbuf_free(kbuf);
+ sshbuf_free(req);
+ sshbuf_free(resp);
+ errno = oerrno;
+ return r;
+}
+
+int
+sshsk_enroll(int type, const char *provider_path, const char *device,
+ const char *application, const char *userid, uint8_t flags,
+ const char *pin, struct sshbuf *challenge_buf,
+ struct sshkey **keyp, struct sshbuf *attest)
+{
+ int oerrno, r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ struct sshbuf *kbuf = NULL, *abuf = NULL, *req = NULL, *resp = NULL;
+ struct sshkey *key = NULL;
+
+ *keyp = NULL;
+ if (attest != NULL)
+ sshbuf_reset(attest);
+
+#ifndef ENABLE_SK
+ return SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN;
+#endif
+
+ if (type < 0)
+ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+
+ if ((abuf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL ||
+ (kbuf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL ||
+ (req = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(req, (u_int)type)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(req, provider_path)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(req, device)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(req, application)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(req, userid)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_u8(req, flags)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(req, pin)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(req, challenge_buf)) != 0) {
+ error("%s: compose: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if ((r = client_converse(req, &resp, SSH_SK_HELPER_ENROLL)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_stringb(resp, kbuf)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_stringb(resp, abuf)) != 0) {
+ error("%s: parse signature: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (sshbuf_len(resp) != 0) {
+ error("%s: trailing data in response", __func__);
+ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((r = sshkey_private_deserialize(kbuf, &key)) != 0) {
+ error("Unable to parse private key: %s", ssh_err(r));
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (attest != NULL && (r = sshbuf_putb(attest, abuf)) != 0) {
+ error("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /* success */
+ r = 0;
+ *keyp = key;
+ key = NULL;
+ out:
+ oerrno = errno;
+ sshkey_free(key);
+ sshbuf_free(kbuf);
+ sshbuf_free(abuf);
+ sshbuf_free(req);
+ sshbuf_free(resp);
+ errno = oerrno;
+ return r;
+}
+
+int
+sshsk_load_resident(const char *provider_path, const char *device,
+ const char *pin, struct sshkey ***keysp, size_t *nkeysp)
+{
+ int oerrno, r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ struct sshbuf *kbuf = NULL, *req = NULL, *resp = NULL;
+ struct sshkey *key = NULL, **keys = NULL, **tmp;
+ size_t i, nkeys = 0;
+
+ *keysp = NULL;
+ *nkeysp = 0;
+
+ if ((resp = sshbuf_new()) == NULL ||
+ (kbuf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL ||
+ (req = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(req, provider_path)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(req, device)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(req, pin)) != 0) {
+ error("%s: compose: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if ((r = client_converse(req, &resp, SSH_SK_HELPER_LOAD_RESIDENT)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ while (sshbuf_len(resp) != 0) {
+ /* key, comment */
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_stringb(resp, kbuf)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(resp, NULL, NULL)) != 0) {
+ error("%s: parse signature: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((r = sshkey_private_deserialize(kbuf, &key)) != 0) {
+ error("Unable to parse private key: %s", ssh_err(r));
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((tmp = recallocarray(keys, nkeys, nkeys + 1,
+ sizeof(*keys))) == NULL) {
+ error("%s: recallocarray keys failed", __func__);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ debug("%s: keys[%zu]: %s %s", __func__,
+ nkeys, sshkey_type(key), key->sk_application);
+ keys = tmp;
+ keys[nkeys++] = key;
+ key = NULL;
+ }
+
+ /* success */
+ r = 0;
+ *keysp = keys;
+ *nkeysp = nkeys;
+ keys = NULL;
+ nkeys = 0;
+ out:
+ oerrno = errno;
+ for (i = 0; i < nkeys; i++)
+ sshkey_free(keys[i]);
+ free(keys);
+ sshkey_free(key);
+ sshbuf_free(kbuf);
+ sshbuf_free(req);
+ sshbuf_free(resp);
+ errno = oerrno;
+ return r;
+}
diff --git a/ssh-pkcs11-helper.8 b/ssh-sk-helper.8
similarity index 83%
copy from ssh-pkcs11-helper.8
copy to ssh-sk-helper.8
index ba5c30fa0525..3c53da1ec796 100644
--- a/ssh-pkcs11-helper.8
+++ b/ssh-sk-helper.8
@@ -1,66 +1,66 @@
-.\" $OpenBSD: ssh-pkcs11-helper.8,v 1.5 2019/01/21 12:53:35 djm Exp $
+.\" $OpenBSD: ssh-sk-helper.8,v 1.3 2019/12/21 20:22:34 naddy Exp $
.\"
.\" Copyright (c) 2010 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
.\"
.\" Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
.\" purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
.\" copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
.\"
.\" THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
.\" WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
.\" MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
.\" ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
.\" WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
.\" ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
.\" OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
.\"
-.Dd $Mdocdate: January 21 2019 $
-.Dt SSH-PKCS11-HELPER 8
+.Dd $Mdocdate: December 21 2019 $
+.Dt SSH-SK-HELPER 8
.Os
.Sh NAME
-.Nm ssh-pkcs11-helper
-.Nd ssh-agent helper program for PKCS#11 support
+.Nm ssh-sk-helper
+.Nd OpenSSH helper for FIDO authenticator support
.Sh SYNOPSIS
.Nm
.Op Fl v
.Sh DESCRIPTION
.Nm
is used by
.Xr ssh-agent 1
-to access keys provided by a PKCS#11 token.
+to access keys provided by a FIDO authenticator.
.Pp
.Nm
is not intended to be invoked by the user, but from
.Xr ssh-agent 1 .
.Pp
A single option is supported:
.Bl -tag -width Ds
.It Fl v
Verbose mode.
Causes
.Nm
to print debugging messages about its progress.
This is helpful in debugging problems.
Multiple
.Fl v
options increase the verbosity.
The maximum is 3.
.Pp
Note that
.Xr ssh-agent 1
will automatically pass the
.Fl v
flag to
.Nm
when it has itself been placed in debug mode.
.El
.Sh SEE ALSO
.Xr ssh 1 ,
.Xr ssh-add 1 ,
.Xr ssh-agent 1
.Sh HISTORY
.Nm
first appeared in
-.Ox 4.7 .
+.Ox 6.7 .
.Sh AUTHORS
-.An Markus Friedl Aq Mt markus@openbsd.org
+.An Damien Miller Aq Mt djm@openbsd.org
diff --git a/ssh-sk-helper.c b/ssh-sk-helper.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..2f93ad716b92
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ssh-sk-helper.c
@@ -0,0 +1,360 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh-sk-helper.c,v 1.9 2020/01/25 23:13:09 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2019 Google LLC
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * This is a tiny program used to isolate the address space used for
+ * security key middleware signing operations from ssh-agent. It is similar
+ * to ssh-pkcs11-helper.c but considerably simpler as the operations for
+ * security keys are stateless.
+ *
+ * Please crank SSH_SK_HELPER_VERSION in sshkey.h for any incompatible
+ * protocol changes.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <limits.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+
+#include "xmalloc.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "sshkey.h"
+#include "authfd.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+#include "sshbuf.h"
+#include "msg.h"
+#include "uidswap.h"
+#include "sshkey.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
+#include "ssh-sk.h"
+
+#ifdef ENABLE_SK
+extern char *__progname;
+
+static struct sshbuf *reply_error(int r, char *fmt, ...)
+ __attribute__((__format__ (printf, 2, 3)));
+
+static struct sshbuf *
+reply_error(int r, char *fmt, ...)
+{
+ char *msg;
+ va_list ap;
+ struct sshbuf *resp;
+
+ va_start(ap, fmt);
+ xvasprintf(&msg, fmt, ap);
+ va_end(ap);
+ debug("%s: %s", __progname, msg);
+ free(msg);
+
+ if (r >= 0)
+ fatal("%s: invalid error code %d", __func__, r);
+
+ if ((resp = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __progname);
+ if (sshbuf_put_u32(resp, SSH_SK_HELPER_ERROR) != 0 ||
+ sshbuf_put_u32(resp, (u_int)-r) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error", __progname);
+ return resp;
+}
+
+/* If the specified string is zero length, then free it and replace with NULL */
+static void
+null_empty(char **s)
+{
+ if (s == NULL || *s == NULL || **s != '\0')
+ return;
+
+ free(*s);
+ *s = NULL;
+}
+
+static struct sshbuf *
+process_sign(struct sshbuf *req)
+{
+ int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ struct sshbuf *resp, *kbuf;
+ struct sshkey *key;
+ uint32_t compat;
+ const u_char *message;
+ u_char *sig;
+ size_t msglen, siglen;
+ char *provider, *pin;
+
+ if ((r = sshbuf_froms(req, &kbuf)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(req, &provider, NULL)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(req, &message, &msglen)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(req, NULL, NULL)) != 0 || /* alg */
+ (r = sshbuf_get_u32(req, &compat)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(req, &pin, NULL)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __progname, ssh_err(r));
+ if (sshbuf_len(req) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: trailing data in request", __progname);
+
+ if ((r = sshkey_private_deserialize(kbuf, &key)) != 0)
+ fatal("Unable to parse private key: %s", ssh_err(r));
+ if (!sshkey_is_sk(key))
+ fatal("Unsupported key type %s", sshkey_ssh_name(key));
+
+ debug("%s: ready to sign with key %s, provider %s: "
+ "msg len %zu, compat 0x%lx", __progname, sshkey_type(key),
+ provider, msglen, (u_long)compat);
+
+ null_empty(&pin);
+
+ if ((r = sshsk_sign(provider, key, &sig, &siglen,
+ message, msglen, compat, pin)) != 0) {
+ resp = reply_error(r, "Signing failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if ((resp = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __progname);
+
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(resp, SSH_SK_HELPER_SIGN)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_string(resp, sig, siglen)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __progname, ssh_err(r));
+ out:
+ sshbuf_free(kbuf);
+ free(provider);
+ if (pin != NULL)
+ freezero(pin, strlen(pin));
+ return resp;
+}
+
+static struct sshbuf *
+process_enroll(struct sshbuf *req)
+{
+ int r;
+ u_int type;
+ char *provider, *application, *pin, *device, *userid;
+ uint8_t flags;
+ struct sshbuf *challenge, *attest, *kbuf, *resp;
+ struct sshkey *key;
+
+ if ((attest = sshbuf_new()) == NULL ||
+ (kbuf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __progname);
+
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(req, &type)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(req, &provider, NULL)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(req, &device, NULL)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(req, &application, NULL)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(req, &userid, NULL)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_u8(req, &flags)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(req, &pin, NULL)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_froms(req, &challenge)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __progname, ssh_err(r));
+ if (sshbuf_len(req) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: trailing data in request", __progname);
+
+ if (type > INT_MAX)
+ fatal("%s: bad type %u", __progname, type);
+ if (sshbuf_len(challenge) == 0) {
+ sshbuf_free(challenge);
+ challenge = NULL;
+ }
+ null_empty(&device);
+ null_empty(&userid);
+ null_empty(&pin);
+
+ if ((r = sshsk_enroll((int)type, provider, device, application, userid,
+ flags, pin, challenge, &key, attest)) != 0) {
+ resp = reply_error(r, "Enrollment failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if ((resp = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __progname);
+ if ((r = sshkey_private_serialize(key, kbuf)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: serialize private key: %s", __progname, ssh_err(r));
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(resp, SSH_SK_HELPER_ENROLL)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(resp, kbuf)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(resp, attest)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __progname, ssh_err(r));
+
+ out:
+ sshkey_free(key);
+ sshbuf_free(kbuf);
+ sshbuf_free(attest);
+ sshbuf_free(challenge);
+ free(provider);
+ free(application);
+ if (pin != NULL)
+ freezero(pin, strlen(pin));
+
+ return resp;
+}
+
+static struct sshbuf *
+process_load_resident(struct sshbuf *req)
+{
+ int r;
+ char *provider, *pin, *device;
+ struct sshbuf *kbuf, *resp;
+ struct sshkey **keys = NULL;
+ size_t nkeys = 0, i;
+
+ if ((kbuf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __progname);
+
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(req, &provider, NULL)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(req, &device, NULL)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(req, &pin, NULL)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __progname, ssh_err(r));
+ if (sshbuf_len(req) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: trailing data in request", __progname);
+
+ null_empty(&device);
+ null_empty(&pin);
+
+ if ((r = sshsk_load_resident(provider, device, pin,
+ &keys, &nkeys)) != 0) {
+ resp = reply_error(r, " sshsk_load_resident failed: %s",
+ ssh_err(r));
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if ((resp = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __progname);
+
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(resp, SSH_SK_HELPER_LOAD_RESIDENT)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __progname, ssh_err(r));
+
+ for (i = 0; i < nkeys; i++) {
+ debug("%s: key %zu %s %s", __func__, i,
+ sshkey_type(keys[i]), keys[i]->sk_application);
+ sshbuf_reset(kbuf);
+ if ((r = sshkey_private_serialize(keys[i], kbuf)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: serialize private key: %s",
+ __progname, ssh_err(r));
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(resp, kbuf)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(resp, "")) != 0) /* comment */
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __progname, ssh_err(r));
+ }
+
+ out:
+ for (i = 0; i < nkeys; i++)
+ sshkey_free(keys[i]);
+ free(keys);
+ sshbuf_free(kbuf);
+ free(provider);
+ if (pin != NULL)
+ freezero(pin, strlen(pin));
+ return resp;
+}
+
+int
+main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+ SyslogFacility log_facility = SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH;
+ LogLevel log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR;
+ struct sshbuf *req, *resp;
+ int in, out, ch, r, vflag = 0;
+ u_int rtype, ll = 0;
+ uint8_t version, log_stderr = 0;
+
+ sanitise_stdfd();
+ log_init(__progname, log_level, log_facility, log_stderr);
+
+ while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "v")) != -1) {
+ switch (ch) {
+ case 'v':
+ vflag = 1;
+ if (log_level == SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR)
+ log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1;
+ else if (log_level < SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3)
+ log_level++;
+ break;
+ default:
+ fprintf(stderr, "usage: %s [-v]\n", __progname);
+ exit(1);
+ }
+ }
+ log_init(__progname, log_level, log_facility, vflag);
+
+ /*
+ * Rearrange our file descriptors a little; we don't trust the
+ * providers not to fiddle with stdin/out.
+ */
+ closefrom(STDERR_FILENO + 1);
+ if ((in = dup(STDIN_FILENO)) == -1 || (out = dup(STDOUT_FILENO)) == -1)
+ fatal("%s: dup: %s", __progname, strerror(errno));
+ close(STDIN_FILENO);
+ close(STDOUT_FILENO);
+ sanitise_stdfd(); /* resets to /dev/null */
+
+ if ((req = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __progname);
+ if (ssh_msg_recv(in, req) < 0)
+ fatal("ssh_msg_recv failed");
+ close(in);
+ debug("%s: received message len %zu", __progname, sshbuf_len(req));
+
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(req, &version)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __progname, ssh_err(r));
+ if (version != SSH_SK_HELPER_VERSION) {
+ fatal("unsupported version: received %d, expected %d",
+ version, SSH_SK_HELPER_VERSION);
+ }
+
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(req, &rtype)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_u8(req, &log_stderr)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_u32(req, &ll)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __progname, ssh_err(r));
+
+ if (!vflag && log_level_name((LogLevel)ll) != NULL)
+ log_init(__progname, (LogLevel)ll, log_facility, log_stderr);
+
+ switch (rtype) {
+ case SSH_SK_HELPER_SIGN:
+ resp = process_sign(req);
+ break;
+ case SSH_SK_HELPER_ENROLL:
+ resp = process_enroll(req);
+ break;
+ case SSH_SK_HELPER_LOAD_RESIDENT:
+ resp = process_load_resident(req);
+ break;
+ default:
+ fatal("%s: unsupported request type %u", __progname, rtype);
+ }
+ sshbuf_free(req);
+ debug("%s: reply len %zu", __progname, sshbuf_len(resp));
+
+ if (ssh_msg_send(out, SSH_SK_HELPER_VERSION, resp) == -1)
+ fatal("ssh_msg_send failed");
+ sshbuf_free(resp);
+ close(out);
+
+ return (0);
+}
+#else /* ENABLE_SK */
+#include <stdio.h>
+
+int
+main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+ fprintf(stderr, "ssh-sk-helper: disabled at compile time\n");
+ return -1;
+}
+#endif /* ENABLE_SK */
diff --git a/ssh-sk.c b/ssh-sk.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..5ff938193201
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ssh-sk.c
@@ -0,0 +1,813 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh-sk.c,v 1.27 2020/02/06 22:30:54 naddy Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2019 Google LLC
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+/* #define DEBUG_SK 1 */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#ifdef ENABLE_SK
+
+#include <dlfcn.h>
+#include <stddef.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
+# include <stdint.h>
+#endif
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include <openssl/ec.h>
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+
+#include "log.h"
+#include "misc.h"
+#include "sshbuf.h"
+#include "sshkey.h"
+#include "ssherr.h"
+#include "digest.h"
+
+#include "ssh-sk.h"
+#include "sk-api.h"
+#include "crypto_api.h"
+
+struct sshsk_provider {
+ char *path;
+ void *dlhandle;
+
+ /* Return the version of the middleware API */
+ uint32_t (*sk_api_version)(void);
+
+ /* Enroll a U2F key (private key generation) */
+ int (*sk_enroll)(int alg, const uint8_t *challenge,
+ size_t challenge_len, const char *application, uint8_t flags,
+ const char *pin, struct sk_option **opts,
+ struct sk_enroll_response **enroll_response);
+
+ /* Sign a challenge */
+ int (*sk_sign)(int alg, const uint8_t *message, size_t message_len,
+ const char *application,
+ const uint8_t *key_handle, size_t key_handle_len,
+ uint8_t flags, const char *pin, struct sk_option **opts,
+ struct sk_sign_response **sign_response);
+
+ /* Enumerate resident keys */
+ int (*sk_load_resident_keys)(const char *pin, struct sk_option **opts,
+ struct sk_resident_key ***rks, size_t *nrks);
+};
+
+/* Built-in version */
+int ssh_sk_enroll(int alg, const uint8_t *challenge,
+ size_t challenge_len, const char *application, uint8_t flags,
+ const char *pin, struct sk_option **opts,
+ struct sk_enroll_response **enroll_response);
+int ssh_sk_sign(int alg, const uint8_t *message, size_t message_len,
+ const char *application,
+ const uint8_t *key_handle, size_t key_handle_len,
+ uint8_t flags, const char *pin, struct sk_option **opts,
+ struct sk_sign_response **sign_response);
+int ssh_sk_load_resident_keys(const char *pin, struct sk_option **opts,
+ struct sk_resident_key ***rks, size_t *nrks);
+
+static void
+sshsk_free(struct sshsk_provider *p)
+{
+ if (p == NULL)
+ return;
+ free(p->path);
+ if (p->dlhandle != NULL)
+ dlclose(p->dlhandle);
+ free(p);
+}
+
+static struct sshsk_provider *
+sshsk_open(const char *path)
+{
+ struct sshsk_provider *ret = NULL;
+ uint32_t version;
+
+ if ((ret = calloc(1, sizeof(*ret))) == NULL) {
+ error("%s: calloc failed", __func__);
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ if ((ret->path = strdup(path)) == NULL) {
+ error("%s: strdup failed", __func__);
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ /* Skip the rest if we're using the linked in middleware */
+ if (strcasecmp(ret->path, "internal") == 0) {
+#ifdef ENABLE_SK_INTERNAL
+ ret->sk_enroll = ssh_sk_enroll;
+ ret->sk_sign = ssh_sk_sign;
+ ret->sk_load_resident_keys = ssh_sk_load_resident_keys;
+#else
+ error("internal security key support not enabled");
+#endif
+ return ret;
+ }
+ if ((ret->dlhandle = dlopen(path, RTLD_NOW)) == NULL) {
+ error("Provider \"%s\" dlopen failed: %s", path, dlerror());
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ if ((ret->sk_api_version = dlsym(ret->dlhandle,
+ "sk_api_version")) == NULL) {
+ error("Provider \"%s\" dlsym(sk_api_version) failed: %s",
+ path, dlerror());
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ version = ret->sk_api_version();
+ debug("%s: provider %s implements version 0x%08lx", __func__,
+ ret->path, (u_long)version);
+ if ((version & SSH_SK_VERSION_MAJOR_MASK) != SSH_SK_VERSION_MAJOR) {
+ error("Provider \"%s\" implements unsupported "
+ "version 0x%08lx (supported: 0x%08lx)",
+ path, (u_long)version, (u_long)SSH_SK_VERSION_MAJOR);
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ if ((ret->sk_enroll = dlsym(ret->dlhandle, "sk_enroll")) == NULL) {
+ error("Provider %s dlsym(sk_enroll) failed: %s",
+ path, dlerror());
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ if ((ret->sk_sign = dlsym(ret->dlhandle, "sk_sign")) == NULL) {
+ error("Provider \"%s\" dlsym(sk_sign) failed: %s",
+ path, dlerror());
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ if ((ret->sk_load_resident_keys = dlsym(ret->dlhandle,
+ "sk_load_resident_keys")) == NULL) {
+ error("Provider \"%s\" dlsym(sk_load_resident_keys) "
+ "failed: %s", path, dlerror());
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ /* success */
+ return ret;
+fail:
+ sshsk_free(ret);
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static void
+sshsk_free_enroll_response(struct sk_enroll_response *r)
+{
+ if (r == NULL)
+ return;
+ freezero(r->key_handle, r->key_handle_len);
+ freezero(r->public_key, r->public_key_len);
+ freezero(r->signature, r->signature_len);
+ freezero(r->attestation_cert, r->attestation_cert_len);
+ freezero(r, sizeof(*r));
+}
+
+static void
+sshsk_free_sign_response(struct sk_sign_response *r)
+{
+ if (r == NULL)
+ return;
+ freezero(r->sig_r, r->sig_r_len);
+ freezero(r->sig_s, r->sig_s_len);
+ freezero(r, sizeof(*r));
+}
+
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+/* Assemble key from response */
+static int
+sshsk_ecdsa_assemble(struct sk_enroll_response *resp, struct sshkey **keyp)
+{
+ struct sshkey *key = NULL;
+ struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
+ EC_POINT *q = NULL;
+ int r;
+
+ *keyp = NULL;
+ if ((key = sshkey_new(KEY_ECDSA_SK)) == NULL) {
+ error("%s: sshkey_new failed", __func__);
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ key->ecdsa_nid = NID_X9_62_prime256v1;
+ if ((key->ecdsa = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(key->ecdsa_nid)) == NULL ||
+ (q = EC_POINT_new(EC_KEY_get0_group(key->ecdsa))) == NULL ||
+ (b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
+ error("%s: allocation failed", __func__);
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(b,
+ resp->public_key, resp->public_key_len)) != 0) {
+ error("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_ec(b, q, EC_KEY_get0_group(key->ecdsa))) != 0) {
+ error("%s: parse key: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (sshkey_ec_validate_public(EC_KEY_get0_group(key->ecdsa), q) != 0) {
+ error("Authenticator returned invalid ECDSA key");
+ r = SSH_ERR_KEY_INVALID_EC_VALUE;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (EC_KEY_set_public_key(key->ecdsa, q) != 1) {
+ /* XXX assume it is a allocation error */
+ error("%s: allocation failed", __func__);
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ /* success */
+ *keyp = key;
+ key = NULL; /* transferred */
+ r = 0;
+ out:
+ EC_POINT_free(q);
+ sshkey_free(key);
+ sshbuf_free(b);
+ return r;
+}
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+
+static int
+sshsk_ed25519_assemble(struct sk_enroll_response *resp, struct sshkey **keyp)
+{
+ struct sshkey *key = NULL;
+ int r;
+
+ *keyp = NULL;
+ if (resp->public_key_len != ED25519_PK_SZ) {
+ error("%s: invalid size: %zu", __func__, resp->public_key_len);
+ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((key = sshkey_new(KEY_ED25519_SK)) == NULL) {
+ error("%s: sshkey_new failed", __func__);
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((key->ed25519_pk = malloc(ED25519_PK_SZ)) == NULL) {
+ error("%s: malloc failed", __func__);
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ memcpy(key->ed25519_pk, resp->public_key, ED25519_PK_SZ);
+ /* success */
+ *keyp = key;
+ key = NULL; /* transferred */
+ r = 0;
+ out:
+ sshkey_free(key);
+ return r;
+}
+
+static int
+sshsk_key_from_response(int alg, const char *application, uint8_t flags,
+ struct sk_enroll_response *resp, struct sshkey **keyp)
+{
+ struct sshkey *key = NULL;
+ int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+
+ *keyp = NULL;
+
+ /* Check response validity */
+ if (resp->public_key == NULL || resp->key_handle == NULL) {
+ error("%s: sk_enroll response invalid", __func__);
+ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ switch (alg) {
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+ case SSH_SK_ECDSA:
+ if ((r = sshsk_ecdsa_assemble(resp, &key)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ break;
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+ case SSH_SK_ED25519:
+ if ((r = sshsk_ed25519_assemble(resp, &key)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ break;
+ default:
+ error("%s: unsupported algorithm %d", __func__, alg);
+ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ key->sk_flags = flags;
+ if ((key->sk_key_handle = sshbuf_new()) == NULL ||
+ (key->sk_reserved = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
+ error("%s: allocation failed", __func__);
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((key->sk_application = strdup(application)) == NULL) {
+ error("%s: strdup application failed", __func__);
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put(key->sk_key_handle, resp->key_handle,
+ resp->key_handle_len)) != 0) {
+ error("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ goto out;
+ }
+ /* success */
+ r = 0;
+ *keyp = key;
+ key = NULL;
+ out:
+ sshkey_free(key);
+ return r;
+}
+
+static int
+skerr_to_ssherr(int skerr)
+{
+ switch (skerr) {
+ case SSH_SK_ERR_UNSUPPORTED:
+ return SSH_ERR_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED;
+ case SSH_SK_ERR_PIN_REQUIRED:
+ return SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE;
+ case SSH_SK_ERR_DEVICE_NOT_FOUND:
+ return SSH_ERR_DEVICE_NOT_FOUND;
+ case SSH_SK_ERR_GENERAL:
+ default:
+ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ }
+}
+
+static void
+sshsk_free_options(struct sk_option **opts)
+{
+ size_t i;
+
+ if (opts == NULL)
+ return;
+ for (i = 0; opts[i] != NULL; i++) {
+ free(opts[i]->name);
+ free(opts[i]->value);
+ free(opts[i]);
+ }
+ free(opts);
+}
+
+static int
+sshsk_add_option(struct sk_option ***optsp, size_t *noptsp,
+ const char *name, const char *value, uint8_t required)
+{
+ struct sk_option **opts = *optsp;
+ size_t nopts = *noptsp;
+
+ if ((opts = recallocarray(opts, nopts, nopts + 2, /* extra for NULL */
+ sizeof(*opts))) == NULL) {
+ error("%s: array alloc failed", __func__);
+ return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ }
+ *optsp = opts;
+ *noptsp = nopts + 1;
+ if ((opts[nopts] = calloc(1, sizeof(**opts))) == NULL) {
+ error("%s: alloc failed", __func__);
+ return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ }
+ if ((opts[nopts]->name = strdup(name)) == NULL ||
+ (opts[nopts]->value = strdup(value)) == NULL) {
+ error("%s: alloc failed", __func__);
+ return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ }
+ opts[nopts]->required = required;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+make_options(const char *device, const char *user_id,
+ struct sk_option ***optsp)
+{
+ struct sk_option **opts = NULL;
+ size_t nopts = 0;
+ int r, ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+
+ if (device != NULL &&
+ (r = sshsk_add_option(&opts, &nopts, "device", device, 0)) != 0) {
+ ret = r;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (user_id != NULL &&
+ (r = sshsk_add_option(&opts, &nopts, "user", user_id, 0)) != 0) {
+ ret = r;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ /* success */
+ *optsp = opts;
+ opts = NULL;
+ nopts = 0;
+ ret = 0;
+ out:
+ sshsk_free_options(opts);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int
+sshsk_enroll(int type, const char *provider_path, const char *device,
+ const char *application, const char *userid, uint8_t flags,
+ const char *pin, struct sshbuf *challenge_buf,
+ struct sshkey **keyp, struct sshbuf *attest)
+{
+ struct sshsk_provider *skp = NULL;
+ struct sshkey *key = NULL;
+ u_char randchall[32];
+ const u_char *challenge;
+ size_t challenge_len;
+ struct sk_enroll_response *resp = NULL;
+ struct sk_option **opts = NULL;
+ int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ int alg;
+
+ debug("%s: provider \"%s\", device \"%s\", application \"%s\", "
+ "userid \"%s\", flags 0x%02x, challenge len %zu%s", __func__,
+ provider_path, device, application, userid, flags,
+ challenge_buf == NULL ? 0 : sshbuf_len(challenge_buf),
+ (pin != NULL && *pin != '\0') ? " with-pin" : "");
+
+ *keyp = NULL;
+ if (attest)
+ sshbuf_reset(attest);
+
+ if ((r = make_options(device, userid, &opts)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ switch (type) {
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+ case KEY_ECDSA_SK:
+ alg = SSH_SK_ECDSA;
+ break;
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+ case KEY_ED25519_SK:
+ alg = SSH_SK_ED25519;
+ break;
+ default:
+ error("%s: unsupported key type", __func__);
+ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (provider_path == NULL) {
+ error("%s: missing provider", __func__);
+ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (application == NULL || *application == '\0') {
+ error("%s: missing application", __func__);
+ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (challenge_buf == NULL) {
+ debug("%s: using random challenge", __func__);
+ arc4random_buf(randchall, sizeof(randchall));
+ challenge = randchall;
+ challenge_len = sizeof(randchall);
+ } else if (sshbuf_len(challenge_buf) == 0) {
+ error("Missing enrollment challenge");
+ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ goto out;
+ } else {
+ challenge = sshbuf_ptr(challenge_buf);
+ challenge_len = sshbuf_len(challenge_buf);
+ debug3("%s: using explicit challenge len=%zd",
+ __func__, challenge_len);
+ }
+ if ((skp = sshsk_open(provider_path)) == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; /* XXX sshsk_open return code? */
+ goto out;
+ }
+ /* XXX validate flags? */
+ /* enroll key */
+ if ((r = skp->sk_enroll(alg, challenge, challenge_len, application,
+ flags, pin, opts, &resp)) != 0) {
+ debug("%s: provider \"%s\" returned failure %d", __func__,
+ provider_path, r);
+ r = skerr_to_ssherr(r);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if ((r = sshsk_key_from_response(alg, application, flags,
+ resp, &key)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+
+ /* Optionally fill in the attestation information */
+ if (attest != NULL) {
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(attest,
+ "ssh-sk-attest-v00")) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_string(attest,
+ resp->attestation_cert, resp->attestation_cert_len)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_string(attest,
+ resp->signature, resp->signature_len)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_u32(attest, 0)) != 0 || /* resvd flags */
+ (r = sshbuf_put_string(attest, NULL, 0)) != 0 /* resvd */) {
+ error("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ goto out;
+ }
+ }
+ /* success */
+ *keyp = key;
+ key = NULL; /* transferred */
+ r = 0;
+ out:
+ sshsk_free_options(opts);
+ sshsk_free(skp);
+ sshkey_free(key);
+ sshsk_free_enroll_response(resp);
+ explicit_bzero(randchall, sizeof(randchall));
+ return r;
+}
+
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+static int
+sshsk_ecdsa_sig(struct sk_sign_response *resp, struct sshbuf *sig)
+{
+ struct sshbuf *inner_sig = NULL;
+ int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+
+ /* Check response validity */
+ if (resp->sig_r == NULL || resp->sig_s == NULL) {
+ error("%s: sk_sign response invalid", __func__);
+ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((inner_sig = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ /* Prepare and append inner signature object */
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_bignum2_bytes(inner_sig,
+ resp->sig_r, resp->sig_r_len)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_bignum2_bytes(inner_sig,
+ resp->sig_s, resp->sig_s_len)) != 0) {
+ debug("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(sig, inner_sig)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_u8(sig, resp->flags)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_u32(sig, resp->counter)) != 0) {
+ debug("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ goto out;
+ }
+#ifdef DEBUG_SK
+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: sig_r:\n", __func__);
+ sshbuf_dump_data(resp->sig_r, resp->sig_r_len, stderr);
+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: sig_s:\n", __func__);
+ sshbuf_dump_data(resp->sig_s, resp->sig_s_len, stderr);
+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: inner:\n", __func__);
+ sshbuf_dump(inner_sig, stderr);
+#endif
+ r = 0;
+ out:
+ sshbuf_free(inner_sig);
+ return r;
+}
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+
+static int
+sshsk_ed25519_sig(struct sk_sign_response *resp, struct sshbuf *sig)
+{
+ int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+
+ /* Check response validity */
+ if (resp->sig_r == NULL) {
+ error("%s: sk_sign response invalid", __func__);
+ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(sig,
+ resp->sig_r, resp->sig_r_len)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_u8(sig, resp->flags)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_u32(sig, resp->counter)) != 0) {
+ debug("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ goto out;
+ }
+#ifdef DEBUG_SK
+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: sig_r:\n", __func__);
+ sshbuf_dump_data(resp->sig_r, resp->sig_r_len, stderr);
+#endif
+ r = 0;
+ out:
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int
+sshsk_sign(const char *provider_path, struct sshkey *key,
+ u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp, const u_char *data, size_t datalen,
+ u_int compat, const char *pin)
+{
+ struct sshsk_provider *skp = NULL;
+ int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ int type, alg;
+ struct sk_sign_response *resp = NULL;
+ struct sshbuf *inner_sig = NULL, *sig = NULL;
+ uint8_t message[32];
+ struct sk_option **opts = NULL;
+
+ debug("%s: provider \"%s\", key %s, flags 0x%02x%s", __func__,
+ provider_path, sshkey_type(key), key->sk_flags,
+ (pin != NULL && *pin != '\0') ? " with-pin" : "");
+
+ if (sigp != NULL)
+ *sigp = NULL;
+ if (lenp != NULL)
+ *lenp = 0;
+ type = sshkey_type_plain(key->type);
+ switch (type) {
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+ case KEY_ECDSA_SK:
+ alg = SSH_SK_ECDSA;
+ break;
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+ case KEY_ED25519_SK:
+ alg = SSH_SK_ED25519;
+ break;
+ default:
+ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ }
+ if (provider_path == NULL ||
+ key->sk_key_handle == NULL ||
+ key->sk_application == NULL || *key->sk_application == '\0') {
+ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((skp = sshsk_open(provider_path)) == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; /* XXX sshsk_open return code? */
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /* hash data to be signed before it goes to the security key */
+ if ((r = ssh_digest_memory(SSH_DIGEST_SHA256, data, datalen,
+ message, sizeof(message))) != 0) {
+ error("%s: hash application failed: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((r = skp->sk_sign(alg, message, sizeof(message),
+ key->sk_application,
+ sshbuf_ptr(key->sk_key_handle), sshbuf_len(key->sk_key_handle),
+ key->sk_flags, pin, opts, &resp)) != 0) {
+ debug("%s: sk_sign failed with code %d", __func__, r);
+ r = skerr_to_ssherr(r);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ /* Assemble signature */
+ if ((sig = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(sig, sshkey_ssh_name_plain(key))) != 0) {
+ debug("%s: buffer error (outer): %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ goto out;
+ }
+ switch (type) {
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+ case KEY_ECDSA_SK:
+ if ((r = sshsk_ecdsa_sig(resp, sig)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ break;
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+ case KEY_ED25519_SK:
+ if ((r = sshsk_ed25519_sig(resp, sig)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ break;
+ }
+#ifdef DEBUG_SK
+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: sig_flags = 0x%02x, sig_counter = %u\n",
+ __func__, resp->flags, resp->counter);
+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: hashed message:\n", __func__);
+ sshbuf_dump_data(message, sizeof(message), stderr);
+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: sigbuf:\n", __func__);
+ sshbuf_dump(sig, stderr);
+#endif
+ if (sigp != NULL) {
+ if ((*sigp = malloc(sshbuf_len(sig))) == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ memcpy(*sigp, sshbuf_ptr(sig), sshbuf_len(sig));
+ }
+ if (lenp != NULL)
+ *lenp = sshbuf_len(sig);
+ /* success */
+ r = 0;
+ out:
+ sshsk_free_options(opts);
+ explicit_bzero(message, sizeof(message));
+ sshsk_free(skp);
+ sshsk_free_sign_response(resp);
+ sshbuf_free(sig);
+ sshbuf_free(inner_sig);
+ return r;
+}
+
+static void
+sshsk_free_sk_resident_keys(struct sk_resident_key **rks, size_t nrks)
+{
+ size_t i;
+
+ if (nrks == 0 || rks == NULL)
+ return;
+ for (i = 0; i < nrks; i++) {
+ free(rks[i]->application);
+ freezero(rks[i]->key.key_handle, rks[i]->key.key_handle_len);
+ freezero(rks[i]->key.public_key, rks[i]->key.public_key_len);
+ freezero(rks[i]->key.signature, rks[i]->key.signature_len);
+ freezero(rks[i]->key.attestation_cert,
+ rks[i]->key.attestation_cert_len);
+ freezero(rks[i], sizeof(**rks));
+ }
+ free(rks);
+}
+
+int
+sshsk_load_resident(const char *provider_path, const char *device,
+ const char *pin, struct sshkey ***keysp, size_t *nkeysp)
+{
+ struct sshsk_provider *skp = NULL;
+ int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ struct sk_resident_key **rks = NULL;
+ size_t i, nrks = 0, nkeys = 0;
+ struct sshkey *key = NULL, **keys = NULL, **tmp;
+ uint8_t flags;
+ struct sk_option **opts = NULL;
+
+ debug("%s: provider \"%s\"%s", __func__, provider_path,
+ (pin != NULL && *pin != '\0') ? ", have-pin": "");
+
+ if (keysp == NULL || nkeysp == NULL)
+ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ *keysp = NULL;
+ *nkeysp = 0;
+
+ if ((r = make_options(device, NULL, &opts)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ if ((skp = sshsk_open(provider_path)) == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; /* XXX sshsk_open return code? */
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((r = skp->sk_load_resident_keys(pin, opts, &rks, &nrks)) != 0) {
+ error("Provider \"%s\" returned failure %d", provider_path, r);
+ r = skerr_to_ssherr(r);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ for (i = 0; i < nrks; i++) {
+ debug3("%s: rk %zu: slot = %zu, alg = %d, application = \"%s\"",
+ __func__, i, rks[i]->slot, rks[i]->alg,
+ rks[i]->application);
+ /* XXX need better filter here */
+ if (strncmp(rks[i]->application, "ssh:", 4) != 0)
+ continue;
+ switch (rks[i]->alg) {
+ case SSH_SK_ECDSA:
+ case SSH_SK_ED25519:
+ break;
+ default:
+ continue;
+ }
+ /* XXX where to get flags? */
+ flags = SSH_SK_USER_PRESENCE_REQD|SSH_SK_RESIDENT_KEY;
+ if ((r = sshsk_key_from_response(rks[i]->alg,
+ rks[i]->application, flags, &rks[i]->key, &key)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ if ((tmp = recallocarray(keys, nkeys, nkeys + 1,
+ sizeof(*tmp))) == NULL) {
+ error("%s: recallocarray failed", __func__);
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ keys = tmp;
+ keys[nkeys++] = key;
+ key = NULL;
+ /* XXX synthesise comment */
+ }
+ /* success */
+ *keysp = keys;
+ *nkeysp = nkeys;
+ keys = NULL;
+ nkeys = 0;
+ r = 0;
+ out:
+ sshsk_free_options(opts);
+ sshsk_free(skp);
+ sshsk_free_sk_resident_keys(rks, nrks);
+ sshkey_free(key);
+ if (nkeys != 0) {
+ for (i = 0; i < nkeys; i++)
+ sshkey_free(keys[i]);
+ free(keys);
+ }
+ return r;
+}
+
+#endif /* ENABLE_SK */
diff --git a/ssh-sk.h b/ssh-sk.h
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..0f566bbc3859
--- /dev/null
+++ b/ssh-sk.h
@@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh-sk.h,v 1.10 2020/01/10 23:43:26 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2019 Google LLC
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#ifndef _SSH_SK_H
+#define _SSH_SK_H 1
+
+struct sshbuf;
+struct sshkey;
+struct sk_option;
+
+/* Version of protocol expected from ssh-sk-helper */
+#define SSH_SK_HELPER_VERSION 5
+
+/* ssh-sk-helper messages */
+#define SSH_SK_HELPER_ERROR 0 /* Only valid H->C */
+#define SSH_SK_HELPER_SIGN 1
+#define SSH_SK_HELPER_ENROLL 2
+#define SSH_SK_HELPER_LOAD_RESIDENT 3
+
+/*
+ * Enroll (generate) a new security-key hosted private key of given type
+ * via the specified provider middleware.
+ * If challenge_buf is NULL then a random 256 bit challenge will be used.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success or a ssherr.h error code on failure.
+ *
+ * If successful and the attest_data buffer is not NULL then attestation
+ * information is placed there.
+ */
+int sshsk_enroll(int type, const char *provider_path, const char *device,
+ const char *application, const char *userid, uint8_t flags,
+ const char *pin, struct sshbuf *challenge_buf,
+ struct sshkey **keyp, struct sshbuf *attest);
+
+/*
+ * Calculate an ECDSA_SK or ED25519_SK signature using the specified key
+ * and provider middleware.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success or a ssherr.h error code on failure.
+ */
+int sshsk_sign(const char *provider_path, struct sshkey *key,
+ u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp, const u_char *data, size_t datalen,
+ u_int compat, const char *pin);
+
+/*
+ * Enumerates and loads all SSH-compatible resident keys from a security
+ * key.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success or a ssherr.h error code on failure.
+ */
+int sshsk_load_resident(const char *provider_path, const char *device,
+ const char *pin, struct sshkey ***keysp, size_t *nkeysp);
+
+#endif /* _SSH_SK_H */
+
diff --git a/ssh.0 b/ssh.0
index bc7a05726a7e..ffacbef65908 100644
--- a/ssh.0
+++ b/ssh.0
@@ -1,980 +1,991 @@
SSH(1) General Commands Manual SSH(1)
NAME
- ssh M-bM-^@M-^S OpenSSH SSH client (remote login program)
+ ssh M-bM-^@M-^S OpenSSH remote login client
SYNOPSIS
ssh [-46AaCfGgKkMNnqsTtVvXxYy] [-B bind_interface] [-b bind_address]
[-c cipher_spec] [-D [bind_address:]port] [-E log_file]
[-e escape_char] [-F configfile] [-I pkcs11] [-i identity_file]
[-J destination] [-L address] [-l login_name] [-m mac_spec]
[-O ctl_cmd] [-o option] [-p port] [-Q query_option] [-R address]
[-S ctl_path] [-W host:port] [-w local_tun[:remote_tun]] destination
[command]
DESCRIPTION
ssh (SSH client) is a program for logging into a remote machine and for
executing commands on a remote machine. It is intended to provide secure
encrypted communications between two untrusted hosts over an insecure
network. X11 connections, arbitrary TCP ports and UNIX-domain sockets
can also be forwarded over the secure channel.
ssh connects and logs into the specified destination, which may be
specified as either [user@]hostname or a URI of the form
ssh://[user@]hostname[:port]. The user must prove his/her identity to
the remote machine using one of several methods (see below).
If a command is specified, it is executed on the remote host instead of a
login shell.
The options are as follows:
-4 Forces ssh to use IPv4 addresses only.
-6 Forces ssh to use IPv6 addresses only.
- -A Enables forwarding of the authentication agent connection. This
- can also be specified on a per-host basis in a configuration
- file.
+ -A Enables forwarding of connections from an authentication agent
+ such as ssh-agent(1). This can also be specified on a per-host
+ basis in a configuration file.
Agent forwarding should be enabled with caution. Users with the
ability to bypass file permissions on the remote host (for the
agent's UNIX-domain socket) can access the local agent through
the forwarded connection. An attacker cannot obtain key material
from the agent, however they can perform operations on the keys
that enable them to authenticate using the identities loaded into
- the agent.
+ the agent. A safer alternative may be to use a jump host (see
+ -J).
-a Disables forwarding of the authentication agent connection.
-B bind_interface
Bind to the address of bind_interface before attempting to
connect to the destination host. This is only useful on systems
with more than one address.
-b bind_address
Use bind_address on the local machine as the source address of
the connection. Only useful on systems with more than one
address.
-C Requests compression of all data (including stdin, stdout,
stderr, and data for forwarded X11, TCP and UNIX-domain
connections). The compression algorithm is the same used by
gzip(1). Compression is desirable on modem lines and other slow
connections, but will only slow down things on fast networks.
The default value can be set on a host-by-host basis in the
configuration files; see the Compression option.
-c cipher_spec
Selects the cipher specification for encrypting the session.
cipher_spec is a comma-separated list of ciphers listed in order
of preference. See the Ciphers keyword in ssh_config(5) for more
information.
-D [bind_address:]port
Specifies a local M-bM-^@M-^\dynamicM-bM-^@M-^] application-level port forwarding.
This works by allocating a socket to listen to port on the local
side, optionally bound to the specified bind_address. Whenever a
connection is made to this port, the connection is forwarded over
the secure channel, and the application protocol is then used to
determine where to connect to from the remote machine. Currently
the SOCKS4 and SOCKS5 protocols are supported, and ssh will act
as a SOCKS server. Only root can forward privileged ports.
Dynamic port forwardings can also be specified in the
configuration file.
IPv6 addresses can be specified by enclosing the address in
square brackets. Only the superuser can forward privileged
ports. By default, the local port is bound in accordance with
the GatewayPorts setting. However, an explicit bind_address may
be used to bind the connection to a specific address. The
bind_address of M-bM-^@M-^\localhostM-bM-^@M-^] indicates that the listening port be
bound for local use only, while an empty address or M-bM-^@M-^X*M-bM-^@M-^Y indicates
that the port should be available from all interfaces.
-E log_file
Append debug logs to log_file instead of standard error.
-e escape_char
Sets the escape character for sessions with a pty (default: M-bM-^@M-^X~M-bM-^@M-^Y).
The escape character is only recognized at the beginning of a
line. The escape character followed by a dot (M-bM-^@M-^X.M-bM-^@M-^Y) closes the
connection; followed by control-Z suspends the connection; and
followed by itself sends the escape character once. Setting the
character to M-bM-^@M-^\noneM-bM-^@M-^] disables any escapes and makes the session
fully transparent.
-F configfile
Specifies an alternative per-user configuration file. If a
configuration file is given on the command line, the system-wide
configuration file (/etc/ssh/ssh_config) will be ignored. The
default for the per-user configuration file is ~/.ssh/config.
-f Requests ssh to go to background just before command execution.
This is useful if ssh is going to ask for passwords or
passphrases, but the user wants it in the background. This
implies -n. The recommended way to start X11 programs at a
remote site is with something like ssh -f host xterm.
If the ExitOnForwardFailure configuration option is set to M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^],
then a client started with -f will wait for all remote port
forwards to be successfully established before placing itself in
the background.
-G Causes ssh to print its configuration after evaluating Host and
Match blocks and exit.
-g Allows remote hosts to connect to local forwarded ports. If used
on a multiplexed connection, then this option must be specified
on the master process.
-I pkcs11
Specify the PKCS#11 shared library ssh should use to communicate
with a PKCS#11 token providing keys for user authentication.
-i identity_file
Selects a file from which the identity (private key) for public
key authentication is read. The default is ~/.ssh/id_dsa,
- ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa, ~/.ssh/id_ed25519 and ~/.ssh/id_rsa. Identity
- files may also be specified on a per-host basis in the
- configuration file. It is possible to have multiple -i options
- (and multiple identities specified in configuration files). If
- no certificates have been explicitly specified by the
- CertificateFile directive, ssh will also try to load certificate
- information from the filename obtained by appending -cert.pub to
- identity filenames.
+ ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa, ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa_sk, ~/.ssh/id_ed25519,
+ ~/.ssh/id_ed25519_sk and ~/.ssh/id_rsa. Identity files may also
+ be specified on a per-host basis in the configuration file. It
+ is possible to have multiple -i options (and multiple identities
+ specified in configuration files). If no certificates have been
+ explicitly specified by the CertificateFile directive, ssh will
+ also try to load certificate information from the filename
+ obtained by appending -cert.pub to identity filenames.
-J destination
Connect to the target host by first making a ssh connection to
the jump host described by destination and then establishing a
TCP forwarding to the ultimate destination from there. Multiple
jump hops may be specified separated by comma characters. This
is a shortcut to specify a ProxyJump configuration directive.
Note that configuration directives supplied on the command-line
generally apply to the destination host and not any specified
jump hosts. Use ~/.ssh/config to specify configuration for jump
hosts.
-K Enables GSSAPI-based authentication and forwarding (delegation)
of GSSAPI credentials to the server.
-k Disables forwarding (delegation) of GSSAPI credentials to the
server.
-L [bind_address:]port:host:hostport
-L [bind_address:]port:remote_socket
-L local_socket:host:hostport
-L local_socket:remote_socket
Specifies that connections to the given TCP port or Unix socket
on the local (client) host are to be forwarded to the given host
and port, or Unix socket, on the remote side. This works by
allocating a socket to listen to either a TCP port on the local
side, optionally bound to the specified bind_address, or to a
Unix socket. Whenever a connection is made to the local port or
socket, the connection is forwarded over the secure channel, and
a connection is made to either host port hostport, or the Unix
socket remote_socket, from the remote machine.
Port forwardings can also be specified in the configuration file.
Only the superuser can forward privileged ports. IPv6 addresses
can be specified by enclosing the address in square brackets.
By default, the local port is bound in accordance with the
GatewayPorts setting. However, an explicit bind_address may be
used to bind the connection to a specific address. The
bind_address of M-bM-^@M-^\localhostM-bM-^@M-^] indicates that the listening port be
bound for local use only, while an empty address or M-bM-^@M-^X*M-bM-^@M-^Y indicates
that the port should be available from all interfaces.
-l login_name
Specifies the user to log in as on the remote machine. This also
may be specified on a per-host basis in the configuration file.
-M Places the ssh client into M-bM-^@M-^\masterM-bM-^@M-^] mode for connection sharing.
Multiple -M options places ssh into M-bM-^@M-^\masterM-bM-^@M-^] mode but with
confirmation required using ssh-askpass(1) before each operation
that changes the multiplexing state (e.g. opening a new session).
Refer to the description of ControlMaster in ssh_config(5) for
details.
-m mac_spec
A comma-separated list of MAC (message authentication code)
algorithms, specified in order of preference. See the MACs
keyword for more information.
-N Do not execute a remote command. This is useful for just
forwarding ports.
-n Redirects stdin from /dev/null (actually, prevents reading from
stdin). This must be used when ssh is run in the background. A
common trick is to use this to run X11 programs on a remote
machine. For example, ssh -n shadows.cs.hut.fi emacs & will
start an emacs on shadows.cs.hut.fi, and the X11 connection will
be automatically forwarded over an encrypted channel. The ssh
program will be put in the background. (This does not work if
ssh needs to ask for a password or passphrase; see also the -f
option.)
-O ctl_cmd
Control an active connection multiplexing master process. When
the -O option is specified, the ctl_cmd argument is interpreted
and passed to the master process. Valid commands are: M-bM-^@M-^\checkM-bM-^@M-^]
(check that the master process is running), M-bM-^@M-^\forwardM-bM-^@M-^] (request
forwardings without command execution), M-bM-^@M-^\cancelM-bM-^@M-^] (cancel
forwardings), M-bM-^@M-^\exitM-bM-^@M-^] (request the master to exit), and M-bM-^@M-^\stopM-bM-^@M-^]
(request the master to stop accepting further multiplexing
requests).
-o option
Can be used to give options in the format used in the
configuration file. This is useful for specifying options for
which there is no separate command-line flag. For full details
of the options listed below, and their possible values, see
ssh_config(5).
AddKeysToAgent
AddressFamily
BatchMode
BindAddress
CanonicalDomains
CanonicalizeFallbackLocal
CanonicalizeHostname
CanonicalizeMaxDots
CanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs
CASignatureAlgorithms
CertificateFile
ChallengeResponseAuthentication
CheckHostIP
Ciphers
ClearAllForwardings
Compression
ConnectionAttempts
ConnectTimeout
ControlMaster
ControlPath
ControlPersist
DynamicForward
EscapeChar
ExitOnForwardFailure
FingerprintHash
ForwardAgent
ForwardX11
ForwardX11Timeout
ForwardX11Trusted
GatewayPorts
GlobalKnownHostsFile
GSSAPIAuthentication
GSSAPIDelegateCredentials
HashKnownHosts
Host
HostbasedAuthentication
HostbasedKeyTypes
HostKeyAlgorithms
HostKeyAlias
Hostname
IdentitiesOnly
IdentityAgent
IdentityFile
IPQoS
KbdInteractiveAuthentication
KbdInteractiveDevices
KexAlgorithms
LocalCommand
LocalForward
LogLevel
MACs
Match
NoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost
NumberOfPasswordPrompts
PasswordAuthentication
PermitLocalCommand
PKCS11Provider
Port
PreferredAuthentications
ProxyCommand
ProxyJump
ProxyUseFdpass
PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes
PubkeyAuthentication
RekeyLimit
RemoteCommand
RemoteForward
RequestTTY
SendEnv
ServerAliveInterval
ServerAliveCountMax
SetEnv
StreamLocalBindMask
StreamLocalBindUnlink
StrictHostKeyChecking
TCPKeepAlive
Tunnel
TunnelDevice
UpdateHostKeys
User
UserKnownHostsFile
VerifyHostKeyDNS
VisualHostKey
XAuthLocation
-p port
Port to connect to on the remote host. This can be specified on
a per-host basis in the configuration file.
-Q query_option
Queries ssh for the algorithms supported for the specified
version 2. The available features are: cipher (supported
symmetric ciphers), cipher-auth (supported symmetric ciphers that
support authenticated encryption), help (supported query terms
for use with the -Q flag), mac (supported message integrity
codes), kex (key exchange algorithms), key (key types), key-cert
(certificate key types), key-plain (non-certificate key types),
+ key-sig (all key types and signature algorithms),
protocol-version (supported SSH protocol versions), and sig
- (supported signature algorithms).
+ (supported signature algorithms). Alternatively, any keyword
+ from ssh_config(5) or sshd_config(5) that takes an algorithm list
+ may be used as an alias for the corresponding query_option.
-q Quiet mode. Causes most warning and diagnostic messages to be
suppressed.
-R [bind_address:]port:host:hostport
-R [bind_address:]port:local_socket
-R remote_socket:host:hostport
-R remote_socket:local_socket
-R [bind_address:]port
Specifies that connections to the given TCP port or Unix socket
on the remote (server) host are to be forwarded to the local
side.
This works by allocating a socket to listen to either a TCP port
or to a Unix socket on the remote side. Whenever a connection is
made to this port or Unix socket, the connection is forwarded
over the secure channel, and a connection is made from the local
machine to either an explicit destination specified by host port
hostport, or local_socket, or, if no explicit destination was
specified, ssh will act as a SOCKS 4/5 proxy and forward
connections to the destinations requested by the remote SOCKS
client.
Port forwardings can also be specified in the configuration file.
Privileged ports can be forwarded only when logging in as root on
the remote machine. IPv6 addresses can be specified by enclosing
the address in square brackets.
By default, TCP listening sockets on the server will be bound to
the loopback interface only. This may be overridden by
specifying a bind_address. An empty bind_address, or the address
M-bM-^@M-^X*M-bM-^@M-^Y, indicates that the remote socket should listen on all
interfaces. Specifying a remote bind_address will only succeed
if the server's GatewayPorts option is enabled (see
sshd_config(5)).
If the port argument is M-bM-^@M-^X0M-bM-^@M-^Y, the listen port will be dynamically
allocated on the server and reported to the client at run time.
When used together with -O forward the allocated port will be
printed to the standard output.
-S ctl_path
Specifies the location of a control socket for connection
sharing, or the string M-bM-^@M-^\noneM-bM-^@M-^] to disable connection sharing.
Refer to the description of ControlPath and ControlMaster in
ssh_config(5) for details.
-s May be used to request invocation of a subsystem on the remote
system. Subsystems facilitate the use of SSH as a secure
transport for other applications (e.g. sftp(1)). The subsystem
is specified as the remote command.
-T Disable pseudo-terminal allocation.
-t Force pseudo-terminal allocation. This can be used to execute
arbitrary screen-based programs on a remote machine, which can be
very useful, e.g. when implementing menu services. Multiple -t
options force tty allocation, even if ssh has no local tty.
-V Display the version number and exit.
-v Verbose mode. Causes ssh to print debugging messages about its
progress. This is helpful in debugging connection,
authentication, and configuration problems. Multiple -v options
increase the verbosity. The maximum is 3.
-W host:port
Requests that standard input and output on the client be
forwarded to host on port over the secure channel. Implies -N,
-T, ExitOnForwardFailure and ClearAllForwardings, though these
can be overridden in the configuration file or using -o command
line options.
-w local_tun[:remote_tun]
Requests tunnel device forwarding with the specified tun(4)
devices between the client (local_tun) and the server
(remote_tun).
The devices may be specified by numerical ID or the keyword
M-bM-^@M-^\anyM-bM-^@M-^], which uses the next available tunnel device. If
remote_tun is not specified, it defaults to M-bM-^@M-^\anyM-bM-^@M-^]. See also the
Tunnel and TunnelDevice directives in ssh_config(5).
If the Tunnel directive is unset, it will be set to the default
tunnel mode, which is M-bM-^@M-^\point-to-pointM-bM-^@M-^]. If a different Tunnel
forwarding mode it desired, then it should be specified before
-w.
-X Enables X11 forwarding. This can also be specified on a per-host
basis in a configuration file.
X11 forwarding should be enabled with caution. Users with the
ability to bypass file permissions on the remote host (for the
user's X authorization database) can access the local X11 display
through the forwarded connection. An attacker may then be able
to perform activities such as keystroke monitoring.
For this reason, X11 forwarding is subjected to X11 SECURITY
extension restrictions by default. Please refer to the ssh -Y
option and the ForwardX11Trusted directive in ssh_config(5) for
more information.
-x Disables X11 forwarding.
-Y Enables trusted X11 forwarding. Trusted X11 forwardings are not
subjected to the X11 SECURITY extension controls.
-y Send log information using the syslog(3) system module. By
default this information is sent to stderr.
ssh may additionally obtain configuration data from a per-user
configuration file and a system-wide configuration file. The file format
and configuration options are described in ssh_config(5).
AUTHENTICATION
The OpenSSH SSH client supports SSH protocol 2.
The methods available for authentication are: GSSAPI-based
authentication, host-based authentication, public key authentication,
challenge-response authentication, and password authentication.
Authentication methods are tried in the order specified above, though
PreferredAuthentications can be used to change the default order.
Host-based authentication works as follows: If the machine the user logs
in from is listed in /etc/hosts.equiv or /etc/shosts.equiv on the remote
machine, and the user names are the same on both sides, or if the files
~/.rhosts or ~/.shosts exist in the user's home directory on the remote
machine and contain a line containing the name of the client machine and
the name of the user on that machine, the user is considered for login.
Additionally, the server must be able to verify the client's host key
(see the description of /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts and ~/.ssh/known_hosts,
below) for login to be permitted. This authentication method closes
security holes due to IP spoofing, DNS spoofing, and routing spoofing.
[Note to the administrator: /etc/hosts.equiv, ~/.rhosts, and the
rlogin/rsh protocol in general, are inherently insecure and should be
disabled if security is desired.]
Public key authentication works as follows: The scheme is based on
public-key cryptography, using cryptosystems where encryption and
decryption are done using separate keys, and it is unfeasible to derive
the decryption key from the encryption key. The idea is that each user
creates a public/private key pair for authentication purposes. The
server knows the public key, and only the user knows the private key.
ssh implements public key authentication protocol automatically, using
one of the DSA, ECDSA, Ed25519 or RSA algorithms. The HISTORY section of
ssl(8) contains a brief discussion of the DSA and RSA algorithms.
The file ~/.ssh/authorized_keys lists the public keys that are permitted
for logging in. When the user logs in, the ssh program tells the server
which key pair it would like to use for authentication. The client
proves that it has access to the private key and the server checks that
the corresponding public key is authorized to accept the account.
The server may inform the client of errors that prevented public key
authentication from succeeding after authentication completes using a
different method. These may be viewed by increasing the LogLevel to
DEBUG or higher (e.g. by using the -v flag).
The user creates his/her key pair by running ssh-keygen(1). This stores
the private key in ~/.ssh/id_dsa (DSA), ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa (ECDSA),
- ~/.ssh/id_ed25519 (Ed25519), or ~/.ssh/id_rsa (RSA) and stores the public
- key in ~/.ssh/id_dsa.pub (DSA), ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa.pub (ECDSA),
- ~/.ssh/id_ed25519.pub (Ed25519), or ~/.ssh/id_rsa.pub (RSA) in the user's
+ ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa_sk (authenticator-hosted ECDSA), ~/.ssh/id_ed25519
+ (Ed25519), ~/.ssh/id_ed25519_sk (authenticator-hosted Ed25519), or
+ ~/.ssh/id_rsa (RSA) and stores the public key in ~/.ssh/id_dsa.pub (DSA),
+ ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa.pub (ECDSA), ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa_sk.pub (authenticator-hosted
+ ECDSA), ~/.ssh/id_ed25519.pub (Ed25519), ~/.ssh/id_ed25519_sk.pub
+ (authenticator-hosted Ed25519), or ~/.ssh/id_rsa.pub (RSA) in the user's
home directory. The user should then copy the public key to
~/.ssh/authorized_keys in his/her home directory on the remote machine.
The authorized_keys file corresponds to the conventional ~/.rhosts file,
and has one key per line, though the lines can be very long. After this,
the user can log in without giving the password.
A variation on public key authentication is available in the form of
certificate authentication: instead of a set of public/private keys,
signed certificates are used. This has the advantage that a single
trusted certification authority can be used in place of many
public/private keys. See the CERTIFICATES section of ssh-keygen(1) for
more information.
The most convenient way to use public key or certificate authentication
may be with an authentication agent. See ssh-agent(1) and (optionally)
the AddKeysToAgent directive in ssh_config(5) for more information.
Challenge-response authentication works as follows: The server sends an
arbitrary "challenge" text, and prompts for a response. Examples of
challenge-response authentication include BSD Authentication (see
login.conf(5)) and PAM (some non-OpenBSD systems).
Finally, if other authentication methods fail, ssh prompts the user for a
password. The password is sent to the remote host for checking; however,
since all communications are encrypted, the password cannot be seen by
someone listening on the network.
ssh automatically maintains and checks a database containing
identification for all hosts it has ever been used with. Host keys are
stored in ~/.ssh/known_hosts in the user's home directory. Additionally,
the file /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts is automatically checked for known
hosts. Any new hosts are automatically added to the user's file. If a
host's identification ever changes, ssh warns about this and disables
password authentication to prevent server spoofing or man-in-the-middle
attacks, which could otherwise be used to circumvent the encryption. The
StrictHostKeyChecking option can be used to control logins to machines
whose host key is not known or has changed.
When the user's identity has been accepted by the server, the server
either executes the given command in a non-interactive session or, if no
command has been specified, logs into the machine and gives the user a
normal shell as an interactive session. All communication with the
remote command or shell will be automatically encrypted.
If an interactive session is requested ssh by default will only request a
pseudo-terminal (pty) for interactive sessions when the client has one.
The flags -T and -t can be used to override this behaviour.
If a pseudo-terminal has been allocated the user may use the escape
characters noted below.
If no pseudo-terminal has been allocated, the session is transparent and
can be used to reliably transfer binary data. On most systems, setting
the escape character to M-bM-^@M-^\noneM-bM-^@M-^] will also make the session transparent
even if a tty is used.
The session terminates when the command or shell on the remote machine
exits and all X11 and TCP connections have been closed.
ESCAPE CHARACTERS
When a pseudo-terminal has been requested, ssh supports a number of
functions through the use of an escape character.
A single tilde character can be sent as ~~ or by following the tilde by a
character other than those described below. The escape character must
always follow a newline to be interpreted as special. The escape
character can be changed in configuration files using the EscapeChar
configuration directive or on the command line by the -e option.
The supported escapes (assuming the default M-bM-^@M-^X~M-bM-^@M-^Y) are:
~. Disconnect.
~^Z Background ssh.
~# List forwarded connections.
~& Background ssh at logout when waiting for forwarded connection /
X11 sessions to terminate.
~? Display a list of escape characters.
~B Send a BREAK to the remote system (only useful if the peer
supports it).
~C Open command line. Currently this allows the addition of port
forwardings using the -L, -R and -D options (see above). It also
allows the cancellation of existing port-forwardings with
-KL[bind_address:]port for local, -KR[bind_address:]port for
remote and -KD[bind_address:]port for dynamic port-forwardings.
!command allows the user to execute a local command if the
PermitLocalCommand option is enabled in ssh_config(5). Basic
help is available, using the -h option.
~R Request rekeying of the connection (only useful if the peer
supports it).
~V Decrease the verbosity (LogLevel) when errors are being written
to stderr.
~v Increase the verbosity (LogLevel) when errors are being written
to stderr.
TCP FORWARDING
Forwarding of arbitrary TCP connections over a secure channel can be
specified either on the command line or in a configuration file. One
possible application of TCP forwarding is a secure connection to a mail
server; another is going through firewalls.
In the example below, we look at encrypting communication for an IRC
client, even though the IRC server it connects to does not directly
support encrypted communication. This works as follows: the user
connects to the remote host using ssh, specifying the ports to be used to
forward the connection. After that it is possible to start the program
locally, and ssh will encrypt and forward the connection to the remote
server.
The following example tunnels an IRC session from the client to an IRC
server at M-bM-^@M-^\server.example.comM-bM-^@M-^], joining channel M-bM-^@M-^\#usersM-bM-^@M-^], nickname
M-bM-^@M-^\pinkyM-bM-^@M-^], using the standard IRC port, 6667:
$ ssh -f -L 6667:localhost:6667 server.example.com sleep 10
$ irc -c '#users' pinky IRC/127.0.0.1
The -f option backgrounds ssh and the remote command M-bM-^@M-^\sleep 10M-bM-^@M-^] is
specified to allow an amount of time (10 seconds, in the example) to
start the program which is going to use the tunnel. If no connections
are made within the time specified, ssh will exit.
X11 FORWARDING
If the ForwardX11 variable is set to M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^] (or see the description of the
-X, -x, and -Y options above) and the user is using X11 (the DISPLAY
environment variable is set), the connection to the X11 display is
automatically forwarded to the remote side in such a way that any X11
programs started from the shell (or command) will go through the
encrypted channel, and the connection to the real X server will be made
from the local machine. The user should not manually set DISPLAY.
Forwarding of X11 connections can be configured on the command line or in
configuration files.
The DISPLAY value set by ssh will point to the server machine, but with a
display number greater than zero. This is normal, and happens because
ssh creates a M-bM-^@M-^\proxyM-bM-^@M-^] X server on the server machine for forwarding the
connections over the encrypted channel.
ssh will also automatically set up Xauthority data on the server machine.
For this purpose, it will generate a random authorization cookie, store
it in Xauthority on the server, and verify that any forwarded connections
carry this cookie and replace it by the real cookie when the connection
is opened. The real authentication cookie is never sent to the server
machine (and no cookies are sent in the plain).
If the ForwardAgent variable is set to M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^] (or see the description of
the -A and -a options above) and the user is using an authentication
agent, the connection to the agent is automatically forwarded to the
remote side.
VERIFYING HOST KEYS
When connecting to a server for the first time, a fingerprint of the
server's public key is presented to the user (unless the option
StrictHostKeyChecking has been disabled). Fingerprints can be determined
using ssh-keygen(1):
$ ssh-keygen -l -f /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key
If the fingerprint is already known, it can be matched and the key can be
accepted or rejected. If only legacy (MD5) fingerprints for the server
are available, the ssh-keygen(1) -E option may be used to downgrade the
fingerprint algorithm to match.
Because of the difficulty of comparing host keys just by looking at
fingerprint strings, there is also support to compare host keys visually,
using random art. By setting the VisualHostKey option to M-bM-^@M-^\yesM-bM-^@M-^], a small
ASCII graphic gets displayed on every login to a server, no matter if the
session itself is interactive or not. By learning the pattern a known
server produces, a user can easily find out that the host key has changed
when a completely different pattern is displayed. Because these patterns
are not unambiguous however, a pattern that looks similar to the pattern
remembered only gives a good probability that the host key is the same,
not guaranteed proof.
To get a listing of the fingerprints along with their random art for all
known hosts, the following command line can be used:
$ ssh-keygen -lv -f ~/.ssh/known_hosts
If the fingerprint is unknown, an alternative method of verification is
available: SSH fingerprints verified by DNS. An additional resource
record (RR), SSHFP, is added to a zonefile and the connecting client is
able to match the fingerprint with that of the key presented.
In this example, we are connecting a client to a server,
M-bM-^@M-^\host.example.comM-bM-^@M-^]. The SSHFP resource records should first be added to
the zonefile for host.example.com:
$ ssh-keygen -r host.example.com.
The output lines will have to be added to the zonefile. To check that
the zone is answering fingerprint queries:
$ dig -t SSHFP host.example.com
Finally the client connects:
$ ssh -o "VerifyHostKeyDNS ask" host.example.com
[...]
Matching host key fingerprint found in DNS.
Are you sure you want to continue connecting (yes/no)?
See the VerifyHostKeyDNS option in ssh_config(5) for more information.
SSH-BASED VIRTUAL PRIVATE NETWORKS
ssh contains support for Virtual Private Network (VPN) tunnelling using
the tun(4) network pseudo-device, allowing two networks to be joined
securely. The sshd_config(5) configuration option PermitTunnel controls
whether the server supports this, and at what level (layer 2 or 3
traffic).
The following example would connect client network 10.0.50.0/24 with
remote network 10.0.99.0/24 using a point-to-point connection from
10.1.1.1 to 10.1.1.2, provided that the SSH server running on the gateway
to the remote network, at 192.168.1.15, allows it.
On the client:
# ssh -f -w 0:1 192.168.1.15 true
# ifconfig tun0 10.1.1.1 10.1.1.2 netmask 255.255.255.252
# route add 10.0.99.0/24 10.1.1.2
On the server:
# ifconfig tun1 10.1.1.2 10.1.1.1 netmask 255.255.255.252
# route add 10.0.50.0/24 10.1.1.1
Client access may be more finely tuned via the /root/.ssh/authorized_keys
file (see below) and the PermitRootLogin server option. The following
entry would permit connections on tun(4) device 1 from user M-bM-^@M-^\janeM-bM-^@M-^] and on
tun device 2 from user M-bM-^@M-^\johnM-bM-^@M-^], if PermitRootLogin is set to
M-bM-^@M-^\forced-commands-onlyM-bM-^@M-^]:
tunnel="1",command="sh /etc/netstart tun1" ssh-rsa ... jane
tunnel="2",command="sh /etc/netstart tun2" ssh-rsa ... john
Since an SSH-based setup entails a fair amount of overhead, it may be
more suited to temporary setups, such as for wireless VPNs. More
permanent VPNs are better provided by tools such as ipsecctl(8) and
isakmpd(8).
ENVIRONMENT
ssh will normally set the following environment variables:
DISPLAY The DISPLAY variable indicates the location of the
X11 server. It is automatically set by ssh to
point to a value of the form M-bM-^@M-^\hostname:nM-bM-^@M-^], where
M-bM-^@M-^\hostnameM-bM-^@M-^] indicates the host where the shell runs,
and M-bM-^@M-^XnM-bM-^@M-^Y is an integer M-bM-^IM-% 1. ssh uses this special
value to forward X11 connections over the secure
channel. The user should normally not set DISPLAY
explicitly, as that will render the X11 connection
insecure (and will require the user to manually
copy any required authorization cookies).
HOME Set to the path of the user's home directory.
LOGNAME Synonym for USER; set for compatibility with
systems that use this variable.
MAIL Set to the path of the user's mailbox.
PATH Set to the default PATH, as specified when
compiling ssh.
SSH_ASKPASS If ssh needs a passphrase, it will read the
passphrase from the current terminal if it was run
from a terminal. If ssh does not have a terminal
associated with it but DISPLAY and SSH_ASKPASS are
set, it will execute the program specified by
SSH_ASKPASS and open an X11 window to read the
passphrase. This is particularly useful when
calling ssh from a .xsession or related script.
(Note that on some machines it may be necessary to
redirect the input from /dev/null to make this
work.)
SSH_AUTH_SOCK Identifies the path of a UNIX-domain socket used to
communicate with the agent.
SSH_CONNECTION Identifies the client and server ends of the
connection. The variable contains four space-
separated values: client IP address, client port
number, server IP address, and server port number.
SSH_ORIGINAL_COMMAND This variable contains the original command line if
a forced command is executed. It can be used to
extract the original arguments.
SSH_TTY This is set to the name of the tty (path to the
device) associated with the current shell or
command. If the current session has no tty, this
variable is not set.
SSH_TUNNEL Optionally set by sshd(8) to contain the interface
names assigned if tunnel forwarding was requested
by the client.
SSH_USER_AUTH Optionally set by sshd(8), this variable may
contain a pathname to a file that lists the
authentication methods successfully used when the
session was established, including any public keys
that were used.
TZ This variable is set to indicate the present time
zone if it was set when the daemon was started
(i.e. the daemon passes the value on to new
connections).
USER Set to the name of the user logging in.
Additionally, ssh reads ~/.ssh/environment, and adds lines of the format
M-bM-^@M-^\VARNAME=valueM-bM-^@M-^] to the environment if the file exists and users are
allowed to change their environment. For more information, see the
PermitUserEnvironment option in sshd_config(5).
FILES
~/.rhosts
This file is used for host-based authentication (see above). On
some machines this file may need to be world-readable if the
user's home directory is on an NFS partition, because sshd(8)
reads it as root. Additionally, this file must be owned by the
user, and must not have write permissions for anyone else. The
recommended permission for most machines is read/write for the
user, and not accessible by others.
~/.shosts
This file is used in exactly the same way as .rhosts, but allows
host-based authentication without permitting login with
rlogin/rsh.
~/.ssh/
This directory is the default location for all user-specific
configuration and authentication information. There is no
general requirement to keep the entire contents of this directory
secret, but the recommended permissions are read/write/execute
for the user, and not accessible by others.
~/.ssh/authorized_keys
Lists the public keys (DSA, ECDSA, Ed25519, RSA) that can be used
for logging in as this user. The format of this file is
described in the sshd(8) manual page. This file is not highly
sensitive, but the recommended permissions are read/write for the
user, and not accessible by others.
~/.ssh/config
This is the per-user configuration file. The file format and
configuration options are described in ssh_config(5). Because of
the potential for abuse, this file must have strict permissions:
read/write for the user, and not writable by others.
~/.ssh/environment
Contains additional definitions for environment variables; see
ENVIRONMENT, above.
~/.ssh/id_dsa
~/.ssh/id_ecdsa
+ ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa_sk
~/.ssh/id_ed25519
+ ~/.ssh/id_ed25519_sk
~/.ssh/id_rsa
Contains the private key for authentication. These files contain
sensitive data and should be readable by the user but not
accessible by others (read/write/execute). ssh will simply
ignore a private key file if it is accessible by others. It is
possible to specify a passphrase when generating the key which
will be used to encrypt the sensitive part of this file using
AES-128.
~/.ssh/id_dsa.pub
~/.ssh/id_ecdsa.pub
+ ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa_sk.pub
~/.ssh/id_ed25519.pub
+ ~/.ssh/id_ed25519_sk.pub
~/.ssh/id_rsa.pub
Contains the public key for authentication. These files are not
sensitive and can (but need not) be readable by anyone.
~/.ssh/known_hosts
Contains a list of host keys for all hosts the user has logged
into that are not already in the systemwide list of known host
keys. See sshd(8) for further details of the format of this
file.
~/.ssh/rc
Commands in this file are executed by ssh when the user logs in,
just before the user's shell (or command) is started. See the
sshd(8) manual page for more information.
/etc/hosts.equiv
This file is for host-based authentication (see above). It
should only be writable by root.
/etc/shosts.equiv
This file is used in exactly the same way as hosts.equiv, but
allows host-based authentication without permitting login with
rlogin/rsh.
/etc/ssh/ssh_config
Systemwide configuration file. The file format and configuration
options are described in ssh_config(5).
/etc/ssh/ssh_host_key
/etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key
/etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key
/etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key
/etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key
These files contain the private parts of the host keys and are
used for host-based authentication.
/etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts
Systemwide list of known host keys. This file should be prepared
by the system administrator to contain the public host keys of
all machines in the organization. It should be world-readable.
See sshd(8) for further details of the format of this file.
/etc/ssh/sshrc
Commands in this file are executed by ssh when the user logs in,
just before the user's shell (or command) is started. See the
sshd(8) manual page for more information.
EXIT STATUS
ssh exits with the exit status of the remote command or with 255 if an
error occurred.
SEE ALSO
scp(1), sftp(1), ssh-add(1), ssh-agent(1), ssh-keygen(1), ssh-keyscan(1),
tun(4), ssh_config(5), ssh-keysign(8), sshd(8)
STANDARDS
S. Lehtinen and C. Lonvick, The Secure Shell (SSH) Protocol Assigned
Numbers, RFC 4250, January 2006.
T. Ylonen and C. Lonvick, The Secure Shell (SSH) Protocol Architecture,
RFC 4251, January 2006.
T. Ylonen and C. Lonvick, The Secure Shell (SSH) Authentication Protocol,
RFC 4252, January 2006.
T. Ylonen and C. Lonvick, The Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer
Protocol, RFC 4253, January 2006.
T. Ylonen and C. Lonvick, The Secure Shell (SSH) Connection Protocol, RFC
4254, January 2006.
J. Schlyter and W. Griffin, Using DNS to Securely Publish Secure Shell
(SSH) Key Fingerprints, RFC 4255, January 2006.
F. Cusack and M. Forssen, Generic Message Exchange Authentication for the
Secure Shell Protocol (SSH), RFC 4256, January 2006.
J. Galbraith and P. Remaker, The Secure Shell (SSH) Session Channel Break
Extension, RFC 4335, January 2006.
M. Bellare, T. Kohno, and C. Namprempre, The Secure Shell (SSH) Transport
Layer Encryption Modes, RFC 4344, January 2006.
B. Harris, Improved Arcfour Modes for the Secure Shell (SSH) Transport
Layer Protocol, RFC 4345, January 2006.
M. Friedl, N. Provos, and W. Simpson, Diffie-Hellman Group Exchange for
the Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Protocol, RFC 4419, March 2006.
J. Galbraith and R. Thayer, The Secure Shell (SSH) Public Key File
Format, RFC 4716, November 2006.
D. Stebila and J. Green, Elliptic Curve Algorithm Integration in the
Secure Shell Transport Layer, RFC 5656, December 2009.
A. Perrig and D. Song, Hash Visualization: a New Technique to improve
Real-World Security, 1999, International Workshop on Cryptographic
Techniques and E-Commerce (CrypTEC '99).
AUTHORS
OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free ssh 1.2.12 release by
Tatu Ylonen. Aaron Campbell, Bob Beck, Markus Friedl, Niels Provos, Theo
de Raadt and Dug Song removed many bugs, re-added newer features and
created OpenSSH. Markus Friedl contributed the support for SSH protocol
versions 1.5 and 2.0.
-OpenBSD 6.6 June 12, 2019 OpenBSD 6.6
+OpenBSD 6.6 February 7, 2020 OpenBSD 6.6
diff --git a/ssh.1 b/ssh.1
index 424d6c3e8a6e..60de6087a75b 100644
--- a/ssh.1
+++ b/ssh.1
@@ -1,1700 +1,1726 @@
.\"
.\" Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
.\" Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
.\" All rights reserved
.\"
.\" As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
.\" can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
.\" software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
.\" incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
.\" called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
.\"
.\" Copyright (c) 1999,2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
.\" Copyright (c) 1999 Aaron Campbell. All rights reserved.
.\" Copyright (c) 1999 Theo de Raadt. All rights reserved.
.\"
.\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
.\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
.\" are met:
.\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
.\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
.\" documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
.\"
.\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
.\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
.\" OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
.\" IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
.\" INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
.\" NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
.\" DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
.\" THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
.\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
.\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
.\"
-.\" $OpenBSD: ssh.1,v 1.403 2019/06/12 11:31:50 jmc Exp $
-.Dd $Mdocdate: June 12 2019 $
+.\" $OpenBSD: ssh.1,v 1.410 2020/02/07 03:54:44 dtucker Exp $
+.Dd $Mdocdate: February 7 2020 $
.Dt SSH 1
.Os
.Sh NAME
.Nm ssh
-.Nd OpenSSH SSH client (remote login program)
+.Nd OpenSSH remote login client
.Sh SYNOPSIS
.Nm ssh
.Op Fl 46AaCfGgKkMNnqsTtVvXxYy
.Op Fl B Ar bind_interface
.Op Fl b Ar bind_address
.Op Fl c Ar cipher_spec
.Op Fl D Oo Ar bind_address : Oc Ns Ar port
.Op Fl E Ar log_file
.Op Fl e Ar escape_char
.Op Fl F Ar configfile
.Op Fl I Ar pkcs11
.Op Fl i Ar identity_file
.Op Fl J Ar destination
.Op Fl L Ar address
.Op Fl l Ar login_name
.Op Fl m Ar mac_spec
.Op Fl O Ar ctl_cmd
.Op Fl o Ar option
.Op Fl p Ar port
.Op Fl Q Ar query_option
.Op Fl R Ar address
.Op Fl S Ar ctl_path
.Op Fl W Ar host : Ns Ar port
.Op Fl w Ar local_tun Ns Op : Ns Ar remote_tun
.Ar destination
.Op Ar command
.Sh DESCRIPTION
.Nm
(SSH client) is a program for logging into a remote machine and for
executing commands on a remote machine.
It is intended to provide secure encrypted communications between
two untrusted hosts over an insecure network.
X11 connections, arbitrary TCP ports and
.Ux Ns -domain
sockets can also be forwarded over the secure channel.
.Pp
.Nm
connects and logs into the specified
.Ar destination ,
which may be specified as either
.Sm off
.Oo user @ Oc hostname
.Sm on
or a URI of the form
.Sm off
.No ssh:// Oo user @ Oc hostname Op : port .
.Sm on
The user must prove
his/her identity to the remote machine using one of several methods
(see below).
.Pp
If a
.Ar command
is specified,
it is executed on the remote host instead of a login shell.
.Pp
The options are as follows:
.Pp
.Bl -tag -width Ds -compact
.It Fl 4
Forces
.Nm
to use IPv4 addresses only.
.Pp
.It Fl 6
Forces
.Nm
to use IPv6 addresses only.
.Pp
.It Fl A
-Enables forwarding of the authentication agent connection.
+Enables forwarding of connections from an authentication agent such as
+.Xr ssh-agent 1 .
This can also be specified on a per-host basis in a configuration file.
.Pp
Agent forwarding should be enabled with caution.
Users with the ability to bypass file permissions on the remote host
(for the agent's
.Ux Ns -domain
socket) can access the local agent through the forwarded connection.
An attacker cannot obtain key material from the agent,
however they can perform operations on the keys that enable them to
authenticate using the identities loaded into the agent.
+A safer alternative may be to use a jump host
+(see
+.Fl J ) .
.Pp
.It Fl a
Disables forwarding of the authentication agent connection.
.Pp
.It Fl B Ar bind_interface
Bind to the address of
.Ar bind_interface
before attempting to connect to the destination host.
This is only useful on systems with more than one address.
.Pp
.It Fl b Ar bind_address
Use
.Ar bind_address
on the local machine as the source address
of the connection.
Only useful on systems with more than one address.
.Pp
.It Fl C
Requests compression of all data (including stdin, stdout, stderr, and
data for forwarded X11, TCP and
.Ux Ns -domain
connections).
The compression algorithm is the same used by
.Xr gzip 1 .
Compression is desirable on modem lines and other
slow connections, but will only slow down things on fast networks.
The default value can be set on a host-by-host basis in the
configuration files; see the
.Cm Compression
option.
.Pp
.It Fl c Ar cipher_spec
Selects the cipher specification for encrypting the session.
.Ar cipher_spec
is a comma-separated list of ciphers
listed in order of preference.
See the
.Cm Ciphers
keyword in
.Xr ssh_config 5
for more information.
.Pp
.It Fl D Xo
.Sm off
.Oo Ar bind_address : Oc
.Ar port
.Sm on
.Xc
Specifies a local
.Dq dynamic
application-level port forwarding.
This works by allocating a socket to listen to
.Ar port
on the local side, optionally bound to the specified
.Ar bind_address .
Whenever a connection is made to this port, the
connection is forwarded over the secure channel, and the application
protocol is then used to determine where to connect to from the
remote machine.
Currently the SOCKS4 and SOCKS5 protocols are supported, and
.Nm
will act as a SOCKS server.
Only root can forward privileged ports.
Dynamic port forwardings can also be specified in the configuration file.
.Pp
IPv6 addresses can be specified by enclosing the address in square brackets.
Only the superuser can forward privileged ports.
By default, the local port is bound in accordance with the
.Cm GatewayPorts
setting.
However, an explicit
.Ar bind_address
may be used to bind the connection to a specific address.
The
.Ar bind_address
of
.Dq localhost
indicates that the listening port be bound for local use only, while an
empty address or
.Sq *
indicates that the port should be available from all interfaces.
.Pp
.It Fl E Ar log_file
Append debug logs to
.Ar log_file
instead of standard error.
.Pp
.It Fl e Ar escape_char
Sets the escape character for sessions with a pty (default:
.Ql ~ ) .
The escape character is only recognized at the beginning of a line.
The escape character followed by a dot
.Pq Ql \&.
closes the connection;
followed by control-Z suspends the connection;
and followed by itself sends the escape character once.
Setting the character to
.Dq none
disables any escapes and makes the session fully transparent.
.Pp
.It Fl F Ar configfile
Specifies an alternative per-user configuration file.
If a configuration file is given on the command line,
the system-wide configuration file
.Pq Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_config
will be ignored.
The default for the per-user configuration file is
.Pa ~/.ssh/config .
.Pp
.It Fl f
Requests
.Nm
to go to background just before command execution.
This is useful if
.Nm
is going to ask for passwords or passphrases, but the user
wants it in the background.
This implies
.Fl n .
The recommended way to start X11 programs at a remote site is with
something like
.Ic ssh -f host xterm .
.Pp
If the
.Cm ExitOnForwardFailure
configuration option is set to
.Dq yes ,
then a client started with
.Fl f
will wait for all remote port forwards to be successfully established
before placing itself in the background.
.Pp
.It Fl G
Causes
.Nm
to print its configuration after evaluating
.Cm Host
and
.Cm Match
blocks and exit.
.Pp
.It Fl g
Allows remote hosts to connect to local forwarded ports.
If used on a multiplexed connection, then this option must be specified
on the master process.
.Pp
.It Fl I Ar pkcs11
Specify the PKCS#11 shared library
.Nm
should use to communicate with a PKCS#11 token providing keys for user
authentication.
.Pp
.It Fl i Ar identity_file
Selects a file from which the identity (private key) for
public key authentication is read.
The default is
.Pa ~/.ssh/id_dsa ,
.Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa ,
-.Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519
+.Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa_sk ,
+.Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519 ,
+.Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519_sk
and
.Pa ~/.ssh/id_rsa .
Identity files may also be specified on
a per-host basis in the configuration file.
It is possible to have multiple
.Fl i
options (and multiple identities specified in
configuration files).
If no certificates have been explicitly specified by the
.Cm CertificateFile
directive,
.Nm
will also try to load certificate information from the filename obtained
by appending
.Pa -cert.pub
to identity filenames.
.Pp
.It Fl J Ar destination
Connect to the target host by first making a
.Nm
connection to the jump host described by
.Ar destination
and then establishing a TCP forwarding to the ultimate destination from
there.
Multiple jump hops may be specified separated by comma characters.
This is a shortcut to specify a
.Cm ProxyJump
configuration directive.
Note that configuration directives supplied on the command-line generally
apply to the destination host and not any specified jump hosts.
Use
.Pa ~/.ssh/config
to specify configuration for jump hosts.
.Pp
.It Fl K
Enables GSSAPI-based authentication and forwarding (delegation) of GSSAPI
credentials to the server.
.Pp
.It Fl k
Disables forwarding (delegation) of GSSAPI credentials to the server.
.Pp
.It Fl L Xo
.Sm off
.Oo Ar bind_address : Oc
.Ar port : host : hostport
.Sm on
.Xc
.It Fl L Xo
.Sm off
.Oo Ar bind_address : Oc
.Ar port : remote_socket
.Sm on
.Xc
.It Fl L Xo
.Sm off
.Ar local_socket : host : hostport
.Sm on
.Xc
.It Fl L Xo
.Sm off
.Ar local_socket : remote_socket
.Sm on
.Xc
Specifies that connections to the given TCP port or Unix socket on the local
(client) host are to be forwarded to the given host and port, or Unix socket,
on the remote side.
This works by allocating a socket to listen to either a TCP
.Ar port
on the local side, optionally bound to the specified
.Ar bind_address ,
or to a Unix socket.
Whenever a connection is made to the local port or socket, the
connection is forwarded over the secure channel, and a connection is
made to either
.Ar host
port
.Ar hostport ,
or the Unix socket
.Ar remote_socket ,
from the remote machine.
.Pp
Port forwardings can also be specified in the configuration file.
Only the superuser can forward privileged ports.
IPv6 addresses can be specified by enclosing the address in square brackets.
.Pp
By default, the local port is bound in accordance with the
.Cm GatewayPorts
setting.
However, an explicit
.Ar bind_address
may be used to bind the connection to a specific address.
The
.Ar bind_address
of
.Dq localhost
indicates that the listening port be bound for local use only, while an
empty address or
.Sq *
indicates that the port should be available from all interfaces.
.Pp
.It Fl l Ar login_name
Specifies the user to log in as on the remote machine.
This also may be specified on a per-host basis in the configuration file.
.Pp
.It Fl M
Places the
.Nm
client into
.Dq master
mode for connection sharing.
Multiple
.Fl M
options places
.Nm
into
.Dq master
mode but with confirmation required using
.Xr ssh-askpass 1
before each operation that changes the multiplexing state
(e.g. opening a new session).
Refer to the description of
.Cm ControlMaster
in
.Xr ssh_config 5
for details.
.Pp
.It Fl m Ar mac_spec
A comma-separated list of MAC (message authentication code) algorithms,
specified in order of preference.
See the
.Cm MACs
keyword for more information.
.Pp
.It Fl N
Do not execute a remote command.
This is useful for just forwarding ports.
.Pp
.It Fl n
Redirects stdin from
.Pa /dev/null
(actually, prevents reading from stdin).
This must be used when
.Nm
is run in the background.
A common trick is to use this to run X11 programs on a remote machine.
For example,
.Ic ssh -n shadows.cs.hut.fi emacs &
will start an emacs on shadows.cs.hut.fi, and the X11
connection will be automatically forwarded over an encrypted channel.
The
.Nm
program will be put in the background.
(This does not work if
.Nm
needs to ask for a password or passphrase; see also the
.Fl f
option.)
.Pp
.It Fl O Ar ctl_cmd
Control an active connection multiplexing master process.
When the
.Fl O
option is specified, the
.Ar ctl_cmd
argument is interpreted and passed to the master process.
Valid commands are:
.Dq check
(check that the master process is running),
.Dq forward
(request forwardings without command execution),
.Dq cancel
(cancel forwardings),
.Dq exit
(request the master to exit), and
.Dq stop
(request the master to stop accepting further multiplexing requests).
.Pp
.It Fl o Ar option
Can be used to give options in the format used in the configuration file.
This is useful for specifying options for which there is no separate
command-line flag.
For full details of the options listed below, and their possible values, see
.Xr ssh_config 5 .
.Pp
.Bl -tag -width Ds -offset indent -compact
.It AddKeysToAgent
.It AddressFamily
.It BatchMode
.It BindAddress
.It CanonicalDomains
.It CanonicalizeFallbackLocal
.It CanonicalizeHostname
.It CanonicalizeMaxDots
.It CanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs
.It CASignatureAlgorithms
.It CertificateFile
.It ChallengeResponseAuthentication
.It CheckHostIP
.It Ciphers
.It ClearAllForwardings
.It Compression
.It ConnectionAttempts
.It ConnectTimeout
.It ControlMaster
.It ControlPath
.It ControlPersist
.It DynamicForward
.It EscapeChar
.It ExitOnForwardFailure
.It FingerprintHash
.It ForwardAgent
.It ForwardX11
.It ForwardX11Timeout
.It ForwardX11Trusted
.It GatewayPorts
.It GlobalKnownHostsFile
.It GSSAPIAuthentication
.It GSSAPIDelegateCredentials
.It HashKnownHosts
.It Host
.It HostbasedAuthentication
.It HostbasedKeyTypes
.It HostKeyAlgorithms
.It HostKeyAlias
.It Hostname
.It IdentitiesOnly
.It IdentityAgent
.It IdentityFile
.It IPQoS
.It KbdInteractiveAuthentication
.It KbdInteractiveDevices
.It KexAlgorithms
.It LocalCommand
.It LocalForward
.It LogLevel
.It MACs
.It Match
.It NoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost
.It NumberOfPasswordPrompts
.It PasswordAuthentication
.It PermitLocalCommand
.It PKCS11Provider
.It Port
.It PreferredAuthentications
.It ProxyCommand
.It ProxyJump
.It ProxyUseFdpass
.It PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes
.It PubkeyAuthentication
.It RekeyLimit
.It RemoteCommand
.It RemoteForward
.It RequestTTY
.It SendEnv
.It ServerAliveInterval
.It ServerAliveCountMax
.It SetEnv
.It StreamLocalBindMask
.It StreamLocalBindUnlink
.It StrictHostKeyChecking
.It TCPKeepAlive
.It Tunnel
.It TunnelDevice
.It UpdateHostKeys
.It User
.It UserKnownHostsFile
.It VerifyHostKeyDNS
.It VisualHostKey
.It XAuthLocation
.El
.Pp
.It Fl p Ar port
Port to connect to on the remote host.
This can be specified on a
per-host basis in the configuration file.
.Pp
.It Fl Q Ar query_option
Queries
.Nm
for the algorithms supported for the specified version 2.
The available features are:
.Ar cipher
(supported symmetric ciphers),
.Ar cipher-auth
(supported symmetric ciphers that support authenticated encryption),
.Ar help
(supported query terms for use with the
.Fl Q
flag),
.Ar mac
(supported message integrity codes),
.Ar kex
(key exchange algorithms),
.Ar key
(key types),
.Ar key-cert
(certificate key types),
.Ar key-plain
(non-certificate key types),
+.Ar key-sig
+(all key types and signature algorithms),
.Ar protocol-version
(supported SSH protocol versions), and
.Ar sig
(supported signature algorithms).
+Alternatively, any keyword from
+.Xr ssh_config 5
+or
+.Xr sshd_config 5
+that takes an algorithm list may be used as an alias for the corresponding
+query_option.
.Pp
.It Fl q
Quiet mode.
Causes most warning and diagnostic messages to be suppressed.
.Pp
.It Fl R Xo
.Sm off
.Oo Ar bind_address : Oc
.Ar port : host : hostport
.Sm on
.Xc
.It Fl R Xo
.Sm off
.Oo Ar bind_address : Oc
.Ar port : local_socket
.Sm on
.Xc
.It Fl R Xo
.Sm off
.Ar remote_socket : host : hostport
.Sm on
.Xc
.It Fl R Xo
.Sm off
.Ar remote_socket : local_socket
.Sm on
.Xc
.It Fl R Xo
.Sm off
.Oo Ar bind_address : Oc
.Ar port
.Sm on
.Xc
Specifies that connections to the given TCP port or Unix socket on the remote
(server) host are to be forwarded to the local side.
.Pp
This works by allocating a socket to listen to either a TCP
.Ar port
or to a Unix socket on the remote side.
Whenever a connection is made to this port or Unix socket, the
connection is forwarded over the secure channel, and a connection
is made from the local machine to either an explicit destination specified by
.Ar host
port
.Ar hostport ,
or
.Ar local_socket ,
or, if no explicit destination was specified,
.Nm
will act as a SOCKS 4/5 proxy and forward connections to the destinations
requested by the remote SOCKS client.
.Pp
Port forwardings can also be specified in the configuration file.
Privileged ports can be forwarded only when
logging in as root on the remote machine.
IPv6 addresses can be specified by enclosing the address in square brackets.
.Pp
By default, TCP listening sockets on the server will be bound to the loopback
interface only.
This may be overridden by specifying a
.Ar bind_address .
An empty
.Ar bind_address ,
or the address
.Ql * ,
indicates that the remote socket should listen on all interfaces.
Specifying a remote
.Ar bind_address
will only succeed if the server's
.Cm GatewayPorts
option is enabled (see
.Xr sshd_config 5 ) .
.Pp
If the
.Ar port
argument is
.Ql 0 ,
the listen port will be dynamically allocated on the server and reported
to the client at run time.
When used together with
.Ic -O forward
the allocated port will be printed to the standard output.
.Pp
.It Fl S Ar ctl_path
Specifies the location of a control socket for connection sharing,
or the string
.Dq none
to disable connection sharing.
Refer to the description of
.Cm ControlPath
and
.Cm ControlMaster
in
.Xr ssh_config 5
for details.
.Pp
.It Fl s
May be used to request invocation of a subsystem on the remote system.
Subsystems facilitate the use of SSH
as a secure transport for other applications (e.g.\&
.Xr sftp 1 ) .
The subsystem is specified as the remote command.
.Pp
.It Fl T
Disable pseudo-terminal allocation.
.Pp
.It Fl t
Force pseudo-terminal allocation.
This can be used to execute arbitrary
screen-based programs on a remote machine, which can be very useful,
e.g. when implementing menu services.
Multiple
.Fl t
options force tty allocation, even if
.Nm
has no local tty.
.Pp
.It Fl V
Display the version number and exit.
.Pp
.It Fl v
Verbose mode.
Causes
.Nm
to print debugging messages about its progress.
This is helpful in
debugging connection, authentication, and configuration problems.
Multiple
.Fl v
options increase the verbosity.
The maximum is 3.
.Pp
.It Fl W Ar host : Ns Ar port
Requests that standard input and output on the client be forwarded to
.Ar host
on
.Ar port
over the secure channel.
Implies
.Fl N ,
.Fl T ,
.Cm ExitOnForwardFailure
and
.Cm ClearAllForwardings ,
though these can be overridden in the configuration file or using
.Fl o
command line options.
.Pp
.It Fl w Xo
.Ar local_tun Ns Op : Ns Ar remote_tun
.Xc
Requests
tunnel
device forwarding with the specified
.Xr tun 4
devices between the client
.Pq Ar local_tun
and the server
.Pq Ar remote_tun .
.Pp
The devices may be specified by numerical ID or the keyword
.Dq any ,
which uses the next available tunnel device.
If
.Ar remote_tun
is not specified, it defaults to
.Dq any .
See also the
.Cm Tunnel
and
.Cm TunnelDevice
directives in
.Xr ssh_config 5 .
.Pp
If the
.Cm Tunnel
directive is unset, it will be set to the default tunnel mode, which is
.Dq point-to-point .
If a different
.Cm Tunnel
forwarding mode it desired, then it should be specified before
.Fl w .
.Pp
.It Fl X
Enables X11 forwarding.
This can also be specified on a per-host basis in a configuration file.
.Pp
X11 forwarding should be enabled with caution.
Users with the ability to bypass file permissions on the remote host
(for the user's X authorization database)
can access the local X11 display through the forwarded connection.
An attacker may then be able to perform activities such as keystroke monitoring.
.Pp
For this reason, X11 forwarding is subjected to X11 SECURITY extension
restrictions by default.
Please refer to the
.Nm
.Fl Y
option and the
.Cm ForwardX11Trusted
directive in
.Xr ssh_config 5
for more information.
.Pp
.It Fl x
Disables X11 forwarding.
.Pp
.It Fl Y
Enables trusted X11 forwarding.
Trusted X11 forwardings are not subjected to the X11 SECURITY extension
controls.
.Pp
.It Fl y
Send log information using the
.Xr syslog 3
system module.
By default this information is sent to stderr.
.El
.Pp
.Nm
may additionally obtain configuration data from
a per-user configuration file and a system-wide configuration file.
The file format and configuration options are described in
.Xr ssh_config 5 .
.Sh AUTHENTICATION
The OpenSSH SSH client supports SSH protocol 2.
.Pp
The methods available for authentication are:
GSSAPI-based authentication,
host-based authentication,
public key authentication,
challenge-response authentication,
and password authentication.
Authentication methods are tried in the order specified above,
though
.Cm PreferredAuthentications
can be used to change the default order.
.Pp
Host-based authentication works as follows:
If the machine the user logs in from is listed in
.Pa /etc/hosts.equiv
or
.Pa /etc/shosts.equiv
on the remote machine, and the user names are
the same on both sides, or if the files
.Pa ~/.rhosts
or
.Pa ~/.shosts
exist in the user's home directory on the
remote machine and contain a line containing the name of the client
machine and the name of the user on that machine, the user is
considered for login.
Additionally, the server
.Em must
be able to verify the client's
host key (see the description of
.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts
and
.Pa ~/.ssh/known_hosts ,
below)
for login to be permitted.
This authentication method closes security holes due to IP
spoofing, DNS spoofing, and routing spoofing.
[Note to the administrator:
.Pa /etc/hosts.equiv ,
.Pa ~/.rhosts ,
and the rlogin/rsh protocol in general, are inherently insecure and should be
disabled if security is desired.]
.Pp
Public key authentication works as follows:
The scheme is based on public-key cryptography,
using cryptosystems
where encryption and decryption are done using separate keys,
and it is unfeasible to derive the decryption key from the encryption key.
The idea is that each user creates a public/private
key pair for authentication purposes.
The server knows the public key, and only the user knows the private key.
.Nm
implements public key authentication protocol automatically,
using one of the DSA, ECDSA, Ed25519 or RSA algorithms.
The HISTORY section of
.Xr ssl 8
contains a brief discussion of the DSA and RSA algorithms.
.Pp
The file
.Pa ~/.ssh/authorized_keys
lists the public keys that are permitted for logging in.
When the user logs in, the
.Nm
program tells the server which key pair it would like to use for
authentication.
The client proves that it has access to the private key
and the server checks that the corresponding public key
is authorized to accept the account.
.Pp
The server may inform the client of errors that prevented public key
authentication from succeeding after authentication completes using a
different method.
These may be viewed by increasing the
.Cm LogLevel
to
.Cm DEBUG
or higher (e.g. by using the
.Fl v
flag).
.Pp
The user creates his/her key pair by running
.Xr ssh-keygen 1 .
This stores the private key in
.Pa ~/.ssh/id_dsa
(DSA),
.Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa
(ECDSA),
+.Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa_sk
+(authenticator-hosted ECDSA),
.Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519
(Ed25519),
+.Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519_sk
+(authenticator-hosted Ed25519),
or
.Pa ~/.ssh/id_rsa
(RSA)
and stores the public key in
.Pa ~/.ssh/id_dsa.pub
(DSA),
.Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa.pub
(ECDSA),
+.Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa_sk.pub
+(authenticator-hosted ECDSA),
.Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519.pub
(Ed25519),
+.Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519_sk.pub
+(authenticator-hosted Ed25519),
or
.Pa ~/.ssh/id_rsa.pub
(RSA)
in the user's home directory.
The user should then copy the public key
to
.Pa ~/.ssh/authorized_keys
in his/her home directory on the remote machine.
The
.Pa authorized_keys
file corresponds to the conventional
.Pa ~/.rhosts
file, and has one key
per line, though the lines can be very long.
After this, the user can log in without giving the password.
.Pp
A variation on public key authentication
is available in the form of certificate authentication:
instead of a set of public/private keys,
signed certificates are used.
This has the advantage that a single trusted certification authority
can be used in place of many public/private keys.
See the CERTIFICATES section of
.Xr ssh-keygen 1
for more information.
.Pp
The most convenient way to use public key or certificate authentication
may be with an authentication agent.
See
.Xr ssh-agent 1
and (optionally) the
.Cm AddKeysToAgent
directive in
.Xr ssh_config 5
for more information.
.Pp
Challenge-response authentication works as follows:
The server sends an arbitrary
.Qq challenge
text, and prompts for a response.
Examples of challenge-response authentication include
.Bx
Authentication (see
.Xr login.conf 5 )
and PAM (some
.Pf non- Ox
systems).
.Pp
Finally, if other authentication methods fail,
.Nm
prompts the user for a password.
The password is sent to the remote
host for checking; however, since all communications are encrypted,
the password cannot be seen by someone listening on the network.
.Pp
.Nm
automatically maintains and checks a database containing
identification for all hosts it has ever been used with.
Host keys are stored in
.Pa ~/.ssh/known_hosts
in the user's home directory.
Additionally, the file
.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts
is automatically checked for known hosts.
Any new hosts are automatically added to the user's file.
If a host's identification ever changes,
.Nm
warns about this and disables password authentication to prevent
server spoofing or man-in-the-middle attacks,
which could otherwise be used to circumvent the encryption.
The
.Cm StrictHostKeyChecking
option can be used to control logins to machines whose
host key is not known or has changed.
.Pp
When the user's identity has been accepted by the server, the server
either executes the given command in a non-interactive session or,
if no command has been specified, logs into the machine and gives
the user a normal shell as an interactive session.
All communication with
the remote command or shell will be automatically encrypted.
.Pp
If an interactive session is requested
.Nm
by default will only request a pseudo-terminal (pty) for interactive
sessions when the client has one.
The flags
.Fl T
and
.Fl t
can be used to override this behaviour.
.Pp
If a pseudo-terminal has been allocated the
user may use the escape characters noted below.
.Pp
If no pseudo-terminal has been allocated,
the session is transparent and can be used to reliably transfer binary data.
On most systems, setting the escape character to
.Dq none
will also make the session transparent even if a tty is used.
.Pp
The session terminates when the command or shell on the remote
machine exits and all X11 and TCP connections have been closed.
.Sh ESCAPE CHARACTERS
When a pseudo-terminal has been requested,
.Nm
supports a number of functions through the use of an escape character.
.Pp
A single tilde character can be sent as
.Ic ~~
or by following the tilde by a character other than those described below.
The escape character must always follow a newline to be interpreted as
special.
The escape character can be changed in configuration files using the
.Cm EscapeChar
configuration directive or on the command line by the
.Fl e
option.
.Pp
The supported escapes (assuming the default
.Ql ~ )
are:
.Bl -tag -width Ds
.It Cm ~.
Disconnect.
.It Cm ~^Z
Background
.Nm .
.It Cm ~#
List forwarded connections.
.It Cm ~&
Background
.Nm
at logout when waiting for forwarded connection / X11 sessions to terminate.
.It Cm ~?
Display a list of escape characters.
.It Cm ~B
Send a BREAK to the remote system
(only useful if the peer supports it).
.It Cm ~C
Open command line.
Currently this allows the addition of port forwardings using the
.Fl L ,
.Fl R
and
.Fl D
options (see above).
It also allows the cancellation of existing port-forwardings
with
.Sm off
.Fl KL Oo Ar bind_address : Oc Ar port
.Sm on
for local,
.Sm off
.Fl KR Oo Ar bind_address : Oc Ar port
.Sm on
for remote and
.Sm off
.Fl KD Oo Ar bind_address : Oc Ar port
.Sm on
for dynamic port-forwardings.
.Ic !\& Ns Ar command
allows the user to execute a local command if the
.Ic PermitLocalCommand
option is enabled in
.Xr ssh_config 5 .
Basic help is available, using the
.Fl h
option.
.It Cm ~R
Request rekeying of the connection
(only useful if the peer supports it).
.It Cm ~V
Decrease the verbosity
.Pq Ic LogLevel
when errors are being written to stderr.
.It Cm ~v
Increase the verbosity
.Pq Ic LogLevel
when errors are being written to stderr.
.El
.Sh TCP FORWARDING
Forwarding of arbitrary TCP connections over a secure channel
can be specified either on the command line or in a configuration file.
One possible application of TCP forwarding is a secure connection to a
mail server; another is going through firewalls.
.Pp
In the example below, we look at encrypting communication for an IRC client,
even though the IRC server it connects to does not directly
support encrypted communication.
This works as follows:
the user connects to the remote host using
.Nm ,
specifying the ports to be used to forward the connection.
After that it is possible to start the program locally,
and
.Nm
will encrypt and forward the connection to the remote server.
.Pp
The following example tunnels an IRC session from the client
to an IRC server at
.Dq server.example.com ,
joining channel
.Dq #users ,
nickname
.Dq pinky ,
using the standard IRC port, 6667:
.Bd -literal -offset 4n
$ ssh -f -L 6667:localhost:6667 server.example.com sleep 10
$ irc -c '#users' pinky IRC/127.0.0.1
.Ed
.Pp
The
.Fl f
option backgrounds
.Nm
and the remote command
.Dq sleep 10
is specified to allow an amount of time
(10 seconds, in the example)
to start the program which is going to use the tunnel.
If no connections are made within the time specified,
.Nm
will exit.
.Sh X11 FORWARDING
If the
.Cm ForwardX11
variable is set to
.Dq yes
(or see the description of the
.Fl X ,
.Fl x ,
and
.Fl Y
options above)
and the user is using X11 (the
.Ev DISPLAY
environment variable is set), the connection to the X11 display is
automatically forwarded to the remote side in such a way that any X11
programs started from the shell (or command) will go through the
encrypted channel, and the connection to the real X server will be made
from the local machine.
The user should not manually set
.Ev DISPLAY .
Forwarding of X11 connections can be
configured on the command line or in configuration files.
.Pp
The
.Ev DISPLAY
value set by
.Nm
will point to the server machine, but with a display number greater than zero.
This is normal, and happens because
.Nm
creates a
.Dq proxy
X server on the server machine for forwarding the
connections over the encrypted channel.
.Pp
.Nm
will also automatically set up Xauthority data on the server machine.
For this purpose, it will generate a random authorization cookie,
store it in Xauthority on the server, and verify that any forwarded
connections carry this cookie and replace it by the real cookie when
the connection is opened.
The real authentication cookie is never
sent to the server machine (and no cookies are sent in the plain).
.Pp
If the
.Cm ForwardAgent
variable is set to
.Dq yes
(or see the description of the
.Fl A
and
.Fl a
options above) and
the user is using an authentication agent, the connection to the agent
is automatically forwarded to the remote side.
.Sh VERIFYING HOST KEYS
When connecting to a server for the first time,
a fingerprint of the server's public key is presented to the user
(unless the option
.Cm StrictHostKeyChecking
has been disabled).
Fingerprints can be determined using
.Xr ssh-keygen 1 :
.Pp
.Dl $ ssh-keygen -l -f /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key
.Pp
If the fingerprint is already known, it can be matched
and the key can be accepted or rejected.
If only legacy (MD5) fingerprints for the server are available, the
.Xr ssh-keygen 1
.Fl E
option may be used to downgrade the fingerprint algorithm to match.
.Pp
Because of the difficulty of comparing host keys
just by looking at fingerprint strings,
there is also support to compare host keys visually,
using
.Em random art .
By setting the
.Cm VisualHostKey
option to
.Dq yes ,
a small ASCII graphic gets displayed on every login to a server, no matter
if the session itself is interactive or not.
By learning the pattern a known server produces, a user can easily
find out that the host key has changed when a completely different pattern
is displayed.
Because these patterns are not unambiguous however, a pattern that looks
similar to the pattern remembered only gives a good probability that the
host key is the same, not guaranteed proof.
.Pp
To get a listing of the fingerprints along with their random art for
all known hosts, the following command line can be used:
.Pp
.Dl $ ssh-keygen -lv -f ~/.ssh/known_hosts
.Pp
If the fingerprint is unknown,
an alternative method of verification is available:
SSH fingerprints verified by DNS.
An additional resource record (RR),
SSHFP,
is added to a zonefile
and the connecting client is able to match the fingerprint
with that of the key presented.
.Pp
In this example, we are connecting a client to a server,
.Dq host.example.com .
The SSHFP resource records should first be added to the zonefile for
host.example.com:
.Bd -literal -offset indent
$ ssh-keygen -r host.example.com.
.Ed
.Pp
The output lines will have to be added to the zonefile.
To check that the zone is answering fingerprint queries:
.Pp
.Dl $ dig -t SSHFP host.example.com
.Pp
Finally the client connects:
.Bd -literal -offset indent
$ ssh -o "VerifyHostKeyDNS ask" host.example.com
[...]
Matching host key fingerprint found in DNS.
Are you sure you want to continue connecting (yes/no)?
.Ed
.Pp
See the
.Cm VerifyHostKeyDNS
option in
.Xr ssh_config 5
for more information.
.Sh SSH-BASED VIRTUAL PRIVATE NETWORKS
.Nm
contains support for Virtual Private Network (VPN) tunnelling
using the
.Xr tun 4
network pseudo-device,
allowing two networks to be joined securely.
The
.Xr sshd_config 5
configuration option
.Cm PermitTunnel
controls whether the server supports this,
and at what level (layer 2 or 3 traffic).
.Pp
The following example would connect client network 10.0.50.0/24
with remote network 10.0.99.0/24 using a point-to-point connection
from 10.1.1.1 to 10.1.1.2,
provided that the SSH server running on the gateway to the remote network,
at 192.168.1.15, allows it.
.Pp
On the client:
.Bd -literal -offset indent
# ssh -f -w 0:1 192.168.1.15 true
# ifconfig tun0 10.1.1.1 10.1.1.2 netmask 255.255.255.252
# route add 10.0.99.0/24 10.1.1.2
.Ed
.Pp
On the server:
.Bd -literal -offset indent
# ifconfig tun1 10.1.1.2 10.1.1.1 netmask 255.255.255.252
# route add 10.0.50.0/24 10.1.1.1
.Ed
.Pp
Client access may be more finely tuned via the
.Pa /root/.ssh/authorized_keys
file (see below) and the
.Cm PermitRootLogin
server option.
The following entry would permit connections on
.Xr tun 4
device 1 from user
.Dq jane
and on tun device 2 from user
.Dq john ,
if
.Cm PermitRootLogin
is set to
.Dq forced-commands-only :
.Bd -literal -offset 2n
tunnel="1",command="sh /etc/netstart tun1" ssh-rsa ... jane
tunnel="2",command="sh /etc/netstart tun2" ssh-rsa ... john
.Ed
.Pp
Since an SSH-based setup entails a fair amount of overhead,
it may be more suited to temporary setups,
such as for wireless VPNs.
More permanent VPNs are better provided by tools such as
.Xr ipsecctl 8
and
.Xr isakmpd 8 .
.Sh ENVIRONMENT
.Nm
will normally set the following environment variables:
.Bl -tag -width "SSH_ORIGINAL_COMMAND"
.It Ev DISPLAY
The
.Ev DISPLAY
variable indicates the location of the X11 server.
It is automatically set by
.Nm
to point to a value of the form
.Dq hostname:n ,
where
.Dq hostname
indicates the host where the shell runs, and
.Sq n
is an integer \*(Ge 1.
.Nm
uses this special value to forward X11 connections over the secure
channel.
The user should normally not set
.Ev DISPLAY
explicitly, as that
will render the X11 connection insecure (and will require the user to
manually copy any required authorization cookies).
.It Ev HOME
Set to the path of the user's home directory.
.It Ev LOGNAME
Synonym for
.Ev USER ;
set for compatibility with systems that use this variable.
.It Ev MAIL
Set to the path of the user's mailbox.
.It Ev PATH
Set to the default
.Ev PATH ,
as specified when compiling
.Nm .
.It Ev SSH_ASKPASS
If
.Nm
needs a passphrase, it will read the passphrase from the current
terminal if it was run from a terminal.
If
.Nm
does not have a terminal associated with it but
.Ev DISPLAY
and
.Ev SSH_ASKPASS
are set, it will execute the program specified by
.Ev SSH_ASKPASS
and open an X11 window to read the passphrase.
This is particularly useful when calling
.Nm
from a
.Pa .xsession
or related script.
(Note that on some machines it
may be necessary to redirect the input from
.Pa /dev/null
to make this work.)
.It Ev SSH_AUTH_SOCK
Identifies the path of a
.Ux Ns -domain
socket used to communicate with the agent.
.It Ev SSH_CONNECTION
Identifies the client and server ends of the connection.
The variable contains
four space-separated values: client IP address, client port number,
server IP address, and server port number.
.It Ev SSH_ORIGINAL_COMMAND
This variable contains the original command line if a forced command
is executed.
It can be used to extract the original arguments.
.It Ev SSH_TTY
This is set to the name of the tty (path to the device) associated
with the current shell or command.
If the current session has no tty,
this variable is not set.
.It Ev SSH_TUNNEL
Optionally set by
.Xr sshd 8
to contain the interface names assigned if tunnel forwarding was
requested by the client.
.It Ev SSH_USER_AUTH
Optionally set by
.Xr sshd 8 ,
this variable may contain a pathname to a file that lists the authentication
methods successfully used when the session was established, including any
public keys that were used.
.It Ev TZ
This variable is set to indicate the present time zone if it
was set when the daemon was started (i.e. the daemon passes the value
on to new connections).
.It Ev USER
Set to the name of the user logging in.
.El
.Pp
Additionally,
.Nm
reads
.Pa ~/.ssh/environment ,
and adds lines of the format
.Dq VARNAME=value
to the environment if the file exists and users are allowed to
change their environment.
For more information, see the
.Cm PermitUserEnvironment
option in
.Xr sshd_config 5 .
.Sh FILES
.Bl -tag -width Ds -compact
.It Pa ~/.rhosts
This file is used for host-based authentication (see above).
On some machines this file may need to be
world-readable if the user's home directory is on an NFS partition,
because
.Xr sshd 8
reads it as root.
Additionally, this file must be owned by the user,
and must not have write permissions for anyone else.
The recommended
permission for most machines is read/write for the user, and not
accessible by others.
.Pp
.It Pa ~/.shosts
This file is used in exactly the same way as
.Pa .rhosts ,
but allows host-based authentication without permitting login with
rlogin/rsh.
.Pp
.It Pa ~/.ssh/
This directory is the default location for all user-specific configuration
and authentication information.
There is no general requirement to keep the entire contents of this directory
secret, but the recommended permissions are read/write/execute for the user,
and not accessible by others.
.Pp
.It Pa ~/.ssh/authorized_keys
Lists the public keys (DSA, ECDSA, Ed25519, RSA)
that can be used for logging in as this user.
The format of this file is described in the
.Xr sshd 8
manual page.
This file is not highly sensitive, but the recommended
permissions are read/write for the user, and not accessible by others.
.Pp
.It Pa ~/.ssh/config
This is the per-user configuration file.
The file format and configuration options are described in
.Xr ssh_config 5 .
Because of the potential for abuse, this file must have strict permissions:
read/write for the user, and not writable by others.
.Pp
.It Pa ~/.ssh/environment
Contains additional definitions for environment variables; see
.Sx ENVIRONMENT ,
above.
.Pp
.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_dsa
.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa
+.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa_sk
.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519
+.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519_sk
.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_rsa
Contains the private key for authentication.
These files
contain sensitive data and should be readable by the user but not
accessible by others (read/write/execute).
.Nm
will simply ignore a private key file if it is accessible by others.
It is possible to specify a passphrase when
generating the key which will be used to encrypt the
sensitive part of this file using AES-128.
.Pp
.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_dsa.pub
.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa.pub
+.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa_sk.pub
.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519.pub
+.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519_sk.pub
.It Pa ~/.ssh/id_rsa.pub
Contains the public key for authentication.
These files are not
sensitive and can (but need not) be readable by anyone.
.Pp
.It Pa ~/.ssh/known_hosts
Contains a list of host keys for all hosts the user has logged into
that are not already in the systemwide list of known host keys.
See
.Xr sshd 8
for further details of the format of this file.
.Pp
.It Pa ~/.ssh/rc
Commands in this file are executed by
.Nm
when the user logs in, just before the user's shell (or command) is
started.
See the
.Xr sshd 8
manual page for more information.
.Pp
.It Pa /etc/hosts.equiv
This file is for host-based authentication (see above).
It should only be writable by root.
.Pp
.It Pa /etc/shosts.equiv
This file is used in exactly the same way as
.Pa hosts.equiv ,
but allows host-based authentication without permitting login with
rlogin/rsh.
.Pp
.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_config
Systemwide configuration file.
The file format and configuration options are described in
.Xr ssh_config 5 .
.Pp
.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_key
.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key
.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key
.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key
.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key
These files contain the private parts of the host keys
and are used for host-based authentication.
.Pp
.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts
Systemwide list of known host keys.
This file should be prepared by the
system administrator to contain the public host keys of all machines in the
organization.
It should be world-readable.
See
.Xr sshd 8
for further details of the format of this file.
.Pp
.It Pa /etc/ssh/sshrc
Commands in this file are executed by
.Nm
when the user logs in, just before the user's shell (or command) is started.
See the
.Xr sshd 8
manual page for more information.
.El
.Sh EXIT STATUS
.Nm
exits with the exit status of the remote command or with 255
if an error occurred.
.Sh SEE ALSO
.Xr scp 1 ,
.Xr sftp 1 ,
.Xr ssh-add 1 ,
.Xr ssh-agent 1 ,
.Xr ssh-keygen 1 ,
.Xr ssh-keyscan 1 ,
.Xr tun 4 ,
.Xr ssh_config 5 ,
.Xr ssh-keysign 8 ,
.Xr sshd 8
.Sh STANDARDS
.Rs
.%A S. Lehtinen
.%A C. Lonvick
.%D January 2006
.%R RFC 4250
.%T The Secure Shell (SSH) Protocol Assigned Numbers
.Re
.Pp
.Rs
.%A T. Ylonen
.%A C. Lonvick
.%D January 2006
.%R RFC 4251
.%T The Secure Shell (SSH) Protocol Architecture
.Re
.Pp
.Rs
.%A T. Ylonen
.%A C. Lonvick
.%D January 2006
.%R RFC 4252
.%T The Secure Shell (SSH) Authentication Protocol
.Re
.Pp
.Rs
.%A T. Ylonen
.%A C. Lonvick
.%D January 2006
.%R RFC 4253
.%T The Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Protocol
.Re
.Pp
.Rs
.%A T. Ylonen
.%A C. Lonvick
.%D January 2006
.%R RFC 4254
.%T The Secure Shell (SSH) Connection Protocol
.Re
.Pp
.Rs
.%A J. Schlyter
.%A W. Griffin
.%D January 2006
.%R RFC 4255
.%T Using DNS to Securely Publish Secure Shell (SSH) Key Fingerprints
.Re
.Pp
.Rs
.%A F. Cusack
.%A M. Forssen
.%D January 2006
.%R RFC 4256
.%T Generic Message Exchange Authentication for the Secure Shell Protocol (SSH)
.Re
.Pp
.Rs
.%A J. Galbraith
.%A P. Remaker
.%D January 2006
.%R RFC 4335
.%T The Secure Shell (SSH) Session Channel Break Extension
.Re
.Pp
.Rs
.%A M. Bellare
.%A T. Kohno
.%A C. Namprempre
.%D January 2006
.%R RFC 4344
.%T The Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Encryption Modes
.Re
.Pp
.Rs
.%A B. Harris
.%D January 2006
.%R RFC 4345
.%T Improved Arcfour Modes for the Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Protocol
.Re
.Pp
.Rs
.%A M. Friedl
.%A N. Provos
.%A W. Simpson
.%D March 2006
.%R RFC 4419
.%T Diffie-Hellman Group Exchange for the Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Protocol
.Re
.Pp
.Rs
.%A J. Galbraith
.%A R. Thayer
.%D November 2006
.%R RFC 4716
.%T The Secure Shell (SSH) Public Key File Format
.Re
.Pp
.Rs
.%A D. Stebila
.%A J. Green
.%D December 2009
.%R RFC 5656
.%T Elliptic Curve Algorithm Integration in the Secure Shell Transport Layer
.Re
.Pp
.Rs
.%A A. Perrig
.%A D. Song
.%D 1999
.%O International Workshop on Cryptographic Techniques and E-Commerce (CrypTEC '99)
.%T Hash Visualization: a New Technique to improve Real-World Security
.Re
.Sh AUTHORS
OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free
ssh 1.2.12 release by Tatu Ylonen.
Aaron Campbell, Bob Beck, Markus Friedl, Niels Provos,
Theo de Raadt and Dug Song
removed many bugs, re-added newer features and
created OpenSSH.
Markus Friedl contributed the support for SSH
protocol versions 1.5 and 2.0.
diff --git a/ssh.c b/ssh.c
index ee51823cd833..15aee569e55d 100644
--- a/ssh.c
+++ b/ssh.c
@@ -1,2167 +1,2248 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: ssh.c,v 1.507 2019/09/13 04:27:35 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh.c,v 1.519 2020/02/07 03:54:44 dtucker Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
* All rights reserved
* Ssh client program. This program can be used to log into a remote machine.
* The software supports strong authentication, encryption, and forwarding
* of X11, TCP/IP, and authentication connections.
*
* As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
* can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
* software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
* incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
* called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
*
* Copyright (c) 1999 Niels Provos. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (c) 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
* Modified to work with SSL by Niels Provos <provos@citi.umich.edu>
* in Canada (German citizen).
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H
# include <sys/stat.h>
#endif
#include <sys/resource.h>
#include <sys/ioctl.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <sys/wait.h>
#include <ctype.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <netdb.h>
#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
#include <paths.h>
#endif
#include <pwd.h>
#include <signal.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <stddef.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <limits.h>
#include <locale.h>
#include <netinet/in.h>
#include <arpa/inet.h>
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/err.h>
#endif
#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "ssh.h"
#include "ssh2.h"
#include "canohost.h"
#include "compat.h"
#include "cipher.h"
#include "digest.h"
#include "packet.h"
#include "sshbuf.h"
#include "channels.h"
#include "sshkey.h"
#include "authfd.h"
#include "authfile.h"
#include "pathnames.h"
#include "dispatch.h"
#include "clientloop.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "readconf.h"
#include "sshconnect.h"
#include "kex.h"
#include "mac.h"
#include "sshpty.h"
#include "match.h"
#include "msg.h"
#include "version.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
#include "myproposal.h"
#include "utf8.h"
#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
#include "ssh-pkcs11.h"
#endif
extern char *__progname;
/* Saves a copy of argv for setproctitle emulation */
#ifndef HAVE_SETPROCTITLE
static char **saved_av;
#endif
/* Flag indicating whether debug mode is on. May be set on the command line. */
int debug_flag = 0;
/* Flag indicating whether a tty should be requested */
int tty_flag = 0;
/* don't exec a shell */
int no_shell_flag = 0;
/*
* Flag indicating that nothing should be read from stdin. This can be set
* on the command line.
*/
int stdin_null_flag = 0;
/*
* Flag indicating that the current process should be backgrounded and
* a new slave launched in the foreground for ControlPersist.
*/
int need_controlpersist_detach = 0;
/* Copies of flags for ControlPersist foreground slave */
int ostdin_null_flag, ono_shell_flag, otty_flag, orequest_tty;
/*
* Flag indicating that ssh should fork after authentication. This is useful
* so that the passphrase can be entered manually, and then ssh goes to the
* background.
*/
int fork_after_authentication_flag = 0;
/*
* General data structure for command line options and options configurable
* in configuration files. See readconf.h.
*/
Options options;
/* optional user configfile */
char *config = NULL;
/*
* Name of the host we are connecting to. This is the name given on the
* command line, or the Hostname specified for the user-supplied name in a
* configuration file.
*/
char *host;
+/*
+ * A config can specify a path to forward, overriding SSH_AUTH_SOCK. If this is
+ * not NULL, forward the socket at this path instead.
+ */
+char *forward_agent_sock_path = NULL;
+
/* Various strings used to to percent_expand() arguments */
static char thishost[NI_MAXHOST], shorthost[NI_MAXHOST], portstr[NI_MAXSERV];
static char uidstr[32], *host_arg, *conn_hash_hex;
/* socket address the host resolves to */
struct sockaddr_storage hostaddr;
/* Private host keys. */
Sensitive sensitive_data;
/* command to be executed */
struct sshbuf *command;
/* Should we execute a command or invoke a subsystem? */
int subsystem_flag = 0;
/* # of replies received for global requests */
static int remote_forward_confirms_received = 0;
/* mux.c */
extern int muxserver_sock;
extern u_int muxclient_command;
/* Prints a help message to the user. This function never returns. */
static void
usage(void)
{
fprintf(stderr,
"usage: ssh [-46AaCfGgKkMNnqsTtVvXxYy] [-B bind_interface]\n"
" [-b bind_address] [-c cipher_spec] [-D [bind_address:]port]\n"
" [-E log_file] [-e escape_char] [-F configfile] [-I pkcs11]\n"
" [-i identity_file] [-J [user@]host[:port]] [-L address]\n"
" [-l login_name] [-m mac_spec] [-O ctl_cmd] [-o option] [-p port]\n"
" [-Q query_option] [-R address] [-S ctl_path] [-W host:port]\n"
" [-w local_tun[:remote_tun]] destination [command]\n"
);
exit(255);
}
static int ssh_session2(struct ssh *, struct passwd *);
static void load_public_identity_files(struct passwd *);
static void main_sigchld_handler(int);
/* ~/ expand a list of paths. NB. assumes path[n] is heap-allocated. */
static void
tilde_expand_paths(char **paths, u_int num_paths)
{
u_int i;
char *cp;
for (i = 0; i < num_paths; i++) {
cp = tilde_expand_filename(paths[i], getuid());
free(paths[i]);
paths[i] = cp;
}
}
/*
* Attempt to resolve a host name / port to a set of addresses and
* optionally return any CNAMEs encountered along the way.
* Returns NULL on failure.
* NB. this function must operate with a options having undefined members.
*/
static struct addrinfo *
resolve_host(const char *name, int port, int logerr, char *cname, size_t clen)
{
char strport[NI_MAXSERV];
struct addrinfo hints, *res;
int gaierr;
LogLevel loglevel = SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1;
if (port <= 0)
port = default_ssh_port();
snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%d", port);
memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
hints.ai_family = options.address_family == -1 ?
AF_UNSPEC : options.address_family;
hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
if (cname != NULL)
hints.ai_flags = AI_CANONNAME;
if ((gaierr = getaddrinfo(name, strport, &hints, &res)) != 0) {
if (logerr || (gaierr != EAI_NONAME && gaierr != EAI_NODATA))
loglevel = SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR;
do_log2(loglevel, "%s: Could not resolve hostname %.100s: %s",
__progname, name, ssh_gai_strerror(gaierr));
return NULL;
}
if (cname != NULL && res->ai_canonname != NULL) {
if (strlcpy(cname, res->ai_canonname, clen) >= clen) {
error("%s: host \"%s\" cname \"%s\" too long (max %lu)",
__func__, name, res->ai_canonname, (u_long)clen);
if (clen > 0)
*cname = '\0';
}
}
return res;
}
/* Returns non-zero if name can only be an address and not a hostname */
static int
is_addr_fast(const char *name)
{
return (strchr(name, '%') != NULL || strchr(name, ':') != NULL ||
strspn(name, "0123456789.") == strlen(name));
}
/* Returns non-zero if name represents a valid, single address */
static int
is_addr(const char *name)
{
char strport[NI_MAXSERV];
struct addrinfo hints, *res;
if (is_addr_fast(name))
return 1;
snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%u", default_ssh_port());
memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
hints.ai_family = options.address_family == -1 ?
AF_UNSPEC : options.address_family;
hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
hints.ai_flags = AI_NUMERICHOST|AI_NUMERICSERV;
if (getaddrinfo(name, strport, &hints, &res) != 0)
return 0;
if (res == NULL || res->ai_next != NULL) {
freeaddrinfo(res);
return 0;
}
freeaddrinfo(res);
return 1;
}
/*
* Attempt to resolve a numeric host address / port to a single address.
* Returns a canonical address string.
* Returns NULL on failure.
* NB. this function must operate with a options having undefined members.
*/
static struct addrinfo *
resolve_addr(const char *name, int port, char *caddr, size_t clen)
{
char addr[NI_MAXHOST], strport[NI_MAXSERV];
struct addrinfo hints, *res;
int gaierr;
if (port <= 0)
port = default_ssh_port();
snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%u", port);
memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
hints.ai_family = options.address_family == -1 ?
AF_UNSPEC : options.address_family;
hints.ai_socktype = SOCK_STREAM;
hints.ai_flags = AI_NUMERICHOST|AI_NUMERICSERV;
if ((gaierr = getaddrinfo(name, strport, &hints, &res)) != 0) {
debug2("%s: could not resolve name %.100s as address: %s",
__func__, name, ssh_gai_strerror(gaierr));
return NULL;
}
if (res == NULL) {
debug("%s: getaddrinfo %.100s returned no addresses",
__func__, name);
return NULL;
}
if (res->ai_next != NULL) {
debug("%s: getaddrinfo %.100s returned multiple addresses",
__func__, name);
goto fail;
}
if ((gaierr = getnameinfo(res->ai_addr, res->ai_addrlen,
addr, sizeof(addr), NULL, 0, NI_NUMERICHOST)) != 0) {
debug("%s: Could not format address for name %.100s: %s",
__func__, name, ssh_gai_strerror(gaierr));
goto fail;
}
if (strlcpy(caddr, addr, clen) >= clen) {
error("%s: host \"%s\" addr \"%s\" too long (max %lu)",
__func__, name, addr, (u_long)clen);
if (clen > 0)
*caddr = '\0';
fail:
freeaddrinfo(res);
return NULL;
}
return res;
}
/*
* Check whether the cname is a permitted replacement for the hostname
* and perform the replacement if it is.
* NB. this function must operate with a options having undefined members.
*/
static int
check_follow_cname(int direct, char **namep, const char *cname)
{
int i;
struct allowed_cname *rule;
if (*cname == '\0' || options.num_permitted_cnames == 0 ||
strcmp(*namep, cname) == 0)
return 0;
if (options.canonicalize_hostname == SSH_CANONICALISE_NO)
return 0;
/*
* Don't attempt to canonicalize names that will be interpreted by
* a proxy or jump host unless the user specifically requests so.
*/
if (!direct &&
options.canonicalize_hostname != SSH_CANONICALISE_ALWAYS)
return 0;
debug3("%s: check \"%s\" CNAME \"%s\"", __func__, *namep, cname);
for (i = 0; i < options.num_permitted_cnames; i++) {
rule = options.permitted_cnames + i;
if (match_pattern_list(*namep, rule->source_list, 1) != 1 ||
match_pattern_list(cname, rule->target_list, 1) != 1)
continue;
verbose("Canonicalized DNS aliased hostname "
"\"%s\" => \"%s\"", *namep, cname);
free(*namep);
*namep = xstrdup(cname);
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
/*
* Attempt to resolve the supplied hostname after applying the user's
* canonicalization rules. Returns the address list for the host or NULL
* if no name was found after canonicalization.
* NB. this function must operate with a options having undefined members.
*/
static struct addrinfo *
resolve_canonicalize(char **hostp, int port)
{
int i, direct, ndots;
char *cp, *fullhost, newname[NI_MAXHOST];
struct addrinfo *addrs;
/*
* Attempt to canonicalise addresses, regardless of
* whether hostname canonicalisation was requested
*/
if ((addrs = resolve_addr(*hostp, port,
newname, sizeof(newname))) != NULL) {
debug2("%s: hostname %.100s is address", __func__, *hostp);
if (strcasecmp(*hostp, newname) != 0) {
debug2("%s: canonicalised address \"%s\" => \"%s\"",
__func__, *hostp, newname);
free(*hostp);
*hostp = xstrdup(newname);
}
return addrs;
}
/*
* If this looks like an address but didn't parse as one, it might
* be an address with an invalid interface scope. Skip further
* attempts at canonicalisation.
*/
if (is_addr_fast(*hostp)) {
debug("%s: hostname %.100s is an unrecognised address",
__func__, *hostp);
return NULL;
}
if (options.canonicalize_hostname == SSH_CANONICALISE_NO)
return NULL;
/*
* Don't attempt to canonicalize names that will be interpreted by
* a proxy unless the user specifically requests so.
*/
direct = option_clear_or_none(options.proxy_command) &&
options.jump_host == NULL;
if (!direct &&
options.canonicalize_hostname != SSH_CANONICALISE_ALWAYS)
return NULL;
/* If domain name is anchored, then resolve it now */
if ((*hostp)[strlen(*hostp) - 1] == '.') {
debug3("%s: name is fully qualified", __func__);
fullhost = xstrdup(*hostp);
if ((addrs = resolve_host(fullhost, port, 0,
newname, sizeof(newname))) != NULL)
goto found;
free(fullhost);
goto notfound;
}
/* Don't apply canonicalization to sufficiently-qualified hostnames */
ndots = 0;
for (cp = *hostp; *cp != '\0'; cp++) {
if (*cp == '.')
ndots++;
}
if (ndots > options.canonicalize_max_dots) {
debug3("%s: not canonicalizing hostname \"%s\" (max dots %d)",
__func__, *hostp, options.canonicalize_max_dots);
return NULL;
}
/* Attempt each supplied suffix */
for (i = 0; i < options.num_canonical_domains; i++) {
*newname = '\0';
xasprintf(&fullhost, "%s.%s.", *hostp,
options.canonical_domains[i]);
debug3("%s: attempting \"%s\" => \"%s\"", __func__,
*hostp, fullhost);
if ((addrs = resolve_host(fullhost, port, 0,
newname, sizeof(newname))) == NULL) {
free(fullhost);
continue;
}
found:
/* Remove trailing '.' */
fullhost[strlen(fullhost) - 1] = '\0';
/* Follow CNAME if requested */
if (!check_follow_cname(direct, &fullhost, newname)) {
debug("Canonicalized hostname \"%s\" => \"%s\"",
*hostp, fullhost);
}
free(*hostp);
*hostp = fullhost;
return addrs;
}
notfound:
if (!options.canonicalize_fallback_local)
fatal("%s: Could not resolve host \"%s\"", __progname, *hostp);
debug2("%s: host %s not found in any suffix", __func__, *hostp);
return NULL;
}
/*
* Check the result of hostkey loading, ignoring some errors and
* fatal()ing for others.
*/
static void
check_load(int r, const char *path, const char *message)
{
switch (r) {
case 0:
break;
case SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR:
case SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL:
fatal("load %s \"%s\": %s", message, path, ssh_err(r));
case SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR:
/* Ignore missing files */
if (errno == ENOENT)
break;
/* FALLTHROUGH */
default:
error("load %s \"%s\": %s", message, path, ssh_err(r));
break;
}
}
/*
* Read per-user configuration file. Ignore the system wide config
* file if the user specifies a config file on the command line.
*/
static void
process_config_files(const char *host_name, struct passwd *pw, int final_pass,
int *want_final_pass)
{
char buf[PATH_MAX];
int r;
if (config != NULL) {
if (strcasecmp(config, "none") != 0 &&
!read_config_file(config, pw, host, host_name, &options,
SSHCONF_USERCONF | (final_pass ? SSHCONF_FINAL : 0),
want_final_pass))
fatal("Can't open user config file %.100s: "
"%.100s", config, strerror(errno));
} else {
r = snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%s/%s", pw->pw_dir,
_PATH_SSH_USER_CONFFILE);
if (r > 0 && (size_t)r < sizeof(buf))
(void)read_config_file(buf, pw, host, host_name,
&options, SSHCONF_CHECKPERM | SSHCONF_USERCONF |
(final_pass ? SSHCONF_FINAL : 0), want_final_pass);
/* Read systemwide configuration file after user config. */
(void)read_config_file(_PATH_HOST_CONFIG_FILE, pw,
host, host_name, &options,
final_pass ? SSHCONF_FINAL : 0, want_final_pass);
}
}
/* Rewrite the port number in an addrinfo list of addresses */
static void
set_addrinfo_port(struct addrinfo *addrs, int port)
{
struct addrinfo *addr;
for (addr = addrs; addr != NULL; addr = addr->ai_next) {
switch (addr->ai_family) {
case AF_INET:
((struct sockaddr_in *)addr->ai_addr)->
sin_port = htons(port);
break;
case AF_INET6:
((struct sockaddr_in6 *)addr->ai_addr)->
sin6_port = htons(port);
break;
}
}
}
/*
* Main program for the ssh client.
*/
int
main(int ac, char **av)
{
struct ssh *ssh = NULL;
int i, r, opt, exit_status, use_syslog, direct, timeout_ms;
int was_addr, config_test = 0, opt_terminated = 0, want_final_pass = 0;
char *p, *cp, *line, *argv0, buf[PATH_MAX], *logfile;
char cname[NI_MAXHOST];
struct stat st;
struct passwd *pw;
extern int optind, optreset;
extern char *optarg;
struct Forward fwd;
struct addrinfo *addrs = NULL;
struct ssh_digest_ctx *md;
u_char conn_hash[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
+ size_t n, len;
/* Ensure that fds 0, 1 and 2 are open or directed to /dev/null */
sanitise_stdfd();
__progname = ssh_get_progname(av[0]);
#ifndef HAVE_SETPROCTITLE
/* Prepare for later setproctitle emulation */
/* Save argv so it isn't clobbered by setproctitle() emulation */
saved_av = xcalloc(ac + 1, sizeof(*saved_av));
for (i = 0; i < ac; i++)
saved_av[i] = xstrdup(av[i]);
saved_av[i] = NULL;
compat_init_setproctitle(ac, av);
av = saved_av;
#endif
seed_rng();
/*
* Discard other fds that are hanging around. These can cause problem
* with backgrounded ssh processes started by ControlPersist.
*/
closefrom(STDERR_FILENO + 1);
/* Get user data. */
pw = getpwuid(getuid());
if (!pw) {
logit("No user exists for uid %lu", (u_long)getuid());
exit(255);
}
/* Take a copy of the returned structure. */
pw = pwcopy(pw);
/*
* Set our umask to something reasonable, as some files are created
* with the default umask. This will make them world-readable but
* writable only by the owner, which is ok for all files for which we
* don't set the modes explicitly.
*/
umask(022);
msetlocale();
/*
* Initialize option structure to indicate that no values have been
* set.
*/
initialize_options(&options);
/*
* Prepare main ssh transport/connection structures
*/
if ((ssh = ssh_alloc_session_state()) == NULL)
fatal("Couldn't allocate session state");
channel_init_channels(ssh);
/* Parse command-line arguments. */
host = NULL;
use_syslog = 0;
logfile = NULL;
argv0 = av[0];
again:
while ((opt = getopt(ac, av, "1246ab:c:e:fgi:kl:m:no:p:qstvx"
"AB:CD:E:F:GI:J:KL:MNO:PQ:R:S:TVw:W:XYy")) != -1) {
switch (opt) {
case '1':
fatal("SSH protocol v.1 is no longer supported");
break;
case '2':
/* Ignored */
break;
case '4':
options.address_family = AF_INET;
break;
case '6':
options.address_family = AF_INET6;
break;
case 'n':
stdin_null_flag = 1;
break;
case 'f':
fork_after_authentication_flag = 1;
stdin_null_flag = 1;
break;
case 'x':
options.forward_x11 = 0;
break;
case 'X':
options.forward_x11 = 1;
break;
case 'y':
use_syslog = 1;
break;
case 'E':
logfile = optarg;
break;
case 'G':
config_test = 1;
break;
case 'Y':
options.forward_x11 = 1;
options.forward_x11_trusted = 1;
break;
case 'g':
options.fwd_opts.gateway_ports = 1;
break;
case 'O':
if (options.stdio_forward_host != NULL)
fatal("Cannot specify multiplexing "
"command with -W");
else if (muxclient_command != 0)
fatal("Multiplexing command already specified");
if (strcmp(optarg, "check") == 0)
muxclient_command = SSHMUX_COMMAND_ALIVE_CHECK;
else if (strcmp(optarg, "forward") == 0)
muxclient_command = SSHMUX_COMMAND_FORWARD;
else if (strcmp(optarg, "exit") == 0)
muxclient_command = SSHMUX_COMMAND_TERMINATE;
else if (strcmp(optarg, "stop") == 0)
muxclient_command = SSHMUX_COMMAND_STOP;
else if (strcmp(optarg, "cancel") == 0)
muxclient_command = SSHMUX_COMMAND_CANCEL_FWD;
else if (strcmp(optarg, "proxy") == 0)
muxclient_command = SSHMUX_COMMAND_PROXY;
else
fatal("Invalid multiplex command.");
break;
case 'P': /* deprecated */
break;
case 'Q':
cp = NULL;
- if (strcmp(optarg, "cipher") == 0)
+ if (strcmp(optarg, "cipher") == 0 ||
+ strcasecmp(optarg, "Ciphers") == 0)
cp = cipher_alg_list('\n', 0);
else if (strcmp(optarg, "cipher-auth") == 0)
cp = cipher_alg_list('\n', 1);
- else if (strcmp(optarg, "mac") == 0)
+ else if (strcmp(optarg, "mac") == 0 ||
+ strcasecmp(optarg, "MACs") == 0)
cp = mac_alg_list('\n');
- else if (strcmp(optarg, "kex") == 0)
+ else if (strcmp(optarg, "kex") == 0 ||
+ strcasecmp(optarg, "KexAlgorithms") == 0)
cp = kex_alg_list('\n');
else if (strcmp(optarg, "key") == 0)
cp = sshkey_alg_list(0, 0, 0, '\n');
else if (strcmp(optarg, "key-cert") == 0)
cp = sshkey_alg_list(1, 0, 0, '\n');
else if (strcmp(optarg, "key-plain") == 0)
cp = sshkey_alg_list(0, 1, 0, '\n');
+ else if (strcmp(optarg, "key-sig") == 0 ||
+ strcasecmp(optarg, "PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes") == 0 ||
+ strcasecmp(optarg, "HostKeyAlgorithms") == 0 ||
+ strcasecmp(optarg, "HostbasedKeyTypes") == 0 ||
+ strcasecmp(optarg, "HostbasedAcceptedKeyTypes") == 0)
+ cp = sshkey_alg_list(0, 0, 1, '\n');
else if (strcmp(optarg, "sig") == 0)
cp = sshkey_alg_list(0, 1, 1, '\n');
else if (strcmp(optarg, "protocol-version") == 0)
cp = xstrdup("2");
- else if (strcmp(optarg, "help") == 0) {
+ else if (strcmp(optarg, "compression") == 0) {
+ cp = xstrdup(compression_alg_list(0));
+ len = strlen(cp);
+ for (n = 0; n < len; n++)
+ if (cp[n] == ',')
+ cp[n] = '\n';
+ } else if (strcmp(optarg, "help") == 0) {
cp = xstrdup(
- "cipher\ncipher-auth\nkex\nkey\n"
- "key-cert\nkey-plain\nmac\n"
+ "cipher\ncipher-auth\ncompression\nkex\n"
+ "key\nkey-cert\nkey-plain\nkey-sig\nmac\n"
"protocol-version\nsig");
}
if (cp == NULL)
fatal("Unsupported query \"%s\"", optarg);
printf("%s\n", cp);
free(cp);
exit(0);
break;
case 'a':
options.forward_agent = 0;
break;
case 'A':
options.forward_agent = 1;
break;
case 'k':
options.gss_deleg_creds = 0;
break;
case 'K':
options.gss_authentication = 1;
options.gss_deleg_creds = 1;
break;
case 'i':
p = tilde_expand_filename(optarg, getuid());
if (stat(p, &st) == -1)
fprintf(stderr, "Warning: Identity file %s "
"not accessible: %s.\n", p,
strerror(errno));
else
add_identity_file(&options, NULL, p, 1);
free(p);
break;
case 'I':
#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
free(options.pkcs11_provider);
options.pkcs11_provider = xstrdup(optarg);
#else
fprintf(stderr, "no support for PKCS#11.\n");
#endif
break;
case 'J':
if (options.jump_host != NULL) {
fatal("Only a single -J option is permitted "
"(use commas to separate multiple "
"jump hops)");
}
if (options.proxy_command != NULL)
fatal("Cannot specify -J with ProxyCommand");
if (parse_jump(optarg, &options, 1) == -1)
fatal("Invalid -J argument");
options.proxy_command = xstrdup("none");
break;
case 't':
if (options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_YES)
options.request_tty = REQUEST_TTY_FORCE;
else
options.request_tty = REQUEST_TTY_YES;
break;
case 'v':
if (debug_flag == 0) {
debug_flag = 1;
options.log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1;
} else {
if (options.log_level < SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3) {
debug_flag++;
options.log_level++;
}
}
break;
case 'V':
fprintf(stderr, "%s, %s\n",
SSH_RELEASE,
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
OpenSSL_version(OPENSSL_VERSION)
#else
"without OpenSSL"
#endif
);
if (opt == 'V')
exit(0);
break;
case 'w':
if (options.tun_open == -1)
options.tun_open = SSH_TUNMODE_DEFAULT;
options.tun_local = a2tun(optarg, &options.tun_remote);
if (options.tun_local == SSH_TUNID_ERR) {
fprintf(stderr,
"Bad tun device '%s'\n", optarg);
exit(255);
}
break;
case 'W':
if (options.stdio_forward_host != NULL)
fatal("stdio forward already specified");
if (muxclient_command != 0)
fatal("Cannot specify stdio forward with -O");
if (parse_forward(&fwd, optarg, 1, 0)) {
options.stdio_forward_host = fwd.listen_host;
options.stdio_forward_port = fwd.listen_port;
free(fwd.connect_host);
} else {
fprintf(stderr,
"Bad stdio forwarding specification '%s'\n",
optarg);
exit(255);
}
options.request_tty = REQUEST_TTY_NO;
no_shell_flag = 1;
break;
case 'q':
options.log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_QUIET;
break;
case 'e':
if (optarg[0] == '^' && optarg[2] == 0 &&
(u_char) optarg[1] >= 64 &&
(u_char) optarg[1] < 128)
options.escape_char = (u_char) optarg[1] & 31;
else if (strlen(optarg) == 1)
options.escape_char = (u_char) optarg[0];
else if (strcmp(optarg, "none") == 0)
options.escape_char = SSH_ESCAPECHAR_NONE;
else {
fprintf(stderr, "Bad escape character '%s'.\n",
optarg);
exit(255);
}
break;
case 'c':
if (!ciphers_valid(*optarg == '+' || *optarg == '^' ?
optarg + 1 : optarg)) {
fprintf(stderr, "Unknown cipher type '%s'\n",
optarg);
exit(255);
}
free(options.ciphers);
options.ciphers = xstrdup(optarg);
break;
case 'm':
if (mac_valid(optarg)) {
free(options.macs);
options.macs = xstrdup(optarg);
} else {
fprintf(stderr, "Unknown mac type '%s'\n",
optarg);
exit(255);
}
break;
case 'M':
if (options.control_master == SSHCTL_MASTER_YES)
options.control_master = SSHCTL_MASTER_ASK;
else
options.control_master = SSHCTL_MASTER_YES;
break;
case 'p':
if (options.port == -1) {
options.port = a2port(optarg);
if (options.port <= 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "Bad port '%s'\n",
optarg);
exit(255);
}
}
break;
case 'l':
if (options.user == NULL)
options.user = optarg;
break;
case 'L':
if (parse_forward(&fwd, optarg, 0, 0))
add_local_forward(&options, &fwd);
else {
fprintf(stderr,
"Bad local forwarding specification '%s'\n",
optarg);
exit(255);
}
break;
case 'R':
if (parse_forward(&fwd, optarg, 0, 1) ||
parse_forward(&fwd, optarg, 1, 1)) {
add_remote_forward(&options, &fwd);
} else {
fprintf(stderr,
"Bad remote forwarding specification "
"'%s'\n", optarg);
exit(255);
}
break;
case 'D':
if (parse_forward(&fwd, optarg, 1, 0)) {
add_local_forward(&options, &fwd);
} else {
fprintf(stderr,
"Bad dynamic forwarding specification "
"'%s'\n", optarg);
exit(255);
}
break;
case 'C':
+#ifdef WITH_ZLIB
options.compression = 1;
+#else
+ error("Compression not supported, disabling.");
+#endif
break;
case 'N':
no_shell_flag = 1;
options.request_tty = REQUEST_TTY_NO;
break;
case 'T':
options.request_tty = REQUEST_TTY_NO;
break;
case 'o':
line = xstrdup(optarg);
if (process_config_line(&options, pw,
host ? host : "", host ? host : "", line,
"command-line", 0, NULL, SSHCONF_USERCONF) != 0)
exit(255);
free(line);
break;
case 's':
subsystem_flag = 1;
break;
case 'S':
free(options.control_path);
options.control_path = xstrdup(optarg);
break;
case 'b':
options.bind_address = optarg;
break;
case 'B':
options.bind_interface = optarg;
break;
case 'F':
config = optarg;
break;
default:
usage();
}
}
if (optind > 1 && strcmp(av[optind - 1], "--") == 0)
opt_terminated = 1;
ac -= optind;
av += optind;
if (ac > 0 && !host) {
int tport;
char *tuser;
switch (parse_ssh_uri(*av, &tuser, &host, &tport)) {
case -1:
usage();
break;
case 0:
if (options.user == NULL) {
options.user = tuser;
tuser = NULL;
}
free(tuser);
if (options.port == -1 && tport != -1)
options.port = tport;
break;
default:
p = xstrdup(*av);
cp = strrchr(p, '@');
if (cp != NULL) {
if (cp == p)
usage();
if (options.user == NULL) {
options.user = p;
p = NULL;
}
*cp++ = '\0';
host = xstrdup(cp);
free(p);
} else
host = p;
break;
}
if (ac > 1 && !opt_terminated) {
optind = optreset = 1;
goto again;
}
ac--, av++;
}
/* Check that we got a host name. */
if (!host)
usage();
host_arg = xstrdup(host);
/* Initialize the command to execute on remote host. */
if ((command = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("sshbuf_new failed");
/*
* Save the command to execute on the remote host in a buffer. There
* is no limit on the length of the command, except by the maximum
* packet size. Also sets the tty flag if there is no command.
*/
if (!ac) {
/* No command specified - execute shell on a tty. */
if (subsystem_flag) {
fprintf(stderr,
"You must specify a subsystem to invoke.\n");
usage();
}
} else {
/* A command has been specified. Store it into the buffer. */
for (i = 0; i < ac; i++) {
if ((r = sshbuf_putf(command, "%s%s",
i ? " " : "", av[i])) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
}
}
/*
* Initialize "log" output. Since we are the client all output
* goes to stderr unless otherwise specified by -y or -E.
*/
if (use_syslog && logfile != NULL)
fatal("Can't specify both -y and -E");
if (logfile != NULL)
log_redirect_stderr_to(logfile);
log_init(argv0,
options.log_level == SYSLOG_LEVEL_NOT_SET ?
SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO : options.log_level,
options.log_facility == SYSLOG_FACILITY_NOT_SET ?
SYSLOG_FACILITY_USER : options.log_facility,
!use_syslog);
if (debug_flag)
logit("%s, %s", SSH_RELEASE,
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
OpenSSL_version(OPENSSL_VERSION)
#else
"without OpenSSL"
#endif
);
/* Parse the configuration files */
process_config_files(host_arg, pw, 0, &want_final_pass);
if (want_final_pass)
debug("configuration requests final Match pass");
/* Hostname canonicalisation needs a few options filled. */
fill_default_options_for_canonicalization(&options);
/* If the user has replaced the hostname then take it into use now */
if (options.hostname != NULL) {
/* NB. Please keep in sync with readconf.c:match_cfg_line() */
cp = percent_expand(options.hostname,
"h", host, (char *)NULL);
free(host);
host = cp;
free(options.hostname);
options.hostname = xstrdup(host);
}
/* Don't lowercase addresses, they will be explicitly canonicalised */
if ((was_addr = is_addr(host)) == 0)
lowercase(host);
/*
* Try to canonicalize if requested by configuration or the
* hostname is an address.
*/
if (options.canonicalize_hostname != SSH_CANONICALISE_NO || was_addr)
addrs = resolve_canonicalize(&host, options.port);
/*
* If CanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs have been specified but
* other canonicalization did not happen (by not being requested
* or by failing with fallback) then the hostname may still be changed
* as a result of CNAME following.
*
* Try to resolve the bare hostname name using the system resolver's
* usual search rules and then apply the CNAME follow rules.
*
* Skip the lookup if a ProxyCommand is being used unless the user
* has specifically requested canonicalisation for this case via
* CanonicalizeHostname=always
*/
direct = option_clear_or_none(options.proxy_command) &&
options.jump_host == NULL;
if (addrs == NULL && options.num_permitted_cnames != 0 && (direct ||
options.canonicalize_hostname == SSH_CANONICALISE_ALWAYS)) {
if ((addrs = resolve_host(host, options.port,
direct, cname, sizeof(cname))) == NULL) {
/* Don't fatal proxied host names not in the DNS */
if (direct)
cleanup_exit(255); /* logged in resolve_host */
} else
check_follow_cname(direct, &host, cname);
}
/*
* If canonicalisation is enabled then re-parse the configuration
* files as new stanzas may match.
*/
if (options.canonicalize_hostname != 0 && !want_final_pass) {
debug("hostname canonicalisation enabled, "
"will re-parse configuration");
want_final_pass = 1;
}
if (want_final_pass) {
debug("re-parsing configuration");
free(options.hostname);
options.hostname = xstrdup(host);
process_config_files(host_arg, pw, 1, NULL);
/*
* Address resolution happens early with canonicalisation
* enabled and the port number may have changed since, so
* reset it in address list
*/
if (addrs != NULL && options.port > 0)
set_addrinfo_port(addrs, options.port);
}
/* Fill configuration defaults. */
fill_default_options(&options);
/*
* If ProxyJump option specified, then construct a ProxyCommand now.
*/
if (options.jump_host != NULL) {
char port_s[8];
const char *sshbin = argv0;
/*
* Try to use SSH indicated by argv[0], but fall back to
* "ssh" if it appears unavailable.
*/
if (strchr(argv0, '/') != NULL && access(argv0, X_OK) != 0)
sshbin = "ssh";
/* Consistency check */
if (options.proxy_command != NULL)
fatal("inconsistent options: ProxyCommand+ProxyJump");
/* Never use FD passing for ProxyJump */
options.proxy_use_fdpass = 0;
snprintf(port_s, sizeof(port_s), "%d", options.jump_port);
xasprintf(&options.proxy_command,
"%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%s%.*s -W '[%%h]:%%p' %s",
sshbin,
/* Optional "-l user" argument if jump_user set */
options.jump_user == NULL ? "" : " -l ",
options.jump_user == NULL ? "" : options.jump_user,
/* Optional "-p port" argument if jump_port set */
options.jump_port <= 0 ? "" : " -p ",
options.jump_port <= 0 ? "" : port_s,
/* Optional additional jump hosts ",..." */
options.jump_extra == NULL ? "" : " -J ",
options.jump_extra == NULL ? "" : options.jump_extra,
/* Optional "-F" argumment if -F specified */
config == NULL ? "" : " -F ",
config == NULL ? "" : config,
/* Optional "-v" arguments if -v set */
debug_flag ? " -" : "",
debug_flag, "vvv",
/* Mandatory hostname */
options.jump_host);
debug("Setting implicit ProxyCommand from ProxyJump: %s",
options.proxy_command);
}
if (options.port == 0)
options.port = default_ssh_port();
channel_set_af(ssh, options.address_family);
/* Tidy and check options */
if (options.host_key_alias != NULL)
lowercase(options.host_key_alias);
if (options.proxy_command != NULL &&
strcmp(options.proxy_command, "-") == 0 &&
options.proxy_use_fdpass)
fatal("ProxyCommand=- and ProxyUseFDPass are incompatible");
- if (options.control_persist &&
- options.update_hostkeys == SSH_UPDATE_HOSTKEYS_ASK) {
- debug("UpdateHostKeys=ask is incompatible with ControlPersist; "
- "disabling");
- options.update_hostkeys = 0;
+ if (options.update_hostkeys == SSH_UPDATE_HOSTKEYS_ASK) {
+ if (options.control_persist && options.control_path != NULL) {
+ debug("UpdateHostKeys=ask is incompatible with "
+ "ControlPersist; disabling");
+ options.update_hostkeys = 0;
+ } else if (sshbuf_len(command) != 0 ||
+ options.remote_command != NULL ||
+ options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_NO) {
+ debug("UpdateHostKeys=ask is incompatible with "
+ "remote command execution; disabling");
+ options.update_hostkeys = 0;
+ } else if (options.log_level < SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO) {
+ /* no point logging anything; user won't see it */
+ options.update_hostkeys = 0;
+ }
}
if (options.connection_attempts <= 0)
fatal("Invalid number of ConnectionAttempts");
if (sshbuf_len(command) != 0 && options.remote_command != NULL)
fatal("Cannot execute command-line and remote command.");
/* Cannot fork to background if no command. */
if (fork_after_authentication_flag && sshbuf_len(command) == 0 &&
options.remote_command == NULL && !no_shell_flag)
fatal("Cannot fork into background without a command "
"to execute.");
/* reinit */
log_init(argv0, options.log_level, options.log_facility, !use_syslog);
if (options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_YES ||
options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_FORCE)
tty_flag = 1;
/* Allocate a tty by default if no command specified. */
if (sshbuf_len(command) == 0 && options.remote_command == NULL)
tty_flag = options.request_tty != REQUEST_TTY_NO;
/* Force no tty */
if (options.request_tty == REQUEST_TTY_NO ||
(muxclient_command && muxclient_command != SSHMUX_COMMAND_PROXY))
tty_flag = 0;
/* Do not allocate a tty if stdin is not a tty. */
if ((!isatty(fileno(stdin)) || stdin_null_flag) &&
options.request_tty != REQUEST_TTY_FORCE) {
if (tty_flag)
logit("Pseudo-terminal will not be allocated because "
"stdin is not a terminal.");
tty_flag = 0;
}
if (options.user == NULL)
options.user = xstrdup(pw->pw_name);
/* Set up strings used to percent_expand() arguments */
if (gethostname(thishost, sizeof(thishost)) == -1)
fatal("gethostname: %s", strerror(errno));
strlcpy(shorthost, thishost, sizeof(shorthost));
shorthost[strcspn(thishost, ".")] = '\0';
snprintf(portstr, sizeof(portstr), "%d", options.port);
snprintf(uidstr, sizeof(uidstr), "%llu",
(unsigned long long)pw->pw_uid);
if ((md = ssh_digest_start(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1)) == NULL ||
ssh_digest_update(md, thishost, strlen(thishost)) < 0 ||
ssh_digest_update(md, host, strlen(host)) < 0 ||
ssh_digest_update(md, portstr, strlen(portstr)) < 0 ||
ssh_digest_update(md, options.user, strlen(options.user)) < 0 ||
ssh_digest_final(md, conn_hash, sizeof(conn_hash)) < 0)
fatal("%s: mux digest failed", __func__);
ssh_digest_free(md);
conn_hash_hex = tohex(conn_hash, ssh_digest_bytes(SSH_DIGEST_SHA1));
/*
* Expand tokens in arguments. NB. LocalCommand is expanded later,
* after port-forwarding is set up, so it may pick up any local
* tunnel interface name allocated.
*/
if (options.remote_command != NULL) {
debug3("expanding RemoteCommand: %s", options.remote_command);
cp = options.remote_command;
options.remote_command = percent_expand(cp,
"C", conn_hash_hex,
"L", shorthost,
"d", pw->pw_dir,
"h", host,
"i", uidstr,
"l", thishost,
"n", host_arg,
"p", portstr,
"r", options.user,
"u", pw->pw_name,
(char *)NULL);
debug3("expanded RemoteCommand: %s", options.remote_command);
free(cp);
if ((r = sshbuf_put(command, options.remote_command,
strlen(options.remote_command))) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
}
if (options.control_path != NULL) {
cp = tilde_expand_filename(options.control_path, getuid());
free(options.control_path);
options.control_path = percent_expand(cp,
"C", conn_hash_hex,
"L", shorthost,
"h", host,
"i", uidstr,
"l", thishost,
"n", host_arg,
"p", portstr,
"r", options.user,
"u", pw->pw_name,
"i", uidstr,
(char *)NULL);
free(cp);
}
if (config_test) {
dump_client_config(&options, host);
exit(0);
}
+ /* Expand SecurityKeyProvider if it refers to an environment variable */
+ if (options.sk_provider != NULL && *options.sk_provider == '$' &&
+ strlen(options.sk_provider) > 1) {
+ if ((cp = getenv(options.sk_provider + 1)) == NULL) {
+ debug("Authenticator provider %s did not resolve; "
+ "disabling", options.sk_provider);
+ free(options.sk_provider);
+ options.sk_provider = NULL;
+ } else {
+ debug2("resolved SecurityKeyProvider %s => %s",
+ options.sk_provider, cp);
+ free(options.sk_provider);
+ options.sk_provider = xstrdup(cp);
+ }
+ }
+
if (muxclient_command != 0 && options.control_path == NULL)
fatal("No ControlPath specified for \"-O\" command");
if (options.control_path != NULL) {
int sock;
if ((sock = muxclient(options.control_path)) >= 0) {
ssh_packet_set_connection(ssh, sock, sock);
ssh_packet_set_mux(ssh);
goto skip_connect;
}
}
/*
* If hostname canonicalisation was not enabled, then we may not
* have yet resolved the hostname. Do so now.
*/
if (addrs == NULL && options.proxy_command == NULL) {
debug2("resolving \"%s\" port %d", host, options.port);
if ((addrs = resolve_host(host, options.port, 1,
cname, sizeof(cname))) == NULL)
cleanup_exit(255); /* resolve_host logs the error */
}
timeout_ms = options.connection_timeout * 1000;
/* Open a connection to the remote host. */
- if (ssh_connect(ssh, host_arg, host, addrs, &hostaddr, options.port,
+ if (ssh_connect(ssh, host, host_arg, addrs, &hostaddr, options.port,
options.address_family, options.connection_attempts,
&timeout_ms, options.tcp_keep_alive) != 0)
exit(255);
if (addrs != NULL)
freeaddrinfo(addrs);
ssh_packet_set_timeout(ssh, options.server_alive_interval,
options.server_alive_count_max);
if (timeout_ms > 0)
debug3("timeout: %d ms remain after connect", timeout_ms);
/*
* If we successfully made the connection and we have hostbased auth
* enabled, load the public keys so we can later use the ssh-keysign
* helper to sign challenges.
*/
sensitive_data.nkeys = 0;
sensitive_data.keys = NULL;
if (options.hostbased_authentication) {
sensitive_data.nkeys = 10;
sensitive_data.keys = xcalloc(sensitive_data.nkeys,
sizeof(struct sshkey));
/* XXX check errors? */
#define L_PUBKEY(p,o) do { \
if ((o) >= sensitive_data.nkeys) \
fatal("%s pubkey out of array bounds", __func__); \
check_load(sshkey_load_public(p, &(sensitive_data.keys[o]), NULL), \
p, "pubkey"); \
} while (0)
#define L_CERT(p,o) do { \
if ((o) >= sensitive_data.nkeys) \
fatal("%s cert out of array bounds", __func__); \
check_load(sshkey_load_cert(p, &(sensitive_data.keys[o])), p, "cert"); \
} while (0)
if (options.hostbased_authentication == 1) {
L_CERT(_PATH_HOST_ECDSA_KEY_FILE, 0);
L_CERT(_PATH_HOST_ED25519_KEY_FILE, 1);
L_CERT(_PATH_HOST_RSA_KEY_FILE, 2);
L_CERT(_PATH_HOST_DSA_KEY_FILE, 3);
L_PUBKEY(_PATH_HOST_ECDSA_KEY_FILE, 4);
L_PUBKEY(_PATH_HOST_ED25519_KEY_FILE, 5);
L_PUBKEY(_PATH_HOST_RSA_KEY_FILE, 6);
L_PUBKEY(_PATH_HOST_DSA_KEY_FILE, 7);
L_CERT(_PATH_HOST_XMSS_KEY_FILE, 8);
L_PUBKEY(_PATH_HOST_XMSS_KEY_FILE, 9);
}
}
/* Create ~/.ssh * directory if it doesn't already exist. */
if (config == NULL) {
r = snprintf(buf, sizeof buf, "%s%s%s", pw->pw_dir,
strcmp(pw->pw_dir, "/") ? "/" : "", _PATH_SSH_USER_DIR);
if (r > 0 && (size_t)r < sizeof(buf) && stat(buf, &st) == -1) {
#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
ssh_selinux_setfscreatecon(buf);
#endif
if (mkdir(buf, 0700) < 0)
error("Could not create directory '%.200s'.",
buf);
#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
ssh_selinux_setfscreatecon(NULL);
#endif
}
}
/* load options.identity_files */
load_public_identity_files(pw);
/* optionally set the SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME variable */
if (options.identity_agent &&
strcmp(options.identity_agent, SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME) != 0) {
if (strcmp(options.identity_agent, "none") == 0) {
unsetenv(SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME);
} else {
p = tilde_expand_filename(options.identity_agent,
getuid());
cp = percent_expand(p,
"d", pw->pw_dir,
"h", host,
"i", uidstr,
"l", thishost,
"r", options.user,
"u", pw->pw_name,
(char *)NULL);
free(p);
/*
* If identity_agent represents an environment variable
* then recheck that it is valid (since processing with
* percent_expand() may have changed it) and substitute
* its value.
*/
if (cp[0] == '$') {
if (!valid_env_name(cp + 1)) {
fatal("Invalid IdentityAgent "
"environment variable name %s", cp);
}
if ((p = getenv(cp + 1)) == NULL)
unsetenv(SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME);
else
setenv(SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME, p, 1);
} else {
/* identity_agent specifies a path directly */
setenv(SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME, cp, 1);
}
free(cp);
}
}
+ if (options.forward_agent && (options.forward_agent_sock_path != NULL)) {
+ p = tilde_expand_filename(options.forward_agent_sock_path, getuid());
+ cp = percent_expand(p,
+ "d", pw->pw_dir,
+ "h", host,
+ "i", uidstr,
+ "l", thishost,
+ "r", options.user,
+ "u", pw->pw_name,
+ (char *)NULL);
+ free(p);
+
+ if (cp[0] == '$') {
+ if (!valid_env_name(cp + 1)) {
+ fatal("Invalid ForwardAgent environment variable name %s", cp);
+ }
+ if ((p = getenv(cp + 1)) != NULL)
+ forward_agent_sock_path = p;
+ else
+ options.forward_agent = 0;
+ free(cp);
+ } else {
+ forward_agent_sock_path = cp;
+ }
+ }
+
/* Expand ~ in known host file names. */
tilde_expand_paths(options.system_hostfiles,
options.num_system_hostfiles);
tilde_expand_paths(options.user_hostfiles, options.num_user_hostfiles);
- signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN); /* ignore SIGPIPE early */
- signal(SIGCHLD, main_sigchld_handler);
+ ssh_signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN); /* ignore SIGPIPE early */
+ ssh_signal(SIGCHLD, main_sigchld_handler);
/* Log into the remote system. Never returns if the login fails. */
ssh_login(ssh, &sensitive_data, host, (struct sockaddr *)&hostaddr,
options.port, pw, timeout_ms);
if (ssh_packet_connection_is_on_socket(ssh)) {
verbose("Authenticated to %s ([%s]:%d).", host,
ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh));
} else {
verbose("Authenticated to %s (via proxy).", host);
}
/* We no longer need the private host keys. Clear them now. */
if (sensitive_data.nkeys != 0) {
for (i = 0; i < sensitive_data.nkeys; i++) {
if (sensitive_data.keys[i] != NULL) {
/* Destroys contents safely */
debug3("clear hostkey %d", i);
sshkey_free(sensitive_data.keys[i]);
sensitive_data.keys[i] = NULL;
}
}
free(sensitive_data.keys);
}
for (i = 0; i < options.num_identity_files; i++) {
free(options.identity_files[i]);
options.identity_files[i] = NULL;
if (options.identity_keys[i]) {
sshkey_free(options.identity_keys[i]);
options.identity_keys[i] = NULL;
}
}
for (i = 0; i < options.num_certificate_files; i++) {
free(options.certificate_files[i]);
options.certificate_files[i] = NULL;
}
skip_connect:
exit_status = ssh_session2(ssh, pw);
ssh_packet_close(ssh);
if (options.control_path != NULL && muxserver_sock != -1)
unlink(options.control_path);
/* Kill ProxyCommand if it is running. */
ssh_kill_proxy_command();
return exit_status;
}
static void
control_persist_detach(void)
{
pid_t pid;
int devnull, keep_stderr;
debug("%s: backgrounding master process", __func__);
/*
* master (current process) into the background, and make the
* foreground process a client of the backgrounded master.
*/
switch ((pid = fork())) {
case -1:
fatal("%s: fork: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
case 0:
/* Child: master process continues mainloop */
break;
default:
/* Parent: set up mux slave to connect to backgrounded master */
debug2("%s: background process is %ld", __func__, (long)pid);
stdin_null_flag = ostdin_null_flag;
options.request_tty = orequest_tty;
tty_flag = otty_flag;
close(muxserver_sock);
muxserver_sock = -1;
options.control_master = SSHCTL_MASTER_NO;
muxclient(options.control_path);
/* muxclient() doesn't return on success. */
fatal("Failed to connect to new control master");
}
if ((devnull = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDWR)) == -1) {
error("%s: open(\"/dev/null\"): %s", __func__,
strerror(errno));
} else {
keep_stderr = log_is_on_stderr() && debug_flag;
if (dup2(devnull, STDIN_FILENO) == -1 ||
dup2(devnull, STDOUT_FILENO) == -1 ||
(!keep_stderr && dup2(devnull, STDERR_FILENO) == -1))
error("%s: dup2: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
if (devnull > STDERR_FILENO)
close(devnull);
}
daemon(1, 1);
setproctitle("%s [mux]", options.control_path);
}
/* Do fork() after authentication. Used by "ssh -f" */
static void
fork_postauth(void)
{
if (need_controlpersist_detach)
control_persist_detach();
debug("forking to background");
fork_after_authentication_flag = 0;
if (daemon(1, 1) == -1)
fatal("daemon() failed: %.200s", strerror(errno));
}
/* Callback for remote forward global requests */
static void
ssh_confirm_remote_forward(struct ssh *ssh, int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
{
struct Forward *rfwd = (struct Forward *)ctxt;
u_int port;
int r;
/* XXX verbose() on failure? */
debug("remote forward %s for: listen %s%s%d, connect %s:%d",
type == SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS ? "success" : "failure",
rfwd->listen_path ? rfwd->listen_path :
rfwd->listen_host ? rfwd->listen_host : "",
(rfwd->listen_path || rfwd->listen_host) ? ":" : "",
rfwd->listen_port, rfwd->connect_path ? rfwd->connect_path :
rfwd->connect_host, rfwd->connect_port);
if (rfwd->listen_path == NULL && rfwd->listen_port == 0) {
if (type == SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_SUCCESS) {
if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &port)) != 0)
fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
if (port > 65535) {
error("Invalid allocated port %u for remote "
"forward to %s:%d", port,
rfwd->connect_host, rfwd->connect_port);
/* Ensure failure processing runs below */
type = SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE;
channel_update_permission(ssh,
rfwd->handle, -1);
} else {
rfwd->allocated_port = (int)port;
logit("Allocated port %u for remote "
"forward to %s:%d",
rfwd->allocated_port, rfwd->connect_host,
rfwd->connect_port);
channel_update_permission(ssh,
rfwd->handle, rfwd->allocated_port);
}
} else {
channel_update_permission(ssh, rfwd->handle, -1);
}
}
if (type == SSH2_MSG_REQUEST_FAILURE) {
if (options.exit_on_forward_failure) {
if (rfwd->listen_path != NULL)
fatal("Error: remote port forwarding failed "
"for listen path %s", rfwd->listen_path);
else
fatal("Error: remote port forwarding failed "
"for listen port %d", rfwd->listen_port);
} else {
if (rfwd->listen_path != NULL)
logit("Warning: remote port forwarding failed "
"for listen path %s", rfwd->listen_path);
else
logit("Warning: remote port forwarding failed "
"for listen port %d", rfwd->listen_port);
}
}
if (++remote_forward_confirms_received == options.num_remote_forwards) {
debug("All remote forwarding requests processed");
if (fork_after_authentication_flag)
fork_postauth();
}
}
static void
client_cleanup_stdio_fwd(struct ssh *ssh, int id, void *arg)
{
debug("stdio forwarding: done");
cleanup_exit(0);
}
static void
ssh_stdio_confirm(struct ssh *ssh, int id, int success, void *arg)
{
if (!success)
fatal("stdio forwarding failed");
}
static void
ssh_init_stdio_forwarding(struct ssh *ssh)
{
Channel *c;
int in, out;
if (options.stdio_forward_host == NULL)
return;
debug3("%s: %s:%d", __func__, options.stdio_forward_host,
options.stdio_forward_port);
if ((in = dup(STDIN_FILENO)) == -1 ||
(out = dup(STDOUT_FILENO)) == -1)
fatal("channel_connect_stdio_fwd: dup() in/out failed");
if ((c = channel_connect_stdio_fwd(ssh, options.stdio_forward_host,
options.stdio_forward_port, in, out)) == NULL)
fatal("%s: channel_connect_stdio_fwd failed", __func__);
channel_register_cleanup(ssh, c->self, client_cleanup_stdio_fwd, 0);
channel_register_open_confirm(ssh, c->self, ssh_stdio_confirm, NULL);
}
static void
ssh_init_forwarding(struct ssh *ssh, char **ifname)
{
int success = 0;
int i;
/* Initiate local TCP/IP port forwardings. */
for (i = 0; i < options.num_local_forwards; i++) {
debug("Local connections to %.200s:%d forwarded to remote "
"address %.200s:%d",
(options.local_forwards[i].listen_path != NULL) ?
options.local_forwards[i].listen_path :
(options.local_forwards[i].listen_host == NULL) ?
(options.fwd_opts.gateway_ports ? "*" : "LOCALHOST") :
options.local_forwards[i].listen_host,
options.local_forwards[i].listen_port,
(options.local_forwards[i].connect_path != NULL) ?
options.local_forwards[i].connect_path :
options.local_forwards[i].connect_host,
options.local_forwards[i].connect_port);
success += channel_setup_local_fwd_listener(ssh,
&options.local_forwards[i], &options.fwd_opts);
}
if (i > 0 && success != i && options.exit_on_forward_failure)
fatal("Could not request local forwarding.");
if (i > 0 && success == 0)
error("Could not request local forwarding.");
/* Initiate remote TCP/IP port forwardings. */
for (i = 0; i < options.num_remote_forwards; i++) {
debug("Remote connections from %.200s:%d forwarded to "
"local address %.200s:%d",
(options.remote_forwards[i].listen_path != NULL) ?
options.remote_forwards[i].listen_path :
(options.remote_forwards[i].listen_host == NULL) ?
"LOCALHOST" : options.remote_forwards[i].listen_host,
options.remote_forwards[i].listen_port,
(options.remote_forwards[i].connect_path != NULL) ?
options.remote_forwards[i].connect_path :
options.remote_forwards[i].connect_host,
options.remote_forwards[i].connect_port);
options.remote_forwards[i].handle =
channel_request_remote_forwarding(ssh,
&options.remote_forwards[i]);
if (options.remote_forwards[i].handle < 0) {
if (options.exit_on_forward_failure)
fatal("Could not request remote forwarding.");
else
logit("Warning: Could not request remote "
"forwarding.");
} else {
client_register_global_confirm(
ssh_confirm_remote_forward,
&options.remote_forwards[i]);
}
}
/* Initiate tunnel forwarding. */
if (options.tun_open != SSH_TUNMODE_NO) {
if ((*ifname = client_request_tun_fwd(ssh,
options.tun_open, options.tun_local,
options.tun_remote)) == NULL) {
if (options.exit_on_forward_failure)
fatal("Could not request tunnel forwarding.");
else
error("Could not request tunnel forwarding.");
}
}
}
static void
check_agent_present(void)
{
int r;
if (options.forward_agent) {
/* Clear agent forwarding if we don't have an agent. */
if ((r = ssh_get_authentication_socket(NULL)) != 0) {
options.forward_agent = 0;
if (r != SSH_ERR_AGENT_NOT_PRESENT)
debug("ssh_get_authentication_socket: %s",
ssh_err(r));
}
}
}
static void
ssh_session2_setup(struct ssh *ssh, int id, int success, void *arg)
{
extern char **environ;
const char *display;
int r, interactive = tty_flag;
char *proto = NULL, *data = NULL;
if (!success)
return; /* No need for error message, channels code sens one */
display = getenv("DISPLAY");
if (display == NULL && options.forward_x11)
debug("X11 forwarding requested but DISPLAY not set");
if (options.forward_x11 && client_x11_get_proto(ssh, display,
options.xauth_location, options.forward_x11_trusted,
options.forward_x11_timeout, &proto, &data) == 0) {
/* Request forwarding with authentication spoofing. */
debug("Requesting X11 forwarding with authentication "
"spoofing.");
x11_request_forwarding_with_spoofing(ssh, id, display, proto,
data, 1);
client_expect_confirm(ssh, id, "X11 forwarding", CONFIRM_WARN);
/* XXX exit_on_forward_failure */
interactive = 1;
}
check_agent_present();
if (options.forward_agent) {
debug("Requesting authentication agent forwarding.");
channel_request_start(ssh, id, "auth-agent-req@openssh.com", 0);
if ((r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
}
/* Tell the packet module whether this is an interactive session. */
ssh_packet_set_interactive(ssh, interactive,
options.ip_qos_interactive, options.ip_qos_bulk);
client_session2_setup(ssh, id, tty_flag, subsystem_flag, getenv("TERM"),
NULL, fileno(stdin), command, environ);
}
/* open new channel for a session */
static int
ssh_session2_open(struct ssh *ssh)
{
Channel *c;
int window, packetmax, in, out, err;
if (stdin_null_flag) {
in = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDONLY);
} else {
in = dup(STDIN_FILENO);
}
out = dup(STDOUT_FILENO);
err = dup(STDERR_FILENO);
if (in == -1 || out == -1 || err == -1)
fatal("dup() in/out/err failed");
/* enable nonblocking unless tty */
if (!isatty(in))
set_nonblock(in);
if (!isatty(out))
set_nonblock(out);
if (!isatty(err))
set_nonblock(err);
window = CHAN_SES_WINDOW_DEFAULT;
packetmax = CHAN_SES_PACKET_DEFAULT;
if (tty_flag) {
window >>= 1;
packetmax >>= 1;
}
c = channel_new(ssh,
"session", SSH_CHANNEL_OPENING, in, out, err,
window, packetmax, CHAN_EXTENDED_WRITE,
"client-session", /*nonblock*/0);
debug3("%s: channel_new: %d", __func__, c->self);
channel_send_open(ssh, c->self);
if (!no_shell_flag)
channel_register_open_confirm(ssh, c->self,
ssh_session2_setup, NULL);
return c->self;
}
static int
ssh_session2(struct ssh *ssh, struct passwd *pw)
{
int r, devnull, id = -1;
char *cp, *tun_fwd_ifname = NULL;
/* XXX should be pre-session */
if (!options.control_persist)
ssh_init_stdio_forwarding(ssh);
ssh_init_forwarding(ssh, &tun_fwd_ifname);
if (options.local_command != NULL) {
debug3("expanding LocalCommand: %s", options.local_command);
cp = options.local_command;
options.local_command = percent_expand(cp,
"C", conn_hash_hex,
"L", shorthost,
"d", pw->pw_dir,
"h", host,
"i", uidstr,
"l", thishost,
"n", host_arg,
"p", portstr,
"r", options.user,
"u", pw->pw_name,
"T", tun_fwd_ifname == NULL ? "NONE" : tun_fwd_ifname,
(char *)NULL);
debug3("expanded LocalCommand: %s", options.local_command);
free(cp);
}
/* Start listening for multiplex clients */
if (!ssh_packet_get_mux(ssh))
muxserver_listen(ssh);
/*
* If we are in control persist mode and have a working mux listen
* socket, then prepare to background ourselves and have a foreground
* client attach as a control slave.
* NB. we must save copies of the flags that we override for
* the backgrounding, since we defer attachment of the slave until
* after the connection is fully established (in particular,
* async rfwd replies have been received for ExitOnForwardFailure).
*/
if (options.control_persist && muxserver_sock != -1) {
ostdin_null_flag = stdin_null_flag;
ono_shell_flag = no_shell_flag;
orequest_tty = options.request_tty;
otty_flag = tty_flag;
stdin_null_flag = 1;
no_shell_flag = 1;
tty_flag = 0;
if (!fork_after_authentication_flag)
need_controlpersist_detach = 1;
fork_after_authentication_flag = 1;
}
/*
* ControlPersist mux listen socket setup failed, attempt the
* stdio forward setup that we skipped earlier.
*/
if (options.control_persist && muxserver_sock == -1)
ssh_init_stdio_forwarding(ssh);
if (!no_shell_flag)
id = ssh_session2_open(ssh);
else {
ssh_packet_set_interactive(ssh,
options.control_master == SSHCTL_MASTER_NO,
options.ip_qos_interactive, options.ip_qos_bulk);
}
/* If we don't expect to open a new session, then disallow it */
if (options.control_master == SSHCTL_MASTER_NO &&
(datafellows & SSH_NEW_OPENSSH)) {
debug("Requesting no-more-sessions@openssh.com");
if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh,
"no-more-sessions@openssh.com")) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, 0)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
}
/* Execute a local command */
if (options.local_command != NULL &&
options.permit_local_command)
ssh_local_cmd(options.local_command);
/*
* stdout is now owned by the session channel; clobber it here
* so future channel closes are propagated to the local fd.
* NB. this can only happen after LocalCommand has completed,
* as it may want to write to stdout.
*/
if (!need_controlpersist_detach) {
if ((devnull = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_WRONLY)) == -1)
error("%s: open %s: %s", __func__,
_PATH_DEVNULL, strerror(errno));
if (dup2(devnull, STDOUT_FILENO) == -1)
fatal("%s: dup2() stdout failed", __func__);
if (devnull > STDERR_FILENO)
close(devnull);
}
/*
* If requested and we are not interested in replies to remote
* forwarding requests, then let ssh continue in the background.
*/
if (fork_after_authentication_flag) {
if (options.exit_on_forward_failure &&
options.num_remote_forwards > 0) {
debug("deferring postauth fork until remote forward "
"confirmation received");
} else
fork_postauth();
}
return client_loop(ssh, tty_flag, tty_flag ?
options.escape_char : SSH_ESCAPECHAR_NONE, id);
}
/* Loads all IdentityFile and CertificateFile keys */
static void
load_public_identity_files(struct passwd *pw)
{
char *filename, *cp;
struct sshkey *public;
int i;
u_int n_ids, n_certs;
char *identity_files[SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES];
struct sshkey *identity_keys[SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES];
int identity_file_userprovided[SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES];
char *certificate_files[SSH_MAX_CERTIFICATE_FILES];
struct sshkey *certificates[SSH_MAX_CERTIFICATE_FILES];
int certificate_file_userprovided[SSH_MAX_CERTIFICATE_FILES];
#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
- struct sshkey **keys;
+ struct sshkey **keys = NULL;
+ char **comments = NULL;
int nkeys;
#endif /* PKCS11 */
n_ids = n_certs = 0;
memset(identity_files, 0, sizeof(identity_files));
memset(identity_keys, 0, sizeof(identity_keys));
memset(identity_file_userprovided, 0,
sizeof(identity_file_userprovided));
memset(certificate_files, 0, sizeof(certificate_files));
memset(certificates, 0, sizeof(certificates));
memset(certificate_file_userprovided, 0,
sizeof(certificate_file_userprovided));
#ifdef ENABLE_PKCS11
if (options.pkcs11_provider != NULL &&
options.num_identity_files < SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES &&
(pkcs11_init(!options.batch_mode) == 0) &&
(nkeys = pkcs11_add_provider(options.pkcs11_provider, NULL,
- &keys)) > 0) {
+ &keys, &comments)) > 0) {
for (i = 0; i < nkeys; i++) {
if (n_ids >= SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES) {
sshkey_free(keys[i]);
+ free(comments[i]);
continue;
}
identity_keys[n_ids] = keys[i];
- identity_files[n_ids] =
- xstrdup(options.pkcs11_provider); /* XXX */
+ identity_files[n_ids] = comments[i]; /* transferred */
n_ids++;
}
free(keys);
+ free(comments);
}
#endif /* ENABLE_PKCS11 */
for (i = 0; i < options.num_identity_files; i++) {
if (n_ids >= SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES ||
strcasecmp(options.identity_files[i], "none") == 0) {
free(options.identity_files[i]);
options.identity_files[i] = NULL;
continue;
}
cp = tilde_expand_filename(options.identity_files[i], getuid());
filename = percent_expand(cp, "d", pw->pw_dir,
"u", pw->pw_name, "l", thishost, "h", host,
"r", options.user, (char *)NULL);
free(cp);
check_load(sshkey_load_public(filename, &public, NULL),
filename, "pubkey");
debug("identity file %s type %d", filename,
public ? public->type : -1);
free(options.identity_files[i]);
identity_files[n_ids] = filename;
identity_keys[n_ids] = public;
identity_file_userprovided[n_ids] =
options.identity_file_userprovided[i];
if (++n_ids >= SSH_MAX_IDENTITY_FILES)
continue;
/*
* If no certificates have been explicitly listed then try
* to add the default certificate variant too.
*/
if (options.num_certificate_files != 0)
continue;
xasprintf(&cp, "%s-cert", filename);
check_load(sshkey_load_public(cp, &public, NULL),
filename, "pubkey");
debug("identity file %s type %d", cp,
public ? public->type : -1);
if (public == NULL) {
free(cp);
continue;
}
if (!sshkey_is_cert(public)) {
debug("%s: key %s type %s is not a certificate",
__func__, cp, sshkey_type(public));
sshkey_free(public);
free(cp);
continue;
}
/* NB. leave filename pointing to private key */
identity_files[n_ids] = xstrdup(filename);
identity_keys[n_ids] = public;
identity_file_userprovided[n_ids] =
options.identity_file_userprovided[i];
n_ids++;
}
if (options.num_certificate_files > SSH_MAX_CERTIFICATE_FILES)
fatal("%s: too many certificates", __func__);
for (i = 0; i < options.num_certificate_files; i++) {
cp = tilde_expand_filename(options.certificate_files[i],
getuid());
filename = percent_expand(cp,
"d", pw->pw_dir,
"h", host,
"i", uidstr,
"l", thishost,
"r", options.user,
"u", pw->pw_name,
(char *)NULL);
free(cp);
check_load(sshkey_load_public(filename, &public, NULL),
filename, "certificate");
debug("certificate file %s type %d", filename,
public ? public->type : -1);
free(options.certificate_files[i]);
options.certificate_files[i] = NULL;
if (public == NULL) {
free(filename);
continue;
}
if (!sshkey_is_cert(public)) {
debug("%s: key %s type %s is not a certificate",
__func__, filename, sshkey_type(public));
sshkey_free(public);
free(filename);
continue;
}
certificate_files[n_certs] = filename;
certificates[n_certs] = public;
certificate_file_userprovided[n_certs] =
options.certificate_file_userprovided[i];
++n_certs;
}
options.num_identity_files = n_ids;
memcpy(options.identity_files, identity_files, sizeof(identity_files));
memcpy(options.identity_keys, identity_keys, sizeof(identity_keys));
memcpy(options.identity_file_userprovided,
identity_file_userprovided, sizeof(identity_file_userprovided));
options.num_certificate_files = n_certs;
memcpy(options.certificate_files,
certificate_files, sizeof(certificate_files));
memcpy(options.certificates, certificates, sizeof(certificates));
memcpy(options.certificate_file_userprovided,
certificate_file_userprovided,
sizeof(certificate_file_userprovided));
}
static void
main_sigchld_handler(int sig)
{
int save_errno = errno;
pid_t pid;
int status;
while ((pid = waitpid(-1, &status, WNOHANG)) > 0 ||
(pid == -1 && errno == EINTR))
;
errno = save_errno;
}
diff --git a/ssh_api.c b/ssh_api.c
index 03dac0982c92..e0b1955212df 100644
--- a/ssh_api.c
+++ b/ssh_api.c
@@ -1,572 +1,573 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: ssh_api.c,v 1.18 2019/09/13 04:36:43 dtucker Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: ssh_api.c,v 1.19 2019/10/31 21:23:19 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2012 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
* Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
* copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
* WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
* ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
* WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
* ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
* OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include "ssh_api.h"
#include "compat.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "authfile.h"
#include "sshkey.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "ssh2.h"
#include "version.h"
#include "myproposal.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
#include "sshbuf.h"
#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
#include <string.h>
int _ssh_exchange_banner(struct ssh *);
int _ssh_send_banner(struct ssh *, struct sshbuf *);
int _ssh_read_banner(struct ssh *, struct sshbuf *);
int _ssh_order_hostkeyalgs(struct ssh *);
int _ssh_verify_host_key(struct sshkey *, struct ssh *);
struct sshkey *_ssh_host_public_key(int, int, struct ssh *);
struct sshkey *_ssh_host_private_key(int, int, struct ssh *);
int _ssh_host_key_sign(struct ssh *, struct sshkey *, struct sshkey *,
u_char **, size_t *, const u_char *, size_t, const char *);
/*
* stubs for the server side implementation of kex.
* disable privsep so our stubs will never be called.
*/
int use_privsep = 0;
int mm_sshkey_sign(struct sshkey *, u_char **, u_int *,
- u_char *, u_int, char *, u_int);
+ const u_char *, u_int, const char *, const char *, u_int);
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
DH *mm_choose_dh(int, int, int);
#endif
/* Define these two variables here so that they are part of the library */
u_char *session_id2 = NULL;
u_int session_id2_len = 0;
int
mm_sshkey_sign(struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, u_int *lenp,
- u_char *data, u_int datalen, char *alg, u_int compat)
+ const u_char *data, u_int datalen, const char *alg, const char *sk_provider,
+ u_int compat)
{
return (-1);
}
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
DH *
mm_choose_dh(int min, int nbits, int max)
{
return (NULL);
}
#endif
/* API */
int
ssh_init(struct ssh **sshp, int is_server, struct kex_params *kex_params)
{
char *myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAX] = { KEX_CLIENT };
struct ssh *ssh;
char **proposal;
static int called;
int r;
if (!called) {
seed_rng();
called = 1;
}
if ((ssh = ssh_packet_set_connection(NULL, -1, -1)) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
if (is_server)
ssh_packet_set_server(ssh);
/* Initialize key exchange */
proposal = kex_params ? kex_params->proposal : myproposal;
if ((r = kex_ready(ssh, proposal)) != 0) {
ssh_free(ssh);
return r;
}
ssh->kex->server = is_server;
if (is_server) {
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1] = kex_gen_server;
ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1] = kex_gen_server;
ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA256] = kex_gen_server;
ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP16_SHA512] = kex_gen_server;
ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP18_SHA512] = kex_gen_server;
ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_server;
ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_server;
# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
ssh->kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kex_gen_server;
# endif
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
ssh->kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kex_gen_server;
ssh->kex->kex[KEX_KEM_SNTRUP4591761X25519_SHA512] = kex_gen_server;
ssh->kex->load_host_public_key=&_ssh_host_public_key;
ssh->kex->load_host_private_key=&_ssh_host_private_key;
ssh->kex->sign=&_ssh_host_key_sign;
} else {
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1] = kex_gen_client;
ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1] = kex_gen_client;
ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA256] = kex_gen_client;
ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP16_SHA512] = kex_gen_client;
ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP18_SHA512] = kex_gen_client;
ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_client;
ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_client;
# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
ssh->kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kex_gen_client;
# endif
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
ssh->kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kex_gen_client;
ssh->kex->kex[KEX_KEM_SNTRUP4591761X25519_SHA512] = kex_gen_client;
ssh->kex->verify_host_key =&_ssh_verify_host_key;
}
*sshp = ssh;
return 0;
}
void
ssh_free(struct ssh *ssh)
{
struct key_entry *k;
ssh_packet_close(ssh);
/*
* we've only created the public keys variants in case we
* are a acting as a server.
*/
while ((k = TAILQ_FIRST(&ssh->public_keys)) != NULL) {
TAILQ_REMOVE(&ssh->public_keys, k, next);
if (ssh->kex && ssh->kex->server)
sshkey_free(k->key);
free(k);
}
while ((k = TAILQ_FIRST(&ssh->private_keys)) != NULL) {
TAILQ_REMOVE(&ssh->private_keys, k, next);
free(k);
}
if (ssh->kex)
kex_free(ssh->kex);
free(ssh);
}
void
ssh_set_app_data(struct ssh *ssh, void *app_data)
{
ssh->app_data = app_data;
}
void *
ssh_get_app_data(struct ssh *ssh)
{
return ssh->app_data;
}
/* Returns < 0 on error, 0 otherwise */
int
ssh_add_hostkey(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshkey *key)
{
struct sshkey *pubkey = NULL;
struct key_entry *k = NULL, *k_prv = NULL;
int r;
if (ssh->kex->server) {
if ((r = sshkey_from_private(key, &pubkey)) != 0)
return r;
if ((k = malloc(sizeof(*k))) == NULL ||
(k_prv = malloc(sizeof(*k_prv))) == NULL) {
free(k);
sshkey_free(pubkey);
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
}
k_prv->key = key;
TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&ssh->private_keys, k_prv, next);
/* add the public key, too */
k->key = pubkey;
TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&ssh->public_keys, k, next);
r = 0;
} else {
if ((k = malloc(sizeof(*k))) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
k->key = key;
TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&ssh->public_keys, k, next);
r = 0;
}
return r;
}
int
ssh_set_verify_host_key_callback(struct ssh *ssh,
int (*cb)(struct sshkey *, struct ssh *))
{
if (cb == NULL || ssh->kex == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
ssh->kex->verify_host_key = cb;
return 0;
}
int
ssh_input_append(struct ssh *ssh, const u_char *data, size_t len)
{
return sshbuf_put(ssh_packet_get_input(ssh), data, len);
}
int
ssh_packet_next(struct ssh *ssh, u_char *typep)
{
int r;
u_int32_t seqnr;
u_char type;
/*
* Try to read a packet. Return SSH_MSG_NONE if no packet or not
* enough data.
*/
*typep = SSH_MSG_NONE;
if (sshbuf_len(ssh->kex->client_version) == 0 ||
sshbuf_len(ssh->kex->server_version) == 0)
return _ssh_exchange_banner(ssh);
/*
* If we enough data and a dispatch function then
* call the function and get the next packet.
* Otherwise return the packet type to the caller so it
* can decide how to go on.
*
* We will only call the dispatch function for:
* 20-29 Algorithm negotiation
* 30-49 Key exchange method specific (numbers can be reused for
* different authentication methods)
*/
for (;;) {
if ((r = ssh_packet_read_poll2(ssh, &type, &seqnr)) != 0)
return r;
if (type > 0 && type < DISPATCH_MAX &&
type >= SSH2_MSG_KEXINIT && type <= SSH2_MSG_TRANSPORT_MAX &&
ssh->dispatch[type] != NULL) {
if ((r = (*ssh->dispatch[type])(type, seqnr, ssh)) != 0)
return r;
} else {
*typep = type;
return 0;
}
}
}
const u_char *
ssh_packet_payload(struct ssh *ssh, size_t *lenp)
{
return sshpkt_ptr(ssh, lenp);
}
int
ssh_packet_put(struct ssh *ssh, int type, const u_char *data, size_t len)
{
int r;
if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, type)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put(ssh, data, len)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
return r;
return 0;
}
const u_char *
ssh_output_ptr(struct ssh *ssh, size_t *len)
{
struct sshbuf *output = ssh_packet_get_output(ssh);
*len = sshbuf_len(output);
return sshbuf_ptr(output);
}
int
ssh_output_consume(struct ssh *ssh, size_t len)
{
return sshbuf_consume(ssh_packet_get_output(ssh), len);
}
int
ssh_output_space(struct ssh *ssh, size_t len)
{
return (0 == sshbuf_check_reserve(ssh_packet_get_output(ssh), len));
}
int
ssh_input_space(struct ssh *ssh, size_t len)
{
return (0 == sshbuf_check_reserve(ssh_packet_get_input(ssh), len));
}
/* Read other side's version identification. */
int
_ssh_read_banner(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshbuf *banner)
{
struct sshbuf *input = ssh_packet_get_input(ssh);
const char *mismatch = "Protocol mismatch.\r\n";
const u_char *s = sshbuf_ptr(input);
u_char c;
char *cp = NULL, *remote_version = NULL;
int r = 0, remote_major, remote_minor, expect_nl;
size_t n, j;
for (j = n = 0;;) {
sshbuf_reset(banner);
expect_nl = 0;
for (;;) {
if (j >= sshbuf_len(input))
return 0; /* insufficient data in input buf */
c = s[j++];
if (c == '\r') {
expect_nl = 1;
continue;
}
if (c == '\n')
break;
if (expect_nl)
goto bad;
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(banner, c)) != 0)
return r;
if (sshbuf_len(banner) > SSH_MAX_BANNER_LEN)
goto bad;
}
if (sshbuf_len(banner) >= 4 &&
memcmp(sshbuf_ptr(banner), "SSH-", 4) == 0)
break;
debug("%s: %.*s", __func__, (int)sshbuf_len(banner),
sshbuf_ptr(banner));
/* Accept lines before banner only on client */
if (ssh->kex->server || ++n > SSH_MAX_PRE_BANNER_LINES) {
bad:
if ((r = sshbuf_put(ssh_packet_get_output(ssh),
mismatch, strlen(mismatch))) != 0)
return r;
return SSH_ERR_NO_PROTOCOL_VERSION;
}
}
if ((r = sshbuf_consume(input, j)) != 0)
return r;
/* XXX remote version must be the same size as banner for sscanf */
if ((cp = sshbuf_dup_string(banner)) == NULL ||
(remote_version = calloc(1, sshbuf_len(banner))) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
/*
* Check that the versions match. In future this might accept
* several versions and set appropriate flags to handle them.
*/
if (sscanf(cp, "SSH-%d.%d-%[^\n]\n",
&remote_major, &remote_minor, remote_version) != 3) {
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
debug("Remote protocol version %d.%d, remote software version %.100s",
remote_major, remote_minor, remote_version);
ssh->compat = compat_datafellows(remote_version);
if (remote_major == 1 && remote_minor == 99) {
remote_major = 2;
remote_minor = 0;
}
if (remote_major != 2)
r = SSH_ERR_PROTOCOL_MISMATCH;
debug("Remote version string %.100s", cp);
out:
free(cp);
free(remote_version);
return r;
}
/* Send our own protocol version identification. */
int
_ssh_send_banner(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshbuf *banner)
{
char *cp;
int r;
if ((r = sshbuf_putf(banner, "SSH-2.0-%.100s\r\n", SSH_VERSION)) != 0)
return r;
if ((r = sshbuf_putb(ssh_packet_get_output(ssh), banner)) != 0)
return r;
/* Remove trailing \r\n */
if ((r = sshbuf_consume_end(banner, 2)) != 0)
return r;
if ((cp = sshbuf_dup_string(banner)) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
debug("Local version string %.100s", cp);
free(cp);
return 0;
}
int
_ssh_exchange_banner(struct ssh *ssh)
{
struct kex *kex = ssh->kex;
int r;
/*
* if _ssh_read_banner() cannot parse a full version string
* it will return NULL and we end up calling it again.
*/
r = 0;
if (kex->server) {
if (sshbuf_len(ssh->kex->server_version) == 0)
r = _ssh_send_banner(ssh, ssh->kex->server_version);
if (r == 0 &&
sshbuf_len(ssh->kex->server_version) != 0 &&
sshbuf_len(ssh->kex->client_version) == 0)
r = _ssh_read_banner(ssh, ssh->kex->client_version);
} else {
if (sshbuf_len(ssh->kex->server_version) == 0)
r = _ssh_read_banner(ssh, ssh->kex->server_version);
if (r == 0 &&
sshbuf_len(ssh->kex->server_version) != 0 &&
sshbuf_len(ssh->kex->client_version) == 0)
r = _ssh_send_banner(ssh, ssh->kex->client_version);
}
if (r != 0)
return r;
/* start initial kex as soon as we have exchanged the banners */
if (sshbuf_len(ssh->kex->server_version) != 0 &&
sshbuf_len(ssh->kex->client_version) != 0) {
if ((r = _ssh_order_hostkeyalgs(ssh)) != 0 ||
(r = kex_send_kexinit(ssh)) != 0)
return r;
}
return 0;
}
struct sshkey *
_ssh_host_public_key(int type, int nid, struct ssh *ssh)
{
struct key_entry *k;
debug3("%s: need %d", __func__, type);
TAILQ_FOREACH(k, &ssh->public_keys, next) {
debug3("%s: check %s", __func__, sshkey_type(k->key));
if (k->key->type == type &&
(type != KEY_ECDSA || k->key->ecdsa_nid == nid))
return (k->key);
}
return (NULL);
}
struct sshkey *
_ssh_host_private_key(int type, int nid, struct ssh *ssh)
{
struct key_entry *k;
debug3("%s: need %d", __func__, type);
TAILQ_FOREACH(k, &ssh->private_keys, next) {
debug3("%s: check %s", __func__, sshkey_type(k->key));
if (k->key->type == type &&
(type != KEY_ECDSA || k->key->ecdsa_nid == nid))
return (k->key);
}
return (NULL);
}
int
_ssh_verify_host_key(struct sshkey *hostkey, struct ssh *ssh)
{
struct key_entry *k;
debug3("%s: need %s", __func__, sshkey_type(hostkey));
TAILQ_FOREACH(k, &ssh->public_keys, next) {
debug3("%s: check %s", __func__, sshkey_type(k->key));
if (sshkey_equal_public(hostkey, k->key))
return (0); /* ok */
}
return (-1); /* failed */
}
/* offer hostkey algorithms in kexinit depending on registered keys */
int
_ssh_order_hostkeyalgs(struct ssh *ssh)
{
struct key_entry *k;
char *orig, *avail, *oavail = NULL, *alg, *replace = NULL;
char **proposal;
size_t maxlen;
int ktype, r;
/* XXX we de-serialize ssh->kex->my, modify it, and change it */
if ((r = kex_buf2prop(ssh->kex->my, NULL, &proposal)) != 0)
return r;
orig = proposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS];
if ((oavail = avail = strdup(orig)) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
maxlen = strlen(avail) + 1;
if ((replace = calloc(1, maxlen)) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
*replace = '\0';
while ((alg = strsep(&avail, ",")) && *alg != '\0') {
if ((ktype = sshkey_type_from_name(alg)) == KEY_UNSPEC)
continue;
TAILQ_FOREACH(k, &ssh->public_keys, next) {
if (k->key->type == ktype ||
(sshkey_is_cert(k->key) && k->key->type ==
sshkey_type_plain(ktype))) {
if (*replace != '\0')
strlcat(replace, ",", maxlen);
strlcat(replace, alg, maxlen);
break;
}
}
}
if (*replace != '\0') {
debug2("%s: orig/%d %s", __func__, ssh->kex->server, orig);
debug2("%s: replace/%d %s", __func__, ssh->kex->server, replace);
free(orig);
proposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = replace;
replace = NULL; /* owned by proposal */
r = kex_prop2buf(ssh->kex->my, proposal);
}
out:
free(oavail);
free(replace);
kex_prop_free(proposal);
return r;
}
int
_ssh_host_key_sign(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshkey *privkey,
struct sshkey *pubkey, u_char **signature, size_t *slen,
const u_char *data, size_t dlen, const char *alg)
{
return sshkey_sign(privkey, signature, slen, data, dlen,
- alg, ssh->compat);
+ alg, NULL, ssh->compat);
}
diff --git a/ssh_config.0 b/ssh_config.0
index 94ef73676817..692e5f6d59a1 100644
--- a/ssh_config.0
+++ b/ssh_config.0
@@ -1,1133 +1,1170 @@
SSH_CONFIG(5) File Formats Manual SSH_CONFIG(5)
NAME
- ssh_config M-bM-^@M-^S OpenSSH SSH client configuration files
+ ssh_config M-bM-^@M-^S OpenSSH client configuration file
DESCRIPTION
ssh(1) obtains configuration data from the following sources in the
following order:
1. command-line options
2. user's configuration file (~/.ssh/config)
3. system-wide configuration file (/etc/ssh/ssh_config)
For each parameter, the first obtained value will be used. The
configuration files contain sections separated by Host specifications,
and that section is only applied for hosts that match one of the patterns
given in the specification. The matched host name is usually the one
given on the command line (see the CanonicalizeHostname option for
exceptions).
Since the first obtained value for each parameter is used, more host-
specific declarations should be given near the beginning of the file, and
general defaults at the end.
The file contains keyword-argument pairs, one per line. Lines starting
with M-bM-^@M-^X#M-bM-^@M-^Y and empty lines are interpreted as comments. Arguments may
optionally be enclosed in double quotes (") in order to represent
arguments containing spaces. Configuration options may be separated by
whitespace or optional whitespace and exactly one M-bM-^@M-^X=M-bM-^@M-^Y; the latter format
is useful to avoid the need to quote whitespace when specifying
configuration options using the ssh, scp, and sftp -o option.
The possible keywords and their meanings are as follows (note that
keywords are case-insensitive and arguments are case-sensitive):
Host Restricts the following declarations (up to the next Host or
Match keyword) to be only for those hosts that match one of the
patterns given after the keyword. If more than one pattern is
provided, they should be separated by whitespace. A single M-bM-^@M-^X*M-bM-^@M-^Y
as a pattern can be used to provide global defaults for all
hosts. The host is usually the hostname argument given on the
command line (see the CanonicalizeHostname keyword for
exceptions).
A pattern entry may be negated by prefixing it with an
exclamation mark (M-bM-^@M-^X!M-bM-^@M-^Y). If a negated entry is matched, then the
Host entry is ignored, regardless of whether any other patterns
on the line match. Negated matches are therefore useful to
provide exceptions for wildcard matches.
See PATTERNS for more information on patterns.
Match Restricts the following declarations (up to the next Host or
Match keyword) to be used only when the conditions following the
Match keyword are satisfied. Match conditions are specified
using one or more criteria or the single token all which always
matches. The available criteria keywords are: canonical, final,
exec, host, originalhost, user, and localuser. The all criteria
must appear alone or immediately after canonical or final. Other
criteria may be combined arbitrarily. All criteria but all,
canonical, and final require an argument. Criteria may be
negated by prepending an exclamation mark (M-bM-^@M-^X!M-bM-^@M-^Y).
The canonical keyword matches only when the configuration file is
being re-parsed after hostname canonicalization (see the
CanonicalizeHostname option). This may be useful to specify
conditions that work with canonical host names only.
The final keyword requests that the configuration be re-parsed
(regardless of whether CanonicalizeHostname is enabled), and
matches only during this final pass. If CanonicalizeHostname is
enabled, then canonical and final match during the same pass.
The exec keyword executes the specified command under the user's
shell. If the command returns a zero exit status then the
condition is considered true. Commands containing whitespace
characters must be quoted. Arguments to exec accept the tokens
described in the TOKENS section.
The other keywords' criteria must be single entries or comma-
separated lists and may use the wildcard and negation operators
described in the PATTERNS section. The criteria for the host
keyword are matched against the target hostname, after any
substitution by the Hostname or CanonicalizeHostname options.
The originalhost keyword matches against the hostname as it was
specified on the command-line. The user keyword matches against
the target username on the remote host. The localuser keyword
matches against the name of the local user running ssh(1) (this
keyword may be useful in system-wide ssh_config files).
AddKeysToAgent
Specifies whether keys should be automatically added to a running
ssh-agent(1). If this option is set to yes and a key is loaded
from a file, the key and its passphrase are added to the agent
with the default lifetime, as if by ssh-add(1). If this option
is set to ask, ssh(1) will require confirmation using the
SSH_ASKPASS program before adding a key (see ssh-add(1) for
details). If this option is set to confirm, each use of the key
must be confirmed, as if the -c option was specified to
ssh-add(1). If this option is set to no, no keys are added to
the agent. The argument must be yes, confirm, ask, or no (the
default).
AddressFamily
Specifies which address family to use when connecting. Valid
arguments are any (the default), inet (use IPv4 only), or inet6
(use IPv6 only).
BatchMode
- If set to yes, passphrase/password querying will be disabled.
- This option is useful in scripts and other batch jobs where no
- user is present to supply the password. The argument must be yes
- or no (the default).
+ If set to yes, user interaction such as password prompts and host
+ key confirmation requests will be disabled. This option is
+ useful in scripts and other batch jobs where no user is present
+ to interact with ssh(1). The argument must be yes or no (the
+ default).
BindAddress
Use the specified address on the local machine as the source
address of the connection. Only useful on systems with more than
one address.
BindInterface
Use the address of the specified interface on the local machine
as the source address of the connection.
CanonicalDomains
When CanonicalizeHostname is enabled, this option specifies the
list of domain suffixes in which to search for the specified
destination host.
CanonicalizeFallbackLocal
Specifies whether to fail with an error when hostname
canonicalization fails. The default, yes, will attempt to look
up the unqualified hostname using the system resolver's search
rules. A value of no will cause ssh(1) to fail instantly if
CanonicalizeHostname is enabled and the target hostname cannot be
found in any of the domains specified by CanonicalDomains.
CanonicalizeHostname
Controls whether explicit hostname canonicalization is performed.
The default, no, is not to perform any name rewriting and let the
system resolver handle all hostname lookups. If set to yes then,
for connections that do not use a ProxyCommand or ProxyJump,
ssh(1) will attempt to canonicalize the hostname specified on the
command line using the CanonicalDomains suffixes and
CanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs rules. If CanonicalizeHostname is
set to always, then canonicalization is applied to proxied
connections too.
If this option is enabled, then the configuration files are
processed again using the new target name to pick up any new
configuration in matching Host and Match stanzas.
CanonicalizeMaxDots
Specifies the maximum number of dot characters in a hostname
before canonicalization is disabled. The default, 1, allows a
single dot (i.e. hostname.subdomain).
CanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs
Specifies rules to determine whether CNAMEs should be followed
when canonicalizing hostnames. The rules consist of one or more
arguments of source_domain_list:target_domain_list, where
source_domain_list is a pattern-list of domains that may follow
CNAMEs in canonicalization, and target_domain_list is a pattern-
list of domains that they may resolve to.
For example, "*.a.example.com:*.b.example.com,*.c.example.com"
will allow hostnames matching "*.a.example.com" to be
canonicalized to names in the "*.b.example.com" or
"*.c.example.com" domains.
CASignatureAlgorithms
Specifies which algorithms are allowed for signing of
certificates by certificate authorities (CAs). The default is:
ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
ssh-ed25519,rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256,ssh-rsa
ssh(1) will not accept host certificates signed using algorithms
other than those specified.
CertificateFile
Specifies a file from which the user's certificate is read. A
corresponding private key must be provided separately in order to
use this certificate either from an IdentityFile directive or -i
- flag to ssh(1), via ssh-agent(1), or via a PKCS11Provider.
+ flag to ssh(1), via ssh-agent(1), or via a PKCS11Provider or
+ SecurityKeyProvider.
Arguments to CertificateFile may use the tilde syntax to refer to
a user's home directory or the tokens described in the TOKENS
section.
It is possible to have multiple certificate files specified in
configuration files; these certificates will be tried in
sequence. Multiple CertificateFile directives will add to the
list of certificates used for authentication.
ChallengeResponseAuthentication
Specifies whether to use challenge-response authentication. The
argument to this keyword must be yes (the default) or no.
CheckHostIP
If set to yes (the default), ssh(1) will additionally check the
host IP address in the known_hosts file. This allows it to
detect if a host key changed due to DNS spoofing and will add
addresses of destination hosts to ~/.ssh/known_hosts in the
process, regardless of the setting of StrictHostKeyChecking. If
the option is set to no, the check will not be executed.
Ciphers
Specifies the ciphers allowed and their order of preference.
Multiple ciphers must be comma-separated. If the specified list
begins with a M-bM-^@M-^X+M-bM-^@M-^Y character, then the specified ciphers will be
appended to the default set instead of replacing them. If the
specified list begins with a M-bM-^@M-^X-M-bM-^@M-^Y character, then the specified
ciphers (including wildcards) will be removed from the default
set instead of replacing them. If the specified list begins with
a M-bM-^@M-^X^M-bM-^@M-^Y character, then the specified ciphers will be placed at the
head of the default set.
The supported ciphers are:
3des-cbc
aes128-cbc
aes192-cbc
aes256-cbc
aes128-ctr
aes192-ctr
aes256-ctr
aes128-gcm@openssh.com
aes256-gcm@openssh.com
chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com
The default is:
chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com,
aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr,
aes128-gcm@openssh.com,aes256-gcm@openssh.com
The list of available ciphers may also be obtained using "ssh -Q
cipher".
ClearAllForwardings
Specifies that all local, remote, and dynamic port forwardings
specified in the configuration files or on the command line be
cleared. This option is primarily useful when used from the
ssh(1) command line to clear port forwardings set in
configuration files, and is automatically set by scp(1) and
sftp(1). The argument must be yes or no (the default).
Compression
Specifies whether to use compression. The argument must be yes
or no (the default).
ConnectionAttempts
Specifies the number of tries (one per second) to make before
exiting. The argument must be an integer. This may be useful in
scripts if the connection sometimes fails. The default is 1.
ConnectTimeout
Specifies the timeout (in seconds) used when connecting to the
SSH server, instead of using the default system TCP timeout.
This timeout is applied both to establishing the connection and
to performing the initial SSH protocol handshake and key
exchange.
ControlMaster
Enables the sharing of multiple sessions over a single network
connection. When set to yes, ssh(1) will listen for connections
on a control socket specified using the ControlPath argument.
Additional sessions can connect to this socket using the same
ControlPath with ControlMaster set to no (the default). These
sessions will try to reuse the master instance's network
connection rather than initiating new ones, but will fall back to
connecting normally if the control socket does not exist, or is
not listening.
Setting this to ask will cause ssh(1) to listen for control
connections, but require confirmation using ssh-askpass(1). If
the ControlPath cannot be opened, ssh(1) will continue without
connecting to a master instance.
X11 and ssh-agent(1) forwarding is supported over these
multiplexed connections, however the display and agent forwarded
will be the one belonging to the master connection i.e. it is not
possible to forward multiple displays or agents.
Two additional options allow for opportunistic multiplexing: try
to use a master connection but fall back to creating a new one if
one does not already exist. These options are: auto and autoask.
The latter requires confirmation like the ask option.
ControlPath
Specify the path to the control socket used for connection
sharing as described in the ControlMaster section above or the
string none to disable connection sharing. Arguments to
ControlPath may use the tilde syntax to refer to a user's home
directory or the tokens described in the TOKENS section. It is
recommended that any ControlPath used for opportunistic
connection sharing include at least %h, %p, and %r (or
alternatively %C) and be placed in a directory that is not
writable by other users. This ensures that shared connections
are uniquely identified.
ControlPersist
When used in conjunction with ControlMaster, specifies that the
master connection should remain open in the background (waiting
for future client connections) after the initial client
- connection has been closed. If set to no, then the master
- connection will not be placed into the background, and will close
- as soon as the initial client connection is closed. If set to
- yes or 0, then the master connection will remain in the
+ connection has been closed. If set to no (the default), then the
+ master connection will not be placed into the background, and
+ will close as soon as the initial client connection is closed.
+ If set to yes or 0, then the master connection will remain in the
background indefinitely (until killed or closed via a mechanism
such as the "ssh -O exit"). If set to a time in seconds, or a
time in any of the formats documented in sshd_config(5), then the
backgrounded master connection will automatically terminate after
it has remained idle (with no client connections) for the
specified time.
DynamicForward
Specifies that a TCP port on the local machine be forwarded over
the secure channel, and the application protocol is then used to
determine where to connect to from the remote machine.
The argument must be [bind_address:]port. IPv6 addresses can be
specified by enclosing addresses in square brackets. By default,
the local port is bound in accordance with the GatewayPorts
setting. However, an explicit bind_address may be used to bind
the connection to a specific address. The bind_address of
localhost indicates that the listening port be bound for local
use only, while an empty address or M-bM-^@M-^X*M-bM-^@M-^Y indicates that the port
should be available from all interfaces.
Currently the SOCKS4 and SOCKS5 protocols are supported, and
ssh(1) will act as a SOCKS server. Multiple forwardings may be
specified, and additional forwardings can be given on the command
line. Only the superuser can forward privileged ports.
EnableSSHKeysign
Setting this option to yes in the global client configuration
file /etc/ssh/ssh_config enables the use of the helper program
ssh-keysign(8) during HostbasedAuthentication. The argument must
be yes or no (the default). This option should be placed in the
non-hostspecific section. See ssh-keysign(8) for more
information.
EscapeChar
Sets the escape character (default: M-bM-^@M-^X~M-bM-^@M-^Y). The escape character
can also be set on the command line. The argument should be a
single character, M-bM-^@M-^X^M-bM-^@M-^Y followed by a letter, or none to disable
the escape character entirely (making the connection transparent
for binary data).
ExitOnForwardFailure
Specifies whether ssh(1) should terminate the connection if it
cannot set up all requested dynamic, tunnel, local, and remote
port forwardings, (e.g. if either end is unable to bind and
listen on a specified port). Note that ExitOnForwardFailure does
not apply to connections made over port forwardings and will not,
for example, cause ssh(1) to exit if TCP connections to the
ultimate forwarding destination fail. The argument must be yes
or no (the default).
FingerprintHash
Specifies the hash algorithm used when displaying key
fingerprints. Valid options are: md5 and sha256 (the default).
ForwardAgent
Specifies whether the connection to the authentication agent (if
- any) will be forwarded to the remote machine. The argument must
- be yes or no (the default).
+ any) will be forwarded to the remote machine. The argument may
+ be yes, no (the default), an explicit path to an agent socket or
+ the name of an environment variable (beginning with M-bM-^@M-^X$M-bM-^@M-^Y) in which
+ to find the path.
Agent forwarding should be enabled with caution. Users with the
ability to bypass file permissions on the remote host (for the
agent's Unix-domain socket) can access the local agent through
the forwarded connection. An attacker cannot obtain key material
from the agent, however they can perform operations on the keys
that enable them to authenticate using the identities loaded into
the agent.
ForwardX11
Specifies whether X11 connections will be automatically
redirected over the secure channel and DISPLAY set. The argument
must be yes or no (the default).
X11 forwarding should be enabled with caution. Users with the
ability to bypass file permissions on the remote host (for the
user's X11 authorization database) can access the local X11
display through the forwarded connection. An attacker may then
be able to perform activities such as keystroke monitoring if the
ForwardX11Trusted option is also enabled.
ForwardX11Timeout
Specify a timeout for untrusted X11 forwarding using the format
described in the TIME FORMATS section of sshd_config(5). X11
connections received by ssh(1) after this time will be refused.
Setting ForwardX11Timeout to zero will disable the timeout and
permit X11 forwarding for the life of the connection. The
default is to disable untrusted X11 forwarding after twenty
minutes has elapsed.
ForwardX11Trusted
If this option is set to yes, remote X11 clients will have full
access to the original X11 display.
If this option is set to no (the default), remote X11 clients
will be considered untrusted and prevented from stealing or
tampering with data belonging to trusted X11 clients.
Furthermore, the xauth(1) token used for the session will be set
to expire after 20 minutes. Remote clients will be refused
access after this time.
See the X11 SECURITY extension specification for full details on
the restrictions imposed on untrusted clients.
GatewayPorts
Specifies whether remote hosts are allowed to connect to local
forwarded ports. By default, ssh(1) binds local port forwardings
to the loopback address. This prevents other remote hosts from
connecting to forwarded ports. GatewayPorts can be used to
specify that ssh should bind local port forwardings to the
wildcard address, thus allowing remote hosts to connect to
forwarded ports. The argument must be yes or no (the default).
GlobalKnownHostsFile
Specifies one or more files to use for the global host key
database, separated by whitespace. The default is
/etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts, /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts2.
GSSAPIAuthentication
Specifies whether user authentication based on GSSAPI is allowed.
The default is no.
GSSAPIDelegateCredentials
Forward (delegate) credentials to the server. The default is no.
HashKnownHosts
Indicates that ssh(1) should hash host names and addresses when
they are added to ~/.ssh/known_hosts. These hashed names may be
- used normally by ssh(1) and sshd(8), but they do not reveal
- identifying information should the file's contents be disclosed.
- The default is no. Note that existing names and addresses in
- known hosts files will not be converted automatically, but may be
- manually hashed using ssh-keygen(1).
+ used normally by ssh(1) and sshd(8), but they do not visually
+ reveal identifying information if the file's contents are
+ disclosed. The default is no. Note that existing names and
+ addresses in known hosts files will not be converted
+ automatically, but may be manually hashed using ssh-keygen(1).
HostbasedAuthentication
Specifies whether to try rhosts based authentication with public
key authentication. The argument must be yes or no (the
default).
HostbasedKeyTypes
Specifies the key types that will be used for hostbased
authentication as a comma-separated list of patterns.
Alternately if the specified list begins with a M-bM-^@M-^X+M-bM-^@M-^Y character,
then the specified key types will be appended to the default set
instead of replacing them. If the specified list begins with a
M-bM-^@M-^X-M-bM-^@M-^Y character, then the specified key types (including wildcards)
will be removed from the default set instead of replacing them.
If the specified list begins with a M-bM-^@M-^X^M-bM-^@M-^Y character, then the
specified key types will be placed at the head of the default
set. The default for this option is:
ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com,
ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+ sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
- rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com,rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+ sk-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+ rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+ rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com,
ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
- ssh-ed25519,rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256,ssh-rsa
+ sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com,
+ ssh-ed25519,sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com,
+ rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256,ssh-rsa
The -Q option of ssh(1) may be used to list supported key types.
HostKeyAlgorithms
Specifies the host key algorithms that the client wants to use in
order of preference. Alternately if the specified list begins
with a M-bM-^@M-^X+M-bM-^@M-^Y character, then the specified key types will be
appended to the default set instead of replacing them. If the
specified list begins with a M-bM-^@M-^X-M-bM-^@M-^Y character, then the specified
key types (including wildcards) will be removed from the default
set instead of replacing them. If the specified list begins with
a M-bM-^@M-^X^M-bM-^@M-^Y character, then the specified key types will be placed at
the head of the default set. The default for this option is:
ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com,
ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+ sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
- rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com,rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+ sk-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+ rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+ rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com,
ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
- ssh-ed25519,rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256,ssh-rsa
+ sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com,
+ ssh-ed25519,sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com,
+ rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256,ssh-rsa
If hostkeys are known for the destination host then this default
is modified to prefer their algorithms.
The list of available key types may also be obtained using "ssh
- -Q key".
+ -Q HostKeyAlgorithms".
HostKeyAlias
Specifies an alias that should be used instead of the real host
name when looking up or saving the host key in the host key
database files and when validating host certificates. This
option is useful for tunneling SSH connections or for multiple
servers running on a single host.
Hostname
Specifies the real host name to log into. This can be used to
specify nicknames or abbreviations for hosts. Arguments to
Hostname accept the tokens described in the TOKENS section.
Numeric IP addresses are also permitted (both on the command line
and in Hostname specifications). The default is the name given
on the command line.
IdentitiesOnly
Specifies that ssh(1) should only use the configured
authentication identity and certificate files (either the default
files, or those explicitly configured in the ssh_config files or
passed on the ssh(1) command-line), even if ssh-agent(1) or a
- PKCS11Provider offers more identities. The argument to this
- keyword must be yes or no (the default). This option is intended
- for situations where ssh-agent offers many different identities.
+ PKCS11Provider or SecurityKeyProvider offers more identities.
+ The argument to this keyword must be yes or no (the default).
+ This option is intended for situations where ssh-agent offers
+ many different identities.
IdentityAgent
Specifies the UNIX-domain socket used to communicate with the
authentication agent.
This option overrides the SSH_AUTH_SOCK environment variable and
can be used to select a specific agent. Setting the socket name
to none disables the use of an authentication agent. If the
string "SSH_AUTH_SOCK" is specified, the location of the socket
will be read from the SSH_AUTH_SOCK environment variable.
Otherwise if the specified value begins with a M-bM-^@M-^X$M-bM-^@M-^Y character,
then it will be treated as an environment variable containing the
location of the socket.
Arguments to IdentityAgent may use the tilde syntax to refer to a
user's home directory or the tokens described in the TOKENS
section.
IdentityFile
- Specifies a file from which the user's DSA, ECDSA, Ed25519 or RSA
+ Specifies a file from which the user's DSA, ECDSA, authenticator-
+ hosted ECDSA, Ed25519, authenticator-hosted Ed25519 or RSA
authentication identity is read. The default is ~/.ssh/id_dsa,
- ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa, ~/.ssh/id_ed25519 and ~/.ssh/id_rsa.
- Additionally, any identities represented by the authentication
- agent will be used for authentication unless IdentitiesOnly is
- set. If no certificates have been explicitly specified by
- CertificateFile, ssh(1) will try to load certificate information
- from the filename obtained by appending -cert.pub to the path of
- a specified IdentityFile.
+ ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa, ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa_sk, ~/.ssh/id_ed25519,
+ ~/.ssh/id_ed25519_sk and ~/.ssh/id_rsa. Additionally, any
+ identities represented by the authentication agent will be used
+ for authentication unless IdentitiesOnly is set. If no
+ certificates have been explicitly specified by CertificateFile,
+ ssh(1) will try to load certificate information from the filename
+ obtained by appending -cert.pub to the path of a specified
+ IdentityFile.
Arguments to IdentityFile may use the tilde syntax to refer to a
user's home directory or the tokens described in the TOKENS
section.
It is possible to have multiple identity files specified in
configuration files; all these identities will be tried in
sequence. Multiple IdentityFile directives will add to the list
of identities tried (this behaviour differs from that of other
configuration directives).
IdentityFile may be used in conjunction with IdentitiesOnly to
select which identities in an agent are offered during
authentication. IdentityFile may also be used in conjunction
with CertificateFile in order to provide any certificate also
needed for authentication with the identity.
IgnoreUnknown
Specifies a pattern-list of unknown options to be ignored if they
are encountered in configuration parsing. This may be used to
suppress errors if ssh_config contains options that are
unrecognised by ssh(1). It is recommended that IgnoreUnknown be
listed early in the configuration file as it will not be applied
to unknown options that appear before it.
Include
Include the specified configuration file(s). Multiple pathnames
may be specified and each pathname may contain glob(7) wildcards
and, for user configurations, shell-like M-bM-^@M-^X~M-bM-^@M-^Y references to user
home directories. Files without absolute paths are assumed to be
in ~/.ssh if included in a user configuration file or /etc/ssh if
included from the system configuration file. Include directive
may appear inside a Match or Host block to perform conditional
inclusion.
IPQoS Specifies the IPv4 type-of-service or DSCP class for connections.
Accepted values are af11, af12, af13, af21, af22, af23, af31,
af32, af33, af41, af42, af43, cs0, cs1, cs2, cs3, cs4, cs5, cs6,
- cs7, ef, lowdelay, throughput, reliability, a numeric value, or
- none to use the operating system default. This option may take
- one or two arguments, separated by whitespace. If one argument
- is specified, it is used as the packet class unconditionally. If
- two values are specified, the first is automatically selected for
- interactive sessions and the second for non-interactive sessions.
- The default is af21 (Low-Latency Data) for interactive sessions
- and cs1 (Lower Effort) for non-interactive sessions.
+ cs7, ef, le, lowdelay, throughput, reliability, a numeric value,
+ or none to use the operating system default. This option may
+ take one or two arguments, separated by whitespace. If one
+ argument is specified, it is used as the packet class
+ unconditionally. If two values are specified, the first is
+ automatically selected for interactive sessions and the second
+ for non-interactive sessions. The default is af21 (Low-Latency
+ Data) for interactive sessions and cs1 (Lower Effort) for non-
+ interactive sessions.
KbdInteractiveAuthentication
Specifies whether to use keyboard-interactive authentication.
The argument to this keyword must be yes (the default) or no.
KbdInteractiveDevices
Specifies the list of methods to use in keyboard-interactive
authentication. Multiple method names must be comma-separated.
The default is to use the server specified list. The methods
available vary depending on what the server supports. For an
OpenSSH server, it may be zero or more of: bsdauth and pam.
KexAlgorithms
Specifies the available KEX (Key Exchange) algorithms. Multiple
algorithms must be comma-separated. If the specified list begins
with a M-bM-^@M-^X+M-bM-^@M-^Y character, then the specified methods will be appended
to the default set instead of replacing them. If the specified
list begins with a M-bM-^@M-^X-M-bM-^@M-^Y character, then the specified methods
(including wildcards) will be removed from the default set
instead of replacing them. If the specified list begins with a
M-bM-^@M-^X^M-bM-^@M-^Y character, then the specified methods will be placed at the
head of the default set. The default is:
curve25519-sha256,curve25519-sha256@libssh.org,
ecdh-sha2-nistp256,ecdh-sha2-nistp384,ecdh-sha2-nistp521,
diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256,
diffie-hellman-group16-sha512,
diffie-hellman-group18-sha512,
- diffie-hellman-group14-sha256,
- diffie-hellman-group14-sha1
+ diffie-hellman-group14-sha256
The list of available key exchange algorithms may also be
obtained using "ssh -Q kex".
LocalCommand
Specifies a command to execute on the local machine after
successfully connecting to the server. The command string
extends to the end of the line, and is executed with the user's
shell. Arguments to LocalCommand accept the tokens described in
the TOKENS section.
The command is run synchronously and does not have access to the
session of the ssh(1) that spawned it. It should not be used for
interactive commands.
This directive is ignored unless PermitLocalCommand has been
enabled.
LocalForward
Specifies that a TCP port on the local machine be forwarded over
the secure channel to the specified host and port from the remote
machine. The first argument must be [bind_address:]port and the
second argument must be host:hostport. IPv6 addresses can be
specified by enclosing addresses in square brackets. Multiple
forwardings may be specified, and additional forwardings can be
given on the command line. Only the superuser can forward
privileged ports. By default, the local port is bound in
accordance with the GatewayPorts setting. However, an explicit
bind_address may be used to bind the connection to a specific
address. The bind_address of localhost indicates that the
listening port be bound for local use only, while an empty
address or M-bM-^@M-^X*M-bM-^@M-^Y indicates that the port should be available from
all interfaces.
LogLevel
Gives the verbosity level that is used when logging messages from
ssh(1). The possible values are: QUIET, FATAL, ERROR, INFO,
VERBOSE, DEBUG, DEBUG1, DEBUG2, and DEBUG3. The default is INFO.
DEBUG and DEBUG1 are equivalent. DEBUG2 and DEBUG3 each specify
higher levels of verbose output.
MACs Specifies the MAC (message authentication code) algorithms in
order of preference. The MAC algorithm is used for data
integrity protection. Multiple algorithms must be comma-
separated. If the specified list begins with a M-bM-^@M-^X+M-bM-^@M-^Y character,
then the specified algorithms will be appended to the default set
instead of replacing them. If the specified list begins with a
M-bM-^@M-^X-M-bM-^@M-^Y character, then the specified algorithms (including
wildcards) will be removed from the default set instead of
replacing them. If the specified list begins with a M-bM-^@M-^X^M-bM-^@M-^Y
character, then the specified algorithms will be placed at the
head of the default set.
The algorithms that contain "-etm" calculate the MAC after
encryption (encrypt-then-mac). These are considered safer and
their use recommended.
The default is:
umac-64-etm@openssh.com,umac-128-etm@openssh.com,
hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com,hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com,
hmac-sha1-etm@openssh.com,
umac-64@openssh.com,umac-128@openssh.com,
hmac-sha2-256,hmac-sha2-512,hmac-sha1
The list of available MAC algorithms may also be obtained using
"ssh -Q mac".
NoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost
Disable host authentication for localhost (loopback addresses).
The argument to this keyword must be yes or no (the default).
NumberOfPasswordPrompts
Specifies the number of password prompts before giving up. The
argument to this keyword must be an integer. The default is 3.
PasswordAuthentication
Specifies whether to use password authentication. The argument
to this keyword must be yes (the default) or no.
PermitLocalCommand
Allow local command execution via the LocalCommand option or
using the !command escape sequence in ssh(1). The argument must
be yes or no (the default).
PKCS11Provider
Specifies which PKCS#11 provider to use or none to indicate that
no provider should be used (the default). The argument to this
keyword is a path to the PKCS#11 shared library ssh(1) should use
to communicate with a PKCS#11 token providing keys for user
authentication.
Port Specifies the port number to connect on the remote host. The
default is 22.
PreferredAuthentications
Specifies the order in which the client should try authentication
methods. This allows a client to prefer one method (e.g.
keyboard-interactive) over another method (e.g. password). The
default is:
gssapi-with-mic,hostbased,publickey,
keyboard-interactive,password
ProxyCommand
Specifies the command to use to connect to the server. The
command string extends to the end of the line, and is executed
using the user's shell M-bM-^@M-^XexecM-bM-^@M-^Y directive to avoid a lingering
shell process.
Arguments to ProxyCommand accept the tokens described in the
TOKENS section. The command can be basically anything, and
should read from its standard input and write to its standard
output. It should eventually connect an sshd(8) server running
on some machine, or execute sshd -i somewhere. Host key
management will be done using the Hostname of the host being
connected (defaulting to the name typed by the user). Setting
the command to none disables this option entirely. Note that
CheckHostIP is not available for connects with a proxy command.
This directive is useful in conjunction with nc(1) and its proxy
support. For example, the following directive would connect via
an HTTP proxy at 192.0.2.0:
ProxyCommand /usr/bin/nc -X connect -x 192.0.2.0:8080 %h %p
ProxyJump
Specifies one or more jump proxies as either [user@]host[:port]
or an ssh URI. Multiple proxies may be separated by comma
characters and will be visited sequentially. Setting this option
will cause ssh(1) to connect to the target host by first making a
ssh(1) connection to the specified ProxyJump host and then
establishing a TCP forwarding to the ultimate target from there.
Note that this option will compete with the ProxyCommand option -
whichever is specified first will prevent later instances of the
other from taking effect.
Note also that the configuration for the destination host (either
supplied via the command-line or the configuration file) is not
generally applied to jump hosts. ~/.ssh/config should be used if
specific configuration is required for jump hosts.
ProxyUseFdpass
Specifies that ProxyCommand will pass a connected file descriptor
back to ssh(1) instead of continuing to execute and pass data.
The default is no.
PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes
Specifies the key types that will be used for public key
authentication as a comma-separated list of patterns. If the
specified list begins with a M-bM-^@M-^X+M-bM-^@M-^Y character, then the key types
after it will be appended to the default instead of replacing it.
If the specified list begins with a M-bM-^@M-^X-M-bM-^@M-^Y character, then the
specified key types (including wildcards) will be removed from
the default set instead of replacing them. If the specified list
begins with a M-bM-^@M-^X^M-bM-^@M-^Y character, then the specified key types will be
placed at the head of the default set. The default for this
option is:
ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com,
ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+ sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
- rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com,rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+ sk-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+ rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+ rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com,
ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
- ssh-ed25519,rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256,ssh-rsa
+ sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com,
+ ssh-ed25519,sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com,
+ rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256,ssh-rsa
The list of available key types may also be obtained using "ssh
- -Q key".
+ -Q PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes".
PubkeyAuthentication
Specifies whether to try public key authentication. The argument
to this keyword must be yes (the default) or no.
RekeyLimit
Specifies the maximum amount of data that may be transmitted
before the session key is renegotiated, optionally followed a
maximum amount of time that may pass before the session key is
renegotiated. The first argument is specified in bytes and may
have a suffix of M-bM-^@M-^XKM-bM-^@M-^Y, M-bM-^@M-^XMM-bM-^@M-^Y, or M-bM-^@M-^XGM-bM-^@M-^Y to indicate Kilobytes,
Megabytes, or Gigabytes, respectively. The default is between
M-bM-^@M-^X1GM-bM-^@M-^Y and M-bM-^@M-^X4GM-bM-^@M-^Y, depending on the cipher. The optional second
value is specified in seconds and may use any of the units
documented in the TIME FORMATS section of sshd_config(5). The
default value for RekeyLimit is default none, which means that
rekeying is performed after the cipher's default amount of data
has been sent or received and no time based rekeying is done.
RemoteCommand
Specifies a command to execute on the remote machine after
successfully connecting to the server. The command string
extends to the end of the line, and is executed with the user's
shell. Arguments to RemoteCommand accept the tokens described in
the TOKENS section.
RemoteForward
Specifies that a TCP port on the remote machine be forwarded over
the secure channel. The remote port may either be forwarded to a
specified host and port from the local machine, or may act as a
SOCKS 4/5 proxy that allows a remote client to connect to
arbitrary destinations from the local machine. The first
argument must be [bind_address:]port If forwarding to a specific
destination then the second argument must be host:hostport,
otherwise if no destination argument is specified then the remote
forwarding will be established as a SOCKS proxy.
IPv6 addresses can be specified by enclosing addresses in square
brackets. Multiple forwardings may be specified, and additional
forwardings can be given on the command line. Privileged ports
can be forwarded only when logging in as root on the remote
machine.
If the port argument is 0, the listen port will be dynamically
allocated on the server and reported to the client at run time.
If the bind_address is not specified, the default is to only bind
to loopback addresses. If the bind_address is M-bM-^@M-^X*M-bM-^@M-^Y or an empty
string, then the forwarding is requested to listen on all
interfaces. Specifying a remote bind_address will only succeed
if the server's GatewayPorts option is enabled (see
sshd_config(5)).
RequestTTY
Specifies whether to request a pseudo-tty for the session. The
argument may be one of: no (never request a TTY), yes (always
request a TTY when standard input is a TTY), force (always
request a TTY) or auto (request a TTY when opening a login
session). This option mirrors the -t and -T flags for ssh(1).
RevokedHostKeys
Specifies revoked host public keys. Keys listed in this file
will be refused for host authentication. Note that if this file
does not exist or is not readable, then host authentication will
be refused for all hosts. Keys may be specified as a text file,
listing one public key per line, or as an OpenSSH Key Revocation
List (KRL) as generated by ssh-keygen(1). For more information
on KRLs, see the KEY REVOCATION LISTS section in ssh-keygen(1).
+ SecurityKeyProvider
+ Specifies a path to a library that will be used when loading any
+ FIDO authenticator-hosted keys, overriding the default of using
+ the built-in USB HID support.
+
+ If the specified value begins with a M-bM-^@M-^X$M-bM-^@M-^Y character, then it will
+ be treated as an environment variable containing the path to the
+ library.
+
SendEnv
Specifies what variables from the local environ(7) should be sent
to the server. The server must also support it, and the server
must be configured to accept these environment variables. Note
that the TERM environment variable is always sent whenever a
pseudo-terminal is requested as it is required by the protocol.
Refer to AcceptEnv in sshd_config(5) for how to configure the
server. Variables are specified by name, which may contain
wildcard characters. Multiple environment variables may be
separated by whitespace or spread across multiple SendEnv
directives.
See PATTERNS for more information on patterns.
It is possible to clear previously set SendEnv variable names by
prefixing patterns with -. The default is not to send any
environment variables.
ServerAliveCountMax
Sets the number of server alive messages (see below) which may be
sent without ssh(1) receiving any messages back from the server.
If this threshold is reached while server alive messages are
being sent, ssh will disconnect from the server, terminating the
session. It is important to note that the use of server alive
messages is very different from TCPKeepAlive (below). The server
alive messages are sent through the encrypted channel and
therefore will not be spoofable. The TCP keepalive option
enabled by TCPKeepAlive is spoofable. The server alive mechanism
is valuable when the client or server depend on knowing when a
connection has become unresponsive.
The default value is 3. If, for example, ServerAliveInterval
(see below) is set to 15 and ServerAliveCountMax is left at the
default, if the server becomes unresponsive, ssh will disconnect
after approximately 45 seconds.
ServerAliveInterval
Sets a timeout interval in seconds after which if no data has
been received from the server, ssh(1) will send a message through
the encrypted channel to request a response from the server. The
default is 0, indicating that these messages will not be sent to
the server.
SetEnv Directly specify one or more environment variables and their
contents to be sent to the server. Similarly to SendEnv, the
server must be prepared to accept the environment variable.
StreamLocalBindMask
Sets the octal file creation mode mask (umask) used when creating
a Unix-domain socket file for local or remote port forwarding.
This option is only used for port forwarding to a Unix-domain
socket file.
The default value is 0177, which creates a Unix-domain socket
file that is readable and writable only by the owner. Note that
not all operating systems honor the file mode on Unix-domain
socket files.
StreamLocalBindUnlink
Specifies whether to remove an existing Unix-domain socket file
for local or remote port forwarding before creating a new one.
If the socket file already exists and StreamLocalBindUnlink is
not enabled, ssh will be unable to forward the port to the Unix-
domain socket file. This option is only used for port forwarding
to a Unix-domain socket file.
The argument must be yes or no (the default).
StrictHostKeyChecking
If this flag is set to yes, ssh(1) will never automatically add
host keys to the ~/.ssh/known_hosts file, and refuses to connect
to hosts whose host key has changed. This provides maximum
protection against man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks, though it
can be annoying when the /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts file is poorly
maintained or when connections to new hosts are frequently made.
This option forces the user to manually add all new hosts.
If this flag is set to M-bM-^@M-^\accept-newM-bM-^@M-^] then ssh will automatically
add new host keys to the user known hosts files, but will not
permit connections to hosts with changed host keys. If this flag
is set to M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^] or M-bM-^@M-^\offM-bM-^@M-^], ssh will automatically add new host keys
to the user known hosts files and allow connections to hosts with
changed hostkeys to proceed, subject to some restrictions. If
this flag is set to ask (the default), new host keys will be
added to the user known host files only after the user has
confirmed that is what they really want to do, and ssh will
refuse to connect to hosts whose host key has changed. The host
keys of known hosts will be verified automatically in all cases.
SyslogFacility
Gives the facility code that is used when logging messages from
ssh(1). The possible values are: DAEMON, USER, AUTH, LOCAL0,
LOCAL1, LOCAL2, LOCAL3, LOCAL4, LOCAL5, LOCAL6, LOCAL7. The
default is USER.
TCPKeepAlive
Specifies whether the system should send TCP keepalive messages
to the other side. If they are sent, death of the connection or
crash of one of the machines will be properly noticed. However,
this means that connections will die if the route is down
temporarily, and some people find it annoying.
The default is yes (to send TCP keepalive messages), and the
client will notice if the network goes down or the remote host
dies. This is important in scripts, and many users want it too.
To disable TCP keepalive messages, the value should be set to no.
See also ServerAliveInterval for protocol-level keepalives.
Tunnel Request tun(4) device forwarding between the client and the
server. The argument must be yes, point-to-point (layer 3),
ethernet (layer 2), or no (the default). Specifying yes requests
the default tunnel mode, which is point-to-point.
TunnelDevice
Specifies the tun(4) devices to open on the client (local_tun)
and the server (remote_tun).
The argument must be local_tun[:remote_tun]. The devices may be
specified by numerical ID or the keyword any, which uses the next
available tunnel device. If remote_tun is not specified, it
defaults to any. The default is any:any.
UpdateHostKeys
Specifies whether ssh(1) should accept notifications of
additional hostkeys from the server sent after authentication has
completed and add them to UserKnownHostsFile. The argument must
- be yes, no (the default) or ask. Enabling this option allows
- learning alternate hostkeys for a server and supports graceful
- key rotation by allowing a server to send replacement public keys
- before old ones are removed. Additional hostkeys are only
- accepted if the key used to authenticate the host was already
- trusted or explicitly accepted by the user. If UpdateHostKeys is
- set to ask, then the user is asked to confirm the modifications
- to the known_hosts file. Confirmation is currently incompatible
- with ControlPersist, and will be disabled if it is enabled.
+ be yes, no or ask. This option allows learning alternate
+ hostkeys for a server and supports graceful key rotation by
+ allowing a server to send replacement public keys before old ones
+ are removed. Additional hostkeys are only accepted if the key
+ used to authenticate the host was already trusted or explicitly
+ accepted by the user.
+
+ UpdateHostKeys is enabled by default if the user has not
+ overridden the default UserKnownHostsFile setting, otherwise
+ UpdateHostKeys will be set to ask.
+
+ If UpdateHostKeys is set to ask, then the user is asked to
+ confirm the modifications to the known_hosts file. Confirmation
+ is currently incompatible with ControlPersist, and will be
+ disabled if it is enabled.
Presently, only sshd(8) from OpenSSH 6.8 and greater support the
"hostkeys@openssh.com" protocol extension used to inform the
client of all the server's hostkeys.
User Specifies the user to log in as. This can be useful when a
different user name is used on different machines. This saves
the trouble of having to remember to give the user name on the
command line.
UserKnownHostsFile
Specifies one or more files to use for the user host key
database, separated by whitespace. The default is
~/.ssh/known_hosts, ~/.ssh/known_hosts2.
VerifyHostKeyDNS
Specifies whether to verify the remote key using DNS and SSHFP
resource records. If this option is set to yes, the client will
implicitly trust keys that match a secure fingerprint from DNS.
Insecure fingerprints will be handled as if this option was set
to ask. If this option is set to ask, information on fingerprint
match will be displayed, but the user will still need to confirm
new host keys according to the StrictHostKeyChecking option. The
default is no.
See also VERIFYING HOST KEYS in ssh(1).
VisualHostKey
If this flag is set to yes, an ASCII art representation of the
remote host key fingerprint is printed in addition to the
fingerprint string at login and for unknown host keys. If this
flag is set to no (the default), no fingerprint strings are
printed at login and only the fingerprint string will be printed
for unknown host keys.
XAuthLocation
Specifies the full pathname of the xauth(1) program. The default
is /usr/X11R6/bin/xauth.
PATTERNS
A pattern consists of zero or more non-whitespace characters, M-bM-^@M-^X*M-bM-^@M-^Y (a
wildcard that matches zero or more characters), or M-bM-^@M-^X?M-bM-^@M-^Y (a wildcard that
matches exactly one character). For example, to specify a set of
declarations for any host in the ".co.uk" set of domains, the following
pattern could be used:
Host *.co.uk
The following pattern would match any host in the 192.168.0.[0-9] network
range:
Host 192.168.0.?
A pattern-list is a comma-separated list of patterns. Patterns within
pattern-lists may be negated by preceding them with an exclamation mark
(M-bM-^@M-^X!M-bM-^@M-^Y). For example, to allow a key to be used from anywhere within an
organization except from the "dialup" pool, the following entry (in
authorized_keys) could be used:
from="!*.dialup.example.com,*.example.com"
Note that a negated match will never produce a positive result by itself.
For example, attempting to match "host3" against the following pattern-
list will fail:
from="!host1,!host2"
The solution here is to include a term that will yield a positive match,
such as a wildcard:
from="!host1,!host2,*"
TOKENS
Arguments to some keywords can make use of tokens, which are expanded at
runtime:
%% A literal M-bM-^@M-^X%M-bM-^@M-^Y.
%C Hash of %l%h%p%r.
%d Local user's home directory.
%h The remote hostname.
%i The local user ID.
%L The local hostname.
%l The local hostname, including the domain name.
%n The original remote hostname, as given on the command line.
%p The remote port.
%r The remote username.
%T The local tun(4) or tap(4) network interface assigned if
tunnel forwarding was requested, or "NONE" otherwise.
%u The local username.
Match exec accepts the tokens %%, %h, %i, %L, %l, %n, %p, %r, and %u.
CertificateFile accepts the tokens %%, %d, %h, %i, %l, %r, and %u.
ControlPath accepts the tokens %%, %C, %h, %i, %L, %l, %n, %p, %r, and
%u.
Hostname accepts the tokens %% and %h.
IdentityAgent and IdentityFile accept the tokens %%, %d, %h, %i, %l, %r,
and %u.
LocalCommand accepts the tokens %%, %C, %d, %h, %i, %l, %n, %p, %r, %T,
and %u.
ProxyCommand accepts the tokens %%, %h, %n, %p, and %r.
RemoteCommand accepts the tokens %%, %C, %d, %h, %i, %l, %n, %p, %r, and
%u.
FILES
~/.ssh/config
This is the per-user configuration file. The format of this file
is described above. This file is used by the SSH client.
Because of the potential for abuse, this file must have strict
permissions: read/write for the user, and not writable by others.
/etc/ssh/ssh_config
Systemwide configuration file. This file provides defaults for
those values that are not specified in the user's configuration
file, and for those users who do not have a configuration file.
This file must be world-readable.
SEE ALSO
ssh(1)
AUTHORS
OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free ssh 1.2.12 release by
Tatu Ylonen. Aaron Campbell, Bob Beck, Markus Friedl, Niels Provos, Theo
de Raadt and Dug Song removed many bugs, re-added newer features and
created OpenSSH. Markus Friedl contributed the support for SSH protocol
versions 1.5 and 2.0.
-OpenBSD 6.6 September 13, 2019 OpenBSD 6.6
+OpenBSD 6.6 February 7, 2020 OpenBSD 6.6
diff --git a/ssh_config.5 b/ssh_config.5
index 02a87892d870..06a32d3142a6 100644
--- a/ssh_config.5
+++ b/ssh_config.5
@@ -1,1857 +1,1902 @@
.\"
.\" Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
.\" Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
.\" All rights reserved
.\"
.\" As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
.\" can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
.\" software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
.\" incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
.\" called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
.\"
.\" Copyright (c) 1999,2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
.\" Copyright (c) 1999 Aaron Campbell. All rights reserved.
.\" Copyright (c) 1999 Theo de Raadt. All rights reserved.
.\"
.\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
.\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
.\" are met:
.\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
.\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
.\" documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
.\"
.\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
.\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
.\" OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
.\" IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
.\" INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
.\" NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
.\" DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
.\" THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
.\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
.\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
.\"
-.\" $OpenBSD: ssh_config.5,v 1.304 2019/09/13 04:52:34 djm Exp $
-.Dd $Mdocdate: September 13 2019 $
+.\" $OpenBSD: ssh_config.5,v 1.322 2020/02/07 03:54:44 dtucker Exp $
+.Dd $Mdocdate: February 7 2020 $
.Dt SSH_CONFIG 5
.Os
.Sh NAME
.Nm ssh_config
-.Nd OpenSSH SSH client configuration files
+.Nd OpenSSH client configuration file
.Sh DESCRIPTION
.Xr ssh 1
obtains configuration data from the following sources in
the following order:
.Pp
.Bl -enum -offset indent -compact
.It
command-line options
.It
user's configuration file
.Pq Pa ~/.ssh/config
.It
system-wide configuration file
.Pq Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_config
.El
.Pp
For each parameter, the first obtained value
will be used.
The configuration files contain sections separated by
.Cm Host
specifications, and that section is only applied for hosts that
match one of the patterns given in the specification.
The matched host name is usually the one given on the command line
(see the
.Cm CanonicalizeHostname
option for exceptions).
.Pp
Since the first obtained value for each parameter is used, more
host-specific declarations should be given near the beginning of the
file, and general defaults at the end.
.Pp
The file contains keyword-argument pairs, one per line.
Lines starting with
.Ql #
and empty lines are interpreted as comments.
Arguments may optionally be enclosed in double quotes
.Pq \&"
in order to represent arguments containing spaces.
Configuration options may be separated by whitespace or
optional whitespace and exactly one
.Ql = ;
the latter format is useful to avoid the need to quote whitespace
when specifying configuration options using the
.Nm ssh ,
.Nm scp ,
and
.Nm sftp
.Fl o
option.
.Pp
The possible
keywords and their meanings are as follows (note that
keywords are case-insensitive and arguments are case-sensitive):
.Bl -tag -width Ds
.It Cm Host
Restricts the following declarations (up to the next
.Cm Host
or
.Cm Match
keyword) to be only for those hosts that match one of the patterns
given after the keyword.
If more than one pattern is provided, they should be separated by whitespace.
A single
.Ql *
as a pattern can be used to provide global
defaults for all hosts.
The host is usually the
.Ar hostname
argument given on the command line
(see the
.Cm CanonicalizeHostname
keyword for exceptions).
.Pp
A pattern entry may be negated by prefixing it with an exclamation mark
.Pq Sq !\& .
If a negated entry is matched, then the
.Cm Host
entry is ignored, regardless of whether any other patterns on the line
match.
Negated matches are therefore useful to provide exceptions for wildcard
matches.
.Pp
See
.Sx PATTERNS
for more information on patterns.
.It Cm Match
Restricts the following declarations (up to the next
.Cm Host
or
.Cm Match
keyword) to be used only when the conditions following the
.Cm Match
keyword are satisfied.
Match conditions are specified using one or more criteria
or the single token
.Cm all
which always matches.
The available criteria keywords are:
.Cm canonical ,
.Cm final ,
.Cm exec ,
.Cm host ,
.Cm originalhost ,
.Cm user ,
and
.Cm localuser .
The
.Cm all
criteria must appear alone or immediately after
.Cm canonical
or
.Cm final .
Other criteria may be combined arbitrarily.
All criteria but
.Cm all ,
.Cm canonical ,
and
.Cm final
require an argument.
Criteria may be negated by prepending an exclamation mark
.Pq Sq !\& .
.Pp
The
.Cm canonical
keyword matches only when the configuration file is being re-parsed
after hostname canonicalization (see the
.Cm CanonicalizeHostname
option).
This may be useful to specify conditions that work with canonical host
names only.
.Pp
The
.Cm final
keyword requests that the configuration be re-parsed (regardless of whether
.Cm CanonicalizeHostname
is enabled), and matches only during this final pass.
If
.Cm CanonicalizeHostname
is enabled, then
.Cm canonical
and
.Cm final
match during the same pass.
.Pp
The
.Cm exec
keyword executes the specified command under the user's shell.
If the command returns a zero exit status then the condition is considered true.
Commands containing whitespace characters must be quoted.
Arguments to
.Cm exec
accept the tokens described in the
.Sx TOKENS
section.
.Pp
The other keywords' criteria must be single entries or comma-separated
lists and may use the wildcard and negation operators described in the
.Sx PATTERNS
section.
The criteria for the
.Cm host
keyword are matched against the target hostname, after any substitution
by the
.Cm Hostname
or
.Cm CanonicalizeHostname
options.
The
.Cm originalhost
keyword matches against the hostname as it was specified on the command-line.
The
.Cm user
keyword matches against the target username on the remote host.
The
.Cm localuser
keyword matches against the name of the local user running
.Xr ssh 1
(this keyword may be useful in system-wide
.Nm
files).
.It Cm AddKeysToAgent
Specifies whether keys should be automatically added to a running
.Xr ssh-agent 1 .
If this option is set to
.Cm yes
and a key is loaded from a file, the key and its passphrase are added to
the agent with the default lifetime, as if by
.Xr ssh-add 1 .
If this option is set to
.Cm ask ,
.Xr ssh 1
will require confirmation using the
.Ev SSH_ASKPASS
program before adding a key (see
.Xr ssh-add 1
for details).
If this option is set to
.Cm confirm ,
each use of the key must be confirmed, as if the
.Fl c
option was specified to
.Xr ssh-add 1 .
If this option is set to
.Cm no ,
no keys are added to the agent.
The argument must be
.Cm yes ,
.Cm confirm ,
.Cm ask ,
or
.Cm no
(the default).
.It Cm AddressFamily
Specifies which address family to use when connecting.
Valid arguments are
.Cm any
(the default),
.Cm inet
(use IPv4 only), or
.Cm inet6
(use IPv6 only).
.It Cm BatchMode
If set to
.Cm yes ,
-passphrase/password querying will be disabled.
+user interaction such as password prompts and host key confirmation requests
+will be disabled.
This option is useful in scripts and other batch jobs where no user
-is present to supply the password.
+is present to interact with
+.Xr ssh 1 .
The argument must be
.Cm yes
or
.Cm no
(the default).
.It Cm BindAddress
Use the specified address on the local machine as the source address of
the connection.
Only useful on systems with more than one address.
.It Cm BindInterface
Use the address of the specified interface on the local machine as the
source address of the connection.
.It Cm CanonicalDomains
When
.Cm CanonicalizeHostname
is enabled, this option specifies the list of domain suffixes in which to
search for the specified destination host.
.It Cm CanonicalizeFallbackLocal
Specifies whether to fail with an error when hostname canonicalization fails.
The default,
.Cm yes ,
will attempt to look up the unqualified hostname using the system resolver's
search rules.
A value of
.Cm no
will cause
.Xr ssh 1
to fail instantly if
.Cm CanonicalizeHostname
is enabled and the target hostname cannot be found in any of the domains
specified by
.Cm CanonicalDomains .
.It Cm CanonicalizeHostname
Controls whether explicit hostname canonicalization is performed.
The default,
.Cm no ,
is not to perform any name rewriting and let the system resolver handle all
hostname lookups.
If set to
.Cm yes
then, for connections that do not use a
.Cm ProxyCommand
or
.Cm ProxyJump ,
.Xr ssh 1
will attempt to canonicalize the hostname specified on the command line
using the
.Cm CanonicalDomains
suffixes and
.Cm CanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs
rules.
If
.Cm CanonicalizeHostname
is set to
.Cm always ,
then canonicalization is applied to proxied connections too.
.Pp
If this option is enabled, then the configuration files are processed
again using the new target name to pick up any new configuration in matching
.Cm Host
and
.Cm Match
stanzas.
.It Cm CanonicalizeMaxDots
Specifies the maximum number of dot characters in a hostname before
canonicalization is disabled.
The default, 1,
allows a single dot (i.e. hostname.subdomain).
.It Cm CanonicalizePermittedCNAMEs
Specifies rules to determine whether CNAMEs should be followed when
canonicalizing hostnames.
The rules consist of one or more arguments of
.Ar source_domain_list : Ns Ar target_domain_list ,
where
.Ar source_domain_list
is a pattern-list of domains that may follow CNAMEs in canonicalization,
and
.Ar target_domain_list
is a pattern-list of domains that they may resolve to.
.Pp
For example,
.Qq *.a.example.com:*.b.example.com,*.c.example.com
will allow hostnames matching
.Qq *.a.example.com
to be canonicalized to names in the
.Qq *.b.example.com
or
.Qq *.c.example.com
domains.
.It Cm CASignatureAlgorithms
Specifies which algorithms are allowed for signing of certificates
by certificate authorities (CAs).
The default is:
.Bd -literal -offset indent
ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
ssh-ed25519,rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256,ssh-rsa
.Ed
.Pp
.Xr ssh 1
will not accept host certificates signed using algorithms other than those
specified.
.It Cm CertificateFile
Specifies a file from which the user's certificate is read.
A corresponding private key must be provided separately in order
to use this certificate either
from an
.Cm IdentityFile
directive or
.Fl i
flag to
.Xr ssh 1 ,
via
.Xr ssh-agent 1 ,
or via a
-.Cm PKCS11Provider .
+.Cm PKCS11Provider
+or
+.Cm SecurityKeyProvider .
.Pp
Arguments to
.Cm CertificateFile
may use the tilde syntax to refer to a user's home directory
or the tokens described in the
.Sx TOKENS
section.
.Pp
It is possible to have multiple certificate files specified in
configuration files; these certificates will be tried in sequence.
Multiple
.Cm CertificateFile
directives will add to the list of certificates used for
authentication.
.It Cm ChallengeResponseAuthentication
Specifies whether to use challenge-response authentication.
The argument to this keyword must be
.Cm yes
(the default)
or
.Cm no .
.It Cm CheckHostIP
If set to
.Cm yes
(the default),
.Xr ssh 1
will additionally check the host IP address in the
.Pa known_hosts
file.
This allows it to detect if a host key changed due to DNS spoofing
and will add addresses of destination hosts to
.Pa ~/.ssh/known_hosts
in the process, regardless of the setting of
.Cm StrictHostKeyChecking .
If the option is set to
.Cm no ,
the check will not be executed.
.It Cm Ciphers
Specifies the ciphers allowed and their order of preference.
Multiple ciphers must be comma-separated.
If the specified list begins with a
.Sq +
character, then the specified ciphers will be appended to the default set
instead of replacing them.
If the specified list begins with a
.Sq -
character, then the specified ciphers (including wildcards) will be removed
from the default set instead of replacing them.
If the specified list begins with a
.Sq ^
character, then the specified ciphers will be placed at the head of the
default set.
.Pp
The supported ciphers are:
.Bd -literal -offset indent
3des-cbc
aes128-cbc
aes192-cbc
aes256-cbc
aes128-ctr
aes192-ctr
aes256-ctr
aes128-gcm@openssh.com
aes256-gcm@openssh.com
chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com
.Ed
.Pp
The default is:
.Bd -literal -offset indent
chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com,
aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr,
aes128-gcm@openssh.com,aes256-gcm@openssh.com
.Ed
.Pp
The list of available ciphers may also be obtained using
.Qq ssh -Q cipher .
.It Cm ClearAllForwardings
Specifies that all local, remote, and dynamic port forwardings
specified in the configuration files or on the command line be
cleared.
This option is primarily useful when used from the
.Xr ssh 1
command line to clear port forwardings set in
configuration files, and is automatically set by
.Xr scp 1
and
.Xr sftp 1 .
The argument must be
.Cm yes
or
.Cm no
(the default).
.It Cm Compression
Specifies whether to use compression.
The argument must be
.Cm yes
or
.Cm no
(the default).
.It Cm ConnectionAttempts
Specifies the number of tries (one per second) to make before exiting.
The argument must be an integer.
This may be useful in scripts if the connection sometimes fails.
The default is 1.
.It Cm ConnectTimeout
Specifies the timeout (in seconds) used when connecting to the
SSH server, instead of using the default system TCP timeout.
This timeout is applied both to establishing the connection and to performing
the initial SSH protocol handshake and key exchange.
.It Cm ControlMaster
Enables the sharing of multiple sessions over a single network connection.
When set to
.Cm yes ,
.Xr ssh 1
will listen for connections on a control socket specified using the
.Cm ControlPath
argument.
Additional sessions can connect to this socket using the same
.Cm ControlPath
with
.Cm ControlMaster
set to
.Cm no
(the default).
These sessions will try to reuse the master instance's network connection
rather than initiating new ones, but will fall back to connecting normally
if the control socket does not exist, or is not listening.
.Pp
Setting this to
.Cm ask
will cause
.Xr ssh 1
to listen for control connections, but require confirmation using
.Xr ssh-askpass 1 .
If the
.Cm ControlPath
cannot be opened,
.Xr ssh 1
will continue without connecting to a master instance.
.Pp
X11 and
.Xr ssh-agent 1
forwarding is supported over these multiplexed connections, however the
display and agent forwarded will be the one belonging to the master
connection i.e. it is not possible to forward multiple displays or agents.
.Pp
Two additional options allow for opportunistic multiplexing: try to use a
master connection but fall back to creating a new one if one does not already
exist.
These options are:
.Cm auto
and
.Cm autoask .
The latter requires confirmation like the
.Cm ask
option.
.It Cm ControlPath
Specify the path to the control socket used for connection sharing as described
in the
.Cm ControlMaster
section above or the string
.Cm none
to disable connection sharing.
Arguments to
.Cm ControlPath
may use the tilde syntax to refer to a user's home directory
or the tokens described in the
.Sx TOKENS
section.
It is recommended that any
.Cm ControlPath
used for opportunistic connection sharing include
at least %h, %p, and %r (or alternatively %C) and be placed in a directory
that is not writable by other users.
This ensures that shared connections are uniquely identified.
.It Cm ControlPersist
When used in conjunction with
.Cm ControlMaster ,
specifies that the master connection should remain open
in the background (waiting for future client connections)
after the initial client connection has been closed.
If set to
-.Cm no ,
+.Cm no
+(the default),
then the master connection will not be placed into the background,
and will close as soon as the initial client connection is closed.
If set to
.Cm yes
or 0,
then the master connection will remain in the background indefinitely
(until killed or closed via a mechanism such as the
.Qq ssh -O exit ) .
If set to a time in seconds, or a time in any of the formats documented in
.Xr sshd_config 5 ,
then the backgrounded master connection will automatically terminate
after it has remained idle (with no client connections) for the
specified time.
.It Cm DynamicForward
Specifies that a TCP port on the local machine be forwarded
over the secure channel, and the application
protocol is then used to determine where to connect to from the
remote machine.
.Pp
The argument must be
.Sm off
.Oo Ar bind_address : Oc Ar port .
.Sm on
IPv6 addresses can be specified by enclosing addresses in square brackets.
By default, the local port is bound in accordance with the
.Cm GatewayPorts
setting.
However, an explicit
.Ar bind_address
may be used to bind the connection to a specific address.
The
.Ar bind_address
of
.Cm localhost
indicates that the listening port be bound for local use only, while an
empty address or
.Sq *
indicates that the port should be available from all interfaces.
.Pp
Currently the SOCKS4 and SOCKS5 protocols are supported, and
.Xr ssh 1
will act as a SOCKS server.
Multiple forwardings may be specified, and
additional forwardings can be given on the command line.
Only the superuser can forward privileged ports.
.It Cm EnableSSHKeysign
Setting this option to
.Cm yes
in the global client configuration file
.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_config
enables the use of the helper program
.Xr ssh-keysign 8
during
.Cm HostbasedAuthentication .
The argument must be
.Cm yes
or
.Cm no
(the default).
This option should be placed in the non-hostspecific section.
See
.Xr ssh-keysign 8
for more information.
.It Cm EscapeChar
Sets the escape character (default:
.Ql ~ ) .
The escape character can also
be set on the command line.
The argument should be a single character,
.Ql ^
followed by a letter, or
.Cm none
to disable the escape
character entirely (making the connection transparent for binary
data).
.It Cm ExitOnForwardFailure
Specifies whether
.Xr ssh 1
should terminate the connection if it cannot set up all requested
dynamic, tunnel, local, and remote port forwardings, (e.g.\&
if either end is unable to bind and listen on a specified port).
Note that
.Cm ExitOnForwardFailure
does not apply to connections made over port forwardings and will not,
for example, cause
.Xr ssh 1
to exit if TCP connections to the ultimate forwarding destination fail.
The argument must be
.Cm yes
or
.Cm no
(the default).
.It Cm FingerprintHash
Specifies the hash algorithm used when displaying key fingerprints.
Valid options are:
.Cm md5
and
.Cm sha256
(the default).
.It Cm ForwardAgent
Specifies whether the connection to the authentication agent (if any)
will be forwarded to the remote machine.
-The argument must be
-.Cm yes
-or
+The argument may be
+.Cm yes ,
.Cm no
-(the default).
+(the default),
+an explicit path to an agent socket or the name of an environment variable
+(beginning with
+.Sq $ )
+in which to find the path.
.Pp
Agent forwarding should be enabled with caution.
Users with the ability to bypass file permissions on the remote host
(for the agent's Unix-domain socket)
can access the local agent through the forwarded connection.
An attacker cannot obtain key material from the agent,
however they can perform operations on the keys that enable them to
authenticate using the identities loaded into the agent.
.It Cm ForwardX11
Specifies whether X11 connections will be automatically redirected
over the secure channel and
.Ev DISPLAY
set.
The argument must be
.Cm yes
or
.Cm no
(the default).
.Pp
X11 forwarding should be enabled with caution.
Users with the ability to bypass file permissions on the remote host
(for the user's X11 authorization database)
can access the local X11 display through the forwarded connection.
An attacker may then be able to perform activities such as keystroke monitoring
if the
.Cm ForwardX11Trusted
option is also enabled.
.It Cm ForwardX11Timeout
Specify a timeout for untrusted X11 forwarding
using the format described in the
.Sx TIME FORMATS
section of
.Xr sshd_config 5 .
X11 connections received by
.Xr ssh 1
after this time will be refused.
Setting
.Cm ForwardX11Timeout
to zero will disable the timeout and permit X11 forwarding for the life
of the connection.
The default is to disable untrusted X11 forwarding after twenty minutes has
elapsed.
.It Cm ForwardX11Trusted
If this option is set to
.Cm yes ,
remote X11 clients will have full access to the original X11 display.
.Pp
If this option is set to
.Cm no
(the default),
remote X11 clients will be considered untrusted and prevented
from stealing or tampering with data belonging to trusted X11
clients.
Furthermore, the
.Xr xauth 1
token used for the session will be set to expire after 20 minutes.
Remote clients will be refused access after this time.
.Pp
See the X11 SECURITY extension specification for full details on
the restrictions imposed on untrusted clients.
.It Cm GatewayPorts
Specifies whether remote hosts are allowed to connect to local
forwarded ports.
By default,
.Xr ssh 1
binds local port forwardings to the loopback address.
This prevents other remote hosts from connecting to forwarded ports.
.Cm GatewayPorts
can be used to specify that ssh
should bind local port forwardings to the wildcard address,
thus allowing remote hosts to connect to forwarded ports.
The argument must be
.Cm yes
or
.Cm no
(the default).
.It Cm GlobalKnownHostsFile
Specifies one or more files to use for the global
host key database, separated by whitespace.
The default is
.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts ,
.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts2 .
.It Cm GSSAPIAuthentication
Specifies whether user authentication based on GSSAPI is allowed.
The default is
.Cm no .
.It Cm GSSAPIDelegateCredentials
Forward (delegate) credentials to the server.
The default is
.Cm no .
.It Cm HashKnownHosts
Indicates that
.Xr ssh 1
should hash host names and addresses when they are added to
.Pa ~/.ssh/known_hosts .
These hashed names may be used normally by
.Xr ssh 1
and
.Xr sshd 8 ,
-but they do not reveal identifying information should the file's contents
-be disclosed.
+but they do not visually reveal identifying information if the
+file's contents are disclosed.
The default is
.Cm no .
Note that existing names and addresses in known hosts files
will not be converted automatically,
but may be manually hashed using
.Xr ssh-keygen 1 .
.It Cm HostbasedAuthentication
Specifies whether to try rhosts based authentication with public key
authentication.
The argument must be
.Cm yes
or
.Cm no
(the default).
.It Cm HostbasedKeyTypes
Specifies the key types that will be used for hostbased authentication
as a comma-separated list of patterns.
Alternately if the specified list begins with a
.Sq +
character, then the specified key types will be appended to the default set
instead of replacing them.
If the specified list begins with a
.Sq -
character, then the specified key types (including wildcards) will be removed
from the default set instead of replacing them.
If the specified list begins with a
.Sq ^
character, then the specified key types will be placed at the head of the
default set.
The default for this option is:
.Bd -literal -offset 3n
ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com,
ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
-rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com,rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+sk-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com,
ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
-ssh-ed25519,rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256,ssh-rsa
+sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com,
+ssh-ed25519,sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com,
+rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256,ssh-rsa
.Ed
.Pp
The
.Fl Q
option of
.Xr ssh 1
may be used to list supported key types.
.It Cm HostKeyAlgorithms
Specifies the host key algorithms
that the client wants to use in order of preference.
Alternately if the specified list begins with a
.Sq +
character, then the specified key types will be appended to the default set
instead of replacing them.
If the specified list begins with a
.Sq -
character, then the specified key types (including wildcards) will be removed
from the default set instead of replacing them.
If the specified list begins with a
.Sq ^
character, then the specified key types will be placed at the head of the
default set.
The default for this option is:
.Bd -literal -offset 3n
ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com,
ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
-rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com,rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+sk-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com,
ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
-ssh-ed25519,rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256,ssh-rsa
+sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com,
+ssh-ed25519,sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com,
+rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256,ssh-rsa
.Ed
.Pp
If hostkeys are known for the destination host then this default is modified
to prefer their algorithms.
.Pp
The list of available key types may also be obtained using
-.Qq ssh -Q key .
+.Qq ssh -Q HostKeyAlgorithms .
.It Cm HostKeyAlias
Specifies an alias that should be used instead of the
real host name when looking up or saving the host key
in the host key database files and when validating host certificates.
This option is useful for tunneling SSH connections
or for multiple servers running on a single host.
.It Cm Hostname
Specifies the real host name to log into.
This can be used to specify nicknames or abbreviations for hosts.
Arguments to
.Cm Hostname
accept the tokens described in the
.Sx TOKENS
section.
Numeric IP addresses are also permitted (both on the command line and in
.Cm Hostname
specifications).
The default is the name given on the command line.
.It Cm IdentitiesOnly
Specifies that
.Xr ssh 1
should only use the configured authentication identity and certificate files
(either the default files, or those explicitly configured in the
.Nm
files
or passed on the
.Xr ssh 1
command-line),
even if
.Xr ssh-agent 1
or a
.Cm PKCS11Provider
+or
+.Cm SecurityKeyProvider
offers more identities.
The argument to this keyword must be
.Cm yes
or
.Cm no
(the default).
This option is intended for situations where ssh-agent
offers many different identities.
.It Cm IdentityAgent
Specifies the
.Ux Ns -domain
socket used to communicate with the authentication agent.
.Pp
This option overrides the
.Ev SSH_AUTH_SOCK
environment variable and can be used to select a specific agent.
Setting the socket name to
.Cm none
disables the use of an authentication agent.
If the string
.Qq SSH_AUTH_SOCK
is specified, the location of the socket will be read from the
.Ev SSH_AUTH_SOCK
environment variable.
Otherwise if the specified value begins with a
.Sq $
character, then it will be treated as an environment variable containing
the location of the socket.
.Pp
Arguments to
.Cm IdentityAgent
may use the tilde syntax to refer to a user's home directory
or the tokens described in the
.Sx TOKENS
section.
.It Cm IdentityFile
-Specifies a file from which the user's DSA, ECDSA, Ed25519 or RSA authentication
-identity is read.
+Specifies a file from which the user's DSA, ECDSA, authenticator-hosted ECDSA,
+Ed25519, authenticator-hosted Ed25519 or RSA authentication identity is read.
The default is
.Pa ~/.ssh/id_dsa ,
.Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa ,
-.Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519
+.Pa ~/.ssh/id_ecdsa_sk ,
+.Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519 ,
+.Pa ~/.ssh/id_ed25519_sk
and
.Pa ~/.ssh/id_rsa .
Additionally, any identities represented by the authentication agent
will be used for authentication unless
.Cm IdentitiesOnly
is set.
If no certificates have been explicitly specified by
.Cm CertificateFile ,
.Xr ssh 1
will try to load certificate information from the filename obtained by
appending
.Pa -cert.pub
to the path of a specified
.Cm IdentityFile .
.Pp
Arguments to
.Cm IdentityFile
may use the tilde syntax to refer to a user's home directory
or the tokens described in the
.Sx TOKENS
section.
.Pp
It is possible to have
multiple identity files specified in configuration files; all these
identities will be tried in sequence.
Multiple
.Cm IdentityFile
directives will add to the list of identities tried (this behaviour
differs from that of other configuration directives).
.Pp
.Cm IdentityFile
may be used in conjunction with
.Cm IdentitiesOnly
to select which identities in an agent are offered during authentication.
.Cm IdentityFile
may also be used in conjunction with
.Cm CertificateFile
in order to provide any certificate also needed for authentication with
the identity.
.It Cm IgnoreUnknown
Specifies a pattern-list of unknown options to be ignored if they are
encountered in configuration parsing.
This may be used to suppress errors if
.Nm
contains options that are unrecognised by
.Xr ssh 1 .
It is recommended that
.Cm IgnoreUnknown
be listed early in the configuration file as it will not be applied
to unknown options that appear before it.
.It Cm Include
Include the specified configuration file(s).
Multiple pathnames may be specified and each pathname may contain
.Xr glob 7
wildcards and, for user configurations, shell-like
.Sq ~
references to user home directories.
Files without absolute paths are assumed to be in
.Pa ~/.ssh
if included in a user configuration file or
.Pa /etc/ssh
if included from the system configuration file.
.Cm Include
directive may appear inside a
.Cm Match
or
.Cm Host
block
to perform conditional inclusion.
.It Cm IPQoS
Specifies the IPv4 type-of-service or DSCP class for connections.
Accepted values are
.Cm af11 ,
.Cm af12 ,
.Cm af13 ,
.Cm af21 ,
.Cm af22 ,
.Cm af23 ,
.Cm af31 ,
.Cm af32 ,
.Cm af33 ,
.Cm af41 ,
.Cm af42 ,
.Cm af43 ,
.Cm cs0 ,
.Cm cs1 ,
.Cm cs2 ,
.Cm cs3 ,
.Cm cs4 ,
.Cm cs5 ,
.Cm cs6 ,
.Cm cs7 ,
.Cm ef ,
+.Cm le ,
.Cm lowdelay ,
.Cm throughput ,
.Cm reliability ,
a numeric value, or
.Cm none
to use the operating system default.
This option may take one or two arguments, separated by whitespace.
If one argument is specified, it is used as the packet class unconditionally.
If two values are specified, the first is automatically selected for
interactive sessions and the second for non-interactive sessions.
The default is
.Cm af21
(Low-Latency Data)
for interactive sessions and
.Cm cs1
(Lower Effort)
for non-interactive sessions.
.It Cm KbdInteractiveAuthentication
Specifies whether to use keyboard-interactive authentication.
The argument to this keyword must be
.Cm yes
(the default)
or
.Cm no .
.It Cm KbdInteractiveDevices
Specifies the list of methods to use in keyboard-interactive authentication.
Multiple method names must be comma-separated.
The default is to use the server specified list.
The methods available vary depending on what the server supports.
For an OpenSSH server,
it may be zero or more of:
.Cm bsdauth
and
.Cm pam .
.It Cm KexAlgorithms
Specifies the available KEX (Key Exchange) algorithms.
Multiple algorithms must be comma-separated.
If the specified list begins with a
.Sq +
character, then the specified methods will be appended to the default set
instead of replacing them.
If the specified list begins with a
.Sq -
character, then the specified methods (including wildcards) will be removed
from the default set instead of replacing them.
If the specified list begins with a
.Sq ^
character, then the specified methods will be placed at the head of the
default set.
The default is:
.Bd -literal -offset indent
curve25519-sha256,curve25519-sha256@libssh.org,
ecdh-sha2-nistp256,ecdh-sha2-nistp384,ecdh-sha2-nistp521,
diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256,
diffie-hellman-group16-sha512,
diffie-hellman-group18-sha512,
-diffie-hellman-group14-sha256,
-diffie-hellman-group14-sha1
+diffie-hellman-group14-sha256
.Ed
.Pp
The list of available key exchange algorithms may also be obtained using
.Qq ssh -Q kex .
.It Cm LocalCommand
Specifies a command to execute on the local machine after successfully
connecting to the server.
The command string extends to the end of the line, and is executed with
the user's shell.
Arguments to
.Cm LocalCommand
accept the tokens described in the
.Sx TOKENS
section.
.Pp
The command is run synchronously and does not have access to the
session of the
.Xr ssh 1
that spawned it.
It should not be used for interactive commands.
.Pp
This directive is ignored unless
.Cm PermitLocalCommand
has been enabled.
.It Cm LocalForward
Specifies that a TCP port on the local machine be forwarded over
the secure channel to the specified host and port from the remote machine.
The first argument must be
.Sm off
.Oo Ar bind_address : Oc Ar port
.Sm on
and the second argument must be
.Ar host : Ns Ar hostport .
IPv6 addresses can be specified by enclosing addresses in square brackets.
Multiple forwardings may be specified, and additional forwardings can be
given on the command line.
Only the superuser can forward privileged ports.
By default, the local port is bound in accordance with the
.Cm GatewayPorts
setting.
However, an explicit
.Ar bind_address
may be used to bind the connection to a specific address.
The
.Ar bind_address
of
.Cm localhost
indicates that the listening port be bound for local use only, while an
empty address or
.Sq *
indicates that the port should be available from all interfaces.
.It Cm LogLevel
Gives the verbosity level that is used when logging messages from
.Xr ssh 1 .
The possible values are:
QUIET, FATAL, ERROR, INFO, VERBOSE, DEBUG, DEBUG1, DEBUG2, and DEBUG3.
The default is INFO.
DEBUG and DEBUG1 are equivalent.
DEBUG2 and DEBUG3 each specify higher levels of verbose output.
.It Cm MACs
Specifies the MAC (message authentication code) algorithms
in order of preference.
The MAC algorithm is used for data integrity protection.
Multiple algorithms must be comma-separated.
If the specified list begins with a
.Sq +
character, then the specified algorithms will be appended to the default set
instead of replacing them.
If the specified list begins with a
.Sq -
character, then the specified algorithms (including wildcards) will be removed
from the default set instead of replacing them.
If the specified list begins with a
.Sq ^
character, then the specified algorithms will be placed at the head of the
default set.
.Pp
The algorithms that contain
.Qq -etm
calculate the MAC after encryption (encrypt-then-mac).
These are considered safer and their use recommended.
.Pp
The default is:
.Bd -literal -offset indent
umac-64-etm@openssh.com,umac-128-etm@openssh.com,
hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com,hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com,
hmac-sha1-etm@openssh.com,
umac-64@openssh.com,umac-128@openssh.com,
hmac-sha2-256,hmac-sha2-512,hmac-sha1
.Ed
.Pp
The list of available MAC algorithms may also be obtained using
.Qq ssh -Q mac .
.It Cm NoHostAuthenticationForLocalhost
Disable host authentication for localhost (loopback addresses).
The argument to this keyword must be
.Cm yes
or
.Cm no
(the default).
.It Cm NumberOfPasswordPrompts
Specifies the number of password prompts before giving up.
The argument to this keyword must be an integer.
The default is 3.
.It Cm PasswordAuthentication
Specifies whether to use password authentication.
The argument to this keyword must be
.Cm yes
(the default)
or
.Cm no .
.It Cm PermitLocalCommand
Allow local command execution via the
.Ic LocalCommand
option or using the
.Ic !\& Ns Ar command
escape sequence in
.Xr ssh 1 .
The argument must be
.Cm yes
or
.Cm no
(the default).
.It Cm PKCS11Provider
Specifies which PKCS#11 provider to use or
.Cm none
to indicate that no provider should be used (the default).
The argument to this keyword is a path to the PKCS#11 shared library
.Xr ssh 1
should use to communicate with a PKCS#11 token providing keys for user
authentication.
.It Cm Port
Specifies the port number to connect on the remote host.
The default is 22.
.It Cm PreferredAuthentications
Specifies the order in which the client should try authentication methods.
This allows a client to prefer one method (e.g.\&
.Cm keyboard-interactive )
over another method (e.g.\&
.Cm password ) .
The default is:
.Bd -literal -offset indent
gssapi-with-mic,hostbased,publickey,
keyboard-interactive,password
.Ed
.It Cm ProxyCommand
Specifies the command to use to connect to the server.
The command
string extends to the end of the line, and is executed
using the user's shell
.Ql exec
directive to avoid a lingering shell process.
.Pp
Arguments to
.Cm ProxyCommand
accept the tokens described in the
.Sx TOKENS
section.
The command can be basically anything,
and should read from its standard input and write to its standard output.
It should eventually connect an
.Xr sshd 8
server running on some machine, or execute
.Ic sshd -i
somewhere.
Host key management will be done using the
.Cm Hostname
of the host being connected (defaulting to the name typed by the user).
Setting the command to
.Cm none
disables this option entirely.
Note that
.Cm CheckHostIP
is not available for connects with a proxy command.
.Pp
This directive is useful in conjunction with
.Xr nc 1
and its proxy support.
For example, the following directive would connect via an HTTP proxy at
192.0.2.0:
.Bd -literal -offset 3n
ProxyCommand /usr/bin/nc -X connect -x 192.0.2.0:8080 %h %p
.Ed
.It Cm ProxyJump
Specifies one or more jump proxies as either
.Xo
.Sm off
.Op Ar user No @
.Ar host
.Op : Ns Ar port
.Sm on
or an ssh URI
.Xc .
Multiple proxies may be separated by comma characters and will be visited
sequentially.
Setting this option will cause
.Xr ssh 1
to connect to the target host by first making a
.Xr ssh 1
connection to the specified
.Cm ProxyJump
host and then establishing a
TCP forwarding to the ultimate target from there.
.Pp
Note that this option will compete with the
.Cm ProxyCommand
option - whichever is specified first will prevent later instances of the
other from taking effect.
.Pp
Note also that the configuration for the destination host (either supplied
via the command-line or the configuration file) is not generally applied
to jump hosts.
.Pa ~/.ssh/config
should be used if specific configuration is required for jump hosts.
.It Cm ProxyUseFdpass
Specifies that
.Cm ProxyCommand
will pass a connected file descriptor back to
.Xr ssh 1
instead of continuing to execute and pass data.
The default is
.Cm no .
.It Cm PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes
Specifies the key types that will be used for public key authentication
as a comma-separated list of patterns.
If the specified list begins with a
.Sq +
character, then the key types after it will be appended to the default
instead of replacing it.
If the specified list begins with a
.Sq -
character, then the specified key types (including wildcards) will be removed
from the default set instead of replacing them.
If the specified list begins with a
.Sq ^
character, then the specified key types will be placed at the head of the
default set.
The default for this option is:
.Bd -literal -offset 3n
ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com,
ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
-rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com,rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+sk-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com,
ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
-ssh-ed25519,rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256,ssh-rsa
+sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com,
+ssh-ed25519,sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com,
+rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256,ssh-rsa
.Ed
.Pp
The list of available key types may also be obtained using
-.Qq ssh -Q key .
+.Qq ssh -Q PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes .
.It Cm PubkeyAuthentication
Specifies whether to try public key authentication.
The argument to this keyword must be
.Cm yes
(the default)
or
.Cm no .
.It Cm RekeyLimit
Specifies the maximum amount of data that may be transmitted before the
session key is renegotiated, optionally followed a maximum amount of
time that may pass before the session key is renegotiated.
The first argument is specified in bytes and may have a suffix of
.Sq K ,
.Sq M ,
or
.Sq G
to indicate Kilobytes, Megabytes, or Gigabytes, respectively.
The default is between
.Sq 1G
and
.Sq 4G ,
depending on the cipher.
The optional second value is specified in seconds and may use any of the
units documented in the TIME FORMATS section of
.Xr sshd_config 5 .
The default value for
.Cm RekeyLimit
is
.Cm default none ,
which means that rekeying is performed after the cipher's default amount
of data has been sent or received and no time based rekeying is done.
.It Cm RemoteCommand
Specifies a command to execute on the remote machine after successfully
connecting to the server.
The command string extends to the end of the line, and is executed with
the user's shell.
Arguments to
.Cm RemoteCommand
accept the tokens described in the
.Sx TOKENS
section.
.It Cm RemoteForward
Specifies that a TCP port on the remote machine be forwarded over
the secure channel.
The remote port may either be forwarded to a specified host and port
from the local machine, or may act as a SOCKS 4/5 proxy that allows a remote
client to connect to arbitrary destinations from the local machine.
The first argument must be
.Sm off
.Oo Ar bind_address : Oc Ar port
.Sm on
If forwarding to a specific destination then the second argument must be
.Ar host : Ns Ar hostport ,
otherwise if no destination argument is specified then the remote forwarding
will be established as a SOCKS proxy.
.Pp
IPv6 addresses can be specified by enclosing addresses in square brackets.
Multiple forwardings may be specified, and additional
forwardings can be given on the command line.
Privileged ports can be forwarded only when
logging in as root on the remote machine.
.Pp
If the
.Ar port
argument is 0,
the listen port will be dynamically allocated on the server and reported
to the client at run time.
.Pp
If the
.Ar bind_address
is not specified, the default is to only bind to loopback addresses.
If the
.Ar bind_address
is
.Ql *
or an empty string, then the forwarding is requested to listen on all
interfaces.
Specifying a remote
.Ar bind_address
will only succeed if the server's
.Cm GatewayPorts
option is enabled (see
.Xr sshd_config 5 ) .
.It Cm RequestTTY
Specifies whether to request a pseudo-tty for the session.
The argument may be one of:
.Cm no
(never request a TTY),
.Cm yes
(always request a TTY when standard input is a TTY),
.Cm force
(always request a TTY) or
.Cm auto
(request a TTY when opening a login session).
This option mirrors the
.Fl t
and
.Fl T
flags for
.Xr ssh 1 .
.It Cm RevokedHostKeys
Specifies revoked host public keys.
Keys listed in this file will be refused for host authentication.
Note that if this file does not exist or is not readable,
then host authentication will be refused for all hosts.
Keys may be specified as a text file, listing one public key per line, or as
an OpenSSH Key Revocation List (KRL) as generated by
.Xr ssh-keygen 1 .
For more information on KRLs, see the KEY REVOCATION LISTS section in
.Xr ssh-keygen 1 .
+.It Cm SecurityKeyProvider
+Specifies a path to a library that will be used when loading any
+FIDO authenticator-hosted keys, overriding the default of using
+the built-in USB HID support.
+.Pp
+If the specified value begins with a
+.Sq $
+character, then it will be treated as an environment variable containing
+the path to the library.
.It Cm SendEnv
Specifies what variables from the local
.Xr environ 7
should be sent to the server.
The server must also support it, and the server must be configured to
accept these environment variables.
Note that the
.Ev TERM
environment variable is always sent whenever a
pseudo-terminal is requested as it is required by the protocol.
Refer to
.Cm AcceptEnv
in
.Xr sshd_config 5
for how to configure the server.
Variables are specified by name, which may contain wildcard characters.
Multiple environment variables may be separated by whitespace or spread
across multiple
.Cm SendEnv
directives.
.Pp
See
.Sx PATTERNS
for more information on patterns.
.Pp
It is possible to clear previously set
.Cm SendEnv
variable names by prefixing patterns with
.Pa - .
The default is not to send any environment variables.
.It Cm ServerAliveCountMax
Sets the number of server alive messages (see below) which may be
sent without
.Xr ssh 1
receiving any messages back from the server.
If this threshold is reached while server alive messages are being sent,
ssh will disconnect from the server, terminating the session.
It is important to note that the use of server alive messages is very
different from
.Cm TCPKeepAlive
(below).
The server alive messages are sent through the encrypted channel
and therefore will not be spoofable.
The TCP keepalive option enabled by
.Cm TCPKeepAlive
is spoofable.
The server alive mechanism is valuable when the client or
server depend on knowing when a connection has become unresponsive.
.Pp
The default value is 3.
If, for example,
.Cm ServerAliveInterval
(see below) is set to 15 and
.Cm ServerAliveCountMax
is left at the default, if the server becomes unresponsive,
ssh will disconnect after approximately 45 seconds.
.It Cm ServerAliveInterval
Sets a timeout interval in seconds after which if no data has been received
from the server,
.Xr ssh 1
will send a message through the encrypted
channel to request a response from the server.
The default
is 0, indicating that these messages will not be sent to the server.
.It Cm SetEnv
Directly specify one or more environment variables and their contents to
be sent to the server.
Similarly to
.Cm SendEnv ,
the server must be prepared to accept the environment variable.
.It Cm StreamLocalBindMask
Sets the octal file creation mode mask
.Pq umask
used when creating a Unix-domain socket file for local or remote
port forwarding.
This option is only used for port forwarding to a Unix-domain socket file.
.Pp
The default value is 0177, which creates a Unix-domain socket file that is
readable and writable only by the owner.
Note that not all operating systems honor the file mode on Unix-domain
socket files.
.It Cm StreamLocalBindUnlink
Specifies whether to remove an existing Unix-domain socket file for local
or remote port forwarding before creating a new one.
If the socket file already exists and
.Cm StreamLocalBindUnlink
is not enabled,
.Nm ssh
will be unable to forward the port to the Unix-domain socket file.
This option is only used for port forwarding to a Unix-domain socket file.
.Pp
The argument must be
.Cm yes
or
.Cm no
(the default).
.It Cm StrictHostKeyChecking
If this flag is set to
.Cm yes ,
.Xr ssh 1
will never automatically add host keys to the
.Pa ~/.ssh/known_hosts
file, and refuses to connect to hosts whose host key has changed.
This provides maximum protection against man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks,
though it can be annoying when the
.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts
file is poorly maintained or when connections to new hosts are
frequently made.
This option forces the user to manually
add all new hosts.
.Pp
If this flag is set to
.Dq accept-new
then ssh will automatically add new host keys to the user
known hosts files, but will not permit connections to hosts with
changed host keys.
If this flag is set to
.Dq no
or
.Dq off ,
ssh will automatically add new host keys to the user known hosts files
and allow connections to hosts with changed hostkeys to proceed,
subject to some restrictions.
If this flag is set to
.Cm ask
(the default),
new host keys
will be added to the user known host files only after the user
has confirmed that is what they really want to do, and
ssh will refuse to connect to hosts whose host key has changed.
The host keys of
known hosts will be verified automatically in all cases.
.It Cm SyslogFacility
Gives the facility code that is used when logging messages from
.Xr ssh 1 .
The possible values are: DAEMON, USER, AUTH, LOCAL0, LOCAL1, LOCAL2,
LOCAL3, LOCAL4, LOCAL5, LOCAL6, LOCAL7.
The default is USER.
.It Cm TCPKeepAlive
Specifies whether the system should send TCP keepalive messages to the
other side.
If they are sent, death of the connection or crash of one
of the machines will be properly noticed.
However, this means that
connections will die if the route is down temporarily, and some people
find it annoying.
.Pp
The default is
.Cm yes
(to send TCP keepalive messages), and the client will notice
if the network goes down or the remote host dies.
This is important in scripts, and many users want it too.
.Pp
To disable TCP keepalive messages, the value should be set to
.Cm no .
See also
.Cm ServerAliveInterval
for protocol-level keepalives.
.It Cm Tunnel
Request
.Xr tun 4
device forwarding between the client and the server.
The argument must be
.Cm yes ,
.Cm point-to-point
(layer 3),
.Cm ethernet
(layer 2),
or
.Cm no
(the default).
Specifying
.Cm yes
requests the default tunnel mode, which is
.Cm point-to-point .
.It Cm TunnelDevice
Specifies the
.Xr tun 4
devices to open on the client
.Pq Ar local_tun
and the server
.Pq Ar remote_tun .
.Pp
The argument must be
.Sm off
.Ar local_tun Op : Ar remote_tun .
.Sm on
The devices may be specified by numerical ID or the keyword
.Cm any ,
which uses the next available tunnel device.
If
.Ar remote_tun
is not specified, it defaults to
.Cm any .
The default is
.Cm any:any .
.It Cm UpdateHostKeys
Specifies whether
.Xr ssh 1
should accept notifications of additional hostkeys from the server sent
after authentication has completed and add them to
.Cm UserKnownHostsFile .
The argument must be
.Cm yes ,
.Cm no
-(the default) or
+or
.Cm ask .
-Enabling this option allows learning alternate hostkeys for a server
+This option allows learning alternate hostkeys for a server
and supports graceful key rotation by allowing a server to send replacement
public keys before old ones are removed.
Additional hostkeys are only accepted if the key used to authenticate the
host was already trusted or explicitly accepted by the user.
+.Pp
+.Cm UpdateHostKeys
+is enabled by default if the user has not overridden the default
+.Cm UserKnownHostsFile
+setting, otherwise
+.Cm UpdateHostKeys
+will be set to
+.Cm ask .
+.Pp
If
.Cm UpdateHostKeys
is set to
.Cm ask ,
then the user is asked to confirm the modifications to the known_hosts file.
Confirmation is currently incompatible with
.Cm ControlPersist ,
and will be disabled if it is enabled.
.Pp
Presently, only
.Xr sshd 8
from OpenSSH 6.8 and greater support the
.Qq hostkeys@openssh.com
protocol extension used to inform the client of all the server's hostkeys.
.It Cm User
Specifies the user to log in as.
This can be useful when a different user name is used on different machines.
This saves the trouble of
having to remember to give the user name on the command line.
.It Cm UserKnownHostsFile
Specifies one or more files to use for the user
host key database, separated by whitespace.
The default is
.Pa ~/.ssh/known_hosts ,
.Pa ~/.ssh/known_hosts2 .
.It Cm VerifyHostKeyDNS
Specifies whether to verify the remote key using DNS and SSHFP resource
records.
If this option is set to
.Cm yes ,
the client will implicitly trust keys that match a secure fingerprint
from DNS.
Insecure fingerprints will be handled as if this option was set to
.Cm ask .
If this option is set to
.Cm ask ,
information on fingerprint match will be displayed, but the user will still
need to confirm new host keys according to the
.Cm StrictHostKeyChecking
option.
The default is
.Cm no .
.Pp
See also
.Sx VERIFYING HOST KEYS
in
.Xr ssh 1 .
.It Cm VisualHostKey
If this flag is set to
.Cm yes ,
an ASCII art representation of the remote host key fingerprint is
printed in addition to the fingerprint string at login and
for unknown host keys.
If this flag is set to
.Cm no
(the default),
no fingerprint strings are printed at login and
only the fingerprint string will be printed for unknown host keys.
.It Cm XAuthLocation
Specifies the full pathname of the
.Xr xauth 1
program.
The default is
.Pa /usr/X11R6/bin/xauth .
.El
.Sh PATTERNS
A
.Em pattern
consists of zero or more non-whitespace characters,
.Sq *
(a wildcard that matches zero or more characters),
or
.Sq ?\&
(a wildcard that matches exactly one character).
For example, to specify a set of declarations for any host in the
.Qq .co.uk
set of domains,
the following pattern could be used:
.Pp
.Dl Host *.co.uk
.Pp
The following pattern
would match any host in the 192.168.0.[0-9] network range:
.Pp
.Dl Host 192.168.0.?
.Pp
A
.Em pattern-list
is a comma-separated list of patterns.
Patterns within pattern-lists may be negated
by preceding them with an exclamation mark
.Pq Sq !\& .
For example,
to allow a key to be used from anywhere within an organization
except from the
.Qq dialup
pool,
the following entry (in authorized_keys) could be used:
.Pp
.Dl from=\&"!*.dialup.example.com,*.example.com\&"
.Pp
Note that a negated match will never produce a positive result by itself.
For example, attempting to match
.Qq host3
against the following pattern-list will fail:
.Pp
.Dl from=\&"!host1,!host2\&"
.Pp
The solution here is to include a term that will yield a positive match,
such as a wildcard:
.Pp
.Dl from=\&"!host1,!host2,*\&"
.Sh TOKENS
Arguments to some keywords can make use of tokens,
which are expanded at runtime:
.Pp
.Bl -tag -width XXXX -offset indent -compact
.It %%
A literal
.Sq % .
.It \&%C
Hash of %l%h%p%r.
.It %d
Local user's home directory.
.It %h
The remote hostname.
.It %i
The local user ID.
.It %L
The local hostname.
.It %l
The local hostname, including the domain name.
.It %n
The original remote hostname, as given on the command line.
.It %p
The remote port.
.It %r
The remote username.
.It \&%T
The local
.Xr tun 4
or
.Xr tap 4
network interface assigned if
tunnel forwarding was requested, or
.Qq NONE
otherwise.
.It %u
The local username.
.El
.Pp
.Cm Match exec
accepts the tokens %%, %h, %i, %L, %l, %n, %p, %r, and %u.
.Pp
.Cm CertificateFile
accepts the tokens %%, %d, %h, %i, %l, %r, and %u.
.Pp
.Cm ControlPath
accepts the tokens %%, %C, %h, %i, %L, %l, %n, %p, %r, and %u.
.Pp
.Cm Hostname
accepts the tokens %% and %h.
.Pp
.Cm IdentityAgent
and
.Cm IdentityFile
accept the tokens %%, %d, %h, %i, %l, %r, and %u.
.Pp
.Cm LocalCommand
accepts the tokens %%, %C, %d, %h, %i, %l, %n, %p, %r, %T, and %u.
.Pp
.Cm ProxyCommand
accepts the tokens %%, %h, %n, %p, and %r.
.Pp
.Cm RemoteCommand
accepts the tokens %%, %C, %d, %h, %i, %l, %n, %p, %r, and %u.
.Sh FILES
.Bl -tag -width Ds
.It Pa ~/.ssh/config
This is the per-user configuration file.
The format of this file is described above.
This file is used by the SSH client.
Because of the potential for abuse, this file must have strict permissions:
read/write for the user, and not writable by others.
.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_config
Systemwide configuration file.
This file provides defaults for those
values that are not specified in the user's configuration file, and
for those users who do not have a configuration file.
This file must be world-readable.
.El
.Sh SEE ALSO
.Xr ssh 1
.Sh AUTHORS
.An -nosplit
OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free
ssh 1.2.12 release by
.An Tatu Ylonen .
.An Aaron Campbell , Bob Beck , Markus Friedl ,
.An Niels Provos , Theo de Raadt
and
.An Dug Song
removed many bugs, re-added newer features and
created OpenSSH.
.An Markus Friedl
contributed the support for SSH protocol versions 1.5 and 2.0.
diff --git a/sshbuf-getput-basic.c b/sshbuf-getput-basic.c
index d401a72653a6..da834d0080c6 100644
--- a/sshbuf-getput-basic.c
+++ b/sshbuf-getput-basic.c
@@ -1,628 +1,631 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: sshbuf-getput-basic.c,v 1.9 2019/09/06 04:53:27 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: sshbuf-getput-basic.c,v 1.10 2019/12/13 19:09:37 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2011 Damien Miller
*
* Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
* copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
* WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
* ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
* WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
* ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
* OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
*/
#define SSHBUF_INTERNAL
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
# include <stdint.h>
#endif
#include "ssherr.h"
#include "sshbuf.h"
int
sshbuf_get(struct sshbuf *buf, void *v, size_t len)
{
const u_char *p = sshbuf_ptr(buf);
int r;
if ((r = sshbuf_consume(buf, len)) < 0)
return r;
if (v != NULL && len != 0)
memcpy(v, p, len);
return 0;
}
int
sshbuf_get_u64(struct sshbuf *buf, u_int64_t *valp)
{
const u_char *p = sshbuf_ptr(buf);
int r;
if ((r = sshbuf_consume(buf, 8)) < 0)
return r;
if (valp != NULL)
*valp = PEEK_U64(p);
return 0;
}
int
sshbuf_get_u32(struct sshbuf *buf, u_int32_t *valp)
{
const u_char *p = sshbuf_ptr(buf);
int r;
if ((r = sshbuf_consume(buf, 4)) < 0)
return r;
if (valp != NULL)
*valp = PEEK_U32(p);
return 0;
}
int
sshbuf_get_u16(struct sshbuf *buf, u_int16_t *valp)
{
const u_char *p = sshbuf_ptr(buf);
int r;
if ((r = sshbuf_consume(buf, 2)) < 0)
return r;
if (valp != NULL)
*valp = PEEK_U16(p);
return 0;
}
int
sshbuf_get_u8(struct sshbuf *buf, u_char *valp)
{
const u_char *p = sshbuf_ptr(buf);
int r;
if ((r = sshbuf_consume(buf, 1)) < 0)
return r;
if (valp != NULL)
*valp = (u_int8_t)*p;
return 0;
}
static int
check_offset(const struct sshbuf *buf, int wr, size_t offset, size_t len)
{
if (sshbuf_ptr(buf) == NULL) /* calls sshbuf_check_sanity() */
return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
if (offset >= SIZE_MAX - len)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
if (offset + len > sshbuf_len(buf)) {
return wr ?
SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE : SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE;
}
return 0;
}
static int
check_roffset(const struct sshbuf *buf, size_t offset, size_t len,
const u_char **p)
{
int r;
*p = NULL;
if ((r = check_offset(buf, 0, offset, len)) != 0)
return r;
*p = sshbuf_ptr(buf) + offset;
return 0;
}
int
sshbuf_peek_u64(const struct sshbuf *buf, size_t offset, u_int64_t *valp)
{
const u_char *p = NULL;
int r;
if (valp != NULL)
*valp = 0;
if ((r = check_roffset(buf, offset, 8, &p)) != 0)
return r;
if (valp != NULL)
*valp = PEEK_U64(p);
return 0;
}
int
sshbuf_peek_u32(const struct sshbuf *buf, size_t offset, u_int32_t *valp)
{
const u_char *p = NULL;
int r;
if (valp != NULL)
*valp = 0;
if ((r = check_roffset(buf, offset, 4, &p)) != 0)
return r;
if (valp != NULL)
*valp = PEEK_U32(p);
return 0;
}
int
sshbuf_peek_u16(const struct sshbuf *buf, size_t offset, u_int16_t *valp)
{
const u_char *p = NULL;
int r;
if (valp != NULL)
*valp = 0;
if ((r = check_roffset(buf, offset, 2, &p)) != 0)
return r;
if (valp != NULL)
*valp = PEEK_U16(p);
return 0;
}
int
sshbuf_peek_u8(const struct sshbuf *buf, size_t offset, u_char *valp)
{
const u_char *p = NULL;
int r;
if (valp != NULL)
*valp = 0;
if ((r = check_roffset(buf, offset, 1, &p)) != 0)
return r;
if (valp != NULL)
*valp = *p;
return 0;
}
int
sshbuf_get_string(struct sshbuf *buf, u_char **valp, size_t *lenp)
{
const u_char *val;
size_t len;
int r;
if (valp != NULL)
*valp = NULL;
if (lenp != NULL)
*lenp = 0;
if ((r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(buf, &val, &len)) < 0)
return r;
if (valp != NULL) {
if ((*valp = malloc(len + 1)) == NULL) {
SSHBUF_DBG(("SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL"));
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
}
if (len != 0)
memcpy(*valp, val, len);
(*valp)[len] = '\0';
}
if (lenp != NULL)
*lenp = len;
return 0;
}
int
sshbuf_get_string_direct(struct sshbuf *buf, const u_char **valp, size_t *lenp)
{
size_t len;
const u_char *p;
int r;
if (valp != NULL)
*valp = NULL;
if (lenp != NULL)
*lenp = 0;
if ((r = sshbuf_peek_string_direct(buf, &p, &len)) < 0)
return r;
if (valp != NULL)
*valp = p;
if (lenp != NULL)
*lenp = len;
if (sshbuf_consume(buf, len + 4) != 0) {
/* Shouldn't happen */
SSHBUF_DBG(("SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR"));
SSHBUF_ABORT();
return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
return 0;
}
int
sshbuf_peek_string_direct(const struct sshbuf *buf, const u_char **valp,
size_t *lenp)
{
u_int32_t len;
const u_char *p = sshbuf_ptr(buf);
if (valp != NULL)
*valp = NULL;
if (lenp != NULL)
*lenp = 0;
if (sshbuf_len(buf) < 4) {
SSHBUF_DBG(("SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE"));
return SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE;
}
len = PEEK_U32(p);
if (len > SSHBUF_SIZE_MAX - 4) {
SSHBUF_DBG(("SSH_ERR_STRING_TOO_LARGE"));
return SSH_ERR_STRING_TOO_LARGE;
}
if (sshbuf_len(buf) - 4 < len) {
SSHBUF_DBG(("SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE"));
return SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE;
}
if (valp != NULL)
*valp = p + 4;
if (lenp != NULL)
*lenp = len;
return 0;
}
int
sshbuf_get_cstring(struct sshbuf *buf, char **valp, size_t *lenp)
{
size_t len;
const u_char *p, *z;
int r;
if (valp != NULL)
*valp = NULL;
if (lenp != NULL)
*lenp = 0;
if ((r = sshbuf_peek_string_direct(buf, &p, &len)) != 0)
return r;
/* Allow a \0 only at the end of the string */
if (len > 0 &&
(z = memchr(p , '\0', len)) != NULL && z < p + len - 1) {
SSHBUF_DBG(("SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT"));
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_skip_string(buf)) != 0)
return -1;
if (valp != NULL) {
if ((*valp = malloc(len + 1)) == NULL) {
SSHBUF_DBG(("SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL"));
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
}
if (len != 0)
memcpy(*valp, p, len);
(*valp)[len] = '\0';
}
if (lenp != NULL)
*lenp = (size_t)len;
return 0;
}
int
sshbuf_get_stringb(struct sshbuf *buf, struct sshbuf *v)
{
u_int32_t len;
u_char *p;
int r;
/*
* Use sshbuf_peek_string_direct() to figure out if there is
* a complete string in 'buf' and copy the string directly
* into 'v'.
*/
if ((r = sshbuf_peek_string_direct(buf, NULL, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(buf, &len)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_reserve(v, len, &p)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get(buf, p, len)) != 0)
return r;
return 0;
}
int
sshbuf_put(struct sshbuf *buf, const void *v, size_t len)
{
u_char *p;
int r;
if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(buf, len, &p)) < 0)
return r;
if (len != 0)
memcpy(p, v, len);
return 0;
}
int
sshbuf_putb(struct sshbuf *buf, const struct sshbuf *v)
{
return sshbuf_put(buf, sshbuf_ptr(v), sshbuf_len(v));
}
int
sshbuf_putf(struct sshbuf *buf, const char *fmt, ...)
{
va_list ap;
int r;
va_start(ap, fmt);
r = sshbuf_putfv(buf, fmt, ap);
va_end(ap);
return r;
}
int
sshbuf_putfv(struct sshbuf *buf, const char *fmt, va_list ap)
{
va_list ap2;
int r, len;
u_char *p;
VA_COPY(ap2, ap);
if ((len = vsnprintf(NULL, 0, fmt, ap2)) < 0) {
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
goto out;
}
if (len == 0) {
r = 0;
goto out; /* Nothing to do */
}
va_end(ap2);
VA_COPY(ap2, ap);
if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(buf, (size_t)len + 1, &p)) < 0)
goto out;
if ((r = vsnprintf((char *)p, len + 1, fmt, ap2)) != len) {
r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
goto out; /* Shouldn't happen */
}
/* Consume terminating \0 */
if ((r = sshbuf_consume_end(buf, 1)) != 0)
goto out;
r = 0;
out:
va_end(ap2);
return r;
}
int
sshbuf_put_u64(struct sshbuf *buf, u_int64_t val)
{
u_char *p;
int r;
if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(buf, 8, &p)) < 0)
return r;
POKE_U64(p, val);
return 0;
}
int
sshbuf_put_u32(struct sshbuf *buf, u_int32_t val)
{
u_char *p;
int r;
if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(buf, 4, &p)) < 0)
return r;
POKE_U32(p, val);
return 0;
}
int
sshbuf_put_u16(struct sshbuf *buf, u_int16_t val)
{
u_char *p;
int r;
if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(buf, 2, &p)) < 0)
return r;
POKE_U16(p, val);
return 0;
}
int
sshbuf_put_u8(struct sshbuf *buf, u_char val)
{
u_char *p;
int r;
if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(buf, 1, &p)) < 0)
return r;
p[0] = val;
return 0;
}
static int
check_woffset(struct sshbuf *buf, size_t offset, size_t len, u_char **p)
{
int r;
*p = NULL;
if ((r = check_offset(buf, 1, offset, len)) != 0)
return r;
if (sshbuf_mutable_ptr(buf) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_BUFFER_READ_ONLY;
*p = sshbuf_mutable_ptr(buf) + offset;
return 0;
}
int
sshbuf_poke_u64(struct sshbuf *buf, size_t offset, u_int64_t val)
{
u_char *p = NULL;
int r;
if ((r = check_woffset(buf, offset, 8, &p)) != 0)
return r;
POKE_U64(p, val);
return 0;
}
int
sshbuf_poke_u32(struct sshbuf *buf, size_t offset, u_int32_t val)
{
u_char *p = NULL;
int r;
if ((r = check_woffset(buf, offset, 4, &p)) != 0)
return r;
POKE_U32(p, val);
return 0;
}
int
sshbuf_poke_u16(struct sshbuf *buf, size_t offset, u_int16_t val)
{
u_char *p = NULL;
int r;
if ((r = check_woffset(buf, offset, 2, &p)) != 0)
return r;
POKE_U16(p, val);
return 0;
}
int
sshbuf_poke_u8(struct sshbuf *buf, size_t offset, u_char val)
{
u_char *p = NULL;
int r;
if ((r = check_woffset(buf, offset, 1, &p)) != 0)
return r;
*p = val;
return 0;
}
int
sshbuf_poke(struct sshbuf *buf, size_t offset, void *v, size_t len)
{
u_char *p = NULL;
int r;
if ((r = check_woffset(buf, offset, len, &p)) != 0)
return r;
memcpy(p, v, len);
return 0;
}
int
sshbuf_put_string(struct sshbuf *buf, const void *v, size_t len)
{
u_char *d;
int r;
if (len > SSHBUF_SIZE_MAX - 4) {
SSHBUF_DBG(("SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE"));
return SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(buf, len + 4, &d)) < 0)
return r;
POKE_U32(d, len);
if (len != 0)
memcpy(d + 4, v, len);
return 0;
}
int
sshbuf_put_cstring(struct sshbuf *buf, const char *v)
{
return sshbuf_put_string(buf, v, v == NULL ? 0 : strlen(v));
}
int
sshbuf_put_stringb(struct sshbuf *buf, const struct sshbuf *v)
{
+ if (v == NULL)
+ return sshbuf_put_string(buf, NULL, 0);
+
return sshbuf_put_string(buf, sshbuf_ptr(v), sshbuf_len(v));
}
int
sshbuf_froms(struct sshbuf *buf, struct sshbuf **bufp)
{
const u_char *p;
size_t len;
struct sshbuf *ret;
int r;
if (buf == NULL || bufp == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
*bufp = NULL;
if ((r = sshbuf_peek_string_direct(buf, &p, &len)) != 0)
return r;
if ((ret = sshbuf_from(p, len)) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
if ((r = sshbuf_consume(buf, len + 4)) != 0 || /* Shouldn't happen */
(r = sshbuf_set_parent(ret, buf)) != 0) {
sshbuf_free(ret);
return r;
}
*bufp = ret;
return 0;
}
int
sshbuf_put_bignum2_bytes(struct sshbuf *buf, const void *v, size_t len)
{
u_char *d;
const u_char *s = (const u_char *)v;
int r, prepend;
if (len > SSHBUF_SIZE_MAX - 5) {
SSHBUF_DBG(("SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE"));
return SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE;
}
/* Skip leading zero bytes */
for (; len > 0 && *s == 0; len--, s++)
;
/*
* If most significant bit is set then prepend a zero byte to
* avoid interpretation as a negative number.
*/
prepend = len > 0 && (s[0] & 0x80) != 0;
if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(buf, len + 4 + prepend, &d)) < 0)
return r;
POKE_U32(d, len + prepend);
if (prepend)
d[4] = 0;
if (len != 0)
memcpy(d + 4 + prepend, s, len);
return 0;
}
int
sshbuf_get_bignum2_bytes_direct(struct sshbuf *buf,
const u_char **valp, size_t *lenp)
{
const u_char *d;
size_t len, olen;
int r;
if ((r = sshbuf_peek_string_direct(buf, &d, &olen)) < 0)
return r;
len = olen;
/* Refuse negative (MSB set) bignums */
if ((len != 0 && (*d & 0x80) != 0))
return SSH_ERR_BIGNUM_IS_NEGATIVE;
/* Refuse overlong bignums, allow prepended \0 to avoid MSB set */
if (len > SSHBUF_MAX_BIGNUM + 1 ||
(len == SSHBUF_MAX_BIGNUM + 1 && *d != 0))
return SSH_ERR_BIGNUM_TOO_LARGE;
/* Trim leading zeros */
while (len > 0 && *d == 0x00) {
d++;
len--;
}
if (valp != NULL)
*valp = d;
if (lenp != NULL)
*lenp = len;
if (sshbuf_consume(buf, olen + 4) != 0) {
/* Shouldn't happen */
SSHBUF_DBG(("SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR"));
SSHBUF_ABORT();
return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
return 0;
}
diff --git a/sshbuf-getput-crypto.c b/sshbuf-getput-crypto.c
index 3dd1e1446f17..2e61d3bcd809 100644
--- a/sshbuf-getput-crypto.c
+++ b/sshbuf-getput-crypto.c
@@ -1,185 +1,180 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: sshbuf-getput-crypto.c,v 1.7 2019/01/21 09:54:11 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: sshbuf-getput-crypto.c,v 1.8 2019/11/15 06:00:20 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2011 Damien Miller
*
* Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
* copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
* WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
* ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
* WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
* ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
* OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
*/
#define SSHBUF_INTERNAL
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
#include <openssl/bn.h>
#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
# include <openssl/ec.h>
#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
#include "ssherr.h"
#include "sshbuf.h"
int
sshbuf_get_bignum2(struct sshbuf *buf, BIGNUM **valp)
{
BIGNUM *v;
const u_char *d;
size_t len;
int r;
if (valp != NULL)
*valp = NULL;
if ((r = sshbuf_get_bignum2_bytes_direct(buf, &d, &len)) != 0)
return r;
if (valp != NULL) {
if ((v = BN_new()) == NULL ||
BN_bin2bn(d, len, v) == NULL) {
BN_clear_free(v);
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
}
*valp = v;
}
return 0;
}
#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
static int
get_ec(const u_char *d, size_t len, EC_POINT *v, const EC_GROUP *g)
{
/* Refuse overlong bignums */
if (len == 0 || len > SSHBUF_MAX_ECPOINT)
return SSH_ERR_ECPOINT_TOO_LARGE;
/* Only handle uncompressed points */
if (*d != POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
if (v != NULL && EC_POINT_oct2point(g, v, d, len, NULL) != 1)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT; /* XXX assumption */
return 0;
}
int
sshbuf_get_ec(struct sshbuf *buf, EC_POINT *v, const EC_GROUP *g)
{
const u_char *d;
size_t len;
int r;
if ((r = sshbuf_peek_string_direct(buf, &d, &len)) < 0)
return r;
if ((r = get_ec(d, len, v, g)) != 0)
return r;
/* Skip string */
if (sshbuf_get_string_direct(buf, NULL, NULL) != 0) {
/* Shouldn't happen */
SSHBUF_DBG(("SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR"));
SSHBUF_ABORT();
return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
return 0;
}
int
sshbuf_get_eckey(struct sshbuf *buf, EC_KEY *v)
{
EC_POINT *pt = EC_POINT_new(EC_KEY_get0_group(v));
int r;
const u_char *d;
size_t len;
if (pt == NULL) {
SSHBUF_DBG(("SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL"));
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_peek_string_direct(buf, &d, &len)) < 0) {
EC_POINT_free(pt);
return r;
}
if ((r = get_ec(d, len, pt, EC_KEY_get0_group(v))) != 0) {
EC_POINT_free(pt);
return r;
}
if (EC_KEY_set_public_key(v, pt) != 1) {
EC_POINT_free(pt);
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL; /* XXX assumption */
}
EC_POINT_free(pt);
/* Skip string */
if (sshbuf_get_string_direct(buf, NULL, NULL) != 0) {
/* Shouldn't happen */
SSHBUF_DBG(("SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR"));
SSHBUF_ABORT();
return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
return 0;
}
#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
int
sshbuf_put_bignum2(struct sshbuf *buf, const BIGNUM *v)
{
u_char d[SSHBUF_MAX_BIGNUM + 1];
int len = BN_num_bytes(v), prepend = 0, r;
if (len < 0 || len > SSHBUF_MAX_BIGNUM)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
*d = '\0';
if (BN_bn2bin(v, d + 1) != len)
return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; /* Shouldn't happen */
/* If MSB is set, prepend a \0 */
if (len > 0 && (d[1] & 0x80) != 0)
prepend = 1;
if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(buf, d + 1 - prepend, len + prepend)) < 0) {
explicit_bzero(d, sizeof(d));
return r;
}
explicit_bzero(d, sizeof(d));
return 0;
}
#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
int
sshbuf_put_ec(struct sshbuf *buf, const EC_POINT *v, const EC_GROUP *g)
{
u_char d[SSHBUF_MAX_ECPOINT];
- BN_CTX *bn_ctx;
size_t len;
int ret;
- if ((bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
- return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
if ((len = EC_POINT_point2oct(g, v, POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
- NULL, 0, bn_ctx)) > SSHBUF_MAX_ECPOINT) {
- BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
+ NULL, 0, NULL)) > SSHBUF_MAX_ECPOINT) {
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
}
if (EC_POINT_point2oct(g, v, POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED,
- d, len, bn_ctx) != len) {
- BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
+ d, len, NULL) != len) {
return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR; /* Shouldn't happen */
}
- BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);
ret = sshbuf_put_string(buf, d, len);
explicit_bzero(d, len);
return ret;
}
int
sshbuf_put_eckey(struct sshbuf *buf, const EC_KEY *v)
{
return sshbuf_put_ec(buf, EC_KEY_get0_public_key(v),
EC_KEY_get0_group(v));
}
#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
-
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
diff --git a/sshbuf-io.c b/sshbuf-io.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..13ef40e7d272
--- /dev/null
+++ b/sshbuf-io.c
@@ -0,0 +1,117 @@
+/* $OpenBSD: sshbuf-io.c,v 1.2 2020/01/25 23:28:06 djm Exp $ */
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2011 Damien Miller
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include "includes.h"
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#include "ssherr.h"
+#include "sshbuf.h"
+#include "atomicio.h"
+
+/* Load a file from a fd into a buffer */
+int
+sshbuf_load_fd(int fd, struct sshbuf **blobp)
+{
+ u_char buf[4096];
+ size_t len;
+ struct stat st;
+ int r;
+ struct sshbuf *blob;
+
+ *blobp = NULL;
+
+ if (fstat(fd, &st) == -1)
+ return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
+ if ((st.st_mode & (S_IFSOCK|S_IFCHR|S_IFIFO)) == 0 &&
+ st.st_size > SSHBUF_SIZE_MAX)
+ return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ if ((blob = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+ return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ for (;;) {
+ if ((len = atomicio(read, fd, buf, sizeof(buf))) == 0) {
+ if (errno == EPIPE)
+ break;
+ r = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put(blob, buf, len)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ if (sshbuf_len(blob) > SSHBUF_SIZE_MAX) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ }
+ if ((st.st_mode & (S_IFSOCK|S_IFCHR|S_IFIFO)) == 0 &&
+ st.st_size != (off_t)sshbuf_len(blob)) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_FILE_CHANGED;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ /* success */
+ *blobp = blob;
+ blob = NULL; /* transferred */
+ r = 0;
+ out:
+ explicit_bzero(buf, sizeof(buf));
+ sshbuf_free(blob);
+ return r;
+}
+
+int
+sshbuf_load_file(const char *path, struct sshbuf **bufp)
+{
+ int r, fd, oerrno;
+
+ *bufp = NULL;
+ if ((fd = open(path, O_RDONLY)) == -1)
+ return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
+ if ((r = sshbuf_load_fd(fd, bufp)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ /* success */
+ r = 0;
+ out:
+ oerrno = errno;
+ close(fd);
+ if (r != 0)
+ errno = oerrno;
+ return r;
+}
+
+int
+sshbuf_write_file(const char *path, struct sshbuf *buf)
+{
+ int fd, oerrno;
+
+ if ((fd = open(path, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_TRUNC, 0644)) == -1)
+ return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
+ if (atomicio(vwrite, fd, sshbuf_mutable_ptr(buf),
+ sshbuf_len(buf)) != sshbuf_len(buf) || close(fd) != 0) {
+ oerrno = errno;
+ close(fd);
+ unlink(path);
+ errno = oerrno;
+ return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
diff --git a/sshbuf-misc.c b/sshbuf-misc.c
index a73f008b0c82..c0336e867659 100644
--- a/sshbuf-misc.c
+++ b/sshbuf-misc.c
@@ -1,231 +1,231 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: sshbuf-misc.c,v 1.11 2019/07/30 05:04:49 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: sshbuf-misc.c,v 1.13 2020/01/25 23:28:06 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2011 Damien Miller
*
* Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
* copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
* WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
* ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
* WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
* ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
* OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <netinet/in.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
# include <stdint.h>
#endif
#include <stdio.h>
#include <limits.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <resolv.h>
#include <ctype.h>
#include "ssherr.h"
#define SSHBUF_INTERNAL
#include "sshbuf.h"
void
sshbuf_dump_data(const void *s, size_t len, FILE *f)
{
size_t i, j;
const u_char *p = (const u_char *)s;
for (i = 0; i < len; i += 16) {
fprintf(f, "%.4zu: ", i);
for (j = i; j < i + 16; j++) {
if (j < len)
fprintf(f, "%02x ", p[j]);
else
fprintf(f, " ");
}
fprintf(f, " ");
for (j = i; j < i + 16; j++) {
if (j < len) {
if (isascii(p[j]) && isprint(p[j]))
fprintf(f, "%c", p[j]);
else
fprintf(f, ".");
}
}
fprintf(f, "\n");
}
}
void
sshbuf_dump(struct sshbuf *buf, FILE *f)
{
fprintf(f, "buffer %p len = %zu\n", buf, sshbuf_len(buf));
sshbuf_dump_data(sshbuf_ptr(buf), sshbuf_len(buf), f);
}
char *
sshbuf_dtob16(struct sshbuf *buf)
{
size_t i, j, len = sshbuf_len(buf);
const u_char *p = sshbuf_ptr(buf);
char *ret;
const char hex[] = "0123456789abcdef";
if (len == 0)
return strdup("");
if (SIZE_MAX / 2 <= len || (ret = malloc(len * 2 + 1)) == NULL)
return NULL;
for (i = j = 0; i < len; i++) {
ret[j++] = hex[(p[i] >> 4) & 0xf];
ret[j++] = hex[p[i] & 0xf];
}
ret[j] = '\0';
return ret;
}
int
sshbuf_dtob64(const struct sshbuf *d, struct sshbuf *b64, int wrap)
{
size_t i, slen = 0;
char *s = NULL;
int r;
if (d == NULL || b64 == NULL || sshbuf_len(d) >= SIZE_MAX / 2)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
if (sshbuf_len(d) == 0)
return 0;
slen = ((sshbuf_len(d) + 2) / 3) * 4 + 1;
if ((s = malloc(slen)) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
if (b64_ntop(sshbuf_ptr(d), sshbuf_len(d), s, slen) == -1) {
r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
goto fail;
}
if (wrap) {
for (i = 0; s[i] != '\0'; i++) {
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(b64, s[i])) != 0)
goto fail;
if (i % 70 == 69 && (r = sshbuf_put_u8(b64, '\n')) != 0)
goto fail;
}
if ((i - 1) % 70 != 69 && (r = sshbuf_put_u8(b64, '\n')) != 0)
goto fail;
} else {
if ((r = sshbuf_put(b64, s, strlen(s))) != 0)
goto fail;
}
/* Success */
r = 0;
fail:
freezero(s, slen);
return r;
}
char *
sshbuf_dtob64_string(const struct sshbuf *buf, int wrap)
{
struct sshbuf *tmp;
char *ret;
if ((tmp = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
return NULL;
if (sshbuf_dtob64(buf, tmp, wrap) != 0) {
sshbuf_free(tmp);
return NULL;
}
ret = sshbuf_dup_string(tmp);
sshbuf_free(tmp);
return ret;
}
int
sshbuf_b64tod(struct sshbuf *buf, const char *b64)
{
size_t plen = strlen(b64);
int nlen, r;
u_char *p;
if (plen == 0)
return 0;
if ((p = malloc(plen)) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
if ((nlen = b64_pton(b64, p, plen)) < 0) {
explicit_bzero(p, plen);
free(p);
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_put(buf, p, nlen)) < 0) {
explicit_bzero(p, plen);
free(p);
return r;
}
explicit_bzero(p, plen);
free(p);
return 0;
}
char *
sshbuf_dup_string(struct sshbuf *buf)
{
const u_char *p = NULL, *s = sshbuf_ptr(buf);
size_t l = sshbuf_len(buf);
char *r;
if (s == NULL || l > SIZE_MAX)
return NULL;
/* accept a nul only as the last character in the buffer */
if (l > 0 && (p = memchr(s, '\0', l)) != NULL) {
if (p != s + l - 1)
return NULL;
l--; /* the nul is put back below */
}
if ((r = malloc(l + 1)) == NULL)
return NULL;
if (l > 0)
memcpy(r, s, l);
r[l] = '\0';
return r;
}
int
sshbuf_cmp(const struct sshbuf *b, size_t offset,
const void *s, size_t len)
{
if (sshbuf_ptr(b) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
if (offset > SSHBUF_SIZE_MAX || len > SSHBUF_SIZE_MAX || len == 0)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
if (offset + len > sshbuf_len(b))
return SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE;
if (timingsafe_bcmp(sshbuf_ptr(b) + offset, s, len) != 0)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
return 0;
}
int
sshbuf_find(const struct sshbuf *b, size_t start_offset,
const void *s, size_t len, size_t *offsetp)
{
void *p;
if (offsetp != NULL)
*offsetp = 0;
if (sshbuf_ptr(b) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
if (start_offset > SSHBUF_SIZE_MAX || len > SSHBUF_SIZE_MAX || len == 0)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
if (start_offset > sshbuf_len(b) || start_offset + len > sshbuf_len(b))
return SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE;
if ((p = memmem(sshbuf_ptr(b) + start_offset,
sshbuf_len(b) - start_offset, s, len)) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
if (offsetp != NULL)
*offsetp = (const u_char *)p - sshbuf_ptr(b);
return 0;
}
diff --git a/sshbuf.c b/sshbuf.c
index adfddf7758c1..f4f7a220f67c 100644
--- a/sshbuf.c
+++ b/sshbuf.c
@@ -1,402 +1,402 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: sshbuf.c,v 1.13 2018/11/16 06:10:29 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: sshbuf.c,v 1.14 2020/01/23 07:10:22 dtucker Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2011 Damien Miller
*
* Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
* copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
* WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
* ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
* WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
* ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
* OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
*/
#define SSHBUF_INTERNAL
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <signal.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#include "ssherr.h"
#include "sshbuf.h"
#include "misc.h"
static inline int
sshbuf_check_sanity(const struct sshbuf *buf)
{
SSHBUF_TELL("sanity");
if (__predict_false(buf == NULL ||
(!buf->readonly && buf->d != buf->cd) ||
buf->refcount < 1 || buf->refcount > SSHBUF_REFS_MAX ||
buf->cd == NULL ||
buf->max_size > SSHBUF_SIZE_MAX ||
buf->alloc > buf->max_size ||
buf->size > buf->alloc ||
buf->off > buf->size)) {
/* Do not try to recover from corrupted buffer internals */
SSHBUF_DBG(("SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR"));
- signal(SIGSEGV, SIG_DFL);
+ ssh_signal(SIGSEGV, SIG_DFL);
raise(SIGSEGV);
return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
return 0;
}
static void
sshbuf_maybe_pack(struct sshbuf *buf, int force)
{
SSHBUF_DBG(("force %d", force));
SSHBUF_TELL("pre-pack");
if (buf->off == 0 || buf->readonly || buf->refcount > 1)
return;
if (force ||
(buf->off >= SSHBUF_PACK_MIN && buf->off >= buf->size / 2)) {
memmove(buf->d, buf->d + buf->off, buf->size - buf->off);
buf->size -= buf->off;
buf->off = 0;
SSHBUF_TELL("packed");
}
}
struct sshbuf *
sshbuf_new(void)
{
struct sshbuf *ret;
if ((ret = calloc(sizeof(*ret), 1)) == NULL)
return NULL;
ret->alloc = SSHBUF_SIZE_INIT;
ret->max_size = SSHBUF_SIZE_MAX;
ret->readonly = 0;
ret->refcount = 1;
ret->parent = NULL;
if ((ret->cd = ret->d = calloc(1, ret->alloc)) == NULL) {
free(ret);
return NULL;
}
return ret;
}
struct sshbuf *
sshbuf_from(const void *blob, size_t len)
{
struct sshbuf *ret;
if (blob == NULL || len > SSHBUF_SIZE_MAX ||
(ret = calloc(sizeof(*ret), 1)) == NULL)
return NULL;
ret->alloc = ret->size = ret->max_size = len;
ret->readonly = 1;
ret->refcount = 1;
ret->parent = NULL;
ret->cd = blob;
ret->d = NULL;
return ret;
}
int
sshbuf_set_parent(struct sshbuf *child, struct sshbuf *parent)
{
int r;
if ((r = sshbuf_check_sanity(child)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_check_sanity(parent)) != 0)
return r;
child->parent = parent;
child->parent->refcount++;
return 0;
}
struct sshbuf *
sshbuf_fromb(struct sshbuf *buf)
{
struct sshbuf *ret;
if (sshbuf_check_sanity(buf) != 0)
return NULL;
if ((ret = sshbuf_from(sshbuf_ptr(buf), sshbuf_len(buf))) == NULL)
return NULL;
if (sshbuf_set_parent(ret, buf) != 0) {
sshbuf_free(ret);
return NULL;
}
return ret;
}
void
sshbuf_free(struct sshbuf *buf)
{
if (buf == NULL)
return;
/*
* The following will leak on insane buffers, but this is the safest
* course of action - an invalid pointer or already-freed pointer may
* have been passed to us and continuing to scribble over memory would
* be bad.
*/
if (sshbuf_check_sanity(buf) != 0)
return;
/*
* If we are a parent with still-extant children, then don't free just
* yet. The last child's call to sshbuf_free should decrement our
* refcount to 0 and trigger the actual free.
*/
buf->refcount--;
if (buf->refcount > 0)
return;
/*
* If we are a child, the free our parent to decrement its reference
* count and possibly free it.
*/
sshbuf_free(buf->parent);
buf->parent = NULL;
if (!buf->readonly) {
explicit_bzero(buf->d, buf->alloc);
free(buf->d);
}
explicit_bzero(buf, sizeof(*buf));
free(buf);
}
void
sshbuf_reset(struct sshbuf *buf)
{
u_char *d;
if (buf->readonly || buf->refcount > 1) {
/* Nonsensical. Just make buffer appear empty */
buf->off = buf->size;
return;
}
(void) sshbuf_check_sanity(buf);
buf->off = buf->size = 0;
if (buf->alloc != SSHBUF_SIZE_INIT) {
if ((d = recallocarray(buf->d, buf->alloc, SSHBUF_SIZE_INIT,
1)) != NULL) {
buf->cd = buf->d = d;
buf->alloc = SSHBUF_SIZE_INIT;
}
}
explicit_bzero(buf->d, SSHBUF_SIZE_INIT);
}
size_t
sshbuf_max_size(const struct sshbuf *buf)
{
return buf->max_size;
}
size_t
sshbuf_alloc(const struct sshbuf *buf)
{
return buf->alloc;
}
const struct sshbuf *
sshbuf_parent(const struct sshbuf *buf)
{
return buf->parent;
}
u_int
sshbuf_refcount(const struct sshbuf *buf)
{
return buf->refcount;
}
int
sshbuf_set_max_size(struct sshbuf *buf, size_t max_size)
{
size_t rlen;
u_char *dp;
int r;
SSHBUF_DBG(("set max buf = %p len = %zu", buf, max_size));
if ((r = sshbuf_check_sanity(buf)) != 0)
return r;
if (max_size == buf->max_size)
return 0;
if (buf->readonly || buf->refcount > 1)
return SSH_ERR_BUFFER_READ_ONLY;
if (max_size > SSHBUF_SIZE_MAX)
return SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE;
/* pack and realloc if necessary */
sshbuf_maybe_pack(buf, max_size < buf->size);
if (max_size < buf->alloc && max_size > buf->size) {
if (buf->size < SSHBUF_SIZE_INIT)
rlen = SSHBUF_SIZE_INIT;
else
rlen = ROUNDUP(buf->size, SSHBUF_SIZE_INC);
if (rlen > max_size)
rlen = max_size;
SSHBUF_DBG(("new alloc = %zu", rlen));
if ((dp = recallocarray(buf->d, buf->alloc, rlen, 1)) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
buf->cd = buf->d = dp;
buf->alloc = rlen;
}
SSHBUF_TELL("new-max");
if (max_size < buf->alloc)
return SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE;
buf->max_size = max_size;
return 0;
}
size_t
sshbuf_len(const struct sshbuf *buf)
{
if (sshbuf_check_sanity(buf) != 0)
return 0;
return buf->size - buf->off;
}
size_t
sshbuf_avail(const struct sshbuf *buf)
{
if (sshbuf_check_sanity(buf) != 0 || buf->readonly || buf->refcount > 1)
return 0;
return buf->max_size - (buf->size - buf->off);
}
const u_char *
sshbuf_ptr(const struct sshbuf *buf)
{
if (sshbuf_check_sanity(buf) != 0)
return NULL;
return buf->cd + buf->off;
}
u_char *
sshbuf_mutable_ptr(const struct sshbuf *buf)
{
if (sshbuf_check_sanity(buf) != 0 || buf->readonly || buf->refcount > 1)
return NULL;
return buf->d + buf->off;
}
int
sshbuf_check_reserve(const struct sshbuf *buf, size_t len)
{
int r;
if ((r = sshbuf_check_sanity(buf)) != 0)
return r;
if (buf->readonly || buf->refcount > 1)
return SSH_ERR_BUFFER_READ_ONLY;
SSHBUF_TELL("check");
/* Check that len is reasonable and that max_size + available < len */
if (len > buf->max_size || buf->max_size - len < buf->size - buf->off)
return SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE;
return 0;
}
int
sshbuf_allocate(struct sshbuf *buf, size_t len)
{
size_t rlen, need;
u_char *dp;
int r;
SSHBUF_DBG(("allocate buf = %p len = %zu", buf, len));
if ((r = sshbuf_check_reserve(buf, len)) != 0)
return r;
/*
* If the requested allocation appended would push us past max_size
* then pack the buffer, zeroing buf->off.
*/
sshbuf_maybe_pack(buf, buf->size + len > buf->max_size);
SSHBUF_TELL("allocate");
if (len + buf->size <= buf->alloc)
return 0; /* already have it. */
/*
* Prefer to alloc in SSHBUF_SIZE_INC units, but
* allocate less if doing so would overflow max_size.
*/
need = len + buf->size - buf->alloc;
rlen = ROUNDUP(buf->alloc + need, SSHBUF_SIZE_INC);
SSHBUF_DBG(("need %zu initial rlen %zu", need, rlen));
if (rlen > buf->max_size)
rlen = buf->alloc + need;
SSHBUF_DBG(("adjusted rlen %zu", rlen));
if ((dp = recallocarray(buf->d, buf->alloc, rlen, 1)) == NULL) {
SSHBUF_DBG(("realloc fail"));
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
}
buf->alloc = rlen;
buf->cd = buf->d = dp;
if ((r = sshbuf_check_reserve(buf, len)) < 0) {
/* shouldn't fail */
return r;
}
SSHBUF_TELL("done");
return 0;
}
int
sshbuf_reserve(struct sshbuf *buf, size_t len, u_char **dpp)
{
u_char *dp;
int r;
if (dpp != NULL)
*dpp = NULL;
SSHBUF_DBG(("reserve buf = %p len = %zu", buf, len));
if ((r = sshbuf_allocate(buf, len)) != 0)
return r;
dp = buf->d + buf->size;
buf->size += len;
if (dpp != NULL)
*dpp = dp;
return 0;
}
int
sshbuf_consume(struct sshbuf *buf, size_t len)
{
int r;
SSHBUF_DBG(("len = %zu", len));
if ((r = sshbuf_check_sanity(buf)) != 0)
return r;
if (len == 0)
return 0;
if (len > sshbuf_len(buf))
return SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE;
buf->off += len;
/* deal with empty buffer */
if (buf->off == buf->size)
buf->off = buf->size = 0;
SSHBUF_TELL("done");
return 0;
}
int
sshbuf_consume_end(struct sshbuf *buf, size_t len)
{
int r;
SSHBUF_DBG(("len = %zu", len));
if ((r = sshbuf_check_sanity(buf)) != 0)
return r;
if (len == 0)
return 0;
if (len > sshbuf_len(buf))
return SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE;
buf->size -= len;
SSHBUF_TELL("done");
return 0;
}
diff --git a/sshbuf.h b/sshbuf.h
index ebd64b10ec19..165cd0b183c1 100644
--- a/sshbuf.h
+++ b/sshbuf.h
@@ -1,393 +1,409 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: sshbuf.h,v 1.18 2019/09/06 05:23:55 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: sshbuf.h,v 1.19 2020/01/25 23:02:14 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2011 Damien Miller
*
* Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
* copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
* WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
* ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
* WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
* ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
* OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
*/
#ifndef _SSHBUF_H
#define _SSHBUF_H
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
# include <openssl/bn.h>
# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
# include <openssl/ec.h>
# endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
#define SSHBUF_SIZE_MAX 0x8000000 /* Hard maximum size */
#define SSHBUF_REFS_MAX 0x100000 /* Max child buffers */
#define SSHBUF_MAX_BIGNUM (16384 / 8) /* Max bignum *bytes* */
#define SSHBUF_MAX_ECPOINT ((528 * 2 / 8) + 1) /* Max EC point *bytes* */
/*
* NB. do not depend on the internals of this. It will be made opaque
* one day.
*/
struct sshbuf {
u_char *d; /* Data */
const u_char *cd; /* Const data */
size_t off; /* First available byte is buf->d + buf->off */
size_t size; /* Last byte is buf->d + buf->size - 1 */
size_t max_size; /* Maximum size of buffer */
size_t alloc; /* Total bytes allocated to buf->d */
int readonly; /* Refers to external, const data */
int dont_free; /* Kludge to support sshbuf_init */
u_int refcount; /* Tracks self and number of child buffers */
struct sshbuf *parent; /* If child, pointer to parent */
};
/*
* Create a new sshbuf buffer.
* Returns pointer to buffer on success, or NULL on allocation failure.
*/
struct sshbuf *sshbuf_new(void);
/*
* Create a new, read-only sshbuf buffer from existing data.
* Returns pointer to buffer on success, or NULL on allocation failure.
*/
struct sshbuf *sshbuf_from(const void *blob, size_t len);
/*
* Create a new, read-only sshbuf buffer from the contents of an existing
* buffer. The contents of "buf" must not change in the lifetime of the
* resultant buffer.
* Returns pointer to buffer on success, or NULL on allocation failure.
*/
struct sshbuf *sshbuf_fromb(struct sshbuf *buf);
/*
* Create a new, read-only sshbuf buffer from the contents of a string in
* an existing buffer (the string is consumed in the process).
* The contents of "buf" must not change in the lifetime of the resultant
* buffer.
* Returns pointer to buffer on success, or NULL on allocation failure.
*/
int sshbuf_froms(struct sshbuf *buf, struct sshbuf **bufp);
/*
* Clear and free buf
*/
void sshbuf_free(struct sshbuf *buf);
/*
* Reset buf, clearing its contents. NB. max_size is preserved.
*/
void sshbuf_reset(struct sshbuf *buf);
/*
* Return the maximum size of buf
*/
size_t sshbuf_max_size(const struct sshbuf *buf);
/*
* Set the maximum size of buf
* Returns 0 on success, or a negative SSH_ERR_* error code on failure.
*/
int sshbuf_set_max_size(struct sshbuf *buf, size_t max_size);
/*
* Returns the length of data in buf
*/
size_t sshbuf_len(const struct sshbuf *buf);
/*
* Returns number of bytes left in buffer before hitting max_size.
*/
size_t sshbuf_avail(const struct sshbuf *buf);
/*
* Returns a read-only pointer to the start of the data in buf
*/
const u_char *sshbuf_ptr(const struct sshbuf *buf);
/*
* Returns a mutable pointer to the start of the data in buf, or
* NULL if the buffer is read-only.
*/
u_char *sshbuf_mutable_ptr(const struct sshbuf *buf);
/*
* Check whether a reservation of size len will succeed in buf
* Safer to use than direct comparisons again sshbuf_avail as it copes
* with unsigned overflows correctly.
* Returns 0 on success, or a negative SSH_ERR_* error code on failure.
*/
int sshbuf_check_reserve(const struct sshbuf *buf, size_t len);
/*
* Preallocates len additional bytes in buf.
* Useful for cases where the caller knows how many bytes will ultimately be
* required to avoid realloc in the buffer code.
* Returns 0 on success, or a negative SSH_ERR_* error code on failure.
*/
int sshbuf_allocate(struct sshbuf *buf, size_t len);
/*
* Reserve len bytes in buf.
* Returns 0 on success and a pointer to the first reserved byte via the
* optional dpp parameter or a negative * SSH_ERR_* error code on failure.
*/
int sshbuf_reserve(struct sshbuf *buf, size_t len, u_char **dpp);
/*
* Consume len bytes from the start of buf
* Returns 0 on success, or a negative SSH_ERR_* error code on failure.
*/
int sshbuf_consume(struct sshbuf *buf, size_t len);
/*
* Consume len bytes from the end of buf
* Returns 0 on success, or a negative SSH_ERR_* error code on failure.
*/
int sshbuf_consume_end(struct sshbuf *buf, size_t len);
/* Extract or deposit some bytes */
int sshbuf_get(struct sshbuf *buf, void *v, size_t len);
int sshbuf_put(struct sshbuf *buf, const void *v, size_t len);
int sshbuf_putb(struct sshbuf *buf, const struct sshbuf *v);
/* Append using a printf(3) format */
int sshbuf_putf(struct sshbuf *buf, const char *fmt, ...)
__attribute__((format(printf, 2, 3)));
int sshbuf_putfv(struct sshbuf *buf, const char *fmt, va_list ap);
/* Functions to extract or store big-endian words of various sizes */
int sshbuf_get_u64(struct sshbuf *buf, u_int64_t *valp);
int sshbuf_get_u32(struct sshbuf *buf, u_int32_t *valp);
int sshbuf_get_u16(struct sshbuf *buf, u_int16_t *valp);
int sshbuf_get_u8(struct sshbuf *buf, u_char *valp);
int sshbuf_put_u64(struct sshbuf *buf, u_int64_t val);
int sshbuf_put_u32(struct sshbuf *buf, u_int32_t val);
int sshbuf_put_u16(struct sshbuf *buf, u_int16_t val);
int sshbuf_put_u8(struct sshbuf *buf, u_char val);
/* Functions to peek at the contents of a buffer without modifying it. */
int sshbuf_peek_u64(const struct sshbuf *buf, size_t offset,
u_int64_t *valp);
int sshbuf_peek_u32(const struct sshbuf *buf, size_t offset,
u_int32_t *valp);
int sshbuf_peek_u16(const struct sshbuf *buf, size_t offset,
u_int16_t *valp);
int sshbuf_peek_u8(const struct sshbuf *buf, size_t offset,
u_char *valp);
/*
* Functions to poke values into an exisiting buffer (e.g. a length header
* to a packet). The destination bytes must already exist in the buffer.
*/
int sshbuf_poke_u64(struct sshbuf *buf, size_t offset, u_int64_t val);
int sshbuf_poke_u32(struct sshbuf *buf, size_t offset, u_int32_t val);
int sshbuf_poke_u16(struct sshbuf *buf, size_t offset, u_int16_t val);
int sshbuf_poke_u8(struct sshbuf *buf, size_t offset, u_char val);
int sshbuf_poke(struct sshbuf *buf, size_t offset, void *v, size_t len);
/*
* Functions to extract or store SSH wire encoded strings (u32 len || data)
* The "cstring" variants admit no \0 characters in the string contents.
* Caller must free *valp.
*/
int sshbuf_get_string(struct sshbuf *buf, u_char **valp, size_t *lenp);
int sshbuf_get_cstring(struct sshbuf *buf, char **valp, size_t *lenp);
int sshbuf_get_stringb(struct sshbuf *buf, struct sshbuf *v);
int sshbuf_put_string(struct sshbuf *buf, const void *v, size_t len);
int sshbuf_put_cstring(struct sshbuf *buf, const char *v);
int sshbuf_put_stringb(struct sshbuf *buf, const struct sshbuf *v);
/*
* "Direct" variant of sshbuf_get_string, returns pointer into the sshbuf to
* avoid an malloc+memcpy. The pointer is guaranteed to be valid until the
* next sshbuf-modifying function call. Caller does not free.
*/
int sshbuf_get_string_direct(struct sshbuf *buf, const u_char **valp,
size_t *lenp);
/* Skip past a string */
#define sshbuf_skip_string(buf) sshbuf_get_string_direct(buf, NULL, NULL)
/* Another variant: "peeks" into the buffer without modifying it */
int sshbuf_peek_string_direct(const struct sshbuf *buf, const u_char **valp,
size_t *lenp);
/*
* Functions to extract or store SSH wire encoded bignums and elliptic
* curve points.
*/
int sshbuf_put_bignum2_bytes(struct sshbuf *buf, const void *v, size_t len);
int sshbuf_get_bignum2_bytes_direct(struct sshbuf *buf,
const u_char **valp, size_t *lenp);
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
int sshbuf_get_bignum2(struct sshbuf *buf, BIGNUM **valp);
int sshbuf_put_bignum2(struct sshbuf *buf, const BIGNUM *v);
# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
int sshbuf_get_ec(struct sshbuf *buf, EC_POINT *v, const EC_GROUP *g);
int sshbuf_get_eckey(struct sshbuf *buf, EC_KEY *v);
int sshbuf_put_ec(struct sshbuf *buf, const EC_POINT *v, const EC_GROUP *g);
int sshbuf_put_eckey(struct sshbuf *buf, const EC_KEY *v);
# endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
/* Dump the contents of the buffer in a human-readable format */
void sshbuf_dump(struct sshbuf *buf, FILE *f);
/* Dump specified memory in a human-readable format */
void sshbuf_dump_data(const void *s, size_t len, FILE *f);
/* Return the hexadecimal representation of the contents of the buffer */
char *sshbuf_dtob16(struct sshbuf *buf);
/* Encode the contents of the buffer as base64 */
char *sshbuf_dtob64_string(const struct sshbuf *buf, int wrap);
int sshbuf_dtob64(const struct sshbuf *d, struct sshbuf *b64, int wrap);
/* Decode base64 data and append it to the buffer */
int sshbuf_b64tod(struct sshbuf *buf, const char *b64);
/*
* Tests whether the buffer contains the specified byte sequence at the
* specified offset. Returns 0 on successful match, or a ssherr.h code
* otherwise. SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT indicates sufficient bytes were
* present but the buffer contents did not match those supplied. Zero-
* length comparisons are not allowed.
*
* If sufficient data is present to make a comparison, then it is
* performed with timing independent of the value of the data. If
* insufficient data is present then the comparison is not attempted at
* all.
*/
int sshbuf_cmp(const struct sshbuf *b, size_t offset,
const void *s, size_t len);
/*
* Searches the buffer for the specified string. Returns 0 on success
* and updates *offsetp with the offset of the first match, relative to
* the start of the buffer. Otherwise sshbuf_find will return a ssherr.h
* error code. SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT indicates sufficient bytes were
* present in the buffer for a match to be possible but none was found.
* Searches for zero-length data are not allowed.
*/
int
sshbuf_find(const struct sshbuf *b, size_t start_offset,
const void *s, size_t len, size_t *offsetp);
/*
* Duplicate the contents of a buffer to a string (caller to free).
* Returns NULL on buffer error, or if the buffer contains a premature
* nul character.
*/
char *sshbuf_dup_string(struct sshbuf *buf);
+/*
+ * Fill a buffer from a file descriptor or filename. Both allocate the
+ * buffer for the caller.
+ */
+int sshbuf_load_fd(int, struct sshbuf **)
+ __attribute__((__nonnull__ (2)));
+int sshbuf_load_file(const char *, struct sshbuf **)
+ __attribute__((__nonnull__ (2)));
+
+/*
+ * Write a buffer to a path, creating/truncating as needed (mode 0644,
+ * subject to umask). The buffer contents are not modified.
+ */
+int sshbuf_write_file(const char *path, struct sshbuf *buf)
+ __attribute__((__nonnull__ (2)));
+
/* Macros for decoding/encoding integers */
#define PEEK_U64(p) \
(((u_int64_t)(((const u_char *)(p))[0]) << 56) | \
((u_int64_t)(((const u_char *)(p))[1]) << 48) | \
((u_int64_t)(((const u_char *)(p))[2]) << 40) | \
((u_int64_t)(((const u_char *)(p))[3]) << 32) | \
((u_int64_t)(((const u_char *)(p))[4]) << 24) | \
((u_int64_t)(((const u_char *)(p))[5]) << 16) | \
((u_int64_t)(((const u_char *)(p))[6]) << 8) | \
(u_int64_t)(((const u_char *)(p))[7]))
#define PEEK_U32(p) \
(((u_int32_t)(((const u_char *)(p))[0]) << 24) | \
((u_int32_t)(((const u_char *)(p))[1]) << 16) | \
((u_int32_t)(((const u_char *)(p))[2]) << 8) | \
(u_int32_t)(((const u_char *)(p))[3]))
#define PEEK_U16(p) \
(((u_int16_t)(((const u_char *)(p))[0]) << 8) | \
(u_int16_t)(((const u_char *)(p))[1]))
#define POKE_U64(p, v) \
do { \
const u_int64_t __v = (v); \
((u_char *)(p))[0] = (__v >> 56) & 0xff; \
((u_char *)(p))[1] = (__v >> 48) & 0xff; \
((u_char *)(p))[2] = (__v >> 40) & 0xff; \
((u_char *)(p))[3] = (__v >> 32) & 0xff; \
((u_char *)(p))[4] = (__v >> 24) & 0xff; \
((u_char *)(p))[5] = (__v >> 16) & 0xff; \
((u_char *)(p))[6] = (__v >> 8) & 0xff; \
((u_char *)(p))[7] = __v & 0xff; \
} while (0)
#define POKE_U32(p, v) \
do { \
const u_int32_t __v = (v); \
((u_char *)(p))[0] = (__v >> 24) & 0xff; \
((u_char *)(p))[1] = (__v >> 16) & 0xff; \
((u_char *)(p))[2] = (__v >> 8) & 0xff; \
((u_char *)(p))[3] = __v & 0xff; \
} while (0)
#define POKE_U16(p, v) \
do { \
const u_int16_t __v = (v); \
((u_char *)(p))[0] = (__v >> 8) & 0xff; \
((u_char *)(p))[1] = __v & 0xff; \
} while (0)
/* Internal definitions follow. Exposed for regress tests */
#ifdef SSHBUF_INTERNAL
/*
* Return the allocation size of buf
*/
size_t sshbuf_alloc(const struct sshbuf *buf);
/*
* Increment the reference count of buf.
*/
int sshbuf_set_parent(struct sshbuf *child, struct sshbuf *parent);
/*
* Return the parent buffer of buf, or NULL if it has no parent.
*/
const struct sshbuf *sshbuf_parent(const struct sshbuf *buf);
/*
* Return the reference count of buf
*/
u_int sshbuf_refcount(const struct sshbuf *buf);
# define SSHBUF_SIZE_INIT 256 /* Initial allocation */
# define SSHBUF_SIZE_INC 256 /* Preferred increment length */
# define SSHBUF_PACK_MIN 8192 /* Minimim packable offset */
/* # define SSHBUF_ABORT abort */
/* # define SSHBUF_DEBUG */
# ifndef SSHBUF_ABORT
# define SSHBUF_ABORT()
# endif
# ifdef SSHBUF_DEBUG
# define SSHBUF_TELL(what) do { \
printf("%s:%d %s: %s size %zu alloc %zu off %zu max %zu\n", \
__FILE__, __LINE__, __func__, what, \
buf->size, buf->alloc, buf->off, buf->max_size); \
fflush(stdout); \
} while (0)
# define SSHBUF_DBG(x) do { \
printf("%s:%d %s: ", __FILE__, __LINE__, __func__); \
printf x; \
printf("\n"); \
fflush(stdout); \
} while (0)
# else
# define SSHBUF_TELL(what)
# define SSHBUF_DBG(x)
# endif
#endif /* SSHBUF_INTERNAL */
#endif /* _SSHBUF_H */
diff --git a/sshconnect.c b/sshconnect.c
index 6230dad32476..4711af782c83 100644
--- a/sshconnect.c
+++ b/sshconnect.c
@@ -1,1434 +1,1438 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect.c,v 1.319 2019/09/13 04:31:19 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect.c,v 1.328 2020/01/25 07:17:18 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
* All rights reserved
* Code to connect to a remote host, and to perform the client side of the
* login (authentication) dialog.
*
* As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
* can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
* software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
* incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
* called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/wait.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
# include <sys/time.h>
#endif
#include <net/if.h>
#include <netinet/in.h>
#include <arpa/inet.h>
#include <ctype.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <netdb.h>
#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
#include <paths.h>
#endif
#include <pwd.h>
#ifdef HAVE_POLL_H
#include <poll.h>
#endif
#include <signal.h>
-#include <stdarg.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#ifdef HAVE_IFADDRS_H
# include <ifaddrs.h>
#endif
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "hostfile.h"
#include "ssh.h"
#include "sshbuf.h"
#include "packet.h"
#include "compat.h"
#include "sshkey.h"
#include "sshconnect.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "readconf.h"
#include "atomicio.h"
#include "dns.h"
#include "monitor_fdpass.h"
#include "ssh2.h"
#include "version.h"
#include "authfile.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
#include "authfd.h"
#include "kex.h"
struct sshkey *previous_host_key = NULL;
static int matching_host_key_dns = 0;
static pid_t proxy_command_pid = 0;
/* import */
extern int debug_flag;
extern Options options;
extern char *__progname;
static int show_other_keys(struct hostkeys *, struct sshkey *);
static void warn_changed_key(struct sshkey *);
/* Expand a proxy command */
static char *
expand_proxy_command(const char *proxy_command, const char *user,
const char *host, const char *host_arg, int port)
{
char *tmp, *ret, strport[NI_MAXSERV];
snprintf(strport, sizeof strport, "%d", port);
xasprintf(&tmp, "exec %s", proxy_command);
ret = percent_expand(tmp,
"h", host,
"n", host_arg,
"p", strport,
"r", options.user,
(char *)NULL);
free(tmp);
return ret;
}
static void
stderr_null(void)
{
int devnull;
if ((devnull = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_WRONLY)) == -1) {
error("Can't open %s for stderr redirection: %s",
_PATH_DEVNULL, strerror(errno));
return;
}
if (devnull == STDERR_FILENO)
return;
if (dup2(devnull, STDERR_FILENO) == -1)
error("Cannot redirect stderr to %s", _PATH_DEVNULL);
if (devnull > STDERR_FILENO)
close(devnull);
}
/*
* Connect to the given ssh server using a proxy command that passes a
* a connected fd back to us.
*/
static int
ssh_proxy_fdpass_connect(struct ssh *ssh, const char *host,
const char *host_arg, u_short port, const char *proxy_command)
{
char *command_string;
int sp[2], sock;
pid_t pid;
char *shell;
if ((shell = getenv("SHELL")) == NULL)
shell = _PATH_BSHELL;
if (socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0, sp) == -1)
fatal("Could not create socketpair to communicate with "
"proxy dialer: %.100s", strerror(errno));
command_string = expand_proxy_command(proxy_command, options.user,
- host_arg, host, port);
+ host, host_arg, port);
debug("Executing proxy dialer command: %.500s", command_string);
/* Fork and execute the proxy command. */
if ((pid = fork()) == 0) {
char *argv[10];
close(sp[1]);
/* Redirect stdin and stdout. */
if (sp[0] != 0) {
if (dup2(sp[0], 0) == -1)
perror("dup2 stdin");
}
if (sp[0] != 1) {
if (dup2(sp[0], 1) == -1)
perror("dup2 stdout");
}
if (sp[0] >= 2)
close(sp[0]);
/*
* Stderr is left for non-ControlPersist connections is so
* error messages may be printed on the user's terminal.
*/
if (!debug_flag && options.control_path != NULL &&
options.control_persist)
stderr_null();
argv[0] = shell;
argv[1] = "-c";
argv[2] = command_string;
argv[3] = NULL;
/*
* Execute the proxy command.
* Note that we gave up any extra privileges above.
*/
execv(argv[0], argv);
perror(argv[0]);
exit(1);
}
/* Parent. */
if (pid == -1)
fatal("fork failed: %.100s", strerror(errno));
close(sp[0]);
free(command_string);
if ((sock = mm_receive_fd(sp[1])) == -1)
fatal("proxy dialer did not pass back a connection");
close(sp[1]);
while (waitpid(pid, NULL, 0) == -1)
if (errno != EINTR)
fatal("Couldn't wait for child: %s", strerror(errno));
/* Set the connection file descriptors. */
if (ssh_packet_set_connection(ssh, sock, sock) == NULL)
return -1; /* ssh_packet_set_connection logs error */
return 0;
}
/*
* Connect to the given ssh server using a proxy command.
*/
static int
ssh_proxy_connect(struct ssh *ssh, const char *host, const char *host_arg,
u_short port, const char *proxy_command)
{
char *command_string;
int pin[2], pout[2];
pid_t pid;
char *shell;
if ((shell = getenv("SHELL")) == NULL || *shell == '\0')
shell = _PATH_BSHELL;
/* Create pipes for communicating with the proxy. */
if (pipe(pin) == -1 || pipe(pout) == -1)
fatal("Could not create pipes to communicate with the proxy: %.100s",
strerror(errno));
command_string = expand_proxy_command(proxy_command, options.user,
- host_arg, host, port);
+ host, host_arg, port);
debug("Executing proxy command: %.500s", command_string);
/* Fork and execute the proxy command. */
if ((pid = fork()) == 0) {
char *argv[10];
/* Redirect stdin and stdout. */
close(pin[1]);
if (pin[0] != 0) {
if (dup2(pin[0], 0) == -1)
perror("dup2 stdin");
close(pin[0]);
}
close(pout[0]);
if (dup2(pout[1], 1) == -1)
perror("dup2 stdout");
/* Cannot be 1 because pin allocated two descriptors. */
close(pout[1]);
/*
* Stderr is left for non-ControlPersist connections is so
* error messages may be printed on the user's terminal.
*/
if (!debug_flag && options.control_path != NULL &&
options.control_persist)
stderr_null();
argv[0] = shell;
argv[1] = "-c";
argv[2] = command_string;
argv[3] = NULL;
/* Execute the proxy command. Note that we gave up any
extra privileges above. */
- signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_DFL);
+ ssh_signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_DFL);
execv(argv[0], argv);
perror(argv[0]);
exit(1);
}
/* Parent. */
if (pid == -1)
fatal("fork failed: %.100s", strerror(errno));
else
proxy_command_pid = pid; /* save pid to clean up later */
/* Close child side of the descriptors. */
close(pin[0]);
close(pout[1]);
/* Free the command name. */
free(command_string);
/* Set the connection file descriptors. */
if (ssh_packet_set_connection(ssh, pout[0], pin[1]) == NULL)
return -1; /* ssh_packet_set_connection logs error */
return 0;
}
void
ssh_kill_proxy_command(void)
{
/*
* Send SIGHUP to proxy command if used. We don't wait() in
* case it hangs and instead rely on init to reap the child
*/
if (proxy_command_pid > 1)
kill(proxy_command_pid, SIGHUP);
}
#ifdef HAVE_IFADDRS_H
/*
* Search a interface address list (returned from getifaddrs(3)) for an
* address that matches the desired address family on the specified interface.
* Returns 0 and fills in *resultp and *rlenp on success. Returns -1 on failure.
*/
static int
check_ifaddrs(const char *ifname, int af, const struct ifaddrs *ifaddrs,
struct sockaddr_storage *resultp, socklen_t *rlenp)
{
struct sockaddr_in6 *sa6;
struct sockaddr_in *sa;
struct in6_addr *v6addr;
const struct ifaddrs *ifa;
int allow_local;
/*
* Prefer addresses that are not loopback or linklocal, but use them
* if nothing else matches.
*/
for (allow_local = 0; allow_local < 2; allow_local++) {
for (ifa = ifaddrs; ifa != NULL; ifa = ifa->ifa_next) {
if (ifa->ifa_addr == NULL || ifa->ifa_name == NULL ||
(ifa->ifa_flags & IFF_UP) == 0 ||
ifa->ifa_addr->sa_family != af ||
strcmp(ifa->ifa_name, options.bind_interface) != 0)
continue;
switch (ifa->ifa_addr->sa_family) {
case AF_INET:
sa = (struct sockaddr_in *)ifa->ifa_addr;
if (!allow_local && sa->sin_addr.s_addr ==
htonl(INADDR_LOOPBACK))
continue;
if (*rlenp < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in)) {
error("%s: v4 addr doesn't fit",
__func__);
return -1;
}
*rlenp = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in);
memcpy(resultp, sa, *rlenp);
return 0;
case AF_INET6:
sa6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)ifa->ifa_addr;
v6addr = &sa6->sin6_addr;
if (!allow_local &&
(IN6_IS_ADDR_LINKLOCAL(v6addr) ||
IN6_IS_ADDR_LOOPBACK(v6addr)))
continue;
if (*rlenp < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6)) {
error("%s: v6 addr doesn't fit",
__func__);
return -1;
}
*rlenp = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6);
memcpy(resultp, sa6, *rlenp);
return 0;
}
}
}
return -1;
}
#endif
/*
* Creates a socket for use as the ssh connection.
*/
static int
ssh_create_socket(struct addrinfo *ai)
{
int sock, r;
struct sockaddr_storage bindaddr;
socklen_t bindaddrlen = 0;
struct addrinfo hints, *res = NULL;
#ifdef HAVE_IFADDRS_H
struct ifaddrs *ifaddrs = NULL;
#endif
char ntop[NI_MAXHOST];
sock = socket(ai->ai_family, ai->ai_socktype, ai->ai_protocol);
if (sock == -1) {
error("socket: %s", strerror(errno));
return -1;
}
fcntl(sock, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC);
/* Bind the socket to an alternative local IP address */
if (options.bind_address == NULL && options.bind_interface == NULL)
return sock;
if (options.bind_address != NULL) {
memset(&hints, 0, sizeof(hints));
hints.ai_family = ai->ai_family;
hints.ai_socktype = ai->ai_socktype;
hints.ai_protocol = ai->ai_protocol;
hints.ai_flags = AI_PASSIVE;
if ((r = getaddrinfo(options.bind_address, NULL,
&hints, &res)) != 0) {
error("getaddrinfo: %s: %s", options.bind_address,
ssh_gai_strerror(r));
goto fail;
}
if (res == NULL) {
error("getaddrinfo: no addrs");
goto fail;
}
memcpy(&bindaddr, res->ai_addr, res->ai_addrlen);
bindaddrlen = res->ai_addrlen;
} else if (options.bind_interface != NULL) {
#ifdef HAVE_IFADDRS_H
if ((r = getifaddrs(&ifaddrs)) != 0) {
error("getifaddrs: %s: %s", options.bind_interface,
strerror(errno));
goto fail;
}
bindaddrlen = sizeof(bindaddr);
if (check_ifaddrs(options.bind_interface, ai->ai_family,
ifaddrs, &bindaddr, &bindaddrlen) != 0) {
logit("getifaddrs: %s: no suitable addresses",
options.bind_interface);
goto fail;
}
#else
error("BindInterface not supported on this platform.");
#endif
}
if ((r = getnameinfo((struct sockaddr *)&bindaddr, bindaddrlen,
ntop, sizeof(ntop), NULL, 0, NI_NUMERICHOST)) != 0) {
error("%s: getnameinfo failed: %s", __func__,
ssh_gai_strerror(r));
goto fail;
}
if (bind(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&bindaddr, bindaddrlen) != 0) {
error("bind %s: %s", ntop, strerror(errno));
goto fail;
}
debug("%s: bound to %s", __func__, ntop);
/* success */
goto out;
fail:
close(sock);
sock = -1;
out:
if (res != NULL)
freeaddrinfo(res);
#ifdef HAVE_IFADDRS_H
if (ifaddrs != NULL)
freeifaddrs(ifaddrs);
#endif
return sock;
}
/*
* Opens a TCP/IP connection to the remote server on the given host.
* The address of the remote host will be returned in hostaddr.
* If port is 0, the default port will be used.
* Connection_attempts specifies the maximum number of tries (one per
* second). If proxy_command is non-NULL, it specifies the command (with %h
* and %p substituted for host and port, respectively) to use to contact
* the daemon.
*/
static int
ssh_connect_direct(struct ssh *ssh, const char *host, struct addrinfo *aitop,
struct sockaddr_storage *hostaddr, u_short port, int family,
int connection_attempts, int *timeout_ms, int want_keepalive)
{
int on = 1, saved_timeout_ms = *timeout_ms;
int oerrno, sock = -1, attempt;
char ntop[NI_MAXHOST], strport[NI_MAXSERV];
struct addrinfo *ai;
debug2("%s", __func__);
memset(ntop, 0, sizeof(ntop));
memset(strport, 0, sizeof(strport));
for (attempt = 0; attempt < connection_attempts; attempt++) {
if (attempt > 0) {
/* Sleep a moment before retrying. */
sleep(1);
debug("Trying again...");
}
/*
* Loop through addresses for this host, and try each one in
* sequence until the connection succeeds.
*/
for (ai = aitop; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) {
if (ai->ai_family != AF_INET &&
ai->ai_family != AF_INET6) {
errno = EAFNOSUPPORT;
continue;
}
if (getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen,
ntop, sizeof(ntop), strport, sizeof(strport),
NI_NUMERICHOST|NI_NUMERICSERV) != 0) {
oerrno = errno;
error("%s: getnameinfo failed", __func__);
errno = oerrno;
continue;
}
debug("Connecting to %.200s [%.100s] port %s.",
host, ntop, strport);
/* Create a socket for connecting. */
sock = ssh_create_socket(ai);
if (sock < 0) {
/* Any error is already output */
errno = 0;
continue;
}
*timeout_ms = saved_timeout_ms;
if (timeout_connect(sock, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen,
timeout_ms) >= 0) {
/* Successful connection. */
memcpy(hostaddr, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen);
break;
} else {
oerrno = errno;
debug("connect to address %s port %s: %s",
ntop, strport, strerror(errno));
close(sock);
sock = -1;
errno = oerrno;
}
}
if (sock != -1)
break; /* Successful connection. */
}
/* Return failure if we didn't get a successful connection. */
if (sock == -1) {
error("ssh: connect to host %s port %s: %s",
host, strport, errno == 0 ? "failure" : strerror(errno));
return -1;
}
debug("Connection established.");
/* Set SO_KEEPALIVE if requested. */
if (want_keepalive &&
setsockopt(sock, SOL_SOCKET, SO_KEEPALIVE, (void *)&on,
sizeof(on)) == -1)
error("setsockopt SO_KEEPALIVE: %.100s", strerror(errno));
/* Set the connection. */
if (ssh_packet_set_connection(ssh, sock, sock) == NULL)
return -1; /* ssh_packet_set_connection logs error */
return 0;
}
int
ssh_connect(struct ssh *ssh, const char *host, const char *host_arg,
struct addrinfo *addrs, struct sockaddr_storage *hostaddr, u_short port,
int family, int connection_attempts, int *timeout_ms, int want_keepalive)
{
int in, out;
if (options.proxy_command == NULL) {
return ssh_connect_direct(ssh, host, addrs, hostaddr, port,
family, connection_attempts, timeout_ms, want_keepalive);
} else if (strcmp(options.proxy_command, "-") == 0) {
if ((in = dup(STDIN_FILENO)) == -1 ||
(out = dup(STDOUT_FILENO)) == -1) {
if (in >= 0)
close(in);
error("%s: dup() in/out failed", __func__);
return -1; /* ssh_packet_set_connection logs error */
}
if ((ssh_packet_set_connection(ssh, in, out)) == NULL)
return -1; /* ssh_packet_set_connection logs error */
return 0;
} else if (options.proxy_use_fdpass) {
return ssh_proxy_fdpass_connect(ssh, host, host_arg, port,
options.proxy_command);
}
return ssh_proxy_connect(ssh, host, host_arg, port,
options.proxy_command);
}
/* defaults to 'no' */
static int
confirm(const char *prompt, const char *fingerprint)
{
const char *msg, *again = "Please type 'yes' or 'no': ";
const char *again_fp = "Please type 'yes', 'no' or the fingerprint: ";
- char *p;
+ char *p, *cp;
int ret = -1;
if (options.batch_mode)
return 0;
for (msg = prompt;;msg = fingerprint ? again_fp : again) {
- p = read_passphrase(msg, RP_ECHO);
+ cp = p = read_passphrase(msg, RP_ECHO);
if (p == NULL)
return 0;
- p[strcspn(p, "\n")] = '\0';
+ p += strspn(p, " \t"); /* skip leading whitespace */
+ p[strcspn(p, " \t\n")] = '\0'; /* remove trailing whitespace */
if (p[0] == '\0' || strcasecmp(p, "no") == 0)
ret = 0;
else if (strcasecmp(p, "yes") == 0 || (fingerprint != NULL &&
strcasecmp(p, fingerprint) == 0))
ret = 1;
- free(p);
+ free(cp);
if (ret != -1)
return ret;
}
}
static int
check_host_cert(const char *host, const struct sshkey *key)
{
const char *reason;
int r;
if (sshkey_cert_check_authority(key, 1, 0, host, &reason) != 0) {
error("%s", reason);
return 0;
}
if (sshbuf_len(key->cert->critical) != 0) {
error("Certificate for %s contains unsupported "
"critical options(s)", host);
return 0;
}
if ((r = sshkey_check_cert_sigtype(key,
options.ca_sign_algorithms)) != 0) {
logit("%s: certificate signature algorithm %s: %s", __func__,
(key->cert == NULL || key->cert->signature_type == NULL) ?
"(null)" : key->cert->signature_type, ssh_err(r));
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
static int
sockaddr_is_local(struct sockaddr *hostaddr)
{
switch (hostaddr->sa_family) {
case AF_INET:
return (ntohl(((struct sockaddr_in *)hostaddr)->
sin_addr.s_addr) >> 24) == IN_LOOPBACKNET;
case AF_INET6:
return IN6_IS_ADDR_LOOPBACK(
&(((struct sockaddr_in6 *)hostaddr)->sin6_addr));
default:
return 0;
}
}
/*
* Prepare the hostname and ip address strings that are used to lookup
* host keys in known_hosts files. These may have a port number appended.
*/
void
get_hostfile_hostname_ipaddr(char *hostname, struct sockaddr *hostaddr,
u_short port, char **hostfile_hostname, char **hostfile_ipaddr)
{
char ntop[NI_MAXHOST];
socklen_t addrlen;
switch (hostaddr == NULL ? -1 : hostaddr->sa_family) {
case -1:
addrlen = 0;
break;
case AF_INET:
addrlen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in);
break;
case AF_INET6:
addrlen = sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6);
break;
default:
addrlen = sizeof(struct sockaddr);
break;
}
/*
* We don't have the remote ip-address for connections
* using a proxy command
*/
if (hostfile_ipaddr != NULL) {
if (options.proxy_command == NULL) {
if (getnameinfo(hostaddr, addrlen,
ntop, sizeof(ntop), NULL, 0, NI_NUMERICHOST) != 0)
fatal("%s: getnameinfo failed", __func__);
*hostfile_ipaddr = put_host_port(ntop, port);
} else {
*hostfile_ipaddr = xstrdup("<no hostip for proxy "
"command>");
}
}
/*
* Allow the user to record the key under a different name or
* differentiate a non-standard port. This is useful for ssh
* tunneling over forwarded connections or if you run multiple
* sshd's on different ports on the same machine.
*/
if (hostfile_hostname != NULL) {
if (options.host_key_alias != NULL) {
*hostfile_hostname = xstrdup(options.host_key_alias);
debug("using hostkeyalias: %s", *hostfile_hostname);
} else {
*hostfile_hostname = put_host_port(hostname, port);
}
}
}
/*
* check whether the supplied host key is valid, return -1 if the key
* is not valid. user_hostfile[0] will not be updated if 'readonly' is true.
*/
#define RDRW 0
#define RDONLY 1
#define ROQUIET 2
static int
check_host_key(char *hostname, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port,
struct sshkey *host_key, int readonly,
char **user_hostfiles, u_int num_user_hostfiles,
char **system_hostfiles, u_int num_system_hostfiles)
{
HostStatus host_status;
HostStatus ip_status;
struct sshkey *raw_key = NULL;
char *ip = NULL, *host = NULL;
char hostline[1000], *hostp, *fp, *ra;
char msg[1024];
const char *type;
const struct hostkey_entry *host_found, *ip_found;
int len, cancelled_forwarding = 0, confirmed;
int local = sockaddr_is_local(hostaddr);
int r, want_cert = sshkey_is_cert(host_key), host_ip_differ = 0;
int hostkey_trusted = 0; /* Known or explicitly accepted by user */
struct hostkeys *host_hostkeys, *ip_hostkeys;
u_int i;
/*
* Force accepting of the host key for loopback/localhost. The
* problem is that if the home directory is NFS-mounted to multiple
* machines, localhost will refer to a different machine in each of
* them, and the user will get bogus HOST_CHANGED warnings. This
* essentially disables host authentication for localhost; however,
* this is probably not a real problem.
*/
if (options.no_host_authentication_for_localhost == 1 && local &&
options.host_key_alias == NULL) {
debug("Forcing accepting of host key for "
"loopback/localhost.");
return 0;
}
/*
* Prepare the hostname and address strings used for hostkey lookup.
* In some cases, these will have a port number appended.
*/
get_hostfile_hostname_ipaddr(hostname, hostaddr, port, &host, &ip);
/*
* Turn off check_host_ip if the connection is to localhost, via proxy
* command or if we don't have a hostname to compare with
*/
if (options.check_host_ip && (local ||
strcmp(hostname, ip) == 0 || options.proxy_command != NULL))
options.check_host_ip = 0;
host_hostkeys = init_hostkeys();
for (i = 0; i < num_user_hostfiles; i++)
load_hostkeys(host_hostkeys, host, user_hostfiles[i]);
for (i = 0; i < num_system_hostfiles; i++)
load_hostkeys(host_hostkeys, host, system_hostfiles[i]);
ip_hostkeys = NULL;
if (!want_cert && options.check_host_ip) {
ip_hostkeys = init_hostkeys();
for (i = 0; i < num_user_hostfiles; i++)
load_hostkeys(ip_hostkeys, ip, user_hostfiles[i]);
for (i = 0; i < num_system_hostfiles; i++)
load_hostkeys(ip_hostkeys, ip, system_hostfiles[i]);
}
retry:
/* Reload these as they may have changed on cert->key downgrade */
want_cert = sshkey_is_cert(host_key);
type = sshkey_type(host_key);
/*
* Check if the host key is present in the user's list of known
* hosts or in the systemwide list.
*/
host_status = check_key_in_hostkeys(host_hostkeys, host_key,
&host_found);
/*
* Also perform check for the ip address, skip the check if we are
* localhost, looking for a certificate, or the hostname was an ip
* address to begin with.
*/
if (!want_cert && ip_hostkeys != NULL) {
ip_status = check_key_in_hostkeys(ip_hostkeys, host_key,
&ip_found);
if (host_status == HOST_CHANGED &&
(ip_status != HOST_CHANGED ||
(ip_found != NULL &&
!sshkey_equal(ip_found->key, host_found->key))))
host_ip_differ = 1;
} else
ip_status = host_status;
switch (host_status) {
case HOST_OK:
/* The host is known and the key matches. */
debug("Host '%.200s' is known and matches the %s host %s.",
host, type, want_cert ? "certificate" : "key");
debug("Found %s in %s:%lu", want_cert ? "CA key" : "key",
host_found->file, host_found->line);
if (want_cert &&
!check_host_cert(options.host_key_alias == NULL ?
hostname : options.host_key_alias, host_key))
goto fail;
if (options.check_host_ip && ip_status == HOST_NEW) {
if (readonly || want_cert)
logit("%s host key for IP address "
"'%.128s' not in list of known hosts.",
type, ip);
else if (!add_host_to_hostfile(user_hostfiles[0], ip,
host_key, options.hash_known_hosts))
logit("Failed to add the %s host key for IP "
"address '%.128s' to the list of known "
"hosts (%.500s).", type, ip,
user_hostfiles[0]);
else
logit("Warning: Permanently added the %s host "
"key for IP address '%.128s' to the list "
"of known hosts.", type, ip);
} else if (options.visual_host_key) {
fp = sshkey_fingerprint(host_key,
options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT);
ra = sshkey_fingerprint(host_key,
options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
if (fp == NULL || ra == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshkey_fingerprint fail", __func__);
logit("Host key fingerprint is %s\n%s", fp, ra);
free(ra);
free(fp);
}
hostkey_trusted = 1;
break;
case HOST_NEW:
if (options.host_key_alias == NULL && port != 0 &&
port != SSH_DEFAULT_PORT) {
debug("checking without port identifier");
if (check_host_key(hostname, hostaddr, 0, host_key,
ROQUIET, user_hostfiles, num_user_hostfiles,
system_hostfiles, num_system_hostfiles) == 0) {
debug("found matching key w/out port");
break;
}
}
if (readonly || want_cert)
goto fail;
/* The host is new. */
if (options.strict_host_key_checking ==
SSH_STRICT_HOSTKEY_YES) {
/*
* User has requested strict host key checking. We
* will not add the host key automatically. The only
* alternative left is to abort.
*/
error("No %s host key is known for %.200s and you "
"have requested strict checking.", type, host);
goto fail;
} else if (options.strict_host_key_checking ==
SSH_STRICT_HOSTKEY_ASK) {
char msg1[1024], msg2[1024];
if (show_other_keys(host_hostkeys, host_key))
snprintf(msg1, sizeof(msg1),
"\nbut keys of different type are already"
" known for this host.");
else
snprintf(msg1, sizeof(msg1), ".");
/* The default */
fp = sshkey_fingerprint(host_key,
options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT);
ra = sshkey_fingerprint(host_key,
options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
if (fp == NULL || ra == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshkey_fingerprint fail", __func__);
msg2[0] = '\0';
if (options.verify_host_key_dns) {
if (matching_host_key_dns)
snprintf(msg2, sizeof(msg2),
"Matching host key fingerprint"
" found in DNS.\n");
else
snprintf(msg2, sizeof(msg2),
"No matching host key fingerprint"
" found in DNS.\n");
}
snprintf(msg, sizeof(msg),
"The authenticity of host '%.200s (%s)' can't be "
"established%s\n"
"%s key fingerprint is %s.%s%s\n%s"
"Are you sure you want to continue connecting "
"(yes/no/[fingerprint])? ",
host, ip, msg1, type, fp,
options.visual_host_key ? "\n" : "",
options.visual_host_key ? ra : "",
msg2);
free(ra);
confirmed = confirm(msg, fp);
free(fp);
if (!confirmed)
goto fail;
hostkey_trusted = 1; /* user explicitly confirmed */
}
/*
* If in "new" or "off" strict mode, add the key automatically
* to the local known_hosts file.
*/
if (options.check_host_ip && ip_status == HOST_NEW) {
snprintf(hostline, sizeof(hostline), "%s,%s", host, ip);
hostp = hostline;
if (options.hash_known_hosts) {
/* Add hash of host and IP separately */
r = add_host_to_hostfile(user_hostfiles[0],
host, host_key, options.hash_known_hosts) &&
add_host_to_hostfile(user_hostfiles[0], ip,
host_key, options.hash_known_hosts);
} else {
/* Add unhashed "host,ip" */
r = add_host_to_hostfile(user_hostfiles[0],
hostline, host_key,
options.hash_known_hosts);
}
} else {
r = add_host_to_hostfile(user_hostfiles[0], host,
host_key, options.hash_known_hosts);
hostp = host;
}
if (!r)
logit("Failed to add the host to the list of known "
"hosts (%.500s).", user_hostfiles[0]);
else
logit("Warning: Permanently added '%.200s' (%s) to the "
"list of known hosts.", hostp, type);
break;
case HOST_REVOKED:
error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@");
error("@ WARNING: REVOKED HOST KEY DETECTED! @");
error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@");
error("The %s host key for %s is marked as revoked.", type, host);
error("This could mean that a stolen key is being used to");
error("impersonate this host.");
/*
* If strict host key checking is in use, the user will have
* to edit the key manually and we can only abort.
*/
if (options.strict_host_key_checking !=
SSH_STRICT_HOSTKEY_OFF) {
error("%s host key for %.200s was revoked and you have "
"requested strict checking.", type, host);
goto fail;
}
goto continue_unsafe;
case HOST_CHANGED:
if (want_cert) {
/*
* This is only a debug() since it is valid to have
* CAs with wildcard DNS matches that don't match
* all hosts that one might visit.
*/
debug("Host certificate authority does not "
"match %s in %s:%lu", CA_MARKER,
host_found->file, host_found->line);
goto fail;
}
if (readonly == ROQUIET)
goto fail;
if (options.check_host_ip && host_ip_differ) {
char *key_msg;
if (ip_status == HOST_NEW)
key_msg = "is unknown";
else if (ip_status == HOST_OK)
key_msg = "is unchanged";
else
key_msg = "has a different value";
error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@");
error("@ WARNING: POSSIBLE DNS SPOOFING DETECTED! @");
error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@");
error("The %s host key for %s has changed,", type, host);
error("and the key for the corresponding IP address %s", ip);
error("%s. This could either mean that", key_msg);
error("DNS SPOOFING is happening or the IP address for the host");
error("and its host key have changed at the same time.");
if (ip_status != HOST_NEW)
error("Offending key for IP in %s:%lu",
ip_found->file, ip_found->line);
}
/* The host key has changed. */
warn_changed_key(host_key);
error("Add correct host key in %.100s to get rid of this message.",
user_hostfiles[0]);
error("Offending %s key in %s:%lu",
sshkey_type(host_found->key),
host_found->file, host_found->line);
/*
* If strict host key checking is in use, the user will have
* to edit the key manually and we can only abort.
*/
if (options.strict_host_key_checking !=
SSH_STRICT_HOSTKEY_OFF) {
error("%s host key for %.200s has changed and you have "
"requested strict checking.", type, host);
goto fail;
}
continue_unsafe:
/*
* If strict host key checking has not been requested, allow
* the connection but without MITM-able authentication or
* forwarding.
*/
if (options.password_authentication) {
error("Password authentication is disabled to avoid "
"man-in-the-middle attacks.");
options.password_authentication = 0;
cancelled_forwarding = 1;
}
if (options.kbd_interactive_authentication) {
error("Keyboard-interactive authentication is disabled"
" to avoid man-in-the-middle attacks.");
options.kbd_interactive_authentication = 0;
options.challenge_response_authentication = 0;
cancelled_forwarding = 1;
}
if (options.challenge_response_authentication) {
error("Challenge/response authentication is disabled"
" to avoid man-in-the-middle attacks.");
options.challenge_response_authentication = 0;
cancelled_forwarding = 1;
}
if (options.forward_agent) {
error("Agent forwarding is disabled to avoid "
"man-in-the-middle attacks.");
options.forward_agent = 0;
cancelled_forwarding = 1;
}
if (options.forward_x11) {
error("X11 forwarding is disabled to avoid "
"man-in-the-middle attacks.");
options.forward_x11 = 0;
cancelled_forwarding = 1;
}
if (options.num_local_forwards > 0 ||
options.num_remote_forwards > 0) {
error("Port forwarding is disabled to avoid "
"man-in-the-middle attacks.");
options.num_local_forwards =
options.num_remote_forwards = 0;
cancelled_forwarding = 1;
}
if (options.tun_open != SSH_TUNMODE_NO) {
error("Tunnel forwarding is disabled to avoid "
"man-in-the-middle attacks.");
options.tun_open = SSH_TUNMODE_NO;
cancelled_forwarding = 1;
}
if (options.exit_on_forward_failure && cancelled_forwarding)
fatal("Error: forwarding disabled due to host key "
"check failure");
/*
* XXX Should permit the user to change to use the new id.
* This could be done by converting the host key to an
* identifying sentence, tell that the host identifies itself
* by that sentence, and ask the user if he/she wishes to
* accept the authentication.
*/
break;
case HOST_FOUND:
fatal("internal error");
break;
}
if (options.check_host_ip && host_status != HOST_CHANGED &&
ip_status == HOST_CHANGED) {
snprintf(msg, sizeof(msg),
"Warning: the %s host key for '%.200s' "
"differs from the key for the IP address '%.128s'"
"\nOffending key for IP in %s:%lu",
type, host, ip, ip_found->file, ip_found->line);
if (host_status == HOST_OK) {
len = strlen(msg);
snprintf(msg + len, sizeof(msg) - len,
"\nMatching host key in %s:%lu",
host_found->file, host_found->line);
}
if (options.strict_host_key_checking ==
SSH_STRICT_HOSTKEY_ASK) {
strlcat(msg, "\nAre you sure you want "
"to continue connecting (yes/no)? ", sizeof(msg));
if (!confirm(msg, NULL))
goto fail;
} else if (options.strict_host_key_checking !=
SSH_STRICT_HOSTKEY_OFF) {
logit("%s", msg);
error("Exiting, you have requested strict checking.");
goto fail;
} else {
logit("%s", msg);
}
}
if (!hostkey_trusted && options.update_hostkeys) {
debug("%s: hostkey not known or explicitly trusted: "
"disabling UpdateHostkeys", __func__);
options.update_hostkeys = 0;
}
free(ip);
free(host);
if (host_hostkeys != NULL)
free_hostkeys(host_hostkeys);
if (ip_hostkeys != NULL)
free_hostkeys(ip_hostkeys);
return 0;
fail:
if (want_cert && host_status != HOST_REVOKED) {
/*
* No matching certificate. Downgrade cert to raw key and
* search normally.
*/
debug("No matching CA found. Retry with plain key");
if ((r = sshkey_from_private(host_key, &raw_key)) != 0)
fatal("%s: sshkey_from_private: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
if ((r = sshkey_drop_cert(raw_key)) != 0)
fatal("Couldn't drop certificate: %s", ssh_err(r));
host_key = raw_key;
goto retry;
}
sshkey_free(raw_key);
free(ip);
free(host);
if (host_hostkeys != NULL)
free_hostkeys(host_hostkeys);
if (ip_hostkeys != NULL)
free_hostkeys(ip_hostkeys);
return -1;
}
/* returns 0 if key verifies or -1 if key does NOT verify */
int
verify_host_key(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, struct sshkey *host_key)
{
u_int i;
int r = -1, flags = 0;
char valid[64], *fp = NULL, *cafp = NULL;
struct sshkey *plain = NULL;
if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(host_key,
options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) {
error("%s: fingerprint host key: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
r = -1;
goto out;
}
if (sshkey_is_cert(host_key)) {
if ((cafp = sshkey_fingerprint(host_key->cert->signature_key,
options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) {
error("%s: fingerprint CA key: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
r = -1;
goto out;
}
sshkey_format_cert_validity(host_key->cert,
valid, sizeof(valid));
debug("Server host certificate: %s %s, serial %llu "
"ID \"%s\" CA %s %s valid %s",
sshkey_ssh_name(host_key), fp,
(unsigned long long)host_key->cert->serial,
host_key->cert->key_id,
sshkey_ssh_name(host_key->cert->signature_key), cafp,
valid);
for (i = 0; i < host_key->cert->nprincipals; i++) {
debug2("Server host certificate hostname: %s",
host_key->cert->principals[i]);
}
} else {
debug("Server host key: %s %s", sshkey_ssh_name(host_key), fp);
}
if (sshkey_equal(previous_host_key, host_key)) {
debug2("%s: server host key %s %s matches cached key",
__func__, sshkey_type(host_key), fp);
r = 0;
goto out;
}
/* Check in RevokedHostKeys file if specified */
if (options.revoked_host_keys != NULL) {
r = sshkey_check_revoked(host_key, options.revoked_host_keys);
switch (r) {
case 0:
break; /* not revoked */
case SSH_ERR_KEY_REVOKED:
error("Host key %s %s revoked by file %s",
sshkey_type(host_key), fp,
options.revoked_host_keys);
r = -1;
goto out;
default:
error("Error checking host key %s %s in "
"revoked keys file %s: %s", sshkey_type(host_key),
fp, options.revoked_host_keys, ssh_err(r));
r = -1;
goto out;
}
}
if (options.verify_host_key_dns) {
/*
* XXX certs are not yet supported for DNS, so downgrade
* them and try the plain key.
*/
if ((r = sshkey_from_private(host_key, &plain)) != 0)
goto out;
if (sshkey_is_cert(plain))
sshkey_drop_cert(plain);
if (verify_host_key_dns(host, hostaddr, plain, &flags) == 0) {
if (flags & DNS_VERIFY_FOUND) {
if (options.verify_host_key_dns == 1 &&
flags & DNS_VERIFY_MATCH &&
flags & DNS_VERIFY_SECURE) {
r = 0;
goto out;
}
if (flags & DNS_VERIFY_MATCH) {
matching_host_key_dns = 1;
} else {
warn_changed_key(plain);
error("Update the SSHFP RR in DNS "
"with the new host key to get rid "
"of this message.");
}
}
}
}
r = check_host_key(host, hostaddr, options.port, host_key, RDRW,
options.user_hostfiles, options.num_user_hostfiles,
options.system_hostfiles, options.num_system_hostfiles);
out:
sshkey_free(plain);
free(fp);
free(cafp);
if (r == 0 && host_key != NULL) {
sshkey_free(previous_host_key);
r = sshkey_from_private(host_key, &previous_host_key);
}
return r;
}
/*
* Starts a dialog with the server, and authenticates the current user on the
* server. This does not need any extra privileges. The basic connection
* to the server must already have been established before this is called.
* If login fails, this function prints an error and never returns.
* This function does not require super-user privileges.
*/
void
ssh_login(struct ssh *ssh, Sensitive *sensitive, const char *orighost,
struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port, struct passwd *pw, int timeout_ms)
{
char *host;
char *server_user, *local_user;
local_user = xstrdup(pw->pw_name);
server_user = options.user ? options.user : local_user;
/* Convert the user-supplied hostname into all lowercase. */
host = xstrdup(orighost);
lowercase(host);
/* Exchange protocol version identification strings with the server. */
if (kex_exchange_identification(ssh, timeout_ms, NULL) != 0)
cleanup_exit(255); /* error already logged */
/* Put the connection into non-blocking mode. */
ssh_packet_set_nonblocking(ssh);
/* key exchange */
/* authenticate user */
debug("Authenticating to %s:%d as '%s'", host, port, server_user);
ssh_kex2(ssh, host, hostaddr, port);
ssh_userauth2(ssh, local_user, server_user, host, sensitive);
free(local_user);
free(host);
}
/* print all known host keys for a given host, but skip keys of given type */
static int
show_other_keys(struct hostkeys *hostkeys, struct sshkey *key)
{
int type[] = {
KEY_RSA,
KEY_DSA,
KEY_ECDSA,
KEY_ED25519,
KEY_XMSS,
-1
};
int i, ret = 0;
char *fp, *ra;
const struct hostkey_entry *found;
for (i = 0; type[i] != -1; i++) {
if (type[i] == key->type)
continue;
if (!lookup_key_in_hostkeys_by_type(hostkeys, type[i], &found))
continue;
fp = sshkey_fingerprint(found->key,
options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT);
ra = sshkey_fingerprint(found->key,
options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_RANDOMART);
if (fp == NULL || ra == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshkey_fingerprint fail", __func__);
logit("WARNING: %s key found for host %s\n"
"in %s:%lu\n"
"%s key fingerprint %s.",
sshkey_type(found->key),
found->host, found->file, found->line,
sshkey_type(found->key), fp);
if (options.visual_host_key)
logit("%s", ra);
free(ra);
free(fp);
ret = 1;
}
return ret;
}
static void
warn_changed_key(struct sshkey *host_key)
{
char *fp;
fp = sshkey_fingerprint(host_key, options.fingerprint_hash,
SSH_FP_DEFAULT);
if (fp == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshkey_fingerprint fail", __func__);
error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@");
error("@ WARNING: REMOTE HOST IDENTIFICATION HAS CHANGED! @");
error("@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@");
error("IT IS POSSIBLE THAT SOMEONE IS DOING SOMETHING NASTY!");
error("Someone could be eavesdropping on you right now (man-in-the-middle attack)!");
error("It is also possible that a host key has just been changed.");
error("The fingerprint for the %s key sent by the remote host is\n%s.",
sshkey_type(host_key), fp);
error("Please contact your system administrator.");
free(fp);
}
/*
* Execute a local command
*/
int
ssh_local_cmd(const char *args)
{
char *shell;
pid_t pid;
int status;
void (*osighand)(int);
if (!options.permit_local_command ||
args == NULL || !*args)
return (1);
if ((shell = getenv("SHELL")) == NULL || *shell == '\0')
shell = _PATH_BSHELL;
- osighand = signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL);
+ osighand = ssh_signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL);
pid = fork();
if (pid == 0) {
- signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_DFL);
+ ssh_signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_DFL);
debug3("Executing %s -c \"%s\"", shell, args);
execl(shell, shell, "-c", args, (char *)NULL);
error("Couldn't execute %s -c \"%s\": %s",
shell, args, strerror(errno));
_exit(1);
} else if (pid == -1)
fatal("fork failed: %.100s", strerror(errno));
while (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) == -1)
if (errno != EINTR)
fatal("Couldn't wait for child: %s", strerror(errno));
- signal(SIGCHLD, osighand);
+ ssh_signal(SIGCHLD, osighand);
if (!WIFEXITED(status))
return (1);
return (WEXITSTATUS(status));
}
void
-maybe_add_key_to_agent(char *authfile, struct sshkey *private,
- char *comment, char *passphrase)
+maybe_add_key_to_agent(const char *authfile, struct sshkey *private,
+ const char *comment, const char *passphrase)
{
int auth_sock = -1, r;
+ const char *skprovider = NULL;
if (options.add_keys_to_agent == 0)
return;
if ((r = ssh_get_authentication_socket(&auth_sock)) != 0) {
debug3("no authentication agent, not adding key");
return;
}
if (options.add_keys_to_agent == 2 &&
!ask_permission("Add key %s (%s) to agent?", authfile, comment)) {
debug3("user denied adding this key");
close(auth_sock);
return;
}
-
- if ((r = ssh_add_identity_constrained(auth_sock, private, comment, 0,
- (options.add_keys_to_agent == 3), 0)) == 0)
+ if (sshkey_is_sk(private))
+ skprovider = options.sk_provider;
+ if ((r = ssh_add_identity_constrained(auth_sock, private,
+ comment == NULL ? authfile : comment, 0,
+ (options.add_keys_to_agent == 3), 0, skprovider)) == 0)
debug("identity added to agent: %s", authfile);
else
debug("could not add identity to agent: %s (%d)", authfile, r);
close(auth_sock);
}
diff --git a/sshconnect.h b/sshconnect.h
index 2e84b8bc523c..7c091e2b1bf8 100644
--- a/sshconnect.h
+++ b/sshconnect.h
@@ -1,56 +1,57 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect.h,v 1.39 2019/09/13 04:27:35 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect.h,v 1.40 2020/01/25 07:17:18 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
typedef struct Sensitive Sensitive;
struct Sensitive {
struct sshkey **keys;
int nkeys;
};
struct addrinfo;
struct ssh;
int ssh_connect(struct ssh *, const char *, const char *,
struct addrinfo *, struct sockaddr_storage *, u_short,
int, int, int *, int);
void ssh_kill_proxy_command(void);
void ssh_login(struct ssh *, Sensitive *, const char *,
struct sockaddr *, u_short, struct passwd *, int);
int verify_host_key(char *, struct sockaddr *, struct sshkey *);
void get_hostfile_hostname_ipaddr(char *, struct sockaddr *, u_short,
char **, char **);
void ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *, struct sockaddr *, u_short);
void ssh_userauth2(struct ssh *ssh, const char *, const char *,
char *, Sensitive *);
int ssh_local_cmd(const char *);
-void maybe_add_key_to_agent(char *, struct sshkey *, char *, char *);
+void maybe_add_key_to_agent(const char *, struct sshkey *,
+ const char *, const char *);
diff --git a/sshconnect2.c b/sshconnect2.c
index 87fa70a40cf2..af00fb30c39b 100644
--- a/sshconnect2.c
+++ b/sshconnect2.c
@@ -1,2185 +1,2261 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect2.c,v 1.308 2019/08/05 11:50:33 dtucker Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: sshconnect2.c,v 1.320 2020/02/06 22:48:23 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (c) 2008 Damien Miller. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#include <sys/wait.h>
#include <sys/stat.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <netdb.h>
#include <pwd.h>
#include <signal.h>
-#include <stdarg.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#if defined(HAVE_STRNVIS) && defined(HAVE_VIS_H) && !defined(BROKEN_STRNVIS)
#include <vis.h>
#endif
#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "ssh.h"
#include "ssh2.h"
#include "sshbuf.h"
#include "packet.h"
#include "compat.h"
#include "cipher.h"
#include "sshkey.h"
#include "kex.h"
#include "myproposal.h"
#include "sshconnect.h"
#include "authfile.h"
#include "dh.h"
#include "authfd.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "readconf.h"
#include "match.h"
#include "dispatch.h"
#include "canohost.h"
#include "msg.h"
#include "pathnames.h"
#include "uidswap.h"
#include "hostfile.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
#include "utf8.h"
+#include "ssh-sk.h"
+#include "sk-api.h"
#ifdef GSSAPI
#include "ssh-gss.h"
#endif
/* import */
extern char *client_version_string;
extern char *server_version_string;
extern Options options;
/*
* SSH2 key exchange
*/
u_char *session_id2 = NULL;
u_int session_id2_len = 0;
char *xxx_host;
struct sockaddr *xxx_hostaddr;
static int
verify_host_key_callback(struct sshkey *hostkey, struct ssh *ssh)
{
if (verify_host_key(xxx_host, xxx_hostaddr, hostkey) == -1)
fatal("Host key verification failed.");
return 0;
}
static char *
order_hostkeyalgs(char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port)
{
char *oavail, *avail, *first, *last, *alg, *hostname, *ret;
size_t maxlen;
struct hostkeys *hostkeys;
int ktype;
u_int i;
/* Find all hostkeys for this hostname */
get_hostfile_hostname_ipaddr(host, hostaddr, port, &hostname, NULL);
hostkeys = init_hostkeys();
for (i = 0; i < options.num_user_hostfiles; i++)
load_hostkeys(hostkeys, hostname, options.user_hostfiles[i]);
for (i = 0; i < options.num_system_hostfiles; i++)
load_hostkeys(hostkeys, hostname, options.system_hostfiles[i]);
- oavail = avail = xstrdup(KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG);
+ oavail = avail = xstrdup(options.hostkeyalgorithms);
maxlen = strlen(avail) + 1;
first = xmalloc(maxlen);
last = xmalloc(maxlen);
*first = *last = '\0';
#define ALG_APPEND(to, from) \
do { \
if (*to != '\0') \
strlcat(to, ",", maxlen); \
strlcat(to, from, maxlen); \
} while (0)
while ((alg = strsep(&avail, ",")) && *alg != '\0') {
if ((ktype = sshkey_type_from_name(alg)) == KEY_UNSPEC)
fatal("%s: unknown alg %s", __func__, alg);
if (lookup_key_in_hostkeys_by_type(hostkeys,
sshkey_type_plain(ktype), NULL))
ALG_APPEND(first, alg);
else
ALG_APPEND(last, alg);
}
#undef ALG_APPEND
xasprintf(&ret, "%s%s%s", first,
(*first == '\0' || *last == '\0') ? "" : ",", last);
if (*first != '\0')
debug3("%s: prefer hostkeyalgs: %s", __func__, first);
free(first);
free(last);
free(hostname);
free(oavail);
free_hostkeys(hostkeys);
return ret;
}
void
ssh_kex2(struct ssh *ssh, char *host, struct sockaddr *hostaddr, u_short port)
{
char *myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAX] = { KEX_CLIENT };
char *s, *all_key;
- int r;
+ int r, use_known_hosts_order = 0;
xxx_host = host;
xxx_hostaddr = hostaddr;
+ /*
+ * If the user has not specified HostkeyAlgorithms, or has only
+ * appended or removed algorithms from that list then prefer algorithms
+ * that are in the list that are supported by known_hosts keys.
+ */
+ if (options.hostkeyalgorithms == NULL ||
+ options.hostkeyalgorithms[0] == '-' ||
+ options.hostkeyalgorithms[0] == '+')
+ use_known_hosts_order = 1;
+
+ /* Expand or fill in HostkeyAlgorithms */
+ all_key = sshkey_alg_list(0, 0, 1, ',');
+ if (kex_assemble_names(&options.hostkeyalgorithms,
+ kex_default_pk_alg(), all_key) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: kex_assemble_namelist", __func__);
+ free(all_key);
+
if ((s = kex_names_cat(options.kex_algorithms, "ext-info-c")) == NULL)
fatal("%s: kex_names_cat", __func__);
myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = compat_kex_proposal(s);
myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] =
compat_cipher_proposal(options.ciphers);
myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC] =
compat_cipher_proposal(options.ciphers);
myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_CTOS] =
- myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_STOC] = options.compression ?
- "zlib@openssh.com,zlib,none" : "none,zlib@openssh.com,zlib";
+ myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_STOC] =
+ (char *)compression_alg_list(options.compression);
myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_CTOS] =
myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_STOC] = options.macs;
- if (options.hostkeyalgorithms != NULL) {
- all_key = sshkey_alg_list(0, 0, 1, ',');
- if (kex_assemble_names(&options.hostkeyalgorithms,
- KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG, all_key) != 0)
- fatal("%s: kex_assemble_namelist", __func__);
- free(all_key);
- myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] =
- compat_pkalg_proposal(options.hostkeyalgorithms);
- } else {
- /* Enforce default */
- options.hostkeyalgorithms = xstrdup(KEX_DEFAULT_PK_ALG);
- /* Prefer algorithms that we already have keys for */
+ if (use_known_hosts_order) {
+ /* Query known_hosts and prefer algorithms that appear there */
myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] =
compat_pkalg_proposal(
order_hostkeyalgs(host, hostaddr, port));
+ } else {
+ /* Use specified HostkeyAlgorithms exactly */
+ myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] =
+ compat_pkalg_proposal(options.hostkeyalgorithms);
}
if (options.rekey_limit || options.rekey_interval)
ssh_packet_set_rekey_limits(ssh, options.rekey_limit,
options.rekey_interval);
/* start key exchange */
if ((r = kex_setup(ssh, myproposal)) != 0)
fatal("kex_setup: %s", ssh_err(r));
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1] = kex_gen_client;
ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1] = kex_gen_client;
ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA256] = kex_gen_client;
ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP16_SHA512] = kex_gen_client;
ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP18_SHA512] = kex_gen_client;
ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_client;
ssh->kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_client;
# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
ssh->kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kex_gen_client;
# endif
#endif
ssh->kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kex_gen_client;
ssh->kex->kex[KEX_KEM_SNTRUP4591761X25519_SHA512] = kex_gen_client;
ssh->kex->verify_host_key=&verify_host_key_callback;
ssh_dispatch_run_fatal(ssh, DISPATCH_BLOCK, &ssh->kex->done);
/* remove ext-info from the KEX proposals for rekeying */
myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] =
compat_kex_proposal(options.kex_algorithms);
if ((r = kex_prop2buf(ssh->kex->my, myproposal)) != 0)
fatal("kex_prop2buf: %s", ssh_err(r));
session_id2 = ssh->kex->session_id;
session_id2_len = ssh->kex->session_id_len;
#ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH
/* send 1st encrypted/maced/compressed message */
if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_IGNORE)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "markus")) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0 ||
(r = ssh_packet_write_wait(ssh)) != 0)
fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
#endif
}
/*
* Authenticate user
*/
typedef struct cauthctxt Authctxt;
typedef struct cauthmethod Authmethod;
typedef struct identity Identity;
typedef struct idlist Idlist;
struct identity {
TAILQ_ENTRY(identity) next;
int agent_fd; /* >=0 if agent supports key */
struct sshkey *key; /* public/private key */
char *filename; /* comment for agent-only keys */
int tried;
int isprivate; /* key points to the private key */
int userprovided;
};
TAILQ_HEAD(idlist, identity);
struct cauthctxt {
const char *server_user;
const char *local_user;
const char *host;
const char *service;
struct cauthmethod *method;
sig_atomic_t success;
char *authlist;
#ifdef GSSAPI
/* gssapi */
gss_OID_set gss_supported_mechs;
u_int mech_tried;
#endif
/* pubkey */
struct idlist keys;
int agent_fd;
/* hostbased */
Sensitive *sensitive;
char *oktypes, *ktypes;
const char *active_ktype;
/* kbd-interactive */
int info_req_seen;
int attempt_kbdint;
/* password */
int attempt_passwd;
/* generic */
void *methoddata;
};
struct cauthmethod {
char *name; /* string to compare against server's list */
int (*userauth)(struct ssh *ssh);
void (*cleanup)(struct ssh *ssh);
int *enabled; /* flag in option struct that enables method */
int *batch_flag; /* flag in option struct that disables method */
};
static int input_userauth_service_accept(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
static int input_userauth_ext_info(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
static int input_userauth_success(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
static int input_userauth_failure(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
static int input_userauth_banner(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
static int input_userauth_error(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
static int input_userauth_info_req(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
static int input_userauth_pk_ok(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
static int input_userauth_passwd_changereq(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
static int userauth_none(struct ssh *);
static int userauth_pubkey(struct ssh *);
static int userauth_passwd(struct ssh *);
static int userauth_kbdint(struct ssh *);
static int userauth_hostbased(struct ssh *);
#ifdef GSSAPI
static int userauth_gssapi(struct ssh *);
static void userauth_gssapi_cleanup(struct ssh *);
static int input_gssapi_response(int type, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
static int input_gssapi_token(int type, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
static int input_gssapi_error(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
static int input_gssapi_errtok(int, u_int32_t, struct ssh *);
#endif
void userauth(struct ssh *, char *);
static void pubkey_cleanup(struct ssh *);
static int sign_and_send_pubkey(struct ssh *ssh, Identity *);
static void pubkey_prepare(Authctxt *);
static void pubkey_reset(Authctxt *);
static struct sshkey *load_identity_file(Identity *);
static Authmethod *authmethod_get(char *authlist);
static Authmethod *authmethod_lookup(const char *name);
static char *authmethods_get(void);
Authmethod authmethods[] = {
#ifdef GSSAPI
{"gssapi-with-mic",
userauth_gssapi,
userauth_gssapi_cleanup,
&options.gss_authentication,
NULL},
#endif
{"hostbased",
userauth_hostbased,
NULL,
&options.hostbased_authentication,
NULL},
{"publickey",
userauth_pubkey,
NULL,
&options.pubkey_authentication,
NULL},
{"keyboard-interactive",
userauth_kbdint,
NULL,
&options.kbd_interactive_authentication,
&options.batch_mode},
{"password",
userauth_passwd,
NULL,
&options.password_authentication,
&options.batch_mode},
{"none",
userauth_none,
NULL,
NULL,
NULL},
{NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}
};
void
ssh_userauth2(struct ssh *ssh, const char *local_user,
const char *server_user, char *host, Sensitive *sensitive)
{
Authctxt authctxt;
int r;
if (options.challenge_response_authentication)
options.kbd_interactive_authentication = 1;
if (options.preferred_authentications == NULL)
options.preferred_authentications = authmethods_get();
/* setup authentication context */
memset(&authctxt, 0, sizeof(authctxt));
authctxt.server_user = server_user;
authctxt.local_user = local_user;
authctxt.host = host;
authctxt.service = "ssh-connection"; /* service name */
authctxt.success = 0;
authctxt.method = authmethod_lookup("none");
authctxt.authlist = NULL;
authctxt.methoddata = NULL;
authctxt.sensitive = sensitive;
authctxt.active_ktype = authctxt.oktypes = authctxt.ktypes = NULL;
authctxt.info_req_seen = 0;
authctxt.attempt_kbdint = 0;
authctxt.attempt_passwd = 0;
#if GSSAPI
authctxt.gss_supported_mechs = NULL;
authctxt.mech_tried = 0;
#endif
authctxt.agent_fd = -1;
pubkey_prepare(&authctxt);
if (authctxt.method == NULL) {
fatal("%s: internal error: cannot send userauth none request",
__func__);
}
if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_REQUEST)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "ssh-userauth")) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
ssh->authctxt = &authctxt;
ssh_dispatch_init(ssh, &input_userauth_error);
ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO, &input_userauth_ext_info);
ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_ACCEPT, &input_userauth_service_accept);
ssh_dispatch_run_fatal(ssh, DISPATCH_BLOCK, &authctxt.success); /* loop until success */
pubkey_cleanup(ssh);
ssh->authctxt = NULL;
ssh_dispatch_range(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_MIN, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_MAX, NULL);
if (!authctxt.success)
fatal("Authentication failed.");
debug("Authentication succeeded (%s).", authctxt.method->name);
}
/* ARGSUSED */
static int
input_userauth_service_accept(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
{
int r;
if (ssh_packet_remaining(ssh) > 0) {
char *reply;
if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &reply, NULL)) != 0)
goto out;
debug2("service_accept: %s", reply);
free(reply);
} else {
debug2("buggy server: service_accept w/o service");
}
if ((r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
goto out;
debug("SSH2_MSG_SERVICE_ACCEPT received");
/* initial userauth request */
userauth_none(ssh);
ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_EXT_INFO, &input_userauth_error);
ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_SUCCESS, &input_userauth_success);
ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE, &input_userauth_failure);
ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_BANNER, &input_userauth_banner);
r = 0;
out:
return r;
}
/* ARGSUSED */
static int
input_userauth_ext_info(int type, u_int32_t seqnr, struct ssh *ssh)
{
return kex_input_ext_info(type, seqnr, ssh);
}
void
userauth(struct ssh *ssh, char *authlist)
{
Authctxt *authctxt = (Authctxt *)ssh->authctxt;
if (authctxt->method != NULL && authctxt->method->cleanup != NULL)
authctxt->method->cleanup(ssh);
free(authctxt->methoddata);
authctxt->methoddata = NULL;
if (authlist == NULL) {
authlist = authctxt->authlist;
} else {
free(authctxt->authlist);
authctxt->authlist = authlist;
}
for (;;) {
Authmethod *method = authmethod_get(authlist);
if (method == NULL)
fatal("%s@%s: Permission denied (%s).",
authctxt->server_user, authctxt->host, authlist);
authctxt->method = method;
/* reset the per method handler */
ssh_dispatch_range(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PER_METHOD_MIN,
SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PER_METHOD_MAX, NULL);
/* and try new method */
if (method->userauth(ssh) != 0) {
debug2("we sent a %s packet, wait for reply", method->name);
break;
} else {
debug2("we did not send a packet, disable method");
method->enabled = NULL;
}
}
}
/* ARGSUSED */
static int
input_userauth_error(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
{
fatal("%s: bad message during authentication: type %d", __func__, type);
return 0;
}
/* ARGSUSED */
static int
input_userauth_banner(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
{
char *msg = NULL;
size_t len;
int r;
debug3("%s", __func__);
if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &msg, &len)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, NULL, NULL)) != 0)
goto out;
if (len > 0 && options.log_level >= SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO)
fmprintf(stderr, "%s", msg);
r = 0;
out:
free(msg);
return r;
}
/* ARGSUSED */
static int
input_userauth_success(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
{
Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt;
if (authctxt == NULL)
fatal("%s: no authentication context", __func__);
free(authctxt->authlist);
authctxt->authlist = NULL;
if (authctxt->method != NULL && authctxt->method->cleanup != NULL)
authctxt->method->cleanup(ssh);
free(authctxt->methoddata);
authctxt->methoddata = NULL;
authctxt->success = 1; /* break out */
return 0;
}
#if 0
static int
input_userauth_success_unexpected(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
{
Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt;
if (authctxt == NULL)
fatal("%s: no authentication context", __func__);
fatal("Unexpected authentication success during %s.",
authctxt->method->name);
return 0;
}
#endif
/* ARGSUSED */
static int
input_userauth_failure(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
{
Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt;
char *authlist = NULL;
u_char partial;
if (authctxt == NULL)
fatal("input_userauth_failure: no authentication context");
if (sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &authlist, NULL) != 0 ||
sshpkt_get_u8(ssh, &partial) != 0 ||
sshpkt_get_end(ssh) != 0)
goto out;
if (partial != 0) {
verbose("Authenticated with partial success.");
/* reset state */
pubkey_reset(authctxt);
}
debug("Authentications that can continue: %s", authlist);
userauth(ssh, authlist);
authlist = NULL;
out:
free(authlist);
return 0;
}
/*
* Format an identity for logging including filename, key type, fingerprint
* and location (agent, etc.). Caller must free.
*/
static char *
format_identity(Identity *id)
{
char *fp = NULL, *ret = NULL;
+ const char *note = "";
if (id->key != NULL) {
fp = sshkey_fingerprint(id->key, options.fingerprint_hash,
SSH_FP_DEFAULT);
}
+ if (id->key) {
+ if ((id->key->flags & SSHKEY_FLAG_EXT) != 0)
+ note = " token";
+ else if (sshkey_is_sk(id->key))
+ note = " authenticator";
+ }
xasprintf(&ret, "%s %s%s%s%s%s%s",
id->filename,
id->key ? sshkey_type(id->key) : "", id->key ? " " : "",
fp ? fp : "",
- id->userprovided ? " explicit" : "",
- (id->key && (id->key->flags & SSHKEY_FLAG_EXT)) ? " token" : "",
+ id->userprovided ? " explicit" : "", note,
id->agent_fd != -1 ? " agent" : "");
free(fp);
return ret;
}
/* ARGSUSED */
static int
input_userauth_pk_ok(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
{
Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt;
struct sshkey *key = NULL;
Identity *id = NULL;
int pktype, found = 0, sent = 0;
size_t blen;
char *pkalg = NULL, *fp = NULL, *ident = NULL;
u_char *pkblob = NULL;
int r;
if (authctxt == NULL)
fatal("input_userauth_pk_ok: no authentication context");
if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &pkalg, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &pkblob, &blen)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
goto done;
if ((pktype = sshkey_type_from_name(pkalg)) == KEY_UNSPEC) {
debug("%s: server sent unknown pkalg %s", __func__, pkalg);
goto done;
}
if ((r = sshkey_from_blob(pkblob, blen, &key)) != 0) {
debug("no key from blob. pkalg %s: %s", pkalg, ssh_err(r));
goto done;
}
if (key->type != pktype) {
error("input_userauth_pk_ok: type mismatch "
"for decoded key (received %d, expected %d)",
key->type, pktype);
goto done;
}
/*
* search keys in the reverse order, because last candidate has been
* moved to the end of the queue. this also avoids confusion by
* duplicate keys
*/
TAILQ_FOREACH_REVERSE(id, &authctxt->keys, idlist, next) {
if (sshkey_equal(key, id->key)) {
found = 1;
break;
}
}
if (!found || id == NULL) {
fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, options.fingerprint_hash,
SSH_FP_DEFAULT);
error("%s: server replied with unknown key: %s %s", __func__,
sshkey_type(key), fp == NULL ? "<ERROR>" : fp);
goto done;
}
ident = format_identity(id);
debug("Server accepts key: %s", ident);
sent = sign_and_send_pubkey(ssh, id);
r = 0;
done:
sshkey_free(key);
free(ident);
free(fp);
free(pkalg);
free(pkblob);
/* try another method if we did not send a packet */
if (r == 0 && sent == 0)
userauth(ssh, NULL);
return r;
}
#ifdef GSSAPI
static int
userauth_gssapi(struct ssh *ssh)
{
Authctxt *authctxt = (Authctxt *)ssh->authctxt;
Gssctxt *gssctxt = NULL;
OM_uint32 min;
int r, ok = 0;
gss_OID mech = NULL;
/* Try one GSSAPI method at a time, rather than sending them all at
* once. */
if (authctxt->gss_supported_mechs == NULL)
gss_indicate_mechs(&min, &authctxt->gss_supported_mechs);
/* Check to see whether the mechanism is usable before we offer it */
while (authctxt->mech_tried < authctxt->gss_supported_mechs->count &&
!ok) {
mech = &authctxt->gss_supported_mechs->
elements[authctxt->mech_tried];
/* My DER encoding requires length<128 */
if (mech->length < 128 && ssh_gssapi_check_mechanism(&gssctxt,
mech, authctxt->host)) {
ok = 1; /* Mechanism works */
} else {
authctxt->mech_tried++;
}
}
if (!ok || mech == NULL)
return 0;
authctxt->methoddata=(void *)gssctxt;
if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->server_user)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->service)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->method->name)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, 1)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, (mech->length) + 2)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, SSH_GSS_OIDTYPE)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, mech->length)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put(ssh, mech->elements, mech->length)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_RESPONSE, &input_gssapi_response);
ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN, &input_gssapi_token);
ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_ERROR, &input_gssapi_error);
ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_ERRTOK, &input_gssapi_errtok);
authctxt->mech_tried++; /* Move along to next candidate */
return 1;
}
static void
userauth_gssapi_cleanup(struct ssh *ssh)
{
Authctxt *authctxt = (Authctxt *)ssh->authctxt;
Gssctxt *gssctxt = (Gssctxt *)authctxt->methoddata;
ssh_gssapi_delete_ctx(&gssctxt);
authctxt->methoddata = NULL;
free(authctxt->gss_supported_mechs);
authctxt->gss_supported_mechs = NULL;
}
static OM_uint32
process_gssapi_token(struct ssh *ssh, gss_buffer_t recv_tok)
{
Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt;
Gssctxt *gssctxt = authctxt->methoddata;
gss_buffer_desc send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
gss_buffer_desc mic = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
gss_buffer_desc gssbuf;
OM_uint32 status, ms, flags;
int r;
status = ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(gssctxt, options.gss_deleg_creds,
recv_tok, &send_tok, &flags);
if (send_tok.length > 0) {
u_char type = GSS_ERROR(status) ?
SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_ERRTOK :
SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_TOKEN;
if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, type)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, send_tok.value,
send_tok.length)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
gss_release_buffer(&ms, &send_tok);
}
if (status == GSS_S_COMPLETE) {
/* send either complete or MIC, depending on mechanism */
if (!(flags & GSS_C_INTEG_FLAG)) {
if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh,
SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_EXCHANGE_COMPLETE)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
} else {
struct sshbuf *b;
if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
ssh_gssapi_buildmic(b, authctxt->server_user,
authctxt->service, "gssapi-with-mic");
if ((gssbuf.value = sshbuf_mutable_ptr(b)) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_mutable_ptr failed", __func__);
gssbuf.length = sshbuf_len(b);
status = ssh_gssapi_sign(gssctxt, &gssbuf, &mic);
if (!GSS_ERROR(status)) {
if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh,
SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_GSSAPI_MIC)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, mic.value,
mic.length)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
}
sshbuf_free(b);
gss_release_buffer(&ms, &mic);
}
}
return status;
}
/* ARGSUSED */
static int
input_gssapi_response(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh)
{
Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt;
Gssctxt *gssctxt;
size_t oidlen;
u_char *oidv = NULL;
int r;
if (authctxt == NULL)
fatal("input_gssapi_response: no authentication context");
gssctxt = authctxt->methoddata;
/* Setup our OID */
if ((r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &oidv, &oidlen)) != 0)
goto done;
if (oidlen <= 2 ||
oidv[0] != SSH_GSS_OIDTYPE ||
oidv[1] != oidlen - 2) {
debug("Badly encoded mechanism OID received");
userauth(ssh, NULL);
goto ok;
}
if (!ssh_gssapi_check_oid(gssctxt, oidv + 2, oidlen - 2))
fatal("Server returned different OID than expected");
if ((r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
goto done;
if (GSS_ERROR(process_gssapi_token(ssh, GSS_C_NO_BUFFER))) {
/* Start again with next method on list */
debug("Trying to start again");
userauth(ssh, NULL);
goto ok;
}
ok:
r = 0;
done:
free(oidv);
return r;
}
/* ARGSUSED */
static int
input_gssapi_token(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh)
{
Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt;
gss_buffer_desc recv_tok;
u_char *p = NULL;
size_t len;
OM_uint32 status;
int r;
if (authctxt == NULL)
fatal("input_gssapi_response: no authentication context");
if ((r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &p, &len)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0)
goto out;
recv_tok.value = p;
recv_tok.length = len;
status = process_gssapi_token(ssh, &recv_tok);
/* Start again with the next method in the list */
if (GSS_ERROR(status)) {
userauth(ssh, NULL);
/* ok */
}
r = 0;
out:
free(p);
return r;
}
/* ARGSUSED */
static int
input_gssapi_errtok(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh)
{
Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt;
Gssctxt *gssctxt;
gss_buffer_desc send_tok = GSS_C_EMPTY_BUFFER;
gss_buffer_desc recv_tok;
OM_uint32 ms;
u_char *p = NULL;
size_t len;
int r;
if (authctxt == NULL)
fatal("input_gssapi_response: no authentication context");
gssctxt = authctxt->methoddata;
if ((r = sshpkt_get_string(ssh, &p, &len)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0) {
free(p);
return r;
}
/* Stick it into GSSAPI and see what it says */
recv_tok.value = p;
recv_tok.length = len;
(void)ssh_gssapi_init_ctx(gssctxt, options.gss_deleg_creds,
&recv_tok, &send_tok, NULL);
free(p);
gss_release_buffer(&ms, &send_tok);
/* Server will be returning a failed packet after this one */
return 0;
}
/* ARGSUSED */
static int
input_gssapi_error(int type, u_int32_t plen, struct ssh *ssh)
{
char *msg = NULL;
char *lang = NULL;
int r;
if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, NULL)) != 0 || /* maj */
(r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, NULL)) != 0 || /* min */
(r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &msg, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &lang, NULL)) != 0)
goto out;
r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh);
debug("Server GSSAPI Error:\n%s", msg);
out:
free(msg);
free(lang);
return r;
}
#endif /* GSSAPI */
static int
userauth_none(struct ssh *ssh)
{
Authctxt *authctxt = (Authctxt *)ssh->authctxt;
int r;
/* initial userauth request */
if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->server_user)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->service)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->method->name)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
return 1;
}
static int
userauth_passwd(struct ssh *ssh)
{
Authctxt *authctxt = (Authctxt *)ssh->authctxt;
char *password, *prompt = NULL;
const char *host = options.host_key_alias ? options.host_key_alias :
authctxt->host;
int r;
if (authctxt->attempt_passwd++ >= options.number_of_password_prompts)
return 0;
if (authctxt->attempt_passwd != 1)
error("Permission denied, please try again.");
xasprintf(&prompt, "%s@%s's password: ", authctxt->server_user, host);
password = read_passphrase(prompt, 0);
if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->server_user)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->service)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->method->name)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, 0)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, password)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_add_padding(ssh, 64)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
free(prompt);
if (password != NULL)
freezero(password, strlen(password));
ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PASSWD_CHANGEREQ,
&input_userauth_passwd_changereq);
return 1;
}
/*
* parse PASSWD_CHANGEREQ, prompt user and send SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST
*/
/* ARGSUSED */
static int
input_userauth_passwd_changereq(int type, u_int32_t seqnr, struct ssh *ssh)
{
Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt;
char *info = NULL, *lang = NULL, *password = NULL, *retype = NULL;
char prompt[256];
const char *host;
int r;
debug2("input_userauth_passwd_changereq");
if (authctxt == NULL)
fatal("input_userauth_passwd_changereq: "
"no authentication context");
host = options.host_key_alias ? options.host_key_alias : authctxt->host;
if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &info, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &lang, NULL)) != 0)
goto out;
if (strlen(info) > 0)
logit("%s", info);
if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->server_user)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->service)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->method->name)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, 1)) != 0) /* additional info */
goto out;
snprintf(prompt, sizeof(prompt),
"Enter %.30s@%.128s's old password: ",
authctxt->server_user, host);
password = read_passphrase(prompt, 0);
if ((r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, password)) != 0)
goto out;
freezero(password, strlen(password));
password = NULL;
while (password == NULL) {
snprintf(prompt, sizeof(prompt),
"Enter %.30s@%.128s's new password: ",
authctxt->server_user, host);
password = read_passphrase(prompt, RP_ALLOW_EOF);
if (password == NULL) {
/* bail out */
r = 0;
goto out;
}
snprintf(prompt, sizeof(prompt),
"Retype %.30s@%.128s's new password: ",
authctxt->server_user, host);
retype = read_passphrase(prompt, 0);
if (strcmp(password, retype) != 0) {
freezero(password, strlen(password));
logit("Mismatch; try again, EOF to quit.");
password = NULL;
}
freezero(retype, strlen(retype));
}
if ((r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, password)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_add_padding(ssh, 64)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
goto out;
ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PASSWD_CHANGEREQ,
&input_userauth_passwd_changereq);
r = 0;
out:
if (password)
freezero(password, strlen(password));
free(info);
free(lang);
return r;
}
/*
* Select an algorithm for publickey signatures.
* Returns algorithm (caller must free) or NULL if no mutual algorithm found.
*
* Call with ssh==NULL to ignore server-sig-algs extension list and
* only attempt with the key's base signature type.
*/
static char *
key_sig_algorithm(struct ssh *ssh, const struct sshkey *key)
{
char *allowed, *oallowed, *cp, *tmp, *alg = NULL;
/*
* The signature algorithm will only differ from the key algorithm
* for RSA keys/certs and when the server advertises support for
* newer (SHA2) algorithms.
*/
if (ssh == NULL || ssh->kex->server_sig_algs == NULL ||
(key->type != KEY_RSA && key->type != KEY_RSA_CERT) ||
(key->type == KEY_RSA_CERT && (datafellows & SSH_BUG_SIGTYPE))) {
/* Filter base key signature alg against our configuration */
return match_list(sshkey_ssh_name(key),
options.pubkey_key_types, NULL);
}
/*
* For RSA keys/certs, since these might have a different sig type:
* find the first entry in PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes of the right type
* that also appears in the supported signature algorithms list from
* the server.
*/
oallowed = allowed = xstrdup(options.pubkey_key_types);
while ((cp = strsep(&allowed, ",")) != NULL) {
if (sshkey_type_from_name(cp) != key->type)
continue;
tmp = match_list(sshkey_sigalg_by_name(cp), ssh->kex->server_sig_algs, NULL);
if (tmp != NULL)
alg = xstrdup(cp);
free(tmp);
if (alg != NULL)
break;
}
free(oallowed);
return alg;
}
static int
identity_sign(struct identity *id, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat, const char *alg)
{
- struct sshkey *prv;
- int r;
+ struct sshkey *sign_key = NULL, *prv = NULL;
+ int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
+ struct notifier_ctx *notifier = NULL;
+ char *fp = NULL;
+
+ *sigp = NULL;
+ *lenp = 0;
/* The agent supports this key. */
if (id->key != NULL && id->agent_fd != -1) {
return ssh_agent_sign(id->agent_fd, id->key, sigp, lenp,
data, datalen, alg, compat);
}
/*
* We have already loaded the private key or the private key is
* stored in external hardware.
*/
if (id->key != NULL &&
(id->isprivate || (id->key->flags & SSHKEY_FLAG_EXT))) {
- if ((r = sshkey_sign(id->key, sigp, lenp, data, datalen,
- alg, compat)) != 0)
- return r;
- /*
- * PKCS#11 tokens may not support all signature algorithms,
- * so check what we get back.
- */
- if ((r = sshkey_check_sigtype(*sigp, *lenp, alg)) != 0)
- return r;
- return 0;
+ sign_key = id->key;
+ } else {
+ /* Load the private key from the file. */
+ if ((prv = load_identity_file(id)) == NULL)
+ return SSH_ERR_KEY_NOT_FOUND;
+ if (id->key != NULL && !sshkey_equal_public(prv, id->key)) {
+ error("%s: private key %s contents do not match public",
+ __func__, id->filename);
+ r = SSH_ERR_KEY_NOT_FOUND;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ sign_key = prv;
+ if (sshkey_is_sk(sign_key) &&
+ (sign_key->sk_flags & SSH_SK_USER_PRESENCE_REQD)) {
+ /* XXX match batch mode should just skip these keys? */
+ if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(sign_key,
+ options.fingerprint_hash, SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: sshkey_fingerprint", __func__);
+ notifier = notify_start(options.batch_mode,
+ "Confirm user presence for key %s %s",
+ sshkey_type(sign_key), fp);
+ free(fp);
+ }
}
-
- /* Load the private key from the file. */
- if ((prv = load_identity_file(id)) == NULL)
- return SSH_ERR_KEY_NOT_FOUND;
- if (id->key != NULL && !sshkey_equal_public(prv, id->key)) {
- error("%s: private key %s contents do not match public",
- __func__, id->filename);
- return SSH_ERR_KEY_NOT_FOUND;
+ if ((r = sshkey_sign(sign_key, sigp, lenp, data, datalen,
+ alg, options.sk_provider, compat)) != 0) {
+ debug("%s: sshkey_sign: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ goto out;
}
- r = sshkey_sign(prv, sigp, lenp, data, datalen, alg, compat);
+ /*
+ * PKCS#11 tokens may not support all signature algorithms,
+ * so check what we get back.
+ */
+ if ((r = sshkey_check_sigtype(*sigp, *lenp, alg)) != 0) {
+ debug("%s: sshkey_check_sigtype: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ goto out;
+ }
+ /* success */
+ r = 0;
+ out:
+ notify_complete(notifier);
sshkey_free(prv);
return r;
}
static int
id_filename_matches(Identity *id, Identity *private_id)
{
const char *suffixes[] = { ".pub", "-cert.pub", NULL };
size_t len = strlen(id->filename), plen = strlen(private_id->filename);
size_t i, slen;
if (strcmp(id->filename, private_id->filename) == 0)
return 1;
for (i = 0; suffixes[i]; i++) {
slen = strlen(suffixes[i]);
if (len > slen && plen == len - slen &&
strcmp(id->filename + (len - slen), suffixes[i]) == 0 &&
memcmp(id->filename, private_id->filename, plen) == 0)
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
static int
sign_and_send_pubkey(struct ssh *ssh, Identity *id)
{
Authctxt *authctxt = (Authctxt *)ssh->authctxt;
struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
Identity *private_id, *sign_id = NULL;
u_char *signature = NULL;
size_t slen = 0, skip = 0;
int r, fallback_sigtype, sent = 0;
char *alg = NULL, *fp = NULL;
const char *loc = "";
if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(id->key, options.fingerprint_hash,
SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL)
return 0;
debug3("%s: %s %s", __func__, sshkey_type(id->key), fp);
/*
* If the key is an certificate, try to find a matching private key
* and use it to complete the signature.
* If no such private key exists, fall back to trying the certificate
* key itself in case it has a private half already loaded.
* This will try to set sign_id to the private key that will perform
* the signature.
*/
if (sshkey_is_cert(id->key)) {
TAILQ_FOREACH(private_id, &authctxt->keys, next) {
if (sshkey_equal_public(id->key, private_id->key) &&
id->key->type != private_id->key->type) {
sign_id = private_id;
break;
}
}
/*
* Exact key matches are preferred, but also allow
* filename matches for non-PKCS#11/agent keys that
* didn't load public keys. This supports the case
* of keeping just a private key file and public
* certificate on disk.
*/
if (sign_id == NULL &&
!id->isprivate && id->agent_fd == -1 &&
(id->key->flags & SSHKEY_FLAG_EXT) == 0) {
TAILQ_FOREACH(private_id, &authctxt->keys, next) {
if (private_id->key == NULL &&
id_filename_matches(id, private_id)) {
sign_id = private_id;
break;
}
}
}
if (sign_id != NULL) {
debug2("%s: using private key \"%s\"%s for "
"certificate", __func__, id->filename,
id->agent_fd != -1 ? " from agent" : "");
} else {
debug("%s: no separate private key for certificate "
"\"%s\"", __func__, id->filename);
}
}
/*
* If the above didn't select another identity to do the signing
* then default to the one we started with.
*/
if (sign_id == NULL)
sign_id = id;
/* assemble and sign data */
for (fallback_sigtype = 0; fallback_sigtype <= 1; fallback_sigtype++) {
free(alg);
slen = 0;
signature = NULL;
if ((alg = key_sig_algorithm(fallback_sigtype ? NULL : ssh,
id->key)) == NULL) {
error("%s: no mutual signature supported", __func__);
goto out;
}
- debug3("%s: signing using %s", __func__, alg);
+ debug3("%s: signing using %s %s", __func__, alg, fp);
sshbuf_free(b);
if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
if (datafellows & SSH_OLD_SESSIONID) {
if ((r = sshbuf_put(b, session_id2,
session_id2_len)) != 0) {
fatal("%s: sshbuf_put: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
}
} else {
if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(b, session_id2,
session_id2_len)) != 0) {
fatal("%s: sshbuf_put_string: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
}
}
skip = sshbuf_len(b);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, authctxt->server_user)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, authctxt->service)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, authctxt->method->name)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, 1)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, alg)) != 0 ||
(r = sshkey_puts(id->key, b)) != 0) {
fatal("%s: assemble signed data: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
}
/* generate signature */
r = identity_sign(sign_id, &signature, &slen,
sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b), datafellows, alg);
if (r == 0)
break;
else if (r == SSH_ERR_KEY_NOT_FOUND)
goto out; /* soft failure */
else if (r == SSH_ERR_SIGN_ALG_UNSUPPORTED &&
!fallback_sigtype) {
if (sign_id->agent_fd != -1)
loc = "agent ";
else if ((sign_id->key->flags & SSHKEY_FLAG_EXT) != 0)
loc = "token ";
logit("%skey %s %s returned incorrect signature type",
loc, sshkey_type(id->key), fp);
continue;
}
- error("%s: signing failed: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ error("%s: signing failed for %s \"%s\"%s: %s", __func__,
+ sshkey_type(sign_id->key), sign_id->filename,
+ id->agent_fd != -1 ? " from agent" : "", ssh_err(r));
goto out;
}
if (slen == 0 || signature == NULL) /* shouldn't happen */
fatal("%s: no signature", __func__);
/* append signature */
if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(b, signature, slen)) != 0)
fatal("%s: append signature: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
#ifdef DEBUG_PK
sshbuf_dump(b, stderr);
#endif
/* skip session id and packet type */
if ((r = sshbuf_consume(b, skip + 1)) != 0)
fatal("%s: consume: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
/* put remaining data from buffer into packet */
if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_putb(ssh, b)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
fatal("%s: enqueue request: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
/* success */
sent = 1;
out:
free(fp);
free(alg);
sshbuf_free(b);
freezero(signature, slen);
return sent;
}
static int
send_pubkey_test(struct ssh *ssh, Identity *id)
{
Authctxt *authctxt = (Authctxt *)ssh->authctxt;
u_char *blob = NULL;
char *alg = NULL;
size_t bloblen;
u_int have_sig = 0;
int sent = 0, r;
if ((alg = key_sig_algorithm(ssh, id->key)) == NULL) {
debug("%s: no mutual signature algorithm", __func__);
goto out;
}
if ((r = sshkey_to_blob(id->key, &blob, &bloblen)) != 0) {
/* we cannot handle this key */
debug3("%s: cannot handle key", __func__);
goto out;
}
/* register callback for USERAUTH_PK_OK message */
ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_PK_OK, &input_userauth_pk_ok);
if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->server_user)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->service)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->method->name)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, have_sig)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, alg)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, blob, bloblen)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
sent = 1;
out:
free(alg);
free(blob);
return sent;
}
static struct sshkey *
load_identity_file(Identity *id)
{
struct sshkey *private = NULL;
char prompt[300], *passphrase, *comment;
int r, quit = 0, i;
struct stat st;
if (stat(id->filename, &st) == -1) {
(id->userprovided ? logit : debug3)("no such identity: %s: %s",
id->filename, strerror(errno));
return NULL;
}
snprintf(prompt, sizeof prompt,
"Enter passphrase for key '%.100s': ", id->filename);
for (i = 0; i <= options.number_of_password_prompts; i++) {
if (i == 0)
passphrase = "";
else {
passphrase = read_passphrase(prompt, 0);
if (*passphrase == '\0') {
debug2("no passphrase given, try next key");
free(passphrase);
break;
}
}
switch ((r = sshkey_load_private_type(KEY_UNSPEC, id->filename,
passphrase, &private, &comment))) {
case 0:
break;
case SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE:
if (options.batch_mode) {
quit = 1;
break;
}
if (i != 0)
debug2("bad passphrase given, try again...");
break;
case SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR:
if (errno == ENOENT) {
debug2("Load key \"%s\": %s",
id->filename, ssh_err(r));
quit = 1;
break;
}
/* FALLTHROUGH */
default:
error("Load key \"%s\": %s", id->filename, ssh_err(r));
quit = 1;
break;
}
+ if (private != NULL && sshkey_is_sk(private) &&
+ options.sk_provider == NULL) {
+ debug("key \"%s\" is an authenticator-hosted key, "
+ "but no provider specified", id->filename);
+ sshkey_free(private);
+ private = NULL;
+ quit = 1;
+ }
if (!quit && private != NULL && id->agent_fd == -1 &&
!(id->key && id->isprivate))
maybe_add_key_to_agent(id->filename, private, comment,
passphrase);
if (i > 0)
freezero(passphrase, strlen(passphrase));
free(comment);
if (private != NULL || quit)
break;
}
return private;
}
static int
key_type_allowed_by_config(struct sshkey *key)
{
if (match_pattern_list(sshkey_ssh_name(key),
options.pubkey_key_types, 0) == 1)
return 1;
/* RSA keys/certs might be allowed by alternate signature types */
switch (key->type) {
case KEY_RSA:
if (match_pattern_list("rsa-sha2-512",
options.pubkey_key_types, 0) == 1)
return 1;
if (match_pattern_list("rsa-sha2-256",
options.pubkey_key_types, 0) == 1)
return 1;
break;
case KEY_RSA_CERT:
if (match_pattern_list("rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com",
options.pubkey_key_types, 0) == 1)
return 1;
if (match_pattern_list("rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com",
options.pubkey_key_types, 0) == 1)
return 1;
break;
}
return 0;
}
/*
* try keys in the following order:
* 1. certificates listed in the config file
* 2. other input certificates
* 3. agent keys that are found in the config file
* 4. other agent keys
* 5. keys that are only listed in the config file
*/
static void
pubkey_prepare(Authctxt *authctxt)
{
struct identity *id, *id2, *tmp;
struct idlist agent, files, *preferred;
struct sshkey *key;
int agent_fd = -1, i, r, found;
size_t j;
struct ssh_identitylist *idlist;
char *ident;
TAILQ_INIT(&agent); /* keys from the agent */
TAILQ_INIT(&files); /* keys from the config file */
preferred = &authctxt->keys;
TAILQ_INIT(preferred); /* preferred order of keys */
/* list of keys stored in the filesystem and PKCS#11 */
for (i = 0; i < options.num_identity_files; i++) {
key = options.identity_keys[i];
- if (key && key->cert && key->cert->type != SSH2_CERT_TYPE_USER)
+ if (key && key->cert &&
+ key->cert->type != SSH2_CERT_TYPE_USER) {
+ debug("%s: ignoring certificate %s: not a user "
+ "certificate", __func__,
+ options.identity_files[i]);
+ continue;
+ }
+ if (key && sshkey_is_sk(key) && options.sk_provider == NULL) {
+ debug("%s: ignoring authenticator-hosted key %s as no "
+ "SecurityKeyProvider has been specified",
+ __func__, options.identity_files[i]);
continue;
+ }
options.identity_keys[i] = NULL;
id = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*id));
id->agent_fd = -1;
id->key = key;
id->filename = xstrdup(options.identity_files[i]);
id->userprovided = options.identity_file_userprovided[i];
TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&files, id, next);
}
/* list of certificates specified by user */
for (i = 0; i < options.num_certificate_files; i++) {
key = options.certificates[i];
if (!sshkey_is_cert(key) || key->cert == NULL ||
- key->cert->type != SSH2_CERT_TYPE_USER)
+ key->cert->type != SSH2_CERT_TYPE_USER) {
+ debug("%s: ignoring certificate %s: not a user "
+ "certificate", __func__,
+ options.identity_files[i]);
continue;
+ }
+ if (key && sshkey_is_sk(key) && options.sk_provider == NULL) {
+ debug("%s: ignoring authenticator-hosted key "
+ "certificate %s as no "
+ "SecurityKeyProvider has been specified",
+ __func__, options.identity_files[i]);
+ continue;
+ }
id = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*id));
id->agent_fd = -1;
id->key = key;
id->filename = xstrdup(options.certificate_files[i]);
id->userprovided = options.certificate_file_userprovided[i];
TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(preferred, id, next);
}
/* list of keys supported by the agent */
if ((r = ssh_get_authentication_socket(&agent_fd)) != 0) {
if (r != SSH_ERR_AGENT_NOT_PRESENT)
debug("%s: ssh_get_authentication_socket: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
} else if ((r = ssh_fetch_identitylist(agent_fd, &idlist)) != 0) {
if (r != SSH_ERR_AGENT_NO_IDENTITIES)
debug("%s: ssh_fetch_identitylist: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
close(agent_fd);
} else {
for (j = 0; j < idlist->nkeys; j++) {
found = 0;
TAILQ_FOREACH(id, &files, next) {
/*
* agent keys from the config file are
* preferred
*/
if (sshkey_equal(idlist->keys[j], id->key)) {
TAILQ_REMOVE(&files, id, next);
TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(preferred, id, next);
id->agent_fd = agent_fd;
found = 1;
break;
}
}
if (!found && !options.identities_only) {
id = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*id));
/* XXX "steals" key/comment from idlist */
id->key = idlist->keys[j];
id->filename = idlist->comments[j];
idlist->keys[j] = NULL;
idlist->comments[j] = NULL;
id->agent_fd = agent_fd;
TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&agent, id, next);
}
}
ssh_free_identitylist(idlist);
/* append remaining agent keys */
for (id = TAILQ_FIRST(&agent); id; id = TAILQ_FIRST(&agent)) {
TAILQ_REMOVE(&agent, id, next);
TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(preferred, id, next);
}
authctxt->agent_fd = agent_fd;
}
/* Prefer PKCS11 keys that are explicitly listed */
TAILQ_FOREACH_SAFE(id, &files, next, tmp) {
if (id->key == NULL || (id->key->flags & SSHKEY_FLAG_EXT) == 0)
continue;
found = 0;
TAILQ_FOREACH(id2, &files, next) {
if (id2->key == NULL ||
(id2->key->flags & SSHKEY_FLAG_EXT) == 0)
continue;
if (sshkey_equal(id->key, id2->key)) {
TAILQ_REMOVE(&files, id, next);
TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(preferred, id, next);
found = 1;
break;
}
}
/* If IdentitiesOnly set and key not found then don't use it */
if (!found && options.identities_only) {
TAILQ_REMOVE(&files, id, next);
freezero(id, sizeof(*id));
}
}
/* append remaining keys from the config file */
for (id = TAILQ_FIRST(&files); id; id = TAILQ_FIRST(&files)) {
TAILQ_REMOVE(&files, id, next);
TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(preferred, id, next);
}
/* finally, filter by PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes */
TAILQ_FOREACH_SAFE(id, preferred, next, id2) {
if (id->key != NULL && !key_type_allowed_by_config(id->key)) {
debug("Skipping %s key %s - "
"not in PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes",
sshkey_ssh_name(id->key), id->filename);
TAILQ_REMOVE(preferred, id, next);
sshkey_free(id->key);
free(id->filename);
memset(id, 0, sizeof(*id));
continue;
}
}
/* List the keys we plan on using */
TAILQ_FOREACH_SAFE(id, preferred, next, id2) {
ident = format_identity(id);
debug("Will attempt key: %s", ident);
free(ident);
}
debug2("%s: done", __func__);
}
static void
pubkey_cleanup(struct ssh *ssh)
{
Authctxt *authctxt = (Authctxt *)ssh->authctxt;
Identity *id;
if (authctxt->agent_fd != -1) {
ssh_close_authentication_socket(authctxt->agent_fd);
authctxt->agent_fd = -1;
}
for (id = TAILQ_FIRST(&authctxt->keys); id;
id = TAILQ_FIRST(&authctxt->keys)) {
TAILQ_REMOVE(&authctxt->keys, id, next);
sshkey_free(id->key);
free(id->filename);
free(id);
}
}
static void
pubkey_reset(Authctxt *authctxt)
{
Identity *id;
TAILQ_FOREACH(id, &authctxt->keys, next)
id->tried = 0;
}
static int
try_identity(Identity *id)
{
if (!id->key)
return (0);
if (sshkey_type_plain(id->key->type) == KEY_RSA &&
(datafellows & SSH_BUG_RSASIGMD5) != 0) {
debug("Skipped %s key %s for RSA/MD5 server",
sshkey_type(id->key), id->filename);
return (0);
}
return 1;
}
static int
userauth_pubkey(struct ssh *ssh)
{
Authctxt *authctxt = (Authctxt *)ssh->authctxt;
Identity *id;
int sent = 0;
char *ident;
while ((id = TAILQ_FIRST(&authctxt->keys))) {
if (id->tried++)
return (0);
/* move key to the end of the queue */
TAILQ_REMOVE(&authctxt->keys, id, next);
TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&authctxt->keys, id, next);
/*
* send a test message if we have the public key. for
* encrypted keys we cannot do this and have to load the
* private key instead
*/
if (id->key != NULL) {
if (try_identity(id)) {
ident = format_identity(id);
debug("Offering public key: %s", ident);
free(ident);
sent = send_pubkey_test(ssh, id);
}
} else {
debug("Trying private key: %s", id->filename);
id->key = load_identity_file(id);
if (id->key != NULL) {
if (try_identity(id)) {
id->isprivate = 1;
sent = sign_and_send_pubkey(ssh, id);
}
sshkey_free(id->key);
id->key = NULL;
id->isprivate = 0;
}
}
if (sent)
return (sent);
}
return (0);
}
/*
* Send userauth request message specifying keyboard-interactive method.
*/
static int
userauth_kbdint(struct ssh *ssh)
{
Authctxt *authctxt = (Authctxt *)ssh->authctxt;
int r;
if (authctxt->attempt_kbdint++ >= options.number_of_password_prompts)
return 0;
/* disable if no SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_REQUEST has been seen */
if (authctxt->attempt_kbdint > 1 && !authctxt->info_req_seen) {
debug3("userauth_kbdint: disable: no info_req_seen");
ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_REQUEST, NULL);
return 0;
}
debug2("userauth_kbdint");
if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->server_user)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->service)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->method->name)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "")) != 0 || /* lang */
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, options.kbd_interactive_devices ?
options.kbd_interactive_devices : "")) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
fatal("%s: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
ssh_dispatch_set(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_REQUEST, &input_userauth_info_req);
return 1;
}
/*
* parse INFO_REQUEST, prompt user and send INFO_RESPONSE
*/
static int
input_userauth_info_req(int type, u_int32_t seq, struct ssh *ssh)
{
Authctxt *authctxt = ssh->authctxt;
char *name = NULL, *inst = NULL, *lang = NULL, *prompt = NULL;
char *response = NULL;
u_char echo = 0;
u_int num_prompts, i;
int r;
debug2("input_userauth_info_req");
if (authctxt == NULL)
fatal("input_userauth_info_req: no authentication context");
authctxt->info_req_seen = 1;
if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &name, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &inst, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &lang, NULL)) != 0)
goto out;
if (strlen(name) > 0)
logit("%s", name);
if (strlen(inst) > 0)
logit("%s", inst);
if ((r = sshpkt_get_u32(ssh, &num_prompts)) != 0)
goto out;
/*
* Begin to build info response packet based on prompts requested.
* We commit to providing the correct number of responses, so if
* further on we run into a problem that prevents this, we have to
* be sure and clean this up and send a correct error response.
*/
if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_INFO_RESPONSE)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u32(ssh, num_prompts)) != 0)
goto out;
debug2("input_userauth_info_req: num_prompts %d", num_prompts);
for (i = 0; i < num_prompts; i++) {
if ((r = sshpkt_get_cstring(ssh, &prompt, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_get_u8(ssh, &echo)) != 0)
goto out;
response = read_passphrase(prompt, echo ? RP_ECHO : 0);
if ((r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, response)) != 0)
goto out;
freezero(response, strlen(response));
free(prompt);
response = prompt = NULL;
}
/* done with parsing incoming message. */
if ((r = sshpkt_get_end(ssh)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_add_padding(ssh, 64)) != 0)
goto out;
r = sshpkt_send(ssh);
out:
if (response)
freezero(response, strlen(response));
free(prompt);
free(name);
free(inst);
free(lang);
return r;
}
static int
ssh_keysign(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
const u_char *data, size_t datalen)
{
struct sshbuf *b;
struct stat st;
pid_t pid;
int r, to[2], from[2], status;
int sock = ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh);
u_char rversion = 0, version = 2;
void (*osigchld)(int);
*sigp = NULL;
*lenp = 0;
if (stat(_PATH_SSH_KEY_SIGN, &st) == -1) {
error("%s: not installed: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
return -1;
}
if (fflush(stdout) != 0) {
error("%s: fflush: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
return -1;
}
if (pipe(to) == -1) {
error("%s: pipe: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
return -1;
}
if (pipe(from) == -1) {
error("%s: pipe: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
return -1;
}
if ((pid = fork()) == -1) {
error("%s: fork: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
return -1;
}
- osigchld = signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL);
+ osigchld = ssh_signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL);
if (pid == 0) {
close(from[0]);
if (dup2(from[1], STDOUT_FILENO) == -1)
fatal("%s: dup2: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
close(to[1]);
if (dup2(to[0], STDIN_FILENO) == -1)
fatal("%s: dup2: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
close(from[1]);
close(to[0]);
if (dup2(sock, STDERR_FILENO + 1) == -1)
fatal("%s: dup2: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
sock = STDERR_FILENO + 1;
fcntl(sock, F_SETFD, 0); /* keep the socket on exec */
closefrom(sock + 1);
debug3("%s: [child] pid=%ld, exec %s",
__func__, (long)getpid(), _PATH_SSH_KEY_SIGN);
execl(_PATH_SSH_KEY_SIGN, _PATH_SSH_KEY_SIGN, (char *)NULL);
fatal("%s: exec(%s): %s", __func__, _PATH_SSH_KEY_SIGN,
strerror(errno));
}
close(from[1]);
close(to[0]);
sock = STDERR_FILENO + 1;
if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
/* send # of sock, data to be signed */
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, sock)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_string(b, data, datalen)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
if (ssh_msg_send(to[1], version, b) == -1)
fatal("%s: couldn't send request", __func__);
sshbuf_reset(b);
r = ssh_msg_recv(from[0], b);
close(from[0]);
close(to[1]);
if (r < 0) {
error("%s: no reply", __func__);
goto fail;
}
errno = 0;
while (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) == -1) {
if (errno != EINTR) {
error("%s: waitpid %ld: %s",
__func__, (long)pid, strerror(errno));
goto fail;
}
}
if (!WIFEXITED(status)) {
error("%s: exited abnormally", __func__);
goto fail;
}
if (WEXITSTATUS(status) != 0) {
error("%s: exited with status %d",
__func__, WEXITSTATUS(status));
goto fail;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(b, &rversion)) != 0) {
error("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
goto fail;
}
if (rversion != version) {
error("%s: bad version", __func__);
goto fail;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(b, sigp, lenp)) != 0) {
error("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
fail:
- signal(SIGCHLD, osigchld);
+ ssh_signal(SIGCHLD, osigchld);
sshbuf_free(b);
return -1;
}
- signal(SIGCHLD, osigchld);
+ ssh_signal(SIGCHLD, osigchld);
sshbuf_free(b);
return 0;
}
static int
userauth_hostbased(struct ssh *ssh)
{
Authctxt *authctxt = (Authctxt *)ssh->authctxt;
struct sshkey *private = NULL;
struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
u_char *sig = NULL, *keyblob = NULL;
char *fp = NULL, *chost = NULL, *lname = NULL;
size_t siglen = 0, keylen = 0;
int i, r, success = 0;
if (authctxt->ktypes == NULL) {
authctxt->oktypes = xstrdup(options.hostbased_key_types);
authctxt->ktypes = authctxt->oktypes;
}
/*
* Work through each listed type pattern in HostbasedKeyTypes,
* trying each hostkey that matches the type in turn.
*/
for (;;) {
if (authctxt->active_ktype == NULL)
authctxt->active_ktype = strsep(&authctxt->ktypes, ",");
if (authctxt->active_ktype == NULL ||
*authctxt->active_ktype == '\0')
break;
debug3("%s: trying key type %s", __func__,
authctxt->active_ktype);
/* check for a useful key */
private = NULL;
for (i = 0; i < authctxt->sensitive->nkeys; i++) {
if (authctxt->sensitive->keys[i] == NULL ||
authctxt->sensitive->keys[i]->type == KEY_UNSPEC)
continue;
if (match_pattern_list(
sshkey_ssh_name(authctxt->sensitive->keys[i]),
authctxt->active_ktype, 0) != 1)
continue;
/* we take and free the key */
private = authctxt->sensitive->keys[i];
authctxt->sensitive->keys[i] = NULL;
break;
}
/* Found one */
if (private != NULL)
break;
/* No more keys of this type; advance */
authctxt->active_ktype = NULL;
}
if (private == NULL) {
free(authctxt->oktypes);
authctxt->oktypes = authctxt->ktypes = NULL;
authctxt->active_ktype = NULL;
debug("No more client hostkeys for hostbased authentication.");
goto out;
}
if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(private, options.fingerprint_hash,
SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL) {
error("%s: sshkey_fingerprint failed", __func__);
goto out;
}
debug("%s: trying hostkey %s %s",
__func__, sshkey_ssh_name(private), fp);
/* figure out a name for the client host */
lname = get_local_name(ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh));
if (lname == NULL) {
error("%s: cannot get local ipaddr/name", __func__);
goto out;
}
/* XXX sshbuf_put_stringf? */
xasprintf(&chost, "%s.", lname);
debug2("%s: chost %s", __func__, chost);
/* construct data */
if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
error("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
goto out;
}
if ((r = sshkey_to_blob(private, &keyblob, &keylen)) != 0) {
error("%s: sshkey_to_blob: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
goto out;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(b, session_id2, session_id2_len)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, authctxt->server_user)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, authctxt->service)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, authctxt->method->name)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, sshkey_ssh_name(private))) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_string(b, keyblob, keylen)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, chost)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, authctxt->local_user)) != 0) {
error("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
goto out;
}
#ifdef DEBUG_PK
sshbuf_dump(b, stderr);
#endif
if ((r = ssh_keysign(ssh, private, &sig, &siglen,
sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b))) != 0) {
error("sign using hostkey %s %s failed",
sshkey_ssh_name(private), fp);
goto out;
}
if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_REQUEST)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->server_user)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->service)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->method->name)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, sshkey_ssh_name(private))) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, keyblob, keylen)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, chost)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, authctxt->local_user)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_string(ssh, sig, siglen)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0) {
error("%s: packet error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
goto out;
}
success = 1;
out:
if (sig != NULL)
freezero(sig, siglen);
free(keyblob);
free(lname);
free(fp);
free(chost);
sshkey_free(private);
sshbuf_free(b);
return success;
}
/* find auth method */
/*
* given auth method name, if configurable options permit this method fill
* in auth_ident field and return true, otherwise return false.
*/
static int
authmethod_is_enabled(Authmethod *method)
{
if (method == NULL)
return 0;
/* return false if options indicate this method is disabled */
if (method->enabled == NULL || *method->enabled == 0)
return 0;
/* return false if batch mode is enabled but method needs interactive mode */
if (method->batch_flag != NULL && *method->batch_flag != 0)
return 0;
return 1;
}
static Authmethod *
authmethod_lookup(const char *name)
{
Authmethod *method = NULL;
if (name != NULL)
for (method = authmethods; method->name != NULL; method++)
if (strcmp(name, method->name) == 0)
return method;
debug2("Unrecognized authentication method name: %s", name ? name : "NULL");
return NULL;
}
/* XXX internal state */
static Authmethod *current = NULL;
static char *supported = NULL;
static char *preferred = NULL;
/*
* Given the authentication method list sent by the server, return the
* next method we should try. If the server initially sends a nil list,
* use a built-in default list.
*/
static Authmethod *
authmethod_get(char *authlist)
{
char *name = NULL;
u_int next;
/* Use a suitable default if we're passed a nil list. */
if (authlist == NULL || strlen(authlist) == 0)
authlist = options.preferred_authentications;
if (supported == NULL || strcmp(authlist, supported) != 0) {
debug3("start over, passed a different list %s", authlist);
free(supported);
supported = xstrdup(authlist);
preferred = options.preferred_authentications;
debug3("preferred %s", preferred);
current = NULL;
} else if (current != NULL && authmethod_is_enabled(current))
return current;
for (;;) {
if ((name = match_list(preferred, supported, &next)) == NULL) {
debug("No more authentication methods to try.");
current = NULL;
return NULL;
}
preferred += next;
debug3("authmethod_lookup %s", name);
debug3("remaining preferred: %s", preferred);
if ((current = authmethod_lookup(name)) != NULL &&
authmethod_is_enabled(current)) {
debug3("authmethod_is_enabled %s", name);
debug("Next authentication method: %s", name);
free(name);
return current;
}
free(name);
}
}
static char *
authmethods_get(void)
{
Authmethod *method = NULL;
struct sshbuf *b;
char *list;
int r;
if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
for (method = authmethods; method->name != NULL; method++) {
if (authmethod_is_enabled(method)) {
if ((r = sshbuf_putf(b, "%s%s",
sshbuf_len(b) ? "," : "", method->name)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
}
}
if ((list = sshbuf_dup_string(b)) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_dup_string failed", __func__);
sshbuf_free(b);
return list;
}
diff --git a/sshd.0 b/sshd.0
index 1b0d5ce2e1ea..15ef5dd3bddf 100644
--- a/sshd.0
+++ b/sshd.0
@@ -1,653 +1,667 @@
SSHD(8) System Manager's Manual SSHD(8)
NAME
- sshd M-bM-^@M-^S OpenSSH SSH daemon
+ sshd M-bM-^@M-^S OpenSSH daemon
SYNOPSIS
sshd [-46DdeiqTt] [-C connection_spec] [-c host_certificate_file]
[-E log_file] [-f config_file] [-g login_grace_time]
[-h host_key_file] [-o option] [-p port] [-u len]
DESCRIPTION
sshd (OpenSSH Daemon) is the daemon program for ssh(1). Together these
programs replace rlogin and rsh, and provide secure encrypted
communications between two untrusted hosts over an insecure network.
sshd listens for connections from clients. It is normally started at
boot from /etc/rc. It forks a new daemon for each incoming connection.
The forked daemons handle key exchange, encryption, authentication,
command execution, and data exchange.
sshd can be configured using command-line options or a configuration file
(by default sshd_config(5)); command-line options override values
specified in the configuration file. sshd rereads its configuration file
when it receives a hangup signal, SIGHUP, by executing itself with the
name and options it was started with, e.g. /usr/sbin/sshd.
The options are as follows:
-4 Forces sshd to use IPv4 addresses only.
-6 Forces sshd to use IPv6 addresses only.
-C connection_spec
Specify the connection parameters to use for the -T extended test
mode. If provided, any Match directives in the configuration
file that would apply are applied before the configuration is
written to standard output. The connection parameters are
supplied as keyword=value pairs and may be supplied in any order,
either with multiple -C options or as a comma-separated list.
The keywords are M-bM-^@M-^\addr,M-bM-^@M-^] M-bM-^@M-^\userM-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\hostM-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\laddrM-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\lportM-bM-^@M-^], and
M-bM-^@M-^\rdomainM-bM-^@M-^] and correspond to source address, user, resolved source
host name, local address, local port number and routing domain
respectively.
-c host_certificate_file
Specifies a path to a certificate file to identify sshd during
key exchange. The certificate file must match a host key file
specified using the -h option or the HostKey configuration
directive.
-D When this option is specified, sshd will not detach and does not
become a daemon. This allows easy monitoring of sshd.
-d Debug mode. The server sends verbose debug output to standard
error, and does not put itself in the background. The server
also will not fork and will only process one connection. This
option is only intended for debugging for the server. Multiple
-d options increase the debugging level. Maximum is 3.
-E log_file
Append debug logs to log_file instead of the system log.
-e Write debug logs to standard error instead of the system log.
-f config_file
Specifies the name of the configuration file. The default is
/etc/ssh/sshd_config. sshd refuses to start if there is no
configuration file.
-g login_grace_time
Gives the grace time for clients to authenticate themselves
(default 120 seconds). If the client fails to authenticate the
user within this many seconds, the server disconnects and exits.
A value of zero indicates no limit.
-h host_key_file
Specifies a file from which a host key is read. This option must
be given if sshd is not run as root (as the normal host key files
are normally not readable by anyone but root). The default is
/etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key, /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key and
/etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key. It is possible to have multiple host
key files for the different host key algorithms.
-i Specifies that sshd is being run from inetd(8).
-o option
Can be used to give options in the format used in the
configuration file. This is useful for specifying options for
which there is no separate command-line flag. For full details
of the options, and their values, see sshd_config(5).
-p port
Specifies the port on which the server listens for connections
(default 22). Multiple port options are permitted. Ports
specified in the configuration file with the Port option are
ignored when a command-line port is specified. Ports specified
using the ListenAddress option override command-line ports.
-q Quiet mode. Nothing is sent to the system log. Normally the
beginning, authentication, and termination of each connection is
logged.
-T Extended test mode. Check the validity of the configuration
file, output the effective configuration to stdout and then exit.
Optionally, Match rules may be applied by specifying the
connection parameters using one or more -C options.
-t Test mode. Only check the validity of the configuration file and
sanity of the keys. This is useful for updating sshd reliably as
configuration options may change.
-u len This option is used to specify the size of the field in the utmp
structure that holds the remote host name. If the resolved host
name is longer than len, the dotted decimal value will be used
instead. This allows hosts with very long host names that
overflow this field to still be uniquely identified. Specifying
-u0 indicates that only dotted decimal addresses should be put
into the utmp file. -u0 may also be used to prevent sshd from
making DNS requests unless the authentication mechanism or
configuration requires it. Authentication mechanisms that may
require DNS include HostbasedAuthentication and using a
from="pattern-list" option in a key file. Configuration options
that require DNS include using a USER@HOST pattern in AllowUsers
or DenyUsers.
AUTHENTICATION
The OpenSSH SSH daemon supports SSH protocol 2 only. Each host has a
host-specific key, used to identify the host. Whenever a client
connects, the daemon responds with its public host key. The client
compares the host key against its own database to verify that it has not
- changed. Forward security is provided through a Diffie-Hellman key
+ changed. Forward secrecy is provided through a Diffie-Hellman key
agreement. This key agreement results in a shared session key. The rest
- of the session is encrypted using a symmetric cipher, currently 128-bit
- AES, Blowfish, 3DES, CAST128, Arcfour, 192-bit AES, or 256-bit AES. The
- client selects the encryption algorithm to use from those offered by the
- server. Additionally, session integrity is provided through a
- cryptographic message authentication code (hmac-md5, hmac-sha1, umac-64,
- umac-128, hmac-sha2-256 or hmac-sha2-512).
+ of the session is encrypted using a symmetric cipher. The client selects
+ the encryption algorithm to use from those offered by the server.
+ Additionally, session integrity is provided through a cryptographic
+ message authentication code (MAC).
Finally, the server and the client enter an authentication dialog. The
client tries to authenticate itself using host-based authentication,
public key authentication, challenge-response authentication, or password
authentication.
Regardless of the authentication type, the account is checked to ensure
that it is accessible. An account is not accessible if it is locked,
listed in DenyUsers or its group is listed in DenyGroups . The
definition of a locked account is system dependent. Some platforms have
their own account database (eg AIX) and some modify the passwd field (
M-bM-^@M-^X*LK*M-bM-^@M-^Y on Solaris and UnixWare, M-bM-^@M-^X*M-bM-^@M-^Y on HP-UX, containing M-bM-^@M-^XNologinM-bM-^@M-^Y on
Tru64, a leading M-bM-^@M-^X*LOCKED*M-bM-^@M-^Y on FreeBSD and a leading M-bM-^@M-^X!M-bM-^@M-^Y on most
Linuxes). If there is a requirement to disable password authentication
for the account while allowing still public-key, then the passwd field
should be set to something other than these values (eg M-bM-^@M-^XNPM-bM-^@M-^Y or M-bM-^@M-^X*NP*M-bM-^@M-^Y ).
If the client successfully authenticates itself, a dialog for preparing
the session is entered. At this time the client may request things like
allocating a pseudo-tty, forwarding X11 connections, forwarding TCP
connections, or forwarding the authentication agent connection over the
secure channel.
After this, the client either requests a shell or execution of a command.
The sides then enter session mode. In this mode, either side may send
data at any time, and such data is forwarded to/from the shell or command
on the server side, and the user terminal in the client side.
When the user program terminates and all forwarded X11 and other
connections have been closed, the server sends command exit status to the
client, and both sides exit.
LOGIN PROCESS
When a user successfully logs in, sshd does the following:
1. If the login is on a tty, and no command has been specified,
prints last login time and /etc/motd (unless prevented in the
configuration file or by ~/.hushlogin; see the FILES section).
2. If the login is on a tty, records login time.
3. Checks /etc/nologin; if it exists, prints contents and quits
(unless root).
4. Changes to run with normal user privileges.
5. Sets up basic environment.
6. Reads the file ~/.ssh/environment, if it exists, and users are
allowed to change their environment. See the
PermitUserEnvironment option in sshd_config(5).
7. Changes to user's home directory.
8. If ~/.ssh/rc exists and the sshd_config(5) PermitUserRC option
is set, runs it; else if /etc/ssh/sshrc exists, runs it;
otherwise runs xauth. The M-bM-^@M-^\rcM-bM-^@M-^] files are given the X11
authentication protocol and cookie in standard input. See
SSHRC, below.
9. Runs user's shell or command. All commands are run under the
user's login shell as specified in the system password
database.
SSHRC
If the file ~/.ssh/rc exists, sh(1) runs it after reading the environment
files but before starting the user's shell or command. It must not
produce any output on stdout; stderr must be used instead. If X11
forwarding is in use, it will receive the "proto cookie" pair in its
standard input (and DISPLAY in its environment). The script must call
xauth(1) because sshd will not run xauth automatically to add X11
cookies.
The primary purpose of this file is to run any initialization routines
which may be needed before the user's home directory becomes accessible;
AFS is a particular example of such an environment.
This file will probably contain some initialization code followed by
something similar to:
if read proto cookie && [ -n "$DISPLAY" ]; then
if [ `echo $DISPLAY | cut -c1-10` = 'localhost:' ]; then
# X11UseLocalhost=yes
echo add unix:`echo $DISPLAY |
cut -c11-` $proto $cookie
else
# X11UseLocalhost=no
echo add $DISPLAY $proto $cookie
fi | xauth -q -
fi
If this file does not exist, /etc/ssh/sshrc is run, and if that does not
exist either, xauth is used to add the cookie.
AUTHORIZED_KEYS FILE FORMAT
AuthorizedKeysFile specifies the files containing public keys for public
key authentication; if this option is not specified, the default is
~/.ssh/authorized_keys and ~/.ssh/authorized_keys2. Each line of the
file contains one key (empty lines and lines starting with a M-bM-^@M-^X#M-bM-^@M-^Y are
ignored as comments). Public keys consist of the following space-
separated fields: options, keytype, base64-encoded key, comment. The
- options field is optional. The keytype is M-bM-^@M-^\ecdsa-sha2-nistp256M-bM-^@M-^],
- M-bM-^@M-^\ecdsa-sha2-nistp384M-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\ecdsa-sha2-nistp521M-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\ssh-ed25519M-bM-^@M-^], M-bM-^@M-^\ssh-dssM-bM-^@M-^] or
- M-bM-^@M-^\ssh-rsaM-bM-^@M-^]; the comment field is not used for anything (but may be
- convenient for the user to identify the key).
+ options field is optional. The supported key types are:
+
+ sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com
+ ecdsa-sha2-nistp256
+ ecdsa-sha2-nistp384
+ ecdsa-sha2-nistp521
+ sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com
+ ssh-ed25519
+ ssh-dss
+ ssh-rsa
+
+ The comment field is not used for anything (but may be convenient for the
+ user to identify the key).
Note that lines in this file can be several hundred bytes long (because
of the size of the public key encoding) up to a limit of 8 kilobytes,
- which permits DSA keys up to 8 kilobits and RSA keys up to 16 kilobits.
- You don't want to type them in; instead, copy the id_dsa.pub,
- id_ecdsa.pub, id_ed25519.pub, or the id_rsa.pub file and edit it.
+ which permits RSA keys up to 16 kilobits. You don't want to type them
+ in; instead, copy the id_dsa.pub, id_ecdsa.pub, id_ecdsa_sk.pub,
+ id_ed25519.pub, id_ed25519_sk.pub, or the id_rsa.pub file and edit it.
sshd enforces a minimum RSA key modulus size of 1024 bits.
The options (if present) consist of comma-separated option
specifications. No spaces are permitted, except within double quotes.
The following option specifications are supported (note that option
keywords are case-insensitive):
agent-forwarding
Enable authentication agent forwarding previously disabled by the
restrict option.
cert-authority
Specifies that the listed key is a certification authority (CA)
that is trusted to validate signed certificates for user
authentication.
Certificates may encode access restrictions similar to these key
options. If both certificate restrictions and key options are
present, the most restrictive union of the two is applied.
command="command"
Specifies that the command is executed whenever this key is used
for authentication. The command supplied by the user (if any) is
ignored. The command is run on a pty if the client requests a
pty; otherwise it is run without a tty. If an 8-bit clean
channel is required, one must not request a pty or should specify
no-pty. A quote may be included in the command by quoting it
with a backslash.
This option might be useful to restrict certain public keys to
perform just a specific operation. An example might be a key
that permits remote backups but nothing else. Note that the
client may specify TCP and/or X11 forwarding unless they are
explicitly prohibited, e.g. using the restrict key option.
The command originally supplied by the client is available in the
SSH_ORIGINAL_COMMAND environment variable. Note that this option
applies to shell, command or subsystem execution. Also note that
this command may be superseded by a sshd_config(5) ForceCommand
directive.
If a command is specified and a forced-command is embedded in a
certificate used for authentication, then the certificate will be
accepted only if the two commands are identical.
environment="NAME=value"
Specifies that the string is to be added to the environment when
logging in using this key. Environment variables set this way
override other default environment values. Multiple options of
this type are permitted. Environment processing is disabled by
default and is controlled via the PermitUserEnvironment option.
expiry-time="timespec"
Specifies a time after which the key will not be accepted. The
time may be specified as a YYYYMMDD date or a YYYYMMDDHHMM[SS]
time in the system time-zone.
from="pattern-list"
Specifies that in addition to public key authentication, either
the canonical name of the remote host or its IP address must be
present in the comma-separated list of patterns. See PATTERNS in
ssh_config(5) for more information on patterns.
In addition to the wildcard matching that may be applied to
hostnames or addresses, a from stanza may match IP addresses
using CIDR address/masklen notation.
The purpose of this option is to optionally increase security:
public key authentication by itself does not trust the network or
name servers or anything (but the key); however, if somebody
somehow steals the key, the key permits an intruder to log in
from anywhere in the world. This additional option makes using a
stolen key more difficult (name servers and/or routers would have
to be compromised in addition to just the key).
no-agent-forwarding
Forbids authentication agent forwarding when this key is used for
authentication.
no-port-forwarding
Forbids TCP forwarding when this key is used for authentication.
Any port forward requests by the client will return an error.
This might be used, e.g. in connection with the command option.
no-pty Prevents tty allocation (a request to allocate a pty will fail).
no-user-rc
Disables execution of ~/.ssh/rc.
no-X11-forwarding
Forbids X11 forwarding when this key is used for authentication.
Any X11 forward requests by the client will return an error.
permitlisten="[host:]port"
Limit remote port forwarding with the ssh(1) -R option such that
it may only listen on the specified host (optional) and port.
IPv6 addresses can be specified by enclosing the address in
square brackets. Multiple permitlisten options may be applied
separated by commas. Hostnames may include wildcards as
described in the PATTERNS section in ssh_config(5). A port
specification of * matches any port. Note that the setting of
GatewayPorts may further restrict listen addresses. Note that
ssh(1) will send a hostname of M-bM-^@M-^\localhostM-bM-^@M-^] if a listen host was
not specified when the forwarding was requested, and that this
name is treated differently to the explicit localhost addresses
M-bM-^@M-^\127.0.0.1M-bM-^@M-^] and M-bM-^@M-^\::1M-bM-^@M-^].
permitopen="host:port"
Limit local port forwarding with the ssh(1) -L option such that
it may only connect to the specified host and port. IPv6
addresses can be specified by enclosing the address in square
brackets. Multiple permitopen options may be applied separated
- by commas. No pattern matching is performed on the specified
- hostnames, they must be literal domains or addresses. A port
- specification of * matches any port.
+ by commas. No pattern matching or name lookup is performed on
+ the specified hostnames, they must be literal host names and/or
+ addresses. A port specification of * matches any port.
port-forwarding
Enable port forwarding previously disabled by the restrict
option.
principals="principals"
On a cert-authority line, specifies allowed principals for
certificate authentication as a comma-separated list. At least
one name from the list must appear in the certificate's list of
principals for the certificate to be accepted. This option is
ignored for keys that are not marked as trusted certificate
signers using the cert-authority option.
pty Permits tty allocation previously disabled by the restrict
option.
+ no-touch-required
+ Do not require demonstration of user presence for signatures made
+ using this key. This option only makes sense for the FIDO
+ authenticator algorithms ecdsa-sk and ed25519-sk.
+
restrict
Enable all restrictions, i.e. disable port, agent and X11
forwarding, as well as disabling PTY allocation and execution of
~/.ssh/rc. If any future restriction capabilities are added to
authorized_keys files they will be included in this set.
tunnel="n"
Force a tun(4) device on the server. Without this option, the
next available device will be used if the client requests a
tunnel.
user-rc
Enables execution of ~/.ssh/rc previously disabled by the
restrict option.
X11-forwarding
Permits X11 forwarding previously disabled by the restrict
option.
An example authorized_keys file:
# Comments allowed at start of line
ssh-rsa AAAAB3Nza...LiPk== user@example.net
from="*.sales.example.net,!pc.sales.example.net" ssh-rsa
AAAAB2...19Q== john@example.net
command="dump /home",no-pty,no-port-forwarding ssh-rsa
AAAAC3...51R== example.net
permitopen="192.0.2.1:80",permitopen="192.0.2.2:25" ssh-rsa
AAAAB5...21S==
permitlisten="localhost:8080",permitopen="localhost:22000" ssh-rsa
AAAAB5...21S==
tunnel="0",command="sh /etc/netstart tun0" ssh-rsa AAAA...==
jane@example.net
restrict,command="uptime" ssh-rsa AAAA1C8...32Tv==
user@example.net
restrict,pty,command="nethack" ssh-rsa AAAA1f8...IrrC5==
user@example.net
+ no-touch-required sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com AAAAInN...Ko==
+ user@example.net
SSH_KNOWN_HOSTS FILE FORMAT
The /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts and ~/.ssh/known_hosts files contain host
public keys for all known hosts. The global file should be prepared by
the administrator (optional), and the per-user file is maintained
automatically: whenever the user connects to an unknown host, its key is
added to the per-user file.
Each line in these files contains the following fields: markers
(optional), hostnames, keytype, base64-encoded key, comment. The fields
are separated by spaces.
The marker is optional, but if it is present then it must be one of
M-bM-^@M-^\@cert-authorityM-bM-^@M-^], to indicate that the line contains a certification
authority (CA) key, or M-bM-^@M-^\@revokedM-bM-^@M-^], to indicate that the key contained on
the line is revoked and must not ever be accepted. Only one marker
should be used on a key line.
Hostnames is a comma-separated list of patterns (M-bM-^@M-^X*M-bM-^@M-^Y and M-bM-^@M-^X?M-bM-^@M-^Y act as
wildcards); each pattern in turn is matched against the host name. When
sshd is authenticating a client, such as when using
HostbasedAuthentication, this will be the canonical client host name.
When ssh(1) is authenticating a server, this will be the host name given
by the user, the value of the ssh(1) HostkeyAlias if it was specified, or
the canonical server hostname if the ssh(1) CanonicalizeHostname option
was used.
A pattern may also be preceded by M-bM-^@M-^X!M-bM-^@M-^Y to indicate negation: if the host
name matches a negated pattern, it is not accepted (by that line) even if
it matched another pattern on the line. A hostname or address may
optionally be enclosed within M-bM-^@M-^X[M-bM-^@M-^Y and M-bM-^@M-^X]M-bM-^@M-^Y brackets then followed by M-bM-^@M-^X:M-bM-^@M-^Y
and a non-standard port number.
Alternately, hostnames may be stored in a hashed form which hides host
names and addresses should the file's contents be disclosed. Hashed
hostnames start with a M-bM-^@M-^X|M-bM-^@M-^Y character. Only one hashed hostname may
appear on a single line and none of the above negation or wildcard
operators may be applied.
The keytype and base64-encoded key are taken directly from the host key;
they can be obtained, for example, from /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key.pub.
The optional comment field continues to the end of the line, and is not
used.
Lines starting with M-bM-^@M-^X#M-bM-^@M-^Y and empty lines are ignored as comments.
When performing host authentication, authentication is accepted if any
matching line has the proper key; either one that matches exactly or, if
the server has presented a certificate for authentication, the key of the
certification authority that signed the certificate. For a key to be
trusted as a certification authority, it must use the M-bM-^@M-^\@cert-authorityM-bM-^@M-^]
marker described above.
The known hosts file also provides a facility to mark keys as revoked,
for example when it is known that the associated private key has been
stolen. Revoked keys are specified by including the M-bM-^@M-^\@revokedM-bM-^@M-^] marker at
the beginning of the key line, and are never accepted for authentication
or as certification authorities, but instead will produce a warning from
ssh(1) when they are encountered.
It is permissible (but not recommended) to have several lines or
different host keys for the same names. This will inevitably happen when
short forms of host names from different domains are put in the file. It
is possible that the files contain conflicting information;
authentication is accepted if valid information can be found from either
file.
Note that the lines in these files are typically hundreds of characters
long, and you definitely don't want to type in the host keys by hand.
Rather, generate them by a script, ssh-keyscan(1) or by taking, for
example, /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key.pub and adding the host names at the
front. ssh-keygen(1) also offers some basic automated editing for
~/.ssh/known_hosts including removing hosts matching a host name and
converting all host names to their hashed representations.
An example ssh_known_hosts file:
# Comments allowed at start of line
closenet,...,192.0.2.53 1024 37 159...93 closenet.example.net
cvs.example.net,192.0.2.10 ssh-rsa AAAA1234.....=
# A hashed hostname
|1|JfKTdBh7rNbXkVAQCRp4OQoPfmI=|USECr3SWf1JUPsms5AqfD5QfxkM= ssh-rsa
AAAA1234.....=
# A revoked key
@revoked * ssh-rsa AAAAB5W...
# A CA key, accepted for any host in *.mydomain.com or *.mydomain.org
@cert-authority *.mydomain.org,*.mydomain.com ssh-rsa AAAAB5W...
FILES
~/.hushlogin
This file is used to suppress printing the last login time and
/etc/motd, if PrintLastLog and PrintMotd, respectively, are
enabled. It does not suppress printing of the banner specified
by Banner.
~/.rhosts
This file is used for host-based authentication (see ssh(1) for
more information). On some machines this file may need to be
world-readable if the user's home directory is on an NFS
partition, because sshd reads it as root. Additionally, this
file must be owned by the user, and must not have write
permissions for anyone else. The recommended permission for most
machines is read/write for the user, and not accessible by
others.
~/.shosts
This file is used in exactly the same way as .rhosts, but allows
host-based authentication without permitting login with
rlogin/rsh.
~/.ssh/
This directory is the default location for all user-specific
configuration and authentication information. There is no
general requirement to keep the entire contents of this directory
secret, but the recommended permissions are read/write/execute
for the user, and not accessible by others.
~/.ssh/authorized_keys
Lists the public keys (DSA, ECDSA, Ed25519, RSA) that can be used
for logging in as this user. The format of this file is
described above. The content of the file is not highly
sensitive, but the recommended permissions are read/write for the
user, and not accessible by others.
If this file, the ~/.ssh directory, or the user's home directory
are writable by other users, then the file could be modified or
replaced by unauthorized users. In this case, sshd will not
allow it to be used unless the StrictModes option has been set to
M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^].
~/.ssh/environment
This file is read into the environment at login (if it exists).
It can only contain empty lines, comment lines (that start with
M-bM-^@M-^X#M-bM-^@M-^Y), and assignment lines of the form name=value. The file
should be writable only by the user; it need not be readable by
anyone else. Environment processing is disabled by default and
is controlled via the PermitUserEnvironment option.
~/.ssh/known_hosts
Contains a list of host keys for all hosts the user has logged
into that are not already in the systemwide list of known host
keys. The format of this file is described above. This file
should be writable only by root/the owner and can, but need not
be, world-readable.
~/.ssh/rc
Contains initialization routines to be run before the user's home
directory becomes accessible. This file should be writable only
by the user, and need not be readable by anyone else.
/etc/hosts.equiv
This file is for host-based authentication (see ssh(1)). It
should only be writable by root.
/etc/moduli
Contains Diffie-Hellman groups used for the "Diffie-Hellman Group
Exchange" key exchange method. The file format is described in
moduli(5). If no usable groups are found in this file then fixed
internal groups will be used.
/etc/motd
See motd(5).
/etc/nologin
If this file exists, sshd refuses to let anyone except root log
in. The contents of the file are displayed to anyone trying to
log in, and non-root connections are refused. The file should be
world-readable.
/etc/shosts.equiv
This file is used in exactly the same way as hosts.equiv, but
allows host-based authentication without permitting login with
rlogin/rsh.
/etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key
/etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key
/etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key
These files contain the private parts of the host keys. These
files should only be owned by root, readable only by root, and
not accessible to others. Note that sshd does not start if these
files are group/world-accessible.
/etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key.pub
/etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key.pub
/etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key.pub
These files contain the public parts of the host keys. These
files should be world-readable but writable only by root. Their
contents should match the respective private parts. These files
are not really used for anything; they are provided for the
convenience of the user so their contents can be copied to known
hosts files. These files are created using ssh-keygen(1).
/etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts
Systemwide list of known host keys. This file should be prepared
by the system administrator to contain the public host keys of
all machines in the organization. The format of this file is
described above. This file should be writable only by root/the
owner and should be world-readable.
/etc/ssh/sshd_config
Contains configuration data for sshd. The file format and
configuration options are described in sshd_config(5).
/etc/ssh/sshrc
Similar to ~/.ssh/rc, it can be used to specify machine-specific
login-time initializations globally. This file should be
writable only by root, and should be world-readable.
/var/empty
chroot(2) directory used by sshd during privilege separation in
the pre-authentication phase. The directory should not contain
any files and must be owned by root and not group or world-
writable.
/var/run/sshd.pid
Contains the process ID of the sshd listening for connections (if
there are several daemons running concurrently for different
ports, this contains the process ID of the one started last).
The content of this file is not sensitive; it can be world-
readable.
SEE ALSO
scp(1), sftp(1), ssh(1), ssh-add(1), ssh-agent(1), ssh-keygen(1),
ssh-keyscan(1), chroot(2), login.conf(5), moduli(5), sshd_config(5),
inetd(8), sftp-server(8)
AUTHORS
OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free ssh 1.2.12 release by
Tatu Ylonen. Aaron Campbell, Bob Beck, Markus Friedl, Niels Provos, Theo
de Raadt and Dug Song removed many bugs, re-added newer features and
created OpenSSH. Markus Friedl contributed the support for SSH protocol
versions 1.5 and 2.0. Niels Provos and Markus Friedl contributed support
for privilege separation.
-OpenBSD 6.6 July 22, 2018 OpenBSD 6.6
+OpenBSD 6.6 January 25, 2020 OpenBSD 6.6
diff --git a/sshd.8 b/sshd.8
index fb133c14b981..c5f8987d228f 100644
--- a/sshd.8
+++ b/sshd.8
@@ -1,993 +1,1013 @@
.\"
.\" Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
.\" Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
.\" All rights reserved
.\"
.\" As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
.\" can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
.\" software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
.\" incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
.\" called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
.\"
.\" Copyright (c) 1999,2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
.\" Copyright (c) 1999 Aaron Campbell. All rights reserved.
.\" Copyright (c) 1999 Theo de Raadt. All rights reserved.
.\"
.\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
.\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
.\" are met:
.\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
.\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
.\" documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
.\"
.\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
.\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
.\" OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
.\" IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
.\" INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
.\" NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
.\" DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
.\" THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
.\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
.\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
.\"
-.\" $OpenBSD: sshd.8,v 1.304 2018/07/22 12:16:59 dtucker Exp $
-.Dd $Mdocdate: July 22 2018 $
+.\" $OpenBSD: sshd.8,v 1.312 2020/01/25 06:03:10 djm Exp $
+.Dd $Mdocdate: January 25 2020 $
.Dt SSHD 8
.Os
.Sh NAME
.Nm sshd
-.Nd OpenSSH SSH daemon
+.Nd OpenSSH daemon
.Sh SYNOPSIS
.Nm sshd
.Bk -words
.Op Fl 46DdeiqTt
.Op Fl C Ar connection_spec
.Op Fl c Ar host_certificate_file
.Op Fl E Ar log_file
.Op Fl f Ar config_file
.Op Fl g Ar login_grace_time
.Op Fl h Ar host_key_file
.Op Fl o Ar option
.Op Fl p Ar port
.Op Fl u Ar len
.Ek
.Sh DESCRIPTION
.Nm
(OpenSSH Daemon) is the daemon program for
.Xr ssh 1 .
Together these programs replace rlogin and rsh,
and provide secure encrypted communications between two untrusted hosts
over an insecure network.
.Pp
.Nm
listens for connections from clients.
It is normally started at boot from
.Pa /etc/rc .
It forks a new
daemon for each incoming connection.
The forked daemons handle
key exchange, encryption, authentication, command execution,
and data exchange.
.Pp
.Nm
can be configured using command-line options or a configuration file
(by default
.Xr sshd_config 5 ) ;
command-line options override values specified in the
configuration file.
.Nm
rereads its configuration file when it receives a hangup signal,
.Dv SIGHUP ,
by executing itself with the name and options it was started with, e.g.\&
.Pa /usr/sbin/sshd .
.Pp
The options are as follows:
.Bl -tag -width Ds
.It Fl 4
Forces
.Nm
to use IPv4 addresses only.
.It Fl 6
Forces
.Nm
to use IPv6 addresses only.
.It Fl C Ar connection_spec
Specify the connection parameters to use for the
.Fl T
extended test mode.
If provided, any
.Cm Match
directives in the configuration file that would apply are applied before the
configuration is written to standard output.
The connection parameters are supplied as keyword=value pairs and may be
supplied in any order, either with multiple
.Fl C
options or as a comma-separated list.
The keywords are
.Dq addr,
.Dq user ,
.Dq host ,
.Dq laddr ,
.Dq lport ,
and
.Dq rdomain
and correspond to source address, user, resolved source host name,
local address, local port number and routing domain respectively.
.It Fl c Ar host_certificate_file
Specifies a path to a certificate file to identify
.Nm
during key exchange.
The certificate file must match a host key file specified using the
.Fl h
option or the
.Cm HostKey
configuration directive.
.It Fl D
When this option is specified,
.Nm
will not detach and does not become a daemon.
This allows easy monitoring of
.Nm sshd .
.It Fl d
Debug mode.
The server sends verbose debug output to standard error,
and does not put itself in the background.
The server also will not fork and will only process one connection.
This option is only intended for debugging for the server.
Multiple
.Fl d
options increase the debugging level.
Maximum is 3.
.It Fl E Ar log_file
Append debug logs to
.Ar log_file
instead of the system log.
.It Fl e
Write debug logs to standard error instead of the system log.
.It Fl f Ar config_file
Specifies the name of the configuration file.
The default is
.Pa /etc/ssh/sshd_config .
.Nm
refuses to start if there is no configuration file.
.It Fl g Ar login_grace_time
Gives the grace time for clients to authenticate themselves (default
120 seconds).
If the client fails to authenticate the user within
this many seconds, the server disconnects and exits.
A value of zero indicates no limit.
.It Fl h Ar host_key_file
Specifies a file from which a host key is read.
This option must be given if
.Nm
is not run as root (as the normal
host key files are normally not readable by anyone but root).
The default is
.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key ,
.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key
and
.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key .
It is possible to have multiple host key files for
the different host key algorithms.
.It Fl i
Specifies that
.Nm
is being run from
.Xr inetd 8 .
.It Fl o Ar option
Can be used to give options in the format used in the configuration file.
This is useful for specifying options for which there is no separate
command-line flag.
For full details of the options, and their values, see
.Xr sshd_config 5 .
.It Fl p Ar port
Specifies the port on which the server listens for connections
(default 22).
Multiple port options are permitted.
Ports specified in the configuration file with the
.Cm Port
option are ignored when a command-line port is specified.
Ports specified using the
.Cm ListenAddress
option override command-line ports.
.It Fl q
Quiet mode.
Nothing is sent to the system log.
Normally the beginning,
authentication, and termination of each connection is logged.
.It Fl T
Extended test mode.
Check the validity of the configuration file, output the effective configuration
to stdout and then exit.
Optionally,
.Cm Match
rules may be applied by specifying the connection parameters using one or more
.Fl C
options.
.It Fl t
Test mode.
Only check the validity of the configuration file and sanity of the keys.
This is useful for updating
.Nm
reliably as configuration options may change.
.It Fl u Ar len
This option is used to specify the size of the field
in the
.Li utmp
structure that holds the remote host name.
If the resolved host name is longer than
.Ar len ,
the dotted decimal value will be used instead.
This allows hosts with very long host names that
overflow this field to still be uniquely identified.
Specifying
.Fl u0
indicates that only dotted decimal addresses
should be put into the
.Pa utmp
file.
.Fl u0
may also be used to prevent
.Nm
from making DNS requests unless the authentication
mechanism or configuration requires it.
Authentication mechanisms that may require DNS include
.Cm HostbasedAuthentication
and using a
.Cm from="pattern-list"
option in a key file.
Configuration options that require DNS include using a
USER@HOST pattern in
.Cm AllowUsers
or
.Cm DenyUsers .
.El
.Sh AUTHENTICATION
The OpenSSH SSH daemon supports SSH protocol 2 only.
Each host has a host-specific key,
used to identify the host.
Whenever a client connects, the daemon responds with its public
host key.
The client compares the
host key against its own database to verify that it has not changed.
-Forward security is provided through a Diffie-Hellman key agreement.
+Forward secrecy is provided through a Diffie-Hellman key agreement.
This key agreement results in a shared session key.
-The rest of the session is encrypted using a symmetric cipher, currently
-128-bit AES, Blowfish, 3DES, CAST128, Arcfour, 192-bit AES, or 256-bit AES.
+The rest of the session is encrypted using a symmetric cipher.
The client selects the encryption algorithm
to use from those offered by the server.
Additionally, session integrity is provided
-through a cryptographic message authentication code
-(hmac-md5, hmac-sha1, umac-64, umac-128,
-hmac-sha2-256 or hmac-sha2-512).
+through a cryptographic message authentication code (MAC).
.Pp
Finally, the server and the client enter an authentication dialog.
The client tries to authenticate itself using
host-based authentication,
public key authentication,
challenge-response authentication,
or password authentication.
.Pp
Regardless of the authentication type, the account is checked to
ensure that it is accessible. An account is not accessible if it is
locked, listed in
.Cm DenyUsers
or its group is listed in
.Cm DenyGroups
\&. The definition of a locked account is system dependent. Some platforms
have their own account database (eg AIX) and some modify the passwd field (
.Ql \&*LK\&*
on Solaris and UnixWare,
.Ql \&*
on HP-UX, containing
.Ql Nologin
on Tru64,
a leading
.Ql \&*LOCKED\&*
on FreeBSD and a leading
.Ql \&!
on most Linuxes).
If there is a requirement to disable password authentication
for the account while allowing still public-key, then the passwd field
should be set to something other than these values (eg
.Ql NP
or
.Ql \&*NP\&*
).
.Pp
If the client successfully authenticates itself, a dialog for
preparing the session is entered.
At this time the client may request
things like allocating a pseudo-tty, forwarding X11 connections,
forwarding TCP connections, or forwarding the authentication agent
connection over the secure channel.
.Pp
After this, the client either requests a shell or execution of a command.
The sides then enter session mode.
In this mode, either side may send
data at any time, and such data is forwarded to/from the shell or
command on the server side, and the user terminal in the client side.
.Pp
When the user program terminates and all forwarded X11 and other
connections have been closed, the server sends command exit status to
the client, and both sides exit.
.Sh LOGIN PROCESS
When a user successfully logs in,
.Nm
does the following:
.Bl -enum -offset indent
.It
If the login is on a tty, and no command has been specified,
prints last login time and
.Pa /etc/motd
(unless prevented in the configuration file or by
.Pa ~/.hushlogin ;
see the
.Sx FILES
section).
.It
If the login is on a tty, records login time.
.It
Checks
.Pa /etc/nologin ;
if it exists, prints contents and quits
(unless root).
.It
Changes to run with normal user privileges.
.It
Sets up basic environment.
.It
Reads the file
.Pa ~/.ssh/environment ,
if it exists, and users are allowed to change their environment.
See the
.Cm PermitUserEnvironment
option in
.Xr sshd_config 5 .
.It
Changes to user's home directory.
.It
If
.Pa ~/.ssh/rc
exists and the
.Xr sshd_config 5
.Cm PermitUserRC
option is set, runs it; else if
.Pa /etc/ssh/sshrc
exists, runs
it; otherwise runs xauth.
The
.Dq rc
files are given the X11
authentication protocol and cookie in standard input.
See
.Sx SSHRC ,
below.
.It
Runs user's shell or command.
All commands are run under the user's login shell as specified in the
system password database.
.El
.Sh SSHRC
If the file
.Pa ~/.ssh/rc
exists,
.Xr sh 1
runs it after reading the
environment files but before starting the user's shell or command.
It must not produce any output on stdout; stderr must be used
instead.
If X11 forwarding is in use, it will receive the "proto cookie" pair in
its standard input (and
.Ev DISPLAY
in its environment).
The script must call
.Xr xauth 1
because
.Nm
will not run xauth automatically to add X11 cookies.
.Pp
The primary purpose of this file is to run any initialization routines
which may be needed before the user's home directory becomes
accessible; AFS is a particular example of such an environment.
.Pp
This file will probably contain some initialization code followed by
something similar to:
.Bd -literal -offset 3n
if read proto cookie && [ -n "$DISPLAY" ]; then
if [ `echo $DISPLAY | cut -c1-10` = 'localhost:' ]; then
# X11UseLocalhost=yes
echo add unix:`echo $DISPLAY |
cut -c11-` $proto $cookie
else
# X11UseLocalhost=no
echo add $DISPLAY $proto $cookie
fi | xauth -q -
fi
.Ed
.Pp
If this file does not exist,
.Pa /etc/ssh/sshrc
is run, and if that
does not exist either, xauth is used to add the cookie.
.Sh AUTHORIZED_KEYS FILE FORMAT
.Cm AuthorizedKeysFile
specifies the files containing public keys for
public key authentication;
if this option is not specified, the default is
.Pa ~/.ssh/authorized_keys
and
.Pa ~/.ssh/authorized_keys2 .
Each line of the file contains one
key (empty lines and lines starting with a
.Ql #
are ignored as
comments).
Public keys consist of the following space-separated fields:
options, keytype, base64-encoded key, comment.
The options field is optional.
-The keytype is
-.Dq ecdsa-sha2-nistp256 ,
-.Dq ecdsa-sha2-nistp384 ,
-.Dq ecdsa-sha2-nistp521 ,
-.Dq ssh-ed25519 ,
-.Dq ssh-dss
-or
-.Dq ssh-rsa ;
-the comment field is not used for anything (but may be convenient for the
+The supported key types are:
+.Pp
+.Bl -item -compact -offset indent
+.It
+sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com
+.It
+ecdsa-sha2-nistp256
+.It
+ecdsa-sha2-nistp384
+.It
+ecdsa-sha2-nistp521
+.It
+sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com
+.It
+ssh-ed25519
+.It
+ssh-dss
+.It
+ssh-rsa
+.El
+.Pp
+The comment field is not used for anything (but may be convenient for the
user to identify the key).
.Pp
Note that lines in this file can be several hundred bytes long
(because of the size of the public key encoding) up to a limit of
-8 kilobytes, which permits DSA keys up to 8 kilobits and RSA
-keys up to 16 kilobits.
+8 kilobytes, which permits RSA keys up to 16 kilobits.
You don't want to type them in; instead, copy the
.Pa id_dsa.pub ,
.Pa id_ecdsa.pub ,
+.Pa id_ecdsa_sk.pub ,
.Pa id_ed25519.pub ,
+.Pa id_ed25519_sk.pub ,
or the
.Pa id_rsa.pub
file and edit it.
.Pp
.Nm
enforces a minimum RSA key modulus size of 1024 bits.
.Pp
The options (if present) consist of comma-separated option
specifications.
No spaces are permitted, except within double quotes.
The following option specifications are supported (note
that option keywords are case-insensitive):
.Bl -tag -width Ds
.It Cm agent-forwarding
Enable authentication agent forwarding previously disabled by the
.Cm restrict
option.
.It Cm cert-authority
Specifies that the listed key is a certification authority (CA) that is
trusted to validate signed certificates for user authentication.
.Pp
Certificates may encode access restrictions similar to these key options.
If both certificate restrictions and key options are present, the most
restrictive union of the two is applied.
.It Cm command="command"
Specifies that the command is executed whenever this key is used for
authentication.
The command supplied by the user (if any) is ignored.
The command is run on a pty if the client requests a pty;
otherwise it is run without a tty.
If an 8-bit clean channel is required,
one must not request a pty or should specify
.Cm no-pty .
A quote may be included in the command by quoting it with a backslash.
.Pp
This option might be useful
to restrict certain public keys to perform just a specific operation.
An example might be a key that permits remote backups but nothing else.
Note that the client may specify TCP and/or X11
forwarding unless they are explicitly prohibited, e.g. using the
.Cm restrict
key option.
.Pp
The command originally supplied by the client is available in the
.Ev SSH_ORIGINAL_COMMAND
environment variable.
Note that this option applies to shell, command or subsystem execution.
Also note that this command may be superseded by a
.Xr sshd_config 5
.Cm ForceCommand
directive.
.Pp
If a command is specified and a forced-command is embedded in a certificate
used for authentication, then the certificate will be accepted only if the
two commands are identical.
.It Cm environment="NAME=value"
Specifies that the string is to be added to the environment when
logging in using this key.
Environment variables set this way
override other default environment values.
Multiple options of this type are permitted.
Environment processing is disabled by default and is
controlled via the
.Cm PermitUserEnvironment
option.
.It Cm expiry-time="timespec"
Specifies a time after which the key will not be accepted.
The time may be specified as a YYYYMMDD date or a YYYYMMDDHHMM[SS] time
in the system time-zone.
.It Cm from="pattern-list"
Specifies that in addition to public key authentication, either the canonical
name of the remote host or its IP address must be present in the
comma-separated list of patterns.
See PATTERNS in
.Xr ssh_config 5
for more information on patterns.
.Pp
In addition to the wildcard matching that may be applied to hostnames or
addresses, a
.Cm from
stanza may match IP addresses using CIDR address/masklen notation.
.Pp
The purpose of this option is to optionally increase security: public key
authentication by itself does not trust the network or name servers or
anything (but the key); however, if somebody somehow steals the key, the key
permits an intruder to log in from anywhere in the world.
This additional option makes using a stolen key more difficult (name
servers and/or routers would have to be compromised in addition to
just the key).
.It Cm no-agent-forwarding
Forbids authentication agent forwarding when this key is used for
authentication.
.It Cm no-port-forwarding
Forbids TCP forwarding when this key is used for authentication.
Any port forward requests by the client will return an error.
This might be used, e.g. in connection with the
.Cm command
option.
.It Cm no-pty
Prevents tty allocation (a request to allocate a pty will fail).
.It Cm no-user-rc
Disables execution of
.Pa ~/.ssh/rc .
.It Cm no-X11-forwarding
Forbids X11 forwarding when this key is used for authentication.
Any X11 forward requests by the client will return an error.
.It Cm permitlisten="[host:]port"
Limit remote port forwarding with the
.Xr ssh 1
.Fl R
option such that it may only listen on the specified host (optional) and port.
IPv6 addresses can be specified by enclosing the address in square brackets.
Multiple
.Cm permitlisten
options may be applied separated by commas.
Hostnames may include wildcards as described in the PATTERNS section in
.Xr ssh_config 5 .
A port specification of
.Cm *
matches any port.
Note that the setting of
.Cm GatewayPorts
may further restrict listen addresses.
Note that
.Xr ssh 1
will send a hostname of
.Dq localhost
if a listen host was not specified when the forwarding was requested, and
that this name is treated differently to the explicit localhost addresses
.Dq 127.0.0.1
and
.Dq ::1 .
.It Cm permitopen="host:port"
Limit local port forwarding with the
.Xr ssh 1
.Fl L
option such that it may only connect to the specified host and port.
IPv6 addresses can be specified by enclosing the address in square brackets.
Multiple
.Cm permitopen
options may be applied separated by commas.
-No pattern matching is performed on the specified hostnames,
-they must be literal domains or addresses.
+No pattern matching or name lookup is performed on the
+specified hostnames, they must be literal host names and/or addresses.
A port specification of
.Cm *
matches any port.
.It Cm port-forwarding
Enable port forwarding previously disabled by the
.Cm restrict
option.
.It Cm principals="principals"
On a
.Cm cert-authority
line, specifies allowed principals for certificate authentication as a
comma-separated list.
At least one name from the list must appear in the certificate's
list of principals for the certificate to be accepted.
This option is ignored for keys that are not marked as trusted certificate
signers using the
.Cm cert-authority
option.
.It Cm pty
Permits tty allocation previously disabled by the
.Cm restrict
option.
+.It Cm no-touch-required
+Do not require demonstration of user presence
+for signatures made using this key.
+This option only makes sense for the FIDO authenticator algorithms
+.Cm ecdsa-sk
+and
+.Cm ed25519-sk .
.It Cm restrict
Enable all restrictions, i.e. disable port, agent and X11 forwarding,
as well as disabling PTY allocation
and execution of
.Pa ~/.ssh/rc .
If any future restriction capabilities are added to authorized_keys files
they will be included in this set.
.It Cm tunnel="n"
Force a
.Xr tun 4
device on the server.
Without this option, the next available device will be used if
the client requests a tunnel.
.It Cm user-rc
Enables execution of
.Pa ~/.ssh/rc
previously disabled by the
.Cm restrict
option.
.It Cm X11-forwarding
Permits X11 forwarding previously disabled by the
.Cm restrict
option.
.El
.Pp
An example authorized_keys file:
.Bd -literal -offset 3n
# Comments allowed at start of line
ssh-rsa AAAAB3Nza...LiPk== user@example.net
from="*.sales.example.net,!pc.sales.example.net" ssh-rsa
AAAAB2...19Q== john@example.net
command="dump /home",no-pty,no-port-forwarding ssh-rsa
AAAAC3...51R== example.net
permitopen="192.0.2.1:80",permitopen="192.0.2.2:25" ssh-rsa
AAAAB5...21S==
permitlisten="localhost:8080",permitopen="localhost:22000" ssh-rsa
AAAAB5...21S==
tunnel="0",command="sh /etc/netstart tun0" ssh-rsa AAAA...==
jane@example.net
restrict,command="uptime" ssh-rsa AAAA1C8...32Tv==
user@example.net
restrict,pty,command="nethack" ssh-rsa AAAA1f8...IrrC5==
user@example.net
+no-touch-required sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com AAAAInN...Ko==
+user@example.net
.Ed
.Sh SSH_KNOWN_HOSTS FILE FORMAT
The
.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts
and
.Pa ~/.ssh/known_hosts
files contain host public keys for all known hosts.
The global file should
be prepared by the administrator (optional), and the per-user file is
maintained automatically: whenever the user connects to an unknown host,
its key is added to the per-user file.
.Pp
Each line in these files contains the following fields: markers (optional),
hostnames, keytype, base64-encoded key, comment.
The fields are separated by spaces.
.Pp
The marker is optional, but if it is present then it must be one of
.Dq @cert-authority ,
to indicate that the line contains a certification authority (CA) key,
or
.Dq @revoked ,
to indicate that the key contained on the line is revoked and must not ever
be accepted.
Only one marker should be used on a key line.
.Pp
Hostnames is a comma-separated list of patterns
.Pf ( Ql *
and
.Ql \&?
act as
wildcards); each pattern in turn is matched against the host name.
When
.Nm sshd
is authenticating a client, such as when using
.Cm HostbasedAuthentication ,
this will be the canonical client host name.
When
.Xr ssh 1
is authenticating a server, this will be the host name
given by the user, the value of the
.Xr ssh 1
.Cm HostkeyAlias
if it was specified, or the canonical server hostname if the
.Xr ssh 1
.Cm CanonicalizeHostname
option was used.
.Pp
A pattern may also be preceded by
.Ql \&!
to indicate negation: if the host name matches a negated
pattern, it is not accepted (by that line) even if it matched another
pattern on the line.
A hostname or address may optionally be enclosed within
.Ql \&[
and
.Ql \&]
brackets then followed by
.Ql \&:
and a non-standard port number.
.Pp
Alternately, hostnames may be stored in a hashed form which hides host names
and addresses should the file's contents be disclosed.
Hashed hostnames start with a
.Ql |
character.
Only one hashed hostname may appear on a single line and none of the above
negation or wildcard operators may be applied.
.Pp
The keytype and base64-encoded key are taken directly from the host key; they
can be obtained, for example, from
.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key.pub .
The optional comment field continues to the end of the line, and is not used.
.Pp
Lines starting with
.Ql #
and empty lines are ignored as comments.
.Pp
When performing host authentication, authentication is accepted if any
matching line has the proper key; either one that matches exactly or,
if the server has presented a certificate for authentication, the key
of the certification authority that signed the certificate.
For a key to be trusted as a certification authority, it must use the
.Dq @cert-authority
marker described above.
.Pp
The known hosts file also provides a facility to mark keys as revoked,
for example when it is known that the associated private key has been
stolen.
Revoked keys are specified by including the
.Dq @revoked
marker at the beginning of the key line, and are never accepted for
authentication or as certification authorities, but instead will
produce a warning from
.Xr ssh 1
when they are encountered.
.Pp
It is permissible (but not
recommended) to have several lines or different host keys for the same
names.
This will inevitably happen when short forms of host names
from different domains are put in the file.
It is possible
that the files contain conflicting information; authentication is
accepted if valid information can be found from either file.
.Pp
Note that the lines in these files are typically hundreds of characters
long, and you definitely don't want to type in the host keys by hand.
Rather, generate them by a script,
.Xr ssh-keyscan 1
or by taking, for example,
.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key.pub
and adding the host names at the front.
.Xr ssh-keygen 1
also offers some basic automated editing for
.Pa ~/.ssh/known_hosts
including removing hosts matching a host name and converting all host
names to their hashed representations.
.Pp
An example ssh_known_hosts file:
.Bd -literal -offset 3n
# Comments allowed at start of line
closenet,...,192.0.2.53 1024 37 159...93 closenet.example.net
cvs.example.net,192.0.2.10 ssh-rsa AAAA1234.....=
# A hashed hostname
|1|JfKTdBh7rNbXkVAQCRp4OQoPfmI=|USECr3SWf1JUPsms5AqfD5QfxkM= ssh-rsa
AAAA1234.....=
# A revoked key
@revoked * ssh-rsa AAAAB5W...
# A CA key, accepted for any host in *.mydomain.com or *.mydomain.org
@cert-authority *.mydomain.org,*.mydomain.com ssh-rsa AAAAB5W...
.Ed
.Sh FILES
.Bl -tag -width Ds -compact
.It Pa ~/.hushlogin
This file is used to suppress printing the last login time and
.Pa /etc/motd ,
if
.Cm PrintLastLog
and
.Cm PrintMotd ,
respectively,
are enabled.
It does not suppress printing of the banner specified by
.Cm Banner .
.Pp
.It Pa ~/.rhosts
This file is used for host-based authentication (see
.Xr ssh 1
for more information).
On some machines this file may need to be
world-readable if the user's home directory is on an NFS partition,
because
.Nm
reads it as root.
Additionally, this file must be owned by the user,
and must not have write permissions for anyone else.
The recommended
permission for most machines is read/write for the user, and not
accessible by others.
.Pp
.It Pa ~/.shosts
This file is used in exactly the same way as
.Pa .rhosts ,
but allows host-based authentication without permitting login with
rlogin/rsh.
.Pp
.It Pa ~/.ssh/
This directory is the default location for all user-specific configuration
and authentication information.
There is no general requirement to keep the entire contents of this directory
secret, but the recommended permissions are read/write/execute for the user,
and not accessible by others.
.Pp
.It Pa ~/.ssh/authorized_keys
Lists the public keys (DSA, ECDSA, Ed25519, RSA)
that can be used for logging in as this user.
The format of this file is described above.
The content of the file is not highly sensitive, but the recommended
permissions are read/write for the user, and not accessible by others.
.Pp
If this file, the
.Pa ~/.ssh
directory, or the user's home directory are writable
by other users, then the file could be modified or replaced by unauthorized
users.
In this case,
.Nm
will not allow it to be used unless the
.Cm StrictModes
option has been set to
.Dq no .
.Pp
.It Pa ~/.ssh/environment
This file is read into the environment at login (if it exists).
It can only contain empty lines, comment lines (that start with
.Ql # ) ,
and assignment lines of the form name=value.
The file should be writable
only by the user; it need not be readable by anyone else.
Environment processing is disabled by default and is
controlled via the
.Cm PermitUserEnvironment
option.
.Pp
.It Pa ~/.ssh/known_hosts
Contains a list of host keys for all hosts the user has logged into
that are not already in the systemwide list of known host keys.
The format of this file is described above.
This file should be writable only by root/the owner and
can, but need not be, world-readable.
.Pp
.It Pa ~/.ssh/rc
Contains initialization routines to be run before
the user's home directory becomes accessible.
This file should be writable only by the user, and need not be
readable by anyone else.
.Pp
.It Pa /etc/hosts.equiv
This file is for host-based authentication (see
.Xr ssh 1 ) .
It should only be writable by root.
.Pp
.It Pa /etc/moduli
Contains Diffie-Hellman groups used for the "Diffie-Hellman Group Exchange"
key exchange method.
The file format is described in
.Xr moduli 5 .
If no usable groups are found in this file then fixed internal groups will
be used.
.Pp
.It Pa /etc/motd
See
.Xr motd 5 .
.Pp
.It Pa /etc/nologin
If this file exists,
.Nm
refuses to let anyone except root log in.
The contents of the file
are displayed to anyone trying to log in, and non-root connections are
refused.
The file should be world-readable.
.Pp
.It Pa /etc/shosts.equiv
This file is used in exactly the same way as
.Pa hosts.equiv ,
but allows host-based authentication without permitting login with
rlogin/rsh.
.Pp
.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key
.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key
.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key
These files contain the private parts of the host keys.
These files should only be owned by root, readable only by root, and not
accessible to others.
Note that
.Nm
does not start if these files are group/world-accessible.
.Pp
.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key.pub
.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key.pub
.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key.pub
These files contain the public parts of the host keys.
These files should be world-readable but writable only by
root.
Their contents should match the respective private parts.
These files are not
really used for anything; they are provided for the convenience of
the user so their contents can be copied to known hosts files.
These files are created using
.Xr ssh-keygen 1 .
.Pp
.It Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_known_hosts
Systemwide list of known host keys.
This file should be prepared by the
system administrator to contain the public host keys of all machines in the
organization.
The format of this file is described above.
This file should be writable only by root/the owner and
should be world-readable.
.Pp
.It Pa /etc/ssh/sshd_config
Contains configuration data for
.Nm sshd .
The file format and configuration options are described in
.Xr sshd_config 5 .
.Pp
.It Pa /etc/ssh/sshrc
Similar to
.Pa ~/.ssh/rc ,
it can be used to specify
machine-specific login-time initializations globally.
This file should be writable only by root, and should be world-readable.
.Pp
.It Pa /var/empty
.Xr chroot 2
directory used by
.Nm
during privilege separation in the pre-authentication phase.
The directory should not contain any files and must be owned by root
and not group or world-writable.
.Pp
.It Pa /var/run/sshd.pid
Contains the process ID of the
.Nm
listening for connections (if there are several daemons running
concurrently for different ports, this contains the process ID of the one
started last).
The content of this file is not sensitive; it can be world-readable.
.El
.Sh SEE ALSO
.Xr scp 1 ,
.Xr sftp 1 ,
.Xr ssh 1 ,
.Xr ssh-add 1 ,
.Xr ssh-agent 1 ,
.Xr ssh-keygen 1 ,
.Xr ssh-keyscan 1 ,
.Xr chroot 2 ,
.Xr login.conf 5 ,
.Xr moduli 5 ,
.Xr sshd_config 5 ,
.Xr inetd 8 ,
.Xr sftp-server 8
.Sh AUTHORS
OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free
ssh 1.2.12 release by Tatu Ylonen.
Aaron Campbell, Bob Beck, Markus Friedl, Niels Provos,
Theo de Raadt and Dug Song
removed many bugs, re-added newer features and
created OpenSSH.
Markus Friedl contributed the support for SSH
protocol versions 1.5 and 2.0.
Niels Provos and Markus Friedl contributed support
for privilege separation.
diff --git a/sshd.c b/sshd.c
index 11571c010115..60b2aaf73e1f 100644
--- a/sshd.c
+++ b/sshd.c
@@ -1,2327 +1,2409 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: sshd.c,v 1.537 2019/06/28 13:35:04 deraadt Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: sshd.c,v 1.549 2020/01/31 23:13:04 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
* All rights reserved
* This program is the ssh daemon. It listens for connections from clients,
* and performs authentication, executes use commands or shell, and forwards
* information to/from the application to the user client over an encrypted
* connection. This can also handle forwarding of X11, TCP/IP, and
* authentication agent connections.
*
* As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
* can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
* software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
* incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
* called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
*
* SSH2 implementation:
* Privilege Separation:
*
* Copyright (c) 2000, 2001, 2002 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (c) 2002 Niels Provos. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/ioctl.h>
#include <sys/socket.h>
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_STAT_H
# include <sys/stat.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_TIME_H
# include <sys/time.h>
#endif
#include "openbsd-compat/sys-tree.h"
#include "openbsd-compat/sys-queue.h"
#include <sys/wait.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <netdb.h>
#ifdef HAVE_PATHS_H
#include <paths.h>
#endif
#include <grp.h>
#include <pwd.h>
#include <signal.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <limits.h>
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
#include <openssl/dh.h>
#include <openssl/bn.h>
#include <openssl/rand.h>
#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_SECUREWARE
#include <sys/security.h>
#include <prot.h>
#endif
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "ssh.h"
#include "ssh2.h"
#include "sshpty.h"
#include "packet.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "sshbuf.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "match.h"
#include "servconf.h"
#include "uidswap.h"
#include "compat.h"
#include "cipher.h"
#include "digest.h"
#include "sshkey.h"
#include "kex.h"
#include "myproposal.h"
#include "authfile.h"
#include "pathnames.h"
#include "atomicio.h"
#include "canohost.h"
#include "hostfile.h"
#include "auth.h"
#include "authfd.h"
#include "msg.h"
#include "dispatch.h"
#include "channels.h"
#include "session.h"
#include "monitor.h"
#ifdef GSSAPI
#include "ssh-gss.h"
#endif
#include "monitor_wrap.h"
#include "ssh-sandbox.h"
#include "auth-options.h"
#include "version.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
+#include "sk-api.h"
/* Re-exec fds */
#define REEXEC_DEVCRYPTO_RESERVED_FD (STDERR_FILENO + 1)
#define REEXEC_STARTUP_PIPE_FD (STDERR_FILENO + 2)
#define REEXEC_CONFIG_PASS_FD (STDERR_FILENO + 3)
#define REEXEC_MIN_FREE_FD (STDERR_FILENO + 4)
extern char *__progname;
/* Server configuration options. */
ServerOptions options;
/* Name of the server configuration file. */
char *config_file_name = _PATH_SERVER_CONFIG_FILE;
/*
* Debug mode flag. This can be set on the command line. If debug
* mode is enabled, extra debugging output will be sent to the system
* log, the daemon will not go to background, and will exit after processing
* the first connection.
*/
int debug_flag = 0;
/*
* Indicating that the daemon should only test the configuration and keys.
* If test_flag > 1 ("-T" flag), then sshd will also dump the effective
* configuration, optionally using connection information provided by the
* "-C" flag.
*/
static int test_flag = 0;
/* Flag indicating that the daemon is being started from inetd. */
static int inetd_flag = 0;
/* Flag indicating that sshd should not detach and become a daemon. */
static int no_daemon_flag = 0;
/* debug goes to stderr unless inetd_flag is set */
static int log_stderr = 0;
/* Saved arguments to main(). */
static char **saved_argv;
static int saved_argc;
/* re-exec */
static int rexeced_flag = 0;
static int rexec_flag = 1;
static int rexec_argc = 0;
static char **rexec_argv;
/*
* The sockets that the server is listening; this is used in the SIGHUP
* signal handler.
*/
#define MAX_LISTEN_SOCKS 16
static int listen_socks[MAX_LISTEN_SOCKS];
static int num_listen_socks = 0;
/* Daemon's agent connection */
int auth_sock = -1;
static int have_agent = 0;
/*
* Any really sensitive data in the application is contained in this
* structure. The idea is that this structure could be locked into memory so
* that the pages do not get written into swap. However, there are some
* problems. The private key contains BIGNUMs, and we do not (in principle)
* have access to the internals of them, and locking just the structure is
* not very useful. Currently, memory locking is not implemented.
*/
struct {
struct sshkey **host_keys; /* all private host keys */
struct sshkey **host_pubkeys; /* all public host keys */
struct sshkey **host_certificates; /* all public host certificates */
int have_ssh2_key;
} sensitive_data;
/* This is set to true when a signal is received. */
static volatile sig_atomic_t received_sighup = 0;
static volatile sig_atomic_t received_sigterm = 0;
/* session identifier, used by RSA-auth */
u_char session_id[16];
/* same for ssh2 */
u_char *session_id2 = NULL;
u_int session_id2_len = 0;
/* record remote hostname or ip */
u_int utmp_len = HOST_NAME_MAX+1;
/*
* startup_pipes/flags are used for tracking children of the listening sshd
* process early in their lifespans. This tracking is needed for three things:
*
* 1) Implementing the MaxStartups limit of concurrent unauthenticated
* connections.
* 2) Avoiding a race condition for SIGHUP processing, where child processes
* may have listen_socks open that could collide with main listener process
* after it restarts.
* 3) Ensuring that rexec'd sshd processes have received their initial state
* from the parent listen process before handling SIGHUP.
*
* Child processes signal that they have completed closure of the listen_socks
* and (if applicable) received their rexec state by sending a char over their
* sock. Child processes signal that authentication has completed by closing
* the sock (or by exiting).
*/
static int *startup_pipes = NULL;
static int *startup_flags = NULL; /* Indicates child closed listener */
static int startup_pipe = -1; /* in child */
/* variables used for privilege separation */
int use_privsep = -1;
struct monitor *pmonitor = NULL;
int privsep_is_preauth = 1;
static int privsep_chroot = 1;
/* global connection state and authentication contexts */
Authctxt *the_authctxt = NULL;
struct ssh *the_active_state;
/* global key/cert auth options. XXX move to permanent ssh->authctxt? */
struct sshauthopt *auth_opts = NULL;
/* sshd_config buffer */
struct sshbuf *cfg;
+/* Included files from the configuration file */
+struct include_list includes = TAILQ_HEAD_INITIALIZER(includes);
+
/* message to be displayed after login */
struct sshbuf *loginmsg;
/* Unprivileged user */
struct passwd *privsep_pw = NULL;
/* Prototypes for various functions defined later in this file. */
void destroy_sensitive_data(void);
void demote_sensitive_data(void);
static void do_ssh2_kex(struct ssh *);
+static char *listener_proctitle;
+
/*
* Close all listening sockets
*/
static void
close_listen_socks(void)
{
int i;
for (i = 0; i < num_listen_socks; i++)
close(listen_socks[i]);
num_listen_socks = -1;
}
static void
close_startup_pipes(void)
{
int i;
if (startup_pipes)
for (i = 0; i < options.max_startups; i++)
if (startup_pipes[i] != -1)
close(startup_pipes[i]);
}
/*
* Signal handler for SIGHUP. Sshd execs itself when it receives SIGHUP;
* the effect is to reread the configuration file (and to regenerate
* the server key).
*/
/*ARGSUSED*/
static void
sighup_handler(int sig)
{
- int save_errno = errno;
-
received_sighup = 1;
- errno = save_errno;
}
/*
* Called from the main program after receiving SIGHUP.
* Restarts the server.
*/
static void
sighup_restart(void)
{
logit("Received SIGHUP; restarting.");
if (options.pid_file != NULL)
unlink(options.pid_file);
platform_pre_restart();
close_listen_socks();
close_startup_pipes();
alarm(0); /* alarm timer persists across exec */
- signal(SIGHUP, SIG_IGN); /* will be restored after exec */
+ ssh_signal(SIGHUP, SIG_IGN); /* will be restored after exec */
execv(saved_argv[0], saved_argv);
logit("RESTART FAILED: av[0]='%.100s', error: %.100s.", saved_argv[0],
strerror(errno));
exit(1);
}
/*
* Generic signal handler for terminating signals in the master daemon.
*/
/*ARGSUSED*/
static void
sigterm_handler(int sig)
{
received_sigterm = sig;
}
/*
* SIGCHLD handler. This is called whenever a child dies. This will then
* reap any zombies left by exited children.
*/
/*ARGSUSED*/
static void
main_sigchld_handler(int sig)
{
int save_errno = errno;
pid_t pid;
int status;
+ debug("main_sigchld_handler: %s", strsignal(sig));
+
while ((pid = waitpid(-1, &status, WNOHANG)) > 0 ||
(pid == -1 && errno == EINTR))
;
errno = save_errno;
}
/*
* Signal handler for the alarm after the login grace period has expired.
*/
/*ARGSUSED*/
static void
grace_alarm_handler(int sig)
{
if (use_privsep && pmonitor != NULL && pmonitor->m_pid > 0)
kill(pmonitor->m_pid, SIGALRM);
/*
* Try to kill any processes that we have spawned, E.g. authorized
* keys command helpers.
*/
if (getpgid(0) == getpid()) {
- signal(SIGTERM, SIG_IGN);
+ ssh_signal(SIGTERM, SIG_IGN);
kill(0, SIGTERM);
}
/* XXX pre-format ipaddr/port so we don't need to access active_state */
/* Log error and exit. */
sigdie("Timeout before authentication for %s port %d",
ssh_remote_ipaddr(the_active_state),
ssh_remote_port(the_active_state));
}
/* Destroy the host and server keys. They will no longer be needed. */
void
destroy_sensitive_data(void)
{
u_int i;
for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) {
if (sensitive_data.host_keys[i]) {
sshkey_free(sensitive_data.host_keys[i]);
sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = NULL;
}
if (sensitive_data.host_certificates[i]) {
sshkey_free(sensitive_data.host_certificates[i]);
sensitive_data.host_certificates[i] = NULL;
}
}
}
/* Demote private to public keys for network child */
void
demote_sensitive_data(void)
{
struct sshkey *tmp;
u_int i;
int r;
for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) {
if (sensitive_data.host_keys[i]) {
if ((r = sshkey_from_private(
sensitive_data.host_keys[i], &tmp)) != 0)
fatal("could not demote host %s key: %s",
sshkey_type(sensitive_data.host_keys[i]),
ssh_err(r));
sshkey_free(sensitive_data.host_keys[i]);
sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = tmp;
}
/* Certs do not need demotion */
}
}
static void
reseed_prngs(void)
{
u_int32_t rnd[256];
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
RAND_poll();
#endif
arc4random_stir(); /* noop on recent arc4random() implementations */
arc4random_buf(rnd, sizeof(rnd)); /* let arc4random notice PID change */
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
RAND_seed(rnd, sizeof(rnd));
/* give libcrypto a chance to notice the PID change */
if ((RAND_bytes((u_char *)rnd, 1)) != 1)
fatal("%s: RAND_bytes failed", __func__);
#endif
explicit_bzero(rnd, sizeof(rnd));
}
static void
privsep_preauth_child(void)
{
gid_t gidset[1];
/* Enable challenge-response authentication for privilege separation */
privsep_challenge_enable();
#ifdef GSSAPI
/* Cache supported mechanism OIDs for later use */
ssh_gssapi_prepare_supported_oids();
#endif
reseed_prngs();
/* Demote the private keys to public keys. */
demote_sensitive_data();
/* Demote the child */
if (privsep_chroot) {
/* Change our root directory */
if (chroot(_PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR) == -1)
fatal("chroot(\"%s\"): %s", _PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR,
strerror(errno));
if (chdir("/") == -1)
fatal("chdir(\"/\"): %s", strerror(errno));
/* Drop our privileges */
debug3("privsep user:group %u:%u", (u_int)privsep_pw->pw_uid,
(u_int)privsep_pw->pw_gid);
gidset[0] = privsep_pw->pw_gid;
if (setgroups(1, gidset) == -1)
fatal("setgroups: %.100s", strerror(errno));
permanently_set_uid(privsep_pw);
}
}
static int
privsep_preauth(struct ssh *ssh)
{
int status, r;
pid_t pid;
struct ssh_sandbox *box = NULL;
/* Set up unprivileged child process to deal with network data */
pmonitor = monitor_init();
/* Store a pointer to the kex for later rekeying */
pmonitor->m_pkex = &ssh->kex;
if (use_privsep == PRIVSEP_ON)
box = ssh_sandbox_init(pmonitor);
pid = fork();
if (pid == -1) {
fatal("fork of unprivileged child failed");
} else if (pid != 0) {
debug2("Network child is on pid %ld", (long)pid);
pmonitor->m_pid = pid;
if (have_agent) {
r = ssh_get_authentication_socket(&auth_sock);
if (r != 0) {
error("Could not get agent socket: %s",
ssh_err(r));
have_agent = 0;
}
}
if (box != NULL)
ssh_sandbox_parent_preauth(box, pid);
monitor_child_preauth(ssh, pmonitor);
/* Wait for the child's exit status */
while (waitpid(pid, &status, 0) == -1) {
if (errno == EINTR)
continue;
pmonitor->m_pid = -1;
fatal("%s: waitpid: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
}
privsep_is_preauth = 0;
pmonitor->m_pid = -1;
if (WIFEXITED(status)) {
if (WEXITSTATUS(status) != 0)
fatal("%s: preauth child exited with status %d",
__func__, WEXITSTATUS(status));
} else if (WIFSIGNALED(status))
fatal("%s: preauth child terminated by signal %d",
__func__, WTERMSIG(status));
if (box != NULL)
ssh_sandbox_parent_finish(box);
return 1;
} else {
/* child */
close(pmonitor->m_sendfd);
close(pmonitor->m_log_recvfd);
/* Arrange for logging to be sent to the monitor */
set_log_handler(mm_log_handler, pmonitor);
privsep_preauth_child();
setproctitle("%s", "[net]");
if (box != NULL)
ssh_sandbox_child(box);
return 0;
}
}
static void
privsep_postauth(struct ssh *ssh, Authctxt *authctxt)
{
#ifdef DISABLE_FD_PASSING
if (1) {
#else
if (authctxt->pw->pw_uid == 0) {
#endif
/* File descriptor passing is broken or root login */
use_privsep = 0;
goto skip;
}
/* New socket pair */
monitor_reinit(pmonitor);
pmonitor->m_pid = fork();
if (pmonitor->m_pid == -1)
fatal("fork of unprivileged child failed");
else if (pmonitor->m_pid != 0) {
verbose("User child is on pid %ld", (long)pmonitor->m_pid);
sshbuf_reset(loginmsg);
monitor_clear_keystate(ssh, pmonitor);
monitor_child_postauth(ssh, pmonitor);
/* NEVERREACHED */
exit(0);
}
/* child */
close(pmonitor->m_sendfd);
pmonitor->m_sendfd = -1;
/* Demote the private keys to public keys. */
demote_sensitive_data();
reseed_prngs();
/* Drop privileges */
do_setusercontext(authctxt->pw);
skip:
/* It is safe now to apply the key state */
monitor_apply_keystate(ssh, pmonitor);
/*
* Tell the packet layer that authentication was successful, since
* this information is not part of the key state.
*/
ssh_packet_set_authenticated(ssh);
}
static void
append_hostkey_type(struct sshbuf *b, const char *s)
{
int r;
if (match_pattern_list(s, options.hostkeyalgorithms, 0) != 1) {
debug3("%s: %s key not permitted by HostkeyAlgorithms",
__func__, s);
return;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_putf(b, "%s%s", sshbuf_len(b) > 0 ? "," : "", s)) != 0)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_putf: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
}
static char *
list_hostkey_types(void)
{
struct sshbuf *b;
struct sshkey *key;
char *ret;
u_int i;
if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) {
key = sensitive_data.host_keys[i];
if (key == NULL)
key = sensitive_data.host_pubkeys[i];
if (key == NULL)
continue;
switch (key->type) {
case KEY_RSA:
/* for RSA we also support SHA2 signatures */
append_hostkey_type(b, "rsa-sha2-512");
append_hostkey_type(b, "rsa-sha2-256");
/* FALLTHROUGH */
case KEY_DSA:
case KEY_ECDSA:
case KEY_ED25519:
+ case KEY_ECDSA_SK:
+ case KEY_ED25519_SK:
case KEY_XMSS:
append_hostkey_type(b, sshkey_ssh_name(key));
break;
}
/* If the private key has a cert peer, then list that too */
key = sensitive_data.host_certificates[i];
if (key == NULL)
continue;
switch (key->type) {
case KEY_RSA_CERT:
/* for RSA we also support SHA2 signatures */
append_hostkey_type(b,
"rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com");
append_hostkey_type(b,
"rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com");
/* FALLTHROUGH */
case KEY_DSA_CERT:
case KEY_ECDSA_CERT:
case KEY_ED25519_CERT:
+ case KEY_ECDSA_SK_CERT:
+ case KEY_ED25519_SK_CERT:
case KEY_XMSS_CERT:
append_hostkey_type(b, sshkey_ssh_name(key));
break;
}
}
if ((ret = sshbuf_dup_string(b)) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_dup_string failed", __func__);
sshbuf_free(b);
debug("%s: %s", __func__, ret);
return ret;
}
static struct sshkey *
get_hostkey_by_type(int type, int nid, int need_private, struct ssh *ssh)
{
u_int i;
struct sshkey *key;
for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) {
switch (type) {
case KEY_RSA_CERT:
case KEY_DSA_CERT:
case KEY_ECDSA_CERT:
case KEY_ED25519_CERT:
+ case KEY_ECDSA_SK_CERT:
+ case KEY_ED25519_SK_CERT:
case KEY_XMSS_CERT:
key = sensitive_data.host_certificates[i];
break;
default:
key = sensitive_data.host_keys[i];
if (key == NULL && !need_private)
key = sensitive_data.host_pubkeys[i];
break;
}
- if (key != NULL && key->type == type &&
- (key->type != KEY_ECDSA || key->ecdsa_nid == nid))
+ if (key == NULL || key->type != type)
+ continue;
+ switch (type) {
+ case KEY_ECDSA:
+ case KEY_ECDSA_SK:
+ case KEY_ECDSA_CERT:
+ case KEY_ECDSA_SK_CERT:
+ if (key->ecdsa_nid != nid)
+ continue;
+ /* FALLTHROUGH */
+ default:
return need_private ?
sensitive_data.host_keys[i] : key;
+ }
}
return NULL;
}
struct sshkey *
get_hostkey_public_by_type(int type, int nid, struct ssh *ssh)
{
return get_hostkey_by_type(type, nid, 0, ssh);
}
struct sshkey *
get_hostkey_private_by_type(int type, int nid, struct ssh *ssh)
{
return get_hostkey_by_type(type, nid, 1, ssh);
}
struct sshkey *
get_hostkey_by_index(int ind)
{
if (ind < 0 || (u_int)ind >= options.num_host_key_files)
return (NULL);
return (sensitive_data.host_keys[ind]);
}
struct sshkey *
get_hostkey_public_by_index(int ind, struct ssh *ssh)
{
if (ind < 0 || (u_int)ind >= options.num_host_key_files)
return (NULL);
return (sensitive_data.host_pubkeys[ind]);
}
int
get_hostkey_index(struct sshkey *key, int compare, struct ssh *ssh)
{
u_int i;
for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) {
if (sshkey_is_cert(key)) {
if (key == sensitive_data.host_certificates[i] ||
(compare && sensitive_data.host_certificates[i] &&
sshkey_equal(key,
sensitive_data.host_certificates[i])))
return (i);
} else {
if (key == sensitive_data.host_keys[i] ||
(compare && sensitive_data.host_keys[i] &&
sshkey_equal(key, sensitive_data.host_keys[i])))
return (i);
if (key == sensitive_data.host_pubkeys[i] ||
(compare && sensitive_data.host_pubkeys[i] &&
sshkey_equal(key, sensitive_data.host_pubkeys[i])))
return (i);
}
}
return (-1);
}
/* Inform the client of all hostkeys */
static void
notify_hostkeys(struct ssh *ssh)
{
struct sshbuf *buf;
struct sshkey *key;
u_int i, nkeys;
int r;
char *fp;
/* Some clients cannot cope with the hostkeys message, skip those. */
if (ssh->compat & SSH_BUG_HOSTKEYS)
return;
if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new", __func__);
for (i = nkeys = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) {
key = get_hostkey_public_by_index(i, ssh);
if (key == NULL || key->type == KEY_UNSPEC ||
sshkey_is_cert(key))
continue;
fp = sshkey_fingerprint(key, options.fingerprint_hash,
SSH_FP_DEFAULT);
debug3("%s: key %d: %s %s", __func__, i,
sshkey_ssh_name(key), fp);
free(fp);
if (nkeys == 0) {
/*
* Start building the request when we find the
* first usable key.
*/
if ((r = sshpkt_start(ssh, SSH2_MSG_GLOBAL_REQUEST)) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_cstring(ssh, "hostkeys-00@openssh.com")) != 0 ||
(r = sshpkt_put_u8(ssh, 0)) != 0) /* want reply */
sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: start request", __func__);
}
/* Append the key to the request */
sshbuf_reset(buf);
if ((r = sshkey_putb(key, buf)) != 0)
fatal("%s: couldn't put hostkey %d: %s",
__func__, i, ssh_err(r));
if ((r = sshpkt_put_stringb(ssh, buf)) != 0)
sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: append key", __func__);
nkeys++;
}
debug3("%s: sent %u hostkeys", __func__, nkeys);
if (nkeys == 0)
fatal("%s: no hostkeys", __func__);
if ((r = sshpkt_send(ssh)) != 0)
sshpkt_fatal(ssh, r, "%s: send", __func__);
sshbuf_free(buf);
}
/*
* returns 1 if connection should be dropped, 0 otherwise.
* dropping starts at connection #max_startups_begin with a probability
* of (max_startups_rate/100). the probability increases linearly until
* all connections are dropped for startups > max_startups
*/
static int
drop_connection(int startups)
{
int p, r;
if (startups < options.max_startups_begin)
return 0;
if (startups >= options.max_startups)
return 1;
if (options.max_startups_rate == 100)
return 1;
p = 100 - options.max_startups_rate;
p *= startups - options.max_startups_begin;
p /= options.max_startups - options.max_startups_begin;
p += options.max_startups_rate;
r = arc4random_uniform(100);
debug("drop_connection: p %d, r %d", p, r);
return (r < p) ? 1 : 0;
}
static void
usage(void)
{
fprintf(stderr, "%s, %s\n",
SSH_RELEASE,
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
OpenSSL_version(OPENSSL_VERSION)
#else
"without OpenSSL"
#endif
);
fprintf(stderr,
"usage: sshd [-46DdeiqTt] [-C connection_spec] [-c host_cert_file]\n"
" [-E log_file] [-f config_file] [-g login_grace_time]\n"
" [-h host_key_file] [-o option] [-p port] [-u len]\n"
);
exit(1);
}
static void
send_rexec_state(int fd, struct sshbuf *conf)
{
- struct sshbuf *m;
+ struct sshbuf *m = NULL, *inc = NULL;
+ struct include_item *item = NULL;
int r;
debug3("%s: entering fd = %d config len %zu", __func__, fd,
sshbuf_len(conf));
+ if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL || (inc = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
+
+ /* pack includes into a string */
+ TAILQ_FOREACH(item, &includes, entry) {
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(inc, item->selector)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(inc, item->filename)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(inc, item->contents)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ }
+
/*
* Protocol from reexec master to child:
* string configuration
- * string rngseed (only if OpenSSL is not self-seeded)
+ * string included_files[] {
+ * string selector
+ * string filename
+ * string contents
+ * }
+ * string rng_seed (if required)
*/
- if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
- fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
- if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, conf)) != 0)
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, conf)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(m, inc)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
-
#if defined(WITH_OPENSSL) && !defined(OPENSSL_PRNG_ONLY)
rexec_send_rng_seed(m);
#endif
-
if (ssh_msg_send(fd, 0, m) == -1)
fatal("%s: ssh_msg_send failed", __func__);
sshbuf_free(m);
+ sshbuf_free(inc);
debug3("%s: done", __func__);
}
static void
recv_rexec_state(int fd, struct sshbuf *conf)
{
- struct sshbuf *m;
+ struct sshbuf *m, *inc;
u_char *cp, ver;
size_t len;
int r;
+ struct include_item *item;
debug3("%s: entering fd = %d", __func__, fd);
- if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+ if ((m = sshbuf_new()) == NULL || (inc = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
if (ssh_msg_recv(fd, m) == -1)
fatal("%s: ssh_msg_recv failed", __func__);
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(m, &ver)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
if (ver != 0)
fatal("%s: rexec version mismatch", __func__);
- if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(m, &cp, &len)) != 0)
- fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
- if (conf != NULL && (r = sshbuf_put(conf, cp, len)))
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(m, &cp, &len)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_stringb(m, inc)) != 0)
fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+
#if defined(WITH_OPENSSL) && !defined(OPENSSL_PRNG_ONLY)
rexec_recv_rng_seed(m);
#endif
+ if (conf != NULL && (r = sshbuf_put(conf, cp, len)))
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+
+ while (sshbuf_len(inc) != 0) {
+ item = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*item));
+ if ((item->contents = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+ fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(inc, &item->selector, NULL)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(inc, &item->filename, NULL)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_stringb(inc, item->contents)) != 0)
+ fatal("%s: buffer error: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
+ TAILQ_INSERT_TAIL(&includes, item, entry);
+ }
+
free(cp);
sshbuf_free(m);
debug3("%s: done", __func__);
}
/* Accept a connection from inetd */
static void
server_accept_inetd(int *sock_in, int *sock_out)
{
int fd;
if (rexeced_flag) {
close(REEXEC_CONFIG_PASS_FD);
*sock_in = *sock_out = dup(STDIN_FILENO);
} else {
*sock_in = dup(STDIN_FILENO);
*sock_out = dup(STDOUT_FILENO);
}
/*
* We intentionally do not close the descriptors 0, 1, and 2
* as our code for setting the descriptors won't work if
* ttyfd happens to be one of those.
*/
if ((fd = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDWR, 0)) != -1) {
dup2(fd, STDIN_FILENO);
dup2(fd, STDOUT_FILENO);
if (!log_stderr)
dup2(fd, STDERR_FILENO);
if (fd > (log_stderr ? STDERR_FILENO : STDOUT_FILENO))
close(fd);
}
debug("inetd sockets after dupping: %d, %d", *sock_in, *sock_out);
}
/*
* Listen for TCP connections
*/
static void
listen_on_addrs(struct listenaddr *la)
{
int ret, listen_sock;
struct addrinfo *ai;
char ntop[NI_MAXHOST], strport[NI_MAXSERV];
for (ai = la->addrs; ai; ai = ai->ai_next) {
if (ai->ai_family != AF_INET && ai->ai_family != AF_INET6)
continue;
if (num_listen_socks >= MAX_LISTEN_SOCKS)
fatal("Too many listen sockets. "
"Enlarge MAX_LISTEN_SOCKS");
if ((ret = getnameinfo(ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen,
ntop, sizeof(ntop), strport, sizeof(strport),
NI_NUMERICHOST|NI_NUMERICSERV)) != 0) {
error("getnameinfo failed: %.100s",
ssh_gai_strerror(ret));
continue;
}
/* Create socket for listening. */
listen_sock = socket(ai->ai_family, ai->ai_socktype,
ai->ai_protocol);
if (listen_sock == -1) {
/* kernel may not support ipv6 */
verbose("socket: %.100s", strerror(errno));
continue;
}
if (set_nonblock(listen_sock) == -1) {
close(listen_sock);
continue;
}
if (fcntl(listen_sock, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC) == -1) {
verbose("socket: CLOEXEC: %s", strerror(errno));
close(listen_sock);
continue;
}
/* Socket options */
set_reuseaddr(listen_sock);
if (la->rdomain != NULL &&
set_rdomain(listen_sock, la->rdomain) == -1) {
close(listen_sock);
continue;
}
/* Only communicate in IPv6 over AF_INET6 sockets. */
if (ai->ai_family == AF_INET6)
sock_set_v6only(listen_sock);
debug("Bind to port %s on %s.", strport, ntop);
/* Bind the socket to the desired port. */
if (bind(listen_sock, ai->ai_addr, ai->ai_addrlen) == -1) {
error("Bind to port %s on %s failed: %.200s.",
strport, ntop, strerror(errno));
close(listen_sock);
continue;
}
listen_socks[num_listen_socks] = listen_sock;
num_listen_socks++;
/* Start listening on the port. */
if (listen(listen_sock, SSH_LISTEN_BACKLOG) == -1)
fatal("listen on [%s]:%s: %.100s",
ntop, strport, strerror(errno));
logit("Server listening on %s port %s%s%s.",
ntop, strport,
la->rdomain == NULL ? "" : " rdomain ",
la->rdomain == NULL ? "" : la->rdomain);
}
}
static void
server_listen(void)
{
u_int i;
for (i = 0; i < options.num_listen_addrs; i++) {
listen_on_addrs(&options.listen_addrs[i]);
freeaddrinfo(options.listen_addrs[i].addrs);
free(options.listen_addrs[i].rdomain);
memset(&options.listen_addrs[i], 0,
sizeof(options.listen_addrs[i]));
}
free(options.listen_addrs);
options.listen_addrs = NULL;
options.num_listen_addrs = 0;
if (!num_listen_socks)
fatal("Cannot bind any address.");
}
/*
* The main TCP accept loop. Note that, for the non-debug case, returns
* from this function are in a forked subprocess.
*/
static void
server_accept_loop(int *sock_in, int *sock_out, int *newsock, int *config_s)
{
fd_set *fdset;
int i, j, ret, maxfd;
- int startups = 0, listening = 0, lameduck = 0;
+ int ostartups = -1, startups = 0, listening = 0, lameduck = 0;
int startup_p[2] = { -1 , -1 };
char c = 0;
struct sockaddr_storage from;
socklen_t fromlen;
pid_t pid;
u_char rnd[256];
/* setup fd set for accept */
fdset = NULL;
maxfd = 0;
for (i = 0; i < num_listen_socks; i++)
if (listen_socks[i] > maxfd)
maxfd = listen_socks[i];
/* pipes connected to unauthenticated childs */
startup_pipes = xcalloc(options.max_startups, sizeof(int));
startup_flags = xcalloc(options.max_startups, sizeof(int));
for (i = 0; i < options.max_startups; i++)
startup_pipes[i] = -1;
/*
* Stay listening for connections until the system crashes or
* the daemon is killed with a signal.
*/
for (;;) {
+ if (ostartups != startups) {
+ setproctitle("%s [listener] %d of %d-%d startups",
+ listener_proctitle, startups,
+ options.max_startups_begin, options.max_startups);
+ ostartups = startups;
+ }
if (received_sighup) {
if (!lameduck) {
debug("Received SIGHUP; waiting for children");
close_listen_socks();
lameduck = 1;
}
if (listening <= 0)
sighup_restart();
}
free(fdset);
fdset = xcalloc(howmany(maxfd + 1, NFDBITS),
sizeof(fd_mask));
for (i = 0; i < num_listen_socks; i++)
FD_SET(listen_socks[i], fdset);
for (i = 0; i < options.max_startups; i++)
if (startup_pipes[i] != -1)
FD_SET(startup_pipes[i], fdset);
/* Wait in select until there is a connection. */
ret = select(maxfd+1, fdset, NULL, NULL, NULL);
if (ret == -1 && errno != EINTR)
error("select: %.100s", strerror(errno));
if (received_sigterm) {
logit("Received signal %d; terminating.",
(int) received_sigterm);
close_listen_socks();
if (options.pid_file != NULL)
unlink(options.pid_file);
exit(received_sigterm == SIGTERM ? 0 : 255);
}
if (ret == -1)
continue;
for (i = 0; i < options.max_startups; i++) {
if (startup_pipes[i] == -1 ||
!FD_ISSET(startup_pipes[i], fdset))
continue;
switch (read(startup_pipes[i], &c, sizeof(c))) {
case -1:
if (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN)
continue;
if (errno != EPIPE) {
error("%s: startup pipe %d (fd=%d): "
"read %s", __func__, i,
startup_pipes[i], strerror(errno));
}
/* FALLTHROUGH */
case 0:
/* child exited or completed auth */
close(startup_pipes[i]);
startup_pipes[i] = -1;
startups--;
if (startup_flags[i])
listening--;
break;
case 1:
/* child has finished preliminaries */
if (startup_flags[i]) {
listening--;
startup_flags[i] = 0;
}
break;
}
}
for (i = 0; i < num_listen_socks; i++) {
if (!FD_ISSET(listen_socks[i], fdset))
continue;
fromlen = sizeof(from);
*newsock = accept(listen_socks[i],
(struct sockaddr *)&from, &fromlen);
if (*newsock == -1) {
if (errno != EINTR && errno != EWOULDBLOCK &&
errno != ECONNABORTED && errno != EAGAIN)
error("accept: %.100s",
strerror(errno));
if (errno == EMFILE || errno == ENFILE)
usleep(100 * 1000);
continue;
}
if (unset_nonblock(*newsock) == -1) {
close(*newsock);
continue;
}
if (drop_connection(startups) == 1) {
char *laddr = get_local_ipaddr(*newsock);
char *raddr = get_peer_ipaddr(*newsock);
+ char msg[] = "Exceeded MaxStartups\r\n";
verbose("drop connection #%d from [%s]:%d "
"on [%s]:%d past MaxStartups", startups,
raddr, get_peer_port(*newsock),
laddr, get_local_port(*newsock));
free(laddr);
free(raddr);
+ /* best-effort notification to client */
+ (void)write(*newsock, msg, strlen(msg));
close(*newsock);
continue;
}
if (pipe(startup_p) == -1) {
close(*newsock);
continue;
}
if (rexec_flag && socketpair(AF_UNIX,
SOCK_STREAM, 0, config_s) == -1) {
error("reexec socketpair: %s",
strerror(errno));
close(*newsock);
close(startup_p[0]);
close(startup_p[1]);
continue;
}
for (j = 0; j < options.max_startups; j++)
if (startup_pipes[j] == -1) {
startup_pipes[j] = startup_p[0];
if (maxfd < startup_p[0])
maxfd = startup_p[0];
startups++;
startup_flags[j] = 1;
break;
}
/*
* Got connection. Fork a child to handle it, unless
* we are in debugging mode.
*/
if (debug_flag) {
/*
* In debugging mode. Close the listening
* socket, and start processing the
* connection without forking.
*/
debug("Server will not fork when running in debugging mode.");
close_listen_socks();
*sock_in = *newsock;
*sock_out = *newsock;
close(startup_p[0]);
close(startup_p[1]);
startup_pipe = -1;
pid = getpid();
if (rexec_flag) {
send_rexec_state(config_s[0], cfg);
close(config_s[0]);
}
return;
}
/*
* Normal production daemon. Fork, and have
* the child process the connection. The
* parent continues listening.
*/
platform_pre_fork();
listening++;
if ((pid = fork()) == 0) {
/*
* Child. Close the listening and
* max_startup sockets. Start using
* the accepted socket. Reinitialize
* logging (since our pid has changed).
* We return from this function to handle
* the connection.
*/
platform_post_fork_child();
startup_pipe = startup_p[1];
close_startup_pipes();
close_listen_socks();
*sock_in = *newsock;
*sock_out = *newsock;
log_init(__progname,
options.log_level,
options.log_facility,
log_stderr);
if (rexec_flag)
close(config_s[0]);
else {
/*
* Signal parent that the preliminaries
* for this child are complete. For the
* re-exec case, this happens after the
* child has received the rexec state
* from the server.
*/
(void)atomicio(vwrite, startup_pipe,
"\0", 1);
}
return;
}
/* Parent. Stay in the loop. */
platform_post_fork_parent(pid);
if (pid == -1)
error("fork: %.100s", strerror(errno));
else
debug("Forked child %ld.", (long)pid);
close(startup_p[1]);
if (rexec_flag) {
send_rexec_state(config_s[0], cfg);
close(config_s[0]);
close(config_s[1]);
}
close(*newsock);
/*
* Ensure that our random state differs
* from that of the child
*/
arc4random_stir();
arc4random_buf(rnd, sizeof(rnd));
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
RAND_seed(rnd, sizeof(rnd));
if ((RAND_bytes((u_char *)rnd, 1)) != 1)
fatal("%s: RAND_bytes failed", __func__);
#endif
explicit_bzero(rnd, sizeof(rnd));
}
}
}
/*
* If IP options are supported, make sure there are none (log and
* return an error if any are found). Basically we are worried about
* source routing; it can be used to pretend you are somebody
* (ip-address) you are not. That itself may be "almost acceptable"
* under certain circumstances, but rhosts authentication is useless
* if source routing is accepted. Notice also that if we just dropped
* source routing here, the other side could use IP spoofing to do
* rest of the interaction and could still bypass security. So we
* exit here if we detect any IP options.
*/
static void
check_ip_options(struct ssh *ssh)
{
#ifdef IP_OPTIONS
int sock_in = ssh_packet_get_connection_in(ssh);
struct sockaddr_storage from;
u_char opts[200];
socklen_t i, option_size = sizeof(opts), fromlen = sizeof(from);
char text[sizeof(opts) * 3 + 1];
memset(&from, 0, sizeof(from));
if (getpeername(sock_in, (struct sockaddr *)&from,
&fromlen) == -1)
return;
if (from.ss_family != AF_INET)
return;
/* XXX IPv6 options? */
if (getsockopt(sock_in, IPPROTO_IP, IP_OPTIONS, opts,
&option_size) >= 0 && option_size != 0) {
text[0] = '\0';
for (i = 0; i < option_size; i++)
snprintf(text + i*3, sizeof(text) - i*3,
" %2.2x", opts[i]);
fatal("Connection from %.100s port %d with IP opts: %.800s",
ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh), ssh_remote_port(ssh), text);
}
return;
#endif /* IP_OPTIONS */
}
/* Set the routing domain for this process */
static void
set_process_rdomain(struct ssh *ssh, const char *name)
{
#if defined(HAVE_SYS_SET_PROCESS_RDOMAIN)
if (name == NULL)
return; /* default */
if (strcmp(name, "%D") == 0) {
/* "expands" to routing domain of connection */
if ((name = ssh_packet_rdomain_in(ssh)) == NULL)
return;
}
/* NB. We don't pass 'ssh' to sys_set_process_rdomain() */
return sys_set_process_rdomain(name);
#elif defined(__OpenBSD__)
int rtable, ortable = getrtable();
const char *errstr;
if (name == NULL)
return; /* default */
if (strcmp(name, "%D") == 0) {
/* "expands" to routing domain of connection */
if ((name = ssh_packet_rdomain_in(ssh)) == NULL)
return;
}
rtable = (int)strtonum(name, 0, 255, &errstr);
if (errstr != NULL) /* Shouldn't happen */
fatal("Invalid routing domain \"%s\": %s", name, errstr);
if (rtable != ortable && setrtable(rtable) != 0)
fatal("Unable to set routing domain %d: %s",
rtable, strerror(errno));
debug("%s: set routing domain %d (was %d)", __func__, rtable, ortable);
#else /* defined(__OpenBSD__) */
fatal("Unable to set routing domain: not supported in this platform");
#endif
}
static void
accumulate_host_timing_secret(struct sshbuf *server_cfg,
struct sshkey *key)
{
static struct ssh_digest_ctx *ctx;
u_char *hash;
size_t len;
struct sshbuf *buf;
int r;
if (ctx == NULL && (ctx = ssh_digest_start(SSH_DIGEST_SHA512)) == NULL)
fatal("%s: ssh_digest_start", __func__);
if (key == NULL) { /* finalize */
/* add server config in case we are using agent for host keys */
if (ssh_digest_update(ctx, sshbuf_ptr(server_cfg),
sshbuf_len(server_cfg)) != 0)
fatal("%s: ssh_digest_update", __func__);
len = ssh_digest_bytes(SSH_DIGEST_SHA512);
hash = xmalloc(len);
if (ssh_digest_final(ctx, hash, len) != 0)
fatal("%s: ssh_digest_final", __func__);
options.timing_secret = PEEK_U64(hash);
freezero(hash, len);
ssh_digest_free(ctx);
ctx = NULL;
return;
}
if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s could not allocate buffer", __func__);
if ((r = sshkey_private_serialize(key, buf)) != 0)
fatal("sshkey_private_serialize: %s", ssh_err(r));
if (ssh_digest_update(ctx, sshbuf_ptr(buf), sshbuf_len(buf)) != 0)
fatal("%s: ssh_digest_update", __func__);
sshbuf_reset(buf);
sshbuf_free(buf);
}
+static char *
+prepare_proctitle(int ac, char **av)
+{
+ char *ret = NULL;
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < ac; i++)
+ xextendf(&ret, " ", "%s", av[i]);
+ return ret;
+}
+
/*
* Main program for the daemon.
*/
int
main(int ac, char **av)
{
struct ssh *ssh = NULL;
extern char *optarg;
extern int optind;
int r, opt, on = 1, already_daemon, remote_port;
int sock_in = -1, sock_out = -1, newsock = -1;
const char *remote_ip, *rdomain;
char *fp, *line, *laddr, *logfile = NULL;
int config_s[2] = { -1 , -1 };
u_int i, j;
u_int64_t ibytes, obytes;
mode_t new_umask;
struct sshkey *key;
struct sshkey *pubkey;
int keytype;
Authctxt *authctxt;
struct connection_info *connection_info = NULL;
#ifdef HAVE_SECUREWARE
(void)set_auth_parameters(ac, av);
#endif
__progname = ssh_get_progname(av[0]);
/* Save argv. Duplicate so setproctitle emulation doesn't clobber it */
saved_argc = ac;
rexec_argc = ac;
saved_argv = xcalloc(ac + 1, sizeof(*saved_argv));
for (i = 0; (int)i < ac; i++)
saved_argv[i] = xstrdup(av[i]);
saved_argv[i] = NULL;
#ifndef HAVE_SETPROCTITLE
/* Prepare for later setproctitle emulation */
compat_init_setproctitle(ac, av);
av = saved_argv;
#endif
if (geteuid() == 0 && setgroups(0, NULL) == -1)
debug("setgroups(): %.200s", strerror(errno));
/* Ensure that fds 0, 1 and 2 are open or directed to /dev/null */
sanitise_stdfd();
seed_rng();
/* Initialize configuration options to their default values. */
initialize_server_options(&options);
/* Parse command-line arguments. */
while ((opt = getopt(ac, av,
"C:E:b:c:f:g:h:k:o:p:u:46DQRTdeiqrt")) != -1) {
switch (opt) {
case '4':
options.address_family = AF_INET;
break;
case '6':
options.address_family = AF_INET6;
break;
case 'f':
config_file_name = optarg;
break;
case 'c':
servconf_add_hostcert("[command-line]", 0,
&options, optarg);
break;
case 'd':
if (debug_flag == 0) {
debug_flag = 1;
options.log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1;
} else if (options.log_level < SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG3)
options.log_level++;
break;
case 'D':
no_daemon_flag = 1;
break;
case 'E':
logfile = optarg;
/* FALLTHROUGH */
case 'e':
log_stderr = 1;
break;
case 'i':
inetd_flag = 1;
break;
case 'r':
rexec_flag = 0;
break;
case 'R':
rexeced_flag = 1;
inetd_flag = 1;
break;
case 'Q':
/* ignored */
break;
case 'q':
options.log_level = SYSLOG_LEVEL_QUIET;
break;
case 'b':
/* protocol 1, ignored */
break;
case 'p':
options.ports_from_cmdline = 1;
if (options.num_ports >= MAX_PORTS) {
fprintf(stderr, "too many ports.\n");
exit(1);
}
options.ports[options.num_ports++] = a2port(optarg);
if (options.ports[options.num_ports-1] <= 0) {
fprintf(stderr, "Bad port number.\n");
exit(1);
}
break;
case 'g':
if ((options.login_grace_time = convtime(optarg)) == -1) {
fprintf(stderr, "Invalid login grace time.\n");
exit(1);
}
break;
case 'k':
/* protocol 1, ignored */
break;
case 'h':
servconf_add_hostkey("[command-line]", 0,
&options, optarg, 1);
break;
case 't':
test_flag = 1;
break;
case 'T':
test_flag = 2;
break;
case 'C':
connection_info = get_connection_info(ssh, 0, 0);
if (parse_server_match_testspec(connection_info,
optarg) == -1)
exit(1);
break;
case 'u':
utmp_len = (u_int)strtonum(optarg, 0, HOST_NAME_MAX+1+1, NULL);
if (utmp_len > HOST_NAME_MAX+1) {
fprintf(stderr, "Invalid utmp length.\n");
exit(1);
}
break;
case 'o':
line = xstrdup(optarg);
if (process_server_config_line(&options, line,
- "command-line", 0, NULL, NULL) != 0)
+ "command-line", 0, NULL, NULL, &includes) != 0)
exit(1);
free(line);
break;
case '?':
default:
usage();
break;
}
}
if (rexeced_flag || inetd_flag)
rexec_flag = 0;
if (!test_flag && rexec_flag && !path_absolute(av[0]))
fatal("sshd re-exec requires execution with an absolute path");
if (rexeced_flag)
closefrom(REEXEC_MIN_FREE_FD);
else
closefrom(REEXEC_DEVCRYPTO_RESERVED_FD);
/* If requested, redirect the logs to the specified logfile. */
if (logfile != NULL)
log_redirect_stderr_to(logfile);
/*
* Force logging to stderr until we have loaded the private host
* key (unless started from inetd)
*/
log_init(__progname,
options.log_level == SYSLOG_LEVEL_NOT_SET ?
SYSLOG_LEVEL_INFO : options.log_level,
options.log_facility == SYSLOG_FACILITY_NOT_SET ?
SYSLOG_FACILITY_AUTH : options.log_facility,
- log_stderr || !inetd_flag);
+ log_stderr || !inetd_flag || debug_flag);
/*
* Unset KRB5CCNAME, otherwise the user's session may inherit it from
* root's environment
*/
if (getenv("KRB5CCNAME") != NULL)
(void) unsetenv("KRB5CCNAME");
sensitive_data.have_ssh2_key = 0;
/*
* If we're not doing an extended test do not silently ignore connection
* test params.
*/
if (test_flag < 2 && connection_info != NULL)
fatal("Config test connection parameter (-C) provided without "
"test mode (-T)");
/* Fetch our configuration */
if ((cfg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
if (rexeced_flag) {
recv_rexec_state(REEXEC_CONFIG_PASS_FD, cfg);
if (!debug_flag) {
startup_pipe = dup(REEXEC_STARTUP_PIPE_FD);
close(REEXEC_STARTUP_PIPE_FD);
/*
* Signal parent that this child is at a point where
* they can go away if they have a SIGHUP pending.
*/
(void)atomicio(vwrite, startup_pipe, "\0", 1);
}
- }
- else if (strcasecmp(config_file_name, "none") != 0)
+ } else if (strcasecmp(config_file_name, "none") != 0)
load_server_config(config_file_name, cfg);
parse_server_config(&options, rexeced_flag ? "rexec" : config_file_name,
- cfg, NULL);
+ cfg, &includes, NULL);
/* Fill in default values for those options not explicitly set. */
fill_default_server_options(&options);
/* challenge-response is implemented via keyboard interactive */
if (options.challenge_response_authentication)
options.kbd_interactive_authentication = 1;
/* Check that options are sensible */
if (options.authorized_keys_command_user == NULL &&
(options.authorized_keys_command != NULL &&
strcasecmp(options.authorized_keys_command, "none") != 0))
fatal("AuthorizedKeysCommand set without "
"AuthorizedKeysCommandUser");
if (options.authorized_principals_command_user == NULL &&
(options.authorized_principals_command != NULL &&
strcasecmp(options.authorized_principals_command, "none") != 0))
fatal("AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand set without "
"AuthorizedPrincipalsCommandUser");
/*
* Check whether there is any path through configured auth methods.
* Unfortunately it is not possible to verify this generally before
* daemonisation in the presence of Match block, but this catches
* and warns for trivial misconfigurations that could break login.
*/
if (options.num_auth_methods != 0) {
for (i = 0; i < options.num_auth_methods; i++) {
if (auth2_methods_valid(options.auth_methods[i],
1) == 0)
break;
}
if (i >= options.num_auth_methods)
fatal("AuthenticationMethods cannot be satisfied by "
"enabled authentication methods");
}
/* Check that there are no remaining arguments. */
if (optind < ac) {
fprintf(stderr, "Extra argument %s.\n", av[optind]);
exit(1);
}
debug("sshd version %s, %s", SSH_VERSION,
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
OpenSSL_version(OPENSSL_VERSION)
#else
"without OpenSSL"
#endif
);
/* Store privilege separation user for later use if required. */
privsep_chroot = use_privsep && (getuid() == 0 || geteuid() == 0);
if ((privsep_pw = getpwnam(SSH_PRIVSEP_USER)) == NULL) {
if (privsep_chroot || options.kerberos_authentication)
fatal("Privilege separation user %s does not exist",
SSH_PRIVSEP_USER);
} else {
privsep_pw = pwcopy(privsep_pw);
freezero(privsep_pw->pw_passwd, strlen(privsep_pw->pw_passwd));
privsep_pw->pw_passwd = xstrdup("*");
}
endpwent();
/* load host keys */
sensitive_data.host_keys = xcalloc(options.num_host_key_files,
sizeof(struct sshkey *));
sensitive_data.host_pubkeys = xcalloc(options.num_host_key_files,
sizeof(struct sshkey *));
if (options.host_key_agent) {
if (strcmp(options.host_key_agent, SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME))
setenv(SSH_AUTHSOCKET_ENV_NAME,
options.host_key_agent, 1);
if ((r = ssh_get_authentication_socket(NULL)) == 0)
have_agent = 1;
else
error("Could not connect to agent \"%s\": %s",
options.host_key_agent, ssh_err(r));
}
for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++) {
int ll = options.host_key_file_userprovided[i] ?
SYSLOG_LEVEL_ERROR : SYSLOG_LEVEL_DEBUG1;
if (options.host_key_files[i] == NULL)
continue;
if ((r = sshkey_load_private(options.host_key_files[i], "",
&key, NULL)) != 0 && r != SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR)
do_log2(ll, "Unable to load host key \"%s\": %s",
options.host_key_files[i], ssh_err(r));
- if (r == 0 && (r = sshkey_shield_private(key)) != 0) {
+ if (sshkey_is_sk(key) &&
+ key->sk_flags & SSH_SK_USER_PRESENCE_REQD) {
+ debug("host key %s requires user presence, ignoring",
+ options.host_key_files[i]);
+ key->sk_flags &= ~SSH_SK_USER_PRESENCE_REQD;
+ }
+ if (r == 0 && key != NULL &&
+ (r = sshkey_shield_private(key)) != 0) {
do_log2(ll, "Unable to shield host key \"%s\": %s",
options.host_key_files[i], ssh_err(r));
sshkey_free(key);
key = NULL;
}
if ((r = sshkey_load_public(options.host_key_files[i],
&pubkey, NULL)) != 0 && r != SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR)
do_log2(ll, "Unable to load host key \"%s\": %s",
options.host_key_files[i], ssh_err(r));
if (pubkey == NULL && key != NULL)
if ((r = sshkey_from_private(key, &pubkey)) != 0)
fatal("Could not demote key: \"%s\": %s",
options.host_key_files[i], ssh_err(r));
sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = key;
sensitive_data.host_pubkeys[i] = pubkey;
if (key == NULL && pubkey != NULL && have_agent) {
debug("will rely on agent for hostkey %s",
options.host_key_files[i]);
keytype = pubkey->type;
} else if (key != NULL) {
keytype = key->type;
accumulate_host_timing_secret(cfg, key);
} else {
do_log2(ll, "Unable to load host key: %s",
options.host_key_files[i]);
sensitive_data.host_keys[i] = NULL;
sensitive_data.host_pubkeys[i] = NULL;
continue;
}
switch (keytype) {
case KEY_RSA:
case KEY_DSA:
case KEY_ECDSA:
case KEY_ED25519:
+ case KEY_ECDSA_SK:
+ case KEY_ED25519_SK:
case KEY_XMSS:
if (have_agent || key != NULL)
sensitive_data.have_ssh2_key = 1;
break;
}
if ((fp = sshkey_fingerprint(pubkey, options.fingerprint_hash,
SSH_FP_DEFAULT)) == NULL)
fatal("sshkey_fingerprint failed");
debug("%s host key #%d: %s %s",
key ? "private" : "agent", i, sshkey_ssh_name(pubkey), fp);
free(fp);
}
accumulate_host_timing_secret(cfg, NULL);
if (!sensitive_data.have_ssh2_key) {
logit("sshd: no hostkeys available -- exiting.");
exit(1);
}
/*
* Load certificates. They are stored in an array at identical
* indices to the public keys that they relate to.
*/
sensitive_data.host_certificates = xcalloc(options.num_host_key_files,
sizeof(struct sshkey *));
for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_key_files; i++)
sensitive_data.host_certificates[i] = NULL;
for (i = 0; i < options.num_host_cert_files; i++) {
if (options.host_cert_files[i] == NULL)
continue;
if ((r = sshkey_load_public(options.host_cert_files[i],
&key, NULL)) != 0) {
error("Could not load host certificate \"%s\": %s",
options.host_cert_files[i], ssh_err(r));
continue;
}
if (!sshkey_is_cert(key)) {
error("Certificate file is not a certificate: %s",
options.host_cert_files[i]);
sshkey_free(key);
continue;
}
/* Find matching private key */
for (j = 0; j < options.num_host_key_files; j++) {
if (sshkey_equal_public(key,
sensitive_data.host_keys[j])) {
sensitive_data.host_certificates[j] = key;
break;
}
}
if (j >= options.num_host_key_files) {
error("No matching private key for certificate: %s",
options.host_cert_files[i]);
sshkey_free(key);
continue;
}
sensitive_data.host_certificates[j] = key;
debug("host certificate: #%u type %d %s", j, key->type,
sshkey_type(key));
}
if (privsep_chroot) {
struct stat st;
if ((stat(_PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR, &st) == -1) ||
(S_ISDIR(st.st_mode) == 0))
fatal("Missing privilege separation directory: %s",
_PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR);
#ifdef HAVE_CYGWIN
if (check_ntsec(_PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR) &&
(st.st_uid != getuid () ||
(st.st_mode & (S_IWGRP|S_IWOTH)) != 0))
#else
if (st.st_uid != 0 || (st.st_mode & (S_IWGRP|S_IWOTH)) != 0)
#endif
fatal("%s must be owned by root and not group or "
"world-writable.", _PATH_PRIVSEP_CHROOT_DIR);
}
if (test_flag > 1) {
/*
* If no connection info was provided by -C then use
* use a blank one that will cause no predicate to match.
*/
if (connection_info == NULL)
connection_info = get_connection_info(ssh, 0, 0);
connection_info->test = 1;
- parse_server_match_config(&options, connection_info);
+ parse_server_match_config(&options, &includes, connection_info);
dump_config(&options);
}
/* Configuration looks good, so exit if in test mode. */
if (test_flag)
exit(0);
/*
* Clear out any supplemental groups we may have inherited. This
* prevents inadvertent creation of files with bad modes (in the
* portable version at least, it's certainly possible for PAM
* to create a file, and we can't control the code in every
* module which might be used).
*/
if (setgroups(0, NULL) < 0)
debug("setgroups() failed: %.200s", strerror(errno));
if (rexec_flag) {
if (rexec_argc < 0)
fatal("rexec_argc %d < 0", rexec_argc);
rexec_argv = xcalloc(rexec_argc + 2, sizeof(char *));
for (i = 0; i < (u_int)rexec_argc; i++) {
debug("rexec_argv[%d]='%s'", i, saved_argv[i]);
rexec_argv[i] = saved_argv[i];
}
rexec_argv[rexec_argc] = "-R";
rexec_argv[rexec_argc + 1] = NULL;
}
+ listener_proctitle = prepare_proctitle(ac, av);
/* Ensure that umask disallows at least group and world write */
new_umask = umask(0077) | 0022;
(void) umask(new_umask);
/* Initialize the log (it is reinitialized below in case we forked). */
if (debug_flag && (!inetd_flag || rexeced_flag))
log_stderr = 1;
log_init(__progname, options.log_level, options.log_facility, log_stderr);
/*
* If not in debugging mode, not started from inetd and not already
* daemonized (eg re-exec via SIGHUP), disconnect from the controlling
* terminal, and fork. The original process exits.
*/
already_daemon = daemonized();
if (!(debug_flag || inetd_flag || no_daemon_flag || already_daemon)) {
if (daemon(0, 0) == -1)
fatal("daemon() failed: %.200s", strerror(errno));
disconnect_controlling_tty();
}
/* Reinitialize the log (because of the fork above). */
log_init(__progname, options.log_level, options.log_facility, log_stderr);
/* Chdir to the root directory so that the current disk can be
unmounted if desired. */
if (chdir("/") == -1)
error("chdir(\"/\"): %s", strerror(errno));
/* ignore SIGPIPE */
- signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN);
+ ssh_signal(SIGPIPE, SIG_IGN);
/* Get a connection, either from inetd or a listening TCP socket */
if (inetd_flag) {
server_accept_inetd(&sock_in, &sock_out);
} else {
platform_pre_listen();
server_listen();
- signal(SIGHUP, sighup_handler);
- signal(SIGCHLD, main_sigchld_handler);
- signal(SIGTERM, sigterm_handler);
- signal(SIGQUIT, sigterm_handler);
+ ssh_signal(SIGHUP, sighup_handler);
+ ssh_signal(SIGCHLD, main_sigchld_handler);
+ ssh_signal(SIGTERM, sigterm_handler);
+ ssh_signal(SIGQUIT, sigterm_handler);
/*
* Write out the pid file after the sigterm handler
* is setup and the listen sockets are bound
*/
if (options.pid_file != NULL && !debug_flag) {
FILE *f = fopen(options.pid_file, "w");
if (f == NULL) {
error("Couldn't create pid file \"%s\": %s",
options.pid_file, strerror(errno));
} else {
fprintf(f, "%ld\n", (long) getpid());
fclose(f);
}
}
/* Accept a connection and return in a forked child */
server_accept_loop(&sock_in, &sock_out,
&newsock, config_s);
}
/* This is the child processing a new connection. */
setproctitle("%s", "[accepted]");
/*
* Create a new session and process group since the 4.4BSD
* setlogin() affects the entire process group. We don't
* want the child to be able to affect the parent.
*/
#if !defined(SSHD_ACQUIRES_CTTY)
/*
* If setsid is called, on some platforms sshd will later acquire a
* controlling terminal which will result in "could not set
* controlling tty" errors.
*/
if (!debug_flag && !inetd_flag && setsid() == -1)
error("setsid: %.100s", strerror(errno));
#endif
if (rexec_flag) {
int fd;
debug("rexec start in %d out %d newsock %d pipe %d sock %d",
sock_in, sock_out, newsock, startup_pipe, config_s[0]);
dup2(newsock, STDIN_FILENO);
dup2(STDIN_FILENO, STDOUT_FILENO);
if (startup_pipe == -1)
close(REEXEC_STARTUP_PIPE_FD);
else if (startup_pipe != REEXEC_STARTUP_PIPE_FD) {
dup2(startup_pipe, REEXEC_STARTUP_PIPE_FD);
close(startup_pipe);
startup_pipe = REEXEC_STARTUP_PIPE_FD;
}
dup2(config_s[1], REEXEC_CONFIG_PASS_FD);
close(config_s[1]);
execv(rexec_argv[0], rexec_argv);
/* Reexec has failed, fall back and continue */
error("rexec of %s failed: %s", rexec_argv[0], strerror(errno));
recv_rexec_state(REEXEC_CONFIG_PASS_FD, NULL);
log_init(__progname, options.log_level,
options.log_facility, log_stderr);
/* Clean up fds */
close(REEXEC_CONFIG_PASS_FD);
newsock = sock_out = sock_in = dup(STDIN_FILENO);
if ((fd = open(_PATH_DEVNULL, O_RDWR, 0)) != -1) {
dup2(fd, STDIN_FILENO);
dup2(fd, STDOUT_FILENO);
if (fd > STDERR_FILENO)
close(fd);
}
debug("rexec cleanup in %d out %d newsock %d pipe %d sock %d",
sock_in, sock_out, newsock, startup_pipe, config_s[0]);
}
/* Executed child processes don't need these. */
fcntl(sock_out, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC);
fcntl(sock_in, F_SETFD, FD_CLOEXEC);
/*
* Disable the key regeneration alarm. We will not regenerate the
* key since we are no longer in a position to give it to anyone. We
* will not restart on SIGHUP since it no longer makes sense.
*/
alarm(0);
- signal(SIGALRM, SIG_DFL);
- signal(SIGHUP, SIG_DFL);
- signal(SIGTERM, SIG_DFL);
- signal(SIGQUIT, SIG_DFL);
- signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL);
- signal(SIGINT, SIG_DFL);
+ ssh_signal(SIGALRM, SIG_DFL);
+ ssh_signal(SIGHUP, SIG_DFL);
+ ssh_signal(SIGTERM, SIG_DFL);
+ ssh_signal(SIGQUIT, SIG_DFL);
+ ssh_signal(SIGCHLD, SIG_DFL);
+ ssh_signal(SIGINT, SIG_DFL);
/*
* Register our connection. This turns encryption off because we do
* not have a key.
*/
if ((ssh = ssh_packet_set_connection(NULL, sock_in, sock_out)) == NULL)
fatal("Unable to create connection");
the_active_state = ssh;
ssh_packet_set_server(ssh);
check_ip_options(ssh);
/* Prepare the channels layer */
channel_init_channels(ssh);
channel_set_af(ssh, options.address_family);
process_permitopen(ssh, &options);
/* Set SO_KEEPALIVE if requested. */
if (options.tcp_keep_alive && ssh_packet_connection_is_on_socket(ssh) &&
setsockopt(sock_in, SOL_SOCKET, SO_KEEPALIVE, &on, sizeof(on)) == -1)
error("setsockopt SO_KEEPALIVE: %.100s", strerror(errno));
if ((remote_port = ssh_remote_port(ssh)) < 0) {
debug("ssh_remote_port failed");
cleanup_exit(255);
}
if (options.routing_domain != NULL)
set_process_rdomain(ssh, options.routing_domain);
/*
* The rest of the code depends on the fact that
* ssh_remote_ipaddr() caches the remote ip, even if
* the socket goes away.
*/
remote_ip = ssh_remote_ipaddr(ssh);
#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
audit_connection_from(remote_ip, remote_port);
#endif
rdomain = ssh_packet_rdomain_in(ssh);
/* Log the connection. */
laddr = get_local_ipaddr(sock_in);
verbose("Connection from %s port %d on %s port %d%s%s%s",
remote_ip, remote_port, laddr, ssh_local_port(ssh),
rdomain == NULL ? "" : " rdomain \"",
rdomain == NULL ? "" : rdomain,
rdomain == NULL ? "" : "\"");
free(laddr);
/*
* We don't want to listen forever unless the other side
* successfully authenticates itself. So we set up an alarm which is
* cleared after successful authentication. A limit of zero
* indicates no limit. Note that we don't set the alarm in debugging
* mode; it is just annoying to have the server exit just when you
* are about to discover the bug.
*/
- signal(SIGALRM, grace_alarm_handler);
+ ssh_signal(SIGALRM, grace_alarm_handler);
if (!debug_flag)
alarm(options.login_grace_time);
if (kex_exchange_identification(ssh, -1, options.version_addendum) != 0)
cleanup_exit(255); /* error already logged */
ssh_packet_set_nonblocking(ssh);
/* allocate authentication context */
authctxt = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*authctxt));
ssh->authctxt = authctxt;
authctxt->loginmsg = loginmsg;
/* XXX global for cleanup, access from other modules */
the_authctxt = authctxt;
/* Set default key authentication options */
if ((auth_opts = sshauthopt_new_with_keys_defaults()) == NULL)
fatal("allocation failed");
/* prepare buffer to collect messages to display to user after login */
if ((loginmsg = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
fatal("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
auth_debug_reset();
if (use_privsep) {
if (privsep_preauth(ssh) == 1)
goto authenticated;
} else if (have_agent) {
if ((r = ssh_get_authentication_socket(&auth_sock)) != 0) {
error("Unable to get agent socket: %s", ssh_err(r));
have_agent = 0;
}
}
/* perform the key exchange */
/* authenticate user and start session */
do_ssh2_kex(ssh);
do_authentication2(ssh);
/*
* If we use privilege separation, the unprivileged child transfers
* the current keystate and exits
*/
if (use_privsep) {
mm_send_keystate(ssh, pmonitor);
ssh_packet_clear_keys(ssh);
exit(0);
}
authenticated:
/*
* Cancel the alarm we set to limit the time taken for
* authentication.
*/
alarm(0);
- signal(SIGALRM, SIG_DFL);
+ ssh_signal(SIGALRM, SIG_DFL);
authctxt->authenticated = 1;
if (startup_pipe != -1) {
close(startup_pipe);
startup_pipe = -1;
}
#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
audit_event(ssh, SSH_AUTH_SUCCESS);
#endif
#ifdef GSSAPI
if (options.gss_authentication) {
temporarily_use_uid(authctxt->pw);
ssh_gssapi_storecreds();
restore_uid();
}
#endif
#ifdef USE_PAM
if (options.use_pam) {
do_pam_setcred(1);
do_pam_session(ssh);
}
#endif
/*
* In privilege separation, we fork another child and prepare
* file descriptor passing.
*/
if (use_privsep) {
privsep_postauth(ssh, authctxt);
/* the monitor process [priv] will not return */
}
ssh_packet_set_timeout(ssh, options.client_alive_interval,
options.client_alive_count_max);
/* Try to send all our hostkeys to the client */
notify_hostkeys(ssh);
/* Start session. */
do_authenticated(ssh, authctxt);
/* The connection has been terminated. */
ssh_packet_get_bytes(ssh, &ibytes, &obytes);
verbose("Transferred: sent %llu, received %llu bytes",
(unsigned long long)obytes, (unsigned long long)ibytes);
verbose("Closing connection to %.500s port %d", remote_ip, remote_port);
#ifdef USE_PAM
if (options.use_pam)
finish_pam();
#endif /* USE_PAM */
#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
PRIVSEP(audit_event(ssh, SSH_CONNECTION_CLOSE));
#endif
ssh_packet_close(ssh);
if (use_privsep)
mm_terminate();
exit(0);
}
int
sshd_hostkey_sign(struct ssh *ssh, struct sshkey *privkey,
struct sshkey *pubkey, u_char **signature, size_t *slenp,
const u_char *data, size_t dlen, const char *alg)
{
int r;
if (use_privsep) {
if (privkey) {
if (mm_sshkey_sign(ssh, privkey, signature, slenp,
- data, dlen, alg, ssh->compat) < 0)
+ data, dlen, alg, options.sk_provider,
+ ssh->compat) < 0)
fatal("%s: privkey sign failed", __func__);
} else {
if (mm_sshkey_sign(ssh, pubkey, signature, slenp,
- data, dlen, alg, ssh->compat) < 0)
+ data, dlen, alg, options.sk_provider,
+ ssh->compat) < 0)
fatal("%s: pubkey sign failed", __func__);
}
} else {
if (privkey) {
if (sshkey_sign(privkey, signature, slenp, data, dlen,
- alg, ssh->compat) < 0)
+ alg, options.sk_provider, ssh->compat) < 0)
fatal("%s: privkey sign failed", __func__);
} else {
if ((r = ssh_agent_sign(auth_sock, pubkey,
signature, slenp, data, dlen, alg,
ssh->compat)) != 0) {
fatal("%s: agent sign failed: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
}
}
}
return 0;
}
/* SSH2 key exchange */
static void
do_ssh2_kex(struct ssh *ssh)
{
char *myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAX] = { KEX_SERVER };
struct kex *kex;
int r;
myproposal[PROPOSAL_KEX_ALGS] = compat_kex_proposal(
options.kex_algorithms);
myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_CTOS] = compat_cipher_proposal(
options.ciphers);
myproposal[PROPOSAL_ENC_ALGS_STOC] = compat_cipher_proposal(
options.ciphers);
myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_CTOS] =
myproposal[PROPOSAL_MAC_ALGS_STOC] = options.macs;
if (options.compression == COMP_NONE) {
myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_CTOS] =
myproposal[PROPOSAL_COMP_ALGS_STOC] = "none";
}
if (options.rekey_limit || options.rekey_interval)
ssh_packet_set_rekey_limits(ssh, options.rekey_limit,
options.rekey_interval);
myproposal[PROPOSAL_SERVER_HOST_KEY_ALGS] = compat_pkalg_proposal(
list_hostkey_types());
/* start key exchange */
if ((r = kex_setup(ssh, myproposal)) != 0)
fatal("kex_setup: %s", ssh_err(r));
kex = ssh->kex;
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP1_SHA1] = kex_gen_server;
kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA1] = kex_gen_server;
kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP14_SHA256] = kex_gen_server;
kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP16_SHA512] = kex_gen_server;
kex->kex[KEX_DH_GRP18_SHA512] = kex_gen_server;
kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA1] = kexgex_server;
kex->kex[KEX_DH_GEX_SHA256] = kexgex_server;
# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
kex->kex[KEX_ECDH_SHA2] = kex_gen_server;
# endif
#endif
kex->kex[KEX_C25519_SHA256] = kex_gen_server;
kex->kex[KEX_KEM_SNTRUP4591761X25519_SHA512] = kex_gen_server;
kex->load_host_public_key=&get_hostkey_public_by_type;
kex->load_host_private_key=&get_hostkey_private_by_type;
kex->host_key_index=&get_hostkey_index;
kex->sign = sshd_hostkey_sign;
ssh_dispatch_run_fatal(ssh, DISPATCH_BLOCK, &kex->done);
session_id2 = kex->session_id;
session_id2_len = kex->session_id_len;
#ifdef DEBUG_KEXDH
/* send 1st encrypted/maced/compressed message */
packet_start(SSH2_MSG_IGNORE);
packet_put_cstring("markus");
packet_send();
packet_write_wait();
#endif
debug("KEX done");
}
/* server specific fatal cleanup */
void
cleanup_exit(int i)
{
if (the_active_state != NULL && the_authctxt != NULL) {
do_cleanup(the_active_state, the_authctxt);
if (use_privsep && privsep_is_preauth &&
pmonitor != NULL && pmonitor->m_pid > 1) {
debug("Killing privsep child %d", pmonitor->m_pid);
if (kill(pmonitor->m_pid, SIGKILL) != 0 &&
errno != ESRCH)
error("%s: kill(%d): %s", __func__,
pmonitor->m_pid, strerror(errno));
}
}
#ifdef SSH_AUDIT_EVENTS
/* done after do_cleanup so it can cancel the PAM auth 'thread' */
if (the_active_state != NULL && (!use_privsep || mm_is_monitor()))
audit_event(the_active_state, SSH_CONNECTION_ABANDON);
#endif
_exit(i);
}
diff --git a/sshd_config.0 b/sshd_config.0
index 1b732197c7c8..1d655a3b84c3 100644
--- a/sshd_config.0
+++ b/sshd_config.0
@@ -1,1102 +1,1145 @@
SSHD_CONFIG(5) File Formats Manual SSHD_CONFIG(5)
NAME
- sshd_config M-bM-^@M-^S OpenSSH SSH daemon configuration file
+ sshd_config M-bM-^@M-^S OpenSSH daemon configuration file
DESCRIPTION
sshd(8) reads configuration data from /etc/ssh/sshd_config (or the file
specified with -f on the command line). The file contains keyword-
argument pairs, one per line. For each keyword, the first obtained value
will be used. Lines starting with M-bM-^@M-^X#M-bM-^@M-^Y and empty lines are interpreted as
comments. Arguments may optionally be enclosed in double quotes (") in
order to represent arguments containing spaces.
The possible keywords and their meanings are as follows (note that
keywords are case-insensitive and arguments are case-sensitive):
AcceptEnv
Specifies what environment variables sent by the client will be
copied into the session's environ(7). See SendEnv and SetEnv in
ssh_config(5) for how to configure the client. The TERM
environment variable is always accepted whenever the client
requests a pseudo-terminal as it is required by the protocol.
Variables are specified by name, which may contain the wildcard
characters M-bM-^@M-^X*M-bM-^@M-^Y and M-bM-^@M-^X?M-bM-^@M-^Y. Multiple environment variables may be
separated by whitespace or spread across multiple AcceptEnv
directives. Be warned that some environment variables could be
used to bypass restricted user environments. For this reason,
care should be taken in the use of this directive. The default
is not to accept any environment variables.
AddressFamily
Specifies which address family should be used by sshd(8). Valid
arguments are any (the default), inet (use IPv4 only), or inet6
(use IPv6 only).
AllowAgentForwarding
Specifies whether ssh-agent(1) forwarding is permitted. The
default is yes. Note that disabling agent forwarding does not
improve security unless users are also denied shell access, as
they can always install their own forwarders.
AllowGroups
This keyword can be followed by a list of group name patterns,
separated by spaces. If specified, login is allowed only for
users whose primary group or supplementary group list matches one
of the patterns. Only group names are valid; a numerical group
ID is not recognized. By default, login is allowed for all
- groups. The allow/deny directives are processed in the following
- order: DenyUsers, AllowUsers, DenyGroups, and finally
- AllowGroups.
+ groups. The allow/deny groups directives are processed in the
+ following order: DenyGroups, AllowGroups.
See PATTERNS in ssh_config(5) for more information on patterns.
AllowStreamLocalForwarding
Specifies whether StreamLocal (Unix-domain socket) forwarding is
permitted. The available options are yes (the default) or all to
allow StreamLocal forwarding, no to prevent all StreamLocal
forwarding, local to allow local (from the perspective of ssh(1))
forwarding only or remote to allow remote forwarding only. Note
that disabling StreamLocal forwarding does not improve security
unless users are also denied shell access, as they can always
install their own forwarders.
AllowTcpForwarding
Specifies whether TCP forwarding is permitted. The available
options are yes (the default) or all to allow TCP forwarding, no
to prevent all TCP forwarding, local to allow local (from the
perspective of ssh(1)) forwarding only or remote to allow remote
forwarding only. Note that disabling TCP forwarding does not
improve security unless users are also denied shell access, as
they can always install their own forwarders.
AllowUsers
This keyword can be followed by a list of user name patterns,
separated by spaces. If specified, login is allowed only for
user names that match one of the patterns. Only user names are
valid; a numerical user ID is not recognized. By default, login
is allowed for all users. If the pattern takes the form
USER@HOST then USER and HOST are separately checked, restricting
logins to particular users from particular hosts. HOST criteria
may additionally contain addresses to match in CIDR
- address/masklen format. The allow/deny directives are processed
- in the following order: DenyUsers, AllowUsers, DenyGroups, and
- finally AllowGroups.
+ address/masklen format. The allow/deny users directives are
+ processed in the following order: DenyUsers, AllowUsers.
See PATTERNS in ssh_config(5) for more information on patterns.
AuthenticationMethods
Specifies the authentication methods that must be successfully
completed for a user to be granted access. This option must be
followed by one or more lists of comma-separated authentication
method names, or by the single string any to indicate the default
behaviour of accepting any single authentication method. If the
default is overridden, then successful authentication requires
completion of every method in at least one of these lists.
For example, "publickey,password publickey,keyboard-interactive"
would require the user to complete public key authentication,
followed by either password or keyboard interactive
authentication. Only methods that are next in one or more lists
are offered at each stage, so for this example it would not be
possible to attempt password or keyboard-interactive
authentication before public key.
For keyboard interactive authentication it is also possible to
restrict authentication to a specific device by appending a colon
followed by the device identifier bsdauth or pam. depending on
the server configuration. For example,
"keyboard-interactive:bsdauth" would restrict keyboard
interactive authentication to the bsdauth device.
If the publickey method is listed more than once, sshd(8)
verifies that keys that have been used successfully are not
reused for subsequent authentications. For example,
"publickey,publickey" requires successful authentication using
two different public keys.
Note that each authentication method listed should also be
explicitly enabled in the configuration.
The available authentication methods are: "gssapi-with-mic",
"hostbased", "keyboard-interactive", "none" (used for access to
password-less accounts when PermitEmptyPasswords is enabled),
"password" and "publickey".
AuthorizedKeysCommand
Specifies a program to be used to look up the user's public keys.
The program must be owned by root, not writable by group or
others and specified by an absolute path. Arguments to
AuthorizedKeysCommand accept the tokens described in the TOKENS
section. If no arguments are specified then the username of the
target user is used.
The program should produce on standard output zero or more lines
of authorized_keys output (see AUTHORIZED_KEYS in sshd(8)). If a
key supplied by AuthorizedKeysCommand does not successfully
authenticate and authorize the user then public key
authentication continues using the usual AuthorizedKeysFile
files. By default, no AuthorizedKeysCommand is run.
AuthorizedKeysCommandUser
Specifies the user under whose account the AuthorizedKeysCommand
is run. It is recommended to use a dedicated user that has no
other role on the host than running authorized keys commands. If
AuthorizedKeysCommand is specified but AuthorizedKeysCommandUser
is not, then sshd(8) will refuse to start.
AuthorizedKeysFile
Specifies the file that contains the public keys used for user
authentication. The format is described in the AUTHORIZED_KEYS
FILE FORMAT section of sshd(8). Arguments to AuthorizedKeysFile
accept the tokens described in the TOKENS section. After
expansion, AuthorizedKeysFile is taken to be an absolute path or
one relative to the user's home directory. Multiple files may be
listed, separated by whitespace. Alternately this option may be
set to none to skip checking for user keys in files. The default
is ".ssh/authorized_keys .ssh/authorized_keys2".
AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand
Specifies a program to be used to generate the list of allowed
certificate principals as per AuthorizedPrincipalsFile. The
program must be owned by root, not writable by group or others
and specified by an absolute path. Arguments to
AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand accept the tokens described in the
TOKENS section. If no arguments are specified then the username
of the target user is used.
The program should produce on standard output zero or more lines
of AuthorizedPrincipalsFile output. If either
AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand or AuthorizedPrincipalsFile is
specified, then certificates offered by the client for
authentication must contain a principal that is listed. By
default, no AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand is run.
AuthorizedPrincipalsCommandUser
Specifies the user under whose account the
AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand is run. It is recommended to use a
dedicated user that has no other role on the host than running
authorized principals commands. If AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand
is specified but AuthorizedPrincipalsCommandUser is not, then
sshd(8) will refuse to start.
AuthorizedPrincipalsFile
Specifies a file that lists principal names that are accepted for
certificate authentication. When using certificates signed by a
key listed in TrustedUserCAKeys, this file lists names, one of
which must appear in the certificate for it to be accepted for
authentication. Names are listed one per line preceded by key
options (as described in AUTHORIZED_KEYS FILE FORMAT in sshd(8)).
Empty lines and comments starting with M-bM-^@M-^X#M-bM-^@M-^Y are ignored.
Arguments to AuthorizedPrincipalsFile accept the tokens described
in the TOKENS section. After expansion, AuthorizedPrincipalsFile
is taken to be an absolute path or one relative to the user's
home directory. The default is none, i.e. not to use a
principals file M-bM-^@M-^S in this case, the username of the user must
appear in a certificate's principals list for it to be accepted.
Note that AuthorizedPrincipalsFile is only used when
authentication proceeds using a CA listed in TrustedUserCAKeys
and is not consulted for certification authorities trusted via
~/.ssh/authorized_keys, though the principals= key option offers
a similar facility (see sshd(8) for details).
Banner The contents of the specified file are sent to the remote user
before authentication is allowed. If the argument is none then
no banner is displayed. By default, no banner is displayed.
CASignatureAlgorithms
Specifies which algorithms are allowed for signing of
certificates by certificate authorities (CAs). The default is:
ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
ssh-ed25519,rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256,ssh-rsa
Certificates signed using other algorithms will not be accepted
for public key or host-based authentication.
ChallengeResponseAuthentication
Specifies whether challenge-response authentication is allowed
(e.g. via PAM or through authentication styles supported in
login.conf(5)) The default is yes.
ChrootDirectory
Specifies the pathname of a directory to chroot(2) to after
authentication. At session startup sshd(8) checks that all
components of the pathname are root-owned directories which are
not writable by any other user or group. After the chroot,
sshd(8) changes the working directory to the user's home
directory. Arguments to ChrootDirectory accept the tokens
described in the TOKENS section.
The ChrootDirectory must contain the necessary files and
directories to support the user's session. For an interactive
session this requires at least a shell, typically sh(1), and
basic /dev nodes such as null(4), zero(4), stdin(4), stdout(4),
stderr(4), and tty(4) devices. For file transfer sessions using
SFTP no additional configuration of the environment is necessary
if the in-process sftp-server is used, though sessions which use
logging may require /dev/log inside the chroot directory on some
operating systems (see sftp-server(8) for details).
For safety, it is very important that the directory hierarchy be
prevented from modification by other processes on the system
(especially those outside the jail). Misconfiguration can lead
to unsafe environments which sshd(8) cannot detect.
The default is none, indicating not to chroot(2).
Ciphers
Specifies the ciphers allowed. Multiple ciphers must be comma-
separated. If the specified list begins with a M-bM-^@M-^X+M-bM-^@M-^Y character,
then the specified ciphers will be appended to the default set
instead of replacing them. If the specified list begins with a
M-bM-^@M-^X-M-bM-^@M-^Y character, then the specified ciphers (including wildcards)
will be removed from the default set instead of replacing them.
If the specified list begins with a M-bM-^@M-^X^M-bM-^@M-^Y character, then the
specified ciphers will be placed at the head of the default set.
The supported ciphers are:
3des-cbc
aes128-cbc
aes192-cbc
aes256-cbc
aes128-ctr
aes192-ctr
aes256-ctr
aes128-gcm@openssh.com
aes256-gcm@openssh.com
chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com
The default is:
chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com,
aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr,
aes128-gcm@openssh.com,aes256-gcm@openssh.com
The list of available ciphers may also be obtained using "ssh -Q
cipher".
ClientAliveCountMax
Sets the number of client alive messages which may be sent
without sshd(8) receiving any messages back from the client. If
this threshold is reached while client alive messages are being
sent, sshd will disconnect the client, terminating the session.
It is important to note that the use of client alive messages is
very different from TCPKeepAlive. The client alive messages are
sent through the encrypted channel and therefore will not be
spoofable. The TCP keepalive option enabled by TCPKeepAlive is
spoofable. The client alive mechanism is valuable when the
client or server depend on knowing when a connection has become
unresponsive.
The default value is 3. If ClientAliveInterval is set to 15, and
ClientAliveCountMax is left at the default, unresponsive SSH
clients will be disconnected after approximately 45 seconds.
+ Setting a zero ClientAliveCountMax disables connection
+ termination.
ClientAliveInterval
Sets a timeout interval in seconds after which if no data has
been received from the client, sshd(8) will send a message
through the encrypted channel to request a response from the
client. The default is 0, indicating that these messages will
not be sent to the client.
Compression
Specifies whether compression is enabled after the user has
authenticated successfully. The argument must be yes, delayed (a
legacy synonym for yes) or no. The default is yes.
DenyGroups
This keyword can be followed by a list of group name patterns,
separated by spaces. Login is disallowed for users whose primary
group or supplementary group list matches one of the patterns.
Only group names are valid; a numerical group ID is not
recognized. By default, login is allowed for all groups. The
- allow/deny directives are processed in the following order:
- DenyUsers, AllowUsers, DenyGroups, and finally AllowGroups.
+ allow/deny groups directives are processed in the following
+ order: DenyGroups, AllowGroups.
See PATTERNS in ssh_config(5) for more information on patterns.
DenyUsers
This keyword can be followed by a list of user name patterns,
separated by spaces. Login is disallowed for user names that
match one of the patterns. Only user names are valid; a
numerical user ID is not recognized. By default, login is
allowed for all users. If the pattern takes the form USER@HOST
then USER and HOST are separately checked, restricting logins to
particular users from particular hosts. HOST criteria may
additionally contain addresses to match in CIDR address/masklen
- format. The allow/deny directives are processed in the following
- order: DenyUsers, AllowUsers, DenyGroups, and finally
- AllowGroups.
+ format. The allow/deny users directives are processed in the
+ following order: DenyUsers, AllowUsers.
See PATTERNS in ssh_config(5) for more information on patterns.
DisableForwarding
Disables all forwarding features, including X11, ssh-agent(1),
TCP and StreamLocal. This option overrides all other forwarding-
related options and may simplify restricted configurations.
ExposeAuthInfo
Writes a temporary file containing a list of authentication
methods and public credentials (e.g. keys) used to authenticate
the user. The location of the file is exposed to the user
session through the SSH_USER_AUTH environment variable. The
default is no.
FingerprintHash
Specifies the hash algorithm used when logging key fingerprints.
Valid options are: md5 and sha256. The default is sha256.
ForceCommand
Forces the execution of the command specified by ForceCommand,
ignoring any command supplied by the client and ~/.ssh/rc if
present. The command is invoked by using the user's login shell
with the -c option. This applies to shell, command, or subsystem
execution. It is most useful inside a Match block. The command
originally supplied by the client is available in the
SSH_ORIGINAL_COMMAND environment variable. Specifying a command
of internal-sftp will force the use of an in-process SFTP server
that requires no support files when used with ChrootDirectory.
The default is none.
GatewayPorts
Specifies whether remote hosts are allowed to connect to ports
forwarded for the client. By default, sshd(8) binds remote port
forwardings to the loopback address. This prevents other remote
hosts from connecting to forwarded ports. GatewayPorts can be
used to specify that sshd should allow remote port forwardings to
bind to non-loopback addresses, thus allowing other hosts to
connect. The argument may be no to force remote port forwardings
to be available to the local host only, yes to force remote port
forwardings to bind to the wildcard address, or clientspecified
to allow the client to select the address to which the forwarding
is bound. The default is no.
GSSAPIAuthentication
Specifies whether user authentication based on GSSAPI is allowed.
The default is no.
GSSAPICleanupCredentials
Specifies whether to automatically destroy the user's credentials
cache on logout. The default is yes.
GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck
Determines whether to be strict about the identity of the GSSAPI
acceptor a client authenticates against. If set to yes then the
client must authenticate against the host service on the current
hostname. If set to no then the client may authenticate against
any service key stored in the machine's default store. This
facility is provided to assist with operation on multi homed
machines. The default is yes.
HostbasedAcceptedKeyTypes
Specifies the key types that will be accepted for hostbased
authentication as a list of comma-separated patterns.
Alternately if the specified list begins with a M-bM-^@M-^X+M-bM-^@M-^Y character,
then the specified key types will be appended to the default set
instead of replacing them. If the specified list begins with a
M-bM-^@M-^X-M-bM-^@M-^Y character, then the specified key types (including wildcards)
will be removed from the default set instead of replacing them.
If the specified list begins with a M-bM-^@M-^X^M-bM-^@M-^Y character, then the
specified key types will be placed at the head of the default
set. The default for this option is:
ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com,
ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+ sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
- rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com,rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+ sk-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+ rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+ rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com,
ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
- ssh-ed25519,rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256,ssh-rsa
+ sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com,
+ ssh-ed25519,sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com,
+ rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256,ssh-rsa
The list of available key types may also be obtained using "ssh
- -Q key".
+ -Q HostbasedAcceptedKeyTypes".
HostbasedAuthentication
Specifies whether rhosts or /etc/hosts.equiv authentication
together with successful public key client host authentication is
allowed (host-based authentication). The default is no.
HostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly
Specifies whether or not the server will attempt to perform a
reverse name lookup when matching the name in the ~/.shosts,
~/.rhosts, and /etc/hosts.equiv files during
HostbasedAuthentication. A setting of yes means that sshd(8)
uses the name supplied by the client rather than attempting to
resolve the name from the TCP connection itself. The default is
no.
HostCertificate
Specifies a file containing a public host certificate. The
certificate's public key must match a private host key already
specified by HostKey. The default behaviour of sshd(8) is not to
load any certificates.
HostKey
Specifies a file containing a private host key used by SSH. The
defaults are /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key,
/etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key and /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key.
Note that sshd(8) will refuse to use a file if it is group/world-
accessible and that the HostKeyAlgorithms option restricts which
of the keys are actually used by sshd(8).
It is possible to have multiple host key files. It is also
possible to specify public host key files instead. In this case
operations on the private key will be delegated to an
ssh-agent(1).
HostKeyAgent
Identifies the UNIX-domain socket used to communicate with an
agent that has access to the private host keys. If the string
"SSH_AUTH_SOCK" is specified, the location of the socket will be
read from the SSH_AUTH_SOCK environment variable.
HostKeyAlgorithms
Specifies the host key algorithms that the server offers. The
default for this option is:
ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com,
ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+ sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
- rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com,rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+ sk-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+ rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+ rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com,
ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
- ssh-ed25519,rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256,ssh-rsa
+ sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com,
+ ssh-ed25519,sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com,
+ rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256,ssh-rsa
The list of available key types may also be obtained using "ssh
- -Q key".
+ -Q HostKeyAlgorithms".
IgnoreRhosts
Specifies that .rhosts and .shosts files will not be used in
HostbasedAuthentication.
/etc/hosts.equiv and /etc/shosts.equiv are still used. The
default is yes.
IgnoreUserKnownHosts
Specifies whether sshd(8) should ignore the user's
~/.ssh/known_hosts during HostbasedAuthentication and use only
the system-wide known hosts file /etc/ssh/known_hosts. The
- default is no.
+ default is M-bM-^@M-^\noM-bM-^@M-^].
+
+ Include
+ Include the specified configuration file(s). Multiple pathnames
+ may be specified and each pathname may contain glob(7) wildcards.
+ Files without absolute paths are assumed to be in /etc/ssh. An
+ Include directive may appear inside a Match block to perform
+ conditional inclusion.
IPQoS Specifies the IPv4 type-of-service or DSCP class for the
connection. Accepted values are af11, af12, af13, af21, af22,
af23, af31, af32, af33, af41, af42, af43, cs0, cs1, cs2, cs3,
- cs4, cs5, cs6, cs7, ef, lowdelay, throughput, reliability, a
+ cs4, cs5, cs6, cs7, ef, le, lowdelay, throughput, reliability, a
numeric value, or none to use the operating system default. This
option may take one or two arguments, separated by whitespace.
If one argument is specified, it is used as the packet class
unconditionally. If two values are specified, the first is
automatically selected for interactive sessions and the second
for non-interactive sessions. The default is af21 (Low-Latency
Data) for interactive sessions and cs1 (Lower Effort) for non-
interactive sessions.
KbdInteractiveAuthentication
Specifies whether to allow keyboard-interactive authentication.
The argument to this keyword must be yes or no. The default is
to use whatever value ChallengeResponseAuthentication is set to
(by default yes).
KerberosAuthentication
Specifies whether the password provided by the user for
PasswordAuthentication will be validated through the Kerberos
KDC. To use this option, the server needs a Kerberos servtab
which allows the verification of the KDC's identity. The default
is no.
KerberosGetAFSToken
If AFS is active and the user has a Kerberos 5 TGT, attempt to
acquire an AFS token before accessing the user's home directory.
The default is no.
KerberosOrLocalPasswd
If password authentication through Kerberos fails then the
password will be validated via any additional local mechanism
such as /etc/passwd. The default is yes.
KerberosTicketCleanup
Specifies whether to automatically destroy the user's ticket
cache file on logout. The default is yes.
KexAlgorithms
Specifies the available KEX (Key Exchange) algorithms. Multiple
algorithms must be comma-separated. Alternately if the specified
list begins with a M-bM-^@M-^X+M-bM-^@M-^Y character, then the specified methods will
be appended to the default set instead of replacing them. If the
specified list begins with a M-bM-^@M-^X-M-bM-^@M-^Y character, then the specified
methods (including wildcards) will be removed from the default
set instead of replacing them. If the specified list begins with
a M-bM-^@M-^X^M-bM-^@M-^Y character, then the specified methods will be placed at the
head of the default set. The supported algorithms are:
curve25519-sha256
curve25519-sha256@libssh.org
diffie-hellman-group1-sha1
diffie-hellman-group14-sha1
diffie-hellman-group14-sha256
diffie-hellman-group16-sha512
diffie-hellman-group18-sha512
diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1
diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256
ecdh-sha2-nistp256
ecdh-sha2-nistp384
ecdh-sha2-nistp521
+ sntrup4591761x25519-sha512@tinyssh.org
The default is:
curve25519-sha256,curve25519-sha256@libssh.org,
ecdh-sha2-nistp256,ecdh-sha2-nistp384,ecdh-sha2-nistp521,
diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256,
diffie-hellman-group16-sha512,diffie-hellman-group18-sha512,
- diffie-hellman-group14-sha256,diffie-hellman-group14-sha1
+ diffie-hellman-group14-sha256
The list of available key exchange algorithms may also be
- obtained using "ssh -Q kex".
+ obtained using "ssh -Q KexAlgorithms".
ListenAddress
Specifies the local addresses sshd(8) should listen on. The
following forms may be used:
ListenAddress hostname|address [rdomain domain]
ListenAddress hostname:port [rdomain domain]
ListenAddress IPv4_address:port [rdomain domain]
ListenAddress [hostname|address]:port [rdomain domain]
The optional rdomain qualifier requests sshd(8) listen in an
explicit routing domain. If port is not specified, sshd will
listen on the address and all Port options specified. The
default is to listen on all local addresses on the current
default routing domain. Multiple ListenAddress options are
permitted. For more information on routing domains, see
rdomain(4).
LoginGraceTime
The server disconnects after this time if the user has not
successfully logged in. If the value is 0, there is no time
limit. The default is 120 seconds.
LogLevel
Gives the verbosity level that is used when logging messages from
sshd(8). The possible values are: QUIET, FATAL, ERROR, INFO,
VERBOSE, DEBUG, DEBUG1, DEBUG2, and DEBUG3. The default is INFO.
DEBUG and DEBUG1 are equivalent. DEBUG2 and DEBUG3 each specify
higher levels of debugging output. Logging with a DEBUG level
violates the privacy of users and is not recommended.
MACs Specifies the available MAC (message authentication code)
algorithms. The MAC algorithm is used for data integrity
protection. Multiple algorithms must be comma-separated. If the
specified list begins with a M-bM-^@M-^X+M-bM-^@M-^Y character, then the specified
algorithms will be appended to the default set instead of
replacing them. If the specified list begins with a M-bM-^@M-^X-M-bM-^@M-^Y
character, then the specified algorithms (including wildcards)
will be removed from the default set instead of replacing them.
If the specified list begins with a M-bM-^@M-^X^M-bM-^@M-^Y character, then the
specified algorithms will be placed at the head of the default
set.
The algorithms that contain "-etm" calculate the MAC after
encryption (encrypt-then-mac). These are considered safer and
their use recommended. The supported MACs are:
hmac-md5
hmac-md5-96
hmac-sha1
hmac-sha1-96
hmac-sha2-256
hmac-sha2-512
umac-64@openssh.com
umac-128@openssh.com
hmac-md5-etm@openssh.com
hmac-md5-96-etm@openssh.com
hmac-sha1-etm@openssh.com
hmac-sha1-96-etm@openssh.com
hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com
hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com
umac-64-etm@openssh.com
umac-128-etm@openssh.com
The default is:
umac-64-etm@openssh.com,umac-128-etm@openssh.com,
hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com,hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com,
hmac-sha1-etm@openssh.com,
umac-64@openssh.com,umac-128@openssh.com,
hmac-sha2-256,hmac-sha2-512,hmac-sha1
The list of available MAC algorithms may also be obtained using
"ssh -Q mac".
Match Introduces a conditional block. If all of the criteria on the
Match line are satisfied, the keywords on the following lines
override those set in the global section of the config file,
until either another Match line or the end of the file. If a
keyword appears in multiple Match blocks that are satisfied, only
the first instance of the keyword is applied.
The arguments to Match are one or more criteria-pattern pairs or
the single token All which matches all criteria. The available
criteria are User, Group, Host, LocalAddress, LocalPort, RDomain,
and Address (with RDomain representing the rdomain(4) on which
the connection was received).
The match patterns may consist of single entries or comma-
separated lists and may use the wildcard and negation operators
described in the PATTERNS section of ssh_config(5).
The patterns in an Address criteria may additionally contain
addresses to match in CIDR address/masklen format, such as
192.0.2.0/24 or 2001:db8::/32. Note that the mask length
provided must be consistent with the address - it is an error to
specify a mask length that is too long for the address or one
with bits set in this host portion of the address. For example,
192.0.2.0/33 and 192.0.2.0/8, respectively.
Only a subset of keywords may be used on the lines following a
Match keyword. Available keywords are AcceptEnv,
AllowAgentForwarding, AllowGroups, AllowStreamLocalForwarding,
AllowTcpForwarding, AllowUsers, AuthenticationMethods,
AuthorizedKeysCommand, AuthorizedKeysCommandUser,
AuthorizedKeysFile, AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand,
AuthorizedPrincipalsCommandUser, AuthorizedPrincipalsFile,
Banner, ChrootDirectory, ClientAliveCountMax,
ClientAliveInterval, DenyGroups, DenyUsers, ForceCommand,
GatewayPorts, GSSAPIAuthentication, HostbasedAcceptedKeyTypes,
- HostbasedAuthentication, HostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly, IPQoS,
- KbdInteractiveAuthentication, KerberosAuthentication, LogLevel,
- MaxAuthTries, MaxSessions, PasswordAuthentication,
- PermitEmptyPasswords, PermitListen, PermitOpen, PermitRootLogin,
- PermitTTY, PermitTunnel, PermitUserRC, PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes,
- PubkeyAuthentication, RekeyLimit, RevokedKeys, RDomain, SetEnv,
- StreamLocalBindMask, StreamLocalBindUnlink, TrustedUserCAKeys,
- X11DisplayOffset, X11Forwarding and X11UseLocalhost.
+ HostbasedAuthentication, HostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly,
+ Include, IPQoS, KbdInteractiveAuthentication,
+ KerberosAuthentication, LogLevel, MaxAuthTries, MaxSessions,
+ PasswordAuthentication, PermitEmptyPasswords, PermitListen,
+ PermitOpen, PermitRootLogin, PermitTTY, PermitTunnel,
+ PermitUserRC, PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes, PubkeyAuthentication,
+ RekeyLimit, RevokedKeys, RDomain, SetEnv, StreamLocalBindMask,
+ StreamLocalBindUnlink, TrustedUserCAKeys, X11DisplayOffset,
+ X11Forwarding and X11UseLocalhost.
MaxAuthTries
Specifies the maximum number of authentication attempts permitted
per connection. Once the number of failures reaches half this
value, additional failures are logged. The default is 6.
MaxSessions
Specifies the maximum number of open shell, login or subsystem
(e.g. sftp) sessions permitted per network connection. Multiple
sessions may be established by clients that support connection
multiplexing. Setting MaxSessions to 1 will effectively disable
session multiplexing, whereas setting it to 0 will prevent all
shell, login and subsystem sessions while still permitting
forwarding. The default is 10.
MaxStartups
Specifies the maximum number of concurrent unauthenticated
connections to the SSH daemon. Additional connections will be
dropped until authentication succeeds or the LoginGraceTime
expires for a connection. The default is 10:30:100.
Alternatively, random early drop can be enabled by specifying the
three colon separated values start:rate:full (e.g. "10:30:60").
sshd(8) will refuse connection attempts with a probability of
rate/100 (30%) if there are currently start (10) unauthenticated
connections. The probability increases linearly and all
connection attempts are refused if the number of unauthenticated
connections reaches full (60).
PasswordAuthentication
Specifies whether password authentication is allowed. The
default is yes.
PermitEmptyPasswords
When password authentication is allowed, it specifies whether the
server allows login to accounts with empty password strings. The
default is no.
PermitListen
Specifies the addresses/ports on which a remote TCP port
forwarding may listen. The listen specification must be one of
the following forms:
PermitListen port
PermitListen host:port
Multiple permissions may be specified by separating them with
whitespace. An argument of any can be used to remove all
restrictions and permit any listen requests. An argument of none
can be used to prohibit all listen requests. The host name may
contain wildcards as described in the PATTERNS section in
ssh_config(5). The wildcard M-bM-^@M-^X*M-bM-^@M-^Y can also be used in place of a
port number to allow all ports. By default all port forwarding
listen requests are permitted. Note that the GatewayPorts option
may further restrict which addresses may be listened on. Note
also that ssh(1) will request a listen host of M-bM-^@M-^\localhostM-bM-^@M-^] if no
listen host was specifically requested, and this name is treated
differently to explicit localhost addresses of M-bM-^@M-^\127.0.0.1M-bM-^@M-^] and
M-bM-^@M-^\::1M-bM-^@M-^].
PermitOpen
Specifies the destinations to which TCP port forwarding is
permitted. The forwarding specification must be one of the
following forms:
PermitOpen host:port
PermitOpen IPv4_addr:port
PermitOpen [IPv6_addr]:port
Multiple forwards may be specified by separating them with
whitespace. An argument of any can be used to remove all
restrictions and permit any forwarding requests. An argument of
none can be used to prohibit all forwarding requests. The
wildcard M-bM-^@M-^X*M-bM-^@M-^Y can be used for host or port to allow all hosts or
- ports, respectively. By default all port forwarding requests are
- permitted.
+ ports respectively. Otherwise, no pattern matching or address
+ lookups are performed on supplied names. By default all port
+ forwarding requests are permitted.
PermitRootLogin
Specifies whether root can log in using ssh(1). The argument
must be yes, prohibit-password, forced-commands-only, or no. The
default is prohibit-password.
If this option is set to prohibit-password (or its deprecated
alias, without-password), password and keyboard-interactive
authentication are disabled for root.
If this option is set to forced-commands-only, root login with
public key authentication will be allowed, but only if the
command option has been specified (which may be useful for taking
remote backups even if root login is normally not allowed). All
other authentication methods are disabled for root.
If this option is set to no, root is not allowed to log in.
PermitTTY
Specifies whether pty(4) allocation is permitted. The default is
yes.
PermitTunnel
Specifies whether tun(4) device forwarding is allowed. The
argument must be yes, point-to-point (layer 3), ethernet (layer
2), or no. Specifying yes permits both point-to-point and
ethernet. The default is no.
Independent of this setting, the permissions of the selected
tun(4) device must allow access to the user.
PermitUserEnvironment
Specifies whether ~/.ssh/environment and environment= options in
~/.ssh/authorized_keys are processed by sshd(8). Valid options
are yes, no or a pattern-list specifying which environment
variable names to accept (for example "LANG,LC_*"). The default
is no. Enabling environment processing may enable users to
bypass access restrictions in some configurations using
mechanisms such as LD_PRELOAD.
PermitUserRC
Specifies whether any ~/.ssh/rc file is executed. The default is
yes.
PidFile
Specifies the file that contains the process ID of the SSH
daemon, or none to not write one. The default is
/var/run/sshd.pid.
Port Specifies the port number that sshd(8) listens on. The default
is 22. Multiple options of this type are permitted. See also
ListenAddress.
PrintLastLog
Specifies whether sshd(8) should print the date and time of the
last user login when a user logs in interactively. The default
is yes.
PrintMotd
Specifies whether sshd(8) should print /etc/motd when a user logs
in interactively. (On some systems it is also printed by the
shell, /etc/profile, or equivalent.) The default is yes.
PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes
Specifies the key types that will be accepted for public key
authentication as a list of comma-separated patterns.
Alternately if the specified list begins with a M-bM-^@M-^X+M-bM-^@M-^Y character,
then the specified key types will be appended to the default set
instead of replacing them. If the specified list begins with a
M-bM-^@M-^X-M-bM-^@M-^Y character, then the specified key types (including wildcards)
will be removed from the default set instead of replacing them.
If the specified list begins with a M-bM-^@M-^X^M-bM-^@M-^Y character, then the
specified key types will be placed at the head of the default
set. The default for this option is:
ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com,
ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+ sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
- rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com,rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+ sk-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+ rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+ rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com,
ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
- ssh-ed25519,rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256,ssh-rsa
+ sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com,
+ ssh-ed25519,sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com,
+ rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256,ssh-rsa
The list of available key types may also be obtained using "ssh
- -Q key".
+ -Q PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes".
+
+ PubkeyAuthOptions
+ Sets one or more public key authentication options. Two option
+ keywords are currently supported: none (the default; indicating
+ no additional options are enabled) and touch-required.
+
+ The touch-required option causes public key authentication using
+ a FIDO authenticator algorithm (i.e. ecdsa-sk or ed25519-sk) to
+ always require the signature to attest that a physically present
+ user explicitly confirmed the authentication (usually by touching
+ the authenticator). By default, sshd(8) requires user presence
+ unless overridden with an authorized_keys option. The
+ touch-required flag disables this override. This option has no
+ effect for other, non-authenticator public key types.
PubkeyAuthentication
Specifies whether public key authentication is allowed. The
default is yes.
RekeyLimit
Specifies the maximum amount of data that may be transmitted
before the session key is renegotiated, optionally followed a
maximum amount of time that may pass before the session key is
renegotiated. The first argument is specified in bytes and may
have a suffix of M-bM-^@M-^XKM-bM-^@M-^Y, M-bM-^@M-^XMM-bM-^@M-^Y, or M-bM-^@M-^XGM-bM-^@M-^Y to indicate Kilobytes,
Megabytes, or Gigabytes, respectively. The default is between
M-bM-^@M-^X1GM-bM-^@M-^Y and M-bM-^@M-^X4GM-bM-^@M-^Y, depending on the cipher. The optional second
value is specified in seconds and may use any of the units
documented in the TIME FORMATS section. The default value for
RekeyLimit is default none, which means that rekeying is
performed after the cipher's default amount of data has been sent
or received and no time based rekeying is done.
RevokedKeys
Specifies revoked public keys file, or none to not use one. Keys
listed in this file will be refused for public key
authentication. Note that if this file is not readable, then
public key authentication will be refused for all users. Keys
may be specified as a text file, listing one public key per line,
or as an OpenSSH Key Revocation List (KRL) as generated by
ssh-keygen(1). For more information on KRLs, see the KEY
REVOCATION LISTS section in ssh-keygen(1).
RDomain
Specifies an explicit routing domain that is applied after
authentication has completed. The user session, as well and any
forwarded or listening IP sockets, will be bound to this
rdomain(4). If the routing domain is set to %D, then the domain
in which the incoming connection was received will be applied.
+ SecurityKeyProvider
+ Specifies a path to a library that will be used when loading FIDO
+ authenticator-hosted keys, overriding the default of using the
+ built-in USB HID support.
+
SetEnv Specifies one or more environment variables to set in child
sessions started by sshd(8) as M-bM-^@M-^\NAME=VALUEM-bM-^@M-^]. The environment
value may be quoted (e.g. if it contains whitespace characters).
Environment variables set by SetEnv override the default
environment and any variables specified by the user via AcceptEnv
or PermitUserEnvironment.
StreamLocalBindMask
Sets the octal file creation mode mask (umask) used when creating
a Unix-domain socket file for local or remote port forwarding.
This option is only used for port forwarding to a Unix-domain
socket file.
The default value is 0177, which creates a Unix-domain socket
file that is readable and writable only by the owner. Note that
not all operating systems honor the file mode on Unix-domain
socket files.
StreamLocalBindUnlink
Specifies whether to remove an existing Unix-domain socket file
for local or remote port forwarding before creating a new one.
If the socket file already exists and StreamLocalBindUnlink is
not enabled, sshd will be unable to forward the port to the Unix-
domain socket file. This option is only used for port forwarding
to a Unix-domain socket file.
The argument must be yes or no. The default is no.
StrictModes
Specifies whether sshd(8) should check file modes and ownership
of the user's files and home directory before accepting login.
This is normally desirable because novices sometimes accidentally
leave their directory or files world-writable. The default is
yes. Note that this does not apply to ChrootDirectory, whose
permissions and ownership are checked unconditionally.
Subsystem
Configures an external subsystem (e.g. file transfer daemon).
Arguments should be a subsystem name and a command (with optional
arguments) to execute upon subsystem request.
The command sftp-server implements the SFTP file transfer
subsystem.
Alternately the name internal-sftp implements an in-process SFTP
server. This may simplify configurations using ChrootDirectory
to force a different filesystem root on clients.
By default no subsystems are defined.
SyslogFacility
Gives the facility code that is used when logging messages from
sshd(8). The possible values are: DAEMON, USER, AUTH, LOCAL0,
LOCAL1, LOCAL2, LOCAL3, LOCAL4, LOCAL5, LOCAL6, LOCAL7. The
default is AUTH.
TCPKeepAlive
Specifies whether the system should send TCP keepalive messages
to the other side. If they are sent, death of the connection or
crash of one of the machines will be properly noticed. However,
this means that connections will die if the route is down
temporarily, and some people find it annoying. On the other
hand, if TCP keepalives are not sent, sessions may hang
indefinitely on the server, leaving "ghost" users and consuming
server resources.
The default is yes (to send TCP keepalive messages), and the
server will notice if the network goes down or the client host
crashes. This avoids infinitely hanging sessions.
To disable TCP keepalive messages, the value should be set to no.
TrustedUserCAKeys
Specifies a file containing public keys of certificate
authorities that are trusted to sign user certificates for
authentication, or none to not use one. Keys are listed one per
line; empty lines and comments starting with M-bM-^@M-^X#M-bM-^@M-^Y are allowed. If
a certificate is presented for authentication and has its signing
CA key listed in this file, then it may be used for
authentication for any user listed in the certificate's
principals list. Note that certificates that lack a list of
principals will not be permitted for authentication using
TrustedUserCAKeys. For more details on certificates, see the
CERTIFICATES section in ssh-keygen(1).
UseDNS Specifies whether sshd(8) should look up the remote host name,
and to check that the resolved host name for the remote IP
address maps back to the very same IP address.
If this option is set to no (the default) then only addresses and
not host names may be used in ~/.ssh/authorized_keys from and
sshd_config Match Host directives.
UsePAM Enables the Pluggable Authentication Module interface. If set to
yes this will enable PAM authentication using
ChallengeResponseAuthentication and PasswordAuthentication in
addition to PAM account and session module processing for all
authentication types.
Because PAM challenge-response authentication usually serves an
equivalent role to password authentication, you should disable
either PasswordAuthentication or ChallengeResponseAuthentication.
If UsePAM is enabled, you will not be able to run sshd(8) as a
non-root user. The default is no.
VersionAddendum
Optionally specifies additional text to append to the SSH
protocol banner sent by the server upon connection. The default
is none.
X11DisplayOffset
Specifies the first display number available for sshd(8)'s X11
forwarding. This prevents sshd from interfering with real X11
servers. The default is 10.
X11Forwarding
Specifies whether X11 forwarding is permitted. The argument must
be yes or no. The default is no.
When X11 forwarding is enabled, there may be additional exposure
to the server and to client displays if the sshd(8) proxy display
is configured to listen on the wildcard address (see
X11UseLocalhost), though this is not the default. Additionally,
the authentication spoofing and authentication data verification
and substitution occur on the client side. The security risk of
using X11 forwarding is that the client's X11 display server may
be exposed to attack when the SSH client requests forwarding (see
the warnings for ForwardX11 in ssh_config(5)). A system
administrator may have a stance in which they want to protect
clients that may expose themselves to attack by unwittingly
requesting X11 forwarding, which can warrant a no setting.
Note that disabling X11 forwarding does not prevent users from
forwarding X11 traffic, as users can always install their own
forwarders.
X11UseLocalhost
Specifies whether sshd(8) should bind the X11 forwarding server
to the loopback address or to the wildcard address. By default,
sshd binds the forwarding server to the loopback address and sets
the hostname part of the DISPLAY environment variable to
localhost. This prevents remote hosts from connecting to the
proxy display. However, some older X11 clients may not function
with this configuration. X11UseLocalhost may be set to no to
specify that the forwarding server should be bound to the
wildcard address. The argument must be yes or no. The default
is yes.
XAuthLocation
Specifies the full pathname of the xauth(1) program, or none to
not use one. The default is /usr/X11R6/bin/xauth.
TIME FORMATS
sshd(8) command-line arguments and configuration file options that
specify time may be expressed using a sequence of the form:
time[qualifier], where time is a positive integer value and qualifier is
one of the following:
M-bM-^_M-(noneM-bM-^_M-) seconds
s | S seconds
m | M minutes
h | H hours
d | D days
w | W weeks
Each member of the sequence is added together to calculate the total time
value.
Time format examples:
600 600 seconds (10 minutes)
10m 10 minutes
1h30m 1 hour 30 minutes (90 minutes)
TOKENS
Arguments to some keywords can make use of tokens, which are expanded at
runtime:
%% A literal M-bM-^@M-^X%M-bM-^@M-^Y.
%D The routing domain in which the incoming connection was
received.
%F The fingerprint of the CA key.
%f The fingerprint of the key or certificate.
%h The home directory of the user.
%i The key ID in the certificate.
%K The base64-encoded CA key.
%k The base64-encoded key or certificate for authentication.
%s The serial number of the certificate.
%T The type of the CA key.
%t The key or certificate type.
%U The numeric user ID of the target user.
%u The username.
AuthorizedKeysCommand accepts the tokens %%, %f, %h, %k, %t, %U, and %u.
AuthorizedKeysFile accepts the tokens %%, %h, %U, and %u.
AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand accepts the tokens %%, %F, %f, %h, %i, %K,
%k, %s, %T, %t, %U, and %u.
AuthorizedPrincipalsFile accepts the tokens %%, %h, %U, and %u.
ChrootDirectory accepts the tokens %%, %h, %U, and %u.
RoutingDomain accepts the token %D.
FILES
/etc/ssh/sshd_config
Contains configuration data for sshd(8). This file should be
writable by root only, but it is recommended (though not
necessary) that it be world-readable.
SEE ALSO
sftp-server(8), sshd(8)
AUTHORS
OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free ssh 1.2.12 release by
Tatu Ylonen. Aaron Campbell, Bob Beck, Markus Friedl, Niels Provos, Theo
de Raadt and Dug Song removed many bugs, re-added newer features and
created OpenSSH. Markus Friedl contributed the support for SSH protocol
versions 1.5 and 2.0. Niels Provos and Markus Friedl contributed support
for privilege separation.
-OpenBSD 6.6 September 6, 2019 OpenBSD 6.6
+OpenBSD 6.6 February 7, 2020 OpenBSD 6.6
diff --git a/sshd_config.5 b/sshd_config.5
index 9486f2a1c678..70ccea449d18 100644
--- a/sshd_config.5
+++ b/sshd_config.5
@@ -1,1840 +1,1893 @@
.\"
.\" Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
.\" Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
.\" All rights reserved
.\"
.\" As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
.\" can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
.\" software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
.\" incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
.\" called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
.\"
.\" Copyright (c) 1999,2000 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
.\" Copyright (c) 1999 Aaron Campbell. All rights reserved.
.\" Copyright (c) 1999 Theo de Raadt. All rights reserved.
.\"
.\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
.\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
.\" are met:
.\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
.\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
.\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
.\" documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
.\"
.\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
.\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
.\" OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
.\" IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
.\" INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
.\" NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
.\" DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
.\" THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
.\" (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
.\" THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
.\"
-.\" $OpenBSD: sshd_config.5,v 1.290 2019/09/06 14:45:34 naddy Exp $
-.Dd $Mdocdate: September 6 2019 $
+.\" $OpenBSD: sshd_config.5,v 1.307 2020/02/07 03:54:44 dtucker Exp $
+.Dd $Mdocdate: February 7 2020 $
.Dt SSHD_CONFIG 5
.Os
.Sh NAME
.Nm sshd_config
-.Nd OpenSSH SSH daemon configuration file
+.Nd OpenSSH daemon configuration file
.Sh DESCRIPTION
.Xr sshd 8
reads configuration data from
.Pa /etc/ssh/sshd_config
(or the file specified with
.Fl f
on the command line).
The file contains keyword-argument pairs, one per line.
For each keyword, the first obtained value will be used.
Lines starting with
.Ql #
and empty lines are interpreted as comments.
Arguments may optionally be enclosed in double quotes
.Pq \&"
in order to represent arguments containing spaces.
.Pp
The possible
keywords and their meanings are as follows (note that
keywords are case-insensitive and arguments are case-sensitive):
.Bl -tag -width Ds
.It Cm AcceptEnv
Specifies what environment variables sent by the client will be copied into
the session's
.Xr environ 7 .
See
.Cm SendEnv
and
.Cm SetEnv
in
.Xr ssh_config 5
for how to configure the client.
The
.Ev TERM
environment variable is always accepted whenever the client
requests a pseudo-terminal as it is required by the protocol.
Variables are specified by name, which may contain the wildcard characters
.Ql *
and
.Ql \&? .
Multiple environment variables may be separated by whitespace or spread
across multiple
.Cm AcceptEnv
directives.
Be warned that some environment variables could be used to bypass restricted
user environments.
For this reason, care should be taken in the use of this directive.
The default is not to accept any environment variables.
.It Cm AddressFamily
Specifies which address family should be used by
.Xr sshd 8 .
Valid arguments are
.Cm any
(the default),
.Cm inet
(use IPv4 only), or
.Cm inet6
(use IPv6 only).
.It Cm AllowAgentForwarding
Specifies whether
.Xr ssh-agent 1
forwarding is permitted.
The default is
.Cm yes .
Note that disabling agent forwarding does not improve security
unless users are also denied shell access, as they can always install
their own forwarders.
.It Cm AllowGroups
This keyword can be followed by a list of group name patterns, separated
by spaces.
If specified, login is allowed only for users whose primary
group or supplementary group list matches one of the patterns.
Only group names are valid; a numerical group ID is not recognized.
By default, login is allowed for all groups.
-The allow/deny directives are processed in the following order:
-.Cm DenyUsers ,
-.Cm AllowUsers ,
+The allow/deny groups directives are processed in the following order:
.Cm DenyGroups ,
-and finally
.Cm AllowGroups .
.Pp
See PATTERNS in
.Xr ssh_config 5
for more information on patterns.
.It Cm AllowStreamLocalForwarding
Specifies whether StreamLocal (Unix-domain socket) forwarding is permitted.
The available options are
.Cm yes
(the default)
or
.Cm all
to allow StreamLocal forwarding,
.Cm no
to prevent all StreamLocal forwarding,
.Cm local
to allow local (from the perspective of
.Xr ssh 1 )
forwarding only or
.Cm remote
to allow remote forwarding only.
Note that disabling StreamLocal forwarding does not improve security unless
users are also denied shell access, as they can always install their
own forwarders.
.It Cm AllowTcpForwarding
Specifies whether TCP forwarding is permitted.
The available options are
.Cm yes
(the default)
or
.Cm all
to allow TCP forwarding,
.Cm no
to prevent all TCP forwarding,
.Cm local
to allow local (from the perspective of
.Xr ssh 1 )
forwarding only or
.Cm remote
to allow remote forwarding only.
Note that disabling TCP forwarding does not improve security unless
users are also denied shell access, as they can always install their
own forwarders.
.It Cm AllowUsers
This keyword can be followed by a list of user name patterns, separated
by spaces.
If specified, login is allowed only for user names that
match one of the patterns.
Only user names are valid; a numerical user ID is not recognized.
By default, login is allowed for all users.
If the pattern takes the form USER@HOST then USER and HOST
are separately checked, restricting logins to particular
users from particular hosts.
HOST criteria may additionally contain addresses to match in CIDR
address/masklen format.
-The allow/deny directives are processed in the following order:
+The allow/deny users directives are processed in the following order:
.Cm DenyUsers ,
-.Cm AllowUsers ,
-.Cm DenyGroups ,
-and finally
-.Cm AllowGroups .
+.Cm AllowUsers .
.Pp
See PATTERNS in
.Xr ssh_config 5
for more information on patterns.
.It Cm AuthenticationMethods
Specifies the authentication methods that must be successfully completed
for a user to be granted access.
This option must be followed by one or more lists of comma-separated
authentication method names, or by the single string
.Cm any
to indicate the default behaviour of accepting any single authentication
method.
If the default is overridden, then successful authentication requires
completion of every method in at least one of these lists.
.Pp
For example,
.Qq publickey,password publickey,keyboard-interactive
would require the user to complete public key authentication, followed by
either password or keyboard interactive authentication.
Only methods that are next in one or more lists are offered at each stage,
so for this example it would not be possible to attempt password or
keyboard-interactive authentication before public key.
.Pp
For keyboard interactive authentication it is also possible to
restrict authentication to a specific device by appending a
colon followed by the device identifier
.Cm bsdauth
or
.Cm pam .
depending on the server configuration.
For example,
.Qq keyboard-interactive:bsdauth
would restrict keyboard interactive authentication to the
.Cm bsdauth
device.
.Pp
If the publickey method is listed more than once,
.Xr sshd 8
verifies that keys that have been used successfully are not reused for
subsequent authentications.
For example,
.Qq publickey,publickey
requires successful authentication using two different public keys.
.Pp
Note that each authentication method listed should also be explicitly enabled
in the configuration.
.Pp
The available authentication methods are:
.Qq gssapi-with-mic ,
.Qq hostbased ,
.Qq keyboard-interactive ,
.Qq none
(used for access to password-less accounts when
.Cm PermitEmptyPasswords
is enabled),
.Qq password
and
.Qq publickey .
.It Cm AuthorizedKeysCommand
Specifies a program to be used to look up the user's public keys.
The program must be owned by root, not writable by group or others and
specified by an absolute path.
Arguments to
.Cm AuthorizedKeysCommand
accept the tokens described in the
.Sx TOKENS
section.
If no arguments are specified then the username of the target user is used.
.Pp
The program should produce on standard output zero or
more lines of authorized_keys output (see
.Sx AUTHORIZED_KEYS
in
.Xr sshd 8 ) .
If a key supplied by
.Cm AuthorizedKeysCommand
does not successfully authenticate
and authorize the user then public key authentication continues using the usual
.Cm AuthorizedKeysFile
files.
By default, no
.Cm AuthorizedKeysCommand
is run.
.It Cm AuthorizedKeysCommandUser
Specifies the user under whose account the
.Cm AuthorizedKeysCommand
is run.
It is recommended to use a dedicated user that has no other role on the host
than running authorized keys commands.
If
.Cm AuthorizedKeysCommand
is specified but
.Cm AuthorizedKeysCommandUser
is not, then
.Xr sshd 8
will refuse to start.
.It Cm AuthorizedKeysFile
Specifies the file that contains the public keys used for user authentication.
The format is described in the AUTHORIZED_KEYS FILE FORMAT section of
.Xr sshd 8 .
Arguments to
.Cm AuthorizedKeysFile
accept the tokens described in the
.Sx TOKENS
section.
After expansion,
.Cm AuthorizedKeysFile
is taken to be an absolute path or one relative to the user's home
directory.
Multiple files may be listed, separated by whitespace.
Alternately this option may be set to
.Cm none
to skip checking for user keys in files.
The default is
.Qq .ssh/authorized_keys .ssh/authorized_keys2 .
.It Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand
Specifies a program to be used to generate the list of allowed
certificate principals as per
.Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsFile .
The program must be owned by root, not writable by group or others and
specified by an absolute path.
Arguments to
.Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand
accept the tokens described in the
.Sx TOKENS
section.
If no arguments are specified then the username of the target user is used.
.Pp
The program should produce on standard output zero or
more lines of
.Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsFile
output.
If either
.Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand
or
.Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsFile
is specified, then certificates offered by the client for authentication
must contain a principal that is listed.
By default, no
.Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand
is run.
.It Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsCommandUser
Specifies the user under whose account the
.Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand
is run.
It is recommended to use a dedicated user that has no other role on the host
than running authorized principals commands.
If
.Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand
is specified but
.Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsCommandUser
is not, then
.Xr sshd 8
will refuse to start.
.It Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsFile
Specifies a file that lists principal names that are accepted for
certificate authentication.
When using certificates signed by a key listed in
.Cm TrustedUserCAKeys ,
this file lists names, one of which must appear in the certificate for it
to be accepted for authentication.
Names are listed one per line preceded by key options (as described in
.Sx AUTHORIZED_KEYS FILE FORMAT
in
.Xr sshd 8 ) .
Empty lines and comments starting with
.Ql #
are ignored.
.Pp
Arguments to
.Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsFile
accept the tokens described in the
.Sx TOKENS
section.
After expansion,
.Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsFile
is taken to be an absolute path or one relative to the user's home directory.
The default is
.Cm none ,
i.e. not to use a principals file \(en in this case, the username
of the user must appear in a certificate's principals list for it to be
accepted.
.Pp
Note that
.Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsFile
is only used when authentication proceeds using a CA listed in
.Cm TrustedUserCAKeys
and is not consulted for certification authorities trusted via
.Pa ~/.ssh/authorized_keys ,
though the
.Cm principals=
key option offers a similar facility (see
.Xr sshd 8
for details).
.It Cm Banner
The contents of the specified file are sent to the remote user before
authentication is allowed.
If the argument is
.Cm none
then no banner is displayed.
By default, no banner is displayed.
.It Cm CASignatureAlgorithms
Specifies which algorithms are allowed for signing of certificates
by certificate authorities (CAs).
The default is:
.Bd -literal -offset indent
ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
ssh-ed25519,rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256,ssh-rsa
.Ed
.Pp
Certificates signed using other algorithms will not be accepted for
public key or host-based authentication.
.It Cm ChallengeResponseAuthentication
Specifies whether challenge-response authentication is allowed (e.g. via
PAM or through authentication styles supported in
.Xr login.conf 5 )
The default is
.Cm yes .
.It Cm ChrootDirectory
Specifies the pathname of a directory to
.Xr chroot 2
to after authentication.
At session startup
.Xr sshd 8
checks that all components of the pathname are root-owned directories
which are not writable by any other user or group.
After the chroot,
.Xr sshd 8
changes the working directory to the user's home directory.
Arguments to
.Cm ChrootDirectory
accept the tokens described in the
.Sx TOKENS
section.
.Pp
The
.Cm ChrootDirectory
must contain the necessary files and directories to support the
user's session.
For an interactive session this requires at least a shell, typically
.Xr sh 1 ,
and basic
.Pa /dev
nodes such as
.Xr null 4 ,
.Xr zero 4 ,
.Xr stdin 4 ,
.Xr stdout 4 ,
.Xr stderr 4 ,
and
.Xr tty 4
devices.
For file transfer sessions using SFTP
no additional configuration of the environment is necessary if the in-process
sftp-server is used,
though sessions which use logging may require
.Pa /dev/log
inside the chroot directory on some operating systems (see
.Xr sftp-server 8
for details).
.Pp
For safety, it is very important that the directory hierarchy be
prevented from modification by other processes on the system (especially
those outside the jail).
Misconfiguration can lead to unsafe environments which
.Xr sshd 8
cannot detect.
.Pp
The default is
.Cm none ,
indicating not to
.Xr chroot 2 .
.It Cm Ciphers
Specifies the ciphers allowed.
Multiple ciphers must be comma-separated.
If the specified list begins with a
.Sq +
character, then the specified ciphers will be appended to the default set
instead of replacing them.
If the specified list begins with a
.Sq -
character, then the specified ciphers (including wildcards) will be removed
from the default set instead of replacing them.
If the specified list begins with a
.Sq ^
character, then the specified ciphers will be placed at the head of the
default set.
.Pp
The supported ciphers are:
.Pp
.Bl -item -compact -offset indent
.It
3des-cbc
.It
aes128-cbc
.It
aes192-cbc
.It
aes256-cbc
.It
aes128-ctr
.It
aes192-ctr
.It
aes256-ctr
.It
aes128-gcm@openssh.com
.It
aes256-gcm@openssh.com
.It
chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com
.El
.Pp
The default is:
.Bd -literal -offset indent
chacha20-poly1305@openssh.com,
aes128-ctr,aes192-ctr,aes256-ctr,
aes128-gcm@openssh.com,aes256-gcm@openssh.com
.Ed
.Pp
The list of available ciphers may also be obtained using
.Qq ssh -Q cipher .
.It Cm ClientAliveCountMax
Sets the number of client alive messages which may be sent without
.Xr sshd 8
receiving any messages back from the client.
If this threshold is reached while client alive messages are being sent,
sshd will disconnect the client, terminating the session.
It is important to note that the use of client alive messages is very
different from
.Cm TCPKeepAlive .
The client alive messages are sent through the encrypted channel
and therefore will not be spoofable.
The TCP keepalive option enabled by
.Cm TCPKeepAlive
is spoofable.
The client alive mechanism is valuable when the client or
server depend on knowing when a connection has become unresponsive.
.Pp
The default value is 3.
If
.Cm ClientAliveInterval
is set to 15, and
.Cm ClientAliveCountMax
is left at the default, unresponsive SSH clients
will be disconnected after approximately 45 seconds.
+Setting a zero
+.Cm ClientAliveCountMax
+disables connection termination.
.It Cm ClientAliveInterval
Sets a timeout interval in seconds after which if no data has been received
from the client,
.Xr sshd 8
will send a message through the encrypted
channel to request a response from the client.
The default
is 0, indicating that these messages will not be sent to the client.
.It Cm Compression
Specifies whether compression is enabled after
the user has authenticated successfully.
The argument must be
.Cm yes ,
.Cm delayed
(a legacy synonym for
.Cm yes )
or
.Cm no .
The default is
.Cm yes .
.It Cm DenyGroups
This keyword can be followed by a list of group name patterns, separated
by spaces.
Login is disallowed for users whose primary group or supplementary
group list matches one of the patterns.
Only group names are valid; a numerical group ID is not recognized.
By default, login is allowed for all groups.
-The allow/deny directives are processed in the following order:
-.Cm DenyUsers ,
-.Cm AllowUsers ,
+The allow/deny groups directives are processed in the following order:
.Cm DenyGroups ,
-and finally
.Cm AllowGroups .
.Pp
See PATTERNS in
.Xr ssh_config 5
for more information on patterns.
.It Cm DenyUsers
This keyword can be followed by a list of user name patterns, separated
by spaces.
Login is disallowed for user names that match one of the patterns.
Only user names are valid; a numerical user ID is not recognized.
By default, login is allowed for all users.
If the pattern takes the form USER@HOST then USER and HOST
are separately checked, restricting logins to particular
users from particular hosts.
HOST criteria may additionally contain addresses to match in CIDR
address/masklen format.
-The allow/deny directives are processed in the following order:
+The allow/deny users directives are processed in the following order:
.Cm DenyUsers ,
-.Cm AllowUsers ,
-.Cm DenyGroups ,
-and finally
-.Cm AllowGroups .
+.Cm AllowUsers .
.Pp
See PATTERNS in
.Xr ssh_config 5
for more information on patterns.
.It Cm DisableForwarding
Disables all forwarding features, including X11,
.Xr ssh-agent 1 ,
TCP and StreamLocal.
This option overrides all other forwarding-related options and may
simplify restricted configurations.
.It Cm ExposeAuthInfo
Writes a temporary file containing a list of authentication methods and
public credentials (e.g. keys) used to authenticate the user.
The location of the file is exposed to the user session through the
.Ev SSH_USER_AUTH
environment variable.
The default is
.Cm no .
.It Cm FingerprintHash
Specifies the hash algorithm used when logging key fingerprints.
Valid options are:
.Cm md5
and
.Cm sha256 .
The default is
.Cm sha256 .
.It Cm ForceCommand
Forces the execution of the command specified by
.Cm ForceCommand ,
ignoring any command supplied by the client and
.Pa ~/.ssh/rc
if present.
The command is invoked by using the user's login shell with the -c option.
This applies to shell, command, or subsystem execution.
It is most useful inside a
.Cm Match
block.
The command originally supplied by the client is available in the
.Ev SSH_ORIGINAL_COMMAND
environment variable.
Specifying a command of
.Cm internal-sftp
will force the use of an in-process SFTP server that requires no support
files when used with
.Cm ChrootDirectory .
The default is
.Cm none .
.It Cm GatewayPorts
Specifies whether remote hosts are allowed to connect to ports
forwarded for the client.
By default,
.Xr sshd 8
binds remote port forwardings to the loopback address.
This prevents other remote hosts from connecting to forwarded ports.
.Cm GatewayPorts
can be used to specify that sshd
should allow remote port forwardings to bind to non-loopback addresses, thus
allowing other hosts to connect.
The argument may be
.Cm no
to force remote port forwardings to be available to the local host only,
.Cm yes
to force remote port forwardings to bind to the wildcard address, or
.Cm clientspecified
to allow the client to select the address to which the forwarding is bound.
The default is
.Cm no .
.It Cm GSSAPIAuthentication
Specifies whether user authentication based on GSSAPI is allowed.
The default is
.Cm no .
.It Cm GSSAPICleanupCredentials
Specifies whether to automatically destroy the user's credentials cache
on logout.
The default is
.Cm yes .
.It Cm GSSAPIStrictAcceptorCheck
Determines whether to be strict about the identity of the GSSAPI acceptor
a client authenticates against.
If set to
.Cm yes
then the client must authenticate against the host
service on the current hostname.
If set to
.Cm no
then the client may authenticate against any service key stored in the
machine's default store.
This facility is provided to assist with operation on multi homed machines.
The default is
.Cm yes .
.It Cm HostbasedAcceptedKeyTypes
Specifies the key types that will be accepted for hostbased authentication
as a list of comma-separated patterns.
Alternately if the specified list begins with a
.Sq +
character, then the specified key types will be appended to the default set
instead of replacing them.
If the specified list begins with a
.Sq -
character, then the specified key types (including wildcards) will be removed
from the default set instead of replacing them.
If the specified list begins with a
.Sq ^
character, then the specified key types will be placed at the head of the
default set.
The default for this option is:
.Bd -literal -offset 3n
ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com,
ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
-rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com,rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+sk-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com,
ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
-ssh-ed25519,rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256,ssh-rsa
+sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com,
+ssh-ed25519,sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com,
+rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256,ssh-rsa
.Ed
.Pp
The list of available key types may also be obtained using
-.Qq ssh -Q key .
+.Qq ssh -Q HostbasedAcceptedKeyTypes .
.It Cm HostbasedAuthentication
Specifies whether rhosts or /etc/hosts.equiv authentication together
with successful public key client host authentication is allowed
(host-based authentication).
The default is
.Cm no .
.It Cm HostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly
Specifies whether or not the server will attempt to perform a reverse
name lookup when matching the name in the
.Pa ~/.shosts ,
.Pa ~/.rhosts ,
and
.Pa /etc/hosts.equiv
files during
.Cm HostbasedAuthentication .
A setting of
.Cm yes
means that
.Xr sshd 8
uses the name supplied by the client rather than
attempting to resolve the name from the TCP connection itself.
The default is
.Cm no .
.It Cm HostCertificate
Specifies a file containing a public host certificate.
The certificate's public key must match a private host key already specified
by
.Cm HostKey .
The default behaviour of
.Xr sshd 8
is not to load any certificates.
.It Cm HostKey
Specifies a file containing a private host key
used by SSH.
The defaults are
.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ecdsa_key ,
.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_ed25519_key
and
.Pa /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key .
.Pp
Note that
.Xr sshd 8
will refuse to use a file if it is group/world-accessible
and that the
.Cm HostKeyAlgorithms
option restricts which of the keys are actually used by
.Xr sshd 8 .
.Pp
It is possible to have multiple host key files.
It is also possible to specify public host key files instead.
In this case operations on the private key will be delegated
to an
.Xr ssh-agent 1 .
.It Cm HostKeyAgent
Identifies the UNIX-domain socket used to communicate
with an agent that has access to the private host keys.
If the string
.Qq SSH_AUTH_SOCK
is specified, the location of the socket will be read from the
.Ev SSH_AUTH_SOCK
environment variable.
.It Cm HostKeyAlgorithms
Specifies the host key algorithms
that the server offers.
The default for this option is:
.Bd -literal -offset 3n
ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com,
ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
-rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com,rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+sk-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com,
ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
-ssh-ed25519,rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256,ssh-rsa
+sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com,
+ssh-ed25519,sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com,
+rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256,ssh-rsa
.Ed
.Pp
The list of available key types may also be obtained using
-.Qq ssh -Q key .
+.Qq ssh -Q HostKeyAlgorithms .
.It Cm IgnoreRhosts
Specifies that
.Pa .rhosts
and
.Pa .shosts
files will not be used in
.Cm HostbasedAuthentication .
.Pp
.Pa /etc/hosts.equiv
and
.Pa /etc/shosts.equiv
are still used.
The default is
.Cm yes .
.It Cm IgnoreUserKnownHosts
Specifies whether
.Xr sshd 8
should ignore the user's
.Pa ~/.ssh/known_hosts
during
.Cm HostbasedAuthentication
and use only the system-wide known hosts file
.Pa /etc/ssh/known_hosts .
The default is
-.Cm no .
+.Dq no .
+.It Cm Include
+Include the specified configuration file(s).
+Multiple pathnames may be specified and each pathname may contain
+.Xr glob 7
+wildcards.
+Files without absolute paths are assumed to be in
+.Pa /etc/ssh .
+An
+.Cm Include
+directive may appear inside a
+.Cm Match
+block
+to perform conditional inclusion.
.It Cm IPQoS
Specifies the IPv4 type-of-service or DSCP class for the connection.
Accepted values are
.Cm af11 ,
.Cm af12 ,
.Cm af13 ,
.Cm af21 ,
.Cm af22 ,
.Cm af23 ,
.Cm af31 ,
.Cm af32 ,
.Cm af33 ,
.Cm af41 ,
.Cm af42 ,
.Cm af43 ,
.Cm cs0 ,
.Cm cs1 ,
.Cm cs2 ,
.Cm cs3 ,
.Cm cs4 ,
.Cm cs5 ,
.Cm cs6 ,
.Cm cs7 ,
.Cm ef ,
+.Cm le ,
.Cm lowdelay ,
.Cm throughput ,
.Cm reliability ,
a numeric value, or
.Cm none
to use the operating system default.
This option may take one or two arguments, separated by whitespace.
If one argument is specified, it is used as the packet class unconditionally.
If two values are specified, the first is automatically selected for
interactive sessions and the second for non-interactive sessions.
The default is
.Cm af21
(Low-Latency Data)
for interactive sessions and
.Cm cs1
(Lower Effort)
for non-interactive sessions.
.It Cm KbdInteractiveAuthentication
Specifies whether to allow keyboard-interactive authentication.
The argument to this keyword must be
.Cm yes
or
.Cm no .
The default is to use whatever value
.Cm ChallengeResponseAuthentication
is set to
(by default
.Cm yes ) .
.It Cm KerberosAuthentication
Specifies whether the password provided by the user for
.Cm PasswordAuthentication
will be validated through the Kerberos KDC.
To use this option, the server needs a
Kerberos servtab which allows the verification of the KDC's identity.
The default is
.Cm no .
.It Cm KerberosGetAFSToken
If AFS is active and the user has a Kerberos 5 TGT, attempt to acquire
an AFS token before accessing the user's home directory.
The default is
.Cm no .
.It Cm KerberosOrLocalPasswd
If password authentication through Kerberos fails then
the password will be validated via any additional local mechanism
such as
.Pa /etc/passwd .
The default is
.Cm yes .
.It Cm KerberosTicketCleanup
Specifies whether to automatically destroy the user's ticket cache
file on logout.
The default is
.Cm yes .
.It Cm KexAlgorithms
Specifies the available KEX (Key Exchange) algorithms.
Multiple algorithms must be comma-separated.
Alternately if the specified list begins with a
.Sq +
character, then the specified methods will be appended to the default set
instead of replacing them.
If the specified list begins with a
.Sq -
character, then the specified methods (including wildcards) will be removed
from the default set instead of replacing them.
If the specified list begins with a
.Sq ^
character, then the specified methods will be placed at the head of the
default set.
The supported algorithms are:
.Pp
.Bl -item -compact -offset indent
.It
curve25519-sha256
.It
curve25519-sha256@libssh.org
.It
diffie-hellman-group1-sha1
.It
diffie-hellman-group14-sha1
.It
diffie-hellman-group14-sha256
.It
diffie-hellman-group16-sha512
.It
diffie-hellman-group18-sha512
.It
diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1
.It
diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256
.It
ecdh-sha2-nistp256
.It
ecdh-sha2-nistp384
.It
ecdh-sha2-nistp521
+.It
+sntrup4591761x25519-sha512@tinyssh.org
.El
.Pp
The default is:
.Bd -literal -offset indent
curve25519-sha256,curve25519-sha256@libssh.org,
ecdh-sha2-nistp256,ecdh-sha2-nistp384,ecdh-sha2-nistp521,
diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256,
diffie-hellman-group16-sha512,diffie-hellman-group18-sha512,
-diffie-hellman-group14-sha256,diffie-hellman-group14-sha1
+diffie-hellman-group14-sha256
.Ed
.Pp
The list of available key exchange algorithms may also be obtained using
-.Qq ssh -Q kex .
+.Qq ssh -Q KexAlgorithms .
.It Cm ListenAddress
Specifies the local addresses
.Xr sshd 8
should listen on.
The following forms may be used:
.Pp
.Bl -item -offset indent -compact
.It
.Cm ListenAddress
.Sm off
.Ar hostname | address
.Sm on
.Op Cm rdomain Ar domain
.It
.Cm ListenAddress
.Sm off
.Ar hostname : port
.Sm on
.Op Cm rdomain Ar domain
.It
.Cm ListenAddress
.Sm off
.Ar IPv4_address : port
.Sm on
.Op Cm rdomain Ar domain
.It
.Cm ListenAddress
.Sm off
.Oo Ar hostname | address Oc : Ar port
.Sm on
.Op Cm rdomain Ar domain
.El
.Pp
The optional
.Cm rdomain
qualifier requests
.Xr sshd 8
listen in an explicit routing domain.
If
.Ar port
is not specified,
sshd will listen on the address and all
.Cm Port
options specified.
The default is to listen on all local addresses on the current default
routing domain.
Multiple
.Cm ListenAddress
options are permitted.
For more information on routing domains, see
.Xr rdomain 4 .
.It Cm LoginGraceTime
The server disconnects after this time if the user has not
successfully logged in.
If the value is 0, there is no time limit.
The default is 120 seconds.
.It Cm LogLevel
Gives the verbosity level that is used when logging messages from
.Xr sshd 8 .
The possible values are:
QUIET, FATAL, ERROR, INFO, VERBOSE, DEBUG, DEBUG1, DEBUG2, and DEBUG3.
The default is INFO.
DEBUG and DEBUG1 are equivalent.
DEBUG2 and DEBUG3 each specify higher levels of debugging output.
Logging with a DEBUG level violates the privacy of users and is not recommended.
.It Cm MACs
Specifies the available MAC (message authentication code) algorithms.
The MAC algorithm is used for data integrity protection.
Multiple algorithms must be comma-separated.
If the specified list begins with a
.Sq +
character, then the specified algorithms will be appended to the default set
instead of replacing them.
If the specified list begins with a
.Sq -
character, then the specified algorithms (including wildcards) will be removed
from the default set instead of replacing them.
If the specified list begins with a
.Sq ^
character, then the specified algorithms will be placed at the head of the
default set.
.Pp
The algorithms that contain
.Qq -etm
calculate the MAC after encryption (encrypt-then-mac).
These are considered safer and their use recommended.
The supported MACs are:
.Pp
.Bl -item -compact -offset indent
.It
hmac-md5
.It
hmac-md5-96
.It
hmac-sha1
.It
hmac-sha1-96
.It
hmac-sha2-256
.It
hmac-sha2-512
.It
umac-64@openssh.com
.It
umac-128@openssh.com
.It
hmac-md5-etm@openssh.com
.It
hmac-md5-96-etm@openssh.com
.It
hmac-sha1-etm@openssh.com
.It
hmac-sha1-96-etm@openssh.com
.It
hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com
.It
hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com
.It
umac-64-etm@openssh.com
.It
umac-128-etm@openssh.com
.El
.Pp
The default is:
.Bd -literal -offset indent
umac-64-etm@openssh.com,umac-128-etm@openssh.com,
hmac-sha2-256-etm@openssh.com,hmac-sha2-512-etm@openssh.com,
hmac-sha1-etm@openssh.com,
umac-64@openssh.com,umac-128@openssh.com,
hmac-sha2-256,hmac-sha2-512,hmac-sha1
.Ed
.Pp
The list of available MAC algorithms may also be obtained using
.Qq ssh -Q mac .
.It Cm Match
Introduces a conditional block.
If all of the criteria on the
.Cm Match
line are satisfied, the keywords on the following lines override those
set in the global section of the config file, until either another
.Cm Match
line or the end of the file.
If a keyword appears in multiple
.Cm Match
blocks that are satisfied, only the first instance of the keyword is
applied.
.Pp
The arguments to
.Cm Match
are one or more criteria-pattern pairs or the single token
.Cm All
which matches all criteria.
The available criteria are
.Cm User ,
.Cm Group ,
.Cm Host ,
.Cm LocalAddress ,
.Cm LocalPort ,
.Cm RDomain ,
and
.Cm Address
(with
.Cm RDomain
representing the
.Xr rdomain 4
on which the connection was received).
.Pp
The match patterns may consist of single entries or comma-separated
lists and may use the wildcard and negation operators described in the
.Sx PATTERNS
section of
.Xr ssh_config 5 .
.Pp
The patterns in an
.Cm Address
criteria may additionally contain addresses to match in CIDR
address/masklen format,
such as 192.0.2.0/24 or 2001:db8::/32.
Note that the mask length provided must be consistent with the address -
it is an error to specify a mask length that is too long for the address
or one with bits set in this host portion of the address.
For example, 192.0.2.0/33 and 192.0.2.0/8, respectively.
.Pp
Only a subset of keywords may be used on the lines following a
.Cm Match
keyword.
Available keywords are
.Cm AcceptEnv ,
.Cm AllowAgentForwarding ,
.Cm AllowGroups ,
.Cm AllowStreamLocalForwarding ,
.Cm AllowTcpForwarding ,
.Cm AllowUsers ,
.Cm AuthenticationMethods ,
.Cm AuthorizedKeysCommand ,
.Cm AuthorizedKeysCommandUser ,
.Cm AuthorizedKeysFile ,
.Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand ,
.Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsCommandUser ,
.Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsFile ,
.Cm Banner ,
.Cm ChrootDirectory ,
.Cm ClientAliveCountMax ,
.Cm ClientAliveInterval ,
.Cm DenyGroups ,
.Cm DenyUsers ,
.Cm ForceCommand ,
.Cm GatewayPorts ,
.Cm GSSAPIAuthentication ,
.Cm HostbasedAcceptedKeyTypes ,
.Cm HostbasedAuthentication ,
.Cm HostbasedUsesNameFromPacketOnly ,
+.Cm Include ,
.Cm IPQoS ,
.Cm KbdInteractiveAuthentication ,
.Cm KerberosAuthentication ,
.Cm LogLevel ,
.Cm MaxAuthTries ,
.Cm MaxSessions ,
.Cm PasswordAuthentication ,
.Cm PermitEmptyPasswords ,
.Cm PermitListen ,
.Cm PermitOpen ,
.Cm PermitRootLogin ,
.Cm PermitTTY ,
.Cm PermitTunnel ,
.Cm PermitUserRC ,
.Cm PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes ,
.Cm PubkeyAuthentication ,
.Cm RekeyLimit ,
.Cm RevokedKeys ,
.Cm RDomain ,
.Cm SetEnv ,
.Cm StreamLocalBindMask ,
.Cm StreamLocalBindUnlink ,
.Cm TrustedUserCAKeys ,
.Cm X11DisplayOffset ,
.Cm X11Forwarding
and
.Cm X11UseLocalhost .
.It Cm MaxAuthTries
Specifies the maximum number of authentication attempts permitted per
connection.
Once the number of failures reaches half this value,
additional failures are logged.
The default is 6.
.It Cm MaxSessions
Specifies the maximum number of open shell, login or subsystem (e.g. sftp)
sessions permitted per network connection.
Multiple sessions may be established by clients that support connection
multiplexing.
Setting
.Cm MaxSessions
to 1 will effectively disable session multiplexing, whereas setting it to 0
will prevent all shell, login and subsystem sessions while still permitting
forwarding.
The default is 10.
.It Cm MaxStartups
Specifies the maximum number of concurrent unauthenticated connections to the
SSH daemon.
Additional connections will be dropped until authentication succeeds or the
.Cm LoginGraceTime
expires for a connection.
The default is 10:30:100.
.Pp
Alternatively, random early drop can be enabled by specifying
the three colon separated values
start:rate:full (e.g. "10:30:60").
.Xr sshd 8
will refuse connection attempts with a probability of rate/100 (30%)
if there are currently start (10) unauthenticated connections.
The probability increases linearly and all connection attempts
are refused if the number of unauthenticated connections reaches full (60).
.It Cm PasswordAuthentication
Specifies whether password authentication is allowed.
The default is
.Cm yes .
.It Cm PermitEmptyPasswords
When password authentication is allowed, it specifies whether the
server allows login to accounts with empty password strings.
The default is
.Cm no .
.It Cm PermitListen
Specifies the addresses/ports on which a remote TCP port forwarding may listen.
The listen specification must be one of the following forms:
.Pp
.Bl -item -offset indent -compact
.It
.Cm PermitListen
.Sm off
.Ar port
.Sm on
.It
.Cm PermitListen
.Sm off
.Ar host : port
.Sm on
.El
.Pp
Multiple permissions may be specified by separating them with whitespace.
An argument of
.Cm any
can be used to remove all restrictions and permit any listen requests.
An argument of
.Cm none
can be used to prohibit all listen requests.
The host name may contain wildcards as described in the PATTERNS section in
.Xr ssh_config 5 .
The wildcard
.Sq *
can also be used in place of a port number to allow all ports.
By default all port forwarding listen requests are permitted.
Note that the
.Cm GatewayPorts
option may further restrict which addresses may be listened on.
Note also that
.Xr ssh 1
will request a listen host of
.Dq localhost
if no listen host was specifically requested, and this name is
treated differently to explicit localhost addresses of
.Dq 127.0.0.1
and
.Dq ::1 .
.It Cm PermitOpen
Specifies the destinations to which TCP port forwarding is permitted.
The forwarding specification must be one of the following forms:
.Pp
.Bl -item -offset indent -compact
.It
.Cm PermitOpen
.Sm off
.Ar host : port
.Sm on
.It
.Cm PermitOpen
.Sm off
.Ar IPv4_addr : port
.Sm on
.It
.Cm PermitOpen
.Sm off
.Ar \&[ IPv6_addr \&] : port
.Sm on
.El
.Pp
Multiple forwards may be specified by separating them with whitespace.
An argument of
.Cm any
can be used to remove all restrictions and permit any forwarding requests.
An argument of
.Cm none
can be used to prohibit all forwarding requests.
The wildcard
.Sq *
-can be used for host or port to allow all hosts or ports, respectively.
+can be used for host or port to allow all hosts or ports respectively.
+Otherwise, no pattern matching or address lookups are performed on supplied
+names.
By default all port forwarding requests are permitted.
.It Cm PermitRootLogin
Specifies whether root can log in using
.Xr ssh 1 .
The argument must be
.Cm yes ,
.Cm prohibit-password ,
.Cm forced-commands-only ,
or
.Cm no .
The default is
.Cm prohibit-password .
.Pp
If this option is set to
.Cm prohibit-password
(or its deprecated alias,
.Cm without-password ) ,
password and keyboard-interactive authentication are disabled for root.
.Pp
If this option is set to
.Cm forced-commands-only ,
root login with public key authentication will be allowed,
but only if the
.Ar command
option has been specified
(which may be useful for taking remote backups even if root login is
normally not allowed).
All other authentication methods are disabled for root.
.Pp
If this option is set to
.Cm no ,
root is not allowed to log in.
.It Cm PermitTTY
Specifies whether
.Xr pty 4
allocation is permitted.
The default is
.Cm yes .
.It Cm PermitTunnel
Specifies whether
.Xr tun 4
device forwarding is allowed.
The argument must be
.Cm yes ,
.Cm point-to-point
(layer 3),
.Cm ethernet
(layer 2), or
.Cm no .
Specifying
.Cm yes
permits both
.Cm point-to-point
and
.Cm ethernet .
The default is
.Cm no .
.Pp
Independent of this setting, the permissions of the selected
.Xr tun 4
device must allow access to the user.
.It Cm PermitUserEnvironment
Specifies whether
.Pa ~/.ssh/environment
and
.Cm environment=
options in
.Pa ~/.ssh/authorized_keys
are processed by
.Xr sshd 8 .
Valid options are
.Cm yes ,
.Cm no
or a pattern-list specifying which environment variable names to accept
(for example
.Qq LANG,LC_* ) .
The default is
.Cm no .
Enabling environment processing may enable users to bypass access
restrictions in some configurations using mechanisms such as
.Ev LD_PRELOAD .
.It Cm PermitUserRC
Specifies whether any
.Pa ~/.ssh/rc
file is executed.
The default is
.Cm yes .
.It Cm PidFile
Specifies the file that contains the process ID of the
SSH daemon, or
.Cm none
to not write one.
The default is
.Pa /var/run/sshd.pid .
.It Cm Port
Specifies the port number that
.Xr sshd 8
listens on.
The default is 22.
Multiple options of this type are permitted.
See also
.Cm ListenAddress .
.It Cm PrintLastLog
Specifies whether
.Xr sshd 8
should print the date and time of the last user login when a user logs
in interactively.
The default is
.Cm yes .
.It Cm PrintMotd
Specifies whether
.Xr sshd 8
should print
.Pa /etc/motd
when a user logs in interactively.
(On some systems it is also printed by the shell,
.Pa /etc/profile ,
or equivalent.)
The default is
.Cm yes .
.It Cm PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes
Specifies the key types that will be accepted for public key authentication
as a list of comma-separated patterns.
Alternately if the specified list begins with a
.Sq +
character, then the specified key types will be appended to the default set
instead of replacing them.
If the specified list begins with a
.Sq -
character, then the specified key types (including wildcards) will be removed
from the default set instead of replacing them.
If the specified list begins with a
.Sq ^
character, then the specified key types will be placed at the head of the
default set.
The default for this option is:
.Bd -literal -offset 3n
ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com,
ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
-rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com,rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+sk-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com,
+rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com,
ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com,
ecdsa-sha2-nistp256,ecdsa-sha2-nistp384,ecdsa-sha2-nistp521,
-ssh-ed25519,rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256,ssh-rsa
+sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com,
+ssh-ed25519,sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com,
+rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256,ssh-rsa
.Ed
.Pp
The list of available key types may also be obtained using
-.Qq ssh -Q key .
+.Qq ssh -Q PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes .
+.It Cm PubkeyAuthOptions
+Sets one or more public key authentication options.
+Two option keywords are currently supported:
+.Cm none
+(the default; indicating no additional options are enabled)
+and
+.Cm touch-required .
+.Pp
+The
+.Cm touch-required
+option causes public key authentication using a FIDO authenticator algorithm
+(i.e.\&
+.Cm ecdsa-sk
+or
+.Cm ed25519-sk )
+to always require the signature to attest that a physically present user
+explicitly confirmed the authentication (usually by touching the authenticator).
+By default,
+.Xr sshd 8
+requires user presence unless overridden with an authorized_keys option.
+The
+.Cm touch-required
+flag disables this override.
+This option has no effect for other, non-authenticator public key types.
.It Cm PubkeyAuthentication
Specifies whether public key authentication is allowed.
The default is
.Cm yes .
.It Cm RekeyLimit
Specifies the maximum amount of data that may be transmitted before the
session key is renegotiated, optionally followed a maximum amount of
time that may pass before the session key is renegotiated.
The first argument is specified in bytes and may have a suffix of
.Sq K ,
.Sq M ,
or
.Sq G
to indicate Kilobytes, Megabytes, or Gigabytes, respectively.
The default is between
.Sq 1G
and
.Sq 4G ,
depending on the cipher.
The optional second value is specified in seconds and may use any of the
units documented in the
.Sx TIME FORMATS
section.
The default value for
.Cm RekeyLimit
is
.Cm default none ,
which means that rekeying is performed after the cipher's default amount
of data has been sent or received and no time based rekeying is done.
.It Cm RevokedKeys
Specifies revoked public keys file, or
.Cm none
to not use one.
Keys listed in this file will be refused for public key authentication.
Note that if this file is not readable, then public key authentication will
be refused for all users.
Keys may be specified as a text file, listing one public key per line, or as
an OpenSSH Key Revocation List (KRL) as generated by
.Xr ssh-keygen 1 .
For more information on KRLs, see the KEY REVOCATION LISTS section in
.Xr ssh-keygen 1 .
.It Cm RDomain
Specifies an explicit routing domain that is applied after authentication
has completed.
The user session, as well and any forwarded or listening IP sockets,
will be bound to this
.Xr rdomain 4 .
If the routing domain is set to
.Cm \&%D ,
then the domain in which the incoming connection was received will be applied.
+.It Cm SecurityKeyProvider
+Specifies a path to a library that will be used when loading
+FIDO authenticator-hosted keys, overriding the default of using
+the built-in USB HID support.
.It Cm SetEnv
Specifies one or more environment variables to set in child sessions started
by
.Xr sshd 8
as
.Dq NAME=VALUE .
The environment value may be quoted (e.g. if it contains whitespace
characters).
Environment variables set by
.Cm SetEnv
override the default environment and any variables specified by the user
via
.Cm AcceptEnv
or
.Cm PermitUserEnvironment .
.It Cm StreamLocalBindMask
Sets the octal file creation mode mask
.Pq umask
used when creating a Unix-domain socket file for local or remote
port forwarding.
This option is only used for port forwarding to a Unix-domain socket file.
.Pp
The default value is 0177, which creates a Unix-domain socket file that is
readable and writable only by the owner.
Note that not all operating systems honor the file mode on Unix-domain
socket files.
.It Cm StreamLocalBindUnlink
Specifies whether to remove an existing Unix-domain socket file for local
or remote port forwarding before creating a new one.
If the socket file already exists and
.Cm StreamLocalBindUnlink
is not enabled,
.Nm sshd
will be unable to forward the port to the Unix-domain socket file.
This option is only used for port forwarding to a Unix-domain socket file.
.Pp
The argument must be
.Cm yes
or
.Cm no .
The default is
.Cm no .
.It Cm StrictModes
Specifies whether
.Xr sshd 8
should check file modes and ownership of the
user's files and home directory before accepting login.
This is normally desirable because novices sometimes accidentally leave their
directory or files world-writable.
The default is
.Cm yes .
Note that this does not apply to
.Cm ChrootDirectory ,
whose permissions and ownership are checked unconditionally.
.It Cm Subsystem
Configures an external subsystem (e.g. file transfer daemon).
Arguments should be a subsystem name and a command (with optional arguments)
to execute upon subsystem request.
.Pp
The command
.Cm sftp-server
implements the SFTP file transfer subsystem.
.Pp
Alternately the name
.Cm internal-sftp
implements an in-process SFTP server.
This may simplify configurations using
.Cm ChrootDirectory
to force a different filesystem root on clients.
.Pp
By default no subsystems are defined.
.It Cm SyslogFacility
Gives the facility code that is used when logging messages from
.Xr sshd 8 .
The possible values are: DAEMON, USER, AUTH, LOCAL0, LOCAL1, LOCAL2,
LOCAL3, LOCAL4, LOCAL5, LOCAL6, LOCAL7.
The default is AUTH.
.It Cm TCPKeepAlive
Specifies whether the system should send TCP keepalive messages to the
other side.
If they are sent, death of the connection or crash of one
of the machines will be properly noticed.
However, this means that
connections will die if the route is down temporarily, and some people
find it annoying.
On the other hand, if TCP keepalives are not sent,
sessions may hang indefinitely on the server, leaving
.Qq ghost
users and consuming server resources.
.Pp
The default is
.Cm yes
(to send TCP keepalive messages), and the server will notice
if the network goes down or the client host crashes.
This avoids infinitely hanging sessions.
.Pp
To disable TCP keepalive messages, the value should be set to
.Cm no .
.It Cm TrustedUserCAKeys
Specifies a file containing public keys of certificate authorities that are
trusted to sign user certificates for authentication, or
.Cm none
to not use one.
Keys are listed one per line; empty lines and comments starting with
.Ql #
are allowed.
If a certificate is presented for authentication and has its signing CA key
listed in this file, then it may be used for authentication for any user
listed in the certificate's principals list.
Note that certificates that lack a list of principals will not be permitted
for authentication using
.Cm TrustedUserCAKeys .
For more details on certificates, see the CERTIFICATES section in
.Xr ssh-keygen 1 .
.It Cm UseDNS
Specifies whether
.Xr sshd 8
should look up the remote host name, and to check that
the resolved host name for the remote IP address maps back to the
very same IP address.
.Pp
If this option is set to
.Cm no
(the default) then only addresses and not host names may be used in
.Pa ~/.ssh/authorized_keys
.Cm from
and
.Nm
.Cm Match
.Cm Host
directives.
.It Cm UsePAM
Enables the Pluggable Authentication Module interface.
If set to
.Cm yes
this will enable PAM authentication using
.Cm ChallengeResponseAuthentication
and
.Cm PasswordAuthentication
in addition to PAM account and session module processing for all
authentication types.
.Pp
Because PAM challenge-response authentication usually serves an equivalent
role to password authentication, you should disable either
.Cm PasswordAuthentication
or
.Cm ChallengeResponseAuthentication.
.Pp
If
.Cm UsePAM
is enabled, you will not be able to run
.Xr sshd 8
as a non-root user.
The default is
.Cm no .
.It Cm VersionAddendum
Optionally specifies additional text to append to the SSH protocol banner
sent by the server upon connection.
The default is
.Cm none .
.It Cm X11DisplayOffset
Specifies the first display number available for
.Xr sshd 8 Ns 's
X11 forwarding.
This prevents sshd from interfering with real X11 servers.
The default is 10.
.It Cm X11Forwarding
Specifies whether X11 forwarding is permitted.
The argument must be
.Cm yes
or
.Cm no .
The default is
.Cm no .
.Pp
When X11 forwarding is enabled, there may be additional exposure to
the server and to client displays if the
.Xr sshd 8
proxy display is configured to listen on the wildcard address (see
.Cm X11UseLocalhost ) ,
though this is not the default.
Additionally, the authentication spoofing and authentication data
verification and substitution occur on the client side.
The security risk of using X11 forwarding is that the client's X11
display server may be exposed to attack when the SSH client requests
forwarding (see the warnings for
.Cm ForwardX11
in
.Xr ssh_config 5 ) .
A system administrator may have a stance in which they want to
protect clients that may expose themselves to attack by unwittingly
requesting X11 forwarding, which can warrant a
.Cm no
setting.
.Pp
Note that disabling X11 forwarding does not prevent users from
forwarding X11 traffic, as users can always install their own forwarders.
.It Cm X11UseLocalhost
Specifies whether
.Xr sshd 8
should bind the X11 forwarding server to the loopback address or to
the wildcard address.
By default,
sshd binds the forwarding server to the loopback address and sets the
hostname part of the
.Ev DISPLAY
environment variable to
.Cm localhost .
This prevents remote hosts from connecting to the proxy display.
However, some older X11 clients may not function with this
configuration.
.Cm X11UseLocalhost
may be set to
.Cm no
to specify that the forwarding server should be bound to the wildcard
address.
The argument must be
.Cm yes
or
.Cm no .
The default is
.Cm yes .
.It Cm XAuthLocation
Specifies the full pathname of the
.Xr xauth 1
program, or
.Cm none
to not use one.
The default is
.Pa /usr/X11R6/bin/xauth .
.El
.Sh TIME FORMATS
.Xr sshd 8
command-line arguments and configuration file options that specify time
may be expressed using a sequence of the form:
.Sm off
.Ar time Op Ar qualifier ,
.Sm on
where
.Ar time
is a positive integer value and
.Ar qualifier
is one of the following:
.Pp
.Bl -tag -width Ds -compact -offset indent
.It Aq Cm none
seconds
.It Cm s | Cm S
seconds
.It Cm m | Cm M
minutes
.It Cm h | Cm H
hours
.It Cm d | Cm D
days
.It Cm w | Cm W
weeks
.El
.Pp
Each member of the sequence is added together to calculate
the total time value.
.Pp
Time format examples:
.Pp
.Bl -tag -width Ds -compact -offset indent
.It 600
600 seconds (10 minutes)
.It 10m
10 minutes
.It 1h30m
1 hour 30 minutes (90 minutes)
.El
.Sh TOKENS
Arguments to some keywords can make use of tokens,
which are expanded at runtime:
.Pp
.Bl -tag -width XXXX -offset indent -compact
.It %%
A literal
.Sq % .
.It \&%D
The routing domain in which the incoming connection was received.
.It %F
The fingerprint of the CA key.
.It %f
The fingerprint of the key or certificate.
.It %h
The home directory of the user.
.It %i
The key ID in the certificate.
.It %K
The base64-encoded CA key.
.It %k
The base64-encoded key or certificate for authentication.
.It %s
The serial number of the certificate.
.It \&%T
The type of the CA key.
.It %t
The key or certificate type.
.It \&%U
The numeric user ID of the target user.
.It %u
The username.
.El
.Pp
.Cm AuthorizedKeysCommand
accepts the tokens %%, %f, %h, %k, %t, %U, and %u.
.Pp
.Cm AuthorizedKeysFile
accepts the tokens %%, %h, %U, and %u.
.Pp
.Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsCommand
accepts the tokens %%, %F, %f, %h, %i, %K, %k, %s, %T, %t, %U, and %u.
.Pp
.Cm AuthorizedPrincipalsFile
accepts the tokens %%, %h, %U, and %u.
.Pp
.Cm ChrootDirectory
accepts the tokens %%, %h, %U, and %u.
.Pp
.Cm RoutingDomain
accepts the token %D.
.Sh FILES
.Bl -tag -width Ds
.It Pa /etc/ssh/sshd_config
Contains configuration data for
.Xr sshd 8 .
This file should be writable by root only, but it is recommended
(though not necessary) that it be world-readable.
.El
.Sh SEE ALSO
.Xr sftp-server 8 ,
.Xr sshd 8
.Sh AUTHORS
.An -nosplit
OpenSSH is a derivative of the original and free
ssh 1.2.12 release by
.An Tatu Ylonen .
.An Aaron Campbell , Bob Beck , Markus Friedl , Niels Provos ,
.An Theo de Raadt
and
.An Dug Song
removed many bugs, re-added newer features and
created OpenSSH.
.An Markus Friedl
contributed the support for SSH protocol versions 1.5 and 2.0.
.An Niels Provos
and
.An Markus Friedl
contributed support for privilege separation.
diff --git a/ssherr.c b/ssherr.c
index 8ad3d5750190..bd954aadd729 100644
--- a/ssherr.c
+++ b/ssherr.c
@@ -1,147 +1,151 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: ssherr.c,v 1.8 2018/07/03 11:39:54 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: ssherr.c,v 1.10 2020/01/25 23:13:09 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2011 Damien Miller
*
* Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
* copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
* WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
* ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
* WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
* ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
* OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
*/
#include <errno.h>
#include <string.h>
#include "ssherr.h"
const char *
ssh_err(int n)
{
switch (n) {
case SSH_ERR_SUCCESS:
return "success";
case SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR:
return "unexpected internal error";
case SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL:
return "memory allocation failed";
case SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE:
return "incomplete message";
case SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT:
return "invalid format";
case SSH_ERR_BIGNUM_IS_NEGATIVE:
return "bignum is negative";
case SSH_ERR_STRING_TOO_LARGE:
return "string is too large";
case SSH_ERR_BIGNUM_TOO_LARGE:
return "bignum is too large";
case SSH_ERR_ECPOINT_TOO_LARGE:
return "elliptic curve point is too large";
case SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE:
return "insufficient buffer space";
case SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT:
return "invalid argument";
case SSH_ERR_KEY_BITS_MISMATCH:
return "key bits do not match";
case SSH_ERR_EC_CURVE_INVALID:
return "invalid elliptic curve";
case SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH:
return "key type does not match";
case SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN:
return "unknown or unsupported key type";
case SSH_ERR_EC_CURVE_MISMATCH:
return "elliptic curve does not match";
case SSH_ERR_EXPECTED_CERT:
return "plain key provided where certificate required";
case SSH_ERR_KEY_LACKS_CERTBLOB:
return "key lacks certificate data";
case SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_UNKNOWN_TYPE:
return "unknown/unsupported certificate type";
case SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_INVALID_SIGN_KEY:
return "invalid certificate signing key";
case SSH_ERR_KEY_INVALID_EC_VALUE:
return "invalid elliptic curve value";
case SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID:
return "incorrect signature";
case SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR:
return "error in libcrypto"; /* XXX fetch and return */
case SSH_ERR_UNEXPECTED_TRAILING_DATA:
return "unexpected bytes remain after decoding";
case SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR:
return strerror(errno);
case SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_INVALID:
return "invalid certificate";
case SSH_ERR_AGENT_COMMUNICATION:
return "communication with agent failed";
case SSH_ERR_AGENT_FAILURE:
return "agent refused operation";
case SSH_ERR_DH_GEX_OUT_OF_RANGE:
return "DH GEX group out of range";
case SSH_ERR_DISCONNECTED:
return "disconnected";
case SSH_ERR_MAC_INVALID:
return "message authentication code incorrect";
case SSH_ERR_NO_CIPHER_ALG_MATCH:
return "no matching cipher found";
case SSH_ERR_NO_MAC_ALG_MATCH:
return "no matching MAC found";
case SSH_ERR_NO_COMPRESS_ALG_MATCH:
return "no matching compression method found";
case SSH_ERR_NO_KEX_ALG_MATCH:
return "no matching key exchange method found";
case SSH_ERR_NO_HOSTKEY_ALG_MATCH:
return "no matching host key type found";
case SSH_ERR_PROTOCOL_MISMATCH:
return "protocol version mismatch";
case SSH_ERR_NO_PROTOCOL_VERSION:
return "could not read protocol version";
case SSH_ERR_NO_HOSTKEY_LOADED:
return "could not load host key";
case SSH_ERR_NEED_REKEY:
return "rekeying not supported by peer";
case SSH_ERR_PASSPHRASE_TOO_SHORT:
return "passphrase is too short (minimum five characters)";
case SSH_ERR_FILE_CHANGED:
return "file changed while reading";
case SSH_ERR_KEY_UNKNOWN_CIPHER:
return "key encrypted using unsupported cipher";
case SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE:
return "incorrect passphrase supplied to decrypt private key";
case SSH_ERR_KEY_BAD_PERMISSIONS:
return "bad permissions";
case SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_MISMATCH:
return "certificate does not match key";
case SSH_ERR_KEY_NOT_FOUND:
return "key not found";
case SSH_ERR_AGENT_NOT_PRESENT:
return "agent not present";
case SSH_ERR_AGENT_NO_IDENTITIES:
return "agent contains no identities";
case SSH_ERR_BUFFER_READ_ONLY:
return "internal error: buffer is read-only";
case SSH_ERR_KRL_BAD_MAGIC:
return "KRL file has invalid magic number";
case SSH_ERR_KEY_REVOKED:
return "Key is revoked";
case SSH_ERR_CONN_CLOSED:
return "Connection closed";
case SSH_ERR_CONN_TIMEOUT:
return "Connection timed out";
case SSH_ERR_CONN_CORRUPT:
return "Connection corrupted";
case SSH_ERR_PROTOCOL_ERROR:
return "Protocol error";
case SSH_ERR_KEY_LENGTH:
return "Invalid key length";
case SSH_ERR_NUMBER_TOO_LARGE:
return "number is too large";
case SSH_ERR_SIGN_ALG_UNSUPPORTED:
return "signature algorithm not supported";
+ case SSH_ERR_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED:
+ return "requested feature not supported";
+ case SSH_ERR_DEVICE_NOT_FOUND:
+ return "device not found";
default:
return "unknown error";
}
}
diff --git a/ssherr.h b/ssherr.h
index 348da5a20865..085e752744d8 100644
--- a/ssherr.h
+++ b/ssherr.h
@@ -1,87 +1,89 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: ssherr.h,v 1.6 2018/07/03 11:39:54 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: ssherr.h,v 1.8 2020/01/25 23:13:09 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2011 Damien Miller
*
* Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
* copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
* WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
* ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
* WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
* ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
* OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
*/
#ifndef _SSHERR_H
#define _SSHERR_H
/* XXX are these too granular? not granular enough? I can't decide - djm */
/* Error codes */
#define SSH_ERR_SUCCESS 0
#define SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR -1
#define SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL -2
#define SSH_ERR_MESSAGE_INCOMPLETE -3
#define SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT -4
#define SSH_ERR_BIGNUM_IS_NEGATIVE -5
#define SSH_ERR_STRING_TOO_LARGE -6
#define SSH_ERR_BIGNUM_TOO_LARGE -7
#define SSH_ERR_ECPOINT_TOO_LARGE -8
#define SSH_ERR_NO_BUFFER_SPACE -9
#define SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT -10
#define SSH_ERR_KEY_BITS_MISMATCH -11
#define SSH_ERR_EC_CURVE_INVALID -12
#define SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH -13
#define SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN -14 /* XXX UNSUPPORTED? */
#define SSH_ERR_EC_CURVE_MISMATCH -15
#define SSH_ERR_EXPECTED_CERT -16
#define SSH_ERR_KEY_LACKS_CERTBLOB -17
#define SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_UNKNOWN_TYPE -18
#define SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_INVALID_SIGN_KEY -19
#define SSH_ERR_KEY_INVALID_EC_VALUE -20
#define SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID -21
#define SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR -22
#define SSH_ERR_UNEXPECTED_TRAILING_DATA -23
#define SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR -24
#define SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_INVALID -25
#define SSH_ERR_AGENT_COMMUNICATION -26
#define SSH_ERR_AGENT_FAILURE -27
#define SSH_ERR_DH_GEX_OUT_OF_RANGE -28
#define SSH_ERR_DISCONNECTED -29
#define SSH_ERR_MAC_INVALID -30
#define SSH_ERR_NO_CIPHER_ALG_MATCH -31
#define SSH_ERR_NO_MAC_ALG_MATCH -32
#define SSH_ERR_NO_COMPRESS_ALG_MATCH -33
#define SSH_ERR_NO_KEX_ALG_MATCH -34
#define SSH_ERR_NO_HOSTKEY_ALG_MATCH -35
#define SSH_ERR_NO_HOSTKEY_LOADED -36
#define SSH_ERR_PROTOCOL_MISMATCH -37
#define SSH_ERR_NO_PROTOCOL_VERSION -38
#define SSH_ERR_NEED_REKEY -39
#define SSH_ERR_PASSPHRASE_TOO_SHORT -40
#define SSH_ERR_FILE_CHANGED -41
#define SSH_ERR_KEY_UNKNOWN_CIPHER -42
#define SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE -43
#define SSH_ERR_KEY_BAD_PERMISSIONS -44
#define SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_MISMATCH -45
#define SSH_ERR_KEY_NOT_FOUND -46
#define SSH_ERR_AGENT_NOT_PRESENT -47
#define SSH_ERR_AGENT_NO_IDENTITIES -48
#define SSH_ERR_BUFFER_READ_ONLY -49
#define SSH_ERR_KRL_BAD_MAGIC -50
#define SSH_ERR_KEY_REVOKED -51
#define SSH_ERR_CONN_CLOSED -52
#define SSH_ERR_CONN_TIMEOUT -53
#define SSH_ERR_CONN_CORRUPT -54
#define SSH_ERR_PROTOCOL_ERROR -55
#define SSH_ERR_KEY_LENGTH -56
#define SSH_ERR_NUMBER_TOO_LARGE -57
#define SSH_ERR_SIGN_ALG_UNSUPPORTED -58
+#define SSH_ERR_FEATURE_UNSUPPORTED -59
+#define SSH_ERR_DEVICE_NOT_FOUND -60
/* Translate a numeric error code to a human-readable error string */
const char *ssh_err(int n);
#endif /* _SSHERR_H */
diff --git a/sshkey-xmss.c b/sshkey-xmss.c
index 9e5f5e475658..88e9ddf4de7d 100644
--- a/sshkey-xmss.c
+++ b/sshkey-xmss.c
@@ -1,1056 +1,1112 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: sshkey-xmss.c,v 1.6 2019/10/09 00:02:57 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: sshkey-xmss.c,v 1.8 2019/11/13 07:53:10 markus Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2017 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#ifdef WITH_XMSS
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/uio.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <errno.h>
#ifdef HAVE_SYS_FILE_H
# include <sys/file.h>
#endif
#include "ssh2.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
#include "sshbuf.h"
#include "cipher.h"
#include "sshkey.h"
#include "sshkey-xmss.h"
#include "atomicio.h"
#include "xmss_fast.h"
/* opaque internal XMSS state */
#define XMSS_MAGIC "xmss-state-v1"
#define XMSS_CIPHERNAME "aes256-gcm@openssh.com"
struct ssh_xmss_state {
xmss_params params;
u_int32_t n, w, h, k;
bds_state bds;
u_char *stack;
u_int32_t stackoffset;
u_char *stacklevels;
u_char *auth;
u_char *keep;
u_char *th_nodes;
u_char *retain;
treehash_inst *treehash;
u_int32_t idx; /* state read from file */
u_int32_t maxidx; /* restricted # of signatures */
int have_state; /* .state file exists */
int lockfd; /* locked in sshkey_xmss_get_state() */
- int allow_update; /* allow sshkey_xmss_update_state() */
+ u_char allow_update; /* allow sshkey_xmss_update_state() */
char *enc_ciphername;/* encrypt state with cipher */
u_char *enc_keyiv; /* encrypt state with key */
u_int32_t enc_keyiv_len; /* length of enc_keyiv */
};
int sshkey_xmss_init_bds_state(struct sshkey *);
int sshkey_xmss_init_enc_key(struct sshkey *, const char *);
void sshkey_xmss_free_bds(struct sshkey *);
int sshkey_xmss_get_state_from_file(struct sshkey *, const char *,
int *, sshkey_printfn *);
int sshkey_xmss_encrypt_state(const struct sshkey *, struct sshbuf *,
struct sshbuf **);
int sshkey_xmss_decrypt_state(const struct sshkey *, struct sshbuf *,
struct sshbuf **);
int sshkey_xmss_serialize_enc_key(const struct sshkey *, struct sshbuf *);
int sshkey_xmss_deserialize_enc_key(struct sshkey *, struct sshbuf *);
#define PRINT(s...) do { if (pr) pr(s); } while (0)
int
sshkey_xmss_init(struct sshkey *key, const char *name)
{
struct ssh_xmss_state *state;
if (key->xmss_state != NULL)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
if (name == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
state = calloc(sizeof(struct ssh_xmss_state), 1);
if (state == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
if (strcmp(name, XMSS_SHA2_256_W16_H10_NAME) == 0) {
state->n = 32;
state->w = 16;
state->h = 10;
} else if (strcmp(name, XMSS_SHA2_256_W16_H16_NAME) == 0) {
state->n = 32;
state->w = 16;
state->h = 16;
} else if (strcmp(name, XMSS_SHA2_256_W16_H20_NAME) == 0) {
state->n = 32;
state->w = 16;
state->h = 20;
} else {
free(state);
return SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN;
}
if ((key->xmss_name = strdup(name)) == NULL) {
free(state);
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
}
state->k = 2; /* XXX hardcoded */
state->lockfd = -1;
if (xmss_set_params(&state->params, state->n, state->h, state->w,
state->k) != 0) {
free(state);
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
}
key->xmss_state = state;
return 0;
}
void
sshkey_xmss_free_state(struct sshkey *key)
{
struct ssh_xmss_state *state = key->xmss_state;
sshkey_xmss_free_bds(key);
if (state) {
if (state->enc_keyiv) {
explicit_bzero(state->enc_keyiv, state->enc_keyiv_len);
free(state->enc_keyiv);
}
free(state->enc_ciphername);
free(state);
}
key->xmss_state = NULL;
}
#define SSH_XMSS_K2_MAGIC "k=2"
#define num_stack(x) ((x->h+1)*(x->n))
#define num_stacklevels(x) (x->h+1)
#define num_auth(x) ((x->h)*(x->n))
#define num_keep(x) ((x->h >> 1)*(x->n))
#define num_th_nodes(x) ((x->h - x->k)*(x->n))
#define num_retain(x) (((1ULL << x->k) - x->k - 1) * (x->n))
#define num_treehash(x) ((x->h) - (x->k))
int
sshkey_xmss_init_bds_state(struct sshkey *key)
{
struct ssh_xmss_state *state = key->xmss_state;
u_int32_t i;
state->stackoffset = 0;
if ((state->stack = calloc(num_stack(state), 1)) == NULL ||
(state->stacklevels = calloc(num_stacklevels(state), 1))== NULL ||
(state->auth = calloc(num_auth(state), 1)) == NULL ||
(state->keep = calloc(num_keep(state), 1)) == NULL ||
(state->th_nodes = calloc(num_th_nodes(state), 1)) == NULL ||
(state->retain = calloc(num_retain(state), 1)) == NULL ||
(state->treehash = calloc(num_treehash(state),
sizeof(treehash_inst))) == NULL) {
sshkey_xmss_free_bds(key);
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
}
for (i = 0; i < state->h - state->k; i++)
state->treehash[i].node = &state->th_nodes[state->n*i];
xmss_set_bds_state(&state->bds, state->stack, state->stackoffset,
state->stacklevels, state->auth, state->keep, state->treehash,
state->retain, 0);
return 0;
}
void
sshkey_xmss_free_bds(struct sshkey *key)
{
struct ssh_xmss_state *state = key->xmss_state;
if (state == NULL)
return;
free(state->stack);
free(state->stacklevels);
free(state->auth);
free(state->keep);
free(state->th_nodes);
free(state->retain);
free(state->treehash);
state->stack = NULL;
state->stacklevels = NULL;
state->auth = NULL;
state->keep = NULL;
state->th_nodes = NULL;
state->retain = NULL;
state->treehash = NULL;
}
void *
sshkey_xmss_params(const struct sshkey *key)
{
struct ssh_xmss_state *state = key->xmss_state;
if (state == NULL)
return NULL;
return &state->params;
}
void *
sshkey_xmss_bds_state(const struct sshkey *key)
{
struct ssh_xmss_state *state = key->xmss_state;
if (state == NULL)
return NULL;
return &state->bds;
}
int
sshkey_xmss_siglen(const struct sshkey *key, size_t *lenp)
{
struct ssh_xmss_state *state = key->xmss_state;
if (lenp == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
if (state == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
*lenp = 4 + state->n +
state->params.wots_par.keysize +
state->h * state->n;
return 0;
}
size_t
sshkey_xmss_pklen(const struct sshkey *key)
{
struct ssh_xmss_state *state = key->xmss_state;
if (state == NULL)
return 0;
return state->n * 2;
}
size_t
sshkey_xmss_sklen(const struct sshkey *key)
{
struct ssh_xmss_state *state = key->xmss_state;
if (state == NULL)
return 0;
return state->n * 4 + 4;
}
int
sshkey_xmss_init_enc_key(struct sshkey *k, const char *ciphername)
{
struct ssh_xmss_state *state = k->xmss_state;
const struct sshcipher *cipher;
size_t keylen = 0, ivlen = 0;
if (state == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
if ((cipher = cipher_by_name(ciphername)) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
if ((state->enc_ciphername = strdup(ciphername)) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
keylen = cipher_keylen(cipher);
ivlen = cipher_ivlen(cipher);
state->enc_keyiv_len = keylen + ivlen;
if ((state->enc_keyiv = calloc(state->enc_keyiv_len, 1)) == NULL) {
free(state->enc_ciphername);
state->enc_ciphername = NULL;
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
}
arc4random_buf(state->enc_keyiv, state->enc_keyiv_len);
return 0;
}
int
sshkey_xmss_serialize_enc_key(const struct sshkey *k, struct sshbuf *b)
{
struct ssh_xmss_state *state = k->xmss_state;
int r;
if (state == NULL || state->enc_keyiv == NULL ||
state->enc_ciphername == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, state->enc_ciphername)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_string(b, state->enc_keyiv,
state->enc_keyiv_len)) != 0)
return r;
return 0;
}
int
sshkey_xmss_deserialize_enc_key(struct sshkey *k, struct sshbuf *b)
{
struct ssh_xmss_state *state = k->xmss_state;
size_t len;
int r;
if (state == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &state->enc_ciphername, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_string(b, &state->enc_keyiv, &len)) != 0)
return r;
state->enc_keyiv_len = len;
return 0;
}
int
sshkey_xmss_serialize_pk_info(const struct sshkey *k, struct sshbuf *b,
enum sshkey_serialize_rep opts)
{
struct ssh_xmss_state *state = k->xmss_state;
u_char have_info = 1;
u_int32_t idx;
int r;
if (state == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
if (opts != SSHKEY_SERIALIZE_INFO)
return 0;
idx = k->xmss_sk ? PEEK_U32(k->xmss_sk) : state->idx;
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, have_info)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, idx)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, state->maxidx)) != 0)
return r;
return 0;
}
int
sshkey_xmss_deserialize_pk_info(struct sshkey *k, struct sshbuf *b)
{
struct ssh_xmss_state *state = k->xmss_state;
u_char have_info;
int r;
if (state == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
/* optional */
if (sshbuf_len(b) == 0)
return 0;
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(b, &have_info)) != 0)
return r;
if (have_info != 1)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &state->idx)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &state->maxidx)) != 0)
return r;
return 0;
}
int
sshkey_xmss_generate_private_key(struct sshkey *k, u_int bits)
{
int r;
const char *name;
if (bits == 10) {
name = XMSS_SHA2_256_W16_H10_NAME;
} else if (bits == 16) {
name = XMSS_SHA2_256_W16_H16_NAME;
} else if (bits == 20) {
name = XMSS_SHA2_256_W16_H20_NAME;
} else {
name = XMSS_DEFAULT_NAME;
}
if ((r = sshkey_xmss_init(k, name)) != 0 ||
(r = sshkey_xmss_init_bds_state(k)) != 0 ||
(r = sshkey_xmss_init_enc_key(k, XMSS_CIPHERNAME)) != 0)
return r;
if ((k->xmss_pk = malloc(sshkey_xmss_pklen(k))) == NULL ||
(k->xmss_sk = malloc(sshkey_xmss_sklen(k))) == NULL) {
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
}
xmss_keypair(k->xmss_pk, k->xmss_sk, sshkey_xmss_bds_state(k),
sshkey_xmss_params(k));
return 0;
}
int
sshkey_xmss_get_state_from_file(struct sshkey *k, const char *filename,
int *have_file, sshkey_printfn *pr)
{
struct sshbuf *b = NULL, *enc = NULL;
int ret = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR, r, fd = -1;
u_int32_t len;
unsigned char buf[4], *data = NULL;
*have_file = 0;
if ((fd = open(filename, O_RDONLY)) >= 0) {
*have_file = 1;
if (atomicio(read, fd, buf, sizeof(buf)) != sizeof(buf)) {
PRINT("%s: corrupt state file: %s", __func__, filename);
goto done;
}
len = PEEK_U32(buf);
if ((data = calloc(len, 1)) == NULL) {
ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto done;
}
if (atomicio(read, fd, data, len) != len) {
PRINT("%s: cannot read blob: %s", __func__, filename);
goto done;
}
if ((enc = sshbuf_from(data, len)) == NULL) {
ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto done;
}
sshkey_xmss_free_bds(k);
if ((r = sshkey_xmss_decrypt_state(k, enc, &b)) != 0) {
ret = r;
goto done;
}
if ((r = sshkey_xmss_deserialize_state(k, b)) != 0) {
ret = r;
goto done;
}
ret = 0;
}
done:
if (fd != -1)
close(fd);
free(data);
sshbuf_free(enc);
sshbuf_free(b);
return ret;
}
int
sshkey_xmss_get_state(const struct sshkey *k, sshkey_printfn *pr)
{
struct ssh_xmss_state *state = k->xmss_state;
u_int32_t idx = 0;
char *filename = NULL;
char *statefile = NULL, *ostatefile = NULL, *lockfile = NULL;
int lockfd = -1, have_state = 0, have_ostate, tries = 0;
int ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT, r;
if (state == NULL)
goto done;
/*
* If maxidx is set, then we are allowed a limited number
* of signatures, but don't need to access the disk.
* Otherwise we need to deal with the on-disk state.
*/
if (state->maxidx) {
/* xmss_sk always contains the current state */
idx = PEEK_U32(k->xmss_sk);
if (idx < state->maxidx) {
state->allow_update = 1;
return 0;
}
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
}
if ((filename = k->xmss_filename) == NULL)
goto done;
if (asprintf(&lockfile, "%s.lock", filename) == -1 ||
asprintf(&statefile, "%s.state", filename) == -1 ||
asprintf(&ostatefile, "%s.ostate", filename) == -1) {
ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto done;
}
if ((lockfd = open(lockfile, O_CREAT|O_RDONLY, 0600)) == -1) {
ret = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
PRINT("%s: cannot open/create: %s", __func__, lockfile);
goto done;
}
while (flock(lockfd, LOCK_EX|LOCK_NB) == -1) {
if (errno != EWOULDBLOCK) {
ret = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
PRINT("%s: cannot lock: %s", __func__, lockfile);
goto done;
}
if (++tries > 10) {
ret = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
PRINT("%s: giving up on: %s", __func__, lockfile);
goto done;
}
usleep(1000*100*tries);
}
/* XXX no longer const */
if ((r = sshkey_xmss_get_state_from_file((struct sshkey *)k,
statefile, &have_state, pr)) != 0) {
if ((r = sshkey_xmss_get_state_from_file((struct sshkey *)k,
ostatefile, &have_ostate, pr)) == 0) {
state->allow_update = 1;
r = sshkey_xmss_forward_state(k, 1);
state->idx = PEEK_U32(k->xmss_sk);
state->allow_update = 0;
}
}
if (!have_state && !have_ostate) {
/* check that bds state is initialized */
if (state->bds.auth == NULL)
goto done;
PRINT("%s: start from scratch idx 0: %u", __func__, state->idx);
} else if (r != 0) {
ret = r;
goto done;
}
if (state->idx + 1 < state->idx) {
PRINT("%s: state wrap: %u", __func__, state->idx);
goto done;
}
state->have_state = have_state;
state->lockfd = lockfd;
state->allow_update = 1;
lockfd = -1;
ret = 0;
done:
if (lockfd != -1)
close(lockfd);
free(lockfile);
free(statefile);
free(ostatefile);
return ret;
}
int
sshkey_xmss_forward_state(const struct sshkey *k, u_int32_t reserve)
{
struct ssh_xmss_state *state = k->xmss_state;
u_char *sig = NULL;
size_t required_siglen;
unsigned long long smlen;
u_char data;
int ret, r;
if (state == NULL || !state->allow_update)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
if (reserve == 0)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
if (state->idx + reserve <= state->idx)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
if ((r = sshkey_xmss_siglen(k, &required_siglen)) != 0)
return r;
if ((sig = malloc(required_siglen)) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
while (reserve-- > 0) {
state->idx = PEEK_U32(k->xmss_sk);
smlen = required_siglen;
if ((ret = xmss_sign(k->xmss_sk, sshkey_xmss_bds_state(k),
sig, &smlen, &data, 0, sshkey_xmss_params(k))) != 0) {
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
break;
}
}
free(sig);
return r;
}
int
sshkey_xmss_update_state(const struct sshkey *k, sshkey_printfn *pr)
{
struct ssh_xmss_state *state = k->xmss_state;
struct sshbuf *b = NULL, *enc = NULL;
u_int32_t idx = 0;
unsigned char buf[4];
char *filename = NULL;
char *statefile = NULL, *ostatefile = NULL, *nstatefile = NULL;
int fd = -1;
int ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
if (state == NULL || !state->allow_update)
return ret;
if (state->maxidx) {
/* no update since the number of signatures is limited */
ret = 0;
goto done;
}
idx = PEEK_U32(k->xmss_sk);
if (idx == state->idx) {
/* no signature happened, no need to update */
ret = 0;
goto done;
} else if (idx != state->idx + 1) {
PRINT("%s: more than one signature happened: idx %u state %u",
__func__, idx, state->idx);
goto done;
}
state->idx = idx;
if ((filename = k->xmss_filename) == NULL)
goto done;
if (asprintf(&statefile, "%s.state", filename) == -1 ||
asprintf(&ostatefile, "%s.ostate", filename) == -1 ||
asprintf(&nstatefile, "%s.nstate", filename) == -1) {
ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto done;
}
unlink(nstatefile);
if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto done;
}
if ((ret = sshkey_xmss_serialize_state(k, b)) != 0) {
PRINT("%s: SERLIALIZE FAILED: %d", __func__, ret);
goto done;
}
if ((ret = sshkey_xmss_encrypt_state(k, b, &enc)) != 0) {
PRINT("%s: ENCRYPT FAILED: %d", __func__, ret);
goto done;
}
if ((fd = open(nstatefile, O_CREAT|O_WRONLY|O_EXCL, 0600)) == -1) {
ret = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
PRINT("%s: open new state file: %s", __func__, nstatefile);
goto done;
}
POKE_U32(buf, sshbuf_len(enc));
if (atomicio(vwrite, fd, buf, sizeof(buf)) != sizeof(buf)) {
ret = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
PRINT("%s: write new state file hdr: %s", __func__, nstatefile);
close(fd);
goto done;
}
if (atomicio(vwrite, fd, sshbuf_mutable_ptr(enc), sshbuf_len(enc)) !=
sshbuf_len(enc)) {
ret = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
PRINT("%s: write new state file data: %s", __func__, nstatefile);
close(fd);
goto done;
}
if (fsync(fd) == -1) {
ret = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
PRINT("%s: sync new state file: %s", __func__, nstatefile);
close(fd);
goto done;
}
if (close(fd) == -1) {
ret = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
PRINT("%s: close new state file: %s", __func__, nstatefile);
goto done;
}
if (state->have_state) {
unlink(ostatefile);
if (link(statefile, ostatefile)) {
ret = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
PRINT("%s: backup state %s to %s", __func__, statefile,
ostatefile);
goto done;
}
}
if (rename(nstatefile, statefile) == -1) {
ret = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
PRINT("%s: rename %s to %s", __func__, nstatefile, statefile);
goto done;
}
ret = 0;
done:
if (state->lockfd != -1) {
close(state->lockfd);
state->lockfd = -1;
}
if (nstatefile)
unlink(nstatefile);
free(statefile);
free(ostatefile);
free(nstatefile);
sshbuf_free(b);
sshbuf_free(enc);
return ret;
}
int
sshkey_xmss_serialize_state(const struct sshkey *k, struct sshbuf *b)
{
struct ssh_xmss_state *state = k->xmss_state;
treehash_inst *th;
u_int32_t i, node;
int r;
if (state == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
if (state->stack == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
state->stackoffset = state->bds.stackoffset; /* copy back */
if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, SSH_XMSS_K2_MAGIC)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, state->idx)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_string(b, state->stack, num_stack(state))) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, state->stackoffset)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_string(b, state->stacklevels, num_stacklevels(state))) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_string(b, state->auth, num_auth(state))) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_string(b, state->keep, num_keep(state))) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_string(b, state->th_nodes, num_th_nodes(state))) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_string(b, state->retain, num_retain(state))) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, num_treehash(state))) != 0)
return r;
for (i = 0; i < num_treehash(state); i++) {
th = &state->treehash[i];
node = th->node - state->th_nodes;
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, th->h)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, th->next_idx)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, th->stackusage)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, th->completed)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, node)) != 0)
return r;
}
return 0;
}
int
sshkey_xmss_serialize_state_opt(const struct sshkey *k, struct sshbuf *b,
enum sshkey_serialize_rep opts)
{
struct ssh_xmss_state *state = k->xmss_state;
int r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ u_char have_stack, have_filename, have_enc;
if (state == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, opts)) != 0)
return r;
switch (opts) {
case SSHKEY_SERIALIZE_STATE:
r = sshkey_xmss_serialize_state(k, b);
break;
case SSHKEY_SERIALIZE_FULL:
if ((r = sshkey_xmss_serialize_enc_key(k, b)) != 0)
- break;
+ return r;
r = sshkey_xmss_serialize_state(k, b);
break;
+ case SSHKEY_SERIALIZE_SHIELD:
+ /* all of stack/filename/enc are optional */
+ have_stack = state->stack != NULL;
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, have_stack)) != 0)
+ return r;
+ if (have_stack) {
+ state->idx = PEEK_U32(k->xmss_sk); /* update */
+ if ((r = sshkey_xmss_serialize_state(k, b)) != 0)
+ return r;
+ }
+ have_filename = k->xmss_filename != NULL;
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, have_filename)) != 0)
+ return r;
+ if (have_filename &&
+ (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, k->xmss_filename)) != 0)
+ return r;
+ have_enc = state->enc_keyiv != NULL;
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, have_enc)) != 0)
+ return r;
+ if (have_enc &&
+ (r = sshkey_xmss_serialize_enc_key(k, b)) != 0)
+ return r;
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(b, state->maxidx)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, state->allow_update)) != 0)
+ return r;
+ break;
case SSHKEY_SERIALIZE_DEFAULT:
r = 0;
break;
default:
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
break;
}
return r;
}
int
sshkey_xmss_deserialize_state(struct sshkey *k, struct sshbuf *b)
{
struct ssh_xmss_state *state = k->xmss_state;
treehash_inst *th;
u_int32_t i, lh, node;
size_t ls, lsl, la, lk, ln, lr;
char *magic;
- int r;
+ int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
if (state == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
if (k->xmss_sk == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
if ((state->treehash = calloc(num_treehash(state),
sizeof(treehash_inst))) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &magic, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &state->idx)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_string(b, &state->stack, &ls)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &state->stackoffset)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_string(b, &state->stacklevels, &lsl)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_string(b, &state->auth, &la)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_string(b, &state->keep, &lk)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_string(b, &state->th_nodes, &ln)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_string(b, &state->retain, &lr)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &lh)) != 0)
- return r;
- if (strcmp(magic, SSH_XMSS_K2_MAGIC) != 0)
- return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ goto out;
+ if (strcmp(magic, SSH_XMSS_K2_MAGIC) != 0) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ goto out;
+ }
/* XXX check stackoffset */
if (ls != num_stack(state) ||
lsl != num_stacklevels(state) ||
la != num_auth(state) ||
lk != num_keep(state) ||
ln != num_th_nodes(state) ||
lr != num_retain(state) ||
- lh != num_treehash(state))
- return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ lh != num_treehash(state)) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ goto out;
+ }
for (i = 0; i < num_treehash(state); i++) {
th = &state->treehash[i];
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &th->h)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &th->next_idx)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &th->stackusage)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u8(b, &th->completed)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &node)) != 0)
- return r;
+ goto out;
if (node < num_th_nodes(state))
th->node = &state->th_nodes[node];
}
POKE_U32(k->xmss_sk, state->idx);
xmss_set_bds_state(&state->bds, state->stack, state->stackoffset,
state->stacklevels, state->auth, state->keep, state->treehash,
state->retain, 0);
- return 0;
+ /* success */
+ r = 0;
+ out:
+ free(magic);
+ return r;
}
int
sshkey_xmss_deserialize_state_opt(struct sshkey *k, struct sshbuf *b)
{
+ struct ssh_xmss_state *state = k->xmss_state;
enum sshkey_serialize_rep opts;
- u_char have_state;
+ u_char have_state, have_stack, have_filename, have_enc;
int r;
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(b, &have_state)) != 0)
return r;
opts = have_state;
switch (opts) {
case SSHKEY_SERIALIZE_DEFAULT:
r = 0;
break;
+ case SSHKEY_SERIALIZE_SHIELD:
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(b, &have_stack)) != 0)
+ return r;
+ if (have_stack &&
+ (r = sshkey_xmss_deserialize_state(k, b)) != 0)
+ return r;
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(b, &have_filename)) != 0)
+ return r;
+ if (have_filename &&
+ (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &k->xmss_filename, NULL)) != 0)
+ return r;
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(b, &have_enc)) != 0)
+ return r;
+ if (have_enc &&
+ (r = sshkey_xmss_deserialize_enc_key(k, b)) != 0)
+ return r;
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &state->maxidx)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_u8(b, &state->allow_update)) != 0)
+ return r;
+ break;
case SSHKEY_SERIALIZE_STATE:
if ((r = sshkey_xmss_deserialize_state(k, b)) != 0)
return r;
break;
case SSHKEY_SERIALIZE_FULL:
if ((r = sshkey_xmss_deserialize_enc_key(k, b)) != 0 ||
(r = sshkey_xmss_deserialize_state(k, b)) != 0)
return r;
break;
default:
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
break;
}
return r;
}
int
sshkey_xmss_encrypt_state(const struct sshkey *k, struct sshbuf *b,
struct sshbuf **retp)
{
struct ssh_xmss_state *state = k->xmss_state;
struct sshbuf *encrypted = NULL, *encoded = NULL, *padded = NULL;
struct sshcipher_ctx *ciphercontext = NULL;
const struct sshcipher *cipher;
u_char *cp, *key, *iv = NULL;
size_t i, keylen, ivlen, blocksize, authlen, encrypted_len, aadlen;
int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
if (retp != NULL)
*retp = NULL;
if (state == NULL ||
state->enc_keyiv == NULL ||
state->enc_ciphername == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
if ((cipher = cipher_by_name(state->enc_ciphername)) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
goto out;
}
blocksize = cipher_blocksize(cipher);
keylen = cipher_keylen(cipher);
ivlen = cipher_ivlen(cipher);
authlen = cipher_authlen(cipher);
if (state->enc_keyiv_len != keylen + ivlen) {
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
key = state->enc_keyiv;
if ((encrypted = sshbuf_new()) == NULL ||
(encoded = sshbuf_new()) == NULL ||
(padded = sshbuf_new()) == NULL ||
(iv = malloc(ivlen)) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
/* replace first 4 bytes of IV with index to ensure uniqueness */
memcpy(iv, key + keylen, ivlen);
POKE_U32(iv, state->idx);
if ((r = sshbuf_put(encoded, XMSS_MAGIC, sizeof(XMSS_MAGIC))) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(encoded, state->idx)) != 0)
goto out;
/* padded state will be encrypted */
if ((r = sshbuf_putb(padded, b)) != 0)
goto out;
i = 0;
while (sshbuf_len(padded) % blocksize) {
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(padded, ++i & 0xff)) != 0)
goto out;
}
encrypted_len = sshbuf_len(padded);
/* header including the length of state is used as AAD */
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(encoded, encrypted_len)) != 0)
goto out;
aadlen = sshbuf_len(encoded);
/* concat header and state */
if ((r = sshbuf_putb(encoded, padded)) != 0)
goto out;
/* reserve space for encryption of encoded data plus auth tag */
/* encrypt at offset addlen */
if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(encrypted,
encrypted_len + aadlen + authlen, &cp)) != 0 ||
(r = cipher_init(&ciphercontext, cipher, key, keylen,
iv, ivlen, 1)) != 0 ||
(r = cipher_crypt(ciphercontext, 0, cp, sshbuf_ptr(encoded),
encrypted_len, aadlen, authlen)) != 0)
goto out;
/* success */
r = 0;
out:
if (retp != NULL) {
*retp = encrypted;
encrypted = NULL;
}
sshbuf_free(padded);
sshbuf_free(encoded);
sshbuf_free(encrypted);
cipher_free(ciphercontext);
free(iv);
return r;
}
int
sshkey_xmss_decrypt_state(const struct sshkey *k, struct sshbuf *encoded,
struct sshbuf **retp)
{
struct ssh_xmss_state *state = k->xmss_state;
struct sshbuf *copy = NULL, *decrypted = NULL;
struct sshcipher_ctx *ciphercontext = NULL;
const struct sshcipher *cipher = NULL;
u_char *key, *iv = NULL, *dp;
size_t keylen, ivlen, authlen, aadlen;
u_int blocksize, encrypted_len, index;
int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
if (retp != NULL)
*retp = NULL;
if (state == NULL ||
state->enc_keyiv == NULL ||
state->enc_ciphername == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
if ((cipher = cipher_by_name(state->enc_ciphername)) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
blocksize = cipher_blocksize(cipher);
keylen = cipher_keylen(cipher);
ivlen = cipher_ivlen(cipher);
authlen = cipher_authlen(cipher);
if (state->enc_keyiv_len != keylen + ivlen) {
r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
goto out;
}
key = state->enc_keyiv;
if ((copy = sshbuf_fromb(encoded)) == NULL ||
(decrypted = sshbuf_new()) == NULL ||
(iv = malloc(ivlen)) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
/* check magic */
if (sshbuf_len(encoded) < sizeof(XMSS_MAGIC) ||
memcmp(sshbuf_ptr(encoded), XMSS_MAGIC, sizeof(XMSS_MAGIC))) {
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
/* parse public portion */
if ((r = sshbuf_consume(encoded, sizeof(XMSS_MAGIC))) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(encoded, &index)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(encoded, &encrypted_len)) != 0)
goto out;
/* check size of encrypted key blob */
if (encrypted_len < blocksize || (encrypted_len % blocksize) != 0) {
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
/* check that an appropriate amount of auth data is present */
if (sshbuf_len(encoded) < authlen ||
sshbuf_len(encoded) - authlen < encrypted_len) {
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
aadlen = sshbuf_len(copy) - sshbuf_len(encoded);
/* replace first 4 bytes of IV with index to ensure uniqueness */
memcpy(iv, key + keylen, ivlen);
POKE_U32(iv, index);
/* decrypt private state of key */
if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(decrypted, aadlen + encrypted_len, &dp)) != 0 ||
(r = cipher_init(&ciphercontext, cipher, key, keylen,
iv, ivlen, 0)) != 0 ||
(r = cipher_crypt(ciphercontext, 0, dp, sshbuf_ptr(copy),
encrypted_len, aadlen, authlen)) != 0)
goto out;
/* there should be no trailing data */
if ((r = sshbuf_consume(encoded, encrypted_len + authlen)) != 0)
goto out;
if (sshbuf_len(encoded) != 0) {
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
/* remove AAD */
if ((r = sshbuf_consume(decrypted, aadlen)) != 0)
goto out;
/* XXX encrypted includes unchecked padding */
/* success */
r = 0;
if (retp != NULL) {
*retp = decrypted;
decrypted = NULL;
}
out:
cipher_free(ciphercontext);
sshbuf_free(copy);
sshbuf_free(decrypted);
free(iv);
return r;
}
u_int32_t
sshkey_xmss_signatures_left(const struct sshkey *k)
{
struct ssh_xmss_state *state = k->xmss_state;
u_int32_t idx;
if (sshkey_type_plain(k->type) == KEY_XMSS && state &&
state->maxidx) {
idx = k->xmss_sk ? PEEK_U32(k->xmss_sk) : state->idx;
if (idx < state->maxidx)
return state->maxidx - idx;
}
return 0;
}
int
sshkey_xmss_enable_maxsign(struct sshkey *k, u_int32_t maxsign)
{
struct ssh_xmss_state *state = k->xmss_state;
if (sshkey_type_plain(k->type) != KEY_XMSS)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
if (maxsign == 0)
return 0;
if (state->idx + maxsign < state->idx)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
state->maxidx = state->idx + maxsign;
return 0;
}
#endif /* WITH_XMSS */
diff --git a/sshkey.c b/sshkey.c
index ef90563b3cde..57995ee68a22 100644
--- a/sshkey.c
+++ b/sshkey.c
@@ -1,4433 +1,4752 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: sshkey.c,v 1.84 2019/10/09 00:04:42 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: sshkey.c,v 1.99 2020/01/21 05:56:56 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (c) 2008 Alexander von Gernler. All rights reserved.
* Copyright (c) 2010,2011 Damien Miller. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <netinet/in.h>
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/err.h>
#include <openssl/pem.h>
#endif
#include "crypto_api.h"
#include <errno.h>
#include <limits.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <resolv.h>
#include <time.h>
#ifdef HAVE_UTIL_H
#include <util.h>
#endif /* HAVE_UTIL_H */
#include "ssh2.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "sshbuf.h"
#include "cipher.h"
#include "digest.h"
#define SSHKEY_INTERNAL
#include "sshkey.h"
#include "match.h"
+#include "ssh-sk.h"
#ifdef WITH_XMSS
#include "sshkey-xmss.h"
#include "xmss_fast.h"
#endif
#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
/* openssh private key file format */
#define MARK_BEGIN "-----BEGIN OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----\n"
#define MARK_END "-----END OPENSSH PRIVATE KEY-----\n"
#define MARK_BEGIN_LEN (sizeof(MARK_BEGIN) - 1)
#define MARK_END_LEN (sizeof(MARK_END) - 1)
#define KDFNAME "bcrypt"
#define AUTH_MAGIC "openssh-key-v1"
#define SALT_LEN 16
#define DEFAULT_CIPHERNAME "aes256-ctr"
#define DEFAULT_ROUNDS 16
/* Version identification string for SSH v1 identity files. */
#define LEGACY_BEGIN "SSH PRIVATE KEY FILE FORMAT 1.1\n"
/*
* Constants relating to "shielding" support; protection of keys expected
* to remain in memory for long durations
*/
#define SSHKEY_SHIELD_PREKEY_LEN (16 * 1024)
#define SSHKEY_SHIELD_CIPHER "aes256-ctr" /* XXX want AES-EME* */
#define SSHKEY_SHIELD_PREKEY_HASH SSH_DIGEST_SHA512
int sshkey_private_serialize_opt(struct sshkey *key,
struct sshbuf *buf, enum sshkey_serialize_rep);
static int sshkey_from_blob_internal(struct sshbuf *buf,
struct sshkey **keyp, int allow_cert);
/* Supported key types */
struct keytype {
const char *name;
const char *shortname;
const char *sigalg;
int type;
int nid;
int cert;
int sigonly;
};
static const struct keytype keytypes[] = {
{ "ssh-ed25519", "ED25519", NULL, KEY_ED25519, 0, 0, 0 },
{ "ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com", "ED25519-CERT", NULL,
KEY_ED25519_CERT, 0, 1, 0 },
+ { "sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com", "ED25519-SK", NULL,
+ KEY_ED25519_SK, 0, 0, 0 },
+ { "sk-ssh-ed25519-cert-v01@openssh.com", "ED25519-SK-CERT", NULL,
+ KEY_ED25519_SK_CERT, 0, 1, 0 },
#ifdef WITH_XMSS
{ "ssh-xmss@openssh.com", "XMSS", NULL, KEY_XMSS, 0, 0, 0 },
{ "ssh-xmss-cert-v01@openssh.com", "XMSS-CERT", NULL,
KEY_XMSS_CERT, 0, 1, 0 },
#endif /* WITH_XMSS */
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
{ "ssh-rsa", "RSA", NULL, KEY_RSA, 0, 0, 0 },
{ "rsa-sha2-256", "RSA", NULL, KEY_RSA, 0, 0, 1 },
{ "rsa-sha2-512", "RSA", NULL, KEY_RSA, 0, 0, 1 },
{ "ssh-dss", "DSA", NULL, KEY_DSA, 0, 0, 0 },
# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
{ "ecdsa-sha2-nistp256", "ECDSA", NULL,
KEY_ECDSA, NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 0, 0 },
{ "ecdsa-sha2-nistp384", "ECDSA", NULL,
KEY_ECDSA, NID_secp384r1, 0, 0 },
# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521
{ "ecdsa-sha2-nistp521", "ECDSA", NULL,
KEY_ECDSA, NID_secp521r1, 0, 0 },
# endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521 */
+ { "sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256@openssh.com", "ECDSA-SK", NULL,
+ KEY_ECDSA_SK, NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 0, 0 },
# endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
{ "ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com", "RSA-CERT", NULL,
KEY_RSA_CERT, 0, 1, 0 },
{ "rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com", "RSA-CERT",
"rsa-sha2-256", KEY_RSA_CERT, 0, 1, 1 },
{ "rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com", "RSA-CERT",
"rsa-sha2-512", KEY_RSA_CERT, 0, 1, 1 },
{ "ssh-dss-cert-v01@openssh.com", "DSA-CERT", NULL,
KEY_DSA_CERT, 0, 1, 0 },
# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
{ "ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com", "ECDSA-CERT", NULL,
KEY_ECDSA_CERT, NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 1, 0 },
{ "ecdsa-sha2-nistp384-cert-v01@openssh.com", "ECDSA-CERT", NULL,
KEY_ECDSA_CERT, NID_secp384r1, 1, 0 },
# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521
{ "ecdsa-sha2-nistp521-cert-v01@openssh.com", "ECDSA-CERT", NULL,
KEY_ECDSA_CERT, NID_secp521r1, 1, 0 },
# endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521 */
+ { "sk-ecdsa-sha2-nistp256-cert-v01@openssh.com", "ECDSA-SK-CERT", NULL,
+ KEY_ECDSA_SK_CERT, NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 1, 0 },
# endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
{ NULL, NULL, NULL, -1, -1, 0, 0 }
};
const char *
sshkey_type(const struct sshkey *k)
{
const struct keytype *kt;
for (kt = keytypes; kt->type != -1; kt++) {
if (kt->type == k->type)
return kt->shortname;
}
return "unknown";
}
static const char *
sshkey_ssh_name_from_type_nid(int type, int nid)
{
const struct keytype *kt;
for (kt = keytypes; kt->type != -1; kt++) {
if (kt->type == type && (kt->nid == 0 || kt->nid == nid))
return kt->name;
}
return "ssh-unknown";
}
int
sshkey_type_is_cert(int type)
{
const struct keytype *kt;
for (kt = keytypes; kt->type != -1; kt++) {
if (kt->type == type)
return kt->cert;
}
return 0;
}
const char *
sshkey_ssh_name(const struct sshkey *k)
{
return sshkey_ssh_name_from_type_nid(k->type, k->ecdsa_nid);
}
const char *
sshkey_ssh_name_plain(const struct sshkey *k)
{
return sshkey_ssh_name_from_type_nid(sshkey_type_plain(k->type),
k->ecdsa_nid);
}
int
sshkey_type_from_name(const char *name)
{
const struct keytype *kt;
for (kt = keytypes; kt->type != -1; kt++) {
/* Only allow shortname matches for plain key types */
if ((kt->name != NULL && strcmp(name, kt->name) == 0) ||
(!kt->cert && strcasecmp(kt->shortname, name) == 0))
return kt->type;
}
return KEY_UNSPEC;
}
+static int
+key_type_is_ecdsa_variant(int type)
+{
+ switch (type) {
+ case KEY_ECDSA:
+ case KEY_ECDSA_CERT:
+ case KEY_ECDSA_SK:
+ case KEY_ECDSA_SK_CERT:
+ return 1;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
int
sshkey_ecdsa_nid_from_name(const char *name)
{
const struct keytype *kt;
for (kt = keytypes; kt->type != -1; kt++) {
- if (kt->type != KEY_ECDSA && kt->type != KEY_ECDSA_CERT)
+ if (!key_type_is_ecdsa_variant(kt->type))
continue;
if (kt->name != NULL && strcmp(name, kt->name) == 0)
return kt->nid;
}
return -1;
}
char *
sshkey_alg_list(int certs_only, int plain_only, int include_sigonly, char sep)
{
char *tmp, *ret = NULL;
size_t nlen, rlen = 0;
const struct keytype *kt;
for (kt = keytypes; kt->type != -1; kt++) {
if (kt->name == NULL)
continue;
if (!include_sigonly && kt->sigonly)
continue;
if ((certs_only && !kt->cert) || (plain_only && kt->cert))
continue;
if (ret != NULL)
ret[rlen++] = sep;
nlen = strlen(kt->name);
if ((tmp = realloc(ret, rlen + nlen + 2)) == NULL) {
free(ret);
return NULL;
}
ret = tmp;
memcpy(ret + rlen, kt->name, nlen + 1);
rlen += nlen;
}
return ret;
}
int
sshkey_names_valid2(const char *names, int allow_wildcard)
{
char *s, *cp, *p;
const struct keytype *kt;
int type;
if (names == NULL || strcmp(names, "") == 0)
return 0;
if ((s = cp = strdup(names)) == NULL)
return 0;
for ((p = strsep(&cp, ",")); p && *p != '\0';
(p = strsep(&cp, ","))) {
type = sshkey_type_from_name(p);
if (type == KEY_UNSPEC) {
if (allow_wildcard) {
/*
* Try matching key types against the string.
* If any has a positive or negative match then
* the component is accepted.
*/
for (kt = keytypes; kt->type != -1; kt++) {
if (match_pattern_list(kt->name,
p, 0) != 0)
break;
}
if (kt->type != -1)
continue;
}
free(s);
return 0;
}
}
free(s);
return 1;
}
u_int
sshkey_size(const struct sshkey *k)
{
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
const BIGNUM *rsa_n, *dsa_p;
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
switch (k->type) {
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
case KEY_RSA:
case KEY_RSA_CERT:
if (k->rsa == NULL)
return 0;
RSA_get0_key(k->rsa, &rsa_n, NULL, NULL);
return BN_num_bits(rsa_n);
case KEY_DSA:
case KEY_DSA_CERT:
if (k->dsa == NULL)
return 0;
DSA_get0_pqg(k->dsa, &dsa_p, NULL, NULL);
return BN_num_bits(dsa_p);
case KEY_ECDSA:
case KEY_ECDSA_CERT:
+ case KEY_ECDSA_SK:
+ case KEY_ECDSA_SK_CERT:
return sshkey_curve_nid_to_bits(k->ecdsa_nid);
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
case KEY_ED25519:
case KEY_ED25519_CERT:
+ case KEY_ED25519_SK:
+ case KEY_ED25519_SK_CERT:
case KEY_XMSS:
case KEY_XMSS_CERT:
return 256; /* XXX */
}
return 0;
}
static int
sshkey_type_is_valid_ca(int type)
{
switch (type) {
case KEY_RSA:
case KEY_DSA:
case KEY_ECDSA:
+ case KEY_ECDSA_SK:
case KEY_ED25519:
+ case KEY_ED25519_SK:
case KEY_XMSS:
return 1;
default:
return 0;
}
}
int
sshkey_is_cert(const struct sshkey *k)
{
if (k == NULL)
return 0;
return sshkey_type_is_cert(k->type);
}
+int
+sshkey_is_sk(const struct sshkey *k)
+{
+ if (k == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ switch (sshkey_type_plain(k->type)) {
+ case KEY_ECDSA_SK:
+ case KEY_ED25519_SK:
+ return 1;
+ default:
+ return 0;
+ }
+}
+
/* Return the cert-less equivalent to a certified key type */
int
sshkey_type_plain(int type)
{
switch (type) {
case KEY_RSA_CERT:
return KEY_RSA;
case KEY_DSA_CERT:
return KEY_DSA;
case KEY_ECDSA_CERT:
return KEY_ECDSA;
+ case KEY_ECDSA_SK_CERT:
+ return KEY_ECDSA_SK;
case KEY_ED25519_CERT:
return KEY_ED25519;
+ case KEY_ED25519_SK_CERT:
+ return KEY_ED25519_SK;
case KEY_XMSS_CERT:
return KEY_XMSS;
default:
return type;
}
}
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
/* XXX: these are really begging for a table-driven approach */
int
sshkey_curve_name_to_nid(const char *name)
{
if (strcmp(name, "nistp256") == 0)
return NID_X9_62_prime256v1;
else if (strcmp(name, "nistp384") == 0)
return NID_secp384r1;
# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521
else if (strcmp(name, "nistp521") == 0)
return NID_secp521r1;
# endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521 */
else
return -1;
}
u_int
sshkey_curve_nid_to_bits(int nid)
{
switch (nid) {
case NID_X9_62_prime256v1:
return 256;
case NID_secp384r1:
return 384;
# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521
case NID_secp521r1:
return 521;
# endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521 */
default:
return 0;
}
}
int
sshkey_ecdsa_bits_to_nid(int bits)
{
switch (bits) {
case 256:
return NID_X9_62_prime256v1;
case 384:
return NID_secp384r1;
# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521
case 521:
return NID_secp521r1;
# endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521 */
default:
return -1;
}
}
const char *
sshkey_curve_nid_to_name(int nid)
{
switch (nid) {
case NID_X9_62_prime256v1:
return "nistp256";
case NID_secp384r1:
return "nistp384";
# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521
case NID_secp521r1:
return "nistp521";
# endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521 */
default:
return NULL;
}
}
int
sshkey_ec_nid_to_hash_alg(int nid)
{
int kbits = sshkey_curve_nid_to_bits(nid);
if (kbits <= 0)
return -1;
/* RFC5656 section 6.2.1 */
if (kbits <= 256)
return SSH_DIGEST_SHA256;
else if (kbits <= 384)
return SSH_DIGEST_SHA384;
else
return SSH_DIGEST_SHA512;
}
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
static void
cert_free(struct sshkey_cert *cert)
{
u_int i;
if (cert == NULL)
return;
sshbuf_free(cert->certblob);
sshbuf_free(cert->critical);
sshbuf_free(cert->extensions);
free(cert->key_id);
for (i = 0; i < cert->nprincipals; i++)
free(cert->principals[i]);
free(cert->principals);
sshkey_free(cert->signature_key);
free(cert->signature_type);
freezero(cert, sizeof(*cert));
}
static struct sshkey_cert *
cert_new(void)
{
struct sshkey_cert *cert;
if ((cert = calloc(1, sizeof(*cert))) == NULL)
return NULL;
if ((cert->certblob = sshbuf_new()) == NULL ||
(cert->critical = sshbuf_new()) == NULL ||
(cert->extensions = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
cert_free(cert);
return NULL;
}
cert->key_id = NULL;
cert->principals = NULL;
cert->signature_key = NULL;
cert->signature_type = NULL;
return cert;
}
struct sshkey *
sshkey_new(int type)
{
struct sshkey *k;
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
RSA *rsa;
DSA *dsa;
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
if ((k = calloc(1, sizeof(*k))) == NULL)
return NULL;
k->type = type;
k->ecdsa = NULL;
k->ecdsa_nid = -1;
k->dsa = NULL;
k->rsa = NULL;
k->cert = NULL;
k->ed25519_sk = NULL;
k->ed25519_pk = NULL;
k->xmss_sk = NULL;
k->xmss_pk = NULL;
switch (k->type) {
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
case KEY_RSA:
case KEY_RSA_CERT:
if ((rsa = RSA_new()) == NULL) {
free(k);
return NULL;
}
k->rsa = rsa;
break;
case KEY_DSA:
case KEY_DSA_CERT:
if ((dsa = DSA_new()) == NULL) {
free(k);
return NULL;
}
k->dsa = dsa;
break;
case KEY_ECDSA:
case KEY_ECDSA_CERT:
+ case KEY_ECDSA_SK:
+ case KEY_ECDSA_SK_CERT:
/* Cannot do anything until we know the group */
break;
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
case KEY_ED25519:
case KEY_ED25519_CERT:
+ case KEY_ED25519_SK:
+ case KEY_ED25519_SK_CERT:
case KEY_XMSS:
case KEY_XMSS_CERT:
/* no need to prealloc */
break;
case KEY_UNSPEC:
break;
default:
free(k);
return NULL;
}
if (sshkey_is_cert(k)) {
if ((k->cert = cert_new()) == NULL) {
sshkey_free(k);
return NULL;
}
}
return k;
}
void
sshkey_free(struct sshkey *k)
{
if (k == NULL)
return;
switch (k->type) {
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
case KEY_RSA:
case KEY_RSA_CERT:
RSA_free(k->rsa);
k->rsa = NULL;
break;
case KEY_DSA:
case KEY_DSA_CERT:
DSA_free(k->dsa);
k->dsa = NULL;
break;
# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
+ case KEY_ECDSA_SK:
+ case KEY_ECDSA_SK_CERT:
+ free(k->sk_application);
+ sshbuf_free(k->sk_key_handle);
+ sshbuf_free(k->sk_reserved);
+ /* FALLTHROUGH */
case KEY_ECDSA:
case KEY_ECDSA_CERT:
EC_KEY_free(k->ecdsa);
k->ecdsa = NULL;
break;
# endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+ case KEY_ED25519_SK:
+ case KEY_ED25519_SK_CERT:
+ free(k->sk_application);
+ sshbuf_free(k->sk_key_handle);
+ sshbuf_free(k->sk_reserved);
+ /* FALLTHROUGH */
case KEY_ED25519:
case KEY_ED25519_CERT:
freezero(k->ed25519_pk, ED25519_PK_SZ);
k->ed25519_pk = NULL;
freezero(k->ed25519_sk, ED25519_SK_SZ);
k->ed25519_sk = NULL;
break;
#ifdef WITH_XMSS
case KEY_XMSS:
case KEY_XMSS_CERT:
freezero(k->xmss_pk, sshkey_xmss_pklen(k));
k->xmss_pk = NULL;
freezero(k->xmss_sk, sshkey_xmss_sklen(k));
k->xmss_sk = NULL;
sshkey_xmss_free_state(k);
free(k->xmss_name);
k->xmss_name = NULL;
free(k->xmss_filename);
k->xmss_filename = NULL;
break;
#endif /* WITH_XMSS */
case KEY_UNSPEC:
break;
default:
break;
}
if (sshkey_is_cert(k))
cert_free(k->cert);
freezero(k->shielded_private, k->shielded_len);
freezero(k->shield_prekey, k->shield_prekey_len);
freezero(k, sizeof(*k));
}
static int
cert_compare(struct sshkey_cert *a, struct sshkey_cert *b)
{
if (a == NULL && b == NULL)
return 1;
if (a == NULL || b == NULL)
return 0;
if (sshbuf_len(a->certblob) != sshbuf_len(b->certblob))
return 0;
if (timingsafe_bcmp(sshbuf_ptr(a->certblob), sshbuf_ptr(b->certblob),
sshbuf_len(a->certblob)) != 0)
return 0;
return 1;
}
/*
* Compare public portions of key only, allowing comparisons between
* certificates and plain keys too.
*/
int
sshkey_equal_public(const struct sshkey *a, const struct sshkey *b)
{
#if defined(WITH_OPENSSL)
const BIGNUM *rsa_e_a, *rsa_n_a;
const BIGNUM *rsa_e_b, *rsa_n_b;
const BIGNUM *dsa_p_a, *dsa_q_a, *dsa_g_a, *dsa_pub_key_a;
const BIGNUM *dsa_p_b, *dsa_q_b, *dsa_g_b, *dsa_pub_key_b;
-# if defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC)
- BN_CTX *bnctx;
-# endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
if (a == NULL || b == NULL ||
sshkey_type_plain(a->type) != sshkey_type_plain(b->type))
return 0;
switch (a->type) {
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
case KEY_RSA_CERT:
case KEY_RSA:
if (a->rsa == NULL || b->rsa == NULL)
return 0;
RSA_get0_key(a->rsa, &rsa_n_a, &rsa_e_a, NULL);
RSA_get0_key(b->rsa, &rsa_n_b, &rsa_e_b, NULL);
return BN_cmp(rsa_e_a, rsa_e_b) == 0 &&
BN_cmp(rsa_n_a, rsa_n_b) == 0;
case KEY_DSA_CERT:
case KEY_DSA:
if (a->dsa == NULL || b->dsa == NULL)
return 0;
DSA_get0_pqg(a->dsa, &dsa_p_a, &dsa_q_a, &dsa_g_a);
DSA_get0_pqg(b->dsa, &dsa_p_b, &dsa_q_b, &dsa_g_b);
DSA_get0_key(a->dsa, &dsa_pub_key_a, NULL);
DSA_get0_key(b->dsa, &dsa_pub_key_b, NULL);
return BN_cmp(dsa_p_a, dsa_p_b) == 0 &&
BN_cmp(dsa_q_a, dsa_q_b) == 0 &&
BN_cmp(dsa_g_a, dsa_g_b) == 0 &&
BN_cmp(dsa_pub_key_a, dsa_pub_key_b) == 0;
# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
+ case KEY_ECDSA_SK:
+ case KEY_ECDSA_SK_CERT:
+ if (a->sk_application == NULL || b->sk_application == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ if (strcmp(a->sk_application, b->sk_application) != 0)
+ return 0;
+ /* FALLTHROUGH */
case KEY_ECDSA_CERT:
case KEY_ECDSA:
if (a->ecdsa == NULL || b->ecdsa == NULL ||
EC_KEY_get0_public_key(a->ecdsa) == NULL ||
EC_KEY_get0_public_key(b->ecdsa) == NULL)
return 0;
- if ((bnctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
- return 0;
if (EC_GROUP_cmp(EC_KEY_get0_group(a->ecdsa),
- EC_KEY_get0_group(b->ecdsa), bnctx) != 0 ||
+ EC_KEY_get0_group(b->ecdsa), NULL) != 0 ||
EC_POINT_cmp(EC_KEY_get0_group(a->ecdsa),
EC_KEY_get0_public_key(a->ecdsa),
- EC_KEY_get0_public_key(b->ecdsa), bnctx) != 0) {
- BN_CTX_free(bnctx);
+ EC_KEY_get0_public_key(b->ecdsa), NULL) != 0)
return 0;
- }
- BN_CTX_free(bnctx);
return 1;
# endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+ case KEY_ED25519_SK:
+ case KEY_ED25519_SK_CERT:
+ if (a->sk_application == NULL || b->sk_application == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ if (strcmp(a->sk_application, b->sk_application) != 0)
+ return 0;
+ /* FALLTHROUGH */
case KEY_ED25519:
case KEY_ED25519_CERT:
return a->ed25519_pk != NULL && b->ed25519_pk != NULL &&
memcmp(a->ed25519_pk, b->ed25519_pk, ED25519_PK_SZ) == 0;
#ifdef WITH_XMSS
case KEY_XMSS:
case KEY_XMSS_CERT:
return a->xmss_pk != NULL && b->xmss_pk != NULL &&
sshkey_xmss_pklen(a) == sshkey_xmss_pklen(b) &&
memcmp(a->xmss_pk, b->xmss_pk, sshkey_xmss_pklen(a)) == 0;
#endif /* WITH_XMSS */
default:
return 0;
}
/* NOTREACHED */
}
int
sshkey_equal(const struct sshkey *a, const struct sshkey *b)
{
if (a == NULL || b == NULL || a->type != b->type)
return 0;
if (sshkey_is_cert(a)) {
if (!cert_compare(a->cert, b->cert))
return 0;
}
return sshkey_equal_public(a, b);
}
static int
to_blob_buf(const struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *b, int force_plain,
enum sshkey_serialize_rep opts)
{
int type, ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
const char *typename;
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
const BIGNUM *rsa_n, *rsa_e, *dsa_p, *dsa_q, *dsa_g, *dsa_pub_key;
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
if (key == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
if (sshkey_is_cert(key)) {
if (key->cert == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_EXPECTED_CERT;
if (sshbuf_len(key->cert->certblob) == 0)
return SSH_ERR_KEY_LACKS_CERTBLOB;
}
type = force_plain ? sshkey_type_plain(key->type) : key->type;
typename = sshkey_ssh_name_from_type_nid(type, key->ecdsa_nid);
switch (type) {
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
case KEY_DSA_CERT:
case KEY_ECDSA_CERT:
+ case KEY_ECDSA_SK_CERT:
case KEY_RSA_CERT:
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
case KEY_ED25519_CERT:
+ case KEY_ED25519_SK_CERT:
#ifdef WITH_XMSS
case KEY_XMSS_CERT:
#endif /* WITH_XMSS */
/* Use the existing blob */
/* XXX modified flag? */
if ((ret = sshbuf_putb(b, key->cert->certblob)) != 0)
return ret;
break;
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
case KEY_DSA:
if (key->dsa == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
DSA_get0_pqg(key->dsa, &dsa_p, &dsa_q, &dsa_g);
DSA_get0_key(key->dsa, &dsa_pub_key, NULL);
if ((ret = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, typename)) != 0 ||
(ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, dsa_p)) != 0 ||
(ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, dsa_q)) != 0 ||
(ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, dsa_g)) != 0 ||
(ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, dsa_pub_key)) != 0)
return ret;
break;
# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
case KEY_ECDSA:
+ case KEY_ECDSA_SK:
if (key->ecdsa == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
if ((ret = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, typename)) != 0 ||
(ret = sshbuf_put_cstring(b,
sshkey_curve_nid_to_name(key->ecdsa_nid))) != 0 ||
(ret = sshbuf_put_eckey(b, key->ecdsa)) != 0)
return ret;
+ if (type == KEY_ECDSA_SK) {
+ if ((ret = sshbuf_put_cstring(b,
+ key->sk_application)) != 0)
+ return ret;
+ }
break;
# endif
case KEY_RSA:
if (key->rsa == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
RSA_get0_key(key->rsa, &rsa_n, &rsa_e, NULL);
if ((ret = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, typename)) != 0 ||
(ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, rsa_e)) != 0 ||
(ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, rsa_n)) != 0)
return ret;
break;
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
case KEY_ED25519:
+ case KEY_ED25519_SK:
if (key->ed25519_pk == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
if ((ret = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, typename)) != 0 ||
(ret = sshbuf_put_string(b,
key->ed25519_pk, ED25519_PK_SZ)) != 0)
return ret;
+ if (type == KEY_ED25519_SK) {
+ if ((ret = sshbuf_put_cstring(b,
+ key->sk_application)) != 0)
+ return ret;
+ }
break;
#ifdef WITH_XMSS
case KEY_XMSS:
if (key->xmss_name == NULL || key->xmss_pk == NULL ||
sshkey_xmss_pklen(key) == 0)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
if ((ret = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, typename)) != 0 ||
(ret = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, key->xmss_name)) != 0 ||
(ret = sshbuf_put_string(b,
key->xmss_pk, sshkey_xmss_pklen(key))) != 0 ||
(ret = sshkey_xmss_serialize_pk_info(key, b, opts)) != 0)
return ret;
break;
#endif /* WITH_XMSS */
default:
return SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN;
}
return 0;
}
int
sshkey_putb(const struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *b)
{
return to_blob_buf(key, b, 0, SSHKEY_SERIALIZE_DEFAULT);
}
int
sshkey_puts_opts(const struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *b,
enum sshkey_serialize_rep opts)
{
struct sshbuf *tmp;
int r;
if ((tmp = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
r = to_blob_buf(key, tmp, 0, opts);
if (r == 0)
r = sshbuf_put_stringb(b, tmp);
sshbuf_free(tmp);
return r;
}
int
sshkey_puts(const struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *b)
{
return sshkey_puts_opts(key, b, SSHKEY_SERIALIZE_DEFAULT);
}
int
sshkey_putb_plain(const struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *b)
{
return to_blob_buf(key, b, 1, SSHKEY_SERIALIZE_DEFAULT);
}
static int
to_blob(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **blobp, size_t *lenp, int force_plain,
enum sshkey_serialize_rep opts)
{
int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
size_t len;
struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
if (lenp != NULL)
*lenp = 0;
if (blobp != NULL)
*blobp = NULL;
if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
if ((ret = to_blob_buf(key, b, force_plain, opts)) != 0)
goto out;
len = sshbuf_len(b);
if (lenp != NULL)
*lenp = len;
if (blobp != NULL) {
if ((*blobp = malloc(len)) == NULL) {
ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
memcpy(*blobp, sshbuf_ptr(b), len);
}
ret = 0;
out:
sshbuf_free(b);
return ret;
}
int
sshkey_to_blob(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **blobp, size_t *lenp)
{
return to_blob(key, blobp, lenp, 0, SSHKEY_SERIALIZE_DEFAULT);
}
int
sshkey_plain_to_blob(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **blobp, size_t *lenp)
{
return to_blob(key, blobp, lenp, 1, SSHKEY_SERIALIZE_DEFAULT);
}
int
sshkey_fingerprint_raw(const struct sshkey *k, int dgst_alg,
u_char **retp, size_t *lenp)
{
u_char *blob = NULL, *ret = NULL;
size_t blob_len = 0;
int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
if (retp != NULL)
*retp = NULL;
if (lenp != NULL)
*lenp = 0;
if (ssh_digest_bytes(dgst_alg) == 0) {
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
goto out;
}
if ((r = to_blob(k, &blob, &blob_len, 1, SSHKEY_SERIALIZE_DEFAULT))
!= 0)
goto out;
if ((ret = calloc(1, SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH)) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
if ((r = ssh_digest_memory(dgst_alg, blob, blob_len,
ret, SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH)) != 0)
goto out;
/* success */
if (retp != NULL) {
*retp = ret;
ret = NULL;
}
if (lenp != NULL)
*lenp = ssh_digest_bytes(dgst_alg);
r = 0;
out:
free(ret);
if (blob != NULL) {
explicit_bzero(blob, blob_len);
free(blob);
}
return r;
}
static char *
fingerprint_b64(const char *alg, u_char *dgst_raw, size_t dgst_raw_len)
{
char *ret;
size_t plen = strlen(alg) + 1;
size_t rlen = ((dgst_raw_len + 2) / 3) * 4 + plen + 1;
if (dgst_raw_len > 65536 || (ret = calloc(1, rlen)) == NULL)
return NULL;
strlcpy(ret, alg, rlen);
strlcat(ret, ":", rlen);
if (dgst_raw_len == 0)
return ret;
if (b64_ntop(dgst_raw, dgst_raw_len, ret + plen, rlen - plen) == -1) {
freezero(ret, rlen);
return NULL;
}
/* Trim padding characters from end */
ret[strcspn(ret, "=")] = '\0';
return ret;
}
static char *
fingerprint_hex(const char *alg, u_char *dgst_raw, size_t dgst_raw_len)
{
char *retval, hex[5];
size_t i, rlen = dgst_raw_len * 3 + strlen(alg) + 2;
if (dgst_raw_len > 65536 || (retval = calloc(1, rlen)) == NULL)
return NULL;
strlcpy(retval, alg, rlen);
strlcat(retval, ":", rlen);
for (i = 0; i < dgst_raw_len; i++) {
snprintf(hex, sizeof(hex), "%s%02x",
i > 0 ? ":" : "", dgst_raw[i]);
strlcat(retval, hex, rlen);
}
return retval;
}
static char *
fingerprint_bubblebabble(u_char *dgst_raw, size_t dgst_raw_len)
{
char vowels[] = { 'a', 'e', 'i', 'o', 'u', 'y' };
char consonants[] = { 'b', 'c', 'd', 'f', 'g', 'h', 'k', 'l', 'm',
'n', 'p', 'r', 's', 't', 'v', 'z', 'x' };
u_int i, j = 0, rounds, seed = 1;
char *retval;
rounds = (dgst_raw_len / 2) + 1;
if ((retval = calloc(rounds, 6)) == NULL)
return NULL;
retval[j++] = 'x';
for (i = 0; i < rounds; i++) {
u_int idx0, idx1, idx2, idx3, idx4;
if ((i + 1 < rounds) || (dgst_raw_len % 2 != 0)) {
idx0 = (((((u_int)(dgst_raw[2 * i])) >> 6) & 3) +
seed) % 6;
idx1 = (((u_int)(dgst_raw[2 * i])) >> 2) & 15;
idx2 = ((((u_int)(dgst_raw[2 * i])) & 3) +
(seed / 6)) % 6;
retval[j++] = vowels[idx0];
retval[j++] = consonants[idx1];
retval[j++] = vowels[idx2];
if ((i + 1) < rounds) {
idx3 = (((u_int)(dgst_raw[(2 * i) + 1])) >> 4) & 15;
idx4 = (((u_int)(dgst_raw[(2 * i) + 1]))) & 15;
retval[j++] = consonants[idx3];
retval[j++] = '-';
retval[j++] = consonants[idx4];
seed = ((seed * 5) +
((((u_int)(dgst_raw[2 * i])) * 7) +
((u_int)(dgst_raw[(2 * i) + 1])))) % 36;
}
} else {
idx0 = seed % 6;
idx1 = 16;
idx2 = seed / 6;
retval[j++] = vowels[idx0];
retval[j++] = consonants[idx1];
retval[j++] = vowels[idx2];
}
}
retval[j++] = 'x';
retval[j++] = '\0';
return retval;
}
/*
* Draw an ASCII-Art representing the fingerprint so human brain can
* profit from its built-in pattern recognition ability.
* This technique is called "random art" and can be found in some
* scientific publications like this original paper:
*
* "Hash Visualization: a New Technique to improve Real-World Security",
* Perrig A. and Song D., 1999, International Workshop on Cryptographic
* Techniques and E-Commerce (CrypTEC '99)
* sparrow.ece.cmu.edu/~adrian/projects/validation/validation.pdf
*
* The subject came up in a talk by Dan Kaminsky, too.
*
* If you see the picture is different, the key is different.
* If the picture looks the same, you still know nothing.
*
* The algorithm used here is a worm crawling over a discrete plane,
* leaving a trace (augmenting the field) everywhere it goes.
* Movement is taken from dgst_raw 2bit-wise. Bumping into walls
* makes the respective movement vector be ignored for this turn.
* Graphs are not unambiguous, because circles in graphs can be
* walked in either direction.
*/
/*
* Field sizes for the random art. Have to be odd, so the starting point
* can be in the exact middle of the picture, and FLDBASE should be >=8 .
* Else pictures would be too dense, and drawing the frame would
* fail, too, because the key type would not fit in anymore.
*/
#define FLDBASE 8
#define FLDSIZE_Y (FLDBASE + 1)
#define FLDSIZE_X (FLDBASE * 2 + 1)
static char *
fingerprint_randomart(const char *alg, u_char *dgst_raw, size_t dgst_raw_len,
const struct sshkey *k)
{
/*
* Chars to be used after each other every time the worm
* intersects with itself. Matter of taste.
*/
char *augmentation_string = " .o+=*BOX@%&#/^SE";
char *retval, *p, title[FLDSIZE_X], hash[FLDSIZE_X];
u_char field[FLDSIZE_X][FLDSIZE_Y];
size_t i, tlen, hlen;
u_int b;
int x, y, r;
size_t len = strlen(augmentation_string) - 1;
if ((retval = calloc((FLDSIZE_X + 3), (FLDSIZE_Y + 2))) == NULL)
return NULL;
/* initialize field */
memset(field, 0, FLDSIZE_X * FLDSIZE_Y * sizeof(char));
x = FLDSIZE_X / 2;
y = FLDSIZE_Y / 2;
/* process raw key */
for (i = 0; i < dgst_raw_len; i++) {
int input;
/* each byte conveys four 2-bit move commands */
input = dgst_raw[i];
for (b = 0; b < 4; b++) {
/* evaluate 2 bit, rest is shifted later */
x += (input & 0x1) ? 1 : -1;
y += (input & 0x2) ? 1 : -1;
/* assure we are still in bounds */
x = MAXIMUM(x, 0);
y = MAXIMUM(y, 0);
x = MINIMUM(x, FLDSIZE_X - 1);
y = MINIMUM(y, FLDSIZE_Y - 1);
/* augment the field */
if (field[x][y] < len - 2)
field[x][y]++;
input = input >> 2;
}
}
/* mark starting point and end point*/
field[FLDSIZE_X / 2][FLDSIZE_Y / 2] = len - 1;
field[x][y] = len;
/* assemble title */
r = snprintf(title, sizeof(title), "[%s %u]",
sshkey_type(k), sshkey_size(k));
/* If [type size] won't fit, then try [type]; fits "[ED25519-CERT]" */
if (r < 0 || r > (int)sizeof(title))
r = snprintf(title, sizeof(title), "[%s]", sshkey_type(k));
tlen = (r <= 0) ? 0 : strlen(title);
/* assemble hash ID. */
r = snprintf(hash, sizeof(hash), "[%s]", alg);
hlen = (r <= 0) ? 0 : strlen(hash);
/* output upper border */
p = retval;
*p++ = '+';
for (i = 0; i < (FLDSIZE_X - tlen) / 2; i++)
*p++ = '-';
memcpy(p, title, tlen);
p += tlen;
for (i += tlen; i < FLDSIZE_X; i++)
*p++ = '-';
*p++ = '+';
*p++ = '\n';
/* output content */
for (y = 0; y < FLDSIZE_Y; y++) {
*p++ = '|';
for (x = 0; x < FLDSIZE_X; x++)
*p++ = augmentation_string[MINIMUM(field[x][y], len)];
*p++ = '|';
*p++ = '\n';
}
/* output lower border */
*p++ = '+';
for (i = 0; i < (FLDSIZE_X - hlen) / 2; i++)
*p++ = '-';
memcpy(p, hash, hlen);
p += hlen;
for (i += hlen; i < FLDSIZE_X; i++)
*p++ = '-';
*p++ = '+';
return retval;
}
char *
sshkey_fingerprint(const struct sshkey *k, int dgst_alg,
enum sshkey_fp_rep dgst_rep)
{
char *retval = NULL;
u_char *dgst_raw;
size_t dgst_raw_len;
if (sshkey_fingerprint_raw(k, dgst_alg, &dgst_raw, &dgst_raw_len) != 0)
return NULL;
switch (dgst_rep) {
case SSH_FP_DEFAULT:
if (dgst_alg == SSH_DIGEST_MD5) {
retval = fingerprint_hex(ssh_digest_alg_name(dgst_alg),
dgst_raw, dgst_raw_len);
} else {
retval = fingerprint_b64(ssh_digest_alg_name(dgst_alg),
dgst_raw, dgst_raw_len);
}
break;
case SSH_FP_HEX:
retval = fingerprint_hex(ssh_digest_alg_name(dgst_alg),
dgst_raw, dgst_raw_len);
break;
case SSH_FP_BASE64:
retval = fingerprint_b64(ssh_digest_alg_name(dgst_alg),
dgst_raw, dgst_raw_len);
break;
case SSH_FP_BUBBLEBABBLE:
retval = fingerprint_bubblebabble(dgst_raw, dgst_raw_len);
break;
case SSH_FP_RANDOMART:
retval = fingerprint_randomart(ssh_digest_alg_name(dgst_alg),
dgst_raw, dgst_raw_len, k);
break;
default:
explicit_bzero(dgst_raw, dgst_raw_len);
free(dgst_raw);
return NULL;
}
explicit_bzero(dgst_raw, dgst_raw_len);
free(dgst_raw);
return retval;
}
static int
peek_type_nid(const char *s, size_t l, int *nid)
{
const struct keytype *kt;
for (kt = keytypes; kt->type != -1; kt++) {
if (kt->name == NULL || strlen(kt->name) != l)
continue;
if (memcmp(s, kt->name, l) == 0) {
*nid = -1;
- if (kt->type == KEY_ECDSA || kt->type == KEY_ECDSA_CERT)
+ if (key_type_is_ecdsa_variant(kt->type))
*nid = kt->nid;
return kt->type;
}
}
return KEY_UNSPEC;
}
/* XXX this can now be made const char * */
int
sshkey_read(struct sshkey *ret, char **cpp)
{
struct sshkey *k;
char *cp, *blobcopy;
size_t space;
int r, type, curve_nid = -1;
struct sshbuf *blob;
if (ret == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
switch (ret->type) {
case KEY_UNSPEC:
case KEY_RSA:
case KEY_DSA:
case KEY_ECDSA:
+ case KEY_ECDSA_SK:
case KEY_ED25519:
+ case KEY_ED25519_SK:
case KEY_DSA_CERT:
case KEY_ECDSA_CERT:
+ case KEY_ECDSA_SK_CERT:
case KEY_RSA_CERT:
case KEY_ED25519_CERT:
+ case KEY_ED25519_SK_CERT:
#ifdef WITH_XMSS
case KEY_XMSS:
case KEY_XMSS_CERT:
#endif /* WITH_XMSS */
break; /* ok */
default:
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
}
/* Decode type */
cp = *cpp;
space = strcspn(cp, " \t");
if (space == strlen(cp))
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
if ((type = peek_type_nid(cp, space, &curve_nid)) == KEY_UNSPEC)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
/* skip whitespace */
for (cp += space; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++)
;
if (*cp == '\0')
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
if (ret->type != KEY_UNSPEC && ret->type != type)
return SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH;
if ((blob = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
/* find end of keyblob and decode */
space = strcspn(cp, " \t");
if ((blobcopy = strndup(cp, space)) == NULL) {
sshbuf_free(blob);
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_b64tod(blob, blobcopy)) != 0) {
free(blobcopy);
sshbuf_free(blob);
return r;
}
free(blobcopy);
if ((r = sshkey_fromb(blob, &k)) != 0) {
sshbuf_free(blob);
return r;
}
sshbuf_free(blob);
/* skip whitespace and leave cp at start of comment */
for (cp += space; *cp == ' ' || *cp == '\t'; cp++)
;
/* ensure type of blob matches type at start of line */
if (k->type != type) {
sshkey_free(k);
return SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_MISMATCH;
}
- if (sshkey_type_plain(type) == KEY_ECDSA && curve_nid != k->ecdsa_nid) {
+ if (key_type_is_ecdsa_variant(type) && curve_nid != k->ecdsa_nid) {
sshkey_free(k);
return SSH_ERR_EC_CURVE_MISMATCH;
}
/* Fill in ret from parsed key */
ret->type = type;
if (sshkey_is_cert(ret)) {
if (!sshkey_is_cert(k)) {
sshkey_free(k);
return SSH_ERR_EXPECTED_CERT;
}
if (ret->cert != NULL)
cert_free(ret->cert);
ret->cert = k->cert;
k->cert = NULL;
}
switch (sshkey_type_plain(ret->type)) {
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
case KEY_RSA:
RSA_free(ret->rsa);
ret->rsa = k->rsa;
k->rsa = NULL;
#ifdef DEBUG_PK
RSA_print_fp(stderr, ret->rsa, 8);
#endif
break;
case KEY_DSA:
DSA_free(ret->dsa);
ret->dsa = k->dsa;
k->dsa = NULL;
#ifdef DEBUG_PK
DSA_print_fp(stderr, ret->dsa, 8);
#endif
break;
# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
case KEY_ECDSA:
EC_KEY_free(ret->ecdsa);
ret->ecdsa = k->ecdsa;
ret->ecdsa_nid = k->ecdsa_nid;
k->ecdsa = NULL;
k->ecdsa_nid = -1;
#ifdef DEBUG_PK
sshkey_dump_ec_key(ret->ecdsa);
+#endif
+ break;
+ case KEY_ECDSA_SK:
+ EC_KEY_free(ret->ecdsa);
+ ret->ecdsa = k->ecdsa;
+ ret->ecdsa_nid = k->ecdsa_nid;
+ ret->sk_application = k->sk_application;
+ k->ecdsa = NULL;
+ k->ecdsa_nid = -1;
+ k->sk_application = NULL;
+#ifdef DEBUG_PK
+ sshkey_dump_ec_key(ret->ecdsa);
+ fprintf(stderr, "App: %s\n", ret->sk_application);
#endif
break;
# endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
case KEY_ED25519:
freezero(ret->ed25519_pk, ED25519_PK_SZ);
ret->ed25519_pk = k->ed25519_pk;
k->ed25519_pk = NULL;
#ifdef DEBUG_PK
/* XXX */
#endif
break;
+ case KEY_ED25519_SK:
+ freezero(ret->ed25519_pk, ED25519_PK_SZ);
+ ret->ed25519_pk = k->ed25519_pk;
+ ret->sk_application = k->sk_application;
+ k->ed25519_pk = NULL;
+ k->sk_application = NULL;
+ break;
#ifdef WITH_XMSS
case KEY_XMSS:
free(ret->xmss_pk);
ret->xmss_pk = k->xmss_pk;
k->xmss_pk = NULL;
free(ret->xmss_state);
ret->xmss_state = k->xmss_state;
k->xmss_state = NULL;
free(ret->xmss_name);
ret->xmss_name = k->xmss_name;
k->xmss_name = NULL;
free(ret->xmss_filename);
ret->xmss_filename = k->xmss_filename;
k->xmss_filename = NULL;
#ifdef DEBUG_PK
/* XXX */
#endif
break;
#endif /* WITH_XMSS */
default:
sshkey_free(k);
return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
sshkey_free(k);
/* success */
*cpp = cp;
return 0;
}
int
sshkey_to_base64(const struct sshkey *key, char **b64p)
{
int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
char *uu = NULL;
if (b64p != NULL)
*b64p = NULL;
if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
if ((r = sshkey_putb(key, b)) != 0)
goto out;
if ((uu = sshbuf_dtob64_string(b, 0)) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
/* Success */
if (b64p != NULL) {
*b64p = uu;
uu = NULL;
}
r = 0;
out:
sshbuf_free(b);
free(uu);
return r;
}
int
sshkey_format_text(const struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *b)
{
int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
char *uu = NULL;
if ((r = sshkey_to_base64(key, &uu)) != 0)
goto out;
if ((r = sshbuf_putf(b, "%s %s",
sshkey_ssh_name(key), uu)) != 0)
goto out;
r = 0;
out:
free(uu);
return r;
}
int
sshkey_write(const struct sshkey *key, FILE *f)
{
struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
if ((r = sshkey_format_text(key, b)) != 0)
goto out;
if (fwrite(sshbuf_ptr(b), sshbuf_len(b), 1, f) != 1) {
if (feof(f))
errno = EPIPE;
r = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
goto out;
}
/* Success */
r = 0;
out:
sshbuf_free(b);
return r;
}
const char *
sshkey_cert_type(const struct sshkey *k)
{
switch (k->cert->type) {
case SSH2_CERT_TYPE_USER:
return "user";
case SSH2_CERT_TYPE_HOST:
return "host";
default:
return "unknown";
}
}
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
static int
rsa_generate_private_key(u_int bits, RSA **rsap)
{
RSA *private = NULL;
BIGNUM *f4 = NULL;
int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
if (rsap == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
if (bits < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE ||
bits > SSHBUF_MAX_BIGNUM * 8)
return SSH_ERR_KEY_LENGTH;
*rsap = NULL;
if ((private = RSA_new()) == NULL || (f4 = BN_new()) == NULL) {
ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
if (!BN_set_word(f4, RSA_F4) ||
!RSA_generate_key_ex(private, bits, f4, NULL)) {
ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
goto out;
}
*rsap = private;
private = NULL;
ret = 0;
out:
RSA_free(private);
BN_free(f4);
return ret;
}
static int
dsa_generate_private_key(u_int bits, DSA **dsap)
{
DSA *private;
int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
if (dsap == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
if (bits != 1024)
return SSH_ERR_KEY_LENGTH;
if ((private = DSA_new()) == NULL) {
ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
*dsap = NULL;
if (!DSA_generate_parameters_ex(private, bits, NULL, 0, NULL,
NULL, NULL) || !DSA_generate_key(private)) {
ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
goto out;
}
*dsap = private;
private = NULL;
ret = 0;
out:
DSA_free(private);
return ret;
}
# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
int
sshkey_ecdsa_key_to_nid(EC_KEY *k)
{
EC_GROUP *eg;
int nids[] = {
NID_X9_62_prime256v1,
NID_secp384r1,
# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521
NID_secp521r1,
# endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_NISTP521 */
-1
};
int nid;
u_int i;
- BN_CTX *bnctx;
const EC_GROUP *g = EC_KEY_get0_group(k);
/*
* The group may be stored in a ASN.1 encoded private key in one of two
* ways: as a "named group", which is reconstituted by ASN.1 object ID
* or explicit group parameters encoded into the key blob. Only the
* "named group" case sets the group NID for us, but we can figure
* it out for the other case by comparing against all the groups that
* are supported.
*/
if ((nid = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(g)) > 0)
return nid;
- if ((bnctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
- return -1;
for (i = 0; nids[i] != -1; i++) {
- if ((eg = EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(nids[i])) == NULL) {
- BN_CTX_free(bnctx);
+ if ((eg = EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(nids[i])) == NULL)
return -1;
- }
- if (EC_GROUP_cmp(g, eg, bnctx) == 0)
+ if (EC_GROUP_cmp(g, eg, NULL) == 0)
break;
EC_GROUP_free(eg);
}
- BN_CTX_free(bnctx);
if (nids[i] != -1) {
/* Use the group with the NID attached */
EC_GROUP_set_asn1_flag(eg, OPENSSL_EC_NAMED_CURVE);
if (EC_KEY_set_group(k, eg) != 1) {
EC_GROUP_free(eg);
return -1;
}
}
return nids[i];
}
static int
ecdsa_generate_private_key(u_int bits, int *nid, EC_KEY **ecdsap)
{
EC_KEY *private;
int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
if (nid == NULL || ecdsap == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
if ((*nid = sshkey_ecdsa_bits_to_nid(bits)) == -1)
return SSH_ERR_KEY_LENGTH;
*ecdsap = NULL;
if ((private = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(*nid)) == NULL) {
ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
if (EC_KEY_generate_key(private) != 1) {
ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
goto out;
}
EC_KEY_set_asn1_flag(private, OPENSSL_EC_NAMED_CURVE);
*ecdsap = private;
private = NULL;
ret = 0;
out:
EC_KEY_free(private);
return ret;
}
# endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
int
sshkey_generate(int type, u_int bits, struct sshkey **keyp)
{
struct sshkey *k;
int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
if (keyp == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
*keyp = NULL;
if ((k = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
switch (type) {
case KEY_ED25519:
if ((k->ed25519_pk = malloc(ED25519_PK_SZ)) == NULL ||
(k->ed25519_sk = malloc(ED25519_SK_SZ)) == NULL) {
ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
break;
}
crypto_sign_ed25519_keypair(k->ed25519_pk, k->ed25519_sk);
ret = 0;
break;
#ifdef WITH_XMSS
case KEY_XMSS:
ret = sshkey_xmss_generate_private_key(k, bits);
break;
#endif /* WITH_XMSS */
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
case KEY_DSA:
ret = dsa_generate_private_key(bits, &k->dsa);
break;
# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
case KEY_ECDSA:
ret = ecdsa_generate_private_key(bits, &k->ecdsa_nid,
&k->ecdsa);
break;
# endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
case KEY_RSA:
ret = rsa_generate_private_key(bits, &k->rsa);
break;
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
default:
ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
}
if (ret == 0) {
k->type = type;
*keyp = k;
} else
sshkey_free(k);
return ret;
}
int
sshkey_cert_copy(const struct sshkey *from_key, struct sshkey *to_key)
{
u_int i;
const struct sshkey_cert *from;
struct sshkey_cert *to;
int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
if (to_key == NULL || (from = from_key->cert) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
if ((to = cert_new()) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
if ((r = sshbuf_putb(to->certblob, from->certblob)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_putb(to->critical, from->critical)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_putb(to->extensions, from->extensions)) != 0)
goto out;
to->serial = from->serial;
to->type = from->type;
if (from->key_id == NULL)
to->key_id = NULL;
else if ((to->key_id = strdup(from->key_id)) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
to->valid_after = from->valid_after;
to->valid_before = from->valid_before;
if (from->signature_key == NULL)
to->signature_key = NULL;
else if ((r = sshkey_from_private(from->signature_key,
&to->signature_key)) != 0)
goto out;
if (from->signature_type != NULL &&
(to->signature_type = strdup(from->signature_type)) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
if (from->nprincipals > SSHKEY_CERT_MAX_PRINCIPALS) {
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
goto out;
}
if (from->nprincipals > 0) {
if ((to->principals = calloc(from->nprincipals,
sizeof(*to->principals))) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
for (i = 0; i < from->nprincipals; i++) {
to->principals[i] = strdup(from->principals[i]);
if (to->principals[i] == NULL) {
to->nprincipals = i;
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
}
}
to->nprincipals = from->nprincipals;
/* success */
cert_free(to_key->cert);
to_key->cert = to;
to = NULL;
r = 0;
out:
cert_free(to);
return r;
}
int
sshkey_from_private(const struct sshkey *k, struct sshkey **pkp)
{
struct sshkey *n = NULL;
int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
const BIGNUM *rsa_n, *rsa_e;
BIGNUM *rsa_n_dup = NULL, *rsa_e_dup = NULL;
const BIGNUM *dsa_p, *dsa_q, *dsa_g, *dsa_pub_key;
BIGNUM *dsa_p_dup = NULL, *dsa_q_dup = NULL, *dsa_g_dup = NULL;
BIGNUM *dsa_pub_key_dup = NULL;
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
*pkp = NULL;
+ if ((n = sshkey_new(k->type)) == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
switch (k->type) {
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
case KEY_DSA:
case KEY_DSA_CERT:
- if ((n = sshkey_new(k->type)) == NULL) {
- r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
- goto out;
- }
-
DSA_get0_pqg(k->dsa, &dsa_p, &dsa_q, &dsa_g);
DSA_get0_key(k->dsa, &dsa_pub_key, NULL);
if ((dsa_p_dup = BN_dup(dsa_p)) == NULL ||
(dsa_q_dup = BN_dup(dsa_q)) == NULL ||
(dsa_g_dup = BN_dup(dsa_g)) == NULL ||
(dsa_pub_key_dup = BN_dup(dsa_pub_key)) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
if (!DSA_set0_pqg(n->dsa, dsa_p_dup, dsa_q_dup, dsa_g_dup)) {
r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
goto out;
}
dsa_p_dup = dsa_q_dup = dsa_g_dup = NULL; /* transferred */
if (!DSA_set0_key(n->dsa, dsa_pub_key_dup, NULL)) {
r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
goto out;
}
dsa_pub_key_dup = NULL; /* transferred */
break;
# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
case KEY_ECDSA:
case KEY_ECDSA_CERT:
- if ((n = sshkey_new(k->type)) == NULL) {
- r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
- goto out;
- }
+ case KEY_ECDSA_SK:
+ case KEY_ECDSA_SK_CERT:
n->ecdsa_nid = k->ecdsa_nid;
n->ecdsa = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(k->ecdsa_nid);
if (n->ecdsa == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
if (EC_KEY_set_public_key(n->ecdsa,
EC_KEY_get0_public_key(k->ecdsa)) != 1) {
r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
goto out;
}
+ if (k->type != KEY_ECDSA_SK && k->type != KEY_ECDSA_SK_CERT)
+ break;
+ /* Append security-key application string */
+ if ((n->sk_application = strdup(k->sk_application)) == NULL)
+ goto out;
break;
# endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
case KEY_RSA:
case KEY_RSA_CERT:
- if ((n = sshkey_new(k->type)) == NULL) {
- r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
- goto out;
- }
RSA_get0_key(k->rsa, &rsa_n, &rsa_e, NULL);
if ((rsa_n_dup = BN_dup(rsa_n)) == NULL ||
(rsa_e_dup = BN_dup(rsa_e)) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
if (!RSA_set0_key(n->rsa, rsa_n_dup, rsa_e_dup, NULL)) {
r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
goto out;
}
rsa_n_dup = rsa_e_dup = NULL; /* transferred */
break;
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
case KEY_ED25519:
case KEY_ED25519_CERT:
- if ((n = sshkey_new(k->type)) == NULL) {
- r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
- goto out;
- }
+ case KEY_ED25519_SK:
+ case KEY_ED25519_SK_CERT:
if (k->ed25519_pk != NULL) {
if ((n->ed25519_pk = malloc(ED25519_PK_SZ)) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
memcpy(n->ed25519_pk, k->ed25519_pk, ED25519_PK_SZ);
}
+ if (k->type != KEY_ED25519_SK &&
+ k->type != KEY_ED25519_SK_CERT)
+ break;
+ /* Append security-key application string */
+ if ((n->sk_application = strdup(k->sk_application)) == NULL)
+ goto out;
break;
#ifdef WITH_XMSS
case KEY_XMSS:
case KEY_XMSS_CERT:
- if ((n = sshkey_new(k->type)) == NULL) {
- r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
- goto out;
- }
if ((r = sshkey_xmss_init(n, k->xmss_name)) != 0)
goto out;
if (k->xmss_pk != NULL) {
+ u_int32_t left;
size_t pklen = sshkey_xmss_pklen(k);
if (pklen == 0 || sshkey_xmss_pklen(n) != pklen) {
r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
goto out;
}
if ((n->xmss_pk = malloc(pklen)) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
memcpy(n->xmss_pk, k->xmss_pk, pklen);
+ /* simulate number of signatures left on pubkey */
+ left = sshkey_xmss_signatures_left(k);
+ if (left)
+ sshkey_xmss_enable_maxsign(n, left);
}
break;
#endif /* WITH_XMSS */
default:
r = SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN;
goto out;
}
if (sshkey_is_cert(k) && (r = sshkey_cert_copy(k, n)) != 0)
goto out;
/* success */
*pkp = n;
n = NULL;
r = 0;
out:
sshkey_free(n);
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
BN_clear_free(rsa_n_dup);
BN_clear_free(rsa_e_dup);
BN_clear_free(dsa_p_dup);
BN_clear_free(dsa_q_dup);
BN_clear_free(dsa_g_dup);
BN_clear_free(dsa_pub_key_dup);
#endif
return r;
}
int
sshkey_is_shielded(struct sshkey *k)
{
return k != NULL && k->shielded_private != NULL;
}
int
sshkey_shield_private(struct sshkey *k)
{
struct sshbuf *prvbuf = NULL;
u_char *prekey = NULL, *enc = NULL, keyiv[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
struct sshcipher_ctx *cctx = NULL;
const struct sshcipher *cipher;
size_t i, enclen = 0;
struct sshkey *kswap = NULL, tmp;
int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
#ifdef DEBUG_PK
fprintf(stderr, "%s: entering for %s\n", __func__, sshkey_ssh_name(k));
#endif
if ((cipher = cipher_by_name(SSHKEY_SHIELD_CIPHER)) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
goto out;
}
if (cipher_keylen(cipher) + cipher_ivlen(cipher) >
ssh_digest_bytes(SSHKEY_SHIELD_PREKEY_HASH)) {
r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
goto out;
}
/* Prepare a random pre-key, and from it an ephemeral key */
if ((prekey = malloc(SSHKEY_SHIELD_PREKEY_LEN)) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
arc4random_buf(prekey, SSHKEY_SHIELD_PREKEY_LEN);
if ((r = ssh_digest_memory(SSHKEY_SHIELD_PREKEY_HASH,
prekey, SSHKEY_SHIELD_PREKEY_LEN,
keyiv, SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH)) != 0)
goto out;
#ifdef DEBUG_PK
fprintf(stderr, "%s: key+iv\n", __func__);
sshbuf_dump_data(keyiv, ssh_digest_bytes(SSHKEY_SHIELD_PREKEY_HASH),
stderr);
#endif
if ((r = cipher_init(&cctx, cipher, keyiv, cipher_keylen(cipher),
keyiv + cipher_keylen(cipher), cipher_ivlen(cipher), 1)) != 0)
goto out;
/* Serialise and encrypt the private key using the ephemeral key */
if ((prvbuf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
if (sshkey_is_shielded(k) && (r = sshkey_unshield_private(k)) != 0)
goto out;
if ((r = sshkey_private_serialize_opt(k, prvbuf,
- SSHKEY_SERIALIZE_FULL)) != 0)
+ SSHKEY_SERIALIZE_SHIELD)) != 0)
goto out;
/* pad to cipher blocksize */
i = 0;
while (sshbuf_len(prvbuf) % cipher_blocksize(cipher)) {
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(prvbuf, ++i & 0xff)) != 0)
goto out;
}
#ifdef DEBUG_PK
fprintf(stderr, "%s: serialised\n", __func__);
sshbuf_dump(prvbuf, stderr);
#endif
/* encrypt */
enclen = sshbuf_len(prvbuf);
if ((enc = malloc(enclen)) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
if ((r = cipher_crypt(cctx, 0, enc,
sshbuf_ptr(prvbuf), sshbuf_len(prvbuf), 0, 0)) != 0)
goto out;
#ifdef DEBUG_PK
fprintf(stderr, "%s: encrypted\n", __func__);
sshbuf_dump_data(enc, enclen, stderr);
#endif
/* Make a scrubbed, public-only copy of our private key argument */
if ((r = sshkey_from_private(k, &kswap)) != 0)
goto out;
/* Swap the private key out (it will be destroyed below) */
tmp = *kswap;
*kswap = *k;
*k = tmp;
/* Insert the shielded key into our argument */
k->shielded_private = enc;
k->shielded_len = enclen;
k->shield_prekey = prekey;
k->shield_prekey_len = SSHKEY_SHIELD_PREKEY_LEN;
enc = prekey = NULL; /* transferred */
enclen = 0;
+ /* preserve key fields that are required for correct operation */
+ k->sk_flags = kswap->sk_flags;
+
/* success */
r = 0;
out:
/* XXX behaviour on error - invalidate original private key? */
cipher_free(cctx);
explicit_bzero(keyiv, sizeof(keyiv));
explicit_bzero(&tmp, sizeof(tmp));
freezero(enc, enclen);
freezero(prekey, SSHKEY_SHIELD_PREKEY_LEN);
sshkey_free(kswap);
sshbuf_free(prvbuf);
return r;
}
int
sshkey_unshield_private(struct sshkey *k)
{
struct sshbuf *prvbuf = NULL;
u_char pad, *cp, keyiv[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
struct sshcipher_ctx *cctx = NULL;
const struct sshcipher *cipher;
size_t i;
struct sshkey *kswap = NULL, tmp;
int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
#ifdef DEBUG_PK
fprintf(stderr, "%s: entering for %s\n", __func__, sshkey_ssh_name(k));
#endif
if (!sshkey_is_shielded(k))
return 0; /* nothing to do */
if ((cipher = cipher_by_name(SSHKEY_SHIELD_CIPHER)) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
goto out;
}
if (cipher_keylen(cipher) + cipher_ivlen(cipher) >
ssh_digest_bytes(SSHKEY_SHIELD_PREKEY_HASH)) {
r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
goto out;
}
/* check size of shielded key blob */
if (k->shielded_len < cipher_blocksize(cipher) ||
(k->shielded_len % cipher_blocksize(cipher)) != 0) {
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
/* Calculate the ephemeral key from the prekey */
if ((r = ssh_digest_memory(SSHKEY_SHIELD_PREKEY_HASH,
k->shield_prekey, k->shield_prekey_len,
keyiv, SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH)) != 0)
goto out;
if ((r = cipher_init(&cctx, cipher, keyiv, cipher_keylen(cipher),
keyiv + cipher_keylen(cipher), cipher_ivlen(cipher), 0)) != 0)
goto out;
#ifdef DEBUG_PK
fprintf(stderr, "%s: key+iv\n", __func__);
sshbuf_dump_data(keyiv, ssh_digest_bytes(SSHKEY_SHIELD_PREKEY_HASH),
stderr);
#endif
/* Decrypt and parse the shielded private key using the ephemeral key */
if ((prvbuf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(prvbuf, k->shielded_len, &cp)) != 0)
goto out;
/* decrypt */
#ifdef DEBUG_PK
fprintf(stderr, "%s: encrypted\n", __func__);
sshbuf_dump_data(k->shielded_private, k->shielded_len, stderr);
#endif
if ((r = cipher_crypt(cctx, 0, cp,
k->shielded_private, k->shielded_len, 0, 0)) != 0)
goto out;
#ifdef DEBUG_PK
fprintf(stderr, "%s: serialised\n", __func__);
sshbuf_dump(prvbuf, stderr);
#endif
/* Parse private key */
if ((r = sshkey_private_deserialize(prvbuf, &kswap)) != 0)
goto out;
/* Check deterministic padding */
i = 0;
while (sshbuf_len(prvbuf)) {
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(prvbuf, &pad)) != 0)
goto out;
if (pad != (++i & 0xff)) {
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
}
/* Swap the parsed key back into place */
tmp = *kswap;
*kswap = *k;
*k = tmp;
/* success */
r = 0;
out:
cipher_free(cctx);
explicit_bzero(keyiv, sizeof(keyiv));
explicit_bzero(&tmp, sizeof(tmp));
sshkey_free(kswap);
sshbuf_free(prvbuf);
return r;
}
static int
cert_parse(struct sshbuf *b, struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *certbuf)
{
struct sshbuf *principals = NULL, *crit = NULL;
struct sshbuf *exts = NULL, *ca = NULL;
u_char *sig = NULL;
size_t signed_len = 0, slen = 0, kidlen = 0;
int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
/* Copy the entire key blob for verification and later serialisation */
if ((ret = sshbuf_putb(key->cert->certblob, certbuf)) != 0)
return ret;
/* Parse body of certificate up to signature */
if ((ret = sshbuf_get_u64(b, &key->cert->serial)) != 0 ||
(ret = sshbuf_get_u32(b, &key->cert->type)) != 0 ||
(ret = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &key->cert->key_id, &kidlen)) != 0 ||
(ret = sshbuf_froms(b, &principals)) != 0 ||
(ret = sshbuf_get_u64(b, &key->cert->valid_after)) != 0 ||
(ret = sshbuf_get_u64(b, &key->cert->valid_before)) != 0 ||
(ret = sshbuf_froms(b, &crit)) != 0 ||
(ret = sshbuf_froms(b, &exts)) != 0 ||
(ret = sshbuf_get_string_direct(b, NULL, NULL)) != 0 ||
(ret = sshbuf_froms(b, &ca)) != 0) {
/* XXX debug print error for ret */
ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
/* Signature is left in the buffer so we can calculate this length */
signed_len = sshbuf_len(key->cert->certblob) - sshbuf_len(b);
if ((ret = sshbuf_get_string(b, &sig, &slen)) != 0) {
ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
if (key->cert->type != SSH2_CERT_TYPE_USER &&
key->cert->type != SSH2_CERT_TYPE_HOST) {
ret = SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_UNKNOWN_TYPE;
goto out;
}
/* Parse principals section */
while (sshbuf_len(principals) > 0) {
char *principal = NULL;
char **oprincipals = NULL;
if (key->cert->nprincipals >= SSHKEY_CERT_MAX_PRINCIPALS) {
ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
if ((ret = sshbuf_get_cstring(principals, &principal,
NULL)) != 0) {
ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
oprincipals = key->cert->principals;
key->cert->principals = recallocarray(key->cert->principals,
key->cert->nprincipals, key->cert->nprincipals + 1,
sizeof(*key->cert->principals));
if (key->cert->principals == NULL) {
free(principal);
key->cert->principals = oprincipals;
ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
key->cert->principals[key->cert->nprincipals++] = principal;
}
/*
* Stash a copies of the critical options and extensions sections
* for later use.
*/
if ((ret = sshbuf_putb(key->cert->critical, crit)) != 0 ||
(exts != NULL &&
(ret = sshbuf_putb(key->cert->extensions, exts)) != 0))
goto out;
/*
* Validate critical options and extensions sections format.
*/
while (sshbuf_len(crit) != 0) {
if ((ret = sshbuf_get_string_direct(crit, NULL, NULL)) != 0 ||
(ret = sshbuf_get_string_direct(crit, NULL, NULL)) != 0) {
sshbuf_reset(key->cert->critical);
ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
}
while (exts != NULL && sshbuf_len(exts) != 0) {
if ((ret = sshbuf_get_string_direct(exts, NULL, NULL)) != 0 ||
(ret = sshbuf_get_string_direct(exts, NULL, NULL)) != 0) {
sshbuf_reset(key->cert->extensions);
ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
}
/* Parse CA key and check signature */
if (sshkey_from_blob_internal(ca, &key->cert->signature_key, 0) != 0) {
ret = SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_INVALID_SIGN_KEY;
goto out;
}
if (!sshkey_type_is_valid_ca(key->cert->signature_key->type)) {
ret = SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_INVALID_SIGN_KEY;
goto out;
}
if ((ret = sshkey_verify(key->cert->signature_key, sig, slen,
- sshbuf_ptr(key->cert->certblob), signed_len, NULL, 0)) != 0)
+ sshbuf_ptr(key->cert->certblob), signed_len, NULL, 0, NULL)) != 0)
goto out;
if ((ret = sshkey_get_sigtype(sig, slen,
&key->cert->signature_type)) != 0)
goto out;
/* Success */
ret = 0;
out:
sshbuf_free(ca);
sshbuf_free(crit);
sshbuf_free(exts);
sshbuf_free(principals);
free(sig);
return ret;
}
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
static int
check_rsa_length(const RSA *rsa)
{
const BIGNUM *rsa_n;
RSA_get0_key(rsa, &rsa_n, NULL, NULL);
if (BN_num_bits(rsa_n) < SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE)
return SSH_ERR_KEY_LENGTH;
return 0;
}
#endif
static int
sshkey_from_blob_internal(struct sshbuf *b, struct sshkey **keyp,
int allow_cert)
{
int type, ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
char *ktype = NULL, *curve = NULL, *xmss_name = NULL;
struct sshkey *key = NULL;
size_t len;
u_char *pk = NULL;
struct sshbuf *copy;
#if defined(WITH_OPENSSL)
BIGNUM *rsa_n = NULL, *rsa_e = NULL;
BIGNUM *dsa_p = NULL, *dsa_q = NULL, *dsa_g = NULL, *dsa_pub_key = NULL;
# if defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC)
EC_POINT *q = NULL;
# endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
#ifdef DEBUG_PK /* XXX */
sshbuf_dump(b, stderr);
#endif
if (keyp != NULL)
*keyp = NULL;
if ((copy = sshbuf_fromb(b)) == NULL) {
ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
if (sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &ktype, NULL) != 0) {
ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
type = sshkey_type_from_name(ktype);
if (!allow_cert && sshkey_type_is_cert(type)) {
ret = SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_INVALID_SIGN_KEY;
goto out;
}
switch (type) {
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
case KEY_RSA_CERT:
/* Skip nonce */
if (sshbuf_get_string_direct(b, NULL, NULL) != 0) {
ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
/* FALLTHROUGH */
case KEY_RSA:
if ((key = sshkey_new(type)) == NULL) {
ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
if (sshbuf_get_bignum2(b, &rsa_e) != 0 ||
sshbuf_get_bignum2(b, &rsa_n) != 0) {
ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
if (!RSA_set0_key(key->rsa, rsa_n, rsa_e, NULL)) {
ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
goto out;
}
rsa_n = rsa_e = NULL; /* transferred */
if ((ret = check_rsa_length(key->rsa)) != 0)
goto out;
#ifdef DEBUG_PK
RSA_print_fp(stderr, key->rsa, 8);
#endif
break;
case KEY_DSA_CERT:
/* Skip nonce */
if (sshbuf_get_string_direct(b, NULL, NULL) != 0) {
ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
/* FALLTHROUGH */
case KEY_DSA:
if ((key = sshkey_new(type)) == NULL) {
ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
if (sshbuf_get_bignum2(b, &dsa_p) != 0 ||
sshbuf_get_bignum2(b, &dsa_q) != 0 ||
sshbuf_get_bignum2(b, &dsa_g) != 0 ||
sshbuf_get_bignum2(b, &dsa_pub_key) != 0) {
ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
if (!DSA_set0_pqg(key->dsa, dsa_p, dsa_q, dsa_g)) {
ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
goto out;
}
dsa_p = dsa_q = dsa_g = NULL; /* transferred */
if (!DSA_set0_key(key->dsa, dsa_pub_key, NULL)) {
ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
goto out;
}
dsa_pub_key = NULL; /* transferred */
#ifdef DEBUG_PK
DSA_print_fp(stderr, key->dsa, 8);
#endif
break;
+# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
case KEY_ECDSA_CERT:
+ case KEY_ECDSA_SK_CERT:
/* Skip nonce */
if (sshbuf_get_string_direct(b, NULL, NULL) != 0) {
ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
/* FALLTHROUGH */
-# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
case KEY_ECDSA:
+ case KEY_ECDSA_SK:
if ((key = sshkey_new(type)) == NULL) {
ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
key->ecdsa_nid = sshkey_ecdsa_nid_from_name(ktype);
if (sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &curve, NULL) != 0) {
ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
if (key->ecdsa_nid != sshkey_curve_name_to_nid(curve)) {
ret = SSH_ERR_EC_CURVE_MISMATCH;
goto out;
}
EC_KEY_free(key->ecdsa);
if ((key->ecdsa = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(key->ecdsa_nid))
== NULL) {
ret = SSH_ERR_EC_CURVE_INVALID;
goto out;
}
if ((q = EC_POINT_new(EC_KEY_get0_group(key->ecdsa))) == NULL) {
ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
if (sshbuf_get_ec(b, q, EC_KEY_get0_group(key->ecdsa)) != 0) {
ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
if (sshkey_ec_validate_public(EC_KEY_get0_group(key->ecdsa),
q) != 0) {
ret = SSH_ERR_KEY_INVALID_EC_VALUE;
goto out;
}
if (EC_KEY_set_public_key(key->ecdsa, q) != 1) {
/* XXX assume it is a allocation error */
ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
#ifdef DEBUG_PK
sshkey_dump_ec_point(EC_KEY_get0_group(key->ecdsa), q);
#endif
+ if (type == KEY_ECDSA_SK || type == KEY_ECDSA_SK_CERT) {
+ /* Parse additional security-key application string */
+ if (sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &key->sk_application,
+ NULL) != 0) {
+ ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+#ifdef DEBUG_PK
+ fprintf(stderr, "App: %s\n", key->sk_application);
+#endif
+ }
break;
# endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
case KEY_ED25519_CERT:
+ case KEY_ED25519_SK_CERT:
/* Skip nonce */
if (sshbuf_get_string_direct(b, NULL, NULL) != 0) {
ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
/* FALLTHROUGH */
case KEY_ED25519:
+ case KEY_ED25519_SK:
if ((ret = sshbuf_get_string(b, &pk, &len)) != 0)
goto out;
if (len != ED25519_PK_SZ) {
ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
if ((key = sshkey_new(type)) == NULL) {
ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
+ if (type == KEY_ED25519_SK || type == KEY_ED25519_SK_CERT) {
+ /* Parse additional security-key application string */
+ if (sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &key->sk_application,
+ NULL) != 0) {
+ ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+#ifdef DEBUG_PK
+ fprintf(stderr, "App: %s\n", key->sk_application);
+#endif
+ }
key->ed25519_pk = pk;
pk = NULL;
break;
#ifdef WITH_XMSS
case KEY_XMSS_CERT:
/* Skip nonce */
if (sshbuf_get_string_direct(b, NULL, NULL) != 0) {
ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
/* FALLTHROUGH */
case KEY_XMSS:
if ((ret = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &xmss_name, NULL)) != 0)
goto out;
if ((key = sshkey_new(type)) == NULL) {
ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
if ((ret = sshkey_xmss_init(key, xmss_name)) != 0)
goto out;
if ((ret = sshbuf_get_string(b, &pk, &len)) != 0)
goto out;
if (len == 0 || len != sshkey_xmss_pklen(key)) {
ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
key->xmss_pk = pk;
pk = NULL;
if (type != KEY_XMSS_CERT &&
(ret = sshkey_xmss_deserialize_pk_info(key, b)) != 0)
goto out;
break;
#endif /* WITH_XMSS */
case KEY_UNSPEC:
default:
ret = SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN;
goto out;
}
/* Parse certificate potion */
if (sshkey_is_cert(key) && (ret = cert_parse(b, key, copy)) != 0)
goto out;
if (key != NULL && sshbuf_len(b) != 0) {
ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
ret = 0;
if (keyp != NULL) {
*keyp = key;
key = NULL;
}
out:
sshbuf_free(copy);
sshkey_free(key);
free(xmss_name);
free(ktype);
free(curve);
free(pk);
#if defined(WITH_OPENSSL)
BN_clear_free(rsa_n);
BN_clear_free(rsa_e);
BN_clear_free(dsa_p);
BN_clear_free(dsa_q);
BN_clear_free(dsa_g);
BN_clear_free(dsa_pub_key);
# if defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC)
EC_POINT_free(q);
# endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
return ret;
}
int
sshkey_from_blob(const u_char *blob, size_t blen, struct sshkey **keyp)
{
struct sshbuf *b;
int r;
if ((b = sshbuf_from(blob, blen)) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
r = sshkey_from_blob_internal(b, keyp, 1);
sshbuf_free(b);
return r;
}
int
sshkey_fromb(struct sshbuf *b, struct sshkey **keyp)
{
return sshkey_from_blob_internal(b, keyp, 1);
}
int
sshkey_froms(struct sshbuf *buf, struct sshkey **keyp)
{
struct sshbuf *b;
int r;
if ((r = sshbuf_froms(buf, &b)) != 0)
return r;
r = sshkey_from_blob_internal(b, keyp, 1);
sshbuf_free(b);
return r;
}
int
sshkey_get_sigtype(const u_char *sig, size_t siglen, char **sigtypep)
{
int r;
struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
char *sigtype = NULL;
if (sigtypep != NULL)
*sigtypep = NULL;
if ((b = sshbuf_from(sig, siglen)) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(b, &sigtype, NULL)) != 0)
goto out;
/* success */
if (sigtypep != NULL) {
*sigtypep = sigtype;
sigtype = NULL;
}
r = 0;
out:
free(sigtype);
sshbuf_free(b);
return r;
}
/*
*
* Checks whether a certificate's signature type is allowed.
* Returns 0 (success) if the certificate signature type appears in the
* "allowed" pattern-list, or the key is not a certificate to begin with.
* Otherwise returns a ssherr.h code.
*/
int
sshkey_check_cert_sigtype(const struct sshkey *key, const char *allowed)
{
if (key == NULL || allowed == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
if (!sshkey_type_is_cert(key->type))
return 0;
if (key->cert == NULL || key->cert->signature_type == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
if (match_pattern_list(key->cert->signature_type, allowed, 0) != 1)
return SSH_ERR_SIGN_ALG_UNSUPPORTED;
return 0;
}
/*
* Returns the expected signature algorithm for a given public key algorithm.
*/
const char *
sshkey_sigalg_by_name(const char *name)
{
const struct keytype *kt;
for (kt = keytypes; kt->type != -1; kt++) {
if (strcmp(kt->name, name) != 0)
continue;
if (kt->sigalg != NULL)
return kt->sigalg;
if (!kt->cert)
return kt->name;
return sshkey_ssh_name_from_type_nid(
sshkey_type_plain(kt->type), kt->nid);
}
return NULL;
}
/*
* Verifies that the signature algorithm appearing inside the signature blob
* matches that which was requested.
*/
int
sshkey_check_sigtype(const u_char *sig, size_t siglen,
const char *requested_alg)
{
const char *expected_alg;
char *sigtype = NULL;
int r;
if (requested_alg == NULL)
return 0;
if ((expected_alg = sshkey_sigalg_by_name(requested_alg)) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
if ((r = sshkey_get_sigtype(sig, siglen, &sigtype)) != 0)
return r;
r = strcmp(expected_alg, sigtype) == 0;
free(sigtype);
return r ? 0 : SSH_ERR_SIGN_ALG_UNSUPPORTED;
}
int
sshkey_sign(struct sshkey *key,
u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
- const u_char *data, size_t datalen, const char *alg, u_int compat)
+ const u_char *data, size_t datalen,
+ const char *alg, const char *sk_provider, u_int compat)
{
int was_shielded = sshkey_is_shielded(key);
int r2, r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
if (sigp != NULL)
*sigp = NULL;
if (lenp != NULL)
*lenp = 0;
if (datalen > SSH_KEY_MAX_SIGN_DATA_SIZE)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
if ((r = sshkey_unshield_private(key)) != 0)
return r;
switch (key->type) {
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
case KEY_DSA_CERT:
case KEY_DSA:
r = ssh_dss_sign(key, sigp, lenp, data, datalen, compat);
break;
# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
case KEY_ECDSA_CERT:
case KEY_ECDSA:
r = ssh_ecdsa_sign(key, sigp, lenp, data, datalen, compat);
break;
# endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
case KEY_RSA_CERT:
case KEY_RSA:
r = ssh_rsa_sign(key, sigp, lenp, data, datalen, alg);
break;
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
case KEY_ED25519:
case KEY_ED25519_CERT:
r = ssh_ed25519_sign(key, sigp, lenp, data, datalen, compat);
break;
+ case KEY_ED25519_SK:
+ case KEY_ED25519_SK_CERT:
+ case KEY_ECDSA_SK_CERT:
+ case KEY_ECDSA_SK:
+ r = sshsk_sign(sk_provider, key, sigp, lenp, data,
+ datalen, compat, /* XXX PIN */ NULL);
+ break;
#ifdef WITH_XMSS
case KEY_XMSS:
case KEY_XMSS_CERT:
r = ssh_xmss_sign(key, sigp, lenp, data, datalen, compat);
break;
#endif /* WITH_XMSS */
default:
r = SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN;
break;
}
if (was_shielded && (r2 = sshkey_shield_private(key)) != 0)
return r2;
return r;
}
/*
* ssh_key_verify returns 0 for a correct signature and < 0 on error.
* If "alg" specified, then the signature must use that algorithm.
*/
int
sshkey_verify(const struct sshkey *key,
const u_char *sig, size_t siglen,
- const u_char *data, size_t dlen, const char *alg, u_int compat)
+ const u_char *data, size_t dlen, const char *alg, u_int compat,
+ struct sshkey_sig_details **detailsp)
{
+ if (detailsp != NULL)
+ *detailsp = NULL;
if (siglen == 0 || dlen > SSH_KEY_MAX_SIGN_DATA_SIZE)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
switch (key->type) {
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
case KEY_DSA_CERT:
case KEY_DSA:
return ssh_dss_verify(key, sig, siglen, data, dlen, compat);
# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
case KEY_ECDSA_CERT:
case KEY_ECDSA:
return ssh_ecdsa_verify(key, sig, siglen, data, dlen, compat);
+ case KEY_ECDSA_SK_CERT:
+ case KEY_ECDSA_SK:
+ return ssh_ecdsa_sk_verify(key, sig, siglen, data, dlen,
+ compat, detailsp);
# endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
case KEY_RSA_CERT:
case KEY_RSA:
return ssh_rsa_verify(key, sig, siglen, data, dlen, alg);
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
case KEY_ED25519:
case KEY_ED25519_CERT:
return ssh_ed25519_verify(key, sig, siglen, data, dlen, compat);
+ case KEY_ED25519_SK:
+ case KEY_ED25519_SK_CERT:
+ return ssh_ed25519_sk_verify(key, sig, siglen, data, dlen,
+ compat, detailsp);
#ifdef WITH_XMSS
case KEY_XMSS:
case KEY_XMSS_CERT:
return ssh_xmss_verify(key, sig, siglen, data, dlen, compat);
#endif /* WITH_XMSS */
default:
return SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN;
}
}
/* Convert a plain key to their _CERT equivalent */
int
sshkey_to_certified(struct sshkey *k)
{
int newtype;
switch (k->type) {
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
case KEY_RSA:
newtype = KEY_RSA_CERT;
break;
case KEY_DSA:
newtype = KEY_DSA_CERT;
break;
case KEY_ECDSA:
newtype = KEY_ECDSA_CERT;
break;
+ case KEY_ECDSA_SK:
+ newtype = KEY_ECDSA_SK_CERT;
+ break;
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
+ case KEY_ED25519_SK:
+ newtype = KEY_ED25519_SK_CERT;
+ break;
case KEY_ED25519:
newtype = KEY_ED25519_CERT;
break;
#ifdef WITH_XMSS
case KEY_XMSS:
newtype = KEY_XMSS_CERT;
break;
#endif /* WITH_XMSS */
default:
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
}
if ((k->cert = cert_new()) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
k->type = newtype;
return 0;
}
/* Convert a certificate to its raw key equivalent */
int
sshkey_drop_cert(struct sshkey *k)
{
if (!sshkey_type_is_cert(k->type))
return SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN;
cert_free(k->cert);
k->cert = NULL;
k->type = sshkey_type_plain(k->type);
return 0;
}
/* Sign a certified key, (re-)generating the signed certblob. */
int
sshkey_certify_custom(struct sshkey *k, struct sshkey *ca, const char *alg,
- sshkey_certify_signer *signer, void *signer_ctx)
+ const char *sk_provider, sshkey_certify_signer *signer, void *signer_ctx)
{
struct sshbuf *principals = NULL;
u_char *ca_blob = NULL, *sig_blob = NULL, nonce[32];
size_t i, ca_len, sig_len;
int ret = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
struct sshbuf *cert = NULL;
char *sigtype = NULL;
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
const BIGNUM *rsa_n, *rsa_e, *dsa_p, *dsa_q, *dsa_g, *dsa_pub_key;
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
if (k == NULL || k->cert == NULL ||
k->cert->certblob == NULL || ca == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
if (!sshkey_is_cert(k))
return SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN;
if (!sshkey_type_is_valid_ca(ca->type))
return SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_INVALID_SIGN_KEY;
/*
* If no alg specified as argument but a signature_type was set,
* then prefer that. If both were specified, then they must match.
*/
if (alg == NULL)
alg = k->cert->signature_type;
else if (k->cert->signature_type != NULL &&
strcmp(alg, k->cert->signature_type) != 0)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
/*
* If no signing algorithm or signature_type was specified and we're
* using a RSA key, then default to a good signature algorithm.
*/
if (alg == NULL && ca->type == KEY_RSA)
alg = "rsa-sha2-512";
if ((ret = sshkey_to_blob(ca, &ca_blob, &ca_len)) != 0)
return SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_INVALID_SIGN_KEY;
cert = k->cert->certblob; /* for readability */
sshbuf_reset(cert);
if ((ret = sshbuf_put_cstring(cert, sshkey_ssh_name(k))) != 0)
goto out;
/* -v01 certs put nonce first */
arc4random_buf(&nonce, sizeof(nonce));
if ((ret = sshbuf_put_string(cert, nonce, sizeof(nonce))) != 0)
goto out;
/* XXX this substantially duplicates to_blob(); refactor */
switch (k->type) {
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
case KEY_DSA_CERT:
DSA_get0_pqg(k->dsa, &dsa_p, &dsa_q, &dsa_g);
DSA_get0_key(k->dsa, &dsa_pub_key, NULL);
if ((ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2(cert, dsa_p)) != 0 ||
(ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2(cert, dsa_q)) != 0 ||
(ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2(cert, dsa_g)) != 0 ||
(ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2(cert, dsa_pub_key)) != 0)
goto out;
break;
# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
case KEY_ECDSA_CERT:
+ case KEY_ECDSA_SK_CERT:
if ((ret = sshbuf_put_cstring(cert,
sshkey_curve_nid_to_name(k->ecdsa_nid))) != 0 ||
(ret = sshbuf_put_ec(cert,
EC_KEY_get0_public_key(k->ecdsa),
EC_KEY_get0_group(k->ecdsa))) != 0)
goto out;
+ if (k->type == KEY_ECDSA_SK_CERT) {
+ if ((ret = sshbuf_put_cstring(cert,
+ k->sk_application)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ }
break;
# endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
case KEY_RSA_CERT:
RSA_get0_key(k->rsa, &rsa_n, &rsa_e, NULL);
if ((ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2(cert, rsa_e)) != 0 ||
(ret = sshbuf_put_bignum2(cert, rsa_n)) != 0)
goto out;
break;
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
case KEY_ED25519_CERT:
+ case KEY_ED25519_SK_CERT:
if ((ret = sshbuf_put_string(cert,
k->ed25519_pk, ED25519_PK_SZ)) != 0)
goto out;
+ if (k->type == KEY_ED25519_SK_CERT) {
+ if ((ret = sshbuf_put_cstring(cert,
+ k->sk_application)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ }
break;
#ifdef WITH_XMSS
case KEY_XMSS_CERT:
if (k->xmss_name == NULL) {
ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
goto out;
}
if ((ret = sshbuf_put_cstring(cert, k->xmss_name)) ||
(ret = sshbuf_put_string(cert,
k->xmss_pk, sshkey_xmss_pklen(k))) != 0)
goto out;
break;
#endif /* WITH_XMSS */
default:
ret = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
goto out;
}
if ((ret = sshbuf_put_u64(cert, k->cert->serial)) != 0 ||
(ret = sshbuf_put_u32(cert, k->cert->type)) != 0 ||
(ret = sshbuf_put_cstring(cert, k->cert->key_id)) != 0)
goto out;
if ((principals = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
for (i = 0; i < k->cert->nprincipals; i++) {
if ((ret = sshbuf_put_cstring(principals,
k->cert->principals[i])) != 0)
goto out;
}
if ((ret = sshbuf_put_stringb(cert, principals)) != 0 ||
(ret = sshbuf_put_u64(cert, k->cert->valid_after)) != 0 ||
(ret = sshbuf_put_u64(cert, k->cert->valid_before)) != 0 ||
(ret = sshbuf_put_stringb(cert, k->cert->critical)) != 0 ||
(ret = sshbuf_put_stringb(cert, k->cert->extensions)) != 0 ||
(ret = sshbuf_put_string(cert, NULL, 0)) != 0 || /* Reserved */
(ret = sshbuf_put_string(cert, ca_blob, ca_len)) != 0)
goto out;
/* Sign the whole mess */
if ((ret = signer(ca, &sig_blob, &sig_len, sshbuf_ptr(cert),
- sshbuf_len(cert), alg, 0, signer_ctx)) != 0)
+ sshbuf_len(cert), alg, sk_provider, 0, signer_ctx)) != 0)
goto out;
/* Check and update signature_type against what was actually used */
if ((ret = sshkey_get_sigtype(sig_blob, sig_len, &sigtype)) != 0)
goto out;
if (alg != NULL && strcmp(alg, sigtype) != 0) {
ret = SSH_ERR_SIGN_ALG_UNSUPPORTED;
goto out;
}
if (k->cert->signature_type == NULL) {
k->cert->signature_type = sigtype;
sigtype = NULL;
}
/* Append signature and we are done */
if ((ret = sshbuf_put_string(cert, sig_blob, sig_len)) != 0)
goto out;
ret = 0;
out:
if (ret != 0)
sshbuf_reset(cert);
free(sig_blob);
free(ca_blob);
free(sigtype);
sshbuf_free(principals);
return ret;
}
static int
default_key_sign(struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
const u_char *data, size_t datalen,
- const char *alg, u_int compat, void *ctx)
+ const char *alg, const char *sk_provider, u_int compat, void *ctx)
{
if (ctx != NULL)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
- return sshkey_sign(key, sigp, lenp, data, datalen, alg, compat);
+ return sshkey_sign(key, sigp, lenp, data, datalen, alg,
+ sk_provider, compat);
}
int
-sshkey_certify(struct sshkey *k, struct sshkey *ca, const char *alg)
+sshkey_certify(struct sshkey *k, struct sshkey *ca, const char *alg,
+ const char *sk_provider)
{
- return sshkey_certify_custom(k, ca, alg, default_key_sign, NULL);
+ return sshkey_certify_custom(k, ca, alg, sk_provider,
+ default_key_sign, NULL);
}
int
sshkey_cert_check_authority(const struct sshkey *k,
int want_host, int require_principal,
const char *name, const char **reason)
{
u_int i, principal_matches;
time_t now = time(NULL);
if (reason != NULL)
*reason = NULL;
if (want_host) {
if (k->cert->type != SSH2_CERT_TYPE_HOST) {
*reason = "Certificate invalid: not a host certificate";
return SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_INVALID;
}
} else {
if (k->cert->type != SSH2_CERT_TYPE_USER) {
*reason = "Certificate invalid: not a user certificate";
return SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_INVALID;
}
}
if (now < 0) {
/* yikes - system clock before epoch! */
*reason = "Certificate invalid: not yet valid";
return SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_INVALID;
}
if ((u_int64_t)now < k->cert->valid_after) {
*reason = "Certificate invalid: not yet valid";
return SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_INVALID;
}
if ((u_int64_t)now >= k->cert->valid_before) {
*reason = "Certificate invalid: expired";
return SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_INVALID;
}
if (k->cert->nprincipals == 0) {
if (require_principal) {
*reason = "Certificate lacks principal list";
return SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_INVALID;
}
} else if (name != NULL) {
principal_matches = 0;
for (i = 0; i < k->cert->nprincipals; i++) {
if (strcmp(name, k->cert->principals[i]) == 0) {
principal_matches = 1;
break;
}
}
if (!principal_matches) {
*reason = "Certificate invalid: name is not a listed "
"principal";
return SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_INVALID;
}
}
return 0;
}
size_t
sshkey_format_cert_validity(const struct sshkey_cert *cert, char *s, size_t l)
{
char from[32], to[32], ret[64];
time_t tt;
struct tm *tm;
*from = *to = '\0';
if (cert->valid_after == 0 &&
cert->valid_before == 0xffffffffffffffffULL)
return strlcpy(s, "forever", l);
if (cert->valid_after != 0) {
/* XXX revisit INT_MAX in 2038 :) */
tt = cert->valid_after > INT_MAX ?
INT_MAX : cert->valid_after;
tm = localtime(&tt);
strftime(from, sizeof(from), "%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S", tm);
}
if (cert->valid_before != 0xffffffffffffffffULL) {
/* XXX revisit INT_MAX in 2038 :) */
tt = cert->valid_before > INT_MAX ?
INT_MAX : cert->valid_before;
tm = localtime(&tt);
strftime(to, sizeof(to), "%Y-%m-%dT%H:%M:%S", tm);
}
if (cert->valid_after == 0)
snprintf(ret, sizeof(ret), "before %s", to);
else if (cert->valid_before == 0xffffffffffffffffULL)
snprintf(ret, sizeof(ret), "after %s", from);
else
snprintf(ret, sizeof(ret), "from %s to %s", from, to);
return strlcpy(s, ret, l);
}
int
sshkey_private_serialize_opt(struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *buf,
enum sshkey_serialize_rep opts)
{
int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
int was_shielded = sshkey_is_shielded(key);
struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
const BIGNUM *rsa_n, *rsa_e, *rsa_d, *rsa_iqmp, *rsa_p, *rsa_q;
const BIGNUM *dsa_p, *dsa_q, *dsa_g, *dsa_pub_key, *dsa_priv_key;
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
if ((r = sshkey_unshield_private(key)) != 0)
return r;
if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, sshkey_ssh_name(key))) != 0)
goto out;
switch (key->type) {
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
case KEY_RSA:
RSA_get0_key(key->rsa, &rsa_n, &rsa_e, &rsa_d);
RSA_get0_factors(key->rsa, &rsa_p, &rsa_q);
RSA_get0_crt_params(key->rsa, NULL, NULL, &rsa_iqmp);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, rsa_n)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, rsa_e)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, rsa_d)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, rsa_iqmp)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, rsa_p)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, rsa_q)) != 0)
goto out;
break;
case KEY_RSA_CERT:
if (key->cert == NULL || sshbuf_len(key->cert->certblob) == 0) {
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
goto out;
}
RSA_get0_key(key->rsa, NULL, NULL, &rsa_d);
RSA_get0_factors(key->rsa, &rsa_p, &rsa_q);
RSA_get0_crt_params(key->rsa, NULL, NULL, &rsa_iqmp);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(b, key->cert->certblob)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, rsa_d)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, rsa_iqmp)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, rsa_p)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, rsa_q)) != 0)
goto out;
break;
case KEY_DSA:
DSA_get0_pqg(key->dsa, &dsa_p, &dsa_q, &dsa_g);
DSA_get0_key(key->dsa, &dsa_pub_key, &dsa_priv_key);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, dsa_p)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, dsa_q)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, dsa_g)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, dsa_pub_key)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, dsa_priv_key)) != 0)
goto out;
break;
case KEY_DSA_CERT:
if (key->cert == NULL || sshbuf_len(key->cert->certblob) == 0) {
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
goto out;
}
DSA_get0_key(key->dsa, NULL, &dsa_priv_key);
if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(b, key->cert->certblob)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b, dsa_priv_key)) != 0)
goto out;
break;
# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
case KEY_ECDSA:
if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b,
sshkey_curve_nid_to_name(key->ecdsa_nid))) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_eckey(b, key->ecdsa)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b,
EC_KEY_get0_private_key(key->ecdsa))) != 0)
goto out;
break;
case KEY_ECDSA_CERT:
if (key->cert == NULL || sshbuf_len(key->cert->certblob) == 0) {
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
goto out;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(b, key->cert->certblob)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_bignum2(b,
EC_KEY_get0_private_key(key->ecdsa))) != 0)
goto out;
break;
+ case KEY_ECDSA_SK:
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b,
+ sshkey_curve_nid_to_name(key->ecdsa_nid))) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_eckey(b, key->ecdsa)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, key->sk_application)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, key->sk_flags)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(b, key->sk_key_handle)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(b, key->sk_reserved)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ break;
+ case KEY_ECDSA_SK_CERT:
+ if (key->cert == NULL || sshbuf_len(key->cert->certblob) == 0) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(b, key->cert->certblob)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, key->sk_application)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, key->sk_flags)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(b, key->sk_key_handle)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(b, key->sk_reserved)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ break;
# endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
case KEY_ED25519:
if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(b, key->ed25519_pk,
ED25519_PK_SZ)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_string(b, key->ed25519_sk,
ED25519_SK_SZ)) != 0)
goto out;
break;
case KEY_ED25519_CERT:
if (key->cert == NULL || sshbuf_len(key->cert->certblob) == 0) {
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
goto out;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(b, key->cert->certblob)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_string(b, key->ed25519_pk,
ED25519_PK_SZ)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_string(b, key->ed25519_sk,
ED25519_SK_SZ)) != 0)
goto out;
break;
+ case KEY_ED25519_SK:
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(b, key->ed25519_pk,
+ ED25519_PK_SZ)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, key->sk_application)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, key->sk_flags)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(b, key->sk_key_handle)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(b, key->sk_reserved)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ break;
+ case KEY_ED25519_SK_CERT:
+ if (key->cert == NULL || sshbuf_len(key->cert->certblob) == 0) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(b, key->cert->certblob)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_string(b, key->ed25519_pk,
+ ED25519_PK_SZ)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, key->sk_application)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_u8(b, key->sk_flags)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(b, key->sk_key_handle)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_put_stringb(b, key->sk_reserved)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ break;
#ifdef WITH_XMSS
case KEY_XMSS:
if (key->xmss_name == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
goto out;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, key->xmss_name)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_string(b, key->xmss_pk,
sshkey_xmss_pklen(key))) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_string(b, key->xmss_sk,
sshkey_xmss_sklen(key))) != 0 ||
(r = sshkey_xmss_serialize_state_opt(key, b, opts)) != 0)
goto out;
break;
case KEY_XMSS_CERT:
if (key->cert == NULL || sshbuf_len(key->cert->certblob) == 0 ||
key->xmss_name == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
goto out;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_put_stringb(b, key->cert->certblob)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(b, key->xmss_name)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_string(b, key->xmss_pk,
sshkey_xmss_pklen(key))) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_string(b, key->xmss_sk,
sshkey_xmss_sklen(key))) != 0 ||
(r = sshkey_xmss_serialize_state_opt(key, b, opts)) != 0)
goto out;
break;
#endif /* WITH_XMSS */
default:
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
goto out;
}
/*
* success (but we still need to append the output to buf after
* possibly re-shielding the private key)
*/
r = 0;
out:
if (was_shielded)
r = sshkey_shield_private(key);
if (r == 0)
r = sshbuf_putb(buf, b);
sshbuf_free(b);
return r;
}
int
sshkey_private_serialize(struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *b)
{
return sshkey_private_serialize_opt(key, b,
SSHKEY_SERIALIZE_DEFAULT);
}
int
sshkey_private_deserialize(struct sshbuf *buf, struct sshkey **kp)
{
char *tname = NULL, *curve = NULL, *xmss_name = NULL;
struct sshkey *k = NULL;
size_t pklen = 0, sklen = 0;
int type, r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
u_char *ed25519_pk = NULL, *ed25519_sk = NULL;
u_char *xmss_pk = NULL, *xmss_sk = NULL;
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
BIGNUM *exponent = NULL;
BIGNUM *rsa_n = NULL, *rsa_e = NULL, *rsa_d = NULL;
BIGNUM *rsa_iqmp = NULL, *rsa_p = NULL, *rsa_q = NULL;
BIGNUM *dsa_p = NULL, *dsa_q = NULL, *dsa_g = NULL;
BIGNUM *dsa_pub_key = NULL, *dsa_priv_key = NULL;
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
if (kp != NULL)
*kp = NULL;
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(buf, &tname, NULL)) != 0)
goto out;
type = sshkey_type_from_name(tname);
switch (type) {
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
case KEY_DSA:
if ((k = sshkey_new(type)) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, &dsa_p)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, &dsa_q)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, &dsa_g)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, &dsa_pub_key)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, &dsa_priv_key)) != 0)
goto out;
if (!DSA_set0_pqg(k->dsa, dsa_p, dsa_q, dsa_g)) {
r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
goto out;
}
dsa_p = dsa_q = dsa_g = NULL; /* transferred */
if (!DSA_set0_key(k->dsa, dsa_pub_key, dsa_priv_key)) {
r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
goto out;
}
dsa_pub_key = dsa_priv_key = NULL; /* transferred */
break;
case KEY_DSA_CERT:
if ((r = sshkey_froms(buf, &k)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, &dsa_priv_key)) != 0)
goto out;
if (k->type != type) {
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
if (!DSA_set0_key(k->dsa, NULL, dsa_priv_key)) {
r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
goto out;
}
dsa_priv_key = NULL; /* transferred */
break;
# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
case KEY_ECDSA:
if ((k = sshkey_new(type)) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
if ((k->ecdsa_nid = sshkey_ecdsa_nid_from_name(tname)) == -1) {
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
goto out;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(buf, &curve, NULL)) != 0)
goto out;
if (k->ecdsa_nid != sshkey_curve_name_to_nid(curve)) {
r = SSH_ERR_EC_CURVE_MISMATCH;
goto out;
}
k->ecdsa = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(k->ecdsa_nid);
if (k->ecdsa == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
goto out;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_get_eckey(buf, k->ecdsa)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, &exponent)))
goto out;
if (EC_KEY_set_private_key(k->ecdsa, exponent) != 1) {
r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
goto out;
}
if ((r = sshkey_ec_validate_public(EC_KEY_get0_group(k->ecdsa),
EC_KEY_get0_public_key(k->ecdsa))) != 0 ||
(r = sshkey_ec_validate_private(k->ecdsa)) != 0)
goto out;
break;
case KEY_ECDSA_CERT:
if ((r = sshkey_froms(buf, &k)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, &exponent)) != 0)
goto out;
if (k->type != type ||
k->ecdsa_nid != sshkey_ecdsa_nid_from_name(tname)) {
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
if (EC_KEY_set_private_key(k->ecdsa, exponent) != 1) {
r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
goto out;
}
if ((r = sshkey_ec_validate_public(EC_KEY_get0_group(k->ecdsa),
EC_KEY_get0_public_key(k->ecdsa))) != 0 ||
(r = sshkey_ec_validate_private(k->ecdsa)) != 0)
goto out;
break;
+ case KEY_ECDSA_SK:
+ if ((k = sshkey_new(type)) == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((k->ecdsa_nid = sshkey_ecdsa_nid_from_name(tname)) == -1) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(buf, &curve, NULL)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ if (k->ecdsa_nid != sshkey_curve_name_to_nid(curve)) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_EC_CURVE_MISMATCH;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((k->sk_key_handle = sshbuf_new()) == NULL ||
+ (k->sk_reserved = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ k->ecdsa = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(k->ecdsa_nid);
+ if (k->ecdsa == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_eckey(buf, k->ecdsa)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_cstring(buf, &k->sk_application,
+ NULL)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_u8(buf, &k->sk_flags)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_stringb(buf, k->sk_key_handle)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_stringb(buf, k->sk_reserved)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ if ((r = sshkey_ec_validate_public(EC_KEY_get0_group(k->ecdsa),
+ EC_KEY_get0_public_key(k->ecdsa))) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ break;
+ case KEY_ECDSA_SK_CERT:
+ if ((r = sshkey_froms(buf, &k)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ if ((k->sk_key_handle = sshbuf_new()) == NULL ||
+ (k->sk_reserved = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(buf, &k->sk_application,
+ NULL)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_u8(buf, &k->sk_flags)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_stringb(buf, k->sk_key_handle)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_stringb(buf, k->sk_reserved)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ if ((r = sshkey_ec_validate_public(EC_KEY_get0_group(k->ecdsa),
+ EC_KEY_get0_public_key(k->ecdsa))) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ break;
# endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
case KEY_RSA:
if ((k = sshkey_new(type)) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, &rsa_n)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, &rsa_e)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, &rsa_d)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, &rsa_iqmp)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, &rsa_p)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, &rsa_q)) != 0)
goto out;
if (!RSA_set0_key(k->rsa, rsa_n, rsa_e, rsa_d)) {
r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
goto out;
}
rsa_n = rsa_e = rsa_d = NULL; /* transferred */
if (!RSA_set0_factors(k->rsa, rsa_p, rsa_q)) {
r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
goto out;
}
rsa_p = rsa_q = NULL; /* transferred */
if ((r = check_rsa_length(k->rsa)) != 0)
goto out;
if ((r = ssh_rsa_complete_crt_parameters(k, rsa_iqmp)) != 0)
goto out;
break;
case KEY_RSA_CERT:
if ((r = sshkey_froms(buf, &k)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, &rsa_d)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, &rsa_iqmp)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, &rsa_p)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_bignum2(buf, &rsa_q)) != 0)
goto out;
if (k->type != type) {
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
if (!RSA_set0_key(k->rsa, NULL, NULL, rsa_d)) {
r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
goto out;
}
rsa_d = NULL; /* transferred */
if (!RSA_set0_factors(k->rsa, rsa_p, rsa_q)) {
r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
goto out;
}
rsa_p = rsa_q = NULL; /* transferred */
if ((r = check_rsa_length(k->rsa)) != 0)
goto out;
if ((r = ssh_rsa_complete_crt_parameters(k, rsa_iqmp)) != 0)
goto out;
break;
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
case KEY_ED25519:
if ((k = sshkey_new(type)) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(buf, &ed25519_pk, &pklen)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_string(buf, &ed25519_sk, &sklen)) != 0)
goto out;
if (pklen != ED25519_PK_SZ || sklen != ED25519_SK_SZ) {
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
k->ed25519_pk = ed25519_pk;
k->ed25519_sk = ed25519_sk;
ed25519_pk = ed25519_sk = NULL;
break;
case KEY_ED25519_CERT:
if ((r = sshkey_froms(buf, &k)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_string(buf, &ed25519_pk, &pklen)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_string(buf, &ed25519_sk, &sklen)) != 0)
goto out;
if (k->type != type) {
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
if (pklen != ED25519_PK_SZ || sklen != ED25519_SK_SZ) {
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
k->ed25519_pk = ed25519_pk;
k->ed25519_sk = ed25519_sk;
ed25519_pk = ed25519_sk = NULL; /* transferred */
break;
+ case KEY_ED25519_SK:
+ if ((k = sshkey_new(type)) == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(buf, &ed25519_pk, &pklen)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ if (pklen != ED25519_PK_SZ) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((k->sk_key_handle = sshbuf_new()) == NULL ||
+ (k->sk_reserved = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(buf, &k->sk_application,
+ NULL)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_u8(buf, &k->sk_flags)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_stringb(buf, k->sk_key_handle)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_stringb(buf, k->sk_reserved)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ k->ed25519_pk = ed25519_pk;
+ ed25519_pk = NULL;
+ break;
+ case KEY_ED25519_SK_CERT:
+ if ((r = sshkey_froms(buf, &k)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_string(buf, &ed25519_pk, &pklen)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ if (k->type != type) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (pklen != ED25519_PK_SZ) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((k->sk_key_handle = sshbuf_new()) == NULL ||
+ (k->sk_reserved = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(buf, &k->sk_application,
+ NULL)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_u8(buf, &k->sk_flags)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_stringb(buf, k->sk_key_handle)) != 0 ||
+ (r = sshbuf_get_stringb(buf, k->sk_reserved)) != 0)
+ goto out;
+ k->ed25519_pk = ed25519_pk;
+ ed25519_pk = NULL; /* transferred */
+ break;
#ifdef WITH_XMSS
case KEY_XMSS:
if ((k = sshkey_new(type)) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_get_cstring(buf, &xmss_name, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshkey_xmss_init(k, xmss_name)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_string(buf, &xmss_pk, &pklen)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_string(buf, &xmss_sk, &sklen)) != 0)
goto out;
if (pklen != sshkey_xmss_pklen(k) ||
sklen != sshkey_xmss_sklen(k)) {
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
k->xmss_pk = xmss_pk;
k->xmss_sk = xmss_sk;
xmss_pk = xmss_sk = NULL;
/* optional internal state */
if ((r = sshkey_xmss_deserialize_state_opt(k, buf)) != 0)
goto out;
break;
case KEY_XMSS_CERT:
if ((r = sshkey_froms(buf, &k)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_cstring(buf, &xmss_name, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_string(buf, &xmss_pk, &pklen)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_string(buf, &xmss_sk, &sklen)) != 0)
goto out;
if (k->type != type || strcmp(xmss_name, k->xmss_name) != 0) {
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
if (pklen != sshkey_xmss_pklen(k) ||
sklen != sshkey_xmss_sklen(k)) {
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
k->xmss_pk = xmss_pk;
k->xmss_sk = xmss_sk;
xmss_pk = xmss_sk = NULL;
/* optional internal state */
if ((r = sshkey_xmss_deserialize_state_opt(k, buf)) != 0)
goto out;
break;
#endif /* WITH_XMSS */
default:
r = SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN;
goto out;
}
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
/* enable blinding */
switch (k->type) {
case KEY_RSA:
case KEY_RSA_CERT:
if (RSA_blinding_on(k->rsa, NULL) != 1) {
r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
goto out;
}
break;
}
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
/* success */
r = 0;
if (kp != NULL) {
*kp = k;
k = NULL;
}
out:
free(tname);
free(curve);
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
BN_clear_free(exponent);
BN_clear_free(dsa_p);
BN_clear_free(dsa_q);
BN_clear_free(dsa_g);
BN_clear_free(dsa_pub_key);
BN_clear_free(dsa_priv_key);
BN_clear_free(rsa_n);
BN_clear_free(rsa_e);
BN_clear_free(rsa_d);
BN_clear_free(rsa_p);
BN_clear_free(rsa_q);
BN_clear_free(rsa_iqmp);
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
sshkey_free(k);
freezero(ed25519_pk, pklen);
freezero(ed25519_sk, sklen);
free(xmss_name);
freezero(xmss_pk, pklen);
freezero(xmss_sk, sklen);
return r;
}
#if defined(WITH_OPENSSL) && defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC)
int
sshkey_ec_validate_public(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *public)
{
- BN_CTX *bnctx;
EC_POINT *nq = NULL;
- BIGNUM *order, *x, *y, *tmp;
+ BIGNUM *order = NULL, *x = NULL, *y = NULL, *tmp = NULL;
int ret = SSH_ERR_KEY_INVALID_EC_VALUE;
/*
* NB. This assumes OpenSSL has already verified that the public
* point lies on the curve. This is done by EC_POINT_oct2point()
* implicitly calling EC_POINT_is_on_curve(). If this code is ever
* reachable with public points not unmarshalled using
* EC_POINT_oct2point then the caller will need to explicitly check.
*/
- if ((bnctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
- return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
- BN_CTX_start(bnctx);
-
/*
* We shouldn't ever hit this case because bignum_get_ecpoint()
* refuses to load GF2m points.
*/
if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(EC_GROUP_method_of(group)) !=
NID_X9_62_prime_field)
goto out;
/* Q != infinity */
if (EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(group, public))
goto out;
- if ((x = BN_CTX_get(bnctx)) == NULL ||
- (y = BN_CTX_get(bnctx)) == NULL ||
- (order = BN_CTX_get(bnctx)) == NULL ||
- (tmp = BN_CTX_get(bnctx)) == NULL) {
+ if ((x = BN_new()) == NULL ||
+ (y = BN_new()) == NULL ||
+ (order = BN_new()) == NULL ||
+ (tmp = BN_new()) == NULL) {
ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
/* log2(x) > log2(order)/2, log2(y) > log2(order)/2 */
- if (EC_GROUP_get_order(group, order, bnctx) != 1 ||
+ if (EC_GROUP_get_order(group, order, NULL) != 1 ||
EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp(group, public,
- x, y, bnctx) != 1) {
+ x, y, NULL) != 1) {
ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
goto out;
}
if (BN_num_bits(x) <= BN_num_bits(order) / 2 ||
BN_num_bits(y) <= BN_num_bits(order) / 2)
goto out;
/* nQ == infinity (n == order of subgroup) */
if ((nq = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) {
ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
- if (EC_POINT_mul(group, nq, NULL, public, order, bnctx) != 1) {
+ if (EC_POINT_mul(group, nq, NULL, public, order, NULL) != 1) {
ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
goto out;
}
if (EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(group, nq) != 1)
goto out;
/* x < order - 1, y < order - 1 */
if (!BN_sub(tmp, order, BN_value_one())) {
ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
goto out;
}
if (BN_cmp(x, tmp) >= 0 || BN_cmp(y, tmp) >= 0)
goto out;
ret = 0;
out:
- BN_CTX_free(bnctx);
+ BN_clear_free(x);
+ BN_clear_free(y);
+ BN_clear_free(order);
+ BN_clear_free(tmp);
EC_POINT_free(nq);
return ret;
}
int
sshkey_ec_validate_private(const EC_KEY *key)
{
- BN_CTX *bnctx;
- BIGNUM *order, *tmp;
+ BIGNUM *order = NULL, *tmp = NULL;
int ret = SSH_ERR_KEY_INVALID_EC_VALUE;
- if ((bnctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
- return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
- BN_CTX_start(bnctx);
-
- if ((order = BN_CTX_get(bnctx)) == NULL ||
- (tmp = BN_CTX_get(bnctx)) == NULL) {
+ if ((order = BN_new()) == NULL || (tmp = BN_new()) == NULL) {
ret = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
/* log2(private) > log2(order)/2 */
- if (EC_GROUP_get_order(EC_KEY_get0_group(key), order, bnctx) != 1) {
+ if (EC_GROUP_get_order(EC_KEY_get0_group(key), order, NULL) != 1) {
ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
goto out;
}
if (BN_num_bits(EC_KEY_get0_private_key(key)) <=
BN_num_bits(order) / 2)
goto out;
/* private < order - 1 */
if (!BN_sub(tmp, order, BN_value_one())) {
ret = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
goto out;
}
if (BN_cmp(EC_KEY_get0_private_key(key), tmp) >= 0)
goto out;
ret = 0;
out:
- BN_CTX_free(bnctx);
+ BN_clear_free(order);
+ BN_clear_free(tmp);
return ret;
}
void
sshkey_dump_ec_point(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *point)
{
- BIGNUM *x, *y;
- BN_CTX *bnctx;
+ BIGNUM *x = NULL, *y = NULL;
if (point == NULL) {
fputs("point=(NULL)\n", stderr);
return;
}
- if ((bnctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) {
- fprintf(stderr, "%s: BN_CTX_new failed\n", __func__);
- return;
- }
- BN_CTX_start(bnctx);
- if ((x = BN_CTX_get(bnctx)) == NULL ||
- (y = BN_CTX_get(bnctx)) == NULL) {
- fprintf(stderr, "%s: BN_CTX_get failed\n", __func__);
- return;
+ if ((x = BN_new()) == NULL || (y = BN_new()) == NULL) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "%s: BN_new failed\n", __func__);
+ goto out;
}
if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(EC_GROUP_method_of(group)) !=
NID_X9_62_prime_field) {
fprintf(stderr, "%s: group is not a prime field\n", __func__);
- return;
+ goto out;
}
- if (EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp(group, point, x, y,
- bnctx) != 1) {
+ if (EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp(group, point,
+ x, y, NULL) != 1) {
fprintf(stderr, "%s: EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp\n",
__func__);
- return;
+ goto out;
}
fputs("x=", stderr);
BN_print_fp(stderr, x);
fputs("\ny=", stderr);
BN_print_fp(stderr, y);
fputs("\n", stderr);
- BN_CTX_free(bnctx);
+ out:
+ BN_clear_free(x);
+ BN_clear_free(y);
}
void
sshkey_dump_ec_key(const EC_KEY *key)
{
const BIGNUM *exponent;
sshkey_dump_ec_point(EC_KEY_get0_group(key),
EC_KEY_get0_public_key(key));
fputs("exponent=", stderr);
if ((exponent = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(key)) == NULL)
fputs("(NULL)", stderr);
else
BN_print_fp(stderr, EC_KEY_get0_private_key(key));
fputs("\n", stderr);
}
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL && OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
static int
sshkey_private_to_blob2(struct sshkey *prv, struct sshbuf *blob,
const char *passphrase, const char *comment, const char *ciphername,
int rounds)
{
u_char *cp, *key = NULL, *pubkeyblob = NULL;
u_char salt[SALT_LEN];
char *b64 = NULL;
size_t i, pubkeylen, keylen, ivlen, blocksize, authlen;
u_int check;
int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
struct sshcipher_ctx *ciphercontext = NULL;
const struct sshcipher *cipher;
const char *kdfname = KDFNAME;
struct sshbuf *encoded = NULL, *encrypted = NULL, *kdf = NULL;
if (rounds <= 0)
rounds = DEFAULT_ROUNDS;
if (passphrase == NULL || !strlen(passphrase)) {
ciphername = "none";
kdfname = "none";
} else if (ciphername == NULL)
ciphername = DEFAULT_CIPHERNAME;
if ((cipher = cipher_by_name(ciphername)) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
goto out;
}
if ((kdf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL ||
(encoded = sshbuf_new()) == NULL ||
(encrypted = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
blocksize = cipher_blocksize(cipher);
keylen = cipher_keylen(cipher);
ivlen = cipher_ivlen(cipher);
authlen = cipher_authlen(cipher);
if ((key = calloc(1, keylen + ivlen)) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
if (strcmp(kdfname, "bcrypt") == 0) {
arc4random_buf(salt, SALT_LEN);
if (bcrypt_pbkdf(passphrase, strlen(passphrase),
salt, SALT_LEN, key, keylen + ivlen, rounds) < 0) {
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
goto out;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_put_string(kdf, salt, SALT_LEN)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(kdf, rounds)) != 0)
goto out;
} else if (strcmp(kdfname, "none") != 0) {
/* Unsupported KDF type */
r = SSH_ERR_KEY_UNKNOWN_CIPHER;
goto out;
}
if ((r = cipher_init(&ciphercontext, cipher, key, keylen,
key + keylen, ivlen, 1)) != 0)
goto out;
if ((r = sshbuf_put(encoded, AUTH_MAGIC, sizeof(AUTH_MAGIC))) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(encoded, ciphername)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(encoded, kdfname)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_stringb(encoded, kdf)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(encoded, 1)) != 0 || /* number of keys */
(r = sshkey_to_blob(prv, &pubkeyblob, &pubkeylen)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_string(encoded, pubkeyblob, pubkeylen)) != 0)
goto out;
/* set up the buffer that will be encrypted */
/* Random check bytes */
check = arc4random();
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(encrypted, check)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(encrypted, check)) != 0)
goto out;
/* append private key and comment*/
if ((r = sshkey_private_serialize_opt(prv, encrypted,
SSHKEY_SERIALIZE_FULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(encrypted, comment)) != 0)
goto out;
/* padding */
i = 0;
while (sshbuf_len(encrypted) % blocksize) {
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(encrypted, ++i & 0xff)) != 0)
goto out;
}
/* length in destination buffer */
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u32(encoded, sshbuf_len(encrypted))) != 0)
goto out;
/* encrypt */
if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(encoded,
sshbuf_len(encrypted) + authlen, &cp)) != 0)
goto out;
if ((r = cipher_crypt(ciphercontext, 0, cp,
sshbuf_ptr(encrypted), sshbuf_len(encrypted), 0, authlen)) != 0)
goto out;
sshbuf_reset(blob);
/* assemble uuencoded key */
if ((r = sshbuf_put(blob, MARK_BEGIN, MARK_BEGIN_LEN)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_dtob64(encoded, blob, 1)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put(blob, MARK_END, MARK_END_LEN)) != 0)
goto out;
/* success */
r = 0;
out:
sshbuf_free(kdf);
sshbuf_free(encoded);
sshbuf_free(encrypted);
cipher_free(ciphercontext);
explicit_bzero(salt, sizeof(salt));
if (key != NULL) {
explicit_bzero(key, keylen + ivlen);
free(key);
}
if (pubkeyblob != NULL) {
explicit_bzero(pubkeyblob, pubkeylen);
free(pubkeyblob);
}
if (b64 != NULL) {
explicit_bzero(b64, strlen(b64));
free(b64);
}
return r;
}
static int
sshkey_parse_private2(struct sshbuf *blob, int type, const char *passphrase,
struct sshkey **keyp, char **commentp)
{
char *comment = NULL, *ciphername = NULL, *kdfname = NULL;
const struct sshcipher *cipher = NULL;
const u_char *cp;
int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
size_t encoded_len;
size_t i, keylen = 0, ivlen = 0, authlen = 0, slen = 0;
struct sshbuf *encoded = NULL, *decoded = NULL;
struct sshbuf *kdf = NULL, *decrypted = NULL;
struct sshcipher_ctx *ciphercontext = NULL;
struct sshkey *k = NULL;
u_char *key = NULL, *salt = NULL, *dp, pad, last;
u_int blocksize, rounds, nkeys, encrypted_len, check1, check2;
if (keyp != NULL)
*keyp = NULL;
if (commentp != NULL)
*commentp = NULL;
if ((encoded = sshbuf_new()) == NULL ||
(decoded = sshbuf_new()) == NULL ||
(decrypted = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
/* check preamble */
cp = sshbuf_ptr(blob);
encoded_len = sshbuf_len(blob);
if (encoded_len < (MARK_BEGIN_LEN + MARK_END_LEN) ||
memcmp(cp, MARK_BEGIN, MARK_BEGIN_LEN) != 0) {
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
cp += MARK_BEGIN_LEN;
encoded_len -= MARK_BEGIN_LEN;
/* Look for end marker, removing whitespace as we go */
while (encoded_len > 0) {
if (*cp != '\n' && *cp != '\r') {
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(encoded, *cp)) != 0)
goto out;
}
last = *cp;
encoded_len--;
cp++;
if (last == '\n') {
if (encoded_len >= MARK_END_LEN &&
memcmp(cp, MARK_END, MARK_END_LEN) == 0) {
/* \0 terminate */
if ((r = sshbuf_put_u8(encoded, 0)) != 0)
goto out;
break;
}
}
}
if (encoded_len == 0) {
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
/* decode base64 */
if ((r = sshbuf_b64tod(decoded, (char *)sshbuf_ptr(encoded))) != 0)
goto out;
/* check magic */
if (sshbuf_len(decoded) < sizeof(AUTH_MAGIC) ||
memcmp(sshbuf_ptr(decoded), AUTH_MAGIC, sizeof(AUTH_MAGIC))) {
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
/* parse public portion of key */
if ((r = sshbuf_consume(decoded, sizeof(AUTH_MAGIC))) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_cstring(decoded, &ciphername, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_cstring(decoded, &kdfname, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_froms(decoded, &kdf)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(decoded, &nkeys)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_skip_string(decoded)) != 0 || /* pubkey */
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(decoded, &encrypted_len)) != 0)
goto out;
if ((cipher = cipher_by_name(ciphername)) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_KEY_UNKNOWN_CIPHER;
goto out;
}
if ((passphrase == NULL || strlen(passphrase) == 0) &&
strcmp(ciphername, "none") != 0) {
/* passphrase required */
r = SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE;
goto out;
}
if (strcmp(kdfname, "none") != 0 && strcmp(kdfname, "bcrypt") != 0) {
r = SSH_ERR_KEY_UNKNOWN_CIPHER;
goto out;
}
if (!strcmp(kdfname, "none") && strcmp(ciphername, "none") != 0) {
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
if (nkeys != 1) {
/* XXX only one key supported */
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
/* check size of encrypted key blob */
blocksize = cipher_blocksize(cipher);
if (encrypted_len < blocksize || (encrypted_len % blocksize) != 0) {
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
/* setup key */
keylen = cipher_keylen(cipher);
ivlen = cipher_ivlen(cipher);
authlen = cipher_authlen(cipher);
if ((key = calloc(1, keylen + ivlen)) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
if (strcmp(kdfname, "bcrypt") == 0) {
if ((r = sshbuf_get_string(kdf, &salt, &slen)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(kdf, &rounds)) != 0)
goto out;
if (bcrypt_pbkdf(passphrase, strlen(passphrase), salt, slen,
key, keylen + ivlen, rounds) < 0) {
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
}
/* check that an appropriate amount of auth data is present */
if (sshbuf_len(decoded) < authlen ||
sshbuf_len(decoded) - authlen < encrypted_len) {
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
/* decrypt private portion of key */
if ((r = sshbuf_reserve(decrypted, encrypted_len, &dp)) != 0 ||
(r = cipher_init(&ciphercontext, cipher, key, keylen,
key + keylen, ivlen, 0)) != 0)
goto out;
if ((r = cipher_crypt(ciphercontext, 0, dp, sshbuf_ptr(decoded),
encrypted_len, 0, authlen)) != 0) {
/* an integrity error here indicates an incorrect passphrase */
if (r == SSH_ERR_MAC_INVALID)
r = SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE;
goto out;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_consume(decoded, encrypted_len + authlen)) != 0)
goto out;
/* there should be no trailing data */
if (sshbuf_len(decoded) != 0) {
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
/* check check bytes */
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u32(decrypted, &check1)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(decrypted, &check2)) != 0)
goto out;
if (check1 != check2) {
r = SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE;
goto out;
}
/* Load the private key and comment */
if ((r = sshkey_private_deserialize(decrypted, &k)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_cstring(decrypted, &comment, NULL)) != 0)
goto out;
/* Check deterministic padding */
i = 0;
while (sshbuf_len(decrypted)) {
if ((r = sshbuf_get_u8(decrypted, &pad)) != 0)
goto out;
if (pad != (++i & 0xff)) {
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
}
/* XXX decode pubkey and check against private */
/* success */
r = 0;
if (keyp != NULL) {
*keyp = k;
k = NULL;
}
if (commentp != NULL) {
*commentp = comment;
comment = NULL;
}
out:
pad = 0;
cipher_free(ciphercontext);
free(ciphername);
free(kdfname);
free(comment);
if (salt != NULL) {
explicit_bzero(salt, slen);
free(salt);
}
if (key != NULL) {
explicit_bzero(key, keylen + ivlen);
free(key);
}
sshbuf_free(encoded);
sshbuf_free(decoded);
sshbuf_free(kdf);
sshbuf_free(decrypted);
sshkey_free(k);
return r;
}
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
/* convert SSH v2 key to PEM or PKCS#8 format */
static int
sshkey_private_to_blob_pem_pkcs8(struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *buf,
int format, const char *_passphrase, const char *comment)
{
int was_shielded = sshkey_is_shielded(key);
int success, r;
int blen, len = strlen(_passphrase);
u_char *passphrase = (len > 0) ? (u_char *)_passphrase : NULL;
const EVP_CIPHER *cipher = (len > 0) ? EVP_aes_128_cbc() : NULL;
char *bptr;
BIO *bio = NULL;
struct sshbuf *blob;
EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL;
if (len > 0 && len <= 4)
return SSH_ERR_PASSPHRASE_TOO_SHORT;
if ((blob = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
if ((bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem())) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
if (format == SSHKEY_PRIVATE_PKCS8 && (pkey = EVP_PKEY_new()) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
if ((r = sshkey_unshield_private(key)) != 0)
goto out;
switch (key->type) {
case KEY_DSA:
if (format == SSHKEY_PRIVATE_PEM) {
success = PEM_write_bio_DSAPrivateKey(bio, key->dsa,
cipher, passphrase, len, NULL, NULL);
} else {
success = EVP_PKEY_set1_DSA(pkey, key->dsa);
}
break;
#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
case KEY_ECDSA:
if (format == SSHKEY_PRIVATE_PEM) {
success = PEM_write_bio_ECPrivateKey(bio, key->ecdsa,
cipher, passphrase, len, NULL, NULL);
} else {
success = EVP_PKEY_set1_EC_KEY(pkey, key->ecdsa);
}
break;
#endif
case KEY_RSA:
if (format == SSHKEY_PRIVATE_PEM) {
success = PEM_write_bio_RSAPrivateKey(bio, key->rsa,
cipher, passphrase, len, NULL, NULL);
} else {
success = EVP_PKEY_set1_RSA(pkey, key->rsa);
}
break;
default:
success = 0;
break;
}
if (success == 0) {
r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
goto out;
}
if (format == SSHKEY_PRIVATE_PKCS8) {
if ((success = PEM_write_bio_PrivateKey(bio, pkey, cipher,
passphrase, len, NULL, NULL)) == 0) {
r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
goto out;
}
}
if ((blen = BIO_get_mem_data(bio, &bptr)) <= 0) {
r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
goto out;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_put(blob, bptr, blen)) != 0)
goto out;
r = 0;
out:
if (was_shielded)
r = sshkey_shield_private(key);
if (r == 0)
r = sshbuf_putb(buf, blob);
EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
sshbuf_free(blob);
BIO_free(bio);
return r;
}
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
/* Serialise "key" to buffer "blob" */
int
sshkey_private_to_fileblob(struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *blob,
const char *passphrase, const char *comment,
int format, const char *openssh_format_cipher, int openssh_format_rounds)
{
switch (key->type) {
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
case KEY_DSA:
case KEY_ECDSA:
case KEY_RSA:
break; /* see below */
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
case KEY_ED25519:
+ case KEY_ED25519_SK:
#ifdef WITH_XMSS
case KEY_XMSS:
#endif /* WITH_XMSS */
+#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
+ case KEY_ECDSA_SK:
+#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
return sshkey_private_to_blob2(key, blob, passphrase,
comment, openssh_format_cipher, openssh_format_rounds);
default:
return SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN;
}
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
switch (format) {
case SSHKEY_PRIVATE_OPENSSH:
return sshkey_private_to_blob2(key, blob, passphrase,
comment, openssh_format_cipher, openssh_format_rounds);
case SSHKEY_PRIVATE_PEM:
case SSHKEY_PRIVATE_PKCS8:
return sshkey_private_to_blob_pem_pkcs8(key, blob,
format, passphrase, comment);
default:
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
}
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
}
-
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
static int
translate_libcrypto_error(unsigned long pem_err)
{
int pem_reason = ERR_GET_REASON(pem_err);
switch (ERR_GET_LIB(pem_err)) {
case ERR_LIB_PEM:
switch (pem_reason) {
case PEM_R_BAD_PASSWORD_READ:
case PEM_R_PROBLEMS_GETTING_PASSWORD:
case PEM_R_BAD_DECRYPT:
return SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE;
default:
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
}
case ERR_LIB_EVP:
switch (pem_reason) {
case EVP_R_BAD_DECRYPT:
return SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE;
#ifdef EVP_R_BN_DECODE_ERROR
case EVP_R_BN_DECODE_ERROR:
#endif
case EVP_R_DECODE_ERROR:
#ifdef EVP_R_PRIVATE_KEY_DECODE_ERROR
case EVP_R_PRIVATE_KEY_DECODE_ERROR:
#endif
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
default:
return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
}
case ERR_LIB_ASN1:
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
}
return SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
}
static void
clear_libcrypto_errors(void)
{
while (ERR_get_error() != 0)
;
}
/*
* Translate OpenSSL error codes to determine whether
* passphrase is required/incorrect.
*/
static int
convert_libcrypto_error(void)
{
/*
* Some password errors are reported at the beginning
* of the error queue.
*/
if (translate_libcrypto_error(ERR_peek_error()) ==
SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE)
return SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE;
return translate_libcrypto_error(ERR_peek_last_error());
}
static int
pem_passphrase_cb(char *buf, int size, int rwflag, void *u)
{
char *p = (char *)u;
size_t len;
if (p == NULL || (len = strlen(p)) == 0)
return -1;
if (size < 0 || len > (size_t)size)
return -1;
memcpy(buf, p, len);
return (int)len;
}
static int
sshkey_parse_private_pem_fileblob(struct sshbuf *blob, int type,
const char *passphrase, struct sshkey **keyp)
{
EVP_PKEY *pk = NULL;
struct sshkey *prv = NULL;
BIO *bio = NULL;
int r;
if (keyp != NULL)
*keyp = NULL;
if ((bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem())) == NULL || sshbuf_len(blob) > INT_MAX)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
if (BIO_write(bio, sshbuf_ptr(blob), sshbuf_len(blob)) !=
(int)sshbuf_len(blob)) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
clear_libcrypto_errors();
if ((pk = PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey(bio, NULL, pem_passphrase_cb,
(char *)passphrase)) == NULL) {
/*
* libcrypto may return various ASN.1 errors when attempting
* to parse a key with an incorrect passphrase.
* Treat all format errors as "incorrect passphrase" if a
* passphrase was supplied.
*/
if (passphrase != NULL && *passphrase != '\0')
r = SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE;
else
r = convert_libcrypto_error();
goto out;
}
if (EVP_PKEY_base_id(pk) == EVP_PKEY_RSA &&
(type == KEY_UNSPEC || type == KEY_RSA)) {
if ((prv = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
prv->rsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(pk);
prv->type = KEY_RSA;
#ifdef DEBUG_PK
RSA_print_fp(stderr, prv->rsa, 8);
#endif
if (RSA_blinding_on(prv->rsa, NULL) != 1) {
r = SSH_ERR_LIBCRYPTO_ERROR;
goto out;
}
if ((r = check_rsa_length(prv->rsa)) != 0)
goto out;
} else if (EVP_PKEY_base_id(pk) == EVP_PKEY_DSA &&
(type == KEY_UNSPEC || type == KEY_DSA)) {
if ((prv = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
prv->dsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_DSA(pk);
prv->type = KEY_DSA;
#ifdef DEBUG_PK
DSA_print_fp(stderr, prv->dsa, 8);
#endif
#ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
} else if (EVP_PKEY_base_id(pk) == EVP_PKEY_EC &&
(type == KEY_UNSPEC || type == KEY_ECDSA)) {
if ((prv = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
prv->ecdsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_EC_KEY(pk);
prv->type = KEY_ECDSA;
prv->ecdsa_nid = sshkey_ecdsa_key_to_nid(prv->ecdsa);
if (prv->ecdsa_nid == -1 ||
sshkey_curve_nid_to_name(prv->ecdsa_nid) == NULL ||
sshkey_ec_validate_public(EC_KEY_get0_group(prv->ecdsa),
EC_KEY_get0_public_key(prv->ecdsa)) != 0 ||
sshkey_ec_validate_private(prv->ecdsa) != 0) {
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
# ifdef DEBUG_PK
if (prv != NULL && prv->ecdsa != NULL)
sshkey_dump_ec_key(prv->ecdsa);
# endif
#endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
} else {
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto out;
}
r = 0;
if (keyp != NULL) {
*keyp = prv;
prv = NULL;
}
out:
BIO_free(bio);
EVP_PKEY_free(pk);
sshkey_free(prv);
return r;
}
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
int
sshkey_parse_private_fileblob_type(struct sshbuf *blob, int type,
const char *passphrase, struct sshkey **keyp, char **commentp)
{
int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
if (keyp != NULL)
*keyp = NULL;
if (commentp != NULL)
*commentp = NULL;
switch (type) {
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
case KEY_DSA:
case KEY_ECDSA:
case KEY_RSA:
return sshkey_parse_private_pem_fileblob(blob, type,
passphrase, keyp);
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
case KEY_ED25519:
#ifdef WITH_XMSS
case KEY_XMSS:
#endif /* WITH_XMSS */
return sshkey_parse_private2(blob, type, passphrase,
keyp, commentp);
case KEY_UNSPEC:
r = sshkey_parse_private2(blob, type, passphrase, keyp,
commentp);
/* Do not fallback to PEM parser if only passphrase is wrong. */
if (r == 0 || r == SSH_ERR_KEY_WRONG_PASSPHRASE)
return r;
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
return sshkey_parse_private_pem_fileblob(blob, type,
passphrase, keyp);
#else
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
default:
return SSH_ERR_KEY_TYPE_UNKNOWN;
}
}
int
sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(struct sshbuf *buffer, const char *passphrase,
struct sshkey **keyp, char **commentp)
{
if (keyp != NULL)
*keyp = NULL;
if (commentp != NULL)
*commentp = NULL;
return sshkey_parse_private_fileblob_type(buffer, KEY_UNSPEC,
passphrase, keyp, commentp);
}
+void
+sshkey_sig_details_free(struct sshkey_sig_details *details)
+{
+ freezero(details, sizeof(*details));
+}
+
#ifdef WITH_XMSS
/*
* serialize the key with the current state and forward the state
* maxsign times.
*/
int
sshkey_private_serialize_maxsign(struct sshkey *k, struct sshbuf *b,
u_int32_t maxsign, sshkey_printfn *pr)
{
int r, rupdate;
if (maxsign == 0 ||
sshkey_type_plain(k->type) != KEY_XMSS)
return sshkey_private_serialize_opt(k, b,
SSHKEY_SERIALIZE_DEFAULT);
if ((r = sshkey_xmss_get_state(k, pr)) != 0 ||
(r = sshkey_private_serialize_opt(k, b,
SSHKEY_SERIALIZE_STATE)) != 0 ||
(r = sshkey_xmss_forward_state(k, maxsign)) != 0)
goto out;
r = 0;
out:
if ((rupdate = sshkey_xmss_update_state(k, pr)) != 0) {
if (r == 0)
r = rupdate;
}
return r;
}
u_int32_t
sshkey_signatures_left(const struct sshkey *k)
{
if (sshkey_type_plain(k->type) == KEY_XMSS)
return sshkey_xmss_signatures_left(k);
return 0;
}
int
sshkey_enable_maxsign(struct sshkey *k, u_int32_t maxsign)
{
if (sshkey_type_plain(k->type) != KEY_XMSS)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
return sshkey_xmss_enable_maxsign(k, maxsign);
}
int
sshkey_set_filename(struct sshkey *k, const char *filename)
{
if (k == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
if (sshkey_type_plain(k->type) != KEY_XMSS)
return 0;
if (filename == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
if ((k->xmss_filename = strdup(filename)) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
return 0;
}
#else
int
sshkey_private_serialize_maxsign(struct sshkey *k, struct sshbuf *b,
u_int32_t maxsign, sshkey_printfn *pr)
{
return sshkey_private_serialize_opt(k, b, SSHKEY_SERIALIZE_DEFAULT);
}
u_int32_t
sshkey_signatures_left(const struct sshkey *k)
{
return 0;
}
int
sshkey_enable_maxsign(struct sshkey *k, u_int32_t maxsign)
{
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
}
int
sshkey_set_filename(struct sshkey *k, const char *filename)
{
if (k == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
return 0;
}
#endif /* WITH_XMSS */
diff --git a/sshkey.h b/sshkey.h
index 1119a7b07634..71a3fddcb517 100644
--- a/sshkey.h
+++ b/sshkey.h
@@ -1,295 +1,330 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: sshkey.h,v 1.34 2019/09/03 08:31:20 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: sshkey.h,v 1.44 2019/12/30 09:23:28 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Copyright (c) 2000, 2001 Markus Friedl. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
* documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE AUTHOR ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES
* OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.
* IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT,
* INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
* DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
* THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
* (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF
* THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
*/
#ifndef SSHKEY_H
#define SSHKEY_H
#include <sys/types.h>
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
#include <openssl/rsa.h>
#include <openssl/dsa.h>
# ifdef OPENSSL_HAS_ECC
# include <openssl/ec.h>
# include <openssl/ecdsa.h>
# else /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
# define EC_KEY void
# define EC_GROUP void
# define EC_POINT void
# endif /* OPENSSL_HAS_ECC */
#else /* WITH_OPENSSL */
# define BIGNUM void
# define RSA void
# define DSA void
# define EC_KEY void
# define EC_GROUP void
# define EC_POINT void
#endif /* WITH_OPENSSL */
#define SSH_RSA_MINIMUM_MODULUS_SIZE 1024
#define SSH_KEY_MAX_SIGN_DATA_SIZE (1 << 20)
struct sshbuf;
/* Key types */
enum sshkey_types {
KEY_RSA,
KEY_DSA,
KEY_ECDSA,
KEY_ED25519,
KEY_RSA_CERT,
KEY_DSA_CERT,
KEY_ECDSA_CERT,
KEY_ED25519_CERT,
KEY_XMSS,
KEY_XMSS_CERT,
+ KEY_ECDSA_SK,
+ KEY_ECDSA_SK_CERT,
+ KEY_ED25519_SK,
+ KEY_ED25519_SK_CERT,
KEY_UNSPEC
};
/* Default fingerprint hash */
#define SSH_FP_HASH_DEFAULT SSH_DIGEST_SHA256
/* Fingerprint representation formats */
enum sshkey_fp_rep {
SSH_FP_DEFAULT = 0,
SSH_FP_HEX,
SSH_FP_BASE64,
SSH_FP_BUBBLEBABBLE,
SSH_FP_RANDOMART
};
/* Private key serialisation formats, used on the wire */
enum sshkey_serialize_rep {
SSHKEY_SERIALIZE_DEFAULT = 0,
- SSHKEY_SERIALIZE_STATE = 1,
- SSHKEY_SERIALIZE_FULL = 2,
- SSHKEY_SERIALIZE_INFO = 254,
+ SSHKEY_SERIALIZE_STATE = 1, /* only state is serialized */
+ SSHKEY_SERIALIZE_FULL = 2, /* include keys for saving to disk */
+ SSHKEY_SERIALIZE_SHIELD = 3, /* everything, for encrypting in ram */
+ SSHKEY_SERIALIZE_INFO = 254, /* minimal information */
};
/* Private key disk formats */
enum sshkey_private_format {
SSHKEY_PRIVATE_OPENSSH = 0,
SSHKEY_PRIVATE_PEM = 1,
SSHKEY_PRIVATE_PKCS8 = 2,
};
/* key is stored in external hardware */
#define SSHKEY_FLAG_EXT 0x0001
#define SSHKEY_CERT_MAX_PRINCIPALS 256
/* XXX opaquify? */
struct sshkey_cert {
struct sshbuf *certblob; /* Kept around for use on wire */
u_int type; /* SSH2_CERT_TYPE_USER or SSH2_CERT_TYPE_HOST */
u_int64_t serial;
char *key_id;
u_int nprincipals;
char **principals;
u_int64_t valid_after, valid_before;
struct sshbuf *critical;
struct sshbuf *extensions;
struct sshkey *signature_key;
char *signature_type;
};
/* XXX opaquify? */
struct sshkey {
int type;
int flags;
+ /* KEY_RSA */
RSA *rsa;
+ /* KEY_DSA */
DSA *dsa;
+ /* KEY_ECDSA and KEY_ECDSA_SK */
int ecdsa_nid; /* NID of curve */
EC_KEY *ecdsa;
+ /* KEY_ED25519 and KEY_ED25519_SK */
u_char *ed25519_sk;
u_char *ed25519_pk;
+ /* KEY_XMSS */
char *xmss_name;
char *xmss_filename; /* for state file updates */
void *xmss_state; /* depends on xmss_name, opaque */
u_char *xmss_sk;
u_char *xmss_pk;
+ /* KEY_ECDSA_SK and KEY_ED25519_SK */
+ char *sk_application;
+ uint8_t sk_flags;
+ struct sshbuf *sk_key_handle;
+ struct sshbuf *sk_reserved;
+ /* Certificates */
struct sshkey_cert *cert;
+ /* Private key shielding */
u_char *shielded_private;
size_t shielded_len;
u_char *shield_prekey;
size_t shield_prekey_len;
};
#define ED25519_SK_SZ crypto_sign_ed25519_SECRETKEYBYTES
#define ED25519_PK_SZ crypto_sign_ed25519_PUBLICKEYBYTES
+/* Additional fields contained in signature */
+struct sshkey_sig_details {
+ uint32_t sk_counter; /* U2F signature counter */
+ uint8_t sk_flags; /* U2F signature flags; see ssh-sk.h */
+};
+
struct sshkey *sshkey_new(int);
void sshkey_free(struct sshkey *);
int sshkey_equal_public(const struct sshkey *,
const struct sshkey *);
int sshkey_equal(const struct sshkey *, const struct sshkey *);
char *sshkey_fingerprint(const struct sshkey *,
int, enum sshkey_fp_rep);
int sshkey_fingerprint_raw(const struct sshkey *k,
int, u_char **retp, size_t *lenp);
const char *sshkey_type(const struct sshkey *);
const char *sshkey_cert_type(const struct sshkey *);
int sshkey_format_text(const struct sshkey *, struct sshbuf *);
int sshkey_write(const struct sshkey *, FILE *);
int sshkey_read(struct sshkey *, char **);
u_int sshkey_size(const struct sshkey *);
int sshkey_generate(int type, u_int bits, struct sshkey **keyp);
int sshkey_from_private(const struct sshkey *, struct sshkey **);
int sshkey_is_shielded(struct sshkey *);
int sshkey_shield_private(struct sshkey *);
int sshkey_unshield_private(struct sshkey *);
int sshkey_type_from_name(const char *);
int sshkey_is_cert(const struct sshkey *);
+int sshkey_is_sk(const struct sshkey *);
int sshkey_type_is_cert(int);
int sshkey_type_plain(int);
int sshkey_to_certified(struct sshkey *);
int sshkey_drop_cert(struct sshkey *);
int sshkey_cert_copy(const struct sshkey *, struct sshkey *);
int sshkey_cert_check_authority(const struct sshkey *, int, int,
const char *, const char **);
size_t sshkey_format_cert_validity(const struct sshkey_cert *,
char *, size_t) __attribute__((__bounded__(__string__, 2, 3)));
int sshkey_check_cert_sigtype(const struct sshkey *, const char *);
-int sshkey_certify(struct sshkey *, struct sshkey *, const char *);
+int sshkey_certify(struct sshkey *, struct sshkey *,
+ const char *, const char *);
/* Variant allowing use of a custom signature function (e.g. for ssh-agent) */
typedef int sshkey_certify_signer(struct sshkey *, u_char **, size_t *,
- const u_char *, size_t, const char *, u_int, void *);
+ const u_char *, size_t, const char *, const char *, u_int, void *);
int sshkey_certify_custom(struct sshkey *, struct sshkey *, const char *,
- sshkey_certify_signer *, void *);
+ const char *, sshkey_certify_signer *, void *);
int sshkey_ecdsa_nid_from_name(const char *);
int sshkey_curve_name_to_nid(const char *);
const char * sshkey_curve_nid_to_name(int);
u_int sshkey_curve_nid_to_bits(int);
int sshkey_ecdsa_bits_to_nid(int);
int sshkey_ecdsa_key_to_nid(EC_KEY *);
int sshkey_ec_nid_to_hash_alg(int nid);
int sshkey_ec_validate_public(const EC_GROUP *, const EC_POINT *);
int sshkey_ec_validate_private(const EC_KEY *);
const char *sshkey_ssh_name(const struct sshkey *);
const char *sshkey_ssh_name_plain(const struct sshkey *);
int sshkey_names_valid2(const char *, int);
char *sshkey_alg_list(int, int, int, char);
int sshkey_from_blob(const u_char *, size_t, struct sshkey **);
int sshkey_fromb(struct sshbuf *, struct sshkey **);
int sshkey_froms(struct sshbuf *, struct sshkey **);
int sshkey_to_blob(const struct sshkey *, u_char **, size_t *);
int sshkey_to_base64(const struct sshkey *, char **);
int sshkey_putb(const struct sshkey *, struct sshbuf *);
int sshkey_puts(const struct sshkey *, struct sshbuf *);
int sshkey_puts_opts(const struct sshkey *, struct sshbuf *,
enum sshkey_serialize_rep);
int sshkey_plain_to_blob(const struct sshkey *, u_char **, size_t *);
int sshkey_putb_plain(const struct sshkey *, struct sshbuf *);
int sshkey_sign(struct sshkey *, u_char **, size_t *,
- const u_char *, size_t, const char *, u_int);
+ const u_char *, size_t, const char *, const char *, u_int);
int sshkey_verify(const struct sshkey *, const u_char *, size_t,
- const u_char *, size_t, const char *, u_int);
+ const u_char *, size_t, const char *, u_int, struct sshkey_sig_details **);
int sshkey_check_sigtype(const u_char *, size_t, const char *);
const char *sshkey_sigalg_by_name(const char *);
int sshkey_get_sigtype(const u_char *, size_t, char **);
/* for debug */
void sshkey_dump_ec_point(const EC_GROUP *, const EC_POINT *);
void sshkey_dump_ec_key(const EC_KEY *);
/* private key parsing and serialisation */
int sshkey_private_serialize(struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *buf);
int sshkey_private_serialize_opt(struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *buf,
enum sshkey_serialize_rep);
int sshkey_private_deserialize(struct sshbuf *buf, struct sshkey **keyp);
/* private key file format parsing and serialisation */
int sshkey_private_to_fileblob(struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *blob,
const char *passphrase, const char *comment,
int format, const char *openssh_format_cipher, int openssh_format_rounds);
int sshkey_parse_private_fileblob(struct sshbuf *buffer,
const char *passphrase, struct sshkey **keyp, char **commentp);
int sshkey_parse_private_fileblob_type(struct sshbuf *blob, int type,
const char *passphrase, struct sshkey **keyp, char **commentp);
/* XXX should be internal, but used by ssh-keygen */
int ssh_rsa_complete_crt_parameters(struct sshkey *, const BIGNUM *);
/* stateful keys (e.g. XMSS) */
#ifdef NO_ATTRIBUTE_ON_PROTOTYPE_ARGS
typedef void sshkey_printfn(const char *, ...);
#else
typedef void sshkey_printfn(const char *, ...) __attribute__((format(printf, 1, 2)));
#endif
int sshkey_set_filename(struct sshkey *, const char *);
int sshkey_enable_maxsign(struct sshkey *, u_int32_t);
u_int32_t sshkey_signatures_left(const struct sshkey *);
int sshkey_forward_state(const struct sshkey *, u_int32_t, sshkey_printfn *);
int sshkey_private_serialize_maxsign(struct sshkey *key, struct sshbuf *buf,
u_int32_t maxsign, sshkey_printfn *pr);
+void sshkey_sig_details_free(struct sshkey_sig_details *);
+
#ifdef SSHKEY_INTERNAL
int ssh_rsa_sign(const struct sshkey *key,
u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp, const u_char *data, size_t datalen,
const char *ident);
int ssh_rsa_verify(const struct sshkey *key,
const u_char *sig, size_t siglen, const u_char *data, size_t datalen,
const char *alg);
int ssh_dss_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat);
int ssh_dss_verify(const struct sshkey *key,
const u_char *signature, size_t signaturelen,
const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat);
int ssh_ecdsa_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat);
int ssh_ecdsa_verify(const struct sshkey *key,
const u_char *signature, size_t signaturelen,
const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat);
+int ssh_ecdsa_sk_verify(const struct sshkey *key,
+ const u_char *signature, size_t signaturelen,
+ const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat,
+ struct sshkey_sig_details **detailsp);
int ssh_ed25519_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat);
int ssh_ed25519_verify(const struct sshkey *key,
const u_char *signature, size_t signaturelen,
const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat);
+int ssh_ed25519_sk_verify(const struct sshkey *key,
+ const u_char *signature, size_t signaturelen,
+ const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat,
+ struct sshkey_sig_details **detailsp);
int ssh_xmss_sign(const struct sshkey *key, u_char **sigp, size_t *lenp,
const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat);
int ssh_xmss_verify(const struct sshkey *key,
const u_char *signature, size_t signaturelen,
const u_char *data, size_t datalen, u_int compat);
#endif
#if !defined(WITH_OPENSSL)
# undef RSA
# undef DSA
# undef EC_KEY
# undef EC_GROUP
# undef EC_POINT
#elif !defined(OPENSSL_HAS_ECC)
# undef EC_KEY
# undef EC_GROUP
# undef EC_POINT
#endif
#endif /* SSHKEY_H */
diff --git a/sshsig.c b/sshsig.c
index b19cd077db39..e63a36e1ec43 100644
--- a/sshsig.c
+++ b/sshsig.c
@@ -1,801 +1,1037 @@
/*
* Copyright (c) 2019 Google LLC
*
* Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
* copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
* WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
* ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
* WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
* ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
* OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <unistd.h>
#include "authfd.h"
#include "authfile.h"
#include "log.h"
#include "misc.h"
#include "sshbuf.h"
#include "sshsig.h"
#include "ssherr.h"
#include "sshkey.h"
#include "match.h"
#include "digest.h"
#define SIG_VERSION 0x01
#define MAGIC_PREAMBLE "SSHSIG"
#define MAGIC_PREAMBLE_LEN (sizeof(MAGIC_PREAMBLE) - 1)
#define BEGIN_SIGNATURE "-----BEGIN SSH SIGNATURE-----\n"
#define END_SIGNATURE "-----END SSH SIGNATURE-----"
#define RSA_SIGN_ALG "rsa-sha2-512" /* XXX maybe make configurable */
#define RSA_SIGN_ALLOWED "rsa-sha2-512,rsa-sha2-256"
#define HASHALG_DEFAULT "sha512" /* XXX maybe make configurable */
#define HASHALG_ALLOWED "sha256,sha512"
int
sshsig_armor(const struct sshbuf *blob, struct sshbuf **out)
{
struct sshbuf *buf = NULL;
int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
*out = NULL;
if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
error("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_put(buf, BEGIN_SIGNATURE,
sizeof(BEGIN_SIGNATURE)-1)) != 0) {
error("%s: sshbuf_putf failed: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
goto out;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_dtob64(blob, buf, 1)) != 0) {
error("%s: Couldn't base64 encode signature blob: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
goto out;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_put(buf, END_SIGNATURE,
sizeof(END_SIGNATURE)-1)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u8(buf, '\n')) != 0) {
error("%s: sshbuf_put failed: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
goto out;
}
/* success */
*out = buf;
buf = NULL; /* transferred */
r = 0;
out:
sshbuf_free(buf);
return r;
}
int
sshsig_dearmor(struct sshbuf *sig, struct sshbuf **out)
{
int r;
size_t eoffset = 0;
struct sshbuf *buf = NULL;
struct sshbuf *sbuf = NULL;
char *b64 = NULL;
if ((sbuf = sshbuf_fromb(sig)) == NULL) {
error("%s: sshbuf_fromb failed", __func__);
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_cmp(sbuf, 0,
BEGIN_SIGNATURE, sizeof(BEGIN_SIGNATURE)-1)) != 0) {
error("Couldn't parse signature: missing header");
goto done;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_consume(sbuf, sizeof(BEGIN_SIGNATURE)-1)) != 0) {
error("%s: sshbuf_consume failed: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
goto done;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_find(sbuf, 0, "\n" END_SIGNATURE,
sizeof("\n" END_SIGNATURE)-1, &eoffset)) != 0) {
error("Couldn't parse signature: missing footer");
goto done;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_consume_end(sbuf, sshbuf_len(sbuf)-eoffset)) != 0) {
error("%s: sshbuf_consume failed: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
goto done;
}
if ((b64 = sshbuf_dup_string(sbuf)) == NULL) {
error("%s: sshbuf_dup_string failed", __func__);
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto done;
}
if ((buf = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
error("%s: sshbuf_new() failed", __func__);
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto done;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_b64tod(buf, b64)) != 0) {
error("Couldn't decode signature: %s", ssh_err(r));
goto done;
}
/* success */
*out = buf;
r = 0;
buf = NULL; /* transferred */
done:
sshbuf_free(buf);
sshbuf_free(sbuf);
free(b64);
return r;
}
static int
sshsig_wrap_sign(struct sshkey *key, const char *hashalg,
- const struct sshbuf *h_message, const char *sig_namespace,
- struct sshbuf **out, sshsig_signer *signer, void *signer_ctx)
+ const char *sk_provider, const struct sshbuf *h_message,
+ const char *sig_namespace, struct sshbuf **out,
+ sshsig_signer *signer, void *signer_ctx)
{
int r;
size_t slen = 0;
u_char *sig = NULL;
struct sshbuf *blob = NULL;
struct sshbuf *tosign = NULL;
const char *sign_alg = NULL;
if ((tosign = sshbuf_new()) == NULL ||
(blob = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
error("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto done;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_put(tosign, MAGIC_PREAMBLE, MAGIC_PREAMBLE_LEN)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(tosign, sig_namespace)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_string(tosign, NULL, 0)) != 0 || /* reserved */
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(tosign, hashalg)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_stringb(tosign, h_message)) != 0) {
error("Couldn't construct message to sign: %s", ssh_err(r));
goto done;
}
/* If using RSA keys then default to a good signature algorithm */
if (sshkey_type_plain(key->type) == KEY_RSA)
sign_alg = RSA_SIGN_ALG;
if (signer != NULL) {
if ((r = signer(key, &sig, &slen,
sshbuf_ptr(tosign), sshbuf_len(tosign),
- sign_alg, 0, signer_ctx)) != 0) {
+ sign_alg, sk_provider, 0, signer_ctx)) != 0) {
error("Couldn't sign message: %s", ssh_err(r));
goto done;
}
} else {
if ((r = sshkey_sign(key, &sig, &slen,
sshbuf_ptr(tosign), sshbuf_len(tosign),
- sign_alg, 0)) != 0) {
+ sign_alg, sk_provider, 0)) != 0) {
error("Couldn't sign message: %s", ssh_err(r));
goto done;
}
}
if ((r = sshbuf_put(blob, MAGIC_PREAMBLE, MAGIC_PREAMBLE_LEN)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_u32(blob, SIG_VERSION)) != 0 ||
(r = sshkey_puts(key, blob)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(blob, sig_namespace)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_string(blob, NULL, 0)) != 0 || /* reserved */
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(blob, hashalg)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_string(blob, sig, slen)) != 0) {
error("Couldn't populate blob: %s", ssh_err(r));
goto done;
}
*out = blob;
blob = NULL;
r = 0;
done:
free(sig);
sshbuf_free(blob);
sshbuf_free(tosign);
return r;
}
/* Check preamble and version. */
static int
sshsig_parse_preamble(struct sshbuf *buf)
{
int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
uint32_t sversion;
if ((r = sshbuf_cmp(buf, 0, MAGIC_PREAMBLE, MAGIC_PREAMBLE_LEN)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_consume(buf, (sizeof(MAGIC_PREAMBLE)-1))) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_u32(buf, &sversion)) != 0) {
error("Couldn't verify signature: invalid format");
return r;
}
if (sversion > SIG_VERSION) {
error("Signature version %lu is larger than supported "
"version %u", (unsigned long)sversion, SIG_VERSION);
return SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
}
return 0;
}
static int
sshsig_check_hashalg(const char *hashalg)
{
if (hashalg == NULL ||
match_pattern_list(hashalg, HASHALG_ALLOWED, 0) == 1)
return 0;
error("%s: unsupported hash algorithm \"%.100s\"", __func__, hashalg);
return SSH_ERR_SIGN_ALG_UNSUPPORTED;
}
static int
sshsig_peek_hashalg(struct sshbuf *signature, char **hashalgp)
{
struct sshbuf *buf = NULL;
char *hashalg = NULL;
int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
if (hashalgp != NULL)
*hashalgp = NULL;
if ((buf = sshbuf_fromb(signature)) == NULL)
return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
if ((r = sshsig_parse_preamble(buf)) != 0)
goto done;
if ((r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(buf, NULL, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(buf, NULL, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_string(buf, NULL, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_cstring(buf, &hashalg, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(buf, NULL, NULL)) != 0) {
error("Couldn't parse signature blob: %s", ssh_err(r));
goto done;
}
/* success */
r = 0;
*hashalgp = hashalg;
hashalg = NULL;
done:
free(hashalg);
sshbuf_free(buf);
return r;
}
static int
sshsig_wrap_verify(struct sshbuf *signature, const char *hashalg,
const struct sshbuf *h_message, const char *expect_namespace,
- struct sshkey **sign_keyp)
+ struct sshkey **sign_keyp, struct sshkey_sig_details **sig_details)
{
int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
struct sshbuf *buf = NULL, *toverify = NULL;
struct sshkey *key = NULL;
const u_char *sig;
char *got_namespace = NULL, *sigtype = NULL, *sig_hashalg = NULL;
size_t siglen;
debug("%s: verify message length %zu", __func__, sshbuf_len(h_message));
+ if (sig_details != NULL)
+ *sig_details = NULL;
if (sign_keyp != NULL)
*sign_keyp = NULL;
if ((toverify = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
error("%s: sshbuf_new failed", __func__);
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto done;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_put(toverify, MAGIC_PREAMBLE,
MAGIC_PREAMBLE_LEN)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(toverify, expect_namespace)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_string(toverify, NULL, 0)) != 0 || /* reserved */
(r = sshbuf_put_cstring(toverify, hashalg)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_put_stringb(toverify, h_message)) != 0) {
error("Couldn't construct message to verify: %s", ssh_err(r));
goto done;
}
if ((r = sshsig_parse_preamble(signature)) != 0)
goto done;
if ((r = sshkey_froms(signature, &key)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_cstring(signature, &got_namespace, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_string(signature, NULL, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_cstring(signature, &sig_hashalg, NULL)) != 0 ||
(r = sshbuf_get_string_direct(signature, &sig, &siglen)) != 0) {
error("Couldn't parse signature blob: %s", ssh_err(r));
goto done;
}
if (sshbuf_len(signature) != 0) {
error("Signature contains trailing data");
r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
goto done;
}
if (strcmp(expect_namespace, got_namespace) != 0) {
error("Couldn't verify signature: namespace does not match");
debug("%s: expected namespace \"%s\" received \"%s\"",
__func__, expect_namespace, got_namespace);
r = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
goto done;
}
if (strcmp(hashalg, sig_hashalg) != 0) {
error("Couldn't verify signature: hash algorithm mismatch");
debug("%s: expected algorithm \"%s\" received \"%s\"",
__func__, hashalg, sig_hashalg);
r = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
goto done;
}
/* Ensure that RSA keys use an acceptable signature algorithm */
if (sshkey_type_plain(key->type) == KEY_RSA) {
if ((r = sshkey_get_sigtype(sig, siglen, &sigtype)) != 0) {
error("Couldn't verify signature: unable to get "
"signature type: %s", ssh_err(r));
goto done;
}
if (match_pattern_list(sigtype, RSA_SIGN_ALLOWED, 0) != 1) {
error("Couldn't verify signature: unsupported RSA "
"signature algorithm %s", sigtype);
r = SSH_ERR_SIGN_ALG_UNSUPPORTED;
goto done;
}
}
if ((r = sshkey_verify(key, sig, siglen, sshbuf_ptr(toverify),
- sshbuf_len(toverify), NULL, 0)) != 0) {
+ sshbuf_len(toverify), NULL, 0, sig_details)) != 0) {
error("Signature verification failed: %s", ssh_err(r));
goto done;
}
/* success */
r = 0;
if (sign_keyp != NULL) {
*sign_keyp = key;
key = NULL; /* transferred */
}
done:
free(got_namespace);
free(sigtype);
free(sig_hashalg);
sshbuf_free(buf);
sshbuf_free(toverify);
sshkey_free(key);
return r;
}
static int
hash_buffer(const struct sshbuf *m, const char *hashalg, struct sshbuf **bp)
{
char *hex, hash[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
int alg, r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
*bp = NULL;
memset(hash, 0, sizeof(hash));
if ((r = sshsig_check_hashalg(hashalg)) != 0)
return r;
if ((alg = ssh_digest_alg_by_name(hashalg)) == -1) {
error("%s: can't look up hash algorithm %s",
__func__, hashalg);
return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
if ((r = ssh_digest_buffer(alg, m, hash, sizeof(hash))) != 0) {
error("%s: ssh_digest_buffer failed: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
return r;
}
if ((hex = tohex(hash, ssh_digest_bytes(alg))) != NULL) {
debug3("%s: final hash: %s", __func__, hex);
freezero(hex, strlen(hex));
}
if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_put(b, hash, ssh_digest_bytes(alg))) != 0) {
error("%s: sshbuf_put: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
goto out;
}
*bp = b;
b = NULL; /* transferred */
/* success */
r = 0;
out:
sshbuf_free(b);
explicit_bzero(hash, sizeof(hash));
return 0;
}
int
-sshsig_signb(struct sshkey *key, const char *hashalg,
+sshsig_signb(struct sshkey *key, const char *hashalg, const char *sk_provider,
const struct sshbuf *message, const char *sig_namespace,
struct sshbuf **out, sshsig_signer *signer, void *signer_ctx)
{
struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
if (hashalg == NULL)
hashalg = HASHALG_DEFAULT;
if (out != NULL)
*out = NULL;
if ((r = hash_buffer(message, hashalg, &b)) != 0) {
error("%s: hash_buffer failed: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
goto out;
}
- if ((r = sshsig_wrap_sign(key, hashalg, b, sig_namespace, out,
- signer, signer_ctx)) != 0)
+ if ((r = sshsig_wrap_sign(key, hashalg, sk_provider, b,
+ sig_namespace, out, signer, signer_ctx)) != 0)
goto out;
/* success */
r = 0;
out:
sshbuf_free(b);
return r;
}
int
sshsig_verifyb(struct sshbuf *signature, const struct sshbuf *message,
- const char *expect_namespace, struct sshkey **sign_keyp)
+ const char *expect_namespace, struct sshkey **sign_keyp,
+ struct sshkey_sig_details **sig_details)
{
struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
char *hashalg = NULL;
+ if (sig_details != NULL)
+ *sig_details = NULL;
if (sign_keyp != NULL)
*sign_keyp = NULL;
-
if ((r = sshsig_peek_hashalg(signature, &hashalg)) != 0)
return r;
debug("%s: signature made with hash \"%s\"", __func__, hashalg);
if ((r = hash_buffer(message, hashalg, &b)) != 0) {
error("%s: hash_buffer failed: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
goto out;
}
if ((r = sshsig_wrap_verify(signature, hashalg, b, expect_namespace,
- sign_keyp)) != 0)
+ sign_keyp, sig_details)) != 0)
goto out;
/* success */
r = 0;
out:
sshbuf_free(b);
free(hashalg);
return r;
}
static int
hash_file(int fd, const char *hashalg, struct sshbuf **bp)
{
char *hex, rbuf[8192], hash[SSH_DIGEST_MAX_LENGTH];
ssize_t n, total = 0;
struct ssh_digest_ctx *ctx;
int alg, oerrno, r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
*bp = NULL;
memset(hash, 0, sizeof(hash));
if ((r = sshsig_check_hashalg(hashalg)) != 0)
return r;
if ((alg = ssh_digest_alg_by_name(hashalg)) == -1) {
error("%s: can't look up hash algorithm %s",
__func__, hashalg);
return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
if ((ctx = ssh_digest_start(alg)) == NULL) {
error("%s: ssh_digest_start failed", __func__);
return SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
}
for (;;) {
if ((n = read(fd, rbuf, sizeof(rbuf))) == -1) {
if (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN)
continue;
oerrno = errno;
error("%s: read: %s", __func__, strerror(errno));
ssh_digest_free(ctx);
errno = oerrno;
r = SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
goto out;
} else if (n == 0) {
debug2("%s: hashed %zu bytes", __func__, total);
break; /* EOF */
}
total += (size_t)n;
if ((r = ssh_digest_update(ctx, rbuf, (size_t)n)) != 0) {
error("%s: ssh_digest_update: %s",
__func__, ssh_err(r));
goto out;
}
}
if ((r = ssh_digest_final(ctx, hash, sizeof(hash))) != 0) {
error("%s: ssh_digest_final: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
goto out;
}
if ((hex = tohex(hash, ssh_digest_bytes(alg))) != NULL) {
debug3("%s: final hash: %s", __func__, hex);
freezero(hex, strlen(hex));
}
if ((b = sshbuf_new()) == NULL) {
r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
goto out;
}
if ((r = sshbuf_put(b, hash, ssh_digest_bytes(alg))) != 0) {
error("%s: sshbuf_put: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
goto out;
}
*bp = b;
b = NULL; /* transferred */
/* success */
r = 0;
out:
sshbuf_free(b);
ssh_digest_free(ctx);
explicit_bzero(hash, sizeof(hash));
return 0;
}
int
-sshsig_sign_fd(struct sshkey *key, const char *hashalg,
+sshsig_sign_fd(struct sshkey *key, const char *hashalg, const char *sk_provider,
int fd, const char *sig_namespace, struct sshbuf **out,
sshsig_signer *signer, void *signer_ctx)
{
struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
if (hashalg == NULL)
hashalg = HASHALG_DEFAULT;
if (out != NULL)
*out = NULL;
if ((r = hash_file(fd, hashalg, &b)) != 0) {
error("%s: hash_file failed: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
return r;
}
- if ((r = sshsig_wrap_sign(key, hashalg, b, sig_namespace, out,
- signer, signer_ctx)) != 0)
+ if ((r = sshsig_wrap_sign(key, hashalg, sk_provider, b,
+ sig_namespace, out, signer, signer_ctx)) != 0)
goto out;
/* success */
r = 0;
out:
sshbuf_free(b);
return r;
}
int
sshsig_verify_fd(struct sshbuf *signature, int fd,
- const char *expect_namespace, struct sshkey **sign_keyp)
+ const char *expect_namespace, struct sshkey **sign_keyp,
+ struct sshkey_sig_details **sig_details)
{
struct sshbuf *b = NULL;
int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
char *hashalg = NULL;
+ if (sig_details != NULL)
+ *sig_details = NULL;
if (sign_keyp != NULL)
*sign_keyp = NULL;
-
if ((r = sshsig_peek_hashalg(signature, &hashalg)) != 0)
return r;
debug("%s: signature made with hash \"%s\"", __func__, hashalg);
if ((r = hash_file(fd, hashalg, &b)) != 0) {
error("%s: hash_file failed: %s", __func__, ssh_err(r));
goto out;
}
if ((r = sshsig_wrap_verify(signature, hashalg, b, expect_namespace,
- sign_keyp)) != 0)
+ sign_keyp, sig_details)) != 0)
goto out;
/* success */
r = 0;
out:
sshbuf_free(b);
free(hashalg);
return r;
}
struct sshsigopt {
int ca;
char *namespaces;
};
struct sshsigopt *
sshsigopt_parse(const char *opts, const char *path, u_long linenum,
const char **errstrp)
{
struct sshsigopt *ret;
int r;
const char *errstr = NULL;
if ((ret = calloc(1, sizeof(*ret))) == NULL)
return NULL;
if (opts == NULL || *opts == '\0')
return ret; /* Empty options yields empty options :) */
while (*opts && *opts != ' ' && *opts != '\t') {
/* flag options */
if ((r = opt_flag("cert-authority", 0, &opts)) != -1) {
ret->ca = 1;
} else if (opt_match(&opts, "namespaces")) {
if (ret->namespaces != NULL) {
errstr = "multiple \"namespaces\" clauses";
goto fail;
}
ret->namespaces = opt_dequote(&opts, &errstr);
if (ret->namespaces == NULL)
goto fail;
}
/*
* Skip the comma, and move to the next option
* (or break out if there are no more).
*/
if (*opts == '\0' || *opts == ' ' || *opts == '\t')
break; /* End of options. */
/* Anything other than a comma is an unknown option */
if (*opts != ',') {
errstr = "unknown key option";
goto fail;
}
opts++;
if (*opts == '\0') {
errstr = "unexpected end-of-options";
goto fail;
}
}
/* success */
return ret;
fail:
if (errstrp != NULL)
*errstrp = errstr;
sshsigopt_free(ret);
return NULL;
}
void
sshsigopt_free(struct sshsigopt *opts)
{
if (opts == NULL)
return;
free(opts->namespaces);
free(opts);
}
static int
-check_allowed_keys_line(const char *path, u_long linenum, char *line,
- const struct sshkey *sign_key, const char *principal,
- const char *sig_namespace)
+parse_principals_key_and_options(const char *path, u_long linenum, char *line,
+ const char *required_principal, char **principalsp, struct sshkey **keyp,
+ struct sshsigopt **sigoptsp)
{
- struct sshkey *found_key = NULL;
- char *cp, *opts = NULL, *identities = NULL;
- int r, found = 0;
+ char *opts = NULL, *tmp, *cp, *principals = NULL;
const char *reason = NULL;
struct sshsigopt *sigopts = NULL;
+ struct sshkey *key = NULL;
+ int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR;
- if ((found_key = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL) {
- error("%s: sshkey_new failed", __func__);
- return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
- }
+ if (principalsp != NULL)
+ *principalsp = NULL;
+ if (sigoptsp != NULL)
+ *sigoptsp = NULL;
+ if (keyp != NULL)
+ *keyp = NULL;
- /* format: identity[,identity...] [option[,option...]] key */
cp = line;
cp = cp + strspn(cp, " \t"); /* skip leading whitespace */
if (*cp == '#' || *cp == '\0')
- goto done;
- if ((identities = strdelimw(&cp)) == NULL) {
+ return SSH_ERR_KEY_NOT_FOUND; /* blank or all-comment line */
+
+ /* format: identity[,identity...] [option[,option...]] key */
+ if ((tmp = strdelimw(&cp)) == NULL) {
error("%s:%lu: invalid line", path, linenum);
- goto done;
+ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ goto out;
}
- if (match_pattern_list(principal, identities, 0) != 1) {
- /* principal didn't match */
- goto done;
+ if ((principals = strdup(tmp)) == NULL) {
+ error("%s: strdup failed", __func__);
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ /*
+ * Bail out early if we're looking for a particular principal and this
+ * line does not list it.
+ */
+ if (required_principal != NULL) {
+ if (match_pattern_list(required_principal,
+ principals, 0) != 1) {
+ /* principal didn't match */
+ r = SSH_ERR_KEY_NOT_FOUND;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ debug("%s: %s:%lu: matched principal \"%s\"",
+ __func__, path, linenum, required_principal);
}
- debug("%s: %s:%lu: matched principal \"%s\"",
- __func__, path, linenum, principal);
- if (sshkey_read(found_key, &cp) != 0) {
+ if ((key = sshkey_new(KEY_UNSPEC)) == NULL) {
+ error("%s: sshkey_new failed", __func__);
+ r = SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if (sshkey_read(key, &cp) != 0) {
/* no key? Check for options */
opts = cp;
if (sshkey_advance_past_options(&cp) != 0) {
- error("%s:%lu: invalid options",
- path, linenum);
- goto done;
+ error("%s:%lu: invalid options", path, linenum);
+ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ goto out;
}
*cp++ = '\0';
skip_space(&cp);
- if (sshkey_read(found_key, &cp) != 0) {
- error("%s:%lu: invalid key", path,
- linenum);
- goto done;
+ if (sshkey_read(key, &cp) != 0) {
+ error("%s:%lu: invalid key", path, linenum);
+ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ goto out;
}
}
debug3("%s:%lu: options %s", path, linenum, opts == NULL ? "" : opts);
if ((sigopts = sshsigopt_parse(opts, path, linenum, &reason)) == NULL) {
error("%s:%lu: bad options: %s", path, linenum, reason);
+ r = SSH_ERR_INVALID_FORMAT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ /* success */
+ if (principalsp != NULL) {
+ *principalsp = principals;
+ principals = NULL; /* transferred */
+ }
+ if (sigoptsp != NULL) {
+ *sigoptsp = sigopts;
+ sigopts = NULL; /* transferred */
+ }
+ if (keyp != NULL) {
+ *keyp = key;
+ key = NULL; /* transferred */
+ }
+ r = 0;
+ out:
+ free(principals);
+ sshsigopt_free(sigopts);
+ sshkey_free(key);
+ return r;
+}
+
+static int
+check_allowed_keys_line(const char *path, u_long linenum, char *line,
+ const struct sshkey *sign_key, const char *principal,
+ const char *sig_namespace)
+{
+ struct sshkey *found_key = NULL;
+ int r, found = 0;
+ const char *reason = NULL;
+ struct sshsigopt *sigopts = NULL;
+
+ /* Parse the line */
+ if ((r = parse_principals_key_and_options(path, linenum, line,
+ principal, NULL, &found_key, &sigopts)) != 0) {
+ /* error already logged */
goto done;
}
/* Check whether options preclude the use of this key */
if (sigopts->namespaces != NULL &&
match_pattern_list(sig_namespace, sigopts->namespaces, 0) != 1) {
error("%s:%lu: key is not permitted for use in signature "
"namespace \"%s\"", path, linenum, sig_namespace);
goto done;
}
if (!sigopts->ca && sshkey_equal(found_key, sign_key)) {
/* Exact match of key */
debug("%s:%lu: matched key and principal", path, linenum);
/* success */
found = 1;
} else if (sigopts->ca && sshkey_is_cert(sign_key) &&
sshkey_equal_public(sign_key->cert->signature_key, found_key)) {
/* Match of certificate's CA key */
if ((r = sshkey_cert_check_authority(sign_key, 0, 1,
principal, &reason)) != 0) {
error("%s:%lu: certificate not authorized: %s",
path, linenum, reason);
goto done;
}
debug("%s:%lu: matched certificate CA key", path, linenum);
/* success */
found = 1;
} else {
/* Principal matched but key didn't */
goto done;
}
done:
sshkey_free(found_key);
sshsigopt_free(sigopts);
return found ? 0 : SSH_ERR_KEY_NOT_FOUND;
}
int
sshsig_check_allowed_keys(const char *path, const struct sshkey *sign_key,
const char *principal, const char *sig_namespace)
{
FILE *f = NULL;
char *line = NULL;
size_t linesize = 0;
u_long linenum = 0;
int r, oerrno;
/* Check key and principal against file */
if ((f = fopen(path, "r")) == NULL) {
oerrno = errno;
error("Unable to open allowed keys file \"%s\": %s",
path, strerror(errno));
errno = oerrno;
return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
}
while (getline(&line, &linesize, f) != -1) {
linenum++;
r = check_allowed_keys_line(path, linenum, line, sign_key,
principal, sig_namespace);
free(line);
line = NULL;
if (r == SSH_ERR_KEY_NOT_FOUND)
continue;
else if (r == 0) {
/* success */
fclose(f);
return 0;
} else
break;
}
/* Either we hit an error parsing or we simply didn't find the key */
fclose(f);
free(line);
return r == 0 ? SSH_ERR_KEY_NOT_FOUND : r;
}
+
+static int
+cert_filter_principals(const char *path, u_long linenum,
+ char **principalsp, const struct sshkey *cert)
+{
+ char *cp, *oprincipals, *principals;
+ const char *reason;
+ struct sshbuf *nprincipals;
+ int r = SSH_ERR_INTERNAL_ERROR, success = 0;
+
+ oprincipals = principals = *principalsp;
+ *principalsp = NULL;
+
+ if ((nprincipals = sshbuf_new()) == NULL)
+ return SSH_ERR_ALLOC_FAIL;
+
+ while ((cp = strsep(&principals, ",")) != NULL && *cp != '\0') {
+ if (strcspn(cp, "!?*") != strlen(cp)) {
+ debug("%s:%lu: principal \"%s\" not authorized: "
+ "contains wildcards", path, linenum, cp);
+ continue;
+ }
+ /* Check against principals list in certificate */
+ if ((r = sshkey_cert_check_authority(cert, 0, 1,
+ cp, &reason)) != 0) {
+ debug("%s:%lu: principal \"%s\" not authorized: %s",
+ path, linenum, cp, reason);
+ continue;
+ }
+ if ((r = sshbuf_putf(nprincipals, "%s%s",
+ sshbuf_len(nprincipals) != 0 ? "," : "", cp)) != 0) {
+ error("%s: buffer error", __func__);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ }
+ if (sshbuf_len(nprincipals) == 0) {
+ error("%s:%lu: no valid principals found", path, linenum);
+ r = SSH_ERR_KEY_CERT_INVALID;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ if ((principals = sshbuf_dup_string(nprincipals)) == NULL) {
+ error("%s: buffer error", __func__);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ /* success */
+ success = 1;
+ *principalsp = principals;
+ out:
+ sshbuf_free(nprincipals);
+ free(oprincipals);
+ return success ? 0 : r;
+}
+
+static int
+get_matching_principals_from_line(const char *path, u_long linenum, char *line,
+ const struct sshkey *sign_key, char **principalsp)
+{
+ struct sshkey *found_key = NULL;
+ char *principals = NULL;
+ int r, found = 0;
+ struct sshsigopt *sigopts = NULL;
+
+ if (principalsp != NULL)
+ *principalsp = NULL;
+
+ /* Parse the line */
+ if ((r = parse_principals_key_and_options(path, linenum, line,
+ NULL, &principals, &found_key, &sigopts)) != 0) {
+ /* error already logged */
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ if (!sigopts->ca && sshkey_equal(found_key, sign_key)) {
+ /* Exact match of key */
+ debug("%s:%lu: matched key", path, linenum);
+ /* success */
+ found = 1;
+ } else if (sigopts->ca && sshkey_is_cert(sign_key) &&
+ sshkey_equal_public(sign_key->cert->signature_key, found_key)) {
+ /* Remove principals listed in file but not allowed by cert */
+ if ((r = cert_filter_principals(path, linenum,
+ &principals, sign_key)) != 0) {
+ /* error already displayed */
+ debug("%s:%lu: cert_filter_principals: %s",
+ path, linenum, ssh_err(r));
+ goto done;
+ }
+ debug("%s:%lu: matched certificate CA key", path, linenum);
+ /* success */
+ found = 1;
+ } else {
+ /* Key didn't match */
+ goto done;
+ }
+ done:
+ if (found) {
+ *principalsp = principals;
+ principals = NULL; /* transferred */
+ }
+ free(principals);
+ sshkey_free(found_key);
+ sshsigopt_free(sigopts);
+ return found ? 0 : SSH_ERR_KEY_NOT_FOUND;
+}
+
+int
+sshsig_find_principals(const char *path, const struct sshkey *sign_key,
+ char **principals)
+{
+ FILE *f = NULL;
+ char *line = NULL;
+ size_t linesize = 0;
+ u_long linenum = 0;
+ int r, oerrno;
+
+ if ((f = fopen(path, "r")) == NULL) {
+ oerrno = errno;
+ error("Unable to open allowed keys file \"%s\": %s",
+ path, strerror(errno));
+ errno = oerrno;
+ return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
+ }
+
+ while (getline(&line, &linesize, f) != -1) {
+ linenum++;
+ r = get_matching_principals_from_line(path, linenum, line,
+ sign_key, principals);
+ free(line);
+ line = NULL;
+ if (r == SSH_ERR_KEY_NOT_FOUND)
+ continue;
+ else if (r == 0) {
+ /* success */
+ fclose(f);
+ return 0;
+ } else
+ break;
+ }
+ free(line);
+ /* Either we hit an error parsing or we simply didn't find the key */
+ if (ferror(f) != 0) {
+ oerrno = errno;
+ fclose(f);
+ error("Unable to read allowed keys file \"%s\": %s",
+ path, strerror(errno));
+ errno = oerrno;
+ return SSH_ERR_SYSTEM_ERROR;
+ }
+ fclose(f);
+ return r == 0 ? SSH_ERR_KEY_NOT_FOUND : r;
+}
+
+int
+sshsig_get_pubkey(struct sshbuf *signature, struct sshkey **pubkey)
+{
+ struct sshkey *pk = NULL;
+ int r = SSH_ERR_SIGNATURE_INVALID;
+
+ if (pubkey != NULL)
+ *pubkey = NULL;
+ if ((r = sshsig_parse_preamble(signature)) != 0)
+ return r;
+ if ((r = sshkey_froms(signature, &pk)) != 0)
+ return r;
+
+ *pubkey = pk;
+ pk = NULL;
+ return 0;
+}
diff --git a/sshsig.h b/sshsig.h
index e3eeb601bd10..63cc1ad1a203 100644
--- a/sshsig.h
+++ b/sshsig.h
@@ -1,92 +1,104 @@
/*
* Copyright (c) 2019 Google LLC
*
* Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
* purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
* copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
*
* THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
* WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
* MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
* ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
* WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
* ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
* OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
*/
#ifndef SSHSIG_H
#define SSHSIG_H
struct sshbuf;
struct sshkey;
struct sshsigopt;
+struct sshkey_sig_details;
typedef int sshsig_signer(struct sshkey *, u_char **, size_t *,
- const u_char *, size_t, const char *, u_int, void *);
+ const u_char *, size_t, const char *, const char *, u_int, void *);
/* Buffer-oriented API */
/*
* Creates a detached SSH signature for a given buffer.
* Returns 0 on success or a negative SSH_ERR_* error code on failure.
* out is populated with the detached signature, or NULL on failure.
*/
int sshsig_signb(struct sshkey *key, const char *hashalg,
- const struct sshbuf *message, const char *sig_namespace,
- struct sshbuf **out, sshsig_signer *signer, void *signer_ctx);
+ const char *sk_provider, const struct sshbuf *message,
+ const char *sig_namespace, struct sshbuf **out,
+ sshsig_signer *signer, void *signer_ctx);
/*
* Verifies that a detached signature is valid and optionally returns key
* used to sign via argument.
* Returns 0 on success or a negative SSH_ERR_* error code on failure.
*/
int sshsig_verifyb(struct sshbuf *signature,
const struct sshbuf *message, const char *sig_namespace,
- struct sshkey **sign_keyp);
+ struct sshkey **sign_keyp, struct sshkey_sig_details **sig_details);
/* File/FD-oriented API */
/*
* Creates a detached SSH signature for a given file.
* Returns 0 on success or a negative SSH_ERR_* error code on failure.
* out is populated with the detached signature, or NULL on failure.
*/
int sshsig_sign_fd(struct sshkey *key, const char *hashalg,
- int fd, const char *sig_namespace, struct sshbuf **out,
- sshsig_signer *signer, void *signer_ctx);
+ const char *sk_provider, int fd, const char *sig_namespace,
+ struct sshbuf **out, sshsig_signer *signer, void *signer_ctx);
/*
* Verifies that a detached signature over a file is valid and optionally
* returns key used to sign via argument.
* Returns 0 on success or a negative SSH_ERR_* error code on failure.
*/
int sshsig_verify_fd(struct sshbuf *signature, int fd,
- const char *sig_namespace, struct sshkey **sign_keyp);
+ const char *sig_namespace, struct sshkey **sign_keyp,
+ struct sshkey_sig_details **sig_details);
/* Utility functions */
/*
* Return a base64 encoded "ASCII armoured" version of a raw signature.
*/
int sshsig_armor(const struct sshbuf *blob, struct sshbuf **out);
/*
* Decode a base64 encoded armoured signature to a raw signature.
*/
int sshsig_dearmor(struct sshbuf *sig, struct sshbuf **out);
/*
* Checks whether a particular key/principal/namespace is permitted by
* an allowed_keys file. Returns 0 on success.
*/
int sshsig_check_allowed_keys(const char *path, const struct sshkey *sign_key,
const char *principal, const char *ns);
/* Parse zero or more allowed_keys signature options */
struct sshsigopt *sshsigopt_parse(const char *opts,
const char *path, u_long linenum, const char **errstrp);
/* Free signature options */
void sshsigopt_free(struct sshsigopt *opts);
+/* Get public key from signature */
+int sshsig_get_pubkey(struct sshbuf *signature, struct sshkey **pubkey);
+
+/* Find principal in allowed_keys file, given a sshkey. Returns
+ * 0 on success.
+ */
+int sshsig_find_principals(const char *path, const struct sshkey *sign_key,
+ char **principal);
+
#endif /* SSHSIG_H */
diff --git a/umac.c b/umac.c
index ccae39f30940..2a6b6ae6b48f 100644
--- a/umac.c
+++ b/umac.c
@@ -1,1282 +1,1283 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: umac.c,v 1.17 2018/04/10 00:10:49 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: umac.c,v 1.18 2019/11/13 04:47:52 deraadt Exp $ */
/* -----------------------------------------------------------------------
*
* umac.c -- C Implementation UMAC Message Authentication
*
* Version 0.93b of rfc4418.txt -- 2006 July 18
*
* For a full description of UMAC message authentication see the UMAC
* world-wide-web page at http://www.cs.ucdavis.edu/~rogaway/umac
* Please report bugs and suggestions to the UMAC webpage.
*
* Copyright (c) 1999-2006 Ted Krovetz
*
* Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software and
* its documentation for any purpose and with or without fee, is hereby
* granted provided that the above copyright notice appears in all copies
* and in supporting documentation, and that the name of the copyright
* holder not be used in advertising or publicity pertaining to
* distribution of the software without specific, written prior permission.
*
* Comments should be directed to Ted Krovetz (tdk@acm.org)
*
* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
/* ////////////////////// IMPORTANT NOTES /////////////////////////////////
*
* 1) This version does not work properly on messages larger than 16MB
*
* 2) If you set the switch to use SSE2, then all data must be 16-byte
* aligned
*
* 3) When calling the function umac(), it is assumed that msg is in
* a writable buffer of length divisible by 32 bytes. The message itself
* does not have to fill the entire buffer, but bytes beyond msg may be
* zeroed.
*
* 4) Three free AES implementations are supported by this implementation of
* UMAC. Paulo Barreto's version is in the public domain and can be found
* at http://www.esat.kuleuven.ac.be/~rijmen/rijndael/ (search for
* "Barreto"). The only two files needed are rijndael-alg-fst.c and
* rijndael-alg-fst.h. Brian Gladman's version is distributed with the GNU
* Public lisence at http://fp.gladman.plus.com/AES/index.htm. It
* includes a fast IA-32 assembly version. The OpenSSL crypo library is
* the third.
*
* 5) With FORCE_C_ONLY flags set to 0, incorrect results are sometimes
* produced under gcc with optimizations set -O3 or higher. Dunno why.
*
/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// */
/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
/* --- User Switches ---------------------------------------------------- */
/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
#ifndef UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN
#define UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN 8 /* Alowable: 4, 8, 12, 16 */
#endif
#if UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN != 4 && UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN != 8 && \
UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN != 12 && UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN != 16
# error UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN must be defined to 4, 8, 12 or 16
#endif
/* #define FORCE_C_ONLY 1 ANSI C and 64-bit integers req'd */
/* #define AES_IMPLEMENTAION 1 1 = OpenSSL, 2 = Barreto, 3 = Gladman */
/* #define SSE2 0 Is SSE2 is available? */
/* #define RUN_TESTS 0 Run basic correctness/speed tests */
/* #define UMAC_AE_SUPPORT 0 Enable authenticated encryption */
/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
/* -- Global Includes --------------------------------------------------- */
/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
#include "includes.h"
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <string.h>
+#include <stdarg.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stddef.h>
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "umac.h"
#include "misc.h"
/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
/* --- Primitive Data Types --- */
/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
/* The following assumptions may need change on your system */
typedef u_int8_t UINT8; /* 1 byte */
typedef u_int16_t UINT16; /* 2 byte */
typedef u_int32_t UINT32; /* 4 byte */
typedef u_int64_t UINT64; /* 8 bytes */
typedef unsigned int UWORD; /* Register */
/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
/* --- Constants -------------------------------------------------------- */
/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
#define UMAC_KEY_LEN 16 /* UMAC takes 16 bytes of external key */
/* Message "words" are read from memory in an endian-specific manner. */
/* For this implementation to behave correctly, __LITTLE_ENDIAN__ must */
/* be set true if the host computer is little-endian. */
#if BYTE_ORDER == LITTLE_ENDIAN
#define __LITTLE_ENDIAN__ 1
#else
#define __LITTLE_ENDIAN__ 0
#endif
/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
/* ----- Architecture Specific ------------------------------------------ */
/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
/* ----- Primitive Routines --------------------------------------------- */
/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
/* --- 32-bit by 32-bit to 64-bit Multiplication ------------------------ */
/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
#define MUL64(a,b) ((UINT64)((UINT64)(UINT32)(a) * (UINT64)(UINT32)(b)))
/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
/* --- Endian Conversion --- Forcing assembly on some platforms */
/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
#if (__LITTLE_ENDIAN__)
#define LOAD_UINT32_REVERSED(p) get_u32(p)
#define STORE_UINT32_REVERSED(p,v) put_u32(p,v)
#else
#define LOAD_UINT32_REVERSED(p) get_u32_le(p)
#define STORE_UINT32_REVERSED(p,v) put_u32_le(p,v)
#endif
#define LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(p) (get_u32_le(p))
#define STORE_UINT32_BIG(p,v) put_u32(p, v)
/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
/* ----- Begin KDF & PDF Section ---------------------------------------- */
/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
/* UMAC uses AES with 16 byte block and key lengths */
#define AES_BLOCK_LEN 16
/* OpenSSL's AES */
#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
#include "openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h"
#ifndef USE_BUILTIN_RIJNDAEL
# include <openssl/aes.h>
#endif
typedef AES_KEY aes_int_key[1];
#define aes_encryption(in,out,int_key) \
AES_encrypt((u_char *)(in),(u_char *)(out),(AES_KEY *)int_key)
#define aes_key_setup(key,int_key) \
AES_set_encrypt_key((const u_char *)(key),UMAC_KEY_LEN*8,int_key)
#else
#include "rijndael.h"
#define AES_ROUNDS ((UMAC_KEY_LEN / 4) + 6)
typedef UINT8 aes_int_key[AES_ROUNDS+1][4][4]; /* AES internal */
#define aes_encryption(in,out,int_key) \
rijndaelEncrypt((u32 *)(int_key), AES_ROUNDS, (u8 *)(in), (u8 *)(out))
#define aes_key_setup(key,int_key) \
rijndaelKeySetupEnc((u32 *)(int_key), (const unsigned char *)(key), \
UMAC_KEY_LEN*8)
#endif
/* The user-supplied UMAC key is stretched using AES in a counter
* mode to supply all random bits needed by UMAC. The kdf function takes
* an AES internal key representation 'key' and writes a stream of
* 'nbytes' bytes to the memory pointed at by 'bufp'. Each distinct
* 'ndx' causes a distinct byte stream.
*/
static void kdf(void *bufp, aes_int_key key, UINT8 ndx, int nbytes)
{
UINT8 in_buf[AES_BLOCK_LEN] = {0};
UINT8 out_buf[AES_BLOCK_LEN];
UINT8 *dst_buf = (UINT8 *)bufp;
int i;
/* Setup the initial value */
in_buf[AES_BLOCK_LEN-9] = ndx;
in_buf[AES_BLOCK_LEN-1] = i = 1;
while (nbytes >= AES_BLOCK_LEN) {
aes_encryption(in_buf, out_buf, key);
memcpy(dst_buf,out_buf,AES_BLOCK_LEN);
in_buf[AES_BLOCK_LEN-1] = ++i;
nbytes -= AES_BLOCK_LEN;
dst_buf += AES_BLOCK_LEN;
}
if (nbytes) {
aes_encryption(in_buf, out_buf, key);
memcpy(dst_buf,out_buf,nbytes);
}
explicit_bzero(in_buf, sizeof(in_buf));
explicit_bzero(out_buf, sizeof(out_buf));
}
/* The final UHASH result is XOR'd with the output of a pseudorandom
* function. Here, we use AES to generate random output and
* xor the appropriate bytes depending on the last bits of nonce.
* This scheme is optimized for sequential, increasing big-endian nonces.
*/
typedef struct {
UINT8 cache[AES_BLOCK_LEN]; /* Previous AES output is saved */
UINT8 nonce[AES_BLOCK_LEN]; /* The AES input making above cache */
aes_int_key prf_key; /* Expanded AES key for PDF */
} pdf_ctx;
static void pdf_init(pdf_ctx *pc, aes_int_key prf_key)
{
UINT8 buf[UMAC_KEY_LEN];
kdf(buf, prf_key, 0, UMAC_KEY_LEN);
aes_key_setup(buf, pc->prf_key);
/* Initialize pdf and cache */
memset(pc->nonce, 0, sizeof(pc->nonce));
aes_encryption(pc->nonce, pc->cache, pc->prf_key);
explicit_bzero(buf, sizeof(buf));
}
static void pdf_gen_xor(pdf_ctx *pc, const UINT8 nonce[8], UINT8 buf[8])
{
/* 'ndx' indicates that we'll be using the 0th or 1st eight bytes
* of the AES output. If last time around we returned the ndx-1st
* element, then we may have the result in the cache already.
*/
#if (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN == 4)
#define LOW_BIT_MASK 3
#elif (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN == 8)
#define LOW_BIT_MASK 1
#elif (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN > 8)
#define LOW_BIT_MASK 0
#endif
union {
UINT8 tmp_nonce_lo[4];
UINT32 align;
} t;
#if LOW_BIT_MASK != 0
int ndx = nonce[7] & LOW_BIT_MASK;
#endif
*(UINT32 *)t.tmp_nonce_lo = ((const UINT32 *)nonce)[1];
t.tmp_nonce_lo[3] &= ~LOW_BIT_MASK; /* zero last bit */
if ( (((UINT32 *)t.tmp_nonce_lo)[0] != ((UINT32 *)pc->nonce)[1]) ||
(((const UINT32 *)nonce)[0] != ((UINT32 *)pc->nonce)[0]) )
{
((UINT32 *)pc->nonce)[0] = ((const UINT32 *)nonce)[0];
((UINT32 *)pc->nonce)[1] = ((UINT32 *)t.tmp_nonce_lo)[0];
aes_encryption(pc->nonce, pc->cache, pc->prf_key);
}
#if (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN == 4)
*((UINT32 *)buf) ^= ((UINT32 *)pc->cache)[ndx];
#elif (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN == 8)
*((UINT64 *)buf) ^= ((UINT64 *)pc->cache)[ndx];
#elif (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN == 12)
((UINT64 *)buf)[0] ^= ((UINT64 *)pc->cache)[0];
((UINT32 *)buf)[2] ^= ((UINT32 *)pc->cache)[2];
#elif (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN == 16)
((UINT64 *)buf)[0] ^= ((UINT64 *)pc->cache)[0];
((UINT64 *)buf)[1] ^= ((UINT64 *)pc->cache)[1];
#endif
}
/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
/* ----- Begin NH Hash Section ------------------------------------------ */
/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
/* The NH-based hash functions used in UMAC are described in the UMAC paper
* and specification, both of which can be found at the UMAC website.
* The interface to this implementation has two
* versions, one expects the entire message being hashed to be passed
* in a single buffer and returns the hash result immediately. The second
* allows the message to be passed in a sequence of buffers. In the
* muliple-buffer interface, the client calls the routine nh_update() as
* many times as necessary. When there is no more data to be fed to the
* hash, the client calls nh_final() which calculates the hash output.
* Before beginning another hash calculation the nh_reset() routine
* must be called. The single-buffer routine, nh(), is equivalent to
* the sequence of calls nh_update() and nh_final(); however it is
* optimized and should be preferred whenever the multiple-buffer interface
* is not necessary. When using either interface, it is the client's
* responsibility to pass no more than L1_KEY_LEN bytes per hash result.
*
* The routine nh_init() initializes the nh_ctx data structure and
* must be called once, before any other PDF routine.
*/
/* The "nh_aux" routines do the actual NH hashing work. They
* expect buffers to be multiples of L1_PAD_BOUNDARY. These routines
* produce output for all STREAMS NH iterations in one call,
* allowing the parallel implementation of the streams.
*/
#define STREAMS (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN / 4) /* Number of times hash is applied */
#define L1_KEY_LEN 1024 /* Internal key bytes */
#define L1_KEY_SHIFT 16 /* Toeplitz key shift between streams */
#define L1_PAD_BOUNDARY 32 /* pad message to boundary multiple */
#define ALLOC_BOUNDARY 16 /* Keep buffers aligned to this */
#define HASH_BUF_BYTES 64 /* nh_aux_hb buffer multiple */
typedef struct {
UINT8 nh_key [L1_KEY_LEN + L1_KEY_SHIFT * (STREAMS - 1)]; /* NH Key */
UINT8 data [HASH_BUF_BYTES]; /* Incoming data buffer */
int next_data_empty; /* Bookkeeping variable for data buffer. */
int bytes_hashed; /* Bytes (out of L1_KEY_LEN) incorporated. */
UINT64 state[STREAMS]; /* on-line state */
} nh_ctx;
#if (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN == 4)
static void nh_aux(void *kp, const void *dp, void *hp, UINT32 dlen)
/* NH hashing primitive. Previous (partial) hash result is loaded and
* then stored via hp pointer. The length of the data pointed at by "dp",
* "dlen", is guaranteed to be divisible by L1_PAD_BOUNDARY (32). Key
* is expected to be endian compensated in memory at key setup.
*/
{
UINT64 h;
UWORD c = dlen / 32;
UINT32 *k = (UINT32 *)kp;
const UINT32 *d = (const UINT32 *)dp;
UINT32 d0,d1,d2,d3,d4,d5,d6,d7;
UINT32 k0,k1,k2,k3,k4,k5,k6,k7;
h = *((UINT64 *)hp);
do {
d0 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+0); d1 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+1);
d2 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+2); d3 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+3);
d4 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+4); d5 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+5);
d6 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+6); d7 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+7);
k0 = *(k+0); k1 = *(k+1); k2 = *(k+2); k3 = *(k+3);
k4 = *(k+4); k5 = *(k+5); k6 = *(k+6); k7 = *(k+7);
h += MUL64((k0 + d0), (k4 + d4));
h += MUL64((k1 + d1), (k5 + d5));
h += MUL64((k2 + d2), (k6 + d6));
h += MUL64((k3 + d3), (k7 + d7));
d += 8;
k += 8;
} while (--c);
*((UINT64 *)hp) = h;
}
#elif (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN == 8)
static void nh_aux(void *kp, const void *dp, void *hp, UINT32 dlen)
/* Same as previous nh_aux, but two streams are handled in one pass,
* reading and writing 16 bytes of hash-state per call.
*/
{
UINT64 h1,h2;
UWORD c = dlen / 32;
UINT32 *k = (UINT32 *)kp;
const UINT32 *d = (const UINT32 *)dp;
UINT32 d0,d1,d2,d3,d4,d5,d6,d7;
UINT32 k0,k1,k2,k3,k4,k5,k6,k7,
k8,k9,k10,k11;
h1 = *((UINT64 *)hp);
h2 = *((UINT64 *)hp + 1);
k0 = *(k+0); k1 = *(k+1); k2 = *(k+2); k3 = *(k+3);
do {
d0 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+0); d1 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+1);
d2 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+2); d3 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+3);
d4 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+4); d5 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+5);
d6 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+6); d7 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+7);
k4 = *(k+4); k5 = *(k+5); k6 = *(k+6); k7 = *(k+7);
k8 = *(k+8); k9 = *(k+9); k10 = *(k+10); k11 = *(k+11);
h1 += MUL64((k0 + d0), (k4 + d4));
h2 += MUL64((k4 + d0), (k8 + d4));
h1 += MUL64((k1 + d1), (k5 + d5));
h2 += MUL64((k5 + d1), (k9 + d5));
h1 += MUL64((k2 + d2), (k6 + d6));
h2 += MUL64((k6 + d2), (k10 + d6));
h1 += MUL64((k3 + d3), (k7 + d7));
h2 += MUL64((k7 + d3), (k11 + d7));
k0 = k8; k1 = k9; k2 = k10; k3 = k11;
d += 8;
k += 8;
} while (--c);
((UINT64 *)hp)[0] = h1;
((UINT64 *)hp)[1] = h2;
}
#elif (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN == 12)
static void nh_aux(void *kp, const void *dp, void *hp, UINT32 dlen)
/* Same as previous nh_aux, but two streams are handled in one pass,
* reading and writing 24 bytes of hash-state per call.
*/
{
UINT64 h1,h2,h3;
UWORD c = dlen / 32;
UINT32 *k = (UINT32 *)kp;
const UINT32 *d = (const UINT32 *)dp;
UINT32 d0,d1,d2,d3,d4,d5,d6,d7;
UINT32 k0,k1,k2,k3,k4,k5,k6,k7,
k8,k9,k10,k11,k12,k13,k14,k15;
h1 = *((UINT64 *)hp);
h2 = *((UINT64 *)hp + 1);
h3 = *((UINT64 *)hp + 2);
k0 = *(k+0); k1 = *(k+1); k2 = *(k+2); k3 = *(k+3);
k4 = *(k+4); k5 = *(k+5); k6 = *(k+6); k7 = *(k+7);
do {
d0 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+0); d1 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+1);
d2 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+2); d3 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+3);
d4 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+4); d5 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+5);
d6 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+6); d7 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+7);
k8 = *(k+8); k9 = *(k+9); k10 = *(k+10); k11 = *(k+11);
k12 = *(k+12); k13 = *(k+13); k14 = *(k+14); k15 = *(k+15);
h1 += MUL64((k0 + d0), (k4 + d4));
h2 += MUL64((k4 + d0), (k8 + d4));
h3 += MUL64((k8 + d0), (k12 + d4));
h1 += MUL64((k1 + d1), (k5 + d5));
h2 += MUL64((k5 + d1), (k9 + d5));
h3 += MUL64((k9 + d1), (k13 + d5));
h1 += MUL64((k2 + d2), (k6 + d6));
h2 += MUL64((k6 + d2), (k10 + d6));
h3 += MUL64((k10 + d2), (k14 + d6));
h1 += MUL64((k3 + d3), (k7 + d7));
h2 += MUL64((k7 + d3), (k11 + d7));
h3 += MUL64((k11 + d3), (k15 + d7));
k0 = k8; k1 = k9; k2 = k10; k3 = k11;
k4 = k12; k5 = k13; k6 = k14; k7 = k15;
d += 8;
k += 8;
} while (--c);
((UINT64 *)hp)[0] = h1;
((UINT64 *)hp)[1] = h2;
((UINT64 *)hp)[2] = h3;
}
#elif (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN == 16)
static void nh_aux(void *kp, const void *dp, void *hp, UINT32 dlen)
/* Same as previous nh_aux, but two streams are handled in one pass,
* reading and writing 24 bytes of hash-state per call.
*/
{
UINT64 h1,h2,h3,h4;
UWORD c = dlen / 32;
UINT32 *k = (UINT32 *)kp;
const UINT32 *d = (const UINT32 *)dp;
UINT32 d0,d1,d2,d3,d4,d5,d6,d7;
UINT32 k0,k1,k2,k3,k4,k5,k6,k7,
k8,k9,k10,k11,k12,k13,k14,k15,
k16,k17,k18,k19;
h1 = *((UINT64 *)hp);
h2 = *((UINT64 *)hp + 1);
h3 = *((UINT64 *)hp + 2);
h4 = *((UINT64 *)hp + 3);
k0 = *(k+0); k1 = *(k+1); k2 = *(k+2); k3 = *(k+3);
k4 = *(k+4); k5 = *(k+5); k6 = *(k+6); k7 = *(k+7);
do {
d0 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+0); d1 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+1);
d2 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+2); d3 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+3);
d4 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+4); d5 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+5);
d6 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+6); d7 = LOAD_UINT32_LITTLE(d+7);
k8 = *(k+8); k9 = *(k+9); k10 = *(k+10); k11 = *(k+11);
k12 = *(k+12); k13 = *(k+13); k14 = *(k+14); k15 = *(k+15);
k16 = *(k+16); k17 = *(k+17); k18 = *(k+18); k19 = *(k+19);
h1 += MUL64((k0 + d0), (k4 + d4));
h2 += MUL64((k4 + d0), (k8 + d4));
h3 += MUL64((k8 + d0), (k12 + d4));
h4 += MUL64((k12 + d0), (k16 + d4));
h1 += MUL64((k1 + d1), (k5 + d5));
h2 += MUL64((k5 + d1), (k9 + d5));
h3 += MUL64((k9 + d1), (k13 + d5));
h4 += MUL64((k13 + d1), (k17 + d5));
h1 += MUL64((k2 + d2), (k6 + d6));
h2 += MUL64((k6 + d2), (k10 + d6));
h3 += MUL64((k10 + d2), (k14 + d6));
h4 += MUL64((k14 + d2), (k18 + d6));
h1 += MUL64((k3 + d3), (k7 + d7));
h2 += MUL64((k7 + d3), (k11 + d7));
h3 += MUL64((k11 + d3), (k15 + d7));
h4 += MUL64((k15 + d3), (k19 + d7));
k0 = k8; k1 = k9; k2 = k10; k3 = k11;
k4 = k12; k5 = k13; k6 = k14; k7 = k15;
k8 = k16; k9 = k17; k10 = k18; k11 = k19;
d += 8;
k += 8;
} while (--c);
((UINT64 *)hp)[0] = h1;
((UINT64 *)hp)[1] = h2;
((UINT64 *)hp)[2] = h3;
((UINT64 *)hp)[3] = h4;
}
/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
#endif /* UMAC_OUTPUT_LENGTH */
/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
static void nh_transform(nh_ctx *hc, const UINT8 *buf, UINT32 nbytes)
/* This function is a wrapper for the primitive NH hash functions. It takes
* as argument "hc" the current hash context and a buffer which must be a
* multiple of L1_PAD_BOUNDARY. The key passed to nh_aux is offset
* appropriately according to how much message has been hashed already.
*/
{
UINT8 *key;
key = hc->nh_key + hc->bytes_hashed;
nh_aux(key, buf, hc->state, nbytes);
}
/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
#if (__LITTLE_ENDIAN__)
static void endian_convert(void *buf, UWORD bpw, UINT32 num_bytes)
/* We endian convert the keys on little-endian computers to */
/* compensate for the lack of big-endian memory reads during hashing. */
{
UWORD iters = num_bytes / bpw;
if (bpw == 4) {
UINT32 *p = (UINT32 *)buf;
do {
*p = LOAD_UINT32_REVERSED(p);
p++;
} while (--iters);
} else if (bpw == 8) {
UINT32 *p = (UINT32 *)buf;
UINT32 t;
do {
t = LOAD_UINT32_REVERSED(p+1);
p[1] = LOAD_UINT32_REVERSED(p);
p[0] = t;
p += 2;
} while (--iters);
}
}
#define endian_convert_if_le(x,y,z) endian_convert((x),(y),(z))
#else
#define endian_convert_if_le(x,y,z) do{}while(0) /* Do nothing */
#endif
/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
static void nh_reset(nh_ctx *hc)
/* Reset nh_ctx to ready for hashing of new data */
{
hc->bytes_hashed = 0;
hc->next_data_empty = 0;
hc->state[0] = 0;
#if (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN >= 8)
hc->state[1] = 0;
#endif
#if (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN >= 12)
hc->state[2] = 0;
#endif
#if (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN == 16)
hc->state[3] = 0;
#endif
}
/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
static void nh_init(nh_ctx *hc, aes_int_key prf_key)
/* Generate nh_key, endian convert and reset to be ready for hashing. */
{
kdf(hc->nh_key, prf_key, 1, sizeof(hc->nh_key));
endian_convert_if_le(hc->nh_key, 4, sizeof(hc->nh_key));
nh_reset(hc);
}
/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
static void nh_update(nh_ctx *hc, const UINT8 *buf, UINT32 nbytes)
/* Incorporate nbytes of data into a nh_ctx, buffer whatever is not an */
/* even multiple of HASH_BUF_BYTES. */
{
UINT32 i,j;
j = hc->next_data_empty;
if ((j + nbytes) >= HASH_BUF_BYTES) {
if (j) {
i = HASH_BUF_BYTES - j;
memcpy(hc->data+j, buf, i);
nh_transform(hc,hc->data,HASH_BUF_BYTES);
nbytes -= i;
buf += i;
hc->bytes_hashed += HASH_BUF_BYTES;
}
if (nbytes >= HASH_BUF_BYTES) {
i = nbytes & ~(HASH_BUF_BYTES - 1);
nh_transform(hc, buf, i);
nbytes -= i;
buf += i;
hc->bytes_hashed += i;
}
j = 0;
}
memcpy(hc->data + j, buf, nbytes);
hc->next_data_empty = j + nbytes;
}
/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
static void zero_pad(UINT8 *p, int nbytes)
{
/* Write "nbytes" of zeroes, beginning at "p" */
if (nbytes >= (int)sizeof(UWORD)) {
while ((ptrdiff_t)p % sizeof(UWORD)) {
*p = 0;
nbytes--;
p++;
}
while (nbytes >= (int)sizeof(UWORD)) {
*(UWORD *)p = 0;
nbytes -= sizeof(UWORD);
p += sizeof(UWORD);
}
}
while (nbytes) {
*p = 0;
nbytes--;
p++;
}
}
/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
static void nh_final(nh_ctx *hc, UINT8 *result)
/* After passing some number of data buffers to nh_update() for integration
* into an NH context, nh_final is called to produce a hash result. If any
* bytes are in the buffer hc->data, incorporate them into the
* NH context. Finally, add into the NH accumulation "state" the total number
* of bits hashed. The resulting numbers are written to the buffer "result".
* If nh_update was never called, L1_PAD_BOUNDARY zeroes are incorporated.
*/
{
int nh_len, nbits;
if (hc->next_data_empty != 0) {
nh_len = ((hc->next_data_empty + (L1_PAD_BOUNDARY - 1)) &
~(L1_PAD_BOUNDARY - 1));
zero_pad(hc->data + hc->next_data_empty,
nh_len - hc->next_data_empty);
nh_transform(hc, hc->data, nh_len);
hc->bytes_hashed += hc->next_data_empty;
} else if (hc->bytes_hashed == 0) {
nh_len = L1_PAD_BOUNDARY;
zero_pad(hc->data, L1_PAD_BOUNDARY);
nh_transform(hc, hc->data, nh_len);
}
nbits = (hc->bytes_hashed << 3);
((UINT64 *)result)[0] = ((UINT64 *)hc->state)[0] + nbits;
#if (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN >= 8)
((UINT64 *)result)[1] = ((UINT64 *)hc->state)[1] + nbits;
#endif
#if (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN >= 12)
((UINT64 *)result)[2] = ((UINT64 *)hc->state)[2] + nbits;
#endif
#if (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN == 16)
((UINT64 *)result)[3] = ((UINT64 *)hc->state)[3] + nbits;
#endif
nh_reset(hc);
}
/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
static void nh(nh_ctx *hc, const UINT8 *buf, UINT32 padded_len,
UINT32 unpadded_len, UINT8 *result)
/* All-in-one nh_update() and nh_final() equivalent.
* Assumes that padded_len is divisible by L1_PAD_BOUNDARY and result is
* well aligned
*/
{
UINT32 nbits;
/* Initialize the hash state */
nbits = (unpadded_len << 3);
((UINT64 *)result)[0] = nbits;
#if (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN >= 8)
((UINT64 *)result)[1] = nbits;
#endif
#if (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN >= 12)
((UINT64 *)result)[2] = nbits;
#endif
#if (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN == 16)
((UINT64 *)result)[3] = nbits;
#endif
nh_aux(hc->nh_key, buf, result, padded_len);
}
/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
/* ----- Begin UHASH Section -------------------------------------------- */
/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
/* UHASH is a multi-layered algorithm. Data presented to UHASH is first
* hashed by NH. The NH output is then hashed by a polynomial-hash layer
* unless the initial data to be hashed is short. After the polynomial-
* layer, an inner-product hash is used to produce the final UHASH output.
*
* UHASH provides two interfaces, one all-at-once and another where data
* buffers are presented sequentially. In the sequential interface, the
* UHASH client calls the routine uhash_update() as many times as necessary.
* When there is no more data to be fed to UHASH, the client calls
* uhash_final() which
* calculates the UHASH output. Before beginning another UHASH calculation
* the uhash_reset() routine must be called. The all-at-once UHASH routine,
* uhash(), is equivalent to the sequence of calls uhash_update() and
* uhash_final(); however it is optimized and should be
* used whenever the sequential interface is not necessary.
*
* The routine uhash_init() initializes the uhash_ctx data structure and
* must be called once, before any other UHASH routine.
*/
/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
/* ----- Constants and uhash_ctx ---------------------------------------- */
/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
/* ----- Poly hash and Inner-Product hash Constants --------------------- */
/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
/* Primes and masks */
#define p36 ((UINT64)0x0000000FFFFFFFFBull) /* 2^36 - 5 */
#define p64 ((UINT64)0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFC5ull) /* 2^64 - 59 */
#define m36 ((UINT64)0x0000000FFFFFFFFFull) /* The low 36 of 64 bits */
/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
typedef struct uhash_ctx {
nh_ctx hash; /* Hash context for L1 NH hash */
UINT64 poly_key_8[STREAMS]; /* p64 poly keys */
UINT64 poly_accum[STREAMS]; /* poly hash result */
UINT64 ip_keys[STREAMS*4]; /* Inner-product keys */
UINT32 ip_trans[STREAMS]; /* Inner-product translation */
UINT32 msg_len; /* Total length of data passed */
/* to uhash */
} uhash_ctx;
typedef struct uhash_ctx *uhash_ctx_t;
/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
/* The polynomial hashes use Horner's rule to evaluate a polynomial one
* word at a time. As described in the specification, poly32 and poly64
* require keys from special domains. The following implementations exploit
* the special domains to avoid overflow. The results are not guaranteed to
* be within Z_p32 and Z_p64, but the Inner-Product hash implementation
* patches any errant values.
*/
static UINT64 poly64(UINT64 cur, UINT64 key, UINT64 data)
{
UINT32 key_hi = (UINT32)(key >> 32),
key_lo = (UINT32)key,
cur_hi = (UINT32)(cur >> 32),
cur_lo = (UINT32)cur,
x_lo,
x_hi;
UINT64 X,T,res;
X = MUL64(key_hi, cur_lo) + MUL64(cur_hi, key_lo);
x_lo = (UINT32)X;
x_hi = (UINT32)(X >> 32);
res = (MUL64(key_hi, cur_hi) + x_hi) * 59 + MUL64(key_lo, cur_lo);
T = ((UINT64)x_lo << 32);
res += T;
if (res < T)
res += 59;
res += data;
if (res < data)
res += 59;
return res;
}
/* Although UMAC is specified to use a ramped polynomial hash scheme, this
* implementation does not handle all ramp levels. Because we don't handle
* the ramp up to p128 modulus in this implementation, we are limited to
* 2^14 poly_hash() invocations per stream (for a total capacity of 2^24
* bytes input to UMAC per tag, ie. 16MB).
*/
static void poly_hash(uhash_ctx_t hc, UINT32 data_in[])
{
int i;
UINT64 *data=(UINT64*)data_in;
for (i = 0; i < STREAMS; i++) {
if ((UINT32)(data[i] >> 32) == 0xfffffffful) {
hc->poly_accum[i] = poly64(hc->poly_accum[i],
hc->poly_key_8[i], p64 - 1);
hc->poly_accum[i] = poly64(hc->poly_accum[i],
hc->poly_key_8[i], (data[i] - 59));
} else {
hc->poly_accum[i] = poly64(hc->poly_accum[i],
hc->poly_key_8[i], data[i]);
}
}
}
/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
/* The final step in UHASH is an inner-product hash. The poly hash
* produces a result not necessarily WORD_LEN bytes long. The inner-
* product hash breaks the polyhash output into 16-bit chunks and
* multiplies each with a 36 bit key.
*/
static UINT64 ip_aux(UINT64 t, UINT64 *ipkp, UINT64 data)
{
t = t + ipkp[0] * (UINT64)(UINT16)(data >> 48);
t = t + ipkp[1] * (UINT64)(UINT16)(data >> 32);
t = t + ipkp[2] * (UINT64)(UINT16)(data >> 16);
t = t + ipkp[3] * (UINT64)(UINT16)(data);
return t;
}
static UINT32 ip_reduce_p36(UINT64 t)
{
/* Divisionless modular reduction */
UINT64 ret;
ret = (t & m36) + 5 * (t >> 36);
if (ret >= p36)
ret -= p36;
/* return least significant 32 bits */
return (UINT32)(ret);
}
/* If the data being hashed by UHASH is no longer than L1_KEY_LEN, then
* the polyhash stage is skipped and ip_short is applied directly to the
* NH output.
*/
static void ip_short(uhash_ctx_t ahc, UINT8 *nh_res, u_char *res)
{
UINT64 t;
UINT64 *nhp = (UINT64 *)nh_res;
t = ip_aux(0,ahc->ip_keys, nhp[0]);
STORE_UINT32_BIG((UINT32 *)res+0, ip_reduce_p36(t) ^ ahc->ip_trans[0]);
#if (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN >= 8)
t = ip_aux(0,ahc->ip_keys+4, nhp[1]);
STORE_UINT32_BIG((UINT32 *)res+1, ip_reduce_p36(t) ^ ahc->ip_trans[1]);
#endif
#if (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN >= 12)
t = ip_aux(0,ahc->ip_keys+8, nhp[2]);
STORE_UINT32_BIG((UINT32 *)res+2, ip_reduce_p36(t) ^ ahc->ip_trans[2]);
#endif
#if (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN == 16)
t = ip_aux(0,ahc->ip_keys+12, nhp[3]);
STORE_UINT32_BIG((UINT32 *)res+3, ip_reduce_p36(t) ^ ahc->ip_trans[3]);
#endif
}
/* If the data being hashed by UHASH is longer than L1_KEY_LEN, then
* the polyhash stage is not skipped and ip_long is applied to the
* polyhash output.
*/
static void ip_long(uhash_ctx_t ahc, u_char *res)
{
int i;
UINT64 t;
for (i = 0; i < STREAMS; i++) {
/* fix polyhash output not in Z_p64 */
if (ahc->poly_accum[i] >= p64)
ahc->poly_accum[i] -= p64;
t = ip_aux(0,ahc->ip_keys+(i*4), ahc->poly_accum[i]);
STORE_UINT32_BIG((UINT32 *)res+i,
ip_reduce_p36(t) ^ ahc->ip_trans[i]);
}
}
/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
/* Reset uhash context for next hash session */
static int uhash_reset(uhash_ctx_t pc)
{
nh_reset(&pc->hash);
pc->msg_len = 0;
pc->poly_accum[0] = 1;
#if (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN >= 8)
pc->poly_accum[1] = 1;
#endif
#if (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN >= 12)
pc->poly_accum[2] = 1;
#endif
#if (UMAC_OUTPUT_LEN == 16)
pc->poly_accum[3] = 1;
#endif
return 1;
}
/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
/* Given a pointer to the internal key needed by kdf() and a uhash context,
* initialize the NH context and generate keys needed for poly and inner-
* product hashing. All keys are endian adjusted in memory so that native
* loads cause correct keys to be in registers during calculation.
*/
static void uhash_init(uhash_ctx_t ahc, aes_int_key prf_key)
{
int i;
UINT8 buf[(8*STREAMS+4)*sizeof(UINT64)];
/* Zero the entire uhash context */
memset(ahc, 0, sizeof(uhash_ctx));
/* Initialize the L1 hash */
nh_init(&ahc->hash, prf_key);
/* Setup L2 hash variables */
kdf(buf, prf_key, 2, sizeof(buf)); /* Fill buffer with index 1 key */
for (i = 0; i < STREAMS; i++) {
/* Fill keys from the buffer, skipping bytes in the buffer not
* used by this implementation. Endian reverse the keys if on a
* little-endian computer.
*/
memcpy(ahc->poly_key_8+i, buf+24*i, 8);
endian_convert_if_le(ahc->poly_key_8+i, 8, 8);
/* Mask the 64-bit keys to their special domain */
ahc->poly_key_8[i] &= ((UINT64)0x01ffffffu << 32) + 0x01ffffffu;
ahc->poly_accum[i] = 1; /* Our polyhash prepends a non-zero word */
}
/* Setup L3-1 hash variables */
kdf(buf, prf_key, 3, sizeof(buf)); /* Fill buffer with index 2 key */
for (i = 0; i < STREAMS; i++)
memcpy(ahc->ip_keys+4*i, buf+(8*i+4)*sizeof(UINT64),
4*sizeof(UINT64));
endian_convert_if_le(ahc->ip_keys, sizeof(UINT64),
sizeof(ahc->ip_keys));
for (i = 0; i < STREAMS*4; i++)
ahc->ip_keys[i] %= p36; /* Bring into Z_p36 */
/* Setup L3-2 hash variables */
/* Fill buffer with index 4 key */
kdf(ahc->ip_trans, prf_key, 4, STREAMS * sizeof(UINT32));
endian_convert_if_le(ahc->ip_trans, sizeof(UINT32),
STREAMS * sizeof(UINT32));
explicit_bzero(buf, sizeof(buf));
}
/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
#if 0
static uhash_ctx_t uhash_alloc(u_char key[])
{
/* Allocate memory and force to a 16-byte boundary. */
uhash_ctx_t ctx;
u_char bytes_to_add;
aes_int_key prf_key;
ctx = (uhash_ctx_t)malloc(sizeof(uhash_ctx)+ALLOC_BOUNDARY);
if (ctx) {
if (ALLOC_BOUNDARY) {
bytes_to_add = ALLOC_BOUNDARY -
((ptrdiff_t)ctx & (ALLOC_BOUNDARY -1));
ctx = (uhash_ctx_t)((u_char *)ctx + bytes_to_add);
*((u_char *)ctx - 1) = bytes_to_add;
}
aes_key_setup(key,prf_key);
uhash_init(ctx, prf_key);
}
return (ctx);
}
#endif
/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
#if 0
static int uhash_free(uhash_ctx_t ctx)
{
/* Free memory allocated by uhash_alloc */
u_char bytes_to_sub;
if (ctx) {
if (ALLOC_BOUNDARY) {
bytes_to_sub = *((u_char *)ctx - 1);
ctx = (uhash_ctx_t)((u_char *)ctx - bytes_to_sub);
}
free(ctx);
}
return (1);
}
#endif
/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
static int uhash_update(uhash_ctx_t ctx, const u_char *input, long len)
/* Given len bytes of data, we parse it into L1_KEY_LEN chunks and
* hash each one with NH, calling the polyhash on each NH output.
*/
{
UWORD bytes_hashed, bytes_remaining;
UINT64 result_buf[STREAMS];
UINT8 *nh_result = (UINT8 *)&result_buf;
if (ctx->msg_len + len <= L1_KEY_LEN) {
nh_update(&ctx->hash, (const UINT8 *)input, len);
ctx->msg_len += len;
} else {
bytes_hashed = ctx->msg_len % L1_KEY_LEN;
if (ctx->msg_len == L1_KEY_LEN)
bytes_hashed = L1_KEY_LEN;
if (bytes_hashed + len >= L1_KEY_LEN) {
/* If some bytes have been passed to the hash function */
/* then we want to pass at most (L1_KEY_LEN - bytes_hashed) */
/* bytes to complete the current nh_block. */
if (bytes_hashed) {
bytes_remaining = (L1_KEY_LEN - bytes_hashed);
nh_update(&ctx->hash, (const UINT8 *)input, bytes_remaining);
nh_final(&ctx->hash, nh_result);
ctx->msg_len += bytes_remaining;
poly_hash(ctx,(UINT32 *)nh_result);
len -= bytes_remaining;
input += bytes_remaining;
}
/* Hash directly from input stream if enough bytes */
while (len >= L1_KEY_LEN) {
nh(&ctx->hash, (const UINT8 *)input, L1_KEY_LEN,
L1_KEY_LEN, nh_result);
ctx->msg_len += L1_KEY_LEN;
len -= L1_KEY_LEN;
input += L1_KEY_LEN;
poly_hash(ctx,(UINT32 *)nh_result);
}
}
/* pass remaining < L1_KEY_LEN bytes of input data to NH */
if (len) {
nh_update(&ctx->hash, (const UINT8 *)input, len);
ctx->msg_len += len;
}
}
return (1);
}
/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
static int uhash_final(uhash_ctx_t ctx, u_char *res)
/* Incorporate any pending data, pad, and generate tag */
{
UINT64 result_buf[STREAMS];
UINT8 *nh_result = (UINT8 *)&result_buf;
if (ctx->msg_len > L1_KEY_LEN) {
if (ctx->msg_len % L1_KEY_LEN) {
nh_final(&ctx->hash, nh_result);
poly_hash(ctx,(UINT32 *)nh_result);
}
ip_long(ctx, res);
} else {
nh_final(&ctx->hash, nh_result);
ip_short(ctx,nh_result, res);
}
uhash_reset(ctx);
return (1);
}
/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
#if 0
static int uhash(uhash_ctx_t ahc, u_char *msg, long len, u_char *res)
/* assumes that msg is in a writable buffer of length divisible by */
/* L1_PAD_BOUNDARY. Bytes beyond msg[len] may be zeroed. */
{
UINT8 nh_result[STREAMS*sizeof(UINT64)];
UINT32 nh_len;
int extra_zeroes_needed;
/* If the message to be hashed is no longer than L1_HASH_LEN, we skip
* the polyhash.
*/
if (len <= L1_KEY_LEN) {
if (len == 0) /* If zero length messages will not */
nh_len = L1_PAD_BOUNDARY; /* be seen, comment out this case */
else
nh_len = ((len + (L1_PAD_BOUNDARY - 1)) & ~(L1_PAD_BOUNDARY - 1));
extra_zeroes_needed = nh_len - len;
zero_pad((UINT8 *)msg + len, extra_zeroes_needed);
nh(&ahc->hash, (UINT8 *)msg, nh_len, len, nh_result);
ip_short(ahc,nh_result, res);
} else {
/* Otherwise, we hash each L1_KEY_LEN chunk with NH, passing the NH
* output to poly_hash().
*/
do {
nh(&ahc->hash, (UINT8 *)msg, L1_KEY_LEN, L1_KEY_LEN, nh_result);
poly_hash(ahc,(UINT32 *)nh_result);
len -= L1_KEY_LEN;
msg += L1_KEY_LEN;
} while (len >= L1_KEY_LEN);
if (len) {
nh_len = ((len + (L1_PAD_BOUNDARY - 1)) & ~(L1_PAD_BOUNDARY - 1));
extra_zeroes_needed = nh_len - len;
zero_pad((UINT8 *)msg + len, extra_zeroes_needed);
nh(&ahc->hash, (UINT8 *)msg, nh_len, len, nh_result);
poly_hash(ahc,(UINT32 *)nh_result);
}
ip_long(ahc, res);
}
uhash_reset(ahc);
return 1;
}
#endif
/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
/* ----- Begin UMAC Section --------------------------------------------- */
/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
/* The UMAC interface has two interfaces, an all-at-once interface where
* the entire message to be authenticated is passed to UMAC in one buffer,
* and a sequential interface where the message is presented a little at a
* time. The all-at-once is more optimaized than the sequential version and
* should be preferred when the sequential interface is not required.
*/
struct umac_ctx {
uhash_ctx hash; /* Hash function for message compression */
pdf_ctx pdf; /* PDF for hashed output */
void *free_ptr; /* Address to free this struct via */
} umac_ctx;
/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
#if 0
int umac_reset(struct umac_ctx *ctx)
/* Reset the hash function to begin a new authentication. */
{
uhash_reset(&ctx->hash);
return (1);
}
#endif
/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
int umac_delete(struct umac_ctx *ctx)
/* Deallocate the ctx structure */
{
if (ctx) {
if (ALLOC_BOUNDARY)
ctx = (struct umac_ctx *)ctx->free_ptr;
explicit_bzero(ctx, sizeof(*ctx) + ALLOC_BOUNDARY);
free(ctx);
}
return (1);
}
/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
struct umac_ctx *umac_new(const u_char key[])
/* Dynamically allocate a umac_ctx struct, initialize variables,
* generate subkeys from key. Align to 16-byte boundary.
*/
{
struct umac_ctx *ctx, *octx;
size_t bytes_to_add;
aes_int_key prf_key;
octx = ctx = xcalloc(1, sizeof(*ctx) + ALLOC_BOUNDARY);
if (ctx) {
if (ALLOC_BOUNDARY) {
bytes_to_add = ALLOC_BOUNDARY -
((ptrdiff_t)ctx & (ALLOC_BOUNDARY - 1));
ctx = (struct umac_ctx *)((u_char *)ctx + bytes_to_add);
}
ctx->free_ptr = octx;
aes_key_setup(key, prf_key);
pdf_init(&ctx->pdf, prf_key);
uhash_init(&ctx->hash, prf_key);
explicit_bzero(prf_key, sizeof(prf_key));
}
return (ctx);
}
/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
int umac_final(struct umac_ctx *ctx, u_char tag[], const u_char nonce[8])
/* Incorporate any pending data, pad, and generate tag */
{
uhash_final(&ctx->hash, (u_char *)tag);
pdf_gen_xor(&ctx->pdf, (const UINT8 *)nonce, (UINT8 *)tag);
return (1);
}
/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
int umac_update(struct umac_ctx *ctx, const u_char *input, long len)
/* Given len bytes of data, we parse it into L1_KEY_LEN chunks and */
/* hash each one, calling the PDF on the hashed output whenever the hash- */
/* output buffer is full. */
{
uhash_update(&ctx->hash, input, len);
return (1);
}
/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
#if 0
int umac(struct umac_ctx *ctx, u_char *input,
long len, u_char tag[],
u_char nonce[8])
/* All-in-one version simply calls umac_update() and umac_final(). */
{
uhash(&ctx->hash, input, len, (u_char *)tag);
pdf_gen_xor(&ctx->pdf, (UINT8 *)nonce, (UINT8 *)tag);
return (1);
}
#endif
/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
/* ----- End UMAC Section ----------------------------------------------- */
/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
/* ---------------------------------------------------------------------- */
diff --git a/version.h b/version.h
index 6b3fadf89edb..c2affcb2aefe 100644
--- a/version.h
+++ b/version.h
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: version.h,v 1.85 2019/10/09 00:04:57 djm Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: version.h,v 1.86 2020/02/14 00:39:20 djm Exp $ */
-#define SSH_VERSION "OpenSSH_8.1"
+#define SSH_VERSION "OpenSSH_8.2"
#define SSH_PORTABLE "p1"
#define SSH_RELEASE SSH_VERSION SSH_PORTABLE
diff --git a/xmalloc.c b/xmalloc.c
index 9cd0127dd3c7..b48d33bbf68c 100644
--- a/xmalloc.c
+++ b/xmalloc.c
@@ -1,112 +1,119 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: xmalloc.c,v 1.35 2019/06/06 05:13:13 otto Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: xmalloc.c,v 1.36 2019/11/12 22:32:48 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
* All rights reserved
* Versions of malloc and friends that check their results, and never return
* failure (they call fatal if they encounter an error).
*
* As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
* can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
* software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
* incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
* called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
*/
#include "includes.h"
#include <stdarg.h>
#ifdef HAVE_STDINT_H
# include <stdint.h>
#endif
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include "xmalloc.h"
#include "log.h"
#if defined(__OpenBSD__)
char *malloc_options = "S";
#endif /* __OpenBSD__ */
void *
xmalloc(size_t size)
{
void *ptr;
if (size == 0)
fatal("xmalloc: zero size");
ptr = malloc(size);
if (ptr == NULL)
fatal("xmalloc: out of memory (allocating %zu bytes)", size);
return ptr;
}
void *
xcalloc(size_t nmemb, size_t size)
{
void *ptr;
if (size == 0 || nmemb == 0)
fatal("xcalloc: zero size");
if (SIZE_MAX / nmemb < size)
fatal("xcalloc: nmemb * size > SIZE_MAX");
ptr = calloc(nmemb, size);
if (ptr == NULL)
fatal("xcalloc: out of memory (allocating %zu bytes)",
size * nmemb);
return ptr;
}
void *
xreallocarray(void *ptr, size_t nmemb, size_t size)
{
void *new_ptr;
new_ptr = reallocarray(ptr, nmemb, size);
if (new_ptr == NULL)
fatal("xreallocarray: out of memory (%zu elements of %zu bytes)",
nmemb, size);
return new_ptr;
}
void *
xrecallocarray(void *ptr, size_t onmemb, size_t nmemb, size_t size)
{
void *new_ptr;
new_ptr = recallocarray(ptr, onmemb, nmemb, size);
if (new_ptr == NULL)
fatal("xrecallocarray: out of memory (%zu elements of %zu bytes)",
nmemb, size);
return new_ptr;
}
char *
xstrdup(const char *str)
{
size_t len;
char *cp;
len = strlen(str) + 1;
cp = xmalloc(len);
strlcpy(cp, str, len);
return cp;
}
+int
+xvasprintf(char **ret, const char *fmt, va_list ap)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ i = vasprintf(ret, fmt, ap);
+ if (i < 0 || *ret == NULL)
+ fatal("xvasprintf: could not allocate memory");
+ return i;
+}
+
int
xasprintf(char **ret, const char *fmt, ...)
{
va_list ap;
int i;
va_start(ap, fmt);
- i = vasprintf(ret, fmt, ap);
+ i = xvasprintf(ret, fmt, ap);
va_end(ap);
-
- if (i < 0 || *ret == NULL)
- fatal("xasprintf: could not allocate memory");
-
- return (i);
+ return i;
}
diff --git a/xmalloc.h b/xmalloc.h
index 1d5f62df77a3..abaf7ada2c6c 100644
--- a/xmalloc.h
+++ b/xmalloc.h
@@ -1,26 +1,28 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: xmalloc.h,v 1.18 2019/06/06 05:13:13 otto Exp $ */
+/* $OpenBSD: xmalloc.h,v 1.19 2019/11/12 22:32:48 djm Exp $ */
/*
* Author: Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>
* Copyright (c) 1995 Tatu Ylonen <ylo@cs.hut.fi>, Espoo, Finland
* All rights reserved
* Created: Mon Mar 20 22:09:17 1995 ylo
*
* Versions of malloc and friends that check their results, and never return
* failure (they call fatal if they encounter an error).
*
* As far as I am concerned, the code I have written for this software
* can be used freely for any purpose. Any derived versions of this
* software must be clearly marked as such, and if the derived work is
* incompatible with the protocol description in the RFC file, it must be
* called by a name other than "ssh" or "Secure Shell".
*/
void *xmalloc(size_t);
void *xcalloc(size_t, size_t);
void *xreallocarray(void *, size_t, size_t);
void *xrecallocarray(void *, size_t, size_t, size_t);
char *xstrdup(const char *);
int xasprintf(char **, const char *, ...)
__attribute__((__format__ (printf, 2, 3)))
__attribute__((__nonnull__ (2)));
+int xvasprintf(char **, const char *, va_list)
+ __attribute__((__nonnull__ (2)));

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