diff --git a/CHANGES b/CHANGES index 824f421b8d33..9d58cb0c58d9 100644 --- a/CHANGES +++ b/CHANGES @@ -1,13670 +1,13690 @@ OpenSSL CHANGES _______________ This is a high-level summary of the most important changes. For a full list of changes, see the git commit log; for example, https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commits/ and pick the appropriate release branch. + Changes between 1.1.1l and 1.1.1m [14 Dec 2021] + + *) Avoid loading of a dynamic engine twice. + + [Bernd Edlinger] + + *) Fixed building on Debian with kfreebsd kernels + + [Mattias Ellert] + + *) Prioritise DANE TLSA issuer certs over peer certs + + [Viktor Dukhovni] + + *) Fixed random API for MacOS prior to 10.12 + + These MacOS versions don't support the CommonCrypto APIs + + [Lenny Primak] + Changes between 1.1.1k and 1.1.1l [24 Aug 2021] *) Fixed an SM2 Decryption Buffer Overflow. In order to decrypt SM2 encrypted data an application is expected to call the API function EVP_PKEY_decrypt(). Typically an application will call this function twice. The first time, on entry, the "out" parameter can be NULL and, on exit, the "outlen" parameter is populated with the buffer size required to hold the decrypted plaintext. The application can then allocate a sufficiently sized buffer and call EVP_PKEY_decrypt() again, but this time passing a non-NULL value for the "out" parameter. A bug in the implementation of the SM2 decryption code means that the calculation of the buffer size required to hold the plaintext returned by the first call to EVP_PKEY_decrypt() can be smaller than the actual size required by the second call. This can lead to a buffer overflow when EVP_PKEY_decrypt() is called by the application a second time with a buffer that is too small. A malicious attacker who is able present SM2 content for decryption to an application could cause attacker chosen data to overflow the buffer by up to a maximum of 62 bytes altering the contents of other data held after the buffer, possibly changing application behaviour or causing the application to crash. The location of the buffer is application dependent but is typically heap allocated. (CVE-2021-3711) [Matt Caswell] *) Fixed various read buffer overruns processing ASN.1 strings ASN.1 strings are represented internally within OpenSSL as an ASN1_STRING structure which contains a buffer holding the string data and a field holding the buffer length. This contrasts with normal C strings which are repesented as a buffer for the string data which is terminated with a NUL (0) byte. Although not a strict requirement, ASN.1 strings that are parsed using OpenSSL's own "d2i" functions (and other similar parsing functions) as well as any string whose value has been set with the ASN1_STRING_set() function will additionally NUL terminate the byte array in the ASN1_STRING structure. However, it is possible for applications to directly construct valid ASN1_STRING structures which do not NUL terminate the byte array by directly setting the "data" and "length" fields in the ASN1_STRING array. This can also happen by using the ASN1_STRING_set0() function. Numerous OpenSSL functions that print ASN.1 data have been found to assume that the ASN1_STRING byte array will be NUL terminated, even though this is not guaranteed for strings that have been directly constructed. Where an application requests an ASN.1 structure to be printed, and where that ASN.1 structure contains ASN1_STRINGs that have been directly constructed by the application without NUL terminating the "data" field, then a read buffer overrun can occur. The same thing can also occur during name constraints processing of certificates (for example if a certificate has been directly constructed by the application instead of loading it via the OpenSSL parsing functions, and the certificate contains non NUL terminated ASN1_STRING structures). It can also occur in the X509_get1_email(), X509_REQ_get1_email() and X509_get1_ocsp() functions. If a malicious actor can cause an application to directly construct an ASN1_STRING and then process it through one of the affected OpenSSL functions then this issue could be hit. This might result in a crash (causing a Denial of Service attack). It could also result in the disclosure of private memory contents (such as private keys, or sensitive plaintext). (CVE-2021-3712) [Matt Caswell] Changes between 1.1.1j and 1.1.1k [25 Mar 2021] *) Fixed a problem with verifying a certificate chain when using the X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT flag. This flag enables additional security checks of the certificates present in a certificate chain. It is not set by default. Starting from OpenSSL version 1.1.1h a check to disallow certificates in the chain that have explicitly encoded elliptic curve parameters was added as an additional strict check. An error in the implementation of this check meant that the result of a previous check to confirm that certificates in the chain are valid CA certificates was overwritten. This effectively bypasses the check that non-CA certificates must not be able to issue other certificates. If a "purpose" has been configured then there is a subsequent opportunity for checks that the certificate is a valid CA. All of the named "purpose" values implemented in libcrypto perform this check. Therefore, where a purpose is set the certificate chain will still be rejected even when the strict flag has been used. A purpose is set by default in libssl client and server certificate verification routines, but it can be overridden or removed by an application. In order to be affected, an application must explicitly set the X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT verification flag and either not set a purpose for the certificate verification or, in the case of TLS client or server applications, override the default purpose. (CVE-2021-3450) [Tomáš Mráz] *) Fixed an issue where an OpenSSL TLS server may crash if sent a maliciously crafted renegotiation ClientHello message from a client. If a TLSv1.2 renegotiation ClientHello omits the signature_algorithms extension (where it was present in the initial ClientHello), but includes a signature_algorithms_cert extension then a NULL pointer dereference will result, leading to a crash and a denial of service attack. A server is only vulnerable if it has TLSv1.2 and renegotiation enabled (which is the default configuration). OpenSSL TLS clients are not impacted by this issue. (CVE-2021-3449) [Peter Kästle and Samuel Sapalski] Changes between 1.1.1i and 1.1.1j [16 Feb 2021] *) Fixed the X509_issuer_and_serial_hash() function. It attempts to create a unique hash value based on the issuer and serial number data contained within an X509 certificate. However it was failing to correctly handle any errors that may occur while parsing the issuer field (which might occur if the issuer field is maliciously constructed). This may subsequently result in a NULL pointer deref and a crash leading to a potential denial of service attack. (CVE-2021-23841) [Matt Caswell] *) Fixed the RSA_padding_check_SSLv23() function and the RSA_SSLV23_PADDING padding mode to correctly check for rollback attacks. This is considered a bug in OpenSSL 1.1.1 because it does not support SSLv2. In 1.0.2 this is CVE-2021-23839. [Matt Caswell] *) Fixed the EVP_CipherUpdate, EVP_EncryptUpdate and EVP_DecryptUpdate functions. Previously they could overflow the output length argument in some cases where the input length is close to the maximum permissable length for an integer on the platform. In such cases the return value from the function call would be 1 (indicating success), but the output length value would be negative. This could cause applications to behave incorrectly or crash. (CVE-2021-23840) [Matt Caswell] *) Fixed SRP_Calc_client_key so that it runs in constant time. The previous implementation called BN_mod_exp without setting BN_FLG_CONSTTIME. This could be exploited in a side channel attack to recover the password. Since the attack is local host only this is outside of the current OpenSSL threat model and therefore no CVE is assigned. Thanks to Mohammed Sabt and Daniel De Almeida Braga for reporting this issue. [Matt Caswell] Changes between 1.1.1h and 1.1.1i [8 Dec 2020] *) Fixed NULL pointer deref in the GENERAL_NAME_cmp function This function could crash if both GENERAL_NAMEs contain an EDIPARTYNAME. If an attacker can control both items being compared then this could lead to a possible denial of service attack. OpenSSL itself uses the GENERAL_NAME_cmp function for two purposes: 1) Comparing CRL distribution point names between an available CRL and a CRL distribution point embedded in an X509 certificate 2) When verifying that a timestamp response token signer matches the timestamp authority name (exposed via the API functions TS_RESP_verify_response and TS_RESP_verify_token) (CVE-2020-1971) [Matt Caswell] *) Add support for Apple Silicon M1 Macs with the darwin64-arm64-cc target. [Stuart Carnie] *) The security callback, which can be customised by application code, supports the security operation SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH. This is defined to take an EVP_PKEY in the "other" parameter. In most places this is what is passed. All these places occur server side. However there was one client side call of this security operation and it passed a DH object instead. This is incorrect according to the definition of SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH, and is inconsistent with all of the other locations. Therefore this client side call has been changed to pass an EVP_PKEY instead. [Matt Caswell] *) In 1.1.1h, an expired trusted (root) certificate was not anymore rejected when validating a certificate path. This check is restored in 1.1.1i. [David von Oheimb] Changes between 1.1.1g and 1.1.1h [22 Sep 2020] *) Certificates with explicit curve parameters are now disallowed in verification chains if the X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT flag is used. [Tomas Mraz] *) The 'MinProtocol' and 'MaxProtocol' configuration commands now silently ignore TLS protocol version bounds when configuring DTLS-based contexts, and conversely, silently ignore DTLS protocol version bounds when configuring TLS-based contexts. The commands can be repeated to set bounds of both types. The same applies with the corresponding "min_protocol" and "max_protocol" command-line switches, in case some application uses both TLS and DTLS. SSL_CTX instances that are created for a fixed protocol version (e.g. TLSv1_server_method()) also silently ignore version bounds. Previously attempts to apply bounds to these protocol versions would result in an error. Now only the "version-flexible" SSL_CTX instances are subject to limits in configuration files in command-line options. [Viktor Dukhovni] *) Handshake now fails if Extended Master Secret extension is dropped on renegotiation. [Tomas Mraz] *) Accidentally, an expired trusted (root) certificate is not anymore rejected when validating a certificate path. [David von Oheimb] *) The Oracle Developer Studio compiler will start reporting deprecated APIs Changes between 1.1.1f and 1.1.1g [21 Apr 2020] *) Fixed segmentation fault in SSL_check_chain() Server or client applications that call the SSL_check_chain() function during or after a TLS 1.3 handshake may crash due to a NULL pointer dereference as a result of incorrect handling of the "signature_algorithms_cert" TLS extension. The crash occurs if an invalid or unrecognised signature algorithm is received from the peer. This could be exploited by a malicious peer in a Denial of Service attack. (CVE-2020-1967) [Benjamin Kaduk] *) Added AES consttime code for no-asm configurations an optional constant time support for AES was added when building openssl for no-asm. Enable with: ./config no-asm -DOPENSSL_AES_CONST_TIME Disable with: ./config no-asm -DOPENSSL_NO_AES_CONST_TIME At this time this feature is by default disabled. It will be enabled by default in 3.0. [Bernd Edlinger] Changes between 1.1.1e and 1.1.1f [31 Mar 2020] *) Revert the change of EOF detection while reading in libssl to avoid regressions in applications depending on the current way of reporting the EOF. As the existing method is not fully accurate the change to reporting the EOF via SSL_ERROR_SSL is kept on the current development branch and will be present in the 3.0 release. [Tomas Mraz] *) Revised BN_generate_prime_ex to not avoid factors 3..17863 in p-1 when primes for RSA keys are computed. Since we previously always generated primes == 2 (mod 3) for RSA keys, the 2-prime and 3-prime RSA modules were easy to distinguish, since N = p*q = 1 (mod 3), but N = p*q*r = 2 (mod 3). Therefore fingerprinting 2-prime vs. 3-prime RSA keys was possible by computing N mod 3. This avoids possible fingerprinting of newly generated RSA modules. [Bernd Edlinger] Changes between 1.1.1d and 1.1.1e [17 Mar 2020] *) Properly detect EOF while reading in libssl. Previously if we hit an EOF while reading in libssl then we would report an error back to the application (SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL) but errno would be 0. We now add an error to the stack (which means we instead return SSL_ERROR_SSL) and therefore give a hint as to what went wrong. [Matt Caswell] *) Check that ed25519 and ed448 are allowed by the security level. Previously signature algorithms not using an MD were not being checked that they were allowed by the security level. [Kurt Roeckx] *) Fixed SSL_get_servername() behaviour. The behaviour of SSL_get_servername() was not quite right. The behaviour was not consistent between resumption and normal handshakes, and also not quite consistent with historical behaviour. The behaviour in various scenarios has been clarified and it has been updated to make it match historical behaviour as closely as possible. [Matt Caswell] *) [VMS only] The header files that the VMS compilers include automatically, __DECC_INCLUDE_PROLOGUE.H and __DECC_INCLUDE_EPILOGUE.H, use pragmas that the C++ compiler doesn't understand. This is a shortcoming in the compiler, but can be worked around with __cplusplus guards. C++ applications that use OpenSSL libraries must be compiled using the qualifier '/NAMES=(AS_IS,SHORTENED)' to be able to use all the OpenSSL functions. Otherwise, only functions with symbols of less than 31 characters can be used, as the linker will not be able to successfully resolve symbols with longer names. [Richard Levitte] *) Corrected the documentation of the return values from the EVP_DigestSign* set of functions. The documentation mentioned negative values for some errors, but this was never the case, so the mention of negative values was removed. Code that followed the documentation and thereby check with something like 'EVP_DigestSignInit(...) <= 0' will continue to work undisturbed. [Richard Levitte] *) Fixed an an overflow bug in the x64_64 Montgomery squaring procedure used in exponentiation with 512-bit moduli. No EC algorithms are affected. Analysis suggests that attacks against 2-prime RSA1024, 3-prime RSA1536, and DSA1024 as a result of this defect would be very difficult to perform and are not believed likely. Attacks against DH512 are considered just feasible. However, for an attack the target would have to re-use the DH512 private key, which is not recommended anyway. Also applications directly using the low level API BN_mod_exp may be affected if they use BN_FLG_CONSTTIME. (CVE-2019-1551) [Andy Polyakov] *) Added a new method to gather entropy on VMS, based on SYS$GET_ENTROPY. The presence of this system service is determined at run-time. [Richard Levitte] *) Added newline escaping functionality to a filename when using openssl dgst. This output format is to replicate the output format found in the '*sum' checksum programs. This aims to preserve backward compatibility. [Matt Eaton, Richard Levitte, and Paul Dale] *) Print all values for a PKCS#12 attribute with 'openssl pkcs12', not just the first value. [Jon Spillett] Changes between 1.1.1c and 1.1.1d [10 Sep 2019] *) Fixed a fork protection issue. OpenSSL 1.1.1 introduced a rewritten random number generator (RNG). This was intended to include protection in the event of a fork() system call in order to ensure that the parent and child processes did not share the same RNG state. However this protection was not being used in the default case. A partial mitigation for this issue is that the output from a high precision timer is mixed into the RNG state so the likelihood of a parent and child process sharing state is significantly reduced. If an application already calls OPENSSL_init_crypto() explicitly using OPENSSL_INIT_ATFORK then this problem does not occur at all. (CVE-2019-1549) [Matthias St. Pierre] *) For built-in EC curves, ensure an EC_GROUP built from the curve name is used even when parsing explicit parameters, when loading a serialized key or calling `EC_GROUP_new_from_ecpkparameters()`/ `EC_GROUP_new_from_ecparameters()`. This prevents bypass of security hardening and performance gains, especially for curves with specialized EC_METHODs. By default, if a key encoded with explicit parameters is loaded and later serialized, the output is still encoded with explicit parameters, even if internally a "named" EC_GROUP is used for computation. [Nicola Tuveri] *) Compute ECC cofactors if not provided during EC_GROUP construction. Before this change, EC_GROUP_set_generator would accept order and/or cofactor as NULL. After this change, only the cofactor parameter can be NULL. It also does some minimal sanity checks on the passed order. (CVE-2019-1547) [Billy Bob Brumley] *) Fixed a padding oracle in PKCS7_dataDecode and CMS_decrypt_set1_pkey. An attack is simple, if the first CMS_recipientInfo is valid but the second CMS_recipientInfo is chosen ciphertext. If the second recipientInfo decodes to PKCS #1 v1.5 form plaintext, the correct encryption key will be replaced by garbage, and the message cannot be decoded, but if the RSA decryption fails, the correct encryption key is used and the recipient will not notice the attack. As a work around for this potential attack the length of the decrypted key must be equal to the cipher default key length, in case the certifiate is not given and all recipientInfo are tried out. The old behaviour can be re-enabled in the CMS code by setting the CMS_DEBUG_DECRYPT flag. (CVE-2019-1563) [Bernd Edlinger] *) Early start up entropy quality from the DEVRANDOM seed source has been improved for older Linux systems. The RAND subsystem will wait for /dev/random to be producing output before seeding from /dev/urandom. The seeded state is stored for future library initialisations using a system global shared memory segment. The shared memory identifier can be configured by defining OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_DEVRANDOM_SHM_ID to the desired value. The default identifier is 114. [Paul Dale] *) Correct the extended master secret constant on EBCDIC systems. Without this fix TLS connections between an EBCDIC system and a non-EBCDIC system that negotiate EMS will fail. Unfortunately this also means that TLS connections between EBCDIC systems with this fix, and EBCDIC systems without this fix will fail if they negotiate EMS. [Matt Caswell] *) Use Windows installation paths in the mingw builds Mingw isn't a POSIX environment per se, which means that Windows paths should be used for installation. (CVE-2019-1552) [Richard Levitte] *) Changed DH_check to accept parameters with order q and 2q subgroups. With order 2q subgroups the bit 0 of the private key is not secret but DH_generate_key works around that by clearing bit 0 of the private key for those. This avoids leaking bit 0 of the private key. [Bernd Edlinger] *) Significantly reduce secure memory usage by the randomness pools. [Paul Dale] *) Revert the DEVRANDOM_WAIT feature for Linux systems The DEVRANDOM_WAIT feature added a select() call to wait for the /dev/random device to become readable before reading from the /dev/urandom device. It turned out that this change had negative side effects on performance which were not acceptable. After some discussion it was decided to revert this feature and leave it up to the OS resp. the platform maintainer to ensure a proper initialization during early boot time. [Matthias St. Pierre] Changes between 1.1.1b and 1.1.1c [28 May 2019] *) Add build tests for C++. These are generated files that only do one thing, to include one public OpenSSL head file each. This tests that the public header files can be usefully included in a C++ application. This test isn't enabled by default. It can be enabled with the option 'enable-buildtest-c++'. [Richard Levitte] *) Enable SHA3 pre-hashing for ECDSA and DSA. [Patrick Steuer] *) Change the default RSA, DSA and DH size to 2048 bit instead of 1024. This changes the size when using the genpkey app when no size is given. It fixes an omission in earlier changes that changed all RSA, DSA and DH generation apps to use 2048 bits by default. [Kurt Roeckx] *) Reorganize the manual pages to consistently have RETURN VALUES, EXAMPLES, SEE ALSO and HISTORY come in that order, and adjust util/fix-doc-nits accordingly. [Paul Yang, Joshua Lock] *) Add the missing accessor EVP_PKEY_get0_engine() [Matt Caswell] *) Have apps like 's_client' and 's_server' output the signature scheme along with other cipher suite parameters when debugging. [Lorinczy Zsigmond] *) Make OPENSSL_config() error agnostic again. [Richard Levitte] *) Do the error handling in RSA decryption constant time. [Bernd Edlinger] *) Prevent over long nonces in ChaCha20-Poly1305. ChaCha20-Poly1305 is an AEAD cipher, and requires a unique nonce input for every encryption operation. RFC 7539 specifies that the nonce value (IV) should be 96 bits (12 bytes). OpenSSL allows a variable nonce length and front pads the nonce with 0 bytes if it is less than 12 bytes. However it also incorrectly allows a nonce to be set of up to 16 bytes. In this case only the last 12 bytes are significant and any additional leading bytes are ignored. It is a requirement of using this cipher that nonce values are unique. Messages encrypted using a reused nonce value are susceptible to serious confidentiality and integrity attacks. If an application changes the default nonce length to be longer than 12 bytes and then makes a change to the leading bytes of the nonce expecting the new value to be a new unique nonce then such an application could inadvertently encrypt messages with a reused nonce. Additionally the ignored bytes in a long nonce are not covered by the integrity guarantee of this cipher. Any application that relies on the integrity of these ignored leading bytes of a long nonce may be further affected. Any OpenSSL internal use of this cipher, including in SSL/TLS, is safe because no such use sets such a long nonce value. However user applications that use this cipher directly and set a non-default nonce length to be longer than 12 bytes may be vulnerable. This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 16th of March 2019 by Joran Dirk Greef of Ronomon. (CVE-2019-1543) [Matt Caswell] *) Add DEVRANDOM_WAIT feature for Linux systems On older Linux systems where the getrandom() system call is not available, OpenSSL normally uses the /dev/urandom device for seeding its CSPRNG. Contrary to getrandom(), the /dev/urandom device will not block during early boot when the kernel CSPRNG has not been seeded yet. To mitigate this known weakness, use select() to wait for /dev/random to become readable before reading from /dev/urandom. *) Ensure that SM2 only uses SM3 as digest algorithm [Paul Yang] Changes between 1.1.1a and 1.1.1b [26 Feb 2019] *) Added SCA hardening for modular field inversion in EC_GROUP through a new dedicated field_inv() pointer in EC_METHOD. This also addresses a leakage affecting conversions from projective to affine coordinates. [Billy Bob Brumley, Nicola Tuveri] *) Change the info callback signals for the start and end of a post-handshake message exchange in TLSv1.3. In 1.1.1/1.1.1a we used SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START and SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE. Experience has shown that many applications get confused by this and assume that a TLSv1.2 renegotiation has started. This can break KeyUpdate handling. Instead we no longer signal the start and end of a post handshake message exchange (although the messages themselves are still signalled). This could break some applications that were expecting the old signals. However without this KeyUpdate is not usable for many applications. [Matt Caswell] *) Fix a bug in the computation of the endpoint-pair shared secret used by DTLS over SCTP. This breaks interoperability with older versions of OpenSSL like OpenSSL 1.1.0 and OpenSSL 1.0.2. There is a runtime switch SSL_MODE_DTLS_SCTP_LABEL_LENGTH_BUG (off by default) enabling interoperability with such broken implementations. However, enabling this switch breaks interoperability with correct implementations. *) Fix a use after free bug in d2i_X509_PUBKEY when overwriting a re-used X509_PUBKEY object if the second PUBKEY is malformed. [Bernd Edlinger] *) Move strictness check from EVP_PKEY_asn1_new() to EVP_PKEY_asn1_add0(). [Richard Levitte] *) Remove the 'dist' target and add a tarball building script. The 'dist' target has fallen out of use, and it shouldn't be necessary to configure just to create a source distribution. [Richard Levitte] Changes between 1.1.1 and 1.1.1a [20 Nov 2018] *) Timing vulnerability in DSA signature generation The OpenSSL DSA signature algorithm has been shown to be vulnerable to a timing side channel attack. An attacker could use variations in the signing algorithm to recover the private key. This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 16th October 2018 by Samuel Weiser. (CVE-2018-0734) [Paul Dale] *) Timing vulnerability in ECDSA signature generation The OpenSSL ECDSA signature algorithm has been shown to be vulnerable to a timing side channel attack. An attacker could use variations in the signing algorithm to recover the private key. This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 25th October 2018 by Samuel Weiser. (CVE-2018-0735) [Paul Dale] *) Added EVP_PKEY_ECDH_KDF_X9_63 and ecdh_KDF_X9_63() as replacements for the EVP_PKEY_ECDH_KDF_X9_62 KDF type and ECDH_KDF_X9_62(). The old names are retained for backwards compatibility. [Antoine Salon] *) Fixed the issue that RAND_add()/RAND_seed() silently discards random input if its length exceeds 4096 bytes. The limit has been raised to a buffer size of two gigabytes and the error handling improved. This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Dr. Falko Strenzke. It has been categorized as a normal bug, not a security issue, because the DRBG reseeds automatically and is fully functional even without additional randomness provided by the application. Changes between 1.1.0i and 1.1.1 [11 Sep 2018] *) Add a new ClientHello callback. Provides a callback interface that gives the application the ability to adjust the nascent SSL object at the earliest stage of ClientHello processing, immediately after extensions have been collected but before they have been processed. In particular, this callback can adjust the supported TLS versions in response to the contents of the ClientHello [Benjamin Kaduk] *) Add SM2 base algorithm support. [Jack Lloyd] *) s390x assembly pack: add (improved) hardware-support for the following cryptographic primitives: sha3, shake, aes-gcm, aes-ccm, aes-ctr, aes-ofb, aes-cfb/cfb8, aes-ecb. [Patrick Steuer] *) Make EVP_PKEY_asn1_new() a bit stricter about its input. A NULL pem_str parameter is no longer accepted, as it leads to a corrupt table. NULL pem_str is reserved for alias entries only. [Richard Levitte] *) Use the new ec_scalar_mul_ladder scaffold to implement a specialized ladder step for prime curves. The new implementation is based on formulae from differential addition-and-doubling in homogeneous projective coordinates from Izu-Takagi "A fast parallel elliptic curve multiplication resistant against side channel attacks" and Brier-Joye "Weierstrass Elliptic Curves and Side-Channel Attacks" Eq. (8) for y-coordinate recovery, modified to work in projective coordinates. [Billy Bob Brumley, Nicola Tuveri] *) Change generating and checking of primes so that the error rate of not being prime depends on the intended use based on the size of the input. For larger primes this will result in more rounds of Miller-Rabin. The maximal error rate for primes with more than 1080 bits is lowered to 2^-128. [Kurt Roeckx, Annie Yousar] *) Increase the number of Miller-Rabin rounds for DSA key generating to 64. [Kurt Roeckx] *) The 'tsget' script is renamed to 'tsget.pl', to avoid confusion when moving between systems, and to avoid confusion when a Windows build is done with mingw vs with MSVC. For POSIX installs, there's still a symlink or copy named 'tsget' to avoid that confusion as well. [Richard Levitte] *) Revert blinding in ECDSA sign and instead make problematic addition length-invariant. Switch even to fixed-length Montgomery multiplication. [Andy Polyakov] *) Use the new ec_scalar_mul_ladder scaffold to implement a specialized ladder step for binary curves. The new implementation is based on formulae from differential addition-and-doubling in mixed Lopez-Dahab projective coordinates, modified to independently blind the operands. [Billy Bob Brumley, Sohaib ul Hassan, Nicola Tuveri] *) Add a scaffold to optionally enhance the Montgomery ladder implementation for `ec_scalar_mul_ladder` (formerly `ec_mul_consttime`) allowing EC_METHODs to implement their own specialized "ladder step", to take advantage of more favorable coordinate systems or more efficient differential addition-and-doubling algorithms. [Billy Bob Brumley, Sohaib ul Hassan, Nicola Tuveri] *) Modified the random device based seed sources to keep the relevant file descriptors open rather than reopening them on each access. This allows such sources to operate in a chroot() jail without the associated device nodes being available. This behaviour can be controlled using RAND_keep_random_devices_open(). [Paul Dale] *) Numerous side-channel attack mitigations have been applied. This may have performance impacts for some algorithms for the benefit of improved security. Specific changes are noted in this change log by their respective authors. [Matt Caswell] *) AIX shared library support overhaul. Switch to AIX "natural" way of handling shared libraries, which means collecting shared objects of different versions and bitnesses in one common archive. This allows to mitigate conflict between 1.0 and 1.1 side-by-side installations. It doesn't affect the way 3rd party applications are linked, only how multi-version installation is managed. [Andy Polyakov] *) Make ec_group_do_inverse_ord() more robust and available to other EC cryptosystems, so that irrespective of BN_FLG_CONSTTIME, SCA mitigations are applied to the fallback BN_mod_inverse(). When using this function rather than BN_mod_inverse() directly, new EC cryptosystem implementations are then safer-by-default. [Billy Bob Brumley] *) Add coordinate blinding for EC_POINT and implement projective coordinate blinding for generic prime curves as a countermeasure to chosen point SCA attacks. [Sohaib ul Hassan, Nicola Tuveri, Billy Bob Brumley] *) Add blinding to ECDSA and DSA signatures to protect against side channel attacks discovered by Keegan Ryan (NCC Group). [Matt Caswell] *) Enforce checking in the pkeyutl command line app to ensure that the input length does not exceed the maximum supported digest length when performing a sign, verify or verifyrecover operation. [Matt Caswell] *) SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY is enabled by default. Applications that use blocking I/O in combination with something like select() or poll() will hang. This can be turned off again using SSL_CTX_clear_mode(). Many applications do not properly handle non-application data records, and TLS 1.3 sends more of such records. Setting SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY works around the problems in those applications, but can also break some. It's recommended to read the manpages about SSL_read(), SSL_write(), SSL_get_error(), SSL_shutdown(), SSL_CTX_set_mode() and SSL_CTX_set_read_ahead() again. [Kurt Roeckx] *) When unlocking a pass phrase protected PEM file or PKCS#8 container, we now allow empty (zero character) pass phrases. [Richard Levitte] *) Apply blinding to binary field modular inversion and remove patent pending (OPENSSL_SUN_GF2M_DIV) BN_GF2m_mod_div implementation. [Billy Bob Brumley] *) Deprecate ec2_mult.c and unify scalar multiplication code paths for binary and prime elliptic curves. [Billy Bob Brumley] *) Remove ECDSA nonce padding: EC_POINT_mul is now responsible for constant time fixed point multiplication. [Billy Bob Brumley] *) Revise elliptic curve scalar multiplication with timing attack defenses: ec_wNAF_mul redirects to a constant time implementation when computing fixed point and variable point multiplication (which in OpenSSL are mostly used with secret scalars in keygen, sign, ECDH derive operations). [Billy Bob Brumley, Nicola Tuveri, Cesar Pereida García, Sohaib ul Hassan] *) Updated CONTRIBUTING [Rich Salz] *) Updated DRBG / RAND to request nonce and additional low entropy randomness from the system. [Matthias St. Pierre] *) Updated 'openssl rehash' to use OpenSSL consistent default. [Richard Levitte] *) Moved the load of the ssl_conf module to libcrypto, which helps loading engines that libssl uses before libssl is initialised. [Matt Caswell] *) Added EVP_PKEY_sign() and EVP_PKEY_verify() for EdDSA [Matt Caswell] *) Fixed X509_NAME_ENTRY_set to get multi-valued RDNs right in all cases. [Ingo Schwarze, Rich Salz] *) Added output of accepting IP address and port for 'openssl s_server' [Richard Levitte] *) Added a new API for TLSv1.3 ciphersuites: SSL_CTX_set_ciphersuites() SSL_set_ciphersuites() [Matt Caswell] *) Memory allocation failures consistently add an error to the error stack. [Rich Salz] *) Don't use OPENSSL_ENGINES and OPENSSL_CONF environment values in libcrypto when run as setuid/setgid. [Bernd Edlinger] *) Load any config file by default when libssl is used. [Matt Caswell] *) Added new public header file and documentation for the RAND_DRBG API. See manual page RAND_DRBG(7) for an overview. [Matthias St. Pierre] *) QNX support removed (cannot find contributors to get their approval for the license change). [Rich Salz] *) TLSv1.3 replay protection for early data has been implemented. See the SSL_read_early_data() man page for further details. [Matt Caswell] *) Separated TLSv1.3 ciphersuite configuration out from TLSv1.2 ciphersuite configuration. TLSv1.3 ciphersuites are not compatible with TLSv1.2 and below. Similarly TLSv1.2 ciphersuites are not compatible with TLSv1.3. In order to avoid issues where legacy TLSv1.2 ciphersuite configuration would otherwise inadvertently disable all TLSv1.3 ciphersuites the configuration has been separated out. See the ciphers man page or the SSL_CTX_set_ciphersuites() man page for more information. [Matt Caswell] *) On POSIX (BSD, Linux, ...) systems the ocsp(1) command running in responder mode now supports the new "-multi" option, which spawns the specified number of child processes to handle OCSP requests. The "-timeout" option now also limits the OCSP responder's patience to wait to receive the full client request on a newly accepted connection. Child processes are respawned as needed, and the CA index file is automatically reloaded when changed. This makes it possible to run the "ocsp" responder as a long-running service, making the OpenSSL CA somewhat more feature-complete. In this mode, most diagnostic messages logged after entering the event loop are logged via syslog(3) rather than written to stderr. [Viktor Dukhovni] *) Added support for X448 and Ed448. Heavily based on original work by Mike Hamburg. [Matt Caswell] *) Extend OSSL_STORE with capabilities to search and to narrow the set of objects loaded. This adds the functions OSSL_STORE_expect() and OSSL_STORE_find() as well as needed tools to construct searches and get the search data out of them. [Richard Levitte] *) Support for TLSv1.3 added. Note that users upgrading from an earlier version of OpenSSL should review their configuration settings to ensure that they are still appropriate for TLSv1.3. For further information see: https://wiki.openssl.org/index.php/TLS1.3 [Matt Caswell] *) Grand redesign of the OpenSSL random generator The default RAND method now utilizes an AES-CTR DRBG according to NIST standard SP 800-90Ar1. The new random generator is essentially a port of the default random generator from the OpenSSL FIPS 2.0 object module. It is a hybrid deterministic random bit generator using an AES-CTR bit stream and which seeds and reseeds itself automatically using trusted system entropy sources. Some of its new features are: o Support for multiple DRBG instances with seed chaining. o The default RAND method makes use of a DRBG. o There is a public and private DRBG instance. o The DRBG instances are fork-safe. o Keep all global DRBG instances on the secure heap if it is enabled. o The public and private DRBG instance are per thread for lock free operation [Paul Dale, Benjamin Kaduk, Kurt Roeckx, Rich Salz, Matthias St. Pierre] *) Changed Configure so it only says what it does and doesn't dump so much data. Instead, ./configdata.pm should be used as a script to display all sorts of configuration data. [Richard Levitte] *) Added processing of "make variables" to Configure. [Richard Levitte] *) Added SHA512/224 and SHA512/256 algorithm support. [Paul Dale] *) The last traces of Netware support, first removed in 1.1.0, have now been removed. [Rich Salz] *) Get rid of Makefile.shared, and in the process, make the processing of certain files (rc.obj, or the .def/.map/.opt files produced from the ordinal files) more visible and hopefully easier to trace and debug (or make silent). [Richard Levitte] *) Make it possible to have environment variable assignments as arguments to config / Configure. [Richard Levitte] *) Add multi-prime RSA (RFC 8017) support. [Paul Yang] *) Add SM3 implemented according to GB/T 32905-2016 [ Jack Lloyd , Ronald Tse , Erick Borsboom ] *) Add 'Maximum Fragment Length' TLS extension negotiation and support as documented in RFC6066. Based on a patch from Tomasz Moń [Filipe Raimundo da Silva] *) Add SM4 implemented according to GB/T 32907-2016. [ Jack Lloyd , Ronald Tse , Erick Borsboom ] *) Reimplement -newreq-nodes and ERR_error_string_n; the original author does not agree with the license change. [Rich Salz] *) Add ARIA AEAD TLS support. [Jon Spillett] *) Some macro definitions to support VS6 have been removed. Visual Studio 6 has not worked since 1.1.0 [Rich Salz] *) Add ERR_clear_last_mark(), to allow callers to clear the last mark without clearing the errors. [Richard Levitte] *) Add "atfork" functions. If building on a system that without pthreads, see doc/man3/OPENSSL_fork_prepare.pod for application requirements. The RAND facility now uses/requires this. [Rich Salz] *) Add SHA3. [Andy Polyakov] *) The UI API becomes a permanent and integral part of libcrypto, i.e. not possible to disable entirely. However, it's still possible to disable the console reading UI method, UI_OpenSSL() (use UI_null() as a fallback). To disable, configure with 'no-ui-console'. 'no-ui' is still possible to use as an alias. Check at compile time with the macro OPENSSL_NO_UI_CONSOLE. The macro OPENSSL_NO_UI is still possible to check and is an alias for OPENSSL_NO_UI_CONSOLE. [Richard Levitte] *) Add a STORE module, which implements a uniform and URI based reader of stores that can contain keys, certificates, CRLs and numerous other objects. The main API is loosely based on a few stdio functions, and includes OSSL_STORE_open, OSSL_STORE_load, OSSL_STORE_eof, OSSL_STORE_error and OSSL_STORE_close. The implementation uses backends called "loaders" to implement arbitrary URI schemes. There is one built in "loader" for the 'file' scheme. [Richard Levitte] *) Add devcrypto engine. This has been implemented against cryptodev-linux, then adjusted to work on FreeBSD 8.4 as well. Enable by configuring with 'enable-devcryptoeng'. This is done by default on BSD implementations, as cryptodev.h is assumed to exist on all of them. [Richard Levitte] *) Module names can prefixed with OSSL_ or OPENSSL_. This affects util/mkerr.pl, which is adapted to allow those prefixes, leading to error code calls like this: OSSL_FOOerr(OSSL_FOO_F_SOMETHING, OSSL_FOO_R_WHATEVER); With this change, we claim the namespaces OSSL and OPENSSL in a manner that can be encoded in C. For the foreseeable future, this will only affect new modules. [Richard Levitte and Tim Hudson] *) Removed BSD cryptodev engine. [Rich Salz] *) Add a build target 'build_all_generated', to build all generated files and only that. This can be used to prepare everything that requires things like perl for a system that lacks perl and then move everything to that system and do the rest of the build there. [Richard Levitte] *) In the UI interface, make it possible to duplicate the user data. This can be used by engines that need to retain the data for a longer time than just the call where this user data is passed. [Richard Levitte] *) Ignore the '-named_curve auto' value for compatibility of applications with OpenSSL 1.0.2. [Tomas Mraz ] *) Fragmented SSL/TLS alerts are no longer accepted. An alert message is 2 bytes long. In theory it is permissible in SSLv3 - TLSv1.2 to fragment such alerts across multiple records (some of which could be empty). In practice it make no sense to send an empty alert record, or to fragment one. TLSv1.3 prohibits this altogether and other libraries (BoringSSL, NSS) do not support this at all. Supporting it adds significant complexity to the record layer, and its removal is unlikely to cause interoperability issues. [Matt Caswell] *) Add the ASN.1 types INT32, UINT32, INT64, UINT64 and variants prefixed with Z. These are meant to replace LONG and ZLONG and to be size safe. The use of LONG and ZLONG is discouraged and scheduled for deprecation in OpenSSL 1.2.0. [Richard Levitte] *) Add the 'z' and 'j' modifiers to BIO_printf() et al formatting string, 'z' is to be used for [s]size_t, and 'j' - with [u]int64_t. [Richard Levitte, Andy Polyakov] *) Add EC_KEY_get0_engine(), which does for EC_KEY what RSA_get0_engine() does for RSA, etc. [Richard Levitte] *) Have 'config' recognise 64-bit mingw and choose 'mingw64' as the target platform rather than 'mingw'. [Richard Levitte] *) The functions X509_STORE_add_cert and X509_STORE_add_crl return success if they are asked to add an object which already exists in the store. This change cascades to other functions which load certificates and CRLs. [Paul Dale] *) x86_64 assembly pack: annotate code with DWARF CFI directives to facilitate stack unwinding even from assembly subroutines. [Andy Polyakov] *) Remove VAX C specific definitions of OPENSSL_EXPORT, OPENSSL_EXTERN. Also remove OPENSSL_GLOBAL entirely, as it became a no-op. [Richard Levitte] *) Remove the VMS-specific reimplementation of gmtime from crypto/o_times.c. VMS C's RTL has a fully up to date gmtime() and gmtime_r() since V7.1, which is the minimum version we support. [Richard Levitte] *) Certificate time validation (X509_cmp_time) enforces stricter compliance with RFC 5280. Fractional seconds and timezone offsets are no longer allowed. [Emilia Käsper] *) Add support for ARIA [Paul Dale] *) s_client will now send the Server Name Indication (SNI) extension by default unless the new "-noservername" option is used. The server name is based on the host provided to the "-connect" option unless overridden by using "-servername". [Matt Caswell] *) Add support for SipHash [Todd Short] *) OpenSSL now fails if it receives an unrecognised record type in TLS1.0 or TLS1.1. Previously this only happened in SSLv3 and TLS1.2. This is to prevent issues where no progress is being made and the peer continually sends unrecognised record types, using up resources processing them. [Matt Caswell] *) 'openssl passwd' can now produce SHA256 and SHA512 based output, using the algorithm defined in https://www.akkadia.org/drepper/SHA-crypt.txt [Richard Levitte] *) Heartbeat support has been removed; the ABI is changed for now. [Richard Levitte, Rich Salz] *) Support for SSL_OP_NO_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC in SSL_CONF_cmd. [Emilia Käsper] *) The RSA "null" method, which was partially supported to avoid patent issues, has been replaced to always returns NULL. [Rich Salz] Changes between 1.1.0h and 1.1.0i [xx XXX xxxx] *) Client DoS due to large DH parameter During key agreement in a TLS handshake using a DH(E) based ciphersuite a malicious server can send a very large prime value to the client. This will cause the client to spend an unreasonably long period of time generating a key for this prime resulting in a hang until the client has finished. This could be exploited in a Denial Of Service attack. This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 5th June 2018 by Guido Vranken (CVE-2018-0732) [Guido Vranken] *) Cache timing vulnerability in RSA Key Generation The OpenSSL RSA Key generation algorithm has been shown to be vulnerable to a cache timing side channel attack. An attacker with sufficient access to mount cache timing attacks during the RSA key generation process could recover the private key. This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 4th April 2018 by Alejandro Cabrera Aldaya, Billy Brumley, Cesar Pereida Garcia and Luis Manuel Alvarez Tapia. (CVE-2018-0737) [Billy Brumley] *) Make EVP_PKEY_asn1_new() a bit stricter about its input. A NULL pem_str parameter is no longer accepted, as it leads to a corrupt table. NULL pem_str is reserved for alias entries only. [Richard Levitte] *) Revert blinding in ECDSA sign and instead make problematic addition length-invariant. Switch even to fixed-length Montgomery multiplication. [Andy Polyakov] *) Change generating and checking of primes so that the error rate of not being prime depends on the intended use based on the size of the input. For larger primes this will result in more rounds of Miller-Rabin. The maximal error rate for primes with more than 1080 bits is lowered to 2^-128. [Kurt Roeckx, Annie Yousar] *) Increase the number of Miller-Rabin rounds for DSA key generating to 64. [Kurt Roeckx] *) Add blinding to ECDSA and DSA signatures to protect against side channel attacks discovered by Keegan Ryan (NCC Group). [Matt Caswell] *) When unlocking a pass phrase protected PEM file or PKCS#8 container, we now allow empty (zero character) pass phrases. [Richard Levitte] *) Certificate time validation (X509_cmp_time) enforces stricter compliance with RFC 5280. Fractional seconds and timezone offsets are no longer allowed. [Emilia Käsper] *) Fixed a text canonicalisation bug in CMS Where a CMS detached signature is used with text content the text goes through a canonicalisation process first prior to signing or verifying a signature. This process strips trailing space at the end of lines, converts line terminators to CRLF and removes additional trailing line terminators at the end of a file. A bug in the canonicalisation process meant that some characters, such as form-feed, were incorrectly treated as whitespace and removed. This is contrary to the specification (RFC5485). This fix could mean that detached text data signed with an earlier version of OpenSSL 1.1.0 may fail to verify using the fixed version, or text data signed with a fixed OpenSSL may fail to verify with an earlier version of OpenSSL 1.1.0. A workaround is to only verify the canonicalised text data and use the "-binary" flag (for the "cms" command line application) or set the SMIME_BINARY/PKCS7_BINARY/CMS_BINARY flags (if using CMS_verify()). [Matt Caswell] Changes between 1.1.0g and 1.1.0h [27 Mar 2018] *) Constructed ASN.1 types with a recursive definition could exceed the stack Constructed ASN.1 types with a recursive definition (such as can be found in PKCS7) could eventually exceed the stack given malicious input with excessive recursion. This could result in a Denial Of Service attack. There are no such structures used within SSL/TLS that come from untrusted sources so this is considered safe. This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 4th January 2018 by the OSS-fuzz project. (CVE-2018-0739) [Matt Caswell] *) Incorrect CRYPTO_memcmp on HP-UX PA-RISC Because of an implementation bug the PA-RISC CRYPTO_memcmp function is effectively reduced to only comparing the least significant bit of each byte. This allows an attacker to forge messages that would be considered as authenticated in an amount of tries lower than that guaranteed by the security claims of the scheme. The module can only be compiled by the HP-UX assembler, so that only HP-UX PA-RISC targets are affected. This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 2nd March 2018 by Peter Waltenberg (IBM). (CVE-2018-0733) [Andy Polyakov] *) Add a build target 'build_all_generated', to build all generated files and only that. This can be used to prepare everything that requires things like perl for a system that lacks perl and then move everything to that system and do the rest of the build there. [Richard Levitte] *) Backport SSL_OP_NO_RENGOTIATION OpenSSL 1.0.2 and below had the ability to disable renegotiation using the (undocumented) SSL3_FLAGS_NO_RENEGOTIATE_CIPHERS flag. Due to the opacity changes this is no longer possible in 1.1.0. Therefore the new SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION option from 1.1.1-dev has been backported to 1.1.0 to provide equivalent functionality. Note that if an application built against 1.1.0h headers (or above) is run using an older version of 1.1.0 (prior to 1.1.0h) then the option will be accepted but nothing will happen, i.e. renegotiation will not be prevented. [Matt Caswell] *) Removed the OS390-Unix config target. It relied on a script that doesn't exist. [Rich Salz] *) rsaz_1024_mul_avx2 overflow bug on x86_64 There is an overflow bug in the AVX2 Montgomery multiplication procedure used in exponentiation with 1024-bit moduli. No EC algorithms are affected. Analysis suggests that attacks against RSA and DSA as a result of this defect would be very difficult to perform and are not believed likely. Attacks against DH1024 are considered just feasible, because most of the work necessary to deduce information about a private key may be performed offline. The amount of resources required for such an attack would be significant. However, for an attack on TLS to be meaningful, the server would have to share the DH1024 private key among multiple clients, which is no longer an option since CVE-2016-0701. This only affects processors that support the AVX2 but not ADX extensions like Intel Haswell (4th generation). This issue was reported to OpenSSL by David Benjamin (Google). The issue was originally found via the OSS-Fuzz project. (CVE-2017-3738) [Andy Polyakov] Changes between 1.1.0f and 1.1.0g [2 Nov 2017] *) bn_sqrx8x_internal carry bug on x86_64 There is a carry propagating bug in the x86_64 Montgomery squaring procedure. No EC algorithms are affected. Analysis suggests that attacks against RSA and DSA as a result of this defect would be very difficult to perform and are not believed likely. Attacks against DH are considered just feasible (although very difficult) because most of the work necessary to deduce information about a private key may be performed offline. The amount of resources required for such an attack would be very significant and likely only accessible to a limited number of attackers. An attacker would additionally need online access to an unpatched system using the target private key in a scenario with persistent DH parameters and a private key that is shared between multiple clients. This only affects processors that support the BMI1, BMI2 and ADX extensions like Intel Broadwell (5th generation) and later or AMD Ryzen. This issue was reported to OpenSSL by the OSS-Fuzz project. (CVE-2017-3736) [Andy Polyakov] *) Malformed X.509 IPAddressFamily could cause OOB read If an X.509 certificate has a malformed IPAddressFamily extension, OpenSSL could do a one-byte buffer overread. The most likely result would be an erroneous display of the certificate in text format. This issue was reported to OpenSSL by the OSS-Fuzz project. (CVE-2017-3735) [Rich Salz] Changes between 1.1.0e and 1.1.0f [25 May 2017] *) Have 'config' recognise 64-bit mingw and choose 'mingw64' as the target platform rather than 'mingw'. [Richard Levitte] *) Remove the VMS-specific reimplementation of gmtime from crypto/o_times.c. VMS C's RTL has a fully up to date gmtime() and gmtime_r() since V7.1, which is the minimum version we support. [Richard Levitte] Changes between 1.1.0d and 1.1.0e [16 Feb 2017] *) Encrypt-Then-Mac renegotiation crash During a renegotiation handshake if the Encrypt-Then-Mac extension is negotiated where it was not in the original handshake (or vice-versa) then this can cause OpenSSL to crash (dependant on ciphersuite). Both clients and servers are affected. This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Joe Orton (Red Hat). (CVE-2017-3733) [Matt Caswell] Changes between 1.1.0c and 1.1.0d [26 Jan 2017] *) Truncated packet could crash via OOB read If one side of an SSL/TLS path is running on a 32-bit host and a specific cipher is being used, then a truncated packet can cause that host to perform an out-of-bounds read, usually resulting in a crash. This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Robert Święcki of Google. (CVE-2017-3731) [Andy Polyakov] *) Bad (EC)DHE parameters cause a client crash If a malicious server supplies bad parameters for a DHE or ECDHE key exchange then this can result in the client attempting to dereference a NULL pointer leading to a client crash. This could be exploited in a Denial of Service attack. This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Guido Vranken. (CVE-2017-3730) [Matt Caswell] *) BN_mod_exp may produce incorrect results on x86_64 There is a carry propagating bug in the x86_64 Montgomery squaring procedure. No EC algorithms are affected. Analysis suggests that attacks against RSA and DSA as a result of this defect would be very difficult to perform and are not believed likely. Attacks against DH are considered just feasible (although very difficult) because most of the work necessary to deduce information about a private key may be performed offline. The amount of resources required for such an attack would be very significant and likely only accessible to a limited number of attackers. An attacker would additionally need online access to an unpatched system using the target private key in a scenario with persistent DH parameters and a private key that is shared between multiple clients. For example this can occur by default in OpenSSL DHE based SSL/TLS ciphersuites. Note: This issue is very similar to CVE-2015-3193 but must be treated as a separate problem. This issue was reported to OpenSSL by the OSS-Fuzz project. (CVE-2017-3732) [Andy Polyakov] Changes between 1.1.0b and 1.1.0c [10 Nov 2016] *) ChaCha20/Poly1305 heap-buffer-overflow TLS connections using *-CHACHA20-POLY1305 ciphersuites are susceptible to a DoS attack by corrupting larger payloads. This can result in an OpenSSL crash. This issue is not considered to be exploitable beyond a DoS. This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Robert Święcki (Google Security Team) (CVE-2016-7054) [Richard Levitte] *) CMS Null dereference Applications parsing invalid CMS structures can crash with a NULL pointer dereference. This is caused by a bug in the handling of the ASN.1 CHOICE type in OpenSSL 1.1.0 which can result in a NULL value being passed to the structure callback if an attempt is made to free certain invalid encodings. Only CHOICE structures using a callback which do not handle NULL value are affected. This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Tyler Nighswander of ForAllSecure. (CVE-2016-7053) [Stephen Henson] *) Montgomery multiplication may produce incorrect results There is a carry propagating bug in the Broadwell-specific Montgomery multiplication procedure that handles input lengths divisible by, but longer than 256 bits. Analysis suggests that attacks against RSA, DSA and DH private keys are impossible. This is because the subroutine in question is not used in operations with the private key itself and an input of the attacker's direct choice. Otherwise the bug can manifest itself as transient authentication and key negotiation failures or reproducible erroneous outcome of public-key operations with specially crafted input. Among EC algorithms only Brainpool P-512 curves are affected and one presumably can attack ECDH key negotiation. Impact was not analyzed in detail, because pre-requisites for attack are considered unlikely. Namely multiple clients have to choose the curve in question and the server has to share the private key among them, neither of which is default behaviour. Even then only clients that chose the curve will be affected. This issue was publicly reported as transient failures and was not initially recognized as a security issue. Thanks to Richard Morgan for providing reproducible case. (CVE-2016-7055) [Andy Polyakov] *) Removed automatic addition of RPATH in shared libraries and executables, as this was a remainder from OpenSSL 1.0.x and isn't needed any more. [Richard Levitte] Changes between 1.1.0a and 1.1.0b [26 Sep 2016] *) Fix Use After Free for large message sizes The patch applied to address CVE-2016-6307 resulted in an issue where if a message larger than approx 16k is received then the underlying buffer to store the incoming message is reallocated and moved. Unfortunately a dangling pointer to the old location is left which results in an attempt to write to the previously freed location. This is likely to result in a crash, however it could potentially lead to execution of arbitrary code. This issue only affects OpenSSL 1.1.0a. This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Robert Święcki. (CVE-2016-6309) [Matt Caswell] Changes between 1.1.0 and 1.1.0a [22 Sep 2016] *) OCSP Status Request extension unbounded memory growth A malicious client can send an excessively large OCSP Status Request extension. If that client continually requests renegotiation, sending a large OCSP Status Request extension each time, then there will be unbounded memory growth on the server. This will eventually lead to a Denial Of Service attack through memory exhaustion. Servers with a default configuration are vulnerable even if they do not support OCSP. Builds using the "no-ocsp" build time option are not affected. This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Shi Lei (Gear Team, Qihoo 360 Inc.) (CVE-2016-6304) [Matt Caswell] *) SSL_peek() hang on empty record OpenSSL 1.1.0 SSL/TLS will hang during a call to SSL_peek() if the peer sends an empty record. This could be exploited by a malicious peer in a Denial Of Service attack. This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Alex Gaynor. (CVE-2016-6305) [Matt Caswell] *) Excessive allocation of memory in tls_get_message_header() and dtls1_preprocess_fragment() A (D)TLS message includes 3 bytes for its length in the header for the message. This would allow for messages up to 16Mb in length. Messages of this length are excessive and OpenSSL includes a check to ensure that a peer is sending reasonably sized messages in order to avoid too much memory being consumed to service a connection. A flaw in the logic of version 1.1.0 means that memory for the message is allocated too early, prior to the excessive message length check. Due to way memory is allocated in OpenSSL this could mean an attacker could force up to 21Mb to be allocated to service a connection. This could lead to a Denial of Service through memory exhaustion. However, the excessive message length check still takes place, and this would cause the connection to immediately fail. Assuming that the application calls SSL_free() on the failed connection in a timely manner then the 21Mb of allocated memory will then be immediately freed again. Therefore the excessive memory allocation will be transitory in nature. This then means that there is only a security impact if: 1) The application does not call SSL_free() in a timely manner in the event that the connection fails or 2) The application is working in a constrained environment where there is very little free memory or 3) The attacker initiates multiple connection attempts such that there are multiple connections in a state where memory has been allocated for the connection; SSL_free() has not yet been called; and there is insufficient memory to service the multiple requests. Except in the instance of (1) above any Denial Of Service is likely to be transitory because as soon as the connection fails the memory is subsequently freed again in the SSL_free() call. However there is an increased risk during this period of application crashes due to the lack of memory - which would then mean a more serious Denial of Service. This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Shi Lei (Gear Team, Qihoo 360 Inc.) (CVE-2016-6307 and CVE-2016-6308) [Matt Caswell] *) solaris-x86-cc, i.e. 32-bit configuration with vendor compiler, had to be removed. Primary reason is that vendor assembler can't assemble our modules with -KPIC flag. As result it, assembly support, was not even available as option. But its lack means lack of side-channel resistant code, which is incompatible with security by todays standards. Fortunately gcc is readily available prepackaged option, which we firmly point at... [Andy Polyakov] Changes between 1.0.2h and 1.1.0 [25 Aug 2016] *) Windows command-line tool supports UTF-8 opt-in option for arguments and console input. Setting OPENSSL_WIN32_UTF8 environment variable (to any value) allows Windows user to access PKCS#12 file generated with Windows CryptoAPI and protected with non-ASCII password, as well as files generated under UTF-8 locale on Linux also protected with non-ASCII password. [Andy Polyakov] *) To mitigate the SWEET32 attack (CVE-2016-2183), 3DES cipher suites have been disabled by default and removed from DEFAULT, just like RC4. See the RC4 item below to re-enable both. [Rich Salz] *) The method for finding the storage location for the Windows RAND seed file has changed. First we check %RANDFILE%. If that is not set then we check the directories %HOME%, %USERPROFILE% and %SYSTEMROOT% in that order. If all else fails we fall back to C:\. [Matt Caswell] *) The EVP_EncryptUpdate() function has had its return type changed from void to int. A return of 0 indicates and error while a return of 1 indicates success. [Matt Caswell] *) The flags RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME, DSA_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME and DH_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME which previously provided the ability to switch off the constant time implementation for RSA, DSA and DH have been made no-ops and deprecated. [Matt Caswell] *) Windows RAND implementation was simplified to only get entropy by calling CryptGenRandom(). Various other RAND-related tickets were also closed. [Joseph Wylie Yandle, Rich Salz] *) The stack and lhash API's were renamed to start with OPENSSL_SK_ and OPENSSL_LH_, respectively. The old names are available with API compatibility. They new names are now completely documented. [Rich Salz] *) Unify TYPE_up_ref(obj) methods signature. SSL_CTX_up_ref(), SSL_up_ref(), X509_up_ref(), EVP_PKEY_up_ref(), X509_CRL_up_ref(), X509_OBJECT_up_ref_count() methods are now returning an int (instead of void) like all others TYPE_up_ref() methods. So now these methods also check the return value of CRYPTO_atomic_add(), and the validity of object reference counter. [fdasilvayy@gmail.com] *) With Windows Visual Studio builds, the .pdb files are installed alongside the installed libraries and executables. For a static library installation, ossl_static.pdb is the associate compiler generated .pdb file to be used when linking programs. [Richard Levitte] *) Remove openssl.spec. Packaging files belong with the packagers. [Richard Levitte] *) Automatic Darwin/OSX configuration has had a refresh, it will now recognise x86_64 architectures automatically. You can still decide to build for a different bitness with the environment variable KERNEL_BITS (can be 32 or 64), for example: KERNEL_BITS=32 ./config [Richard Levitte] *) Change default algorithms in pkcs8 utility to use PKCS#5 v2.0, 256 bit AES and HMAC with SHA256. [Steve Henson] *) Remove support for MIPS o32 ABI on IRIX (and IRIX only). [Andy Polyakov] *) Triple-DES ciphers have been moved from HIGH to MEDIUM. [Rich Salz] *) To enable users to have their own config files and build file templates, Configure looks in the directory indicated by the environment variable OPENSSL_LOCAL_CONFIG_DIR as well as the in-source Configurations/ directory. On VMS, OPENSSL_LOCAL_CONFIG_DIR is expected to be a logical name and is used as is. [Richard Levitte] *) The following datatypes were made opaque: X509_OBJECT, X509_STORE_CTX, X509_STORE, X509_LOOKUP, and X509_LOOKUP_METHOD. The unused type X509_CERT_FILE_CTX was removed. [Rich Salz] *) "shared" builds are now the default. To create only static libraries use the "no-shared" Configure option. [Matt Caswell] *) Remove the no-aes, no-hmac, no-rsa, no-sha and no-md5 Configure options. All of these option have not worked for some while and are fundamental algorithms. [Matt Caswell] *) Make various cleanup routines no-ops and mark them as deprecated. Most global cleanup functions are no longer required because they are handled via auto-deinit (see OPENSSL_init_crypto and OPENSSL_init_ssl man pages). Explicitly de-initing can cause problems (e.g. where a library that uses OpenSSL de-inits, but an application is still using it). The affected functions are CONF_modules_free(), ENGINE_cleanup(), OBJ_cleanup(), EVP_cleanup(), BIO_sock_cleanup(), CRYPTO_cleanup_all_ex_data(), RAND_cleanup(), SSL_COMP_free_compression_methods(), ERR_free_strings() and COMP_zlib_cleanup(). [Matt Caswell] *) --strict-warnings no longer enables runtime debugging options such as REF_DEBUG. Instead, debug options are automatically enabled with '--debug' builds. [Andy Polyakov, Emilia Käsper] *) Made DH and DH_METHOD opaque. The structures for managing DH objects have been moved out of the public header files. New functions for managing these have been added. [Matt Caswell] *) Made RSA and RSA_METHOD opaque. The structures for managing RSA objects have been moved out of the public header files. New functions for managing these have been added. [Richard Levitte] *) Made DSA and DSA_METHOD opaque. The structures for managing DSA objects have been moved out of the public header files. New functions for managing these have been added. [Matt Caswell] *) Made BIO and BIO_METHOD opaque. The structures for managing BIOs have been moved out of the public header files. New functions for managing these have been added. [Matt Caswell] *) Removed no-rijndael as a config option. Rijndael is an old name for AES. [Matt Caswell] *) Removed the mk1mf build scripts. [Richard Levitte] *) Headers are now wrapped, if necessary, with OPENSSL_NO_xxx, so it is always safe to #include a header now. [Rich Salz] *) Removed the aged BC-32 config and all its supporting scripts [Richard Levitte] *) Removed support for Ultrix, Netware, and OS/2. [Rich Salz] *) Add support for HKDF. [Alessandro Ghedini] *) Add support for blake2b and blake2s [Bill Cox] *) Added support for "pipelining". Ciphers that have the EVP_CIPH_FLAG_PIPELINE flag set have a capability to process multiple encryptions/decryptions simultaneously. There are currently no built-in ciphers with this property but the expectation is that engines will be able to offer it to significantly improve throughput. Support has been extended into libssl so that multiple records for a single connection can be processed in one go (for >=TLS 1.1). [Matt Caswell] *) Added the AFALG engine. This is an async capable engine which is able to offload work to the Linux kernel. In this initial version it only supports AES128-CBC. The kernel must be version 4.1.0 or greater. [Catriona Lucey] *) OpenSSL now uses a new threading API. It is no longer necessary to set locking callbacks to use OpenSSL in a multi-threaded environment. There are two supported threading models: pthreads and windows threads. It is also possible to configure OpenSSL at compile time for "no-threads". The old threading API should no longer be used. The functions have been replaced with "no-op" compatibility macros. [Alessandro Ghedini, Matt Caswell] *) Modify behavior of ALPN to invoke callback after SNI/servername callback, such that updates to the SSL_CTX affect ALPN. [Todd Short] *) Add SSL_CIPHER queries for authentication and key-exchange. [Todd Short] *) Changes to the DEFAULT cipherlist: - Prefer (EC)DHE handshakes over plain RSA. - Prefer AEAD ciphers over legacy ciphers. - Prefer ECDSA over RSA when both certificates are available. - Prefer TLSv1.2 ciphers/PRF. - Remove DSS, SEED, IDEA, CAMELLIA, and AES-CCM from the default cipherlist. [Emilia Käsper] *) Change the ECC default curve list to be this, in order: x25519, secp256r1, secp521r1, secp384r1. [Rich Salz] *) RC4 based libssl ciphersuites are now classed as "weak" ciphers and are disabled by default. They can be re-enabled using the enable-weak-ssl-ciphers option to Configure. [Matt Caswell] *) If the server has ALPN configured, but supports no protocols that the client advertises, send a fatal "no_application_protocol" alert. This behaviour is SHALL in RFC 7301, though it isn't universally implemented by other servers. [Emilia Käsper] *) Add X25519 support. Add ASN.1 and EVP_PKEY methods for X25519. This includes support for public and private key encoding using the format documented in draft-ietf-curdle-pkix-02. The corresponding EVP_PKEY method supports key generation and key derivation. TLS support complies with draft-ietf-tls-rfc4492bis-08 and uses X25519(29). [Steve Henson] *) Deprecate SRP_VBASE_get_by_user. SRP_VBASE_get_by_user had inconsistent memory management behaviour. In order to fix an unavoidable memory leak (CVE-2016-0798), SRP_VBASE_get_by_user was changed to ignore the "fake user" SRP seed, even if the seed is configured. Users should use SRP_VBASE_get1_by_user instead. Note that in SRP_VBASE_get1_by_user, caller must free the returned value. Note also that even though configuring the SRP seed attempts to hide invalid usernames by continuing the handshake with fake credentials, this behaviour is not constant time and no strong guarantees are made that the handshake is indistinguishable from that of a valid user. [Emilia Käsper] *) Configuration change; it's now possible to build dynamic engines without having to build shared libraries and vice versa. This only applies to the engines in engines/, those in crypto/engine/ will always be built into libcrypto (i.e. "static"). Building dynamic engines is enabled by default; to disable, use the configuration option "disable-dynamic-engine". The only requirements for building dynamic engines are the presence of the DSO module and building with position independent code, so they will also automatically be disabled if configuring with "disable-dso" or "disable-pic". The macros OPENSSL_NO_STATIC_ENGINE and OPENSSL_NO_DYNAMIC_ENGINE are also taken away from openssl/opensslconf.h, as they are irrelevant. [Richard Levitte] *) Configuration change; if there is a known flag to compile position independent code, it will always be applied on the libcrypto and libssl object files, and never on the application object files. This means other libraries that use routines from libcrypto / libssl can be made into shared libraries regardless of how OpenSSL was configured. If this isn't desirable, the configuration options "disable-pic" or "no-pic" can be used to disable the use of PIC. This will also disable building shared libraries and dynamic engines. [Richard Levitte] *) Removed JPAKE code. It was experimental and has no wide use. [Rich Salz] *) The INSTALL_PREFIX Makefile variable has been renamed to DESTDIR. That makes for less confusion on what this variable is for. Also, the configuration option --install_prefix is removed. [Richard Levitte] *) Heartbeat for TLS has been removed and is disabled by default for DTLS; configure with enable-heartbeats. Code that uses the old #define's might need to be updated. [Emilia Käsper, Rich Salz] *) Rename REF_CHECK to REF_DEBUG. [Rich Salz] *) New "unified" build system The "unified" build system is aimed to be a common system for all platforms we support. With it comes new support for VMS. This system builds supports building in a different directory tree than the source tree. It produces one Makefile (for unix family or lookalikes), or one descrip.mms (for VMS). The source of information to make the Makefile / descrip.mms is small files called 'build.info', holding the necessary information for each directory with source to compile, and a template in Configurations, like unix-Makefile.tmpl or descrip.mms.tmpl. With this change, the library names were also renamed on Windows and on VMS. They now have names that are closer to the standard on Unix, and include the major version number, and in certain cases, the architecture they are built for. See "Notes on shared libraries" in INSTALL. We rely heavily on the perl module Text::Template. [Richard Levitte] *) Added support for auto-initialisation and de-initialisation of the library. OpenSSL no longer requires explicit init or deinit routines to be called, except in certain circumstances. See the OPENSSL_init_crypto() and OPENSSL_init_ssl() man pages for further information. [Matt Caswell] *) The arguments to the DTLSv1_listen function have changed. Specifically the "peer" argument is now expected to be a BIO_ADDR object. *) Rewrite of BIO networking library. The BIO library lacked consistent support of IPv6, and adding it required some more extensive modifications. This introduces the BIO_ADDR and BIO_ADDRINFO types, which hold all types of addresses and chains of address information. It also introduces a new API, with functions like BIO_socket, BIO_connect, BIO_listen, BIO_lookup and a rewrite of BIO_accept. The source/sink BIOs BIO_s_connect, BIO_s_accept and BIO_s_datagram have been adapted accordingly. [Richard Levitte] *) RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_1 now accepts inputs with and without the leading 0-byte. [Emilia Käsper] *) CRIME protection: disable compression by default, even if OpenSSL is compiled with zlib enabled. Applications can still enable compression by calling SSL_CTX_clear_options(ctx, SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION), or by using the SSL_CONF library to configure compression. [Emilia Käsper] *) The signature of the session callback configured with SSL_CTX_sess_set_get_cb was changed. The read-only input buffer was explicitly marked as 'const unsigned char*' instead of 'unsigned char*'. [Emilia Käsper] *) Always DPURIFY. Remove the use of uninitialized memory in the RNG, and other conditional uses of DPURIFY. This makes -DPURIFY a no-op. [Emilia Käsper] *) Removed many obsolete configuration items, including DES_PTR, DES_RISC1, DES_RISC2, DES_INT MD2_CHAR, MD2_INT, MD2_LONG BF_PTR, BF_PTR2 IDEA_SHORT, IDEA_LONG RC2_SHORT, RC2_LONG, RC4_LONG, RC4_CHUNK, RC4_INDEX [Rich Salz, with advice from Andy Polyakov] *) Many BN internals have been moved to an internal header file. [Rich Salz with help from Andy Polyakov] *) Configuration and writing out the results from it has changed. Files such as Makefile include/openssl/opensslconf.h and are now produced through general templates, such as Makefile.in and crypto/opensslconf.h.in and some help from the perl module Text::Template. Also, the center of configuration information is no longer Makefile. Instead, Configure produces a perl module in configdata.pm which holds most of the config data (in the hash table %config), the target data that comes from the target configuration in one of the Configurations/*.conf files (in %target). [Richard Levitte] *) To clarify their intended purposes, the Configure options --prefix and --openssldir change their semantics, and become more straightforward and less interdependent. --prefix shall be used exclusively to give the location INSTALLTOP where programs, scripts, libraries, include files and manuals are going to be installed. The default is now /usr/local. --openssldir shall be used exclusively to give the default location OPENSSLDIR where certificates, private keys, CRLs are managed. This is also where the default openssl.cnf gets installed. If the directory given with this option is a relative path, the values of both the --prefix value and the --openssldir value will be combined to become OPENSSLDIR. The default for --openssldir is INSTALLTOP/ssl. Anyone who uses --openssldir to specify where OpenSSL is to be installed MUST change to use --prefix instead. [Richard Levitte] *) The GOST engine was out of date and therefore it has been removed. An up to date GOST engine is now being maintained in an external repository. See: https://wiki.openssl.org/index.php/Binaries. Libssl still retains support for GOST ciphersuites (these are only activated if a GOST engine is present). [Matt Caswell] *) EGD is no longer supported by default; use enable-egd when configuring. [Ben Kaduk and Rich Salz] *) The distribution now has Makefile.in files, which are used to create Makefile's when Configure is run. *Configure must be run before trying to build now.* [Rich Salz] *) The return value for SSL_CIPHER_description() for error conditions has changed. [Rich Salz] *) Support for RFC6698/RFC7671 DANE TLSA peer authentication. Obtaining and performing DNSSEC validation of TLSA records is the application's responsibility. The application provides the TLSA records of its choice to OpenSSL, and these are then used to authenticate the peer. The TLSA records need not even come from DNS. They can, for example, be used to implement local end-entity certificate or trust-anchor "pinning", where the "pin" data takes the form of TLSA records, which can augment or replace verification based on the usual WebPKI public certification authorities. [Viktor Dukhovni] *) Revert default OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED setting. Instead OpenSSL continues to support deprecated interfaces in default builds. However, applications are strongly advised to compile their source files with -DOPENSSL_API_COMPAT=0x10100000L, which hides the declarations of all interfaces deprecated in 0.9.8, 1.0.0 or the 1.1.0 releases. In environments in which all applications have been ported to not use any deprecated interfaces OpenSSL's Configure script should be used with the --api=1.1.0 option to entirely remove support for the deprecated features from the library and unconditionally disable them in the installed headers. Essentially the same effect can be achieved with the "no-deprecated" argument to Configure, except that this will always restrict the build to just the latest API, rather than a fixed API version. As applications are ported to future revisions of the API, they should update their compile-time OPENSSL_API_COMPAT define accordingly, but in most cases should be able to continue to compile with later releases. The OPENSSL_API_COMPAT versions for 1.0.0, and 0.9.8 are 0x10000000L and 0x00908000L, respectively. However those versions did not support the OPENSSL_API_COMPAT feature, and so applications are not typically tested for explicit support of just the undeprecated features of either release. [Viktor Dukhovni] *) Add support for setting the minimum and maximum supported protocol. It can bet set via the SSL_set_min_proto_version() and SSL_set_max_proto_version(), or via the SSL_CONF's MinProtocol and MaxProtocol. It's recommended to use the new APIs to disable protocols instead of disabling individual protocols using SSL_set_options() or SSL_CONF's Protocol. This change also removes support for disabling TLS 1.2 in the OpenSSL TLS client at compile time by defining OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2_CLIENT. [Kurt Roeckx] *) Support for ChaCha20 and Poly1305 added to libcrypto and libssl. [Andy Polyakov] *) New EC_KEY_METHOD, this replaces the older ECDSA_METHOD and ECDH_METHOD and integrates ECDSA and ECDH functionality into EC. Implementations can now redirect key generation and no longer need to convert to or from ECDSA_SIG format. Note: the ecdsa.h and ecdh.h headers are now no longer needed and just include the ec.h header file instead. [Steve Henson] *) Remove support for all 40 and 56 bit ciphers. This includes all the export ciphers who are no longer supported and drops support the ephemeral RSA key exchange. The LOW ciphers currently doesn't have any ciphers in it. [Kurt Roeckx] *) Made EVP_MD_CTX, EVP_MD, EVP_CIPHER_CTX, EVP_CIPHER and HMAC_CTX opaque. For HMAC_CTX, the following constructors and destructors were added: HMAC_CTX *HMAC_CTX_new(void); void HMAC_CTX_free(HMAC_CTX *ctx); For EVP_MD and EVP_CIPHER, complete APIs to create, fill and destroy such methods has been added. See EVP_MD_meth_new(3) and EVP_CIPHER_meth_new(3) for documentation. Additional changes: 1) EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(), EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup() and HMAC_CTX_cleanup() were removed. HMAC_CTX_reset() and EVP_MD_CTX_reset() should be called instead to reinitialise an already created structure. 2) For consistency with the majority of our object creators and destructors, EVP_MD_CTX_(create|destroy) were renamed to EVP_MD_CTX_(new|free). The old names are retained as macros for deprecated builds. [Richard Levitte] *) Added ASYNC support. Libcrypto now includes the async sub-library to enable cryptographic operations to be performed asynchronously as long as an asynchronous capable engine is used. See the ASYNC_start_job() man page for further details. Libssl has also had this capability integrated with the introduction of the new mode SSL_MODE_ASYNC and associated error SSL_ERROR_WANT_ASYNC. See the SSL_CTX_set_mode() and SSL_get_error() man pages. This work was developed in partnership with Intel Corp. [Matt Caswell] *) SSL_{CTX_}set_ecdh_auto() has been removed and ECDH is support is always enabled now. If you want to disable the support you should exclude it using the list of supported ciphers. This also means that the "-no_ecdhe" option has been removed from s_server. [Kurt Roeckx] *) SSL_{CTX}_set_tmp_ecdh() which can set 1 EC curve now internally calls SSL_{CTX_}set1_curves() which can set a list. [Kurt Roeckx] *) Remove support for SSL_{CTX_}set_tmp_ecdh_callback(). You should set the curve you want to support using SSL_{CTX_}set1_curves(). [Kurt Roeckx] *) State machine rewrite. The state machine code has been significantly refactored in order to remove much duplication of code and solve issues with the old code (see ssl/statem/README for further details). This change does have some associated API changes. Notably the SSL_state() function has been removed and replaced by SSL_get_state which now returns an "OSSL_HANDSHAKE_STATE" instead of an int. SSL_set_state() has been removed altogether. The previous handshake states defined in ssl.h and ssl3.h have also been removed. [Matt Caswell] *) All instances of the string "ssleay" in the public API were replaced with OpenSSL (case-matching; e.g., OPENSSL_VERSION for #define's) Some error codes related to internal RSA_eay API's were renamed. [Rich Salz] *) The demo files in crypto/threads were moved to demo/threads. [Rich Salz] *) Removed obsolete engines: 4758cca, aep, atalla, cswift, nuron, gmp, sureware and ubsec. [Matt Caswell, Rich Salz] *) New ASN.1 embed macro. New ASN.1 macro ASN1_EMBED. This is the same as ASN1_SIMPLE except the structure is not allocated: it is part of the parent. That is instead of FOO *x; it must be: FOO x; This reduces memory fragmentation and make it impossible to accidentally set a mandatory field to NULL. This currently only works for some fields specifically a SEQUENCE, CHOICE, or ASN1_STRING type which is part of a parent SEQUENCE. Since it is equivalent to ASN1_SIMPLE it cannot be tagged, OPTIONAL, SET OF or SEQUENCE OF. [Steve Henson] *) Remove EVP_CHECK_DES_KEY, a compile-time option that never compiled. [Emilia Käsper] *) Removed DES and RC4 ciphersuites from DEFAULT. Also removed RC2 although in 1.0.2 EXPORT was already removed and the only RC2 ciphersuite is also an EXPORT one. COMPLEMENTOFDEFAULT has been updated accordingly to add DES and RC4 ciphersuites. [Matt Caswell] *) Rewrite EVP_DecodeUpdate (base64 decoding) to fix several bugs. This changes the decoding behaviour for some invalid messages, though the change is mostly in the more lenient direction, and legacy behaviour is preserved as much as possible. [Emilia Käsper] *) Fix no-stdio build. [ David Woodhouse and also Ivan Nestlerode ] *) New testing framework The testing framework has been largely rewritten and is now using perl and the perl modules Test::Harness and an extended variant of Test::More called OpenSSL::Test to do its work. All test scripts in test/ have been rewritten into test recipes, and all direct calls to executables in test/Makefile have become individual recipes using the simplified testing OpenSSL::Test::Simple. For documentation on our testing modules, do: perldoc test/testlib/OpenSSL/Test/Simple.pm perldoc test/testlib/OpenSSL/Test.pm [Richard Levitte] *) Revamped memory debug; only -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG and -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG_ABORT are used; the latter aborts on memory leaks (usually checked on exit). Some undocumented "set malloc, etc., hooks" functions were removed and others were changed. All are now documented. [Rich Salz] *) In DSA_generate_parameters_ex, if the provided seed is too short, return an error [Rich Salz and Ismo Puustinen ] *) Rewrite PSK to support ECDHE_PSK, DHE_PSK and RSA_PSK. Add ciphersuites from RFC4279, RFC4785, RFC5487, RFC5489. Thanks to Christian J. Dietrich and Giuseppe D'Angelo for the original RSA_PSK patch. [Steve Henson] *) Dropped support for the SSL3_FLAGS_DELAY_CLIENT_FINISHED flag. This SSLeay era flag was never set throughout the codebase (only read). Also removed SSL3_FLAGS_POP_BUFFER which was only used if SSL3_FLAGS_DELAY_CLIENT_FINISHED was also set. [Matt Caswell] *) Changed the default name options in the "ca", "crl", "req" and "x509" to be "oneline" instead of "compat". [Richard Levitte] *) Remove SSL_OP_TLS_BLOCK_PADDING_BUG. This is SSLeay legacy, we're not aware of clients that still exhibit this bug, and the workaround hasn't been working properly for a while. [Emilia Käsper] *) The return type of BIO_number_read() and BIO_number_written() as well as the corresponding num_read and num_write members in the BIO structure has changed from unsigned long to uint64_t. On platforms where an unsigned long is 32 bits (e.g. Windows) these counters could overflow if >4Gb is transferred. [Matt Caswell] *) Given the pervasive nature of TLS extensions it is inadvisable to run OpenSSL without support for them. It also means that maintaining the OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT option within the code is very invasive (and probably not well tested). Therefore the OPENSSL_NO_TLSEXT option has been removed. [Matt Caswell] *) Removed support for the two export grade static DH ciphersuites EXP-DH-RSA-DES-CBC-SHA and EXP-DH-DSS-DES-CBC-SHA. These two ciphersuites were newly added (along with a number of other static DH ciphersuites) to 1.0.2. However the two export ones have *never* worked since they were introduced. It seems strange in any case to be adding new export ciphersuites, and given "logjam" it also does not seem correct to fix them. [Matt Caswell] *) Version negotiation has been rewritten. In particular SSLv23_method(), SSLv23_client_method() and SSLv23_server_method() have been deprecated, and turned into macros which simply call the new preferred function names TLS_method(), TLS_client_method() and TLS_server_method(). All new code should use the new names instead. Also as part of this change the ssl23.h header file has been removed. [Matt Caswell] *) Support for Kerberos ciphersuites in TLS (RFC2712) has been removed. This code and the associated standard is no longer considered fit-for-purpose. [Matt Caswell] *) RT2547 was closed. When generating a private key, try to make the output file readable only by the owner. This behavior change might be noticeable when interacting with other software. *) Documented all exdata functions. Added CRYPTO_free_ex_index. Added a test. [Rich Salz] *) Added HTTP GET support to the ocsp command. [Rich Salz] *) Changed default digest for the dgst and enc commands from MD5 to sha256 [Rich Salz] *) RAND_pseudo_bytes has been deprecated. Users should use RAND_bytes instead. [Matt Caswell] *) Added support for TLS extended master secret from draft-ietf-tls-session-hash-03.txt. Thanks for Alfredo Pironti for an initial patch which was a great help during development. [Steve Henson] *) All libssl internal structures have been removed from the public header files, and the OPENSSL_NO_SSL_INTERN option has been removed (since it is now redundant). Users should not attempt to access internal structures directly. Instead they should use the provided API functions. [Matt Caswell] *) config has been changed so that by default OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED is used. Access to deprecated functions can be re-enabled by running config with "enable-deprecated". In addition applications wishing to use deprecated functions must define OPENSSL_USE_DEPRECATED. Note that this new behaviour will, by default, disable some transitive includes that previously existed in the header files (e.g. ec.h will no longer, by default, include bn.h) [Matt Caswell] *) Added support for OCB mode. OpenSSL has been granted a patent license compatible with the OpenSSL license for use of OCB. Details are available at https://www.openssl.org/source/OCB-patent-grant-OpenSSL.pdf. Support for OCB can be removed by calling config with no-ocb. [Matt Caswell] *) SSLv2 support has been removed. It still supports receiving a SSLv2 compatible client hello. [Kurt Roeckx] *) Increased the minimal RSA keysize from 256 to 512 bits [Rich Salz], done while fixing the error code for the key-too-small case. [Annie Yousar ] *) CA.sh has been removed; use CA.pl instead. [Rich Salz] *) Removed old DES API. [Rich Salz] *) Remove various unsupported platforms: Sony NEWS4 BEOS and BEOS_R5 NeXT SUNOS MPE/iX Sinix/ReliantUNIX RM400 DGUX NCR Tandem Cray 16-bit platforms such as WIN16 [Rich Salz] *) Clean up OPENSSL_NO_xxx #define's Use setbuf() and remove OPENSSL_NO_SETVBUF_IONBF Rename OPENSSL_SYSNAME_xxx to OPENSSL_SYS_xxx OPENSSL_NO_EC{DH,DSA} merged into OPENSSL_NO_EC OPENSSL_NO_RIPEMD160, OPENSSL_NO_RIPEMD merged into OPENSSL_NO_RMD160 OPENSSL_NO_FP_API merged into OPENSSL_NO_STDIO Remove OPENSSL_NO_BIO OPENSSL_NO_BUFFER OPENSSL_NO_CHAIN_VERIFY OPENSSL_NO_EVP OPENSSL_NO_FIPS_ERR OPENSSL_NO_HASH_COMP OPENSSL_NO_LHASH OPENSSL_NO_OBJECT OPENSSL_NO_SPEED OPENSSL_NO_STACK OPENSSL_NO_X509 OPENSSL_NO_X509_VERIFY Remove MS_STATIC; it's a relic from platforms <32 bits. [Rich Salz] *) Cleaned up dead code Remove all but one '#ifdef undef' which is to be looked at. [Rich Salz] *) Clean up calling of xxx_free routines. Just like free(), fix most of the xxx_free routines to accept NULL. Remove the non-null checks from callers. Save much code. [Rich Salz] *) Add secure heap for storage of private keys (when possible). Add BIO_s_secmem(), CBIGNUM, etc. Contributed by Akamai Technologies under our Corporate CLA. [Rich Salz] *) Experimental support for a new, fast, unbiased prime candidate generator, bn_probable_prime_dh_coprime(). Not currently used by any prime generator. [Felix Laurie von Massenbach ] *) New output format NSS in the sess_id command line tool. This allows exporting the session id and the master key in NSS keylog format. [Martin Kaiser ] *) Harmonize version and its documentation. -f flag is used to display compilation flags. [mancha ] *) Fix eckey_priv_encode so it immediately returns an error upon a failure in i2d_ECPrivateKey. Thanks to Ted Unangst for feedback on this issue. [mancha ] *) Fix some double frees. These are not thought to be exploitable. [mancha ] *) A missing bounds check in the handling of the TLS heartbeat extension can be used to reveal up to 64k of memory to a connected client or server. Thanks for Neel Mehta of Google Security for discovering this bug and to Adam Langley and Bodo Moeller for preparing the fix (CVE-2014-0160) [Adam Langley, Bodo Moeller] *) Fix for the attack described in the paper "Recovering OpenSSL ECDSA Nonces Using the FLUSH+RELOAD Cache Side-channel Attack" by Yuval Yarom and Naomi Benger. Details can be obtained from: http://eprint.iacr.org/2014/140 Thanks to Yuval Yarom and Naomi Benger for discovering this flaw and to Yuval Yarom for supplying a fix (CVE-2014-0076) [Yuval Yarom and Naomi Benger] *) Use algorithm specific chains in SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file(): this fixes a limitation in previous versions of OpenSSL. [Steve Henson] *) Experimental encrypt-then-mac support. Experimental support for encrypt then mac from draft-gutmann-tls-encrypt-then-mac-02.txt To enable it set the appropriate extension number (0x42 for the test server) using e.g. -DTLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac=0x42 For non-compliant peers (i.e. just about everything) this should have no effect. WARNING: EXPERIMENTAL, SUBJECT TO CHANGE. [Steve Henson] *) Add EVP support for key wrapping algorithms, to avoid problems with existing code the flag EVP_CIPHER_CTX_WRAP_ALLOW has to be set in the EVP_CIPHER_CTX or an error is returned. Add AES and DES3 wrap algorithms and include tests cases. [Steve Henson] *) Extend CMS code to support RSA-PSS signatures and RSA-OAEP for enveloped data. [Steve Henson] *) Extended RSA OAEP support via EVP_PKEY API. Options to specify digest, MGF1 digest and OAEP label. [Steve Henson] *) Make openssl verify return errors. [Chris Palmer and Ben Laurie] *) New function ASN1_TIME_diff to calculate the difference between two ASN1_TIME structures or one structure and the current time. [Steve Henson] *) Update fips_test_suite to support multiple command line options. New test to induce all self test errors in sequence and check expected failures. [Steve Henson] *) Add FIPS_{rsa,dsa,ecdsa}_{sign,verify} functions which digest and sign or verify all in one operation. [Steve Henson] *) Add fips_algvs: a multicall fips utility incorporating all the algorithm test programs and fips_test_suite. Includes functionality to parse the minimal script output of fipsalgest.pl directly. [Steve Henson] *) Add authorisation parameter to FIPS_module_mode_set(). [Steve Henson] *) Add FIPS selftest for ECDH algorithm using P-224 and B-233 curves. [Steve Henson] *) Use separate DRBG fields for internal and external flags. New function FIPS_drbg_health_check() to perform on demand health checking. Add generation tests to fips_test_suite with reduced health check interval to demonstrate periodic health checking. Add "nodh" option to fips_test_suite to skip very slow DH test. [Steve Henson] *) New function FIPS_get_cipherbynid() to lookup FIPS supported ciphers based on NID. [Steve Henson] *) More extensive health check for DRBG checking many more failure modes. New function FIPS_selftest_drbg_all() to handle every possible DRBG combination: call this in fips_test_suite. [Steve Henson] *) Add support for canonical generation of DSA parameter 'g'. See FIPS 186-3 A.2.3. *) Add support for HMAC DRBG from SP800-90. Update DRBG algorithm test and POST to handle HMAC cases. [Steve Henson] *) Add functions FIPS_module_version() and FIPS_module_version_text() to return numerical and string versions of the FIPS module number. [Steve Henson] *) Rename FIPS_mode_set and FIPS_mode to FIPS_module_mode_set and FIPS_module_mode. FIPS_mode and FIPS_mode_set will be implemented outside the validated module in the FIPS capable OpenSSL. [Steve Henson] *) Minor change to DRBG entropy callback semantics. In some cases there is no multiple of the block length between min_len and max_len. Allow the callback to return more than max_len bytes of entropy but discard any extra: it is the callback's responsibility to ensure that the extra data discarded does not impact the requested amount of entropy. [Steve Henson] *) Add PRNG security strength checks to RSA, DSA and ECDSA using information in FIPS186-3, SP800-57 and SP800-131A. [Steve Henson] *) CCM support via EVP. Interface is very similar to GCM case except we must supply all data in one chunk (i.e. no update, final) and the message length must be supplied if AAD is used. Add algorithm test support. [Steve Henson] *) Initial version of POST overhaul. Add POST callback to allow the status of POST to be monitored and/or failures induced. Modify fips_test_suite to use callback. Always run all selftests even if one fails. [Steve Henson] *) XTS support including algorithm test driver in the fips_gcmtest program. Note: this does increase the maximum key length from 32 to 64 bytes but there should be no binary compatibility issues as existing applications will never use XTS mode. [Steve Henson] *) Extensive reorganisation of FIPS PRNG behaviour. Remove all dependencies to OpenSSL RAND code and replace with a tiny FIPS RAND API which also performs algorithm blocking for unapproved PRNG types. Also do not set PRNG type in FIPS_mode_set(): leave this to the application. Add default OpenSSL DRBG handling: sets up FIPS PRNG and seeds with the standard OpenSSL PRNG: set additional data to a date time vector. [Steve Henson] *) Rename old X9.31 PRNG functions of the form FIPS_rand* to FIPS_x931*. This shouldn't present any incompatibility problems because applications shouldn't be using these directly and any that are will need to rethink anyway as the X9.31 PRNG is now deprecated by FIPS 140-2 [Steve Henson] *) Extensive self tests and health checking required by SP800-90 DRBG. Remove strength parameter from FIPS_drbg_instantiate and always instantiate at maximum supported strength. [Steve Henson] *) Add ECDH code to fips module and fips_ecdhvs for primitives only testing. [Steve Henson] *) New algorithm test program fips_dhvs to handle DH primitives only testing. [Steve Henson] *) New function DH_compute_key_padded() to compute a DH key and pad with leading zeroes if needed: this complies with SP800-56A et al. [Steve Henson] *) Initial implementation of SP800-90 DRBGs for Hash and CTR. Not used by anything, incomplete, subject to change and largely untested at present. [Steve Henson] *) Modify fipscanisteronly build option to only build the necessary object files by filtering FIPS_EX_OBJ through a perl script in crypto/Makefile. [Steve Henson] *) Add experimental option FIPSSYMS to give all symbols in fipscanister.o and FIPS or fips prefix. This will avoid conflicts with future versions of OpenSSL. Add perl script util/fipsas.pl to preprocess assembly language source files and rename any affected symbols. [Steve Henson] *) Add selftest checks and algorithm block of non-fips algorithms in FIPS mode. Remove DES2 from selftests. [Steve Henson] *) Add ECDSA code to fips module. Add tiny fips_ecdsa_check to just return internal method without any ENGINE dependencies. Add new tiny fips sign and verify functions. [Steve Henson] *) New build option no-ec2m to disable characteristic 2 code. [Steve Henson] *) New build option "fipscanisteronly". This only builds fipscanister.o and (currently) associated fips utilities. Uses the file Makefile.fips instead of Makefile.org as the prototype. [Steve Henson] *) Add some FIPS mode restrictions to GCM. Add internal IV generator. Update fips_gcmtest to use IV generator. [Steve Henson] *) Initial, experimental EVP support for AES-GCM. AAD can be input by setting output buffer to NULL. The *Final function must be called although it will not retrieve any additional data. The tag can be set or retrieved with a ctrl. The IV length is by default 12 bytes (96 bits) but can be set to an alternative value. If the IV length exceeds the maximum IV length (currently 16 bytes) it cannot be set before the key. [Steve Henson] *) New flag in ciphers: EVP_CIPH_FLAG_CUSTOM_CIPHER. This means the underlying do_cipher function handles all cipher semantics itself including padding and finalisation. This is useful if (for example) an ENGINE cipher handles block padding itself. The behaviour of do_cipher is subtly changed if this flag is set: the return value is the number of characters written to the output buffer (zero is no longer an error code) or a negative error code. Also if the input buffer is NULL and length 0 finalisation should be performed. [Steve Henson] *) If a candidate issuer certificate is already part of the constructed path ignore it: new debug notification X509_V_ERR_PATH_LOOP for this case. [Steve Henson] *) Improve forward-security support: add functions void SSL_CTX_set_not_resumable_session_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*cb)(SSL *ssl, int is_forward_secure)) void SSL_set_not_resumable_session_callback(SSL *ssl, int (*cb)(SSL *ssl, int is_forward_secure)) for use by SSL/TLS servers; the callback function will be called whenever a new session is created, and gets to decide whether the session may be cached to make it resumable (return 0) or not (return 1). (As by the SSL/TLS protocol specifications, the session_id sent by the server will be empty to indicate that the session is not resumable; also, the server will not generate RFC 4507 (RFC 5077) session tickets.) A simple reasonable callback implementation is to return is_forward_secure. This parameter will be set to 1 or 0 depending on the ciphersuite selected by the SSL/TLS server library, indicating whether it can provide forward security. [Emilia Käsper (Google)] *) New -verify_name option in command line utilities to set verification parameters by name. [Steve Henson] *) Initial CMAC implementation. WARNING: EXPERIMENTAL, API MAY CHANGE. Add CMAC pkey methods. [Steve Henson] *) Experimental renegotiation in s_server -www mode. If the client browses /reneg connection is renegotiated. If /renegcert it is renegotiated requesting a certificate. [Steve Henson] *) Add an "external" session cache for debugging purposes to s_server. This should help trace issues which normally are only apparent in deployed multi-process servers. [Steve Henson] *) Extensive audit of libcrypto with DEBUG_UNUSED. Fix many cases where return value is ignored. NB. The functions RAND_add(), RAND_seed(), BIO_set_cipher() and some obscure PEM functions were changed so they can now return an error. The RAND changes required a change to the RAND_METHOD structure. [Steve Henson] *) New macro __owur for "OpenSSL Warn Unused Result". This makes use of a gcc attribute to warn if the result of a function is ignored. This is enable if DEBUG_UNUSED is set. Add to several functions in evp.h whose return value is often ignored. [Steve Henson] *) New -noct, -requestct, -requirect and -ctlogfile options for s_client. These allow SCTs (signed certificate timestamps) to be requested and validated when establishing a connection. [Rob Percival ] Changes between 1.0.2g and 1.0.2h [3 May 2016] *) Prevent padding oracle in AES-NI CBC MAC check A MITM attacker can use a padding oracle attack to decrypt traffic when the connection uses an AES CBC cipher and the server support AES-NI. This issue was introduced as part of the fix for Lucky 13 padding attack (CVE-2013-0169). The padding check was rewritten to be in constant time by making sure that always the same bytes are read and compared against either the MAC or padding bytes. But it no longer checked that there was enough data to have both the MAC and padding bytes. This issue was reported by Juraj Somorovsky using TLS-Attacker. (CVE-2016-2107) [Kurt Roeckx] *) Fix EVP_EncodeUpdate overflow An overflow can occur in the EVP_EncodeUpdate() function which is used for Base64 encoding of binary data. If an attacker is able to supply very large amounts of input data then a length check can overflow resulting in a heap corruption. Internally to OpenSSL the EVP_EncodeUpdate() function is primarily used by the PEM_write_bio* family of functions. These are mainly used within the OpenSSL command line applications, so any application which processes data from an untrusted source and outputs it as a PEM file should be considered vulnerable to this issue. User applications that call these APIs directly with large amounts of untrusted data may also be vulnerable. This issue was reported by Guido Vranken. (CVE-2016-2105) [Matt Caswell] *) Fix EVP_EncryptUpdate overflow An overflow can occur in the EVP_EncryptUpdate() function. If an attacker is able to supply very large amounts of input data after a previous call to EVP_EncryptUpdate() with a partial block then a length check can overflow resulting in a heap corruption. Following an analysis of all OpenSSL internal usage of the EVP_EncryptUpdate() function all usage is one of two forms. The first form is where the EVP_EncryptUpdate() call is known to be the first called function after an EVP_EncryptInit(), and therefore that specific call must be safe. The second form is where the length passed to EVP_EncryptUpdate() can be seen from the code to be some small value and therefore there is no possibility of an overflow. Since all instances are one of these two forms, it is believed that there can be no overflows in internal code due to this problem. It should be noted that EVP_DecryptUpdate() can call EVP_EncryptUpdate() in certain code paths. Also EVP_CipherUpdate() is a synonym for EVP_EncryptUpdate(). All instances of these calls have also been analysed too and it is believed there are no instances in internal usage where an overflow could occur. This issue was reported by Guido Vranken. (CVE-2016-2106) [Matt Caswell] *) Prevent ASN.1 BIO excessive memory allocation When ASN.1 data is read from a BIO using functions such as d2i_CMS_bio() a short invalid encoding can cause allocation of large amounts of memory potentially consuming excessive resources or exhausting memory. Any application parsing untrusted data through d2i BIO functions is affected. The memory based functions such as d2i_X509() are *not* affected. Since the memory based functions are used by the TLS library, TLS applications are not affected. This issue was reported by Brian Carpenter. (CVE-2016-2109) [Stephen Henson] *) EBCDIC overread ASN1 Strings that are over 1024 bytes can cause an overread in applications using the X509_NAME_oneline() function on EBCDIC systems. This could result in arbitrary stack data being returned in the buffer. This issue was reported by Guido Vranken. (CVE-2016-2176) [Matt Caswell] *) Modify behavior of ALPN to invoke callback after SNI/servername callback, such that updates to the SSL_CTX affect ALPN. [Todd Short] *) Remove LOW from the DEFAULT cipher list. This removes singles DES from the default. [Kurt Roeckx] *) Only remove the SSLv2 methods with the no-ssl2-method option. When the methods are enabled and ssl2 is disabled the methods return NULL. [Kurt Roeckx] Changes between 1.0.2f and 1.0.2g [1 Mar 2016] * Disable weak ciphers in SSLv3 and up in default builds of OpenSSL. Builds that are not configured with "enable-weak-ssl-ciphers" will not provide any "EXPORT" or "LOW" strength ciphers. [Viktor Dukhovni] * Disable SSLv2 default build, default negotiation and weak ciphers. SSLv2 is by default disabled at build-time. Builds that are not configured with "enable-ssl2" will not support SSLv2. Even if "enable-ssl2" is used, users who want to negotiate SSLv2 via the version-flexible SSLv23_method() will need to explicitly call either of: SSL_CTX_clear_options(ctx, SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2); or SSL_clear_options(ssl, SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2); as appropriate. Even if either of those is used, or the application explicitly uses the version-specific SSLv2_method() or its client and server variants, SSLv2 ciphers vulnerable to exhaustive search key recovery have been removed. Specifically, the SSLv2 40-bit EXPORT ciphers, and SSLv2 56-bit DES are no longer available. (CVE-2016-0800) [Viktor Dukhovni] *) Fix a double-free in DSA code A double free bug was discovered when OpenSSL parses malformed DSA private keys and could lead to a DoS attack or memory corruption for applications that receive DSA private keys from untrusted sources. This scenario is considered rare. This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Adam Langley(Google/BoringSSL) using libFuzzer. (CVE-2016-0705) [Stephen Henson] *) Disable SRP fake user seed to address a server memory leak. Add a new method SRP_VBASE_get1_by_user that handles the seed properly. SRP_VBASE_get_by_user had inconsistent memory management behaviour. In order to fix an unavoidable memory leak, SRP_VBASE_get_by_user was changed to ignore the "fake user" SRP seed, even if the seed is configured. Users should use SRP_VBASE_get1_by_user instead. Note that in SRP_VBASE_get1_by_user, caller must free the returned value. Note also that even though configuring the SRP seed attempts to hide invalid usernames by continuing the handshake with fake credentials, this behaviour is not constant time and no strong guarantees are made that the handshake is indistinguishable from that of a valid user. (CVE-2016-0798) [Emilia Käsper] *) Fix BN_hex2bn/BN_dec2bn NULL pointer deref/heap corruption In the BN_hex2bn function the number of hex digits is calculated using an int value |i|. Later |bn_expand| is called with a value of |i * 4|. For large values of |i| this can result in |bn_expand| not allocating any memory because |i * 4| is negative. This can leave the internal BIGNUM data field as NULL leading to a subsequent NULL ptr deref. For very large values of |i|, the calculation |i * 4| could be a positive value smaller than |i|. In this case memory is allocated to the internal BIGNUM data field, but it is insufficiently sized leading to heap corruption. A similar issue exists in BN_dec2bn. This could have security consequences if BN_hex2bn/BN_dec2bn is ever called by user applications with very large untrusted hex/dec data. This is anticipated to be a rare occurrence. All OpenSSL internal usage of these functions use data that is not expected to be untrusted, e.g. config file data or application command line arguments. If user developed applications generate config file data based on untrusted data then it is possible that this could also lead to security consequences. This is also anticipated to be rare. This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Guido Vranken. (CVE-2016-0797) [Matt Caswell] *) Fix memory issues in BIO_*printf functions The internal |fmtstr| function used in processing a "%s" format string in the BIO_*printf functions could overflow while calculating the length of a string and cause an OOB read when printing very long strings. Additionally the internal |doapr_outch| function can attempt to write to an OOB memory location (at an offset from the NULL pointer) in the event of a memory allocation failure. In 1.0.2 and below this could be caused where the size of a buffer to be allocated is greater than INT_MAX. E.g. this could be in processing a very long "%s" format string. Memory leaks can also occur. The first issue may mask the second issue dependent on compiler behaviour. These problems could enable attacks where large amounts of untrusted data is passed to the BIO_*printf functions. If applications use these functions in this way then they could be vulnerable. OpenSSL itself uses these functions when printing out human-readable dumps of ASN.1 data. Therefore applications that print this data could be vulnerable if the data is from untrusted sources. OpenSSL command line applications could also be vulnerable where they print out ASN.1 data, or if untrusted data is passed as command line arguments. Libssl is not considered directly vulnerable. Additionally certificates etc received via remote connections via libssl are also unlikely to be able to trigger these issues because of message size limits enforced within libssl. This issue was reported to OpenSSL Guido Vranken. (CVE-2016-0799) [Matt Caswell] *) Side channel attack on modular exponentiation A side-channel attack was found which makes use of cache-bank conflicts on the Intel Sandy-Bridge microarchitecture which could lead to the recovery of RSA keys. The ability to exploit this issue is limited as it relies on an attacker who has control of code in a thread running on the same hyper-threaded core as the victim thread which is performing decryptions. This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Yuval Yarom, The University of Adelaide and NICTA, Daniel Genkin, Technion and Tel Aviv University, and Nadia Heninger, University of Pennsylvania with more information at http://cachebleed.info. (CVE-2016-0702) [Andy Polyakov] *) Change the req app to generate a 2048-bit RSA/DSA key by default, if no keysize is specified with default_bits. This fixes an omission in an earlier change that changed all RSA/DSA key generation apps to use 2048 bits by default. [Emilia Käsper] Changes between 1.0.2e and 1.0.2f [28 Jan 2016] *) DH small subgroups Historically OpenSSL only ever generated DH parameters based on "safe" primes. More recently (in version 1.0.2) support was provided for generating X9.42 style parameter files such as those required for RFC 5114 support. The primes used in such files may not be "safe". Where an application is using DH configured with parameters based on primes that are not "safe" then an attacker could use this fact to find a peer's private DH exponent. This attack requires that the attacker complete multiple handshakes in which the peer uses the same private DH exponent. For example this could be used to discover a TLS server's private DH exponent if it's reusing the private DH exponent or it's using a static DH ciphersuite. OpenSSL provides the option SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE for ephemeral DH (DHE) in TLS. It is not on by default. If the option is not set then the server reuses the same private DH exponent for the life of the server process and would be vulnerable to this attack. It is believed that many popular applications do set this option and would therefore not be at risk. The fix for this issue adds an additional check where a "q" parameter is available (as is the case in X9.42 based parameters). This detects the only known attack, and is the only possible defense for static DH ciphersuites. This could have some performance impact. Additionally the SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE option has been switched on by default and cannot be disabled. This could have some performance impact. This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Antonio Sanso (Adobe). (CVE-2016-0701) [Matt Caswell] *) SSLv2 doesn't block disabled ciphers A malicious client can negotiate SSLv2 ciphers that have been disabled on the server and complete SSLv2 handshakes even if all SSLv2 ciphers have been disabled, provided that the SSLv2 protocol was not also disabled via SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2. This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 26th December 2015 by Nimrod Aviram and Sebastian Schinzel. (CVE-2015-3197) [Viktor Dukhovni] Changes between 1.0.2d and 1.0.2e [3 Dec 2015] *) BN_mod_exp may produce incorrect results on x86_64 There is a carry propagating bug in the x86_64 Montgomery squaring procedure. No EC algorithms are affected. Analysis suggests that attacks against RSA and DSA as a result of this defect would be very difficult to perform and are not believed likely. Attacks against DH are considered just feasible (although very difficult) because most of the work necessary to deduce information about a private key may be performed offline. The amount of resources required for such an attack would be very significant and likely only accessible to a limited number of attackers. An attacker would additionally need online access to an unpatched system using the target private key in a scenario with persistent DH parameters and a private key that is shared between multiple clients. For example this can occur by default in OpenSSL DHE based SSL/TLS ciphersuites. This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Hanno Böck. (CVE-2015-3193) [Andy Polyakov] *) Certificate verify crash with missing PSS parameter The signature verification routines will crash with a NULL pointer dereference if presented with an ASN.1 signature using the RSA PSS algorithm and absent mask generation function parameter. Since these routines are used to verify certificate signature algorithms this can be used to crash any certificate verification operation and exploited in a DoS attack. Any application which performs certificate verification is vulnerable including OpenSSL clients and servers which enable client authentication. This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Loïc Jonas Etienne (Qnective AG). (CVE-2015-3194) [Stephen Henson] *) X509_ATTRIBUTE memory leak When presented with a malformed X509_ATTRIBUTE structure OpenSSL will leak memory. This structure is used by the PKCS#7 and CMS routines so any application which reads PKCS#7 or CMS data from untrusted sources is affected. SSL/TLS is not affected. This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Adam Langley (Google/BoringSSL) using libFuzzer. (CVE-2015-3195) [Stephen Henson] *) Rewrite EVP_DecodeUpdate (base64 decoding) to fix several bugs. This changes the decoding behaviour for some invalid messages, though the change is mostly in the more lenient direction, and legacy behaviour is preserved as much as possible. [Emilia Käsper] *) In DSA_generate_parameters_ex, if the provided seed is too short, return an error [Rich Salz and Ismo Puustinen ] Changes between 1.0.2c and 1.0.2d [9 Jul 2015] *) Alternate chains certificate forgery During certificate verification, OpenSSL will attempt to find an alternative certificate chain if the first attempt to build such a chain fails. An error in the implementation of this logic can mean that an attacker could cause certain checks on untrusted certificates to be bypassed, such as the CA flag, enabling them to use a valid leaf certificate to act as a CA and "issue" an invalid certificate. This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Adam Langley/David Benjamin (Google/BoringSSL). [Matt Caswell] Changes between 1.0.2b and 1.0.2c [12 Jun 2015] *) Fix HMAC ABI incompatibility. The previous version introduced an ABI incompatibility in the handling of HMAC. The previous ABI has now been restored. [Matt Caswell] Changes between 1.0.2a and 1.0.2b [11 Jun 2015] *) Malformed ECParameters causes infinite loop When processing an ECParameters structure OpenSSL enters an infinite loop if the curve specified is over a specially malformed binary polynomial field. This can be used to perform denial of service against any system which processes public keys, certificate requests or certificates. This includes TLS clients and TLS servers with client authentication enabled. This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Joseph Barr-Pixton. (CVE-2015-1788) [Andy Polyakov] *) Exploitable out-of-bounds read in X509_cmp_time X509_cmp_time does not properly check the length of the ASN1_TIME string and can read a few bytes out of bounds. In addition, X509_cmp_time accepts an arbitrary number of fractional seconds in the time string. An attacker can use this to craft malformed certificates and CRLs of various sizes and potentially cause a segmentation fault, resulting in a DoS on applications that verify certificates or CRLs. TLS clients that verify CRLs are affected. TLS clients and servers with client authentication enabled may be affected if they use custom verification callbacks. This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Robert Swiecki (Google), and independently by Hanno Böck. (CVE-2015-1789) [Emilia Käsper] *) PKCS7 crash with missing EnvelopedContent The PKCS#7 parsing code does not handle missing inner EncryptedContent correctly. An attacker can craft malformed ASN.1-encoded PKCS#7 blobs with missing content and trigger a NULL pointer dereference on parsing. Applications that decrypt PKCS#7 data or otherwise parse PKCS#7 structures from untrusted sources are affected. OpenSSL clients and servers are not affected. This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Michal Zalewski (Google). (CVE-2015-1790) [Emilia Käsper] *) CMS verify infinite loop with unknown hash function When verifying a signedData message the CMS code can enter an infinite loop if presented with an unknown hash function OID. This can be used to perform denial of service against any system which verifies signedData messages using the CMS code. This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Johannes Bauer. (CVE-2015-1792) [Stephen Henson] *) Race condition handling NewSessionTicket If a NewSessionTicket is received by a multi-threaded client when attempting to reuse a previous ticket then a race condition can occur potentially leading to a double free of the ticket data. (CVE-2015-1791) [Matt Caswell] *) Only support 256-bit or stronger elliptic curves with the 'ecdh_auto' setting (server) or by default (client). Of supported curves, prefer P-256 (both). [Emilia Kasper] Changes between 1.0.2 and 1.0.2a [19 Mar 2015] *) ClientHello sigalgs DoS fix If a client connects to an OpenSSL 1.0.2 server and renegotiates with an invalid signature algorithms extension a NULL pointer dereference will occur. This can be exploited in a DoS attack against the server. This issue was was reported to OpenSSL by David Ramos of Stanford University. (CVE-2015-0291) [Stephen Henson and Matt Caswell] *) Multiblock corrupted pointer fix OpenSSL 1.0.2 introduced the "multiblock" performance improvement. This feature only applies on 64 bit x86 architecture platforms that support AES NI instructions. A defect in the implementation of "multiblock" can cause OpenSSL's internal write buffer to become incorrectly set to NULL when using non-blocking IO. Typically, when the user application is using a socket BIO for writing, this will only result in a failed connection. However if some other BIO is used then it is likely that a segmentation fault will be triggered, thus enabling a potential DoS attack. This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Daniel Danner and Rainer Mueller. (CVE-2015-0290) [Matt Caswell] *) Segmentation fault in DTLSv1_listen fix The DTLSv1_listen function is intended to be stateless and processes the initial ClientHello from many peers. It is common for user code to loop over the call to DTLSv1_listen until a valid ClientHello is received with an associated cookie. A defect in the implementation of DTLSv1_listen means that state is preserved in the SSL object from one invocation to the next that can lead to a segmentation fault. Errors processing the initial ClientHello can trigger this scenario. An example of such an error could be that a DTLS1.0 only client is attempting to connect to a DTLS1.2 only server. This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Per Allansson. (CVE-2015-0207) [Matt Caswell] *) Segmentation fault in ASN1_TYPE_cmp fix The function ASN1_TYPE_cmp will crash with an invalid read if an attempt is made to compare ASN.1 boolean types. Since ASN1_TYPE_cmp is used to check certificate signature algorithm consistency this can be used to crash any certificate verification operation and exploited in a DoS attack. Any application which performs certificate verification is vulnerable including OpenSSL clients and servers which enable client authentication. (CVE-2015-0286) [Stephen Henson] *) Segmentation fault for invalid PSS parameters fix The signature verification routines will crash with a NULL pointer dereference if presented with an ASN.1 signature using the RSA PSS algorithm and invalid parameters. Since these routines are used to verify certificate signature algorithms this can be used to crash any certificate verification operation and exploited in a DoS attack. Any application which performs certificate verification is vulnerable including OpenSSL clients and servers which enable client authentication. This issue was was reported to OpenSSL by Brian Carpenter. (CVE-2015-0208) [Stephen Henson] *) ASN.1 structure reuse memory corruption fix Reusing a structure in ASN.1 parsing may allow an attacker to cause memory corruption via an invalid write. Such reuse is and has been strongly discouraged and is believed to be rare. Applications that parse structures containing CHOICE or ANY DEFINED BY components may be affected. Certificate parsing (d2i_X509 and related functions) are however not affected. OpenSSL clients and servers are not affected. (CVE-2015-0287) [Stephen Henson] *) PKCS7 NULL pointer dereferences fix The PKCS#7 parsing code does not handle missing outer ContentInfo correctly. An attacker can craft malformed ASN.1-encoded PKCS#7 blobs with missing content and trigger a NULL pointer dereference on parsing. Applications that verify PKCS#7 signatures, decrypt PKCS#7 data or otherwise parse PKCS#7 structures from untrusted sources are affected. OpenSSL clients and servers are not affected. This issue was reported to OpenSSL by Michal Zalewski (Google). (CVE-2015-0289) [Emilia Käsper] *) DoS via reachable assert in SSLv2 servers fix A malicious client can trigger an OPENSSL_assert (i.e., an abort) in servers that both support SSLv2 and enable export cipher suites by sending a specially crafted SSLv2 CLIENT-MASTER-KEY message. This issue was discovered by Sean Burford (Google) and Emilia Käsper (OpenSSL development team). (CVE-2015-0293) [Emilia Käsper] *) Empty CKE with client auth and DHE fix If client auth is used then a server can seg fault in the event of a DHE ciphersuite being selected and a zero length ClientKeyExchange message being sent by the client. This could be exploited in a DoS attack. (CVE-2015-1787) [Matt Caswell] *) Handshake with unseeded PRNG fix Under certain conditions an OpenSSL 1.0.2 client can complete a handshake with an unseeded PRNG. The conditions are: - The client is on a platform where the PRNG has not been seeded automatically, and the user has not seeded manually - A protocol specific client method version has been used (i.e. not SSL_client_methodv23) - A ciphersuite is used that does not require additional random data from the PRNG beyond the initial ClientHello client random (e.g. PSK-RC4-SHA). If the handshake succeeds then the client random that has been used will have been generated from a PRNG with insufficient entropy and therefore the output may be predictable. For example using the following command with an unseeded openssl will succeed on an unpatched platform: openssl s_client -psk 1a2b3c4d -tls1_2 -cipher PSK-RC4-SHA (CVE-2015-0285) [Matt Caswell] *) Use After Free following d2i_ECPrivatekey error fix A malformed EC private key file consumed via the d2i_ECPrivateKey function could cause a use after free condition. This, in turn, could cause a double free in several private key parsing functions (such as d2i_PrivateKey or EVP_PKCS82PKEY) and could lead to a DoS attack or memory corruption for applications that receive EC private keys from untrusted sources. This scenario is considered rare. This issue was discovered by the BoringSSL project and fixed in their commit 517073cd4b. (CVE-2015-0209) [Matt Caswell] *) X509_to_X509_REQ NULL pointer deref fix The function X509_to_X509_REQ will crash with a NULL pointer dereference if the certificate key is invalid. This function is rarely used in practice. This issue was discovered by Brian Carpenter. (CVE-2015-0288) [Stephen Henson] *) Removed the export ciphers from the DEFAULT ciphers [Kurt Roeckx] Changes between 1.0.1l and 1.0.2 [22 Jan 2015] *) Facilitate "universal" ARM builds targeting range of ARM ISAs, e.g. ARMv5 through ARMv8, as opposite to "locking" it to single one. So far those who have to target multiple platforms would compromise and argue that binary targeting say ARMv5 would still execute on ARMv8. "Universal" build resolves this compromise by providing near-optimal performance even on newer platforms. [Andy Polyakov] *) Accelerated NIST P-256 elliptic curve implementation for x86_64 (other platforms pending). [Shay Gueron & Vlad Krasnov (Intel Corp), Andy Polyakov] *) Add support for the SignedCertificateTimestampList certificate and OCSP response extensions from RFC6962. [Rob Stradling] *) Fix ec_GFp_simple_points_make_affine (thus, EC_POINTs_mul etc.) for corner cases. (Certain input points at infinity could lead to bogus results, with non-infinity inputs mapped to infinity too.) [Bodo Moeller] *) Initial support for PowerISA 2.0.7, first implemented in POWER8. This covers AES, SHA256/512 and GHASH. "Initial" means that most common cases are optimized and there still is room for further improvements. Vector Permutation AES for Altivec is also added. [Andy Polyakov] *) Add support for little-endian ppc64 Linux target. [Marcelo Cerri (IBM)] *) Initial support for AMRv8 ISA crypto extensions. This covers AES, SHA1, SHA256 and GHASH. "Initial" means that most common cases are optimized and there still is room for further improvements. Both 32- and 64-bit modes are supported. [Andy Polyakov, Ard Biesheuvel (Linaro)] *) Improved ARMv7 NEON support. [Andy Polyakov] *) Support for SPARC Architecture 2011 crypto extensions, first implemented in SPARC T4. This covers AES, DES, Camellia, SHA1, SHA256/512, MD5, GHASH and modular exponentiation. [Andy Polyakov, David Miller] *) Accelerated modular exponentiation for Intel processors, a.k.a. RSAZ. [Shay Gueron & Vlad Krasnov (Intel Corp)] *) Support for new and upcoming Intel processors, including AVX2, BMI and SHA ISA extensions. This includes additional "stitched" implementations, AESNI-SHA256 and GCM, and multi-buffer support for TLS encrypt. This work was sponsored by Intel Corp. [Andy Polyakov] *) Support for DTLS 1.2. This adds two sets of DTLS methods: DTLS_*_method() supports both DTLS 1.2 and 1.0 and should use whatever version the peer supports and DTLSv1_2_*_method() which supports DTLS 1.2 only. [Steve Henson] *) Use algorithm specific chains in SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file(): this fixes a limitation in previous versions of OpenSSL. [Steve Henson] *) Extended RSA OAEP support via EVP_PKEY API. Options to specify digest, MGF1 digest and OAEP label. [Steve Henson] *) Add EVP support for key wrapping algorithms, to avoid problems with existing code the flag EVP_CIPHER_CTX_WRAP_ALLOW has to be set in the EVP_CIPHER_CTX or an error is returned. Add AES and DES3 wrap algorithms and include tests cases. [Steve Henson] *) Add functions to allocate and set the fields of an ECDSA_METHOD structure. [Douglas E. Engert, Steve Henson] *) New functions OPENSSL_gmtime_diff and ASN1_TIME_diff to find the difference in days and seconds between two tm or ASN1_TIME structures. [Steve Henson] *) Add -rev test option to s_server to just reverse order of characters received by client and send back to server. Also prints an abbreviated summary of the connection parameters. [Steve Henson] *) New option -brief for s_client and s_server to print out a brief summary of connection parameters. [Steve Henson] *) Add callbacks for arbitrary TLS extensions. [Trevor Perrin and Ben Laurie] *) New option -crl_download in several openssl utilities to download CRLs from CRLDP extension in certificates. [Steve Henson] *) New options -CRL and -CRLform for s_client and s_server for CRLs. [Steve Henson] *) New function X509_CRL_diff to generate a delta CRL from the difference of two full CRLs. Add support to "crl" utility. [Steve Henson] *) New functions to set lookup_crls function and to retrieve X509_STORE from X509_STORE_CTX. [Steve Henson] *) Print out deprecated issuer and subject unique ID fields in certificates. [Steve Henson] *) Extend OCSP I/O functions so they can be used for simple general purpose HTTP as well as OCSP. New wrapper function which can be used to download CRLs using the OCSP API. [Steve Henson] *) Delegate command line handling in s_client/s_server to SSL_CONF APIs. [Steve Henson] *) SSL_CONF* functions. These provide a common framework for application configuration using configuration files or command lines. [Steve Henson] *) SSL/TLS tracing code. This parses out SSL/TLS records using the message callback and prints the results. Needs compile time option "enable-ssl-trace". New options to s_client and s_server to enable tracing. [Steve Henson] *) New ctrl and macro to retrieve supported points extensions. Print out extension in s_server and s_client. [Steve Henson] *) New functions to retrieve certificate signature and signature OID NID. [Steve Henson] *) Add functions to retrieve and manipulate the raw cipherlist sent by a client to OpenSSL. [Steve Henson] *) New Suite B modes for TLS code. These use and enforce the requirements of RFC6460: restrict ciphersuites, only permit Suite B algorithms and only use Suite B curves. The Suite B modes can be set by using the strings "SUITEB128", "SUITEB192" or "SUITEB128ONLY" for the cipherstring. [Steve Henson] *) New chain verification flags for Suite B levels of security. Check algorithms are acceptable when flags are set in X509_verify_cert. [Steve Henson] *) Make tls1_check_chain return a set of flags indicating checks passed by a certificate chain. Add additional tests to handle client certificates: checks for matching certificate type and issuer name comparison. [Steve Henson] *) If an attempt is made to use a signature algorithm not in the peer preference list abort the handshake. If client has no suitable signature algorithms in response to a certificate request do not use the certificate. [Steve Henson] *) If server EC tmp key is not in client preference list abort handshake. [Steve Henson] *) Add support for certificate stores in CERT structure. This makes it possible to have different stores per SSL structure or one store in the parent SSL_CTX. Include distinct stores for certificate chain verification and chain building. New ctrl SSL_CTRL_BUILD_CERT_CHAIN to build and store a certificate chain in CERT structure: returning an error if the chain cannot be built: this will allow applications to test if a chain is correctly configured. Note: if the CERT based stores are not set then the parent SSL_CTX store is used to retain compatibility with existing behaviour. [Steve Henson] *) New function ssl_set_client_disabled to set a ciphersuite disabled mask based on the current session, check mask when sending client hello and checking the requested ciphersuite. [Steve Henson] *) New ctrls to retrieve and set certificate types in a certificate request message. Print out received values in s_client. If certificate types is not set with custom values set sensible values based on supported signature algorithms. [Steve Henson] *) Support for distinct client and server supported signature algorithms. [Steve Henson] *) Add certificate callback. If set this is called whenever a certificate is required by client or server. An application can decide which certificate chain to present based on arbitrary criteria: for example supported signature algorithms. Add very simple example to s_server. This fixes many of the problems and restrictions of the existing client certificate callback: for example you can now clear an existing certificate and specify the whole chain. [Steve Henson] *) Add new "valid_flags" field to CERT_PKEY structure which determines what the certificate can be used for (if anything). Set valid_flags field in new tls1_check_chain function. Simplify ssl_set_cert_masks which used to have similar checks in it. Add new "cert_flags" field to CERT structure and include a "strict mode". This enforces some TLS certificate requirements (such as only permitting certificate signature algorithms contained in the supported algorithms extension) which some implementations ignore: this option should be used with caution as it could cause interoperability issues. [Steve Henson] *) Update and tidy signature algorithm extension processing. Work out shared signature algorithms based on preferences and peer algorithms and print them out in s_client and s_server. Abort handshake if no shared signature algorithms. [Steve Henson] *) Add new functions to allow customised supported signature algorithms for SSL and SSL_CTX structures. Add options to s_client and s_server to support them. [Steve Henson] *) New function SSL_certs_clear() to delete all references to certificates from an SSL structure. Before this once a certificate had been added it couldn't be removed. [Steve Henson] *) Integrate hostname, email address and IP address checking with certificate verification. New verify options supporting checking in openssl utility. [Steve Henson] *) Fixes and wildcard matching support to hostname and email checking functions. Add manual page. [Florian Weimer (Red Hat Product Security Team)] *) New functions to check a hostname email or IP address against a certificate. Add options x509 utility to print results of checks against a certificate. [Steve Henson] *) Fix OCSP checking. [Rob Stradling and Ben Laurie] *) Initial experimental support for explicitly trusted non-root CAs. OpenSSL still tries to build a complete chain to a root but if an intermediate CA has a trust setting included that is used. The first setting is used: whether to trust (e.g., -addtrust option to the x509 utility) or reject. [Steve Henson] *) Add -trusted_first option which attempts to find certificates in the trusted store even if an untrusted chain is also supplied. [Steve Henson] *) MIPS assembly pack updates: support for MIPS32r2 and SmartMIPS ASE, platform support for Linux and Android. [Andy Polyakov] *) Support for linux-x32, ILP32 environment in x86_64 framework. [Andy Polyakov] *) Experimental multi-implementation support for FIPS capable OpenSSL. When in FIPS mode the approved implementations are used as normal, when not in FIPS mode the internal unapproved versions are used instead. This means that the FIPS capable OpenSSL isn't forced to use the (often lower performance) FIPS implementations outside FIPS mode. [Steve Henson] *) Transparently support X9.42 DH parameters when calling PEM_read_bio_DHparameters. This means existing applications can handle the new parameter format automatically. [Steve Henson] *) Initial experimental support for X9.42 DH parameter format: mainly to support use of 'q' parameter for RFC5114 parameters. [Steve Henson] *) Add DH parameters from RFC5114 including test data to dhtest. [Steve Henson] *) Support for automatic EC temporary key parameter selection. If enabled the most preferred EC parameters are automatically used instead of hardcoded fixed parameters. Now a server just has to call: SSL_CTX_set_ecdh_auto(ctx, 1) and the server will automatically support ECDH and use the most appropriate parameters. [Steve Henson] *) Enhance and tidy EC curve and point format TLS extension code. Use static structures instead of allocation if default values are used. New ctrls to set curves we wish to support and to retrieve shared curves. Print out shared curves in s_server. New options to s_server and s_client to set list of supported curves. [Steve Henson] *) New ctrls to retrieve supported signature algorithms and supported curve values as an array of NIDs. Extend openssl utility to print out received values. [Steve Henson] *) Add new APIs EC_curve_nist2nid and EC_curve_nid2nist which convert between NIDs and the more common NIST names such as "P-256". Enhance ecparam utility and ECC method to recognise the NIST names for curves. [Steve Henson] *) Enhance SSL/TLS certificate chain handling to support different chains for each certificate instead of one chain in the parent SSL_CTX. [Steve Henson] *) Support for fixed DH ciphersuite client authentication: where both server and client use DH certificates with common parameters. [Steve Henson] *) Support for fixed DH ciphersuites: those requiring DH server certificates. [Steve Henson] *) New function i2d_re_X509_tbs for re-encoding the TBS portion of the certificate. Note: Related 1.0.2-beta specific macros X509_get_cert_info, X509_CINF_set_modified, X509_CINF_get_issuer, X509_CINF_get_extensions and X509_CINF_get_signature were reverted post internal team review. Changes between 1.0.1k and 1.0.1l [15 Jan 2015] *) Build fixes for the Windows and OpenVMS platforms [Matt Caswell and Richard Levitte] Changes between 1.0.1j and 1.0.1k [8 Jan 2015] *) Fix DTLS segmentation fault in dtls1_get_record. A carefully crafted DTLS message can cause a segmentation fault in OpenSSL due to a NULL pointer dereference. This could lead to a Denial Of Service attack. Thanks to Markus Stenberg of Cisco Systems, Inc. for reporting this issue. (CVE-2014-3571) [Steve Henson] *) Fix DTLS memory leak in dtls1_buffer_record. A memory leak can occur in the dtls1_buffer_record function under certain conditions. In particular this could occur if an attacker sent repeated DTLS records with the same sequence number but for the next epoch. The memory leak could be exploited by an attacker in a Denial of Service attack through memory exhaustion. Thanks to Chris Mueller for reporting this issue. (CVE-2015-0206) [Matt Caswell] *) Fix issue where no-ssl3 configuration sets method to NULL. When openssl is built with the no-ssl3 option and a SSL v3 ClientHello is received the ssl method would be set to NULL which could later result in a NULL pointer dereference. Thanks to Frank Schmirler for reporting this issue. (CVE-2014-3569) [Kurt Roeckx] *) Abort handshake if server key exchange message is omitted for ephemeral ECDH ciphersuites. Thanks to Karthikeyan Bhargavan of the PROSECCO team at INRIA for reporting this issue. (CVE-2014-3572) [Steve Henson] *) Remove non-export ephemeral RSA code on client and server. This code violated the TLS standard by allowing the use of temporary RSA keys in non-export ciphersuites and could be used by a server to effectively downgrade the RSA key length used to a value smaller than the server certificate. Thanks for Karthikeyan Bhargavan of the PROSECCO team at INRIA or reporting this issue. (CVE-2015-0204) [Steve Henson] *) Fixed issue where DH client certificates are accepted without verification. An OpenSSL server will accept a DH certificate for client authentication without the certificate verify message. This effectively allows a client to authenticate without the use of a private key. This only affects servers which trust a client certificate authority which issues certificates containing DH keys: these are extremely rare and hardly ever encountered. Thanks for Karthikeyan Bhargavan of the PROSECCO team at INRIA or reporting this issue. (CVE-2015-0205) [Steve Henson] *) Ensure that the session ID context of an SSL is updated when its SSL_CTX is updated via SSL_set_SSL_CTX. The session ID context is typically set from the parent SSL_CTX, and can vary with the CTX. [Adam Langley] *) Fix various certificate fingerprint issues. By using non-DER or invalid encodings outside the signed portion of a certificate the fingerprint can be changed without breaking the signature. Although no details of the signed portion of the certificate can be changed this can cause problems with some applications: e.g. those using the certificate fingerprint for blacklists. 1. Reject signatures with non zero unused bits. If the BIT STRING containing the signature has non zero unused bits reject the signature. All current signature algorithms require zero unused bits. 2. Check certificate algorithm consistency. Check the AlgorithmIdentifier inside TBS matches the one in the certificate signature. NB: this will result in signature failure errors for some broken certificates. Thanks to Konrad Kraszewski from Google for reporting this issue. 3. Check DSA/ECDSA signatures use DER. Re-encode DSA/ECDSA signatures and compare with the original received signature. Return an error if there is a mismatch. This will reject various cases including garbage after signature (thanks to Antti Karjalainen and Tuomo Untinen from the Codenomicon CROSS program for discovering this case) and use of BER or invalid ASN.1 INTEGERs (negative or with leading zeroes). Further analysis was conducted and fixes were developed by Stephen Henson of the OpenSSL core team. (CVE-2014-8275) [Steve Henson] *) Correct Bignum squaring. Bignum squaring (BN_sqr) may produce incorrect results on some platforms, including x86_64. This bug occurs at random with a very low probability, and is not known to be exploitable in any way, though its exact impact is difficult to determine. Thanks to Pieter Wuille (Blockstream) who reported this issue and also suggested an initial fix. Further analysis was conducted by the OpenSSL development team and Adam Langley of Google. The final fix was developed by Andy Polyakov of the OpenSSL core team. (CVE-2014-3570) [Andy Polyakov] *) Do not resume sessions on the server if the negotiated protocol version does not match the session's version. Resuming with a different version, while not strictly forbidden by the RFC, is of questionable sanity and breaks all known clients. [David Benjamin, Emilia Käsper] *) Tighten handling of the ChangeCipherSpec (CCS) message: reject early CCS messages during renegotiation. (Note that because renegotiation is encrypted, this early CCS was not exploitable.) [Emilia Käsper] *) Tighten client-side session ticket handling during renegotiation: ensure that the client only accepts a session ticket if the server sends the extension anew in the ServerHello. Previously, a TLS client would reuse the old extension state and thus accept a session ticket if one was announced in the initial ServerHello. Similarly, ensure that the client requires a session ticket if one was advertised in the ServerHello. Previously, a TLS client would ignore a missing NewSessionTicket message. [Emilia Käsper] Changes between 1.0.1i and 1.0.1j [15 Oct 2014] *) SRTP Memory Leak. A flaw in the DTLS SRTP extension parsing code allows an attacker, who sends a carefully crafted handshake message, to cause OpenSSL to fail to free up to 64k of memory causing a memory leak. This could be exploited in a Denial Of Service attack. This issue affects OpenSSL 1.0.1 server implementations for both SSL/TLS and DTLS regardless of whether SRTP is used or configured. Implementations of OpenSSL that have been compiled with OPENSSL_NO_SRTP defined are not affected. The fix was developed by the OpenSSL team. (CVE-2014-3513) [OpenSSL team] *) Session Ticket Memory Leak. When an OpenSSL SSL/TLS/DTLS server receives a session ticket the integrity of that ticket is first verified. In the event of a session ticket integrity check failing, OpenSSL will fail to free memory causing a memory leak. By sending a large number of invalid session tickets an attacker could exploit this issue in a Denial Of Service attack. (CVE-2014-3567) [Steve Henson] *) Build option no-ssl3 is incomplete. When OpenSSL is configured with "no-ssl3" as a build option, servers could accept and complete a SSL 3.0 handshake, and clients could be configured to send them. (CVE-2014-3568) [Akamai and the OpenSSL team] *) Add support for TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV. Client applications doing fallback retries should call SSL_set_mode(s, SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV). (CVE-2014-3566) [Adam Langley, Bodo Moeller] *) Add additional DigestInfo checks. Re-encode DigestInto in DER and check against the original when verifying RSA signature: this will reject any improperly encoded DigestInfo structures. Note: this is a precautionary measure and no attacks are currently known. [Steve Henson] Changes between 1.0.1h and 1.0.1i [6 Aug 2014] *) Fix SRP buffer overrun vulnerability. Invalid parameters passed to the SRP code can be overrun an internal buffer. Add sanity check that g, A, B < N to SRP code. Thanks to Sean Devlin and Watson Ladd of Cryptography Services, NCC Group for discovering this issue. (CVE-2014-3512) [Steve Henson] *) A flaw in the OpenSSL SSL/TLS server code causes the server to negotiate TLS 1.0 instead of higher protocol versions when the ClientHello message is badly fragmented. This allows a man-in-the-middle attacker to force a downgrade to TLS 1.0 even if both the server and the client support a higher protocol version, by modifying the client's TLS records. Thanks to David Benjamin and Adam Langley (Google) for discovering and researching this issue. (CVE-2014-3511) [David Benjamin] *) OpenSSL DTLS clients enabling anonymous (EC)DH ciphersuites are subject to a denial of service attack. A malicious server can crash the client with a null pointer dereference (read) by specifying an anonymous (EC)DH ciphersuite and sending carefully crafted handshake messages. Thanks to Felix Gröbert (Google) for discovering and researching this issue. (CVE-2014-3510) [Emilia Käsper] *) By sending carefully crafted DTLS packets an attacker could cause openssl to leak memory. This can be exploited through a Denial of Service attack. Thanks to Adam Langley for discovering and researching this issue. (CVE-2014-3507) [Adam Langley] *) An attacker can force openssl to consume large amounts of memory whilst processing DTLS handshake messages. This can be exploited through a Denial of Service attack. Thanks to Adam Langley for discovering and researching this issue. (CVE-2014-3506) [Adam Langley] *) An attacker can force an error condition which causes openssl to crash whilst processing DTLS packets due to memory being freed twice. This can be exploited through a Denial of Service attack. Thanks to Adam Langley and Wan-Teh Chang for discovering and researching this issue. (CVE-2014-3505) [Adam Langley] *) If a multithreaded client connects to a malicious server using a resumed session and the server sends an ec point format extension it could write up to 255 bytes to freed memory. Thanks to Gabor Tyukasz (LogMeIn Inc) for discovering and researching this issue. (CVE-2014-3509) [Gabor Tyukasz] *) A malicious server can crash an OpenSSL client with a null pointer dereference (read) by specifying an SRP ciphersuite even though it was not properly negotiated with the client. This can be exploited through a Denial of Service attack. Thanks to Joonas Kuorilehto and Riku Hietamäki (Codenomicon) for discovering and researching this issue. (CVE-2014-5139) [Steve Henson] *) A flaw in OBJ_obj2txt may cause pretty printing functions such as X509_name_oneline, X509_name_print_ex et al. to leak some information from the stack. Applications may be affected if they echo pretty printing output to the attacker. Thanks to Ivan Fratric (Google) for discovering this issue. (CVE-2014-3508) [Emilia Käsper, and Steve Henson] *) Fix ec_GFp_simple_points_make_affine (thus, EC_POINTs_mul etc.) for corner cases. (Certain input points at infinity could lead to bogus results, with non-infinity inputs mapped to infinity too.) [Bodo Moeller] Changes between 1.0.1g and 1.0.1h [5 Jun 2014] *) Fix for SSL/TLS MITM flaw. An attacker using a carefully crafted handshake can force the use of weak keying material in OpenSSL SSL/TLS clients and servers. Thanks to KIKUCHI Masashi (Lepidum Co. Ltd.) for discovering and researching this issue. (CVE-2014-0224) [KIKUCHI Masashi, Steve Henson] *) Fix DTLS recursion flaw. By sending an invalid DTLS handshake to an OpenSSL DTLS client the code can be made to recurse eventually crashing in a DoS attack. Thanks to Imre Rad (Search-Lab Ltd.) for discovering this issue. (CVE-2014-0221) [Imre Rad, Steve Henson] *) Fix DTLS invalid fragment vulnerability. A buffer overrun attack can be triggered by sending invalid DTLS fragments to an OpenSSL DTLS client or server. This is potentially exploitable to run arbitrary code on a vulnerable client or server. Thanks to Jüri Aedla for reporting this issue. (CVE-2014-0195) [Jüri Aedla, Steve Henson] *) Fix bug in TLS code where clients enable anonymous ECDH ciphersuites are subject to a denial of service attack. Thanks to Felix Gröbert and Ivan Fratric at Google for discovering this issue. (CVE-2014-3470) [Felix Gröbert, Ivan Fratric, Steve Henson] *) Harmonize version and its documentation. -f flag is used to display compilation flags. [mancha ] *) Fix eckey_priv_encode so it immediately returns an error upon a failure in i2d_ECPrivateKey. [mancha ] *) Fix some double frees. These are not thought to be exploitable. [mancha ] Changes between 1.0.1f and 1.0.1g [7 Apr 2014] *) A missing bounds check in the handling of the TLS heartbeat extension can be used to reveal up to 64k of memory to a connected client or server. Thanks for Neel Mehta of Google Security for discovering this bug and to Adam Langley and Bodo Moeller for preparing the fix (CVE-2014-0160) [Adam Langley, Bodo Moeller] *) Fix for the attack described in the paper "Recovering OpenSSL ECDSA Nonces Using the FLUSH+RELOAD Cache Side-channel Attack" by Yuval Yarom and Naomi Benger. Details can be obtained from: http://eprint.iacr.org/2014/140 Thanks to Yuval Yarom and Naomi Benger for discovering this flaw and to Yuval Yarom for supplying a fix (CVE-2014-0076) [Yuval Yarom and Naomi Benger] *) TLS pad extension: draft-agl-tls-padding-03 Workaround for the "TLS hang bug" (see FAQ and PR#2771): if the TLS client Hello record length value would otherwise be > 255 and less that 512 pad with a dummy extension containing zeroes so it is at least 512 bytes long. [Adam Langley, Steve Henson] Changes between 1.0.1e and 1.0.1f [6 Jan 2014] *) Fix for TLS record tampering bug. A carefully crafted invalid handshake could crash OpenSSL with a NULL pointer exception. Thanks to Anton Johansson for reporting this issues. (CVE-2013-4353) *) Keep original DTLS digest and encryption contexts in retransmission structures so we can use the previous session parameters if they need to be resent. (CVE-2013-6450) [Steve Henson] *) Add option SSL_OP_SAFARI_ECDHE_ECDSA_BUG (part of SSL_OP_ALL) which avoids preferring ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers when the client appears to be Safari on OS X. Safari on OS X 10.8..10.8.3 advertises support for several ECDHE-ECDSA ciphers, but fails to negotiate them. The bug is fixed in OS X 10.8.4, but Apple have ruled out both hot fixing 10.8..10.8.3 and forcing users to upgrade to 10.8.4 or newer. [Rob Stradling, Adam Langley] Changes between 1.0.1d and 1.0.1e [11 Feb 2013] *) Correct fix for CVE-2013-0169. The original didn't work on AES-NI supporting platforms or when small records were transferred. [Andy Polyakov, Steve Henson] Changes between 1.0.1c and 1.0.1d [5 Feb 2013] *) Make the decoding of SSLv3, TLS and DTLS CBC records constant time. This addresses the flaw in CBC record processing discovered by Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson. Details of this attack can be found at: http://www.isg.rhul.ac.uk/tls/ Thanks go to Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson of the Information Security Group at Royal Holloway, University of London (www.isg.rhul.ac.uk) for discovering this flaw and Adam Langley and Emilia Käsper for the initial patch. (CVE-2013-0169) [Emilia Käsper, Adam Langley, Ben Laurie, Andy Polyakov, Steve Henson] *) Fix flaw in AESNI handling of TLS 1.2 and 1.1 records for CBC mode ciphersuites which can be exploited in a denial of service attack. Thanks go to and to Adam Langley for discovering and detecting this bug and to Wolfgang Ettlinger for independently discovering this issue. (CVE-2012-2686) [Adam Langley] *) Return an error when checking OCSP signatures when key is NULL. This fixes a DoS attack. (CVE-2013-0166) [Steve Henson] *) Make openssl verify return errors. [Chris Palmer and Ben Laurie] *) Call OCSP Stapling callback after ciphersuite has been chosen, so the right response is stapled. Also change SSL_get_certificate() so it returns the certificate actually sent. See http://rt.openssl.org/Ticket/Display.html?id=2836. [Rob Stradling ] *) Fix possible deadlock when decoding public keys. [Steve Henson] *) Don't use TLS 1.0 record version number in initial client hello if renegotiating. [Steve Henson] Changes between 1.0.1b and 1.0.1c [10 May 2012] *) Sanity check record length before skipping explicit IV in TLS 1.2, 1.1 and DTLS to fix DoS attack. Thanks to Codenomicon for discovering this issue using Fuzz-o-Matic fuzzing as a service testing platform. (CVE-2012-2333) [Steve Henson] *) Initialise tkeylen properly when encrypting CMS messages. Thanks to Solar Designer of Openwall for reporting this issue. [Steve Henson] *) In FIPS mode don't try to use composite ciphers as they are not approved. [Steve Henson] Changes between 1.0.1a and 1.0.1b [26 Apr 2012] *) OpenSSL 1.0.0 sets SSL_OP_ALL to 0x80000FFFL and OpenSSL 1.0.1 and 1.0.1a set SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1 to 0x00000400L which would unfortunately mean any application compiled against OpenSSL 1.0.0 headers setting SSL_OP_ALL would also set SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1, unintentionally disabling TLS 1.1 also. Fix this by changing the value of SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1 to 0x10000000L Any application which was previously compiled against OpenSSL 1.0.1 or 1.0.1a headers and which cares about SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1 will need to be recompiled as a result. Letting be results in inability to disable specifically TLS 1.1 and in client context, in unlike event, limit maximum offered version to TLS 1.0 [see below]. [Steve Henson] *) In order to ensure interoperability SSL_OP_NO_protocolX does not disable just protocol X, but all protocols above X *if* there are protocols *below* X still enabled. In more practical terms it means that if application wants to disable TLS1.0 in favor of TLS1.1 and above, it's not sufficient to pass SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1, one has to pass SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1|SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3|SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2. This applies to client side. [Andy Polyakov] Changes between 1.0.1 and 1.0.1a [19 Apr 2012] *) Check for potentially exploitable overflows in asn1_d2i_read_bio BUF_mem_grow and BUF_mem_grow_clean. Refuse attempts to shrink buffer in CRYPTO_realloc_clean. Thanks to Tavis Ormandy, Google Security Team, for discovering this issue and to Adam Langley for fixing it. (CVE-2012-2110) [Adam Langley (Google), Tavis Ormandy, Google Security Team] *) Don't allow TLS 1.2 SHA-256 ciphersuites in TLS 1.0, 1.1 connections. [Adam Langley] *) Workarounds for some broken servers that "hang" if a client hello record length exceeds 255 bytes. 1. Do not use record version number > TLS 1.0 in initial client hello: some (but not all) hanging servers will now work. 2. If we set OPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH this will truncate the number of ciphers sent in the client hello. This should be set to an even number, such as 50, for example by passing: -DOPENSSL_MAX_TLS1_2_CIPHER_LENGTH=50 to config or Configure. Most broken servers should now work. 3. If all else fails setting OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2_CLIENT will disable TLS 1.2 client support entirely. [Steve Henson] *) Fix SEGV in Vector Permutation AES module observed in OpenSSH. [Andy Polyakov] Changes between 1.0.0h and 1.0.1 [14 Mar 2012] *) Add compatibility with old MDC2 signatures which use an ASN1 OCTET STRING form instead of a DigestInfo. [Steve Henson] *) The format used for MDC2 RSA signatures is inconsistent between EVP and the RSA_sign/RSA_verify functions. This was made more apparent when OpenSSL used RSA_sign/RSA_verify for some RSA signatures in particular those which went through EVP_PKEY_METHOD in 1.0.0 and later. Detect the correct format in RSA_verify so both forms transparently work. [Steve Henson] *) Some servers which support TLS 1.0 can choke if we initially indicate support for TLS 1.2 and later renegotiate using TLS 1.0 in the RSA encrypted premaster secret. As a workaround use the maximum permitted client version in client hello, this should keep such servers happy and still work with previous versions of OpenSSL. [Steve Henson] *) Add support for TLS/DTLS heartbeats. [Robin Seggelmann ] *) Add support for SCTP. [Robin Seggelmann ] *) Improved PRNG seeding for VOS. [Paul Green ] *) Extensive assembler packs updates, most notably: - x86[_64]: AES-NI, PCLMULQDQ, RDRAND support; - x86[_64]: SSSE3 support (SHA1, vector-permutation AES); - x86_64: bit-sliced AES implementation; - ARM: NEON support, contemporary platforms optimizations; - s390x: z196 support; - *: GHASH and GF(2^m) multiplication implementations; [Andy Polyakov] *) Make TLS-SRP code conformant with RFC 5054 API cleanup (removal of unnecessary code) [Peter Sylvester ] *) Add TLS key material exporter from RFC 5705. [Eric Rescorla] *) Add DTLS-SRTP negotiation from RFC 5764. [Eric Rescorla] *) Add Next Protocol Negotiation, http://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-agl-tls-nextprotoneg-00. Can be disabled with a no-npn flag to config or Configure. Code donated by Google. [Adam Langley and Ben Laurie] *) Add optional 64-bit optimized implementations of elliptic curves NIST-P224, NIST-P256, NIST-P521, with constant-time single point multiplication on typical inputs. Compiler support for the nonstandard type __uint128_t is required to use this (present in gcc 4.4 and later, for 64-bit builds). Code made available under Apache License version 2.0. Specify "enable-ec_nistp_64_gcc_128" on the Configure (or config) command line to include this in your build of OpenSSL, and run "make depend" (or "make update"). This enables the following EC_METHODs: EC_GFp_nistp224_method() EC_GFp_nistp256_method() EC_GFp_nistp521_method() EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name() will automatically use these (while EC_GROUP_new_curve_GFp() currently prefers the more flexible implementations). [Emilia Käsper, Adam Langley, Bodo Moeller (Google)] *) Use type ossl_ssize_t instead of ssize_t which isn't available on all platforms. Move ssize_t definition from e_os.h to the public header file e_os2.h as it now appears in public header file cms.h [Steve Henson] *) New -sigopt option to the ca, req and x509 utilities. Additional signature parameters can be passed using this option and in particular PSS. [Steve Henson] *) Add RSA PSS signing function. This will generate and set the appropriate AlgorithmIdentifiers for PSS based on those in the corresponding EVP_MD_CTX structure. No application support yet. [Steve Henson] *) Support for companion algorithm specific ASN1 signing routines. New function ASN1_item_sign_ctx() signs a pre-initialised EVP_MD_CTX structure and sets AlgorithmIdentifiers based on the appropriate parameters. [Steve Henson] *) Add new algorithm specific ASN1 verification initialisation function to EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD: this is not in EVP_PKEY_METHOD since the ASN1 handling will be the same no matter what EVP_PKEY_METHOD is used. Add a PSS handler to support verification of PSS signatures: checked against a number of sample certificates. [Steve Henson] *) Add signature printing for PSS. Add PSS OIDs. [Steve Henson, Martin Kaiser ] *) Add algorithm specific signature printing. An individual ASN1 method can now print out signatures instead of the standard hex dump. More complex signatures (e.g. PSS) can print out more meaningful information. Include DSA version that prints out the signature parameters r, s. [Steve Henson] *) Password based recipient info support for CMS library: implementing RFC3211. [Steve Henson] *) Split password based encryption into PBES2 and PBKDF2 functions. This neatly separates the code into cipher and PBE sections and is required for some algorithms that split PBES2 into separate pieces (such as password based CMS). [Steve Henson] *) Session-handling fixes: - Fix handling of connections that are resuming with a session ID, but also support Session Tickets. - Fix a bug that suppressed issuing of a new ticket if the client presented a ticket with an expired session. - Try to set the ticket lifetime hint to something reasonable. - Make tickets shorter by excluding irrelevant information. - On the client side, don't ignore renewed tickets. [Adam Langley, Bodo Moeller (Google)] *) Fix PSK session representation. [Bodo Moeller] *) Add RC4-MD5 and AESNI-SHA1 "stitched" implementations. This work was sponsored by Intel. [Andy Polyakov] *) Add GCM support to TLS library. Some custom code is needed to split the IV between the fixed (from PRF) and explicit (from TLS record) portions. This adds all GCM ciphersuites supported by RFC5288 and RFC5289. Generalise some AES* cipherstrings to include GCM and add a special AESGCM string for GCM only. [Steve Henson] *) Expand range of ctrls for AES GCM. Permit setting invocation field on decrypt and retrieval of invocation field only on encrypt. [Steve Henson] *) Add HMAC ECC ciphersuites from RFC5289. Include SHA384 PRF support. As required by RFC5289 these ciphersuites cannot be used if for versions of TLS earlier than 1.2. [Steve Henson] *) For FIPS capable OpenSSL interpret a NULL default public key method as unset and return the appropriate default but do *not* set the default. This means we can return the appropriate method in applications that switch between FIPS and non-FIPS modes. [Steve Henson] *) Redirect HMAC and CMAC operations to FIPS module in FIPS mode. If an ENGINE is used then we cannot handle that in the FIPS module so we keep original code iff non-FIPS operations are allowed. [Steve Henson] *) Add -attime option to openssl utilities. [Peter Eckersley , Ben Laurie and Steve Henson] *) Redirect DSA and DH operations to FIPS module in FIPS mode. [Steve Henson] *) Redirect ECDSA and ECDH operations to FIPS module in FIPS mode. Also use FIPS EC methods unconditionally for now. [Steve Henson] *) New build option no-ec2m to disable characteristic 2 code. [Steve Henson] *) Backport libcrypto audit of return value checking from 1.1.0-dev; not all cases can be covered as some introduce binary incompatibilities. [Steve Henson] *) Redirect RSA operations to FIPS module including keygen, encrypt, decrypt, sign and verify. Block use of non FIPS RSA methods. [Steve Henson] *) Add similar low level API blocking to ciphers. [Steve Henson] *) Low level digest APIs are not approved in FIPS mode: any attempt to use these will cause a fatal error. Applications that *really* want to use them can use the private_* version instead. [Steve Henson] *) Redirect cipher operations to FIPS module for FIPS builds. [Steve Henson] *) Redirect digest operations to FIPS module for FIPS builds. [Steve Henson] *) Update build system to add "fips" flag which will link in fipscanister.o for static and shared library builds embedding a signature if needed. [Steve Henson] *) Output TLS supported curves in preference order instead of numerical order. This is currently hardcoded for the highest order curves first. This should be configurable so applications can judge speed vs strength. [Steve Henson] *) Add TLS v1.2 server support for client authentication. [Steve Henson] *) Add support for FIPS mode in ssl library: disable SSLv3, non-FIPS ciphers and enable MD5. [Steve Henson] *) Functions FIPS_mode_set() and FIPS_mode() which call the underlying FIPS modules versions. [Steve Henson] *) Add TLS v1.2 client side support for client authentication. Keep cache of handshake records longer as we don't know the hash algorithm to use until after the certificate request message is received. [Steve Henson] *) Initial TLS v1.2 client support. Add a default signature algorithms extension including all the algorithms we support. Parse new signature format in client key exchange. Relax some ECC signing restrictions for TLS v1.2 as indicated in RFC5246. [Steve Henson] *) Add server support for TLS v1.2 signature algorithms extension. Switch to new signature format when needed using client digest preference. All server ciphersuites should now work correctly in TLS v1.2. No client support yet and no support for client certificates. [Steve Henson] *) Initial TLS v1.2 support. Add new SHA256 digest to ssl code, switch to SHA256 for PRF when using TLS v1.2 and later. Add new SHA256 based ciphersuites. At present only RSA key exchange ciphersuites work with TLS v1.2. Add new option for TLS v1.2 replacing the old and obsolete SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK flags with SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2. New TLSv1.2 methods and version checking. [Steve Henson] *) New option OPENSSL_NO_SSL_INTERN. If an application can be compiled with this defined it will not be affected by any changes to ssl internal structures. Add several utility functions to allow openssl application to work with OPENSSL_NO_SSL_INTERN defined. [Steve Henson] *) A long standing patch to add support for SRP from EdelWeb (Peter Sylvester and Christophe Renou) was integrated. [Christophe Renou , Peter Sylvester , Tom Wu , and Ben Laurie] *) Add functions to copy EVP_PKEY_METHOD and retrieve flags and id. [Steve Henson] *) Permit abbreviated handshakes when renegotiating using the function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated(). [Robin Seggelmann ] *) Add call to ENGINE_register_all_complete() to ENGINE_load_builtin_engines(), so some implementations get used automatically instead of needing explicit application support. [Steve Henson] *) Add support for TLS key exporter as described in RFC5705. [Robin Seggelmann , Steve Henson] *) Initial TLSv1.1 support. Since TLSv1.1 is very similar to TLS v1.0 only a few changes are required: Add SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1 flag. Add TLSv1_1 methods. Update version checking logic to handle version 1.1. Add explicit IV handling (ported from DTLS code). Add command line options to s_client/s_server. [Steve Henson] Changes between 1.0.0g and 1.0.0h [12 Mar 2012] *) Fix MMA (Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding) weakness in CMS and PKCS7 code. When RSA decryption fails use a random key for content decryption and always return the same error. Note: this attack needs on average 2^20 messages so it only affects automated senders. The old behaviour can be re-enabled in the CMS code by setting the CMS_DEBUG_DECRYPT flag: this is useful for debugging and testing where an MMA defence is not necessary. Thanks to Ivan Nestlerode for discovering this issue. (CVE-2012-0884) [Steve Henson] *) Fix CVE-2011-4619: make sure we really are receiving a client hello before rejecting multiple SGC restarts. Thanks to Ivan Nestlerode for discovering this bug. [Steve Henson] Changes between 1.0.0f and 1.0.0g [18 Jan 2012] *) Fix for DTLS DoS issue introduced by fix for CVE-2011-4109. Thanks to Antonio Martin, Enterprise Secure Access Research and Development, Cisco Systems, Inc. for discovering this bug and preparing a fix. (CVE-2012-0050) [Antonio Martin] Changes between 1.0.0e and 1.0.0f [4 Jan 2012] *) Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson have discovered an extension of the Vaudenay padding oracle attack on CBC mode encryption which enables an efficient plaintext recovery attack against the OpenSSL implementation of DTLS. Their attack exploits timing differences arising during decryption processing. A research paper describing this attack can be found at: http://www.isg.rhul.ac.uk/~kp/dtls.pdf Thanks go to Nadhem Alfardan and Kenny Paterson of the Information Security Group at Royal Holloway, University of London (www.isg.rhul.ac.uk) for discovering this flaw and to Robin Seggelmann and Michael Tuexen for preparing the fix. (CVE-2011-4108) [Robin Seggelmann, Michael Tuexen] *) Clear bytes used for block padding of SSL 3.0 records. (CVE-2011-4576) [Adam Langley (Google)] *) Only allow one SGC handshake restart for SSL/TLS. Thanks to George Kadianakis for discovering this issue and Adam Langley for preparing the fix. (CVE-2011-4619) [Adam Langley (Google)] *) Check parameters are not NULL in GOST ENGINE. (CVE-2012-0027) [Andrey Kulikov ] *) Prevent malformed RFC3779 data triggering an assertion failure. Thanks to Andrew Chi, BBN Technologies, for discovering the flaw and Rob Austein for fixing it. (CVE-2011-4577) [Rob Austein ] *) Improved PRNG seeding for VOS. [Paul Green ] *) Fix ssl_ciph.c set-up race. [Adam Langley (Google)] *) Fix spurious failures in ecdsatest.c. [Emilia Käsper (Google)] *) Fix the BIO_f_buffer() implementation (which was mixing different interpretations of the '..._len' fields). [Adam Langley (Google)] *) Fix handling of BN_BLINDING: now BN_BLINDING_invert_ex (rather than BN_BLINDING_invert_ex) calls BN_BLINDING_update, ensuring that concurrent threads won't reuse the same blinding coefficients. This also avoids the need to obtain the CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA_BLINDING lock to call BN_BLINDING_invert_ex, and avoids one use of BN_BLINDING_update for each BN_BLINDING structure (previously, the last update always remained unused). [Emilia Käsper (Google)] *) In ssl3_clear, preserve s3->init_extra along with s3->rbuf. [Bob Buckholz (Google)] Changes between 1.0.0d and 1.0.0e [6 Sep 2011] *) Fix bug where CRLs with nextUpdate in the past are sometimes accepted by initialising X509_STORE_CTX properly. (CVE-2011-3207) [Kaspar Brand ] *) Fix SSL memory handling for (EC)DH ciphersuites, in particular for multi-threaded use of ECDH. (CVE-2011-3210) [Adam Langley (Google)] *) Fix x509_name_ex_d2i memory leak on bad inputs. [Bodo Moeller] *) Remove hard coded ecdsaWithSHA1 signature tests in ssl code and check signature public key algorithm by using OID xref utilities instead. Before this you could only use some ECC ciphersuites with SHA1 only. [Steve Henson] *) Add protection against ECDSA timing attacks as mentioned in the paper by Billy Bob Brumley and Nicola Tuveri, see: http://eprint.iacr.org/2011/232.pdf [Billy Bob Brumley and Nicola Tuveri] Changes between 1.0.0c and 1.0.0d [8 Feb 2011] *) Fix parsing of OCSP stapling ClientHello extension. CVE-2011-0014 [Neel Mehta, Adam Langley, Bodo Moeller (Google)] *) Fix bug in string printing code: if *any* escaping is enabled we must escape the escape character (backslash) or the resulting string is ambiguous. [Steve Henson] Changes between 1.0.0b and 1.0.0c [2 Dec 2010] *) Disable code workaround for ancient and obsolete Netscape browsers and servers: an attacker can use it in a ciphersuite downgrade attack. Thanks to Martin Rex for discovering this bug. CVE-2010-4180 [Steve Henson] *) Fixed J-PAKE implementation error, originally discovered by Sebastien Martini, further info and confirmation from Stefan Arentz and Feng Hao. Note that this fix is a security fix. CVE-2010-4252 [Ben Laurie] Changes between 1.0.0a and 1.0.0b [16 Nov 2010] *) Fix extension code to avoid race conditions which can result in a buffer overrun vulnerability: resumed sessions must not be modified as they can be shared by multiple threads. CVE-2010-3864 [Steve Henson] *) Fix WIN32 build system to correctly link an ENGINE directory into a DLL. [Steve Henson] Changes between 1.0.0 and 1.0.0a [01 Jun 2010] *) Check return value of int_rsa_verify in pkey_rsa_verifyrecover (CVE-2010-1633) [Steve Henson, Peter-Michael Hager ] Changes between 0.9.8n and 1.0.0 [29 Mar 2010] *) Add "missing" function EVP_CIPHER_CTX_copy(). This copies a cipher context. The operation can be customised via the ctrl mechanism in case ENGINEs want to include additional functionality. [Steve Henson] *) Tolerate yet another broken PKCS#8 key format: private key value negative. [Steve Henson] *) Add new -subject_hash_old and -issuer_hash_old options to x509 utility to output hashes compatible with older versions of OpenSSL. [Willy Weisz ] *) Fix compression algorithm handling: if resuming a session use the compression algorithm of the resumed session instead of determining it from client hello again. Don't allow server to change algorithm. [Steve Henson] *) Add load_crls() function to apps tidying load_certs() too. Add option to verify utility to allow additional CRLs to be included. [Steve Henson] *) Update OCSP request code to permit adding custom headers to the request: some responders need this. [Steve Henson] *) The function EVP_PKEY_sign() returns <=0 on error: check return code correctly. [Julia Lawall ] *) Update verify callback code in apps/s_cb.c and apps/verify.c, it needlessly dereferenced structures, used obsolete functions and didn't handle all updated verify codes correctly. [Steve Henson] *) Disable MD2 in the default configuration. [Steve Henson] *) In BIO_pop() and BIO_push() use the ctrl argument (which was NULL) to indicate the initial BIO being pushed or popped. This makes it possible to determine whether the BIO is the one explicitly called or as a result of the ctrl being passed down the chain. Fix BIO_pop() and SSL BIOs so it handles reference counts correctly and doesn't zero out the I/O bio when it is not being explicitly popped. WARNING: applications which included workarounds for the old buggy behaviour will need to be modified or they could free up already freed BIOs. [Steve Henson] *) Extend the uni2asc/asc2uni => OPENSSL_uni2asc/OPENSSL_asc2uni renaming to all platforms (within the 0.9.8 branch, this was done conditionally on Netware platforms to avoid a name clash). [Guenter ] *) Add ECDHE and PSK support to DTLS. [Michael Tuexen ] *) Add CHECKED_STACK_OF macro to safestack.h, otherwise safestack can't be used on C++. [Steve Henson] *) Add "missing" function EVP_MD_flags() (without this the only way to retrieve a digest flags is by accessing the structure directly. Update EVP_MD_do_all*() and EVP_CIPHER_do_all*() to include the name a digest or cipher is registered as in the "from" argument. Print out all registered digests in the dgst usage message instead of manually attempting to work them out. [Steve Henson] *) If no SSLv2 ciphers are used don't use an SSLv2 compatible client hello: this allows the use of compression and extensions. Change default cipher string to remove SSLv2 ciphersuites. This effectively avoids ancient SSLv2 by default unless an application cipher string requests it. [Steve Henson] *) Alter match criteria in PKCS12_parse(). It used to try to use local key ids to find matching certificates and keys but some PKCS#12 files don't follow the (somewhat unwritten) rules and this strategy fails. Now just gather all certificates together and the first private key then look for the first certificate that matches the key. [Steve Henson] *) Support use of registered digest and cipher names for dgst and cipher commands instead of having to add each one as a special case. So now you can do: openssl sha256 foo as well as: openssl dgst -sha256 foo and this works for ENGINE based algorithms too. [Steve Henson] *) Update Gost ENGINE to support parameter files. [Victor B. Wagner ] *) Support GeneralizedTime in ca utility. [Oliver Martin , Steve Henson] *) Enhance the hash format used for certificate directory links. The new form uses the canonical encoding (meaning equivalent names will work even if they aren't identical) and uses SHA1 instead of MD5. This form is incompatible with the older format and as a result c_rehash should be used to rebuild symbolic links. [Steve Henson] *) Make PKCS#8 the default write format for private keys, replacing the traditional format. This form is standardised, more secure and doesn't include an implicit MD5 dependency. [Steve Henson] *) Add a $gcc_devteam_warn option to Configure. The idea is that any code committed to OpenSSL should pass this lot as a minimum. [Steve Henson] *) Add session ticket override functionality for use by EAP-FAST. [Jouni Malinen ] *) Modify HMAC functions to return a value. Since these can be implemented in an ENGINE errors can occur. [Steve Henson] *) Type-checked OBJ_bsearch_ex. [Ben Laurie] *) Type-checked OBJ_bsearch. Also some constification necessitated by type-checking. Still to come: TXT_DB, bsearch(?), OBJ_bsearch_ex, qsort, CRYPTO_EX_DATA, ASN1_VALUE, ASN1_STRING, CONF_VALUE. [Ben Laurie] *) New function OPENSSL_gmtime_adj() to add a specific number of days and seconds to a tm structure directly, instead of going through OS specific date routines. This avoids any issues with OS routines such as the year 2038 bug. New *_adj() functions for ASN1 time structures and X509_time_adj_ex() to cover the extended range. The existing X509_time_adj() is still usable and will no longer have any date issues. [Steve Henson] *) Delta CRL support. New use deltas option which will attempt to locate and search any appropriate delta CRLs available. This work was sponsored by Google. [Steve Henson] *) Support for CRLs partitioned by reason code. Reorganise CRL processing code and add additional score elements. Validate alternate CRL paths as part of the CRL checking and indicate a new error "CRL path validation error" in this case. Applications wanting additional details can use the verify callback and check the new "parent" field. If this is not NULL CRL path validation is taking place. Existing applications won't see this because it requires extended CRL support which is off by default. This work was sponsored by Google. [Steve Henson] *) Support for freshest CRL extension. This work was sponsored by Google. [Steve Henson] *) Initial indirect CRL support. Currently only supported in the CRLs passed directly and not via lookup. Process certificate issuer CRL entry extension and lookup CRL entries by bother issuer name and serial number. Check and process CRL issuer entry in IDP extension. This work was sponsored by Google. [Steve Henson] *) Add support for distinct certificate and CRL paths. The CRL issuer certificate is validated separately in this case. Only enabled if an extended CRL support flag is set: this flag will enable additional CRL functionality in future. This work was sponsored by Google. [Steve Henson] *) Add support for policy mappings extension. This work was sponsored by Google. [Steve Henson] *) Fixes to pathlength constraint, self issued certificate handling, policy processing to align with RFC3280 and PKITS tests. This work was sponsored by Google. [Steve Henson] *) Support for name constraints certificate extension. DN, email, DNS and URI types are currently supported. This work was sponsored by Google. [Steve Henson] *) To cater for systems that provide a pointer-based thread ID rather than numeric, deprecate the current numeric thread ID mechanism and replace it with a structure and associated callback type. This mechanism allows a numeric "hash" to be extracted from a thread ID in either case, and on platforms where pointers are larger than 'long', mixing is done to help ensure the numeric 'hash' is usable even if it can't be guaranteed unique. The default mechanism is to use "&errno" as a pointer-based thread ID to distinguish between threads. Applications that want to provide their own thread IDs should now use CRYPTO_THREADID_set_callback() to register a callback that will call either CRYPTO_THREADID_set_numeric() or CRYPTO_THREADID_set_pointer(). Note that ERR_remove_state() is now deprecated, because it is tied to the assumption that thread IDs are numeric. ERR_remove_state(0) to free the current thread's error state should be replaced by ERR_remove_thread_state(NULL). (This new approach replaces the functions CRYPTO_set_idptr_callback(), CRYPTO_get_idptr_callback(), and CRYPTO_thread_idptr() that existed in OpenSSL 0.9.9-dev between June 2006 and August 2008. Also, if an application was previously providing a numeric thread callback that was inappropriate for distinguishing threads, then uniqueness might have been obtained with &errno that happened immediately in the intermediate development versions of OpenSSL; this is no longer the case, the numeric thread callback will now override the automatic use of &errno.) [Geoff Thorpe, with help from Bodo Moeller] *) Initial support for different CRL issuing certificates. This covers a simple case where the self issued certificates in the chain exist and the real CRL issuer is higher in the existing chain. This work was sponsored by Google. [Steve Henson] *) Removed effectively defunct crypto/store from the build. [Ben Laurie] *) Revamp of STACK to provide stronger type-checking. Still to come: TXT_DB, bsearch(?), OBJ_bsearch, qsort, CRYPTO_EX_DATA, ASN1_VALUE, ASN1_STRING, CONF_VALUE. [Ben Laurie] *) Add a new SSL_MODE_RELEASE_BUFFERS mode flag to release unused buffer RAM on SSL connections. This option can save about 34k per idle SSL. [Nick Mathewson] *) Revamp of LHASH to provide stronger type-checking. Still to come: STACK, TXT_DB, bsearch, qsort. [Ben Laurie] *) Initial support for Cryptographic Message Syntax (aka CMS) based on RFC3850, RFC3851 and RFC3852. New cms directory and cms utility, support for data, signedData, compressedData, digestedData and encryptedData, envelopedData types included. Scripts to check against RFC4134 examples draft and interop and consistency checks of many content types and variants. [Steve Henson] *) Add options to enc utility to support use of zlib compression BIO. [Steve Henson] *) Extend mk1mf to support importing of options and assembly language files from Configure script, currently only included in VC-WIN32. The assembly language rules can now optionally generate the source files from the associated perl scripts. [Steve Henson] *) Implement remaining functionality needed to support GOST ciphersuites. Interop testing has been performed using CryptoPro implementations. [Victor B. Wagner ] *) s390x assembler pack. [Andy Polyakov] *) ARMv4 assembler pack. ARMv4 refers to v4 and later ISA, not CPU "family." [Andy Polyakov] *) Implement Opaque PRF Input TLS extension as specified in draft-rescorla-tls-opaque-prf-input-00.txt. Since this is not an official specification yet and no extension type assignment by IANA exists, this extension (for now) will have to be explicitly enabled when building OpenSSL by providing the extension number to use. For example, specify an option -DTLSEXT_TYPE_opaque_prf_input=0x9527 to the "config" or "Configure" script to enable the extension, assuming extension number 0x9527 (which is a completely arbitrary and unofficial assignment based on the MD5 hash of the Internet Draft). Note that by doing so, you potentially lose interoperability with other TLS implementations since these might be using the same extension number for other purposes. SSL_set_tlsext_opaque_prf_input(ssl, src, len) is used to set the opaque PRF input value to use in the handshake. This will create an internal copy of the length-'len' string at 'src', and will return non-zero for success. To get more control and flexibility, provide a callback function by using SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback(ctx, cb) SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg(ctx, arg) where int (*cb)(SSL *, void *peerinput, size_t len, void *arg); void *arg; Callback function 'cb' will be called in handshakes, and is expected to use SSL_set_tlsext_opaque_prf_input() as appropriate. Argument 'arg' is for application purposes (the value as given to SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_opaque_prf_input_callback_arg() will directly be provided to the callback function). The callback function has to return non-zero to report success: usually 1 to use opaque PRF input just if possible, or 2 to enforce use of the opaque PRF input. In the latter case, the library will abort the handshake if opaque PRF input is not successfully negotiated. Arguments 'peerinput' and 'len' given to the callback function will always be NULL and 0 in the case of a client. A server will see the client's opaque PRF input through these variables if available (NULL and 0 otherwise). Note that if the server provides an opaque PRF input, the length must be the same as the length of the client's opaque PRF input. Note that the callback function will only be called when creating a new session (session resumption can resume whatever was previously negotiated), and will not be called in SSL 2.0 handshakes; thus, SSL_CTX_set_options(ctx, SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2) or SSL_set_options(ssl, SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2) is especially recommended for applications that need to enforce opaque PRF input. [Bodo Moeller] *) Update ssl code to support digests other than SHA1+MD5 for handshake MAC. [Victor B. Wagner ] *) Add RFC4507 support to OpenSSL. This includes the corrections in RFC4507bis. The encrypted ticket format is an encrypted encoded SSL_SESSION structure, that way new session features are automatically supported. If a client application caches session in an SSL_SESSION structure support is transparent because tickets are now stored in the encoded SSL_SESSION. The SSL_CTX structure automatically generates keys for ticket protection in servers so again support should be possible with no application modification. If a client or server wishes to disable RFC4507 support then the option SSL_OP_NO_TICKET can be set. Add a TLS extension debugging callback to allow the contents of any client or server extensions to be examined. This work was sponsored by Google. [Steve Henson] *) Final changes to avoid use of pointer pointer casts in OpenSSL. OpenSSL should now compile cleanly on gcc 4.2 [Peter Hartley , Steve Henson] *) Update SSL library to use new EVP_PKEY MAC API. Include generic MAC support including streaming MAC support: this is required for GOST ciphersuite support. [Victor B. Wagner , Steve Henson] *) Add option -stream to use PKCS#7 streaming in smime utility. New function i2d_PKCS7_bio_stream() and PEM_write_PKCS7_bio_stream() to output in BER and PEM format. [Steve Henson] *) Experimental support for use of HMAC via EVP_PKEY interface. This allows HMAC to be handled via the EVP_DigestSign*() interface. The EVP_PKEY "key" in this case is the HMAC key, potentially allowing ENGINE support for HMAC keys which are unextractable. New -mac and -macopt options to dgst utility. [Steve Henson] *) New option -sigopt to dgst utility. Update dgst to use EVP_Digest{Sign,Verify}*. These two changes make it possible to use alternative signing parameters such as X9.31 or PSS in the dgst utility. [Steve Henson] *) Change ssl_cipher_apply_rule(), the internal function that does the work each time a ciphersuite string requests enabling ("foo+bar"), moving ("+foo+bar"), disabling ("-foo+bar", or removing ("!foo+bar") a class of ciphersuites: Now it maintains the order of disabled ciphersuites such that those ciphersuites that most recently went from enabled to disabled not only stay in order with respect to each other, but also have higher priority than other disabled ciphersuites the next time ciphersuites are enabled again. This means that you can now say, e.g., "PSK:-PSK:HIGH" to enable the same ciphersuites as with "HIGH" alone, but in a specific order where the PSK ciphersuites come first (since they are the most recently disabled ciphersuites when "HIGH" is parsed). Also, change ssl_create_cipher_list() (using this new functionality) such that between otherwise identical ciphersuites, ephemeral ECDH is preferred over ephemeral DH in the default order. [Bodo Moeller] *) Change ssl_create_cipher_list() so that it automatically arranges the ciphersuites in reasonable order before starting to process the rule string. Thus, the definition for "DEFAULT" (SSL_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST) now is just "ALL:!aNULL:!eNULL", but remains equivalent to "AES:ALL:!aNULL:!eNULL:+aECDH:+kRSA:+RC4:@STRENGTH". This makes it much easier to arrive at a reasonable default order in applications for which anonymous ciphers are OK (meaning that you can't actually use DEFAULT). [Bodo Moeller; suggested by Victor Duchovni] *) Split the SSL/TLS algorithm mask (as used for ciphersuite string processing) into multiple integers instead of setting "SSL_MKEY_MASK" bits, "SSL_AUTH_MASK" bits, "SSL_ENC_MASK", "SSL_MAC_MASK", and "SSL_SSL_MASK" bits all in a single integer. (These masks as well as the individual bit definitions are hidden away into the non-exported interface ssl/ssl_locl.h, so this change to the definition of the SSL_CIPHER structure shouldn't affect applications.) This give us more bits for each of these categories, so there is no longer a need to coagulate AES128 and AES256 into a single algorithm bit, and to coagulate Camellia128 and Camellia256 into a single algorithm bit, which has led to all kinds of kludges. Thus, among other things, the kludge introduced in 0.9.7m and 0.9.8e for masking out AES256 independently of AES128 or masking out Camellia256 independently of AES256 is not needed here in 0.9.9. With the change, we also introduce new ciphersuite aliases that so far were missing: "AES128", "AES256", "CAMELLIA128", and "CAMELLIA256". [Bodo Moeller] *) Add support for dsa-with-SHA224 and dsa-with-SHA256. Use the leftmost N bytes of the signature input if the input is larger than the prime q (with N being the size in bytes of q). [Nils Larsch] *) Very *very* experimental PKCS#7 streaming encoder support. Nothing uses it yet and it is largely untested. [Steve Henson] *) Add support for the ecdsa-with-SHA224/256/384/512 signature types. [Nils Larsch] *) Initial incomplete changes to avoid need for function casts in OpenSSL some compilers (gcc 4.2 and later) reject their use. Safestack is reimplemented. Update ASN1 to avoid use of legacy functions. [Steve Henson] *) Win32/64 targets are linked with Winsock2. [Andy Polyakov] *) Add an X509_CRL_METHOD structure to allow CRL processing to be redirected to external functions. This can be used to increase CRL handling efficiency especially when CRLs are very large by (for example) storing the CRL revoked certificates in a database. [Steve Henson] *) Overhaul of by_dir code. Add support for dynamic loading of CRLs so new CRLs added to a directory can be used. New command line option -verify_return_error to s_client and s_server. This causes real errors to be returned by the verify callback instead of carrying on no matter what. This reflects the way a "real world" verify callback would behave. [Steve Henson] *) GOST engine, supporting several GOST algorithms and public key formats. Kindly donated by Cryptocom. [Cryptocom] *) Partial support for Issuing Distribution Point CRL extension. CRLs partitioned by DP are handled but no indirect CRL or reason partitioning (yet). Complete overhaul of CRL handling: now the most suitable CRL is selected via a scoring technique which handles IDP and AKID in CRLs. [Steve Henson] *) New X509_STORE_CTX callbacks lookup_crls() and lookup_certs() which will ultimately be used for all verify operations: this will remove the X509_STORE dependency on certificate verification and allow alternative lookup methods. X509_STORE based implementations of these two callbacks. [Steve Henson] *) Allow multiple CRLs to exist in an X509_STORE with matching issuer names. Modify get_crl() to find a valid (unexpired) CRL if possible. [Steve Henson] *) New function X509_CRL_match() to check if two CRLs are identical. Normally this would be called X509_CRL_cmp() but that name is already used by a function that just compares CRL issuer names. Cache several CRL extensions in X509_CRL structure and cache CRLDP in X509. [Steve Henson] *) Store a "canonical" representation of X509_NAME structure (ASN1 Name) this maps equivalent X509_NAME structures into a consistent structure. Name comparison can then be performed rapidly using memcmp(). [Steve Henson] *) Non-blocking OCSP request processing. Add -timeout option to ocsp utility. [Steve Henson] *) Allow digests to supply their own micalg string for S/MIME type using the ctrl EVP_MD_CTRL_MICALG. [Steve Henson] *) During PKCS7 signing pass the PKCS7 SignerInfo structure to the EVP_PKEY_METHOD before and after signing via the EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PKCS7_SIGN ctrl. It can then customise the structure before and/or after signing if necessary. [Steve Henson] *) New function OBJ_add_sigid() to allow application defined signature OIDs to be added to OpenSSLs internal tables. New function OBJ_sigid_free() to free up any added signature OIDs. [Steve Henson] *) New functions EVP_CIPHER_do_all(), EVP_CIPHER_do_all_sorted(), EVP_MD_do_all() and EVP_MD_do_all_sorted() to enumerate internal digest and cipher tables. New options added to openssl utility: list-message-digest-algorithms and list-cipher-algorithms. [Steve Henson] *) Change the array representation of binary polynomials: the list of degrees of non-zero coefficients is now terminated with -1. Previously it was terminated with 0, which was also part of the value; thus, the array representation was not applicable to polynomials where t^0 has coefficient zero. This change makes the array representation useful in a more general context. [Douglas Stebila] *) Various modifications and fixes to SSL/TLS cipher string handling. For ECC, the code now distinguishes between fixed ECDH with RSA certificates on the one hand and with ECDSA certificates on the other hand, since these are separate ciphersuites. The unused code for Fortezza ciphersuites has been removed. For consistency with EDH, ephemeral ECDH is now called "EECDH" (not "ECDHE"). For consistency with the code for DH certificates, use of ECDH certificates is now considered ECDH authentication, not RSA or ECDSA authentication (the latter is merely the CA's signing algorithm and not actively used in the protocol). The temporary ciphersuite alias "ECCdraft" is no longer available, and ECC ciphersuites are no longer excluded from "ALL" and "DEFAULT". The following aliases now exist for RFC 4492 ciphersuites, most of these by analogy with the DH case: kECDHr - ECDH cert, signed with RSA kECDHe - ECDH cert, signed with ECDSA kECDH - ECDH cert (signed with either RSA or ECDSA) kEECDH - ephemeral ECDH ECDH - ECDH cert or ephemeral ECDH aECDH - ECDH cert aECDSA - ECDSA cert ECDSA - ECDSA cert AECDH - anonymous ECDH EECDH - non-anonymous ephemeral ECDH (equivalent to "kEECDH:-AECDH") [Bodo Moeller] *) Add additional S/MIME capabilities for AES and GOST ciphers if supported. Use correct micalg parameters depending on digest(s) in signed message. [Steve Henson] *) Add engine support for EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD. Add functions to process an ENGINE asn1 method. Support ENGINE lookups in the ASN1 code. [Steve Henson] *) Initial engine support for EVP_PKEY_METHOD. New functions to permit an engine to register a method. Add ENGINE lookups for methods and functional reference processing. [Steve Henson] *) New functions EVP_Digest{Sign,Verify)*. These are enhanced versions of EVP_{Sign,Verify}* which allow an application to customise the signature process. [Steve Henson] *) New -resign option to smime utility. This adds one or more signers to an existing PKCS#7 signedData structure. Also -md option to use an alternative message digest algorithm for signing. [Steve Henson] *) Tidy up PKCS#7 routines and add new functions to make it easier to create PKCS7 structures containing multiple signers. Update smime application to support multiple signers. [Steve Henson] *) New -macalg option to pkcs12 utility to allow setting of an alternative digest MAC. [Steve Henson] *) Initial support for PKCS#5 v2.0 PRFs other than default SHA1 HMAC. Reorganize PBE internals to lookup from a static table using NIDs, add support for HMAC PBE OID translation. Add a EVP_CIPHER ctrl: EVP_CTRL_PBE_PRF_NID this allows a cipher to specify an alternative PRF which will be automatically used with PBES2. [Steve Henson] *) Replace the algorithm specific calls to generate keys in "req" with the new API. [Steve Henson] *) Update PKCS#7 enveloped data routines to use new API. This is now supported by any public key method supporting the encrypt operation. A ctrl is added to allow the public key algorithm to examine or modify the PKCS#7 RecipientInfo structure if it needs to: for RSA this is a no op. [Steve Henson] *) Add a ctrl to asn1 method to allow a public key algorithm to express a default digest type to use. In most cases this will be SHA1 but some algorithms (such as GOST) need to specify an alternative digest. The return value indicates how strong the preference is 1 means optional and 2 is mandatory (that is it is the only supported type). Modify ASN1_item_sign() to accept a NULL digest argument to indicate it should use the default md. Update openssl utilities to use the default digest type for signing if it is not explicitly indicated. [Steve Henson] *) Use OID cross reference table in ASN1_sign() and ASN1_verify(). New EVP_MD flag EVP_MD_FLAG_PKEY_METHOD_SIGNATURE. This uses the relevant signing method from the key type. This effectively removes the link between digests and public key types. [Steve Henson] *) Add an OID cross reference table and utility functions. Its purpose is to translate between signature OIDs such as SHA1WithrsaEncryption and SHA1, rsaEncryption. This will allow some of the algorithm specific hackery needed to use the correct OID to be removed. [Steve Henson] *) Remove algorithm specific dependencies when setting PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO structures for PKCS7_sign(). They are now set up by the relevant public key ASN1 method. [Steve Henson] *) Add provisional EC pkey method with support for ECDSA and ECDH. [Steve Henson] *) Add support for key derivation (agreement) in the API, DH method and pkeyutl. [Steve Henson] *) Add DSA pkey method and DH pkey methods, extend DH ASN1 method to support public and private key formats. As a side effect these add additional command line functionality not previously available: DSA signatures can be generated and verified using pkeyutl and DH key support and generation in pkey, genpkey. [Steve Henson] *) BeOS support. [Oliver Tappe ] *) New make target "install_html_docs" installs HTML renditions of the manual pages. [Oliver Tappe ] *) New utility "genpkey" this is analogous to "genrsa" etc except it can generate keys for any algorithm. Extend and update EVP_PKEY_METHOD to support key and parameter generation and add initial key generation functionality for RSA. [Steve Henson] *) Add functions for main EVP_PKEY_method operations. The undocumented functions EVP_PKEY_{encrypt,decrypt} have been renamed to EVP_PKEY_{encrypt,decrypt}_old. [Steve Henson] *) Initial definitions for EVP_PKEY_METHOD. This will be a high level public key API, doesn't do much yet. [Steve Henson] *) New function EVP_PKEY_asn1_get0_info() to retrieve information about public key algorithms. New option to openssl utility: "list-public-key-algorithms" to print out info. [Steve Henson] *) Implement the Supported Elliptic Curves Extension for ECC ciphersuites from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt. [Douglas Stebila] *) Don't free up OIDs in OBJ_cleanup() if they are in use by EVP_MD or EVP_CIPHER structures to avoid later problems in EVP_cleanup(). [Steve Henson] *) New utilities pkey and pkeyparam. These are similar to algorithm specific utilities such as rsa, dsa, dsaparam etc except they process any key type. [Steve Henson] *) Transfer public key printing routines to EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD. New functions EVP_PKEY_print_public(), EVP_PKEY_print_private(), EVP_PKEY_print_param() to print public key data from an EVP_PKEY structure. [Steve Henson] *) Initial support for pluggable public key ASN1. De-spaghettify the public key ASN1 handling. Move public and private key ASN1 handling to a new EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD structure. Relocate algorithm specific handling to a single module within the relevant algorithm directory. Add functions to allow (near) opaque processing of public and private key structures. [Steve Henson] *) Implement the Supported Point Formats Extension for ECC ciphersuites from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt. [Douglas Stebila] *) Add initial support for RFC 4279 PSK TLS ciphersuites. Add members for the psk identity [hint] and the psk callback functions to the SSL_SESSION, SSL and SSL_CTX structure. New ciphersuites: PSK-RC4-SHA, PSK-3DES-EDE-CBC-SHA, PSK-AES128-CBC-SHA, PSK-AES256-CBC-SHA New functions: SSL_CTX_use_psk_identity_hint SSL_get_psk_identity_hint SSL_get_psk_identity SSL_use_psk_identity_hint [Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of Nokia Corporation] *) Add RFC 3161 compliant time stamp request creation, response generation and response verification functionality. [Zoltán Glózik , The OpenTSA Project] *) Add initial support for TLS extensions, specifically for the server_name extension so far. The SSL_SESSION, SSL_CTX, and SSL data structures now have new members for a host name. The SSL data structure has an additional member SSL_CTX *initial_ctx so that new sessions can be stored in that context to allow for session resumption, even after the SSL has been switched to a new SSL_CTX in reaction to a client's server_name extension. New functions (subject to change): SSL_get_servername() SSL_get_servername_type() SSL_set_SSL_CTX() New CTRL codes and macros (subject to change): SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_SERVERNAME_CB - SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_callback() SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_SERVERNAME_ARG - SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_arg() SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_HOSTNAME - SSL_set_tlsext_host_name() openssl s_client has a new '-servername ...' option. openssl s_server has new options '-servername_host ...', '-cert2 ...', '-key2 ...', '-servername_fatal' (subject to change). This allows testing the HostName extension for a specific single host name ('-cert' and '-key' remain fallbacks for handshakes without HostName negotiation). If the unrecognized_name alert has to be sent, this by default is a warning; it becomes fatal with the '-servername_fatal' option. [Peter Sylvester, Remy Allais, Christophe Renou] *) Whirlpool hash implementation is added. [Andy Polyakov] *) BIGNUM code on 64-bit SPARCv9 targets is switched from bn(64,64) to bn(64,32). Because of instruction set limitations it doesn't have any negative impact on performance. This was done mostly in order to make it possible to share assembler modules, such as bn_mul_mont implementations, between 32- and 64-bit builds without hassle. [Andy Polyakov] *) Move code previously exiled into file crypto/ec/ec2_smpt.c to ec2_smpl.c, and no longer require the OPENSSL_EC_BIN_PT_COMP macro. [Bodo Moeller] *) New candidate for BIGNUM assembler implementation, bn_mul_mont, dedicated Montgomery multiplication procedure, is introduced. BN_MONT_CTX is modified to allow bn_mul_mont to reach for higher "64-bit" performance on certain 32-bit targets. [Andy Polyakov] *) New option SSL_OP_NO_COMP to disable use of compression selectively in SSL structures. New SSL ctrl to set maximum send fragment size. Save memory by setting the I/O buffer sizes dynamically instead of using the maximum available value. [Steve Henson] *) New option -V for 'openssl ciphers'. This prints the ciphersuite code in addition to the text details. [Bodo Moeller] *) Very, very preliminary EXPERIMENTAL support for printing of general ASN1 structures. This currently produces rather ugly output and doesn't handle several customised structures at all. [Steve Henson] *) Integrated support for PVK file format and some related formats such as MS PUBLICKEYBLOB and PRIVATEKEYBLOB. Command line switches to support these in the 'rsa' and 'dsa' utilities. [Steve Henson] *) Support for PKCS#1 RSAPublicKey format on rsa utility command line. [Steve Henson] *) Remove the ancient ASN1_METHOD code. This was only ever used in one place for the (very old) "NETSCAPE" format certificates which are now handled using new ASN1 code equivalents. [Steve Henson] *) Let the TLSv1_method() etc. functions return a 'const' SSL_METHOD pointer and make the SSL_METHOD parameter in SSL_CTX_new, SSL_CTX_set_ssl_version and SSL_set_ssl_method 'const'. [Nils Larsch] *) Modify CRL distribution points extension code to print out previously unsupported fields. Enhance extension setting code to allow setting of all fields. [Steve Henson] *) Add print and set support for Issuing Distribution Point CRL extension. [Steve Henson] *) Change 'Configure' script to enable Camellia by default. [NTT] Changes between 0.9.8m and 0.9.8n [24 Mar 2010] *) When rejecting SSL/TLS records due to an incorrect version number, never update s->server with a new major version number. As of - OpenSSL 0.9.8m if 'short' is a 16-bit type, - OpenSSL 0.9.8f if 'short' is longer than 16 bits, the previous behavior could result in a read attempt at NULL when receiving specific incorrect SSL/TLS records once record payload protection is active. (CVE-2010-0740) [Bodo Moeller, Adam Langley ] *) Fix for CVE-2010-0433 where some kerberos enabled versions of OpenSSL could be crashed if the relevant tables were not present (e.g. chrooted). [Tomas Hoger ] Changes between 0.9.8l and 0.9.8m [25 Feb 2010] *) Always check bn_wexpand() return values for failure. (CVE-2009-3245) [Martin Olsson, Neel Mehta] *) Fix X509_STORE locking: Every 'objs' access requires a lock (to accommodate for stack sorting, always a write lock!). [Bodo Moeller] *) On some versions of WIN32 Heap32Next is very slow. This can cause excessive delays in the RAND_poll(): over a minute. As a workaround include a time check in the inner Heap32Next loop too. [Steve Henson] *) The code that handled flushing of data in SSL/TLS originally used the BIO_CTRL_INFO ctrl to see if any data was pending first. This caused the problem outlined in PR#1949. The fix suggested there however can trigger problems with buggy BIO_CTRL_WPENDING (e.g. some versions of Apache). So instead simplify the code to flush unconditionally. This should be fine since flushing with no data to flush is a no op. [Steve Henson] *) Handle TLS versions 2.0 and later properly and correctly use the highest version of TLS/SSL supported. Although TLS >= 2.0 is some way off ancient servers have a habit of sticking around for a while... [Steve Henson] *) Modify compression code so it frees up structures without using the ex_data callbacks. This works around a problem where some applications call CRYPTO_cleanup_all_ex_data() before application exit (e.g. when restarting) then use compression (e.g. SSL with compression) later. This results in significant per-connection memory leaks and has caused some security issues including CVE-2008-1678 and CVE-2009-4355. [Steve Henson] *) Constify crypto/cast (i.e., ): a CAST_KEY doesn't change when encrypting or decrypting. [Bodo Moeller] *) Add option SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT which will allow clients to connect and renegotiate with servers which do not support RI. Until RI is more widely deployed this option is enabled by default. [Steve Henson] *) Add "missing" ssl ctrls to clear options and mode. [Steve Henson] *) If client attempts to renegotiate and doesn't support RI respond with a no_renegotiation alert as required by RFC5746. Some renegotiating TLS clients will continue a connection gracefully when they receive the alert. Unfortunately OpenSSL mishandled this alert and would hang waiting for a server hello which it will never receive. Now we treat a received no_renegotiation alert as a fatal error. This is because applications requesting a renegotiation might well expect it to succeed and would have no code in place to handle the server denying it so the only safe thing to do is to terminate the connection. [Steve Henson] *) Add ctrl macro SSL_get_secure_renegotiation_support() which returns 1 if peer supports secure renegotiation and 0 otherwise. Print out peer renegotiation support in s_client/s_server. [Steve Henson] *) Replace the highly broken and deprecated SPKAC certification method with the updated NID creation version. This should correctly handle UTF8. [Steve Henson] *) Implement RFC5746. Re-enable renegotiation but require the extension as needed. Unfortunately, SSL3_FLAGS_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION turns out to be a bad idea. It has been replaced by SSL_OP_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION which can be set with SSL_CTX_set_options(). This is really not recommended unless you know what you are doing. [Eric Rescorla , Ben Laurie, Steve Henson] *) Fixes to stateless session resumption handling. Use initial_ctx when issuing and attempting to decrypt tickets in case it has changed during servername handling. Use a non-zero length session ID when attempting stateless session resumption: this makes it possible to determine if a resumption has occurred immediately after receiving server hello (several places in OpenSSL subtly assume this) instead of later in the handshake. [Steve Henson] *) The functions ENGINE_ctrl(), OPENSSL_isservice(), CMS_get1_RecipientRequest() and RAND_bytes() can return <=0 on error fixes for a few places where the return code is not checked correctly. [Julia Lawall ] *) Add --strict-warnings option to Configure script to include devteam warnings in other configurations. [Steve Henson] *) Add support for --libdir option and LIBDIR variable in makefiles. This makes it possible to install openssl libraries in locations which have names other than "lib", for example "/usr/lib64" which some systems need. [Steve Henson, based on patch from Jeremy Utley] *) Don't allow the use of leading 0x80 in OIDs. This is a violation of X690 8.9.12 and can produce some misleading textual output of OIDs. [Steve Henson, reported by Dan Kaminsky] *) Delete MD2 from algorithm tables. This follows the recommendation in several standards that it is not used in new applications due to several cryptographic weaknesses. For binary compatibility reasons the MD2 API is still compiled in by default. [Steve Henson] *) Add compression id to {d2i,i2d}_SSL_SESSION so it is correctly saved and restored. [Steve Henson] *) Rename uni2asc and asc2uni functions to OPENSSL_uni2asc and OPENSSL_asc2uni conditionally on Netware platforms to avoid a name clash. [Guenter ] *) Fix the server certificate chain building code to use X509_verify_cert(), it used to have an ad-hoc builder which was unable to cope with anything other than a simple chain. [David Woodhouse , Steve Henson] *) Don't check self signed certificate signatures in X509_verify_cert() by default (a flag can override this): it just wastes time without adding any security. As a useful side effect self signed root CAs with non-FIPS digests are now usable in FIPS mode. [Steve Henson] *) In dtls1_process_out_of_seq_message() the check if the current message is already buffered was missing. For every new message was memory allocated, allowing an attacker to perform an denial of service attack with sending out of seq handshake messages until there is no memory left. Additionally every future message was buffered, even if the sequence number made no sense and would be part of another handshake. So only messages with sequence numbers less than 10 in advance will be buffered. (CVE-2009-1378) [Robin Seggelmann, discovered by Daniel Mentz] *) Records are buffered if they arrive with a future epoch to be processed after finishing the corresponding handshake. There is currently no limitation to this buffer allowing an attacker to perform a DOS attack with sending records with future epochs until there is no memory left. This patch adds the pqueue_size() function to determine the size of a buffer and limits the record buffer to 100 entries. (CVE-2009-1377) [Robin Seggelmann, discovered by Daniel Mentz] *) Keep a copy of frag->msg_header.frag_len so it can be used after the parent structure is freed. (CVE-2009-1379) [Daniel Mentz] *) Handle non-blocking I/O properly in SSL_shutdown() call. [Darryl Miles ] *) Add 2.5.4.* OIDs [Ilya O. ] Changes between 0.9.8k and 0.9.8l [5 Nov 2009] *) Disable renegotiation completely - this fixes a severe security problem (CVE-2009-3555) at the cost of breaking all renegotiation. Renegotiation can be re-enabled by setting SSL3_FLAGS_ALLOW_UNSAFE_LEGACY_RENEGOTIATION in s3->flags at run-time. This is really not recommended unless you know what you're doing. [Ben Laurie] Changes between 0.9.8j and 0.9.8k [25 Mar 2009] *) Don't set val to NULL when freeing up structures, it is freed up by underlying code. If sizeof(void *) > sizeof(long) this can result in zeroing past the valid field. (CVE-2009-0789) [Paolo Ganci ] *) Fix bug where return value of CMS_SignerInfo_verify_content() was not checked correctly. This would allow some invalid signed attributes to appear to verify correctly. (CVE-2009-0591) [Ivan Nestlerode ] *) Reject UniversalString and BMPString types with invalid lengths. This prevents a crash in ASN1_STRING_print_ex() which assumes the strings have a legal length. (CVE-2009-0590) [Steve Henson] *) Set S/MIME signing as the default purpose rather than setting it unconditionally. This allows applications to override it at the store level. [Steve Henson] *) Permit restricted recursion of ASN1 strings. This is needed in practice to handle some structures. [Steve Henson] *) Improve efficiency of mem_gets: don't search whole buffer each time for a '\n' [Jeremy Shapiro ] *) New -hex option for openssl rand. [Matthieu Herrb] *) Print out UTF8String and NumericString when parsing ASN1. [Steve Henson] *) Support NumericString type for name components. [Steve Henson] *) Allow CC in the environment to override the automatically chosen compiler. Note that nothing is done to ensure flags work with the chosen compiler. [Ben Laurie] Changes between 0.9.8i and 0.9.8j [07 Jan 2009] *) Properly check EVP_VerifyFinal() and similar return values (CVE-2008-5077). [Ben Laurie, Bodo Moeller, Google Security Team] *) Enable TLS extensions by default. [Ben Laurie] *) Allow the CHIL engine to be loaded, whether the application is multithreaded or not. (This does not release the developer from the obligation to set up the dynamic locking callbacks.) [Sander Temme ] *) Use correct exit code if there is an error in dgst command. [Steve Henson; problem pointed out by Roland Dirlewanger] *) Tweak Configure so that you need to say "experimental-jpake" to enable JPAKE, and need to use -DOPENSSL_EXPERIMENTAL_JPAKE in applications. [Bodo Moeller] *) Add experimental JPAKE support, including demo authentication in s_client and s_server. [Ben Laurie] *) Set the comparison function in v3_addr_canonize(). [Rob Austein ] *) Add support for XMPP STARTTLS in s_client. [Philip Paeps ] *) Change the server-side SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG behavior to ensure that even with this option, only ciphersuites in the server's preference list will be accepted. (Note that the option applies only when resuming a session, so the earlier behavior was just about the algorithm choice for symmetric cryptography.) [Bodo Moeller] Changes between 0.9.8h and 0.9.8i [15 Sep 2008] *) Fix NULL pointer dereference if a DTLS server received ChangeCipherSpec as first record (CVE-2009-1386). [PR #1679] *) Fix a state transition in s3_srvr.c and d1_srvr.c (was using SSL3_ST_CW_CLNT_HELLO_B, should be ..._ST_SW_SRVR_...). [Nagendra Modadugu] *) The fix in 0.9.8c that supposedly got rid of unsafe double-checked locking was incomplete for RSA blinding, addressing just one layer of what turns out to have been doubly unsafe triple-checked locking. So now fix this for real by retiring the MONT_HELPER macro in crypto/rsa/rsa_eay.c. [Bodo Moeller; problem pointed out by Marius Schilder] *) Various precautionary measures: - Avoid size_t integer overflow in HASH_UPDATE (md32_common.h). - Avoid a buffer overflow in d2i_SSL_SESSION() (ssl_asn1.c). (NB: This would require knowledge of the secret session ticket key to exploit, in which case you'd be SOL either way.) - Change bn_nist.c so that it will properly handle input BIGNUMs outside the expected range. - Enforce the 'num' check in BN_div() (bn_div.c) for non-BN_DEBUG builds. [Neel Mehta, Bodo Moeller] *) Allow engines to be "soft loaded" - i.e. optionally don't die if the load fails. Useful for distros. [Ben Laurie and the FreeBSD team] *) Add support for Local Machine Keyset attribute in PKCS#12 files. [Steve Henson] *) Fix BN_GF2m_mod_arr() top-bit cleanup code. [Huang Ying] *) Expand ENGINE to support engine supplied SSL client certificate functions. This work was sponsored by Logica. [Steve Henson] *) Add CryptoAPI ENGINE to support use of RSA and DSA keys held in Windows keystores. Support for SSL/TLS client authentication too. Not compiled unless enable-capieng specified to Configure. This work was sponsored by Logica. [Steve Henson] *) Fix bug in X509_ATTRIBUTE creation: don't set attribute using ASN1_TYPE_set1 if MBSTRING flag set. This bug would crash certain attribute creation routines such as certificate requests and PKCS#12 files. [Steve Henson] Changes between 0.9.8g and 0.9.8h [28 May 2008] *) Fix flaw if 'Server Key exchange message' is omitted from a TLS handshake which could lead to a client crash as found using the Codenomicon TLS test suite (CVE-2008-1672) [Steve Henson, Mark Cox] *) Fix double free in TLS server name extensions which could lead to a remote crash found by Codenomicon TLS test suite (CVE-2008-0891) [Joe Orton] *) Clear error queue in SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file() Clear the error queue to ensure that error entries left from older function calls do not interfere with the correct operation. [Lutz Jaenicke, Erik de Castro Lopo] *) Remove root CA certificates of commercial CAs: The OpenSSL project does not recommend any specific CA and does not have any policy with respect to including or excluding any CA. Therefore it does not make any sense to ship an arbitrary selection of root CA certificates with the OpenSSL software. [Lutz Jaenicke] *) RSA OAEP patches to fix two separate invalid memory reads. The first one involves inputs when 'lzero' is greater than 'SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH' (it would read about SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH bytes before the beginning of from). The second one involves inputs where the 'db' section contains nothing but zeroes (there is a one-byte invalid read after the end of 'db'). [Ivan Nestlerode ] *) Partial backport from 0.9.9-dev: Introduce bn_mul_mont (dedicated Montgomery multiplication procedure) as a candidate for BIGNUM assembler implementation. While 0.9.9-dev uses assembler for various architectures, only x86_64 is available by default here in the 0.9.8 branch, and 32-bit x86 is available through a compile-time setting. To try the 32-bit x86 assembler implementation, use Configure option "enable-montasm" (which exists only for this backport). As "enable-montasm" for 32-bit x86 disclaims code stability anyway, in this constellation we activate additional code backported from 0.9.9-dev for further performance improvements, namely BN_from_montgomery_word. (To enable this otherwise, e.g. x86_64, try "-DMONT_FROM_WORD___NON_DEFAULT_0_9_8_BUILD".) [Andy Polyakov (backport partially by Bodo Moeller)] *) Add TLS session ticket callback. This allows an application to set TLS ticket cipher and HMAC keys rather than relying on hardcoded fixed values. This is useful for key rollover for example where several key sets may exist with different names. [Steve Henson] *) Reverse ENGINE-internal logic for caching default ENGINE handles. This was broken until now in 0.9.8 releases, such that the only way a registered ENGINE could be used (assuming it initialises successfully on the host) was to explicitly set it as the default for the relevant algorithms. This is in contradiction with 0.9.7 behaviour and the documentation. With this fix, when an ENGINE is registered into a given algorithm's table of implementations, the 'uptodate' flag is reset so that auto-discovery will be used next time a new context for that algorithm attempts to select an implementation. [Ian Lister (tweaked by Geoff Thorpe)] *) Backport of CMS code to OpenSSL 0.9.8. This differs from the 0.9.9 implementation in the following ways: Lack of EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD means algorithm parameters have to be hard coded. Lack of BER streaming support means one pass streaming processing is only supported if data is detached: setting the streaming flag is ignored for embedded content. CMS support is disabled by default and must be explicitly enabled with the enable-cms configuration option. [Steve Henson] *) Update the GMP engine glue to do direct copies between BIGNUM and mpz_t when openssl and GMP use the same limb size. Otherwise the existing "conversion via a text string export" trick is still used. [Paul Sheer ] *) Zlib compression BIO. This is a filter BIO which compressed and uncompresses any data passed through it. [Steve Henson] *) Add AES_wrap_key() and AES_unwrap_key() functions to implement RFC3394 compatible AES key wrapping. [Steve Henson] *) Add utility functions to handle ASN1 structures. ASN1_STRING_set0(): sets string data without copying. X509_ALGOR_set0() and X509_ALGOR_get0(): set and retrieve X509_ALGOR (AlgorithmIdentifier) data. Attribute function X509at_get0_data_by_OBJ(): retrieves data from an X509_ATTRIBUTE structure optionally checking it occurs only once. ASN1_TYPE_set1(): set and ASN1_TYPE structure copying supplied data. [Steve Henson] *) Fix BN flag handling in RSA_eay_mod_exp() and BN_MONT_CTX_set() to get the expected BN_FLG_CONSTTIME behavior. [Bodo Moeller (Google)] *) Netware support: - fixed wrong usage of ioctlsocket() when build for LIBC BSD sockets - fixed do_tests.pl to run the test suite with CLIB builds too (CLIB_OPT) - added some more tests to do_tests.pl - fixed RunningProcess usage so that it works with newer LIBC NDKs too - removed usage of BN_LLONG for CLIB builds to avoid runtime dependency - added new Configure targets netware-clib-bsdsock, netware-clib-gcc, netware-clib-bsdsock-gcc, netware-libc-bsdsock-gcc - various changes to netware.pl to enable gcc-cross builds on Win32 platform - changed crypto/bio/b_sock.c to work with macro functions (CLIB BSD) - various changes to fix missing prototype warnings - fixed x86nasm.pl to create correct asm files for NASM COFF output - added AES, WHIRLPOOL and CPUID assembler code to build files - added missing AES assembler make rules to mk1mf.pl - fixed order of includes in apps/ocsp.c so that e_os.h settings apply [Guenter Knauf ] *) Implement certificate status request TLS extension defined in RFC3546. A client can set the appropriate parameters and receive the encoded OCSP response via a callback. A server can query the supplied parameters and set the encoded OCSP response in the callback. Add simplified examples to s_client and s_server. [Steve Henson] Changes between 0.9.8f and 0.9.8g [19 Oct 2007] *) Fix various bugs: + Binary incompatibility of ssl_ctx_st structure + DTLS interoperation with non-compliant servers + Don't call get_session_cb() without proposed session + Fix ia64 assembler code [Andy Polyakov, Steve Henson] Changes between 0.9.8e and 0.9.8f [11 Oct 2007] *) DTLS Handshake overhaul. There were longstanding issues with OpenSSL DTLS implementation, which were making it impossible for RFC 4347 compliant client to communicate with OpenSSL server. Unfortunately just fixing these incompatibilities would "cut off" pre-0.9.8f clients. To allow for hassle free upgrade post-0.9.8e server keeps tolerating non RFC compliant syntax. The opposite is not true, 0.9.8f client can not communicate with earlier server. This update even addresses CVE-2007-4995. [Andy Polyakov] *) Changes to avoid need for function casts in OpenSSL: some compilers (gcc 4.2 and later) reject their use. [Kurt Roeckx , Peter Hartley , Steve Henson] *) Add RFC4507 support to OpenSSL. This includes the corrections in RFC4507bis. The encrypted ticket format is an encrypted encoded SSL_SESSION structure, that way new session features are automatically supported. If a client application caches session in an SSL_SESSION structure support is transparent because tickets are now stored in the encoded SSL_SESSION. The SSL_CTX structure automatically generates keys for ticket protection in servers so again support should be possible with no application modification. If a client or server wishes to disable RFC4507 support then the option SSL_OP_NO_TICKET can be set. Add a TLS extension debugging callback to allow the contents of any client or server extensions to be examined. This work was sponsored by Google. [Steve Henson] *) Add initial support for TLS extensions, specifically for the server_name extension so far. The SSL_SESSION, SSL_CTX, and SSL data structures now have new members for a host name. The SSL data structure has an additional member SSL_CTX *initial_ctx so that new sessions can be stored in that context to allow for session resumption, even after the SSL has been switched to a new SSL_CTX in reaction to a client's server_name extension. New functions (subject to change): SSL_get_servername() SSL_get_servername_type() SSL_set_SSL_CTX() New CTRL codes and macros (subject to change): SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_SERVERNAME_CB - SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_callback() SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_SERVERNAME_ARG - SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_arg() SSL_CTRL_SET_TLSEXT_HOSTNAME - SSL_set_tlsext_host_name() openssl s_client has a new '-servername ...' option. openssl s_server has new options '-servername_host ...', '-cert2 ...', '-key2 ...', '-servername_fatal' (subject to change). This allows testing the HostName extension for a specific single host name ('-cert' and '-key' remain fallbacks for handshakes without HostName negotiation). If the unrecognized_name alert has to be sent, this by default is a warning; it becomes fatal with the '-servername_fatal' option. [Peter Sylvester, Remy Allais, Christophe Renou, Steve Henson] *) Add AES and SSE2 assembly language support to VC++ build. [Steve Henson] *) Mitigate attack on final subtraction in Montgomery reduction. [Andy Polyakov] *) Fix crypto/ec/ec_mult.c to work properly with scalars of value 0 (which previously caused an internal error). [Bodo Moeller] *) Squeeze another 10% out of IGE mode when in != out. [Ben Laurie] *) AES IGE mode speedup. [Dean Gaudet (Google)] *) Add the Korean symmetric 128-bit cipher SEED (see http://www.kisa.or.kr/kisa/seed/jsp/seed_eng.jsp) and add SEED ciphersuites from RFC 4162: TLS_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA = "SEED-SHA" TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA = "DHE-DSS-SEED-SHA" TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA = "DHE-RSA-SEED-SHA" TLS_DH_anon_WITH_SEED_CBC_SHA = "ADH-SEED-SHA" To minimize changes between patchlevels in the OpenSSL 0.9.8 series, SEED remains excluded from compilation unless OpenSSL is configured with 'enable-seed'. [KISA, Bodo Moeller] *) Mitigate branch prediction attacks, which can be practical if a single processor is shared, allowing a spy process to extract information. For detailed background information, see http://eprint.iacr.org/2007/039 (O. Aciicmez, S. Gueron, J.-P. Seifert, "New Branch Prediction Vulnerabilities in OpenSSL and Necessary Software Countermeasures"). The core of the change are new versions BN_div_no_branch() and BN_mod_inverse_no_branch() of BN_div() and BN_mod_inverse(), respectively, which are slower, but avoid the security-relevant conditional branches. These are automatically called by BN_div() and BN_mod_inverse() if the flag BN_FLG_CONSTTIME is set for one of the input BIGNUMs. Also, BN_is_bit_set() has been changed to remove a conditional branch. BN_FLG_CONSTTIME is the new name for the previous BN_FLG_EXP_CONSTTIME flag, since it now affects more than just modular exponentiation. (Since OpenSSL 0.9.7h, setting this flag in the exponent causes BN_mod_exp_mont() to use the alternative implementation in BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime().) The old name remains as a deprecated alias. Similarly, RSA_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME is replaced by a more general RSA_FLAG_NO_CONSTTIME flag since the RSA implementation now uses constant-time implementations for more than just exponentiation. Here too the old name is kept as a deprecated alias. BN_BLINDING_new() will now use BN_dup() for the modulus so that the BN_BLINDING structure gets an independent copy of the modulus. This means that the previous "BIGNUM *m" argument to BN_BLINDING_new() and to BN_BLINDING_create_param() now essentially becomes "const BIGNUM *m", although we can't actually change this in the header file before 0.9.9. It allows RSA_setup_blinding() to use BN_with_flags() on the modulus to enable BN_FLG_CONSTTIME. [Matthew D Wood (Intel Corp)] *) In the SSL/TLS server implementation, be strict about session ID context matching (which matters if an application uses a single external cache for different purposes). Previously, out-of-context reuse was forbidden only if SSL_VERIFY_PEER was set. This did ensure strict client verification, but meant that, with applications using a single external cache for quite different requirements, clients could circumvent ciphersuite restrictions for a given session ID context by starting a session in a different context. [Bodo Moeller] *) Include "!eNULL" in SSL_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST to make sure that a ciphersuite string such as "DEFAULT:RSA" cannot enable authentication-only ciphersuites. [Bodo Moeller] *) Update the SSL_get_shared_ciphers() fix CVE-2006-3738 which was not complete and could lead to a possible single byte overflow (CVE-2007-5135) [Ben Laurie] Changes between 0.9.8d and 0.9.8e [23 Feb 2007] *) Since AES128 and AES256 (and similarly Camellia128 and Camellia256) share a single mask bit in the logic of ssl/ssl_ciph.c, the code for masking out disabled ciphers needs a kludge to work properly if AES128 is available and AES256 isn't (or if Camellia128 is available and Camellia256 isn't). [Victor Duchovni] *) Fix the BIT STRING encoding generated by crypto/ec/ec_asn1.c (within i2d_ECPrivateKey, i2d_ECPKParameters, i2d_ECParameters): When a point or a seed is encoded in a BIT STRING, we need to prevent the removal of trailing zero bits to get the proper DER encoding. (By default, crypto/asn1/a_bitstr.c assumes the case of a NamedBitList, for which trailing 0 bits need to be removed.) [Bodo Moeller] *) Have SSL/TLS server implementation tolerate "mismatched" record protocol version while receiving ClientHello even if the ClientHello is fragmented. (The server can't insist on the particular protocol version it has chosen before the ServerHello message has informed the client about his choice.) [Bodo Moeller] *) Add RFC 3779 support. [Rob Austein for ARIN, Ben Laurie] *) Load error codes if they are not already present instead of using a static variable. This allows them to be cleanly unloaded and reloaded. Improve header file function name parsing. [Steve Henson] *) extend SMTP and IMAP protocol emulation in s_client to use EHLO or CAPABILITY handshake as required by RFCs. [Goetz Babin-Ebell] Changes between 0.9.8c and 0.9.8d [28 Sep 2006] *) Introduce limits to prevent malicious keys being able to cause a denial of service. (CVE-2006-2940) [Steve Henson, Bodo Moeller] *) Fix ASN.1 parsing of certain invalid structures that can result in a denial of service. (CVE-2006-2937) [Steve Henson] *) Fix buffer overflow in SSL_get_shared_ciphers() function. (CVE-2006-3738) [Tavis Ormandy and Will Drewry, Google Security Team] *) Fix SSL client code which could crash if connecting to a malicious SSLv2 server. (CVE-2006-4343) [Tavis Ormandy and Will Drewry, Google Security Team] *) Since 0.9.8b, ciphersuite strings naming explicit ciphersuites match only those. Before that, "AES256-SHA" would be interpreted as a pattern and match "AES128-SHA" too (since AES128-SHA got the same strength classification in 0.9.7h) as we currently only have a single AES bit in the ciphersuite description bitmap. That change, however, also applied to ciphersuite strings such as "RC4-MD5" that intentionally matched multiple ciphersuites -- namely, SSL 2.0 ciphersuites in addition to the more common ones from SSL 3.0/TLS 1.0. So we change the selection algorithm again: Naming an explicit ciphersuite selects this one ciphersuite, and any other similar ciphersuite (same bitmap) from *other* protocol versions. Thus, "RC4-MD5" again will properly select both the SSL 2.0 ciphersuite and the SSL 3.0/TLS 1.0 ciphersuite. Since SSL 2.0 does not have any ciphersuites for which the 128/256 bit distinction would be relevant, this works for now. The proper fix will be to use different bits for AES128 and AES256, which would have avoided the problems from the beginning; however, bits are scarce, so we can only do this in a new release (not just a patchlevel) when we can change the SSL_CIPHER definition to split the single 'unsigned long mask' bitmap into multiple values to extend the available space. [Bodo Moeller] Changes between 0.9.8b and 0.9.8c [05 Sep 2006] *) Avoid PKCS #1 v1.5 signature attack discovered by Daniel Bleichenbacher (CVE-2006-4339) [Ben Laurie and Google Security Team] *) Add AES IGE and biIGE modes. [Ben Laurie] *) Change the Unix randomness entropy gathering to use poll() when possible instead of select(), since the latter has some undesirable limitations. [Darryl Miles via Richard Levitte and Bodo Moeller] *) Disable "ECCdraft" ciphersuites more thoroughly. Now special treatment in ssl/ssl_ciph.s makes sure that these ciphersuites cannot be implicitly activated as part of, e.g., the "AES" alias. However, please upgrade to OpenSSL 0.9.9[-dev] for non-experimental use of the ECC ciphersuites to get TLS extension support, which is required for curve and point format negotiation to avoid potential handshake problems. [Bodo Moeller] *) Disable rogue ciphersuites: - SSLv2 0x08 0x00 0x80 ("RC4-64-MD5") - SSLv3/TLSv1 0x00 0x61 ("EXP1024-RC2-CBC-MD5") - SSLv3/TLSv1 0x00 0x60 ("EXP1024-RC4-MD5") The latter two were purportedly from draft-ietf-tls-56-bit-ciphersuites-0[01].txt, but do not really appear there. Also deactivate the remaining ciphersuites from draft-ietf-tls-56-bit-ciphersuites-01.txt. These are just as unofficial, and the ID has long expired. [Bodo Moeller] *) Fix RSA blinding Heisenbug (problems sometimes occurred on dual-core machines) and other potential thread-safety issues. [Bodo Moeller] *) Add the symmetric cipher Camellia (128-bit, 192-bit, 256-bit key versions), which is now available for royalty-free use (see http://info.isl.ntt.co.jp/crypt/eng/info/chiteki.html). Also, add Camellia TLS ciphersuites from RFC 4132. To minimize changes between patchlevels in the OpenSSL 0.9.8 series, Camellia remains excluded from compilation unless OpenSSL is configured with 'enable-camellia'. [NTT] *) Disable the padding bug check when compression is in use. The padding bug check assumes the first packet is of even length, this is not necessarily true if compression is enabled and can result in false positives causing handshake failure. The actual bug test is ancient code so it is hoped that implementations will either have fixed it by now or any which still have the bug do not support compression. [Steve Henson] Changes between 0.9.8a and 0.9.8b [04 May 2006] *) When applying a cipher rule check to see if string match is an explicit cipher suite and only match that one cipher suite if it is. [Steve Henson] *) Link in manifests for VC++ if needed. [Austin Ziegler ] *) Update support for ECC-based TLS ciphersuites according to draft-ietf-tls-ecc-12.txt with proposed changes (but without TLS extensions, which are supported starting with the 0.9.9 branch, not in the OpenSSL 0.9.8 branch). [Douglas Stebila] *) New functions EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new() and EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free() to support opaque EVP_CIPHER_CTX handling. [Steve Henson] *) Fixes and enhancements to zlib compression code. We now only use "zlib1.dll" and use the default __cdecl calling convention on Win32 to conform with the standards mentioned here: http://www.zlib.net/DLL_FAQ.txt Static zlib linking now works on Windows and the new --with-zlib-include --with-zlib-lib options to Configure can be used to supply the location of the headers and library. Gracefully handle case where zlib library can't be loaded. [Steve Henson] *) Several fixes and enhancements to the OID generation code. The old code sometimes allowed invalid OIDs (1.X for X >= 40 for example), couldn't handle numbers larger than ULONG_MAX, truncated printing and had a non standard OBJ_obj2txt() behaviour. [Steve Henson] *) Add support for building of engines under engine/ as shared libraries under VC++ build system. [Steve Henson] *) Corrected the numerous bugs in the Win32 path splitter in DSO. Hopefully, we will not see any false combination of paths any more. [Richard Levitte] Changes between 0.9.8 and 0.9.8a [11 Oct 2005] *) Remove the functionality of SSL_OP_MSIE_SSLV2_RSA_PADDING (part of SSL_OP_ALL). This option used to disable the countermeasure against man-in-the-middle protocol-version rollback in the SSL 2.0 server implementation, which is a bad idea. (CVE-2005-2969) [Bodo Moeller; problem pointed out by Yutaka Oiwa (Research Center for Information Security, National Institute of Advanced Industrial Science and Technology [AIST], Japan)] *) Add two function to clear and return the verify parameter flags. [Steve Henson] *) Keep cipherlists sorted in the source instead of sorting them at runtime, thus removing the need for a lock. [Nils Larsch] *) Avoid some small subgroup attacks in Diffie-Hellman. [Nick Mathewson and Ben Laurie] *) Add functions for well-known primes. [Nick Mathewson] *) Extended Windows CE support. [Satoshi Nakamura and Andy Polyakov] *) Initialize SSL_METHOD structures at compile time instead of during runtime, thus removing the need for a lock. [Steve Henson] *) Make PKCS7_decrypt() work even if no certificate is supplied by attempting to decrypt each encrypted key in turn. Add support to smime utility. [Steve Henson] Changes between 0.9.7h and 0.9.8 [05 Jul 2005] [NB: OpenSSL 0.9.7i and later 0.9.7 patch levels were released after OpenSSL 0.9.8.] *) Add libcrypto.pc and libssl.pc for those who feel they need them. [Richard Levitte] *) Change CA.sh and CA.pl so they don't bundle the CSR and the private key into the same file any more. [Richard Levitte] *) Add initial support for Win64, both IA64 and AMD64/x64 flavors. [Andy Polyakov] *) Add -utf8 command line and config file option to 'ca'. [Stefan and Geoff Thorpe] *) Add attribute functions to EVP_PKEY structure. Modify PKCS12_create() to recognize a CSP name attribute and use it. Make -CSP option work again in pkcs12 utility. [Steve Henson] *) Add new functionality to the bn blinding code: - automatic re-creation of the BN_BLINDING parameters after a fixed number of uses (currently 32) - add new function for parameter creation - introduce flags to control the update behaviour of the BN_BLINDING parameters - hide BN_BLINDING structure Add a second BN_BLINDING slot to the RSA structure to improve performance when a single RSA object is shared among several threads. [Nils Larsch] *) Add support for DTLS. [Nagendra Modadugu and Ben Laurie] *) Add support for DER encoded private keys (SSL_FILETYPE_ASN1) to SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_file() and SSL_use_PrivateKey_file() [Walter Goulet] *) Remove buggy and incomplete DH cert support from ssl/ssl_rsa.c and ssl/s3_both.c [Nils Larsch] *) Use SHA-1 instead of MD5 as the default digest algorithm for the apps/openssl applications. [Nils Larsch] *) Compile clean with "-Wall -Wmissing-prototypes -Wstrict-prototypes -Wmissing-declarations -Werror". Currently DEBUG_SAFESTACK must also be set. [Ben Laurie] *) Change ./Configure so that certain algorithms can be disabled by default. The new counterpiece to "no-xxx" is "enable-xxx". The patented RC5 and MDC2 algorithms will now be disabled unless "enable-rc5" and "enable-mdc2", respectively, are specified. (IDEA remains enabled despite being patented. This is because IDEA is frequently required for interoperability, and there is no license fee for non-commercial use. As before, "no-idea" can be used to avoid this algorithm.) [Bodo Moeller] *) Add processing of proxy certificates (see RFC 3820). This work was sponsored by KTH (The Royal Institute of Technology in Stockholm) and EGEE (Enabling Grids for E-science in Europe). [Richard Levitte] *) RC4 performance overhaul on modern architectures/implementations, such as Intel P4, IA-64 and AMD64. [Andy Polyakov] *) New utility extract-section.pl. This can be used specify an alternative section number in a pod file instead of having to treat each file as a separate case in Makefile. This can be done by adding two lines to the pod file: =for comment openssl_section:XXX The blank line is mandatory. [Steve Henson] *) New arguments -certform, -keyform and -pass for s_client and s_server to allow alternative format key and certificate files and passphrase sources. [Steve Henson] *) New structure X509_VERIFY_PARAM which combines current verify parameters, update associated structures and add various utility functions. Add new policy related verify parameters, include policy checking in standard verify code. Enhance 'smime' application with extra parameters to support policy checking and print out. [Steve Henson] *) Add a new engine to support VIA PadLock ACE extensions in the VIA C3 Nehemiah processors. These extensions support AES encryption in hardware as well as RNG (though RNG support is currently disabled). [Michal Ludvig , with help from Andy Polyakov] *) Deprecate BN_[get|set]_params() functions (they were ignored internally). [Geoff Thorpe] *) New FIPS 180-2 algorithms, SHA-224/-256/-384/-512 are implemented. [Andy Polyakov and a number of other people] *) Improved PowerPC platform support. Most notably BIGNUM assembler implementation contributed by IBM. [Suresh Chari, Peter Waltenberg, Andy Polyakov] *) The new 'RSA_generate_key_ex' function now takes a BIGNUM for the public exponent rather than 'unsigned long'. There is a corresponding change to the new 'rsa_keygen' element of the RSA_METHOD structure. [Jelte Jansen, Geoff Thorpe] *) Functionality for creating the initial serial number file is now moved from CA.pl to the 'ca' utility with a new option -create_serial. (Before OpenSSL 0.9.7e, CA.pl used to initialize the serial number file to 1, which is bound to cause problems. To avoid the problems while respecting compatibility between different 0.9.7 patchlevels, 0.9.7e employed 'openssl x509 -next_serial' in CA.pl for serial number initialization. With the new release 0.9.8, we can fix the problem directly in the 'ca' utility.) [Steve Henson] *) Reduced header interdependencies by declaring more opaque objects in ossl_typ.h. As a consequence, including some headers (eg. engine.h) will give fewer recursive includes, which could break lazy source code - so this change is covered by the OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED symbol. As always, developers should define this symbol when building and using openssl to ensure they track the recommended behaviour, interfaces, [etc], but backwards-compatible behaviour prevails when this isn't defined. [Geoff Thorpe] *) New function X509_POLICY_NODE_print() which prints out policy nodes. [Steve Henson] *) Add new EVP function EVP_CIPHER_CTX_rand_key and associated functionality. This will generate a random key of the appropriate length based on the cipher context. The EVP_CIPHER can provide its own random key generation routine to support keys of a specific form. This is used in the des and 3des routines to generate a key of the correct parity. Update S/MIME code to use new functions and hence generate correct parity DES keys. Add EVP_CHECK_DES_KEY #define to return an error if the key is not valid (weak or incorrect parity). [Steve Henson] *) Add a local set of CRLs that can be used by X509_verify_cert() as well as looking them up. This is useful when the verified structure may contain CRLs, for example PKCS#7 signedData. Modify PKCS7_verify() to use any CRLs present unless the new PKCS7_NO_CRL flag is asserted. [Steve Henson] *) Extend ASN1 oid configuration module. It now additionally accepts the syntax: shortName = some long name, 1.2.3.4 [Steve Henson] *) Reimplemented the BN_CTX implementation. There is now no more static limitation on the number of variables it can handle nor the depth of the "stack" handling for BN_CTX_start()/BN_CTX_end() pairs. The stack information can now expand as required, and rather than having a single static array of bignums, BN_CTX now uses a linked-list of such arrays allowing it to expand on demand whilst maintaining the usefulness of BN_CTX's "bundling". [Geoff Thorpe] *) Add a missing BN_CTX parameter to the 'rsa_mod_exp' callback in RSA_METHOD to allow all RSA operations to function using a single BN_CTX. [Geoff Thorpe] *) Preliminary support for certificate policy evaluation and checking. This is initially intended to pass the tests outlined in "Conformance Testing of Relying Party Client Certificate Path Processing Logic" v1.07. [Steve Henson] *) bn_dup_expand() has been deprecated, it was introduced in 0.9.7 and remained unused and not that useful. A variety of other little bignum tweaks and fixes have also been made continuing on from the audit (see below). [Geoff Thorpe] *) Constify all or almost all d2i, c2i, s2i and r2i functions, along with associated ASN1, EVP and SSL functions and old ASN1 macros. [Richard Levitte] *) BN_zero() only needs to set 'top' and 'neg' to zero for correct results, and this should never fail. So the return value from the use of BN_set_word() (which can fail due to needless expansion) is now deprecated; if OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED is defined, BN_zero() is a void macro. [Geoff Thorpe] *) BN_CTX_get() should return zero-valued bignums, providing the same initialised value as BN_new(). [Geoff Thorpe, suggested by Ulf Möller] *) Support for inhibitAnyPolicy certificate extension. [Steve Henson] *) An audit of the BIGNUM code is underway, for which debugging code is enabled when BN_DEBUG is defined. This makes stricter enforcements on what is considered valid when processing BIGNUMs, and causes execution to assert() when a problem is discovered. If BN_DEBUG_RAND is defined, further steps are taken to deliberately pollute unused data in BIGNUM structures to try and expose faulty code further on. For now, openssl will (in its default mode of operation) continue to tolerate the inconsistent forms that it has tolerated in the past, but authors and packagers should consider trying openssl and their own applications when compiled with these debugging symbols defined. It will help highlight potential bugs in their own code, and will improve the test coverage for OpenSSL itself. At some point, these tighter rules will become openssl's default to improve maintainability, though the assert()s and other overheads will remain only in debugging configurations. See bn.h for more details. [Geoff Thorpe, Nils Larsch, Ulf Möller] *) BN_CTX_init() has been deprecated, as BN_CTX is an opaque structure that can only be obtained through BN_CTX_new() (which implicitly initialises it). The presence of this function only made it possible to overwrite an existing structure (and cause memory leaks). [Geoff Thorpe] *) Because of the callback-based approach for implementing LHASH as a template type, lh_insert() adds opaque objects to hash-tables and lh_doall() or lh_doall_arg() are typically used with a destructor callback to clean up those corresponding objects before destroying the hash table (and losing the object pointers). So some over-zealous constifications in LHASH have been relaxed so that lh_insert() does not take (nor store) the objects as "const" and the lh_doall[_arg] callback wrappers are not prototyped to have "const" restrictions on the object pointers they are given (and so aren't required to cast them away any more). [Geoff Thorpe] *) The tmdiff.h API was so ugly and minimal that our own timing utility (speed) prefers to use its own implementation. The two implementations haven't been consolidated as yet (volunteers?) but the tmdiff API has had its object type properly exposed (MS_TM) instead of casting to/from "char *". This may still change yet if someone realises MS_TM and "ms_time_***" aren't necessarily the greatest nomenclatures - but this is what was used internally to the implementation so I've used that for now. [Geoff Thorpe] *) Ensure that deprecated functions do not get compiled when OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED is defined. Some "openssl" subcommands and a few of the self-tests were still using deprecated key-generation functions so these have been updated also. [Geoff Thorpe] *) Reorganise PKCS#7 code to separate the digest location functionality into PKCS7_find_digest(), digest addition into PKCS7_bio_add_digest(). New function PKCS7_set_digest() to set the digest type for PKCS#7 digestedData type. Add additional code to correctly generate the digestedData type and add support for this type in PKCS7 initialization functions. [Steve Henson] *) New function PKCS7_set0_type_other() this initializes a PKCS7 structure of type "other". [Steve Henson] *) Fix prime generation loop in crypto/bn/bn_prime.pl by making sure the loop does correctly stop and breaking ("division by zero") modulus operations are not performed. The (pre-generated) prime table crypto/bn/bn_prime.h was already correct, but it could not be re-generated on some platforms because of the "division by zero" situation in the script. [Ralf S. Engelschall] *) Update support for ECC-based TLS ciphersuites according to draft-ietf-tls-ecc-03.txt: the KDF1 key derivation function with SHA-1 now is only used for "small" curves (where the representation of a field element takes up to 24 bytes); for larger curves, the field element resulting from ECDH is directly used as premaster secret. [Douglas Stebila (Sun Microsystems Laboratories)] *) Add code for kP+lQ timings to crypto/ec/ectest.c, and add SEC2 curve secp160r1 to the tests. [Douglas Stebila (Sun Microsystems Laboratories)] *) Add the possibility to load symbols globally with DSO. [Götz Babin-Ebell via Richard Levitte] *) Add the functions ERR_set_mark() and ERR_pop_to_mark() for better control of the error stack. [Richard Levitte] *) Add support for STORE in ENGINE. [Richard Levitte] *) Add the STORE type. The intention is to provide a common interface to certificate and key stores, be they simple file-based stores, or HSM-type store, or LDAP stores, or... NOTE: The code is currently UNTESTED and isn't really used anywhere. [Richard Levitte] *) Add a generic structure called OPENSSL_ITEM. This can be used to pass a list of arguments to any function as well as provide a way for a function to pass data back to the caller. [Richard Levitte] *) Add the functions BUF_strndup() and BUF_memdup(). BUF_strndup() works like BUF_strdup() but can be used to duplicate a portion of a string. The copy gets NUL-terminated. BUF_memdup() duplicates a memory area. [Richard Levitte] *) Add the function sk_find_ex() which works like sk_find(), but will return an index to an element even if an exact match couldn't be found. The index is guaranteed to point at the element where the searched-for key would be inserted to preserve sorting order. [Richard Levitte] *) Add the function OBJ_bsearch_ex() which works like OBJ_bsearch() but takes an extra flags argument for optional functionality. Currently, the following flags are defined: OBJ_BSEARCH_VALUE_ON_NOMATCH This one gets OBJ_bsearch_ex() to return a pointer to the first element where the comparing function returns a negative or zero number. OBJ_BSEARCH_FIRST_VALUE_ON_MATCH This one gets OBJ_bsearch_ex() to return a pointer to the first element where the comparing function returns zero. This is useful if there are more than one element where the comparing function returns zero. [Richard Levitte] *) Make it possible to create self-signed certificates with 'openssl ca' in such a way that the self-signed certificate becomes part of the CA database and uses the same mechanisms for serial number generation as all other certificate signing. The new flag '-selfsign' enables this functionality. Adapt CA.sh and CA.pl.in. [Richard Levitte] *) Add functionality to check the public key of a certificate request against a given private. This is useful to check that a certificate request can be signed by that key (self-signing). [Richard Levitte] *) Make it possible to have multiple active certificates with the same subject in the CA index file. This is done only if the keyword 'unique_subject' is set to 'no' in the main CA section (default if 'CA_default') of the configuration file. The value is saved with the database itself in a separate index attribute file, named like the index file with '.attr' appended to the name. [Richard Levitte] *) Generate multi-valued AVAs using '+' notation in config files for req and dirName. [Steve Henson] *) Support for nameConstraints certificate extension. [Steve Henson] *) Support for policyConstraints certificate extension. [Steve Henson] *) Support for policyMappings certificate extension. [Steve Henson] *) Make sure the default DSA_METHOD implementation only uses its dsa_mod_exp() and/or bn_mod_exp() handlers if they are non-NULL, and change its own handlers to be NULL so as to remove unnecessary indirection. This lets alternative implementations fallback to the default implementation more easily. [Geoff Thorpe] *) Support for directoryName in GeneralName related extensions in config files. [Steve Henson] *) Make it possible to link applications using Makefile.shared. Make that possible even when linking against static libraries! [Richard Levitte] *) Support for single pass processing for S/MIME signing. This now means that S/MIME signing can be done from a pipe, in addition cleartext signing (multipart/signed type) is effectively streaming and the signed data does not need to be all held in memory. This is done with a new flag PKCS7_STREAM. When this flag is set PKCS7_sign() only initializes the PKCS7 structure and the actual signing is done after the data is output (and digests calculated) in SMIME_write_PKCS7(). [Steve Henson] *) Add full support for -rpath/-R, both in shared libraries and applications, at least on the platforms where it's known how to do it. [Richard Levitte] *) In crypto/ec/ec_mult.c, implement fast point multiplication with precomputation, based on wNAF splitting: EC_GROUP_precompute_mult() will now compute a table of multiples of the generator that makes subsequent invocations of EC_POINTs_mul() or EC_POINT_mul() faster (notably in the case of a single point multiplication, scalar * generator). [Nils Larsch, Bodo Moeller] *) IPv6 support for certificate extensions. The various extensions which use the IP:a.b.c.d can now take IPv6 addresses using the formats of RFC1884 2.2 . IPv6 addresses are now also displayed correctly. [Steve Henson] *) Added an ENGINE that implements RSA by performing private key exponentiations with the GMP library. The conversions to and from GMP's mpz_t format aren't optimised nor are any montgomery forms cached, and on x86 it appears OpenSSL's own performance has caught up. However there are likely to be other architectures where GMP could provide a boost. This ENGINE is not built in by default, but it can be specified at Configure time and should be accompanied by the necessary linker additions, eg; ./config -DOPENSSL_USE_GMP -lgmp [Geoff Thorpe] *) "openssl engine" will not display ENGINE/DSO load failure errors when testing availability of engines with "-t" - the old behaviour is produced by increasing the feature's verbosity with "-tt". [Geoff Thorpe] *) ECDSA routines: under certain error conditions uninitialized BN objects could be freed. Solution: make sure initialization is performed early enough. (Reported and fix supplied by Nils Larsch via PR#459) [Lutz Jaenicke] *) Key-generation can now be implemented in RSA_METHOD, DSA_METHOD and DH_METHOD (eg. by ENGINE implementations) to override the normal software implementations. For DSA and DH, parameter generation can also be overridden by providing the appropriate method callbacks. [Geoff Thorpe] *) Change the "progress" mechanism used in key-generation and primality testing to functions that take a new BN_GENCB pointer in place of callback/argument pairs. The new API functions have "_ex" postfixes and the older functions are reimplemented as wrappers for the new ones. The OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED symbol can be used to hide declarations of the old functions to help (graceful) attempts to migrate to the new functions. Also, the new key-generation API functions operate on a caller-supplied key-structure and return success/failure rather than returning a key or NULL - this is to help make "keygen" another member function of RSA_METHOD etc. Example for using the new callback interface: int (*my_callback)(int a, int b, BN_GENCB *cb) = ...; void *my_arg = ...; BN_GENCB my_cb; BN_GENCB_set(&my_cb, my_callback, my_arg); return BN_is_prime_ex(some_bignum, BN_prime_checks, NULL, &cb); /* For the meaning of a, b in calls to my_callback(), see the * documentation of the function that calls the callback. * cb will point to my_cb; my_arg can be retrieved as cb->arg. * my_callback should return 1 if it wants BN_is_prime_ex() * to continue, or 0 to stop. */ [Geoff Thorpe] *) Change the ZLIB compression method to be stateful, and make it available to TLS with the number defined in draft-ietf-tls-compression-04.txt. [Richard Levitte] *) Add the ASN.1 structures and functions for CertificatePair, which is defined as follows (according to X.509_4thEditionDraftV6.pdf): CertificatePair ::= SEQUENCE { forward [0] Certificate OPTIONAL, reverse [1] Certificate OPTIONAL, -- at least one of the pair shall be present -- } Also implement the PEM functions to read and write certificate pairs, and defined the PEM tag as "CERTIFICATE PAIR". This needed to be defined, mostly for the sake of the LDAP attribute crossCertificatePair, but may prove useful elsewhere as well. [Richard Levitte] *) Make it possible to inhibit symlinking of shared libraries in Makefile.shared, for Cygwin's sake. [Richard Levitte] *) Extend the BIGNUM API by creating a function void BN_set_negative(BIGNUM *a, int neg); and a macro that behave like int BN_is_negative(const BIGNUM *a); to avoid the need to access 'a->neg' directly in applications. [Nils Larsch] *) Implement fast modular reduction for pseudo-Mersenne primes used in NIST curves (crypto/bn/bn_nist.c, crypto/ec/ecp_nist.c). EC_GROUP_new_curve_GFp() will now automatically use this if applicable. [Nils Larsch ] *) Add new lock type (CRYPTO_LOCK_BN). [Bodo Moeller] *) Change the ENGINE framework to automatically load engines dynamically from specific directories unless they could be found to already be built in or loaded. Move all the current engines except for the cryptodev one to a new directory engines/. The engines in engines/ are built as shared libraries if the "shared" options was given to ./Configure or ./config. Otherwise, they are inserted in libcrypto.a. /usr/local/ssl/engines is the default directory for dynamic engines, but that can be overridden at configure time through the usual use of --prefix and/or --openssldir, and at run time with the environment variable OPENSSL_ENGINES. [Geoff Thorpe and Richard Levitte] *) Add Makefile.shared, a helper makefile to build shared libraries. Adapt Makefile.org. [Richard Levitte] *) Add version info to Win32 DLLs. [Peter 'Luna' Runestig" ] *) Add new 'medium level' PKCS#12 API. Certificates and keys can be added using this API to created arbitrary PKCS#12 files while avoiding the low level API. New options to PKCS12_create(), key or cert can be NULL and will then be omitted from the output file. The encryption algorithm NIDs can be set to -1 for no encryption, the mac iteration count can be set to 0 to omit the mac. Enhance pkcs12 utility by making the -nokeys and -nocerts options work when creating a PKCS#12 file. New option -nomac to omit the mac, NONE can be set for an encryption algorithm. New code is modified to use the enhanced PKCS12_create() instead of the low level API. [Steve Henson] *) Extend ASN1 encoder to support indefinite length constructed encoding. This can output sequences tags and octet strings in this form. Modify pk7_asn1.c to support indefinite length encoding. This is experimental and needs additional code to be useful, such as an ASN1 bio and some enhanced streaming PKCS#7 code. Extend template encode functionality so that tagging is passed down to the template encoder. [Steve Henson] *) Let 'openssl req' fail if an argument to '-newkey' is not recognized instead of using RSA as a default. [Bodo Moeller] *) Add support for ECC-based ciphersuites from draft-ietf-tls-ecc-01.txt. As these are not official, they are not included in "ALL"; the "ECCdraft" ciphersuite group alias can be used to select them. [Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta (Sun Microsystems Laboratories)] *) Add ECDH engine support. [Nils Gura and Douglas Stebila (Sun Microsystems Laboratories)] *) Add ECDH in new directory crypto/ecdh/. [Douglas Stebila (Sun Microsystems Laboratories)] *) Let BN_rand_range() abort with an error after 100 iterations without success (which indicates a broken PRNG). [Bodo Moeller] *) Change BN_mod_sqrt() so that it verifies that the input value is really the square of the return value. (Previously, BN_mod_sqrt would show GIGO behaviour.) [Bodo Moeller] *) Add named elliptic curves over binary fields from X9.62, SECG, and WAP/WTLS; add OIDs that were still missing. [Sheueling Chang Shantz and Douglas Stebila (Sun Microsystems Laboratories)] *) Extend the EC library for elliptic curves over binary fields (new files ec2_smpl.c, ec2_smpt.c, ec2_mult.c in crypto/ec/). New EC_METHOD: EC_GF2m_simple_method New API functions: EC_GROUP_new_curve_GF2m EC_GROUP_set_curve_GF2m EC_GROUP_get_curve_GF2m EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GF2m EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GF2m EC_POINT_set_compressed_coordinates_GF2m Point compression for binary fields is disabled by default for patent reasons (compile with OPENSSL_EC_BIN_PT_COMP defined to enable it). As binary polynomials are represented as BIGNUMs, various members of the EC_GROUP and EC_POINT data structures can be shared between the implementations for prime fields and binary fields; the above ..._GF2m functions (except for EX_GROUP_new_curve_GF2m) are essentially identical to their ..._GFp counterparts. (For simplicity, the '..._GFp' prefix has been dropped from various internal method names.) An internal 'field_div' method (similar to 'field_mul' and 'field_sqr') has been added; this is used only for binary fields. [Sheueling Chang Shantz and Douglas Stebila (Sun Microsystems Laboratories)] *) Optionally dispatch EC_POINT_mul(), EC_POINT_precompute_mult() through methods ('mul', 'precompute_mult'). The generic implementations (now internally called 'ec_wNAF_mul' and 'ec_wNAF_precomputed_mult') remain the default if these methods are undefined. [Sheueling Chang Shantz and Douglas Stebila (Sun Microsystems Laboratories)] *) New function EC_GROUP_get_degree, which is defined through EC_METHOD. For curves over prime fields, this returns the bit length of the modulus. [Sheueling Chang Shantz and Douglas Stebila (Sun Microsystems Laboratories)] *) New functions EC_GROUP_dup, EC_POINT_dup. (These simply call ..._new and ..._copy). [Sheueling Chang Shantz and Douglas Stebila (Sun Microsystems Laboratories)] *) Add binary polynomial arithmetic software in crypto/bn/bn_gf2m.c. Polynomials are represented as BIGNUMs (where the sign bit is not used) in the following functions [macros]: BN_GF2m_add BN_GF2m_sub [= BN_GF2m_add] BN_GF2m_mod [wrapper for BN_GF2m_mod_arr] BN_GF2m_mod_mul [wrapper for BN_GF2m_mod_mul_arr] BN_GF2m_mod_sqr [wrapper for BN_GF2m_mod_sqr_arr] BN_GF2m_mod_inv BN_GF2m_mod_exp [wrapper for BN_GF2m_mod_exp_arr] BN_GF2m_mod_sqrt [wrapper for BN_GF2m_mod_sqrt_arr] BN_GF2m_mod_solve_quad [wrapper for BN_GF2m_mod_solve_quad_arr] BN_GF2m_cmp [= BN_ucmp] (Note that only the 'mod' functions are actually for fields GF(2^m). BN_GF2m_add() is misnomer, but this is for the sake of consistency.) For some functions, an the irreducible polynomial defining a field can be given as an 'unsigned int[]' with strictly decreasing elements giving the indices of those bits that are set; i.e., p[] represents the polynomial f(t) = t^p[0] + t^p[1] + ... + t^p[k] where p[0] > p[1] > ... > p[k] = 0. This applies to the following functions: BN_GF2m_mod_arr BN_GF2m_mod_mul_arr BN_GF2m_mod_sqr_arr BN_GF2m_mod_inv_arr [wrapper for BN_GF2m_mod_inv] BN_GF2m_mod_div_arr [wrapper for BN_GF2m_mod_div] BN_GF2m_mod_exp_arr BN_GF2m_mod_sqrt_arr BN_GF2m_mod_solve_quad_arr BN_GF2m_poly2arr BN_GF2m_arr2poly Conversion can be performed by the following functions: BN_GF2m_poly2arr BN_GF2m_arr2poly bntest.c has additional tests for binary polynomial arithmetic. Two implementations for BN_GF2m_mod_div() are available. The default algorithm simply uses BN_GF2m_mod_inv() and BN_GF2m_mod_mul(). The alternative algorithm is compiled in only if OPENSSL_SUN_GF2M_DIV is defined (patent pending; read the copyright notice in crypto/bn/bn_gf2m.c before enabling it). [Sheueling Chang Shantz and Douglas Stebila (Sun Microsystems Laboratories)] *) Add new error code 'ERR_R_DISABLED' that can be used when some functionality is disabled at compile-time. [Douglas Stebila ] *) Change default behaviour of 'openssl asn1parse' so that more information is visible when viewing, e.g., a certificate: Modify asn1_parse2 (crypto/asn1/asn1_par.c) so that in non-'dump' mode the content of non-printable OCTET STRINGs is output in a style similar to INTEGERs, but with '[HEX DUMP]' prepended to avoid the appearance of a printable string. [Nils Larsch ] *) Add 'asn1_flag' and 'asn1_form' member to EC_GROUP with access functions EC_GROUP_set_asn1_flag() EC_GROUP_get_asn1_flag() EC_GROUP_set_point_conversion_form() EC_GROUP_get_point_conversion_form() These control ASN1 encoding details: - Curves (i.e., groups) are encoded explicitly unless asn1_flag has been set to OPENSSL_EC_NAMED_CURVE. - Points are encoded in uncompressed form by default; options for asn1_for are as for point2oct, namely POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED POINT_CONVERSION_HYBRID Also add 'seed' and 'seed_len' members to EC_GROUP with access functions EC_GROUP_set_seed() EC_GROUP_get0_seed() EC_GROUP_get_seed_len() This is used only for ASN1 purposes (so far). [Nils Larsch ] *) Add 'field_type' member to EC_METHOD, which holds the NID of the appropriate field type OID. The new function EC_METHOD_get_field_type() returns this value. [Nils Larsch ] *) Add functions EC_POINT_point2bn() EC_POINT_bn2point() EC_POINT_point2hex() EC_POINT_hex2point() providing useful interfaces to EC_POINT_point2oct() and EC_POINT_oct2point(). [Nils Larsch ] *) Change internals of the EC library so that the functions EC_GROUP_set_generator() EC_GROUP_get_generator() EC_GROUP_get_order() EC_GROUP_get_cofactor() are implemented directly in crypto/ec/ec_lib.c and not dispatched to methods, which would lead to unnecessary code duplication when adding different types of curves. [Nils Larsch with input by Bodo Moeller] *) Implement compute_wNAF (crypto/ec/ec_mult.c) without BIGNUM arithmetic, and such that modified wNAFs are generated (which avoid length expansion in many cases). [Bodo Moeller] *) Add a function EC_GROUP_check_discriminant() (defined via EC_METHOD) that verifies that the curve discriminant is non-zero. Add a function EC_GROUP_check() that makes some sanity tests on a EC_GROUP, its generator and order. This includes EC_GROUP_check_discriminant(). [Nils Larsch ] *) Add ECDSA in new directory crypto/ecdsa/. Add applications 'openssl ecparam' and 'openssl ecdsa' (these are based on 'openssl dsaparam' and 'openssl dsa'). ECDSA support is also included in various other files across the library. Most notably, - 'openssl req' now has a '-newkey ecdsa:file' option; - EVP_PKCS82PKEY (crypto/evp/evp_pkey.c) now can handle ECDSA; - X509_PUBKEY_get (crypto/asn1/x_pubkey.c) and d2i_PublicKey (crypto/asn1/d2i_pu.c) have been modified to make them suitable for ECDSA where domain parameters must be extracted before the specific public key; - ECDSA engine support has been added. [Nils Larsch ] *) Include some named elliptic curves, and add OIDs from X9.62, SECG, and WAP/WTLS. Each curve can be obtained from the new function EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(), and the list of available named curves can be obtained with EC_get_builtin_curves(). Also add a 'curve_name' member to EC_GROUP objects, which can be accessed via EC_GROUP_set_curve_name() EC_GROUP_get_curve_name() [Nils Larsch ] *) Include "!eNULL" in SSL_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST to make sure that a ciphersuite string such as "DEFAULT:RSA" cannot enable authentication-only ciphersuites. [Bodo Moeller] *) Since AES128 and AES256 share a single mask bit in the logic of ssl/ssl_ciph.c, the code for masking out disabled ciphers needs a kludge to work properly if AES128 is available and AES256 isn't. [Victor Duchovni] *) Expand security boundary to match 1.1.1 module. [Steve Henson] *) Remove redundant features: hash file source, editing of test vectors modify fipsld to use external fips_premain.c signature. [Steve Henson] *) New perl script mkfipsscr.pl to create shell scripts or batch files to run algorithm test programs. [Steve Henson] *) Make algorithm test programs more tolerant of whitespace. [Steve Henson] *) Have SSL/TLS server implementation tolerate "mismatched" record protocol version while receiving ClientHello even if the ClientHello is fragmented. (The server can't insist on the particular protocol version it has chosen before the ServerHello message has informed the client about his choice.) [Bodo Moeller] *) Load error codes if they are not already present instead of using a static variable. This allows them to be cleanly unloaded and reloaded. [Steve Henson] Changes between 0.9.7k and 0.9.7l [28 Sep 2006] *) Introduce limits to prevent malicious keys being able to cause a denial of service. (CVE-2006-2940) [Steve Henson, Bodo Moeller] *) Fix ASN.1 parsing of certain invalid structures that can result in a denial of service. (CVE-2006-2937) [Steve Henson] *) Fix buffer overflow in SSL_get_shared_ciphers() function. (CVE-2006-3738) [Tavis Ormandy and Will Drewry, Google Security Team] *) Fix SSL client code which could crash if connecting to a malicious SSLv2 server. (CVE-2006-4343) [Tavis Ormandy and Will Drewry, Google Security Team] *) Change ciphersuite string processing so that an explicit ciphersuite selects this one ciphersuite (so that "AES256-SHA" will no longer include "AES128-SHA"), and any other similar ciphersuite (same bitmap) from *other* protocol versions (so that "RC4-MD5" will still include both the SSL 2.0 ciphersuite and the SSL 3.0/TLS 1.0 ciphersuite). This is a backport combining changes from 0.9.8b and 0.9.8d. [Bodo Moeller] Changes between 0.9.7j and 0.9.7k [05 Sep 2006] *) Avoid PKCS #1 v1.5 signature attack discovered by Daniel Bleichenbacher (CVE-2006-4339) [Ben Laurie and Google Security Team] *) Change the Unix randomness entropy gathering to use poll() when possible instead of select(), since the latter has some undesirable limitations. [Darryl Miles via Richard Levitte and Bodo Moeller] *) Disable rogue ciphersuites: - SSLv2 0x08 0x00 0x80 ("RC4-64-MD5") - SSLv3/TLSv1 0x00 0x61 ("EXP1024-RC2-CBC-MD5") - SSLv3/TLSv1 0x00 0x60 ("EXP1024-RC4-MD5") The latter two were purportedly from draft-ietf-tls-56-bit-ciphersuites-0[01].txt, but do not really appear there. Also deactivate the remaining ciphersuites from draft-ietf-tls-56-bit-ciphersuites-01.txt. These are just as unofficial, and the ID has long expired. [Bodo Moeller] *) Fix RSA blinding Heisenbug (problems sometimes occurred on dual-core machines) and other potential thread-safety issues. [Bodo Moeller] Changes between 0.9.7i and 0.9.7j [04 May 2006] *) Adapt fipsld and the build system to link against the validated FIPS module in FIPS mode. [Steve Henson] *) Fixes for VC++ 2005 build under Windows. [Steve Henson] *) Add new Windows build target VC-32-GMAKE for VC++. This uses GNU make from a Windows bash shell such as MSYS. It is autodetected from the "config" script when run from a VC++ environment. Modify standard VC++ build to use fipscanister.o from the GNU make build. [Steve Henson] Changes between 0.9.7h and 0.9.7i [14 Oct 2005] *) Wrapped the definition of EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE in a #ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS. The value now differs depending on if you build for FIPS or not. BEWARE! A program linked with a shared FIPSed libcrypto can't be safely run with a non-FIPSed libcrypto, as it may crash because of the difference induced by this change. [Andy Polyakov] Changes between 0.9.7g and 0.9.7h [11 Oct 2005] *) Remove the functionality of SSL_OP_MSIE_SSLV2_RSA_PADDING (part of SSL_OP_ALL). This option used to disable the countermeasure against man-in-the-middle protocol-version rollback in the SSL 2.0 server implementation, which is a bad idea. (CVE-2005-2969) [Bodo Moeller; problem pointed out by Yutaka Oiwa (Research Center for Information Security, National Institute of Advanced Industrial Science and Technology [AIST], Japan)] *) Minimal support for X9.31 signatures and PSS padding modes. This is mainly for FIPS compliance and not fully integrated at this stage. [Steve Henson] *) For DSA signing, unless DSA_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME is set, perform the exponentiation using a fixed-length exponent. (Otherwise, the information leaked through timing could expose the secret key after many signatures; cf. Bleichenbacher's attack on DSA with biased k.) [Bodo Moeller] *) Make a new fixed-window mod_exp implementation the default for RSA, DSA, and DH private-key operations so that the sequence of squares and multiplies and the memory access pattern are independent of the particular secret key. This will mitigate cache-timing and potential related attacks. BN_mod_exp_mont_consttime() is the new exponentiation implementation, and this is automatically used by BN_mod_exp_mont() if the new flag BN_FLG_EXP_CONSTTIME is set for the exponent. RSA, DSA, and DH will use this BN flag for private exponents unless the flag RSA_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME, DSA_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME, or DH_FLAG_NO_EXP_CONSTTIME, respectively, is set. [Matthew D Wood (Intel Corp), with some changes by Bodo Moeller] *) Change the client implementation for SSLv23_method() and SSLv23_client_method() so that is uses the SSL 3.0/TLS 1.0 Client Hello message format if the SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2 option is set. (Previously, the SSL 2.0 backwards compatible Client Hello message format would be used even with SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2.) [Bodo Moeller] *) Add support for smime-type MIME parameter in S/MIME messages which some clients need. [Steve Henson] *) New function BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked() to set montgomery parameters in a threadsafe manner. Modify rsa code to use new function and add calls to dsa and dh code (which had race conditions before). [Steve Henson] *) Include the fixed error library code in the C error file definitions instead of fixing them up at runtime. This keeps the error code structures constant. [Steve Henson] Changes between 0.9.7f and 0.9.7g [11 Apr 2005] [NB: OpenSSL 0.9.7h and later 0.9.7 patch levels were released after OpenSSL 0.9.8.] *) Fixes for newer kerberos headers. NB: the casts are needed because the 'length' field is signed on one version and unsigned on another with no (?) obvious way to tell the difference, without these VC++ complains. Also the "definition" of FAR (blank) is no longer included nor is the error ENOMEM. KRB5_PRIVATE has to be set to 1 to pick up some needed definitions. [Steve Henson] *) Undo Cygwin change. [Ulf Möller] *) Added support for proxy certificates according to RFC 3820. Because they may be a security thread to unaware applications, they must be explicitly allowed in run-time. See docs/HOWTO/proxy_certificates.txt for further information. [Richard Levitte] Changes between 0.9.7e and 0.9.7f [22 Mar 2005] *) Use (SSL_RANDOM_VALUE - 4) bytes of pseudo random data when generating server and client random values. Previously (SSL_RANDOM_VALUE - sizeof(time_t)) would be used which would result in less random data when sizeof(time_t) > 4 (some 64 bit platforms). This change has negligible security impact because: 1. Server and client random values still have 24 bytes of pseudo random data. 2. Server and client random values are sent in the clear in the initial handshake. 3. The master secret is derived using the premaster secret (48 bytes in size for static RSA ciphersuites) as well as client server and random values. The OpenSSL team would like to thank the UK NISCC for bringing this issue to our attention. [Stephen Henson, reported by UK NISCC] *) Use Windows randomness collection on Cygwin. [Ulf Möller] *) Fix hang in EGD/PRNGD query when communication socket is closed prematurely by EGD/PRNGD. [Darren Tucker via Lutz Jänicke, resolves #1014] *) Prompt for pass phrases when appropriate for PKCS12 input format. [Steve Henson] *) Back-port of selected performance improvements from development branch, as well as improved support for PowerPC platforms. [Andy Polyakov] *) Add lots of checks for memory allocation failure, error codes to indicate failure and freeing up memory if a failure occurs. [Nauticus Networks SSL Team , Steve Henson] *) Add new -passin argument to dgst. [Steve Henson] *) Perform some character comparisons of different types in X509_NAME_cmp: this is needed for some certificates that re-encode DNs into UTF8Strings (in violation of RFC3280) and can't or won't issue name rollover certificates. [Steve Henson] *) Make an explicit check during certificate validation to see that the CA setting in each certificate on the chain is correct. As a side effect always do the following basic checks on extensions, not just when there's an associated purpose to the check: - if there is an unhandled critical extension (unless the user has chosen to ignore this fault) - if the path length has been exceeded (if one is set at all) - that certain extensions fit the associated purpose (if one has been given) [Richard Levitte] Changes between 0.9.7d and 0.9.7e [25 Oct 2004] *) Avoid a race condition when CRLs are checked in a multi threaded environment. This would happen due to the reordering of the revoked entries during signature checking and serial number lookup. Now the encoding is cached and the serial number sort performed under a lock. Add new STACK function sk_is_sorted(). [Steve Henson] *) Add Delta CRL to the extension code. [Steve Henson] *) Various fixes to s3_pkt.c so alerts are sent properly. [David Holmes ] *) Reduce the chances of duplicate issuer name and serial numbers (in violation of RFC3280) using the OpenSSL certificate creation utilities. This is done by creating a random 64 bit value for the initial serial number when a serial number file is created or when a self signed certificate is created using 'openssl req -x509'. The initial serial number file is created using 'openssl x509 -next_serial' in CA.pl rather than being initialized to 1. [Steve Henson] Changes between 0.9.7c and 0.9.7d [17 Mar 2004] *) Fix null-pointer assignment in do_change_cipher_spec() revealed by using the Codenomicon TLS Test Tool (CVE-2004-0079) [Joe Orton, Steve Henson] *) Fix flaw in SSL/TLS handshaking when using Kerberos ciphersuites (CVE-2004-0112) [Joe Orton, Steve Henson] *) Make it possible to have multiple active certificates with the same subject in the CA index file. This is done only if the keyword 'unique_subject' is set to 'no' in the main CA section (default if 'CA_default') of the configuration file. The value is saved with the database itself in a separate index attribute file, named like the index file with '.attr' appended to the name. [Richard Levitte] *) X509 verify fixes. Disable broken certificate workarounds when X509_V_FLAGS_X509_STRICT is set. Check CRL issuer has cRLSign set if keyUsage extension present. Don't accept CRLs with unhandled critical extensions: since verify currently doesn't process CRL extensions this rejects a CRL with *any* critical extensions. Add new verify error codes for these cases. [Steve Henson] *) When creating an OCSP nonce use an OCTET STRING inside the extnValue. A clarification of RFC2560 will require the use of OCTET STRINGs and some implementations cannot handle the current raw format. Since OpenSSL copies and compares OCSP nonces as opaque blobs without any attempt at parsing them this should not create any compatibility issues. [Steve Henson] *) New md flag EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_REUSE this allows md_data to be reused when calling EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex() to avoid calling OPENSSL_malloc(). Without this HMAC (and other) operations are several times slower than OpenSSL < 0.9.7. [Steve Henson] *) Print out GeneralizedTime and UTCTime in ASN1_STRING_print_ex(). [Peter Sylvester ] *) Use the correct content when signing type "other". [Steve Henson] Changes between 0.9.7b and 0.9.7c [30 Sep 2003] *) Fix various bugs revealed by running the NISCC test suite: Stop out of bounds reads in the ASN1 code when presented with invalid tags (CVE-2003-0543 and CVE-2003-0544). Free up ASN1_TYPE correctly if ANY type is invalid (CVE-2003-0545). If verify callback ignores invalid public key errors don't try to check certificate signature with the NULL public key. [Steve Henson] *) New -ignore_err option in ocsp application to stop the server exiting on the first error in a request. [Steve Henson] *) In ssl3_accept() (ssl/s3_srvr.c) only accept a client certificate if the server requested one: as stated in TLS 1.0 and SSL 3.0 specifications. [Steve Henson] *) In ssl3_get_client_hello() (ssl/s3_srvr.c), tolerate additional extra data after the compression methods not only for TLS 1.0 but also for SSL 3.0 (as required by the specification). [Bodo Moeller; problem pointed out by Matthias Loepfe] *) Change X509_certificate_type() to mark the key as exported/exportable when it's 512 *bits* long, not 512 bytes. [Richard Levitte] *) Change AES_cbc_encrypt() so it outputs exact multiple of blocks during encryption. [Richard Levitte] *) Various fixes to base64 BIO and non blocking I/O. On write flushes were not handled properly if the BIO retried. On read data was not being buffered properly and had various logic bugs. This also affects blocking I/O when the data being decoded is a certain size. [Steve Henson] *) Various S/MIME bugfixes and compatibility changes: output correct application/pkcs7 MIME type if PKCS7_NOOLDMIMETYPE is set. Tolerate some broken signatures. Output CR+LF for EOL if PKCS7_CRLFEOL is set (this makes opening of files as .eml work). Correctly handle very long lines in MIME parser. [Steve Henson] Changes between 0.9.7a and 0.9.7b [10 Apr 2003] *) Countermeasure against the Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 padding: treat a protocol version number mismatch like a decryption error in ssl3_get_client_key_exchange (ssl/s3_srvr.c). [Bodo Moeller] *) Turn on RSA blinding by default in the default implementation to avoid a timing attack. Applications that don't want it can call RSA_blinding_off() or use the new flag RSA_FLAG_NO_BLINDING. They would be ill-advised to do so in most cases. [Ben Laurie, Steve Henson, Geoff Thorpe, Bodo Moeller] *) Change RSA blinding code so that it works when the PRNG is not seeded (in this case, the secret RSA exponent is abused as an unpredictable seed -- if it is not unpredictable, there is no point in blinding anyway). Make RSA blinding thread-safe by remembering the creator's thread ID in rsa->blinding and having all other threads use local one-time blinding factors (this requires more computation than sharing rsa->blinding, but avoids excessive locking; and if an RSA object is not shared between threads, blinding will still be very fast). [Bodo Moeller] *) Fixed a typo bug that would cause ENGINE_set_default() to set an ENGINE as defaults for all supported algorithms irrespective of the 'flags' parameter. 'flags' is now honoured, so applications should make sure they are passing it correctly. [Geoff Thorpe] *) Target "mingw" now allows native Windows code to be generated in the Cygwin environment as well as with the MinGW compiler. [Ulf Moeller] Changes between 0.9.7 and 0.9.7a [19 Feb 2003] *) In ssl3_get_record (ssl/s3_pkt.c), minimize information leaked via timing by performing a MAC computation even if incorrect block cipher padding has been found. This is a countermeasure against active attacks where the attacker has to distinguish between bad padding and a MAC verification error. (CVE-2003-0078) [Bodo Moeller; problem pointed out by Brice Canvel (EPFL), Alain Hiltgen (UBS), Serge Vaudenay (EPFL), and Martin Vuagnoux (EPFL, Ilion)] *) Make the no-err option work as intended. The intention with no-err is not to have the whole error stack handling routines removed from libcrypto, it's only intended to remove all the function name and reason texts, thereby removing some of the footprint that may not be interesting if those errors aren't displayed anyway. NOTE: it's still possible for any application or module to have its own set of error texts inserted. The routines are there, just not used by default when no-err is given. [Richard Levitte] *) Add support for FreeBSD on IA64. [dirk.meyer@dinoex.sub.org via Richard Levitte, resolves #454] *) Adjust DES_cbc_cksum() so it returns the same value as the MIT Kerberos function mit_des_cbc_cksum(). Before this change, the value returned by DES_cbc_cksum() was like the one from mit_des_cbc_cksum(), except the bytes were swapped. [Kevin Greaney and Richard Levitte] *) Allow an application to disable the automatic SSL chain building. Before this a rather primitive chain build was always performed in ssl3_output_cert_chain(): an application had no way to send the correct chain if the automatic operation produced an incorrect result. Now the chain builder is disabled if either: 1. Extra certificates are added via SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert(). 2. The mode flag SSL_MODE_NO_AUTO_CHAIN is set. The reasoning behind this is that an application would not want the auto chain building to take place if extra chain certificates are present and it might also want a means of sending no additional certificates (for example the chain has two certificates and the root is omitted). [Steve Henson] *) Add the possibility to build without the ENGINE framework. [Steven Reddie via Richard Levitte] *) Under Win32 gmtime() can return NULL: check return value in OPENSSL_gmtime(). Add error code for case where gmtime() fails. [Steve Henson] *) DSA routines: under certain error conditions uninitialized BN objects could be freed. Solution: make sure initialization is performed early enough. (Reported and fix supplied by Ivan D Nestlerode , Nils Larsch via PR#459) [Lutz Jaenicke] *) Another fix for SSLv2 session ID handling: the session ID was incorrectly checked on reconnect on the client side, therefore session resumption could still fail with a "ssl session id is different" error. This behaviour is masked when SSL_OP_ALL is used due to SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_SESS_ID_BUG being set. Behaviour observed by Crispin Flowerday as followup to PR #377. [Lutz Jaenicke] *) IA-32 assembler support enhancements: unified ELF targets, support for SCO/Caldera platforms, fix for Cygwin shared build. [Andy Polyakov] *) Add support for FreeBSD on sparc64. As a consequence, support for FreeBSD on non-x86 processors is separate from x86 processors on the config script, much like the NetBSD support. [Richard Levitte & Kris Kennaway ] Changes between 0.9.6h and 0.9.7 [31 Dec 2002] [NB: OpenSSL 0.9.6i and later 0.9.6 patch levels were released after OpenSSL 0.9.7.] *) Fix session ID handling in SSLv2 client code: the SERVER FINISHED code (06) was taken as the first octet of the session ID and the last octet was ignored consequently. As a result SSLv2 client side session caching could not have worked due to the session ID mismatch between client and server. Behaviour observed by Crispin Flowerday as PR #377. [Lutz Jaenicke] *) Change the declaration of needed Kerberos libraries to use EX_LIBS instead of the special (and badly supported) LIBKRB5. LIBKRB5 is removed entirely. [Richard Levitte] *) The hw_ncipher.c engine requires dynamic locks. Unfortunately, it seems that in spite of existing for more than a year, many application author have done nothing to provide the necessary callbacks, which means that this particular engine will not work properly anywhere. This is a very unfortunate situation which forces us, in the name of usability, to give the hw_ncipher.c a static lock, which is part of libcrypto. NOTE: This is for the 0.9.7 series ONLY. This hack will never appear in 0.9.8 or later. We EXPECT application authors to have dealt properly with this when 0.9.8 is released (unless we actually make such changes in the libcrypto locking code that changes will have to be made anyway). [Richard Levitte] *) In asn1_d2i_read_bio() repeatedly call BIO_read() until all content octets have been read, EOF or an error occurs. Without this change some truncated ASN1 structures will not produce an error. [Steve Henson] *) Disable Heimdal support, since it hasn't been fully implemented. Still give the possibility to force the use of Heimdal, but with warnings and a request that patches get sent to openssl-dev. [Richard Levitte] *) Add the VC-CE target, introduce the WINCE sysname, and add INSTALL.WCE and appropriate conditionals to make it build. [Steven Reddie via Richard Levitte] *) Change the DLL names for Cygwin to cygcrypto-x.y.z.dll and cygssl-x.y.z.dll, where x, y and z are the major, minor and edit numbers of the version. [Corinna Vinschen and Richard Levitte] *) Introduce safe string copy and catenation functions (BUF_strlcpy() and BUF_strlcat()). [Ben Laurie (CHATS) and Richard Levitte] *) Avoid using fixed-size buffers for one-line DNs. [Ben Laurie (CHATS)] *) Add BUF_MEM_grow_clean() to avoid information leakage when resizing buffers containing secrets, and use where appropriate. [Ben Laurie (CHATS)] *) Avoid using fixed size buffers for configuration file location. [Ben Laurie (CHATS)] *) Avoid filename truncation for various CA files. [Ben Laurie (CHATS)] *) Use sizeof in preference to magic numbers. [Ben Laurie (CHATS)] *) Avoid filename truncation in cert requests. [Ben Laurie (CHATS)] *) Add assertions to check for (supposedly impossible) buffer overflows. [Ben Laurie (CHATS)] *) Don't cache truncated DNS entries in the local cache (this could potentially lead to a spoofing attack). [Ben Laurie (CHATS)] *) Fix various buffers to be large enough for hex/decimal representations in a platform independent manner. [Ben Laurie (CHATS)] *) Add CRYPTO_realloc_clean() to avoid information leakage when resizing buffers containing secrets, and use where appropriate. [Ben Laurie (CHATS)] *) Add BIO_indent() to avoid much slightly worrying code to do indents. [Ben Laurie (CHATS)] *) Convert sprintf()/BIO_puts() to BIO_printf(). [Ben Laurie (CHATS)] *) buffer_gets() could terminate with the buffer only half full. Fixed. [Ben Laurie (CHATS)] *) Add assertions to prevent user-supplied crypto functions from overflowing internal buffers by having large block sizes, etc. [Ben Laurie (CHATS)] *) New OPENSSL_assert() macro (similar to assert(), but enabled unconditionally). [Ben Laurie (CHATS)] *) Eliminate unused copy of key in RC4. [Ben Laurie (CHATS)] *) Eliminate unused and incorrectly sized buffers for IV in pem.h. [Ben Laurie (CHATS)] *) Fix off-by-one error in EGD path. [Ben Laurie (CHATS)] *) If RANDFILE path is too long, ignore instead of truncating. [Ben Laurie (CHATS)] *) Eliminate unused and incorrectly sized X.509 structure CBCParameter. [Ben Laurie (CHATS)] *) Eliminate unused and dangerous function knumber(). [Ben Laurie (CHATS)] *) Eliminate unused and dangerous structure, KSSL_ERR. [Ben Laurie (CHATS)] *) Protect against overlong session ID context length in an encoded session object. Since these are local, this does not appear to be exploitable. [Ben Laurie (CHATS)] *) Change from security patch (see 0.9.6e below) that did not affect the 0.9.6 release series: Remote buffer overflow in SSL3 protocol - an attacker could supply an oversized master key in Kerberos-enabled versions. (CVE-2002-0657) [Ben Laurie (CHATS)] *) Change the SSL kerb5 codes to match RFC 2712. [Richard Levitte] *) Make -nameopt work fully for req and add -reqopt switch. [Michael Bell , Steve Henson] *) The "block size" for block ciphers in CFB and OFB mode should be 1. [Steve Henson, reported by Yngve Nysaeter Pettersen ] *) Make sure tests can be performed even if the corresponding algorithms have been removed entirely. This was also the last step to make OpenSSL compilable with DJGPP under all reasonable conditions. [Richard Levitte, Doug Kaufman ] *) Add cipher selection rules COMPLEMENTOFALL and COMPLEMENTOFDEFAULT to allow version independent disabling of normally unselected ciphers, which may be activated as a side-effect of selecting a single cipher. (E.g., cipher list string "RSA" enables ciphersuites that are left out of "ALL" because they do not provide symmetric encryption. "RSA:!COMPLEMEMENTOFALL" avoids these unsafe ciphersuites.) [Lutz Jaenicke, Bodo Moeller] *) Add appropriate support for separate platform-dependent build directories. The recommended way to make a platform-dependent build directory is the following (tested on Linux), maybe with some local tweaks: # Place yourself outside of the OpenSSL source tree. In # this example, the environment variable OPENSSL_SOURCE # is assumed to contain the absolute OpenSSL source directory. mkdir -p objtree/"`uname -s`-`uname -r`-`uname -m`" cd objtree/"`uname -s`-`uname -r`-`uname -m`" (cd $OPENSSL_SOURCE; find . -type f) | while read F; do mkdir -p `dirname $F` ln -s $OPENSSL_SOURCE/$F $F done To be absolutely sure not to disturb the source tree, a "make clean" is a good thing. If it isn't successful, don't worry about it, it probably means the source directory is very clean. [Richard Levitte] *) Make sure any ENGINE control commands make local copies of string pointers passed to them whenever necessary. Otherwise it is possible the caller may have overwritten (or deallocated) the original string data when a later ENGINE operation tries to use the stored values. [Götz Babin-Ebell ] *) Improve diagnostics in file reading and command-line digests. [Ben Laurie aided and abetted by Solar Designer ] *) Add AES modes CFB and OFB to the object database. Correct an error in AES-CFB decryption. [Richard Levitte] *) Remove most calls to EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup() in evp_enc.c, this allows existing EVP_CIPHER_CTX structures to be reused after calling EVP_*Final(). This behaviour is used by encryption BIOs and some applications. This has the side effect that applications must explicitly clean up cipher contexts with EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup() or they will leak memory. [Steve Henson] *) Check the values of dna and dnb in bn_mul_recursive before calling bn_mul_comba (a non zero value means the a or b arrays do not contain n2 elements) and fallback to bn_mul_normal if either is not zero. [Steve Henson] *) Fix escaping of non-ASCII characters when using the -subj option of the "openssl req" command line tool. (Robert Joop ) [Lutz Jaenicke] *) Make object definitions compliant to LDAP (RFC2256): SN is the short form for "surname", serialNumber has no short form. Use "mail" as the short name for "rfc822Mailbox" according to RFC2798; therefore remove "mail" short name for "internet 7". The OID for unique identifiers in X509 certificates is x500UniqueIdentifier, not uniqueIdentifier. Some more OID additions. (Michael Bell ) [Lutz Jaenicke] *) Add an "init" command to the ENGINE config module and auto initialize ENGINEs. Without any "init" command the ENGINE will be initialized after all ctrl commands have been executed on it. If init=1 the ENGINE is initialized at that point (ctrls before that point are run on the uninitialized ENGINE and after on the initialized one). If init=0 then the ENGINE will not be initialized at all. [Steve Henson] *) Fix the 'app_verify_callback' interface so that the user-defined argument is actually passed to the callback: In the SSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback() prototype, the callback declaration has been changed from int (*cb)() into int (*cb)(X509_STORE_CTX *,void *); in ssl_verify_cert_chain (ssl/ssl_cert.c), the call i=s->ctx->app_verify_callback(&ctx) has been changed into i=s->ctx->app_verify_callback(&ctx, s->ctx->app_verify_arg). To update applications using SSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback(), a dummy argument can be added to their callback functions. [D. K. Smetters ] *) Added the '4758cca' ENGINE to support IBM 4758 cards. [Maurice Gittens , touchups by Geoff Thorpe] *) Add and OPENSSL_LOAD_CONF define which will cause OpenSSL_add_all_algorithms() to load the openssl.cnf config file. This allows older applications to transparently support certain OpenSSL features: such as crypto acceleration and dynamic ENGINE loading. Two new functions OPENSSL_add_all_algorithms_noconf() which will never load the config file and OPENSSL_add_all_algorithms_conf() which will always load it have also been added. [Steve Henson] *) Add the OFB, CFB and CTR (all with 128 bit feedback) to AES. Adjust NIDs and EVP layer. [Stephen Sprunk and Richard Levitte] *) Config modules support in openssl utility. Most commands now load modules from the config file, though in a few (such as version) this isn't done because it couldn't be used for anything. In the case of ca and req the config file used is the same as the utility itself: that is the -config command line option can be used to specify an alternative file. [Steve Henson] *) Move default behaviour from OPENSSL_config(). If appname is NULL use "openssl_conf" if filename is NULL use default openssl config file. [Steve Henson] *) Add an argument to OPENSSL_config() to allow the use of an alternative config section name. Add a new flag to tolerate a missing config file and move code to CONF_modules_load_file(). [Steve Henson] *) Support for crypto accelerator cards from Accelerated Encryption Processing, www.aep.ie. (Use engine 'aep') The support was copied from 0.9.6c [engine] and adapted/corrected to work with the new engine framework. [AEP Inc. and Richard Levitte] *) Support for SureWare crypto accelerator cards from Baltimore Technologies. (Use engine 'sureware') The support was copied from 0.9.6c [engine] and adapted to work with the new engine framework. [Richard Levitte] *) Have the CHIL engine fork-safe (as defined by nCipher) and actually make the newer ENGINE framework commands for the CHIL engine work. [Toomas Kiisk and Richard Levitte] *) Make it possible to produce shared libraries on ReliantUNIX. [Robert Dahlem via Richard Levitte] *) Add the configuration target debug-linux-ppro. Make 'openssl rsa' use the general key loading routines implemented in apps.c, and make those routines able to handle the key format FORMAT_NETSCAPE and the variant FORMAT_IISSGC. [Toomas Kiisk via Richard Levitte] *) Fix a crashbug and a logic bug in hwcrhk_load_pubkey(). [Toomas Kiisk via Richard Levitte] *) Add -keyform to rsautl, and document -engine. [Richard Levitte, inspired by Toomas Kiisk ] *) Change BIO_new_file (crypto/bio/bss_file.c) to use new BIO_R_NO_SUCH_FILE error code rather than the generic ERR_R_SYS_LIB error code if fopen() fails with ENOENT. [Ben Laurie] *) Add new functions ERR_peek_last_error ERR_peek_last_error_line ERR_peek_last_error_line_data. These are similar to ERR_peek_error ERR_peek_error_line ERR_peek_error_line_data, but report on the latest error recorded rather than the first one still in the error queue. [Ben Laurie, Bodo Moeller] *) default_algorithms option in ENGINE config module. This allows things like: default_algorithms = ALL default_algorithms = RSA, DSA, RAND, CIPHERS, DIGESTS [Steve Henson] *) Preliminary ENGINE config module. [Steve Henson] *) New experimental application configuration code. [Steve Henson] *) Change the AES code to follow the same name structure as all other symmetric ciphers, and behave the same way. Move everything to the directory crypto/aes, thereby obsoleting crypto/rijndael. [Stephen Sprunk and Richard Levitte] *) SECURITY: remove unsafe setjmp/signal interaction from ui_openssl.c. [Ben Laurie and Theo de Raadt] *) Add option to output public keys in req command. [Massimiliano Pala madwolf@openca.org] *) Use wNAFs in EC_POINTs_mul() for improved efficiency (up to about 10% better than before for P-192 and P-224). [Bodo Moeller] *) New functions/macros SSL_CTX_set_msg_callback(ctx, cb) SSL_CTX_set_msg_callback_arg(ctx, arg) SSL_set_msg_callback(ssl, cb) SSL_set_msg_callback_arg(ssl, arg) to request calling a callback function void cb(int write_p, int version, int content_type, const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg) whenever a protocol message has been completely received (write_p == 0) or sent (write_p == 1). Here 'version' is the protocol version according to which the SSL library interprets the current protocol message (SSL2_VERSION, SSL3_VERSION, or TLS1_VERSION). 'content_type' is 0 in the case of SSL 2.0, or the content type as defined in the SSL 3.0/TLS 1.0 protocol specification (change_cipher_spec(20), alert(21), handshake(22)). 'buf' and 'len' point to the actual message, 'ssl' to the SSL object, and 'arg' is the application-defined value set by SSL[_CTX]_set_msg_callback_arg(). 'openssl s_client' and 'openssl s_server' have new '-msg' options to enable a callback that displays all protocol messages. [Bodo Moeller] *) Change the shared library support so shared libraries are built as soon as the corresponding static library is finished, and thereby get openssl and the test programs linked against the shared library. This still only happens when the keyword "shard" has been given to the configuration scripts. NOTE: shared library support is still an experimental thing, and backward binary compatibility is still not guaranteed. ["Maciej W. Rozycki" and Richard Levitte] *) Add support for Subject Information Access extension. [Peter Sylvester ] *) Make BUF_MEM_grow() behaviour more consistent: Initialise to zero additional bytes when new memory had to be allocated, not just when reusing an existing buffer. [Bodo Moeller] *) New command line and configuration option 'utf8' for the req command. This allows field values to be specified as UTF8 strings. [Steve Henson] *) Add -multi and -mr options to "openssl speed" - giving multiple parallel runs for the former and machine-readable output for the latter. [Ben Laurie] *) Add '-noemailDN' option to 'openssl ca'. This prevents inclusion of the e-mail address in the DN (i.e., it will go into a certificate extension only). The new configuration file option 'email_in_dn = no' has the same effect. [Massimiliano Pala madwolf@openca.org] *) Change all functions with names starting with des_ to be starting with DES_ instead. Add wrappers that are compatible with libdes, but are named _ossl_old_des_*. Finally, add macros that map the des_* symbols to the corresponding _ossl_old_des_* if libdes compatibility is desired. If OpenSSL 0.9.6c compatibility is desired, the des_* symbols will be mapped to DES_*, with one exception. Since we provide two compatibility mappings, the user needs to define the macro OPENSSL_DES_LIBDES_COMPATIBILITY if libdes compatibility is desired. The default (i.e., when that macro isn't defined) is OpenSSL 0.9.6c compatibility. There are also macros that enable and disable the support of old des functions altogether. Those are OPENSSL_ENABLE_OLD_DES_SUPPORT and OPENSSL_DISABLE_OLD_DES_SUPPORT. If none or both of those are defined, the default will apply: to support the old des routines. In either case, one must include openssl/des.h to get the correct definitions. Do not try to just include openssl/des_old.h, that won't work. NOTE: This is a major break of an old API into a new one. Software authors are encouraged to switch to the DES_ style functions. Some time in the future, des_old.h and the libdes compatibility functions will be disable (i.e. OPENSSL_DISABLE_OLD_DES_SUPPORT will be the default), and then completely removed. [Richard Levitte] *) Test for certificates which contain unsupported critical extensions. If such a certificate is found during a verify operation it is rejected by default: this behaviour can be overridden by either handling the new error X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION or by setting the verify flag X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL. A new function X509_supported_extension() has also been added which returns 1 if a particular extension is supported. [Steve Henson] *) Modify the behaviour of EVP cipher functions in similar way to digests to retain compatibility with existing code. [Steve Henson] *) Modify the behaviour of EVP_DigestInit() and EVP_DigestFinal() to retain compatibility with existing code. In particular the 'ctx' parameter does not have to be to be initialized before the call to EVP_DigestInit() and it is tidied up after a call to EVP_DigestFinal(). New function EVP_DigestFinal_ex() which does not tidy up the ctx. Similarly function EVP_MD_CTX_copy() changed to not require the destination to be initialized valid and new function EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex() added which requires the destination to be valid. Modify all the OpenSSL digest calls to use EVP_DigestInit_ex(), EVP_DigestFinal_ex() and EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(). [Steve Henson] *) Change ssl3_get_message (ssl/s3_both.c) and the functions using it so that complete 'Handshake' protocol structures are kept in memory instead of overwriting 'msg_type' and 'length' with 'body' data. [Bodo Moeller] *) Add an implementation of SSL_add_dir_cert_subjects_to_stack for Win32. [Massimo Santin via Richard Levitte] *) Major restructuring to the underlying ENGINE code. This includes reduction of linker bloat, separation of pure "ENGINE" manipulation (initialisation, etc) from functionality dealing with implementations of specific crypto interfaces. This change also introduces integrated support for symmetric ciphers and digest implementations - so ENGINEs can now accelerate these by providing EVP_CIPHER and EVP_MD implementations of their own. This is detailed in crypto/engine/README as it couldn't be adequately described here. However, there are a few API changes worth noting - some RSA, DSA, DH, and RAND functions that were changed in the original introduction of ENGINE code have now reverted back - the hooking from this code to ENGINE is now a good deal more passive and at run-time, operations deal directly with RSA_METHODs, DSA_METHODs (etc) as they did before, rather than dereferencing through an ENGINE pointer any more. Also, the ENGINE functions dealing with BN_MOD_EXP[_CRT] handlers have been removed - they were not being used by the framework as there is no concept of a BIGNUM_METHOD and they could not be generalised to the new 'ENGINE_TABLE' mechanism that underlies the new code. Similarly, ENGINE_cpy() has been removed as it cannot be consistently defined in the new code. [Geoff Thorpe] *) Change ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_check() to allow fractional seconds. [Steve Henson] *) Change mkdef.pl to sort symbols that get the same entry number, and make sure the automatically generated functions ERR_load_* become part of libeay.num as well. [Richard Levitte] *) New function SSL_renegotiate_pending(). This returns true once renegotiation has been requested (either SSL_renegotiate() call or HelloRequest/ClientHello received from the peer) and becomes false once a handshake has been completed. (For servers, SSL_renegotiate() followed by SSL_do_handshake() sends a HelloRequest, but does not ensure that a handshake takes place. SSL_renegotiate_pending() is useful for checking if the client has followed the request.) [Bodo Moeller] *) New SSL option SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION. By default, clients may request session resumption even during renegotiation (if session ID contexts permit); with this option, session resumption is possible only in the first handshake. SSL_OP_ALL is now 0x00000FFFL instead of 0x000FFFFFL. This makes more bits available for options that should not be part of SSL_OP_ALL (such as SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION). [Bodo Moeller] *) Add some demos for certificate and certificate request creation. [Steve Henson] *) Make maximum certificate chain size accepted from the peer application settable (SSL*_get/set_max_cert_list()), as proposed by "Douglas E. Engert" . [Lutz Jaenicke] *) Add support for shared libraries for Unixware-7 (Boyd Lynn Gerber ). [Lutz Jaenicke] *) Add a "destroy" handler to ENGINEs that allows structural cleanup to be done prior to destruction. Use this to unload error strings from ENGINEs that load their own error strings. NB: This adds two new API functions to "get" and "set" this destroy handler in an ENGINE. [Geoff Thorpe] *) Alter all existing ENGINE implementations (except "openssl" and "openbsd") to dynamically instantiate their own error strings. This makes them more flexible to be built both as statically-linked ENGINEs and self-contained shared-libraries loadable via the "dynamic" ENGINE. Also, add stub code to each that makes building them as self-contained shared-libraries easier (see README.ENGINE). [Geoff Thorpe] *) Add a "dynamic" ENGINE that provides a mechanism for binding ENGINE implementations into applications that are completely implemented in self-contained shared-libraries. The "dynamic" ENGINE exposes control commands that can be used to configure what shared-library to load and to control aspects of the way it is handled. Also, made an update to the README.ENGINE file that brings its information up-to-date and provides some information and instructions on the "dynamic" ENGINE (ie. how to use it, how to build "dynamic"-loadable ENGINEs, etc). [Geoff Thorpe] *) Make it possible to unload ranges of ERR strings with a new "ERR_unload_strings" function. [Geoff Thorpe] *) Add a copy() function to EVP_MD. [Ben Laurie] *) Make EVP_MD routines take a context pointer instead of just the md_data void pointer. [Ben Laurie] *) Add flags to EVP_MD and EVP_MD_CTX. EVP_MD_FLAG_ONESHOT indicates that the digest can only process a single chunk of data (typically because it is provided by a piece of hardware). EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_ONESHOT indicates that the application is only going to provide a single chunk of data, and hence the framework needn't accumulate the data for oneshot drivers. [Ben Laurie] *) As with "ERR", make it possible to replace the underlying "ex_data" functions. This change also alters the storage and management of global ex_data state - it's now all inside ex_data.c and all "class" code (eg. RSA, BIO, SSL_CTX, etc) no longer stores its own STACKS and per-class index counters. The API functions that use this state have been changed to take a "class_index" rather than pointers to the class's local STACK and counter, and there is now an API function to dynamically create new classes. This centralisation allows us to (a) plug a lot of the thread-safety problems that existed, and (b) makes it possible to clean up all allocated state using "CRYPTO_cleanup_all_ex_data()". W.r.t. (b) such data would previously have always leaked in application code and workarounds were in place to make the memory debugging turn a blind eye to it. Application code that doesn't use this new function will still leak as before, but their memory debugging output will announce it now rather than letting it slide. Besides the addition of CRYPTO_cleanup_all_ex_data(), another API change induced by the "ex_data" overhaul is that X509_STORE_CTX_init() now has a return value to indicate success or failure. [Geoff Thorpe] *) Make it possible to replace the underlying "ERR" functions such that the global state (2 LHASH tables and 2 locks) is only used by the "default" implementation. This change also adds two functions to "get" and "set" the implementation prior to it being automatically set the first time any other ERR function takes place. Ie. an application can call "get", pass the return value to a module it has just loaded, and that module can call its own "set" function using that value. This means the module's "ERR" operations will use (and modify) the error state in the application and not in its own statically linked copy of OpenSSL code. [Geoff Thorpe] *) Give DH, DSA, and RSA types their own "**_up_ref()" function to increment reference counts. This performs normal REF_PRINT/REF_CHECK macros on the operation, and provides a more encapsulated way for external code (crypto/evp/ and ssl/) to do this. Also changed the evp and ssl code to use these functions rather than manually incrementing the counts. Also rename "DSO_up()" function to more descriptive "DSO_up_ref()". [Geoff Thorpe] *) Add EVP test program. [Ben Laurie] *) Add symmetric cipher support to ENGINE. Expect the API to change! [Ben Laurie] *) New CRL functions: X509_CRL_set_version(), X509_CRL_set_issuer_name() X509_CRL_set_lastUpdate(), X509_CRL_set_nextUpdate(), X509_CRL_sort(), X509_REVOKED_set_serialNumber(), and X509_REVOKED_set_revocationDate(). These allow a CRL to be built without having to access X509_CRL fields directly. Modify 'ca' application to use new functions. [Steve Henson] *) Move SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG out of the SSL_OP_ALL list of recommended bug workarounds. Rollback attack detection is a security feature. The problem will only arise on OpenSSL servers when TLSv1 is not available (sslv3_server_method() or SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1). Software authors not wanting to support TLSv1 will have special reasons for their choice and can explicitly enable this option. [Bodo Moeller, Lutz Jaenicke] *) Rationalise EVP so it can be extended: don't include a union of cipher/digest structures, add init/cleanup functions for EVP_MD_CTX (similar to those existing for EVP_CIPHER_CTX). Usage example: EVP_MD_CTX md; EVP_MD_CTX_init(&md); /* new function call */ EVP_DigestInit(&md, EVP_sha1()); EVP_DigestUpdate(&md, in, len); EVP_DigestFinal(&md, out, NULL); EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&md); /* new function call */ [Ben Laurie] *) Make DES key schedule conform to the usual scheme, as well as correcting its structure. This means that calls to DES functions now have to pass a pointer to a des_key_schedule instead of a plain des_key_schedule (which was actually always a pointer anyway): E.g., des_key_schedule ks; des_set_key_checked(..., &ks); des_ncbc_encrypt(..., &ks, ...); (Note that a later change renames 'des_...' into 'DES_...'.) [Ben Laurie] *) Initial reduction of linker bloat: the use of some functions, such as PEM causes large amounts of unused functions to be linked in due to poor organisation. For example pem_all.c contains every PEM function which has a knock on effect of linking in large amounts of (unused) ASN1 code. Grouping together similar functions and splitting unrelated functions prevents this. [Steve Henson] *) Cleanup of EVP macros. [Ben Laurie] *) Change historical references to {NID,SN,LN}_des_ede and ede3 to add the correct _ecb suffix. [Ben Laurie] *) Add initial OCSP responder support to ocsp application. The revocation information is handled using the text based index use by the ca application. The responder can either handle requests generated internally, supplied in files (for example via a CGI script) or using an internal minimal server. [Steve Henson] *) Add configuration choices to get zlib compression for TLS. [Richard Levitte] *) Changes to Kerberos SSL for RFC 2712 compliance: 1. Implemented real KerberosWrapper, instead of just using KRB5 AP_REQ message. [Thanks to Simon Wilkinson ] 2. Implemented optional authenticator field of KerberosWrapper. Added openssl-style ASN.1 macros for Kerberos ticket, ap_req, and authenticator structs; see crypto/krb5/. Generalized Kerberos calls to support multiple Kerberos libraries. [Vern Staats , Jeffrey Altman via Richard Levitte] *) Cause 'openssl speed' to use fully hard-coded DSA keys as it already does with RSA. testdsa.h now has 'priv_key/pub_key' values for each of the key sizes rather than having just parameters (and 'speed' generating keys each time). [Geoff Thorpe] *) Speed up EVP routines. Before: encrypt type 8 bytes 64 bytes 256 bytes 1024 bytes 8192 bytes des-cbc 4408.85k 5560.51k 5778.46k 5862.20k 5825.16k des-cbc 4389.55k 5571.17k 5792.23k 5846.91k 5832.11k des-cbc 4394.32k 5575.92k 5807.44k 5848.37k 5841.30k decrypt des-cbc 3482.66k 5069.49k 5496.39k 5614.16k 5639.28k des-cbc 3480.74k 5068.76k 5510.34k 5609.87k 5635.52k des-cbc 3483.72k 5067.62k 5504.60k 5708.01k 5724.80k After: encrypt des-cbc 4660.16k 5650.19k 5807.19k 5827.13k 5783.32k decrypt des-cbc 3624.96k 5258.21k 5530.91k 5624.30k 5628.26k [Ben Laurie] *) Added the OS2-EMX target. ["Brian Havard" and Richard Levitte] *) Rewrite apps to use NCONF routines instead of the old CONF. New functions to support NCONF routines in extension code. New function CONF_set_nconf() to allow functions which take an NCONF to also handle the old LHASH structure: this means that the old CONF compatible routines can be retained (in particular wrt extensions) without having to duplicate the code. New function X509V3_add_ext_nconf_sk to add extensions to a stack. [Steve Henson] *) Enhance the general user interface with mechanisms for inner control and with possibilities to have yes/no kind of prompts. [Richard Levitte] *) Change all calls to low level digest routines in the library and applications to use EVP. Add missing calls to HMAC_cleanup() and don't assume HMAC_CTX can be copied using memcpy(). [Verdon Walker , Steve Henson] *) Add the possibility to control engines through control names but with arbitrary arguments instead of just a string. Change the key loaders to take a UI_METHOD instead of a callback function pointer. NOTE: this breaks binary compatibility with earlier versions of OpenSSL [engine]. Adapt the nCipher code for these new conditions and add a card insertion callback. [Richard Levitte] *) Enhance the general user interface with mechanisms to better support dialog box interfaces, application-defined prompts, the possibility to use defaults (for example default passwords from somewhere else) and interrupts/cancellations. [Richard Levitte] *) Tidy up PKCS#12 attribute handling. Add support for the CSP name attribute in PKCS#12 files, add new -CSP option to pkcs12 utility. [Steve Henson] *) Fix a memory leak in 'sk_dup()' in the case reallocation fails. (Also tidy up some unnecessarily weird code in 'sk_new()'). [Geoff, reported by Diego Tartara ] *) Change the key loading routines for ENGINEs to use the same kind callback (pem_password_cb) as all other routines that need this kind of callback. [Richard Levitte] *) Increase ENTROPY_NEEDED to 32 bytes, as Rijndael can operate with 256 bit (=32 byte) keys. Of course seeding with more entropy bytes than this minimum value is recommended. [Lutz Jaenicke] *) New random seeder for OpenVMS, using the system process statistics that are easily reachable. [Richard Levitte] *) Windows apparently can't transparently handle global variables defined in DLLs. Initialisations such as: const ASN1_ITEM *it = &ASN1_INTEGER_it; won't compile. This is used by the any applications that need to declare their own ASN1 modules. This was fixed by adding the option EXPORT_VAR_AS_FN to all Win32 platforms, although this isn't strictly needed for static libraries under Win32. [Steve Henson] *) New functions X509_PURPOSE_set() and X509_TRUST_set() to handle setting of purpose and trust fields. New X509_STORE trust and purpose functions and tidy up setting in other SSL functions. [Steve Henson] *) Add copies of X509_STORE_CTX fields and callbacks to X509_STORE structure. These are inherited by X509_STORE_CTX when it is initialised. This allows various defaults to be set in the X509_STORE structure (such as flags for CRL checking and custom purpose or trust settings) for functions which only use X509_STORE_CTX internally such as S/MIME. Modify X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit() so it only sets purposes and trust settings if they are not set in X509_STORE. This allows X509_STORE purposes and trust (in S/MIME for example) to override any set by default. Add command line options for CRL checking to smime, s_client and s_server applications. [Steve Henson] *) Initial CRL based revocation checking. If the CRL checking flag(s) are set then the CRL is looked up in the X509_STORE structure and its validity and signature checked, then if the certificate is found in the CRL the verify fails with a revoked error. Various new CRL related callbacks added to X509_STORE_CTX structure. Command line options added to 'verify' application to support this. This needs some additional work, such as being able to handle multiple CRLs with different times, extension based lookup (rather than just by subject name) and ultimately more complete V2 CRL extension handling. [Steve Henson] *) Add a general user interface API (crypto/ui/). This is designed to replace things like des_read_password and friends (backward compatibility functions using this new API are provided). The purpose is to remove prompting functions from the DES code section as well as provide for prompting through dialog boxes in a window system and the like. [Richard Levitte] *) Add "ex_data" support to ENGINE so implementations can add state at a per-structure level rather than having to store it globally. [Geoff] *) Make it possible for ENGINE structures to be copied when retrieved by ENGINE_by_id() if the ENGINE specifies a new flag: ENGINE_FLAGS_BY_ID_COPY. This causes the "original" ENGINE structure to act like a template, analogous to the RSA vs. RSA_METHOD type of separation. Because of this operational state can be localised to each ENGINE structure, despite the fact they all share the same "methods". New ENGINE structures returned in this case have no functional references and the return value is the single structural reference. This matches the single structural reference returned by ENGINE_by_id() normally, when it is incremented on the pre-existing ENGINE structure. [Geoff] *) Fix ASN1 decoder when decoding type ANY and V_ASN1_OTHER: since this needs to match any other type at all we need to manually clear the tag cache. [Steve Henson] *) Changes to the "openssl engine" utility to include; - verbosity levels ('-v', '-vv', and '-vvv') that provide information about an ENGINE's available control commands. - executing control commands from command line arguments using the '-pre' and '-post' switches. '-post' is only used if '-t' is specified and the ENGINE is successfully initialised. The syntax for the individual commands are colon-separated, for example; openssl engine chil -pre FORK_CHECK:0 -pre SO_PATH:/lib/test.so [Geoff] *) New dynamic control command support for ENGINEs. ENGINEs can now declare their own commands (numbers), names (strings), descriptions, and input types for run-time discovery by calling applications. A subset of these commands are implicitly classed as "executable" depending on their input type, and only these can be invoked through the new string-based API function ENGINE_ctrl_cmd_string(). (Eg. this can be based on user input, config files, etc). The distinction is that "executable" commands cannot return anything other than a boolean result and can only support numeric or string input, whereas some discoverable commands may only be for direct use through ENGINE_ctrl(), eg. supporting the exchange of binary data, function pointers, or other custom uses. The "executable" commands are to support parameterisations of ENGINE behaviour that can be unambiguously defined by ENGINEs and used consistently across any OpenSSL-based application. Commands have been added to all the existing hardware-supporting ENGINEs, noticeably "SO_PATH" to allow control over shared-library paths without source code alterations. [Geoff] *) Changed all ENGINE implementations to dynamically allocate their ENGINEs rather than declaring them statically. Apart from this being necessary with the removal of the ENGINE_FLAGS_MALLOCED distinction, this also allows the implementations to compile without using the internal engine_int.h header. [Geoff] *) Minor adjustment to "rand" code. RAND_get_rand_method() now returns a 'const' value. Any code that should be able to modify a RAND_METHOD should already have non-const pointers to it (ie. they should only modify their own ones). [Geoff] *) Made a variety of little tweaks to the ENGINE code. - "atalla" and "ubsec" string definitions were moved from header files to C code. "nuron" string definitions were placed in variables rather than hard-coded - allowing parameterisation of these values later on via ctrl() commands. - Removed unused "#if 0"'d code. - Fixed engine list iteration code so it uses ENGINE_free() to release structural references. - Constified the RAND_METHOD element of ENGINE structures. - Constified various get/set functions as appropriate and added missing functions (including a catch-all ENGINE_cpy that duplicates all ENGINE values onto a new ENGINE except reference counts/state). - Removed NULL parameter checks in get/set functions. Setting a method or function to NULL is a way of cancelling out a previously set value. Passing a NULL ENGINE parameter is just plain stupid anyway and doesn't justify the extra error symbols and code. - Deprecate the ENGINE_FLAGS_MALLOCED define and move the area for flags from engine_int.h to engine.h. - Changed prototypes for ENGINE handler functions (init(), finish(), ctrl(), key-load functions, etc) to take an (ENGINE*) parameter. [Geoff] *) Implement binary inversion algorithm for BN_mod_inverse in addition to the algorithm using long division. The binary algorithm can be used only if the modulus is odd. On 32-bit systems, it is faster only for relatively small moduli (roughly 20-30% for 128-bit moduli, roughly 5-15% for 256-bit moduli), so we use it only for moduli up to 450 bits. In 64-bit environments, the binary algorithm appears to be advantageous for much longer moduli; here we use it for moduli up to 2048 bits. [Bodo Moeller] *) Rewrite CHOICE field setting in ASN1_item_ex_d2i(). The old code could not support the combine flag in choice fields. [Steve Henson] *) Add a 'copy_extensions' option to the 'ca' utility. This copies extensions from a certificate request to the certificate. [Steve Henson] *) Allow multiple 'certopt' and 'nameopt' options to be separated by commas. Add 'namopt' and 'certopt' options to the 'ca' config file: this allows the display of the certificate about to be signed to be customised, to allow certain fields to be included or excluded and extension details. The old system didn't display multicharacter strings properly, omitted fields not in the policy and couldn't display additional details such as extensions. [Steve Henson] *) Function EC_POINTs_mul for multiple scalar multiplication of an arbitrary number of elliptic curve points \sum scalars[i]*points[i], optionally including the generator defined for the EC_GROUP: scalar*generator + \sum scalars[i]*points[i]. EC_POINT_mul is a simple wrapper function for the typical case that the point list has just one item (besides the optional generator). [Bodo Moeller] *) First EC_METHODs for curves over GF(p): EC_GFp_simple_method() uses the basic BN_mod_mul and BN_mod_sqr operations and provides various method functions that can also operate with faster implementations of modular arithmetic. EC_GFp_mont_method() reuses most functions that are part of EC_GFp_simple_method, but uses Montgomery arithmetic. [Bodo Moeller; point addition and point doubling implementation directly derived from source code provided by Lenka Fibikova ] *) Framework for elliptic curves (crypto/ec/ec.h, crypto/ec/ec_lcl.h, crypto/ec/ec_lib.c): Curves are EC_GROUP objects (with an optional group generator) based on EC_METHODs that are built into the library. Points are EC_POINT objects based on EC_GROUP objects. Most of the framework would be able to handle curves over arbitrary finite fields, but as there are no obvious types for fields other than GF(p), some functions are limited to that for now. [Bodo Moeller] *) Add the -HTTP option to s_server. It is similar to -WWW, but requires that the file contains a complete HTTP response. [Richard Levitte] *) Add the ec directory to mkdef.pl and mkfiles.pl. In mkdef.pl change the def and num file printf format specifier from "%-40sXXX" to "%-39s XXX". The latter will always guarantee a space after the field while the former will cause them to run together if the field is 40 of more characters long. [Steve Henson] *) Constify the cipher and digest 'method' functions and structures and modify related functions to take constant EVP_MD and EVP_CIPHER pointers. [Steve Henson] *) Hide BN_CTX structure details in bn_lcl.h instead of publishing them in . Also further increase BN_CTX_NUM to 32. [Bodo Moeller] *) Modify EVP_Digest*() routines so they now return values. Although the internal software routines can never fail additional hardware versions might. [Steve Henson] *) Clean up crypto/err/err.h and change some error codes to avoid conflicts: Previously ERR_R_FATAL was too small and coincided with ERR_LIB_PKCS7 (= ERR_R_PKCS7_LIB); it is now 64 instead of 32. ASN1 error codes ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR ... ERR_R_MISSING_ASN1_EOS were 4 .. 9, conflicting with ERR_LIB_RSA (= ERR_R_RSA_LIB) ... ERR_LIB_PEM (= ERR_R_PEM_LIB). They are now 58 .. 63 (i.e., just below ERR_R_FATAL). Add new error code 'ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR'. [Bodo Moeller] *) Don't overuse locks in crypto/err/err.c: For data retrieval, CRYPTO_r_lock suffices. [Bodo Moeller] *) New option '-subj arg' for 'openssl req' and 'openssl ca'. This sets the subject name for a new request or supersedes the subject name in a given request. Formats that can be parsed are 'CN=Some Name, OU=myOU, C=IT' and 'CN=Some Name/OU=myOU/C=IT'. Add options '-batch' and '-verbose' to 'openssl req'. [Massimiliano Pala ] *) Introduce the possibility to access global variables through functions on platform were that's the best way to handle exporting global variables in shared libraries. To enable this functionality, one must configure with "EXPORT_VAR_AS_FN" or defined the C macro "OPENSSL_EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION" in crypto/opensslconf.h (the latter is normally done by Configure or something similar). To implement a global variable, use the macro OPENSSL_IMPLEMENT_GLOBAL in the source file (foo.c) like this: OPENSSL_IMPLEMENT_GLOBAL(int,foo)=1; OPENSSL_IMPLEMENT_GLOBAL(double,bar); To declare a global variable, use the macros OPENSSL_DECLARE_GLOBAL and OPENSSL_GLOBAL_REF in the header file (foo.h) like this: OPENSSL_DECLARE_GLOBAL(int,foo); #define foo OPENSSL_GLOBAL_REF(foo) OPENSSL_DECLARE_GLOBAL(double,bar); #define bar OPENSSL_GLOBAL_REF(bar) The #defines are very important, and therefore so is including the header file everywhere where the defined globals are used. The macro OPENSSL_EXPORT_VAR_AS_FUNCTION also affects the definition of ASN.1 items, but that structure is a bit different. The largest change is in util/mkdef.pl which has been enhanced with better and easier to understand logic to choose which symbols should go into the Windows .def files as well as a number of fixes and code cleanup (among others, algorithm keywords are now sorted lexicographically to avoid constant rewrites). [Richard Levitte] *) In BN_div() keep a copy of the sign of 'num' before writing the result to 'rm' because if rm==num the value will be overwritten and produce the wrong result if 'num' is negative: this caused problems with BN_mod() and BN_nnmod(). [Steve Henson] *) Function OCSP_request_verify(). This checks the signature on an OCSP request and verifies the signer certificate. The signer certificate is just checked for a generic purpose and OCSP request trust settings. [Steve Henson] *) Add OCSP_check_validity() function to check the validity of OCSP responses. OCSP responses are prepared in real time and may only be a few seconds old. Simply checking that the current time lies between thisUpdate and nextUpdate max reject otherwise valid responses caused by either OCSP responder or client clock inaccuracy. Instead we allow thisUpdate and nextUpdate to fall within a certain period of the current time. The age of the response can also optionally be checked. Two new options -validity_period and -status_age added to ocsp utility. [Steve Henson] *) If signature or public key algorithm is unrecognized print out its OID rather that just UNKNOWN. [Steve Henson] *) Change OCSP_cert_to_id() to tolerate a NULL subject certificate and OCSP_cert_id_new() a NULL serialNumber. This allows a partial certificate ID to be generated from the issuer certificate alone which can then be passed to OCSP_id_issuer_cmp(). [Steve Henson] *) New compilation option ASN1_ITEM_FUNCTIONS. This causes the new ASN1 modules to export functions returning ASN1_ITEM pointers instead of the ASN1_ITEM structures themselves. This adds several new macros which allow the underlying ASN1 function/structure to be accessed transparently. As a result code should not use ASN1_ITEM references directly (such as &X509_it) but instead use the relevant macros (such as ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509)). This option is to allow use of the new ASN1 code on platforms where exporting structures is problematical (for example in shared libraries) but exporting functions returning pointers to structures is not. [Steve Henson] *) Add support for overriding the generation of SSL/TLS session IDs. These callbacks can be registered either in an SSL_CTX or per SSL. The purpose of this is to allow applications to control, if they wish, the arbitrary values chosen for use as session IDs, particularly as it can be useful for session caching in multiple-server environments. A command-line switch for testing this (and any client code that wishes to use such a feature) has been added to "s_server". [Geoff Thorpe, Lutz Jaenicke] *) Modify mkdef.pl to recognise and parse preprocessor conditionals of the form '#if defined(...) || defined(...) || ...' and '#if !defined(...) && !defined(...) && ...'. This also avoids the growing number of special cases it was previously handling. [Richard Levitte] *) Make all configuration macros available for application by making sure they are available in opensslconf.h, by giving them names starting with "OPENSSL_" to avoid conflicts with other packages and by making sure e_os2.h will cover all platform-specific cases together with opensslconf.h. Additionally, it is now possible to define configuration/platform- specific names (called "system identities"). In the C code, these are prefixed with "OPENSSL_SYSNAME_". e_os2.h will create another macro with the name beginning with "OPENSSL_SYS_", which is determined from "OPENSSL_SYSNAME_*" or compiler-specific macros depending on what is available. [Richard Levitte] *) New option -set_serial to 'req' and 'x509' this allows the serial number to use to be specified on the command line. Previously self signed certificates were hard coded with serial number 0 and the CA options of 'x509' had to use a serial number in a file which was auto incremented. [Steve Henson] *) New options to 'ca' utility to support V2 CRL entry extensions. Currently CRL reason, invalidity date and hold instruction are supported. Add new CRL extensions to V3 code and some new objects. [Steve Henson] *) New function EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding() this is used to disable standard block padding (aka PKCS#5 padding) in the EVP API, which was previously mandatory. This means that the data is not padded in any way and so the total length much be a multiple of the block size, otherwise an error occurs. [Steve Henson] *) Initial (incomplete) OCSP SSL support. [Steve Henson] *) New function OCSP_parse_url(). This splits up a URL into its host, port and path components: primarily to parse OCSP URLs. New -url option to ocsp utility. [Steve Henson] *) New nonce behavior. The return value of OCSP_check_nonce() now reflects the various checks performed. Applications can decide whether to tolerate certain situations such as an absent nonce in a response when one was present in a request: the ocsp application just prints out a warning. New function OCSP_add1_basic_nonce() this is to allow responders to include a nonce in a response even if the request is nonce-less. [Steve Henson] *) Disable stdin buffering in load_cert (apps/apps.c) so that no certs are skipped when using openssl x509 multiple times on a single input file, e.g. "(openssl x509 -out cert1; openssl x509 -out cert2) ] *) New OCSP verify flag OCSP_TRUSTOTHER. When set the "other" certificates passed by the function are trusted implicitly. If any of them signed the response then it is assumed to be valid and is not verified. [Steve Henson] *) In PKCS7_set_type() initialise content_type in PKCS7_ENC_CONTENT to data. This was previously part of the PKCS7 ASN1 code. This was causing problems with OpenSSL created PKCS#12 and PKCS#7 structures. [Steve Henson, reported by Kenneth R. Robinette ] *) Add CRYPTO_push_info() and CRYPTO_pop_info() calls to new ASN1 routines: without these tracing memory leaks is very painful. Fix leaks in PKCS12 and PKCS7 routines. [Steve Henson] *) Make X509_time_adj() cope with the new behaviour of ASN1_TIME_new(). Previously it initialised the 'type' argument to V_ASN1_UTCTIME which effectively meant GeneralizedTime would never be used. Now it is initialised to -1 but X509_time_adj() now has to check the value and use ASN1_TIME_set() if the value is not V_ASN1_UTCTIME or V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME, without this it always uses GeneralizedTime. [Steve Henson, reported by Kenneth R. Robinette ] *) Fixes to BN_to_ASN1_INTEGER when bn is zero. This would previously result in a zero length in the ASN1_INTEGER structure which was not consistent with the structure when d2i_ASN1_INTEGER() was used and would cause ASN1_INTEGER_cmp() to fail. Enhance s2i_ASN1_INTEGER() to cope with hex and negative integers. Fix bug in i2a_ASN1_INTEGER() where it did not print out a minus for negative ASN1_INTEGER. [Steve Henson] *) Add summary printout to ocsp utility. The various functions which convert status values to strings have been renamed to: OCSP_response_status_str(), OCSP_cert_status_str() and OCSP_crl_reason_str() and are no longer static. New options to verify nonce values and to disable verification. OCSP response printout format cleaned up. [Steve Henson] *) Add additional OCSP certificate checks. These are those specified in RFC2560. This consists of two separate checks: the CA of the certificate being checked must either be the OCSP signer certificate or the issuer of the OCSP signer certificate. In the latter case the OCSP signer certificate must contain the OCSP signing extended key usage. This check is performed by attempting to match the OCSP signer or the OCSP signer CA to the issuerNameHash and issuerKeyHash in the OCSP_CERTID structures of the response. [Steve Henson] *) Initial OCSP certificate verification added to OCSP_basic_verify() and related routines. This uses the standard OpenSSL certificate verify routines to perform initial checks (just CA validity) and to obtain the certificate chain. Then additional checks will be performed on the chain. Currently the root CA is checked to see if it is explicitly trusted for OCSP signing. This is used to set a root CA as a global signing root: that is any certificate that chains to that CA is an acceptable OCSP signing certificate. [Steve Henson] *) New '-extfile ...' option to 'openssl ca' for reading X.509v3 extensions from a separate configuration file. As when reading extensions from the main configuration file, the '-extensions ...' option may be used for specifying the section to use. [Massimiliano Pala ] *) New OCSP utility. Allows OCSP requests to be generated or read. The request can be sent to a responder and the output parsed, outputted or printed in text form. Not complete yet: still needs to check the OCSP response validity. [Steve Henson] *) New subcommands for 'openssl ca': 'openssl ca -status ' prints the status of the cert with the given serial number (according to the index file). 'openssl ca -updatedb' updates the expiry status of certificates in the index file. [Massimiliano Pala ] *) New '-newreq-nodes' command option to CA.pl. This is like '-newreq', but calls 'openssl req' with the '-nodes' option so that the resulting key is not encrypted. [Damien Miller ] *) New configuration for the GNU Hurd. [Jonathan Bartlett via Richard Levitte] *) Initial code to implement OCSP basic response verify. This is currently incomplete. Currently just finds the signer's certificate and verifies the signature on the response. [Steve Henson] *) New SSLeay_version code SSLEAY_DIR to determine the compiled-in value of OPENSSLDIR. This is available via the new '-d' option to 'openssl version', and is also included in 'openssl version -a'. [Bodo Moeller] *) Allowing defining memory allocation callbacks that will be given file name and line number information in additional arguments (a const char* and an int). The basic functionality remains, as well as the original possibility to just replace malloc(), realloc() and free() by functions that do not know about these additional arguments. To register and find out the current settings for extended allocation functions, the following functions are provided: CRYPTO_set_mem_ex_functions CRYPTO_set_locked_mem_ex_functions CRYPTO_get_mem_ex_functions CRYPTO_get_locked_mem_ex_functions These work the same way as CRYPTO_set_mem_functions and friends. CRYPTO_get_[locked_]mem_functions now writes 0 where such an extended allocation function is enabled. Similarly, CRYPTO_get_[locked_]mem_ex_functions writes 0 where a conventional allocation function is enabled. [Richard Levitte, Bodo Moeller] *) Finish off removing the remaining LHASH function pointer casts. There should no longer be any prototype-casting required when using the LHASH abstraction, and any casts that remain are "bugs". See the callback types and macros at the head of lhash.h for details (and "OBJ_cleanup" in crypto/objects/obj_dat.c as an example). [Geoff Thorpe] *) Add automatic query of EGD sockets in RAND_poll() for the unix variant. If /dev/[u]random devices are not available or do not return enough entropy, EGD style sockets (served by EGD or PRNGD) will automatically be queried. The locations /var/run/egd-pool, /dev/egd-pool, /etc/egd-pool, and /etc/entropy will be queried once each in this sequence, querying stops when enough entropy was collected without querying more sockets. [Lutz Jaenicke] *) Change the Unix RAND_poll() variant to be able to poll several random devices, as specified by DEVRANDOM, until a sufficient amount of data has been collected. We spend at most 10 ms on each file (select timeout) and read in non-blocking mode. DEVRANDOM now defaults to the list "/dev/urandom", "/dev/random", "/dev/srandom" (previously it was just the string "/dev/urandom"), so on typical platforms the 10 ms delay will never occur. Also separate out the Unix variant to its own file, rand_unix.c. For VMS, there's a currently-empty rand_vms.c. [Richard Levitte] *) Move OCSP client related routines to ocsp_cl.c. These provide utility functions which an application needing to issue a request to an OCSP responder and analyse the response will typically need: as opposed to those which an OCSP responder itself would need which will be added later. OCSP_request_sign() signs an OCSP request with an API similar to PKCS7_sign(). OCSP_response_status() returns status of OCSP response. OCSP_response_get1_basic() extracts basic response from response. OCSP_resp_find_status(): finds and extracts status information from an OCSP_CERTID structure (which will be created when the request structure is built). These are built from lower level functions which work on OCSP_SINGLERESP structures but won't normally be used unless the application wishes to examine extensions in the OCSP response for example. Replace nonce routines with a pair of functions. OCSP_request_add1_nonce() adds a nonce value and optionally generates a random value. OCSP_check_nonce() checks the validity of the nonce in an OCSP response. [Steve Henson] *) Change function OCSP_request_add() to OCSP_request_add0_id(). This doesn't copy the supplied OCSP_CERTID and avoids the need to free up the newly created id. Change return type to OCSP_ONEREQ to return the internal OCSP_ONEREQ structure. This can then be used to add extensions to the request. Deleted OCSP_request_new(), since most of its functionality is now in OCSP_REQUEST_new() (and the case insensitive name clash) apart from the ability to set the request name which will be added elsewhere. [Steve Henson] *) Update OCSP API. Remove obsolete extensions argument from various functions. Extensions are now handled using the new OCSP extension code. New simple OCSP HTTP function which can be used to send requests and parse the response. [Steve Henson] *) Fix the PKCS#7 (S/MIME) code to work with new ASN1. Two new ASN1_ITEM structures help with sign and verify. PKCS7_ATTR_SIGN uses the special reorder version of SET OF to sort the attributes and reorder them to match the encoded order. This resolves a long standing problem: a verify on a PKCS7 structure just after signing it used to fail because the attribute order did not match the encoded order. PKCS7_ATTR_VERIFY does not reorder the attributes: it uses the received order. This is necessary to tolerate some broken software that does not order SET OF. This is handled by encoding as a SEQUENCE OF but using implicit tagging (with UNIVERSAL class) to produce the required SET OF. [Steve Henson] *) Have mk1mf.pl generate the macros OPENSSL_BUILD_SHLIBCRYPTO and OPENSSL_BUILD_SHLIBSSL and use them appropriately in the header files to get correct declarations of the ASN.1 item variables. [Richard Levitte] *) Rewrite of PKCS#12 code to use new ASN1 functionality. Replace many PKCS#12 macros with real functions. Fix two unrelated ASN1 bugs: asn1_check_tlen() would sometimes attempt to use 'ctx' when it was NULL and ASN1_TYPE was not dereferenced properly in asn1_ex_c2i(). New ASN1 macro: DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM() which just declares the relevant ASN1_ITEM and no wrapper functions. [Steve Henson] *) New functions or ASN1_item_d2i_fp() and ASN1_item_d2i_bio(). These replace the old function pointer based I/O routines. Change most of the *_d2i_bio() and *_d2i_fp() functions to use these. [Steve Henson] *) Enhance mkdef.pl to be more accepting about spacing in C preprocessor lines, recognize more "algorithms" that can be deselected, and make it complain about algorithm deselection that isn't recognised. [Richard Levitte] *) New ASN1 functions to handle dup, sign, verify, digest, pack and unpack operations in terms of ASN1_ITEM. Modify existing wrappers to use new functions. Add NO_ASN1_OLD which can be set to remove some old style ASN1 functions: this can be used to determine if old code will still work when these eventually go away. [Steve Henson] *) New extension functions for OCSP structures, these follow the same conventions as certificates and CRLs. [Steve Henson] *) New function X509V3_add1_i2d(). This automatically encodes and adds an extension. Its behaviour can be customised with various flags to append, replace or delete. Various wrappers added for certificates and CRLs. [Steve Henson] *) Fix to avoid calling the underlying ASN1 print routine when an extension cannot be parsed. Correct a typo in the OCSP_SERVICELOC extension. Tidy up print OCSP format. [Steve Henson] *) Make mkdef.pl parse some of the ASN1 macros and add appropriate entries for variables. [Steve Henson] *) Add functionality to apps/openssl.c for detecting locking problems: As the program is single-threaded, all we have to do is register a locking callback using an array for storing which locks are currently held by the program. [Bodo Moeller] *) Use a lock around the call to CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index() in SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_idx(), which is used in ssl_verify_cert_chain() and thus can be called at any time during TLS/SSL handshakes so that thread-safety is essential. Unfortunately, the ex_data design is not at all suited for multi-threaded use, so it probably should be abolished. [Bodo Moeller] *) Added Broadcom "ubsec" ENGINE to OpenSSL. [Broadcom, tweaked and integrated by Geoff Thorpe] *) Move common extension printing code to new function X509V3_print_extensions(). Reorganise OCSP print routines and implement some needed OCSP ASN1 functions. Add OCSP extensions. [Steve Henson] *) New function X509_signature_print() to remove duplication in some print routines. [Steve Henson] *) Add a special meaning when SET OF and SEQUENCE OF flags are both set (this was treated exactly the same as SET OF previously). This is used to reorder the STACK representing the structure to match the encoding. This will be used to get round a problem where a PKCS7 structure which was signed could not be verified because the STACK order did not reflect the encoded order. [Steve Henson] *) Reimplement the OCSP ASN1 module using the new code. [Steve Henson] *) Update the X509V3 code to permit the use of an ASN1_ITEM structure for its ASN1 operations. The old style function pointers still exist for now but they will eventually go away. [Steve Henson] *) Merge in replacement ASN1 code from the ASN1 branch. This almost completely replaces the old ASN1 functionality with a table driven encoder and decoder which interprets an ASN1_ITEM structure describing the ASN1 module. Compatibility with the existing ASN1 API (i2d,d2i) is largely maintained. Almost all of the old asn1_mac.h macro based ASN1 has also been converted to the new form. [Steve Henson] *) Change BN_mod_exp_recp so that negative moduli are tolerated (the sign is ignored). Similarly, ignore the sign in BN_MONT_CTX_set so that BN_mod_exp_mont and BN_mod_exp_mont_word work for negative moduli. [Bodo Moeller] *) Fix BN_uadd and BN_usub: Always return non-negative results instead of not touching the result's sign bit. [Bodo Moeller] *) BN_div bugfix: If the result is 0, the sign (res->neg) must not be set. [Bodo Moeller] *) Changed the LHASH code to use prototypes for callbacks, and created macros to declare and implement thin (optionally static) functions that provide type-safety and avoid function pointer casting for the type-specific callbacks. [Geoff Thorpe] *) Added Kerberos Cipher Suites to be used with TLS, as written in RFC 2712. [Veers Staats , Jeffrey Altman , via Richard Levitte] *) Reformat the FAQ so the different questions and answers can be divided in sections depending on the subject. [Richard Levitte] *) Have the zlib compression code load ZLIB.DLL dynamically under Windows. [Richard Levitte] *) New function BN_mod_sqrt for computing square roots modulo a prime (using the probabilistic Tonelli-Shanks algorithm unless p == 3 (mod 4) or p == 5 (mod 8), which are cases that can be handled deterministically). [Lenka Fibikova , Bodo Moeller] *) Make BN_mod_inverse faster by explicitly handling small quotients in the Euclid loop. (Speed gain about 20% for small moduli [256 or 512 bits], about 30% for larger ones [1024 or 2048 bits].) [Bodo Moeller] *) New function BN_kronecker. [Bodo Moeller] *) Fix BN_gcd so that it works on negative inputs; the result is positive unless both parameters are zero. Previously something reasonably close to an infinite loop was possible because numbers could be growing instead of shrinking in the implementation of Euclid's algorithm. [Bodo Moeller] *) Fix BN_is_word() and BN_is_one() macros to take into account the sign of the number in question. Fix BN_is_word(a,w) to work correctly for w == 0. The old BN_is_word(a,w) macro is now called BN_abs_is_word(a,w) because its test if the absolute value of 'a' equals 'w'. Note that BN_abs_is_word does *not* handle w == 0 reliably; it exists mostly for use in the implementations of BN_is_zero(), BN_is_one(), and BN_is_word(). [Bodo Moeller] *) New function BN_swap. [Bodo Moeller] *) Use BN_nnmod instead of BN_mod in crypto/bn/bn_exp.c so that the exponentiation functions are more likely to produce reasonable results on negative inputs. [Bodo Moeller] *) Change BN_mod_mul so that the result is always non-negative. Previously, it could be negative if one of the factors was negative; I don't think anyone really wanted that behaviour. [Bodo Moeller] *) Move BN_mod_... functions into new file crypto/bn/bn_mod.c (except for exponentiation, which stays in crypto/bn/bn_exp.c, and BN_mod_mul_reciprocal, which stays in crypto/bn/bn_recp.c) and add new functions: BN_nnmod BN_mod_sqr BN_mod_add BN_mod_add_quick BN_mod_sub BN_mod_sub_quick BN_mod_lshift1 BN_mod_lshift1_quick BN_mod_lshift BN_mod_lshift_quick These functions always generate non-negative results. BN_nnmod otherwise is like BN_mod (if BN_mod computes a remainder r such that |m| < r < 0, BN_nnmod will output rem + |m| instead). BN_mod_XXX_quick(r, a, [b,] m) generates the same result as BN_mod_XXX(r, a, [b,] m, ctx), but requires that a [and b] be reduced modulo m. [Lenka Fibikova , Bodo Moeller] #if 0 The following entry accidentally appeared in the CHANGES file distributed with OpenSSL 0.9.7. The modifications described in it do *not* apply to OpenSSL 0.9.7. *) Remove a few calls to bn_wexpand() in BN_sqr() (the one in there was actually never needed) and in BN_mul(). The removal in BN_mul() required a small change in bn_mul_part_recursive() and the addition of the functions bn_cmp_part_words(), bn_sub_part_words() and bn_add_part_words(), which do the same thing as bn_cmp_words(), bn_sub_words() and bn_add_words() except they take arrays with differing sizes. [Richard Levitte] #endif *) In 'openssl passwd', verify passwords read from the terminal unless the '-salt' option is used (which usually means that verification would just waste user's time since the resulting hash is going to be compared with some given password hash) or the new '-noverify' option is used. This is an incompatible change, but it does not affect non-interactive use of 'openssl passwd' (passwords on the command line, '-stdin' option, '-in ...' option) and thus should not cause any problems. [Bodo Moeller] *) Remove all references to RSAref, since there's no more need for it. [Richard Levitte] *) Make DSO load along a path given through an environment variable (SHLIB_PATH) with shl_load(). [Richard Levitte] *) Constify the ENGINE code as a result of BIGNUM constification. Also constify the RSA code and most things related to it. In a few places, most notable in the depth of the ASN.1 code, ugly casts back to non-const were required (to be solved at a later time) [Richard Levitte] *) Make it so the openssl application has all engines loaded by default. [Richard Levitte] *) Constify the BIGNUM routines a little more. [Richard Levitte] *) Add the following functions: ENGINE_load_cswift() ENGINE_load_chil() ENGINE_load_atalla() ENGINE_load_nuron() ENGINE_load_builtin_engines() That way, an application can itself choose if external engines that are built-in in OpenSSL shall ever be used or not. The benefit is that applications won't have to be linked with libdl or other dso libraries unless it's really needed. Changed 'openssl engine' to load all engines on demand. Changed the engine header files to avoid the duplication of some declarations (they differed!). [Richard Levitte] *) 'openssl engine' can now list capabilities. [Richard Levitte] *) Better error reporting in 'openssl engine'. [Richard Levitte] *) Never call load_dh_param(NULL) in s_server. [Bodo Moeller] *) Add engine application. It can currently list engines by name and identity, and test if they are actually available. [Richard Levitte] *) Improve RPM specification file by forcing symbolic linking and making sure the installed documentation is also owned by root.root. [Damien Miller ] *) Give the OpenSSL applications more possibilities to make use of keys (public as well as private) handled by engines. [Richard Levitte] *) Add OCSP code that comes from CertCo. [Richard Levitte] *) Add VMS support for the Rijndael code. [Richard Levitte] *) Added untested support for Nuron crypto accelerator. [Ben Laurie] *) Add support for external cryptographic devices. This code was previously distributed separately as the "engine" branch. [Geoff Thorpe, Richard Levitte] *) Rework the filename-translation in the DSO code. It is now possible to have far greater control over how a "name" is turned into a filename depending on the operating environment and any oddities about the different shared library filenames on each system. [Geoff Thorpe] *) Support threads on FreeBSD-elf in Configure. [Richard Levitte] *) Fix for SHA1 assembly problem with MASM: it produces warnings about corrupt line number information when assembling with debugging information. This is caused by the overlapping of two sections. [Bernd Matthes , Steve Henson] *) NCONF changes. NCONF_get_number() has no error checking at all. As a replacement, NCONF_get_number_e() is defined (_e for "error checking") and is promoted strongly. The old NCONF_get_number is kept around for binary backward compatibility. Make it possible for methods to load from something other than a BIO, by providing a function pointer that is given a name instead of a BIO. For example, this could be used to load configuration data from an LDAP server. [Richard Levitte] *) Fix for non blocking accept BIOs. Added new I/O special reason BIO_RR_ACCEPT to cover this case. Previously use of accept BIOs with non blocking I/O was not possible because no retry code was implemented. Also added new SSL code SSL_WANT_ACCEPT to cover this case. [Steve Henson] *) Added the beginnings of Rijndael support. [Ben Laurie] *) Fix for bug in DirectoryString mask setting. Add support for X509_NAME_print_ex() in 'req' and X509_print_ex() function to allow certificate printing to more controllable, additional 'certopt' option to 'x509' to allow new printing options to be set. [Steve Henson] *) Clean old EAY MD5 hack from e_os.h. [Richard Levitte] Changes between 0.9.6l and 0.9.6m [17 Mar 2004] *) Fix null-pointer assignment in do_change_cipher_spec() revealed by using the Codenomicon TLS Test Tool (CVE-2004-0079) [Joe Orton, Steve Henson] Changes between 0.9.6k and 0.9.6l [04 Nov 2003] *) Fix additional bug revealed by the NISCC test suite: Stop bug triggering large recursion when presented with certain ASN.1 tags (CVE-2003-0851) [Steve Henson] Changes between 0.9.6j and 0.9.6k [30 Sep 2003] *) Fix various bugs revealed by running the NISCC test suite: Stop out of bounds reads in the ASN1 code when presented with invalid tags (CVE-2003-0543 and CVE-2003-0544). If verify callback ignores invalid public key errors don't try to check certificate signature with the NULL public key. [Steve Henson] *) In ssl3_accept() (ssl/s3_srvr.c) only accept a client certificate if the server requested one: as stated in TLS 1.0 and SSL 3.0 specifications. [Steve Henson] *) In ssl3_get_client_hello() (ssl/s3_srvr.c), tolerate additional extra data after the compression methods not only for TLS 1.0 but also for SSL 3.0 (as required by the specification). [Bodo Moeller; problem pointed out by Matthias Loepfe] *) Change X509_certificate_type() to mark the key as exported/exportable when it's 512 *bits* long, not 512 bytes. [Richard Levitte] Changes between 0.9.6i and 0.9.6j [10 Apr 2003] *) Countermeasure against the Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 padding: treat a protocol version number mismatch like a decryption error in ssl3_get_client_key_exchange (ssl/s3_srvr.c). [Bodo Moeller] *) Turn on RSA blinding by default in the default implementation to avoid a timing attack. Applications that don't want it can call RSA_blinding_off() or use the new flag RSA_FLAG_NO_BLINDING. They would be ill-advised to do so in most cases. [Ben Laurie, Steve Henson, Geoff Thorpe, Bodo Moeller] *) Change RSA blinding code so that it works when the PRNG is not seeded (in this case, the secret RSA exponent is abused as an unpredictable seed -- if it is not unpredictable, there is no point in blinding anyway). Make RSA blinding thread-safe by remembering the creator's thread ID in rsa->blinding and having all other threads use local one-time blinding factors (this requires more computation than sharing rsa->blinding, but avoids excessive locking; and if an RSA object is not shared between threads, blinding will still be very fast). [Bodo Moeller] Changes between 0.9.6h and 0.9.6i [19 Feb 2003] *) In ssl3_get_record (ssl/s3_pkt.c), minimize information leaked via timing by performing a MAC computation even if incorrect block cipher padding has been found. This is a countermeasure against active attacks where the attacker has to distinguish between bad padding and a MAC verification error. (CVE-2003-0078) [Bodo Moeller; problem pointed out by Brice Canvel (EPFL), Alain Hiltgen (UBS), Serge Vaudenay (EPFL), and Martin Vuagnoux (EPFL, Ilion)] Changes between 0.9.6g and 0.9.6h [5 Dec 2002] *) New function OPENSSL_cleanse(), which is used to cleanse a section of memory from its contents. This is done with a counter that will place alternating values in each byte. This can be used to solve two issues: 1) the removal of calls to memset() by highly optimizing compilers, and 2) cleansing with other values than 0, since those can be read through on certain media, for example a swap space on disk. [Geoff Thorpe] *) Bugfix: client side session caching did not work with external caching, because the session->cipher setting was not restored when reloading from the external cache. This problem was masked, when SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG (part of SSL_OP_ALL) was set. (Found by Steve Haslam .) [Lutz Jaenicke] *) Fix client_certificate (ssl/s2_clnt.c): The permissible total length of the REQUEST-CERTIFICATE message is 18 .. 34, not 17 .. 33. [Zeev Lieber ] *) Undo an undocumented change introduced in 0.9.6e which caused repeated calls to OpenSSL_add_all_ciphers() and OpenSSL_add_all_digests() to be ignored, even after calling EVP_cleanup(). [Richard Levitte] *) Change the default configuration reader to deal with last line not being properly terminated. [Richard Levitte] *) Change X509_NAME_cmp() so it applies the special rules on handling DN values that are of type PrintableString, as well as RDNs of type emailAddress where the value has the type ia5String. [stefank@valicert.com via Richard Levitte] *) Add a SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_STORE flag to take over half the job SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_LOOKUP was inconsistently doing, define a new flag (SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL) to be the bitwise-OR of the two for use by the majority of applications wanting this behaviour, and update the docs. The documented behaviour and actual behaviour were inconsistent and had been changing anyway, so this is more a bug-fix than a behavioural change. [Geoff Thorpe, diagnosed by Nadav Har'El] *) Don't impose a 16-byte length minimum on session IDs in ssl/s3_clnt.c (the SSL 3.0 and TLS 1.0 specifications allow any length up to 32 bytes). [Bodo Moeller] *) Fix initialization code race conditions in SSLv23_method(), SSLv23_client_method(), SSLv23_server_method(), SSLv2_method(), SSLv2_client_method(), SSLv2_server_method(), SSLv3_method(), SSLv3_client_method(), SSLv3_server_method(), TLSv1_method(), TLSv1_client_method(), TLSv1_server_method(), ssl2_get_cipher_by_char(), ssl3_get_cipher_by_char(). [Patrick McCormick , Bodo Moeller] *) Reorder cleanup sequence in SSL_CTX_free(): only remove the ex_data after the cached sessions are flushed, as the remove_cb() might use ex_data contents. Bug found by Sam Varshavchik (see [openssl.org #212]). [Geoff Thorpe, Lutz Jaenicke] *) Fix typo in OBJ_txt2obj which incorrectly passed the content length, instead of the encoding length to d2i_ASN1_OBJECT. [Steve Henson] Changes between 0.9.6f and 0.9.6g [9 Aug 2002] *) [In 0.9.6g-engine release:] Fix crypto/engine/vendor_defns/cswift.h for WIN32 (use '_stdcall'). [Lynn Gazis ] Changes between 0.9.6e and 0.9.6f [8 Aug 2002] *) Fix ASN1 checks. Check for overflow by comparing with LONG_MAX and get fix the header length calculation. [Florian Weimer , Alon Kantor (and others), Steve Henson] *) Use proper error handling instead of 'assertions' in buffer overflow checks added in 0.9.6e. This prevents DoS (the assertions could call abort()). [Arne Ansper , Bodo Moeller] Changes between 0.9.6d and 0.9.6e [30 Jul 2002] *) Add various sanity checks to asn1_get_length() to reject the ASN1 length bytes if they exceed sizeof(long), will appear negative or the content length exceeds the length of the supplied buffer. [Steve Henson, Adi Stav , James Yonan ] *) Fix cipher selection routines: ciphers without encryption had no flags for the cipher strength set and where therefore not handled correctly by the selection routines (PR #130). [Lutz Jaenicke] *) Fix EVP_dsa_sha macro. [Nils Larsch] *) New option SSL_OP_DONT_INSERT_EMPTY_FRAGMENTS for disabling the SSL 3.0/TLS 1.0 CBC vulnerability countermeasure that was added in OpenSSL 0.9.6d. As the countermeasure turned out to be incompatible with some broken SSL implementations, the new option is part of SSL_OP_ALL. SSL_OP_ALL is usually employed when compatibility with weird SSL implementations is desired (e.g. '-bugs' option to 's_client' and 's_server'), so the new option is automatically set in many applications. [Bodo Moeller] *) Changes in security patch: Changes marked "(CHATS)" were sponsored by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) and Air Force Research Laboratory, Air Force Materiel Command, USAF, under agreement number F30602-01-2-0537. *) Add various sanity checks to asn1_get_length() to reject the ASN1 length bytes if they exceed sizeof(long), will appear negative or the content length exceeds the length of the supplied buffer. (CVE-2002-0659) [Steve Henson, Adi Stav , James Yonan ] *) Assertions for various potential buffer overflows, not known to happen in practice. [Ben Laurie (CHATS)] *) Various temporary buffers to hold ASCII versions of integers were too small for 64 bit platforms. (CVE-2002-0655) [Matthew Byng-Maddick and Ben Laurie (CHATS)> *) Remote buffer overflow in SSL3 protocol - an attacker could supply an oversized session ID to a client. (CVE-2002-0656) [Ben Laurie (CHATS)] *) Remote buffer overflow in SSL2 protocol - an attacker could supply an oversized client master key. (CVE-2002-0656) [Ben Laurie (CHATS)] Changes between 0.9.6c and 0.9.6d [9 May 2002] *) Fix crypto/asn1/a_sign.c so that 'parameters' is omitted (not encoded as NULL) with id-dsa-with-sha1. [Nils Larsch ; problem pointed out by Bodo Moeller] *) Check various X509_...() return values in apps/req.c. [Nils Larsch ] *) Fix BASE64 decode (EVP_DecodeUpdate) for data with CR/LF ended lines: an end-of-file condition would erroneously be flagged, when the CRLF was just at the end of a processed block. The bug was discovered when processing data through a buffering memory BIO handing the data to a BASE64-decoding BIO. Bug fund and patch submitted by Pavel Tsekov and Nedelcho Stanev. [Lutz Jaenicke] *) Implement a countermeasure against a vulnerability recently found in CBC ciphersuites in SSL 3.0/TLS 1.0: Send an empty fragment before application data chunks to avoid the use of known IVs with data potentially chosen by the attacker. [Bodo Moeller] *) Fix length checks in ssl3_get_client_hello(). [Bodo Moeller] *) TLS/SSL library bugfix: use s->s3->in_read_app_data differently to prevent ssl3_read_internal() from incorrectly assuming that ssl3_read_bytes() found application data while handshake processing was enabled when in fact s->s3->in_read_app_data was merely automatically cleared during the initial handshake. [Bodo Moeller; problem pointed out by Arne Ansper ] *) Fix object definitions for Private and Enterprise: they were not recognized in their shortname (=lowercase) representation. Extend obj_dat.pl to issue an error when using undefined keywords instead of silently ignoring the problem (Svenning Sorensen ). [Lutz Jaenicke] *) Fix DH_generate_parameters() so that it works for 'non-standard' generators, i.e. generators other than 2 and 5. (Previously, the code did not properly initialise the 'add' and 'rem' values to BN_generate_prime().) In the new general case, we do not insist that 'generator' is actually a primitive root: This requirement is rather pointless; a generator of the order-q subgroup is just as good, if not better. [Bodo Moeller] *) Map new X509 verification errors to alerts. Discovered and submitted by Tom Wu . [Lutz Jaenicke] *) Fix ssl3_pending() (ssl/s3_lib.c) to prevent SSL_pending() from returning non-zero before the data has been completely received when using non-blocking I/O. [Bodo Moeller; problem pointed out by John Hughes] *) Some of the ciphers missed the strength entry (SSL_LOW etc). [Ben Laurie, Lutz Jaenicke] *) Fix bug in SSL_clear(): bad sessions were not removed (found by Yoram Zahavi ). [Lutz Jaenicke] *) Add information about CygWin 1.3 and on, and preserve proper configuration for the versions before that. [Corinna Vinschen and Richard Levitte] *) Make removal from session cache (SSL_CTX_remove_session()) more robust: check whether we deal with a copy of a session and do not delete from the cache in this case. Problem reported by "Izhar Shoshani Levi" . [Lutz Jaenicke] *) Do not store session data into the internal session cache, if it is never intended to be looked up (SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_LOOKUP flag is set). Proposed by Aslam . [Lutz Jaenicke] *) Have ASN1_BIT_STRING_set_bit() really clear a bit when the requested value is 0. [Richard Levitte] *) [In 0.9.6d-engine release:] Fix a crashbug and a logic bug in hwcrhk_load_pubkey(). [Toomas Kiisk via Richard Levitte] *) Add the configuration target linux-s390x. [Neale Ferguson via Richard Levitte] *) The earlier bugfix for the SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C case of ssl3_accept (ssl/s3_srvr.c) incorrectly used a local flag variable as an indication that a ClientHello message has been received. As the flag value will be lost between multiple invocations of ssl3_accept when using non-blocking I/O, the function may not be aware that a handshake has actually taken place, thus preventing a new session from being added to the session cache. To avoid this problem, we now set s->new_session to 2 instead of using a local variable. [Lutz Jaenicke, Bodo Moeller] *) Bugfix: Return -1 from ssl3_get_server_done (ssl3/s3_clnt.c) if the SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH error is detected. [Geoff Thorpe, Bodo Moeller] *) New 'shared_ldflag' column in Configure platform table. [Richard Levitte] *) Fix EVP_CIPHER_mode macro. ["Dan S. Camper" ] *) Fix ssl3_read_bytes (ssl/s3_pkt.c): To ignore messages of unknown type, we must throw them away by setting rr->length to 0. [D P Chang ] Changes between 0.9.6b and 0.9.6c [21 dec 2001] *) Fix BN_rand_range bug pointed out by Dominikus Scherkl . (The previous implementation worked incorrectly for those cases where range = 10..._2 and 3*range is two bits longer than range.) [Bodo Moeller] *) Only add signing time to PKCS7 structures if it is not already present. [Steve Henson] *) Fix crypto/objects/objects.h: "ld-ce" should be "id-ce", OBJ_ld_ce should be OBJ_id_ce. Also some ip-pda OIDs in crypto/objects/objects.txt were incorrect (cf. RFC 3039). [Matt Cooper, Frederic Giudicelli, Bodo Moeller] *) Release CRYPTO_LOCK_DYNLOCK when CRYPTO_destroy_dynlockid() returns early because it has nothing to do. [Andy Schneider ] *) [In 0.9.6c-engine release:] Fix mutex callback return values in crypto/engine/hw_ncipher.c. [Andy Schneider ] *) [In 0.9.6c-engine release:] Add support for Cryptographic Appliance's keyserver technology. (Use engine 'keyclient') [Cryptographic Appliances and Geoff Thorpe] *) Add a configuration entry for OS/390 Unix. The C compiler 'c89' is called via tools/c89.sh because arguments have to be rearranged (all '-L' options must appear before the first object modules). [Richard Shapiro ] *) [In 0.9.6c-engine release:] Add support for Broadcom crypto accelerator cards, backported from 0.9.7. [Broadcom, Nalin Dahyabhai , Mark Cox] *) [In 0.9.6c-engine release:] Add support for SureWare crypto accelerator cards from Baltimore Technologies. (Use engine 'sureware') [Baltimore Technologies and Mark Cox] *) [In 0.9.6c-engine release:] Add support for crypto accelerator cards from Accelerated Encryption Processing, www.aep.ie. (Use engine 'aep') [AEP Inc. and Mark Cox] *) Add a configuration entry for gcc on UnixWare. [Gary Benson ] *) Change ssl/s2_clnt.c and ssl/s2_srvr.c so that received handshake messages are stored in a single piece (fixed-length part and variable-length part combined) and fix various bugs found on the way. [Bodo Moeller] *) Disable caching in BIO_gethostbyname(), directly use gethostbyname() instead. BIO_gethostbyname() does not know what timeouts are appropriate, so entries would stay in cache even when they have become invalid. [Bodo Moeller; problem pointed out by Rich Salz *) Change ssl23_get_client_hello (ssl/s23_srvr.c) behaviour when faced with a pathologically small ClientHello fragment that does not contain client_version: Instead of aborting with an error, simply choose the highest available protocol version (i.e., TLS 1.0 unless it is disabled). In practice, ClientHello messages are never sent like this, but this change gives us strictly correct behaviour at least for TLS. [Bodo Moeller] *) Fix SSL handshake functions and SSL_clear() such that SSL_clear() never resets s->method to s->ctx->method when called from within one of the SSL handshake functions. [Bodo Moeller; problem pointed out by Niko Baric] *) In ssl3_get_client_hello (ssl/s3_srvr.c), generate a fatal alert (sent using the client's version number) if client_version is smaller than the protocol version in use. Also change ssl23_get_client_hello (ssl/s23_srvr.c) to select TLS 1.0 if the client demanded SSL 3.0 but only TLS 1.0 is enabled; then the client will at least see that alert. [Bodo Moeller] *) Fix ssl3_get_message (ssl/s3_both.c) to handle message fragmentation correctly. [Bodo Moeller] *) Avoid infinite loop in ssl3_get_message (ssl/s3_both.c) if a client receives HelloRequest while in a handshake. [Bodo Moeller; bug noticed by Andy Schneider ] *) Bugfix in ssl3_accept (ssl/s3_srvr.c): Case SSL3_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ_C should end in 'break', not 'goto end' which circumvents various cleanups done in state SSL_ST_OK. But session related stuff must be disabled for SSL_ST_OK in the case that we just sent a HelloRequest. Also avoid some overhead by not calling ssl_init_wbio_buffer() before just sending a HelloRequest. [Bodo Moeller, Eric Rescorla ] *) Fix ssl/s3_enc.c, ssl/t1_enc.c and ssl/s3_pkt.c so that we don't reveal whether illegal block cipher padding was found or a MAC verification error occurred. (Neither SSLerr() codes nor alerts are directly visible to potential attackers, but the information may leak via logfiles.) Similar changes are not required for the SSL 2.0 implementation because the number of padding bytes is sent in clear for SSL 2.0, and the extra bytes are just ignored. However ssl/s2_pkt.c failed to verify that the purported number of padding bytes is in the legal range. [Bodo Moeller] *) Add OpenUNIX-8 support including shared libraries (Boyd Lynn Gerber ). [Lutz Jaenicke] *) Improve RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP() check again to avoid 'wristwatch attack' using huge encoding parameters (cf. James H. Manger's CRYPTO 2001 paper). Note that the RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING case of RSA_private_decrypt() does not use encoding parameters and hence was not vulnerable. [Bodo Moeller] *) BN_sqr() bug fix. [Ulf Möller, reported by Jim Ellis ] *) Rabin-Miller test analyses assume uniformly distributed witnesses, so use BN_pseudo_rand_range() instead of using BN_pseudo_rand() followed by modular reduction. [Bodo Moeller; pointed out by Adam Young ] *) Add BN_pseudo_rand_range() with obvious functionality: BN_rand_range() equivalent based on BN_pseudo_rand() instead of BN_rand(). [Bodo Moeller] *) s3_srvr.c: allow sending of large client certificate lists (> 16 kB). This function was broken, as the check for a new client hello message to handle SGC did not allow these large messages. (Tracked down by "Douglas E. Engert" .) [Lutz Jaenicke] *) Add alert descriptions for TLSv1 to SSL_alert_desc_string[_long](). [Lutz Jaenicke] *) Fix buggy behaviour of BIO_get_num_renegotiates() and BIO_ctrl() for BIO_C_GET_WRITE_BUF_SIZE ("Stephen Hinton" ). [Lutz Jaenicke] *) Rework the configuration and shared library support for Tru64 Unix. The configuration part makes use of modern compiler features and still retains old compiler behavior for those that run older versions of the OS. The shared library support part includes a variant that uses the RPATH feature, and is available through the special configuration target "alpha-cc-rpath", which will never be selected automatically. [Tim Mooney via Richard Levitte] *) In ssl3_get_key_exchange (ssl/s3_clnt.c), call ssl3_get_message() with the same message size as in ssl3_get_certificate_request(). Otherwise, if no ServerKeyExchange message occurs, CertificateRequest messages might inadvertently be reject as too long. [Petr Lampa ] *) Enhanced support for IA-64 Unix platforms (well, Linux and HP-UX). [Andy Polyakov] *) Modified SSL library such that the verify_callback that has been set specifically for an SSL object with SSL_set_verify() is actually being used. Before the change, a verify_callback set with this function was ignored and the verify_callback() set in the SSL_CTX at the time of the call was used. New function X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb() introduced to allow the necessary settings. [Lutz Jaenicke] *) Initialize static variable in crypto/dsa/dsa_lib.c and crypto/dh/dh_lib.c explicitly to NULL, as at least on Solaris 8 this seems not always to be done automatically (in contradiction to the requirements of the C standard). This made problems when used from OpenSSH. [Lutz Jaenicke] *) In OpenSSL 0.9.6a and 0.9.6b, crypto/dh/dh_key.c ignored dh->length and always used BN_rand_range(priv_key, dh->p). BN_rand_range() is not necessary for Diffie-Hellman, and this specific range makes Diffie-Hellman unnecessarily inefficient if dh->length (recommended exponent length) is much smaller than the length of dh->p. We could use BN_rand_range() if the order of the subgroup was stored in the DH structure, but we only have dh->length. So switch back to BN_rand(priv_key, l, ...) where 'l' is dh->length if this is defined, or BN_num_bits(dh->p)-1 otherwise. [Bodo Moeller] *) In RSA_eay_public_encrypt RSA_eay_private_decrypt RSA_eay_private_encrypt (signing) RSA_eay_public_decrypt (signature verification) (default implementations for RSA_public_encrypt, RSA_private_decrypt, RSA_private_encrypt, RSA_public_decrypt), always reject numbers >= n. [Bodo Moeller] *) In crypto/rand/md_rand.c, use a new short-time lock CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2 to synchronize access to 'locking_thread'. This is necessary on systems where access to 'locking_thread' (an 'unsigned long' variable) is not atomic. [Bodo Moeller] *) In crypto/rand/md_rand.c, set 'locking_thread' to current thread's ID *before* setting the 'crypto_lock_rand' flag. The previous code had a race condition if 0 is a valid thread ID. [Travis Vitek ] *) Add support for shared libraries under Irix. [Albert Chin-A-Young ] *) Add configuration option to build on Linux on both big-endian and little-endian MIPS. [Ralf Baechle ] *) Add the possibility to create shared libraries on HP-UX. [Richard Levitte] Changes between 0.9.6a and 0.9.6b [9 Jul 2001] *) Change ssleay_rand_bytes (crypto/rand/md_rand.c) to avoid a SSLeay/OpenSSL PRNG weakness pointed out by Markku-Juhani O. Saarinen : PRNG state recovery was possible based on the output of one PRNG request appropriately sized to gain knowledge on 'md' followed by enough consecutive 1-byte PRNG requests to traverse all of 'state'. 1. When updating 'md_local' (the current thread's copy of 'md') during PRNG output generation, hash all of the previous 'md_local' value, not just the half used for PRNG output. 2. Make the number of bytes from 'state' included into the hash independent from the number of PRNG bytes requested. The first measure alone would be sufficient to avoid Markku-Juhani's attack. (Actually it had never occurred to me that the half of 'md_local' used for chaining was the half from which PRNG output bytes were taken -- I had always assumed that the secret half would be used.) The second measure makes sure that additional data from 'state' is never mixed into 'md_local' in small portions; this heuristically further strengthens the PRNG. [Bodo Moeller] *) Fix crypto/bn/asm/mips3.s. [Andy Polyakov] *) When only the key is given to "enc", the IV is undefined. Print out an error message in this case. [Lutz Jaenicke] *) Handle special case when X509_NAME is empty in X509 printing routines. [Steve Henson] *) In dsa_do_verify (crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c), verify that r and s are positive and less than q. [Bodo Moeller] *) Don't change *pointer in CRYPTO_add_lock() is add_lock_callback is used: it isn't thread safe and the add_lock_callback should handle that itself. [Paul Rose ] *) Verify that incoming data obeys the block size in ssl3_enc (ssl/s3_enc.c) and tls1_enc (ssl/t1_enc.c). [Bodo Moeller] *) Fix OAEP check. [Ulf Möller, Bodo Möller] *) The countermeasure against Bleichbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA encryption was accidentally removed in s3_srvr.c in OpenSSL 0.9.5 when fixing the server behaviour for backwards-compatible 'client hello' messages. (Note that the attack is impractical against SSL 3.0 and TLS 1.0 anyway because length and version checking means that the probability of guessing a valid ciphertext is around 2^-40; see section 5 in Bleichenbacher's CRYPTO '98 paper.) Before 0.9.5, the countermeasure (hide the error by generating a random 'decryption result') did not work properly because ERR_clear_error() was missing, meaning that SSL_get_error() would detect the supposedly ignored error. Both problems are now fixed. [Bodo Moeller] *) In crypto/bio/bf_buff.c, increase DEFAULT_BUFFER_SIZE to 4096 (previously it was 1024). [Bodo Moeller] *) Fix for compatibility mode trust settings: ignore trust settings unless some valid trust or reject settings are present. [Steve Henson] *) Fix for blowfish EVP: its a variable length cipher. [Steve Henson] *) Fix various bugs related to DSA S/MIME verification. Handle missing parameters in DSA public key structures and return an error in the DSA routines if parameters are absent. [Steve Henson] *) In versions up to 0.9.6, RAND_file_name() resorted to file ".rnd" in the current directory if neither $RANDFILE nor $HOME was set. RAND_file_name() in 0.9.6a returned NULL in this case. This has caused some confusion to Windows users who haven't defined $HOME. Thus RAND_file_name() is changed again: e_os.h can define a DEFAULT_HOME, which will be used if $HOME is not set. For Windows, we use "C:"; on other platforms, we still require environment variables. *) Move 'if (!initialized) RAND_poll()' into regions protected by CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND. This is not strictly necessary, but avoids having multiple threads call RAND_poll() concurrently. [Bodo Moeller] *) In crypto/rand/md_rand.c, replace 'add_do_not_lock' flag by a combination of a flag and a thread ID variable. Otherwise while one thread is in ssleay_rand_bytes (which sets the flag), *other* threads can enter ssleay_add_bytes without obeying the CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND lock (and may even illegally release the lock that they do not hold after the first thread unsets add_do_not_lock). [Bodo Moeller] *) Change bctest again: '-x' expressions are not available in all versions of 'test'. [Bodo Moeller] Changes between 0.9.6 and 0.9.6a [5 Apr 2001] *) Fix a couple of memory leaks in PKCS7_dataDecode() [Steve Henson, reported by Heyun Zheng ] *) Change Configure and Makefiles to provide EXE_EXT, which will contain the default extension for executables, if any. Also, make the perl scripts that use symlink() to test if it really exists and use "cp" if it doesn't. All this made OpenSSL compilable and installable in CygWin. [Richard Levitte] *) Fix for asn1_GetSequence() for indefinite length constructed data. If SEQUENCE is length is indefinite just set c->slen to the total amount of data available. [Steve Henson, reported by shige@FreeBSD.org] [This change does not apply to 0.9.7.] *) Change bctest to avoid here-documents inside command substitution (workaround for FreeBSD /bin/sh bug). For compatibility with Ultrix, avoid shell functions (introduced in the bctest version that searches along $PATH). [Bodo Moeller] *) Rename 'des_encrypt' to 'des_encrypt1'. This avoids the clashes with des_encrypt() defined on some operating systems, like Solaris and UnixWare. [Richard Levitte] *) Check the result of RSA-CRT (see D. Boneh, R. DeMillo, R. Lipton: On the Importance of Eliminating Errors in Cryptographic Computations, J. Cryptology 14 (2001) 2, 101-119, http://theory.stanford.edu/~dabo/papers/faults.ps.gz). [Ulf Moeller] *) MIPS assembler BIGNUM division bug fix. [Andy Polyakov] *) Disabled incorrect Alpha assembler code. [Richard Levitte] *) Fix PKCS#7 decode routines so they correctly update the length after reading an EOC for the EXPLICIT tag. [Steve Henson] [This change does not apply to 0.9.7.] *) Fix bug in PKCS#12 key generation routines. This was triggered if a 3DES key was generated with a 0 initial byte. Include PKCS12_BROKEN_KEYGEN compilation option to retain the old (but broken) behaviour. [Steve Henson] *) Enhance bctest to search for a working bc along $PATH and print it when found. [Tim Rice via Richard Levitte] *) Fix memory leaks in err.c: free err_data string if necessary; don't write to the wrong index in ERR_set_error_data. [Bodo Moeller] *) Implement ssl23_peek (analogous to ssl23_read), which previously did not exist. [Bodo Moeller] *) Replace rdtsc with _emit statements for VC++ version 5. [Jeremy Cooper ] *) Make it possible to reuse SSLv2 sessions. [Richard Levitte] *) In copy_email() check for >= 0 as a return value for X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID() since 0 is a valid index. [Steve Henson reported by Massimiliano Pala ] *) Avoid coredump with unsupported or invalid public keys by checking if X509_get_pubkey() fails in PKCS7_verify(). Fix memory leak when PKCS7_verify() fails with non detached data. [Steve Henson] *) Don't use getenv in library functions when run as setuid/setgid. New function OPENSSL_issetugid(). [Ulf Moeller] *) Avoid false positives in memory leak detection code (crypto/mem_dbg.c) due to incorrect handling of multi-threading: 1. Fix timing glitch in the MemCheck_off() portion of CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(). 2. Fix logical glitch in is_MemCheck_on() aka CRYPTO_is_mem_check_on(). 3. Count how many times MemCheck_off() has been called so that nested use can be treated correctly. This also avoids inband-signalling in the previous code (which relied on the assumption that thread ID 0 is impossible). [Bodo Moeller] *) Add "-rand" option also to s_client and s_server. [Lutz Jaenicke] *) Fix CPU detection on Irix 6.x. [Kurt Hockenbury and "Bruce W. Forsberg" ] *) Fix X509_NAME bug which produced incorrect encoding if X509_NAME was empty. [Steve Henson] [This change does not apply to 0.9.7.] *) Use the cached encoding of an X509_NAME structure rather than copying it. This is apparently the reason for the libsafe "errors" but the code is actually correct. [Steve Henson] *) Add new function BN_rand_range(), and fix DSA_sign_setup() to prevent Bleichenbacher's DSA attack. Extend BN_[pseudo_]rand: As before, top=1 forces the highest two bits to be set and top=0 forces the highest bit to be set; top=-1 is new and leaves the highest bit random. [Ulf Moeller, Bodo Moeller] *) In the NCONF_...-based implementations for CONF_... queries (crypto/conf/conf_lib.c), if the input LHASH is NULL, avoid using a temporary CONF structure with the data component set to NULL (which gives segmentation faults in lh_retrieve). Instead, use NULL for the CONF pointer in CONF_get_string and CONF_get_number (which may use environment variables) and directly return NULL from CONF_get_section. [Bodo Moeller] *) Fix potential buffer overrun for EBCDIC. [Ulf Moeller] *) Tolerate nonRepudiation as being valid for S/MIME signing and certSign keyUsage if basicConstraints absent for a CA. [Steve Henson] *) Make SMIME_write_PKCS7() write mail header values with a format that is more generally accepted (no spaces before the semicolon), since some programs can't parse those values properly otherwise. Also make sure BIO's that break lines after each write do not create invalid headers. [Richard Levitte] *) Make the CRL encoding routines work with empty SEQUENCE OF. The macros previously used would not encode an empty SEQUENCE OF and break the signature. [Steve Henson] [This change does not apply to 0.9.7.] *) Zero the premaster secret after deriving the master secret in DH ciphersuites. [Steve Henson] *) Add some EVP_add_digest_alias registrations (as found in OpenSSL_add_all_digests()) to SSL_library_init() aka OpenSSL_add_ssl_algorithms(). This provides improved compatibility with peers using X.509 certificates with unconventional AlgorithmIdentifier OIDs. [Bodo Moeller] *) Fix for Irix with NO_ASM. ["Bruce W. Forsberg" ] *) ./config script fixes. [Ulf Moeller, Richard Levitte] *) Fix 'openssl passwd -1'. [Bodo Moeller] *) Change PKCS12_key_gen_asc() so it can cope with non null terminated strings whose length is passed in the passlen parameter, for example from PEM callbacks. This was done by adding an extra length parameter to asc2uni(). [Steve Henson, reported by ] *) Fix C code generated by 'openssl dsaparam -C': If a BN_bin2bn call failed, free the DSA structure. [Bodo Moeller] *) Fix to uni2asc() to cope with zero length Unicode strings. These are present in some PKCS#12 files. [Steve Henson] *) Increase s2->wbuf allocation by one byte in ssl2_new (ssl/s2_lib.c). Otherwise do_ssl_write (ssl/s2_pkt.c) will write beyond buffer limits when writing a 32767 byte record. [Bodo Moeller; problem reported by Eric Day ] *) In RSA_eay_public_{en,ed}crypt and RSA_eay_mod_exp (rsa_eay.c), obtain lock CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA before setting rsa->_method_mod_{n,p,q}. (RSA objects have a reference count access to which is protected by CRYPTO_LOCK_RSA [see rsa_lib.c, s3_srvr.c, ssl_cert.c, ssl_rsa.c], so they are meant to be shared between threads.) [Bodo Moeller, Geoff Thorpe; original patch submitted by "Reddie, Steven" ] *) Fix a deadlock in CRYPTO_mem_leaks(). [Bodo Moeller] *) Use better test patterns in bntest. [Ulf Möller] *) rand_win.c fix for Borland C. [Ulf Möller] *) BN_rshift bugfix for n == 0. [Bodo Moeller] *) Add a 'bctest' script that checks for some known 'bc' bugs so that 'make test' does not abort just because 'bc' is broken. [Bodo Moeller] *) Store verify_result within SSL_SESSION also for client side to avoid potential security hole. (Re-used sessions on the client side always resulted in verify_result==X509_V_OK, not using the original result of the server certificate verification.) [Lutz Jaenicke] *) Fix ssl3_pending: If the record in s->s3->rrec is not of type SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA, return 0. Similarly, change ssl2_pending to return 0 if SSL_in_init(s) is true. [Bodo Moeller] *) Fix SSL_peek: Both ssl2_peek and ssl3_peek, which were totally broken in earlier releases, have been re-implemented by renaming the previous implementations of ssl2_read and ssl3_read to ssl2_read_internal and ssl3_read_internal, respectively, and adding 'peek' parameters to them. The new ssl[23]_{read,peek} functions are calls to ssl[23]_read_internal with the 'peek' flag set appropriately. A 'peek' parameter has also been added to ssl3_read_bytes, which does the actual work for ssl3_read_internal. [Bodo Moeller] *) Initialise "ex_data" member of RSA/DSA/DH structures prior to calling the method-specific "init()" handler. Also clean up ex_data after calling the method-specific "finish()" handler. Previously, this was happening the other way round. [Geoff Thorpe] *) Increase BN_CTX_NUM (the number of BIGNUMs in a BN_CTX) to 16. The previous value, 12, was not always sufficient for BN_mod_exp(). [Bodo Moeller] *) Make sure that shared libraries get the internal name engine with the full version number and not just 0. This should mark the shared libraries as not backward compatible. Of course, this should be changed again when we can guarantee backward binary compatibility. [Richard Levitte] *) Fix typo in get_cert_by_subject() in by_dir.c [Jean-Marc Desperrier ] *) Rework the system to generate shared libraries: - Make note of the expected extension for the shared libraries and if there is a need for symbolic links from for example libcrypto.so.0 to libcrypto.so.0.9.7. There is extended info in Configure for that. - Make as few rebuilds of the shared libraries as possible. - Still avoid linking the OpenSSL programs with the shared libraries. - When installing, install the shared libraries separately from the static ones. [Richard Levitte] *) Fix SSL_CTX_set_read_ahead macro to actually use its argument. Copy SSL_CTX's read_ahead flag to SSL object directly in SSL_new and not in SSL_clear because the latter is also used by the accept/connect functions; previously, the settings made by SSL_set_read_ahead would be lost during the handshake. [Bodo Moeller; problems reported by Anders Gertz ] *) Correct util/mkdef.pl to be selective about disabled algorithms. Previously, it would create entries for disabled algorithms no matter what. [Richard Levitte] *) Added several new manual pages for SSL_* function. [Lutz Jaenicke] Changes between 0.9.5a and 0.9.6 [24 Sep 2000] *) In ssl23_get_client_hello, generate an error message when faced with an initial SSL 3.0/TLS record that is too small to contain the first two bytes of the ClientHello message, i.e. client_version. (Note that this is a pathologic case that probably has never happened in real life.) The previous approach was to use the version number from the record header as a substitute; but our protocol choice should not depend on that one because it is not authenticated by the Finished messages. [Bodo Moeller] *) More robust randomness gathering functions for Windows. [Jeffrey Altman ] *) For compatibility reasons if the flag X509_V_FLAG_ISSUER_CHECK is not set then we don't setup the error code for issuer check errors to avoid possibly overwriting other errors which the callback does handle. If an application does set the flag then we assume it knows what it is doing and can handle the new informational codes appropriately. [Steve Henson] *) Fix for a nasty bug in ASN1_TYPE handling. ASN1_TYPE is used for a general "ANY" type, as such it should be able to decode anything including tagged types. However it didn't check the class so it would wrongly interpret tagged types in the same way as their universal counterpart and unknown types were just rejected. Changed so that the tagged and unknown types are handled in the same way as a SEQUENCE: that is the encoding is stored intact. There is also a new type "V_ASN1_OTHER" which is used when the class is not universal, in this case we have no idea what the actual type is so we just lump them all together. [Steve Henson] *) On VMS, stdout may very well lead to a file that is written to in a record-oriented fashion. That means that every write() will write a separate record, which will be read separately by the programs trying to read from it. This can be very confusing. The solution is to put a BIO filter in the way that will buffer text until a linefeed is reached, and then write everything a line at a time, so every record written will be an actual line, not chunks of lines and not (usually doesn't happen, but I've seen it once) several lines in one record. BIO_f_linebuffer() is the answer. Currently, it's a VMS-only method, because that's where it has been tested well enough. [Richard Levitte] *) Remove 'optimized' squaring variant in BN_mod_mul_montgomery, it can return incorrect results. (Note: The buggy variant was not enabled in OpenSSL 0.9.5a, but it was in 0.9.6-beta[12].) [Bodo Moeller] *) Disable the check for content being present when verifying detached signatures in pk7_smime.c. Some versions of Netscape (wrongly) include zero length content when signing messages. [Steve Henson] *) New BIO_shutdown_wr macro, which invokes the BIO_C_SHUTDOWN_WR BIO_ctrl (for BIO pairs). [Bodo Möller] *) Add DSO method for VMS. [Richard Levitte] *) Bug fix: Montgomery multiplication could produce results with the wrong sign. [Ulf Möller] *) Add RPM specification openssl.spec and modify it to build three packages. The default package contains applications, application documentation and run-time libraries. The devel package contains include files, static libraries and function documentation. The doc package contains the contents of the doc directory. The original openssl.spec was provided by Damien Miller . [Richard Levitte] *) Add a large number of documentation files for many SSL routines. [Lutz Jaenicke ] *) Add a configuration entry for Sony News 4. [NAKAJI Hiroyuki ] *) Don't set the two most significant bits to one when generating a random number < q in the DSA library. [Ulf Möller] *) New SSL API mode 'SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY'. This disables the default behaviour that SSL_read may result in SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ (even if the underlying transport is blocking) if a handshake took place. (The default behaviour is needed by applications such as s_client and s_server that use select() to determine when to use SSL_read; but for applications that know in advance when to expect data, it just makes things more complicated.) [Bodo Moeller] *) Add RAND_egd_bytes(), which gives control over the number of bytes read from EGD. [Ben Laurie] *) Add a few more EBCDIC conditionals that make `req' and `x509' work better on such systems. [Martin Kraemer ] *) Add two demo programs for PKCS12_parse() and PKCS12_create(). Update PKCS12_parse() so it copies the friendlyName and the keyid to the certificates aux info. [Steve Henson] *) Fix bug in PKCS7_verify() which caused an infinite loop if there was more than one signature. [Sven Uszpelkat ] *) Major change in util/mkdef.pl to include extra information about each symbol, as well as presenting variables as well as functions. This change means that there's n more need to rebuild the .num files when some algorithms are excluded. [Richard Levitte] *) Allow the verify time to be set by an application, rather than always using the current time. [Steve Henson] *) Phase 2 verify code reorganisation. The certificate verify code now looks up an issuer certificate by a number of criteria: subject name, authority key id and key usage. It also verifies self signed certificates by the same criteria. The main comparison function is X509_check_issued() which performs these checks. Lot of changes were necessary in order to support this without completely rewriting the lookup code. Authority and subject key identifier are now cached. The LHASH 'certs' is X509_STORE has now been replaced by a STACK_OF(X509_OBJECT). This is mainly because an LHASH can't store or retrieve multiple objects with the same hash value. As a result various functions (which were all internal use only) have changed to handle the new X509_STORE structure. This will break anything that messed round with X509_STORE internally. The functions X509_STORE_add_cert() now checks for an exact match, rather than just subject name. The X509_STORE API doesn't directly support the retrieval of multiple certificates matching a given criteria, however this can be worked round by performing a lookup first (which will fill the cache with candidate certificates) and then examining the cache for matches. This is probably the best we can do without throwing out X509_LOOKUP entirely (maybe later...). The X509_VERIFY_CTX structure has been enhanced considerably. All certificate lookup operations now go via a get_issuer() callback. Although this currently uses an X509_STORE it can be replaced by custom lookups. This is a simple way to bypass the X509_STORE hackery necessary to make this work and makes it possible to use more efficient techniques in future. A very simple version which uses a simple STACK for its trusted certificate store is also provided using X509_STORE_CTX_trusted_stack(). The verify_cb() and verify() callbacks now have equivalents in the X509_STORE_CTX structure. X509_STORE_CTX also has a 'flags' field which can be used to customise the verify behaviour. [Steve Henson] *) Add new PKCS#7 signing option PKCS7_NOSMIMECAP which excludes S/MIME capabilities. [Steve Henson] *) When a certificate request is read in keep a copy of the original encoding of the signed data and use it when outputting again. Signatures then use the original encoding rather than a decoded, encoded version which may cause problems if the request is improperly encoded. [Steve Henson] *) For consistency with other BIO_puts implementations, call buffer_write(b, ...) directly in buffer_puts instead of calling BIO_write(b, ...). In BIO_puts, increment b->num_write as in BIO_write. [Peter.Sylvester@EdelWeb.fr] *) Fix BN_mul_word for the case where the word is 0. (We have to use BN_zero, we may not return a BIGNUM with an array consisting of words set to zero.) [Bodo Moeller] *) Avoid calling abort() from within the library when problems are detected, except if preprocessor symbols have been defined (such as REF_CHECK, BN_DEBUG etc.). [Bodo Moeller] *) New openssl application 'rsautl'. This utility can be used for low level RSA operations. DER public key BIO/fp routines also added. [Steve Henson] *) New Configure entry and patches for compiling on QNX 4. [Andreas Schneider ] *) A demo state-machine implementation was sponsored by Nuron (http://www.nuron.com/) and is now available in demos/state_machine. [Ben Laurie] *) New options added to the 'dgst' utility for signature generation and verification. [Steve Henson] *) Unrecognized PKCS#7 content types are now handled via a catch all ASN1_TYPE structure. This allows unsupported types to be stored as a "blob" and an application can encode and decode it manually. [Steve Henson] *) Fix various signed/unsigned issues to make a_strex.c compile under VC++. [Oscar Jacobsson ] *) ASN1 fixes. i2d_ASN1_OBJECT was not returning the correct length if passed a buffer. ASN1_INTEGER_to_BN failed if passed a NULL BN and its argument was negative. [Steve Henson, pointed out by Sven Heiberg ] *) Modification to PKCS#7 encoding routines to output definite length encoding. Since currently the whole structures are in memory there's not real point in using indefinite length constructed encoding. However if OpenSSL is compiled with the flag PKCS7_INDEFINITE_ENCODING the old form is used. [Steve Henson] *) Added BIO_vprintf() and BIO_vsnprintf(). [Richard Levitte] *) Added more prefixes to parse for in the strings written through a logging bio, to cover all the levels that are available through syslog. The prefixes are now: PANIC, EMERG, EMR => LOG_EMERG ALERT, ALR => LOG_ALERT CRIT, CRI => LOG_CRIT ERROR, ERR => LOG_ERR WARNING, WARN, WAR => LOG_WARNING NOTICE, NOTE, NOT => LOG_NOTICE INFO, INF => LOG_INFO DEBUG, DBG => LOG_DEBUG and as before, if none of those prefixes are present at the beginning of the string, LOG_ERR is chosen. On Win32, the LOG_* levels are mapped according to this: LOG_EMERG, LOG_ALERT, LOG_CRIT, LOG_ERR => EVENTLOG_ERROR_TYPE LOG_WARNING => EVENTLOG_WARNING_TYPE LOG_NOTICE, LOG_INFO, LOG_DEBUG => EVENTLOG_INFORMATION_TYPE [Richard Levitte] *) Made it possible to reconfigure with just the configuration argument "reconf" or "reconfigure". The command line arguments are stored in Makefile.ssl in the variable CONFIGURE_ARGS, and are retrieved from there when reconfiguring. [Richard Levitte] *) MD4 implemented. [Assar Westerlund , Richard Levitte] *) Add the arguments -CAfile and -CApath to the pkcs12 utility. [Richard Levitte] *) The obj_dat.pl script was messing up the sorting of object names. The reason was that it compared the quoted version of strings as a result "OCSP" > "OCSP Signing" because " > SPACE. Changed script to store unquoted versions of names and add quotes on output. It was also omitting some names from the lookup table if they were given a default value (that is if SN is missing it is given the same value as LN and vice versa), these are now added on the grounds that if an object has a name we should be able to look it up. Finally added warning output when duplicate short or long names are found. [Steve Henson] *) Changes needed for Tandem NSK. [Scott Uroff ] *) Fix SSL 2.0 rollback checking: Due to an off-by-one error in RSA_padding_check_SSLv23(), special padding was never detected and thus the SSL 3.0/TLS 1.0 countermeasure against protocol version rollback attacks was not effective. In s23_clnt.c, don't use special rollback-attack detection padding (RSA_SSLV23_PADDING) if SSL 2.0 is the only protocol enabled in the client; similarly, in s23_srvr.c, don't do the rollback check if SSL 2.0 is the only protocol enabled in the server. [Bodo Moeller] *) Make it possible to get hexdumps of unprintable data with 'openssl asn1parse'. By implication, the functions ASN1_parse_dump() and BIO_dump_indent() are added. [Richard Levitte] *) New functions ASN1_STRING_print_ex() and X509_NAME_print_ex() these print out strings and name structures based on various flags including RFC2253 support and proper handling of multibyte characters. Added options to the 'x509' utility to allow the various flags to be set. [Steve Henson] *) Various fixes to use ASN1_TIME instead of ASN1_UTCTIME. Also change the functions X509_cmp_current_time() and X509_gmtime_adj() work with an ASN1_TIME structure, this will enable certificates using GeneralizedTime in validity dates to be checked. [Steve Henson] *) Make the NEG_PUBKEY_BUG code (which tolerates invalid negative public key encodings) on by default, NO_NEG_PUBKEY_BUG can be set to disable it. [Steve Henson] *) New function c2i_ASN1_OBJECT() which acts on ASN1_OBJECT content octets. An i2c_ASN1_OBJECT is unnecessary because the encoding can be trivially obtained from the structure. [Steve Henson] *) crypto/err.c locking bugfix: Use write locks (CRYPTO_w_[un]lock), not read locks (CRYPTO_r_[un]lock). [Bodo Moeller] *) A first attempt at creating official support for shared libraries through configuration. I've kept it so the default is static libraries only, and the OpenSSL programs are always statically linked for now, but there are preparations for dynamic linking in place. This has been tested on Linux and Tru64. [Richard Levitte] *) Randomness polling function for Win9x, as described in: Peter Gutmann, Software Generation of Practically Strong Random Numbers. [Ulf Möller] *) Fix so PRNG is seeded in req if using an already existing DSA key. [Steve Henson] *) New options to smime application. -inform and -outform allow alternative formats for the S/MIME message including PEM and DER. The -content option allows the content to be specified separately. This should allow things like Netscape form signing output easier to verify. [Steve Henson] *) Fix the ASN1 encoding of tags using the 'long form'. [Steve Henson] *) New ASN1 functions, i2c_* and c2i_* for INTEGER and BIT STRING types. These convert content octets to and from the underlying type. The actual tag and length octets are already assumed to have been read in and checked. These are needed because all other string types have virtually identical handling apart from the tag. By having versions of the ASN1 functions that just operate on content octets IMPLICIT tagging can be handled properly. It also allows the ASN1_ENUMERATED code to be cut down because ASN1_ENUMERATED and ASN1_INTEGER are identical apart from the tag. [Steve Henson] *) Change the handling of OID objects as follows: - New object identifiers are inserted in objects.txt, following the syntax given in objects.README. - objects.pl is used to process obj_mac.num and create a new obj_mac.h. - obj_dat.pl is used to create a new obj_dat.h, using the data in obj_mac.h. This is currently kind of a hack, and the perl code in objects.pl isn't very elegant, but it works as I intended. The simplest way to check that it worked correctly is to look in obj_dat.h and check the array nid_objs and make sure the objects haven't moved around (this is important!). Additions are OK, as well as consistent name changes. [Richard Levitte] *) Add BSD-style MD5-based passwords to 'openssl passwd' (option '-1'). [Bodo Moeller] *) Addition of the command line parameter '-rand file' to 'openssl req'. The given file adds to whatever has already been seeded into the random pool through the RANDFILE configuration file option or environment variable, or the default random state file. [Richard Levitte] *) mkstack.pl now sorts each macro group into lexical order. Previously the output order depended on the order the files appeared in the directory, resulting in needless rewriting of safestack.h . [Steve Henson] *) Patches to make OpenSSL compile under Win32 again. Mostly work arounds for the VC++ problem that it treats func() as func(void). Also stripped out the parts of mkdef.pl that added extra typesafe functions: these no longer exist. [Steve Henson] *) Reorganisation of the stack code. The macros are now all collected in safestack.h . Each macro is defined in terms of a "stack macro" of the form SKM_(type, a, b). The DEBUG_SAFESTACK is now handled in terms of function casts, this has the advantage of retaining type safety without the use of additional functions. If DEBUG_SAFESTACK is not defined then the non typesafe macros are used instead. Also modified the mkstack.pl script to handle the new form. Needs testing to see if which (if any) compilers it chokes and maybe make DEBUG_SAFESTACK the default if no major problems. Similar behaviour for ASN1_SET_OF and PKCS12_STACK_OF. [Steve Henson] *) When some versions of IIS use the 'NET' form of private key the key derivation algorithm is different. Normally MD5(password) is used as a 128 bit RC4 key. In the modified case MD5(MD5(password) + "SGCKEYSALT") is used instead. Added some new functions i2d_RSA_NET(), d2i_RSA_NET() etc which are the same as the old Netscape_RSA functions except they have an additional 'sgckey' parameter which uses the modified algorithm. Also added an -sgckey command line option to the rsa utility. Thanks to Adrian Peck for posting details of the modified algorithm to openssl-dev. [Steve Henson] *) The evp_local.h macros were using 'c.##kname' which resulted in invalid expansion on some systems (SCO 5.0.5 for example). Corrected to 'c.kname'. [Phillip Porch ] *) New X509_get1_email() and X509_REQ_get1_email() functions that return a STACK of email addresses from a certificate or request, these look in the subject name and the subject alternative name extensions and omit any duplicate addresses. [Steve Henson] *) Re-implement BN_mod_exp2_mont using independent (and larger) windows. This makes DSA verification about 2 % faster. [Bodo Moeller] *) Increase maximum window size in BN_mod_exp_... to 6 bits instead of 5 (meaning that now 2^5 values will be precomputed, which is only 4 KB plus overhead for 1024 bit moduli). This makes exponentiations about 0.5 % faster for 1024 bit exponents (as measured by "openssl speed rsa2048"). [Bodo Moeller] *) Rename memory handling macros to avoid conflicts with other software: Malloc => OPENSSL_malloc Malloc_locked => OPENSSL_malloc_locked Realloc => OPENSSL_realloc Free => OPENSSL_free [Richard Levitte] *) New function BN_mod_exp_mont_word for small bases (roughly 15% faster than BN_mod_exp_mont, i.e. 7% for a full DH exchange). [Bodo Moeller] *) CygWin32 support. [John Jarvie ] *) The type-safe stack code has been rejigged. It is now only compiled in when OpenSSL is configured with the DEBUG_SAFESTACK option and by default all type-specific stack functions are "#define"d back to standard stack functions. This results in more streamlined output but retains the type-safety checking possibilities of the original approach. [Geoff Thorpe] *) The STACK code has been cleaned up, and certain type declarations that didn't make a lot of sense have been brought in line. This has also involved a cleanup of sorts in safestack.h to more correctly map type-safe stack functions onto their plain stack counterparts. This work has also resulted in a variety of "const"ifications of lots of the code, especially "_cmp" operations which should normally be prototyped with "const" parameters anyway. [Geoff Thorpe] *) When generating bytes for the first time in md_rand.c, 'stir the pool' by seeding with STATE_SIZE dummy bytes (with zero entropy count). (The PRNG state consists of two parts, the large pool 'state' and 'md', where all of 'md' is used each time the PRNG is used, but 'state' is used only indexed by a cyclic counter. As entropy may not be well distributed from the beginning, 'md' is important as a chaining variable. However, the output function chains only half of 'md', i.e. 80 bits. ssleay_rand_add, on the other hand, chains all of 'md', and seeding with STATE_SIZE dummy bytes will result in all of 'state' being rewritten, with the new values depending on virtually all of 'md'. This overcomes the 80 bit limitation.) [Bodo Moeller] *) In ssl/s2_clnt.c and ssl/s3_clnt.c, call ERR_clear_error() when the handshake is continued after ssl_verify_cert_chain(); otherwise, if SSL_VERIFY_NONE is set, remaining error codes can lead to 'unexplainable' connection aborts later. [Bodo Moeller; problem tracked down by Lutz Jaenicke] *) Major EVP API cipher revision. Add hooks for extra EVP features. This allows various cipher parameters to be set in the EVP interface. Support added for variable key length ciphers via the EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length() function and setting of RC2 and RC5 parameters. Modify EVP_OpenInit() and EVP_SealInit() to cope with variable key length ciphers. Remove lots of duplicated code from the EVP library. For example *every* cipher init() function handles the 'iv' in the same way according to the cipher mode. They also all do nothing if the 'key' parameter is NULL and for CFB and OFB modes they zero ctx->num. New functionality allows removal of S/MIME code RC2 hack. Most of the routines have the same form and so can be declared in terms of macros. By shifting this to the top level EVP_CipherInit() it can be removed from all individual ciphers. If the cipher wants to handle IVs or keys differently it can set the EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_IV or EVP_CIPH_ALWAYS_CALL_INIT flags. Change lots of functions like EVP_EncryptUpdate() to now return a value: although software versions of the algorithms cannot fail any installed hardware versions can. [Steve Henson] *) Implement SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG: In ssl3_get_client_key_exchange, if this option is set, tolerate broken clients that send the negotiated protocol version number instead of the requested protocol version number. [Bodo Moeller] *) Call dh_tmp_cb (set by ..._TMP_DH_CB) with correct 'is_export' flag; i.e. non-zero for export ciphersuites, zero otherwise. Previous versions had this flag inverted, inconsistent with rsa_tmp_cb (..._TMP_RSA_CB). [Bodo Moeller; problem reported by Amit Chopra] *) Add missing DSA library text string. Work around for some IIS key files with invalid SEQUENCE encoding. [Steve Henson] *) Add a document (doc/standards.txt) that list all kinds of standards and so on that are implemented in OpenSSL. [Richard Levitte] *) Enhance c_rehash script. Old version would mishandle certificates with the same subject name hash and wouldn't handle CRLs at all. Added -fingerprint option to crl utility, to support new c_rehash features. [Steve Henson] *) Eliminate non-ANSI declarations in crypto.h and stack.h. [Ulf Möller] *) Fix for SSL server purpose checking. Server checking was rejecting certificates which had extended key usage present but no ssl client purpose. [Steve Henson, reported by Rene Grosser ] *) Make PKCS#12 code work with no password. The PKCS#12 spec is a little unclear about how a blank password is handled. Since the password in encoded as a BMPString with terminating double NULL a zero length password would end up as just the double NULL. However no password at all is different and is handled differently in the PKCS#12 key generation code. NS treats a blank password as zero length. MSIE treats it as no password on export: but it will try both on import. We now do the same: PKCS12_parse() tries zero length and no password if the password is set to "" or NULL (NULL is now a valid password: it wasn't before) as does the pkcs12 application. [Steve Henson] *) Bugfixes in apps/x509.c: Avoid a memory leak; and don't use perror when PEM_read_bio_X509_REQ fails, the error message must be obtained from the error queue. [Bodo Moeller] *) Avoid 'thread_hash' memory leak in crypto/err/err.c by freeing it in ERR_remove_state if appropriate, and change ERR_get_state accordingly to avoid race conditions (this is necessary because thread_hash is no longer constant once set). [Bodo Moeller] *) Bugfix for linux-elf makefile.one. [Ulf Möller] *) RSA_get_default_method() will now cause a default RSA_METHOD to be chosen if one doesn't exist already. Previously this was only set during a call to RSA_new() or RSA_new_method(NULL) meaning it was possible for RSA_get_default_method() to return NULL. [Geoff Thorpe] *) Added native name translation to the existing DSO code that will convert (if the flag to do so is set) filenames that are sufficiently small and have no path information into a canonical native form. Eg. "blah" converted to "libblah.so" or "blah.dll" etc. [Geoff Thorpe] *) New function ERR_error_string_n(e, buf, len) which is like ERR_error_string(e, buf), but writes at most 'len' bytes including the 0 terminator. For ERR_error_string_n, 'buf' may not be NULL. [Damien Miller , Bodo Moeller] *) CONF library reworked to become more general. A new CONF configuration file reader "class" is implemented as well as a new functions (NCONF_*, for "New CONF") to handle it. The now old CONF_* functions are still there, but are reimplemented to work in terms of the new functions. Also, a set of functions to handle the internal storage of the configuration data is provided to make it easier to write new configuration file reader "classes" (I can definitely see something reading a configuration file in XML format, for example), called _CONF_*, or "the configuration storage API"... The new configuration file reading functions are: NCONF_new, NCONF_free, NCONF_load, NCONF_load_fp, NCONF_load_bio, NCONF_get_section, NCONF_get_string, NCONF_get_numbre NCONF_default, NCONF_WIN32 NCONF_dump_fp, NCONF_dump_bio NCONF_default and NCONF_WIN32 are method (or "class") choosers, NCONF_new creates a new CONF object. This works in the same way as other interfaces in OpenSSL, like the BIO interface. NCONF_dump_* dump the internal storage of the configuration file, which is useful for debugging. All other functions take the same arguments as the old CONF_* functions with the exception of the first that must be a `CONF *' instead of a `LHASH *'. To make it easier to use the new classes with the old CONF_* functions, the function CONF_set_default_method is provided. [Richard Levitte] *) Add '-tls1' option to 'openssl ciphers', which was already mentioned in the documentation but had not been implemented. (This option is not yet really useful because even the additional experimental TLS 1.0 ciphers are currently treated as SSL 3.0 ciphers.) [Bodo Moeller] *) Initial DSO code added into libcrypto for letting OpenSSL (and OpenSSL-based applications) load shared libraries and bind to them in a portable way. [Geoff Thorpe, with contributions from Richard Levitte] Changes between 0.9.5 and 0.9.5a [1 Apr 2000] *) Make sure _lrotl and _lrotr are only used with MSVC. *) Use lock CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND correctly in ssleay_rand_status (the default implementation of RAND_status). *) Rename openssl x509 option '-crlext', which was added in 0.9.5, to '-clrext' (= clear extensions), as intended and documented. [Bodo Moeller; inconsistency pointed out by Michael Attili ] *) Fix for HMAC. It wasn't zeroing the rest of the block if the key length was larger than the MD block size. [Steve Henson, pointed out by Yost William ] *) Modernise PKCS12_parse() so it uses STACK_OF(X509) for its ca argument fix a leak when the ca argument was passed as NULL. Stop X509_PUBKEY_set() using the passed key: if the passed key was a private key the result of X509_print(), for example, would be to print out all the private key components. [Steve Henson] *) des_quad_cksum() byte order bug fix. [Ulf Möller, using the problem description in krb4-0.9.7, where the solution is attributed to Derrick J Brashear ] *) Fix so V_ASN1_APP_CHOOSE works again: however its use is strongly discouraged. [Steve Henson, pointed out by Brian Korver ] *) For easily testing in shell scripts whether some command 'openssl XXX' exists, the new pseudo-command 'openssl no-XXX' returns with exit code 0 iff no command of the given name is available. 'no-XXX' is printed in this case, 'XXX' otherwise. In both cases, the output goes to stdout and nothing is printed to stderr. Additional arguments are always ignored. Since for each cipher there is a command of the same name, the 'no-cipher' compilation switches can be tested this way. ('openssl no-XXX' is not able to detect pseudo-commands such as 'quit', 'list-XXX-commands', or 'no-XXX' itself.) [Bodo Moeller] *) Update test suite so that 'make test' succeeds in 'no-rsa' configuration. [Bodo Moeller] *) For SSL_[CTX_]set_tmp_dh, don't create a DH key if SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE is set; it will be thrown away anyway because each handshake creates its own key. ssl_cert_dup, which is used by SSL_new, now copies DH keys in addition to parameters -- in previous versions (since OpenSSL 0.9.3) the 'default key' from SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh would always be lost, meaning you effectively got SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE when using this macro. [Bodo Moeller] *) New s_client option -ign_eof: EOF at stdin is ignored, and 'Q' and 'R' lose their special meanings (quit/renegotiate). This is part of what -quiet does; unlike -quiet, -ign_eof does not suppress any output. [Richard Levitte] *) Add compatibility options to the purpose and trust code. The purpose X509_PURPOSE_ANY is "any purpose" which automatically accepts a certificate or CA, this was the previous behaviour, with all the associated security issues. X509_TRUST_COMPAT is the old trust behaviour: only and automatically trust self signed roots in certificate store. A new trust setting X509_TRUST_DEFAULT is used to specify that a purpose has no associated trust setting and it should instead use the value in the default purpose. [Steve Henson] *) Fix the PKCS#8 DSA private key code so it decodes keys again and fix a memory leak. [Steve Henson] *) In util/mkerr.pl (which implements 'make errors'), preserve reason strings from the previous version of the .c file, as the default to have only downcase letters (and digits) in automatically generated reasons codes is not always appropriate. [Bodo Moeller] *) In ERR_load_ERR_strings(), build an ERR_LIB_SYS error reason table using strerror. Previously, ERR_reason_error_string() returned library names as reason strings for SYSerr; but SYSerr is a special case where small numbers are errno values, not library numbers. [Bodo Moeller] *) Add '-dsaparam' option to 'openssl dhparam' application. This converts DSA parameters into DH parameters. (When creating parameters, DSA_generate_parameters is used.) [Bodo Moeller] *) Include 'length' (recommended exponent length) in C code generated by 'openssl dhparam -C'. [Bodo Moeller] *) The second argument to set_label in perlasm was already being used so couldn't be used as a "file scope" flag. Moved to third argument which was free. [Steve Henson] *) In PEM_ASN1_write_bio and some other functions, use RAND_pseudo_bytes instead of RAND_bytes for encryption IVs and salts. [Bodo Moeller] *) Include RAND_status() into RAND_METHOD instead of implementing it only for md_rand.c Otherwise replacing the PRNG by calling RAND_set_rand_method would be impossible. [Bodo Moeller] *) Don't let DSA_generate_key() enter an infinite loop if the random number generation fails. [Bodo Moeller] *) New 'rand' application for creating pseudo-random output. [Bodo Moeller] *) Added configuration support for Linux/IA64 [Rolf Haberrecker ] *) Assembler module support for Mingw32. [Ulf Möller] *) Shared library support for HPUX (in shlib/). [Lutz Jaenicke and Anonymous] *) Shared library support for Solaris gcc. [Lutz Behnke ] Changes between 0.9.4 and 0.9.5 [28 Feb 2000] *) PKCS7_encrypt() was adding text MIME headers twice because they were added manually and by SMIME_crlf_copy(). [Steve Henson] *) In bntest.c don't call BN_rand with zero bits argument. [Steve Henson, pointed out by Andrew W. Gray ] *) BN_mul bugfix: In bn_mul_part_recursion() only the a>a[n] && b>b[n] case was implemented. This caused BN_div_recp() to fail occasionally. [Ulf Möller] *) Add an optional second argument to the set_label() in the perl assembly language builder. If this argument exists and is set to 1 it signals that the assembler should use a symbol whose scope is the entire file, not just the current function. This is needed with MASM which uses the format label:: for this scope. [Steve Henson, pointed out by Peter Runestig ] *) Change the ASN1 types so they are typedefs by default. Before almost all types were #define'd to ASN1_STRING which was causing STACK_OF() problems: you couldn't declare STACK_OF(ASN1_UTF8STRING) for example. [Steve Henson] *) Change names of new functions to the new get1/get0 naming convention: After 'get1', the caller owns a reference count and has to call ..._free; 'get0' returns a pointer to some data structure without incrementing reference counters. (Some of the existing 'get' functions increment a reference counter, some don't.) Similarly, 'set1' and 'add1' functions increase reference counters or duplicate objects. [Steve Henson] *) Allow for the possibility of temp RSA key generation failure: the code used to assume it always worked and crashed on failure. [Steve Henson] *) Fix potential buffer overrun problem in BIO_printf(). [Ulf Möller, using public domain code by Patrick Powell; problem pointed out by David Sacerdote ] *) Support EGD . New functions RAND_egd() and RAND_status(). In the command line application, the EGD socket can be specified like a seed file using RANDFILE or -rand. [Ulf Möller] *) Allow the string CERTIFICATE to be tolerated in PKCS#7 structures. Some CAs (e.g. Verisign) distribute certificates in this form. [Steve Henson] *) Remove the SSL_ALLOW_ADH compile option and set the default cipher list to exclude them. This means that no special compilation option is needed to use anonymous DH: it just needs to be included in the cipher list. [Steve Henson] *) Change the EVP_MD_CTX_type macro so its meaning consistent with EVP_MD_type. The old functionality is available in a new macro called EVP_MD_md(). Change code that uses it and update docs. [Steve Henson] *) ..._ctrl functions now have corresponding ..._callback_ctrl functions where the 'void *' argument is replaced by a function pointer argument. Previously 'void *' was abused to point to functions, which works on many platforms, but is not correct. As these functions are usually called by macros defined in OpenSSL header files, most source code should work without changes. [Richard Levitte] *) (which is created by Configure) now contains sections with information on -D... compiler switches used for compiling the library so that applications can see them. To enable one of these sections, a pre-processor symbol OPENSSL_..._DEFINES must be defined. E.g., #define OPENSSL_ALGORITHM_DEFINES #include defines all pertinent NO_ symbols, such as NO_IDEA, NO_RSA, etc. [Richard Levitte, Ulf and Bodo Möller] *) Bugfix: Tolerate fragmentation and interleaving in the SSL 3/TLS record layer. [Bodo Moeller] *) Change the 'other' type in certificate aux info to a STACK_OF X509_ALGOR. Although not an AlgorithmIdentifier as such it has the required ASN1 format: arbitrary types determined by an OID. [Steve Henson] *) Add some PEM_write_X509_REQ_NEW() functions and a command line argument to 'req'. This is not because the function is newer or better than others it just uses the work 'NEW' in the certificate request header lines. Some software needs this. [Steve Henson] *) Reorganise password command line arguments: now passwords can be obtained from various sources. Delete the PEM_cb function and make it the default behaviour: i.e. if the callback is NULL and the usrdata argument is not NULL interpret it as a null terminated pass phrase. If usrdata and the callback are NULL then the pass phrase is prompted for as usual. [Steve Henson] *) Add support for the Compaq Atalla crypto accelerator. If it is installed, the support is automatically enabled. The resulting binaries will autodetect the card and use it if present. [Ben Laurie and Compaq Inc.] *) Work around for Netscape hang bug. This sends certificate request and server done in one record. Since this is perfectly legal in the SSL/TLS protocol it isn't a "bug" option and is on by default. See the bugs/SSLv3 entry for more info. [Steve Henson] *) HP-UX tune-up: new unified configs, HP C compiler bug workaround. [Andy Polyakov] *) Add -rand argument to smime and pkcs12 applications and read/write of seed file. [Steve Henson] *) New 'passwd' tool for crypt(3) and apr1 password hashes. [Bodo Moeller] *) Add command line password options to the remaining applications. [Steve Henson] *) Bug fix for BN_div_recp() for numerators with an even number of bits. [Ulf Möller] *) More tests in bntest.c, and changed test_bn output. [Ulf Möller] *) ./config recognizes MacOS X now. [Andy Polyakov] *) Bug fix for BN_div() when the first words of num and divisor are equal (it gave wrong results if (rem=(n1-q*d0)&BN_MASK2) < d0). [Ulf Möller] *) Add support for various broken PKCS#8 formats, and command line options to produce them. [Steve Henson] *) New functions BN_CTX_start(), BN_CTX_get() and BT_CTX_end() to get temporary BIGNUMs from a BN_CTX. [Ulf Möller] *) Correct return values in BN_mod_exp_mont() and BN_mod_exp2_mont() for p == 0. [Ulf Möller] *) Change the SSLeay_add_all_*() functions to OpenSSL_add_all_*() and include a #define from the old name to the new. The original intent was that statically linked binaries could for example just call SSLeay_add_all_ciphers() to just add ciphers to the table and not link with digests. This never worked because SSLeay_add_all_digests() and SSLeay_add_all_ciphers() were in the same source file so calling one would link with the other. They are now in separate source files. [Steve Henson] *) Add a new -notext option to 'ca' and a -pubkey option to 'spkac'. [Steve Henson] *) Use a less unusual form of the Miller-Rabin primality test (it used a binary algorithm for exponentiation integrated into the Miller-Rabin loop, our standard modexp algorithms are faster). [Bodo Moeller] *) Support for the EBCDIC character set completed. [Martin Kraemer ] *) Source code cleanups: use const where appropriate, eliminate casts, use void * instead of char * in lhash. [Ulf Möller] *) Bugfix: ssl3_send_server_key_exchange was not restartable (the state was not changed to SSL3_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH_B, and because of this the server could overwrite ephemeral keys that the client has already seen). [Bodo Moeller] *) Turn DSA_is_prime into a macro that calls BN_is_prime, using 50 iterations of the Rabin-Miller test. DSA_generate_parameters now uses BN_is_prime_fasttest (with 50 iterations of the Rabin-Miller test as required by the appendix to FIPS PUB 186[-1]) instead of DSA_is_prime. As BN_is_prime_fasttest includes trial division, DSA parameter generation becomes much faster. This implies a change for the callback functions in DSA_is_prime and DSA_generate_parameters: The callback function is called once for each positive witness in the Rabin-Miller test, not just occasionally in the inner loop; and the parameters to the callback function now provide an iteration count for the outer loop rather than for the current invocation of the inner loop. DSA_generate_parameters additionally can call the callback function with an 'iteration count' of -1, meaning that a candidate has passed the trial division test (when q is generated from an application-provided seed, trial division is skipped). [Bodo Moeller] *) New function BN_is_prime_fasttest that optionally does trial division before starting the Rabin-Miller test and has an additional BN_CTX * argument (whereas BN_is_prime always has to allocate at least one BN_CTX). 'callback(1, -1, cb_arg)' is called when a number has passed the trial division stage. [Bodo Moeller] *) Fix for bug in CRL encoding. The validity dates weren't being handled as ASN1_TIME. [Steve Henson] *) New -pkcs12 option to CA.pl script to write out a PKCS#12 file. [Steve Henson] *) New function BN_pseudo_rand(). [Ulf Möller] *) Clean up BN_mod_mul_montgomery(): replace the broken (and unreadable) bignum version of BN_from_montgomery() with the working code from SSLeay 0.9.0 (the word based version is faster anyway), and clean up the comments. [Ulf Möller] *) Avoid a race condition in s2_clnt.c (function get_server_hello) that made it impossible to use the same SSL_SESSION data structure in SSL2 clients in multiple threads. [Bodo Moeller] *) The return value of RAND_load_file() no longer counts bytes obtained by stat(). RAND_load_file(..., -1) is new and uses the complete file to seed the PRNG (previously an explicit byte count was required). [Ulf Möller, Bodo Möller] *) Clean up CRYPTO_EX_DATA functions, some of these didn't have prototypes used (char *) instead of (void *) and had casts all over the place. [Steve Henson] *) Make BN_generate_prime() return NULL on error if ret!=NULL. [Ulf Möller] *) Retain source code compatibility for BN_prime_checks macro: BN_is_prime(..., BN_prime_checks, ...) now uses BN_prime_checks_for_size to determine the appropriate number of Rabin-Miller iterations. [Ulf Möller] *) Diffie-Hellman uses "safe" primes: DH_check() return code renamed to DH_CHECK_P_NOT_SAFE_PRIME. (Check if this is true? OpenPGP calls them "strong".) [Ulf Möller] *) Merge the functionality of "dh" and "gendh" programs into a new program "dhparam". The old programs are retained for now but will handle DH keys (instead of parameters) in future. [Steve Henson] *) Make the ciphers, s_server and s_client programs check the return values when a new cipher list is set. [Steve Henson] *) Enhance the SSL/TLS cipher mechanism to correctly handle the TLS 56bit ciphers. Before when the 56bit ciphers were enabled the sorting was wrong. The syntax for the cipher sorting has been extended to support sorting by cipher-strength (using the strength_bits hard coded in the tables). The new command is "@STRENGTH" (see also doc/apps/ciphers.pod). Fix a bug in the cipher-command parser: when supplying a cipher command string with an "undefined" symbol (neither command nor alphanumeric [A-Za-z0-9], ssl_set_cipher_list used to hang in an endless loop. Now an error is flagged. Due to the strength-sorting extension, the code of the ssl_create_cipher_list() function was completely rearranged. I hope that the readability was also increased :-) [Lutz Jaenicke ] *) Minor change to 'x509' utility. The -CAcreateserial option now uses 1 for the first serial number and places 2 in the serial number file. This avoids problems when the root CA is created with serial number zero and the first user certificate has the same issuer name and serial number as the root CA. [Steve Henson] *) Fixes to X509_ATTRIBUTE utilities, change the 'req' program so it uses the new code. Add documentation for this stuff. [Steve Henson] *) Changes to X509_ATTRIBUTE utilities. These have been renamed from X509_*() to X509at_*() on the grounds that they don't handle X509 structures and behave in an analogous way to the X509v3 functions: they shouldn't be called directly but wrapper functions should be used instead. So we also now have some wrapper functions that call the X509at functions when passed certificate requests. (TO DO: similar things can be done with PKCS#7 signed and unsigned attributes, PKCS#12 attributes and a few other things. Some of these need some d2i or i2d and print functionality because they handle more complex structures.) [Steve Henson] *) Add missing #ifndefs that caused missing symbols when building libssl as a shared library without RSA. Use #ifndef NO_SSL2 instead of NO_RSA in ssl/s2*.c. [Kris Kennaway , modified by Ulf Möller] *) Precautions against using the PRNG uninitialized: RAND_bytes() now has a return value which indicates the quality of the random data (1 = ok, 0 = not seeded). Also an error is recorded on the thread's error queue. New function RAND_pseudo_bytes() generates output that is guaranteed to be unique but not unpredictable. RAND_add is like RAND_seed, but takes an extra argument for an entropy estimate (RAND_seed always assumes full entropy). [Ulf Möller] *) Do more iterations of Rabin-Miller probable prime test (specifically, 3 for 1024-bit primes, 6 for 512-bit primes, 12 for 256-bit primes instead of only 2 for all lengths; see BN_prime_checks_for_size definition in crypto/bn/bn_prime.c for the complete table). This guarantees a false-positive rate of at most 2^-80 for random input. [Bodo Moeller] *) Rewrite ssl3_read_n (ssl/s3_pkt.c) avoiding a couple of bugs. [Bodo Moeller] *) New function X509_CTX_rget_chain() (renamed to X509_CTX_get1_chain in the 0.9.5 release), this returns the chain from an X509_CTX structure with a dup of the stack and all the X509 reference counts upped: so the stack will exist after X509_CTX_cleanup() has been called. Modify pkcs12.c to use this. Also make SSL_SESSION_print() print out the verify return code. [Steve Henson] *) Add manpage for the pkcs12 command. Also change the default behaviour so MAC iteration counts are used unless the new -nomaciter option is used. This improves file security and only older versions of MSIE (4.0 for example) need it. [Steve Henson] *) Honor the no-xxx Configure options when creating .DEF files. [Ulf Möller] *) Add PKCS#10 attributes to field table: challengePassword, unstructuredName and unstructuredAddress. These are taken from draft PKCS#9 v2.0 but are compatible with v1.2 provided no international characters are used. More changes to X509_ATTRIBUTE code: allow the setting of types based on strings. Remove the 'loc' parameter when adding attributes because these will be a SET OF encoding which is sorted in ASN1 order. [Steve Henson] *) Initial changes to the 'req' utility to allow request generation automation. This will allow an application to just generate a template file containing all the field values and have req construct the request. Initial support for X509_ATTRIBUTE handling. Stacks of these are used all over the place including certificate requests and PKCS#7 structures. They are currently handled manually where necessary with some primitive wrappers for PKCS#7. The new functions behave in a manner analogous to the X509 extension functions: they allow attributes to be looked up by NID and added. Later something similar to the X509V3 code would be desirable to automatically handle the encoding, decoding and printing of the more complex types. The string types like challengePassword can be handled by the string table functions. Also modified the multi byte string table handling. Now there is a 'global mask' which masks out certain types. The table itself can use the flag STABLE_NO_MASK to ignore the mask setting: this is useful when for example there is only one permissible type (as in countryName) and using the mask might result in no valid types at all. [Steve Henson] *) Clean up 'Finished' handling, and add functions SSL_get_finished and SSL_get_peer_finished to allow applications to obtain the latest Finished messages sent to the peer or expected from the peer, respectively. (SSL_get_peer_finished is usually the Finished message actually received from the peer, otherwise the protocol will be aborted.) As the Finished message are message digests of the complete handshake (with a total of 192 bits for TLS 1.0 and more for SSL 3.0), they can be used for external authentication procedures when the authentication provided by SSL/TLS is not desired or is not enough. [Bodo Moeller] *) Enhanced support for Alpha Linux is added. Now ./config checks if the host supports BWX extension and if Compaq C is present on the $PATH. Just exploiting of the BWX extension results in 20-30% performance kick for some algorithms, e.g. DES and RC4 to mention a couple. Compaq C in turn generates ~20% faster code for MD5 and SHA1. [Andy Polyakov] *) Add support for MS "fast SGC". This is arguably a violation of the SSL3/TLS protocol. Netscape SGC does two handshakes: the first with weak crypto and after checking the certificate is SGC a second one with strong crypto. MS SGC stops the first handshake after receiving the server certificate message and sends a second client hello. Since a server will typically do all the time consuming operations before expecting any further messages from the client (server key exchange is the most expensive) there is little difference between the two. To get OpenSSL to support MS SGC we have to permit a second client hello message after we have sent server done. In addition we have to reset the MAC if we do get this second client hello. [Steve Henson] *) Add a function 'd2i_AutoPrivateKey()' this will automatically decide if a DER encoded private key is RSA or DSA traditional format. Changed d2i_PrivateKey_bio() to use it. This is only needed for the "traditional" format DER encoded private key. Newer code should use PKCS#8 format which has the key type encoded in the ASN1 structure. Added DER private key support to pkcs8 application. [Steve Henson] *) SSL 3/TLS 1 servers now don't request certificates when an anonymous ciphersuites has been selected (as required by the SSL 3/TLS 1 specifications). Exception: When SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT is set, we interpret this as a request to violate the specification (the worst that can happen is a handshake failure, and 'correct' behaviour would result in a handshake failure anyway). [Bodo Moeller] *) In SSL_CTX_add_session, take into account that there might be multiple SSL_SESSION structures with the same session ID (e.g. when two threads concurrently obtain them from an external cache). The internal cache can handle only one SSL_SESSION with a given ID, so if there's a conflict, we now throw out the old one to achieve consistency. [Bodo Moeller] *) Add OIDs for idea and blowfish in CBC mode. This will allow both to be used in PKCS#5 v2.0 and S/MIME. Also add checking to some routines that use cipher OIDs: some ciphers do not have OIDs defined and so they cannot be used for S/MIME and PKCS#5 v2.0 for example. [Steve Henson] *) Simplify the trust setting structure and code. Now we just have two sequences of OIDs for trusted and rejected settings. These will typically have values the same as the extended key usage extension and any application specific purposes. The trust checking code now has a default behaviour: it will just check for an object with the same NID as the passed id. Functions can be provided to override either the default behaviour or the behaviour for a given id. SSL client, server and email already have functions in place for compatibility: they check the NID and also return "trusted" if the certificate is self signed. [Steve Henson] *) Add d2i,i2d bio/fp functions for PrivateKey: these convert the traditional format into an EVP_PKEY structure. [Steve Henson] *) Add a password callback function PEM_cb() which either prompts for a password if usr_data is NULL or otherwise assumes it is a null terminated password. Allow passwords to be passed on command line environment or config files in a few more utilities. [Steve Henson] *) Add a bunch of DER and PEM functions to handle PKCS#8 format private keys. Add some short names for PKCS#8 PBE algorithms and allow them to be specified on the command line for the pkcs8 and pkcs12 utilities. Update documentation. [Steve Henson] *) Support for ASN1 "NULL" type. This could be handled before by using ASN1_TYPE but there wasn't any function that would try to read a NULL and produce an error if it couldn't. For compatibility we also have ASN1_NULL_new() and ASN1_NULL_free() functions but these are faked and don't allocate anything because they don't need to. [Steve Henson] *) Initial support for MacOS is now provided. Examine INSTALL.MacOS for details. [Andy Polyakov, Roy Woods ] *) Rebuild of the memory allocation routines used by OpenSSL code and possibly others as well. The purpose is to make an interface that provide hooks so anyone can build a separate set of allocation and deallocation routines to be used by OpenSSL, for example memory pool implementations, or something else, which was previously hard since Malloc(), Realloc() and Free() were defined as macros having the values malloc, realloc and free, respectively (except for Win32 compilations). The same is provided for memory debugging code. OpenSSL already comes with functionality to find memory leaks, but this gives people a chance to debug other memory problems. With these changes, a new set of functions and macros have appeared: CRYPTO_set_mem_debug_functions() [F] CRYPTO_get_mem_debug_functions() [F] CRYPTO_dbg_set_options() [F] CRYPTO_dbg_get_options() [F] CRYPTO_malloc_debug_init() [M] The memory debug functions are NULL by default, unless the library is compiled with CRYPTO_MDEBUG or friends is defined. If someone wants to debug memory anyway, CRYPTO_malloc_debug_init() (which gives the standard debugging functions that come with OpenSSL) or CRYPTO_set_mem_debug_functions() (tells OpenSSL to use functions provided by the library user) must be used. When the standard debugging functions are used, CRYPTO_dbg_set_options can be used to request additional information: CRYPTO_dbg_set_options(V_CYRPTO_MDEBUG_xxx) corresponds to setting the CRYPTO_MDEBUG_xxx macro when compiling the library. Also, things like CRYPTO_set_mem_functions will always give the expected result (the new set of functions is used for allocation and deallocation) at all times, regardless of platform and compiler options. To finish it up, some functions that were never use in any other way than through macros have a new API and new semantic: CRYPTO_dbg_malloc() CRYPTO_dbg_realloc() CRYPTO_dbg_free() All macros of value have retained their old syntax. [Richard Levitte and Bodo Moeller] *) Some S/MIME fixes. The OID for SMIMECapabilities was wrong, the ordering of SMIMECapabilities wasn't in "strength order" and there was a missing NULL in the AlgorithmIdentifier for the SHA1 signature algorithm. [Steve Henson] *) Some ASN1 types with illegal zero length encoding (INTEGER, ENUMERATED and OBJECT IDENTIFIER) choked the ASN1 routines. [Frans Heymans , modified by Steve Henson] *) Merge in my S/MIME library for OpenSSL. This provides a simple S/MIME API on top of the PKCS#7 code, a MIME parser (with enough functionality to handle multipart/signed properly) and a utility called 'smime' to call all this stuff. This is based on code I originally wrote for Celo who have kindly allowed it to be included in OpenSSL. [Steve Henson] *) Add variants des_set_key_checked and des_set_key_unchecked of des_set_key (aka des_key_sched). Global variable des_check_key decides which of these is called by des_set_key; this way des_check_key behaves as it always did, but applications and the library itself, which was buggy for des_check_key == 1, have a cleaner way to pick the version they need. [Bodo Moeller] *) New function PKCS12_newpass() which changes the password of a PKCS12 structure. [Steve Henson] *) Modify X509_TRUST and X509_PURPOSE so it also uses a static and dynamic mix. In both cases the ids can be used as an index into the table. Also modified the X509_TRUST_add() and X509_PURPOSE_add() functions so they accept a list of the field values and the application doesn't need to directly manipulate the X509_TRUST structure. [Steve Henson] *) Modify the ASN1_STRING_TABLE stuff so it also uses bsearch and doesn't need initialising. [Steve Henson] *) Modify the way the V3 extension code looks up extensions. This now works in a similar way to the object code: we have some "standard" extensions in a static table which is searched with OBJ_bsearch() and the application can add dynamic ones if needed. The file crypto/x509v3/ext_dat.h now has the info: this file needs to be updated whenever a new extension is added to the core code and kept in ext_nid order. There is a simple program 'tabtest.c' which checks this. New extensions are not added too often so this file can readily be maintained manually. There are two big advantages in doing things this way. The extensions can be looked up immediately and no longer need to be "added" using X509V3_add_standard_extensions(): this function now does nothing. [Side note: I get *lots* of email saying the extension code doesn't work because people forget to call this function] Also no dynamic allocation is done unless new extensions are added: so if we don't add custom extensions there is no need to call X509V3_EXT_cleanup(). [Steve Henson] *) Modify enc utility's salting as follows: make salting the default. Add a magic header, so unsalted files fail gracefully instead of just decrypting to garbage. This is because not salting is a big security hole, so people should be discouraged from doing it. [Ben Laurie] *) Fixes and enhancements to the 'x509' utility. It allowed a message digest to be passed on the command line but it only used this parameter when signing a certificate. Modified so all relevant operations are affected by the digest parameter including the -fingerprint and -x509toreq options. Also -x509toreq choked if a DSA key was used because it didn't fix the digest. [Steve Henson] *) Initial certificate chain verify code. Currently tests the untrusted certificates for consistency with the verify purpose (which is set when the X509_STORE_CTX structure is set up) and checks the pathlength. There is a NO_CHAIN_VERIFY compilation option to keep the old behaviour: this is because it will reject chains with invalid extensions whereas every previous version of OpenSSL and SSLeay made no checks at all. Trust code: checks the root CA for the relevant trust settings. Trust settings have an initial value consistent with the verify purpose: e.g. if the verify purpose is for SSL client use it expects the CA to be trusted for SSL client use. However the default value can be changed to permit custom trust settings: one example of this would be to only trust certificates from a specific "secure" set of CAs. Also added X509_STORE_CTX_new() and X509_STORE_CTX_free() functions which should be used for version portability: especially since the verify structure is likely to change more often now. SSL integration. Add purpose and trust to SSL_CTX and SSL and functions to set them. If not set then assume SSL clients will verify SSL servers and vice versa. Two new options to the verify program: -untrusted allows a set of untrusted certificates to be passed in and -purpose which sets the intended purpose of the certificate. If a purpose is set then the new chain verify code is used to check extension consistency. [Steve Henson] *) Support for the authority information access extension. [Steve Henson] *) Modify RSA and DSA PEM read routines to transparently handle PKCS#8 format private keys. New *_PUBKEY_* functions that handle public keys in a format compatible with certificate SubjectPublicKeyInfo structures. Unfortunately there were already functions called *_PublicKey_* which used various odd formats so these are retained for compatibility: however the DSA variants were never in a public release so they have been deleted. Changed dsa/rsa utilities to handle the new format: note no releases ever handled public keys so we should be OK. The primary motivation for this change is to avoid the same fiasco that dogs private keys: there are several incompatible private key formats some of which are standard and some OpenSSL specific and require various evil hacks to allow partial transparent handling and even then it doesn't work with DER formats. Given the option anything other than PKCS#8 should be dumped: but the other formats have to stay in the name of compatibility. With public keys and the benefit of hindsight one standard format is used which works with EVP_PKEY, RSA or DSA structures: though it clearly returns an error if you try to read the wrong kind of key. Added a -pubkey option to the 'x509' utility to output the public key. Also rename the EVP_PKEY_get_*() to EVP_PKEY_rget_*() (renamed to EVP_PKEY_get1_*() in the OpenSSL 0.9.5 release) and add EVP_PKEY_rset_*() functions (renamed to EVP_PKEY_set1_*()) that do the same as the EVP_PKEY_assign_*() except they up the reference count of the added key (they don't "swallow" the supplied key). [Steve Henson] *) Fixes to crypto/x509/by_file.c the code to read in certificates and CRLs would fail if the file contained no certificates or no CRLs: added a new function to read in both types and return the number read: this means that if none are read it will be an error. The DER versions of the certificate and CRL reader would always fail because it isn't possible to mix certificates and CRLs in DER format without choking one or the other routine. Changed this to just read a certificate: this is the best we can do. Also modified the code in apps/verify.c to take notice of return codes: it was previously attempting to read in certificates from NULL pointers and ignoring any errors: this is one reason why the cert and CRL reader seemed to work. It doesn't check return codes from the default certificate routines: these may well fail if the certificates aren't installed. [Steve Henson] *) Code to support otherName option in GeneralName. [Steve Henson] *) First update to verify code. Change the verify utility so it warns if it is passed a self signed certificate: for consistency with the normal behaviour. X509_verify has been modified to it will now verify a self signed certificate if *exactly* the same certificate appears in the store: it was previously impossible to trust a single self signed certificate. This means that: openssl verify ss.pem now gives a warning about a self signed certificate but openssl verify -CAfile ss.pem ss.pem is OK. [Steve Henson] *) For servers, store verify_result in SSL_SESSION data structure (and add it to external session representation). This is needed when client certificate verifications fails, but an application-provided verification callback (set by SSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback) allows accepting the session anyway (i.e. leaves x509_store_ctx->error != X509_V_OK but returns 1): When the session is reused, we have to set ssl->verify_result to the appropriate error code to avoid security holes. [Bodo Moeller, problem pointed out by Lutz Jaenicke] *) Fix a bug in the new PKCS#7 code: it didn't consider the case in PKCS7_dataInit() where the signed PKCS7 structure didn't contain any existing data because it was being created. [Po-Cheng Chen , slightly modified by Steve Henson] *) Add a salt to the key derivation routines in enc.c. This forms the first 8 bytes of the encrypted file. Also add a -S option to allow a salt to be input on the command line. [Steve Henson] *) New function X509_cmp(). Oddly enough there wasn't a function to compare two certificates. We do this by working out the SHA1 hash and comparing that. X509_cmp() will be needed by the trust code. [Steve Henson] *) SSL_get1_session() is like SSL_get_session(), but increments the reference count in the SSL_SESSION returned. [Geoff Thorpe ] *) Fix for 'req': it was adding a null to request attributes. Also change the X509_LOOKUP and X509_INFO code to handle certificate auxiliary information. [Steve Henson] *) Add support for 40 and 64 bit RC2 and RC4 algorithms: document the 'enc' command. [Steve Henson] *) Add the possibility to add extra information to the memory leak detecting output, to form tracebacks, showing from where each allocation was originated: CRYPTO_push_info("constant string") adds the string plus current file name and line number to a per-thread stack, CRYPTO_pop_info() does the obvious, CRYPTO_remove_all_info() is like calling CYRPTO_pop_info() until the stack is empty. Also updated memory leak detection code to be multi-thread-safe. [Richard Levitte] *) Add options -text and -noout to pkcs7 utility and delete the encryption options which never did anything. Update docs. [Steve Henson] *) Add options to some of the utilities to allow the pass phrase to be included on either the command line (not recommended on OSes like Unix) or read from the environment. Update the manpages and fix a few bugs. [Steve Henson] *) Add a few manpages for some of the openssl commands. [Steve Henson] *) Fix the -revoke option in ca. It was freeing up memory twice, leaking and not finding already revoked certificates. [Steve Henson] *) Extensive changes to support certificate auxiliary information. This involves the use of X509_CERT_AUX structure and X509_AUX functions. An X509_AUX function such as PEM_read_X509_AUX() can still read in a certificate file in the usual way but it will also read in any additional "auxiliary information". By doing things this way a fair degree of compatibility can be retained: existing certificates can have this information added using the new 'x509' options. Current auxiliary information includes an "alias" and some trust settings. The trust settings will ultimately be used in enhanced certificate chain verification routines: currently a certificate can only be trusted if it is self signed and then it is trusted for all purposes. [Steve Henson] *) Fix assembler for Alpha (tested only on DEC OSF not Linux or *BSD). The problem was that one of the replacement routines had not been working since SSLeay releases. For now the offending routine has been replaced with non-optimised assembler. Even so, this now gives around 95% performance improvement for 1024 bit RSA signs. [Mark Cox] *) Hack to fix PKCS#7 decryption when used with some unorthodox RC2 handling. Most clients have the effective key size in bits equal to the key length in bits: so a 40 bit RC2 key uses a 40 bit (5 byte) key. A few however don't do this and instead use the size of the decrypted key to determine the RC2 key length and the AlgorithmIdentifier to determine the effective key length. In this case the effective key length can still be 40 bits but the key length can be 168 bits for example. This is fixed by manually forcing an RC2 key into the EVP_PKEY structure because the EVP code can't currently handle unusual RC2 key sizes: it always assumes the key length and effective key length are equal. [Steve Henson] *) Add a bunch of functions that should simplify the creation of X509_NAME structures. Now you should be able to do: X509_NAME_add_entry_by_txt(nm, "CN", MBSTRING_ASC, "Steve", -1, -1, 0); and have it automatically work out the correct field type and fill in the structures. The more adventurous can try: X509_NAME_add_entry_by_txt(nm, field, MBSTRING_UTF8, str, -1, -1, 0); and it will (hopefully) work out the correct multibyte encoding. [Steve Henson] *) Change the 'req' utility to use the new field handling and multibyte copy routines. Before the DN field creation was handled in an ad hoc way in req, ca, and x509 which was rather broken and didn't support BMPStrings or UTF8Strings. Since some software doesn't implement BMPStrings or UTF8Strings yet, they can be enabled using the config file using the dirstring_type option. See the new comment in the default openssl.cnf for more info. [Steve Henson] *) Make crypto/rand/md_rand.c more robust: - Assure unique random numbers after fork(). - Make sure that concurrent threads access the global counter and md serializably so that we never lose entropy in them or use exactly the same state in multiple threads. Access to the large state is not always serializable because the additional locking could be a performance killer, and md should be large enough anyway. [Bodo Moeller] *) New file apps/app_rand.c with commonly needed functionality for handling the random seed file. Use the random seed file in some applications that previously did not: ca, dsaparam -genkey (which also ignored its '-rand' option), s_client, s_server, x509 (when signing). Except on systems with /dev/urandom, it is crucial to have a random seed file at least for key creation, DSA signing, and for DH exchanges; for RSA signatures we could do without one. gendh and gendsa (unlike genrsa) used to read only the first byte of each file listed in the '-rand' option. The function as previously found in genrsa is now in app_rand.c and is used by all programs that support '-rand'. [Bodo Moeller] *) In RAND_write_file, use mode 0600 for creating files; don't just chmod when it may be too late. [Bodo Moeller] *) Report an error from X509_STORE_load_locations when X509_LOOKUP_load_file or X509_LOOKUP_add_dir failed. [Bill Perry] *) New function ASN1_mbstring_copy() this copies a string in either ASCII, Unicode, Universal (4 bytes per character) or UTF8 format into an ASN1_STRING type. A mask of permissible types is passed and it chooses the "minimal" type to use or an error if not type is suitable. [Steve Henson] *) Add function equivalents to the various macros in asn1.h. The old macros are retained with an M_ prefix. Code inside the library can use the M_ macros. External code (including the openssl utility) should *NOT* in order to be "shared library friendly". [Steve Henson] *) Add various functions that can check a certificate's extensions to see if it usable for various purposes such as SSL client, server or S/MIME and CAs of these types. This is currently VERY EXPERIMENTAL but will ultimately be used for certificate chain verification. Also added a -purpose flag to x509 utility to print out all the purposes. [Steve Henson] *) Add a CRYPTO_EX_DATA to X509 certificate structure and associated functions. [Steve Henson] *) New X509V3_{X509,CRL,REVOKED}_get_d2i() functions. These will search for, obtain and decode and extension and obtain its critical flag. This allows all the necessary extension code to be handled in a single function call. [Steve Henson] *) RC4 tune-up featuring 30-40% performance improvement on most RISC platforms. See crypto/rc4/rc4_enc.c for further details. [Andy Polyakov] *) New -noout option to asn1parse. This causes no output to be produced its main use is when combined with -strparse and -out to extract data from a file (which may not be in ASN.1 format). [Steve Henson] *) Fix for pkcs12 program. It was hashing an invalid certificate pointer when producing the local key id. [Richard Levitte ] *) New option -dhparam in s_server. This allows a DH parameter file to be stated explicitly. If it is not stated then it tries the first server certificate file. The previous behaviour hard coded the filename "server.pem". [Steve Henson] *) Add -pubin and -pubout options to the rsa and dsa commands. These allow a public key to be input or output. For example: openssl rsa -in key.pem -pubout -out pubkey.pem Also added necessary DSA public key functions to handle this. [Steve Henson] *) Fix so PKCS7_dataVerify() doesn't crash if no certificates are contained in the message. This was handled by allowing X509_find_by_issuer_and_serial() to tolerate a NULL passed to it. [Steve Henson, reported by Sampo Kellomaki ] *) Fix for bug in d2i_ASN1_bytes(): other ASN1 functions add an extra null to the end of the strings whereas this didn't. This would cause problems if strings read with d2i_ASN1_bytes() were later modified. [Steve Henson, reported by Arne Ansper ] *) Fix for base64 decode bug. When a base64 bio reads only one line of data and it contains EOF it will end up returning an error. This is caused by input 46 bytes long. The cause is due to the way base64 BIOs find the start of base64 encoded data. They do this by trying a trial decode on each line until they find one that works. When they do a flag is set and it starts again knowing it can pass all the data directly through the decoder. Unfortunately it doesn't reset the context it uses. This means that if EOF is reached an attempt is made to pass two EOFs through the context and this causes the resulting error. This can also cause other problems as well. As is usual with these problems it takes *ages* to find and the fix is trivial: move one line. [Steve Henson, reported by ian@uns.ns.ac.yu (Ivan Nejgebauer) ] *) Ugly workaround to get s_client and s_server working under Windows. The old code wouldn't work because it needed to select() on sockets and the tty (for keypresses and to see if data could be written). Win32 only supports select() on sockets so we select() with a 1s timeout on the sockets and then see if any characters are waiting to be read, if none are present then we retry, we also assume we can always write data to the tty. This isn't nice because the code then blocks until we've received a complete line of data and it is effectively polling the keyboard at 1s intervals: however it's quite a bit better than not working at all :-) A dedicated Windows application might handle this with an event loop for example. [Steve Henson] *) Enhance RSA_METHOD structure. Now there are two extra methods, rsa_sign and rsa_verify. When the RSA_FLAGS_SIGN_VER option is set these functions will be called when RSA_sign() and RSA_verify() are used. This is useful if rsa_pub_dec() and rsa_priv_enc() equivalents are not available. For this to work properly RSA_public_decrypt() and RSA_private_encrypt() should *not* be used: RSA_sign() and RSA_verify() must be used instead. This necessitated the support of an extra signature type NID_md5_sha1 for SSL signatures and modifications to the SSL library to use it instead of calling RSA_public_decrypt() and RSA_private_encrypt(). [Steve Henson] *) Add new -verify -CAfile and -CApath options to the crl program, these will lookup a CRL issuers certificate and verify the signature in a similar way to the verify program. Tidy up the crl program so it no longer accesses structures directly. Make the ASN1 CRL parsing a bit less strict. It will now permit CRL extensions even if it is not a V2 CRL: this will allow it to tolerate some broken CRLs. [Steve Henson] *) Initialize all non-automatic variables each time one of the openssl sub-programs is started (this is necessary as they may be started multiple times from the "OpenSSL>" prompt). [Lennart Bang, Bodo Moeller] *) Preliminary compilation option RSA_NULL which disables RSA crypto without removing all other RSA functionality (this is what NO_RSA does). This is so (for example) those in the US can disable those operations covered by the RSA patent while allowing storage and parsing of RSA keys and RSA key generation. [Steve Henson] *) Non-copying interface to BIO pairs. (still largely untested) [Bodo Moeller] *) New function ANS1_tag2str() to convert an ASN1 tag to a descriptive ASCII string. This was handled independently in various places before. [Steve Henson] *) New functions UTF8_getc() and UTF8_putc() that parse and generate UTF8 strings a character at a time. [Steve Henson] *) Use client_version from client hello to select the protocol (s23_srvr.c) and for RSA client key exchange verification (s3_srvr.c), as required by the SSL 3.0/TLS 1.0 specifications. [Bodo Moeller] *) Add various utility functions to handle SPKACs, these were previously handled by poking round in the structure internals. Added new function NETSCAPE_SPKI_print() to print out SPKAC and a new utility 'spkac' to print, verify and generate SPKACs. Based on an original idea from Massimiliano Pala but extensively modified. [Steve Henson] *) RIPEMD160 is operational on all platforms and is back in 'make test'. [Andy Polyakov] *) Allow the config file extension section to be overwritten on the command line. Based on an original idea from Massimiliano Pala . The new option is called -extensions and can be applied to ca, req and x509. Also -reqexts to override the request extensions in req and -crlexts to override the crl extensions in ca. [Steve Henson] *) Add new feature to the SPKAC handling in ca. Now you can include the same field multiple times by preceding it by "XXXX." for example: 1.OU="Unit name 1" 2.OU="Unit name 2" this is the same syntax as used in the req config file. [Steve Henson] *) Allow certificate extensions to be added to certificate requests. These are specified in a 'req_extensions' option of the req section of the config file. They can be printed out with the -text option to req but are otherwise ignored at present. [Steve Henson] *) Fix a horrible bug in enc_read() in crypto/evp/bio_enc.c: if the first data read consists of only the final block it would not decrypted because EVP_CipherUpdate() would correctly report zero bytes had been decrypted. A misplaced 'break' also meant the decrypted final block might not be copied until the next read. [Steve Henson] *) Initial support for DH_METHOD. Again based on RSA_METHOD. Also added a few extra parameters to the DH structure: these will be useful if for example we want the value of 'q' or implement X9.42 DH. [Steve Henson] *) Initial support for DSA_METHOD. This is based on the RSA_METHOD and provides hooks that allow the default DSA functions or functions on a "per key" basis to be replaced. This allows hardware acceleration and hardware key storage to be handled without major modification to the library. Also added low level modexp hooks and CRYPTO_EX structure and associated functions. [Steve Henson] *) Add a new flag to memory BIOs, BIO_FLAG_MEM_RDONLY. This marks the BIO as "read only": it can't be written to and the buffer it points to will not be freed. Reading from a read only BIO is much more efficient than a normal memory BIO. This was added because there are several times when an area of memory needs to be read from a BIO. The previous method was to create a memory BIO and write the data to it, this results in two copies of the data and an O(n^2) reading algorithm. There is a new function BIO_new_mem_buf() which creates a read only memory BIO from an area of memory. Also modified the PKCS#7 routines to use read only memory BIOs. [Steve Henson] *) Bugfix: ssl23_get_client_hello did not work properly when called in state SSL23_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO_B, i.e. when the first 7 bytes of a SSLv2-compatible client hello for SSLv3 or TLSv1 could be read, but a retry condition occurred while trying to read the rest. [Bodo Moeller] *) The PKCS7_ENC_CONTENT_new() function was setting the content type as NID_pkcs7_encrypted by default: this was wrong since this should almost always be NID_pkcs7_data. Also modified the PKCS7_set_type() to handle the encrypted data type: this is a more sensible place to put it and it allows the PKCS#12 code to be tidied up that duplicated this functionality. [Steve Henson] *) Changed obj_dat.pl script so it takes its input and output files on the command line. This should avoid shell escape redirection problems under Win32. [Steve Henson] *) Initial support for certificate extension requests, these are included in things like Xenroll certificate requests. Included functions to allow extensions to be obtained and added. [Steve Henson] *) -crlf option to s_client and s_server for sending newlines as CRLF (as required by many protocols). [Bodo Moeller] Changes between 0.9.3a and 0.9.4 [09 Aug 1999] *) Install libRSAglue.a when OpenSSL is built with RSAref. [Ralf S. Engelschall] *) A few more ``#ifndef NO_FP_API / #endif'' pairs for consistency. [Andrija Antonijevic ] *) Fix -startdate and -enddate (which was missing) arguments to 'ca' program. [Steve Henson] *) New function DSA_dup_DH, which duplicates DSA parameters/keys as DH parameters/keys (q is lost during that conversion, but the resulting DH parameters contain its length). For 1024-bit p, DSA_generate_parameters followed by DSA_dup_DH is much faster than DH_generate_parameters (which creates parameters where p = 2*q + 1), and also the smaller q makes DH computations much more efficient (160-bit exponentiation instead of 1024-bit exponentiation); so this provides a convenient way to support DHE ciphersuites in SSL/TLS servers (see ssl/ssltest.c). It is of utter importance to use SSL_CTX_set_options(s_ctx, SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE); or SSL_set_options(s_ctx, SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE); when such DH parameters are used, because otherwise small subgroup attacks may become possible! [Bodo Moeller] *) Avoid memory leak in i2d_DHparams. [Bodo Moeller] *) Allow the -k option to be used more than once in the enc program: this allows the same encrypted message to be read by multiple recipients. [Steve Henson] *) New function OBJ_obj2txt(buf, buf_len, a, no_name), this converts an ASN1_OBJECT to a text string. If the "no_name" parameter is set then it will always use the numerical form of the OID, even if it has a short or long name. [Steve Henson] *) Added an extra RSA flag: RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY. Previously the rsa_mod_exp method only got called if p,q,dmp1,dmq1,iqmp components were present, otherwise bn_mod_exp was called. In the case of hardware keys for example no private key components need be present and it might store extra data in the RSA structure, which cannot be accessed from bn_mod_exp. By setting RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY rsa_mod_exp will always be called for private key operations. [Steve Henson] *) Added support for SPARC Linux. [Andy Polyakov] *) pem_password_cb function type incompatibly changed from typedef int pem_password_cb(char *buf, int size, int rwflag); to ....(char *buf, int size, int rwflag, void *userdata); so that applications can pass data to their callbacks: The PEM[_ASN1]_{read,write}... functions and macros now take an additional void * argument, which is just handed through whenever the password callback is called. [Damien Miller ; tiny changes by Bodo Moeller] New function SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb_userdata. Compatibility note: As many C implementations push function arguments onto the stack in reverse order, the new library version is likely to interoperate with programs that have been compiled with the old pem_password_cb definition (PEM_whatever takes some data that happens to be on the stack as its last argument, and the callback just ignores this garbage); but there is no guarantee whatsoever that this will work. *) The -DPLATFORM="\"$(PLATFORM)\"" definition and the similar -DCFLAGS=... (both in crypto/Makefile.ssl for use by crypto/cversion.c) caused problems not only on Windows, but also on some Unix platforms. To avoid problematic command lines, these definitions are now in an auto-generated file crypto/buildinf.h (created by crypto/Makefile.ssl for standard "make" builds, by util/mk1mf.pl for "mk1mf" builds). [Bodo Moeller] *) MIPS III/IV assembler module is reimplemented. [Andy Polyakov] *) More DES library cleanups: remove references to srand/rand and delete an unused file. [Ulf Möller] *) Add support for the free Netwide assembler (NASM) under Win32, since not many people have MASM (ml) and it can be hard to obtain. This is currently experimental but it seems to work OK and pass all the tests. Check out INSTALL.W32 for info. [Steve Henson] *) Fix memory leaks in s3_clnt.c: All non-anonymous SSL3/TLS1 connections without temporary keys kept an extra copy of the server key, and connections with temporary keys did not free everything in case of an error. [Bodo Moeller] *) New function RSA_check_key and new openssl rsa option -check for verifying the consistency of RSA keys. [Ulf Moeller, Bodo Moeller] *) Various changes to make Win32 compile work: 1. Casts to avoid "loss of data" warnings in p5_crpt2.c 2. Change unsigned int to int in b_dump.c to avoid "signed/unsigned comparison" warnings. 3. Add sk__sort to DEF file generator and do make update. [Steve Henson] *) Add a debugging option to PKCS#5 v2 key generation function: when you #define DEBUG_PKCS5V2 passwords, salts, iteration counts and derived keys are printed to stderr. [Steve Henson] *) Copy the flags in ASN1_STRING_dup(). [Roman E. Pavlov ] *) The x509 application mishandled signing requests containing DSA keys when the signing key was also DSA and the parameters didn't match. It was supposed to omit the parameters when they matched the signing key: the verifying software was then supposed to automatically use the CA's parameters if they were absent from the end user certificate. Omitting parameters is no longer recommended. The test was also the wrong way round! This was probably due to unusual behaviour in EVP_cmp_parameters() which returns 1 if the parameters match. This meant that parameters were omitted when they *didn't* match and the certificate was useless. Certificates signed with 'ca' didn't have this bug. [Steve Henson, reported by Doug Erickson ] *) Memory leak checking (-DCRYPTO_MDEBUG) had some problems. The interface is as follows: Applications can use CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_ON) aka MemCheck_start(), CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_OFF) aka MemCheck_stop(); "off" is now the default. The library internally uses CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_DISABLE) aka MemCheck_off(), CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_ENABLE) aka MemCheck_on() to disable memory-checking temporarily. Some inconsistent states that previously were possible (and were even the default) are now avoided. -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG_TIME is new and additionally stores the current time with each memory chunk allocated; this is occasionally more helpful than just having a counter. -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG_THREAD is also new and adds the thread ID. -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG_ALL enables all of the above, plus any future extensions. [Bodo Moeller] *) Introduce "mode" for SSL structures (with defaults in SSL_CTX), which largely parallels "options", but is for changing API behaviour, whereas "options" are about protocol behaviour. Initial "mode" flags are: SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE Allow SSL_write to report success when a single record has been written. SSL_MODE_ACCEPT_MOVING_WRITE_BUFFER Don't insist that SSL_write retries use the same buffer location. (But all of the contents must be copied!) [Bodo Moeller] *) Bugfix: SSL_set_options ignored its parameter, only SSL_CTX_set_options worked. *) Fix problems with no-hmac etc. [Ulf Möller, pointed out by Brian Wellington ] *) New functions RSA_get_default_method(), RSA_set_method() and RSA_get_method(). These allows replacement of RSA_METHODs without having to mess around with the internals of an RSA structure. [Steve Henson] *) Fix memory leaks in DSA_do_sign and DSA_is_prime. Also really enable memory leak checks in openssl.c and in some test programs. [Chad C. Mulligan, Bodo Moeller] *) Fix a bug in d2i_ASN1_INTEGER() and i2d_ASN1_INTEGER() which can mess up the length of negative integers. This has now been simplified to just store the length when it is first determined and use it later, rather than trying to keep track of where data is copied and updating it to point to the end. [Steve Henson, reported by Brien Wheeler ] *) Add a new function PKCS7_signatureVerify. This allows the verification of a PKCS#7 signature but with the signing certificate passed to the function itself. This contrasts with PKCS7_dataVerify which assumes the certificate is present in the PKCS#7 structure. This isn't always the case: certificates can be omitted from a PKCS#7 structure and be distributed by "out of band" means (such as a certificate database). [Steve Henson] *) Complete the PEM_* macros with DECLARE_PEM versions to replace the function prototypes in pem.h, also change util/mkdef.pl to add the necessary function names. [Steve Henson] *) mk1mf.pl (used by Windows builds) did not properly read the options set by Configure in the top level Makefile, and Configure was not even able to write more than one option correctly. Fixed, now "no-idea no-rc5 -DCRYPTO_MDEBUG" etc. works as intended. [Bodo Moeller] *) New functions CONF_load_bio() and CONF_load_fp() to allow a config file to be loaded from a BIO or FILE pointer. The BIO version will for example allow memory BIOs to contain config info. [Steve Henson] *) New function "CRYPTO_num_locks" that returns CRYPTO_NUM_LOCKS. Whoever hopes to achieve shared-library compatibility across versions must use this, not the compile-time macro. (Exercise 0.9.4: Which is the minimum library version required by such programs?) Note: All this applies only to multi-threaded programs, others don't need locks. [Bodo Moeller] *) Add missing case to s3_clnt.c state machine -- one of the new SSL tests through a BIO pair triggered the default case, i.e. SSLerr(...,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_STATE). [Bodo Moeller] *) New "BIO pair" concept (crypto/bio/bss_bio.c) so that applications can use the SSL library even if none of the specific BIOs is appropriate. [Bodo Moeller] *) Fix a bug in i2d_DSAPublicKey() which meant it returned the wrong value for the encoded length. [Jeon KyoungHo ] *) Add initial documentation of the X509V3 functions. [Steve Henson] *) Add a new pair of functions PEM_write_PKCS8PrivateKey() and PEM_write_bio_PKCS8PrivateKey() that are equivalent to PEM_write_PrivateKey() and PEM_write_bio_PrivateKey() but use the more secure PKCS#8 private key format with a high iteration count. [Steve Henson] *) Fix determination of Perl interpreter: A perl or perl5 _directory_ in $PATH was also accepted as the interpreter. [Ralf S. Engelschall] *) Fix demos/sign/sign.c: well there wasn't anything strictly speaking wrong with it but it was very old and did things like calling PEM_ASN1_read() directly and used MD5 for the hash not to mention some unusual formatting. [Steve Henson] *) Fix demos/selfsign.c: it used obsolete and deleted functions, changed to use the new extension code. [Steve Henson] *) Implement the PEM_read/PEM_write functions in crypto/pem/pem_all.c with macros. This should make it easier to change their form, add extra arguments etc. Fix a few PEM prototypes which didn't have cipher as a constant. [Steve Henson] *) Add to configuration table a new entry that can specify an alternative name for unistd.h (for pre-POSIX systems); we need this for NeXTstep, according to Mark Crispin . [Bodo Moeller] #if 0 *) DES CBC did not update the IV. Weird. [Ben Laurie] #else des_cbc_encrypt does not update the IV, but des_ncbc_encrypt does. Changing the behaviour of the former might break existing programs -- where IV updating is needed, des_ncbc_encrypt can be used. #endif *) When bntest is run from "make test" it drives bc to check its calculations, as well as internally checking them. If an internal check fails, it needs to cause bc to give a non-zero result or make test carries on without noticing the failure. Fixed. [Ben Laurie] *) DES library cleanups. [Ulf Möller] *) Add support for PKCS#5 v2.0 PBE algorithms. This will permit PKCS#8 to be used with any cipher unlike PKCS#5 v1.5 which can at most handle 64 bit ciphers. NOTE: although the key derivation function has been verified against some published test vectors it has not been extensively tested yet. Added a -v2 "cipher" option to pkcs8 application to allow the use of v2.0. [Steve Henson] *) Instead of "mkdir -p", which is not fully portable, use new Perl script "util/mkdir-p.pl". [Bodo Moeller] *) Rewrite the way password based encryption (PBE) is handled. It used to assume that the ASN1 AlgorithmIdentifier parameter was a PBEParameter structure. This was true for the PKCS#5 v1.5 and PKCS#12 PBE algorithms but doesn't apply to PKCS#5 v2.0 where it can be something else. Now the 'parameter' field of the AlgorithmIdentifier is passed to the underlying key generation function so it must do its own ASN1 parsing. This has also changed the EVP_PBE_CipherInit() function which now has a 'parameter' argument instead of literal salt and iteration count values and the function EVP_PBE_ALGOR_CipherInit() has been deleted. [Steve Henson] *) Support for PKCS#5 v1.5 compatible password based encryption algorithms and PKCS#8 functionality. New 'pkcs8' application linked to openssl. Needed to change the PEM_STRING_EVP_PKEY value which was just "PRIVATE KEY" because this clashed with PKCS#8 unencrypted string. Since this value was just used as a "magic string" and not used directly its value doesn't matter. [Steve Henson] *) Introduce some semblance of const correctness to BN. Shame C doesn't support mutable. [Ben Laurie] *) "linux-sparc64" configuration (ultrapenguin). [Ray Miller ] "linux-sparc" configuration. [Christian Forster ] *) config now generates no-xxx options for missing ciphers. [Ulf Möller] *) Support the EBCDIC character set (work in progress). File ebcdic.c not yet included because it has a different license. [Martin Kraemer ] *) Support BS2000/OSD-POSIX. [Martin Kraemer ] *) Make callbacks for key generation use void * instead of char *. [Ben Laurie] *) Make S/MIME samples compile (not yet tested). [Ben Laurie] *) Additional typesafe stacks. [Ben Laurie] *) New configuration variants "bsdi-elf-gcc" (BSD/OS 4.x). [Bodo Moeller] Changes between 0.9.3 and 0.9.3a [29 May 1999] *) New configuration variant "sco5-gcc". *) Updated some demos. [Sean O Riordain, Wade Scholine] *) Add missing BIO_free at exit of pkcs12 application. [Wu Zhigang] *) Fix memory leak in conf.c. [Steve Henson] *) Updates for Win32 to assembler version of MD5. [Steve Henson] *) Set #! path to perl in apps/der_chop to where we found it instead of using a fixed path. [Bodo Moeller] *) SHA library changes for irix64-mips4-cc. [Andy Polyakov] *) Improvements for VMS support. [Richard Levitte] Changes between 0.9.2b and 0.9.3 [24 May 1999] *) Bignum library bug fix. IRIX 6 passes "make test" now! This also avoids the problems with SC4.2 and unpatched SC5. [Andy Polyakov ] *) New functions sk_num, sk_value and sk_set to replace the previous macros. These are required because of the typesafe stack would otherwise break existing code. If old code used a structure member which used to be STACK and is now STACK_OF (for example cert in a PKCS7_SIGNED structure) with sk_num or sk_value it would produce an error because the num, data members are not present in STACK_OF. Now it just produces a warning. sk_set replaces the old method of assigning a value to sk_value (e.g. sk_value(x, i) = y) which the library used in a few cases. Any code that does this will no longer work (and should use sk_set instead) but this could be regarded as a "questionable" behaviour anyway. [Steve Henson] *) Fix most of the other PKCS#7 bugs. The "experimental" code can now correctly handle encrypted S/MIME data. [Steve Henson] *) Change type of various DES function arguments from des_cblock (which means, in function argument declarations, pointer to char) to des_cblock * (meaning pointer to array with 8 char elements), which allows the compiler to do more typechecking; it was like that back in SSLeay, but with lots of ugly casts. Introduce new type const_des_cblock. [Bodo Moeller] *) Reorganise the PKCS#7 library and get rid of some of the more obvious problems: find RecipientInfo structure that matches recipient certificate and initialise the ASN1 structures properly based on passed cipher. [Steve Henson] *) Belatedly make the BN tests actually check the results. [Ben Laurie] *) Fix the encoding and decoding of negative ASN1 INTEGERS and conversion to and from BNs: it was completely broken. New compilation option NEG_PUBKEY_BUG to allow for some broken certificates that encode public key elements as negative integers. [Steve Henson] *) Reorganize and speed up MD5. [Andy Polyakov ] *) VMS support. [Richard Levitte ] *) New option -out to asn1parse to allow the parsed structure to be output to a file. This is most useful when combined with the -strparse option to examine the output of things like OCTET STRINGS. [Steve Henson] *) Make SSL library a little more fool-proof by not requiring any longer that SSL_set_{accept,connect}_state be called before SSL_{accept,connect} may be used (SSL_set_..._state is omitted in many applications because usually everything *appeared* to work as intended anyway -- now it really works as intended). [Bodo Moeller] *) Move openssl.cnf out of lib/. [Ulf Möller] *) Fix various things to let OpenSSL even pass ``egcc -pipe -O2 -Wall -Wshadow -Wpointer-arith -Wcast-align -Wmissing-prototypes -Wmissing-declarations -Wnested-externs -Winline'' with EGCS 1.1.2+ [Ralf S. Engelschall] *) Various fixes to the EVP and PKCS#7 code. It may now be able to handle PKCS#7 enveloped data properly. [Sebastian Akerman , modified by Steve] *) Create a duplicate of the SSL_CTX's CERT in SSL_new instead of copying pointers. The cert_st handling is changed by this in various ways (and thus what used to be known as ctx->default_cert is now called ctx->cert, since we don't resort to s->ctx->[default_]cert any longer when s->cert does not give us what we need). ssl_cert_instantiate becomes obsolete by this change. As soon as we've got the new code right (possibly it already is?), we have solved a couple of bugs of the earlier code where s->cert was used as if it could not have been shared with other SSL structures. Note that using the SSL API in certain dirty ways now will result in different behaviour than observed with earlier library versions: Changing settings for an SSL_CTX *ctx after having done s = SSL_new(ctx) does not influence s as it used to. In order to clean up things more thoroughly, inside SSL_SESSION we don't use CERT any longer, but a new structure SESS_CERT that holds per-session data (if available); currently, this is the peer's certificate chain and, for clients, the server's certificate and temporary key. CERT holds only those values that can have meaningful defaults in an SSL_CTX. [Bodo Moeller] *) New function X509V3_EXT_i2d() to create an X509_EXTENSION structure from the internal representation. Various PKCS#7 fixes: remove some evil casts and set the enc_dig_alg field properly based on the signing key type. [Steve Henson] *) Allow PKCS#12 password to be set from the command line or the environment. Let 'ca' get its config file name from the environment variables "OPENSSL_CONF" or "SSLEAY_CONF" (for consistency with 'req' and 'x509'). [Steve Henson] *) Allow certificate policies extension to use an IA5STRING for the organization field. This is contrary to the PKIX definition but VeriSign uses it and IE5 only recognises this form. Document 'x509' extension option. [Steve Henson] *) Add PEDANTIC compiler flag to allow compilation with gcc -pedantic, without disallowing inline assembler and the like for non-pedantic builds. [Ben Laurie] *) Support Borland C++ builder. [Janez Jere , modified by Ulf Möller] *) Support Mingw32. [Ulf Möller] *) SHA-1 cleanups and performance enhancements. [Andy Polyakov ] *) Sparc v8plus assembler for the bignum library. [Andy Polyakov ] *) Accept any -xxx and +xxx compiler options in Configure. [Ulf Möller] *) Update HPUX configuration. [Anonymous] *) Add missing sk__unshift() function to safestack.h [Ralf S. Engelschall] *) New function SSL_CTX_use_certificate_chain_file that sets the "extra_cert"s in addition to the certificate. (This makes sense only for "PEM" format files, as chains as a whole are not DER-encoded.) [Bodo Moeller] *) Support verify_depth from the SSL API. x509_vfy.c had what can be considered an off-by-one-error: Its depth (which was not part of the external interface) was actually counting the number of certificates in a chain; now it really counts the depth. [Bodo Moeller] *) Bugfix in crypto/x509/x509_cmp.c: The SSLerr macro was used instead of X509err, which often resulted in confusing error messages since the error codes are not globally unique (e.g. an alleged error in ssl3_accept when a certificate didn't match the private key). *) New function SSL_CTX_set_session_id_context that allows to set a default value (so that you don't need SSL_set_session_id_context for each connection using the SSL_CTX). [Bodo Moeller] *) OAEP decoding bug fix. [Ulf Möller] *) Support INSTALL_PREFIX for package builders, as proposed by David Harris. [Bodo Moeller] *) New Configure options "threads" and "no-threads". For systems where the proper compiler options are known (currently Solaris and Linux), "threads" is the default. [Bodo Moeller] *) New script util/mklink.pl as a faster substitute for util/mklink.sh. [Bodo Moeller] *) Install various scripts to $(OPENSSLDIR)/misc, not to $(INSTALLTOP)/bin -- they shouldn't clutter directories such as /usr/local/bin. [Bodo Moeller] *) "make linux-shared" to build shared libraries. [Niels Poppe ] *) New Configure option no- (rsa, idea, rc5, ...). [Ulf Möller] *) Add the PKCS#12 API documentation to openssl.txt. Preliminary support for extension adding in x509 utility. [Steve Henson] *) Remove NOPROTO sections and error code comments. [Ulf Möller] *) Partial rewrite of the DEF file generator to now parse the ANSI prototypes. [Steve Henson] *) New Configure options --prefix=DIR and --openssldir=DIR. [Ulf Möller] *) Complete rewrite of the error code script(s). It is all now handled by one script at the top level which handles error code gathering, header rewriting and C source file generation. It should be much better than the old method: it now uses a modified version of Ulf's parser to read the ANSI prototypes in all header files (thus the old K&R definitions aren't needed for error creation any more) and do a better job of translating function codes into names. The old 'ASN1 error code embedded in a comment' is no longer necessary and it doesn't use .err files which have now been deleted. Also the error code call doesn't have to appear all on one line (which resulted in some large lines...). [Steve Henson] *) Change #include filenames from to . [Bodo Moeller] *) Change behaviour of ssl2_read when facing length-0 packets: Don't return 0 (which usually indicates a closed connection), but continue reading. [Bodo Moeller] *) Fix some race conditions. [Bodo Moeller] *) Add support for CRL distribution points extension. Add Certificate Policies and CRL distribution points documentation. [Steve Henson] *) Move the autogenerated header file parts to crypto/opensslconf.h. [Ulf Möller] *) Fix new 56-bit DES export ciphersuites: they were using 7 bytes instead of 8 of keying material. Merlin has also confirmed interop with this fix between OpenSSL and Baltimore C/SSL 2.0 and J/SSL 2.0. [Merlin Hughes ] *) Fix lots of warnings. [Richard Levitte ] *) In add_cert_dir() in crypto/x509/by_dir.c, break out of the loop if the directory spec didn't end with a LIST_SEPARATOR_CHAR. [Richard Levitte ] *) Fix problems with sizeof(long) == 8. [Andy Polyakov ] *) Change functions to ANSI C. [Ulf Möller] *) Fix typos in error codes. [Martin Kraemer , Ulf Möller] *) Remove defunct assembler files from Configure. [Ulf Möller] *) SPARC v8 assembler BIGNUM implementation. [Andy Polyakov ] *) Support for Certificate Policies extension: both print and set. Various additions to support the r2i method this uses. [Steve Henson] *) A lot of constification, and fix a bug in X509_NAME_oneline() that could return a const string when you are expecting an allocated buffer. [Ben Laurie] *) Add support for ASN1 types UTF8String and VISIBLESTRING, also the CHOICE types DirectoryString and DisplayText. [Steve Henson] *) Add code to allow r2i extensions to access the configuration database, add an LHASH database driver and add several ctx helper functions. [Steve Henson] *) Fix an evil bug in bn_expand2() which caused various BN functions to fail when they extended the size of a BIGNUM. [Steve Henson] *) Various utility functions to handle SXNet extension. Modify mkdef.pl to support typesafe stack. [Steve Henson] *) Fix typo in SSL_[gs]et_options(). [Nils Frostberg ] *) Delete various functions and files that belonged to the (now obsolete) old X509V3 handling code. [Steve Henson] *) New Configure option "rsaref". [Ulf Möller] *) Don't auto-generate pem.h. [Bodo Moeller] *) Introduce type-safe ASN.1 SETs. [Ben Laurie] *) Convert various additional casted stacks to type-safe STACK_OF() variants. [Ben Laurie, Ralf S. Engelschall, Steve Henson] *) Introduce type-safe STACKs. This will almost certainly break lots of code that links with OpenSSL (well at least cause lots of warnings), but fear not: the conversion is trivial, and it eliminates loads of evil casts. A few STACKed things have been converted already. Feel free to convert more. In the fullness of time, I'll do away with the STACK type altogether. [Ben Laurie] *) Add `openssl ca -revoke ' facility which revokes a certificate specified in by updating the entry in the index.txt file. This way one no longer has to edit the index.txt file manually for revoking a certificate. The -revoke option does the gory details now. [Massimiliano Pala , Ralf S. Engelschall] *) Fix `openssl crl -noout -text' combination where `-noout' killed the `-text' option at all and this way the `-noout -text' combination was inconsistent in `openssl crl' with the friends in `openssl x509|rsa|dsa'. [Ralf S. Engelschall] *) Make sure a corresponding plain text error message exists for the X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED/23 error number which can occur when a verify callback function determined that a certificate was revoked. [Ralf S. Engelschall] *) Bugfix: In test/testenc, don't test "openssl " for ciphers that were excluded, e.g. by -DNO_IDEA. Also, test all available ciphers including rc5, which was forgotten until now. In order to let the testing shell script know which algorithms are available, a new (up to now undocumented) command "openssl list-cipher-commands" is used. [Bodo Moeller] *) Bugfix: s_client occasionally would sleep in select() when it should have checked SSL_pending() first. [Bodo Moeller] *) New functions DSA_do_sign and DSA_do_verify to provide access to the raw DSA values prior to ASN.1 encoding. [Ulf Möller] *) Tweaks to Configure [Niels Poppe ] *) Add support for PKCS#5 v2.0 ASN1 PBES2 structures. No other support, yet... [Steve Henson] *) New variables $(RANLIB) and $(PERL) in the Makefiles. [Ulf Möller] *) New config option to avoid instructions that are illegal on the 80386. The default code is faster, but requires at least a 486. [Ulf Möller] *) Got rid of old SSL2_CLIENT_VERSION (inconsistently used) and SSL2_SERVER_VERSION (not used at all) macros, which are now the same as SSL2_VERSION anyway. [Bodo Moeller] *) New "-showcerts" option for s_client. [Bodo Moeller] *) Still more PKCS#12 integration. Add pkcs12 application to openssl application. Various cleanups and fixes. [Steve Henson] *) More PKCS#12 integration. Add new pkcs12 directory with Makefile.ssl and modify error routines to work internally. Add error codes and PBE init to library startup routines. [Steve Henson] *) Further PKCS#12 integration. Added password based encryption, PKCS#8 and packing functions to asn1 and evp. Changed function names and error codes along the way. [Steve Henson] *) PKCS12 integration: and so it begins... First of several patches to slowly integrate PKCS#12 functionality into OpenSSL. Add PKCS#12 objects to objects.h [Steve Henson] *) Add a new 'indent' option to some X509V3 extension code. Initial ASN1 and display support for Thawte strong extranet extension. [Steve Henson] *) Add LinuxPPC support. [Jeff Dubrule ] *) Get rid of redundant BN file bn_mulw.c, and rename bn_div64 to bn_div_words in alpha.s. [Hannes Reinecke and Ben Laurie] *) Make sure the RSA OAEP test is skipped under -DRSAref because OAEP isn't supported when OpenSSL is built with RSAref. [Ulf Moeller ] *) Move definitions of IS_SET/IS_SEQUENCE inside crypto/asn1/asn1.h so they no longer are missing under -DNOPROTO. [Soren S. Jorvang ] Changes between 0.9.1c and 0.9.2b [22 Mar 1999] *) Make SSL_get_peer_cert_chain() work in servers. Unfortunately, it still doesn't work when the session is reused. Coming soon! [Ben Laurie] *) Fix a security hole, that allows sessions to be reused in the wrong context thus bypassing client cert protection! All software that uses client certs and session caches in multiple contexts NEEDS PATCHING to allow session reuse! A fuller solution is in the works. [Ben Laurie, problem pointed out by Holger Reif, Bodo Moeller (and ???)] *) Some more source tree cleanups (removed obsolete files crypto/bf/asm/bf586.pl, test/test.txt and crypto/sha/asm/f.s; changed permission on "config" script to be executable) and a fix for the INSTALL document. [Ulf Moeller ] *) Remove some legacy and erroneous uses of malloc, free instead of Malloc, Free. [Lennart Bang , with minor changes by Steve] *) Make rsa_oaep_test return non-zero on error. [Ulf Moeller ] *) Add support for native Solaris shared libraries. Configure solaris-sparc-sc4-pic, make, then run shlib/solaris-sc4.sh. It'd be nice if someone would make that last step automatic. [Matthias Loepfe ] *) ctx_size was not built with the right compiler during "make links". Fixed. [Ben Laurie] *) Change the meaning of 'ALL' in the cipher list. It now means "everything except NULL ciphers". This means the default cipher list will no longer enable NULL ciphers. They need to be specifically enabled e.g. with the string "DEFAULT:eNULL". [Steve Henson] *) Fix to RSA private encryption routines: if p < q then it would occasionally produce an invalid result. This will only happen with externally generated keys because OpenSSL (and SSLeay) ensure p > q. [Steve Henson] *) Be less restrictive and allow also `perl util/perlpath.pl /path/to/bin/perl' in addition to `perl util/perlpath.pl /path/to/bin', because this way one can also use an interpreter named `perl5' (which is usually the name of Perl 5.xxx on platforms where an Perl 4.x is still installed as `perl'). [Matthias Loepfe ] *) Let util/clean-depend.pl work also with older Perl 5.00x versions. [Matthias Loepfe ] *) Fix Makefile.org so CC,CFLAG etc are passed to 'make links' add advapi32.lib to Win32 build and change the pem test comparison to fc.exe (thanks to Ulrich Kroener for the suggestion). Fix misplaced ASNI prototypes and declarations in evp.h and crypto/des/ede_cbcm_enc.c. [Steve Henson] *) DES quad checksum was broken on big-endian architectures. Fixed. [Ben Laurie] *) Comment out two functions in bio.h that aren't implemented. Fix up the Win32 test batch file so it (might) work again. The Win32 test batch file is horrible: I feel ill.... [Steve Henson] *) Move various #ifdefs around so NO_SYSLOG, NO_DIRENT etc are now selected in e_os.h. Audit of header files to check ANSI and non ANSI sections: 10 functions were absent from non ANSI section and not exported from Windows DLLs. Fixed up libeay.num for new functions. [Steve Henson] *) Make `openssl version' output lines consistent. [Ralf S. Engelschall] *) Fix Win32 symbol export lists for BIO functions: Added BIO_get_ex_new_index, BIO_get_ex_num, BIO_get_ex_data and BIO_set_ex_data to ms/libeay{16,32}.def. [Ralf S. Engelschall] *) Second round of fixing the OpenSSL perl/ stuff. It now at least compiled fine under Unix and passes some trivial tests I've now added. But the whole stuff is horribly incomplete, so a README.1ST with a disclaimer was added to make sure no one expects that this stuff really works in the OpenSSL 0.9.2 release. Additionally I've started to clean the XS sources up and fixed a few little bugs and inconsistencies in OpenSSL.{pm,xs} and openssl_bio.xs. [Ralf S. Engelschall] *) Fix the generation of two part addresses in perl. [Kenji Miyake , integrated by Ben Laurie] *) Add config entry for Linux on MIPS. [John Tobey ] *) Make links whenever Configure is run, unless we are on Windoze. [Ben Laurie] *) Permit extensions to be added to CRLs using crl_section in openssl.cnf. Currently only issuerAltName and AuthorityKeyIdentifier make any sense in CRLs. [Steve Henson] *) Add a useful kludge to allow package maintainers to specify compiler and other platforms details on the command line without having to patch the Configure script every time: One now can use ``perl Configure :
'', i.e. platform ids are allowed to have details appended to them (separated by colons). This is treated as there would be a static pre-configured entry in Configure's %table under key with value
and ``perl Configure '' is called. So, when you want to perform a quick test-compile under FreeBSD 3.1 with pgcc and without assembler stuff you can use ``perl Configure "FreeBSD-elf:pgcc:-O6:::"'' now, which overrides the FreeBSD-elf entry on-the-fly. [Ralf S. Engelschall] *) Disable new TLS1 ciphersuites by default: they aren't official yet. [Ben Laurie] *) Allow DSO flags like -fpic, -fPIC, -KPIC etc. to be specified on the `perl Configure ...' command line. This way one can compile OpenSSL libraries with Position Independent Code (PIC) which is needed for linking it into DSOs. [Ralf S. Engelschall] *) Remarkably, export ciphers were totally broken and no-one had noticed! Fixed. [Ben Laurie] *) Cleaned up the LICENSE document: The official contact for any license questions now is the OpenSSL core team under openssl-core@openssl.org. And add a paragraph about the dual-license situation to make sure people recognize that _BOTH_ the OpenSSL license _AND_ the SSLeay license apply to the OpenSSL toolkit. [Ralf S. Engelschall] *) General source tree makefile cleanups: Made `making xxx in yyy...' display consistent in the source tree and replaced `/bin/rm' by `rm'. Additionally cleaned up the `make links' target: Remove unnecessary semicolons, subsequent redundant removes, inline point.sh into mklink.sh to speed processing and no longer clutter the display with confusing stuff. Instead only the actually done links are displayed. [Ralf S. Engelschall] *) Permit null encryption ciphersuites, used for authentication only. It used to be necessary to set the preprocessor define SSL_ALLOW_ENULL to do this. It is now necessary to set SSL_FORBID_ENULL to prevent the use of null encryption. [Ben Laurie] *) Add a bunch of fixes to the PKCS#7 stuff. It used to sometimes reorder signed attributes when verifying signatures (this would break them), the detached data encoding was wrong and public keys obtained using X509_get_pubkey() weren't freed. [Steve Henson] *) Add text documentation for the BUFFER functions. Also added a work around to a Win95 console bug. This was triggered by the password read stuff: the last character typed gets carried over to the next fread(). If you were generating a new cert request using 'req' for example then the last character of the passphrase would be CR which would then enter the first field as blank. [Steve Henson] *) Added the new `Includes OpenSSL Cryptography Software' button as doc/openssl_button.{gif,html} which is similar in style to the old SSLeay button and can be used by applications based on OpenSSL to show the relationship to the OpenSSL project. [Ralf S. Engelschall] *) Remove confusing variables in function signatures in files ssl/ssl_lib.c and ssl/ssl.h. [Lennart Bong ] *) Don't install bss_file.c under PREFIX/include/ [Lennart Bong ] *) Get the Win32 compile working again. Modify mkdef.pl so it can handle functions that return function pointers and has support for NT specific stuff. Fix mk1mf.pl and VC-32.pl to support NT differences also. Various #ifdef WIN32 and WINNTs sprinkled about the place and some changes from unsigned to signed types: this was killing the Win32 compile. [Steve Henson] *) Add new certificate file to stack functions, SSL_add_dir_cert_subjects_to_stack() and SSL_add_file_cert_subjects_to_stack(). These largely supplant SSL_load_client_CA_file(), and can be used to add multiple certs easily to a stack (usually this is then handed to SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list()). This means that Apache-SSL and similar packages don't have to mess around to add as many CAs as they want to the preferred list. [Ben Laurie] *) Experiment with doxygen documentation. Currently only partially applied to ssl/ssl_lib.c. See http://www.stack.nl/~dimitri/doxygen/index.html, and run doxygen with openssl.doxy as the configuration file. [Ben Laurie] *) Get rid of remaining C++-style comments which strict C compilers hate. [Ralf S. Engelschall, pointed out by Carlos Amengual] *) Changed BN_RECURSION in bn_mont.c to BN_RECURSION_MONT so it is not compiled in by default: it has problems with large keys. [Steve Henson] *) Add a bunch of SSL_xxx() functions for configuring the temporary RSA and DH private keys and/or callback functions which directly correspond to their SSL_CTX_xxx() counterparts but work on a per-connection basis. This is needed for applications which have to configure certificates on a per-connection basis (e.g. Apache+mod_ssl) instead of a per-context basis (e.g. s_server). For the RSA certificate situation is makes no difference, but for the DSA certificate situation this fixes the "no shared cipher" problem where the OpenSSL cipher selection procedure failed because the temporary keys were not overtaken from the context and the API provided no way to reconfigure them. The new functions now let applications reconfigure the stuff and they are in detail: SSL_need_tmp_RSA, SSL_set_tmp_rsa, SSL_set_tmp_dh, SSL_set_tmp_rsa_callback and SSL_set_tmp_dh_callback. Additionally a new non-public-API function ssl_cert_instantiate() is used as a helper function and also to reduce code redundancy inside ssl_rsa.c. [Ralf S. Engelschall] *) Move s_server -dcert and -dkey options out of the undocumented feature area because they are useful for the DSA situation and should be recognized by the users. [Ralf S. Engelschall] *) Fix the cipher decision scheme for export ciphers: the export bits are *not* within SSL_MKEY_MASK or SSL_AUTH_MASK, they are within SSL_EXP_MASK. So, the original variable has to be used instead of the already masked variable. [Richard Levitte ] *) Fix 'port' variable from `int' to `unsigned int' in crypto/bio/b_sock.c [Richard Levitte ] *) Change type of another md_len variable in pk7_doit.c:PKCS7_dataFinal() from `int' to `unsigned int' because it's a length and initialized by EVP_DigestFinal() which expects an `unsigned int *'. [Richard Levitte ] *) Don't hard-code path to Perl interpreter on shebang line of Configure script. Instead use the usual Shell->Perl transition trick. [Ralf S. Engelschall] *) Make `openssl x509 -noout -modulus' functional also for DSA certificates (in addition to RSA certificates) to match the behaviour of `openssl dsa -noout -modulus' as it's already the case for `openssl rsa -noout -modulus'. For RSA the -modulus is the real "modulus" while for DSA currently the public key is printed (a decision which was already done by `openssl dsa -modulus' in the past) which serves a similar purpose. Additionally the NO_RSA no longer completely removes the whole -modulus option; it now only avoids using the RSA stuff. Same applies to NO_DSA now, too. [Ralf S. Engelschall] *) Add Arne Ansper's reliable BIO - this is an encrypted, block-digested BIO. See the source (crypto/evp/bio_ok.c) for more info. [Arne Ansper ] *) Dump the old yucky req code that tried (and failed) to allow raw OIDs to be added. Now both 'req' and 'ca' can use new objects defined in the config file. [Steve Henson] *) Add cool BIO that does syslog (or event log on NT). [Arne Ansper , integrated by Ben Laurie] *) Add support for new TLS ciphersuites, TLS_RSA_EXPORT56_WITH_RC4_56_MD5, TLS_RSA_EXPORT56_WITH_RC2_CBC_56_MD5 and TLS_RSA_EXPORT56_WITH_DES_CBC_SHA, as specified in "56-bit Export Cipher Suites For TLS", draft-ietf-tls-56-bit-ciphersuites-00.txt. [Ben Laurie] *) Add preliminary config info for new extension code. [Steve Henson] *) Make RSA_NO_PADDING really use no padding. [Ulf Moeller ] *) Generate errors when private/public key check is done. [Ben Laurie] *) Overhaul for 'crl' utility. New function X509_CRL_print. Partial support for some CRL extensions and new objects added. [Steve Henson] *) Really fix the ASN1 IMPLICIT bug this time... Partial support for private key usage extension and fuller support for authority key id. [Steve Henson] *) Add OAEP encryption for the OpenSSL crypto library. OAEP is the improved padding method for RSA, which is recommended for new applications in PKCS #1 v2.0 (RFC 2437, October 1998). OAEP (Optimal Asymmetric Encryption Padding) has better theoretical foundations than the ad-hoc padding used in PKCS #1 v1.5. It is secure against Bleichbacher's attack on RSA. [Ulf Moeller , reformatted, corrected and integrated by Ben Laurie] *) Updates to the new SSL compression code [Eric A. Young, (from changes to C2Net SSLeay, integrated by Mark Cox)] *) Fix so that the version number in the master secret, when passed via RSA, checks that if TLS was proposed, but we roll back to SSLv3 (because the server will not accept higher), that the version number is 0x03,0x01, not 0x03,0x00 [Eric A. Young, (from changes to C2Net SSLeay, integrated by Mark Cox)] *) Run extensive memory leak checks on SSL apps. Fixed *lots* of memory leaks in ssl/ relating to new X509_get_pubkey() behaviour. Also fixes in apps/ and an unrelated leak in crypto/dsa/dsa_vrf.c [Steve Henson] *) Support for RAW extensions where an arbitrary extension can be created by including its DER encoding. See apps/openssl.cnf for an example. [Steve Henson] *) Make sure latest Perl versions don't interpret some generated C array code as Perl array code in the crypto/err/err_genc.pl script. [Lars Weber <3weber@informatik.uni-hamburg.de>] *) Modify ms/do_ms.bat to not generate assembly language makefiles since not many people have the assembler. Various Win32 compilation fixes and update to the INSTALL.W32 file with (hopefully) more accurate Win32 build instructions. [Steve Henson] *) Modify configure script 'Configure' to automatically create crypto/date.h file under Win32 and also build pem.h from pem.org. New script util/mkfiles.pl to create the MINFO file on environments that can't do a 'make files': perl util/mkfiles.pl >MINFO should work. [Steve Henson] *) Major rework of DES function declarations, in the pursuit of correctness and purity. As a result, many evil casts evaporated, and some weirdness, too. You may find this causes warnings in your code. Zapping your evil casts will probably fix them. Mostly. [Ben Laurie] *) Fix for a typo in asn1.h. Bug fix to object creation script obj_dat.pl. It considered a zero in an object definition to mean "end of object": none of the objects in objects.h have any zeros so it wasn't spotted. [Steve Henson, reported by Erwann ABALEA ] *) Add support for Triple DES Cipher Block Chaining with Output Feedback Masking (CBCM). In the absence of test vectors, the best I have been able to do is check that the decrypt undoes the encrypt, so far. Send me test vectors if you have them. [Ben Laurie] *) Correct calculation of key length for export ciphers (too much space was allocated for null ciphers). This has not been tested! [Ben Laurie] *) Modifications to the mkdef.pl for Win32 DEF file creation. The usage message is now correct (it understands "crypto" and "ssl" on its command line). There is also now an "update" option. This will update the util/ssleay.num and util/libeay.num files with any new functions. If you do a: perl util/mkdef.pl crypto ssl update it will update them. [Steve Henson] *) Overhauled the Perl interface (perl/*): - ported BN stuff to OpenSSL's different BN library - made the perl/ source tree CVS-aware - renamed the package from SSLeay to OpenSSL (the files still contain their history because I've copied them in the repository) - removed obsolete files (the test scripts will be replaced by better Test::Harness variants in the future) [Ralf S. Engelschall] *) First cut for a very conservative source tree cleanup: 1. merge various obsolete readme texts into doc/ssleay.txt where we collect the old documents and readme texts. 2. remove the first part of files where I'm already sure that we no longer need them because of three reasons: either they are just temporary files which were left by Eric or they are preserved original files where I've verified that the diff is also available in the CVS via "cvs diff -rSSLeay_0_8_1b" or they were renamed (as it was definitely the case for the crypto/md/ stuff). [Ralf S. Engelschall] *) More extension code. Incomplete support for subject and issuer alt name, issuer and authority key id. Change the i2v function parameters and add an extra 'crl' parameter in the X509V3_CTX structure: guess what that's for :-) Fix to ASN1 macro which messed up IMPLICIT tag and add f_enum.c which adds a2i, i2a for ENUMERATED. [Steve Henson] *) Preliminary support for ENUMERATED type. This is largely copied from the INTEGER code. [Steve Henson] *) Add new function, EVP_MD_CTX_copy() to replace frequent use of memcpy. [Eric A. Young, (from changes to C2Net SSLeay, integrated by Mark Cox)] *) Make sure `make rehash' target really finds the `openssl' program. [Ralf S. Engelschall, Matthias Loepfe ] *) Squeeze another 7% of speed out of MD5 assembler, at least on a P2. I'd like to hear about it if this slows down other processors. [Ben Laurie] *) Add CygWin32 platform information to Configure script. [Alan Batie ] *) Fixed ms/32all.bat script: `no_asm' -> `no-asm' [Rainer W. Gerling ] *) New program nseq to manipulate netscape certificate sequences [Steve Henson] *) Modify crl2pkcs7 so it supports multiple -certfile arguments. Fix a few typos. [Steve Henson] *) Fixes to BN code. Previously the default was to define BN_RECURSION but the BN code had some problems that would cause failures when doing certificate verification and some other functions. [Eric A. Young, (from changes to C2Net SSLeay, integrated by Mark Cox)] *) Add ASN1 and PEM code to support netscape certificate sequences. [Steve Henson] *) Add ASN1 and PEM code to support netscape certificate sequences. [Steve Henson] *) Add several PKIX and private extended key usage OIDs. [Steve Henson] *) Modify the 'ca' program to handle the new extension code. Modify openssl.cnf for new extension format, add comments. [Steve Henson] *) More X509 V3 changes. Fix typo in v3_bitstr.c. Add support to 'req' and add a sample to openssl.cnf so req -x509 now adds appropriate CA extensions. [Steve Henson] *) Continued X509 V3 changes. Add to other makefiles, integrate with the error code, add initial support to X509_print() and x509 application. [Steve Henson] *) Takes a deep breath and start adding X509 V3 extension support code. Add files in crypto/x509v3. Move original stuff to crypto/x509v3/old. All this stuff is currently isolated and isn't even compiled yet. [Steve Henson] *) Continuing patches for GeneralizedTime. Fix up certificate and CRL ASN1 to use ASN1_TIME and modify print routines to use ASN1_TIME_print. Removed the versions check from X509 routines when loading extensions: this allows certain broken certificates that don't set the version properly to be processed. [Steve Henson] *) Deal with irritating shit to do with dependencies, in YAAHW (Yet Another Ad Hoc Way) - Makefile.ssls now all contain local dependencies, which can still be regenerated with "make depend". [Ben Laurie] *) Spelling mistake in C version of CAST-128. [Ben Laurie, reported by Jeremy Hylton ] *) Changes to the error generation code. The perl script err-code.pl now reads in the old error codes and retains the old numbers, only adding new ones if necessary. It also only changes the .err files if new codes are added. The makefiles have been modified to only insert errors when needed (to avoid needlessly modifying header files). This is done by only inserting errors if the .err file is newer than the auto generated C file. To rebuild all the error codes from scratch (the old behaviour) either modify crypto/Makefile.ssl to pass the -regen flag to err_code.pl or delete all the .err files. [Steve Henson] *) CAST-128 was incorrectly implemented for short keys. The C version has been fixed, but is untested. The assembler versions are also fixed, but new assembler HAS NOT BEEN GENERATED FOR WIN32 - the Makefile needs fixing to regenerate it if needed. [Ben Laurie, reported (with fix for C version) by Jun-ichiro itojun Hagino ] *) File was opened incorrectly in randfile.c. [Ulf Möller ] *) Beginning of support for GeneralizedTime. d2i, i2d, check and print functions. Also ASN1_TIME suite which is a CHOICE of UTCTime or GeneralizedTime. ASN1_TIME is the proper type used in certificates et al: it's just almost always a UTCTime. Note this patch adds new error codes so do a "make errors" if there are problems. [Steve Henson] *) Correct Linux 1 recognition in config. [Ulf Möller ] *) Remove pointless MD5 hash when using DSA keys in ca. [Anonymous ] *) Generate an error if given an empty string as a cert directory. Also generate an error if handed NULL (previously returned 0 to indicate an error, but didn't set one). [Ben Laurie, reported by Anonymous ] *) Add prototypes to SSL methods. Make SSL_write's buffer const, at last. [Ben Laurie] *) Fix the dummy function BN_ref_mod_exp() in rsaref.c to have the correct parameters. This was causing a warning which killed off the Win32 compile. [Steve Henson] *) Remove C++ style comments from crypto/bn/bn_local.h. [Neil Costigan ] *) The function OBJ_txt2nid was broken. It was supposed to return a nid based on a text string, looking up short and long names and finally "dot" format. The "dot" format stuff didn't work. Added new function OBJ_txt2obj to do the same but return an ASN1_OBJECT and rewrote OBJ_txt2nid to use it. OBJ_txt2obj can also return objects even if the OID is not part of the table. [Steve Henson] *) Add prototypes to X509 lookup/verify methods, fixing a bug in X509_LOOKUP_by_alias(). [Ben Laurie] *) Sort openssl functions by name. [Ben Laurie] *) Get the gendsa program working (hopefully) and add it to app list. Remove encryption from sample DSA keys (in case anyone is interested the password was "1234"). [Steve Henson] *) Make _all_ *_free functions accept a NULL pointer. [Frans Heymans ] *) If a DH key is generated in s3_srvr.c, don't blow it by trying to use NULL pointers. [Anonymous ] *) s_server should send the CAfile as acceptable CAs, not its own cert. [Bodo Moeller <3moeller@informatik.uni-hamburg.de>] *) Don't blow it for numeric -newkey arguments to apps/req. [Bodo Moeller <3moeller@informatik.uni-hamburg.de>] *) Temp key "for export" tests were wrong in s3_srvr.c. [Anonymous ] *) Add prototype for temp key callback functions SSL_CTX_set_tmp_{rsa,dh}_callback(). [Ben Laurie] *) Make DH_free() tolerate being passed a NULL pointer (like RSA_free() and DSA_free()). Make X509_PUBKEY_set() check for errors in d2i_PublicKey(). [Steve Henson] *) X509_name_add_entry() freed the wrong thing after an error. [Arne Ansper ] *) rsa_eay.c would attempt to free a NULL context. [Arne Ansper ] *) BIO_s_socket() had a broken should_retry() on Windoze. [Arne Ansper ] *) BIO_f_buffer() didn't pass on BIO_CTRL_FLUSH. [Arne Ansper ] *) Make sure the already existing X509_STORE->depth variable is initialized in X509_STORE_new(), but document the fact that this variable is still unused in the certificate verification process. [Ralf S. Engelschall] *) Fix the various library and apps files to free up pkeys obtained from X509_PUBKEY_get() et al. Also allow x509.c to handle netscape extensions. [Steve Henson] *) Fix reference counting in X509_PUBKEY_get(). This makes demos/maurice/example2.c work, amongst others, probably. [Steve Henson and Ben Laurie] *) First cut of a cleanup for apps/. First the `ssleay' program is now named `openssl' and second, the shortcut symlinks for the `openssl ' are no longer created. This way we have a single and consistent command line interface `openssl ', similar to `cvs '. [Ralf S. Engelschall, Paul Sutton and Ben Laurie] *) ca.c: move test for DSA keys inside #ifndef NO_DSA. Make pubkey BIT STRING wrapper always have zero unused bits. [Steve Henson] *) Add CA.pl, perl version of CA.sh, add extended key usage OID. [Steve Henson] *) Make the top-level INSTALL documentation easier to understand. [Paul Sutton] *) Makefiles updated to exit if an error occurs in a sub-directory make (including if user presses ^C) [Paul Sutton] *) Make Montgomery context stuff explicit in RSA data structure. [Ben Laurie] *) Fix build order of pem and err to allow for generated pem.h. [Ben Laurie] *) Fix renumbering bug in X509_NAME_delete_entry(). [Ben Laurie] *) Enhanced the err-ins.pl script so it makes the error library number global and can add a library name. This is needed for external ASN1 and other error libraries. [Steve Henson] *) Fixed sk_insert which never worked properly. [Steve Henson] *) Fix ASN1 macros so they can handle indefinite length constructed EXPLICIT tags. Some non standard certificates use these: they can now be read in. [Steve Henson] *) Merged the various old/obsolete SSLeay documentation files (doc/xxx.doc) into a single doc/ssleay.txt bundle. This way the information is still preserved but no longer messes up this directory. Now it's new room for the new set of documentation files. [Ralf S. Engelschall] *) SETs were incorrectly DER encoded. This was a major pain, because they shared code with SEQUENCEs, which aren't coded the same. This means that almost everything to do with SETs or SEQUENCEs has either changed name or number of arguments. [Ben Laurie, based on a partial fix by GP Jayan ] *) Fix test data to work with the above. [Ben Laurie] *) Fix the RSA header declarations that hid a bug I fixed in 0.9.0b but was already fixed by Eric for 0.9.1 it seems. [Ben Laurie - pointed out by Ulf Möller ] *) Autodetect FreeBSD3. [Ben Laurie] *) Fix various bugs in Configure. This affects the following platforms: nextstep ncr-scde unixware-2.0 unixware-2.0-pentium sco5-cc. [Ben Laurie] *) Eliminate generated files from CVS. Reorder tests to regenerate files before they are needed. [Ben Laurie] *) Generate Makefile.ssl from Makefile.org (to keep CVS happy). [Ben Laurie] Changes between 0.9.1b and 0.9.1c [23-Dec-1998] *) Added OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER to crypto/crypto.h and changed SSLeay to OpenSSL in version strings. [Ralf S. Engelschall] *) Some fixups to the top-level documents. [Paul Sutton] *) Fixed the nasty bug where rsaref.h was not found under compile-time because the symlink to include/ was missing. [Ralf S. Engelschall] *) Incorporated the popular no-RSA/DSA-only patches which allow to compile a RSA-free SSLeay. [Andrew Cooke / Interrader Ldt., Ralf S. Engelschall] *) Fixed nasty rehash problem under `make -f Makefile.ssl links' when "ssleay" is still not found. [Ralf S. Engelschall] *) Added more platforms to Configure: Cray T3E, HPUX 11, [Ralf S. Engelschall, Beckmann ] *) Updated the README file. [Ralf S. Engelschall] *) Added various .cvsignore files in the CVS repository subdirs to make a "cvs update" really silent. [Ralf S. Engelschall] *) Recompiled the error-definition header files and added missing symbols to the Win32 linker tables. [Ralf S. Engelschall] *) Cleaned up the top-level documents; o new files: CHANGES and LICENSE o merged VERSION, HISTORY* and README* files a CHANGES.SSLeay o merged COPYRIGHT into LICENSE o removed obsolete TODO file o renamed MICROSOFT to INSTALL.W32 [Ralf S. Engelschall] *) Removed dummy files from the 0.9.1b source tree: crypto/asn1/x crypto/bio/cd crypto/bio/fg crypto/bio/grep crypto/bio/vi crypto/bn/asm/......add.c crypto/bn/asm/a.out crypto/dsa/f crypto/md5/f crypto/pem/gmon.out crypto/perlasm/f crypto/pkcs7/build crypto/rsa/f crypto/sha/asm/f crypto/threads/f ms/zzz ssl/f ssl/f.mak test/f util/f.mak util/pl/f util/pl/f.mak crypto/bf/bf_locl.old apps/f [Ralf S. Engelschall] *) Added various platform portability fixes. [Mark J. Cox] *) The Genesis of the OpenSSL rpject: We start with the latest (unreleased) SSLeay version 0.9.1b which Eric A. Young and Tim J. Hudson created while they were working for C2Net until summer 1998. [The OpenSSL Project] Changes between 0.9.0b and 0.9.1b [not released] *) Updated a few CA certificates under certs/ [Eric A. Young] *) Changed some BIGNUM api stuff. [Eric A. Young] *) Various platform ports: OpenBSD, Ultrix, IRIX 64bit, NetBSD, DGUX x86, Linux Alpha, etc. [Eric A. Young] *) New COMP library [crypto/comp/] for SSL Record Layer Compression: RLE (dummy implemented) and ZLIB (really implemented when ZLIB is available). [Eric A. Young] *) Add -strparse option to asn1pars program which parses nested binary structures [Dr Stephen Henson ] *) Added "oid_file" to ssleay.cnf for "ca" and "req" programs. [Eric A. Young] *) DSA fix for "ca" program. [Eric A. Young] *) Added "-genkey" option to "dsaparam" program. [Eric A. Young] *) Added RIPE MD160 (rmd160) message digest. [Eric A. Young] *) Added -a (all) option to "ssleay version" command. [Eric A. Young] *) Added PLATFORM define which is the id given to Configure. [Eric A. Young] *) Added MemCheck_XXXX functions to crypto/mem.c for memory checking. [Eric A. Young] *) Extended the ASN.1 parser routines. [Eric A. Young] *) Extended BIO routines to support REUSEADDR, seek, tell, etc. [Eric A. Young] *) Added a BN_CTX to the BN library. [Eric A. Young] *) Fixed the weak key values in DES library [Eric A. Young] *) Changed API in EVP library for cipher aliases. [Eric A. Young] *) Added support for RC2/64bit cipher. [Eric A. Young] *) Converted the lhash library to the crypto/mem.c functions. [Eric A. Young] *) Added more recognized ASN.1 object ids. [Eric A. Young] *) Added more RSA padding checks for SSL/TLS. [Eric A. Young] *) Added BIO proxy/filter functionality. [Eric A. Young] *) Added extra_certs to SSL_CTX which can be used send extra CA certificates to the client in the CA cert chain sending process. It can be configured with SSL_CTX_add_extra_chain_cert(). [Eric A. Young] *) Now Fortezza is denied in the authentication phase because this is key exchange mechanism is not supported by SSLeay at all. [Eric A. Young] *) Additional PKCS1 checks. [Eric A. Young] *) Support the string "TLSv1" for all TLS v1 ciphers. [Eric A. Young] *) Added function SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx() which gives the ex_data index of the SSL context in the X509_STORE_CTX ex_data. [Eric A. Young] *) Fixed a few memory leaks. [Eric A. Young] *) Fixed various code and comment typos. [Eric A. Young] *) A minor bug in ssl/s3_clnt.c where there would always be 4 0 bytes sent in the client random. [Edward Bishop ] diff --git a/Configure b/Configure index b286dd0678bb..faf57b155a1c 100755 --- a/Configure +++ b/Configure @@ -1,3612 +1,3615 @@ #! /usr/bin/env perl # -*- mode: perl; -*- # Copyright 2016-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html ## Configure -- OpenSSL source tree configuration script use 5.10.0; use strict; use Config; use FindBin; use lib "$FindBin::Bin/util/perl"; use File::Basename; use File::Spec::Functions qw/:DEFAULT abs2rel rel2abs/; use File::Path qw/mkpath/; use OpenSSL::Glob; # see INSTALL for instructions. my $orig_death_handler = $SIG{__DIE__}; $SIG{__DIE__} = \&death_handler; my $usage="Usage: Configure [no- ...] [enable- ...] [-Dxxx] [-lxxx] [-Lxxx] [-fxxx] [-Kxxx] [no-hw-xxx|no-hw] [[no-]threads] [[no-]shared] [[no-]zlib|zlib-dynamic] [no-asm] [no-egd] [sctp] [386] [--prefix=DIR] [--openssldir=OPENSSLDIR] [--with-xxx[=vvv]] [--config=FILE] os/compiler[:flags]\n"; # Options: # # --config add the given configuration file, which will be read after # any "Configurations*" files that are found in the same # directory as this script. # --prefix prefix for the OpenSSL installation, which includes the # directories bin, lib, include, share/man, share/doc/openssl # This becomes the value of INSTALLTOP in Makefile # (Default: /usr/local) # --openssldir OpenSSL data area, such as openssl.cnf, certificates and keys. # If it's a relative directory, it will be added on the directory # given with --prefix. # This becomes the value of OPENSSLDIR in Makefile and in C. # (Default: PREFIX/ssl) # # --cross-compile-prefix Add specified prefix to binutils components. # # --api One of 0.9.8, 1.0.0 or 1.1.0. Do not compile support for # interfaces deprecated as of the specified OpenSSL version. # # no-hw-xxx do not compile support for specific crypto hardware. # Generic OpenSSL-style methods relating to this support # are always compiled but return NULL if the hardware # support isn't compiled. # no-hw do not compile support for any crypto hardware. # [no-]threads [don't] try to create a library that is suitable for # multithreaded applications (default is "threads" if we # know how to do it) # [no-]shared [don't] try to create shared libraries when supported. # [no-]pic [don't] try to build position independent code when supported. # If disabled, it also disables shared and dynamic-engine. # no-asm do not use assembler # no-egd do not compile support for the entropy-gathering daemon APIs # [no-]zlib [don't] compile support for zlib compression. # zlib-dynamic Like "zlib", but the zlib library is expected to be a shared # library and will be loaded in run-time by the OpenSSL library. # sctp include SCTP support # enable-weak-ssl-ciphers # Enable weak ciphers that are disabled by default. # 386 generate 80386 code in assembly modules # no-sse2 disables IA-32 SSE2 code in assembly modules, the above # mentioned '386' option implies this one # no- build without specified algorithm (rsa, idea, rc5, ...) # - + All options which are unknown to the 'Configure' script are # / passed through to the compiler. Unix-style options beginning # with a '-' or '+' are recognized, as well as Windows-style # options beginning with a '/'. If the option contains arguments # separated by spaces, then the URL-style notation %20 can be # used for the space character in order to avoid having to quote # the option. For example, -opt%20arg gets expanded to -opt arg. # In fact, any ASCII character can be encoded as %xx using its # hexadecimal encoding. # -static while -static is also a pass-through compiler option (and # as such is limited to environments where it's actually # meaningful), it triggers a number configuration options, # namely no-pic, no-shared and no-threads. It is # argued that the only reason to produce statically linked # binaries (and in context it means executables linked with # -static flag, and not just executables linked with static # libcrypto.a) is to eliminate dependency on specific run-time, # a.k.a. libc version. The mentioned config options are meant # to achieve just that. Unfortunately on Linux it's impossible # to eliminate the dependency completely for openssl executable # because of getaddrinfo and gethostbyname calls, which can # invoke dynamically loadable library facility anyway to meet # the lookup requests. For this reason on Linux statically # linked openssl executable has rather debugging value than # production quality. # # BN_LLONG use the type 'long long' in crypto/bn/bn.h # RC4_CHAR use 'char' instead of 'int' for RC4_INT in crypto/rc4/rc4.h # Following are set automatically by this script # # MD5_ASM use some extra md5 assembler, # SHA1_ASM use some extra sha1 assembler, must define L_ENDIAN for x86 # RMD160_ASM use some extra ripemd160 assembler, # SHA256_ASM sha256_block is implemented in assembler # SHA512_ASM sha512_block is implemented in assembler # AES_ASM AES_[en|de]crypt is implemented in assembler # Minimum warning options... any contributions to OpenSSL should at least # get past these. Note that we only use these with C compilers, not with # C++ compilers. # DEBUG_UNUSED enables __owur (warn unused result) checks. # -DPEDANTIC complements -pedantic and is meant to mask code that # is not strictly standard-compliant and/or implementation-specific, # e.g. inline assembly, disregards to alignment requirements, such # that -pedantic would complain about. Incidentally -DPEDANTIC has # to be used even in sanitized builds, because sanitizer too is # supposed to and does take notice of non-standard behaviour. Then # -pedantic with pre-C9x compiler would also complain about 'long # long' not being supported. As 64-bit algorithms are common now, # it grew impossible to resolve this without sizeable additional # code, so we just tell compiler to be pedantic about everything # but 'long long' type. my @gcc_devteam_warn = qw( -DDEBUG_UNUSED -DPEDANTIC -pedantic -Wno-long-long -Wall -Wextra -Wno-unused-parameter -Wno-missing-field-initializers -Wswitch -Wsign-compare -Wshadow -Wformat -Wtype-limits -Wundef -Werror -Wmissing-prototypes -Wstrict-prototypes ); # These are used in addition to $gcc_devteam_warn when the compiler is clang. # TODO(openssl-team): fix problems and investigate if (at least) the # following warnings can also be enabled: # -Wcast-align # -Wunreachable-code -- no, too ugly/compiler-specific # -Wlanguage-extension-token -- no, we use asm() # -Wunused-macros -- no, too tricky for BN and _XOPEN_SOURCE etc # -Wextended-offsetof -- no, needed in CMS ASN1 code my @clang_devteam_warn = qw( -Wno-unknown-warning-option -Wswitch-default -Wno-parentheses-equality -Wno-language-extension-token -Wno-extended-offsetof -Wconditional-uninitialized -Wincompatible-pointer-types-discards-qualifiers -Wmissing-variable-declarations ); my @cl_devteam_warn = qw( /WX ); # This adds backtrace information to the memory leak info. Is only used # when crypto-mdebug-backtrace is enabled. my $memleak_devteam_backtrace = "-rdynamic"; my $strict_warnings = 0; # As for $BSDthreads. Idea is to maintain "collective" set of flags, # which would cover all BSD flavors. -pthread applies to them all, # but is treated differently. OpenBSD expands is as -D_POSIX_THREAD # -lc_r, which is sufficient. FreeBSD 4.x expands it as -lc_r, # which has to be accompanied by explicit -D_THREAD_SAFE and # sometimes -D_REENTRANT. FreeBSD 5.x expands it as -lc_r, which # seems to be sufficient? our $BSDthreads="-pthread -D_THREAD_SAFE -D_REENTRANT"; # # API compatibility name to version number mapping. # my $maxapi = "1.1.0"; # API for "no-deprecated" builds my $apitable = { "1.1.0" => "0x10100000L", "1.0.0" => "0x10000000L", "0.9.8" => "0x00908000L", }; our %table = (); our %config = (); our %withargs = (); our $now_printing; # set to current entry's name in print_table_entry # (todo: right thing would be to encapsulate name # into %target [class] and make print_table_entry # a method) # Forward declarations ############################################### # read_config(filename) # # Reads a configuration file and populates %table with the contents # (which the configuration file places in %targets). sub read_config; # resolve_config(target) # # Resolves all the late evaluations, inheritances and so on for the # chosen target and any target it inherits from. sub resolve_config; # Information collection ############################################# # Unified build supports separate build dir my $srcdir = catdir(absolutedir(dirname($0))); # catdir ensures local syntax my $blddir = catdir(absolutedir(".")); # catdir ensures local syntax # File::Spec::Unix doesn't detect case insensitivity, so we make sure to # check if the source and build directory are really the same, and make # them so. This avoids all kinds of confusion later on. # We must check @File::Spec::ISA rather than using File::Spec->isa() to # know if File::Spec ended up loading File::Spec::Unix. $srcdir = $blddir if (grep(/::Unix$/, @File::Spec::ISA) && samedir($srcdir, $blddir)); my $dofile = abs2rel(catfile($srcdir, "util/dofile.pl")); my $local_config_envname = 'OPENSSL_LOCAL_CONFIG_DIR'; $config{sourcedir} = abs2rel($srcdir, $blddir); $config{builddir} = abs2rel($blddir, $blddir); # Collect reconfiguration information if needed my @argvcopy=@ARGV; if (grep /^reconf(igure)?$/, @argvcopy) { die "reconfiguring with other arguments present isn't supported" if scalar @argvcopy > 1; if (-f "./configdata.pm") { my $file = "./configdata.pm"; unless (my $return = do $file) { die "couldn't parse $file: $@" if $@; die "couldn't do $file: $!" unless defined $return; die "couldn't run $file" unless $return; } @argvcopy = defined($configdata::config{perlargv}) ? @{$configdata::config{perlargv}} : (); die "Incorrect data to reconfigure, please do a normal configuration\n" if (grep(/^reconf/,@argvcopy)); $config{perlenv} = $configdata::config{perlenv} // {}; } else { die "Insufficient data to reconfigure, please do a normal configuration\n"; } } $config{perlargv} = [ @argvcopy ]; # Collect version numbers $config{version} = "unknown"; $config{version_num} = "unknown"; $config{shlib_version_number} = "unknown"; $config{shlib_version_history} = "unknown"; collect_information( collect_from_file(catfile($srcdir,'include/openssl/opensslv.h')), qr/OPENSSL.VERSION.TEXT.*OpenSSL (\S+) / => sub { $config{version} = $1; }, qr/OPENSSL.VERSION.NUMBER.*(0x\S+)/ => sub { $config{version_num}=$1 }, qr/SHLIB_VERSION_NUMBER *"([^"]+)"/ => sub { $config{shlib_version_number}=$1 }, qr/SHLIB_VERSION_HISTORY *"([^"]*)"/ => sub { $config{shlib_version_history}=$1 } ); if ($config{shlib_version_history} ne "") { $config{shlib_version_history} .= ":"; } ($config{major}, $config{minor}) = ($config{version} =~ /^([0-9]+)\.([0-9\.]+)/); ($config{shlib_major}, $config{shlib_minor}) = ($config{shlib_version_number} =~ /^([0-9]+)\.([0-9\.]+)/); die "erroneous version information in opensslv.h: ", "$config{major}, $config{minor}, $config{shlib_major}, $config{shlib_minor}\n" if ($config{major} eq "" || $config{minor} eq "" || $config{shlib_major} eq "" || $config{shlib_minor} eq ""); # Collect target configurations my $pattern = catfile(dirname($0), "Configurations", "*.conf"); foreach (sort glob($pattern)) { &read_config($_); } if (defined env($local_config_envname)) { if ($^O eq 'VMS') { # VMS environment variables are logical names, # which can be used as is $pattern = $local_config_envname . ':' . '*.conf'; } else { $pattern = catfile(env($local_config_envname), '*.conf'); } foreach (sort glob($pattern)) { &read_config($_); } } # Save away perl command information $config{perl_cmd} = $^X; $config{perl_version} = $Config{version}; $config{perl_archname} = $Config{archname}; $config{prefix}=""; $config{openssldir}=""; $config{processor}=""; $config{libdir}=""; my $auto_threads=1; # enable threads automatically? true by default my $default_ranlib; # Top level directories to build $config{dirs} = [ "crypto", "ssl", "engines", "apps", "test", "util", "tools", "fuzz" ]; # crypto/ subdirectories to build $config{sdirs} = [ "objects", "md2", "md4", "md5", "sha", "mdc2", "hmac", "ripemd", "whrlpool", "poly1305", "blake2", "siphash", "sm3", "des", "aes", "rc2", "rc4", "rc5", "idea", "aria", "bf", "cast", "camellia", "seed", "sm4", "chacha", "modes", "bn", "ec", "rsa", "dsa", "dh", "sm2", "dso", "engine", "buffer", "bio", "stack", "lhash", "rand", "err", "evp", "asn1", "pem", "x509", "x509v3", "conf", "txt_db", "pkcs7", "pkcs12", "comp", "ocsp", "ui", "cms", "ts", "srp", "cmac", "ct", "async", "kdf", "store" ]; # test/ subdirectories to build $config{tdirs} = [ "ossl_shim" ]; # Known TLS and DTLS protocols my @tls = qw(ssl3 tls1 tls1_1 tls1_2 tls1_3); my @dtls = qw(dtls1 dtls1_2); # Explicitly known options that are possible to disable. They can # be regexps, and will be used like this: /^no-${option}$/ # For developers: keep it sorted alphabetically my @disablables = ( "afalgeng", "aria", "asan", "asm", "async", "autoalginit", "autoerrinit", "autoload-config", "bf", "blake2", "buildtest-c\\+\\+", "camellia", "capieng", "cast", "chacha", "cmac", "cms", "comp", "crypto-mdebug", "crypto-mdebug-backtrace", "ct", "deprecated", "des", "devcryptoeng", "dgram", "dh", "dsa", "dso", "dtls", "dynamic-engine", "ec", "ec2m", "ecdh", "ecdsa", "ec_nistp_64_gcc_128", "egd", "engine", "err", "external-tests", "filenames", "fuzz-libfuzzer", "fuzz-afl", "gost", "heartbeats", "hw(-.+)?", "idea", "makedepend", "md2", "md4", "mdc2", "msan", "multiblock", "nextprotoneg", "pinshared", "ocb", "ocsp", "pic", "poly1305", "posix-io", "psk", "rc2", "rc4", "rc5", "rdrand", "rfc3779", "rmd160", "scrypt", "sctp", "seed", "shared", "siphash", "sm2", "sm3", "sm4", "sock", "srp", "srtp", "sse2", "ssl", "ssl-trace", "static-engine", "stdio", "tests", "threads", "tls", "ts", "ubsan", "ui-console", "unit-test", "whirlpool", "weak-ssl-ciphers", "zlib", "zlib-dynamic", ); foreach my $proto ((@tls, @dtls)) { push(@disablables, $proto); push(@disablables, "$proto-method") unless $proto eq "tls1_3"; } my %deprecated_disablables = ( "ssl2" => undef, "buf-freelists" => undef, "ripemd" => "rmd160", "ui" => "ui-console", ); # All of the following are disabled by default: our %disabled = ( # "what" => "comment" "asan" => "default", "buildtest-c++" => "default", "crypto-mdebug" => "default", "crypto-mdebug-backtrace" => "default", "devcryptoeng" => "default", "ec_nistp_64_gcc_128" => "default", "egd" => "default", "external-tests" => "default", "fuzz-libfuzzer" => "default", "fuzz-afl" => "default", "heartbeats" => "default", "md2" => "default", "msan" => "default", "rc5" => "default", "sctp" => "default", "ssl-trace" => "default", "ssl3" => "default", "ssl3-method" => "default", "ubsan" => "default", "unit-test" => "default", "weak-ssl-ciphers" => "default", "zlib" => "default", "zlib-dynamic" => "default", ); # Note: => pair form used for aesthetics, not to truly make a hash table my @disable_cascades = ( # "what" => [ "cascade", ... ] sub { $config{processor} eq "386" } => [ "sse2" ], "ssl" => [ "ssl3" ], "ssl3-method" => [ "ssl3" ], "zlib" => [ "zlib-dynamic" ], "des" => [ "mdc2" ], "ec" => [ "ecdsa", "ecdh" ], "dgram" => [ "dtls", "sctp" ], "sock" => [ "dgram" ], "dtls" => [ @dtls ], sub { 0 == scalar grep { !$disabled{$_} } @dtls } => [ "dtls" ], "tls" => [ @tls ], sub { 0 == scalar grep { !$disabled{$_} } @tls } => [ "tls" ], "crypto-mdebug" => [ "crypto-mdebug-backtrace" ], # Without position independent code, there can be no shared libraries or DSOs "pic" => [ "shared" ], "shared" => [ "dynamic-engine" ], "dso" => [ "dynamic-engine" ], "engine" => [ "afalgeng", "devcryptoeng" ], # no-autoalginit is only useful when building non-shared "autoalginit" => [ "shared", "apps" ], "stdio" => [ "apps", "capieng", "egd" ], "apps" => [ "tests" ], "tests" => [ "external-tests" ], "comp" => [ "zlib" ], "ec" => [ "tls1_3", "sm2" ], "sm3" => [ "sm2" ], sub { !$disabled{"unit-test"} } => [ "heartbeats" ], sub { !$disabled{"msan"} } => [ "asm" ], ); # Avoid protocol support holes. Also disable all versions below N, if version # N is disabled while N+1 is enabled. # my @list = (reverse @tls); while ((my $first, my $second) = (shift @list, shift @list)) { last unless @list; push @disable_cascades, ( sub { !$disabled{$first} && $disabled{$second} } => [ @list ] ); unshift @list, $second; } my @list = (reverse @dtls); while ((my $first, my $second) = (shift @list, shift @list)) { last unless @list; push @disable_cascades, ( sub { !$disabled{$first} && $disabled{$second} } => [ @list ] ); unshift @list, $second; } # Explicit "no-..." options will be collected in %disabled along with the defaults. # To remove something from %disabled, use "enable-foo". # For symmetry, "disable-foo" is a synonym for "no-foo". &usage if ($#ARGV < 0); # For the "make variables" CPPINCLUDES and CPPDEFINES, we support lists with # platform specific list separators. Users from those platforms should # recognise those separators from how you set up the PATH to find executables. # The default is the Unix like separator, :, but as an exception, we also # support the space as separator. my $list_separator_re = { VMS => qr/(? qr/(? {$^O} // qr/(? env('AR'), ARFLAGS => [], AS => undef, ASFLAGS => [], CC => env('CC'), CFLAGS => [ env('CFLAGS') || () ], CXX => env('CXX'), CXXFLAGS => [ env('CXXFLAGS') || () ], CPP => undef, CPPFLAGS => [ env('CPPFLAGS') || () ], # -D, -I, -Wp, CPPDEFINES => [], # Alternative for -D CPPINCLUDES => [], # Alternative for -I CROSS_COMPILE => env('CROSS_COMPILE'), HASHBANGPERL=> env('HASHBANGPERL') || env('PERL'), LD => undef, LDFLAGS => [ env('LDFLAGS') || () ], # -L, -Wl, LDLIBS => [ env('LDLIBS') || () ], # -l MT => undef, MTFLAGS => [], PERL => env('PERL') || ($^O ne "VMS" ? $^X : "perl"), RANLIB => env('RANLIB'), RC => env('RC') || env('WINDRES'), RCFLAGS => [ env('RCFLAGS') || () ], RM => undef, ); # Info about what "make variables" may be prefixed with the cross compiler # prefix. This should NEVER mention any such variable with a list for value. my @user_crossable = qw ( AR AS CC CXX CPP LD MT RANLIB RC ); # The same but for flags given as Configure options. These are *additional* # input, as opposed to the VAR=string option that override the corresponding # config target attributes my %useradd = ( CPPDEFINES => [], CPPINCLUDES => [], CPPFLAGS => [], CFLAGS => [], CXXFLAGS => [], LDFLAGS => [], LDLIBS => [], RCFLAGS => [], ); my %user_synonyms = ( HASHBANGPERL=> 'PERL', RC => 'WINDRES', ); # Some target attributes have been renamed, this is the translation table my %target_attr_translate =( ar => 'AR', as => 'AS', cc => 'CC', cxx => 'CXX', cpp => 'CPP', hashbangperl => 'HASHBANGPERL', ld => 'LD', mt => 'MT', ranlib => 'RANLIB', rc => 'RC', rm => 'RM', ); # Initialisers coming from 'config' scripts $config{defines} = [ split(/$list_separator_re/, env('__CNF_CPPDEFINES')) ]; $config{includes} = [ split(/$list_separator_re/, env('__CNF_CPPINCLUDES')) ]; $config{cppflags} = [ env('__CNF_CPPFLAGS') || () ]; $config{cflags} = [ env('__CNF_CFLAGS') || () ]; $config{cxxflags} = [ env('__CNF_CXXFLAGS') || () ]; $config{lflags} = [ env('__CNF_LDFLAGS') || () ]; $config{ex_libs} = [ env('__CNF_LDLIBS') || () ]; $config{openssl_api_defines}=[]; $config{openssl_algorithm_defines}=[]; $config{openssl_thread_defines}=[]; $config{openssl_sys_defines}=[]; $config{openssl_other_defines}=[]; $config{options}=""; $config{build_type} = "release"; my $target=""; my %cmdvars = (); # Stores FOO='blah' type arguments my %unsupported_options = (); my %deprecated_options = (); # If you change this, update apps/version.c my @known_seed_sources = qw(getrandom devrandom os egd none rdcpu librandom); my @seed_sources = (); while (@argvcopy) { $_ = shift @argvcopy; # Support env variable assignments among the options if (m|^(\w+)=(.+)?$|) { $cmdvars{$1} = $2; # Every time a variable is given as a configuration argument, # it acts as a reset if the variable. if (exists $user{$1}) { $user{$1} = ref $user{$1} eq "ARRAY" ? [] : undef; } #if (exists $useradd{$1}) # { # $useradd{$1} = []; # } next; } # VMS is a case insensitive environment, and depending on settings # out of our control, we may receive options uppercased. Let's # downcase at least the part before any equal sign. if ($^O eq "VMS") { s/^([^=]*)/lc($1)/e; } # some people just can't read the instructions, clang people have to... s/^-no-(?!integrated-as)/no-/; # rewrite some options in "enable-..." form s /^-?-?shared$/enable-shared/; s /^sctp$/enable-sctp/; s /^threads$/enable-threads/; s /^zlib$/enable-zlib/; s /^zlib-dynamic$/enable-zlib-dynamic/; if (/^(no|disable|enable)-(.+)$/) { my $word = $2; if (!exists $deprecated_disablables{$word} && !grep { $word =~ /^${_}$/ } @disablables) { $unsupported_options{$_} = 1; next; } } if (/^no-(.+)$/ || /^disable-(.+)$/) { foreach my $proto ((@tls, @dtls)) { if ($1 eq "$proto-method") { $disabled{"$proto"} = "option($proto-method)"; last; } } if ($1 eq "dtls") { foreach my $proto (@dtls) { $disabled{$proto} = "option(dtls)"; } $disabled{"dtls"} = "option(dtls)"; } elsif ($1 eq "ssl") { # Last one of its kind $disabled{"ssl3"} = "option(ssl)"; } elsif ($1 eq "tls") { # XXX: Tests will fail if all SSL/TLS # protocols are disabled. foreach my $proto (@tls) { $disabled{$proto} = "option(tls)"; } } elsif ($1 eq "static-engine") { delete $disabled{"dynamic-engine"}; } elsif ($1 eq "dynamic-engine") { $disabled{"dynamic-engine"} = "option"; } elsif (exists $deprecated_disablables{$1}) { if ($deprecated_disablables{$1} ne "") { $deprecated_options{$_} = 1; if (defined $deprecated_disablables{$1}) { $disabled{$deprecated_disablables{$1}} = "option"; } } } else { $disabled{$1} = "option"; } # No longer an automatic choice $auto_threads = 0 if ($1 eq "threads"); } elsif (/^enable-(.+)$/) { if ($1 eq "static-engine") { $disabled{"dynamic-engine"} = "option"; } elsif ($1 eq "dynamic-engine") { delete $disabled{"dynamic-engine"}; } elsif ($1 eq "zlib-dynamic") { delete $disabled{"zlib"}; } my $algo = $1; delete $disabled{$algo}; # No longer an automatic choice $auto_threads = 0 if ($1 eq "threads"); } elsif (/^--strict-warnings$/) { # Pretend that our strict flags is a C flag, and replace it # with the proper flags later on push @{$useradd{CFLAGS}}, '--ossl-strict-warnings'; $strict_warnings=1; } elsif (/^--debug$/) { $config{build_type} = "debug"; } elsif (/^--release$/) { $config{build_type} = "release"; } elsif (/^386$/) { $config{processor}=386; } elsif (/^fips$/) { die "FIPS mode not supported\n"; } elsif (/^rsaref$/) { # No RSAref support any more since it's not needed. # The check for the option is there so scripts aren't # broken } elsif (/^nofipscanistercheck$/) { die "FIPS mode not supported\n"; } elsif (m|^[-+/]|) { if (/^--prefix=(.*)$/) { $config{prefix}=$1; die "Directory given with --prefix MUST be absolute\n" unless file_name_is_absolute($config{prefix}); } elsif (/^--api=(.*)$/) { $config{api}=$1; } elsif (/^--libdir=(.*)$/) { $config{libdir}=$1; } elsif (/^--openssldir=(.*)$/) { $config{openssldir}=$1; } elsif (/^--with-zlib-lib=(.*)$/) { $withargs{zlib_lib}=$1; } elsif (/^--with-zlib-include=(.*)$/) { $withargs{zlib_include}=$1; } elsif (/^--with-fuzzer-lib=(.*)$/) { $withargs{fuzzer_lib}=$1; } elsif (/^--with-fuzzer-include=(.*)$/) { $withargs{fuzzer_include}=$1; } elsif (/^--with-rand-seed=(.*)$/) { foreach my $x (split(m|,|, $1)) { die "Unknown --with-rand-seed choice $x\n" if ! grep { $x eq $_ } @known_seed_sources; push @seed_sources, $x; } } elsif (/^--cross-compile-prefix=(.*)$/) { $user{CROSS_COMPILE}=$1; } elsif (/^--config=(.*)$/) { read_config $1; } elsif (/^-l(.*)$/) { push @{$useradd{LDLIBS}}, $_; } elsif (/^-framework$/) { push @{$useradd{LDLIBS}}, $_, shift(@argvcopy); } elsif (/^-L(.*)$/ or /^-Wl,/) { push @{$useradd{LDFLAGS}}, $_; } elsif (/^-rpath$/ or /^-R$/) # -rpath is the OSF1 rpath flag # -R is the old Solaris rpath flag { my $rpath = shift(@argvcopy) || ""; $rpath .= " " if $rpath ne ""; push @{$useradd{LDFLAGS}}, $_, $rpath; } elsif (/^-static$/) { push @{$useradd{LDFLAGS}}, $_; } elsif (m|^[-/]D(.*)$|) { push @{$useradd{CPPDEFINES}}, $1; } elsif (m|^[-/]I(.*)$|) { push @{$useradd{CPPINCLUDES}}, $1; } elsif (/^-Wp,$/) { push @{$useradd{CPPFLAGS}}, $1; } else # common if (/^[-+]/), just pass down... { # Treat %xx as an ASCII code (e.g. replace %20 by a space character). # This provides a simple way to pass options with arguments separated # by spaces without quoting (e.g. -opt%20arg translates to -opt arg). $_ =~ s/%([0-9a-f]{1,2})/chr(hex($1))/gei; push @{$useradd{CFLAGS}}, $_; push @{$useradd{CXXFLAGS}}, $_; } } elsif (m|^/|) { # Treat %xx as an ASCII code (e.g. replace %20 by a space character). # This provides a simple way to pass options with arguments separated # by spaces without quoting (e.g. /opt%20arg translates to /opt arg). $_ =~ s/%([0-9a-f]{1,2})/chr(hex($1))/gei; push @{$useradd{CFLAGS}}, $_; push @{$useradd{CXXFLAGS}}, $_; } else { die "target already defined - $target (offending arg: $_)\n" if ($target ne ""); $target=$_; } unless ($_ eq $target || /^no-/ || /^disable-/) { # "no-..." follows later after implied deactivations # have been derived. (Don't take this too seriously, # we really only write OPTIONS to the Makefile out of # nostalgia.) if ($config{options} eq "") { $config{options} = $_; } else { $config{options} .= " ".$_; } } } if (defined($config{api}) && !exists $apitable->{$config{api}}) { die "***** Unsupported api compatibility level: $config{api}\n", } if (keys %deprecated_options) { warn "***** Deprecated options: ", join(", ", keys %deprecated_options), "\n"; } if (keys %unsupported_options) { die "***** Unsupported options: ", join(", ", keys %unsupported_options), "\n"; } # If any %useradd entry has been set, we must check that the "make # variables" haven't been set. We start by checking of any %useradd entry # is set. if (grep { scalar @$_ > 0 } values %useradd) { # Hash of env / make variables names. The possible values are: # 1 - "make vars" # 2 - %useradd entry set # 3 - both set my %detected_vars = map { my $v = 0; $v += 1 if $cmdvars{$_}; $v += 2 if @{$useradd{$_}}; $_ => $v } keys %useradd; # If any of the corresponding "make variables" is set, we error if (grep { $_ & 1 } values %detected_vars) { my $names = join(', ', grep { $detected_vars{$_} > 0 } sort keys %detected_vars); die <<"_____"; ***** Mixing make variables and additional compiler/linker flags as ***** configure command line option is not permitted. ***** Affected make variables: $names _____ } } # Check through all supported command line variables to see if any of them # were set, and canonicalise the values we got. If no compiler or linker # flag or anything else that affects %useradd was set, we also check the # environment for values. my $anyuseradd = grep { defined $_ && (ref $_ ne 'ARRAY' || @$_) } values %useradd; foreach (keys %user) { my $value = $cmdvars{$_}; $value //= env($_) unless $anyuseradd; $value //= defined $user_synonyms{$_} ? $cmdvars{$user_synonyms{$_}} : undef; $value //= defined $user_synonyms{$_} ? env($user_synonyms{$_}) : undef unless $anyuseradd; if (defined $value) { if (ref $user{$_} eq 'ARRAY') { if ($_ eq 'CPPDEFINES' || $_ eq 'CPPINCLUDES') { $user{$_} = [ split /$list_separator_re/, $value ]; } else { $user{$_} = [ $value ]; } } elsif (!defined $user{$_}) { $user{$_} = $value; } } } if (grep { /-rpath\b/ } ($user{LDFLAGS} ? @{$user{LDFLAGS}} : ()) && !$disabled{shared} && !($disabled{asan} && $disabled{msan} && $disabled{ubsan})) { die "***** Cannot simultaneously use -rpath, shared libraries, and\n", "***** any of asan, msan or ubsan\n"; } sub disable { my $disable_type = shift; for (@_) { $disabled{$_} = $disable_type; } my @tocheckfor = (@_ ? @_ : keys %disabled); while (@tocheckfor) { my %new_tocheckfor = (); my @cascade_copy = (@disable_cascades); while (@cascade_copy) { my ($test, $descendents) = (shift @cascade_copy, shift @cascade_copy); if (ref($test) eq "CODE" ? $test->() : defined($disabled{$test})) { foreach (grep { !defined($disabled{$_}) } @$descendents) { $new_tocheckfor{$_} = 1; $disabled{$_} = "cascade"; } } } @tocheckfor = (keys %new_tocheckfor); } } disable(); # First cascade run our $die = sub { die @_; }; if ($target eq "TABLE") { local $die = sub { warn @_; }; foreach (sort keys %table) { print_table_entry($_, "TABLE"); } exit 0; } if ($target eq "LIST") { foreach (sort keys %table) { print $_,"\n" unless $table{$_}->{template}; } exit 0; } if ($target eq "HASH") { local $die = sub { warn @_; }; print "%table = (\n"; foreach (sort keys %table) { print_table_entry($_, "HASH"); } exit 0; } print "Configuring OpenSSL version $config{version} ($config{version_num}) "; print "for $target\n"; if (scalar(@seed_sources) == 0) { print "Using os-specific seed configuration\n"; push @seed_sources, 'os'; } if (scalar(grep { $_ eq 'egd' } @seed_sources) > 0) { delete $disabled{'egd'}; } if (scalar(grep { $_ eq 'none' } @seed_sources) > 0) { die "Cannot seed with none and anything else" if scalar(@seed_sources) > 1; warn <<_____ if scalar(@seed_sources) == 1; ============================== WARNING =============================== You have selected the --with-rand-seed=none option, which effectively disables automatic reseeding of the OpenSSL random generator. All operations depending on the random generator such as creating keys will not work unless the random generator is seeded manually by the application. Please read the 'Note on random number generation' section in the INSTALL instructions and the RAND_DRBG(7) manual page for more details. ============================== WARNING =============================== _____ } push @{$config{openssl_other_defines}}, map { (my $x = $_) =~ tr|[\-a-z]|[_A-Z]|; "OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_$x" } @seed_sources; # Backward compatibility? if ($target =~ m/^CygWin32(-.*)$/) { $target = "Cygwin".$1; } # Support for legacy targets having a name starting with 'debug-' my ($d, $t) = $target =~ m/^(debug-)?(.*)$/; if ($d) { $config{build_type} = "debug"; # If we do not find debug-foo in the table, the target is set to foo. if (!$table{$target}) { $target = $t; } } &usage if !$table{$target} || $table{$target}->{template}; $config{target} = $target; my %target = resolve_config($target); foreach (keys %target_attr_translate) { $target{$target_attr_translate{$_}} = $target{$_} if $target{$_}; delete $target{$_}; } %target = ( %{$table{DEFAULTS}}, %target ); my %conf_files = map { $_ => 1 } (@{$target{_conf_fname_int}}); $config{conf_files} = [ sort keys %conf_files ]; # Using sub disable within these loops may prove fragile, so we run # a cascade afterwards foreach my $feature (@{$target{disable}}) { if (exists $deprecated_disablables{$feature}) { warn "***** config $target disables deprecated feature $feature\n"; } elsif (!grep { $feature eq $_ } @disablables) { die "***** config $target disables unknown feature $feature\n"; } $disabled{$feature} = 'config'; } foreach my $feature (@{$target{enable}}) { if ("default" eq ($disabled{$feature} // "")) { if (exists $deprecated_disablables{$feature}) { warn "***** config $target enables deprecated feature $feature\n"; } elsif (!grep { $feature eq $_ } @disablables) { die "***** config $target enables unknown feature $feature\n"; } delete $disabled{$feature}; } } disable(); # Run a cascade now $target{CXXFLAGS}//=$target{CFLAGS} if $target{CXX}; $target{cxxflags}//=$target{cflags} if $target{CXX}; $target{exe_extension}=""; $target{exe_extension}=".exe" if ($config{target} eq "DJGPP" || $config{target} =~ /^(?:Cygwin|mingw)/); $target{exe_extension}=".pm" if ($config{target} =~ /vos/); ($target{shared_extension_simple}=$target{shared_extension}) =~ s|\.\$\(SHLIB_VERSION_NUMBER\)|| unless defined($target{shared_extension_simple}); $target{dso_extension}//=$target{shared_extension_simple}; ($target{shared_import_extension}=$target{shared_extension_simple}.".a") if ($config{target} =~ /^(?:Cygwin|mingw)/); # Fill %config with values from %user, and in case those are undefined or # empty, use values from %target (acting as a default). foreach (keys %user) { my $ref_type = ref $user{$_}; # Temporary function. Takes an intended ref type (empty string or "ARRAY") # and a value that's to be coerced into that type. my $mkvalue = sub { my $type = shift; my $value = shift; my $undef_p = shift; die "Too many arguments for \$mkvalue" if @_; while (ref $value eq 'CODE') { $value = $value->(); } if ($type eq 'ARRAY') { return undef unless defined $value; return undef if ref $value ne 'ARRAY' && !$value; return undef if ref $value eq 'ARRAY' && !@$value; return [ $value ] unless ref $value eq 'ARRAY'; } return undef unless $value; return $value; }; $config{$_} = $mkvalue->($ref_type, $user{$_}) || $mkvalue->($ref_type, $target{$_}); delete $config{$_} unless defined $config{$_}; } # Finish up %config by appending things the user gave us on the command line # apart from "make variables" foreach (keys %useradd) { # The must all be lists, so we assert that here die "internal error: \$useradd{$_} isn't an ARRAY\n" unless ref $useradd{$_} eq 'ARRAY'; if (defined $config{$_}) { push @{$config{$_}}, @{$useradd{$_}}; } else { $config{$_} = [ @{$useradd{$_}} ]; } } # At this point, we can forget everything about %user and %useradd, # because it's now all been merged into the corresponding $config entry if (grep { $_ eq '-static' } @{$config{LDFLAGS}}) { disable('static', 'pic', 'threads'); } # Allow overriding the build file name $config{build_file} = env('BUILDFILE') || $target{build_file} || "Makefile"; # Make sure build_scheme is consistent. $target{build_scheme} = [ $target{build_scheme} ] if ref($target{build_scheme}) ne "ARRAY"; my ($builder, $builder_platform, @builder_opts) = @{$target{build_scheme}}; foreach my $checker (($builder_platform."-".$target{build_file}."-checker.pm", $builder_platform."-checker.pm")) { my $checker_path = catfile($srcdir, "Configurations", $checker); if (-f $checker_path) { my $fn = $ENV{CONFIGURE_CHECKER_WARN} ? sub { warn $@; } : sub { die $@; }; if (! do $checker_path) { if ($@) { $fn->($@); } elsif ($!) { $fn->($!); } else { $fn->("The detected tools didn't match the platform\n"); } } last; } } push @{$config{defines}}, "NDEBUG" if $config{build_type} eq "release"; if ($target =~ /^mingw/ && `$config{CC} --target-help 2>&1` =~ m/-mno-cygwin/m) { push @{$config{cflags}}, "-mno-cygwin"; push @{$config{cxxflags}}, "-mno-cygwin" if $config{CXX}; push @{$config{shared_ldflag}}, "-mno-cygwin"; } if ($target =~ /linux.*-mips/ && !$disabled{asm} && !grep { $_ !~ /-m(ips|arch=)/ } (@{$config{CFLAGS}})) { # minimally required architecture flags for assembly modules my $value; $value = '-mips2' if ($target =~ /mips32/); $value = '-mips3' if ($target =~ /mips64/); unshift @{$config{cflags}}, $value; unshift @{$config{cxxflags}}, $value if $config{CXX}; } # If threads aren't disabled, check how possible they are unless ($disabled{threads}) { if ($auto_threads) { # Enabled by default, disable it forcibly if unavailable if ($target{thread_scheme} eq "(unknown)") { disable("unavailable", 'threads'); } } else { # The user chose to enable threads explicitly, let's see # if there's a chance that's possible if ($target{thread_scheme} eq "(unknown)") { # If the user asked for "threads" and we don't have internal # knowledge how to do it, [s]he is expected to provide any # system-dependent compiler options that are necessary. We # can't truly check that the given options are correct, but # we expect the user to know what [s]He is doing. if (!@{$config{CFLAGS}} && !@{$config{CPPDEFINES}}) { die "You asked for multi-threading support, but didn't\n" ,"provide any system-specific compiler options\n"; } } } } # If threads still aren't disabled, add a C macro to ensure the source # code knows about it. Any other flag is taken care of by the configs. unless($disabled{threads}) { push @{$config{openssl_thread_defines}}, "OPENSSL_THREADS"; } # With "deprecated" disable all deprecated features. if (defined($disabled{"deprecated"})) { $config{api} = $maxapi; } my $no_shared_warn=0; if ($target{shared_target} eq "") { $no_shared_warn = 1 if (!$disabled{shared} || !$disabled{"dynamic-engine"}); disable('no-shared-target', 'pic'); } if ($disabled{"dynamic-engine"}) { $config{dynamic_engines} = 0; } else { $config{dynamic_engines} = 1; } unless ($disabled{asan}) { push @{$config{cflags}}, "-fsanitize=address"; + push @{$config{cxxflags}}, "-fsanitize=address" if $config{CXX}; } unless ($disabled{ubsan}) { # -DPEDANTIC or -fnosanitize=alignment may also be required on some # platforms. push @{$config{cflags}}, "-fsanitize=undefined", "-fno-sanitize-recover=all"; + push @{$config{cxxflags}}, "-fsanitize=undefined", "-fno-sanitize-recover=all" if $config{CXX}; } unless ($disabled{msan}) { push @{$config{cflags}}, "-fsanitize=memory"; + push @{$config{cxxflags}}, "-fsanitize=memory" if $config{CXX}; } unless ($disabled{"fuzz-libfuzzer"} && $disabled{"fuzz-afl"} && $disabled{asan} && $disabled{ubsan} && $disabled{msan}) { push @{$config{cflags}}, "-fno-omit-frame-pointer", "-g"; push @{$config{cxxflags}}, "-fno-omit-frame-pointer", "-g" if $config{CXX}; } # # Platform fix-ups # # This saves the build files from having to check if ($disabled{pic}) { foreach (qw(shared_cflag shared_cxxflag shared_cppflag shared_defines shared_includes shared_ldflag module_cflags module_cxxflags module_cppflags module_defines module_includes module_lflags)) { delete $config{$_}; $target{$_} = ""; } } else { push @{$config{lib_defines}}, "OPENSSL_PIC"; } if ($target{sys_id} ne "") { push @{$config{openssl_sys_defines}}, "OPENSSL_SYS_$target{sys_id}"; } unless ($disabled{asm}) { $target{cpuid_asm_src}=$table{DEFAULTS}->{cpuid_asm_src} if ($config{processor} eq "386"); push @{$config{lib_defines}}, "OPENSSL_CPUID_OBJ" if ($target{cpuid_asm_src} ne "mem_clr.c"); $target{bn_asm_src} =~ s/\w+-gf2m.c// if (defined($disabled{ec2m})); # bn-586 is the only one implementing bn_*_part_words push @{$config{lib_defines}}, "OPENSSL_BN_ASM_PART_WORDS" if ($target{bn_asm_src} =~ /bn-586/); push @{$config{lib_defines}}, "OPENSSL_IA32_SSE2" if (!$disabled{sse2} && $target{bn_asm_src} =~ /86/); push @{$config{lib_defines}}, "OPENSSL_BN_ASM_MONT" if ($target{bn_asm_src} =~ /-mont/); push @{$config{lib_defines}}, "OPENSSL_BN_ASM_MONT5" if ($target{bn_asm_src} =~ /-mont5/); push @{$config{lib_defines}}, "OPENSSL_BN_ASM_GF2m" if ($target{bn_asm_src} =~ /-gf2m/); push @{$config{lib_defines}}, "BN_DIV3W" if ($target{bn_asm_src} =~ /-div3w/); if ($target{sha1_asm_src}) { push @{$config{lib_defines}}, "SHA1_ASM" if ($target{sha1_asm_src} =~ /sx86/ || $target{sha1_asm_src} =~ /sha1/); push @{$config{lib_defines}}, "SHA256_ASM" if ($target{sha1_asm_src} =~ /sha256/); push @{$config{lib_defines}}, "SHA512_ASM" if ($target{sha1_asm_src} =~ /sha512/); } if ($target{keccak1600_asm_src} ne $table{DEFAULTS}->{keccak1600_asm_src}) { push @{$config{lib_defines}}, "KECCAK1600_ASM"; } if ($target{rc4_asm_src} ne $table{DEFAULTS}->{rc4_asm_src}) { push @{$config{lib_defines}}, "RC4_ASM"; } if ($target{md5_asm_src}) { push @{$config{lib_defines}}, "MD5_ASM"; } $target{cast_asm_src}=$table{DEFAULTS}->{cast_asm_src} unless $disabled{pic}; # CAST assembler is not PIC if ($target{rmd160_asm_src}) { push @{$config{lib_defines}}, "RMD160_ASM"; } if ($target{aes_asm_src}) { push @{$config{lib_defines}}, "AES_ASM" if ($target{aes_asm_src} =~ m/\baes-/);; push @{$config{lib_defines}}, "AESNI_ASM" if ($target{aes_asm_src} =~ m/\baesni-/);; # aes-ctr.fake is not a real file, only indication that assembler # module implements AES_ctr32_encrypt... push @{$config{lib_defines}}, "AES_CTR_ASM" if ($target{aes_asm_src} =~ s/\s*aes-ctr\.fake//); # aes-xts.fake indicates presence of AES_xts_[en|de]crypt... push @{$config{lib_defines}}, "AES_XTS_ASM" if ($target{aes_asm_src} =~ s/\s*aes-xts\.fake//); $target{aes_asm_src} =~ s/\s*(vpaes|aesni)-x86\.s//g if ($disabled{sse2}); push @{$config{lib_defines}}, "VPAES_ASM" if ($target{aes_asm_src} =~ m/vpaes/); push @{$config{lib_defines}}, "BSAES_ASM" if ($target{aes_asm_src} =~ m/bsaes/); } if ($target{wp_asm_src} =~ /mmx/) { if ($config{processor} eq "386") { $target{wp_asm_src}=$table{DEFAULTS}->{wp_asm_src}; } elsif (!$disabled{"whirlpool"}) { push @{$config{lib_defines}}, "WHIRLPOOL_ASM"; } } if ($target{modes_asm_src} =~ /ghash-/) { push @{$config{lib_defines}}, "GHASH_ASM"; } if ($target{ec_asm_src} =~ /ecp_nistz256/) { push @{$config{lib_defines}}, "ECP_NISTZ256_ASM"; } if ($target{ec_asm_src} =~ /x25519/) { push @{$config{lib_defines}}, "X25519_ASM"; } if ($target{padlock_asm_src} ne $table{DEFAULTS}->{padlock_asm_src}) { push @{$config{dso_defines}}, "PADLOCK_ASM"; } if ($target{poly1305_asm_src} ne "") { push @{$config{lib_defines}}, "POLY1305_ASM"; } } my %predefined_C = compiler_predefined($config{CROSS_COMPILE}.$config{CC}); my %predefined_CXX = $config{CXX} ? compiler_predefined($config{CROSS_COMPILE}.$config{CXX}) : (); # Check for makedepend capabilities. if (!$disabled{makedepend}) { if ($config{target} =~ /^(VC|vms)-/) { # For VC- and vms- targets, there's nothing more to do here. The # functionality is hard coded in the corresponding build files for # cl (Windows) and CC/DECC (VMS). } elsif (($predefined_C{__GNUC__} // -1) >= 3 && !($predefined_C{__APPLE_CC__} && !$predefined_C{__clang__})) { # We know that GNU C version 3 and up as well as all clang # versions support dependency generation, but Xcode did not # handle $cc -M before clang support (but claims __GNUC__ = 3) $config{makedepprog} = "\$(CROSS_COMPILE)$config{CC}"; } else { # In all other cases, we look for 'makedepend', and disable the # capability if not found. $config{makedepprog} = which('makedepend'); disable('unavailable', 'makedepend') unless $config{makedepprog}; } } if (!$disabled{asm} && !$predefined_C{__MACH__} && $^O ne 'VMS') { # probe for -Wa,--noexecstack option... if ($predefined_C{__clang__}) { # clang has builtin assembler, which doesn't recognize --help, # but it apparently recognizes the option in question on all # supported platforms even when it's meaningless. In other words # probe would fail, but probed option always accepted... push @{$config{cflags}}, "-Wa,--noexecstack", "-Qunused-arguments"; } else { my $cc = $config{CROSS_COMPILE}.$config{CC}; open(PIPE, "$cc -Wa,--help -c -o null.$$.o -x assembler /dev/null 2>&1 |"); while() { if (m/--noexecstack/) { push @{$config{cflags}}, "-Wa,--noexecstack"; last; } } close(PIPE); unlink("null.$$.o"); } } # Deal with bn_ops ################################################### $config{bn_ll} =0; $config{export_var_as_fn} =0; my $def_int="unsigned int"; $config{rc4_int} =$def_int; ($config{b64l},$config{b64},$config{b32})=(0,0,1); my $count = 0; foreach (sort split(/\s+/,$target{bn_ops})) { $count++ if /SIXTY_FOUR_BIT|SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG|THIRTY_TWO_BIT/; $config{export_var_as_fn}=1 if $_ eq 'EXPORT_VAR_AS_FN'; $config{bn_ll}=1 if $_ eq 'BN_LLONG'; $config{rc4_int}="unsigned char" if $_ eq 'RC4_CHAR'; ($config{b64l},$config{b64},$config{b32}) =(0,1,0) if $_ eq 'SIXTY_FOUR_BIT'; ($config{b64l},$config{b64},$config{b32}) =(1,0,0) if $_ eq 'SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG'; ($config{b64l},$config{b64},$config{b32}) =(0,0,1) if $_ eq 'THIRTY_TWO_BIT'; } die "Exactly one of SIXTY_FOUR_BIT|SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG|THIRTY_TWO_BIT can be set in bn_ops\n" if $count > 1; # Hack cflags for better warnings (dev option) ####################### # "Stringify" the C and C++ flags string. This permits it to be made part of # a string and works as well on command lines. $config{cflags} = [ map { (my $x = $_) =~ s/([\\\"])/\\$1/g; $x } @{$config{cflags}} ]; $config{cxxflags} = [ map { (my $x = $_) =~ s/([\\\"])/\\$1/g; $x } @{$config{cxxflags}} ] if $config{CXX}; if (defined($config{api})) { $config{openssl_api_defines} = [ "OPENSSL_MIN_API=".$apitable->{$config{api}} ]; my $apiflag = sprintf("OPENSSL_API_COMPAT=%s", $apitable->{$config{api}}); push @{$config{defines}}, $apiflag; } my @strict_warnings_collection=(); if ($strict_warnings) { my $wopt; my $gccver = $predefined_C{__GNUC__} // -1; if ($gccver >= 4) { push @strict_warnings_collection, @gcc_devteam_warn; push @strict_warnings_collection, @clang_devteam_warn if (defined($predefined_C{__clang__})); } elsif ($config{target} =~ /^VC-/) { push @strict_warnings_collection, @cl_devteam_warn; } else { warn "WARNING --strict-warnings requires gcc[>=4] or gcc-alike, or MSVC" } } $config{CFLAGS} = [ map { $_ eq '--ossl-strict-warnings' ? @strict_warnings_collection : ( $_ ) } @{$config{CFLAGS}} ]; unless ($disabled{"crypto-mdebug-backtrace"}) { foreach my $wopt (split /\s+/, $memleak_devteam_backtrace) { push @{$config{cflags}}, $wopt unless grep { $_ eq $wopt } @{$config{cflags}}; } if ($target =~ /^BSD-/) { push @{$config{ex_libs}}, "-lexecinfo"; } } unless ($disabled{afalgeng}) { $config{afalgeng}=""; if (grep { $_ eq 'afalgeng' } @{$target{enable}}) { my $minver = 4*10000 + 1*100 + 0; if ($config{CROSS_COMPILE} eq "") { my $verstr = `uname -r`; my ($ma, $mi1, $mi2) = split("\\.", $verstr); ($mi2) = $mi2 =~ /(\d+)/; my $ver = $ma*10000 + $mi1*100 + $mi2; if ($ver < $minver) { disable('too-old-kernel', 'afalgeng'); } else { push @{$config{engdirs}}, "afalg"; } } else { disable('cross-compiling', 'afalgeng'); } } else { disable('not-linux', 'afalgeng'); } } unless ($disabled{devcryptoeng}) { if ($target =~ m/^BSD/) { my $maxver = 5*100 + 7; my $sysstr = `uname -s`; my $verstr = `uname -r`; $sysstr =~ s|\R$||; $verstr =~ s|\R$||; my ($ma, $mi, @rest) = split m|\.|, $verstr; my $ver = $ma*100 + $mi; if ($sysstr eq 'OpenBSD' && $ver >= $maxver) { disable('too-new-kernel', 'devcryptoeng'); } } } # Get the extra flags used when building shared libraries and modules. We # do this late because some of them depend on %disabled. # Make the flags to build DSOs the same as for shared libraries unless they # are already defined $target{module_cflags} = $target{shared_cflag} unless defined $target{module_cflags}; $target{module_cxxflags} = $target{shared_cxxflag} unless defined $target{module_cxxflags}; $target{module_ldflags} = $target{shared_ldflag} unless defined $target{module_ldflags}; { my $shared_info_pl = catfile(dirname($0), "Configurations", "shared-info.pl"); my %shared_info = read_eval_file($shared_info_pl); push @{$target{_conf_fname_int}}, $shared_info_pl; my $si = $target{shared_target}; while (ref $si ne "HASH") { last if ! defined $si; if (ref $si eq "CODE") { $si = $si->(); } else { $si = $shared_info{$si}; } } # Some of the 'shared_target' values don't have any entries in # %shared_info. That's perfectly fine, AS LONG AS the build file # template knows how to handle this. That is currently the case for # Windows and VMS. if (defined $si) { # Just as above, copy certain shared_* attributes to the corresponding # module_ attribute unless the latter is already defined $si->{module_cflags} = $si->{shared_cflag} unless defined $si->{module_cflags}; $si->{module_cxxflags} = $si->{shared_cxxflag} unless defined $si->{module_cxxflags}; $si->{module_ldflags} = $si->{shared_ldflag} unless defined $si->{module_ldflags}; foreach (sort keys %$si) { $target{$_} = defined $target{$_} ? add($si->{$_})->($target{$_}) : $si->{$_}; } } } # ALL MODIFICATIONS TO %disabled, %config and %target MUST BE DONE FROM HERE ON my %disabled_info = (); # For configdata.pm foreach my $what (sort keys %disabled) { $config{options} .= " no-$what"; if (!grep { $what eq $_ } ( 'buildtest-c++', 'threads', 'shared', 'pic', 'dynamic-engine', 'makedepend', 'zlib-dynamic', 'zlib', 'sse2' )) { (my $WHAT = uc $what) =~ s|-|_|g; # Fix up C macro end names $WHAT = "RMD160" if $what eq "ripemd"; # fix-up crypto/directory name(s) $what = "ripemd" if $what eq "rmd160"; $what = "whrlpool" if $what eq "whirlpool"; my $macro = $disabled_info{$what}->{macro} = "OPENSSL_NO_$WHAT"; if ((grep { $what eq $_ } @{$config{sdirs}}) && $what ne 'async' && $what ne 'err' && $what ne 'dso') { @{$config{sdirs}} = grep { $what ne $_} @{$config{sdirs}}; $disabled_info{$what}->{skipped} = [ catdir('crypto', $what) ]; if ($what ne 'engine') { push @{$config{openssl_algorithm_defines}}, $macro; } else { @{$config{dirs}} = grep !/^engines$/, @{$config{dirs}}; push @{$disabled_info{engine}->{skipped}}, catdir('engines'); push @{$config{openssl_other_defines}}, $macro; } } else { push @{$config{openssl_other_defines}}, $macro; } } } if ($disabled{"dynamic-engine"}) { push @{$config{openssl_other_defines}}, "OPENSSL_NO_DYNAMIC_ENGINE"; } else { push @{$config{openssl_other_defines}}, "OPENSSL_NO_STATIC_ENGINE"; } # If we use the unified build, collect information from build.info files my %unified_info = (); my $buildinfo_debug = defined($ENV{CONFIGURE_DEBUG_BUILDINFO}); if ($builder eq "unified") { use with_fallback qw(Text::Template); sub cleandir { my $base = shift; my $dir = shift; my $relativeto = shift || "."; $dir = catdir($base,$dir) unless isabsolute($dir); # Make sure the directories we're building in exists mkpath($dir); my $res = abs2rel(absolutedir($dir), rel2abs($relativeto)); #print STDERR "DEBUG[cleandir]: $dir , $base => $res\n"; return $res; } sub cleanfile { my $base = shift; my $file = shift; my $relativeto = shift || "."; $file = catfile($base,$file) unless isabsolute($file); my $d = dirname($file); my $f = basename($file); # Make sure the directories we're building in exists mkpath($d); my $res = abs2rel(catfile(absolutedir($d), $f), rel2abs($relativeto)); #print STDERR "DEBUG[cleanfile]: $d , $f => $res\n"; return $res; } # Store the name of the template file we will build the build file from # in %config. This may be useful for the build file itself. my @build_file_template_names = ( $builder_platform."-".$target{build_file}.".tmpl", $target{build_file}.".tmpl" ); my @build_file_templates = (); # First, look in the user provided directory, if given if (defined env($local_config_envname)) { @build_file_templates = map { if ($^O eq 'VMS') { # VMS environment variables are logical names, # which can be used as is $local_config_envname . ':' . $_; } else { catfile(env($local_config_envname), $_); } } @build_file_template_names; } # Then, look in our standard directory push @build_file_templates, ( map { cleanfile($srcdir, catfile("Configurations", $_), $blddir) } @build_file_template_names ); my $build_file_template; for $_ (@build_file_templates) { $build_file_template = $_; last if -f $build_file_template; $build_file_template = undef; } if (!defined $build_file_template) { die "*** Couldn't find any of:\n", join("\n", @build_file_templates), "\n"; } $config{build_file_templates} = [ cleanfile($srcdir, catfile("Configurations", "common0.tmpl"), $blddir), $build_file_template, cleanfile($srcdir, catfile("Configurations", "common.tmpl"), $blddir) ]; my @build_infos = ( [ ".", "build.info" ] ); foreach (@{$config{dirs}}) { push @build_infos, [ $_, "build.info" ] if (-f catfile($srcdir, $_, "build.info")); } foreach (@{$config{sdirs}}) { push @build_infos, [ catdir("crypto", $_), "build.info" ] if (-f catfile($srcdir, "crypto", $_, "build.info")); } foreach (@{$config{engdirs}}) { push @build_infos, [ catdir("engines", $_), "build.info" ] if (-f catfile($srcdir, "engines", $_, "build.info")); } foreach (@{$config{tdirs}}) { push @build_infos, [ catdir("test", $_), "build.info" ] if (-f catfile($srcdir, "test", $_, "build.info")); } $config{build_infos} = [ ]; my %ordinals = (); foreach (@build_infos) { my $sourced = catdir($srcdir, $_->[0]); my $buildd = catdir($blddir, $_->[0]); mkpath($buildd); my $f = $_->[1]; # The basic things we're trying to build my @programs = (); my @programs_install = (); my @libraries = (); my @libraries_install = (); my @engines = (); my @engines_install = (); my @scripts = (); my @scripts_install = (); my @extra = (); my @overrides = (); my @intermediates = (); my @rawlines = (); my %sources = (); my %shared_sources = (); my %includes = (); my %depends = (); my %renames = (); my %sharednames = (); my %generate = (); # We want to detect configdata.pm in the source tree, so we # don't use it if the build tree is different. my $src_configdata = cleanfile($srcdir, "configdata.pm", $blddir); push @{$config{build_infos}}, catfile(abs2rel($sourced, $blddir), $f); my $template = Text::Template->new(TYPE => 'FILE', SOURCE => catfile($sourced, $f), PREPEND => qq{use lib "$FindBin::Bin/util/perl";}); die "Something went wrong with $sourced/$f: $!\n" unless $template; my @text = split /^/m, $template->fill_in(HASH => { config => \%config, target => \%target, disabled => \%disabled, withargs => \%withargs, builddir => abs2rel($buildd, $blddir), sourcedir => abs2rel($sourced, $blddir), buildtop => abs2rel($blddir, $blddir), sourcetop => abs2rel($srcdir, $blddir) }, DELIMITERS => [ "{-", "-}" ]); # The top item of this stack has the following values # -2 positive already run and we found ELSE (following ELSIF should fail) # -1 positive already run (skip until ENDIF) # 0 negatives so far (if we're at a condition, check it) # 1 last was positive (don't skip lines until next ELSE, ELSIF or ENDIF) # 2 positive ELSE (following ELSIF should fail) my @skip = (); collect_information( collect_from_array([ @text ], qr/\\$/ => sub { my $l1 = shift; my $l2 = shift; $l1 =~ s/\\$//; $l1.$l2 }), # Info we're looking for qr/^\s*IF\[((?:\\.|[^\\\]])*)\]\s*$/ => sub { if (! @skip || $skip[$#skip] > 0) { push @skip, !! $1; } else { push @skip, -1; } }, qr/^\s*ELSIF\[((?:\\.|[^\\\]])*)\]\s*$/ => sub { die "ELSIF out of scope" if ! @skip; die "ELSIF following ELSE" if abs($skip[$#skip]) == 2; $skip[$#skip] = -1 if $skip[$#skip] != 0; $skip[$#skip] = !! $1 if $skip[$#skip] == 0; }, qr/^\s*ELSE\s*$/ => sub { die "ELSE out of scope" if ! @skip; $skip[$#skip] = -2 if $skip[$#skip] != 0; $skip[$#skip] = 2 if $skip[$#skip] == 0; }, qr/^\s*ENDIF\s*$/ => sub { die "ENDIF out of scope" if ! @skip; pop @skip; }, qr/^\s*PROGRAMS(_NO_INST)?\s*=\s*(.*)\s*$/ => sub { if (!@skip || $skip[$#skip] > 0) { my $install = $1; my @x = tokenize($2); push @programs, @x; push @programs_install, @x unless $install; } }, qr/^\s*LIBS(_NO_INST)?\s*=\s*(.*)\s*$/ => sub { if (!@skip || $skip[$#skip] > 0) { my $install = $1; my @x = tokenize($2); push @libraries, @x; push @libraries_install, @x unless $install; } }, qr/^\s*ENGINES(_NO_INST)?\s*=\s*(.*)\s*$/ => sub { if (!@skip || $skip[$#skip] > 0) { my $install = $1; my @x = tokenize($2); push @engines, @x; push @engines_install, @x unless $install; } }, qr/^\s*SCRIPTS(_NO_INST)?\s*=\s*(.*)\s*$/ => sub { if (!@skip || $skip[$#skip] > 0) { my $install = $1; my @x = tokenize($2); push @scripts, @x; push @scripts_install, @x unless $install; } }, qr/^\s*EXTRA\s*=\s*(.*)\s*$/ => sub { push @extra, tokenize($1) if !@skip || $skip[$#skip] > 0 }, qr/^\s*OVERRIDES\s*=\s*(.*)\s*$/ => sub { push @overrides, tokenize($1) if !@skip || $skip[$#skip] > 0 }, qr/^\s*ORDINALS\[((?:\\.|[^\\\]])+)\]\s*=\s*(.*)\s*$/, => sub { push @{$ordinals{$1}}, tokenize($2) if !@skip || $skip[$#skip] > 0 }, qr/^\s*SOURCE\[((?:\\.|[^\\\]])+)\]\s*=\s*(.*)\s*$/ => sub { push @{$sources{$1}}, tokenize($2) if !@skip || $skip[$#skip] > 0 }, qr/^\s*SHARED_SOURCE\[((?:\\.|[^\\\]])+)\]\s*=\s*(.*)\s*$/ => sub { push @{$shared_sources{$1}}, tokenize($2) if !@skip || $skip[$#skip] > 0 }, qr/^\s*INCLUDE\[((?:\\.|[^\\\]])+)\]\s*=\s*(.*)\s*$/ => sub { push @{$includes{$1}}, tokenize($2) if !@skip || $skip[$#skip] > 0 }, qr/^\s*DEPEND\[((?:\\.|[^\\\]])*)\]\s*=\s*(.*)\s*$/ => sub { push @{$depends{$1}}, tokenize($2) if !@skip || $skip[$#skip] > 0 }, qr/^\s*GENERATE\[((?:\\.|[^\\\]])+)\]\s*=\s*(.*)\s*$/ => sub { push @{$generate{$1}}, $2 if !@skip || $skip[$#skip] > 0 }, qr/^\s*RENAME\[((?:\\.|[^\\\]])+)\]\s*=\s*(.*)\s*$/ => sub { push @{$renames{$1}}, tokenize($2) if !@skip || $skip[$#skip] > 0 }, qr/^\s*SHARED_NAME\[((?:\\.|[^\\\]])+)\]\s*=\s*(.*)\s*$/ => sub { push @{$sharednames{$1}}, tokenize($2) if !@skip || $skip[$#skip] > 0 }, qr/^\s*BEGINRAW\[((?:\\.|[^\\\]])+)\]\s*$/ => sub { my $lineiterator = shift; my $target_kind = $1; while (defined $lineiterator->()) { s|\R$||; if (/^\s*ENDRAW\[((?:\\.|[^\\\]])+)\]\s*$/) { die "ENDRAW doesn't match BEGINRAW" if $1 ne $target_kind; last; } next if @skip && $skip[$#skip] <= 0; push @rawlines, $_ if ($target_kind eq $target{build_file} || $target_kind eq $target{build_file}."(".$builder_platform.")"); } }, qr/^\s*(?:#.*)?$/ => sub { }, "OTHERWISE" => sub { die "Something wrong with this line:\n$_\nat $sourced/$f" }, "BEFORE" => sub { if ($buildinfo_debug) { print STDERR "DEBUG: Parsing ",join(" ", @_),"\n"; print STDERR "DEBUG: ... before parsing, skip stack is ",join(" ", map { int($_) } @skip),"\n"; } }, "AFTER" => sub { if ($buildinfo_debug) { print STDERR "DEBUG: .... after parsing, skip stack is ",join(" ", map { int($_) } @skip),"\n"; } }, ); die "runaway IF?" if (@skip); foreach (keys %renames) { die "$_ renamed to more than one thing: " ,join(" ", @{$renames{$_}}),"\n" if scalar @{$renames{$_}} > 1; my $dest = cleanfile($buildd, $_, $blddir); my $to = cleanfile($buildd, $renames{$_}->[0], $blddir); die "$dest renamed to more than one thing: " ,$unified_info{rename}->{$dest}, $to unless !defined($unified_info{rename}->{$dest}) or $unified_info{rename}->{$dest} eq $to; $unified_info{rename}->{$dest} = $to; } foreach (@programs) { my $program = cleanfile($buildd, $_, $blddir); if ($unified_info{rename}->{$program}) { $program = $unified_info{rename}->{$program}; } $unified_info{programs}->{$program} = 1; } foreach (@programs_install) { my $program = cleanfile($buildd, $_, $blddir); if ($unified_info{rename}->{$program}) { $program = $unified_info{rename}->{$program}; } $unified_info{install}->{programs}->{$program} = 1; } foreach (@libraries) { my $library = cleanfile($buildd, $_, $blddir); if ($unified_info{rename}->{$library}) { $library = $unified_info{rename}->{$library}; } $unified_info{libraries}->{$library} = 1; } foreach (@libraries_install) { my $library = cleanfile($buildd, $_, $blddir); if ($unified_info{rename}->{$library}) { $library = $unified_info{rename}->{$library}; } $unified_info{install}->{libraries}->{$library} = 1; } die <<"EOF" if scalar @engines and !$config{dynamic_engines}; ENGINES can only be used if configured with 'dynamic-engine'. This is usually a fault in a build.info file. EOF foreach (@engines) { my $library = cleanfile($buildd, $_, $blddir); if ($unified_info{rename}->{$library}) { $library = $unified_info{rename}->{$library}; } $unified_info{engines}->{$library} = 1; } foreach (@engines_install) { my $library = cleanfile($buildd, $_, $blddir); if ($unified_info{rename}->{$library}) { $library = $unified_info{rename}->{$library}; } $unified_info{install}->{engines}->{$library} = 1; } foreach (@scripts) { my $script = cleanfile($buildd, $_, $blddir); if ($unified_info{rename}->{$script}) { $script = $unified_info{rename}->{$script}; } $unified_info{scripts}->{$script} = 1; } foreach (@scripts_install) { my $script = cleanfile($buildd, $_, $blddir); if ($unified_info{rename}->{$script}) { $script = $unified_info{rename}->{$script}; } $unified_info{install}->{scripts}->{$script} = 1; } foreach (@extra) { my $extra = cleanfile($buildd, $_, $blddir); $unified_info{extra}->{$extra} = 1; } foreach (@overrides) { my $override = cleanfile($buildd, $_, $blddir); $unified_info{overrides}->{$override} = 1; } push @{$unified_info{rawlines}}, @rawlines; unless ($disabled{shared}) { # Check sharednames. foreach (keys %sharednames) { my $dest = cleanfile($buildd, $_, $blddir); if ($unified_info{rename}->{$dest}) { $dest = $unified_info{rename}->{$dest}; } die "shared_name for $dest with multiple values: " ,join(" ", @{$sharednames{$_}}),"\n" if scalar @{$sharednames{$_}} > 1; my $to = cleanfile($buildd, $sharednames{$_}->[0], $blddir); die "shared_name found for a library $dest that isn't defined\n" unless $unified_info{libraries}->{$dest}; die "shared_name for $dest with multiple values: " ,$unified_info{sharednames}->{$dest}, ", ", $to unless !defined($unified_info{sharednames}->{$dest}) or $unified_info{sharednames}->{$dest} eq $to; $unified_info{sharednames}->{$dest} = $to; } # Additionally, we set up sharednames for libraries that don't # have any, as themselves. Only for libraries that aren't # explicitly static. foreach (grep !/\.a$/, keys %{$unified_info{libraries}}) { if (!defined $unified_info{sharednames}->{$_}) { $unified_info{sharednames}->{$_} = $_ } } # Check that we haven't defined any library as both shared and # explicitly static. That is forbidden. my @doubles = (); foreach (grep /\.a$/, keys %{$unified_info{libraries}}) { (my $l = $_) =~ s/\.a$//; push @doubles, $l if defined $unified_info{sharednames}->{$l}; } die "these libraries are both explicitly static and shared:\n ", join(" ", @doubles), "\n" if @doubles; } foreach (keys %sources) { my $dest = $_; my $ddest = cleanfile($buildd, $_, $blddir); if ($unified_info{rename}->{$ddest}) { $ddest = $unified_info{rename}->{$ddest}; } foreach (@{$sources{$dest}}) { my $s = cleanfile($sourced, $_, $blddir); # If it isn't in the source tree, we assume it's generated # in the build tree if ($s eq $src_configdata || ! -f $s || $generate{$_}) { $s = cleanfile($buildd, $_, $blddir); } # We recognise C++, C and asm files if ($s =~ /\.(cc|cpp|c|s|S)$/) { my $o = $_; $o =~ s/\.[csS]$/.o/; # C and assembler $o =~ s/\.(cc|cpp)$/_cc.o/; # C++ $o = cleanfile($buildd, $o, $blddir); $unified_info{sources}->{$ddest}->{$o} = 1; $unified_info{sources}->{$o}->{$s} = 1; } elsif ($s =~ /\.rc$/) { # We also recognise resource files my $o = $_; $o =~ s/\.rc$/.res/; # Resource configuration my $o = cleanfile($buildd, $o, $blddir); $unified_info{sources}->{$ddest}->{$o} = 1; $unified_info{sources}->{$o}->{$s} = 1; } else { $unified_info{sources}->{$ddest}->{$s} = 1; } } } foreach (keys %shared_sources) { my $dest = $_; my $ddest = cleanfile($buildd, $_, $blddir); if ($unified_info{rename}->{$ddest}) { $ddest = $unified_info{rename}->{$ddest}; } foreach (@{$shared_sources{$dest}}) { my $s = cleanfile($sourced, $_, $blddir); # If it isn't in the source tree, we assume it's generated # in the build tree if ($s eq $src_configdata || ! -f $s || $generate{$_}) { $s = cleanfile($buildd, $_, $blddir); } if ($s =~ /\.(cc|cpp|c|s|S)$/) { # We recognise C++, C and asm files my $o = $_; $o =~ s/\.[csS]$/.o/; # C and assembler $o =~ s/\.(cc|cpp)$/_cc.o/; # C++ $o = cleanfile($buildd, $o, $blddir); $unified_info{shared_sources}->{$ddest}->{$o} = 1; $unified_info{sources}->{$o}->{$s} = 1; } elsif ($s =~ /\.rc$/) { # We also recognise resource files my $o = $_; $o =~ s/\.rc$/.res/; # Resource configuration my $o = cleanfile($buildd, $o, $blddir); $unified_info{shared_sources}->{$ddest}->{$o} = 1; $unified_info{sources}->{$o}->{$s} = 1; } elsif ($s =~ /\.(def|map|opt)$/) { # We also recognise .def / .map / .opt files # We know they are generated files my $def = cleanfile($buildd, $s, $blddir); $unified_info{shared_sources}->{$ddest}->{$def} = 1; } else { die "unrecognised source file type for shared library: $s\n"; } } } foreach (keys %generate) { my $dest = $_; my $ddest = cleanfile($buildd, $_, $blddir); if ($unified_info{rename}->{$ddest}) { $ddest = $unified_info{rename}->{$ddest}; } die "more than one generator for $dest: " ,join(" ", @{$generate{$_}}),"\n" if scalar @{$generate{$_}} > 1; my @generator = split /\s+/, $generate{$dest}->[0]; $generator[0] = cleanfile($sourced, $generator[0], $blddir), $unified_info{generate}->{$ddest} = [ @generator ]; } foreach (keys %depends) { my $dest = $_; my $ddest = $dest eq "" ? "" : cleanfile($sourced, $_, $blddir); # If the destination doesn't exist in source, it can only be # a generated file in the build tree. if ($ddest ne "" && ($ddest eq $src_configdata || ! -f $ddest)) { $ddest = cleanfile($buildd, $_, $blddir); if ($unified_info{rename}->{$ddest}) { $ddest = $unified_info{rename}->{$ddest}; } } foreach (@{$depends{$dest}}) { my $d = cleanfile($sourced, $_, $blddir); # If we know it's generated, or assume it is because we can't # find it in the source tree, we set file we depend on to be # in the build tree rather than the source tree, and assume # and that there are lines to build it in a BEGINRAW..ENDRAW # section or in the Makefile template. if ($d eq $src_configdata || ! -f $d || (grep { $d eq $_ } map { cleanfile($srcdir, $_, $blddir) } grep { /\.h$/ } keys %{$unified_info{generate}})) { $d = cleanfile($buildd, $_, $blddir); } # Take note if the file to depend on is being renamed # Take extra care with files ending with .a, they should # be treated without that extension, and the extension # should be added back after treatment. $d =~ /(\.a)?$/; my $e = $1 // ""; $d = $`; if ($unified_info{rename}->{$d}) { $d = $unified_info{rename}->{$d}; } $d .= $e; $unified_info{depends}->{$ddest}->{$d} = 1; } } foreach (keys %includes) { my $dest = $_; my $ddest = cleanfile($sourced, $_, $blddir); # If the destination doesn't exist in source, it can only be # a generated file in the build tree. if ($ddest eq $src_configdata || ! -f $ddest) { $ddest = cleanfile($buildd, $_, $blddir); if ($unified_info{rename}->{$ddest}) { $ddest = $unified_info{rename}->{$ddest}; } } foreach (@{$includes{$dest}}) { my $is = cleandir($sourced, $_, $blddir); my $ib = cleandir($buildd, $_, $blddir); push @{$unified_info{includes}->{$ddest}->{source}}, $is unless grep { $_ eq $is } @{$unified_info{includes}->{$ddest}->{source}}; push @{$unified_info{includes}->{$ddest}->{build}}, $ib unless grep { $_ eq $ib } @{$unified_info{includes}->{$ddest}->{build}}; } } } my $ordinals_text = join(', ', sort keys %ordinals); warn <<"EOF" if $ordinals_text; WARNING: ORDINALS were specified for $ordinals_text They are ignored and should be replaced with a combination of GENERATE, DEPEND and SHARED_SOURCE. EOF # Massage the result # If the user configured no-shared, we allow no shared sources if ($disabled{shared}) { foreach (keys %{$unified_info{shared_sources}}) { foreach (keys %{$unified_info{shared_sources}->{$_}}) { delete $unified_info{sources}->{$_}; } } $unified_info{shared_sources} = {}; } # If we depend on a header file or a perl module, add an inclusion of # its directory to allow smoothe inclusion foreach my $dest (keys %{$unified_info{depends}}) { next if $dest eq ""; foreach my $d (keys %{$unified_info{depends}->{$dest}}) { next unless $d =~ /\.(h|pm)$/; my $i = dirname($d); my $spot = $d eq "configdata.pm" || defined($unified_info{generate}->{$d}) ? 'build' : 'source'; push @{$unified_info{includes}->{$dest}->{$spot}}, $i unless grep { $_ eq $i } @{$unified_info{includes}->{$dest}->{$spot}}; } } # Trickle down includes placed on libraries, engines and programs to # their sources (i.e. object files) foreach my $dest (keys %{$unified_info{engines}}, keys %{$unified_info{libraries}}, keys %{$unified_info{programs}}) { foreach my $k (("source", "build")) { next unless defined($unified_info{includes}->{$dest}->{$k}); my @incs = reverse @{$unified_info{includes}->{$dest}->{$k}}; foreach my $obj (grep /\.o$/, (keys %{$unified_info{sources}->{$dest} // {}}, keys %{$unified_info{shared_sources}->{$dest} // {}})) { foreach my $inc (@incs) { unshift @{$unified_info{includes}->{$obj}->{$k}}, $inc unless grep { $_ eq $inc } @{$unified_info{includes}->{$obj}->{$k}}; } } } delete $unified_info{includes}->{$dest}; } ### Make unified_info a bit more efficient # One level structures foreach (("programs", "libraries", "engines", "scripts", "extra", "overrides")) { $unified_info{$_} = [ sort keys %{$unified_info{$_}} ]; } # Two level structures foreach my $l1 (("install", "sources", "shared_sources", "ldadd", "depends")) { foreach my $l2 (sort keys %{$unified_info{$l1}}) { $unified_info{$l1}->{$l2} = [ sort keys %{$unified_info{$l1}->{$l2}} ]; } } # Includes foreach my $dest (sort keys %{$unified_info{includes}}) { if (defined($unified_info{includes}->{$dest}->{build})) { my @source_includes = (); @source_includes = ( @{$unified_info{includes}->{$dest}->{source}} ) if defined($unified_info{includes}->{$dest}->{source}); $unified_info{includes}->{$dest} = [ @{$unified_info{includes}->{$dest}->{build}} ]; foreach my $inc (@source_includes) { push @{$unified_info{includes}->{$dest}}, $inc unless grep { $_ eq $inc } @{$unified_info{includes}->{$dest}}; } } else { $unified_info{includes}->{$dest} = [ @{$unified_info{includes}->{$dest}->{source}} ]; } } # For convenience collect information regarding directories where # files are generated, those generated files and the end product # they end up in where applicable. Then, add build rules for those # directories my %loopinfo = ( "lib" => [ @{$unified_info{libraries}} ], "dso" => [ @{$unified_info{engines}} ], "bin" => [ @{$unified_info{programs}} ], "script" => [ @{$unified_info{scripts}} ] ); foreach my $type (keys %loopinfo) { foreach my $product (@{$loopinfo{$type}}) { my %dirs = (); my $pd = dirname($product); foreach (@{$unified_info{sources}->{$product} // []}, @{$unified_info{shared_sources}->{$product} // []}) { my $d = dirname($_); # We don't want to create targets for source directories # when building out of source next if ($config{sourcedir} ne $config{builddir} && $d =~ m|^\Q$config{sourcedir}\E|); # We already have a "test" target, and the current directory # is just silly to make a target for next if $d eq "test" || $d eq "."; $dirs{$d} = 1; push @{$unified_info{dirinfo}->{$d}->{deps}}, $_ if $d ne $pd; } foreach (keys %dirs) { push @{$unified_info{dirinfo}->{$_}->{products}->{$type}}, $product; } } } } # For the schemes that need it, we provide the old *_obj configs # from the *_asm_obj ones foreach (grep /_(asm|aux)_src$/, keys %target) { my $src = $_; (my $obj = $_) =~ s/_(asm|aux)_src$/_obj/; $target{$obj} = $target{$src}; $target{$obj} =~ s/\.[csS]\b/.o/g; # C and assembler $target{$obj} =~ s/\.(cc|cpp)\b/_cc.o/g; # C++ } # Write down our configuration where it fits ######################### print "Creating configdata.pm\n"; open(OUT,">configdata.pm") || die "unable to create configdata.pm: $!\n"; print OUT <<"EOF"; #! $config{HASHBANGPERL} package configdata; use strict; use warnings; use Exporter; #use vars qw(\@ISA \@EXPORT); our \@ISA = qw(Exporter); our \@EXPORT = qw(\%config \%target \%disabled \%withargs \%unified_info \@disablables); EOF print OUT "our %config = (\n"; foreach (sort keys %config) { if (ref($config{$_}) eq "ARRAY") { print OUT " ", $_, " => [ ", join(", ", map { quotify("perl", $_) } @{$config{$_}}), " ],\n"; } elsif (ref($config{$_}) eq "HASH") { print OUT " ", $_, " => {"; if (scalar keys %{$config{$_}} > 0) { print OUT "\n"; foreach my $key (sort keys %{$config{$_}}) { print OUT " ", join(" => ", quotify("perl", $key), defined $config{$_}->{$key} ? quotify("perl", $config{$_}->{$key}) : "undef"); print OUT ",\n"; } print OUT " "; } print OUT "},\n"; } else { print OUT " ", $_, " => ", quotify("perl", $config{$_}), ",\n" } } print OUT <<"EOF"; ); EOF print OUT "our %target = (\n"; foreach (sort keys %target) { if (ref($target{$_}) eq "ARRAY") { print OUT " ", $_, " => [ ", join(", ", map { quotify("perl", $_) } @{$target{$_}}), " ],\n"; } else { print OUT " ", $_, " => ", quotify("perl", $target{$_}), ",\n" } } print OUT <<"EOF"; ); EOF print OUT "our \%available_protocols = (\n"; print OUT " tls => [ ", join(", ", map { quotify("perl", $_) } @tls), " ],\n"; print OUT " dtls => [ ", join(", ", map { quotify("perl", $_) } @dtls), " ],\n"; print OUT <<"EOF"; ); EOF print OUT "our \@disablables = (\n"; foreach (@disablables) { print OUT " ", quotify("perl", $_), ",\n"; } print OUT <<"EOF"; ); EOF print OUT "our \%disabled = (\n"; foreach (sort keys %disabled) { print OUT " ", quotify("perl", $_), " => ", quotify("perl", $disabled{$_}), ",\n"; } print OUT <<"EOF"; ); EOF print OUT "our %withargs = (\n"; foreach (sort keys %withargs) { if (ref($withargs{$_}) eq "ARRAY") { print OUT " ", $_, " => [ ", join(", ", map { quotify("perl", $_) } @{$withargs{$_}}), " ],\n"; } else { print OUT " ", $_, " => ", quotify("perl", $withargs{$_}), ",\n" } } print OUT <<"EOF"; ); EOF if ($builder eq "unified") { my $recurse; $recurse = sub { my $indent = shift; foreach (@_) { if (ref $_ eq "ARRAY") { print OUT " "x$indent, "[\n"; foreach (@$_) { $recurse->($indent + 4, $_); } print OUT " "x$indent, "],\n"; } elsif (ref $_ eq "HASH") { my %h = %$_; print OUT " "x$indent, "{\n"; foreach (sort keys %h) { if (ref $h{$_} eq "") { print OUT " "x($indent + 4), quotify("perl", $_), " => ", quotify("perl", $h{$_}), ",\n"; } else { print OUT " "x($indent + 4), quotify("perl", $_), " =>\n"; $recurse->($indent + 8, $h{$_}); } } print OUT " "x$indent, "},\n"; } else { print OUT " "x$indent, quotify("perl", $_), ",\n"; } } }; print OUT "our %unified_info = (\n"; foreach (sort keys %unified_info) { if (ref $unified_info{$_} eq "") { print OUT " "x4, quotify("perl", $_), " => ", quotify("perl", $unified_info{$_}), ",\n"; } else { print OUT " "x4, quotify("perl", $_), " =>\n"; $recurse->(8, $unified_info{$_}); } } print OUT <<"EOF"; ); EOF } print OUT "# The following data is only used when this files is use as a script\n"; print OUT "my \@makevars = (\n"; foreach (sort keys %user) { print OUT " '",$_,"',\n"; } print OUT ");\n"; print OUT "my \%disabled_info = (\n"; foreach my $what (sort keys %disabled_info) { print OUT " '$what' => {\n"; foreach my $info (sort keys %{$disabled_info{$what}}) { if (ref $disabled_info{$what}->{$info} eq 'ARRAY') { print OUT " $info => [ ", join(', ', map { "'$_'" } @{$disabled_info{$what}->{$info}}), " ],\n"; } else { print OUT " $info => '", $disabled_info{$what}->{$info}, "',\n"; } } print OUT " },\n"; } print OUT ");\n"; print OUT 'my @user_crossable = qw( ', join (' ', @user_crossable), " );\n"; print OUT << 'EOF'; # If run directly, we can give some answers, and even reconfigure unless (caller) { use Getopt::Long; use File::Spec::Functions; use File::Basename; use Pod::Usage; my $here = dirname($0); my $dump = undef; my $cmdline = undef; my $options = undef; my $target = undef; my $envvars = undef; my $makevars = undef; my $buildparams = undef; my $reconf = undef; my $verbose = undef; my $help = undef; my $man = undef; GetOptions('dump|d' => \$dump, 'command-line|c' => \$cmdline, 'options|o' => \$options, 'target|t' => \$target, 'environment|e' => \$envvars, 'make-variables|m' => \$makevars, 'build-parameters|b' => \$buildparams, 'reconfigure|reconf|r' => \$reconf, 'verbose|v' => \$verbose, 'help' => \$help, 'man' => \$man) or die "Errors in command line arguments\n"; unless ($dump || $cmdline || $options || $target || $envvars || $makevars || $buildparams || $reconf || $verbose || $help || $man) { print STDERR <<"_____"; You must give at least one option. For more information, do '$0 --help' _____ exit(2); } if ($help) { pod2usage(-exitval => 0, -verbose => 1); } if ($man) { pod2usage(-exitval => 0, -verbose => 2); } if ($dump || $cmdline) { print "\nCommand line (with current working directory = $here):\n\n"; print ' ',join(' ', $config{PERL}, catfile($config{sourcedir}, 'Configure'), @{$config{perlargv}}), "\n"; print "\nPerl information:\n\n"; print ' ',$config{perl_cmd},"\n"; print ' ',$config{perl_version},' for ',$config{perl_archname},"\n"; } if ($dump || $options) { my $longest = 0; my $longest2 = 0; foreach my $what (@disablables) { $longest = length($what) if $longest < length($what); $longest2 = length($disabled{$what}) if $disabled{$what} && $longest2 < length($disabled{$what}); } print "\nEnabled features:\n\n"; foreach my $what (@disablables) { print " $what\n" unless grep { $_ =~ /^${what}$/ } keys %disabled; } print "\nDisabled features:\n\n"; foreach my $what (@disablables) { my @what2 = grep { $_ =~ /^${what}$/ } keys %disabled; my $what3 = $what2[0]; if ($what3) { print " $what3", ' ' x ($longest - length($what3) + 1), "[$disabled{$what3}]", ' ' x ($longest2 - length($disabled{$what3}) + 1); print $disabled_info{$what3}->{macro} if $disabled_info{$what3}->{macro}; print ' (skip ', join(', ', @{$disabled_info{$what3}->{skipped}}), ')' if $disabled_info{$what3}->{skipped}; print "\n"; } } } if ($dump || $target) { print "\nConfig target attributes:\n\n"; foreach (sort keys %target) { next if $_ =~ m|^_| || $_ eq 'template'; my $quotify = sub { map { (my $x = $_) =~ s|([\\\$\@"])|\\$1|g; "\"$x\""} @_; }; print ' ', $_, ' => '; if (ref($target{$_}) eq "ARRAY") { print '[ ', join(', ', $quotify->(@{$target{$_}})), " ],\n"; } else { print $quotify->($target{$_}), ",\n" } } } if ($dump || $envvars) { print "\nRecorded environment:\n\n"; foreach (sort keys %{$config{perlenv}}) { print ' ',$_,' = ',($config{perlenv}->{$_} || ''),"\n"; } } if ($dump || $makevars) { print "\nMakevars:\n\n"; foreach my $var (@makevars) { my $prefix = ''; $prefix = $config{CROSS_COMPILE} if grep { $var eq $_ } @user_crossable; $prefix //= ''; print ' ',$var,' ' x (16 - length $var),'= ', (ref $config{$var} eq 'ARRAY' ? join(' ', @{$config{$var}}) : $prefix.$config{$var}), "\n" if defined $config{$var}; } my @buildfile = ($config{builddir}, $config{build_file}); unshift @buildfile, $here unless file_name_is_absolute($config{builddir}); my $buildfile = canonpath(catdir(@buildfile)); print <<"_____"; NOTE: These variables only represent the configuration view. The build file template may have processed these variables further, please have a look at the build file for more exact data: $buildfile _____ } if ($dump || $buildparams) { my @buildfile = ($config{builddir}, $config{build_file}); unshift @buildfile, $here unless file_name_is_absolute($config{builddir}); print "\nbuild file:\n\n"; print " ", canonpath(catfile(@buildfile)),"\n"; print "\nbuild file templates:\n\n"; foreach (@{$config{build_file_templates}}) { my @tmpl = ($_); unshift @tmpl, $here unless file_name_is_absolute($config{sourcedir}); print ' ',canonpath(catfile(@tmpl)),"\n"; } } if ($reconf) { if ($verbose) { print 'Reconfiguring with: ', join(' ',@{$config{perlargv}}), "\n"; foreach (sort keys %{$config{perlenv}}) { print ' ',$_,' = ',($config{perlenv}->{$_} || ""),"\n"; } } chdir $here; exec $^X,catfile($config{sourcedir}, 'Configure'),'reconf'; } } 1; __END__ =head1 NAME configdata.pm - configuration data for OpenSSL builds =head1 SYNOPSIS Interactive: perl configdata.pm [options] As data bank module: use configdata; =head1 DESCRIPTION This module can be used in two modes, interactively and as a module containing all the data recorded by OpenSSL's Configure script. When used interactively, simply run it as any perl script, with at least one option, and you will get the information you ask for. See L below. When loaded as a module, you get a few databanks with useful information to perform build related tasks. The databanks are: %config Configured things. %target The OpenSSL config target with all inheritances resolved. %disabled The features that are disabled. @disablables The list of features that can be disabled. %withargs All data given through --with-THING options. %unified_info All information that was computed from the build.info files. =head1 OPTIONS =over 4 =item B<--help> Print a brief help message and exit. =item B<--man> Print the manual page and exit. =item B<--dump> | B<-d> Print all relevant configuration data. This is equivalent to B<--command-line> B<--options> B<--target> B<--environment> B<--make-variables> B<--build-parameters>. =item B<--command-line> | B<-c> Print the current configuration command line. =item B<--options> | B<-o> Print the features, both enabled and disabled, and display defined macro and skipped directories where applicable. =item B<--target> | B<-t> Print the config attributes for this config target. =item B<--environment> | B<-e> Print the environment variables and their values at the time of configuration. =item B<--make-variables> | B<-m> Print the main make variables generated in the current configuration =item B<--build-parameters> | B<-b> Print the build parameters, i.e. build file and build file templates. =item B<--reconfigure> | B<--reconf> | B<-r> Redo the configuration. =item B<--verbose> | B<-v> Verbose output. =back =cut EOF close(OUT); if ($builder_platform eq 'unix') { my $mode = (0755 & ~umask); chmod $mode, 'configdata.pm' or warn sprintf("WARNING: Couldn't change mode for 'configdata.pm' to 0%03o: %s\n",$mode,$!); } my %builders = ( unified => sub { print 'Creating ',$target{build_file},"\n"; run_dofile(catfile($blddir, $target{build_file}), @{$config{build_file_templates}}); }, ); $builders{$builder}->($builder_platform, @builder_opts); $SIG{__DIE__} = $orig_death_handler; print <<"EOF" if ($disabled{threads} eq "unavailable"); The library could not be configured for supporting multi-threaded applications as the compiler options required on this system are not known. See file INSTALL for details if you need multi-threading. EOF print <<"EOF" if ($no_shared_warn); The options 'shared', 'pic' and 'dynamic-engine' aren't supported on this platform, so we will pretend you gave the option 'no-pic', which also disables 'shared' and 'dynamic-engine'. If you know how to implement shared libraries or position independent code, please let us know (but please first make sure you have tried with a current version of OpenSSL). EOF print <<"EOF"; ********************************************************************** *** *** *** OpenSSL has been successfully configured *** *** *** *** If you encounter a problem while building, please open an *** *** issue on GitHub *** *** and include the output from the following command: *** *** *** *** perl configdata.pm --dump *** *** *** *** (If you are new to OpenSSL, you might want to consult the *** *** 'Troubleshooting' section in the INSTALL file first) *** *** *** ********************************************************************** EOF exit(0); ###################################################################### # # Helpers and utility functions # # Death handler, to print a helpful message in case of failure ####### # sub death_handler { die @_ if $^S; # To prevent the added message in eval blocks my $build_file = $target{build_file} // "build file"; my @message = ( <<"_____", @_ ); Failure! $build_file wasn't produced. Please read INSTALL and associated NOTES files. You may also have to look over your available compiler tool chain or change your configuration. _____ # Dying is terminal, so it's ok to reset the signal handler here. $SIG{__DIE__} = $orig_death_handler; die @message; } # Configuration file reading ######################################### # Note: All of the helper functions are for lazy evaluation. They all # return a CODE ref, which will return the intended value when evaluated. # Thus, whenever there's mention of a returned value, it's about that # intended value. # Helper function to implement conditional inheritance depending on the # value of $disabled{asm}. Used in inherit_from values as follows: # # inherit_from => [ "template", asm("asm_tmpl") ] # sub asm { my @x = @_; sub { $disabled{asm} ? () : @x; } } # Helper function to implement conditional value variants, with a default # plus additional values based on the value of $config{build_type}. # Arguments are given in hash table form: # # picker(default => "Basic string: ", # debug => "debug", # release => "release") # # When configuring with --debug, the resulting string will be # "Basic string: debug", and when not, it will be "Basic string: release" # # This can be used to create variants of sets of flags according to the # build type: # # cflags => picker(default => "-Wall", # debug => "-g -O0", # release => "-O3") # sub picker { my %opts = @_; return sub { add($opts{default} || (), $opts{$config{build_type}} || ())->(); } } # Helper function to combine several values of different types into one. # This is useful if you want to combine a string with the result of a # lazy function, such as: # # cflags => combine("-Wall", sub { $disabled{zlib} ? () : "-DZLIB" }) # sub combine { my @stuff = @_; return sub { add(@stuff)->(); } } # Helper function to implement conditional values depending on the value # of $disabled{threads}. Can be used as follows: # # cflags => combine("-Wall", threads("-pthread")) # sub threads { my @flags = @_; return sub { add($disabled{threads} ? () : @flags)->(); } } sub shared { my @flags = @_; return sub { add($disabled{shared} ? () : @flags)->(); } } our $add_called = 0; # Helper function to implement adding values to already existing configuration # values. It handles elements that are ARRAYs, CODEs and scalars sub _add { my $separator = shift; # If there's any ARRAY in the collection of values OR the separator # is undef, we will return an ARRAY of combined values, otherwise a # string of joined values with $separator as the separator. my $found_array = !defined($separator); my @values = map { my $res = $_; while (ref($res) eq "CODE") { $res = $res->(); } if (defined($res)) { if (ref($res) eq "ARRAY") { $found_array = 1; @$res; } else { $res; } } else { (); } } (@_); $add_called = 1; if ($found_array) { [ @values ]; } else { join($separator, grep { defined($_) && $_ ne "" } @values); } } sub add_before { my $separator = " "; if (ref($_[$#_]) eq "HASH") { my $opts = pop; $separator = $opts->{separator}; } my @x = @_; sub { _add($separator, @x, @_) }; } sub add { my $separator = " "; if (ref($_[$#_]) eq "HASH") { my $opts = pop; $separator = $opts->{separator}; } my @x = @_; sub { _add($separator, @_, @x) }; } sub read_eval_file { my $fname = shift; my $content; my @result; open F, "< $fname" or die "Can't open '$fname': $!\n"; { undef local $/; $content = ; } close F; { local $@; @result = ( eval $content ); warn $@ if $@; } return wantarray ? @result : $result[0]; } # configuration reader, evaluates the input file as a perl script and expects # it to fill %targets with target configurations. Those are then added to # %table. sub read_config { my $fname = shift; my %targets; { # Protect certain tables from tampering local %table = (); %targets = read_eval_file($fname); } my %preexisting = (); foreach (sort keys %targets) { $preexisting{$_} = 1 if $table{$_}; } die <<"EOF", The following config targets from $fname shadow pre-existing config targets with the same name: EOF map { " $_\n" } sort keys %preexisting if %preexisting; # For each target, check that it's configured with a hash table. foreach (keys %targets) { if (ref($targets{$_}) ne "HASH") { if (ref($targets{$_}) eq "") { warn "Deprecated target configuration for $_, ignoring...\n"; } else { warn "Misconfigured target configuration for $_ (should be a hash table), ignoring...\n"; } delete $targets{$_}; } else { $targets{$_}->{_conf_fname_int} = add([ $fname ]); } } %table = (%table, %targets); } # configuration resolver. Will only resolve all the lazy evaluation # codeblocks for the chosen target and all those it inherits from, # recursively sub resolve_config { my $target = shift; my @breadcrumbs = @_; # my $extra_checks = defined($ENV{CONFIGURE_EXTRA_CHECKS}); if (grep { $_ eq $target } @breadcrumbs) { die "inherit_from loop! target backtrace:\n " ,$target,"\n ",join("\n ", @breadcrumbs),"\n"; } if (!defined($table{$target})) { warn "Warning! target $target doesn't exist!\n"; return (); } # Recurse through all inheritances. They will be resolved on the # fly, so when this operation is done, they will all just be a # bunch of attributes with string values. # What we get here, though, are keys with references to lists of # the combined values of them all. We will deal with lists after # this stage is done. my %combined_inheritance = (); if ($table{$target}->{inherit_from}) { my @inherit_from = map { ref($_) eq "CODE" ? $_->() : $_ } @{$table{$target}->{inherit_from}}; foreach (@inherit_from) { my %inherited_config = resolve_config($_, $target, @breadcrumbs); # 'template' is a marker that's considered private to # the config that had it. delete $inherited_config{template}; foreach (keys %inherited_config) { if (!$combined_inheritance{$_}) { $combined_inheritance{$_} = []; } push @{$combined_inheritance{$_}}, $inherited_config{$_}; } } } # We won't need inherit_from in this target any more, since we've # resolved all the inheritances that lead to this delete $table{$target}->{inherit_from}; # Now is the time to deal with those lists. Here's the place to # decide what shall be done with those lists, all based on the # values of the target we're currently dealing with. # - If a value is a coderef, it will be executed with the list of # inherited values as arguments. # - If the corresponding key doesn't have a value at all or is the # empty string, the inherited value list will be run through the # default combiner (below), and the result becomes this target's # value. # - Otherwise, this target's value is assumed to be a string that # will simply override the inherited list of values. my $default_combiner = add(); my %all_keys = map { $_ => 1 } (keys %combined_inheritance, keys %{$table{$target}}); sub process_values { my $object = shift; my $inherited = shift; # Always a [ list ] my $target = shift; my $entry = shift; $add_called = 0; while(ref($object) eq "CODE") { $object = $object->(@$inherited); } if (!defined($object)) { return (); } elsif (ref($object) eq "ARRAY") { local $add_called; # To make sure recursive calls don't affect it return [ map { process_values($_, $inherited, $target, $entry) } @$object ]; } elsif (ref($object) eq "") { return $object; } else { die "cannot handle reference type ",ref($object) ," found in target ",$target," -> ",$entry,"\n"; } } foreach (sort keys %all_keys) { my $previous = $combined_inheritance{$_}; # Current target doesn't have a value for the current key? # Assign it the default combiner, the rest of this loop body # will handle it just like any other coderef. if (!exists $table{$target}->{$_}) { $table{$target}->{$_} = $default_combiner; } $table{$target}->{$_} = process_values($table{$target}->{$_}, $combined_inheritance{$_}, $target, $_); unless(defined($table{$target}->{$_})) { delete $table{$target}->{$_}; } # if ($extra_checks && # $previous && !($add_called || $previous ~~ $table{$target}->{$_})) { # warn "$_ got replaced in $target\n"; # } } # Finally done, return the result. return %{$table{$target}}; } sub usage { print STDERR $usage; print STDERR "\npick os/compiler from:\n"; my $j=0; my $i; my $k=0; foreach $i (sort keys %table) { next if $table{$i}->{template}; next if $i =~ /^debug/; $k += length($i) + 1; if ($k > 78) { print STDERR "\n"; $k=length($i); } print STDERR $i . " "; } foreach $i (sort keys %table) { next if $table{$i}->{template}; next if $i !~ /^debug/; $k += length($i) + 1; if ($k > 78) { print STDERR "\n"; $k=length($i); } print STDERR $i . " "; } print STDERR "\n\nNOTE: If in doubt, on Unix-ish systems use './config'.\n"; exit(1); } sub run_dofile { my $out = shift; my @templates = @_; unlink $out || warn "Can't remove $out, $!" if -f $out; foreach (@templates) { die "Can't open $_, $!" unless -f $_; } my $perlcmd = (quotify("maybeshell", $config{PERL}))[0]; my $cmd = "$perlcmd \"-I.\" \"-Mconfigdata\" \"$dofile\" -o\"Configure\" \"".join("\" \"",@templates)."\" > \"$out.new\""; #print STDERR "DEBUG[run_dofile]: \$cmd = $cmd\n"; system($cmd); exit 1 if $? != 0; rename("$out.new", $out) || die "Can't rename $out.new, $!"; } sub compiler_predefined { state %predefined; my $cc = shift; return () if $^O eq 'VMS'; die 'compiler_predefined called without a compiler command' unless $cc; if (! $predefined{$cc}) { $predefined{$cc} = {}; # collect compiler pre-defines from gcc or gcc-alike... open(PIPE, "$cc -dM -E -x c /dev/null 2>&1 |"); while (my $l = ) { $l =~ m/^#define\s+(\w+(?:\(\w+\))?)(?:\s+(.+))?/ or last; $predefined{$cc}->{$1} = $2 // ''; } close(PIPE); } return %{$predefined{$cc}}; } sub which { my ($name)=@_; if (eval { require IPC::Cmd; 1; }) { IPC::Cmd->import(); return scalar IPC::Cmd::can_run($name); } else { # if there is $directories component in splitpath, # then it's not something to test with $PATH... return $name if (File::Spec->splitpath($name))[1]; foreach (File::Spec->path()) { my $fullpath = catfile($_, "$name$target{exe_extension}"); if (-f $fullpath and -x $fullpath) { return $fullpath; } } } } sub env { my $name = shift; my %opts = @_; unless ($opts{cacheonly}) { # Note that if $ENV{$name} doesn't exist or is undefined, # $config{perlenv}->{$name} will be created with the value # undef. This is intentional. $config{perlenv}->{$name} = $ENV{$name} if ! exists $config{perlenv}->{$name}; } return $config{perlenv}->{$name}; } # Configuration printer ############################################## sub print_table_entry { local $now_printing = shift; my %target = resolve_config($now_printing); my $type = shift; # Don't print the templates return if $target{template}; my @sequence = ( "sys_id", "cpp", "cppflags", "defines", "includes", "cc", "cflags", "unistd", "ld", "lflags", "loutflag", "ex_libs", "bn_ops", "apps_aux_src", "cpuid_asm_src", "uplink_aux_src", "bn_asm_src", "ec_asm_src", "des_asm_src", "aes_asm_src", "bf_asm_src", "md5_asm_src", "cast_asm_src", "sha1_asm_src", "rc4_asm_src", "rmd160_asm_src", "rc5_asm_src", "wp_asm_src", "cmll_asm_src", "modes_asm_src", "padlock_asm_src", "chacha_asm_src", "poly1035_asm_src", "thread_scheme", "perlasm_scheme", "dso_scheme", "shared_target", "shared_cflag", "shared_defines", "shared_ldflag", "shared_rcflag", "shared_extension", "dso_extension", "obj_extension", "exe_extension", "ranlib", "ar", "arflags", "aroutflag", "rc", "rcflags", "rcoutflag", "mt", "mtflags", "mtinflag", "mtoutflag", "multilib", "build_scheme", ); if ($type eq "TABLE") { print "\n"; print "*** $now_printing\n"; foreach (@sequence) { if (ref($target{$_}) eq "ARRAY") { printf "\$%-12s = %s\n", $_, join(" ", @{$target{$_}}); } else { printf "\$%-12s = %s\n", $_, $target{$_}; } } } elsif ($type eq "HASH") { my $largest = length((sort { length($a) <=> length($b) } @sequence)[-1]); print " '$now_printing' => {\n"; foreach (@sequence) { if ($target{$_}) { if (ref($target{$_}) eq "ARRAY") { print " '",$_,"'"," " x ($largest - length($_))," => [ ",join(", ", map { "'$_'" } @{$target{$_}})," ],\n"; } else { print " '",$_,"'"," " x ($largest - length($_))," => '",$target{$_},"',\n"; } } } print " },\n"; } } # Utility routines ################################################### # On VMS, if the given file is a logical name, File::Spec::Functions # will consider it an absolute path. There are cases when we want a # purely syntactic check without checking the environment. sub isabsolute { my $file = shift; # On non-platforms, we just use file_name_is_absolute(). return file_name_is_absolute($file) unless $^O eq "VMS"; # If the file spec includes a device or a directory spec, # file_name_is_absolute() is perfectly safe. return file_name_is_absolute($file) if $file =~ m|[:\[]|; # Here, we know the given file spec isn't absolute return 0; } # Makes a directory absolute and cleans out /../ in paths like foo/../bar # On some platforms, this uses rel2abs(), while on others, realpath() is used. # realpath() requires that at least all path components except the last is an # existing directory. On VMS, the last component of the directory spec must # exist. sub absolutedir { my $dir = shift; # realpath() is quite buggy on VMS. It uses LIB$FID_TO_NAME, which # will return the volume name for the device, no matter what. Also, # it will return an incorrect directory spec if the argument is a # directory that doesn't exist. if ($^O eq "VMS") { return rel2abs($dir); } # We use realpath() on Unix, since no other will properly clean out # a directory spec. use Cwd qw/realpath/; return realpath($dir); } # Check if all paths are one and the same, using stat. They must both exist # We need this for the cases when File::Spec doesn't detect case insensitivity # (File::Spec::Unix assumes case sensitivity) sub samedir { die "samedir expects two arguments\n" unless scalar @_ == 2; my @stat0 = stat($_[0]); # First argument my @stat1 = stat($_[1]); # Second argument die "Couldn't stat $_[0]" unless @stat0; die "Couldn't stat $_[1]" unless @stat1; # Compare device number return 0 unless ($stat0[0] == $stat1[0]); # Compare "inode". The perl manual recommends comparing as # string rather than as number. return 0 unless ($stat0[1] eq $stat1[1]); return 1; # All the same } sub quotify { my %processors = ( perl => sub { my $x = shift; $x =~ s/([\\\$\@"])/\\$1/g; return '"'.$x.'"'; }, maybeshell => sub { my $x = shift; (my $y = $x) =~ s/([\\\"])/\\$1/g; if ($x ne $y || $x =~ m|\s|) { return '"'.$y.'"'; } else { return $x; } }, ); my $for = shift; my $processor = defined($processors{$for}) ? $processors{$for} : sub { shift; }; return map { $processor->($_); } @_; } # collect_from_file($filename, $line_concat_cond_re, $line_concat) # $filename is a file name to read from # $line_concat_cond_re is a regexp detecting a line continuation ending # $line_concat is a CODEref that takes care of concatenating two lines sub collect_from_file { my $filename = shift; my $line_concat_cond_re = shift; my $line_concat = shift; open my $fh, $filename || die "unable to read $filename: $!\n"; return sub { my $saved_line = ""; $_ = ""; while (<$fh>) { s|\R$||; if (defined $line_concat) { $_ = $line_concat->($saved_line, $_); $saved_line = ""; } if (defined $line_concat_cond_re && /$line_concat_cond_re/) { $saved_line = $_; next; } return $_; } die "$filename ending with continuation line\n" if $_; close $fh; return undef; } } # collect_from_array($array, $line_concat_cond_re, $line_concat) # $array is an ARRAYref of lines # $line_concat_cond_re is a regexp detecting a line continuation ending # $line_concat is a CODEref that takes care of concatenating two lines sub collect_from_array { my $array = shift; my $line_concat_cond_re = shift; my $line_concat = shift; my @array = (@$array); return sub { my $saved_line = ""; $_ = ""; while (defined($_ = shift @array)) { s|\R$||; if (defined $line_concat) { $_ = $line_concat->($saved_line, $_); $saved_line = ""; } if (defined $line_concat_cond_re && /$line_concat_cond_re/) { $saved_line = $_; next; } return $_; } die "input text ending with continuation line\n" if $_; return undef; } } # collect_information($lineiterator, $line_continue, $regexp => $CODEref, ...) # $lineiterator is a CODEref that delivers one line at a time. # All following arguments are regex/CODEref pairs, where the regexp detects a # line and the CODEref does something with the result of the regexp. sub collect_information { my $lineiterator = shift; my %collectors = @_; while(defined($_ = $lineiterator->())) { s|\R$||; my $found = 0; if ($collectors{"BEFORE"}) { $collectors{"BEFORE"}->($_); } foreach my $re (keys %collectors) { if ($re !~ /^OTHERWISE|BEFORE|AFTER$/ && /$re/) { $collectors{$re}->($lineiterator); $found = 1; }; } if ($collectors{"OTHERWISE"}) { $collectors{"OTHERWISE"}->($lineiterator, $_) unless $found || !defined $collectors{"OTHERWISE"}; } if ($collectors{"AFTER"}) { $collectors{"AFTER"}->($_); } } } # tokenize($line) # $line is a line of text to split up into tokens # returns a list of tokens # # Tokens are divided by spaces. If the tokens include spaces, they # have to be quoted with single or double quotes. Double quotes # inside a double quoted token must be escaped. Escaping is done # with backslash. # Basically, the same quoting rules apply for " and ' as in any # Unix shell. sub tokenize { my $line = my $debug_line = shift; my @result = (); while ($line =~ s|^\s+||, $line ne "") { my $token = ""; while ($line ne "" && $line !~ m|^\s|) { if ($line =~ m/^"((?:[^"\\]+|\\.)*)"/) { $token .= $1; $line = $'; } elsif ($line =~ m/^'([^']*)'/) { $token .= $1; $line = $'; } elsif ($line =~ m/^(\S+)/) { $token .= $1; $line = $'; } } push @result, $token; } if ($ENV{CONFIGURE_DEBUG_TOKENIZE}) { print STDERR "DEBUG[tokenize]: Parsed '$debug_line' into:\n"; print STDERR "DEBUG[tokenize]: ('", join("', '", @result), "')\n"; } return @result; } diff --git a/NEWS b/NEWS index 5a1207c66ed4..0769464fefa2 100644 --- a/NEWS +++ b/NEWS @@ -1,1003 +1,1007 @@ NEWS ==== This file gives a brief overview of the major changes between each OpenSSL release. For more details please read the CHANGES file. + Major changes between OpenSSL 1.1.1l and OpenSSL 1.1.1m [14 Dec 2021] + + o None + Major changes between OpenSSL 1.1.1k and OpenSSL 1.1.1l [24 Aug 2021] o Fixed an SM2 Decryption Buffer Overflow (CVE-2021-3711) o Fixed various read buffer overruns processing ASN.1 strings (CVE-2021-3712) Major changes between OpenSSL 1.1.1j and OpenSSL 1.1.1k [25 Mar 2021] o Fixed a problem with verifying a certificate chain when using the X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT flag (CVE-2021-3450) o Fixed an issue where an OpenSSL TLS server may crash if sent a maliciously crafted renegotiation ClientHello message from a client (CVE-2021-3449) Major changes between OpenSSL 1.1.1i and OpenSSL 1.1.1j [16 Feb 2021] o Fixed a NULL pointer deref in the X509_issuer_and_serial_hash() function (CVE-2021-23841) o Fixed the RSA_padding_check_SSLv23() function and the RSA_SSLV23_PADDING padding mode to correctly check for rollback attacks o Fixed an overflow in the EVP_CipherUpdate, EVP_EncryptUpdate and EVP_DecryptUpdate functions (CVE-2021-23840) o Fixed SRP_Calc_client_key so that it runs in constant time Major changes between OpenSSL 1.1.1h and OpenSSL 1.1.1i [8 Dec 2020] o Fixed NULL pointer deref in GENERAL_NAME_cmp (CVE-2020-1971) Major changes between OpenSSL 1.1.1g and OpenSSL 1.1.1h [22 Sep 2020] o Disallow explicit curve parameters in verifications chains when X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT is used o Enable 'MinProtocol' and 'MaxProtocol' to configure both TLS and DTLS contexts o Oracle Developer Studio will start reporting deprecation warnings Major changes between OpenSSL 1.1.1f and OpenSSL 1.1.1g [21 Apr 2020] o Fixed segmentation fault in SSL_check_chain() (CVE-2020-1967) Major changes between OpenSSL 1.1.1e and OpenSSL 1.1.1f [31 Mar 2020] o Revert the unexpected EOF reporting via SSL_ERROR_SSL Major changes between OpenSSL 1.1.1d and OpenSSL 1.1.1e [17 Mar 2020] o Fixed an overflow bug in the x64_64 Montgomery squaring procedure used in exponentiation with 512-bit moduli (CVE-2019-1551) o Properly detect unexpected EOF while reading in libssl and report it via SSL_ERROR_SSL Major changes between OpenSSL 1.1.1c and OpenSSL 1.1.1d [10 Sep 2019] o Fixed a fork protection issue (CVE-2019-1549) o Fixed a padding oracle in PKCS7_dataDecode and CMS_decrypt_set1_pkey (CVE-2019-1563) o For built-in EC curves, ensure an EC_GROUP built from the curve name is used even when parsing explicit parameters o Compute ECC cofactors if not provided during EC_GROUP construction (CVE-2019-1547) o Early start up entropy quality from the DEVRANDOM seed source has been improved for older Linux systems o Correct the extended master secret constant on EBCDIC systems o Use Windows installation paths in the mingw builds (CVE-2019-1552) o Changed DH_check to accept parameters with order q and 2q subgroups o Significantly reduce secure memory usage by the randomness pools o Revert the DEVRANDOM_WAIT feature for Linux systems Major changes between OpenSSL 1.1.1b and OpenSSL 1.1.1c [28 May 2019] o Prevent over long nonces in ChaCha20-Poly1305 (CVE-2019-1543) Major changes between OpenSSL 1.1.1a and OpenSSL 1.1.1b [26 Feb 2019] o Change the info callback signals for the start and end of a post-handshake message exchange in TLSv1.3. o Fix a bug in DTLS over SCTP. This breaks interoperability with older versions of OpenSSL like OpenSSL 1.1.0 and OpenSSL 1.0.2. Major changes between OpenSSL 1.1.1 and OpenSSL 1.1.1a [20 Nov 2018] o Timing vulnerability in DSA signature generation (CVE-2018-0734) o Timing vulnerability in ECDSA signature generation (CVE-2018-0735) Major changes between OpenSSL 1.1.0i and OpenSSL 1.1.1 [11 Sep 2018] o Support for TLSv1.3 added (see https://wiki.openssl.org/index.php/TLS1.3 for further important information). The TLSv1.3 implementation includes: o Fully compliant implementation of RFC8446 (TLSv1.3) on by default o Early data (0-RTT) o Post-handshake authentication and key update o Middlebox Compatibility Mode o TLSv1.3 PSKs o Support for all five RFC8446 ciphersuites o RSA-PSS signature algorithms (backported to TLSv1.2) o Configurable session ticket support o Stateless server support o Rewrite of the packet construction code for "safer" packet handling o Rewrite of the extension handling code o Complete rewrite of the OpenSSL random number generator to introduce the following capabilities o The default RAND method now utilizes an AES-CTR DRBG according to NIST standard SP 800-90Ar1. o Support for multiple DRBG instances with seed chaining. o There is a public and private DRBG instance. o The DRBG instances are fork-safe. o Keep all global DRBG instances on the secure heap if it is enabled. o The public and private DRBG instance are per thread for lock free operation o Support for various new cryptographic algorithms including: o SHA3 o SHA512/224 and SHA512/256 o EdDSA (both Ed25519 and Ed448) including X509 and TLS support o X448 (adding to the existing X25519 support in 1.1.0) o Multi-prime RSA o SM2 o SM3 o SM4 o SipHash o ARIA (including TLS support) o Significant Side-Channel attack security improvements o Add a new ClientHello callback to provide the ability to adjust the SSL object at an early stage. o Add 'Maximum Fragment Length' TLS extension negotiation and support o A new STORE module, which implements a uniform and URI based reader of stores that can contain keys, certificates, CRLs and numerous other objects. o Move the display of configuration data to configdata.pm. o Allow GNU style "make variables" to be used with Configure. o Claim the namespaces OSSL and OPENSSL, represented as symbol prefixes o Rewrite of devcrypto engine Major changes between OpenSSL 1.1.0h and OpenSSL 1.1.0i [under development] o Client DoS due to large DH parameter (CVE-2018-0732) o Cache timing vulnerability in RSA Key Generation (CVE-2018-0737) Major changes between OpenSSL 1.1.0g and OpenSSL 1.1.0h [under development] o Constructed ASN.1 types with a recursive definition could exceed the stack (CVE-2018-0739) o Incorrect CRYPTO_memcmp on HP-UX PA-RISC (CVE-2018-0733) o rsaz_1024_mul_avx2 overflow bug on x86_64 (CVE-2017-3738) Major changes between OpenSSL 1.1.0f and OpenSSL 1.1.0g [2 Nov 2017] o bn_sqrx8x_internal carry bug on x86_64 (CVE-2017-3736) o Malformed X.509 IPAddressFamily could cause OOB read (CVE-2017-3735) Major changes between OpenSSL 1.1.0e and OpenSSL 1.1.0f [25 May 2017] o config now recognises 64-bit mingw and chooses mingw64 instead of mingw Major changes between OpenSSL 1.1.0d and OpenSSL 1.1.0e [16 Feb 2017] o Encrypt-Then-Mac renegotiation crash (CVE-2017-3733) Major changes between OpenSSL 1.1.0c and OpenSSL 1.1.0d [26 Jan 2017] o Truncated packet could crash via OOB read (CVE-2017-3731) o Bad (EC)DHE parameters cause a client crash (CVE-2017-3730) o BN_mod_exp may produce incorrect results on x86_64 (CVE-2017-3732) Major changes between OpenSSL 1.1.0b and OpenSSL 1.1.0c [10 Nov 2016] o ChaCha20/Poly1305 heap-buffer-overflow (CVE-2016-7054) o CMS Null dereference (CVE-2016-7053) o Montgomery multiplication may produce incorrect results (CVE-2016-7055) Major changes between OpenSSL 1.1.0a and OpenSSL 1.1.0b [26 Sep 2016] o Fix Use After Free for large message sizes (CVE-2016-6309) Major changes between OpenSSL 1.1.0 and OpenSSL 1.1.0a [22 Sep 2016] o OCSP Status Request extension unbounded memory growth (CVE-2016-6304) o SSL_peek() hang on empty record (CVE-2016-6305) o Excessive allocation of memory in tls_get_message_header() (CVE-2016-6307) o Excessive allocation of memory in dtls1_preprocess_fragment() (CVE-2016-6308) Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.2h and OpenSSL 1.1.0 [25 Aug 2016] o Copyright text was shrunk to a boilerplate that points to the license o "shared" builds are now the default when possible o Added support for "pipelining" o Added the AFALG engine o New threading API implemented o Support for ChaCha20 and Poly1305 added to libcrypto and libssl o Support for extended master secret o CCM ciphersuites o Reworked test suite, now based on perl, Test::Harness and Test::More o *Most* libcrypto and libssl public structures were made opaque, including: BIGNUM and associated types, EC_KEY and EC_KEY_METHOD, DH and DH_METHOD, DSA and DSA_METHOD, RSA and RSA_METHOD, BIO and BIO_METHOD, EVP_MD_CTX, EVP_MD, EVP_CIPHER_CTX, EVP_CIPHER, EVP_PKEY and associated types, HMAC_CTX, X509, X509_CRL, X509_OBJECT, X509_STORE_CTX, X509_STORE, X509_LOOKUP, X509_LOOKUP_METHOD o libssl internal structures made opaque o SSLv2 support removed o Kerberos ciphersuite support removed o RC4 removed from DEFAULT ciphersuites in libssl o 40 and 56 bit cipher support removed from libssl o All public header files moved to include/openssl, no more symlinking o SSL/TLS state machine, version negotiation and record layer rewritten o EC revision: now operations use new EC_KEY_METHOD. o Support for OCB mode added to libcrypto o Support for asynchronous crypto operations added to libcrypto and libssl o Deprecated interfaces can now be disabled at build time either relative to the latest release via the "no-deprecated" Configure argument, or via the "--api=1.1.0|1.0.0|0.9.8" option. o Application software can be compiled with -DOPENSSL_API_COMPAT=version to ensure that features deprecated in that version are not exposed. o Support for RFC6698/RFC7671 DANE TLSA peer authentication o Change of Configure to use --prefix as the main installation directory location rather than --openssldir. The latter becomes the directory for certs, private key and openssl.cnf exclusively. o Reworked BIO networking library, with full support for IPv6. o New "unified" build system o New security levels o Support for scrypt algorithm o Support for X25519 o Extended SSL_CONF support using configuration files o KDF algorithm support. Implement TLS PRF as a KDF. o Support for Certificate Transparency o HKDF support. Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.2g and OpenSSL 1.0.2h [3 May 2016] o Prevent padding oracle in AES-NI CBC MAC check (CVE-2016-2107) o Fix EVP_EncodeUpdate overflow (CVE-2016-2105) o Fix EVP_EncryptUpdate overflow (CVE-2016-2106) o Prevent ASN.1 BIO excessive memory allocation (CVE-2016-2109) o EBCDIC overread (CVE-2016-2176) o Modify behavior of ALPN to invoke callback after SNI/servername callback, such that updates to the SSL_CTX affect ALPN. o Remove LOW from the DEFAULT cipher list. This removes singles DES from the default. o Only remove the SSLv2 methods with the no-ssl2-method option. Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.2f and OpenSSL 1.0.2g [1 Mar 2016] o Disable weak ciphers in SSLv3 and up in default builds of OpenSSL. o Disable SSLv2 default build, default negotiation and weak ciphers (CVE-2016-0800) o Fix a double-free in DSA code (CVE-2016-0705) o Disable SRP fake user seed to address a server memory leak (CVE-2016-0798) o Fix BN_hex2bn/BN_dec2bn NULL pointer deref/heap corruption (CVE-2016-0797) o Fix memory issues in BIO_*printf functions (CVE-2016-0799) o Fix side channel attack on modular exponentiation (CVE-2016-0702) Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.2e and OpenSSL 1.0.2f [28 Jan 2016] o DH small subgroups (CVE-2016-0701) o SSLv2 doesn't block disabled ciphers (CVE-2015-3197) Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.2d and OpenSSL 1.0.2e [3 Dec 2015] o BN_mod_exp may produce incorrect results on x86_64 (CVE-2015-3193) o Certificate verify crash with missing PSS parameter (CVE-2015-3194) o X509_ATTRIBUTE memory leak (CVE-2015-3195) o Rewrite EVP_DecodeUpdate (base64 decoding) to fix several bugs o In DSA_generate_parameters_ex, if the provided seed is too short, return an error Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.2c and OpenSSL 1.0.2d [9 Jul 2015] o Alternate chains certificate forgery (CVE-2015-1793) o Race condition handling PSK identify hint (CVE-2015-3196) Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.2b and OpenSSL 1.0.2c [12 Jun 2015] o Fix HMAC ABI incompatibility Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.2a and OpenSSL 1.0.2b [11 Jun 2015] o Malformed ECParameters causes infinite loop (CVE-2015-1788) o Exploitable out-of-bounds read in X509_cmp_time (CVE-2015-1789) o PKCS7 crash with missing EnvelopedContent (CVE-2015-1790) o CMS verify infinite loop with unknown hash function (CVE-2015-1792) o Race condition handling NewSessionTicket (CVE-2015-1791) Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.2 and OpenSSL 1.0.2a [19 Mar 2015] o OpenSSL 1.0.2 ClientHello sigalgs DoS fix (CVE-2015-0291) o Multiblock corrupted pointer fix (CVE-2015-0290) o Segmentation fault in DTLSv1_listen fix (CVE-2015-0207) o Segmentation fault in ASN1_TYPE_cmp fix (CVE-2015-0286) o Segmentation fault for invalid PSS parameters fix (CVE-2015-0208) o ASN.1 structure reuse memory corruption fix (CVE-2015-0287) o PKCS7 NULL pointer dereferences fix (CVE-2015-0289) o DoS via reachable assert in SSLv2 servers fix (CVE-2015-0293) o Empty CKE with client auth and DHE fix (CVE-2015-1787) o Handshake with unseeded PRNG fix (CVE-2015-0285) o Use After Free following d2i_ECPrivatekey error fix (CVE-2015-0209) o X509_to_X509_REQ NULL pointer deref fix (CVE-2015-0288) o Removed the export ciphers from the DEFAULT ciphers Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.1l and OpenSSL 1.0.2 [22 Jan 2015]: o Suite B support for TLS 1.2 and DTLS 1.2 o Support for DTLS 1.2 o TLS automatic EC curve selection. o API to set TLS supported signature algorithms and curves o SSL_CONF configuration API. o TLS Brainpool support. o ALPN support. o CMS support for RSA-PSS, RSA-OAEP, ECDH and X9.42 DH. Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.1k and OpenSSL 1.0.1l [15 Jan 2015] o Build fixes for the Windows and OpenVMS platforms Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.1j and OpenSSL 1.0.1k [8 Jan 2015] o Fix for CVE-2014-3571 o Fix for CVE-2015-0206 o Fix for CVE-2014-3569 o Fix for CVE-2014-3572 o Fix for CVE-2015-0204 o Fix for CVE-2015-0205 o Fix for CVE-2014-8275 o Fix for CVE-2014-3570 Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.1i and OpenSSL 1.0.1j [15 Oct 2014] o Fix for CVE-2014-3513 o Fix for CVE-2014-3567 o Mitigation for CVE-2014-3566 (SSL protocol vulnerability) o Fix for CVE-2014-3568 Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.1h and OpenSSL 1.0.1i [6 Aug 2014] o Fix for CVE-2014-3512 o Fix for CVE-2014-3511 o Fix for CVE-2014-3510 o Fix for CVE-2014-3507 o Fix for CVE-2014-3506 o Fix for CVE-2014-3505 o Fix for CVE-2014-3509 o Fix for CVE-2014-5139 o Fix for CVE-2014-3508 Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.1g and OpenSSL 1.0.1h [5 Jun 2014] o Fix for CVE-2014-0224 o Fix for CVE-2014-0221 o Fix for CVE-2014-0198 o Fix for CVE-2014-0195 o Fix for CVE-2014-3470 o Fix for CVE-2010-5298 Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.1f and OpenSSL 1.0.1g [7 Apr 2014] o Fix for CVE-2014-0160 o Add TLS padding extension workaround for broken servers. o Fix for CVE-2014-0076 Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.1e and OpenSSL 1.0.1f [6 Jan 2014] o Don't include gmt_unix_time in TLS server and client random values o Fix for TLS record tampering bug CVE-2013-4353 o Fix for TLS version checking bug CVE-2013-6449 o Fix for DTLS retransmission bug CVE-2013-6450 Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.1d and OpenSSL 1.0.1e [11 Feb 2013]: o Corrected fix for CVE-2013-0169 Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.1c and OpenSSL 1.0.1d [4 Feb 2013]: o Fix renegotiation in TLS 1.1, 1.2 by using the correct TLS version. o Include the fips configuration module. o Fix OCSP bad key DoS attack CVE-2013-0166 o Fix for SSL/TLS/DTLS CBC plaintext recovery attack CVE-2013-0169 o Fix for TLS AESNI record handling flaw CVE-2012-2686 Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.1b and OpenSSL 1.0.1c [10 May 2012]: o Fix TLS/DTLS record length checking bug CVE-2012-2333 o Don't attempt to use non-FIPS composite ciphers in FIPS mode. Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.1a and OpenSSL 1.0.1b [26 Apr 2012]: o Fix compilation error on non-x86 platforms. o Make FIPS capable OpenSSL ciphers work in non-FIPS mode. o Fix SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1 clash with SSL_OP_ALL in OpenSSL 1.0.0 Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.1 and OpenSSL 1.0.1a [19 Apr 2012]: o Fix for ASN1 overflow bug CVE-2012-2110 o Workarounds for some servers that hang on long client hellos. o Fix SEGV in AES code. Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.0h and OpenSSL 1.0.1 [14 Mar 2012]: o TLS/DTLS heartbeat support. o SCTP support. o RFC 5705 TLS key material exporter. o RFC 5764 DTLS-SRTP negotiation. o Next Protocol Negotiation. o PSS signatures in certificates, requests and CRLs. o Support for password based recipient info for CMS. o Support TLS v1.2 and TLS v1.1. o Preliminary FIPS capability for unvalidated 2.0 FIPS module. o SRP support. Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.0g and OpenSSL 1.0.0h [12 Mar 2012]: o Fix for CMS/PKCS#7 MMA CVE-2012-0884 o Corrected fix for CVE-2011-4619 o Various DTLS fixes. Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.0f and OpenSSL 1.0.0g [18 Jan 2012]: o Fix for DTLS DoS issue CVE-2012-0050 Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.0e and OpenSSL 1.0.0f [4 Jan 2012]: o Fix for DTLS plaintext recovery attack CVE-2011-4108 o Clear block padding bytes of SSL 3.0 records CVE-2011-4576 o Only allow one SGC handshake restart for SSL/TLS CVE-2011-4619 o Check parameters are not NULL in GOST ENGINE CVE-2012-0027 o Check for malformed RFC3779 data CVE-2011-4577 Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.0d and OpenSSL 1.0.0e [6 Sep 2011]: o Fix for CRL vulnerability issue CVE-2011-3207 o Fix for ECDH crashes CVE-2011-3210 o Protection against EC timing attacks. o Support ECDH ciphersuites for certificates using SHA2 algorithms. o Various DTLS fixes. Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.0c and OpenSSL 1.0.0d [8 Feb 2011]: o Fix for security issue CVE-2011-0014 Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.0b and OpenSSL 1.0.0c [2 Dec 2010]: o Fix for security issue CVE-2010-4180 o Fix for CVE-2010-4252 o Fix mishandling of absent EC point format extension. o Fix various platform compilation issues. o Corrected fix for security issue CVE-2010-3864. Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.0a and OpenSSL 1.0.0b [16 Nov 2010]: o Fix for security issue CVE-2010-3864. o Fix for CVE-2010-2939 o Fix WIN32 build system for GOST ENGINE. Major changes between OpenSSL 1.0.0 and OpenSSL 1.0.0a [1 Jun 2010]: o Fix for security issue CVE-2010-1633. o GOST MAC and CFB fixes. Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8n and OpenSSL 1.0.0 [29 Mar 2010]: o RFC3280 path validation: sufficient to process PKITS tests. o Integrated support for PVK files and keyblobs. o Change default private key format to PKCS#8. o CMS support: able to process all examples in RFC4134 o Streaming ASN1 encode support for PKCS#7 and CMS. o Multiple signer and signer add support for PKCS#7 and CMS. o ASN1 printing support. o Whirlpool hash algorithm added. o RFC3161 time stamp support. o New generalised public key API supporting ENGINE based algorithms. o New generalised public key API utilities. o New ENGINE supporting GOST algorithms. o SSL/TLS GOST ciphersuite support. o PKCS#7 and CMS GOST support. o RFC4279 PSK ciphersuite support. o Supported points format extension for ECC ciphersuites. o ecdsa-with-SHA224/256/384/512 signature types. o dsa-with-SHA224 and dsa-with-SHA256 signature types. o Opaque PRF Input TLS extension support. o Updated time routines to avoid OS limitations. Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8m and OpenSSL 0.9.8n [24 Mar 2010]: o CFB cipher definition fixes. o Fix security issues CVE-2010-0740 and CVE-2010-0433. Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8l and OpenSSL 0.9.8m [25 Feb 2010]: o Cipher definition fixes. o Workaround for slow RAND_poll() on some WIN32 versions. o Remove MD2 from algorithm tables. o SPKAC handling fixes. o Support for RFC5746 TLS renegotiation extension. o Compression memory leak fixed. o Compression session resumption fixed. o Ticket and SNI coexistence fixes. o Many fixes to DTLS handling. Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8k and OpenSSL 0.9.8l [5 Nov 2009]: o Temporary work around for CVE-2009-3555: disable renegotiation. Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8j and OpenSSL 0.9.8k [25 Mar 2009]: o Fix various build issues. o Fix security issues (CVE-2009-0590, CVE-2009-0591, CVE-2009-0789) Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8i and OpenSSL 0.9.8j [7 Jan 2009]: o Fix security issue (CVE-2008-5077) o Merge FIPS 140-2 branch code. Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8g and OpenSSL 0.9.8h [28 May 2008]: o CryptoAPI ENGINE support. o Various precautionary measures. o Fix for bugs affecting certificate request creation. o Support for local machine keyset attribute in PKCS#12 files. Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8f and OpenSSL 0.9.8g [19 Oct 2007]: o Backport of CMS functionality to 0.9.8. o Fixes for bugs introduced with 0.9.8f. Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8e and OpenSSL 0.9.8f [11 Oct 2007]: o Add gcc 4.2 support. o Add support for AES and SSE2 assembly language optimization for VC++ build. o Support for RFC4507bis and server name extensions if explicitly selected at compile time. o DTLS improvements. o RFC4507bis support. o TLS Extensions support. Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8d and OpenSSL 0.9.8e [23 Feb 2007]: o Various ciphersuite selection fixes. o RFC3779 support. Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8c and OpenSSL 0.9.8d [28 Sep 2006]: o Introduce limits to prevent malicious key DoS (CVE-2006-2940) o Fix security issues (CVE-2006-2937, CVE-2006-3737, CVE-2006-4343) o Changes to ciphersuite selection algorithm Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8b and OpenSSL 0.9.8c [5 Sep 2006]: o Fix Daniel Bleichenbacher forged signature attack, CVE-2006-4339 o New cipher Camellia Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8a and OpenSSL 0.9.8b [4 May 2006]: o Cipher string fixes. o Fixes for VC++ 2005. o Updated ECC cipher suite support. o New functions EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new() and EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(). o Zlib compression usage fixes. o Built in dynamic engine compilation support on Win32. o Fixes auto dynamic engine loading in Win32. Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.8 and OpenSSL 0.9.8a [11 Oct 2005]: o Fix potential SSL 2.0 rollback, CVE-2005-2969 o Extended Windows CE support Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7g and OpenSSL 0.9.8 [5 Jul 2005]: o Major work on the BIGNUM library for higher efficiency and to make operations more streamlined and less contradictory. This is the result of a major audit of the BIGNUM library. o Addition of BIGNUM functions for fields GF(2^m) and NIST curves, to support the Elliptic Crypto functions. o Major work on Elliptic Crypto; ECDH and ECDSA added, including the use through EVP, X509 and ENGINE. o New ASN.1 mini-compiler that's usable through the OpenSSL configuration file. o Added support for ASN.1 indefinite length constructed encoding. o New PKCS#12 'medium level' API to manipulate PKCS#12 files. o Complete rework of shared library construction and linking programs with shared or static libraries, through a separate Makefile.shared. o Rework of the passing of parameters from one Makefile to another. o Changed ENGINE framework to load dynamic engine modules automatically from specifically given directories. o New structure and ASN.1 functions for CertificatePair. o Changed the ZLIB compression method to be stateful. o Changed the key-generation and primality testing "progress" mechanism to take a structure that contains the ticker function and an argument. o New engine module: GMP (performs private key exponentiation). o New engine module: VIA PadLOck ACE extension in VIA C3 Nehemiah processors. o Added support for IPv6 addresses in certificate extensions. See RFC 1884, section 2.2. o Added support for certificate policy mappings, policy constraints and name constraints. o Added support for multi-valued AVAs in the OpenSSL configuration file. o Added support for multiple certificates with the same subject in the 'openssl ca' index file. o Make it possible to create self-signed certificates using 'openssl ca -selfsign'. o Make it possible to generate a serial number file with 'openssl ca -create_serial'. o New binary search functions with extended functionality. o New BUF functions. o New STORE structure and library to provide an interface to all sorts of data repositories. Supports storage of public and private keys, certificates, CRLs, numbers and arbitrary blobs. This library is unfortunately unfinished and unused within OpenSSL. o New control functions for the error stack. o Changed the PKCS#7 library to support one-pass S/MIME processing. o Added the possibility to compile without old deprecated functionality with the OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED macro or the 'no-deprecated' argument to the config and Configure scripts. o Constification of all ASN.1 conversion functions, and other affected functions. o Improved platform support for PowerPC. o New FIPS 180-2 algorithms (SHA-224, -256, -384 and -512). o New X509_VERIFY_PARAM structure to support parameterisation of X.509 path validation. o Major overhaul of RC4 performance on Intel P4, IA-64 and AMD64. o Changed the Configure script to have some algorithms disabled by default. Those can be explicitly enabled with the new argument form 'enable-xxx'. o Change the default digest in 'openssl' commands from MD5 to SHA-1. o Added support for DTLS. o New BIGNUM blinding. o Added support for the RSA-PSS encryption scheme o Added support for the RSA X.931 padding. o Added support for BSD sockets on NetWare. o Added support for files larger than 2GB. o Added initial support for Win64. o Added alternate pkg-config files. Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7l and OpenSSL 0.9.7m [23 Feb 2007]: o FIPS 1.1.1 module linking. o Various ciphersuite selection fixes. Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7k and OpenSSL 0.9.7l [28 Sep 2006]: o Introduce limits to prevent malicious key DoS (CVE-2006-2940) o Fix security issues (CVE-2006-2937, CVE-2006-3737, CVE-2006-4343) Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7j and OpenSSL 0.9.7k [5 Sep 2006]: o Fix Daniel Bleichenbacher forged signature attack, CVE-2006-4339 Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7i and OpenSSL 0.9.7j [4 May 2006]: o Visual C++ 2005 fixes. o Update Windows build system for FIPS. Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7h and OpenSSL 0.9.7i [14 Oct 2005]: o Give EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE its old value, except for a FIPS build. Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7g and OpenSSL 0.9.7h [11 Oct 2005]: o Fix SSL 2.0 Rollback, CVE-2005-2969 o Allow use of fixed-length exponent on DSA signing o Default fixed-window RSA, DSA, DH private-key operations Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7f and OpenSSL 0.9.7g [11 Apr 2005]: o More compilation issues fixed. o Adaptation to more modern Kerberos API. o Enhanced or corrected configuration for Solaris64, Mingw and Cygwin. o Enhanced x86_64 assembler BIGNUM module. o More constification. o Added processing of proxy certificates (RFC 3820). Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7e and OpenSSL 0.9.7f [22 Mar 2005]: o Several compilation issues fixed. o Many memory allocation failure checks added. o Improved comparison of X509 Name type. o Mandatory basic checks on certificates. o Performance improvements. Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7d and OpenSSL 0.9.7e [25 Oct 2004]: o Fix race condition in CRL checking code. o Fixes to PKCS#7 (S/MIME) code. Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7c and OpenSSL 0.9.7d [17 Mar 2004]: o Security: Fix Kerberos ciphersuite SSL/TLS handshaking bug o Security: Fix null-pointer assignment in do_change_cipher_spec() o Allow multiple active certificates with same subject in CA index o Multiple X509 verification fixes o Speed up HMAC and other operations Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7b and OpenSSL 0.9.7c [30 Sep 2003]: o Security: fix various ASN1 parsing bugs. o New -ignore_err option to OCSP utility. o Various interop and bug fixes in S/MIME code. o SSL/TLS protocol fix for unrequested client certificates. Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7a and OpenSSL 0.9.7b [10 Apr 2003]: o Security: counter the Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichbacher's attack o Security: make RSA blinding default. o Configuration: Irix fixes, AIX fixes, better mingw support. o Support for new platforms: linux-ia64-ecc. o Build: shared library support fixes. o ASN.1: treat domainComponent correctly. o Documentation: fixes and additions. Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.7 and OpenSSL 0.9.7a [19 Feb 2003]: o Security: Important security related bugfixes. o Enhanced compatibility with MIT Kerberos. o Can be built without the ENGINE framework. o IA32 assembler enhancements. o Support for new platforms: FreeBSD/IA64 and FreeBSD/Sparc64. o Configuration: the no-err option now works properly. o SSL/TLS: now handles manual certificate chain building. o SSL/TLS: certain session ID malfunctions corrected. Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6 and OpenSSL 0.9.7 [30 Dec 2002]: o New library section OCSP. o Complete rewrite of ASN1 code. o CRL checking in verify code and openssl utility. o Extension copying in 'ca' utility. o Flexible display options in 'ca' utility. o Provisional support for international characters with UTF8. o Support for external crypto devices ('engine') is no longer a separate distribution. o New elliptic curve library section. o New AES (Rijndael) library section. o Support for new platforms: Windows CE, Tandem OSS, A/UX, AIX 64-bit, Linux x86_64, Linux 64-bit on Sparc v9 o Extended support for some platforms: VxWorks o Enhanced support for shared libraries. o Now only builds PIC code when shared library support is requested. o Support for pkg-config. o Lots of new manuals. o Makes symbolic links to or copies of manuals to cover all described functions. o Change DES API to clean up the namespace (some applications link also against libdes providing similar functions having the same name). Provide macros for backward compatibility (will be removed in the future). o Unify handling of cryptographic algorithms (software and engine) to be available via EVP routines for asymmetric and symmetric ciphers. o NCONF: new configuration handling routines. o Change API to use more 'const' modifiers to improve error checking and help optimizers. o Finally remove references to RSAref. o Reworked parts of the BIGNUM code. o Support for new engines: Broadcom ubsec, Accelerated Encryption Processing, IBM 4758. o A few new engines added in the demos area. o Extended and corrected OID (object identifier) table. o PRNG: query at more locations for a random device, automatic query for EGD style random sources at several locations. o SSL/TLS: allow optional cipher choice according to server's preference. o SSL/TLS: allow server to explicitly set new session ids. o SSL/TLS: support Kerberos cipher suites (RFC2712). Only supports MIT Kerberos for now. o SSL/TLS: allow more precise control of renegotiations and sessions. o SSL/TLS: add callback to retrieve SSL/TLS messages. o SSL/TLS: support AES cipher suites (RFC3268). Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6j and OpenSSL 0.9.6k [30 Sep 2003]: o Security: fix various ASN1 parsing bugs. o SSL/TLS protocol fix for unrequested client certificates. Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6i and OpenSSL 0.9.6j [10 Apr 2003]: o Security: counter the Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichbacher's attack o Security: make RSA blinding default. o Build: shared library support fixes. Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6h and OpenSSL 0.9.6i [19 Feb 2003]: o Important security related bugfixes. Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6g and OpenSSL 0.9.6h [5 Dec 2002]: o New configuration targets for Tandem OSS and A/UX. o New OIDs for Microsoft attributes. o Better handling of SSL session caching. o Better comparison of distinguished names. o Better handling of shared libraries in a mixed GNU/non-GNU environment. o Support assembler code with Borland C. o Fixes for length problems. o Fixes for uninitialised variables. o Fixes for memory leaks, some unusual crashes and some race conditions. o Fixes for smaller building problems. o Updates of manuals, FAQ and other instructive documents. Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6f and OpenSSL 0.9.6g [9 Aug 2002]: o Important building fixes on Unix. Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6e and OpenSSL 0.9.6f [8 Aug 2002]: o Various important bugfixes. Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6d and OpenSSL 0.9.6e [30 Jul 2002]: o Important security related bugfixes. o Various SSL/TLS library bugfixes. Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6c and OpenSSL 0.9.6d [9 May 2002]: o Various SSL/TLS library bugfixes. o Fix DH parameter generation for 'non-standard' generators. Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6b and OpenSSL 0.9.6c [21 Dec 2001]: o Various SSL/TLS library bugfixes. o BIGNUM library fixes. o RSA OAEP and random number generation fixes. o Object identifiers corrected and added. o Add assembler BN routines for IA64. o Add support for OS/390 Unix, UnixWare with gcc, OpenUNIX 8, MIPS Linux; shared library support for Irix, HP-UX. o Add crypto accelerator support for AEP, Baltimore SureWare, Broadcom and Cryptographic Appliance's keyserver [in 0.9.6c-engine release]. Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6a and OpenSSL 0.9.6b [9 Jul 2001]: o Security fix: PRNG improvements. o Security fix: RSA OAEP check. o Security fix: Reinsert and fix countermeasure to Bleichbacher's attack. o MIPS bug fix in BIGNUM. o Bug fix in "openssl enc". o Bug fix in X.509 printing routine. o Bug fix in DSA verification routine and DSA S/MIME verification. o Bug fix to make PRNG thread-safe. o Bug fix in RAND_file_name(). o Bug fix in compatibility mode trust settings. o Bug fix in blowfish EVP. o Increase default size for BIO buffering filter. o Compatibility fixes in some scripts. Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.6 and OpenSSL 0.9.6a [5 Apr 2001]: o Security fix: change behavior of OpenSSL to avoid using environment variables when running as root. o Security fix: check the result of RSA-CRT to reduce the possibility of deducing the private key from an incorrectly calculated signature. o Security fix: prevent Bleichenbacher's DSA attack. o Security fix: Zero the premaster secret after deriving the master secret in DH ciphersuites. o Reimplement SSL_peek(), which had various problems. o Compatibility fix: the function des_encrypt() renamed to des_encrypt1() to avoid clashes with some Unixen libc. o Bug fixes for Win32, HP/UX and Irix. o Bug fixes in BIGNUM, SSL, PKCS#7, PKCS#12, X.509, CONF and memory checking routines. o Bug fixes for RSA operations in threaded environments. o Bug fixes in misc. openssl applications. o Remove a few potential memory leaks. o Add tighter checks of BIGNUM routines. o Shared library support has been reworked for generality. o More documentation. o New function BN_rand_range(). o Add "-rand" option to openssl s_client and s_server. Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.5a and OpenSSL 0.9.6 [10 Oct 2000]: o Some documentation for BIO and SSL libraries. o Enhanced chain verification using key identifiers. o New sign and verify options to 'dgst' application. o Support for DER and PEM encoded messages in 'smime' application. o New 'rsautl' application, low level RSA utility. o MD4 now included. o Bugfix for SSL rollback padding check. o Support for external crypto devices [1]. o Enhanced EVP interface. [1] The support for external crypto devices is currently a separate distribution. See the file README.ENGINE. Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.5 and OpenSSL 0.9.5a [1 Apr 2000]: o Bug fixes for Win32, SuSE Linux, NeXTSTEP and FreeBSD 2.2.8 o Shared library support for HPUX and Solaris-gcc o Support of Linux/IA64 o Assembler support for Mingw32 o New 'rand' application o New way to check for existence of algorithms from scripts Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.4 and OpenSSL 0.9.5 [25 May 2000]: o S/MIME support in new 'smime' command o Documentation for the OpenSSL command line application o Automation of 'req' application o Fixes to make s_client, s_server work under Windows o Support for multiple fieldnames in SPKACs o New SPKAC command line utility and associated library functions o Options to allow passwords to be obtained from various sources o New public key PEM format and options to handle it o Many other fixes and enhancements to command line utilities o Usable certificate chain verification o Certificate purpose checking o Certificate trust settings o Support of authority information access extension o Extensions in certificate requests o Simplified X509 name and attribute routines o Initial (incomplete) support for international character sets o New DH_METHOD, DSA_METHOD and enhanced RSA_METHOD o Read only memory BIOs and simplified creation function o TLS/SSL protocol bugfixes: Accept TLS 'client hello' in SSL 3.0 record; allow fragmentation and interleaving of handshake and other data o TLS/SSL code now "tolerates" MS SGC o Work around for Netscape client certificate hang bug o RSA_NULL option that removes RSA patent code but keeps other RSA functionality o Memory leak detection now allows applications to add extra information via a per-thread stack o PRNG robustness improved o EGD support o BIGNUM library bug fixes o Faster DSA parameter generation o Enhanced support for Alpha Linux o Experimental MacOS support Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.3 and OpenSSL 0.9.4 [9 Aug 1999]: o Transparent support for PKCS#8 format private keys: these are used by several software packages and are more secure than the standard form o PKCS#5 v2.0 implementation o Password callbacks have a new void * argument for application data o Avoid various memory leaks o New pipe-like BIO that allows using the SSL library when actual I/O must be handled by the application (BIO pair) Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.2b and OpenSSL 0.9.3 [24 May 1999]: o Lots of enhancements and cleanups to the Configuration mechanism o RSA OEAP related fixes o Added `openssl ca -revoke' option for revoking a certificate o Source cleanups: const correctness, type-safe stacks and ASN.1 SETs o Source tree cleanups: removed lots of obsolete files o Thawte SXNet, certificate policies and CRL distribution points extension support o Preliminary (experimental) S/MIME support o Support for ASN.1 UTF8String and VisibleString o Full integration of PKCS#12 code o Sparc assembler bignum implementation, optimized hash functions o Option to disable selected ciphers Major changes between OpenSSL 0.9.1c and OpenSSL 0.9.2b [22 Mar 1999]: o Fixed a security hole related to session resumption o Fixed RSA encryption routines for the p < q case o "ALL" in cipher lists now means "everything except NULL ciphers" o Support for Triple-DES CBCM cipher o Support of Optimal Asymmetric Encryption Padding (OAEP) for RSA o First support for new TLSv1 ciphers o Added a few new BIOs (syslog BIO, reliable BIO) o Extended support for DSA certificate/keys. o Extended support for Certificate Signing Requests (CSR) o Initial support for X.509v3 extensions o Extended support for compression inside the SSL record layer o Overhauled Win32 builds o Cleanups and fixes to the Big Number (BN) library o Support for ASN.1 GeneralizedTime o Splitted ASN.1 SETs from SEQUENCEs o ASN1 and PEM support for Netscape Certificate Sequences o Overhauled Perl interface o Lots of source tree cleanups. o Lots of memory leak fixes. o Lots of bug fixes. Major changes between SSLeay 0.9.0b and OpenSSL 0.9.1c [23 Dec 1998]: o Integration of the popular NO_RSA/NO_DSA patches o Initial support for compression inside the SSL record layer o Added BIO proxy and filtering functionality o Extended Big Number (BN) library o Added RIPE MD160 message digest o Added support for RC2/64bit cipher o Extended ASN.1 parser routines o Adjustments of the source tree for CVS o Support for various new platforms diff --git a/README b/README index 7dc4e6790c34..50345c3c28eb 100644 --- a/README +++ b/README @@ -1,93 +1,93 @@ - OpenSSL 1.1.1l 24 Aug 2021 + OpenSSL 1.1.1m 14 Dec 2021 Copyright (c) 1998-2021 The OpenSSL Project Copyright (c) 1995-1998 Eric A. Young, Tim J. Hudson All rights reserved. DESCRIPTION ----------- The OpenSSL Project is a collaborative effort to develop a robust, commercial-grade, fully featured, and Open Source toolkit implementing the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocols (including SSLv3) as well as a full-strength general purpose cryptographic library. OpenSSL is descended from the SSLeay library developed by Eric A. Young and Tim J. Hudson. The OpenSSL toolkit is licensed under a dual-license (the OpenSSL license plus the SSLeay license), which means that you are free to get and use it for commercial and non-commercial purposes as long as you fulfill the conditions of both licenses. OVERVIEW -------- The OpenSSL toolkit includes: libssl (with platform specific naming): Provides the client and server-side implementations for SSLv3 and TLS. libcrypto (with platform specific naming): Provides general cryptographic and X.509 support needed by SSL/TLS but not logically part of it. openssl: A command line tool that can be used for: Creation of key parameters Creation of X.509 certificates, CSRs and CRLs Calculation of message digests Encryption and decryption SSL/TLS client and server tests Handling of S/MIME signed or encrypted mail And more... INSTALLATION ------------ See the appropriate file: INSTALL Linux, Unix, Windows, OpenVMS, ... NOTES.* INSTALL addendums for different platforms SUPPORT ------- See the OpenSSL website www.openssl.org for details on how to obtain commercial technical support. Free community support is available through the openssl-users email list (see https://www.openssl.org/community/mailinglists.html for further details). If you have any problems with OpenSSL then please take the following steps first: - Download the latest version from the repository to see if the problem has already been addressed - Configure with no-asm - Remove compiler optimization flags If you wish to report a bug then please include the following information and create an issue on GitHub: - OpenSSL version: output of 'openssl version -a' - Configuration data: output of 'perl configdata.pm --dump' - OS Name, Version, Hardware platform - Compiler Details (name, version) - Application Details (name, version) - Problem Description (steps that will reproduce the problem, if known) - Stack Traceback (if the application dumps core) Just because something doesn't work the way you expect does not mean it is necessarily a bug in OpenSSL. Use the openssl-users email list for this type of query. HOW TO CONTRIBUTE TO OpenSSL ---------------------------- See CONTRIBUTING LEGALITIES ---------- A number of nations restrict the use or export of cryptography. If you are potentially subject to such restrictions you should seek competent professional legal advice before attempting to develop or distribute cryptographic code. diff --git a/apps/ciphers.c b/apps/ciphers.c index 0bb33a4aca4b..aade3fbf5671 100644 --- a/apps/ciphers.c +++ b/apps/ciphers.c @@ -1,266 +1,267 @@ /* - * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 1995-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include #include "apps.h" #include "progs.h" #include #include typedef enum OPTION_choice { OPT_ERR = -1, OPT_EOF = 0, OPT_HELP, OPT_STDNAME, OPT_CONVERT, OPT_SSL3, OPT_TLS1, OPT_TLS1_1, OPT_TLS1_2, OPT_TLS1_3, OPT_PSK, OPT_SRP, OPT_CIPHERSUITES, OPT_V, OPT_UPPER_V, OPT_S } OPTION_CHOICE; const OPTIONS ciphers_options[] = { {"help", OPT_HELP, '-', "Display this summary"}, {"v", OPT_V, '-', "Verbose listing of the SSL/TLS ciphers"}, {"V", OPT_UPPER_V, '-', "Even more verbose"}, {"s", OPT_S, '-', "Only supported ciphers"}, #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3 {"ssl3", OPT_SSL3, '-', "SSL3 mode"}, #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1 {"tls1", OPT_TLS1, '-', "TLS1 mode"}, #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_1 {"tls1_1", OPT_TLS1_1, '-', "TLS1.1 mode"}, #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2 {"tls1_2", OPT_TLS1_2, '-', "TLS1.2 mode"}, #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3 {"tls1_3", OPT_TLS1_3, '-', "TLS1.3 mode"}, #endif {"stdname", OPT_STDNAME, '-', "Show standard cipher names"}, #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK {"psk", OPT_PSK, '-', "include ciphersuites requiring PSK"}, #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP {"srp", OPT_SRP, '-', "include ciphersuites requiring SRP"}, #endif {"convert", OPT_CONVERT, 's', "Convert standard name into OpenSSL name"}, {"ciphersuites", OPT_CIPHERSUITES, 's', "Configure the TLSv1.3 ciphersuites to use"}, {NULL} }; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK static unsigned int dummy_psk(SSL *ssl, const char *hint, char *identity, unsigned int max_identity_len, unsigned char *psk, unsigned int max_psk_len) { return 0; } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP static char *dummy_srp(SSL *ssl, void *arg) { return ""; } #endif int ciphers_main(int argc, char **argv) { SSL_CTX *ctx = NULL; SSL *ssl = NULL; STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk = NULL; const SSL_METHOD *meth = TLS_server_method(); int ret = 1, i, verbose = 0, Verbose = 0, use_supported = 0; int stdname = 0; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK int psk = 0; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP int srp = 0; #endif const char *p; char *ciphers = NULL, *prog, *convert = NULL, *ciphersuites = NULL; char buf[512]; OPTION_CHOICE o; int min_version = 0, max_version = 0; prog = opt_init(argc, argv, ciphers_options); while ((o = opt_next()) != OPT_EOF) { switch (o) { case OPT_EOF: case OPT_ERR: opthelp: BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Use -help for summary.\n", prog); goto end; case OPT_HELP: opt_help(ciphers_options); ret = 0; goto end; case OPT_V: verbose = 1; break; case OPT_UPPER_V: verbose = Verbose = 1; break; case OPT_S: use_supported = 1; break; case OPT_STDNAME: stdname = verbose = 1; break; case OPT_CONVERT: convert = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_SSL3: min_version = SSL3_VERSION; max_version = SSL3_VERSION; break; case OPT_TLS1: min_version = TLS1_VERSION; max_version = TLS1_VERSION; break; case OPT_TLS1_1: min_version = TLS1_1_VERSION; max_version = TLS1_1_VERSION; break; case OPT_TLS1_2: min_version = TLS1_2_VERSION; max_version = TLS1_2_VERSION; break; case OPT_TLS1_3: min_version = TLS1_3_VERSION; max_version = TLS1_3_VERSION; break; case OPT_PSK: #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK psk = 1; #endif break; case OPT_SRP: #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP srp = 1; #endif break; case OPT_CIPHERSUITES: ciphersuites = opt_arg(); break; } } argv = opt_rest(); argc = opt_num_rest(); if (argc == 1) ciphers = *argv; else if (argc != 0) goto opthelp; if (convert != NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_out, "OpenSSL cipher name: %s\n", OPENSSL_cipher_name(convert)); + ret = 0; goto end; } ctx = SSL_CTX_new(meth); if (ctx == NULL) goto err; if (SSL_CTX_set_min_proto_version(ctx, min_version) == 0) goto err; if (SSL_CTX_set_max_proto_version(ctx, max_version) == 0) goto err; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK if (psk) SSL_CTX_set_psk_client_callback(ctx, dummy_psk); #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP if (srp) SSL_CTX_set_srp_client_pwd_callback(ctx, dummy_srp); #endif if (ciphersuites != NULL && !SSL_CTX_set_ciphersuites(ctx, ciphersuites)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error setting TLSv1.3 ciphersuites\n"); goto err; } if (ciphers != NULL) { if (!SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(ctx, ciphers)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error in cipher list\n"); goto err; } } ssl = SSL_new(ctx); if (ssl == NULL) goto err; if (use_supported) sk = SSL_get1_supported_ciphers(ssl); else sk = SSL_get_ciphers(ssl); if (!verbose) { for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++) { const SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, i); p = SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c); if (p == NULL) break; if (i != 0) BIO_printf(bio_out, ":"); BIO_printf(bio_out, "%s", p); } BIO_printf(bio_out, "\n"); } else { for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); i++) { const SSL_CIPHER *c; c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, i); if (Verbose) { unsigned long id = SSL_CIPHER_get_id(c); int id0 = (int)(id >> 24); int id1 = (int)((id >> 16) & 0xffL); int id2 = (int)((id >> 8) & 0xffL); int id3 = (int)(id & 0xffL); if ((id & 0xff000000L) == 0x03000000L) BIO_printf(bio_out, " 0x%02X,0x%02X - ", id2, id3); /* SSL3 * cipher */ else BIO_printf(bio_out, "0x%02X,0x%02X,0x%02X,0x%02X - ", id0, id1, id2, id3); /* whatever */ } if (stdname) { const char *nm = SSL_CIPHER_standard_name(c); if (nm == NULL) nm = "UNKNOWN"; BIO_printf(bio_out, "%s - ", nm); } BIO_puts(bio_out, SSL_CIPHER_description(c, buf, sizeof(buf))); } } ret = 0; goto end; err: ERR_print_errors(bio_err); end: if (use_supported) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(sk); SSL_CTX_free(ctx); SSL_free(ssl); return ret; } diff --git a/apps/dgst.c b/apps/dgst.c index e595f7d8186f..f9b184be4cc1 100644 --- a/apps/dgst.c +++ b/apps/dgst.c @@ -1,596 +1,596 @@ /* - * Copyright 1995-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 1995-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include #include "apps.h" #include "progs.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #undef BUFSIZE #define BUFSIZE 1024*8 int do_fp(BIO *out, unsigned char *buf, BIO *bp, int sep, int binout, EVP_PKEY *key, unsigned char *sigin, int siglen, const char *sig_name, const char *md_name, const char *file); static void show_digests(const OBJ_NAME *name, void *bio_); struct doall_dgst_digests { BIO *bio; int n; }; typedef enum OPTION_choice { OPT_ERR = -1, OPT_EOF = 0, OPT_HELP, OPT_LIST, OPT_C, OPT_R, OPT_OUT, OPT_SIGN, OPT_PASSIN, OPT_VERIFY, OPT_PRVERIFY, OPT_SIGNATURE, OPT_KEYFORM, OPT_ENGINE, OPT_ENGINE_IMPL, OPT_HEX, OPT_BINARY, OPT_DEBUG, OPT_FIPS_FINGERPRINT, OPT_HMAC, OPT_MAC, OPT_SIGOPT, OPT_MACOPT, OPT_DIGEST, OPT_R_ENUM } OPTION_CHOICE; const OPTIONS dgst_options[] = { {OPT_HELP_STR, 1, '-', "Usage: %s [options] [file...]\n"}, {OPT_HELP_STR, 1, '-', " file... files to digest (default is stdin)\n"}, {"help", OPT_HELP, '-', "Display this summary"}, {"list", OPT_LIST, '-', "List digests"}, {"c", OPT_C, '-', "Print the digest with separating colons"}, {"r", OPT_R, '-', "Print the digest in coreutils format"}, {"out", OPT_OUT, '>', "Output to filename rather than stdout"}, {"passin", OPT_PASSIN, 's', "Input file pass phrase source"}, {"sign", OPT_SIGN, 's', "Sign digest using private key"}, {"verify", OPT_VERIFY, 's', "Verify a signature using public key"}, {"prverify", OPT_PRVERIFY, 's', "Verify a signature using private key"}, {"signature", OPT_SIGNATURE, '<', "File with signature to verify"}, {"keyform", OPT_KEYFORM, 'f', "Key file format (PEM or ENGINE)"}, {"hex", OPT_HEX, '-', "Print as hex dump"}, {"binary", OPT_BINARY, '-', "Print in binary form"}, {"d", OPT_DEBUG, '-', "Print debug info"}, {"debug", OPT_DEBUG, '-', "Print debug info"}, {"fips-fingerprint", OPT_FIPS_FINGERPRINT, '-', "Compute HMAC with the key used in OpenSSL-FIPS fingerprint"}, {"hmac", OPT_HMAC, 's', "Create hashed MAC with key"}, {"mac", OPT_MAC, 's', "Create MAC (not necessarily HMAC)"}, {"sigopt", OPT_SIGOPT, 's', "Signature parameter in n:v form"}, {"macopt", OPT_MACOPT, 's', "MAC algorithm parameters in n:v form or key"}, {"", OPT_DIGEST, '-', "Any supported digest"}, OPT_R_OPTIONS, #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE {"engine", OPT_ENGINE, 's', "Use engine e, possibly a hardware device"}, {"engine_impl", OPT_ENGINE_IMPL, '-', "Also use engine given by -engine for digest operations"}, #endif {NULL} }; int dgst_main(int argc, char **argv) { BIO *in = NULL, *inp, *bmd = NULL, *out = NULL; ENGINE *e = NULL, *impl = NULL; EVP_PKEY *sigkey = NULL; STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *sigopts = NULL, *macopts = NULL; char *hmac_key = NULL; char *mac_name = NULL; char *passinarg = NULL, *passin = NULL; const EVP_MD *md = NULL, *m; const char *outfile = NULL, *keyfile = NULL, *prog = NULL; const char *sigfile = NULL; OPTION_CHOICE o; int separator = 0, debug = 0, keyform = FORMAT_PEM, siglen = 0; int i, ret = 1, out_bin = -1, want_pub = 0, do_verify = 0; unsigned char *buf = NULL, *sigbuf = NULL; int engine_impl = 0; struct doall_dgst_digests dec; prog = opt_progname(argv[0]); buf = app_malloc(BUFSIZE, "I/O buffer"); md = EVP_get_digestbyname(prog); prog = opt_init(argc, argv, dgst_options); while ((o = opt_next()) != OPT_EOF) { switch (o) { case OPT_EOF: case OPT_ERR: opthelp: BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Use -help for summary.\n", prog); goto end; case OPT_HELP: opt_help(dgst_options); ret = 0; goto end; case OPT_LIST: BIO_printf(bio_out, "Supported digests:\n"); dec.bio = bio_out; dec.n = 0; OBJ_NAME_do_all_sorted(OBJ_NAME_TYPE_MD_METH, show_digests, &dec); BIO_printf(bio_out, "\n"); ret = 0; goto end; case OPT_C: separator = 1; break; case OPT_R: separator = 2; break; case OPT_R_CASES: if (!opt_rand(o)) goto end; break; case OPT_OUT: outfile = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_SIGN: keyfile = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_PASSIN: passinarg = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_VERIFY: keyfile = opt_arg(); want_pub = do_verify = 1; break; case OPT_PRVERIFY: keyfile = opt_arg(); do_verify = 1; break; case OPT_SIGNATURE: sigfile = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_KEYFORM: if (!opt_format(opt_arg(), OPT_FMT_ANY, &keyform)) goto opthelp; break; case OPT_ENGINE: e = setup_engine(opt_arg(), 0); break; case OPT_ENGINE_IMPL: engine_impl = 1; break; case OPT_HEX: out_bin = 0; break; case OPT_BINARY: out_bin = 1; break; case OPT_DEBUG: debug = 1; break; case OPT_FIPS_FINGERPRINT: hmac_key = "etaonrishdlcupfm"; break; case OPT_HMAC: hmac_key = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_MAC: mac_name = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_SIGOPT: if (!sigopts) sigopts = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_new_null(); if (!sigopts || !sk_OPENSSL_STRING_push(sigopts, opt_arg())) goto opthelp; break; case OPT_MACOPT: if (!macopts) macopts = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_new_null(); if (!macopts || !sk_OPENSSL_STRING_push(macopts, opt_arg())) goto opthelp; break; case OPT_DIGEST: if (!opt_md(opt_unknown(), &m)) goto opthelp; md = m; break; } } argc = opt_num_rest(); argv = opt_rest(); if (keyfile != NULL && argc > 1) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Can only sign or verify one file.\n", prog); goto end; } if (do_verify && sigfile == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "No signature to verify: use the -signature option\n"); goto end; } if (engine_impl) impl = e; in = BIO_new(BIO_s_file()); bmd = BIO_new(BIO_f_md()); if ((in == NULL) || (bmd == NULL)) { ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } if (debug) { BIO_set_callback(in, BIO_debug_callback); /* needed for windows 3.1 */ BIO_set_callback_arg(in, (char *)bio_err); } if (!app_passwd(passinarg, NULL, &passin, NULL)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error getting password\n"); goto end; } if (out_bin == -1) { if (keyfile != NULL) out_bin = 1; else out_bin = 0; } out = bio_open_default(outfile, 'w', out_bin ? FORMAT_BINARY : FORMAT_TEXT); if (out == NULL) goto end; if ((!(mac_name == NULL) + !(keyfile == NULL) + !(hmac_key == NULL)) > 1) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "MAC and Signing key cannot both be specified\n"); goto end; } if (keyfile != NULL) { int type; if (want_pub) sigkey = load_pubkey(keyfile, keyform, 0, NULL, e, "key file"); else sigkey = load_key(keyfile, keyform, 0, passin, e, "key file"); if (sigkey == NULL) { /* * load_[pub]key() has already printed an appropriate message */ goto end; } type = EVP_PKEY_id(sigkey); if (type == EVP_PKEY_ED25519 || type == EVP_PKEY_ED448) { /* * We implement PureEdDSA for these which doesn't have a separate * digest, and only supports one shot. */ BIO_printf(bio_err, "Key type not supported for this operation\n"); goto end; } } if (mac_name != NULL) { EVP_PKEY_CTX *mac_ctx = NULL; int r = 0; if (!init_gen_str(&mac_ctx, mac_name, impl, 0)) goto mac_end; if (macopts != NULL) { char *macopt; for (i = 0; i < sk_OPENSSL_STRING_num(macopts); i++) { macopt = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_value(macopts, i); if (pkey_ctrl_string(mac_ctx, macopt) <= 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "MAC parameter error \"%s\"\n", macopt); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto mac_end; } } } if (EVP_PKEY_keygen(mac_ctx, &sigkey) <= 0) { BIO_puts(bio_err, "Error generating key\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto mac_end; } r = 1; mac_end: EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(mac_ctx); if (r == 0) goto end; } if (hmac_key != NULL) { sigkey = EVP_PKEY_new_raw_private_key(EVP_PKEY_HMAC, impl, (unsigned char *)hmac_key, -1); if (sigkey == NULL) goto end; } if (sigkey != NULL) { EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = NULL; EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL; int r; - if (!BIO_get_md_ctx(bmd, &mctx)) { + if (BIO_get_md_ctx(bmd, &mctx) <= 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error getting context\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } if (do_verify) r = EVP_DigestVerifyInit(mctx, &pctx, md, impl, sigkey); else r = EVP_DigestSignInit(mctx, &pctx, md, impl, sigkey); if (!r) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error setting context\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } if (sigopts != NULL) { char *sigopt; for (i = 0; i < sk_OPENSSL_STRING_num(sigopts); i++) { sigopt = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_value(sigopts, i); if (pkey_ctrl_string(pctx, sigopt) <= 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "parameter error \"%s\"\n", sigopt); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } } } } /* we use md as a filter, reading from 'in' */ else { EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = NULL; - if (!BIO_get_md_ctx(bmd, &mctx)) { + if (BIO_get_md_ctx(bmd, &mctx) <= 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error getting context\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } if (md == NULL) md = EVP_sha256(); if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(mctx, md, impl)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error setting digest\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } } if (sigfile != NULL && sigkey != NULL) { BIO *sigbio = BIO_new_file(sigfile, "rb"); if (sigbio == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error opening signature file %s\n", sigfile); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } siglen = EVP_PKEY_size(sigkey); sigbuf = app_malloc(siglen, "signature buffer"); siglen = BIO_read(sigbio, sigbuf, siglen); BIO_free(sigbio); if (siglen <= 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error reading signature file %s\n", sigfile); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } } inp = BIO_push(bmd, in); if (md == NULL) { EVP_MD_CTX *tctx; BIO_get_md_ctx(bmd, &tctx); md = EVP_MD_CTX_md(tctx); } if (argc == 0) { BIO_set_fp(in, stdin, BIO_NOCLOSE); ret = do_fp(out, buf, inp, separator, out_bin, sigkey, sigbuf, siglen, NULL, NULL, "stdin"); } else { const char *md_name = NULL, *sig_name = NULL; if (!out_bin) { if (sigkey != NULL) { const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *ameth; ameth = EVP_PKEY_get0_asn1(sigkey); if (ameth) EVP_PKEY_asn1_get0_info(NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, &sig_name, ameth); } if (md != NULL) md_name = EVP_MD_name(md); } ret = 0; for (i = 0; i < argc; i++) { int r; if (BIO_read_filename(in, argv[i]) <= 0) { perror(argv[i]); ret++; continue; } else { r = do_fp(out, buf, inp, separator, out_bin, sigkey, sigbuf, siglen, sig_name, md_name, argv[i]); } if (r) ret = r; (void)BIO_reset(bmd); } } end: OPENSSL_clear_free(buf, BUFSIZE); BIO_free(in); OPENSSL_free(passin); BIO_free_all(out); EVP_PKEY_free(sigkey); sk_OPENSSL_STRING_free(sigopts); sk_OPENSSL_STRING_free(macopts); OPENSSL_free(sigbuf); BIO_free(bmd); release_engine(e); return ret; } static void show_digests(const OBJ_NAME *name, void *arg) { struct doall_dgst_digests *dec = (struct doall_dgst_digests *)arg; const EVP_MD *md = NULL; /* Filter out signed digests (a.k.a signature algorithms) */ if (strstr(name->name, "rsa") != NULL || strstr(name->name, "RSA") != NULL) return; if (!islower((unsigned char)*name->name)) return; /* Filter out message digests that we cannot use */ md = EVP_get_digestbyname(name->name); if (md == NULL) return; BIO_printf(dec->bio, "-%-25s", name->name); if (++dec->n == 3) { BIO_printf(dec->bio, "\n"); dec->n = 0; } else { BIO_printf(dec->bio, " "); } } /* * The newline_escape_filename function performs newline escaping for any * filename that contains a newline. This function also takes a pointer * to backslash. The backslash pointer is a flag to indicating whether a newline * is present in the filename. If a newline is present, the backslash flag is * set and the output format will contain a backslash at the beginning of the * digest output. This output format is to replicate the output format found * in the '*sum' checksum programs. This aims to preserve backward * compatibility. */ static const char *newline_escape_filename(const char *file, int * backslash) { size_t i, e = 0, length = strlen(file), newline_count = 0, mem_len = 0; char *file_cpy = NULL; for (i = 0; i < length; i++) if (file[i] == '\n') newline_count++; mem_len = length + newline_count + 1; file_cpy = app_malloc(mem_len, file); i = 0; while(e < length) { const char c = file[e]; if (c == '\n') { file_cpy[i++] = '\\'; file_cpy[i++] = 'n'; *backslash = 1; } else { file_cpy[i++] = c; } e++; } file_cpy[i] = '\0'; return (const char*)file_cpy; } int do_fp(BIO *out, unsigned char *buf, BIO *bp, int sep, int binout, EVP_PKEY *key, unsigned char *sigin, int siglen, const char *sig_name, const char *md_name, const char *file) { size_t len = BUFSIZE; int i, backslash = 0, ret = 1; unsigned char *sigbuf = NULL; while (BIO_pending(bp) || !BIO_eof(bp)) { i = BIO_read(bp, (char *)buf, BUFSIZE); if (i < 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Read Error in %s\n", file); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } if (i == 0) break; } if (sigin != NULL) { EVP_MD_CTX *ctx; BIO_get_md_ctx(bp, &ctx); i = EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(ctx, sigin, (unsigned int)siglen); if (i > 0) { BIO_printf(out, "Verified OK\n"); } else if (i == 0) { BIO_printf(out, "Verification Failure\n"); goto end; } else { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error Verifying Data\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } ret = 0; goto end; } if (key != NULL) { EVP_MD_CTX *ctx; int pkey_len; BIO_get_md_ctx(bp, &ctx); pkey_len = EVP_PKEY_size(key); if (pkey_len > BUFSIZE) { len = pkey_len; sigbuf = app_malloc(len, "Signature buffer"); buf = sigbuf; } if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(ctx, buf, &len)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error Signing Data\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } } else { len = BIO_gets(bp, (char *)buf, BUFSIZE); if ((int)len < 0) { ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } } if (binout) { BIO_write(out, buf, len); } else if (sep == 2) { file = newline_escape_filename(file, &backslash); if (backslash == 1) BIO_puts(out, "\\"); for (i = 0; i < (int)len; i++) BIO_printf(out, "%02x", buf[i]); BIO_printf(out, " *%s\n", file); OPENSSL_free((char *)file); } else { if (sig_name != NULL) { BIO_puts(out, sig_name); if (md_name != NULL) BIO_printf(out, "-%s", md_name); BIO_printf(out, "(%s)= ", file); } else if (md_name != NULL) { BIO_printf(out, "%s(%s)= ", md_name, file); } else { BIO_printf(out, "(%s)= ", file); } for (i = 0; i < (int)len; i++) { if (sep && (i != 0)) BIO_printf(out, ":"); BIO_printf(out, "%02x", buf[i]); } BIO_printf(out, "\n"); } ret = 0; end: if (sigbuf != NULL) OPENSSL_clear_free(sigbuf, len); return ret; } diff --git a/apps/s_cb.c b/apps/s_cb.c index dee1b2e5b4f6..d066a423dee8 100644 --- a/apps/s_cb.c +++ b/apps/s_cb.c @@ -1,1540 +1,1542 @@ /* * Copyright 1995-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ /* callback functions used by s_client, s_server, and s_time */ #include #include #include /* for memcpy() and strcmp() */ #include "apps.h" #include #include #include #include #include #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH # include #endif #include "s_apps.h" #define COOKIE_SECRET_LENGTH 16 VERIFY_CB_ARGS verify_args = { -1, 0, X509_V_OK, 0 }; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SOCK static unsigned char cookie_secret[COOKIE_SECRET_LENGTH]; static int cookie_initialized = 0; #endif static BIO *bio_keylog = NULL; static const char *lookup(int val, const STRINT_PAIR* list, const char* def) { for ( ; list->name; ++list) if (list->retval == val) return list->name; return def; } int verify_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) { X509 *err_cert; int err, depth; err_cert = X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(ctx); err = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(ctx); depth = X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(ctx); if (!verify_args.quiet || !ok) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "depth=%d ", depth); if (err_cert != NULL) { X509_NAME_print_ex(bio_err, X509_get_subject_name(err_cert), 0, get_nameopt()); BIO_puts(bio_err, "\n"); } else { BIO_puts(bio_err, "\n"); } } if (!ok) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "verify error:num=%d:%s\n", err, X509_verify_cert_error_string(err)); if (verify_args.depth < 0 || verify_args.depth >= depth) { if (!verify_args.return_error) ok = 1; verify_args.error = err; } else { ok = 0; verify_args.error = X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG; } } switch (err) { case X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT: BIO_puts(bio_err, "issuer= "); X509_NAME_print_ex(bio_err, X509_get_issuer_name(err_cert), 0, get_nameopt()); BIO_puts(bio_err, "\n"); break; case X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID: case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD: BIO_printf(bio_err, "notBefore="); ASN1_TIME_print(bio_err, X509_get0_notBefore(err_cert)); BIO_printf(bio_err, "\n"); break; case X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED: case X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD: BIO_printf(bio_err, "notAfter="); ASN1_TIME_print(bio_err, X509_get0_notAfter(err_cert)); BIO_printf(bio_err, "\n"); break; case X509_V_ERR_NO_EXPLICIT_POLICY: if (!verify_args.quiet) policies_print(ctx); break; } if (err == X509_V_OK && ok == 2 && !verify_args.quiet) policies_print(ctx); if (ok && !verify_args.quiet) BIO_printf(bio_err, "verify return:%d\n", ok); return ok; } int set_cert_stuff(SSL_CTX *ctx, char *cert_file, char *key_file) { if (cert_file != NULL) { if (SSL_CTX_use_certificate_file(ctx, cert_file, SSL_FILETYPE_PEM) <= 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "unable to get certificate from '%s'\n", cert_file); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); return 0; } if (key_file == NULL) key_file = cert_file; if (SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_file(ctx, key_file, SSL_FILETYPE_PEM) <= 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "unable to get private key from '%s'\n", key_file); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); return 0; } /* * If we are using DSA, we can copy the parameters from the private * key */ /* * Now we know that a key and cert have been set against the SSL * context */ if (!SSL_CTX_check_private_key(ctx)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Private key does not match the certificate public key\n"); return 0; } } return 1; } int set_cert_key_stuff(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert, EVP_PKEY *key, STACK_OF(X509) *chain, int build_chain) { int chflags = chain ? SSL_BUILD_CHAIN_FLAG_CHECK : 0; if (cert == NULL) return 1; if (SSL_CTX_use_certificate(ctx, cert) <= 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "error setting certificate\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); return 0; } if (SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey(ctx, key) <= 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "error setting private key\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); return 0; } /* * Now we know that a key and cert have been set against the SSL context */ if (!SSL_CTX_check_private_key(ctx)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Private key does not match the certificate public key\n"); return 0; } if (chain && !SSL_CTX_set1_chain(ctx, chain)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "error setting certificate chain\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); return 0; } if (build_chain && !SSL_CTX_build_cert_chain(ctx, chflags)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "error building certificate chain\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); return 0; } return 1; } static STRINT_PAIR cert_type_list[] = { {"RSA sign", TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN}, {"DSA sign", TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN}, {"RSA fixed DH", TLS_CT_RSA_FIXED_DH}, {"DSS fixed DH", TLS_CT_DSS_FIXED_DH}, {"ECDSA sign", TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN}, {"RSA fixed ECDH", TLS_CT_RSA_FIXED_ECDH}, {"ECDSA fixed ECDH", TLS_CT_ECDSA_FIXED_ECDH}, {"GOST01 Sign", TLS_CT_GOST01_SIGN}, {"GOST12 Sign", TLS_CT_GOST12_SIGN}, {NULL} }; static void ssl_print_client_cert_types(BIO *bio, SSL *s) { const unsigned char *p; int i; int cert_type_num = SSL_get0_certificate_types(s, &p); if (!cert_type_num) return; BIO_puts(bio, "Client Certificate Types: "); for (i = 0; i < cert_type_num; i++) { unsigned char cert_type = p[i]; const char *cname = lookup((int)cert_type, cert_type_list, NULL); if (i) BIO_puts(bio, ", "); if (cname != NULL) BIO_puts(bio, cname); else BIO_printf(bio, "UNKNOWN (%d),", cert_type); } BIO_puts(bio, "\n"); } static const char *get_sigtype(int nid) { switch (nid) { case EVP_PKEY_RSA: return "RSA"; case EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS: return "RSA-PSS"; case EVP_PKEY_DSA: return "DSA"; case EVP_PKEY_EC: return "ECDSA"; case NID_ED25519: return "Ed25519"; case NID_ED448: return "Ed448"; case NID_id_GostR3410_2001: return "gost2001"; case NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256: return "gost2012_256"; case NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512: return "gost2012_512"; default: return NULL; } } static int do_print_sigalgs(BIO *out, SSL *s, int shared) { int i, nsig, client; client = SSL_is_server(s) ? 0 : 1; if (shared) nsig = SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(s, 0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL); else nsig = SSL_get_sigalgs(s, -1, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL); if (nsig == 0) return 1; if (shared) BIO_puts(out, "Shared "); if (client) BIO_puts(out, "Requested "); BIO_puts(out, "Signature Algorithms: "); for (i = 0; i < nsig; i++) { int hash_nid, sign_nid; unsigned char rhash, rsign; const char *sstr = NULL; if (shared) SSL_get_shared_sigalgs(s, i, &sign_nid, &hash_nid, NULL, &rsign, &rhash); else SSL_get_sigalgs(s, i, &sign_nid, &hash_nid, NULL, &rsign, &rhash); if (i) BIO_puts(out, ":"); sstr = get_sigtype(sign_nid); if (sstr) BIO_printf(out, "%s", sstr); else BIO_printf(out, "0x%02X", (int)rsign); if (hash_nid != NID_undef) BIO_printf(out, "+%s", OBJ_nid2sn(hash_nid)); else if (sstr == NULL) BIO_printf(out, "+0x%02X", (int)rhash); } BIO_puts(out, "\n"); return 1; } int ssl_print_sigalgs(BIO *out, SSL *s) { int nid; if (!SSL_is_server(s)) ssl_print_client_cert_types(out, s); do_print_sigalgs(out, s, 0); do_print_sigalgs(out, s, 1); if (SSL_get_peer_signature_nid(s, &nid) && nid != NID_undef) BIO_printf(out, "Peer signing digest: %s\n", OBJ_nid2sn(nid)); if (SSL_get_peer_signature_type_nid(s, &nid)) BIO_printf(out, "Peer signature type: %s\n", get_sigtype(nid)); return 1; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC int ssl_print_point_formats(BIO *out, SSL *s) { int i, nformats; const char *pformats; nformats = SSL_get0_ec_point_formats(s, &pformats); if (nformats <= 0) return 1; BIO_puts(out, "Supported Elliptic Curve Point Formats: "); for (i = 0; i < nformats; i++, pformats++) { if (i) BIO_puts(out, ":"); switch (*pformats) { case TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_uncompressed: BIO_puts(out, "uncompressed"); break; case TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_prime: BIO_puts(out, "ansiX962_compressed_prime"); break; case TLSEXT_ECPOINTFORMAT_ansiX962_compressed_char2: BIO_puts(out, "ansiX962_compressed_char2"); break; default: BIO_printf(out, "unknown(%d)", (int)*pformats); break; } } BIO_puts(out, "\n"); return 1; } int ssl_print_groups(BIO *out, SSL *s, int noshared) { int i, ngroups, *groups, nid; const char *gname; ngroups = SSL_get1_groups(s, NULL); if (ngroups <= 0) return 1; groups = app_malloc(ngroups * sizeof(int), "groups to print"); SSL_get1_groups(s, groups); BIO_puts(out, "Supported Elliptic Groups: "); for (i = 0; i < ngroups; i++) { if (i) BIO_puts(out, ":"); nid = groups[i]; /* If unrecognised print out hex version */ if (nid & TLSEXT_nid_unknown) { BIO_printf(out, "0x%04X", nid & 0xFFFF); } else { /* TODO(TLS1.3): Get group name here */ /* Use NIST name for curve if it exists */ gname = EC_curve_nid2nist(nid); if (gname == NULL) gname = OBJ_nid2sn(nid); BIO_printf(out, "%s", gname); } } OPENSSL_free(groups); if (noshared) { BIO_puts(out, "\n"); return 1; } BIO_puts(out, "\nShared Elliptic groups: "); ngroups = SSL_get_shared_group(s, -1); for (i = 0; i < ngroups; i++) { if (i) BIO_puts(out, ":"); nid = SSL_get_shared_group(s, i); /* TODO(TLS1.3): Convert for DH groups */ gname = EC_curve_nid2nist(nid); if (gname == NULL) gname = OBJ_nid2sn(nid); BIO_printf(out, "%s", gname); } if (ngroups == 0) BIO_puts(out, "NONE"); BIO_puts(out, "\n"); return 1; } #endif int ssl_print_tmp_key(BIO *out, SSL *s) { EVP_PKEY *key; if (!SSL_get_peer_tmp_key(s, &key)) return 1; BIO_puts(out, "Server Temp Key: "); switch (EVP_PKEY_id(key)) { case EVP_PKEY_RSA: BIO_printf(out, "RSA, %d bits\n", EVP_PKEY_bits(key)); break; case EVP_PKEY_DH: BIO_printf(out, "DH, %d bits\n", EVP_PKEY_bits(key)); break; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC case EVP_PKEY_EC: { EC_KEY *ec = EVP_PKEY_get1_EC_KEY(key); int nid; const char *cname; nid = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(EC_KEY_get0_group(ec)); EC_KEY_free(ec); cname = EC_curve_nid2nist(nid); if (cname == NULL) cname = OBJ_nid2sn(nid); BIO_printf(out, "ECDH, %s, %d bits\n", cname, EVP_PKEY_bits(key)); } break; #endif default: BIO_printf(out, "%s, %d bits\n", OBJ_nid2sn(EVP_PKEY_id(key)), EVP_PKEY_bits(key)); } EVP_PKEY_free(key); return 1; } long bio_dump_callback(BIO *bio, int cmd, const char *argp, int argi, long argl, long ret) { BIO *out; out = (BIO *)BIO_get_callback_arg(bio); if (out == NULL) return ret; if (cmd == (BIO_CB_READ | BIO_CB_RETURN)) { BIO_printf(out, "read from %p [%p] (%lu bytes => %ld (0x%lX))\n", (void *)bio, (void *)argp, (unsigned long)argi, ret, ret); BIO_dump(out, argp, (int)ret); return ret; } else if (cmd == (BIO_CB_WRITE | BIO_CB_RETURN)) { BIO_printf(out, "write to %p [%p] (%lu bytes => %ld (0x%lX))\n", (void *)bio, (void *)argp, (unsigned long)argi, ret, ret); BIO_dump(out, argp, (int)ret); } return ret; } void apps_ssl_info_callback(const SSL *s, int where, int ret) { const char *str; int w; w = where & ~SSL_ST_MASK; if (w & SSL_ST_CONNECT) str = "SSL_connect"; else if (w & SSL_ST_ACCEPT) str = "SSL_accept"; else str = "undefined"; if (where & SSL_CB_LOOP) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s:%s\n", str, SSL_state_string_long(s)); } else if (where & SSL_CB_ALERT) { str = (where & SSL_CB_READ) ? "read" : "write"; BIO_printf(bio_err, "SSL3 alert %s:%s:%s\n", str, SSL_alert_type_string_long(ret), SSL_alert_desc_string_long(ret)); } else if (where & SSL_CB_EXIT) { if (ret == 0) BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s:failed in %s\n", str, SSL_state_string_long(s)); else if (ret < 0) BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s:error in %s\n", str, SSL_state_string_long(s)); } } static STRINT_PAIR ssl_versions[] = { {"SSL 3.0", SSL3_VERSION}, {"TLS 1.0", TLS1_VERSION}, {"TLS 1.1", TLS1_1_VERSION}, {"TLS 1.2", TLS1_2_VERSION}, {"TLS 1.3", TLS1_3_VERSION}, {"DTLS 1.0", DTLS1_VERSION}, {"DTLS 1.0 (bad)", DTLS1_BAD_VER}, {NULL} }; static STRINT_PAIR alert_types[] = { {" close_notify", 0}, {" end_of_early_data", 1}, {" unexpected_message", 10}, {" bad_record_mac", 20}, {" decryption_failed", 21}, {" record_overflow", 22}, {" decompression_failure", 30}, {" handshake_failure", 40}, {" bad_certificate", 42}, {" unsupported_certificate", 43}, {" certificate_revoked", 44}, {" certificate_expired", 45}, {" certificate_unknown", 46}, {" illegal_parameter", 47}, {" unknown_ca", 48}, {" access_denied", 49}, {" decode_error", 50}, {" decrypt_error", 51}, {" export_restriction", 60}, {" protocol_version", 70}, {" insufficient_security", 71}, {" internal_error", 80}, {" inappropriate_fallback", 86}, {" user_canceled", 90}, {" no_renegotiation", 100}, {" missing_extension", 109}, {" unsupported_extension", 110}, {" certificate_unobtainable", 111}, {" unrecognized_name", 112}, {" bad_certificate_status_response", 113}, {" bad_certificate_hash_value", 114}, {" unknown_psk_identity", 115}, {" certificate_required", 116}, {NULL} }; static STRINT_PAIR handshakes[] = { {", HelloRequest", SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST}, {", ClientHello", SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO}, {", ServerHello", SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO}, {", HelloVerifyRequest", DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST}, {", NewSessionTicket", SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET}, {", EndOfEarlyData", SSL3_MT_END_OF_EARLY_DATA}, {", EncryptedExtensions", SSL3_MT_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS}, {", Certificate", SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE}, {", ServerKeyExchange", SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE}, {", CertificateRequest", SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST}, {", ServerHelloDone", SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE}, {", CertificateVerify", SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY}, {", ClientKeyExchange", SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE}, {", Finished", SSL3_MT_FINISHED}, {", CertificateUrl", SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_URL}, {", CertificateStatus", SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS}, {", SupplementalData", SSL3_MT_SUPPLEMENTAL_DATA}, {", KeyUpdate", SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE}, #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG {", NextProto", SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO}, #endif {", MessageHash", SSL3_MT_MESSAGE_HASH}, {NULL} }; void msg_cb(int write_p, int version, int content_type, const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg) { BIO *bio = arg; const char *str_write_p = write_p ? ">>>" : "<<<"; const char *str_version = lookup(version, ssl_versions, "???"); const char *str_content_type = "", *str_details1 = "", *str_details2 = ""; const unsigned char* bp = buf; if (version == SSL3_VERSION || version == TLS1_VERSION || version == TLS1_1_VERSION || version == TLS1_2_VERSION || version == TLS1_3_VERSION || version == DTLS1_VERSION || version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) { switch (content_type) { case 20: str_content_type = ", ChangeCipherSpec"; break; case 21: str_content_type = ", Alert"; str_details1 = ", ???"; if (len == 2) { switch (bp[0]) { case 1: str_details1 = ", warning"; break; case 2: str_details1 = ", fatal"; break; } str_details2 = lookup((int)bp[1], alert_types, " ???"); } break; case 22: str_content_type = ", Handshake"; str_details1 = "???"; if (len > 0) str_details1 = lookup((int)bp[0], handshakes, "???"); break; case 23: str_content_type = ", ApplicationData"; break; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS case 24: str_details1 = ", Heartbeat"; if (len > 0) { switch (bp[0]) { case 1: str_details1 = ", HeartbeatRequest"; break; case 2: str_details1 = ", HeartbeatResponse"; break; } } break; #endif } } BIO_printf(bio, "%s %s%s [length %04lx]%s%s\n", str_write_p, str_version, str_content_type, (unsigned long)len, str_details1, str_details2); if (len > 0) { size_t num, i; BIO_printf(bio, " "); num = len; for (i = 0; i < num; i++) { if (i % 16 == 0 && i > 0) BIO_printf(bio, "\n "); BIO_printf(bio, " %02x", ((const unsigned char *)buf)[i]); } if (i < len) BIO_printf(bio, " ..."); BIO_printf(bio, "\n"); } (void)BIO_flush(bio); } static STRINT_PAIR tlsext_types[] = { {"server name", TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name}, {"max fragment length", TLSEXT_TYPE_max_fragment_length}, {"client certificate URL", TLSEXT_TYPE_client_certificate_url}, {"trusted CA keys", TLSEXT_TYPE_trusted_ca_keys}, {"truncated HMAC", TLSEXT_TYPE_truncated_hmac}, {"status request", TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request}, {"user mapping", TLSEXT_TYPE_user_mapping}, {"client authz", TLSEXT_TYPE_client_authz}, {"server authz", TLSEXT_TYPE_server_authz}, {"cert type", TLSEXT_TYPE_cert_type}, {"supported_groups", TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_groups}, {"EC point formats", TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats}, {"SRP", TLSEXT_TYPE_srp}, {"signature algorithms", TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms}, {"use SRTP", TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp}, {"heartbeat", TLSEXT_TYPE_heartbeat}, {"session ticket", TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket}, {"renegotiation info", TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate}, {"signed certificate timestamps", TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp}, {"TLS padding", TLSEXT_TYPE_padding}, #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg {"next protocol", TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg}, #endif #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac {"encrypt-then-mac", TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac}, #endif #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation {"application layer protocol negotiation", TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation}, #endif #ifdef TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret {"extended master secret", TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret}, #endif {"key share", TLSEXT_TYPE_key_share}, {"supported versions", TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_versions}, {"psk", TLSEXT_TYPE_psk}, {"psk kex modes", TLSEXT_TYPE_psk_kex_modes}, {"certificate authorities", TLSEXT_TYPE_certificate_authorities}, {"post handshake auth", TLSEXT_TYPE_post_handshake_auth}, {NULL} }; /* from rfc8446 4.2.3. + gost (https://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-smyshlyaev-tls12-gost-suites-04.html) */ static STRINT_PAIR signature_tls13_scheme_list[] = { {"rsa_pkcs1_sha1", 0x0201 /* TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha1 */}, {"ecdsa_sha1", 0x0203 /* TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha1 */}, /* {"rsa_pkcs1_sha224", 0x0301 TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha224}, not in rfc8446 */ /* {"ecdsa_sha224", 0x0303 TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha224} not in rfc8446 */ {"rsa_pkcs1_sha256", 0x0401 /* TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha256 */}, {"ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256", 0x0403 /* TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256 */}, {"rsa_pkcs1_sha384", 0x0501 /* TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha384 */}, {"ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384", 0x0503 /* TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384 */}, {"rsa_pkcs1_sha512", 0x0601 /* TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha512 */}, {"ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512", 0x0603 /* TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512 */}, {"rsa_pss_rsae_sha256", 0x0804 /* TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha256 */}, {"rsa_pss_rsae_sha384", 0x0805 /* TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha384 */}, {"rsa_pss_rsae_sha512", 0x0806 /* TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha512 */}, {"ed25519", 0x0807 /* TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed25519 */}, {"ed448", 0x0808 /* TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed448 */}, {"rsa_pss_pss_sha256", 0x0809 /* TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha256 */}, {"rsa_pss_pss_sha384", 0x080a /* TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha384 */}, {"rsa_pss_pss_sha512", 0x080b /* TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha512 */}, {"gostr34102001", 0xeded /* TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102001_gostr3411 */}, {"gostr34102012_256", 0xeeee /* TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_gostr34112012_256 */}, {"gostr34102012_512", 0xefef /* TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_gostr34112012_512 */}, {NULL} }; /* from rfc5246 7.4.1.4.1. */ static STRINT_PAIR signature_tls12_alg_list[] = { {"anonymous", TLSEXT_signature_anonymous /* 0 */}, {"RSA", TLSEXT_signature_rsa /* 1 */}, {"DSA", TLSEXT_signature_dsa /* 2 */}, {"ECDSA", TLSEXT_signature_ecdsa /* 3 */}, {NULL} }; /* from rfc5246 7.4.1.4.1. */ static STRINT_PAIR signature_tls12_hash_list[] = { {"none", TLSEXT_hash_none /* 0 */}, {"MD5", TLSEXT_hash_md5 /* 1 */}, {"SHA1", TLSEXT_hash_sha1 /* 2 */}, {"SHA224", TLSEXT_hash_sha224 /* 3 */}, {"SHA256", TLSEXT_hash_sha256 /* 4 */}, {"SHA384", TLSEXT_hash_sha384 /* 5 */}, {"SHA512", TLSEXT_hash_sha512 /* 6 */}, {NULL} }; void tlsext_cb(SSL *s, int client_server, int type, const unsigned char *data, int len, void *arg) { BIO *bio = arg; const char *extname = lookup(type, tlsext_types, "unknown"); BIO_printf(bio, "TLS %s extension \"%s\" (id=%d), len=%d\n", client_server ? "server" : "client", extname, type, len); BIO_dump(bio, (const char *)data, len); (void)BIO_flush(bio); } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SOCK int generate_cookie_callback(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *cookie, unsigned int *cookie_len) { unsigned char *buffer; size_t length = 0; unsigned short port; BIO_ADDR *lpeer = NULL, *peer = NULL; /* Initialize a random secret */ if (!cookie_initialized) { if (RAND_bytes(cookie_secret, COOKIE_SECRET_LENGTH) <= 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "error setting random cookie secret\n"); return 0; } cookie_initialized = 1; } if (SSL_is_dtls(ssl)) { lpeer = peer = BIO_ADDR_new(); if (peer == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "memory full\n"); return 0; } /* Read peer information */ (void)BIO_dgram_get_peer(SSL_get_rbio(ssl), peer); } else { peer = ourpeer; } /* Create buffer with peer's address and port */ if (!BIO_ADDR_rawaddress(peer, NULL, &length)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Failed getting peer address\n"); return 0; } OPENSSL_assert(length != 0); port = BIO_ADDR_rawport(peer); length += sizeof(port); buffer = app_malloc(length, "cookie generate buffer"); memcpy(buffer, &port, sizeof(port)); BIO_ADDR_rawaddress(peer, buffer + sizeof(port), NULL); /* Calculate HMAC of buffer using the secret */ HMAC(EVP_sha1(), cookie_secret, COOKIE_SECRET_LENGTH, buffer, length, cookie, cookie_len); OPENSSL_free(buffer); BIO_ADDR_free(lpeer); return 1; } int verify_cookie_callback(SSL *ssl, const unsigned char *cookie, unsigned int cookie_len) { unsigned char result[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; unsigned int resultlength; /* Note: we check cookie_initialized because if it's not, * it cannot be valid */ if (cookie_initialized && generate_cookie_callback(ssl, result, &resultlength) && cookie_len == resultlength && memcmp(result, cookie, resultlength) == 0) return 1; return 0; } int generate_stateless_cookie_callback(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *cookie, size_t *cookie_len) { unsigned int temp; int res = generate_cookie_callback(ssl, cookie, &temp); - *cookie_len = temp; + + if (res != 0) + *cookie_len = temp; return res; } int verify_stateless_cookie_callback(SSL *ssl, const unsigned char *cookie, size_t cookie_len) { return verify_cookie_callback(ssl, cookie, cookie_len); } #endif /* * Example of extended certificate handling. Where the standard support of * one certificate per algorithm is not sufficient an application can decide * which certificate(s) to use at runtime based on whatever criteria it deems * appropriate. */ /* Linked list of certificates, keys and chains */ struct ssl_excert_st { int certform; const char *certfile; int keyform; const char *keyfile; const char *chainfile; X509 *cert; EVP_PKEY *key; STACK_OF(X509) *chain; int build_chain; struct ssl_excert_st *next, *prev; }; static STRINT_PAIR chain_flags[] = { {"Overall Validity", CERT_PKEY_VALID}, {"Sign with EE key", CERT_PKEY_SIGN}, {"EE signature", CERT_PKEY_EE_SIGNATURE}, {"CA signature", CERT_PKEY_CA_SIGNATURE}, {"EE key parameters", CERT_PKEY_EE_PARAM}, {"CA key parameters", CERT_PKEY_CA_PARAM}, {"Explicitly sign with EE key", CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN}, {"Issuer Name", CERT_PKEY_ISSUER_NAME}, {"Certificate Type", CERT_PKEY_CERT_TYPE}, {NULL} }; static void print_chain_flags(SSL *s, int flags) { STRINT_PAIR *pp; for (pp = chain_flags; pp->name; ++pp) BIO_printf(bio_err, "\t%s: %s\n", pp->name, (flags & pp->retval) ? "OK" : "NOT OK"); BIO_printf(bio_err, "\tSuite B: "); if (SSL_set_cert_flags(s, 0) & SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS) BIO_puts(bio_err, flags & CERT_PKEY_SUITEB ? "OK\n" : "NOT OK\n"); else BIO_printf(bio_err, "not tested\n"); } /* * Very basic selection callback: just use any certificate chain reported as * valid. More sophisticated could prioritise according to local policy. */ static int set_cert_cb(SSL *ssl, void *arg) { int i, rv; SSL_EXCERT *exc = arg; #ifdef CERT_CB_TEST_RETRY static int retry_cnt; if (retry_cnt < 5) { retry_cnt++; BIO_printf(bio_err, "Certificate callback retry test: count %d\n", retry_cnt); return -1; } #endif SSL_certs_clear(ssl); if (exc == NULL) return 1; /* * Go to end of list and traverse backwards since we prepend newer * entries this retains the original order. */ while (exc->next != NULL) exc = exc->next; i = 0; while (exc != NULL) { i++; rv = SSL_check_chain(ssl, exc->cert, exc->key, exc->chain); BIO_printf(bio_err, "Checking cert chain %d:\nSubject: ", i); X509_NAME_print_ex(bio_err, X509_get_subject_name(exc->cert), 0, get_nameopt()); BIO_puts(bio_err, "\n"); print_chain_flags(ssl, rv); if (rv & CERT_PKEY_VALID) { if (!SSL_use_certificate(ssl, exc->cert) || !SSL_use_PrivateKey(ssl, exc->key)) { return 0; } /* * NB: we wouldn't normally do this as it is not efficient * building chains on each connection better to cache the chain * in advance. */ if (exc->build_chain) { if (!SSL_build_cert_chain(ssl, 0)) return 0; } else if (exc->chain != NULL) { if (!SSL_set1_chain(ssl, exc->chain)) return 0; } } exc = exc->prev; } return 1; } void ssl_ctx_set_excert(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_EXCERT *exc) { SSL_CTX_set_cert_cb(ctx, set_cert_cb, exc); } static int ssl_excert_prepend(SSL_EXCERT **pexc) { SSL_EXCERT *exc = app_malloc(sizeof(*exc), "prepend cert"); memset(exc, 0, sizeof(*exc)); exc->next = *pexc; *pexc = exc; if (exc->next) { exc->certform = exc->next->certform; exc->keyform = exc->next->keyform; exc->next->prev = exc; } else { exc->certform = FORMAT_PEM; exc->keyform = FORMAT_PEM; } return 1; } void ssl_excert_free(SSL_EXCERT *exc) { SSL_EXCERT *curr; if (exc == NULL) return; while (exc) { X509_free(exc->cert); EVP_PKEY_free(exc->key); sk_X509_pop_free(exc->chain, X509_free); curr = exc; exc = exc->next; OPENSSL_free(curr); } } int load_excert(SSL_EXCERT **pexc) { SSL_EXCERT *exc = *pexc; if (exc == NULL) return 1; /* If nothing in list, free and set to NULL */ if (exc->certfile == NULL && exc->next == NULL) { ssl_excert_free(exc); *pexc = NULL; return 1; } for (; exc; exc = exc->next) { if (exc->certfile == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Missing filename\n"); return 0; } exc->cert = load_cert(exc->certfile, exc->certform, "Server Certificate"); if (exc->cert == NULL) return 0; if (exc->keyfile != NULL) { exc->key = load_key(exc->keyfile, exc->keyform, 0, NULL, NULL, "Server Key"); } else { exc->key = load_key(exc->certfile, exc->certform, 0, NULL, NULL, "Server Key"); } if (exc->key == NULL) return 0; if (exc->chainfile != NULL) { if (!load_certs(exc->chainfile, &exc->chain, FORMAT_PEM, NULL, "Server Chain")) return 0; } } return 1; } enum range { OPT_X_ENUM }; int args_excert(int opt, SSL_EXCERT **pexc) { SSL_EXCERT *exc = *pexc; assert(opt > OPT_X__FIRST); assert(opt < OPT_X__LAST); if (exc == NULL) { if (!ssl_excert_prepend(&exc)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, " %s: Error initialising xcert\n", opt_getprog()); goto err; } *pexc = exc; } switch ((enum range)opt) { case OPT_X__FIRST: case OPT_X__LAST: return 0; case OPT_X_CERT: if (exc->certfile != NULL && !ssl_excert_prepend(&exc)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Error adding xcert\n", opt_getprog()); goto err; } *pexc = exc; exc->certfile = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_X_KEY: if (exc->keyfile != NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Key already specified\n", opt_getprog()); goto err; } exc->keyfile = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_X_CHAIN: if (exc->chainfile != NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Chain already specified\n", opt_getprog()); goto err; } exc->chainfile = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_X_CHAIN_BUILD: exc->build_chain = 1; break; case OPT_X_CERTFORM: if (!opt_format(opt_arg(), OPT_FMT_PEMDER, &exc->certform)) return 0; break; case OPT_X_KEYFORM: if (!opt_format(opt_arg(), OPT_FMT_PEMDER, &exc->keyform)) return 0; break; } return 1; err: ERR_print_errors(bio_err); ssl_excert_free(exc); *pexc = NULL; return 0; } static void print_raw_cipherlist(SSL *s) { const unsigned char *rlist; static const unsigned char scsv_id[] = { 0, 0xFF }; size_t i, rlistlen, num; if (!SSL_is_server(s)) return; num = SSL_get0_raw_cipherlist(s, NULL); OPENSSL_assert(num == 2); rlistlen = SSL_get0_raw_cipherlist(s, &rlist); BIO_puts(bio_err, "Client cipher list: "); for (i = 0; i < rlistlen; i += num, rlist += num) { const SSL_CIPHER *c = SSL_CIPHER_find(s, rlist); if (i) BIO_puts(bio_err, ":"); if (c != NULL) { BIO_puts(bio_err, SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c)); } else if (memcmp(rlist, scsv_id, num) == 0) { BIO_puts(bio_err, "SCSV"); } else { size_t j; BIO_puts(bio_err, "0x"); for (j = 0; j < num; j++) BIO_printf(bio_err, "%02X", rlist[j]); } } BIO_puts(bio_err, "\n"); } /* * Hex encoder for TLSA RRdata, not ':' delimited. */ static char *hexencode(const unsigned char *data, size_t len) { static const char *hex = "0123456789abcdef"; char *out; char *cp; size_t outlen = 2 * len + 1; int ilen = (int) outlen; if (outlen < len || ilen < 0 || outlen != (size_t)ilen) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: %zu-byte buffer too large to hexencode\n", opt_getprog(), len); exit(1); } cp = out = app_malloc(ilen, "TLSA hex data buffer"); while (len-- > 0) { *cp++ = hex[(*data >> 4) & 0x0f]; *cp++ = hex[*data++ & 0x0f]; } *cp = '\0'; return out; } void print_verify_detail(SSL *s, BIO *bio) { int mdpth; EVP_PKEY *mspki; long verify_err = SSL_get_verify_result(s); if (verify_err == X509_V_OK) { const char *peername = SSL_get0_peername(s); BIO_printf(bio, "Verification: OK\n"); if (peername != NULL) BIO_printf(bio, "Verified peername: %s\n", peername); } else { const char *reason = X509_verify_cert_error_string(verify_err); BIO_printf(bio, "Verification error: %s\n", reason); } if ((mdpth = SSL_get0_dane_authority(s, NULL, &mspki)) >= 0) { uint8_t usage, selector, mtype; const unsigned char *data = NULL; size_t dlen = 0; char *hexdata; mdpth = SSL_get0_dane_tlsa(s, &usage, &selector, &mtype, &data, &dlen); /* * The TLSA data field can be quite long when it is a certificate, * public key or even a SHA2-512 digest. Because the initial octets of * ASN.1 certificates and public keys contain mostly boilerplate OIDs * and lengths, we show the last 12 bytes of the data instead, as these * are more likely to distinguish distinct TLSA records. */ #define TLSA_TAIL_SIZE 12 if (dlen > TLSA_TAIL_SIZE) hexdata = hexencode(data + dlen - TLSA_TAIL_SIZE, TLSA_TAIL_SIZE); else hexdata = hexencode(data, dlen); BIO_printf(bio, "DANE TLSA %d %d %d %s%s %s at depth %d\n", usage, selector, mtype, (dlen > TLSA_TAIL_SIZE) ? "..." : "", hexdata, (mspki != NULL) ? "signed the certificate" : mdpth ? "matched TA certificate" : "matched EE certificate", mdpth); OPENSSL_free(hexdata); } } void print_ssl_summary(SSL *s) { const SSL_CIPHER *c; X509 *peer; BIO_printf(bio_err, "Protocol version: %s\n", SSL_get_version(s)); print_raw_cipherlist(s); c = SSL_get_current_cipher(s); BIO_printf(bio_err, "Ciphersuite: %s\n", SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c)); do_print_sigalgs(bio_err, s, 0); peer = SSL_get_peer_certificate(s); if (peer != NULL) { int nid; BIO_puts(bio_err, "Peer certificate: "); X509_NAME_print_ex(bio_err, X509_get_subject_name(peer), 0, get_nameopt()); BIO_puts(bio_err, "\n"); if (SSL_get_peer_signature_nid(s, &nid)) BIO_printf(bio_err, "Hash used: %s\n", OBJ_nid2sn(nid)); if (SSL_get_peer_signature_type_nid(s, &nid)) BIO_printf(bio_err, "Signature type: %s\n", get_sigtype(nid)); print_verify_detail(s, bio_err); } else { BIO_puts(bio_err, "No peer certificate\n"); } X509_free(peer); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC ssl_print_point_formats(bio_err, s); if (SSL_is_server(s)) ssl_print_groups(bio_err, s, 1); else ssl_print_tmp_key(bio_err, s); #else if (!SSL_is_server(s)) ssl_print_tmp_key(bio_err, s); #endif } int config_ctx(SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx, STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *str, SSL_CTX *ctx) { int i; SSL_CONF_CTX_set_ssl_ctx(cctx, ctx); for (i = 0; i < sk_OPENSSL_STRING_num(str); i += 2) { const char *flag = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_value(str, i); const char *arg = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_value(str, i + 1); if (SSL_CONF_cmd(cctx, flag, arg) <= 0) { if (arg != NULL) BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error with command: \"%s %s\"\n", flag, arg); else BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error with command: \"%s\"\n", flag); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); return 0; } } if (!SSL_CONF_CTX_finish(cctx)) { BIO_puts(bio_err, "Error finishing context\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); return 0; } return 1; } static int add_crls_store(X509_STORE *st, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls) { X509_CRL *crl; int i; for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++) { crl = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i); X509_STORE_add_crl(st, crl); } return 1; } int ssl_ctx_add_crls(SSL_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls, int crl_download) { X509_STORE *st; st = SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(ctx); add_crls_store(st, crls); if (crl_download) store_setup_crl_download(st); return 1; } int ssl_load_stores(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *vfyCApath, const char *vfyCAfile, const char *chCApath, const char *chCAfile, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls, int crl_download) { X509_STORE *vfy = NULL, *ch = NULL; int rv = 0; if (vfyCApath != NULL || vfyCAfile != NULL) { vfy = X509_STORE_new(); if (vfy == NULL) goto err; if (!X509_STORE_load_locations(vfy, vfyCAfile, vfyCApath)) goto err; add_crls_store(vfy, crls); SSL_CTX_set1_verify_cert_store(ctx, vfy); if (crl_download) store_setup_crl_download(vfy); } if (chCApath != NULL || chCAfile != NULL) { ch = X509_STORE_new(); if (ch == NULL) goto err; if (!X509_STORE_load_locations(ch, chCAfile, chCApath)) goto err; SSL_CTX_set1_chain_cert_store(ctx, ch); } rv = 1; err: X509_STORE_free(vfy); X509_STORE_free(ch); return rv; } /* Verbose print out of security callback */ typedef struct { BIO *out; int verbose; int (*old_cb) (const SSL *s, const SSL_CTX *ctx, int op, int bits, int nid, void *other, void *ex); } security_debug_ex; static STRINT_PAIR callback_types[] = { {"Supported Ciphersuite", SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SUPPORTED}, {"Shared Ciphersuite", SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SHARED}, {"Check Ciphersuite", SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_CHECK}, #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH {"Temp DH key bits", SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH}, #endif {"Supported Curve", SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED}, {"Shared Curve", SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SHARED}, {"Check Curve", SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK}, {"Supported Signature Algorithm", SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED}, {"Shared Signature Algorithm", SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SHARED}, {"Check Signature Algorithm", SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK}, {"Signature Algorithm mask", SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK}, {"Certificate chain EE key", SSL_SECOP_EE_KEY}, {"Certificate chain CA key", SSL_SECOP_CA_KEY}, {"Peer Chain EE key", SSL_SECOP_PEER_EE_KEY}, {"Peer Chain CA key", SSL_SECOP_PEER_CA_KEY}, {"Certificate chain CA digest", SSL_SECOP_CA_MD}, {"Peer chain CA digest", SSL_SECOP_PEER_CA_MD}, {"SSL compression", SSL_SECOP_COMPRESSION}, {"Session ticket", SSL_SECOP_TICKET}, {NULL} }; static int security_callback_debug(const SSL *s, const SSL_CTX *ctx, int op, int bits, int nid, void *other, void *ex) { security_debug_ex *sdb = ex; int rv, show_bits = 1, cert_md = 0; const char *nm; int show_nm; rv = sdb->old_cb(s, ctx, op, bits, nid, other, ex); if (rv == 1 && sdb->verbose < 2) return 1; BIO_puts(sdb->out, "Security callback: "); nm = lookup(op, callback_types, NULL); show_nm = nm != NULL; switch (op) { case SSL_SECOP_TICKET: case SSL_SECOP_COMPRESSION: show_bits = 0; show_nm = 0; break; case SSL_SECOP_VERSION: BIO_printf(sdb->out, "Version=%s", lookup(nid, ssl_versions, "???")); show_bits = 0; show_nm = 0; break; case SSL_SECOP_CA_MD: case SSL_SECOP_PEER_CA_MD: cert_md = 1; break; case SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SUPPORTED: case SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_SHARED: case SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_CHECK: case SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK: show_nm = 0; break; } if (show_nm) BIO_printf(sdb->out, "%s=", nm); switch (op & SSL_SECOP_OTHER_TYPE) { case SSL_SECOP_OTHER_CIPHER: BIO_puts(sdb->out, SSL_CIPHER_get_name(other)); break; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC case SSL_SECOP_OTHER_CURVE: { const char *cname; cname = EC_curve_nid2nist(nid); if (cname == NULL) cname = OBJ_nid2sn(nid); BIO_puts(sdb->out, cname); } break; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH case SSL_SECOP_OTHER_DH: { DH *dh = other; BIO_printf(sdb->out, "%d", DH_bits(dh)); break; } #endif case SSL_SECOP_OTHER_CERT: { if (cert_md) { int sig_nid = X509_get_signature_nid(other); BIO_puts(sdb->out, OBJ_nid2sn(sig_nid)); } else { EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(other); const char *algname = ""; EVP_PKEY_asn1_get0_info(NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, &algname, EVP_PKEY_get0_asn1(pkey)); BIO_printf(sdb->out, "%s, bits=%d", algname, EVP_PKEY_bits(pkey)); } break; } case SSL_SECOP_OTHER_SIGALG: { const unsigned char *salg = other; const char *sname = NULL; int raw_sig_code = (salg[0] << 8) + salg[1]; /* always big endian (msb, lsb) */ /* raw_sig_code: signature_scheme from tls1.3, or signature_and_hash from tls1.2 */ if (nm != NULL) BIO_printf(sdb->out, "%s", nm); else BIO_printf(sdb->out, "s_cb.c:security_callback_debug op=0x%x", op); sname = lookup(raw_sig_code, signature_tls13_scheme_list, NULL); if (sname != NULL) { BIO_printf(sdb->out, " scheme=%s", sname); } else { int alg_code = salg[1]; int hash_code = salg[0]; const char *alg_str = lookup(alg_code, signature_tls12_alg_list, NULL); const char *hash_str = lookup(hash_code, signature_tls12_hash_list, NULL); if (alg_str != NULL && hash_str != NULL) BIO_printf(sdb->out, " digest=%s, algorithm=%s", hash_str, alg_str); else BIO_printf(sdb->out, " scheme=unknown(0x%04x)", raw_sig_code); } } } if (show_bits) BIO_printf(sdb->out, ", security bits=%d", bits); BIO_printf(sdb->out, ": %s\n", rv ? "yes" : "no"); return rv; } void ssl_ctx_security_debug(SSL_CTX *ctx, int verbose) { static security_debug_ex sdb; sdb.out = bio_err; sdb.verbose = verbose; sdb.old_cb = SSL_CTX_get_security_callback(ctx); SSL_CTX_set_security_callback(ctx, security_callback_debug); SSL_CTX_set0_security_ex_data(ctx, &sdb); } static void keylog_callback(const SSL *ssl, const char *line) { if (bio_keylog == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Keylog callback is invoked without valid file!\n"); return; } /* * There might be concurrent writers to the keylog file, so we must ensure * that the given line is written at once. */ BIO_printf(bio_keylog, "%s\n", line); (void)BIO_flush(bio_keylog); } int set_keylog_file(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *keylog_file) { /* Close any open files */ BIO_free_all(bio_keylog); bio_keylog = NULL; if (ctx == NULL || keylog_file == NULL) { /* Keylogging is disabled, OK. */ return 0; } /* * Append rather than write in order to allow concurrent modification. * Furthermore, this preserves existing keylog files which is useful when * the tool is run multiple times. */ bio_keylog = BIO_new_file(keylog_file, "a"); if (bio_keylog == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error writing keylog file %s\n", keylog_file); return 1; } /* Write a header for seekable, empty files (this excludes pipes). */ if (BIO_tell(bio_keylog) == 0) { BIO_puts(bio_keylog, "# SSL/TLS secrets log file, generated by OpenSSL\n"); (void)BIO_flush(bio_keylog); } SSL_CTX_set_keylog_callback(ctx, keylog_callback); return 0; } void print_ca_names(BIO *bio, SSL *s) { const char *cs = SSL_is_server(s) ? "server" : "client"; const STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk = SSL_get0_peer_CA_list(s); int i; if (sk == NULL || sk_X509_NAME_num(sk) == 0) { if (!SSL_is_server(s)) BIO_printf(bio, "---\nNo %s certificate CA names sent\n", cs); return; } BIO_printf(bio, "---\nAcceptable %s certificate CA names\n",cs); for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++) { X509_NAME_print_ex(bio, sk_X509_NAME_value(sk, i), 0, get_nameopt()); BIO_write(bio, "\n", 1); } } diff --git a/apps/s_client.c b/apps/s_client.c index 83b3fc9c7f13..121cd1444fe6 100644 --- a/apps/s_client.c +++ b/apps/s_client.c @@ -1,3564 +1,3566 @@ /* - * Copyright 1995-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 1995-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include "e_os.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SOCK /* * With IPv6, it looks like Digital has mixed up the proper order of * recursive header file inclusion, resulting in the compiler complaining * that u_int isn't defined, but only if _POSIX_C_SOURCE is defined, which is * needed to have fileno() declared correctly... So let's define u_int */ #if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS_DECC) && !defined(__U_INT) # define __U_INT typedef unsigned int u_int; #endif #include "apps.h" #include "progs.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP # include #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT # include #endif #include "s_apps.h" #include "timeouts.h" #include "internal/sockets.h" #if defined(__has_feature) # if __has_feature(memory_sanitizer) # include # endif #endif #undef BUFSIZZ #define BUFSIZZ 1024*8 #define S_CLIENT_IRC_READ_TIMEOUT 8 static char *prog; static int c_debug = 0; static int c_showcerts = 0; static char *keymatexportlabel = NULL; static int keymatexportlen = 20; static BIO *bio_c_out = NULL; static int c_quiet = 0; static char *sess_out = NULL; static SSL_SESSION *psksess = NULL; static void print_stuff(BIO *berr, SSL *con, int full); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP static int ocsp_resp_cb(SSL *s, void *arg); #endif static int ldap_ExtendedResponse_parse(const char *buf, long rem); static int is_dNS_name(const char *host); static int saved_errno; static void save_errno(void) { saved_errno = errno; errno = 0; } static int restore_errno(void) { int ret = errno; errno = saved_errno; return ret; } static void do_ssl_shutdown(SSL *ssl) { int ret; do { /* We only do unidirectional shutdown */ ret = SSL_shutdown(ssl); if (ret < 0) { switch (SSL_get_error(ssl, ret)) { case SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ: case SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE: case SSL_ERROR_WANT_ASYNC: case SSL_ERROR_WANT_ASYNC_JOB: /* We just do busy waiting. Nothing clever */ continue; } ret = 0; } } while (ret < 0); } /* Default PSK identity and key */ static char *psk_identity = "Client_identity"; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK static unsigned int psk_client_cb(SSL *ssl, const char *hint, char *identity, unsigned int max_identity_len, unsigned char *psk, unsigned int max_psk_len) { int ret; long key_len; unsigned char *key; if (c_debug) BIO_printf(bio_c_out, "psk_client_cb\n"); if (!hint) { /* no ServerKeyExchange message */ if (c_debug) BIO_printf(bio_c_out, "NULL received PSK identity hint, continuing anyway\n"); } else if (c_debug) { BIO_printf(bio_c_out, "Received PSK identity hint '%s'\n", hint); } /* * lookup PSK identity and PSK key based on the given identity hint here */ ret = BIO_snprintf(identity, max_identity_len, "%s", psk_identity); if (ret < 0 || (unsigned int)ret > max_identity_len) goto out_err; if (c_debug) BIO_printf(bio_c_out, "created identity '%s' len=%d\n", identity, ret); /* convert the PSK key to binary */ key = OPENSSL_hexstr2buf(psk_key, &key_len); if (key == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Could not convert PSK key '%s' to buffer\n", psk_key); return 0; } if (max_psk_len > INT_MAX || key_len > (long)max_psk_len) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "psk buffer of callback is too small (%d) for key (%ld)\n", max_psk_len, key_len); OPENSSL_free(key); return 0; } memcpy(psk, key, key_len); OPENSSL_free(key); if (c_debug) BIO_printf(bio_c_out, "created PSK len=%ld\n", key_len); return key_len; out_err: if (c_debug) BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error in PSK client callback\n"); return 0; } #endif const unsigned char tls13_aes128gcmsha256_id[] = { 0x13, 0x01 }; const unsigned char tls13_aes256gcmsha384_id[] = { 0x13, 0x02 }; static int psk_use_session_cb(SSL *s, const EVP_MD *md, const unsigned char **id, size_t *idlen, SSL_SESSION **sess) { SSL_SESSION *usesess = NULL; const SSL_CIPHER *cipher = NULL; if (psksess != NULL) { SSL_SESSION_up_ref(psksess); usesess = psksess; } else { long key_len; unsigned char *key = OPENSSL_hexstr2buf(psk_key, &key_len); if (key == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Could not convert PSK key '%s' to buffer\n", psk_key); return 0; } /* We default to SHA-256 */ cipher = SSL_CIPHER_find(s, tls13_aes128gcmsha256_id); if (cipher == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error finding suitable ciphersuite\n"); OPENSSL_free(key); return 0; } usesess = SSL_SESSION_new(); if (usesess == NULL || !SSL_SESSION_set1_master_key(usesess, key, key_len) || !SSL_SESSION_set_cipher(usesess, cipher) || !SSL_SESSION_set_protocol_version(usesess, TLS1_3_VERSION)) { OPENSSL_free(key); goto err; } OPENSSL_free(key); } cipher = SSL_SESSION_get0_cipher(usesess); if (cipher == NULL) goto err; if (md != NULL && SSL_CIPHER_get_handshake_digest(cipher) != md) { /* PSK not usable, ignore it */ *id = NULL; *idlen = 0; *sess = NULL; SSL_SESSION_free(usesess); } else { *sess = usesess; *id = (unsigned char *)psk_identity; *idlen = strlen(psk_identity); } return 1; err: SSL_SESSION_free(usesess); return 0; } /* This is a context that we pass to callbacks */ typedef struct tlsextctx_st { BIO *biodebug; int ack; } tlsextctx; static int ssl_servername_cb(SSL *s, int *ad, void *arg) { tlsextctx *p = (tlsextctx *) arg; const char *hn = SSL_get_servername(s, TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name); if (SSL_get_servername_type(s) != -1) p->ack = !SSL_session_reused(s) && hn != NULL; else BIO_printf(bio_err, "Can't use SSL_get_servername\n"); return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP /* This is a context that we pass to all callbacks */ typedef struct srp_arg_st { char *srppassin; char *srplogin; int msg; /* copy from c_msg */ int debug; /* copy from c_debug */ int amp; /* allow more groups */ int strength; /* minimal size for N */ } SRP_ARG; # define SRP_NUMBER_ITERATIONS_FOR_PRIME 64 static int srp_Verify_N_and_g(const BIGNUM *N, const BIGNUM *g) { BN_CTX *bn_ctx = BN_CTX_new(); BIGNUM *p = BN_new(); BIGNUM *r = BN_new(); int ret = g != NULL && N != NULL && bn_ctx != NULL && BN_is_odd(N) && BN_is_prime_ex(N, SRP_NUMBER_ITERATIONS_FOR_PRIME, bn_ctx, NULL) == 1 && p != NULL && BN_rshift1(p, N) && /* p = (N-1)/2 */ BN_is_prime_ex(p, SRP_NUMBER_ITERATIONS_FOR_PRIME, bn_ctx, NULL) == 1 && r != NULL && /* verify g^((N-1)/2) == -1 (mod N) */ BN_mod_exp(r, g, p, N, bn_ctx) && BN_add_word(r, 1) && BN_cmp(r, N) == 0; BN_free(r); BN_free(p); BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx); return ret; } /*- * This callback is used here for two purposes: * - extended debugging * - making some primality tests for unknown groups * The callback is only called for a non default group. * * An application does not need the call back at all if * only the standard groups are used. In real life situations, * client and server already share well known groups, * thus there is no need to verify them. * Furthermore, in case that a server actually proposes a group that * is not one of those defined in RFC 5054, it is more appropriate * to add the group to a static list and then compare since * primality tests are rather cpu consuming. */ static int ssl_srp_verify_param_cb(SSL *s, void *arg) { SRP_ARG *srp_arg = (SRP_ARG *)arg; BIGNUM *N = NULL, *g = NULL; if (((N = SSL_get_srp_N(s)) == NULL) || ((g = SSL_get_srp_g(s)) == NULL)) return 0; if (srp_arg->debug || srp_arg->msg || srp_arg->amp == 1) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "SRP parameters:\n"); BIO_printf(bio_err, "\tN="); BN_print(bio_err, N); BIO_printf(bio_err, "\n\tg="); BN_print(bio_err, g); BIO_printf(bio_err, "\n"); } if (SRP_check_known_gN_param(g, N)) return 1; if (srp_arg->amp == 1) { if (srp_arg->debug) BIO_printf(bio_err, "SRP param N and g are not known params, going to check deeper.\n"); /* * The srp_moregroups is a real debugging feature. Implementors * should rather add the value to the known ones. The minimal size * has already been tested. */ if (BN_num_bits(g) <= BN_BITS && srp_Verify_N_and_g(N, g)) return 1; } BIO_printf(bio_err, "SRP param N and g rejected.\n"); return 0; } # define PWD_STRLEN 1024 static char *ssl_give_srp_client_pwd_cb(SSL *s, void *arg) { SRP_ARG *srp_arg = (SRP_ARG *)arg; char *pass = app_malloc(PWD_STRLEN + 1, "SRP password buffer"); PW_CB_DATA cb_tmp; int l; cb_tmp.password = (char *)srp_arg->srppassin; cb_tmp.prompt_info = "SRP user"; if ((l = password_callback(pass, PWD_STRLEN, 0, &cb_tmp)) < 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Can't read Password\n"); OPENSSL_free(pass); return NULL; } *(pass + l) = '\0'; return pass; } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG /* This the context that we pass to next_proto_cb */ typedef struct tlsextnextprotoctx_st { unsigned char *data; size_t len; int status; } tlsextnextprotoctx; static tlsextnextprotoctx next_proto; static int next_proto_cb(SSL *s, unsigned char **out, unsigned char *outlen, const unsigned char *in, unsigned int inlen, void *arg) { tlsextnextprotoctx *ctx = arg; if (!c_quiet) { /* We can assume that |in| is syntactically valid. */ unsigned i; BIO_printf(bio_c_out, "Protocols advertised by server: "); for (i = 0; i < inlen;) { if (i) BIO_write(bio_c_out, ", ", 2); BIO_write(bio_c_out, &in[i + 1], in[i]); i += in[i] + 1; } BIO_write(bio_c_out, "\n", 1); } ctx->status = SSL_select_next_proto(out, outlen, in, inlen, ctx->data, ctx->len); return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK; } #endif /* ndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG */ static int serverinfo_cli_parse_cb(SSL *s, unsigned int ext_type, const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen, int *al, void *arg) { char pem_name[100]; unsigned char ext_buf[4 + 65536]; /* Reconstruct the type/len fields prior to extension data */ inlen &= 0xffff; /* for formal memcmpy correctness */ ext_buf[0] = (unsigned char)(ext_type >> 8); ext_buf[1] = (unsigned char)(ext_type); ext_buf[2] = (unsigned char)(inlen >> 8); ext_buf[3] = (unsigned char)(inlen); memcpy(ext_buf + 4, in, inlen); BIO_snprintf(pem_name, sizeof(pem_name), "SERVERINFO FOR EXTENSION %d", ext_type); PEM_write_bio(bio_c_out, pem_name, "", ext_buf, 4 + inlen); return 1; } /* * Hex decoder that tolerates optional whitespace. Returns number of bytes * produced, advances inptr to end of input string. */ static ossl_ssize_t hexdecode(const char **inptr, void *result) { unsigned char **out = (unsigned char **)result; const char *in = *inptr; unsigned char *ret = app_malloc(strlen(in) / 2, "hexdecode"); unsigned char *cp = ret; uint8_t byte; int nibble = 0; if (ret == NULL) return -1; for (byte = 0; *in; ++in) { int x; if (isspace(_UC(*in))) continue; x = OPENSSL_hexchar2int(*in); if (x < 0) { OPENSSL_free(ret); return 0; } byte |= (char)x; if ((nibble ^= 1) == 0) { *cp++ = byte; byte = 0; } else { byte <<= 4; } } if (nibble != 0) { OPENSSL_free(ret); return 0; } *inptr = in; return cp - (*out = ret); } /* * Decode unsigned 0..255, returns 1 on success, <= 0 on failure. Advances * inptr to next field skipping leading whitespace. */ static ossl_ssize_t checked_uint8(const char **inptr, void *out) { uint8_t *result = (uint8_t *)out; const char *in = *inptr; char *endp; long v; int e; save_errno(); v = strtol(in, &endp, 10); e = restore_errno(); if (((v == LONG_MIN || v == LONG_MAX) && e == ERANGE) || endp == in || !isspace(_UC(*endp)) || v != (*result = (uint8_t) v)) { return -1; } for (in = endp; isspace(_UC(*in)); ++in) continue; *inptr = in; return 1; } struct tlsa_field { void *var; const char *name; ossl_ssize_t (*parser)(const char **, void *); }; static int tlsa_import_rr(SSL *con, const char *rrdata) { /* Not necessary to re-init these values; the "parsers" do that. */ static uint8_t usage; static uint8_t selector; static uint8_t mtype; static unsigned char *data; static struct tlsa_field tlsa_fields[] = { { &usage, "usage", checked_uint8 }, { &selector, "selector", checked_uint8 }, { &mtype, "mtype", checked_uint8 }, { &data, "data", hexdecode }, { NULL, } }; struct tlsa_field *f; int ret; const char *cp = rrdata; ossl_ssize_t len = 0; for (f = tlsa_fields; f->var; ++f) { /* Returns number of bytes produced, advances cp to next field */ if ((len = f->parser(&cp, f->var)) <= 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: warning: bad TLSA %s field in: %s\n", prog, f->name, rrdata); return 0; } } /* The data field is last, so len is its length */ ret = SSL_dane_tlsa_add(con, usage, selector, mtype, data, len); OPENSSL_free(data); if (ret == 0) { ERR_print_errors(bio_err); BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: warning: unusable TLSA rrdata: %s\n", prog, rrdata); return 0; } if (ret < 0) { ERR_print_errors(bio_err); BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: warning: error loading TLSA rrdata: %s\n", prog, rrdata); return 0; } return ret; } static int tlsa_import_rrset(SSL *con, STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *rrset) { int num = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_num(rrset); int count = 0; int i; for (i = 0; i < num; ++i) { char *rrdata = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_value(rrset, i); if (tlsa_import_rr(con, rrdata) > 0) ++count; } return count > 0; } typedef enum OPTION_choice { OPT_ERR = -1, OPT_EOF = 0, OPT_HELP, OPT_4, OPT_6, OPT_HOST, OPT_PORT, OPT_CONNECT, OPT_BIND, OPT_UNIX, OPT_XMPPHOST, OPT_VERIFY, OPT_NAMEOPT, OPT_CERT, OPT_CRL, OPT_CRL_DOWNLOAD, OPT_SESS_OUT, OPT_SESS_IN, OPT_CERTFORM, OPT_CRLFORM, OPT_VERIFY_RET_ERROR, OPT_VERIFY_QUIET, OPT_BRIEF, OPT_PREXIT, OPT_CRLF, OPT_QUIET, OPT_NBIO, OPT_SSL_CLIENT_ENGINE, OPT_IGN_EOF, OPT_NO_IGN_EOF, OPT_DEBUG, OPT_TLSEXTDEBUG, OPT_STATUS, OPT_WDEBUG, OPT_MSG, OPT_MSGFILE, OPT_ENGINE, OPT_TRACE, OPT_SECURITY_DEBUG, OPT_SECURITY_DEBUG_VERBOSE, OPT_SHOWCERTS, OPT_NBIO_TEST, OPT_STATE, OPT_PSK_IDENTITY, OPT_PSK, OPT_PSK_SESS, #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP OPT_SRPUSER, OPT_SRPPASS, OPT_SRP_STRENGTH, OPT_SRP_LATEUSER, OPT_SRP_MOREGROUPS, #endif OPT_SSL3, OPT_SSL_CONFIG, OPT_TLS1_3, OPT_TLS1_2, OPT_TLS1_1, OPT_TLS1, OPT_DTLS, OPT_DTLS1, OPT_DTLS1_2, OPT_SCTP, OPT_TIMEOUT, OPT_MTU, OPT_KEYFORM, OPT_PASS, OPT_CERT_CHAIN, OPT_CAPATH, OPT_NOCAPATH, OPT_CHAINCAPATH, OPT_VERIFYCAPATH, OPT_KEY, OPT_RECONNECT, OPT_BUILD_CHAIN, OPT_CAFILE, OPT_NOCAFILE, OPT_CHAINCAFILE, OPT_VERIFYCAFILE, OPT_NEXTPROTONEG, OPT_ALPN, OPT_SERVERINFO, OPT_STARTTLS, OPT_SERVERNAME, OPT_NOSERVERNAME, OPT_ASYNC, OPT_USE_SRTP, OPT_KEYMATEXPORT, OPT_KEYMATEXPORTLEN, OPT_PROTOHOST, OPT_MAXFRAGLEN, OPT_MAX_SEND_FRAG, OPT_SPLIT_SEND_FRAG, OPT_MAX_PIPELINES, OPT_READ_BUF, OPT_KEYLOG_FILE, OPT_EARLY_DATA, OPT_REQCAFILE, OPT_V_ENUM, OPT_X_ENUM, OPT_S_ENUM, OPT_FALLBACKSCSV, OPT_NOCMDS, OPT_PROXY, OPT_DANE_TLSA_DOMAIN, #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT OPT_CT, OPT_NOCT, OPT_CTLOG_FILE, #endif OPT_DANE_TLSA_RRDATA, OPT_DANE_EE_NO_NAME, OPT_ENABLE_PHA, OPT_SCTP_LABEL_BUG, OPT_R_ENUM } OPTION_CHOICE; const OPTIONS s_client_options[] = { {"help", OPT_HELP, '-', "Display this summary"}, {"host", OPT_HOST, 's', "Use -connect instead"}, {"port", OPT_PORT, 'p', "Use -connect instead"}, {"connect", OPT_CONNECT, 's', "TCP/IP where to connect (default is :" PORT ")"}, {"bind", OPT_BIND, 's', "bind local address for connection"}, {"proxy", OPT_PROXY, 's', "Connect to via specified proxy to the real server"}, #ifdef AF_UNIX {"unix", OPT_UNIX, 's', "Connect over the specified Unix-domain socket"}, #endif {"4", OPT_4, '-', "Use IPv4 only"}, #ifdef AF_INET6 {"6", OPT_6, '-', "Use IPv6 only"}, #endif {"verify", OPT_VERIFY, 'p', "Turn on peer certificate verification"}, {"cert", OPT_CERT, '<', "Certificate file to use, PEM format assumed"}, {"certform", OPT_CERTFORM, 'F', "Certificate format (PEM or DER) PEM default"}, {"nameopt", OPT_NAMEOPT, 's', "Various certificate name options"}, {"key", OPT_KEY, 's', "Private key file to use, if not in -cert file"}, {"keyform", OPT_KEYFORM, 'E', "Key format (PEM, DER or engine) PEM default"}, {"pass", OPT_PASS, 's', "Private key file pass phrase source"}, {"CApath", OPT_CAPATH, '/', "PEM format directory of CA's"}, {"CAfile", OPT_CAFILE, '<', "PEM format file of CA's"}, {"no-CAfile", OPT_NOCAFILE, '-', "Do not load the default certificates file"}, {"no-CApath", OPT_NOCAPATH, '-', "Do not load certificates from the default certificates directory"}, {"requestCAfile", OPT_REQCAFILE, '<', "PEM format file of CA names to send to the server"}, {"dane_tlsa_domain", OPT_DANE_TLSA_DOMAIN, 's', "DANE TLSA base domain"}, {"dane_tlsa_rrdata", OPT_DANE_TLSA_RRDATA, 's', "DANE TLSA rrdata presentation form"}, {"dane_ee_no_namechecks", OPT_DANE_EE_NO_NAME, '-', "Disable name checks when matching DANE-EE(3) TLSA records"}, {"reconnect", OPT_RECONNECT, '-', "Drop and re-make the connection with the same Session-ID"}, {"showcerts", OPT_SHOWCERTS, '-', "Show all certificates sent by the server"}, {"debug", OPT_DEBUG, '-', "Extra output"}, {"msg", OPT_MSG, '-', "Show protocol messages"}, {"msgfile", OPT_MSGFILE, '>', "File to send output of -msg or -trace, instead of stdout"}, {"nbio_test", OPT_NBIO_TEST, '-', "More ssl protocol testing"}, {"state", OPT_STATE, '-', "Print the ssl states"}, {"crlf", OPT_CRLF, '-', "Convert LF from terminal into CRLF"}, {"quiet", OPT_QUIET, '-', "No s_client output"}, {"ign_eof", OPT_IGN_EOF, '-', "Ignore input eof (default when -quiet)"}, {"no_ign_eof", OPT_NO_IGN_EOF, '-', "Don't ignore input eof"}, {"starttls", OPT_STARTTLS, 's', "Use the appropriate STARTTLS command before starting TLS"}, {"xmpphost", OPT_XMPPHOST, 's', "Alias of -name option for \"-starttls xmpp[-server]\""}, OPT_R_OPTIONS, {"sess_out", OPT_SESS_OUT, '>', "File to write SSL session to"}, {"sess_in", OPT_SESS_IN, '<', "File to read SSL session from"}, #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP {"use_srtp", OPT_USE_SRTP, 's', "Offer SRTP key management with a colon-separated profile list"}, #endif {"keymatexport", OPT_KEYMATEXPORT, 's', "Export keying material using label"}, {"keymatexportlen", OPT_KEYMATEXPORTLEN, 'p', "Export len bytes of keying material (default 20)"}, {"maxfraglen", OPT_MAXFRAGLEN, 'p', "Enable Maximum Fragment Length Negotiation (len values: 512, 1024, 2048 and 4096)"}, {"fallback_scsv", OPT_FALLBACKSCSV, '-', "Send the fallback SCSV"}, {"name", OPT_PROTOHOST, 's', "Hostname to use for \"-starttls lmtp\", \"-starttls smtp\" or \"-starttls xmpp[-server]\""}, {"CRL", OPT_CRL, '<', "CRL file to use"}, {"crl_download", OPT_CRL_DOWNLOAD, '-', "Download CRL from distribution points"}, {"CRLform", OPT_CRLFORM, 'F', "CRL format (PEM or DER) PEM is default"}, {"verify_return_error", OPT_VERIFY_RET_ERROR, '-', "Close connection on verification error"}, {"verify_quiet", OPT_VERIFY_QUIET, '-', "Restrict verify output to errors"}, {"brief", OPT_BRIEF, '-', "Restrict output to brief summary of connection parameters"}, {"prexit", OPT_PREXIT, '-', "Print session information when the program exits"}, {"security_debug", OPT_SECURITY_DEBUG, '-', "Enable security debug messages"}, {"security_debug_verbose", OPT_SECURITY_DEBUG_VERBOSE, '-', "Output more security debug output"}, {"cert_chain", OPT_CERT_CHAIN, '<', "Certificate chain file (in PEM format)"}, {"chainCApath", OPT_CHAINCAPATH, '/', "Use dir as certificate store path to build CA certificate chain"}, {"verifyCApath", OPT_VERIFYCAPATH, '/', "Use dir as certificate store path to verify CA certificate"}, {"build_chain", OPT_BUILD_CHAIN, '-', "Build certificate chain"}, {"chainCAfile", OPT_CHAINCAFILE, '<', "CA file for certificate chain (PEM format)"}, {"verifyCAfile", OPT_VERIFYCAFILE, '<', "CA file for certificate verification (PEM format)"}, {"nocommands", OPT_NOCMDS, '-', "Do not use interactive command letters"}, {"servername", OPT_SERVERNAME, 's', "Set TLS extension servername (SNI) in ClientHello (default)"}, {"noservername", OPT_NOSERVERNAME, '-', "Do not send the server name (SNI) extension in the ClientHello"}, {"tlsextdebug", OPT_TLSEXTDEBUG, '-', "Hex dump of all TLS extensions received"}, #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP {"status", OPT_STATUS, '-', "Request certificate status from server"}, #endif {"serverinfo", OPT_SERVERINFO, 's', "types Send empty ClientHello extensions (comma-separated numbers)"}, {"alpn", OPT_ALPN, 's', "Enable ALPN extension, considering named protocols supported (comma-separated list)"}, {"async", OPT_ASYNC, '-', "Support asynchronous operation"}, {"ssl_config", OPT_SSL_CONFIG, 's', "Use specified configuration file"}, {"max_send_frag", OPT_MAX_SEND_FRAG, 'p', "Maximum Size of send frames "}, {"split_send_frag", OPT_SPLIT_SEND_FRAG, 'p', "Size used to split data for encrypt pipelines"}, {"max_pipelines", OPT_MAX_PIPELINES, 'p', "Maximum number of encrypt/decrypt pipelines to be used"}, {"read_buf", OPT_READ_BUF, 'p', "Default read buffer size to be used for connections"}, OPT_S_OPTIONS, OPT_V_OPTIONS, OPT_X_OPTIONS, #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3 {"ssl3", OPT_SSL3, '-', "Just use SSLv3"}, #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1 {"tls1", OPT_TLS1, '-', "Just use TLSv1"}, #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_1 {"tls1_1", OPT_TLS1_1, '-', "Just use TLSv1.1"}, #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2 {"tls1_2", OPT_TLS1_2, '-', "Just use TLSv1.2"}, #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3 {"tls1_3", OPT_TLS1_3, '-', "Just use TLSv1.3"}, #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS {"dtls", OPT_DTLS, '-', "Use any version of DTLS"}, {"timeout", OPT_TIMEOUT, '-', "Enable send/receive timeout on DTLS connections"}, {"mtu", OPT_MTU, 'p', "Set the link layer MTU"}, #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1 {"dtls1", OPT_DTLS1, '-', "Just use DTLSv1"}, #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1_2 {"dtls1_2", OPT_DTLS1_2, '-', "Just use DTLSv1.2"}, #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP {"sctp", OPT_SCTP, '-', "Use SCTP"}, {"sctp_label_bug", OPT_SCTP_LABEL_BUG, '-', "Enable SCTP label length bug"}, #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL_TRACE {"trace", OPT_TRACE, '-', "Show trace output of protocol messages"}, #endif #ifdef WATT32 {"wdebug", OPT_WDEBUG, '-', "WATT-32 tcp debugging"}, #endif {"nbio", OPT_NBIO, '-', "Use non-blocking IO"}, {"psk_identity", OPT_PSK_IDENTITY, 's', "PSK identity"}, {"psk", OPT_PSK, 's', "PSK in hex (without 0x)"}, {"psk_session", OPT_PSK_SESS, '<', "File to read PSK SSL session from"}, #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP {"srpuser", OPT_SRPUSER, 's', "SRP authentication for 'user'"}, {"srppass", OPT_SRPPASS, 's', "Password for 'user'"}, {"srp_lateuser", OPT_SRP_LATEUSER, '-', "SRP username into second ClientHello message"}, {"srp_moregroups", OPT_SRP_MOREGROUPS, '-', "Tolerate other than the known g N values."}, {"srp_strength", OPT_SRP_STRENGTH, 'p', "Minimal length in bits for N"}, #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG {"nextprotoneg", OPT_NEXTPROTONEG, 's', "Enable NPN extension, considering named protocols supported (comma-separated list)"}, #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE {"engine", OPT_ENGINE, 's', "Use engine, possibly a hardware device"}, {"ssl_client_engine", OPT_SSL_CLIENT_ENGINE, 's', "Specify engine to be used for client certificate operations"}, #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT {"ct", OPT_CT, '-', "Request and parse SCTs (also enables OCSP stapling)"}, {"noct", OPT_NOCT, '-', "Do not request or parse SCTs (default)"}, {"ctlogfile", OPT_CTLOG_FILE, '<', "CT log list CONF file"}, #endif {"keylogfile", OPT_KEYLOG_FILE, '>', "Write TLS secrets to file"}, {"early_data", OPT_EARLY_DATA, '<', "File to send as early data"}, {"enable_pha", OPT_ENABLE_PHA, '-', "Enable post-handshake-authentication"}, {NULL, OPT_EOF, 0x00, NULL} }; typedef enum PROTOCOL_choice { PROTO_OFF, PROTO_SMTP, PROTO_POP3, PROTO_IMAP, PROTO_FTP, PROTO_TELNET, PROTO_XMPP, PROTO_XMPP_SERVER, PROTO_CONNECT, PROTO_IRC, PROTO_MYSQL, PROTO_POSTGRES, PROTO_LMTP, PROTO_NNTP, PROTO_SIEVE, PROTO_LDAP } PROTOCOL_CHOICE; static const OPT_PAIR services[] = { {"smtp", PROTO_SMTP}, {"pop3", PROTO_POP3}, {"imap", PROTO_IMAP}, {"ftp", PROTO_FTP}, {"xmpp", PROTO_XMPP}, {"xmpp-server", PROTO_XMPP_SERVER}, {"telnet", PROTO_TELNET}, {"irc", PROTO_IRC}, {"mysql", PROTO_MYSQL}, {"postgres", PROTO_POSTGRES}, {"lmtp", PROTO_LMTP}, {"nntp", PROTO_NNTP}, {"sieve", PROTO_SIEVE}, {"ldap", PROTO_LDAP}, {NULL, 0} }; #define IS_INET_FLAG(o) \ (o == OPT_4 || o == OPT_6 || o == OPT_HOST || o == OPT_PORT || o == OPT_CONNECT) #define IS_UNIX_FLAG(o) (o == OPT_UNIX) #define IS_PROT_FLAG(o) \ (o == OPT_SSL3 || o == OPT_TLS1 || o == OPT_TLS1_1 || o == OPT_TLS1_2 \ || o == OPT_TLS1_3 || o == OPT_DTLS || o == OPT_DTLS1 || o == OPT_DTLS1_2) /* Free |*dest| and optionally set it to a copy of |source|. */ static void freeandcopy(char **dest, const char *source) { OPENSSL_free(*dest); *dest = NULL; if (source != NULL) *dest = OPENSSL_strdup(source); } static int new_session_cb(SSL *s, SSL_SESSION *sess) { if (sess_out != NULL) { BIO *stmp = BIO_new_file(sess_out, "w"); if (stmp == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error writing session file %s\n", sess_out); } else { PEM_write_bio_SSL_SESSION(stmp, sess); BIO_free(stmp); } } /* * Session data gets dumped on connection for TLSv1.2 and below, and on * arrival of the NewSessionTicket for TLSv1.3. */ if (SSL_version(s) == TLS1_3_VERSION) { BIO_printf(bio_c_out, "---\nPost-Handshake New Session Ticket arrived:\n"); SSL_SESSION_print(bio_c_out, sess); BIO_printf(bio_c_out, "---\n"); } /* * We always return a "fail" response so that the session gets freed again * because we haven't used the reference. */ return 0; } int s_client_main(int argc, char **argv) { BIO *sbio; EVP_PKEY *key = NULL; SSL *con = NULL; SSL_CTX *ctx = NULL; STACK_OF(X509) *chain = NULL; X509 *cert = NULL; X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm = NULL; SSL_EXCERT *exc = NULL; SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx = NULL; STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *ssl_args = NULL; char *dane_tlsa_domain = NULL; STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *dane_tlsa_rrset = NULL; int dane_ee_no_name = 0; STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls = NULL; const SSL_METHOD *meth = TLS_client_method(); const char *CApath = NULL, *CAfile = NULL; char *cbuf = NULL, *sbuf = NULL; char *mbuf = NULL, *proxystr = NULL, *connectstr = NULL, *bindstr = NULL; char *cert_file = NULL, *key_file = NULL, *chain_file = NULL; char *chCApath = NULL, *chCAfile = NULL, *host = NULL; char *port = OPENSSL_strdup(PORT); char *bindhost = NULL, *bindport = NULL; char *passarg = NULL, *pass = NULL, *vfyCApath = NULL, *vfyCAfile = NULL; char *ReqCAfile = NULL; char *sess_in = NULL, *crl_file = NULL, *p; const char *protohost = NULL; struct timeval timeout, *timeoutp; fd_set readfds, writefds; int noCApath = 0, noCAfile = 0; int build_chain = 0, cbuf_len, cbuf_off, cert_format = FORMAT_PEM; int key_format = FORMAT_PEM, crlf = 0, full_log = 1, mbuf_len = 0; int prexit = 0; int sdebug = 0; int reconnect = 0, verify = SSL_VERIFY_NONE, vpmtouched = 0; int ret = 1, in_init = 1, i, nbio_test = 0, s = -1, k, width, state = 0; int sbuf_len, sbuf_off, cmdletters = 1; int socket_family = AF_UNSPEC, socket_type = SOCK_STREAM, protocol = 0; int starttls_proto = PROTO_OFF, crl_format = FORMAT_PEM, crl_download = 0; int write_tty, read_tty, write_ssl, read_ssl, tty_on, ssl_pending; #if !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS) int at_eof = 0; #endif int read_buf_len = 0; int fallback_scsv = 0; OPTION_CHOICE o; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS int enable_timeouts = 0; long socket_mtu = 0; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE ENGINE *ssl_client_engine = NULL; #endif ENGINE *e = NULL; #if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS) struct timeval tv; #endif const char *servername = NULL; int noservername = 0; const char *alpn_in = NULL; tlsextctx tlsextcbp = { NULL, 0 }; const char *ssl_config = NULL; #define MAX_SI_TYPES 100 unsigned short serverinfo_types[MAX_SI_TYPES]; int serverinfo_count = 0, start = 0, len; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG const char *next_proto_neg_in = NULL; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP char *srppass = NULL; int srp_lateuser = 0; SRP_ARG srp_arg = { NULL, NULL, 0, 0, 0, 1024 }; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP char *srtp_profiles = NULL; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT char *ctlog_file = NULL; int ct_validation = 0; #endif int min_version = 0, max_version = 0, prot_opt = 0, no_prot_opt = 0; int async = 0; unsigned int max_send_fragment = 0; unsigned int split_send_fragment = 0, max_pipelines = 0; enum { use_inet, use_unix, use_unknown } connect_type = use_unknown; int count4or6 = 0; uint8_t maxfraglen = 0; int c_nbio = 0, c_msg = 0, c_ign_eof = 0, c_brief = 0; int c_tlsextdebug = 0; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP int c_status_req = 0; #endif BIO *bio_c_msg = NULL; const char *keylog_file = NULL, *early_data_file = NULL; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS int isdtls = 0; #endif char *psksessf = NULL; int enable_pha = 0; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP int sctp_label_bug = 0; #endif FD_ZERO(&readfds); FD_ZERO(&writefds); /* Known false-positive of MemorySanitizer. */ #if defined(__has_feature) # if __has_feature(memory_sanitizer) __msan_unpoison(&readfds, sizeof(readfds)); __msan_unpoison(&writefds, sizeof(writefds)); # endif #endif prog = opt_progname(argv[0]); c_quiet = 0; c_debug = 0; c_showcerts = 0; c_nbio = 0; vpm = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new(); cctx = SSL_CONF_CTX_new(); if (vpm == NULL || cctx == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: out of memory\n", prog); goto end; } cbuf = app_malloc(BUFSIZZ, "cbuf"); sbuf = app_malloc(BUFSIZZ, "sbuf"); mbuf = app_malloc(BUFSIZZ, "mbuf"); SSL_CONF_CTX_set_flags(cctx, SSL_CONF_FLAG_CLIENT | SSL_CONF_FLAG_CMDLINE); prog = opt_init(argc, argv, s_client_options); while ((o = opt_next()) != OPT_EOF) { /* Check for intermixing flags. */ if (connect_type == use_unix && IS_INET_FLAG(o)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Intermixed protocol flags (unix and internet domains)\n", prog); goto end; } if (connect_type == use_inet && IS_UNIX_FLAG(o)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Intermixed protocol flags (internet and unix domains)\n", prog); goto end; } if (IS_PROT_FLAG(o) && ++prot_opt > 1) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Cannot supply multiple protocol flags\n"); goto end; } if (IS_NO_PROT_FLAG(o)) no_prot_opt++; if (prot_opt == 1 && no_prot_opt) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Cannot supply both a protocol flag and '-no_'\n"); goto end; } switch (o) { case OPT_EOF: case OPT_ERR: opthelp: BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Use -help for summary.\n", prog); goto end; case OPT_HELP: opt_help(s_client_options); ret = 0; goto end; case OPT_4: connect_type = use_inet; socket_family = AF_INET; count4or6++; break; #ifdef AF_INET6 case OPT_6: connect_type = use_inet; socket_family = AF_INET6; count4or6++; break; #endif case OPT_HOST: connect_type = use_inet; freeandcopy(&host, opt_arg()); break; case OPT_PORT: connect_type = use_inet; freeandcopy(&port, opt_arg()); break; case OPT_CONNECT: connect_type = use_inet; freeandcopy(&connectstr, opt_arg()); break; case OPT_BIND: freeandcopy(&bindstr, opt_arg()); break; case OPT_PROXY: proxystr = opt_arg(); starttls_proto = PROTO_CONNECT; break; #ifdef AF_UNIX case OPT_UNIX: connect_type = use_unix; socket_family = AF_UNIX; freeandcopy(&host, opt_arg()); break; #endif case OPT_XMPPHOST: /* fall through, since this is an alias */ case OPT_PROTOHOST: protohost = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_VERIFY: verify = SSL_VERIFY_PEER; verify_args.depth = atoi(opt_arg()); if (!c_quiet) BIO_printf(bio_err, "verify depth is %d\n", verify_args.depth); break; case OPT_CERT: cert_file = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_NAMEOPT: if (!set_nameopt(opt_arg())) goto end; break; case OPT_CRL: crl_file = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_CRL_DOWNLOAD: crl_download = 1; break; case OPT_SESS_OUT: sess_out = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_SESS_IN: sess_in = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_CERTFORM: if (!opt_format(opt_arg(), OPT_FMT_PEMDER, &cert_format)) goto opthelp; break; case OPT_CRLFORM: if (!opt_format(opt_arg(), OPT_FMT_PEMDER, &crl_format)) goto opthelp; break; case OPT_VERIFY_RET_ERROR: verify = SSL_VERIFY_PEER; verify_args.return_error = 1; break; case OPT_VERIFY_QUIET: verify_args.quiet = 1; break; case OPT_BRIEF: c_brief = verify_args.quiet = c_quiet = 1; break; case OPT_S_CASES: if (ssl_args == NULL) ssl_args = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_new_null(); if (ssl_args == NULL || !sk_OPENSSL_STRING_push(ssl_args, opt_flag()) || !sk_OPENSSL_STRING_push(ssl_args, opt_arg())) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Memory allocation failure\n", prog); goto end; } break; case OPT_V_CASES: if (!opt_verify(o, vpm)) goto end; vpmtouched++; break; case OPT_X_CASES: if (!args_excert(o, &exc)) goto end; break; case OPT_PREXIT: prexit = 1; break; case OPT_CRLF: crlf = 1; break; case OPT_QUIET: c_quiet = c_ign_eof = 1; break; case OPT_NBIO: c_nbio = 1; break; case OPT_NOCMDS: cmdletters = 0; break; case OPT_ENGINE: e = setup_engine(opt_arg(), 1); break; case OPT_SSL_CLIENT_ENGINE: #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE ssl_client_engine = ENGINE_by_id(opt_arg()); if (ssl_client_engine == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error getting client auth engine\n"); goto opthelp; } #endif break; case OPT_R_CASES: if (!opt_rand(o)) goto end; break; case OPT_IGN_EOF: c_ign_eof = 1; break; case OPT_NO_IGN_EOF: c_ign_eof = 0; break; case OPT_DEBUG: c_debug = 1; break; case OPT_TLSEXTDEBUG: c_tlsextdebug = 1; break; case OPT_STATUS: #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP c_status_req = 1; #endif break; case OPT_WDEBUG: #ifdef WATT32 dbug_init(); #endif break; case OPT_MSG: c_msg = 1; break; case OPT_MSGFILE: bio_c_msg = BIO_new_file(opt_arg(), "w"); break; case OPT_TRACE: #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL_TRACE c_msg = 2; #endif break; case OPT_SECURITY_DEBUG: sdebug = 1; break; case OPT_SECURITY_DEBUG_VERBOSE: sdebug = 2; break; case OPT_SHOWCERTS: c_showcerts = 1; break; case OPT_NBIO_TEST: nbio_test = 1; break; case OPT_STATE: state = 1; break; case OPT_PSK_IDENTITY: psk_identity = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_PSK: for (p = psk_key = opt_arg(); *p; p++) { if (isxdigit(_UC(*p))) continue; BIO_printf(bio_err, "Not a hex number '%s'\n", psk_key); goto end; } break; case OPT_PSK_SESS: psksessf = opt_arg(); break; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP case OPT_SRPUSER: srp_arg.srplogin = opt_arg(); if (min_version < TLS1_VERSION) min_version = TLS1_VERSION; break; case OPT_SRPPASS: srppass = opt_arg(); if (min_version < TLS1_VERSION) min_version = TLS1_VERSION; break; case OPT_SRP_STRENGTH: srp_arg.strength = atoi(opt_arg()); BIO_printf(bio_err, "SRP minimal length for N is %d\n", srp_arg.strength); if (min_version < TLS1_VERSION) min_version = TLS1_VERSION; break; case OPT_SRP_LATEUSER: srp_lateuser = 1; if (min_version < TLS1_VERSION) min_version = TLS1_VERSION; break; case OPT_SRP_MOREGROUPS: srp_arg.amp = 1; if (min_version < TLS1_VERSION) min_version = TLS1_VERSION; break; #endif case OPT_SSL_CONFIG: ssl_config = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_SSL3: min_version = SSL3_VERSION; max_version = SSL3_VERSION; socket_type = SOCK_STREAM; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS isdtls = 0; #endif break; case OPT_TLS1_3: min_version = TLS1_3_VERSION; max_version = TLS1_3_VERSION; socket_type = SOCK_STREAM; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS isdtls = 0; #endif break; case OPT_TLS1_2: min_version = TLS1_2_VERSION; max_version = TLS1_2_VERSION; socket_type = SOCK_STREAM; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS isdtls = 0; #endif break; case OPT_TLS1_1: min_version = TLS1_1_VERSION; max_version = TLS1_1_VERSION; socket_type = SOCK_STREAM; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS isdtls = 0; #endif break; case OPT_TLS1: min_version = TLS1_VERSION; max_version = TLS1_VERSION; socket_type = SOCK_STREAM; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS isdtls = 0; #endif break; case OPT_DTLS: #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS meth = DTLS_client_method(); socket_type = SOCK_DGRAM; isdtls = 1; #endif break; case OPT_DTLS1: #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1 meth = DTLS_client_method(); min_version = DTLS1_VERSION; max_version = DTLS1_VERSION; socket_type = SOCK_DGRAM; isdtls = 1; #endif break; case OPT_DTLS1_2: #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1_2 meth = DTLS_client_method(); min_version = DTLS1_2_VERSION; max_version = DTLS1_2_VERSION; socket_type = SOCK_DGRAM; isdtls = 1; #endif break; case OPT_SCTP: #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP protocol = IPPROTO_SCTP; #endif break; case OPT_SCTP_LABEL_BUG: #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP sctp_label_bug = 1; #endif break; case OPT_TIMEOUT: #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS enable_timeouts = 1; #endif break; case OPT_MTU: #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS socket_mtu = atol(opt_arg()); #endif break; case OPT_FALLBACKSCSV: fallback_scsv = 1; break; case OPT_KEYFORM: if (!opt_format(opt_arg(), OPT_FMT_PDE, &key_format)) goto opthelp; break; case OPT_PASS: passarg = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_CERT_CHAIN: chain_file = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_KEY: key_file = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_RECONNECT: reconnect = 5; break; case OPT_CAPATH: CApath = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_NOCAPATH: noCApath = 1; break; case OPT_CHAINCAPATH: chCApath = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_VERIFYCAPATH: vfyCApath = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_BUILD_CHAIN: build_chain = 1; break; case OPT_REQCAFILE: ReqCAfile = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_CAFILE: CAfile = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_NOCAFILE: noCAfile = 1; break; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT case OPT_NOCT: ct_validation = 0; break; case OPT_CT: ct_validation = 1; break; case OPT_CTLOG_FILE: ctlog_file = opt_arg(); break; #endif case OPT_CHAINCAFILE: chCAfile = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_VERIFYCAFILE: vfyCAfile = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_DANE_TLSA_DOMAIN: dane_tlsa_domain = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_DANE_TLSA_RRDATA: if (dane_tlsa_rrset == NULL) dane_tlsa_rrset = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_new_null(); if (dane_tlsa_rrset == NULL || !sk_OPENSSL_STRING_push(dane_tlsa_rrset, opt_arg())) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Memory allocation failure\n", prog); goto end; } break; case OPT_DANE_EE_NO_NAME: dane_ee_no_name = 1; break; case OPT_NEXTPROTONEG: #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG next_proto_neg_in = opt_arg(); #endif break; case OPT_ALPN: alpn_in = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_SERVERINFO: p = opt_arg(); len = strlen(p); for (start = 0, i = 0; i <= len; ++i) { if (i == len || p[i] == ',') { serverinfo_types[serverinfo_count] = atoi(p + start); if (++serverinfo_count == MAX_SI_TYPES) break; start = i + 1; } } break; case OPT_STARTTLS: if (!opt_pair(opt_arg(), services, &starttls_proto)) goto end; break; case OPT_SERVERNAME: servername = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_NOSERVERNAME: noservername = 1; break; case OPT_USE_SRTP: #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP srtp_profiles = opt_arg(); #endif break; case OPT_KEYMATEXPORT: keymatexportlabel = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_KEYMATEXPORTLEN: keymatexportlen = atoi(opt_arg()); break; case OPT_ASYNC: async = 1; break; case OPT_MAXFRAGLEN: len = atoi(opt_arg()); switch (len) { case 512: maxfraglen = TLSEXT_max_fragment_length_512; break; case 1024: maxfraglen = TLSEXT_max_fragment_length_1024; break; case 2048: maxfraglen = TLSEXT_max_fragment_length_2048; break; case 4096: maxfraglen = TLSEXT_max_fragment_length_4096; break; default: BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Max Fragment Len %u is out of permitted values", prog, len); goto opthelp; } break; case OPT_MAX_SEND_FRAG: max_send_fragment = atoi(opt_arg()); break; case OPT_SPLIT_SEND_FRAG: split_send_fragment = atoi(opt_arg()); break; case OPT_MAX_PIPELINES: max_pipelines = atoi(opt_arg()); break; case OPT_READ_BUF: read_buf_len = atoi(opt_arg()); break; case OPT_KEYLOG_FILE: keylog_file = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_EARLY_DATA: early_data_file = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_ENABLE_PHA: enable_pha = 1; break; } } if (count4or6 >= 2) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Can't use both -4 and -6\n", prog); goto opthelp; } if (noservername) { if (servername != NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Can't use -servername and -noservername together\n", prog); goto opthelp; } if (dane_tlsa_domain != NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Can't use -dane_tlsa_domain and -noservername together\n", prog); goto opthelp; } } argc = opt_num_rest(); if (argc == 1) { /* If there's a positional argument, it's the equivalent of * OPT_CONNECT. * Don't allow -connect and a separate argument. */ if (connectstr != NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: must not provide both -connect option and target parameter\n", prog); goto opthelp; } connect_type = use_inet; freeandcopy(&connectstr, *opt_rest()); } else if (argc != 0) { goto opthelp; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG if (min_version == TLS1_3_VERSION && next_proto_neg_in != NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Cannot supply -nextprotoneg with TLSv1.3\n"); goto opthelp; } #endif if (proxystr != NULL) { int res; char *tmp_host = host, *tmp_port = port; if (connectstr == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: -proxy requires use of -connect or target parameter\n", prog); goto opthelp; } res = BIO_parse_hostserv(proxystr, &host, &port, BIO_PARSE_PRIO_HOST); if (tmp_host != host) OPENSSL_free(tmp_host); if (tmp_port != port) OPENSSL_free(tmp_port); if (!res) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: -proxy argument malformed or ambiguous\n", prog); goto end; } } else { int res = 1; char *tmp_host = host, *tmp_port = port; if (connectstr != NULL) res = BIO_parse_hostserv(connectstr, &host, &port, BIO_PARSE_PRIO_HOST); if (tmp_host != host) OPENSSL_free(tmp_host); if (tmp_port != port) OPENSSL_free(tmp_port); if (!res) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: -connect argument or target parameter malformed or ambiguous\n", prog); goto end; } } if (bindstr != NULL) { int res; res = BIO_parse_hostserv(bindstr, &bindhost, &bindport, BIO_PARSE_PRIO_HOST); if (!res) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: -bind argument parameter malformed or ambiguous\n", prog); goto end; } } #ifdef AF_UNIX if (socket_family == AF_UNIX && socket_type != SOCK_STREAM) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Can't use unix sockets and datagrams together\n"); goto end; } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP if (protocol == IPPROTO_SCTP) { if (socket_type != SOCK_DGRAM) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Can't use -sctp without DTLS\n"); goto end; } /* SCTP is unusual. It uses DTLS over a SOCK_STREAM protocol */ socket_type = SOCK_STREAM; } #endif #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) next_proto.status = -1; if (next_proto_neg_in) { next_proto.data = next_protos_parse(&next_proto.len, next_proto_neg_in); if (next_proto.data == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error parsing -nextprotoneg argument\n"); goto end; } } else next_proto.data = NULL; #endif if (!app_passwd(passarg, NULL, &pass, NULL)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error getting password\n"); goto end; } if (key_file == NULL) key_file = cert_file; if (key_file != NULL) { key = load_key(key_file, key_format, 0, pass, e, "client certificate private key file"); if (key == NULL) { ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } } if (cert_file != NULL) { cert = load_cert(cert_file, cert_format, "client certificate file"); if (cert == NULL) { ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } } if (chain_file != NULL) { if (!load_certs(chain_file, &chain, FORMAT_PEM, NULL, "client certificate chain")) goto end; } if (crl_file != NULL) { X509_CRL *crl; crl = load_crl(crl_file, crl_format); if (crl == NULL) { BIO_puts(bio_err, "Error loading CRL\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } crls = sk_X509_CRL_new_null(); if (crls == NULL || !sk_X509_CRL_push(crls, crl)) { BIO_puts(bio_err, "Error adding CRL\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); X509_CRL_free(crl); goto end; } } if (!load_excert(&exc)) goto end; if (bio_c_out == NULL) { if (c_quiet && !c_debug) { bio_c_out = BIO_new(BIO_s_null()); if (c_msg && bio_c_msg == NULL) bio_c_msg = dup_bio_out(FORMAT_TEXT); } else if (bio_c_out == NULL) bio_c_out = dup_bio_out(FORMAT_TEXT); } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP if (!app_passwd(srppass, NULL, &srp_arg.srppassin, NULL)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error getting password\n"); goto end; } #endif ctx = SSL_CTX_new(meth); if (ctx == NULL) { ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } SSL_CTX_clear_mode(ctx, SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY); if (sdebug) ssl_ctx_security_debug(ctx, sdebug); if (!config_ctx(cctx, ssl_args, ctx)) goto end; if (ssl_config != NULL) { if (SSL_CTX_config(ctx, ssl_config) == 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error using configuration \"%s\"\n", ssl_config); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP if (protocol == IPPROTO_SCTP && sctp_label_bug == 1) SSL_CTX_set_mode(ctx, SSL_MODE_DTLS_SCTP_LABEL_LENGTH_BUG); #endif if (min_version != 0 && SSL_CTX_set_min_proto_version(ctx, min_version) == 0) goto end; if (max_version != 0 && SSL_CTX_set_max_proto_version(ctx, max_version) == 0) goto end; if (vpmtouched && !SSL_CTX_set1_param(ctx, vpm)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error setting verify params\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } if (async) { SSL_CTX_set_mode(ctx, SSL_MODE_ASYNC); } if (max_send_fragment > 0 && !SSL_CTX_set_max_send_fragment(ctx, max_send_fragment)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Max send fragment size %u is out of permitted range\n", prog, max_send_fragment); goto end; } if (split_send_fragment > 0 && !SSL_CTX_set_split_send_fragment(ctx, split_send_fragment)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Split send fragment size %u is out of permitted range\n", prog, split_send_fragment); goto end; } if (max_pipelines > 0 && !SSL_CTX_set_max_pipelines(ctx, max_pipelines)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Max pipelines %u is out of permitted range\n", prog, max_pipelines); goto end; } if (read_buf_len > 0) { SSL_CTX_set_default_read_buffer_len(ctx, read_buf_len); } if (maxfraglen > 0 && !SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_max_fragment_length(ctx, maxfraglen)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Max Fragment Length code %u is out of permitted values" "\n", prog, maxfraglen); goto end; } if (!ssl_load_stores(ctx, vfyCApath, vfyCAfile, chCApath, chCAfile, crls, crl_download)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error loading store locations\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } if (ReqCAfile != NULL) { STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *nm = sk_X509_NAME_new_null(); if (nm == NULL || !SSL_add_file_cert_subjects_to_stack(nm, ReqCAfile)) { sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(nm, X509_NAME_free); BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error loading CA names\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } SSL_CTX_set0_CA_list(ctx, nm); } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE if (ssl_client_engine) { if (!SSL_CTX_set_client_cert_engine(ctx, ssl_client_engine)) { BIO_puts(bio_err, "Error setting client auth engine\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); ENGINE_free(ssl_client_engine); goto end; } ENGINE_free(ssl_client_engine); } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK if (psk_key != NULL) { if (c_debug) BIO_printf(bio_c_out, "PSK key given, setting client callback\n"); SSL_CTX_set_psk_client_callback(ctx, psk_client_cb); } #endif if (psksessf != NULL) { BIO *stmp = BIO_new_file(psksessf, "r"); if (stmp == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Can't open PSK session file %s\n", psksessf); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } psksess = PEM_read_bio_SSL_SESSION(stmp, NULL, 0, NULL); BIO_free(stmp); if (psksess == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Can't read PSK session file %s\n", psksessf); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } } if (psk_key != NULL || psksess != NULL) SSL_CTX_set_psk_use_session_callback(ctx, psk_use_session_cb); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP if (srtp_profiles != NULL) { /* Returns 0 on success! */ if (SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_use_srtp(ctx, srtp_profiles) != 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error setting SRTP profile\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } } #endif if (exc != NULL) ssl_ctx_set_excert(ctx, exc); #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) if (next_proto.data != NULL) SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb(ctx, next_proto_cb, &next_proto); #endif if (alpn_in) { size_t alpn_len; unsigned char *alpn = next_protos_parse(&alpn_len, alpn_in); if (alpn == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error parsing -alpn argument\n"); goto end; } /* Returns 0 on success! */ if (SSL_CTX_set_alpn_protos(ctx, alpn, alpn_len) != 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error setting ALPN\n"); goto end; } OPENSSL_free(alpn); } for (i = 0; i < serverinfo_count; i++) { if (!SSL_CTX_add_client_custom_ext(ctx, serverinfo_types[i], NULL, NULL, NULL, serverinfo_cli_parse_cb, NULL)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Warning: Unable to add custom extension %u, skipping\n", serverinfo_types[i]); } } if (state) SSL_CTX_set_info_callback(ctx, apps_ssl_info_callback); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT /* Enable SCT processing, without early connection termination */ if (ct_validation && !SSL_CTX_enable_ct(ctx, SSL_CT_VALIDATION_PERMISSIVE)) { ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } if (!ctx_set_ctlog_list_file(ctx, ctlog_file)) { if (ct_validation) { ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } /* * If CT validation is not enabled, the log list isn't needed so don't * show errors or abort. We try to load it regardless because then we * can show the names of the logs any SCTs came from (SCTs may be seen * even with validation disabled). */ ERR_clear_error(); } #endif SSL_CTX_set_verify(ctx, verify, verify_callback); if (!ctx_set_verify_locations(ctx, CAfile, CApath, noCAfile, noCApath)) { ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } ssl_ctx_add_crls(ctx, crls, crl_download); if (!set_cert_key_stuff(ctx, cert, key, chain, build_chain)) goto end; if (!noservername) { tlsextcbp.biodebug = bio_err; SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_callback(ctx, ssl_servername_cb); SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_arg(ctx, &tlsextcbp); } # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP if (srp_arg.srplogin) { if (!srp_lateuser && !SSL_CTX_set_srp_username(ctx, srp_arg.srplogin)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Unable to set SRP username\n"); goto end; } srp_arg.msg = c_msg; srp_arg.debug = c_debug; SSL_CTX_set_srp_cb_arg(ctx, &srp_arg); SSL_CTX_set_srp_client_pwd_callback(ctx, ssl_give_srp_client_pwd_cb); SSL_CTX_set_srp_strength(ctx, srp_arg.strength); if (c_msg || c_debug || srp_arg.amp == 0) SSL_CTX_set_srp_verify_param_callback(ctx, ssl_srp_verify_param_cb); } # endif if (dane_tlsa_domain != NULL) { if (SSL_CTX_dane_enable(ctx) <= 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Error enabling DANE TLSA authentication.\n", prog); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } } /* * In TLSv1.3 NewSessionTicket messages arrive after the handshake and can * come at any time. Therefore we use a callback to write out the session * when we know about it. This approach works for < TLSv1.3 as well. */ SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode(ctx, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT | SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_STORE); SSL_CTX_sess_set_new_cb(ctx, new_session_cb); if (set_keylog_file(ctx, keylog_file)) goto end; con = SSL_new(ctx); if (con == NULL) goto end; if (enable_pha) SSL_set_post_handshake_auth(con, 1); if (sess_in != NULL) { SSL_SESSION *sess; BIO *stmp = BIO_new_file(sess_in, "r"); if (stmp == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Can't open session file %s\n", sess_in); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } sess = PEM_read_bio_SSL_SESSION(stmp, NULL, 0, NULL); BIO_free(stmp); if (sess == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Can't open session file %s\n", sess_in); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } if (!SSL_set_session(con, sess)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Can't set session\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } SSL_SESSION_free(sess); } if (fallback_scsv) SSL_set_mode(con, SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV); if (!noservername && (servername != NULL || dane_tlsa_domain == NULL)) { if (servername == NULL) { if(host == NULL || is_dNS_name(host)) servername = (host == NULL) ? "localhost" : host; } if (servername != NULL && !SSL_set_tlsext_host_name(con, servername)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Unable to set TLS servername extension.\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } } if (dane_tlsa_domain != NULL) { if (SSL_dane_enable(con, dane_tlsa_domain) <= 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Error enabling DANE TLSA " "authentication.\n", prog); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } if (dane_tlsa_rrset == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: DANE TLSA authentication requires at " "least one -dane_tlsa_rrdata option.\n", prog); goto end; } if (tlsa_import_rrset(con, dane_tlsa_rrset) <= 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Failed to import any TLSA " "records.\n", prog); goto end; } if (dane_ee_no_name) SSL_dane_set_flags(con, DANE_FLAG_NO_DANE_EE_NAMECHECKS); } else if (dane_tlsa_rrset != NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: DANE TLSA authentication requires the " "-dane_tlsa_domain option.\n", prog); goto end; } re_start: if (init_client(&s, host, port, bindhost, bindport, socket_family, socket_type, protocol) == 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "connect:errno=%d\n", get_last_socket_error()); BIO_closesocket(s); goto end; } BIO_printf(bio_c_out, "CONNECTED(%08X)\n", s); if (c_nbio) { if (!BIO_socket_nbio(s, 1)) { ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } BIO_printf(bio_c_out, "Turned on non blocking io\n"); } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS if (isdtls) { union BIO_sock_info_u peer_info; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP if (protocol == IPPROTO_SCTP) sbio = BIO_new_dgram_sctp(s, BIO_NOCLOSE); else #endif sbio = BIO_new_dgram(s, BIO_NOCLOSE); if ((peer_info.addr = BIO_ADDR_new()) == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "memory allocation failure\n"); BIO_closesocket(s); goto end; } if (!BIO_sock_info(s, BIO_SOCK_INFO_ADDRESS, &peer_info)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "getsockname:errno=%d\n", get_last_socket_error()); BIO_ADDR_free(peer_info.addr); BIO_closesocket(s); goto end; } (void)BIO_ctrl_set_connected(sbio, peer_info.addr); BIO_ADDR_free(peer_info.addr); peer_info.addr = NULL; if (enable_timeouts) { timeout.tv_sec = 0; timeout.tv_usec = DGRAM_RCV_TIMEOUT; BIO_ctrl(sbio, BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_RECV_TIMEOUT, 0, &timeout); timeout.tv_sec = 0; timeout.tv_usec = DGRAM_SND_TIMEOUT; BIO_ctrl(sbio, BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_SEND_TIMEOUT, 0, &timeout); } if (socket_mtu) { if (socket_mtu < DTLS_get_link_min_mtu(con)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "MTU too small. Must be at least %ld\n", DTLS_get_link_min_mtu(con)); BIO_free(sbio); goto shut; } SSL_set_options(con, SSL_OP_NO_QUERY_MTU); if (!DTLS_set_link_mtu(con, socket_mtu)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Failed to set MTU\n"); BIO_free(sbio); goto shut; } } else { /* want to do MTU discovery */ BIO_ctrl(sbio, BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_MTU_DISCOVER, 0, NULL); } } else #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DTLS */ sbio = BIO_new_socket(s, BIO_NOCLOSE); if (nbio_test) { BIO *test; test = BIO_new(BIO_f_nbio_test()); sbio = BIO_push(test, sbio); } if (c_debug) { BIO_set_callback(sbio, bio_dump_callback); BIO_set_callback_arg(sbio, (char *)bio_c_out); } if (c_msg) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL_TRACE if (c_msg == 2) SSL_set_msg_callback(con, SSL_trace); else #endif SSL_set_msg_callback(con, msg_cb); SSL_set_msg_callback_arg(con, bio_c_msg ? bio_c_msg : bio_c_out); } if (c_tlsextdebug) { SSL_set_tlsext_debug_callback(con, tlsext_cb); SSL_set_tlsext_debug_arg(con, bio_c_out); } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP if (c_status_req) { SSL_set_tlsext_status_type(con, TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp); SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_cb(ctx, ocsp_resp_cb); SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_arg(ctx, bio_c_out); } #endif SSL_set_bio(con, sbio, sbio); SSL_set_connect_state(con); /* ok, lets connect */ if (fileno_stdin() > SSL_get_fd(con)) width = fileno_stdin() + 1; else width = SSL_get_fd(con) + 1; read_tty = 1; write_tty = 0; tty_on = 0; read_ssl = 1; write_ssl = 1; cbuf_len = 0; cbuf_off = 0; sbuf_len = 0; sbuf_off = 0; switch ((PROTOCOL_CHOICE) starttls_proto) { case PROTO_OFF: break; case PROTO_LMTP: case PROTO_SMTP: { /* * This is an ugly hack that does a lot of assumptions. We do * have to handle multi-line responses which may come in a single * packet or not. We therefore have to use BIO_gets() which does * need a buffering BIO. So during the initial chitchat we do * push a buffering BIO into the chain that is removed again * later on to not disturb the rest of the s_client operation. */ int foundit = 0; BIO *fbio = BIO_new(BIO_f_buffer()); BIO_push(fbio, sbio); /* Wait for multi-line response to end from LMTP or SMTP */ do { mbuf_len = BIO_gets(fbio, mbuf, BUFSIZZ); } while (mbuf_len > 3 && mbuf[3] == '-'); if (protohost == NULL) protohost = "mail.example.com"; if (starttls_proto == (int)PROTO_LMTP) BIO_printf(fbio, "LHLO %s\r\n", protohost); else BIO_printf(fbio, "EHLO %s\r\n", protohost); (void)BIO_flush(fbio); /* * Wait for multi-line response to end LHLO LMTP or EHLO SMTP * response. */ do { mbuf_len = BIO_gets(fbio, mbuf, BUFSIZZ); if (strstr(mbuf, "STARTTLS")) foundit = 1; } while (mbuf_len > 3 && mbuf[3] == '-'); (void)BIO_flush(fbio); BIO_pop(fbio); BIO_free(fbio); if (!foundit) BIO_printf(bio_err, "Didn't find STARTTLS in server response," " trying anyway...\n"); BIO_printf(sbio, "STARTTLS\r\n"); BIO_read(sbio, sbuf, BUFSIZZ); } break; case PROTO_POP3: { BIO_read(sbio, mbuf, BUFSIZZ); BIO_printf(sbio, "STLS\r\n"); mbuf_len = BIO_read(sbio, sbuf, BUFSIZZ); if (mbuf_len < 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "BIO_read failed\n"); goto end; } } break; case PROTO_IMAP: { int foundit = 0; BIO *fbio = BIO_new(BIO_f_buffer()); BIO_push(fbio, sbio); BIO_gets(fbio, mbuf, BUFSIZZ); /* STARTTLS command requires CAPABILITY... */ BIO_printf(fbio, ". CAPABILITY\r\n"); (void)BIO_flush(fbio); /* wait for multi-line CAPABILITY response */ do { mbuf_len = BIO_gets(fbio, mbuf, BUFSIZZ); if (strstr(mbuf, "STARTTLS")) foundit = 1; } while (mbuf_len > 3 && mbuf[0] != '.'); (void)BIO_flush(fbio); BIO_pop(fbio); BIO_free(fbio); if (!foundit) BIO_printf(bio_err, "Didn't find STARTTLS in server response," " trying anyway...\n"); BIO_printf(sbio, ". STARTTLS\r\n"); BIO_read(sbio, sbuf, BUFSIZZ); } break; case PROTO_FTP: { BIO *fbio = BIO_new(BIO_f_buffer()); BIO_push(fbio, sbio); /* wait for multi-line response to end from FTP */ do { mbuf_len = BIO_gets(fbio, mbuf, BUFSIZZ); } while (mbuf_len > 3 && (!isdigit(mbuf[0]) || !isdigit(mbuf[1]) || !isdigit(mbuf[2]) || mbuf[3] != ' ')); (void)BIO_flush(fbio); BIO_pop(fbio); BIO_free(fbio); BIO_printf(sbio, "AUTH TLS\r\n"); BIO_read(sbio, sbuf, BUFSIZZ); } break; case PROTO_XMPP: case PROTO_XMPP_SERVER: { int seen = 0; BIO_printf(sbio, "", starttls_proto == PROTO_XMPP ? "client" : "server", protohost ? protohost : host); seen = BIO_read(sbio, mbuf, BUFSIZZ); if (seen < 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "BIO_read failed\n"); goto end; } mbuf[seen] = '\0'; while (!strstr (mbuf, ""); seen = BIO_read(sbio, sbuf, BUFSIZZ); if (seen < 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "BIO_read failed\n"); goto shut; } sbuf[seen] = '\0'; if (!strstr(sbuf, " 2); } (void)BIO_flush(fbio); BIO_pop(fbio); BIO_free(fbio); if (foundit != success) { goto shut; } } break; case PROTO_IRC: { int numeric; BIO *fbio = BIO_new(BIO_f_buffer()); BIO_push(fbio, sbio); BIO_printf(fbio, "STARTTLS\r\n"); (void)BIO_flush(fbio); width = SSL_get_fd(con) + 1; do { numeric = 0; FD_ZERO(&readfds); openssl_fdset(SSL_get_fd(con), &readfds); timeout.tv_sec = S_CLIENT_IRC_READ_TIMEOUT; timeout.tv_usec = 0; /* * If the IRCd doesn't respond within * S_CLIENT_IRC_READ_TIMEOUT seconds, assume * it doesn't support STARTTLS. Many IRCds * will not give _any_ sort of response to a * STARTTLS command when it's not supported. */ if (!BIO_get_buffer_num_lines(fbio) && !BIO_pending(fbio) && !BIO_pending(sbio) && select(width, (void *)&readfds, NULL, NULL, &timeout) < 1) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Timeout waiting for response (%d seconds).\n", S_CLIENT_IRC_READ_TIMEOUT); break; } mbuf_len = BIO_gets(fbio, mbuf, BUFSIZZ); if (mbuf_len < 1 || sscanf(mbuf, "%*s %d", &numeric) != 1) break; /* :example.net 451 STARTTLS :You have not registered */ /* :example.net 421 STARTTLS :Unknown command */ if ((numeric == 451 || numeric == 421) && strstr(mbuf, "STARTTLS") != NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "STARTTLS not supported: %s", mbuf); break; } if (numeric == 691) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "STARTTLS negotiation failed: "); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); break; } } while (numeric != 670); (void)BIO_flush(fbio); BIO_pop(fbio); BIO_free(fbio); if (numeric != 670) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Server does not support STARTTLS.\n"); ret = 1; goto shut; } } break; case PROTO_MYSQL: { /* SSL request packet */ static const unsigned char ssl_req[] = { /* payload_length, sequence_id */ 0x20, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, /* payload */ /* capability flags, CLIENT_SSL always set */ 0x85, 0xae, 0x7f, 0x00, /* max-packet size */ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, /* character set */ 0x21, /* string[23] reserved (all [0]) */ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00 }; int bytes = 0; int ssl_flg = 0x800; int pos; const unsigned char *packet = (const unsigned char *)sbuf; /* Receiving Initial Handshake packet. */ bytes = BIO_read(sbio, (void *)packet, BUFSIZZ); if (bytes < 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "BIO_read failed\n"); goto shut; /* Packet length[3], Packet number[1] + minimum payload[17] */ } else if (bytes < 21) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "MySQL packet too short.\n"); goto shut; } else if (bytes != (4 + packet[0] + (packet[1] << 8) + (packet[2] << 16))) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "MySQL packet length does not match.\n"); goto shut; /* protocol version[1] */ } else if (packet[4] != 0xA) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Only MySQL protocol version 10 is supported.\n"); goto shut; } pos = 5; /* server version[string+NULL] */ for (;;) { if (pos >= bytes) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Cannot confirm server version. "); goto shut; } else if (packet[pos++] == '\0') { break; } } /* make sure we have at least 15 bytes left in the packet */ if (pos + 15 > bytes) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "MySQL server handshake packet is broken.\n"); goto shut; } pos += 12; /* skip over conn id[4] + SALT[8] */ if (packet[pos++] != '\0') { /* verify filler */ BIO_printf(bio_err, "MySQL packet is broken.\n"); goto shut; } /* capability flags[2] */ if (!((packet[pos] + (packet[pos + 1] << 8)) & ssl_flg)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "MySQL server does not support SSL.\n"); goto shut; } /* Sending SSL Handshake packet. */ BIO_write(sbio, ssl_req, sizeof(ssl_req)); (void)BIO_flush(sbio); } break; case PROTO_POSTGRES: { static const unsigned char ssl_request[] = { /* Length SSLRequest */ 0, 0, 0, 8, 4, 210, 22, 47 }; int bytes; /* Send SSLRequest packet */ BIO_write(sbio, ssl_request, 8); (void)BIO_flush(sbio); /* Reply will be a single S if SSL is enabled */ bytes = BIO_read(sbio, sbuf, BUFSIZZ); if (bytes != 1 || sbuf[0] != 'S') goto shut; } break; case PROTO_NNTP: { int foundit = 0; BIO *fbio = BIO_new(BIO_f_buffer()); BIO_push(fbio, sbio); BIO_gets(fbio, mbuf, BUFSIZZ); /* STARTTLS command requires CAPABILITIES... */ BIO_printf(fbio, "CAPABILITIES\r\n"); (void)BIO_flush(fbio); /* wait for multi-line CAPABILITIES response */ do { mbuf_len = BIO_gets(fbio, mbuf, BUFSIZZ); if (strstr(mbuf, "STARTTLS")) foundit = 1; } while (mbuf_len > 1 && mbuf[0] != '.'); (void)BIO_flush(fbio); BIO_pop(fbio); BIO_free(fbio); if (!foundit) BIO_printf(bio_err, "Didn't find STARTTLS in server response," " trying anyway...\n"); BIO_printf(sbio, "STARTTLS\r\n"); mbuf_len = BIO_read(sbio, mbuf, BUFSIZZ); if (mbuf_len < 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "BIO_read failed\n"); goto end; } mbuf[mbuf_len] = '\0'; if (strstr(mbuf, "382") == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "STARTTLS failed: %s", mbuf); goto shut; } } break; case PROTO_SIEVE: { int foundit = 0; BIO *fbio = BIO_new(BIO_f_buffer()); BIO_push(fbio, sbio); /* wait for multi-line response to end from Sieve */ do { mbuf_len = BIO_gets(fbio, mbuf, BUFSIZZ); /* * According to RFC 5804 § 1.7, capability * is case-insensitive, make it uppercase */ if (mbuf_len > 1 && mbuf[0] == '"') { make_uppercase(mbuf); if (strncmp(mbuf, "\"STARTTLS\"", 10) == 0) foundit = 1; } } while (mbuf_len > 1 && mbuf[0] == '"'); (void)BIO_flush(fbio); BIO_pop(fbio); BIO_free(fbio); if (!foundit) BIO_printf(bio_err, "Didn't find STARTTLS in server response," " trying anyway...\n"); BIO_printf(sbio, "STARTTLS\r\n"); mbuf_len = BIO_read(sbio, mbuf, BUFSIZZ); if (mbuf_len < 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "BIO_read failed\n"); goto end; } mbuf[mbuf_len] = '\0'; if (mbuf_len < 2) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "STARTTLS failed: %s", mbuf); goto shut; } /* * According to RFC 5804 § 2.2, response codes are case- * insensitive, make it uppercase but preserve the response. */ strncpy(sbuf, mbuf, 2); make_uppercase(sbuf); if (strncmp(sbuf, "OK", 2) != 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "STARTTLS not supported: %s", mbuf); goto shut; } } break; case PROTO_LDAP: { /* StartTLS Operation according to RFC 4511 */ static char ldap_tls_genconf[] = "asn1=SEQUENCE:LDAPMessage\n" "[LDAPMessage]\n" "messageID=INTEGER:1\n" "extendedReq=EXPLICIT:23A,IMPLICIT:0C," "FORMAT:ASCII,OCT:1.3.6.1.4.1.1466.20037\n"; long errline = -1; char *genstr = NULL; int result = -1; ASN1_TYPE *atyp = NULL; BIO *ldapbio = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem()); CONF *cnf = NCONF_new(NULL); if (cnf == NULL) { BIO_free(ldapbio); goto end; } BIO_puts(ldapbio, ldap_tls_genconf); if (NCONF_load_bio(cnf, ldapbio, &errline) <= 0) { BIO_free(ldapbio); NCONF_free(cnf); if (errline <= 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "NCONF_load_bio failed\n"); goto end; } else { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error on line %ld\n", errline); goto end; } } BIO_free(ldapbio); genstr = NCONF_get_string(cnf, "default", "asn1"); if (genstr == NULL) { NCONF_free(cnf); BIO_printf(bio_err, "NCONF_get_string failed\n"); goto end; } atyp = ASN1_generate_nconf(genstr, cnf); if (atyp == NULL) { NCONF_free(cnf); BIO_printf(bio_err, "ASN1_generate_nconf failed\n"); goto end; } NCONF_free(cnf); /* Send SSLRequest packet */ BIO_write(sbio, atyp->value.sequence->data, atyp->value.sequence->length); (void)BIO_flush(sbio); ASN1_TYPE_free(atyp); mbuf_len = BIO_read(sbio, mbuf, BUFSIZZ); if (mbuf_len < 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "BIO_read failed\n"); goto end; } result = ldap_ExtendedResponse_parse(mbuf, mbuf_len); if (result < 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "ldap_ExtendedResponse_parse failed\n"); goto shut; } else if (result > 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "STARTTLS failed, LDAP Result Code: %i\n", result); goto shut; } mbuf_len = 0; } break; } if (early_data_file != NULL && ((SSL_get0_session(con) != NULL && SSL_SESSION_get_max_early_data(SSL_get0_session(con)) > 0) || (psksess != NULL && SSL_SESSION_get_max_early_data(psksess) > 0))) { BIO *edfile = BIO_new_file(early_data_file, "r"); size_t readbytes, writtenbytes; int finish = 0; if (edfile == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Cannot open early data file\n"); goto shut; } while (!finish) { if (!BIO_read_ex(edfile, cbuf, BUFSIZZ, &readbytes)) finish = 1; while (!SSL_write_early_data(con, cbuf, readbytes, &writtenbytes)) { switch (SSL_get_error(con, 0)) { case SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE: case SSL_ERROR_WANT_ASYNC: case SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ: /* Just keep trying - busy waiting */ continue; default: BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error writing early data\n"); BIO_free(edfile); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto shut; } } } BIO_free(edfile); } for (;;) { FD_ZERO(&readfds); FD_ZERO(&writefds); if (SSL_is_dtls(con) && DTLSv1_get_timeout(con, &timeout)) timeoutp = &timeout; else timeoutp = NULL; if (!SSL_is_init_finished(con) && SSL_total_renegotiations(con) == 0 && SSL_get_key_update_type(con) == SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE) { in_init = 1; tty_on = 0; } else { tty_on = 1; if (in_init) { in_init = 0; if (c_brief) { BIO_puts(bio_err, "CONNECTION ESTABLISHED\n"); print_ssl_summary(con); } print_stuff(bio_c_out, con, full_log); if (full_log > 0) full_log--; if (starttls_proto) { BIO_write(bio_err, mbuf, mbuf_len); /* We don't need to know any more */ if (!reconnect) starttls_proto = PROTO_OFF; } if (reconnect) { reconnect--; BIO_printf(bio_c_out, "drop connection and then reconnect\n"); do_ssl_shutdown(con); SSL_set_connect_state(con); BIO_closesocket(SSL_get_fd(con)); goto re_start; } } } ssl_pending = read_ssl && SSL_has_pending(con); if (!ssl_pending) { #if !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS) if (tty_on) { /* * Note that select() returns when read _would not block_, * and EOF satisfies that. To avoid a CPU-hogging loop, * set the flag so we exit. */ if (read_tty && !at_eof) openssl_fdset(fileno_stdin(), &readfds); #if !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) if (write_tty) openssl_fdset(fileno_stdout(), &writefds); #endif } if (read_ssl) openssl_fdset(SSL_get_fd(con), &readfds); if (write_ssl) openssl_fdset(SSL_get_fd(con), &writefds); #else if (!tty_on || !write_tty) { if (read_ssl) openssl_fdset(SSL_get_fd(con), &readfds); if (write_ssl) openssl_fdset(SSL_get_fd(con), &writefds); } #endif /* * Note: under VMS with SOCKETSHR the second parameter is * currently of type (int *) whereas under other systems it is * (void *) if you don't have a cast it will choke the compiler: * if you do have a cast then you can either go for (int *) or * (void *). */ #if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS) /* * Under Windows/DOS we make the assumption that we can always * write to the tty: therefore if we need to write to the tty we * just fall through. Otherwise we timeout the select every * second and see if there are any keypresses. Note: this is a * hack, in a proper Windows application we wouldn't do this. */ i = 0; if (!write_tty) { if (read_tty) { tv.tv_sec = 1; tv.tv_usec = 0; i = select(width, (void *)&readfds, (void *)&writefds, NULL, &tv); if (!i && (!has_stdin_waiting() || !read_tty)) continue; } else i = select(width, (void *)&readfds, (void *)&writefds, NULL, timeoutp); } #else i = select(width, (void *)&readfds, (void *)&writefds, NULL, timeoutp); #endif if (i < 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "bad select %d\n", get_last_socket_error()); goto shut; } } if (SSL_is_dtls(con) && DTLSv1_handle_timeout(con) > 0) BIO_printf(bio_err, "TIMEOUT occurred\n"); if (!ssl_pending && FD_ISSET(SSL_get_fd(con), &writefds)) { k = SSL_write(con, &(cbuf[cbuf_off]), (unsigned int)cbuf_len); switch (SSL_get_error(con, k)) { case SSL_ERROR_NONE: cbuf_off += k; cbuf_len -= k; if (k <= 0) goto end; /* we have done a write(con,NULL,0); */ if (cbuf_len <= 0) { read_tty = 1; write_ssl = 0; } else { /* if (cbuf_len > 0) */ read_tty = 0; write_ssl = 1; } break; case SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE: BIO_printf(bio_c_out, "write W BLOCK\n"); write_ssl = 1; read_tty = 0; break; case SSL_ERROR_WANT_ASYNC: BIO_printf(bio_c_out, "write A BLOCK\n"); wait_for_async(con); write_ssl = 1; read_tty = 0; break; case SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ: BIO_printf(bio_c_out, "write R BLOCK\n"); write_tty = 0; read_ssl = 1; write_ssl = 0; break; case SSL_ERROR_WANT_X509_LOOKUP: BIO_printf(bio_c_out, "write X BLOCK\n"); break; case SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN: if (cbuf_len != 0) { BIO_printf(bio_c_out, "shutdown\n"); ret = 0; goto shut; } else { read_tty = 1; write_ssl = 0; break; } case SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL: if ((k != 0) || (cbuf_len != 0)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "write:errno=%d\n", get_last_socket_error()); goto shut; } else { read_tty = 1; write_ssl = 0; } break; case SSL_ERROR_WANT_ASYNC_JOB: /* This shouldn't ever happen in s_client - treat as an error */ case SSL_ERROR_SSL: ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto shut; } } #if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) /* Assume Windows/DOS/BeOS can always write */ else if (!ssl_pending && write_tty) #else else if (!ssl_pending && FD_ISSET(fileno_stdout(), &writefds)) #endif { #ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC ascii2ebcdic(&(sbuf[sbuf_off]), &(sbuf[sbuf_off]), sbuf_len); #endif i = raw_write_stdout(&(sbuf[sbuf_off]), sbuf_len); if (i <= 0) { BIO_printf(bio_c_out, "DONE\n"); ret = 0; goto shut; } sbuf_len -= i; sbuf_off += i; if (sbuf_len <= 0) { read_ssl = 1; write_tty = 0; } } else if (ssl_pending || FD_ISSET(SSL_get_fd(con), &readfds)) { #ifdef RENEG { static int iiii; if (++iiii == 52) { SSL_renegotiate(con); iiii = 0; } } #endif k = SSL_read(con, sbuf, 1024 /* BUFSIZZ */ ); switch (SSL_get_error(con, k)) { case SSL_ERROR_NONE: if (k <= 0) goto end; sbuf_off = 0; sbuf_len = k; read_ssl = 0; write_tty = 1; break; case SSL_ERROR_WANT_ASYNC: BIO_printf(bio_c_out, "read A BLOCK\n"); wait_for_async(con); write_tty = 0; read_ssl = 1; if ((read_tty == 0) && (write_ssl == 0)) write_ssl = 1; break; case SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE: BIO_printf(bio_c_out, "read W BLOCK\n"); write_ssl = 1; read_tty = 0; break; case SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ: BIO_printf(bio_c_out, "read R BLOCK\n"); write_tty = 0; read_ssl = 1; if ((read_tty == 0) && (write_ssl == 0)) write_ssl = 1; break; case SSL_ERROR_WANT_X509_LOOKUP: BIO_printf(bio_c_out, "read X BLOCK\n"); break; case SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL: ret = get_last_socket_error(); if (c_brief) BIO_puts(bio_err, "CONNECTION CLOSED BY SERVER\n"); else BIO_printf(bio_err, "read:errno=%d\n", ret); goto shut; case SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN: BIO_printf(bio_c_out, "closed\n"); ret = 0; goto shut; case SSL_ERROR_WANT_ASYNC_JOB: /* This shouldn't ever happen in s_client. Treat as an error */ case SSL_ERROR_SSL: ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto shut; } } /* OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS includes OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS */ #if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS) else if (has_stdin_waiting()) #else else if (FD_ISSET(fileno_stdin(), &readfds)) #endif { if (crlf) { int j, lf_num; i = raw_read_stdin(cbuf, BUFSIZZ / 2); lf_num = 0; /* both loops are skipped when i <= 0 */ for (j = 0; j < i; j++) if (cbuf[j] == '\n') lf_num++; for (j = i - 1; j >= 0; j--) { cbuf[j + lf_num] = cbuf[j]; if (cbuf[j] == '\n') { lf_num--; i++; cbuf[j + lf_num] = '\r'; } } assert(lf_num == 0); } else i = raw_read_stdin(cbuf, BUFSIZZ); #if !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS) if (i == 0) at_eof = 1; #endif if ((!c_ign_eof) && ((i <= 0) || (cbuf[0] == 'Q' && cmdletters))) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "DONE\n"); ret = 0; goto shut; } if ((!c_ign_eof) && (cbuf[0] == 'R' && cmdletters)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "RENEGOTIATING\n"); SSL_renegotiate(con); cbuf_len = 0; } else if (!c_ign_eof && (cbuf[0] == 'K' || cbuf[0] == 'k' ) && cmdletters) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "KEYUPDATE\n"); SSL_key_update(con, cbuf[0] == 'K' ? SSL_KEY_UPDATE_REQUESTED : SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NOT_REQUESTED); cbuf_len = 0; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS else if ((!c_ign_eof) && (cbuf[0] == 'B' && cmdletters)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "HEARTBEATING\n"); SSL_heartbeat(con); cbuf_len = 0; } #endif else { cbuf_len = i; cbuf_off = 0; #ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC ebcdic2ascii(cbuf, cbuf, i); #endif } write_ssl = 1; read_tty = 0; } } ret = 0; shut: if (in_init) print_stuff(bio_c_out, con, full_log); do_ssl_shutdown(con); /* * If we ended with an alert being sent, but still with data in the * network buffer to be read, then calling BIO_closesocket() will * result in a TCP-RST being sent. On some platforms (notably * Windows) then this will result in the peer immediately abandoning * the connection including any buffered alert data before it has * had a chance to be read. Shutting down the sending side first, * and then closing the socket sends TCP-FIN first followed by * TCP-RST. This seems to allow the peer to read the alert data. */ shutdown(SSL_get_fd(con), 1); /* SHUT_WR */ /* * We just said we have nothing else to say, but it doesn't mean that * the other side has nothing. It's even recommended to consume incoming * data. [In testing context this ensures that alerts are passed on...] */ timeout.tv_sec = 0; timeout.tv_usec = 500000; /* some extreme round-trip */ do { FD_ZERO(&readfds); openssl_fdset(s, &readfds); } while (select(s + 1, &readfds, NULL, NULL, &timeout) > 0 && BIO_read(sbio, sbuf, BUFSIZZ) > 0); BIO_closesocket(SSL_get_fd(con)); end: if (con != NULL) { if (prexit != 0) print_stuff(bio_c_out, con, 1); SSL_free(con); } SSL_SESSION_free(psksess); #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) OPENSSL_free(next_proto.data); #endif SSL_CTX_free(ctx); set_keylog_file(NULL, NULL); X509_free(cert); sk_X509_CRL_pop_free(crls, X509_CRL_free); EVP_PKEY_free(key); sk_X509_pop_free(chain, X509_free); OPENSSL_free(pass); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP OPENSSL_free(srp_arg.srppassin); #endif OPENSSL_free(connectstr); OPENSSL_free(bindstr); + OPENSSL_free(bindhost); + OPENSSL_free(bindport); OPENSSL_free(host); OPENSSL_free(port); X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(vpm); ssl_excert_free(exc); sk_OPENSSL_STRING_free(ssl_args); sk_OPENSSL_STRING_free(dane_tlsa_rrset); SSL_CONF_CTX_free(cctx); OPENSSL_clear_free(cbuf, BUFSIZZ); OPENSSL_clear_free(sbuf, BUFSIZZ); OPENSSL_clear_free(mbuf, BUFSIZZ); release_engine(e); BIO_free(bio_c_out); bio_c_out = NULL; BIO_free(bio_c_msg); bio_c_msg = NULL; return ret; } static void print_stuff(BIO *bio, SSL *s, int full) { X509 *peer = NULL; STACK_OF(X509) *sk; const SSL_CIPHER *c; int i, istls13 = (SSL_version(s) == TLS1_3_VERSION); long verify_result; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP const COMP_METHOD *comp, *expansion; #endif unsigned char *exportedkeymat; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT const SSL_CTX *ctx = SSL_get_SSL_CTX(s); #endif if (full) { int got_a_chain = 0; sk = SSL_get_peer_cert_chain(s); if (sk != NULL) { got_a_chain = 1; BIO_printf(bio, "---\nCertificate chain\n"); for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) { BIO_printf(bio, "%2d s:", i); X509_NAME_print_ex(bio, X509_get_subject_name(sk_X509_value(sk, i)), 0, get_nameopt()); BIO_puts(bio, "\n"); BIO_printf(bio, " i:"); X509_NAME_print_ex(bio, X509_get_issuer_name(sk_X509_value(sk, i)), 0, get_nameopt()); BIO_puts(bio, "\n"); if (c_showcerts) PEM_write_bio_X509(bio, sk_X509_value(sk, i)); } } BIO_printf(bio, "---\n"); peer = SSL_get_peer_certificate(s); if (peer != NULL) { BIO_printf(bio, "Server certificate\n"); /* Redundant if we showed the whole chain */ if (!(c_showcerts && got_a_chain)) PEM_write_bio_X509(bio, peer); dump_cert_text(bio, peer); } else { BIO_printf(bio, "no peer certificate available\n"); } print_ca_names(bio, s); ssl_print_sigalgs(bio, s); ssl_print_tmp_key(bio, s); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT /* * When the SSL session is anonymous, or resumed via an abbreviated * handshake, no SCTs are provided as part of the handshake. While in * a resumed session SCTs may be present in the session's certificate, * no callbacks are invoked to revalidate these, and in any case that * set of SCTs may be incomplete. Thus it makes little sense to * attempt to display SCTs from a resumed session's certificate, and of * course none are associated with an anonymous peer. */ if (peer != NULL && !SSL_session_reused(s) && SSL_ct_is_enabled(s)) { const STACK_OF(SCT) *scts = SSL_get0_peer_scts(s); int sct_count = scts != NULL ? sk_SCT_num(scts) : 0; BIO_printf(bio, "---\nSCTs present (%i)\n", sct_count); if (sct_count > 0) { const CTLOG_STORE *log_store = SSL_CTX_get0_ctlog_store(ctx); BIO_printf(bio, "---\n"); for (i = 0; i < sct_count; ++i) { SCT *sct = sk_SCT_value(scts, i); BIO_printf(bio, "SCT validation status: %s\n", SCT_validation_status_string(sct)); SCT_print(sct, bio, 0, log_store); if (i < sct_count - 1) BIO_printf(bio, "\n---\n"); } BIO_printf(bio, "\n"); } } #endif BIO_printf(bio, "---\nSSL handshake has read %ju bytes " "and written %ju bytes\n", BIO_number_read(SSL_get_rbio(s)), BIO_number_written(SSL_get_wbio(s))); } print_verify_detail(s, bio); BIO_printf(bio, (SSL_session_reused(s) ? "---\nReused, " : "---\nNew, ")); c = SSL_get_current_cipher(s); BIO_printf(bio, "%s, Cipher is %s\n", SSL_CIPHER_get_version(c), SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c)); if (peer != NULL) { EVP_PKEY *pktmp; pktmp = X509_get0_pubkey(peer); BIO_printf(bio, "Server public key is %d bit\n", EVP_PKEY_bits(pktmp)); } BIO_printf(bio, "Secure Renegotiation IS%s supported\n", SSL_get_secure_renegotiation_support(s) ? "" : " NOT"); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP comp = SSL_get_current_compression(s); expansion = SSL_get_current_expansion(s); BIO_printf(bio, "Compression: %s\n", comp ? SSL_COMP_get_name(comp) : "NONE"); BIO_printf(bio, "Expansion: %s\n", expansion ? SSL_COMP_get_name(expansion) : "NONE"); #endif #ifdef SSL_DEBUG { /* Print out local port of connection: useful for debugging */ int sock; union BIO_sock_info_u info; sock = SSL_get_fd(s); if ((info.addr = BIO_ADDR_new()) != NULL && BIO_sock_info(sock, BIO_SOCK_INFO_ADDRESS, &info)) { BIO_printf(bio_c_out, "LOCAL PORT is %u\n", ntohs(BIO_ADDR_rawport(info.addr))); } BIO_ADDR_free(info.addr); } #endif #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) if (next_proto.status != -1) { const unsigned char *proto; unsigned int proto_len; SSL_get0_next_proto_negotiated(s, &proto, &proto_len); BIO_printf(bio, "Next protocol: (%d) ", next_proto.status); BIO_write(bio, proto, proto_len); BIO_write(bio, "\n", 1); } #endif { const unsigned char *proto; unsigned int proto_len; SSL_get0_alpn_selected(s, &proto, &proto_len); if (proto_len > 0) { BIO_printf(bio, "ALPN protocol: "); BIO_write(bio, proto, proto_len); BIO_write(bio, "\n", 1); } else BIO_printf(bio, "No ALPN negotiated\n"); } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP { SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *srtp_profile = SSL_get_selected_srtp_profile(s); if (srtp_profile) BIO_printf(bio, "SRTP Extension negotiated, profile=%s\n", srtp_profile->name); } #endif if (istls13) { switch (SSL_get_early_data_status(s)) { case SSL_EARLY_DATA_NOT_SENT: BIO_printf(bio, "Early data was not sent\n"); break; case SSL_EARLY_DATA_REJECTED: BIO_printf(bio, "Early data was rejected\n"); break; case SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED: BIO_printf(bio, "Early data was accepted\n"); break; } /* * We also print the verify results when we dump session information, * but in TLSv1.3 we may not get that right away (or at all) depending * on when we get a NewSessionTicket. Therefore we print it now as well. */ verify_result = SSL_get_verify_result(s); BIO_printf(bio, "Verify return code: %ld (%s)\n", verify_result, X509_verify_cert_error_string(verify_result)); } else { /* In TLSv1.3 we do this on arrival of a NewSessionTicket */ SSL_SESSION_print(bio, SSL_get_session(s)); } if (SSL_get_session(s) != NULL && keymatexportlabel != NULL) { BIO_printf(bio, "Keying material exporter:\n"); BIO_printf(bio, " Label: '%s'\n", keymatexportlabel); BIO_printf(bio, " Length: %i bytes\n", keymatexportlen); exportedkeymat = app_malloc(keymatexportlen, "export key"); if (!SSL_export_keying_material(s, exportedkeymat, keymatexportlen, keymatexportlabel, strlen(keymatexportlabel), NULL, 0, 0)) { BIO_printf(bio, " Error\n"); } else { BIO_printf(bio, " Keying material: "); for (i = 0; i < keymatexportlen; i++) BIO_printf(bio, "%02X", exportedkeymat[i]); BIO_printf(bio, "\n"); } OPENSSL_free(exportedkeymat); } BIO_printf(bio, "---\n"); X509_free(peer); /* flush, or debugging output gets mixed with http response */ (void)BIO_flush(bio); } # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP static int ocsp_resp_cb(SSL *s, void *arg) { const unsigned char *p; int len; OCSP_RESPONSE *rsp; len = SSL_get_tlsext_status_ocsp_resp(s, &p); BIO_puts(arg, "OCSP response: "); if (p == NULL) { BIO_puts(arg, "no response sent\n"); return 1; } rsp = d2i_OCSP_RESPONSE(NULL, &p, len); if (rsp == NULL) { BIO_puts(arg, "response parse error\n"); BIO_dump_indent(arg, (char *)p, len, 4); return 0; } BIO_puts(arg, "\n======================================\n"); OCSP_RESPONSE_print(arg, rsp, 0); BIO_puts(arg, "======================================\n"); OCSP_RESPONSE_free(rsp); return 1; } # endif static int ldap_ExtendedResponse_parse(const char *buf, long rem) { const unsigned char *cur, *end; long len; int tag, xclass, inf, ret = -1; cur = (const unsigned char *)buf; end = cur + rem; /* * From RFC 4511: * * LDAPMessage ::= SEQUENCE { * messageID MessageID, * protocolOp CHOICE { * ... * extendedResp ExtendedResponse, * ... }, * controls [0] Controls OPTIONAL } * * ExtendedResponse ::= [APPLICATION 24] SEQUENCE { * COMPONENTS OF LDAPResult, * responseName [10] LDAPOID OPTIONAL, * responseValue [11] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL } * * LDAPResult ::= SEQUENCE { * resultCode ENUMERATED { * success (0), * ... * other (80), * ... }, * matchedDN LDAPDN, * diagnosticMessage LDAPString, * referral [3] Referral OPTIONAL } */ /* pull SEQUENCE */ inf = ASN1_get_object(&cur, &len, &tag, &xclass, rem); if (inf != V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED || tag != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE || (rem = end - cur, len > rem)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Unexpected LDAP response\n"); goto end; } rem = len; /* ensure that we don't overstep the SEQUENCE */ /* pull MessageID */ inf = ASN1_get_object(&cur, &len, &tag, &xclass, rem); if (inf != V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL || tag != V_ASN1_INTEGER || (rem = end - cur, len > rem)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "No MessageID\n"); goto end; } cur += len; /* shall we check for MessageId match or just skip? */ /* pull [APPLICATION 24] */ rem = end - cur; inf = ASN1_get_object(&cur, &len, &tag, &xclass, rem); if (inf != V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED || xclass != V_ASN1_APPLICATION || tag != 24) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Not ExtendedResponse\n"); goto end; } /* pull resultCode */ rem = end - cur; inf = ASN1_get_object(&cur, &len, &tag, &xclass, rem); if (inf != V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL || tag != V_ASN1_ENUMERATED || len == 0 || (rem = end - cur, len > rem)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Not LDAPResult\n"); goto end; } /* len should always be one, but just in case... */ for (ret = 0, inf = 0; inf < len; inf++) { ret <<= 8; ret |= cur[inf]; } /* There is more data, but we don't care... */ end: return ret; } /* * Host dNS Name verifier: used for checking that the hostname is in dNS format * before setting it as SNI */ static int is_dNS_name(const char *host) { const size_t MAX_LABEL_LENGTH = 63; size_t i; int isdnsname = 0; size_t length = strlen(host); size_t label_length = 0; int all_numeric = 1; /* * Deviation from strict DNS name syntax, also check names with '_' * Check DNS name syntax, any '-' or '.' must be internal, * and on either side of each '.' we can't have a '-' or '.'. * * If the name has just one label, we don't consider it a DNS name. */ for (i = 0; i < length && label_length < MAX_LABEL_LENGTH; ++i) { char c = host[i]; if ((c >= 'a' && c <= 'z') || (c >= 'A' && c <= 'Z') || c == '_') { label_length += 1; all_numeric = 0; continue; } if (c >= '0' && c <= '9') { label_length += 1; continue; } /* Dot and hyphen cannot be first or last. */ if (i > 0 && i < length - 1) { if (c == '-') { label_length += 1; continue; } /* * Next to a dot the preceding and following characters must not be * another dot or a hyphen. Otherwise, record that the name is * plausible, since it has two or more labels. */ if (c == '.' && host[i + 1] != '.' && host[i - 1] != '-' && host[i + 1] != '-') { label_length = 0; isdnsname = 1; continue; } } isdnsname = 0; break; } /* dNS name must not be all numeric and labels must be shorter than 64 characters. */ isdnsname &= !all_numeric && !(label_length == MAX_LABEL_LENGTH); return isdnsname; } #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SOCK */ diff --git a/apps/s_server.c b/apps/s_server.c index 938e244222d8..64d53e68d0ee 100644 --- a/apps/s_server.c +++ b/apps/s_server.c @@ -1,3646 +1,3646 @@ /* * Copyright 1995-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include #include #if defined(_WIN32) /* Included before async.h to avoid some warnings */ # include #endif #include #include #include #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SOCK /* * With IPv6, it looks like Digital has mixed up the proper order of * recursive header file inclusion, resulting in the compiler complaining * that u_int isn't defined, but only if _POSIX_C_SOURCE is defined, which is * needed to have fileno() declared correctly... So let's define u_int */ #if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS_DECC) && !defined(__U_INT) # define __U_INT typedef unsigned int u_int; #endif #include #include "apps.h" #include "progs.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH # include #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA # include #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP # include #endif #include "s_apps.h" #include "timeouts.h" #ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC #include #endif #include "internal/sockets.h" static int not_resumable_sess_cb(SSL *s, int is_forward_secure); static int sv_body(int s, int stype, int prot, unsigned char *context); static int www_body(int s, int stype, int prot, unsigned char *context); static int rev_body(int s, int stype, int prot, unsigned char *context); static void close_accept_socket(void); static int init_ssl_connection(SSL *s); static void print_stats(BIO *bp, SSL_CTX *ctx); static int generate_session_id(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *id, unsigned int *id_len); static void init_session_cache_ctx(SSL_CTX *sctx); static void free_sessions(void); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH static DH *load_dh_param(const char *dhfile); #endif static void print_connection_info(SSL *con); static const int bufsize = 16 * 1024; static int accept_socket = -1; #define TEST_CERT "server.pem" #define TEST_CERT2 "server2.pem" static int s_nbio = 0; static int s_nbio_test = 0; static int s_crlf = 0; static SSL_CTX *ctx = NULL; static SSL_CTX *ctx2 = NULL; static int www = 0; static BIO *bio_s_out = NULL; static BIO *bio_s_msg = NULL; static int s_debug = 0; static int s_tlsextdebug = 0; static int s_msg = 0; static int s_quiet = 0; static int s_ign_eof = 0; static int s_brief = 0; static char *keymatexportlabel = NULL; static int keymatexportlen = 20; static int async = 0; static const char *session_id_prefix = NULL; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS static int enable_timeouts = 0; static long socket_mtu; #endif /* * We define this but make it always be 0 in no-dtls builds to simplify the * code. */ static int dtlslisten = 0; static int stateless = 0; static int early_data = 0; static SSL_SESSION *psksess = NULL; static char *psk_identity = "Client_identity"; char *psk_key = NULL; /* by default PSK is not used */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK static unsigned int psk_server_cb(SSL *ssl, const char *identity, unsigned char *psk, unsigned int max_psk_len) { long key_len = 0; unsigned char *key; if (s_debug) BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "psk_server_cb\n"); - if (SSL_version(ssl) >= TLS1_3_VERSION) { + if (!SSL_is_dtls(ssl) && SSL_version(ssl) >= TLS1_3_VERSION) { /* - * This callback is designed for use in TLSv1.2. It is possible to use - * a single callback for all protocol versions - but it is preferred to - * use a dedicated callback for TLSv1.3. For TLSv1.3 we have - * psk_find_session_cb. + * This callback is designed for use in (D)TLSv1.2 (or below). It is + * possible to use a single callback for all protocol versions - but it + * is preferred to use a dedicated callback for TLSv1.3. For TLSv1.3 we + * have psk_find_session_cb. */ return 0; } if (identity == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error: client did not send PSK identity\n"); goto out_err; } if (s_debug) BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "identity_len=%d identity=%s\n", (int)strlen(identity), identity); /* here we could lookup the given identity e.g. from a database */ if (strcmp(identity, psk_identity) != 0) { BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "PSK warning: client identity not what we expected" " (got '%s' expected '%s')\n", identity, psk_identity); } else { if (s_debug) BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "PSK client identity found\n"); } /* convert the PSK key to binary */ key = OPENSSL_hexstr2buf(psk_key, &key_len); if (key == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Could not convert PSK key '%s' to buffer\n", psk_key); return 0; } if (key_len > (int)max_psk_len) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "psk buffer of callback is too small (%d) for key (%ld)\n", max_psk_len, key_len); OPENSSL_free(key); return 0; } memcpy(psk, key, key_len); OPENSSL_free(key); if (s_debug) BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "fetched PSK len=%ld\n", key_len); return key_len; out_err: if (s_debug) BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error in PSK server callback\n"); (void)BIO_flush(bio_err); (void)BIO_flush(bio_s_out); return 0; } #endif static int psk_find_session_cb(SSL *ssl, const unsigned char *identity, size_t identity_len, SSL_SESSION **sess) { SSL_SESSION *tmpsess = NULL; unsigned char *key; long key_len; const SSL_CIPHER *cipher = NULL; if (strlen(psk_identity) != identity_len || memcmp(psk_identity, identity, identity_len) != 0) { *sess = NULL; return 1; } if (psksess != NULL) { SSL_SESSION_up_ref(psksess); *sess = psksess; return 1; } key = OPENSSL_hexstr2buf(psk_key, &key_len); if (key == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Could not convert PSK key '%s' to buffer\n", psk_key); return 0; } /* We default to SHA256 */ cipher = SSL_CIPHER_find(ssl, tls13_aes128gcmsha256_id); if (cipher == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error finding suitable ciphersuite\n"); OPENSSL_free(key); return 0; } tmpsess = SSL_SESSION_new(); if (tmpsess == NULL || !SSL_SESSION_set1_master_key(tmpsess, key, key_len) || !SSL_SESSION_set_cipher(tmpsess, cipher) || !SSL_SESSION_set_protocol_version(tmpsess, SSL_version(ssl))) { OPENSSL_free(key); return 0; } OPENSSL_free(key); *sess = tmpsess; return 1; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP /* This is a context that we pass to callbacks */ typedef struct srpsrvparm_st { char *login; SRP_VBASE *vb; SRP_user_pwd *user; } srpsrvparm; static srpsrvparm srp_callback_parm; /* * This callback pretends to require some asynchronous logic in order to * obtain a verifier. When the callback is called for a new connection we * return with a negative value. This will provoke the accept etc to return * with an LOOKUP_X509. The main logic of the reinvokes the suspended call * (which would normally occur after a worker has finished) and we set the * user parameters. */ static int ssl_srp_server_param_cb(SSL *s, int *ad, void *arg) { srpsrvparm *p = (srpsrvparm *) arg; int ret = SSL3_AL_FATAL; if (p->login == NULL && p->user == NULL) { p->login = SSL_get_srp_username(s); BIO_printf(bio_err, "SRP username = \"%s\"\n", p->login); return -1; } if (p->user == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "User %s doesn't exist\n", p->login); goto err; } if (SSL_set_srp_server_param (s, p->user->N, p->user->g, p->user->s, p->user->v, p->user->info) < 0) { *ad = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; goto err; } BIO_printf(bio_err, "SRP parameters set: username = \"%s\" info=\"%s\" \n", p->login, p->user->info); ret = SSL_ERROR_NONE; err: SRP_user_pwd_free(p->user); p->user = NULL; p->login = NULL; return ret; } #endif static int local_argc = 0; static char **local_argv; #ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC static int ebcdic_new(BIO *bi); static int ebcdic_free(BIO *a); static int ebcdic_read(BIO *b, char *out, int outl); static int ebcdic_write(BIO *b, const char *in, int inl); static long ebcdic_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long num, void *ptr); static int ebcdic_gets(BIO *bp, char *buf, int size); static int ebcdic_puts(BIO *bp, const char *str); # define BIO_TYPE_EBCDIC_FILTER (18|0x0200) static BIO_METHOD *methods_ebcdic = NULL; /* This struct is "unwarranted chumminess with the compiler." */ typedef struct { size_t alloced; char buff[1]; } EBCDIC_OUTBUFF; static const BIO_METHOD *BIO_f_ebcdic_filter() { if (methods_ebcdic == NULL) { methods_ebcdic = BIO_meth_new(BIO_TYPE_EBCDIC_FILTER, "EBCDIC/ASCII filter"); if (methods_ebcdic == NULL || !BIO_meth_set_write(methods_ebcdic, ebcdic_write) || !BIO_meth_set_read(methods_ebcdic, ebcdic_read) || !BIO_meth_set_puts(methods_ebcdic, ebcdic_puts) || !BIO_meth_set_gets(methods_ebcdic, ebcdic_gets) || !BIO_meth_set_ctrl(methods_ebcdic, ebcdic_ctrl) || !BIO_meth_set_create(methods_ebcdic, ebcdic_new) || !BIO_meth_set_destroy(methods_ebcdic, ebcdic_free)) return NULL; } return methods_ebcdic; } static int ebcdic_new(BIO *bi) { EBCDIC_OUTBUFF *wbuf; wbuf = app_malloc(sizeof(*wbuf) + 1024, "ebcdic wbuf"); wbuf->alloced = 1024; wbuf->buff[0] = '\0'; BIO_set_data(bi, wbuf); BIO_set_init(bi, 1); return 1; } static int ebcdic_free(BIO *a) { EBCDIC_OUTBUFF *wbuf; if (a == NULL) return 0; wbuf = BIO_get_data(a); OPENSSL_free(wbuf); BIO_set_data(a, NULL); BIO_set_init(a, 0); return 1; } static int ebcdic_read(BIO *b, char *out, int outl) { int ret = 0; BIO *next = BIO_next(b); if (out == NULL || outl == 0) return 0; if (next == NULL) return 0; ret = BIO_read(next, out, outl); if (ret > 0) ascii2ebcdic(out, out, ret); return ret; } static int ebcdic_write(BIO *b, const char *in, int inl) { EBCDIC_OUTBUFF *wbuf; BIO *next = BIO_next(b); int ret = 0; int num; if ((in == NULL) || (inl <= 0)) return 0; if (next == NULL) return 0; wbuf = (EBCDIC_OUTBUFF *) BIO_get_data(b); if (inl > (num = wbuf->alloced)) { num = num + num; /* double the size */ if (num < inl) num = inl; OPENSSL_free(wbuf); wbuf = app_malloc(sizeof(*wbuf) + num, "grow ebcdic wbuf"); wbuf->alloced = num; wbuf->buff[0] = '\0'; BIO_set_data(b, wbuf); } ebcdic2ascii(wbuf->buff, in, inl); ret = BIO_write(next, wbuf->buff, inl); return ret; } static long ebcdic_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long num, void *ptr) { long ret; BIO *next = BIO_next(b); if (next == NULL) return 0; switch (cmd) { case BIO_CTRL_DUP: ret = 0L; break; default: ret = BIO_ctrl(next, cmd, num, ptr); break; } return ret; } static int ebcdic_gets(BIO *bp, char *buf, int size) { int i, ret = 0; BIO *next = BIO_next(bp); if (next == NULL) return 0; /* return(BIO_gets(bp->next_bio,buf,size));*/ for (i = 0; i < size - 1; ++i) { ret = ebcdic_read(bp, &buf[i], 1); if (ret <= 0) break; else if (buf[i] == '\n') { ++i; break; } } if (i < size) buf[i] = '\0'; return (ret < 0 && i == 0) ? ret : i; } static int ebcdic_puts(BIO *bp, const char *str) { if (BIO_next(bp) == NULL) return 0; return ebcdic_write(bp, str, strlen(str)); } #endif /* This is a context that we pass to callbacks */ typedef struct tlsextctx_st { char *servername; BIO *biodebug; int extension_error; } tlsextctx; static int ssl_servername_cb(SSL *s, int *ad, void *arg) { tlsextctx *p = (tlsextctx *) arg; const char *servername = SSL_get_servername(s, TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name); if (servername != NULL && p->biodebug != NULL) { const char *cp = servername; unsigned char uc; BIO_printf(p->biodebug, "Hostname in TLS extension: \""); while ((uc = *cp++) != 0) BIO_printf(p->biodebug, isascii(uc) && isprint(uc) ? "%c" : "\\x%02x", uc); BIO_printf(p->biodebug, "\"\n"); } if (p->servername == NULL) return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK; if (servername != NULL) { if (strcasecmp(servername, p->servername)) return p->extension_error; if (ctx2 != NULL) { BIO_printf(p->biodebug, "Switching server context.\n"); SSL_set_SSL_CTX(s, ctx2); } } return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK; } /* Structure passed to cert status callback */ typedef struct tlsextstatusctx_st { int timeout; /* File to load OCSP Response from (or NULL if no file) */ char *respin; /* Default responder to use */ char *host, *path, *port; int use_ssl; int verbose; } tlsextstatusctx; static tlsextstatusctx tlscstatp = { -1 }; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP /* * Helper function to get an OCSP_RESPONSE from a responder. This is a * simplified version. It examines certificates each time and makes one OCSP * responder query for each request. A full version would store details such as * the OCSP certificate IDs and minimise the number of OCSP responses by caching * them until they were considered "expired". */ static int get_ocsp_resp_from_responder(SSL *s, tlsextstatusctx *srctx, OCSP_RESPONSE **resp) { char *host = NULL, *port = NULL, *path = NULL; int use_ssl; STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *aia = NULL; X509 *x = NULL; X509_STORE_CTX *inctx = NULL; X509_OBJECT *obj; OCSP_REQUEST *req = NULL; OCSP_CERTID *id = NULL; STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *exts; int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK; int i; /* Build up OCSP query from server certificate */ x = SSL_get_certificate(s); aia = X509_get1_ocsp(x); if (aia != NULL) { if (!OCSP_parse_url(sk_OPENSSL_STRING_value(aia, 0), &host, &port, &path, &use_ssl)) { BIO_puts(bio_err, "cert_status: can't parse AIA URL\n"); goto err; } if (srctx->verbose) BIO_printf(bio_err, "cert_status: AIA URL: %s\n", sk_OPENSSL_STRING_value(aia, 0)); } else { if (srctx->host == NULL) { BIO_puts(bio_err, "cert_status: no AIA and no default responder URL\n"); goto done; } host = srctx->host; path = srctx->path; port = srctx->port; use_ssl = srctx->use_ssl; } inctx = X509_STORE_CTX_new(); if (inctx == NULL) goto err; if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(inctx, SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(SSL_get_SSL_CTX(s)), NULL, NULL)) goto err; obj = X509_STORE_CTX_get_obj_by_subject(inctx, X509_LU_X509, X509_get_issuer_name(x)); if (obj == NULL) { BIO_puts(bio_err, "cert_status: Can't retrieve issuer certificate.\n"); goto done; } id = OCSP_cert_to_id(NULL, x, X509_OBJECT_get0_X509(obj)); X509_OBJECT_free(obj); if (id == NULL) goto err; req = OCSP_REQUEST_new(); if (req == NULL) goto err; if (!OCSP_request_add0_id(req, id)) goto err; id = NULL; /* Add any extensions to the request */ SSL_get_tlsext_status_exts(s, &exts); for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_EXTENSION_num(exts); i++) { X509_EXTENSION *ext = sk_X509_EXTENSION_value(exts, i); if (!OCSP_REQUEST_add_ext(req, ext, -1)) goto err; } *resp = process_responder(req, host, path, port, use_ssl, NULL, srctx->timeout); if (*resp == NULL) { BIO_puts(bio_err, "cert_status: error querying responder\n"); goto done; } ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK; goto done; err: ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; done: /* * If we parsed aia we need to free; otherwise they were copied and we * don't */ if (aia != NULL) { OPENSSL_free(host); OPENSSL_free(path); OPENSSL_free(port); X509_email_free(aia); } OCSP_CERTID_free(id); OCSP_REQUEST_free(req); X509_STORE_CTX_free(inctx); return ret; } /* * Certificate Status callback. This is called when a client includes a * certificate status request extension. The response is either obtained from a * file, or from an OCSP responder. */ static int cert_status_cb(SSL *s, void *arg) { tlsextstatusctx *srctx = arg; OCSP_RESPONSE *resp = NULL; unsigned char *rspder = NULL; int rspderlen; int ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; if (srctx->verbose) BIO_puts(bio_err, "cert_status: callback called\n"); if (srctx->respin != NULL) { BIO *derbio = bio_open_default(srctx->respin, 'r', FORMAT_ASN1); if (derbio == NULL) { BIO_puts(bio_err, "cert_status: Cannot open OCSP response file\n"); goto err; } resp = d2i_OCSP_RESPONSE_bio(derbio, NULL); BIO_free(derbio); if (resp == NULL) { BIO_puts(bio_err, "cert_status: Error reading OCSP response\n"); goto err; } } else { ret = get_ocsp_resp_from_responder(s, srctx, &resp); if (ret != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) goto err; } rspderlen = i2d_OCSP_RESPONSE(resp, &rspder); if (rspderlen <= 0) goto err; SSL_set_tlsext_status_ocsp_resp(s, rspder, rspderlen); if (srctx->verbose) { BIO_puts(bio_err, "cert_status: ocsp response sent:\n"); OCSP_RESPONSE_print(bio_err, resp, 2); } ret = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK; err: if (ret != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) ERR_print_errors(bio_err); OCSP_RESPONSE_free(resp); return ret; } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG /* This is the context that we pass to next_proto_cb */ typedef struct tlsextnextprotoctx_st { unsigned char *data; size_t len; } tlsextnextprotoctx; static int next_proto_cb(SSL *s, const unsigned char **data, unsigned int *len, void *arg) { tlsextnextprotoctx *next_proto = arg; *data = next_proto->data; *len = next_proto->len; return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK; } #endif /* ndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG */ /* This the context that we pass to alpn_cb */ typedef struct tlsextalpnctx_st { unsigned char *data; size_t len; } tlsextalpnctx; static int alpn_cb(SSL *s, const unsigned char **out, unsigned char *outlen, const unsigned char *in, unsigned int inlen, void *arg) { tlsextalpnctx *alpn_ctx = arg; if (!s_quiet) { /* We can assume that |in| is syntactically valid. */ unsigned int i; BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "ALPN protocols advertised by the client: "); for (i = 0; i < inlen;) { if (i) BIO_write(bio_s_out, ", ", 2); BIO_write(bio_s_out, &in[i + 1], in[i]); i += in[i] + 1; } BIO_write(bio_s_out, "\n", 1); } if (SSL_select_next_proto ((unsigned char **)out, outlen, alpn_ctx->data, alpn_ctx->len, in, inlen) != OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED) { return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_NOACK; } if (!s_quiet) { BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "ALPN protocols selected: "); BIO_write(bio_s_out, *out, *outlen); BIO_write(bio_s_out, "\n", 1); } return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK; } static int not_resumable_sess_cb(SSL *s, int is_forward_secure) { /* disable resumption for sessions with forward secure ciphers */ return is_forward_secure; } typedef enum OPTION_choice { OPT_ERR = -1, OPT_EOF = 0, OPT_HELP, OPT_ENGINE, OPT_4, OPT_6, OPT_ACCEPT, OPT_PORT, OPT_UNIX, OPT_UNLINK, OPT_NACCEPT, OPT_VERIFY, OPT_NAMEOPT, OPT_UPPER_V_VERIFY, OPT_CONTEXT, OPT_CERT, OPT_CRL, OPT_CRL_DOWNLOAD, OPT_SERVERINFO, OPT_CERTFORM, OPT_KEY, OPT_KEYFORM, OPT_PASS, OPT_CERT_CHAIN, OPT_DHPARAM, OPT_DCERTFORM, OPT_DCERT, OPT_DKEYFORM, OPT_DPASS, OPT_DKEY, OPT_DCERT_CHAIN, OPT_NOCERT, OPT_CAPATH, OPT_NOCAPATH, OPT_CHAINCAPATH, OPT_VERIFYCAPATH, OPT_NO_CACHE, OPT_EXT_CACHE, OPT_CRLFORM, OPT_VERIFY_RET_ERROR, OPT_VERIFY_QUIET, OPT_BUILD_CHAIN, OPT_CAFILE, OPT_NOCAFILE, OPT_CHAINCAFILE, OPT_VERIFYCAFILE, OPT_NBIO, OPT_NBIO_TEST, OPT_IGN_EOF, OPT_NO_IGN_EOF, OPT_DEBUG, OPT_TLSEXTDEBUG, OPT_STATUS, OPT_STATUS_VERBOSE, OPT_STATUS_TIMEOUT, OPT_STATUS_URL, OPT_STATUS_FILE, OPT_MSG, OPT_MSGFILE, OPT_TRACE, OPT_SECURITY_DEBUG, OPT_SECURITY_DEBUG_VERBOSE, OPT_STATE, OPT_CRLF, OPT_QUIET, OPT_BRIEF, OPT_NO_DHE, OPT_NO_RESUME_EPHEMERAL, OPT_PSK_IDENTITY, OPT_PSK_HINT, OPT_PSK, OPT_PSK_SESS, OPT_SRPVFILE, OPT_SRPUSERSEED, OPT_REV, OPT_WWW, OPT_UPPER_WWW, OPT_HTTP, OPT_ASYNC, OPT_SSL_CONFIG, OPT_MAX_SEND_FRAG, OPT_SPLIT_SEND_FRAG, OPT_MAX_PIPELINES, OPT_READ_BUF, OPT_SSL3, OPT_TLS1_3, OPT_TLS1_2, OPT_TLS1_1, OPT_TLS1, OPT_DTLS, OPT_DTLS1, OPT_DTLS1_2, OPT_SCTP, OPT_TIMEOUT, OPT_MTU, OPT_LISTEN, OPT_STATELESS, OPT_ID_PREFIX, OPT_SERVERNAME, OPT_SERVERNAME_FATAL, OPT_CERT2, OPT_KEY2, OPT_NEXTPROTONEG, OPT_ALPN, OPT_SRTP_PROFILES, OPT_KEYMATEXPORT, OPT_KEYMATEXPORTLEN, OPT_KEYLOG_FILE, OPT_MAX_EARLY, OPT_RECV_MAX_EARLY, OPT_EARLY_DATA, OPT_S_NUM_TICKETS, OPT_ANTI_REPLAY, OPT_NO_ANTI_REPLAY, OPT_SCTP_LABEL_BUG, OPT_R_ENUM, OPT_S_ENUM, OPT_V_ENUM, OPT_X_ENUM } OPTION_CHOICE; const OPTIONS s_server_options[] = { {"help", OPT_HELP, '-', "Display this summary"}, {"port", OPT_PORT, 'p', "TCP/IP port to listen on for connections (default is " PORT ")"}, {"accept", OPT_ACCEPT, 's', "TCP/IP optional host and port to listen on for connections (default is *:" PORT ")"}, #ifdef AF_UNIX {"unix", OPT_UNIX, 's', "Unix domain socket to accept on"}, #endif {"4", OPT_4, '-', "Use IPv4 only"}, {"6", OPT_6, '-', "Use IPv6 only"}, #ifdef AF_UNIX {"unlink", OPT_UNLINK, '-', "For -unix, unlink existing socket first"}, #endif {"context", OPT_CONTEXT, 's', "Set session ID context"}, {"verify", OPT_VERIFY, 'n', "Turn on peer certificate verification"}, {"Verify", OPT_UPPER_V_VERIFY, 'n', "Turn on peer certificate verification, must have a cert"}, {"cert", OPT_CERT, '<', "Certificate file to use; default is " TEST_CERT}, {"nameopt", OPT_NAMEOPT, 's', "Various certificate name options"}, {"naccept", OPT_NACCEPT, 'p', "Terminate after #num connections"}, {"serverinfo", OPT_SERVERINFO, 's', "PEM serverinfo file for certificate"}, {"certform", OPT_CERTFORM, 'F', "Certificate format (PEM or DER) PEM default"}, {"key", OPT_KEY, 's', "Private Key if not in -cert; default is " TEST_CERT}, {"keyform", OPT_KEYFORM, 'f', "Key format (PEM, DER or ENGINE) PEM default"}, {"pass", OPT_PASS, 's', "Private key file pass phrase source"}, {"dcert", OPT_DCERT, '<', "Second certificate file to use (usually for DSA)"}, {"dhparam", OPT_DHPARAM, '<', "DH parameters file to use"}, {"dcertform", OPT_DCERTFORM, 'F', "Second certificate format (PEM or DER) PEM default"}, {"dkey", OPT_DKEY, '<', "Second private key file to use (usually for DSA)"}, {"dkeyform", OPT_DKEYFORM, 'F', "Second key format (PEM, DER or ENGINE) PEM default"}, {"dpass", OPT_DPASS, 's', "Second private key file pass phrase source"}, {"nbio_test", OPT_NBIO_TEST, '-', "Test with the non-blocking test bio"}, {"crlf", OPT_CRLF, '-', "Convert LF from terminal into CRLF"}, {"debug", OPT_DEBUG, '-', "Print more output"}, {"msg", OPT_MSG, '-', "Show protocol messages"}, {"msgfile", OPT_MSGFILE, '>', "File to send output of -msg or -trace, instead of stdout"}, {"state", OPT_STATE, '-', "Print the SSL states"}, {"CAfile", OPT_CAFILE, '<', "PEM format file of CA's"}, {"CApath", OPT_CAPATH, '/', "PEM format directory of CA's"}, {"no-CAfile", OPT_NOCAFILE, '-', "Do not load the default certificates file"}, {"no-CApath", OPT_NOCAPATH, '-', "Do not load certificates from the default certificates directory"}, {"nocert", OPT_NOCERT, '-', "Don't use any certificates (Anon-DH)"}, {"quiet", OPT_QUIET, '-', "No server output"}, {"no_resume_ephemeral", OPT_NO_RESUME_EPHEMERAL, '-', "Disable caching and tickets if ephemeral (EC)DH is used"}, {"www", OPT_WWW, '-', "Respond to a 'GET /' with a status page"}, {"WWW", OPT_UPPER_WWW, '-', "Respond to a 'GET with the file ./path"}, {"servername", OPT_SERVERNAME, 's', "Servername for HostName TLS extension"}, {"servername_fatal", OPT_SERVERNAME_FATAL, '-', "mismatch send fatal alert (default warning alert)"}, {"cert2", OPT_CERT2, '<', "Certificate file to use for servername; default is" TEST_CERT2}, {"key2", OPT_KEY2, '<', "-Private Key file to use for servername if not in -cert2"}, {"tlsextdebug", OPT_TLSEXTDEBUG, '-', "Hex dump of all TLS extensions received"}, {"HTTP", OPT_HTTP, '-', "Like -WWW but ./path includes HTTP headers"}, {"id_prefix", OPT_ID_PREFIX, 's', "Generate SSL/TLS session IDs prefixed by arg"}, OPT_R_OPTIONS, {"keymatexport", OPT_KEYMATEXPORT, 's', "Export keying material using label"}, {"keymatexportlen", OPT_KEYMATEXPORTLEN, 'p', "Export len bytes of keying material (default 20)"}, {"CRL", OPT_CRL, '<', "CRL file to use"}, {"crl_download", OPT_CRL_DOWNLOAD, '-', "Download CRL from distribution points"}, {"cert_chain", OPT_CERT_CHAIN, '<', "certificate chain file in PEM format"}, {"dcert_chain", OPT_DCERT_CHAIN, '<', "second certificate chain file in PEM format"}, {"chainCApath", OPT_CHAINCAPATH, '/', "use dir as certificate store path to build CA certificate chain"}, {"verifyCApath", OPT_VERIFYCAPATH, '/', "use dir as certificate store path to verify CA certificate"}, {"no_cache", OPT_NO_CACHE, '-', "Disable session cache"}, {"ext_cache", OPT_EXT_CACHE, '-', "Disable internal cache, setup and use external cache"}, {"CRLform", OPT_CRLFORM, 'F', "CRL format (PEM or DER) PEM is default"}, {"verify_return_error", OPT_VERIFY_RET_ERROR, '-', "Close connection on verification error"}, {"verify_quiet", OPT_VERIFY_QUIET, '-', "No verify output except verify errors"}, {"build_chain", OPT_BUILD_CHAIN, '-', "Build certificate chain"}, {"chainCAfile", OPT_CHAINCAFILE, '<', "CA file for certificate chain (PEM format)"}, {"verifyCAfile", OPT_VERIFYCAFILE, '<', "CA file for certificate verification (PEM format)"}, {"ign_eof", OPT_IGN_EOF, '-', "ignore input eof (default when -quiet)"}, {"no_ign_eof", OPT_NO_IGN_EOF, '-', "Do not ignore input eof"}, #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP {"status", OPT_STATUS, '-', "Request certificate status from server"}, {"status_verbose", OPT_STATUS_VERBOSE, '-', "Print more output in certificate status callback"}, {"status_timeout", OPT_STATUS_TIMEOUT, 'n', "Status request responder timeout"}, {"status_url", OPT_STATUS_URL, 's', "Status request fallback URL"}, {"status_file", OPT_STATUS_FILE, '<', "File containing DER encoded OCSP Response"}, #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL_TRACE {"trace", OPT_TRACE, '-', "trace protocol messages"}, #endif {"security_debug", OPT_SECURITY_DEBUG, '-', "Print output from SSL/TLS security framework"}, {"security_debug_verbose", OPT_SECURITY_DEBUG_VERBOSE, '-', "Print more output from SSL/TLS security framework"}, {"brief", OPT_BRIEF, '-', "Restrict output to brief summary of connection parameters"}, {"rev", OPT_REV, '-', "act as a simple test server which just sends back with the received text reversed"}, {"async", OPT_ASYNC, '-', "Operate in asynchronous mode"}, {"ssl_config", OPT_SSL_CONFIG, 's', "Configure SSL_CTX using the configuration 'val'"}, {"max_send_frag", OPT_MAX_SEND_FRAG, 'p', "Maximum Size of send frames "}, {"split_send_frag", OPT_SPLIT_SEND_FRAG, 'p', "Size used to split data for encrypt pipelines"}, {"max_pipelines", OPT_MAX_PIPELINES, 'p', "Maximum number of encrypt/decrypt pipelines to be used"}, {"read_buf", OPT_READ_BUF, 'p', "Default read buffer size to be used for connections"}, OPT_S_OPTIONS, OPT_V_OPTIONS, OPT_X_OPTIONS, {"nbio", OPT_NBIO, '-', "Use non-blocking IO"}, {"psk_identity", OPT_PSK_IDENTITY, 's', "PSK identity to expect"}, #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK {"psk_hint", OPT_PSK_HINT, 's', "PSK identity hint to use"}, #endif {"psk", OPT_PSK, 's', "PSK in hex (without 0x)"}, {"psk_session", OPT_PSK_SESS, '<', "File to read PSK SSL session from"}, #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP {"srpvfile", OPT_SRPVFILE, '<', "The verifier file for SRP"}, {"srpuserseed", OPT_SRPUSERSEED, 's', "A seed string for a default user salt"}, #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3 {"ssl3", OPT_SSL3, '-', "Just talk SSLv3"}, #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1 {"tls1", OPT_TLS1, '-', "Just talk TLSv1"}, #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_1 {"tls1_1", OPT_TLS1_1, '-', "Just talk TLSv1.1"}, #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2 {"tls1_2", OPT_TLS1_2, '-', "just talk TLSv1.2"}, #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3 {"tls1_3", OPT_TLS1_3, '-', "just talk TLSv1.3"}, #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS {"dtls", OPT_DTLS, '-', "Use any DTLS version"}, {"timeout", OPT_TIMEOUT, '-', "Enable timeouts"}, {"mtu", OPT_MTU, 'p', "Set link layer MTU"}, {"listen", OPT_LISTEN, '-', "Listen for a DTLS ClientHello with a cookie and then connect"}, #endif {"stateless", OPT_STATELESS, '-', "Require TLSv1.3 cookies"}, #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1 {"dtls1", OPT_DTLS1, '-', "Just talk DTLSv1"}, #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1_2 {"dtls1_2", OPT_DTLS1_2, '-', "Just talk DTLSv1.2"}, #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP {"sctp", OPT_SCTP, '-', "Use SCTP"}, {"sctp_label_bug", OPT_SCTP_LABEL_BUG, '-', "Enable SCTP label length bug"}, #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH {"no_dhe", OPT_NO_DHE, '-', "Disable ephemeral DH"}, #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG {"nextprotoneg", OPT_NEXTPROTONEG, 's', "Set the advertised protocols for the NPN extension (comma-separated list)"}, #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP {"use_srtp", OPT_SRTP_PROFILES, 's', "Offer SRTP key management with a colon-separated profile list"}, #endif {"alpn", OPT_ALPN, 's', "Set the advertised protocols for the ALPN extension (comma-separated list)"}, #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE {"engine", OPT_ENGINE, 's', "Use engine, possibly a hardware device"}, #endif {"keylogfile", OPT_KEYLOG_FILE, '>', "Write TLS secrets to file"}, {"max_early_data", OPT_MAX_EARLY, 'n', "The maximum number of bytes of early data as advertised in tickets"}, {"recv_max_early_data", OPT_RECV_MAX_EARLY, 'n', "The maximum number of bytes of early data (hard limit)"}, {"early_data", OPT_EARLY_DATA, '-', "Attempt to read early data"}, {"num_tickets", OPT_S_NUM_TICKETS, 'n', "The number of TLSv1.3 session tickets that a server will automatically issue" }, {"anti_replay", OPT_ANTI_REPLAY, '-', "Switch on anti-replay protection (default)"}, {"no_anti_replay", OPT_NO_ANTI_REPLAY, '-', "Switch off anti-replay protection"}, {NULL, OPT_EOF, 0, NULL} }; #define IS_PROT_FLAG(o) \ (o == OPT_SSL3 || o == OPT_TLS1 || o == OPT_TLS1_1 || o == OPT_TLS1_2 \ || o == OPT_TLS1_3 || o == OPT_DTLS || o == OPT_DTLS1 || o == OPT_DTLS1_2) int s_server_main(int argc, char *argv[]) { ENGINE *engine = NULL; EVP_PKEY *s_key = NULL, *s_dkey = NULL; SSL_CONF_CTX *cctx = NULL; const SSL_METHOD *meth = TLS_server_method(); SSL_EXCERT *exc = NULL; STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *ssl_args = NULL; STACK_OF(X509) *s_chain = NULL, *s_dchain = NULL; STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls = NULL; X509 *s_cert = NULL, *s_dcert = NULL; X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm = NULL; const char *CApath = NULL, *CAfile = NULL, *chCApath = NULL, *chCAfile = NULL; char *dpassarg = NULL, *dpass = NULL; char *passarg = NULL, *pass = NULL, *vfyCApath = NULL, *vfyCAfile = NULL; char *crl_file = NULL, *prog; #ifdef AF_UNIX int unlink_unix_path = 0; #endif do_server_cb server_cb; int vpmtouched = 0, build_chain = 0, no_cache = 0, ext_cache = 0; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH char *dhfile = NULL; int no_dhe = 0; #endif int nocert = 0, ret = 1; int noCApath = 0, noCAfile = 0; int s_cert_format = FORMAT_PEM, s_key_format = FORMAT_PEM; int s_dcert_format = FORMAT_PEM, s_dkey_format = FORMAT_PEM; int rev = 0, naccept = -1, sdebug = 0; int socket_family = AF_UNSPEC, socket_type = SOCK_STREAM, protocol = 0; int state = 0, crl_format = FORMAT_PEM, crl_download = 0; char *host = NULL; char *port = BUF_strdup(PORT); unsigned char *context = NULL; OPTION_CHOICE o; EVP_PKEY *s_key2 = NULL; X509 *s_cert2 = NULL; tlsextctx tlsextcbp = { NULL, NULL, SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_WARNING }; const char *ssl_config = NULL; int read_buf_len = 0; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG const char *next_proto_neg_in = NULL; tlsextnextprotoctx next_proto = { NULL, 0 }; #endif const char *alpn_in = NULL; tlsextalpnctx alpn_ctx = { NULL, 0 }; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK /* by default do not send a PSK identity hint */ char *psk_identity_hint = NULL; #endif char *p; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP char *srpuserseed = NULL; char *srp_verifier_file = NULL; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP char *srtp_profiles = NULL; #endif int min_version = 0, max_version = 0, prot_opt = 0, no_prot_opt = 0; int s_server_verify = SSL_VERIFY_NONE; int s_server_session_id_context = 1; /* anything will do */ const char *s_cert_file = TEST_CERT, *s_key_file = NULL, *s_chain_file = NULL; const char *s_cert_file2 = TEST_CERT2, *s_key_file2 = NULL; char *s_dcert_file = NULL, *s_dkey_file = NULL, *s_dchain_file = NULL; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP int s_tlsextstatus = 0; #endif int no_resume_ephemeral = 0; unsigned int max_send_fragment = 0; unsigned int split_send_fragment = 0, max_pipelines = 0; const char *s_serverinfo_file = NULL; const char *keylog_file = NULL; int max_early_data = -1, recv_max_early_data = -1; char *psksessf = NULL; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP int sctp_label_bug = 0; #endif /* Init of few remaining global variables */ local_argc = argc; local_argv = argv; ctx = ctx2 = NULL; s_nbio = s_nbio_test = 0; www = 0; bio_s_out = NULL; s_debug = 0; s_msg = 0; s_quiet = 0; s_brief = 0; async = 0; cctx = SSL_CONF_CTX_new(); vpm = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new(); if (cctx == NULL || vpm == NULL) goto end; SSL_CONF_CTX_set_flags(cctx, SSL_CONF_FLAG_SERVER | SSL_CONF_FLAG_CMDLINE); prog = opt_init(argc, argv, s_server_options); while ((o = opt_next()) != OPT_EOF) { if (IS_PROT_FLAG(o) && ++prot_opt > 1) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Cannot supply multiple protocol flags\n"); goto end; } if (IS_NO_PROT_FLAG(o)) no_prot_opt++; if (prot_opt == 1 && no_prot_opt) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Cannot supply both a protocol flag and '-no_'\n"); goto end; } switch (o) { case OPT_EOF: case OPT_ERR: opthelp: BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Use -help for summary.\n", prog); goto end; case OPT_HELP: opt_help(s_server_options); ret = 0; goto end; case OPT_4: #ifdef AF_UNIX if (socket_family == AF_UNIX) { OPENSSL_free(host); host = NULL; OPENSSL_free(port); port = NULL; } #endif socket_family = AF_INET; break; case OPT_6: if (1) { #ifdef AF_INET6 #ifdef AF_UNIX if (socket_family == AF_UNIX) { OPENSSL_free(host); host = NULL; OPENSSL_free(port); port = NULL; } #endif socket_family = AF_INET6; } else { #endif BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: IPv6 domain sockets unsupported\n", prog); goto end; } break; case OPT_PORT: #ifdef AF_UNIX if (socket_family == AF_UNIX) { socket_family = AF_UNSPEC; } #endif OPENSSL_free(port); port = NULL; OPENSSL_free(host); host = NULL; if (BIO_parse_hostserv(opt_arg(), NULL, &port, BIO_PARSE_PRIO_SERV) < 1) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: -port argument malformed or ambiguous\n", port); goto end; } break; case OPT_ACCEPT: #ifdef AF_UNIX if (socket_family == AF_UNIX) { socket_family = AF_UNSPEC; } #endif OPENSSL_free(port); port = NULL; OPENSSL_free(host); host = NULL; if (BIO_parse_hostserv(opt_arg(), &host, &port, BIO_PARSE_PRIO_SERV) < 1) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: -accept argument malformed or ambiguous\n", port); goto end; } break; #ifdef AF_UNIX case OPT_UNIX: socket_family = AF_UNIX; OPENSSL_free(host); host = BUF_strdup(opt_arg()); OPENSSL_free(port); port = NULL; break; case OPT_UNLINK: unlink_unix_path = 1; break; #endif case OPT_NACCEPT: naccept = atol(opt_arg()); break; case OPT_VERIFY: s_server_verify = SSL_VERIFY_PEER | SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE; verify_args.depth = atoi(opt_arg()); if (!s_quiet) BIO_printf(bio_err, "verify depth is %d\n", verify_args.depth); break; case OPT_UPPER_V_VERIFY: s_server_verify = SSL_VERIFY_PEER | SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT | SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE; verify_args.depth = atoi(opt_arg()); if (!s_quiet) BIO_printf(bio_err, "verify depth is %d, must return a certificate\n", verify_args.depth); break; case OPT_CONTEXT: context = (unsigned char *)opt_arg(); break; case OPT_CERT: s_cert_file = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_NAMEOPT: if (!set_nameopt(opt_arg())) goto end; break; case OPT_CRL: crl_file = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_CRL_DOWNLOAD: crl_download = 1; break; case OPT_SERVERINFO: s_serverinfo_file = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_CERTFORM: if (!opt_format(opt_arg(), OPT_FMT_PEMDER, &s_cert_format)) goto opthelp; break; case OPT_KEY: s_key_file = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_KEYFORM: if (!opt_format(opt_arg(), OPT_FMT_ANY, &s_key_format)) goto opthelp; break; case OPT_PASS: passarg = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_CERT_CHAIN: s_chain_file = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_DHPARAM: #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH dhfile = opt_arg(); #endif break; case OPT_DCERTFORM: if (!opt_format(opt_arg(), OPT_FMT_PEMDER, &s_dcert_format)) goto opthelp; break; case OPT_DCERT: s_dcert_file = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_DKEYFORM: if (!opt_format(opt_arg(), OPT_FMT_PEMDER, &s_dkey_format)) goto opthelp; break; case OPT_DPASS: dpassarg = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_DKEY: s_dkey_file = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_DCERT_CHAIN: s_dchain_file = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_NOCERT: nocert = 1; break; case OPT_CAPATH: CApath = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_NOCAPATH: noCApath = 1; break; case OPT_CHAINCAPATH: chCApath = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_VERIFYCAPATH: vfyCApath = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_NO_CACHE: no_cache = 1; break; case OPT_EXT_CACHE: ext_cache = 1; break; case OPT_CRLFORM: if (!opt_format(opt_arg(), OPT_FMT_PEMDER, &crl_format)) goto opthelp; break; case OPT_S_CASES: case OPT_S_NUM_TICKETS: case OPT_ANTI_REPLAY: case OPT_NO_ANTI_REPLAY: if (ssl_args == NULL) ssl_args = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_new_null(); if (ssl_args == NULL || !sk_OPENSSL_STRING_push(ssl_args, opt_flag()) || !sk_OPENSSL_STRING_push(ssl_args, opt_arg())) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Memory allocation failure\n", prog); goto end; } break; case OPT_V_CASES: if (!opt_verify(o, vpm)) goto end; vpmtouched++; break; case OPT_X_CASES: if (!args_excert(o, &exc)) goto end; break; case OPT_VERIFY_RET_ERROR: verify_args.return_error = 1; break; case OPT_VERIFY_QUIET: verify_args.quiet = 1; break; case OPT_BUILD_CHAIN: build_chain = 1; break; case OPT_CAFILE: CAfile = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_NOCAFILE: noCAfile = 1; break; case OPT_CHAINCAFILE: chCAfile = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_VERIFYCAFILE: vfyCAfile = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_NBIO: s_nbio = 1; break; case OPT_NBIO_TEST: s_nbio = s_nbio_test = 1; break; case OPT_IGN_EOF: s_ign_eof = 1; break; case OPT_NO_IGN_EOF: s_ign_eof = 0; break; case OPT_DEBUG: s_debug = 1; break; case OPT_TLSEXTDEBUG: s_tlsextdebug = 1; break; case OPT_STATUS: #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP s_tlsextstatus = 1; #endif break; case OPT_STATUS_VERBOSE: #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP s_tlsextstatus = tlscstatp.verbose = 1; #endif break; case OPT_STATUS_TIMEOUT: #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP s_tlsextstatus = 1; tlscstatp.timeout = atoi(opt_arg()); #endif break; case OPT_STATUS_URL: #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP s_tlsextstatus = 1; if (!OCSP_parse_url(opt_arg(), &tlscstatp.host, &tlscstatp.port, &tlscstatp.path, &tlscstatp.use_ssl)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error parsing URL\n"); goto end; } #endif break; case OPT_STATUS_FILE: #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP s_tlsextstatus = 1; tlscstatp.respin = opt_arg(); #endif break; case OPT_MSG: s_msg = 1; break; case OPT_MSGFILE: bio_s_msg = BIO_new_file(opt_arg(), "w"); break; case OPT_TRACE: #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL_TRACE s_msg = 2; #endif break; case OPT_SECURITY_DEBUG: sdebug = 1; break; case OPT_SECURITY_DEBUG_VERBOSE: sdebug = 2; break; case OPT_STATE: state = 1; break; case OPT_CRLF: s_crlf = 1; break; case OPT_QUIET: s_quiet = 1; break; case OPT_BRIEF: s_quiet = s_brief = verify_args.quiet = 1; break; case OPT_NO_DHE: #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH no_dhe = 1; #endif break; case OPT_NO_RESUME_EPHEMERAL: no_resume_ephemeral = 1; break; case OPT_PSK_IDENTITY: psk_identity = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_PSK_HINT: #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK psk_identity_hint = opt_arg(); #endif break; case OPT_PSK: for (p = psk_key = opt_arg(); *p; p++) { if (isxdigit(_UC(*p))) continue; BIO_printf(bio_err, "Not a hex number '%s'\n", psk_key); goto end; } break; case OPT_PSK_SESS: psksessf = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_SRPVFILE: #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP srp_verifier_file = opt_arg(); if (min_version < TLS1_VERSION) min_version = TLS1_VERSION; #endif break; case OPT_SRPUSERSEED: #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP srpuserseed = opt_arg(); if (min_version < TLS1_VERSION) min_version = TLS1_VERSION; #endif break; case OPT_REV: rev = 1; break; case OPT_WWW: www = 1; break; case OPT_UPPER_WWW: www = 2; break; case OPT_HTTP: www = 3; break; case OPT_SSL_CONFIG: ssl_config = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_SSL3: min_version = SSL3_VERSION; max_version = SSL3_VERSION; break; case OPT_TLS1_3: min_version = TLS1_3_VERSION; max_version = TLS1_3_VERSION; break; case OPT_TLS1_2: min_version = TLS1_2_VERSION; max_version = TLS1_2_VERSION; break; case OPT_TLS1_1: min_version = TLS1_1_VERSION; max_version = TLS1_1_VERSION; break; case OPT_TLS1: min_version = TLS1_VERSION; max_version = TLS1_VERSION; break; case OPT_DTLS: #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS meth = DTLS_server_method(); socket_type = SOCK_DGRAM; #endif break; case OPT_DTLS1: #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS meth = DTLS_server_method(); min_version = DTLS1_VERSION; max_version = DTLS1_VERSION; socket_type = SOCK_DGRAM; #endif break; case OPT_DTLS1_2: #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS meth = DTLS_server_method(); min_version = DTLS1_2_VERSION; max_version = DTLS1_2_VERSION; socket_type = SOCK_DGRAM; #endif break; case OPT_SCTP: #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP protocol = IPPROTO_SCTP; #endif break; case OPT_SCTP_LABEL_BUG: #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP sctp_label_bug = 1; #endif break; case OPT_TIMEOUT: #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS enable_timeouts = 1; #endif break; case OPT_MTU: #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS socket_mtu = atol(opt_arg()); #endif break; case OPT_LISTEN: #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS dtlslisten = 1; #endif break; case OPT_STATELESS: stateless = 1; break; case OPT_ID_PREFIX: session_id_prefix = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_ENGINE: engine = setup_engine(opt_arg(), 1); break; case OPT_R_CASES: if (!opt_rand(o)) goto end; break; case OPT_SERVERNAME: tlsextcbp.servername = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_SERVERNAME_FATAL: tlsextcbp.extension_error = SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_ALERT_FATAL; break; case OPT_CERT2: s_cert_file2 = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_KEY2: s_key_file2 = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_NEXTPROTONEG: # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG next_proto_neg_in = opt_arg(); #endif break; case OPT_ALPN: alpn_in = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_SRTP_PROFILES: #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP srtp_profiles = opt_arg(); #endif break; case OPT_KEYMATEXPORT: keymatexportlabel = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_KEYMATEXPORTLEN: keymatexportlen = atoi(opt_arg()); break; case OPT_ASYNC: async = 1; break; case OPT_MAX_SEND_FRAG: max_send_fragment = atoi(opt_arg()); break; case OPT_SPLIT_SEND_FRAG: split_send_fragment = atoi(opt_arg()); break; case OPT_MAX_PIPELINES: max_pipelines = atoi(opt_arg()); break; case OPT_READ_BUF: read_buf_len = atoi(opt_arg()); break; case OPT_KEYLOG_FILE: keylog_file = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_MAX_EARLY: max_early_data = atoi(opt_arg()); if (max_early_data < 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Invalid value for max_early_data\n"); goto end; } break; case OPT_RECV_MAX_EARLY: recv_max_early_data = atoi(opt_arg()); if (recv_max_early_data < 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Invalid value for recv_max_early_data\n"); goto end; } break; case OPT_EARLY_DATA: early_data = 1; if (max_early_data == -1) max_early_data = SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH; break; } } argc = opt_num_rest(); argv = opt_rest(); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG if (min_version == TLS1_3_VERSION && next_proto_neg_in != NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Cannot supply -nextprotoneg with TLSv1.3\n"); goto opthelp; } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS if (www && socket_type == SOCK_DGRAM) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Can't use -HTTP, -www or -WWW with DTLS\n"); goto end; } if (dtlslisten && socket_type != SOCK_DGRAM) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Can only use -listen with DTLS\n"); goto end; } #endif if (stateless && socket_type != SOCK_STREAM) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Can only use --stateless with TLS\n"); goto end; } #ifdef AF_UNIX if (socket_family == AF_UNIX && socket_type != SOCK_STREAM) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Can't use unix sockets and datagrams together\n"); goto end; } #endif if (early_data && (www > 0 || rev)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Can't use -early_data in combination with -www, -WWW, -HTTP, or -rev\n"); goto end; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP if (protocol == IPPROTO_SCTP) { if (socket_type != SOCK_DGRAM) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Can't use -sctp without DTLS\n"); goto end; } /* SCTP is unusual. It uses DTLS over a SOCK_STREAM protocol */ socket_type = SOCK_STREAM; } #endif if (!app_passwd(passarg, dpassarg, &pass, &dpass)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error getting password\n"); goto end; } if (s_key_file == NULL) s_key_file = s_cert_file; if (s_key_file2 == NULL) s_key_file2 = s_cert_file2; if (!load_excert(&exc)) goto end; if (nocert == 0) { s_key = load_key(s_key_file, s_key_format, 0, pass, engine, "server certificate private key file"); if (s_key == NULL) { ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } s_cert = load_cert(s_cert_file, s_cert_format, "server certificate file"); if (s_cert == NULL) { ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } if (s_chain_file != NULL) { if (!load_certs(s_chain_file, &s_chain, FORMAT_PEM, NULL, "server certificate chain")) goto end; } if (tlsextcbp.servername != NULL) { s_key2 = load_key(s_key_file2, s_key_format, 0, pass, engine, "second server certificate private key file"); if (s_key2 == NULL) { ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } s_cert2 = load_cert(s_cert_file2, s_cert_format, "second server certificate file"); if (s_cert2 == NULL) { ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } } } #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) if (next_proto_neg_in) { next_proto.data = next_protos_parse(&next_proto.len, next_proto_neg_in); if (next_proto.data == NULL) goto end; } #endif alpn_ctx.data = NULL; if (alpn_in) { alpn_ctx.data = next_protos_parse(&alpn_ctx.len, alpn_in); if (alpn_ctx.data == NULL) goto end; } if (crl_file != NULL) { X509_CRL *crl; crl = load_crl(crl_file, crl_format); if (crl == NULL) { BIO_puts(bio_err, "Error loading CRL\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } crls = sk_X509_CRL_new_null(); if (crls == NULL || !sk_X509_CRL_push(crls, crl)) { BIO_puts(bio_err, "Error adding CRL\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); X509_CRL_free(crl); goto end; } } if (s_dcert_file != NULL) { if (s_dkey_file == NULL) s_dkey_file = s_dcert_file; s_dkey = load_key(s_dkey_file, s_dkey_format, 0, dpass, engine, "second certificate private key file"); if (s_dkey == NULL) { ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } s_dcert = load_cert(s_dcert_file, s_dcert_format, "second server certificate file"); if (s_dcert == NULL) { ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } if (s_dchain_file != NULL) { if (!load_certs(s_dchain_file, &s_dchain, FORMAT_PEM, NULL, "second server certificate chain")) goto end; } } if (bio_s_out == NULL) { if (s_quiet && !s_debug) { bio_s_out = BIO_new(BIO_s_null()); if (s_msg && bio_s_msg == NULL) bio_s_msg = dup_bio_out(FORMAT_TEXT); } else { if (bio_s_out == NULL) bio_s_out = dup_bio_out(FORMAT_TEXT); } } #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) if (nocert) #endif { s_cert_file = NULL; s_key_file = NULL; s_dcert_file = NULL; s_dkey_file = NULL; s_cert_file2 = NULL; s_key_file2 = NULL; } ctx = SSL_CTX_new(meth); if (ctx == NULL) { ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } SSL_CTX_clear_mode(ctx, SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY); if (sdebug) ssl_ctx_security_debug(ctx, sdebug); if (!config_ctx(cctx, ssl_args, ctx)) goto end; if (ssl_config) { if (SSL_CTX_config(ctx, ssl_config) == 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error using configuration \"%s\"\n", ssl_config); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP if (protocol == IPPROTO_SCTP && sctp_label_bug == 1) SSL_CTX_set_mode(ctx, SSL_MODE_DTLS_SCTP_LABEL_LENGTH_BUG); #endif if (min_version != 0 && SSL_CTX_set_min_proto_version(ctx, min_version) == 0) goto end; if (max_version != 0 && SSL_CTX_set_max_proto_version(ctx, max_version) == 0) goto end; if (session_id_prefix) { if (strlen(session_id_prefix) >= 32) BIO_printf(bio_err, "warning: id_prefix is too long, only one new session will be possible\n"); if (!SSL_CTX_set_generate_session_id(ctx, generate_session_id)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "error setting 'id_prefix'\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } BIO_printf(bio_err, "id_prefix '%s' set.\n", session_id_prefix); } SSL_CTX_set_quiet_shutdown(ctx, 1); if (exc != NULL) ssl_ctx_set_excert(ctx, exc); if (state) SSL_CTX_set_info_callback(ctx, apps_ssl_info_callback); if (no_cache) SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode(ctx, SSL_SESS_CACHE_OFF); else if (ext_cache) init_session_cache_ctx(ctx); else SSL_CTX_sess_set_cache_size(ctx, 128); if (async) { SSL_CTX_set_mode(ctx, SSL_MODE_ASYNC); } if (max_send_fragment > 0 && !SSL_CTX_set_max_send_fragment(ctx, max_send_fragment)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Max send fragment size %u is out of permitted range\n", prog, max_send_fragment); goto end; } if (split_send_fragment > 0 && !SSL_CTX_set_split_send_fragment(ctx, split_send_fragment)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Split send fragment size %u is out of permitted range\n", prog, split_send_fragment); goto end; } if (max_pipelines > 0 && !SSL_CTX_set_max_pipelines(ctx, max_pipelines)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Max pipelines %u is out of permitted range\n", prog, max_pipelines); goto end; } if (read_buf_len > 0) { SSL_CTX_set_default_read_buffer_len(ctx, read_buf_len); } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP if (srtp_profiles != NULL) { /* Returns 0 on success! */ if (SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_use_srtp(ctx, srtp_profiles) != 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error setting SRTP profile\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } } #endif if (!ctx_set_verify_locations(ctx, CAfile, CApath, noCAfile, noCApath)) { ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } if (vpmtouched && !SSL_CTX_set1_param(ctx, vpm)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error setting verify params\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } ssl_ctx_add_crls(ctx, crls, 0); if (!ssl_load_stores(ctx, vfyCApath, vfyCAfile, chCApath, chCAfile, crls, crl_download)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error loading store locations\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } if (s_cert2) { ctx2 = SSL_CTX_new(meth); if (ctx2 == NULL) { ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } } if (ctx2 != NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "Setting secondary ctx parameters\n"); if (sdebug) ssl_ctx_security_debug(ctx2, sdebug); if (session_id_prefix) { if (strlen(session_id_prefix) >= 32) BIO_printf(bio_err, "warning: id_prefix is too long, only one new session will be possible\n"); if (!SSL_CTX_set_generate_session_id(ctx2, generate_session_id)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "error setting 'id_prefix'\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } BIO_printf(bio_err, "id_prefix '%s' set.\n", session_id_prefix); } SSL_CTX_set_quiet_shutdown(ctx2, 1); if (exc != NULL) ssl_ctx_set_excert(ctx2, exc); if (state) SSL_CTX_set_info_callback(ctx2, apps_ssl_info_callback); if (no_cache) SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode(ctx2, SSL_SESS_CACHE_OFF); else if (ext_cache) init_session_cache_ctx(ctx2); else SSL_CTX_sess_set_cache_size(ctx2, 128); if (async) SSL_CTX_set_mode(ctx2, SSL_MODE_ASYNC); if (!ctx_set_verify_locations(ctx2, CAfile, CApath, noCAfile, noCApath)) { ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } if (vpmtouched && !SSL_CTX_set1_param(ctx2, vpm)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error setting verify params\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } ssl_ctx_add_crls(ctx2, crls, 0); if (!config_ctx(cctx, ssl_args, ctx2)) goto end; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG if (next_proto.data) SSL_CTX_set_next_protos_advertised_cb(ctx, next_proto_cb, &next_proto); #endif if (alpn_ctx.data) SSL_CTX_set_alpn_select_cb(ctx, alpn_cb, &alpn_ctx); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH if (!no_dhe) { DH *dh = NULL; if (dhfile != NULL) dh = load_dh_param(dhfile); else if (s_cert_file != NULL) dh = load_dh_param(s_cert_file); if (dh != NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "Setting temp DH parameters\n"); } else { BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "Using default temp DH parameters\n"); } (void)BIO_flush(bio_s_out); if (dh == NULL) { SSL_CTX_set_dh_auto(ctx, 1); } else if (!SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh(ctx, dh)) { BIO_puts(bio_err, "Error setting temp DH parameters\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); DH_free(dh); goto end; } if (ctx2 != NULL) { if (!dhfile) { DH *dh2 = load_dh_param(s_cert_file2); if (dh2 != NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "Setting temp DH parameters\n"); (void)BIO_flush(bio_s_out); DH_free(dh); dh = dh2; } } if (dh == NULL) { SSL_CTX_set_dh_auto(ctx2, 1); } else if (!SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh(ctx2, dh)) { BIO_puts(bio_err, "Error setting temp DH parameters\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); DH_free(dh); goto end; } } DH_free(dh); } #endif if (!set_cert_key_stuff(ctx, s_cert, s_key, s_chain, build_chain)) goto end; if (s_serverinfo_file != NULL && !SSL_CTX_use_serverinfo_file(ctx, s_serverinfo_file)) { ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } if (ctx2 != NULL && !set_cert_key_stuff(ctx2, s_cert2, s_key2, NULL, build_chain)) goto end; if (s_dcert != NULL) { if (!set_cert_key_stuff(ctx, s_dcert, s_dkey, s_dchain, build_chain)) goto end; } if (no_resume_ephemeral) { SSL_CTX_set_not_resumable_session_callback(ctx, not_resumable_sess_cb); if (ctx2 != NULL) SSL_CTX_set_not_resumable_session_callback(ctx2, not_resumable_sess_cb); } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK if (psk_key != NULL) { if (s_debug) BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "PSK key given, setting server callback\n"); SSL_CTX_set_psk_server_callback(ctx, psk_server_cb); } if (!SSL_CTX_use_psk_identity_hint(ctx, psk_identity_hint)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "error setting PSK identity hint to context\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } #endif if (psksessf != NULL) { BIO *stmp = BIO_new_file(psksessf, "r"); if (stmp == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Can't open PSK session file %s\n", psksessf); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } psksess = PEM_read_bio_SSL_SESSION(stmp, NULL, 0, NULL); BIO_free(stmp); if (psksess == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Can't read PSK session file %s\n", psksessf); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } } if (psk_key != NULL || psksess != NULL) SSL_CTX_set_psk_find_session_callback(ctx, psk_find_session_cb); SSL_CTX_set_verify(ctx, s_server_verify, verify_callback); if (!SSL_CTX_set_session_id_context(ctx, (void *)&s_server_session_id_context, sizeof(s_server_session_id_context))) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "error setting session id context\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } /* Set DTLS cookie generation and verification callbacks */ SSL_CTX_set_cookie_generate_cb(ctx, generate_cookie_callback); SSL_CTX_set_cookie_verify_cb(ctx, verify_cookie_callback); /* Set TLS1.3 cookie generation and verification callbacks */ SSL_CTX_set_stateless_cookie_generate_cb(ctx, generate_stateless_cookie_callback); SSL_CTX_set_stateless_cookie_verify_cb(ctx, verify_stateless_cookie_callback); if (ctx2 != NULL) { SSL_CTX_set_verify(ctx2, s_server_verify, verify_callback); if (!SSL_CTX_set_session_id_context(ctx2, (void *)&s_server_session_id_context, sizeof(s_server_session_id_context))) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "error setting session id context\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } tlsextcbp.biodebug = bio_s_out; SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_callback(ctx2, ssl_servername_cb); SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_arg(ctx2, &tlsextcbp); SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_callback(ctx, ssl_servername_cb); SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_servername_arg(ctx, &tlsextcbp); } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP if (srp_verifier_file != NULL) { srp_callback_parm.vb = SRP_VBASE_new(srpuserseed); srp_callback_parm.user = NULL; srp_callback_parm.login = NULL; if ((ret = SRP_VBASE_init(srp_callback_parm.vb, srp_verifier_file)) != SRP_NO_ERROR) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Cannot initialize SRP verifier file \"%s\":ret=%d\n", srp_verifier_file, ret); goto end; } SSL_CTX_set_verify(ctx, SSL_VERIFY_NONE, verify_callback); SSL_CTX_set_srp_cb_arg(ctx, &srp_callback_parm); SSL_CTX_set_srp_username_callback(ctx, ssl_srp_server_param_cb); } else #endif if (CAfile != NULL) { SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list(ctx, SSL_load_client_CA_file(CAfile)); if (ctx2) SSL_CTX_set_client_CA_list(ctx2, SSL_load_client_CA_file(CAfile)); } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP if (s_tlsextstatus) { SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_cb(ctx, cert_status_cb); SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_arg(ctx, &tlscstatp); if (ctx2) { SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_cb(ctx2, cert_status_cb); SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_status_arg(ctx2, &tlscstatp); } } #endif if (set_keylog_file(ctx, keylog_file)) goto end; if (max_early_data >= 0) SSL_CTX_set_max_early_data(ctx, max_early_data); if (recv_max_early_data >= 0) SSL_CTX_set_recv_max_early_data(ctx, recv_max_early_data); if (rev) server_cb = rev_body; else if (www) server_cb = www_body; else server_cb = sv_body; #ifdef AF_UNIX if (socket_family == AF_UNIX && unlink_unix_path) unlink(host); #endif do_server(&accept_socket, host, port, socket_family, socket_type, protocol, server_cb, context, naccept, bio_s_out); print_stats(bio_s_out, ctx); ret = 0; end: SSL_CTX_free(ctx); SSL_SESSION_free(psksess); set_keylog_file(NULL, NULL); X509_free(s_cert); sk_X509_CRL_pop_free(crls, X509_CRL_free); X509_free(s_dcert); EVP_PKEY_free(s_key); EVP_PKEY_free(s_dkey); sk_X509_pop_free(s_chain, X509_free); sk_X509_pop_free(s_dchain, X509_free); OPENSSL_free(pass); OPENSSL_free(dpass); OPENSSL_free(host); OPENSSL_free(port); X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(vpm); free_sessions(); OPENSSL_free(tlscstatp.host); OPENSSL_free(tlscstatp.port); OPENSSL_free(tlscstatp.path); SSL_CTX_free(ctx2); X509_free(s_cert2); EVP_PKEY_free(s_key2); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG OPENSSL_free(next_proto.data); #endif OPENSSL_free(alpn_ctx.data); ssl_excert_free(exc); sk_OPENSSL_STRING_free(ssl_args); SSL_CONF_CTX_free(cctx); release_engine(engine); BIO_free(bio_s_out); bio_s_out = NULL; BIO_free(bio_s_msg); bio_s_msg = NULL; #ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC BIO_meth_free(methods_ebcdic); #endif return ret; } static void print_stats(BIO *bio, SSL_CTX *ssl_ctx) { BIO_printf(bio, "%4ld items in the session cache\n", SSL_CTX_sess_number(ssl_ctx)); BIO_printf(bio, "%4ld client connects (SSL_connect())\n", SSL_CTX_sess_connect(ssl_ctx)); BIO_printf(bio, "%4ld client renegotiates (SSL_connect())\n", SSL_CTX_sess_connect_renegotiate(ssl_ctx)); BIO_printf(bio, "%4ld client connects that finished\n", SSL_CTX_sess_connect_good(ssl_ctx)); BIO_printf(bio, "%4ld server accepts (SSL_accept())\n", SSL_CTX_sess_accept(ssl_ctx)); BIO_printf(bio, "%4ld server renegotiates (SSL_accept())\n", SSL_CTX_sess_accept_renegotiate(ssl_ctx)); BIO_printf(bio, "%4ld server accepts that finished\n", SSL_CTX_sess_accept_good(ssl_ctx)); BIO_printf(bio, "%4ld session cache hits\n", SSL_CTX_sess_hits(ssl_ctx)); BIO_printf(bio, "%4ld session cache misses\n", SSL_CTX_sess_misses(ssl_ctx)); BIO_printf(bio, "%4ld session cache timeouts\n", SSL_CTX_sess_timeouts(ssl_ctx)); BIO_printf(bio, "%4ld callback cache hits\n", SSL_CTX_sess_cb_hits(ssl_ctx)); BIO_printf(bio, "%4ld cache full overflows (%ld allowed)\n", SSL_CTX_sess_cache_full(ssl_ctx), SSL_CTX_sess_get_cache_size(ssl_ctx)); } static int sv_body(int s, int stype, int prot, unsigned char *context) { char *buf = NULL; fd_set readfds; int ret = 1, width; int k, i; unsigned long l; SSL *con = NULL; BIO *sbio; struct timeval timeout; #if !(defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS)) struct timeval *timeoutp; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP int isdtls = (stype == SOCK_DGRAM || prot == IPPROTO_SCTP); # else int isdtls = (stype == SOCK_DGRAM); # endif #endif buf = app_malloc(bufsize, "server buffer"); if (s_nbio) { if (!BIO_socket_nbio(s, 1)) ERR_print_errors(bio_err); else if (!s_quiet) BIO_printf(bio_err, "Turned on non blocking io\n"); } con = SSL_new(ctx); if (con == NULL) { ret = -1; goto err; } if (s_tlsextdebug) { SSL_set_tlsext_debug_callback(con, tlsext_cb); SSL_set_tlsext_debug_arg(con, bio_s_out); } if (context != NULL && !SSL_set_session_id_context(con, context, strlen((char *)context))) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error setting session id context\n"); ret = -1; goto err; } if (!SSL_clear(con)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error clearing SSL connection\n"); ret = -1; goto err; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS if (isdtls) { # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP if (prot == IPPROTO_SCTP) sbio = BIO_new_dgram_sctp(s, BIO_NOCLOSE); else # endif sbio = BIO_new_dgram(s, BIO_NOCLOSE); if (enable_timeouts) { timeout.tv_sec = 0; timeout.tv_usec = DGRAM_RCV_TIMEOUT; BIO_ctrl(sbio, BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_RECV_TIMEOUT, 0, &timeout); timeout.tv_sec = 0; timeout.tv_usec = DGRAM_SND_TIMEOUT; BIO_ctrl(sbio, BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_SEND_TIMEOUT, 0, &timeout); } if (socket_mtu) { if (socket_mtu < DTLS_get_link_min_mtu(con)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "MTU too small. Must be at least %ld\n", DTLS_get_link_min_mtu(con)); ret = -1; BIO_free(sbio); goto err; } SSL_set_options(con, SSL_OP_NO_QUERY_MTU); if (!DTLS_set_link_mtu(con, socket_mtu)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Failed to set MTU\n"); ret = -1; BIO_free(sbio); goto err; } } else /* want to do MTU discovery */ BIO_ctrl(sbio, BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_MTU_DISCOVER, 0, NULL); # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP if (prot != IPPROTO_SCTP) # endif /* Turn on cookie exchange. Not necessary for SCTP */ SSL_set_options(con, SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE); } else #endif sbio = BIO_new_socket(s, BIO_NOCLOSE); if (sbio == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Unable to create BIO\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto err; } if (s_nbio_test) { BIO *test; test = BIO_new(BIO_f_nbio_test()); sbio = BIO_push(test, sbio); } SSL_set_bio(con, sbio, sbio); SSL_set_accept_state(con); /* SSL_set_fd(con,s); */ if (s_debug) { BIO_set_callback(SSL_get_rbio(con), bio_dump_callback); BIO_set_callback_arg(SSL_get_rbio(con), (char *)bio_s_out); } if (s_msg) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL_TRACE if (s_msg == 2) SSL_set_msg_callback(con, SSL_trace); else #endif SSL_set_msg_callback(con, msg_cb); SSL_set_msg_callback_arg(con, bio_s_msg ? bio_s_msg : bio_s_out); } if (s_tlsextdebug) { SSL_set_tlsext_debug_callback(con, tlsext_cb); SSL_set_tlsext_debug_arg(con, bio_s_out); } if (early_data) { int write_header = 1, edret = SSL_READ_EARLY_DATA_ERROR; size_t readbytes; while (edret != SSL_READ_EARLY_DATA_FINISH) { for (;;) { edret = SSL_read_early_data(con, buf, bufsize, &readbytes); if (edret != SSL_READ_EARLY_DATA_ERROR) break; switch (SSL_get_error(con, 0)) { case SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE: case SSL_ERROR_WANT_ASYNC: case SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ: /* Just keep trying - busy waiting */ continue; default: BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error reading early data\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto err; } } if (readbytes > 0) { if (write_header) { BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "Early data received:\n"); write_header = 0; } raw_write_stdout(buf, (unsigned int)readbytes); (void)BIO_flush(bio_s_out); } } if (write_header) { if (SSL_get_early_data_status(con) == SSL_EARLY_DATA_NOT_SENT) BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "No early data received\n"); else BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "Early data was rejected\n"); } else { BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "\nEnd of early data\n"); } if (SSL_is_init_finished(con)) print_connection_info(con); } if (fileno_stdin() > s) width = fileno_stdin() + 1; else width = s + 1; for (;;) { int read_from_terminal; int read_from_sslcon; read_from_terminal = 0; read_from_sslcon = SSL_has_pending(con) || (async && SSL_waiting_for_async(con)); if (!read_from_sslcon) { FD_ZERO(&readfds); #if !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS) openssl_fdset(fileno_stdin(), &readfds); #endif openssl_fdset(s, &readfds); /* * Note: under VMS with SOCKETSHR the second parameter is * currently of type (int *) whereas under other systems it is * (void *) if you don't have a cast it will choke the compiler: * if you do have a cast then you can either go for (int *) or * (void *). */ #if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS) /* * Under DOS (non-djgpp) and Windows we can't select on stdin: * only on sockets. As a workaround we timeout the select every * second and check for any keypress. In a proper Windows * application we wouldn't do this because it is inefficient. */ timeout.tv_sec = 1; timeout.tv_usec = 0; i = select(width, (void *)&readfds, NULL, NULL, &timeout); if (has_stdin_waiting()) read_from_terminal = 1; if ((i < 0) || (!i && !read_from_terminal)) continue; #else if (SSL_is_dtls(con) && DTLSv1_get_timeout(con, &timeout)) timeoutp = &timeout; else timeoutp = NULL; i = select(width, (void *)&readfds, NULL, NULL, timeoutp); if ((SSL_is_dtls(con)) && DTLSv1_handle_timeout(con) > 0) BIO_printf(bio_err, "TIMEOUT occurred\n"); if (i <= 0) continue; if (FD_ISSET(fileno_stdin(), &readfds)) read_from_terminal = 1; #endif if (FD_ISSET(s, &readfds)) read_from_sslcon = 1; } if (read_from_terminal) { if (s_crlf) { int j, lf_num; i = raw_read_stdin(buf, bufsize / 2); lf_num = 0; /* both loops are skipped when i <= 0 */ for (j = 0; j < i; j++) if (buf[j] == '\n') lf_num++; for (j = i - 1; j >= 0; j--) { buf[j + lf_num] = buf[j]; if (buf[j] == '\n') { lf_num--; i++; buf[j + lf_num] = '\r'; } } assert(lf_num == 0); } else { i = raw_read_stdin(buf, bufsize); } if (!s_quiet && !s_brief) { if ((i <= 0) || (buf[0] == 'Q')) { BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "DONE\n"); (void)BIO_flush(bio_s_out); BIO_closesocket(s); close_accept_socket(); ret = -11; goto err; } if ((i <= 0) || (buf[0] == 'q')) { BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "DONE\n"); (void)BIO_flush(bio_s_out); if (SSL_version(con) != DTLS1_VERSION) BIO_closesocket(s); /* * close_accept_socket(); ret= -11; */ goto err; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_HEARTBEATS if ((buf[0] == 'B') && ((buf[1] == '\n') || (buf[1] == '\r'))) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "HEARTBEATING\n"); SSL_heartbeat(con); i = 0; continue; } #endif if ((buf[0] == 'r') && ((buf[1] == '\n') || (buf[1] == '\r'))) { SSL_renegotiate(con); i = SSL_do_handshake(con); printf("SSL_do_handshake -> %d\n", i); i = 0; /* 13; */ continue; } if ((buf[0] == 'R') && ((buf[1] == '\n') || (buf[1] == '\r'))) { SSL_set_verify(con, SSL_VERIFY_PEER | SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE, NULL); SSL_renegotiate(con); i = SSL_do_handshake(con); printf("SSL_do_handshake -> %d\n", i); i = 0; /* 13; */ continue; } if ((buf[0] == 'K' || buf[0] == 'k') && ((buf[1] == '\n') || (buf[1] == '\r'))) { SSL_key_update(con, buf[0] == 'K' ? SSL_KEY_UPDATE_REQUESTED : SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NOT_REQUESTED); i = SSL_do_handshake(con); printf("SSL_do_handshake -> %d\n", i); i = 0; continue; } if (buf[0] == 'c' && ((buf[1] == '\n') || (buf[1] == '\r'))) { SSL_set_verify(con, SSL_VERIFY_PEER, NULL); i = SSL_verify_client_post_handshake(con); if (i == 0) { printf("Failed to initiate request\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); } else { i = SSL_do_handshake(con); printf("SSL_do_handshake -> %d\n", i); i = 0; } continue; } if (buf[0] == 'P') { static const char *str = "Lets print some clear text\n"; BIO_write(SSL_get_wbio(con), str, strlen(str)); } if (buf[0] == 'S') { print_stats(bio_s_out, SSL_get_SSL_CTX(con)); } } #ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC ebcdic2ascii(buf, buf, i); #endif l = k = 0; for (;;) { /* should do a select for the write */ #ifdef RENEG static count = 0; if (++count == 100) { count = 0; SSL_renegotiate(con); } #endif k = SSL_write(con, &(buf[l]), (unsigned int)i); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP while (SSL_get_error(con, k) == SSL_ERROR_WANT_X509_LOOKUP) { BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "LOOKUP renego during write\n"); SRP_user_pwd_free(srp_callback_parm.user); srp_callback_parm.user = SRP_VBASE_get1_by_user(srp_callback_parm.vb, srp_callback_parm.login); if (srp_callback_parm.user) BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "LOOKUP done %s\n", srp_callback_parm.user->info); else BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "LOOKUP not successful\n"); k = SSL_write(con, &(buf[l]), (unsigned int)i); } #endif switch (SSL_get_error(con, k)) { case SSL_ERROR_NONE: break; case SSL_ERROR_WANT_ASYNC: BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "Write BLOCK (Async)\n"); (void)BIO_flush(bio_s_out); wait_for_async(con); break; case SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE: case SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ: case SSL_ERROR_WANT_X509_LOOKUP: BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "Write BLOCK\n"); (void)BIO_flush(bio_s_out); break; case SSL_ERROR_WANT_ASYNC_JOB: /* * This shouldn't ever happen in s_server. Treat as an error */ case SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL: case SSL_ERROR_SSL: BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "ERROR\n"); (void)BIO_flush(bio_s_out); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); ret = 1; goto err; /* break; */ case SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN: BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "DONE\n"); (void)BIO_flush(bio_s_out); ret = 1; goto err; } if (k > 0) { l += k; i -= k; } if (i <= 0) break; } } if (read_from_sslcon) { /* * init_ssl_connection handles all async events itself so if we're * waiting for async then we shouldn't go back into * init_ssl_connection */ if ((!async || !SSL_waiting_for_async(con)) && !SSL_is_init_finished(con)) { i = init_ssl_connection(con); if (i < 0) { ret = 0; goto err; } else if (i == 0) { ret = 1; goto err; } } else { again: i = SSL_read(con, (char *)buf, bufsize); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP while (SSL_get_error(con, i) == SSL_ERROR_WANT_X509_LOOKUP) { BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "LOOKUP renego during read\n"); SRP_user_pwd_free(srp_callback_parm.user); srp_callback_parm.user = SRP_VBASE_get1_by_user(srp_callback_parm.vb, srp_callback_parm.login); if (srp_callback_parm.user) BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "LOOKUP done %s\n", srp_callback_parm.user->info); else BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "LOOKUP not successful\n"); i = SSL_read(con, (char *)buf, bufsize); } #endif switch (SSL_get_error(con, i)) { case SSL_ERROR_NONE: #ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC ascii2ebcdic(buf, buf, i); #endif raw_write_stdout(buf, (unsigned int)i); (void)BIO_flush(bio_s_out); if (SSL_has_pending(con)) goto again; break; case SSL_ERROR_WANT_ASYNC: BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "Read BLOCK (Async)\n"); (void)BIO_flush(bio_s_out); wait_for_async(con); break; case SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE: case SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ: BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "Read BLOCK\n"); (void)BIO_flush(bio_s_out); break; case SSL_ERROR_WANT_ASYNC_JOB: /* * This shouldn't ever happen in s_server. Treat as an error */ case SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL: case SSL_ERROR_SSL: BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "ERROR\n"); (void)BIO_flush(bio_s_out); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); ret = 1; goto err; case SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN: BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "DONE\n"); (void)BIO_flush(bio_s_out); ret = 1; goto err; } } } } err: if (con != NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "shutting down SSL\n"); SSL_set_shutdown(con, SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN | SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN); SSL_free(con); } BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "CONNECTION CLOSED\n"); OPENSSL_clear_free(buf, bufsize); return ret; } static void close_accept_socket(void) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "shutdown accept socket\n"); if (accept_socket >= 0) { BIO_closesocket(accept_socket); } } static int is_retryable(SSL *con, int i) { int err = SSL_get_error(con, i); /* If it's not a fatal error, it must be retryable */ return (err != SSL_ERROR_SSL) && (err != SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL) && (err != SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN); } static int init_ssl_connection(SSL *con) { int i; long verify_err; int retry = 0; if (dtlslisten || stateless) { BIO_ADDR *client = NULL; if (dtlslisten) { if ((client = BIO_ADDR_new()) == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "ERROR - memory\n"); return 0; } i = DTLSv1_listen(con, client); } else { i = SSL_stateless(con); } if (i > 0) { BIO *wbio; int fd = -1; if (dtlslisten) { wbio = SSL_get_wbio(con); if (wbio) { BIO_get_fd(wbio, &fd); } if (!wbio || BIO_connect(fd, client, 0) == 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "ERROR - unable to connect\n"); BIO_ADDR_free(client); return 0; } (void)BIO_ctrl_set_connected(wbio, client); BIO_ADDR_free(client); dtlslisten = 0; } else { stateless = 0; } i = SSL_accept(con); } else { BIO_ADDR_free(client); } } else { do { i = SSL_accept(con); if (i <= 0) retry = is_retryable(con, i); #ifdef CERT_CB_TEST_RETRY { while (i <= 0 && SSL_get_error(con, i) == SSL_ERROR_WANT_X509_LOOKUP && SSL_get_state(con) == TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "LOOKUP from certificate callback during accept\n"); i = SSL_accept(con); if (i <= 0) retry = is_retryable(con, i); } } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP while (i <= 0 && SSL_get_error(con, i) == SSL_ERROR_WANT_X509_LOOKUP) { BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "LOOKUP during accept %s\n", srp_callback_parm.login); SRP_user_pwd_free(srp_callback_parm.user); srp_callback_parm.user = SRP_VBASE_get1_by_user(srp_callback_parm.vb, srp_callback_parm.login); if (srp_callback_parm.user) BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "LOOKUP done %s\n", srp_callback_parm.user->info); else BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "LOOKUP not successful\n"); i = SSL_accept(con); if (i <= 0) retry = is_retryable(con, i); } #endif } while (i < 0 && SSL_waiting_for_async(con)); } if (i <= 0) { if (((dtlslisten || stateless) && i == 0) || (!dtlslisten && !stateless && retry)) { BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "DELAY\n"); return 1; } BIO_printf(bio_err, "ERROR\n"); verify_err = SSL_get_verify_result(con); if (verify_err != X509_V_OK) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "verify error:%s\n", X509_verify_cert_error_string(verify_err)); } /* Always print any error messages */ ERR_print_errors(bio_err); return 0; } print_connection_info(con); return 1; } static void print_connection_info(SSL *con) { const char *str; X509 *peer; char buf[BUFSIZ]; #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) const unsigned char *next_proto_neg; unsigned next_proto_neg_len; #endif unsigned char *exportedkeymat; int i; if (s_brief) print_ssl_summary(con); PEM_write_bio_SSL_SESSION(bio_s_out, SSL_get_session(con)); peer = SSL_get_peer_certificate(con); if (peer != NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "Client certificate\n"); PEM_write_bio_X509(bio_s_out, peer); dump_cert_text(bio_s_out, peer); X509_free(peer); peer = NULL; } if (SSL_get_shared_ciphers(con, buf, sizeof(buf)) != NULL) BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "Shared ciphers:%s\n", buf); str = SSL_CIPHER_get_name(SSL_get_current_cipher(con)); ssl_print_sigalgs(bio_s_out, con); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC ssl_print_point_formats(bio_s_out, con); ssl_print_groups(bio_s_out, con, 0); #endif print_ca_names(bio_s_out, con); BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "CIPHER is %s\n", (str != NULL) ? str : "(NONE)"); #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) SSL_get0_next_proto_negotiated(con, &next_proto_neg, &next_proto_neg_len); if (next_proto_neg) { BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "NEXTPROTO is "); BIO_write(bio_s_out, next_proto_neg, next_proto_neg_len); BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "\n"); } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP { SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *srtp_profile = SSL_get_selected_srtp_profile(con); if (srtp_profile) BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "SRTP Extension negotiated, profile=%s\n", srtp_profile->name); } #endif if (SSL_session_reused(con)) BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "Reused session-id\n"); BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "Secure Renegotiation IS%s supported\n", SSL_get_secure_renegotiation_support(con) ? "" : " NOT"); if ((SSL_get_options(con) & SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION)) BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "Renegotiation is DISABLED\n"); if (keymatexportlabel != NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "Keying material exporter:\n"); BIO_printf(bio_s_out, " Label: '%s'\n", keymatexportlabel); BIO_printf(bio_s_out, " Length: %i bytes\n", keymatexportlen); exportedkeymat = app_malloc(keymatexportlen, "export key"); if (!SSL_export_keying_material(con, exportedkeymat, keymatexportlen, keymatexportlabel, strlen(keymatexportlabel), NULL, 0, 0)) { BIO_printf(bio_s_out, " Error\n"); } else { BIO_printf(bio_s_out, " Keying material: "); for (i = 0; i < keymatexportlen; i++) BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "%02X", exportedkeymat[i]); BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "\n"); } OPENSSL_free(exportedkeymat); } (void)BIO_flush(bio_s_out); } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH static DH *load_dh_param(const char *dhfile) { DH *ret = NULL; BIO *bio; if ((bio = BIO_new_file(dhfile, "r")) == NULL) goto err; ret = PEM_read_bio_DHparams(bio, NULL, NULL, NULL); err: BIO_free(bio); return ret; } #endif static int www_body(int s, int stype, int prot, unsigned char *context) { char *buf = NULL; int ret = 1; int i, j, k, dot; SSL *con; const SSL_CIPHER *c; BIO *io, *ssl_bio, *sbio; #ifdef RENEG int total_bytes = 0; #endif int width; fd_set readfds; /* Set width for a select call if needed */ width = s + 1; buf = app_malloc(bufsize, "server www buffer"); io = BIO_new(BIO_f_buffer()); ssl_bio = BIO_new(BIO_f_ssl()); if ((io == NULL) || (ssl_bio == NULL)) goto err; if (s_nbio) { if (!BIO_socket_nbio(s, 1)) ERR_print_errors(bio_err); else if (!s_quiet) BIO_printf(bio_err, "Turned on non blocking io\n"); } /* lets make the output buffer a reasonable size */ if (!BIO_set_write_buffer_size(io, bufsize)) goto err; if ((con = SSL_new(ctx)) == NULL) goto err; if (s_tlsextdebug) { SSL_set_tlsext_debug_callback(con, tlsext_cb); SSL_set_tlsext_debug_arg(con, bio_s_out); } if (context != NULL && !SSL_set_session_id_context(con, context, strlen((char *)context))) { SSL_free(con); goto err; } sbio = BIO_new_socket(s, BIO_NOCLOSE); if (s_nbio_test) { BIO *test; test = BIO_new(BIO_f_nbio_test()); sbio = BIO_push(test, sbio); } SSL_set_bio(con, sbio, sbio); SSL_set_accept_state(con); /* No need to free |con| after this. Done by BIO_free(ssl_bio) */ BIO_set_ssl(ssl_bio, con, BIO_CLOSE); BIO_push(io, ssl_bio); #ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC io = BIO_push(BIO_new(BIO_f_ebcdic_filter()), io); #endif if (s_debug) { BIO_set_callback(SSL_get_rbio(con), bio_dump_callback); BIO_set_callback_arg(SSL_get_rbio(con), (char *)bio_s_out); } if (s_msg) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL_TRACE if (s_msg == 2) SSL_set_msg_callback(con, SSL_trace); else #endif SSL_set_msg_callback(con, msg_cb); SSL_set_msg_callback_arg(con, bio_s_msg ? bio_s_msg : bio_s_out); } for (;;) { i = BIO_gets(io, buf, bufsize - 1); if (i < 0) { /* error */ if (!BIO_should_retry(io) && !SSL_waiting_for_async(con)) { if (!s_quiet) ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto err; } else { BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "read R BLOCK\n"); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP if (BIO_should_io_special(io) && BIO_get_retry_reason(io) == BIO_RR_SSL_X509_LOOKUP) { BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "LOOKUP renego during read\n"); SRP_user_pwd_free(srp_callback_parm.user); srp_callback_parm.user = SRP_VBASE_get1_by_user(srp_callback_parm.vb, srp_callback_parm.login); if (srp_callback_parm.user) BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "LOOKUP done %s\n", srp_callback_parm.user->info); else BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "LOOKUP not successful\n"); continue; } #endif #if !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS) sleep(1); #endif continue; } } else if (i == 0) { /* end of input */ ret = 1; goto end; } /* else we have data */ if (((www == 1) && (strncmp("GET ", buf, 4) == 0)) || ((www == 2) && (strncmp("GET /stats ", buf, 11) == 0))) { char *p; X509 *peer = NULL; STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk; static const char *space = " "; if (www == 1 && strncmp("GET /reneg", buf, 10) == 0) { if (strncmp("GET /renegcert", buf, 14) == 0) SSL_set_verify(con, SSL_VERIFY_PEER | SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE, NULL); i = SSL_renegotiate(con); BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "SSL_renegotiate -> %d\n", i); /* Send the HelloRequest */ i = SSL_do_handshake(con); if (i <= 0) { BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "SSL_do_handshake() Retval %d\n", SSL_get_error(con, i)); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto err; } /* Wait for a ClientHello to come back */ FD_ZERO(&readfds); openssl_fdset(s, &readfds); i = select(width, (void *)&readfds, NULL, NULL, NULL); if (i <= 0 || !FD_ISSET(s, &readfds)) { BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "Error waiting for client response\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto err; } /* * We're not actually expecting any data here and we ignore * any that is sent. This is just to force the handshake that * we're expecting to come from the client. If they haven't * sent one there's not much we can do. */ BIO_gets(io, buf, bufsize - 1); } BIO_puts(io, "HTTP/1.0 200 ok\r\nContent-type: text/html\r\n\r\n"); BIO_puts(io, "\n"); BIO_puts(io, "
\n");
             /* BIO_puts(io, OpenSSL_version(OPENSSL_VERSION)); */
             BIO_puts(io, "\n");
             for (i = 0; i < local_argc; i++) {
                 const char *myp;
                 for (myp = local_argv[i]; *myp; myp++)
                     switch (*myp) {
                     case '<':
                         BIO_puts(io, "<");
                         break;
                     case '>':
                         BIO_puts(io, ">");
                         break;
                     case '&':
                         BIO_puts(io, "&");
                         break;
                     default:
                         BIO_write(io, myp, 1);
                         break;
                     }
                 BIO_write(io, " ", 1);
             }
             BIO_puts(io, "\n");
 
             BIO_printf(io,
                        "Secure Renegotiation IS%s supported\n",
                        SSL_get_secure_renegotiation_support(con) ?
                        "" : " NOT");
 
             /*
              * The following is evil and should not really be done
              */
             BIO_printf(io, "Ciphers supported in s_server binary\n");
             sk = SSL_get_ciphers(con);
             j = sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk);
             for (i = 0; i < j; i++) {
                 c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, i);
                 BIO_printf(io, "%-11s:%-25s ",
                            SSL_CIPHER_get_version(c), SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
                 if ((((i + 1) % 2) == 0) && (i + 1 != j))
                     BIO_puts(io, "\n");
             }
             BIO_puts(io, "\n");
             p = SSL_get_shared_ciphers(con, buf, bufsize);
             if (p != NULL) {
                 BIO_printf(io,
                            "---\nCiphers common between both SSL end points:\n");
                 j = i = 0;
                 while (*p) {
                     if (*p == ':') {
                         BIO_write(io, space, 26 - j);
                         i++;
                         j = 0;
                         BIO_write(io, ((i % 3) ? " " : "\n"), 1);
                     } else {
                         BIO_write(io, p, 1);
                         j++;
                     }
                     p++;
                 }
                 BIO_puts(io, "\n");
             }
             ssl_print_sigalgs(io, con);
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
             ssl_print_groups(io, con, 0);
 #endif
             print_ca_names(io, con);
             BIO_printf(io, (SSL_session_reused(con)
                             ? "---\nReused, " : "---\nNew, "));
             c = SSL_get_current_cipher(con);
             BIO_printf(io, "%s, Cipher is %s\n",
                        SSL_CIPHER_get_version(c), SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c));
             SSL_SESSION_print(io, SSL_get_session(con));
             BIO_printf(io, "---\n");
             print_stats(io, SSL_get_SSL_CTX(con));
             BIO_printf(io, "---\n");
             peer = SSL_get_peer_certificate(con);
             if (peer != NULL) {
                 BIO_printf(io, "Client certificate\n");
                 X509_print(io, peer);
                 PEM_write_bio_X509(io, peer);
                 X509_free(peer);
                 peer = NULL;
             } else {
                 BIO_puts(io, "no client certificate available\n");
             }
             BIO_puts(io, "
\r\n\r\n"); break; } else if ((www == 2 || www == 3) && (strncmp("GET /", buf, 5) == 0)) { BIO *file; char *p, *e; static const char *text = "HTTP/1.0 200 ok\r\nContent-type: text/plain\r\n\r\n"; /* skip the '/' */ p = &(buf[5]); dot = 1; for (e = p; *e != '\0'; e++) { if (e[0] == ' ') break; if (e[0] == ':') { /* Windows drive. We treat this the same way as ".." */ dot = -1; break; } switch (dot) { case 1: dot = (e[0] == '.') ? 2 : 0; break; case 2: dot = (e[0] == '.') ? 3 : 0; break; case 3: dot = (e[0] == '/' || e[0] == '\\') ? -1 : 0; break; } if (dot == 0) dot = (e[0] == '/' || e[0] == '\\') ? 1 : 0; } dot = (dot == 3) || (dot == -1); /* filename contains ".." * component */ if (*e == '\0') { BIO_puts(io, text); BIO_printf(io, "'%s' is an invalid file name\r\n", p); break; } *e = '\0'; if (dot) { BIO_puts(io, text); BIO_printf(io, "'%s' contains '..' or ':'\r\n", p); break; } if (*p == '/' || *p == '\\') { BIO_puts(io, text); BIO_printf(io, "'%s' is an invalid path\r\n", p); break; } /* if a directory, do the index thang */ if (app_isdir(p) > 0) { BIO_puts(io, text); BIO_printf(io, "'%s' is a directory\r\n", p); break; } if ((file = BIO_new_file(p, "r")) == NULL) { BIO_puts(io, text); BIO_printf(io, "Error opening '%s'\r\n", p); ERR_print_errors(io); break; } if (!s_quiet) BIO_printf(bio_err, "FILE:%s\n", p); if (www == 2) { i = strlen(p); if (((i > 5) && (strcmp(&(p[i - 5]), ".html") == 0)) || ((i > 4) && (strcmp(&(p[i - 4]), ".php") == 0)) || ((i > 4) && (strcmp(&(p[i - 4]), ".htm") == 0))) BIO_puts(io, "HTTP/1.0 200 ok\r\nContent-type: text/html\r\n\r\n"); else BIO_puts(io, "HTTP/1.0 200 ok\r\nContent-type: text/plain\r\n\r\n"); } /* send the file */ for (;;) { i = BIO_read(file, buf, bufsize); if (i <= 0) break; #ifdef RENEG total_bytes += i; BIO_printf(bio_err, "%d\n", i); if (total_bytes > 3 * 1024) { total_bytes = 0; BIO_printf(bio_err, "RENEGOTIATE\n"); SSL_renegotiate(con); } #endif for (j = 0; j < i;) { #ifdef RENEG static count = 0; if (++count == 13) { SSL_renegotiate(con); } #endif k = BIO_write(io, &(buf[j]), i - j); if (k <= 0) { if (!BIO_should_retry(io) && !SSL_waiting_for_async(con)) goto write_error; else { BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "rwrite W BLOCK\n"); } } else { j += k; } } } write_error: BIO_free(file); break; } } for (;;) { i = (int)BIO_flush(io); if (i <= 0) { if (!BIO_should_retry(io)) break; } else break; } end: /* make sure we re-use sessions */ SSL_set_shutdown(con, SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN | SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN); err: OPENSSL_free(buf); BIO_free_all(io); return ret; } static int rev_body(int s, int stype, int prot, unsigned char *context) { char *buf = NULL; int i; int ret = 1; SSL *con; BIO *io, *ssl_bio, *sbio; buf = app_malloc(bufsize, "server rev buffer"); io = BIO_new(BIO_f_buffer()); ssl_bio = BIO_new(BIO_f_ssl()); if ((io == NULL) || (ssl_bio == NULL)) goto err; /* lets make the output buffer a reasonable size */ if (!BIO_set_write_buffer_size(io, bufsize)) goto err; if ((con = SSL_new(ctx)) == NULL) goto err; if (s_tlsextdebug) { SSL_set_tlsext_debug_callback(con, tlsext_cb); SSL_set_tlsext_debug_arg(con, bio_s_out); } if (context != NULL && !SSL_set_session_id_context(con, context, strlen((char *)context))) { SSL_free(con); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto err; } sbio = BIO_new_socket(s, BIO_NOCLOSE); SSL_set_bio(con, sbio, sbio); SSL_set_accept_state(con); /* No need to free |con| after this. Done by BIO_free(ssl_bio) */ BIO_set_ssl(ssl_bio, con, BIO_CLOSE); BIO_push(io, ssl_bio); #ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC io = BIO_push(BIO_new(BIO_f_ebcdic_filter()), io); #endif if (s_debug) { BIO_set_callback(SSL_get_rbio(con), bio_dump_callback); BIO_set_callback_arg(SSL_get_rbio(con), (char *)bio_s_out); } if (s_msg) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL_TRACE if (s_msg == 2) SSL_set_msg_callback(con, SSL_trace); else #endif SSL_set_msg_callback(con, msg_cb); SSL_set_msg_callback_arg(con, bio_s_msg ? bio_s_msg : bio_s_out); } for (;;) { i = BIO_do_handshake(io); if (i > 0) break; if (!BIO_should_retry(io)) { BIO_puts(bio_err, "CONNECTION FAILURE\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto end; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP if (BIO_should_io_special(io) && BIO_get_retry_reason(io) == BIO_RR_SSL_X509_LOOKUP) { BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "LOOKUP renego during accept\n"); SRP_user_pwd_free(srp_callback_parm.user); srp_callback_parm.user = SRP_VBASE_get1_by_user(srp_callback_parm.vb, srp_callback_parm.login); if (srp_callback_parm.user) BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "LOOKUP done %s\n", srp_callback_parm.user->info); else BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "LOOKUP not successful\n"); continue; } #endif } BIO_printf(bio_err, "CONNECTION ESTABLISHED\n"); print_ssl_summary(con); for (;;) { i = BIO_gets(io, buf, bufsize - 1); if (i < 0) { /* error */ if (!BIO_should_retry(io)) { if (!s_quiet) ERR_print_errors(bio_err); goto err; } else { BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "read R BLOCK\n"); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP if (BIO_should_io_special(io) && BIO_get_retry_reason(io) == BIO_RR_SSL_X509_LOOKUP) { BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "LOOKUP renego during read\n"); SRP_user_pwd_free(srp_callback_parm.user); srp_callback_parm.user = SRP_VBASE_get1_by_user(srp_callback_parm.vb, srp_callback_parm.login); if (srp_callback_parm.user) BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "LOOKUP done %s\n", srp_callback_parm.user->info); else BIO_printf(bio_s_out, "LOOKUP not successful\n"); continue; } #endif #if !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS) sleep(1); #endif continue; } } else if (i == 0) { /* end of input */ ret = 1; BIO_printf(bio_err, "CONNECTION CLOSED\n"); goto end; } else { char *p = buf + i - 1; while (i && (*p == '\n' || *p == '\r')) { p--; i--; } if (!s_ign_eof && (i == 5) && (strncmp(buf, "CLOSE", 5) == 0)) { ret = 1; BIO_printf(bio_err, "CONNECTION CLOSED\n"); goto end; } BUF_reverse((unsigned char *)buf, NULL, i); buf[i] = '\n'; BIO_write(io, buf, i + 1); for (;;) { i = BIO_flush(io); if (i > 0) break; if (!BIO_should_retry(io)) goto end; } } } end: /* make sure we re-use sessions */ SSL_set_shutdown(con, SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN | SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN); err: OPENSSL_free(buf); BIO_free_all(io); return ret; } #define MAX_SESSION_ID_ATTEMPTS 10 static int generate_session_id(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *id, unsigned int *id_len) { unsigned int count = 0; do { if (RAND_bytes(id, *id_len) <= 0) return 0; /* * Prefix the session_id with the required prefix. NB: If our prefix * is too long, clip it - but there will be worse effects anyway, eg. * the server could only possibly create 1 session ID (ie. the * prefix!) so all future session negotiations will fail due to * conflicts. */ memcpy(id, session_id_prefix, (strlen(session_id_prefix) < *id_len) ? strlen(session_id_prefix) : *id_len); } while (SSL_has_matching_session_id(ssl, id, *id_len) && (++count < MAX_SESSION_ID_ATTEMPTS)); if (count >= MAX_SESSION_ID_ATTEMPTS) return 0; return 1; } /* * By default s_server uses an in-memory cache which caches SSL_SESSION * structures without any serialisation. This hides some bugs which only * become apparent in deployed servers. By implementing a basic external * session cache some issues can be debugged using s_server. */ typedef struct simple_ssl_session_st { unsigned char *id; unsigned int idlen; unsigned char *der; int derlen; struct simple_ssl_session_st *next; } simple_ssl_session; static simple_ssl_session *first = NULL; static int add_session(SSL *ssl, SSL_SESSION *session) { simple_ssl_session *sess = app_malloc(sizeof(*sess), "get session"); unsigned char *p; SSL_SESSION_get_id(session, &sess->idlen); sess->derlen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(session, NULL); if (sess->derlen < 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error encoding session\n"); OPENSSL_free(sess); return 0; } sess->id = OPENSSL_memdup(SSL_SESSION_get_id(session, NULL), sess->idlen); sess->der = app_malloc(sess->derlen, "get session buffer"); if (!sess->id) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Out of memory adding to external cache\n"); OPENSSL_free(sess->id); OPENSSL_free(sess->der); OPENSSL_free(sess); return 0; } p = sess->der; /* Assume it still works. */ if (i2d_SSL_SESSION(session, &p) != sess->derlen) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Unexpected session encoding length\n"); OPENSSL_free(sess->id); OPENSSL_free(sess->der); OPENSSL_free(sess); return 0; } sess->next = first; first = sess; BIO_printf(bio_err, "New session added to external cache\n"); return 0; } static SSL_SESSION *get_session(SSL *ssl, const unsigned char *id, int idlen, int *do_copy) { simple_ssl_session *sess; *do_copy = 0; for (sess = first; sess; sess = sess->next) { if (idlen == (int)sess->idlen && !memcmp(sess->id, id, idlen)) { const unsigned char *p = sess->der; BIO_printf(bio_err, "Lookup session: cache hit\n"); return d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &p, sess->derlen); } } BIO_printf(bio_err, "Lookup session: cache miss\n"); return NULL; } static void del_session(SSL_CTX *sctx, SSL_SESSION *session) { simple_ssl_session *sess, *prev = NULL; const unsigned char *id; unsigned int idlen; id = SSL_SESSION_get_id(session, &idlen); for (sess = first; sess; sess = sess->next) { if (idlen == sess->idlen && !memcmp(sess->id, id, idlen)) { if (prev) prev->next = sess->next; else first = sess->next; OPENSSL_free(sess->id); OPENSSL_free(sess->der); OPENSSL_free(sess); return; } prev = sess; } } static void init_session_cache_ctx(SSL_CTX *sctx) { SSL_CTX_set_session_cache_mode(sctx, SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL | SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER); SSL_CTX_sess_set_new_cb(sctx, add_session); SSL_CTX_sess_set_get_cb(sctx, get_session); SSL_CTX_sess_set_remove_cb(sctx, del_session); } static void free_sessions(void) { simple_ssl_session *sess, *tsess; for (sess = first; sess;) { OPENSSL_free(sess->id); OPENSSL_free(sess->der); tsess = sess; sess = sess->next; OPENSSL_free(tsess); } first = NULL; } #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SOCK */ diff --git a/apps/speed.c b/apps/speed.c index d4ae7ab7bfde..89bf18480fa1 100644 --- a/apps/speed.c +++ b/apps/speed.c @@ -1,3719 +1,3723 @@ /* - * Copyright 1995-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 1995-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #undef SECONDS #define SECONDS 3 #define RSA_SECONDS 10 #define DSA_SECONDS 10 #define ECDSA_SECONDS 10 #define ECDH_SECONDS 10 #define EdDSA_SECONDS 10 #include #include #include #include #include "apps.h" #include "progs.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include #if !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS) # include OPENSSL_UNISTD #endif #if defined(_WIN32) # include #endif #include #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DES # include #endif #include #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CAMELLIA # include #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD2 # include #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MDC2 # include #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD4 # include #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5 # include #endif #include #include #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RMD160 # include #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_WHIRLPOOL # include #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC4 # include #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC5 # include #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC2 # include #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_IDEA # include #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SEED # include #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_BF # include #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CAST # include #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA # include # include "./testrsa.h" #endif #include #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA # include # include "./testdsa.h" #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC # include #endif #include #ifndef HAVE_FORK # if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VXWORKS) # define HAVE_FORK 0 # else # define HAVE_FORK 1 # endif #endif #if HAVE_FORK # undef NO_FORK #else # define NO_FORK #endif #define MAX_MISALIGNMENT 63 #define MAX_ECDH_SIZE 256 #define MISALIGN 64 typedef struct openssl_speed_sec_st { int sym; int rsa; int dsa; int ecdsa; int ecdh; int eddsa; } openssl_speed_sec_t; static volatile int run = 0; static int mr = 0; static int usertime = 1; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD2 static int EVP_Digest_MD2_loop(void *args); #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MDC2 static int EVP_Digest_MDC2_loop(void *args); #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD4 static int EVP_Digest_MD4_loop(void *args); #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5 static int MD5_loop(void *args); static int HMAC_loop(void *args); #endif static int SHA1_loop(void *args); static int SHA256_loop(void *args); static int SHA512_loop(void *args); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_WHIRLPOOL static int WHIRLPOOL_loop(void *args); #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RMD160 static int EVP_Digest_RMD160_loop(void *args); #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC4 static int RC4_loop(void *args); #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DES static int DES_ncbc_encrypt_loop(void *args); static int DES_ede3_cbc_encrypt_loop(void *args); #endif static int AES_cbc_128_encrypt_loop(void *args); static int AES_cbc_192_encrypt_loop(void *args); static int AES_ige_128_encrypt_loop(void *args); static int AES_cbc_256_encrypt_loop(void *args); static int AES_ige_192_encrypt_loop(void *args); static int AES_ige_256_encrypt_loop(void *args); static int CRYPTO_gcm128_aad_loop(void *args); static int RAND_bytes_loop(void *args); static int EVP_Update_loop(void *args); static int EVP_Update_loop_ccm(void *args); static int EVP_Update_loop_aead(void *args); static int EVP_Digest_loop(void *args); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA static int RSA_sign_loop(void *args); static int RSA_verify_loop(void *args); #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA static int DSA_sign_loop(void *args); static int DSA_verify_loop(void *args); #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC static int ECDSA_sign_loop(void *args); static int ECDSA_verify_loop(void *args); static int EdDSA_sign_loop(void *args); static int EdDSA_verify_loop(void *args); #endif static double Time_F(int s); static void print_message(const char *s, long num, int length, int tm); static void pkey_print_message(const char *str, const char *str2, long num, unsigned int bits, int sec); static void print_result(int alg, int run_no, int count, double time_used); #ifndef NO_FORK static int do_multi(int multi, int size_num); #endif static const int lengths_list[] = { 16, 64, 256, 1024, 8 * 1024, 16 * 1024 }; static const int *lengths = lengths_list; static const int aead_lengths_list[] = { 2, 31, 136, 1024, 8 * 1024, 16 * 1024 }; #define START 0 #define STOP 1 #ifdef SIGALRM static void alarmed(int sig) { signal(SIGALRM, alarmed); run = 0; } static double Time_F(int s) { double ret = app_tminterval(s, usertime); if (s == STOP) alarm(0); return ret; } #elif defined(_WIN32) # define SIGALRM -1 static unsigned int lapse; static volatile unsigned int schlock; static void alarm_win32(unsigned int secs) { lapse = secs * 1000; } # define alarm alarm_win32 static DWORD WINAPI sleepy(VOID * arg) { schlock = 1; Sleep(lapse); run = 0; return 0; } static double Time_F(int s) { double ret; static HANDLE thr; if (s == START) { schlock = 0; thr = CreateThread(NULL, 4096, sleepy, NULL, 0, NULL); if (thr == NULL) { DWORD err = GetLastError(); BIO_printf(bio_err, "unable to CreateThread (%lu)", err); ExitProcess(err); } while (!schlock) Sleep(0); /* scheduler spinlock */ ret = app_tminterval(s, usertime); } else { ret = app_tminterval(s, usertime); if (run) TerminateThread(thr, 0); CloseHandle(thr); } return ret; } #else static double Time_F(int s) { return app_tminterval(s, usertime); } #endif static void multiblock_speed(const EVP_CIPHER *evp_cipher, int lengths_single, const openssl_speed_sec_t *seconds); #define found(value, pairs, result)\ opt_found(value, result, pairs, OSSL_NELEM(pairs)) static int opt_found(const char *name, unsigned int *result, const OPT_PAIR pairs[], unsigned int nbelem) { unsigned int idx; for (idx = 0; idx < nbelem; ++idx, pairs++) if (strcmp(name, pairs->name) == 0) { *result = pairs->retval; return 1; } return 0; } typedef enum OPTION_choice { OPT_ERR = -1, OPT_EOF = 0, OPT_HELP, OPT_ELAPSED, OPT_EVP, OPT_DECRYPT, OPT_ENGINE, OPT_MULTI, OPT_MR, OPT_MB, OPT_MISALIGN, OPT_ASYNCJOBS, OPT_R_ENUM, OPT_PRIMES, OPT_SECONDS, OPT_BYTES, OPT_AEAD } OPTION_CHOICE; const OPTIONS speed_options[] = { {OPT_HELP_STR, 1, '-', "Usage: %s [options] ciphers...\n"}, {OPT_HELP_STR, 1, '-', "Valid options are:\n"}, {"help", OPT_HELP, '-', "Display this summary"}, {"evp", OPT_EVP, 's', "Use EVP-named cipher or digest"}, {"decrypt", OPT_DECRYPT, '-', "Time decryption instead of encryption (only EVP)"}, {"aead", OPT_AEAD, '-', "Benchmark EVP-named AEAD cipher in TLS-like sequence"}, {"mb", OPT_MB, '-', "Enable (tls1>=1) multi-block mode on EVP-named cipher"}, {"mr", OPT_MR, '-', "Produce machine readable output"}, #ifndef NO_FORK {"multi", OPT_MULTI, 'p', "Run benchmarks in parallel"}, #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ASYNC {"async_jobs", OPT_ASYNCJOBS, 'p', "Enable async mode and start specified number of jobs"}, #endif OPT_R_OPTIONS, #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE {"engine", OPT_ENGINE, 's', "Use engine, possibly a hardware device"}, #endif {"elapsed", OPT_ELAPSED, '-', "Use wall-clock time instead of CPU user time as divisor"}, {"primes", OPT_PRIMES, 'p', "Specify number of primes (for RSA only)"}, {"seconds", OPT_SECONDS, 'p', "Run benchmarks for specified amount of seconds"}, {"bytes", OPT_BYTES, 'p', "Run [non-PKI] benchmarks on custom-sized buffer"}, {"misalign", OPT_MISALIGN, 'p', "Use specified offset to mis-align buffers"}, {NULL} }; #define D_MD2 0 #define D_MDC2 1 #define D_MD4 2 #define D_MD5 3 #define D_HMAC 4 #define D_SHA1 5 #define D_RMD160 6 #define D_RC4 7 #define D_CBC_DES 8 #define D_EDE3_DES 9 #define D_CBC_IDEA 10 #define D_CBC_SEED 11 #define D_CBC_RC2 12 #define D_CBC_RC5 13 #define D_CBC_BF 14 #define D_CBC_CAST 15 #define D_CBC_128_AES 16 #define D_CBC_192_AES 17 #define D_CBC_256_AES 18 #define D_CBC_128_CML 19 #define D_CBC_192_CML 20 #define D_CBC_256_CML 21 #define D_EVP 22 #define D_SHA256 23 #define D_SHA512 24 #define D_WHIRLPOOL 25 #define D_IGE_128_AES 26 #define D_IGE_192_AES 27 #define D_IGE_256_AES 28 #define D_GHASH 29 #define D_RAND 30 /* name of algorithms to test */ static const char *names[] = { "md2", "mdc2", "md4", "md5", "hmac(md5)", "sha1", "rmd160", "rc4", "des cbc", "des ede3", "idea cbc", "seed cbc", "rc2 cbc", "rc5-32/12 cbc", "blowfish cbc", "cast cbc", "aes-128 cbc", "aes-192 cbc", "aes-256 cbc", "camellia-128 cbc", "camellia-192 cbc", "camellia-256 cbc", "evp", "sha256", "sha512", "whirlpool", "aes-128 ige", "aes-192 ige", "aes-256 ige", "ghash", "rand" }; #define ALGOR_NUM OSSL_NELEM(names) /* list of configured algorithm (remaining) */ static const OPT_PAIR doit_choices[] = { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD2 {"md2", D_MD2}, #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MDC2 {"mdc2", D_MDC2}, #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD4 {"md4", D_MD4}, #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5 {"md5", D_MD5}, {"hmac", D_HMAC}, #endif {"sha1", D_SHA1}, {"sha256", D_SHA256}, {"sha512", D_SHA512}, #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_WHIRLPOOL {"whirlpool", D_WHIRLPOOL}, #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RMD160 {"ripemd", D_RMD160}, {"rmd160", D_RMD160}, {"ripemd160", D_RMD160}, #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC4 {"rc4", D_RC4}, #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DES {"des-cbc", D_CBC_DES}, {"des-ede3", D_EDE3_DES}, #endif {"aes-128-cbc", D_CBC_128_AES}, {"aes-192-cbc", D_CBC_192_AES}, {"aes-256-cbc", D_CBC_256_AES}, {"aes-128-ige", D_IGE_128_AES}, {"aes-192-ige", D_IGE_192_AES}, {"aes-256-ige", D_IGE_256_AES}, #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC2 {"rc2-cbc", D_CBC_RC2}, {"rc2", D_CBC_RC2}, #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC5 {"rc5-cbc", D_CBC_RC5}, {"rc5", D_CBC_RC5}, #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_IDEA {"idea-cbc", D_CBC_IDEA}, {"idea", D_CBC_IDEA}, #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SEED {"seed-cbc", D_CBC_SEED}, {"seed", D_CBC_SEED}, #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_BF {"bf-cbc", D_CBC_BF}, {"blowfish", D_CBC_BF}, {"bf", D_CBC_BF}, #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CAST {"cast-cbc", D_CBC_CAST}, {"cast", D_CBC_CAST}, {"cast5", D_CBC_CAST}, #endif {"ghash", D_GHASH}, {"rand", D_RAND} }; static double results[ALGOR_NUM][OSSL_NELEM(lengths_list)]; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA # define R_DSA_512 0 # define R_DSA_1024 1 # define R_DSA_2048 2 static const OPT_PAIR dsa_choices[] = { {"dsa512", R_DSA_512}, {"dsa1024", R_DSA_1024}, {"dsa2048", R_DSA_2048} }; # define DSA_NUM OSSL_NELEM(dsa_choices) static double dsa_results[DSA_NUM][2]; /* 2 ops: sign then verify */ #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */ #define R_RSA_512 0 #define R_RSA_1024 1 #define R_RSA_2048 2 #define R_RSA_3072 3 #define R_RSA_4096 4 #define R_RSA_7680 5 #define R_RSA_15360 6 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA static const OPT_PAIR rsa_choices[] = { {"rsa512", R_RSA_512}, {"rsa1024", R_RSA_1024}, {"rsa2048", R_RSA_2048}, {"rsa3072", R_RSA_3072}, {"rsa4096", R_RSA_4096}, {"rsa7680", R_RSA_7680}, {"rsa15360", R_RSA_15360} }; # define RSA_NUM OSSL_NELEM(rsa_choices) static double rsa_results[RSA_NUM][2]; /* 2 ops: sign then verify */ #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */ enum { R_EC_P160, R_EC_P192, R_EC_P224, R_EC_P256, R_EC_P384, R_EC_P521, #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M R_EC_K163, R_EC_K233, R_EC_K283, R_EC_K409, R_EC_K571, R_EC_B163, R_EC_B233, R_EC_B283, R_EC_B409, R_EC_B571, #endif R_EC_BRP256R1, R_EC_BRP256T1, R_EC_BRP384R1, R_EC_BRP384T1, R_EC_BRP512R1, R_EC_BRP512T1, R_EC_X25519, R_EC_X448 }; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC static OPT_PAIR ecdsa_choices[] = { {"ecdsap160", R_EC_P160}, {"ecdsap192", R_EC_P192}, {"ecdsap224", R_EC_P224}, {"ecdsap256", R_EC_P256}, {"ecdsap384", R_EC_P384}, {"ecdsap521", R_EC_P521}, # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M {"ecdsak163", R_EC_K163}, {"ecdsak233", R_EC_K233}, {"ecdsak283", R_EC_K283}, {"ecdsak409", R_EC_K409}, {"ecdsak571", R_EC_K571}, {"ecdsab163", R_EC_B163}, {"ecdsab233", R_EC_B233}, {"ecdsab283", R_EC_B283}, {"ecdsab409", R_EC_B409}, {"ecdsab571", R_EC_B571}, # endif {"ecdsabrp256r1", R_EC_BRP256R1}, {"ecdsabrp256t1", R_EC_BRP256T1}, {"ecdsabrp384r1", R_EC_BRP384R1}, {"ecdsabrp384t1", R_EC_BRP384T1}, {"ecdsabrp512r1", R_EC_BRP512R1}, {"ecdsabrp512t1", R_EC_BRP512T1} }; # define ECDSA_NUM OSSL_NELEM(ecdsa_choices) static double ecdsa_results[ECDSA_NUM][2]; /* 2 ops: sign then verify */ static const OPT_PAIR ecdh_choices[] = { {"ecdhp160", R_EC_P160}, {"ecdhp192", R_EC_P192}, {"ecdhp224", R_EC_P224}, {"ecdhp256", R_EC_P256}, {"ecdhp384", R_EC_P384}, {"ecdhp521", R_EC_P521}, # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M {"ecdhk163", R_EC_K163}, {"ecdhk233", R_EC_K233}, {"ecdhk283", R_EC_K283}, {"ecdhk409", R_EC_K409}, {"ecdhk571", R_EC_K571}, {"ecdhb163", R_EC_B163}, {"ecdhb233", R_EC_B233}, {"ecdhb283", R_EC_B283}, {"ecdhb409", R_EC_B409}, {"ecdhb571", R_EC_B571}, # endif {"ecdhbrp256r1", R_EC_BRP256R1}, {"ecdhbrp256t1", R_EC_BRP256T1}, {"ecdhbrp384r1", R_EC_BRP384R1}, {"ecdhbrp384t1", R_EC_BRP384T1}, {"ecdhbrp512r1", R_EC_BRP512R1}, {"ecdhbrp512t1", R_EC_BRP512T1}, {"ecdhx25519", R_EC_X25519}, {"ecdhx448", R_EC_X448} }; # define EC_NUM OSSL_NELEM(ecdh_choices) static double ecdh_results[EC_NUM][1]; /* 1 op: derivation */ #define R_EC_Ed25519 0 #define R_EC_Ed448 1 static OPT_PAIR eddsa_choices[] = { {"ed25519", R_EC_Ed25519}, {"ed448", R_EC_Ed448} }; # define EdDSA_NUM OSSL_NELEM(eddsa_choices) static double eddsa_results[EdDSA_NUM][2]; /* 2 ops: sign then verify */ #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ #ifndef SIGALRM # define COND(d) (count < (d)) # define COUNT(d) (d) #else # define COND(unused_cond) (run && count<0x7fffffff) # define COUNT(d) (count) #endif /* SIGALRM */ typedef struct loopargs_st { ASYNC_JOB *inprogress_job; ASYNC_WAIT_CTX *wait_ctx; unsigned char *buf; unsigned char *buf2; unsigned char *buf_malloc; unsigned char *buf2_malloc; unsigned char *key; unsigned int siglen; size_t sigsize; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA RSA *rsa_key[RSA_NUM]; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA DSA *dsa_key[DSA_NUM]; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC EC_KEY *ecdsa[ECDSA_NUM]; EVP_PKEY_CTX *ecdh_ctx[EC_NUM]; EVP_MD_CTX *eddsa_ctx[EdDSA_NUM]; unsigned char *secret_a; unsigned char *secret_b; size_t outlen[EC_NUM]; #endif EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx; HMAC_CTX *hctx; GCM128_CONTEXT *gcm_ctx; } loopargs_t; static int run_benchmark(int async_jobs, int (*loop_function) (void *), loopargs_t * loopargs); static unsigned int testnum; /* Nb of iterations to do per algorithm and key-size */ static long c[ALGOR_NUM][OSSL_NELEM(lengths_list)]; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD2 static int EVP_Digest_MD2_loop(void *args) { loopargs_t *tempargs = *(loopargs_t **) args; unsigned char *buf = tempargs->buf; unsigned char md2[MD2_DIGEST_LENGTH]; int count; for (count = 0; COND(c[D_MD2][testnum]); count++) { if (!EVP_Digest(buf, (size_t)lengths[testnum], md2, NULL, EVP_md2(), NULL)) return -1; } return count; } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MDC2 static int EVP_Digest_MDC2_loop(void *args) { loopargs_t *tempargs = *(loopargs_t **) args; unsigned char *buf = tempargs->buf; unsigned char mdc2[MDC2_DIGEST_LENGTH]; int count; for (count = 0; COND(c[D_MDC2][testnum]); count++) { if (!EVP_Digest(buf, (size_t)lengths[testnum], mdc2, NULL, EVP_mdc2(), NULL)) return -1; } return count; } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD4 static int EVP_Digest_MD4_loop(void *args) { loopargs_t *tempargs = *(loopargs_t **) args; unsigned char *buf = tempargs->buf; unsigned char md4[MD4_DIGEST_LENGTH]; int count; for (count = 0; COND(c[D_MD4][testnum]); count++) { if (!EVP_Digest(buf, (size_t)lengths[testnum], md4, NULL, EVP_md4(), NULL)) return -1; } return count; } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5 static int MD5_loop(void *args) { loopargs_t *tempargs = *(loopargs_t **) args; unsigned char *buf = tempargs->buf; unsigned char md5[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]; int count; for (count = 0; COND(c[D_MD5][testnum]); count++) MD5(buf, lengths[testnum], md5); return count; } static int HMAC_loop(void *args) { loopargs_t *tempargs = *(loopargs_t **) args; unsigned char *buf = tempargs->buf; HMAC_CTX *hctx = tempargs->hctx; unsigned char hmac[MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH]; int count; for (count = 0; COND(c[D_HMAC][testnum]); count++) { HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL); HMAC_Update(hctx, buf, lengths[testnum]); HMAC_Final(hctx, hmac, NULL); } return count; } #endif static int SHA1_loop(void *args) { loopargs_t *tempargs = *(loopargs_t **) args; unsigned char *buf = tempargs->buf; unsigned char sha[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH]; int count; for (count = 0; COND(c[D_SHA1][testnum]); count++) SHA1(buf, lengths[testnum], sha); return count; } static int SHA256_loop(void *args) { loopargs_t *tempargs = *(loopargs_t **) args; unsigned char *buf = tempargs->buf; unsigned char sha256[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH]; int count; for (count = 0; COND(c[D_SHA256][testnum]); count++) SHA256(buf, lengths[testnum], sha256); return count; } static int SHA512_loop(void *args) { loopargs_t *tempargs = *(loopargs_t **) args; unsigned char *buf = tempargs->buf; unsigned char sha512[SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH]; int count; for (count = 0; COND(c[D_SHA512][testnum]); count++) SHA512(buf, lengths[testnum], sha512); return count; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_WHIRLPOOL static int WHIRLPOOL_loop(void *args) { loopargs_t *tempargs = *(loopargs_t **) args; unsigned char *buf = tempargs->buf; unsigned char whirlpool[WHIRLPOOL_DIGEST_LENGTH]; int count; for (count = 0; COND(c[D_WHIRLPOOL][testnum]); count++) WHIRLPOOL(buf, lengths[testnum], whirlpool); return count; } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RMD160 static int EVP_Digest_RMD160_loop(void *args) { loopargs_t *tempargs = *(loopargs_t **) args; unsigned char *buf = tempargs->buf; unsigned char rmd160[RIPEMD160_DIGEST_LENGTH]; int count; for (count = 0; COND(c[D_RMD160][testnum]); count++) { if (!EVP_Digest(buf, (size_t)lengths[testnum], &(rmd160[0]), NULL, EVP_ripemd160(), NULL)) return -1; } return count; } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC4 static RC4_KEY rc4_ks; static int RC4_loop(void *args) { loopargs_t *tempargs = *(loopargs_t **) args; unsigned char *buf = tempargs->buf; int count; for (count = 0; COND(c[D_RC4][testnum]); count++) RC4(&rc4_ks, (size_t)lengths[testnum], buf, buf); return count; } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DES static unsigned char DES_iv[8]; static DES_key_schedule sch; static DES_key_schedule sch2; static DES_key_schedule sch3; static int DES_ncbc_encrypt_loop(void *args) { loopargs_t *tempargs = *(loopargs_t **) args; unsigned char *buf = tempargs->buf; int count; for (count = 0; COND(c[D_CBC_DES][testnum]); count++) DES_ncbc_encrypt(buf, buf, lengths[testnum], &sch, &DES_iv, DES_ENCRYPT); return count; } static int DES_ede3_cbc_encrypt_loop(void *args) { loopargs_t *tempargs = *(loopargs_t **) args; unsigned char *buf = tempargs->buf; int count; for (count = 0; COND(c[D_EDE3_DES][testnum]); count++) DES_ede3_cbc_encrypt(buf, buf, lengths[testnum], &sch, &sch2, &sch3, &DES_iv, DES_ENCRYPT); return count; } #endif #define MAX_BLOCK_SIZE 128 static unsigned char iv[2 * MAX_BLOCK_SIZE / 8]; static AES_KEY aes_ks1, aes_ks2, aes_ks3; static int AES_cbc_128_encrypt_loop(void *args) { loopargs_t *tempargs = *(loopargs_t **) args; unsigned char *buf = tempargs->buf; int count; for (count = 0; COND(c[D_CBC_128_AES][testnum]); count++) AES_cbc_encrypt(buf, buf, (size_t)lengths[testnum], &aes_ks1, iv, AES_ENCRYPT); return count; } static int AES_cbc_192_encrypt_loop(void *args) { loopargs_t *tempargs = *(loopargs_t **) args; unsigned char *buf = tempargs->buf; int count; for (count = 0; COND(c[D_CBC_192_AES][testnum]); count++) AES_cbc_encrypt(buf, buf, (size_t)lengths[testnum], &aes_ks2, iv, AES_ENCRYPT); return count; } static int AES_cbc_256_encrypt_loop(void *args) { loopargs_t *tempargs = *(loopargs_t **) args; unsigned char *buf = tempargs->buf; int count; for (count = 0; COND(c[D_CBC_256_AES][testnum]); count++) AES_cbc_encrypt(buf, buf, (size_t)lengths[testnum], &aes_ks3, iv, AES_ENCRYPT); return count; } static int AES_ige_128_encrypt_loop(void *args) { loopargs_t *tempargs = *(loopargs_t **) args; unsigned char *buf = tempargs->buf; unsigned char *buf2 = tempargs->buf2; int count; for (count = 0; COND(c[D_IGE_128_AES][testnum]); count++) AES_ige_encrypt(buf, buf2, (size_t)lengths[testnum], &aes_ks1, iv, AES_ENCRYPT); return count; } static int AES_ige_192_encrypt_loop(void *args) { loopargs_t *tempargs = *(loopargs_t **) args; unsigned char *buf = tempargs->buf; unsigned char *buf2 = tempargs->buf2; int count; for (count = 0; COND(c[D_IGE_192_AES][testnum]); count++) AES_ige_encrypt(buf, buf2, (size_t)lengths[testnum], &aes_ks2, iv, AES_ENCRYPT); return count; } static int AES_ige_256_encrypt_loop(void *args) { loopargs_t *tempargs = *(loopargs_t **) args; unsigned char *buf = tempargs->buf; unsigned char *buf2 = tempargs->buf2; int count; for (count = 0; COND(c[D_IGE_256_AES][testnum]); count++) AES_ige_encrypt(buf, buf2, (size_t)lengths[testnum], &aes_ks3, iv, AES_ENCRYPT); return count; } static int CRYPTO_gcm128_aad_loop(void *args) { loopargs_t *tempargs = *(loopargs_t **) args; unsigned char *buf = tempargs->buf; GCM128_CONTEXT *gcm_ctx = tempargs->gcm_ctx; int count; for (count = 0; COND(c[D_GHASH][testnum]); count++) CRYPTO_gcm128_aad(gcm_ctx, buf, lengths[testnum]); return count; } static int RAND_bytes_loop(void *args) { loopargs_t *tempargs = *(loopargs_t **) args; unsigned char *buf = tempargs->buf; int count; for (count = 0; COND(c[D_RAND][testnum]); count++) RAND_bytes(buf, lengths[testnum]); return count; } static long save_count = 0; static int decrypt = 0; static int EVP_Update_loop(void *args) { loopargs_t *tempargs = *(loopargs_t **) args; unsigned char *buf = tempargs->buf; EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = tempargs->ctx; int outl, count, rc; #ifndef SIGALRM int nb_iter = save_count * 4 * lengths[0] / lengths[testnum]; #endif if (decrypt) { for (count = 0; COND(nb_iter); count++) { rc = EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, buf, &outl, buf, lengths[testnum]); if (rc != 1) { /* reset iv in case of counter overflow */ EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctx, NULL, NULL, NULL, iv, -1); } } } else { for (count = 0; COND(nb_iter); count++) { rc = EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, buf, &outl, buf, lengths[testnum]); if (rc != 1) { /* reset iv in case of counter overflow */ EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctx, NULL, NULL, NULL, iv, -1); } } } if (decrypt) EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(ctx, buf, &outl); else EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(ctx, buf, &outl); return count; } /* * CCM does not support streaming. For the purpose of performance measurement, * each message is encrypted using the same (key,iv)-pair. Do not use this * code in your application. */ static int EVP_Update_loop_ccm(void *args) { loopargs_t *tempargs = *(loopargs_t **) args; unsigned char *buf = tempargs->buf; EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = tempargs->ctx; int outl, count; unsigned char tag[12]; #ifndef SIGALRM int nb_iter = save_count * 4 * lengths[0] / lengths[testnum]; #endif if (decrypt) { for (count = 0; COND(nb_iter); count++) { EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_TAG, sizeof(tag), tag); /* reset iv */ EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, NULL, NULL, NULL, iv); /* counter is reset on every update */ EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, buf, &outl, buf, lengths[testnum]); } } else { for (count = 0; COND(nb_iter); count++) { /* restore iv length field */ EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, NULL, &outl, NULL, lengths[testnum]); /* counter is reset on every update */ EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, buf, &outl, buf, lengths[testnum]); } } if (decrypt) EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(ctx, buf, &outl); else EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(ctx, buf, &outl); return count; } /* * To make AEAD benchmarking more relevant perform TLS-like operations, * 13-byte AAD followed by payload. But don't use TLS-formatted AAD, as * payload length is not actually limited by 16KB... */ static int EVP_Update_loop_aead(void *args) { loopargs_t *tempargs = *(loopargs_t **) args; unsigned char *buf = tempargs->buf; EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = tempargs->ctx; int outl, count; unsigned char aad[13] = { 0xcc }; unsigned char faketag[16] = { 0xcc }; #ifndef SIGALRM int nb_iter = save_count * 4 * lengths[0] / lengths[testnum]; #endif if (decrypt) { for (count = 0; COND(nb_iter); count++) { EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, NULL, NULL, NULL, iv); EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_TAG, sizeof(faketag), faketag); EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, NULL, &outl, aad, sizeof(aad)); EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, buf, &outl, buf, lengths[testnum]); EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(ctx, buf + outl, &outl); } } else { for (count = 0; COND(nb_iter); count++) { EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, NULL, NULL, NULL, iv); EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, NULL, &outl, aad, sizeof(aad)); EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, buf, &outl, buf, lengths[testnum]); EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(ctx, buf + outl, &outl); } } return count; } static const EVP_MD *evp_md = NULL; static int EVP_Digest_loop(void *args) { loopargs_t *tempargs = *(loopargs_t **) args; unsigned char *buf = tempargs->buf; unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; int count; #ifndef SIGALRM int nb_iter = save_count * 4 * lengths[0] / lengths[testnum]; #endif for (count = 0; COND(nb_iter); count++) { if (!EVP_Digest(buf, lengths[testnum], md, NULL, evp_md, NULL)) return -1; } return count; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA static long rsa_c[RSA_NUM][2]; /* # RSA iteration test */ static int RSA_sign_loop(void *args) { loopargs_t *tempargs = *(loopargs_t **) args; unsigned char *buf = tempargs->buf; unsigned char *buf2 = tempargs->buf2; unsigned int *rsa_num = &tempargs->siglen; RSA **rsa_key = tempargs->rsa_key; int ret, count; for (count = 0; COND(rsa_c[testnum][0]); count++) { ret = RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, buf, 36, buf2, rsa_num, rsa_key[testnum]); if (ret == 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "RSA sign failure\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); count = -1; break; } } return count; } static int RSA_verify_loop(void *args) { loopargs_t *tempargs = *(loopargs_t **) args; unsigned char *buf = tempargs->buf; unsigned char *buf2 = tempargs->buf2; unsigned int rsa_num = tempargs->siglen; RSA **rsa_key = tempargs->rsa_key; int ret, count; for (count = 0; COND(rsa_c[testnum][1]); count++) { ret = RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, buf, 36, buf2, rsa_num, rsa_key[testnum]); if (ret <= 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "RSA verify failure\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); count = -1; break; } } return count; } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA static long dsa_c[DSA_NUM][2]; static int DSA_sign_loop(void *args) { loopargs_t *tempargs = *(loopargs_t **) args; unsigned char *buf = tempargs->buf; unsigned char *buf2 = tempargs->buf2; DSA **dsa_key = tempargs->dsa_key; unsigned int *siglen = &tempargs->siglen; int ret, count; for (count = 0; COND(dsa_c[testnum][0]); count++) { ret = DSA_sign(0, buf, 20, buf2, siglen, dsa_key[testnum]); if (ret == 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "DSA sign failure\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); count = -1; break; } } return count; } static int DSA_verify_loop(void *args) { loopargs_t *tempargs = *(loopargs_t **) args; unsigned char *buf = tempargs->buf; unsigned char *buf2 = tempargs->buf2; DSA **dsa_key = tempargs->dsa_key; unsigned int siglen = tempargs->siglen; int ret, count; for (count = 0; COND(dsa_c[testnum][1]); count++) { ret = DSA_verify(0, buf, 20, buf2, siglen, dsa_key[testnum]); if (ret <= 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "DSA verify failure\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); count = -1; break; } } return count; } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC static long ecdsa_c[ECDSA_NUM][2]; static int ECDSA_sign_loop(void *args) { loopargs_t *tempargs = *(loopargs_t **) args; unsigned char *buf = tempargs->buf; EC_KEY **ecdsa = tempargs->ecdsa; unsigned char *ecdsasig = tempargs->buf2; unsigned int *ecdsasiglen = &tempargs->siglen; int ret, count; for (count = 0; COND(ecdsa_c[testnum][0]); count++) { ret = ECDSA_sign(0, buf, 20, ecdsasig, ecdsasiglen, ecdsa[testnum]); if (ret == 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "ECDSA sign failure\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); count = -1; break; } } return count; } static int ECDSA_verify_loop(void *args) { loopargs_t *tempargs = *(loopargs_t **) args; unsigned char *buf = tempargs->buf; EC_KEY **ecdsa = tempargs->ecdsa; unsigned char *ecdsasig = tempargs->buf2; unsigned int ecdsasiglen = tempargs->siglen; int ret, count; for (count = 0; COND(ecdsa_c[testnum][1]); count++) { ret = ECDSA_verify(0, buf, 20, ecdsasig, ecdsasiglen, ecdsa[testnum]); if (ret != 1) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "ECDSA verify failure\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); count = -1; break; } } return count; } /* ******************************************************************** */ static long ecdh_c[EC_NUM][1]; static int ECDH_EVP_derive_key_loop(void *args) { loopargs_t *tempargs = *(loopargs_t **) args; EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = tempargs->ecdh_ctx[testnum]; unsigned char *derived_secret = tempargs->secret_a; int count; size_t *outlen = &(tempargs->outlen[testnum]); for (count = 0; COND(ecdh_c[testnum][0]); count++) EVP_PKEY_derive(ctx, derived_secret, outlen); return count; } static long eddsa_c[EdDSA_NUM][2]; static int EdDSA_sign_loop(void *args) { loopargs_t *tempargs = *(loopargs_t **) args; unsigned char *buf = tempargs->buf; EVP_MD_CTX **edctx = tempargs->eddsa_ctx; unsigned char *eddsasig = tempargs->buf2; size_t *eddsasigsize = &tempargs->sigsize; int ret, count; for (count = 0; COND(eddsa_c[testnum][0]); count++) { ret = EVP_DigestSign(edctx[testnum], eddsasig, eddsasigsize, buf, 20); if (ret == 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "EdDSA sign failure\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); count = -1; break; } } return count; } static int EdDSA_verify_loop(void *args) { loopargs_t *tempargs = *(loopargs_t **) args; unsigned char *buf = tempargs->buf; EVP_MD_CTX **edctx = tempargs->eddsa_ctx; unsigned char *eddsasig = tempargs->buf2; size_t eddsasigsize = tempargs->sigsize; int ret, count; for (count = 0; COND(eddsa_c[testnum][1]); count++) { ret = EVP_DigestVerify(edctx[testnum], eddsasig, eddsasigsize, buf, 20); if (ret != 1) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "EdDSA verify failure\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); count = -1; break; } } return count; } #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ static int run_benchmark(int async_jobs, int (*loop_function) (void *), loopargs_t * loopargs) { int job_op_count = 0; int total_op_count = 0; int num_inprogress = 0; int error = 0, i = 0, ret = 0; OSSL_ASYNC_FD job_fd = 0; size_t num_job_fds = 0; if (async_jobs == 0) { return loop_function((void *)&loopargs); } for (i = 0; i < async_jobs && !error; i++) { loopargs_t *looparg_item = loopargs + i; /* Copy pointer content (looparg_t item address) into async context */ ret = ASYNC_start_job(&loopargs[i].inprogress_job, loopargs[i].wait_ctx, &job_op_count, loop_function, (void *)&looparg_item, sizeof(looparg_item)); switch (ret) { case ASYNC_PAUSE: ++num_inprogress; break; case ASYNC_FINISH: if (job_op_count == -1) { error = 1; } else { total_op_count += job_op_count; } break; case ASYNC_NO_JOBS: case ASYNC_ERR: BIO_printf(bio_err, "Failure in the job\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); error = 1; break; } } while (num_inprogress > 0) { #if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS) DWORD avail = 0; #elif defined(OPENSSL_SYS_UNIX) int select_result = 0; OSSL_ASYNC_FD max_fd = 0; fd_set waitfdset; FD_ZERO(&waitfdset); for (i = 0; i < async_jobs && num_inprogress > 0; i++) { if (loopargs[i].inprogress_job == NULL) continue; if (!ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_get_all_fds (loopargs[i].wait_ctx, NULL, &num_job_fds) || num_job_fds > 1) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Too many fds in ASYNC_WAIT_CTX\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); error = 1; break; } ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_get_all_fds(loopargs[i].wait_ctx, &job_fd, &num_job_fds); FD_SET(job_fd, &waitfdset); if (job_fd > max_fd) max_fd = job_fd; } if (max_fd >= (OSSL_ASYNC_FD)FD_SETSIZE) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error: max_fd (%d) must be smaller than FD_SETSIZE (%d). " "Decrease the value of async_jobs\n", max_fd, FD_SETSIZE); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); error = 1; break; } select_result = select(max_fd + 1, &waitfdset, NULL, NULL, NULL); if (select_result == -1 && errno == EINTR) continue; if (select_result == -1) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Failure in the select\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); error = 1; break; } if (select_result == 0) continue; #endif for (i = 0; i < async_jobs; i++) { if (loopargs[i].inprogress_job == NULL) continue; if (!ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_get_all_fds (loopargs[i].wait_ctx, NULL, &num_job_fds) || num_job_fds > 1) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Too many fds in ASYNC_WAIT_CTX\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); error = 1; break; } ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_get_all_fds(loopargs[i].wait_ctx, &job_fd, &num_job_fds); #if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_UNIX) if (num_job_fds == 1 && !FD_ISSET(job_fd, &waitfdset)) continue; #elif defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS) if (num_job_fds == 1 && !PeekNamedPipe(job_fd, NULL, 0, NULL, &avail, NULL) && avail > 0) continue; #endif ret = ASYNC_start_job(&loopargs[i].inprogress_job, loopargs[i].wait_ctx, &job_op_count, loop_function, (void *)(loopargs + i), sizeof(loopargs_t)); switch (ret) { case ASYNC_PAUSE: break; case ASYNC_FINISH: if (job_op_count == -1) { error = 1; } else { total_op_count += job_op_count; } --num_inprogress; loopargs[i].inprogress_job = NULL; break; case ASYNC_NO_JOBS: case ASYNC_ERR: --num_inprogress; loopargs[i].inprogress_job = NULL; BIO_printf(bio_err, "Failure in the job\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); error = 1; break; } } } return error ? -1 : total_op_count; } int speed_main(int argc, char **argv) { ENGINE *e = NULL; loopargs_t *loopargs = NULL; const char *prog; const char *engine_id = NULL; const EVP_CIPHER *evp_cipher = NULL; double d = 0.0; OPTION_CHOICE o; int async_init = 0, multiblock = 0, pr_header = 0; int doit[ALGOR_NUM] = { 0 }; int ret = 1, misalign = 0, lengths_single = 0, aead = 0; long count = 0; unsigned int size_num = OSSL_NELEM(lengths_list); unsigned int i, k, loop, loopargs_len = 0, async_jobs = 0; int keylen; int buflen; #ifndef NO_FORK int multi = 0; #endif #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DSA) \ || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) long rsa_count = 1; #endif openssl_speed_sec_t seconds = { SECONDS, RSA_SECONDS, DSA_SECONDS, ECDSA_SECONDS, ECDH_SECONDS, EdDSA_SECONDS }; /* What follows are the buffers and key material. */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC5 RC5_32_KEY rc5_ks; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC2 RC2_KEY rc2_ks; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_IDEA IDEA_KEY_SCHEDULE idea_ks; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SEED SEED_KEY_SCHEDULE seed_ks; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_BF BF_KEY bf_ks; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CAST CAST_KEY cast_ks; #endif static const unsigned char key16[16] = { 0x12, 0x34, 0x56, 0x78, 0x9a, 0xbc, 0xde, 0xf0, 0x34, 0x56, 0x78, 0x9a, 0xbc, 0xde, 0xf0, 0x12 }; static const unsigned char key24[24] = { 0x12, 0x34, 0x56, 0x78, 0x9a, 0xbc, 0xde, 0xf0, 0x34, 0x56, 0x78, 0x9a, 0xbc, 0xde, 0xf0, 0x12, 0x56, 0x78, 0x9a, 0xbc, 0xde, 0xf0, 0x12, 0x34 }; static const unsigned char key32[32] = { 0x12, 0x34, 0x56, 0x78, 0x9a, 0xbc, 0xde, 0xf0, 0x34, 0x56, 0x78, 0x9a, 0xbc, 0xde, 0xf0, 0x12, 0x56, 0x78, 0x9a, 0xbc, 0xde, 0xf0, 0x12, 0x34, 0x78, 0x9a, 0xbc, 0xde, 0xf0, 0x12, 0x34, 0x56 }; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CAMELLIA static const unsigned char ckey24[24] = { 0x12, 0x34, 0x56, 0x78, 0x9a, 0xbc, 0xde, 0xf0, 0x34, 0x56, 0x78, 0x9a, 0xbc, 0xde, 0xf0, 0x12, 0x56, 0x78, 0x9a, 0xbc, 0xde, 0xf0, 0x12, 0x34 }; static const unsigned char ckey32[32] = { 0x12, 0x34, 0x56, 0x78, 0x9a, 0xbc, 0xde, 0xf0, 0x34, 0x56, 0x78, 0x9a, 0xbc, 0xde, 0xf0, 0x12, 0x56, 0x78, 0x9a, 0xbc, 0xde, 0xf0, 0x12, 0x34, 0x78, 0x9a, 0xbc, 0xde, 0xf0, 0x12, 0x34, 0x56 }; CAMELLIA_KEY camellia_ks1, camellia_ks2, camellia_ks3; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DES static DES_cblock key = { 0x12, 0x34, 0x56, 0x78, 0x9a, 0xbc, 0xde, 0xf0 }; static DES_cblock key2 = { 0x34, 0x56, 0x78, 0x9a, 0xbc, 0xde, 0xf0, 0x12 }; static DES_cblock key3 = { 0x56, 0x78, 0x9a, 0xbc, 0xde, 0xf0, 0x12, 0x34 }; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA static const unsigned int rsa_bits[RSA_NUM] = { 512, 1024, 2048, 3072, 4096, 7680, 15360 }; static const unsigned char *rsa_data[RSA_NUM] = { test512, test1024, test2048, test3072, test4096, test7680, test15360 }; static const int rsa_data_length[RSA_NUM] = { sizeof(test512), sizeof(test1024), sizeof(test2048), sizeof(test3072), sizeof(test4096), sizeof(test7680), sizeof(test15360) }; int rsa_doit[RSA_NUM] = { 0 }; int primes = RSA_DEFAULT_PRIME_NUM; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA static const unsigned int dsa_bits[DSA_NUM] = { 512, 1024, 2048 }; int dsa_doit[DSA_NUM] = { 0 }; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC /* * We only test over the following curves as they are representative, To * add tests over more curves, simply add the curve NID and curve name to * the following arrays and increase the |ecdh_choices| list accordingly. */ static const struct { const char *name; unsigned int nid; unsigned int bits; } test_curves[] = { /* Prime Curves */ {"secp160r1", NID_secp160r1, 160}, {"nistp192", NID_X9_62_prime192v1, 192}, {"nistp224", NID_secp224r1, 224}, {"nistp256", NID_X9_62_prime256v1, 256}, {"nistp384", NID_secp384r1, 384}, {"nistp521", NID_secp521r1, 521}, # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M /* Binary Curves */ {"nistk163", NID_sect163k1, 163}, {"nistk233", NID_sect233k1, 233}, {"nistk283", NID_sect283k1, 283}, {"nistk409", NID_sect409k1, 409}, {"nistk571", NID_sect571k1, 571}, {"nistb163", NID_sect163r2, 163}, {"nistb233", NID_sect233r1, 233}, {"nistb283", NID_sect283r1, 283}, {"nistb409", NID_sect409r1, 409}, {"nistb571", NID_sect571r1, 571}, # endif {"brainpoolP256r1", NID_brainpoolP256r1, 256}, {"brainpoolP256t1", NID_brainpoolP256t1, 256}, {"brainpoolP384r1", NID_brainpoolP384r1, 384}, {"brainpoolP384t1", NID_brainpoolP384t1, 384}, {"brainpoolP512r1", NID_brainpoolP512r1, 512}, {"brainpoolP512t1", NID_brainpoolP512t1, 512}, /* Other and ECDH only ones */ {"X25519", NID_X25519, 253}, {"X448", NID_X448, 448} }; static const struct { const char *name; unsigned int nid; unsigned int bits; size_t sigsize; } test_ed_curves[] = { /* EdDSA */ {"Ed25519", NID_ED25519, 253, 64}, {"Ed448", NID_ED448, 456, 114} }; int ecdsa_doit[ECDSA_NUM] = { 0 }; int ecdh_doit[EC_NUM] = { 0 }; int eddsa_doit[EdDSA_NUM] = { 0 }; OPENSSL_assert(OSSL_NELEM(test_curves) >= EC_NUM); OPENSSL_assert(OSSL_NELEM(test_ed_curves) >= EdDSA_NUM); #endif /* ndef OPENSSL_NO_EC */ prog = opt_init(argc, argv, speed_options); while ((o = opt_next()) != OPT_EOF) { switch (o) { case OPT_EOF: case OPT_ERR: opterr: BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Use -help for summary.\n", prog); goto end; case OPT_HELP: opt_help(speed_options); ret = 0; goto end; case OPT_ELAPSED: usertime = 0; break; case OPT_EVP: evp_md = NULL; evp_cipher = EVP_get_cipherbyname(opt_arg()); if (evp_cipher == NULL) evp_md = EVP_get_digestbyname(opt_arg()); if (evp_cipher == NULL && evp_md == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: %s is an unknown cipher or digest\n", prog, opt_arg()); goto end; } doit[D_EVP] = 1; break; case OPT_DECRYPT: decrypt = 1; break; case OPT_ENGINE: /* * In a forked execution, an engine might need to be * initialised by each child process, not by the parent. * So store the name here and run setup_engine() later on. */ engine_id = opt_arg(); break; case OPT_MULTI: #ifndef NO_FORK multi = atoi(opt_arg()); + if (multi >= INT_MAX / (int)sizeof(int)) { + BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: multi argument too large\n", prog); + return 0; + } #endif break; case OPT_ASYNCJOBS: #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ASYNC async_jobs = atoi(opt_arg()); if (!ASYNC_is_capable()) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: async_jobs specified but async not supported\n", prog); goto opterr; } if (async_jobs > 99999) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: too many async_jobs\n", prog); goto opterr; } #endif break; case OPT_MISALIGN: if (!opt_int(opt_arg(), &misalign)) goto end; if (misalign > MISALIGN) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Maximum offset is %d\n", prog, MISALIGN); goto opterr; } break; case OPT_MR: mr = 1; break; case OPT_MB: multiblock = 1; #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_MULTIBLOCK BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: -mb specified but multi-block support is disabled\n", prog); goto end; #endif break; case OPT_R_CASES: if (!opt_rand(o)) goto end; break; case OPT_PRIMES: if (!opt_int(opt_arg(), &primes)) goto end; break; case OPT_SECONDS: seconds.sym = seconds.rsa = seconds.dsa = seconds.ecdsa = seconds.ecdh = seconds.eddsa = atoi(opt_arg()); break; case OPT_BYTES: lengths_single = atoi(opt_arg()); lengths = &lengths_single; size_num = 1; break; case OPT_AEAD: aead = 1; break; } } argc = opt_num_rest(); argv = opt_rest(); /* Remaining arguments are algorithms. */ for (; *argv; argv++) { if (found(*argv, doit_choices, &i)) { doit[i] = 1; continue; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DES if (strcmp(*argv, "des") == 0) { doit[D_CBC_DES] = doit[D_EDE3_DES] = 1; continue; } #endif if (strcmp(*argv, "sha") == 0) { doit[D_SHA1] = doit[D_SHA256] = doit[D_SHA512] = 1; continue; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA if (strcmp(*argv, "openssl") == 0) continue; if (strcmp(*argv, "rsa") == 0) { for (loop = 0; loop < OSSL_NELEM(rsa_doit); loop++) rsa_doit[loop] = 1; continue; } if (found(*argv, rsa_choices, &i)) { rsa_doit[i] = 1; continue; } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA if (strcmp(*argv, "dsa") == 0) { dsa_doit[R_DSA_512] = dsa_doit[R_DSA_1024] = dsa_doit[R_DSA_2048] = 1; continue; } if (found(*argv, dsa_choices, &i)) { dsa_doit[i] = 2; continue; } #endif if (strcmp(*argv, "aes") == 0) { doit[D_CBC_128_AES] = doit[D_CBC_192_AES] = doit[D_CBC_256_AES] = 1; continue; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CAMELLIA if (strcmp(*argv, "camellia") == 0) { doit[D_CBC_128_CML] = doit[D_CBC_192_CML] = doit[D_CBC_256_CML] = 1; continue; } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC if (strcmp(*argv, "ecdsa") == 0) { for (loop = 0; loop < OSSL_NELEM(ecdsa_doit); loop++) ecdsa_doit[loop] = 1; continue; } if (found(*argv, ecdsa_choices, &i)) { ecdsa_doit[i] = 2; continue; } if (strcmp(*argv, "ecdh") == 0) { for (loop = 0; loop < OSSL_NELEM(ecdh_doit); loop++) ecdh_doit[loop] = 1; continue; } if (found(*argv, ecdh_choices, &i)) { ecdh_doit[i] = 2; continue; } if (strcmp(*argv, "eddsa") == 0) { for (loop = 0; loop < OSSL_NELEM(eddsa_doit); loop++) eddsa_doit[loop] = 1; continue; } if (found(*argv, eddsa_choices, &i)) { eddsa_doit[i] = 2; continue; } #endif BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: Unknown algorithm %s\n", prog, *argv); goto end; } /* Sanity checks */ if (aead) { if (evp_cipher == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "-aead can be used only with an AEAD cipher\n"); goto end; } else if (!(EVP_CIPHER_flags(evp_cipher) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s is not an AEAD cipher\n", OBJ_nid2ln(EVP_CIPHER_nid(evp_cipher))); goto end; } } if (multiblock) { if (evp_cipher == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err,"-mb can be used only with a multi-block" " capable cipher\n"); goto end; } else if (!(EVP_CIPHER_flags(evp_cipher) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s is not a multi-block capable\n", OBJ_nid2ln(EVP_CIPHER_nid(evp_cipher))); goto end; } else if (async_jobs > 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Async mode is not supported with -mb"); goto end; } } /* Initialize the job pool if async mode is enabled */ if (async_jobs > 0) { async_init = ASYNC_init_thread(async_jobs, async_jobs); if (!async_init) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error creating the ASYNC job pool\n"); goto end; } } loopargs_len = (async_jobs == 0 ? 1 : async_jobs); loopargs = app_malloc(loopargs_len * sizeof(loopargs_t), "array of loopargs"); memset(loopargs, 0, loopargs_len * sizeof(loopargs_t)); for (i = 0; i < loopargs_len; i++) { if (async_jobs > 0) { loopargs[i].wait_ctx = ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_new(); if (loopargs[i].wait_ctx == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error creating the ASYNC_WAIT_CTX\n"); goto end; } } buflen = lengths[size_num - 1]; if (buflen < 36) /* size of random vector in RSA benchmark */ buflen = 36; buflen += MAX_MISALIGNMENT + 1; loopargs[i].buf_malloc = app_malloc(buflen, "input buffer"); loopargs[i].buf2_malloc = app_malloc(buflen, "input buffer"); memset(loopargs[i].buf_malloc, 0, buflen); memset(loopargs[i].buf2_malloc, 0, buflen); /* Align the start of buffers on a 64 byte boundary */ loopargs[i].buf = loopargs[i].buf_malloc + misalign; loopargs[i].buf2 = loopargs[i].buf2_malloc + misalign; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC loopargs[i].secret_a = app_malloc(MAX_ECDH_SIZE, "ECDH secret a"); loopargs[i].secret_b = app_malloc(MAX_ECDH_SIZE, "ECDH secret b"); #endif } #ifndef NO_FORK if (multi && do_multi(multi, size_num)) goto show_res; #endif /* Initialize the engine after the fork */ e = setup_engine(engine_id, 0); /* No parameters; turn on everything. */ if ((argc == 0) && !doit[D_EVP]) { for (i = 0; i < ALGOR_NUM; i++) if (i != D_EVP) doit[i] = 1; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA for (i = 0; i < RSA_NUM; i++) rsa_doit[i] = 1; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA for (i = 0; i < DSA_NUM; i++) dsa_doit[i] = 1; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC for (loop = 0; loop < OSSL_NELEM(ecdsa_doit); loop++) ecdsa_doit[loop] = 1; for (loop = 0; loop < OSSL_NELEM(ecdh_doit); loop++) ecdh_doit[loop] = 1; for (loop = 0; loop < OSSL_NELEM(eddsa_doit); loop++) eddsa_doit[loop] = 1; #endif } for (i = 0; i < ALGOR_NUM; i++) if (doit[i]) pr_header++; if (usertime == 0 && !mr) BIO_printf(bio_err, "You have chosen to measure elapsed time " "instead of user CPU time.\n"); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA for (i = 0; i < loopargs_len; i++) { if (primes > RSA_DEFAULT_PRIME_NUM) { /* for multi-prime RSA, skip this */ break; } for (k = 0; k < RSA_NUM; k++) { const unsigned char *p; p = rsa_data[k]; loopargs[i].rsa_key[k] = d2i_RSAPrivateKey(NULL, &p, rsa_data_length[k]); if (loopargs[i].rsa_key[k] == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "internal error loading RSA key number %d\n", k); goto end; } } } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA for (i = 0; i < loopargs_len; i++) { loopargs[i].dsa_key[0] = get_dsa(512); loopargs[i].dsa_key[1] = get_dsa(1024); loopargs[i].dsa_key[2] = get_dsa(2048); } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DES DES_set_key_unchecked(&key, &sch); DES_set_key_unchecked(&key2, &sch2); DES_set_key_unchecked(&key3, &sch3); #endif AES_set_encrypt_key(key16, 128, &aes_ks1); AES_set_encrypt_key(key24, 192, &aes_ks2); AES_set_encrypt_key(key32, 256, &aes_ks3); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CAMELLIA Camellia_set_key(key16, 128, &camellia_ks1); Camellia_set_key(ckey24, 192, &camellia_ks2); Camellia_set_key(ckey32, 256, &camellia_ks3); #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_IDEA IDEA_set_encrypt_key(key16, &idea_ks); #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SEED SEED_set_key(key16, &seed_ks); #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC4 RC4_set_key(&rc4_ks, 16, key16); #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC2 RC2_set_key(&rc2_ks, 16, key16, 128); #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC5 RC5_32_set_key(&rc5_ks, 16, key16, 12); #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_BF BF_set_key(&bf_ks, 16, key16); #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CAST CAST_set_key(&cast_ks, 16, key16); #endif #ifndef SIGALRM # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DES BIO_printf(bio_err, "First we calculate the approximate speed ...\n"); count = 10; do { long it; count *= 2; Time_F(START); for (it = count; it; it--) DES_ecb_encrypt((DES_cblock *)loopargs[0].buf, (DES_cblock *)loopargs[0].buf, &sch, DES_ENCRYPT); d = Time_F(STOP); } while (d < 3); save_count = count; c[D_MD2][0] = count / 10; c[D_MDC2][0] = count / 10; c[D_MD4][0] = count; c[D_MD5][0] = count; c[D_HMAC][0] = count; c[D_SHA1][0] = count; c[D_RMD160][0] = count; c[D_RC4][0] = count * 5; c[D_CBC_DES][0] = count; c[D_EDE3_DES][0] = count / 3; c[D_CBC_IDEA][0] = count; c[D_CBC_SEED][0] = count; c[D_CBC_RC2][0] = count; c[D_CBC_RC5][0] = count; c[D_CBC_BF][0] = count; c[D_CBC_CAST][0] = count; c[D_CBC_128_AES][0] = count; c[D_CBC_192_AES][0] = count; c[D_CBC_256_AES][0] = count; c[D_CBC_128_CML][0] = count; c[D_CBC_192_CML][0] = count; c[D_CBC_256_CML][0] = count; c[D_SHA256][0] = count; c[D_SHA512][0] = count; c[D_WHIRLPOOL][0] = count; c[D_IGE_128_AES][0] = count; c[D_IGE_192_AES][0] = count; c[D_IGE_256_AES][0] = count; c[D_GHASH][0] = count; c[D_RAND][0] = count; for (i = 1; i < size_num; i++) { long l0, l1; l0 = (long)lengths[0]; l1 = (long)lengths[i]; c[D_MD2][i] = c[D_MD2][0] * 4 * l0 / l1; c[D_MDC2][i] = c[D_MDC2][0] * 4 * l0 / l1; c[D_MD4][i] = c[D_MD4][0] * 4 * l0 / l1; c[D_MD5][i] = c[D_MD5][0] * 4 * l0 / l1; c[D_HMAC][i] = c[D_HMAC][0] * 4 * l0 / l1; c[D_SHA1][i] = c[D_SHA1][0] * 4 * l0 / l1; c[D_RMD160][i] = c[D_RMD160][0] * 4 * l0 / l1; c[D_SHA256][i] = c[D_SHA256][0] * 4 * l0 / l1; c[D_SHA512][i] = c[D_SHA512][0] * 4 * l0 / l1; c[D_WHIRLPOOL][i] = c[D_WHIRLPOOL][0] * 4 * l0 / l1; c[D_GHASH][i] = c[D_GHASH][0] * 4 * l0 / l1; c[D_RAND][i] = c[D_RAND][0] * 4 * l0 / l1; l0 = (long)lengths[i - 1]; c[D_RC4][i] = c[D_RC4][i - 1] * l0 / l1; c[D_CBC_DES][i] = c[D_CBC_DES][i - 1] * l0 / l1; c[D_EDE3_DES][i] = c[D_EDE3_DES][i - 1] * l0 / l1; c[D_CBC_IDEA][i] = c[D_CBC_IDEA][i - 1] * l0 / l1; c[D_CBC_SEED][i] = c[D_CBC_SEED][i - 1] * l0 / l1; c[D_CBC_RC2][i] = c[D_CBC_RC2][i - 1] * l0 / l1; c[D_CBC_RC5][i] = c[D_CBC_RC5][i - 1] * l0 / l1; c[D_CBC_BF][i] = c[D_CBC_BF][i - 1] * l0 / l1; c[D_CBC_CAST][i] = c[D_CBC_CAST][i - 1] * l0 / l1; c[D_CBC_128_AES][i] = c[D_CBC_128_AES][i - 1] * l0 / l1; c[D_CBC_192_AES][i] = c[D_CBC_192_AES][i - 1] * l0 / l1; c[D_CBC_256_AES][i] = c[D_CBC_256_AES][i - 1] * l0 / l1; c[D_CBC_128_CML][i] = c[D_CBC_128_CML][i - 1] * l0 / l1; c[D_CBC_192_CML][i] = c[D_CBC_192_CML][i - 1] * l0 / l1; c[D_CBC_256_CML][i] = c[D_CBC_256_CML][i - 1] * l0 / l1; c[D_IGE_128_AES][i] = c[D_IGE_128_AES][i - 1] * l0 / l1; c[D_IGE_192_AES][i] = c[D_IGE_192_AES][i - 1] * l0 / l1; c[D_IGE_256_AES][i] = c[D_IGE_256_AES][i - 1] * l0 / l1; } # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA rsa_c[R_RSA_512][0] = count / 2000; rsa_c[R_RSA_512][1] = count / 400; for (i = 1; i < RSA_NUM; i++) { rsa_c[i][0] = rsa_c[i - 1][0] / 8; rsa_c[i][1] = rsa_c[i - 1][1] / 4; if (rsa_doit[i] <= 1 && rsa_c[i][0] == 0) rsa_doit[i] = 0; else { if (rsa_c[i][0] == 0) { rsa_c[i][0] = 1; /* Set minimum iteration Nb to 1. */ rsa_c[i][1] = 20; } } } # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA dsa_c[R_DSA_512][0] = count / 1000; dsa_c[R_DSA_512][1] = count / 1000 / 2; for (i = 1; i < DSA_NUM; i++) { dsa_c[i][0] = dsa_c[i - 1][0] / 4; dsa_c[i][1] = dsa_c[i - 1][1] / 4; if (dsa_doit[i] <= 1 && dsa_c[i][0] == 0) dsa_doit[i] = 0; else { if (dsa_c[i][0] == 0) { dsa_c[i][0] = 1; /* Set minimum iteration Nb to 1. */ dsa_c[i][1] = 1; } } } # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC ecdsa_c[R_EC_P160][0] = count / 1000; ecdsa_c[R_EC_P160][1] = count / 1000 / 2; for (i = R_EC_P192; i <= R_EC_P521; i++) { ecdsa_c[i][0] = ecdsa_c[i - 1][0] / 2; ecdsa_c[i][1] = ecdsa_c[i - 1][1] / 2; if (ecdsa_doit[i] <= 1 && ecdsa_c[i][0] == 0) ecdsa_doit[i] = 0; else { if (ecdsa_c[i][0] == 0) { ecdsa_c[i][0] = 1; ecdsa_c[i][1] = 1; } } } # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M ecdsa_c[R_EC_K163][0] = count / 1000; ecdsa_c[R_EC_K163][1] = count / 1000 / 2; for (i = R_EC_K233; i <= R_EC_K571; i++) { ecdsa_c[i][0] = ecdsa_c[i - 1][0] / 2; ecdsa_c[i][1] = ecdsa_c[i - 1][1] / 2; if (ecdsa_doit[i] <= 1 && ecdsa_c[i][0] == 0) ecdsa_doit[i] = 0; else { if (ecdsa_c[i][0] == 0) { ecdsa_c[i][0] = 1; ecdsa_c[i][1] = 1; } } } ecdsa_c[R_EC_B163][0] = count / 1000; ecdsa_c[R_EC_B163][1] = count / 1000 / 2; for (i = R_EC_B233; i <= R_EC_B571; i++) { ecdsa_c[i][0] = ecdsa_c[i - 1][0] / 2; ecdsa_c[i][1] = ecdsa_c[i - 1][1] / 2; if (ecdsa_doit[i] <= 1 && ecdsa_c[i][0] == 0) ecdsa_doit[i] = 0; else { if (ecdsa_c[i][0] == 0) { ecdsa_c[i][0] = 1; ecdsa_c[i][1] = 1; } } } # endif ecdh_c[R_EC_P160][0] = count / 1000; for (i = R_EC_P192; i <= R_EC_P521; i++) { ecdh_c[i][0] = ecdh_c[i - 1][0] / 2; if (ecdh_doit[i] <= 1 && ecdh_c[i][0] == 0) ecdh_doit[i] = 0; else { if (ecdh_c[i][0] == 0) { ecdh_c[i][0] = 1; } } } # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M ecdh_c[R_EC_K163][0] = count / 1000; for (i = R_EC_K233; i <= R_EC_K571; i++) { ecdh_c[i][0] = ecdh_c[i - 1][0] / 2; if (ecdh_doit[i] <= 1 && ecdh_c[i][0] == 0) ecdh_doit[i] = 0; else { if (ecdh_c[i][0] == 0) { ecdh_c[i][0] = 1; } } } ecdh_c[R_EC_B163][0] = count / 1000; for (i = R_EC_B233; i <= R_EC_B571; i++) { ecdh_c[i][0] = ecdh_c[i - 1][0] / 2; if (ecdh_doit[i] <= 1 && ecdh_c[i][0] == 0) ecdh_doit[i] = 0; else { if (ecdh_c[i][0] == 0) { ecdh_c[i][0] = 1; } } } # endif /* repeated code good to factorize */ ecdh_c[R_EC_BRP256R1][0] = count / 1000; for (i = R_EC_BRP384R1; i <= R_EC_BRP512R1; i += 2) { ecdh_c[i][0] = ecdh_c[i - 2][0] / 2; if (ecdh_doit[i] <= 1 && ecdh_c[i][0] == 0) ecdh_doit[i] = 0; else { if (ecdh_c[i][0] == 0) { ecdh_c[i][0] = 1; } } } ecdh_c[R_EC_BRP256T1][0] = count / 1000; for (i = R_EC_BRP384T1; i <= R_EC_BRP512T1; i += 2) { ecdh_c[i][0] = ecdh_c[i - 2][0] / 2; if (ecdh_doit[i] <= 1 && ecdh_c[i][0] == 0) ecdh_doit[i] = 0; else { if (ecdh_c[i][0] == 0) { ecdh_c[i][0] = 1; } } } /* default iteration count for the last two EC Curves */ ecdh_c[R_EC_X25519][0] = count / 1800; ecdh_c[R_EC_X448][0] = count / 7200; eddsa_c[R_EC_Ed25519][0] = count / 1800; eddsa_c[R_EC_Ed448][0] = count / 7200; # endif # else /* not worth fixing */ # error "You cannot disable DES on systems without SIGALRM." # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DES */ #elif SIGALRM > 0 signal(SIGALRM, alarmed); #endif /* SIGALRM */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD2 if (doit[D_MD2]) { for (testnum = 0; testnum < size_num; testnum++) { print_message(names[D_MD2], c[D_MD2][testnum], lengths[testnum], seconds.sym); Time_F(START); count = run_benchmark(async_jobs, EVP_Digest_MD2_loop, loopargs); d = Time_F(STOP); print_result(D_MD2, testnum, count, d); } } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MDC2 if (doit[D_MDC2]) { for (testnum = 0; testnum < size_num; testnum++) { print_message(names[D_MDC2], c[D_MDC2][testnum], lengths[testnum], seconds.sym); Time_F(START); count = run_benchmark(async_jobs, EVP_Digest_MDC2_loop, loopargs); d = Time_F(STOP); print_result(D_MDC2, testnum, count, d); } } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD4 if (doit[D_MD4]) { for (testnum = 0; testnum < size_num; testnum++) { print_message(names[D_MD4], c[D_MD4][testnum], lengths[testnum], seconds.sym); Time_F(START); count = run_benchmark(async_jobs, EVP_Digest_MD4_loop, loopargs); d = Time_F(STOP); print_result(D_MD4, testnum, count, d); } } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD5 if (doit[D_MD5]) { for (testnum = 0; testnum < size_num; testnum++) { print_message(names[D_MD5], c[D_MD5][testnum], lengths[testnum], seconds.sym); Time_F(START); count = run_benchmark(async_jobs, MD5_loop, loopargs); d = Time_F(STOP); print_result(D_MD5, testnum, count, d); } } if (doit[D_HMAC]) { static const char hmac_key[] = "This is a key..."; int len = strlen(hmac_key); for (i = 0; i < loopargs_len; i++) { loopargs[i].hctx = HMAC_CTX_new(); if (loopargs[i].hctx == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "HMAC malloc failure, exiting..."); exit(1); } HMAC_Init_ex(loopargs[i].hctx, hmac_key, len, EVP_md5(), NULL); } for (testnum = 0; testnum < size_num; testnum++) { print_message(names[D_HMAC], c[D_HMAC][testnum], lengths[testnum], seconds.sym); Time_F(START); count = run_benchmark(async_jobs, HMAC_loop, loopargs); d = Time_F(STOP); print_result(D_HMAC, testnum, count, d); } for (i = 0; i < loopargs_len; i++) { HMAC_CTX_free(loopargs[i].hctx); } } #endif if (doit[D_SHA1]) { for (testnum = 0; testnum < size_num; testnum++) { print_message(names[D_SHA1], c[D_SHA1][testnum], lengths[testnum], seconds.sym); Time_F(START); count = run_benchmark(async_jobs, SHA1_loop, loopargs); d = Time_F(STOP); print_result(D_SHA1, testnum, count, d); } } if (doit[D_SHA256]) { for (testnum = 0; testnum < size_num; testnum++) { print_message(names[D_SHA256], c[D_SHA256][testnum], lengths[testnum], seconds.sym); Time_F(START); count = run_benchmark(async_jobs, SHA256_loop, loopargs); d = Time_F(STOP); print_result(D_SHA256, testnum, count, d); } } if (doit[D_SHA512]) { for (testnum = 0; testnum < size_num; testnum++) { print_message(names[D_SHA512], c[D_SHA512][testnum], lengths[testnum], seconds.sym); Time_F(START); count = run_benchmark(async_jobs, SHA512_loop, loopargs); d = Time_F(STOP); print_result(D_SHA512, testnum, count, d); } } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_WHIRLPOOL if (doit[D_WHIRLPOOL]) { for (testnum = 0; testnum < size_num; testnum++) { print_message(names[D_WHIRLPOOL], c[D_WHIRLPOOL][testnum], lengths[testnum], seconds.sym); Time_F(START); count = run_benchmark(async_jobs, WHIRLPOOL_loop, loopargs); d = Time_F(STOP); print_result(D_WHIRLPOOL, testnum, count, d); } } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RMD160 if (doit[D_RMD160]) { for (testnum = 0; testnum < size_num; testnum++) { print_message(names[D_RMD160], c[D_RMD160][testnum], lengths[testnum], seconds.sym); Time_F(START); count = run_benchmark(async_jobs, EVP_Digest_RMD160_loop, loopargs); d = Time_F(STOP); print_result(D_RMD160, testnum, count, d); } } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC4 if (doit[D_RC4]) { for (testnum = 0; testnum < size_num; testnum++) { print_message(names[D_RC4], c[D_RC4][testnum], lengths[testnum], seconds.sym); Time_F(START); count = run_benchmark(async_jobs, RC4_loop, loopargs); d = Time_F(STOP); print_result(D_RC4, testnum, count, d); } } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DES if (doit[D_CBC_DES]) { for (testnum = 0; testnum < size_num; testnum++) { print_message(names[D_CBC_DES], c[D_CBC_DES][testnum], lengths[testnum], seconds.sym); Time_F(START); count = run_benchmark(async_jobs, DES_ncbc_encrypt_loop, loopargs); d = Time_F(STOP); print_result(D_CBC_DES, testnum, count, d); } } if (doit[D_EDE3_DES]) { for (testnum = 0; testnum < size_num; testnum++) { print_message(names[D_EDE3_DES], c[D_EDE3_DES][testnum], lengths[testnum], seconds.sym); Time_F(START); count = run_benchmark(async_jobs, DES_ede3_cbc_encrypt_loop, loopargs); d = Time_F(STOP); print_result(D_EDE3_DES, testnum, count, d); } } #endif if (doit[D_CBC_128_AES]) { for (testnum = 0; testnum < size_num; testnum++) { print_message(names[D_CBC_128_AES], c[D_CBC_128_AES][testnum], lengths[testnum], seconds.sym); Time_F(START); count = run_benchmark(async_jobs, AES_cbc_128_encrypt_loop, loopargs); d = Time_F(STOP); print_result(D_CBC_128_AES, testnum, count, d); } } if (doit[D_CBC_192_AES]) { for (testnum = 0; testnum < size_num; testnum++) { print_message(names[D_CBC_192_AES], c[D_CBC_192_AES][testnum], lengths[testnum], seconds.sym); Time_F(START); count = run_benchmark(async_jobs, AES_cbc_192_encrypt_loop, loopargs); d = Time_F(STOP); print_result(D_CBC_192_AES, testnum, count, d); } } if (doit[D_CBC_256_AES]) { for (testnum = 0; testnum < size_num; testnum++) { print_message(names[D_CBC_256_AES], c[D_CBC_256_AES][testnum], lengths[testnum], seconds.sym); Time_F(START); count = run_benchmark(async_jobs, AES_cbc_256_encrypt_loop, loopargs); d = Time_F(STOP); print_result(D_CBC_256_AES, testnum, count, d); } } if (doit[D_IGE_128_AES]) { for (testnum = 0; testnum < size_num; testnum++) { print_message(names[D_IGE_128_AES], c[D_IGE_128_AES][testnum], lengths[testnum], seconds.sym); Time_F(START); count = run_benchmark(async_jobs, AES_ige_128_encrypt_loop, loopargs); d = Time_F(STOP); print_result(D_IGE_128_AES, testnum, count, d); } } if (doit[D_IGE_192_AES]) { for (testnum = 0; testnum < size_num; testnum++) { print_message(names[D_IGE_192_AES], c[D_IGE_192_AES][testnum], lengths[testnum], seconds.sym); Time_F(START); count = run_benchmark(async_jobs, AES_ige_192_encrypt_loop, loopargs); d = Time_F(STOP); print_result(D_IGE_192_AES, testnum, count, d); } } if (doit[D_IGE_256_AES]) { for (testnum = 0; testnum < size_num; testnum++) { print_message(names[D_IGE_256_AES], c[D_IGE_256_AES][testnum], lengths[testnum], seconds.sym); Time_F(START); count = run_benchmark(async_jobs, AES_ige_256_encrypt_loop, loopargs); d = Time_F(STOP); print_result(D_IGE_256_AES, testnum, count, d); } } if (doit[D_GHASH]) { for (i = 0; i < loopargs_len; i++) { loopargs[i].gcm_ctx = CRYPTO_gcm128_new(&aes_ks1, (block128_f) AES_encrypt); CRYPTO_gcm128_setiv(loopargs[i].gcm_ctx, (unsigned char *)"0123456789ab", 12); } for (testnum = 0; testnum < size_num; testnum++) { print_message(names[D_GHASH], c[D_GHASH][testnum], lengths[testnum], seconds.sym); Time_F(START); count = run_benchmark(async_jobs, CRYPTO_gcm128_aad_loop, loopargs); d = Time_F(STOP); print_result(D_GHASH, testnum, count, d); } for (i = 0; i < loopargs_len; i++) CRYPTO_gcm128_release(loopargs[i].gcm_ctx); } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CAMELLIA if (doit[D_CBC_128_CML]) { if (async_jobs > 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Async mode is not supported with %s\n", names[D_CBC_128_CML]); doit[D_CBC_128_CML] = 0; } for (testnum = 0; testnum < size_num && async_init == 0; testnum++) { print_message(names[D_CBC_128_CML], c[D_CBC_128_CML][testnum], lengths[testnum], seconds.sym); Time_F(START); for (count = 0; COND(c[D_CBC_128_CML][testnum]); count++) Camellia_cbc_encrypt(loopargs[0].buf, loopargs[0].buf, (size_t)lengths[testnum], &camellia_ks1, iv, CAMELLIA_ENCRYPT); d = Time_F(STOP); print_result(D_CBC_128_CML, testnum, count, d); } } if (doit[D_CBC_192_CML]) { if (async_jobs > 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Async mode is not supported with %s\n", names[D_CBC_192_CML]); doit[D_CBC_192_CML] = 0; } for (testnum = 0; testnum < size_num && async_init == 0; testnum++) { print_message(names[D_CBC_192_CML], c[D_CBC_192_CML][testnum], lengths[testnum], seconds.sym); if (async_jobs > 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Async mode is not supported, exiting..."); exit(1); } Time_F(START); for (count = 0; COND(c[D_CBC_192_CML][testnum]); count++) Camellia_cbc_encrypt(loopargs[0].buf, loopargs[0].buf, (size_t)lengths[testnum], &camellia_ks2, iv, CAMELLIA_ENCRYPT); d = Time_F(STOP); print_result(D_CBC_192_CML, testnum, count, d); } } if (doit[D_CBC_256_CML]) { if (async_jobs > 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Async mode is not supported with %s\n", names[D_CBC_256_CML]); doit[D_CBC_256_CML] = 0; } for (testnum = 0; testnum < size_num && async_init == 0; testnum++) { print_message(names[D_CBC_256_CML], c[D_CBC_256_CML][testnum], lengths[testnum], seconds.sym); Time_F(START); for (count = 0; COND(c[D_CBC_256_CML][testnum]); count++) Camellia_cbc_encrypt(loopargs[0].buf, loopargs[0].buf, (size_t)lengths[testnum], &camellia_ks3, iv, CAMELLIA_ENCRYPT); d = Time_F(STOP); print_result(D_CBC_256_CML, testnum, count, d); } } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_IDEA if (doit[D_CBC_IDEA]) { if (async_jobs > 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Async mode is not supported with %s\n", names[D_CBC_IDEA]); doit[D_CBC_IDEA] = 0; } for (testnum = 0; testnum < size_num && async_init == 0; testnum++) { print_message(names[D_CBC_IDEA], c[D_CBC_IDEA][testnum], lengths[testnum], seconds.sym); Time_F(START); for (count = 0; COND(c[D_CBC_IDEA][testnum]); count++) IDEA_cbc_encrypt(loopargs[0].buf, loopargs[0].buf, (size_t)lengths[testnum], &idea_ks, iv, IDEA_ENCRYPT); d = Time_F(STOP); print_result(D_CBC_IDEA, testnum, count, d); } } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SEED if (doit[D_CBC_SEED]) { if (async_jobs > 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Async mode is not supported with %s\n", names[D_CBC_SEED]); doit[D_CBC_SEED] = 0; } for (testnum = 0; testnum < size_num && async_init == 0; testnum++) { print_message(names[D_CBC_SEED], c[D_CBC_SEED][testnum], lengths[testnum], seconds.sym); Time_F(START); for (count = 0; COND(c[D_CBC_SEED][testnum]); count++) SEED_cbc_encrypt(loopargs[0].buf, loopargs[0].buf, (size_t)lengths[testnum], &seed_ks, iv, 1); d = Time_F(STOP); print_result(D_CBC_SEED, testnum, count, d); } } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC2 if (doit[D_CBC_RC2]) { if (async_jobs > 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Async mode is not supported with %s\n", names[D_CBC_RC2]); doit[D_CBC_RC2] = 0; } for (testnum = 0; testnum < size_num && async_init == 0; testnum++) { print_message(names[D_CBC_RC2], c[D_CBC_RC2][testnum], lengths[testnum], seconds.sym); if (async_jobs > 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Async mode is not supported, exiting..."); exit(1); } Time_F(START); for (count = 0; COND(c[D_CBC_RC2][testnum]); count++) RC2_cbc_encrypt(loopargs[0].buf, loopargs[0].buf, (size_t)lengths[testnum], &rc2_ks, iv, RC2_ENCRYPT); d = Time_F(STOP); print_result(D_CBC_RC2, testnum, count, d); } } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC5 if (doit[D_CBC_RC5]) { if (async_jobs > 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Async mode is not supported with %s\n", names[D_CBC_RC5]); doit[D_CBC_RC5] = 0; } for (testnum = 0; testnum < size_num && async_init == 0; testnum++) { print_message(names[D_CBC_RC5], c[D_CBC_RC5][testnum], lengths[testnum], seconds.sym); if (async_jobs > 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Async mode is not supported, exiting..."); exit(1); } Time_F(START); for (count = 0; COND(c[D_CBC_RC5][testnum]); count++) RC5_32_cbc_encrypt(loopargs[0].buf, loopargs[0].buf, (size_t)lengths[testnum], &rc5_ks, iv, RC5_ENCRYPT); d = Time_F(STOP); print_result(D_CBC_RC5, testnum, count, d); } } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_BF if (doit[D_CBC_BF]) { if (async_jobs > 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Async mode is not supported with %s\n", names[D_CBC_BF]); doit[D_CBC_BF] = 0; } for (testnum = 0; testnum < size_num && async_init == 0; testnum++) { print_message(names[D_CBC_BF], c[D_CBC_BF][testnum], lengths[testnum], seconds.sym); Time_F(START); for (count = 0; COND(c[D_CBC_BF][testnum]); count++) BF_cbc_encrypt(loopargs[0].buf, loopargs[0].buf, (size_t)lengths[testnum], &bf_ks, iv, BF_ENCRYPT); d = Time_F(STOP); print_result(D_CBC_BF, testnum, count, d); } } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CAST if (doit[D_CBC_CAST]) { if (async_jobs > 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Async mode is not supported with %s\n", names[D_CBC_CAST]); doit[D_CBC_CAST] = 0; } for (testnum = 0; testnum < size_num && async_init == 0; testnum++) { print_message(names[D_CBC_CAST], c[D_CBC_CAST][testnum], lengths[testnum], seconds.sym); Time_F(START); for (count = 0; COND(c[D_CBC_CAST][testnum]); count++) CAST_cbc_encrypt(loopargs[0].buf, loopargs[0].buf, (size_t)lengths[testnum], &cast_ks, iv, CAST_ENCRYPT); d = Time_F(STOP); print_result(D_CBC_CAST, testnum, count, d); } } #endif if (doit[D_RAND]) { for (testnum = 0; testnum < size_num; testnum++) { print_message(names[D_RAND], c[D_RAND][testnum], lengths[testnum], seconds.sym); Time_F(START); count = run_benchmark(async_jobs, RAND_bytes_loop, loopargs); d = Time_F(STOP); print_result(D_RAND, testnum, count, d); } } if (doit[D_EVP]) { if (evp_cipher != NULL) { int (*loopfunc)(void *args) = EVP_Update_loop; if (multiblock && (EVP_CIPHER_flags(evp_cipher) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK)) { multiblock_speed(evp_cipher, lengths_single, &seconds); ret = 0; goto end; } names[D_EVP] = OBJ_nid2ln(EVP_CIPHER_nid(evp_cipher)); if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(evp_cipher) == EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE) { loopfunc = EVP_Update_loop_ccm; } else if (aead && (EVP_CIPHER_flags(evp_cipher) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER)) { loopfunc = EVP_Update_loop_aead; if (lengths == lengths_list) { lengths = aead_lengths_list; size_num = OSSL_NELEM(aead_lengths_list); } } for (testnum = 0; testnum < size_num; testnum++) { print_message(names[D_EVP], save_count, lengths[testnum], seconds.sym); for (k = 0; k < loopargs_len; k++) { loopargs[k].ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new(); if (loopargs[k].ctx == NULL) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "\nEVP_CIPHER_CTX_new failure\n"); exit(1); } if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(loopargs[k].ctx, evp_cipher, NULL, NULL, iv, decrypt ? 0 : 1)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "\nEVP_CipherInit_ex failure\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); exit(1); } EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding(loopargs[k].ctx, 0); keylen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(loopargs[k].ctx); loopargs[k].key = app_malloc(keylen, "evp_cipher key"); EVP_CIPHER_CTX_rand_key(loopargs[k].ctx, loopargs[k].key); if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(loopargs[k].ctx, NULL, NULL, loopargs[k].key, NULL, -1)) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "\nEVP_CipherInit_ex failure\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); exit(1); } OPENSSL_clear_free(loopargs[k].key, keylen); } Time_F(START); count = run_benchmark(async_jobs, loopfunc, loopargs); d = Time_F(STOP); for (k = 0; k < loopargs_len; k++) { EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(loopargs[k].ctx); } print_result(D_EVP, testnum, count, d); } } else if (evp_md != NULL) { names[D_EVP] = OBJ_nid2ln(EVP_MD_type(evp_md)); for (testnum = 0; testnum < size_num; testnum++) { print_message(names[D_EVP], save_count, lengths[testnum], seconds.sym); Time_F(START); count = run_benchmark(async_jobs, EVP_Digest_loop, loopargs); d = Time_F(STOP); print_result(D_EVP, testnum, count, d); } } } for (i = 0; i < loopargs_len; i++) if (RAND_bytes(loopargs[i].buf, 36) <= 0) goto end; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA for (testnum = 0; testnum < RSA_NUM; testnum++) { int st = 0; if (!rsa_doit[testnum]) continue; for (i = 0; i < loopargs_len; i++) { if (primes > 2) { /* we haven't set keys yet, generate multi-prime RSA keys */ BIGNUM *bn = BN_new(); if (bn == NULL) goto end; if (!BN_set_word(bn, RSA_F4)) { BN_free(bn); goto end; } BIO_printf(bio_err, "Generate multi-prime RSA key for %s\n", rsa_choices[testnum].name); loopargs[i].rsa_key[testnum] = RSA_new(); if (loopargs[i].rsa_key[testnum] == NULL) { BN_free(bn); goto end; } if (!RSA_generate_multi_prime_key(loopargs[i].rsa_key[testnum], rsa_bits[testnum], primes, bn, NULL)) { BN_free(bn); goto end; } BN_free(bn); } st = RSA_sign(NID_md5_sha1, loopargs[i].buf, 36, loopargs[i].buf2, &loopargs[i].siglen, loopargs[i].rsa_key[testnum]); if (st == 0) break; } if (st == 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "RSA sign failure. No RSA sign will be done.\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); rsa_count = 1; } else { pkey_print_message("private", "rsa", rsa_c[testnum][0], rsa_bits[testnum], seconds.rsa); /* RSA_blinding_on(rsa_key[testnum],NULL); */ Time_F(START); count = run_benchmark(async_jobs, RSA_sign_loop, loopargs); d = Time_F(STOP); BIO_printf(bio_err, mr ? "+R1:%ld:%d:%.2f\n" : "%ld %u bits private RSA's in %.2fs\n", count, rsa_bits[testnum], d); rsa_results[testnum][0] = (double)count / d; rsa_count = count; } for (i = 0; i < loopargs_len; i++) { st = RSA_verify(NID_md5_sha1, loopargs[i].buf, 36, loopargs[i].buf2, loopargs[i].siglen, loopargs[i].rsa_key[testnum]); if (st <= 0) break; } if (st <= 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "RSA verify failure. No RSA verify will be done.\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); rsa_doit[testnum] = 0; } else { pkey_print_message("public", "rsa", rsa_c[testnum][1], rsa_bits[testnum], seconds.rsa); Time_F(START); count = run_benchmark(async_jobs, RSA_verify_loop, loopargs); d = Time_F(STOP); BIO_printf(bio_err, mr ? "+R2:%ld:%d:%.2f\n" : "%ld %u bits public RSA's in %.2fs\n", count, rsa_bits[testnum], d); rsa_results[testnum][1] = (double)count / d; } if (rsa_count <= 1) { /* if longer than 10s, don't do any more */ for (testnum++; testnum < RSA_NUM; testnum++) rsa_doit[testnum] = 0; } } #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_RSA */ for (i = 0; i < loopargs_len; i++) if (RAND_bytes(loopargs[i].buf, 36) <= 0) goto end; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA for (testnum = 0; testnum < DSA_NUM; testnum++) { int st = 0; if (!dsa_doit[testnum]) continue; /* DSA_generate_key(dsa_key[testnum]); */ /* DSA_sign_setup(dsa_key[testnum],NULL); */ for (i = 0; i < loopargs_len; i++) { st = DSA_sign(0, loopargs[i].buf, 20, loopargs[i].buf2, &loopargs[i].siglen, loopargs[i].dsa_key[testnum]); if (st == 0) break; } if (st == 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "DSA sign failure. No DSA sign will be done.\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); rsa_count = 1; } else { pkey_print_message("sign", "dsa", dsa_c[testnum][0], dsa_bits[testnum], seconds.dsa); Time_F(START); count = run_benchmark(async_jobs, DSA_sign_loop, loopargs); d = Time_F(STOP); BIO_printf(bio_err, mr ? "+R3:%ld:%u:%.2f\n" : "%ld %u bits DSA signs in %.2fs\n", count, dsa_bits[testnum], d); dsa_results[testnum][0] = (double)count / d; rsa_count = count; } for (i = 0; i < loopargs_len; i++) { st = DSA_verify(0, loopargs[i].buf, 20, loopargs[i].buf2, loopargs[i].siglen, loopargs[i].dsa_key[testnum]); if (st <= 0) break; } if (st <= 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "DSA verify failure. No DSA verify will be done.\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); dsa_doit[testnum] = 0; } else { pkey_print_message("verify", "dsa", dsa_c[testnum][1], dsa_bits[testnum], seconds.dsa); Time_F(START); count = run_benchmark(async_jobs, DSA_verify_loop, loopargs); d = Time_F(STOP); BIO_printf(bio_err, mr ? "+R4:%ld:%u:%.2f\n" : "%ld %u bits DSA verify in %.2fs\n", count, dsa_bits[testnum], d); dsa_results[testnum][1] = (double)count / d; } if (rsa_count <= 1) { /* if longer than 10s, don't do any more */ for (testnum++; testnum < DSA_NUM; testnum++) dsa_doit[testnum] = 0; } } #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_DSA */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC for (testnum = 0; testnum < ECDSA_NUM; testnum++) { int st = 1; if (!ecdsa_doit[testnum]) continue; /* Ignore Curve */ for (i = 0; i < loopargs_len; i++) { loopargs[i].ecdsa[testnum] = EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(test_curves[testnum].nid); if (loopargs[i].ecdsa[testnum] == NULL) { st = 0; break; } } if (st == 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "ECDSA failure.\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); rsa_count = 1; } else { for (i = 0; i < loopargs_len; i++) { EC_KEY_precompute_mult(loopargs[i].ecdsa[testnum], NULL); /* Perform ECDSA signature test */ EC_KEY_generate_key(loopargs[i].ecdsa[testnum]); st = ECDSA_sign(0, loopargs[i].buf, 20, loopargs[i].buf2, &loopargs[i].siglen, loopargs[i].ecdsa[testnum]); if (st == 0) break; } if (st == 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "ECDSA sign failure. No ECDSA sign will be done.\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); rsa_count = 1; } else { pkey_print_message("sign", "ecdsa", ecdsa_c[testnum][0], test_curves[testnum].bits, seconds.ecdsa); Time_F(START); count = run_benchmark(async_jobs, ECDSA_sign_loop, loopargs); d = Time_F(STOP); BIO_printf(bio_err, mr ? "+R5:%ld:%u:%.2f\n" : "%ld %u bits ECDSA signs in %.2fs \n", count, test_curves[testnum].bits, d); ecdsa_results[testnum][0] = (double)count / d; rsa_count = count; } /* Perform ECDSA verification test */ for (i = 0; i < loopargs_len; i++) { st = ECDSA_verify(0, loopargs[i].buf, 20, loopargs[i].buf2, loopargs[i].siglen, loopargs[i].ecdsa[testnum]); if (st != 1) break; } if (st != 1) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "ECDSA verify failure. No ECDSA verify will be done.\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); ecdsa_doit[testnum] = 0; } else { pkey_print_message("verify", "ecdsa", ecdsa_c[testnum][1], test_curves[testnum].bits, seconds.ecdsa); Time_F(START); count = run_benchmark(async_jobs, ECDSA_verify_loop, loopargs); d = Time_F(STOP); BIO_printf(bio_err, mr ? "+R6:%ld:%u:%.2f\n" : "%ld %u bits ECDSA verify in %.2fs\n", count, test_curves[testnum].bits, d); ecdsa_results[testnum][1] = (double)count / d; } if (rsa_count <= 1) { /* if longer than 10s, don't do any more */ for (testnum++; testnum < ECDSA_NUM; testnum++) ecdsa_doit[testnum] = 0; } } } for (testnum = 0; testnum < EC_NUM; testnum++) { int ecdh_checks = 1; if (!ecdh_doit[testnum]) continue; for (i = 0; i < loopargs_len; i++) { EVP_PKEY_CTX *kctx = NULL; EVP_PKEY_CTX *test_ctx = NULL; EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx = NULL; EVP_PKEY *key_A = NULL; EVP_PKEY *key_B = NULL; size_t outlen; size_t test_outlen; /* Ensure that the error queue is empty */ if (ERR_peek_error()) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "WARNING: the error queue contains previous unhandled errors.\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); } /* Let's try to create a ctx directly from the NID: this works for * curves like Curve25519 that are not implemented through the low * level EC interface. * If this fails we try creating a EVP_PKEY_EC generic param ctx, * then we set the curve by NID before deriving the actual keygen * ctx for that specific curve. */ kctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_id(test_curves[testnum].nid, NULL); /* keygen ctx from NID */ if (!kctx) { EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL; EVP_PKEY *params = NULL; /* If we reach this code EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_id() failed and a * "int_ctx_new:unsupported algorithm" error was added to the * error queue. * We remove it from the error queue as we are handling it. */ unsigned long error = ERR_peek_error(); /* peek the latest error in the queue */ if (error == ERR_peek_last_error() && /* oldest and latest errors match */ /* check that the error origin matches */ ERR_GET_LIB(error) == ERR_LIB_EVP && ERR_GET_FUNC(error) == EVP_F_INT_CTX_NEW && ERR_GET_REASON(error) == EVP_R_UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHM) ERR_get_error(); /* pop error from queue */ if (ERR_peek_error()) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Unhandled error in the error queue during ECDH init.\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); rsa_count = 1; break; } if ( /* Create the context for parameter generation */ !(pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_id(EVP_PKEY_EC, NULL)) || /* Initialise the parameter generation */ !EVP_PKEY_paramgen_init(pctx) || /* Set the curve by NID */ !EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_ec_paramgen_curve_nid(pctx, test_curves [testnum].nid) || /* Create the parameter object params */ !EVP_PKEY_paramgen(pctx, ¶ms)) { ecdh_checks = 0; BIO_printf(bio_err, "ECDH EC params init failure.\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); rsa_count = 1; break; } /* Create the context for the key generation */ kctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(params, NULL); EVP_PKEY_free(params); params = NULL; EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx); pctx = NULL; } if (kctx == NULL || /* keygen ctx is not null */ EVP_PKEY_keygen_init(kctx) <= 0/* init keygen ctx */ ) { ecdh_checks = 0; BIO_printf(bio_err, "ECDH keygen failure.\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); rsa_count = 1; break; } if (EVP_PKEY_keygen(kctx, &key_A) <= 0 || /* generate secret key A */ EVP_PKEY_keygen(kctx, &key_B) <= 0 || /* generate secret key B */ !(ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(key_A, NULL)) || /* derivation ctx from skeyA */ EVP_PKEY_derive_init(ctx) <= 0 || /* init derivation ctx */ EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(ctx, key_B) <= 0 || /* set peer pubkey in ctx */ EVP_PKEY_derive(ctx, NULL, &outlen) <= 0 || /* determine max length */ outlen == 0 || /* ensure outlen is a valid size */ outlen > MAX_ECDH_SIZE /* avoid buffer overflow */ ) { ecdh_checks = 0; BIO_printf(bio_err, "ECDH key generation failure.\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); rsa_count = 1; break; } /* Here we perform a test run, comparing the output of a*B and b*A; * we try this here and assume that further EVP_PKEY_derive calls * never fail, so we can skip checks in the actually benchmarked * code, for maximum performance. */ if (!(test_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(key_B, NULL)) || /* test ctx from skeyB */ !EVP_PKEY_derive_init(test_ctx) || /* init derivation test_ctx */ !EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(test_ctx, key_A) || /* set peer pubkey in test_ctx */ !EVP_PKEY_derive(test_ctx, NULL, &test_outlen) || /* determine max length */ !EVP_PKEY_derive(ctx, loopargs[i].secret_a, &outlen) || /* compute a*B */ !EVP_PKEY_derive(test_ctx, loopargs[i].secret_b, &test_outlen) || /* compute b*A */ test_outlen != outlen /* compare output length */ ) { ecdh_checks = 0; BIO_printf(bio_err, "ECDH computation failure.\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); rsa_count = 1; break; } /* Compare the computation results: CRYPTO_memcmp() returns 0 if equal */ if (CRYPTO_memcmp(loopargs[i].secret_a, loopargs[i].secret_b, outlen)) { ecdh_checks = 0; BIO_printf(bio_err, "ECDH computations don't match.\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); rsa_count = 1; break; } loopargs[i].ecdh_ctx[testnum] = ctx; loopargs[i].outlen[testnum] = outlen; EVP_PKEY_free(key_A); EVP_PKEY_free(key_B); EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(kctx); kctx = NULL; EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(test_ctx); test_ctx = NULL; } if (ecdh_checks != 0) { pkey_print_message("", "ecdh", ecdh_c[testnum][0], test_curves[testnum].bits, seconds.ecdh); Time_F(START); count = run_benchmark(async_jobs, ECDH_EVP_derive_key_loop, loopargs); d = Time_F(STOP); BIO_printf(bio_err, mr ? "+R7:%ld:%d:%.2f\n" : "%ld %u-bits ECDH ops in %.2fs\n", count, test_curves[testnum].bits, d); ecdh_results[testnum][0] = (double)count / d; rsa_count = count; } if (rsa_count <= 1) { /* if longer than 10s, don't do any more */ for (testnum++; testnum < OSSL_NELEM(ecdh_doit); testnum++) ecdh_doit[testnum] = 0; } } for (testnum = 0; testnum < EdDSA_NUM; testnum++) { int st = 1; EVP_PKEY *ed_pkey = NULL; EVP_PKEY_CTX *ed_pctx = NULL; if (!eddsa_doit[testnum]) continue; /* Ignore Curve */ for (i = 0; i < loopargs_len; i++) { loopargs[i].eddsa_ctx[testnum] = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); if (loopargs[i].eddsa_ctx[testnum] == NULL) { st = 0; break; } if ((ed_pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_id(test_ed_curves[testnum].nid, NULL)) == NULL || EVP_PKEY_keygen_init(ed_pctx) <= 0 || EVP_PKEY_keygen(ed_pctx, &ed_pkey) <= 0) { st = 0; EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ed_pctx); break; } EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ed_pctx); if (!EVP_DigestSignInit(loopargs[i].eddsa_ctx[testnum], NULL, NULL, NULL, ed_pkey)) { st = 0; EVP_PKEY_free(ed_pkey); break; } EVP_PKEY_free(ed_pkey); } if (st == 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "EdDSA failure.\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); rsa_count = 1; } else { for (i = 0; i < loopargs_len; i++) { /* Perform EdDSA signature test */ loopargs[i].sigsize = test_ed_curves[testnum].sigsize; st = EVP_DigestSign(loopargs[i].eddsa_ctx[testnum], loopargs[i].buf2, &loopargs[i].sigsize, loopargs[i].buf, 20); if (st == 0) break; } if (st == 0) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "EdDSA sign failure. No EdDSA sign will be done.\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); rsa_count = 1; } else { pkey_print_message("sign", test_ed_curves[testnum].name, eddsa_c[testnum][0], test_ed_curves[testnum].bits, seconds.eddsa); Time_F(START); count = run_benchmark(async_jobs, EdDSA_sign_loop, loopargs); d = Time_F(STOP); BIO_printf(bio_err, mr ? "+R8:%ld:%u:%s:%.2f\n" : "%ld %u bits %s signs in %.2fs \n", count, test_ed_curves[testnum].bits, test_ed_curves[testnum].name, d); eddsa_results[testnum][0] = (double)count / d; rsa_count = count; } /* Perform EdDSA verification test */ for (i = 0; i < loopargs_len; i++) { st = EVP_DigestVerify(loopargs[i].eddsa_ctx[testnum], loopargs[i].buf2, loopargs[i].sigsize, loopargs[i].buf, 20); if (st != 1) break; } if (st != 1) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "EdDSA verify failure. No EdDSA verify will be done.\n"); ERR_print_errors(bio_err); eddsa_doit[testnum] = 0; } else { pkey_print_message("verify", test_ed_curves[testnum].name, eddsa_c[testnum][1], test_ed_curves[testnum].bits, seconds.eddsa); Time_F(START); count = run_benchmark(async_jobs, EdDSA_verify_loop, loopargs); d = Time_F(STOP); BIO_printf(bio_err, mr ? "+R9:%ld:%u:%s:%.2f\n" : "%ld %u bits %s verify in %.2fs\n", count, test_ed_curves[testnum].bits, test_ed_curves[testnum].name, d); eddsa_results[testnum][1] = (double)count / d; } if (rsa_count <= 1) { /* if longer than 10s, don't do any more */ for (testnum++; testnum < EdDSA_NUM; testnum++) eddsa_doit[testnum] = 0; } } } #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ #ifndef NO_FORK show_res: #endif if (!mr) { printf("%s\n", OpenSSL_version(OPENSSL_VERSION)); printf("%s\n", OpenSSL_version(OPENSSL_BUILT_ON)); printf("options:"); printf("%s ", BN_options()); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_MD2 printf("%s ", MD2_options()); #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC4 printf("%s ", RC4_options()); #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DES printf("%s ", DES_options()); #endif printf("%s ", AES_options()); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_IDEA printf("%s ", IDEA_options()); #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_BF printf("%s ", BF_options()); #endif printf("\n%s\n", OpenSSL_version(OPENSSL_CFLAGS)); } if (pr_header) { if (mr) printf("+H"); else { printf ("The 'numbers' are in 1000s of bytes per second processed.\n"); printf("type "); } for (testnum = 0; testnum < size_num; testnum++) printf(mr ? ":%d" : "%7d bytes", lengths[testnum]); printf("\n"); } for (k = 0; k < ALGOR_NUM; k++) { if (!doit[k]) continue; if (mr) printf("+F:%u:%s", k, names[k]); else printf("%-13s", names[k]); for (testnum = 0; testnum < size_num; testnum++) { if (results[k][testnum] > 10000 && !mr) printf(" %11.2fk", results[k][testnum] / 1e3); else printf(mr ? ":%.2f" : " %11.2f ", results[k][testnum]); } printf("\n"); } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA testnum = 1; for (k = 0; k < RSA_NUM; k++) { if (!rsa_doit[k]) continue; if (testnum && !mr) { printf("%18ssign verify sign/s verify/s\n", " "); testnum = 0; } if (mr) printf("+F2:%u:%u:%f:%f\n", k, rsa_bits[k], rsa_results[k][0], rsa_results[k][1]); else printf("rsa %4u bits %8.6fs %8.6fs %8.1f %8.1f\n", rsa_bits[k], 1.0 / rsa_results[k][0], 1.0 / rsa_results[k][1], rsa_results[k][0], rsa_results[k][1]); } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA testnum = 1; for (k = 0; k < DSA_NUM; k++) { if (!dsa_doit[k]) continue; if (testnum && !mr) { printf("%18ssign verify sign/s verify/s\n", " "); testnum = 0; } if (mr) printf("+F3:%u:%u:%f:%f\n", k, dsa_bits[k], dsa_results[k][0], dsa_results[k][1]); else printf("dsa %4u bits %8.6fs %8.6fs %8.1f %8.1f\n", dsa_bits[k], 1.0 / dsa_results[k][0], 1.0 / dsa_results[k][1], dsa_results[k][0], dsa_results[k][1]); } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC testnum = 1; for (k = 0; k < OSSL_NELEM(ecdsa_doit); k++) { if (!ecdsa_doit[k]) continue; if (testnum && !mr) { printf("%30ssign verify sign/s verify/s\n", " "); testnum = 0; } if (mr) printf("+F4:%u:%u:%f:%f\n", k, test_curves[k].bits, ecdsa_results[k][0], ecdsa_results[k][1]); else printf("%4u bits ecdsa (%s) %8.4fs %8.4fs %8.1f %8.1f\n", test_curves[k].bits, test_curves[k].name, 1.0 / ecdsa_results[k][0], 1.0 / ecdsa_results[k][1], ecdsa_results[k][0], ecdsa_results[k][1]); } testnum = 1; for (k = 0; k < EC_NUM; k++) { if (!ecdh_doit[k]) continue; if (testnum && !mr) { printf("%30sop op/s\n", " "); testnum = 0; } if (mr) printf("+F5:%u:%u:%f:%f\n", k, test_curves[k].bits, ecdh_results[k][0], 1.0 / ecdh_results[k][0]); else printf("%4u bits ecdh (%s) %8.4fs %8.1f\n", test_curves[k].bits, test_curves[k].name, 1.0 / ecdh_results[k][0], ecdh_results[k][0]); } testnum = 1; for (k = 0; k < OSSL_NELEM(eddsa_doit); k++) { if (!eddsa_doit[k]) continue; if (testnum && !mr) { printf("%30ssign verify sign/s verify/s\n", " "); testnum = 0; } if (mr) printf("+F6:%u:%u:%s:%f:%f\n", k, test_ed_curves[k].bits, test_ed_curves[k].name, eddsa_results[k][0], eddsa_results[k][1]); else printf("%4u bits EdDSA (%s) %8.4fs %8.4fs %8.1f %8.1f\n", test_ed_curves[k].bits, test_ed_curves[k].name, 1.0 / eddsa_results[k][0], 1.0 / eddsa_results[k][1], eddsa_results[k][0], eddsa_results[k][1]); } #endif ret = 0; end: ERR_print_errors(bio_err); for (i = 0; i < loopargs_len; i++) { OPENSSL_free(loopargs[i].buf_malloc); OPENSSL_free(loopargs[i].buf2_malloc); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA for (k = 0; k < RSA_NUM; k++) RSA_free(loopargs[i].rsa_key[k]); #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA for (k = 0; k < DSA_NUM; k++) DSA_free(loopargs[i].dsa_key[k]); #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC for (k = 0; k < ECDSA_NUM; k++) EC_KEY_free(loopargs[i].ecdsa[k]); for (k = 0; k < EC_NUM; k++) EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(loopargs[i].ecdh_ctx[k]); for (k = 0; k < EdDSA_NUM; k++) EVP_MD_CTX_free(loopargs[i].eddsa_ctx[k]); OPENSSL_free(loopargs[i].secret_a); OPENSSL_free(loopargs[i].secret_b); #endif } if (async_jobs > 0) { for (i = 0; i < loopargs_len; i++) ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_free(loopargs[i].wait_ctx); } if (async_init) { ASYNC_cleanup_thread(); } OPENSSL_free(loopargs); release_engine(e); return ret; } static void print_message(const char *s, long num, int length, int tm) { #ifdef SIGALRM BIO_printf(bio_err, mr ? "+DT:%s:%d:%d\n" : "Doing %s for %ds on %d size blocks: ", s, tm, length); (void)BIO_flush(bio_err); run = 1; alarm(tm); #else BIO_printf(bio_err, mr ? "+DN:%s:%ld:%d\n" : "Doing %s %ld times on %d size blocks: ", s, num, length); (void)BIO_flush(bio_err); #endif } static void pkey_print_message(const char *str, const char *str2, long num, unsigned int bits, int tm) { #ifdef SIGALRM BIO_printf(bio_err, mr ? "+DTP:%d:%s:%s:%d\n" : "Doing %u bits %s %s's for %ds: ", bits, str, str2, tm); (void)BIO_flush(bio_err); run = 1; alarm(tm); #else BIO_printf(bio_err, mr ? "+DNP:%ld:%d:%s:%s\n" : "Doing %ld %u bits %s %s's: ", num, bits, str, str2); (void)BIO_flush(bio_err); #endif } static void print_result(int alg, int run_no, int count, double time_used) { if (count == -1) { BIO_puts(bio_err, "EVP error!\n"); exit(1); } BIO_printf(bio_err, mr ? "+R:%d:%s:%f\n" : "%d %s's in %.2fs\n", count, names[alg], time_used); results[alg][run_no] = ((double)count) / time_used * lengths[run_no]; } #ifndef NO_FORK static char *sstrsep(char **string, const char *delim) { char isdelim[256]; char *token = *string; if (**string == 0) return NULL; memset(isdelim, 0, sizeof(isdelim)); isdelim[0] = 1; while (*delim) { isdelim[(unsigned char)(*delim)] = 1; delim++; } while (!isdelim[(unsigned char)(**string)]) { (*string)++; } if (**string) { **string = 0; (*string)++; } return token; } static int do_multi(int multi, int size_num) { int n; int fd[2]; int *fds; static char sep[] = ":"; fds = app_malloc(sizeof(*fds) * multi, "fd buffer for do_multi"); for (n = 0; n < multi; ++n) { if (pipe(fd) == -1) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "pipe failure\n"); exit(1); } fflush(stdout); (void)BIO_flush(bio_err); if (fork()) { close(fd[1]); fds[n] = fd[0]; } else { close(fd[0]); close(1); if (dup(fd[1]) == -1) { BIO_printf(bio_err, "dup failed\n"); exit(1); } close(fd[1]); mr = 1; usertime = 0; - free(fds); + OPENSSL_free(fds); return 0; } printf("Forked child %d\n", n); } /* for now, assume the pipe is long enough to take all the output */ for (n = 0; n < multi; ++n) { FILE *f; char buf[1024]; char *p; f = fdopen(fds[n], "r"); while (fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), f)) { p = strchr(buf, '\n'); if (p) *p = '\0'; if (buf[0] != '+') { BIO_printf(bio_err, "Don't understand line '%s' from child %d\n", buf, n); continue; } printf("Got: %s from %d\n", buf, n); if (strncmp(buf, "+F:", 3) == 0) { int alg; int j; p = buf + 3; alg = atoi(sstrsep(&p, sep)); sstrsep(&p, sep); for (j = 0; j < size_num; ++j) results[alg][j] += atof(sstrsep(&p, sep)); } else if (strncmp(buf, "+F2:", 4) == 0) { int k; double d; p = buf + 4; k = atoi(sstrsep(&p, sep)); sstrsep(&p, sep); d = atof(sstrsep(&p, sep)); rsa_results[k][0] += d; d = atof(sstrsep(&p, sep)); rsa_results[k][1] += d; } # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA else if (strncmp(buf, "+F3:", 4) == 0) { int k; double d; p = buf + 4; k = atoi(sstrsep(&p, sep)); sstrsep(&p, sep); d = atof(sstrsep(&p, sep)); dsa_results[k][0] += d; d = atof(sstrsep(&p, sep)); dsa_results[k][1] += d; } # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC else if (strncmp(buf, "+F4:", 4) == 0) { int k; double d; p = buf + 4; k = atoi(sstrsep(&p, sep)); sstrsep(&p, sep); d = atof(sstrsep(&p, sep)); ecdsa_results[k][0] += d; d = atof(sstrsep(&p, sep)); ecdsa_results[k][1] += d; } else if (strncmp(buf, "+F5:", 4) == 0) { int k; double d; p = buf + 4; k = atoi(sstrsep(&p, sep)); sstrsep(&p, sep); d = atof(sstrsep(&p, sep)); ecdh_results[k][0] += d; } else if (strncmp(buf, "+F6:", 4) == 0) { int k; double d; p = buf + 4; k = atoi(sstrsep(&p, sep)); sstrsep(&p, sep); sstrsep(&p, sep); d = atof(sstrsep(&p, sep)); eddsa_results[k][0] += d; d = atof(sstrsep(&p, sep)); eddsa_results[k][1] += d; } # endif else if (strncmp(buf, "+H:", 3) == 0) { ; } else BIO_printf(bio_err, "Unknown type '%s' from child %d\n", buf, n); } fclose(f); } - free(fds); + OPENSSL_free(fds); return 1; } #endif static void multiblock_speed(const EVP_CIPHER *evp_cipher, int lengths_single, const openssl_speed_sec_t *seconds) { static const int mblengths_list[] = { 8 * 1024, 2 * 8 * 1024, 4 * 8 * 1024, 8 * 8 * 1024, 8 * 16 * 1024 }; const int *mblengths = mblengths_list; int j, count, keylen, num = OSSL_NELEM(mblengths_list); const char *alg_name; unsigned char *inp, *out, *key, no_key[32], no_iv[16]; EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx; double d = 0.0; if (lengths_single) { mblengths = &lengths_single; num = 1; } inp = app_malloc(mblengths[num - 1], "multiblock input buffer"); out = app_malloc(mblengths[num - 1] + 1024, "multiblock output buffer"); ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new(); EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, evp_cipher, NULL, NULL, no_iv); keylen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx); key = app_malloc(keylen, "evp_cipher key"); EVP_CIPHER_CTX_rand_key(ctx, key); EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, NULL, NULL, key, NULL); OPENSSL_clear_free(key, keylen); EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_MAC_KEY, sizeof(no_key), no_key); alg_name = OBJ_nid2ln(EVP_CIPHER_nid(evp_cipher)); for (j = 0; j < num; j++) { print_message(alg_name, 0, mblengths[j], seconds->sym); Time_F(START); for (count = 0; run && count < 0x7fffffff; count++) { unsigned char aad[EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN]; EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_PARAM mb_param; size_t len = mblengths[j]; int packlen; memset(aad, 0, 8); /* avoid uninitialized values */ aad[8] = 23; /* SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA */ aad[9] = 3; /* version */ aad[10] = 2; aad[11] = 0; /* length */ aad[12] = 0; mb_param.out = NULL; mb_param.inp = aad; mb_param.len = len; mb_param.interleave = 8; packlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_AAD, sizeof(mb_param), &mb_param); if (packlen > 0) { mb_param.out = out; mb_param.inp = inp; mb_param.len = len; EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_TLS1_1_MULTIBLOCK_ENCRYPT, sizeof(mb_param), &mb_param); } else { int pad; RAND_bytes(out, 16); len += 16; aad[11] = (unsigned char)(len >> 8); aad[12] = (unsigned char)(len); pad = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_TLS1_AAD, EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN, aad); EVP_Cipher(ctx, out, inp, len + pad); } } d = Time_F(STOP); BIO_printf(bio_err, mr ? "+R:%d:%s:%f\n" : "%d %s's in %.2fs\n", count, "evp", d); results[D_EVP][j] = ((double)count) / d * mblengths[j]; } if (mr) { fprintf(stdout, "+H"); for (j = 0; j < num; j++) fprintf(stdout, ":%d", mblengths[j]); fprintf(stdout, "\n"); fprintf(stdout, "+F:%d:%s", D_EVP, alg_name); for (j = 0; j < num; j++) fprintf(stdout, ":%.2f", results[D_EVP][j]); fprintf(stdout, "\n"); } else { fprintf(stdout, "The 'numbers' are in 1000s of bytes per second processed.\n"); fprintf(stdout, "type "); for (j = 0; j < num; j++) fprintf(stdout, "%7d bytes", mblengths[j]); fprintf(stdout, "\n"); fprintf(stdout, "%-24s", alg_name); for (j = 0; j < num; j++) { if (results[D_EVP][j] > 10000) fprintf(stdout, " %11.2fk", results[D_EVP][j] / 1e3); else fprintf(stdout, " %11.2f ", results[D_EVP][j]); } fprintf(stdout, "\n"); } OPENSSL_free(inp); OPENSSL_free(out); EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx); } diff --git a/crypto/armcap.c b/crypto/armcap.c index c5685bde5891..48c5d4d64e32 100644 --- a/crypto/armcap.c +++ b/crypto/armcap.c @@ -1,246 +1,249 @@ /* * Copyright 2011-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include "arm_arch.h" unsigned int OPENSSL_armcap_P = 0; #if __ARM_MAX_ARCH__<7 void OPENSSL_cpuid_setup(void) { } uint32_t OPENSSL_rdtsc(void) { return 0; } #else static sigset_t all_masked; static sigjmp_buf ill_jmp; static void ill_handler(int sig) { siglongjmp(ill_jmp, sig); } /* * Following subroutines could have been inlined, but it's not all * ARM compilers support inline assembler... */ void _armv7_neon_probe(void); void _armv8_aes_probe(void); void _armv8_sha1_probe(void); void _armv8_sha256_probe(void); void _armv8_pmull_probe(void); # ifdef __aarch64__ void _armv8_sha512_probe(void); # endif uint32_t _armv7_tick(void); uint32_t OPENSSL_rdtsc(void) { if (OPENSSL_armcap_P & ARMV7_TICK) return _armv7_tick(); else return 0; } # if defined(__GNUC__) && __GNUC__>=2 void OPENSSL_cpuid_setup(void) __attribute__ ((constructor)); # endif # if defined(__GLIBC__) && defined(__GLIBC_PREREQ) # if __GLIBC_PREREQ(2, 16) # include # define OSSL_IMPLEMENT_GETAUXVAL # endif # elif defined(__ANDROID_API__) /* see https://developer.android.google.cn/ndk/guides/cpu-features */ # if __ANDROID_API__ >= 18 # include # define OSSL_IMPLEMENT_GETAUXVAL # endif # endif # if defined(__FreeBSD__) # include # if __FreeBSD_version >= 1200000 # include # define OSSL_IMPLEMENT_GETAUXVAL static unsigned long getauxval(unsigned long key) { unsigned long val = 0ul; if (elf_aux_info((int)key, &val, sizeof(val)) != 0) return 0ul; return val; } # endif # endif /* * Android: according to https://developer.android.com/ndk/guides/cpu-features, * getauxval is supported starting with API level 18 */ # if defined(__ANDROID__) && defined(__ANDROID_API__) && __ANDROID_API__ >= 18 # include # define OSSL_IMPLEMENT_GETAUXVAL # endif /* * ARM puts the feature bits for Crypto Extensions in AT_HWCAP2, whereas * AArch64 used AT_HWCAP. */ +# ifndef AT_HWCAP +# define AT_HWCAP 16 +# endif +# ifndef AT_HWCAP2 +# define AT_HWCAP2 26 +# endif # if defined(__arm__) || defined (__arm) -# define HWCAP 16 - /* AT_HWCAP */ +# define HWCAP AT_HWCAP # define HWCAP_NEON (1 << 12) -# define HWCAP_CE 26 - /* AT_HWCAP2 */ +# define HWCAP_CE AT_HWCAP2 # define HWCAP_CE_AES (1 << 0) # define HWCAP_CE_PMULL (1 << 1) # define HWCAP_CE_SHA1 (1 << 2) # define HWCAP_CE_SHA256 (1 << 3) # elif defined(__aarch64__) -# define HWCAP 16 - /* AT_HWCAP */ +# define HWCAP AT_HWCAP # define HWCAP_NEON (1 << 1) # define HWCAP_CE HWCAP # define HWCAP_CE_AES (1 << 3) # define HWCAP_CE_PMULL (1 << 4) # define HWCAP_CE_SHA1 (1 << 5) # define HWCAP_CE_SHA256 (1 << 6) # define HWCAP_CE_SHA512 (1 << 21) # endif void OPENSSL_cpuid_setup(void) { const char *e; struct sigaction ill_oact, ill_act; sigset_t oset; static int trigger = 0; if (trigger) return; trigger = 1; if ((e = getenv("OPENSSL_armcap"))) { OPENSSL_armcap_P = (unsigned int)strtoul(e, NULL, 0); return; } # if defined(__APPLE__) && !defined(__aarch64__) /* * Capability probing by catching SIGILL appears to be problematic * on iOS. But since Apple universe is "monocultural", it's actually * possible to simply set pre-defined processor capability mask. */ if (1) { OPENSSL_armcap_P = ARMV7_NEON; return; } /* * One could do same even for __aarch64__ iOS builds. It's not done * exclusively for reasons of keeping code unified across platforms. * Unified code works because it never triggers SIGILL on Apple * devices... */ # endif OPENSSL_armcap_P = 0; # ifdef OSSL_IMPLEMENT_GETAUXVAL if (getauxval(HWCAP) & HWCAP_NEON) { unsigned long hwcap = getauxval(HWCAP_CE); OPENSSL_armcap_P |= ARMV7_NEON; if (hwcap & HWCAP_CE_AES) OPENSSL_armcap_P |= ARMV8_AES; if (hwcap & HWCAP_CE_PMULL) OPENSSL_armcap_P |= ARMV8_PMULL; if (hwcap & HWCAP_CE_SHA1) OPENSSL_armcap_P |= ARMV8_SHA1; if (hwcap & HWCAP_CE_SHA256) OPENSSL_armcap_P |= ARMV8_SHA256; # ifdef __aarch64__ if (hwcap & HWCAP_CE_SHA512) OPENSSL_armcap_P |= ARMV8_SHA512; # endif } # endif sigfillset(&all_masked); sigdelset(&all_masked, SIGILL); sigdelset(&all_masked, SIGTRAP); sigdelset(&all_masked, SIGFPE); sigdelset(&all_masked, SIGBUS); sigdelset(&all_masked, SIGSEGV); memset(&ill_act, 0, sizeof(ill_act)); ill_act.sa_handler = ill_handler; ill_act.sa_mask = all_masked; sigprocmask(SIG_SETMASK, &ill_act.sa_mask, &oset); sigaction(SIGILL, &ill_act, &ill_oact); /* If we used getauxval, we already have all the values */ # ifndef OSSL_IMPLEMENT_GETAUXVAL if (sigsetjmp(ill_jmp, 1) == 0) { _armv7_neon_probe(); OPENSSL_armcap_P |= ARMV7_NEON; if (sigsetjmp(ill_jmp, 1) == 0) { _armv8_pmull_probe(); OPENSSL_armcap_P |= ARMV8_PMULL | ARMV8_AES; } else if (sigsetjmp(ill_jmp, 1) == 0) { _armv8_aes_probe(); OPENSSL_armcap_P |= ARMV8_AES; } if (sigsetjmp(ill_jmp, 1) == 0) { _armv8_sha1_probe(); OPENSSL_armcap_P |= ARMV8_SHA1; } if (sigsetjmp(ill_jmp, 1) == 0) { _armv8_sha256_probe(); OPENSSL_armcap_P |= ARMV8_SHA256; } # if defined(__aarch64__) && !defined(__APPLE__) if (sigsetjmp(ill_jmp, 1) == 0) { _armv8_sha512_probe(); OPENSSL_armcap_P |= ARMV8_SHA512; } # endif } # endif /* Things that getauxval didn't tell us */ if (sigsetjmp(ill_jmp, 1) == 0) { _armv7_tick(); OPENSSL_armcap_P |= ARMV7_TICK; } sigaction(SIGILL, &ill_oact, NULL); sigprocmask(SIG_SETMASK, &oset, NULL); } #endif diff --git a/crypto/asn1/a_print.c b/crypto/asn1/a_print.c index 85a631a27aa7..3790e82bb13a 100644 --- a/crypto/asn1/a_print.c +++ b/crypto/asn1/a_print.c @@ -1,95 +1,96 @@ /* - * Copyright 1995-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 1995-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "crypto/ctype.h" #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include int ASN1_PRINTABLE_type(const unsigned char *s, int len) { int c; int ia5 = 0; int t61 = 0; - if (len <= 0) - len = -1; if (s == NULL) return V_ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING; - while ((*s) && (len-- != 0)) { + if (len < 0) + len = strlen((const char *)s); + + while (len-- > 0) { c = *(s++); if (!ossl_isasn1print(c)) ia5 = 1; if (!ossl_isascii(c)) t61 = 1; } if (t61) return V_ASN1_T61STRING; if (ia5) return V_ASN1_IA5STRING; return V_ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING; } int ASN1_UNIVERSALSTRING_to_string(ASN1_UNIVERSALSTRING *s) { int i; unsigned char *p; if (s->type != V_ASN1_UNIVERSALSTRING) return 0; if ((s->length % 4) != 0) return 0; p = s->data; for (i = 0; i < s->length; i += 4) { if ((p[0] != '\0') || (p[1] != '\0') || (p[2] != '\0')) break; else p += 4; } if (i < s->length) return 0; p = s->data; for (i = 3; i < s->length; i += 4) { *(p++) = s->data[i]; } *(p) = '\0'; s->length /= 4; s->type = ASN1_PRINTABLE_type(s->data, s->length); return 1; } int ASN1_STRING_print(BIO *bp, const ASN1_STRING *v) { int i, n; char buf[80]; const char *p; if (v == NULL) return 0; n = 0; p = (const char *)v->data; for (i = 0; i < v->length; i++) { if ((p[i] > '~') || ((p[i] < ' ') && (p[i] != '\n') && (p[i] != '\r'))) buf[n] = '.'; else buf[n] = p[i]; n++; if (n >= 80) { if (BIO_write(bp, buf, n) <= 0) return 0; n = 0; } } if (n > 0) if (BIO_write(bp, buf, n) <= 0) return 0; return 1; } diff --git a/crypto/asn1/asn1_lib.c b/crypto/asn1/asn1_lib.c index 3d99d1383d42..b9b7ad8e9e02 100644 --- a/crypto/asn1/asn1_lib.c +++ b/crypto/asn1/asn1_lib.c @@ -1,412 +1,417 @@ /* * Copyright 1995-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include "asn1_local.h" static int asn1_get_length(const unsigned char **pp, int *inf, long *rl, long max); static void asn1_put_length(unsigned char **pp, int length); static int _asn1_check_infinite_end(const unsigned char **p, long len) { /* * If there is 0 or 1 byte left, the length check should pick things up */ if (len <= 0) return 1; else if ((len >= 2) && ((*p)[0] == 0) && ((*p)[1] == 0)) { (*p) += 2; return 1; } return 0; } int ASN1_check_infinite_end(unsigned char **p, long len) { return _asn1_check_infinite_end((const unsigned char **)p, len); } int ASN1_const_check_infinite_end(const unsigned char **p, long len) { return _asn1_check_infinite_end(p, len); } int ASN1_get_object(const unsigned char **pp, long *plength, int *ptag, int *pclass, long omax) { int i, ret; long l; const unsigned char *p = *pp; int tag, xclass, inf; long max = omax; if (!max) goto err; ret = (*p & V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED); xclass = (*p & V_ASN1_PRIVATE); i = *p & V_ASN1_PRIMITIVE_TAG; if (i == V_ASN1_PRIMITIVE_TAG) { /* high-tag */ p++; if (--max == 0) goto err; l = 0; while (*p & 0x80) { l <<= 7L; l |= *(p++) & 0x7f; if (--max == 0) goto err; if (l > (INT_MAX >> 7L)) goto err; } l <<= 7L; l |= *(p++) & 0x7f; tag = (int)l; if (--max == 0) goto err; } else { tag = i; p++; if (--max == 0) goto err; } *ptag = tag; *pclass = xclass; if (!asn1_get_length(&p, &inf, plength, max)) goto err; if (inf && !(ret & V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED)) goto err; if (*plength > (omax - (p - *pp))) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_GET_OBJECT, ASN1_R_TOO_LONG); /* * Set this so that even if things are not long enough the values are * set correctly */ ret |= 0x80; } *pp = p; return ret | inf; err: ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_GET_OBJECT, ASN1_R_HEADER_TOO_LONG); return 0x80; } /* * Decode a length field. * The short form is a single byte defining a length 0 - 127. * The long form is a byte 0 - 127 with the top bit set and this indicates * the number of following octets that contain the length. These octets * are stored most significant digit first. */ static int asn1_get_length(const unsigned char **pp, int *inf, long *rl, long max) { const unsigned char *p = *pp; unsigned long ret = 0; int i; if (max-- < 1) return 0; if (*p == 0x80) { *inf = 1; p++; } else { *inf = 0; i = *p & 0x7f; if (*p++ & 0x80) { if (max < i + 1) return 0; /* Skip leading zeroes */ while (i > 0 && *p == 0) { p++; i--; } if (i > (int)sizeof(long)) return 0; while (i > 0) { ret <<= 8; ret |= *p++; i--; } if (ret > LONG_MAX) return 0; } else ret = i; } *pp = p; *rl = (long)ret; return 1; } /* * class 0 is constructed constructed == 2 for indefinite length constructed */ void ASN1_put_object(unsigned char **pp, int constructed, int length, int tag, int xclass) { unsigned char *p = *pp; int i, ttag; i = (constructed) ? V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED : 0; i |= (xclass & V_ASN1_PRIVATE); if (tag < 31) *(p++) = i | (tag & V_ASN1_PRIMITIVE_TAG); else { *(p++) = i | V_ASN1_PRIMITIVE_TAG; for (i = 0, ttag = tag; ttag > 0; i++) ttag >>= 7; ttag = i; while (i-- > 0) { p[i] = tag & 0x7f; if (i != (ttag - 1)) p[i] |= 0x80; tag >>= 7; } p += ttag; } if (constructed == 2) *(p++) = 0x80; else asn1_put_length(&p, length); *pp = p; } int ASN1_put_eoc(unsigned char **pp) { unsigned char *p = *pp; *p++ = 0; *p++ = 0; *pp = p; return 2; } static void asn1_put_length(unsigned char **pp, int length) { unsigned char *p = *pp; int i, l; if (length <= 127) *(p++) = (unsigned char)length; else { l = length; for (i = 0; l > 0; i++) l >>= 8; *(p++) = i | 0x80; l = i; while (i-- > 0) { p[i] = length & 0xff; length >>= 8; } p += l; } *pp = p; } int ASN1_object_size(int constructed, int length, int tag) { int ret = 1; if (length < 0) return -1; if (tag >= 31) { while (tag > 0) { tag >>= 7; ret++; } } if (constructed == 2) { ret += 3; } else { ret++; if (length > 127) { int tmplen = length; while (tmplen > 0) { tmplen >>= 8; ret++; } } } if (ret >= INT_MAX - length) return -1; return ret + length; } int ASN1_STRING_copy(ASN1_STRING *dst, const ASN1_STRING *str) { if (str == NULL) return 0; dst->type = str->type; if (!ASN1_STRING_set(dst, str->data, str->length)) return 0; /* Copy flags but preserve embed value */ dst->flags &= ASN1_STRING_FLAG_EMBED; dst->flags |= str->flags & ~ASN1_STRING_FLAG_EMBED; return 1; } ASN1_STRING *ASN1_STRING_dup(const ASN1_STRING *str) { ASN1_STRING *ret; if (!str) return NULL; ret = ASN1_STRING_new(); if (ret == NULL) return NULL; if (!ASN1_STRING_copy(ret, str)) { ASN1_STRING_free(ret); return NULL; } return ret; } int ASN1_STRING_set(ASN1_STRING *str, const void *_data, int len_in) { unsigned char *c; const char *data = _data; size_t len; if (len_in < 0) { if (data == NULL) return 0; len = strlen(data); } else { len = (size_t)len_in; } /* * Verify that the length fits within an integer for assignment to * str->length below. The additional 1 is subtracted to allow for the * '\0' terminator even though this isn't strictly necessary. */ if (len > INT_MAX - 1) { ASN1err(0, ASN1_R_TOO_LARGE); return 0; } if ((size_t)str->length <= len || str->data == NULL) { c = str->data; #ifdef FUZZING_BUILD_MODE_UNSAFE_FOR_PRODUCTION /* No NUL terminator in fuzzing builds */ - str->data = OPENSSL_realloc(c, len); + str->data = OPENSSL_realloc(c, len != 0 ? len : 1); #else str->data = OPENSSL_realloc(c, len + 1); #endif if (str->data == NULL) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_STRING_SET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); str->data = c; return 0; } } str->length = len; if (data != NULL) { memcpy(str->data, data, len); -#ifndef FUZZING_BUILD_MODE_UNSAFE_FOR_PRODUCTION +#ifdef FUZZING_BUILD_MODE_UNSAFE_FOR_PRODUCTION + /* Set the unused byte to something non NUL and printable. */ + if (len == 0) + str->data[len] = '~'; +#else /* * Add a NUL terminator. This should not be necessary - but we add it as * a safety precaution */ str->data[len] = '\0'; #endif } return 1; } void ASN1_STRING_set0(ASN1_STRING *str, void *data, int len) { OPENSSL_free(str->data); str->data = data; str->length = len; } ASN1_STRING *ASN1_STRING_new(void) { return ASN1_STRING_type_new(V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING); } ASN1_STRING *ASN1_STRING_type_new(int type) { ASN1_STRING *ret; ret = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ret)); if (ret == NULL) { ASN1err(ASN1_F_ASN1_STRING_TYPE_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return NULL; } ret->type = type; return ret; } void asn1_string_embed_free(ASN1_STRING *a, int embed) { if (a == NULL) return; if (!(a->flags & ASN1_STRING_FLAG_NDEF)) OPENSSL_free(a->data); if (embed == 0) OPENSSL_free(a); } void ASN1_STRING_free(ASN1_STRING *a) { if (a == NULL) return; asn1_string_embed_free(a, a->flags & ASN1_STRING_FLAG_EMBED); } void ASN1_STRING_clear_free(ASN1_STRING *a) { if (a == NULL) return; if (a->data && !(a->flags & ASN1_STRING_FLAG_NDEF)) OPENSSL_cleanse(a->data, a->length); ASN1_STRING_free(a); } int ASN1_STRING_cmp(const ASN1_STRING *a, const ASN1_STRING *b) { int i; i = (a->length - b->length); if (i == 0) { - i = memcmp(a->data, b->data, a->length); + if (a->length != 0) + i = memcmp(a->data, b->data, a->length); if (i == 0) return a->type - b->type; else return i; } else return i; } int ASN1_STRING_length(const ASN1_STRING *x) { return x->length; } void ASN1_STRING_length_set(ASN1_STRING *x, int len) { x->length = len; } int ASN1_STRING_type(const ASN1_STRING *x) { return x->type; } const unsigned char *ASN1_STRING_get0_data(const ASN1_STRING *x) { return x->data; } # if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L unsigned char *ASN1_STRING_data(ASN1_STRING *x) { return x->data; } #endif diff --git a/crypto/bio/bss_dgram.c b/crypto/bio/bss_dgram.c index 942fd8b514be..c87ba4d26508 100644 --- a/crypto/bio/bss_dgram.c +++ b/crypto/bio/bss_dgram.c @@ -1,1925 +1,1929 @@ /* - * Copyright 2005-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 2005-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ +#ifndef _GNU_SOURCE +# define _GNU_SOURCE +#endif + #include #include #include "bio_local.h" #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DGRAM # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP # include # include # define OPENSSL_SCTP_DATA_CHUNK_TYPE 0x00 # define OPENSSL_SCTP_FORWARD_CUM_TSN_CHUNK_TYPE 0xc0 # endif # if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_LINUX) && !defined(IP_MTU) # define IP_MTU 14 /* linux is lame */ # endif # if OPENSSL_USE_IPV6 && !defined(IPPROTO_IPV6) # define IPPROTO_IPV6 41 /* windows is lame */ # endif # if defined(__FreeBSD__) && defined(IN6_IS_ADDR_V4MAPPED) /* Standard definition causes type-punning problems. */ # undef IN6_IS_ADDR_V4MAPPED # define s6_addr32 __u6_addr.__u6_addr32 # define IN6_IS_ADDR_V4MAPPED(a) \ (((a)->s6_addr32[0] == 0) && \ ((a)->s6_addr32[1] == 0) && \ ((a)->s6_addr32[2] == htonl(0x0000ffff))) # endif static int dgram_write(BIO *h, const char *buf, int num); static int dgram_read(BIO *h, char *buf, int size); static int dgram_puts(BIO *h, const char *str); static long dgram_ctrl(BIO *h, int cmd, long arg1, void *arg2); static int dgram_new(BIO *h); static int dgram_free(BIO *data); static int dgram_clear(BIO *bio); # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP static int dgram_sctp_write(BIO *h, const char *buf, int num); static int dgram_sctp_read(BIO *h, char *buf, int size); static int dgram_sctp_puts(BIO *h, const char *str); static long dgram_sctp_ctrl(BIO *h, int cmd, long arg1, void *arg2); static int dgram_sctp_new(BIO *h); static int dgram_sctp_free(BIO *data); # ifdef SCTP_AUTHENTICATION_EVENT static void dgram_sctp_handle_auth_free_key_event(BIO *b, union sctp_notification *snp); # endif # endif static int BIO_dgram_should_retry(int s); static void get_current_time(struct timeval *t); static const BIO_METHOD methods_dgramp = { BIO_TYPE_DGRAM, "datagram socket", /* TODO: Convert to new style write function */ bwrite_conv, dgram_write, /* TODO: Convert to new style read function */ bread_conv, dgram_read, dgram_puts, NULL, /* dgram_gets, */ dgram_ctrl, dgram_new, dgram_free, NULL, /* dgram_callback_ctrl */ }; # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP static const BIO_METHOD methods_dgramp_sctp = { BIO_TYPE_DGRAM_SCTP, "datagram sctp socket", /* TODO: Convert to new style write function */ bwrite_conv, dgram_sctp_write, /* TODO: Convert to new style write function */ bread_conv, dgram_sctp_read, dgram_sctp_puts, NULL, /* dgram_gets, */ dgram_sctp_ctrl, dgram_sctp_new, dgram_sctp_free, NULL, /* dgram_callback_ctrl */ }; # endif typedef struct bio_dgram_data_st { BIO_ADDR peer; unsigned int connected; unsigned int _errno; unsigned int mtu; struct timeval next_timeout; struct timeval socket_timeout; unsigned int peekmode; } bio_dgram_data; # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP typedef struct bio_dgram_sctp_save_message_st { BIO *bio; char *data; int length; } bio_dgram_sctp_save_message; typedef struct bio_dgram_sctp_data_st { BIO_ADDR peer; unsigned int connected; unsigned int _errno; unsigned int mtu; struct bio_dgram_sctp_sndinfo sndinfo; struct bio_dgram_sctp_rcvinfo rcvinfo; struct bio_dgram_sctp_prinfo prinfo; void (*handle_notifications) (BIO *bio, void *context, void *buf); void *notification_context; int in_handshake; int ccs_rcvd; int ccs_sent; int save_shutdown; int peer_auth_tested; } bio_dgram_sctp_data; # endif const BIO_METHOD *BIO_s_datagram(void) { return &methods_dgramp; } BIO *BIO_new_dgram(int fd, int close_flag) { BIO *ret; ret = BIO_new(BIO_s_datagram()); if (ret == NULL) return NULL; BIO_set_fd(ret, fd, close_flag); return ret; } static int dgram_new(BIO *bi) { bio_dgram_data *data = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*data)); if (data == NULL) return 0; bi->ptr = data; return 1; } static int dgram_free(BIO *a) { bio_dgram_data *data; if (a == NULL) return 0; if (!dgram_clear(a)) return 0; data = (bio_dgram_data *)a->ptr; OPENSSL_free(data); return 1; } static int dgram_clear(BIO *a) { if (a == NULL) return 0; if (a->shutdown) { if (a->init) { BIO_closesocket(a->num); } a->init = 0; a->flags = 0; } return 1; } static void dgram_adjust_rcv_timeout(BIO *b) { # if defined(SO_RCVTIMEO) bio_dgram_data *data = (bio_dgram_data *)b->ptr; union { size_t s; int i; } sz = { 0 }; /* Is a timer active? */ if (data->next_timeout.tv_sec > 0 || data->next_timeout.tv_usec > 0) { struct timeval timenow, timeleft; /* Read current socket timeout */ # ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS int timeout; sz.i = sizeof(timeout); if (getsockopt(b->num, SOL_SOCKET, SO_RCVTIMEO, (void *)&timeout, &sz.i) < 0) { perror("getsockopt"); } else { data->socket_timeout.tv_sec = timeout / 1000; data->socket_timeout.tv_usec = (timeout % 1000) * 1000; } # else sz.i = sizeof(data->socket_timeout); if (getsockopt(b->num, SOL_SOCKET, SO_RCVTIMEO, &(data->socket_timeout), (void *)&sz) < 0) { perror("getsockopt"); } else if (sizeof(sz.s) != sizeof(sz.i) && sz.i == 0) OPENSSL_assert(sz.s <= sizeof(data->socket_timeout)); # endif /* Get current time */ get_current_time(&timenow); /* Calculate time left until timer expires */ memcpy(&timeleft, &(data->next_timeout), sizeof(struct timeval)); if (timeleft.tv_usec < timenow.tv_usec) { timeleft.tv_usec = 1000000 - timenow.tv_usec + timeleft.tv_usec; timeleft.tv_sec--; } else { timeleft.tv_usec -= timenow.tv_usec; } if (timeleft.tv_sec < timenow.tv_sec) { timeleft.tv_sec = 0; timeleft.tv_usec = 1; } else { timeleft.tv_sec -= timenow.tv_sec; } /* * Adjust socket timeout if next handshake message timer will expire * earlier. */ if ((data->socket_timeout.tv_sec == 0 && data->socket_timeout.tv_usec == 0) || (data->socket_timeout.tv_sec > timeleft.tv_sec) || (data->socket_timeout.tv_sec == timeleft.tv_sec && data->socket_timeout.tv_usec >= timeleft.tv_usec)) { # ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS timeout = timeleft.tv_sec * 1000 + timeleft.tv_usec / 1000; if (setsockopt(b->num, SOL_SOCKET, SO_RCVTIMEO, (void *)&timeout, sizeof(timeout)) < 0) { perror("setsockopt"); } # else if (setsockopt(b->num, SOL_SOCKET, SO_RCVTIMEO, &timeleft, sizeof(struct timeval)) < 0) { perror("setsockopt"); } # endif } } # endif } static void dgram_reset_rcv_timeout(BIO *b) { # if defined(SO_RCVTIMEO) bio_dgram_data *data = (bio_dgram_data *)b->ptr; /* Is a timer active? */ if (data->next_timeout.tv_sec > 0 || data->next_timeout.tv_usec > 0) { # ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS int timeout = data->socket_timeout.tv_sec * 1000 + data->socket_timeout.tv_usec / 1000; if (setsockopt(b->num, SOL_SOCKET, SO_RCVTIMEO, (void *)&timeout, sizeof(timeout)) < 0) { perror("setsockopt"); } # else if (setsockopt (b->num, SOL_SOCKET, SO_RCVTIMEO, &(data->socket_timeout), sizeof(struct timeval)) < 0) { perror("setsockopt"); } # endif } # endif } static int dgram_read(BIO *b, char *out, int outl) { int ret = 0; bio_dgram_data *data = (bio_dgram_data *)b->ptr; int flags = 0; BIO_ADDR peer; socklen_t len = sizeof(peer); if (out != NULL) { clear_socket_error(); memset(&peer, 0, sizeof(peer)); dgram_adjust_rcv_timeout(b); if (data->peekmode) flags = MSG_PEEK; ret = recvfrom(b->num, out, outl, flags, BIO_ADDR_sockaddr_noconst(&peer), &len); if (!data->connected && ret >= 0) BIO_ctrl(b, BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_PEER, 0, &peer); BIO_clear_retry_flags(b); if (ret < 0) { if (BIO_dgram_should_retry(ret)) { BIO_set_retry_read(b); data->_errno = get_last_socket_error(); } } dgram_reset_rcv_timeout(b); } return ret; } static int dgram_write(BIO *b, const char *in, int inl) { int ret; bio_dgram_data *data = (bio_dgram_data *)b->ptr; clear_socket_error(); if (data->connected) ret = writesocket(b->num, in, inl); else { int peerlen = BIO_ADDR_sockaddr_size(&data->peer); ret = sendto(b->num, in, inl, 0, BIO_ADDR_sockaddr(&data->peer), peerlen); } BIO_clear_retry_flags(b); if (ret <= 0) { if (BIO_dgram_should_retry(ret)) { BIO_set_retry_write(b); data->_errno = get_last_socket_error(); } } return ret; } static long dgram_get_mtu_overhead(bio_dgram_data *data) { long ret; switch (BIO_ADDR_family(&data->peer)) { case AF_INET: /* * Assume this is UDP - 20 bytes for IP, 8 bytes for UDP */ ret = 28; break; # if OPENSSL_USE_IPV6 case AF_INET6: { # ifdef IN6_IS_ADDR_V4MAPPED struct in6_addr tmp_addr; if (BIO_ADDR_rawaddress(&data->peer, &tmp_addr, NULL) && IN6_IS_ADDR_V4MAPPED(&tmp_addr)) /* * Assume this is UDP - 20 bytes for IP, 8 bytes for UDP */ ret = 28; else # endif /* * Assume this is UDP - 40 bytes for IP, 8 bytes for UDP */ ret = 48; } break; # endif default: /* We don't know. Go with the historical default */ ret = 28; break; } return ret; } static long dgram_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long num, void *ptr) { long ret = 1; int *ip; bio_dgram_data *data = NULL; int sockopt_val = 0; int d_errno; # if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_LINUX) && (defined(IP_MTU_DISCOVER) || defined(IP_MTU)) socklen_t sockopt_len; /* assume that system supporting IP_MTU is * modern enough to define socklen_t */ socklen_t addr_len; BIO_ADDR addr; # endif data = (bio_dgram_data *)b->ptr; switch (cmd) { case BIO_CTRL_RESET: num = 0; ret = 0; break; case BIO_CTRL_INFO: ret = 0; break; case BIO_C_SET_FD: dgram_clear(b); b->num = *((int *)ptr); b->shutdown = (int)num; b->init = 1; break; case BIO_C_GET_FD: if (b->init) { ip = (int *)ptr; if (ip != NULL) *ip = b->num; ret = b->num; } else ret = -1; break; case BIO_CTRL_GET_CLOSE: ret = b->shutdown; break; case BIO_CTRL_SET_CLOSE: b->shutdown = (int)num; break; case BIO_CTRL_PENDING: case BIO_CTRL_WPENDING: ret = 0; break; case BIO_CTRL_DUP: case BIO_CTRL_FLUSH: ret = 1; break; case BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_CONNECT: BIO_ADDR_make(&data->peer, BIO_ADDR_sockaddr((BIO_ADDR *)ptr)); break; /* (Linux)kernel sets DF bit on outgoing IP packets */ case BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_MTU_DISCOVER: # if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_LINUX) && defined(IP_MTU_DISCOVER) && defined(IP_PMTUDISC_DO) addr_len = (socklen_t) sizeof(addr); memset(&addr, 0, sizeof(addr)); if (getsockname(b->num, &addr.sa, &addr_len) < 0) { ret = 0; break; } switch (addr.sa.sa_family) { case AF_INET: sockopt_val = IP_PMTUDISC_DO; if ((ret = setsockopt(b->num, IPPROTO_IP, IP_MTU_DISCOVER, &sockopt_val, sizeof(sockopt_val))) < 0) perror("setsockopt"); break; # if OPENSSL_USE_IPV6 && defined(IPV6_MTU_DISCOVER) && defined(IPV6_PMTUDISC_DO) case AF_INET6: sockopt_val = IPV6_PMTUDISC_DO; if ((ret = setsockopt(b->num, IPPROTO_IPV6, IPV6_MTU_DISCOVER, &sockopt_val, sizeof(sockopt_val))) < 0) perror("setsockopt"); break; # endif default: ret = -1; break; } # else ret = -1; # endif break; case BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_QUERY_MTU: # if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_LINUX) && defined(IP_MTU) addr_len = (socklen_t) sizeof(addr); memset(&addr, 0, sizeof(addr)); if (getsockname(b->num, &addr.sa, &addr_len) < 0) { ret = 0; break; } sockopt_len = sizeof(sockopt_val); switch (addr.sa.sa_family) { case AF_INET: if ((ret = getsockopt(b->num, IPPROTO_IP, IP_MTU, (void *)&sockopt_val, &sockopt_len)) < 0 || sockopt_val < 0) { ret = 0; } else { /* * we assume that the transport protocol is UDP and no IP * options are used. */ data->mtu = sockopt_val - 8 - 20; ret = data->mtu; } break; # if OPENSSL_USE_IPV6 && defined(IPV6_MTU) case AF_INET6: if ((ret = getsockopt(b->num, IPPROTO_IPV6, IPV6_MTU, (void *)&sockopt_val, &sockopt_len)) < 0 || sockopt_val < 0) { ret = 0; } else { /* * we assume that the transport protocol is UDP and no IPV6 * options are used. */ data->mtu = sockopt_val - 8 - 40; ret = data->mtu; } break; # endif default: ret = 0; break; } # else ret = 0; # endif break; case BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_GET_FALLBACK_MTU: ret = -dgram_get_mtu_overhead(data); switch (BIO_ADDR_family(&data->peer)) { case AF_INET: ret += 576; break; # if OPENSSL_USE_IPV6 case AF_INET6: { # ifdef IN6_IS_ADDR_V4MAPPED struct in6_addr tmp_addr; if (BIO_ADDR_rawaddress(&data->peer, &tmp_addr, NULL) && IN6_IS_ADDR_V4MAPPED(&tmp_addr)) ret += 576; else # endif ret += 1280; } break; # endif default: ret += 576; break; } break; case BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_GET_MTU: return data->mtu; case BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_MTU: data->mtu = num; ret = num; break; case BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_CONNECTED: if (ptr != NULL) { data->connected = 1; BIO_ADDR_make(&data->peer, BIO_ADDR_sockaddr((BIO_ADDR *)ptr)); } else { data->connected = 0; memset(&data->peer, 0, sizeof(data->peer)); } break; case BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_GET_PEER: ret = BIO_ADDR_sockaddr_size(&data->peer); /* FIXME: if num < ret, we will only return part of an address. That should bee an error, no? */ if (num == 0 || num > ret) num = ret; memcpy(ptr, &data->peer, (ret = num)); break; case BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_PEER: BIO_ADDR_make(&data->peer, BIO_ADDR_sockaddr((BIO_ADDR *)ptr)); break; case BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_NEXT_TIMEOUT: memcpy(&(data->next_timeout), ptr, sizeof(struct timeval)); break; # if defined(SO_RCVTIMEO) case BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_RECV_TIMEOUT: # ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS { struct timeval *tv = (struct timeval *)ptr; int timeout = tv->tv_sec * 1000 + tv->tv_usec / 1000; if (setsockopt(b->num, SOL_SOCKET, SO_RCVTIMEO, (void *)&timeout, sizeof(timeout)) < 0) { perror("setsockopt"); ret = -1; } } # else if (setsockopt(b->num, SOL_SOCKET, SO_RCVTIMEO, ptr, sizeof(struct timeval)) < 0) { perror("setsockopt"); ret = -1; } # endif break; case BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_GET_RECV_TIMEOUT: { union { size_t s; int i; } sz = { 0 }; # ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS int timeout; struct timeval *tv = (struct timeval *)ptr; sz.i = sizeof(timeout); if (getsockopt(b->num, SOL_SOCKET, SO_RCVTIMEO, (void *)&timeout, &sz.i) < 0) { perror("getsockopt"); ret = -1; } else { tv->tv_sec = timeout / 1000; tv->tv_usec = (timeout % 1000) * 1000; ret = sizeof(*tv); } # else sz.i = sizeof(struct timeval); if (getsockopt(b->num, SOL_SOCKET, SO_RCVTIMEO, ptr, (void *)&sz) < 0) { perror("getsockopt"); ret = -1; } else if (sizeof(sz.s) != sizeof(sz.i) && sz.i == 0) { OPENSSL_assert(sz.s <= sizeof(struct timeval)); ret = (int)sz.s; } else ret = sz.i; # endif } break; # endif # if defined(SO_SNDTIMEO) case BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_SEND_TIMEOUT: # ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS { struct timeval *tv = (struct timeval *)ptr; int timeout = tv->tv_sec * 1000 + tv->tv_usec / 1000; if (setsockopt(b->num, SOL_SOCKET, SO_SNDTIMEO, (void *)&timeout, sizeof(timeout)) < 0) { perror("setsockopt"); ret = -1; } } # else if (setsockopt(b->num, SOL_SOCKET, SO_SNDTIMEO, ptr, sizeof(struct timeval)) < 0) { perror("setsockopt"); ret = -1; } # endif break; case BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_GET_SEND_TIMEOUT: { union { size_t s; int i; } sz = { 0 }; # ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS int timeout; struct timeval *tv = (struct timeval *)ptr; sz.i = sizeof(timeout); if (getsockopt(b->num, SOL_SOCKET, SO_SNDTIMEO, (void *)&timeout, &sz.i) < 0) { perror("getsockopt"); ret = -1; } else { tv->tv_sec = timeout / 1000; tv->tv_usec = (timeout % 1000) * 1000; ret = sizeof(*tv); } # else sz.i = sizeof(struct timeval); if (getsockopt(b->num, SOL_SOCKET, SO_SNDTIMEO, ptr, (void *)&sz) < 0) { perror("getsockopt"); ret = -1; } else if (sizeof(sz.s) != sizeof(sz.i) && sz.i == 0) { OPENSSL_assert(sz.s <= sizeof(struct timeval)); ret = (int)sz.s; } else ret = sz.i; # endif } break; # endif case BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_GET_SEND_TIMER_EXP: /* fall-through */ case BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_GET_RECV_TIMER_EXP: # ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS d_errno = (data->_errno == WSAETIMEDOUT); # else d_errno = (data->_errno == EAGAIN); # endif if (d_errno) { ret = 1; data->_errno = 0; } else ret = 0; break; # ifdef EMSGSIZE case BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_MTU_EXCEEDED: if (data->_errno == EMSGSIZE) { ret = 1; data->_errno = 0; } else ret = 0; break; # endif case BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_DONT_FRAG: sockopt_val = num ? 1 : 0; switch (data->peer.sa.sa_family) { case AF_INET: # if defined(IP_DONTFRAG) if ((ret = setsockopt(b->num, IPPROTO_IP, IP_DONTFRAG, &sockopt_val, sizeof(sockopt_val))) < 0) { perror("setsockopt"); ret = -1; } # elif defined(OPENSSL_SYS_LINUX) && defined(IP_MTU_DISCOVER) && defined (IP_PMTUDISC_PROBE) if ((sockopt_val = num ? IP_PMTUDISC_PROBE : IP_PMTUDISC_DONT), (ret = setsockopt(b->num, IPPROTO_IP, IP_MTU_DISCOVER, &sockopt_val, sizeof(sockopt_val))) < 0) { perror("setsockopt"); ret = -1; } # elif defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS) && defined(IP_DONTFRAGMENT) if ((ret = setsockopt(b->num, IPPROTO_IP, IP_DONTFRAGMENT, (const char *)&sockopt_val, sizeof(sockopt_val))) < 0) { perror("setsockopt"); ret = -1; } # else ret = -1; # endif break; # if OPENSSL_USE_IPV6 case AF_INET6: # if defined(IPV6_DONTFRAG) if ((ret = setsockopt(b->num, IPPROTO_IPV6, IPV6_DONTFRAG, (const void *)&sockopt_val, sizeof(sockopt_val))) < 0) { perror("setsockopt"); ret = -1; } # elif defined(OPENSSL_SYS_LINUX) && defined(IPV6_MTUDISCOVER) if ((sockopt_val = num ? IP_PMTUDISC_PROBE : IP_PMTUDISC_DONT), (ret = setsockopt(b->num, IPPROTO_IPV6, IPV6_MTU_DISCOVER, &sockopt_val, sizeof(sockopt_val))) < 0) { perror("setsockopt"); ret = -1; } # else ret = -1; # endif break; # endif default: ret = -1; break; } break; case BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_GET_MTU_OVERHEAD: ret = dgram_get_mtu_overhead(data); break; /* * BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_SET_IN_HANDSHAKE is used here for compatibility * reasons. When BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_PEEK_MODE was first defined its value * was incorrectly clashing with BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_SET_IN_HANDSHAKE. The * value has been updated to a non-clashing value. However to preserve * binary compatibility we now respond to both the old value and the new one */ case BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_SET_IN_HANDSHAKE: case BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_PEEK_MODE: data->peekmode = (unsigned int)num; break; default: ret = 0; break; } return ret; } static int dgram_puts(BIO *bp, const char *str) { int n, ret; n = strlen(str); ret = dgram_write(bp, str, n); return ret; } # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP const BIO_METHOD *BIO_s_datagram_sctp(void) { return &methods_dgramp_sctp; } BIO *BIO_new_dgram_sctp(int fd, int close_flag) { BIO *bio; int ret, optval = 20000; int auth_data = 0, auth_forward = 0; unsigned char *p; struct sctp_authchunk auth; struct sctp_authchunks *authchunks; socklen_t sockopt_len; # ifdef SCTP_AUTHENTICATION_EVENT # ifdef SCTP_EVENT struct sctp_event event; # else struct sctp_event_subscribe event; # endif # endif bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_datagram_sctp()); if (bio == NULL) return NULL; BIO_set_fd(bio, fd, close_flag); /* Activate SCTP-AUTH for DATA and FORWARD-TSN chunks */ auth.sauth_chunk = OPENSSL_SCTP_DATA_CHUNK_TYPE; ret = setsockopt(fd, IPPROTO_SCTP, SCTP_AUTH_CHUNK, &auth, sizeof(struct sctp_authchunk)); if (ret < 0) { BIO_vfree(bio); BIOerr(BIO_F_BIO_NEW_DGRAM_SCTP, ERR_R_SYS_LIB); ERR_add_error_data(1, "Ensure SCTP AUTH chunks are enabled in kernel"); return NULL; } auth.sauth_chunk = OPENSSL_SCTP_FORWARD_CUM_TSN_CHUNK_TYPE; ret = setsockopt(fd, IPPROTO_SCTP, SCTP_AUTH_CHUNK, &auth, sizeof(struct sctp_authchunk)); if (ret < 0) { BIO_vfree(bio); BIOerr(BIO_F_BIO_NEW_DGRAM_SCTP, ERR_R_SYS_LIB); ERR_add_error_data(1, "Ensure SCTP AUTH chunks are enabled in kernel"); return NULL; } /* * Test if activation was successful. When using accept(), SCTP-AUTH has * to be activated for the listening socket already, otherwise the * connected socket won't use it. Similarly with connect(): the socket * prior to connection must be activated for SCTP-AUTH */ sockopt_len = (socklen_t) (sizeof(sctp_assoc_t) + 256 * sizeof(uint8_t)); authchunks = OPENSSL_zalloc(sockopt_len); if (authchunks == NULL) { BIO_vfree(bio); return NULL; } ret = getsockopt(fd, IPPROTO_SCTP, SCTP_LOCAL_AUTH_CHUNKS, authchunks, &sockopt_len); if (ret < 0) { OPENSSL_free(authchunks); BIO_vfree(bio); return NULL; } for (p = (unsigned char *)authchunks->gauth_chunks; p < (unsigned char *)authchunks + sockopt_len; p += sizeof(uint8_t)) { if (*p == OPENSSL_SCTP_DATA_CHUNK_TYPE) auth_data = 1; if (*p == OPENSSL_SCTP_FORWARD_CUM_TSN_CHUNK_TYPE) auth_forward = 1; } OPENSSL_free(authchunks); if (!auth_data || !auth_forward) { BIO_vfree(bio); BIOerr(BIO_F_BIO_NEW_DGRAM_SCTP, ERR_R_SYS_LIB); ERR_add_error_data(1, "Ensure SCTP AUTH chunks are enabled on the " "underlying socket"); return NULL; } # ifdef SCTP_AUTHENTICATION_EVENT # ifdef SCTP_EVENT memset(&event, 0, sizeof(event)); event.se_assoc_id = 0; event.se_type = SCTP_AUTHENTICATION_EVENT; event.se_on = 1; ret = setsockopt(fd, IPPROTO_SCTP, SCTP_EVENT, &event, sizeof(struct sctp_event)); if (ret < 0) { BIO_vfree(bio); return NULL; } # else sockopt_len = (socklen_t) sizeof(struct sctp_event_subscribe); ret = getsockopt(fd, IPPROTO_SCTP, SCTP_EVENTS, &event, &sockopt_len); if (ret < 0) { BIO_vfree(bio); return NULL; } event.sctp_authentication_event = 1; ret = setsockopt(fd, IPPROTO_SCTP, SCTP_EVENTS, &event, sizeof(struct sctp_event_subscribe)); if (ret < 0) { BIO_vfree(bio); return NULL; } # endif # endif /* * Disable partial delivery by setting the min size larger than the max * record size of 2^14 + 2048 + 13 */ ret = setsockopt(fd, IPPROTO_SCTP, SCTP_PARTIAL_DELIVERY_POINT, &optval, sizeof(optval)); if (ret < 0) { BIO_vfree(bio); return NULL; } return bio; } int BIO_dgram_is_sctp(BIO *bio) { return (BIO_method_type(bio) == BIO_TYPE_DGRAM_SCTP); } static int dgram_sctp_new(BIO *bi) { bio_dgram_sctp_data *data = NULL; bi->init = 0; bi->num = 0; if ((data = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*data))) == NULL) { BIOerr(BIO_F_DGRAM_SCTP_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } # ifdef SCTP_PR_SCTP_NONE data->prinfo.pr_policy = SCTP_PR_SCTP_NONE; # endif bi->ptr = data; bi->flags = 0; return 1; } static int dgram_sctp_free(BIO *a) { bio_dgram_sctp_data *data; if (a == NULL) return 0; if (!dgram_clear(a)) return 0; data = (bio_dgram_sctp_data *) a->ptr; if (data != NULL) OPENSSL_free(data); return 1; } # ifdef SCTP_AUTHENTICATION_EVENT void dgram_sctp_handle_auth_free_key_event(BIO *b, union sctp_notification *snp) { int ret; struct sctp_authkey_event *authkeyevent = &snp->sn_auth_event; if (authkeyevent->auth_indication == SCTP_AUTH_FREE_KEY) { struct sctp_authkeyid authkeyid; /* delete key */ authkeyid.scact_keynumber = authkeyevent->auth_keynumber; ret = setsockopt(b->num, IPPROTO_SCTP, SCTP_AUTH_DELETE_KEY, &authkeyid, sizeof(struct sctp_authkeyid)); } } # endif static int dgram_sctp_read(BIO *b, char *out, int outl) { int ret = 0, n = 0, i, optval; socklen_t optlen; bio_dgram_sctp_data *data = (bio_dgram_sctp_data *) b->ptr; union sctp_notification *snp; struct msghdr msg; struct iovec iov; struct cmsghdr *cmsg; char cmsgbuf[512]; if (out != NULL) { clear_socket_error(); do { memset(&data->rcvinfo, 0, sizeof(data->rcvinfo)); iov.iov_base = out; iov.iov_len = outl; msg.msg_name = NULL; msg.msg_namelen = 0; msg.msg_iov = &iov; msg.msg_iovlen = 1; msg.msg_control = cmsgbuf; msg.msg_controllen = 512; msg.msg_flags = 0; n = recvmsg(b->num, &msg, 0); if (n <= 0) { if (n < 0) ret = n; break; } if (msg.msg_controllen > 0) { for (cmsg = CMSG_FIRSTHDR(&msg); cmsg; cmsg = CMSG_NXTHDR(&msg, cmsg)) { if (cmsg->cmsg_level != IPPROTO_SCTP) continue; # ifdef SCTP_RCVINFO if (cmsg->cmsg_type == SCTP_RCVINFO) { struct sctp_rcvinfo *rcvinfo; rcvinfo = (struct sctp_rcvinfo *)CMSG_DATA(cmsg); data->rcvinfo.rcv_sid = rcvinfo->rcv_sid; data->rcvinfo.rcv_ssn = rcvinfo->rcv_ssn; data->rcvinfo.rcv_flags = rcvinfo->rcv_flags; data->rcvinfo.rcv_ppid = rcvinfo->rcv_ppid; data->rcvinfo.rcv_tsn = rcvinfo->rcv_tsn; data->rcvinfo.rcv_cumtsn = rcvinfo->rcv_cumtsn; data->rcvinfo.rcv_context = rcvinfo->rcv_context; } # endif # ifdef SCTP_SNDRCV if (cmsg->cmsg_type == SCTP_SNDRCV) { struct sctp_sndrcvinfo *sndrcvinfo; sndrcvinfo = (struct sctp_sndrcvinfo *)CMSG_DATA(cmsg); data->rcvinfo.rcv_sid = sndrcvinfo->sinfo_stream; data->rcvinfo.rcv_ssn = sndrcvinfo->sinfo_ssn; data->rcvinfo.rcv_flags = sndrcvinfo->sinfo_flags; data->rcvinfo.rcv_ppid = sndrcvinfo->sinfo_ppid; data->rcvinfo.rcv_tsn = sndrcvinfo->sinfo_tsn; data->rcvinfo.rcv_cumtsn = sndrcvinfo->sinfo_cumtsn; data->rcvinfo.rcv_context = sndrcvinfo->sinfo_context; } # endif } } if (msg.msg_flags & MSG_NOTIFICATION) { snp = (union sctp_notification *)out; if (snp->sn_header.sn_type == SCTP_SENDER_DRY_EVENT) { # ifdef SCTP_EVENT struct sctp_event event; # else struct sctp_event_subscribe event; socklen_t eventsize; # endif /* disable sender dry event */ # ifdef SCTP_EVENT memset(&event, 0, sizeof(event)); event.se_assoc_id = 0; event.se_type = SCTP_SENDER_DRY_EVENT; event.se_on = 0; i = setsockopt(b->num, IPPROTO_SCTP, SCTP_EVENT, &event, sizeof(struct sctp_event)); if (i < 0) { ret = i; break; } # else eventsize = sizeof(struct sctp_event_subscribe); i = getsockopt(b->num, IPPROTO_SCTP, SCTP_EVENTS, &event, &eventsize); if (i < 0) { ret = i; break; } event.sctp_sender_dry_event = 0; i = setsockopt(b->num, IPPROTO_SCTP, SCTP_EVENTS, &event, sizeof(struct sctp_event_subscribe)); if (i < 0) { ret = i; break; } # endif } # ifdef SCTP_AUTHENTICATION_EVENT if (snp->sn_header.sn_type == SCTP_AUTHENTICATION_EVENT) dgram_sctp_handle_auth_free_key_event(b, snp); # endif if (data->handle_notifications != NULL) data->handle_notifications(b, data->notification_context, (void *)out); memset(out, 0, outl); } else ret += n; } while ((msg.msg_flags & MSG_NOTIFICATION) && (msg.msg_flags & MSG_EOR) && (ret < outl)); if (ret > 0 && !(msg.msg_flags & MSG_EOR)) { /* Partial message read, this should never happen! */ /* * The buffer was too small, this means the peer sent a message * that was larger than allowed. */ if (ret == outl) return -1; /* * Test if socket buffer can handle max record size (2^14 + 2048 * + 13) */ optlen = (socklen_t) sizeof(int); ret = getsockopt(b->num, SOL_SOCKET, SO_RCVBUF, &optval, &optlen); if (ret >= 0) OPENSSL_assert(optval >= 18445); /* * Test if SCTP doesn't partially deliver below max record size * (2^14 + 2048 + 13) */ optlen = (socklen_t) sizeof(int); ret = getsockopt(b->num, IPPROTO_SCTP, SCTP_PARTIAL_DELIVERY_POINT, &optval, &optlen); if (ret >= 0) OPENSSL_assert(optval >= 18445); /* * Partially delivered notification??? Probably a bug.... */ OPENSSL_assert(!(msg.msg_flags & MSG_NOTIFICATION)); /* * Everything seems ok till now, so it's most likely a message * dropped by PR-SCTP. */ memset(out, 0, outl); BIO_set_retry_read(b); return -1; } BIO_clear_retry_flags(b); if (ret < 0) { if (BIO_dgram_should_retry(ret)) { BIO_set_retry_read(b); data->_errno = get_last_socket_error(); } } /* Test if peer uses SCTP-AUTH before continuing */ if (!data->peer_auth_tested) { int ii, auth_data = 0, auth_forward = 0; unsigned char *p; struct sctp_authchunks *authchunks; optlen = (socklen_t) (sizeof(sctp_assoc_t) + 256 * sizeof(uint8_t)); authchunks = OPENSSL_malloc(optlen); if (authchunks == NULL) { BIOerr(BIO_F_DGRAM_SCTP_READ, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return -1; } memset(authchunks, 0, optlen); ii = getsockopt(b->num, IPPROTO_SCTP, SCTP_PEER_AUTH_CHUNKS, authchunks, &optlen); if (ii >= 0) for (p = (unsigned char *)authchunks->gauth_chunks; p < (unsigned char *)authchunks + optlen; p += sizeof(uint8_t)) { if (*p == OPENSSL_SCTP_DATA_CHUNK_TYPE) auth_data = 1; if (*p == OPENSSL_SCTP_FORWARD_CUM_TSN_CHUNK_TYPE) auth_forward = 1; } OPENSSL_free(authchunks); if (!auth_data || !auth_forward) { BIOerr(BIO_F_DGRAM_SCTP_READ, BIO_R_CONNECT_ERROR); return -1; } data->peer_auth_tested = 1; } } return ret; } /* * dgram_sctp_write - send message on SCTP socket * @b: BIO to write to * @in: data to send * @inl: amount of bytes in @in to send * * Returns -1 on error or the sent amount of bytes on success */ static int dgram_sctp_write(BIO *b, const char *in, int inl) { int ret; bio_dgram_sctp_data *data = (bio_dgram_sctp_data *) b->ptr; struct bio_dgram_sctp_sndinfo *sinfo = &(data->sndinfo); struct bio_dgram_sctp_prinfo *pinfo = &(data->prinfo); struct bio_dgram_sctp_sndinfo handshake_sinfo; struct iovec iov[1]; struct msghdr msg; struct cmsghdr *cmsg; # if defined(SCTP_SNDINFO) && defined(SCTP_PRINFO) char cmsgbuf[CMSG_SPACE(sizeof(struct sctp_sndinfo)) + CMSG_SPACE(sizeof(struct sctp_prinfo))]; struct sctp_sndinfo *sndinfo; struct sctp_prinfo *prinfo; # else char cmsgbuf[CMSG_SPACE(sizeof(struct sctp_sndrcvinfo))]; struct sctp_sndrcvinfo *sndrcvinfo; # endif clear_socket_error(); /* * If we're send anything else than application data, disable all user * parameters and flags. */ if (in[0] != 23) { memset(&handshake_sinfo, 0, sizeof(handshake_sinfo)); # ifdef SCTP_SACK_IMMEDIATELY handshake_sinfo.snd_flags = SCTP_SACK_IMMEDIATELY; # endif sinfo = &handshake_sinfo; } /* We can only send a shutdown alert if the socket is dry */ if (data->save_shutdown) { ret = BIO_dgram_sctp_wait_for_dry(b); if (ret < 0) return -1; if (ret == 0) { BIO_clear_retry_flags(b); BIO_set_retry_write(b); return -1; } } iov[0].iov_base = (char *)in; iov[0].iov_len = inl; msg.msg_name = NULL; msg.msg_namelen = 0; msg.msg_iov = iov; msg.msg_iovlen = 1; msg.msg_control = (caddr_t) cmsgbuf; msg.msg_controllen = 0; msg.msg_flags = 0; # if defined(SCTP_SNDINFO) && defined(SCTP_PRINFO) cmsg = (struct cmsghdr *)cmsgbuf; cmsg->cmsg_level = IPPROTO_SCTP; cmsg->cmsg_type = SCTP_SNDINFO; cmsg->cmsg_len = CMSG_LEN(sizeof(struct sctp_sndinfo)); sndinfo = (struct sctp_sndinfo *)CMSG_DATA(cmsg); memset(sndinfo, 0, sizeof(*sndinfo)); sndinfo->snd_sid = sinfo->snd_sid; sndinfo->snd_flags = sinfo->snd_flags; sndinfo->snd_ppid = sinfo->snd_ppid; sndinfo->snd_context = sinfo->snd_context; msg.msg_controllen += CMSG_SPACE(sizeof(struct sctp_sndinfo)); cmsg = (struct cmsghdr *)&cmsgbuf[CMSG_SPACE(sizeof(struct sctp_sndinfo))]; cmsg->cmsg_level = IPPROTO_SCTP; cmsg->cmsg_type = SCTP_PRINFO; cmsg->cmsg_len = CMSG_LEN(sizeof(struct sctp_prinfo)); prinfo = (struct sctp_prinfo *)CMSG_DATA(cmsg); memset(prinfo, 0, sizeof(*prinfo)); prinfo->pr_policy = pinfo->pr_policy; prinfo->pr_value = pinfo->pr_value; msg.msg_controllen += CMSG_SPACE(sizeof(struct sctp_prinfo)); # else cmsg = (struct cmsghdr *)cmsgbuf; cmsg->cmsg_level = IPPROTO_SCTP; cmsg->cmsg_type = SCTP_SNDRCV; cmsg->cmsg_len = CMSG_LEN(sizeof(struct sctp_sndrcvinfo)); sndrcvinfo = (struct sctp_sndrcvinfo *)CMSG_DATA(cmsg); memset(sndrcvinfo, 0, sizeof(*sndrcvinfo)); sndrcvinfo->sinfo_stream = sinfo->snd_sid; sndrcvinfo->sinfo_flags = sinfo->snd_flags; # ifdef __FreeBSD__ sndrcvinfo->sinfo_flags |= pinfo->pr_policy; # endif sndrcvinfo->sinfo_ppid = sinfo->snd_ppid; sndrcvinfo->sinfo_context = sinfo->snd_context; sndrcvinfo->sinfo_timetolive = pinfo->pr_value; msg.msg_controllen += CMSG_SPACE(sizeof(struct sctp_sndrcvinfo)); # endif ret = sendmsg(b->num, &msg, 0); BIO_clear_retry_flags(b); if (ret <= 0) { if (BIO_dgram_should_retry(ret)) { BIO_set_retry_write(b); data->_errno = get_last_socket_error(); } } return ret; } static long dgram_sctp_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long num, void *ptr) { long ret = 1; bio_dgram_sctp_data *data = NULL; socklen_t sockopt_len = 0; struct sctp_authkeyid authkeyid; struct sctp_authkey *authkey = NULL; data = (bio_dgram_sctp_data *) b->ptr; switch (cmd) { case BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_QUERY_MTU: /* * Set to maximum (2^14) and ignore user input to enable transport * protocol fragmentation. Returns always 2^14. */ data->mtu = 16384; ret = data->mtu; break; case BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_MTU: /* * Set to maximum (2^14) and ignore input to enable transport * protocol fragmentation. Returns always 2^14. */ data->mtu = 16384; ret = data->mtu; break; case BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_CONNECTED: case BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_CONNECT: /* Returns always -1. */ ret = -1; break; case BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SET_NEXT_TIMEOUT: /* * SCTP doesn't need the DTLS timer Returns always 1. */ break; case BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_GET_MTU_OVERHEAD: /* * We allow transport protocol fragmentation so this is irrelevant */ ret = 0; break; case BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_SET_IN_HANDSHAKE: if (num > 0) data->in_handshake = 1; else data->in_handshake = 0; ret = setsockopt(b->num, IPPROTO_SCTP, SCTP_NODELAY, &data->in_handshake, sizeof(int)); break; case BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY: /* * New shared key for SCTP AUTH. Returns 0 on success, -1 otherwise. */ /* Get active key */ sockopt_len = sizeof(struct sctp_authkeyid); ret = getsockopt(b->num, IPPROTO_SCTP, SCTP_AUTH_ACTIVE_KEY, &authkeyid, &sockopt_len); if (ret < 0) break; /* Add new key */ sockopt_len = sizeof(struct sctp_authkey) + 64 * sizeof(uint8_t); authkey = OPENSSL_malloc(sockopt_len); if (authkey == NULL) { ret = -1; break; } memset(authkey, 0, sockopt_len); authkey->sca_keynumber = authkeyid.scact_keynumber + 1; # ifndef __FreeBSD__ /* * This field is missing in FreeBSD 8.2 and earlier, and FreeBSD 8.3 * and higher work without it. */ authkey->sca_keylength = 64; # endif memcpy(&authkey->sca_key[0], ptr, 64 * sizeof(uint8_t)); ret = setsockopt(b->num, IPPROTO_SCTP, SCTP_AUTH_KEY, authkey, sockopt_len); OPENSSL_free(authkey); authkey = NULL; if (ret < 0) break; /* Reset active key */ ret = setsockopt(b->num, IPPROTO_SCTP, SCTP_AUTH_ACTIVE_KEY, &authkeyid, sizeof(struct sctp_authkeyid)); if (ret < 0) break; break; case BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY: /* Returns 0 on success, -1 otherwise. */ /* Get active key */ sockopt_len = sizeof(struct sctp_authkeyid); ret = getsockopt(b->num, IPPROTO_SCTP, SCTP_AUTH_ACTIVE_KEY, &authkeyid, &sockopt_len); if (ret < 0) break; /* Set active key */ authkeyid.scact_keynumber = authkeyid.scact_keynumber + 1; ret = setsockopt(b->num, IPPROTO_SCTP, SCTP_AUTH_ACTIVE_KEY, &authkeyid, sizeof(struct sctp_authkeyid)); if (ret < 0) break; /* * CCS has been sent, so remember that and fall through to check if * we need to deactivate an old key */ data->ccs_sent = 1; /* fall-through */ case BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_AUTH_CCS_RCVD: /* Returns 0 on success, -1 otherwise. */ /* * Has this command really been called or is this just a * fall-through? */ if (cmd == BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_AUTH_CCS_RCVD) data->ccs_rcvd = 1; /* * CSS has been both, received and sent, so deactivate an old key */ if (data->ccs_rcvd == 1 && data->ccs_sent == 1) { /* Get active key */ sockopt_len = sizeof(struct sctp_authkeyid); ret = getsockopt(b->num, IPPROTO_SCTP, SCTP_AUTH_ACTIVE_KEY, &authkeyid, &sockopt_len); if (ret < 0) break; /* * Deactivate key or delete second last key if * SCTP_AUTHENTICATION_EVENT is not available. */ authkeyid.scact_keynumber = authkeyid.scact_keynumber - 1; # ifdef SCTP_AUTH_DEACTIVATE_KEY sockopt_len = sizeof(struct sctp_authkeyid); ret = setsockopt(b->num, IPPROTO_SCTP, SCTP_AUTH_DEACTIVATE_KEY, &authkeyid, sockopt_len); if (ret < 0) break; # endif # ifndef SCTP_AUTHENTICATION_EVENT if (authkeyid.scact_keynumber > 0) { authkeyid.scact_keynumber = authkeyid.scact_keynumber - 1; ret = setsockopt(b->num, IPPROTO_SCTP, SCTP_AUTH_DELETE_KEY, &authkeyid, sizeof(struct sctp_authkeyid)); if (ret < 0) break; } # endif data->ccs_rcvd = 0; data->ccs_sent = 0; } break; case BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_GET_SNDINFO: /* Returns the size of the copied struct. */ if (num > (long)sizeof(struct bio_dgram_sctp_sndinfo)) num = sizeof(struct bio_dgram_sctp_sndinfo); memcpy(ptr, &(data->sndinfo), num); ret = num; break; case BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_SET_SNDINFO: /* Returns the size of the copied struct. */ if (num > (long)sizeof(struct bio_dgram_sctp_sndinfo)) num = sizeof(struct bio_dgram_sctp_sndinfo); memcpy(&(data->sndinfo), ptr, num); break; case BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_GET_RCVINFO: /* Returns the size of the copied struct. */ if (num > (long)sizeof(struct bio_dgram_sctp_rcvinfo)) num = sizeof(struct bio_dgram_sctp_rcvinfo); memcpy(ptr, &data->rcvinfo, num); ret = num; break; case BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_SET_RCVINFO: /* Returns the size of the copied struct. */ if (num > (long)sizeof(struct bio_dgram_sctp_rcvinfo)) num = sizeof(struct bio_dgram_sctp_rcvinfo); memcpy(&(data->rcvinfo), ptr, num); break; case BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_GET_PRINFO: /* Returns the size of the copied struct. */ if (num > (long)sizeof(struct bio_dgram_sctp_prinfo)) num = sizeof(struct bio_dgram_sctp_prinfo); memcpy(ptr, &(data->prinfo), num); ret = num; break; case BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_SET_PRINFO: /* Returns the size of the copied struct. */ if (num > (long)sizeof(struct bio_dgram_sctp_prinfo)) num = sizeof(struct bio_dgram_sctp_prinfo); memcpy(&(data->prinfo), ptr, num); break; case BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_SAVE_SHUTDOWN: /* Returns always 1. */ if (num > 0) data->save_shutdown = 1; else data->save_shutdown = 0; break; default: /* * Pass to default ctrl function to process SCTP unspecific commands */ ret = dgram_ctrl(b, cmd, num, ptr); break; } return ret; } int BIO_dgram_sctp_notification_cb(BIO *b, void (*handle_notifications) (BIO *bio, void *context, void *buf), void *context) { bio_dgram_sctp_data *data = (bio_dgram_sctp_data *) b->ptr; if (handle_notifications != NULL) { data->handle_notifications = handle_notifications; data->notification_context = context; } else return -1; return 0; } /* * BIO_dgram_sctp_wait_for_dry - Wait for SCTP SENDER_DRY event * @b: The BIO to check for the dry event * * Wait until the peer confirms all packets have been received, and so that * our kernel doesn't have anything to send anymore. This is only received by * the peer's kernel, not the application. * * Returns: * -1 on error * 0 when not dry yet * 1 when dry */ int BIO_dgram_sctp_wait_for_dry(BIO *b) { int is_dry = 0; int sockflags = 0; int n, ret; union sctp_notification snp; struct msghdr msg; struct iovec iov; # ifdef SCTP_EVENT struct sctp_event event; # else struct sctp_event_subscribe event; socklen_t eventsize; # endif bio_dgram_sctp_data *data = (bio_dgram_sctp_data *) b->ptr; /* set sender dry event */ # ifdef SCTP_EVENT memset(&event, 0, sizeof(event)); event.se_assoc_id = 0; event.se_type = SCTP_SENDER_DRY_EVENT; event.se_on = 1; ret = setsockopt(b->num, IPPROTO_SCTP, SCTP_EVENT, &event, sizeof(struct sctp_event)); # else eventsize = sizeof(struct sctp_event_subscribe); ret = getsockopt(b->num, IPPROTO_SCTP, SCTP_EVENTS, &event, &eventsize); if (ret < 0) return -1; event.sctp_sender_dry_event = 1; ret = setsockopt(b->num, IPPROTO_SCTP, SCTP_EVENTS, &event, sizeof(struct sctp_event_subscribe)); # endif if (ret < 0) return -1; /* peek for notification */ memset(&snp, 0, sizeof(snp)); iov.iov_base = (char *)&snp; iov.iov_len = sizeof(union sctp_notification); msg.msg_name = NULL; msg.msg_namelen = 0; msg.msg_iov = &iov; msg.msg_iovlen = 1; msg.msg_control = NULL; msg.msg_controllen = 0; msg.msg_flags = 0; n = recvmsg(b->num, &msg, MSG_PEEK); if (n <= 0) { if ((n < 0) && (get_last_socket_error() != EAGAIN) && (get_last_socket_error() != EWOULDBLOCK)) return -1; else return 0; } /* if we find a notification, process it and try again if necessary */ while (msg.msg_flags & MSG_NOTIFICATION) { memset(&snp, 0, sizeof(snp)); iov.iov_base = (char *)&snp; iov.iov_len = sizeof(union sctp_notification); msg.msg_name = NULL; msg.msg_namelen = 0; msg.msg_iov = &iov; msg.msg_iovlen = 1; msg.msg_control = NULL; msg.msg_controllen = 0; msg.msg_flags = 0; n = recvmsg(b->num, &msg, 0); if (n <= 0) { if ((n < 0) && (get_last_socket_error() != EAGAIN) && (get_last_socket_error() != EWOULDBLOCK)) return -1; else return is_dry; } if (snp.sn_header.sn_type == SCTP_SENDER_DRY_EVENT) { is_dry = 1; /* disable sender dry event */ # ifdef SCTP_EVENT memset(&event, 0, sizeof(event)); event.se_assoc_id = 0; event.se_type = SCTP_SENDER_DRY_EVENT; event.se_on = 0; ret = setsockopt(b->num, IPPROTO_SCTP, SCTP_EVENT, &event, sizeof(struct sctp_event)); # else eventsize = (socklen_t) sizeof(struct sctp_event_subscribe); ret = getsockopt(b->num, IPPROTO_SCTP, SCTP_EVENTS, &event, &eventsize); if (ret < 0) return -1; event.sctp_sender_dry_event = 0; ret = setsockopt(b->num, IPPROTO_SCTP, SCTP_EVENTS, &event, sizeof(struct sctp_event_subscribe)); # endif if (ret < 0) return -1; } # ifdef SCTP_AUTHENTICATION_EVENT if (snp.sn_header.sn_type == SCTP_AUTHENTICATION_EVENT) dgram_sctp_handle_auth_free_key_event(b, &snp); # endif if (data->handle_notifications != NULL) data->handle_notifications(b, data->notification_context, (void *)&snp); /* found notification, peek again */ memset(&snp, 0, sizeof(snp)); iov.iov_base = (char *)&snp; iov.iov_len = sizeof(union sctp_notification); msg.msg_name = NULL; msg.msg_namelen = 0; msg.msg_iov = &iov; msg.msg_iovlen = 1; msg.msg_control = NULL; msg.msg_controllen = 0; msg.msg_flags = 0; /* if we have seen the dry already, don't wait */ if (is_dry) { sockflags = fcntl(b->num, F_GETFL, 0); fcntl(b->num, F_SETFL, O_NONBLOCK); } n = recvmsg(b->num, &msg, MSG_PEEK); if (is_dry) { fcntl(b->num, F_SETFL, sockflags); } if (n <= 0) { if ((n < 0) && (get_last_socket_error() != EAGAIN) && (get_last_socket_error() != EWOULDBLOCK)) return -1; else return is_dry; } } /* read anything else */ return is_dry; } int BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(BIO *b) { int n, sockflags; union sctp_notification snp; struct msghdr msg; struct iovec iov; bio_dgram_sctp_data *data = (bio_dgram_sctp_data *) b->ptr; /* Check if there are any messages waiting to be read */ do { memset(&snp, 0, sizeof(snp)); iov.iov_base = (char *)&snp; iov.iov_len = sizeof(union sctp_notification); msg.msg_name = NULL; msg.msg_namelen = 0; msg.msg_iov = &iov; msg.msg_iovlen = 1; msg.msg_control = NULL; msg.msg_controllen = 0; msg.msg_flags = 0; sockflags = fcntl(b->num, F_GETFL, 0); fcntl(b->num, F_SETFL, O_NONBLOCK); n = recvmsg(b->num, &msg, MSG_PEEK); fcntl(b->num, F_SETFL, sockflags); /* if notification, process and try again */ if (n > 0 && (msg.msg_flags & MSG_NOTIFICATION)) { # ifdef SCTP_AUTHENTICATION_EVENT if (snp.sn_header.sn_type == SCTP_AUTHENTICATION_EVENT) dgram_sctp_handle_auth_free_key_event(b, &snp); # endif memset(&snp, 0, sizeof(snp)); iov.iov_base = (char *)&snp; iov.iov_len = sizeof(union sctp_notification); msg.msg_name = NULL; msg.msg_namelen = 0; msg.msg_iov = &iov; msg.msg_iovlen = 1; msg.msg_control = NULL; msg.msg_controllen = 0; msg.msg_flags = 0; n = recvmsg(b->num, &msg, 0); if (data->handle_notifications != NULL) data->handle_notifications(b, data->notification_context, (void *)&snp); } } while (n > 0 && (msg.msg_flags & MSG_NOTIFICATION)); /* Return 1 if there is a message to be read, return 0 otherwise. */ if (n > 0) return 1; else return 0; } static int dgram_sctp_puts(BIO *bp, const char *str) { int n, ret; n = strlen(str); ret = dgram_sctp_write(bp, str, n); return ret; } # endif static int BIO_dgram_should_retry(int i) { int err; if ((i == 0) || (i == -1)) { err = get_last_socket_error(); # if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS) /* * If the socket return value (i) is -1 and err is unexpectedly 0 at * this point, the error code was overwritten by another system call * before this error handling is called. */ # endif return BIO_dgram_non_fatal_error(err); } return 0; } int BIO_dgram_non_fatal_error(int err) { switch (err) { # if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS) # if defined(WSAEWOULDBLOCK) case WSAEWOULDBLOCK: # endif # endif # ifdef EWOULDBLOCK # ifdef WSAEWOULDBLOCK # if WSAEWOULDBLOCK != EWOULDBLOCK case EWOULDBLOCK: # endif # else case EWOULDBLOCK: # endif # endif # ifdef EINTR case EINTR: # endif # ifdef EAGAIN # if EWOULDBLOCK != EAGAIN case EAGAIN: # endif # endif # ifdef EPROTO case EPROTO: # endif # ifdef EINPROGRESS case EINPROGRESS: # endif # ifdef EALREADY case EALREADY: # endif return 1; default: break; } return 0; } static void get_current_time(struct timeval *t) { # if defined(_WIN32) SYSTEMTIME st; union { unsigned __int64 ul; FILETIME ft; } now; GetSystemTime(&st); SystemTimeToFileTime(&st, &now.ft); # ifdef __MINGW32__ now.ul -= 116444736000000000ULL; # else now.ul -= 116444736000000000UI64; /* re-bias to 1/1/1970 */ # endif t->tv_sec = (long)(now.ul / 10000000); t->tv_usec = ((int)(now.ul % 10000000)) / 10; # else gettimeofday(t, NULL); # endif } #endif diff --git a/crypto/bio/bss_mem.c b/crypto/bio/bss_mem.c index 7cb4a57813fd..2420b26553e0 100644 --- a/crypto/bio/bss_mem.c +++ b/crypto/bio/bss_mem.c @@ -1,372 +1,372 @@ /* - * Copyright 1995-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 1995-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include "bio_local.h" #include "internal/cryptlib.h" static int mem_write(BIO *h, const char *buf, int num); static int mem_read(BIO *h, char *buf, int size); static int mem_puts(BIO *h, const char *str); static int mem_gets(BIO *h, char *str, int size); static long mem_ctrl(BIO *h, int cmd, long arg1, void *arg2); static int mem_new(BIO *h); static int secmem_new(BIO *h); static int mem_free(BIO *data); static int mem_buf_free(BIO *data); static int mem_buf_sync(BIO *h); static const BIO_METHOD mem_method = { BIO_TYPE_MEM, "memory buffer", /* TODO: Convert to new style write function */ bwrite_conv, mem_write, /* TODO: Convert to new style read function */ bread_conv, mem_read, mem_puts, mem_gets, mem_ctrl, mem_new, mem_free, NULL, /* mem_callback_ctrl */ }; static const BIO_METHOD secmem_method = { BIO_TYPE_MEM, "secure memory buffer", /* TODO: Convert to new style write function */ bwrite_conv, mem_write, /* TODO: Convert to new style read function */ bread_conv, mem_read, mem_puts, mem_gets, mem_ctrl, secmem_new, mem_free, NULL, /* mem_callback_ctrl */ }; /* * BIO memory stores buffer and read pointer * however the roles are different for read only BIOs. * In that case the readp just stores the original state * to be used for reset. */ typedef struct bio_buf_mem_st { struct buf_mem_st *buf; /* allocated buffer */ struct buf_mem_st *readp; /* read pointer */ } BIO_BUF_MEM; /* * bio->num is used to hold the value to return on 'empty', if it is 0, * should_retry is not set */ const BIO_METHOD *BIO_s_mem(void) { return &mem_method; } const BIO_METHOD *BIO_s_secmem(void) { return(&secmem_method); } BIO *BIO_new_mem_buf(const void *buf, int len) { BIO *ret; BUF_MEM *b; BIO_BUF_MEM *bb; size_t sz; if (buf == NULL) { BIOerr(BIO_F_BIO_NEW_MEM_BUF, BIO_R_NULL_PARAMETER); return NULL; } sz = (len < 0) ? strlen(buf) : (size_t)len; if ((ret = BIO_new(BIO_s_mem())) == NULL) return NULL; bb = (BIO_BUF_MEM *)ret->ptr; b = bb->buf; /* Cast away const and trust in the MEM_RDONLY flag. */ b->data = (void *)buf; b->length = sz; b->max = sz; *bb->readp = *bb->buf; ret->flags |= BIO_FLAGS_MEM_RDONLY; /* Since this is static data retrying won't help */ ret->num = 0; return ret; } static int mem_init(BIO *bi, unsigned long flags) { BIO_BUF_MEM *bb = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*bb)); if (bb == NULL) return 0; if ((bb->buf = BUF_MEM_new_ex(flags)) == NULL) { OPENSSL_free(bb); return 0; } if ((bb->readp = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*bb->readp))) == NULL) { BUF_MEM_free(bb->buf); OPENSSL_free(bb); return 0; } *bb->readp = *bb->buf; bi->shutdown = 1; bi->init = 1; bi->num = -1; bi->ptr = (char *)bb; return 1; } static int mem_new(BIO *bi) { return mem_init(bi, 0L); } static int secmem_new(BIO *bi) { return mem_init(bi, BUF_MEM_FLAG_SECURE); } static int mem_free(BIO *a) { BIO_BUF_MEM *bb; if (a == NULL) return 0; bb = (BIO_BUF_MEM *)a->ptr; if (!mem_buf_free(a)) return 0; OPENSSL_free(bb->readp); OPENSSL_free(bb); return 1; } static int mem_buf_free(BIO *a) { if (a == NULL) return 0; if (a->shutdown && a->init && a->ptr != NULL) { BIO_BUF_MEM *bb = (BIO_BUF_MEM *)a->ptr; BUF_MEM *b = bb->buf; if (a->flags & BIO_FLAGS_MEM_RDONLY) b->data = NULL; BUF_MEM_free(b); } return 1; } /* * Reallocate memory buffer if read pointer differs */ static int mem_buf_sync(BIO *b) { if (b != NULL && b->init != 0 && b->ptr != NULL) { BIO_BUF_MEM *bbm = (BIO_BUF_MEM *)b->ptr; if (bbm->readp->data != bbm->buf->data) { memmove(bbm->buf->data, bbm->readp->data, bbm->readp->length); bbm->buf->length = bbm->readp->length; bbm->readp->data = bbm->buf->data; } } return 0; } static int mem_read(BIO *b, char *out, int outl) { int ret = -1; BIO_BUF_MEM *bbm = (BIO_BUF_MEM *)b->ptr; BUF_MEM *bm = bbm->readp; if (b->flags & BIO_FLAGS_MEM_RDONLY) bm = bbm->buf; BIO_clear_retry_flags(b); ret = (outl >= 0 && (size_t)outl > bm->length) ? (int)bm->length : outl; if ((out != NULL) && (ret > 0)) { memcpy(out, bm->data, ret); bm->length -= ret; bm->max -= ret; bm->data += ret; } else if (bm->length == 0) { ret = b->num; if (ret != 0) BIO_set_retry_read(b); } return ret; } static int mem_write(BIO *b, const char *in, int inl) { int ret = -1; int blen; BIO_BUF_MEM *bbm = (BIO_BUF_MEM *)b->ptr; if (in == NULL) { BIOerr(BIO_F_MEM_WRITE, BIO_R_NULL_PARAMETER); goto end; } if (b->flags & BIO_FLAGS_MEM_RDONLY) { BIOerr(BIO_F_MEM_WRITE, BIO_R_WRITE_TO_READ_ONLY_BIO); goto end; } BIO_clear_retry_flags(b); if (inl == 0) return 0; blen = bbm->readp->length; mem_buf_sync(b); if (BUF_MEM_grow_clean(bbm->buf, blen + inl) == 0) goto end; memcpy(bbm->buf->data + blen, in, inl); *bbm->readp = *bbm->buf; ret = inl; end: return ret; } static long mem_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long num, void *ptr) { long ret = 1; char **pptr; BIO_BUF_MEM *bbm = (BIO_BUF_MEM *)b->ptr; BUF_MEM *bm; if (b->flags & BIO_FLAGS_MEM_RDONLY) bm = bbm->buf; else bm = bbm->readp; switch (cmd) { case BIO_CTRL_RESET: bm = bbm->buf; if (bm->data != NULL) { if (!(b->flags & BIO_FLAGS_MEM_RDONLY)) { if (!(b->flags & BIO_FLAGS_NONCLEAR_RST)) { memset(bm->data, 0, bm->max); bm->length = 0; } *bbm->readp = *bbm->buf; } else { /* For read only case just reset to the start again */ *bbm->buf = *bbm->readp; } } break; case BIO_CTRL_EOF: ret = (long)(bm->length == 0); break; case BIO_C_SET_BUF_MEM_EOF_RETURN: b->num = (int)num; break; case BIO_CTRL_INFO: ret = (long)bm->length; if (ptr != NULL) { pptr = (char **)ptr; - *pptr = (char *)&(bm->data[0]); + *pptr = (char *)bm->data; } break; case BIO_C_SET_BUF_MEM: mem_buf_free(b); b->shutdown = (int)num; bbm->buf = ptr; *bbm->readp = *bbm->buf; break; case BIO_C_GET_BUF_MEM_PTR: if (ptr != NULL) { if (!(b->flags & BIO_FLAGS_MEM_RDONLY)) mem_buf_sync(b); bm = bbm->buf; pptr = (char **)ptr; *pptr = (char *)bm; } break; case BIO_CTRL_GET_CLOSE: ret = (long)b->shutdown; break; case BIO_CTRL_SET_CLOSE: b->shutdown = (int)num; break; case BIO_CTRL_WPENDING: ret = 0L; break; case BIO_CTRL_PENDING: ret = (long)bm->length; break; case BIO_CTRL_DUP: case BIO_CTRL_FLUSH: ret = 1; break; case BIO_CTRL_PUSH: case BIO_CTRL_POP: default: ret = 0; break; } return ret; } static int mem_gets(BIO *bp, char *buf, int size) { int i, j; int ret = -1; char *p; BIO_BUF_MEM *bbm = (BIO_BUF_MEM *)bp->ptr; BUF_MEM *bm = bbm->readp; if (bp->flags & BIO_FLAGS_MEM_RDONLY) bm = bbm->buf; BIO_clear_retry_flags(bp); j = bm->length; if ((size - 1) < j) j = size - 1; if (j <= 0) { *buf = '\0'; return 0; } p = bm->data; for (i = 0; i < j; i++) { if (p[i] == '\n') { i++; break; } } /* * i is now the max num of bytes to copy, either j or up to * and including the first newline */ i = mem_read(bp, buf, i); if (i > 0) buf[i] = '\0'; ret = i; return ret; } static int mem_puts(BIO *bp, const char *str) { int n, ret; n = strlen(str); ret = mem_write(bp, str, n); /* memory semantics is that it will always work */ return ret; } diff --git a/crypto/bn/asm/mips.pl b/crypto/bn/asm/mips.pl index 8ad715bda4d4..76fe82334f88 100644 --- a/crypto/bn/asm/mips.pl +++ b/crypto/bn/asm/mips.pl @@ -1,2263 +1,2267 @@ #! /usr/bin/env perl -# Copyright 2010-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. +# Copyright 2010-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. # # Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use # this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy # in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at # https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html # # ==================================================================== # Written by Andy Polyakov for the OpenSSL # project. # # Rights for redistribution and usage in source and binary forms are # granted according to the OpenSSL license. Warranty of any kind is # disclaimed. # ==================================================================== # July 1999 # # This is drop-in MIPS III/IV ISA replacement for crypto/bn/bn_asm.c. # # The module is designed to work with either of the "new" MIPS ABI(5), # namely N32 or N64, offered by IRIX 6.x. It's not meant to work under # IRIX 5.x not only because it doesn't support new ABIs but also # because 5.x kernels put R4x00 CPU into 32-bit mode and all those # 64-bit instructions (daddu, dmultu, etc.) found below gonna only # cause illegal instruction exception:-( # # In addition the code depends on preprocessor flags set up by MIPSpro # compiler driver (either as or cc) and therefore (probably?) can't be # compiled by the GNU assembler. GNU C driver manages fine though... # I mean as long as -mmips-as is specified or is the default option, # because then it simply invokes /usr/bin/as which in turn takes # perfect care of the preprocessor definitions. Another neat feature # offered by the MIPSpro assembler is an optimization pass. This gave # me the opportunity to have the code looking more regular as all those # architecture dependent instruction rescheduling details were left to # the assembler. Cool, huh? # # Performance improvement is astonishing! 'apps/openssl speed rsa dsa' # goes way over 3 times faster! # # # October 2010 # # Adapt the module even for 32-bit ABIs and other OSes. The former was # achieved by mechanical replacement of 64-bit arithmetic instructions # such as dmultu, daddu, etc. with their 32-bit counterparts and # adjusting offsets denoting multiples of BN_ULONG. Above mentioned # >3x performance improvement naturally does not apply to 32-bit code # [because there is no instruction 32-bit compiler can't use], one # has to content with 40-85% improvement depending on benchmark and # key length, more for longer keys. $flavour = shift || "o32"; while (($output=shift) && ($output!~/\w[\w\-]*\.\w+$/)) {} open STDOUT,">$output"; if ($flavour =~ /64|n32/i) { $LD="ld"; $ST="sd"; $MULTU="dmultu"; $DIVU="ddivu"; $ADDU="daddu"; $SUBU="dsubu"; $SRL="dsrl"; $SLL="dsll"; $BNSZ=8; $PTR_ADD="daddu"; $PTR_SUB="dsubu"; $SZREG=8; $REG_S="sd"; $REG_L="ld"; } else { $LD="lw"; $ST="sw"; $MULTU="multu"; $DIVU="divu"; $ADDU="addu"; $SUBU="subu"; $SRL="srl"; $SLL="sll"; $BNSZ=4; $PTR_ADD="addu"; $PTR_SUB="subu"; $SZREG=4; $REG_S="sw"; $REG_L="lw"; $code="#if !(defined (__mips_isa_rev) && (__mips_isa_rev >= 6))\n.set mips2\n#endif\n"; } # Below is N32/64 register layout used in the original module. # ($zero,$at,$v0,$v1)=map("\$$_",(0..3)); ($a0,$a1,$a2,$a3,$a4,$a5,$a6,$a7)=map("\$$_",(4..11)); ($t0,$t1,$t2,$t3,$t8,$t9)=map("\$$_",(12..15,24,25)); ($s0,$s1,$s2,$s3,$s4,$s5,$s6,$s7)=map("\$$_",(16..23)); ($gp,$sp,$fp,$ra)=map("\$$_",(28..31)); ($ta0,$ta1,$ta2,$ta3)=($a4,$a5,$a6,$a7); # # No special adaptation is required for O32. NUBI on the other hand # is treated by saving/restoring ($v1,$t0..$t3). $gp=$v1 if ($flavour =~ /nubi/i); $minus4=$v1; $code.=<<___; #include "mips_arch.h" #if defined(_MIPS_ARCH_MIPS64R6) # define ddivu(rs,rt) # define mfqt(rd,rs,rt) ddivu rd,rs,rt # define mfrm(rd,rs,rt) dmodu rd,rs,rt #elif defined(_MIPS_ARCH_MIPS32R6) # define divu(rs,rt) # define mfqt(rd,rs,rt) divu rd,rs,rt # define mfrm(rd,rs,rt) modu rd,rs,rt #else # define $DIVU(rs,rt) $DIVU $zero,rs,rt # define mfqt(rd,rs,rt) mflo rd # define mfrm(rd,rs,rt) mfhi rd #endif .rdata .asciiz "mips3.s, Version 1.2" .asciiz "MIPS II/III/IV ISA artwork by Andy Polyakov " .text .set noat .align 5 .globl bn_mul_add_words .ent bn_mul_add_words bn_mul_add_words: .set noreorder bgtz $a2,bn_mul_add_words_internal move $v0,$zero jr $ra move $a0,$v0 .end bn_mul_add_words .align 5 .ent bn_mul_add_words_internal bn_mul_add_words_internal: ___ $code.=<<___ if ($flavour =~ /nubi/i); .frame $sp,6*$SZREG,$ra .mask 0x8000f008,-$SZREG .set noreorder $PTR_SUB $sp,6*$SZREG $REG_S $ra,5*$SZREG($sp) $REG_S $t3,4*$SZREG($sp) $REG_S $t2,3*$SZREG($sp) $REG_S $t1,2*$SZREG($sp) $REG_S $t0,1*$SZREG($sp) $REG_S $gp,0*$SZREG($sp) ___ $code.=<<___; .set reorder li $minus4,-4 and $ta0,$a2,$minus4 beqz $ta0,.L_bn_mul_add_words_tail .L_bn_mul_add_words_loop: $LD $t0,0($a1) $MULTU ($t0,$a3) $LD $t1,0($a0) $LD $t2,$BNSZ($a1) $LD $t3,$BNSZ($a0) $LD $ta0,2*$BNSZ($a1) $LD $ta1,2*$BNSZ($a0) $ADDU $t1,$v0 sltu $v0,$t1,$v0 # All manuals say it "compares 32-bit # values", but it seems to work fine # even on 64-bit registers. mflo ($at,$t0,$a3) mfhi ($t0,$t0,$a3) $ADDU $t1,$at $ADDU $v0,$t0 $MULTU ($t2,$a3) sltu $at,$t1,$at $ST $t1,0($a0) $ADDU $v0,$at $LD $ta2,3*$BNSZ($a1) $LD $ta3,3*$BNSZ($a0) $ADDU $t3,$v0 sltu $v0,$t3,$v0 mflo ($at,$t2,$a3) mfhi ($t2,$t2,$a3) $ADDU $t3,$at $ADDU $v0,$t2 $MULTU ($ta0,$a3) sltu $at,$t3,$at $ST $t3,$BNSZ($a0) $ADDU $v0,$at subu $a2,4 $PTR_ADD $a0,4*$BNSZ $PTR_ADD $a1,4*$BNSZ $ADDU $ta1,$v0 sltu $v0,$ta1,$v0 mflo ($at,$ta0,$a3) mfhi ($ta0,$ta0,$a3) $ADDU $ta1,$at $ADDU $v0,$ta0 $MULTU ($ta2,$a3) sltu $at,$ta1,$at $ST $ta1,-2*$BNSZ($a0) $ADDU $v0,$at and $ta0,$a2,$minus4 $ADDU $ta3,$v0 sltu $v0,$ta3,$v0 mflo ($at,$ta2,$a3) mfhi ($ta2,$ta2,$a3) $ADDU $ta3,$at $ADDU $v0,$ta2 sltu $at,$ta3,$at $ST $ta3,-$BNSZ($a0) .set noreorder bgtz $ta0,.L_bn_mul_add_words_loop $ADDU $v0,$at beqz $a2,.L_bn_mul_add_words_return nop .L_bn_mul_add_words_tail: .set reorder $LD $t0,0($a1) $MULTU ($t0,$a3) $LD $t1,0($a0) subu $a2,1 $ADDU $t1,$v0 sltu $v0,$t1,$v0 mflo ($at,$t0,$a3) mfhi ($t0,$t0,$a3) $ADDU $t1,$at $ADDU $v0,$t0 sltu $at,$t1,$at $ST $t1,0($a0) $ADDU $v0,$at beqz $a2,.L_bn_mul_add_words_return $LD $t0,$BNSZ($a1) $MULTU ($t0,$a3) $LD $t1,$BNSZ($a0) subu $a2,1 $ADDU $t1,$v0 sltu $v0,$t1,$v0 mflo ($at,$t0,$a3) mfhi ($t0,$t0,$a3) $ADDU $t1,$at $ADDU $v0,$t0 sltu $at,$t1,$at $ST $t1,$BNSZ($a0) $ADDU $v0,$at beqz $a2,.L_bn_mul_add_words_return $LD $t0,2*$BNSZ($a1) $MULTU ($t0,$a3) $LD $t1,2*$BNSZ($a0) $ADDU $t1,$v0 sltu $v0,$t1,$v0 mflo ($at,$t0,$a3) mfhi ($t0,$t0,$a3) $ADDU $t1,$at $ADDU $v0,$t0 sltu $at,$t1,$at $ST $t1,2*$BNSZ($a0) $ADDU $v0,$at .L_bn_mul_add_words_return: .set noreorder ___ $code.=<<___ if ($flavour =~ /nubi/i); $REG_L $t3,4*$SZREG($sp) $REG_L $t2,3*$SZREG($sp) $REG_L $t1,2*$SZREG($sp) $REG_L $t0,1*$SZREG($sp) $REG_L $gp,0*$SZREG($sp) $PTR_ADD $sp,6*$SZREG ___ $code.=<<___; jr $ra move $a0,$v0 .end bn_mul_add_words_internal .align 5 .globl bn_mul_words .ent bn_mul_words bn_mul_words: .set noreorder bgtz $a2,bn_mul_words_internal move $v0,$zero jr $ra move $a0,$v0 .end bn_mul_words .align 5 .ent bn_mul_words_internal bn_mul_words_internal: ___ $code.=<<___ if ($flavour =~ /nubi/i); .frame $sp,6*$SZREG,$ra .mask 0x8000f008,-$SZREG .set noreorder $PTR_SUB $sp,6*$SZREG $REG_S $ra,5*$SZREG($sp) $REG_S $t3,4*$SZREG($sp) $REG_S $t2,3*$SZREG($sp) $REG_S $t1,2*$SZREG($sp) $REG_S $t0,1*$SZREG($sp) $REG_S $gp,0*$SZREG($sp) ___ $code.=<<___; .set reorder li $minus4,-4 and $ta0,$a2,$minus4 beqz $ta0,.L_bn_mul_words_tail .L_bn_mul_words_loop: $LD $t0,0($a1) $MULTU ($t0,$a3) $LD $t2,$BNSZ($a1) $LD $ta0,2*$BNSZ($a1) $LD $ta2,3*$BNSZ($a1) mflo ($at,$t0,$a3) mfhi ($t0,$t0,$a3) $ADDU $v0,$at sltu $t1,$v0,$at $MULTU ($t2,$a3) $ST $v0,0($a0) $ADDU $v0,$t1,$t0 subu $a2,4 $PTR_ADD $a0,4*$BNSZ $PTR_ADD $a1,4*$BNSZ mflo ($at,$t2,$a3) mfhi ($t2,$t2,$a3) $ADDU $v0,$at sltu $t3,$v0,$at $MULTU ($ta0,$a3) $ST $v0,-3*$BNSZ($a0) $ADDU $v0,$t3,$t2 mflo ($at,$ta0,$a3) mfhi ($ta0,$ta0,$a3) $ADDU $v0,$at sltu $ta1,$v0,$at $MULTU ($ta2,$a3) $ST $v0,-2*$BNSZ($a0) $ADDU $v0,$ta1,$ta0 and $ta0,$a2,$minus4 mflo ($at,$ta2,$a3) mfhi ($ta2,$ta2,$a3) $ADDU $v0,$at sltu $ta3,$v0,$at $ST $v0,-$BNSZ($a0) .set noreorder bgtz $ta0,.L_bn_mul_words_loop $ADDU $v0,$ta3,$ta2 beqz $a2,.L_bn_mul_words_return nop .L_bn_mul_words_tail: .set reorder $LD $t0,0($a1) $MULTU ($t0,$a3) subu $a2,1 mflo ($at,$t0,$a3) mfhi ($t0,$t0,$a3) $ADDU $v0,$at sltu $t1,$v0,$at $ST $v0,0($a0) $ADDU $v0,$t1,$t0 beqz $a2,.L_bn_mul_words_return $LD $t0,$BNSZ($a1) $MULTU ($t0,$a3) subu $a2,1 mflo ($at,$t0,$a3) mfhi ($t0,$t0,$a3) $ADDU $v0,$at sltu $t1,$v0,$at $ST $v0,$BNSZ($a0) $ADDU $v0,$t1,$t0 beqz $a2,.L_bn_mul_words_return $LD $t0,2*$BNSZ($a1) $MULTU ($t0,$a3) mflo ($at,$t0,$a3) mfhi ($t0,$t0,$a3) $ADDU $v0,$at sltu $t1,$v0,$at $ST $v0,2*$BNSZ($a0) $ADDU $v0,$t1,$t0 .L_bn_mul_words_return: .set noreorder ___ $code.=<<___ if ($flavour =~ /nubi/i); $REG_L $t3,4*$SZREG($sp) $REG_L $t2,3*$SZREG($sp) $REG_L $t1,2*$SZREG($sp) $REG_L $t0,1*$SZREG($sp) $REG_L $gp,0*$SZREG($sp) $PTR_ADD $sp,6*$SZREG ___ $code.=<<___; jr $ra move $a0,$v0 .end bn_mul_words_internal .align 5 .globl bn_sqr_words .ent bn_sqr_words bn_sqr_words: .set noreorder bgtz $a2,bn_sqr_words_internal move $v0,$zero jr $ra move $a0,$v0 .end bn_sqr_words .align 5 .ent bn_sqr_words_internal bn_sqr_words_internal: ___ $code.=<<___ if ($flavour =~ /nubi/i); .frame $sp,6*$SZREG,$ra .mask 0x8000f008,-$SZREG .set noreorder $PTR_SUB $sp,6*$SZREG $REG_S $ra,5*$SZREG($sp) $REG_S $t3,4*$SZREG($sp) $REG_S $t2,3*$SZREG($sp) $REG_S $t1,2*$SZREG($sp) $REG_S $t0,1*$SZREG($sp) $REG_S $gp,0*$SZREG($sp) ___ $code.=<<___; .set reorder li $minus4,-4 and $ta0,$a2,$minus4 beqz $ta0,.L_bn_sqr_words_tail .L_bn_sqr_words_loop: $LD $t0,0($a1) $MULTU ($t0,$t0) $LD $t2,$BNSZ($a1) $LD $ta0,2*$BNSZ($a1) $LD $ta2,3*$BNSZ($a1) mflo ($t1,$t0,$t0) mfhi ($t0,$t0,$t0) $ST $t1,0($a0) $ST $t0,$BNSZ($a0) $MULTU ($t2,$t2) subu $a2,4 $PTR_ADD $a0,8*$BNSZ $PTR_ADD $a1,4*$BNSZ mflo ($t3,$t2,$t2) mfhi ($t2,$t2,$t2) $ST $t3,-6*$BNSZ($a0) $ST $t2,-5*$BNSZ($a0) $MULTU ($ta0,$ta0) mflo ($ta1,$ta0,$ta0) mfhi ($ta0,$ta0,$ta0) $ST $ta1,-4*$BNSZ($a0) $ST $ta0,-3*$BNSZ($a0) $MULTU ($ta2,$ta2) and $ta0,$a2,$minus4 mflo ($ta3,$ta2,$ta2) mfhi ($ta2,$ta2,$ta2) $ST $ta3,-2*$BNSZ($a0) .set noreorder bgtz $ta0,.L_bn_sqr_words_loop $ST $ta2,-$BNSZ($a0) beqz $a2,.L_bn_sqr_words_return nop .L_bn_sqr_words_tail: .set reorder $LD $t0,0($a1) $MULTU ($t0,$t0) subu $a2,1 mflo ($t1,$t0,$t0) mfhi ($t0,$t0,$t0) $ST $t1,0($a0) $ST $t0,$BNSZ($a0) beqz $a2,.L_bn_sqr_words_return $LD $t0,$BNSZ($a1) $MULTU ($t0,$t0) subu $a2,1 mflo ($t1,$t0,$t0) mfhi ($t0,$t0,$t0) $ST $t1,2*$BNSZ($a0) $ST $t0,3*$BNSZ($a0) beqz $a2,.L_bn_sqr_words_return $LD $t0,2*$BNSZ($a1) $MULTU ($t0,$t0) mflo ($t1,$t0,$t0) mfhi ($t0,$t0,$t0) $ST $t1,4*$BNSZ($a0) $ST $t0,5*$BNSZ($a0) .L_bn_sqr_words_return: .set noreorder ___ $code.=<<___ if ($flavour =~ /nubi/i); $REG_L $t3,4*$SZREG($sp) $REG_L $t2,3*$SZREG($sp) $REG_L $t1,2*$SZREG($sp) $REG_L $t0,1*$SZREG($sp) $REG_L $gp,0*$SZREG($sp) $PTR_ADD $sp,6*$SZREG ___ $code.=<<___; jr $ra move $a0,$v0 .end bn_sqr_words_internal .align 5 .globl bn_add_words .ent bn_add_words bn_add_words: .set noreorder bgtz $a3,bn_add_words_internal move $v0,$zero jr $ra move $a0,$v0 .end bn_add_words .align 5 .ent bn_add_words_internal bn_add_words_internal: ___ $code.=<<___ if ($flavour =~ /nubi/i); .frame $sp,6*$SZREG,$ra .mask 0x8000f008,-$SZREG .set noreorder $PTR_SUB $sp,6*$SZREG $REG_S $ra,5*$SZREG($sp) $REG_S $t3,4*$SZREG($sp) $REG_S $t2,3*$SZREG($sp) $REG_S $t1,2*$SZREG($sp) $REG_S $t0,1*$SZREG($sp) $REG_S $gp,0*$SZREG($sp) ___ $code.=<<___; .set reorder li $minus4,-4 and $at,$a3,$minus4 beqz $at,.L_bn_add_words_tail .L_bn_add_words_loop: $LD $t0,0($a1) $LD $ta0,0($a2) subu $a3,4 $LD $t1,$BNSZ($a1) and $at,$a3,$minus4 $LD $t2,2*$BNSZ($a1) $PTR_ADD $a2,4*$BNSZ $LD $t3,3*$BNSZ($a1) $PTR_ADD $a0,4*$BNSZ $LD $ta1,-3*$BNSZ($a2) $PTR_ADD $a1,4*$BNSZ $LD $ta2,-2*$BNSZ($a2) $LD $ta3,-$BNSZ($a2) $ADDU $ta0,$t0 sltu $t8,$ta0,$t0 $ADDU $t0,$ta0,$v0 sltu $v0,$t0,$ta0 $ST $t0,-4*$BNSZ($a0) $ADDU $v0,$t8 $ADDU $ta1,$t1 sltu $t9,$ta1,$t1 $ADDU $t1,$ta1,$v0 sltu $v0,$t1,$ta1 $ST $t1,-3*$BNSZ($a0) $ADDU $v0,$t9 $ADDU $ta2,$t2 sltu $t8,$ta2,$t2 $ADDU $t2,$ta2,$v0 sltu $v0,$t2,$ta2 $ST $t2,-2*$BNSZ($a0) $ADDU $v0,$t8 $ADDU $ta3,$t3 sltu $t9,$ta3,$t3 $ADDU $t3,$ta3,$v0 sltu $v0,$t3,$ta3 $ST $t3,-$BNSZ($a0) .set noreorder bgtz $at,.L_bn_add_words_loop $ADDU $v0,$t9 beqz $a3,.L_bn_add_words_return nop .L_bn_add_words_tail: .set reorder $LD $t0,0($a1) $LD $ta0,0($a2) $ADDU $ta0,$t0 subu $a3,1 sltu $t8,$ta0,$t0 $ADDU $t0,$ta0,$v0 sltu $v0,$t0,$ta0 $ST $t0,0($a0) $ADDU $v0,$t8 beqz $a3,.L_bn_add_words_return $LD $t1,$BNSZ($a1) $LD $ta1,$BNSZ($a2) $ADDU $ta1,$t1 subu $a3,1 sltu $t9,$ta1,$t1 $ADDU $t1,$ta1,$v0 sltu $v0,$t1,$ta1 $ST $t1,$BNSZ($a0) $ADDU $v0,$t9 beqz $a3,.L_bn_add_words_return $LD $t2,2*$BNSZ($a1) $LD $ta2,2*$BNSZ($a2) $ADDU $ta2,$t2 sltu $t8,$ta2,$t2 $ADDU $t2,$ta2,$v0 sltu $v0,$t2,$ta2 $ST $t2,2*$BNSZ($a0) $ADDU $v0,$t8 .L_bn_add_words_return: .set noreorder ___ $code.=<<___ if ($flavour =~ /nubi/i); $REG_L $t3,4*$SZREG($sp) $REG_L $t2,3*$SZREG($sp) $REG_L $t1,2*$SZREG($sp) $REG_L $t0,1*$SZREG($sp) $REG_L $gp,0*$SZREG($sp) $PTR_ADD $sp,6*$SZREG ___ $code.=<<___; jr $ra move $a0,$v0 .end bn_add_words_internal .align 5 .globl bn_sub_words .ent bn_sub_words bn_sub_words: .set noreorder bgtz $a3,bn_sub_words_internal move $v0,$zero jr $ra move $a0,$zero .end bn_sub_words .align 5 .ent bn_sub_words_internal bn_sub_words_internal: ___ $code.=<<___ if ($flavour =~ /nubi/i); .frame $sp,6*$SZREG,$ra .mask 0x8000f008,-$SZREG .set noreorder $PTR_SUB $sp,6*$SZREG $REG_S $ra,5*$SZREG($sp) $REG_S $t3,4*$SZREG($sp) $REG_S $t2,3*$SZREG($sp) $REG_S $t1,2*$SZREG($sp) $REG_S $t0,1*$SZREG($sp) $REG_S $gp,0*$SZREG($sp) ___ $code.=<<___; .set reorder li $minus4,-4 and $at,$a3,$minus4 beqz $at,.L_bn_sub_words_tail .L_bn_sub_words_loop: $LD $t0,0($a1) $LD $ta0,0($a2) subu $a3,4 $LD $t1,$BNSZ($a1) and $at,$a3,$minus4 $LD $t2,2*$BNSZ($a1) $PTR_ADD $a2,4*$BNSZ $LD $t3,3*$BNSZ($a1) $PTR_ADD $a0,4*$BNSZ $LD $ta1,-3*$BNSZ($a2) $PTR_ADD $a1,4*$BNSZ $LD $ta2,-2*$BNSZ($a2) $LD $ta3,-$BNSZ($a2) sltu $t8,$t0,$ta0 $SUBU $ta0,$t0,$ta0 $SUBU $t0,$ta0,$v0 sgtu $v0,$t0,$ta0 $ST $t0,-4*$BNSZ($a0) $ADDU $v0,$t8 sltu $t9,$t1,$ta1 $SUBU $ta1,$t1,$ta1 $SUBU $t1,$ta1,$v0 sgtu $v0,$t1,$ta1 $ST $t1,-3*$BNSZ($a0) $ADDU $v0,$t9 sltu $t8,$t2,$ta2 $SUBU $ta2,$t2,$ta2 $SUBU $t2,$ta2,$v0 sgtu $v0,$t2,$ta2 $ST $t2,-2*$BNSZ($a0) $ADDU $v0,$t8 sltu $t9,$t3,$ta3 $SUBU $ta3,$t3,$ta3 $SUBU $t3,$ta3,$v0 sgtu $v0,$t3,$ta3 $ST $t3,-$BNSZ($a0) .set noreorder bgtz $at,.L_bn_sub_words_loop $ADDU $v0,$t9 beqz $a3,.L_bn_sub_words_return nop .L_bn_sub_words_tail: .set reorder $LD $t0,0($a1) $LD $ta0,0($a2) subu $a3,1 sltu $t8,$t0,$ta0 $SUBU $ta0,$t0,$ta0 $SUBU $t0,$ta0,$v0 sgtu $v0,$t0,$ta0 $ST $t0,0($a0) $ADDU $v0,$t8 beqz $a3,.L_bn_sub_words_return $LD $t1,$BNSZ($a1) subu $a3,1 $LD $ta1,$BNSZ($a2) sltu $t9,$t1,$ta1 $SUBU $ta1,$t1,$ta1 $SUBU $t1,$ta1,$v0 sgtu $v0,$t1,$ta1 $ST $t1,$BNSZ($a0) $ADDU $v0,$t9 beqz $a3,.L_bn_sub_words_return $LD $t2,2*$BNSZ($a1) $LD $ta2,2*$BNSZ($a2) sltu $t8,$t2,$ta2 $SUBU $ta2,$t2,$ta2 $SUBU $t2,$ta2,$v0 sgtu $v0,$t2,$ta2 $ST $t2,2*$BNSZ($a0) $ADDU $v0,$t8 .L_bn_sub_words_return: .set noreorder ___ $code.=<<___ if ($flavour =~ /nubi/i); $REG_L $t3,4*$SZREG($sp) $REG_L $t2,3*$SZREG($sp) $REG_L $t1,2*$SZREG($sp) $REG_L $t0,1*$SZREG($sp) $REG_L $gp,0*$SZREG($sp) $PTR_ADD $sp,6*$SZREG ___ $code.=<<___; jr $ra move $a0,$v0 .end bn_sub_words_internal #if 0 /* * The bn_div_3_words entry point is re-used for constant-time interface. * Implementation is retained as historical reference. */ .align 5 .globl bn_div_3_words .ent bn_div_3_words bn_div_3_words: .set noreorder move $a3,$a0 # we know that bn_div_words does not # touch $a3, $ta2, $ta3 and preserves $a2 # so that we can save two arguments # and return address in registers # instead of stack:-) $LD $a0,($a3) move $ta2,$a1 bne $a0,$a2,bn_div_3_words_internal $LD $a1,-$BNSZ($a3) li $v0,-1 jr $ra move $a0,$v0 .end bn_div_3_words .align 5 .ent bn_div_3_words_internal bn_div_3_words_internal: ___ $code.=<<___ if ($flavour =~ /nubi/i); .frame $sp,6*$SZREG,$ra .mask 0x8000f008,-$SZREG .set noreorder $PTR_SUB $sp,6*$SZREG $REG_S $ra,5*$SZREG($sp) $REG_S $t3,4*$SZREG($sp) $REG_S $t2,3*$SZREG($sp) $REG_S $t1,2*$SZREG($sp) $REG_S $t0,1*$SZREG($sp) $REG_S $gp,0*$SZREG($sp) ___ $code.=<<___; .set reorder move $ta3,$ra bal bn_div_words_internal move $ra,$ta3 $MULTU ($ta2,$v0) $LD $t2,-2*$BNSZ($a3) move $ta0,$zero mfhi ($t1,$ta2,$v0) mflo ($t0,$ta2,$v0) sltu $t8,$t1,$a1 .L_bn_div_3_words_inner_loop: bnez $t8,.L_bn_div_3_words_inner_loop_done sgeu $at,$t2,$t0 seq $t9,$t1,$a1 and $at,$t9 sltu $t3,$t0,$ta2 $ADDU $a1,$a2 $SUBU $t1,$t3 $SUBU $t0,$ta2 sltu $t8,$t1,$a1 sltu $ta0,$a1,$a2 or $t8,$ta0 .set noreorder beqz $at,.L_bn_div_3_words_inner_loop $SUBU $v0,1 $ADDU $v0,1 .set reorder .L_bn_div_3_words_inner_loop_done: .set noreorder ___ $code.=<<___ if ($flavour =~ /nubi/i); $REG_L $t3,4*$SZREG($sp) $REG_L $t2,3*$SZREG($sp) $REG_L $t1,2*$SZREG($sp) $REG_L $t0,1*$SZREG($sp) $REG_L $gp,0*$SZREG($sp) $PTR_ADD $sp,6*$SZREG ___ $code.=<<___; jr $ra move $a0,$v0 .end bn_div_3_words_internal #endif .align 5 .globl bn_div_words .ent bn_div_words bn_div_words: .set noreorder bnez $a2,bn_div_words_internal li $v0,-1 # I would rather signal div-by-zero # which can be done with 'break 7' jr $ra move $a0,$v0 .end bn_div_words .align 5 .ent bn_div_words_internal bn_div_words_internal: ___ $code.=<<___ if ($flavour =~ /nubi/i); .frame $sp,6*$SZREG,$ra .mask 0x8000f008,-$SZREG .set noreorder $PTR_SUB $sp,6*$SZREG $REG_S $ra,5*$SZREG($sp) $REG_S $t3,4*$SZREG($sp) $REG_S $t2,3*$SZREG($sp) $REG_S $t1,2*$SZREG($sp) $REG_S $t0,1*$SZREG($sp) $REG_S $gp,0*$SZREG($sp) ___ $code.=<<___; move $v1,$zero bltz $a2,.L_bn_div_words_body move $t9,$v1 $SLL $a2,1 bgtz $a2,.-4 addu $t9,1 .set reorder negu $t1,$t9 li $t2,-1 $SLL $t2,$t1 and $t2,$a0 $SRL $at,$a1,$t1 .set noreorder beqz $t2,.+12 nop break 6 # signal overflow .set reorder $SLL $a0,$t9 $SLL $a1,$t9 or $a0,$at ___ $QT=$ta0; $HH=$ta1; $DH=$v1; $code.=<<___; .L_bn_div_words_body: $SRL $DH,$a2,4*$BNSZ # bits sgeu $at,$a0,$a2 .set noreorder beqz $at,.+12 nop $SUBU $a0,$a2 .set reorder li $QT,-1 $SRL $HH,$a0,4*$BNSZ # bits $SRL $QT,4*$BNSZ # q=0xffffffff beq $DH,$HH,.L_bn_div_words_skip_div1 $DIVU ($a0,$DH) mfqt ($QT,$a0,$DH) .L_bn_div_words_skip_div1: $MULTU ($a2,$QT) $SLL $t3,$a0,4*$BNSZ # bits $SRL $at,$a1,4*$BNSZ # bits or $t3,$at mflo ($t0,$a2,$QT) mfhi ($t1,$a2,$QT) .L_bn_div_words_inner_loop1: sltu $t2,$t3,$t0 seq $t8,$HH,$t1 sltu $at,$HH,$t1 and $t2,$t8 sltu $v0,$t0,$a2 or $at,$t2 .set noreorder beqz $at,.L_bn_div_words_inner_loop1_done $SUBU $t1,$v0 $SUBU $t0,$a2 b .L_bn_div_words_inner_loop1 $SUBU $QT,1 .set reorder .L_bn_div_words_inner_loop1_done: $SLL $a1,4*$BNSZ # bits $SUBU $a0,$t3,$t0 $SLL $v0,$QT,4*$BNSZ # bits li $QT,-1 $SRL $HH,$a0,4*$BNSZ # bits $SRL $QT,4*$BNSZ # q=0xffffffff beq $DH,$HH,.L_bn_div_words_skip_div2 $DIVU ($a0,$DH) mfqt ($QT,$a0,$DH) .L_bn_div_words_skip_div2: $MULTU ($a2,$QT) $SLL $t3,$a0,4*$BNSZ # bits $SRL $at,$a1,4*$BNSZ # bits or $t3,$at mflo ($t0,$a2,$QT) mfhi ($t1,$a2,$QT) .L_bn_div_words_inner_loop2: sltu $t2,$t3,$t0 seq $t8,$HH,$t1 sltu $at,$HH,$t1 and $t2,$t8 sltu $v1,$t0,$a2 or $at,$t2 .set noreorder beqz $at,.L_bn_div_words_inner_loop2_done $SUBU $t1,$v1 $SUBU $t0,$a2 b .L_bn_div_words_inner_loop2 $SUBU $QT,1 .set reorder .L_bn_div_words_inner_loop2_done: $SUBU $a0,$t3,$t0 or $v0,$QT $SRL $v1,$a0,$t9 # $v1 contains remainder if anybody wants it $SRL $a2,$t9 # restore $a2 .set noreorder move $a1,$v1 ___ $code.=<<___ if ($flavour =~ /nubi/i); $REG_L $t3,4*$SZREG($sp) $REG_L $t2,3*$SZREG($sp) $REG_L $t1,2*$SZREG($sp) $REG_L $t0,1*$SZREG($sp) $REG_L $gp,0*$SZREG($sp) $PTR_ADD $sp,6*$SZREG ___ $code.=<<___; jr $ra move $a0,$v0 .end bn_div_words_internal ___ undef $HH; undef $QT; undef $DH; ($a_0,$a_1,$a_2,$a_3)=($t0,$t1,$t2,$t3); ($b_0,$b_1,$b_2,$b_3)=($ta0,$ta1,$ta2,$ta3); ($a_4,$a_5,$a_6,$a_7)=($s0,$s2,$s4,$a1); # once we load a[7], no use for $a1 ($b_4,$b_5,$b_6,$b_7)=($s1,$s3,$s5,$a2); # once we load b[7], no use for $a2 ($t_1,$t_2,$c_1,$c_2,$c_3)=($t8,$t9,$v0,$v1,$a3); $code.=<<___; .align 5 .globl bn_mul_comba8 .ent bn_mul_comba8 bn_mul_comba8: .set noreorder ___ $code.=<<___ if ($flavour =~ /nubi/i); .frame $sp,12*$SZREG,$ra .mask 0x803ff008,-$SZREG $PTR_SUB $sp,12*$SZREG $REG_S $ra,11*$SZREG($sp) $REG_S $s5,10*$SZREG($sp) $REG_S $s4,9*$SZREG($sp) $REG_S $s3,8*$SZREG($sp) $REG_S $s2,7*$SZREG($sp) $REG_S $s1,6*$SZREG($sp) $REG_S $s0,5*$SZREG($sp) $REG_S $t3,4*$SZREG($sp) $REG_S $t2,3*$SZREG($sp) $REG_S $t1,2*$SZREG($sp) $REG_S $t0,1*$SZREG($sp) $REG_S $gp,0*$SZREG($sp) ___ $code.=<<___ if ($flavour !~ /nubi/i); .frame $sp,6*$SZREG,$ra .mask 0x003f0000,-$SZREG $PTR_SUB $sp,6*$SZREG $REG_S $s5,5*$SZREG($sp) $REG_S $s4,4*$SZREG($sp) $REG_S $s3,3*$SZREG($sp) $REG_S $s2,2*$SZREG($sp) $REG_S $s1,1*$SZREG($sp) $REG_S $s0,0*$SZREG($sp) ___ $code.=<<___; .set reorder $LD $a_0,0($a1) # If compiled with -mips3 option on # R5000 box assembler barks on this # 1ine with "should not have mult/div # as last instruction in bb (R10K # bug)" warning. If anybody out there # has a clue about how to circumvent # this do send me a note. # $LD $b_0,0($a2) $LD $a_1,$BNSZ($a1) $LD $a_2,2*$BNSZ($a1) $MULTU ($a_0,$b_0) # mul_add_c(a[0],b[0],c1,c2,c3); $LD $a_3,3*$BNSZ($a1) $LD $b_1,$BNSZ($a2) $LD $b_2,2*$BNSZ($a2) $LD $b_3,3*$BNSZ($a2) mflo ($c_1,$a_0,$b_0) mfhi ($c_2,$a_0,$b_0) $LD $a_4,4*$BNSZ($a1) $LD $a_5,5*$BNSZ($a1) $MULTU ($a_0,$b_1) # mul_add_c(a[0],b[1],c2,c3,c1); $LD $a_6,6*$BNSZ($a1) $LD $a_7,7*$BNSZ($a1) $LD $b_4,4*$BNSZ($a2) $LD $b_5,5*$BNSZ($a2) mflo ($t_1,$a_0,$b_1) mfhi ($t_2,$a_0,$b_1) $ADDU $c_2,$t_1 sltu $at,$c_2,$t_1 $MULTU ($a_1,$b_0) # mul_add_c(a[1],b[0],c2,c3,c1); $ADDU $c_3,$t_2,$at $LD $b_6,6*$BNSZ($a2) $LD $b_7,7*$BNSZ($a2) $ST $c_1,0($a0) # r[0]=c1; mflo ($t_1,$a_1,$b_0) mfhi ($t_2,$a_1,$b_0) $ADDU $c_2,$t_1 sltu $at,$c_2,$t_1 $MULTU ($a_2,$b_0) # mul_add_c(a[2],b[0],c3,c1,c2); $ADDU $t_2,$at $ADDU $c_3,$t_2 sltu $c_1,$c_3,$t_2 $ST $c_2,$BNSZ($a0) # r[1]=c2; mflo ($t_1,$a_2,$b_0) mfhi ($t_2,$a_2,$b_0) $ADDU $c_3,$t_1 sltu $at,$c_3,$t_1 $MULTU ($a_1,$b_1) # mul_add_c(a[1],b[1],c3,c1,c2); $ADDU $t_2,$at $ADDU $c_1,$t_2 mflo ($t_1,$a_1,$b_1) mfhi ($t_2,$a_1,$b_1) $ADDU $c_3,$t_1 sltu $at,$c_3,$t_1 $MULTU ($a_0,$b_2) # mul_add_c(a[0],b[2],c3,c1,c2); $ADDU $t_2,$at $ADDU $c_1,$t_2 sltu $c_2,$c_1,$t_2 mflo ($t_1,$a_0,$b_2) mfhi ($t_2,$a_0,$b_2) $ADDU $c_3,$t_1 sltu $at,$c_3,$t_1 $MULTU ($a_0,$b_3) # mul_add_c(a[0],b[3],c1,c2,c3); $ADDU $t_2,$at $ADDU $c_1,$t_2 sltu $at,$c_1,$t_2 $ADDU $c_2,$at $ST $c_3,2*$BNSZ($a0) # r[2]=c3; mflo ($t_1,$a_0,$b_3) mfhi ($t_2,$a_0,$b_3) $ADDU $c_1,$t_1 sltu $at,$c_1,$t_1 $MULTU ($a_1,$b_2) # mul_add_c(a[1],b[2],c1,c2,c3); $ADDU $t_2,$at $ADDU $c_2,$t_2 sltu $c_3,$c_2,$t_2 mflo ($t_1,$a_1,$b_2) mfhi ($t_2,$a_1,$b_2) $ADDU $c_1,$t_1 sltu $at,$c_1,$t_1 $MULTU ($a_2,$b_1) # mul_add_c(a[2],b[1],c1,c2,c3); $ADDU $t_2,$at $ADDU $c_2,$t_2 sltu $at,$c_2,$t_2 $ADDU $c_3,$at mflo ($t_1,$a_2,$b_1) mfhi ($t_2,$a_2,$b_1) $ADDU $c_1,$t_1 sltu $at,$c_1,$t_1 $MULTU ($a_3,$b_0) # mul_add_c(a[3],b[0],c1,c2,c3); $ADDU $t_2,$at $ADDU $c_2,$t_2 sltu $at,$c_2,$t_2 $ADDU $c_3,$at mflo ($t_1,$a_3,$b_0) mfhi ($t_2,$a_3,$b_0) $ADDU $c_1,$t_1 sltu $at,$c_1,$t_1 $MULTU ($a_4,$b_0) # mul_add_c(a[4],b[0],c2,c3,c1); $ADDU $t_2,$at $ADDU $c_2,$t_2 sltu $at,$c_2,$t_2 $ADDU $c_3,$at $ST $c_1,3*$BNSZ($a0) # r[3]=c1; mflo ($t_1,$a_4,$b_0) mfhi ($t_2,$a_4,$b_0) $ADDU $c_2,$t_1 sltu $at,$c_2,$t_1 $MULTU ($a_3,$b_1) # mul_add_c(a[3],b[1],c2,c3,c1); $ADDU $t_2,$at $ADDU $c_3,$t_2 sltu $c_1,$c_3,$t_2 mflo ($t_1,$a_3,$b_1) mfhi ($t_2,$a_3,$b_1) $ADDU $c_2,$t_1 sltu $at,$c_2,$t_1 $MULTU ($a_2,$b_2) # mul_add_c(a[2],b[2],c2,c3,c1); $ADDU $t_2,$at $ADDU $c_3,$t_2 sltu $at,$c_3,$t_2 $ADDU $c_1,$at mflo ($t_1,$a_2,$b_2) mfhi ($t_2,$a_2,$b_2) $ADDU $c_2,$t_1 sltu $at,$c_2,$t_1 $MULTU ($a_1,$b_3) # mul_add_c(a[1],b[3],c2,c3,c1); $ADDU $t_2,$at $ADDU $c_3,$t_2 sltu $at,$c_3,$t_2 $ADDU $c_1,$at mflo ($t_1,$a_1,$b_3) mfhi ($t_2,$a_1,$b_3) $ADDU $c_2,$t_1 sltu $at,$c_2,$t_1 $MULTU ($a_0,$b_4) # mul_add_c(a[0],b[4],c2,c3,c1); $ADDU $t_2,$at $ADDU $c_3,$t_2 sltu $at,$c_3,$t_2 $ADDU $c_1,$at mflo ($t_1,$a_0,$b_4) mfhi ($t_2,$a_0,$b_4) $ADDU $c_2,$t_1 sltu $at,$c_2,$t_1 $MULTU ($a_0,$b_5) # mul_add_c(a[0],b[5],c3,c1,c2); $ADDU $t_2,$at $ADDU $c_3,$t_2 sltu $at,$c_3,$t_2 $ADDU $c_1,$at $ST $c_2,4*$BNSZ($a0) # r[4]=c2; mflo ($t_1,$a_0,$b_5) mfhi ($t_2,$a_0,$b_5) $ADDU $c_3,$t_1 sltu $at,$c_3,$t_1 $MULTU ($a_1,$b_4) # mul_add_c(a[1],b[4],c3,c1,c2); $ADDU $t_2,$at $ADDU $c_1,$t_2 sltu $c_2,$c_1,$t_2 mflo ($t_1,$a_1,$b_4) mfhi ($t_2,$a_1,$b_4) $ADDU $c_3,$t_1 sltu $at,$c_3,$t_1 $MULTU ($a_2,$b_3) # mul_add_c(a[2],b[3],c3,c1,c2); $ADDU $t_2,$at $ADDU $c_1,$t_2 sltu $at,$c_1,$t_2 $ADDU $c_2,$at mflo ($t_1,$a_2,$b_3) mfhi ($t_2,$a_2,$b_3) $ADDU $c_3,$t_1 sltu $at,$c_3,$t_1 $MULTU ($a_3,$b_2) # mul_add_c(a[3],b[2],c3,c1,c2); $ADDU $t_2,$at $ADDU $c_1,$t_2 sltu $at,$c_1,$t_2 $ADDU $c_2,$at mflo ($t_1,$a_3,$b_2) mfhi ($t_2,$a_3,$b_2) $ADDU $c_3,$t_1 sltu $at,$c_3,$t_1 $MULTU ($a_4,$b_1) # mul_add_c(a[4],b[1],c3,c1,c2); $ADDU $t_2,$at $ADDU $c_1,$t_2 sltu $at,$c_1,$t_2 $ADDU $c_2,$at mflo ($t_1,$a_4,$b_1) mfhi ($t_2,$a_4,$b_1) $ADDU $c_3,$t_1 sltu $at,$c_3,$t_1 $MULTU ($a_5,$b_0) # mul_add_c(a[5],b[0],c3,c1,c2); $ADDU $t_2,$at $ADDU $c_1,$t_2 sltu $at,$c_1,$t_2 $ADDU $c_2,$at mflo ($t_1,$a_5,$b_0) mfhi ($t_2,$a_5,$b_0) $ADDU $c_3,$t_1 sltu $at,$c_3,$t_1 $MULTU ($a_6,$b_0) # mul_add_c(a[6],b[0],c1,c2,c3); $ADDU $t_2,$at $ADDU $c_1,$t_2 sltu $at,$c_1,$t_2 $ADDU $c_2,$at $ST $c_3,5*$BNSZ($a0) # r[5]=c3; mflo ($t_1,$a_6,$b_0) mfhi ($t_2,$a_6,$b_0) $ADDU $c_1,$t_1 sltu $at,$c_1,$t_1 $MULTU ($a_5,$b_1) # mul_add_c(a[5],b[1],c1,c2,c3); $ADDU $t_2,$at $ADDU $c_2,$t_2 sltu $c_3,$c_2,$t_2 mflo ($t_1,$a_5,$b_1) mfhi ($t_2,$a_5,$b_1) $ADDU $c_1,$t_1 sltu $at,$c_1,$t_1 $MULTU ($a_4,$b_2) # mul_add_c(a[4],b[2],c1,c2,c3); $ADDU $t_2,$at $ADDU $c_2,$t_2 sltu $at,$c_2,$t_2 $ADDU $c_3,$at mflo ($t_1,$a_4,$b_2) mfhi ($t_2,$a_4,$b_2) $ADDU $c_1,$t_1 sltu $at,$c_1,$t_1 $MULTU ($a_3,$b_3) # mul_add_c(a[3],b[3],c1,c2,c3); $ADDU $t_2,$at $ADDU $c_2,$t_2 sltu $at,$c_2,$t_2 $ADDU $c_3,$at mflo ($t_1,$a_3,$b_3) mfhi ($t_2,$a_3,$b_3) $ADDU $c_1,$t_1 sltu $at,$c_1,$t_1 $MULTU ($a_2,$b_4) # mul_add_c(a[2],b[4],c1,c2,c3); $ADDU $t_2,$at $ADDU $c_2,$t_2 sltu $at,$c_2,$t_2 $ADDU $c_3,$at mflo ($t_1,$a_2,$b_4) mfhi ($t_2,$a_2,$b_4) $ADDU $c_1,$t_1 sltu $at,$c_1,$t_1 $MULTU ($a_1,$b_5) # mul_add_c(a[1],b[5],c1,c2,c3); $ADDU $t_2,$at $ADDU $c_2,$t_2 sltu $at,$c_2,$t_2 $ADDU $c_3,$at mflo ($t_1,$a_1,$b_5) mfhi ($t_2,$a_1,$b_5) $ADDU $c_1,$t_1 sltu $at,$c_1,$t_1 $MULTU ($a_0,$b_6) # mul_add_c(a[0],b[6],c1,c2,c3); $ADDU $t_2,$at $ADDU $c_2,$t_2 sltu $at,$c_2,$t_2 $ADDU $c_3,$at mflo ($t_1,$a_0,$b_6) mfhi ($t_2,$a_0,$b_6) $ADDU $c_1,$t_1 sltu $at,$c_1,$t_1 $MULTU ($a_0,$b_7) # mul_add_c(a[0],b[7],c2,c3,c1); $ADDU $t_2,$at $ADDU $c_2,$t_2 sltu $at,$c_2,$t_2 $ADDU $c_3,$at $ST $c_1,6*$BNSZ($a0) # r[6]=c1; mflo ($t_1,$a_0,$b_7) mfhi ($t_2,$a_0,$b_7) $ADDU $c_2,$t_1 sltu $at,$c_2,$t_1 $MULTU ($a_1,$b_6) # mul_add_c(a[1],b[6],c2,c3,c1); $ADDU $t_2,$at $ADDU $c_3,$t_2 sltu $c_1,$c_3,$t_2 mflo ($t_1,$a_1,$b_6) mfhi ($t_2,$a_1,$b_6) $ADDU $c_2,$t_1 sltu $at,$c_2,$t_1 $MULTU ($a_2,$b_5) # mul_add_c(a[2],b[5],c2,c3,c1); $ADDU $t_2,$at $ADDU $c_3,$t_2 sltu $at,$c_3,$t_2 $ADDU $c_1,$at mflo ($t_1,$a_2,$b_5) mfhi ($t_2,$a_2,$b_5) $ADDU $c_2,$t_1 sltu $at,$c_2,$t_1 $MULTU ($a_3,$b_4) # mul_add_c(a[3],b[4],c2,c3,c1); $ADDU $t_2,$at $ADDU $c_3,$t_2 sltu $at,$c_3,$t_2 $ADDU $c_1,$at mflo ($t_1,$a_3,$b_4) mfhi ($t_2,$a_3,$b_4) $ADDU $c_2,$t_1 sltu $at,$c_2,$t_1 $MULTU ($a_4,$b_3) # mul_add_c(a[4],b[3],c2,c3,c1); $ADDU $t_2,$at $ADDU $c_3,$t_2 sltu $at,$c_3,$t_2 $ADDU $c_1,$at mflo ($t_1,$a_4,$b_3) mfhi ($t_2,$a_4,$b_3) $ADDU $c_2,$t_1 sltu $at,$c_2,$t_1 $MULTU ($a_5,$b_2) # mul_add_c(a[5],b[2],c2,c3,c1); $ADDU $t_2,$at $ADDU $c_3,$t_2 sltu $at,$c_3,$t_2 $ADDU $c_1,$at mflo ($t_1,$a_5,$b_2) mfhi ($t_2,$a_5,$b_2) $ADDU $c_2,$t_1 sltu $at,$c_2,$t_1 $MULTU ($a_6,$b_1) # mul_add_c(a[6],b[1],c2,c3,c1); $ADDU $t_2,$at $ADDU $c_3,$t_2 sltu $at,$c_3,$t_2 $ADDU $c_1,$at mflo ($t_1,$a_6,$b_1) mfhi ($t_2,$a_6,$b_1) $ADDU $c_2,$t_1 sltu $at,$c_2,$t_1 $MULTU ($a_7,$b_0) # mul_add_c(a[7],b[0],c2,c3,c1); $ADDU $t_2,$at $ADDU $c_3,$t_2 sltu $at,$c_3,$t_2 $ADDU $c_1,$at mflo ($t_1,$a_7,$b_0) mfhi ($t_2,$a_7,$b_0) $ADDU $c_2,$t_1 sltu $at,$c_2,$t_1 $MULTU ($a_7,$b_1) # mul_add_c(a[7],b[1],c3,c1,c2); $ADDU $t_2,$at $ADDU $c_3,$t_2 sltu $at,$c_3,$t_2 $ADDU $c_1,$at $ST $c_2,7*$BNSZ($a0) # r[7]=c2; mflo ($t_1,$a_7,$b_1) mfhi ($t_2,$a_7,$b_1) $ADDU $c_3,$t_1 sltu $at,$c_3,$t_1 $MULTU ($a_6,$b_2) # mul_add_c(a[6],b[2],c3,c1,c2); $ADDU $t_2,$at $ADDU $c_1,$t_2 sltu $c_2,$c_1,$t_2 mflo ($t_1,$a_6,$b_2) mfhi ($t_2,$a_6,$b_2) $ADDU $c_3,$t_1 sltu $at,$c_3,$t_1 $MULTU ($a_5,$b_3) # mul_add_c(a[5],b[3],c3,c1,c2); $ADDU $t_2,$at $ADDU $c_1,$t_2 sltu $at,$c_1,$t_2 $ADDU $c_2,$at mflo ($t_1,$a_5,$b_3) mfhi ($t_2,$a_5,$b_3) $ADDU $c_3,$t_1 sltu $at,$c_3,$t_1 $MULTU ($a_4,$b_4) # mul_add_c(a[4],b[4],c3,c1,c2); $ADDU $t_2,$at $ADDU $c_1,$t_2 sltu $at,$c_1,$t_2 $ADDU $c_2,$at mflo ($t_1,$a_4,$b_4) mfhi ($t_2,$a_4,$b_4) $ADDU $c_3,$t_1 sltu $at,$c_3,$t_1 $MULTU ($a_3,$b_5) # mul_add_c(a[3],b[5],c3,c1,c2); $ADDU $t_2,$at $ADDU $c_1,$t_2 sltu $at,$c_1,$t_2 $ADDU $c_2,$at mflo ($t_1,$a_3,$b_5) mfhi ($t_2,$a_3,$b_5) $ADDU $c_3,$t_1 sltu $at,$c_3,$t_1 $MULTU ($a_2,$b_6) # mul_add_c(a[2],b[6],c3,c1,c2); $ADDU $t_2,$at $ADDU $c_1,$t_2 sltu $at,$c_1,$t_2 $ADDU $c_2,$at mflo ($t_1,$a_2,$b_6) mfhi ($t_2,$a_2,$b_6) $ADDU $c_3,$t_1 sltu $at,$c_3,$t_1 $MULTU ($a_1,$b_7) # mul_add_c(a[1],b[7],c3,c1,c2); $ADDU $t_2,$at $ADDU $c_1,$t_2 sltu $at,$c_1,$t_2 $ADDU $c_2,$at mflo ($t_1,$a_1,$b_7) mfhi ($t_2,$a_1,$b_7) $ADDU $c_3,$t_1 sltu $at,$c_3,$t_1 $MULTU ($a_2,$b_7) # mul_add_c(a[2],b[7],c1,c2,c3); $ADDU $t_2,$at $ADDU $c_1,$t_2 sltu $at,$c_1,$t_2 $ADDU $c_2,$at $ST $c_3,8*$BNSZ($a0) # r[8]=c3; mflo ($t_1,$a_2,$b_7) mfhi ($t_2,$a_2,$b_7) $ADDU $c_1,$t_1 sltu $at,$c_1,$t_1 $MULTU ($a_3,$b_6) # mul_add_c(a[3],b[6],c1,c2,c3); $ADDU $t_2,$at $ADDU $c_2,$t_2 sltu $c_3,$c_2,$t_2 mflo ($t_1,$a_3,$b_6) mfhi ($t_2,$a_3,$b_6) $ADDU $c_1,$t_1 sltu $at,$c_1,$t_1 $MULTU ($a_4,$b_5) # mul_add_c(a[4],b[5],c1,c2,c3); $ADDU $t_2,$at $ADDU $c_2,$t_2 sltu $at,$c_2,$t_2 $ADDU $c_3,$at mflo ($t_1,$a_4,$b_5) mfhi ($t_2,$a_4,$b_5) $ADDU $c_1,$t_1 sltu $at,$c_1,$t_1 $MULTU ($a_5,$b_4) # mul_add_c(a[5],b[4],c1,c2,c3); $ADDU $t_2,$at $ADDU $c_2,$t_2 sltu $at,$c_2,$t_2 $ADDU $c_3,$at mflo ($t_1,$a_5,$b_4) mfhi ($t_2,$a_5,$b_4) $ADDU $c_1,$t_1 sltu $at,$c_1,$t_1 $MULTU ($a_6,$b_3) # mul_add_c(a[6],b[3],c1,c2,c3); $ADDU $t_2,$at $ADDU $c_2,$t_2 sltu $at,$c_2,$t_2 $ADDU $c_3,$at mflo ($t_1,$a_6,$b_3) mfhi ($t_2,$a_6,$b_3) $ADDU $c_1,$t_1 sltu $at,$c_1,$t_1 $MULTU ($a_7,$b_2) # mul_add_c(a[7],b[2],c1,c2,c3); $ADDU $t_2,$at $ADDU $c_2,$t_2 sltu $at,$c_2,$t_2 $ADDU $c_3,$at mflo ($t_1,$a_7,$b_2) mfhi ($t_2,$a_7,$b_2) $ADDU $c_1,$t_1 sltu $at,$c_1,$t_1 $MULTU ($a_7,$b_3) # mul_add_c(a[7],b[3],c2,c3,c1); $ADDU $t_2,$at $ADDU $c_2,$t_2 sltu $at,$c_2,$t_2 $ADDU $c_3,$at $ST $c_1,9*$BNSZ($a0) # r[9]=c1; mflo ($t_1,$a_7,$b_3) mfhi ($t_2,$a_7,$b_3) $ADDU $c_2,$t_1 sltu $at,$c_2,$t_1 $MULTU ($a_6,$b_4) # mul_add_c(a[6],b[4],c2,c3,c1); $ADDU $t_2,$at $ADDU $c_3,$t_2 sltu $c_1,$c_3,$t_2 mflo ($t_1,$a_6,$b_4) mfhi ($t_2,$a_6,$b_4) $ADDU $c_2,$t_1 sltu $at,$c_2,$t_1 $MULTU ($a_5,$b_5) # mul_add_c(a[5],b[5],c2,c3,c1); $ADDU $t_2,$at $ADDU $c_3,$t_2 sltu $at,$c_3,$t_2 $ADDU $c_1,$at mflo ($t_1,$a_5,$b_5) mfhi ($t_2,$a_5,$b_5) $ADDU $c_2,$t_1 sltu $at,$c_2,$t_1 $MULTU ($a_4,$b_6) # mul_add_c(a[4],b[6],c2,c3,c1); $ADDU $t_2,$at $ADDU $c_3,$t_2 sltu $at,$c_3,$t_2 $ADDU $c_1,$at mflo ($t_1,$a_4,$b_6) mfhi ($t_2,$a_4,$b_6) $ADDU $c_2,$t_1 sltu $at,$c_2,$t_1 $MULTU ($a_3,$b_7) # mul_add_c(a[3],b[7],c2,c3,c1); $ADDU $t_2,$at $ADDU $c_3,$t_2 sltu $at,$c_3,$t_2 $ADDU $c_1,$at mflo ($t_1,$a_3,$b_7) mfhi ($t_2,$a_3,$b_7) $ADDU $c_2,$t_1 sltu $at,$c_2,$t_1 $MULTU ($a_4,$b_7) # mul_add_c(a[4],b[7],c3,c1,c2); $ADDU $t_2,$at $ADDU $c_3,$t_2 sltu $at,$c_3,$t_2 $ADDU $c_1,$at $ST $c_2,10*$BNSZ($a0) # r[10]=c2; mflo ($t_1,$a_4,$b_7) mfhi ($t_2,$a_4,$b_7) $ADDU $c_3,$t_1 sltu $at,$c_3,$t_1 $MULTU ($a_5,$b_6) # mul_add_c(a[5],b[6],c3,c1,c2); $ADDU $t_2,$at $ADDU $c_1,$t_2 sltu $c_2,$c_1,$t_2 mflo ($t_1,$a_5,$b_6) mfhi ($t_2,$a_5,$b_6) $ADDU $c_3,$t_1 sltu $at,$c_3,$t_1 $MULTU ($a_6,$b_5) # mul_add_c(a[6],b[5],c3,c1,c2); $ADDU $t_2,$at $ADDU $c_1,$t_2 sltu $at,$c_1,$t_2 $ADDU $c_2,$at mflo ($t_1,$a_6,$b_5) mfhi ($t_2,$a_6,$b_5) $ADDU $c_3,$t_1 sltu $at,$c_3,$t_1 $MULTU ($a_7,$b_4) # mul_add_c(a[7],b[4],c3,c1,c2); $ADDU $t_2,$at $ADDU $c_1,$t_2 sltu $at,$c_1,$t_2 $ADDU $c_2,$at mflo ($t_1,$a_7,$b_4) mfhi ($t_2,$a_7,$b_4) $ADDU $c_3,$t_1 sltu $at,$c_3,$t_1 $MULTU ($a_7,$b_5) # mul_add_c(a[7],b[5],c1,c2,c3); $ADDU $t_2,$at $ADDU $c_1,$t_2 sltu $at,$c_1,$t_2 $ADDU $c_2,$at $ST $c_3,11*$BNSZ($a0) # r[11]=c3; mflo ($t_1,$a_7,$b_5) mfhi ($t_2,$a_7,$b_5) $ADDU $c_1,$t_1 sltu $at,$c_1,$t_1 $MULTU ($a_6,$b_6) # mul_add_c(a[6],b[6],c1,c2,c3); $ADDU $t_2,$at $ADDU $c_2,$t_2 sltu $c_3,$c_2,$t_2 mflo ($t_1,$a_6,$b_6) mfhi ($t_2,$a_6,$b_6) $ADDU $c_1,$t_1 sltu $at,$c_1,$t_1 $MULTU ($a_5,$b_7) # mul_add_c(a[5],b[7],c1,c2,c3); $ADDU $t_2,$at $ADDU $c_2,$t_2 sltu $at,$c_2,$t_2 $ADDU $c_3,$at mflo ($t_1,$a_5,$b_7) mfhi ($t_2,$a_5,$b_7) $ADDU $c_1,$t_1 sltu $at,$c_1,$t_1 $MULTU ($a_6,$b_7) # mul_add_c(a[6],b[7],c2,c3,c1); $ADDU $t_2,$at $ADDU $c_2,$t_2 sltu $at,$c_2,$t_2 $ADDU $c_3,$at $ST $c_1,12*$BNSZ($a0) # r[12]=c1; mflo ($t_1,$a_6,$b_7) mfhi ($t_2,$a_6,$b_7) $ADDU $c_2,$t_1 sltu $at,$c_2,$t_1 $MULTU ($a_7,$b_6) # mul_add_c(a[7],b[6],c2,c3,c1); $ADDU $t_2,$at $ADDU $c_3,$t_2 sltu $c_1,$c_3,$t_2 mflo ($t_1,$a_7,$b_6) mfhi ($t_2,$a_7,$b_6) $ADDU $c_2,$t_1 sltu $at,$c_2,$t_1 $MULTU ($a_7,$b_7) # mul_add_c(a[7],b[7],c3,c1,c2); $ADDU $t_2,$at $ADDU $c_3,$t_2 sltu $at,$c_3,$t_2 $ADDU $c_1,$at $ST $c_2,13*$BNSZ($a0) # r[13]=c2; mflo ($t_1,$a_7,$b_7) mfhi ($t_2,$a_7,$b_7) $ADDU $c_3,$t_1 sltu $at,$c_3,$t_1 $ADDU $t_2,$at $ADDU $c_1,$t_2 $ST $c_3,14*$BNSZ($a0) # r[14]=c3; $ST $c_1,15*$BNSZ($a0) # r[15]=c1; .set noreorder ___ $code.=<<___ if ($flavour =~ /nubi/i); $REG_L $s5,10*$SZREG($sp) $REG_L $s4,9*$SZREG($sp) $REG_L $s3,8*$SZREG($sp) $REG_L $s2,7*$SZREG($sp) $REG_L $s1,6*$SZREG($sp) $REG_L $s0,5*$SZREG($sp) $REG_L $t3,4*$SZREG($sp) $REG_L $t2,3*$SZREG($sp) $REG_L $t1,2*$SZREG($sp) $REG_L $t0,1*$SZREG($sp) $REG_L $gp,0*$SZREG($sp) jr $ra $PTR_ADD $sp,12*$SZREG ___ $code.=<<___ if ($flavour !~ /nubi/i); $REG_L $s5,5*$SZREG($sp) $REG_L $s4,4*$SZREG($sp) $REG_L $s3,3*$SZREG($sp) $REG_L $s2,2*$SZREG($sp) $REG_L $s1,1*$SZREG($sp) $REG_L $s0,0*$SZREG($sp) jr $ra $PTR_ADD $sp,6*$SZREG ___ $code.=<<___; .end bn_mul_comba8 .align 5 .globl bn_mul_comba4 .ent bn_mul_comba4 bn_mul_comba4: ___ $code.=<<___ if ($flavour =~ /nubi/i); .frame $sp,6*$SZREG,$ra .mask 0x8000f008,-$SZREG .set noreorder $PTR_SUB $sp,6*$SZREG $REG_S $ra,5*$SZREG($sp) $REG_S $t3,4*$SZREG($sp) $REG_S $t2,3*$SZREG($sp) $REG_S $t1,2*$SZREG($sp) $REG_S $t0,1*$SZREG($sp) $REG_S $gp,0*$SZREG($sp) ___ $code.=<<___; .set reorder $LD $a_0,0($a1) $LD $b_0,0($a2) $LD $a_1,$BNSZ($a1) $LD $a_2,2*$BNSZ($a1) $MULTU ($a_0,$b_0) # mul_add_c(a[0],b[0],c1,c2,c3); $LD $a_3,3*$BNSZ($a1) $LD $b_1,$BNSZ($a2) $LD $b_2,2*$BNSZ($a2) $LD $b_3,3*$BNSZ($a2) mflo ($c_1,$a_0,$b_0) mfhi ($c_2,$a_0,$b_0) $ST $c_1,0($a0) $MULTU ($a_0,$b_1) # mul_add_c(a[0],b[1],c2,c3,c1); mflo ($t_1,$a_0,$b_1) mfhi ($t_2,$a_0,$b_1) $ADDU $c_2,$t_1 sltu $at,$c_2,$t_1 $MULTU ($a_1,$b_0) # mul_add_c(a[1],b[0],c2,c3,c1); $ADDU $c_3,$t_2,$at mflo ($t_1,$a_1,$b_0) mfhi ($t_2,$a_1,$b_0) $ADDU $c_2,$t_1 sltu $at,$c_2,$t_1 $MULTU ($a_2,$b_0) # mul_add_c(a[2],b[0],c3,c1,c2); $ADDU $t_2,$at $ADDU $c_3,$t_2 sltu $c_1,$c_3,$t_2 $ST $c_2,$BNSZ($a0) mflo ($t_1,$a_2,$b_0) mfhi ($t_2,$a_2,$b_0) $ADDU $c_3,$t_1 sltu $at,$c_3,$t_1 $MULTU ($a_1,$b_1) # mul_add_c(a[1],b[1],c3,c1,c2); $ADDU $t_2,$at $ADDU $c_1,$t_2 mflo ($t_1,$a_1,$b_1) mfhi ($t_2,$a_1,$b_1) $ADDU $c_3,$t_1 sltu $at,$c_3,$t_1 $MULTU ($a_0,$b_2) # mul_add_c(a[0],b[2],c3,c1,c2); $ADDU $t_2,$at $ADDU $c_1,$t_2 sltu $c_2,$c_1,$t_2 mflo ($t_1,$a_0,$b_2) mfhi ($t_2,$a_0,$b_2) $ADDU $c_3,$t_1 sltu $at,$c_3,$t_1 $MULTU ($a_0,$b_3) # mul_add_c(a[0],b[3],c1,c2,c3); $ADDU $t_2,$at $ADDU $c_1,$t_2 sltu $at,$c_1,$t_2 $ADDU $c_2,$at $ST $c_3,2*$BNSZ($a0) mflo ($t_1,$a_0,$b_3) mfhi ($t_2,$a_0,$b_3) $ADDU $c_1,$t_1 sltu $at,$c_1,$t_1 $MULTU ($a_1,$b_2) # mul_add_c(a[1],b[2],c1,c2,c3); $ADDU $t_2,$at $ADDU $c_2,$t_2 sltu $c_3,$c_2,$t_2 mflo ($t_1,$a_1,$b_2) mfhi ($t_2,$a_1,$b_2) $ADDU $c_1,$t_1 sltu $at,$c_1,$t_1 $MULTU ($a_2,$b_1) # mul_add_c(a[2],b[1],c1,c2,c3); $ADDU $t_2,$at $ADDU $c_2,$t_2 sltu $at,$c_2,$t_2 $ADDU $c_3,$at mflo ($t_1,$a_2,$b_1) mfhi ($t_2,$a_2,$b_1) $ADDU $c_1,$t_1 sltu $at,$c_1,$t_1 $MULTU ($a_3,$b_0) # mul_add_c(a[3],b[0],c1,c2,c3); $ADDU $t_2,$at $ADDU $c_2,$t_2 sltu $at,$c_2,$t_2 $ADDU $c_3,$at mflo ($t_1,$a_3,$b_0) mfhi ($t_2,$a_3,$b_0) $ADDU $c_1,$t_1 sltu $at,$c_1,$t_1 $MULTU ($a_3,$b_1) # mul_add_c(a[3],b[1],c2,c3,c1); $ADDU $t_2,$at $ADDU $c_2,$t_2 sltu $at,$c_2,$t_2 $ADDU $c_3,$at $ST $c_1,3*$BNSZ($a0) mflo ($t_1,$a_3,$b_1) mfhi ($t_2,$a_3,$b_1) $ADDU $c_2,$t_1 sltu $at,$c_2,$t_1 $MULTU ($a_2,$b_2) # mul_add_c(a[2],b[2],c2,c3,c1); $ADDU $t_2,$at $ADDU $c_3,$t_2 sltu $c_1,$c_3,$t_2 mflo ($t_1,$a_2,$b_2) mfhi ($t_2,$a_2,$b_2) $ADDU $c_2,$t_1 sltu $at,$c_2,$t_1 $MULTU ($a_1,$b_3) # mul_add_c(a[1],b[3],c2,c3,c1); $ADDU $t_2,$at $ADDU $c_3,$t_2 sltu $at,$c_3,$t_2 $ADDU $c_1,$at mflo ($t_1,$a_1,$b_3) mfhi ($t_2,$a_1,$b_3) $ADDU $c_2,$t_1 sltu $at,$c_2,$t_1 $MULTU ($a_2,$b_3) # mul_add_c(a[2],b[3],c3,c1,c2); $ADDU $t_2,$at $ADDU $c_3,$t_2 sltu $at,$c_3,$t_2 $ADDU $c_1,$at $ST $c_2,4*$BNSZ($a0) mflo ($t_1,$a_2,$b_3) mfhi ($t_2,$a_2,$b_3) $ADDU $c_3,$t_1 sltu $at,$c_3,$t_1 $MULTU ($a_3,$b_2) # mul_add_c(a[3],b[2],c3,c1,c2); $ADDU $t_2,$at $ADDU $c_1,$t_2 sltu $c_2,$c_1,$t_2 mflo ($t_1,$a_3,$b_2) mfhi ($t_2,$a_3,$b_2) $ADDU $c_3,$t_1 sltu $at,$c_3,$t_1 $MULTU ($a_3,$b_3) # mul_add_c(a[3],b[3],c1,c2,c3); $ADDU $t_2,$at $ADDU $c_1,$t_2 sltu $at,$c_1,$t_2 $ADDU $c_2,$at $ST $c_3,5*$BNSZ($a0) mflo ($t_1,$a_3,$b_3) mfhi ($t_2,$a_3,$b_3) $ADDU $c_1,$t_1 sltu $at,$c_1,$t_1 $ADDU $t_2,$at $ADDU $c_2,$t_2 $ST $c_1,6*$BNSZ($a0) $ST $c_2,7*$BNSZ($a0) .set noreorder ___ $code.=<<___ if ($flavour =~ /nubi/i); $REG_L $t3,4*$SZREG($sp) $REG_L $t2,3*$SZREG($sp) $REG_L $t1,2*$SZREG($sp) $REG_L $t0,1*$SZREG($sp) $REG_L $gp,0*$SZREG($sp) $PTR_ADD $sp,6*$SZREG ___ $code.=<<___; jr $ra nop .end bn_mul_comba4 ___ ($a_4,$a_5,$a_6,$a_7)=($b_0,$b_1,$b_2,$b_3); sub add_c2 () { my ($hi,$lo,$c0,$c1,$c2, $warm, # !$warm denotes first call with specific sequence of # $c_[XYZ] when there is no Z-carry to accumulate yet; $an,$bn # these two are arguments for multiplication which # result is used in *next* step [which is why it's # commented as "forward multiplication" below]; )=@_; $code.=<<___; $ADDU $c0,$lo sltu $at,$c0,$lo $MULTU ($an,$bn) # forward multiplication $ADDU $c0,$lo $ADDU $at,$hi sltu $lo,$c0,$lo $ADDU $c1,$at $ADDU $hi,$lo ___ $code.=<<___ if (!$warm); sltu $c2,$c1,$at $ADDU $c1,$hi ___ $code.=<<___ if ($warm); sltu $at,$c1,$at $ADDU $c1,$hi $ADDU $c2,$at ___ $code.=<<___; sltu $hi,$c1,$hi $ADDU $c2,$hi mflo ($lo,$an,$bn) mfhi ($hi,$an,$bn) ___ } $code.=<<___; .align 5 .globl bn_sqr_comba8 .ent bn_sqr_comba8 bn_sqr_comba8: ___ $code.=<<___ if ($flavour =~ /nubi/i); .frame $sp,6*$SZREG,$ra .mask 0x8000f008,-$SZREG .set noreorder $PTR_SUB $sp,6*$SZREG $REG_S $ra,5*$SZREG($sp) $REG_S $t3,4*$SZREG($sp) $REG_S $t2,3*$SZREG($sp) $REG_S $t1,2*$SZREG($sp) $REG_S $t0,1*$SZREG($sp) $REG_S $gp,0*$SZREG($sp) ___ $code.=<<___; .set reorder $LD $a_0,0($a1) $LD $a_1,$BNSZ($a1) $LD $a_2,2*$BNSZ($a1) $LD $a_3,3*$BNSZ($a1) $MULTU ($a_0,$a_0) # mul_add_c(a[0],b[0],c1,c2,c3); $LD $a_4,4*$BNSZ($a1) $LD $a_5,5*$BNSZ($a1) $LD $a_6,6*$BNSZ($a1) $LD $a_7,7*$BNSZ($a1) mflo ($c_1,$a_0,$a_0) mfhi ($c_2,$a_0,$a_0) $ST $c_1,0($a0) $MULTU ($a_0,$a_1) # mul_add_c2(a[0],b[1],c2,c3,c1); mflo ($t_1,$a_0,$a_1) mfhi ($t_2,$a_0,$a_1) slt $c_1,$t_2,$zero $SLL $t_2,1 $MULTU ($a_2,$a_0) # mul_add_c2(a[2],b[0],c3,c1,c2); slt $a2,$t_1,$zero $ADDU $t_2,$a2 $SLL $t_1,1 $ADDU $c_2,$t_1 sltu $at,$c_2,$t_1 $ADDU $c_3,$t_2,$at $ST $c_2,$BNSZ($a0) + sltu $at,$c_3,$t_2 + $ADDU $c_1,$at mflo ($t_1,$a_2,$a_0) mfhi ($t_2,$a_2,$a_0) ___ &add_c2($t_2,$t_1,$c_3,$c_1,$c_2,0, $a_1,$a_1); # mul_add_c(a[1],b[1],c3,c1,c2); $code.=<<___; $ADDU $c_3,$t_1 sltu $at,$c_3,$t_1 $MULTU ($a_0,$a_3) # mul_add_c2(a[0],b[3],c1,c2,c3); $ADDU $t_2,$at $ADDU $c_1,$t_2 sltu $at,$c_1,$t_2 $ADDU $c_2,$at $ST $c_3,2*$BNSZ($a0) mflo ($t_1,$a_0,$a_3) mfhi ($t_2,$a_0,$a_3) ___ &add_c2($t_2,$t_1,$c_1,$c_2,$c_3,0, $a_1,$a_2); # mul_add_c2(a[1],b[2],c1,c2,c3); &add_c2($t_2,$t_1,$c_1,$c_2,$c_3,1, $a_4,$a_0); # mul_add_c2(a[4],b[0],c2,c3,c1); $code.=<<___; $ST $c_1,3*$BNSZ($a0) ___ &add_c2($t_2,$t_1,$c_2,$c_3,$c_1,0, $a_3,$a_1); # mul_add_c2(a[3],b[1],c2,c3,c1); &add_c2($t_2,$t_1,$c_2,$c_3,$c_1,1, $a_2,$a_2); # mul_add_c(a[2],b[2],c2,c3,c1); $code.=<<___; $ADDU $c_2,$t_1 sltu $at,$c_2,$t_1 $MULTU ($a_0,$a_5) # mul_add_c2(a[0],b[5],c3,c1,c2); $ADDU $t_2,$at $ADDU $c_3,$t_2 sltu $at,$c_3,$t_2 $ADDU $c_1,$at $ST $c_2,4*$BNSZ($a0) mflo ($t_1,$a_0,$a_5) mfhi ($t_2,$a_0,$a_5) ___ &add_c2($t_2,$t_1,$c_3,$c_1,$c_2,0, $a_1,$a_4); # mul_add_c2(a[1],b[4],c3,c1,c2); &add_c2($t_2,$t_1,$c_3,$c_1,$c_2,1, $a_2,$a_3); # mul_add_c2(a[2],b[3],c3,c1,c2); &add_c2($t_2,$t_1,$c_3,$c_1,$c_2,1, $a_6,$a_0); # mul_add_c2(a[6],b[0],c1,c2,c3); $code.=<<___; $ST $c_3,5*$BNSZ($a0) ___ &add_c2($t_2,$t_1,$c_1,$c_2,$c_3,0, $a_5,$a_1); # mul_add_c2(a[5],b[1],c1,c2,c3); &add_c2($t_2,$t_1,$c_1,$c_2,$c_3,1, $a_4,$a_2); # mul_add_c2(a[4],b[2],c1,c2,c3); &add_c2($t_2,$t_1,$c_1,$c_2,$c_3,1, $a_3,$a_3); # mul_add_c(a[3],b[3],c1,c2,c3); $code.=<<___; $ADDU $c_1,$t_1 sltu $at,$c_1,$t_1 $MULTU ($a_0,$a_7) # mul_add_c2(a[0],b[7],c2,c3,c1); $ADDU $t_2,$at $ADDU $c_2,$t_2 sltu $at,$c_2,$t_2 $ADDU $c_3,$at $ST $c_1,6*$BNSZ($a0) mflo ($t_1,$a_0,$a_7) mfhi ($t_2,$a_0,$a_7) ___ &add_c2($t_2,$t_1,$c_2,$c_3,$c_1,0, $a_1,$a_6); # mul_add_c2(a[1],b[6],c2,c3,c1); &add_c2($t_2,$t_1,$c_2,$c_3,$c_1,1, $a_2,$a_5); # mul_add_c2(a[2],b[5],c2,c3,c1); &add_c2($t_2,$t_1,$c_2,$c_3,$c_1,1, $a_3,$a_4); # mul_add_c2(a[3],b[4],c2,c3,c1); &add_c2($t_2,$t_1,$c_2,$c_3,$c_1,1, $a_7,$a_1); # mul_add_c2(a[7],b[1],c3,c1,c2); $code.=<<___; $ST $c_2,7*$BNSZ($a0) ___ &add_c2($t_2,$t_1,$c_3,$c_1,$c_2,0, $a_6,$a_2); # mul_add_c2(a[6],b[2],c3,c1,c2); &add_c2($t_2,$t_1,$c_3,$c_1,$c_2,1, $a_5,$a_3); # mul_add_c2(a[5],b[3],c3,c1,c2); &add_c2($t_2,$t_1,$c_3,$c_1,$c_2,1, $a_4,$a_4); # mul_add_c(a[4],b[4],c3,c1,c2); $code.=<<___; $ADDU $c_3,$t_1 sltu $at,$c_3,$t_1 $MULTU ($a_2,$a_7) # mul_add_c2(a[2],b[7],c1,c2,c3); $ADDU $t_2,$at $ADDU $c_1,$t_2 sltu $at,$c_1,$t_2 $ADDU $c_2,$at $ST $c_3,8*$BNSZ($a0) mflo ($t_1,$a_2,$a_7) mfhi ($t_2,$a_2,$a_7) ___ &add_c2($t_2,$t_1,$c_1,$c_2,$c_3,0, $a_3,$a_6); # mul_add_c2(a[3],b[6],c1,c2,c3); &add_c2($t_2,$t_1,$c_1,$c_2,$c_3,1, $a_4,$a_5); # mul_add_c2(a[4],b[5],c1,c2,c3); &add_c2($t_2,$t_1,$c_1,$c_2,$c_3,1, $a_7,$a_3); # mul_add_c2(a[7],b[3],c2,c3,c1); $code.=<<___; $ST $c_1,9*$BNSZ($a0) ___ &add_c2($t_2,$t_1,$c_2,$c_3,$c_1,0, $a_6,$a_4); # mul_add_c2(a[6],b[4],c2,c3,c1); &add_c2($t_2,$t_1,$c_2,$c_3,$c_1,1, $a_5,$a_5); # mul_add_c(a[5],b[5],c2,c3,c1); $code.=<<___; $ADDU $c_2,$t_1 sltu $at,$c_2,$t_1 $MULTU ($a_4,$a_7) # mul_add_c2(a[4],b[7],c3,c1,c2); $ADDU $t_2,$at $ADDU $c_3,$t_2 sltu $at,$c_3,$t_2 $ADDU $c_1,$at $ST $c_2,10*$BNSZ($a0) mflo ($t_1,$a_4,$a_7) mfhi ($t_2,$a_4,$a_7) ___ &add_c2($t_2,$t_1,$c_3,$c_1,$c_2,0, $a_5,$a_6); # mul_add_c2(a[5],b[6],c3,c1,c2); &add_c2($t_2,$t_1,$c_3,$c_1,$c_2,1, $a_7,$a_5); # mul_add_c2(a[7],b[5],c1,c2,c3); $code.=<<___; $ST $c_3,11*$BNSZ($a0) ___ &add_c2($t_2,$t_1,$c_1,$c_2,$c_3,0, $a_6,$a_6); # mul_add_c(a[6],b[6],c1,c2,c3); $code.=<<___; $ADDU $c_1,$t_1 sltu $at,$c_1,$t_1 $MULTU ($a_6,$a_7) # mul_add_c2(a[6],b[7],c2,c3,c1); $ADDU $t_2,$at $ADDU $c_2,$t_2 sltu $at,$c_2,$t_2 $ADDU $c_3,$at $ST $c_1,12*$BNSZ($a0) mflo ($t_1,$a_6,$a_7) mfhi ($t_2,$a_6,$a_7) ___ &add_c2($t_2,$t_1,$c_2,$c_3,$c_1,0, $a_7,$a_7); # mul_add_c(a[7],b[7],c3,c1,c2); $code.=<<___; $ST $c_2,13*$BNSZ($a0) $ADDU $c_3,$t_1 sltu $at,$c_3,$t_1 $ADDU $t_2,$at $ADDU $c_1,$t_2 $ST $c_3,14*$BNSZ($a0) $ST $c_1,15*$BNSZ($a0) .set noreorder ___ $code.=<<___ if ($flavour =~ /nubi/i); $REG_L $t3,4*$SZREG($sp) $REG_L $t2,3*$SZREG($sp) $REG_L $t1,2*$SZREG($sp) $REG_L $t0,1*$SZREG($sp) $REG_L $gp,0*$SZREG($sp) $PTR_ADD $sp,6*$SZREG ___ $code.=<<___; jr $ra nop .end bn_sqr_comba8 .align 5 .globl bn_sqr_comba4 .ent bn_sqr_comba4 bn_sqr_comba4: ___ $code.=<<___ if ($flavour =~ /nubi/i); .frame $sp,6*$SZREG,$ra .mask 0x8000f008,-$SZREG .set noreorder $PTR_SUB $sp,6*$SZREG $REG_S $ra,5*$SZREG($sp) $REG_S $t3,4*$SZREG($sp) $REG_S $t2,3*$SZREG($sp) $REG_S $t1,2*$SZREG($sp) $REG_S $t0,1*$SZREG($sp) $REG_S $gp,0*$SZREG($sp) ___ $code.=<<___; .set reorder $LD $a_0,0($a1) $LD $a_1,$BNSZ($a1) $MULTU ($a_0,$a_0) # mul_add_c(a[0],b[0],c1,c2,c3); $LD $a_2,2*$BNSZ($a1) $LD $a_3,3*$BNSZ($a1) mflo ($c_1,$a_0,$a_0) mfhi ($c_2,$a_0,$a_0) $ST $c_1,0($a0) $MULTU ($a_0,$a_1) # mul_add_c2(a[0],b[1],c2,c3,c1); mflo ($t_1,$a_0,$a_1) mfhi ($t_2,$a_0,$a_1) slt $c_1,$t_2,$zero $SLL $t_2,1 $MULTU ($a_2,$a_0) # mul_add_c2(a[2],b[0],c3,c1,c2); slt $a2,$t_1,$zero $ADDU $t_2,$a2 $SLL $t_1,1 $ADDU $c_2,$t_1 sltu $at,$c_2,$t_1 $ADDU $c_3,$t_2,$at $ST $c_2,$BNSZ($a0) + sltu $at,$c_3,$t_2 + $ADDU $c_1,$at mflo ($t_1,$a_2,$a_0) mfhi ($t_2,$a_2,$a_0) ___ &add_c2($t_2,$t_1,$c_3,$c_1,$c_2,0, $a_1,$a_1); # mul_add_c(a[1],b[1],c3,c1,c2); $code.=<<___; $ADDU $c_3,$t_1 sltu $at,$c_3,$t_1 $MULTU ($a_0,$a_3) # mul_add_c2(a[0],b[3],c1,c2,c3); $ADDU $t_2,$at $ADDU $c_1,$t_2 sltu $at,$c_1,$t_2 $ADDU $c_2,$at $ST $c_3,2*$BNSZ($a0) mflo ($t_1,$a_0,$a_3) mfhi ($t_2,$a_0,$a_3) ___ &add_c2($t_2,$t_1,$c_1,$c_2,$c_3,0, $a_1,$a_2); # mul_add_c2(a2[1],b[2],c1,c2,c3); &add_c2($t_2,$t_1,$c_1,$c_2,$c_3,1, $a_3,$a_1); # mul_add_c2(a[3],b[1],c2,c3,c1); $code.=<<___; $ST $c_1,3*$BNSZ($a0) ___ &add_c2($t_2,$t_1,$c_2,$c_3,$c_1,0, $a_2,$a_2); # mul_add_c(a[2],b[2],c2,c3,c1); $code.=<<___; $ADDU $c_2,$t_1 sltu $at,$c_2,$t_1 $MULTU ($a_2,$a_3) # mul_add_c2(a[2],b[3],c3,c1,c2); $ADDU $t_2,$at $ADDU $c_3,$t_2 sltu $at,$c_3,$t_2 $ADDU $c_1,$at $ST $c_2,4*$BNSZ($a0) mflo ($t_1,$a_2,$a_3) mfhi ($t_2,$a_2,$a_3) ___ &add_c2($t_2,$t_1,$c_3,$c_1,$c_2,0, $a_3,$a_3); # mul_add_c(a[3],b[3],c1,c2,c3); $code.=<<___; $ST $c_3,5*$BNSZ($a0) $ADDU $c_1,$t_1 sltu $at,$c_1,$t_1 $ADDU $t_2,$at $ADDU $c_2,$t_2 $ST $c_1,6*$BNSZ($a0) $ST $c_2,7*$BNSZ($a0) .set noreorder ___ $code.=<<___ if ($flavour =~ /nubi/i); $REG_L $t3,4*$SZREG($sp) $REG_L $t2,3*$SZREG($sp) $REG_L $t1,2*$SZREG($sp) $REG_L $t0,1*$SZREG($sp) $REG_L $gp,0*$SZREG($sp) $PTR_ADD $sp,6*$SZREG ___ $code.=<<___; jr $ra nop .end bn_sqr_comba4 ___ print $code; close STDOUT or die "error closing STDOUT: $!"; diff --git a/crypto/cms/cms_env.c b/crypto/cms/cms_env.c index 04940146fd25..962a0137542a 100644 --- a/crypto/cms/cms_env.c +++ b/crypto/cms/cms_env.c @@ -1,919 +1,920 @@ /* - * Copyright 2008-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 2008-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "cms_local.h" #include "crypto/asn1.h" #include "crypto/evp.h" /* CMS EnvelopedData Utilities */ CMS_EnvelopedData *cms_get0_enveloped(CMS_ContentInfo *cms) { if (OBJ_obj2nid(cms->contentType) != NID_pkcs7_enveloped) { CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_GET0_ENVELOPED, CMS_R_CONTENT_TYPE_NOT_ENVELOPED_DATA); return NULL; } return cms->d.envelopedData; } static CMS_EnvelopedData *cms_enveloped_data_init(CMS_ContentInfo *cms) { if (cms->d.other == NULL) { cms->d.envelopedData = M_ASN1_new_of(CMS_EnvelopedData); if (!cms->d.envelopedData) { CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ENVELOPED_DATA_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return NULL; } cms->d.envelopedData->version = 0; cms->d.envelopedData->encryptedContentInfo->contentType = OBJ_nid2obj(NID_pkcs7_data); ASN1_OBJECT_free(cms->contentType); cms->contentType = OBJ_nid2obj(NID_pkcs7_enveloped); return cms->d.envelopedData; } return cms_get0_enveloped(cms); } int cms_env_asn1_ctrl(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri, int cmd) { EVP_PKEY *pkey; int i; if (ri->type == CMS_RECIPINFO_TRANS) pkey = ri->d.ktri->pkey; else if (ri->type == CMS_RECIPINFO_AGREE) { EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = ri->d.kari->pctx; if (!pctx) return 0; pkey = EVP_PKEY_CTX_get0_pkey(pctx); if (!pkey) return 0; } else return 0; if (!pkey->ameth || !pkey->ameth->pkey_ctrl) return 1; i = pkey->ameth->pkey_ctrl(pkey, ASN1_PKEY_CTRL_CMS_ENVELOPE, cmd, ri); if (i == -2) { CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ENV_ASN1_CTRL, CMS_R_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_KEY_TYPE); return 0; } if (i <= 0) { CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ENV_ASN1_CTRL, CMS_R_CTRL_FAILURE); return 0; } return 1; } STACK_OF(CMS_RecipientInfo) *CMS_get0_RecipientInfos(CMS_ContentInfo *cms) { CMS_EnvelopedData *env; env = cms_get0_enveloped(cms); if (!env) return NULL; return env->recipientInfos; } int CMS_RecipientInfo_type(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri) { return ri->type; } EVP_PKEY_CTX *CMS_RecipientInfo_get0_pkey_ctx(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri) { if (ri->type == CMS_RECIPINFO_TRANS) return ri->d.ktri->pctx; else if (ri->type == CMS_RECIPINFO_AGREE) return ri->d.kari->pctx; return NULL; } CMS_ContentInfo *CMS_EnvelopedData_create(const EVP_CIPHER *cipher) { CMS_ContentInfo *cms; CMS_EnvelopedData *env; cms = CMS_ContentInfo_new(); if (cms == NULL) goto merr; env = cms_enveloped_data_init(cms); if (env == NULL) goto merr; if (!cms_EncryptedContent_init(env->encryptedContentInfo, cipher, NULL, 0)) goto merr; return cms; merr: CMS_ContentInfo_free(cms); CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ENVELOPEDDATA_CREATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return NULL; } /* Key Transport Recipient Info (KTRI) routines */ /* Initialise a ktri based on passed certificate and key */ static int cms_RecipientInfo_ktri_init(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri, X509 *recip, EVP_PKEY *pk, unsigned int flags) { CMS_KeyTransRecipientInfo *ktri; int idtype; ri->d.ktri = M_ASN1_new_of(CMS_KeyTransRecipientInfo); if (!ri->d.ktri) return 0; ri->type = CMS_RECIPINFO_TRANS; ktri = ri->d.ktri; if (flags & CMS_USE_KEYID) { ktri->version = 2; idtype = CMS_RECIPINFO_KEYIDENTIFIER; } else { ktri->version = 0; idtype = CMS_RECIPINFO_ISSUER_SERIAL; } /* * Not a typo: RecipientIdentifier and SignerIdentifier are the same * structure. */ if (!cms_set1_SignerIdentifier(ktri->rid, recip, idtype)) return 0; X509_up_ref(recip); EVP_PKEY_up_ref(pk); ktri->pkey = pk; ktri->recip = recip; if (flags & CMS_KEY_PARAM) { ktri->pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(ktri->pkey, NULL); if (ktri->pctx == NULL) return 0; if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(ktri->pctx) <= 0) return 0; } else if (!cms_env_asn1_ctrl(ri, 0)) return 0; return 1; } /* * Add a recipient certificate using appropriate type of RecipientInfo */ CMS_RecipientInfo *CMS_add1_recipient_cert(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, X509 *recip, unsigned int flags) { CMS_RecipientInfo *ri = NULL; CMS_EnvelopedData *env; EVP_PKEY *pk = NULL; env = cms_get0_enveloped(cms); if (!env) goto err; /* Initialize recipient info */ ri = M_ASN1_new_of(CMS_RecipientInfo); if (!ri) goto merr; pk = X509_get0_pubkey(recip); if (!pk) { CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ADD1_RECIPIENT_CERT, CMS_R_ERROR_GETTING_PUBLIC_KEY); goto err; } switch (cms_pkey_get_ri_type(pk)) { case CMS_RECIPINFO_TRANS: if (!cms_RecipientInfo_ktri_init(ri, recip, pk, flags)) goto err; break; case CMS_RECIPINFO_AGREE: if (!cms_RecipientInfo_kari_init(ri, recip, pk, flags)) goto err; break; default: CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ADD1_RECIPIENT_CERT, CMS_R_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_KEY_TYPE); goto err; } if (!sk_CMS_RecipientInfo_push(env->recipientInfos, ri)) goto merr; return ri; merr: CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ADD1_RECIPIENT_CERT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); err: M_ASN1_free_of(ri, CMS_RecipientInfo); return NULL; } int CMS_RecipientInfo_ktri_get0_algs(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri, EVP_PKEY **pk, X509 **recip, X509_ALGOR **palg) { CMS_KeyTransRecipientInfo *ktri; if (ri->type != CMS_RECIPINFO_TRANS) { CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KTRI_GET0_ALGS, CMS_R_NOT_KEY_TRANSPORT); return 0; } ktri = ri->d.ktri; if (pk) *pk = ktri->pkey; if (recip) *recip = ktri->recip; if (palg) *palg = ktri->keyEncryptionAlgorithm; return 1; } int CMS_RecipientInfo_ktri_get0_signer_id(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri, ASN1_OCTET_STRING **keyid, X509_NAME **issuer, ASN1_INTEGER **sno) { CMS_KeyTransRecipientInfo *ktri; if (ri->type != CMS_RECIPINFO_TRANS) { CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KTRI_GET0_SIGNER_ID, CMS_R_NOT_KEY_TRANSPORT); return 0; } ktri = ri->d.ktri; return cms_SignerIdentifier_get0_signer_id(ktri->rid, keyid, issuer, sno); } int CMS_RecipientInfo_ktri_cert_cmp(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri, X509 *cert) { if (ri->type != CMS_RECIPINFO_TRANS) { CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KTRI_CERT_CMP, CMS_R_NOT_KEY_TRANSPORT); return -2; } return cms_SignerIdentifier_cert_cmp(ri->d.ktri->rid, cert); } int CMS_RecipientInfo_set0_pkey(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri, EVP_PKEY *pkey) { if (ri->type != CMS_RECIPINFO_TRANS) { CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_SET0_PKEY, CMS_R_NOT_KEY_TRANSPORT); return 0; } EVP_PKEY_free(ri->d.ktri->pkey); ri->d.ktri->pkey = pkey; return 1; } /* Encrypt content key in key transport recipient info */ static int cms_RecipientInfo_ktri_encrypt(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, CMS_RecipientInfo *ri) { CMS_KeyTransRecipientInfo *ktri; CMS_EncryptedContentInfo *ec; EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx; unsigned char *ek = NULL; size_t eklen; int ret = 0; if (ri->type != CMS_RECIPINFO_TRANS) { CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KTRI_ENCRYPT, CMS_R_NOT_KEY_TRANSPORT); return 0; } ktri = ri->d.ktri; ec = cms->d.envelopedData->encryptedContentInfo; pctx = ktri->pctx; if (pctx) { if (!cms_env_asn1_ctrl(ri, 0)) goto err; } else { pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(ktri->pkey, NULL); if (pctx == NULL) return 0; if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt_init(pctx) <= 0) goto err; } if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(pctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_ENCRYPT, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_CMS_ENCRYPT, 0, ri) <= 0) { CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KTRI_ENCRYPT, CMS_R_CTRL_ERROR); goto err; } if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx, NULL, &eklen, ec->key, ec->keylen) <= 0) goto err; ek = OPENSSL_malloc(eklen); if (ek == NULL) { CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KTRI_ENCRYPT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } if (EVP_PKEY_encrypt(pctx, ek, &eklen, ec->key, ec->keylen) <= 0) goto err; ASN1_STRING_set0(ktri->encryptedKey, ek, eklen); ek = NULL; ret = 1; err: EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pctx); ktri->pctx = NULL; OPENSSL_free(ek); return ret; } /* Decrypt content key from KTRI */ static int cms_RecipientInfo_ktri_decrypt(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, CMS_RecipientInfo *ri) { CMS_KeyTransRecipientInfo *ktri = ri->d.ktri; EVP_PKEY *pkey = ktri->pkey; unsigned char *ek = NULL; size_t eklen; int ret = 0; size_t fixlen = 0; CMS_EncryptedContentInfo *ec; ec = cms->d.envelopedData->encryptedContentInfo; if (ktri->pkey == NULL) { CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KTRI_DECRYPT, CMS_R_NO_PRIVATE_KEY); return 0; } if (cms->d.envelopedData->encryptedContentInfo->havenocert && !cms->d.envelopedData->encryptedContentInfo->debug) { X509_ALGOR *calg = ec->contentEncryptionAlgorithm; const EVP_CIPHER *ciph = EVP_get_cipherbyobj(calg->algorithm); if (ciph == NULL) { CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KTRI_DECRYPT, CMS_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER); return 0; } fixlen = EVP_CIPHER_key_length(ciph); } ktri->pctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL); if (ktri->pctx == NULL) return 0; if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(ktri->pctx) <= 0) goto err; if (!cms_env_asn1_ctrl(ri, 1)) goto err; if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ktri->pctx, -1, EVP_PKEY_OP_DECRYPT, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_CMS_DECRYPT, 0, ri) <= 0) { CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KTRI_DECRYPT, CMS_R_CTRL_ERROR); goto err; } if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(ktri->pctx, NULL, &eklen, ktri->encryptedKey->data, ktri->encryptedKey->length) <= 0) goto err; ek = OPENSSL_malloc(eklen); if (ek == NULL) { CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KTRI_DECRYPT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(ktri->pctx, ek, &eklen, ktri->encryptedKey->data, ktri->encryptedKey->length) <= 0 || eklen == 0 || (fixlen != 0 && eklen != fixlen)) { CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KTRI_DECRYPT, CMS_R_CMS_LIB); goto err; } ret = 1; OPENSSL_clear_free(ec->key, ec->keylen); ec->key = ek; ec->keylen = eklen; err: EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ktri->pctx); ktri->pctx = NULL; if (!ret) OPENSSL_free(ek); return ret; } /* Key Encrypted Key (KEK) RecipientInfo routines */ int CMS_RecipientInfo_kekri_id_cmp(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri, const unsigned char *id, size_t idlen) { ASN1_OCTET_STRING tmp_os; CMS_KEKRecipientInfo *kekri; if (ri->type != CMS_RECIPINFO_KEK) { CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KEKRI_ID_CMP, CMS_R_NOT_KEK); return -2; } kekri = ri->d.kekri; tmp_os.type = V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING; tmp_os.flags = 0; tmp_os.data = (unsigned char *)id; tmp_os.length = (int)idlen; return ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(&tmp_os, kekri->kekid->keyIdentifier); } /* For now hard code AES key wrap info */ static size_t aes_wrap_keylen(int nid) { switch (nid) { case NID_id_aes128_wrap: return 16; case NID_id_aes192_wrap: return 24; case NID_id_aes256_wrap: return 32; default: return 0; } } CMS_RecipientInfo *CMS_add0_recipient_key(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, int nid, unsigned char *key, size_t keylen, unsigned char *id, size_t idlen, ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *date, ASN1_OBJECT *otherTypeId, ASN1_TYPE *otherType) { CMS_RecipientInfo *ri = NULL; CMS_EnvelopedData *env; CMS_KEKRecipientInfo *kekri; env = cms_get0_enveloped(cms); if (!env) goto err; if (nid == NID_undef) { switch (keylen) { case 16: nid = NID_id_aes128_wrap; break; case 24: nid = NID_id_aes192_wrap; break; case 32: nid = NID_id_aes256_wrap; break; default: CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ADD0_RECIPIENT_KEY, CMS_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH); goto err; } } else { size_t exp_keylen = aes_wrap_keylen(nid); if (!exp_keylen) { CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ADD0_RECIPIENT_KEY, CMS_R_UNSUPPORTED_KEK_ALGORITHM); goto err; } if (keylen != exp_keylen) { CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ADD0_RECIPIENT_KEY, CMS_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH); goto err; } } /* Initialize recipient info */ ri = M_ASN1_new_of(CMS_RecipientInfo); if (!ri) goto merr; ri->d.kekri = M_ASN1_new_of(CMS_KEKRecipientInfo); if (!ri->d.kekri) goto merr; ri->type = CMS_RECIPINFO_KEK; kekri = ri->d.kekri; if (otherTypeId) { kekri->kekid->other = M_ASN1_new_of(CMS_OtherKeyAttribute); if (kekri->kekid->other == NULL) goto merr; } if (!sk_CMS_RecipientInfo_push(env->recipientInfos, ri)) goto merr; /* After this point no calls can fail */ kekri->version = 4; kekri->key = key; kekri->keylen = keylen; ASN1_STRING_set0(kekri->kekid->keyIdentifier, id, idlen); kekri->kekid->date = date; if (kekri->kekid->other) { kekri->kekid->other->keyAttrId = otherTypeId; kekri->kekid->other->keyAttr = otherType; } X509_ALGOR_set0(kekri->keyEncryptionAlgorithm, OBJ_nid2obj(nid), V_ASN1_UNDEF, NULL); return ri; merr: CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ADD0_RECIPIENT_KEY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); err: M_ASN1_free_of(ri, CMS_RecipientInfo); return NULL; } int CMS_RecipientInfo_kekri_get0_id(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri, X509_ALGOR **palg, ASN1_OCTET_STRING **pid, ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME **pdate, ASN1_OBJECT **potherid, ASN1_TYPE **pothertype) { CMS_KEKIdentifier *rkid; if (ri->type != CMS_RECIPINFO_KEK) { CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KEKRI_GET0_ID, CMS_R_NOT_KEK); return 0; } rkid = ri->d.kekri->kekid; if (palg) *palg = ri->d.kekri->keyEncryptionAlgorithm; if (pid) *pid = rkid->keyIdentifier; if (pdate) *pdate = rkid->date; if (potherid) { if (rkid->other) *potherid = rkid->other->keyAttrId; else *potherid = NULL; } if (pothertype) { if (rkid->other) *pothertype = rkid->other->keyAttr; else *pothertype = NULL; } return 1; } int CMS_RecipientInfo_set0_key(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri, unsigned char *key, size_t keylen) { CMS_KEKRecipientInfo *kekri; if (ri->type != CMS_RECIPINFO_KEK) { CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_SET0_KEY, CMS_R_NOT_KEK); return 0; } kekri = ri->d.kekri; kekri->key = key; kekri->keylen = keylen; return 1; } /* Encrypt content key in KEK recipient info */ static int cms_RecipientInfo_kekri_encrypt(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, CMS_RecipientInfo *ri) { CMS_EncryptedContentInfo *ec; CMS_KEKRecipientInfo *kekri; AES_KEY actx; unsigned char *wkey = NULL; int wkeylen; int r = 0; ec = cms->d.envelopedData->encryptedContentInfo; kekri = ri->d.kekri; if (!kekri->key) { CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KEKRI_ENCRYPT, CMS_R_NO_KEY); return 0; } if (AES_set_encrypt_key(kekri->key, kekri->keylen << 3, &actx)) { CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KEKRI_ENCRYPT, CMS_R_ERROR_SETTING_KEY); goto err; } wkey = OPENSSL_malloc(ec->keylen + 8); if (wkey == NULL) { CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KEKRI_ENCRYPT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } wkeylen = AES_wrap_key(&actx, NULL, wkey, ec->key, ec->keylen); if (wkeylen <= 0) { CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KEKRI_ENCRYPT, CMS_R_WRAP_ERROR); goto err; } ASN1_STRING_set0(kekri->encryptedKey, wkey, wkeylen); r = 1; err: if (!r) OPENSSL_free(wkey); OPENSSL_cleanse(&actx, sizeof(actx)); return r; } /* Decrypt content key in KEK recipient info */ static int cms_RecipientInfo_kekri_decrypt(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, CMS_RecipientInfo *ri) { CMS_EncryptedContentInfo *ec; CMS_KEKRecipientInfo *kekri; AES_KEY actx; unsigned char *ukey = NULL; int ukeylen; int r = 0, wrap_nid; ec = cms->d.envelopedData->encryptedContentInfo; kekri = ri->d.kekri; if (!kekri->key) { CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KEKRI_DECRYPT, CMS_R_NO_KEY); return 0; } wrap_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(kekri->keyEncryptionAlgorithm->algorithm); if (aes_wrap_keylen(wrap_nid) != kekri->keylen) { CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KEKRI_DECRYPT, CMS_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH); return 0; } /* If encrypted key length is invalid don't bother */ if (kekri->encryptedKey->length < 16) { CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KEKRI_DECRYPT, CMS_R_INVALID_ENCRYPTED_KEY_LENGTH); goto err; } if (AES_set_decrypt_key(kekri->key, kekri->keylen << 3, &actx)) { CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KEKRI_DECRYPT, CMS_R_ERROR_SETTING_KEY); goto err; } ukey = OPENSSL_malloc(kekri->encryptedKey->length - 8); if (ukey == NULL) { CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KEKRI_DECRYPT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } ukeylen = AES_unwrap_key(&actx, NULL, ukey, kekri->encryptedKey->data, kekri->encryptedKey->length); if (ukeylen <= 0) { CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KEKRI_DECRYPT, CMS_R_UNWRAP_ERROR); goto err; } + OPENSSL_clear_free(ec->key, ec->keylen); ec->key = ukey; ec->keylen = ukeylen; r = 1; err: if (!r) OPENSSL_free(ukey); OPENSSL_cleanse(&actx, sizeof(actx)); return r; } int CMS_RecipientInfo_decrypt(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, CMS_RecipientInfo *ri) { switch (ri->type) { case CMS_RECIPINFO_TRANS: return cms_RecipientInfo_ktri_decrypt(cms, ri); case CMS_RECIPINFO_KEK: return cms_RecipientInfo_kekri_decrypt(cms, ri); case CMS_RECIPINFO_PASS: return cms_RecipientInfo_pwri_crypt(cms, ri, 0); default: CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_DECRYPT, CMS_R_UNSUPPORTED_RECIPIENTINFO_TYPE); return 0; } } int CMS_RecipientInfo_encrypt(CMS_ContentInfo *cms, CMS_RecipientInfo *ri) { switch (ri->type) { case CMS_RECIPINFO_TRANS: return cms_RecipientInfo_ktri_encrypt(cms, ri); case CMS_RECIPINFO_AGREE: return cms_RecipientInfo_kari_encrypt(cms, ri); case CMS_RECIPINFO_KEK: return cms_RecipientInfo_kekri_encrypt(cms, ri); case CMS_RECIPINFO_PASS: return cms_RecipientInfo_pwri_crypt(cms, ri, 1); default: CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_ENCRYPT, CMS_R_UNSUPPORTED_RECIPIENT_TYPE); return 0; } } /* Check structures and fixup version numbers (if necessary) */ static void cms_env_set_originfo_version(CMS_EnvelopedData *env) { CMS_OriginatorInfo *org = env->originatorInfo; int i; if (org == NULL) return; for (i = 0; i < sk_CMS_CertificateChoices_num(org->certificates); i++) { CMS_CertificateChoices *cch; cch = sk_CMS_CertificateChoices_value(org->certificates, i); if (cch->type == CMS_CERTCHOICE_OTHER) { env->version = 4; return; } else if (cch->type == CMS_CERTCHOICE_V2ACERT) { if (env->version < 3) env->version = 3; } } for (i = 0; i < sk_CMS_RevocationInfoChoice_num(org->crls); i++) { CMS_RevocationInfoChoice *rch; rch = sk_CMS_RevocationInfoChoice_value(org->crls, i); if (rch->type == CMS_REVCHOICE_OTHER) { env->version = 4; return; } } } static void cms_env_set_version(CMS_EnvelopedData *env) { int i; CMS_RecipientInfo *ri; /* * Can't set version higher than 4 so if 4 or more already nothing to do. */ if (env->version >= 4) return; cms_env_set_originfo_version(env); if (env->version >= 3) return; for (i = 0; i < sk_CMS_RecipientInfo_num(env->recipientInfos); i++) { ri = sk_CMS_RecipientInfo_value(env->recipientInfos, i); if (ri->type == CMS_RECIPINFO_PASS || ri->type == CMS_RECIPINFO_OTHER) { env->version = 3; return; } else if (ri->type != CMS_RECIPINFO_TRANS || ri->d.ktri->version != 0) { env->version = 2; } } if (env->originatorInfo || env->unprotectedAttrs) env->version = 2; if (env->version == 2) return; env->version = 0; } BIO *cms_EnvelopedData_init_bio(CMS_ContentInfo *cms) { CMS_EncryptedContentInfo *ec; STACK_OF(CMS_RecipientInfo) *rinfos; CMS_RecipientInfo *ri; int i, ok = 0; BIO *ret; /* Get BIO first to set up key */ ec = cms->d.envelopedData->encryptedContentInfo; ret = cms_EncryptedContent_init_bio(ec); /* If error or no cipher end of processing */ if (!ret || !ec->cipher) return ret; /* Now encrypt content key according to each RecipientInfo type */ rinfos = cms->d.envelopedData->recipientInfos; for (i = 0; i < sk_CMS_RecipientInfo_num(rinfos); i++) { ri = sk_CMS_RecipientInfo_value(rinfos, i); if (CMS_RecipientInfo_encrypt(cms, ri) <= 0) { CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_ENVELOPEDDATA_INIT_BIO, CMS_R_ERROR_SETTING_RECIPIENTINFO); goto err; } } cms_env_set_version(cms->d.envelopedData); ok = 1; err: ec->cipher = NULL; OPENSSL_clear_free(ec->key, ec->keylen); ec->key = NULL; ec->keylen = 0; if (ok) return ret; BIO_free(ret); return NULL; } /* * Get RecipientInfo type (if any) supported by a key (public or private). To * retain compatibility with previous behaviour if the ctrl value isn't * supported we assume key transport. */ int cms_pkey_get_ri_type(EVP_PKEY *pk) { if (pk->ameth && pk->ameth->pkey_ctrl) { int i, r; i = pk->ameth->pkey_ctrl(pk, ASN1_PKEY_CTRL_CMS_RI_TYPE, 0, &r); if (i > 0) return r; } return CMS_RECIPINFO_TRANS; } diff --git a/crypto/dh/dh_ameth.c b/crypto/dh/dh_ameth.c index d53004080d5e..576409ccb51b 100644 --- a/crypto/dh/dh_ameth.c +++ b/crypto/dh/dh_ameth.c @@ -1,908 +1,911 @@ /* - * Copyright 2006-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 2006-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include #include "dh_local.h" #include #include "crypto/asn1.h" #include "crypto/evp.h" #include /* * i2d/d2i like DH parameter functions which use the appropriate routine for * PKCS#3 DH or X9.42 DH. */ static DH *d2i_dhp(const EVP_PKEY *pkey, const unsigned char **pp, long length) { if (pkey->ameth == &dhx_asn1_meth) return d2i_DHxparams(NULL, pp, length); return d2i_DHparams(NULL, pp, length); } static int i2d_dhp(const EVP_PKEY *pkey, const DH *a, unsigned char **pp) { if (pkey->ameth == &dhx_asn1_meth) return i2d_DHxparams(a, pp); return i2d_DHparams(a, pp); } static void int_dh_free(EVP_PKEY *pkey) { DH_free(pkey->pkey.dh); } static int dh_pub_decode(EVP_PKEY *pkey, X509_PUBKEY *pubkey) { const unsigned char *p, *pm; int pklen, pmlen; int ptype; const void *pval; const ASN1_STRING *pstr; X509_ALGOR *palg; ASN1_INTEGER *public_key = NULL; DH *dh = NULL; if (!X509_PUBKEY_get0_param(NULL, &p, &pklen, &palg, pubkey)) return 0; X509_ALGOR_get0(NULL, &ptype, &pval, palg); if (ptype != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE) { DHerr(DH_F_DH_PUB_DECODE, DH_R_PARAMETER_ENCODING_ERROR); goto err; } pstr = pval; pm = pstr->data; pmlen = pstr->length; if ((dh = d2i_dhp(pkey, &pm, pmlen)) == NULL) { DHerr(DH_F_DH_PUB_DECODE, DH_R_DECODE_ERROR); goto err; } if ((public_key = d2i_ASN1_INTEGER(NULL, &p, pklen)) == NULL) { DHerr(DH_F_DH_PUB_DECODE, DH_R_DECODE_ERROR); goto err; } /* We have parameters now set public key */ if ((dh->pub_key = ASN1_INTEGER_to_BN(public_key, NULL)) == NULL) { DHerr(DH_F_DH_PUB_DECODE, DH_R_BN_DECODE_ERROR); goto err; } ASN1_INTEGER_free(public_key); EVP_PKEY_assign(pkey, pkey->ameth->pkey_id, dh); return 1; err: ASN1_INTEGER_free(public_key); DH_free(dh); return 0; } static int dh_pub_encode(X509_PUBKEY *pk, const EVP_PKEY *pkey) { DH *dh; int ptype; unsigned char *penc = NULL; int penclen; ASN1_STRING *str; ASN1_INTEGER *pub_key = NULL; dh = pkey->pkey.dh; str = ASN1_STRING_new(); if (str == NULL) { DHerr(DH_F_DH_PUB_ENCODE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } str->length = i2d_dhp(pkey, dh, &str->data); if (str->length <= 0) { DHerr(DH_F_DH_PUB_ENCODE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } ptype = V_ASN1_SEQUENCE; pub_key = BN_to_ASN1_INTEGER(dh->pub_key, NULL); if (!pub_key) goto err; penclen = i2d_ASN1_INTEGER(pub_key, &penc); ASN1_INTEGER_free(pub_key); if (penclen <= 0) { DHerr(DH_F_DH_PUB_ENCODE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } if (X509_PUBKEY_set0_param(pk, OBJ_nid2obj(pkey->ameth->pkey_id), ptype, str, penc, penclen)) return 1; err: OPENSSL_free(penc); ASN1_STRING_free(str); return 0; } /* * PKCS#8 DH is defined in PKCS#11 of all places. It is similar to DH in that * the AlgorithmIdentifier contains the parameters, the private key is * explicitly included and the pubkey must be recalculated. */ static int dh_priv_decode(EVP_PKEY *pkey, const PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8) { const unsigned char *p, *pm; int pklen, pmlen; int ptype; const void *pval; const ASN1_STRING *pstr; const X509_ALGOR *palg; ASN1_INTEGER *privkey = NULL; DH *dh = NULL; if (!PKCS8_pkey_get0(NULL, &p, &pklen, &palg, p8)) return 0; X509_ALGOR_get0(NULL, &ptype, &pval, palg); if (ptype != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE) goto decerr; if ((privkey = d2i_ASN1_INTEGER(NULL, &p, pklen)) == NULL) goto decerr; pstr = pval; pm = pstr->data; pmlen = pstr->length; if ((dh = d2i_dhp(pkey, &pm, pmlen)) == NULL) goto decerr; /* We have parameters now set private key */ if ((dh->priv_key = BN_secure_new()) == NULL || !ASN1_INTEGER_to_BN(privkey, dh->priv_key)) { DHerr(DH_F_DH_PRIV_DECODE, DH_R_BN_ERROR); goto dherr; } /* Calculate public key */ if (!DH_generate_key(dh)) goto dherr; EVP_PKEY_assign(pkey, pkey->ameth->pkey_id, dh); ASN1_STRING_clear_free(privkey); return 1; decerr: DHerr(DH_F_DH_PRIV_DECODE, EVP_R_DECODE_ERROR); dherr: DH_free(dh); ASN1_STRING_clear_free(privkey); return 0; } static int dh_priv_encode(PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8, const EVP_PKEY *pkey) { ASN1_STRING *params = NULL; ASN1_INTEGER *prkey = NULL; unsigned char *dp = NULL; int dplen; params = ASN1_STRING_new(); if (params == NULL) { DHerr(DH_F_DH_PRIV_ENCODE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } params->length = i2d_dhp(pkey, pkey->pkey.dh, ¶ms->data); if (params->length <= 0) { DHerr(DH_F_DH_PRIV_ENCODE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } params->type = V_ASN1_SEQUENCE; /* Get private key into integer */ prkey = BN_to_ASN1_INTEGER(pkey->pkey.dh->priv_key, NULL); if (!prkey) { DHerr(DH_F_DH_PRIV_ENCODE, DH_R_BN_ERROR); goto err; } dplen = i2d_ASN1_INTEGER(prkey, &dp); ASN1_STRING_clear_free(prkey); prkey = NULL; if (!PKCS8_pkey_set0(p8, OBJ_nid2obj(pkey->ameth->pkey_id), 0, V_ASN1_SEQUENCE, params, dp, dplen)) goto err; return 1; err: OPENSSL_free(dp); ASN1_STRING_free(params); ASN1_STRING_clear_free(prkey); return 0; } static int dh_param_decode(EVP_PKEY *pkey, const unsigned char **pder, int derlen) { DH *dh; if ((dh = d2i_dhp(pkey, pder, derlen)) == NULL) { DHerr(DH_F_DH_PARAM_DECODE, ERR_R_DH_LIB); return 0; } EVP_PKEY_assign(pkey, pkey->ameth->pkey_id, dh); return 1; } static int dh_param_encode(const EVP_PKEY *pkey, unsigned char **pder) { return i2d_dhp(pkey, pkey->pkey.dh, pder); } static int do_dh_print(BIO *bp, const DH *x, int indent, int ptype) { int reason = ERR_R_BUF_LIB; const char *ktype = NULL; BIGNUM *priv_key, *pub_key; if (ptype == 2) priv_key = x->priv_key; else priv_key = NULL; if (ptype > 0) pub_key = x->pub_key; else pub_key = NULL; if (x->p == NULL || (ptype == 2 && priv_key == NULL) || (ptype > 0 && pub_key == NULL)) { reason = ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER; goto err; } if (ptype == 2) ktype = "DH Private-Key"; else if (ptype == 1) ktype = "DH Public-Key"; else ktype = "DH Parameters"; BIO_indent(bp, indent, 128); if (BIO_printf(bp, "%s: (%d bit)\n", ktype, BN_num_bits(x->p)) <= 0) goto err; indent += 4; if (!ASN1_bn_print(bp, "private-key:", priv_key, NULL, indent)) goto err; if (!ASN1_bn_print(bp, "public-key:", pub_key, NULL, indent)) goto err; if (!ASN1_bn_print(bp, "prime:", x->p, NULL, indent)) goto err; if (!ASN1_bn_print(bp, "generator:", x->g, NULL, indent)) goto err; if (x->q && !ASN1_bn_print(bp, "subgroup order:", x->q, NULL, indent)) goto err; if (x->j && !ASN1_bn_print(bp, "subgroup factor:", x->j, NULL, indent)) goto err; if (x->seed) { int i; BIO_indent(bp, indent, 128); BIO_puts(bp, "seed:"); for (i = 0; i < x->seedlen; i++) { if ((i % 15) == 0) { if (BIO_puts(bp, "\n") <= 0 || !BIO_indent(bp, indent + 4, 128)) goto err; } if (BIO_printf(bp, "%02x%s", x->seed[i], ((i + 1) == x->seedlen) ? "" : ":") <= 0) goto err; } if (BIO_write(bp, "\n", 1) <= 0) return 0; } if (x->counter && !ASN1_bn_print(bp, "counter:", x->counter, NULL, indent)) goto err; if (x->length != 0) { BIO_indent(bp, indent, 128); if (BIO_printf(bp, "recommended-private-length: %d bits\n", (int)x->length) <= 0) goto err; } return 1; err: DHerr(DH_F_DO_DH_PRINT, reason); return 0; } static int int_dh_size(const EVP_PKEY *pkey) { return DH_size(pkey->pkey.dh); } static int dh_bits(const EVP_PKEY *pkey) { return BN_num_bits(pkey->pkey.dh->p); } static int dh_security_bits(const EVP_PKEY *pkey) { return DH_security_bits(pkey->pkey.dh); } static int dh_cmp_parameters(const EVP_PKEY *a, const EVP_PKEY *b) { if (BN_cmp(a->pkey.dh->p, b->pkey.dh->p) || BN_cmp(a->pkey.dh->g, b->pkey.dh->g)) return 0; else if (a->ameth == &dhx_asn1_meth) { if (BN_cmp(a->pkey.dh->q, b->pkey.dh->q)) return 0; } return 1; } static int int_dh_bn_cpy(BIGNUM **dst, const BIGNUM *src) { BIGNUM *a; /* * If source is read only just copy the pointer, so * we don't have to reallocate it. */ if (src == NULL) a = NULL; else if (BN_get_flags(src, BN_FLG_STATIC_DATA) && !BN_get_flags(src, BN_FLG_MALLOCED)) a = (BIGNUM *)src; else if ((a = BN_dup(src)) == NULL) return 0; BN_clear_free(*dst); *dst = a; return 1; } static int int_dh_param_copy(DH *to, const DH *from, int is_x942) { if (is_x942 == -1) is_x942 = ! !from->q; if (!int_dh_bn_cpy(&to->p, from->p)) return 0; if (!int_dh_bn_cpy(&to->g, from->g)) return 0; if (is_x942) { if (!int_dh_bn_cpy(&to->q, from->q)) return 0; if (!int_dh_bn_cpy(&to->j, from->j)) return 0; OPENSSL_free(to->seed); to->seed = NULL; to->seedlen = 0; if (from->seed) { to->seed = OPENSSL_memdup(from->seed, from->seedlen); if (!to->seed) return 0; to->seedlen = from->seedlen; } } else to->length = from->length; return 1; } DH *DHparams_dup(DH *dh) { DH *ret; ret = DH_new(); if (ret == NULL) return NULL; if (!int_dh_param_copy(ret, dh, -1)) { DH_free(ret); return NULL; } return ret; } static int dh_copy_parameters(EVP_PKEY *to, const EVP_PKEY *from) { if (to->pkey.dh == NULL) { to->pkey.dh = DH_new(); if (to->pkey.dh == NULL) return 0; } return int_dh_param_copy(to->pkey.dh, from->pkey.dh, from->ameth == &dhx_asn1_meth); } static int dh_missing_parameters(const EVP_PKEY *a) { if (a->pkey.dh == NULL || a->pkey.dh->p == NULL || a->pkey.dh->g == NULL) return 1; return 0; } static int dh_pub_cmp(const EVP_PKEY *a, const EVP_PKEY *b) { if (dh_cmp_parameters(a, b) == 0) return 0; if (BN_cmp(b->pkey.dh->pub_key, a->pkey.dh->pub_key) != 0) return 0; else return 1; } static int dh_param_print(BIO *bp, const EVP_PKEY *pkey, int indent, ASN1_PCTX *ctx) { return do_dh_print(bp, pkey->pkey.dh, indent, 0); } static int dh_public_print(BIO *bp, const EVP_PKEY *pkey, int indent, ASN1_PCTX *ctx) { return do_dh_print(bp, pkey->pkey.dh, indent, 1); } static int dh_private_print(BIO *bp, const EVP_PKEY *pkey, int indent, ASN1_PCTX *ctx) { return do_dh_print(bp, pkey->pkey.dh, indent, 2); } int DHparams_print(BIO *bp, const DH *x) { return do_dh_print(bp, x, 4, 0); } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CMS static int dh_cms_decrypt(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri); static int dh_cms_encrypt(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri); #endif static int dh_pkey_ctrl(EVP_PKEY *pkey, int op, long arg1, void *arg2) { switch (op) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CMS case ASN1_PKEY_CTRL_CMS_ENVELOPE: if (arg1 == 1) return dh_cms_decrypt(arg2); else if (arg1 == 0) return dh_cms_encrypt(arg2); return -2; case ASN1_PKEY_CTRL_CMS_RI_TYPE: *(int *)arg2 = CMS_RECIPINFO_AGREE; return 1; #endif default: return -2; } } static int dh_pkey_public_check(const EVP_PKEY *pkey) { DH *dh = pkey->pkey.dh; if (dh->pub_key == NULL) { DHerr(DH_F_DH_PKEY_PUBLIC_CHECK, DH_R_MISSING_PUBKEY); return 0; } return DH_check_pub_key_ex(dh, dh->pub_key); } static int dh_pkey_param_check(const EVP_PKEY *pkey) { DH *dh = pkey->pkey.dh; return DH_check_ex(dh); } const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD dh_asn1_meth = { EVP_PKEY_DH, EVP_PKEY_DH, 0, "DH", "OpenSSL PKCS#3 DH method", dh_pub_decode, dh_pub_encode, dh_pub_cmp, dh_public_print, dh_priv_decode, dh_priv_encode, dh_private_print, int_dh_size, dh_bits, dh_security_bits, dh_param_decode, dh_param_encode, dh_missing_parameters, dh_copy_parameters, dh_cmp_parameters, dh_param_print, 0, int_dh_free, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, dh_pkey_public_check, dh_pkey_param_check }; const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD dhx_asn1_meth = { EVP_PKEY_DHX, EVP_PKEY_DHX, 0, "X9.42 DH", "OpenSSL X9.42 DH method", dh_pub_decode, dh_pub_encode, dh_pub_cmp, dh_public_print, dh_priv_decode, dh_priv_encode, dh_private_print, int_dh_size, dh_bits, dh_security_bits, dh_param_decode, dh_param_encode, dh_missing_parameters, dh_copy_parameters, dh_cmp_parameters, dh_param_print, 0, int_dh_free, dh_pkey_ctrl, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, dh_pkey_public_check, dh_pkey_param_check }; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CMS static int dh_cms_set_peerkey(EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx, X509_ALGOR *alg, ASN1_BIT_STRING *pubkey) { const ASN1_OBJECT *aoid; int atype; const void *aval; ASN1_INTEGER *public_key = NULL; int rv = 0; EVP_PKEY *pkpeer = NULL, *pk = NULL; DH *dhpeer = NULL; const unsigned char *p; int plen; X509_ALGOR_get0(&aoid, &atype, &aval, alg); if (OBJ_obj2nid(aoid) != NID_dhpublicnumber) goto err; /* Only absent parameters allowed in RFC XXXX */ if (atype != V_ASN1_UNDEF && atype == V_ASN1_NULL) goto err; pk = EVP_PKEY_CTX_get0_pkey(pctx); - if (!pk) - goto err; - if (pk->type != EVP_PKEY_DHX) + if (pk == NULL || pk->type != EVP_PKEY_DHX) goto err; + /* Get parameters from parent key */ dhpeer = DHparams_dup(pk->pkey.dh); + if (dhpeer == NULL) + goto err; + /* We have parameters now set public key */ plen = ASN1_STRING_length(pubkey); p = ASN1_STRING_get0_data(pubkey); - if (!p || !plen) + if (p == NULL || plen == 0) goto err; if ((public_key = d2i_ASN1_INTEGER(NULL, &p, plen)) == NULL) { DHerr(DH_F_DH_CMS_SET_PEERKEY, DH_R_DECODE_ERROR); goto err; } /* We have parameters now set public key */ if ((dhpeer->pub_key = ASN1_INTEGER_to_BN(public_key, NULL)) == NULL) { DHerr(DH_F_DH_CMS_SET_PEERKEY, DH_R_BN_DECODE_ERROR); goto err; } pkpeer = EVP_PKEY_new(); if (pkpeer == NULL) goto err; + EVP_PKEY_assign(pkpeer, pk->ameth->pkey_id, dhpeer); dhpeer = NULL; if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pctx, pkpeer) > 0) rv = 1; err: ASN1_INTEGER_free(public_key); EVP_PKEY_free(pkpeer); DH_free(dhpeer); return rv; } static int dh_cms_set_shared_info(EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx, CMS_RecipientInfo *ri) { int rv = 0; X509_ALGOR *alg, *kekalg = NULL; ASN1_OCTET_STRING *ukm; const unsigned char *p; unsigned char *dukm = NULL; size_t dukmlen = 0; int keylen, plen; const EVP_CIPHER *kekcipher; EVP_CIPHER_CTX *kekctx; if (!CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_get0_alg(ri, &alg, &ukm)) goto err; /* * For DH we only have one OID permissible. If ever any more get defined * we will need something cleverer. */ if (OBJ_obj2nid(alg->algorithm) != NID_id_smime_alg_ESDH) { DHerr(DH_F_DH_CMS_SET_SHARED_INFO, DH_R_KDF_PARAMETER_ERROR); goto err; } if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_dh_kdf_type(pctx, EVP_PKEY_DH_KDF_X9_42) <= 0) goto err; if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_dh_kdf_md(pctx, EVP_sha1()) <= 0) goto err; if (alg->parameter->type != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE) goto err; p = alg->parameter->value.sequence->data; plen = alg->parameter->value.sequence->length; kekalg = d2i_X509_ALGOR(NULL, &p, plen); if (!kekalg) goto err; kekctx = CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_get0_ctx(ri); if (!kekctx) goto err; kekcipher = EVP_get_cipherbyobj(kekalg->algorithm); if (!kekcipher || EVP_CIPHER_mode(kekcipher) != EVP_CIPH_WRAP_MODE) goto err; if (!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(kekctx, kekcipher, NULL, NULL, NULL)) goto err; if (EVP_CIPHER_asn1_to_param(kekctx, kekalg->parameter) <= 0) goto err; keylen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(kekctx); if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_dh_kdf_outlen(pctx, keylen) <= 0) goto err; /* Use OBJ_nid2obj to ensure we use built in OID that isn't freed */ if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set0_dh_kdf_oid(pctx, OBJ_nid2obj(EVP_CIPHER_type(kekcipher))) <= 0) goto err; if (ukm) { dukmlen = ASN1_STRING_length(ukm); dukm = OPENSSL_memdup(ASN1_STRING_get0_data(ukm), dukmlen); if (!dukm) goto err; } if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set0_dh_kdf_ukm(pctx, dukm, dukmlen) <= 0) goto err; dukm = NULL; rv = 1; err: X509_ALGOR_free(kekalg); OPENSSL_free(dukm); return rv; } static int dh_cms_decrypt(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri) { EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx; pctx = CMS_RecipientInfo_get0_pkey_ctx(ri); if (!pctx) return 0; /* See if we need to set peer key */ if (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_get0_peerkey(pctx)) { X509_ALGOR *alg; ASN1_BIT_STRING *pubkey; if (!CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_get0_orig_id(ri, &alg, &pubkey, NULL, NULL, NULL)) return 0; if (!alg || !pubkey) return 0; if (!dh_cms_set_peerkey(pctx, alg, pubkey)) { DHerr(DH_F_DH_CMS_DECRYPT, DH_R_PEER_KEY_ERROR); return 0; } } /* Set DH derivation parameters and initialise unwrap context */ if (!dh_cms_set_shared_info(pctx, ri)) { DHerr(DH_F_DH_CMS_DECRYPT, DH_R_SHARED_INFO_ERROR); return 0; } return 1; } static int dh_cms_encrypt(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri) { EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx; EVP_PKEY *pkey; EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx; int keylen; X509_ALGOR *talg, *wrap_alg = NULL; const ASN1_OBJECT *aoid; ASN1_BIT_STRING *pubkey; ASN1_STRING *wrap_str; ASN1_OCTET_STRING *ukm; unsigned char *penc = NULL, *dukm = NULL; int penclen; size_t dukmlen = 0; int rv = 0; int kdf_type, wrap_nid; const EVP_MD *kdf_md; pctx = CMS_RecipientInfo_get0_pkey_ctx(ri); if (!pctx) return 0; /* Get ephemeral key */ pkey = EVP_PKEY_CTX_get0_pkey(pctx); if (!CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_get0_orig_id(ri, &talg, &pubkey, NULL, NULL, NULL)) goto err; X509_ALGOR_get0(&aoid, NULL, NULL, talg); /* Is everything uninitialised? */ if (aoid == OBJ_nid2obj(NID_undef)) { ASN1_INTEGER *pubk = BN_to_ASN1_INTEGER(pkey->pkey.dh->pub_key, NULL); if (!pubk) goto err; /* Set the key */ penclen = i2d_ASN1_INTEGER(pubk, &penc); ASN1_INTEGER_free(pubk); if (penclen <= 0) goto err; ASN1_STRING_set0(pubkey, penc, penclen); pubkey->flags &= ~(ASN1_STRING_FLAG_BITS_LEFT | 0x07); pubkey->flags |= ASN1_STRING_FLAG_BITS_LEFT; penc = NULL; X509_ALGOR_set0(talg, OBJ_nid2obj(NID_dhpublicnumber), V_ASN1_UNDEF, NULL); } /* See if custom parameters set */ kdf_type = EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_dh_kdf_type(pctx); if (kdf_type <= 0) goto err; if (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_dh_kdf_md(pctx, &kdf_md)) goto err; if (kdf_type == EVP_PKEY_DH_KDF_NONE) { kdf_type = EVP_PKEY_DH_KDF_X9_42; if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_dh_kdf_type(pctx, kdf_type) <= 0) goto err; } else if (kdf_type != EVP_PKEY_DH_KDF_X9_42) /* Unknown KDF */ goto err; if (kdf_md == NULL) { /* Only SHA1 supported */ kdf_md = EVP_sha1(); if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_dh_kdf_md(pctx, kdf_md) <= 0) goto err; } else if (EVP_MD_type(kdf_md) != NID_sha1) /* Unsupported digest */ goto err; if (!CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_get0_alg(ri, &talg, &ukm)) goto err; /* Get wrap NID */ ctx = CMS_RecipientInfo_kari_get0_ctx(ri); wrap_nid = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_type(ctx); if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set0_dh_kdf_oid(pctx, OBJ_nid2obj(wrap_nid)) <= 0) goto err; keylen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx); /* Package wrap algorithm in an AlgorithmIdentifier */ wrap_alg = X509_ALGOR_new(); if (wrap_alg == NULL) goto err; wrap_alg->algorithm = OBJ_nid2obj(wrap_nid); wrap_alg->parameter = ASN1_TYPE_new(); if (wrap_alg->parameter == NULL) goto err; if (EVP_CIPHER_param_to_asn1(ctx, wrap_alg->parameter) <= 0) goto err; if (ASN1_TYPE_get(wrap_alg->parameter) == NID_undef) { ASN1_TYPE_free(wrap_alg->parameter); wrap_alg->parameter = NULL; } if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_dh_kdf_outlen(pctx, keylen) <= 0) goto err; if (ukm) { dukmlen = ASN1_STRING_length(ukm); dukm = OPENSSL_memdup(ASN1_STRING_get0_data(ukm), dukmlen); if (!dukm) goto err; } if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set0_dh_kdf_ukm(pctx, dukm, dukmlen) <= 0) goto err; dukm = NULL; /* * Now need to wrap encoding of wrap AlgorithmIdentifier into parameter * of another AlgorithmIdentifier. */ penc = NULL; penclen = i2d_X509_ALGOR(wrap_alg, &penc); if (!penc || !penclen) goto err; wrap_str = ASN1_STRING_new(); if (wrap_str == NULL) goto err; ASN1_STRING_set0(wrap_str, penc, penclen); penc = NULL; X509_ALGOR_set0(talg, OBJ_nid2obj(NID_id_smime_alg_ESDH), V_ASN1_SEQUENCE, wrap_str); rv = 1; err: OPENSSL_free(penc); X509_ALGOR_free(wrap_alg); OPENSSL_free(dukm); return rv; } #endif diff --git a/crypto/ec/curve448/field.h b/crypto/ec/curve448/field.h index ccd04482d205..4e4eda664f78 100644 --- a/crypto/ec/curve448/field.h +++ b/crypto/ec/curve448/field.h @@ -1,168 +1,168 @@ /* - * Copyright 2017-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 2017-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * Copyright 2014 Cryptography Research, Inc. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html * * Originally written by Mike Hamburg */ #ifndef OSSL_CRYPTO_EC_CURVE448_FIELD_H # define OSSL_CRYPTO_EC_CURVE448_FIELD_H # include "internal/constant_time.h" # include # include # include "word.h" # define NLIMBS (64/sizeof(word_t)) # define X_SER_BYTES 56 # define SER_BYTES 56 # if defined(__GNUC__) || defined(__clang__) # define INLINE_UNUSED __inline__ __attribute__((__unused__,__always_inline__)) # define RESTRICT __restrict__ # define ALIGNED __attribute__((__aligned__(16))) # else # define INLINE_UNUSED ossl_inline # define RESTRICT # define ALIGNED # endif typedef struct gf_s { word_t limb[NLIMBS]; } ALIGNED gf_s, gf[1]; /* RFC 7748 support */ # define X_PUBLIC_BYTES X_SER_BYTES # define X_PRIVATE_BYTES X_PUBLIC_BYTES # define X_PRIVATE_BITS 448 static INLINE_UNUSED void gf_copy(gf out, const gf a) { *out = *a; } static INLINE_UNUSED void gf_add_RAW(gf out, const gf a, const gf b); static INLINE_UNUSED void gf_sub_RAW(gf out, const gf a, const gf b); static INLINE_UNUSED void gf_bias(gf inout, int amount); static INLINE_UNUSED void gf_weak_reduce(gf inout); void gf_strong_reduce(gf inout); void gf_add(gf out, const gf a, const gf b); void gf_sub(gf out, const gf a, const gf b); void gf_mul(gf_s * RESTRICT out, const gf a, const gf b); void gf_mulw_unsigned(gf_s * RESTRICT out, const gf a, uint32_t b); void gf_sqr(gf_s * RESTRICT out, const gf a); mask_t gf_isr(gf a, const gf x); /** a^2 x = 1, QNR, or 0 if x=0. Return true if successful */ mask_t gf_eq(const gf x, const gf y); mask_t gf_lobit(const gf x); mask_t gf_hibit(const gf x); -void gf_serialize(uint8_t *serial, const gf x, int with_highbit); +void gf_serialize(uint8_t serial[SER_BYTES], const gf x, int with_highbit); mask_t gf_deserialize(gf x, const uint8_t serial[SER_BYTES], int with_hibit, uint8_t hi_nmask); # include "f_impl.h" /* Bring in the inline implementations */ # define LIMBPERM(i) (i) # define LIMB_MASK(i) (((1)< 0); if (n & 1) { gf_sqr(y, x); n--; } else { gf_sqr(tmp, x); gf_sqr(y, tmp); n -= 2; } for (; n; n -= 2) { gf_sqr(tmp, y); gf_sqr(y, tmp); } } # define gf_add_nr gf_add_RAW /* Subtract mod p. Bias by 2 and don't reduce */ static ossl_inline void gf_sub_nr(gf c, const gf a, const gf b) { gf_sub_RAW(c, a, b); gf_bias(c, 2); if (GF_HEADROOM < 3) gf_weak_reduce(c); } /* Subtract mod p. Bias by amt but don't reduce. */ static ossl_inline void gf_subx_nr(gf c, const gf a, const gf b, int amt) { gf_sub_RAW(c, a, b); gf_bias(c, amt); if (GF_HEADROOM < amt + 1) gf_weak_reduce(c); } /* Mul by signed int. Not constant-time WRT the sign of that int. */ static ossl_inline void gf_mulw(gf c, const gf a, int32_t w) { if (w > 0) { gf_mulw_unsigned(c, a, w); } else { gf_mulw_unsigned(c, a, -w); gf_sub(c, ZERO, c); } } /* Constant time, x = is_z ? z : y */ static ossl_inline void gf_cond_sel(gf x, const gf y, const gf z, mask_t is_z) { size_t i; for (i = 0; i < NLIMBS; i++) { #if ARCH_WORD_BITS == 32 x[0].limb[i] = constant_time_select_32(is_z, z[0].limb[i], y[0].limb[i]); #else /* Must be 64 bit */ x[0].limb[i] = constant_time_select_64(is_z, z[0].limb[i], y[0].limb[i]); #endif } } /* Constant time, if (neg) x=-x; */ static ossl_inline void gf_cond_neg(gf x, mask_t neg) { gf y; gf_sub(y, ZERO, x); gf_cond_sel(x, x, y, neg); } /* Constant time, if (swap) (x,y) = (y,x); */ static ossl_inline void gf_cond_swap(gf x, gf_s * RESTRICT y, mask_t swap) { size_t i; for (i = 0; i < NLIMBS; i++) { #if ARCH_WORD_BITS == 32 constant_time_cond_swap_32(swap, &(x[0].limb[i]), &(y->limb[i])); #else /* Must be 64 bit */ constant_time_cond_swap_64(swap, &(x[0].limb[i]), &(y->limb[i])); #endif } } #endif /* OSSL_CRYPTO_EC_CURVE448_FIELD_H */ diff --git a/crypto/ec/ec_asn1.c b/crypto/ec/ec_asn1.c index c8ee1e6f1762..4335b3da1a54 100644 --- a/crypto/ec/ec_asn1.c +++ b/crypto/ec/ec_asn1.c @@ -1,1328 +1,1328 @@ /* * Copyright 2002-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "ec_local.h" #include #include #include #include "internal/nelem.h" int EC_GROUP_get_basis_type(const EC_GROUP *group) { int i; if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(EC_GROUP_method_of(group)) != NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field) /* everything else is currently not supported */ return 0; /* Find the last non-zero element of group->poly[] */ for (i = 0; i < (int)OSSL_NELEM(group->poly) && group->poly[i] != 0; i++) continue; if (i == 4) return NID_X9_62_ppBasis; else if (i == 2) return NID_X9_62_tpBasis; else /* everything else is currently not supported */ return 0; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M int EC_GROUP_get_trinomial_basis(const EC_GROUP *group, unsigned int *k) { if (group == NULL) return 0; if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(EC_GROUP_method_of(group)) != NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field || !((group->poly[0] != 0) && (group->poly[1] != 0) && (group->poly[2] == 0))) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_GET_TRINOMIAL_BASIS, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); return 0; } if (k) *k = group->poly[1]; return 1; } int EC_GROUP_get_pentanomial_basis(const EC_GROUP *group, unsigned int *k1, unsigned int *k2, unsigned int *k3) { if (group == NULL) return 0; if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(EC_GROUP_method_of(group)) != NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field || !((group->poly[0] != 0) && (group->poly[1] != 0) && (group->poly[2] != 0) && (group->poly[3] != 0) && (group->poly[4] == 0))) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_GET_PENTANOMIAL_BASIS, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); return 0; } if (k1) *k1 = group->poly[3]; if (k2) *k2 = group->poly[2]; if (k3) *k3 = group->poly[1]; return 1; } #endif /* some structures needed for the asn1 encoding */ typedef struct x9_62_pentanomial_st { int32_t k1; int32_t k2; int32_t k3; } X9_62_PENTANOMIAL; typedef struct x9_62_characteristic_two_st { int32_t m; ASN1_OBJECT *type; union { char *ptr; /* NID_X9_62_onBasis */ ASN1_NULL *onBasis; /* NID_X9_62_tpBasis */ ASN1_INTEGER *tpBasis; /* NID_X9_62_ppBasis */ X9_62_PENTANOMIAL *ppBasis; /* anything else */ ASN1_TYPE *other; } p; } X9_62_CHARACTERISTIC_TWO; typedef struct x9_62_fieldid_st { ASN1_OBJECT *fieldType; union { char *ptr; /* NID_X9_62_prime_field */ ASN1_INTEGER *prime; /* NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field */ X9_62_CHARACTERISTIC_TWO *char_two; /* anything else */ ASN1_TYPE *other; } p; } X9_62_FIELDID; typedef struct x9_62_curve_st { ASN1_OCTET_STRING *a; ASN1_OCTET_STRING *b; ASN1_BIT_STRING *seed; } X9_62_CURVE; struct ec_parameters_st { int32_t version; X9_62_FIELDID *fieldID; X9_62_CURVE *curve; ASN1_OCTET_STRING *base; ASN1_INTEGER *order; ASN1_INTEGER *cofactor; } /* ECPARAMETERS */ ; typedef enum { ECPKPARAMETERS_TYPE_NAMED = 0, ECPKPARAMETERS_TYPE_EXPLICIT, ECPKPARAMETERS_TYPE_IMPLICIT } ecpk_parameters_type_t; struct ecpk_parameters_st { int type; union { ASN1_OBJECT *named_curve; ECPARAMETERS *parameters; ASN1_NULL *implicitlyCA; } value; } /* ECPKPARAMETERS */ ; /* SEC1 ECPrivateKey */ typedef struct ec_privatekey_st { int32_t version; ASN1_OCTET_STRING *privateKey; ECPKPARAMETERS *parameters; ASN1_BIT_STRING *publicKey; } EC_PRIVATEKEY; /* the OpenSSL ASN.1 definitions */ ASN1_SEQUENCE(X9_62_PENTANOMIAL) = { ASN1_EMBED(X9_62_PENTANOMIAL, k1, INT32), ASN1_EMBED(X9_62_PENTANOMIAL, k2, INT32), ASN1_EMBED(X9_62_PENTANOMIAL, k3, INT32) } static_ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(X9_62_PENTANOMIAL) DECLARE_ASN1_ALLOC_FUNCTIONS(X9_62_PENTANOMIAL) IMPLEMENT_ASN1_ALLOC_FUNCTIONS(X9_62_PENTANOMIAL) ASN1_ADB_TEMPLATE(char_two_def) = ASN1_SIMPLE(X9_62_CHARACTERISTIC_TWO, p.other, ASN1_ANY); ASN1_ADB(X9_62_CHARACTERISTIC_TWO) = { ADB_ENTRY(NID_X9_62_onBasis, ASN1_SIMPLE(X9_62_CHARACTERISTIC_TWO, p.onBasis, ASN1_NULL)), ADB_ENTRY(NID_X9_62_tpBasis, ASN1_SIMPLE(X9_62_CHARACTERISTIC_TWO, p.tpBasis, ASN1_INTEGER)), ADB_ENTRY(NID_X9_62_ppBasis, ASN1_SIMPLE(X9_62_CHARACTERISTIC_TWO, p.ppBasis, X9_62_PENTANOMIAL)) } ASN1_ADB_END(X9_62_CHARACTERISTIC_TWO, 0, type, 0, &char_two_def_tt, NULL); ASN1_SEQUENCE(X9_62_CHARACTERISTIC_TWO) = { ASN1_EMBED(X9_62_CHARACTERISTIC_TWO, m, INT32), ASN1_SIMPLE(X9_62_CHARACTERISTIC_TWO, type, ASN1_OBJECT), ASN1_ADB_OBJECT(X9_62_CHARACTERISTIC_TWO) } static_ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(X9_62_CHARACTERISTIC_TWO) DECLARE_ASN1_ALLOC_FUNCTIONS(X9_62_CHARACTERISTIC_TWO) IMPLEMENT_ASN1_ALLOC_FUNCTIONS(X9_62_CHARACTERISTIC_TWO) ASN1_ADB_TEMPLATE(fieldID_def) = ASN1_SIMPLE(X9_62_FIELDID, p.other, ASN1_ANY); ASN1_ADB(X9_62_FIELDID) = { ADB_ENTRY(NID_X9_62_prime_field, ASN1_SIMPLE(X9_62_FIELDID, p.prime, ASN1_INTEGER)), ADB_ENTRY(NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field, ASN1_SIMPLE(X9_62_FIELDID, p.char_two, X9_62_CHARACTERISTIC_TWO)) } ASN1_ADB_END(X9_62_FIELDID, 0, fieldType, 0, &fieldID_def_tt, NULL); ASN1_SEQUENCE(X9_62_FIELDID) = { ASN1_SIMPLE(X9_62_FIELDID, fieldType, ASN1_OBJECT), ASN1_ADB_OBJECT(X9_62_FIELDID) } static_ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(X9_62_FIELDID) ASN1_SEQUENCE(X9_62_CURVE) = { ASN1_SIMPLE(X9_62_CURVE, a, ASN1_OCTET_STRING), ASN1_SIMPLE(X9_62_CURVE, b, ASN1_OCTET_STRING), ASN1_OPT(X9_62_CURVE, seed, ASN1_BIT_STRING) } static_ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(X9_62_CURVE) ASN1_SEQUENCE(ECPARAMETERS) = { ASN1_EMBED(ECPARAMETERS, version, INT32), ASN1_SIMPLE(ECPARAMETERS, fieldID, X9_62_FIELDID), ASN1_SIMPLE(ECPARAMETERS, curve, X9_62_CURVE), ASN1_SIMPLE(ECPARAMETERS, base, ASN1_OCTET_STRING), ASN1_SIMPLE(ECPARAMETERS, order, ASN1_INTEGER), ASN1_OPT(ECPARAMETERS, cofactor, ASN1_INTEGER) } ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(ECPARAMETERS) DECLARE_ASN1_ALLOC_FUNCTIONS(ECPARAMETERS) IMPLEMENT_ASN1_ALLOC_FUNCTIONS(ECPARAMETERS) ASN1_CHOICE(ECPKPARAMETERS) = { ASN1_SIMPLE(ECPKPARAMETERS, value.named_curve, ASN1_OBJECT), ASN1_SIMPLE(ECPKPARAMETERS, value.parameters, ECPARAMETERS), ASN1_SIMPLE(ECPKPARAMETERS, value.implicitlyCA, ASN1_NULL) } ASN1_CHOICE_END(ECPKPARAMETERS) DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS_const(ECPKPARAMETERS) DECLARE_ASN1_ENCODE_FUNCTIONS_const(ECPKPARAMETERS, ECPKPARAMETERS) IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS_const(ECPKPARAMETERS) ASN1_SEQUENCE(EC_PRIVATEKEY) = { ASN1_EMBED(EC_PRIVATEKEY, version, INT32), ASN1_SIMPLE(EC_PRIVATEKEY, privateKey, ASN1_OCTET_STRING), ASN1_EXP_OPT(EC_PRIVATEKEY, parameters, ECPKPARAMETERS, 0), ASN1_EXP_OPT(EC_PRIVATEKEY, publicKey, ASN1_BIT_STRING, 1) } static_ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(EC_PRIVATEKEY) DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS_const(EC_PRIVATEKEY) DECLARE_ASN1_ENCODE_FUNCTIONS_const(EC_PRIVATEKEY, EC_PRIVATEKEY) IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS_const(EC_PRIVATEKEY) /* some declarations of internal function */ /* ec_asn1_group2field() sets the values in a X9_62_FIELDID object */ static int ec_asn1_group2fieldid(const EC_GROUP *, X9_62_FIELDID *); /* ec_asn1_group2curve() sets the values in a X9_62_CURVE object */ static int ec_asn1_group2curve(const EC_GROUP *, X9_62_CURVE *); /* the function definitions */ static int ec_asn1_group2fieldid(const EC_GROUP *group, X9_62_FIELDID *field) { int ok = 0, nid; BIGNUM *tmp = NULL; if (group == NULL || field == NULL) return 0; /* clear the old values (if necessary) */ ASN1_OBJECT_free(field->fieldType); ASN1_TYPE_free(field->p.other); nid = EC_METHOD_get_field_type(EC_GROUP_method_of(group)); /* set OID for the field */ if ((field->fieldType = OBJ_nid2obj(nid)) == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_GROUP2FIELDID, ERR_R_OBJ_LIB); goto err; } if (nid == NID_X9_62_prime_field) { if ((tmp = BN_new()) == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_GROUP2FIELDID, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } /* the parameters are specified by the prime number p */ if (!EC_GROUP_get_curve(group, tmp, NULL, NULL, NULL)) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_GROUP2FIELDID, ERR_R_EC_LIB); goto err; } /* set the prime number */ field->p.prime = BN_to_ASN1_INTEGER(tmp, NULL); if (field->p.prime == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_GROUP2FIELDID, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB); goto err; } } else if (nid == NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field) #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M { ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_GROUP2FIELDID, EC_R_GF2M_NOT_SUPPORTED); goto err; } #else { int field_type; X9_62_CHARACTERISTIC_TWO *char_two; field->p.char_two = X9_62_CHARACTERISTIC_TWO_new(); char_two = field->p.char_two; if (char_two == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_GROUP2FIELDID, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } char_two->m = (long)EC_GROUP_get_degree(group); field_type = EC_GROUP_get_basis_type(group); if (field_type == 0) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_GROUP2FIELDID, ERR_R_EC_LIB); goto err; } /* set base type OID */ if ((char_two->type = OBJ_nid2obj(field_type)) == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_GROUP2FIELDID, ERR_R_OBJ_LIB); goto err; } if (field_type == NID_X9_62_tpBasis) { unsigned int k; if (!EC_GROUP_get_trinomial_basis(group, &k)) goto err; char_two->p.tpBasis = ASN1_INTEGER_new(); if (char_two->p.tpBasis == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_GROUP2FIELDID, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } if (!ASN1_INTEGER_set(char_two->p.tpBasis, (long)k)) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_GROUP2FIELDID, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB); goto err; } } else if (field_type == NID_X9_62_ppBasis) { unsigned int k1, k2, k3; if (!EC_GROUP_get_pentanomial_basis(group, &k1, &k2, &k3)) goto err; char_two->p.ppBasis = X9_62_PENTANOMIAL_new(); if (char_two->p.ppBasis == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_GROUP2FIELDID, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } /* set k? values */ char_two->p.ppBasis->k1 = (long)k1; char_two->p.ppBasis->k2 = (long)k2; char_two->p.ppBasis->k3 = (long)k3; } else { /* field_type == NID_X9_62_onBasis */ /* for ONB the parameters are (asn1) NULL */ char_two->p.onBasis = ASN1_NULL_new(); if (char_two->p.onBasis == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_GROUP2FIELDID, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } } } #endif else { ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_GROUP2FIELDID, EC_R_UNSUPPORTED_FIELD); goto err; } ok = 1; err: BN_free(tmp); return ok; } static int ec_asn1_group2curve(const EC_GROUP *group, X9_62_CURVE *curve) { int ok = 0; BIGNUM *tmp_1 = NULL, *tmp_2 = NULL; unsigned char *a_buf = NULL, *b_buf = NULL; size_t len; if (!group || !curve || !curve->a || !curve->b) return 0; if ((tmp_1 = BN_new()) == NULL || (tmp_2 = BN_new()) == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_GROUP2CURVE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } /* get a and b */ if (!EC_GROUP_get_curve(group, NULL, tmp_1, tmp_2, NULL)) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_GROUP2CURVE, ERR_R_EC_LIB); goto err; } /* * Per SEC 1, the curve coefficients must be padded up to size. See C.2's * definition of Curve, C.1's definition of FieldElement, and 2.3.5's * definition of how to encode the field elements. */ len = ((size_t)EC_GROUP_get_degree(group) + 7) / 8; if ((a_buf = OPENSSL_malloc(len)) == NULL || (b_buf = OPENSSL_malloc(len)) == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_GROUP2CURVE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } if (BN_bn2binpad(tmp_1, a_buf, len) < 0 || BN_bn2binpad(tmp_2, b_buf, len) < 0) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_GROUP2CURVE, ERR_R_BN_LIB); goto err; } /* set a and b */ if (!ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(curve->a, a_buf, len) || !ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(curve->b, b_buf, len)) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_GROUP2CURVE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB); goto err; } /* set the seed (optional) */ if (group->seed) { if (!curve->seed) if ((curve->seed = ASN1_BIT_STRING_new()) == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_GROUP2CURVE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } curve->seed->flags &= ~(ASN1_STRING_FLAG_BITS_LEFT | 0x07); curve->seed->flags |= ASN1_STRING_FLAG_BITS_LEFT; if (!ASN1_BIT_STRING_set(curve->seed, group->seed, (int)group->seed_len)) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_ASN1_GROUP2CURVE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB); goto err; } } else { ASN1_BIT_STRING_free(curve->seed); curve->seed = NULL; } ok = 1; err: OPENSSL_free(a_buf); OPENSSL_free(b_buf); BN_free(tmp_1); BN_free(tmp_2); return ok; } ECPARAMETERS *EC_GROUP_get_ecparameters(const EC_GROUP *group, ECPARAMETERS *params) { size_t len = 0; ECPARAMETERS *ret = NULL; const BIGNUM *tmp; unsigned char *buffer = NULL; const EC_POINT *point = NULL; point_conversion_form_t form; ASN1_INTEGER *orig; if (params == NULL) { if ((ret = ECPARAMETERS_new()) == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_GET_ECPARAMETERS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } } else ret = params; /* set the version (always one) */ ret->version = (long)0x1; /* set the fieldID */ if (!ec_asn1_group2fieldid(group, ret->fieldID)) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_GET_ECPARAMETERS, ERR_R_EC_LIB); goto err; } /* set the curve */ if (!ec_asn1_group2curve(group, ret->curve)) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_GET_ECPARAMETERS, ERR_R_EC_LIB); goto err; } /* set the base point */ if ((point = EC_GROUP_get0_generator(group)) == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_GET_ECPARAMETERS, EC_R_UNDEFINED_GENERATOR); goto err; } form = EC_GROUP_get_point_conversion_form(group); len = EC_POINT_point2buf(group, point, form, &buffer, NULL); if (len == 0) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_GET_ECPARAMETERS, ERR_R_EC_LIB); goto err; } if (ret->base == NULL && (ret->base = ASN1_OCTET_STRING_new()) == NULL) { OPENSSL_free(buffer); ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_GET_ECPARAMETERS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } ASN1_STRING_set0(ret->base, buffer, len); /* set the order */ tmp = EC_GROUP_get0_order(group); if (tmp == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_GET_ECPARAMETERS, ERR_R_EC_LIB); goto err; } ret->order = BN_to_ASN1_INTEGER(tmp, orig = ret->order); if (ret->order == NULL) { ret->order = orig; ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_GET_ECPARAMETERS, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB); goto err; } /* set the cofactor (optional) */ tmp = EC_GROUP_get0_cofactor(group); if (tmp != NULL) { ret->cofactor = BN_to_ASN1_INTEGER(tmp, orig = ret->cofactor); if (ret->cofactor == NULL) { ret->cofactor = orig; ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_GET_ECPARAMETERS, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB); goto err; } } return ret; err: if (params == NULL) ECPARAMETERS_free(ret); return NULL; } ECPKPARAMETERS *EC_GROUP_get_ecpkparameters(const EC_GROUP *group, ECPKPARAMETERS *params) { int ok = 1, tmp; ECPKPARAMETERS *ret = params; if (ret == NULL) { if ((ret = ECPKPARAMETERS_new()) == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_GET_ECPKPARAMETERS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return NULL; } } else { if (ret->type == ECPKPARAMETERS_TYPE_NAMED) ASN1_OBJECT_free(ret->value.named_curve); else if (ret->type == ECPKPARAMETERS_TYPE_EXPLICIT && ret->value.parameters != NULL) ECPARAMETERS_free(ret->value.parameters); } - if (EC_GROUP_get_asn1_flag(group)) { + if (EC_GROUP_get_asn1_flag(group) == OPENSSL_EC_NAMED_CURVE) { /* * use the asn1 OID to describe the elliptic curve parameters */ tmp = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group); if (tmp) { ASN1_OBJECT *asn1obj = OBJ_nid2obj(tmp); if (asn1obj == NULL || OBJ_length(asn1obj) == 0) { ASN1_OBJECT_free(asn1obj); ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_GET_ECPKPARAMETERS, EC_R_MISSING_OID); ok = 0; } else { ret->type = ECPKPARAMETERS_TYPE_NAMED; ret->value.named_curve = asn1obj; } } else /* we don't know the nid => ERROR */ ok = 0; } else { /* use the ECPARAMETERS structure */ ret->type = ECPKPARAMETERS_TYPE_EXPLICIT; if ((ret->value.parameters = EC_GROUP_get_ecparameters(group, NULL)) == NULL) ok = 0; } if (!ok) { ECPKPARAMETERS_free(ret); return NULL; } return ret; } EC_GROUP *EC_GROUP_new_from_ecparameters(const ECPARAMETERS *params) { int ok = 0, tmp; EC_GROUP *ret = NULL, *dup = NULL; BIGNUM *p = NULL, *a = NULL, *b = NULL; EC_POINT *point = NULL; long field_bits; int curve_name = NID_undef; BN_CTX *ctx = NULL; if (!params->fieldID || !params->fieldID->fieldType || !params->fieldID->p.ptr) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_ECPARAMETERS, EC_R_ASN1_ERROR); goto err; } /* * Now extract the curve parameters a and b. Note that, although SEC 1 * specifies the length of their encodings, historical versions of OpenSSL * encoded them incorrectly, so we must accept any length for backwards * compatibility. */ if (!params->curve || !params->curve->a || !params->curve->a->data || !params->curve->b || !params->curve->b->data) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_ECPARAMETERS, EC_R_ASN1_ERROR); goto err; } a = BN_bin2bn(params->curve->a->data, params->curve->a->length, NULL); if (a == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_ECPARAMETERS, ERR_R_BN_LIB); goto err; } b = BN_bin2bn(params->curve->b->data, params->curve->b->length, NULL); if (b == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_ECPARAMETERS, ERR_R_BN_LIB); goto err; } /* get the field parameters */ tmp = OBJ_obj2nid(params->fieldID->fieldType); if (tmp == NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field) #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_ECPARAMETERS, EC_R_GF2M_NOT_SUPPORTED); goto err; } #else { X9_62_CHARACTERISTIC_TWO *char_two; char_two = params->fieldID->p.char_two; field_bits = char_two->m; if (field_bits > OPENSSL_ECC_MAX_FIELD_BITS) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_ECPARAMETERS, EC_R_FIELD_TOO_LARGE); goto err; } if ((p = BN_new()) == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_ECPARAMETERS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } /* get the base type */ tmp = OBJ_obj2nid(char_two->type); if (tmp == NID_X9_62_tpBasis) { long tmp_long; if (!char_two->p.tpBasis) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_ECPARAMETERS, EC_R_ASN1_ERROR); goto err; } tmp_long = ASN1_INTEGER_get(char_two->p.tpBasis); if (!(char_two->m > tmp_long && tmp_long > 0)) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_ECPARAMETERS, EC_R_INVALID_TRINOMIAL_BASIS); goto err; } /* create the polynomial */ if (!BN_set_bit(p, (int)char_two->m)) goto err; if (!BN_set_bit(p, (int)tmp_long)) goto err; if (!BN_set_bit(p, 0)) goto err; } else if (tmp == NID_X9_62_ppBasis) { X9_62_PENTANOMIAL *penta; penta = char_two->p.ppBasis; if (!penta) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_ECPARAMETERS, EC_R_ASN1_ERROR); goto err; } if (! (char_two->m > penta->k3 && penta->k3 > penta->k2 && penta->k2 > penta->k1 && penta->k1 > 0)) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_ECPARAMETERS, EC_R_INVALID_PENTANOMIAL_BASIS); goto err; } /* create the polynomial */ if (!BN_set_bit(p, (int)char_two->m)) goto err; if (!BN_set_bit(p, (int)penta->k1)) goto err; if (!BN_set_bit(p, (int)penta->k2)) goto err; if (!BN_set_bit(p, (int)penta->k3)) goto err; if (!BN_set_bit(p, 0)) goto err; } else if (tmp == NID_X9_62_onBasis) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_ECPARAMETERS, EC_R_NOT_IMPLEMENTED); goto err; } else { /* error */ ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_ECPARAMETERS, EC_R_ASN1_ERROR); goto err; } /* create the EC_GROUP structure */ ret = EC_GROUP_new_curve_GF2m(p, a, b, NULL); } #endif else if (tmp == NID_X9_62_prime_field) { /* we have a curve over a prime field */ /* extract the prime number */ if (!params->fieldID->p.prime) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_ECPARAMETERS, EC_R_ASN1_ERROR); goto err; } p = ASN1_INTEGER_to_BN(params->fieldID->p.prime, NULL); if (p == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_ECPARAMETERS, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB); goto err; } if (BN_is_negative(p) || BN_is_zero(p)) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_ECPARAMETERS, EC_R_INVALID_FIELD); goto err; } field_bits = BN_num_bits(p); if (field_bits > OPENSSL_ECC_MAX_FIELD_BITS) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_ECPARAMETERS, EC_R_FIELD_TOO_LARGE); goto err; } /* create the EC_GROUP structure */ ret = EC_GROUP_new_curve_GFp(p, a, b, NULL); } else { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_ECPARAMETERS, EC_R_INVALID_FIELD); goto err; } if (ret == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_ECPARAMETERS, ERR_R_EC_LIB); goto err; } /* extract seed (optional) */ if (params->curve->seed != NULL) { OPENSSL_free(ret->seed); if ((ret->seed = OPENSSL_malloc(params->curve->seed->length)) == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_ECPARAMETERS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } memcpy(ret->seed, params->curve->seed->data, params->curve->seed->length); ret->seed_len = params->curve->seed->length; } if (params->order == NULL || params->base == NULL || params->base->data == NULL || params->base->length == 0) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_ECPARAMETERS, EC_R_ASN1_ERROR); goto err; } if ((point = EC_POINT_new(ret)) == NULL) goto err; /* set the point conversion form */ EC_GROUP_set_point_conversion_form(ret, (point_conversion_form_t) (params->base->data[0] & ~0x01)); /* extract the ec point */ if (!EC_POINT_oct2point(ret, point, params->base->data, params->base->length, NULL)) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_ECPARAMETERS, ERR_R_EC_LIB); goto err; } /* extract the order */ if ((a = ASN1_INTEGER_to_BN(params->order, a)) == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_ECPARAMETERS, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB); goto err; } if (BN_is_negative(a) || BN_is_zero(a)) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_ECPARAMETERS, EC_R_INVALID_GROUP_ORDER); goto err; } if (BN_num_bits(a) > (int)field_bits + 1) { /* Hasse bound */ ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_ECPARAMETERS, EC_R_INVALID_GROUP_ORDER); goto err; } /* extract the cofactor (optional) */ if (params->cofactor == NULL) { BN_free(b); b = NULL; } else if ((b = ASN1_INTEGER_to_BN(params->cofactor, b)) == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_ECPARAMETERS, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB); goto err; } /* set the generator, order and cofactor (if present) */ if (!EC_GROUP_set_generator(ret, point, a, b)) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_ECPARAMETERS, ERR_R_EC_LIB); goto err; } /* * Check if the explicit parameters group just created matches one of the * built-in curves. * * We create a copy of the group just built, so that we can remove optional * fields for the lookup: we do this to avoid the possibility that one of * the optional parameters is used to force the library into using a less * performant and less secure EC_METHOD instead of the specialized one. * In any case, `seed` is not really used in any computation, while a * cofactor different from the one in the built-in table is just * mathematically wrong anyway and should not be used. */ if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_ECPARAMETERS, ERR_R_BN_LIB); goto err; } if ((dup = EC_GROUP_dup(ret)) == NULL || EC_GROUP_set_seed(dup, NULL, 0) != 1 || !EC_GROUP_set_generator(dup, point, a, NULL)) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_ECPARAMETERS, ERR_R_EC_LIB); goto err; } if ((curve_name = ec_curve_nid_from_params(dup, ctx)) != NID_undef) { /* * The input explicit parameters successfully matched one of the * built-in curves: often for built-in curves we have specialized * methods with better performance and hardening. * * In this case we replace the `EC_GROUP` created through explicit * parameters with one created from a named group. */ EC_GROUP *named_group = NULL; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC_NISTP_64_GCC_128 /* * NID_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls12 and NID_secp224r1 are both aliases for * the same curve, we prefer the SECP nid when matching explicit * parameters as that is associated with a specialized EC_METHOD. */ if (curve_name == NID_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls12) curve_name = NID_secp224r1; #endif /* !def(OPENSSL_NO_EC_NISTP_64_GCC_128) */ if ((named_group = EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(curve_name)) == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_ECPARAMETERS, ERR_R_EC_LIB); goto err; } EC_GROUP_free(ret); ret = named_group; /* * Set the flag so that EC_GROUPs created from explicit parameters are * serialized using explicit parameters by default. */ EC_GROUP_set_asn1_flag(ret, OPENSSL_EC_EXPLICIT_CURVE); /* * If the input params do not contain the optional seed field we make * sure it is not added to the returned group. * * The seed field is not really used inside libcrypto anyway, and * adding it to parsed explicit parameter keys would alter their DER * encoding output (because of the extra field) which could impact * applications fingerprinting keys by their DER encoding. */ if (params->curve->seed == NULL) { if (EC_GROUP_set_seed(ret, NULL, 0) != 1) goto err; } } ok = 1; err: if (!ok) { EC_GROUP_free(ret); ret = NULL; } EC_GROUP_free(dup); BN_free(p); BN_free(a); BN_free(b); EC_POINT_free(point); BN_CTX_free(ctx); return ret; } EC_GROUP *EC_GROUP_new_from_ecpkparameters(const ECPKPARAMETERS *params) { EC_GROUP *ret = NULL; int tmp = 0; if (params == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_ECPKPARAMETERS, EC_R_MISSING_PARAMETERS); return NULL; } if (params->type == ECPKPARAMETERS_TYPE_NAMED) { /* the curve is given by an OID */ tmp = OBJ_obj2nid(params->value.named_curve); if ((ret = EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(tmp)) == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_ECPKPARAMETERS, EC_R_EC_GROUP_NEW_BY_NAME_FAILURE); return NULL; } EC_GROUP_set_asn1_flag(ret, OPENSSL_EC_NAMED_CURVE); } else if (params->type == ECPKPARAMETERS_TYPE_EXPLICIT) { /* the parameters are given by an ECPARAMETERS structure */ ret = EC_GROUP_new_from_ecparameters(params->value.parameters); if (!ret) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_ECPKPARAMETERS, ERR_R_EC_LIB); return NULL; } EC_GROUP_set_asn1_flag(ret, OPENSSL_EC_EXPLICIT_CURVE); } else if (params->type == ECPKPARAMETERS_TYPE_IMPLICIT) { /* implicit parameters inherited from CA - unsupported */ return NULL; } else { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_ECPKPARAMETERS, EC_R_ASN1_ERROR); return NULL; } return ret; } /* EC_GROUP <-> DER encoding of ECPKPARAMETERS */ EC_GROUP *d2i_ECPKParameters(EC_GROUP **a, const unsigned char **in, long len) { EC_GROUP *group = NULL; ECPKPARAMETERS *params = NULL; const unsigned char *p = *in; if ((params = d2i_ECPKPARAMETERS(NULL, &p, len)) == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_D2I_ECPKPARAMETERS, EC_R_D2I_ECPKPARAMETERS_FAILURE); ECPKPARAMETERS_free(params); return NULL; } if ((group = EC_GROUP_new_from_ecpkparameters(params)) == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_D2I_ECPKPARAMETERS, EC_R_PKPARAMETERS2GROUP_FAILURE); ECPKPARAMETERS_free(params); return NULL; } if (params->type == ECPKPARAMETERS_TYPE_EXPLICIT) group->decoded_from_explicit_params = 1; if (a) { EC_GROUP_free(*a); *a = group; } ECPKPARAMETERS_free(params); *in = p; return group; } int i2d_ECPKParameters(const EC_GROUP *a, unsigned char **out) { int ret = 0; ECPKPARAMETERS *tmp = EC_GROUP_get_ecpkparameters(a, NULL); if (tmp == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_I2D_ECPKPARAMETERS, EC_R_GROUP2PKPARAMETERS_FAILURE); return 0; } if ((ret = i2d_ECPKPARAMETERS(tmp, out)) == 0) { ECerr(EC_F_I2D_ECPKPARAMETERS, EC_R_I2D_ECPKPARAMETERS_FAILURE); ECPKPARAMETERS_free(tmp); return 0; } ECPKPARAMETERS_free(tmp); return ret; } /* some EC_KEY functions */ EC_KEY *d2i_ECPrivateKey(EC_KEY **a, const unsigned char **in, long len) { EC_KEY *ret = NULL; EC_PRIVATEKEY *priv_key = NULL; const unsigned char *p = *in; if ((priv_key = d2i_EC_PRIVATEKEY(NULL, &p, len)) == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_D2I_ECPRIVATEKEY, ERR_R_EC_LIB); return NULL; } if (a == NULL || *a == NULL) { if ((ret = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_D2I_ECPRIVATEKEY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } } else ret = *a; if (priv_key->parameters) { EC_GROUP_free(ret->group); ret->group = EC_GROUP_new_from_ecpkparameters(priv_key->parameters); if (ret->group != NULL && priv_key->parameters->type == ECPKPARAMETERS_TYPE_EXPLICIT) ret->group->decoded_from_explicit_params = 1; } if (ret->group == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_D2I_ECPRIVATEKEY, ERR_R_EC_LIB); goto err; } ret->version = priv_key->version; if (priv_key->privateKey) { ASN1_OCTET_STRING *pkey = priv_key->privateKey; if (EC_KEY_oct2priv(ret, ASN1_STRING_get0_data(pkey), ASN1_STRING_length(pkey)) == 0) goto err; } else { ECerr(EC_F_D2I_ECPRIVATEKEY, EC_R_MISSING_PRIVATE_KEY); goto err; } EC_POINT_clear_free(ret->pub_key); ret->pub_key = EC_POINT_new(ret->group); if (ret->pub_key == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_D2I_ECPRIVATEKEY, ERR_R_EC_LIB); goto err; } if (priv_key->publicKey) { const unsigned char *pub_oct; int pub_oct_len; pub_oct = ASN1_STRING_get0_data(priv_key->publicKey); pub_oct_len = ASN1_STRING_length(priv_key->publicKey); if (!EC_KEY_oct2key(ret, pub_oct, pub_oct_len, NULL)) { ECerr(EC_F_D2I_ECPRIVATEKEY, ERR_R_EC_LIB); goto err; } } else { if (ret->group->meth->keygenpub == NULL || ret->group->meth->keygenpub(ret) == 0) goto err; /* Remember the original private-key-only encoding. */ ret->enc_flag |= EC_PKEY_NO_PUBKEY; } if (a) *a = ret; EC_PRIVATEKEY_free(priv_key); *in = p; return ret; err: if (a == NULL || *a != ret) EC_KEY_free(ret); EC_PRIVATEKEY_free(priv_key); return NULL; } int i2d_ECPrivateKey(EC_KEY *a, unsigned char **out) { int ret = 0, ok = 0; unsigned char *priv= NULL, *pub= NULL; size_t privlen = 0, publen = 0; EC_PRIVATEKEY *priv_key = NULL; if (a == NULL || a->group == NULL || (!(a->enc_flag & EC_PKEY_NO_PUBKEY) && a->pub_key == NULL)) { ECerr(EC_F_I2D_ECPRIVATEKEY, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); goto err; } if ((priv_key = EC_PRIVATEKEY_new()) == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_I2D_ECPRIVATEKEY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } priv_key->version = a->version; privlen = EC_KEY_priv2buf(a, &priv); if (privlen == 0) { ECerr(EC_F_I2D_ECPRIVATEKEY, ERR_R_EC_LIB); goto err; } ASN1_STRING_set0(priv_key->privateKey, priv, privlen); priv = NULL; if (!(a->enc_flag & EC_PKEY_NO_PARAMETERS)) { if ((priv_key->parameters = EC_GROUP_get_ecpkparameters(a->group, priv_key->parameters)) == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_I2D_ECPRIVATEKEY, ERR_R_EC_LIB); goto err; } } if (!(a->enc_flag & EC_PKEY_NO_PUBKEY)) { priv_key->publicKey = ASN1_BIT_STRING_new(); if (priv_key->publicKey == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_I2D_ECPRIVATEKEY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } publen = EC_KEY_key2buf(a, a->conv_form, &pub, NULL); if (publen == 0) { ECerr(EC_F_I2D_ECPRIVATEKEY, ERR_R_EC_LIB); goto err; } priv_key->publicKey->flags &= ~(ASN1_STRING_FLAG_BITS_LEFT | 0x07); priv_key->publicKey->flags |= ASN1_STRING_FLAG_BITS_LEFT; ASN1_STRING_set0(priv_key->publicKey, pub, publen); pub = NULL; } if ((ret = i2d_EC_PRIVATEKEY(priv_key, out)) == 0) { ECerr(EC_F_I2D_ECPRIVATEKEY, ERR_R_EC_LIB); goto err; } ok = 1; err: OPENSSL_clear_free(priv, privlen); OPENSSL_free(pub); EC_PRIVATEKEY_free(priv_key); return (ok ? ret : 0); } int i2d_ECParameters(EC_KEY *a, unsigned char **out) { if (a == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_I2D_ECPARAMETERS, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); return 0; } return i2d_ECPKParameters(a->group, out); } EC_KEY *d2i_ECParameters(EC_KEY **a, const unsigned char **in, long len) { EC_KEY *ret; if (in == NULL || *in == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_D2I_ECPARAMETERS, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); return NULL; } if (a == NULL || *a == NULL) { if ((ret = EC_KEY_new()) == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_D2I_ECPARAMETERS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return NULL; } } else ret = *a; if (!d2i_ECPKParameters(&ret->group, in, len)) { ECerr(EC_F_D2I_ECPARAMETERS, ERR_R_EC_LIB); if (a == NULL || *a != ret) EC_KEY_free(ret); return NULL; } if (a) *a = ret; return ret; } EC_KEY *o2i_ECPublicKey(EC_KEY **a, const unsigned char **in, long len) { EC_KEY *ret = NULL; if (a == NULL || (*a) == NULL || (*a)->group == NULL) { /* * sorry, but a EC_GROUP-structure is necessary to set the public key */ ECerr(EC_F_O2I_ECPUBLICKEY, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); return 0; } ret = *a; if (!EC_KEY_oct2key(ret, *in, len, NULL)) { ECerr(EC_F_O2I_ECPUBLICKEY, ERR_R_EC_LIB); return 0; } *in += len; return ret; } int i2o_ECPublicKey(const EC_KEY *a, unsigned char **out) { size_t buf_len = 0; int new_buffer = 0; if (a == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_I2O_ECPUBLICKEY, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); return 0; } buf_len = EC_POINT_point2oct(a->group, a->pub_key, a->conv_form, NULL, 0, NULL); if (out == NULL || buf_len == 0) /* out == NULL => just return the length of the octet string */ return buf_len; if (*out == NULL) { if ((*out = OPENSSL_malloc(buf_len)) == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_I2O_ECPUBLICKEY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } new_buffer = 1; } if (!EC_POINT_point2oct(a->group, a->pub_key, a->conv_form, *out, buf_len, NULL)) { ECerr(EC_F_I2O_ECPUBLICKEY, ERR_R_EC_LIB); if (new_buffer) { OPENSSL_free(*out); *out = NULL; } return 0; } if (!new_buffer) *out += buf_len; return buf_len; } ASN1_SEQUENCE(ECDSA_SIG) = { ASN1_SIMPLE(ECDSA_SIG, r, CBIGNUM), ASN1_SIMPLE(ECDSA_SIG, s, CBIGNUM) } static_ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(ECDSA_SIG) DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS_const(ECDSA_SIG) DECLARE_ASN1_ENCODE_FUNCTIONS_const(ECDSA_SIG, ECDSA_SIG) IMPLEMENT_ASN1_ENCODE_FUNCTIONS_const_fname(ECDSA_SIG, ECDSA_SIG, ECDSA_SIG) ECDSA_SIG *ECDSA_SIG_new(void) { ECDSA_SIG *sig = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*sig)); if (sig == NULL) ECerr(EC_F_ECDSA_SIG_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return sig; } void ECDSA_SIG_free(ECDSA_SIG *sig) { if (sig == NULL) return; BN_clear_free(sig->r); BN_clear_free(sig->s); OPENSSL_free(sig); } void ECDSA_SIG_get0(const ECDSA_SIG *sig, const BIGNUM **pr, const BIGNUM **ps) { if (pr != NULL) *pr = sig->r; if (ps != NULL) *ps = sig->s; } const BIGNUM *ECDSA_SIG_get0_r(const ECDSA_SIG *sig) { return sig->r; } const BIGNUM *ECDSA_SIG_get0_s(const ECDSA_SIG *sig) { return sig->s; } int ECDSA_SIG_set0(ECDSA_SIG *sig, BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *s) { if (r == NULL || s == NULL) return 0; BN_clear_free(sig->r); BN_clear_free(sig->s); sig->r = r; sig->s = s; return 1; } int ECDSA_size(const EC_KEY *r) { int ret, i; ASN1_INTEGER bs; unsigned char buf[4]; const EC_GROUP *group; if (r == NULL) return 0; group = EC_KEY_get0_group(r); if (group == NULL) return 0; i = EC_GROUP_order_bits(group); if (i == 0) return 0; bs.length = (i + 7) / 8; bs.data = buf; bs.type = V_ASN1_INTEGER; /* If the top bit is set the asn1 encoding is 1 larger. */ buf[0] = 0xff; i = i2d_ASN1_INTEGER(&bs, NULL); i += i; /* r and s */ ret = ASN1_object_size(1, i, V_ASN1_SEQUENCE); if (ret < 0) return 0; return ret; } diff --git a/crypto/ec/ec_curve.c b/crypto/ec/ec_curve.c index 8de486cbd763..b4c14e91e175 100644 --- a/crypto/ec/ec_curve.c +++ b/crypto/ec/ec_curve.c @@ -1,3311 +1,3338 @@ /* - * Copyright 2002-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 2002-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "ec_local.h" #include #include +#include #include #include "internal/nelem.h" typedef struct { int field_type, /* either NID_X9_62_prime_field or * NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field */ seed_len, param_len; unsigned int cofactor; /* promoted to BN_ULONG */ } EC_CURVE_DATA; /* the nist prime curves */ static const struct { EC_CURVE_DATA h; unsigned char data[20 + 24 * 6]; } _EC_NIST_PRIME_192 = { { NID_X9_62_prime_field, 20, 24, 1 }, { /* seed */ 0x30, 0x45, 0xAE, 0x6F, 0xC8, 0x42, 0x2F, 0x64, 0xED, 0x57, 0x95, 0x28, 0xD3, 0x81, 0x20, 0xEA, 0xE1, 0x21, 0x96, 0xD5, /* p */ 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFE, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, /* a */ 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFE, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFC, /* b */ 0x64, 0x21, 0x05, 0x19, 0xE5, 0x9C, 0x80, 0xE7, 0x0F, 0xA7, 0xE9, 0xAB, 0x72, 0x24, 0x30, 0x49, 0xFE, 0xB8, 0xDE, 0xEC, 0xC1, 0x46, 0xB9, 0xB1, /* x */ 0x18, 0x8D, 0xA8, 0x0E, 0xB0, 0x30, 0x90, 0xF6, 0x7C, 0xBF, 0x20, 0xEB, 0x43, 0xA1, 0x88, 0x00, 0xF4, 0xFF, 0x0A, 0xFD, 0x82, 0xFF, 0x10, 0x12, /* y */ 0x07, 0x19, 0x2b, 0x95, 0xff, 0xc8, 0xda, 0x78, 0x63, 0x10, 0x11, 0xed, 0x6b, 0x24, 0xcd, 0xd5, 0x73, 0xf9, 0x77, 0xa1, 0x1e, 0x79, 0x48, 0x11, /* order */ 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0x99, 0xDE, 0xF8, 0x36, 0x14, 0x6B, 0xC9, 0xB1, 0xB4, 0xD2, 0x28, 0x31 } }; static const struct { EC_CURVE_DATA h; unsigned char data[20 + 28 * 6]; } _EC_NIST_PRIME_224 = { { NID_X9_62_prime_field, 20, 28, 1 }, { /* seed */ 0xBD, 0x71, 0x34, 0x47, 0x99, 0xD5, 0xC7, 0xFC, 0xDC, 0x45, 0xB5, 0x9F, 0xA3, 0xB9, 0xAB, 0x8F, 0x6A, 0x94, 0x8B, 0xC5, /* p */ 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, /* a */ 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFE, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFE, /* b */ 0xB4, 0x05, 0x0A, 0x85, 0x0C, 0x04, 0xB3, 0xAB, 0xF5, 0x41, 0x32, 0x56, 0x50, 0x44, 0xB0, 0xB7, 0xD7, 0xBF, 0xD8, 0xBA, 0x27, 0x0B, 0x39, 0x43, 0x23, 0x55, 0xFF, 0xB4, /* x */ 0xB7, 0x0E, 0x0C, 0xBD, 0x6B, 0xB4, 0xBF, 0x7F, 0x32, 0x13, 0x90, 0xB9, 0x4A, 0x03, 0xC1, 0xD3, 0x56, 0xC2, 0x11, 0x22, 0x34, 0x32, 0x80, 0xD6, 0x11, 0x5C, 0x1D, 0x21, /* y */ 0xbd, 0x37, 0x63, 0x88, 0xb5, 0xf7, 0x23, 0xfb, 0x4c, 0x22, 0xdf, 0xe6, 0xcd, 0x43, 0x75, 0xa0, 0x5a, 0x07, 0x47, 0x64, 0x44, 0xd5, 0x81, 0x99, 0x85, 0x00, 0x7e, 0x34, /* order */ 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0x16, 0xA2, 0xE0, 0xB8, 0xF0, 0x3E, 0x13, 0xDD, 0x29, 0x45, 0x5C, 0x5C, 0x2A, 0x3D } }; static const struct { EC_CURVE_DATA h; unsigned char data[20 + 48 * 6]; } _EC_NIST_PRIME_384 = { { NID_X9_62_prime_field, 20, 48, 1 }, { /* seed */ 0xA3, 0x35, 0x92, 0x6A, 0xA3, 0x19, 0xA2, 0x7A, 0x1D, 0x00, 0x89, 0x6A, 0x67, 0x73, 0xA4, 0x82, 0x7A, 0xCD, 0xAC, 0x73, /* p */ 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFE, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, /* a */ 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFE, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFC, /* b */ 0xB3, 0x31, 0x2F, 0xA7, 0xE2, 0x3E, 0xE7, 0xE4, 0x98, 0x8E, 0x05, 0x6B, 0xE3, 0xF8, 0x2D, 0x19, 0x18, 0x1D, 0x9C, 0x6E, 0xFE, 0x81, 0x41, 0x12, 0x03, 0x14, 0x08, 0x8F, 0x50, 0x13, 0x87, 0x5A, 0xC6, 0x56, 0x39, 0x8D, 0x8A, 0x2E, 0xD1, 0x9D, 0x2A, 0x85, 0xC8, 0xED, 0xD3, 0xEC, 0x2A, 0xEF, /* x */ 0xAA, 0x87, 0xCA, 0x22, 0xBE, 0x8B, 0x05, 0x37, 0x8E, 0xB1, 0xC7, 0x1E, 0xF3, 0x20, 0xAD, 0x74, 0x6E, 0x1D, 0x3B, 0x62, 0x8B, 0xA7, 0x9B, 0x98, 0x59, 0xF7, 0x41, 0xE0, 0x82, 0x54, 0x2A, 0x38, 0x55, 0x02, 0xF2, 0x5D, 0xBF, 0x55, 0x29, 0x6C, 0x3A, 0x54, 0x5E, 0x38, 0x72, 0x76, 0x0A, 0xB7, /* y */ 0x36, 0x17, 0xde, 0x4a, 0x96, 0x26, 0x2c, 0x6f, 0x5d, 0x9e, 0x98, 0xbf, 0x92, 0x92, 0xdc, 0x29, 0xf8, 0xf4, 0x1d, 0xbd, 0x28, 0x9a, 0x14, 0x7c, 0xe9, 0xda, 0x31, 0x13, 0xb5, 0xf0, 0xb8, 0xc0, 0x0a, 0x60, 0xb1, 0xce, 0x1d, 0x7e, 0x81, 0x9d, 0x7a, 0x43, 0x1d, 0x7c, 0x90, 0xea, 0x0e, 0x5f, /* order */ 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xC7, 0x63, 0x4D, 0x81, 0xF4, 0x37, 0x2D, 0xDF, 0x58, 0x1A, 0x0D, 0xB2, 0x48, 0xB0, 0xA7, 0x7A, 0xEC, 0xEC, 0x19, 0x6A, 0xCC, 0xC5, 0x29, 0x73 } }; static const struct { EC_CURVE_DATA h; unsigned char data[20 + 66 * 6]; } _EC_NIST_PRIME_521 = { { NID_X9_62_prime_field, 20, 66, 1 }, { /* seed */ 0xD0, 0x9E, 0x88, 0x00, 0x29, 0x1C, 0xB8, 0x53, 0x96, 0xCC, 0x67, 0x17, 0x39, 0x32, 0x84, 0xAA, 0xA0, 0xDA, 0x64, 0xBA, /* p */ 0x01, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, /* a */ 0x01, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFC, /* b */ 0x00, 0x51, 0x95, 0x3E, 0xB9, 0x61, 0x8E, 0x1C, 0x9A, 0x1F, 0x92, 0x9A, 0x21, 0xA0, 0xB6, 0x85, 0x40, 0xEE, 0xA2, 0xDA, 0x72, 0x5B, 0x99, 0xB3, 0x15, 0xF3, 0xB8, 0xB4, 0x89, 0x91, 0x8E, 0xF1, 0x09, 0xE1, 0x56, 0x19, 0x39, 0x51, 0xEC, 0x7E, 0x93, 0x7B, 0x16, 0x52, 0xC0, 0xBD, 0x3B, 0xB1, 0xBF, 0x07, 0x35, 0x73, 0xDF, 0x88, 0x3D, 0x2C, 0x34, 0xF1, 0xEF, 0x45, 0x1F, 0xD4, 0x6B, 0x50, 0x3F, 0x00, /* x */ 0x00, 0xC6, 0x85, 0x8E, 0x06, 0xB7, 0x04, 0x04, 0xE9, 0xCD, 0x9E, 0x3E, 0xCB, 0x66, 0x23, 0x95, 0xB4, 0x42, 0x9C, 0x64, 0x81, 0x39, 0x05, 0x3F, 0xB5, 0x21, 0xF8, 0x28, 0xAF, 0x60, 0x6B, 0x4D, 0x3D, 0xBA, 0xA1, 0x4B, 0x5E, 0x77, 0xEF, 0xE7, 0x59, 0x28, 0xFE, 0x1D, 0xC1, 0x27, 0xA2, 0xFF, 0xA8, 0xDE, 0x33, 0x48, 0xB3, 0xC1, 0x85, 0x6A, 0x42, 0x9B, 0xF9, 0x7E, 0x7E, 0x31, 0xC2, 0xE5, 0xBD, 0x66, /* y */ 0x01, 0x18, 0x39, 0x29, 0x6a, 0x78, 0x9a, 0x3b, 0xc0, 0x04, 0x5c, 0x8a, 0x5f, 0xb4, 0x2c, 0x7d, 0x1b, 0xd9, 0x98, 0xf5, 0x44, 0x49, 0x57, 0x9b, 0x44, 0x68, 0x17, 0xaf, 0xbd, 0x17, 0x27, 0x3e, 0x66, 0x2c, 0x97, 0xee, 0x72, 0x99, 0x5e, 0xf4, 0x26, 0x40, 0xc5, 0x50, 0xb9, 0x01, 0x3f, 0xad, 0x07, 0x61, 0x35, 0x3c, 0x70, 0x86, 0xa2, 0x72, 0xc2, 0x40, 0x88, 0xbe, 0x94, 0x76, 0x9f, 0xd1, 0x66, 0x50, /* order */ 0x01, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFA, 0x51, 0x86, 0x87, 0x83, 0xBF, 0x2F, 0x96, 0x6B, 0x7F, 0xCC, 0x01, 0x48, 0xF7, 0x09, 0xA5, 0xD0, 0x3B, 0xB5, 0xC9, 0xB8, 0x89, 0x9C, 0x47, 0xAE, 0xBB, 0x6F, 0xB7, 0x1E, 0x91, 0x38, 0x64, 0x09 } }; /* the x9.62 prime curves (minus the nist prime curves) */ static const struct { EC_CURVE_DATA h; unsigned char data[20 + 24 * 6]; } _EC_X9_62_PRIME_192V2 = { { NID_X9_62_prime_field, 20, 24, 1 }, { /* seed */ 0x31, 0xA9, 0x2E, 0xE2, 0x02, 0x9F, 0xD1, 0x0D, 0x90, 0x1B, 0x11, 0x3E, 0x99, 0x07, 0x10, 0xF0, 0xD2, 0x1A, 0xC6, 0xB6, /* p */ 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFE, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, /* a */ 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFE, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFC, /* b */ 0xCC, 0x22, 0xD6, 0xDF, 0xB9, 0x5C, 0x6B, 0x25, 0xE4, 0x9C, 0x0D, 0x63, 0x64, 0xA4, 0xE5, 0x98, 0x0C, 0x39, 0x3A, 0xA2, 0x16, 0x68, 0xD9, 0x53, /* x */ 0xEE, 0xA2, 0xBA, 0xE7, 0xE1, 0x49, 0x78, 0x42, 0xF2, 0xDE, 0x77, 0x69, 0xCF, 0xE9, 0xC9, 0x89, 0xC0, 0x72, 0xAD, 0x69, 0x6F, 0x48, 0x03, 0x4A, /* y */ 0x65, 0x74, 0xd1, 0x1d, 0x69, 0xb6, 0xec, 0x7a, 0x67, 0x2b, 0xb8, 0x2a, 0x08, 0x3d, 0xf2, 0xf2, 0xb0, 0x84, 0x7d, 0xe9, 0x70, 0xb2, 0xde, 0x15, /* order */ 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFE, 0x5F, 0xB1, 0xA7, 0x24, 0xDC, 0x80, 0x41, 0x86, 0x48, 0xD8, 0xDD, 0x31 } }; static const struct { EC_CURVE_DATA h; unsigned char data[20 + 24 * 6]; } _EC_X9_62_PRIME_192V3 = { { NID_X9_62_prime_field, 20, 24, 1 }, { /* seed */ 0xC4, 0x69, 0x68, 0x44, 0x35, 0xDE, 0xB3, 0x78, 0xC4, 0xB6, 0x5C, 0xA9, 0x59, 0x1E, 0x2A, 0x57, 0x63, 0x05, 0x9A, 0x2E, /* p */ 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFE, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, /* a */ 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFE, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFC, /* b */ 0x22, 0x12, 0x3D, 0xC2, 0x39, 0x5A, 0x05, 0xCA, 0xA7, 0x42, 0x3D, 0xAE, 0xCC, 0xC9, 0x47, 0x60, 0xA7, 0xD4, 0x62, 0x25, 0x6B, 0xD5, 0x69, 0x16, /* x */ 0x7D, 0x29, 0x77, 0x81, 0x00, 0xC6, 0x5A, 0x1D, 0xA1, 0x78, 0x37, 0x16, 0x58, 0x8D, 0xCE, 0x2B, 0x8B, 0x4A, 0xEE, 0x8E, 0x22, 0x8F, 0x18, 0x96, /* y */ 0x38, 0xa9, 0x0f, 0x22, 0x63, 0x73, 0x37, 0x33, 0x4b, 0x49, 0xdc, 0xb6, 0x6a, 0x6d, 0xc8, 0xf9, 0x97, 0x8a, 0xca, 0x76, 0x48, 0xa9, 0x43, 0xb0, /* order */ 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0x7A, 0x62, 0xD0, 0x31, 0xC8, 0x3F, 0x42, 0x94, 0xF6, 0x40, 0xEC, 0x13 } }; static const struct { EC_CURVE_DATA h; unsigned char data[20 + 30 * 6]; } _EC_X9_62_PRIME_239V1 = { { NID_X9_62_prime_field, 20, 30, 1 }, { /* seed */ 0xE4, 0x3B, 0xB4, 0x60, 0xF0, 0xB8, 0x0C, 0xC0, 0xC0, 0xB0, 0x75, 0x79, 0x8E, 0x94, 0x80, 0x60, 0xF8, 0x32, 0x1B, 0x7D, /* p */ 0x7F, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0x7F, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0x80, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x7F, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, /* a */ 0x7F, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0x7F, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0x80, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x7F, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFC, /* b */ 0x6B, 0x01, 0x6C, 0x3B, 0xDC, 0xF1, 0x89, 0x41, 0xD0, 0xD6, 0x54, 0x92, 0x14, 0x75, 0xCA, 0x71, 0xA9, 0xDB, 0x2F, 0xB2, 0x7D, 0x1D, 0x37, 0x79, 0x61, 0x85, 0xC2, 0x94, 0x2C, 0x0A, /* x */ 0x0F, 0xFA, 0x96, 0x3C, 0xDC, 0xA8, 0x81, 0x6C, 0xCC, 0x33, 0xB8, 0x64, 0x2B, 0xED, 0xF9, 0x05, 0xC3, 0xD3, 0x58, 0x57, 0x3D, 0x3F, 0x27, 0xFB, 0xBD, 0x3B, 0x3C, 0xB9, 0xAA, 0xAF, /* y */ 0x7d, 0xeb, 0xe8, 0xe4, 0xe9, 0x0a, 0x5d, 0xae, 0x6e, 0x40, 0x54, 0xca, 0x53, 0x0b, 0xa0, 0x46, 0x54, 0xb3, 0x68, 0x18, 0xce, 0x22, 0x6b, 0x39, 0xfc, 0xcb, 0x7b, 0x02, 0xf1, 0xae, /* order */ 0x7F, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0x7F, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0x9E, 0x5E, 0x9A, 0x9F, 0x5D, 0x90, 0x71, 0xFB, 0xD1, 0x52, 0x26, 0x88, 0x90, 0x9D, 0x0B } }; static const struct { EC_CURVE_DATA h; unsigned char data[20 + 30 * 6]; } _EC_X9_62_PRIME_239V2 = { { NID_X9_62_prime_field, 20, 30, 1 }, { /* seed */ 0xE8, 0xB4, 0x01, 0x16, 0x04, 0x09, 0x53, 0x03, 0xCA, 0x3B, 0x80, 0x99, 0x98, 0x2B, 0xE0, 0x9F, 0xCB, 0x9A, 0xE6, 0x16, /* p */ 0x7F, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0x7F, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0x80, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x7F, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, /* a */ 0x7F, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0x7F, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0x80, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x7F, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFC, /* b */ 0x61, 0x7F, 0xAB, 0x68, 0x32, 0x57, 0x6C, 0xBB, 0xFE, 0xD5, 0x0D, 0x99, 0xF0, 0x24, 0x9C, 0x3F, 0xEE, 0x58, 0xB9, 0x4B, 0xA0, 0x03, 0x8C, 0x7A, 0xE8, 0x4C, 0x8C, 0x83, 0x2F, 0x2C, /* x */ 0x38, 0xAF, 0x09, 0xD9, 0x87, 0x27, 0x70, 0x51, 0x20, 0xC9, 0x21, 0xBB, 0x5E, 0x9E, 0x26, 0x29, 0x6A, 0x3C, 0xDC, 0xF2, 0xF3, 0x57, 0x57, 0xA0, 0xEA, 0xFD, 0x87, 0xB8, 0x30, 0xE7, /* y */ 0x5b, 0x01, 0x25, 0xe4, 0xdb, 0xea, 0x0e, 0xc7, 0x20, 0x6d, 0xa0, 0xfc, 0x01, 0xd9, 0xb0, 0x81, 0x32, 0x9f, 0xb5, 0x55, 0xde, 0x6e, 0xf4, 0x60, 0x23, 0x7d, 0xff, 0x8b, 0xe4, 0xba, /* order */ 0x7F, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0x80, 0x00, 0x00, 0xCF, 0xA7, 0xE8, 0x59, 0x43, 0x77, 0xD4, 0x14, 0xC0, 0x38, 0x21, 0xBC, 0x58, 0x20, 0x63 } }; static const struct { EC_CURVE_DATA h; unsigned char data[20 + 30 * 6]; } _EC_X9_62_PRIME_239V3 = { { NID_X9_62_prime_field, 20, 30, 1 }, { /* seed */ 0x7D, 0x73, 0x74, 0x16, 0x8F, 0xFE, 0x34, 0x71, 0xB6, 0x0A, 0x85, 0x76, 0x86, 0xA1, 0x94, 0x75, 0xD3, 0xBF, 0xA2, 0xFF, /* p */ 0x7F, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0x7F, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0x80, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x7F, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, /* a */ 0x7F, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0x7F, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0x80, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x7F, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFC, /* b */ 0x25, 0x57, 0x05, 0xFA, 0x2A, 0x30, 0x66, 0x54, 0xB1, 0xF4, 0xCB, 0x03, 0xD6, 0xA7, 0x50, 0xA3, 0x0C, 0x25, 0x01, 0x02, 0xD4, 0x98, 0x87, 0x17, 0xD9, 0xBA, 0x15, 0xAB, 0x6D, 0x3E, /* x */ 0x67, 0x68, 0xAE, 0x8E, 0x18, 0xBB, 0x92, 0xCF, 0xCF, 0x00, 0x5C, 0x94, 0x9A, 0xA2, 0xC6, 0xD9, 0x48, 0x53, 0xD0, 0xE6, 0x60, 0xBB, 0xF8, 0x54, 0xB1, 0xC9, 0x50, 0x5F, 0xE9, 0x5A, /* y */ 0x16, 0x07, 0xe6, 0x89, 0x8f, 0x39, 0x0c, 0x06, 0xbc, 0x1d, 0x55, 0x2b, 0xad, 0x22, 0x6f, 0x3b, 0x6f, 0xcf, 0xe4, 0x8b, 0x6e, 0x81, 0x84, 0x99, 0xaf, 0x18, 0xe3, 0xed, 0x6c, 0xf3, /* order */ 0x7F, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0x7F, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0x97, 0x5D, 0xEB, 0x41, 0xB3, 0xA6, 0x05, 0x7C, 0x3C, 0x43, 0x21, 0x46, 0x52, 0x65, 0x51 } }; static const struct { EC_CURVE_DATA h; unsigned char data[20 + 32 * 6]; } _EC_X9_62_PRIME_256V1 = { { NID_X9_62_prime_field, 20, 32, 1 }, { /* seed */ 0xC4, 0x9D, 0x36, 0x08, 0x86, 0xE7, 0x04, 0x93, 0x6A, 0x66, 0x78, 0xE1, 0x13, 0x9D, 0x26, 0xB7, 0x81, 0x9F, 0x7E, 0x90, /* p */ 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, /* a */ 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFC, /* b */ 0x5A, 0xC6, 0x35, 0xD8, 0xAA, 0x3A, 0x93, 0xE7, 0xB3, 0xEB, 0xBD, 0x55, 0x76, 0x98, 0x86, 0xBC, 0x65, 0x1D, 0x06, 0xB0, 0xCC, 0x53, 0xB0, 0xF6, 0x3B, 0xCE, 0x3C, 0x3E, 0x27, 0xD2, 0x60, 0x4B, /* x */ 0x6B, 0x17, 0xD1, 0xF2, 0xE1, 0x2C, 0x42, 0x47, 0xF8, 0xBC, 0xE6, 0xE5, 0x63, 0xA4, 0x40, 0xF2, 0x77, 0x03, 0x7D, 0x81, 0x2D, 0xEB, 0x33, 0xA0, 0xF4, 0xA1, 0x39, 0x45, 0xD8, 0x98, 0xC2, 0x96, /* y */ 0x4f, 0xe3, 0x42, 0xe2, 0xfe, 0x1a, 0x7f, 0x9b, 0x8e, 0xe7, 0xeb, 0x4a, 0x7c, 0x0f, 0x9e, 0x16, 0x2b, 0xce, 0x33, 0x57, 0x6b, 0x31, 0x5e, 0xce, 0xcb, 0xb6, 0x40, 0x68, 0x37, 0xbf, 0x51, 0xf5, /* order */ 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xBC, 0xE6, 0xFA, 0xAD, 0xA7, 0x17, 0x9E, 0x84, 0xF3, 0xB9, 0xCA, 0xC2, 0xFC, 0x63, 0x25, 0x51 } }; /* the secg prime curves (minus the nist and x9.62 prime curves) */ static const struct { EC_CURVE_DATA h; unsigned char data[20 + 14 * 6]; } _EC_SECG_PRIME_112R1 = { { NID_X9_62_prime_field, 20, 14, 1 }, { /* seed */ 0x00, 0xF5, 0x0B, 0x02, 0x8E, 0x4D, 0x69, 0x6E, 0x67, 0x68, 0x75, 0x61, 0x51, 0x75, 0x29, 0x04, 0x72, 0x78, 0x3F, 0xB1, /* p */ 0xDB, 0x7C, 0x2A, 0xBF, 0x62, 0xE3, 0x5E, 0x66, 0x80, 0x76, 0xBE, 0xAD, 0x20, 0x8B, /* a */ 0xDB, 0x7C, 0x2A, 0xBF, 0x62, 0xE3, 0x5E, 0x66, 0x80, 0x76, 0xBE, 0xAD, 0x20, 0x88, /* b */ 0x65, 0x9E, 0xF8, 0xBA, 0x04, 0x39, 0x16, 0xEE, 0xDE, 0x89, 0x11, 0x70, 0x2B, 0x22, /* x */ 0x09, 0x48, 0x72, 0x39, 0x99, 0x5A, 0x5E, 0xE7, 0x6B, 0x55, 0xF9, 0xC2, 0xF0, 0x98, /* y */ 0xa8, 0x9c, 0xe5, 0xaf, 0x87, 0x24, 0xc0, 0xa2, 0x3e, 0x0e, 0x0f, 0xf7, 0x75, 0x00, /* order */ 0xDB, 0x7C, 0x2A, 0xBF, 0x62, 0xE3, 0x5E, 0x76, 0x28, 0xDF, 0xAC, 0x65, 0x61, 0xC5 } }; static const struct { EC_CURVE_DATA h; unsigned char data[20 + 14 * 6]; } _EC_SECG_PRIME_112R2 = { { NID_X9_62_prime_field, 20, 14, 4 }, { /* seed */ 0x00, 0x27, 0x57, 0xA1, 0x11, 0x4D, 0x69, 0x6E, 0x67, 0x68, 0x75, 0x61, 0x51, 0x75, 0x53, 0x16, 0xC0, 0x5E, 0x0B, 0xD4, /* p */ 0xDB, 0x7C, 0x2A, 0xBF, 0x62, 0xE3, 0x5E, 0x66, 0x80, 0x76, 0xBE, 0xAD, 0x20, 0x8B, /* a */ 0x61, 0x27, 0xC2, 0x4C, 0x05, 0xF3, 0x8A, 0x0A, 0xAA, 0xF6, 0x5C, 0x0E, 0xF0, 0x2C, /* b */ 0x51, 0xDE, 0xF1, 0x81, 0x5D, 0xB5, 0xED, 0x74, 0xFC, 0xC3, 0x4C, 0x85, 0xD7, 0x09, /* x */ 0x4B, 0xA3, 0x0A, 0xB5, 0xE8, 0x92, 0xB4, 0xE1, 0x64, 0x9D, 0xD0, 0x92, 0x86, 0x43, /* y */ 0xad, 0xcd, 0x46, 0xf5, 0x88, 0x2e, 0x37, 0x47, 0xde, 0xf3, 0x6e, 0x95, 0x6e, 0x97, /* order */ 0x36, 0xDF, 0x0A, 0xAF, 0xD8, 0xB8, 0xD7, 0x59, 0x7C, 0xA1, 0x05, 0x20, 0xD0, 0x4B } }; static const struct { EC_CURVE_DATA h; unsigned char data[20 + 16 * 6]; } _EC_SECG_PRIME_128R1 = { { NID_X9_62_prime_field, 20, 16, 1 }, { /* seed */ 0x00, 0x0E, 0x0D, 0x4D, 0x69, 0x6E, 0x67, 0x68, 0x75, 0x61, 0x51, 0x75, 0x0C, 0xC0, 0x3A, 0x44, 0x73, 0xD0, 0x36, 0x79, /* p */ 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFD, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, /* a */ 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFD, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFC, /* b */ 0xE8, 0x75, 0x79, 0xC1, 0x10, 0x79, 0xF4, 0x3D, 0xD8, 0x24, 0x99, 0x3C, 0x2C, 0xEE, 0x5E, 0xD3, /* x */ 0x16, 0x1F, 0xF7, 0x52, 0x8B, 0x89, 0x9B, 0x2D, 0x0C, 0x28, 0x60, 0x7C, 0xA5, 0x2C, 0x5B, 0x86, /* y */ 0xcf, 0x5a, 0xc8, 0x39, 0x5b, 0xaf, 0xeb, 0x13, 0xc0, 0x2d, 0xa2, 0x92, 0xdd, 0xed, 0x7a, 0x83, /* order */ 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFE, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x75, 0xA3, 0x0D, 0x1B, 0x90, 0x38, 0xA1, 0x15 } }; static const struct { EC_CURVE_DATA h; unsigned char data[20 + 16 * 6]; } _EC_SECG_PRIME_128R2 = { { NID_X9_62_prime_field, 20, 16, 4 }, { /* seed */ 0x00, 0x4D, 0x69, 0x6E, 0x67, 0x68, 0x75, 0x61, 0x51, 0x75, 0x12, 0xD8, 0xF0, 0x34, 0x31, 0xFC, 0xE6, 0x3B, 0x88, 0xF4, /* p */ 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFD, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, /* a */ 0xD6, 0x03, 0x19, 0x98, 0xD1, 0xB3, 0xBB, 0xFE, 0xBF, 0x59, 0xCC, 0x9B, 0xBF, 0xF9, 0xAE, 0xE1, /* b */ 0x5E, 0xEE, 0xFC, 0xA3, 0x80, 0xD0, 0x29, 0x19, 0xDC, 0x2C, 0x65, 0x58, 0xBB, 0x6D, 0x8A, 0x5D, /* x */ 0x7B, 0x6A, 0xA5, 0xD8, 0x5E, 0x57, 0x29, 0x83, 0xE6, 0xFB, 0x32, 0xA7, 0xCD, 0xEB, 0xC1, 0x40, /* y */ 0x27, 0xb6, 0x91, 0x6a, 0x89, 0x4d, 0x3a, 0xee, 0x71, 0x06, 0xfe, 0x80, 0x5f, 0xc3, 0x4b, 0x44, /* order */ 0x3F, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0x7F, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xBE, 0x00, 0x24, 0x72, 0x06, 0x13, 0xB5, 0xA3 } }; static const struct { EC_CURVE_DATA h; unsigned char data[0 + 21 * 6]; } _EC_SECG_PRIME_160K1 = { { NID_X9_62_prime_field, 0, 21, 1 }, { /* no seed */ /* p */ 0x00, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFE, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xAC, 0x73, /* a */ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, /* b */ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x07, /* x */ 0x00, 0x3B, 0x4C, 0x38, 0x2C, 0xE3, 0x7A, 0xA1, 0x92, 0xA4, 0x01, 0x9E, 0x76, 0x30, 0x36, 0xF4, 0xF5, 0xDD, 0x4D, 0x7E, 0xBB, /* y */ 0x00, 0x93, 0x8c, 0xf9, 0x35, 0x31, 0x8f, 0xdc, 0xed, 0x6b, 0xc2, 0x82, 0x86, 0x53, 0x17, 0x33, 0xc3, 0xf0, 0x3c, 0x4f, 0xee, /* order */ 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0xB8, 0xFA, 0x16, 0xDF, 0xAB, 0x9A, 0xCA, 0x16, 0xB6, 0xB3 } }; static const struct { EC_CURVE_DATA h; unsigned char data[20 + 21 * 6]; } _EC_SECG_PRIME_160R1 = { { NID_X9_62_prime_field, 20, 21, 1 }, { /* seed */ 0x10, 0x53, 0xCD, 0xE4, 0x2C, 0x14, 0xD6, 0x96, 0xE6, 0x76, 0x87, 0x56, 0x15, 0x17, 0x53, 0x3B, 0xF3, 0xF8, 0x33, 0x45, /* p */ 0x00, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0x7F, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, /* a */ 0x00, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0x7F, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFC, /* b */ 0x00, 0x1C, 0x97, 0xBE, 0xFC, 0x54, 0xBD, 0x7A, 0x8B, 0x65, 0xAC, 0xF8, 0x9F, 0x81, 0xD4, 0xD4, 0xAD, 0xC5, 0x65, 0xFA, 0x45, /* x */ 0x00, 0x4A, 0x96, 0xB5, 0x68, 0x8E, 0xF5, 0x73, 0x28, 0x46, 0x64, 0x69, 0x89, 0x68, 0xC3, 0x8B, 0xB9, 0x13, 0xCB, 0xFC, 0x82, /* y */ 0x00, 0x23, 0xa6, 0x28, 0x55, 0x31, 0x68, 0x94, 0x7d, 0x59, 0xdc, 0xc9, 0x12, 0x04, 0x23, 0x51, 0x37, 0x7a, 0xc5, 0xfb, 0x32, /* order */ 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0xF4, 0xC8, 0xF9, 0x27, 0xAE, 0xD3, 0xCA, 0x75, 0x22, 0x57 } }; static const struct { EC_CURVE_DATA h; unsigned char data[20 + 21 * 6]; } _EC_SECG_PRIME_160R2 = { { NID_X9_62_prime_field, 20, 21, 1 }, { /* seed */ 0xB9, 0x9B, 0x99, 0xB0, 0x99, 0xB3, 0x23, 0xE0, 0x27, 0x09, 0xA4, 0xD6, 0x96, 0xE6, 0x76, 0x87, 0x56, 0x15, 0x17, 0x51, /* p */ 0x00, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFE, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xAC, 0x73, /* a */ 0x00, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFE, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xAC, 0x70, /* b */ 0x00, 0xB4, 0xE1, 0x34, 0xD3, 0xFB, 0x59, 0xEB, 0x8B, 0xAB, 0x57, 0x27, 0x49, 0x04, 0x66, 0x4D, 0x5A, 0xF5, 0x03, 0x88, 0xBA, /* x */ 0x00, 0x52, 0xDC, 0xB0, 0x34, 0x29, 0x3A, 0x11, 0x7E, 0x1F, 0x4F, 0xF1, 0x1B, 0x30, 0xF7, 0x19, 0x9D, 0x31, 0x44, 0xCE, 0x6D, /* y */ 0x00, 0xfe, 0xaf, 0xfe, 0xf2, 0xe3, 0x31, 0xf2, 0x96, 0xe0, 0x71, 0xfa, 0x0d, 0xf9, 0x98, 0x2c, 0xfe, 0xa7, 0xd4, 0x3f, 0x2e, /* order */ 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x35, 0x1E, 0xE7, 0x86, 0xA8, 0x18, 0xF3, 0xA1, 0xA1, 0x6B } }; static const struct { EC_CURVE_DATA h; unsigned char data[0 + 24 * 6]; } _EC_SECG_PRIME_192K1 = { { NID_X9_62_prime_field, 0, 24, 1 }, { /* no seed */ /* p */ 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFE, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xEE, 0x37, /* a */ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, /* b */ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x03, /* x */ 0xDB, 0x4F, 0xF1, 0x0E, 0xC0, 0x57, 0xE9, 0xAE, 0x26, 0xB0, 0x7D, 0x02, 0x80, 0xB7, 0xF4, 0x34, 0x1D, 0xA5, 0xD1, 0xB1, 0xEA, 0xE0, 0x6C, 0x7D, /* y */ 0x9b, 0x2f, 0x2f, 0x6d, 0x9c, 0x56, 0x28, 0xa7, 0x84, 0x41, 0x63, 0xd0, 0x15, 0xbe, 0x86, 0x34, 0x40, 0x82, 0xaa, 0x88, 0xd9, 0x5e, 0x2f, 0x9d, /* order */ 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFE, 0x26, 0xF2, 0xFC, 0x17, 0x0F, 0x69, 0x46, 0x6A, 0x74, 0xDE, 0xFD, 0x8D } }; static const struct { EC_CURVE_DATA h; unsigned char data[0 + 29 * 6]; } _EC_SECG_PRIME_224K1 = { { NID_X9_62_prime_field, 0, 29, 1 }, { /* no seed */ /* p */ 0x00, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFE, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xE5, 0x6D, /* a */ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, /* b */ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x05, /* x */ 0x00, 0xA1, 0x45, 0x5B, 0x33, 0x4D, 0xF0, 0x99, 0xDF, 0x30, 0xFC, 0x28, 0xA1, 0x69, 0xA4, 0x67, 0xE9, 0xE4, 0x70, 0x75, 0xA9, 0x0F, 0x7E, 0x65, 0x0E, 0xB6, 0xB7, 0xA4, 0x5C, /* y */ 0x00, 0x7e, 0x08, 0x9f, 0xed, 0x7f, 0xba, 0x34, 0x42, 0x82, 0xca, 0xfb, 0xd6, 0xf7, 0xe3, 0x19, 0xf7, 0xc0, 0xb0, 0xbd, 0x59, 0xe2, 0xca, 0x4b, 0xdb, 0x55, 0x6d, 0x61, 0xa5, /* order */ 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0xDC, 0xE8, 0xD2, 0xEC, 0x61, 0x84, 0xCA, 0xF0, 0xA9, 0x71, 0x76, 0x9F, 0xB1, 0xF7 } }; static const struct { EC_CURVE_DATA h; unsigned char data[0 + 32 * 6]; } _EC_SECG_PRIME_256K1 = { { NID_X9_62_prime_field, 0, 32, 1 }, { /* no seed */ /* p */ 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFE, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFC, 0x2F, /* a */ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, /* b */ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x07, /* x */ 0x79, 0xBE, 0x66, 0x7E, 0xF9, 0xDC, 0xBB, 0xAC, 0x55, 0xA0, 0x62, 0x95, 0xCE, 0x87, 0x0B, 0x07, 0x02, 0x9B, 0xFC, 0xDB, 0x2D, 0xCE, 0x28, 0xD9, 0x59, 0xF2, 0x81, 0x5B, 0x16, 0xF8, 0x17, 0x98, /* y */ 0x48, 0x3a, 0xda, 0x77, 0x26, 0xa3, 0xc4, 0x65, 0x5d, 0xa4, 0xfb, 0xfc, 0x0e, 0x11, 0x08, 0xa8, 0xfd, 0x17, 0xb4, 0x48, 0xa6, 0x85, 0x54, 0x19, 0x9c, 0x47, 0xd0, 0x8f, 0xfb, 0x10, 0xd4, 0xb8, /* order */ 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFE, 0xBA, 0xAE, 0xDC, 0xE6, 0xAF, 0x48, 0xA0, 0x3B, 0xBF, 0xD2, 0x5E, 0x8C, 0xD0, 0x36, 0x41, 0x41 } }; /* some wap/wtls curves */ static const struct { EC_CURVE_DATA h; unsigned char data[0 + 15 * 6]; } _EC_WTLS_8 = { { NID_X9_62_prime_field, 0, 15, 1 }, { /* no seed */ /* p */ 0x00, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFD, 0xE7, /* a */ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, /* b */ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x03, /* x */ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, /* y */ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x02, /* order */ 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0xEC, 0xEA, 0x55, 0x1A, 0xD8, 0x37, 0xE9 } }; static const struct { EC_CURVE_DATA h; unsigned char data[0 + 21 * 6]; } _EC_WTLS_9 = { { NID_X9_62_prime_field, 0, 21, 1 }, { /* no seed */ /* p */ 0x00, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFC, 0x80, 0x8F, /* a */ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, /* b */ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x03, /* x */ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, /* y */ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x02, /* order */ 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0xCD, 0xC9, 0x8A, 0xE0, 0xE2, 0xDE, 0x57, 0x4A, 0xBF, 0x33 } }; static const struct { EC_CURVE_DATA h; unsigned char data[0 + 28 * 6]; } _EC_WTLS_12 = { { NID_X9_62_prime_field, 0, 28, 1 }, { /* no seed */ /* p */ 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, /* a */ 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFE, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFE, /* b */ 0xB4, 0x05, 0x0A, 0x85, 0x0C, 0x04, 0xB3, 0xAB, 0xF5, 0x41, 0x32, 0x56, 0x50, 0x44, 0xB0, 0xB7, 0xD7, 0xBF, 0xD8, 0xBA, 0x27, 0x0B, 0x39, 0x43, 0x23, 0x55, 0xFF, 0xB4, /* x */ 0xB7, 0x0E, 0x0C, 0xBD, 0x6B, 0xB4, 0xBF, 0x7F, 0x32, 0x13, 0x90, 0xB9, 0x4A, 0x03, 0xC1, 0xD3, 0x56, 0xC2, 0x11, 0x22, 0x34, 0x32, 0x80, 0xD6, 0x11, 0x5C, 0x1D, 0x21, /* y */ 0xbd, 0x37, 0x63, 0x88, 0xb5, 0xf7, 0x23, 0xfb, 0x4c, 0x22, 0xdf, 0xe6, 0xcd, 0x43, 0x75, 0xa0, 0x5a, 0x07, 0x47, 0x64, 0x44, 0xd5, 0x81, 0x99, 0x85, 0x00, 0x7e, 0x34, /* order */ 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0x16, 0xA2, 0xE0, 0xB8, 0xF0, 0x3E, 0x13, 0xDD, 0x29, 0x45, 0x5C, 0x5C, 0x2A, 0x3D } }; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M /* characteristic two curves */ static const struct { EC_CURVE_DATA h; unsigned char data[20 + 15 * 6]; } _EC_SECG_CHAR2_113R1 = { { NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field, 20, 15, 2 }, { /* seed */ 0x10, 0xE7, 0x23, 0xAB, 0x14, 0xD6, 0x96, 0xE6, 0x76, 0x87, 0x56, 0x15, 0x17, 0x56, 0xFE, 0xBF, 0x8F, 0xCB, 0x49, 0xA9, /* p */ 0x02, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x02, 0x01, /* a */ 0x00, 0x30, 0x88, 0x25, 0x0C, 0xA6, 0xE7, 0xC7, 0xFE, 0x64, 0x9C, 0xE8, 0x58, 0x20, 0xF7, /* b */ 0x00, 0xE8, 0xBE, 0xE4, 0xD3, 0xE2, 0x26, 0x07, 0x44, 0x18, 0x8B, 0xE0, 0xE9, 0xC7, 0x23, /* x */ 0x00, 0x9D, 0x73, 0x61, 0x6F, 0x35, 0xF4, 0xAB, 0x14, 0x07, 0xD7, 0x35, 0x62, 0xC1, 0x0F, /* y */ 0x00, 0xA5, 0x28, 0x30, 0x27, 0x79, 0x58, 0xEE, 0x84, 0xD1, 0x31, 0x5E, 0xD3, 0x18, 0x86, /* order */ 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xD9, 0xCC, 0xEC, 0x8A, 0x39, 0xE5, 0x6F } }; static const struct { EC_CURVE_DATA h; unsigned char data[20 + 15 * 6]; } _EC_SECG_CHAR2_113R2 = { { NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field, 20, 15, 2 }, { /* seed */ 0x10, 0xC0, 0xFB, 0x15, 0x76, 0x08, 0x60, 0xDE, 0xF1, 0xEE, 0xF4, 0xD6, 0x96, 0xE6, 0x76, 0x87, 0x56, 0x15, 0x17, 0x5D, /* p */ 0x02, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x02, 0x01, /* a */ 0x00, 0x68, 0x99, 0x18, 0xDB, 0xEC, 0x7E, 0x5A, 0x0D, 0xD6, 0xDF, 0xC0, 0xAA, 0x55, 0xC7, /* b */ 0x00, 0x95, 0xE9, 0xA9, 0xEC, 0x9B, 0x29, 0x7B, 0xD4, 0xBF, 0x36, 0xE0, 0x59, 0x18, 0x4F, /* x */ 0x01, 0xA5, 0x7A, 0x6A, 0x7B, 0x26, 0xCA, 0x5E, 0xF5, 0x2F, 0xCD, 0xB8, 0x16, 0x47, 0x97, /* y */ 0x00, 0xB3, 0xAD, 0xC9, 0x4E, 0xD1, 0xFE, 0x67, 0x4C, 0x06, 0xE6, 0x95, 0xBA, 0xBA, 0x1D, /* order */ 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x08, 0x78, 0x9B, 0x24, 0x96, 0xAF, 0x93 } }; static const struct { EC_CURVE_DATA h; unsigned char data[20 + 17 * 6]; } _EC_SECG_CHAR2_131R1 = { { NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field, 20, 17, 2 }, { /* seed */ 0x4D, 0x69, 0x6E, 0x67, 0x68, 0x75, 0x61, 0x51, 0x75, 0x98, 0x5B, 0xD3, 0xAD, 0xBA, 0xDA, 0x21, 0xB4, 0x3A, 0x97, 0xE2, /* p */ 0x08, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x0D, /* a */ 0x07, 0xA1, 0x1B, 0x09, 0xA7, 0x6B, 0x56, 0x21, 0x44, 0x41, 0x8F, 0xF3, 0xFF, 0x8C, 0x25, 0x70, 0xB8, /* b */ 0x02, 0x17, 0xC0, 0x56, 0x10, 0x88, 0x4B, 0x63, 0xB9, 0xC6, 0xC7, 0x29, 0x16, 0x78, 0xF9, 0xD3, 0x41, /* x */ 0x00, 0x81, 0xBA, 0xF9, 0x1F, 0xDF, 0x98, 0x33, 0xC4, 0x0F, 0x9C, 0x18, 0x13, 0x43, 0x63, 0x83, 0x99, /* y */ 0x07, 0x8C, 0x6E, 0x7E, 0xA3, 0x8C, 0x00, 0x1F, 0x73, 0xC8, 0x13, 0x4B, 0x1B, 0x4E, 0xF9, 0xE1, 0x50, /* order */ 0x04, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x02, 0x31, 0x23, 0x95, 0x3A, 0x94, 0x64, 0xB5, 0x4D } }; static const struct { EC_CURVE_DATA h; unsigned char data[20 + 17 * 6]; } _EC_SECG_CHAR2_131R2 = { { NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field, 20, 17, 2 }, { /* seed */ 0x98, 0x5B, 0xD3, 0xAD, 0xBA, 0xD4, 0xD6, 0x96, 0xE6, 0x76, 0x87, 0x56, 0x15, 0x17, 0x5A, 0x21, 0xB4, 0x3A, 0x97, 0xE3, /* p */ 0x08, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x0D, /* a */ 0x03, 0xE5, 0xA8, 0x89, 0x19, 0xD7, 0xCA, 0xFC, 0xBF, 0x41, 0x5F, 0x07, 0xC2, 0x17, 0x65, 0x73, 0xB2, /* b */ 0x04, 0xB8, 0x26, 0x6A, 0x46, 0xC5, 0x56, 0x57, 0xAC, 0x73, 0x4C, 0xE3, 0x8F, 0x01, 0x8F, 0x21, 0x92, /* x */ 0x03, 0x56, 0xDC, 0xD8, 0xF2, 0xF9, 0x50, 0x31, 0xAD, 0x65, 0x2D, 0x23, 0x95, 0x1B, 0xB3, 0x66, 0xA8, /* y */ 0x06, 0x48, 0xF0, 0x6D, 0x86, 0x79, 0x40, 0xA5, 0x36, 0x6D, 0x9E, 0x26, 0x5D, 0xE9, 0xEB, 0x24, 0x0F, /* order */ 0x04, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x69, 0x54, 0xA2, 0x33, 0x04, 0x9B, 0xA9, 0x8F } }; static const struct { EC_CURVE_DATA h; unsigned char data[0 + 21 * 6]; } _EC_NIST_CHAR2_163K = { { NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field, 0, 21, 2 }, { /* no seed */ /* p */ 0x08, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xC9, /* a */ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, /* b */ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, /* x */ 0x02, 0xFE, 0x13, 0xC0, 0x53, 0x7B, 0xBC, 0x11, 0xAC, 0xAA, 0x07, 0xD7, 0x93, 0xDE, 0x4E, 0x6D, 0x5E, 0x5C, 0x94, 0xEE, 0xE8, /* y */ 0x02, 0x89, 0x07, 0x0F, 0xB0, 0x5D, 0x38, 0xFF, 0x58, 0x32, 0x1F, 0x2E, 0x80, 0x05, 0x36, 0xD5, 0x38, 0xCC, 0xDA, 0xA3, 0xD9, /* order */ 0x04, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x02, 0x01, 0x08, 0xA2, 0xE0, 0xCC, 0x0D, 0x99, 0xF8, 0xA5, 0xEF } }; static const struct { EC_CURVE_DATA h; unsigned char data[0 + 21 * 6]; } _EC_SECG_CHAR2_163R1 = { { NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field, 0, 21, 2 }, { /* p */ 0x08, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xC9, /* a */ 0x07, 0xB6, 0x88, 0x2C, 0xAA, 0xEF, 0xA8, 0x4F, 0x95, 0x54, 0xFF, 0x84, 0x28, 0xBD, 0x88, 0xE2, 0x46, 0xD2, 0x78, 0x2A, 0xE2, /* b */ 0x07, 0x13, 0x61, 0x2D, 0xCD, 0xDC, 0xB4, 0x0A, 0xAB, 0x94, 0x6B, 0xDA, 0x29, 0xCA, 0x91, 0xF7, 0x3A, 0xF9, 0x58, 0xAF, 0xD9, /* x */ 0x03, 0x69, 0x97, 0x96, 0x97, 0xAB, 0x43, 0x89, 0x77, 0x89, 0x56, 0x67, 0x89, 0x56, 0x7F, 0x78, 0x7A, 0x78, 0x76, 0xA6, 0x54, /* y */ 0x00, 0x43, 0x5E, 0xDB, 0x42, 0xEF, 0xAF, 0xB2, 0x98, 0x9D, 0x51, 0xFE, 0xFC, 0xE3, 0xC8, 0x09, 0x88, 0xF4, 0x1F, 0xF8, 0x83, /* order */ 0x03, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0x48, 0xAA, 0xB6, 0x89, 0xC2, 0x9C, 0xA7, 0x10, 0x27, 0x9B } }; static const struct { EC_CURVE_DATA h; unsigned char data[0 + 21 * 6]; } _EC_NIST_CHAR2_163B = { { NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field, 0, 21, 2 }, { /* p */ 0x08, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xC9, /* a */ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, /* b */ 0x02, 0x0A, 0x60, 0x19, 0x07, 0xB8, 0xC9, 0x53, 0xCA, 0x14, 0x81, 0xEB, 0x10, 0x51, 0x2F, 0x78, 0x74, 0x4A, 0x32, 0x05, 0xFD, /* x */ 0x03, 0xF0, 0xEB, 0xA1, 0x62, 0x86, 0xA2, 0xD5, 0x7E, 0xA0, 0x99, 0x11, 0x68, 0xD4, 0x99, 0x46, 0x37, 0xE8, 0x34, 0x3E, 0x36, /* y */ 0x00, 0xD5, 0x1F, 0xBC, 0x6C, 0x71, 0xA0, 0x09, 0x4F, 0xA2, 0xCD, 0xD5, 0x45, 0xB1, 0x1C, 0x5C, 0x0C, 0x79, 0x73, 0x24, 0xF1, /* order */ 0x04, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x02, 0x92, 0xFE, 0x77, 0xE7, 0x0C, 0x12, 0xA4, 0x23, 0x4C, 0x33 } }; static const struct { EC_CURVE_DATA h; unsigned char data[20 + 25 * 6]; } _EC_SECG_CHAR2_193R1 = { { NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field, 20, 25, 2 }, { /* seed */ 0x10, 0x3F, 0xAE, 0xC7, 0x4D, 0x69, 0x6E, 0x67, 0x68, 0x75, 0x61, 0x51, 0x75, 0x77, 0x7F, 0xC5, 0xB1, 0x91, 0xEF, 0x30, /* p */ 0x02, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x80, 0x01, /* a */ 0x00, 0x17, 0x85, 0x8F, 0xEB, 0x7A, 0x98, 0x97, 0x51, 0x69, 0xE1, 0x71, 0xF7, 0x7B, 0x40, 0x87, 0xDE, 0x09, 0x8A, 0xC8, 0xA9, 0x11, 0xDF, 0x7B, 0x01, /* b */ 0x00, 0xFD, 0xFB, 0x49, 0xBF, 0xE6, 0xC3, 0xA8, 0x9F, 0xAC, 0xAD, 0xAA, 0x7A, 0x1E, 0x5B, 0xBC, 0x7C, 0xC1, 0xC2, 0xE5, 0xD8, 0x31, 0x47, 0x88, 0x14, /* x */ 0x01, 0xF4, 0x81, 0xBC, 0x5F, 0x0F, 0xF8, 0x4A, 0x74, 0xAD, 0x6C, 0xDF, 0x6F, 0xDE, 0xF4, 0xBF, 0x61, 0x79, 0x62, 0x53, 0x72, 0xD8, 0xC0, 0xC5, 0xE1, /* y */ 0x00, 0x25, 0xE3, 0x99, 0xF2, 0x90, 0x37, 0x12, 0xCC, 0xF3, 0xEA, 0x9E, 0x3A, 0x1A, 0xD1, 0x7F, 0xB0, 0xB3, 0x20, 0x1B, 0x6A, 0xF7, 0xCE, 0x1B, 0x05, /* order */ 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xC7, 0xF3, 0x4A, 0x77, 0x8F, 0x44, 0x3A, 0xCC, 0x92, 0x0E, 0xBA, 0x49 } }; static const struct { EC_CURVE_DATA h; unsigned char data[20 + 25 * 6]; } _EC_SECG_CHAR2_193R2 = { { NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field, 20, 25, 2 }, { /* seed */ 0x10, 0xB7, 0xB4, 0xD6, 0x96, 0xE6, 0x76, 0x87, 0x56, 0x15, 0x17, 0x51, 0x37, 0xC8, 0xA1, 0x6F, 0xD0, 0xDA, 0x22, 0x11, /* p */ 0x02, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x80, 0x01, /* a */ 0x01, 0x63, 0xF3, 0x5A, 0x51, 0x37, 0xC2, 0xCE, 0x3E, 0xA6, 0xED, 0x86, 0x67, 0x19, 0x0B, 0x0B, 0xC4, 0x3E, 0xCD, 0x69, 0x97, 0x77, 0x02, 0x70, 0x9B, /* b */ 0x00, 0xC9, 0xBB, 0x9E, 0x89, 0x27, 0xD4, 0xD6, 0x4C, 0x37, 0x7E, 0x2A, 0xB2, 0x85, 0x6A, 0x5B, 0x16, 0xE3, 0xEF, 0xB7, 0xF6, 0x1D, 0x43, 0x16, 0xAE, /* x */ 0x00, 0xD9, 0xB6, 0x7D, 0x19, 0x2E, 0x03, 0x67, 0xC8, 0x03, 0xF3, 0x9E, 0x1A, 0x7E, 0x82, 0xCA, 0x14, 0xA6, 0x51, 0x35, 0x0A, 0xAE, 0x61, 0x7E, 0x8F, /* y */ 0x01, 0xCE, 0x94, 0x33, 0x56, 0x07, 0xC3, 0x04, 0xAC, 0x29, 0xE7, 0xDE, 0xFB, 0xD9, 0xCA, 0x01, 0xF5, 0x96, 0xF9, 0x27, 0x22, 0x4C, 0xDE, 0xCF, 0x6C, /* order */ 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x5A, 0xAB, 0x56, 0x1B, 0x00, 0x54, 0x13, 0xCC, 0xD4, 0xEE, 0x99, 0xD5 } }; static const struct { EC_CURVE_DATA h; unsigned char data[0 + 30 * 6]; } _EC_NIST_CHAR2_233K = { { NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field, 0, 30, 4 }, { /* no seed */ 0x02, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x04, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, /* a */ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, /* b */ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, /* x */ 0x01, 0x72, 0x32, 0xBA, 0x85, 0x3A, 0x7E, 0x73, 0x1A, 0xF1, 0x29, 0xF2, 0x2F, 0xF4, 0x14, 0x95, 0x63, 0xA4, 0x19, 0xC2, 0x6B, 0xF5, 0x0A, 0x4C, 0x9D, 0x6E, 0xEF, 0xAD, 0x61, 0x26, /* y */ 0x01, 0xDB, 0x53, 0x7D, 0xEC, 0xE8, 0x19, 0xB7, 0xF7, 0x0F, 0x55, 0x5A, 0x67, 0xC4, 0x27, 0xA8, 0xCD, 0x9B, 0xF1, 0x8A, 0xEB, 0x9B, 0x56, 0xE0, 0xC1, 0x10, 0x56, 0xFA, 0xE6, 0xA3, /* order */ 0x00, 0x80, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x06, 0x9D, 0x5B, 0xB9, 0x15, 0xBC, 0xD4, 0x6E, 0xFB, 0x1A, 0xD5, 0xF1, 0x73, 0xAB, 0xDF } }; static const struct { EC_CURVE_DATA h; unsigned char data[20 + 30 * 6]; } _EC_NIST_CHAR2_233B = { { NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field, 20, 30, 2 }, { /* seed */ 0x74, 0xD5, 0x9F, 0xF0, 0x7F, 0x6B, 0x41, 0x3D, 0x0E, 0xA1, 0x4B, 0x34, 0x4B, 0x20, 0xA2, 0xDB, 0x04, 0x9B, 0x50, 0xC3, /* p */ 0x02, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x04, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, /* a */ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, /* b */ 0x00, 0x66, 0x64, 0x7E, 0xDE, 0x6C, 0x33, 0x2C, 0x7F, 0x8C, 0x09, 0x23, 0xBB, 0x58, 0x21, 0x3B, 0x33, 0x3B, 0x20, 0xE9, 0xCE, 0x42, 0x81, 0xFE, 0x11, 0x5F, 0x7D, 0x8F, 0x90, 0xAD, /* x */ 0x00, 0xFA, 0xC9, 0xDF, 0xCB, 0xAC, 0x83, 0x13, 0xBB, 0x21, 0x39, 0xF1, 0xBB, 0x75, 0x5F, 0xEF, 0x65, 0xBC, 0x39, 0x1F, 0x8B, 0x36, 0xF8, 0xF8, 0xEB, 0x73, 0x71, 0xFD, 0x55, 0x8B, /* y */ 0x01, 0x00, 0x6A, 0x08, 0xA4, 0x19, 0x03, 0x35, 0x06, 0x78, 0xE5, 0x85, 0x28, 0xBE, 0xBF, 0x8A, 0x0B, 0xEF, 0xF8, 0x67, 0xA7, 0xCA, 0x36, 0x71, 0x6F, 0x7E, 0x01, 0xF8, 0x10, 0x52, /* order */ 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x13, 0xE9, 0x74, 0xE7, 0x2F, 0x8A, 0x69, 0x22, 0x03, 0x1D, 0x26, 0x03, 0xCF, 0xE0, 0xD7 } }; static const struct { EC_CURVE_DATA h; unsigned char data[0 + 30 * 6]; } _EC_SECG_CHAR2_239K1 = { { NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field, 0, 30, 4 }, { /* no seed */ 0x80, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x40, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, /* a */ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, /* b */ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, /* x */ 0x29, 0xA0, 0xB6, 0xA8, 0x87, 0xA9, 0x83, 0xE9, 0x73, 0x09, 0x88, 0xA6, 0x87, 0x27, 0xA8, 0xB2, 0xD1, 0x26, 0xC4, 0x4C, 0xC2, 0xCC, 0x7B, 0x2A, 0x65, 0x55, 0x19, 0x30, 0x35, 0xDC, /* y */ 0x76, 0x31, 0x08, 0x04, 0xF1, 0x2E, 0x54, 0x9B, 0xDB, 0x01, 0x1C, 0x10, 0x30, 0x89, 0xE7, 0x35, 0x10, 0xAC, 0xB2, 0x75, 0xFC, 0x31, 0x2A, 0x5D, 0xC6, 0xB7, 0x65, 0x53, 0xF0, 0xCA, /* order */ 0x20, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x5A, 0x79, 0xFE, 0xC6, 0x7C, 0xB6, 0xE9, 0x1F, 0x1C, 0x1D, 0xA8, 0x00, 0xE4, 0x78, 0xA5 } }; static const struct { EC_CURVE_DATA h; unsigned char data[0 + 36 * 6]; } _EC_NIST_CHAR2_283K = { { NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field, 0, 36, 4 }, { /* no seed */ 0x08, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x10, 0xA1, /* a */ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, /* b */ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, /* x */ 0x05, 0x03, 0x21, 0x3F, 0x78, 0xCA, 0x44, 0x88, 0x3F, 0x1A, 0x3B, 0x81, 0x62, 0xF1, 0x88, 0xE5, 0x53, 0xCD, 0x26, 0x5F, 0x23, 0xC1, 0x56, 0x7A, 0x16, 0x87, 0x69, 0x13, 0xB0, 0xC2, 0xAC, 0x24, 0x58, 0x49, 0x28, 0x36, /* y */ 0x01, 0xCC, 0xDA, 0x38, 0x0F, 0x1C, 0x9E, 0x31, 0x8D, 0x90, 0xF9, 0x5D, 0x07, 0xE5, 0x42, 0x6F, 0xE8, 0x7E, 0x45, 0xC0, 0xE8, 0x18, 0x46, 0x98, 0xE4, 0x59, 0x62, 0x36, 0x4E, 0x34, 0x11, 0x61, 0x77, 0xDD, 0x22, 0x59, /* order */ 0x01, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xE9, 0xAE, 0x2E, 0xD0, 0x75, 0x77, 0x26, 0x5D, 0xFF, 0x7F, 0x94, 0x45, 0x1E, 0x06, 0x1E, 0x16, 0x3C, 0x61 } }; static const struct { EC_CURVE_DATA h; unsigned char data[20 + 36 * 6]; } _EC_NIST_CHAR2_283B = { { NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field, 20, 36, 2 }, { /* no seed */ 0x77, 0xE2, 0xB0, 0x73, 0x70, 0xEB, 0x0F, 0x83, 0x2A, 0x6D, 0xD5, 0xB6, 0x2D, 0xFC, 0x88, 0xCD, 0x06, 0xBB, 0x84, 0xBE, /* p */ 0x08, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x10, 0xA1, /* a */ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, /* b */ 0x02, 0x7B, 0x68, 0x0A, 0xC8, 0xB8, 0x59, 0x6D, 0xA5, 0xA4, 0xAF, 0x8A, 0x19, 0xA0, 0x30, 0x3F, 0xCA, 0x97, 0xFD, 0x76, 0x45, 0x30, 0x9F, 0xA2, 0xA5, 0x81, 0x48, 0x5A, 0xF6, 0x26, 0x3E, 0x31, 0x3B, 0x79, 0xA2, 0xF5, /* x */ 0x05, 0xF9, 0x39, 0x25, 0x8D, 0xB7, 0xDD, 0x90, 0xE1, 0x93, 0x4F, 0x8C, 0x70, 0xB0, 0xDF, 0xEC, 0x2E, 0xED, 0x25, 0xB8, 0x55, 0x7E, 0xAC, 0x9C, 0x80, 0xE2, 0xE1, 0x98, 0xF8, 0xCD, 0xBE, 0xCD, 0x86, 0xB1, 0x20, 0x53, /* y */ 0x03, 0x67, 0x68, 0x54, 0xFE, 0x24, 0x14, 0x1C, 0xB9, 0x8F, 0xE6, 0xD4, 0xB2, 0x0D, 0x02, 0xB4, 0x51, 0x6F, 0xF7, 0x02, 0x35, 0x0E, 0xDD, 0xB0, 0x82, 0x67, 0x79, 0xC8, 0x13, 0xF0, 0xDF, 0x45, 0xBE, 0x81, 0x12, 0xF4, /* order */ 0x03, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xEF, 0x90, 0x39, 0x96, 0x60, 0xFC, 0x93, 0x8A, 0x90, 0x16, 0x5B, 0x04, 0x2A, 0x7C, 0xEF, 0xAD, 0xB3, 0x07 } }; static const struct { EC_CURVE_DATA h; unsigned char data[0 + 52 * 6]; } _EC_NIST_CHAR2_409K = { { NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field, 0, 52, 4 }, { /* no seed */ /* p */ 0x02, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x80, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, /* a */ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, /* b */ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, /* x */ 0x00, 0x60, 0xF0, 0x5F, 0x65, 0x8F, 0x49, 0xC1, 0xAD, 0x3A, 0xB1, 0x89, 0x0F, 0x71, 0x84, 0x21, 0x0E, 0xFD, 0x09, 0x87, 0xE3, 0x07, 0xC8, 0x4C, 0x27, 0xAC, 0xCF, 0xB8, 0xF9, 0xF6, 0x7C, 0xC2, 0xC4, 0x60, 0x18, 0x9E, 0xB5, 0xAA, 0xAA, 0x62, 0xEE, 0x22, 0x2E, 0xB1, 0xB3, 0x55, 0x40, 0xCF, 0xE9, 0x02, 0x37, 0x46, /* y */ 0x01, 0xE3, 0x69, 0x05, 0x0B, 0x7C, 0x4E, 0x42, 0xAC, 0xBA, 0x1D, 0xAC, 0xBF, 0x04, 0x29, 0x9C, 0x34, 0x60, 0x78, 0x2F, 0x91, 0x8E, 0xA4, 0x27, 0xE6, 0x32, 0x51, 0x65, 0xE9, 0xEA, 0x10, 0xE3, 0xDA, 0x5F, 0x6C, 0x42, 0xE9, 0xC5, 0x52, 0x15, 0xAA, 0x9C, 0xA2, 0x7A, 0x58, 0x63, 0xEC, 0x48, 0xD8, 0xE0, 0x28, 0x6B, /* order */ 0x00, 0x7F, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFE, 0x5F, 0x83, 0xB2, 0xD4, 0xEA, 0x20, 0x40, 0x0E, 0xC4, 0x55, 0x7D, 0x5E, 0xD3, 0xE3, 0xE7, 0xCA, 0x5B, 0x4B, 0x5C, 0x83, 0xB8, 0xE0, 0x1E, 0x5F, 0xCF } }; static const struct { EC_CURVE_DATA h; unsigned char data[20 + 52 * 6]; } _EC_NIST_CHAR2_409B = { { NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field, 20, 52, 2 }, { /* seed */ 0x40, 0x99, 0xB5, 0xA4, 0x57, 0xF9, 0xD6, 0x9F, 0x79, 0x21, 0x3D, 0x09, 0x4C, 0x4B, 0xCD, 0x4D, 0x42, 0x62, 0x21, 0x0B, /* p */ 0x02, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x80, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, /* a */ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, /* b */ 0x00, 0x21, 0xA5, 0xC2, 0xC8, 0xEE, 0x9F, 0xEB, 0x5C, 0x4B, 0x9A, 0x75, 0x3B, 0x7B, 0x47, 0x6B, 0x7F, 0xD6, 0x42, 0x2E, 0xF1, 0xF3, 0xDD, 0x67, 0x47, 0x61, 0xFA, 0x99, 0xD6, 0xAC, 0x27, 0xC8, 0xA9, 0xA1, 0x97, 0xB2, 0x72, 0x82, 0x2F, 0x6C, 0xD5, 0x7A, 0x55, 0xAA, 0x4F, 0x50, 0xAE, 0x31, 0x7B, 0x13, 0x54, 0x5F, /* x */ 0x01, 0x5D, 0x48, 0x60, 0xD0, 0x88, 0xDD, 0xB3, 0x49, 0x6B, 0x0C, 0x60, 0x64, 0x75, 0x62, 0x60, 0x44, 0x1C, 0xDE, 0x4A, 0xF1, 0x77, 0x1D, 0x4D, 0xB0, 0x1F, 0xFE, 0x5B, 0x34, 0xE5, 0x97, 0x03, 0xDC, 0x25, 0x5A, 0x86, 0x8A, 0x11, 0x80, 0x51, 0x56, 0x03, 0xAE, 0xAB, 0x60, 0x79, 0x4E, 0x54, 0xBB, 0x79, 0x96, 0xA7, /* y */ 0x00, 0x61, 0xB1, 0xCF, 0xAB, 0x6B, 0xE5, 0xF3, 0x2B, 0xBF, 0xA7, 0x83, 0x24, 0xED, 0x10, 0x6A, 0x76, 0x36, 0xB9, 0xC5, 0xA7, 0xBD, 0x19, 0x8D, 0x01, 0x58, 0xAA, 0x4F, 0x54, 0x88, 0xD0, 0x8F, 0x38, 0x51, 0x4F, 0x1F, 0xDF, 0x4B, 0x4F, 0x40, 0xD2, 0x18, 0x1B, 0x36, 0x81, 0xC3, 0x64, 0xBA, 0x02, 0x73, 0xC7, 0x06, /* order */ 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0xE2, 0xAA, 0xD6, 0xA6, 0x12, 0xF3, 0x33, 0x07, 0xBE, 0x5F, 0xA4, 0x7C, 0x3C, 0x9E, 0x05, 0x2F, 0x83, 0x81, 0x64, 0xCD, 0x37, 0xD9, 0xA2, 0x11, 0x73 } }; static const struct { EC_CURVE_DATA h; unsigned char data[0 + 72 * 6]; } _EC_NIST_CHAR2_571K = { { NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field, 0, 72, 4 }, { /* no seed */ /* p */ 0x08, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x04, 0x25, /* a */ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, /* b */ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, /* x */ 0x02, 0x6E, 0xB7, 0xA8, 0x59, 0x92, 0x3F, 0xBC, 0x82, 0x18, 0x96, 0x31, 0xF8, 0x10, 0x3F, 0xE4, 0xAC, 0x9C, 0xA2, 0x97, 0x00, 0x12, 0xD5, 0xD4, 0x60, 0x24, 0x80, 0x48, 0x01, 0x84, 0x1C, 0xA4, 0x43, 0x70, 0x95, 0x84, 0x93, 0xB2, 0x05, 0xE6, 0x47, 0xDA, 0x30, 0x4D, 0xB4, 0xCE, 0xB0, 0x8C, 0xBB, 0xD1, 0xBA, 0x39, 0x49, 0x47, 0x76, 0xFB, 0x98, 0x8B, 0x47, 0x17, 0x4D, 0xCA, 0x88, 0xC7, 0xE2, 0x94, 0x52, 0x83, 0xA0, 0x1C, 0x89, 0x72, /* y */ 0x03, 0x49, 0xDC, 0x80, 0x7F, 0x4F, 0xBF, 0x37, 0x4F, 0x4A, 0xEA, 0xDE, 0x3B, 0xCA, 0x95, 0x31, 0x4D, 0xD5, 0x8C, 0xEC, 0x9F, 0x30, 0x7A, 0x54, 0xFF, 0xC6, 0x1E, 0xFC, 0x00, 0x6D, 0x8A, 0x2C, 0x9D, 0x49, 0x79, 0xC0, 0xAC, 0x44, 0xAE, 0xA7, 0x4F, 0xBE, 0xBB, 0xB9, 0xF7, 0x72, 0xAE, 0xDC, 0xB6, 0x20, 0xB0, 0x1A, 0x7B, 0xA7, 0xAF, 0x1B, 0x32, 0x04, 0x30, 0xC8, 0x59, 0x19, 0x84, 0xF6, 0x01, 0xCD, 0x4C, 0x14, 0x3E, 0xF1, 0xC7, 0xA3, /* order */ 0x02, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x13, 0x18, 0x50, 0xE1, 0xF1, 0x9A, 0x63, 0xE4, 0xB3, 0x91, 0xA8, 0xDB, 0x91, 0x7F, 0x41, 0x38, 0xB6, 0x30, 0xD8, 0x4B, 0xE5, 0xD6, 0x39, 0x38, 0x1E, 0x91, 0xDE, 0xB4, 0x5C, 0xFE, 0x77, 0x8F, 0x63, 0x7C, 0x10, 0x01 } }; static const struct { EC_CURVE_DATA h; unsigned char data[20 + 72 * 6]; } _EC_NIST_CHAR2_571B = { { NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field, 20, 72, 2 }, { /* seed */ 0x2A, 0xA0, 0x58, 0xF7, 0x3A, 0x0E, 0x33, 0xAB, 0x48, 0x6B, 0x0F, 0x61, 0x04, 0x10, 0xC5, 0x3A, 0x7F, 0x13, 0x23, 0x10, /* p */ 0x08, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x04, 0x25, /* a */ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, /* b */ 0x02, 0xF4, 0x0E, 0x7E, 0x22, 0x21, 0xF2, 0x95, 0xDE, 0x29, 0x71, 0x17, 0xB7, 0xF3, 0xD6, 0x2F, 0x5C, 0x6A, 0x97, 0xFF, 0xCB, 0x8C, 0xEF, 0xF1, 0xCD, 0x6B, 0xA8, 0xCE, 0x4A, 0x9A, 0x18, 0xAD, 0x84, 0xFF, 0xAB, 0xBD, 0x8E, 0xFA, 0x59, 0x33, 0x2B, 0xE7, 0xAD, 0x67, 0x56, 0xA6, 0x6E, 0x29, 0x4A, 0xFD, 0x18, 0x5A, 0x78, 0xFF, 0x12, 0xAA, 0x52, 0x0E, 0x4D, 0xE7, 0x39, 0xBA, 0xCA, 0x0C, 0x7F, 0xFE, 0xFF, 0x7F, 0x29, 0x55, 0x72, 0x7A, /* x */ 0x03, 0x03, 0x00, 0x1D, 0x34, 0xB8, 0x56, 0x29, 0x6C, 0x16, 0xC0, 0xD4, 0x0D, 0x3C, 0xD7, 0x75, 0x0A, 0x93, 0xD1, 0xD2, 0x95, 0x5F, 0xA8, 0x0A, 0xA5, 0xF4, 0x0F, 0xC8, 0xDB, 0x7B, 0x2A, 0xBD, 0xBD, 0xE5, 0x39, 0x50, 0xF4, 0xC0, 0xD2, 0x93, 0xCD, 0xD7, 0x11, 0xA3, 0x5B, 0x67, 0xFB, 0x14, 0x99, 0xAE, 0x60, 0x03, 0x86, 0x14, 0xF1, 0x39, 0x4A, 0xBF, 0xA3, 0xB4, 0xC8, 0x50, 0xD9, 0x27, 0xE1, 0xE7, 0x76, 0x9C, 0x8E, 0xEC, 0x2D, 0x19, /* y */ 0x03, 0x7B, 0xF2, 0x73, 0x42, 0xDA, 0x63, 0x9B, 0x6D, 0xCC, 0xFF, 0xFE, 0xB7, 0x3D, 0x69, 0xD7, 0x8C, 0x6C, 0x27, 0xA6, 0x00, 0x9C, 0xBB, 0xCA, 0x19, 0x80, 0xF8, 0x53, 0x39, 0x21, 0xE8, 0xA6, 0x84, 0x42, 0x3E, 0x43, 0xBA, 0xB0, 0x8A, 0x57, 0x62, 0x91, 0xAF, 0x8F, 0x46, 0x1B, 0xB2, 0xA8, 0xB3, 0x53, 0x1D, 0x2F, 0x04, 0x85, 0xC1, 0x9B, 0x16, 0xE2, 0xF1, 0x51, 0x6E, 0x23, 0xDD, 0x3C, 0x1A, 0x48, 0x27, 0xAF, 0x1B, 0x8A, 0xC1, 0x5B, /* order */ 0x03, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xE6, 0x61, 0xCE, 0x18, 0xFF, 0x55, 0x98, 0x73, 0x08, 0x05, 0x9B, 0x18, 0x68, 0x23, 0x85, 0x1E, 0xC7, 0xDD, 0x9C, 0xA1, 0x16, 0x1D, 0xE9, 0x3D, 0x51, 0x74, 0xD6, 0x6E, 0x83, 0x82, 0xE9, 0xBB, 0x2F, 0xE8, 0x4E, 0x47 } }; static const struct { EC_CURVE_DATA h; unsigned char data[20 + 21 * 6]; } _EC_X9_62_CHAR2_163V1 = { { NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field, 20, 21, 2 }, { /* seed */ 0xD2, 0xC0, 0xFB, 0x15, 0x76, 0x08, 0x60, 0xDE, 0xF1, 0xEE, 0xF4, 0xD6, 0x96, 0xE6, 0x76, 0x87, 0x56, 0x15, 0x17, 0x54, /* p */ 0x08, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x07, /* a */ 0x07, 0x25, 0x46, 0xB5, 0x43, 0x52, 0x34, 0xA4, 0x22, 0xE0, 0x78, 0x96, 0x75, 0xF4, 0x32, 0xC8, 0x94, 0x35, 0xDE, 0x52, 0x42, /* b */ 0x00, 0xC9, 0x51, 0x7D, 0x06, 0xD5, 0x24, 0x0D, 0x3C, 0xFF, 0x38, 0xC7, 0x4B, 0x20, 0xB6, 0xCD, 0x4D, 0x6F, 0x9D, 0xD4, 0xD9, /* x */ 0x07, 0xAF, 0x69, 0x98, 0x95, 0x46, 0x10, 0x3D, 0x79, 0x32, 0x9F, 0xCC, 0x3D, 0x74, 0x88, 0x0F, 0x33, 0xBB, 0xE8, 0x03, 0xCB, /* y */ 0x01, 0xEC, 0x23, 0x21, 0x1B, 0x59, 0x66, 0xAD, 0xEA, 0x1D, 0x3F, 0x87, 0xF7, 0xEA, 0x58, 0x48, 0xAE, 0xF0, 0xB7, 0xCA, 0x9F, /* order */ 0x04, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0xE6, 0x0F, 0xC8, 0x82, 0x1C, 0xC7, 0x4D, 0xAE, 0xAF, 0xC1 } }; static const struct { EC_CURVE_DATA h; unsigned char data[20 + 21 * 6]; } _EC_X9_62_CHAR2_163V2 = { { NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field, 20, 21, 2 }, { /* seed */ 0x53, 0x81, 0x4C, 0x05, 0x0D, 0x44, 0xD6, 0x96, 0xE6, 0x76, 0x87, 0x56, 0x15, 0x17, 0x58, 0x0C, 0xA4, 0xE2, 0x9F, 0xFD, /* p */ 0x08, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x07, /* a */ 0x01, 0x08, 0xB3, 0x9E, 0x77, 0xC4, 0xB1, 0x08, 0xBE, 0xD9, 0x81, 0xED, 0x0E, 0x89, 0x0E, 0x11, 0x7C, 0x51, 0x1C, 0xF0, 0x72, /* b */ 0x06, 0x67, 0xAC, 0xEB, 0x38, 0xAF, 0x4E, 0x48, 0x8C, 0x40, 0x74, 0x33, 0xFF, 0xAE, 0x4F, 0x1C, 0x81, 0x16, 0x38, 0xDF, 0x20, /* x */ 0x00, 0x24, 0x26, 0x6E, 0x4E, 0xB5, 0x10, 0x6D, 0x0A, 0x96, 0x4D, 0x92, 0xC4, 0x86, 0x0E, 0x26, 0x71, 0xDB, 0x9B, 0x6C, 0xC5, /* y */ 0x07, 0x9F, 0x68, 0x4D, 0xDF, 0x66, 0x84, 0xC5, 0xCD, 0x25, 0x8B, 0x38, 0x90, 0x02, 0x1B, 0x23, 0x86, 0xDF, 0xD1, 0x9F, 0xC5, /* order */ 0x03, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFD, 0xF6, 0x4D, 0xE1, 0x15, 0x1A, 0xDB, 0xB7, 0x8F, 0x10, 0xA7 } }; static const struct { EC_CURVE_DATA h; unsigned char data[20 + 21 * 6]; } _EC_X9_62_CHAR2_163V3 = { { NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field, 20, 21, 2 }, { /* seed */ 0x50, 0xCB, 0xF1, 0xD9, 0x5C, 0xA9, 0x4D, 0x69, 0x6E, 0x67, 0x68, 0x75, 0x61, 0x51, 0x75, 0xF1, 0x6A, 0x36, 0xA3, 0xB8, /* p */ 0x08, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x07, /* a */ 0x07, 0xA5, 0x26, 0xC6, 0x3D, 0x3E, 0x25, 0xA2, 0x56, 0xA0, 0x07, 0x69, 0x9F, 0x54, 0x47, 0xE3, 0x2A, 0xE4, 0x56, 0xB5, 0x0E, /* b */ 0x03, 0xF7, 0x06, 0x17, 0x98, 0xEB, 0x99, 0xE2, 0x38, 0xFD, 0x6F, 0x1B, 0xF9, 0x5B, 0x48, 0xFE, 0xEB, 0x48, 0x54, 0x25, 0x2B, /* x */ 0x02, 0xF9, 0xF8, 0x7B, 0x7C, 0x57, 0x4D, 0x0B, 0xDE, 0xCF, 0x8A, 0x22, 0xE6, 0x52, 0x47, 0x75, 0xF9, 0x8C, 0xDE, 0xBD, 0xCB, /* y */ 0x05, 0xB9, 0x35, 0x59, 0x0C, 0x15, 0x5E, 0x17, 0xEA, 0x48, 0xEB, 0x3F, 0xF3, 0x71, 0x8B, 0x89, 0x3D, 0xF5, 0x9A, 0x05, 0xD0, /* order */ 0x03, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFE, 0x1A, 0xEE, 0x14, 0x0F, 0x11, 0x0A, 0xFF, 0x96, 0x13, 0x09 } }; static const struct { EC_CURVE_DATA h; unsigned char data[0 + 23 * 6]; } _EC_X9_62_CHAR2_176V1 = { { NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field, 0, 23, 0xFF6E }, { /* no seed */ /* p */ 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x08, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x07, /* a */ 0x00, 0xE4, 0xE6, 0xDB, 0x29, 0x95, 0x06, 0x5C, 0x40, 0x7D, 0x9D, 0x39, 0xB8, 0xD0, 0x96, 0x7B, 0x96, 0x70, 0x4B, 0xA8, 0xE9, 0xC9, 0x0B, /* b */ 0x00, 0x5D, 0xDA, 0x47, 0x0A, 0xBE, 0x64, 0x14, 0xDE, 0x8E, 0xC1, 0x33, 0xAE, 0x28, 0xE9, 0xBB, 0xD7, 0xFC, 0xEC, 0x0A, 0xE0, 0xFF, 0xF2, /* x */ 0x00, 0x8D, 0x16, 0xC2, 0x86, 0x67, 0x98, 0xB6, 0x00, 0xF9, 0xF0, 0x8B, 0xB4, 0xA8, 0xE8, 0x60, 0xF3, 0x29, 0x8C, 0xE0, 0x4A, 0x57, 0x98, /* y */ 0x00, 0x6F, 0xA4, 0x53, 0x9C, 0x2D, 0xAD, 0xDD, 0xD6, 0xBA, 0xB5, 0x16, 0x7D, 0x61, 0xB4, 0x36, 0xE1, 0xD9, 0x2B, 0xB1, 0x6A, 0x56, 0x2C, /* order */ 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x92, 0x53, 0x73, 0x97, 0xEC, 0xA4, 0xF6, 0x14, 0x57, 0x99, 0xD6, 0x2B, 0x0A, 0x19, 0xCE, 0x06, 0xFE, 0x26, 0xAD } }; static const struct { EC_CURVE_DATA h; unsigned char data[20 + 24 * 6]; } _EC_X9_62_CHAR2_191V1 = { { NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field, 20, 24, 2 }, { /* seed */ 0x4E, 0x13, 0xCA, 0x54, 0x27, 0x44, 0xD6, 0x96, 0xE6, 0x76, 0x87, 0x56, 0x15, 0x17, 0x55, 0x2F, 0x27, 0x9A, 0x8C, 0x84, /* p */ 0x80, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x02, 0x01, /* a */ 0x28, 0x66, 0x53, 0x7B, 0x67, 0x67, 0x52, 0x63, 0x6A, 0x68, 0xF5, 0x65, 0x54, 0xE1, 0x26, 0x40, 0x27, 0x6B, 0x64, 0x9E, 0xF7, 0x52, 0x62, 0x67, /* b */ 0x2E, 0x45, 0xEF, 0x57, 0x1F, 0x00, 0x78, 0x6F, 0x67, 0xB0, 0x08, 0x1B, 0x94, 0x95, 0xA3, 0xD9, 0x54, 0x62, 0xF5, 0xDE, 0x0A, 0xA1, 0x85, 0xEC, /* x */ 0x36, 0xB3, 0xDA, 0xF8, 0xA2, 0x32, 0x06, 0xF9, 0xC4, 0xF2, 0x99, 0xD7, 0xB2, 0x1A, 0x9C, 0x36, 0x91, 0x37, 0xF2, 0xC8, 0x4A, 0xE1, 0xAA, 0x0D, /* y */ 0x76, 0x5B, 0xE7, 0x34, 0x33, 0xB3, 0xF9, 0x5E, 0x33, 0x29, 0x32, 0xE7, 0x0E, 0xA2, 0x45, 0xCA, 0x24, 0x18, 0xEA, 0x0E, 0xF9, 0x80, 0x18, 0xFB, /* order */ 0x40, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x04, 0xA2, 0x0E, 0x90, 0xC3, 0x90, 0x67, 0xC8, 0x93, 0xBB, 0xB9, 0xA5 } }; static const struct { EC_CURVE_DATA h; unsigned char data[20 + 24 * 6]; } _EC_X9_62_CHAR2_191V2 = { { NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field, 20, 24, 4 }, { /* seed */ 0x08, 0x71, 0xEF, 0x2F, 0xEF, 0x24, 0xD6, 0x96, 0xE6, 0x76, 0x87, 0x56, 0x15, 0x17, 0x58, 0xBE, 0xE0, 0xD9, 0x5C, 0x15, /* p */ 0x80, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x02, 0x01, /* a */ 0x40, 0x10, 0x28, 0x77, 0x4D, 0x77, 0x77, 0xC7, 0xB7, 0x66, 0x6D, 0x13, 0x66, 0xEA, 0x43, 0x20, 0x71, 0x27, 0x4F, 0x89, 0xFF, 0x01, 0xE7, 0x18, /* b */ 0x06, 0x20, 0x04, 0x8D, 0x28, 0xBC, 0xBD, 0x03, 0xB6, 0x24, 0x9C, 0x99, 0x18, 0x2B, 0x7C, 0x8C, 0xD1, 0x97, 0x00, 0xC3, 0x62, 0xC4, 0x6A, 0x01, /* x */ 0x38, 0x09, 0xB2, 0xB7, 0xCC, 0x1B, 0x28, 0xCC, 0x5A, 0x87, 0x92, 0x6A, 0xAD, 0x83, 0xFD, 0x28, 0x78, 0x9E, 0x81, 0xE2, 0xC9, 0xE3, 0xBF, 0x10, /* y */ 0x17, 0x43, 0x43, 0x86, 0x62, 0x6D, 0x14, 0xF3, 0xDB, 0xF0, 0x17, 0x60, 0xD9, 0x21, 0x3A, 0x3E, 0x1C, 0xF3, 0x7A, 0xEC, 0x43, 0x7D, 0x66, 0x8A, /* order */ 0x20, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x50, 0x50, 0x8C, 0xB8, 0x9F, 0x65, 0x28, 0x24, 0xE0, 0x6B, 0x81, 0x73 } }; static const struct { EC_CURVE_DATA h; unsigned char data[20 + 24 * 6]; } _EC_X9_62_CHAR2_191V3 = { { NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field, 20, 24, 6 }, { /* seed */ 0xE0, 0x53, 0x51, 0x2D, 0xC6, 0x84, 0xD6, 0x96, 0xE6, 0x76, 0x87, 0x56, 0x15, 0x17, 0x50, 0x67, 0xAE, 0x78, 0x6D, 0x1F, /* p */ 0x80, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x02, 0x01, /* a */ 0x6C, 0x01, 0x07, 0x47, 0x56, 0x09, 0x91, 0x22, 0x22, 0x10, 0x56, 0x91, 0x1C, 0x77, 0xD7, 0x7E, 0x77, 0xA7, 0x77, 0xE7, 0xE7, 0xE7, 0x7F, 0xCB, /* b */ 0x71, 0xFE, 0x1A, 0xF9, 0x26, 0xCF, 0x84, 0x79, 0x89, 0xEF, 0xEF, 0x8D, 0xB4, 0x59, 0xF6, 0x63, 0x94, 0xD9, 0x0F, 0x32, 0xAD, 0x3F, 0x15, 0xE8, /* x */ 0x37, 0x5D, 0x4C, 0xE2, 0x4F, 0xDE, 0x43, 0x44, 0x89, 0xDE, 0x87, 0x46, 0xE7, 0x17, 0x86, 0x01, 0x50, 0x09, 0xE6, 0x6E, 0x38, 0xA9, 0x26, 0xDD, /* y */ 0x54, 0x5A, 0x39, 0x17, 0x61, 0x96, 0x57, 0x5D, 0x98, 0x59, 0x99, 0x36, 0x6E, 0x6A, 0xD3, 0x4C, 0xE0, 0xA7, 0x7C, 0xD7, 0x12, 0x7B, 0x06, 0xBE, /* order */ 0x15, 0x55, 0x55, 0x55, 0x55, 0x55, 0x55, 0x55, 0x55, 0x55, 0x55, 0x55, 0x61, 0x0C, 0x0B, 0x19, 0x68, 0x12, 0xBF, 0xB6, 0x28, 0x8A, 0x3E, 0xA3 } }; static const struct { EC_CURVE_DATA h; unsigned char data[0 + 27 * 6]; } _EC_X9_62_CHAR2_208W1 = { { NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field, 0, 27, 0xFE48 }, { /* no seed */ /* p */ 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x08, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x07, /* a */ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, /* b */ 0x00, 0xC8, 0x61, 0x9E, 0xD4, 0x5A, 0x62, 0xE6, 0x21, 0x2E, 0x11, 0x60, 0x34, 0x9E, 0x2B, 0xFA, 0x84, 0x44, 0x39, 0xFA, 0xFC, 0x2A, 0x3F, 0xD1, 0x63, 0x8F, 0x9E, /* x */ 0x00, 0x89, 0xFD, 0xFB, 0xE4, 0xAB, 0xE1, 0x93, 0xDF, 0x95, 0x59, 0xEC, 0xF0, 0x7A, 0xC0, 0xCE, 0x78, 0x55, 0x4E, 0x27, 0x84, 0xEB, 0x8C, 0x1E, 0xD1, 0xA5, 0x7A, /* y */ 0x00, 0x0F, 0x55, 0xB5, 0x1A, 0x06, 0xE7, 0x8E, 0x9A, 0xC3, 0x8A, 0x03, 0x5F, 0xF5, 0x20, 0xD8, 0xB0, 0x17, 0x81, 0xBE, 0xB1, 0xA6, 0xBB, 0x08, 0x61, 0x7D, 0xE3, /* order */ 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x01, 0xBA, 0xF9, 0x5C, 0x97, 0x23, 0xC5, 0x7B, 0x6C, 0x21, 0xDA, 0x2E, 0xFF, 0x2D, 0x5E, 0xD5, 0x88, 0xBD, 0xD5, 0x71, 0x7E, 0x21, 0x2F, 0x9D } }; static const struct { EC_CURVE_DATA h; unsigned char data[20 + 30 * 6]; } _EC_X9_62_CHAR2_239V1 = { { NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field, 20, 30, 4 }, { /* seed */ 0xD3, 0x4B, 0x9A, 0x4D, 0x69, 0x6E, 0x67, 0x68, 0x75, 0x61, 0x51, 0x75, 0xCA, 0x71, 0xB9, 0x20, 0xBF, 0xEF, 0xB0, 0x5D, /* p */ 0x80, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x10, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, /* a */ 0x32, 0x01, 0x08, 0x57, 0x07, 0x7C, 0x54, 0x31, 0x12, 0x3A, 0x46, 0xB8, 0x08, 0x90, 0x67, 0x56, 0xF5, 0x43, 0x42, 0x3E, 0x8D, 0x27, 0x87, 0x75, 0x78, 0x12, 0x57, 0x78, 0xAC, 0x76, /* b */ 0x79, 0x04, 0x08, 0xF2, 0xEE, 0xDA, 0xF3, 0x92, 0xB0, 0x12, 0xED, 0xEF, 0xB3, 0x39, 0x2F, 0x30, 0xF4, 0x32, 0x7C, 0x0C, 0xA3, 0xF3, 0x1F, 0xC3, 0x83, 0xC4, 0x22, 0xAA, 0x8C, 0x16, /* x */ 0x57, 0x92, 0x70, 0x98, 0xFA, 0x93, 0x2E, 0x7C, 0x0A, 0x96, 0xD3, 0xFD, 0x5B, 0x70, 0x6E, 0xF7, 0xE5, 0xF5, 0xC1, 0x56, 0xE1, 0x6B, 0x7E, 0x7C, 0x86, 0x03, 0x85, 0x52, 0xE9, 0x1D, /* y */ 0x61, 0xD8, 0xEE, 0x50, 0x77, 0xC3, 0x3F, 0xEC, 0xF6, 0xF1, 0xA1, 0x6B, 0x26, 0x8D, 0xE4, 0x69, 0xC3, 0xC7, 0x74, 0x4E, 0xA9, 0xA9, 0x71, 0x64, 0x9F, 0xC7, 0xA9, 0x61, 0x63, 0x05, /* order */ 0x20, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x0F, 0x4D, 0x42, 0xFF, 0xE1, 0x49, 0x2A, 0x49, 0x93, 0xF1, 0xCA, 0xD6, 0x66, 0xE4, 0x47 } }; static const struct { EC_CURVE_DATA h; unsigned char data[20 + 30 * 6]; } _EC_X9_62_CHAR2_239V2 = { { NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field, 20, 30, 6 }, { /* seed */ 0x2A, 0xA6, 0x98, 0x2F, 0xDF, 0xA4, 0xD6, 0x96, 0xE6, 0x76, 0x87, 0x56, 0x15, 0x17, 0x5D, 0x26, 0x67, 0x27, 0x27, 0x7D, /* p */ 0x80, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x10, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, /* a */ 0x42, 0x30, 0x01, 0x77, 0x57, 0xA7, 0x67, 0xFA, 0xE4, 0x23, 0x98, 0x56, 0x9B, 0x74, 0x63, 0x25, 0xD4, 0x53, 0x13, 0xAF, 0x07, 0x66, 0x26, 0x64, 0x79, 0xB7, 0x56, 0x54, 0xE6, 0x5F, /* b */ 0x50, 0x37, 0xEA, 0x65, 0x41, 0x96, 0xCF, 0xF0, 0xCD, 0x82, 0xB2, 0xC1, 0x4A, 0x2F, 0xCF, 0x2E, 0x3F, 0xF8, 0x77, 0x52, 0x85, 0xB5, 0x45, 0x72, 0x2F, 0x03, 0xEA, 0xCD, 0xB7, 0x4B, /* x */ 0x28, 0xF9, 0xD0, 0x4E, 0x90, 0x00, 0x69, 0xC8, 0xDC, 0x47, 0xA0, 0x85, 0x34, 0xFE, 0x76, 0xD2, 0xB9, 0x00, 0xB7, 0xD7, 0xEF, 0x31, 0xF5, 0x70, 0x9F, 0x20, 0x0C, 0x4C, 0xA2, 0x05, /* y */ 0x56, 0x67, 0x33, 0x4C, 0x45, 0xAF, 0xF3, 0xB5, 0xA0, 0x3B, 0xAD, 0x9D, 0xD7, 0x5E, 0x2C, 0x71, 0xA9, 0x93, 0x62, 0x56, 0x7D, 0x54, 0x53, 0xF7, 0xFA, 0x6E, 0x22, 0x7E, 0xC8, 0x33, /* order */ 0x15, 0x55, 0x55, 0x55, 0x55, 0x55, 0x55, 0x55, 0x55, 0x55, 0x55, 0x55, 0x55, 0x55, 0x55, 0x3C, 0x6F, 0x28, 0x85, 0x25, 0x9C, 0x31, 0xE3, 0xFC, 0xDF, 0x15, 0x46, 0x24, 0x52, 0x2D } }; static const struct { EC_CURVE_DATA h; unsigned char data[20 + 30 * 6]; } _EC_X9_62_CHAR2_239V3 = { { NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field, 20, 30, 0xA }, { /* seed */ 0x9E, 0x07, 0x6F, 0x4D, 0x69, 0x6E, 0x67, 0x68, 0x75, 0x61, 0x51, 0x75, 0xE1, 0x1E, 0x9F, 0xDD, 0x77, 0xF9, 0x20, 0x41, /* p */ 0x80, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x10, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, /* a */ 0x01, 0x23, 0x87, 0x74, 0x66, 0x6A, 0x67, 0x76, 0x6D, 0x66, 0x76, 0xF7, 0x78, 0xE6, 0x76, 0xB6, 0x69, 0x99, 0x17, 0x66, 0x66, 0xE6, 0x87, 0x66, 0x6D, 0x87, 0x66, 0xC6, 0x6A, 0x9F, /* b */ 0x6A, 0x94, 0x19, 0x77, 0xBA, 0x9F, 0x6A, 0x43, 0x51, 0x99, 0xAC, 0xFC, 0x51, 0x06, 0x7E, 0xD5, 0x87, 0xF5, 0x19, 0xC5, 0xEC, 0xB5, 0x41, 0xB8, 0xE4, 0x41, 0x11, 0xDE, 0x1D, 0x40, /* x */ 0x70, 0xF6, 0xE9, 0xD0, 0x4D, 0x28, 0x9C, 0x4E, 0x89, 0x91, 0x3C, 0xE3, 0x53, 0x0B, 0xFD, 0xE9, 0x03, 0x97, 0x7D, 0x42, 0xB1, 0x46, 0xD5, 0x39, 0xBF, 0x1B, 0xDE, 0x4E, 0x9C, 0x92, /* y */ 0x2E, 0x5A, 0x0E, 0xAF, 0x6E, 0x5E, 0x13, 0x05, 0xB9, 0x00, 0x4D, 0xCE, 0x5C, 0x0E, 0xD7, 0xFE, 0x59, 0xA3, 0x56, 0x08, 0xF3, 0x38, 0x37, 0xC8, 0x16, 0xD8, 0x0B, 0x79, 0xF4, 0x61, /* order */ 0x0C, 0xCC, 0xCC, 0xCC, 0xCC, 0xCC, 0xCC, 0xCC, 0xCC, 0xCC, 0xCC, 0xCC, 0xCC, 0xCC, 0xCC, 0xAC, 0x49, 0x12, 0xD2, 0xD9, 0xDF, 0x90, 0x3E, 0xF9, 0x88, 0x8B, 0x8A, 0x0E, 0x4C, 0xFF } }; static const struct { EC_CURVE_DATA h; unsigned char data[0 + 35 * 6]; } _EC_X9_62_CHAR2_272W1 = { { NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field, 0, 35, 0xFF06 }, { /* no seed */ /* p */ 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x0B, /* a */ 0x00, 0x91, 0xA0, 0x91, 0xF0, 0x3B, 0x5F, 0xBA, 0x4A, 0xB2, 0xCC, 0xF4, 0x9C, 0x4E, 0xDD, 0x22, 0x0F, 0xB0, 0x28, 0x71, 0x2D, 0x42, 0xBE, 0x75, 0x2B, 0x2C, 0x40, 0x09, 0x4D, 0xBA, 0xCD, 0xB5, 0x86, 0xFB, 0x20, /* b */ 0x00, 0x71, 0x67, 0xEF, 0xC9, 0x2B, 0xB2, 0xE3, 0xCE, 0x7C, 0x8A, 0xAA, 0xFF, 0x34, 0xE1, 0x2A, 0x9C, 0x55, 0x70, 0x03, 0xD7, 0xC7, 0x3A, 0x6F, 0xAF, 0x00, 0x3F, 0x99, 0xF6, 0xCC, 0x84, 0x82, 0xE5, 0x40, 0xF7, /* x */ 0x00, 0x61, 0x08, 0xBA, 0xBB, 0x2C, 0xEE, 0xBC, 0xF7, 0x87, 0x05, 0x8A, 0x05, 0x6C, 0xBE, 0x0C, 0xFE, 0x62, 0x2D, 0x77, 0x23, 0xA2, 0x89, 0xE0, 0x8A, 0x07, 0xAE, 0x13, 0xEF, 0x0D, 0x10, 0xD1, 0x71, 0xDD, 0x8D, /* y */ 0x00, 0x10, 0xC7, 0x69, 0x57, 0x16, 0x85, 0x1E, 0xEF, 0x6B, 0xA7, 0xF6, 0x87, 0x2E, 0x61, 0x42, 0xFB, 0xD2, 0x41, 0xB8, 0x30, 0xFF, 0x5E, 0xFC, 0xAC, 0xEC, 0xCA, 0xB0, 0x5E, 0x02, 0x00, 0x5D, 0xDE, 0x9D, 0x23, /* order */ 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0xFA, 0xF5, 0x13, 0x54, 0xE0, 0xE3, 0x9E, 0x48, 0x92, 0xDF, 0x6E, 0x31, 0x9C, 0x72, 0xC8, 0x16, 0x16, 0x03, 0xFA, 0x45, 0xAA, 0x7B, 0x99, 0x8A, 0x16, 0x7B, 0x8F, 0x1E, 0x62, 0x95, 0x21 } }; static const struct { EC_CURVE_DATA h; unsigned char data[0 + 39 * 6]; } _EC_X9_62_CHAR2_304W1 = { { NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field, 0, 39, 0xFE2E }, { /* no seed */ /* p */ 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x08, 0x07, /* a */ 0x00, 0xFD, 0x0D, 0x69, 0x31, 0x49, 0xA1, 0x18, 0xF6, 0x51, 0xE6, 0xDC, 0xE6, 0x80, 0x20, 0x85, 0x37, 0x7E, 0x5F, 0x88, 0x2D, 0x1B, 0x51, 0x0B, 0x44, 0x16, 0x00, 0x74, 0xC1, 0x28, 0x80, 0x78, 0x36, 0x5A, 0x03, 0x96, 0xC8, 0xE6, 0x81, /* b */ 0x00, 0xBD, 0xDB, 0x97, 0xE5, 0x55, 0xA5, 0x0A, 0x90, 0x8E, 0x43, 0xB0, 0x1C, 0x79, 0x8E, 0xA5, 0xDA, 0xA6, 0x78, 0x8F, 0x1E, 0xA2, 0x79, 0x4E, 0xFC, 0xF5, 0x71, 0x66, 0xB8, 0xC1, 0x40, 0x39, 0x60, 0x1E, 0x55, 0x82, 0x73, 0x40, 0xBE, /* x */ 0x00, 0x19, 0x7B, 0x07, 0x84, 0x5E, 0x9B, 0xE2, 0xD9, 0x6A, 0xDB, 0x0F, 0x5F, 0x3C, 0x7F, 0x2C, 0xFF, 0xBD, 0x7A, 0x3E, 0xB8, 0xB6, 0xFE, 0xC3, 0x5C, 0x7F, 0xD6, 0x7F, 0x26, 0xDD, 0xF6, 0x28, 0x5A, 0x64, 0x4F, 0x74, 0x0A, 0x26, 0x14, /* y */ 0x00, 0xE1, 0x9F, 0xBE, 0xB7, 0x6E, 0x0D, 0xA1, 0x71, 0x51, 0x7E, 0xCF, 0x40, 0x1B, 0x50, 0x28, 0x9B, 0xF0, 0x14, 0x10, 0x32, 0x88, 0x52, 0x7A, 0x9B, 0x41, 0x6A, 0x10, 0x5E, 0x80, 0x26, 0x0B, 0x54, 0x9F, 0xDC, 0x1B, 0x92, 0xC0, 0x3B, /* order */ 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x01, 0xD5, 0x56, 0x57, 0x2A, 0xAB, 0xAC, 0x80, 0x01, 0x01, 0xD5, 0x56, 0x57, 0x2A, 0xAB, 0xAC, 0x80, 0x01, 0x02, 0x2D, 0x5C, 0x91, 0xDD, 0x17, 0x3F, 0x8F, 0xB5, 0x61, 0xDA, 0x68, 0x99, 0x16, 0x44, 0x43, 0x05, 0x1D } }; static const struct { EC_CURVE_DATA h; unsigned char data[20 + 45 * 6]; } _EC_X9_62_CHAR2_359V1 = { { NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field, 20, 45, 0x4C }, { /* seed */ 0x2B, 0x35, 0x49, 0x20, 0xB7, 0x24, 0xD6, 0x96, 0xE6, 0x76, 0x87, 0x56, 0x15, 0x17, 0x58, 0x5B, 0xA1, 0x33, 0x2D, 0xC6, /* p */ 0x80, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x10, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, /* a */ 0x56, 0x67, 0x67, 0x6A, 0x65, 0x4B, 0x20, 0x75, 0x4F, 0x35, 0x6E, 0xA9, 0x20, 0x17, 0xD9, 0x46, 0x56, 0x7C, 0x46, 0x67, 0x55, 0x56, 0xF1, 0x95, 0x56, 0xA0, 0x46, 0x16, 0xB5, 0x67, 0xD2, 0x23, 0xA5, 0xE0, 0x56, 0x56, 0xFB, 0x54, 0x90, 0x16, 0xA9, 0x66, 0x56, 0xA5, 0x57, /* b */ 0x24, 0x72, 0xE2, 0xD0, 0x19, 0x7C, 0x49, 0x36, 0x3F, 0x1F, 0xE7, 0xF5, 0xB6, 0xDB, 0x07, 0x5D, 0x52, 0xB6, 0x94, 0x7D, 0x13, 0x5D, 0x8C, 0xA4, 0x45, 0x80, 0x5D, 0x39, 0xBC, 0x34, 0x56, 0x26, 0x08, 0x96, 0x87, 0x74, 0x2B, 0x63, 0x29, 0xE7, 0x06, 0x80, 0x23, 0x19, 0x88, /* x */ 0x3C, 0x25, 0x8E, 0xF3, 0x04, 0x77, 0x67, 0xE7, 0xED, 0xE0, 0xF1, 0xFD, 0xAA, 0x79, 0xDA, 0xEE, 0x38, 0x41, 0x36, 0x6A, 0x13, 0x2E, 0x16, 0x3A, 0xCE, 0xD4, 0xED, 0x24, 0x01, 0xDF, 0x9C, 0x6B, 0xDC, 0xDE, 0x98, 0xE8, 0xE7, 0x07, 0xC0, 0x7A, 0x22, 0x39, 0xB1, 0xB0, 0x97, /* y */ 0x53, 0xD7, 0xE0, 0x85, 0x29, 0x54, 0x70, 0x48, 0x12, 0x1E, 0x9C, 0x95, 0xF3, 0x79, 0x1D, 0xD8, 0x04, 0x96, 0x39, 0x48, 0xF3, 0x4F, 0xAE, 0x7B, 0xF4, 0x4E, 0xA8, 0x23, 0x65, 0xDC, 0x78, 0x68, 0xFE, 0x57, 0xE4, 0xAE, 0x2D, 0xE2, 0x11, 0x30, 0x5A, 0x40, 0x71, 0x04, 0xBD, /* order */ 0x01, 0xAF, 0x28, 0x6B, 0xCA, 0x1A, 0xF2, 0x86, 0xBC, 0xA1, 0xAF, 0x28, 0x6B, 0xCA, 0x1A, 0xF2, 0x86, 0xBC, 0xA1, 0xAF, 0x28, 0x6B, 0xC9, 0xFB, 0x8F, 0x6B, 0x85, 0xC5, 0x56, 0x89, 0x2C, 0x20, 0xA7, 0xEB, 0x96, 0x4F, 0xE7, 0x71, 0x9E, 0x74, 0xF4, 0x90, 0x75, 0x8D, 0x3B } }; static const struct { EC_CURVE_DATA h; unsigned char data[0 + 47 * 6]; } _EC_X9_62_CHAR2_368W1 = { { NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field, 0, 47, 0xFF70 }, { /* no seed */ /* p */ 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x20, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x07, /* a */ 0x00, 0xE0, 0xD2, 0xEE, 0x25, 0x09, 0x52, 0x06, 0xF5, 0xE2, 0xA4, 0xF9, 0xED, 0x22, 0x9F, 0x1F, 0x25, 0x6E, 0x79, 0xA0, 0xE2, 0xB4, 0x55, 0x97, 0x0D, 0x8D, 0x0D, 0x86, 0x5B, 0xD9, 0x47, 0x78, 0xC5, 0x76, 0xD6, 0x2F, 0x0A, 0xB7, 0x51, 0x9C, 0xCD, 0x2A, 0x1A, 0x90, 0x6A, 0xE3, 0x0D, /* b */ 0x00, 0xFC, 0x12, 0x17, 0xD4, 0x32, 0x0A, 0x90, 0x45, 0x2C, 0x76, 0x0A, 0x58, 0xED, 0xCD, 0x30, 0xC8, 0xDD, 0x06, 0x9B, 0x3C, 0x34, 0x45, 0x38, 0x37, 0xA3, 0x4E, 0xD5, 0x0C, 0xB5, 0x49, 0x17, 0xE1, 0xC2, 0x11, 0x2D, 0x84, 0xD1, 0x64, 0xF4, 0x44, 0xF8, 0xF7, 0x47, 0x86, 0x04, 0x6A, /* x */ 0x00, 0x10, 0x85, 0xE2, 0x75, 0x53, 0x81, 0xDC, 0xCC, 0xE3, 0xC1, 0x55, 0x7A, 0xFA, 0x10, 0xC2, 0xF0, 0xC0, 0xC2, 0x82, 0x56, 0x46, 0xC5, 0xB3, 0x4A, 0x39, 0x4C, 0xBC, 0xFA, 0x8B, 0xC1, 0x6B, 0x22, 0xE7, 0xE7, 0x89, 0xE9, 0x27, 0xBE, 0x21, 0x6F, 0x02, 0xE1, 0xFB, 0x13, 0x6A, 0x5F, /* y */ 0x00, 0x7B, 0x3E, 0xB1, 0xBD, 0xDC, 0xBA, 0x62, 0xD5, 0xD8, 0xB2, 0x05, 0x9B, 0x52, 0x57, 0x97, 0xFC, 0x73, 0x82, 0x2C, 0x59, 0x05, 0x9C, 0x62, 0x3A, 0x45, 0xFF, 0x38, 0x43, 0xCE, 0xE8, 0xF8, 0x7C, 0xD1, 0x85, 0x5A, 0xDA, 0xA8, 0x1E, 0x2A, 0x07, 0x50, 0xB8, 0x0F, 0xDA, 0x23, 0x10, /* order */ 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x90, 0x51, 0x2D, 0xA9, 0xAF, 0x72, 0xB0, 0x83, 0x49, 0xD9, 0x8A, 0x5D, 0xD4, 0xC7, 0xB0, 0x53, 0x2E, 0xCA, 0x51, 0xCE, 0x03, 0xE2, 0xD1, 0x0F, 0x3B, 0x7A, 0xC5, 0x79, 0xBD, 0x87, 0xE9, 0x09, 0xAE, 0x40, 0xA6, 0xF1, 0x31, 0xE9, 0xCF, 0xCE, 0x5B, 0xD9, 0x67 } }; static const struct { EC_CURVE_DATA h; unsigned char data[0 + 54 * 6]; } _EC_X9_62_CHAR2_431R1 = { { NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field, 0, 54, 0x2760 }, { /* no seed */ /* p */ 0x80, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, /* a */ 0x1A, 0x82, 0x7E, 0xF0, 0x0D, 0xD6, 0xFC, 0x0E, 0x23, 0x4C, 0xAF, 0x04, 0x6C, 0x6A, 0x5D, 0x8A, 0x85, 0x39, 0x5B, 0x23, 0x6C, 0xC4, 0xAD, 0x2C, 0xF3, 0x2A, 0x0C, 0xAD, 0xBD, 0xC9, 0xDD, 0xF6, 0x20, 0xB0, 0xEB, 0x99, 0x06, 0xD0, 0x95, 0x7F, 0x6C, 0x6F, 0xEA, 0xCD, 0x61, 0x54, 0x68, 0xDF, 0x10, 0x4D, 0xE2, 0x96, 0xCD, 0x8F, /* b */ 0x10, 0xD9, 0xB4, 0xA3, 0xD9, 0x04, 0x7D, 0x8B, 0x15, 0x43, 0x59, 0xAB, 0xFB, 0x1B, 0x7F, 0x54, 0x85, 0xB0, 0x4C, 0xEB, 0x86, 0x82, 0x37, 0xDD, 0xC9, 0xDE, 0xDA, 0x98, 0x2A, 0x67, 0x9A, 0x5A, 0x91, 0x9B, 0x62, 0x6D, 0x4E, 0x50, 0xA8, 0xDD, 0x73, 0x1B, 0x10, 0x7A, 0x99, 0x62, 0x38, 0x1F, 0xB5, 0xD8, 0x07, 0xBF, 0x26, 0x18, /* x */ 0x12, 0x0F, 0xC0, 0x5D, 0x3C, 0x67, 0xA9, 0x9D, 0xE1, 0x61, 0xD2, 0xF4, 0x09, 0x26, 0x22, 0xFE, 0xCA, 0x70, 0x1B, 0xE4, 0xF5, 0x0F, 0x47, 0x58, 0x71, 0x4E, 0x8A, 0x87, 0xBB, 0xF2, 0xA6, 0x58, 0xEF, 0x8C, 0x21, 0xE7, 0xC5, 0xEF, 0xE9, 0x65, 0x36, 0x1F, 0x6C, 0x29, 0x99, 0xC0, 0xC2, 0x47, 0xB0, 0xDB, 0xD7, 0x0C, 0xE6, 0xB7, /* y */ 0x20, 0xD0, 0xAF, 0x89, 0x03, 0xA9, 0x6F, 0x8D, 0x5F, 0xA2, 0xC2, 0x55, 0x74, 0x5D, 0x3C, 0x45, 0x1B, 0x30, 0x2C, 0x93, 0x46, 0xD9, 0xB7, 0xE4, 0x85, 0xE7, 0xBC, 0xE4, 0x1F, 0x6B, 0x59, 0x1F, 0x3E, 0x8F, 0x6A, 0xDD, 0xCB, 0xB0, 0xBC, 0x4C, 0x2F, 0x94, 0x7A, 0x7D, 0xE1, 0xA8, 0x9B, 0x62, 0x5D, 0x6A, 0x59, 0x8B, 0x37, 0x60, /* order */ 0x00, 0x03, 0x40, 0x34, 0x03, 0x40, 0x34, 0x03, 0x40, 0x34, 0x03, 0x40, 0x34, 0x03, 0x40, 0x34, 0x03, 0x40, 0x34, 0x03, 0x40, 0x34, 0x03, 0x40, 0x34, 0x03, 0x40, 0x34, 0x03, 0x23, 0xC3, 0x13, 0xFA, 0xB5, 0x05, 0x89, 0x70, 0x3B, 0x5E, 0xC6, 0x8D, 0x35, 0x87, 0xFE, 0xC6, 0x0D, 0x16, 0x1C, 0xC1, 0x49, 0xC1, 0xAD, 0x4A, 0x91 } }; static const struct { EC_CURVE_DATA h; unsigned char data[0 + 15 * 6]; } _EC_WTLS_1 = { { NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field, 0, 15, 2 }, { /* no seed */ /* p */ 0x02, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x02, 0x01, /* a */ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, /* b */ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, /* x */ 0x01, 0x66, 0x79, 0x79, 0xA4, 0x0B, 0xA4, 0x97, 0xE5, 0xD5, 0xC2, 0x70, 0x78, 0x06, 0x17, /* y */ 0x00, 0xF4, 0x4B, 0x4A, 0xF1, 0xEC, 0xC2, 0x63, 0x0E, 0x08, 0x78, 0x5C, 0xEB, 0xCC, 0x15, /* order */ 0x00, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFD, 0xBF, 0x91, 0xAF, 0x6D, 0xEA, 0x73 } }; /* IPSec curves */ /* * NOTE: The of curves over a extension field of non prime degree is not * recommended (Weil-descent). As the group order is not a prime this curve * is not suitable for ECDSA. */ static const struct { EC_CURVE_DATA h; unsigned char data[0 + 20 * 6]; } _EC_IPSEC_155_ID3 = { { NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field, 0, 20, 3 }, { /* no seed */ /* p */ 0x08, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x40, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, /* a */ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, /* b */ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x07, 0x33, 0x8f, /* x */ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x7b, /* y */ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, 0xc8, /* order */ 0x02, 0xAA, 0xAA, 0xAA, 0xAA, 0xAA, 0xAA, 0xAA, 0xAA, 0xAA, 0xC7, 0xF3, 0xC7, 0x88, 0x1B, 0xD0, 0x86, 0x8F, 0xA8, 0x6C } }; /* * NOTE: The of curves over a extension field of non prime degree is not * recommended (Weil-descent). As the group order is not a prime this curve * is not suitable for ECDSA. */ static const struct { EC_CURVE_DATA h; unsigned char data[0 + 24 * 6]; } _EC_IPSEC_185_ID4 = { { NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field, 0, 24, 2 }, { /* no seed */ /* p */ 0x02, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x20, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, /* a */ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, /* b */ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x1e, 0xe9, /* x */ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x18, /* y */ 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x0d, /* order */ 0x00, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xFF, 0xED, 0xF9, 0x7C, 0x44, 0xDB, 0x9F, 0x24, 0x20, 0xBA, 0xFC, 0xA7, 0x5E } }; #endif /* * These curves were added by Annie Yousar. * For the definition of RFC 5639 curves see * http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc5639.txt These curves are generated verifiable * at random, nevertheless the seed is omitted as parameter because the * generation mechanism is different from those defined in ANSI X9.62. */ static const struct { EC_CURVE_DATA h; unsigned char data[0 + 20 * 6]; } _EC_brainpoolP160r1 = { { NID_X9_62_prime_field, 0, 20, 1 }, { /* no seed */ /* p */ 0xE9, 0x5E, 0x4A, 0x5F, 0x73, 0x70, 0x59, 0xDC, 0x60, 0xDF, 0xC7, 0xAD, 0x95, 0xB3, 0xD8, 0x13, 0x95, 0x15, 0x62, 0x0F, /* a */ 0x34, 0x0E, 0x7B, 0xE2, 0xA2, 0x80, 0xEB, 0x74, 0xE2, 0xBE, 0x61, 0xBA, 0xDA, 0x74, 0x5D, 0x97, 0xE8, 0xF7, 0xC3, 0x00, /* b */ 0x1E, 0x58, 0x9A, 0x85, 0x95, 0x42, 0x34, 0x12, 0x13, 0x4F, 0xAA, 0x2D, 0xBD, 0xEC, 0x95, 0xC8, 0xD8, 0x67, 0x5E, 0x58, /* x */ 0xBE, 0xD5, 0xAF, 0x16, 0xEA, 0x3F, 0x6A, 0x4F, 0x62, 0x93, 0x8C, 0x46, 0x31, 0xEB, 0x5A, 0xF7, 0xBD, 0xBC, 0xDB, 0xC3, /* y */ 0x16, 0x67, 0xCB, 0x47, 0x7A, 0x1A, 0x8E, 0xC3, 0x38, 0xF9, 0x47, 0x41, 0x66, 0x9C, 0x97, 0x63, 0x16, 0xDA, 0x63, 0x21, /* order */ 0xE9, 0x5E, 0x4A, 0x5F, 0x73, 0x70, 0x59, 0xDC, 0x60, 0xDF, 0x59, 0x91, 0xD4, 0x50, 0x29, 0x40, 0x9E, 0x60, 0xFC, 0x09 } }; static const struct { EC_CURVE_DATA h; unsigned char data[0 + 20 * 6]; } _EC_brainpoolP160t1 = { { NID_X9_62_prime_field, 0, 20, 1 }, { /* no seed */ /* p */ 0xE9, 0x5E, 0x4A, 0x5F, 0x73, 0x70, 0x59, 0xDC, 0x60, 0xDF, 0xC7, 0xAD, 0x95, 0xB3, 0xD8, 0x13, 0x95, 0x15, 0x62, 0x0F, /* a */ 0xE9, 0x5E, 0x4A, 0x5F, 0x73, 0x70, 0x59, 0xDC, 0x60, 0xDF, 0xC7, 0xAD, 0x95, 0xB3, 0xD8, 0x13, 0x95, 0x15, 0x62, 0x0C, /* b */ 0x7A, 0x55, 0x6B, 0x6D, 0xAE, 0x53, 0x5B, 0x7B, 0x51, 0xED, 0x2C, 0x4D, 0x7D, 0xAA, 0x7A, 0x0B, 0x5C, 0x55, 0xF3, 0x80, /* x */ 0xB1, 0x99, 0xB1, 0x3B, 0x9B, 0x34, 0xEF, 0xC1, 0x39, 0x7E, 0x64, 0xBA, 0xEB, 0x05, 0xAC, 0xC2, 0x65, 0xFF, 0x23, 0x78, /* y */ 0xAD, 0xD6, 0x71, 0x8B, 0x7C, 0x7C, 0x19, 0x61, 0xF0, 0x99, 0x1B, 0x84, 0x24, 0x43, 0x77, 0x21, 0x52, 0xC9, 0xE0, 0xAD, /* order */ 0xE9, 0x5E, 0x4A, 0x5F, 0x73, 0x70, 0x59, 0xDC, 0x60, 0xDF, 0x59, 0x91, 0xD4, 0x50, 0x29, 0x40, 0x9E, 0x60, 0xFC, 0x09 } }; static const struct { EC_CURVE_DATA h; unsigned char data[0 + 24 * 6]; } _EC_brainpoolP192r1 = { { NID_X9_62_prime_field, 0, 24, 1 }, { /* no seed */ /* p */ 0xC3, 0x02, 0xF4, 0x1D, 0x93, 0x2A, 0x36, 0xCD, 0xA7, 0xA3, 0x46, 0x30, 0x93, 0xD1, 0x8D, 0xB7, 0x8F, 0xCE, 0x47, 0x6D, 0xE1, 0xA8, 0x62, 0x97, /* a */ 0x6A, 0x91, 0x17, 0x40, 0x76, 0xB1, 0xE0, 0xE1, 0x9C, 0x39, 0xC0, 0x31, 0xFE, 0x86, 0x85, 0xC1, 0xCA, 0xE0, 0x40, 0xE5, 0xC6, 0x9A, 0x28, 0xEF, /* b */ 0x46, 0x9A, 0x28, 0xEF, 0x7C, 0x28, 0xCC, 0xA3, 0xDC, 0x72, 0x1D, 0x04, 0x4F, 0x44, 0x96, 0xBC, 0xCA, 0x7E, 0xF4, 0x14, 0x6F, 0xBF, 0x25, 0xC9, /* x */ 0xC0, 0xA0, 0x64, 0x7E, 0xAA, 0xB6, 0xA4, 0x87, 0x53, 0xB0, 0x33, 0xC5, 0x6C, 0xB0, 0xF0, 0x90, 0x0A, 0x2F, 0x5C, 0x48, 0x53, 0x37, 0x5F, 0xD6, /* y */ 0x14, 0xB6, 0x90, 0x86, 0x6A, 0xBD, 0x5B, 0xB8, 0x8B, 0x5F, 0x48, 0x28, 0xC1, 0x49, 0x00, 0x02, 0xE6, 0x77, 0x3F, 0xA2, 0xFA, 0x29, 0x9B, 0x8F, /* order */ 0xC3, 0x02, 0xF4, 0x1D, 0x93, 0x2A, 0x36, 0xCD, 0xA7, 0xA3, 0x46, 0x2F, 0x9E, 0x9E, 0x91, 0x6B, 0x5B, 0xE8, 0xF1, 0x02, 0x9A, 0xC4, 0xAC, 0xC1 } }; static const struct { EC_CURVE_DATA h; unsigned char data[0 + 24 * 6]; } _EC_brainpoolP192t1 = { { NID_X9_62_prime_field, 0, 24, 1 }, { /* no seed */ /* p */ 0xC3, 0x02, 0xF4, 0x1D, 0x93, 0x2A, 0x36, 0xCD, 0xA7, 0xA3, 0x46, 0x30, 0x93, 0xD1, 0x8D, 0xB7, 0x8F, 0xCE, 0x47, 0x6D, 0xE1, 0xA8, 0x62, 0x97, /* a */ 0xC3, 0x02, 0xF4, 0x1D, 0x93, 0x2A, 0x36, 0xCD, 0xA7, 0xA3, 0x46, 0x30, 0x93, 0xD1, 0x8D, 0xB7, 0x8F, 0xCE, 0x47, 0x6D, 0xE1, 0xA8, 0x62, 0x94, /* b */ 0x13, 0xD5, 0x6F, 0xFA, 0xEC, 0x78, 0x68, 0x1E, 0x68, 0xF9, 0xDE, 0xB4, 0x3B, 0x35, 0xBE, 0xC2, 0xFB, 0x68, 0x54, 0x2E, 0x27, 0x89, 0x7B, 0x79, /* x */ 0x3A, 0xE9, 0xE5, 0x8C, 0x82, 0xF6, 0x3C, 0x30, 0x28, 0x2E, 0x1F, 0xE7, 0xBB, 0xF4, 0x3F, 0xA7, 0x2C, 0x44, 0x6A, 0xF6, 0xF4, 0x61, 0x81, 0x29, /* y */ 0x09, 0x7E, 0x2C, 0x56, 0x67, 0xC2, 0x22, 0x3A, 0x90, 0x2A, 0xB5, 0xCA, 0x44, 0x9D, 0x00, 0x84, 0xB7, 0xE5, 0xB3, 0xDE, 0x7C, 0xCC, 0x01, 0xC9, /* order */ 0xC3, 0x02, 0xF4, 0x1D, 0x93, 0x2A, 0x36, 0xCD, 0xA7, 0xA3, 0x46, 0x2F, 0x9E, 0x9E, 0x91, 0x6B, 0x5B, 0xE8, 0xF1, 0x02, 0x9A, 0xC4, 0xAC, 0xC1 } }; static const struct { EC_CURVE_DATA h; unsigned char data[0 + 28 * 6]; } _EC_brainpoolP224r1 = { { NID_X9_62_prime_field, 0, 28, 1 }, { /* no seed */ /* p */ 0xD7, 0xC1, 0x34, 0xAA, 0x26, 0x43, 0x66, 0x86, 0x2A, 0x18, 0x30, 0x25, 0x75, 0xD1, 0xD7, 0x87, 0xB0, 0x9F, 0x07, 0x57, 0x97, 0xDA, 0x89, 0xF5, 0x7E, 0xC8, 0xC0, 0xFF, /* a */ 0x68, 0xA5, 0xE6, 0x2C, 0xA9, 0xCE, 0x6C, 0x1C, 0x29, 0x98, 0x03, 0xA6, 0xC1, 0x53, 0x0B, 0x51, 0x4E, 0x18, 0x2A, 0xD8, 0xB0, 0x04, 0x2A, 0x59, 0xCA, 0xD2, 0x9F, 0x43, /* b */ 0x25, 0x80, 0xF6, 0x3C, 0xCF, 0xE4, 0x41, 0x38, 0x87, 0x07, 0x13, 0xB1, 0xA9, 0x23, 0x69, 0xE3, 0x3E, 0x21, 0x35, 0xD2, 0x66, 0xDB, 0xB3, 0x72, 0x38, 0x6C, 0x40, 0x0B, /* x */ 0x0D, 0x90, 0x29, 0xAD, 0x2C, 0x7E, 0x5C, 0xF4, 0x34, 0x08, 0x23, 0xB2, 0xA8, 0x7D, 0xC6, 0x8C, 0x9E, 0x4C, 0xE3, 0x17, 0x4C, 0x1E, 0x6E, 0xFD, 0xEE, 0x12, 0xC0, 0x7D, /* y */ 0x58, 0xAA, 0x56, 0xF7, 0x72, 0xC0, 0x72, 0x6F, 0x24, 0xC6, 0xB8, 0x9E, 0x4E, 0xCD, 0xAC, 0x24, 0x35, 0x4B, 0x9E, 0x99, 0xCA, 0xA3, 0xF6, 0xD3, 0x76, 0x14, 0x02, 0xCD, /* order */ 0xD7, 0xC1, 0x34, 0xAA, 0x26, 0x43, 0x66, 0x86, 0x2A, 0x18, 0x30, 0x25, 0x75, 0xD0, 0xFB, 0x98, 0xD1, 0x16, 0xBC, 0x4B, 0x6D, 0xDE, 0xBC, 0xA3, 0xA5, 0xA7, 0x93, 0x9F } }; static const struct { EC_CURVE_DATA h; unsigned char data[0 + 28 * 6]; } _EC_brainpoolP224t1 = { { NID_X9_62_prime_field, 0, 28, 1 }, { /* no seed */ /* p */ 0xD7, 0xC1, 0x34, 0xAA, 0x26, 0x43, 0x66, 0x86, 0x2A, 0x18, 0x30, 0x25, 0x75, 0xD1, 0xD7, 0x87, 0xB0, 0x9F, 0x07, 0x57, 0x97, 0xDA, 0x89, 0xF5, 0x7E, 0xC8, 0xC0, 0xFF, /* a */ 0xD7, 0xC1, 0x34, 0xAA, 0x26, 0x43, 0x66, 0x86, 0x2A, 0x18, 0x30, 0x25, 0x75, 0xD1, 0xD7, 0x87, 0xB0, 0x9F, 0x07, 0x57, 0x97, 0xDA, 0x89, 0xF5, 0x7E, 0xC8, 0xC0, 0xFC, /* b */ 0x4B, 0x33, 0x7D, 0x93, 0x41, 0x04, 0xCD, 0x7B, 0xEF, 0x27, 0x1B, 0xF6, 0x0C, 0xED, 0x1E, 0xD2, 0x0D, 0xA1, 0x4C, 0x08, 0xB3, 0xBB, 0x64, 0xF1, 0x8A, 0x60, 0x88, 0x8D, /* x */ 0x6A, 0xB1, 0xE3, 0x44, 0xCE, 0x25, 0xFF, 0x38, 0x96, 0x42, 0x4E, 0x7F, 0xFE, 0x14, 0x76, 0x2E, 0xCB, 0x49, 0xF8, 0x92, 0x8A, 0xC0, 0xC7, 0x60, 0x29, 0xB4, 0xD5, 0x80, /* y */ 0x03, 0x74, 0xE9, 0xF5, 0x14, 0x3E, 0x56, 0x8C, 0xD2, 0x3F, 0x3F, 0x4D, 0x7C, 0x0D, 0x4B, 0x1E, 0x41, 0xC8, 0xCC, 0x0D, 0x1C, 0x6A, 0xBD, 0x5F, 0x1A, 0x46, 0xDB, 0x4C, /* order */ 0xD7, 0xC1, 0x34, 0xAA, 0x26, 0x43, 0x66, 0x86, 0x2A, 0x18, 0x30, 0x25, 0x75, 0xD0, 0xFB, 0x98, 0xD1, 0x16, 0xBC, 0x4B, 0x6D, 0xDE, 0xBC, 0xA3, 0xA5, 0xA7, 0x93, 0x9F } }; static const struct { EC_CURVE_DATA h; unsigned char data[0 + 32 * 6]; } _EC_brainpoolP256r1 = { { NID_X9_62_prime_field, 0, 32, 1 }, { /* no seed */ /* p */ 0xA9, 0xFB, 0x57, 0xDB, 0xA1, 0xEE, 0xA9, 0xBC, 0x3E, 0x66, 0x0A, 0x90, 0x9D, 0x83, 0x8D, 0x72, 0x6E, 0x3B, 0xF6, 0x23, 0xD5, 0x26, 0x20, 0x28, 0x20, 0x13, 0x48, 0x1D, 0x1F, 0x6E, 0x53, 0x77, /* a */ 0x7D, 0x5A, 0x09, 0x75, 0xFC, 0x2C, 0x30, 0x57, 0xEE, 0xF6, 0x75, 0x30, 0x41, 0x7A, 0xFF, 0xE7, 0xFB, 0x80, 0x55, 0xC1, 0x26, 0xDC, 0x5C, 0x6C, 0xE9, 0x4A, 0x4B, 0x44, 0xF3, 0x30, 0xB5, 0xD9, /* b */ 0x26, 0xDC, 0x5C, 0x6C, 0xE9, 0x4A, 0x4B, 0x44, 0xF3, 0x30, 0xB5, 0xD9, 0xBB, 0xD7, 0x7C, 0xBF, 0x95, 0x84, 0x16, 0x29, 0x5C, 0xF7, 0xE1, 0xCE, 0x6B, 0xCC, 0xDC, 0x18, 0xFF, 0x8C, 0x07, 0xB6, /* x */ 0x8B, 0xD2, 0xAE, 0xB9, 0xCB, 0x7E, 0x57, 0xCB, 0x2C, 0x4B, 0x48, 0x2F, 0xFC, 0x81, 0xB7, 0xAF, 0xB9, 0xDE, 0x27, 0xE1, 0xE3, 0xBD, 0x23, 0xC2, 0x3A, 0x44, 0x53, 0xBD, 0x9A, 0xCE, 0x32, 0x62, /* y */ 0x54, 0x7E, 0xF8, 0x35, 0xC3, 0xDA, 0xC4, 0xFD, 0x97, 0xF8, 0x46, 0x1A, 0x14, 0x61, 0x1D, 0xC9, 0xC2, 0x77, 0x45, 0x13, 0x2D, 0xED, 0x8E, 0x54, 0x5C, 0x1D, 0x54, 0xC7, 0x2F, 0x04, 0x69, 0x97, /* order */ 0xA9, 0xFB, 0x57, 0xDB, 0xA1, 0xEE, 0xA9, 0xBC, 0x3E, 0x66, 0x0A, 0x90, 0x9D, 0x83, 0x8D, 0x71, 0x8C, 0x39, 0x7A, 0xA3, 0xB5, 0x61, 0xA6, 0xF7, 0x90, 0x1E, 0x0E, 0x82, 0x97, 0x48, 0x56, 0xA7 } }; static const struct { EC_CURVE_DATA h; unsigned char data[0 + 32 * 6]; } _EC_brainpoolP256t1 = { { NID_X9_62_prime_field, 0, 32, 1 }, { /* no seed */ /* p */ 0xA9, 0xFB, 0x57, 0xDB, 0xA1, 0xEE, 0xA9, 0xBC, 0x3E, 0x66, 0x0A, 0x90, 0x9D, 0x83, 0x8D, 0x72, 0x6E, 0x3B, 0xF6, 0x23, 0xD5, 0x26, 0x20, 0x28, 0x20, 0x13, 0x48, 0x1D, 0x1F, 0x6E, 0x53, 0x77, /* a */ 0xA9, 0xFB, 0x57, 0xDB, 0xA1, 0xEE, 0xA9, 0xBC, 0x3E, 0x66, 0x0A, 0x90, 0x9D, 0x83, 0x8D, 0x72, 0x6E, 0x3B, 0xF6, 0x23, 0xD5, 0x26, 0x20, 0x28, 0x20, 0x13, 0x48, 0x1D, 0x1F, 0x6E, 0x53, 0x74, /* b */ 0x66, 0x2C, 0x61, 0xC4, 0x30, 0xD8, 0x4E, 0xA4, 0xFE, 0x66, 0xA7, 0x73, 0x3D, 0x0B, 0x76, 0xB7, 0xBF, 0x93, 0xEB, 0xC4, 0xAF, 0x2F, 0x49, 0x25, 0x6A, 0xE5, 0x81, 0x01, 0xFE, 0xE9, 0x2B, 0x04, /* x */ 0xA3, 0xE8, 0xEB, 0x3C, 0xC1, 0xCF, 0xE7, 0xB7, 0x73, 0x22, 0x13, 0xB2, 0x3A, 0x65, 0x61, 0x49, 0xAF, 0xA1, 0x42, 0xC4, 0x7A, 0xAF, 0xBC, 0x2B, 0x79, 0xA1, 0x91, 0x56, 0x2E, 0x13, 0x05, 0xF4, /* y */ 0x2D, 0x99, 0x6C, 0x82, 0x34, 0x39, 0xC5, 0x6D, 0x7F, 0x7B, 0x22, 0xE1, 0x46, 0x44, 0x41, 0x7E, 0x69, 0xBC, 0xB6, 0xDE, 0x39, 0xD0, 0x27, 0x00, 0x1D, 0xAB, 0xE8, 0xF3, 0x5B, 0x25, 0xC9, 0xBE, /* order */ 0xA9, 0xFB, 0x57, 0xDB, 0xA1, 0xEE, 0xA9, 0xBC, 0x3E, 0x66, 0x0A, 0x90, 0x9D, 0x83, 0x8D, 0x71, 0x8C, 0x39, 0x7A, 0xA3, 0xB5, 0x61, 0xA6, 0xF7, 0x90, 0x1E, 0x0E, 0x82, 0x97, 0x48, 0x56, 0xA7 } }; static const struct { EC_CURVE_DATA h; unsigned char data[0 + 40 * 6]; } _EC_brainpoolP320r1 = { { NID_X9_62_prime_field, 0, 40, 1 }, { /* no seed */ /* p */ 0xD3, 0x5E, 0x47, 0x20, 0x36, 0xBC, 0x4F, 0xB7, 0xE1, 0x3C, 0x78, 0x5E, 0xD2, 0x01, 0xE0, 0x65, 0xF9, 0x8F, 0xCF, 0xA6, 0xF6, 0xF4, 0x0D, 0xEF, 0x4F, 0x92, 0xB9, 0xEC, 0x78, 0x93, 0xEC, 0x28, 0xFC, 0xD4, 0x12, 0xB1, 0xF1, 0xB3, 0x2E, 0x27, /* a */ 0x3E, 0xE3, 0x0B, 0x56, 0x8F, 0xBA, 0xB0, 0xF8, 0x83, 0xCC, 0xEB, 0xD4, 0x6D, 0x3F, 0x3B, 0xB8, 0xA2, 0xA7, 0x35, 0x13, 0xF5, 0xEB, 0x79, 0xDA, 0x66, 0x19, 0x0E, 0xB0, 0x85, 0xFF, 0xA9, 0xF4, 0x92, 0xF3, 0x75, 0xA9, 0x7D, 0x86, 0x0E, 0xB4, /* b */ 0x52, 0x08, 0x83, 0x94, 0x9D, 0xFD, 0xBC, 0x42, 0xD3, 0xAD, 0x19, 0x86, 0x40, 0x68, 0x8A, 0x6F, 0xE1, 0x3F, 0x41, 0x34, 0x95, 0x54, 0xB4, 0x9A, 0xCC, 0x31, 0xDC, 0xCD, 0x88, 0x45, 0x39, 0x81, 0x6F, 0x5E, 0xB4, 0xAC, 0x8F, 0xB1, 0xF1, 0xA6, /* x */ 0x43, 0xBD, 0x7E, 0x9A, 0xFB, 0x53, 0xD8, 0xB8, 0x52, 0x89, 0xBC, 0xC4, 0x8E, 0xE5, 0xBF, 0xE6, 0xF2, 0x01, 0x37, 0xD1, 0x0A, 0x08, 0x7E, 0xB6, 0xE7, 0x87, 0x1E, 0x2A, 0x10, 0xA5, 0x99, 0xC7, 0x10, 0xAF, 0x8D, 0x0D, 0x39, 0xE2, 0x06, 0x11, /* y */ 0x14, 0xFD, 0xD0, 0x55, 0x45, 0xEC, 0x1C, 0xC8, 0xAB, 0x40, 0x93, 0x24, 0x7F, 0x77, 0x27, 0x5E, 0x07, 0x43, 0xFF, 0xED, 0x11, 0x71, 0x82, 0xEA, 0xA9, 0xC7, 0x78, 0x77, 0xAA, 0xAC, 0x6A, 0xC7, 0xD3, 0x52, 0x45, 0xD1, 0x69, 0x2E, 0x8E, 0xE1, /* order */ 0xD3, 0x5E, 0x47, 0x20, 0x36, 0xBC, 0x4F, 0xB7, 0xE1, 0x3C, 0x78, 0x5E, 0xD2, 0x01, 0xE0, 0x65, 0xF9, 0x8F, 0xCF, 0xA5, 0xB6, 0x8F, 0x12, 0xA3, 0x2D, 0x48, 0x2E, 0xC7, 0xEE, 0x86, 0x58, 0xE9, 0x86, 0x91, 0x55, 0x5B, 0x44, 0xC5, 0x93, 0x11 } }; static const struct { EC_CURVE_DATA h; unsigned char data[0 + 40 * 6]; } _EC_brainpoolP320t1 = { { NID_X9_62_prime_field, 0, 40, 1 }, { /* no seed */ /* p */ 0xD3, 0x5E, 0x47, 0x20, 0x36, 0xBC, 0x4F, 0xB7, 0xE1, 0x3C, 0x78, 0x5E, 0xD2, 0x01, 0xE0, 0x65, 0xF9, 0x8F, 0xCF, 0xA6, 0xF6, 0xF4, 0x0D, 0xEF, 0x4F, 0x92, 0xB9, 0xEC, 0x78, 0x93, 0xEC, 0x28, 0xFC, 0xD4, 0x12, 0xB1, 0xF1, 0xB3, 0x2E, 0x27, /* a */ 0xD3, 0x5E, 0x47, 0x20, 0x36, 0xBC, 0x4F, 0xB7, 0xE1, 0x3C, 0x78, 0x5E, 0xD2, 0x01, 0xE0, 0x65, 0xF9, 0x8F, 0xCF, 0xA6, 0xF6, 0xF4, 0x0D, 0xEF, 0x4F, 0x92, 0xB9, 0xEC, 0x78, 0x93, 0xEC, 0x28, 0xFC, 0xD4, 0x12, 0xB1, 0xF1, 0xB3, 0x2E, 0x24, /* b */ 0xA7, 0xF5, 0x61, 0xE0, 0x38, 0xEB, 0x1E, 0xD5, 0x60, 0xB3, 0xD1, 0x47, 0xDB, 0x78, 0x20, 0x13, 0x06, 0x4C, 0x19, 0xF2, 0x7E, 0xD2, 0x7C, 0x67, 0x80, 0xAA, 0xF7, 0x7F, 0xB8, 0xA5, 0x47, 0xCE, 0xB5, 0xB4, 0xFE, 0xF4, 0x22, 0x34, 0x03, 0x53, /* x */ 0x92, 0x5B, 0xE9, 0xFB, 0x01, 0xAF, 0xC6, 0xFB, 0x4D, 0x3E, 0x7D, 0x49, 0x90, 0x01, 0x0F, 0x81, 0x34, 0x08, 0xAB, 0x10, 0x6C, 0x4F, 0x09, 0xCB, 0x7E, 0xE0, 0x78, 0x68, 0xCC, 0x13, 0x6F, 0xFF, 0x33, 0x57, 0xF6, 0x24, 0xA2, 0x1B, 0xED, 0x52, /* y */ 0x63, 0xBA, 0x3A, 0x7A, 0x27, 0x48, 0x3E, 0xBF, 0x66, 0x71, 0xDB, 0xEF, 0x7A, 0xBB, 0x30, 0xEB, 0xEE, 0x08, 0x4E, 0x58, 0xA0, 0xB0, 0x77, 0xAD, 0x42, 0xA5, 0xA0, 0x98, 0x9D, 0x1E, 0xE7, 0x1B, 0x1B, 0x9B, 0xC0, 0x45, 0x5F, 0xB0, 0xD2, 0xC3, /* order */ 0xD3, 0x5E, 0x47, 0x20, 0x36, 0xBC, 0x4F, 0xB7, 0xE1, 0x3C, 0x78, 0x5E, 0xD2, 0x01, 0xE0, 0x65, 0xF9, 0x8F, 0xCF, 0xA5, 0xB6, 0x8F, 0x12, 0xA3, 0x2D, 0x48, 0x2E, 0xC7, 0xEE, 0x86, 0x58, 0xE9, 0x86, 0x91, 0x55, 0x5B, 0x44, 0xC5, 0x93, 0x11 } }; static const struct { EC_CURVE_DATA h; unsigned char data[0 + 48 * 6]; } _EC_brainpoolP384r1 = { { NID_X9_62_prime_field, 0, 48, 1 }, { /* no seed */ /* p */ 0x8C, 0xB9, 0x1E, 0x82, 0xA3, 0x38, 0x6D, 0x28, 0x0F, 0x5D, 0x6F, 0x7E, 0x50, 0xE6, 0x41, 0xDF, 0x15, 0x2F, 0x71, 0x09, 0xED, 0x54, 0x56, 0xB4, 0x12, 0xB1, 0xDA, 0x19, 0x7F, 0xB7, 0x11, 0x23, 0xAC, 0xD3, 0xA7, 0x29, 0x90, 0x1D, 0x1A, 0x71, 0x87, 0x47, 0x00, 0x13, 0x31, 0x07, 0xEC, 0x53, /* a */ 0x7B, 0xC3, 0x82, 0xC6, 0x3D, 0x8C, 0x15, 0x0C, 0x3C, 0x72, 0x08, 0x0A, 0xCE, 0x05, 0xAF, 0xA0, 0xC2, 0xBE, 0xA2, 0x8E, 0x4F, 0xB2, 0x27, 0x87, 0x13, 0x91, 0x65, 0xEF, 0xBA, 0x91, 0xF9, 0x0F, 0x8A, 0xA5, 0x81, 0x4A, 0x50, 0x3A, 0xD4, 0xEB, 0x04, 0xA8, 0xC7, 0xDD, 0x22, 0xCE, 0x28, 0x26, /* b */ 0x04, 0xA8, 0xC7, 0xDD, 0x22, 0xCE, 0x28, 0x26, 0x8B, 0x39, 0xB5, 0x54, 0x16, 0xF0, 0x44, 0x7C, 0x2F, 0xB7, 0x7D, 0xE1, 0x07, 0xDC, 0xD2, 0xA6, 0x2E, 0x88, 0x0E, 0xA5, 0x3E, 0xEB, 0x62, 0xD5, 0x7C, 0xB4, 0x39, 0x02, 0x95, 0xDB, 0xC9, 0x94, 0x3A, 0xB7, 0x86, 0x96, 0xFA, 0x50, 0x4C, 0x11, /* x */ 0x1D, 0x1C, 0x64, 0xF0, 0x68, 0xCF, 0x45, 0xFF, 0xA2, 0xA6, 0x3A, 0x81, 0xB7, 0xC1, 0x3F, 0x6B, 0x88, 0x47, 0xA3, 0xE7, 0x7E, 0xF1, 0x4F, 0xE3, 0xDB, 0x7F, 0xCA, 0xFE, 0x0C, 0xBD, 0x10, 0xE8, 0xE8, 0x26, 0xE0, 0x34, 0x36, 0xD6, 0x46, 0xAA, 0xEF, 0x87, 0xB2, 0xE2, 0x47, 0xD4, 0xAF, 0x1E, /* y */ 0x8A, 0xBE, 0x1D, 0x75, 0x20, 0xF9, 0xC2, 0xA4, 0x5C, 0xB1, 0xEB, 0x8E, 0x95, 0xCF, 0xD5, 0x52, 0x62, 0xB7, 0x0B, 0x29, 0xFE, 0xEC, 0x58, 0x64, 0xE1, 0x9C, 0x05, 0x4F, 0xF9, 0x91, 0x29, 0x28, 0x0E, 0x46, 0x46, 0x21, 0x77, 0x91, 0x81, 0x11, 0x42, 0x82, 0x03, 0x41, 0x26, 0x3C, 0x53, 0x15, /* order */ 0x8C, 0xB9, 0x1E, 0x82, 0xA3, 0x38, 0x6D, 0x28, 0x0F, 0x5D, 0x6F, 0x7E, 0x50, 0xE6, 0x41, 0xDF, 0x15, 0x2F, 0x71, 0x09, 0xED, 0x54, 0x56, 0xB3, 0x1F, 0x16, 0x6E, 0x6C, 0xAC, 0x04, 0x25, 0xA7, 0xCF, 0x3A, 0xB6, 0xAF, 0x6B, 0x7F, 0xC3, 0x10, 0x3B, 0x88, 0x32, 0x02, 0xE9, 0x04, 0x65, 0x65 } }; static const struct { EC_CURVE_DATA h; unsigned char data[0 + 48 * 6]; } _EC_brainpoolP384t1 = { { NID_X9_62_prime_field, 0, 48, 1 }, { /* no seed */ /* p */ 0x8C, 0xB9, 0x1E, 0x82, 0xA3, 0x38, 0x6D, 0x28, 0x0F, 0x5D, 0x6F, 0x7E, 0x50, 0xE6, 0x41, 0xDF, 0x15, 0x2F, 0x71, 0x09, 0xED, 0x54, 0x56, 0xB4, 0x12, 0xB1, 0xDA, 0x19, 0x7F, 0xB7, 0x11, 0x23, 0xAC, 0xD3, 0xA7, 0x29, 0x90, 0x1D, 0x1A, 0x71, 0x87, 0x47, 0x00, 0x13, 0x31, 0x07, 0xEC, 0x53, /* a */ 0x8C, 0xB9, 0x1E, 0x82, 0xA3, 0x38, 0x6D, 0x28, 0x0F, 0x5D, 0x6F, 0x7E, 0x50, 0xE6, 0x41, 0xDF, 0x15, 0x2F, 0x71, 0x09, 0xED, 0x54, 0x56, 0xB4, 0x12, 0xB1, 0xDA, 0x19, 0x7F, 0xB7, 0x11, 0x23, 0xAC, 0xD3, 0xA7, 0x29, 0x90, 0x1D, 0x1A, 0x71, 0x87, 0x47, 0x00, 0x13, 0x31, 0x07, 0xEC, 0x50, /* b */ 0x7F, 0x51, 0x9E, 0xAD, 0xA7, 0xBD, 0xA8, 0x1B, 0xD8, 0x26, 0xDB, 0xA6, 0x47, 0x91, 0x0F, 0x8C, 0x4B, 0x93, 0x46, 0xED, 0x8C, 0xCD, 0xC6, 0x4E, 0x4B, 0x1A, 0xBD, 0x11, 0x75, 0x6D, 0xCE, 0x1D, 0x20, 0x74, 0xAA, 0x26, 0x3B, 0x88, 0x80, 0x5C, 0xED, 0x70, 0x35, 0x5A, 0x33, 0xB4, 0x71, 0xEE, /* x */ 0x18, 0xDE, 0x98, 0xB0, 0x2D, 0xB9, 0xA3, 0x06, 0xF2, 0xAF, 0xCD, 0x72, 0x35, 0xF7, 0x2A, 0x81, 0x9B, 0x80, 0xAB, 0x12, 0xEB, 0xD6, 0x53, 0x17, 0x24, 0x76, 0xFE, 0xCD, 0x46, 0x2A, 0xAB, 0xFF, 0xC4, 0xFF, 0x19, 0x1B, 0x94, 0x6A, 0x5F, 0x54, 0xD8, 0xD0, 0xAA, 0x2F, 0x41, 0x88, 0x08, 0xCC, /* y */ 0x25, 0xAB, 0x05, 0x69, 0x62, 0xD3, 0x06, 0x51, 0xA1, 0x14, 0xAF, 0xD2, 0x75, 0x5A, 0xD3, 0x36, 0x74, 0x7F, 0x93, 0x47, 0x5B, 0x7A, 0x1F, 0xCA, 0x3B, 0x88, 0xF2, 0xB6, 0xA2, 0x08, 0xCC, 0xFE, 0x46, 0x94, 0x08, 0x58, 0x4D, 0xC2, 0xB2, 0x91, 0x26, 0x75, 0xBF, 0x5B, 0x9E, 0x58, 0x29, 0x28, /* order */ 0x8C, 0xB9, 0x1E, 0x82, 0xA3, 0x38, 0x6D, 0x28, 0x0F, 0x5D, 0x6F, 0x7E, 0x50, 0xE6, 0x41, 0xDF, 0x15, 0x2F, 0x71, 0x09, 0xED, 0x54, 0x56, 0xB3, 0x1F, 0x16, 0x6E, 0x6C, 0xAC, 0x04, 0x25, 0xA7, 0xCF, 0x3A, 0xB6, 0xAF, 0x6B, 0x7F, 0xC3, 0x10, 0x3B, 0x88, 0x32, 0x02, 0xE9, 0x04, 0x65, 0x65 } }; static const struct { EC_CURVE_DATA h; unsigned char data[0 + 64 * 6]; } _EC_brainpoolP512r1 = { { NID_X9_62_prime_field, 0, 64, 1 }, { /* no seed */ /* p */ 0xAA, 0xDD, 0x9D, 0xB8, 0xDB, 0xE9, 0xC4, 0x8B, 0x3F, 0xD4, 0xE6, 0xAE, 0x33, 0xC9, 0xFC, 0x07, 0xCB, 0x30, 0x8D, 0xB3, 0xB3, 0xC9, 0xD2, 0x0E, 0xD6, 0x63, 0x9C, 0xCA, 0x70, 0x33, 0x08, 0x71, 0x7D, 0x4D, 0x9B, 0x00, 0x9B, 0xC6, 0x68, 0x42, 0xAE, 0xCD, 0xA1, 0x2A, 0xE6, 0xA3, 0x80, 0xE6, 0x28, 0x81, 0xFF, 0x2F, 0x2D, 0x82, 0xC6, 0x85, 0x28, 0xAA, 0x60, 0x56, 0x58, 0x3A, 0x48, 0xF3, /* a */ 0x78, 0x30, 0xA3, 0x31, 0x8B, 0x60, 0x3B, 0x89, 0xE2, 0x32, 0x71, 0x45, 0xAC, 0x23, 0x4C, 0xC5, 0x94, 0xCB, 0xDD, 0x8D, 0x3D, 0xF9, 0x16, 0x10, 0xA8, 0x34, 0x41, 0xCA, 0xEA, 0x98, 0x63, 0xBC, 0x2D, 0xED, 0x5D, 0x5A, 0xA8, 0x25, 0x3A, 0xA1, 0x0A, 0x2E, 0xF1, 0xC9, 0x8B, 0x9A, 0xC8, 0xB5, 0x7F, 0x11, 0x17, 0xA7, 0x2B, 0xF2, 0xC7, 0xB9, 0xE7, 0xC1, 0xAC, 0x4D, 0x77, 0xFC, 0x94, 0xCA, /* b */ 0x3D, 0xF9, 0x16, 0x10, 0xA8, 0x34, 0x41, 0xCA, 0xEA, 0x98, 0x63, 0xBC, 0x2D, 0xED, 0x5D, 0x5A, 0xA8, 0x25, 0x3A, 0xA1, 0x0A, 0x2E, 0xF1, 0xC9, 0x8B, 0x9A, 0xC8, 0xB5, 0x7F, 0x11, 0x17, 0xA7, 0x2B, 0xF2, 0xC7, 0xB9, 0xE7, 0xC1, 0xAC, 0x4D, 0x77, 0xFC, 0x94, 0xCA, 0xDC, 0x08, 0x3E, 0x67, 0x98, 0x40, 0x50, 0xB7, 0x5E, 0xBA, 0xE5, 0xDD, 0x28, 0x09, 0xBD, 0x63, 0x80, 0x16, 0xF7, 0x23, /* x */ 0x81, 0xAE, 0xE4, 0xBD, 0xD8, 0x2E, 0xD9, 0x64, 0x5A, 0x21, 0x32, 0x2E, 0x9C, 0x4C, 0x6A, 0x93, 0x85, 0xED, 0x9F, 0x70, 0xB5, 0xD9, 0x16, 0xC1, 0xB4, 0x3B, 0x62, 0xEE, 0xF4, 0xD0, 0x09, 0x8E, 0xFF, 0x3B, 0x1F, 0x78, 0xE2, 0xD0, 0xD4, 0x8D, 0x50, 0xD1, 0x68, 0x7B, 0x93, 0xB9, 0x7D, 0x5F, 0x7C, 0x6D, 0x50, 0x47, 0x40, 0x6A, 0x5E, 0x68, 0x8B, 0x35, 0x22, 0x09, 0xBC, 0xB9, 0xF8, 0x22, /* y */ 0x7D, 0xDE, 0x38, 0x5D, 0x56, 0x63, 0x32, 0xEC, 0xC0, 0xEA, 0xBF, 0xA9, 0xCF, 0x78, 0x22, 0xFD, 0xF2, 0x09, 0xF7, 0x00, 0x24, 0xA5, 0x7B, 0x1A, 0xA0, 0x00, 0xC5, 0x5B, 0x88, 0x1F, 0x81, 0x11, 0xB2, 0xDC, 0xDE, 0x49, 0x4A, 0x5F, 0x48, 0x5E, 0x5B, 0xCA, 0x4B, 0xD8, 0x8A, 0x27, 0x63, 0xAE, 0xD1, 0xCA, 0x2B, 0x2F, 0xA8, 0xF0, 0x54, 0x06, 0x78, 0xCD, 0x1E, 0x0F, 0x3A, 0xD8, 0x08, 0x92, /* order */ 0xAA, 0xDD, 0x9D, 0xB8, 0xDB, 0xE9, 0xC4, 0x8B, 0x3F, 0xD4, 0xE6, 0xAE, 0x33, 0xC9, 0xFC, 0x07, 0xCB, 0x30, 0x8D, 0xB3, 0xB3, 0xC9, 0xD2, 0x0E, 0xD6, 0x63, 0x9C, 0xCA, 0x70, 0x33, 0x08, 0x70, 0x55, 0x3E, 0x5C, 0x41, 0x4C, 0xA9, 0x26, 0x19, 0x41, 0x86, 0x61, 0x19, 0x7F, 0xAC, 0x10, 0x47, 0x1D, 0xB1, 0xD3, 0x81, 0x08, 0x5D, 0xDA, 0xDD, 0xB5, 0x87, 0x96, 0x82, 0x9C, 0xA9, 0x00, 0x69 } }; static const struct { EC_CURVE_DATA h; unsigned char data[0 + 64 * 6]; } _EC_brainpoolP512t1 = { { NID_X9_62_prime_field, 0, 64, 1 }, { /* no seed */ /* p */ 0xAA, 0xDD, 0x9D, 0xB8, 0xDB, 0xE9, 0xC4, 0x8B, 0x3F, 0xD4, 0xE6, 0xAE, 0x33, 0xC9, 0xFC, 0x07, 0xCB, 0x30, 0x8D, 0xB3, 0xB3, 0xC9, 0xD2, 0x0E, 0xD6, 0x63, 0x9C, 0xCA, 0x70, 0x33, 0x08, 0x71, 0x7D, 0x4D, 0x9B, 0x00, 0x9B, 0xC6, 0x68, 0x42, 0xAE, 0xCD, 0xA1, 0x2A, 0xE6, 0xA3, 0x80, 0xE6, 0x28, 0x81, 0xFF, 0x2F, 0x2D, 0x82, 0xC6, 0x85, 0x28, 0xAA, 0x60, 0x56, 0x58, 0x3A, 0x48, 0xF3, /* a */ 0xAA, 0xDD, 0x9D, 0xB8, 0xDB, 0xE9, 0xC4, 0x8B, 0x3F, 0xD4, 0xE6, 0xAE, 0x33, 0xC9, 0xFC, 0x07, 0xCB, 0x30, 0x8D, 0xB3, 0xB3, 0xC9, 0xD2, 0x0E, 0xD6, 0x63, 0x9C, 0xCA, 0x70, 0x33, 0x08, 0x71, 0x7D, 0x4D, 0x9B, 0x00, 0x9B, 0xC6, 0x68, 0x42, 0xAE, 0xCD, 0xA1, 0x2A, 0xE6, 0xA3, 0x80, 0xE6, 0x28, 0x81, 0xFF, 0x2F, 0x2D, 0x82, 0xC6, 0x85, 0x28, 0xAA, 0x60, 0x56, 0x58, 0x3A, 0x48, 0xF0, /* b */ 0x7C, 0xBB, 0xBC, 0xF9, 0x44, 0x1C, 0xFA, 0xB7, 0x6E, 0x18, 0x90, 0xE4, 0x68, 0x84, 0xEA, 0xE3, 0x21, 0xF7, 0x0C, 0x0B, 0xCB, 0x49, 0x81, 0x52, 0x78, 0x97, 0x50, 0x4B, 0xEC, 0x3E, 0x36, 0xA6, 0x2B, 0xCD, 0xFA, 0x23, 0x04, 0x97, 0x65, 0x40, 0xF6, 0x45, 0x00, 0x85, 0xF2, 0xDA, 0xE1, 0x45, 0xC2, 0x25, 0x53, 0xB4, 0x65, 0x76, 0x36, 0x89, 0x18, 0x0E, 0xA2, 0x57, 0x18, 0x67, 0x42, 0x3E, /* x */ 0x64, 0x0E, 0xCE, 0x5C, 0x12, 0x78, 0x87, 0x17, 0xB9, 0xC1, 0xBA, 0x06, 0xCB, 0xC2, 0xA6, 0xFE, 0xBA, 0x85, 0x84, 0x24, 0x58, 0xC5, 0x6D, 0xDE, 0x9D, 0xB1, 0x75, 0x8D, 0x39, 0xC0, 0x31, 0x3D, 0x82, 0xBA, 0x51, 0x73, 0x5C, 0xDB, 0x3E, 0xA4, 0x99, 0xAA, 0x77, 0xA7, 0xD6, 0x94, 0x3A, 0x64, 0xF7, 0xA3, 0xF2, 0x5F, 0xE2, 0x6F, 0x06, 0xB5, 0x1B, 0xAA, 0x26, 0x96, 0xFA, 0x90, 0x35, 0xDA, /* y */ 0x5B, 0x53, 0x4B, 0xD5, 0x95, 0xF5, 0xAF, 0x0F, 0xA2, 0xC8, 0x92, 0x37, 0x6C, 0x84, 0xAC, 0xE1, 0xBB, 0x4E, 0x30, 0x19, 0xB7, 0x16, 0x34, 0xC0, 0x11, 0x31, 0x15, 0x9C, 0xAE, 0x03, 0xCE, 0xE9, 0xD9, 0x93, 0x21, 0x84, 0xBE, 0xEF, 0x21, 0x6B, 0xD7, 0x1D, 0xF2, 0xDA, 0xDF, 0x86, 0xA6, 0x27, 0x30, 0x6E, 0xCF, 0xF9, 0x6D, 0xBB, 0x8B, 0xAC, 0xE1, 0x98, 0xB6, 0x1E, 0x00, 0xF8, 0xB3, 0x32, /* order */ 0xAA, 0xDD, 0x9D, 0xB8, 0xDB, 0xE9, 0xC4, 0x8B, 0x3F, 0xD4, 0xE6, 0xAE, 0x33, 0xC9, 0xFC, 0x07, 0xCB, 0x30, 0x8D, 0xB3, 0xB3, 0xC9, 0xD2, 0x0E, 0xD6, 0x63, 0x9C, 0xCA, 0x70, 0x33, 0x08, 0x70, 0x55, 0x3E, 0x5C, 0x41, 0x4C, 0xA9, 0x26, 0x19, 0x41, 0x86, 0x61, 0x19, 0x7F, 0xAC, 0x10, 0x47, 0x1D, 0xB1, 0xD3, 0x81, 0x08, 0x5D, 0xDA, 0xDD, 0xB5, 0x87, 0x96, 0x82, 0x9C, 0xA9, 0x00, 0x69 } }; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SM2 static const struct { EC_CURVE_DATA h; unsigned char data[0 + 32 * 6]; } _EC_sm2p256v1 = { { NID_X9_62_prime_field, 0, 32, 1 }, { /* no seed */ /* p */ 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xfe, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, /* a */ 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xfe, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xfc, /* b */ 0x28, 0xe9, 0xfa, 0x9e, 0x9d, 0x9f, 0x5e, 0x34, 0x4d, 0x5a, 0x9e, 0x4b, 0xcf, 0x65, 0x09, 0xa7, 0xf3, 0x97, 0x89, 0xf5, 0x15, 0xab, 0x8f, 0x92, 0xdd, 0xbc, 0xbd, 0x41, 0x4d, 0x94, 0x0e, 0x93, /* x */ 0x32, 0xc4, 0xae, 0x2c, 0x1f, 0x19, 0x81, 0x19, 0x5f, 0x99, 0x04, 0x46, 0x6a, 0x39, 0xc9, 0x94, 0x8f, 0xe3, 0x0b, 0xbf, 0xf2, 0x66, 0x0b, 0xe1, 0x71, 0x5a, 0x45, 0x89, 0x33, 0x4c, 0x74, 0xc7, /* y */ 0xbc, 0x37, 0x36, 0xa2, 0xf4, 0xf6, 0x77, 0x9c, 0x59, 0xbd, 0xce, 0xe3, 0x6b, 0x69, 0x21, 0x53, 0xd0, 0xa9, 0x87, 0x7c, 0xc6, 0x2a, 0x47, 0x40, 0x02, 0xdf, 0x32, 0xe5, 0x21, 0x39, 0xf0, 0xa0, /* order */ 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xfe, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0x72, 0x03, 0xdf, 0x6b, 0x21, 0xc6, 0x05, 0x2b, 0x53, 0xbb, 0xf4, 0x09, 0x39, 0xd5, 0x41, 0x23, } }; #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SM2 */ typedef struct _ec_list_element_st { int nid; const EC_CURVE_DATA *data; const EC_METHOD *(*meth) (void); const char *comment; } ec_list_element; static const ec_list_element curve_list[] = { /* prime field curves */ /* secg curves */ {NID_secp112r1, &_EC_SECG_PRIME_112R1.h, 0, "SECG/WTLS curve over a 112 bit prime field"}, {NID_secp112r2, &_EC_SECG_PRIME_112R2.h, 0, "SECG curve over a 112 bit prime field"}, {NID_secp128r1, &_EC_SECG_PRIME_128R1.h, 0, "SECG curve over a 128 bit prime field"}, {NID_secp128r2, &_EC_SECG_PRIME_128R2.h, 0, "SECG curve over a 128 bit prime field"}, {NID_secp160k1, &_EC_SECG_PRIME_160K1.h, 0, "SECG curve over a 160 bit prime field"}, {NID_secp160r1, &_EC_SECG_PRIME_160R1.h, 0, "SECG curve over a 160 bit prime field"}, {NID_secp160r2, &_EC_SECG_PRIME_160R2.h, 0, "SECG/WTLS curve over a 160 bit prime field"}, /* SECG secp192r1 is the same as X9.62 prime192v1 and hence omitted */ {NID_secp192k1, &_EC_SECG_PRIME_192K1.h, 0, "SECG curve over a 192 bit prime field"}, {NID_secp224k1, &_EC_SECG_PRIME_224K1.h, 0, "SECG curve over a 224 bit prime field"}, #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC_NISTP_64_GCC_128 {NID_secp224r1, &_EC_NIST_PRIME_224.h, EC_GFp_nistp224_method, "NIST/SECG curve over a 224 bit prime field"}, #else {NID_secp224r1, &_EC_NIST_PRIME_224.h, 0, "NIST/SECG curve over a 224 bit prime field"}, #endif {NID_secp256k1, &_EC_SECG_PRIME_256K1.h, 0, "SECG curve over a 256 bit prime field"}, /* SECG secp256r1 is the same as X9.62 prime256v1 and hence omitted */ {NID_secp384r1, &_EC_NIST_PRIME_384.h, 0, "NIST/SECG curve over a 384 bit prime field"}, #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC_NISTP_64_GCC_128 {NID_secp521r1, &_EC_NIST_PRIME_521.h, EC_GFp_nistp521_method, "NIST/SECG curve over a 521 bit prime field"}, #else {NID_secp521r1, &_EC_NIST_PRIME_521.h, 0, "NIST/SECG curve over a 521 bit prime field"}, #endif /* X9.62 curves */ {NID_X9_62_prime192v1, &_EC_NIST_PRIME_192.h, 0, "NIST/X9.62/SECG curve over a 192 bit prime field"}, {NID_X9_62_prime192v2, &_EC_X9_62_PRIME_192V2.h, 0, "X9.62 curve over a 192 bit prime field"}, {NID_X9_62_prime192v3, &_EC_X9_62_PRIME_192V3.h, 0, "X9.62 curve over a 192 bit prime field"}, {NID_X9_62_prime239v1, &_EC_X9_62_PRIME_239V1.h, 0, "X9.62 curve over a 239 bit prime field"}, {NID_X9_62_prime239v2, &_EC_X9_62_PRIME_239V2.h, 0, "X9.62 curve over a 239 bit prime field"}, {NID_X9_62_prime239v3, &_EC_X9_62_PRIME_239V3.h, 0, "X9.62 curve over a 239 bit prime field"}, {NID_X9_62_prime256v1, &_EC_X9_62_PRIME_256V1.h, #if defined(ECP_NISTZ256_ASM) EC_GFp_nistz256_method, #elif !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC_NISTP_64_GCC_128) EC_GFp_nistp256_method, #else 0, #endif "X9.62/SECG curve over a 256 bit prime field"}, #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M /* characteristic two field curves */ /* NIST/SECG curves */ {NID_sect113r1, &_EC_SECG_CHAR2_113R1.h, 0, "SECG curve over a 113 bit binary field"}, {NID_sect113r2, &_EC_SECG_CHAR2_113R2.h, 0, "SECG curve over a 113 bit binary field"}, {NID_sect131r1, &_EC_SECG_CHAR2_131R1.h, 0, "SECG/WTLS curve over a 131 bit binary field"}, {NID_sect131r2, &_EC_SECG_CHAR2_131R2.h, 0, "SECG curve over a 131 bit binary field"}, {NID_sect163k1, &_EC_NIST_CHAR2_163K.h, 0, "NIST/SECG/WTLS curve over a 163 bit binary field"}, {NID_sect163r1, &_EC_SECG_CHAR2_163R1.h, 0, "SECG curve over a 163 bit binary field"}, {NID_sect163r2, &_EC_NIST_CHAR2_163B.h, 0, "NIST/SECG curve over a 163 bit binary field"}, {NID_sect193r1, &_EC_SECG_CHAR2_193R1.h, 0, "SECG curve over a 193 bit binary field"}, {NID_sect193r2, &_EC_SECG_CHAR2_193R2.h, 0, "SECG curve over a 193 bit binary field"}, {NID_sect233k1, &_EC_NIST_CHAR2_233K.h, 0, "NIST/SECG/WTLS curve over a 233 bit binary field"}, {NID_sect233r1, &_EC_NIST_CHAR2_233B.h, 0, "NIST/SECG/WTLS curve over a 233 bit binary field"}, {NID_sect239k1, &_EC_SECG_CHAR2_239K1.h, 0, "SECG curve over a 239 bit binary field"}, {NID_sect283k1, &_EC_NIST_CHAR2_283K.h, 0, "NIST/SECG curve over a 283 bit binary field"}, {NID_sect283r1, &_EC_NIST_CHAR2_283B.h, 0, "NIST/SECG curve over a 283 bit binary field"}, {NID_sect409k1, &_EC_NIST_CHAR2_409K.h, 0, "NIST/SECG curve over a 409 bit binary field"}, {NID_sect409r1, &_EC_NIST_CHAR2_409B.h, 0, "NIST/SECG curve over a 409 bit binary field"}, {NID_sect571k1, &_EC_NIST_CHAR2_571K.h, 0, "NIST/SECG curve over a 571 bit binary field"}, {NID_sect571r1, &_EC_NIST_CHAR2_571B.h, 0, "NIST/SECG curve over a 571 bit binary field"}, /* X9.62 curves */ {NID_X9_62_c2pnb163v1, &_EC_X9_62_CHAR2_163V1.h, 0, "X9.62 curve over a 163 bit binary field"}, {NID_X9_62_c2pnb163v2, &_EC_X9_62_CHAR2_163V2.h, 0, "X9.62 curve over a 163 bit binary field"}, {NID_X9_62_c2pnb163v3, &_EC_X9_62_CHAR2_163V3.h, 0, "X9.62 curve over a 163 bit binary field"}, {NID_X9_62_c2pnb176v1, &_EC_X9_62_CHAR2_176V1.h, 0, "X9.62 curve over a 176 bit binary field"}, {NID_X9_62_c2tnb191v1, &_EC_X9_62_CHAR2_191V1.h, 0, "X9.62 curve over a 191 bit binary field"}, {NID_X9_62_c2tnb191v2, &_EC_X9_62_CHAR2_191V2.h, 0, "X9.62 curve over a 191 bit binary field"}, {NID_X9_62_c2tnb191v3, &_EC_X9_62_CHAR2_191V3.h, 0, "X9.62 curve over a 191 bit binary field"}, {NID_X9_62_c2pnb208w1, &_EC_X9_62_CHAR2_208W1.h, 0, "X9.62 curve over a 208 bit binary field"}, {NID_X9_62_c2tnb239v1, &_EC_X9_62_CHAR2_239V1.h, 0, "X9.62 curve over a 239 bit binary field"}, {NID_X9_62_c2tnb239v2, &_EC_X9_62_CHAR2_239V2.h, 0, "X9.62 curve over a 239 bit binary field"}, {NID_X9_62_c2tnb239v3, &_EC_X9_62_CHAR2_239V3.h, 0, "X9.62 curve over a 239 bit binary field"}, {NID_X9_62_c2pnb272w1, &_EC_X9_62_CHAR2_272W1.h, 0, "X9.62 curve over a 272 bit binary field"}, {NID_X9_62_c2pnb304w1, &_EC_X9_62_CHAR2_304W1.h, 0, "X9.62 curve over a 304 bit binary field"}, {NID_X9_62_c2tnb359v1, &_EC_X9_62_CHAR2_359V1.h, 0, "X9.62 curve over a 359 bit binary field"}, {NID_X9_62_c2pnb368w1, &_EC_X9_62_CHAR2_368W1.h, 0, "X9.62 curve over a 368 bit binary field"}, {NID_X9_62_c2tnb431r1, &_EC_X9_62_CHAR2_431R1.h, 0, "X9.62 curve over a 431 bit binary field"}, /* * the WAP/WTLS curves [unlike SECG, spec has its own OIDs for curves * from X9.62] */ {NID_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls1, &_EC_WTLS_1.h, 0, "WTLS curve over a 113 bit binary field"}, {NID_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls3, &_EC_NIST_CHAR2_163K.h, 0, "NIST/SECG/WTLS curve over a 163 bit binary field"}, {NID_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls4, &_EC_SECG_CHAR2_113R1.h, 0, "SECG curve over a 113 bit binary field"}, {NID_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls5, &_EC_X9_62_CHAR2_163V1.h, 0, "X9.62 curve over a 163 bit binary field"}, #endif {NID_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls6, &_EC_SECG_PRIME_112R1.h, 0, "SECG/WTLS curve over a 112 bit prime field"}, {NID_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls7, &_EC_SECG_PRIME_160R2.h, 0, "SECG/WTLS curve over a 160 bit prime field"}, {NID_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls8, &_EC_WTLS_8.h, 0, "WTLS curve over a 112 bit prime field"}, {NID_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls9, &_EC_WTLS_9.h, 0, "WTLS curve over a 160 bit prime field"}, #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M {NID_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls10, &_EC_NIST_CHAR2_233K.h, 0, "NIST/SECG/WTLS curve over a 233 bit binary field"}, {NID_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls11, &_EC_NIST_CHAR2_233B.h, 0, "NIST/SECG/WTLS curve over a 233 bit binary field"}, #endif {NID_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls12, &_EC_WTLS_12.h, 0, "WTLS curve over a 224 bit prime field"}, #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M /* IPSec curves */ {NID_ipsec3, &_EC_IPSEC_155_ID3.h, 0, "\n\tIPSec/IKE/Oakley curve #3 over a 155 bit binary field.\n" "\tNot suitable for ECDSA.\n\tQuestionable extension field!"}, {NID_ipsec4, &_EC_IPSEC_185_ID4.h, 0, "\n\tIPSec/IKE/Oakley curve #4 over a 185 bit binary field.\n" "\tNot suitable for ECDSA.\n\tQuestionable extension field!"}, #endif /* brainpool curves */ {NID_brainpoolP160r1, &_EC_brainpoolP160r1.h, 0, "RFC 5639 curve over a 160 bit prime field"}, {NID_brainpoolP160t1, &_EC_brainpoolP160t1.h, 0, "RFC 5639 curve over a 160 bit prime field"}, {NID_brainpoolP192r1, &_EC_brainpoolP192r1.h, 0, "RFC 5639 curve over a 192 bit prime field"}, {NID_brainpoolP192t1, &_EC_brainpoolP192t1.h, 0, "RFC 5639 curve over a 192 bit prime field"}, {NID_brainpoolP224r1, &_EC_brainpoolP224r1.h, 0, "RFC 5639 curve over a 224 bit prime field"}, {NID_brainpoolP224t1, &_EC_brainpoolP224t1.h, 0, "RFC 5639 curve over a 224 bit prime field"}, {NID_brainpoolP256r1, &_EC_brainpoolP256r1.h, 0, "RFC 5639 curve over a 256 bit prime field"}, {NID_brainpoolP256t1, &_EC_brainpoolP256t1.h, 0, "RFC 5639 curve over a 256 bit prime field"}, {NID_brainpoolP320r1, &_EC_brainpoolP320r1.h, 0, "RFC 5639 curve over a 320 bit prime field"}, {NID_brainpoolP320t1, &_EC_brainpoolP320t1.h, 0, "RFC 5639 curve over a 320 bit prime field"}, {NID_brainpoolP384r1, &_EC_brainpoolP384r1.h, 0, "RFC 5639 curve over a 384 bit prime field"}, {NID_brainpoolP384t1, &_EC_brainpoolP384t1.h, 0, "RFC 5639 curve over a 384 bit prime field"}, {NID_brainpoolP512r1, &_EC_brainpoolP512r1.h, 0, "RFC 5639 curve over a 512 bit prime field"}, {NID_brainpoolP512t1, &_EC_brainpoolP512t1.h, 0, "RFC 5639 curve over a 512 bit prime field"}, #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SM2 {NID_sm2, &_EC_sm2p256v1.h, 0, "SM2 curve over a 256 bit prime field"}, #endif }; #define curve_list_length OSSL_NELEM(curve_list) static EC_GROUP *ec_group_new_from_data(const ec_list_element curve) { EC_GROUP *group = NULL; EC_POINT *P = NULL; BN_CTX *ctx = NULL; BIGNUM *p = NULL, *a = NULL, *b = NULL, *x = NULL, *y = NULL, *order = NULL; int ok = 0; int seed_len, param_len; const EC_METHOD *meth; const EC_CURVE_DATA *data; const unsigned char *params; /* If no curve data curve method must handle everything */ if (curve.data == NULL) return EC_GROUP_new(curve.meth != NULL ? curve.meth() : NULL); if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_DATA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } data = curve.data; seed_len = data->seed_len; param_len = data->param_len; params = (const unsigned char *)(data + 1); /* skip header */ params += seed_len; /* skip seed */ if ((p = BN_bin2bn(params + 0 * param_len, param_len, NULL)) == NULL || (a = BN_bin2bn(params + 1 * param_len, param_len, NULL)) == NULL || (b = BN_bin2bn(params + 2 * param_len, param_len, NULL)) == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_DATA, ERR_R_BN_LIB); goto err; } if (curve.meth != 0) { meth = curve.meth(); if (((group = EC_GROUP_new(meth)) == NULL) || (!(group->meth->group_set_curve(group, p, a, b, ctx)))) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_DATA, ERR_R_EC_LIB); goto err; } } else if (data->field_type == NID_X9_62_prime_field) { if ((group = EC_GROUP_new_curve_GFp(p, a, b, ctx)) == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_DATA, ERR_R_EC_LIB); goto err; } } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M else { /* field_type == * NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field */ if ((group = EC_GROUP_new_curve_GF2m(p, a, b, ctx)) == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_DATA, ERR_R_EC_LIB); goto err; } } #endif EC_GROUP_set_curve_name(group, curve.nid); if ((P = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_DATA, ERR_R_EC_LIB); goto err; } if ((x = BN_bin2bn(params + 3 * param_len, param_len, NULL)) == NULL || (y = BN_bin2bn(params + 4 * param_len, param_len, NULL)) == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_DATA, ERR_R_BN_LIB); goto err; } if (!EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates(group, P, x, y, ctx)) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_DATA, ERR_R_EC_LIB); goto err; } if ((order = BN_bin2bn(params + 5 * param_len, param_len, NULL)) == NULL || !BN_set_word(x, (BN_ULONG)data->cofactor)) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_DATA, ERR_R_BN_LIB); goto err; } if (!EC_GROUP_set_generator(group, P, order, x)) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_DATA, ERR_R_EC_LIB); goto err; } if (seed_len) { if (!EC_GROUP_set_seed(group, params - seed_len, seed_len)) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_DATA, ERR_R_EC_LIB); goto err; } } + + if (EC_GROUP_get_asn1_flag(group) == OPENSSL_EC_NAMED_CURVE) { + /* + * Some curves don't have an associated OID: for those we should not + * default to `OPENSSL_EC_NAMED_CURVE` encoding of parameters and + * instead set the ASN1 flag to `OPENSSL_EC_EXPLICIT_CURVE`. + * + * Note that `OPENSSL_EC_NAMED_CURVE` is set as the default ASN1 flag on + * `EC_GROUP_new()`, when we don't have enough elements to determine if + * an OID for the curve name actually exists. + * We could implement this check on `EC_GROUP_set_curve_name()` but + * overloading the simple setter with this lookup could have a negative + * performance impact and unexpected consequences. + */ + ASN1_OBJECT *asn1obj = OBJ_nid2obj(curve.nid); + + if (asn1obj == NULL) { + ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_DATA, ERR_R_OBJ_LIB); + goto err; + } + if (OBJ_length(asn1obj) == 0) + EC_GROUP_set_asn1_flag(group, OPENSSL_EC_EXPLICIT_CURVE); + + ASN1_OBJECT_free(asn1obj); + } + ok = 1; err: if (!ok) { EC_GROUP_free(group); group = NULL; } EC_POINT_free(P); BN_CTX_free(ctx); BN_free(p); BN_free(a); BN_free(b); BN_free(order); BN_free(x); BN_free(y); return group; } EC_GROUP *EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(int nid) { size_t i; EC_GROUP *ret = NULL; if (nid <= 0) return NULL; for (i = 0; i < curve_list_length; i++) if (curve_list[i].nid == nid) { ret = ec_group_new_from_data(curve_list[i]); break; } if (ret == NULL) { ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_BY_CURVE_NAME, EC_R_UNKNOWN_GROUP); return NULL; } return ret; } size_t EC_get_builtin_curves(EC_builtin_curve *r, size_t nitems) { size_t i, min; if (r == NULL || nitems == 0) return curve_list_length; min = nitems < curve_list_length ? nitems : curve_list_length; for (i = 0; i < min; i++) { r[i].nid = curve_list[i].nid; r[i].comment = curve_list[i].comment; } return curve_list_length; } /* Functions to translate between common NIST curve names and NIDs */ typedef struct { const char *name; /* NIST Name of curve */ int nid; /* Curve NID */ } EC_NIST_NAME; static EC_NIST_NAME nist_curves[] = { {"B-163", NID_sect163r2}, {"B-233", NID_sect233r1}, {"B-283", NID_sect283r1}, {"B-409", NID_sect409r1}, {"B-571", NID_sect571r1}, {"K-163", NID_sect163k1}, {"K-233", NID_sect233k1}, {"K-283", NID_sect283k1}, {"K-409", NID_sect409k1}, {"K-571", NID_sect571k1}, {"P-192", NID_X9_62_prime192v1}, {"P-224", NID_secp224r1}, {"P-256", NID_X9_62_prime256v1}, {"P-384", NID_secp384r1}, {"P-521", NID_secp521r1} }; const char *EC_curve_nid2nist(int nid) { size_t i; for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(nist_curves); i++) { if (nist_curves[i].nid == nid) return nist_curves[i].name; } return NULL; } int EC_curve_nist2nid(const char *name) { size_t i; for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(nist_curves); i++) { if (strcmp(nist_curves[i].name, name) == 0) return nist_curves[i].nid; } return NID_undef; } #define NUM_BN_FIELDS 6 /* * Validates EC domain parameter data for known named curves. * This can be used when a curve is loaded explicitly (without a curve * name) or to validate that domain parameters have not been modified. * * Returns: The nid associated with the found named curve, or NID_undef * if not found. If there was an error it returns -1. */ int ec_curve_nid_from_params(const EC_GROUP *group, BN_CTX *ctx) { int ret = -1, nid, len, field_type, param_len; size_t i, seed_len; const unsigned char *seed, *params_seed, *params; unsigned char *param_bytes = NULL; const EC_CURVE_DATA *data; const EC_POINT *generator = NULL; const EC_METHOD *meth; const BIGNUM *cofactor = NULL; /* An array of BIGNUMs for (p, a, b, x, y, order) */ BIGNUM *bn[NUM_BN_FIELDS] = {NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL}; meth = EC_GROUP_method_of(group); if (meth == NULL) return -1; /* Use the optional named curve nid as a search field */ nid = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group); field_type = EC_METHOD_get_field_type(meth); seed_len = EC_GROUP_get_seed_len(group); seed = EC_GROUP_get0_seed(group); cofactor = EC_GROUP_get0_cofactor(group); BN_CTX_start(ctx); /* * The built-in curves contains data fields (p, a, b, x, y, order) that are * all zero-padded to be the same size. The size of the padding is * determined by either the number of bytes in the field modulus (p) or the * EC group order, whichever is larger. */ param_len = BN_num_bytes(group->order); len = BN_num_bytes(group->field); if (len > param_len) param_len = len; /* Allocate space to store the padded data for (p, a, b, x, y, order) */ param_bytes = OPENSSL_malloc(param_len * NUM_BN_FIELDS); if (param_bytes == NULL) goto end; /* Create the bignums */ for (i = 0; i < NUM_BN_FIELDS; ++i) { if ((bn[i] = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL) goto end; } /* * Fill in the bn array with the same values as the internal curves * i.e. the values are p, a, b, x, y, order. */ /* Get p, a & b */ if (!(EC_GROUP_get_curve(group, bn[0], bn[1], bn[2], ctx) && ((generator = EC_GROUP_get0_generator(group)) != NULL) /* Get x & y */ && EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates(group, generator, bn[3], bn[4], ctx) /* Get order */ && EC_GROUP_get_order(group, bn[5], ctx))) goto end; /* * Convert the bignum array to bytes that are joined together to form * a single buffer that contains data for all fields. * (p, a, b, x, y, order) are all zero padded to be the same size. */ for (i = 0; i < NUM_BN_FIELDS; ++i) { if (BN_bn2binpad(bn[i], ¶m_bytes[i*param_len], param_len) <= 0) goto end; } for (i = 0; i < curve_list_length; i++) { const ec_list_element curve = curve_list[i]; data = curve.data; /* Get the raw order byte data */ params_seed = (const unsigned char *)(data + 1); /* skip header */ params = params_seed + data->seed_len; /* Look for unique fields in the fixed curve data */ if (data->field_type == field_type && param_len == data->param_len && (nid <= 0 || nid == curve.nid) /* check the optional cofactor (ignore if its zero) */ && (BN_is_zero(cofactor) || BN_is_word(cofactor, (const BN_ULONG)curve.data->cofactor)) /* Check the optional seed (ignore if its not set) */ && (data->seed_len == 0 || seed_len == 0 || ((size_t)data->seed_len == seed_len && memcmp(params_seed, seed, seed_len) == 0)) /* Check that the groups params match the built-in curve params */ && memcmp(param_bytes, params, param_len * NUM_BN_FIELDS) == 0) { ret = curve.nid; goto end; } } /* Gets here if the group was not found */ ret = NID_undef; end: OPENSSL_free(param_bytes); BN_CTX_end(ctx); return ret; } diff --git a/crypto/engine/eng_dyn.c b/crypto/engine/eng_dyn.c index 06e677290a70..87c762edb8a0 100644 --- a/crypto/engine/eng_dyn.c +++ b/crypto/engine/eng_dyn.c @@ -1,510 +1,512 @@ /* - * Copyright 2001-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 2001-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include "eng_local.h" #include "internal/dso.h" #include /* * Shared libraries implementing ENGINEs for use by the "dynamic" ENGINE * loader should implement the hook-up functions with the following * prototypes. */ /* Our ENGINE handlers */ static int dynamic_init(ENGINE *e); static int dynamic_finish(ENGINE *e); static int dynamic_ctrl(ENGINE *e, int cmd, long i, void *p, void (*f) (void)); /* Predeclare our context type */ typedef struct st_dynamic_data_ctx dynamic_data_ctx; /* The implementation for the important control command */ static int dynamic_load(ENGINE *e, dynamic_data_ctx *ctx); #define DYNAMIC_CMD_SO_PATH ENGINE_CMD_BASE #define DYNAMIC_CMD_NO_VCHECK (ENGINE_CMD_BASE + 1) #define DYNAMIC_CMD_ID (ENGINE_CMD_BASE + 2) #define DYNAMIC_CMD_LIST_ADD (ENGINE_CMD_BASE + 3) #define DYNAMIC_CMD_DIR_LOAD (ENGINE_CMD_BASE + 4) #define DYNAMIC_CMD_DIR_ADD (ENGINE_CMD_BASE + 5) #define DYNAMIC_CMD_LOAD (ENGINE_CMD_BASE + 6) /* The constants used when creating the ENGINE */ static const char *engine_dynamic_id = "dynamic"; static const char *engine_dynamic_name = "Dynamic engine loading support"; static const ENGINE_CMD_DEFN dynamic_cmd_defns[] = { {DYNAMIC_CMD_SO_PATH, "SO_PATH", "Specifies the path to the new ENGINE shared library", ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_STRING}, {DYNAMIC_CMD_NO_VCHECK, "NO_VCHECK", "Specifies to continue even if version checking fails (boolean)", ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_NUMERIC}, {DYNAMIC_CMD_ID, "ID", "Specifies an ENGINE id name for loading", ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_STRING}, {DYNAMIC_CMD_LIST_ADD, "LIST_ADD", "Whether to add a loaded ENGINE to the internal list (0=no,1=yes,2=mandatory)", ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_NUMERIC}, {DYNAMIC_CMD_DIR_LOAD, "DIR_LOAD", "Specifies whether to load from 'DIR_ADD' directories (0=no,1=yes,2=mandatory)", ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_NUMERIC}, {DYNAMIC_CMD_DIR_ADD, "DIR_ADD", "Adds a directory from which ENGINEs can be loaded", ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_STRING}, {DYNAMIC_CMD_LOAD, "LOAD", "Load up the ENGINE specified by other settings", ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_NO_INPUT}, {0, NULL, NULL, 0} }; /* * Loading code stores state inside the ENGINE structure via the "ex_data" * element. We load all our state into a single structure and use that as a * single context in the "ex_data" stack. */ struct st_dynamic_data_ctx { /* The DSO object we load that supplies the ENGINE code */ DSO *dynamic_dso; /* * The function pointer to the version checking shared library function */ dynamic_v_check_fn v_check; /* * The function pointer to the engine-binding shared library function */ dynamic_bind_engine bind_engine; /* The default name/path for loading the shared library */ char *DYNAMIC_LIBNAME; /* Whether to continue loading on a version check failure */ int no_vcheck; /* If non-NULL, stipulates the 'id' of the ENGINE to be loaded */ char *engine_id; /* * If non-zero, a successfully loaded ENGINE should be added to the * internal ENGINE list. If 2, the add must succeed or the entire load * should fail. */ int list_add_value; /* The symbol name for the version checking function */ const char *DYNAMIC_F1; /* The symbol name for the "initialise ENGINE structure" function */ const char *DYNAMIC_F2; /* * Whether to never use 'dirs', use 'dirs' as a fallback, or only use * 'dirs' for loading. Default is to use 'dirs' as a fallback. */ int dir_load; /* A stack of directories from which ENGINEs could be loaded */ STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *dirs; }; /* * This is the "ex_data" index we obtain and reserve for use with our context * structure. */ static int dynamic_ex_data_idx = -1; static void int_free_str(char *s) { OPENSSL_free(s); } /* * Because our ex_data element may or may not get allocated depending on * whether a "first-use" occurs before the ENGINE is freed, we have a memory * leak problem to solve. We can't declare a "new" handler for the ex_data as * we don't want a dynamic_data_ctx in *all* ENGINE structures of all types * (this is a bug in the design of CRYPTO_EX_DATA). As such, we just declare * a "free" handler and that will get called if an ENGINE is being destroyed * and there was an ex_data element corresponding to our context type. */ static void dynamic_data_ctx_free_func(void *parent, void *ptr, CRYPTO_EX_DATA *ad, int idx, long argl, void *argp) { if (ptr) { dynamic_data_ctx *ctx = (dynamic_data_ctx *)ptr; DSO_free(ctx->dynamic_dso); OPENSSL_free(ctx->DYNAMIC_LIBNAME); OPENSSL_free(ctx->engine_id); sk_OPENSSL_STRING_pop_free(ctx->dirs, int_free_str); OPENSSL_free(ctx); } } /* * Construct the per-ENGINE context. We create it blindly and then use a lock * to check for a race - if so, all but one of the threads "racing" will have * wasted their time. The alternative involves creating everything inside the * lock which is far worse. */ static int dynamic_set_data_ctx(ENGINE *e, dynamic_data_ctx **ctx) { dynamic_data_ctx *c = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*c)); int ret = 1; if (c == NULL) { ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_DYNAMIC_SET_DATA_CTX, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } c->dirs = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_new_null(); if (c->dirs == NULL) { ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_DYNAMIC_SET_DATA_CTX, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); OPENSSL_free(c); return 0; } c->DYNAMIC_F1 = "v_check"; c->DYNAMIC_F2 = "bind_engine"; c->dir_load = 1; CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(global_engine_lock); if ((*ctx = (dynamic_data_ctx *)ENGINE_get_ex_data(e, dynamic_ex_data_idx)) == NULL) { /* Good, we're the first */ ret = ENGINE_set_ex_data(e, dynamic_ex_data_idx, c); if (ret) { *ctx = c; c = NULL; } } CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(global_engine_lock); /* * If we lost the race to set the context, c is non-NULL and *ctx is the * context of the thread that won. */ if (c) sk_OPENSSL_STRING_free(c->dirs); OPENSSL_free(c); return ret; } /* * This function retrieves the context structure from an ENGINE's "ex_data", * or if it doesn't exist yet, sets it up. */ static dynamic_data_ctx *dynamic_get_data_ctx(ENGINE *e) { dynamic_data_ctx *ctx; if (dynamic_ex_data_idx < 0) { /* * Create and register the ENGINE ex_data, and associate our "free" * function with it to ensure any allocated contexts get freed when * an ENGINE goes underground. */ int new_idx = ENGINE_get_ex_new_index(0, NULL, NULL, NULL, dynamic_data_ctx_free_func); if (new_idx == -1) { ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_DYNAMIC_GET_DATA_CTX, ENGINE_R_NO_INDEX); return NULL; } CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(global_engine_lock); /* Avoid a race by checking again inside this lock */ if (dynamic_ex_data_idx < 0) { /* Good, someone didn't beat us to it */ dynamic_ex_data_idx = new_idx; new_idx = -1; } CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(global_engine_lock); /* * In theory we could "give back" the index here if (new_idx>-1), but * it's not possible and wouldn't gain us much if it were. */ } ctx = (dynamic_data_ctx *)ENGINE_get_ex_data(e, dynamic_ex_data_idx); /* Check if the context needs to be created */ if ((ctx == NULL) && !dynamic_set_data_ctx(e, &ctx)) /* "set_data" will set errors if necessary */ return NULL; return ctx; } static ENGINE *engine_dynamic(void) { ENGINE *ret = ENGINE_new(); if (ret == NULL) return NULL; if (!ENGINE_set_id(ret, engine_dynamic_id) || !ENGINE_set_name(ret, engine_dynamic_name) || !ENGINE_set_init_function(ret, dynamic_init) || !ENGINE_set_finish_function(ret, dynamic_finish) || !ENGINE_set_ctrl_function(ret, dynamic_ctrl) || !ENGINE_set_flags(ret, ENGINE_FLAGS_BY_ID_COPY) || !ENGINE_set_cmd_defns(ret, dynamic_cmd_defns)) { ENGINE_free(ret); return NULL; } return ret; } void engine_load_dynamic_int(void) { ENGINE *toadd = engine_dynamic(); if (!toadd) return; ENGINE_add(toadd); /* * If the "add" worked, it gets a structural reference. So either way, we * release our just-created reference. */ ENGINE_free(toadd); /* * If the "add" didn't work, it was probably a conflict because it was * already added (eg. someone calling ENGINE_load_blah then calling * ENGINE_load_builtin_engines() perhaps). */ ERR_clear_error(); } static int dynamic_init(ENGINE *e) { /* * We always return failure - the "dynamic" engine itself can't be used * for anything. */ return 0; } static int dynamic_finish(ENGINE *e) { /* * This should never be called on account of "dynamic_init" always * failing. */ return 0; } static int dynamic_ctrl(ENGINE *e, int cmd, long i, void *p, void (*f) (void)) { dynamic_data_ctx *ctx = dynamic_get_data_ctx(e); int initialised; if (!ctx) { ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_DYNAMIC_CTRL, ENGINE_R_NOT_LOADED); return 0; } initialised = ((ctx->dynamic_dso == NULL) ? 0 : 1); /* All our control commands require the ENGINE to be uninitialised */ if (initialised) { ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_DYNAMIC_CTRL, ENGINE_R_ALREADY_LOADED); return 0; } switch (cmd) { case DYNAMIC_CMD_SO_PATH: /* a NULL 'p' or a string of zero-length is the same thing */ if (p && (strlen((const char *)p) < 1)) p = NULL; OPENSSL_free(ctx->DYNAMIC_LIBNAME); if (p) ctx->DYNAMIC_LIBNAME = OPENSSL_strdup(p); else ctx->DYNAMIC_LIBNAME = NULL; return (ctx->DYNAMIC_LIBNAME ? 1 : 0); case DYNAMIC_CMD_NO_VCHECK: ctx->no_vcheck = ((i == 0) ? 0 : 1); return 1; case DYNAMIC_CMD_ID: /* a NULL 'p' or a string of zero-length is the same thing */ if (p && (strlen((const char *)p) < 1)) p = NULL; OPENSSL_free(ctx->engine_id); if (p) ctx->engine_id = OPENSSL_strdup(p); else ctx->engine_id = NULL; return (ctx->engine_id ? 1 : 0); case DYNAMIC_CMD_LIST_ADD: if ((i < 0) || (i > 2)) { ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_DYNAMIC_CTRL, ENGINE_R_INVALID_ARGUMENT); return 0; } ctx->list_add_value = (int)i; return 1; case DYNAMIC_CMD_LOAD: return dynamic_load(e, ctx); case DYNAMIC_CMD_DIR_LOAD: if ((i < 0) || (i > 2)) { ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_DYNAMIC_CTRL, ENGINE_R_INVALID_ARGUMENT); return 0; } ctx->dir_load = (int)i; return 1; case DYNAMIC_CMD_DIR_ADD: /* a NULL 'p' or a string of zero-length is the same thing */ if (!p || (strlen((const char *)p) < 1)) { ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_DYNAMIC_CTRL, ENGINE_R_INVALID_ARGUMENT); return 0; } { char *tmp_str = OPENSSL_strdup(p); if (tmp_str == NULL) { ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_DYNAMIC_CTRL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } if (!sk_OPENSSL_STRING_push(ctx->dirs, tmp_str)) { OPENSSL_free(tmp_str); ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_DYNAMIC_CTRL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } } return 1; default: break; } ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_DYNAMIC_CTRL, ENGINE_R_CTRL_COMMAND_NOT_IMPLEMENTED); return 0; } static int int_load(dynamic_data_ctx *ctx) { int num, loop; /* Unless told not to, try a direct load */ if ((ctx->dir_load != 2) && (DSO_load(ctx->dynamic_dso, ctx->DYNAMIC_LIBNAME, NULL, 0)) != NULL) return 1; /* If we're not allowed to use 'dirs' or we have none, fail */ if (!ctx->dir_load || (num = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_num(ctx->dirs)) < 1) return 0; for (loop = 0; loop < num; loop++) { const char *s = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_value(ctx->dirs, loop); char *merge = DSO_merge(ctx->dynamic_dso, ctx->DYNAMIC_LIBNAME, s); if (!merge) return 0; if (DSO_load(ctx->dynamic_dso, merge, NULL, 0)) { /* Found what we're looking for */ OPENSSL_free(merge); return 1; } OPENSSL_free(merge); } return 0; } static int dynamic_load(ENGINE *e, dynamic_data_ctx *ctx) { ENGINE cpy; dynamic_fns fns; if (ctx->dynamic_dso == NULL) ctx->dynamic_dso = DSO_new(); if (ctx->dynamic_dso == NULL) return 0; if (!ctx->DYNAMIC_LIBNAME) { if (!ctx->engine_id) return 0; DSO_ctrl(ctx->dynamic_dso, DSO_CTRL_SET_FLAGS, DSO_FLAG_NAME_TRANSLATION_EXT_ONLY, NULL); ctx->DYNAMIC_LIBNAME = DSO_convert_filename(ctx->dynamic_dso, ctx->engine_id); } if (!int_load(ctx)) { ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_DYNAMIC_LOAD, ENGINE_R_DSO_NOT_FOUND); DSO_free(ctx->dynamic_dso); ctx->dynamic_dso = NULL; return 0; } /* We have to find a bind function otherwise it'll always end badly */ if (! (ctx->bind_engine = (dynamic_bind_engine) DSO_bind_func(ctx->dynamic_dso, ctx->DYNAMIC_F2))) { ctx->bind_engine = NULL; DSO_free(ctx->dynamic_dso); ctx->dynamic_dso = NULL; ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_DYNAMIC_LOAD, ENGINE_R_DSO_FAILURE); return 0; } /* Do we perform version checking? */ if (!ctx->no_vcheck) { unsigned long vcheck_res = 0; /* * Now we try to find a version checking function and decide how to * cope with failure if/when it fails. */ ctx->v_check = (dynamic_v_check_fn) DSO_bind_func(ctx->dynamic_dso, ctx->DYNAMIC_F1); if (ctx->v_check) vcheck_res = ctx->v_check(OSSL_DYNAMIC_VERSION); /* * We fail if the version checker veto'd the load *or* if it is * deferring to us (by returning its version) and we think it is too * old. */ if (vcheck_res < OSSL_DYNAMIC_OLDEST) { /* Fail */ ctx->bind_engine = NULL; ctx->v_check = NULL; DSO_free(ctx->dynamic_dso); ctx->dynamic_dso = NULL; ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_DYNAMIC_LOAD, ENGINE_R_VERSION_INCOMPATIBILITY); return 0; } } /* * First binary copy the ENGINE structure so that we can roll back if the * hand-over fails */ memcpy(&cpy, e, sizeof(ENGINE)); /* * Provide the ERR, "ex_data", memory, and locking callbacks so the * loaded library uses our state rather than its own. FIXME: As noted in * engine.h, much of this would be simplified if each area of code * provided its own "summary" structure of all related callbacks. It * would also increase opaqueness. */ fns.static_state = ENGINE_get_static_state(); CRYPTO_get_mem_functions(&fns.mem_fns.malloc_fn, &fns.mem_fns.realloc_fn, &fns.mem_fns.free_fn); /* * Now that we've loaded the dynamic engine, make sure no "dynamic" * ENGINE elements will show through. */ engine_set_all_null(e); /* Try to bind the ENGINE onto our own ENGINE structure */ - if (!ctx->bind_engine(e, ctx->engine_id, &fns)) { + if (!engine_add_dynamic_id(e, (ENGINE_DYNAMIC_ID)ctx->bind_engine, 1) + || !ctx->bind_engine(e, ctx->engine_id, &fns)) { + engine_remove_dynamic_id(e, 1); ctx->bind_engine = NULL; ctx->v_check = NULL; DSO_free(ctx->dynamic_dso); ctx->dynamic_dso = NULL; ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_DYNAMIC_LOAD, ENGINE_R_INIT_FAILED); /* Copy the original ENGINE structure back */ memcpy(e, &cpy, sizeof(ENGINE)); return 0; } /* Do we try to add this ENGINE to the internal list too? */ if (ctx->list_add_value > 0) { if (!ENGINE_add(e)) { /* Do we tolerate this or fail? */ if (ctx->list_add_value > 1) { /* * Fail - NB: By this time, it's too late to rollback, and * trying to do so allows the bind_engine() code to have * created leaks. We just have to fail where we are, after * the ENGINE has changed. */ ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_DYNAMIC_LOAD, ENGINE_R_CONFLICTING_ENGINE_ID); return 0; } /* Tolerate */ ERR_clear_error(); } } return 1; } diff --git a/crypto/engine/eng_lib.c b/crypto/engine/eng_lib.c index 5bd584c5999a..fb727b787747 100644 --- a/crypto/engine/eng_lib.c +++ b/crypto/engine/eng_lib.c @@ -1,300 +1,302 @@ /* - * Copyright 2001-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 2001-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include "e_os.h" #include "eng_local.h" #include #include "internal/refcount.h" CRYPTO_RWLOCK *global_engine_lock; CRYPTO_ONCE engine_lock_init = CRYPTO_ONCE_STATIC_INIT; /* The "new"/"free" stuff first */ DEFINE_RUN_ONCE(do_engine_lock_init) { if (!OPENSSL_init_crypto(0, NULL)) return 0; global_engine_lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new(); return global_engine_lock != NULL; } ENGINE *ENGINE_new(void) { ENGINE *ret; if (!RUN_ONCE(&engine_lock_init, do_engine_lock_init) || (ret = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ret))) == NULL) { ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return NULL; } ret->struct_ref = 1; engine_ref_debug(ret, 0, 1); if (!CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_ENGINE, ret, &ret->ex_data)) { OPENSSL_free(ret); return NULL; } return ret; } /* * Placed here (close proximity to ENGINE_new) so that modifications to the * elements of the ENGINE structure are more likely to be caught and changed * here. */ void engine_set_all_null(ENGINE *e) { e->id = NULL; e->name = NULL; e->rsa_meth = NULL; e->dsa_meth = NULL; e->dh_meth = NULL; e->rand_meth = NULL; e->ciphers = NULL; e->digests = NULL; e->destroy = NULL; e->init = NULL; e->finish = NULL; e->ctrl = NULL; e->load_privkey = NULL; e->load_pubkey = NULL; e->cmd_defns = NULL; e->flags = 0; + e->dynamic_id = NULL; } int engine_free_util(ENGINE *e, int not_locked) { int i; if (e == NULL) return 1; if (not_locked) CRYPTO_DOWN_REF(&e->struct_ref, &i, global_engine_lock); else i = --e->struct_ref; engine_ref_debug(e, 0, -1); if (i > 0) return 1; REF_ASSERT_ISNT(i < 0); /* Free up any dynamically allocated public key methods */ engine_pkey_meths_free(e); engine_pkey_asn1_meths_free(e); /* * Give the ENGINE a chance to do any structural cleanup corresponding to * allocation it did in its constructor (eg. unload error strings) */ if (e->destroy) e->destroy(e); + engine_remove_dynamic_id(e, not_locked); CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_ENGINE, e, &e->ex_data); OPENSSL_free(e); return 1; } int ENGINE_free(ENGINE *e) { return engine_free_util(e, 1); } /* Cleanup stuff */ /* * engine_cleanup_int() is coded such that anything that does work that will * need cleanup can register a "cleanup" callback here. That way we don't get * linker bloat by referring to all *possible* cleanups, but any linker bloat * into code "X" will cause X's cleanup function to end up here. */ static STACK_OF(ENGINE_CLEANUP_ITEM) *cleanup_stack = NULL; static int int_cleanup_check(int create) { if (cleanup_stack) return 1; if (!create) return 0; cleanup_stack = sk_ENGINE_CLEANUP_ITEM_new_null(); return (cleanup_stack ? 1 : 0); } static ENGINE_CLEANUP_ITEM *int_cleanup_item(ENGINE_CLEANUP_CB *cb) { ENGINE_CLEANUP_ITEM *item; if ((item = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*item))) == NULL) { ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_INT_CLEANUP_ITEM, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return NULL; } item->cb = cb; return item; } void engine_cleanup_add_first(ENGINE_CLEANUP_CB *cb) { ENGINE_CLEANUP_ITEM *item; if (!int_cleanup_check(1)) return; item = int_cleanup_item(cb); if (item) sk_ENGINE_CLEANUP_ITEM_insert(cleanup_stack, item, 0); } void engine_cleanup_add_last(ENGINE_CLEANUP_CB *cb) { ENGINE_CLEANUP_ITEM *item; if (!int_cleanup_check(1)) return; item = int_cleanup_item(cb); if (item != NULL) { if (sk_ENGINE_CLEANUP_ITEM_push(cleanup_stack, item) <= 0) OPENSSL_free(item); } } /* The API function that performs all cleanup */ static void engine_cleanup_cb_free(ENGINE_CLEANUP_ITEM *item) { (*(item->cb)) (); OPENSSL_free(item); } void engine_cleanup_int(void) { if (int_cleanup_check(0)) { sk_ENGINE_CLEANUP_ITEM_pop_free(cleanup_stack, engine_cleanup_cb_free); cleanup_stack = NULL; } CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(global_engine_lock); global_engine_lock = NULL; } /* Now the "ex_data" support */ int ENGINE_set_ex_data(ENGINE *e, int idx, void *arg) { return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&e->ex_data, idx, arg); } void *ENGINE_get_ex_data(const ENGINE *e, int idx) { return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&e->ex_data, idx); } /* * Functions to get/set an ENGINE's elements - mainly to avoid exposing the * ENGINE structure itself. */ int ENGINE_set_id(ENGINE *e, const char *id) { if (id == NULL) { ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_SET_ID, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); return 0; } e->id = id; return 1; } int ENGINE_set_name(ENGINE *e, const char *name) { if (name == NULL) { ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_SET_NAME, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); return 0; } e->name = name; return 1; } int ENGINE_set_destroy_function(ENGINE *e, ENGINE_GEN_INT_FUNC_PTR destroy_f) { e->destroy = destroy_f; return 1; } int ENGINE_set_init_function(ENGINE *e, ENGINE_GEN_INT_FUNC_PTR init_f) { e->init = init_f; return 1; } int ENGINE_set_finish_function(ENGINE *e, ENGINE_GEN_INT_FUNC_PTR finish_f) { e->finish = finish_f; return 1; } int ENGINE_set_ctrl_function(ENGINE *e, ENGINE_CTRL_FUNC_PTR ctrl_f) { e->ctrl = ctrl_f; return 1; } int ENGINE_set_flags(ENGINE *e, int flags) { e->flags = flags; return 1; } int ENGINE_set_cmd_defns(ENGINE *e, const ENGINE_CMD_DEFN *defns) { e->cmd_defns = defns; return 1; } const char *ENGINE_get_id(const ENGINE *e) { return e->id; } const char *ENGINE_get_name(const ENGINE *e) { return e->name; } ENGINE_GEN_INT_FUNC_PTR ENGINE_get_destroy_function(const ENGINE *e) { return e->destroy; } ENGINE_GEN_INT_FUNC_PTR ENGINE_get_init_function(const ENGINE *e) { return e->init; } ENGINE_GEN_INT_FUNC_PTR ENGINE_get_finish_function(const ENGINE *e) { return e->finish; } ENGINE_CTRL_FUNC_PTR ENGINE_get_ctrl_function(const ENGINE *e) { return e->ctrl; } int ENGINE_get_flags(const ENGINE *e) { return e->flags; } const ENGINE_CMD_DEFN *ENGINE_get_cmd_defns(const ENGINE *e) { return e->cmd_defns; } /* * eng_lib.o is pretty much linked into anything that touches ENGINE already, * so put the "static_state" hack here. */ static int internal_static_hack = 0; void *ENGINE_get_static_state(void) { return &internal_static_hack; } diff --git a/crypto/engine/eng_list.c b/crypto/engine/eng_list.c index 1352fb7c961d..e2e91d297bd6 100644 --- a/crypto/engine/eng_list.c +++ b/crypto/engine/eng_list.c @@ -1,349 +1,436 @@ /* - * Copyright 2001-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 2001-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include "eng_local.h" /* * The linked-list of pointers to engine types. engine_list_head incorporates * an implicit structural reference but engine_list_tail does not - the * latter is a computational optimization and only points to something that * is already pointed to by its predecessor in the list (or engine_list_head * itself). In the same way, the use of the "prev" pointer in each ENGINE is * to save excessive list iteration, it doesn't correspond to an extra * structural reference. Hence, engine_list_head, and each non-null "next" * pointer account for the list itself assuming exactly 1 structural * reference on each list member. */ static ENGINE *engine_list_head = NULL; static ENGINE *engine_list_tail = NULL; +/* + * The linked list of currently loaded dynamic engines. + */ +static ENGINE *engine_dyn_list_head = NULL; +static ENGINE *engine_dyn_list_tail = NULL; + /* * This cleanup function is only needed internally. If it should be called, * we register it with the "engine_cleanup_int()" stack to be called during * cleanup. */ static void engine_list_cleanup(void) { ENGINE *iterator = engine_list_head; while (iterator != NULL) { ENGINE_remove(iterator); iterator = engine_list_head; } return; } /* * These static functions starting with a lower case "engine_" always take * place when global_engine_lock has been locked up. */ static int engine_list_add(ENGINE *e) { int conflict = 0; ENGINE *iterator = NULL; if (e == NULL) { ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_LIST_ADD, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); return 0; } iterator = engine_list_head; while (iterator && !conflict) { conflict = (strcmp(iterator->id, e->id) == 0); iterator = iterator->next; } if (conflict) { ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_LIST_ADD, ENGINE_R_CONFLICTING_ENGINE_ID); return 0; } if (engine_list_head == NULL) { /* We are adding to an empty list. */ if (engine_list_tail) { ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_LIST_ADD, ENGINE_R_INTERNAL_LIST_ERROR); return 0; } engine_list_head = e; e->prev = NULL; /* * The first time the list allocates, we should register the cleanup. */ engine_cleanup_add_last(engine_list_cleanup); } else { /* We are adding to the tail of an existing list. */ if ((engine_list_tail == NULL) || (engine_list_tail->next != NULL)) { ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_LIST_ADD, ENGINE_R_INTERNAL_LIST_ERROR); return 0; } engine_list_tail->next = e; e->prev = engine_list_tail; } /* * Having the engine in the list assumes a structural reference. */ e->struct_ref++; engine_ref_debug(e, 0, 1); /* However it came to be, e is the last item in the list. */ engine_list_tail = e; e->next = NULL; return 1; } static int engine_list_remove(ENGINE *e) { ENGINE *iterator; if (e == NULL) { ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_LIST_REMOVE, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); return 0; } /* We need to check that e is in our linked list! */ iterator = engine_list_head; while (iterator && (iterator != e)) iterator = iterator->next; if (iterator == NULL) { ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_LIST_REMOVE, ENGINE_R_ENGINE_IS_NOT_IN_LIST); return 0; } /* un-link e from the chain. */ if (e->next) e->next->prev = e->prev; if (e->prev) e->prev->next = e->next; /* Correct our head/tail if necessary. */ if (engine_list_head == e) engine_list_head = e->next; if (engine_list_tail == e) engine_list_tail = e->prev; engine_free_util(e, 0); return 1; } +/* Add engine to dynamic engine list. */ +int engine_add_dynamic_id(ENGINE *e, ENGINE_DYNAMIC_ID dynamic_id, + int not_locked) +{ + int result = 0; + ENGINE *iterator = NULL; + + if (e == NULL) + return 0; + + if (e->dynamic_id == NULL && dynamic_id == NULL) + return 0; + + if (not_locked && !CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(global_engine_lock)) + return 0; + + if (dynamic_id != NULL) { + iterator = engine_dyn_list_head; + while (iterator != NULL) { + if (iterator->dynamic_id == dynamic_id) + goto err; + iterator = iterator->next; + } + if (e->dynamic_id != NULL) + goto err; + e->dynamic_id = dynamic_id; + } + + if (engine_dyn_list_head == NULL) { + /* We are adding to an empty list. */ + if (engine_dyn_list_tail != NULL) + goto err; + engine_dyn_list_head = e; + e->prev_dyn = NULL; + } else { + /* We are adding to the tail of an existing list. */ + if (engine_dyn_list_tail == NULL + || engine_dyn_list_tail->next_dyn != NULL) + goto err; + engine_dyn_list_tail->next_dyn = e; + e->prev_dyn = engine_dyn_list_tail; + } + + engine_dyn_list_tail = e; + e->next_dyn = NULL; + result = 1; + + err: + if (not_locked) + CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(global_engine_lock); + return result; +} + +/* Remove engine from dynamic engine list. */ +void engine_remove_dynamic_id(ENGINE *e, int not_locked) +{ + if (e == NULL || e->dynamic_id == NULL) + return; + + if (not_locked && !CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(global_engine_lock)) + return; + + e->dynamic_id = NULL; + + /* un-link e from the chain. */ + if (e->next_dyn != NULL) + e->next_dyn->prev_dyn = e->prev_dyn; + if (e->prev_dyn != NULL) + e->prev_dyn->next_dyn = e->next_dyn; + /* Correct our head/tail if necessary. */ + if (engine_dyn_list_head == e) + engine_dyn_list_head = e->next_dyn; + if (engine_dyn_list_tail == e) + engine_dyn_list_tail = e->prev_dyn; + + if (not_locked) + CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(global_engine_lock); +} + /* Get the first/last "ENGINE" type available. */ ENGINE *ENGINE_get_first(void) { ENGINE *ret; if (!RUN_ONCE(&engine_lock_init, do_engine_lock_init)) { ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_GET_FIRST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return NULL; } CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(global_engine_lock); ret = engine_list_head; if (ret) { ret->struct_ref++; engine_ref_debug(ret, 0, 1); } CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(global_engine_lock); return ret; } ENGINE *ENGINE_get_last(void) { ENGINE *ret; if (!RUN_ONCE(&engine_lock_init, do_engine_lock_init)) { ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_GET_LAST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return NULL; } CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(global_engine_lock); ret = engine_list_tail; if (ret) { ret->struct_ref++; engine_ref_debug(ret, 0, 1); } CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(global_engine_lock); return ret; } /* Iterate to the next/previous "ENGINE" type (NULL = end of the list). */ ENGINE *ENGINE_get_next(ENGINE *e) { ENGINE *ret = NULL; if (e == NULL) { ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_GET_NEXT, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); return 0; } CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(global_engine_lock); ret = e->next; if (ret) { /* Return a valid structural reference to the next ENGINE */ ret->struct_ref++; engine_ref_debug(ret, 0, 1); } CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(global_engine_lock); /* Release the structural reference to the previous ENGINE */ ENGINE_free(e); return ret; } ENGINE *ENGINE_get_prev(ENGINE *e) { ENGINE *ret = NULL; if (e == NULL) { ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_GET_PREV, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); return 0; } CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(global_engine_lock); ret = e->prev; if (ret) { /* Return a valid structural reference to the next ENGINE */ ret->struct_ref++; engine_ref_debug(ret, 0, 1); } CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(global_engine_lock); /* Release the structural reference to the previous ENGINE */ ENGINE_free(e); return ret; } /* Add another "ENGINE" type into the list. */ int ENGINE_add(ENGINE *e) { int to_return = 1; if (e == NULL) { ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_ADD, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); return 0; } if ((e->id == NULL) || (e->name == NULL)) { ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_ADD, ENGINE_R_ID_OR_NAME_MISSING); return 0; } CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(global_engine_lock); if (!engine_list_add(e)) { ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_ADD, ENGINE_R_INTERNAL_LIST_ERROR); to_return = 0; } CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(global_engine_lock); return to_return; } /* Remove an existing "ENGINE" type from the array. */ int ENGINE_remove(ENGINE *e) { int to_return = 1; if (e == NULL) { ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_REMOVE, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); return 0; } CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(global_engine_lock); if (!engine_list_remove(e)) { ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_REMOVE, ENGINE_R_INTERNAL_LIST_ERROR); to_return = 0; } CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(global_engine_lock); return to_return; } static void engine_cpy(ENGINE *dest, const ENGINE *src) { dest->id = src->id; dest->name = src->name; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA dest->rsa_meth = src->rsa_meth; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA dest->dsa_meth = src->dsa_meth; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH dest->dh_meth = src->dh_meth; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC dest->ec_meth = src->ec_meth; #endif dest->rand_meth = src->rand_meth; dest->ciphers = src->ciphers; dest->digests = src->digests; dest->pkey_meths = src->pkey_meths; dest->destroy = src->destroy; dest->init = src->init; dest->finish = src->finish; dest->ctrl = src->ctrl; dest->load_privkey = src->load_privkey; dest->load_pubkey = src->load_pubkey; dest->cmd_defns = src->cmd_defns; dest->flags = src->flags; + dest->dynamic_id = src->dynamic_id; + engine_add_dynamic_id(dest, NULL, 0); } ENGINE *ENGINE_by_id(const char *id) { ENGINE *iterator; char *load_dir = NULL; if (id == NULL) { ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_BY_ID, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); return NULL; } if (!RUN_ONCE(&engine_lock_init, do_engine_lock_init)) { ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_BY_ID, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return NULL; } CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(global_engine_lock); iterator = engine_list_head; while (iterator && (strcmp(id, iterator->id) != 0)) iterator = iterator->next; if (iterator != NULL) { /* * We need to return a structural reference. If this is an ENGINE * type that returns copies, make a duplicate - otherwise increment * the existing ENGINE's reference count. */ if (iterator->flags & ENGINE_FLAGS_BY_ID_COPY) { ENGINE *cp = ENGINE_new(); if (cp == NULL) iterator = NULL; else { engine_cpy(cp, iterator); iterator = cp; } } else { iterator->struct_ref++; engine_ref_debug(iterator, 0, 1); } } CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(global_engine_lock); if (iterator != NULL) return iterator; /* * Prevent infinite recursion if we're looking for the dynamic engine. */ if (strcmp(id, "dynamic")) { if ((load_dir = ossl_safe_getenv("OPENSSL_ENGINES")) == NULL) load_dir = ENGINESDIR; iterator = ENGINE_by_id("dynamic"); if (!iterator || !ENGINE_ctrl_cmd_string(iterator, "ID", id, 0) || !ENGINE_ctrl_cmd_string(iterator, "DIR_LOAD", "2", 0) || !ENGINE_ctrl_cmd_string(iterator, "DIR_ADD", load_dir, 0) || !ENGINE_ctrl_cmd_string(iterator, "LIST_ADD", "1", 0) || !ENGINE_ctrl_cmd_string(iterator, "LOAD", NULL, 0)) goto notfound; return iterator; } notfound: ENGINE_free(iterator); ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_BY_ID, ENGINE_R_NO_SUCH_ENGINE); ERR_add_error_data(2, "id=", id); return NULL; /* EEK! Experimental code ends */ } int ENGINE_up_ref(ENGINE *e) { int i; if (e == NULL) { ENGINEerr(ENGINE_F_ENGINE_UP_REF, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); return 0; } CRYPTO_UP_REF(&e->struct_ref, &i, global_engine_lock); return 1; } diff --git a/crypto/engine/eng_local.h b/crypto/engine/eng_local.h index 8ef7172b9f45..e271222d76a8 100644 --- a/crypto/engine/eng_local.h +++ b/crypto/engine/eng_local.h @@ -1,171 +1,180 @@ /* - * Copyright 2001-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 2001-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #ifndef OSSL_CRYPTO_ENGINE_ENG_LOCAL_H # define OSSL_CRYPTO_ENGINE_ENG_LOCAL_H # include "internal/cryptlib.h" # include "crypto/engine.h" # include "internal/thread_once.h" # include "internal/refcount.h" extern CRYPTO_RWLOCK *global_engine_lock; /* * If we compile with this symbol defined, then both reference counts in the * ENGINE structure will be monitored with a line of output on stderr for * each change. This prints the engine's pointer address (truncated to * unsigned int), "struct" or "funct" to indicate the reference type, the * before and after reference count, and the file:line-number pair. The * "engine_ref_debug" statements must come *after* the change. */ # ifdef ENGINE_REF_COUNT_DEBUG # define engine_ref_debug(e, isfunct, diff) \ fprintf(stderr, "engine: %08x %s from %d to %d (%s:%d)\n", \ (unsigned int)(e), (isfunct ? "funct" : "struct"), \ ((isfunct) ? ((e)->funct_ref - (diff)) : ((e)->struct_ref - (diff))), \ ((isfunct) ? (e)->funct_ref : (e)->struct_ref), \ (OPENSSL_FILE), (OPENSSL_LINE)) # else # define engine_ref_debug(e, isfunct, diff) # endif /* * Any code that will need cleanup operations should use these functions to * register callbacks. engine_cleanup_int() will call all registered * callbacks in order. NB: both the "add" functions assume the engine lock to * already be held (in "write" mode). */ typedef void (ENGINE_CLEANUP_CB) (void); typedef struct st_engine_cleanup_item { ENGINE_CLEANUP_CB *cb; } ENGINE_CLEANUP_ITEM; DEFINE_STACK_OF(ENGINE_CLEANUP_ITEM) void engine_cleanup_add_first(ENGINE_CLEANUP_CB *cb); void engine_cleanup_add_last(ENGINE_CLEANUP_CB *cb); /* We need stacks of ENGINEs for use in eng_table.c */ DEFINE_STACK_OF(ENGINE) /* * If this symbol is defined then engine_table_select(), the function that is * used by RSA, DSA (etc) code to select registered ENGINEs, cache defaults * and functional references (etc), will display debugging summaries to * stderr. */ /* #define ENGINE_TABLE_DEBUG */ /* * This represents an implementation table. Dependent code should instantiate * it as a (ENGINE_TABLE *) pointer value set initially to NULL. */ typedef struct st_engine_table ENGINE_TABLE; int engine_table_register(ENGINE_TABLE **table, ENGINE_CLEANUP_CB *cleanup, ENGINE *e, const int *nids, int num_nids, int setdefault); void engine_table_unregister(ENGINE_TABLE **table, ENGINE *e); void engine_table_cleanup(ENGINE_TABLE **table); # ifndef ENGINE_TABLE_DEBUG ENGINE *engine_table_select(ENGINE_TABLE **table, int nid); # else ENGINE *engine_table_select_tmp(ENGINE_TABLE **table, int nid, const char *f, int l); # define engine_table_select(t,n) engine_table_select_tmp(t,n,OPENSSL_FILE,OPENSSL_LINE) # endif typedef void (engine_table_doall_cb) (int nid, STACK_OF(ENGINE) *sk, ENGINE *def, void *arg); void engine_table_doall(ENGINE_TABLE *table, engine_table_doall_cb *cb, void *arg); /* * Internal versions of API functions that have control over locking. These * are used between C files when functionality needs to be shared but the * caller may already be controlling of the engine lock. */ int engine_unlocked_init(ENGINE *e); int engine_unlocked_finish(ENGINE *e, int unlock_for_handlers); int engine_free_util(ENGINE *e, int not_locked); /* * This function will reset all "set"able values in an ENGINE to NULL. This * won't touch reference counts or ex_data, but is equivalent to calling all * the ENGINE_set_***() functions with a NULL value. */ void engine_set_all_null(ENGINE *e); /* * NB: Bitwise OR-able values for the "flags" variable in ENGINE are now * exposed in engine.h. */ /* Free up dynamically allocated public key methods associated with ENGINE */ void engine_pkey_meths_free(ENGINE *e); void engine_pkey_asn1_meths_free(ENGINE *e); /* Once initialisation function */ extern CRYPTO_ONCE engine_lock_init; DECLARE_RUN_ONCE(do_engine_lock_init) +typedef void (*ENGINE_DYNAMIC_ID)(void); +int engine_add_dynamic_id(ENGINE *e, ENGINE_DYNAMIC_ID dynamic_id, + int not_locked); +void engine_remove_dynamic_id(ENGINE *e, int not_locked); + /* * This is a structure for storing implementations of various crypto * algorithms and functions. */ struct engine_st { const char *id; const char *name; const RSA_METHOD *rsa_meth; const DSA_METHOD *dsa_meth; const DH_METHOD *dh_meth; const EC_KEY_METHOD *ec_meth; const RAND_METHOD *rand_meth; /* Cipher handling is via this callback */ ENGINE_CIPHERS_PTR ciphers; /* Digest handling is via this callback */ ENGINE_DIGESTS_PTR digests; /* Public key handling via this callback */ ENGINE_PKEY_METHS_PTR pkey_meths; /* ASN1 public key handling via this callback */ ENGINE_PKEY_ASN1_METHS_PTR pkey_asn1_meths; ENGINE_GEN_INT_FUNC_PTR destroy; ENGINE_GEN_INT_FUNC_PTR init; ENGINE_GEN_INT_FUNC_PTR finish; ENGINE_CTRL_FUNC_PTR ctrl; ENGINE_LOAD_KEY_PTR load_privkey; ENGINE_LOAD_KEY_PTR load_pubkey; ENGINE_SSL_CLIENT_CERT_PTR load_ssl_client_cert; const ENGINE_CMD_DEFN *cmd_defns; int flags; /* reference count on the structure itself */ CRYPTO_REF_COUNT struct_ref; /* * reference count on usability of the engine type. NB: This controls the * loading and initialisation of any functionality required by this * engine, whereas the previous count is simply to cope with * (de)allocation of this structure. Hence, running_ref <= struct_ref at * all times. */ int funct_ref; /* A place to store per-ENGINE data */ CRYPTO_EX_DATA ex_data; /* Used to maintain the linked-list of engines. */ struct engine_st *prev; struct engine_st *next; + /* Used to maintain the linked-list of dynamic engines. */ + struct engine_st *prev_dyn; + struct engine_st *next_dyn; + ENGINE_DYNAMIC_ID dynamic_id; }; typedef struct st_engine_pile ENGINE_PILE; DEFINE_LHASH_OF(ENGINE_PILE); #endif /* OSSL_CRYPTO_ENGINE_ENG_LOCAL_H */ diff --git a/crypto/err/err.c b/crypto/err/err.c index 1372d52f80ee..bd116e249acb 100644 --- a/crypto/err/err.c +++ b/crypto/err/err.c @@ -1,952 +1,953 @@ /* - * Copyright 1995-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 1995-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include #include "crypto/cryptlib.h" #include "internal/err.h" #include "crypto/err.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include "internal/thread_once.h" #include "crypto/ctype.h" #include "internal/constant_time.h" #include "e_os.h" static int err_load_strings(const ERR_STRING_DATA *str); static void ERR_STATE_free(ERR_STATE *s); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR static ERR_STRING_DATA ERR_str_libraries[] = { {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_NONE, 0, 0), "unknown library"}, {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SYS, 0, 0), "system library"}, {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_BN, 0, 0), "bignum routines"}, {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, 0, 0), "rsa routines"}, {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_DH, 0, 0), "Diffie-Hellman routines"}, {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_EVP, 0, 0), "digital envelope routines"}, {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_BUF, 0, 0), "memory buffer routines"}, {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_OBJ, 0, 0), "object identifier routines"}, {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_PEM, 0, 0), "PEM routines"}, {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_DSA, 0, 0), "dsa routines"}, {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_X509, 0, 0), "x509 certificate routines"}, {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_ASN1, 0, 0), "asn1 encoding routines"}, {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_CONF, 0, 0), "configuration file routines"}, {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_CRYPTO, 0, 0), "common libcrypto routines"}, {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_EC, 0, 0), "elliptic curve routines"}, {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_ECDSA, 0, 0), "ECDSA routines"}, {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_ECDH, 0, 0), "ECDH routines"}, {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SSL, 0, 0), "SSL routines"}, {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_BIO, 0, 0), "BIO routines"}, {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_PKCS7, 0, 0), "PKCS7 routines"}, {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_X509V3, 0, 0), "X509 V3 routines"}, {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_PKCS12, 0, 0), "PKCS12 routines"}, {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RAND, 0, 0), "random number generator"}, {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_DSO, 0, 0), "DSO support routines"}, {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_TS, 0, 0), "time stamp routines"}, {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_ENGINE, 0, 0), "engine routines"}, {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_OCSP, 0, 0), "OCSP routines"}, {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_UI, 0, 0), "UI routines"}, {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_FIPS, 0, 0), "FIPS routines"}, {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_CMS, 0, 0), "CMS routines"}, {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_HMAC, 0, 0), "HMAC routines"}, {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_CT, 0, 0), "CT routines"}, {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_ASYNC, 0, 0), "ASYNC routines"}, {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_KDF, 0, 0), "KDF routines"}, {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_OSSL_STORE, 0, 0), "STORE routines"}, {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SM2, 0, 0), "SM2 routines"}, {0, NULL}, }; static ERR_STRING_DATA ERR_str_functs[] = { {ERR_PACK(0, SYS_F_FOPEN, 0), "fopen"}, {ERR_PACK(0, SYS_F_CONNECT, 0), "connect"}, {ERR_PACK(0, SYS_F_GETSERVBYNAME, 0), "getservbyname"}, {ERR_PACK(0, SYS_F_SOCKET, 0), "socket"}, {ERR_PACK(0, SYS_F_IOCTLSOCKET, 0), "ioctlsocket"}, {ERR_PACK(0, SYS_F_BIND, 0), "bind"}, {ERR_PACK(0, SYS_F_LISTEN, 0), "listen"}, {ERR_PACK(0, SYS_F_ACCEPT, 0), "accept"}, # ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS {ERR_PACK(0, SYS_F_WSASTARTUP, 0), "WSAstartup"}, # endif {ERR_PACK(0, SYS_F_OPENDIR, 0), "opendir"}, {ERR_PACK(0, SYS_F_FREAD, 0), "fread"}, {ERR_PACK(0, SYS_F_GETADDRINFO, 0), "getaddrinfo"}, {ERR_PACK(0, SYS_F_GETNAMEINFO, 0), "getnameinfo"}, {ERR_PACK(0, SYS_F_SETSOCKOPT, 0), "setsockopt"}, {ERR_PACK(0, SYS_F_GETSOCKOPT, 0), "getsockopt"}, {ERR_PACK(0, SYS_F_GETSOCKNAME, 0), "getsockname"}, {ERR_PACK(0, SYS_F_GETHOSTBYNAME, 0), "gethostbyname"}, {ERR_PACK(0, SYS_F_FFLUSH, 0), "fflush"}, {ERR_PACK(0, SYS_F_OPEN, 0), "open"}, {ERR_PACK(0, SYS_F_CLOSE, 0), "close"}, {ERR_PACK(0, SYS_F_IOCTL, 0), "ioctl"}, {ERR_PACK(0, SYS_F_STAT, 0), "stat"}, {ERR_PACK(0, SYS_F_FCNTL, 0), "fcntl"}, {ERR_PACK(0, SYS_F_FSTAT, 0), "fstat"}, {0, NULL}, }; static ERR_STRING_DATA ERR_str_reasons[] = { {ERR_R_SYS_LIB, "system lib"}, {ERR_R_BN_LIB, "BN lib"}, {ERR_R_RSA_LIB, "RSA lib"}, {ERR_R_DH_LIB, "DH lib"}, {ERR_R_EVP_LIB, "EVP lib"}, {ERR_R_BUF_LIB, "BUF lib"}, {ERR_R_OBJ_LIB, "OBJ lib"}, {ERR_R_PEM_LIB, "PEM lib"}, {ERR_R_DSA_LIB, "DSA lib"}, {ERR_R_X509_LIB, "X509 lib"}, {ERR_R_ASN1_LIB, "ASN1 lib"}, {ERR_R_EC_LIB, "EC lib"}, {ERR_R_BIO_LIB, "BIO lib"}, {ERR_R_PKCS7_LIB, "PKCS7 lib"}, {ERR_R_X509V3_LIB, "X509V3 lib"}, {ERR_R_ENGINE_LIB, "ENGINE lib"}, {ERR_R_UI_LIB, "UI lib"}, {ERR_R_OSSL_STORE_LIB, "STORE lib"}, {ERR_R_ECDSA_LIB, "ECDSA lib"}, {ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR, "nested asn1 error"}, {ERR_R_MISSING_ASN1_EOS, "missing asn1 eos"}, {ERR_R_FATAL, "fatal"}, {ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE, "malloc failure"}, {ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED, "called a function you should not call"}, {ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER, "passed a null parameter"}, {ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR, "internal error"}, {ERR_R_DISABLED, "called a function that was disabled at compile-time"}, {ERR_R_INIT_FAIL, "init fail"}, + {ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT, "passed invalid argument"}, {ERR_R_OPERATION_FAIL, "operation fail"}, {0, NULL}, }; #endif static CRYPTO_ONCE err_init = CRYPTO_ONCE_STATIC_INIT; static int set_err_thread_local; static CRYPTO_THREAD_LOCAL err_thread_local; static CRYPTO_ONCE err_string_init = CRYPTO_ONCE_STATIC_INIT; static CRYPTO_RWLOCK *err_string_lock; static ERR_STRING_DATA *int_err_get_item(const ERR_STRING_DATA *); /* * The internal state */ static LHASH_OF(ERR_STRING_DATA) *int_error_hash = NULL; static int int_err_library_number = ERR_LIB_USER; static unsigned long get_error_values(int inc, int top, const char **file, int *line, const char **data, int *flags); static unsigned long err_string_data_hash(const ERR_STRING_DATA *a) { unsigned long ret, l; l = a->error; ret = l ^ ERR_GET_LIB(l) ^ ERR_GET_FUNC(l); return (ret ^ ret % 19 * 13); } static int err_string_data_cmp(const ERR_STRING_DATA *a, const ERR_STRING_DATA *b) { if (a->error == b->error) return 0; return a->error > b->error ? 1 : -1; } static ERR_STRING_DATA *int_err_get_item(const ERR_STRING_DATA *d) { ERR_STRING_DATA *p = NULL; CRYPTO_THREAD_read_lock(err_string_lock); p = lh_ERR_STRING_DATA_retrieve(int_error_hash, d); CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(err_string_lock); return p; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR /* 2019-05-21: Russian and Ukrainian locales on Linux require more than 6,5 kB */ # define SPACE_SYS_STR_REASONS 8 * 1024 # define NUM_SYS_STR_REASONS 127 static ERR_STRING_DATA SYS_str_reasons[NUM_SYS_STR_REASONS + 1]; /* * SYS_str_reasons is filled with copies of strerror() results at * initialization. 'errno' values up to 127 should cover all usual errors, * others will be displayed numerically by ERR_error_string. It is crucial * that we have something for each reason code that occurs in * ERR_str_reasons, or bogus reason strings will be returned for SYSerr(), * which always gets an errno value and never one of those 'standard' reason * codes. */ static void build_SYS_str_reasons(void) { /* OPENSSL_malloc cannot be used here, use static storage instead */ static char strerror_pool[SPACE_SYS_STR_REASONS]; char *cur = strerror_pool; size_t cnt = 0; static int init = 1; int i; int saveerrno = get_last_sys_error(); CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(err_string_lock); if (!init) { CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(err_string_lock); return; } for (i = 1; i <= NUM_SYS_STR_REASONS; i++) { ERR_STRING_DATA *str = &SYS_str_reasons[i - 1]; str->error = ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_SYS, 0, i); /* * If we have used up all the space in strerror_pool, * there's no point in calling openssl_strerror_r() */ if (str->string == NULL && cnt < sizeof(strerror_pool)) { if (openssl_strerror_r(i, cur, sizeof(strerror_pool) - cnt)) { size_t l = strlen(cur); str->string = cur; cnt += l; cur += l; /* * VMS has an unusual quirk of adding spaces at the end of * some (most? all?) messages. Lets trim them off. */ while (cur > strerror_pool && ossl_isspace(cur[-1])) { cur--; cnt--; } *cur++ = '\0'; cnt++; } } if (str->string == NULL) str->string = "unknown"; } /* * Now we still have SYS_str_reasons[NUM_SYS_STR_REASONS] = {0, NULL}, as * required by ERR_load_strings. */ init = 0; CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(err_string_lock); /* openssl_strerror_r could change errno, but we want to preserve it */ set_sys_error(saveerrno); err_load_strings(SYS_str_reasons); } #endif #define err_clear_data(p, i) \ do { \ if ((p)->err_data_flags[i] & ERR_TXT_MALLOCED) {\ OPENSSL_free((p)->err_data[i]); \ (p)->err_data[i] = NULL; \ } \ (p)->err_data_flags[i] = 0; \ } while (0) #define err_clear(p, i) \ do { \ err_clear_data(p, i); \ (p)->err_flags[i] = 0; \ (p)->err_buffer[i] = 0; \ (p)->err_file[i] = NULL; \ (p)->err_line[i] = -1; \ } while (0) static void ERR_STATE_free(ERR_STATE *s) { int i; if (s == NULL) return; for (i = 0; i < ERR_NUM_ERRORS; i++) { err_clear_data(s, i); } OPENSSL_free(s); } DEFINE_RUN_ONCE_STATIC(do_err_strings_init) { if (!OPENSSL_init_crypto(0, NULL)) return 0; err_string_lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new(); if (err_string_lock == NULL) return 0; int_error_hash = lh_ERR_STRING_DATA_new(err_string_data_hash, err_string_data_cmp); if (int_error_hash == NULL) { CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(err_string_lock); err_string_lock = NULL; return 0; } return 1; } void err_cleanup(void) { if (set_err_thread_local != 0) CRYPTO_THREAD_cleanup_local(&err_thread_local); CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(err_string_lock); err_string_lock = NULL; lh_ERR_STRING_DATA_free(int_error_hash); int_error_hash = NULL; } /* * Legacy; pack in the library. */ static void err_patch(int lib, ERR_STRING_DATA *str) { unsigned long plib = ERR_PACK(lib, 0, 0); for (; str->error != 0; str++) str->error |= plib; } /* * Hash in |str| error strings. Assumes the URN_ONCE was done. */ static int err_load_strings(const ERR_STRING_DATA *str) { CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(err_string_lock); for (; str->error; str++) (void)lh_ERR_STRING_DATA_insert(int_error_hash, (ERR_STRING_DATA *)str); CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(err_string_lock); return 1; } int ERR_load_ERR_strings(void) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR if (!RUN_ONCE(&err_string_init, do_err_strings_init)) return 0; err_load_strings(ERR_str_libraries); err_load_strings(ERR_str_reasons); err_patch(ERR_LIB_SYS, ERR_str_functs); err_load_strings(ERR_str_functs); build_SYS_str_reasons(); #endif return 1; } int ERR_load_strings(int lib, ERR_STRING_DATA *str) { if (ERR_load_ERR_strings() == 0) return 0; err_patch(lib, str); err_load_strings(str); return 1; } int ERR_load_strings_const(const ERR_STRING_DATA *str) { if (ERR_load_ERR_strings() == 0) return 0; err_load_strings(str); return 1; } int ERR_unload_strings(int lib, ERR_STRING_DATA *str) { if (!RUN_ONCE(&err_string_init, do_err_strings_init)) return 0; CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(err_string_lock); /* * We don't need to ERR_PACK the lib, since that was done (to * the table) when it was loaded. */ for (; str->error; str++) (void)lh_ERR_STRING_DATA_delete(int_error_hash, str); CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(err_string_lock); return 1; } void err_free_strings_int(void) { if (!RUN_ONCE(&err_string_init, do_err_strings_init)) return; } /********************************************************/ void ERR_put_error(int lib, int func, int reason, const char *file, int line) { ERR_STATE *es; #ifdef _OSD_POSIX /* * In the BS2000-OSD POSIX subsystem, the compiler generates path names * in the form "*POSIX(/etc/passwd)". This dirty hack strips them to * something sensible. @@@ We shouldn't modify a const string, though. */ if (strncmp(file, "*POSIX(", sizeof("*POSIX(") - 1) == 0) { char *end; /* Skip the "*POSIX(" prefix */ file += sizeof("*POSIX(") - 1; end = &file[strlen(file) - 1]; if (*end == ')') *end = '\0'; /* Optional: use the basename of the path only. */ if ((end = strrchr(file, '/')) != NULL) file = &end[1]; } #endif es = ERR_get_state(); if (es == NULL) return; es->top = (es->top + 1) % ERR_NUM_ERRORS; if (es->top == es->bottom) es->bottom = (es->bottom + 1) % ERR_NUM_ERRORS; es->err_flags[es->top] = 0; es->err_buffer[es->top] = ERR_PACK(lib, func, reason); es->err_file[es->top] = file; es->err_line[es->top] = line; err_clear_data(es, es->top); } void ERR_clear_error(void) { int i; ERR_STATE *es; es = ERR_get_state(); if (es == NULL) return; for (i = 0; i < ERR_NUM_ERRORS; i++) { err_clear(es, i); } es->top = es->bottom = 0; } unsigned long ERR_get_error(void) { return get_error_values(1, 0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL); } unsigned long ERR_get_error_line(const char **file, int *line) { return get_error_values(1, 0, file, line, NULL, NULL); } unsigned long ERR_get_error_line_data(const char **file, int *line, const char **data, int *flags) { return get_error_values(1, 0, file, line, data, flags); } unsigned long ERR_peek_error(void) { return get_error_values(0, 0, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL); } unsigned long ERR_peek_error_line(const char **file, int *line) { return get_error_values(0, 0, file, line, NULL, NULL); } unsigned long ERR_peek_error_line_data(const char **file, int *line, const char **data, int *flags) { return get_error_values(0, 0, file, line, data, flags); } unsigned long ERR_peek_last_error(void) { return get_error_values(0, 1, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL); } unsigned long ERR_peek_last_error_line(const char **file, int *line) { return get_error_values(0, 1, file, line, NULL, NULL); } unsigned long ERR_peek_last_error_line_data(const char **file, int *line, const char **data, int *flags) { return get_error_values(0, 1, file, line, data, flags); } static unsigned long get_error_values(int inc, int top, const char **file, int *line, const char **data, int *flags) { int i = 0; ERR_STATE *es; unsigned long ret; es = ERR_get_state(); if (es == NULL) return 0; if (inc && top) { if (file) *file = ""; if (line) *line = 0; if (data) *data = ""; if (flags) *flags = 0; return ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR; } while (es->bottom != es->top) { if (es->err_flags[es->top] & ERR_FLAG_CLEAR) { err_clear(es, es->top); es->top = es->top > 0 ? es->top - 1 : ERR_NUM_ERRORS - 1; continue; } i = (es->bottom + 1) % ERR_NUM_ERRORS; if (es->err_flags[i] & ERR_FLAG_CLEAR) { es->bottom = i; err_clear(es, es->bottom); continue; } break; } if (es->bottom == es->top) return 0; if (top) i = es->top; /* last error */ else i = (es->bottom + 1) % ERR_NUM_ERRORS; /* first error */ ret = es->err_buffer[i]; if (inc) { es->bottom = i; es->err_buffer[i] = 0; } if (file != NULL && line != NULL) { if (es->err_file[i] == NULL) { *file = "NA"; *line = 0; } else { *file = es->err_file[i]; *line = es->err_line[i]; } } if (data == NULL) { if (inc) { err_clear_data(es, i); } } else { if (es->err_data[i] == NULL) { *data = ""; if (flags != NULL) *flags = 0; } else { *data = es->err_data[i]; if (flags != NULL) *flags = es->err_data_flags[i]; } } return ret; } void ERR_error_string_n(unsigned long e, char *buf, size_t len) { char lsbuf[64], fsbuf[64], rsbuf[64]; const char *ls, *fs, *rs; unsigned long l, f, r; if (len == 0) return; l = ERR_GET_LIB(e); ls = ERR_lib_error_string(e); if (ls == NULL) { BIO_snprintf(lsbuf, sizeof(lsbuf), "lib(%lu)", l); ls = lsbuf; } fs = ERR_func_error_string(e); f = ERR_GET_FUNC(e); if (fs == NULL) { BIO_snprintf(fsbuf, sizeof(fsbuf), "func(%lu)", f); fs = fsbuf; } rs = ERR_reason_error_string(e); r = ERR_GET_REASON(e); if (rs == NULL) { BIO_snprintf(rsbuf, sizeof(rsbuf), "reason(%lu)", r); rs = rsbuf; } BIO_snprintf(buf, len, "error:%08lX:%s:%s:%s", e, ls, fs, rs); if (strlen(buf) == len - 1) { /* Didn't fit; use a minimal format. */ BIO_snprintf(buf, len, "err:%lx:%lx:%lx:%lx", e, l, f, r); } } /* * ERR_error_string_n should be used instead for ret != NULL as * ERR_error_string cannot know how large the buffer is */ char *ERR_error_string(unsigned long e, char *ret) { static char buf[256]; if (ret == NULL) ret = buf; ERR_error_string_n(e, ret, (int)sizeof(buf)); return ret; } const char *ERR_lib_error_string(unsigned long e) { ERR_STRING_DATA d, *p; unsigned long l; if (!RUN_ONCE(&err_string_init, do_err_strings_init)) { return NULL; } l = ERR_GET_LIB(e); d.error = ERR_PACK(l, 0, 0); p = int_err_get_item(&d); return ((p == NULL) ? NULL : p->string); } const char *ERR_func_error_string(unsigned long e) { ERR_STRING_DATA d, *p; unsigned long l, f; if (!RUN_ONCE(&err_string_init, do_err_strings_init)) { return NULL; } l = ERR_GET_LIB(e); f = ERR_GET_FUNC(e); d.error = ERR_PACK(l, f, 0); p = int_err_get_item(&d); return ((p == NULL) ? NULL : p->string); } const char *ERR_reason_error_string(unsigned long e) { ERR_STRING_DATA d, *p = NULL; unsigned long l, r; if (!RUN_ONCE(&err_string_init, do_err_strings_init)) { return NULL; } l = ERR_GET_LIB(e); r = ERR_GET_REASON(e); d.error = ERR_PACK(l, 0, r); p = int_err_get_item(&d); if (!p) { d.error = ERR_PACK(0, 0, r); p = int_err_get_item(&d); } return ((p == NULL) ? NULL : p->string); } void err_delete_thread_state(void) { ERR_STATE *state = CRYPTO_THREAD_get_local(&err_thread_local); if (state == NULL) return; CRYPTO_THREAD_set_local(&err_thread_local, NULL); ERR_STATE_free(state); } #if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L void ERR_remove_thread_state(void *dummy) { } #endif #if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10000000L void ERR_remove_state(unsigned long pid) { } #endif DEFINE_RUN_ONCE_STATIC(err_do_init) { set_err_thread_local = 1; return CRYPTO_THREAD_init_local(&err_thread_local, NULL); } ERR_STATE *ERR_get_state(void) { ERR_STATE *state; int saveerrno = get_last_sys_error(); if (!OPENSSL_init_crypto(OPENSSL_INIT_BASE_ONLY, NULL)) return NULL; if (!RUN_ONCE(&err_init, err_do_init)) return NULL; state = CRYPTO_THREAD_get_local(&err_thread_local); if (state == (ERR_STATE*)-1) return NULL; if (state == NULL) { if (!CRYPTO_THREAD_set_local(&err_thread_local, (ERR_STATE*)-1)) return NULL; if ((state = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*state))) == NULL) { CRYPTO_THREAD_set_local(&err_thread_local, NULL); return NULL; } if (!ossl_init_thread_start(OPENSSL_INIT_THREAD_ERR_STATE) || !CRYPTO_THREAD_set_local(&err_thread_local, state)) { ERR_STATE_free(state); CRYPTO_THREAD_set_local(&err_thread_local, NULL); return NULL; } /* Ignore failures from these */ OPENSSL_init_crypto(OPENSSL_INIT_LOAD_CRYPTO_STRINGS, NULL); } set_sys_error(saveerrno); return state; } /* * err_shelve_state returns the current thread local error state * and freezes the error module until err_unshelve_state is called. */ int err_shelve_state(void **state) { int saveerrno = get_last_sys_error(); /* * Note, at present our only caller is OPENSSL_init_crypto(), indirectly * via ossl_init_load_crypto_nodelete(), by which point the requested * "base" initialization has already been performed, so the below call is a * NOOP, that re-enters OPENSSL_init_crypto() only to quickly return. * * If are no other valid callers of this function, the call below can be * removed, avoiding the re-entry into OPENSSL_init_crypto(). If there are * potential uses that are not from inside OPENSSL_init_crypto(), then this * call is needed, but some care is required to make sure that the re-entry * remains a NOOP. */ if (!OPENSSL_init_crypto(OPENSSL_INIT_BASE_ONLY, NULL)) return 0; if (!RUN_ONCE(&err_init, err_do_init)) return 0; *state = CRYPTO_THREAD_get_local(&err_thread_local); if (!CRYPTO_THREAD_set_local(&err_thread_local, (ERR_STATE*)-1)) return 0; set_sys_error(saveerrno); return 1; } /* * err_unshelve_state restores the error state that was returned * by err_shelve_state previously. */ void err_unshelve_state(void* state) { if (state != (void*)-1) CRYPTO_THREAD_set_local(&err_thread_local, (ERR_STATE*)state); } int ERR_get_next_error_library(void) { int ret; if (!RUN_ONCE(&err_string_init, do_err_strings_init)) return 0; CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(err_string_lock); ret = int_err_library_number++; CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(err_string_lock); return ret; } static int err_set_error_data_int(char *data, int flags) { ERR_STATE *es; int i; es = ERR_get_state(); if (es == NULL) return 0; i = es->top; err_clear_data(es, i); es->err_data[i] = data; es->err_data_flags[i] = flags; return 1; } void ERR_set_error_data(char *data, int flags) { /* * This function is void so we cannot propagate the error return. Since it * is also in the public API we can't change the return type. */ err_set_error_data_int(data, flags); } void ERR_add_error_data(int num, ...) { va_list args; va_start(args, num); ERR_add_error_vdata(num, args); va_end(args); } void ERR_add_error_vdata(int num, va_list args) { int i, n, s; char *str, *p, *a; s = 80; if ((str = OPENSSL_malloc(s + 1)) == NULL) { /* ERRerr(ERR_F_ERR_ADD_ERROR_VDATA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); */ return; } str[0] = '\0'; n = 0; for (i = 0; i < num; i++) { a = va_arg(args, char *); if (a == NULL) a = ""; n += strlen(a); if (n > s) { s = n + 20; p = OPENSSL_realloc(str, s + 1); if (p == NULL) { OPENSSL_free(str); return; } str = p; } OPENSSL_strlcat(str, a, (size_t)s + 1); } if (!err_set_error_data_int(str, ERR_TXT_MALLOCED | ERR_TXT_STRING)) OPENSSL_free(str); } int ERR_set_mark(void) { ERR_STATE *es; es = ERR_get_state(); if (es == NULL) return 0; if (es->bottom == es->top) return 0; es->err_flags[es->top] |= ERR_FLAG_MARK; return 1; } int ERR_pop_to_mark(void) { ERR_STATE *es; es = ERR_get_state(); if (es == NULL) return 0; while (es->bottom != es->top && (es->err_flags[es->top] & ERR_FLAG_MARK) == 0) { err_clear(es, es->top); es->top = es->top > 0 ? es->top - 1 : ERR_NUM_ERRORS - 1; } if (es->bottom == es->top) return 0; es->err_flags[es->top] &= ~ERR_FLAG_MARK; return 1; } int ERR_clear_last_mark(void) { ERR_STATE *es; int top; es = ERR_get_state(); if (es == NULL) return 0; top = es->top; while (es->bottom != top && (es->err_flags[top] & ERR_FLAG_MARK) == 0) { top = top > 0 ? top - 1 : ERR_NUM_ERRORS - 1; } if (es->bottom == top) return 0; es->err_flags[top] &= ~ERR_FLAG_MARK; return 1; } void err_clear_last_constant_time(int clear) { ERR_STATE *es; int top; es = ERR_get_state(); if (es == NULL) return; top = es->top; /* * Flag error as cleared but remove it elsewhere to avoid two errors * accessing the same error stack location, revealing timing information. */ clear = constant_time_select_int(constant_time_eq_int(clear, 0), 0, ERR_FLAG_CLEAR); es->err_flags[top] |= clear; } diff --git a/crypto/evp/evp_enc.c b/crypto/evp/evp_enc.c index e3c165d48e08..d835968f253c 100644 --- a/crypto/evp/evp_enc.c +++ b/crypto/evp/evp_enc.c @@ -1,717 +1,717 @@ /* * Copyright 1995-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include "crypto/evp.h" #include "evp_local.h" int EVP_CIPHER_CTX_reset(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c) { if (c == NULL) return 1; if (c->cipher != NULL) { if (c->cipher->cleanup && !c->cipher->cleanup(c)) return 0; /* Cleanse cipher context data */ if (c->cipher_data && c->cipher->ctx_size) OPENSSL_cleanse(c->cipher_data, c->cipher->ctx_size); } OPENSSL_free(c->cipher_data); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE ENGINE_finish(c->engine); #endif memset(c, 0, sizeof(*c)); return 1; } EVP_CIPHER_CTX *EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new(void) { return OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(EVP_CIPHER_CTX)); } void EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx) { EVP_CIPHER_CTX_reset(ctx); OPENSSL_free(ctx); } int EVP_CipherInit(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const EVP_CIPHER *cipher, const unsigned char *key, const unsigned char *iv, int enc) { if (cipher != NULL) EVP_CIPHER_CTX_reset(ctx); return EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctx, cipher, NULL, key, iv, enc); } int EVP_CipherInit_ex(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const EVP_CIPHER *cipher, ENGINE *impl, const unsigned char *key, const unsigned char *iv, int enc) { if (enc == -1) enc = ctx->encrypt; else { if (enc) enc = 1; ctx->encrypt = enc; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE /* * Whether it's nice or not, "Inits" can be used on "Final"'d contexts so * this context may already have an ENGINE! Try to avoid releasing the * previous handle, re-querying for an ENGINE, and having a * reinitialisation, when it may all be unnecessary. */ if (ctx->engine && ctx->cipher && (cipher == NULL || cipher->nid == ctx->cipher->nid)) goto skip_to_init; #endif if (cipher) { /* * Ensure a context left lying around from last time is cleared (the * previous check attempted to avoid this if the same ENGINE and * EVP_CIPHER could be used). */ - if (ctx->cipher) { + if (ctx->cipher +#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE + || ctx->engine +#endif + || ctx->cipher_data) { unsigned long flags = ctx->flags; EVP_CIPHER_CTX_reset(ctx); /* Restore encrypt and flags */ ctx->encrypt = enc; ctx->flags = flags; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE if (impl) { if (!ENGINE_init(impl)) { EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_CIPHERINIT_EX, EVP_R_INITIALIZATION_ERROR); return 0; } } else /* Ask if an ENGINE is reserved for this job */ impl = ENGINE_get_cipher_engine(cipher->nid); if (impl) { /* There's an ENGINE for this job ... (apparently) */ const EVP_CIPHER *c = ENGINE_get_cipher(impl, cipher->nid); if (!c) { - /* - * One positive side-effect of US's export control history, - * is that we should at least be able to avoid using US - * misspellings of "initialisation"? - */ + ENGINE_finish(impl); EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_CIPHERINIT_EX, EVP_R_INITIALIZATION_ERROR); return 0; } /* We'll use the ENGINE's private cipher definition */ cipher = c; /* * Store the ENGINE functional reference so we know 'cipher' came * from an ENGINE and we need to release it when done. */ ctx->engine = impl; } else ctx->engine = NULL; #endif ctx->cipher = cipher; if (ctx->cipher->ctx_size) { ctx->cipher_data = OPENSSL_zalloc(ctx->cipher->ctx_size); if (ctx->cipher_data == NULL) { ctx->cipher = NULL; EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_CIPHERINIT_EX, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } } else { ctx->cipher_data = NULL; } ctx->key_len = cipher->key_len; /* Preserve wrap enable flag, zero everything else */ ctx->flags &= EVP_CIPHER_CTX_FLAG_WRAP_ALLOW; if (ctx->cipher->flags & EVP_CIPH_CTRL_INIT) { if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_INIT, 0, NULL)) { ctx->cipher = NULL; EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_CIPHERINIT_EX, EVP_R_INITIALIZATION_ERROR); return 0; } } } else if (!ctx->cipher) { EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_CIPHERINIT_EX, EVP_R_NO_CIPHER_SET); return 0; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE skip_to_init: #endif /* we assume block size is a power of 2 in *cryptUpdate */ OPENSSL_assert(ctx->cipher->block_size == 1 || ctx->cipher->block_size == 8 || ctx->cipher->block_size == 16); if (!(ctx->flags & EVP_CIPHER_CTX_FLAG_WRAP_ALLOW) && EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(ctx) == EVP_CIPH_WRAP_MODE) { EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_CIPHERINIT_EX, EVP_R_WRAP_MODE_NOT_ALLOWED); return 0; } if (!(EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(ctx)) & EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_IV)) { switch (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(ctx)) { case EVP_CIPH_STREAM_CIPHER: case EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE: break; case EVP_CIPH_CFB_MODE: case EVP_CIPH_OFB_MODE: ctx->num = 0; /* fall-through */ case EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE: OPENSSL_assert(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx) <= (int)sizeof(ctx->iv)); if (iv) memcpy(ctx->oiv, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx)); memcpy(ctx->iv, ctx->oiv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx)); break; case EVP_CIPH_CTR_MODE: ctx->num = 0; /* Don't reuse IV for CTR mode */ if (iv) memcpy(ctx->iv, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx)); break; default: return 0; } } if (key || (ctx->cipher->flags & EVP_CIPH_ALWAYS_CALL_INIT)) { if (!ctx->cipher->init(ctx, key, iv, enc)) return 0; } ctx->buf_len = 0; ctx->final_used = 0; ctx->block_mask = ctx->cipher->block_size - 1; return 1; } int EVP_CipherUpdate(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl, const unsigned char *in, int inl) { if (ctx->encrypt) return EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, out, outl, in, inl); else return EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, out, outl, in, inl); } int EVP_CipherFinal_ex(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl) { if (ctx->encrypt) return EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(ctx, out, outl); else return EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(ctx, out, outl); } int EVP_CipherFinal(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl) { if (ctx->encrypt) return EVP_EncryptFinal(ctx, out, outl); else return EVP_DecryptFinal(ctx, out, outl); } int EVP_EncryptInit(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const EVP_CIPHER *cipher, const unsigned char *key, const unsigned char *iv) { return EVP_CipherInit(ctx, cipher, key, iv, 1); } int EVP_EncryptInit_ex(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const EVP_CIPHER *cipher, ENGINE *impl, const unsigned char *key, const unsigned char *iv) { return EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctx, cipher, impl, key, iv, 1); } int EVP_DecryptInit(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const EVP_CIPHER *cipher, const unsigned char *key, const unsigned char *iv) { return EVP_CipherInit(ctx, cipher, key, iv, 0); } int EVP_DecryptInit_ex(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const EVP_CIPHER *cipher, ENGINE *impl, const unsigned char *key, const unsigned char *iv) { return EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctx, cipher, impl, key, iv, 0); } /* * According to the letter of standard difference between pointers * is specified to be valid only within same object. This makes * it formally challenging to determine if input and output buffers * are not partially overlapping with standard pointer arithmetic. */ #ifdef PTRDIFF_T # undef PTRDIFF_T #endif #if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) && __INITIAL_POINTER_SIZE==64 /* * Then we have VMS that distinguishes itself by adhering to * sizeof(size_t)==4 even in 64-bit builds, which means that * difference between two pointers might be truncated to 32 bits. * In the context one can even wonder how comparison for * equality is implemented. To be on the safe side we adhere to * PTRDIFF_T even for comparison for equality. */ # define PTRDIFF_T uint64_t #else # define PTRDIFF_T size_t #endif int is_partially_overlapping(const void *ptr1, const void *ptr2, int len) { PTRDIFF_T diff = (PTRDIFF_T)ptr1-(PTRDIFF_T)ptr2; /* * Check for partially overlapping buffers. [Binary logical * operations are used instead of boolean to minimize number * of conditional branches.] */ int overlapped = (len > 0) & (diff != 0) & ((diff < (PTRDIFF_T)len) | (diff > (0 - (PTRDIFF_T)len))); return overlapped; } static int evp_EncryptDecryptUpdate(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl, const unsigned char *in, int inl) { int i, j, bl, cmpl = inl; if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_test_flags(ctx, EVP_CIPH_FLAG_LENGTH_BITS)) cmpl = (cmpl + 7) / 8; bl = ctx->cipher->block_size; /* * CCM mode needs to know about the case where inl == 0 && in == NULL - it * means the plaintext/ciphertext length is 0 */ if (inl < 0 || (inl == 0 && EVP_CIPHER_mode(ctx->cipher) != EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE)) { *outl = 0; return inl == 0; } if (ctx->cipher->flags & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_CUSTOM_CIPHER) { /* If block size > 1 then the cipher will have to do this check */ if (bl == 1 && is_partially_overlapping(out, in, cmpl)) { EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_ENCRYPTDECRYPTUPDATE, EVP_R_PARTIALLY_OVERLAPPING); return 0; } i = ctx->cipher->do_cipher(ctx, out, in, inl); if (i < 0) return 0; else *outl = i; return 1; } if (is_partially_overlapping(out + ctx->buf_len, in, cmpl)) { EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_ENCRYPTDECRYPTUPDATE, EVP_R_PARTIALLY_OVERLAPPING); return 0; } if (ctx->buf_len == 0 && (inl & (ctx->block_mask)) == 0) { if (ctx->cipher->do_cipher(ctx, out, in, inl)) { *outl = inl; return 1; } else { *outl = 0; return 0; } } i = ctx->buf_len; OPENSSL_assert(bl <= (int)sizeof(ctx->buf)); if (i != 0) { if (bl - i > inl) { memcpy(&(ctx->buf[i]), in, inl); ctx->buf_len += inl; *outl = 0; return 1; } else { j = bl - i; /* * Once we've processed the first j bytes from in, the amount of * data left that is a multiple of the block length is: * (inl - j) & ~(bl - 1) * We must ensure that this amount of data, plus the one block that * we process from ctx->buf does not exceed INT_MAX */ if (((inl - j) & ~(bl - 1)) > INT_MAX - bl) { EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_ENCRYPTDECRYPTUPDATE, EVP_R_OUTPUT_WOULD_OVERFLOW); return 0; } memcpy(&(ctx->buf[i]), in, j); inl -= j; in += j; if (!ctx->cipher->do_cipher(ctx, out, ctx->buf, bl)) return 0; out += bl; *outl = bl; } } else *outl = 0; i = inl & (bl - 1); inl -= i; if (inl > 0) { if (!ctx->cipher->do_cipher(ctx, out, in, inl)) return 0; *outl += inl; } if (i != 0) memcpy(ctx->buf, &(in[inl]), i); ctx->buf_len = i; return 1; } int EVP_EncryptUpdate(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl, const unsigned char *in, int inl) { /* Prevent accidental use of decryption context when encrypting */ if (!ctx->encrypt) { EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_ENCRYPTUPDATE, EVP_R_INVALID_OPERATION); return 0; } return evp_EncryptDecryptUpdate(ctx, out, outl, in, inl); } int EVP_EncryptFinal(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl) { int ret; ret = EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(ctx, out, outl); return ret; } int EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl) { int n, ret; unsigned int i, b, bl; /* Prevent accidental use of decryption context when encrypting */ if (!ctx->encrypt) { EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_ENCRYPTFINAL_EX, EVP_R_INVALID_OPERATION); return 0; } if (ctx->cipher->flags & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_CUSTOM_CIPHER) { ret = ctx->cipher->do_cipher(ctx, out, NULL, 0); if (ret < 0) return 0; else *outl = ret; return 1; } b = ctx->cipher->block_size; OPENSSL_assert(b <= sizeof(ctx->buf)); if (b == 1) { *outl = 0; return 1; } bl = ctx->buf_len; if (ctx->flags & EVP_CIPH_NO_PADDING) { if (bl) { EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_ENCRYPTFINAL_EX, EVP_R_DATA_NOT_MULTIPLE_OF_BLOCK_LENGTH); return 0; } *outl = 0; return 1; } n = b - bl; for (i = bl; i < b; i++) ctx->buf[i] = n; ret = ctx->cipher->do_cipher(ctx, out, ctx->buf, b); if (ret) *outl = b; return ret; } int EVP_DecryptUpdate(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl, const unsigned char *in, int inl) { int fix_len, cmpl = inl; unsigned int b; /* Prevent accidental use of encryption context when decrypting */ if (ctx->encrypt) { EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_DECRYPTUPDATE, EVP_R_INVALID_OPERATION); return 0; } b = ctx->cipher->block_size; if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_test_flags(ctx, EVP_CIPH_FLAG_LENGTH_BITS)) cmpl = (cmpl + 7) / 8; /* * CCM mode needs to know about the case where inl == 0 - it means the * plaintext/ciphertext length is 0 */ if (inl < 0 || (inl == 0 && EVP_CIPHER_mode(ctx->cipher) != EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE)) { *outl = 0; return inl == 0; } if (ctx->cipher->flags & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_CUSTOM_CIPHER) { if (b == 1 && is_partially_overlapping(out, in, cmpl)) { EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_DECRYPTUPDATE, EVP_R_PARTIALLY_OVERLAPPING); return 0; } fix_len = ctx->cipher->do_cipher(ctx, out, in, inl); if (fix_len < 0) { *outl = 0; return 0; } else *outl = fix_len; return 1; } if (ctx->flags & EVP_CIPH_NO_PADDING) return evp_EncryptDecryptUpdate(ctx, out, outl, in, inl); OPENSSL_assert(b <= sizeof(ctx->final)); if (ctx->final_used) { /* see comment about PTRDIFF_T comparison above */ if (((PTRDIFF_T)out == (PTRDIFF_T)in) || is_partially_overlapping(out, in, b)) { EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_DECRYPTUPDATE, EVP_R_PARTIALLY_OVERLAPPING); return 0; } /* * final_used is only ever set if buf_len is 0. Therefore the maximum * length output we will ever see from evp_EncryptDecryptUpdate is * the maximum multiple of the block length that is <= inl, or just: * inl & ~(b - 1) * Since final_used has been set then the final output length is: * (inl & ~(b - 1)) + b * This must never exceed INT_MAX */ if ((inl & ~(b - 1)) > INT_MAX - b) { EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_DECRYPTUPDATE, EVP_R_OUTPUT_WOULD_OVERFLOW); return 0; } memcpy(out, ctx->final, b); out += b; fix_len = 1; } else fix_len = 0; if (!evp_EncryptDecryptUpdate(ctx, out, outl, in, inl)) return 0; /* * if we have 'decrypted' a multiple of block size, make sure we have a * copy of this last block */ if (b > 1 && !ctx->buf_len) { *outl -= b; ctx->final_used = 1; memcpy(ctx->final, &out[*outl], b); } else ctx->final_used = 0; if (fix_len) *outl += b; return 1; } int EVP_DecryptFinal(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl) { int ret; ret = EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(ctx, out, outl); return ret; } int EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl) { int i, n; unsigned int b; /* Prevent accidental use of encryption context when decrypting */ if (ctx->encrypt) { EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_DECRYPTFINAL_EX, EVP_R_INVALID_OPERATION); return 0; } *outl = 0; if (ctx->cipher->flags & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_CUSTOM_CIPHER) { i = ctx->cipher->do_cipher(ctx, out, NULL, 0); if (i < 0) return 0; else *outl = i; return 1; } b = ctx->cipher->block_size; if (ctx->flags & EVP_CIPH_NO_PADDING) { if (ctx->buf_len) { EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_DECRYPTFINAL_EX, EVP_R_DATA_NOT_MULTIPLE_OF_BLOCK_LENGTH); return 0; } *outl = 0; return 1; } if (b > 1) { if (ctx->buf_len || !ctx->final_used) { EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_DECRYPTFINAL_EX, EVP_R_WRONG_FINAL_BLOCK_LENGTH); return 0; } OPENSSL_assert(b <= sizeof(ctx->final)); /* * The following assumes that the ciphertext has been authenticated. * Otherwise it provides a padding oracle. */ n = ctx->final[b - 1]; if (n == 0 || n > (int)b) { EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_DECRYPTFINAL_EX, EVP_R_BAD_DECRYPT); return 0; } for (i = 0; i < n; i++) { if (ctx->final[--b] != n) { EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_DECRYPTFINAL_EX, EVP_R_BAD_DECRYPT); return 0; } } n = ctx->cipher->block_size - n; for (i = 0; i < n; i++) out[i] = ctx->final[i]; *outl = n; } else *outl = 0; return 1; } int EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c, int keylen) { if (c->cipher->flags & EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_KEY_LENGTH) return EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(c, EVP_CTRL_SET_KEY_LENGTH, keylen, NULL); if (c->key_len == keylen) return 1; if ((keylen > 0) && (c->cipher->flags & EVP_CIPH_VARIABLE_LENGTH)) { c->key_len = keylen; return 1; } EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_SET_KEY_LENGTH, EVP_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH); return 0; } int EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, int pad) { if (pad) ctx->flags &= ~EVP_CIPH_NO_PADDING; else ctx->flags |= EVP_CIPH_NO_PADDING; return 1; } int EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, int type, int arg, void *ptr) { int ret; if (!ctx->cipher) { EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_CTRL, EVP_R_NO_CIPHER_SET); return 0; } if (!ctx->cipher->ctrl) { EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_CTRL, EVP_R_CTRL_NOT_IMPLEMENTED); return 0; } ret = ctx->cipher->ctrl(ctx, type, arg, ptr); if (ret == -1) { EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_CTRL, EVP_R_CTRL_OPERATION_NOT_IMPLEMENTED); return 0; } return ret; } int EVP_CIPHER_CTX_rand_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *key) { if (ctx->cipher->flags & EVP_CIPH_RAND_KEY) return EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_RAND_KEY, 0, key); if (RAND_priv_bytes(key, ctx->key_len) <= 0) return 0; return 1; } int EVP_CIPHER_CTX_copy(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *out, const EVP_CIPHER_CTX *in) { if ((in == NULL) || (in->cipher == NULL)) { EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_COPY, EVP_R_INPUT_NOT_INITIALIZED); return 0; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE /* Make sure it's safe to copy a cipher context using an ENGINE */ if (in->engine && !ENGINE_init(in->engine)) { EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_COPY, ERR_R_ENGINE_LIB); return 0; } #endif EVP_CIPHER_CTX_reset(out); memcpy(out, in, sizeof(*out)); if (in->cipher_data && in->cipher->ctx_size) { out->cipher_data = OPENSSL_malloc(in->cipher->ctx_size); if (out->cipher_data == NULL) { out->cipher = NULL; EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_COPY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } memcpy(out->cipher_data, in->cipher_data, in->cipher->ctx_size); } if (in->cipher->flags & EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_COPY) if (!in->cipher->ctrl((EVP_CIPHER_CTX *)in, EVP_CTRL_COPY, 0, out)) { out->cipher = NULL; EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_COPY, EVP_R_INITIALIZATION_ERROR); return 0; } return 1; } diff --git a/crypto/evp/p_lib.c b/crypto/evp/p_lib.c index 9f1a485a5b83..1f36cb2164fc 100644 --- a/crypto/evp/p_lib.c +++ b/crypto/evp/p_lib.c @@ -1,693 +1,698 @@ /* - * Copyright 1995-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 1995-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include "internal/refcount.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "crypto/asn1.h" #include "crypto/evp.h" static void EVP_PKEY_free_it(EVP_PKEY *x); int EVP_PKEY_bits(const EVP_PKEY *pkey) { if (pkey && pkey->ameth && pkey->ameth->pkey_bits) return pkey->ameth->pkey_bits(pkey); return 0; } int EVP_PKEY_security_bits(const EVP_PKEY *pkey) { if (pkey == NULL) return 0; if (!pkey->ameth || !pkey->ameth->pkey_security_bits) return -2; return pkey->ameth->pkey_security_bits(pkey); } int EVP_PKEY_size(const EVP_PKEY *pkey) { if (pkey && pkey->ameth && pkey->ameth->pkey_size) return pkey->ameth->pkey_size(pkey); return 0; } int EVP_PKEY_save_parameters(EVP_PKEY *pkey, int mode) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_DSA) { int ret = pkey->save_parameters; if (mode >= 0) pkey->save_parameters = mode; return ret; } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC if (pkey->type == EVP_PKEY_EC) { int ret = pkey->save_parameters; if (mode >= 0) pkey->save_parameters = mode; return ret; } #endif return 0; } int EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(EVP_PKEY *to, const EVP_PKEY *from) { if (to->type == EVP_PKEY_NONE) { if (EVP_PKEY_set_type(to, from->type) == 0) return 0; } else if (to->type != from->type) { EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_COPY_PARAMETERS, EVP_R_DIFFERENT_KEY_TYPES); goto err; } if (EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(from)) { EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_COPY_PARAMETERS, EVP_R_MISSING_PARAMETERS); goto err; } if (!EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(to)) { if (EVP_PKEY_cmp_parameters(to, from) == 1) return 1; EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_COPY_PARAMETERS, EVP_R_DIFFERENT_PARAMETERS); return 0; } if (from->ameth && from->ameth->param_copy) return from->ameth->param_copy(to, from); err: return 0; } int EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(const EVP_PKEY *pkey) { if (pkey != NULL && pkey->ameth && pkey->ameth->param_missing) return pkey->ameth->param_missing(pkey); return 0; } int EVP_PKEY_cmp_parameters(const EVP_PKEY *a, const EVP_PKEY *b) { if (a->type != b->type) return -1; if (a->ameth && a->ameth->param_cmp) return a->ameth->param_cmp(a, b); return -2; } int EVP_PKEY_cmp(const EVP_PKEY *a, const EVP_PKEY *b) { if (a->type != b->type) return -1; if (a->ameth) { int ret; /* Compare parameters if the algorithm has them */ if (a->ameth->param_cmp) { ret = a->ameth->param_cmp(a, b); if (ret <= 0) return ret; } if (a->ameth->pub_cmp) return a->ameth->pub_cmp(a, b); } return -2; } EVP_PKEY *EVP_PKEY_new(void) { EVP_PKEY *ret = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ret)); if (ret == NULL) { EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return NULL; } ret->type = EVP_PKEY_NONE; ret->save_type = EVP_PKEY_NONE; ret->references = 1; ret->save_parameters = 1; ret->lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new(); if (ret->lock == NULL) { EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); OPENSSL_free(ret); return NULL; } return ret; } int EVP_PKEY_up_ref(EVP_PKEY *pkey) { int i; if (CRYPTO_UP_REF(&pkey->references, &i, pkey->lock) <= 0) return 0; REF_PRINT_COUNT("EVP_PKEY", pkey); REF_ASSERT_ISNT(i < 2); return ((i > 1) ? 1 : 0); } /* * Setup a public key ASN1 method and ENGINE from a NID or a string. If pkey * is NULL just return 1 or 0 if the algorithm exists. */ static int pkey_set_type(EVP_PKEY *pkey, ENGINE *e, int type, const char *str, int len) { const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *ameth; ENGINE **eptr = (e == NULL) ? &e : NULL; if (pkey) { if (pkey->pkey.ptr) EVP_PKEY_free_it(pkey); /* * If key type matches and a method exists then this lookup has * succeeded once so just indicate success. */ if ((type == pkey->save_type) && pkey->ameth) return 1; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE /* If we have ENGINEs release them */ ENGINE_finish(pkey->engine); pkey->engine = NULL; ENGINE_finish(pkey->pmeth_engine); pkey->pmeth_engine = NULL; #endif } if (str) ameth = EVP_PKEY_asn1_find_str(eptr, str, len); else ameth = EVP_PKEY_asn1_find(eptr, type); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE if (pkey == NULL && eptr != NULL) ENGINE_finish(e); #endif if (ameth == NULL) { EVPerr(EVP_F_PKEY_SET_TYPE, EVP_R_UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHM); return 0; } if (pkey) { pkey->ameth = ameth; - pkey->engine = e; - pkey->type = pkey->ameth->pkey_id; pkey->save_type = type; +# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE + if (eptr == NULL && e != NULL && !ENGINE_init(e)) { + EVPerr(EVP_F_PKEY_SET_TYPE, EVP_R_INITIALIZATION_ERROR); + return 0; + } +# endif + pkey->engine = e; } return 1; } EVP_PKEY *EVP_PKEY_new_raw_private_key(int type, ENGINE *e, const unsigned char *priv, size_t len) { EVP_PKEY *ret = EVP_PKEY_new(); if (ret == NULL || !pkey_set_type(ret, e, type, NULL, -1)) { /* EVPerr already called */ goto err; } if (ret->ameth->set_priv_key == NULL) { EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_NEW_RAW_PRIVATE_KEY, EVP_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_KEYTYPE); goto err; } if (!ret->ameth->set_priv_key(ret, priv, len)) { EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_NEW_RAW_PRIVATE_KEY, EVP_R_KEY_SETUP_FAILED); goto err; } return ret; err: EVP_PKEY_free(ret); return NULL; } EVP_PKEY *EVP_PKEY_new_raw_public_key(int type, ENGINE *e, const unsigned char *pub, size_t len) { EVP_PKEY *ret = EVP_PKEY_new(); if (ret == NULL || !pkey_set_type(ret, e, type, NULL, -1)) { /* EVPerr already called */ goto err; } if (ret->ameth->set_pub_key == NULL) { EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_NEW_RAW_PUBLIC_KEY, EVP_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_KEYTYPE); goto err; } if (!ret->ameth->set_pub_key(ret, pub, len)) { EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_NEW_RAW_PUBLIC_KEY, EVP_R_KEY_SETUP_FAILED); goto err; } return ret; err: EVP_PKEY_free(ret); return NULL; } int EVP_PKEY_get_raw_private_key(const EVP_PKEY *pkey, unsigned char *priv, size_t *len) { if (pkey->ameth->get_priv_key == NULL) { EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_GET_RAW_PRIVATE_KEY, EVP_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_KEYTYPE); return 0; } if (!pkey->ameth->get_priv_key(pkey, priv, len)) { EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_GET_RAW_PRIVATE_KEY, EVP_R_GET_RAW_KEY_FAILED); return 0; } return 1; } int EVP_PKEY_get_raw_public_key(const EVP_PKEY *pkey, unsigned char *pub, size_t *len) { if (pkey->ameth->get_pub_key == NULL) { EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_GET_RAW_PUBLIC_KEY, EVP_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_KEYTYPE); return 0; } if (!pkey->ameth->get_pub_key(pkey, pub, len)) { EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_GET_RAW_PUBLIC_KEY, EVP_R_GET_RAW_KEY_FAILED); return 0; } return 1; } EVP_PKEY *EVP_PKEY_new_CMAC_key(ENGINE *e, const unsigned char *priv, size_t len, const EVP_CIPHER *cipher) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CMAC EVP_PKEY *ret = EVP_PKEY_new(); CMAC_CTX *cmctx = CMAC_CTX_new(); if (ret == NULL || cmctx == NULL || !pkey_set_type(ret, e, EVP_PKEY_CMAC, NULL, -1)) { /* EVPerr already called */ goto err; } if (!CMAC_Init(cmctx, priv, len, cipher, e)) { EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_NEW_CMAC_KEY, EVP_R_KEY_SETUP_FAILED); goto err; } ret->pkey.ptr = cmctx; return ret; err: EVP_PKEY_free(ret); CMAC_CTX_free(cmctx); return NULL; #else EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_NEW_CMAC_KEY, EVP_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_KEYTYPE); return NULL; #endif } int EVP_PKEY_set_type(EVP_PKEY *pkey, int type) { return pkey_set_type(pkey, NULL, type, NULL, -1); } int EVP_PKEY_set_type_str(EVP_PKEY *pkey, const char *str, int len) { return pkey_set_type(pkey, NULL, EVP_PKEY_NONE, str, len); } int EVP_PKEY_set_alias_type(EVP_PKEY *pkey, int type) { if (pkey->type == type) { return 1; /* it already is that type */ } /* * The application is requesting to alias this to a different pkey type, * but not one that resolves to the base type. */ if (EVP_PKEY_type(type) != EVP_PKEY_base_id(pkey)) { EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_SET_ALIAS_TYPE, EVP_R_UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHM); return 0; } pkey->type = type; return 1; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE int EVP_PKEY_set1_engine(EVP_PKEY *pkey, ENGINE *e) { if (e != NULL) { if (!ENGINE_init(e)) { EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_SET1_ENGINE, ERR_R_ENGINE_LIB); return 0; } if (ENGINE_get_pkey_meth(e, pkey->type) == NULL) { ENGINE_finish(e); EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_SET1_ENGINE, EVP_R_UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHM); return 0; } } ENGINE_finish(pkey->pmeth_engine); pkey->pmeth_engine = e; return 1; } ENGINE *EVP_PKEY_get0_engine(const EVP_PKEY *pkey) { return pkey->engine; } #endif int EVP_PKEY_assign(EVP_PKEY *pkey, int type, void *key) { if (pkey == NULL || !EVP_PKEY_set_type(pkey, type)) return 0; pkey->pkey.ptr = key; return (key != NULL); } void *EVP_PKEY_get0(const EVP_PKEY *pkey) { return pkey->pkey.ptr; } const unsigned char *EVP_PKEY_get0_hmac(const EVP_PKEY *pkey, size_t *len) { ASN1_OCTET_STRING *os = NULL; if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_HMAC) { EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_GET0_HMAC, EVP_R_EXPECTING_AN_HMAC_KEY); return NULL; } os = EVP_PKEY_get0(pkey); *len = os->length; return os->data; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_POLY1305 const unsigned char *EVP_PKEY_get0_poly1305(const EVP_PKEY *pkey, size_t *len) { ASN1_OCTET_STRING *os = NULL; if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_POLY1305) { EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_GET0_POLY1305, EVP_R_EXPECTING_A_POLY1305_KEY); return NULL; } os = EVP_PKEY_get0(pkey); *len = os->length; return os->data; } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SIPHASH const unsigned char *EVP_PKEY_get0_siphash(const EVP_PKEY *pkey, size_t *len) { ASN1_OCTET_STRING *os = NULL; if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_SIPHASH) { EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_GET0_SIPHASH, EVP_R_EXPECTING_A_SIPHASH_KEY); return NULL; } os = EVP_PKEY_get0(pkey); *len = os->length; return os->data; } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA int EVP_PKEY_set1_RSA(EVP_PKEY *pkey, RSA *key) { int ret = EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA(pkey, key); if (ret) RSA_up_ref(key); return ret; } RSA *EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(EVP_PKEY *pkey) { if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA && pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) { EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_GET0_RSA, EVP_R_EXPECTING_AN_RSA_KEY); return NULL; } return pkey->pkey.rsa; } RSA *EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(EVP_PKEY *pkey) { RSA *ret = EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(pkey); if (ret != NULL) RSA_up_ref(ret); return ret; } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DSA int EVP_PKEY_set1_DSA(EVP_PKEY *pkey, DSA *key) { int ret = EVP_PKEY_assign_DSA(pkey, key); if (ret) DSA_up_ref(key); return ret; } DSA *EVP_PKEY_get0_DSA(EVP_PKEY *pkey) { if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_DSA) { EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_GET0_DSA, EVP_R_EXPECTING_A_DSA_KEY); return NULL; } return pkey->pkey.dsa; } DSA *EVP_PKEY_get1_DSA(EVP_PKEY *pkey) { DSA *ret = EVP_PKEY_get0_DSA(pkey); if (ret != NULL) DSA_up_ref(ret); return ret; } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC int EVP_PKEY_set1_EC_KEY(EVP_PKEY *pkey, EC_KEY *key) { int ret = EVP_PKEY_assign_EC_KEY(pkey, key); if (ret) EC_KEY_up_ref(key); return ret; } EC_KEY *EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(EVP_PKEY *pkey) { - if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_EC) { + if (EVP_PKEY_base_id(pkey) != EVP_PKEY_EC) { EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_GET0_EC_KEY, EVP_R_EXPECTING_A_EC_KEY); return NULL; } return pkey->pkey.ec; } EC_KEY *EVP_PKEY_get1_EC_KEY(EVP_PKEY *pkey) { EC_KEY *ret = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey); if (ret != NULL) EC_KEY_up_ref(ret); return ret; } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH int EVP_PKEY_set1_DH(EVP_PKEY *pkey, DH *key) { int type = DH_get0_q(key) == NULL ? EVP_PKEY_DH : EVP_PKEY_DHX; int ret = EVP_PKEY_assign(pkey, type, key); if (ret) DH_up_ref(key); return ret; } DH *EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(EVP_PKEY *pkey) { if (pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_DH && pkey->type != EVP_PKEY_DHX) { EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_GET0_DH, EVP_R_EXPECTING_A_DH_KEY); return NULL; } return pkey->pkey.dh; } DH *EVP_PKEY_get1_DH(EVP_PKEY *pkey) { DH *ret = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(pkey); if (ret != NULL) DH_up_ref(ret); return ret; } #endif int EVP_PKEY_type(int type) { int ret; const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *ameth; ENGINE *e; ameth = EVP_PKEY_asn1_find(&e, type); if (ameth) ret = ameth->pkey_id; else ret = NID_undef; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE ENGINE_finish(e); #endif return ret; } int EVP_PKEY_id(const EVP_PKEY *pkey) { return pkey->type; } int EVP_PKEY_base_id(const EVP_PKEY *pkey) { return EVP_PKEY_type(pkey->type); } void EVP_PKEY_free(EVP_PKEY *x) { int i; if (x == NULL) return; CRYPTO_DOWN_REF(&x->references, &i, x->lock); REF_PRINT_COUNT("EVP_PKEY", x); if (i > 0) return; REF_ASSERT_ISNT(i < 0); EVP_PKEY_free_it(x); CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(x->lock); sk_X509_ATTRIBUTE_pop_free(x->attributes, X509_ATTRIBUTE_free); OPENSSL_free(x); } static void EVP_PKEY_free_it(EVP_PKEY *x) { /* internal function; x is never NULL */ if (x->ameth && x->ameth->pkey_free) { x->ameth->pkey_free(x); x->pkey.ptr = NULL; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE ENGINE_finish(x->engine); x->engine = NULL; ENGINE_finish(x->pmeth_engine); x->pmeth_engine = NULL; #endif } static int unsup_alg(BIO *out, const EVP_PKEY *pkey, int indent, const char *kstr) { BIO_indent(out, indent, 128); BIO_printf(out, "%s algorithm \"%s\" unsupported\n", kstr, OBJ_nid2ln(pkey->type)); return 1; } int EVP_PKEY_print_public(BIO *out, const EVP_PKEY *pkey, int indent, ASN1_PCTX *pctx) { if (pkey->ameth && pkey->ameth->pub_print) return pkey->ameth->pub_print(out, pkey, indent, pctx); return unsup_alg(out, pkey, indent, "Public Key"); } int EVP_PKEY_print_private(BIO *out, const EVP_PKEY *pkey, int indent, ASN1_PCTX *pctx) { if (pkey->ameth && pkey->ameth->priv_print) return pkey->ameth->priv_print(out, pkey, indent, pctx); return unsup_alg(out, pkey, indent, "Private Key"); } int EVP_PKEY_print_params(BIO *out, const EVP_PKEY *pkey, int indent, ASN1_PCTX *pctx) { if (pkey->ameth && pkey->ameth->param_print) return pkey->ameth->param_print(out, pkey, indent, pctx); return unsup_alg(out, pkey, indent, "Parameters"); } static int evp_pkey_asn1_ctrl(EVP_PKEY *pkey, int op, int arg1, void *arg2) { if (pkey->ameth == NULL || pkey->ameth->pkey_ctrl == NULL) return -2; return pkey->ameth->pkey_ctrl(pkey, op, arg1, arg2); } int EVP_PKEY_get_default_digest_nid(EVP_PKEY *pkey, int *pnid) { return evp_pkey_asn1_ctrl(pkey, ASN1_PKEY_CTRL_DEFAULT_MD_NID, 0, pnid); } int EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(EVP_PKEY *pkey, const unsigned char *pt, size_t ptlen) { if (ptlen > INT_MAX) return 0; if (evp_pkey_asn1_ctrl(pkey, ASN1_PKEY_CTRL_SET1_TLS_ENCPT, ptlen, (void *)pt) <= 0) return 0; return 1; } size_t EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(EVP_PKEY *pkey, unsigned char **ppt) { int rv; rv = evp_pkey_asn1_ctrl(pkey, ASN1_PKEY_CTRL_GET1_TLS_ENCPT, 0, ppt); if (rv <= 0) return 0; return rv; } diff --git a/crypto/objects/o_names.c b/crypto/objects/o_names.c index 979d83577c22..872676ba2277 100644 --- a/crypto/objects/o_names.c +++ b/crypto/objects/o_names.c @@ -1,406 +1,410 @@ /* - * Copyright 1998-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 1998-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "internal/thread_once.h" #include "crypto/lhash.h" #include "obj_local.h" #include "e_os.h" /* * We define this wrapper for two reasons. Firstly, later versions of * DEC C add linkage information to certain functions, which makes it * tricky to use them as values to regular function pointers. * Secondly, in the EDK2 build environment, the strcasecmp function is * actually an external function with the Microsoft ABI, so we can't * transparently assign function pointers to it. */ #if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS_DECC) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_UEFI) static int obj_strcasecmp(const char *a, const char *b) { return strcasecmp(a, b); } #else #define obj_strcasecmp strcasecmp #endif /* * I use the ex_data stuff to manage the identifiers for the obj_name_types * that applications may define. I only really use the free function field. */ static LHASH_OF(OBJ_NAME) *names_lh = NULL; static int names_type_num = OBJ_NAME_TYPE_NUM; static CRYPTO_RWLOCK *obj_lock = NULL; struct name_funcs_st { unsigned long (*hash_func) (const char *name); int (*cmp_func) (const char *a, const char *b); void (*free_func) (const char *, int, const char *); }; static STACK_OF(NAME_FUNCS) *name_funcs_stack; /* * The LHASH callbacks now use the raw "void *" prototypes and do * per-variable casting in the functions. This prevents function pointer * casting without the need for macro-generated wrapper functions. */ static unsigned long obj_name_hash(const OBJ_NAME *a); static int obj_name_cmp(const OBJ_NAME *a, const OBJ_NAME *b); static CRYPTO_ONCE init = CRYPTO_ONCE_STATIC_INIT; DEFINE_RUN_ONCE_STATIC(o_names_init) { CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_DISABLE); - names_lh = lh_OBJ_NAME_new(obj_name_hash, obj_name_cmp); + names_lh = NULL; obj_lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new(); + if (obj_lock != NULL) + names_lh = lh_OBJ_NAME_new(obj_name_hash, obj_name_cmp); + if (names_lh == NULL) { + CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(obj_lock); + obj_lock = NULL; + } CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_ENABLE); return names_lh != NULL && obj_lock != NULL; } int OBJ_NAME_init(void) { return RUN_ONCE(&init, o_names_init); } int OBJ_NAME_new_index(unsigned long (*hash_func) (const char *), int (*cmp_func) (const char *, const char *), void (*free_func) (const char *, int, const char *)) { int ret = 0, i, push; NAME_FUNCS *name_funcs; if (!OBJ_NAME_init()) return 0; CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(obj_lock); if (name_funcs_stack == NULL) { CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_DISABLE); name_funcs_stack = sk_NAME_FUNCS_new_null(); CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_ENABLE); } if (name_funcs_stack == NULL) { /* ERROR */ goto out; } ret = names_type_num; names_type_num++; for (i = sk_NAME_FUNCS_num(name_funcs_stack); i < names_type_num; i++) { CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_DISABLE); name_funcs = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*name_funcs)); CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_ENABLE); if (name_funcs == NULL) { OBJerr(OBJ_F_OBJ_NAME_NEW_INDEX, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); ret = 0; goto out; } name_funcs->hash_func = openssl_lh_strcasehash; name_funcs->cmp_func = obj_strcasecmp; CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_DISABLE); push = sk_NAME_FUNCS_push(name_funcs_stack, name_funcs); CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_ENABLE); if (!push) { OBJerr(OBJ_F_OBJ_NAME_NEW_INDEX, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); OPENSSL_free(name_funcs); ret = 0; goto out; } } name_funcs = sk_NAME_FUNCS_value(name_funcs_stack, ret); if (hash_func != NULL) name_funcs->hash_func = hash_func; if (cmp_func != NULL) name_funcs->cmp_func = cmp_func; if (free_func != NULL) name_funcs->free_func = free_func; out: CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(obj_lock); return ret; } static int obj_name_cmp(const OBJ_NAME *a, const OBJ_NAME *b) { int ret; ret = a->type - b->type; if (ret == 0) { if ((name_funcs_stack != NULL) && (sk_NAME_FUNCS_num(name_funcs_stack) > a->type)) { ret = sk_NAME_FUNCS_value(name_funcs_stack, a->type)->cmp_func(a->name, b->name); } else ret = strcasecmp(a->name, b->name); } return ret; } static unsigned long obj_name_hash(const OBJ_NAME *a) { unsigned long ret; if ((name_funcs_stack != NULL) && (sk_NAME_FUNCS_num(name_funcs_stack) > a->type)) { ret = sk_NAME_FUNCS_value(name_funcs_stack, a->type)->hash_func(a->name); } else { ret = openssl_lh_strcasehash(a->name); } ret ^= a->type; return ret; } const char *OBJ_NAME_get(const char *name, int type) { OBJ_NAME on, *ret; int num = 0, alias; const char *value = NULL; if (name == NULL) return NULL; if (!OBJ_NAME_init()) return NULL; CRYPTO_THREAD_read_lock(obj_lock); alias = type & OBJ_NAME_ALIAS; type &= ~OBJ_NAME_ALIAS; on.name = name; on.type = type; for (;;) { ret = lh_OBJ_NAME_retrieve(names_lh, &on); if (ret == NULL) break; if ((ret->alias) && !alias) { if (++num > 10) break; on.name = ret->data; } else { value = ret->data; break; } } CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(obj_lock); return value; } int OBJ_NAME_add(const char *name, int type, const char *data) { OBJ_NAME *onp, *ret; int alias, ok = 0; if (!OBJ_NAME_init()) return 0; alias = type & OBJ_NAME_ALIAS; type &= ~OBJ_NAME_ALIAS; onp = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*onp)); - if (onp == NULL) { - /* ERROR */ - goto unlock; - } + if (onp == NULL) + return 0; onp->name = name; onp->alias = alias; onp->type = type; onp->data = data; CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(obj_lock); ret = lh_OBJ_NAME_insert(names_lh, onp); if (ret != NULL) { /* free things */ if ((name_funcs_stack != NULL) && (sk_NAME_FUNCS_num(name_funcs_stack) > ret->type)) { /* * XXX: I'm not sure I understand why the free function should * get three arguments... -- Richard Levitte */ sk_NAME_FUNCS_value(name_funcs_stack, ret->type)->free_func(ret->name, ret->type, ret->data); } OPENSSL_free(ret); } else { if (lh_OBJ_NAME_error(names_lh)) { /* ERROR */ OPENSSL_free(onp); goto unlock; } } ok = 1; unlock: CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(obj_lock); return ok; } int OBJ_NAME_remove(const char *name, int type) { OBJ_NAME on, *ret; int ok = 0; if (!OBJ_NAME_init()) return 0; CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(obj_lock); type &= ~OBJ_NAME_ALIAS; on.name = name; on.type = type; ret = lh_OBJ_NAME_delete(names_lh, &on); if (ret != NULL) { /* free things */ if ((name_funcs_stack != NULL) && (sk_NAME_FUNCS_num(name_funcs_stack) > ret->type)) { /* * XXX: I'm not sure I understand why the free function should * get three arguments... -- Richard Levitte */ sk_NAME_FUNCS_value(name_funcs_stack, ret->type)->free_func(ret->name, ret->type, ret->data); } OPENSSL_free(ret); ok = 1; } CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(obj_lock); return ok; } typedef struct { int type; void (*fn) (const OBJ_NAME *, void *arg); void *arg; } OBJ_DOALL; static void do_all_fn(const OBJ_NAME *name, OBJ_DOALL *d) { if (name->type == d->type) d->fn(name, d->arg); } IMPLEMENT_LHASH_DOALL_ARG_CONST(OBJ_NAME, OBJ_DOALL); void OBJ_NAME_do_all(int type, void (*fn) (const OBJ_NAME *, void *arg), void *arg) { OBJ_DOALL d; d.type = type; d.fn = fn; d.arg = arg; lh_OBJ_NAME_doall_OBJ_DOALL(names_lh, do_all_fn, &d); } struct doall_sorted { int type; int n; const OBJ_NAME **names; }; static void do_all_sorted_fn(const OBJ_NAME *name, void *d_) { struct doall_sorted *d = d_; if (name->type != d->type) return; d->names[d->n++] = name; } static int do_all_sorted_cmp(const void *n1_, const void *n2_) { const OBJ_NAME *const *n1 = n1_; const OBJ_NAME *const *n2 = n2_; return strcmp((*n1)->name, (*n2)->name); } void OBJ_NAME_do_all_sorted(int type, void (*fn) (const OBJ_NAME *, void *arg), void *arg) { struct doall_sorted d; int n; d.type = type; d.names = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*d.names) * lh_OBJ_NAME_num_items(names_lh)); /* Really should return an error if !d.names...but its a void function! */ if (d.names != NULL) { d.n = 0; OBJ_NAME_do_all(type, do_all_sorted_fn, &d); qsort((void *)d.names, d.n, sizeof(*d.names), do_all_sorted_cmp); for (n = 0; n < d.n; ++n) fn(d.names[n], arg); OPENSSL_free((void *)d.names); } } static int free_type; static void names_lh_free_doall(OBJ_NAME *onp) { if (onp == NULL) return; if (free_type < 0 || free_type == onp->type) OBJ_NAME_remove(onp->name, onp->type); } static void name_funcs_free(NAME_FUNCS *ptr) { OPENSSL_free(ptr); } void OBJ_NAME_cleanup(int type) { unsigned long down_load; if (names_lh == NULL) return; free_type = type; down_load = lh_OBJ_NAME_get_down_load(names_lh); lh_OBJ_NAME_set_down_load(names_lh, 0); lh_OBJ_NAME_doall(names_lh, names_lh_free_doall); if (type < 0) { lh_OBJ_NAME_free(names_lh); sk_NAME_FUNCS_pop_free(name_funcs_stack, name_funcs_free); CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(obj_lock); names_lh = NULL; name_funcs_stack = NULL; obj_lock = NULL; } else lh_OBJ_NAME_set_down_load(names_lh, down_load); } diff --git a/crypto/pem/pem_lib.c b/crypto/pem/pem_lib.c index a26322119aa7..2de093595d0d 100644 --- a/crypto/pem/pem_lib.c +++ b/crypto/pem/pem_lib.c @@ -1,1002 +1,1005 @@ /* - * Copyright 1995-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 1995-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "crypto/ctype.h" #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "crypto/asn1.h" #include #include #define MIN_LENGTH 4 static int load_iv(char **fromp, unsigned char *to, int num); static int check_pem(const char *nm, const char *name); int pem_check_suffix(const char *pem_str, const char *suffix); int PEM_def_callback(char *buf, int num, int rwflag, void *userdata) { int i, min_len; const char *prompt; /* We assume that the user passes a default password as userdata */ if (userdata) { i = strlen(userdata); i = (i > num) ? num : i; memcpy(buf, userdata, i); return i; } prompt = EVP_get_pw_prompt(); if (prompt == NULL) prompt = "Enter PEM pass phrase:"; /* * rwflag == 0 means decryption * rwflag == 1 means encryption * * We assume that for encryption, we want a minimum length, while for * decryption, we cannot know any minimum length, so we assume zero. */ min_len = rwflag ? MIN_LENGTH : 0; i = EVP_read_pw_string_min(buf, min_len, num, prompt, rwflag); if (i != 0) { PEMerr(PEM_F_PEM_DEF_CALLBACK, PEM_R_PROBLEMS_GETTING_PASSWORD); memset(buf, 0, (unsigned int)num); return -1; } return strlen(buf); } void PEM_proc_type(char *buf, int type) { const char *str; char *p = buf + strlen(buf); if (type == PEM_TYPE_ENCRYPTED) str = "ENCRYPTED"; else if (type == PEM_TYPE_MIC_CLEAR) str = "MIC-CLEAR"; else if (type == PEM_TYPE_MIC_ONLY) str = "MIC-ONLY"; else str = "BAD-TYPE"; BIO_snprintf(p, PEM_BUFSIZE - (size_t)(p - buf), "Proc-Type: 4,%s\n", str); } void PEM_dek_info(char *buf, const char *type, int len, char *str) { long i; char *p = buf + strlen(buf); int j = PEM_BUFSIZE - (size_t)(p - buf), n; n = BIO_snprintf(p, j, "DEK-Info: %s,", type); if (n > 0) { j -= n; p += n; for (i = 0; i < len; i++) { n = BIO_snprintf(p, j, "%02X", 0xff & str[i]); if (n <= 0) return; j -= n; p += n; } if (j > 1) strcpy(p, "\n"); } } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO void *PEM_ASN1_read(d2i_of_void *d2i, const char *name, FILE *fp, void **x, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u) { BIO *b; void *ret; if ((b = BIO_new(BIO_s_file())) == NULL) { PEMerr(PEM_F_PEM_ASN1_READ, ERR_R_BUF_LIB); return 0; } BIO_set_fp(b, fp, BIO_NOCLOSE); ret = PEM_ASN1_read_bio(d2i, name, b, x, cb, u); BIO_free(b); return ret; } #endif static int check_pem(const char *nm, const char *name) { /* Normal matching nm and name */ if (strcmp(nm, name) == 0) return 1; /* Make PEM_STRING_EVP_PKEY match any private key */ if (strcmp(name, PEM_STRING_EVP_PKEY) == 0) { int slen; const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *ameth; if (strcmp(nm, PEM_STRING_PKCS8) == 0) return 1; if (strcmp(nm, PEM_STRING_PKCS8INF) == 0) return 1; slen = pem_check_suffix(nm, "PRIVATE KEY"); if (slen > 0) { /* * NB: ENGINE implementations won't contain a deprecated old * private key decode function so don't look for them. */ ameth = EVP_PKEY_asn1_find_str(NULL, nm, slen); if (ameth && ameth->old_priv_decode) return 1; } return 0; } if (strcmp(name, PEM_STRING_PARAMETERS) == 0) { int slen; const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *ameth; slen = pem_check_suffix(nm, "PARAMETERS"); if (slen > 0) { ENGINE *e; ameth = EVP_PKEY_asn1_find_str(&e, nm, slen); if (ameth) { int r; if (ameth->param_decode) r = 1; else r = 0; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE ENGINE_finish(e); #endif return r; } } return 0; } /* If reading DH parameters handle X9.42 DH format too */ if (strcmp(nm, PEM_STRING_DHXPARAMS) == 0 && strcmp(name, PEM_STRING_DHPARAMS) == 0) return 1; /* Permit older strings */ if (strcmp(nm, PEM_STRING_X509_OLD) == 0 && strcmp(name, PEM_STRING_X509) == 0) return 1; if (strcmp(nm, PEM_STRING_X509_REQ_OLD) == 0 && strcmp(name, PEM_STRING_X509_REQ) == 0) return 1; /* Allow normal certs to be read as trusted certs */ if (strcmp(nm, PEM_STRING_X509) == 0 && strcmp(name, PEM_STRING_X509_TRUSTED) == 0) return 1; if (strcmp(nm, PEM_STRING_X509_OLD) == 0 && strcmp(name, PEM_STRING_X509_TRUSTED) == 0) return 1; /* Some CAs use PKCS#7 with CERTIFICATE headers */ if (strcmp(nm, PEM_STRING_X509) == 0 && strcmp(name, PEM_STRING_PKCS7) == 0) return 1; if (strcmp(nm, PEM_STRING_PKCS7_SIGNED) == 0 && strcmp(name, PEM_STRING_PKCS7) == 0) return 1; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CMS if (strcmp(nm, PEM_STRING_X509) == 0 && strcmp(name, PEM_STRING_CMS) == 0) return 1; /* Allow CMS to be read from PKCS#7 headers */ if (strcmp(nm, PEM_STRING_PKCS7) == 0 && strcmp(name, PEM_STRING_CMS) == 0) return 1; #endif return 0; } static void pem_free(void *p, unsigned int flags, size_t num) { if (flags & PEM_FLAG_SECURE) OPENSSL_secure_clear_free(p, num); else OPENSSL_free(p); } static void *pem_malloc(int num, unsigned int flags) { return (flags & PEM_FLAG_SECURE) ? OPENSSL_secure_malloc(num) : OPENSSL_malloc(num); } static int pem_bytes_read_bio_flags(unsigned char **pdata, long *plen, char **pnm, const char *name, BIO *bp, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u, unsigned int flags) { EVP_CIPHER_INFO cipher; char *nm = NULL, *header = NULL; unsigned char *data = NULL; long len = 0; int ret = 0; do { pem_free(nm, flags, 0); pem_free(header, flags, 0); pem_free(data, flags, len); if (!PEM_read_bio_ex(bp, &nm, &header, &data, &len, flags)) { if (ERR_GET_REASON(ERR_peek_error()) == PEM_R_NO_START_LINE) ERR_add_error_data(2, "Expecting: ", name); return 0; } } while (!check_pem(nm, name)); if (!PEM_get_EVP_CIPHER_INFO(header, &cipher)) goto err; if (!PEM_do_header(&cipher, data, &len, cb, u)) goto err; *pdata = data; *plen = len; if (pnm != NULL) *pnm = nm; ret = 1; err: if (!ret || pnm == NULL) pem_free(nm, flags, 0); pem_free(header, flags, 0); if (!ret) pem_free(data, flags, len); return ret; } int PEM_bytes_read_bio(unsigned char **pdata, long *plen, char **pnm, const char *name, BIO *bp, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u) { return pem_bytes_read_bio_flags(pdata, plen, pnm, name, bp, cb, u, PEM_FLAG_EAY_COMPATIBLE); } int PEM_bytes_read_bio_secmem(unsigned char **pdata, long *plen, char **pnm, const char *name, BIO *bp, pem_password_cb *cb, void *u) { return pem_bytes_read_bio_flags(pdata, plen, pnm, name, bp, cb, u, PEM_FLAG_SECURE | PEM_FLAG_EAY_COMPATIBLE); } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO int PEM_ASN1_write(i2d_of_void *i2d, const char *name, FILE *fp, void *x, const EVP_CIPHER *enc, unsigned char *kstr, int klen, pem_password_cb *callback, void *u) { BIO *b; int ret; if ((b = BIO_new(BIO_s_file())) == NULL) { PEMerr(PEM_F_PEM_ASN1_WRITE, ERR_R_BUF_LIB); return 0; } BIO_set_fp(b, fp, BIO_NOCLOSE); ret = PEM_ASN1_write_bio(i2d, name, b, x, enc, kstr, klen, callback, u); BIO_free(b); return ret; } #endif int PEM_ASN1_write_bio(i2d_of_void *i2d, const char *name, BIO *bp, void *x, const EVP_CIPHER *enc, unsigned char *kstr, int klen, pem_password_cb *callback, void *u) { EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = NULL; int dsize = 0, i = 0, j = 0, ret = 0; unsigned char *p, *data = NULL; const char *objstr = NULL; char buf[PEM_BUFSIZE]; unsigned char key[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH]; unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH]; if (enc != NULL) { objstr = OBJ_nid2sn(EVP_CIPHER_nid(enc)); if (objstr == NULL || EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(enc) == 0 || EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(enc) > (int)sizeof(iv) /* * Check "Proc-Type: 4,Encrypted\nDEK-Info: objstr,hex-iv\n" * fits into buf */ || (strlen(objstr) + 23 + 2 * EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(enc) + 13) > sizeof(buf)) { PEMerr(PEM_F_PEM_ASN1_WRITE_BIO, PEM_R_UNSUPPORTED_CIPHER); goto err; } } if ((dsize = i2d(x, NULL)) <= 0) { PEMerr(PEM_F_PEM_ASN1_WRITE_BIO, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB); dsize = 0; goto err; } /* dsize + 8 bytes are needed */ /* actually it needs the cipher block size extra... */ data = OPENSSL_malloc((unsigned int)dsize + 20); if (data == NULL) { PEMerr(PEM_F_PEM_ASN1_WRITE_BIO, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } p = data; i = i2d(x, &p); if (enc != NULL) { if (kstr == NULL) { if (callback == NULL) klen = PEM_def_callback(buf, PEM_BUFSIZE, 1, u); else klen = (*callback) (buf, PEM_BUFSIZE, 1, u); if (klen <= 0) { PEMerr(PEM_F_PEM_ASN1_WRITE_BIO, PEM_R_READ_KEY); goto err; } #ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC /* Convert the pass phrase from EBCDIC */ ebcdic2ascii(buf, buf, klen); #endif kstr = (unsigned char *)buf; } if (RAND_bytes(iv, EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(enc)) <= 0) /* Generate a salt */ goto err; /* * The 'iv' is used as the iv and as a salt. It is NOT taken from * the BytesToKey function */ if (!EVP_BytesToKey(enc, EVP_md5(), iv, kstr, klen, 1, key, NULL)) goto err; if (kstr == (unsigned char *)buf) OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, PEM_BUFSIZE); buf[0] = '\0'; PEM_proc_type(buf, PEM_TYPE_ENCRYPTED); PEM_dek_info(buf, objstr, EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(enc), (char *)iv); /* k=strlen(buf); */ ret = 1; if ((ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new()) == NULL || !EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, enc, NULL, key, iv) || !EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, data, &j, data, i) || !EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(ctx, &(data[j]), &i)) ret = 0; if (ret == 0) goto err; i += j; } else { ret = 1; buf[0] = '\0'; } i = PEM_write_bio(bp, name, buf, data, i); if (i <= 0) ret = 0; err: OPENSSL_cleanse(key, sizeof(key)); OPENSSL_cleanse(iv, sizeof(iv)); EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx); OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, PEM_BUFSIZE); OPENSSL_clear_free(data, (unsigned int)dsize); return ret; } int PEM_do_header(EVP_CIPHER_INFO *cipher, unsigned char *data, long *plen, pem_password_cb *callback, void *u) { int ok; int keylen; long len = *plen; int ilen = (int) len; /* EVP_DecryptUpdate etc. take int lengths */ EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx; unsigned char key[EVP_MAX_KEY_LENGTH]; char buf[PEM_BUFSIZE]; #if LONG_MAX > INT_MAX /* Check that we did not truncate the length */ if (len > INT_MAX) { PEMerr(PEM_F_PEM_DO_HEADER, PEM_R_HEADER_TOO_LONG); return 0; } #endif if (cipher->cipher == NULL) return 1; if (callback == NULL) keylen = PEM_def_callback(buf, PEM_BUFSIZE, 0, u); else keylen = callback(buf, PEM_BUFSIZE, 0, u); if (keylen < 0) { PEMerr(PEM_F_PEM_DO_HEADER, PEM_R_BAD_PASSWORD_READ); return 0; } #ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC /* Convert the pass phrase from EBCDIC */ ebcdic2ascii(buf, buf, keylen); #endif if (!EVP_BytesToKey(cipher->cipher, EVP_md5(), &(cipher->iv[0]), (unsigned char *)buf, keylen, 1, key, NULL)) return 0; ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new(); if (ctx == NULL) return 0; ok = EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, cipher->cipher, NULL, key, &(cipher->iv[0])); if (ok) ok = EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, data, &ilen, data, ilen); if (ok) { /* Squirrel away the length of data decrypted so far. */ *plen = ilen; ok = EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(ctx, &(data[ilen]), &ilen); } if (ok) *plen += ilen; else PEMerr(PEM_F_PEM_DO_HEADER, PEM_R_BAD_DECRYPT); EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx); OPENSSL_cleanse((char *)buf, sizeof(buf)); OPENSSL_cleanse((char *)key, sizeof(key)); return ok; } /* * This implements a very limited PEM header parser that does not support the * full grammar of rfc1421. In particular, folded headers are not supported, * nor is additional whitespace. * * A robust implementation would make use of a library that turns the headers * into a BIO from which one folded line is read at a time, and is then split * into a header label and content. We would then parse the content of the * headers we care about. This is overkill for just this limited use-case, but * presumably we also parse rfc822-style headers for S/MIME, so a common * abstraction might well be more generally useful. */ int PEM_get_EVP_CIPHER_INFO(char *header, EVP_CIPHER_INFO *cipher) { static const char ProcType[] = "Proc-Type:"; static const char ENCRYPTED[] = "ENCRYPTED"; static const char DEKInfo[] = "DEK-Info:"; const EVP_CIPHER *enc = NULL; int ivlen; char *dekinfostart, c; cipher->cipher = NULL; memset(cipher->iv, 0, sizeof(cipher->iv)); if ((header == NULL) || (*header == '\0') || (*header == '\n')) return 1; if (strncmp(header, ProcType, sizeof(ProcType)-1) != 0) { PEMerr(PEM_F_PEM_GET_EVP_CIPHER_INFO, PEM_R_NOT_PROC_TYPE); return 0; } header += sizeof(ProcType)-1; header += strspn(header, " \t"); if (*header++ != '4' || *header++ != ',') return 0; header += strspn(header, " \t"); /* We expect "ENCRYPTED" followed by optional white-space + line break */ if (strncmp(header, ENCRYPTED, sizeof(ENCRYPTED)-1) != 0 || strspn(header+sizeof(ENCRYPTED)-1, " \t\r\n") == 0) { PEMerr(PEM_F_PEM_GET_EVP_CIPHER_INFO, PEM_R_NOT_ENCRYPTED); return 0; } header += sizeof(ENCRYPTED)-1; header += strspn(header, " \t\r"); if (*header++ != '\n') { PEMerr(PEM_F_PEM_GET_EVP_CIPHER_INFO, PEM_R_SHORT_HEADER); return 0; } /*- * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc1421#section-4.6.1.3 * We expect "DEK-Info: algo[,hex-parameters]" */ if (strncmp(header, DEKInfo, sizeof(DEKInfo)-1) != 0) { PEMerr(PEM_F_PEM_GET_EVP_CIPHER_INFO, PEM_R_NOT_DEK_INFO); return 0; } header += sizeof(DEKInfo)-1; header += strspn(header, " \t"); /* * DEK-INFO is a comma-separated combination of algorithm name and optional * parameters. */ dekinfostart = header; header += strcspn(header, " \t,"); c = *header; *header = '\0'; cipher->cipher = enc = EVP_get_cipherbyname(dekinfostart); *header = c; header += strspn(header, " \t"); if (enc == NULL) { PEMerr(PEM_F_PEM_GET_EVP_CIPHER_INFO, PEM_R_UNSUPPORTED_ENCRYPTION); return 0; } ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(enc); if (ivlen > 0 && *header++ != ',') { PEMerr(PEM_F_PEM_GET_EVP_CIPHER_INFO, PEM_R_MISSING_DEK_IV); return 0; } else if (ivlen == 0 && *header == ',') { PEMerr(PEM_F_PEM_GET_EVP_CIPHER_INFO, PEM_R_UNEXPECTED_DEK_IV); return 0; } if (!load_iv(&header, cipher->iv, EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(enc))) return 0; return 1; } static int load_iv(char **fromp, unsigned char *to, int num) { int v, i; char *from; from = *fromp; for (i = 0; i < num; i++) to[i] = 0; num *= 2; for (i = 0; i < num; i++) { v = OPENSSL_hexchar2int(*from); if (v < 0) { PEMerr(PEM_F_LOAD_IV, PEM_R_BAD_IV_CHARS); return 0; } from++; to[i / 2] |= v << (long)((!(i & 1)) * 4); } *fromp = from; return 1; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO int PEM_write(FILE *fp, const char *name, const char *header, const unsigned char *data, long len) { BIO *b; int ret; if ((b = BIO_new(BIO_s_file())) == NULL) { PEMerr(PEM_F_PEM_WRITE, ERR_R_BUF_LIB); return 0; } BIO_set_fp(b, fp, BIO_NOCLOSE); ret = PEM_write_bio(b, name, header, data, len); BIO_free(b); return ret; } #endif int PEM_write_bio(BIO *bp, const char *name, const char *header, const unsigned char *data, long len) { int nlen, n, i, j, outl; unsigned char *buf = NULL; EVP_ENCODE_CTX *ctx = EVP_ENCODE_CTX_new(); int reason = ERR_R_BUF_LIB; int retval = 0; if (ctx == NULL) { reason = ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE; goto err; } EVP_EncodeInit(ctx); nlen = strlen(name); if ((BIO_write(bp, "-----BEGIN ", 11) != 11) || (BIO_write(bp, name, nlen) != nlen) || (BIO_write(bp, "-----\n", 6) != 6)) goto err; i = strlen(header); if (i > 0) { if ((BIO_write(bp, header, i) != i) || (BIO_write(bp, "\n", 1) != 1)) goto err; } buf = OPENSSL_malloc(PEM_BUFSIZE * 8); if (buf == NULL) { reason = ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE; goto err; } i = j = 0; while (len > 0) { n = (int)((len > (PEM_BUFSIZE * 5)) ? (PEM_BUFSIZE * 5) : len); if (!EVP_EncodeUpdate(ctx, buf, &outl, &(data[j]), n)) goto err; if ((outl) && (BIO_write(bp, (char *)buf, outl) != outl)) goto err; i += outl; len -= n; j += n; } EVP_EncodeFinal(ctx, buf, &outl); if ((outl > 0) && (BIO_write(bp, (char *)buf, outl) != outl)) goto err; if ((BIO_write(bp, "-----END ", 9) != 9) || (BIO_write(bp, name, nlen) != nlen) || (BIO_write(bp, "-----\n", 6) != 6)) goto err; retval = i + outl; err: if (retval == 0) PEMerr(PEM_F_PEM_WRITE_BIO, reason); EVP_ENCODE_CTX_free(ctx); OPENSSL_clear_free(buf, PEM_BUFSIZE * 8); return retval; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO int PEM_read(FILE *fp, char **name, char **header, unsigned char **data, long *len) { BIO *b; int ret; if ((b = BIO_new(BIO_s_file())) == NULL) { PEMerr(PEM_F_PEM_READ, ERR_R_BUF_LIB); return 0; } BIO_set_fp(b, fp, BIO_NOCLOSE); ret = PEM_read_bio(b, name, header, data, len); BIO_free(b); return ret; } #endif /* Some helpers for PEM_read_bio_ex(). */ static int sanitize_line(char *linebuf, int len, unsigned int flags) { int i; if (flags & PEM_FLAG_EAY_COMPATIBLE) { /* Strip trailing whitespace */ while ((len >= 0) && (linebuf[len] <= ' ')) len--; /* Go back to whitespace before applying uniform line ending. */ len++; } else if (flags & PEM_FLAG_ONLY_B64) { for (i = 0; i < len; ++i) { if (!ossl_isbase64(linebuf[i]) || linebuf[i] == '\n' || linebuf[i] == '\r') break; } len = i; } else { /* EVP_DecodeBlock strips leading and trailing whitespace, so just strip * control characters in-place and let everything through. */ for (i = 0; i < len; ++i) { if (linebuf[i] == '\n' || linebuf[i] == '\r') break; if (ossl_iscntrl(linebuf[i])) linebuf[i] = ' '; } len = i; } /* The caller allocated LINESIZE+1, so this is safe. */ linebuf[len++] = '\n'; linebuf[len] = '\0'; return len; } #define LINESIZE 255 /* Note trailing spaces for begin and end. */ static const char beginstr[] = "-----BEGIN "; static const char endstr[] = "-----END "; static const char tailstr[] = "-----\n"; #define BEGINLEN ((int)(sizeof(beginstr) - 1)) #define ENDLEN ((int)(sizeof(endstr) - 1)) #define TAILLEN ((int)(sizeof(tailstr) - 1)) static int get_name(BIO *bp, char **name, unsigned int flags) { char *linebuf; int ret = 0; int len; /* * Need to hold trailing NUL (accounted for by BIO_gets() and the newline * that will be added by sanitize_line() (the extra '1'). */ linebuf = pem_malloc(LINESIZE + 1, flags); if (linebuf == NULL) { PEMerr(PEM_F_GET_NAME, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } do { len = BIO_gets(bp, linebuf, LINESIZE); if (len <= 0) { PEMerr(PEM_F_GET_NAME, PEM_R_NO_START_LINE); goto err; } /* Strip trailing garbage and standardize ending. */ len = sanitize_line(linebuf, len, flags & ~PEM_FLAG_ONLY_B64); /* Allow leading empty or non-matching lines. */ } while (strncmp(linebuf, beginstr, BEGINLEN) != 0 || len < TAILLEN || strncmp(linebuf + len - TAILLEN, tailstr, TAILLEN) != 0); linebuf[len - TAILLEN] = '\0'; len = len - BEGINLEN - TAILLEN + 1; *name = pem_malloc(len, flags); if (*name == NULL) { PEMerr(PEM_F_GET_NAME, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } memcpy(*name, linebuf + BEGINLEN, len); ret = 1; err: pem_free(linebuf, flags, LINESIZE + 1); return ret; } /* Keep track of how much of a header we've seen. */ enum header_status { MAYBE_HEADER, IN_HEADER, POST_HEADER }; /** * Extract the optional PEM header, with details on the type of content and * any encryption used on the contents, and the bulk of the data from the bio. * The end of the header is marked by a blank line; if the end-of-input marker * is reached prior to a blank line, there is no header. * * The header and data arguments are BIO** since we may have to swap them * if there is no header, for efficiency. * * We need the name of the PEM-encoded type to verify the end string. */ static int get_header_and_data(BIO *bp, BIO **header, BIO **data, char *name, unsigned int flags) { BIO *tmp = *header; char *linebuf, *p; int len, line, ret = 0, end = 0, prev_partial_line_read = 0, partial_line_read = 0; /* 0 if not seen (yet), 1 if reading header, 2 if finished header */ enum header_status got_header = MAYBE_HEADER; unsigned int flags_mask; size_t namelen; /* Need to hold trailing NUL (accounted for by BIO_gets() and the newline * that will be added by sanitize_line() (the extra '1'). */ linebuf = pem_malloc(LINESIZE + 1, flags); if (linebuf == NULL) { PEMerr(PEM_F_GET_HEADER_AND_DATA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } for (line = 0; ; line++) { flags_mask = ~0u; len = BIO_gets(bp, linebuf, LINESIZE); if (len <= 0) { PEMerr(PEM_F_GET_HEADER_AND_DATA, PEM_R_BAD_END_LINE); goto err; } /* * Check if line has been read completely or if only part of the line * has been read. Keep the previous value to ignore newlines that * appear due to reading a line up until the char before the newline. */ prev_partial_line_read = partial_line_read; partial_line_read = len == LINESIZE-1 && linebuf[LINESIZE-2] != '\n'; if (got_header == MAYBE_HEADER) { if (memchr(linebuf, ':', len) != NULL) got_header = IN_HEADER; } if (!strncmp(linebuf, endstr, ENDLEN) || got_header == IN_HEADER) flags_mask &= ~PEM_FLAG_ONLY_B64; len = sanitize_line(linebuf, len, flags & flags_mask); /* Check for end of header. */ if (linebuf[0] == '\n') { /* * If previous line has been read only partially this newline is a * regular newline at the end of a line and not an empty line. */ if (!prev_partial_line_read) { if (got_header == POST_HEADER) { /* Another blank line is an error. */ PEMerr(PEM_F_GET_HEADER_AND_DATA, PEM_R_BAD_END_LINE); goto err; } got_header = POST_HEADER; tmp = *data; } continue; } /* Check for end of stream (which means there is no header). */ if (strncmp(linebuf, endstr, ENDLEN) == 0) { p = linebuf + ENDLEN; namelen = strlen(name); if (strncmp(p, name, namelen) != 0 || strncmp(p + namelen, tailstr, TAILLEN) != 0) { PEMerr(PEM_F_GET_HEADER_AND_DATA, PEM_R_BAD_END_LINE); goto err; } if (got_header == MAYBE_HEADER) { *header = *data; *data = tmp; } break; } else if (end) { /* Malformed input; short line not at end of data. */ PEMerr(PEM_F_GET_HEADER_AND_DATA, PEM_R_BAD_END_LINE); goto err; } /* * Else, a line of text -- could be header or data; we don't * know yet. Just pass it through. */ if (BIO_puts(tmp, linebuf) < 0) goto err; /* * Only encrypted files need the line length check applied. */ if (got_header == POST_HEADER) { /* 65 includes the trailing newline */ if (len > 65) goto err; if (len < 65) end = 1; } } ret = 1; err: pem_free(linebuf, flags, LINESIZE + 1); return ret; } /** * Read in PEM-formatted data from the given BIO. * * By nature of the PEM format, all content must be printable ASCII (except * for line endings). Other characters are malformed input and will be rejected. */ int PEM_read_bio_ex(BIO *bp, char **name_out, char **header, unsigned char **data, long *len_out, unsigned int flags) { - EVP_ENCODE_CTX *ctx = EVP_ENCODE_CTX_new(); + EVP_ENCODE_CTX *ctx = NULL; const BIO_METHOD *bmeth; BIO *headerB = NULL, *dataB = NULL; char *name = NULL; int len, taillen, headerlen, ret = 0; BUF_MEM * buf_mem; - if (ctx == NULL) { - PEMerr(PEM_F_PEM_READ_BIO_EX, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - return 0; - } - *len_out = 0; *name_out = *header = NULL; *data = NULL; if ((flags & PEM_FLAG_EAY_COMPATIBLE) && (flags & PEM_FLAG_ONLY_B64)) { /* These two are mutually incompatible; bail out. */ PEMerr(PEM_F_PEM_READ_BIO_EX, ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT); goto end; } bmeth = (flags & PEM_FLAG_SECURE) ? BIO_s_secmem() : BIO_s_mem(); headerB = BIO_new(bmeth); dataB = BIO_new(bmeth); if (headerB == NULL || dataB == NULL) { PEMerr(PEM_F_PEM_READ_BIO_EX, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto end; } if (!get_name(bp, &name, flags)) goto end; if (!get_header_and_data(bp, &headerB, &dataB, name, flags)) goto end; - EVP_DecodeInit(ctx); BIO_get_mem_ptr(dataB, &buf_mem); len = buf_mem->length; + + /* There was no data in the PEM file */ + if (len == 0) + goto end; + + ctx = EVP_ENCODE_CTX_new(); + if (ctx == NULL) { + PEMerr(PEM_F_PEM_READ_BIO_EX, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto end; + } + + EVP_DecodeInit(ctx); if (EVP_DecodeUpdate(ctx, (unsigned char*)buf_mem->data, &len, (unsigned char*)buf_mem->data, len) < 0 || EVP_DecodeFinal(ctx, (unsigned char*)&(buf_mem->data[len]), &taillen) < 0) { PEMerr(PEM_F_PEM_READ_BIO_EX, PEM_R_BAD_BASE64_DECODE); goto end; } len += taillen; buf_mem->length = len; - /* There was no data in the PEM file; avoid malloc(0). */ - if (len == 0) - goto end; headerlen = BIO_get_mem_data(headerB, NULL); *header = pem_malloc(headerlen + 1, flags); *data = pem_malloc(len, flags); if (*header == NULL || *data == NULL) { pem_free(*header, flags, 0); pem_free(*data, flags, 0); goto end; } BIO_read(headerB, *header, headerlen); (*header)[headerlen] = '\0'; BIO_read(dataB, *data, len); *len_out = len; *name_out = name; name = NULL; ret = 1; end: EVP_ENCODE_CTX_free(ctx); pem_free(name, flags, 0); BIO_free(headerB); BIO_free(dataB); return ret; } int PEM_read_bio(BIO *bp, char **name, char **header, unsigned char **data, long *len) { return PEM_read_bio_ex(bp, name, header, data, len, PEM_FLAG_EAY_COMPATIBLE); } /* * Check pem string and return prefix length. If for example the pem_str == * "RSA PRIVATE KEY" and suffix = "PRIVATE KEY" the return value is 3 for the * string "RSA". */ int pem_check_suffix(const char *pem_str, const char *suffix) { int pem_len = strlen(pem_str); int suffix_len = strlen(suffix); const char *p; if (suffix_len + 1 >= pem_len) return 0; p = pem_str + pem_len - suffix_len; if (strcmp(p, suffix)) return 0; p--; if (*p != ' ') return 0; return p - pem_str; } diff --git a/crypto/rand/rand_unix.c b/crypto/rand/rand_unix.c index 43f1069d151d..0f4525106af7 100644 --- a/crypto/rand/rand_unix.c +++ b/crypto/rand/rand_unix.c @@ -1,883 +1,880 @@ /* * Copyright 1995-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #ifndef _GNU_SOURCE # define _GNU_SOURCE #endif #include "e_os.h" #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include #include "rand_local.h" #include "crypto/rand.h" #include #include "internal/dso.h" #ifdef __linux # include # ifdef DEVRANDOM_WAIT # include # include # endif #endif #if (defined(__FreeBSD__) || defined(__NetBSD__)) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_UEFI) # include # include # include #endif #if defined(__OpenBSD__) # include #endif -#if defined(__APPLE__) -# include -#endif #if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_UNIX) || defined(__DJGPP__) # include # include # include # include # include static uint64_t get_time_stamp(void); static uint64_t get_timer_bits(void); /* Macro to convert two thirty two bit values into a sixty four bit one */ # define TWO32TO64(a, b) ((((uint64_t)(a)) << 32) + (b)) /* * Check for the existence and support of POSIX timers. The standard * says that the _POSIX_TIMERS macro will have a positive value if they * are available. * * However, we want an additional constraint: that the timer support does * not require an extra library dependency. Early versions of glibc * require -lrt to be specified on the link line to access the timers, * so this needs to be checked for. * * It is worse because some libraries define __GLIBC__ but don't * support the version testing macro (e.g. uClibc). This means * an extra check is needed. * * The final condition is: * "have posix timers and either not glibc or glibc without -lrt" * * The nested #if sequences are required to avoid using a parameterised * macro that might be undefined. */ # undef OSSL_POSIX_TIMER_OKAY # if defined(_POSIX_TIMERS) && _POSIX_TIMERS > 0 # if defined(__GLIBC__) # if defined(__GLIBC_PREREQ) # if __GLIBC_PREREQ(2, 17) # define OSSL_POSIX_TIMER_OKAY # endif # endif # else # define OSSL_POSIX_TIMER_OKAY # endif # endif #endif /* (defined(OPENSSL_SYS_UNIX) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VXWORKS)) || defined(__DJGPP__) */ #if defined(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_NONE) /* none means none. this simplifies the following logic */ # undef OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_OS # undef OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_GETRANDOM # undef OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_LIBRANDOM # undef OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_DEVRANDOM # undef OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_RDTSC # undef OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_RDCPU # undef OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_EGD #endif #if (defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VXWORKS) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_UEFI)) && \ !defined(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_NONE) # error "UEFI and VXWorks only support seeding NONE" #endif #if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VXWORKS) /* empty implementation */ int rand_pool_init(void) { return 1; } void rand_pool_cleanup(void) { } void rand_pool_keep_random_devices_open(int keep) { } size_t rand_pool_acquire_entropy(RAND_POOL *pool) { return rand_pool_entropy_available(pool); } #endif #if !(defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32) \ || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VXWORKS) \ || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_UEFI)) # if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VOS) # ifndef OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_OS # error "Unsupported seeding method configured; must be os" # endif # if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VOS_HPPA) && defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VOS_IA32) # error "Unsupported HP-PA and IA32 at the same time." # endif # if !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VOS_HPPA) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VOS_IA32) # error "Must have one of HP-PA or IA32" # endif /* * The following algorithm repeatedly samples the real-time clock (RTC) to * generate a sequence of unpredictable data. The algorithm relies upon the * uneven execution speed of the code (due to factors such as cache misses, * interrupts, bus activity, and scheduling) and upon the rather large * relative difference between the speed of the clock and the rate at which * it can be read. If it is ported to an environment where execution speed * is more constant or where the RTC ticks at a much slower rate, or the * clock can be read with fewer instructions, it is likely that the results * would be far more predictable. This should only be used for legacy * platforms. * * As a precaution, we assume only 2 bits of entropy per byte. */ size_t rand_pool_acquire_entropy(RAND_POOL *pool) { short int code; int i, k; size_t bytes_needed; struct timespec ts; unsigned char v; # ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VOS_HPPA long duration; extern void s$sleep(long *_duration, short int *_code); # else long long duration; extern void s$sleep2(long long *_duration, short int *_code); # endif bytes_needed = rand_pool_bytes_needed(pool, 4 /*entropy_factor*/); for (i = 0; i < bytes_needed; i++) { /* * burn some cpu; hope for interrupts, cache collisions, bus * interference, etc. */ for (k = 0; k < 99; k++) ts.tv_nsec = random(); # ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VOS_HPPA /* sleep for 1/1024 of a second (976 us). */ duration = 1; s$sleep(&duration, &code); # else /* sleep for 1/65536 of a second (15 us). */ duration = 1; s$sleep2(&duration, &code); # endif /* Get wall clock time, take 8 bits. */ clock_gettime(CLOCK_REALTIME, &ts); v = (unsigned char)(ts.tv_nsec & 0xFF); rand_pool_add(pool, arg, &v, sizeof(v) , 2); } return rand_pool_entropy_available(pool); } void rand_pool_cleanup(void) { } void rand_pool_keep_random_devices_open(int keep) { } # else # if defined(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_EGD) && \ (defined(OPENSSL_NO_EGD) || !defined(DEVRANDOM_EGD)) # error "Seeding uses EGD but EGD is turned off or no device given" # endif # if defined(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_DEVRANDOM) && !defined(DEVRANDOM) # error "Seeding uses urandom but DEVRANDOM is not configured" # endif # if defined(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_OS) # if !defined(DEVRANDOM) # error "OS seeding requires DEVRANDOM to be configured" # endif # define OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_GETRANDOM # define OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_DEVRANDOM # endif # if defined(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_LIBRANDOM) # error "librandom not (yet) supported" # endif # if (defined(__FreeBSD__) || defined(__NetBSD__)) && defined(KERN_ARND) /* * sysctl_random(): Use sysctl() to read a random number from the kernel * Returns the number of bytes returned in buf on success, -1 on failure. */ static ssize_t sysctl_random(char *buf, size_t buflen) { int mib[2]; size_t done = 0; size_t len; /* * Note: sign conversion between size_t and ssize_t is safe even * without a range check, see comment in syscall_random() */ /* * On FreeBSD old implementations returned longs, newer versions support * variable sizes up to 256 byte. The code below would not work properly * when the sysctl returns long and we want to request something not a * multiple of longs, which should never be the case. */ #if defined(__FreeBSD__) if (!ossl_assert(buflen % sizeof(long) == 0)) { errno = EINVAL; return -1; } #endif /* * On NetBSD before 4.0 KERN_ARND was an alias for KERN_URND, and only * filled in an int, leaving the rest uninitialized. Since NetBSD 4.0 * it returns a variable number of bytes with the current version supporting * up to 256 bytes. * Just return an error on older NetBSD versions. */ #if defined(__NetBSD__) && __NetBSD_Version__ < 400000000 errno = ENOSYS; return -1; #endif mib[0] = CTL_KERN; mib[1] = KERN_ARND; do { len = buflen > 256 ? 256 : buflen; if (sysctl(mib, 2, buf, &len, NULL, 0) == -1) return done > 0 ? done : -1; done += len; buf += len; buflen -= len; } while (buflen > 0); return done; } # endif # if defined(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_GETRANDOM) # if defined(__linux) && !defined(__NR_getrandom) # if defined(__arm__) # define __NR_getrandom (__NR_SYSCALL_BASE+384) # elif defined(__i386__) # define __NR_getrandom 355 # elif defined(__x86_64__) # if defined(__ILP32__) # define __NR_getrandom (__X32_SYSCALL_BIT + 318) # else # define __NR_getrandom 318 # endif # elif defined(__xtensa__) # define __NR_getrandom 338 # elif defined(__s390__) || defined(__s390x__) # define __NR_getrandom 349 # elif defined(__bfin__) # define __NR_getrandom 389 # elif defined(__powerpc__) # define __NR_getrandom 359 # elif defined(__mips__) || defined(__mips64) # if _MIPS_SIM == _MIPS_SIM_ABI32 # define __NR_getrandom (__NR_Linux + 353) # elif _MIPS_SIM == _MIPS_SIM_ABI64 # define __NR_getrandom (__NR_Linux + 313) # elif _MIPS_SIM == _MIPS_SIM_NABI32 # define __NR_getrandom (__NR_Linux + 317) # endif # elif defined(__hppa__) # define __NR_getrandom (__NR_Linux + 339) # elif defined(__sparc__) # define __NR_getrandom 347 # elif defined(__ia64__) # define __NR_getrandom 1339 # elif defined(__alpha__) # define __NR_getrandom 511 # elif defined(__sh__) # if defined(__SH5__) # define __NR_getrandom 373 # else # define __NR_getrandom 384 # endif # elif defined(__avr32__) # define __NR_getrandom 317 # elif defined(__microblaze__) # define __NR_getrandom 385 # elif defined(__m68k__) # define __NR_getrandom 352 # elif defined(__cris__) # define __NR_getrandom 356 # elif defined(__aarch64__) # define __NR_getrandom 278 # else /* generic */ # define __NR_getrandom 278 # endif # endif /* * syscall_random(): Try to get random data using a system call * returns the number of bytes returned in buf, or < 0 on error. */ static ssize_t syscall_random(void *buf, size_t buflen) { /* * Note: 'buflen' equals the size of the buffer which is used by the * get_entropy() callback of the RAND_DRBG. It is roughly bounded by * * 2 * RAND_POOL_FACTOR * (RAND_DRBG_STRENGTH / 8) = 2^14 * * which is way below the OSSL_SSIZE_MAX limit. Therefore sign conversion * between size_t and ssize_t is safe even without a range check. */ /* * Do runtime detection to find getentropy(). * * Known OSs that should support this: * - Darwin since 16 (OSX 10.12, IOS 10.0). * - Solaris since 11.3 * - OpenBSD since 5.6 * - Linux since 3.17 with glibc 2.25 * - FreeBSD since 12.0 (1200061) * * Note: Sometimes getentropy() can be provided but not implemented * internally. So we need to check errno for ENOSYS */ # if defined(__GNUC__) && __GNUC__>=2 && defined(__ELF__) && !defined(__hpux) extern int getentropy(void *buffer, size_t length) __attribute__((weak)); if (getentropy != NULL) { if (getentropy(buf, buflen) == 0) return (ssize_t)buflen; if (errno != ENOSYS) return -1; } -# elif defined(__APPLE__) +# elif defined(OPENSSL_APPLE_CRYPTO_RANDOM) if (CCRandomGenerateBytes(buf, buflen) == kCCSuccess) return (ssize_t)buflen; return -1; # else union { void *p; int (*f)(void *buffer, size_t length); } p_getentropy; /* * We could cache the result of the lookup, but we normally don't * call this function often. */ ERR_set_mark(); p_getentropy.p = DSO_global_lookup("getentropy"); ERR_pop_to_mark(); if (p_getentropy.p != NULL) return p_getentropy.f(buf, buflen) == 0 ? (ssize_t)buflen : -1; # endif /* Linux supports this since version 3.17 */ # if defined(__linux) && defined(__NR_getrandom) return syscall(__NR_getrandom, buf, buflen, 0); # elif (defined(__FreeBSD__) || defined(__NetBSD__)) && defined(KERN_ARND) return sysctl_random(buf, buflen); # else errno = ENOSYS; return -1; # endif } # endif /* defined(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_GETRANDOM) */ # if defined(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_DEVRANDOM) static const char *random_device_paths[] = { DEVRANDOM }; static struct random_device { int fd; dev_t dev; ino_t ino; mode_t mode; dev_t rdev; } random_devices[OSSL_NELEM(random_device_paths)]; static int keep_random_devices_open = 1; # if defined(__linux) && defined(DEVRANDOM_WAIT) \ && defined(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_GETRANDOM) static void *shm_addr; static void cleanup_shm(void) { shmdt(shm_addr); } /* * Ensure that the system randomness source has been adequately seeded. * This is done by having the first start of libcrypto, wait until the device * /dev/random becomes able to supply a byte of entropy. Subsequent starts * of the library and later reseedings do not need to do this. */ static int wait_random_seeded(void) { static int seeded = OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_DEVRANDOM_SHM_ID < 0; static const int kernel_version[] = { DEVRANDOM_SAFE_KERNEL }; int kernel[2]; int shm_id, fd, r; char c, *p; struct utsname un; fd_set fds; if (!seeded) { /* See if anything has created the global seeded indication */ if ((shm_id = shmget(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_DEVRANDOM_SHM_ID, 1, 0)) == -1) { /* * Check the kernel's version and fail if it is too recent. * * Linux kernels from 4.8 onwards do not guarantee that * /dev/urandom is properly seeded when /dev/random becomes * readable. However, such kernels support the getentropy(2) * system call and this should always succeed which renders * this alternative but essentially identical source moot. */ if (uname(&un) == 0) { kernel[0] = atoi(un.release); p = strchr(un.release, '.'); kernel[1] = p == NULL ? 0 : atoi(p + 1); if (kernel[0] > kernel_version[0] || (kernel[0] == kernel_version[0] && kernel[1] >= kernel_version[1])) { return 0; } } /* Open /dev/random and wait for it to be readable */ if ((fd = open(DEVRANDOM_WAIT, O_RDONLY)) != -1) { if (DEVRANDM_WAIT_USE_SELECT && fd < FD_SETSIZE) { FD_ZERO(&fds); FD_SET(fd, &fds); while ((r = select(fd + 1, &fds, NULL, NULL, NULL)) < 0 && errno == EINTR); } else { while ((r = read(fd, &c, 1)) < 0 && errno == EINTR); } close(fd); if (r == 1) { seeded = 1; /* Create the shared memory indicator */ shm_id = shmget(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_DEVRANDOM_SHM_ID, 1, IPC_CREAT | S_IRUSR | S_IRGRP | S_IROTH); } } } if (shm_id != -1) { seeded = 1; /* * Map the shared memory to prevent its premature destruction. * If this call fails, it isn't a big problem. */ shm_addr = shmat(shm_id, NULL, SHM_RDONLY); if (shm_addr != (void *)-1) OPENSSL_atexit(&cleanup_shm); } } return seeded; } # else /* defined __linux && DEVRANDOM_WAIT && OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_GETRANDOM */ static int wait_random_seeded(void) { return 1; } # endif /* * Verify that the file descriptor associated with the random source is * still valid. The rationale for doing this is the fact that it is not * uncommon for daemons to close all open file handles when daemonizing. * So the handle might have been closed or even reused for opening * another file. */ static int check_random_device(struct random_device * rd) { struct stat st; return rd->fd != -1 && fstat(rd->fd, &st) != -1 && rd->dev == st.st_dev && rd->ino == st.st_ino && ((rd->mode ^ st.st_mode) & ~(S_IRWXU | S_IRWXG | S_IRWXO)) == 0 && rd->rdev == st.st_rdev; } /* * Open a random device if required and return its file descriptor or -1 on error */ static int get_random_device(size_t n) { struct stat st; struct random_device * rd = &random_devices[n]; /* reuse existing file descriptor if it is (still) valid */ if (check_random_device(rd)) return rd->fd; /* open the random device ... */ if ((rd->fd = open(random_device_paths[n], O_RDONLY)) == -1) return rd->fd; /* ... and cache its relevant stat(2) data */ if (fstat(rd->fd, &st) != -1) { rd->dev = st.st_dev; rd->ino = st.st_ino; rd->mode = st.st_mode; rd->rdev = st.st_rdev; } else { close(rd->fd); rd->fd = -1; } return rd->fd; } /* * Close a random device making sure it is a random device */ static void close_random_device(size_t n) { struct random_device * rd = &random_devices[n]; if (check_random_device(rd)) close(rd->fd); rd->fd = -1; } int rand_pool_init(void) { size_t i; for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(random_devices); i++) random_devices[i].fd = -1; return 1; } void rand_pool_cleanup(void) { size_t i; for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(random_devices); i++) close_random_device(i); } void rand_pool_keep_random_devices_open(int keep) { if (!keep) rand_pool_cleanup(); keep_random_devices_open = keep; } # else /* !defined(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_DEVRANDOM) */ int rand_pool_init(void) { return 1; } void rand_pool_cleanup(void) { } void rand_pool_keep_random_devices_open(int keep) { } # endif /* defined(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_DEVRANDOM) */ /* * Try the various seeding methods in turn, exit when successful. * * TODO(DRBG): If more than one entropy source is available, is it * preferable to stop as soon as enough entropy has been collected * (as favored by @rsalz) or should one rather be defensive and add * more entropy than requested and/or from different sources? * * Currently, the user can select multiple entropy sources in the * configure step, yet in practice only the first available source * will be used. A more flexible solution has been requested, but * currently it is not clear how this can be achieved without * overengineering the problem. There are many parameters which * could be taken into account when selecting the order and amount * of input from the different entropy sources (trust, quality, * possibility of blocking). */ size_t rand_pool_acquire_entropy(RAND_POOL *pool) { # if defined(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_NONE) return rand_pool_entropy_available(pool); # else size_t entropy_available; # if defined(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_GETRANDOM) { size_t bytes_needed; unsigned char *buffer; ssize_t bytes; /* Maximum allowed number of consecutive unsuccessful attempts */ int attempts = 3; bytes_needed = rand_pool_bytes_needed(pool, 1 /*entropy_factor*/); while (bytes_needed != 0 && attempts-- > 0) { buffer = rand_pool_add_begin(pool, bytes_needed); bytes = syscall_random(buffer, bytes_needed); if (bytes > 0) { rand_pool_add_end(pool, bytes, 8 * bytes); bytes_needed -= bytes; attempts = 3; /* reset counter after successful attempt */ } else if (bytes < 0 && errno != EINTR) { break; } } } entropy_available = rand_pool_entropy_available(pool); if (entropy_available > 0) return entropy_available; # endif # if defined(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_LIBRANDOM) { /* Not yet implemented. */ } # endif # if defined(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_DEVRANDOM) if (wait_random_seeded()) { size_t bytes_needed; unsigned char *buffer; size_t i; bytes_needed = rand_pool_bytes_needed(pool, 1 /*entropy_factor*/); for (i = 0; bytes_needed > 0 && i < OSSL_NELEM(random_device_paths); i++) { ssize_t bytes = 0; /* Maximum number of consecutive unsuccessful attempts */ int attempts = 3; const int fd = get_random_device(i); if (fd == -1) continue; while (bytes_needed != 0 && attempts-- > 0) { buffer = rand_pool_add_begin(pool, bytes_needed); bytes = read(fd, buffer, bytes_needed); if (bytes > 0) { rand_pool_add_end(pool, bytes, 8 * bytes); bytes_needed -= bytes; attempts = 3; /* reset counter on successful attempt */ } else if (bytes < 0 && errno != EINTR) { break; } } if (bytes < 0 || !keep_random_devices_open) close_random_device(i); bytes_needed = rand_pool_bytes_needed(pool, 1); } entropy_available = rand_pool_entropy_available(pool); if (entropy_available > 0) return entropy_available; } # endif # if defined(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_RDTSC) entropy_available = rand_acquire_entropy_from_tsc(pool); if (entropy_available > 0) return entropy_available; # endif # if defined(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_RDCPU) entropy_available = rand_acquire_entropy_from_cpu(pool); if (entropy_available > 0) return entropy_available; # endif # if defined(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_EGD) { static const char *paths[] = { DEVRANDOM_EGD, NULL }; size_t bytes_needed; unsigned char *buffer; int i; bytes_needed = rand_pool_bytes_needed(pool, 1 /*entropy_factor*/); for (i = 0; bytes_needed > 0 && paths[i] != NULL; i++) { size_t bytes = 0; int num; buffer = rand_pool_add_begin(pool, bytes_needed); num = RAND_query_egd_bytes(paths[i], buffer, (int)bytes_needed); if (num == (int)bytes_needed) bytes = bytes_needed; rand_pool_add_end(pool, bytes, 8 * bytes); bytes_needed = rand_pool_bytes_needed(pool, 1); } entropy_available = rand_pool_entropy_available(pool); if (entropy_available > 0) return entropy_available; } # endif return rand_pool_entropy_available(pool); # endif } # endif #endif #if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_UNIX) || defined(__DJGPP__) int rand_pool_add_nonce_data(RAND_POOL *pool) { struct { pid_t pid; CRYPTO_THREAD_ID tid; uint64_t time; } data = { 0 }; /* * Add process id, thread id, and a high resolution timestamp to * ensure that the nonce is unique with high probability for * different process instances. */ data.pid = getpid(); data.tid = CRYPTO_THREAD_get_current_id(); data.time = get_time_stamp(); return rand_pool_add(pool, (unsigned char *)&data, sizeof(data), 0); } int rand_pool_add_additional_data(RAND_POOL *pool) { struct { int fork_id; CRYPTO_THREAD_ID tid; uint64_t time; } data = { 0 }; /* * Add some noise from the thread id and a high resolution timer. * The fork_id adds some extra fork-safety. * The thread id adds a little randomness if the drbg is accessed * concurrently (which is the case for the drbg). */ data.fork_id = openssl_get_fork_id(); data.tid = CRYPTO_THREAD_get_current_id(); data.time = get_timer_bits(); return rand_pool_add(pool, (unsigned char *)&data, sizeof(data), 0); } /* * Get the current time with the highest possible resolution * * The time stamp is added to the nonce, so it is optimized for not repeating. * The current time is ideal for this purpose, provided the computer's clock * is synchronized. */ static uint64_t get_time_stamp(void) { # if defined(OSSL_POSIX_TIMER_OKAY) { struct timespec ts; if (clock_gettime(CLOCK_REALTIME, &ts) == 0) return TWO32TO64(ts.tv_sec, ts.tv_nsec); } # endif # if defined(__unix__) \ || (defined(_POSIX_C_SOURCE) && _POSIX_C_SOURCE >= 200112L) { struct timeval tv; if (gettimeofday(&tv, NULL) == 0) return TWO32TO64(tv.tv_sec, tv.tv_usec); } # endif return time(NULL); } /* * Get an arbitrary timer value of the highest possible resolution * * The timer value is added as random noise to the additional data, * which is not considered a trusted entropy sourec, so any result * is acceptable. */ static uint64_t get_timer_bits(void) { uint64_t res = OPENSSL_rdtsc(); if (res != 0) return res; # if defined(__sun) || defined(__hpux) return gethrtime(); # elif defined(_AIX) { timebasestruct_t t; read_wall_time(&t, TIMEBASE_SZ); return TWO32TO64(t.tb_high, t.tb_low); } # elif defined(OSSL_POSIX_TIMER_OKAY) { struct timespec ts; # ifdef CLOCK_BOOTTIME # define CLOCK_TYPE CLOCK_BOOTTIME # elif defined(_POSIX_MONOTONIC_CLOCK) # define CLOCK_TYPE CLOCK_MONOTONIC # else # define CLOCK_TYPE CLOCK_REALTIME # endif if (clock_gettime(CLOCK_TYPE, &ts) == 0) return TWO32TO64(ts.tv_sec, ts.tv_nsec); } # endif # if defined(__unix__) \ || (defined(_POSIX_C_SOURCE) && _POSIX_C_SOURCE >= 200112L) { struct timeval tv; if (gettimeofday(&tv, NULL) == 0) return TWO32TO64(tv.tv_sec, tv.tv_usec); } # endif return time(NULL); } #endif /* (defined(OPENSSL_SYS_UNIX) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VXWORKS)) || defined(__DJGPP__) */ diff --git a/crypto/ts/ts_verify_ctx.c b/crypto/ts/ts_verify_ctx.c index 32cd2f542bb7..b504649a415f 100644 --- a/crypto/ts/ts_verify_ctx.c +++ b/crypto/ts/ts_verify_ctx.c @@ -1,148 +1,149 @@ /* * Copyright 2006-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include #include "ts_local.h" TS_VERIFY_CTX *TS_VERIFY_CTX_new(void) { TS_VERIFY_CTX *ctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ctx)); if (ctx == NULL) TSerr(TS_F_TS_VERIFY_CTX_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return ctx; } void TS_VERIFY_CTX_init(TS_VERIFY_CTX *ctx) { OPENSSL_assert(ctx != NULL); memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx)); } void TS_VERIFY_CTX_free(TS_VERIFY_CTX *ctx) { if (!ctx) return; TS_VERIFY_CTX_cleanup(ctx); OPENSSL_free(ctx); } int TS_VERIFY_CTX_add_flags(TS_VERIFY_CTX *ctx, int f) { ctx->flags |= f; return ctx->flags; } int TS_VERIFY_CTX_set_flags(TS_VERIFY_CTX *ctx, int f) { ctx->flags = f; return ctx->flags; } BIO *TS_VERIFY_CTX_set_data(TS_VERIFY_CTX *ctx, BIO *b) { ctx->data = b; return ctx->data; } X509_STORE *TS_VERIFY_CTX_set_store(TS_VERIFY_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *s) { ctx->store = s; return ctx->store; } STACK_OF(X509) *TS_VERIFY_CTS_set_certs(TS_VERIFY_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *certs) { ctx->certs = certs; return ctx->certs; } unsigned char *TS_VERIFY_CTX_set_imprint(TS_VERIFY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *hexstr, long len) { + OPENSSL_free(ctx->imprint); ctx->imprint = hexstr; ctx->imprint_len = len; return ctx->imprint; } void TS_VERIFY_CTX_cleanup(TS_VERIFY_CTX *ctx) { if (!ctx) return; X509_STORE_free(ctx->store); sk_X509_pop_free(ctx->certs, X509_free); ASN1_OBJECT_free(ctx->policy); X509_ALGOR_free(ctx->md_alg); OPENSSL_free(ctx->imprint); BIO_free_all(ctx->data); ASN1_INTEGER_free(ctx->nonce); GENERAL_NAME_free(ctx->tsa_name); TS_VERIFY_CTX_init(ctx); } TS_VERIFY_CTX *TS_REQ_to_TS_VERIFY_CTX(TS_REQ *req, TS_VERIFY_CTX *ctx) { TS_VERIFY_CTX *ret = ctx; ASN1_OBJECT *policy; TS_MSG_IMPRINT *imprint; X509_ALGOR *md_alg; ASN1_OCTET_STRING *msg; const ASN1_INTEGER *nonce; OPENSSL_assert(req != NULL); if (ret) TS_VERIFY_CTX_cleanup(ret); else if ((ret = TS_VERIFY_CTX_new()) == NULL) return NULL; ret->flags = TS_VFY_ALL_IMPRINT & ~(TS_VFY_TSA_NAME | TS_VFY_SIGNATURE); if ((policy = req->policy_id) != NULL) { if ((ret->policy = OBJ_dup(policy)) == NULL) goto err; } else ret->flags &= ~TS_VFY_POLICY; imprint = req->msg_imprint; md_alg = imprint->hash_algo; if ((ret->md_alg = X509_ALGOR_dup(md_alg)) == NULL) goto err; msg = imprint->hashed_msg; ret->imprint_len = ASN1_STRING_length(msg); if (ret->imprint_len <= 0) goto err; if ((ret->imprint = OPENSSL_malloc(ret->imprint_len)) == NULL) goto err; memcpy(ret->imprint, ASN1_STRING_get0_data(msg), ret->imprint_len); if ((nonce = req->nonce) != NULL) { if ((ret->nonce = ASN1_INTEGER_dup(nonce)) == NULL) goto err; } else ret->flags &= ~TS_VFY_NONCE; return ret; err: if (ctx) TS_VERIFY_CTX_cleanup(ctx); else TS_VERIFY_CTX_free(ret); return NULL; } diff --git a/crypto/uid.c b/crypto/uid.c index 5e3315eeb2e3..a9eae36818ca 100644 --- a/crypto/uid.c +++ b/crypto/uid.c @@ -1,55 +1,55 @@ /* * Copyright 2001-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VXWORKS) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_UEFI) int OPENSSL_issetugid(void) { return 0; } -#elif defined(__OpenBSD__) || (defined(__FreeBSD__) && __FreeBSD__ > 2) || defined(__DragonFly__) +#elif defined(__OpenBSD__) || (defined(__FreeBSD__) && __FreeBSD__ > 2) || defined(__DragonFly__) || (defined(__GLIBC__) && defined(__FreeBSD_kernel__)) # include OPENSSL_UNISTD int OPENSSL_issetugid(void) { return issetugid(); } #else # include OPENSSL_UNISTD # include # if defined(__GLIBC__) && defined(__GLIBC_PREREQ) # if __GLIBC_PREREQ(2, 16) # include # define OSSL_IMPLEMENT_GETAUXVAL # endif # elif defined(__ANDROID_API__) /* see https://developer.android.google.cn/ndk/guides/cpu-features */ # if __ANDROID_API__ >= 18 # include # define OSSL_IMPLEMENT_GETAUXVAL # endif # endif int OPENSSL_issetugid(void) { # ifdef OSSL_IMPLEMENT_GETAUXVAL return getauxval(AT_SECURE) != 0; # else return getuid() != geteuid() || getgid() != getegid(); # endif } #endif diff --git a/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c b/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c index 20a36e763c5d..e404fcc602df 100644 --- a/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c +++ b/crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c @@ -1,3379 +1,3389 @@ /* * Copyright 1995-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include #include #include "crypto/ctype.h" #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "internal/dane.h" #include "crypto/x509.h" #include "x509_local.h" /* CRL score values */ /* No unhandled critical extensions */ #define CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL 0x100 /* certificate is within CRL scope */ #define CRL_SCORE_SCOPE 0x080 /* CRL times valid */ #define CRL_SCORE_TIME 0x040 /* Issuer name matches certificate */ #define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME 0x020 /* If this score or above CRL is probably valid */ #define CRL_SCORE_VALID (CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL|CRL_SCORE_TIME|CRL_SCORE_SCOPE) /* CRL issuer is certificate issuer */ #define CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT 0x018 /* CRL issuer is on certificate path */ #define CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH 0x008 /* CRL issuer matches CRL AKID */ #define CRL_SCORE_AKID 0x004 /* Have a delta CRL with valid times */ #define CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA 0x002 static int build_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); static int verify_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); static int dane_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); static int null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e); static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer); static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x); static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); static int check_id(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int num_untrusted); static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); static int get_issuer_sk(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x); static int check_dane_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth); static int check_key_level(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert); static int check_sig_level(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert); static int check_curve(X509 *cert); static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer, unsigned int *preasons, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x); static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x); static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl, int *pcrl_score, X509_CRL *base, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls); static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 **pissuer, int *pcrl_score); static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score, unsigned int *preasons); static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x); static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path, STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path); static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); static int null_callback(int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *e) { return ok; } /* * Return 1 if given cert is considered self-signed, 0 if not or on error. * This does not verify self-signedness but relies on x509v3_cache_extensions() * matching issuer and subject names (i.e., the cert being self-issued) and any * present authority key identifier matching the subject key identifier, etc. */ static int cert_self_signed(X509 *x) { if (X509_check_purpose(x, -1, 0) != 1) return 0; if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SS) return 1; else return 0; } /* Given a certificate try and find an exact match in the store */ static X509 *lookup_cert_match(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) { STACK_OF(X509) *certs; X509 *xtmp = NULL; int i; /* Lookup all certs with matching subject name */ certs = ctx->lookup_certs(ctx, X509_get_subject_name(x)); if (certs == NULL) return NULL; /* Look for exact match */ for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(certs); i++) { xtmp = sk_X509_value(certs, i); if (!X509_cmp(xtmp, x)) break; xtmp = NULL; } if (xtmp != NULL && !X509_up_ref(xtmp)) xtmp = NULL; sk_X509_pop_free(certs, X509_free); return xtmp; } /*- * Inform the verify callback of an error. * If B is not NULL it is the error cert, otherwise use the chain cert at * B. * If B is not X509_V_OK, that's the error value, otherwise leave * unchanged (presumably set by the caller). * * Returns 0 to abort verification with an error, non-zero to continue. */ static int verify_cb_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int depth, int err) { ctx->error_depth = depth; ctx->current_cert = (x != NULL) ? x : sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, depth); if (err != X509_V_OK) ctx->error = err; return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); } /*- * Inform the verify callback of an error, CRL-specific variant. Here, the * error depth and certificate are already set, we just specify the error * number. * * Returns 0 to abort verification with an error, non-zero to continue. */ static int verify_cb_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int err) { ctx->error = err; return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); } static int check_auth_level(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) { int i; int num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); if (ctx->param->auth_level <= 0) return 1; for (i = 0; i < num; ++i) { X509 *cert = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i); /* * We've already checked the security of the leaf key, so here we only * check the security of issuer keys. */ if (i > 0 && !check_key_level(ctx, cert) && verify_cb_cert(ctx, cert, i, X509_V_ERR_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL) == 0) return 0; /* * We also check the signature algorithm security of all certificates * except those of the trust anchor at index num-1. */ if (i < num - 1 && !check_sig_level(ctx, cert) && verify_cb_cert(ctx, cert, i, X509_V_ERR_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK) == 0) return 0; } return 1; } static int verify_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) { int err; int ok; /* * Before either returning with an error, or continuing with CRL checks, * instantiate chain public key parameters. */ if ((ok = build_chain(ctx)) == 0 || (ok = check_chain_extensions(ctx)) == 0 || (ok = check_auth_level(ctx)) == 0 || (ok = check_id(ctx)) == 0 || 1) X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL, ctx->chain); if (ok == 0 || (ok = ctx->check_revocation(ctx)) == 0) return ok; err = X509_chain_check_suiteb(&ctx->error_depth, NULL, ctx->chain, ctx->param->flags); if (err != X509_V_OK) { if ((ok = verify_cb_cert(ctx, NULL, ctx->error_depth, err)) == 0) return ok; } /* Verify chain signatures and expiration times */ ok = (ctx->verify != NULL) ? ctx->verify(ctx) : internal_verify(ctx); if (!ok) return ok; if ((ok = check_name_constraints(ctx)) == 0) return ok; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779 /* RFC 3779 path validation, now that CRL check has been done */ if ((ok = X509v3_asid_validate_path(ctx)) == 0) return ok; if ((ok = X509v3_addr_validate_path(ctx)) == 0) return ok; #endif /* If we get this far evaluate policies */ if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_POLICY_CHECK) ok = ctx->check_policy(ctx); return ok; } int X509_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) { SSL_DANE *dane = ctx->dane; int ret; if (ctx->cert == NULL) { X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, X509_R_NO_CERT_SET_FOR_US_TO_VERIFY); ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL; return -1; } if (ctx->chain != NULL) { /* * This X509_STORE_CTX has already been used to verify a cert. We * cannot do another one. */ X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL; return -1; } if (!X509_up_ref(ctx->cert)) { X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED; return -1; } /* * first we make sure the chain we are going to build is present and that * the first entry is in place */ if ((ctx->chain = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL || !sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, ctx->cert)) { X509_free(ctx->cert); X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_CERT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM; return -1; } ctx->num_untrusted = 1; /* If the peer's public key is too weak, we can stop early. */ if (!check_key_level(ctx, ctx->cert) && !verify_cb_cert(ctx, ctx->cert, 0, X509_V_ERR_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL)) return 0; if (DANETLS_ENABLED(dane)) ret = dane_verify(ctx); else ret = verify_chain(ctx); /* * Safety-net. If we are returning an error, we must also set ctx->error, * so that the chain is not considered verified should the error be ignored * (e.g. TLS with SSL_VERIFY_NONE). */ if (ret <= 0 && ctx->error == X509_V_OK) ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED; return ret; } static int sk_X509_contains(STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *cert) { int i, n = sk_X509_num(sk); for (i = 0; i < n; i++) if (X509_cmp(sk_X509_value(sk, i), cert) == 0) return 1; return 0; } /* * Find in given STACK_OF(X509) sk an issuer cert of given cert x. * The issuer must not yet be in ctx->chain, where the exceptional case * that x is self-issued and ctx->chain has just one element is allowed. * Prefer the first one that is not expired, else take the last expired one. */ static X509 *find_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *x) { int i; X509 *issuer, *rv = NULL; for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(sk); i++) { issuer = sk_X509_value(sk, i); if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, x, issuer) && (((x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI) != 0 && sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) == 1) || !sk_X509_contains(ctx->chain, issuer))) { rv = issuer; if (x509_check_cert_time(ctx, rv, -1)) break; } } return rv; } /* Check that the given certificate 'x' is issued by the certificate 'issuer' */ static int check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, X509 *issuer) { return x509_likely_issued(issuer, x) == X509_V_OK; } /* Alternative lookup method: look from a STACK stored in other_ctx */ static int get_issuer_sk(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) { *issuer = find_issuer(ctx, ctx->other_ctx, x); if (*issuer == NULL || !X509_up_ref(*issuer)) goto err; return 1; err: *issuer = NULL; return 0; } static STACK_OF(X509) *lookup_certs_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_NAME *nm) { STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL; X509 *x; int i; for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->other_ctx); i++) { x = sk_X509_value(ctx->other_ctx, i); if (X509_NAME_cmp(nm, X509_get_subject_name(x)) == 0) { if (!X509_up_ref(x)) { sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free); X509err(X509_F_LOOKUP_CERTS_SK, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED; return NULL; } if (sk == NULL) sk = sk_X509_new_null(); if (sk == NULL || !sk_X509_push(sk, x)) { X509_free(x); sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free); X509err(X509_F_LOOKUP_CERTS_SK, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM; return NULL; } } } return sk; } /* * Check EE or CA certificate purpose. For trusted certificates explicit local * auxiliary trust can be used to override EKU-restrictions. */ static int check_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int purpose, int depth, int must_be_ca) { int tr_ok = X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED; /* * For trusted certificates we want to see whether any auxiliary trust * settings trump the purpose constraints. * * This is complicated by the fact that the trust ordinals in * ctx->param->trust are entirely independent of the purpose ordinals in * ctx->param->purpose! * * What connects them is their mutual initialization via calls from * X509_STORE_CTX_set_default() into X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup() which sets * related values of both param->trust and param->purpose. It is however * typically possible to infer associated trust values from a purpose value * via the X509_PURPOSE API. * * Therefore, we can only check for trust overrides when the purpose we're * checking is the same as ctx->param->purpose and ctx->param->trust is * also set. */ if (depth >= ctx->num_untrusted && purpose == ctx->param->purpose) tr_ok = X509_check_trust(x, ctx->param->trust, X509_TRUST_NO_SS_COMPAT); switch (tr_ok) { case X509_TRUST_TRUSTED: return 1; case X509_TRUST_REJECTED: break; default: switch (X509_check_purpose(x, purpose, must_be_ca > 0)) { case 1: return 1; case 0: break; default: if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT) == 0) return 1; } break; } return verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, depth, X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE); } /* * Check a certificate chains extensions for consistency with the supplied * purpose */ static int check_chain_extensions(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) { int i, must_be_ca, plen = 0; X509 *x; int proxy_path_length = 0; int purpose; int allow_proxy_certs; int num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); /*- * must_be_ca can have 1 of 3 values: * -1: we accept both CA and non-CA certificates, to allow direct * use of self-signed certificates (which are marked as CA). * 0: we only accept non-CA certificates. This is currently not * used, but the possibility is present for future extensions. * 1: we only accept CA certificates. This is currently used for * all certificates in the chain except the leaf certificate. */ must_be_ca = -1; /* CRL path validation */ if (ctx->parent) { allow_proxy_certs = 0; purpose = X509_PURPOSE_CRL_SIGN; } else { allow_proxy_certs = ! !(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_ALLOW_PROXY_CERTS); purpose = ctx->param->purpose; } for (i = 0; i < num; i++) { int ret; x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i); if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL) && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL)) { if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION)) return 0; } if (!allow_proxy_certs && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY)) { if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_PROXY_CERTIFICATES_NOT_ALLOWED)) return 0; } ret = X509_check_ca(x); switch (must_be_ca) { case -1: if ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT) && (ret != 1) && (ret != 0)) { ret = 0; ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA; } else ret = 1; break; case 0: if (ret != 0) { ret = 0; ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_NON_CA; } else ret = 1; break; default: /* X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT is implicit for intermediate CAs */ if ((ret == 0) || ((i + 1 < num || ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT) && (ret != 1))) { ret = 0; ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA; } else ret = 1; break; } if (ret > 0 && (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT) && num > 1) { /* Check for presence of explicit elliptic curve parameters */ ret = check_curve(x); if (ret < 0) { ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED; ret = 0; } else if (ret == 0) { ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_EC_KEY_EXPLICIT_PARAMS; } } if (ret > 0 && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA) == 0 && x->ex_pathlen != -1 && (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_X509_STRICT)) { ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION; ret = 0; } if (ret == 0 && !verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, i, X509_V_OK)) return 0; /* check_purpose() makes the callback as needed */ if (purpose > 0 && !check_purpose(ctx, x, purpose, i, must_be_ca)) return 0; /* Check pathlen */ if ((i > 1) && (x->ex_pathlen != -1) && (plen > (x->ex_pathlen + proxy_path_length))) { if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED)) return 0; } /* Increment path length if not a self issued intermediate CA */ if (i > 0 && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI) == 0) plen++; /* * If this certificate is a proxy certificate, the next certificate * must be another proxy certificate or a EE certificate. If not, * the next certificate must be a CA certificate. */ if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY) { /* * RFC3820, 4.1.3 (b)(1) stipulates that if pCPathLengthConstraint * is less than max_path_length, the former should be copied to * the latter, and 4.1.4 (a) stipulates that max_path_length * should be verified to be larger than zero and decrement it. * * Because we're checking the certs in the reverse order, we start * with verifying that proxy_path_length isn't larger than pcPLC, * and copy the latter to the former if it is, and finally, * increment proxy_path_length. */ if (x->ex_pcpathlen != -1) { if (proxy_path_length > x->ex_pcpathlen) { if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_PROXY_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED)) return 0; } proxy_path_length = x->ex_pcpathlen; } proxy_path_length++; must_be_ca = 0; } else must_be_ca = 1; } return 1; } static int has_san_id(X509 *x, int gtype) { int i; int ret = 0; GENERAL_NAMES *gs = X509_get_ext_d2i(x, NID_subject_alt_name, NULL, NULL); if (gs == NULL) return 0; for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gs); i++) { GENERAL_NAME *g = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gs, i); if (g->type == gtype) { ret = 1; break; } } GENERAL_NAMES_free(gs); return ret; } static int check_name_constraints(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) { int i; /* Check name constraints for all certificates */ for (i = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; i >= 0; i--) { X509 *x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i); int j; /* Ignore self issued certs unless last in chain */ if (i && (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SI)) continue; /* * Proxy certificates policy has an extra constraint, where the * certificate subject MUST be the issuer with a single CN entry * added. * (RFC 3820: 3.4, 4.1.3 (a)(4)) */ if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY) { X509_NAME *tmpsubject = X509_get_subject_name(x); X509_NAME *tmpissuer = X509_get_issuer_name(x); X509_NAME_ENTRY *tmpentry = NULL; int last_object_nid = 0; int err = X509_V_OK; int last_object_loc = X509_NAME_entry_count(tmpsubject) - 1; /* Check that there are at least two RDNs */ if (last_object_loc < 1) { err = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_SUBJECT_NAME_VIOLATION; goto proxy_name_done; } /* * Check that there is exactly one more RDN in subject as * there is in issuer. */ if (X509_NAME_entry_count(tmpsubject) != X509_NAME_entry_count(tmpissuer) + 1) { err = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_SUBJECT_NAME_VIOLATION; goto proxy_name_done; } /* * Check that the last subject component isn't part of a * multivalued RDN */ if (X509_NAME_ENTRY_set(X509_NAME_get_entry(tmpsubject, last_object_loc)) == X509_NAME_ENTRY_set(X509_NAME_get_entry(tmpsubject, last_object_loc - 1))) { err = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_SUBJECT_NAME_VIOLATION; goto proxy_name_done; } /* * Check that the last subject RDN is a commonName, and that * all the previous RDNs match the issuer exactly */ tmpsubject = X509_NAME_dup(tmpsubject); if (tmpsubject == NULL) { X509err(X509_F_CHECK_NAME_CONSTRAINTS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM; return 0; } tmpentry = X509_NAME_delete_entry(tmpsubject, last_object_loc); last_object_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_object(tmpentry)); if (last_object_nid != NID_commonName || X509_NAME_cmp(tmpsubject, tmpissuer) != 0) { err = X509_V_ERR_PROXY_SUBJECT_NAME_VIOLATION; } X509_NAME_ENTRY_free(tmpentry); X509_NAME_free(tmpsubject); proxy_name_done: if (err != X509_V_OK && !verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, i, err)) return 0; } /* * Check against constraints for all certificates higher in chain * including trust anchor. Trust anchor not strictly speaking needed * but if it includes constraints it is to be assumed it expects them * to be obeyed. */ for (j = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; j > i; j--) { NAME_CONSTRAINTS *nc = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, j)->nc; if (nc) { int rv = NAME_CONSTRAINTS_check(x, nc); /* If EE certificate check commonName too */ if (rv == X509_V_OK && i == 0 && (ctx->param->hostflags & X509_CHECK_FLAG_NEVER_CHECK_SUBJECT) == 0 && ((ctx->param->hostflags & X509_CHECK_FLAG_ALWAYS_CHECK_SUBJECT) != 0 || !has_san_id(x, GEN_DNS))) rv = NAME_CONSTRAINTS_check_CN(x, nc); switch (rv) { case X509_V_OK: break; case X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM: return 0; default: if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, i, rv)) return 0; break; } } } } return 1; } static int check_id_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int errcode) { return verify_cb_cert(ctx, ctx->cert, 0, errcode); } static int check_hosts(X509 *x, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm) { int i; int n = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_num(vpm->hosts); char *name; if (vpm->peername != NULL) { OPENSSL_free(vpm->peername); vpm->peername = NULL; } for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) { name = sk_OPENSSL_STRING_value(vpm->hosts, i); if (X509_check_host(x, name, 0, vpm->hostflags, &vpm->peername) > 0) return 1; } return n == 0; } static int check_id(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) { X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm = ctx->param; X509 *x = ctx->cert; if (vpm->hosts && check_hosts(x, vpm) <= 0) { if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH)) return 0; } if (vpm->email && X509_check_email(x, vpm->email, vpm->emaillen, 0) <= 0) { if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH)) return 0; } if (vpm->ip && X509_check_ip(x, vpm->ip, vpm->iplen, 0) <= 0) { if (!check_id_error(ctx, X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH)) return 0; } return 1; } static int check_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int num_untrusted) { int i; X509 *x = NULL; X509 *mx; SSL_DANE *dane = ctx->dane; int num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); int trust; /* * Check for a DANE issuer at depth 1 or greater, if it is a DANE-TA(2) * match, we're done, otherwise we'll merely record the match depth. */ if (DANETLS_HAS_TA(dane) && num_untrusted > 0 && num_untrusted < num) { switch (trust = check_dane_issuer(ctx, num_untrusted)) { case X509_TRUST_TRUSTED: case X509_TRUST_REJECTED: return trust; } } /* * Check trusted certificates in chain at depth num_untrusted and up. * Note, that depths 0..num_untrusted-1 may also contain trusted * certificates, but the caller is expected to have already checked those, * and wants to incrementally check just any added since. */ for (i = num_untrusted; i < num; i++) { x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i); trust = X509_check_trust(x, ctx->param->trust, 0); /* If explicitly trusted return trusted */ if (trust == X509_TRUST_TRUSTED) goto trusted; if (trust == X509_TRUST_REJECTED) goto rejected; } /* * If we are looking at a trusted certificate, and accept partial chains, * the chain is PKIX trusted. */ if (num_untrusted < num) { if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN) goto trusted; return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED; } if (num_untrusted == num && ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN) { /* * Last-resort call with no new trusted certificates, check the leaf * for a direct trust store match. */ i = 0; x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i); mx = lookup_cert_match(ctx, x); if (!mx) return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED; /* * Check explicit auxiliary trust/reject settings. If none are set, * we'll accept X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED when not self-signed. */ trust = X509_check_trust(mx, ctx->param->trust, 0); if (trust == X509_TRUST_REJECTED) { X509_free(mx); goto rejected; } /* Replace leaf with trusted match */ (void) sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, 0, mx); X509_free(x); ctx->num_untrusted = 0; goto trusted; } /* * If no trusted certs in chain at all return untrusted and allow * standard (no issuer cert) etc errors to be indicated. */ return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED; rejected: if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED)) return X509_TRUST_REJECTED; return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED; trusted: if (!DANETLS_ENABLED(dane)) return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED; if (dane->pdpth < 0) dane->pdpth = num_untrusted; /* With DANE, PKIX alone is not trusted until we have both */ if (dane->mdpth >= 0) return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED; return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED; } static int check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) { int i = 0, last = 0, ok = 0; if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK)) return 1; if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CRL_CHECK_ALL) last = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; else { /* If checking CRL paths this isn't the EE certificate */ if (ctx->parent) return 1; last = 0; } for (i = 0; i <= last; i++) { ctx->error_depth = i; ok = check_cert(ctx); if (!ok) return ok; } return 1; } static int check_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) { X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL; int ok = 0; int cnum = ctx->error_depth; X509 *x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum); ctx->current_cert = x; ctx->current_issuer = NULL; ctx->current_crl_score = 0; ctx->current_reasons = 0; if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_PROXY) return 1; while (ctx->current_reasons != CRLDP_ALL_REASONS) { unsigned int last_reasons = ctx->current_reasons; /* Try to retrieve relevant CRL */ if (ctx->get_crl) ok = ctx->get_crl(ctx, &crl, x); else ok = get_crl_delta(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, x); /* * If error looking up CRL, nothing we can do except notify callback */ if (!ok) { ok = verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL); goto done; } ctx->current_crl = crl; ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, crl); if (!ok) goto done; if (dcrl) { ok = ctx->check_crl(ctx, dcrl); if (!ok) goto done; ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, dcrl, x); if (!ok) goto done; } else ok = 1; /* Don't look in full CRL if delta reason is removefromCRL */ if (ok != 2) { ok = ctx->cert_crl(ctx, crl, x); if (!ok) goto done; } X509_CRL_free(crl); X509_CRL_free(dcrl); crl = NULL; dcrl = NULL; /* * If reasons not updated we won't get anywhere by another iteration, * so exit loop. */ if (last_reasons == ctx->current_reasons) { ok = verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL); goto done; } } done: X509_CRL_free(crl); X509_CRL_free(dcrl); ctx->current_crl = NULL; return ok; } /* Check CRL times against values in X509_STORE_CTX */ static int check_crl_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, int notify) { time_t *ptime; int i; if (notify) ctx->current_crl = crl; if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME) ptime = &ctx->param->check_time; else if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NO_CHECK_TIME) return 1; else ptime = NULL; i = X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get0_lastUpdate(crl), ptime); if (i == 0) { if (!notify) return 0; if (!verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD)) return 0; } if (i > 0) { if (!notify) return 0; if (!verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID)) return 0; } if (X509_CRL_get0_nextUpdate(crl)) { i = X509_cmp_time(X509_CRL_get0_nextUpdate(crl), ptime); if (i == 0) { if (!notify) return 0; if (!verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD)) return 0; } /* Ignore expiry of base CRL is delta is valid */ if ((i < 0) && !(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA)) { if (!notify) return 0; if (!verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED)) return 0; } } if (notify) ctx->current_crl = NULL; return 1; } static int get_crl_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 **pissuer, int *pscore, unsigned int *preasons, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls) { int i, crl_score, best_score = *pscore; unsigned int reasons, best_reasons = 0; X509 *x = ctx->current_cert; X509_CRL *crl, *best_crl = NULL; X509 *crl_issuer = NULL, *best_crl_issuer = NULL; for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++) { crl = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i); reasons = *preasons; crl_score = get_crl_score(ctx, &crl_issuer, &reasons, crl, x); if (crl_score < best_score || crl_score == 0) continue; /* If current CRL is equivalent use it if it is newer */ if (crl_score == best_score && best_crl != NULL) { int day, sec; if (ASN1_TIME_diff(&day, &sec, X509_CRL_get0_lastUpdate(best_crl), X509_CRL_get0_lastUpdate(crl)) == 0) continue; /* * ASN1_TIME_diff never returns inconsistent signs for |day| * and |sec|. */ if (day <= 0 && sec <= 0) continue; } best_crl = crl; best_crl_issuer = crl_issuer; best_score = crl_score; best_reasons = reasons; } if (best_crl) { X509_CRL_free(*pcrl); *pcrl = best_crl; *pissuer = best_crl_issuer; *pscore = best_score; *preasons = best_reasons; X509_CRL_up_ref(best_crl); X509_CRL_free(*pdcrl); *pdcrl = NULL; get_delta_sk(ctx, pdcrl, pscore, best_crl, crls); } if (best_score >= CRL_SCORE_VALID) return 1; return 0; } /* * Compare two CRL extensions for delta checking purposes. They should be * both present or both absent. If both present all fields must be identical. */ static int crl_extension_match(X509_CRL *a, X509_CRL *b, int nid) { ASN1_OCTET_STRING *exta, *extb; int i; i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, -1); if (i >= 0) { /* Can't have multiple occurrences */ if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(a, nid, i) != -1) return 0; exta = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(a, i)); } else exta = NULL; i = X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, -1); if (i >= 0) { if (X509_CRL_get_ext_by_NID(b, nid, i) != -1) return 0; extb = X509_EXTENSION_get_data(X509_CRL_get_ext(b, i)); } else extb = NULL; if (!exta && !extb) return 1; if (!exta || !extb) return 0; if (ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(exta, extb)) return 0; return 1; } /* See if a base and delta are compatible */ static int check_delta_base(X509_CRL *delta, X509_CRL *base) { /* Delta CRL must be a delta */ if (!delta->base_crl_number) return 0; /* Base must have a CRL number */ if (!base->crl_number) return 0; /* Issuer names must match */ if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base), X509_CRL_get_issuer(delta))) return 0; /* AKID and IDP must match */ if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_authority_key_identifier)) return 0; if (!crl_extension_match(delta, base, NID_issuing_distribution_point)) return 0; /* Delta CRL base number must not exceed Full CRL number. */ if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->base_crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0) return 0; /* Delta CRL number must exceed full CRL number */ if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(delta->crl_number, base->crl_number) > 0) return 1; return 0; } /* * For a given base CRL find a delta... maybe extend to delta scoring or * retrieve a chain of deltas... */ static void get_delta_sk(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **dcrl, int *pscore, X509_CRL *base, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *crls) { X509_CRL *delta; int i; if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_DELTAS)) return; if (!((ctx->current_cert->ex_flags | base->flags) & EXFLAG_FRESHEST)) return; for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(crls); i++) { delta = sk_X509_CRL_value(crls, i); if (check_delta_base(delta, base)) { if (check_crl_time(ctx, delta, 0)) *pscore |= CRL_SCORE_TIME_DELTA; X509_CRL_up_ref(delta); *dcrl = delta; return; } } *dcrl = NULL; } /* * For a given CRL return how suitable it is for the supplied certificate * 'x'. The return value is a mask of several criteria. If the issuer is not * the certificate issuer this is returned in *pissuer. The reasons mask is * also used to determine if the CRL is suitable: if no new reasons the CRL * is rejected, otherwise reasons is updated. */ static int get_crl_score(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 **pissuer, unsigned int *preasons, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x) { int crl_score = 0; unsigned int tmp_reasons = *preasons, crl_reasons; /* First see if we can reject CRL straight away */ /* Invalid IDP cannot be processed */ if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID) return 0; /* Reason codes or indirect CRLs need extended CRL support */ if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT)) { if (crl->idp_flags & (IDP_INDIRECT | IDP_REASONS)) return 0; } else if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_REASONS) { /* If no new reasons reject */ if (!(crl->idp_reasons & ~tmp_reasons)) return 0; } /* Don't process deltas at this stage */ else if (crl->base_crl_number) return 0; /* If issuer name doesn't match certificate need indirect CRL */ if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_issuer_name(x), X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl))) { if (!(crl->idp_flags & IDP_INDIRECT)) return 0; } else crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME; if (!(crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL)) crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_NOCRITICAL; /* Check expiry */ if (check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 0)) crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_TIME; /* Check authority key ID and locate certificate issuer */ crl_akid_check(ctx, crl, pissuer, &crl_score); /* If we can't locate certificate issuer at this point forget it */ if (!(crl_score & CRL_SCORE_AKID)) return 0; /* Check cert for matching CRL distribution points */ if (crl_crldp_check(x, crl, crl_score, &crl_reasons)) { /* If no new reasons reject */ if (!(crl_reasons & ~tmp_reasons)) return 0; tmp_reasons |= crl_reasons; crl_score |= CRL_SCORE_SCOPE; } *preasons = tmp_reasons; return crl_score; } static void crl_akid_check(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 **pissuer, int *pcrl_score) { X509 *crl_issuer = NULL; X509_NAME *cnm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl); int cidx = ctx->error_depth; int i; if (cidx != sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1) cidx++; crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx); if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) { if (*pcrl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME) { *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID | CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_CERT; *pissuer = crl_issuer; return; } } for (cidx++; cidx < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); cidx++) { crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cidx); if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm)) continue; if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) { *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID | CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH; *pissuer = crl_issuer; return; } } /* Anything else needs extended CRL support */ if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_EXTENDED_CRL_SUPPORT)) return; /* * Otherwise the CRL issuer is not on the path. Look for it in the set of * untrusted certificates. */ for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->untrusted); i++) { crl_issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->untrusted, i); if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_get_subject_name(crl_issuer), cnm)) continue; if (X509_check_akid(crl_issuer, crl->akid) == X509_V_OK) { *pissuer = crl_issuer; *pcrl_score |= CRL_SCORE_AKID; return; } } } /* * Check the path of a CRL issuer certificate. This creates a new * X509_STORE_CTX and populates it with most of the parameters from the * parent. This could be optimised somewhat since a lot of path checking will * be duplicated by the parent, but this will rarely be used in practice. */ static int check_crl_path(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) { X509_STORE_CTX crl_ctx; int ret; /* Don't allow recursive CRL path validation */ if (ctx->parent) return 0; if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(&crl_ctx, ctx->ctx, x, ctx->untrusted)) return -1; crl_ctx.crls = ctx->crls; /* Copy verify params across */ X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(&crl_ctx, ctx->param); crl_ctx.parent = ctx; crl_ctx.verify_cb = ctx->verify_cb; /* Verify CRL issuer */ ret = X509_verify_cert(&crl_ctx); if (ret <= 0) goto err; /* Check chain is acceptable */ ret = check_crl_chain(ctx, ctx->chain, crl_ctx.chain); err: X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(&crl_ctx); return ret; } /* * RFC3280 says nothing about the relationship between CRL path and * certificate path, which could lead to situations where a certificate could * be revoked or validated by a CA not authorised to do so. RFC5280 is more * strict and states that the two paths must end in the same trust anchor, * though some discussions remain... until this is resolved we use the * RFC5280 version */ static int check_crl_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *cert_path, STACK_OF(X509) *crl_path) { X509 *cert_ta, *crl_ta; cert_ta = sk_X509_value(cert_path, sk_X509_num(cert_path) - 1); crl_ta = sk_X509_value(crl_path, sk_X509_num(crl_path) - 1); if (!X509_cmp(cert_ta, crl_ta)) return 1; return 0; } /*- * Check for match between two dist point names: three separate cases. * 1. Both are relative names and compare X509_NAME types. * 2. One full, one relative. Compare X509_NAME to GENERAL_NAMES. * 3. Both are full names and compare two GENERAL_NAMES. * 4. One is NULL: automatic match. */ static int idp_check_dp(DIST_POINT_NAME *a, DIST_POINT_NAME *b) { X509_NAME *nm = NULL; GENERAL_NAMES *gens = NULL; GENERAL_NAME *gena, *genb; int i, j; if (!a || !b) return 1; if (a->type == 1) { if (!a->dpname) return 0; /* Case 1: two X509_NAME */ if (b->type == 1) { if (!b->dpname) return 0; if (!X509_NAME_cmp(a->dpname, b->dpname)) return 1; else return 0; } /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */ nm = a->dpname; gens = b->name.fullname; } else if (b->type == 1) { if (!b->dpname) return 0; /* Case 2: set name and GENERAL_NAMES appropriately */ gens = a->name.fullname; nm = b->dpname; } /* Handle case 2 with one GENERAL_NAMES and one X509_NAME */ if (nm) { for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(gens); i++) { gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(gens, i); if (gena->type != GEN_DIRNAME) continue; if (!X509_NAME_cmp(nm, gena->d.directoryName)) return 1; } return 0; } /* Else case 3: two GENERAL_NAMES */ for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(a->name.fullname); i++) { gena = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(a->name.fullname, i); for (j = 0; j < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(b->name.fullname); j++) { genb = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(b->name.fullname, j); if (!GENERAL_NAME_cmp(gena, genb)) return 1; } } return 0; } static int crldp_check_crlissuer(DIST_POINT *dp, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score) { int i; X509_NAME *nm = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl); /* If no CRLissuer return is successful iff don't need a match */ if (!dp->CRLissuer) return ! !(crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME); for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(dp->CRLissuer); i++) { GENERAL_NAME *gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(dp->CRLissuer, i); if (gen->type != GEN_DIRNAME) continue; if (!X509_NAME_cmp(gen->d.directoryName, nm)) return 1; } return 0; } /* Check CRLDP and IDP */ static int crl_crldp_check(X509 *x, X509_CRL *crl, int crl_score, unsigned int *preasons) { int i; if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYATTR) return 0; if (x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA) { if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYUSER) return 0; } else { if (crl->idp_flags & IDP_ONLYCA) return 0; } *preasons = crl->idp_reasons; for (i = 0; i < sk_DIST_POINT_num(x->crldp); i++) { DIST_POINT *dp = sk_DIST_POINT_value(x->crldp, i); if (crldp_check_crlissuer(dp, crl, crl_score)) { if (!crl->idp || idp_check_dp(dp->distpoint, crl->idp->distpoint)) { *preasons &= dp->dp_reasons; return 1; } } } if ((!crl->idp || !crl->idp->distpoint) && (crl_score & CRL_SCORE_ISSUER_NAME)) return 1; return 0; } /* * Retrieve CRL corresponding to current certificate. If deltas enabled try * to find a delta CRL too */ static int get_crl_delta(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL **pcrl, X509_CRL **pdcrl, X509 *x) { int ok; X509 *issuer = NULL; int crl_score = 0; unsigned int reasons; X509_CRL *crl = NULL, *dcrl = NULL; STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *skcrl; X509_NAME *nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x); reasons = ctx->current_reasons; ok = get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, ctx->crls); if (ok) goto done; /* Lookup CRLs from store */ skcrl = ctx->lookup_crls(ctx, nm); /* If no CRLs found and a near match from get_crl_sk use that */ if (!skcrl && crl) goto done; get_crl_sk(ctx, &crl, &dcrl, &issuer, &crl_score, &reasons, skcrl); sk_X509_CRL_pop_free(skcrl, X509_CRL_free); done: /* If we got any kind of CRL use it and return success */ if (crl) { ctx->current_issuer = issuer; ctx->current_crl_score = crl_score; ctx->current_reasons = reasons; *pcrl = crl; *pdcrl = dcrl; return 1; } return 0; } /* Check CRL validity */ static int check_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl) { X509 *issuer = NULL; EVP_PKEY *ikey = NULL; int cnum = ctx->error_depth; int chnum = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; /* if we have an alternative CRL issuer cert use that */ if (ctx->current_issuer) issuer = ctx->current_issuer; /* * Else find CRL issuer: if not last certificate then issuer is next * certificate in chain. */ else if (cnum < chnum) issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, cnum + 1); else { issuer = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, chnum); /* If not self signed, can't check signature */ if (!ctx->check_issued(ctx, issuer, issuer) && !verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER)) return 0; } if (issuer == NULL) return 1; /* * Skip most tests for deltas because they have already been done */ if (!crl->base_crl_number) { /* Check for cRLSign bit if keyUsage present */ if ((issuer->ex_flags & EXFLAG_KUSAGE) && !(issuer->ex_kusage & KU_CRL_SIGN) && !verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CRL_SIGN)) return 0; if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SCOPE) && !verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_DIFFERENT_CRL_SCOPE)) return 0; if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_SAME_PATH) && check_crl_path(ctx, ctx->current_issuer) <= 0 && !verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_CRL_PATH_VALIDATION_ERROR)) return 0; if ((crl->idp_flags & IDP_INVALID) && !verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION)) return 0; } if (!(ctx->current_crl_score & CRL_SCORE_TIME) && !check_crl_time(ctx, crl, 1)) return 0; /* Attempt to get issuer certificate public key */ ikey = X509_get0_pubkey(issuer); if (!ikey && !verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY)) return 0; if (ikey) { int rv = X509_CRL_check_suiteb(crl, ikey, ctx->param->flags); if (rv != X509_V_OK && !verify_cb_crl(ctx, rv)) return 0; /* Verify CRL signature */ if (X509_CRL_verify(crl, ikey) <= 0 && !verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE)) return 0; } return 1; } /* Check certificate against CRL */ static int cert_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_CRL *crl, X509 *x) { X509_REVOKED *rev; /* * The rules changed for this... previously if a CRL contained unhandled * critical extensions it could still be used to indicate a certificate * was revoked. This has since been changed since critical extensions can * change the meaning of CRL entries. */ if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_IGNORE_CRITICAL) && (crl->flags & EXFLAG_CRITICAL) && !verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_CRL_EXTENSION)) return 0; /* * Look for serial number of certificate in CRL. If found, make sure * reason is not removeFromCRL. */ if (X509_CRL_get0_by_cert(crl, &rev, x)) { if (rev->reason == CRL_REASON_REMOVE_FROM_CRL) return 2; if (!verify_cb_crl(ctx, X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED)) return 0; } return 1; } static int check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) { int ret; if (ctx->parent) return 1; /* * With DANE, the trust anchor might be a bare public key, not a * certificate! In that case our chain does not have the trust anchor * certificate as a top-most element. This comports well with RFC5280 * chain verification, since there too, the trust anchor is not part of the * chain to be verified. In particular, X509_policy_check() does not look * at the TA cert, but assumes that it is present as the top-most chain * element. We therefore temporarily push a NULL cert onto the chain if it * was verified via a bare public key, and pop it off right after the * X509_policy_check() call. */ if (ctx->bare_ta_signed && !sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, NULL)) { X509err(X509_F_CHECK_POLICY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM; return 0; } ret = X509_policy_check(&ctx->tree, &ctx->explicit_policy, ctx->chain, ctx->param->policies, ctx->param->flags); if (ctx->bare_ta_signed) sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain); if (ret == X509_PCY_TREE_INTERNAL) { X509err(X509_F_CHECK_POLICY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM; return 0; } /* Invalid or inconsistent extensions */ if (ret == X509_PCY_TREE_INVALID) { int i; /* Locate certificates with bad extensions and notify callback. */ for (i = 1; i < sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); i++) { X509 *x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i); if (!(x->ex_flags & EXFLAG_INVALID_POLICY)) continue; if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, i, X509_V_ERR_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION)) return 0; } return 1; } if (ret == X509_PCY_TREE_FAILURE) { ctx->current_cert = NULL; ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_NO_EXPLICIT_POLICY; return ctx->verify_cb(0, ctx); } if (ret != X509_PCY_TREE_VALID) { X509err(X509_F_CHECK_POLICY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NOTIFY_POLICY) { ctx->current_cert = NULL; /* * Verification errors need to be "sticky", a callback may have allowed * an SSL handshake to continue despite an error, and we must then * remain in an error state. Therefore, we MUST NOT clear earlier * verification errors by setting the error to X509_V_OK. */ if (!ctx->verify_cb(2, ctx)) return 0; } return 1; } /*- * Check certificate validity times. * If depth >= 0, invoke verification callbacks on error, otherwise just return * the validation status. * * Return 1 on success, 0 otherwise. */ int x509_check_cert_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int depth) { time_t *ptime; int i; if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_USE_CHECK_TIME) ptime = &ctx->param->check_time; else if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NO_CHECK_TIME) return 1; else ptime = NULL; i = X509_cmp_time(X509_get0_notBefore(x), ptime); if (i >= 0 && depth < 0) return 0; if (i == 0 && !verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, depth, X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD)) return 0; if (i > 0 && !verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, depth, X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID)) return 0; i = X509_cmp_time(X509_get0_notAfter(x), ptime); if (i <= 0 && depth < 0) return 0; if (i == 0 && !verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, depth, X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD)) return 0; if (i < 0 && !verify_cb_cert(ctx, x, depth, X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED)) return 0; return 1; } /* verify the issuer signatures and cert times of ctx->chain */ static int internal_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) { int n = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) - 1; X509 *xi = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n); X509 *xs; /* * With DANE-verified bare public key TA signatures, it remains only to * check the timestamps of the top certificate. We report the issuer as * NULL, since all we have is a bare key. */ if (ctx->bare_ta_signed) { xs = xi; xi = NULL; goto check_cert_time; } if (ctx->check_issued(ctx, xi, xi)) xs = xi; /* the typical case: last cert in the chain is self-issued */ else { if (ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN) { xs = xi; goto check_cert_time; } if (n <= 0) { if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx, xi, 0, X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE)) return 0; xs = xi; goto check_cert_time; } n--; ctx->error_depth = n; xs = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n); } /* * Do not clear ctx->error=0, it must be "sticky", only the user's callback * is allowed to reset errors (at its own peril). */ while (n >= 0) { /* * For each iteration of this loop: * n is the subject depth * xs is the subject cert, for which the signature is to be checked * xi is the supposed issuer cert containing the public key to use * Initially xs == xi if the last cert in the chain is self-issued. * * Skip signature check for self-signed certificates unless explicitly * asked for because it does not add any security and just wastes time. */ if (xs != xi || ((ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_CHECK_SS_SIGNATURE) && (xi->ex_flags & EXFLAG_SS) != 0)) { EVP_PKEY *pkey; /* * If the issuer's public key is not available or its key usage * does not support issuing the subject cert, report the issuer * cert and its depth (rather than n, the depth of the subject). */ int issuer_depth = n + (xs == xi ? 0 : 1); /* * According to https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5280#section-6.1.4 * step (n) we must check any given key usage extension in a CA cert * when preparing the verification of a certificate issued by it. * According to https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5280#section-4.2.1.3 * we must not verify a certifiate signature if the key usage of the * CA certificate that issued the certificate prohibits signing. * In case the 'issuing' certificate is the last in the chain and is * not a CA certificate but a 'self-issued' end-entity cert (i.e., * xs == xi && !(xi->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA)) RFC 5280 does not apply * (see https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6818#section-2) and thus * we are free to ignore any key usage restrictions on such certs. */ int ret = xs == xi && (xi->ex_flags & EXFLAG_CA) == 0 ? X509_V_OK : x509_signing_allowed(xi, xs); if (ret != X509_V_OK && !verify_cb_cert(ctx, xi, issuer_depth, ret)) return 0; if ((pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(xi)) == NULL) { ret = X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY; if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx, xi, issuer_depth, ret)) return 0; } else if (X509_verify(xs, pkey) <= 0) { ret = X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE; if (!verify_cb_cert(ctx, xs, n, ret)) return 0; } } check_cert_time: /* in addition to RFC 5280, do also for trusted (root) cert */ /* Calls verify callback as needed */ if (!x509_check_cert_time(ctx, xs, n)) return 0; /* * Signal success at this depth. However, the previous error (if any) * is retained. */ ctx->current_issuer = xi; ctx->current_cert = xs; ctx->error_depth = n; if (!ctx->verify_cb(1, ctx)) return 0; if (--n >= 0) { xi = xs; xs = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, n); } } return 1; } int X509_cmp_current_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm) { return X509_cmp_time(ctm, NULL); } int X509_cmp_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm, time_t *cmp_time) { static const size_t utctime_length = sizeof("YYMMDDHHMMSSZ") - 1; static const size_t generalizedtime_length = sizeof("YYYYMMDDHHMMSSZ") - 1; ASN1_TIME *asn1_cmp_time = NULL; int i, day, sec, ret = 0; #ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC const char upper_z = 0x5A; #else const char upper_z = 'Z'; #endif /* * Note that ASN.1 allows much more slack in the time format than RFC5280. * In RFC5280, the representation is fixed: * UTCTime: YYMMDDHHMMSSZ * GeneralizedTime: YYYYMMDDHHMMSSZ * * We do NOT currently enforce the following RFC 5280 requirement: * "CAs conforming to this profile MUST always encode certificate * validity dates through the year 2049 as UTCTime; certificate validity * dates in 2050 or later MUST be encoded as GeneralizedTime." */ switch (ctm->type) { case V_ASN1_UTCTIME: if (ctm->length != (int)(utctime_length)) return 0; break; case V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME: if (ctm->length != (int)(generalizedtime_length)) return 0; break; default: return 0; } /** * Verify the format: the ASN.1 functions we use below allow a more * flexible format than what's mandated by RFC 5280. * Digit and date ranges will be verified in the conversion methods. */ for (i = 0; i < ctm->length - 1; i++) { if (!ascii_isdigit(ctm->data[i])) return 0; } if (ctm->data[ctm->length - 1] != upper_z) return 0; /* * There is ASN1_UTCTIME_cmp_time_t but no * ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_cmp_time_t or ASN1_TIME_cmp_time_t, * so we go through ASN.1 */ asn1_cmp_time = X509_time_adj(NULL, 0, cmp_time); if (asn1_cmp_time == NULL) goto err; if (!ASN1_TIME_diff(&day, &sec, ctm, asn1_cmp_time)) goto err; /* * X509_cmp_time comparison is <=. * The return value 0 is reserved for errors. */ ret = (day >= 0 && sec >= 0) ? -1 : 1; err: ASN1_TIME_free(asn1_cmp_time); return ret; } ASN1_TIME *X509_gmtime_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long adj) { return X509_time_adj(s, adj, NULL); } ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long offset_sec, time_t *in_tm) { return X509_time_adj_ex(s, 0, offset_sec, in_tm); } ASN1_TIME *X509_time_adj_ex(ASN1_TIME *s, int offset_day, long offset_sec, time_t *in_tm) { time_t t; if (in_tm) t = *in_tm; else time(&t); if (s && !(s->flags & ASN1_STRING_FLAG_MSTRING)) { if (s->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME) return ASN1_UTCTIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec); if (s->type == V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME) return ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec); } return ASN1_TIME_adj(s, t, offset_day, offset_sec); } int X509_get_pubkey_parameters(EVP_PKEY *pkey, STACK_OF(X509) *chain) { EVP_PKEY *ktmp = NULL, *ktmp2; int i, j; if ((pkey != NULL) && !EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)) return 1; for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(chain); i++) { ktmp = X509_get0_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain, i)); if (ktmp == NULL) { X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS, X509_R_UNABLE_TO_GET_CERTS_PUBLIC_KEY); return 0; } if (!EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(ktmp)) break; } if (ktmp == NULL) { X509err(X509_F_X509_GET_PUBKEY_PARAMETERS, X509_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PARAMETERS_IN_CHAIN); return 0; } /* first, populate the other certs */ for (j = i - 1; j >= 0; j--) { ktmp2 = X509_get0_pubkey(sk_X509_value(chain, j)); EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ktmp2, ktmp); } if (pkey != NULL) EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(pkey, ktmp); return 1; } /* Make a delta CRL as the diff between two full CRLs */ X509_CRL *X509_CRL_diff(X509_CRL *base, X509_CRL *newer, EVP_PKEY *skey, const EVP_MD *md, unsigned int flags) { X509_CRL *crl = NULL; int i; STACK_OF(X509_REVOKED) *revs = NULL; /* CRLs can't be delta already */ if (base->base_crl_number || newer->base_crl_number) { X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_CRL_ALREADY_DELTA); return NULL; } /* Base and new CRL must have a CRL number */ if (!base->crl_number || !newer->crl_number) { X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_NO_CRL_NUMBER); return NULL; } /* Issuer names must match */ if (X509_NAME_cmp(X509_CRL_get_issuer(base), X509_CRL_get_issuer(newer))) { X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_ISSUER_MISMATCH); return NULL; } /* AKID and IDP must match */ if (!crl_extension_match(base, newer, NID_authority_key_identifier)) { X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_AKID_MISMATCH); return NULL; } if (!crl_extension_match(base, newer, NID_issuing_distribution_point)) { X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_IDP_MISMATCH); return NULL; } /* Newer CRL number must exceed full CRL number */ if (ASN1_INTEGER_cmp(newer->crl_number, base->crl_number) <= 0) { X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_NEWER_CRL_NOT_NEWER); return NULL; } /* CRLs must verify */ if (skey && (X509_CRL_verify(base, skey) <= 0 || X509_CRL_verify(newer, skey) <= 0)) { X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, X509_R_CRL_VERIFY_FAILURE); return NULL; } /* Create new CRL */ crl = X509_CRL_new(); if (crl == NULL || !X509_CRL_set_version(crl, 1)) goto memerr; /* Set issuer name */ if (!X509_CRL_set_issuer_name(crl, X509_CRL_get_issuer(newer))) goto memerr; if (!X509_CRL_set1_lastUpdate(crl, X509_CRL_get0_lastUpdate(newer))) goto memerr; if (!X509_CRL_set1_nextUpdate(crl, X509_CRL_get0_nextUpdate(newer))) goto memerr; /* Set base CRL number: must be critical */ if (!X509_CRL_add1_ext_i2d(crl, NID_delta_crl, base->crl_number, 1, 0)) goto memerr; /* * Copy extensions across from newest CRL to delta: this will set CRL * number to correct value too. */ for (i = 0; i < X509_CRL_get_ext_count(newer); i++) { X509_EXTENSION *ext; ext = X509_CRL_get_ext(newer, i); if (!X509_CRL_add_ext(crl, ext, -1)) goto memerr; } /* Go through revoked entries, copying as needed */ revs = X509_CRL_get_REVOKED(newer); for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_REVOKED_num(revs); i++) { X509_REVOKED *rvn, *rvtmp; rvn = sk_X509_REVOKED_value(revs, i); /* * Add only if not also in base. TODO: need something cleverer here * for some more complex CRLs covering multiple CAs. */ if (!X509_CRL_get0_by_serial(base, &rvtmp, &rvn->serialNumber)) { rvtmp = X509_REVOKED_dup(rvn); if (!rvtmp) goto memerr; if (!X509_CRL_add0_revoked(crl, rvtmp)) { X509_REVOKED_free(rvtmp); goto memerr; } } } /* TODO: optionally prune deleted entries */ if (skey && md && !X509_CRL_sign(crl, skey, md)) goto memerr; return crl; memerr: X509err(X509_F_X509_CRL_DIFF, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); X509_CRL_free(crl); return NULL; } int X509_STORE_CTX_set_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx, void *data) { return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data, idx, data); } void *X509_STORE_CTX_get_ex_data(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int idx) { return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&ctx->ex_data, idx); } int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->error; } void X509_STORE_CTX_set_error(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int err) { ctx->error = err; } int X509_STORE_CTX_get_error_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->error_depth; } void X509_STORE_CTX_set_error_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth) { ctx->error_depth = depth; } X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get_current_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->current_cert; } void X509_STORE_CTX_set_current_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) { ctx->current_cert = x; } STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->chain; } STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) { if (!ctx->chain) return NULL; return X509_chain_up_ref(ctx->chain); } X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->current_issuer; } X509_CRL *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_current_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->current_crl; } X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_parent_ctx(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->parent; } void X509_STORE_CTX_set_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *x) { ctx->cert = x; } void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509_CRL) *sk) { ctx->crls = sk; } int X509_STORE_CTX_set_purpose(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int purpose) { /* * XXX: Why isn't this function always used to set the associated trust? * Should there even be a VPM->trust field at all? Or should the trust * always be inferred from the purpose by X509_STORE_CTX_init(). */ return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, purpose, 0); } int X509_STORE_CTX_set_trust(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int trust) { /* * XXX: See above, this function would only be needed when the default * trust for the purpose needs an override in a corner case. */ return X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(ctx, 0, 0, trust); } /* * This function is used to set the X509_STORE_CTX purpose and trust values. * This is intended to be used when another structure has its own trust and * purpose values which (if set) will be inherited by the ctx. If they aren't * set then we will usually have a default purpose in mind which should then * be used to set the trust value. An example of this is SSL use: an SSL * structure will have its own purpose and trust settings which the * application can set: if they aren't set then we use the default of SSL * client/server. */ int X509_STORE_CTX_purpose_inherit(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int def_purpose, int purpose, int trust) { int idx; /* If purpose not set use default */ if (!purpose) purpose = def_purpose; /* If we have a purpose then check it is valid */ if (purpose) { X509_PURPOSE *ptmp; idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(purpose); if (idx == -1) { X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT, X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID); return 0; } ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx); if (ptmp->trust == X509_TRUST_DEFAULT) { idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(def_purpose); /* * XXX: In the two callers above def_purpose is always 0, which is * not a known value, so idx will always be -1. How is the * X509_TRUST_DEFAULT case actually supposed to be handled? */ if (idx == -1) { X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT, X509_R_UNKNOWN_PURPOSE_ID); return 0; } ptmp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx); } /* If trust not set then get from purpose default */ if (!trust) trust = ptmp->trust; } if (trust) { idx = X509_TRUST_get_by_id(trust); if (idx == -1) { X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_PURPOSE_INHERIT, X509_R_UNKNOWN_TRUST_ID); return 0; } } if (purpose && !ctx->param->purpose) ctx->param->purpose = purpose; if (trust && !ctx->param->trust) ctx->param->trust = trust; return 1; } X509_STORE_CTX *X509_STORE_CTX_new(void) { X509_STORE_CTX *ctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ctx)); if (ctx == NULL) { X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return NULL; } return ctx; } void X509_STORE_CTX_free(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) { if (ctx == NULL) return; X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx); OPENSSL_free(ctx); } int X509_STORE_CTX_init(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store, X509 *x509, STACK_OF(X509) *chain) { int ret = 1; ctx->ctx = store; ctx->cert = x509; ctx->untrusted = chain; ctx->crls = NULL; ctx->num_untrusted = 0; ctx->other_ctx = NULL; ctx->valid = 0; ctx->chain = NULL; ctx->error = 0; ctx->explicit_policy = 0; ctx->error_depth = 0; ctx->current_cert = NULL; ctx->current_issuer = NULL; ctx->current_crl = NULL; ctx->current_crl_score = 0; ctx->current_reasons = 0; ctx->tree = NULL; ctx->parent = NULL; ctx->dane = NULL; ctx->bare_ta_signed = 0; /* Zero ex_data to make sure we're cleanup-safe */ memset(&ctx->ex_data, 0, sizeof(ctx->ex_data)); /* store->cleanup is always 0 in OpenSSL, if set must be idempotent */ if (store) ctx->cleanup = store->cleanup; else ctx->cleanup = 0; if (store && store->check_issued) ctx->check_issued = store->check_issued; else ctx->check_issued = check_issued; if (store && store->get_issuer) ctx->get_issuer = store->get_issuer; else ctx->get_issuer = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_issuer; if (store && store->verify_cb) ctx->verify_cb = store->verify_cb; else ctx->verify_cb = null_callback; if (store && store->verify) ctx->verify = store->verify; else ctx->verify = internal_verify; if (store && store->check_revocation) ctx->check_revocation = store->check_revocation; else ctx->check_revocation = check_revocation; if (store && store->get_crl) ctx->get_crl = store->get_crl; else ctx->get_crl = NULL; if (store && store->check_crl) ctx->check_crl = store->check_crl; else ctx->check_crl = check_crl; if (store && store->cert_crl) ctx->cert_crl = store->cert_crl; else ctx->cert_crl = cert_crl; if (store && store->check_policy) ctx->check_policy = store->check_policy; else ctx->check_policy = check_policy; if (store && store->lookup_certs) ctx->lookup_certs = store->lookup_certs; else ctx->lookup_certs = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_certs; if (store && store->lookup_crls) ctx->lookup_crls = store->lookup_crls; else ctx->lookup_crls = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_crls; ctx->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new(); if (ctx->param == NULL) { X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } /* * Inherit callbacks and flags from X509_STORE if not set use defaults. */ if (store) ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, store->param); else ctx->param->inh_flags |= X509_VP_FLAG_DEFAULT | X509_VP_FLAG_ONCE; if (ret) ret = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup("default")); if (ret == 0) { X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } /* * XXX: For now, continue to inherit trust from VPM, but infer from the * purpose if this still yields the default value. */ if (ctx->param->trust == X509_TRUST_DEFAULT) { int idx = X509_PURPOSE_get_by_id(ctx->param->purpose); X509_PURPOSE *xp = X509_PURPOSE_get0(idx); if (xp != NULL) ctx->param->trust = X509_PURPOSE_get_trust(xp); } if (CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx, &ctx->ex_data)) return 1; X509err(X509_F_X509_STORE_CTX_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); err: /* * On error clean up allocated storage, if the store context was not * allocated with X509_STORE_CTX_new() this is our last chance to do so. */ X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(ctx); return 0; } /* * Set alternative lookup method: just a STACK of trusted certificates. This * avoids X509_STORE nastiness where it isn't needed. */ void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_trusted_stack(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk) { ctx->other_ctx = sk; ctx->get_issuer = get_issuer_sk; ctx->lookup_certs = lookup_certs_sk; } void X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) { /* * We need to be idempotent because, unfortunately, free() also calls * cleanup(), so the natural call sequence new(), init(), cleanup(), free() * calls cleanup() for the same object twice! Thus we must zero the * pointers below after they're freed! */ /* Seems to always be 0 in OpenSSL, do this at most once. */ if (ctx->cleanup != NULL) { ctx->cleanup(ctx); ctx->cleanup = NULL; } if (ctx->param != NULL) { if (ctx->parent == NULL) X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param); ctx->param = NULL; } X509_policy_tree_free(ctx->tree); ctx->tree = NULL; sk_X509_pop_free(ctx->chain, X509_free); ctx->chain = NULL; CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_X509_STORE_CTX, ctx, &(ctx->ex_data)); memset(&ctx->ex_data, 0, sizeof(ctx->ex_data)); } void X509_STORE_CTX_set_depth(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth) { X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(ctx->param, depth); } void X509_STORE_CTX_set_flags(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags) { X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_flags(ctx->param, flags); } void X509_STORE_CTX_set_time(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags, time_t t) { X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_time(ctx->param, t); } X509 *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->cert; } STACK_OF(X509) *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_untrusted(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->untrusted; } void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_untrusted(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk) { ctx->untrusted = sk; } void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_verified_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *sk) { sk_X509_pop_free(ctx->chain, X509_free); ctx->chain = sk; } void X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify_cb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE_CTX_verify_cb verify_cb) { ctx->verify_cb = verify_cb; } X509_STORE_CTX_verify_cb X509_STORE_CTX_get_verify_cb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->verify_cb; } void X509_STORE_CTX_set_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE_CTX_verify_fn verify) { ctx->verify = verify; } X509_STORE_CTX_verify_fn X509_STORE_CTX_get_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->verify; } X509_STORE_CTX_get_issuer_fn X509_STORE_CTX_get_get_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->get_issuer; } X509_STORE_CTX_check_issued_fn X509_STORE_CTX_get_check_issued(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->check_issued; } X509_STORE_CTX_check_revocation_fn X509_STORE_CTX_get_check_revocation(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->check_revocation; } X509_STORE_CTX_get_crl_fn X509_STORE_CTX_get_get_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->get_crl; } X509_STORE_CTX_check_crl_fn X509_STORE_CTX_get_check_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->check_crl; } X509_STORE_CTX_cert_crl_fn X509_STORE_CTX_get_cert_crl(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->cert_crl; } X509_STORE_CTX_check_policy_fn X509_STORE_CTX_get_check_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->check_policy; } X509_STORE_CTX_lookup_certs_fn X509_STORE_CTX_get_lookup_certs(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->lookup_certs; } X509_STORE_CTX_lookup_crls_fn X509_STORE_CTX_get_lookup_crls(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->lookup_crls; } X509_STORE_CTX_cleanup_fn X509_STORE_CTX_get_cleanup(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->cleanup; } X509_POLICY_TREE *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_policy_tree(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->tree; } int X509_STORE_CTX_get_explicit_policy(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->explicit_policy; } int X509_STORE_CTX_get_num_untrusted(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->num_untrusted; } int X509_STORE_CTX_set_default(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, const char *name) { const X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param; param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_lookup(name); if (!param) return 0; return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ctx->param, param); } X509_VERIFY_PARAM *X509_STORE_CTX_get0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->param; } void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_param(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param) { X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(ctx->param); ctx->param = param; } void X509_STORE_CTX_set0_dane(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, SSL_DANE *dane) { ctx->dane = dane; } static unsigned char *dane_i2d( X509 *cert, uint8_t selector, unsigned int *i2dlen) { unsigned char *buf = NULL; int len; /* * Extract ASN.1 DER form of certificate or public key. */ switch (selector) { case DANETLS_SELECTOR_CERT: len = i2d_X509(cert, &buf); break; case DANETLS_SELECTOR_SPKI: len = i2d_X509_PUBKEY(X509_get_X509_PUBKEY(cert), &buf); break; default: X509err(X509_F_DANE_I2D, X509_R_BAD_SELECTOR); return NULL; } if (len < 0 || buf == NULL) { X509err(X509_F_DANE_I2D, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return NULL; } *i2dlen = (unsigned int)len; return buf; } #define DANETLS_NONE 256 /* impossible uint8_t */ static int dane_match(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert, int depth) { SSL_DANE *dane = ctx->dane; unsigned usage = DANETLS_NONE; unsigned selector = DANETLS_NONE; unsigned ordinal = DANETLS_NONE; unsigned mtype = DANETLS_NONE; unsigned char *i2dbuf = NULL; unsigned int i2dlen = 0; unsigned char mdbuf[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; unsigned char *cmpbuf = NULL; unsigned int cmplen = 0; int i; int recnum; int matched = 0; danetls_record *t = NULL; uint32_t mask; mask = (depth == 0) ? DANETLS_EE_MASK : DANETLS_TA_MASK; /* * The trust store is not applicable with DANE-TA(2) */ if (depth >= ctx->num_untrusted) mask &= DANETLS_PKIX_MASK; /* * If we've previously matched a PKIX-?? record, no need to test any * further PKIX-?? records, it remains to just build the PKIX chain. * Had the match been a DANE-?? record, we'd be done already. */ if (dane->mdpth >= 0) mask &= ~DANETLS_PKIX_MASK; /*- * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7671#section-5.1 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7671#section-5.2 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7671#section-5.3 * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7671#section-5.4 * * We handle DANE-EE(3) records first as they require no chain building * and no expiration or hostname checks. We also process digests with * higher ordinals first and ignore lower priorities except Full(0) which * is always processed (last). If none match, we then process PKIX-EE(1). * * NOTE: This relies on DANE usages sorting before the corresponding PKIX * usages in SSL_dane_tlsa_add(), and also on descending sorting of digest * priorities. See twin comment in ssl/ssl_lib.c. * * We expect that most TLSA RRsets will have just a single usage, so we * don't go out of our way to cache multiple selector-specific i2d buffers * across usages, but if the selector happens to remain the same as switch * usages, that's OK. Thus, a set of "3 1 1", "3 0 1", "1 1 1", "1 0 1", * records would result in us generating each of the certificate and public * key DER forms twice, but more typically we'd just see multiple "3 1 1" * or multiple "3 0 1" records. * * As soon as we find a match at any given depth, we stop, because either * we've matched a DANE-?? record and the peer is authenticated, or, after * exhausting all DANE-?? records, we've matched a PKIX-?? record, which is * sufficient for DANE, and what remains to do is ordinary PKIX validation. */ recnum = (dane->umask & mask) ? sk_danetls_record_num(dane->trecs) : 0; for (i = 0; matched == 0 && i < recnum; ++i) { t = sk_danetls_record_value(dane->trecs, i); if ((DANETLS_USAGE_BIT(t->usage) & mask) == 0) continue; if (t->usage != usage) { usage = t->usage; /* Reset digest agility for each usage/selector pair */ mtype = DANETLS_NONE; ordinal = dane->dctx->mdord[t->mtype]; } if (t->selector != selector) { selector = t->selector; /* Update per-selector state */ OPENSSL_free(i2dbuf); i2dbuf = dane_i2d(cert, selector, &i2dlen); if (i2dbuf == NULL) return -1; /* Reset digest agility for each usage/selector pair */ mtype = DANETLS_NONE; ordinal = dane->dctx->mdord[t->mtype]; } else if (t->mtype != DANETLS_MATCHING_FULL) { /*- * Digest agility: * * * * For a fixed selector, after processing all records with the * highest mtype ordinal, ignore all mtypes with lower ordinals * other than "Full". */ if (dane->dctx->mdord[t->mtype] < ordinal) continue; } /* * Each time we hit a (new selector or) mtype, re-compute the relevant * digest, more complex caching is not worth the code space. */ if (t->mtype != mtype) { const EVP_MD *md = dane->dctx->mdevp[mtype = t->mtype]; cmpbuf = i2dbuf; cmplen = i2dlen; if (md != NULL) { cmpbuf = mdbuf; if (!EVP_Digest(i2dbuf, i2dlen, cmpbuf, &cmplen, md, 0)) { matched = -1; break; } } } /* * Squirrel away the certificate and depth if we have a match. Any * DANE match is dispositive, but with PKIX we still need to build a * full chain. */ if (cmplen == t->dlen && memcmp(cmpbuf, t->data, cmplen) == 0) { if (DANETLS_USAGE_BIT(usage) & DANETLS_DANE_MASK) matched = 1; if (matched || dane->mdpth < 0) { dane->mdpth = depth; dane->mtlsa = t; OPENSSL_free(dane->mcert); dane->mcert = cert; X509_up_ref(cert); } break; } } /* Clear the one-element DER cache */ OPENSSL_free(i2dbuf); return matched; } static int check_dane_issuer(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, int depth) { SSL_DANE *dane = ctx->dane; int matched = 0; X509 *cert; if (!DANETLS_HAS_TA(dane) || depth == 0) return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED; /* * Record any DANE trust-anchor matches, for the first depth to test, if * there's one at that depth. (This'll be false for length 1 chains looking * for an exact match for the leaf certificate). */ cert = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, depth); if (cert != NULL && (matched = dane_match(ctx, cert, depth)) < 0) return X509_TRUST_REJECTED; if (matched > 0) { ctx->num_untrusted = depth - 1; return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED; } return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED; } static int check_dane_pkeys(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) { SSL_DANE *dane = ctx->dane; danetls_record *t; int num = ctx->num_untrusted; X509 *cert = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, num - 1); int recnum = sk_danetls_record_num(dane->trecs); int i; for (i = 0; i < recnum; ++i) { t = sk_danetls_record_value(dane->trecs, i); if (t->usage != DANETLS_USAGE_DANE_TA || t->selector != DANETLS_SELECTOR_SPKI || t->mtype != DANETLS_MATCHING_FULL || X509_verify(cert, t->spki) <= 0) continue; /* Clear any PKIX-?? matches that failed to extend to a full chain */ X509_free(dane->mcert); dane->mcert = NULL; /* Record match via a bare TA public key */ ctx->bare_ta_signed = 1; dane->mdpth = num - 1; dane->mtlsa = t; /* Prune any excess chain certificates */ num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); for (; num > ctx->num_untrusted; --num) X509_free(sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain)); return X509_TRUST_TRUSTED; } return X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED; } static void dane_reset(SSL_DANE *dane) { /* * Reset state to verify another chain, or clear after failure. */ X509_free(dane->mcert); dane->mcert = NULL; dane->mtlsa = NULL; dane->mdpth = -1; dane->pdpth = -1; } static int check_leaf_suiteb(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert) { int err = X509_chain_check_suiteb(NULL, cert, NULL, ctx->param->flags); if (err == X509_V_OK) return 1; return verify_cb_cert(ctx, cert, 0, err); } static int dane_verify(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) { X509 *cert = ctx->cert; SSL_DANE *dane = ctx->dane; int matched; int done; dane_reset(dane); /*- * When testing the leaf certificate, if we match a DANE-EE(3) record, * dane_match() returns 1 and we're done. If however we match a PKIX-EE(1) * record, the match depth and matching TLSA record are recorded, but the * return value is 0, because we still need to find a PKIX trust-anchor. * Therefore, when DANE authentication is enabled (required), we're done * if: * + matched < 0, internal error. * + matched == 1, we matched a DANE-EE(3) record * + matched == 0, mdepth < 0 (no PKIX-EE match) and there are no * DANE-TA(2) or PKIX-TA(0) to test. */ matched = dane_match(ctx, ctx->cert, 0); done = matched != 0 || (!DANETLS_HAS_TA(dane) && dane->mdpth < 0); if (done) X509_get_pubkey_parameters(NULL, ctx->chain); if (matched > 0) { /* Callback invoked as needed */ if (!check_leaf_suiteb(ctx, cert)) return 0; /* Callback invoked as needed */ if ((dane->flags & DANE_FLAG_NO_DANE_EE_NAMECHECKS) == 0 && !check_id(ctx)) return 0; /* Bypass internal_verify(), issue depth 0 success callback */ ctx->error_depth = 0; ctx->current_cert = cert; return ctx->verify_cb(1, ctx); } if (matched < 0) { ctx->error_depth = 0; ctx->current_cert = cert; ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM; return -1; } if (done) { /* Fail early, TA-based success is not possible */ if (!check_leaf_suiteb(ctx, cert)) return 0; return verify_cb_cert(ctx, cert, 0, X509_V_ERR_DANE_NO_MATCH); } /* * Chain verification for usages 0/1/2. TLSA record matching of depth > 0 * certificates happens in-line with building the rest of the chain. */ return verify_chain(ctx); } /* Get issuer, without duplicate suppression */ static int get_issuer(X509 **issuer, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert) { STACK_OF(X509) *saved_chain = ctx->chain; int ok; ctx->chain = NULL; ok = ctx->get_issuer(issuer, ctx, cert); ctx->chain = saved_chain; return ok; } +static int augment_stack(STACK_OF(X509) *src, STACK_OF(X509) **dstPtr) +{ + if (src) { + STACK_OF(X509) *dst; + int i; + + if (*dstPtr == NULL) + return ((*dstPtr = sk_X509_dup(src)) != NULL); + + for (dst = *dstPtr, i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(src); ++i) { + if (!sk_X509_push(dst, sk_X509_value(src, i))) { + sk_X509_free(dst); + *dstPtr = NULL; + return 0; + } + } + } + return 1; +} + static int build_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx) { SSL_DANE *dane = ctx->dane; int num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); X509 *cert = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, num - 1); int ss = cert_self_signed(cert); STACK_OF(X509) *sktmp = NULL; unsigned int search; int may_trusted = 0; int may_alternate = 0; int trust = X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED; int alt_untrusted = 0; int depth; int ok = 0; int i; /* Our chain starts with a single untrusted element. */ if (!ossl_assert(num == 1 && ctx->num_untrusted == num)) { X509err(X509_F_BUILD_CHAIN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED; return 0; } #define S_DOUNTRUSTED (1 << 0) /* Search untrusted chain */ #define S_DOTRUSTED (1 << 1) /* Search trusted store */ #define S_DOALTERNATE (1 << 2) /* Retry with pruned alternate chain */ /* * Set up search policy, untrusted if possible, trusted-first if enabled. * If we're doing DANE and not doing PKIX-TA/PKIX-EE, we never look in the * trust_store, otherwise we might look there first. If not trusted-first, * and alternate chains are not disabled, try building an alternate chain * if no luck with untrusted first. */ search = (ctx->untrusted != NULL) ? S_DOUNTRUSTED : 0; if (DANETLS_HAS_PKIX(dane) || !DANETLS_HAS_DANE(dane)) { if (search == 0 || ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_TRUSTED_FIRST) search |= S_DOTRUSTED; else if (!(ctx->param->flags & X509_V_FLAG_NO_ALT_CHAINS)) may_alternate = 1; may_trusted = 1; } /* - * Shallow-copy the stack of untrusted certificates (with TLS, this is - * typically the content of the peer's certificate message) so can make - * multiple passes over it, while free to remove elements as we go. - */ - if (ctx->untrusted && (sktmp = sk_X509_dup(ctx->untrusted)) == NULL) { - X509err(X509_F_BUILD_CHAIN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM; - return 0; - } - - /* - * If we got any "DANE-TA(2) Cert(0) Full(0)" trust-anchors from DNS, add + * If we got any "Cert(0) Full(0)" issuer certificates from DNS, *prepend* * them to our working copy of the untrusted certificate stack. Since the * caller of X509_STORE_CTX_init() may have provided only a leaf cert with * no corresponding stack of untrusted certificates, we may need to create * an empty stack first. [ At present only the ssl library provides DANE * support, and ssl_verify_cert_chain() always provides a non-null stack * containing at least the leaf certificate, but we must be prepared for * this to change. ] */ - if (DANETLS_ENABLED(dane) && dane->certs != NULL) { - if (sktmp == NULL && (sktmp = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) { - X509err(X509_F_BUILD_CHAIN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM; - return 0; - } - for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(dane->certs); ++i) { - if (!sk_X509_push(sktmp, sk_X509_value(dane->certs, i))) { - sk_X509_free(sktmp); - X509err(X509_F_BUILD_CHAIN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); - ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM; - return 0; - } - } + if (DANETLS_ENABLED(dane) && !augment_stack(dane->certs, &sktmp)) { + X509err(X509_F_BUILD_CHAIN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM; + return 0; + } + + /* + * Shallow-copy the stack of untrusted certificates (with TLS, this is + * typically the content of the peer's certificate message) so can make + * multiple passes over it, while free to remove elements as we go. + */ + if (!augment_stack(ctx->untrusted, &sktmp)) { + X509err(X509_F_BUILD_CHAIN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM; + return 0; } /* * Still absurdly large, but arithmetically safe, a lower hard upper bound * might be reasonable. */ if (ctx->param->depth > INT_MAX/2) ctx->param->depth = INT_MAX/2; /* * Try to Extend the chain until we reach an ultimately trusted issuer. * Build chains up to one longer the limit, later fail if we hit the limit, * with an X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG error code. */ depth = ctx->param->depth + 1; while (search != 0) { X509 *x; X509 *xtmp = NULL; /* * Look in the trust store if enabled for first lookup, or we've run * out of untrusted issuers and search here is not disabled. When we * reach the depth limit, we stop extending the chain, if by that point * we've not found a trust-anchor, any trusted chain would be too long. * * The error reported to the application verify callback is at the * maximal valid depth with the current certificate equal to the last * not ultimately-trusted issuer. For example, with verify_depth = 0, * the callback will report errors at depth=1 when the immediate issuer * of the leaf certificate is not a trust anchor. No attempt will be * made to locate an issuer for that certificate, since such a chain * would be a-priori too long. */ if ((search & S_DOTRUSTED) != 0) { i = num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); if ((search & S_DOALTERNATE) != 0) { /* * As high up the chain as we can, look for an alternative * trusted issuer of an untrusted certificate that currently * has an untrusted issuer. We use the alt_untrusted variable * to track how far up the chain we find the first match. It * is only if and when we find a match, that we prune the chain * and reset ctx->num_untrusted to the reduced count of * untrusted certificates. While we're searching for such a * match (which may never be found), it is neither safe nor * wise to preemptively modify either the chain or * ctx->num_untrusted. * * Note, like ctx->num_untrusted, alt_untrusted is a count of * untrusted certificates, not a "depth". */ i = alt_untrusted; } x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, i-1); ok = (depth < num) ? 0 : get_issuer(&xtmp, ctx, x); if (ok < 0) { trust = X509_TRUST_REJECTED; ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP; search = 0; continue; } if (ok > 0) { /* * Alternative trusted issuer for a mid-chain untrusted cert? * Pop the untrusted cert's successors and retry. We might now * be able to complete a valid chain via the trust store. Note * that despite the current trust-store match we might still * fail complete the chain to a suitable trust-anchor, in which * case we may prune some more untrusted certificates and try * again. Thus the S_DOALTERNATE bit may yet be turned on * again with an even shorter untrusted chain! * * If in the process we threw away our matching PKIX-TA trust * anchor, reset DANE trust. We might find a suitable trusted * certificate among the ones from the trust store. */ if ((search & S_DOALTERNATE) != 0) { if (!ossl_assert(num > i && i > 0 && ss == 0)) { X509err(X509_F_BUILD_CHAIN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); X509_free(xtmp); trust = X509_TRUST_REJECTED; ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED; search = 0; continue; } search &= ~S_DOALTERNATE; for (; num > i; --num) X509_free(sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain)); ctx->num_untrusted = num; if (DANETLS_ENABLED(dane) && dane->mdpth >= ctx->num_untrusted) { dane->mdpth = -1; X509_free(dane->mcert); dane->mcert = NULL; } if (DANETLS_ENABLED(dane) && dane->pdpth >= ctx->num_untrusted) dane->pdpth = -1; } /* * Self-signed untrusted certificates get replaced by their * trusted matching issuer. Otherwise, grow the chain. */ if (ss == 0) { if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, x = xtmp)) { X509_free(xtmp); X509err(X509_F_BUILD_CHAIN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); trust = X509_TRUST_REJECTED; ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM; search = 0; continue; } ss = cert_self_signed(x); } else if (num == ctx->num_untrusted) { /* * We have a self-signed certificate that has the same * subject name (and perhaps keyid and/or serial number) as * a trust-anchor. We must have an exact match to avoid * possible impersonation via key substitution etc. */ if (X509_cmp(x, xtmp) != 0) { /* Self-signed untrusted mimic. */ X509_free(xtmp); ok = 0; } else { X509_free(x); ctx->num_untrusted = --num; (void) sk_X509_set(ctx->chain, num, x = xtmp); } } /* * We've added a new trusted certificate to the chain, recheck * trust. If not done, and not self-signed look deeper. * Whether or not we're doing "trusted first", we no longer * look for untrusted certificates from the peer's chain. * * At this point ctx->num_trusted and num must reflect the * correct number of untrusted certificates, since the DANE * logic in check_trust() depends on distinguishing CAs from * "the wire" from CAs from the trust store. In particular, the * certificate at depth "num" should be the new trusted * certificate with ctx->num_untrusted <= num. */ if (ok) { if (!ossl_assert(ctx->num_untrusted <= num)) { X509err(X509_F_BUILD_CHAIN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); trust = X509_TRUST_REJECTED; ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED; search = 0; continue; } search &= ~S_DOUNTRUSTED; switch (trust = check_trust(ctx, num)) { case X509_TRUST_TRUSTED: case X509_TRUST_REJECTED: search = 0; continue; } if (ss == 0) continue; } } /* * No dispositive decision, and either self-signed or no match, if * we were doing untrusted-first, and alt-chains are not disabled, * do that, by repeatedly losing one untrusted element at a time, * and trying to extend the shorted chain. */ if ((search & S_DOUNTRUSTED) == 0) { /* Continue search for a trusted issuer of a shorter chain? */ if ((search & S_DOALTERNATE) != 0 && --alt_untrusted > 0) continue; /* Still no luck and no fallbacks left? */ if (!may_alternate || (search & S_DOALTERNATE) != 0 || ctx->num_untrusted < 2) break; /* Search for a trusted issuer of a shorter chain */ search |= S_DOALTERNATE; alt_untrusted = ctx->num_untrusted - 1; ss = 0; } } /* * Extend chain with peer-provided certificates */ if ((search & S_DOUNTRUSTED) != 0) { num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); if (!ossl_assert(num == ctx->num_untrusted)) { X509err(X509_F_BUILD_CHAIN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); trust = X509_TRUST_REJECTED; ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED; search = 0; continue; } x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, num-1); /* * Once we run out of untrusted issuers, we stop looking for more * and start looking only in the trust store if enabled. */ xtmp = (ss || depth < num) ? NULL : find_issuer(ctx, sktmp, x); if (xtmp == NULL) { search &= ~S_DOUNTRUSTED; if (may_trusted) search |= S_DOTRUSTED; continue; } /* Drop this issuer from future consideration */ (void) sk_X509_delete_ptr(sktmp, xtmp); if (!X509_up_ref(xtmp)) { X509err(X509_F_BUILD_CHAIN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); trust = X509_TRUST_REJECTED; ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED; search = 0; continue; } if (!sk_X509_push(ctx->chain, xtmp)) { X509_free(xtmp); X509err(X509_F_BUILD_CHAIN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); trust = X509_TRUST_REJECTED; ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM; search = 0; continue; } x = xtmp; ++ctx->num_untrusted; ss = cert_self_signed(xtmp); /* * Check for DANE-TA trust of the topmost untrusted certificate. */ switch (trust = check_dane_issuer(ctx, ctx->num_untrusted - 1)) { case X509_TRUST_TRUSTED: case X509_TRUST_REJECTED: search = 0; continue; } } } sk_X509_free(sktmp); /* * Last chance to make a trusted chain, either bare DANE-TA public-key * signers, or else direct leaf PKIX trust. */ num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); if (num <= depth) { if (trust == X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED && DANETLS_HAS_DANE_TA(dane)) trust = check_dane_pkeys(ctx); if (trust == X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED && num == ctx->num_untrusted) trust = check_trust(ctx, num); } switch (trust) { case X509_TRUST_TRUSTED: return 1; case X509_TRUST_REJECTED: /* Callback already issued */ return 0; case X509_TRUST_UNTRUSTED: default: num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain); if (num > depth) return verify_cb_cert(ctx, NULL, num-1, X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG); if (DANETLS_ENABLED(dane) && (!DANETLS_HAS_PKIX(dane) || dane->pdpth >= 0)) return verify_cb_cert(ctx, NULL, num-1, X509_V_ERR_DANE_NO_MATCH); if (ss && sk_X509_num(ctx->chain) == 1) return verify_cb_cert(ctx, NULL, num-1, X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT); if (ss) return verify_cb_cert(ctx, NULL, num-1, X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN); if (ctx->num_untrusted < num) return verify_cb_cert(ctx, NULL, num-1, X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT); return verify_cb_cert(ctx, NULL, num-1, X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY); } } static const int minbits_table[] = { 80, 112, 128, 192, 256 }; static const int NUM_AUTH_LEVELS = OSSL_NELEM(minbits_table); /* * Check whether the public key of ``cert`` meets the security level of * ``ctx``. * * Returns 1 on success, 0 otherwise. */ static int check_key_level(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert) { EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(cert); int level = ctx->param->auth_level; /* * At security level zero, return without checking for a supported public * key type. Some engines support key types not understood outside the * engine, and we only need to understand the key when enforcing a security * floor. */ if (level <= 0) return 1; /* Unsupported or malformed keys are not secure */ if (pkey == NULL) return 0; if (level > NUM_AUTH_LEVELS) level = NUM_AUTH_LEVELS; return EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkey) >= minbits_table[level - 1]; } /* * Check whether the public key of ``cert`` does not use explicit params * for an elliptic curve. * * Returns 1 on success, 0 if check fails, -1 for other errors. */ static int check_curve(X509 *cert) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC EVP_PKEY *pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(cert); /* Unsupported or malformed key */ if (pkey == NULL) return -1; if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == EVP_PKEY_EC) { int ret; ret = EC_KEY_decoded_from_explicit_params(EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey)); return ret < 0 ? ret : !ret; } #endif return 1; } /* * Check whether the signature digest algorithm of ``cert`` meets the security * level of ``ctx``. Should not be checked for trust anchors (whether * self-signed or otherwise). * * Returns 1 on success, 0 otherwise. */ static int check_sig_level(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert) { int secbits = -1; int level = ctx->param->auth_level; if (level <= 0) return 1; if (level > NUM_AUTH_LEVELS) level = NUM_AUTH_LEVELS; if (!X509_get_signature_info(cert, NULL, NULL, &secbits, NULL)) return 0; return secbits >= minbits_table[level - 1]; } diff --git a/crypto/x509/x_name.c b/crypto/x509/x_name.c index aa7f4722b6b9..59ac6895bc26 100644 --- a/crypto/x509/x_name.c +++ b/crypto/x509/x_name.c @@ -1,551 +1,551 @@ /* - * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 1995-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "crypto/ctype.h" #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include #include "crypto/x509.h" #include "crypto/asn1.h" #include "x509_local.h" /* * Maximum length of X509_NAME: much larger than anything we should * ever see in practice. */ #define X509_NAME_MAX (1024 * 1024) static int x509_name_ex_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **val, const unsigned char **in, long len, const ASN1_ITEM *it, int tag, int aclass, char opt, ASN1_TLC *ctx); static int x509_name_ex_i2d(ASN1_VALUE **val, unsigned char **out, const ASN1_ITEM *it, int tag, int aclass); static int x509_name_ex_new(ASN1_VALUE **val, const ASN1_ITEM *it); static void x509_name_ex_free(ASN1_VALUE **val, const ASN1_ITEM *it); static int x509_name_encode(X509_NAME *a); static int x509_name_canon(X509_NAME *a); static int asn1_string_canon(ASN1_STRING *out, const ASN1_STRING *in); static int i2d_name_canon(STACK_OF(STACK_OF_X509_NAME_ENTRY) * intname, unsigned char **in); static int x509_name_ex_print(BIO *out, ASN1_VALUE **pval, int indent, const char *fname, const ASN1_PCTX *pctx); ASN1_SEQUENCE(X509_NAME_ENTRY) = { ASN1_SIMPLE(X509_NAME_ENTRY, object, ASN1_OBJECT), ASN1_SIMPLE(X509_NAME_ENTRY, value, ASN1_PRINTABLE) } ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(X509_NAME_ENTRY) IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(X509_NAME_ENTRY) IMPLEMENT_ASN1_DUP_FUNCTION(X509_NAME_ENTRY) /* * For the "Name" type we need a SEQUENCE OF { SET OF X509_NAME_ENTRY } so * declare two template wrappers for this */ ASN1_ITEM_TEMPLATE(X509_NAME_ENTRIES) = ASN1_EX_TEMPLATE_TYPE(ASN1_TFLG_SET_OF, 0, RDNS, X509_NAME_ENTRY) static_ASN1_ITEM_TEMPLATE_END(X509_NAME_ENTRIES) ASN1_ITEM_TEMPLATE(X509_NAME_INTERNAL) = ASN1_EX_TEMPLATE_TYPE(ASN1_TFLG_SEQUENCE_OF, 0, Name, X509_NAME_ENTRIES) static_ASN1_ITEM_TEMPLATE_END(X509_NAME_INTERNAL) /* * Normally that's where it would end: we'd have two nested STACK structures * representing the ASN1. Unfortunately X509_NAME uses a completely different * form and caches encodings so we have to process the internal form and * convert to the external form. */ static const ASN1_EXTERN_FUNCS x509_name_ff = { NULL, x509_name_ex_new, x509_name_ex_free, 0, /* Default clear behaviour is OK */ x509_name_ex_d2i, x509_name_ex_i2d, x509_name_ex_print }; IMPLEMENT_EXTERN_ASN1(X509_NAME, V_ASN1_SEQUENCE, x509_name_ff) IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(X509_NAME) IMPLEMENT_ASN1_DUP_FUNCTION(X509_NAME) static int x509_name_ex_new(ASN1_VALUE **val, const ASN1_ITEM *it) { X509_NAME *ret = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ret)); if (ret == NULL) goto memerr; if ((ret->entries = sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_new_null()) == NULL) goto memerr; if ((ret->bytes = BUF_MEM_new()) == NULL) goto memerr; ret->modified = 1; *val = (ASN1_VALUE *)ret; return 1; memerr: ASN1err(ASN1_F_X509_NAME_EX_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); if (ret) { sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_free(ret->entries); OPENSSL_free(ret); } return 0; } static void x509_name_ex_free(ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it) { X509_NAME *a; if (!pval || !*pval) return; a = (X509_NAME *)*pval; BUF_MEM_free(a->bytes); sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_pop_free(a->entries, X509_NAME_ENTRY_free); OPENSSL_free(a->canon_enc); OPENSSL_free(a); *pval = NULL; } static void local_sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_free(STACK_OF(X509_NAME_ENTRY) *ne) { sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_free(ne); } static void local_sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_pop_free(STACK_OF(X509_NAME_ENTRY) *ne) { sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_pop_free(ne, X509_NAME_ENTRY_free); } static int x509_name_ex_d2i(ASN1_VALUE **val, const unsigned char **in, long len, const ASN1_ITEM *it, int tag, int aclass, char opt, ASN1_TLC *ctx) { const unsigned char *p = *in, *q; union { STACK_OF(STACK_OF_X509_NAME_ENTRY) *s; ASN1_VALUE *a; } intname = { NULL }; union { X509_NAME *x; ASN1_VALUE *a; } nm = { NULL }; int i, j, ret; STACK_OF(X509_NAME_ENTRY) *entries; X509_NAME_ENTRY *entry; if (len > X509_NAME_MAX) len = X509_NAME_MAX; q = p; /* Get internal representation of Name */ ret = ASN1_item_ex_d2i(&intname.a, &p, len, ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509_NAME_INTERNAL), tag, aclass, opt, ctx); if (ret <= 0) return ret; if (*val) x509_name_ex_free(val, NULL); if (!x509_name_ex_new(&nm.a, NULL)) goto err; /* We've decoded it: now cache encoding */ if (!BUF_MEM_grow(nm.x->bytes, p - q)) goto err; memcpy(nm.x->bytes->data, q, p - q); /* Convert internal representation to X509_NAME structure */ for (i = 0; i < sk_STACK_OF_X509_NAME_ENTRY_num(intname.s); i++) { entries = sk_STACK_OF_X509_NAME_ENTRY_value(intname.s, i); for (j = 0; j < sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_num(entries); j++) { entry = sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_value(entries, j); entry->set = i; if (!sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_push(nm.x->entries, entry)) goto err; sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_set(entries, j, NULL); } } ret = x509_name_canon(nm.x); if (!ret) goto err; sk_STACK_OF_X509_NAME_ENTRY_pop_free(intname.s, local_sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_free); nm.x->modified = 0; *val = nm.a; *in = p; return ret; err: if (nm.x != NULL) X509_NAME_free(nm.x); sk_STACK_OF_X509_NAME_ENTRY_pop_free(intname.s, local_sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_pop_free); ASN1err(ASN1_F_X509_NAME_EX_D2I, ERR_R_NESTED_ASN1_ERROR); return 0; } static int x509_name_ex_i2d(ASN1_VALUE **val, unsigned char **out, const ASN1_ITEM *it, int tag, int aclass) { int ret; X509_NAME *a = (X509_NAME *)*val; if (a->modified) { ret = x509_name_encode(a); if (ret < 0) return ret; ret = x509_name_canon(a); - if (ret < 0) - return ret; + if (!ret) + return -1; } ret = a->bytes->length; if (out != NULL) { memcpy(*out, a->bytes->data, ret); *out += ret; } return ret; } static int x509_name_encode(X509_NAME *a) { union { STACK_OF(STACK_OF_X509_NAME_ENTRY) *s; ASN1_VALUE *a; } intname = { NULL }; int len; unsigned char *p; STACK_OF(X509_NAME_ENTRY) *entries = NULL; X509_NAME_ENTRY *entry; int i, set = -1; intname.s = sk_STACK_OF_X509_NAME_ENTRY_new_null(); if (!intname.s) goto memerr; for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_num(a->entries); i++) { entry = sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_value(a->entries, i); if (entry->set != set) { entries = sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_new_null(); if (!entries) goto memerr; if (!sk_STACK_OF_X509_NAME_ENTRY_push(intname.s, entries)) { sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_free(entries); goto memerr; } set = entry->set; } if (!sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_push(entries, entry)) goto memerr; } len = ASN1_item_ex_i2d(&intname.a, NULL, ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509_NAME_INTERNAL), -1, -1); if (!BUF_MEM_grow(a->bytes, len)) goto memerr; p = (unsigned char *)a->bytes->data; ASN1_item_ex_i2d(&intname.a, &p, ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509_NAME_INTERNAL), -1, -1); sk_STACK_OF_X509_NAME_ENTRY_pop_free(intname.s, local_sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_free); a->modified = 0; return len; memerr: sk_STACK_OF_X509_NAME_ENTRY_pop_free(intname.s, local_sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_free); ASN1err(ASN1_F_X509_NAME_ENCODE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return -1; } static int x509_name_ex_print(BIO *out, ASN1_VALUE **pval, int indent, const char *fname, const ASN1_PCTX *pctx) { if (X509_NAME_print_ex(out, (const X509_NAME *)*pval, indent, pctx->nm_flags) <= 0) return 0; return 2; } /* * This function generates the canonical encoding of the Name structure. In * it all strings are converted to UTF8, leading, trailing and multiple * spaces collapsed, converted to lower case and the leading SEQUENCE header * removed. In future we could also normalize the UTF8 too. By doing this * comparison of Name structures can be rapidly performed by just using * memcmp() of the canonical encoding. By omitting the leading SEQUENCE name * constraints of type dirName can also be checked with a simple memcmp(). */ static int x509_name_canon(X509_NAME *a) { unsigned char *p; STACK_OF(STACK_OF_X509_NAME_ENTRY) *intname; STACK_OF(X509_NAME_ENTRY) *entries = NULL; X509_NAME_ENTRY *entry, *tmpentry = NULL; int i, set = -1, ret = 0, len; OPENSSL_free(a->canon_enc); a->canon_enc = NULL; /* Special case: empty X509_NAME => null encoding */ if (sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_num(a->entries) == 0) { a->canon_enclen = 0; return 1; } intname = sk_STACK_OF_X509_NAME_ENTRY_new_null(); if (intname == NULL) { X509err(X509_F_X509_NAME_CANON, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_num(a->entries); i++) { entry = sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_value(a->entries, i); if (entry->set != set) { entries = sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_new_null(); if (entries == NULL) goto err; if (!sk_STACK_OF_X509_NAME_ENTRY_push(intname, entries)) { sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_free(entries); X509err(X509_F_X509_NAME_CANON, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } set = entry->set; } tmpentry = X509_NAME_ENTRY_new(); if (tmpentry == NULL) { X509err(X509_F_X509_NAME_CANON, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } tmpentry->object = OBJ_dup(entry->object); if (tmpentry->object == NULL) { X509err(X509_F_X509_NAME_CANON, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } if (!asn1_string_canon(tmpentry->value, entry->value)) goto err; if (!sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_push(entries, tmpentry)) { X509err(X509_F_X509_NAME_CANON, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } tmpentry = NULL; } /* Finally generate encoding */ len = i2d_name_canon(intname, NULL); if (len < 0) goto err; a->canon_enclen = len; p = OPENSSL_malloc(a->canon_enclen); if (p == NULL) { X509err(X509_F_X509_NAME_CANON, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } a->canon_enc = p; i2d_name_canon(intname, &p); ret = 1; err: X509_NAME_ENTRY_free(tmpentry); sk_STACK_OF_X509_NAME_ENTRY_pop_free(intname, local_sk_X509_NAME_ENTRY_pop_free); return ret; } /* Bitmap of all the types of string that will be canonicalized. */ #define ASN1_MASK_CANON \ (B_ASN1_UTF8STRING | B_ASN1_BMPSTRING | B_ASN1_UNIVERSALSTRING \ | B_ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING | B_ASN1_T61STRING | B_ASN1_IA5STRING \ | B_ASN1_VISIBLESTRING) static int asn1_string_canon(ASN1_STRING *out, const ASN1_STRING *in) { unsigned char *to, *from; int len, i; /* If type not in bitmask just copy string across */ if (!(ASN1_tag2bit(in->type) & ASN1_MASK_CANON)) { if (!ASN1_STRING_copy(out, in)) return 0; return 1; } out->type = V_ASN1_UTF8STRING; out->length = ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8(&out->data, in); if (out->length == -1) return 0; to = out->data; from = to; len = out->length; /* * Convert string in place to canonical form. Ultimately we may need to * handle a wider range of characters but for now ignore anything with * MSB set and rely on the ossl_isspace() to fail on bad characters without * needing isascii or range checks as well. */ /* Ignore leading spaces */ while (len > 0 && ossl_isspace(*from)) { from++; len--; } to = from + len; /* Ignore trailing spaces */ while (len > 0 && ossl_isspace(to[-1])) { to--; len--; } to = out->data; i = 0; while (i < len) { /* If not ASCII set just copy across */ if (!ossl_isascii(*from)) { *to++ = *from++; i++; } /* Collapse multiple spaces */ else if (ossl_isspace(*from)) { /* Copy one space across */ *to++ = ' '; /* * Ignore subsequent spaces. Note: don't need to check len here * because we know the last character is a non-space so we can't * overflow. */ do { from++; i++; } while (ossl_isspace(*from)); } else { *to++ = ossl_tolower(*from); from++; i++; } } out->length = to - out->data; return 1; } static int i2d_name_canon(STACK_OF(STACK_OF_X509_NAME_ENTRY) * _intname, unsigned char **in) { int i, len, ltmp; ASN1_VALUE *v; STACK_OF(ASN1_VALUE) *intname = (STACK_OF(ASN1_VALUE) *)_intname; len = 0; for (i = 0; i < sk_ASN1_VALUE_num(intname); i++) { v = sk_ASN1_VALUE_value(intname, i); ltmp = ASN1_item_ex_i2d(&v, in, ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509_NAME_ENTRIES), -1, -1); if (ltmp < 0) return ltmp; len += ltmp; } return len; } int X509_NAME_set(X509_NAME **xn, X509_NAME *name) { if (*xn == name) return *xn != NULL; if ((name = X509_NAME_dup(name)) == NULL) return 0; X509_NAME_free(*xn); *xn = name; return 1; } int X509_NAME_print(BIO *bp, const X509_NAME *name, int obase) { char *s, *c, *b; int l, i; l = 80 - 2 - obase; b = X509_NAME_oneline(name, NULL, 0); if (!b) return 0; if (!*b) { OPENSSL_free(b); return 1; } s = b + 1; /* skip the first slash */ c = s; for (;;) { if (((*s == '/') && (ossl_isupper(s[1]) && ((s[2] == '=') || (ossl_isupper(s[2]) && (s[3] == '=')) ))) || (*s == '\0')) { i = s - c; if (BIO_write(bp, c, i) != i) goto err; c = s + 1; /* skip following slash */ if (*s != '\0') { if (BIO_write(bp, ", ", 2) != 2) goto err; } l--; } if (*s == '\0') break; s++; l--; } OPENSSL_free(b); return 1; err: X509err(X509_F_X509_NAME_PRINT, ERR_R_BUF_LIB); OPENSSL_free(b); return 0; } int X509_NAME_get0_der(X509_NAME *nm, const unsigned char **pder, size_t *pderlen) { /* Make sure encoding is valid */ if (i2d_X509_NAME(nm, NULL) <= 0) return 0; if (pder != NULL) *pder = (unsigned char *)nm->bytes->data; if (pderlen != NULL) *pderlen = nm->bytes->length; return 1; } diff --git a/crypto/x509v3/v3_ncons.c b/crypto/x509v3/v3_ncons.c index d985aa91dacd..60cb4ceaa8f8 100644 --- a/crypto/x509v3/v3_ncons.c +++ b/crypto/x509v3/v3_ncons.c @@ -1,702 +1,705 @@ /* * Copyright 2003-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include "internal/numbers.h" #include #include "crypto/asn1.h" #include #include #include #include "crypto/x509.h" #include "ext_dat.h" static void *v2i_NAME_CONSTRAINTS(const X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method, X509V3_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *nval); static int i2r_NAME_CONSTRAINTS(const X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method, void *a, BIO *bp, int ind); static int do_i2r_name_constraints(const X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method, STACK_OF(GENERAL_SUBTREE) *trees, BIO *bp, int ind, const char *name); static int print_nc_ipadd(BIO *bp, ASN1_OCTET_STRING *ip); static int nc_match(GENERAL_NAME *gen, NAME_CONSTRAINTS *nc); static int nc_match_single(GENERAL_NAME *sub, GENERAL_NAME *gen); static int nc_dn(X509_NAME *sub, X509_NAME *nm); static int nc_dns(ASN1_IA5STRING *sub, ASN1_IA5STRING *dns); static int nc_email(ASN1_IA5STRING *sub, ASN1_IA5STRING *eml); static int nc_uri(ASN1_IA5STRING *uri, ASN1_IA5STRING *base); static int nc_ip(ASN1_OCTET_STRING *ip, ASN1_OCTET_STRING *base); const X509V3_EXT_METHOD v3_name_constraints = { NID_name_constraints, 0, ASN1_ITEM_ref(NAME_CONSTRAINTS), 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, v2i_NAME_CONSTRAINTS, i2r_NAME_CONSTRAINTS, 0, NULL }; ASN1_SEQUENCE(GENERAL_SUBTREE) = { ASN1_SIMPLE(GENERAL_SUBTREE, base, GENERAL_NAME), ASN1_IMP_OPT(GENERAL_SUBTREE, minimum, ASN1_INTEGER, 0), ASN1_IMP_OPT(GENERAL_SUBTREE, maximum, ASN1_INTEGER, 1) } ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(GENERAL_SUBTREE) ASN1_SEQUENCE(NAME_CONSTRAINTS) = { ASN1_IMP_SEQUENCE_OF_OPT(NAME_CONSTRAINTS, permittedSubtrees, GENERAL_SUBTREE, 0), ASN1_IMP_SEQUENCE_OF_OPT(NAME_CONSTRAINTS, excludedSubtrees, GENERAL_SUBTREE, 1), } ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(NAME_CONSTRAINTS) IMPLEMENT_ASN1_ALLOC_FUNCTIONS(GENERAL_SUBTREE) IMPLEMENT_ASN1_ALLOC_FUNCTIONS(NAME_CONSTRAINTS) #define IA5_OFFSET_LEN(ia5base, offset) \ ((ia5base)->length - ((unsigned char *)(offset) - (ia5base)->data)) /* Like memchr but for ASN1_IA5STRING. Additionally you can specify the * starting point to search from */ # define ia5memchr(str, start, c) memchr(start, c, IA5_OFFSET_LEN(str, start)) /* Like memrrchr but for ASN1_IA5STRING */ static char *ia5memrchr(ASN1_IA5STRING *str, int c) { int i; for (i = str->length; i > 0 && str->data[i - 1] != c; i--); if (i == 0) return NULL; return (char *)&str->data[i - 1]; } /* * We cannot use strncasecmp here because that applies locale specific rules. It * also doesn't work with ASN1_STRINGs that may have embedded NUL characters. * For example in Turkish 'I' is not the uppercase character for 'i'. We need to * do a simple ASCII case comparison ignoring the locale (that is why we use * numeric constants below). */ static int ia5ncasecmp(const char *s1, const char *s2, size_t n) { for (; n > 0; n--, s1++, s2++) { if (*s1 != *s2) { unsigned char c1 = (unsigned char)*s1, c2 = (unsigned char)*s2; /* Convert to lower case */ if (c1 >= 0x41 /* A */ && c1 <= 0x5A /* Z */) c1 += 0x20; if (c2 >= 0x41 /* A */ && c2 <= 0x5A /* Z */) c2 += 0x20; if (c1 == c2) continue; if (c1 < c2) return -1; /* c1 > c2 */ return 1; } } return 0; } static void *v2i_NAME_CONSTRAINTS(const X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method, X509V3_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *nval) { int i; CONF_VALUE tval, *val; STACK_OF(GENERAL_SUBTREE) **ptree = NULL; NAME_CONSTRAINTS *ncons = NULL; GENERAL_SUBTREE *sub = NULL; ncons = NAME_CONSTRAINTS_new(); if (ncons == NULL) goto memerr; for (i = 0; i < sk_CONF_VALUE_num(nval); i++) { val = sk_CONF_VALUE_value(nval, i); if (strncmp(val->name, "permitted", 9) == 0 && val->name[9]) { ptree = &ncons->permittedSubtrees; tval.name = val->name + 10; } else if (strncmp(val->name, "excluded", 8) == 0 && val->name[8]) { ptree = &ncons->excludedSubtrees; tval.name = val->name + 9; } else { X509V3err(X509V3_F_V2I_NAME_CONSTRAINTS, X509V3_R_INVALID_SYNTAX); goto err; } tval.value = val->value; sub = GENERAL_SUBTREE_new(); if (sub == NULL) goto memerr; if (!v2i_GENERAL_NAME_ex(sub->base, method, ctx, &tval, 1)) goto err; if (*ptree == NULL) *ptree = sk_GENERAL_SUBTREE_new_null(); if (*ptree == NULL || !sk_GENERAL_SUBTREE_push(*ptree, sub)) goto memerr; sub = NULL; } return ncons; memerr: X509V3err(X509V3_F_V2I_NAME_CONSTRAINTS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); err: NAME_CONSTRAINTS_free(ncons); GENERAL_SUBTREE_free(sub); return NULL; } static int i2r_NAME_CONSTRAINTS(const X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method, void *a, BIO *bp, int ind) { NAME_CONSTRAINTS *ncons = a; do_i2r_name_constraints(method, ncons->permittedSubtrees, bp, ind, "Permitted"); do_i2r_name_constraints(method, ncons->excludedSubtrees, bp, ind, "Excluded"); return 1; } static int do_i2r_name_constraints(const X509V3_EXT_METHOD *method, STACK_OF(GENERAL_SUBTREE) *trees, BIO *bp, int ind, const char *name) { GENERAL_SUBTREE *tree; int i; if (sk_GENERAL_SUBTREE_num(trees) > 0) BIO_printf(bp, "%*s%s:\n", ind, "", name); for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_SUBTREE_num(trees); i++) { tree = sk_GENERAL_SUBTREE_value(trees, i); BIO_printf(bp, "%*s", ind + 2, ""); if (tree->base->type == GEN_IPADD) print_nc_ipadd(bp, tree->base->d.ip); else GENERAL_NAME_print(bp, tree->base); BIO_puts(bp, "\n"); } return 1; } static int print_nc_ipadd(BIO *bp, ASN1_OCTET_STRING *ip) { int i, len; unsigned char *p; p = ip->data; len = ip->length; BIO_puts(bp, "IP:"); if (len == 8) { BIO_printf(bp, "%d.%d.%d.%d/%d.%d.%d.%d", p[0], p[1], p[2], p[3], p[4], p[5], p[6], p[7]); } else if (len == 32) { for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) { BIO_printf(bp, "%X", p[0] << 8 | p[1]); p += 2; if (i == 7) BIO_puts(bp, "/"); else if (i != 15) BIO_puts(bp, ":"); } } else BIO_printf(bp, "IP Address:"); return 1; } #define NAME_CHECK_MAX (1 << 20) static int add_lengths(int *out, int a, int b) { /* sk_FOO_num(NULL) returns -1 but is effectively 0 when iterating. */ if (a < 0) a = 0; if (b < 0) b = 0; if (a > INT_MAX - b) return 0; *out = a + b; return 1; } /*- * Check a certificate conforms to a specified set of constraints. * Return values: * X509_V_OK: All constraints obeyed. * X509_V_ERR_PERMITTED_VIOLATION: Permitted subtree violation. * X509_V_ERR_EXCLUDED_VIOLATION: Excluded subtree violation. * X509_V_ERR_SUBTREE_MINMAX: Min or max values present and matching type. * X509_V_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_CONSTRAINT_TYPE: Unsupported constraint type. * X509_V_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_CONSTRAINT_SYNTAX: bad unsupported constraint syntax. * X509_V_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_NAME_SYNTAX: bad or unsupported syntax of name */ int NAME_CONSTRAINTS_check(X509 *x, NAME_CONSTRAINTS *nc) { int r, i, name_count, constraint_count; X509_NAME *nm; nm = X509_get_subject_name(x); /* * Guard against certificates with an excessive number of names or * constraints causing a computationally expensive name constraints check. */ if (!add_lengths(&name_count, X509_NAME_entry_count(nm), sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(x->altname)) || !add_lengths(&constraint_count, sk_GENERAL_SUBTREE_num(nc->permittedSubtrees), sk_GENERAL_SUBTREE_num(nc->excludedSubtrees)) || (name_count > 0 && constraint_count > NAME_CHECK_MAX / name_count)) return X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED; if (X509_NAME_entry_count(nm) > 0) { GENERAL_NAME gntmp; gntmp.type = GEN_DIRNAME; gntmp.d.directoryName = nm; r = nc_match(&gntmp, nc); if (r != X509_V_OK) return r; gntmp.type = GEN_EMAIL; /* Process any email address attributes in subject name */ for (i = -1;;) { const X509_NAME_ENTRY *ne; i = X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID(nm, NID_pkcs9_emailAddress, i); if (i == -1) break; ne = X509_NAME_get_entry(nm, i); gntmp.d.rfc822Name = X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_data(ne); if (gntmp.d.rfc822Name->type != V_ASN1_IA5STRING) return X509_V_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_NAME_SYNTAX; r = nc_match(&gntmp, nc); if (r != X509_V_OK) return r; } } for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(x->altname); i++) { GENERAL_NAME *gen = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(x->altname, i); r = nc_match(gen, nc); if (r != X509_V_OK) return r; } return X509_V_OK; } static int cn2dnsid(ASN1_STRING *cn, unsigned char **dnsid, size_t *idlen) { int utf8_length; unsigned char *utf8_value; int i; int isdnsname = 0; /* Don't leave outputs uninitialized */ *dnsid = NULL; *idlen = 0; /*- * Per RFC 6125, DNS-IDs representing internationalized domain names appear * in certificates in A-label encoded form: * * https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc6125#section-6.4.2 * * The same applies to CNs which are intended to represent DNS names. * However, while in the SAN DNS-IDs are IA5Strings, as CNs they may be * needlessly encoded in 16-bit Unicode. We perform a conversion to UTF-8 * to ensure that we get an ASCII representation of any CNs that are * representable as ASCII, but just not encoded as ASCII. The UTF-8 form * may contain some non-ASCII octets, and that's fine, such CNs are not * valid legacy DNS names. * * Note, 'int' is the return type of ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8() so that's what * we must use for 'utf8_length'. */ if ((utf8_length = ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8(&utf8_value, cn)) < 0) return X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM; /* * Some certificates have had names that include a *trailing* NUL byte. * Remove these harmless NUL characters. They would otherwise yield false * alarms with the following embedded NUL check. */ while (utf8_length > 0 && utf8_value[utf8_length - 1] == '\0') --utf8_length; /* Reject *embedded* NULs */ if (memchr(utf8_value, 0, utf8_length) != NULL) { OPENSSL_free(utf8_value); return X509_V_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_NAME_SYNTAX; } /* * XXX: Deviation from strict DNS name syntax, also check names with '_' * Check DNS name syntax, any '-' or '.' must be internal, * and on either side of each '.' we can't have a '-' or '.'. * * If the name has just one label, we don't consider it a DNS name. This * means that "CN=sometld" cannot be precluded by DNS name constraints, but * that is not a problem. */ for (i = 0; i < utf8_length; ++i) { unsigned char c = utf8_value[i]; if ((c >= 'a' && c <= 'z') || (c >= 'A' && c <= 'Z') || (c >= '0' && c <= '9') || c == '_') continue; /* Dot and hyphen cannot be first or last. */ if (i > 0 && i < utf8_length - 1) { if (c == '-') continue; /* * Next to a dot the preceding and following characters must not be * another dot or a hyphen. Otherwise, record that the name is * plausible, since it has two or more labels. */ if (c == '.' && utf8_value[i + 1] != '.' && utf8_value[i - 1] != '-' && utf8_value[i + 1] != '-') { isdnsname = 1; continue; } } isdnsname = 0; break; } if (isdnsname) { *dnsid = utf8_value; *idlen = (size_t)utf8_length; return X509_V_OK; } OPENSSL_free(utf8_value); return X509_V_OK; } /* * Check CN against DNS-ID name constraints. */ int NAME_CONSTRAINTS_check_CN(X509 *x, NAME_CONSTRAINTS *nc) { int r, i; X509_NAME *nm = X509_get_subject_name(x); ASN1_STRING stmp; GENERAL_NAME gntmp; stmp.flags = 0; stmp.type = V_ASN1_IA5STRING; gntmp.type = GEN_DNS; gntmp.d.dNSName = &stmp; /* Process any commonName attributes in subject name */ for (i = -1;;) { X509_NAME_ENTRY *ne; ASN1_STRING *cn; unsigned char *idval; size_t idlen; i = X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID(nm, NID_commonName, i); if (i == -1) break; ne = X509_NAME_get_entry(nm, i); cn = X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_data(ne); /* Only process attributes that look like host names */ if ((r = cn2dnsid(cn, &idval, &idlen)) != X509_V_OK) return r; if (idlen == 0) continue; stmp.length = idlen; stmp.data = idval; r = nc_match(&gntmp, nc); OPENSSL_free(idval); if (r != X509_V_OK) return r; } return X509_V_OK; } static int nc_match(GENERAL_NAME *gen, NAME_CONSTRAINTS *nc) { GENERAL_SUBTREE *sub; int i, r, match = 0; /* * Permitted subtrees: if any subtrees exist of matching the type at * least one subtree must match. */ for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_SUBTREE_num(nc->permittedSubtrees); i++) { sub = sk_GENERAL_SUBTREE_value(nc->permittedSubtrees, i); if (gen->type != sub->base->type) continue; if (sub->minimum || sub->maximum) return X509_V_ERR_SUBTREE_MINMAX; /* If we already have a match don't bother trying any more */ if (match == 2) continue; if (match == 0) match = 1; r = nc_match_single(gen, sub->base); if (r == X509_V_OK) match = 2; else if (r != X509_V_ERR_PERMITTED_VIOLATION) return r; } if (match == 1) return X509_V_ERR_PERMITTED_VIOLATION; /* Excluded subtrees: must not match any of these */ for (i = 0; i < sk_GENERAL_SUBTREE_num(nc->excludedSubtrees); i++) { sub = sk_GENERAL_SUBTREE_value(nc->excludedSubtrees, i); if (gen->type != sub->base->type) continue; if (sub->minimum || sub->maximum) return X509_V_ERR_SUBTREE_MINMAX; r = nc_match_single(gen, sub->base); if (r == X509_V_OK) return X509_V_ERR_EXCLUDED_VIOLATION; else if (r != X509_V_ERR_PERMITTED_VIOLATION) return r; } return X509_V_OK; } static int nc_match_single(GENERAL_NAME *gen, GENERAL_NAME *base) { switch (base->type) { case GEN_DIRNAME: return nc_dn(gen->d.directoryName, base->d.directoryName); case GEN_DNS: return nc_dns(gen->d.dNSName, base->d.dNSName); case GEN_EMAIL: return nc_email(gen->d.rfc822Name, base->d.rfc822Name); case GEN_URI: return nc_uri(gen->d.uniformResourceIdentifier, base->d.uniformResourceIdentifier); case GEN_IPADD: return nc_ip(gen->d.iPAddress, base->d.iPAddress); default: return X509_V_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_CONSTRAINT_TYPE; } } /* * directoryName name constraint matching. The canonical encoding of * X509_NAME makes this comparison easy. It is matched if the subtree is a * subset of the name. */ static int nc_dn(X509_NAME *nm, X509_NAME *base) { /* Ensure canonical encodings are up to date. */ if (nm->modified && i2d_X509_NAME(nm, NULL) < 0) return X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM; if (base->modified && i2d_X509_NAME(base, NULL) < 0) return X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM; if (base->canon_enclen > nm->canon_enclen) return X509_V_ERR_PERMITTED_VIOLATION; if (memcmp(base->canon_enc, nm->canon_enc, base->canon_enclen)) return X509_V_ERR_PERMITTED_VIOLATION; return X509_V_OK; } static int nc_dns(ASN1_IA5STRING *dns, ASN1_IA5STRING *base) { char *baseptr = (char *)base->data; char *dnsptr = (char *)dns->data; /* Empty matches everything */ if (base->length == 0) return X509_V_OK; if (dns->length < base->length) return X509_V_ERR_PERMITTED_VIOLATION; /* * Otherwise can add zero or more components on the left so compare RHS * and if dns is longer and expect '.' as preceding character. */ if (dns->length > base->length) { dnsptr += dns->length - base->length; if (*baseptr != '.' && dnsptr[-1] != '.') return X509_V_ERR_PERMITTED_VIOLATION; } if (ia5ncasecmp(baseptr, dnsptr, base->length)) return X509_V_ERR_PERMITTED_VIOLATION; return X509_V_OK; } static int nc_email(ASN1_IA5STRING *eml, ASN1_IA5STRING *base) { const char *baseptr = (char *)base->data; const char *emlptr = (char *)eml->data; const char *baseat = ia5memrchr(base, '@'); const char *emlat = ia5memrchr(eml, '@'); size_t basehostlen, emlhostlen; if (!emlat) return X509_V_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_NAME_SYNTAX; /* Special case: initial '.' is RHS match */ if (!baseat && base->length > 0 && (*baseptr == '.')) { if (eml->length > base->length) { emlptr += eml->length - base->length; if (ia5ncasecmp(baseptr, emlptr, base->length) == 0) return X509_V_OK; } return X509_V_ERR_PERMITTED_VIOLATION; } /* If we have anything before '@' match local part */ if (baseat) { if (baseat != baseptr) { if ((baseat - baseptr) != (emlat - emlptr)) return X509_V_ERR_PERMITTED_VIOLATION; + if (memchr(baseptr, 0, baseat - baseptr) || + memchr(emlptr, 0, emlat - emlptr)) + return X509_V_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_NAME_SYNTAX; /* Case sensitive match of local part */ if (strncmp(baseptr, emlptr, emlat - emlptr)) return X509_V_ERR_PERMITTED_VIOLATION; } /* Position base after '@' */ baseptr = baseat + 1; } emlptr = emlat + 1; basehostlen = IA5_OFFSET_LEN(base, baseptr); emlhostlen = IA5_OFFSET_LEN(eml, emlptr); /* Just have hostname left to match: case insensitive */ if (basehostlen != emlhostlen || ia5ncasecmp(baseptr, emlptr, emlhostlen)) return X509_V_ERR_PERMITTED_VIOLATION; return X509_V_OK; } static int nc_uri(ASN1_IA5STRING *uri, ASN1_IA5STRING *base) { const char *baseptr = (char *)base->data; const char *hostptr = (char *)uri->data; const char *p = ia5memchr(uri, (char *)uri->data, ':'); int hostlen; /* Check for foo:// and skip past it */ if (p == NULL || IA5_OFFSET_LEN(uri, p) < 3 || p[1] != '/' || p[2] != '/') return X509_V_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_NAME_SYNTAX; hostptr = p + 3; /* Determine length of hostname part of URI */ /* Look for a port indicator as end of hostname first */ p = ia5memchr(uri, hostptr, ':'); /* Otherwise look for trailing slash */ if (p == NULL) p = ia5memchr(uri, hostptr, '/'); if (p == NULL) hostlen = IA5_OFFSET_LEN(uri, hostptr); else hostlen = p - hostptr; if (hostlen == 0) return X509_V_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_NAME_SYNTAX; /* Special case: initial '.' is RHS match */ if (base->length > 0 && *baseptr == '.') { if (hostlen > base->length) { p = hostptr + hostlen - base->length; if (ia5ncasecmp(p, baseptr, base->length) == 0) return X509_V_OK; } return X509_V_ERR_PERMITTED_VIOLATION; } if ((base->length != (int)hostlen) || ia5ncasecmp(hostptr, baseptr, hostlen)) return X509_V_ERR_PERMITTED_VIOLATION; return X509_V_OK; } static int nc_ip(ASN1_OCTET_STRING *ip, ASN1_OCTET_STRING *base) { int hostlen, baselen, i; unsigned char *hostptr, *baseptr, *maskptr; hostptr = ip->data; hostlen = ip->length; baseptr = base->data; baselen = base->length; /* Invalid if not IPv4 or IPv6 */ if (!((hostlen == 4) || (hostlen == 16))) return X509_V_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_NAME_SYNTAX; if (!((baselen == 8) || (baselen == 32))) return X509_V_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_NAME_SYNTAX; /* Do not match IPv4 with IPv6 */ if (hostlen * 2 != baselen) return X509_V_ERR_PERMITTED_VIOLATION; maskptr = base->data + hostlen; /* Considering possible not aligned base ipAddress */ /* Not checking for wrong mask definition: i.e.: 255.0.255.0 */ for (i = 0; i < hostlen; i++) if ((hostptr[i] & maskptr[i]) != (baseptr[i] & maskptr[i])) return X509_V_ERR_PERMITTED_VIOLATION; return X509_V_OK; } diff --git a/doc/man1/passwd.pod b/doc/man1/passwd.pod index c5760fe76eae..26eb2ad35eaf 100644 --- a/doc/man1/passwd.pod +++ b/doc/man1/passwd.pod @@ -1,132 +1,130 @@ =pod =head1 NAME openssl-passwd, passwd - compute password hashes =head1 SYNOPSIS B [B<-help>] [B<-crypt>] [B<-1>] [B<-apr1>] [B<-aixmd5>] [B<-5>] [B<-6>] [B<-salt> I] [B<-in> I] [B<-stdin>] [B<-noverify>] [B<-quiet>] [B<-table>] [B<-rand file...>] [B<-writerand file>] {I} =head1 DESCRIPTION The B command computes the hash of a password typed at run-time or the hash of each password in a list. The password list is taken from the named file for option B<-in file>, from stdin for option B<-stdin>, or from the command line, or from the terminal otherwise. -The Unix standard algorithm B and the MD5-based BSD password -algorithm B<1>, its Apache variant B, and its AIX variant are available. =head1 OPTIONS =over 4 =item B<-help> Print out a usage message. =item B<-crypt> Use the B algorithm (default). =item B<-1> Use the MD5 based BSD password algorithm B<1>. =item B<-apr1> Use the B algorithm (Apache variant of the BSD algorithm). =item B<-aixmd5> Use the B algorithm (AIX variant of the BSD algorithm). =item B<-5> =item B<-6> Use the B / B based algorithms defined by Ulrich Drepper. See L. =item B<-salt> I Use the specified salt. When reading a password from the terminal, this implies B<-noverify>. =item B<-in> I Read passwords from I. =item B<-stdin> Read passwords from B. =item B<-noverify> Don't verify when reading a password from the terminal. =item B<-quiet> Don't output warnings when passwords given at the command line are truncated. =item B<-table> In the output list, prepend the cleartext password and a TAB character to each password hash. =item B<-rand file...> A file or files containing random data used to seed the random number generator. Multiple files can be specified separated by an OS-dependent character. The separator is B<;> for MS-Windows, B<,> for OpenVMS, and B<:> for all others. =item [B<-writerand file>] Writes random data to the specified I upon exit. This can be used with a subsequent B<-rand> flag. =back =head1 EXAMPLES % openssl passwd -crypt -salt xx password xxj31ZMTZzkVA % openssl passwd -1 -salt xxxxxxxx password $1$xxxxxxxx$UYCIxa628.9qXjpQCjM4a. % openssl passwd -apr1 -salt xxxxxxxx password $apr1$xxxxxxxx$dxHfLAsjHkDRmG83UXe8K0 % openssl passwd -aixmd5 -salt xxxxxxxx password xxxxxxxx$8Oaipk/GPKhC64w/YVeFD/ =head1 COPYRIGHT -Copyright 2000-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. +Copyright 2000-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut diff --git a/doc/man1/pkeyutl.pod b/doc/man1/pkeyutl.pod index 3b350efadd4f..f6fd48d5b579 100644 --- a/doc/man1/pkeyutl.pod +++ b/doc/man1/pkeyutl.pod @@ -1,337 +1,347 @@ =pod =head1 NAME openssl-pkeyutl, pkeyutl - public key algorithm utility =head1 SYNOPSIS B B [B<-help>] [B<-in file>] [B<-out file>] [B<-sigfile file>] [B<-inkey file>] [B<-keyform PEM|DER|ENGINE>] [B<-passin arg>] [B<-peerkey file>] [B<-peerform PEM|DER|ENGINE>] [B<-pubin>] [B<-certin>] [B<-rev>] [B<-sign>] [B<-verify>] [B<-verifyrecover>] [B<-encrypt>] [B<-decrypt>] [B<-derive>] [B<-kdf algorithm>] [B<-kdflen length>] [B<-pkeyopt opt:value>] [B<-hexdump>] [B<-asn1parse>] [B<-rand file...>] [B<-writerand file>] [B<-engine id>] [B<-engine_impl>] =head1 DESCRIPTION The B command can be used to perform low-level public key operations using any supported algorithm. =head1 OPTIONS =over 4 =item B<-help> Print out a usage message. =item B<-in filename> This specifies the input filename to read data from or standard input if this option is not specified. =item B<-out filename> Specifies the output filename to write to or standard output by default. =item B<-sigfile file> Signature file, required for B operations only =item B<-inkey file> The input key file, by default it should be a private key. =item B<-keyform PEM|DER|ENGINE> The key format PEM, DER or ENGINE. Default is PEM. =item B<-passin arg> The input key password source. For more information about the format of B see L. =item B<-peerkey file> The peer key file, used by key derivation (agreement) operations. =item B<-peerform PEM|DER|ENGINE> The peer key format PEM, DER or ENGINE. Default is PEM. =item B<-pubin> The input file is a public key. =item B<-certin> The input is a certificate containing a public key. =item B<-rev> Reverse the order of the input buffer. This is useful for some libraries (such as CryptoAPI) which represent the buffer in little endian format. =item B<-sign> Sign the input data (which must be a hash) and output the signed result. This requires a private key. =item B<-verify> Verify the input data (which must be a hash) against the signature file and indicate if the verification succeeded or failed. =item B<-verifyrecover> Verify the input data (which must be a hash) and output the recovered data. =item B<-encrypt> Encrypt the input data using a public key. =item B<-decrypt> Decrypt the input data using a private key. =item B<-derive> Derive a shared secret using the peer key. =item B<-kdf algorithm> Use key derivation function B. The supported algorithms are at present B and B. Note: additional parameters and the KDF output length will normally have to be set for this to work. See L and L for the supported string parameters of each algorithm. =item B<-kdflen length> Set the output length for KDF. =item B<-pkeyopt opt:value> Public key options specified as opt:value. See NOTES below for more details. =item B<-hexdump> hex dump the output data. =item B<-asn1parse> Parse the ASN.1 output data, this is useful when combined with the B<-verifyrecover> option when an ASN1 structure is signed. =item B<-rand file...> A file or files containing random data used to seed the random number generator. Multiple files can be specified separated by an OS-dependent character. The separator is B<;> for MS-Windows, B<,> for OpenVMS, and B<:> for all others. =item [B<-writerand file>] Writes random data to the specified I upon exit. This can be used with a subsequent B<-rand> flag. =item B<-engine id> Specifying an engine (by its unique B string) will cause B to attempt to obtain a functional reference to the specified engine, thus initialising it if needed. The engine will then be set as the default for all available algorithms. =item B<-engine_impl> When used with the B<-engine> option, it specifies to also use engine B for crypto operations. =back =head1 NOTES The operations and options supported vary according to the key algorithm and its implementation. The OpenSSL operations and options are indicated below. Unless otherwise mentioned all algorithms support the B option which specifies the digest in use for sign, verify and verifyrecover operations. The value B should represent a digest name as used in the EVP_get_digestbyname() function for example B. This value is not used to hash the input data. It is used (by some algorithms) for sanity-checking the lengths of data passed in to the B and for creating the structures that make up the signature (e.g. B in RSASSA PKCS#1 v1.5 signatures). This utility does not hash the input data but rather it will use the data directly as input to the signature algorithm. Depending on the key type, signature type, and mode of padding, the maximum acceptable lengths of input data differ. The signed data can't be longer than the key modulus with RSA. In case of ECDSA and DSA the data shouldn't be longer than the field size, otherwise it will be silently truncated to the field size. In any event the input size must not be larger than the largest supported digest size. In other words, if the value of digest is B the input should be the 20 bytes long binary encoding of the SHA-1 hash function output. The Ed25519 and Ed448 signature algorithms are not supported by this utility. They accept non-hashed input, but this utility can only be used to sign hashed input. =head1 RSA ALGORITHM The RSA algorithm generally supports the encrypt, decrypt, sign, verify and verifyrecover operations. However, some padding modes support only a subset of these operations. The following additional B values are supported: =over 4 =item B This sets the RSA padding mode. Acceptable values for B are B for PKCS#1 padding, B for SSLv23 padding, B for no padding, B for B mode, B for X9.31 mode and B for PSS. In PKCS#1 padding if the message digest is not set then the supplied data is signed or verified directly instead of using a B structure. If a digest is set then the a B structure is used and its the length must correspond to the digest type. For B mode only encryption and decryption is supported. For B if the digest type is set it is used to format the block data otherwise the first byte is used to specify the X9.31 digest ID. Sign, verify and verifyrecover are can be performed in this mode. For B mode only sign and verify are supported and the digest type must be specified. =item B For B mode only this option specifies the salt length. Three special values are supported: "digest" sets the salt length to the digest length, "max" sets the salt length to the maximum permissible value. When verifying "auto" causes the salt length to be automatically determined based on the B block structure. =item B For PSS and OAEP padding sets the MGF1 digest. If the MGF1 digest is not explicitly set in PSS mode then the signing digest is used. +=item BI + +Sets the digest used for the OAEP hash function. If not explicitly set then +SHA1 is used. + =back =head1 RSA-PSS ALGORITHM The RSA-PSS algorithm is a restricted version of the RSA algorithm which only supports the sign and verify operations with PSS padding. The following additional B values are supported: =over 4 =item B, B, B These have the same meaning as the B algorithm with some additional restrictions. The padding mode can only be set to B which is the default value. If the key has parameter restrictions than the digest, MGF1 digest and salt length are set to the values specified in the parameters. The digest and MG cannot be changed and the salt length cannot be set to a value less than the minimum restriction. =back =head1 DSA ALGORITHM The DSA algorithm supports signing and verification operations only. Currently there are no additional B<-pkeyopt> options other than B. The SHA1 digest is assumed by default. =head1 DH ALGORITHM The DH algorithm only supports the derivation operation and no additional B<-pkeyopt> options. =head1 EC ALGORITHM The EC algorithm supports sign, verify and derive operations. The sign and verify operations use ECDSA and derive uses ECDH. SHA1 is assumed by default for the B<-pkeyopt> B option. =head1 X25519 and X448 ALGORITHMS The X25519 and X448 algorithms support key derivation only. Currently there are no additional options. =head1 EXAMPLES Sign some data using a private key: openssl pkeyutl -sign -in file -inkey key.pem -out sig Recover the signed data (e.g. if an RSA key is used): openssl pkeyutl -verifyrecover -in sig -inkey key.pem Verify the signature (e.g. a DSA key): openssl pkeyutl -verify -in file -sigfile sig -inkey key.pem Sign data using a message digest value (this is currently only valid for RSA): openssl pkeyutl -sign -in file -inkey key.pem -out sig -pkeyopt digest:sha256 Derive a shared secret value: openssl pkeyutl -derive -inkey key.pem -peerkey pubkey.pem -out secret Hexdump 48 bytes of TLS1 PRF using digest B and shared secret and seed consisting of the single byte 0xFF: openssl pkeyutl -kdf TLS1-PRF -kdflen 48 -pkeyopt md:SHA256 \ -pkeyopt hexsecret:ff -pkeyopt hexseed:ff -hexdump +Decrypt some data using a private key with OAEP padding using SHA256: + + openssl pkeyutl -decrypt -in file -inkey key.pem -out secret \ + -pkeyopt rsa_padding_mode:oaep -pkeyopt rsa_oaep_md:sha256 + =head1 SEE ALSO L, L, L L, L, L, L, L =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2006-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut diff --git a/doc/man3/BIO_f_ssl.pod b/doc/man3/BIO_f_ssl.pod index 641ee2329efc..8866785cfe1d 100644 --- a/doc/man3/BIO_f_ssl.pod +++ b/doc/man3/BIO_f_ssl.pod @@ -1,303 +1,302 @@ =pod =head1 NAME BIO_do_handshake, BIO_f_ssl, BIO_set_ssl, BIO_get_ssl, BIO_set_ssl_mode, BIO_set_ssl_renegotiate_bytes, BIO_get_num_renegotiates, BIO_set_ssl_renegotiate_timeout, BIO_new_ssl, BIO_new_ssl_connect, BIO_new_buffer_ssl_connect, BIO_ssl_copy_session_id, BIO_ssl_shutdown - SSL BIO =head1 SYNOPSIS =for comment multiple includes #include #include const BIO_METHOD *BIO_f_ssl(void); long BIO_set_ssl(BIO *b, SSL *ssl, long c); long BIO_get_ssl(BIO *b, SSL **sslp); long BIO_set_ssl_mode(BIO *b, long client); long BIO_set_ssl_renegotiate_bytes(BIO *b, long num); long BIO_set_ssl_renegotiate_timeout(BIO *b, long seconds); long BIO_get_num_renegotiates(BIO *b); BIO *BIO_new_ssl(SSL_CTX *ctx, int client); BIO *BIO_new_ssl_connect(SSL_CTX *ctx); BIO *BIO_new_buffer_ssl_connect(SSL_CTX *ctx); int BIO_ssl_copy_session_id(BIO *to, BIO *from); void BIO_ssl_shutdown(BIO *bio); long BIO_do_handshake(BIO *b); =head1 DESCRIPTION BIO_f_ssl() returns the SSL BIO method. This is a filter BIO which is a wrapper round the OpenSSL SSL routines adding a BIO "flavour" to SSL I/O. I/O performed on an SSL BIO communicates using the SSL protocol with the SSLs read and write BIOs. If an SSL connection is not established then an attempt is made to establish one on the first I/O call. If a BIO is appended to an SSL BIO using BIO_push() it is automatically used as the SSL BIOs read and write BIOs. Calling BIO_reset() on an SSL BIO closes down any current SSL connection by calling SSL_shutdown(). BIO_reset() is then sent to the next BIO in the chain: this will typically disconnect the underlying transport. The SSL BIO is then reset to the initial accept or connect state. If the close flag is set when an SSL BIO is freed then the internal SSL structure is also freed using SSL_free(). -BIO_set_ssl() sets the internal SSL pointer of BIO B to B using +BIO_set_ssl() sets the internal SSL pointer of SSL BIO B to B using the close flag B. -BIO_get_ssl() retrieves the SSL pointer of BIO B, it can then be +BIO_get_ssl() retrieves the SSL pointer of SSL BIO B, it can then be manipulated using the standard SSL library functions. BIO_set_ssl_mode() sets the SSL BIO mode to B. If B is 1 client mode is set. If B is 0 server mode is set. -BIO_set_ssl_renegotiate_bytes() sets the renegotiate byte count +BIO_set_ssl_renegotiate_bytes() sets the renegotiate byte count of SSL BIO B to B. When set after every B bytes of I/O (read and write) the SSL session is automatically renegotiated. B must be at least 512 bytes. -BIO_set_ssl_renegotiate_timeout() sets the renegotiate timeout to -B. When the renegotiate timeout elapses the session is -automatically renegotiated. +BIO_set_ssl_renegotiate_timeout() sets the renegotiate timeout of SSL BIO B +to B. +When the renegotiate timeout elapses the session is automatically renegotiated. BIO_get_num_renegotiates() returns the total number of session -renegotiations due to I/O or timeout. +renegotiations due to I/O or timeout of SSL BIO B. BIO_new_ssl() allocates an SSL BIO using SSL_CTX B and using client mode if B is non zero. BIO_new_ssl_connect() creates a new BIO chain consisting of an SSL BIO (using B) followed by a connect BIO. BIO_new_buffer_ssl_connect() creates a new BIO chain consisting -of a buffering BIO, an SSL BIO (using B) and a connect -BIO. +of a buffering BIO, an SSL BIO (using B), and a connect BIO. BIO_ssl_copy_session_id() copies an SSL session id between BIO chains B and B. It does this by locating the SSL BIOs in each chain and calling SSL_copy_session_id() on the internal SSL pointer. BIO_ssl_shutdown() closes down an SSL connection on BIO chain B. It does this by locating the SSL BIO in the chain and calling SSL_shutdown() on its internal SSL pointer. BIO_do_handshake() attempts to complete an SSL handshake on the supplied BIO and establish the SSL connection. It returns 1 if the connection was established successfully. A zero or negative value is returned if the connection could not be established, the call BIO_should_retry() should be used for non blocking connect BIOs to determine if the call should be retried. If an SSL connection has already been established this call has no effect. =head1 NOTES SSL BIOs are exceptional in that if the underlying transport is non blocking they can still request a retry in exceptional circumstances. Specifically this will happen if a session renegotiation takes place during a BIO_read_ex() operation, one case where this happens is when step up occurs. The SSL flag SSL_AUTO_RETRY can be set to disable this behaviour. That is when this flag is set an SSL BIO using a blocking transport will never request a retry. Since unknown BIO_ctrl() operations are sent through filter BIOs the servers name and port can be set using BIO_set_host() on the BIO returned by BIO_new_ssl_connect() without having to locate the connect BIO first. Applications do not have to call BIO_do_handshake() but may wish to do so to separate the handshake process from other I/O processing. BIO_set_ssl(), BIO_get_ssl(), BIO_set_ssl_mode(), BIO_set_ssl_renegotiate_bytes(), BIO_set_ssl_renegotiate_timeout(), BIO_get_num_renegotiates(), and BIO_do_handshake() are implemented as macros. =head1 RETURN VALUES BIO_f_ssl() returns the SSL B structure. BIO_set_ssl(), BIO_get_ssl(), BIO_set_ssl_mode(), BIO_set_ssl_renegotiate_bytes(), BIO_set_ssl_renegotiate_timeout() and BIO_get_num_renegotiates() return 1 on success or a value which is less than or equal to 0 if an error occurred. BIO_new_ssl(), BIO_new_ssl_connect() and BIO_new_buffer_ssl_connect() return a valid B structure on success or B if an error occurred. BIO_ssl_copy_session_id() returns 1 on success or 0 on error. BIO_do_handshake() returns 1 if the connection was established successfully. A zero or negative value is returned if the connection could not be established. =head1 EXAMPLES This SSL/TLS client example attempts to retrieve a page from an SSL/TLS web server. The I/O routines are identical to those of the unencrypted example in L. BIO *sbio, *out; int len; char tmpbuf[1024]; SSL_CTX *ctx; SSL *ssl; /* XXX Seed the PRNG if needed. */ ctx = SSL_CTX_new(TLS_client_method()); /* XXX Set verify paths and mode here. */ sbio = BIO_new_ssl_connect(ctx); BIO_get_ssl(sbio, &ssl); if (ssl == NULL) { fprintf(stderr, "Can't locate SSL pointer\n"); ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr); exit(1); } /* Don't want any retries */ SSL_set_mode(ssl, SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY); /* XXX We might want to do other things with ssl here */ /* An empty host part means the loopback address */ BIO_set_conn_hostname(sbio, ":https"); out = BIO_new_fp(stdout, BIO_NOCLOSE); if (BIO_do_connect(sbio) <= 0) { fprintf(stderr, "Error connecting to server\n"); ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr); exit(1); } /* XXX Could examine ssl here to get connection info */ BIO_puts(sbio, "GET / HTTP/1.0\n\n"); for (;;) { len = BIO_read(sbio, tmpbuf, 1024); if (len <= 0) break; BIO_write(out, tmpbuf, len); } BIO_free_all(sbio); BIO_free(out); Here is a simple server example. It makes use of a buffering BIO to allow lines to be read from the SSL BIO using BIO_gets. It creates a pseudo web page containing the actual request from a client and also echoes the request to standard output. BIO *sbio, *bbio, *acpt, *out; int len; char tmpbuf[1024]; SSL_CTX *ctx; SSL *ssl; /* XXX Seed the PRNG if needed. */ ctx = SSL_CTX_new(TLS_server_method()); if (!SSL_CTX_use_certificate_file(ctx, "server.pem", SSL_FILETYPE_PEM) || !SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey_file(ctx, "server.pem", SSL_FILETYPE_PEM) || !SSL_CTX_check_private_key(ctx)) { fprintf(stderr, "Error setting up SSL_CTX\n"); ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr); exit(1); } /* XXX Other things like set verify locations, EDH temp callbacks. */ /* New SSL BIO setup as server */ sbio = BIO_new_ssl(ctx, 0); BIO_get_ssl(sbio, &ssl); if (ssl == NULL) { fprintf(stderr, "Can't locate SSL pointer\n"); ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr); exit(1); } SSL_set_mode(ssl, SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY); bbio = BIO_new(BIO_f_buffer()); sbio = BIO_push(bbio, sbio); acpt = BIO_new_accept("4433"); /* * By doing this when a new connection is established * we automatically have sbio inserted into it. The * BIO chain is now 'swallowed' by the accept BIO and * will be freed when the accept BIO is freed. */ BIO_set_accept_bios(acpt, sbio); out = BIO_new_fp(stdout, BIO_NOCLOSE); /* Setup accept BIO */ if (BIO_do_accept(acpt) <= 0) { fprintf(stderr, "Error setting up accept BIO\n"); ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr); exit(1); } /* We only want one connection so remove and free accept BIO */ sbio = BIO_pop(acpt); BIO_free_all(acpt); if (BIO_do_handshake(sbio) <= 0) { fprintf(stderr, "Error in SSL handshake\n"); ERR_print_errors_fp(stderr); exit(1); } BIO_puts(sbio, "HTTP/1.0 200 OK\r\nContent-type: text/plain\r\n\r\n"); BIO_puts(sbio, "\r\nConnection Established\r\nRequest headers:\r\n"); BIO_puts(sbio, "--------------------------------------------------\r\n"); for (;;) { len = BIO_gets(sbio, tmpbuf, 1024); if (len <= 0) break; BIO_write(sbio, tmpbuf, len); BIO_write(out, tmpbuf, len); /* Look for blank line signifying end of headers*/ if (tmpbuf[0] == '\r' || tmpbuf[0] == '\n') break; } BIO_puts(sbio, "--------------------------------------------------\r\n"); BIO_puts(sbio, "\r\n"); BIO_flush(sbio); BIO_free_all(sbio); =head1 HISTORY In OpenSSL before 1.0.0 the BIO_pop() call was handled incorrectly, the I/O BIO reference count was incorrectly incremented (instead of decremented) and dissociated with the SSL BIO even if the SSL BIO was not explicitly being popped (e.g. a pop higher up the chain). Applications which included workarounds for this bug (e.g. freeing BIOs more than once) should be modified to handle this fix or they may free up an already freed BIO. =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2000-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut diff --git a/doc/man3/BIO_push.pod b/doc/man3/BIO_push.pod index 8b98bee49885..e16daafe8822 100644 --- a/doc/man3/BIO_push.pod +++ b/doc/man3/BIO_push.pod @@ -1,89 +1,98 @@ =pod =head1 NAME BIO_push, BIO_pop, BIO_set_next - add and remove BIOs from a chain =head1 SYNOPSIS #include - BIO *BIO_push(BIO *b, BIO *append); + BIO *BIO_push(BIO *b, BIO *next); BIO *BIO_pop(BIO *b); void BIO_set_next(BIO *b, BIO *next); =head1 DESCRIPTION -The BIO_push() function appends the BIO B to B, it returns -B. +BIO_push() pushes I on I. +If I is NULL the function does nothing and returns I. +Otherwise it prepends I, which may be a single BIO or a chain of BIOs, +to I (unless I is NULL). +It then makes a control call on I and returns I. -BIO_pop() removes the BIO B from a chain and returns the next BIO -in the chain, or NULL if there is no next BIO. The removed BIO then -becomes a single BIO with no association with the original chain, -it can thus be freed or attached to a different chain. +BIO_pop() removes the BIO I from any chain is is part of. +If I is NULL the function does nothing and returns NULL. +Otherwise it makes a control call on I and +returns the next BIO in the chain, or NULL if there is no next BIO. +The removed BIO becomes a single BIO with no association with +the original chain, it can thus be freed or be made part of a different chain. BIO_set_next() replaces the existing next BIO in a chain with the BIO pointed to -by B. The new chain may include some of the same BIOs from the old chain +by I. The new chain may include some of the same BIOs from the old chain or it may be completely different. =head1 NOTES The names of these functions are perhaps a little misleading. BIO_push() joins two BIO chains whereas BIO_pop() deletes a single BIO from a chain, the deleted BIO does not need to be at the end of a chain. The process of calling BIO_push() and BIO_pop() on a BIO may have additional -consequences (a control call is made to the affected BIOs) any effects will -be noted in the descriptions of individual BIOs. +consequences (a control call is made to the affected BIOs). +Any effects will be noted in the descriptions of individual BIOs. =head1 RETURN VALUES -BIO_push() returns the end of the chain, B. +BIO_push() returns the head of the chain, +which usually is I, or I if I is NULL. -BIO_pop() returns the next BIO in the chain, or NULL if there is no next -BIO. +BIO_pop() returns the next BIO in the chain, +or NULL if there is no next BIO. =head1 EXAMPLES -For these examples suppose B and B are digest BIOs, B is -a base64 BIO and B is a file BIO. +For these examples suppose I and I are digest BIOs, +I is a base64 BIO and I is a file BIO. If the call: BIO_push(b64, f); -is made then the new chain will be B. After making the calls +is made then the new chain will be I. After making the calls BIO_push(md2, b64); BIO_push(md1, md2); -the new chain is B. Data written to B will be digested -by B and B, B encoded and written to B. +the new chain is I. Data written to I will be digested +by I and I, base64 encoded, and finally written to I. It should be noted that reading causes data to pass in the reverse -direction, that is data is read from B, B decoded and digested -by B and B. If the call: +direction, that is data is read from I, base64 decoded, +and digested by I and then I. + +The call: BIO_pop(md2); -The call will return B and the new chain will be B data can -be written to B as before. +will return I and the new chain will be I. +Data can be written to and read from I as before, +except that I will no more be applied. =head1 SEE ALSO L =head1 HISTORY The BIO_set_next() function was added in OpenSSL 1.1.0. =head1 COPYRIGHT Copyright 2000-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut diff --git a/doc/man3/BN_rand.pod b/doc/man3/BN_rand.pod index d57348e62b8c..5ed14a926fcc 100644 --- a/doc/man3/BN_rand.pod +++ b/doc/man3/BN_rand.pod @@ -1,99 +1,99 @@ =pod =head1 NAME BN_rand, BN_priv_rand, BN_pseudo_rand, BN_rand_range, BN_priv_rand_range, BN_pseudo_rand_range - generate pseudo-random number =head1 SYNOPSIS #include int BN_rand(BIGNUM *rnd, int bits, int top, int bottom); int BN_priv_rand(BIGNUM *rnd, int bits, int top, int bottom); int BN_pseudo_rand(BIGNUM *rnd, int bits, int top, int bottom); int BN_rand_range(BIGNUM *rnd, BIGNUM *range); int BN_priv_rand_range(BIGNUM *rnd, BIGNUM *range); int BN_pseudo_rand_range(BIGNUM *rnd, BIGNUM *range); =head1 DESCRIPTION BN_rand() generates a cryptographically strong pseudo-random number of B in length and stores it in B. If B is less than zero, or too small to accommodate the requirements specified by the B and B parameters, an error is returned. The B parameters specifies requirements on the most significant bit of the generated number. If it is B, there is no constraint. If it is B, the top bit must be one. If it is B, the two most significant bits of the number will be set to 1, so that the product of two such random numbers will always have 2*B length. If B is B, the number will be odd; if it is B it can be odd or even. -If B is 1 then B cannot also be B. +If B is 1 then B cannot also be B. BN_rand_range() generates a cryptographically strong pseudo-random number B in the range 0 E= B E B. BN_priv_rand() and BN_priv_rand_range() have the same semantics as BN_rand() and BN_rand_range() respectively. They are intended to be used for generating values that should remain private, and mirror the same difference between L and L. =head1 NOTES Always check the error return value of these functions and do not take randomness for granted: an error occurs if the CSPRNG has not been seeded with enough randomness to ensure an unpredictable byte sequence. =head1 RETURN VALUES The functions return 1 on success, 0 on error. The error codes can be obtained by L. =head1 SEE ALSO L, L, L, L, L, L =head1 HISTORY =over 2 =item * Starting with OpenSSL release 1.1.0, BN_pseudo_rand() has been identical to BN_rand() and BN_pseudo_rand_range() has been identical to BN_rand_range(). The "pseudo" functions should not be used and may be deprecated in a future release. =item * The BN_priv_rand() and BN_priv_rand_range() functions were added in OpenSSL 1.1.1. =back =head1 COPYRIGHT -Copyright 2000-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. +Copyright 2000-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut diff --git a/doc/man3/ENGINE_add.pod b/doc/man3/ENGINE_add.pod index 369900c248c5..34a640d20553 100644 --- a/doc/man3/ENGINE_add.pod +++ b/doc/man3/ENGINE_add.pod @@ -1,667 +1,666 @@ =pod =head1 NAME ENGINE_get_DH, ENGINE_get_DSA, ENGINE_by_id, ENGINE_get_cipher_engine, ENGINE_get_default_DH, ENGINE_get_default_DSA, ENGINE_get_default_RAND, ENGINE_get_default_RSA, ENGINE_get_digest_engine, ENGINE_get_first, ENGINE_get_last, ENGINE_get_next, ENGINE_get_prev, ENGINE_new, ENGINE_get_ciphers, ENGINE_get_ctrl_function, ENGINE_get_digests, ENGINE_get_destroy_function, ENGINE_get_finish_function, ENGINE_get_init_function, ENGINE_get_load_privkey_function, ENGINE_get_load_pubkey_function, ENGINE_load_private_key, ENGINE_load_public_key, ENGINE_get_RAND, ENGINE_get_RSA, ENGINE_get_id, ENGINE_get_name, ENGINE_get_cmd_defns, ENGINE_get_cipher, ENGINE_get_digest, ENGINE_add, ENGINE_cmd_is_executable, ENGINE_ctrl, ENGINE_ctrl_cmd, ENGINE_ctrl_cmd_string, ENGINE_finish, ENGINE_free, ENGINE_get_flags, ENGINE_init, ENGINE_register_DH, ENGINE_register_DSA, ENGINE_register_RAND, ENGINE_register_RSA, ENGINE_register_all_complete, ENGINE_register_ciphers, ENGINE_register_complete, ENGINE_register_digests, ENGINE_remove, ENGINE_set_DH, ENGINE_set_DSA, ENGINE_set_RAND, ENGINE_set_RSA, ENGINE_set_ciphers, ENGINE_set_cmd_defns, ENGINE_set_ctrl_function, ENGINE_set_default, ENGINE_set_default_DH, ENGINE_set_default_DSA, ENGINE_set_default_RAND, ENGINE_set_default_RSA, ENGINE_set_default_ciphers, ENGINE_set_default_digests, ENGINE_set_default_string, ENGINE_set_destroy_function, ENGINE_set_digests, ENGINE_set_finish_function, ENGINE_set_flags, ENGINE_set_id, ENGINE_set_init_function, ENGINE_set_load_privkey_function, ENGINE_set_load_pubkey_function, ENGINE_set_name, ENGINE_up_ref, ENGINE_get_table_flags, ENGINE_cleanup, ENGINE_load_builtin_engines, ENGINE_register_all_DH, ENGINE_register_all_DSA, ENGINE_register_all_RAND, ENGINE_register_all_RSA, ENGINE_register_all_ciphers, ENGINE_register_all_digests, ENGINE_set_table_flags, ENGINE_unregister_DH, ENGINE_unregister_DSA, ENGINE_unregister_RAND, ENGINE_unregister_RSA, ENGINE_unregister_ciphers, ENGINE_unregister_digests - ENGINE cryptographic module support =head1 SYNOPSIS #include ENGINE *ENGINE_get_first(void); ENGINE *ENGINE_get_last(void); ENGINE *ENGINE_get_next(ENGINE *e); ENGINE *ENGINE_get_prev(ENGINE *e); int ENGINE_add(ENGINE *e); int ENGINE_remove(ENGINE *e); ENGINE *ENGINE_by_id(const char *id); int ENGINE_init(ENGINE *e); int ENGINE_finish(ENGINE *e); void ENGINE_load_builtin_engines(void); ENGINE *ENGINE_get_default_RSA(void); ENGINE *ENGINE_get_default_DSA(void); ENGINE *ENGINE_get_default_DH(void); ENGINE *ENGINE_get_default_RAND(void); ENGINE *ENGINE_get_cipher_engine(int nid); ENGINE *ENGINE_get_digest_engine(int nid); int ENGINE_set_default_RSA(ENGINE *e); int ENGINE_set_default_DSA(ENGINE *e); int ENGINE_set_default_DH(ENGINE *e); int ENGINE_set_default_RAND(ENGINE *e); int ENGINE_set_default_ciphers(ENGINE *e); int ENGINE_set_default_digests(ENGINE *e); int ENGINE_set_default_string(ENGINE *e, const char *list); int ENGINE_set_default(ENGINE *e, unsigned int flags); unsigned int ENGINE_get_table_flags(void); void ENGINE_set_table_flags(unsigned int flags); int ENGINE_register_RSA(ENGINE *e); void ENGINE_unregister_RSA(ENGINE *e); void ENGINE_register_all_RSA(void); int ENGINE_register_DSA(ENGINE *e); void ENGINE_unregister_DSA(ENGINE *e); void ENGINE_register_all_DSA(void); int ENGINE_register_DH(ENGINE *e); void ENGINE_unregister_DH(ENGINE *e); void ENGINE_register_all_DH(void); int ENGINE_register_RAND(ENGINE *e); void ENGINE_unregister_RAND(ENGINE *e); void ENGINE_register_all_RAND(void); int ENGINE_register_ciphers(ENGINE *e); void ENGINE_unregister_ciphers(ENGINE *e); void ENGINE_register_all_ciphers(void); int ENGINE_register_digests(ENGINE *e); void ENGINE_unregister_digests(ENGINE *e); void ENGINE_register_all_digests(void); int ENGINE_register_complete(ENGINE *e); int ENGINE_register_all_complete(void); int ENGINE_ctrl(ENGINE *e, int cmd, long i, void *p, void (*f)(void)); int ENGINE_cmd_is_executable(ENGINE *e, int cmd); int ENGINE_ctrl_cmd(ENGINE *e, const char *cmd_name, long i, void *p, void (*f)(void), int cmd_optional); int ENGINE_ctrl_cmd_string(ENGINE *e, const char *cmd_name, const char *arg, int cmd_optional); ENGINE *ENGINE_new(void); int ENGINE_free(ENGINE *e); int ENGINE_up_ref(ENGINE *e); int ENGINE_set_id(ENGINE *e, const char *id); int ENGINE_set_name(ENGINE *e, const char *name); int ENGINE_set_RSA(ENGINE *e, const RSA_METHOD *rsa_meth); int ENGINE_set_DSA(ENGINE *e, const DSA_METHOD *dsa_meth); int ENGINE_set_DH(ENGINE *e, const DH_METHOD *dh_meth); int ENGINE_set_RAND(ENGINE *e, const RAND_METHOD *rand_meth); int ENGINE_set_destroy_function(ENGINE *e, ENGINE_GEN_INT_FUNC_PTR destroy_f); int ENGINE_set_init_function(ENGINE *e, ENGINE_GEN_INT_FUNC_PTR init_f); int ENGINE_set_finish_function(ENGINE *e, ENGINE_GEN_INT_FUNC_PTR finish_f); int ENGINE_set_ctrl_function(ENGINE *e, ENGINE_CTRL_FUNC_PTR ctrl_f); int ENGINE_set_load_privkey_function(ENGINE *e, ENGINE_LOAD_KEY_PTR loadpriv_f); int ENGINE_set_load_pubkey_function(ENGINE *e, ENGINE_LOAD_KEY_PTR loadpub_f); int ENGINE_set_ciphers(ENGINE *e, ENGINE_CIPHERS_PTR f); int ENGINE_set_digests(ENGINE *e, ENGINE_DIGESTS_PTR f); int ENGINE_set_flags(ENGINE *e, int flags); int ENGINE_set_cmd_defns(ENGINE *e, const ENGINE_CMD_DEFN *defns); const char *ENGINE_get_id(const ENGINE *e); const char *ENGINE_get_name(const ENGINE *e); const RSA_METHOD *ENGINE_get_RSA(const ENGINE *e); const DSA_METHOD *ENGINE_get_DSA(const ENGINE *e); const DH_METHOD *ENGINE_get_DH(const ENGINE *e); const RAND_METHOD *ENGINE_get_RAND(const ENGINE *e); ENGINE_GEN_INT_FUNC_PTR ENGINE_get_destroy_function(const ENGINE *e); ENGINE_GEN_INT_FUNC_PTR ENGINE_get_init_function(const ENGINE *e); ENGINE_GEN_INT_FUNC_PTR ENGINE_get_finish_function(const ENGINE *e); ENGINE_CTRL_FUNC_PTR ENGINE_get_ctrl_function(const ENGINE *e); ENGINE_LOAD_KEY_PTR ENGINE_get_load_privkey_function(const ENGINE *e); ENGINE_LOAD_KEY_PTR ENGINE_get_load_pubkey_function(const ENGINE *e); ENGINE_CIPHERS_PTR ENGINE_get_ciphers(const ENGINE *e); ENGINE_DIGESTS_PTR ENGINE_get_digests(const ENGINE *e); const EVP_CIPHER *ENGINE_get_cipher(ENGINE *e, int nid); const EVP_MD *ENGINE_get_digest(ENGINE *e, int nid); int ENGINE_get_flags(const ENGINE *e); const ENGINE_CMD_DEFN *ENGINE_get_cmd_defns(const ENGINE *e); EVP_PKEY *ENGINE_load_private_key(ENGINE *e, const char *key_id, UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data); EVP_PKEY *ENGINE_load_public_key(ENGINE *e, const char *key_id, UI_METHOD *ui_method, void *callback_data); Deprecated: #if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L void ENGINE_cleanup(void) #endif =head1 DESCRIPTION These functions create, manipulate, and use cryptographic modules in the form of B objects. These objects act as containers for implementations of cryptographic algorithms, and support a reference-counted mechanism to allow them to be dynamically loaded in and out of the running application. The cryptographic functionality that can be provided by an B implementation includes the following abstractions; RSA_METHOD - for providing alternative RSA implementations DSA_METHOD, DH_METHOD, RAND_METHOD, ECDH_METHOD, ECDSA_METHOD, - similarly for other OpenSSL APIs EVP_CIPHER - potentially multiple cipher algorithms (indexed by 'nid') EVP_DIGEST - potentially multiple hash algorithms (indexed by 'nid') key-loading - loading public and/or private EVP_PKEY keys =head2 Reference counting and handles Due to the modular nature of the ENGINE API, pointers to ENGINEs need to be treated as handles - i.e. not only as pointers, but also as references to the underlying ENGINE object. Ie. one should obtain a new reference when making copies of an ENGINE pointer if the copies will be used (and released) independently. ENGINE objects have two levels of reference-counting to match the way in which the objects are used. At the most basic level, each ENGINE pointer is inherently a B reference - a structural reference is required to use the pointer value at all, as this kind of reference is a guarantee that the structure can not be deallocated until the reference is released. However, a structural reference provides no guarantee that the ENGINE is initialised and able to use any of its cryptographic implementations. Indeed it's quite possible that most ENGINEs will not initialise at all in typical environments, as ENGINEs are typically used to support specialised hardware. To use an ENGINE's functionality, you need a B reference. This kind of reference can be considered a specialised form of structural reference, because each functional reference implicitly contains a structural reference as well - however to avoid difficult-to-find programming bugs, it is recommended to treat the two kinds of reference independently. If you have a functional reference to an ENGINE, you have a guarantee that the ENGINE has been initialised and is ready to perform cryptographic operations, and will remain initialised until after you have released your reference. I This basic type of reference is used for instantiating new ENGINEs, iterating across OpenSSL's internal linked-list of loaded ENGINEs, reading information about an ENGINE, etc. Essentially a structural reference is sufficient if you only need to query or manipulate the data of an ENGINE implementation rather than use its functionality. The ENGINE_new() function returns a structural reference to a new (empty) ENGINE object. There are other ENGINE API functions that return structural references such as; ENGINE_by_id(), ENGINE_get_first(), ENGINE_get_last(), ENGINE_get_next(), ENGINE_get_prev(). All structural references should be released by a corresponding to call to the ENGINE_free() function - the ENGINE object itself will only actually be cleaned up and deallocated when the last structural reference is released. It should also be noted that many ENGINE API function calls that accept a structural reference will internally obtain another reference - typically this happens whenever the supplied ENGINE will be needed by OpenSSL after the function has returned. Eg. the function to add a new ENGINE to OpenSSL's internal list is ENGINE_add() - if this function returns success, then OpenSSL will have stored a new structural reference internally so the caller is still responsible for freeing their own reference with ENGINE_free() when they are finished with it. In a similar way, some functions will automatically release the structural reference passed to it if part of the function's job is to do so. Eg. the ENGINE_get_next() and ENGINE_get_prev() functions are used for iterating across the internal ENGINE list - they will return a new structural reference to the next (or previous) ENGINE in the list or NULL if at the end (or beginning) of the list, but in either case the structural reference passed to the function is released on behalf of the caller. To clarify a particular function's handling of references, one should always consult that function's documentation "man" page, or failing that the openssl/engine.h header file includes some hints. I As mentioned, functional references exist when the cryptographic functionality of an ENGINE is required to be available. A functional reference can be obtained in one of two ways; from an existing structural reference to the required ENGINE, or by asking OpenSSL for the default operational ENGINE for a given cryptographic purpose. To obtain a functional reference from an existing structural reference, call the ENGINE_init() function. This returns zero if the ENGINE was not already operational and couldn't be successfully initialised (e.g. lack of system drivers, no special hardware attached, etc), otherwise it will return nonzero to indicate that the ENGINE is now operational and will have allocated a new B reference to the ENGINE. All functional references are released by calling ENGINE_finish() (which removes the implicit structural reference as well). The second way to get a functional reference is by asking OpenSSL for a default implementation for a given task, e.g. by ENGINE_get_default_RSA(), ENGINE_get_default_cipher_engine(), etc. These are discussed in the next section, though they are not usually required by application programmers as they are used automatically when creating and using the relevant algorithm-specific types in OpenSSL, such as RSA, DSA, EVP_CIPHER_CTX, etc. =head2 Default implementations For each supported abstraction, the ENGINE code maintains an internal table of state to control which implementations are available for a given abstraction and which should be used by default. These implementations are registered in the tables and indexed by an 'nid' value, because abstractions like EVP_CIPHER and EVP_DIGEST support many distinct algorithms and modes, and ENGINEs can support arbitrarily many of them. In the case of other abstractions like RSA, DSA, etc, there is only one "algorithm" so all implementations implicitly register using the same 'nid' index. When a default ENGINE is requested for a given abstraction/algorithm/mode, (e.g. when calling RSA_new_method(NULL)), a "get_default" call will be made to the ENGINE subsystem to process the corresponding state table and return a functional reference to an initialised ENGINE whose implementation should be used. If no ENGINE should (or can) be used, it will return NULL and the caller will operate with a NULL ENGINE handle - this usually equates to using the conventional software implementation. In the latter case, OpenSSL will from then on behave the way it used to before the ENGINE API existed. Each state table has a flag to note whether it has processed this "get_default" query since the table was last modified, because to process this question it must iterate across all the registered ENGINEs in the table trying to initialise each of them in turn, in case one of them is operational. If it returns a functional reference to an ENGINE, it will also cache another reference to speed up processing future queries (without needing to iterate across the table). Likewise, it will cache a NULL response if no ENGINE was available so that future queries won't repeat the same iteration unless the state table changes. This behaviour can also be changed; if the ENGINE_TABLE_FLAG_NOINIT flag is set (using ENGINE_set_table_flags()), no attempted initialisations will take place, instead the only way for the state table to return a non-NULL ENGINE to the "get_default" query will be if one is expressly set in the table. Eg. ENGINE_set_default_RSA() does the same job as ENGINE_register_RSA() except that it also sets the state table's cached response for the "get_default" query. In the case of abstractions like EVP_CIPHER, where implementations are indexed by 'nid', these flags and cached-responses are distinct for each 'nid' value. =head2 Application requirements This section will explain the basic things an application programmer should support to make the most useful elements of the ENGINE functionality available to the user. The first thing to consider is whether the programmer wishes to make alternative ENGINE modules available to the application and user. OpenSSL maintains an internal linked list of "visible" ENGINEs from which it has to operate - at start-up, this list is empty and in fact if an application does not call any ENGINE API calls and it uses static linking against openssl, then the resulting application binary will not contain any alternative ENGINE code at all. So the first consideration is whether any/all available ENGINE implementations should be made visible to OpenSSL - this is controlled by calling the various "load" functions. The fact that ENGINEs are made visible to OpenSSL (and thus are linked into the program and loaded into memory at run-time) does not mean they are "registered" or called into use by OpenSSL automatically - that behaviour is something for the application to control. Some applications will want to allow the user to specify exactly which ENGINE they want used if any is to be used at all. Others may prefer to load all support and have OpenSSL automatically use at run-time any ENGINE that is able to successfully initialise - i.e. to assume that this corresponds to acceleration hardware attached to the machine or some such thing. There are probably numerous other ways in which applications may prefer to handle things, so we will simply illustrate the consequences as they apply to a couple of simple cases and leave developers to consider these and the source code to openssl's builtin utilities as guides. If no ENGINE API functions are called within an application, then OpenSSL will not allocate any internal resources. Prior to OpenSSL 1.1.0, however, if any ENGINEs are loaded, even if not registered or used, it was necessary to call ENGINE_cleanup() before the program exits. I Here we'll assume an application has been configured by its user or admin to want to use the "ACME" ENGINE if it is available in the version of OpenSSL the application was compiled with. If it is available, it should be used by default for all RSA, DSA, and symmetric cipher operations, otherwise OpenSSL should use its builtin software as per usual. The following code illustrates how to approach this; ENGINE *e; const char *engine_id = "ACME"; ENGINE_load_builtin_engines(); e = ENGINE_by_id(engine_id); if (!e) /* the engine isn't available */ return; if (!ENGINE_init(e)) { /* the engine couldn't initialise, release 'e' */ ENGINE_free(e); return; } if (!ENGINE_set_default_RSA(e)) /* * This should only happen when 'e' can't initialise, but the previous * statement suggests it did. */ abort(); ENGINE_set_default_DSA(e); ENGINE_set_default_ciphers(e); /* Release the functional reference from ENGINE_init() */ ENGINE_finish(e); /* Release the structural reference from ENGINE_by_id() */ ENGINE_free(e); I Here we'll assume we want to load and register all ENGINE implementations bundled with OpenSSL, such that for any cryptographic algorithm required by OpenSSL - if there is an ENGINE that implements it and can be initialised, it should be used. The following code illustrates how this can work; /* Load all bundled ENGINEs into memory and make them visible */ ENGINE_load_builtin_engines(); /* Register all of them for every algorithm they collectively implement */ ENGINE_register_all_complete(); That's all that's required. Eg. the next time OpenSSL tries to set up an RSA key, any bundled ENGINEs that implement RSA_METHOD will be passed to ENGINE_init() and if any of those succeed, that ENGINE will be set as the default for RSA use from then on. =head2 Advanced configuration support There is a mechanism supported by the ENGINE framework that allows each ENGINE implementation to define an arbitrary set of configuration "commands" and expose them to OpenSSL and any applications based on OpenSSL. This mechanism is entirely based on the use of name-value pairs and assumes ASCII input (no unicode or UTF for now!), so it is ideal if applications want to provide a transparent way for users to provide arbitrary configuration "directives" directly to such ENGINEs. It is also possible for the application to dynamically interrogate the loaded ENGINE implementations for the names, descriptions, and input flags of their available "control commands", providing a more flexible configuration scheme. However, if the user is expected to know which ENGINE device he/she is using (in the case of specialised hardware, this goes without saying) then applications may not need to concern themselves with discovering the supported control commands and simply prefer to pass settings into ENGINEs exactly as they are provided by the user. Before illustrating how control commands work, it is worth mentioning what they are typically used for. Broadly speaking there are two uses for control commands; the first is to provide the necessary details to the implementation (which may know nothing at all specific to the host system) so that it can be initialised for use. This could include the path to any driver or config files it needs to load, required network addresses, smart-card identifiers, passwords to initialise protected devices, logging information, etc etc. This class of commands typically needs to be passed to an ENGINE B attempting to initialise it, i.e. before calling ENGINE_init(). The other class of commands consist of settings or operations that tweak certain behaviour or cause certain operations to take place, and these commands may work either before or after ENGINE_init(), or in some cases both. ENGINE implementations should provide indications of this in the descriptions attached to builtin control commands and/or in external product documentation. I Let's illustrate by example; a function for which the caller supplies the name of the ENGINE it wishes to use, a table of string-pairs for use before initialisation, and another table for use after initialisation. Note that the string-pairs used for control commands consist of a command "name" followed by the command "parameter" - the parameter could be NULL in some cases but the name can not. This function should initialise the ENGINE (issuing the "pre" commands beforehand and the "post" commands afterwards) and set it as the default for everything except RAND and then return a boolean success or failure. int generic_load_engine_fn(const char *engine_id, const char **pre_cmds, int pre_num, const char **post_cmds, int post_num) { ENGINE *e = ENGINE_by_id(engine_id); if (!e) return 0; while (pre_num--) { if (!ENGINE_ctrl_cmd_string(e, pre_cmds[0], pre_cmds[1], 0)) { fprintf(stderr, "Failed command (%s - %s:%s)\n", engine_id, pre_cmds[0], pre_cmds[1] ? pre_cmds[1] : "(NULL)"); ENGINE_free(e); return 0; } pre_cmds += 2; } if (!ENGINE_init(e)) { fprintf(stderr, "Failed initialisation\n"); ENGINE_free(e); return 0; } /* * ENGINE_init() returned a functional reference, so free the structural * reference from ENGINE_by_id(). */ ENGINE_free(e); while (post_num--) { if (!ENGINE_ctrl_cmd_string(e, post_cmds[0], post_cmds[1], 0)) { fprintf(stderr, "Failed command (%s - %s:%s)\n", engine_id, post_cmds[0], post_cmds[1] ? post_cmds[1] : "(NULL)"); ENGINE_finish(e); return 0; } post_cmds += 2; } ENGINE_set_default(e, ENGINE_METHOD_ALL & ~ENGINE_METHOD_RAND); /* Success */ return 1; } Note that ENGINE_ctrl_cmd_string() accepts a boolean argument that can relax the semantics of the function - if set nonzero it will only return failure if the ENGINE supported the given command name but failed while executing it, if the ENGINE doesn't support the command name it will simply return success without doing anything. In this case we assume the user is only supplying commands specific to the given ENGINE so we set this to FALSE. I It is possible to discover at run-time the names, numerical-ids, descriptions and input parameters of the control commands supported by an ENGINE using a structural reference. Note that some control commands are defined by OpenSSL itself and it will intercept and handle these control commands on behalf of the ENGINE, i.e. the ENGINE's ctrl() handler is not used for the control command. openssl/engine.h defines an index, ENGINE_CMD_BASE, that all control commands implemented by ENGINEs should be numbered from. Any command value lower than this symbol is considered a "generic" command is handled directly by the OpenSSL core routines. It is using these "core" control commands that one can discover the control commands implemented by a given ENGINE, specifically the commands: ENGINE_HAS_CTRL_FUNCTION ENGINE_CTRL_GET_FIRST_CMD_TYPE ENGINE_CTRL_GET_NEXT_CMD_TYPE ENGINE_CTRL_GET_CMD_FROM_NAME ENGINE_CTRL_GET_NAME_LEN_FROM_CMD ENGINE_CTRL_GET_NAME_FROM_CMD ENGINE_CTRL_GET_DESC_LEN_FROM_CMD ENGINE_CTRL_GET_DESC_FROM_CMD ENGINE_CTRL_GET_CMD_FLAGS Whilst these commands are automatically processed by the OpenSSL framework code, they use various properties exposed by each ENGINE to process these queries. An ENGINE has 3 properties it exposes that can affect how this behaves; it can supply a ctrl() handler, it can specify ENGINE_FLAGS_MANUAL_CMD_CTRL in the ENGINE's flags, and it can expose an array of control command descriptions. If an ENGINE specifies the ENGINE_FLAGS_MANUAL_CMD_CTRL flag, then it will simply pass all these "core" control commands directly to the ENGINE's ctrl() handler (and thus, it must have supplied one), so it is up to the ENGINE to reply to these "discovery" commands itself. If that flag is not set, then the OpenSSL framework code will work with the following rules: if no ctrl() handler supplied; ENGINE_HAS_CTRL_FUNCTION returns FALSE (zero), all other commands fail. if a ctrl() handler was supplied but no array of control commands; ENGINE_HAS_CTRL_FUNCTION returns TRUE, all other commands fail. if a ctrl() handler and array of control commands was supplied; ENGINE_HAS_CTRL_FUNCTION returns TRUE, all other commands proceed processing ... If the ENGINE's array of control commands is empty then all other commands will fail, otherwise; ENGINE_CTRL_GET_FIRST_CMD_TYPE returns the identifier of the first command supported by the ENGINE, ENGINE_GET_NEXT_CMD_TYPE takes the identifier of a command supported by the ENGINE and returns the next command identifier or fails if there are no more, ENGINE_CMD_FROM_NAME takes a string name for a command and returns the corresponding identifier or fails if no such command name exists, and the remaining commands take a command identifier and return properties of the corresponding commands. All except ENGINE_CTRL_GET_FLAGS return the string length of a command name or description, or populate a supplied character buffer with a copy of the command name or description. ENGINE_CTRL_GET_FLAGS returns a bitwise-OR'd mask of the following possible values: ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_NUMERIC ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_STRING ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_NO_INPUT ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_INTERNAL If the ENGINE_CMD_FLAG_INTERNAL flag is set, then any other flags are purely informational to the caller - this flag will prevent the command being usable for any higher-level ENGINE functions such as ENGINE_ctrl_cmd_string(). "INTERNAL" commands are not intended to be exposed to text-based configuration by applications, administrations, users, etc. These can support arbitrary operations via ENGINE_ctrl(), including passing to and/or from the control commands data of any arbitrary type. These commands are supported in the discovery mechanisms simply to allow applications to determine if an ENGINE supports certain specific commands it might want to use (e.g. application "foo" might query various ENGINEs to see if they implement "FOO_GET_VENDOR_LOGO_GIF" - and ENGINE could therefore decide whether or not to support this "foo"-specific extension). =head1 ENVIRONMENT =over 4 =item B The path to the engines directory. Ignored in set-user-ID and set-group-ID programs. =back =head1 RETURN VALUES ENGINE_get_first(), ENGINE_get_last(), ENGINE_get_next() and ENGINE_get_prev() return a valid B structure or NULL if an error occurred. ENGINE_add() and ENGINE_remove() return 1 on success or 0 on error. ENGINE_by_id() returns a valid B structure or NULL if an error occurred. ENGINE_init() and ENGINE_finish() return 1 on success or 0 on error. All ENGINE_get_default_TYPE() functions, ENGINE_get_cipher_engine() and ENGINE_get_digest_engine() return a valid B structure on success or NULL if an error occurred. All ENGINE_set_default_TYPE() functions return 1 on success or 0 on error. ENGINE_set_default() returns 1 on success or 0 on error. ENGINE_get_table_flags() returns an unsigned integer value representing the global table flags which are used to control the registration behaviour of B implementations. All ENGINE_register_TYPE() functions return 1 on success or 0 on error. -ENGINE_register_complete() and ENGINE_register_all_complete() return 1 on success -or 0 on error. +ENGINE_register_complete() and ENGINE_register_all_complete() always return 1. ENGINE_ctrl() returns a positive value on success or others on error. ENGINE_cmd_is_executable() returns 1 if B is executable or 0 otherwise. ENGINE_ctrl_cmd() and ENGINE_ctrl_cmd_string() return 1 on success or 0 on error. ENGINE_new() returns a valid B structure on success or NULL if an error occurred. -ENGINE_free() returns 1 on success or 0 on error. +ENGINE_free() always returns 1. ENGINE_up_ref() returns 1 on success or 0 on error. ENGINE_set_id() and ENGINE_set_name() return 1 on success or 0 on error. All other B functions return 1 on success or 0 on error. ENGINE_get_id() and ENGINE_get_name() return a string representing the identifier and the name of the ENGINE B respectively. ENGINE_get_RSA(), ENGINE_get_DSA(), ENGINE_get_DH() and ENGINE_get_RAND() return corresponding method structures for each algorithms. ENGINE_get_destroy_function(), ENGINE_get_init_function(), ENGINE_get_finish_function(), ENGINE_get_ctrl_function(), ENGINE_get_load_privkey_function(), ENGINE_get_load_pubkey_function(), ENGINE_get_ciphers() and ENGINE_get_digests() return corresponding function pointers of the callbacks. ENGINE_get_cipher() returns a valid B structure on success or NULL if an error occurred. ENGINE_get_digest() returns a valid B structure on success or NULL if an error occurred. ENGINE_get_flags() returns an integer representing the ENGINE flags which are used to control various behaviours of an ENGINE. ENGINE_get_cmd_defns() returns an B structure or NULL if it's not set. ENGINE_load_private_key() and ENGINE_load_public_key() return a valid B structure on success or NULL if an error occurred. =head1 SEE ALSO L, L, L, L, L, L =head1 HISTORY ENGINE_cleanup() was deprecated in OpenSSL 1.1.0 by the automatic cleanup done by OPENSSL_cleanup() and should not be used. =head1 COPYRIGHT -Copyright 2002-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. +Copyright 2002-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut diff --git a/doc/man3/ERR_load_strings.pod b/doc/man3/ERR_load_strings.pod index 3167f2715052..2b21a3bc6d96 100644 --- a/doc/man3/ERR_load_strings.pod +++ b/doc/man3/ERR_load_strings.pod @@ -1,58 +1,58 @@ =pod =head1 NAME ERR_load_strings, ERR_PACK, ERR_get_next_error_library - load arbitrary error strings =head1 SYNOPSIS #include - void ERR_load_strings(int lib, ERR_STRING_DATA str[]); + int ERR_load_strings(int lib, ERR_STRING_DATA *str); int ERR_get_next_error_library(void); unsigned long ERR_PACK(int lib, int func, int reason); =head1 DESCRIPTION ERR_load_strings() registers error strings for library number B. B is an array of error string data: typedef struct ERR_string_data_st { unsigned long error; char *string; } ERR_STRING_DATA; The error code is generated from the library number and a function and reason code: B = ERR_PACK(B, B, B). ERR_PACK() is a macro. The last entry in the array is {0,0}. ERR_get_next_error_library() can be used to assign library numbers to user libraries at runtime. =head1 RETURN VALUES -ERR_load_strings() returns no value. ERR_PACK() return the error code. +ERR_load_strings() returns 1 for success and 0 for failure. ERR_PACK() returns the error code. ERR_get_next_error_library() returns zero on failure, otherwise a new library number. =head1 SEE ALSO L =head1 COPYRIGHT -Copyright 2000-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. +Copyright 2000-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut diff --git a/doc/man3/EVP_EncryptInit.pod b/doc/man3/EVP_EncryptInit.pod index 0d8a780bb794..392ce5dbc579 100644 --- a/doc/man3/EVP_EncryptInit.pod +++ b/doc/man3/EVP_EncryptInit.pod @@ -1,669 +1,671 @@ =pod =head1 NAME EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_reset, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free, EVP_EncryptInit_ex, EVP_EncryptUpdate, EVP_EncryptFinal_ex, EVP_DecryptInit_ex, EVP_DecryptUpdate, EVP_DecryptFinal_ex, EVP_CipherInit_ex, EVP_CipherUpdate, EVP_CipherFinal_ex, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl, EVP_EncryptInit, EVP_EncryptFinal, EVP_DecryptInit, EVP_DecryptFinal, EVP_CipherInit, EVP_CipherFinal, EVP_get_cipherbyname, EVP_get_cipherbynid, EVP_get_cipherbyobj, EVP_CIPHER_nid, EVP_CIPHER_block_size, EVP_CIPHER_key_length, EVP_CIPHER_iv_length, EVP_CIPHER_flags, EVP_CIPHER_mode, EVP_CIPHER_type, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_nid, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_block_size, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_app_data, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_app_data, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_type, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_flags, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode, EVP_CIPHER_param_to_asn1, EVP_CIPHER_asn1_to_param, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding, EVP_enc_null - EVP cipher routines =head1 SYNOPSIS =for comment generic #include EVP_CIPHER_CTX *EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new(void); int EVP_CIPHER_CTX_reset(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx); void EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx); int EVP_EncryptInit_ex(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const EVP_CIPHER *type, ENGINE *impl, const unsigned char *key, const unsigned char *iv); int EVP_EncryptUpdate(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl, const unsigned char *in, int inl); int EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl); int EVP_DecryptInit_ex(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const EVP_CIPHER *type, ENGINE *impl, const unsigned char *key, const unsigned char *iv); int EVP_DecryptUpdate(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl, const unsigned char *in, int inl); int EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *outm, int *outl); int EVP_CipherInit_ex(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const EVP_CIPHER *type, ENGINE *impl, const unsigned char *key, const unsigned char *iv, int enc); int EVP_CipherUpdate(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl, const unsigned char *in, int inl); int EVP_CipherFinal_ex(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *outm, int *outl); int EVP_EncryptInit(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const EVP_CIPHER *type, const unsigned char *key, const unsigned char *iv); int EVP_EncryptFinal(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl); int EVP_DecryptInit(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const EVP_CIPHER *type, const unsigned char *key, const unsigned char *iv); int EVP_DecryptFinal(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *outm, int *outl); int EVP_CipherInit(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const EVP_CIPHER *type, const unsigned char *key, const unsigned char *iv, int enc); int EVP_CipherFinal(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *outm, int *outl); int EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *x, int padding); int EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *x, int keylen); int EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, int type, int arg, void *ptr); int EVP_CIPHER_CTX_rand_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *key); const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_get_cipherbyname(const char *name); const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_get_cipherbynid(int nid); const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_get_cipherbyobj(const ASN1_OBJECT *a); int EVP_CIPHER_nid(const EVP_CIPHER *e); int EVP_CIPHER_block_size(const EVP_CIPHER *e); int EVP_CIPHER_key_length(const EVP_CIPHER *e); int EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(const EVP_CIPHER *e); unsigned long EVP_CIPHER_flags(const EVP_CIPHER *e); unsigned long EVP_CIPHER_mode(const EVP_CIPHER *e); int EVP_CIPHER_type(const EVP_CIPHER *ctx); const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(const EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx); int EVP_CIPHER_CTX_nid(const EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx); int EVP_CIPHER_CTX_block_size(const EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx); int EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(const EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx); int EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(const EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx); void *EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_app_data(const EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx); void EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_app_data(const EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, void *data); int EVP_CIPHER_CTX_type(const EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx); int EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(const EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx); int EVP_CIPHER_param_to_asn1(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c, ASN1_TYPE *type); int EVP_CIPHER_asn1_to_param(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c, ASN1_TYPE *type); =head1 DESCRIPTION The EVP cipher routines are a high-level interface to certain symmetric ciphers. EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new() creates a cipher context. EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free() clears all information from a cipher context and free up any allocated memory associate with it, including B itself. This function should be called after all operations using a cipher are complete so sensitive information does not remain in memory. EVP_EncryptInit_ex() sets up cipher context B for encryption with cipher B from ENGINE B. B must be created before calling this function. B is normally supplied by a function such as EVP_aes_256_cbc(). If B is NULL then the default implementation is used. B is the symmetric key to use and B is the IV to use (if necessary), the actual number of bytes used for the key and IV depends on the cipher. It is possible to set all parameters to NULL except B in an initial call and supply the remaining parameters in subsequent calls, all of which have B set to NULL. This is done when the default cipher parameters are not appropriate. EVP_EncryptUpdate() encrypts B bytes from the buffer B and writes the encrypted version to B. This function can be called multiple times to encrypt successive blocks of data. The amount of data written depends on the block alignment of the encrypted data. For most ciphers and modes, the amount of data written can be anything from zero bytes to (inl + cipher_block_size - 1) bytes. For wrap cipher modes, the amount of data written can be anything from zero bytes to (inl + cipher_block_size) bytes. For stream ciphers, the amount of data written can be anything from zero bytes to inl bytes. Thus, B should contain sufficient room for the operation being performed. The actual number of bytes written is placed in B. It also checks if B and B are partially overlapping, and if they are 0 is returned to indicate failure. If padding is enabled (the default) then EVP_EncryptFinal_ex() encrypts the "final" data, that is any data that remains in a partial block. It uses standard block padding (aka PKCS padding) as described in the NOTES section, below. The encrypted final data is written to B which should have sufficient space for one cipher block. The number of bytes written is placed in B. After this function is called the encryption operation is finished and no further calls to EVP_EncryptUpdate() should be made. If padding is disabled then EVP_EncryptFinal_ex() will not encrypt any more data and it will return an error if any data remains in a partial block: that is if the total data length is not a multiple of the block size. EVP_DecryptInit_ex(), EVP_DecryptUpdate() and EVP_DecryptFinal_ex() are the corresponding decryption operations. EVP_DecryptFinal() will return an error code if padding is enabled and the final block is not correctly formatted. The parameters and restrictions are identical to the encryption operations except that if padding is enabled the decrypted data buffer B passed to EVP_DecryptUpdate() should have sufficient room for (B + cipher_block_size) bytes unless the cipher block size is 1 in which case B bytes is sufficient. EVP_CipherInit_ex(), EVP_CipherUpdate() and EVP_CipherFinal_ex() are functions that can be used for decryption or encryption. The operation performed depends on the value of the B parameter. It should be set to 1 for encryption, 0 for decryption and -1 to leave the value unchanged (the actual value of 'enc' being supplied in a previous call). EVP_CIPHER_CTX_reset() clears all information from a cipher context and free up any allocated memory associate with it, except the B itself. This function should be called anytime B is to be reused for another EVP_CipherInit() / EVP_CipherUpdate() / EVP_CipherFinal() series of calls. EVP_EncryptInit(), EVP_DecryptInit() and EVP_CipherInit() behave in a similar way to EVP_EncryptInit_ex(), EVP_DecryptInit_ex() and EVP_CipherInit_ex() except they always use the default cipher implementation. EVP_EncryptFinal(), EVP_DecryptFinal() and EVP_CipherFinal() are identical to EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(), EVP_DecryptFinal_ex() and EVP_CipherFinal_ex(). In previous releases they also cleaned up the B, but this is no longer done and EVP_CIPHER_CTX_clean() must be called to free any context resources. EVP_get_cipherbyname(), EVP_get_cipherbynid() and EVP_get_cipherbyobj() return an EVP_CIPHER structure when passed a cipher name, a NID or an ASN1_OBJECT structure. EVP_CIPHER_nid() and EVP_CIPHER_CTX_nid() return the NID of a cipher when passed an B or B structure. The actual NID value is an internal value which may not have a corresponding OBJECT IDENTIFIER. EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding() enables or disables padding. This function should be called after the context is set up for encryption or decryption with EVP_EncryptInit_ex(), EVP_DecryptInit_ex() or EVP_CipherInit_ex(). By default encryption operations are padded using standard block padding and the padding is checked and removed when decrypting. If the B parameter is zero then no padding is performed, the total amount of data encrypted or decrypted must then be a multiple of the block size or an error will occur. EVP_CIPHER_key_length() and EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length() return the key length of a cipher when passed an B or B structure. The constant B is the maximum key length for all ciphers. Note: although EVP_CIPHER_key_length() is fixed for a given cipher, the value of EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length() may be different for variable key length ciphers. EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length() sets the key length of the cipher ctx. If the cipher is a fixed length cipher then attempting to set the key length to any value other than the fixed value is an error. EVP_CIPHER_iv_length() and EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length() return the IV length of a cipher when passed an B or B. It will return zero if the cipher does not use an IV. The constant B is the maximum IV length for all ciphers. EVP_CIPHER_block_size() and EVP_CIPHER_CTX_block_size() return the block size of a cipher when passed an B or B structure. The constant B is also the maximum block length for all ciphers. EVP_CIPHER_type() and EVP_CIPHER_CTX_type() return the type of the passed cipher or context. This "type" is the actual NID of the cipher OBJECT IDENTIFIER as such it ignores the cipher parameters and 40 bit RC2 and 128 bit RC2 have the same NID. If the cipher does not have an object identifier or does not have ASN1 support this function will return B. EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher() returns the B structure when passed an B structure. EVP_CIPHER_mode() and EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode() return the block cipher mode: EVP_CIPH_ECB_MODE, EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE, EVP_CIPH_CFB_MODE, EVP_CIPH_OFB_MODE, EVP_CIPH_CTR_MODE, EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE, EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE, EVP_CIPH_XTS_MODE, EVP_CIPH_WRAP_MODE or EVP_CIPH_OCB_MODE. If the cipher is a stream cipher then EVP_CIPH_STREAM_CIPHER is returned. EVP_CIPHER_param_to_asn1() sets the AlgorithmIdentifier "parameter" based on the passed cipher. This will typically include any parameters and an IV. The cipher IV (if any) must be set when this call is made. This call should be made before the cipher is actually "used" (before any EVP_EncryptUpdate(), EVP_DecryptUpdate() calls for example). This function may fail if the cipher does not have any ASN1 support. EVP_CIPHER_asn1_to_param() sets the cipher parameters based on an ASN1 AlgorithmIdentifier "parameter". The precise effect depends on the cipher In the case of RC2, for example, it will set the IV and effective key length. This function should be called after the base cipher type is set but before the key is set. For example EVP_CipherInit() will be called with the IV and key set to NULL, EVP_CIPHER_asn1_to_param() will be called and finally EVP_CipherInit() again with all parameters except the key set to NULL. It is possible for this function to fail if the cipher does not have any ASN1 support or the parameters cannot be set (for example the RC2 effective key length is not supported. EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl() allows various cipher specific parameters to be determined and set. EVP_CIPHER_CTX_rand_key() generates a random key of the appropriate length based on the cipher context. The EVP_CIPHER can provide its own random key generation routine to support keys of a specific form. B must point to a buffer at least as big as the value returned by EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(). =head1 RETURN VALUES EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new() returns a pointer to a newly created B for success and B for failure. EVP_EncryptInit_ex(), EVP_EncryptUpdate() and EVP_EncryptFinal_ex() return 1 for success and 0 for failure. EVP_DecryptInit_ex() and EVP_DecryptUpdate() return 1 for success and 0 for failure. EVP_DecryptFinal_ex() returns 0 if the decrypt failed or 1 for success. EVP_CipherInit_ex() and EVP_CipherUpdate() return 1 for success and 0 for failure. EVP_CipherFinal_ex() returns 0 for a decryption failure or 1 for success. EVP_CIPHER_CTX_reset() returns 1 for success and 0 for failure. EVP_get_cipherbyname(), EVP_get_cipherbynid() and EVP_get_cipherbyobj() return an B structure or NULL on error. EVP_CIPHER_nid() and EVP_CIPHER_CTX_nid() return a NID. EVP_CIPHER_block_size() and EVP_CIPHER_CTX_block_size() return the block size. EVP_CIPHER_key_length() and EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length() return the key length. EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding() always returns 1. EVP_CIPHER_iv_length() and EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length() return the IV length or zero if the cipher does not use an IV. EVP_CIPHER_type() and EVP_CIPHER_CTX_type() return the NID of the cipher's OBJECT IDENTIFIER or NID_undef if it has no defined OBJECT IDENTIFIER. EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher() returns an B structure. EVP_CIPHER_param_to_asn1() and EVP_CIPHER_asn1_to_param() return greater than zero for success and zero or a negative number on failure. EVP_CIPHER_CTX_rand_key() returns 1 for success. =head1 CIPHER LISTING All algorithms have a fixed key length unless otherwise stated. Refer to L for the full list of ciphers available through the EVP interface. =over 4 =item EVP_enc_null() Null cipher: does nothing. =back =head1 AEAD Interface The EVP interface for Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data (AEAD) modes are subtly altered and several additional I operations are supported depending on the mode specified. To specify additional authenticated data (AAD), a call to EVP_CipherUpdate(), EVP_EncryptUpdate() or EVP_DecryptUpdate() should be made with the output parameter B set to B. When decrypting, the return value of EVP_DecryptFinal() or EVP_CipherFinal() indicates whether the operation was successful. If it does not indicate success, the authentication operation has failed and any output data B be used as it is corrupted. =head2 GCM and OCB Modes The following Is are supported in GCM and OCB modes. =over 4 =item EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_IVLEN, ivlen, NULL) Sets the IV length. This call can only be made before specifying an IV. If not called a default IV length is used. For GCM AES and OCB AES the default is 12 (i.e. 96 bits). For OCB mode the maximum is 15. =item EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_GET_TAG, taglen, tag) Writes C bytes of the tag value to the buffer indicated by C. This call can only be made when encrypting data and B all data has been processed (e.g. after an EVP_EncryptFinal() call). For OCB, C must either be 16 or the value previously set via B. =item EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_TAG, taglen, tag) -Sets the expected tag to C bytes from C. -The tag length can only be set before specifying an IV. +When decrypting, this call sets the expected tag to C bytes from C. C must be between 1 and 16 inclusive. +The tag must be set prior to any call to EVP_DecryptFinal() or +EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(). For GCM, this call is only valid when decrypting data. For OCB, this call is valid when decrypting data to set the expected tag, -and before encryption to set the desired tag length. +and when encrypting to set the desired tag length. -In OCB mode, calling this before encryption with C set to C sets the -tag length. If this is not called prior to encryption, a default tag length is -used. +In OCB mode, calling this when encrypting with C set to C sets the +tag length. The tag length can only be set before specifying an IV. If this is +not called prior to setting the IV during encryption, then a default tag length +is used. For OCB AES, the default tag length is 16 (i.e. 128 bits). It is also the maximum tag length for OCB. =back =head2 CCM Mode The EVP interface for CCM mode is similar to that of the GCM mode but with a few additional requirements and different I values. For CCM mode, the total plaintext or ciphertext length B be passed to EVP_CipherUpdate(), EVP_EncryptUpdate() or EVP_DecryptUpdate() with the output and input parameters (B and B) set to B and the length passed in the B parameter. The following Is are supported in CCM mode. =over 4 =item EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_TAG, taglen, tag) This call is made to set the expected B tag value when decrypting or the length of the tag (with the C parameter set to NULL) when encrypting. The tag length is often referred to as B. If not set a default value is used (12 for AES). When decrypting, the tag needs to be set before passing in data to be decrypted, but as in GCM and OCB mode, it can be set after passing additional authenticated data (see L). =item EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_CCM_SET_L, ivlen, NULL) Sets the CCM B value. If not set a default is used (8 for AES). =item EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_IVLEN, ivlen, NULL) Sets the CCM nonce (IV) length. This call can only be made before specifying a nonce value. The nonce length is given by B<15 - L> so it is 7 by default for AES. =back =head2 ChaCha20-Poly1305 The following Is are supported for the ChaCha20-Poly1305 AEAD algorithm. =over 4 =item EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_IVLEN, ivlen, NULL) Sets the nonce length. This call can only be made before specifying the nonce. If not called a default nonce length of 12 (i.e. 96 bits) is used. The maximum nonce length is 12 bytes (i.e. 96-bits). If a nonce of less than 12 bytes is set then the nonce is automatically padded with leading 0 bytes to make it 12 bytes in length. =item EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_GET_TAG, taglen, tag) Writes C bytes of the tag value to the buffer indicated by C. This call can only be made when encrypting data and B all data has been processed (e.g. after an EVP_EncryptFinal() call). C specified here must be 16 (B, i.e. 128-bits) or less. =item EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_TAG, taglen, tag) Sets the expected tag to C bytes from C. The tag length can only be set before specifying an IV. C must be between 1 and 16 (B) inclusive. This call is only valid when decrypting data. =back =head1 NOTES Where possible the B interface to symmetric ciphers should be used in preference to the low-level interfaces. This is because the code then becomes transparent to the cipher used and much more flexible. Additionally, the B interface will ensure the use of platform specific cryptographic acceleration such as AES-NI (the low-level interfaces do not provide the guarantee). PKCS padding works by adding B padding bytes of value B to make the total length of the encrypted data a multiple of the block size. Padding is always added so if the data is already a multiple of the block size B will equal the block size. For example if the block size is 8 and 11 bytes are to be encrypted then 5 padding bytes of value 5 will be added. When decrypting the final block is checked to see if it has the correct form. Although the decryption operation can produce an error if padding is enabled, it is not a strong test that the input data or key is correct. A random block has better than 1 in 256 chance of being of the correct format and problems with the input data earlier on will not produce a final decrypt error. If padding is disabled then the decryption operation will always succeed if the total amount of data decrypted is a multiple of the block size. The functions EVP_EncryptInit(), EVP_EncryptFinal(), EVP_DecryptInit(), EVP_CipherInit() and EVP_CipherFinal() are obsolete but are retained for compatibility with existing code. New code should use EVP_EncryptInit_ex(), EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(), EVP_DecryptInit_ex(), EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(), EVP_CipherInit_ex() and EVP_CipherFinal_ex() because they can reuse an existing context without allocating and freeing it up on each call. There are some differences between functions EVP_CipherInit() and EVP_CipherInit_ex(), significant in some circumstances. EVP_CipherInit() fills the passed context object with zeros. As a consequence, EVP_CipherInit() does not allow step-by-step initialization of the ctx when the I and I are passed in separate calls. It also means that the flags set for the CTX are removed, and it is especially important for the B flag treated specially in EVP_CipherInit_ex(). EVP_get_cipherbynid(), and EVP_get_cipherbyobj() are implemented as macros. =head1 BUGS B and B only refer to the internal ciphers with default key lengths. If custom ciphers exceed these values the results are unpredictable. This is because it has become standard practice to define a generic key as a fixed unsigned char array containing B bytes. The ASN1 code is incomplete (and sometimes inaccurate) it has only been tested for certain common S/MIME ciphers (RC2, DES, triple DES) in CBC mode. =head1 EXAMPLES Encrypt a string using IDEA: int do_crypt(char *outfile) { unsigned char outbuf[1024]; int outlen, tmplen; /* * Bogus key and IV: we'd normally set these from * another source. */ unsigned char key[] = {0,1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15}; unsigned char iv[] = {1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8}; char intext[] = "Some Crypto Text"; EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx; FILE *out; ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new(); EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_idea_cbc(), NULL, key, iv); if (!EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, outbuf, &outlen, intext, strlen(intext))) { /* Error */ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx); return 0; } /* * Buffer passed to EVP_EncryptFinal() must be after data just * encrypted to avoid overwriting it. */ if (!EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(ctx, outbuf + outlen, &tmplen)) { /* Error */ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx); return 0; } outlen += tmplen; EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx); /* * Need binary mode for fopen because encrypted data is * binary data. Also cannot use strlen() on it because * it won't be NUL terminated and may contain embedded * NULs. */ out = fopen(outfile, "wb"); if (out == NULL) { /* Error */ return 0; } fwrite(outbuf, 1, outlen, out); fclose(out); return 1; } The ciphertext from the above example can be decrypted using the B utility with the command line (shown on two lines for clarity): openssl idea -d \ -K 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F -iv 0102030405060708 Supported ciphers are listed in: L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L, L =head1 HISTORY Support for OCB mode was added in OpenSSL 1.1.0. B was made opaque in OpenSSL 1.1.0. As a result, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_reset() appeared and EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup() disappeared. EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init() remains as an alias for EVP_CIPHER_CTX_reset(). =head1 COPYRIGHT -Copyright 2000-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. +Copyright 2000-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut diff --git a/doc/man3/OBJ_nid2obj.pod b/doc/man3/OBJ_nid2obj.pod index f84d5b1eb384..74379ad817da 100644 --- a/doc/man3/OBJ_nid2obj.pod +++ b/doc/man3/OBJ_nid2obj.pod @@ -1,191 +1,191 @@ =pod =head1 NAME i2t_ASN1_OBJECT, OBJ_length, OBJ_get0_data, OBJ_nid2obj, OBJ_nid2ln, OBJ_nid2sn, OBJ_obj2nid, OBJ_txt2nid, OBJ_ln2nid, OBJ_sn2nid, OBJ_cmp, OBJ_dup, OBJ_txt2obj, OBJ_obj2txt, OBJ_create, OBJ_cleanup - ASN1 object utility functions =head1 SYNOPSIS #include ASN1_OBJECT *OBJ_nid2obj(int n); const char *OBJ_nid2ln(int n); const char *OBJ_nid2sn(int n); int OBJ_obj2nid(const ASN1_OBJECT *o); int OBJ_ln2nid(const char *ln); int OBJ_sn2nid(const char *sn); int OBJ_txt2nid(const char *s); ASN1_OBJECT *OBJ_txt2obj(const char *s, int no_name); int OBJ_obj2txt(char *buf, int buf_len, const ASN1_OBJECT *a, int no_name); int i2t_ASN1_OBJECT(char *buf, int buf_len, const ASN1_OBJECT *a); int OBJ_cmp(const ASN1_OBJECT *a, const ASN1_OBJECT *b); ASN1_OBJECT *OBJ_dup(const ASN1_OBJECT *o); int OBJ_create(const char *oid, const char *sn, const char *ln); size_t OBJ_length(const ASN1_OBJECT *obj); const unsigned char *OBJ_get0_data(const ASN1_OBJECT *obj); Deprecated: #if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L void OBJ_cleanup(void) #endif =head1 DESCRIPTION The ASN1 object utility functions process ASN1_OBJECT structures which are a representation of the ASN1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER (OID) type. For convenience, OIDs are usually represented in source code as numeric -identifiers, or Bs. OpenSSL has an internal table of OIDs that +identifiers, or Is. OpenSSL has an internal table of OIDs that are generated when the library is built, and their corresponding NIDs are available as defined constants. For the functions below, application code should treat all returned values -- OIDs, NIDs, or names -- as constants. -OBJ_nid2obj(), OBJ_nid2ln() and OBJ_nid2sn() convert the NID B to +OBJ_nid2obj(), OBJ_nid2ln() and OBJ_nid2sn() convert the NID I to an ASN1_OBJECT structure, its long name and its short name respectively, or B if an error occurred. OBJ_obj2nid(), OBJ_ln2nid(), OBJ_sn2nid() return the corresponding NID -for the object B, the long name or the short name respectively +for the object I, the long name or the short name respectively or NID_undef if an error occurred. -OBJ_txt2nid() returns NID corresponding to text string . B can be +OBJ_txt2nid() returns NID corresponding to text string I. I can be a long name, a short name or the numerical representation of an object. -OBJ_txt2obj() converts the text string B into an ASN1_OBJECT structure. -If B is 0 then long names and short names will be interpreted -as well as numerical forms. If B is 1 only the numerical form +OBJ_txt2obj() converts the text string I into an ASN1_OBJECT structure. +If I is 0 then long names and short names will be interpreted +as well as numerical forms. If I is 1 only the numerical form is acceptable. OBJ_obj2txt() converts the B B into a textual representation. The representation is written as a null terminated string to B at most B bytes are written, truncating the result if necessary. The total amount of space required is returned. If B is 0 then if the object has a long or short name then that will be used, otherwise the numerical form will be used. If B is 1 then the numerical form will always be used. -i2t_ASN1_OBJECT() is the same as OBJ_obj2txt() with the B set to zero. +i2t_ASN1_OBJECT() is the same as OBJ_obj2txt() with the I set to zero. -OBJ_cmp() compares B to B. If the two are identical 0 is returned. +OBJ_cmp() compares I to I. If the two are identical 0 is returned. -OBJ_dup() returns a copy of B. +OBJ_dup() returns a copy of I. -OBJ_create() adds a new object to the internal table. B is the -numerical form of the object, B the short name and B the +OBJ_create() adds a new object to the internal table. I is the +numerical form of the object, I the short name and I the long name. A new NID is returned for the created object in case of success and NID_undef in case of failure. -OBJ_length() returns the size of the content octets of B. +OBJ_length() returns the size of the content octets of I. -OBJ_get0_data() returns a pointer to the content octets of B. +OBJ_get0_data() returns a pointer to the content octets of I. The returned pointer is an internal pointer which B be freed. OBJ_cleanup() releases any resources allocated by creating new objects. =head1 NOTES Objects in OpenSSL can have a short name, a long name and a numerical identifier (NID) associated with them. A standard set of objects is represented in an internal table. The appropriate values are defined in the header file B. For example the OID for commonName has the following definitions: #define SN_commonName "CN" #define LN_commonName "commonName" #define NID_commonName 13 New objects can be added by calling OBJ_create(). Table objects have certain advantages over other objects: for example their NIDs can be used in a C language switch statement. They are also static constant structures which are shared: that is there is only a single constant structure for each table object. Objects which are not in the table have the NID value NID_undef. Objects do not need to be in the internal tables to be processed, the functions OBJ_txt2obj() and OBJ_obj2txt() can process the numerical form of an OID. Some objects are used to represent algorithms which do not have a corresponding ASN.1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER encoding (for example no OID currently exists for a particular algorithm). As a result they B be encoded or decoded as part of ASN.1 structures. Applications can determine if there is a corresponding OBJECT IDENTIFIER by checking OBJ_length() is not zero. These functions cannot return B because an B can represent both an internal, constant, OID and a dynamically-created one. The latter cannot be constant because it needs to be freed after use. =head1 RETURN VALUES OBJ_nid2obj() returns an B structure or B is an error occurred. OBJ_nid2ln() and OBJ_nid2sn() returns a valid string or B on error. OBJ_obj2nid(), OBJ_ln2nid(), OBJ_sn2nid() and OBJ_txt2nid() return a NID or B on error. =head1 EXAMPLES Create an object for B: ASN1_OBJECT *o = OBJ_nid2obj(NID_commonName); Check if an object is B if (OBJ_obj2nid(obj) == NID_commonName) /* Do something */ Create a new NID and initialize an object from it: int new_nid = OBJ_create("1.2.3.4", "NewOID", "New Object Identifier"); ASN1_OBJECT *obj = OBJ_nid2obj(new_nid); Create a new object directly: obj = OBJ_txt2obj("1.2.3.4", 1); =head1 BUGS OBJ_obj2txt() is awkward and messy to use: it doesn't follow the convention of other OpenSSL functions where the buffer can be set to B to determine the amount of data that should be written. Instead B must point to a valid buffer and B should be set to a positive value. A buffer length of 80 should be more than enough to handle any OID encountered in practice. =head1 SEE ALSO L =head1 HISTORY OBJ_cleanup() was deprecated in OpenSSL 1.1.0 by L and should not be used. =head1 COPYRIGHT -Copyright 2002-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. +Copyright 2002-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut diff --git a/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_num_tickets.pod b/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_num_tickets.pod index ad13ed15f406..bc031008f2f4 100644 --- a/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_num_tickets.pod +++ b/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_num_tickets.pod @@ -1,68 +1,68 @@ =pod =head1 NAME SSL_set_num_tickets, SSL_get_num_tickets, SSL_CTX_set_num_tickets, SSL_CTX_get_num_tickets - control the number of TLSv1.3 session tickets that are issued =head1 SYNOPSIS #include int SSL_set_num_tickets(SSL *s, size_t num_tickets); size_t SSL_get_num_tickets(SSL *s); int SSL_CTX_set_num_tickets(SSL_CTX *ctx, size_t num_tickets); size_t SSL_CTX_get_num_tickets(SSL_CTX *ctx); =head1 DESCRIPTION SSL_CTX_set_num_tickets() and SSL_set_num_tickets() can be called for a server application and set the number of TLSv1.3 session tickets that will be sent to the client after a full handshake. Set the desired value (which could be 0) in the B argument. Typically these functions should be called before the start of the handshake. -The default number of tickets is 2; the default number of tickets sent following -a resumption handshake is 1 but this cannot be changed using these functions. -The number of tickets following a resumption handshake can be reduced to 0 using -custom session ticket callbacks (see L). +The default number of tickets is 2. Following a resumption the number of tickets +issued will never be more than 1 regardless of the value set via +SSL_set_num_tickets() or SSL_CTX_set_num_tickets(). If B is set to +0 then no tickets will be issued for either a normal connection or a resumption. Tickets are also issued on receipt of a post-handshake certificate from the client following a request by the server using L. These new tickets will be associated with the updated client identity (i.e. including their certificate and verification status). The number of tickets issued will normally be the same as was used for the initial handshake. If the initial handshake was a full handshake then SSL_set_num_tickets() can be called again prior to calling SSL_verify_client_post_handshake() to update the number of tickets that will be sent. SSL_CTX_get_num_tickets() and SSL_get_num_tickets() return the number of tickets set by a previous call to SSL_CTX_set_num_tickets() or SSL_set_num_tickets(), or 2 if no such call has been made. =head1 RETURN VALUES SSL_CTX_set_num_tickets() and SSL_set_num_tickets() return 1 on success or 0 on failure. SSL_CTX_get_num_tickets() and SSL_get_num_tickets() return the number of tickets that have been previously set. =head1 HISTORY These functions were added in OpenSSL 1.1.1. =head1 COPYRIGHT -Copyright 2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. +Copyright 2018-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut diff --git a/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_ticket_key_cb.pod b/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_ticket_key_cb.pod index b2637efc1a72..15642f48f1e5 100644 --- a/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_ticket_key_cb.pod +++ b/doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_ticket_key_cb.pod @@ -1,203 +1,203 @@ =pod =head1 NAME SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_ticket_key_cb - set a callback for session ticket processing =head1 SYNOPSIS #include long SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_ticket_key_cb(SSL_CTX sslctx, int (*cb)(SSL *s, unsigned char key_name[16], unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH], EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, HMAC_CTX *hctx, int enc)); =head1 DESCRIPTION SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_ticket_key_cb() sets a callback function I for handling session tickets for the ssl context I. Session tickets, defined in RFC5077 provide an enhanced session resumption capability where the server implementation is not required to maintain per session state. It only applies to TLS and there is no SSLv3 implementation. The callback function I will be called for every client instigated TLS session when session ticket extension is presented in the TLS hello message. It is the responsibility of this function to create or retrieve the cryptographic parameters and to maintain their state. The OpenSSL library uses your callback function to help implement a common TLS ticket construction state according to RFC5077 Section 4 such that per session state is unnecessary and a small set of cryptographic variables needs to be maintained by the callback function implementation. In order to reuse a session, a TLS client must send the a session ticket extension to the server. The client can only send exactly one session ticket. The server, through the callback function, either agrees to reuse the session ticket information or it starts a full TLS handshake to create a new session ticket. Before the callback function is started I and I have been initialised with L and L respectively. For new sessions tickets, when the client doesn't present a session ticket, or an attempted retrieval of the ticket failed, or a renew option was indicated, the callback function will be called with I equal to 1. The OpenSSL library expects that the function will set an arbitrary I, initialize I, and set the cipher context I and the hash context I. The I is 16 characters long and is used as a key identifier. The I length is the length of the IV of the corresponding cipher. The maximum IV length is B bytes defined in B. The initialization vector I should be a random value. The cipher context I should use the initialisation vector I. The cipher context can be set using L. The hmac context can be set using L. When the client presents a session ticket, the callback function with be called with I set to 0 indicating that the I function should retrieve a set of parameters. In this case I and I have already been parsed out of the session ticket. The OpenSSL library expects that the I will be used to retrieve a cryptographic parameters and that the cryptographic context I will be set with the retrieved parameters and the initialization vector I. using a function like L. The I needs to be set using L. If the I is still valid but a renewal of the ticket is required the callback function should return 2. The library will call the callback again with an argument of enc equal to 1 to set the new ticket. The return value of the I function is used by OpenSSL to determine what further processing will occur. The following return values have meaning: =over 4 =item Z<>2 This indicates that the I and I have been set and the session can continue on those parameters. Additionally it indicates that the session ticket is in a renewal period and should be replaced. The OpenSSL library will call I again with an enc argument of 1 to set the new ticket (see RFC5077 3.3 paragraph 2). =item Z<>1 This indicates that the I and I have been set and the session can continue on those parameters. =item Z<>0 This indicates that it was not possible to set/retrieve a session ticket and the SSL/TLS session will continue by negotiating a set of cryptographic parameters or using the alternate SSL/TLS resumption mechanism, session ids. If called with enc equal to 0 the library will call the I again to get a new set of parameters. =item less than 0 This indicates an error. =back =head1 NOTES Session resumption shortcuts the TLS so that the client certificate negotiation don't occur. It makes up for this by storing client certificate an all other negotiated state information encrypted within the ticket. In a resumed session the applications will have all this state information available exactly as if a full negotiation had occurred. If an attacker can obtain the key used to encrypt a session ticket, they can obtain the master secret for any ticket using that key and decrypt any traffic using that session: even if the cipher suite supports forward secrecy. As a result applications may wish to use multiple keys and avoid using long term keys stored in files. Applications can use longer keys to maintain a consistent level of security. For example if a cipher suite uses 256 bit ciphers but only a 128 bit ticket key the overall security is only 128 bits because breaking the ticket key will enable an attacker to obtain the session keys. =head1 RETURN VALUES -returns 0 to indicate the callback function was set. +Returns 1 to indicate the callback function was set and 0 otherwise. =head1 EXAMPLES Reference Implementation: SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_ticket_key_cb(SSL, ssl_tlsext_ticket_key_cb); ... static int ssl_tlsext_ticket_key_cb(SSL *s, unsigned char key_name[16], unsigned char *iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, HMAC_CTX *hctx, int enc) { your_type_t *key; /* something that you need to implement */ if (enc) { /* create new session */ if (RAND_bytes(iv, EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH) <= 0) return -1; /* insufficient random */ key = currentkey(); /* something that you need to implement */ if (key == NULL) { /* current key doesn't exist or isn't valid */ key = createkey(); /* * Something that you need to implement. * createkey needs to initialise a name, * an aes_key, a hmac_key and optionally * an expire time. */ if (key == NULL) /* key couldn't be created */ return 0; } memcpy(key_name, key->name, 16); EVP_EncryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_256_cbc(), NULL, key->aes_key, iv); HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, key->hmac_key, 32, EVP_sha256(), NULL); return 1; } else { /* retrieve session */ time_t t = time(NULL); key = findkey(key_name); /* something that you need to implement */ if (key == NULL || key->expire < t) return 0; HMAC_Init_ex(&hctx, key->hmac_key, 32, EVP_sha256(), NULL); EVP_DecryptInit_ex(&ctx, EVP_aes_256_cbc(), NULL, key->aes_key, iv); if (key->expire < t - RENEW_TIME) { /* RENEW_TIME: implement */ /* * return 2 - This session will get a new ticket even though the * current one is still valid. */ return 2; } return 1; } } =head1 SEE ALSO L, L, L, L, L, L, L, =head1 COPYRIGHT -Copyright 2014-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. +Copyright 2014-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut diff --git a/doc/man3/SSL_get_session.pod b/doc/man3/SSL_get_session.pod index 7c04570635da..b7472bd6082a 100644 --- a/doc/man3/SSL_get_session.pod +++ b/doc/man3/SSL_get_session.pod @@ -1,110 +1,113 @@ =pod =head1 NAME SSL_get_session, SSL_get0_session, SSL_get1_session - retrieve TLS/SSL session data =head1 SYNOPSIS #include SSL_SESSION *SSL_get_session(const SSL *ssl); SSL_SESSION *SSL_get0_session(const SSL *ssl); SSL_SESSION *SSL_get1_session(SSL *ssl); =head1 DESCRIPTION SSL_get_session() returns a pointer to the B actually used in B. The reference count of the B is not incremented, so that the pointer can become invalid by other operations. SSL_get0_session() is the same as SSL_get_session(). SSL_get1_session() is the same as SSL_get_session(), but the reference count of the B is incremented by one. =head1 NOTES The ssl session contains all information required to re-establish the connection without a full handshake for SSL versions up to and including TLSv1.2. In TLSv1.3 the same is true, but sessions are established after the main handshake has occurred. The server will send the session information to the client at a time of its choosing, which may be some while after the initial connection is established (or never). Calling these functions on the client side in TLSv1.3 before the session has been established will still return an SSL_SESSION object but that object cannot be used for resuming the session. See L for information on how to determine whether an SSL_SESSION object can be used for resumption or not. Additionally, in TLSv1.3, a server can send multiple messages that establish a -session for a single connection. In that case the above functions will only -return information on the last session that was received. +session for a single connection. In that case, on the client side, the above +functions will only return information on the last session that was received. On +the server side they will only return information on the last session that was +sent, or if no session tickets were sent then the session for the current +connection. The preferred way for applications to obtain a resumable SSL_SESSION object is to use a new session callback as described in L. The new session callback is only invoked when a session is actually established, so this avoids the problem described above where an application obtains an SSL_SESSION object that cannot be used for resumption in TLSv1.3. It also enables applications to obtain information about all sessions sent by the server. A session will be automatically removed from the session cache and marked as non-resumable if the connection is not closed down cleanly, e.g. if a fatal error occurs on the connection or L is not called prior to L. In TLSv1.3 it is recommended that each SSL_SESSION object is only used for resumption once. SSL_get0_session() returns a pointer to the actual session. As the reference counter is not incremented, the pointer is only valid while the connection is in use. If L or L is called, the session may be removed completely (if considered bad), and the pointer obtained will become invalid. Even if the session is valid, it can be removed at any time due to timeout during L. If the data is to be kept, SSL_get1_session() will increment the reference count, so that the session will not be implicitly removed by other operations but stays in memory. In order to remove the session L must be explicitly called once to decrement the reference count again. SSL_SESSION objects keep internal link information about the session cache list, when being inserted into one SSL_CTX object's session cache. One SSL_SESSION object, regardless of its reference count, must therefore only be used with one SSL_CTX object (and the SSL objects created from this SSL_CTX object). =head1 RETURN VALUES The following return values can occur: =over 4 =item NULL There is no session available in B. =item Pointer to an SSL_SESSION The return value points to the data of an SSL session. =back =head1 SEE ALSO L, L, L, L =head1 COPYRIGHT -Copyright 2000-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. +Copyright 2000-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut diff --git a/doc/man3/SSL_set_fd.pod b/doc/man3/SSL_set_fd.pod index 6780d515f91f..3195a4ece937 100644 --- a/doc/man3/SSL_set_fd.pod +++ b/doc/man3/SSL_set_fd.pod @@ -1,63 +1,74 @@ =pod =head1 NAME SSL_set_fd, SSL_set_rfd, SSL_set_wfd - connect the SSL object with a file descriptor =head1 SYNOPSIS #include int SSL_set_fd(SSL *ssl, int fd); int SSL_set_rfd(SSL *ssl, int fd); int SSL_set_wfd(SSL *ssl, int fd); =head1 DESCRIPTION SSL_set_fd() sets the file descriptor B as the input/output facility for the TLS/SSL (encrypted) side of B. B will typically be the socket file descriptor of a network connection. When performing the operation, a B is automatically created to interface between the B and B. The BIO and hence the SSL engine inherit the behaviour of B. If B is nonblocking, the B will also have nonblocking behaviour. If there was already a BIO connected to B, BIO_free() will be called (for both the reading and writing side, if different). SSL_set_rfd() and SSL_set_wfd() perform the respective action, but only for the read channel or the write channel, which can be set independently. =head1 RETURN VALUES The following return values can occur: =over 4 =item Z<>0 The operation failed. Check the error stack to find out why. =item Z<>1 The operation succeeded. =back +=head1 NOTES + +On Windows, a socket handle is a 64-bit data type (UINT_PTR), which leads to a +compiler warning (conversion from 'SOCKET' to 'int', possible loss of data) when +passing the socket handle to SSL_set_*fd(). For the time being, this warning can +safely be ignored, because although the Microsoft documentation claims that the +upper limit is INVALID_SOCKET-1 (2^64 - 2), in practice the current socket() +implementation returns an index into the kernel handle table, the size of which +is limited to 2^24. + + =head1 SEE ALSO L, L, L, L, L, L , L =head1 COPYRIGHT -Copyright 2000-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. +Copyright 2000-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut diff --git a/doc/man3/d2i_X509.pod b/doc/man3/d2i_X509.pod index e42049d2baec..30b419c512d6 100644 --- a/doc/man3/d2i_X509.pod +++ b/doc/man3/d2i_X509.pod @@ -1,622 +1,626 @@ =pod =head1 NAME d2i_ACCESS_DESCRIPTION, d2i_ADMISSIONS, d2i_ADMISSION_SYNTAX, d2i_ASIdOrRange, d2i_ASIdentifierChoice, d2i_ASIdentifiers, d2i_ASN1_BIT_STRING, d2i_ASN1_BMPSTRING, d2i_ASN1_ENUMERATED, d2i_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME, d2i_ASN1_GENERALSTRING, d2i_ASN1_IA5STRING, d2i_ASN1_INTEGER, d2i_ASN1_NULL, d2i_ASN1_OBJECT, d2i_ASN1_OCTET_STRING, d2i_ASN1_PRINTABLE, d2i_ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING, d2i_ASN1_SEQUENCE_ANY, d2i_ASN1_SET_ANY, d2i_ASN1_T61STRING, d2i_ASN1_TIME, d2i_ASN1_TYPE, d2i_ASN1_UINTEGER, d2i_ASN1_UNIVERSALSTRING, d2i_ASN1_UTCTIME, d2i_ASN1_UTF8STRING, d2i_ASN1_VISIBLESTRING, d2i_ASRange, d2i_AUTHORITY_INFO_ACCESS, d2i_AUTHORITY_KEYID, d2i_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS, d2i_CERTIFICATEPOLICIES, d2i_CMS_ContentInfo, d2i_CMS_ReceiptRequest, d2i_CMS_bio, d2i_CRL_DIST_POINTS, d2i_DHxparams, d2i_DIRECTORYSTRING, d2i_DISPLAYTEXT, d2i_DIST_POINT, d2i_DIST_POINT_NAME, d2i_DSAPrivateKey, d2i_DSAPrivateKey_bio, d2i_DSAPrivateKey_fp, d2i_DSAPublicKey, d2i_DSA_PUBKEY, d2i_DSA_PUBKEY_bio, d2i_DSA_PUBKEY_fp, d2i_DSA_SIG, d2i_DSAparams, d2i_ECDSA_SIG, d2i_ECPKParameters, d2i_ECParameters, d2i_ECPrivateKey, d2i_ECPrivateKey_bio, d2i_ECPrivateKey_fp, d2i_EC_PUBKEY, d2i_EC_PUBKEY_bio, d2i_EC_PUBKEY_fp, d2i_EDIPARTYNAME, d2i_ESS_CERT_ID, d2i_ESS_ISSUER_SERIAL, d2i_ESS_SIGNING_CERT, d2i_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE, d2i_GENERAL_NAME, d2i_GENERAL_NAMES, d2i_IPAddressChoice, d2i_IPAddressFamily, d2i_IPAddressOrRange, d2i_IPAddressRange, d2i_ISSUING_DIST_POINT, d2i_NAMING_AUTHORITY, d2i_NETSCAPE_CERT_SEQUENCE, d2i_NETSCAPE_SPKAC, d2i_NETSCAPE_SPKI, d2i_NOTICEREF, d2i_OCSP_BASICRESP, d2i_OCSP_CERTID, d2i_OCSP_CERTSTATUS, d2i_OCSP_CRLID, d2i_OCSP_ONEREQ, d2i_OCSP_REQINFO, d2i_OCSP_REQUEST, d2i_OCSP_RESPBYTES, d2i_OCSP_RESPDATA, d2i_OCSP_RESPID, d2i_OCSP_RESPONSE, d2i_OCSP_REVOKEDINFO, d2i_OCSP_SERVICELOC, d2i_OCSP_SIGNATURE, d2i_OCSP_SINGLERESP, d2i_OTHERNAME, d2i_PBE2PARAM, d2i_PBEPARAM, d2i_PBKDF2PARAM, d2i_PKCS12, d2i_PKCS12_BAGS, d2i_PKCS12_MAC_DATA, d2i_PKCS12_SAFEBAG, d2i_PKCS12_bio, d2i_PKCS12_fp, d2i_PKCS7, d2i_PKCS7_DIGEST, d2i_PKCS7_ENCRYPT, d2i_PKCS7_ENC_CONTENT, d2i_PKCS7_ENVELOPE, d2i_PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL, d2i_PKCS7_RECIP_INFO, d2i_PKCS7_SIGNED, d2i_PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO, d2i_PKCS7_SIGN_ENVELOPE, d2i_PKCS7_bio, d2i_PKCS7_fp, d2i_PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO, d2i_PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO_bio, d2i_PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO_fp, d2i_PKCS8_bio, d2i_PKCS8_fp, d2i_PKEY_USAGE_PERIOD, d2i_POLICYINFO, d2i_POLICYQUALINFO, d2i_PROFESSION_INFO, d2i_PROXY_CERT_INFO_EXTENSION, d2i_PROXY_POLICY, d2i_RSAPrivateKey, d2i_RSAPrivateKey_bio, d2i_RSAPrivateKey_fp, d2i_RSAPublicKey, d2i_RSAPublicKey_bio, d2i_RSAPublicKey_fp, d2i_RSA_OAEP_PARAMS, d2i_RSA_PSS_PARAMS, d2i_RSA_PUBKEY, d2i_RSA_PUBKEY_bio, d2i_RSA_PUBKEY_fp, d2i_SCRYPT_PARAMS, d2i_SCT_LIST, d2i_SXNET, d2i_SXNETID, d2i_TS_ACCURACY, d2i_TS_MSG_IMPRINT, d2i_TS_MSG_IMPRINT_bio, d2i_TS_MSG_IMPRINT_fp, d2i_TS_REQ, d2i_TS_REQ_bio, d2i_TS_REQ_fp, d2i_TS_RESP, d2i_TS_RESP_bio, d2i_TS_RESP_fp, d2i_TS_STATUS_INFO, d2i_TS_TST_INFO, d2i_TS_TST_INFO_bio, d2i_TS_TST_INFO_fp, d2i_USERNOTICE, d2i_X509, +d2i_X509_bio, +d2i_X509_fp, d2i_X509_ALGOR, d2i_X509_ALGORS, d2i_X509_ATTRIBUTE, d2i_X509_CERT_AUX, d2i_X509_CINF, d2i_X509_CRL, d2i_X509_CRL_INFO, d2i_X509_CRL_bio, d2i_X509_CRL_fp, d2i_X509_EXTENSION, d2i_X509_EXTENSIONS, d2i_X509_NAME, d2i_X509_NAME_ENTRY, d2i_X509_PUBKEY, d2i_X509_REQ, d2i_X509_REQ_INFO, d2i_X509_REQ_bio, d2i_X509_REQ_fp, d2i_X509_REVOKED, d2i_X509_SIG, d2i_X509_VAL, i2d_ACCESS_DESCRIPTION, i2d_ADMISSIONS, i2d_ADMISSION_SYNTAX, i2d_ASIdOrRange, i2d_ASIdentifierChoice, i2d_ASIdentifiers, i2d_ASN1_BIT_STRING, i2d_ASN1_BMPSTRING, i2d_ASN1_ENUMERATED, i2d_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME, i2d_ASN1_GENERALSTRING, i2d_ASN1_IA5STRING, i2d_ASN1_INTEGER, i2d_ASN1_NULL, i2d_ASN1_OBJECT, i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING, i2d_ASN1_PRINTABLE, i2d_ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING, i2d_ASN1_SEQUENCE_ANY, i2d_ASN1_SET_ANY, i2d_ASN1_T61STRING, i2d_ASN1_TIME, i2d_ASN1_TYPE, i2d_ASN1_UNIVERSALSTRING, i2d_ASN1_UTCTIME, i2d_ASN1_UTF8STRING, i2d_ASN1_VISIBLESTRING, i2d_ASN1_bio_stream, i2d_ASRange, i2d_AUTHORITY_INFO_ACCESS, i2d_AUTHORITY_KEYID, i2d_BASIC_CONSTRAINTS, i2d_CERTIFICATEPOLICIES, i2d_CMS_ContentInfo, i2d_CMS_ReceiptRequest, i2d_CMS_bio, i2d_CRL_DIST_POINTS, i2d_DHxparams, i2d_DIRECTORYSTRING, i2d_DISPLAYTEXT, i2d_DIST_POINT, i2d_DIST_POINT_NAME, i2d_DSAPrivateKey, i2d_DSAPrivateKey_bio, i2d_DSAPrivateKey_fp, i2d_DSAPublicKey, i2d_DSA_PUBKEY, i2d_DSA_PUBKEY_bio, i2d_DSA_PUBKEY_fp, i2d_DSA_SIG, i2d_DSAparams, i2d_ECDSA_SIG, i2d_ECPKParameters, i2d_ECParameters, i2d_ECPrivateKey, i2d_ECPrivateKey_bio, i2d_ECPrivateKey_fp, i2d_EC_PUBKEY, i2d_EC_PUBKEY_bio, i2d_EC_PUBKEY_fp, i2d_EDIPARTYNAME, i2d_ESS_CERT_ID, i2d_ESS_ISSUER_SERIAL, i2d_ESS_SIGNING_CERT, i2d_EXTENDED_KEY_USAGE, i2d_GENERAL_NAME, i2d_GENERAL_NAMES, i2d_IPAddressChoice, i2d_IPAddressFamily, i2d_IPAddressOrRange, i2d_IPAddressRange, i2d_ISSUING_DIST_POINT, i2d_NAMING_AUTHORITY, i2d_NETSCAPE_CERT_SEQUENCE, i2d_NETSCAPE_SPKAC, i2d_NETSCAPE_SPKI, i2d_NOTICEREF, i2d_OCSP_BASICRESP, i2d_OCSP_CERTID, i2d_OCSP_CERTSTATUS, i2d_OCSP_CRLID, i2d_OCSP_ONEREQ, i2d_OCSP_REQINFO, i2d_OCSP_REQUEST, i2d_OCSP_RESPBYTES, i2d_OCSP_RESPDATA, i2d_OCSP_RESPID, i2d_OCSP_RESPONSE, i2d_OCSP_REVOKEDINFO, i2d_OCSP_SERVICELOC, i2d_OCSP_SIGNATURE, i2d_OCSP_SINGLERESP, i2d_OTHERNAME, i2d_PBE2PARAM, i2d_PBEPARAM, i2d_PBKDF2PARAM, i2d_PKCS12, i2d_PKCS12_BAGS, i2d_PKCS12_MAC_DATA, i2d_PKCS12_SAFEBAG, i2d_PKCS12_bio, i2d_PKCS12_fp, i2d_PKCS7, i2d_PKCS7_DIGEST, i2d_PKCS7_ENCRYPT, i2d_PKCS7_ENC_CONTENT, i2d_PKCS7_ENVELOPE, i2d_PKCS7_ISSUER_AND_SERIAL, i2d_PKCS7_NDEF, i2d_PKCS7_RECIP_INFO, i2d_PKCS7_SIGNED, i2d_PKCS7_SIGNER_INFO, i2d_PKCS7_SIGN_ENVELOPE, i2d_PKCS7_bio, i2d_PKCS7_fp, i2d_PKCS8PrivateKeyInfo_bio, i2d_PKCS8PrivateKeyInfo_fp, i2d_PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO, i2d_PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO_bio, i2d_PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO_fp, i2d_PKCS8_bio, i2d_PKCS8_fp, i2d_PKEY_USAGE_PERIOD, i2d_POLICYINFO, i2d_POLICYQUALINFO, i2d_PROFESSION_INFO, i2d_PROXY_CERT_INFO_EXTENSION, i2d_PROXY_POLICY, i2d_RSAPrivateKey, i2d_RSAPrivateKey_bio, i2d_RSAPrivateKey_fp, i2d_RSAPublicKey, i2d_RSAPublicKey_bio, i2d_RSAPublicKey_fp, i2d_RSA_OAEP_PARAMS, i2d_RSA_PSS_PARAMS, i2d_RSA_PUBKEY, i2d_RSA_PUBKEY_bio, i2d_RSA_PUBKEY_fp, i2d_SCRYPT_PARAMS, i2d_SCT_LIST, i2d_SXNET, i2d_SXNETID, i2d_TS_ACCURACY, i2d_TS_MSG_IMPRINT, i2d_TS_MSG_IMPRINT_bio, i2d_TS_MSG_IMPRINT_fp, i2d_TS_REQ, i2d_TS_REQ_bio, i2d_TS_REQ_fp, i2d_TS_RESP, i2d_TS_RESP_bio, i2d_TS_RESP_fp, i2d_TS_STATUS_INFO, i2d_TS_TST_INFO, i2d_TS_TST_INFO_bio, i2d_TS_TST_INFO_fp, i2d_USERNOTICE, i2d_X509, +i2d_X509_bio, +i2d_X509_fp, i2d_X509_ALGOR, i2d_X509_ALGORS, i2d_X509_ATTRIBUTE, i2d_X509_CERT_AUX, i2d_X509_CINF, i2d_X509_CRL, i2d_X509_CRL_INFO, i2d_X509_CRL_bio, i2d_X509_CRL_fp, i2d_X509_EXTENSION, i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS, i2d_X509_NAME, i2d_X509_NAME_ENTRY, i2d_X509_PUBKEY, i2d_X509_REQ, i2d_X509_REQ_INFO, i2d_X509_REQ_bio, i2d_X509_REQ_fp, i2d_X509_REVOKED, i2d_X509_SIG, i2d_X509_VAL, - convert objects from/to ASN.1/DER representation =head1 SYNOPSIS =for comment generic TYPE *d2i_TYPE(TYPE **a, const unsigned char **ppin, long length); TYPE *d2i_TYPE_bio(BIO *bp, TYPE **a); TYPE *d2i_TYPE_fp(FILE *fp, TYPE **a); int i2d_TYPE(TYPE *a, unsigned char **ppout); int i2d_TYPE_fp(FILE *fp, TYPE *a); int i2d_TYPE_bio(BIO *bp, TYPE *a); =head1 DESCRIPTION In the description here, I is used a placeholder for any of the OpenSSL datatypes, such as I. The function parameters I and I are generally either both named I in the headers, or I and I. These functions convert OpenSSL objects to and from their ASN.1/DER encoding. Unlike the C structures which can have pointers to sub-objects within, the DER is a serialized encoding, suitable for sending over the network, writing to a file, and so on. d2i_TYPE() attempts to decode B bytes at B<*ppin>. If successful a pointer to the B structure is returned and B<*ppin> is incremented to the byte following the parsed data. If B is not B then a pointer to the returned structure is also written to B<*a>. If an error occurred then B is returned. On a successful return, if B<*a> is not B then it is assumed that B<*a> contains a valid B structure and an attempt is made to reuse it. This "reuse" capability is present for historical compatibility but its use is B (see BUGS below, and the discussion in the RETURN VALUES section). d2i_TYPE_bio() is similar to d2i_TYPE() except it attempts to parse data from BIO B. d2i_TYPE_fp() is similar to d2i_TYPE() except it attempts to parse data from FILE pointer B. i2d_TYPE() encodes the structure pointed to by B into DER format. If B is not B, it writes the DER encoded data to the buffer at B<*ppout>, and increments it to point after the data just written. If the return value is negative an error occurred, otherwise it returns the length of the encoded data. If B<*ppout> is B memory will be allocated for a buffer and the encoded data written to it. In this case B<*ppout> is not incremented and it points to the start of the data just written. i2d_TYPE_bio() is similar to i2d_TYPE() except it writes the encoding of the structure B to BIO B and it returns 1 for success and 0 for failure. i2d_TYPE_fp() is similar to i2d_TYPE() except it writes the encoding of the structure B to BIO B and it returns 1 for success and 0 for failure. These routines do not encrypt private keys and therefore offer no security; use L or similar for writing to files. =head1 NOTES The letters B and B in B stand for "internal" (that is, an internal C structure) and "DER" respectively. So B converts from internal to DER. The functions can also understand B forms. The actual TYPE structure passed to i2d_TYPE() must be a valid populated B structure -- it B simply be fed with an empty structure such as that returned by TYPE_new(). The encoded data is in binary form and may contain embedded zeros. Therefore, any FILE pointers or BIOs should be opened in binary mode. Functions such as strlen() will B return the correct length of the encoded structure. The ways that B<*ppin> and B<*ppout> are incremented after the operation can trap the unwary. See the B section for some common errors. The reason for this-auto increment behaviour is to reflect a typical usage of ASN1 functions: after one structure is encoded or decoded another will be processed after it. The following points about the data types might be useful: =over 4 =item B Represents an ASN1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER. =item B Represents a PKCS#3 DH parameters structure. =item B Represents an ANSI X9.42 DH parameters structure. =item B Represents a DSA public key using a B structure. =item B Use a non-standard OpenSSL format and should be avoided; use B, B, or similar instead. =item B Represents an ECDSA signature. =item B Represents a PKCS#1 RSA public key structure. =item B Represents an B structure as used in IETF RFC 6960 and elsewhere. =item B Represents a B type as used for subject and issuer names in IETF RFC 6960 and elsewhere. =item B Represents a PKCS#10 certificate request. =item B Represents the B structure defined in PKCS#1 and PKCS#7. =back =head1 RETURN VALUES d2i_TYPE(), d2i_TYPE_bio() and d2i_TYPE_fp() return a valid B structure or B if an error occurs. If the "reuse" capability has been used with a valid structure being passed in via B, then the object is freed in the event of error and B<*a> is set to NULL. i2d_TYPE() returns the number of bytes successfully encoded or a negative value if an error occurs. i2d_TYPE_bio() and i2d_TYPE_fp() return 1 for success and 0 if an error occurs. =head1 EXAMPLES Allocate and encode the DER encoding of an X509 structure: int len; unsigned char *buf; buf = NULL; len = i2d_X509(x, &buf); if (len < 0) /* error */ Attempt to decode a buffer: X509 *x; unsigned char *buf; const unsigned char *p; int len; /* Set up buf and len to point to the input buffer. */ p = buf; x = d2i_X509(NULL, &p, len); if (x == NULL) /* error */ Alternative technique: X509 *x; unsigned char *buf; const unsigned char *p; int len; /* Set up buf and len to point to the input buffer. */ p = buf; x = NULL; if (d2i_X509(&x, &p, len) == NULL) /* error */ =head1 WARNINGS Using a temporary variable is mandatory. A common mistake is to attempt to use a buffer directly as follows: int len; unsigned char *buf; len = i2d_X509(x, NULL); buf = OPENSSL_malloc(len); ... i2d_X509(x, &buf); ... OPENSSL_free(buf); This code will result in B apparently containing garbage because it was incremented after the call to point after the data just written. Also B will no longer contain the pointer allocated by OPENSSL_malloc() and the subsequent call to OPENSSL_free() is likely to crash. Another trap to avoid is misuse of the B argument to d2i_TYPE(): X509 *x; if (d2i_X509(&x, &p, len) == NULL) /* error */ This will probably crash somewhere in d2i_X509(). The reason for this is that the variable B is uninitialized and an attempt will be made to interpret its (invalid) value as an B structure, typically causing a segmentation violation. If B is set to NULL first then this will not happen. =head1 BUGS In some versions of OpenSSL the "reuse" behaviour of d2i_TYPE() when B<*a> is valid is broken and some parts of the reused structure may persist if they are not present in the new one. Additionally, in versions of OpenSSL prior to 1.1.0, when the "reuse" behaviour is used and an error occurs the behaviour is inconsistent. Some functions behaved as described here, while some did not free B<*a> on error and did not set B<*a> to NULL. As a result of the above issues the "reuse" behaviour is strongly discouraged. i2d_TYPE() will not return an error in many versions of OpenSSL, if mandatory fields are not initialized due to a programming error then the encoded structure may contain invalid data or omit the fields entirely and will not be parsed by d2i_TYPE(). This may be fixed in future so code should not assume that i2d_TYPE() will always succeed. Any function which encodes a structure (i2d_TYPE(), i2d_TYPE() or i2d_TYPE()) may return a stale encoding if the structure has been modified after deserialization or previous serialization. This is because some objects cache the encoding for efficiency reasons. =head1 COPYRIGHT -Copyright 1998-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. +Copyright 1998-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut diff --git a/doc/man7/ossl_store.pod b/doc/man7/ossl_store.pod index b70619685103..19e15a65f82b 100644 --- a/doc/man7/ossl_store.pod +++ b/doc/man7/ossl_store.pod @@ -1,87 +1,87 @@ =pod =head1 NAME ossl_store - Store retrieval functions =head1 SYNOPSIS =for comment generic #include =head1 DESCRIPTION =head2 General A STORE is a layer of functionality to retrieve a number of supported objects from a repository of any kind, addressable as a filename or as a URI. The functionality supports the pattern "open a channel to the repository", "loop and retrieve one object at a time", and "finish up by closing the channel". The retrieved objects are returned as a wrapper type B, from which an OpenSSL type can be retrieved. =head2 URI schemes and loaders Support for a URI scheme is called a STORE "loader", and can be added dynamically from the calling application or from a loadable engine. Support for the 'file' scheme is built into C. See L for more information. =head2 UI_METHOD and pass phrases The B API does nothing to enforce any specific format or encoding on the pass phrase that the B provides. However, the pass phrase is expected to be UTF-8 encoded. The result of any other encoding is undefined. =head1 EXAMPLES =head2 A generic call OSSL_STORE_CTX *ctx = OSSL_STORE_open("file:/foo/bar/data.pem"); /* * OSSL_STORE_eof() simulates file semantics for any repository to signal * that no more data can be expected */ while (!OSSL_STORE_eof(ctx)) { OSSL_STORE_INFO *info = OSSL_STORE_load(ctx); /* * Do whatever is necessary with the OSSL_STORE_INFO, * here just one example */ switch (OSSL_STORE_INFO_get_type(info)) { - case OSSL_STORE_INFO_X509: + case OSSL_STORE_INFO_CERT: /* Print the X.509 certificate text */ X509_print_fp(stdout, OSSL_STORE_INFO_get0_CERT(info)); /* Print the X.509 certificate PEM output */ PEM_write_X509(stdout, OSSL_STORE_INFO_get0_CERT(info)); break; } } OSSL_STORE_close(ctx); =head1 SEE ALSO L, L, L, L, L =head1 COPYRIGHT -Copyright 2016-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. +Copyright 2016-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at L. =cut diff --git a/engines/e_afalg.c b/engines/e_afalg.c index 4b1722846133..2d16c1383442 100644 --- a/engines/e_afalg.c +++ b/engines/e_afalg.c @@ -1,864 +1,861 @@ /* - * Copyright 2016-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 2016-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ /* Required for vmsplice */ #ifndef _GNU_SOURCE # define _GNU_SOURCE #endif #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "internal/nelem.h" #include #include #define K_MAJ 4 #define K_MIN1 1 #define K_MIN2 0 #if LINUX_VERSION_CODE < KERNEL_VERSION(K_MAJ, K_MIN1, K_MIN2) || \ !defined(AF_ALG) # ifndef PEDANTIC # warning "AFALG ENGINE requires Kernel Headers >= 4.1.0" # warning "Skipping Compilation of AFALG engine" # endif void engine_load_afalg_int(void); void engine_load_afalg_int(void) { } #else # include # include # include # include # include # include # include "e_afalg.h" # include "e_afalg_err.c" # ifndef SOL_ALG # define SOL_ALG 279 # endif # ifdef ALG_ZERO_COPY # ifndef SPLICE_F_GIFT # define SPLICE_F_GIFT (0x08) # endif # endif # define ALG_AES_IV_LEN 16 # define ALG_IV_LEN(len) (sizeof(struct af_alg_iv) + (len)) # define ALG_OP_TYPE unsigned int # define ALG_OP_LEN (sizeof(ALG_OP_TYPE)) # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DYNAMIC_ENGINE void engine_load_afalg_int(void); # endif /* Local Linkage Functions */ static int afalg_init_aio(afalg_aio *aio); static int afalg_fin_cipher_aio(afalg_aio *ptr, int sfd, unsigned char *buf, size_t len); static int afalg_create_sk(afalg_ctx *actx, const char *ciphertype, const char *ciphername); static int afalg_destroy(ENGINE *e); static int afalg_init(ENGINE *e); static int afalg_finish(ENGINE *e); static const EVP_CIPHER *afalg_aes_cbc(int nid); static cbc_handles *get_cipher_handle(int nid); static int afalg_ciphers(ENGINE *e, const EVP_CIPHER **cipher, const int **nids, int nid); static int afalg_cipher_init(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key, const unsigned char *iv, int enc); static int afalg_do_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in, size_t inl); static int afalg_cipher_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx); static int afalg_chk_platform(void); /* Engine Id and Name */ static const char *engine_afalg_id = "afalg"; static const char *engine_afalg_name = "AFALG engine support"; static int afalg_cipher_nids[] = { NID_aes_128_cbc, NID_aes_192_cbc, NID_aes_256_cbc, }; static cbc_handles cbc_handle[] = {{AES_KEY_SIZE_128, NULL}, {AES_KEY_SIZE_192, NULL}, {AES_KEY_SIZE_256, NULL}}; static ossl_inline int io_setup(unsigned n, aio_context_t *ctx) { return syscall(__NR_io_setup, n, ctx); } static ossl_inline int eventfd(int n) { return syscall(__NR_eventfd2, n, 0); } static ossl_inline int io_destroy(aio_context_t ctx) { return syscall(__NR_io_destroy, ctx); } static ossl_inline int io_read(aio_context_t ctx, long n, struct iocb **iocb) { return syscall(__NR_io_submit, ctx, n, iocb); } static ossl_inline int io_getevents(aio_context_t ctx, long min, long max, struct io_event *events, struct timespec *timeout) { return syscall(__NR_io_getevents, ctx, min, max, events, timeout); } static void afalg_waitfd_cleanup(ASYNC_WAIT_CTX *ctx, const void *key, OSSL_ASYNC_FD waitfd, void *custom) { close(waitfd); } static int afalg_setup_async_event_notification(afalg_aio *aio) { ASYNC_JOB *job; ASYNC_WAIT_CTX *waitctx; void *custom = NULL; int ret; if ((job = ASYNC_get_current_job()) != NULL) { /* Async mode */ waitctx = ASYNC_get_wait_ctx(job); if (waitctx == NULL) { ALG_WARN("%s(%d): ASYNC_get_wait_ctx error", __FILE__, __LINE__); return 0; } /* Get waitfd from ASYNC_WAIT_CTX if it is already set */ ret = ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_get_fd(waitctx, engine_afalg_id, &aio->efd, &custom); if (ret == 0) { /* * waitfd is not set in ASYNC_WAIT_CTX, create a new one * and set it. efd will be signaled when AIO operation completes */ aio->efd = eventfd(0); if (aio->efd == -1) { ALG_PERR("%s(%d): Failed to get eventfd : ", __FILE__, __LINE__); AFALGerr(AFALG_F_AFALG_SETUP_ASYNC_EVENT_NOTIFICATION, AFALG_R_EVENTFD_FAILED); return 0; } ret = ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_set_wait_fd(waitctx, engine_afalg_id, aio->efd, custom, afalg_waitfd_cleanup); if (ret == 0) { ALG_WARN("%s(%d): Failed to set wait fd", __FILE__, __LINE__); close(aio->efd); return 0; } /* make fd non-blocking in async mode */ if (fcntl(aio->efd, F_SETFL, O_NONBLOCK) != 0) { ALG_WARN("%s(%d): Failed to set event fd as NONBLOCKING", __FILE__, __LINE__); } } aio->mode = MODE_ASYNC; } else { /* Sync mode */ aio->efd = eventfd(0); if (aio->efd == -1) { ALG_PERR("%s(%d): Failed to get eventfd : ", __FILE__, __LINE__); AFALGerr(AFALG_F_AFALG_SETUP_ASYNC_EVENT_NOTIFICATION, AFALG_R_EVENTFD_FAILED); return 0; } aio->mode = MODE_SYNC; } return 1; } static int afalg_init_aio(afalg_aio *aio) { int r = -1; /* Initialise for AIO */ aio->aio_ctx = 0; r = io_setup(MAX_INFLIGHTS, &aio->aio_ctx); if (r < 0) { ALG_PERR("%s(%d): io_setup error : ", __FILE__, __LINE__); AFALGerr(AFALG_F_AFALG_INIT_AIO, AFALG_R_IO_SETUP_FAILED); return 0; } memset(aio->cbt, 0, sizeof(aio->cbt)); aio->efd = -1; aio->mode = MODE_UNINIT; return 1; } static int afalg_fin_cipher_aio(afalg_aio *aio, int sfd, unsigned char *buf, size_t len) { int r; int retry = 0; unsigned int done = 0; struct iocb *cb; struct timespec timeout; struct io_event events[MAX_INFLIGHTS]; u_int64_t eval = 0; timeout.tv_sec = 0; timeout.tv_nsec = 0; /* if efd has not been initialised yet do it here */ if (aio->mode == MODE_UNINIT) { r = afalg_setup_async_event_notification(aio); if (r == 0) return 0; } cb = &(aio->cbt[0 % MAX_INFLIGHTS]); memset(cb, '\0', sizeof(*cb)); cb->aio_fildes = sfd; cb->aio_lio_opcode = IOCB_CMD_PREAD; /* * The pointer has to be converted to unsigned value first to avoid * sign extension on cast to 64 bit value in 32-bit builds */ cb->aio_buf = (size_t)buf; cb->aio_offset = 0; cb->aio_data = 0; cb->aio_nbytes = len; cb->aio_flags = IOCB_FLAG_RESFD; cb->aio_resfd = aio->efd; /* * Perform AIO read on AFALG socket, this in turn performs an async * crypto operation in kernel space */ r = io_read(aio->aio_ctx, 1, &cb); if (r < 0) { ALG_PWARN("%s(%d): io_read failed : ", __FILE__, __LINE__); return 0; } do { /* While AIO read is being performed pause job */ ASYNC_pause_job(); /* Check for completion of AIO read */ r = read(aio->efd, &eval, sizeof(eval)); if (r < 0) { if (errno == EAGAIN || errno == EWOULDBLOCK) continue; ALG_PERR("%s(%d): read failed for event fd : ", __FILE__, __LINE__); return 0; } else if (r == 0 || eval <= 0) { ALG_WARN("%s(%d): eventfd read %d bytes, eval = %lu\n", __FILE__, __LINE__, r, eval); } if (eval > 0) { /* Get results of AIO read */ r = io_getevents(aio->aio_ctx, 1, MAX_INFLIGHTS, events, &timeout); if (r > 0) { /* * events.res indicates the actual status of the operation. * Handle the error condition first. */ if (events[0].res < 0) { /* * Underlying operation cannot be completed at the time * of previous submission. Resubmit for the operation. */ if (events[0].res == -EBUSY && retry++ < 3) { r = io_read(aio->aio_ctx, 1, &cb); if (r < 0) { ALG_PERR("%s(%d): retry %d for io_read failed : ", __FILE__, __LINE__, retry); return 0; } continue; } else { /* * Retries exceed for -EBUSY or unrecoverable error * condition for this instance of operation. */ ALG_WARN ("%s(%d): Crypto Operation failed with code %lld\n", __FILE__, __LINE__, events[0].res); return 0; } } /* Operation successful. */ done = 1; } else if (r < 0) { ALG_PERR("%s(%d): io_getevents failed : ", __FILE__, __LINE__); return 0; } else { ALG_WARN("%s(%d): io_geteventd read 0 bytes\n", __FILE__, __LINE__); } } } while (!done); return 1; } static ossl_inline void afalg_set_op_sk(struct cmsghdr *cmsg, const ALG_OP_TYPE op) { cmsg->cmsg_level = SOL_ALG; cmsg->cmsg_type = ALG_SET_OP; cmsg->cmsg_len = CMSG_LEN(ALG_OP_LEN); memcpy(CMSG_DATA(cmsg), &op, ALG_OP_LEN); } static void afalg_set_iv_sk(struct cmsghdr *cmsg, const unsigned char *iv, const unsigned int len) { struct af_alg_iv *aiv; cmsg->cmsg_level = SOL_ALG; cmsg->cmsg_type = ALG_SET_IV; cmsg->cmsg_len = CMSG_LEN(ALG_IV_LEN(len)); aiv = (struct af_alg_iv *)CMSG_DATA(cmsg); aiv->ivlen = len; memcpy(aiv->iv, iv, len); } static ossl_inline int afalg_set_key(afalg_ctx *actx, const unsigned char *key, const int klen) { int ret; ret = setsockopt(actx->bfd, SOL_ALG, ALG_SET_KEY, key, klen); if (ret < 0) { ALG_PERR("%s(%d): Failed to set socket option : ", __FILE__, __LINE__); AFALGerr(AFALG_F_AFALG_SET_KEY, AFALG_R_SOCKET_SET_KEY_FAILED); return 0; } return 1; } static int afalg_create_sk(afalg_ctx *actx, const char *ciphertype, const char *ciphername) { struct sockaddr_alg sa; int r = -1; actx->bfd = actx->sfd = -1; memset(&sa, 0, sizeof(sa)); sa.salg_family = AF_ALG; OPENSSL_strlcpy((char *) sa.salg_type, ciphertype, sizeof(sa.salg_type)); OPENSSL_strlcpy((char *) sa.salg_name, ciphername, sizeof(sa.salg_name)); actx->bfd = socket(AF_ALG, SOCK_SEQPACKET, 0); if (actx->bfd == -1) { ALG_PERR("%s(%d): Failed to open socket : ", __FILE__, __LINE__); AFALGerr(AFALG_F_AFALG_CREATE_SK, AFALG_R_SOCKET_CREATE_FAILED); goto err; } r = bind(actx->bfd, (struct sockaddr *)&sa, sizeof(sa)); if (r < 0) { ALG_PERR("%s(%d): Failed to bind socket : ", __FILE__, __LINE__); AFALGerr(AFALG_F_AFALG_CREATE_SK, AFALG_R_SOCKET_BIND_FAILED); goto err; } actx->sfd = accept(actx->bfd, NULL, 0); if (actx->sfd < 0) { ALG_PERR("%s(%d): Socket Accept Failed : ", __FILE__, __LINE__); AFALGerr(AFALG_F_AFALG_CREATE_SK, AFALG_R_SOCKET_ACCEPT_FAILED); goto err; } return 1; err: if (actx->bfd >= 0) close(actx->bfd); if (actx->sfd >= 0) close(actx->sfd); actx->bfd = actx->sfd = -1; return 0; } static int afalg_start_cipher_sk(afalg_ctx *actx, const unsigned char *in, size_t inl, const unsigned char *iv, unsigned int enc) { struct msghdr msg = { 0 }; struct cmsghdr *cmsg; struct iovec iov; ssize_t sbytes; # ifdef ALG_ZERO_COPY int ret; # endif char cbuf[CMSG_SPACE(ALG_IV_LEN(ALG_AES_IV_LEN)) + CMSG_SPACE(ALG_OP_LEN)]; memset(cbuf, 0, sizeof(cbuf)); msg.msg_control = cbuf; msg.msg_controllen = sizeof(cbuf); /* * cipher direction (i.e. encrypt or decrypt) and iv are sent to the * kernel as part of sendmsg()'s ancillary data */ cmsg = CMSG_FIRSTHDR(&msg); afalg_set_op_sk(cmsg, enc); cmsg = CMSG_NXTHDR(&msg, cmsg); afalg_set_iv_sk(cmsg, iv, ALG_AES_IV_LEN); /* iov that describes input data */ iov.iov_base = (unsigned char *)in; iov.iov_len = inl; msg.msg_flags = MSG_MORE; # ifdef ALG_ZERO_COPY /* * ZERO_COPY mode * Works best when buffer is 4k aligned * OPENS: out of place processing (i.e. out != in) */ /* Input data is not sent as part of call to sendmsg() */ msg.msg_iovlen = 0; msg.msg_iov = NULL; /* Sendmsg() sends iv and cipher direction to the kernel */ sbytes = sendmsg(actx->sfd, &msg, 0); if (sbytes < 0) { ALG_PERR("%s(%d): sendmsg failed for zero copy cipher operation : ", __FILE__, __LINE__); return 0; } /* * vmsplice and splice are used to pin the user space input buffer for * kernel space processing avoiding copies from user to kernel space */ ret = vmsplice(actx->zc_pipe[1], &iov, 1, SPLICE_F_GIFT); if (ret < 0) { ALG_PERR("%s(%d): vmsplice failed : ", __FILE__, __LINE__); return 0; } ret = splice(actx->zc_pipe[0], NULL, actx->sfd, NULL, inl, 0); if (ret < 0) { ALG_PERR("%s(%d): splice failed : ", __FILE__, __LINE__); return 0; } # else msg.msg_iovlen = 1; msg.msg_iov = &iov; /* Sendmsg() sends iv, cipher direction and input data to the kernel */ sbytes = sendmsg(actx->sfd, &msg, 0); if (sbytes < 0) { ALG_PERR("%s(%d): sendmsg failed for cipher operation : ", __FILE__, __LINE__); return 0; } if (sbytes != (ssize_t) inl) { ALG_WARN("Cipher operation send bytes %zd != inlen %zd\n", sbytes, inl); return 0; } # endif return 1; } static int afalg_cipher_init(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key, const unsigned char *iv, int enc) { int ciphertype; int ret; afalg_ctx *actx; const char *ciphername; if (ctx == NULL || key == NULL) { ALG_WARN("%s(%d): Null Parameter\n", __FILE__, __LINE__); return 0; } if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(ctx) == NULL) { ALG_WARN("%s(%d): Cipher object NULL\n", __FILE__, __LINE__); return 0; } actx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_cipher_data(ctx); if (actx == NULL) { ALG_WARN("%s(%d): Cipher data NULL\n", __FILE__, __LINE__); return 0; } ciphertype = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_nid(ctx); switch (ciphertype) { case NID_aes_128_cbc: case NID_aes_192_cbc: case NID_aes_256_cbc: ciphername = "cbc(aes)"; break; default: ALG_WARN("%s(%d): Unsupported Cipher type %d\n", __FILE__, __LINE__, ciphertype); return 0; } if (ALG_AES_IV_LEN != EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx)) { ALG_WARN("%s(%d): Unsupported IV length :%d\n", __FILE__, __LINE__, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx)); return 0; } /* Setup AFALG socket for crypto processing */ ret = afalg_create_sk(actx, "skcipher", ciphername); if (ret < 1) return 0; ret = afalg_set_key(actx, key, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx)); if (ret < 1) goto err; /* Setup AIO ctx to allow async AFALG crypto processing */ if (afalg_init_aio(&actx->aio) == 0) goto err; # ifdef ALG_ZERO_COPY pipe(actx->zc_pipe); # endif actx->init_done = MAGIC_INIT_NUM; return 1; err: close(actx->sfd); close(actx->bfd); return 0; } static int afalg_do_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in, size_t inl) { afalg_ctx *actx; int ret; char nxtiv[ALG_AES_IV_LEN] = { 0 }; if (ctx == NULL || out == NULL || in == NULL) { ALG_WARN("NULL parameter passed to function %s(%d)\n", __FILE__, __LINE__); return 0; } actx = (afalg_ctx *) EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_cipher_data(ctx); if (actx == NULL || actx->init_done != MAGIC_INIT_NUM) { ALG_WARN("%s afalg ctx passed\n", ctx == NULL ? "NULL" : "Uninitialised"); return 0; } /* * set iv now for decrypt operation as the input buffer can be * overwritten for inplace operation where in = out. */ if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx) == 0) { memcpy(nxtiv, in + (inl - ALG_AES_IV_LEN), ALG_AES_IV_LEN); } /* Send input data to kernel space */ ret = afalg_start_cipher_sk(actx, (unsigned char *)in, inl, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv(ctx), EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx)); if (ret < 1) { return 0; } /* Perform async crypto operation in kernel space */ ret = afalg_fin_cipher_aio(&actx->aio, actx->sfd, out, inl); if (ret < 1) return 0; if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx)) { memcpy(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx), out + (inl - ALG_AES_IV_LEN), ALG_AES_IV_LEN); } else { memcpy(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx), nxtiv, ALG_AES_IV_LEN); } return 1; } static int afalg_cipher_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx) { afalg_ctx *actx; if (ctx == NULL) { ALG_WARN("NULL parameter passed to function %s(%d)\n", __FILE__, __LINE__); return 0; } actx = (afalg_ctx *) EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_cipher_data(ctx); - if (actx == NULL || actx->init_done != MAGIC_INIT_NUM) { - ALG_WARN("%s afalg ctx passed\n", - ctx == NULL ? "NULL" : "Uninitialised"); - return 0; - } + if (actx == NULL || actx->init_done != MAGIC_INIT_NUM) + return 1; close(actx->sfd); close(actx->bfd); # ifdef ALG_ZERO_COPY close(actx->zc_pipe[0]); close(actx->zc_pipe[1]); # endif /* close efd in sync mode, async mode is closed in afalg_waitfd_cleanup() */ if (actx->aio.mode == MODE_SYNC) close(actx->aio.efd); io_destroy(actx->aio.aio_ctx); return 1; } static cbc_handles *get_cipher_handle(int nid) { switch (nid) { case NID_aes_128_cbc: return &cbc_handle[AES_CBC_128]; case NID_aes_192_cbc: return &cbc_handle[AES_CBC_192]; case NID_aes_256_cbc: return &cbc_handle[AES_CBC_256]; default: return NULL; } } static const EVP_CIPHER *afalg_aes_cbc(int nid) { cbc_handles *cipher_handle = get_cipher_handle(nid); if (cipher_handle->_hidden == NULL && ((cipher_handle->_hidden = EVP_CIPHER_meth_new(nid, AES_BLOCK_SIZE, cipher_handle->key_size)) == NULL || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_iv_length(cipher_handle->_hidden, AES_IV_LEN) || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_flags(cipher_handle->_hidden, EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE | EVP_CIPH_FLAG_DEFAULT_ASN1) || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_init(cipher_handle->_hidden, afalg_cipher_init) || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_do_cipher(cipher_handle->_hidden, afalg_do_cipher) || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_cleanup(cipher_handle->_hidden, afalg_cipher_cleanup) || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_impl_ctx_size(cipher_handle->_hidden, sizeof(afalg_ctx)))) { EVP_CIPHER_meth_free(cipher_handle->_hidden); cipher_handle->_hidden= NULL; } return cipher_handle->_hidden; } static int afalg_ciphers(ENGINE *e, const EVP_CIPHER **cipher, const int **nids, int nid) { int r = 1; if (cipher == NULL) { *nids = afalg_cipher_nids; return (sizeof(afalg_cipher_nids) / sizeof(afalg_cipher_nids[0])); } switch (nid) { case NID_aes_128_cbc: case NID_aes_192_cbc: case NID_aes_256_cbc: *cipher = afalg_aes_cbc(nid); break; default: *cipher = NULL; r = 0; } return r; } static int bind_afalg(ENGINE *e) { /* Ensure the afalg error handling is set up */ unsigned short i; ERR_load_AFALG_strings(); if (!ENGINE_set_id(e, engine_afalg_id) || !ENGINE_set_name(e, engine_afalg_name) || !ENGINE_set_destroy_function(e, afalg_destroy) || !ENGINE_set_init_function(e, afalg_init) || !ENGINE_set_finish_function(e, afalg_finish)) { AFALGerr(AFALG_F_BIND_AFALG, AFALG_R_INIT_FAILED); return 0; } /* * Create _hidden_aes_xxx_cbc by calling afalg_aes_xxx_cbc * now, as bind_aflag can only be called by one thread at a * time. */ for(i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(afalg_cipher_nids); i++) { if (afalg_aes_cbc(afalg_cipher_nids[i]) == NULL) { AFALGerr(AFALG_F_BIND_AFALG, AFALG_R_INIT_FAILED); return 0; } } if (!ENGINE_set_ciphers(e, afalg_ciphers)) { AFALGerr(AFALG_F_BIND_AFALG, AFALG_R_INIT_FAILED); return 0; } return 1; } # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DYNAMIC_ENGINE static int bind_helper(ENGINE *e, const char *id) { if (id && (strcmp(id, engine_afalg_id) != 0)) return 0; if (!afalg_chk_platform()) return 0; if (!bind_afalg(e)) return 0; return 1; } IMPLEMENT_DYNAMIC_CHECK_FN() IMPLEMENT_DYNAMIC_BIND_FN(bind_helper) # endif static int afalg_chk_platform(void) { int ret; int i; int kver[3] = { -1, -1, -1 }; int sock; char *str; struct utsname ut; ret = uname(&ut); if (ret != 0) { AFALGerr(AFALG_F_AFALG_CHK_PLATFORM, AFALG_R_FAILED_TO_GET_PLATFORM_INFO); return 0; } str = strtok(ut.release, "."); for (i = 0; i < 3 && str != NULL; i++) { kver[i] = atoi(str); str = strtok(NULL, "."); } if (KERNEL_VERSION(kver[0], kver[1], kver[2]) < KERNEL_VERSION(K_MAJ, K_MIN1, K_MIN2)) { ALG_ERR("ASYNC AFALG not supported this kernel(%d.%d.%d)\n", kver[0], kver[1], kver[2]); ALG_ERR("ASYNC AFALG requires kernel version %d.%d.%d or later\n", K_MAJ, K_MIN1, K_MIN2); AFALGerr(AFALG_F_AFALG_CHK_PLATFORM, AFALG_R_KERNEL_DOES_NOT_SUPPORT_ASYNC_AFALG); return 0; } /* Test if we can actually create an AF_ALG socket */ sock = socket(AF_ALG, SOCK_SEQPACKET, 0); if (sock == -1) { AFALGerr(AFALG_F_AFALG_CHK_PLATFORM, AFALG_R_SOCKET_CREATE_FAILED); return 0; } close(sock); return 1; } # ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DYNAMIC_ENGINE static ENGINE *engine_afalg(void) { ENGINE *ret = ENGINE_new(); if (ret == NULL) return NULL; if (!bind_afalg(ret)) { ENGINE_free(ret); return NULL; } return ret; } void engine_load_afalg_int(void) { ENGINE *toadd; if (!afalg_chk_platform()) return; toadd = engine_afalg(); if (toadd == NULL) return; ENGINE_add(toadd); ENGINE_free(toadd); ERR_clear_error(); } # endif static int afalg_init(ENGINE *e) { return 1; } static int afalg_finish(ENGINE *e) { return 1; } static int free_cbc(void) { short unsigned int i; for(i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(afalg_cipher_nids); i++) { EVP_CIPHER_meth_free(cbc_handle[i]._hidden); cbc_handle[i]._hidden = NULL; } return 1; } static int afalg_destroy(ENGINE *e) { ERR_unload_AFALG_strings(); free_cbc(); return 1; } #endif /* KERNEL VERSION */ diff --git a/engines/e_dasync.c b/engines/e_dasync.c index 5cdacb66a043..9ad043b1bd1a 100644 --- a/engines/e_dasync.c +++ b/engines/e_dasync.c @@ -1,785 +1,807 @@ /* - * Copyright 2015-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 2015-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #if defined(_WIN32) # include #endif #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_UNIX) && defined(OPENSSL_THREADS) # undef ASYNC_POSIX # define ASYNC_POSIX # include #elif defined(_WIN32) # undef ASYNC_WIN # define ASYNC_WIN #endif #include "e_dasync_err.c" /* Engine Id and Name */ static const char *engine_dasync_id = "dasync"; static const char *engine_dasync_name = "Dummy Async engine support"; /* Engine Lifetime functions */ static int dasync_destroy(ENGINE *e); static int dasync_init(ENGINE *e); static int dasync_finish(ENGINE *e); void engine_load_dasync_int(void); /* Set up digests. Just SHA1 for now */ static int dasync_digests(ENGINE *e, const EVP_MD **digest, const int **nids, int nid); static void dummy_pause_job(void); /* SHA1 */ static int dasync_sha1_init(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx); static int dasync_sha1_update(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const void *data, size_t count); static int dasync_sha1_final(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *md); /* * Holds the EVP_MD object for sha1 in this engine. Set up once only during * engine bind and can then be reused many times. */ static EVP_MD *_hidden_sha1_md = NULL; static const EVP_MD *dasync_sha1(void) { return _hidden_sha1_md; } static void destroy_digests(void) { EVP_MD_meth_free(_hidden_sha1_md); _hidden_sha1_md = NULL; } static int dasync_digest_nids(const int **nids) { static int digest_nids[2] = { 0, 0 }; static int pos = 0; static int init = 0; if (!init) { const EVP_MD *md; if ((md = dasync_sha1()) != NULL) digest_nids[pos++] = EVP_MD_type(md); digest_nids[pos] = 0; init = 1; } *nids = digest_nids; return pos; } /* RSA */ static int dasync_pub_enc(int flen, const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding); static int dasync_pub_dec(int flen, const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding); static int dasync_rsa_priv_enc(int flen, const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding); static int dasync_rsa_priv_dec(int flen, const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding); static int dasync_rsa_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx); static int dasync_rsa_init(RSA *rsa); static int dasync_rsa_finish(RSA *rsa); static RSA_METHOD *dasync_rsa_method = NULL; /* AES */ static int dasync_aes128_cbc_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, int type, int arg, void *ptr); static int dasync_aes128_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key, const unsigned char *iv, int enc); static int dasync_aes128_cbc_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in, size_t inl); static int dasync_aes128_cbc_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx); static int dasync_aes128_cbc_hmac_sha1_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, int type, int arg, void *ptr); static int dasync_aes128_cbc_hmac_sha1_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key, const unsigned char *iv, int enc); static int dasync_aes128_cbc_hmac_sha1_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in, size_t inl); static int dasync_aes128_cbc_hmac_sha1_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx); struct dasync_pipeline_ctx { void *inner_cipher_data; unsigned int numpipes; unsigned char **inbufs; unsigned char **outbufs; size_t *lens; unsigned char tlsaad[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES][EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN]; unsigned int aadctr; }; /* * Holds the EVP_CIPHER object for aes_128_cbc in this engine. Set up once only * during engine bind and can then be reused many times. */ static EVP_CIPHER *_hidden_aes_128_cbc = NULL; static const EVP_CIPHER *dasync_aes_128_cbc(void) { return _hidden_aes_128_cbc; } /* * Holds the EVP_CIPHER object for aes_128_cbc_hmac_sha1 in this engine. Set up * once only during engine bind and can then be reused many times. * * This 'stitched' cipher depends on the EVP_aes_128_cbc_hmac_sha1() cipher, * which is implemented only if the AES-NI instruction set extension is available * (see OPENSSL_IA32CAP(3)). If that's not the case, then this cipher will not * be available either. * * Note: Since it is a legacy mac-then-encrypt cipher, modern TLS peers (which * negotiate the encrypt-then-mac extension) won't negotiate it anyway. */ static EVP_CIPHER *_hidden_aes_128_cbc_hmac_sha1 = NULL; static const EVP_CIPHER *dasync_aes_128_cbc_hmac_sha1(void) { return _hidden_aes_128_cbc_hmac_sha1; } static void destroy_ciphers(void) { EVP_CIPHER_meth_free(_hidden_aes_128_cbc); EVP_CIPHER_meth_free(_hidden_aes_128_cbc_hmac_sha1); _hidden_aes_128_cbc = NULL; _hidden_aes_128_cbc_hmac_sha1 = NULL; } static int dasync_ciphers(ENGINE *e, const EVP_CIPHER **cipher, const int **nids, int nid); static int dasync_cipher_nids[] = { - NID_aes_128_cbc, NID_aes_128_cbc_hmac_sha1, + NID_aes_128_cbc, 0 }; static int bind_dasync(ENGINE *e) { /* Setup RSA_METHOD */ if ((dasync_rsa_method = RSA_meth_new("Dummy Async RSA method", 0)) == NULL || RSA_meth_set_pub_enc(dasync_rsa_method, dasync_pub_enc) == 0 || RSA_meth_set_pub_dec(dasync_rsa_method, dasync_pub_dec) == 0 || RSA_meth_set_priv_enc(dasync_rsa_method, dasync_rsa_priv_enc) == 0 || RSA_meth_set_priv_dec(dasync_rsa_method, dasync_rsa_priv_dec) == 0 || RSA_meth_set_mod_exp(dasync_rsa_method, dasync_rsa_mod_exp) == 0 || RSA_meth_set_bn_mod_exp(dasync_rsa_method, BN_mod_exp_mont) == 0 || RSA_meth_set_init(dasync_rsa_method, dasync_rsa_init) == 0 || RSA_meth_set_finish(dasync_rsa_method, dasync_rsa_finish) == 0) { DASYNCerr(DASYNC_F_BIND_DASYNC, DASYNC_R_INIT_FAILED); return 0; } /* Ensure the dasync error handling is set up */ ERR_load_DASYNC_strings(); if (!ENGINE_set_id(e, engine_dasync_id) || !ENGINE_set_name(e, engine_dasync_name) || !ENGINE_set_RSA(e, dasync_rsa_method) || !ENGINE_set_digests(e, dasync_digests) || !ENGINE_set_ciphers(e, dasync_ciphers) || !ENGINE_set_destroy_function(e, dasync_destroy) || !ENGINE_set_init_function(e, dasync_init) || !ENGINE_set_finish_function(e, dasync_finish)) { DASYNCerr(DASYNC_F_BIND_DASYNC, DASYNC_R_INIT_FAILED); return 0; } /* * Set up the EVP_CIPHER and EVP_MD objects for the ciphers/digests * supplied by this engine */ _hidden_sha1_md = EVP_MD_meth_new(NID_sha1, NID_sha1WithRSAEncryption); if (_hidden_sha1_md == NULL || !EVP_MD_meth_set_result_size(_hidden_sha1_md, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH) || !EVP_MD_meth_set_input_blocksize(_hidden_sha1_md, SHA_CBLOCK) || !EVP_MD_meth_set_app_datasize(_hidden_sha1_md, sizeof(EVP_MD *) + sizeof(SHA_CTX)) || !EVP_MD_meth_set_flags(_hidden_sha1_md, EVP_MD_FLAG_DIGALGID_ABSENT) || !EVP_MD_meth_set_init(_hidden_sha1_md, dasync_sha1_init) || !EVP_MD_meth_set_update(_hidden_sha1_md, dasync_sha1_update) || !EVP_MD_meth_set_final(_hidden_sha1_md, dasync_sha1_final)) { EVP_MD_meth_free(_hidden_sha1_md); _hidden_sha1_md = NULL; } _hidden_aes_128_cbc = EVP_CIPHER_meth_new(NID_aes_128_cbc, 16 /* block size */, 16 /* key len */); if (_hidden_aes_128_cbc == NULL || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_iv_length(_hidden_aes_128_cbc,16) || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_flags(_hidden_aes_128_cbc, EVP_CIPH_FLAG_DEFAULT_ASN1 | EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE - | EVP_CIPH_FLAG_PIPELINE) + | EVP_CIPH_FLAG_PIPELINE + | EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_COPY) || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_init(_hidden_aes_128_cbc, dasync_aes128_init_key) || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_do_cipher(_hidden_aes_128_cbc, dasync_aes128_cbc_cipher) || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_cleanup(_hidden_aes_128_cbc, dasync_aes128_cbc_cleanup) || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_ctrl(_hidden_aes_128_cbc, dasync_aes128_cbc_ctrl) || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_impl_ctx_size(_hidden_aes_128_cbc, sizeof(struct dasync_pipeline_ctx))) { EVP_CIPHER_meth_free(_hidden_aes_128_cbc); _hidden_aes_128_cbc = NULL; } _hidden_aes_128_cbc_hmac_sha1 = EVP_CIPHER_meth_new( NID_aes_128_cbc_hmac_sha1, 16 /* block size */, 16 /* key len */); if (_hidden_aes_128_cbc_hmac_sha1 == NULL + || EVP_aes_128_cbc_hmac_sha1() == NULL || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_iv_length(_hidden_aes_128_cbc_hmac_sha1,16) || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_flags(_hidden_aes_128_cbc_hmac_sha1, EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE | EVP_CIPH_FLAG_DEFAULT_ASN1 | EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER - | EVP_CIPH_FLAG_PIPELINE) + | EVP_CIPH_FLAG_PIPELINE + | EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_COPY) || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_init(_hidden_aes_128_cbc_hmac_sha1, dasync_aes128_cbc_hmac_sha1_init_key) || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_do_cipher(_hidden_aes_128_cbc_hmac_sha1, dasync_aes128_cbc_hmac_sha1_cipher) || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_cleanup(_hidden_aes_128_cbc_hmac_sha1, dasync_aes128_cbc_hmac_sha1_cleanup) || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_ctrl(_hidden_aes_128_cbc_hmac_sha1, dasync_aes128_cbc_hmac_sha1_ctrl) || !EVP_CIPHER_meth_set_impl_ctx_size(_hidden_aes_128_cbc_hmac_sha1, sizeof(struct dasync_pipeline_ctx))) { EVP_CIPHER_meth_free(_hidden_aes_128_cbc_hmac_sha1); _hidden_aes_128_cbc_hmac_sha1 = NULL; } return 1; } # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DYNAMIC_ENGINE static int bind_helper(ENGINE *e, const char *id) { if (id && (strcmp(id, engine_dasync_id) != 0)) return 0; if (!bind_dasync(e)) return 0; return 1; } IMPLEMENT_DYNAMIC_CHECK_FN() IMPLEMENT_DYNAMIC_BIND_FN(bind_helper) # endif static ENGINE *engine_dasync(void) { ENGINE *ret = ENGINE_new(); if (!ret) return NULL; if (!bind_dasync(ret)) { ENGINE_free(ret); return NULL; } return ret; } void engine_load_dasync_int(void) { ENGINE *toadd = engine_dasync(); if (!toadd) return; ENGINE_add(toadd); ENGINE_free(toadd); ERR_clear_error(); } static int dasync_init(ENGINE *e) { return 1; } static int dasync_finish(ENGINE *e) { return 1; } static int dasync_destroy(ENGINE *e) { destroy_digests(); destroy_ciphers(); RSA_meth_free(dasync_rsa_method); ERR_unload_DASYNC_strings(); return 1; } static int dasync_digests(ENGINE *e, const EVP_MD **digest, const int **nids, int nid) { int ok = 1; if (!digest) { /* We are returning a list of supported nids */ return dasync_digest_nids(nids); } /* We are being asked for a specific digest */ switch (nid) { case NID_sha1: *digest = dasync_sha1(); break; default: ok = 0; *digest = NULL; break; } return ok; } static int dasync_ciphers(ENGINE *e, const EVP_CIPHER **cipher, const int **nids, int nid) { int ok = 1; if (cipher == NULL) { /* We are returning a list of supported nids */ + if (dasync_aes_128_cbc_hmac_sha1() == NULL) { + *nids = dasync_cipher_nids + 1; + return 1; + } *nids = dasync_cipher_nids; return (sizeof(dasync_cipher_nids) - 1) / sizeof(dasync_cipher_nids[0]); } /* We are being asked for a specific cipher */ switch (nid) { case NID_aes_128_cbc: *cipher = dasync_aes_128_cbc(); break; case NID_aes_128_cbc_hmac_sha1: *cipher = dasync_aes_128_cbc_hmac_sha1(); break; default: ok = 0; *cipher = NULL; break; } return ok; } static void wait_cleanup(ASYNC_WAIT_CTX *ctx, const void *key, OSSL_ASYNC_FD readfd, void *pvwritefd) { OSSL_ASYNC_FD *pwritefd = (OSSL_ASYNC_FD *)pvwritefd; #if defined(ASYNC_WIN) CloseHandle(readfd); CloseHandle(*pwritefd); #elif defined(ASYNC_POSIX) close(readfd); close(*pwritefd); #endif OPENSSL_free(pwritefd); } #define DUMMY_CHAR 'X' static void dummy_pause_job(void) { ASYNC_JOB *job; ASYNC_WAIT_CTX *waitctx; OSSL_ASYNC_FD pipefds[2] = {0, 0}; OSSL_ASYNC_FD *writefd; #if defined(ASYNC_WIN) DWORD numwritten, numread; char buf = DUMMY_CHAR; #elif defined(ASYNC_POSIX) char buf = DUMMY_CHAR; #endif if ((job = ASYNC_get_current_job()) == NULL) return; waitctx = ASYNC_get_wait_ctx(job); if (ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_get_fd(waitctx, engine_dasync_id, &pipefds[0], (void **)&writefd)) { pipefds[1] = *writefd; } else { writefd = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*writefd)); if (writefd == NULL) return; #if defined(ASYNC_WIN) if (CreatePipe(&pipefds[0], &pipefds[1], NULL, 256) == 0) { OPENSSL_free(writefd); return; } #elif defined(ASYNC_POSIX) if (pipe(pipefds) != 0) { OPENSSL_free(writefd); return; } #endif *writefd = pipefds[1]; if (!ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_set_wait_fd(waitctx, engine_dasync_id, pipefds[0], writefd, wait_cleanup)) { wait_cleanup(waitctx, engine_dasync_id, pipefds[0], writefd); return; } } /* * In the Dummy async engine we are cheating. We signal that the job * is complete by waking it before the call to ASYNC_pause_job(). A real * async engine would only wake when the job was actually complete */ #if defined(ASYNC_WIN) WriteFile(pipefds[1], &buf, 1, &numwritten, NULL); #elif defined(ASYNC_POSIX) if (write(pipefds[1], &buf, 1) < 0) return; #endif /* Ignore errors - we carry on anyway */ ASYNC_pause_job(); /* Clear the wake signal */ #if defined(ASYNC_WIN) ReadFile(pipefds[0], &buf, 1, &numread, NULL); #elif defined(ASYNC_POSIX) if (read(pipefds[0], &buf, 1) < 0) return; #endif } /* * SHA1 implementation. At the moment we just defer to the standard * implementation */ #undef data #define data(ctx) ((SHA_CTX *)EVP_MD_CTX_md_data(ctx)) static int dasync_sha1_init(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx) { dummy_pause_job(); return SHA1_Init(data(ctx)); } static int dasync_sha1_update(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const void *data, size_t count) { dummy_pause_job(); return SHA1_Update(data(ctx), data, (size_t)count); } static int dasync_sha1_final(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *md) { dummy_pause_job(); return SHA1_Final(md, data(ctx)); } /* * RSA implementation */ static int dasync_pub_enc(int flen, const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding) { /* Ignore errors - we carry on anyway */ dummy_pause_job(); return RSA_meth_get_pub_enc(RSA_PKCS1_OpenSSL()) (flen, from, to, rsa, padding); } static int dasync_pub_dec(int flen, const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding) { /* Ignore errors - we carry on anyway */ dummy_pause_job(); return RSA_meth_get_pub_dec(RSA_PKCS1_OpenSSL()) (flen, from, to, rsa, padding); } static int dasync_rsa_priv_enc(int flen, const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding) { /* Ignore errors - we carry on anyway */ dummy_pause_job(); return RSA_meth_get_priv_enc(RSA_PKCS1_OpenSSL()) (flen, from, to, rsa, padding); } static int dasync_rsa_priv_dec(int flen, const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding) { /* Ignore errors - we carry on anyway */ dummy_pause_job(); return RSA_meth_get_priv_dec(RSA_PKCS1_OpenSSL()) (flen, from, to, rsa, padding); } static int dasync_rsa_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx) { /* Ignore errors - we carry on anyway */ dummy_pause_job(); return RSA_meth_get_mod_exp(RSA_PKCS1_OpenSSL())(r0, I, rsa, ctx); } static int dasync_rsa_init(RSA *rsa) { return RSA_meth_get_init(RSA_PKCS1_OpenSSL())(rsa); } static int dasync_rsa_finish(RSA *rsa) { return RSA_meth_get_finish(RSA_PKCS1_OpenSSL())(rsa); } /* Cipher helper functions */ static int dasync_cipher_ctrl_helper(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, int type, int arg, void *ptr, int aeadcapable) { int ret; struct dasync_pipeline_ctx *pipe_ctx = (struct dasync_pipeline_ctx *)EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_cipher_data(ctx); if (pipe_ctx == NULL) return 0; switch (type) { case EVP_CTRL_SET_PIPELINE_OUTPUT_BUFS: pipe_ctx->numpipes = arg; pipe_ctx->outbufs = (unsigned char **)ptr; break; case EVP_CTRL_SET_PIPELINE_INPUT_BUFS: pipe_ctx->numpipes = arg; pipe_ctx->inbufs = (unsigned char **)ptr; break; case EVP_CTRL_SET_PIPELINE_INPUT_LENS: pipe_ctx->numpipes = arg; pipe_ctx->lens = (size_t *)ptr; break; case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_MAC_KEY: if (!aeadcapable) return -1; EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_cipher_data(ctx, pipe_ctx->inner_cipher_data); ret = EVP_CIPHER_meth_get_ctrl(EVP_aes_128_cbc_hmac_sha1()) (ctx, type, arg, ptr); EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_cipher_data(ctx, pipe_ctx); return ret; case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_TLS1_AAD: { unsigned char *p = ptr; unsigned int len; if (!aeadcapable || arg != EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN) return -1; if (pipe_ctx->aadctr >= SSL_MAX_PIPELINES) return -1; memcpy(pipe_ctx->tlsaad[pipe_ctx->aadctr], ptr, EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN); pipe_ctx->aadctr++; len = p[arg - 2] << 8 | p[arg - 1]; if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx)) { if ((p[arg - 4] << 8 | p[arg - 3]) >= TLS1_1_VERSION) { if (len < AES_BLOCK_SIZE) return 0; len -= AES_BLOCK_SIZE; } return ((len + SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH + AES_BLOCK_SIZE) & -AES_BLOCK_SIZE) - len; } else { return SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH; } } + case EVP_CTRL_COPY: + { + const EVP_CIPHER *cipher = aeadcapable + ? EVP_aes_128_cbc_hmac_sha1() + : EVP_aes_128_cbc(); + size_t data_size = EVP_CIPHER_impl_ctx_size(cipher); + void *cipher_data = OPENSSL_malloc(data_size); + + if (cipher_data == NULL) + return 0; + memcpy(cipher_data, pipe_ctx->inner_cipher_data, data_size); + pipe_ctx->inner_cipher_data = cipher_data; + return 1; + } + default: return 0; } return 1; } static int dasync_cipher_init_key_helper(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key, const unsigned char *iv, int enc, const EVP_CIPHER *cipher) { int ret; struct dasync_pipeline_ctx *pipe_ctx = (struct dasync_pipeline_ctx *)EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_cipher_data(ctx); if (pipe_ctx->inner_cipher_data == NULL && EVP_CIPHER_impl_ctx_size(cipher) != 0) { pipe_ctx->inner_cipher_data = OPENSSL_zalloc( EVP_CIPHER_impl_ctx_size(cipher)); if (pipe_ctx->inner_cipher_data == NULL) { DASYNCerr(DASYNC_F_DASYNC_CIPHER_INIT_KEY_HELPER, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } } pipe_ctx->numpipes = 0; pipe_ctx->aadctr = 0; EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_cipher_data(ctx, pipe_ctx->inner_cipher_data); ret = EVP_CIPHER_meth_get_init(cipher)(ctx, key, iv, enc); EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_cipher_data(ctx, pipe_ctx); return ret; } static int dasync_cipher_helper(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in, size_t inl, const EVP_CIPHER *cipher) { int ret = 1; unsigned int i, pipes; struct dasync_pipeline_ctx *pipe_ctx = (struct dasync_pipeline_ctx *)EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_cipher_data(ctx); pipes = pipe_ctx->numpipes; EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_cipher_data(ctx, pipe_ctx->inner_cipher_data); if (pipes == 0) { if (pipe_ctx->aadctr != 0) { if (pipe_ctx->aadctr != 1) return -1; EVP_CIPHER_meth_get_ctrl(cipher) (ctx, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_TLS1_AAD, EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN, pipe_ctx->tlsaad[0]); } ret = EVP_CIPHER_meth_get_do_cipher(cipher) (ctx, out, in, inl); } else { if (pipe_ctx->aadctr > 0 && pipe_ctx->aadctr != pipes) return -1; for (i = 0; i < pipes; i++) { if (pipe_ctx->aadctr > 0) { EVP_CIPHER_meth_get_ctrl(cipher) (ctx, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_TLS1_AAD, EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN, pipe_ctx->tlsaad[i]); } ret = ret && EVP_CIPHER_meth_get_do_cipher(cipher) (ctx, pipe_ctx->outbufs[i], pipe_ctx->inbufs[i], pipe_ctx->lens[i]); } pipe_ctx->numpipes = 0; } pipe_ctx->aadctr = 0; EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_cipher_data(ctx, pipe_ctx); return ret; } static int dasync_cipher_cleanup_helper(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const EVP_CIPHER *cipher) { struct dasync_pipeline_ctx *pipe_ctx = (struct dasync_pipeline_ctx *)EVP_CIPHER_CTX_get_cipher_data(ctx); OPENSSL_clear_free(pipe_ctx->inner_cipher_data, EVP_CIPHER_impl_ctx_size(cipher)); return 1; } /* * AES128 CBC Implementation */ static int dasync_aes128_cbc_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, int type, int arg, void *ptr) { return dasync_cipher_ctrl_helper(ctx, type, arg, ptr, 0); } static int dasync_aes128_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key, const unsigned char *iv, int enc) { return dasync_cipher_init_key_helper(ctx, key, iv, enc, EVP_aes_128_cbc()); } static int dasync_aes128_cbc_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in, size_t inl) { return dasync_cipher_helper(ctx, out, in, inl, EVP_aes_128_cbc()); } static int dasync_aes128_cbc_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx) { return dasync_cipher_cleanup_helper(ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc()); } /* * AES128 CBC HMAC SHA1 Implementation */ static int dasync_aes128_cbc_hmac_sha1_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, int type, int arg, void *ptr) { return dasync_cipher_ctrl_helper(ctx, type, arg, ptr, 1); } static int dasync_aes128_cbc_hmac_sha1_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key, const unsigned char *iv, int enc) { /* * We can safely assume that EVP_aes_128_cbc_hmac_sha1() != NULL, * see comment before the definition of dasync_aes_128_cbc_hmac_sha1(). */ return dasync_cipher_init_key_helper(ctx, key, iv, enc, EVP_aes_128_cbc_hmac_sha1()); } static int dasync_aes128_cbc_hmac_sha1_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *in, size_t inl) { return dasync_cipher_helper(ctx, out, in, inl, EVP_aes_128_cbc_hmac_sha1()); } static int dasync_aes128_cbc_hmac_sha1_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx) { /* * We can safely assume that EVP_aes_128_cbc_hmac_sha1() != NULL, * see comment before the definition of dasync_aes_128_cbc_hmac_sha1(). */ return dasync_cipher_cleanup_helper(ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc_hmac_sha1()); } diff --git a/include/crypto/rand.h b/include/crypto/rand.h index 5350d3a93119..9e02bb0e504b 100644 --- a/include/crypto/rand.h +++ b/include/crypto/rand.h @@ -1,134 +1,144 @@ /* - * Copyright 2016-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 2016-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ /* * Licensed under the OpenSSL licenses, (the "License"); * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. * You may obtain a copy of the License at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html * or in the file LICENSE in the source distribution. */ #ifndef OSSL_CRYPTO_RAND_H # define OSSL_CRYPTO_RAND_H # include +# if defined(__APPLE__) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_APPLE_CRYPTO_RANDOM) +# include +# if (defined(__MAC_OS_X_VERSION_MIN_REQUIRED) && __MAC_OS_X_VERSION_MIN_REQUIRED >= 101200) || \ + (defined(__IPHONE_OS_VERSION_MIN_REQUIRED) && __IPHONE_OS_VERSION_MIN_REQUIRED >= 80000) +# define OPENSSL_APPLE_CRYPTO_RANDOM 1 +# include +# include +# endif +# endif + /* forward declaration */ typedef struct rand_pool_st RAND_POOL; void rand_cleanup_int(void); void rand_drbg_cleanup_int(void); void drbg_delete_thread_state(void); /* Hardware-based seeding functions. */ size_t rand_acquire_entropy_from_tsc(RAND_POOL *pool); size_t rand_acquire_entropy_from_cpu(RAND_POOL *pool); /* DRBG entropy callbacks. */ size_t rand_drbg_get_entropy(RAND_DRBG *drbg, unsigned char **pout, int entropy, size_t min_len, size_t max_len, int prediction_resistance); void rand_drbg_cleanup_entropy(RAND_DRBG *drbg, unsigned char *out, size_t outlen); size_t rand_drbg_get_nonce(RAND_DRBG *drbg, unsigned char **pout, int entropy, size_t min_len, size_t max_len); void rand_drbg_cleanup_nonce(RAND_DRBG *drbg, unsigned char *out, size_t outlen); size_t rand_drbg_get_additional_data(RAND_POOL *pool, unsigned char **pout); void rand_drbg_cleanup_additional_data(RAND_POOL *pool, unsigned char *out); /* * RAND_POOL functions */ RAND_POOL *rand_pool_new(int entropy_requested, int secure, size_t min_len, size_t max_len); RAND_POOL *rand_pool_attach(const unsigned char *buffer, size_t len, size_t entropy); void rand_pool_free(RAND_POOL *pool); const unsigned char *rand_pool_buffer(RAND_POOL *pool); unsigned char *rand_pool_detach(RAND_POOL *pool); void rand_pool_reattach(RAND_POOL *pool, unsigned char *buffer); size_t rand_pool_entropy(RAND_POOL *pool); size_t rand_pool_length(RAND_POOL *pool); size_t rand_pool_entropy_available(RAND_POOL *pool); size_t rand_pool_entropy_needed(RAND_POOL *pool); /* |entropy_factor| expresses how many bits of data contain 1 bit of entropy */ size_t rand_pool_bytes_needed(RAND_POOL *pool, unsigned int entropy_factor); size_t rand_pool_bytes_remaining(RAND_POOL *pool); int rand_pool_add(RAND_POOL *pool, const unsigned char *buffer, size_t len, size_t entropy); unsigned char *rand_pool_add_begin(RAND_POOL *pool, size_t len); int rand_pool_add_end(RAND_POOL *pool, size_t len, size_t entropy); /* * Add random bytes to the pool to acquire requested amount of entropy * * This function is platform specific and tries to acquire the requested * amount of entropy by polling platform specific entropy sources. * * If the function succeeds in acquiring at least |entropy_requested| bits * of entropy, the total entropy count is returned. If it fails, it returns * an entropy count of 0. */ size_t rand_pool_acquire_entropy(RAND_POOL *pool); /* * Add some application specific nonce data * * This function is platform specific and adds some application specific * data to the nonce used for instantiating the drbg. * * This data currently consists of the process and thread id, and a high * resolution timestamp. The data does not include an atomic counter, * because that is added by the calling function rand_drbg_get_nonce(). * * Returns 1 on success and 0 on failure. */ int rand_pool_add_nonce_data(RAND_POOL *pool); /* * Add some platform specific additional data * * This function is platform specific and adds some random noise to the * additional data used for generating random bytes and for reseeding * the drbg. * * Returns 1 on success and 0 on failure. */ int rand_pool_add_additional_data(RAND_POOL *pool); /* * Initialise the random pool reseeding sources. * * Returns 1 on success and 0 on failure. */ int rand_pool_init(void); /* * Finalise the random pool reseeding sources. */ void rand_pool_cleanup(void); /* * Control the random pool use of open file descriptors. */ void rand_pool_keep_random_devices_open(int keep); #endif diff --git a/include/openssl/ec.h b/include/openssl/ec.h index 44cc139966ef..24baf53c34d6 100644 --- a/include/openssl/ec.h +++ b/include/openssl/ec.h @@ -1,1481 +1,1484 @@ /* - * Copyright 2002-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 2002-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #ifndef HEADER_EC_H # define HEADER_EC_H # include # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC # include # include # if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L # include # endif # include # ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_ECC_MAX_FIELD_BITS # define OPENSSL_ECC_MAX_FIELD_BITS 661 # endif /** Enum for the point conversion form as defined in X9.62 (ECDSA) * for the encoding of a elliptic curve point (x,y) */ typedef enum { /** the point is encoded as z||x, where the octet z specifies * which solution of the quadratic equation y is */ POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED = 2, /** the point is encoded as z||x||y, where z is the octet 0x04 */ POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED = 4, /** the point is encoded as z||x||y, where the octet z specifies * which solution of the quadratic equation y is */ POINT_CONVERSION_HYBRID = 6 } point_conversion_form_t; typedef struct ec_method_st EC_METHOD; typedef struct ec_group_st EC_GROUP; typedef struct ec_point_st EC_POINT; typedef struct ecpk_parameters_st ECPKPARAMETERS; typedef struct ec_parameters_st ECPARAMETERS; /********************************************************************/ /* EC_METHODs for curves over GF(p) */ /********************************************************************/ /** Returns the basic GFp ec methods which provides the basis for the * optimized methods. * \return EC_METHOD object */ const EC_METHOD *EC_GFp_simple_method(void); /** Returns GFp methods using montgomery multiplication. * \return EC_METHOD object */ const EC_METHOD *EC_GFp_mont_method(void); /** Returns GFp methods using optimized methods for NIST recommended curves * \return EC_METHOD object */ const EC_METHOD *EC_GFp_nist_method(void); # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC_NISTP_64_GCC_128 /** Returns 64-bit optimized methods for nistp224 * \return EC_METHOD object */ const EC_METHOD *EC_GFp_nistp224_method(void); /** Returns 64-bit optimized methods for nistp256 * \return EC_METHOD object */ const EC_METHOD *EC_GFp_nistp256_method(void); /** Returns 64-bit optimized methods for nistp521 * \return EC_METHOD object */ const EC_METHOD *EC_GFp_nistp521_method(void); # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M /********************************************************************/ /* EC_METHOD for curves over GF(2^m) */ /********************************************************************/ /** Returns the basic GF2m ec method * \return EC_METHOD object */ const EC_METHOD *EC_GF2m_simple_method(void); # endif /********************************************************************/ /* EC_GROUP functions */ /********************************************************************/ /** Creates a new EC_GROUP object * \param meth EC_METHOD to use * \return newly created EC_GROUP object or NULL in case of an error. */ EC_GROUP *EC_GROUP_new(const EC_METHOD *meth); /** Frees a EC_GROUP object * \param group EC_GROUP object to be freed. */ void EC_GROUP_free(EC_GROUP *group); /** Clears and frees a EC_GROUP object * \param group EC_GROUP object to be cleared and freed. */ void EC_GROUP_clear_free(EC_GROUP *group); /** Copies EC_GROUP objects. Note: both EC_GROUPs must use the same EC_METHOD. * \param dst destination EC_GROUP object * \param src source EC_GROUP object * \return 1 on success and 0 if an error occurred. */ int EC_GROUP_copy(EC_GROUP *dst, const EC_GROUP *src); /** Creates a new EC_GROUP object and copies the copies the content * form src to the newly created EC_KEY object * \param src source EC_GROUP object * \return newly created EC_GROUP object or NULL in case of an error. */ EC_GROUP *EC_GROUP_dup(const EC_GROUP *src); /** Returns the EC_METHOD of the EC_GROUP object. * \param group EC_GROUP object * \return EC_METHOD used in this EC_GROUP object. */ const EC_METHOD *EC_GROUP_method_of(const EC_GROUP *group); /** Returns the field type of the EC_METHOD. * \param meth EC_METHOD object * \return NID of the underlying field type OID. */ int EC_METHOD_get_field_type(const EC_METHOD *meth); /** Sets the generator and its order/cofactor of a EC_GROUP object. * \param group EC_GROUP object * \param generator EC_POINT object with the generator. * \param order the order of the group generated by the generator. * \param cofactor the index of the sub-group generated by the generator * in the group of all points on the elliptic curve. * \return 1 on success and 0 if an error occurred */ int EC_GROUP_set_generator(EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *generator, const BIGNUM *order, const BIGNUM *cofactor); /** Returns the generator of a EC_GROUP object. * \param group EC_GROUP object * \return the currently used generator (possibly NULL). */ const EC_POINT *EC_GROUP_get0_generator(const EC_GROUP *group); /** Returns the montgomery data for order(Generator) * \param group EC_GROUP object * \return the currently used montgomery data (possibly NULL). */ BN_MONT_CTX *EC_GROUP_get_mont_data(const EC_GROUP *group); /** Gets the order of a EC_GROUP * \param group EC_GROUP object * \param order BIGNUM to which the order is copied * \param ctx unused * \return 1 on success and 0 if an error occurred */ int EC_GROUP_get_order(const EC_GROUP *group, BIGNUM *order, BN_CTX *ctx); /** Gets the order of an EC_GROUP * \param group EC_GROUP object * \return the group order */ const BIGNUM *EC_GROUP_get0_order(const EC_GROUP *group); /** Gets the number of bits of the order of an EC_GROUP * \param group EC_GROUP object * \return number of bits of group order. */ int EC_GROUP_order_bits(const EC_GROUP *group); /** Gets the cofactor of a EC_GROUP * \param group EC_GROUP object * \param cofactor BIGNUM to which the cofactor is copied * \param ctx unused * \return 1 on success and 0 if an error occurred */ int EC_GROUP_get_cofactor(const EC_GROUP *group, BIGNUM *cofactor, BN_CTX *ctx); /** Gets the cofactor of an EC_GROUP * \param group EC_GROUP object * \return the group cofactor */ const BIGNUM *EC_GROUP_get0_cofactor(const EC_GROUP *group); /** Sets the name of a EC_GROUP object * \param group EC_GROUP object * \param nid NID of the curve name OID */ void EC_GROUP_set_curve_name(EC_GROUP *group, int nid); /** Returns the curve name of a EC_GROUP object * \param group EC_GROUP object * \return NID of the curve name OID or 0 if not set. */ int EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(const EC_GROUP *group); void EC_GROUP_set_asn1_flag(EC_GROUP *group, int flag); int EC_GROUP_get_asn1_flag(const EC_GROUP *group); void EC_GROUP_set_point_conversion_form(EC_GROUP *group, point_conversion_form_t form); point_conversion_form_t EC_GROUP_get_point_conversion_form(const EC_GROUP *); unsigned char *EC_GROUP_get0_seed(const EC_GROUP *x); size_t EC_GROUP_get_seed_len(const EC_GROUP *); size_t EC_GROUP_set_seed(EC_GROUP *, const unsigned char *, size_t len); /** Sets the parameters of a ec curve defined by y^2 = x^3 + a*x + b (for GFp) * or y^2 + x*y = x^3 + a*x^2 + b (for GF2m) * \param group EC_GROUP object * \param p BIGNUM with the prime number (GFp) or the polynomial * defining the underlying field (GF2m) * \param a BIGNUM with parameter a of the equation * \param b BIGNUM with parameter b of the equation * \param ctx BN_CTX object (optional) * \return 1 on success and 0 if an error occurred */ int EC_GROUP_set_curve(EC_GROUP *group, const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *ctx); /** Gets the parameters of the ec curve defined by y^2 = x^3 + a*x + b (for GFp) * or y^2 + x*y = x^3 + a*x^2 + b (for GF2m) * \param group EC_GROUP object * \param p BIGNUM with the prime number (GFp) or the polynomial * defining the underlying field (GF2m) * \param a BIGNUM for parameter a of the equation * \param b BIGNUM for parameter b of the equation * \param ctx BN_CTX object (optional) * \return 1 on success and 0 if an error occurred */ int EC_GROUP_get_curve(const EC_GROUP *group, BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *a, BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *ctx); /** Sets the parameters of an ec curve. Synonym for EC_GROUP_set_curve * \param group EC_GROUP object * \param p BIGNUM with the prime number (GFp) or the polynomial * defining the underlying field (GF2m) * \param a BIGNUM with parameter a of the equation * \param b BIGNUM with parameter b of the equation * \param ctx BN_CTX object (optional) * \return 1 on success and 0 if an error occurred */ DEPRECATEDIN_1_2_0(int EC_GROUP_set_curve_GFp(EC_GROUP *group, const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *ctx)) /** Gets the parameters of an ec curve. Synonym for EC_GROUP_get_curve * \param group EC_GROUP object * \param p BIGNUM with the prime number (GFp) or the polynomial * defining the underlying field (GF2m) * \param a BIGNUM for parameter a of the equation * \param b BIGNUM for parameter b of the equation * \param ctx BN_CTX object (optional) * \return 1 on success and 0 if an error occurred */ DEPRECATEDIN_1_2_0(int EC_GROUP_get_curve_GFp(const EC_GROUP *group, BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *a, BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *ctx)) # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M /** Sets the parameter of an ec curve. Synonym for EC_GROUP_set_curve * \param group EC_GROUP object * \param p BIGNUM with the prime number (GFp) or the polynomial * defining the underlying field (GF2m) * \param a BIGNUM with parameter a of the equation * \param b BIGNUM with parameter b of the equation * \param ctx BN_CTX object (optional) * \return 1 on success and 0 if an error occurred */ DEPRECATEDIN_1_2_0(int EC_GROUP_set_curve_GF2m(EC_GROUP *group, const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *ctx)) /** Gets the parameters of an ec curve. Synonym for EC_GROUP_get_curve * \param group EC_GROUP object * \param p BIGNUM with the prime number (GFp) or the polynomial * defining the underlying field (GF2m) * \param a BIGNUM for parameter a of the equation * \param b BIGNUM for parameter b of the equation * \param ctx BN_CTX object (optional) * \return 1 on success and 0 if an error occurred */ DEPRECATEDIN_1_2_0(int EC_GROUP_get_curve_GF2m(const EC_GROUP *group, BIGNUM *p, BIGNUM *a, BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *ctx)) # endif /** Returns the number of bits needed to represent a field element * \param group EC_GROUP object * \return number of bits needed to represent a field element */ int EC_GROUP_get_degree(const EC_GROUP *group); /** Checks whether the parameter in the EC_GROUP define a valid ec group * \param group EC_GROUP object * \param ctx BN_CTX object (optional) * \return 1 if group is a valid ec group and 0 otherwise */ int EC_GROUP_check(const EC_GROUP *group, BN_CTX *ctx); /** Checks whether the discriminant of the elliptic curve is zero or not * \param group EC_GROUP object * \param ctx BN_CTX object (optional) * \return 1 if the discriminant is not zero and 0 otherwise */ int EC_GROUP_check_discriminant(const EC_GROUP *group, BN_CTX *ctx); /** Compares two EC_GROUP objects * \param a first EC_GROUP object * \param b second EC_GROUP object * \param ctx BN_CTX object (optional) * \return 0 if the groups are equal, 1 if not, or -1 on error */ int EC_GROUP_cmp(const EC_GROUP *a, const EC_GROUP *b, BN_CTX *ctx); /* * EC_GROUP_new_GF*() calls EC_GROUP_new() and EC_GROUP_set_GF*() after * choosing an appropriate EC_METHOD */ /** Creates a new EC_GROUP object with the specified parameters defined * over GFp (defined by the equation y^2 = x^3 + a*x + b) * \param p BIGNUM with the prime number * \param a BIGNUM with the parameter a of the equation * \param b BIGNUM with the parameter b of the equation * \param ctx BN_CTX object (optional) * \return newly created EC_GROUP object with the specified parameters */ EC_GROUP *EC_GROUP_new_curve_GFp(const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *ctx); # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M /** Creates a new EC_GROUP object with the specified parameters defined * over GF2m (defined by the equation y^2 + x*y = x^3 + a*x^2 + b) * \param p BIGNUM with the polynomial defining the underlying field * \param a BIGNUM with the parameter a of the equation * \param b BIGNUM with the parameter b of the equation * \param ctx BN_CTX object (optional) * \return newly created EC_GROUP object with the specified parameters */ EC_GROUP *EC_GROUP_new_curve_GF2m(const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *ctx); # endif /** Creates a EC_GROUP object with a curve specified by a NID * \param nid NID of the OID of the curve name * \return newly created EC_GROUP object with specified curve or NULL * if an error occurred */ EC_GROUP *EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(int nid); /** Creates a new EC_GROUP object from an ECPARAMETERS object * \param params pointer to the ECPARAMETERS object * \return newly created EC_GROUP object with specified curve or NULL * if an error occurred */ EC_GROUP *EC_GROUP_new_from_ecparameters(const ECPARAMETERS *params); /** Creates an ECPARAMETERS object for the given EC_GROUP object. * \param group pointer to the EC_GROUP object * \param params pointer to an existing ECPARAMETERS object or NULL * \return pointer to the new ECPARAMETERS object or NULL * if an error occurred. */ ECPARAMETERS *EC_GROUP_get_ecparameters(const EC_GROUP *group, ECPARAMETERS *params); /** Creates a new EC_GROUP object from an ECPKPARAMETERS object * \param params pointer to an existing ECPKPARAMETERS object, or NULL * \return newly created EC_GROUP object with specified curve, or NULL * if an error occurred */ EC_GROUP *EC_GROUP_new_from_ecpkparameters(const ECPKPARAMETERS *params); /** Creates an ECPKPARAMETERS object for the given EC_GROUP object. * \param group pointer to the EC_GROUP object * \param params pointer to an existing ECPKPARAMETERS object or NULL * \return pointer to the new ECPKPARAMETERS object or NULL * if an error occurred. */ ECPKPARAMETERS *EC_GROUP_get_ecpkparameters(const EC_GROUP *group, ECPKPARAMETERS *params); /********************************************************************/ /* handling of internal curves */ /********************************************************************/ typedef struct { int nid; const char *comment; } EC_builtin_curve; /* * EC_builtin_curves(EC_builtin_curve *r, size_t size) returns number of all * available curves or zero if a error occurred. In case r is not zero, * nitems EC_builtin_curve structures are filled with the data of the first * nitems internal groups */ size_t EC_get_builtin_curves(EC_builtin_curve *r, size_t nitems); const char *EC_curve_nid2nist(int nid); int EC_curve_nist2nid(const char *name); /********************************************************************/ /* EC_POINT functions */ /********************************************************************/ /** Creates a new EC_POINT object for the specified EC_GROUP * \param group EC_GROUP the underlying EC_GROUP object * \return newly created EC_POINT object or NULL if an error occurred */ EC_POINT *EC_POINT_new(const EC_GROUP *group); /** Frees a EC_POINT object * \param point EC_POINT object to be freed */ void EC_POINT_free(EC_POINT *point); /** Clears and frees a EC_POINT object * \param point EC_POINT object to be cleared and freed */ void EC_POINT_clear_free(EC_POINT *point); /** Copies EC_POINT object * \param dst destination EC_POINT object * \param src source EC_POINT object * \return 1 on success and 0 if an error occurred */ int EC_POINT_copy(EC_POINT *dst, const EC_POINT *src); /** Creates a new EC_POINT object and copies the content of the supplied * EC_POINT * \param src source EC_POINT object * \param group underlying the EC_GROUP object * \return newly created EC_POINT object or NULL if an error occurred */ EC_POINT *EC_POINT_dup(const EC_POINT *src, const EC_GROUP *group); /** Returns the EC_METHOD used in EC_POINT object * \param point EC_POINT object * \return the EC_METHOD used */ const EC_METHOD *EC_POINT_method_of(const EC_POINT *point); /** Sets a point to infinity (neutral element) * \param group underlying EC_GROUP object * \param point EC_POINT to set to infinity * \return 1 on success and 0 if an error occurred */ int EC_POINT_set_to_infinity(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *point); /** Sets the jacobian projective coordinates of a EC_POINT over GFp * \param group underlying EC_GROUP object * \param p EC_POINT object * \param x BIGNUM with the x-coordinate * \param y BIGNUM with the y-coordinate * \param z BIGNUM with the z-coordinate * \param ctx BN_CTX object (optional) * \return 1 on success and 0 if an error occurred */ int EC_POINT_set_Jprojective_coordinates_GFp(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *p, const BIGNUM *x, const BIGNUM *y, const BIGNUM *z, BN_CTX *ctx); /** Gets the jacobian projective coordinates of a EC_POINT over GFp * \param group underlying EC_GROUP object * \param p EC_POINT object * \param x BIGNUM for the x-coordinate * \param y BIGNUM for the y-coordinate * \param z BIGNUM for the z-coordinate * \param ctx BN_CTX object (optional) * \return 1 on success and 0 if an error occurred */ int EC_POINT_get_Jprojective_coordinates_GFp(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *p, BIGNUM *x, BIGNUM *y, BIGNUM *z, BN_CTX *ctx); /** Sets the affine coordinates of an EC_POINT * \param group underlying EC_GROUP object * \param p EC_POINT object * \param x BIGNUM with the x-coordinate * \param y BIGNUM with the y-coordinate * \param ctx BN_CTX object (optional) * \return 1 on success and 0 if an error occurred */ int EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *p, const BIGNUM *x, const BIGNUM *y, BN_CTX *ctx); /** Gets the affine coordinates of an EC_POINT. * \param group underlying EC_GROUP object * \param p EC_POINT object * \param x BIGNUM for the x-coordinate * \param y BIGNUM for the y-coordinate * \param ctx BN_CTX object (optional) * \return 1 on success and 0 if an error occurred */ int EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *p, BIGNUM *x, BIGNUM *y, BN_CTX *ctx); /** Sets the affine coordinates of an EC_POINT. A synonym of * EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates * \param group underlying EC_GROUP object * \param p EC_POINT object * \param x BIGNUM with the x-coordinate * \param y BIGNUM with the y-coordinate * \param ctx BN_CTX object (optional) * \return 1 on success and 0 if an error occurred */ DEPRECATEDIN_1_2_0(int EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *p, const BIGNUM *x, const BIGNUM *y, BN_CTX *ctx)) /** Gets the affine coordinates of an EC_POINT. A synonym of * EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates * \param group underlying EC_GROUP object * \param p EC_POINT object * \param x BIGNUM for the x-coordinate * \param y BIGNUM for the y-coordinate * \param ctx BN_CTX object (optional) * \return 1 on success and 0 if an error occurred */ DEPRECATEDIN_1_2_0(int EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *p, BIGNUM *x, BIGNUM *y, BN_CTX *ctx)) /** Sets the x9.62 compressed coordinates of a EC_POINT * \param group underlying EC_GROUP object * \param p EC_POINT object * \param x BIGNUM with x-coordinate * \param y_bit integer with the y-Bit (either 0 or 1) * \param ctx BN_CTX object (optional) * \return 1 on success and 0 if an error occurred */ int EC_POINT_set_compressed_coordinates(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *p, const BIGNUM *x, int y_bit, BN_CTX *ctx); /** Sets the x9.62 compressed coordinates of a EC_POINT. A synonym of * EC_POINT_set_compressed_coordinates * \param group underlying EC_GROUP object * \param p EC_POINT object * \param x BIGNUM with x-coordinate * \param y_bit integer with the y-Bit (either 0 or 1) * \param ctx BN_CTX object (optional) * \return 1 on success and 0 if an error occurred */ DEPRECATEDIN_1_2_0(int EC_POINT_set_compressed_coordinates_GFp(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *p, const BIGNUM *x, int y_bit, BN_CTX *ctx)) # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M /** Sets the affine coordinates of an EC_POINT. A synonym of * EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates * \param group underlying EC_GROUP object * \param p EC_POINT object * \param x BIGNUM with the x-coordinate * \param y BIGNUM with the y-coordinate * \param ctx BN_CTX object (optional) * \return 1 on success and 0 if an error occurred */ DEPRECATEDIN_1_2_0(int EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GF2m(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *p, const BIGNUM *x, const BIGNUM *y, BN_CTX *ctx)) /** Gets the affine coordinates of an EC_POINT. A synonym of * EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates * \param group underlying EC_GROUP object * \param p EC_POINT object * \param x BIGNUM for the x-coordinate * \param y BIGNUM for the y-coordinate * \param ctx BN_CTX object (optional) * \return 1 on success and 0 if an error occurred */ DEPRECATEDIN_1_2_0(int EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GF2m(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *p, BIGNUM *x, BIGNUM *y, BN_CTX *ctx)) /** Sets the x9.62 compressed coordinates of a EC_POINT. A synonym of * EC_POINT_set_compressed_coordinates * \param group underlying EC_GROUP object * \param p EC_POINT object * \param x BIGNUM with x-coordinate * \param y_bit integer with the y-Bit (either 0 or 1) * \param ctx BN_CTX object (optional) * \return 1 on success and 0 if an error occurred */ DEPRECATEDIN_1_2_0(int EC_POINT_set_compressed_coordinates_GF2m(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *p, const BIGNUM *x, int y_bit, BN_CTX *ctx)) # endif /** Encodes a EC_POINT object to a octet string * \param group underlying EC_GROUP object * \param p EC_POINT object * \param form point conversion form * \param buf memory buffer for the result. If NULL the function returns * required buffer size. * \param len length of the memory buffer * \param ctx BN_CTX object (optional) * \return the length of the encoded octet string or 0 if an error occurred */ size_t EC_POINT_point2oct(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *p, point_conversion_form_t form, unsigned char *buf, size_t len, BN_CTX *ctx); /** Decodes a EC_POINT from a octet string * \param group underlying EC_GROUP object * \param p EC_POINT object * \param buf memory buffer with the encoded ec point * \param len length of the encoded ec point * \param ctx BN_CTX object (optional) * \return 1 on success and 0 if an error occurred */ int EC_POINT_oct2point(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *p, const unsigned char *buf, size_t len, BN_CTX *ctx); /** Encodes an EC_POINT object to an allocated octet string * \param group underlying EC_GROUP object * \param point EC_POINT object * \param form point conversion form * \param pbuf returns pointer to allocated buffer * \param ctx BN_CTX object (optional) * \return the length of the encoded octet string or 0 if an error occurred */ size_t EC_POINT_point2buf(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *point, point_conversion_form_t form, unsigned char **pbuf, BN_CTX *ctx); /* other interfaces to point2oct/oct2point: */ BIGNUM *EC_POINT_point2bn(const EC_GROUP *, const EC_POINT *, point_conversion_form_t form, BIGNUM *, BN_CTX *); EC_POINT *EC_POINT_bn2point(const EC_GROUP *, const BIGNUM *, EC_POINT *, BN_CTX *); char *EC_POINT_point2hex(const EC_GROUP *, const EC_POINT *, point_conversion_form_t form, BN_CTX *); EC_POINT *EC_POINT_hex2point(const EC_GROUP *, const char *, EC_POINT *, BN_CTX *); /********************************************************************/ /* functions for doing EC_POINT arithmetic */ /********************************************************************/ /** Computes the sum of two EC_POINT * \param group underlying EC_GROUP object * \param r EC_POINT object for the result (r = a + b) * \param a EC_POINT object with the first summand * \param b EC_POINT object with the second summand * \param ctx BN_CTX object (optional) * \return 1 on success and 0 if an error occurred */ int EC_POINT_add(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r, const EC_POINT *a, const EC_POINT *b, BN_CTX *ctx); /** Computes the double of a EC_POINT * \param group underlying EC_GROUP object * \param r EC_POINT object for the result (r = 2 * a) * \param a EC_POINT object * \param ctx BN_CTX object (optional) * \return 1 on success and 0 if an error occurred */ int EC_POINT_dbl(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r, const EC_POINT *a, BN_CTX *ctx); /** Computes the inverse of a EC_POINT * \param group underlying EC_GROUP object * \param a EC_POINT object to be inverted (it's used for the result as well) * \param ctx BN_CTX object (optional) * \return 1 on success and 0 if an error occurred */ int EC_POINT_invert(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *a, BN_CTX *ctx); /** Checks whether the point is the neutral element of the group * \param group the underlying EC_GROUP object * \param p EC_POINT object * \return 1 if the point is the neutral element and 0 otherwise */ int EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *p); /** Checks whether the point is on the curve * \param group underlying EC_GROUP object * \param point EC_POINT object to check * \param ctx BN_CTX object (optional) * \return 1 if the point is on the curve, 0 if not, or -1 on error */ int EC_POINT_is_on_curve(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *point, BN_CTX *ctx); /** Compares two EC_POINTs * \param group underlying EC_GROUP object * \param a first EC_POINT object * \param b second EC_POINT object * \param ctx BN_CTX object (optional) * \return 1 if the points are not equal, 0 if they are, or -1 on error */ int EC_POINT_cmp(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *a, const EC_POINT *b, BN_CTX *ctx); int EC_POINT_make_affine(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *point, BN_CTX *ctx); int EC_POINTs_make_affine(const EC_GROUP *group, size_t num, EC_POINT *points[], BN_CTX *ctx); /** Computes r = generator * n + sum_{i=0}^{num-1} p[i] * m[i] * \param group underlying EC_GROUP object * \param r EC_POINT object for the result * \param n BIGNUM with the multiplier for the group generator (optional) * \param num number further summands * \param p array of size num of EC_POINT objects * \param m array of size num of BIGNUM objects * \param ctx BN_CTX object (optional) * \return 1 on success and 0 if an error occurred */ int EC_POINTs_mul(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r, const BIGNUM *n, size_t num, const EC_POINT *p[], const BIGNUM *m[], BN_CTX *ctx); /** Computes r = generator * n + q * m * \param group underlying EC_GROUP object * \param r EC_POINT object for the result * \param n BIGNUM with the multiplier for the group generator (optional) * \param q EC_POINT object with the first factor of the second summand * \param m BIGNUM with the second factor of the second summand * \param ctx BN_CTX object (optional) * \return 1 on success and 0 if an error occurred */ int EC_POINT_mul(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r, const BIGNUM *n, const EC_POINT *q, const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx); /** Stores multiples of generator for faster point multiplication * \param group EC_GROUP object * \param ctx BN_CTX object (optional) * \return 1 on success and 0 if an error occurred */ int EC_GROUP_precompute_mult(EC_GROUP *group, BN_CTX *ctx); /** Reports whether a precomputation has been done * \param group EC_GROUP object * \return 1 if a pre-computation has been done and 0 otherwise */ int EC_GROUP_have_precompute_mult(const EC_GROUP *group); /********************************************************************/ /* ASN1 stuff */ /********************************************************************/ DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(ECPKPARAMETERS) DECLARE_ASN1_ALLOC_FUNCTIONS(ECPKPARAMETERS) DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(ECPARAMETERS) DECLARE_ASN1_ALLOC_FUNCTIONS(ECPARAMETERS) /* * EC_GROUP_get_basis_type() returns the NID of the basis type used to * represent the field elements */ int EC_GROUP_get_basis_type(const EC_GROUP *); # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M int EC_GROUP_get_trinomial_basis(const EC_GROUP *, unsigned int *k); int EC_GROUP_get_pentanomial_basis(const EC_GROUP *, unsigned int *k1, unsigned int *k2, unsigned int *k3); # endif # define OPENSSL_EC_EXPLICIT_CURVE 0x000 # define OPENSSL_EC_NAMED_CURVE 0x001 EC_GROUP *d2i_ECPKParameters(EC_GROUP **, const unsigned char **in, long len); int i2d_ECPKParameters(const EC_GROUP *, unsigned char **out); -# define d2i_ECPKParameters_bio(bp,x) ASN1_d2i_bio_of(EC_GROUP,NULL,d2i_ECPKParameters,bp,x) -# define i2d_ECPKParameters_bio(bp,x) ASN1_i2d_bio_of_const(EC_GROUP,i2d_ECPKParameters,bp,x) -# define d2i_ECPKParameters_fp(fp,x) (EC_GROUP *)ASN1_d2i_fp(NULL, \ - (char *(*)())d2i_ECPKParameters,(fp),(unsigned char **)(x)) -# define i2d_ECPKParameters_fp(fp,x) ASN1_i2d_fp(i2d_ECPKParameters,(fp), \ - (unsigned char *)(x)) +# define d2i_ECPKParameters_bio(bp,x) \ + ASN1_d2i_bio_of(EC_GROUP, NULL, d2i_ECPKParameters, bp, x) +# define i2d_ECPKParameters_bio(bp,x) \ + ASN1_i2d_bio_of_const(EC_GROUP, i2d_ECPKParameters, bp, x) +# define d2i_ECPKParameters_fp(fp,x) \ + (EC_GROUP *)ASN1_d2i_fp(NULL, (d2i_of_void *)d2i_ECPKParameters, (fp), \ + (void **)(x)) +# define i2d_ECPKParameters_fp(fp,x) \ + ASN1_i2d_fp((i2d_of_void *)i2d_ECPKParameters, (fp), (void *)(x)) int ECPKParameters_print(BIO *bp, const EC_GROUP *x, int off); # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO int ECPKParameters_print_fp(FILE *fp, const EC_GROUP *x, int off); # endif /********************************************************************/ /* EC_KEY functions */ /********************************************************************/ /* some values for the encoding_flag */ # define EC_PKEY_NO_PARAMETERS 0x001 # define EC_PKEY_NO_PUBKEY 0x002 /* some values for the flags field */ # define EC_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW 0x1 # define EC_FLAG_FIPS_CHECKED 0x2 # define EC_FLAG_COFACTOR_ECDH 0x1000 /** Creates a new EC_KEY object. * \return EC_KEY object or NULL if an error occurred. */ EC_KEY *EC_KEY_new(void); int EC_KEY_get_flags(const EC_KEY *key); void EC_KEY_set_flags(EC_KEY *key, int flags); void EC_KEY_clear_flags(EC_KEY *key, int flags); int EC_KEY_decoded_from_explicit_params(const EC_KEY *key); /** Creates a new EC_KEY object using a named curve as underlying * EC_GROUP object. * \param nid NID of the named curve. * \return EC_KEY object or NULL if an error occurred. */ EC_KEY *EC_KEY_new_by_curve_name(int nid); /** Frees a EC_KEY object. * \param key EC_KEY object to be freed. */ void EC_KEY_free(EC_KEY *key); /** Copies a EC_KEY object. * \param dst destination EC_KEY object * \param src src EC_KEY object * \return dst or NULL if an error occurred. */ EC_KEY *EC_KEY_copy(EC_KEY *dst, const EC_KEY *src); /** Creates a new EC_KEY object and copies the content from src to it. * \param src the source EC_KEY object * \return newly created EC_KEY object or NULL if an error occurred. */ EC_KEY *EC_KEY_dup(const EC_KEY *src); /** Increases the internal reference count of a EC_KEY object. * \param key EC_KEY object * \return 1 on success and 0 if an error occurred. */ int EC_KEY_up_ref(EC_KEY *key); /** Returns the ENGINE object of a EC_KEY object * \param eckey EC_KEY object * \return the ENGINE object (possibly NULL). */ ENGINE *EC_KEY_get0_engine(const EC_KEY *eckey); /** Returns the EC_GROUP object of a EC_KEY object * \param key EC_KEY object * \return the EC_GROUP object (possibly NULL). */ const EC_GROUP *EC_KEY_get0_group(const EC_KEY *key); /** Sets the EC_GROUP of a EC_KEY object. * \param key EC_KEY object * \param group EC_GROUP to use in the EC_KEY object (note: the EC_KEY * object will use an own copy of the EC_GROUP). * \return 1 on success and 0 if an error occurred. */ int EC_KEY_set_group(EC_KEY *key, const EC_GROUP *group); /** Returns the private key of a EC_KEY object. * \param key EC_KEY object * \return a BIGNUM with the private key (possibly NULL). */ const BIGNUM *EC_KEY_get0_private_key(const EC_KEY *key); /** Sets the private key of a EC_KEY object. * \param key EC_KEY object * \param prv BIGNUM with the private key (note: the EC_KEY object * will use an own copy of the BIGNUM). * \return 1 on success and 0 if an error occurred. */ int EC_KEY_set_private_key(EC_KEY *key, const BIGNUM *prv); /** Returns the public key of a EC_KEY object. * \param key the EC_KEY object * \return a EC_POINT object with the public key (possibly NULL) */ const EC_POINT *EC_KEY_get0_public_key(const EC_KEY *key); /** Sets the public key of a EC_KEY object. * \param key EC_KEY object * \param pub EC_POINT object with the public key (note: the EC_KEY object * will use an own copy of the EC_POINT object). * \return 1 on success and 0 if an error occurred. */ int EC_KEY_set_public_key(EC_KEY *key, const EC_POINT *pub); unsigned EC_KEY_get_enc_flags(const EC_KEY *key); void EC_KEY_set_enc_flags(EC_KEY *eckey, unsigned int flags); point_conversion_form_t EC_KEY_get_conv_form(const EC_KEY *key); void EC_KEY_set_conv_form(EC_KEY *eckey, point_conversion_form_t cform); #define EC_KEY_get_ex_new_index(l, p, newf, dupf, freef) \ CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_EC_KEY, l, p, newf, dupf, freef) int EC_KEY_set_ex_data(EC_KEY *key, int idx, void *arg); void *EC_KEY_get_ex_data(const EC_KEY *key, int idx); /* wrapper functions for the underlying EC_GROUP object */ void EC_KEY_set_asn1_flag(EC_KEY *eckey, int asn1_flag); /** Creates a table of pre-computed multiples of the generator to * accelerate further EC_KEY operations. * \param key EC_KEY object * \param ctx BN_CTX object (optional) * \return 1 on success and 0 if an error occurred. */ int EC_KEY_precompute_mult(EC_KEY *key, BN_CTX *ctx); /** Creates a new ec private (and optional a new public) key. * \param key EC_KEY object * \return 1 on success and 0 if an error occurred. */ int EC_KEY_generate_key(EC_KEY *key); /** Verifies that a private and/or public key is valid. * \param key the EC_KEY object * \return 1 on success and 0 otherwise. */ int EC_KEY_check_key(const EC_KEY *key); /** Indicates if an EC_KEY can be used for signing. * \param eckey the EC_KEY object * \return 1 if can can sign and 0 otherwise. */ int EC_KEY_can_sign(const EC_KEY *eckey); /** Sets a public key from affine coordinates performing * necessary NIST PKV tests. * \param key the EC_KEY object * \param x public key x coordinate * \param y public key y coordinate * \return 1 on success and 0 otherwise. */ int EC_KEY_set_public_key_affine_coordinates(EC_KEY *key, BIGNUM *x, BIGNUM *y); /** Encodes an EC_KEY public key to an allocated octet string * \param key key to encode * \param form point conversion form * \param pbuf returns pointer to allocated buffer * \param ctx BN_CTX object (optional) * \return the length of the encoded octet string or 0 if an error occurred */ size_t EC_KEY_key2buf(const EC_KEY *key, point_conversion_form_t form, unsigned char **pbuf, BN_CTX *ctx); /** Decodes a EC_KEY public key from a octet string * \param key key to decode * \param buf memory buffer with the encoded ec point * \param len length of the encoded ec point * \param ctx BN_CTX object (optional) * \return 1 on success and 0 if an error occurred */ int EC_KEY_oct2key(EC_KEY *key, const unsigned char *buf, size_t len, BN_CTX *ctx); /** Decodes an EC_KEY private key from an octet string * \param key key to decode * \param buf memory buffer with the encoded private key * \param len length of the encoded key * \return 1 on success and 0 if an error occurred */ int EC_KEY_oct2priv(EC_KEY *key, const unsigned char *buf, size_t len); /** Encodes a EC_KEY private key to an octet string * \param key key to encode * \param buf memory buffer for the result. If NULL the function returns * required buffer size. * \param len length of the memory buffer * \return the length of the encoded octet string or 0 if an error occurred */ size_t EC_KEY_priv2oct(const EC_KEY *key, unsigned char *buf, size_t len); /** Encodes an EC_KEY private key to an allocated octet string * \param eckey key to encode * \param pbuf returns pointer to allocated buffer * \return the length of the encoded octet string or 0 if an error occurred */ size_t EC_KEY_priv2buf(const EC_KEY *eckey, unsigned char **pbuf); /********************************************************************/ /* de- and encoding functions for SEC1 ECPrivateKey */ /********************************************************************/ /** Decodes a private key from a memory buffer. * \param key a pointer to a EC_KEY object which should be used (or NULL) * \param in pointer to memory with the DER encoded private key * \param len length of the DER encoded private key * \return the decoded private key or NULL if an error occurred. */ EC_KEY *d2i_ECPrivateKey(EC_KEY **key, const unsigned char **in, long len); /** Encodes a private key object and stores the result in a buffer. * \param key the EC_KEY object to encode * \param out the buffer for the result (if NULL the function returns number * of bytes needed). * \return 1 on success and 0 if an error occurred. */ int i2d_ECPrivateKey(EC_KEY *key, unsigned char **out); /********************************************************************/ /* de- and encoding functions for EC parameters */ /********************************************************************/ /** Decodes ec parameter from a memory buffer. * \param key a pointer to a EC_KEY object which should be used (or NULL) * \param in pointer to memory with the DER encoded ec parameters * \param len length of the DER encoded ec parameters * \return a EC_KEY object with the decoded parameters or NULL if an error * occurred. */ EC_KEY *d2i_ECParameters(EC_KEY **key, const unsigned char **in, long len); /** Encodes ec parameter and stores the result in a buffer. * \param key the EC_KEY object with ec parameters to encode * \param out the buffer for the result (if NULL the function returns number * of bytes needed). * \return 1 on success and 0 if an error occurred. */ int i2d_ECParameters(EC_KEY *key, unsigned char **out); /********************************************************************/ /* de- and encoding functions for EC public key */ /* (octet string, not DER -- hence 'o2i' and 'i2o') */ /********************************************************************/ /** Decodes a ec public key from a octet string. * \param key a pointer to a EC_KEY object which should be used * \param in memory buffer with the encoded public key * \param len length of the encoded public key * \return EC_KEY object with decoded public key or NULL if an error * occurred. */ EC_KEY *o2i_ECPublicKey(EC_KEY **key, const unsigned char **in, long len); /** Encodes a ec public key in an octet string. * \param key the EC_KEY object with the public key * \param out the buffer for the result (if NULL the function returns number * of bytes needed). * \return 1 on success and 0 if an error occurred */ int i2o_ECPublicKey(const EC_KEY *key, unsigned char **out); /** Prints out the ec parameters on human readable form. * \param bp BIO object to which the information is printed * \param key EC_KEY object * \return 1 on success and 0 if an error occurred */ int ECParameters_print(BIO *bp, const EC_KEY *key); /** Prints out the contents of a EC_KEY object * \param bp BIO object to which the information is printed * \param key EC_KEY object * \param off line offset * \return 1 on success and 0 if an error occurred */ int EC_KEY_print(BIO *bp, const EC_KEY *key, int off); # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_STDIO /** Prints out the ec parameters on human readable form. * \param fp file descriptor to which the information is printed * \param key EC_KEY object * \return 1 on success and 0 if an error occurred */ int ECParameters_print_fp(FILE *fp, const EC_KEY *key); /** Prints out the contents of a EC_KEY object * \param fp file descriptor to which the information is printed * \param key EC_KEY object * \param off line offset * \return 1 on success and 0 if an error occurred */ int EC_KEY_print_fp(FILE *fp, const EC_KEY *key, int off); # endif const EC_KEY_METHOD *EC_KEY_OpenSSL(void); const EC_KEY_METHOD *EC_KEY_get_default_method(void); void EC_KEY_set_default_method(const EC_KEY_METHOD *meth); const EC_KEY_METHOD *EC_KEY_get_method(const EC_KEY *key); int EC_KEY_set_method(EC_KEY *key, const EC_KEY_METHOD *meth); EC_KEY *EC_KEY_new_method(ENGINE *engine); /** The old name for ecdh_KDF_X9_63 * The ECDH KDF specification has been mistakingly attributed to ANSI X9.62, * it is actually specified in ANSI X9.63. * This identifier is retained for backwards compatibility */ int ECDH_KDF_X9_62(unsigned char *out, size_t outlen, const unsigned char *Z, size_t Zlen, const unsigned char *sinfo, size_t sinfolen, const EVP_MD *md); int ECDH_compute_key(void *out, size_t outlen, const EC_POINT *pub_key, const EC_KEY *ecdh, void *(*KDF) (const void *in, size_t inlen, void *out, size_t *outlen)); typedef struct ECDSA_SIG_st ECDSA_SIG; /** Allocates and initialize a ECDSA_SIG structure * \return pointer to a ECDSA_SIG structure or NULL if an error occurred */ ECDSA_SIG *ECDSA_SIG_new(void); /** frees a ECDSA_SIG structure * \param sig pointer to the ECDSA_SIG structure */ void ECDSA_SIG_free(ECDSA_SIG *sig); /** DER encode content of ECDSA_SIG object (note: this function modifies *pp * (*pp += length of the DER encoded signature)). * \param sig pointer to the ECDSA_SIG object * \param pp pointer to a unsigned char pointer for the output or NULL * \return the length of the DER encoded ECDSA_SIG object or a negative value * on error */ int i2d_ECDSA_SIG(const ECDSA_SIG *sig, unsigned char **pp); /** Decodes a DER encoded ECDSA signature (note: this function changes *pp * (*pp += len)). * \param sig pointer to ECDSA_SIG pointer (may be NULL) * \param pp memory buffer with the DER encoded signature * \param len length of the buffer * \return pointer to the decoded ECDSA_SIG structure (or NULL) */ ECDSA_SIG *d2i_ECDSA_SIG(ECDSA_SIG **sig, const unsigned char **pp, long len); /** Accessor for r and s fields of ECDSA_SIG * \param sig pointer to ECDSA_SIG structure * \param pr pointer to BIGNUM pointer for r (may be NULL) * \param ps pointer to BIGNUM pointer for s (may be NULL) */ void ECDSA_SIG_get0(const ECDSA_SIG *sig, const BIGNUM **pr, const BIGNUM **ps); /** Accessor for r field of ECDSA_SIG * \param sig pointer to ECDSA_SIG structure */ const BIGNUM *ECDSA_SIG_get0_r(const ECDSA_SIG *sig); /** Accessor for s field of ECDSA_SIG * \param sig pointer to ECDSA_SIG structure */ const BIGNUM *ECDSA_SIG_get0_s(const ECDSA_SIG *sig); /** Setter for r and s fields of ECDSA_SIG * \param sig pointer to ECDSA_SIG structure * \param r pointer to BIGNUM for r (may be NULL) * \param s pointer to BIGNUM for s (may be NULL) */ int ECDSA_SIG_set0(ECDSA_SIG *sig, BIGNUM *r, BIGNUM *s); /** Computes the ECDSA signature of the given hash value using * the supplied private key and returns the created signature. * \param dgst pointer to the hash value * \param dgst_len length of the hash value * \param eckey EC_KEY object containing a private EC key * \return pointer to a ECDSA_SIG structure or NULL if an error occurred */ ECDSA_SIG *ECDSA_do_sign(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len, EC_KEY *eckey); /** Computes ECDSA signature of a given hash value using the supplied * private key (note: sig must point to ECDSA_size(eckey) bytes of memory). * \param dgst pointer to the hash value to sign * \param dgstlen length of the hash value * \param kinv BIGNUM with a pre-computed inverse k (optional) * \param rp BIGNUM with a pre-computed rp value (optional), * see ECDSA_sign_setup * \param eckey EC_KEY object containing a private EC key * \return pointer to a ECDSA_SIG structure or NULL if an error occurred */ ECDSA_SIG *ECDSA_do_sign_ex(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgstlen, const BIGNUM *kinv, const BIGNUM *rp, EC_KEY *eckey); /** Verifies that the supplied signature is a valid ECDSA * signature of the supplied hash value using the supplied public key. * \param dgst pointer to the hash value * \param dgst_len length of the hash value * \param sig ECDSA_SIG structure * \param eckey EC_KEY object containing a public EC key * \return 1 if the signature is valid, 0 if the signature is invalid * and -1 on error */ int ECDSA_do_verify(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len, const ECDSA_SIG *sig, EC_KEY *eckey); /** Precompute parts of the signing operation * \param eckey EC_KEY object containing a private EC key * \param ctx BN_CTX object (optional) * \param kinv BIGNUM pointer for the inverse of k * \param rp BIGNUM pointer for x coordinate of k * generator * \return 1 on success and 0 otherwise */ int ECDSA_sign_setup(EC_KEY *eckey, BN_CTX *ctx, BIGNUM **kinv, BIGNUM **rp); /** Computes ECDSA signature of a given hash value using the supplied * private key (note: sig must point to ECDSA_size(eckey) bytes of memory). * \param type this parameter is ignored * \param dgst pointer to the hash value to sign * \param dgstlen length of the hash value * \param sig memory for the DER encoded created signature * \param siglen pointer to the length of the returned signature * \param eckey EC_KEY object containing a private EC key * \return 1 on success and 0 otherwise */ int ECDSA_sign(int type, const unsigned char *dgst, int dgstlen, unsigned char *sig, unsigned int *siglen, EC_KEY *eckey); /** Computes ECDSA signature of a given hash value using the supplied * private key (note: sig must point to ECDSA_size(eckey) bytes of memory). * \param type this parameter is ignored * \param dgst pointer to the hash value to sign * \param dgstlen length of the hash value * \param sig buffer to hold the DER encoded signature * \param siglen pointer to the length of the returned signature * \param kinv BIGNUM with a pre-computed inverse k (optional) * \param rp BIGNUM with a pre-computed rp value (optional), * see ECDSA_sign_setup * \param eckey EC_KEY object containing a private EC key * \return 1 on success and 0 otherwise */ int ECDSA_sign_ex(int type, const unsigned char *dgst, int dgstlen, unsigned char *sig, unsigned int *siglen, const BIGNUM *kinv, const BIGNUM *rp, EC_KEY *eckey); /** Verifies that the given signature is valid ECDSA signature * of the supplied hash value using the specified public key. * \param type this parameter is ignored * \param dgst pointer to the hash value * \param dgstlen length of the hash value * \param sig pointer to the DER encoded signature * \param siglen length of the DER encoded signature * \param eckey EC_KEY object containing a public EC key * \return 1 if the signature is valid, 0 if the signature is invalid * and -1 on error */ int ECDSA_verify(int type, const unsigned char *dgst, int dgstlen, const unsigned char *sig, int siglen, EC_KEY *eckey); /** Returns the maximum length of the DER encoded signature * \param eckey EC_KEY object * \return numbers of bytes required for the DER encoded signature */ int ECDSA_size(const EC_KEY *eckey); /********************************************************************/ /* EC_KEY_METHOD constructors, destructors, writers and accessors */ /********************************************************************/ EC_KEY_METHOD *EC_KEY_METHOD_new(const EC_KEY_METHOD *meth); void EC_KEY_METHOD_free(EC_KEY_METHOD *meth); void EC_KEY_METHOD_set_init(EC_KEY_METHOD *meth, int (*init)(EC_KEY *key), void (*finish)(EC_KEY *key), int (*copy)(EC_KEY *dest, const EC_KEY *src), int (*set_group)(EC_KEY *key, const EC_GROUP *grp), int (*set_private)(EC_KEY *key, const BIGNUM *priv_key), int (*set_public)(EC_KEY *key, const EC_POINT *pub_key)); void EC_KEY_METHOD_set_keygen(EC_KEY_METHOD *meth, int (*keygen)(EC_KEY *key)); void EC_KEY_METHOD_set_compute_key(EC_KEY_METHOD *meth, int (*ckey)(unsigned char **psec, size_t *pseclen, const EC_POINT *pub_key, const EC_KEY *ecdh)); void EC_KEY_METHOD_set_sign(EC_KEY_METHOD *meth, int (*sign)(int type, const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen, unsigned char *sig, unsigned int *siglen, const BIGNUM *kinv, const BIGNUM *r, EC_KEY *eckey), int (*sign_setup)(EC_KEY *eckey, BN_CTX *ctx_in, BIGNUM **kinvp, BIGNUM **rp), ECDSA_SIG *(*sign_sig)(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len, const BIGNUM *in_kinv, const BIGNUM *in_r, EC_KEY *eckey)); void EC_KEY_METHOD_set_verify(EC_KEY_METHOD *meth, int (*verify)(int type, const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len, const unsigned char *sigbuf, int sig_len, EC_KEY *eckey), int (*verify_sig)(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len, const ECDSA_SIG *sig, EC_KEY *eckey)); void EC_KEY_METHOD_get_init(const EC_KEY_METHOD *meth, int (**pinit)(EC_KEY *key), void (**pfinish)(EC_KEY *key), int (**pcopy)(EC_KEY *dest, const EC_KEY *src), int (**pset_group)(EC_KEY *key, const EC_GROUP *grp), int (**pset_private)(EC_KEY *key, const BIGNUM *priv_key), int (**pset_public)(EC_KEY *key, const EC_POINT *pub_key)); void EC_KEY_METHOD_get_keygen(const EC_KEY_METHOD *meth, int (**pkeygen)(EC_KEY *key)); void EC_KEY_METHOD_get_compute_key(const EC_KEY_METHOD *meth, int (**pck)(unsigned char **psec, size_t *pseclen, const EC_POINT *pub_key, const EC_KEY *ecdh)); void EC_KEY_METHOD_get_sign(const EC_KEY_METHOD *meth, int (**psign)(int type, const unsigned char *dgst, int dlen, unsigned char *sig, unsigned int *siglen, const BIGNUM *kinv, const BIGNUM *r, EC_KEY *eckey), int (**psign_setup)(EC_KEY *eckey, BN_CTX *ctx_in, BIGNUM **kinvp, BIGNUM **rp), ECDSA_SIG *(**psign_sig)(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len, const BIGNUM *in_kinv, const BIGNUM *in_r, EC_KEY *eckey)); void EC_KEY_METHOD_get_verify(const EC_KEY_METHOD *meth, int (**pverify)(int type, const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len, const unsigned char *sigbuf, int sig_len, EC_KEY *eckey), int (**pverify_sig)(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len, const ECDSA_SIG *sig, EC_KEY *eckey)); # define ECParameters_dup(x) ASN1_dup_of(EC_KEY,i2d_ECParameters,d2i_ECParameters,x) # ifndef __cplusplus # if defined(__SUNPRO_C) # if __SUNPRO_C >= 0x520 # pragma error_messages (default,E_ARRAY_OF_INCOMPLETE_NONAME,E_ARRAY_OF_INCOMPLETE) # endif # endif # endif # define EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_ec_paramgen_curve_nid(ctx, nid) \ EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_EC, \ EVP_PKEY_OP_PARAMGEN|EVP_PKEY_OP_KEYGEN, \ EVP_PKEY_CTRL_EC_PARAMGEN_CURVE_NID, nid, NULL) # define EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_ec_param_enc(ctx, flag) \ EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_EC, \ EVP_PKEY_OP_PARAMGEN|EVP_PKEY_OP_KEYGEN, \ EVP_PKEY_CTRL_EC_PARAM_ENC, flag, NULL) # define EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_ecdh_cofactor_mode(ctx, flag) \ EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_EC, \ EVP_PKEY_OP_DERIVE, \ EVP_PKEY_CTRL_EC_ECDH_COFACTOR, flag, NULL) # define EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_ecdh_cofactor_mode(ctx) \ EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_EC, \ EVP_PKEY_OP_DERIVE, \ EVP_PKEY_CTRL_EC_ECDH_COFACTOR, -2, NULL) # define EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_ecdh_kdf_type(ctx, kdf) \ EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_EC, \ EVP_PKEY_OP_DERIVE, \ EVP_PKEY_CTRL_EC_KDF_TYPE, kdf, NULL) # define EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_ecdh_kdf_type(ctx) \ EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_EC, \ EVP_PKEY_OP_DERIVE, \ EVP_PKEY_CTRL_EC_KDF_TYPE, -2, NULL) # define EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_ecdh_kdf_md(ctx, md) \ EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_EC, \ EVP_PKEY_OP_DERIVE, \ EVP_PKEY_CTRL_EC_KDF_MD, 0, (void *)(md)) # define EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_ecdh_kdf_md(ctx, pmd) \ EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_EC, \ EVP_PKEY_OP_DERIVE, \ EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_EC_KDF_MD, 0, (void *)(pmd)) # define EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_ecdh_kdf_outlen(ctx, len) \ EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_EC, \ EVP_PKEY_OP_DERIVE, \ EVP_PKEY_CTRL_EC_KDF_OUTLEN, len, NULL) # define EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_ecdh_kdf_outlen(ctx, plen) \ EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_EC, \ EVP_PKEY_OP_DERIVE, \ EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_EC_KDF_OUTLEN, 0, \ (void *)(plen)) # define EVP_PKEY_CTX_set0_ecdh_kdf_ukm(ctx, p, plen) \ EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_EC, \ EVP_PKEY_OP_DERIVE, \ EVP_PKEY_CTRL_EC_KDF_UKM, plen, (void *)(p)) # define EVP_PKEY_CTX_get0_ecdh_kdf_ukm(ctx, p) \ EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_EC, \ EVP_PKEY_OP_DERIVE, \ EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_EC_KDF_UKM, 0, (void *)(p)) /* SM2 will skip the operation check so no need to pass operation here */ # define EVP_PKEY_CTX_set1_id(ctx, id, id_len) \ EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, -1, -1, \ EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET1_ID, (int)id_len, (void*)(id)) # define EVP_PKEY_CTX_get1_id(ctx, id) \ EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, -1, -1, \ EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET1_ID, 0, (void*)(id)) # define EVP_PKEY_CTX_get1_id_len(ctx, id_len) \ EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, -1, -1, \ EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET1_ID_LEN, 0, (void*)(id_len)) # define EVP_PKEY_CTRL_EC_PARAMGEN_CURVE_NID (EVP_PKEY_ALG_CTRL + 1) # define EVP_PKEY_CTRL_EC_PARAM_ENC (EVP_PKEY_ALG_CTRL + 2) # define EVP_PKEY_CTRL_EC_ECDH_COFACTOR (EVP_PKEY_ALG_CTRL + 3) # define EVP_PKEY_CTRL_EC_KDF_TYPE (EVP_PKEY_ALG_CTRL + 4) # define EVP_PKEY_CTRL_EC_KDF_MD (EVP_PKEY_ALG_CTRL + 5) # define EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_EC_KDF_MD (EVP_PKEY_ALG_CTRL + 6) # define EVP_PKEY_CTRL_EC_KDF_OUTLEN (EVP_PKEY_ALG_CTRL + 7) # define EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_EC_KDF_OUTLEN (EVP_PKEY_ALG_CTRL + 8) # define EVP_PKEY_CTRL_EC_KDF_UKM (EVP_PKEY_ALG_CTRL + 9) # define EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_EC_KDF_UKM (EVP_PKEY_ALG_CTRL + 10) # define EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET1_ID (EVP_PKEY_ALG_CTRL + 11) # define EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET1_ID (EVP_PKEY_ALG_CTRL + 12) # define EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET1_ID_LEN (EVP_PKEY_ALG_CTRL + 13) /* KDF types */ # define EVP_PKEY_ECDH_KDF_NONE 1 # define EVP_PKEY_ECDH_KDF_X9_63 2 /** The old name for EVP_PKEY_ECDH_KDF_X9_63 * The ECDH KDF specification has been mistakingly attributed to ANSI X9.62, * it is actually specified in ANSI X9.63. * This identifier is retained for backwards compatibility */ # define EVP_PKEY_ECDH_KDF_X9_62 EVP_PKEY_ECDH_KDF_X9_63 # ifdef __cplusplus } # endif # endif #endif diff --git a/include/openssl/opensslv.h b/include/openssl/opensslv.h index cbbfab12b3f3..261d7cb326cb 100644 --- a/include/openssl/opensslv.h +++ b/include/openssl/opensslv.h @@ -1,101 +1,101 @@ /* * Copyright 1999-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #ifndef HEADER_OPENSSLV_H # define HEADER_OPENSSLV_H #ifdef __cplusplus extern "C" { #endif /*- * Numeric release version identifier: * MNNFFPPS: major minor fix patch status * The status nibble has one of the values 0 for development, 1 to e for betas * 1 to 14, and f for release. The patch level is exactly that. * For example: * 0.9.3-dev 0x00903000 * 0.9.3-beta1 0x00903001 * 0.9.3-beta2-dev 0x00903002 * 0.9.3-beta2 0x00903002 (same as ...beta2-dev) * 0.9.3 0x0090300f * 0.9.3a 0x0090301f * 0.9.4 0x0090400f * 1.2.3z 0x102031af * * For continuity reasons (because 0.9.5 is already out, and is coded * 0x00905100), between 0.9.5 and 0.9.6 the coding of the patch level * part is slightly different, by setting the highest bit. This means * that 0.9.5a looks like this: 0x0090581f. At 0.9.6, we can start * with 0x0090600S... * * (Prior to 0.9.3-dev a different scheme was used: 0.9.2b is 0x0922.) * (Prior to 0.9.5a beta1, a different scheme was used: MMNNFFRBB for * major minor fix final patch/beta) */ -# define OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER 0x101010cfL -# define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT "OpenSSL 1.1.1l 24 Aug 2021" +# define OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER 0x101010dfL +# define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT "OpenSSL 1.1.1m 14 Dec 2021" /*- * The macros below are to be used for shared library (.so, .dll, ...) * versioning. That kind of versioning works a bit differently between * operating systems. The most usual scheme is to set a major and a minor * number, and have the runtime loader check that the major number is equal * to what it was at application link time, while the minor number has to * be greater or equal to what it was at application link time. With this * scheme, the version number is usually part of the file name, like this: * * libcrypto.so.0.9 * * Some unixen also make a softlink with the major version number only: * * libcrypto.so.0 * * On Tru64 and IRIX 6.x it works a little bit differently. There, the * shared library version is stored in the file, and is actually a series * of versions, separated by colons. The rightmost version present in the * library when linking an application is stored in the application to be * matched at run time. When the application is run, a check is done to * see if the library version stored in the application matches any of the * versions in the version string of the library itself. * This version string can be constructed in any way, depending on what * kind of matching is desired. However, to implement the same scheme as * the one used in the other unixen, all compatible versions, from lowest * to highest, should be part of the string. Consecutive builds would * give the following versions strings: * * 3.0 * 3.0:3.1 * 3.0:3.1:3.2 * 4.0 * 4.0:4.1 * * Notice how version 4 is completely incompatible with version, and * therefore give the breach you can see. * * There may be other schemes as well that I haven't yet discovered. * * So, here's the way it works here: first of all, the library version * number doesn't need at all to match the overall OpenSSL version. * However, it's nice and more understandable if it actually does. * The current library version is stored in the macro SHLIB_VERSION_NUMBER, * which is just a piece of text in the format "M.m.e" (Major, minor, edit). * For the sake of Tru64, IRIX, and any other OS that behaves in similar ways, * we need to keep a history of version numbers, which is done in the * macro SHLIB_VERSION_HISTORY. The numbers are separated by colons and * should only keep the versions that are binary compatible with the current. */ # define SHLIB_VERSION_HISTORY "" # define SHLIB_VERSION_NUMBER "1.1" #ifdef __cplusplus } #endif #endif /* HEADER_OPENSSLV_H */ diff --git a/ssl/bio_ssl.c b/ssl/bio_ssl.c index c4239345b633..67097d5cca41 100644 --- a/ssl/bio_ssl.c +++ b/ssl/bio_ssl.c @@ -1,507 +1,506 @@ /* * Copyright 1995-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include #include #include #include "internal/bio.h" #include #include "ssl_local.h" static int ssl_write(BIO *h, const char *buf, size_t size, size_t *written); static int ssl_read(BIO *b, char *buf, size_t size, size_t *readbytes); static int ssl_puts(BIO *h, const char *str); static long ssl_ctrl(BIO *h, int cmd, long arg1, void *arg2); static int ssl_new(BIO *h); static int ssl_free(BIO *data); static long ssl_callback_ctrl(BIO *h, int cmd, BIO_info_cb *fp); typedef struct bio_ssl_st { SSL *ssl; /* The ssl handle :-) */ /* re-negotiate every time the total number of bytes is this size */ int num_renegotiates; unsigned long renegotiate_count; size_t byte_count; unsigned long renegotiate_timeout; unsigned long last_time; } BIO_SSL; static const BIO_METHOD methods_sslp = { BIO_TYPE_SSL, "ssl", ssl_write, NULL, /* ssl_write_old, */ ssl_read, NULL, /* ssl_read_old, */ ssl_puts, NULL, /* ssl_gets, */ ssl_ctrl, ssl_new, ssl_free, ssl_callback_ctrl, }; const BIO_METHOD *BIO_f_ssl(void) { return &methods_sslp; } static int ssl_new(BIO *bi) { BIO_SSL *bs = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*bs)); if (bs == NULL) { BIOerr(BIO_F_SSL_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } BIO_set_init(bi, 0); BIO_set_data(bi, bs); /* Clear all flags */ BIO_clear_flags(bi, ~0); return 1; } static int ssl_free(BIO *a) { BIO_SSL *bs; if (a == NULL) return 0; bs = BIO_get_data(a); - if (bs->ssl != NULL) - SSL_shutdown(bs->ssl); if (BIO_get_shutdown(a)) { + if (bs->ssl != NULL) + SSL_shutdown(bs->ssl); if (BIO_get_init(a)) SSL_free(bs->ssl); - /* Clear all flags */ - BIO_clear_flags(a, ~0); + BIO_clear_flags(a, ~0); /* Clear all flags */ BIO_set_init(a, 0); } OPENSSL_free(bs); return 1; } static int ssl_read(BIO *b, char *buf, size_t size, size_t *readbytes) { int ret = 1; BIO_SSL *sb; SSL *ssl; int retry_reason = 0; int r = 0; if (buf == NULL) return 0; sb = BIO_get_data(b); ssl = sb->ssl; BIO_clear_retry_flags(b); ret = ssl_read_internal(ssl, buf, size, readbytes); switch (SSL_get_error(ssl, ret)) { case SSL_ERROR_NONE: if (sb->renegotiate_count > 0) { sb->byte_count += *readbytes; if (sb->byte_count > sb->renegotiate_count) { sb->byte_count = 0; sb->num_renegotiates++; SSL_renegotiate(ssl); r = 1; } } if ((sb->renegotiate_timeout > 0) && (!r)) { unsigned long tm; tm = (unsigned long)time(NULL); if (tm > sb->last_time + sb->renegotiate_timeout) { sb->last_time = tm; sb->num_renegotiates++; SSL_renegotiate(ssl); } } break; case SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ: BIO_set_retry_read(b); break; case SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE: BIO_set_retry_write(b); break; case SSL_ERROR_WANT_X509_LOOKUP: BIO_set_retry_special(b); retry_reason = BIO_RR_SSL_X509_LOOKUP; break; case SSL_ERROR_WANT_ACCEPT: BIO_set_retry_special(b); retry_reason = BIO_RR_ACCEPT; break; case SSL_ERROR_WANT_CONNECT: BIO_set_retry_special(b); retry_reason = BIO_RR_CONNECT; break; case SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL: case SSL_ERROR_SSL: case SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN: default: break; } BIO_set_retry_reason(b, retry_reason); return ret; } static int ssl_write(BIO *b, const char *buf, size_t size, size_t *written) { int ret, r = 0; int retry_reason = 0; SSL *ssl; BIO_SSL *bs; if (buf == NULL) return 0; bs = BIO_get_data(b); ssl = bs->ssl; BIO_clear_retry_flags(b); ret = ssl_write_internal(ssl, buf, size, written); switch (SSL_get_error(ssl, ret)) { case SSL_ERROR_NONE: if (bs->renegotiate_count > 0) { bs->byte_count += *written; if (bs->byte_count > bs->renegotiate_count) { bs->byte_count = 0; bs->num_renegotiates++; SSL_renegotiate(ssl); r = 1; } } if ((bs->renegotiate_timeout > 0) && (!r)) { unsigned long tm; tm = (unsigned long)time(NULL); if (tm > bs->last_time + bs->renegotiate_timeout) { bs->last_time = tm; bs->num_renegotiates++; SSL_renegotiate(ssl); } } break; case SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE: BIO_set_retry_write(b); break; case SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ: BIO_set_retry_read(b); break; case SSL_ERROR_WANT_X509_LOOKUP: BIO_set_retry_special(b); retry_reason = BIO_RR_SSL_X509_LOOKUP; break; case SSL_ERROR_WANT_CONNECT: BIO_set_retry_special(b); retry_reason = BIO_RR_CONNECT; case SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL: case SSL_ERROR_SSL: default: break; } BIO_set_retry_reason(b, retry_reason); return ret; } static long ssl_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long num, void *ptr) { SSL **sslp, *ssl; BIO_SSL *bs, *dbs; BIO *dbio, *bio; long ret = 1; BIO *next; bs = BIO_get_data(b); next = BIO_next(b); ssl = bs->ssl; if ((ssl == NULL) && (cmd != BIO_C_SET_SSL)) return 0; switch (cmd) { case BIO_CTRL_RESET: SSL_shutdown(ssl); if (ssl->handshake_func == ssl->method->ssl_connect) SSL_set_connect_state(ssl); else if (ssl->handshake_func == ssl->method->ssl_accept) SSL_set_accept_state(ssl); if (!SSL_clear(ssl)) { ret = 0; break; } if (next != NULL) ret = BIO_ctrl(next, cmd, num, ptr); else if (ssl->rbio != NULL) ret = BIO_ctrl(ssl->rbio, cmd, num, ptr); else ret = 1; break; case BIO_CTRL_INFO: ret = 0; break; case BIO_C_SSL_MODE: if (num) /* client mode */ SSL_set_connect_state(ssl); else SSL_set_accept_state(ssl); break; case BIO_C_SET_SSL_RENEGOTIATE_TIMEOUT: ret = bs->renegotiate_timeout; if (num < 60) num = 5; bs->renegotiate_timeout = (unsigned long)num; bs->last_time = (unsigned long)time(NULL); break; case BIO_C_SET_SSL_RENEGOTIATE_BYTES: ret = bs->renegotiate_count; if ((long)num >= 512) bs->renegotiate_count = (unsigned long)num; break; case BIO_C_GET_SSL_NUM_RENEGOTIATES: ret = bs->num_renegotiates; break; case BIO_C_SET_SSL: if (ssl != NULL) { ssl_free(b); if (!ssl_new(b)) return 0; bs = BIO_get_data(b); } BIO_set_shutdown(b, num); ssl = (SSL *)ptr; bs->ssl = ssl; bio = SSL_get_rbio(ssl); if (bio != NULL) { if (next != NULL) BIO_push(bio, next); BIO_set_next(b, bio); BIO_up_ref(bio); } BIO_set_init(b, 1); break; case BIO_C_GET_SSL: if (ptr != NULL) { sslp = (SSL **)ptr; *sslp = ssl; } else ret = 0; break; case BIO_CTRL_GET_CLOSE: ret = BIO_get_shutdown(b); break; case BIO_CTRL_SET_CLOSE: BIO_set_shutdown(b, (int)num); break; case BIO_CTRL_WPENDING: ret = BIO_ctrl(ssl->wbio, cmd, num, ptr); break; case BIO_CTRL_PENDING: ret = SSL_pending(ssl); if (ret == 0) ret = BIO_pending(ssl->rbio); break; case BIO_CTRL_FLUSH: BIO_clear_retry_flags(b); ret = BIO_ctrl(ssl->wbio, cmd, num, ptr); BIO_copy_next_retry(b); break; case BIO_CTRL_PUSH: if ((next != NULL) && (next != ssl->rbio)) { /* * We are going to pass ownership of next to the SSL object...but * we don't own a reference to pass yet - so up ref */ BIO_up_ref(next); SSL_set_bio(ssl, next, next); } break; case BIO_CTRL_POP: /* Only detach if we are the BIO explicitly being popped */ if (b == ptr) { /* This will clear the reference we obtained during push */ SSL_set_bio(ssl, NULL, NULL); } break; case BIO_C_DO_STATE_MACHINE: BIO_clear_retry_flags(b); BIO_set_retry_reason(b, 0); ret = (int)SSL_do_handshake(ssl); switch (SSL_get_error(ssl, (int)ret)) { case SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ: BIO_set_flags(b, BIO_FLAGS_READ | BIO_FLAGS_SHOULD_RETRY); break; case SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE: BIO_set_flags(b, BIO_FLAGS_WRITE | BIO_FLAGS_SHOULD_RETRY); break; case SSL_ERROR_WANT_CONNECT: BIO_set_flags(b, BIO_FLAGS_IO_SPECIAL | BIO_FLAGS_SHOULD_RETRY); BIO_set_retry_reason(b, BIO_get_retry_reason(next)); break; case SSL_ERROR_WANT_X509_LOOKUP: BIO_set_retry_special(b); BIO_set_retry_reason(b, BIO_RR_SSL_X509_LOOKUP); break; default: break; } break; case BIO_CTRL_DUP: dbio = (BIO *)ptr; dbs = BIO_get_data(dbio); SSL_free(dbs->ssl); dbs->ssl = SSL_dup(ssl); dbs->num_renegotiates = bs->num_renegotiates; dbs->renegotiate_count = bs->renegotiate_count; dbs->byte_count = bs->byte_count; dbs->renegotiate_timeout = bs->renegotiate_timeout; dbs->last_time = bs->last_time; ret = (dbs->ssl != NULL); break; case BIO_C_GET_FD: ret = BIO_ctrl(ssl->rbio, cmd, num, ptr); break; case BIO_CTRL_SET_CALLBACK: ret = 0; /* use callback ctrl */ break; default: ret = BIO_ctrl(ssl->rbio, cmd, num, ptr); break; } return ret; } static long ssl_callback_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, BIO_info_cb *fp) { SSL *ssl; BIO_SSL *bs; long ret = 1; bs = BIO_get_data(b); ssl = bs->ssl; switch (cmd) { case BIO_CTRL_SET_CALLBACK: ret = BIO_callback_ctrl(ssl->rbio, cmd, fp); break; default: ret = 0; break; } return ret; } static int ssl_puts(BIO *bp, const char *str) { int n, ret; n = strlen(str); ret = BIO_write(bp, str, n); return ret; } BIO *BIO_new_buffer_ssl_connect(SSL_CTX *ctx) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SOCK BIO *ret = NULL, *buf = NULL, *ssl = NULL; if ((buf = BIO_new(BIO_f_buffer())) == NULL) return NULL; if ((ssl = BIO_new_ssl_connect(ctx)) == NULL) goto err; if ((ret = BIO_push(buf, ssl)) == NULL) goto err; return ret; err: BIO_free(buf); BIO_free(ssl); #endif return NULL; } BIO *BIO_new_ssl_connect(SSL_CTX *ctx) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SOCK BIO *ret = NULL, *con = NULL, *ssl = NULL; if ((con = BIO_new(BIO_s_connect())) == NULL) return NULL; if ((ssl = BIO_new_ssl(ctx, 1)) == NULL) goto err; if ((ret = BIO_push(ssl, con)) == NULL) goto err; return ret; err: BIO_free(ssl); BIO_free(con); #endif return NULL; } BIO *BIO_new_ssl(SSL_CTX *ctx, int client) { BIO *ret; SSL *ssl; if ((ret = BIO_new(BIO_f_ssl())) == NULL) return NULL; if ((ssl = SSL_new(ctx)) == NULL) { BIO_free(ret); return NULL; } if (client) SSL_set_connect_state(ssl); else SSL_set_accept_state(ssl); BIO_set_ssl(ret, ssl, BIO_CLOSE); return ret; } int BIO_ssl_copy_session_id(BIO *t, BIO *f) { BIO_SSL *tdata, *fdata; t = BIO_find_type(t, BIO_TYPE_SSL); f = BIO_find_type(f, BIO_TYPE_SSL); if ((t == NULL) || (f == NULL)) return 0; tdata = BIO_get_data(t); fdata = BIO_get_data(f); if ((tdata->ssl == NULL) || (fdata->ssl == NULL)) return 0; if (!SSL_copy_session_id(tdata->ssl, (fdata->ssl))) return 0; return 1; } void BIO_ssl_shutdown(BIO *b) { BIO_SSL *bdata; for (; b != NULL; b = BIO_next(b)) { if (BIO_method_type(b) != BIO_TYPE_SSL) continue; bdata = BIO_get_data(b); if (bdata != NULL && bdata->ssl != NULL) SSL_shutdown(bdata->ssl); } } diff --git a/ssl/record/ssl3_record.c b/ssl/record/ssl3_record.c index e6a8bbd71073..f158544789bb 100644 --- a/ssl/record/ssl3_record.c +++ b/ssl/record/ssl3_record.c @@ -1,2063 +1,2063 @@ /* * Copyright 1995-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include "../ssl_local.h" #include "internal/constant_time.h" #include #include "record_local.h" #include "internal/cryptlib.h" static const unsigned char ssl3_pad_1[48] = { 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36, 0x36 }; static const unsigned char ssl3_pad_2[48] = { 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c, 0x5c }; /* * Clear the contents of an SSL3_RECORD but retain any memory allocated */ void SSL3_RECORD_clear(SSL3_RECORD *r, size_t num_recs) { unsigned char *comp; size_t i; for (i = 0; i < num_recs; i++) { comp = r[i].comp; memset(&r[i], 0, sizeof(*r)); r[i].comp = comp; } } void SSL3_RECORD_release(SSL3_RECORD *r, size_t num_recs) { size_t i; for (i = 0; i < num_recs; i++) { OPENSSL_free(r[i].comp); r[i].comp = NULL; } } void SSL3_RECORD_set_seq_num(SSL3_RECORD *r, const unsigned char *seq_num) { memcpy(r->seq_num, seq_num, SEQ_NUM_SIZE); } /* * Peeks ahead into "read_ahead" data to see if we have a whole record waiting * for us in the buffer. */ static int ssl3_record_app_data_waiting(SSL *s) { SSL3_BUFFER *rbuf; size_t left, len; unsigned char *p; rbuf = RECORD_LAYER_get_rbuf(&s->rlayer); p = SSL3_BUFFER_get_buf(rbuf); if (p == NULL) return 0; left = SSL3_BUFFER_get_left(rbuf); if (left < SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) return 0; p += SSL3_BUFFER_get_offset(rbuf); /* * We only check the type and record length, we will sanity check version * etc later */ if (*p != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) return 0; p += 3; n2s(p, len); if (left < SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + len) return 0; return 1; } int early_data_count_ok(SSL *s, size_t length, size_t overhead, int send) { uint32_t max_early_data; SSL_SESSION *sess = s->session; /* * If we are a client then we always use the max_early_data from the * session/psksession. Otherwise we go with the lowest out of the max early * data set in the session and the configured max_early_data. */ if (!s->server && sess->ext.max_early_data == 0) { if (!ossl_assert(s->psksession != NULL && s->psksession->ext.max_early_data > 0)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_EARLY_DATA_COUNT_OK, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } sess = s->psksession; } if (!s->server) max_early_data = sess->ext.max_early_data; else if (s->ext.early_data != SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED) max_early_data = s->recv_max_early_data; else max_early_data = s->recv_max_early_data < sess->ext.max_early_data ? s->recv_max_early_data : sess->ext.max_early_data; if (max_early_data == 0) { SSLfatal(s, send ? SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR : SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_EARLY_DATA_COUNT_OK, SSL_R_TOO_MUCH_EARLY_DATA); return 0; } /* If we are dealing with ciphertext we need to allow for the overhead */ max_early_data += overhead; if (s->early_data_count + length > max_early_data) { SSLfatal(s, send ? SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR : SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_EARLY_DATA_COUNT_OK, SSL_R_TOO_MUCH_EARLY_DATA); return 0; } s->early_data_count += length; return 1; } /* * MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS defines the number of consecutive, empty records that * will be processed per call to ssl3_get_record. Without this limit an * attacker could send empty records at a faster rate than we can process and * cause ssl3_get_record to loop forever. */ #define MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS 32 #define SSL2_RT_HEADER_LENGTH 2 /*- * Call this to get new input records. * It will return <= 0 if more data is needed, normally due to an error * or non-blocking IO. * When it finishes, |numrpipes| records have been decoded. For each record 'i': * rr[i].type - is the type of record * rr[i].data, - data * rr[i].length, - number of bytes * Multiple records will only be returned if the record types are all * SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA. The number of records returned will always be <= * |max_pipelines| */ /* used only by ssl3_read_bytes */ int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s) { int enc_err, rret; int i; size_t more, n; SSL3_RECORD *rr, *thisrr; SSL3_BUFFER *rbuf; SSL_SESSION *sess; unsigned char *p; unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; unsigned int version; size_t mac_size; int imac_size; size_t num_recs = 0, max_recs, j; PACKET pkt, sslv2pkt; size_t first_rec_len; rr = RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec(&s->rlayer); rbuf = RECORD_LAYER_get_rbuf(&s->rlayer); max_recs = s->max_pipelines; if (max_recs == 0) max_recs = 1; sess = s->session; do { thisrr = &rr[num_recs]; /* check if we have the header */ if ((RECORD_LAYER_get_rstate(&s->rlayer) != SSL_ST_READ_BODY) || (RECORD_LAYER_get_packet_length(&s->rlayer) < SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)) { size_t sslv2len; unsigned int type; rret = ssl3_read_n(s, SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(rbuf), 0, num_recs == 0 ? 1 : 0, &n); if (rret <= 0) return rret; /* error or non-blocking */ RECORD_LAYER_set_rstate(&s->rlayer, SSL_ST_READ_BODY); p = RECORD_LAYER_get_packet(&s->rlayer); if (!PACKET_buf_init(&pkt, RECORD_LAYER_get_packet(&s->rlayer), RECORD_LAYER_get_packet_length(&s->rlayer))) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return -1; } sslv2pkt = pkt; if (!PACKET_get_net_2_len(&sslv2pkt, &sslv2len) || !PACKET_get_1(&sslv2pkt, &type)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return -1; } /* * The first record received by the server may be a V2ClientHello. */ if (s->server && RECORD_LAYER_is_first_record(&s->rlayer) && (sslv2len & 0x8000) != 0 && (type == SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO)) { /* * SSLv2 style record * * |num_recs| here will actually always be 0 because * |num_recs > 0| only ever occurs when we are processing * multiple app data records - which we know isn't the case here * because it is an SSLv2ClientHello. We keep it using * |num_recs| for the sake of consistency */ thisrr->type = SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE; thisrr->rec_version = SSL2_VERSION; thisrr->length = sslv2len & 0x7fff; if (thisrr->length > SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(rbuf) - SSL2_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW, SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_PACKET_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); return -1; } if (thisrr->length < MIN_SSL2_RECORD_LEN) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); return -1; } } else { /* SSLv3+ style record */ if (s->msg_callback) s->msg_callback(0, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER, p, 5, s, s->msg_callback_arg); /* Pull apart the header into the SSL3_RECORD */ if (!PACKET_get_1(&pkt, &type) || !PACKET_get_net_2(&pkt, &version) || !PACKET_get_net_2_len(&pkt, &thisrr->length)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return -1; } thisrr->type = type; thisrr->rec_version = version; /* * Lets check version. In TLSv1.3 we only check this field * when encryption is occurring (see later check). For the * ServerHello after an HRR we haven't actually selected TLSv1.3 * yet, but we still treat it as TLSv1.3, so we must check for * that explicitly */ if (!s->first_packet && !SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_PENDING && version != (unsigned int)s->version) { if ((s->version & 0xFF00) == (version & 0xFF00) && !s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash) { if (thisrr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT) { /* * The record is using an incorrect version number, * but what we've got appears to be an alert. We * haven't read the body yet to check whether its a * fatal or not - but chances are it is. We probably * shouldn't send a fatal alert back. We'll just * end. */ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER); return -1; } /* * Send back error using their minor version number :-) */ s->version = (unsigned short)version; } SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER); return -1; } if ((version >> 8) != SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR) { if (RECORD_LAYER_is_first_record(&s->rlayer)) { /* Go back to start of packet, look at the five bytes * that we have. */ p = RECORD_LAYER_get_packet(&s->rlayer); if (strncmp((char *)p, "GET ", 4) == 0 || strncmp((char *)p, "POST ", 5) == 0 || strncmp((char *)p, "HEAD ", 5) == 0 || strncmp((char *)p, "PUT ", 4) == 0) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_HTTP_REQUEST); return -1; } else if (strncmp((char *)p, "CONNE", 5) == 0) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_HTTPS_PROXY_REQUEST); return -1; } /* Doesn't look like TLS - don't send an alert */ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_NO_ALERT, SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER); return -1; } else { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER); return -1; } } if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->enc_read_ctx != NULL) { if (thisrr->type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA && (thisrr->type != SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC || !SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) && (thisrr->type != SSL3_RT_ALERT || s->statem.enc_read_state != ENC_READ_STATE_ALLOW_PLAIN_ALERTS)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_BAD_RECORD_TYPE); return -1; } if (thisrr->rec_version != TLS1_2_VERSION) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER); return -1; } } if (thisrr->length > SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(rbuf) - SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW, SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_PACKET_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); return -1; } } /* now s->rlayer.rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY */ } if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { if (thisrr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_TLS13_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW, SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); return -1; } } else { size_t len = SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP /* * If OPENSSL_NO_COMP is defined then SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH * does not include the compression overhead anyway. */ if (s->expand == NULL) len -= SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_OVERHEAD; #endif if (thisrr->length > len) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW, SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); return -1; } } /* * s->rlayer.rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY, get and decode the data. * Calculate how much more data we need to read for the rest of the * record */ if (thisrr->rec_version == SSL2_VERSION) { more = thisrr->length + SSL2_RT_HEADER_LENGTH - SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH; } else { more = thisrr->length; } if (more > 0) { /* now s->rlayer.packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH */ rret = ssl3_read_n(s, more, more, 1, 0, &n); if (rret <= 0) return rret; /* error or non-blocking io */ } /* set state for later operations */ RECORD_LAYER_set_rstate(&s->rlayer, SSL_ST_READ_HEADER); /* * At this point, s->rlayer.packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH * + thisrr->length, or s->rlayer.packet_length == SSL2_RT_HEADER_LENGTH * + thisrr->length and we have that many bytes in s->rlayer.packet */ if (thisrr->rec_version == SSL2_VERSION) { thisrr->input = &(RECORD_LAYER_get_packet(&s->rlayer)[SSL2_RT_HEADER_LENGTH]); } else { thisrr->input = &(RECORD_LAYER_get_packet(&s->rlayer)[SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH]); } /* * ok, we can now read from 's->rlayer.packet' data into 'thisrr'. * thisrr->input points at thisrr->length bytes, which need to be copied * into thisrr->data by either the decryption or by the decompression. * When the data is 'copied' into the thisrr->data buffer, * thisrr->input will be updated to point at the new buffer */ /* * We now have - encrypted [ MAC [ compressed [ plain ] ] ] * thisrr->length bytes of encrypted compressed stuff. */ /* decrypt in place in 'thisrr->input' */ thisrr->data = thisrr->input; thisrr->orig_len = thisrr->length; /* Mark this record as not read by upper layers yet */ thisrr->read = 0; num_recs++; /* we have pulled in a full packet so zero things */ RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer); RECORD_LAYER_clear_first_record(&s->rlayer); } while (num_recs < max_recs && thisrr->type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA && SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s) && s->enc_read_ctx != NULL && (EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_read_ctx)) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_PIPELINE) && ssl3_record_app_data_waiting(s)); if (num_recs == 1 && thisrr->type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC && (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_NONE) && SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) { /* * CCS messages must be exactly 1 byte long, containing the value 0x01 */ if (thisrr->length != 1 || thisrr->data[0] != 0x01) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_INVALID_CCS_MESSAGE); return -1; } /* * CCS messages are ignored in TLSv1.3. We treat it like an empty * handshake record */ thisrr->type = SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE; RECORD_LAYER_inc_empty_record_count(&s->rlayer); if (RECORD_LAYER_get_empty_record_count(&s->rlayer) > MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_UNEXPECTED_CCS_MESSAGE); return -1; } thisrr->read = 1; RECORD_LAYER_set_numrpipes(&s->rlayer, 1); return 1; } /* * If in encrypt-then-mac mode calculate mac from encrypted record. All * the details below are public so no timing details can leak. */ if (SSL_READ_ETM(s) && s->read_hash) { unsigned char *mac; /* TODO(size_t): convert this to do size_t properly */ imac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash); if (!ossl_assert(imac_size >= 0 && imac_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, ERR_LIB_EVP); return -1; } mac_size = (size_t)imac_size; for (j = 0; j < num_recs; j++) { thisrr = &rr[j]; if (thisrr->length < mac_size) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); return -1; } thisrr->length -= mac_size; mac = thisrr->data + thisrr->length; i = s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, thisrr, md, 0 /* not send */ ); if (i == 0 || CRYPTO_memcmp(md, mac, mac_size) != 0) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC, SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC); return -1; } } } first_rec_len = rr[0].length; enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s, rr, num_recs, 0); /*- * enc_err is: * 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publicly invalid. * 1: if the padding is valid * -1: if the padding is invalid */ if (enc_err == 0) { if (ossl_statem_in_error(s)) { /* SSLfatal() already got called */ return -1; } if (num_recs == 1 && ossl_statem_skip_early_data(s)) { /* * Valid early_data that we cannot decrypt might fail here as * publicly invalid. We treat it like an empty record. */ thisrr = &rr[0]; if (!early_data_count_ok(s, thisrr->length, EARLY_DATA_CIPHERTEXT_OVERHEAD, 0)) { /* SSLfatal() already called */ return -1; } thisrr->length = 0; thisrr->read = 1; RECORD_LAYER_set_numrpipes(&s->rlayer, 1); RECORD_LAYER_reset_read_sequence(&s->rlayer); return 1; } SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC, SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_BLOCK_CIPHER_PAD_IS_WRONG); return -1; } #ifdef SSL_DEBUG printf("dec %lu\n", (unsigned long)rr[0].length); { size_t z; for (z = 0; z < rr[0].length; z++) printf("%02X%c", rr[0].data[z], ((z + 1) % 16) ? ' ' : '\n'); } printf("\n"); #endif /* r->length is now the compressed data plus mac */ if ((sess != NULL) && (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL) && (!SSL_READ_ETM(s) && EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL)) { /* s->read_hash != NULL => mac_size != -1 */ unsigned char *mac = NULL; unsigned char mac_tmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash); if (!ossl_assert(mac_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return -1; } for (j = 0; j < num_recs; j++) { thisrr = &rr[j]; /* * orig_len is the length of the record before any padding was * removed. This is public information, as is the MAC in use, * therefore we can safely process the record in a different amount * of time if it's too short to possibly contain a MAC. */ if (thisrr->orig_len < mac_size || /* CBC records must have a padding length byte too. */ (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE && thisrr->orig_len < mac_size + 1)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); return -1; } if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) { /* * We update the length so that the TLS header bytes can be * constructed correctly but we need to extract the MAC in * constant time from within the record, without leaking the * contents of the padding bytes. */ mac = mac_tmp; if (!ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(mac_tmp, thisrr, mac_size)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return -1; } thisrr->length -= mac_size; } else { /* * In this case there's no padding, so |rec->orig_len| equals * |rec->length| and we checked that there's enough bytes for * |mac_size| above. */ thisrr->length -= mac_size; mac = &thisrr->data[thisrr->length]; } i = s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, thisrr, md, 0 /* not send */ ); if (i == 0 || mac == NULL || CRYPTO_memcmp(md, mac, (size_t)mac_size) != 0) enc_err = -1; if (thisrr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH + mac_size) enc_err = -1; } } if (enc_err < 0) { if (ossl_statem_in_error(s)) { /* We already called SSLfatal() */ return -1; } if (num_recs == 1 && ossl_statem_skip_early_data(s)) { /* * We assume this is unreadable early_data - we treat it like an * empty record */ /* * The record length may have been modified by the mac check above * so we use the previously saved value */ if (!early_data_count_ok(s, first_rec_len, EARLY_DATA_CIPHERTEXT_OVERHEAD, 0)) { /* SSLfatal() already called */ return -1; } thisrr = &rr[0]; thisrr->length = 0; thisrr->read = 1; RECORD_LAYER_set_numrpipes(&s->rlayer, 1); RECORD_LAYER_reset_read_sequence(&s->rlayer); return 1; } /* * A separate 'decryption_failed' alert was introduced with TLS 1.0, * SSL 3.0 only has 'bad_record_mac'. But unless a decryption * failure is directly visible from the ciphertext anyway, we should * not reveal which kind of error occurred -- this might become * visible to an attacker (e.g. via a logfile) */ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC, SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC); return -1; } for (j = 0; j < num_recs; j++) { thisrr = &rr[j]; /* thisrr->length is now just compressed */ if (s->expand != NULL) { if (thisrr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW, SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_COMPRESSED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); return -1; } if (!ssl3_do_uncompress(s, thisrr)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE, SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION); return -1; } } if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->enc_read_ctx != NULL && thisrr->type != SSL3_RT_ALERT) { size_t end; if (thisrr->length == 0 || thisrr->type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_BAD_RECORD_TYPE); return -1; } /* Strip trailing padding */ for (end = thisrr->length - 1; end > 0 && thisrr->data[end] == 0; end--) continue; thisrr->length = end; thisrr->type = thisrr->data[end]; if (thisrr->type != SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA && thisrr->type != SSL3_RT_ALERT && thisrr->type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_BAD_RECORD_TYPE); return -1; } if (s->msg_callback) s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_INNER_CONTENT_TYPE, &thisrr->data[end], 1, s, s->msg_callback_arg); } /* * TLSv1.3 alert and handshake records are required to be non-zero in * length. */ if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && (thisrr->type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE || thisrr->type == SSL3_RT_ALERT) && thisrr->length == 0) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH); return -1; } if (thisrr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW, SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); return -1; } /* If received packet overflows current Max Fragment Length setting */ if (s->session != NULL && USE_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT(s->session) && thisrr->length > GET_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH(s->session)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW, SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); return -1; } thisrr->off = 0; /*- * So at this point the following is true * thisrr->type is the type of record * thisrr->length == number of bytes in record * thisrr->off == offset to first valid byte * thisrr->data == where to take bytes from, increment after use :-). */ /* just read a 0 length packet */ if (thisrr->length == 0) { RECORD_LAYER_inc_empty_record_count(&s->rlayer); if (RECORD_LAYER_get_empty_record_count(&s->rlayer) > MAX_EMPTY_RECORDS) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD, SSL_R_RECORD_TOO_SMALL); return -1; } } else { RECORD_LAYER_reset_empty_record_count(&s->rlayer); } } if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_READING) { thisrr = &rr[0]; if (thisrr->type == SSL3_RT_APPLICATION_DATA && !early_data_count_ok(s, thisrr->length, 0, 0)) { /* SSLfatal already called */ return -1; } } RECORD_LAYER_set_numrpipes(&s->rlayer, num_recs); return 1; } int ssl3_do_uncompress(SSL *ssl, SSL3_RECORD *rr) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP int i; if (rr->comp == NULL) { rr->comp = (unsigned char *) OPENSSL_malloc(SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH); } if (rr->comp == NULL) return 0; /* TODO(size_t): Convert this call */ i = COMP_expand_block(ssl->expand, rr->comp, SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, rr->data, (int)rr->length); if (i < 0) return 0; else rr->length = i; rr->data = rr->comp; #endif return 1; } int ssl3_do_compress(SSL *ssl, SSL3_RECORD *wr) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP int i; /* TODO(size_t): Convert this call */ i = COMP_compress_block(ssl->compress, wr->data, (int)(wr->length + SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_OVERHEAD), wr->input, (int)wr->length); if (i < 0) return 0; else wr->length = i; wr->input = wr->data; #endif return 1; } /*- * ssl3_enc encrypts/decrypts |n_recs| records in |inrecs|. Will call * SSLfatal() for internal errors, but not otherwise. * * Returns: * 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publicly invalid (i.e. too * short etc). * 1: if the record's padding is valid / the encryption was successful. * -1: if the record's padding is invalid or, if sending, an internal error * occurred. */ int ssl3_enc(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *inrecs, size_t n_recs, int sending) { SSL3_RECORD *rec; EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ds; size_t l, i; size_t bs, mac_size = 0; int imac_size; const EVP_CIPHER *enc; rec = inrecs; /* * We shouldn't ever be called with more than one record in the SSLv3 case */ if (n_recs != 1) return 0; if (sending) { ds = s->enc_write_ctx; if (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) enc = NULL; else enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_write_ctx); } else { ds = s->enc_read_ctx; if (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL) enc = NULL; else enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_read_ctx); } if ((s->session == NULL) || (ds == NULL) || (enc == NULL)) { memmove(rec->data, rec->input, rec->length); rec->input = rec->data; } else { l = rec->length; /* TODO(size_t): Convert this call */ bs = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_block_size(ds); /* COMPRESS */ if ((bs != 1) && sending) { i = bs - (l % bs); /* we need to add 'i-1' padding bytes */ l += i; /* * the last of these zero bytes will be overwritten with the * padding length. */ memset(&rec->input[rec->length], 0, i); rec->length += i; rec->input[l - 1] = (unsigned char)(i - 1); } if (!sending) { if (l == 0 || l % bs != 0) return 0; /* otherwise, rec->length >= bs */ } /* TODO(size_t): Convert this call */ if (EVP_Cipher(ds, rec->data, rec->input, (unsigned int)l) < 1) return -1; if (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL) { /* TODO(size_t): convert me */ imac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash); if (imac_size < 0) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_ENC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return -1; } mac_size = (size_t)imac_size; } if ((bs != 1) && !sending) return ssl3_cbc_remove_padding(rec, bs, mac_size); } return 1; } #define MAX_PADDING 256 /*- * tls1_enc encrypts/decrypts |n_recs| in |recs|. Will call SSLfatal() for * internal errors, but not otherwise. * * Returns: * 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publicly invalid (i.e. too * short etc). * 1: if the record's padding is valid / the encryption was successful. * -1: if the record's padding/AEAD-authenticator is invalid or, if sending, * an internal error occurred. */ int tls1_enc(SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *recs, size_t n_recs, int sending) { EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ds; size_t reclen[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES]; unsigned char buf[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES][EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN]; int i, pad = 0, ret, tmpr; size_t bs, mac_size = 0, ctr, padnum, loop; unsigned char padval; int imac_size; const EVP_CIPHER *enc; if (n_recs == 0) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS1_ENC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } if (sending) { if (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->write_hash)) { int n = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->write_hash); if (!ossl_assert(n >= 0)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS1_ENC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return -1; } } ds = s->enc_write_ctx; if (s->enc_write_ctx == NULL) enc = NULL; else { int ivlen; enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_write_ctx); /* For TLSv1.1 and later explicit IV */ if (SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s) && EVP_CIPHER_mode(enc) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(enc); else ivlen = 0; if (ivlen > 1) { for (ctr = 0; ctr < n_recs; ctr++) { if (recs[ctr].data != recs[ctr].input) { /* * we can't write into the input stream: Can this ever * happen?? (steve) */ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS1_ENC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return -1; } else if (RAND_bytes(recs[ctr].input, ivlen) <= 0) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS1_ENC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return -1; } } } } } else { if (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash)) { int n = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash); if (!ossl_assert(n >= 0)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS1_ENC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return -1; } } ds = s->enc_read_ctx; if (s->enc_read_ctx == NULL) enc = NULL; else enc = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_read_ctx); } if ((s->session == NULL) || (ds == NULL) || (enc == NULL)) { for (ctr = 0; ctr < n_recs; ctr++) { memmove(recs[ctr].data, recs[ctr].input, recs[ctr].length); recs[ctr].input = recs[ctr].data; } ret = 1; } else { bs = EVP_CIPHER_block_size(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(ds)); if (n_recs > 1) { if (!(EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(ds)) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_PIPELINE)) { /* * We shouldn't have been called with pipeline data if the * cipher doesn't support pipelining */ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS1_ENC, SSL_R_PIPELINE_FAILURE); return -1; } } for (ctr = 0; ctr < n_recs; ctr++) { reclen[ctr] = recs[ctr].length; if (EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(ds)) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER) { unsigned char *seq; seq = sending ? RECORD_LAYER_get_write_sequence(&s->rlayer) : RECORD_LAYER_get_read_sequence(&s->rlayer); if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { /* DTLS does not support pipelining */ - unsigned char dtlsseq[9], *p = dtlsseq; + unsigned char dtlsseq[8], *p = dtlsseq; s2n(sending ? DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_get_w_epoch(&s->rlayer) : DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_get_r_epoch(&s->rlayer), p); memcpy(p, &seq[2], 6); memcpy(buf[ctr], dtlsseq, 8); } else { memcpy(buf[ctr], seq, 8); for (i = 7; i >= 0; i--) { /* increment */ ++seq[i]; if (seq[i] != 0) break; } } buf[ctr][8] = recs[ctr].type; buf[ctr][9] = (unsigned char)(s->version >> 8); buf[ctr][10] = (unsigned char)(s->version); buf[ctr][11] = (unsigned char)(recs[ctr].length >> 8); buf[ctr][12] = (unsigned char)(recs[ctr].length & 0xff); pad = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ds, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_TLS1_AAD, EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN, buf[ctr]); if (pad <= 0) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS1_ENC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return -1; } if (sending) { reclen[ctr] += pad; recs[ctr].length += pad; } } else if ((bs != 1) && sending) { padnum = bs - (reclen[ctr] % bs); /* Add weird padding of up to 256 bytes */ if (padnum > MAX_PADDING) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS1_ENC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return -1; } /* we need to add 'padnum' padding bytes of value padval */ padval = (unsigned char)(padnum - 1); for (loop = reclen[ctr]; loop < reclen[ctr] + padnum; loop++) recs[ctr].input[loop] = padval; reclen[ctr] += padnum; recs[ctr].length += padnum; } if (!sending) { if (reclen[ctr] == 0 || reclen[ctr] % bs != 0) return 0; } } if (n_recs > 1) { unsigned char *data[SSL_MAX_PIPELINES]; /* Set the output buffers */ for (ctr = 0; ctr < n_recs; ctr++) { data[ctr] = recs[ctr].data; } if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ds, EVP_CTRL_SET_PIPELINE_OUTPUT_BUFS, (int)n_recs, data) <= 0) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS1_ENC, SSL_R_PIPELINE_FAILURE); return -1; } /* Set the input buffers */ for (ctr = 0; ctr < n_recs; ctr++) { data[ctr] = recs[ctr].input; } if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ds, EVP_CTRL_SET_PIPELINE_INPUT_BUFS, (int)n_recs, data) <= 0 || EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ds, EVP_CTRL_SET_PIPELINE_INPUT_LENS, (int)n_recs, reclen) <= 0) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS1_ENC, SSL_R_PIPELINE_FAILURE); return -1; } } /* TODO(size_t): Convert this call */ tmpr = EVP_Cipher(ds, recs[0].data, recs[0].input, (unsigned int)reclen[0]); if ((EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(ds)) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_CUSTOM_CIPHER) ? (tmpr < 0) : (tmpr == 0)) return -1; /* AEAD can fail to verify MAC */ if (sending == 0) { if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(enc) == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE) { for (ctr = 0; ctr < n_recs; ctr++) { recs[ctr].data += EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; recs[ctr].input += EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; recs[ctr].length -= EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; } } else if (EVP_CIPHER_mode(enc) == EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE) { for (ctr = 0; ctr < n_recs; ctr++) { recs[ctr].data += EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; recs[ctr].input += EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; recs[ctr].length -= EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN; } } } ret = 1; if (!SSL_READ_ETM(s) && EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL) { imac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash); if (imac_size < 0) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS1_ENC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return -1; } mac_size = (size_t)imac_size; } if ((bs != 1) && !sending) { int tmpret; for (ctr = 0; ctr < n_recs; ctr++) { tmpret = tls1_cbc_remove_padding(s, &recs[ctr], bs, mac_size); /* * If tmpret == 0 then this means publicly invalid so we can * short circuit things here. Otherwise we must respect constant * time behaviour. */ if (tmpret == 0) return 0; ret = constant_time_select_int(constant_time_eq_int(tmpret, 1), ret, -1); } } if (pad && !sending) { for (ctr = 0; ctr < n_recs; ctr++) { recs[ctr].length -= pad; } } } return ret; } int n_ssl3_mac(SSL *ssl, SSL3_RECORD *rec, unsigned char *md, int sending) { unsigned char *mac_sec, *seq; const EVP_MD_CTX *hash; unsigned char *p, rec_char; size_t md_size; size_t npad; int t; if (sending) { mac_sec = &(ssl->s3->write_mac_secret[0]); seq = RECORD_LAYER_get_write_sequence(&ssl->rlayer); hash = ssl->write_hash; } else { mac_sec = &(ssl->s3->read_mac_secret[0]); seq = RECORD_LAYER_get_read_sequence(&ssl->rlayer); hash = ssl->read_hash; } t = EVP_MD_CTX_size(hash); if (t < 0) return 0; md_size = t; npad = (48 / md_size) * md_size; if (!sending && EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(ssl->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE && ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported(hash)) { /* * This is a CBC-encrypted record. We must avoid leaking any * timing-side channel information about how many blocks of data we * are hashing because that gives an attacker a timing-oracle. */ /*- * npad is, at most, 48 bytes and that's with MD5: * 16 + 48 + 8 (sequence bytes) + 1 + 2 = 75. * * With SHA-1 (the largest hash speced for SSLv3) the hash size * goes up 4, but npad goes down by 8, resulting in a smaller * total size. */ unsigned char header[75]; size_t j = 0; memcpy(header + j, mac_sec, md_size); j += md_size; memcpy(header + j, ssl3_pad_1, npad); j += npad; memcpy(header + j, seq, 8); j += 8; header[j++] = rec->type; header[j++] = (unsigned char)(rec->length >> 8); header[j++] = (unsigned char)(rec->length & 0xff); /* Final param == is SSLv3 */ if (ssl3_cbc_digest_record(hash, md, &md_size, header, rec->input, rec->length + md_size, rec->orig_len, mac_sec, md_size, 1) <= 0) return 0; } else { unsigned int md_size_u; /* Chop the digest off the end :-) */ EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); if (md_ctx == NULL) return 0; rec_char = rec->type; p = md; s2n(rec->length, p); if (EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(md_ctx, hash) <= 0 || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, mac_sec, md_size) <= 0 || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, ssl3_pad_1, npad) <= 0 || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, seq, 8) <= 0 || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, &rec_char, 1) <= 0 || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, md, 2) <= 0 || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, rec->input, rec->length) <= 0 || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(md_ctx, md, NULL) <= 0 || EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(md_ctx, hash) <= 0 || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, mac_sec, md_size) <= 0 || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, ssl3_pad_2, npad) <= 0 || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, md, md_size) <= 0 || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(md_ctx, md, &md_size_u) <= 0) { EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx); return 0; } EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx); } ssl3_record_sequence_update(seq); return 1; } int tls1_mac(SSL *ssl, SSL3_RECORD *rec, unsigned char *md, int sending) { unsigned char *seq; EVP_MD_CTX *hash; size_t md_size; int i; EVP_MD_CTX *hmac = NULL, *mac_ctx; unsigned char header[13]; int stream_mac = (sending ? (ssl->mac_flags & SSL_MAC_FLAG_WRITE_MAC_STREAM) : (ssl->mac_flags & SSL_MAC_FLAG_READ_MAC_STREAM)); int t; if (sending) { seq = RECORD_LAYER_get_write_sequence(&ssl->rlayer); hash = ssl->write_hash; } else { seq = RECORD_LAYER_get_read_sequence(&ssl->rlayer); hash = ssl->read_hash; } t = EVP_MD_CTX_size(hash); if (!ossl_assert(t >= 0)) return 0; md_size = t; /* I should fix this up TLS TLS TLS TLS TLS XXXXXXXX */ if (stream_mac) { mac_ctx = hash; } else { hmac = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); if (hmac == NULL || !EVP_MD_CTX_copy(hmac, hash)) { EVP_MD_CTX_free(hmac); return 0; } mac_ctx = hmac; } if (SSL_IS_DTLS(ssl)) { unsigned char dtlsseq[8], *p = dtlsseq; s2n(sending ? DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_get_w_epoch(&ssl->rlayer) : DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_get_r_epoch(&ssl->rlayer), p); memcpy(p, &seq[2], 6); memcpy(header, dtlsseq, 8); } else memcpy(header, seq, 8); header[8] = rec->type; header[9] = (unsigned char)(ssl->version >> 8); header[10] = (unsigned char)(ssl->version); header[11] = (unsigned char)(rec->length >> 8); header[12] = (unsigned char)(rec->length & 0xff); if (!sending && !SSL_READ_ETM(ssl) && EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(ssl->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE && ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported(mac_ctx)) { /* * This is a CBC-encrypted record. We must avoid leaking any * timing-side channel information about how many blocks of data we * are hashing because that gives an attacker a timing-oracle. */ /* Final param == not SSLv3 */ if (ssl3_cbc_digest_record(mac_ctx, md, &md_size, header, rec->input, rec->length + md_size, rec->orig_len, ssl->s3->read_mac_secret, ssl->s3->read_mac_secret_size, 0) <= 0) { EVP_MD_CTX_free(hmac); return 0; } } else { /* TODO(size_t): Convert these calls */ if (EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx, header, sizeof(header)) <= 0 || EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mac_ctx, rec->input, rec->length) <= 0 || EVP_DigestSignFinal(mac_ctx, md, &md_size) <= 0) { EVP_MD_CTX_free(hmac); return 0; } } EVP_MD_CTX_free(hmac); #ifdef SSL_DEBUG fprintf(stderr, "seq="); { int z; for (z = 0; z < 8; z++) fprintf(stderr, "%02X ", seq[z]); fprintf(stderr, "\n"); } fprintf(stderr, "rec="); { size_t z; for (z = 0; z < rec->length; z++) fprintf(stderr, "%02X ", rec->data[z]); fprintf(stderr, "\n"); } #endif if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(ssl)) { for (i = 7; i >= 0; i--) { ++seq[i]; if (seq[i] != 0) break; } } #ifdef SSL_DEBUG { unsigned int z; for (z = 0; z < md_size; z++) fprintf(stderr, "%02X ", md[z]); fprintf(stderr, "\n"); } #endif return 1; } /*- * ssl3_cbc_remove_padding removes padding from the decrypted, SSLv3, CBC * record in |rec| by updating |rec->length| in constant time. * * block_size: the block size of the cipher used to encrypt the record. * returns: * 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publicly invalid. * 1: if the padding was valid * -1: otherwise. */ int ssl3_cbc_remove_padding(SSL3_RECORD *rec, size_t block_size, size_t mac_size) { size_t padding_length; size_t good; const size_t overhead = 1 /* padding length byte */ + mac_size; /* * These lengths are all public so we can test them in non-constant time. */ if (overhead > rec->length) return 0; padding_length = rec->data[rec->length - 1]; good = constant_time_ge_s(rec->length, padding_length + overhead); /* SSLv3 requires that the padding is minimal. */ good &= constant_time_ge_s(block_size, padding_length + 1); rec->length -= good & (padding_length + 1); return constant_time_select_int_s(good, 1, -1); } /*- * tls1_cbc_remove_padding removes the CBC padding from the decrypted, TLS, CBC * record in |rec| in constant time and returns 1 if the padding is valid and * -1 otherwise. It also removes any explicit IV from the start of the record * without leaking any timing about whether there was enough space after the * padding was removed. * * block_size: the block size of the cipher used to encrypt the record. * returns: * 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publicly invalid. * 1: if the padding was valid * -1: otherwise. */ int tls1_cbc_remove_padding(const SSL *s, SSL3_RECORD *rec, size_t block_size, size_t mac_size) { size_t good; size_t padding_length, to_check, i; const size_t overhead = 1 /* padding length byte */ + mac_size; /* Check if version requires explicit IV */ if (SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s)) { /* * These lengths are all public so we can test them in non-constant * time. */ if (overhead + block_size > rec->length) return 0; /* We can now safely skip explicit IV */ rec->data += block_size; rec->input += block_size; rec->length -= block_size; rec->orig_len -= block_size; } else if (overhead > rec->length) return 0; padding_length = rec->data[rec->length - 1]; if (EVP_CIPHER_flags(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cipher(s->enc_read_ctx)) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER) { /* padding is already verified */ rec->length -= padding_length + 1; return 1; } good = constant_time_ge_s(rec->length, overhead + padding_length); /* * The padding consists of a length byte at the end of the record and * then that many bytes of padding, all with the same value as the length * byte. Thus, with the length byte included, there are i+1 bytes of * padding. We can't check just |padding_length+1| bytes because that * leaks decrypted information. Therefore we always have to check the * maximum amount of padding possible. (Again, the length of the record * is public information so we can use it.) */ to_check = 256; /* maximum amount of padding, inc length byte. */ if (to_check > rec->length) to_check = rec->length; for (i = 0; i < to_check; i++) { unsigned char mask = constant_time_ge_8_s(padding_length, i); unsigned char b = rec->data[rec->length - 1 - i]; /* * The final |padding_length+1| bytes should all have the value * |padding_length|. Therefore the XOR should be zero. */ good &= ~(mask & (padding_length ^ b)); } /* * If any of the final |padding_length+1| bytes had the wrong value, one * or more of the lower eight bits of |good| will be cleared. */ good = constant_time_eq_s(0xff, good & 0xff); rec->length -= good & (padding_length + 1); return constant_time_select_int_s(good, 1, -1); } /*- * ssl3_cbc_copy_mac copies |md_size| bytes from the end of |rec| to |out| in * constant time (independent of the concrete value of rec->length, which may * vary within a 256-byte window). * * ssl3_cbc_remove_padding or tls1_cbc_remove_padding must be called prior to * this function. * * On entry: * rec->orig_len >= md_size * md_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE * * If CBC_MAC_ROTATE_IN_PLACE is defined then the rotation is performed with * variable accesses in a 64-byte-aligned buffer. Assuming that this fits into * a single or pair of cache-lines, then the variable memory accesses don't * actually affect the timing. CPUs with smaller cache-lines [if any] are * not multi-core and are not considered vulnerable to cache-timing attacks. */ #define CBC_MAC_ROTATE_IN_PLACE int ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(unsigned char *out, const SSL3_RECORD *rec, size_t md_size) { #if defined(CBC_MAC_ROTATE_IN_PLACE) unsigned char rotated_mac_buf[64 + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; unsigned char *rotated_mac; #else unsigned char rotated_mac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; #endif /* * mac_end is the index of |rec->data| just after the end of the MAC. */ size_t mac_end = rec->length; size_t mac_start = mac_end - md_size; size_t in_mac; /* * scan_start contains the number of bytes that we can ignore because the * MAC's position can only vary by 255 bytes. */ size_t scan_start = 0; size_t i, j; size_t rotate_offset; if (!ossl_assert(rec->orig_len >= md_size && md_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE)) return 0; #if defined(CBC_MAC_ROTATE_IN_PLACE) rotated_mac = rotated_mac_buf + ((0 - (size_t)rotated_mac_buf) & 63); #endif /* This information is public so it's safe to branch based on it. */ if (rec->orig_len > md_size + 255 + 1) scan_start = rec->orig_len - (md_size + 255 + 1); in_mac = 0; rotate_offset = 0; memset(rotated_mac, 0, md_size); for (i = scan_start, j = 0; i < rec->orig_len; i++) { size_t mac_started = constant_time_eq_s(i, mac_start); size_t mac_ended = constant_time_lt_s(i, mac_end); unsigned char b = rec->data[i]; in_mac |= mac_started; in_mac &= mac_ended; rotate_offset |= j & mac_started; rotated_mac[j++] |= b & in_mac; j &= constant_time_lt_s(j, md_size); } /* Now rotate the MAC */ #if defined(CBC_MAC_ROTATE_IN_PLACE) j = 0; for (i = 0; i < md_size; i++) { /* in case cache-line is 32 bytes, touch second line */ ((volatile unsigned char *)rotated_mac)[rotate_offset ^ 32]; out[j++] = rotated_mac[rotate_offset++]; rotate_offset &= constant_time_lt_s(rotate_offset, md_size); } #else memset(out, 0, md_size); rotate_offset = md_size - rotate_offset; rotate_offset &= constant_time_lt_s(rotate_offset, md_size); for (i = 0; i < md_size; i++) { for (j = 0; j < md_size; j++) out[j] |= rotated_mac[i] & constant_time_eq_8_s(j, rotate_offset); rotate_offset++; rotate_offset &= constant_time_lt_s(rotate_offset, md_size); } #endif return 1; } int dtls1_process_record(SSL *s, DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap) { int i; int enc_err; SSL_SESSION *sess; SSL3_RECORD *rr; int imac_size; size_t mac_size; unsigned char md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; size_t max_plain_length = SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH; rr = RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec(&s->rlayer); sess = s->session; /* * At this point, s->rlayer.packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LNGTH + rr->length, * and we have that many bytes in s->rlayer.packet */ rr->input = &(RECORD_LAYER_get_packet(&s->rlayer)[DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH]); /* * ok, we can now read from 's->rlayer.packet' data into 'rr'. rr->input * points at rr->length bytes, which need to be copied into rr->data by * either the decryption or by the decompression. When the data is 'copied' * into the rr->data buffer, rr->input will be pointed at the new buffer */ /* * We now have - encrypted [ MAC [ compressed [ plain ] ] ] rr->length * bytes of encrypted compressed stuff. */ /* check is not needed I believe */ if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW, SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD, SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); return 0; } /* decrypt in place in 'rr->input' */ rr->data = rr->input; rr->orig_len = rr->length; if (SSL_READ_ETM(s) && s->read_hash) { unsigned char *mac; mac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash); if (!ossl_assert(mac_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } if (rr->orig_len < mac_size) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); return 0; } rr->length -= mac_size; mac = rr->data + rr->length; i = s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, rr, md, 0 /* not send */ ); if (i == 0 || CRYPTO_memcmp(md, mac, (size_t)mac_size) != 0) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC, SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC); return 0; } } enc_err = s->method->ssl3_enc->enc(s, rr, 1, 0); /*- * enc_err is: * 0: (in non-constant time) if the record is publicly invalid. * 1: if the padding is valid * -1: if the padding is invalid */ if (enc_err == 0) { if (ossl_statem_in_error(s)) { /* SSLfatal() got called */ return 0; } /* For DTLS we simply ignore bad packets. */ rr->length = 0; RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer); return 0; } #ifdef SSL_DEBUG printf("dec %ld\n", rr->length); { size_t z; for (z = 0; z < rr->length; z++) printf("%02X%c", rr->data[z], ((z + 1) % 16) ? ' ' : '\n'); } printf("\n"); #endif /* r->length is now the compressed data plus mac */ if ((sess != NULL) && !SSL_READ_ETM(s) && (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL) && (EVP_MD_CTX_md(s->read_hash) != NULL)) { /* s->read_hash != NULL => mac_size != -1 */ unsigned char *mac = NULL; unsigned char mac_tmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; /* TODO(size_t): Convert this to do size_t properly */ imac_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(s->read_hash); if (imac_size < 0) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD, ERR_LIB_EVP); return 0; } mac_size = (size_t)imac_size; if (!ossl_assert(mac_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } /* * orig_len is the length of the record before any padding was * removed. This is public information, as is the MAC in use, * therefore we can safely process the record in a different amount * of time if it's too short to possibly contain a MAC. */ if (rr->orig_len < mac_size || /* CBC records must have a padding length byte too. */ (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE && rr->orig_len < mac_size + 1)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); return 0; } if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_mode(s->enc_read_ctx) == EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) { /* * We update the length so that the TLS header bytes can be * constructed correctly but we need to extract the MAC in * constant time from within the record, without leaking the * contents of the padding bytes. */ mac = mac_tmp; if (!ssl3_cbc_copy_mac(mac_tmp, rr, mac_size)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } rr->length -= mac_size; } else { /* * In this case there's no padding, so |rec->orig_len| equals * |rec->length| and we checked that there's enough bytes for * |mac_size| above. */ rr->length -= mac_size; mac = &rr->data[rr->length]; } i = s->method->ssl3_enc->mac(s, rr, md, 0 /* not send */ ); if (i == 0 || mac == NULL || CRYPTO_memcmp(md, mac, mac_size) != 0) enc_err = -1; if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH + mac_size) enc_err = -1; } if (enc_err < 0) { /* decryption failed, silently discard message */ rr->length = 0; RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer); return 0; } /* r->length is now just compressed */ if (s->expand != NULL) { if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_LENGTH) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW, SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD, SSL_R_COMPRESSED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); return 0; } if (!ssl3_do_uncompress(s, rr)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECOMPRESSION_FAILURE, SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD, SSL_R_BAD_DECOMPRESSION); return 0; } } /* use current Max Fragment Length setting if applicable */ if (s->session != NULL && USE_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT(s->session)) max_plain_length = GET_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH(s->session); /* send overflow if the plaintext is too long now it has passed MAC */ if (rr->length > max_plain_length) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW, SSL_F_DTLS1_PROCESS_RECORD, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); return 0; } rr->off = 0; /*- * So at this point the following is true * ssl->s3->rrec.type is the type of record * ssl->s3->rrec.length == number of bytes in record * ssl->s3->rrec.off == offset to first valid byte * ssl->s3->rrec.data == where to take bytes from, increment * after use :-). */ /* we have pulled in a full packet so zero things */ RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer); /* Mark receipt of record. */ dtls1_record_bitmap_update(s, bitmap); return 1; } /* * Retrieve a buffered record that belongs to the current epoch, i.e. processed */ #define dtls1_get_processed_record(s) \ dtls1_retrieve_buffered_record((s), \ &(DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_get_processed_rcds(&s->rlayer))) /*- * Call this to get a new input record. * It will return <= 0 if more data is needed, normally due to an error * or non-blocking IO. * When it finishes, one packet has been decoded and can be found in * ssl->s3->rrec.type - is the type of record * ssl->s3->rrec.data, - data * ssl->s3->rrec.length, - number of bytes */ /* used only by dtls1_read_bytes */ int dtls1_get_record(SSL *s) { int ssl_major, ssl_minor; int rret; size_t more, n; SSL3_RECORD *rr; unsigned char *p = NULL; unsigned short version; DTLS1_BITMAP *bitmap; unsigned int is_next_epoch; rr = RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec(&s->rlayer); again: /* * The epoch may have changed. If so, process all the pending records. * This is a non-blocking operation. */ if (!dtls1_process_buffered_records(s)) { /* SSLfatal() already called */ return -1; } /* if we're renegotiating, then there may be buffered records */ if (dtls1_get_processed_record(s)) return 1; /* get something from the wire */ /* check if we have the header */ if ((RECORD_LAYER_get_rstate(&s->rlayer) != SSL_ST_READ_BODY) || (RECORD_LAYER_get_packet_length(&s->rlayer) < DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH)) { rret = ssl3_read_n(s, DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(&s->rlayer.rbuf), 0, 1, &n); /* read timeout is handled by dtls1_read_bytes */ if (rret <= 0) { /* SSLfatal() already called if appropriate */ return rret; /* error or non-blocking */ } /* this packet contained a partial record, dump it */ if (RECORD_LAYER_get_packet_length(&s->rlayer) != DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) { RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer); goto again; } RECORD_LAYER_set_rstate(&s->rlayer, SSL_ST_READ_BODY); p = RECORD_LAYER_get_packet(&s->rlayer); if (s->msg_callback) s->msg_callback(0, 0, SSL3_RT_HEADER, p, DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH, s, s->msg_callback_arg); /* Pull apart the header into the DTLS1_RECORD */ rr->type = *(p++); ssl_major = *(p++); ssl_minor = *(p++); version = (ssl_major << 8) | ssl_minor; /* sequence number is 64 bits, with top 2 bytes = epoch */ n2s(p, rr->epoch); memcpy(&(RECORD_LAYER_get_read_sequence(&s->rlayer)[2]), p, 6); p += 6; n2s(p, rr->length); rr->read = 0; /* * Lets check the version. We tolerate alerts that don't have the exact * version number (e.g. because of protocol version errors) */ if (!s->first_packet && rr->type != SSL3_RT_ALERT) { if (version != s->version) { /* unexpected version, silently discard */ rr->length = 0; rr->read = 1; RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer); goto again; } } if ((version & 0xff00) != (s->version & 0xff00)) { /* wrong version, silently discard record */ rr->length = 0; rr->read = 1; RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer); goto again; } if (rr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH) { /* record too long, silently discard it */ rr->length = 0; rr->read = 1; RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer); goto again; } /* If received packet overflows own-client Max Fragment Length setting */ if (s->session != NULL && USE_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT(s->session) && rr->length > GET_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH(s->session) + SSL3_RT_MAX_ENCRYPTED_OVERHEAD) { /* record too long, silently discard it */ rr->length = 0; rr->read = 1; RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer); goto again; } /* now s->rlayer.rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY */ } /* s->rlayer.rstate == SSL_ST_READ_BODY, get and decode the data */ if (rr->length > RECORD_LAYER_get_packet_length(&s->rlayer) - DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH) { /* now s->rlayer.packet_length == DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH */ more = rr->length; rret = ssl3_read_n(s, more, more, 1, 1, &n); /* this packet contained a partial record, dump it */ if (rret <= 0 || n != more) { if (ossl_statem_in_error(s)) { /* ssl3_read_n() called SSLfatal() */ return -1; } rr->length = 0; rr->read = 1; RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer); goto again; } /* * now n == rr->length, and s->rlayer.packet_length == * DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + rr->length */ } /* set state for later operations */ RECORD_LAYER_set_rstate(&s->rlayer, SSL_ST_READ_HEADER); /* match epochs. NULL means the packet is dropped on the floor */ bitmap = dtls1_get_bitmap(s, rr, &is_next_epoch); if (bitmap == NULL) { rr->length = 0; RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer); /* dump this record */ goto again; /* get another record */ } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP /* Only do replay check if no SCTP bio */ if (!BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_rbio(s))) { #endif /* Check whether this is a repeat, or aged record. */ /* * TODO: Does it make sense to have replay protection in epoch 0 where * we have no integrity negotiated yet? */ if (!dtls1_record_replay_check(s, bitmap)) { rr->length = 0; rr->read = 1; RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer); /* dump this record */ goto again; /* get another record */ } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP } #endif /* just read a 0 length packet */ if (rr->length == 0) { rr->read = 1; goto again; } /* * If this record is from the next epoch (either HM or ALERT), and a * handshake is currently in progress, buffer it since it cannot be * processed at this time. */ if (is_next_epoch) { if ((SSL_in_init(s) || ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s))) { if (dtls1_buffer_record (s, &(DTLS_RECORD_LAYER_get_unprocessed_rcds(&s->rlayer)), rr->seq_num) < 0) { /* SSLfatal() already called */ return -1; } } rr->length = 0; rr->read = 1; RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer); goto again; } if (!dtls1_process_record(s, bitmap)) { if (ossl_statem_in_error(s)) { /* dtls1_process_record() called SSLfatal */ return -1; } rr->length = 0; rr->read = 1; RECORD_LAYER_reset_packet_length(&s->rlayer); /* dump this record */ goto again; /* get another record */ } return 1; } int dtls_buffer_listen_record(SSL *s, size_t len, unsigned char *seq, size_t off) { SSL3_RECORD *rr; rr = RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec(&s->rlayer); memset(rr, 0, sizeof(SSL3_RECORD)); rr->length = len; rr->type = SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE; memcpy(rr->seq_num, seq, sizeof(rr->seq_num)); rr->off = off; s->rlayer.packet = RECORD_LAYER_get_rbuf(&s->rlayer)->buf; s->rlayer.packet_length = DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH + len; rr->data = s->rlayer.packet + DTLS1_RT_HEADER_LENGTH; if (dtls1_buffer_record(s, &(s->rlayer.d->processed_rcds), SSL3_RECORD_get_seq_num(s->rlayer.rrec)) <= 0) { /* SSLfatal() already called */ return 0; } return 1; } diff --git a/ssl/s3_cbc.c b/ssl/s3_cbc.c index aa7d63f84a9f..c95dcd9fdec1 100644 --- a/ssl/s3_cbc.c +++ b/ssl/s3_cbc.c @@ -1,487 +1,487 @@ /* - * Copyright 2012-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 2012-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include "internal/constant_time.h" #include "ssl_local.h" #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include /* * MAX_HASH_BIT_COUNT_BYTES is the maximum number of bytes in the hash's * length field. (SHA-384/512 have 128-bit length.) */ #define MAX_HASH_BIT_COUNT_BYTES 16 /* * MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE is the maximum hash block size that we'll support. * Currently SHA-384/512 has a 128-byte block size and that's the largest * supported by TLS.) */ #define MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE 128 /* * u32toLE serialises an unsigned, 32-bit number (n) as four bytes at (p) in * little-endian order. The value of p is advanced by four. */ #define u32toLE(n, p) \ (*((p)++)=(unsigned char)(n), \ *((p)++)=(unsigned char)(n>>8), \ *((p)++)=(unsigned char)(n>>16), \ *((p)++)=(unsigned char)(n>>24)) /* * These functions serialize the state of a hash and thus perform the * standard "final" operation without adding the padding and length that such * a function typically does. */ static void tls1_md5_final_raw(void *ctx, unsigned char *md_out) { MD5_CTX *md5 = ctx; u32toLE(md5->A, md_out); u32toLE(md5->B, md_out); u32toLE(md5->C, md_out); u32toLE(md5->D, md_out); } static void tls1_sha1_final_raw(void *ctx, unsigned char *md_out) { SHA_CTX *sha1 = ctx; l2n(sha1->h0, md_out); l2n(sha1->h1, md_out); l2n(sha1->h2, md_out); l2n(sha1->h3, md_out); l2n(sha1->h4, md_out); } static void tls1_sha256_final_raw(void *ctx, unsigned char *md_out) { SHA256_CTX *sha256 = ctx; unsigned i; for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) { l2n(sha256->h[i], md_out); } } static void tls1_sha512_final_raw(void *ctx, unsigned char *md_out) { SHA512_CTX *sha512 = ctx; unsigned i; for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) { l2n8(sha512->h[i], md_out); } } #undef LARGEST_DIGEST_CTX #define LARGEST_DIGEST_CTX SHA512_CTX /* * ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported returns 1 iff |ctx| uses a hash function * which ssl3_cbc_digest_record supports. */ char ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported(const EVP_MD_CTX *ctx) { switch (EVP_MD_CTX_type(ctx)) { case NID_md5: case NID_sha1: case NID_sha224: case NID_sha256: case NID_sha384: case NID_sha512: return 1; default: return 0; } } /*- * ssl3_cbc_digest_record computes the MAC of a decrypted, padded SSLv3/TLS * record. * * ctx: the EVP_MD_CTX from which we take the hash function. * ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported must return true for this EVP_MD_CTX. * md_out: the digest output. At most EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE bytes will be written. * md_out_size: if non-NULL, the number of output bytes is written here. * header: the 13-byte, TLS record header. * data: the record data itself, less any preceding explicit IV. * data_plus_mac_size: the secret, reported length of the data and MAC * once the padding has been removed. * data_plus_mac_plus_padding_size: the public length of the whole * record, including padding. * is_sslv3: non-zero if we are to use SSLv3. Otherwise, TLS. * * On entry: by virtue of having been through one of the remove_padding * functions, above, we know that data_plus_mac_size is large enough to contain * a padding byte and MAC. (If the padding was invalid, it might contain the * padding too. ) * Returns 1 on success or 0 on error */ int ssl3_cbc_digest_record(const EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *md_out, size_t *md_out_size, - const unsigned char header[13], + const unsigned char *header, const unsigned char *data, size_t data_plus_mac_size, size_t data_plus_mac_plus_padding_size, const unsigned char *mac_secret, size_t mac_secret_length, char is_sslv3) { union { double align; unsigned char c[sizeof(LARGEST_DIGEST_CTX)]; } md_state; void (*md_final_raw) (void *ctx, unsigned char *md_out); void (*md_transform) (void *ctx, const unsigned char *block); size_t md_size, md_block_size = 64; size_t sslv3_pad_length = 40, header_length, variance_blocks, len, max_mac_bytes, num_blocks, num_starting_blocks, k, mac_end_offset, c, index_a, index_b; size_t bits; /* at most 18 bits */ unsigned char length_bytes[MAX_HASH_BIT_COUNT_BYTES]; /* hmac_pad is the masked HMAC key. */ unsigned char hmac_pad[MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE]; unsigned char first_block[MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE]; unsigned char mac_out[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; size_t i, j; unsigned md_out_size_u; EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = NULL; /* * mdLengthSize is the number of bytes in the length field that * terminates * the hash. */ size_t md_length_size = 8; char length_is_big_endian = 1; int ret; /* * This is a, hopefully redundant, check that allows us to forget about * many possible overflows later in this function. */ if (!ossl_assert(data_plus_mac_plus_padding_size < 1024 * 1024)) return 0; switch (EVP_MD_CTX_type(ctx)) { case NID_md5: if (MD5_Init((MD5_CTX *)md_state.c) <= 0) return 0; md_final_raw = tls1_md5_final_raw; md_transform = (void (*)(void *ctx, const unsigned char *block))MD5_Transform; md_size = 16; sslv3_pad_length = 48; length_is_big_endian = 0; break; case NID_sha1: if (SHA1_Init((SHA_CTX *)md_state.c) <= 0) return 0; md_final_raw = tls1_sha1_final_raw; md_transform = (void (*)(void *ctx, const unsigned char *block))SHA1_Transform; md_size = 20; break; case NID_sha224: if (SHA224_Init((SHA256_CTX *)md_state.c) <= 0) return 0; md_final_raw = tls1_sha256_final_raw; md_transform = (void (*)(void *ctx, const unsigned char *block))SHA256_Transform; md_size = 224 / 8; break; case NID_sha256: if (SHA256_Init((SHA256_CTX *)md_state.c) <= 0) return 0; md_final_raw = tls1_sha256_final_raw; md_transform = (void (*)(void *ctx, const unsigned char *block))SHA256_Transform; md_size = 32; break; case NID_sha384: if (SHA384_Init((SHA512_CTX *)md_state.c) <= 0) return 0; md_final_raw = tls1_sha512_final_raw; md_transform = (void (*)(void *ctx, const unsigned char *block))SHA512_Transform; md_size = 384 / 8; md_block_size = 128; md_length_size = 16; break; case NID_sha512: if (SHA512_Init((SHA512_CTX *)md_state.c) <= 0) return 0; md_final_raw = tls1_sha512_final_raw; md_transform = (void (*)(void *ctx, const unsigned char *block))SHA512_Transform; md_size = 64; md_block_size = 128; md_length_size = 16; break; default: /* * ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported should have been called first to * check that the hash function is supported. */ if (md_out_size != NULL) *md_out_size = 0; return ossl_assert(0); } if (!ossl_assert(md_length_size <= MAX_HASH_BIT_COUNT_BYTES) || !ossl_assert(md_block_size <= MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE) || !ossl_assert(md_size <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE)) return 0; header_length = 13; if (is_sslv3) { header_length = mac_secret_length + sslv3_pad_length + 8 /* sequence * number */ + 1 /* record type */ + 2 /* record length */ ; } /* * variance_blocks is the number of blocks of the hash that we have to * calculate in constant time because they could be altered by the * padding value. In SSLv3, the padding must be minimal so the end of * the plaintext varies by, at most, 15+20 = 35 bytes. (We conservatively * assume that the MAC size varies from 0..20 bytes.) In case the 9 bytes * of hash termination (0x80 + 64-bit length) don't fit in the final * block, we say that the final two blocks can vary based on the padding. * TLSv1 has MACs up to 48 bytes long (SHA-384) and the padding is not * required to be minimal. Therefore we say that the final |variance_blocks| * blocks can * vary based on the padding. Later in the function, if the message is * short and there obviously cannot be this many blocks then * variance_blocks can be reduced. */ variance_blocks = is_sslv3 ? 2 : ( ((255 + 1 + md_size + md_block_size - 1) / md_block_size) + 1); /* * From now on we're dealing with the MAC, which conceptually has 13 * bytes of `header' before the start of the data (TLS) or 71/75 bytes * (SSLv3) */ len = data_plus_mac_plus_padding_size + header_length; /* * max_mac_bytes contains the maximum bytes of bytes in the MAC, * including * |header|, assuming that there's no padding. */ max_mac_bytes = len - md_size - 1; /* num_blocks is the maximum number of hash blocks. */ num_blocks = (max_mac_bytes + 1 + md_length_size + md_block_size - 1) / md_block_size; /* * In order to calculate the MAC in constant time we have to handle the * final blocks specially because the padding value could cause the end * to appear somewhere in the final |variance_blocks| blocks and we can't * leak where. However, |num_starting_blocks| worth of data can be hashed * right away because no padding value can affect whether they are * plaintext. */ num_starting_blocks = 0; /* * k is the starting byte offset into the conceptual header||data where * we start processing. */ k = 0; /* * mac_end_offset is the index just past the end of the data to be MACed. */ mac_end_offset = data_plus_mac_size + header_length - md_size; /* * c is the index of the 0x80 byte in the final hash block that contains * application data. */ c = mac_end_offset % md_block_size; /* * index_a is the hash block number that contains the 0x80 terminating * value. */ index_a = mac_end_offset / md_block_size; /* * index_b is the hash block number that contains the 64-bit hash length, * in bits. */ index_b = (mac_end_offset + md_length_size) / md_block_size; /* * bits is the hash-length in bits. It includes the additional hash block * for the masked HMAC key, or whole of |header| in the case of SSLv3. */ /* * For SSLv3, if we're going to have any starting blocks then we need at * least two because the header is larger than a single block. */ if (num_blocks > variance_blocks + (is_sslv3 ? 1 : 0)) { num_starting_blocks = num_blocks - variance_blocks; k = md_block_size * num_starting_blocks; } bits = 8 * mac_end_offset; if (!is_sslv3) { /* * Compute the initial HMAC block. For SSLv3, the padding and secret * bytes are included in |header| because they take more than a * single block. */ bits += 8 * md_block_size; memset(hmac_pad, 0, md_block_size); if (!ossl_assert(mac_secret_length <= sizeof(hmac_pad))) return 0; memcpy(hmac_pad, mac_secret, mac_secret_length); for (i = 0; i < md_block_size; i++) hmac_pad[i] ^= 0x36; md_transform(md_state.c, hmac_pad); } if (length_is_big_endian) { memset(length_bytes, 0, md_length_size - 4); length_bytes[md_length_size - 4] = (unsigned char)(bits >> 24); length_bytes[md_length_size - 3] = (unsigned char)(bits >> 16); length_bytes[md_length_size - 2] = (unsigned char)(bits >> 8); length_bytes[md_length_size - 1] = (unsigned char)bits; } else { memset(length_bytes, 0, md_length_size); length_bytes[md_length_size - 5] = (unsigned char)(bits >> 24); length_bytes[md_length_size - 6] = (unsigned char)(bits >> 16); length_bytes[md_length_size - 7] = (unsigned char)(bits >> 8); length_bytes[md_length_size - 8] = (unsigned char)bits; } if (k > 0) { if (is_sslv3) { size_t overhang; /* * The SSLv3 header is larger than a single block. overhang is * the number of bytes beyond a single block that the header * consumes: either 7 bytes (SHA1) or 11 bytes (MD5). There are no * ciphersuites in SSLv3 that are not SHA1 or MD5 based and * therefore we can be confident that the header_length will be * greater than |md_block_size|. However we add a sanity check just * in case */ if (header_length <= md_block_size) { /* Should never happen */ return 0; } overhang = header_length - md_block_size; md_transform(md_state.c, header); memcpy(first_block, header + md_block_size, overhang); memcpy(first_block + overhang, data, md_block_size - overhang); md_transform(md_state.c, first_block); for (i = 1; i < k / md_block_size - 1; i++) md_transform(md_state.c, data + md_block_size * i - overhang); } else { /* k is a multiple of md_block_size. */ memcpy(first_block, header, 13); memcpy(first_block + 13, data, md_block_size - 13); md_transform(md_state.c, first_block); for (i = 1; i < k / md_block_size; i++) md_transform(md_state.c, data + md_block_size * i - 13); } } memset(mac_out, 0, sizeof(mac_out)); /* * We now process the final hash blocks. For each block, we construct it * in constant time. If the |i==index_a| then we'll include the 0x80 * bytes and zero pad etc. For each block we selectively copy it, in * constant time, to |mac_out|. */ for (i = num_starting_blocks; i <= num_starting_blocks + variance_blocks; i++) { unsigned char block[MAX_HASH_BLOCK_SIZE]; unsigned char is_block_a = constant_time_eq_8_s(i, index_a); unsigned char is_block_b = constant_time_eq_8_s(i, index_b); for (j = 0; j < md_block_size; j++) { unsigned char b = 0, is_past_c, is_past_cp1; if (k < header_length) b = header[k]; else if (k < data_plus_mac_plus_padding_size + header_length) b = data[k - header_length]; k++; is_past_c = is_block_a & constant_time_ge_8_s(j, c); is_past_cp1 = is_block_a & constant_time_ge_8_s(j, c + 1); /* * If this is the block containing the end of the application * data, and we are at the offset for the 0x80 value, then * overwrite b with 0x80. */ b = constant_time_select_8(is_past_c, 0x80, b); /* * If this block contains the end of the application data * and we're past the 0x80 value then just write zero. */ b = b & ~is_past_cp1; /* * If this is index_b (the final block), but not index_a (the end * of the data), then the 64-bit length didn't fit into index_a * and we're having to add an extra block of zeros. */ b &= ~is_block_b | is_block_a; /* * The final bytes of one of the blocks contains the length. */ if (j >= md_block_size - md_length_size) { /* If this is index_b, write a length byte. */ b = constant_time_select_8(is_block_b, length_bytes[j - (md_block_size - md_length_size)], b); } block[j] = b; } md_transform(md_state.c, block); md_final_raw(md_state.c, block); /* If this is index_b, copy the hash value to |mac_out|. */ for (j = 0; j < md_size; j++) mac_out[j] |= block[j] & is_block_b; } md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); if (md_ctx == NULL) goto err; if (EVP_DigestInit_ex(md_ctx, EVP_MD_CTX_md(ctx), NULL /* engine */ ) <= 0) goto err; if (is_sslv3) { /* We repurpose |hmac_pad| to contain the SSLv3 pad2 block. */ memset(hmac_pad, 0x5c, sslv3_pad_length); if (EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, mac_secret, mac_secret_length) <= 0 || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, hmac_pad, sslv3_pad_length) <= 0 || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, mac_out, md_size) <= 0) goto err; } else { /* Complete the HMAC in the standard manner. */ for (i = 0; i < md_block_size; i++) hmac_pad[i] ^= 0x6a; if (EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, hmac_pad, md_block_size) <= 0 || EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, mac_out, md_size) <= 0) goto err; } /* TODO(size_t): Convert me */ ret = EVP_DigestFinal(md_ctx, md_out, &md_out_size_u); if (ret && md_out_size) *md_out_size = md_out_size_u; EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx); return 1; err: EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx); return 0; } diff --git a/ssl/ssl_asn1.c b/ssl/ssl_asn1.c index 799fee771ba5..926436410050 100644 --- a/ssl/ssl_asn1.c +++ b/ssl/ssl_asn1.c @@ -1,393 +1,393 @@ /* - * Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 1995-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include "ssl_local.h" #include #include typedef struct { uint32_t version; int32_t ssl_version; ASN1_OCTET_STRING *cipher; ASN1_OCTET_STRING *comp_id; ASN1_OCTET_STRING *master_key; ASN1_OCTET_STRING *session_id; ASN1_OCTET_STRING *key_arg; int64_t time; int64_t timeout; X509 *peer; ASN1_OCTET_STRING *session_id_context; int32_t verify_result; ASN1_OCTET_STRING *tlsext_hostname; uint64_t tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint; uint32_t tlsext_tick_age_add; ASN1_OCTET_STRING *tlsext_tick; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK ASN1_OCTET_STRING *psk_identity_hint; ASN1_OCTET_STRING *psk_identity; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP ASN1_OCTET_STRING *srp_username; #endif uint64_t flags; uint32_t max_early_data; ASN1_OCTET_STRING *alpn_selected; uint32_t tlsext_max_fragment_len_mode; ASN1_OCTET_STRING *ticket_appdata; } SSL_SESSION_ASN1; ASN1_SEQUENCE(SSL_SESSION_ASN1) = { ASN1_EMBED(SSL_SESSION_ASN1, version, UINT32), ASN1_EMBED(SSL_SESSION_ASN1, ssl_version, INT32), ASN1_SIMPLE(SSL_SESSION_ASN1, cipher, ASN1_OCTET_STRING), ASN1_SIMPLE(SSL_SESSION_ASN1, session_id, ASN1_OCTET_STRING), ASN1_SIMPLE(SSL_SESSION_ASN1, master_key, ASN1_OCTET_STRING), ASN1_IMP_OPT(SSL_SESSION_ASN1, key_arg, ASN1_OCTET_STRING, 0), ASN1_EXP_OPT_EMBED(SSL_SESSION_ASN1, time, ZINT64, 1), ASN1_EXP_OPT_EMBED(SSL_SESSION_ASN1, timeout, ZINT64, 2), ASN1_EXP_OPT(SSL_SESSION_ASN1, peer, X509, 3), ASN1_EXP_OPT(SSL_SESSION_ASN1, session_id_context, ASN1_OCTET_STRING, 4), ASN1_EXP_OPT_EMBED(SSL_SESSION_ASN1, verify_result, ZINT32, 5), ASN1_EXP_OPT(SSL_SESSION_ASN1, tlsext_hostname, ASN1_OCTET_STRING, 6), #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK ASN1_EXP_OPT(SSL_SESSION_ASN1, psk_identity_hint, ASN1_OCTET_STRING, 7), ASN1_EXP_OPT(SSL_SESSION_ASN1, psk_identity, ASN1_OCTET_STRING, 8), #endif ASN1_EXP_OPT_EMBED(SSL_SESSION_ASN1, tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint, ZUINT64, 9), ASN1_EXP_OPT(SSL_SESSION_ASN1, tlsext_tick, ASN1_OCTET_STRING, 10), ASN1_EXP_OPT(SSL_SESSION_ASN1, comp_id, ASN1_OCTET_STRING, 11), #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP ASN1_EXP_OPT(SSL_SESSION_ASN1, srp_username, ASN1_OCTET_STRING, 12), #endif ASN1_EXP_OPT_EMBED(SSL_SESSION_ASN1, flags, ZUINT64, 13), ASN1_EXP_OPT_EMBED(SSL_SESSION_ASN1, tlsext_tick_age_add, ZUINT32, 14), ASN1_EXP_OPT_EMBED(SSL_SESSION_ASN1, max_early_data, ZUINT32, 15), ASN1_EXP_OPT(SSL_SESSION_ASN1, alpn_selected, ASN1_OCTET_STRING, 16), ASN1_EXP_OPT_EMBED(SSL_SESSION_ASN1, tlsext_max_fragment_len_mode, ZUINT32, 17), ASN1_EXP_OPT(SSL_SESSION_ASN1, ticket_appdata, ASN1_OCTET_STRING, 18) } static_ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(SSL_SESSION_ASN1) IMPLEMENT_STATIC_ASN1_ENCODE_FUNCTIONS(SSL_SESSION_ASN1) /* Utility functions for i2d_SSL_SESSION */ /* Initialise OCTET STRING from buffer and length */ static void ssl_session_oinit(ASN1_OCTET_STRING **dest, ASN1_OCTET_STRING *os, unsigned char *data, size_t len) { os->data = data; os->length = (int)len; os->flags = 0; *dest = os; } /* Initialise OCTET STRING from string */ static void ssl_session_sinit(ASN1_OCTET_STRING **dest, ASN1_OCTET_STRING *os, char *data) { if (data != NULL) ssl_session_oinit(dest, os, (unsigned char *)data, strlen(data)); else *dest = NULL; } int i2d_SSL_SESSION(SSL_SESSION *in, unsigned char **pp) { SSL_SESSION_ASN1 as; ASN1_OCTET_STRING cipher; unsigned char cipher_data[2]; ASN1_OCTET_STRING master_key, session_id, sid_ctx; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP ASN1_OCTET_STRING comp_id; unsigned char comp_id_data; #endif ASN1_OCTET_STRING tlsext_hostname, tlsext_tick; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP ASN1_OCTET_STRING srp_username; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK ASN1_OCTET_STRING psk_identity, psk_identity_hint; #endif ASN1_OCTET_STRING alpn_selected; ASN1_OCTET_STRING ticket_appdata; long l; if ((in == NULL) || ((in->cipher == NULL) && (in->cipher_id == 0))) return 0; memset(&as, 0, sizeof(as)); as.version = SSL_SESSION_ASN1_VERSION; as.ssl_version = in->ssl_version; if (in->cipher == NULL) l = in->cipher_id; else l = in->cipher->id; cipher_data[0] = ((unsigned char)(l >> 8L)) & 0xff; cipher_data[1] = ((unsigned char)(l)) & 0xff; ssl_session_oinit(&as.cipher, &cipher, cipher_data, 2); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP if (in->compress_meth) { comp_id_data = (unsigned char)in->compress_meth; ssl_session_oinit(&as.comp_id, &comp_id, &comp_id_data, 1); } #endif ssl_session_oinit(&as.master_key, &master_key, in->master_key, in->master_key_length); ssl_session_oinit(&as.session_id, &session_id, in->session_id, in->session_id_length); ssl_session_oinit(&as.session_id_context, &sid_ctx, in->sid_ctx, in->sid_ctx_length); as.time = in->time; as.timeout = in->timeout; as.verify_result = in->verify_result; as.peer = in->peer; ssl_session_sinit(&as.tlsext_hostname, &tlsext_hostname, in->ext.hostname); if (in->ext.tick) { ssl_session_oinit(&as.tlsext_tick, &tlsext_tick, in->ext.tick, in->ext.ticklen); } if (in->ext.tick_lifetime_hint > 0) as.tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint = in->ext.tick_lifetime_hint; as.tlsext_tick_age_add = in->ext.tick_age_add; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK ssl_session_sinit(&as.psk_identity_hint, &psk_identity_hint, in->psk_identity_hint); ssl_session_sinit(&as.psk_identity, &psk_identity, in->psk_identity); #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP ssl_session_sinit(&as.srp_username, &srp_username, in->srp_username); #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */ as.flags = in->flags; as.max_early_data = in->ext.max_early_data; if (in->ext.alpn_selected == NULL) as.alpn_selected = NULL; else ssl_session_oinit(&as.alpn_selected, &alpn_selected, in->ext.alpn_selected, in->ext.alpn_selected_len); as.tlsext_max_fragment_len_mode = in->ext.max_fragment_len_mode; if (in->ticket_appdata == NULL) as.ticket_appdata = NULL; else ssl_session_oinit(&as.ticket_appdata, &ticket_appdata, in->ticket_appdata, in->ticket_appdata_len); return i2d_SSL_SESSION_ASN1(&as, pp); } /* Utility functions for d2i_SSL_SESSION */ /* OPENSSL_strndup an OCTET STRING */ static int ssl_session_strndup(char **pdst, ASN1_OCTET_STRING *src) { OPENSSL_free(*pdst); *pdst = NULL; if (src == NULL) return 1; *pdst = OPENSSL_strndup((char *)src->data, src->length); if (*pdst == NULL) return 0; return 1; } /* Copy an OCTET STRING, return error if it exceeds maximum length */ static int ssl_session_memcpy(unsigned char *dst, size_t *pdstlen, ASN1_OCTET_STRING *src, size_t maxlen) { - if (src == NULL) { + if (src == NULL || src->length == 0) { *pdstlen = 0; return 1; } if (src->length < 0 || src->length > (int)maxlen) return 0; memcpy(dst, src->data, src->length); *pdstlen = src->length; return 1; } SSL_SESSION *d2i_SSL_SESSION(SSL_SESSION **a, const unsigned char **pp, long length) { long id; size_t tmpl; const unsigned char *p = *pp; SSL_SESSION_ASN1 *as = NULL; SSL_SESSION *ret = NULL; as = d2i_SSL_SESSION_ASN1(NULL, &p, length); /* ASN.1 code returns suitable error */ if (as == NULL) goto err; if (!a || !*a) { ret = SSL_SESSION_new(); if (ret == NULL) goto err; } else { ret = *a; } if (as->version != SSL_SESSION_ASN1_VERSION) { SSLerr(SSL_F_D2I_SSL_SESSION, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_SSL_VERSION); goto err; } if ((as->ssl_version >> 8) != SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR && (as->ssl_version >> 8) != DTLS1_VERSION_MAJOR && as->ssl_version != DTLS1_BAD_VER) { SSLerr(SSL_F_D2I_SSL_SESSION, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_SSL_VERSION); goto err; } ret->ssl_version = (int)as->ssl_version; if (as->cipher->length != 2) { SSLerr(SSL_F_D2I_SSL_SESSION, SSL_R_CIPHER_CODE_WRONG_LENGTH); goto err; } id = 0x03000000L | ((unsigned long)as->cipher->data[0] << 8L) | (unsigned long)as->cipher->data[1]; ret->cipher_id = id; ret->cipher = ssl3_get_cipher_by_id(id); if (ret->cipher == NULL) goto err; if (!ssl_session_memcpy(ret->session_id, &ret->session_id_length, as->session_id, SSL3_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH)) goto err; if (!ssl_session_memcpy(ret->master_key, &tmpl, as->master_key, TLS13_MAX_RESUMPTION_PSK_LENGTH)) goto err; ret->master_key_length = tmpl; if (as->time != 0) ret->time = (long)as->time; else ret->time = (long)time(NULL); if (as->timeout != 0) ret->timeout = (long)as->timeout; else ret->timeout = 3; X509_free(ret->peer); ret->peer = as->peer; as->peer = NULL; if (!ssl_session_memcpy(ret->sid_ctx, &ret->sid_ctx_length, as->session_id_context, SSL_MAX_SID_CTX_LENGTH)) goto err; /* NB: this defaults to zero which is X509_V_OK */ ret->verify_result = as->verify_result; if (!ssl_session_strndup(&ret->ext.hostname, as->tlsext_hostname)) goto err; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK if (!ssl_session_strndup(&ret->psk_identity_hint, as->psk_identity_hint)) goto err; if (!ssl_session_strndup(&ret->psk_identity, as->psk_identity)) goto err; #endif ret->ext.tick_lifetime_hint = (unsigned long)as->tlsext_tick_lifetime_hint; ret->ext.tick_age_add = as->tlsext_tick_age_add; OPENSSL_free(ret->ext.tick); if (as->tlsext_tick != NULL) { ret->ext.tick = as->tlsext_tick->data; ret->ext.ticklen = as->tlsext_tick->length; as->tlsext_tick->data = NULL; } else { ret->ext.tick = NULL; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP if (as->comp_id) { if (as->comp_id->length != 1) { SSLerr(SSL_F_D2I_SSL_SESSION, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH); goto err; } ret->compress_meth = as->comp_id->data[0]; } else { ret->compress_meth = 0; } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP if (!ssl_session_strndup(&ret->srp_username, as->srp_username)) goto err; #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */ /* Flags defaults to zero which is fine */ ret->flags = (int32_t)as->flags; ret->ext.max_early_data = as->max_early_data; OPENSSL_free(ret->ext.alpn_selected); if (as->alpn_selected != NULL) { ret->ext.alpn_selected = as->alpn_selected->data; ret->ext.alpn_selected_len = as->alpn_selected->length; as->alpn_selected->data = NULL; } else { ret->ext.alpn_selected = NULL; ret->ext.alpn_selected_len = 0; } ret->ext.max_fragment_len_mode = as->tlsext_max_fragment_len_mode; OPENSSL_free(ret->ticket_appdata); if (as->ticket_appdata != NULL) { ret->ticket_appdata = as->ticket_appdata->data; ret->ticket_appdata_len = as->ticket_appdata->length; as->ticket_appdata->data = NULL; } else { ret->ticket_appdata = NULL; ret->ticket_appdata_len = 0; } M_ASN1_free_of(as, SSL_SESSION_ASN1); if ((a != NULL) && (*a == NULL)) *a = ret; *pp = p; return ret; err: M_ASN1_free_of(as, SSL_SESSION_ASN1); if ((a == NULL) || (*a != ret)) SSL_SESSION_free(ret); return NULL; } diff --git a/ssl/ssl_ciph.c b/ssl/ssl_ciph.c index 735a483c6448..55f919fcd58a 100644 --- a/ssl/ssl_ciph.c +++ b/ssl/ssl_ciph.c @@ -1,2164 +1,2165 @@ /* - * Copyright 1995-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 1995-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "internal/nelem.h" #include "ssl_local.h" #include "internal/thread_once.h" #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #define SSL_ENC_DES_IDX 0 #define SSL_ENC_3DES_IDX 1 #define SSL_ENC_RC4_IDX 2 #define SSL_ENC_RC2_IDX 3 #define SSL_ENC_IDEA_IDX 4 #define SSL_ENC_NULL_IDX 5 #define SSL_ENC_AES128_IDX 6 #define SSL_ENC_AES256_IDX 7 #define SSL_ENC_CAMELLIA128_IDX 8 #define SSL_ENC_CAMELLIA256_IDX 9 #define SSL_ENC_GOST89_IDX 10 #define SSL_ENC_SEED_IDX 11 #define SSL_ENC_AES128GCM_IDX 12 #define SSL_ENC_AES256GCM_IDX 13 #define SSL_ENC_AES128CCM_IDX 14 #define SSL_ENC_AES256CCM_IDX 15 #define SSL_ENC_AES128CCM8_IDX 16 #define SSL_ENC_AES256CCM8_IDX 17 #define SSL_ENC_GOST8912_IDX 18 #define SSL_ENC_CHACHA_IDX 19 #define SSL_ENC_ARIA128GCM_IDX 20 #define SSL_ENC_ARIA256GCM_IDX 21 #define SSL_ENC_NUM_IDX 22 /* NB: make sure indices in these tables match values above */ typedef struct { uint32_t mask; int nid; } ssl_cipher_table; /* Table of NIDs for each cipher */ static const ssl_cipher_table ssl_cipher_table_cipher[SSL_ENC_NUM_IDX] = { {SSL_DES, NID_des_cbc}, /* SSL_ENC_DES_IDX 0 */ {SSL_3DES, NID_des_ede3_cbc}, /* SSL_ENC_3DES_IDX 1 */ {SSL_RC4, NID_rc4}, /* SSL_ENC_RC4_IDX 2 */ {SSL_RC2, NID_rc2_cbc}, /* SSL_ENC_RC2_IDX 3 */ {SSL_IDEA, NID_idea_cbc}, /* SSL_ENC_IDEA_IDX 4 */ {SSL_eNULL, NID_undef}, /* SSL_ENC_NULL_IDX 5 */ {SSL_AES128, NID_aes_128_cbc}, /* SSL_ENC_AES128_IDX 6 */ {SSL_AES256, NID_aes_256_cbc}, /* SSL_ENC_AES256_IDX 7 */ {SSL_CAMELLIA128, NID_camellia_128_cbc}, /* SSL_ENC_CAMELLIA128_IDX 8 */ {SSL_CAMELLIA256, NID_camellia_256_cbc}, /* SSL_ENC_CAMELLIA256_IDX 9 */ {SSL_eGOST2814789CNT, NID_gost89_cnt}, /* SSL_ENC_GOST89_IDX 10 */ {SSL_SEED, NID_seed_cbc}, /* SSL_ENC_SEED_IDX 11 */ {SSL_AES128GCM, NID_aes_128_gcm}, /* SSL_ENC_AES128GCM_IDX 12 */ {SSL_AES256GCM, NID_aes_256_gcm}, /* SSL_ENC_AES256GCM_IDX 13 */ {SSL_AES128CCM, NID_aes_128_ccm}, /* SSL_ENC_AES128CCM_IDX 14 */ {SSL_AES256CCM, NID_aes_256_ccm}, /* SSL_ENC_AES256CCM_IDX 15 */ {SSL_AES128CCM8, NID_aes_128_ccm}, /* SSL_ENC_AES128CCM8_IDX 16 */ {SSL_AES256CCM8, NID_aes_256_ccm}, /* SSL_ENC_AES256CCM8_IDX 17 */ {SSL_eGOST2814789CNT12, NID_gost89_cnt_12}, /* SSL_ENC_GOST8912_IDX 18 */ {SSL_CHACHA20POLY1305, NID_chacha20_poly1305}, /* SSL_ENC_CHACHA_IDX 19 */ {SSL_ARIA128GCM, NID_aria_128_gcm}, /* SSL_ENC_ARIA128GCM_IDX 20 */ {SSL_ARIA256GCM, NID_aria_256_gcm}, /* SSL_ENC_ARIA256GCM_IDX 21 */ }; static const EVP_CIPHER *ssl_cipher_methods[SSL_ENC_NUM_IDX]; #define SSL_COMP_NULL_IDX 0 #define SSL_COMP_ZLIB_IDX 1 #define SSL_COMP_NUM_IDX 2 static STACK_OF(SSL_COMP) *ssl_comp_methods = NULL; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP static CRYPTO_ONCE ssl_load_builtin_comp_once = CRYPTO_ONCE_STATIC_INIT; #endif /* * Constant SSL_MAX_DIGEST equal to size of digests array should be defined * in the ssl_local.h */ #define SSL_MD_NUM_IDX SSL_MAX_DIGEST /* NB: make sure indices in this table matches values above */ static const ssl_cipher_table ssl_cipher_table_mac[SSL_MD_NUM_IDX] = { {SSL_MD5, NID_md5}, /* SSL_MD_MD5_IDX 0 */ {SSL_SHA1, NID_sha1}, /* SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX 1 */ {SSL_GOST94, NID_id_GostR3411_94}, /* SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX 2 */ {SSL_GOST89MAC, NID_id_Gost28147_89_MAC}, /* SSL_MD_GOST89MAC_IDX 3 */ {SSL_SHA256, NID_sha256}, /* SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX 4 */ {SSL_SHA384, NID_sha384}, /* SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX 5 */ {SSL_GOST12_256, NID_id_GostR3411_2012_256}, /* SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX 6 */ {SSL_GOST89MAC12, NID_gost_mac_12}, /* SSL_MD_GOST89MAC12_IDX 7 */ {SSL_GOST12_512, NID_id_GostR3411_2012_512}, /* SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX 8 */ {0, NID_md5_sha1}, /* SSL_MD_MD5_SHA1_IDX 9 */ {0, NID_sha224}, /* SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX 10 */ {0, NID_sha512} /* SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX 11 */ }; static const EVP_MD *ssl_digest_methods[SSL_MD_NUM_IDX] = { NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL }; /* *INDENT-OFF* */ static const ssl_cipher_table ssl_cipher_table_kx[] = { {SSL_kRSA, NID_kx_rsa}, {SSL_kECDHE, NID_kx_ecdhe}, {SSL_kDHE, NID_kx_dhe}, {SSL_kECDHEPSK, NID_kx_ecdhe_psk}, {SSL_kDHEPSK, NID_kx_dhe_psk}, {SSL_kRSAPSK, NID_kx_rsa_psk}, {SSL_kPSK, NID_kx_psk}, {SSL_kSRP, NID_kx_srp}, {SSL_kGOST, NID_kx_gost}, {SSL_kANY, NID_kx_any} }; static const ssl_cipher_table ssl_cipher_table_auth[] = { {SSL_aRSA, NID_auth_rsa}, {SSL_aECDSA, NID_auth_ecdsa}, {SSL_aPSK, NID_auth_psk}, {SSL_aDSS, NID_auth_dss}, {SSL_aGOST01, NID_auth_gost01}, {SSL_aGOST12, NID_auth_gost12}, {SSL_aSRP, NID_auth_srp}, {SSL_aNULL, NID_auth_null}, {SSL_aANY, NID_auth_any} }; /* *INDENT-ON* */ /* Utility function for table lookup */ static int ssl_cipher_info_find(const ssl_cipher_table * table, size_t table_cnt, uint32_t mask) { size_t i; for (i = 0; i < table_cnt; i++, table++) { if (table->mask == mask) return (int)i; } return -1; } #define ssl_cipher_info_lookup(table, x) \ ssl_cipher_info_find(table, OSSL_NELEM(table), x) /* * PKEY_TYPE for GOST89MAC is known in advance, but, because implementation * is engine-provided, we'll fill it only if corresponding EVP_PKEY_METHOD is * found */ static int ssl_mac_pkey_id[SSL_MD_NUM_IDX] = { /* MD5, SHA, GOST94, MAC89 */ EVP_PKEY_HMAC, EVP_PKEY_HMAC, EVP_PKEY_HMAC, NID_undef, /* SHA256, SHA384, GOST2012_256, MAC89-12 */ EVP_PKEY_HMAC, EVP_PKEY_HMAC, EVP_PKEY_HMAC, NID_undef, /* GOST2012_512 */ EVP_PKEY_HMAC, /* MD5/SHA1, SHA224, SHA512 */ NID_undef, NID_undef, NID_undef }; static size_t ssl_mac_secret_size[SSL_MD_NUM_IDX]; #define CIPHER_ADD 1 #define CIPHER_KILL 2 #define CIPHER_DEL 3 #define CIPHER_ORD 4 #define CIPHER_SPECIAL 5 /* * Bump the ciphers to the top of the list. * This rule isn't currently supported by the public cipherstring API. */ #define CIPHER_BUMP 6 typedef struct cipher_order_st { const SSL_CIPHER *cipher; int active; int dead; struct cipher_order_st *next, *prev; } CIPHER_ORDER; static const SSL_CIPHER cipher_aliases[] = { /* "ALL" doesn't include eNULL (must be specifically enabled) */ {0, SSL_TXT_ALL, NULL, 0, 0, 0, ~SSL_eNULL}, /* "COMPLEMENTOFALL" */ {0, SSL_TXT_CMPALL, NULL, 0, 0, 0, SSL_eNULL}, /* * "COMPLEMENTOFDEFAULT" (does *not* include ciphersuites not found in * ALL!) */ {0, SSL_TXT_CMPDEF, NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_NOT_DEFAULT}, /* * key exchange aliases (some of those using only a single bit here * combine multiple key exchange algs according to the RFCs, e.g. kDHE * combines DHE_DSS and DHE_RSA) */ {0, SSL_TXT_kRSA, NULL, 0, SSL_kRSA}, {0, SSL_TXT_kEDH, NULL, 0, SSL_kDHE}, {0, SSL_TXT_kDHE, NULL, 0, SSL_kDHE}, {0, SSL_TXT_DH, NULL, 0, SSL_kDHE}, {0, SSL_TXT_kEECDH, NULL, 0, SSL_kECDHE}, {0, SSL_TXT_kECDHE, NULL, 0, SSL_kECDHE}, {0, SSL_TXT_ECDH, NULL, 0, SSL_kECDHE}, {0, SSL_TXT_kPSK, NULL, 0, SSL_kPSK}, {0, SSL_TXT_kRSAPSK, NULL, 0, SSL_kRSAPSK}, {0, SSL_TXT_kECDHEPSK, NULL, 0, SSL_kECDHEPSK}, {0, SSL_TXT_kDHEPSK, NULL, 0, SSL_kDHEPSK}, {0, SSL_TXT_kSRP, NULL, 0, SSL_kSRP}, {0, SSL_TXT_kGOST, NULL, 0, SSL_kGOST}, /* server authentication aliases */ {0, SSL_TXT_aRSA, NULL, 0, 0, SSL_aRSA}, {0, SSL_TXT_aDSS, NULL, 0, 0, SSL_aDSS}, {0, SSL_TXT_DSS, NULL, 0, 0, SSL_aDSS}, {0, SSL_TXT_aNULL, NULL, 0, 0, SSL_aNULL}, {0, SSL_TXT_aECDSA, NULL, 0, 0, SSL_aECDSA}, {0, SSL_TXT_ECDSA, NULL, 0, 0, SSL_aECDSA}, {0, SSL_TXT_aPSK, NULL, 0, 0, SSL_aPSK}, {0, SSL_TXT_aGOST01, NULL, 0, 0, SSL_aGOST01}, {0, SSL_TXT_aGOST12, NULL, 0, 0, SSL_aGOST12}, {0, SSL_TXT_aGOST, NULL, 0, 0, SSL_aGOST01 | SSL_aGOST12}, {0, SSL_TXT_aSRP, NULL, 0, 0, SSL_aSRP}, /* aliases combining key exchange and server authentication */ {0, SSL_TXT_EDH, NULL, 0, SSL_kDHE, ~SSL_aNULL}, {0, SSL_TXT_DHE, NULL, 0, SSL_kDHE, ~SSL_aNULL}, {0, SSL_TXT_EECDH, NULL, 0, SSL_kECDHE, ~SSL_aNULL}, {0, SSL_TXT_ECDHE, NULL, 0, SSL_kECDHE, ~SSL_aNULL}, {0, SSL_TXT_NULL, NULL, 0, 0, 0, SSL_eNULL}, {0, SSL_TXT_RSA, NULL, 0, SSL_kRSA, SSL_aRSA}, {0, SSL_TXT_ADH, NULL, 0, SSL_kDHE, SSL_aNULL}, {0, SSL_TXT_AECDH, NULL, 0, SSL_kECDHE, SSL_aNULL}, {0, SSL_TXT_PSK, NULL, 0, SSL_PSK}, {0, SSL_TXT_SRP, NULL, 0, SSL_kSRP}, /* symmetric encryption aliases */ {0, SSL_TXT_3DES, NULL, 0, 0, 0, SSL_3DES}, {0, SSL_TXT_RC4, NULL, 0, 0, 0, SSL_RC4}, {0, SSL_TXT_RC2, NULL, 0, 0, 0, SSL_RC2}, {0, SSL_TXT_IDEA, NULL, 0, 0, 0, SSL_IDEA}, {0, SSL_TXT_SEED, NULL, 0, 0, 0, SSL_SEED}, {0, SSL_TXT_eNULL, NULL, 0, 0, 0, SSL_eNULL}, {0, SSL_TXT_GOST, NULL, 0, 0, 0, SSL_eGOST2814789CNT | SSL_eGOST2814789CNT12}, {0, SSL_TXT_AES128, NULL, 0, 0, 0, SSL_AES128 | SSL_AES128GCM | SSL_AES128CCM | SSL_AES128CCM8}, {0, SSL_TXT_AES256, NULL, 0, 0, 0, SSL_AES256 | SSL_AES256GCM | SSL_AES256CCM | SSL_AES256CCM8}, {0, SSL_TXT_AES, NULL, 0, 0, 0, SSL_AES}, {0, SSL_TXT_AES_GCM, NULL, 0, 0, 0, SSL_AES128GCM | SSL_AES256GCM}, {0, SSL_TXT_AES_CCM, NULL, 0, 0, 0, SSL_AES128CCM | SSL_AES256CCM | SSL_AES128CCM8 | SSL_AES256CCM8}, {0, SSL_TXT_AES_CCM_8, NULL, 0, 0, 0, SSL_AES128CCM8 | SSL_AES256CCM8}, {0, SSL_TXT_CAMELLIA128, NULL, 0, 0, 0, SSL_CAMELLIA128}, {0, SSL_TXT_CAMELLIA256, NULL, 0, 0, 0, SSL_CAMELLIA256}, {0, SSL_TXT_CAMELLIA, NULL, 0, 0, 0, SSL_CAMELLIA}, {0, SSL_TXT_CHACHA20, NULL, 0, 0, 0, SSL_CHACHA20}, {0, SSL_TXT_ARIA, NULL, 0, 0, 0, SSL_ARIA}, {0, SSL_TXT_ARIA_GCM, NULL, 0, 0, 0, SSL_ARIA128GCM | SSL_ARIA256GCM}, {0, SSL_TXT_ARIA128, NULL, 0, 0, 0, SSL_ARIA128GCM}, {0, SSL_TXT_ARIA256, NULL, 0, 0, 0, SSL_ARIA256GCM}, /* MAC aliases */ {0, SSL_TXT_MD5, NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_MD5}, {0, SSL_TXT_SHA1, NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_SHA1}, {0, SSL_TXT_SHA, NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_SHA1}, {0, SSL_TXT_GOST94, NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_GOST94}, {0, SSL_TXT_GOST89MAC, NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_GOST89MAC | SSL_GOST89MAC12}, {0, SSL_TXT_SHA256, NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_SHA256}, {0, SSL_TXT_SHA384, NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_SHA384}, {0, SSL_TXT_GOST12, NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_GOST12_256}, /* protocol version aliases */ {0, SSL_TXT_SSLV3, NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL3_VERSION}, {0, SSL_TXT_TLSV1, NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, TLS1_VERSION}, {0, "TLSv1.0", NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, TLS1_VERSION}, {0, SSL_TXT_TLSV1_2, NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, TLS1_2_VERSION}, /* strength classes */ {0, SSL_TXT_LOW, NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_LOW}, {0, SSL_TXT_MEDIUM, NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_MEDIUM}, {0, SSL_TXT_HIGH, NULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_HIGH}, /* FIPS 140-2 approved ciphersuite */ {0, SSL_TXT_FIPS, NULL, 0, 0, 0, ~SSL_eNULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_FIPS}, /* "EDH-" aliases to "DHE-" labels (for backward compatibility) */ {0, SSL3_TXT_EDH_DSS_DES_192_CBC3_SHA, NULL, 0, SSL_kDHE, SSL_aDSS, SSL_3DES, SSL_SHA1, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS}, {0, SSL3_TXT_EDH_RSA_DES_192_CBC3_SHA, NULL, 0, SSL_kDHE, SSL_aRSA, SSL_3DES, SSL_SHA1, 0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_HIGH | SSL_FIPS}, }; /* * Search for public key algorithm with given name and return its pkey_id if * it is available. Otherwise return 0 */ #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE static int get_optional_pkey_id(const char *pkey_name) { const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *ameth; int pkey_id = 0; ameth = EVP_PKEY_asn1_find_str(NULL, pkey_name, -1); if (ameth && EVP_PKEY_asn1_get0_info(&pkey_id, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, ameth) > 0) return pkey_id; return 0; } #else static int get_optional_pkey_id(const char *pkey_name) { const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD *ameth; ENGINE *tmpeng = NULL; int pkey_id = 0; ameth = EVP_PKEY_asn1_find_str(&tmpeng, pkey_name, -1); if (ameth) { if (EVP_PKEY_asn1_get0_info(&pkey_id, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, ameth) <= 0) pkey_id = 0; } ENGINE_finish(tmpeng); return pkey_id; } #endif /* masks of disabled algorithms */ static uint32_t disabled_enc_mask; static uint32_t disabled_mac_mask; static uint32_t disabled_mkey_mask; static uint32_t disabled_auth_mask; int ssl_load_ciphers(void) { size_t i; const ssl_cipher_table *t; disabled_enc_mask = 0; ssl_sort_cipher_list(); for (i = 0, t = ssl_cipher_table_cipher; i < SSL_ENC_NUM_IDX; i++, t++) { if (t->nid == NID_undef) { ssl_cipher_methods[i] = NULL; } else { const EVP_CIPHER *cipher = EVP_get_cipherbynid(t->nid); ssl_cipher_methods[i] = cipher; if (cipher == NULL) disabled_enc_mask |= t->mask; } } disabled_mac_mask = 0; for (i = 0, t = ssl_cipher_table_mac; i < SSL_MD_NUM_IDX; i++, t++) { const EVP_MD *md = EVP_get_digestbynid(t->nid); ssl_digest_methods[i] = md; if (md == NULL) { disabled_mac_mask |= t->mask; } else { int tmpsize = EVP_MD_size(md); if (!ossl_assert(tmpsize >= 0)) return 0; ssl_mac_secret_size[i] = tmpsize; } } /* Make sure we can access MD5 and SHA1 */ if (!ossl_assert(ssl_digest_methods[SSL_MD_MD5_IDX] != NULL)) return 0; if (!ossl_assert(ssl_digest_methods[SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX] != NULL)) return 0; disabled_mkey_mask = 0; disabled_auth_mask = 0; #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_RSA disabled_mkey_mask |= SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK; disabled_auth_mask |= SSL_aRSA; #endif #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DSA disabled_auth_mask |= SSL_aDSS; #endif #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DH disabled_mkey_mask |= SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK; #endif #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_EC disabled_mkey_mask |= SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK; disabled_auth_mask |= SSL_aECDSA; #endif #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_PSK disabled_mkey_mask |= SSL_PSK; disabled_auth_mask |= SSL_aPSK; #endif #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SRP disabled_mkey_mask |= SSL_kSRP; #endif /* * Check for presence of GOST 34.10 algorithms, and if they are not * present, disable appropriate auth and key exchange */ ssl_mac_pkey_id[SSL_MD_GOST89MAC_IDX] = get_optional_pkey_id("gost-mac"); if (ssl_mac_pkey_id[SSL_MD_GOST89MAC_IDX]) ssl_mac_secret_size[SSL_MD_GOST89MAC_IDX] = 32; else disabled_mac_mask |= SSL_GOST89MAC; ssl_mac_pkey_id[SSL_MD_GOST89MAC12_IDX] = get_optional_pkey_id("gost-mac-12"); if (ssl_mac_pkey_id[SSL_MD_GOST89MAC12_IDX]) ssl_mac_secret_size[SSL_MD_GOST89MAC12_IDX] = 32; else disabled_mac_mask |= SSL_GOST89MAC12; if (!get_optional_pkey_id("gost2001")) disabled_auth_mask |= SSL_aGOST01 | SSL_aGOST12; if (!get_optional_pkey_id("gost2012_256")) disabled_auth_mask |= SSL_aGOST12; if (!get_optional_pkey_id("gost2012_512")) disabled_auth_mask |= SSL_aGOST12; /* * Disable GOST key exchange if no GOST signature algs are available * */ if ((disabled_auth_mask & (SSL_aGOST01 | SSL_aGOST12)) == (SSL_aGOST01 | SSL_aGOST12)) disabled_mkey_mask |= SSL_kGOST; return 1; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP static int sk_comp_cmp(const SSL_COMP *const *a, const SSL_COMP *const *b) { return ((*a)->id - (*b)->id); } DEFINE_RUN_ONCE_STATIC(do_load_builtin_compressions) { SSL_COMP *comp = NULL; COMP_METHOD *method = COMP_zlib(); CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_DISABLE); ssl_comp_methods = sk_SSL_COMP_new(sk_comp_cmp); if (COMP_get_type(method) != NID_undef && ssl_comp_methods != NULL) { comp = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*comp)); if (comp != NULL) { comp->method = method; comp->id = SSL_COMP_ZLIB_IDX; comp->name = COMP_get_name(method); sk_SSL_COMP_push(ssl_comp_methods, comp); sk_SSL_COMP_sort(ssl_comp_methods); } } CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_ENABLE); return 1; } static int load_builtin_compressions(void) { return RUN_ONCE(&ssl_load_builtin_comp_once, do_load_builtin_compressions); } #endif int ssl_cipher_get_evp(const SSL_SESSION *s, const EVP_CIPHER **enc, const EVP_MD **md, int *mac_pkey_type, size_t *mac_secret_size, SSL_COMP **comp, int use_etm) { int i; const SSL_CIPHER *c; c = s->cipher; if (c == NULL) return 0; if (comp != NULL) { SSL_COMP ctmp; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP if (!load_builtin_compressions()) { /* * Currently don't care, since a failure only means that * ssl_comp_methods is NULL, which is perfectly OK */ } #endif *comp = NULL; ctmp.id = s->compress_meth; if (ssl_comp_methods != NULL) { i = sk_SSL_COMP_find(ssl_comp_methods, &ctmp); *comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(ssl_comp_methods, i); } /* If were only interested in comp then return success */ if ((enc == NULL) && (md == NULL)) return 1; } if ((enc == NULL) || (md == NULL)) return 0; i = ssl_cipher_info_lookup(ssl_cipher_table_cipher, c->algorithm_enc); if (i == -1) { *enc = NULL; } else { if (i == SSL_ENC_NULL_IDX) *enc = EVP_enc_null(); else *enc = ssl_cipher_methods[i]; } i = ssl_cipher_info_lookup(ssl_cipher_table_mac, c->algorithm_mac); if (i == -1) { *md = NULL; if (mac_pkey_type != NULL) *mac_pkey_type = NID_undef; if (mac_secret_size != NULL) *mac_secret_size = 0; if (c->algorithm_mac == SSL_AEAD) mac_pkey_type = NULL; } else { *md = ssl_digest_methods[i]; if (mac_pkey_type != NULL) *mac_pkey_type = ssl_mac_pkey_id[i]; if (mac_secret_size != NULL) *mac_secret_size = ssl_mac_secret_size[i]; } if ((*enc != NULL) && (*md != NULL || (EVP_CIPHER_flags(*enc) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER)) && (!mac_pkey_type || *mac_pkey_type != NID_undef)) { const EVP_CIPHER *evp; if (use_etm) return 1; if (s->ssl_version >> 8 != TLS1_VERSION_MAJOR || s->ssl_version < TLS1_VERSION) return 1; if (c->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4 && c->algorithm_mac == SSL_MD5 && (evp = EVP_get_cipherbyname("RC4-HMAC-MD5"))) *enc = evp, *md = NULL; else if (c->algorithm_enc == SSL_AES128 && c->algorithm_mac == SSL_SHA1 && (evp = EVP_get_cipherbyname("AES-128-CBC-HMAC-SHA1"))) *enc = evp, *md = NULL; else if (c->algorithm_enc == SSL_AES256 && c->algorithm_mac == SSL_SHA1 && (evp = EVP_get_cipherbyname("AES-256-CBC-HMAC-SHA1"))) *enc = evp, *md = NULL; else if (c->algorithm_enc == SSL_AES128 && c->algorithm_mac == SSL_SHA256 && (evp = EVP_get_cipherbyname("AES-128-CBC-HMAC-SHA256"))) *enc = evp, *md = NULL; else if (c->algorithm_enc == SSL_AES256 && c->algorithm_mac == SSL_SHA256 && (evp = EVP_get_cipherbyname("AES-256-CBC-HMAC-SHA256"))) *enc = evp, *md = NULL; return 1; } else { return 0; } } const EVP_MD *ssl_md(int idx) { idx &= SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_MASK; if (idx < 0 || idx >= SSL_MD_NUM_IDX) return NULL; return ssl_digest_methods[idx]; } const EVP_MD *ssl_handshake_md(SSL *s) { return ssl_md(ssl_get_algorithm2(s)); } const EVP_MD *ssl_prf_md(SSL *s) { return ssl_md(ssl_get_algorithm2(s) >> TLS1_PRF_DGST_SHIFT); } #define ITEM_SEP(a) \ (((a) == ':') || ((a) == ' ') || ((a) == ';') || ((a) == ',')) static void ll_append_tail(CIPHER_ORDER **head, CIPHER_ORDER *curr, CIPHER_ORDER **tail) { if (curr == *tail) return; if (curr == *head) *head = curr->next; if (curr->prev != NULL) curr->prev->next = curr->next; if (curr->next != NULL) curr->next->prev = curr->prev; (*tail)->next = curr; curr->prev = *tail; curr->next = NULL; *tail = curr; } static void ll_append_head(CIPHER_ORDER **head, CIPHER_ORDER *curr, CIPHER_ORDER **tail) { if (curr == *head) return; if (curr == *tail) *tail = curr->prev; if (curr->next != NULL) curr->next->prev = curr->prev; if (curr->prev != NULL) curr->prev->next = curr->next; (*head)->prev = curr; curr->next = *head; curr->prev = NULL; *head = curr; } static void ssl_cipher_collect_ciphers(const SSL_METHOD *ssl_method, int num_of_ciphers, uint32_t disabled_mkey, uint32_t disabled_auth, uint32_t disabled_enc, uint32_t disabled_mac, CIPHER_ORDER *co_list, CIPHER_ORDER **head_p, CIPHER_ORDER **tail_p) { int i, co_list_num; const SSL_CIPHER *c; /* * We have num_of_ciphers descriptions compiled in, depending on the * method selected (SSLv3, TLSv1 etc). * These will later be sorted in a linked list with at most num * entries. */ /* Get the initial list of ciphers */ co_list_num = 0; /* actual count of ciphers */ for (i = 0; i < num_of_ciphers; i++) { c = ssl_method->get_cipher(i); /* drop those that use any of that is not available */ if (c == NULL || !c->valid) continue; if ((c->algorithm_mkey & disabled_mkey) || (c->algorithm_auth & disabled_auth) || (c->algorithm_enc & disabled_enc) || (c->algorithm_mac & disabled_mac)) continue; if (((ssl_method->ssl3_enc->enc_flags & SSL_ENC_FLAG_DTLS) == 0) && c->min_tls == 0) continue; if (((ssl_method->ssl3_enc->enc_flags & SSL_ENC_FLAG_DTLS) != 0) && c->min_dtls == 0) continue; co_list[co_list_num].cipher = c; co_list[co_list_num].next = NULL; co_list[co_list_num].prev = NULL; co_list[co_list_num].active = 0; co_list_num++; } /* * Prepare linked list from list entries */ if (co_list_num > 0) { co_list[0].prev = NULL; if (co_list_num > 1) { co_list[0].next = &co_list[1]; for (i = 1; i < co_list_num - 1; i++) { co_list[i].prev = &co_list[i - 1]; co_list[i].next = &co_list[i + 1]; } co_list[co_list_num - 1].prev = &co_list[co_list_num - 2]; } co_list[co_list_num - 1].next = NULL; *head_p = &co_list[0]; *tail_p = &co_list[co_list_num - 1]; } } static void ssl_cipher_collect_aliases(const SSL_CIPHER **ca_list, int num_of_group_aliases, uint32_t disabled_mkey, uint32_t disabled_auth, uint32_t disabled_enc, uint32_t disabled_mac, CIPHER_ORDER *head) { CIPHER_ORDER *ciph_curr; const SSL_CIPHER **ca_curr; int i; uint32_t mask_mkey = ~disabled_mkey; uint32_t mask_auth = ~disabled_auth; uint32_t mask_enc = ~disabled_enc; uint32_t mask_mac = ~disabled_mac; /* * First, add the real ciphers as already collected */ ciph_curr = head; ca_curr = ca_list; while (ciph_curr != NULL) { *ca_curr = ciph_curr->cipher; ca_curr++; ciph_curr = ciph_curr->next; } /* * Now we add the available ones from the cipher_aliases[] table. * They represent either one or more algorithms, some of which * in any affected category must be supported (set in enabled_mask), * or represent a cipher strength value (will be added in any case because algorithms=0). */ for (i = 0; i < num_of_group_aliases; i++) { uint32_t algorithm_mkey = cipher_aliases[i].algorithm_mkey; uint32_t algorithm_auth = cipher_aliases[i].algorithm_auth; uint32_t algorithm_enc = cipher_aliases[i].algorithm_enc; uint32_t algorithm_mac = cipher_aliases[i].algorithm_mac; if (algorithm_mkey) if ((algorithm_mkey & mask_mkey) == 0) continue; if (algorithm_auth) if ((algorithm_auth & mask_auth) == 0) continue; if (algorithm_enc) if ((algorithm_enc & mask_enc) == 0) continue; if (algorithm_mac) if ((algorithm_mac & mask_mac) == 0) continue; *ca_curr = (SSL_CIPHER *)(cipher_aliases + i); ca_curr++; } *ca_curr = NULL; /* end of list */ } static void ssl_cipher_apply_rule(uint32_t cipher_id, uint32_t alg_mkey, uint32_t alg_auth, uint32_t alg_enc, uint32_t alg_mac, int min_tls, uint32_t algo_strength, int rule, int32_t strength_bits, CIPHER_ORDER **head_p, CIPHER_ORDER **tail_p) { CIPHER_ORDER *head, *tail, *curr, *next, *last; const SSL_CIPHER *cp; int reverse = 0; #ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG fprintf(stderr, "Applying rule %d with %08x/%08x/%08x/%08x/%08x %08x (%d)\n", rule, alg_mkey, alg_auth, alg_enc, alg_mac, min_tls, algo_strength, strength_bits); #endif if (rule == CIPHER_DEL || rule == CIPHER_BUMP) reverse = 1; /* needed to maintain sorting between currently * deleted ciphers */ head = *head_p; tail = *tail_p; if (reverse) { next = tail; last = head; } else { next = head; last = tail; } curr = NULL; for (;;) { if (curr == last) break; curr = next; if (curr == NULL) break; next = reverse ? curr->prev : curr->next; cp = curr->cipher; /* * Selection criteria is either the value of strength_bits * or the algorithms used. */ if (strength_bits >= 0) { if (strength_bits != cp->strength_bits) continue; } else { #ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG fprintf(stderr, "\nName: %s:\nAlgo = %08x/%08x/%08x/%08x/%08x Algo_strength = %08x\n", cp->name, cp->algorithm_mkey, cp->algorithm_auth, cp->algorithm_enc, cp->algorithm_mac, cp->min_tls, cp->algo_strength); #endif if (cipher_id != 0 && (cipher_id != cp->id)) continue; if (alg_mkey && !(alg_mkey & cp->algorithm_mkey)) continue; if (alg_auth && !(alg_auth & cp->algorithm_auth)) continue; if (alg_enc && !(alg_enc & cp->algorithm_enc)) continue; if (alg_mac && !(alg_mac & cp->algorithm_mac)) continue; if (min_tls && (min_tls != cp->min_tls)) continue; if ((algo_strength & SSL_STRONG_MASK) && !(algo_strength & SSL_STRONG_MASK & cp->algo_strength)) continue; if ((algo_strength & SSL_DEFAULT_MASK) && !(algo_strength & SSL_DEFAULT_MASK & cp->algo_strength)) continue; } #ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG fprintf(stderr, "Action = %d\n", rule); #endif /* add the cipher if it has not been added yet. */ if (rule == CIPHER_ADD) { /* reverse == 0 */ if (!curr->active) { ll_append_tail(&head, curr, &tail); curr->active = 1; } } /* Move the added cipher to this location */ else if (rule == CIPHER_ORD) { /* reverse == 0 */ if (curr->active) { ll_append_tail(&head, curr, &tail); } } else if (rule == CIPHER_DEL) { /* reverse == 1 */ if (curr->active) { /* * most recently deleted ciphersuites get best positions for * any future CIPHER_ADD (note that the CIPHER_DEL loop works * in reverse to maintain the order) */ ll_append_head(&head, curr, &tail); curr->active = 0; } } else if (rule == CIPHER_BUMP) { if (curr->active) ll_append_head(&head, curr, &tail); } else if (rule == CIPHER_KILL) { /* reverse == 0 */ if (head == curr) head = curr->next; else curr->prev->next = curr->next; if (tail == curr) tail = curr->prev; curr->active = 0; if (curr->next != NULL) curr->next->prev = curr->prev; if (curr->prev != NULL) curr->prev->next = curr->next; curr->next = NULL; curr->prev = NULL; } } *head_p = head; *tail_p = tail; } static int ssl_cipher_strength_sort(CIPHER_ORDER **head_p, CIPHER_ORDER **tail_p) { int32_t max_strength_bits; int i, *number_uses; CIPHER_ORDER *curr; /* * This routine sorts the ciphers with descending strength. The sorting * must keep the pre-sorted sequence, so we apply the normal sorting * routine as '+' movement to the end of the list. */ max_strength_bits = 0; curr = *head_p; while (curr != NULL) { if (curr->active && (curr->cipher->strength_bits > max_strength_bits)) max_strength_bits = curr->cipher->strength_bits; curr = curr->next; } number_uses = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(int) * (max_strength_bits + 1)); if (number_uses == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_STRENGTH_SORT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } /* * Now find the strength_bits values actually used */ curr = *head_p; while (curr != NULL) { if (curr->active) number_uses[curr->cipher->strength_bits]++; curr = curr->next; } /* * Go through the list of used strength_bits values in descending * order. */ for (i = max_strength_bits; i >= 0; i--) if (number_uses[i] > 0) ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_ORD, i, head_p, tail_p); OPENSSL_free(number_uses); return 1; } static int ssl_cipher_process_rulestr(const char *rule_str, CIPHER_ORDER **head_p, CIPHER_ORDER **tail_p, const SSL_CIPHER **ca_list, CERT *c) { uint32_t alg_mkey, alg_auth, alg_enc, alg_mac, algo_strength; int min_tls; const char *l, *buf; int j, multi, found, rule, retval, ok, buflen; uint32_t cipher_id = 0; char ch; retval = 1; l = rule_str; for ( ; ; ) { ch = *l; if (ch == '\0') break; /* done */ if (ch == '-') { rule = CIPHER_DEL; l++; } else if (ch == '+') { rule = CIPHER_ORD; l++; } else if (ch == '!') { rule = CIPHER_KILL; l++; } else if (ch == '@') { rule = CIPHER_SPECIAL; l++; } else { rule = CIPHER_ADD; } if (ITEM_SEP(ch)) { l++; continue; } alg_mkey = 0; alg_auth = 0; alg_enc = 0; alg_mac = 0; min_tls = 0; algo_strength = 0; for (;;) { ch = *l; buf = l; buflen = 0; #ifndef CHARSET_EBCDIC while (((ch >= 'A') && (ch <= 'Z')) || ((ch >= '0') && (ch <= '9')) || ((ch >= 'a') && (ch <= 'z')) || (ch == '-') || (ch == '.') || (ch == '=')) #else while (isalnum((unsigned char)ch) || (ch == '-') || (ch == '.') || (ch == '=')) #endif { ch = *(++l); buflen++; } if (buflen == 0) { /* * We hit something we cannot deal with, * it is no command or separator nor * alphanumeric, so we call this an error. */ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_PROCESS_RULESTR, SSL_R_INVALID_COMMAND); retval = found = 0; l++; break; } if (rule == CIPHER_SPECIAL) { found = 0; /* unused -- avoid compiler warning */ break; /* special treatment */ } /* check for multi-part specification */ if (ch == '+') { multi = 1; l++; } else { multi = 0; } /* * Now search for the cipher alias in the ca_list. Be careful * with the strncmp, because the "buflen" limitation * will make the rule "ADH:SOME" and the cipher * "ADH-MY-CIPHER" look like a match for buflen=3. * So additionally check whether the cipher name found * has the correct length. We can save a strlen() call: * just checking for the '\0' at the right place is * sufficient, we have to strncmp() anyway. (We cannot * use strcmp(), because buf is not '\0' terminated.) */ j = found = 0; cipher_id = 0; while (ca_list[j]) { if (strncmp(buf, ca_list[j]->name, buflen) == 0 && (ca_list[j]->name[buflen] == '\0')) { found = 1; break; } else j++; } if (!found) break; /* ignore this entry */ if (ca_list[j]->algorithm_mkey) { if (alg_mkey) { alg_mkey &= ca_list[j]->algorithm_mkey; if (!alg_mkey) { found = 0; break; } } else { alg_mkey = ca_list[j]->algorithm_mkey; } } if (ca_list[j]->algorithm_auth) { if (alg_auth) { alg_auth &= ca_list[j]->algorithm_auth; if (!alg_auth) { found = 0; break; } } else { alg_auth = ca_list[j]->algorithm_auth; } } if (ca_list[j]->algorithm_enc) { if (alg_enc) { alg_enc &= ca_list[j]->algorithm_enc; if (!alg_enc) { found = 0; break; } } else { alg_enc = ca_list[j]->algorithm_enc; } } if (ca_list[j]->algorithm_mac) { if (alg_mac) { alg_mac &= ca_list[j]->algorithm_mac; if (!alg_mac) { found = 0; break; } } else { alg_mac = ca_list[j]->algorithm_mac; } } if (ca_list[j]->algo_strength & SSL_STRONG_MASK) { if (algo_strength & SSL_STRONG_MASK) { algo_strength &= (ca_list[j]->algo_strength & SSL_STRONG_MASK) | ~SSL_STRONG_MASK; if (!(algo_strength & SSL_STRONG_MASK)) { found = 0; break; } } else { algo_strength = ca_list[j]->algo_strength & SSL_STRONG_MASK; } } if (ca_list[j]->algo_strength & SSL_DEFAULT_MASK) { if (algo_strength & SSL_DEFAULT_MASK) { algo_strength &= (ca_list[j]->algo_strength & SSL_DEFAULT_MASK) | ~SSL_DEFAULT_MASK; if (!(algo_strength & SSL_DEFAULT_MASK)) { found = 0; break; } } else { algo_strength |= ca_list[j]->algo_strength & SSL_DEFAULT_MASK; } } if (ca_list[j]->valid) { /* * explicit ciphersuite found; its protocol version does not * become part of the search pattern! */ cipher_id = ca_list[j]->id; } else { /* * not an explicit ciphersuite; only in this case, the * protocol version is considered part of the search pattern */ if (ca_list[j]->min_tls) { if (min_tls != 0 && min_tls != ca_list[j]->min_tls) { found = 0; break; } else { min_tls = ca_list[j]->min_tls; } } } if (!multi) break; } /* * Ok, we have the rule, now apply it */ if (rule == CIPHER_SPECIAL) { /* special command */ ok = 0; if ((buflen == 8) && strncmp(buf, "STRENGTH", 8) == 0) { ok = ssl_cipher_strength_sort(head_p, tail_p); } else if (buflen == 10 && strncmp(buf, "SECLEVEL=", 9) == 0) { int level = buf[9] - '0'; if (level < 0 || level > 5) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_PROCESS_RULESTR, SSL_R_INVALID_COMMAND); } else { c->sec_level = level; ok = 1; } } else { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_PROCESS_RULESTR, SSL_R_INVALID_COMMAND); } if (ok == 0) retval = 0; /* * We do not support any "multi" options * together with "@", so throw away the * rest of the command, if any left, until * end or ':' is found. */ while ((*l != '\0') && !ITEM_SEP(*l)) l++; } else if (found) { ssl_cipher_apply_rule(cipher_id, alg_mkey, alg_auth, alg_enc, alg_mac, min_tls, algo_strength, rule, -1, head_p, tail_p); } else { while ((*l != '\0') && !ITEM_SEP(*l)) l++; } if (*l == '\0') break; /* done */ } return retval; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC static int check_suiteb_cipher_list(const SSL_METHOD *meth, CERT *c, const char **prule_str) { unsigned int suiteb_flags = 0, suiteb_comb2 = 0; if (strncmp(*prule_str, "SUITEB128ONLY", 13) == 0) { suiteb_flags = SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY; } else if (strncmp(*prule_str, "SUITEB128C2", 11) == 0) { suiteb_comb2 = 1; suiteb_flags = SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS; } else if (strncmp(*prule_str, "SUITEB128", 9) == 0) { suiteb_flags = SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS; } else if (strncmp(*prule_str, "SUITEB192", 9) == 0) { suiteb_flags = SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS; } if (suiteb_flags) { c->cert_flags &= ~SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS; c->cert_flags |= suiteb_flags; } else { suiteb_flags = c->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS; } if (!suiteb_flags) return 1; /* Check version: if TLS 1.2 ciphers allowed we can use Suite B */ if (!(meth->ssl3_enc->enc_flags & SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_CHECK_SUITEB_CIPHER_LIST, SSL_R_AT_LEAST_TLS_1_2_NEEDED_IN_SUITEB_MODE); return 0; } # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC switch (suiteb_flags) { case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS: if (suiteb_comb2) *prule_str = "ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384"; else *prule_str = "ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256:ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384"; break; case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS_ONLY: *prule_str = "ECDHE-ECDSA-AES128-GCM-SHA256"; break; case SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_192_LOS: *prule_str = "ECDHE-ECDSA-AES256-GCM-SHA384"; break; } return 1; # else SSLerr(SSL_F_CHECK_SUITEB_CIPHER_LIST, SSL_R_ECDH_REQUIRED_FOR_SUITEB_MODE); return 0; # endif } #endif static int ciphersuite_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg) { STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphersuites = (STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *)arg; const SSL_CIPHER *cipher; /* Arbitrary sized temp buffer for the cipher name. Should be big enough */ char name[80]; if (len > (int)(sizeof(name) - 1)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_CIPHERSUITE_CB, SSL_R_NO_CIPHER_MATCH); return 0; } memcpy(name, elem, len); name[len] = '\0'; cipher = ssl3_get_cipher_by_std_name(name); if (cipher == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_CIPHERSUITE_CB, SSL_R_NO_CIPHER_MATCH); return 0; } if (!sk_SSL_CIPHER_push(ciphersuites, cipher)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_CIPHERSUITE_CB, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } return 1; } static __owur int set_ciphersuites(STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) **currciphers, const char *str) { STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *newciphers = sk_SSL_CIPHER_new_null(); if (newciphers == NULL) return 0; /* Parse the list. We explicitly allow an empty list */ if (*str != '\0' && !CONF_parse_list(str, ':', 1, ciphersuite_cb, newciphers)) { sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(newciphers); return 0; } sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(*currciphers); *currciphers = newciphers; return 1; } static int update_cipher_list_by_id(STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) **cipher_list_by_id, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipherstack) { STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *tmp_cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(cipherstack); if (tmp_cipher_list == NULL) { return 0; } sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(*cipher_list_by_id); *cipher_list_by_id = tmp_cipher_list; (void)sk_SSL_CIPHER_set_cmp_func(*cipher_list_by_id, ssl_cipher_ptr_id_cmp); sk_SSL_CIPHER_sort(*cipher_list_by_id); return 1; } static int update_cipher_list(STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) **cipher_list, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) **cipher_list_by_id, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *tls13_ciphersuites) { int i; STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *tmp_cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(*cipher_list); if (tmp_cipher_list == NULL) return 0; /* * Delete any existing TLSv1.3 ciphersuites. These are always first in the * list. */ while (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(tmp_cipher_list) > 0 && sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(tmp_cipher_list, 0)->min_tls == TLS1_3_VERSION) sk_SSL_CIPHER_delete(tmp_cipher_list, 0); /* Insert the new TLSv1.3 ciphersuites */ for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(tls13_ciphersuites); i++) sk_SSL_CIPHER_insert(tmp_cipher_list, sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(tls13_ciphersuites, i), i); if (!update_cipher_list_by_id(cipher_list_by_id, tmp_cipher_list)) return 0; sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(*cipher_list); *cipher_list = tmp_cipher_list; return 1; } int SSL_CTX_set_ciphersuites(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *str) { int ret = set_ciphersuites(&(ctx->tls13_ciphersuites), str); if (ret && ctx->cipher_list != NULL) return update_cipher_list(&ctx->cipher_list, &ctx->cipher_list_by_id, ctx->tls13_ciphersuites); return ret; } int SSL_set_ciphersuites(SSL *s, const char *str) { STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_list; int ret = set_ciphersuites(&(s->tls13_ciphersuites), str); if (s->cipher_list == NULL) { if ((cipher_list = SSL_get_ciphers(s)) != NULL) s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(cipher_list); } if (ret && s->cipher_list != NULL) return update_cipher_list(&s->cipher_list, &s->cipher_list_by_id, s->tls13_ciphersuites); return ret; } STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_create_cipher_list(const SSL_METHOD *ssl_method, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *tls13_ciphersuites, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) **cipher_list, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) **cipher_list_by_id, const char *rule_str, CERT *c) { int ok, num_of_ciphers, num_of_alias_max, num_of_group_aliases, i; uint32_t disabled_mkey, disabled_auth, disabled_enc, disabled_mac; STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipherstack; const char *rule_p; CIPHER_ORDER *co_list = NULL, *head = NULL, *tail = NULL, *curr; const SSL_CIPHER **ca_list = NULL; /* * Return with error if nothing to do. */ if (rule_str == NULL || cipher_list == NULL || cipher_list_by_id == NULL) return NULL; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC if (!check_suiteb_cipher_list(ssl_method, c, &rule_str)) return NULL; #endif /* * To reduce the work to do we only want to process the compiled * in algorithms, so we first get the mask of disabled ciphers. */ disabled_mkey = disabled_mkey_mask; disabled_auth = disabled_auth_mask; disabled_enc = disabled_enc_mask; disabled_mac = disabled_mac_mask; /* * Now we have to collect the available ciphers from the compiled * in ciphers. We cannot get more than the number compiled in, so * it is used for allocation. */ num_of_ciphers = ssl_method->num_ciphers(); co_list = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*co_list) * num_of_ciphers); if (co_list == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CREATE_CIPHER_LIST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return NULL; /* Failure */ } ssl_cipher_collect_ciphers(ssl_method, num_of_ciphers, disabled_mkey, disabled_auth, disabled_enc, disabled_mac, co_list, &head, &tail); /* Now arrange all ciphers by preference. */ /* * Everything else being equal, prefer ephemeral ECDH over other key * exchange mechanisms. * For consistency, prefer ECDSA over RSA (though this only matters if the * server has both certificates, and is using the DEFAULT, or a client * preference). */ ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, SSL_kECDHE, SSL_aECDSA, 0, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_ADD, -1, &head, &tail); ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, SSL_kECDHE, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_ADD, -1, &head, &tail); ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, SSL_kECDHE, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_DEL, -1, &head, &tail); /* Within each strength group, we prefer GCM over CHACHA... */ ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, 0, 0, SSL_AESGCM, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_ADD, -1, &head, &tail); ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, 0, 0, SSL_CHACHA20, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_ADD, -1, &head, &tail); /* * ...and generally, our preferred cipher is AES. * Note that AEADs will be bumped to take preference after sorting by * strength. */ ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, 0, 0, SSL_AES ^ SSL_AESGCM, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_ADD, -1, &head, &tail); /* Temporarily enable everything else for sorting */ ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_ADD, -1, &head, &tail); /* Low priority for MD5 */ ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_MD5, 0, 0, CIPHER_ORD, -1, &head, &tail); /* * Move anonymous ciphers to the end. Usually, these will remain * disabled. (For applications that allow them, they aren't too bad, but * we prefer authenticated ciphers.) */ ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, 0, SSL_aNULL, 0, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_ORD, -1, &head, &tail); ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, SSL_kRSA, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_ORD, -1, &head, &tail); ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, SSL_kPSK, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_ORD, -1, &head, &tail); /* RC4 is sort-of broken -- move to the end */ ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, 0, 0, SSL_RC4, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_ORD, -1, &head, &tail); /* * Now sort by symmetric encryption strength. The above ordering remains * in force within each class */ if (!ssl_cipher_strength_sort(&head, &tail)) { OPENSSL_free(co_list); return NULL; } /* * Partially overrule strength sort to prefer TLS 1.2 ciphers/PRFs. * TODO(openssl-team): is there an easier way to accomplish all this? */ ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, TLS1_2_VERSION, 0, CIPHER_BUMP, -1, &head, &tail); /* * Irrespective of strength, enforce the following order: * (EC)DHE + AEAD > (EC)DHE > rest of AEAD > rest. * Within each group, ciphers remain sorted by strength and previous * preference, i.e., * 1) ECDHE > DHE * 2) GCM > CHACHA * 3) AES > rest * 4) TLS 1.2 > legacy * * Because we now bump ciphers to the top of the list, we proceed in * reverse order of preference. */ ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, 0, 0, 0, SSL_AEAD, 0, 0, CIPHER_BUMP, -1, &head, &tail); ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_BUMP, -1, &head, &tail); ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE, 0, 0, SSL_AEAD, 0, 0, CIPHER_BUMP, -1, &head, &tail); /* Now disable everything (maintaining the ordering!) */ ssl_cipher_apply_rule(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, CIPHER_DEL, -1, &head, &tail); /* * We also need cipher aliases for selecting based on the rule_str. * There might be two types of entries in the rule_str: 1) names * of ciphers themselves 2) aliases for groups of ciphers. * For 1) we need the available ciphers and for 2) the cipher * groups of cipher_aliases added together in one list (otherwise * we would be happy with just the cipher_aliases table). */ num_of_group_aliases = OSSL_NELEM(cipher_aliases); num_of_alias_max = num_of_ciphers + num_of_group_aliases + 1; ca_list = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*ca_list) * num_of_alias_max); if (ca_list == NULL) { OPENSSL_free(co_list); SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CREATE_CIPHER_LIST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return NULL; /* Failure */ } ssl_cipher_collect_aliases(ca_list, num_of_group_aliases, disabled_mkey, disabled_auth, disabled_enc, disabled_mac, head); /* * If the rule_string begins with DEFAULT, apply the default rule * before using the (possibly available) additional rules. */ ok = 1; rule_p = rule_str; if (strncmp(rule_str, "DEFAULT", 7) == 0) { ok = ssl_cipher_process_rulestr(SSL_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST, &head, &tail, ca_list, c); rule_p += 7; if (*rule_p == ':') rule_p++; } if (ok && (strlen(rule_p) > 0)) ok = ssl_cipher_process_rulestr(rule_p, &head, &tail, ca_list, c); OPENSSL_free(ca_list); /* Not needed anymore */ if (!ok) { /* Rule processing failure */ OPENSSL_free(co_list); return NULL; } /* * Allocate new "cipherstack" for the result, return with error * if we cannot get one. */ if ((cipherstack = sk_SSL_CIPHER_new_null()) == NULL) { OPENSSL_free(co_list); return NULL; } /* Add TLSv1.3 ciphers first - we always prefer those if possible */ for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(tls13_ciphersuites); i++) { if (!sk_SSL_CIPHER_push(cipherstack, sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(tls13_ciphersuites, i))) { + OPENSSL_free(co_list); sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(cipherstack); return NULL; } } /* * The cipher selection for the list is done. The ciphers are added * to the resulting precedence to the STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER). */ for (curr = head; curr != NULL; curr = curr->next) { if (curr->active) { if (!sk_SSL_CIPHER_push(cipherstack, curr->cipher)) { OPENSSL_free(co_list); sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(cipherstack); return NULL; } #ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG fprintf(stderr, "<%s>\n", curr->cipher->name); #endif } } OPENSSL_free(co_list); /* Not needed any longer */ if (!update_cipher_list_by_id(cipher_list_by_id, cipherstack)) { sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(cipherstack); return NULL; } sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(*cipher_list); *cipher_list = cipherstack; return cipherstack; } char *SSL_CIPHER_description(const SSL_CIPHER *cipher, char *buf, int len) { const char *ver; const char *kx, *au, *enc, *mac; uint32_t alg_mkey, alg_auth, alg_enc, alg_mac; static const char *format = "%-23s %s Kx=%-8s Au=%-4s Enc=%-9s Mac=%-4s\n"; if (buf == NULL) { len = 128; if ((buf = OPENSSL_malloc(len)) == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CIPHER_DESCRIPTION, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return NULL; } } else if (len < 128) { return NULL; } alg_mkey = cipher->algorithm_mkey; alg_auth = cipher->algorithm_auth; alg_enc = cipher->algorithm_enc; alg_mac = cipher->algorithm_mac; ver = ssl_protocol_to_string(cipher->min_tls); switch (alg_mkey) { case SSL_kRSA: kx = "RSA"; break; case SSL_kDHE: kx = "DH"; break; case SSL_kECDHE: kx = "ECDH"; break; case SSL_kPSK: kx = "PSK"; break; case SSL_kRSAPSK: kx = "RSAPSK"; break; case SSL_kECDHEPSK: kx = "ECDHEPSK"; break; case SSL_kDHEPSK: kx = "DHEPSK"; break; case SSL_kSRP: kx = "SRP"; break; case SSL_kGOST: kx = "GOST"; break; case SSL_kANY: kx = "any"; break; default: kx = "unknown"; } switch (alg_auth) { case SSL_aRSA: au = "RSA"; break; case SSL_aDSS: au = "DSS"; break; case SSL_aNULL: au = "None"; break; case SSL_aECDSA: au = "ECDSA"; break; case SSL_aPSK: au = "PSK"; break; case SSL_aSRP: au = "SRP"; break; case SSL_aGOST01: au = "GOST01"; break; /* New GOST ciphersuites have both SSL_aGOST12 and SSL_aGOST01 bits */ case (SSL_aGOST12 | SSL_aGOST01): au = "GOST12"; break; case SSL_aANY: au = "any"; break; default: au = "unknown"; break; } switch (alg_enc) { case SSL_DES: enc = "DES(56)"; break; case SSL_3DES: enc = "3DES(168)"; break; case SSL_RC4: enc = "RC4(128)"; break; case SSL_RC2: enc = "RC2(128)"; break; case SSL_IDEA: enc = "IDEA(128)"; break; case SSL_eNULL: enc = "None"; break; case SSL_AES128: enc = "AES(128)"; break; case SSL_AES256: enc = "AES(256)"; break; case SSL_AES128GCM: enc = "AESGCM(128)"; break; case SSL_AES256GCM: enc = "AESGCM(256)"; break; case SSL_AES128CCM: enc = "AESCCM(128)"; break; case SSL_AES256CCM: enc = "AESCCM(256)"; break; case SSL_AES128CCM8: enc = "AESCCM8(128)"; break; case SSL_AES256CCM8: enc = "AESCCM8(256)"; break; case SSL_CAMELLIA128: enc = "Camellia(128)"; break; case SSL_CAMELLIA256: enc = "Camellia(256)"; break; case SSL_ARIA128GCM: enc = "ARIAGCM(128)"; break; case SSL_ARIA256GCM: enc = "ARIAGCM(256)"; break; case SSL_SEED: enc = "SEED(128)"; break; case SSL_eGOST2814789CNT: case SSL_eGOST2814789CNT12: enc = "GOST89(256)"; break; case SSL_CHACHA20POLY1305: enc = "CHACHA20/POLY1305(256)"; break; default: enc = "unknown"; break; } switch (alg_mac) { case SSL_MD5: mac = "MD5"; break; case SSL_SHA1: mac = "SHA1"; break; case SSL_SHA256: mac = "SHA256"; break; case SSL_SHA384: mac = "SHA384"; break; case SSL_AEAD: mac = "AEAD"; break; case SSL_GOST89MAC: case SSL_GOST89MAC12: mac = "GOST89"; break; case SSL_GOST94: mac = "GOST94"; break; case SSL_GOST12_256: case SSL_GOST12_512: mac = "GOST2012"; break; default: mac = "unknown"; break; } BIO_snprintf(buf, len, format, cipher->name, ver, kx, au, enc, mac); return buf; } const char *SSL_CIPHER_get_version(const SSL_CIPHER *c) { if (c == NULL) return "(NONE)"; /* * Backwards-compatibility crutch. In almost all contexts we report TLS * 1.0 as "TLSv1", but for ciphers we report "TLSv1.0". */ if (c->min_tls == TLS1_VERSION) return "TLSv1.0"; return ssl_protocol_to_string(c->min_tls); } /* return the actual cipher being used */ const char *SSL_CIPHER_get_name(const SSL_CIPHER *c) { if (c != NULL) return c->name; return "(NONE)"; } /* return the actual cipher being used in RFC standard name */ const char *SSL_CIPHER_standard_name(const SSL_CIPHER *c) { if (c != NULL) return c->stdname; return "(NONE)"; } /* return the OpenSSL name based on given RFC standard name */ const char *OPENSSL_cipher_name(const char *stdname) { const SSL_CIPHER *c; if (stdname == NULL) return "(NONE)"; c = ssl3_get_cipher_by_std_name(stdname); return SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c); } /* number of bits for symmetric cipher */ int SSL_CIPHER_get_bits(const SSL_CIPHER *c, int *alg_bits) { int ret = 0; if (c != NULL) { if (alg_bits != NULL) *alg_bits = (int)c->alg_bits; ret = (int)c->strength_bits; } return ret; } uint32_t SSL_CIPHER_get_id(const SSL_CIPHER *c) { return c->id; } uint16_t SSL_CIPHER_get_protocol_id(const SSL_CIPHER *c) { return c->id & 0xFFFF; } SSL_COMP *ssl3_comp_find(STACK_OF(SSL_COMP) *sk, int n) { SSL_COMP *ctmp; int i, nn; if ((n == 0) || (sk == NULL)) return NULL; nn = sk_SSL_COMP_num(sk); for (i = 0; i < nn; i++) { ctmp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(sk, i); if (ctmp->id == n) return ctmp; } return NULL; } #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP STACK_OF(SSL_COMP) *SSL_COMP_get_compression_methods(void) { return NULL; } STACK_OF(SSL_COMP) *SSL_COMP_set0_compression_methods(STACK_OF(SSL_COMP) *meths) { return meths; } int SSL_COMP_add_compression_method(int id, COMP_METHOD *cm) { return 1; } #else STACK_OF(SSL_COMP) *SSL_COMP_get_compression_methods(void) { load_builtin_compressions(); return ssl_comp_methods; } STACK_OF(SSL_COMP) *SSL_COMP_set0_compression_methods(STACK_OF(SSL_COMP) *meths) { STACK_OF(SSL_COMP) *old_meths = ssl_comp_methods; ssl_comp_methods = meths; return old_meths; } static void cmeth_free(SSL_COMP *cm) { OPENSSL_free(cm); } void ssl_comp_free_compression_methods_int(void) { STACK_OF(SSL_COMP) *old_meths = ssl_comp_methods; ssl_comp_methods = NULL; sk_SSL_COMP_pop_free(old_meths, cmeth_free); } int SSL_COMP_add_compression_method(int id, COMP_METHOD *cm) { SSL_COMP *comp; if (cm == NULL || COMP_get_type(cm) == NID_undef) return 1; /*- * According to draft-ietf-tls-compression-04.txt, the * compression number ranges should be the following: * * 0 to 63: methods defined by the IETF * 64 to 192: external party methods assigned by IANA * 193 to 255: reserved for private use */ if (id < 193 || id > 255) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_COMP_ADD_COMPRESSION_METHOD, SSL_R_COMPRESSION_ID_NOT_WITHIN_PRIVATE_RANGE); return 1; } CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_DISABLE); comp = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*comp)); if (comp == NULL) { CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_ENABLE); SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_COMP_ADD_COMPRESSION_METHOD, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 1; } comp->id = id; comp->method = cm; load_builtin_compressions(); if (ssl_comp_methods && sk_SSL_COMP_find(ssl_comp_methods, comp) >= 0) { OPENSSL_free(comp); CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_ENABLE); SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_COMP_ADD_COMPRESSION_METHOD, SSL_R_DUPLICATE_COMPRESSION_ID); return 1; } if (ssl_comp_methods == NULL || !sk_SSL_COMP_push(ssl_comp_methods, comp)) { OPENSSL_free(comp); CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_ENABLE); SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_COMP_ADD_COMPRESSION_METHOD, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 1; } CRYPTO_mem_ctrl(CRYPTO_MEM_CHECK_ENABLE); return 0; } #endif const char *SSL_COMP_get_name(const COMP_METHOD *comp) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP return comp ? COMP_get_name(comp) : NULL; #else return NULL; #endif } const char *SSL_COMP_get0_name(const SSL_COMP *comp) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP return comp->name; #else return NULL; #endif } int SSL_COMP_get_id(const SSL_COMP *comp) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP return comp->id; #else return -1; #endif } const SSL_CIPHER *ssl_get_cipher_by_char(SSL *ssl, const unsigned char *ptr, int all) { const SSL_CIPHER *c = ssl->method->get_cipher_by_char(ptr); if (c == NULL || (!all && c->valid == 0)) return NULL; return c; } const SSL_CIPHER *SSL_CIPHER_find(SSL *ssl, const unsigned char *ptr) { return ssl->method->get_cipher_by_char(ptr); } int SSL_CIPHER_get_cipher_nid(const SSL_CIPHER *c) { int i; if (c == NULL) return NID_undef; i = ssl_cipher_info_lookup(ssl_cipher_table_cipher, c->algorithm_enc); if (i == -1) return NID_undef; return ssl_cipher_table_cipher[i].nid; } int SSL_CIPHER_get_digest_nid(const SSL_CIPHER *c) { int i = ssl_cipher_info_lookup(ssl_cipher_table_mac, c->algorithm_mac); if (i == -1) return NID_undef; return ssl_cipher_table_mac[i].nid; } int SSL_CIPHER_get_kx_nid(const SSL_CIPHER *c) { int i = ssl_cipher_info_lookup(ssl_cipher_table_kx, c->algorithm_mkey); if (i == -1) return NID_undef; return ssl_cipher_table_kx[i].nid; } int SSL_CIPHER_get_auth_nid(const SSL_CIPHER *c) { int i = ssl_cipher_info_lookup(ssl_cipher_table_auth, c->algorithm_auth); if (i == -1) return NID_undef; return ssl_cipher_table_auth[i].nid; } const EVP_MD *SSL_CIPHER_get_handshake_digest(const SSL_CIPHER *c) { int idx = c->algorithm2 & SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_MASK; if (idx < 0 || idx >= SSL_MD_NUM_IDX) return NULL; return ssl_digest_methods[idx]; } int SSL_CIPHER_is_aead(const SSL_CIPHER *c) { return (c->algorithm_mac & SSL_AEAD) ? 1 : 0; } int ssl_cipher_get_overhead(const SSL_CIPHER *c, size_t *mac_overhead, size_t *int_overhead, size_t *blocksize, size_t *ext_overhead) { size_t mac = 0, in = 0, blk = 0, out = 0; /* Some hard-coded numbers for the CCM/Poly1305 MAC overhead * because there are no handy #defines for those. */ if (c->algorithm_enc & (SSL_AESGCM | SSL_ARIAGCM)) { out = EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN + EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN; } else if (c->algorithm_enc & (SSL_AES128CCM | SSL_AES256CCM)) { out = EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN + 16; } else if (c->algorithm_enc & (SSL_AES128CCM8 | SSL_AES256CCM8)) { out = EVP_CCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN + 8; } else if (c->algorithm_enc & SSL_CHACHA20POLY1305) { out = 16; } else if (c->algorithm_mac & SSL_AEAD) { /* We're supposed to have handled all the AEAD modes above */ return 0; } else { /* Non-AEAD modes. Calculate MAC/cipher overhead separately */ int digest_nid = SSL_CIPHER_get_digest_nid(c); const EVP_MD *e_md = EVP_get_digestbynid(digest_nid); if (e_md == NULL) return 0; mac = EVP_MD_size(e_md); if (c->algorithm_enc != SSL_eNULL) { int cipher_nid = SSL_CIPHER_get_cipher_nid(c); const EVP_CIPHER *e_ciph = EVP_get_cipherbynid(cipher_nid); /* If it wasn't AEAD or SSL_eNULL, we expect it to be a known CBC cipher. */ if (e_ciph == NULL || EVP_CIPHER_mode(e_ciph) != EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE) return 0; in = 1; /* padding length byte */ out = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(e_ciph); blk = EVP_CIPHER_block_size(e_ciph); } } *mac_overhead = mac; *int_overhead = in; *blocksize = blk; *ext_overhead = out; return 1; } int ssl_cert_is_disabled(size_t idx) { const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *cl = ssl_cert_lookup_by_idx(idx); if (cl == NULL || (cl->amask & disabled_auth_mask) != 0) return 1; return 0; } diff --git a/ssl/ssl_lib.c b/ssl/ssl_lib.c index ffd0a0bc6d17..9c411a329396 100644 --- a/ssl/ssl_lib.c +++ b/ssl/ssl_lib.c @@ -1,5691 +1,5693 @@ /* * Copyright 1995-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "ssl_local.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include "internal/refcount.h" const char SSL_version_str[] = OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT; static int ssl_undefined_function_1(SSL *ssl, SSL3_RECORD *r, size_t s, int t) { (void)r; (void)s; (void)t; return ssl_undefined_function(ssl); } static int ssl_undefined_function_2(SSL *ssl, SSL3_RECORD *r, unsigned char *s, int t) { (void)r; (void)s; (void)t; return ssl_undefined_function(ssl); } static int ssl_undefined_function_3(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *r, unsigned char *s, size_t t, size_t *u) { (void)r; (void)s; (void)t; (void)u; return ssl_undefined_function(ssl); } static int ssl_undefined_function_4(SSL *ssl, int r) { (void)r; return ssl_undefined_function(ssl); } static size_t ssl_undefined_function_5(SSL *ssl, const char *r, size_t s, unsigned char *t) { (void)r; (void)s; (void)t; return ssl_undefined_function(ssl); } static int ssl_undefined_function_6(int r) { (void)r; return ssl_undefined_function(NULL); } static int ssl_undefined_function_7(SSL *ssl, unsigned char *r, size_t s, const char *t, size_t u, const unsigned char *v, size_t w, int x) { (void)r; (void)s; (void)t; (void)u; (void)v; (void)w; (void)x; return ssl_undefined_function(ssl); } SSL3_ENC_METHOD ssl3_undef_enc_method = { ssl_undefined_function_1, ssl_undefined_function_2, ssl_undefined_function, ssl_undefined_function_3, ssl_undefined_function_4, ssl_undefined_function_5, NULL, /* client_finished_label */ 0, /* client_finished_label_len */ NULL, /* server_finished_label */ 0, /* server_finished_label_len */ ssl_undefined_function_6, ssl_undefined_function_7, }; struct ssl_async_args { SSL *s; void *buf; size_t num; enum { READFUNC, WRITEFUNC, OTHERFUNC } type; union { int (*func_read) (SSL *, void *, size_t, size_t *); int (*func_write) (SSL *, const void *, size_t, size_t *); int (*func_other) (SSL *); } f; }; static const struct { uint8_t mtype; uint8_t ord; int nid; } dane_mds[] = { { DANETLS_MATCHING_FULL, 0, NID_undef }, { DANETLS_MATCHING_2256, 1, NID_sha256 }, { DANETLS_MATCHING_2512, 2, NID_sha512 }, }; static int dane_ctx_enable(struct dane_ctx_st *dctx) { const EVP_MD **mdevp; uint8_t *mdord; uint8_t mdmax = DANETLS_MATCHING_LAST; int n = ((int)mdmax) + 1; /* int to handle PrivMatch(255) */ size_t i; if (dctx->mdevp != NULL) return 1; mdevp = OPENSSL_zalloc(n * sizeof(*mdevp)); mdord = OPENSSL_zalloc(n * sizeof(*mdord)); if (mdord == NULL || mdevp == NULL) { OPENSSL_free(mdord); OPENSSL_free(mdevp); SSLerr(SSL_F_DANE_CTX_ENABLE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } /* Install default entries */ for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(dane_mds); ++i) { const EVP_MD *md; if (dane_mds[i].nid == NID_undef || (md = EVP_get_digestbynid(dane_mds[i].nid)) == NULL) continue; mdevp[dane_mds[i].mtype] = md; mdord[dane_mds[i].mtype] = dane_mds[i].ord; } dctx->mdevp = mdevp; dctx->mdord = mdord; dctx->mdmax = mdmax; return 1; } static void dane_ctx_final(struct dane_ctx_st *dctx) { OPENSSL_free(dctx->mdevp); dctx->mdevp = NULL; OPENSSL_free(dctx->mdord); dctx->mdord = NULL; dctx->mdmax = 0; } static void tlsa_free(danetls_record *t) { if (t == NULL) return; OPENSSL_free(t->data); EVP_PKEY_free(t->spki); OPENSSL_free(t); } static void dane_final(SSL_DANE *dane) { sk_danetls_record_pop_free(dane->trecs, tlsa_free); dane->trecs = NULL; sk_X509_pop_free(dane->certs, X509_free); dane->certs = NULL; X509_free(dane->mcert); dane->mcert = NULL; dane->mtlsa = NULL; dane->mdpth = -1; dane->pdpth = -1; } /* * dane_copy - Copy dane configuration, sans verification state. */ static int ssl_dane_dup(SSL *to, SSL *from) { int num; int i; if (!DANETLS_ENABLED(&from->dane)) return 1; num = sk_danetls_record_num(from->dane.trecs); dane_final(&to->dane); to->dane.flags = from->dane.flags; to->dane.dctx = &to->ctx->dane; to->dane.trecs = sk_danetls_record_new_reserve(NULL, num); if (to->dane.trecs == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_DANE_DUP, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } for (i = 0; i < num; ++i) { danetls_record *t = sk_danetls_record_value(from->dane.trecs, i); if (SSL_dane_tlsa_add(to, t->usage, t->selector, t->mtype, t->data, t->dlen) <= 0) return 0; } return 1; } static int dane_mtype_set(struct dane_ctx_st *dctx, const EVP_MD *md, uint8_t mtype, uint8_t ord) { int i; if (mtype == DANETLS_MATCHING_FULL && md != NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_DANE_MTYPE_SET, SSL_R_DANE_CANNOT_OVERRIDE_MTYPE_FULL); return 0; } if (mtype > dctx->mdmax) { const EVP_MD **mdevp; uint8_t *mdord; int n = ((int)mtype) + 1; mdevp = OPENSSL_realloc(dctx->mdevp, n * sizeof(*mdevp)); if (mdevp == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_DANE_MTYPE_SET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return -1; } dctx->mdevp = mdevp; mdord = OPENSSL_realloc(dctx->mdord, n * sizeof(*mdord)); if (mdord == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_DANE_MTYPE_SET, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return -1; } dctx->mdord = mdord; /* Zero-fill any gaps */ for (i = dctx->mdmax + 1; i < mtype; ++i) { mdevp[i] = NULL; mdord[i] = 0; } dctx->mdmax = mtype; } dctx->mdevp[mtype] = md; /* Coerce ordinal of disabled matching types to 0 */ dctx->mdord[mtype] = (md == NULL) ? 0 : ord; return 1; } static const EVP_MD *tlsa_md_get(SSL_DANE *dane, uint8_t mtype) { if (mtype > dane->dctx->mdmax) return NULL; return dane->dctx->mdevp[mtype]; } static int dane_tlsa_add(SSL_DANE *dane, uint8_t usage, uint8_t selector, uint8_t mtype, unsigned const char *data, size_t dlen) { danetls_record *t; const EVP_MD *md = NULL; int ilen = (int)dlen; int i; int num; if (dane->trecs == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_DANE_TLSA_ADD, SSL_R_DANE_NOT_ENABLED); return -1; } if (ilen < 0 || dlen != (size_t)ilen) { SSLerr(SSL_F_DANE_TLSA_ADD, SSL_R_DANE_TLSA_BAD_DATA_LENGTH); return 0; } if (usage > DANETLS_USAGE_LAST) { SSLerr(SSL_F_DANE_TLSA_ADD, SSL_R_DANE_TLSA_BAD_CERTIFICATE_USAGE); return 0; } if (selector > DANETLS_SELECTOR_LAST) { SSLerr(SSL_F_DANE_TLSA_ADD, SSL_R_DANE_TLSA_BAD_SELECTOR); return 0; } if (mtype != DANETLS_MATCHING_FULL) { md = tlsa_md_get(dane, mtype); if (md == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_DANE_TLSA_ADD, SSL_R_DANE_TLSA_BAD_MATCHING_TYPE); return 0; } } if (md != NULL && dlen != (size_t)EVP_MD_size(md)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_DANE_TLSA_ADD, SSL_R_DANE_TLSA_BAD_DIGEST_LENGTH); return 0; } if (!data) { SSLerr(SSL_F_DANE_TLSA_ADD, SSL_R_DANE_TLSA_NULL_DATA); return 0; } if ((t = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*t))) == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_DANE_TLSA_ADD, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return -1; } t->usage = usage; t->selector = selector; t->mtype = mtype; t->data = OPENSSL_malloc(dlen); if (t->data == NULL) { tlsa_free(t); SSLerr(SSL_F_DANE_TLSA_ADD, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return -1; } memcpy(t->data, data, dlen); t->dlen = dlen; /* Validate and cache full certificate or public key */ if (mtype == DANETLS_MATCHING_FULL) { const unsigned char *p = data; X509 *cert = NULL; EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; switch (selector) { case DANETLS_SELECTOR_CERT: if (!d2i_X509(&cert, &p, ilen) || p < data || dlen != (size_t)(p - data)) { tlsa_free(t); SSLerr(SSL_F_DANE_TLSA_ADD, SSL_R_DANE_TLSA_BAD_CERTIFICATE); return 0; } if (X509_get0_pubkey(cert) == NULL) { tlsa_free(t); SSLerr(SSL_F_DANE_TLSA_ADD, SSL_R_DANE_TLSA_BAD_CERTIFICATE); return 0; } if ((DANETLS_USAGE_BIT(usage) & DANETLS_TA_MASK) == 0) { X509_free(cert); break; } /* * For usage DANE-TA(2), we support authentication via "2 0 0" TLSA * records that contain full certificates of trust-anchors that are * not present in the wire chain. For usage PKIX-TA(0), we augment * the chain with untrusted Full(0) certificates from DNS, in case * they are missing from the chain. */ if ((dane->certs == NULL && (dane->certs = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) || !sk_X509_push(dane->certs, cert)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_DANE_TLSA_ADD, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); X509_free(cert); tlsa_free(t); return -1; } break; case DANETLS_SELECTOR_SPKI: if (!d2i_PUBKEY(&pkey, &p, ilen) || p < data || dlen != (size_t)(p - data)) { tlsa_free(t); SSLerr(SSL_F_DANE_TLSA_ADD, SSL_R_DANE_TLSA_BAD_PUBLIC_KEY); return 0; } /* * For usage DANE-TA(2), we support authentication via "2 1 0" TLSA * records that contain full bare keys of trust-anchors that are * not present in the wire chain. */ if (usage == DANETLS_USAGE_DANE_TA) t->spki = pkey; else EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); break; } } /*- * Find the right insertion point for the new record. * * See crypto/x509/x509_vfy.c. We sort DANE-EE(3) records first, so that * they can be processed first, as they require no chain building, and no * expiration or hostname checks. Because DANE-EE(3) is numerically * largest, this is accomplished via descending sort by "usage". * * We also sort in descending order by matching ordinal to simplify * the implementation of digest agility in the verification code. * * The choice of order for the selector is not significant, so we * use the same descending order for consistency. */ num = sk_danetls_record_num(dane->trecs); for (i = 0; i < num; ++i) { danetls_record *rec = sk_danetls_record_value(dane->trecs, i); if (rec->usage > usage) continue; if (rec->usage < usage) break; if (rec->selector > selector) continue; if (rec->selector < selector) break; if (dane->dctx->mdord[rec->mtype] > dane->dctx->mdord[mtype]) continue; break; } if (!sk_danetls_record_insert(dane->trecs, t, i)) { tlsa_free(t); SSLerr(SSL_F_DANE_TLSA_ADD, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return -1; } dane->umask |= DANETLS_USAGE_BIT(usage); return 1; } /* * Return 0 if there is only one version configured and it was disabled * at configure time. Return 1 otherwise. */ static int ssl_check_allowed_versions(int min_version, int max_version) { int minisdtls = 0, maxisdtls = 0; /* Figure out if we're doing DTLS versions or TLS versions */ if (min_version == DTLS1_BAD_VER || min_version >> 8 == DTLS1_VERSION_MAJOR) minisdtls = 1; if (max_version == DTLS1_BAD_VER || max_version >> 8 == DTLS1_VERSION_MAJOR) maxisdtls = 1; /* A wildcard version of 0 could be DTLS or TLS. */ if ((minisdtls && !maxisdtls && max_version != 0) || (maxisdtls && !minisdtls && min_version != 0)) { /* Mixing DTLS and TLS versions will lead to sadness; deny it. */ return 0; } if (minisdtls || maxisdtls) { /* Do DTLS version checks. */ if (min_version == 0) /* Ignore DTLS1_BAD_VER */ min_version = DTLS1_VERSION; if (max_version == 0) max_version = DTLS1_2_VERSION; #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1_2 if (max_version == DTLS1_2_VERSION) max_version = DTLS1_VERSION; #endif #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1 if (min_version == DTLS1_VERSION) min_version = DTLS1_2_VERSION; #endif /* Done massaging versions; do the check. */ if (0 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1 || (DTLS_VERSION_GE(min_version, DTLS1_VERSION) && DTLS_VERSION_GE(DTLS1_VERSION, max_version)) #endif #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1_2 || (DTLS_VERSION_GE(min_version, DTLS1_2_VERSION) && DTLS_VERSION_GE(DTLS1_2_VERSION, max_version)) #endif ) return 0; } else { /* Regular TLS version checks. */ if (min_version == 0) min_version = SSL3_VERSION; if (max_version == 0) max_version = TLS1_3_VERSION; #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3 if (max_version == TLS1_3_VERSION) max_version = TLS1_2_VERSION; #endif #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2 if (max_version == TLS1_2_VERSION) max_version = TLS1_1_VERSION; #endif #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_1 if (max_version == TLS1_1_VERSION) max_version = TLS1_VERSION; #endif #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1 if (max_version == TLS1_VERSION) max_version = SSL3_VERSION; #endif #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3 if (min_version == SSL3_VERSION) min_version = TLS1_VERSION; #endif #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1 if (min_version == TLS1_VERSION) min_version = TLS1_1_VERSION; #endif #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_1 if (min_version == TLS1_1_VERSION) min_version = TLS1_2_VERSION; #endif #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2 if (min_version == TLS1_2_VERSION) min_version = TLS1_3_VERSION; #endif /* Done massaging versions; do the check. */ if (0 #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3 || (min_version <= SSL3_VERSION && SSL3_VERSION <= max_version) #endif #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1 || (min_version <= TLS1_VERSION && TLS1_VERSION <= max_version) #endif #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_1 || (min_version <= TLS1_1_VERSION && TLS1_1_VERSION <= max_version) #endif #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2 || (min_version <= TLS1_2_VERSION && TLS1_2_VERSION <= max_version) #endif #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3 || (min_version <= TLS1_3_VERSION && TLS1_3_VERSION <= max_version) #endif ) return 0; } return 1; } static void clear_ciphers(SSL *s) { /* clear the current cipher */ ssl_clear_cipher_ctx(s); ssl_clear_hash_ctx(&s->read_hash); ssl_clear_hash_ctx(&s->write_hash); } int SSL_clear(SSL *s) { if (s->method == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CLEAR, SSL_R_NO_METHOD_SPECIFIED); return 0; } if (ssl_clear_bad_session(s)) { SSL_SESSION_free(s->session); s->session = NULL; } SSL_SESSION_free(s->psksession); s->psksession = NULL; OPENSSL_free(s->psksession_id); s->psksession_id = NULL; s->psksession_id_len = 0; s->hello_retry_request = 0; s->sent_tickets = 0; s->error = 0; s->hit = 0; s->shutdown = 0; if (s->renegotiate) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CLEAR, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } ossl_statem_clear(s); s->version = s->method->version; s->client_version = s->version; s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf); s->init_buf = NULL; clear_ciphers(s); s->first_packet = 0; s->key_update = SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE; EVP_MD_CTX_free(s->pha_dgst); s->pha_dgst = NULL; /* Reset DANE verification result state */ s->dane.mdpth = -1; s->dane.pdpth = -1; X509_free(s->dane.mcert); s->dane.mcert = NULL; s->dane.mtlsa = NULL; /* Clear the verification result peername */ X509_VERIFY_PARAM_move_peername(s->param, NULL); /* Clear any shared connection state */ OPENSSL_free(s->shared_sigalgs); s->shared_sigalgs = NULL; s->shared_sigalgslen = 0; /* * Check to see if we were changed into a different method, if so, revert * back. */ if (s->method != s->ctx->method) { s->method->ssl_free(s); s->method = s->ctx->method; if (!s->method->ssl_new(s)) return 0; } else { if (!s->method->ssl_clear(s)) return 0; } RECORD_LAYER_clear(&s->rlayer); return 1; } /** Used to change an SSL_CTXs default SSL method type */ int SSL_CTX_set_ssl_version(SSL_CTX *ctx, const SSL_METHOD *meth) { STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk; ctx->method = meth; if (!SSL_CTX_set_ciphersuites(ctx, TLS_DEFAULT_CIPHERSUITES)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_SSL_VERSION, SSL_R_SSL_LIBRARY_HAS_NO_CIPHERS); return 0; } sk = ssl_create_cipher_list(ctx->method, ctx->tls13_ciphersuites, &(ctx->cipher_list), &(ctx->cipher_list_by_id), SSL_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST, ctx->cert); if ((sk == NULL) || (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) <= 0)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_SSL_VERSION, SSL_R_SSL_LIBRARY_HAS_NO_CIPHERS); return 0; } return 1; } SSL *SSL_new(SSL_CTX *ctx) { SSL *s; if (ctx == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_NEW, SSL_R_NULL_SSL_CTX); return NULL; } if (ctx->method == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_NEW, SSL_R_SSL_CTX_HAS_NO_DEFAULT_SSL_VERSION); return NULL; } s = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*s)); if (s == NULL) goto err; s->references = 1; s->lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new(); if (s->lock == NULL) { OPENSSL_free(s); s = NULL; goto err; } RECORD_LAYER_init(&s->rlayer, s); s->options = ctx->options; s->dane.flags = ctx->dane.flags; s->min_proto_version = ctx->min_proto_version; s->max_proto_version = ctx->max_proto_version; s->mode = ctx->mode; s->max_cert_list = ctx->max_cert_list; s->max_early_data = ctx->max_early_data; s->recv_max_early_data = ctx->recv_max_early_data; s->num_tickets = ctx->num_tickets; s->pha_enabled = ctx->pha_enabled; /* Shallow copy of the ciphersuites stack */ s->tls13_ciphersuites = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(ctx->tls13_ciphersuites); if (s->tls13_ciphersuites == NULL) goto err; /* * Earlier library versions used to copy the pointer to the CERT, not * its contents; only when setting new parameters for the per-SSL * copy, ssl_cert_new would be called (and the direct reference to * the per-SSL_CTX settings would be lost, but those still were * indirectly accessed for various purposes, and for that reason they * used to be known as s->ctx->default_cert). Now we don't look at the * SSL_CTX's CERT after having duplicated it once. */ s->cert = ssl_cert_dup(ctx->cert); if (s->cert == NULL) goto err; RECORD_LAYER_set_read_ahead(&s->rlayer, ctx->read_ahead); s->msg_callback = ctx->msg_callback; s->msg_callback_arg = ctx->msg_callback_arg; s->verify_mode = ctx->verify_mode; s->not_resumable_session_cb = ctx->not_resumable_session_cb; s->record_padding_cb = ctx->record_padding_cb; s->record_padding_arg = ctx->record_padding_arg; s->block_padding = ctx->block_padding; s->sid_ctx_length = ctx->sid_ctx_length; if (!ossl_assert(s->sid_ctx_length <= sizeof(s->sid_ctx))) goto err; memcpy(&s->sid_ctx, &ctx->sid_ctx, sizeof(s->sid_ctx)); s->verify_callback = ctx->default_verify_callback; s->generate_session_id = ctx->generate_session_id; s->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new(); if (s->param == NULL) goto err; X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(s->param, ctx->param); s->quiet_shutdown = ctx->quiet_shutdown; s->ext.max_fragment_len_mode = ctx->ext.max_fragment_len_mode; s->max_send_fragment = ctx->max_send_fragment; s->split_send_fragment = ctx->split_send_fragment; s->max_pipelines = ctx->max_pipelines; if (s->max_pipelines > 1) RECORD_LAYER_set_read_ahead(&s->rlayer, 1); if (ctx->default_read_buf_len > 0) SSL_set_default_read_buffer_len(s, ctx->default_read_buf_len); SSL_CTX_up_ref(ctx); s->ctx = ctx; s->ext.debug_cb = 0; s->ext.debug_arg = NULL; s->ext.ticket_expected = 0; s->ext.status_type = ctx->ext.status_type; s->ext.status_expected = 0; s->ext.ocsp.ids = NULL; s->ext.ocsp.exts = NULL; s->ext.ocsp.resp = NULL; s->ext.ocsp.resp_len = 0; SSL_CTX_up_ref(ctx); s->session_ctx = ctx; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC if (ctx->ext.ecpointformats) { s->ext.ecpointformats = OPENSSL_memdup(ctx->ext.ecpointformats, ctx->ext.ecpointformats_len); if (!s->ext.ecpointformats) { s->ext.ecpointformats_len = 0; goto err; } s->ext.ecpointformats_len = ctx->ext.ecpointformats_len; } if (ctx->ext.supportedgroups) { s->ext.supportedgroups = OPENSSL_memdup(ctx->ext.supportedgroups, ctx->ext.supportedgroups_len * sizeof(*ctx->ext.supportedgroups)); if (!s->ext.supportedgroups) { s->ext.supportedgroups_len = 0; goto err; } s->ext.supportedgroups_len = ctx->ext.supportedgroups_len; } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG s->ext.npn = NULL; #endif if (s->ctx->ext.alpn) { s->ext.alpn = OPENSSL_malloc(s->ctx->ext.alpn_len); if (s->ext.alpn == NULL) { s->ext.alpn_len = 0; goto err; } memcpy(s->ext.alpn, s->ctx->ext.alpn, s->ctx->ext.alpn_len); s->ext.alpn_len = s->ctx->ext.alpn_len; } s->verified_chain = NULL; s->verify_result = X509_V_OK; s->default_passwd_callback = ctx->default_passwd_callback; s->default_passwd_callback_userdata = ctx->default_passwd_callback_userdata; s->method = ctx->method; s->key_update = SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE; s->allow_early_data_cb = ctx->allow_early_data_cb; s->allow_early_data_cb_data = ctx->allow_early_data_cb_data; if (!s->method->ssl_new(s)) goto err; s->server = (ctx->method->ssl_accept == ssl_undefined_function) ? 0 : 1; if (!SSL_clear(s)) goto err; if (!CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL, s, &s->ex_data)) goto err; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK s->psk_client_callback = ctx->psk_client_callback; s->psk_server_callback = ctx->psk_server_callback; #endif s->psk_find_session_cb = ctx->psk_find_session_cb; s->psk_use_session_cb = ctx->psk_use_session_cb; s->job = NULL; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT if (!SSL_set_ct_validation_callback(s, ctx->ct_validation_callback, ctx->ct_validation_callback_arg)) goto err; #endif return s; err: SSL_free(s); SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return NULL; } int SSL_is_dtls(const SSL *s) { return SSL_IS_DTLS(s) ? 1 : 0; } int SSL_up_ref(SSL *s) { int i; if (CRYPTO_UP_REF(&s->references, &i, s->lock) <= 0) return 0; REF_PRINT_COUNT("SSL", s); REF_ASSERT_ISNT(i < 2); return ((i > 1) ? 1 : 0); } int SSL_CTX_set_session_id_context(SSL_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *sid_ctx, unsigned int sid_ctx_len) { if (sid_ctx_len > SSL_MAX_SID_CTX_LENGTH) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT, SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT_TOO_LONG); return 0; } ctx->sid_ctx_length = sid_ctx_len; memcpy(ctx->sid_ctx, sid_ctx, sid_ctx_len); return 1; } int SSL_set_session_id_context(SSL *ssl, const unsigned char *sid_ctx, unsigned int sid_ctx_len) { if (sid_ctx_len > SSL_MAX_SID_CTX_LENGTH) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT, SSL_R_SSL_SESSION_ID_CONTEXT_TOO_LONG); return 0; } ssl->sid_ctx_length = sid_ctx_len; memcpy(ssl->sid_ctx, sid_ctx, sid_ctx_len); return 1; } int SSL_CTX_set_generate_session_id(SSL_CTX *ctx, GEN_SESSION_CB cb) { CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(ctx->lock); ctx->generate_session_id = cb; CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(ctx->lock); return 1; } int SSL_set_generate_session_id(SSL *ssl, GEN_SESSION_CB cb) { CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(ssl->lock); ssl->generate_session_id = cb; CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(ssl->lock); return 1; } int SSL_has_matching_session_id(const SSL *ssl, const unsigned char *id, unsigned int id_len) { /* * A quick examination of SSL_SESSION_hash and SSL_SESSION_cmp shows how * we can "construct" a session to give us the desired check - i.e. to * find if there's a session in the hash table that would conflict with * any new session built out of this id/id_len and the ssl_version in use * by this SSL. */ SSL_SESSION r, *p; if (id_len > sizeof(r.session_id)) return 0; r.ssl_version = ssl->version; r.session_id_length = id_len; memcpy(r.session_id, id, id_len); CRYPTO_THREAD_read_lock(ssl->session_ctx->lock); p = lh_SSL_SESSION_retrieve(ssl->session_ctx->sessions, &r); CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(ssl->session_ctx->lock); return (p != NULL); } int SSL_CTX_set_purpose(SSL_CTX *s, int purpose) { return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_purpose(s->param, purpose); } int SSL_set_purpose(SSL *s, int purpose) { return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_purpose(s->param, purpose); } int SSL_CTX_set_trust(SSL_CTX *s, int trust) { return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_trust(s->param, trust); } int SSL_set_trust(SSL *s, int trust) { return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_trust(s->param, trust); } int SSL_set1_host(SSL *s, const char *hostname) { return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_host(s->param, hostname, 0); } int SSL_add1_host(SSL *s, const char *hostname) { return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_add1_host(s->param, hostname, 0); } void SSL_set_hostflags(SSL *s, unsigned int flags) { X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_hostflags(s->param, flags); } const char *SSL_get0_peername(SSL *s) { return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get0_peername(s->param); } int SSL_CTX_dane_enable(SSL_CTX *ctx) { return dane_ctx_enable(&ctx->dane); } unsigned long SSL_CTX_dane_set_flags(SSL_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags) { unsigned long orig = ctx->dane.flags; ctx->dane.flags |= flags; return orig; } unsigned long SSL_CTX_dane_clear_flags(SSL_CTX *ctx, unsigned long flags) { unsigned long orig = ctx->dane.flags; ctx->dane.flags &= ~flags; return orig; } int SSL_dane_enable(SSL *s, const char *basedomain) { SSL_DANE *dane = &s->dane; if (s->ctx->dane.mdmax == 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_DANE_ENABLE, SSL_R_CONTEXT_NOT_DANE_ENABLED); return 0; } if (dane->trecs != NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_DANE_ENABLE, SSL_R_DANE_ALREADY_ENABLED); return 0; } /* * Default SNI name. This rejects empty names, while set1_host below * accepts them and disables host name checks. To avoid side-effects with * invalid input, set the SNI name first. */ if (s->ext.hostname == NULL) { if (!SSL_set_tlsext_host_name(s, basedomain)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_DANE_ENABLE, SSL_R_ERROR_SETTING_TLSA_BASE_DOMAIN); return -1; } } /* Primary RFC6125 reference identifier */ if (!X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1_host(s->param, basedomain, 0)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_DANE_ENABLE, SSL_R_ERROR_SETTING_TLSA_BASE_DOMAIN); return -1; } dane->mdpth = -1; dane->pdpth = -1; dane->dctx = &s->ctx->dane; dane->trecs = sk_danetls_record_new_null(); if (dane->trecs == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_DANE_ENABLE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return -1; } return 1; } unsigned long SSL_dane_set_flags(SSL *ssl, unsigned long flags) { unsigned long orig = ssl->dane.flags; ssl->dane.flags |= flags; return orig; } unsigned long SSL_dane_clear_flags(SSL *ssl, unsigned long flags) { unsigned long orig = ssl->dane.flags; ssl->dane.flags &= ~flags; return orig; } int SSL_get0_dane_authority(SSL *s, X509 **mcert, EVP_PKEY **mspki) { SSL_DANE *dane = &s->dane; if (!DANETLS_ENABLED(dane) || s->verify_result != X509_V_OK) return -1; if (dane->mtlsa) { if (mcert) *mcert = dane->mcert; if (mspki) *mspki = (dane->mcert == NULL) ? dane->mtlsa->spki : NULL; } return dane->mdpth; } int SSL_get0_dane_tlsa(SSL *s, uint8_t *usage, uint8_t *selector, uint8_t *mtype, unsigned const char **data, size_t *dlen) { SSL_DANE *dane = &s->dane; if (!DANETLS_ENABLED(dane) || s->verify_result != X509_V_OK) return -1; if (dane->mtlsa) { if (usage) *usage = dane->mtlsa->usage; if (selector) *selector = dane->mtlsa->selector; if (mtype) *mtype = dane->mtlsa->mtype; if (data) *data = dane->mtlsa->data; if (dlen) *dlen = dane->mtlsa->dlen; } return dane->mdpth; } SSL_DANE *SSL_get0_dane(SSL *s) { return &s->dane; } int SSL_dane_tlsa_add(SSL *s, uint8_t usage, uint8_t selector, uint8_t mtype, unsigned const char *data, size_t dlen) { return dane_tlsa_add(&s->dane, usage, selector, mtype, data, dlen); } int SSL_CTX_dane_mtype_set(SSL_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD *md, uint8_t mtype, uint8_t ord) { return dane_mtype_set(&ctx->dane, md, mtype, ord); } int SSL_CTX_set1_param(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm) { return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1(ctx->param, vpm); } int SSL_set1_param(SSL *ssl, X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm) { return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set1(ssl->param, vpm); } X509_VERIFY_PARAM *SSL_CTX_get0_param(SSL_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->param; } X509_VERIFY_PARAM *SSL_get0_param(SSL *ssl) { return ssl->param; } void SSL_certs_clear(SSL *s) { ssl_cert_clear_certs(s->cert); } void SSL_free(SSL *s) { int i; if (s == NULL) return; CRYPTO_DOWN_REF(&s->references, &i, s->lock); REF_PRINT_COUNT("SSL", s); if (i > 0) return; REF_ASSERT_ISNT(i < 0); X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(s->param); dane_final(&s->dane); CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL, s, &s->ex_data); /* Ignore return value */ ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s); BIO_free_all(s->wbio); BIO_free_all(s->rbio); BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf); /* add extra stuff */ sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list); sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id); sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->tls13_ciphersuites); sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->peer_ciphers); /* Make the next call work :-) */ if (s->session != NULL) { ssl_clear_bad_session(s); SSL_SESSION_free(s->session); } SSL_SESSION_free(s->psksession); OPENSSL_free(s->psksession_id); clear_ciphers(s); ssl_cert_free(s->cert); OPENSSL_free(s->shared_sigalgs); /* Free up if allocated */ OPENSSL_free(s->ext.hostname); SSL_CTX_free(s->session_ctx); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC OPENSSL_free(s->ext.ecpointformats); OPENSSL_free(s->ext.peer_ecpointformats); OPENSSL_free(s->ext.supportedgroups); OPENSSL_free(s->ext.peer_supportedgroups); #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(s->ext.ocsp.exts, X509_EXTENSION_free); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP sk_OCSP_RESPID_pop_free(s->ext.ocsp.ids, OCSP_RESPID_free); #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT SCT_LIST_free(s->scts); OPENSSL_free(s->ext.scts); #endif OPENSSL_free(s->ext.ocsp.resp); OPENSSL_free(s->ext.alpn); OPENSSL_free(s->ext.tls13_cookie); if (s->clienthello != NULL) OPENSSL_free(s->clienthello->pre_proc_exts); OPENSSL_free(s->clienthello); OPENSSL_free(s->pha_context); EVP_MD_CTX_free(s->pha_dgst); sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s->ca_names, X509_NAME_free); sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s->client_ca_names, X509_NAME_free); sk_X509_pop_free(s->verified_chain, X509_free); if (s->method != NULL) s->method->ssl_free(s); RECORD_LAYER_release(&s->rlayer); SSL_CTX_free(s->ctx); ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_free(s->waitctx); #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG) OPENSSL_free(s->ext.npn); #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_free(s->srtp_profiles); #endif CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(s->lock); OPENSSL_free(s); } void SSL_set0_rbio(SSL *s, BIO *rbio) { BIO_free_all(s->rbio); s->rbio = rbio; } void SSL_set0_wbio(SSL *s, BIO *wbio) { /* * If the output buffering BIO is still in place, remove it */ if (s->bbio != NULL) s->wbio = BIO_pop(s->wbio); BIO_free_all(s->wbio); s->wbio = wbio; /* Re-attach |bbio| to the new |wbio|. */ if (s->bbio != NULL) s->wbio = BIO_push(s->bbio, s->wbio); } void SSL_set_bio(SSL *s, BIO *rbio, BIO *wbio) { /* * For historical reasons, this function has many different cases in * ownership handling. */ /* If nothing has changed, do nothing */ if (rbio == SSL_get_rbio(s) && wbio == SSL_get_wbio(s)) return; /* * If the two arguments are equal then one fewer reference is granted by the * caller than we want to take */ if (rbio != NULL && rbio == wbio) BIO_up_ref(rbio); /* * If only the wbio is changed only adopt one reference. */ if (rbio == SSL_get_rbio(s)) { SSL_set0_wbio(s, wbio); return; } /* * There is an asymmetry here for historical reasons. If only the rbio is * changed AND the rbio and wbio were originally different, then we only * adopt one reference. */ if (wbio == SSL_get_wbio(s) && SSL_get_rbio(s) != SSL_get_wbio(s)) { SSL_set0_rbio(s, rbio); return; } /* Otherwise, adopt both references. */ SSL_set0_rbio(s, rbio); SSL_set0_wbio(s, wbio); } BIO *SSL_get_rbio(const SSL *s) { return s->rbio; } BIO *SSL_get_wbio(const SSL *s) { if (s->bbio != NULL) { /* * If |bbio| is active, the true caller-configured BIO is its * |next_bio|. */ return BIO_next(s->bbio); } return s->wbio; } int SSL_get_fd(const SSL *s) { return SSL_get_rfd(s); } int SSL_get_rfd(const SSL *s) { int ret = -1; BIO *b, *r; b = SSL_get_rbio(s); r = BIO_find_type(b, BIO_TYPE_DESCRIPTOR); if (r != NULL) BIO_get_fd(r, &ret); return ret; } int SSL_get_wfd(const SSL *s) { int ret = -1; BIO *b, *r; b = SSL_get_wbio(s); r = BIO_find_type(b, BIO_TYPE_DESCRIPTOR); if (r != NULL) BIO_get_fd(r, &ret); return ret; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SOCK int SSL_set_fd(SSL *s, int fd) { int ret = 0; BIO *bio = NULL; bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_socket()); if (bio == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_FD, ERR_R_BUF_LIB); goto err; } BIO_set_fd(bio, fd, BIO_NOCLOSE); SSL_set_bio(s, bio, bio); ret = 1; err: return ret; } int SSL_set_wfd(SSL *s, int fd) { BIO *rbio = SSL_get_rbio(s); if (rbio == NULL || BIO_method_type(rbio) != BIO_TYPE_SOCKET || (int)BIO_get_fd(rbio, NULL) != fd) { BIO *bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_socket()); if (bio == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_WFD, ERR_R_BUF_LIB); return 0; } BIO_set_fd(bio, fd, BIO_NOCLOSE); SSL_set0_wbio(s, bio); } else { BIO_up_ref(rbio); SSL_set0_wbio(s, rbio); } return 1; } int SSL_set_rfd(SSL *s, int fd) { BIO *wbio = SSL_get_wbio(s); if (wbio == NULL || BIO_method_type(wbio) != BIO_TYPE_SOCKET || ((int)BIO_get_fd(wbio, NULL) != fd)) { BIO *bio = BIO_new(BIO_s_socket()); if (bio == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_RFD, ERR_R_BUF_LIB); return 0; } BIO_set_fd(bio, fd, BIO_NOCLOSE); SSL_set0_rbio(s, bio); } else { BIO_up_ref(wbio); SSL_set0_rbio(s, wbio); } return 1; } #endif /* return length of latest Finished message we sent, copy to 'buf' */ size_t SSL_get_finished(const SSL *s, void *buf, size_t count) { size_t ret = 0; if (s->s3 != NULL) { ret = s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len; if (count > ret) count = ret; memcpy(buf, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, count); } return ret; } /* return length of latest Finished message we expected, copy to 'buf' */ size_t SSL_get_peer_finished(const SSL *s, void *buf, size_t count) { size_t ret = 0; if (s->s3 != NULL) { ret = s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len; if (count > ret) count = ret; memcpy(buf, s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, count); } return ret; } int SSL_get_verify_mode(const SSL *s) { return s->verify_mode; } int SSL_get_verify_depth(const SSL *s) { return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_depth(s->param); } int (*SSL_get_verify_callback(const SSL *s)) (int, X509_STORE_CTX *) { return s->verify_callback; } int SSL_CTX_get_verify_mode(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->verify_mode; } int SSL_CTX_get_verify_depth(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { return X509_VERIFY_PARAM_get_depth(ctx->param); } int (*SSL_CTX_get_verify_callback(const SSL_CTX *ctx)) (int, X509_STORE_CTX *) { return ctx->default_verify_callback; } void SSL_set_verify(SSL *s, int mode, int (*callback) (int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)) { s->verify_mode = mode; if (callback != NULL) s->verify_callback = callback; } void SSL_set_verify_depth(SSL *s, int depth) { X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(s->param, depth); } void SSL_set_read_ahead(SSL *s, int yes) { RECORD_LAYER_set_read_ahead(&s->rlayer, yes); } int SSL_get_read_ahead(const SSL *s) { return RECORD_LAYER_get_read_ahead(&s->rlayer); } int SSL_pending(const SSL *s) { size_t pending = s->method->ssl_pending(s); /* * SSL_pending cannot work properly if read-ahead is enabled * (SSL_[CTX_]ctrl(..., SSL_CTRL_SET_READ_AHEAD, 1, NULL)), and it is * impossible to fix since SSL_pending cannot report errors that may be * observed while scanning the new data. (Note that SSL_pending() is * often used as a boolean value, so we'd better not return -1.) * * SSL_pending also cannot work properly if the value >INT_MAX. In that case * we just return INT_MAX. */ return pending < INT_MAX ? (int)pending : INT_MAX; } int SSL_has_pending(const SSL *s) { /* * Similar to SSL_pending() but returns a 1 to indicate that we have * unprocessed data available or 0 otherwise (as opposed to the number of * bytes available). Unlike SSL_pending() this will take into account * read_ahead data. A 1 return simply indicates that we have unprocessed * data. That data may not result in any application data, or we may fail * to parse the records for some reason. */ if (RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) return 1; return RECORD_LAYER_read_pending(&s->rlayer); } X509 *SSL_get_peer_certificate(const SSL *s) { X509 *r; if ((s == NULL) || (s->session == NULL)) r = NULL; else r = s->session->peer; if (r == NULL) return r; X509_up_ref(r); return r; } STACK_OF(X509) *SSL_get_peer_cert_chain(const SSL *s) { STACK_OF(X509) *r; if ((s == NULL) || (s->session == NULL)) r = NULL; else r = s->session->peer_chain; /* * If we are a client, cert_chain includes the peer's own certificate; if * we are a server, it does not. */ return r; } /* * Now in theory, since the calling process own 't' it should be safe to * modify. We need to be able to read f without being hassled */ int SSL_copy_session_id(SSL *t, const SSL *f) { int i; /* Do we need to to SSL locking? */ if (!SSL_set_session(t, SSL_get_session(f))) { return 0; } /* * what if we are setup for one protocol version but want to talk another */ if (t->method != f->method) { t->method->ssl_free(t); t->method = f->method; if (t->method->ssl_new(t) == 0) return 0; } CRYPTO_UP_REF(&f->cert->references, &i, f->cert->lock); ssl_cert_free(t->cert); t->cert = f->cert; if (!SSL_set_session_id_context(t, f->sid_ctx, (int)f->sid_ctx_length)) { return 0; } return 1; } /* Fix this so it checks all the valid key/cert options */ int SSL_CTX_check_private_key(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { if ((ctx == NULL) || (ctx->cert->key->x509 == NULL)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_ASSIGNED); return 0; } if (ctx->cert->key->privatekey == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, SSL_R_NO_PRIVATE_KEY_ASSIGNED); return 0; } return X509_check_private_key (ctx->cert->key->x509, ctx->cert->key->privatekey); } /* Fix this function so that it takes an optional type parameter */ int SSL_check_private_key(const SSL *ssl) { if (ssl == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); return 0; } if (ssl->cert->key->x509 == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATE_ASSIGNED); return 0; } if (ssl->cert->key->privatekey == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_PRIVATE_KEY, SSL_R_NO_PRIVATE_KEY_ASSIGNED); return 0; } return X509_check_private_key(ssl->cert->key->x509, ssl->cert->key->privatekey); } int SSL_waiting_for_async(SSL *s) { if (s->job) return 1; return 0; } int SSL_get_all_async_fds(SSL *s, OSSL_ASYNC_FD *fds, size_t *numfds) { ASYNC_WAIT_CTX *ctx = s->waitctx; if (ctx == NULL) return 0; return ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_get_all_fds(ctx, fds, numfds); } int SSL_get_changed_async_fds(SSL *s, OSSL_ASYNC_FD *addfd, size_t *numaddfds, OSSL_ASYNC_FD *delfd, size_t *numdelfds) { ASYNC_WAIT_CTX *ctx = s->waitctx; if (ctx == NULL) return 0; return ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_get_changed_fds(ctx, addfd, numaddfds, delfd, numdelfds); } int SSL_accept(SSL *s) { if (s->handshake_func == NULL) { /* Not properly initialized yet */ SSL_set_accept_state(s); } return SSL_do_handshake(s); } int SSL_connect(SSL *s) { if (s->handshake_func == NULL) { /* Not properly initialized yet */ SSL_set_connect_state(s); } return SSL_do_handshake(s); } long SSL_get_default_timeout(const SSL *s) { return s->method->get_timeout(); } static int ssl_start_async_job(SSL *s, struct ssl_async_args *args, int (*func) (void *)) { int ret; if (s->waitctx == NULL) { s->waitctx = ASYNC_WAIT_CTX_new(); if (s->waitctx == NULL) return -1; } + + s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; switch (ASYNC_start_job(&s->job, s->waitctx, &ret, func, args, sizeof(struct ssl_async_args))) { case ASYNC_ERR: s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_START_ASYNC_JOB, SSL_R_FAILED_TO_INIT_ASYNC); return -1; case ASYNC_PAUSE: s->rwstate = SSL_ASYNC_PAUSED; return -1; case ASYNC_NO_JOBS: s->rwstate = SSL_ASYNC_NO_JOBS; return -1; case ASYNC_FINISH: s->job = NULL; return ret; default: s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_START_ASYNC_JOB, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); /* Shouldn't happen */ return -1; } } static int ssl_io_intern(void *vargs) { struct ssl_async_args *args; SSL *s; void *buf; size_t num; args = (struct ssl_async_args *)vargs; s = args->s; buf = args->buf; num = args->num; switch (args->type) { case READFUNC: return args->f.func_read(s, buf, num, &s->asyncrw); case WRITEFUNC: return args->f.func_write(s, buf, num, &s->asyncrw); case OTHERFUNC: return args->f.func_other(s); } return -1; } int ssl_read_internal(SSL *s, void *buf, size_t num, size_t *readbytes) { if (s->handshake_func == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_READ_INTERNAL, SSL_R_UNINITIALIZED); return -1; } if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) { s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; return 0; } if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECT_RETRY || s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPT_RETRY) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_READ_INTERNAL, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); return 0; } /* * If we are a client and haven't received the ServerHello etc then we * better do that */ ossl_statem_check_finish_init(s, 0); if ((s->mode & SSL_MODE_ASYNC) && ASYNC_get_current_job() == NULL) { struct ssl_async_args args; int ret; args.s = s; args.buf = buf; args.num = num; args.type = READFUNC; args.f.func_read = s->method->ssl_read; ret = ssl_start_async_job(s, &args, ssl_io_intern); *readbytes = s->asyncrw; return ret; } else { return s->method->ssl_read(s, buf, num, readbytes); } } int SSL_read(SSL *s, void *buf, int num) { int ret; size_t readbytes; if (num < 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_READ, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH); return -1; } ret = ssl_read_internal(s, buf, (size_t)num, &readbytes); /* * The cast is safe here because ret should be <= INT_MAX because num is * <= INT_MAX */ if (ret > 0) ret = (int)readbytes; return ret; } int SSL_read_ex(SSL *s, void *buf, size_t num, size_t *readbytes) { int ret = ssl_read_internal(s, buf, num, readbytes); if (ret < 0) ret = 0; return ret; } int SSL_read_early_data(SSL *s, void *buf, size_t num, size_t *readbytes) { int ret; if (!s->server) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_READ_EARLY_DATA, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); return SSL_READ_EARLY_DATA_ERROR; } switch (s->early_data_state) { case SSL_EARLY_DATA_NONE: if (!SSL_in_before(s)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_READ_EARLY_DATA, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); return SSL_READ_EARLY_DATA_ERROR; } /* fall through */ case SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPT_RETRY: s->early_data_state = SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTING; ret = SSL_accept(s); if (ret <= 0) { /* NBIO or error */ s->early_data_state = SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPT_RETRY; return SSL_READ_EARLY_DATA_ERROR; } /* fall through */ case SSL_EARLY_DATA_READ_RETRY: if (s->ext.early_data == SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED) { s->early_data_state = SSL_EARLY_DATA_READING; ret = SSL_read_ex(s, buf, num, readbytes); /* * State machine will update early_data_state to * SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_READING if we get an EndOfEarlyData * message */ if (ret > 0 || (ret <= 0 && s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_READING)) { s->early_data_state = SSL_EARLY_DATA_READ_RETRY; return ret > 0 ? SSL_READ_EARLY_DATA_SUCCESS : SSL_READ_EARLY_DATA_ERROR; } } else { s->early_data_state = SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_READING; } *readbytes = 0; return SSL_READ_EARLY_DATA_FINISH; default: SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_READ_EARLY_DATA, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); return SSL_READ_EARLY_DATA_ERROR; } } int SSL_get_early_data_status(const SSL *s) { return s->ext.early_data; } static int ssl_peek_internal(SSL *s, void *buf, size_t num, size_t *readbytes) { if (s->handshake_func == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PEEK_INTERNAL, SSL_R_UNINITIALIZED); return -1; } if (s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) { return 0; } if ((s->mode & SSL_MODE_ASYNC) && ASYNC_get_current_job() == NULL) { struct ssl_async_args args; int ret; args.s = s; args.buf = buf; args.num = num; args.type = READFUNC; args.f.func_read = s->method->ssl_peek; ret = ssl_start_async_job(s, &args, ssl_io_intern); *readbytes = s->asyncrw; return ret; } else { return s->method->ssl_peek(s, buf, num, readbytes); } } int SSL_peek(SSL *s, void *buf, int num) { int ret; size_t readbytes; if (num < 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PEEK, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH); return -1; } ret = ssl_peek_internal(s, buf, (size_t)num, &readbytes); /* * The cast is safe here because ret should be <= INT_MAX because num is * <= INT_MAX */ if (ret > 0) ret = (int)readbytes; return ret; } int SSL_peek_ex(SSL *s, void *buf, size_t num, size_t *readbytes) { int ret = ssl_peek_internal(s, buf, num, readbytes); if (ret < 0) ret = 0; return ret; } int ssl_write_internal(SSL *s, const void *buf, size_t num, size_t *written) { if (s->handshake_func == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_WRITE_INTERNAL, SSL_R_UNINITIALIZED); return -1; } if (s->shutdown & SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN) { s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_WRITE_INTERNAL, SSL_R_PROTOCOL_IS_SHUTDOWN); return -1; } if (s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECT_RETRY || s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPT_RETRY || s->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_READ_RETRY) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_WRITE_INTERNAL, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); return 0; } /* If we are a client and haven't sent the Finished we better do that */ ossl_statem_check_finish_init(s, 1); if ((s->mode & SSL_MODE_ASYNC) && ASYNC_get_current_job() == NULL) { int ret; struct ssl_async_args args; args.s = s; args.buf = (void *)buf; args.num = num; args.type = WRITEFUNC; args.f.func_write = s->method->ssl_write; ret = ssl_start_async_job(s, &args, ssl_io_intern); *written = s->asyncrw; return ret; } else { return s->method->ssl_write(s, buf, num, written); } } int SSL_write(SSL *s, const void *buf, int num) { int ret; size_t written; if (num < 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_WRITE, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH); return -1; } ret = ssl_write_internal(s, buf, (size_t)num, &written); /* * The cast is safe here because ret should be <= INT_MAX because num is * <= INT_MAX */ if (ret > 0) ret = (int)written; return ret; } int SSL_write_ex(SSL *s, const void *buf, size_t num, size_t *written) { int ret = ssl_write_internal(s, buf, num, written); if (ret < 0) ret = 0; return ret; } int SSL_write_early_data(SSL *s, const void *buf, size_t num, size_t *written) { int ret, early_data_state; size_t writtmp; uint32_t partialwrite; switch (s->early_data_state) { case SSL_EARLY_DATA_NONE: if (s->server || !SSL_in_before(s) || ((s->session == NULL || s->session->ext.max_early_data == 0) && (s->psk_use_session_cb == NULL))) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_WRITE_EARLY_DATA, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); return 0; } /* fall through */ case SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECT_RETRY: s->early_data_state = SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING; ret = SSL_connect(s); if (ret <= 0) { /* NBIO or error */ s->early_data_state = SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECT_RETRY; return 0; } /* fall through */ case SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_RETRY: s->early_data_state = SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITING; /* * We disable partial write for early data because we don't keep track * of how many bytes we've written between the SSL_write_ex() call and * the flush if the flush needs to be retried) */ partialwrite = s->mode & SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE; s->mode &= ~SSL_MODE_ENABLE_PARTIAL_WRITE; ret = SSL_write_ex(s, buf, num, &writtmp); s->mode |= partialwrite; if (!ret) { s->early_data_state = SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_RETRY; return ret; } s->early_data_state = SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_FLUSH; /* fall through */ case SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_FLUSH: /* The buffering BIO is still in place so we need to flush it */ if (statem_flush(s) != 1) return 0; *written = num; s->early_data_state = SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_RETRY; return 1; case SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_READING: case SSL_EARLY_DATA_READ_RETRY: early_data_state = s->early_data_state; /* We are a server writing to an unauthenticated client */ s->early_data_state = SSL_EARLY_DATA_UNAUTH_WRITING; ret = SSL_write_ex(s, buf, num, written); /* The buffering BIO is still in place */ if (ret) (void)BIO_flush(s->wbio); s->early_data_state = early_data_state; return ret; default: SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_WRITE_EARLY_DATA, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); return 0; } } int SSL_shutdown(SSL *s) { /* * Note that this function behaves differently from what one might * expect. Return values are 0 for no success (yet), 1 for success; but * calling it once is usually not enough, even if blocking I/O is used * (see ssl3_shutdown). */ if (s->handshake_func == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SHUTDOWN, SSL_R_UNINITIALIZED); return -1; } if (!SSL_in_init(s)) { if ((s->mode & SSL_MODE_ASYNC) && ASYNC_get_current_job() == NULL) { struct ssl_async_args args; args.s = s; args.type = OTHERFUNC; args.f.func_other = s->method->ssl_shutdown; return ssl_start_async_job(s, &args, ssl_io_intern); } else { return s->method->ssl_shutdown(s); } } else { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SHUTDOWN, SSL_R_SHUTDOWN_WHILE_IN_INIT); return -1; } } int SSL_key_update(SSL *s, int updatetype) { /* * TODO(TLS1.3): How will applications know whether TLSv1.3 has been * negotiated, and that it is appropriate to call SSL_key_update() instead * of SSL_renegotiate(). */ if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_KEY_UPDATE, SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION); return 0; } if (updatetype != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NOT_REQUESTED && updatetype != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_REQUESTED) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_KEY_UPDATE, SSL_R_INVALID_KEY_UPDATE_TYPE); return 0; } if (!SSL_is_init_finished(s)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_KEY_UPDATE, SSL_R_STILL_IN_INIT); return 0; } if (RECORD_LAYER_write_pending(&s->rlayer)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_KEY_UPDATE, SSL_R_BAD_WRITE_RETRY); return 0; } ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 1); s->key_update = updatetype; return 1; } int SSL_get_key_update_type(const SSL *s) { return s->key_update; } int SSL_renegotiate(SSL *s) { if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_RENEGOTIATE, SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION); return 0; } if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_RENEGOTIATE, SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION); return 0; } s->renegotiate = 1; s->new_session = 1; return s->method->ssl_renegotiate(s); } int SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated(SSL *s) { if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_RENEGOTIATE_ABBREVIATED, SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION); return 0; } if ((s->options & SSL_OP_NO_RENEGOTIATION)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_RENEGOTIATE_ABBREVIATED, SSL_R_NO_RENEGOTIATION); return 0; } s->renegotiate = 1; s->new_session = 0; return s->method->ssl_renegotiate(s); } int SSL_renegotiate_pending(const SSL *s) { /* * becomes true when negotiation is requested; false again once a * handshake has finished */ return (s->renegotiate != 0); } long SSL_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, long larg, void *parg) { long l; switch (cmd) { case SSL_CTRL_GET_READ_AHEAD: return RECORD_LAYER_get_read_ahead(&s->rlayer); case SSL_CTRL_SET_READ_AHEAD: l = RECORD_LAYER_get_read_ahead(&s->rlayer); RECORD_LAYER_set_read_ahead(&s->rlayer, larg); return l; case SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK_ARG: s->msg_callback_arg = parg; return 1; case SSL_CTRL_MODE: return (s->mode |= larg); case SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_MODE: return (s->mode &= ~larg); case SSL_CTRL_GET_MAX_CERT_LIST: return (long)s->max_cert_list; case SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_CERT_LIST: if (larg < 0) return 0; l = (long)s->max_cert_list; s->max_cert_list = (size_t)larg; return l; case SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_SEND_FRAGMENT: if (larg < 512 || larg > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH) return 0; s->max_send_fragment = larg; if (s->max_send_fragment < s->split_send_fragment) s->split_send_fragment = s->max_send_fragment; return 1; case SSL_CTRL_SET_SPLIT_SEND_FRAGMENT: if ((size_t)larg > s->max_send_fragment || larg == 0) return 0; s->split_send_fragment = larg; return 1; case SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_PIPELINES: if (larg < 1 || larg > SSL_MAX_PIPELINES) return 0; s->max_pipelines = larg; if (larg > 1) RECORD_LAYER_set_read_ahead(&s->rlayer, 1); return 1; case SSL_CTRL_GET_RI_SUPPORT: if (s->s3) return s->s3->send_connection_binding; else return 0; case SSL_CTRL_CERT_FLAGS: return (s->cert->cert_flags |= larg); case SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_CERT_FLAGS: return (s->cert->cert_flags &= ~larg); case SSL_CTRL_GET_RAW_CIPHERLIST: if (parg) { if (s->s3->tmp.ciphers_raw == NULL) return 0; *(unsigned char **)parg = s->s3->tmp.ciphers_raw; return (int)s->s3->tmp.ciphers_rawlen; } else { return TLS_CIPHER_LEN; } case SSL_CTRL_GET_EXTMS_SUPPORT: if (!s->session || SSL_in_init(s) || ossl_statem_get_in_handshake(s)) return -1; if (s->session->flags & SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS) return 1; else return 0; case SSL_CTRL_SET_MIN_PROTO_VERSION: return ssl_check_allowed_versions(larg, s->max_proto_version) && ssl_set_version_bound(s->ctx->method->version, (int)larg, &s->min_proto_version); case SSL_CTRL_GET_MIN_PROTO_VERSION: return s->min_proto_version; case SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_PROTO_VERSION: return ssl_check_allowed_versions(s->min_proto_version, larg) && ssl_set_version_bound(s->ctx->method->version, (int)larg, &s->max_proto_version); case SSL_CTRL_GET_MAX_PROTO_VERSION: return s->max_proto_version; default: return s->method->ssl_ctrl(s, cmd, larg, parg); } } long SSL_callback_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, void (*fp) (void)) { switch (cmd) { case SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK: s->msg_callback = (void (*) (int write_p, int version, int content_type, const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg))(fp); return 1; default: return s->method->ssl_callback_ctrl(s, cmd, fp); } } LHASH_OF(SSL_SESSION) *SSL_CTX_sessions(SSL_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->sessions; } long SSL_CTX_ctrl(SSL_CTX *ctx, int cmd, long larg, void *parg) { long l; /* For some cases with ctx == NULL perform syntax checks */ if (ctx == NULL) { switch (cmd) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC case SSL_CTRL_SET_GROUPS_LIST: return tls1_set_groups_list(NULL, NULL, parg); #endif case SSL_CTRL_SET_SIGALGS_LIST: case SSL_CTRL_SET_CLIENT_SIGALGS_LIST: return tls1_set_sigalgs_list(NULL, parg, 0); default: return 0; } } switch (cmd) { case SSL_CTRL_GET_READ_AHEAD: return ctx->read_ahead; case SSL_CTRL_SET_READ_AHEAD: l = ctx->read_ahead; ctx->read_ahead = larg; return l; case SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK_ARG: ctx->msg_callback_arg = parg; return 1; case SSL_CTRL_GET_MAX_CERT_LIST: return (long)ctx->max_cert_list; case SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_CERT_LIST: if (larg < 0) return 0; l = (long)ctx->max_cert_list; ctx->max_cert_list = (size_t)larg; return l; case SSL_CTRL_SET_SESS_CACHE_SIZE: if (larg < 0) return 0; l = (long)ctx->session_cache_size; ctx->session_cache_size = (size_t)larg; return l; case SSL_CTRL_GET_SESS_CACHE_SIZE: return (long)ctx->session_cache_size; case SSL_CTRL_SET_SESS_CACHE_MODE: l = ctx->session_cache_mode; ctx->session_cache_mode = larg; return l; case SSL_CTRL_GET_SESS_CACHE_MODE: return ctx->session_cache_mode; case SSL_CTRL_SESS_NUMBER: return lh_SSL_SESSION_num_items(ctx->sessions); case SSL_CTRL_SESS_CONNECT: return tsan_load(&ctx->stats.sess_connect); case SSL_CTRL_SESS_CONNECT_GOOD: return tsan_load(&ctx->stats.sess_connect_good); case SSL_CTRL_SESS_CONNECT_RENEGOTIATE: return tsan_load(&ctx->stats.sess_connect_renegotiate); case SSL_CTRL_SESS_ACCEPT: return tsan_load(&ctx->stats.sess_accept); case SSL_CTRL_SESS_ACCEPT_GOOD: return tsan_load(&ctx->stats.sess_accept_good); case SSL_CTRL_SESS_ACCEPT_RENEGOTIATE: return tsan_load(&ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate); case SSL_CTRL_SESS_HIT: return tsan_load(&ctx->stats.sess_hit); case SSL_CTRL_SESS_CB_HIT: return tsan_load(&ctx->stats.sess_cb_hit); case SSL_CTRL_SESS_MISSES: return tsan_load(&ctx->stats.sess_miss); case SSL_CTRL_SESS_TIMEOUTS: return tsan_load(&ctx->stats.sess_timeout); case SSL_CTRL_SESS_CACHE_FULL: return tsan_load(&ctx->stats.sess_cache_full); case SSL_CTRL_MODE: return (ctx->mode |= larg); case SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_MODE: return (ctx->mode &= ~larg); case SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_SEND_FRAGMENT: if (larg < 512 || larg > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH) return 0; ctx->max_send_fragment = larg; if (ctx->max_send_fragment < ctx->split_send_fragment) ctx->split_send_fragment = ctx->max_send_fragment; return 1; case SSL_CTRL_SET_SPLIT_SEND_FRAGMENT: if ((size_t)larg > ctx->max_send_fragment || larg == 0) return 0; ctx->split_send_fragment = larg; return 1; case SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_PIPELINES: if (larg < 1 || larg > SSL_MAX_PIPELINES) return 0; ctx->max_pipelines = larg; return 1; case SSL_CTRL_CERT_FLAGS: return (ctx->cert->cert_flags |= larg); case SSL_CTRL_CLEAR_CERT_FLAGS: return (ctx->cert->cert_flags &= ~larg); case SSL_CTRL_SET_MIN_PROTO_VERSION: return ssl_check_allowed_versions(larg, ctx->max_proto_version) && ssl_set_version_bound(ctx->method->version, (int)larg, &ctx->min_proto_version); case SSL_CTRL_GET_MIN_PROTO_VERSION: return ctx->min_proto_version; case SSL_CTRL_SET_MAX_PROTO_VERSION: return ssl_check_allowed_versions(ctx->min_proto_version, larg) && ssl_set_version_bound(ctx->method->version, (int)larg, &ctx->max_proto_version); case SSL_CTRL_GET_MAX_PROTO_VERSION: return ctx->max_proto_version; default: return ctx->method->ssl_ctx_ctrl(ctx, cmd, larg, parg); } } long SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(SSL_CTX *ctx, int cmd, void (*fp) (void)) { switch (cmd) { case SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK: ctx->msg_callback = (void (*) (int write_p, int version, int content_type, const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg))(fp); return 1; default: return ctx->method->ssl_ctx_callback_ctrl(ctx, cmd, fp); } } int ssl_cipher_id_cmp(const SSL_CIPHER *a, const SSL_CIPHER *b) { if (a->id > b->id) return 1; if (a->id < b->id) return -1; return 0; } int ssl_cipher_ptr_id_cmp(const SSL_CIPHER *const *ap, const SSL_CIPHER *const *bp) { if ((*ap)->id > (*bp)->id) return 1; if ((*ap)->id < (*bp)->id) return -1; return 0; } /** return a STACK of the ciphers available for the SSL and in order of * preference */ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *SSL_get_ciphers(const SSL *s) { if (s != NULL) { if (s->cipher_list != NULL) { return s->cipher_list; } else if ((s->ctx != NULL) && (s->ctx->cipher_list != NULL)) { return s->ctx->cipher_list; } } return NULL; } STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *SSL_get_client_ciphers(const SSL *s) { if ((s == NULL) || !s->server) return NULL; return s->peer_ciphers; } STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *SSL_get1_supported_ciphers(SSL *s) { STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk = NULL, *ciphers; int i; ciphers = SSL_get_ciphers(s); if (!ciphers) return NULL; if (!ssl_set_client_disabled(s)) return NULL; for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) { const SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i); if (!ssl_cipher_disabled(s, c, SSL_SECOP_CIPHER_SUPPORTED, 0)) { if (!sk) sk = sk_SSL_CIPHER_new_null(); if (!sk) return NULL; if (!sk_SSL_CIPHER_push(sk, c)) { sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(sk); return NULL; } } } return sk; } /** return a STACK of the ciphers available for the SSL and in order of * algorithm id */ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(SSL *s) { if (s != NULL) { if (s->cipher_list_by_id != NULL) { return s->cipher_list_by_id; } else if ((s->ctx != NULL) && (s->ctx->cipher_list_by_id != NULL)) { return s->ctx->cipher_list_by_id; } } return NULL; } /** The old interface to get the same thing as SSL_get_ciphers() */ const char *SSL_get_cipher_list(const SSL *s, int n) { const SSL_CIPHER *c; STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk; if (s == NULL) return NULL; sk = SSL_get_ciphers(s); if ((sk == NULL) || (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk) <= n)) return NULL; c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, n); if (c == NULL) return NULL; return c->name; } /** return a STACK of the ciphers available for the SSL_CTX and in order of * preference */ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *SSL_CTX_get_ciphers(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { if (ctx != NULL) return ctx->cipher_list; return NULL; } /* * Distinguish between ciphers controlled by set_ciphersuite() and * set_cipher_list() when counting. */ static int cipher_list_tls12_num(STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk) { int i, num = 0; const SSL_CIPHER *c; if (sk == NULL) return 0; for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(sk); ++i) { c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(sk, i); if (c->min_tls >= TLS1_3_VERSION) continue; num++; } return num; } /** specify the ciphers to be used by default by the SSL_CTX */ int SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *str) { STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk; sk = ssl_create_cipher_list(ctx->method, ctx->tls13_ciphersuites, &ctx->cipher_list, &ctx->cipher_list_by_id, str, ctx->cert); /* * ssl_create_cipher_list may return an empty stack if it was unable to * find a cipher matching the given rule string (for example if the rule * string specifies a cipher which has been disabled). This is not an * error as far as ssl_create_cipher_list is concerned, and hence * ctx->cipher_list and ctx->cipher_list_by_id has been updated. */ if (sk == NULL) return 0; else if (cipher_list_tls12_num(sk) == 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_CIPHER_LIST, SSL_R_NO_CIPHER_MATCH); return 0; } return 1; } /** specify the ciphers to be used by the SSL */ int SSL_set_cipher_list(SSL *s, const char *str) { STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk; sk = ssl_create_cipher_list(s->ctx->method, s->tls13_ciphersuites, &s->cipher_list, &s->cipher_list_by_id, str, s->cert); /* see comment in SSL_CTX_set_cipher_list */ if (sk == NULL) return 0; else if (cipher_list_tls12_num(sk) == 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_CIPHER_LIST, SSL_R_NO_CIPHER_MATCH); return 0; } return 1; } char *SSL_get_shared_ciphers(const SSL *s, char *buf, int size) { char *p; STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *clntsk, *srvrsk; const SSL_CIPHER *c; int i; if (!s->server || s->peer_ciphers == NULL || size < 2) return NULL; p = buf; clntsk = s->peer_ciphers; srvrsk = SSL_get_ciphers(s); if (clntsk == NULL || srvrsk == NULL) return NULL; if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(clntsk) == 0 || sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(srvrsk) == 0) return NULL; for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(clntsk); i++) { int n; c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(clntsk, i); if (sk_SSL_CIPHER_find(srvrsk, c) < 0) continue; n = strlen(c->name); if (n + 1 > size) { if (p != buf) --p; *p = '\0'; return buf; } strcpy(p, c->name); p += n; *(p++) = ':'; size -= n + 1; } p[-1] = '\0'; return buf; } /** * Return the requested servername (SNI) value. Note that the behaviour varies * depending on: * - whether this is called by the client or the server, * - if we are before or during/after the handshake, * - if a resumption or normal handshake is being attempted/has occurred * - whether we have negotiated TLSv1.2 (or below) or TLSv1.3 * * Note that only the host_name type is defined (RFC 3546). */ const char *SSL_get_servername(const SSL *s, const int type) { /* * If we don't know if we are the client or the server yet then we assume * client. */ int server = s->handshake_func == NULL ? 0 : s->server; if (type != TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name) return NULL; if (server) { /** * Server side * In TLSv1.3 on the server SNI is not associated with the session * but in TLSv1.2 or below it is. * * Before the handshake: * - return NULL * * During/after the handshake (TLSv1.2 or below resumption occurred): * - If a servername was accepted by the server in the original * handshake then it will return that servername, or NULL otherwise. * * During/after the handshake (TLSv1.2 or below resumption did not occur): * - The function will return the servername requested by the client in * this handshake or NULL if none was requested. */ if (s->hit && !SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) return s->session->ext.hostname; } else { /** * Client side * * Before the handshake: * - If a servername has been set via a call to * SSL_set_tlsext_host_name() then it will return that servername * - If one has not been set, but a TLSv1.2 resumption is being * attempted and the session from the original handshake had a * servername accepted by the server then it will return that * servername * - Otherwise it returns NULL * * During/after the handshake (TLSv1.2 or below resumption occurred): * - If the session from the original handshake had a servername accepted * by the server then it will return that servername. * - Otherwise it returns the servername set via * SSL_set_tlsext_host_name() (or NULL if it was not called). * * During/after the handshake (TLSv1.2 or below resumption did not occur): * - It will return the servername set via SSL_set_tlsext_host_name() * (or NULL if it was not called). */ if (SSL_in_before(s)) { if (s->ext.hostname == NULL && s->session != NULL && s->session->ssl_version != TLS1_3_VERSION) return s->session->ext.hostname; } else { if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->hit && s->session->ext.hostname != NULL) return s->session->ext.hostname; } } return s->ext.hostname; } int SSL_get_servername_type(const SSL *s) { if (SSL_get_servername(s, TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name) != NULL) return TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name; return -1; } /* * SSL_select_next_proto implements the standard protocol selection. It is * expected that this function is called from the callback set by * SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb. The protocol data is assumed to be a * vector of 8-bit, length prefixed byte strings. The length byte itself is * not included in the length. A byte string of length 0 is invalid. No byte * string may be truncated. The current, but experimental algorithm for * selecting the protocol is: 1) If the server doesn't support NPN then this * is indicated to the callback. In this case, the client application has to * abort the connection or have a default application level protocol. 2) If * the server supports NPN, but advertises an empty list then the client * selects the first protocol in its list, but indicates via the API that this * fallback case was enacted. 3) Otherwise, the client finds the first * protocol in the server's list that it supports and selects this protocol. * This is because it's assumed that the server has better information about * which protocol a client should use. 4) If the client doesn't support any * of the server's advertised protocols, then this is treated the same as * case 2. It returns either OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED if a common protocol was * found, or OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP if the fallback case was reached. */ int SSL_select_next_proto(unsigned char **out, unsigned char *outlen, const unsigned char *server, unsigned int server_len, const unsigned char *client, unsigned int client_len) { unsigned int i, j; const unsigned char *result; int status = OPENSSL_NPN_UNSUPPORTED; /* * For each protocol in server preference order, see if we support it. */ for (i = 0; i < server_len;) { for (j = 0; j < client_len;) { if (server[i] == client[j] && memcmp(&server[i + 1], &client[j + 1], server[i]) == 0) { /* We found a match */ result = &server[i]; status = OPENSSL_NPN_NEGOTIATED; goto found; } j += client[j]; j++; } i += server[i]; i++; } /* There's no overlap between our protocols and the server's list. */ result = client; status = OPENSSL_NPN_NO_OVERLAP; found: *out = (unsigned char *)result + 1; *outlen = result[0]; return status; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG /* * SSL_get0_next_proto_negotiated sets *data and *len to point to the * client's requested protocol for this connection and returns 0. If the * client didn't request any protocol, then *data is set to NULL. Note that * the client can request any protocol it chooses. The value returned from * this function need not be a member of the list of supported protocols * provided by the callback. */ void SSL_get0_next_proto_negotiated(const SSL *s, const unsigned char **data, unsigned *len) { *data = s->ext.npn; if (!*data) { *len = 0; } else { *len = (unsigned int)s->ext.npn_len; } } /* * SSL_CTX_set_npn_advertised_cb sets a callback that is called when * a TLS server needs a list of supported protocols for Next Protocol * Negotiation. The returned list must be in wire format. The list is * returned by setting |out| to point to it and |outlen| to its length. This * memory will not be modified, but one should assume that the SSL* keeps a * reference to it. The callback should return SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK if it * wishes to advertise. Otherwise, no such extension will be included in the * ServerHello. */ void SSL_CTX_set_npn_advertised_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_CTX_npn_advertised_cb_func cb, void *arg) { ctx->ext.npn_advertised_cb = cb; ctx->ext.npn_advertised_cb_arg = arg; } /* * SSL_CTX_set_next_proto_select_cb sets a callback that is called when a * client needs to select a protocol from the server's provided list. |out| * must be set to point to the selected protocol (which may be within |in|). * The length of the protocol name must be written into |outlen|. The * server's advertised protocols are provided in |in| and |inlen|. The * callback can assume that |in| is syntactically valid. The client must * select a protocol. It is fatal to the connection if this callback returns * a value other than SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK. */ void SSL_CTX_set_npn_select_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_CTX_npn_select_cb_func cb, void *arg) { ctx->ext.npn_select_cb = cb; ctx->ext.npn_select_cb_arg = arg; } #endif static int alpn_value_ok(const unsigned char *protos, unsigned int protos_len) { unsigned int idx; if (protos_len < 2 || protos == NULL) return 0; for (idx = 0; idx < protos_len; idx += protos[idx] + 1) { if (protos[idx] == 0) return 0; } return idx == protos_len; } /* * SSL_CTX_set_alpn_protos sets the ALPN protocol list on |ctx| to |protos|. * |protos| must be in wire-format (i.e. a series of non-empty, 8-bit * length-prefixed strings). Returns 0 on success. */ int SSL_CTX_set_alpn_protos(SSL_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *protos, unsigned int protos_len) { unsigned char *alpn; if (protos_len == 0 || protos == NULL) { OPENSSL_free(ctx->ext.alpn); ctx->ext.alpn = NULL; ctx->ext.alpn_len = 0; return 0; } /* Not valid per RFC */ if (!alpn_value_ok(protos, protos_len)) return 1; alpn = OPENSSL_memdup(protos, protos_len); if (alpn == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_ALPN_PROTOS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 1; } OPENSSL_free(ctx->ext.alpn); ctx->ext.alpn = alpn; ctx->ext.alpn_len = protos_len; return 0; } /* * SSL_set_alpn_protos sets the ALPN protocol list on |ssl| to |protos|. * |protos| must be in wire-format (i.e. a series of non-empty, 8-bit * length-prefixed strings). Returns 0 on success. */ int SSL_set_alpn_protos(SSL *ssl, const unsigned char *protos, unsigned int protos_len) { unsigned char *alpn; if (protos_len == 0 || protos == NULL) { OPENSSL_free(ssl->ext.alpn); ssl->ext.alpn = NULL; ssl->ext.alpn_len = 0; return 0; } /* Not valid per RFC */ if (!alpn_value_ok(protos, protos_len)) return 1; alpn = OPENSSL_memdup(protos, protos_len); if (alpn == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_ALPN_PROTOS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 1; } OPENSSL_free(ssl->ext.alpn); ssl->ext.alpn = alpn; ssl->ext.alpn_len = protos_len; return 0; } /* * SSL_CTX_set_alpn_select_cb sets a callback function on |ctx| that is * called during ClientHello processing in order to select an ALPN protocol * from the client's list of offered protocols. */ void SSL_CTX_set_alpn_select_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_CTX_alpn_select_cb_func cb, void *arg) { ctx->ext.alpn_select_cb = cb; ctx->ext.alpn_select_cb_arg = arg; } /* * SSL_get0_alpn_selected gets the selected ALPN protocol (if any) from |ssl|. * On return it sets |*data| to point to |*len| bytes of protocol name * (not including the leading length-prefix byte). If the server didn't * respond with a negotiated protocol then |*len| will be zero. */ void SSL_get0_alpn_selected(const SSL *ssl, const unsigned char **data, unsigned int *len) { *data = NULL; if (ssl->s3) *data = ssl->s3->alpn_selected; if (*data == NULL) *len = 0; else *len = (unsigned int)ssl->s3->alpn_selected_len; } int SSL_export_keying_material(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, size_t olen, const char *label, size_t llen, const unsigned char *context, size_t contextlen, int use_context) { if (s->session == NULL || (s->version < TLS1_VERSION && s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER)) return -1; return s->method->ssl3_enc->export_keying_material(s, out, olen, label, llen, context, contextlen, use_context); } int SSL_export_keying_material_early(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, size_t olen, const char *label, size_t llen, const unsigned char *context, size_t contextlen) { if (s->version != TLS1_3_VERSION) return 0; return tls13_export_keying_material_early(s, out, olen, label, llen, context, contextlen); } static unsigned long ssl_session_hash(const SSL_SESSION *a) { const unsigned char *session_id = a->session_id; unsigned long l; unsigned char tmp_storage[4]; if (a->session_id_length < sizeof(tmp_storage)) { memset(tmp_storage, 0, sizeof(tmp_storage)); memcpy(tmp_storage, a->session_id, a->session_id_length); session_id = tmp_storage; } l = (unsigned long) ((unsigned long)session_id[0]) | ((unsigned long)session_id[1] << 8L) | ((unsigned long)session_id[2] << 16L) | ((unsigned long)session_id[3] << 24L); return l; } /* * NB: If this function (or indeed the hash function which uses a sort of * coarser function than this one) is changed, ensure * SSL_CTX_has_matching_session_id() is checked accordingly. It relies on * being able to construct an SSL_SESSION that will collide with any existing * session with a matching session ID. */ static int ssl_session_cmp(const SSL_SESSION *a, const SSL_SESSION *b) { if (a->ssl_version != b->ssl_version) return 1; if (a->session_id_length != b->session_id_length) return 1; return memcmp(a->session_id, b->session_id, a->session_id_length); } /* * These wrapper functions should remain rather than redeclaring * SSL_SESSION_hash and SSL_SESSION_cmp for void* types and casting each * variable. The reason is that the functions aren't static, they're exposed * via ssl.h. */ SSL_CTX *SSL_CTX_new(const SSL_METHOD *meth) { SSL_CTX *ret = NULL; if (meth == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW, SSL_R_NULL_SSL_METHOD_PASSED); return NULL; } if (!OPENSSL_init_ssl(OPENSSL_INIT_LOAD_SSL_STRINGS, NULL)) return NULL; if (SSL_get_ex_data_X509_STORE_CTX_idx() < 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW, SSL_R_X509_VERIFICATION_SETUP_PROBLEMS); goto err; } ret = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ret)); if (ret == NULL) goto err; ret->method = meth; ret->min_proto_version = 0; ret->max_proto_version = 0; ret->mode = SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY; ret->session_cache_mode = SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER; ret->session_cache_size = SSL_SESSION_CACHE_MAX_SIZE_DEFAULT; /* We take the system default. */ ret->session_timeout = meth->get_timeout(); ret->references = 1; ret->lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new(); if (ret->lock == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); OPENSSL_free(ret); return NULL; } ret->max_cert_list = SSL_MAX_CERT_LIST_DEFAULT; ret->verify_mode = SSL_VERIFY_NONE; if ((ret->cert = ssl_cert_new()) == NULL) goto err; ret->sessions = lh_SSL_SESSION_new(ssl_session_hash, ssl_session_cmp); if (ret->sessions == NULL) goto err; ret->cert_store = X509_STORE_new(); if (ret->cert_store == NULL) goto err; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT ret->ctlog_store = CTLOG_STORE_new(); if (ret->ctlog_store == NULL) goto err; #endif if (!SSL_CTX_set_ciphersuites(ret, TLS_DEFAULT_CIPHERSUITES)) goto err; if (!ssl_create_cipher_list(ret->method, ret->tls13_ciphersuites, &ret->cipher_list, &ret->cipher_list_by_id, SSL_DEFAULT_CIPHER_LIST, ret->cert) || sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ret->cipher_list) <= 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW, SSL_R_LIBRARY_HAS_NO_CIPHERS); goto err2; } ret->param = X509_VERIFY_PARAM_new(); if (ret->param == NULL) goto err; if ((ret->md5 = EVP_get_digestbyname("ssl3-md5")) == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW, SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_LOAD_SSL3_MD5_ROUTINES); goto err2; } if ((ret->sha1 = EVP_get_digestbyname("ssl3-sha1")) == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW, SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_LOAD_SSL3_SHA1_ROUTINES); goto err2; } if ((ret->ca_names = sk_X509_NAME_new_null()) == NULL) goto err; if ((ret->client_ca_names = sk_X509_NAME_new_null()) == NULL) goto err; if (!CRYPTO_new_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_CTX, ret, &ret->ex_data)) goto err; if ((ret->ext.secure = OPENSSL_secure_zalloc(sizeof(*ret->ext.secure))) == NULL) goto err; /* No compression for DTLS */ if (!(meth->ssl3_enc->enc_flags & SSL_ENC_FLAG_DTLS)) ret->comp_methods = SSL_COMP_get_compression_methods(); ret->max_send_fragment = SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH; ret->split_send_fragment = SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH; /* Setup RFC5077 ticket keys */ if ((RAND_bytes(ret->ext.tick_key_name, sizeof(ret->ext.tick_key_name)) <= 0) || (RAND_priv_bytes(ret->ext.secure->tick_hmac_key, sizeof(ret->ext.secure->tick_hmac_key)) <= 0) || (RAND_priv_bytes(ret->ext.secure->tick_aes_key, sizeof(ret->ext.secure->tick_aes_key)) <= 0)) ret->options |= SSL_OP_NO_TICKET; if (RAND_priv_bytes(ret->ext.cookie_hmac_key, sizeof(ret->ext.cookie_hmac_key)) <= 0) goto err; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP if (!SSL_CTX_SRP_CTX_init(ret)) goto err; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE # ifdef OPENSSL_SSL_CLIENT_ENGINE_AUTO # define eng_strx(x) #x # define eng_str(x) eng_strx(x) /* Use specific client engine automatically... ignore errors */ { ENGINE *eng; eng = ENGINE_by_id(eng_str(OPENSSL_SSL_CLIENT_ENGINE_AUTO)); if (!eng) { ERR_clear_error(); ENGINE_load_builtin_engines(); eng = ENGINE_by_id(eng_str(OPENSSL_SSL_CLIENT_ENGINE_AUTO)); } if (!eng || !SSL_CTX_set_client_cert_engine(ret, eng)) ERR_clear_error(); } # endif #endif /* * Default is to connect to non-RI servers. When RI is more widely * deployed might change this. */ ret->options |= SSL_OP_LEGACY_SERVER_CONNECT; /* * Disable compression by default to prevent CRIME. Applications can * re-enable compression by configuring * SSL_CTX_clear_options(ctx, SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION); * or by using the SSL_CONF library. Similarly we also enable TLSv1.3 * middlebox compatibility by default. This may be disabled by default in * a later OpenSSL version. */ ret->options |= SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION | SSL_OP_ENABLE_MIDDLEBOX_COMPAT; ret->ext.status_type = TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing; /* * We cannot usefully set a default max_early_data here (which gets * propagated in SSL_new(), for the following reason: setting the * SSL field causes tls_construct_stoc_early_data() to tell the * client that early data will be accepted when constructing a TLS 1.3 * session ticket, and the client will accordingly send us early data * when using that ticket (if the client has early data to send). * However, in order for the early data to actually be consumed by * the application, the application must also have calls to * SSL_read_early_data(); otherwise we'll just skip past the early data * and ignore it. So, since the application must add calls to * SSL_read_early_data(), we also require them to add * calls to SSL_CTX_set_max_early_data() in order to use early data, * eliminating the bandwidth-wasting early data in the case described * above. */ ret->max_early_data = 0; /* * Default recv_max_early_data is a fully loaded single record. Could be * split across multiple records in practice. We set this differently to * max_early_data so that, in the default case, we do not advertise any * support for early_data, but if a client were to send us some (e.g. * because of an old, stale ticket) then we will tolerate it and skip over * it. */ ret->recv_max_early_data = SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH; /* By default we send two session tickets automatically in TLSv1.3 */ ret->num_tickets = 2; ssl_ctx_system_config(ret); return ret; err: SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); err2: SSL_CTX_free(ret); return NULL; } int SSL_CTX_up_ref(SSL_CTX *ctx) { int i; if (CRYPTO_UP_REF(&ctx->references, &i, ctx->lock) <= 0) return 0; REF_PRINT_COUNT("SSL_CTX", ctx); REF_ASSERT_ISNT(i < 2); return ((i > 1) ? 1 : 0); } void SSL_CTX_free(SSL_CTX *a) { int i; if (a == NULL) return; CRYPTO_DOWN_REF(&a->references, &i, a->lock); REF_PRINT_COUNT("SSL_CTX", a); if (i > 0) return; REF_ASSERT_ISNT(i < 0); X509_VERIFY_PARAM_free(a->param); dane_ctx_final(&a->dane); /* * Free internal session cache. However: the remove_cb() may reference * the ex_data of SSL_CTX, thus the ex_data store can only be removed * after the sessions were flushed. * As the ex_data handling routines might also touch the session cache, * the most secure solution seems to be: empty (flush) the cache, then * free ex_data, then finally free the cache. * (See ticket [openssl.org #212].) */ if (a->sessions != NULL) SSL_CTX_flush_sessions(a, 0); CRYPTO_free_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL_CTX, a, &a->ex_data); lh_SSL_SESSION_free(a->sessions); X509_STORE_free(a->cert_store); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT CTLOG_STORE_free(a->ctlog_store); #endif sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(a->cipher_list); sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(a->cipher_list_by_id); sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(a->tls13_ciphersuites); ssl_cert_free(a->cert); sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(a->ca_names, X509_NAME_free); sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(a->client_ca_names, X509_NAME_free); sk_X509_pop_free(a->extra_certs, X509_free); a->comp_methods = NULL; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_free(a->srtp_profiles); #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP SSL_CTX_SRP_CTX_free(a); #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE ENGINE_finish(a->client_cert_engine); #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC OPENSSL_free(a->ext.ecpointformats); OPENSSL_free(a->ext.supportedgroups); #endif OPENSSL_free(a->ext.alpn); OPENSSL_secure_free(a->ext.secure); CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(a->lock); OPENSSL_free(a); } void SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, pem_password_cb *cb) { ctx->default_passwd_callback = cb; } void SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb_userdata(SSL_CTX *ctx, void *u) { ctx->default_passwd_callback_userdata = u; } pem_password_cb *SSL_CTX_get_default_passwd_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->default_passwd_callback; } void *SSL_CTX_get_default_passwd_cb_userdata(SSL_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->default_passwd_callback_userdata; } void SSL_set_default_passwd_cb(SSL *s, pem_password_cb *cb) { s->default_passwd_callback = cb; } void SSL_set_default_passwd_cb_userdata(SSL *s, void *u) { s->default_passwd_callback_userdata = u; } pem_password_cb *SSL_get_default_passwd_cb(SSL *s) { return s->default_passwd_callback; } void *SSL_get_default_passwd_cb_userdata(SSL *s) { return s->default_passwd_callback_userdata; } void SSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*cb) (X509_STORE_CTX *, void *), void *arg) { ctx->app_verify_callback = cb; ctx->app_verify_arg = arg; } void SSL_CTX_set_verify(SSL_CTX *ctx, int mode, int (*cb) (int, X509_STORE_CTX *)) { ctx->verify_mode = mode; ctx->default_verify_callback = cb; } void SSL_CTX_set_verify_depth(SSL_CTX *ctx, int depth) { X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_depth(ctx->param, depth); } void SSL_CTX_set_cert_cb(SSL_CTX *c, int (*cb) (SSL *ssl, void *arg), void *arg) { ssl_cert_set_cert_cb(c->cert, cb, arg); } void SSL_set_cert_cb(SSL *s, int (*cb) (SSL *ssl, void *arg), void *arg) { ssl_cert_set_cert_cb(s->cert, cb, arg); } void ssl_set_masks(SSL *s) { CERT *c = s->cert; uint32_t *pvalid = s->s3->tmp.valid_flags; int rsa_enc, rsa_sign, dh_tmp, dsa_sign; unsigned long mask_k, mask_a; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC int have_ecc_cert, ecdsa_ok; #endif if (c == NULL) return; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH dh_tmp = (c->dh_tmp != NULL || c->dh_tmp_cb != NULL || c->dh_tmp_auto); #else dh_tmp = 0; #endif rsa_enc = pvalid[SSL_PKEY_RSA] & CERT_PKEY_VALID; rsa_sign = pvalid[SSL_PKEY_RSA] & CERT_PKEY_VALID; dsa_sign = pvalid[SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN] & CERT_PKEY_VALID; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC have_ecc_cert = pvalid[SSL_PKEY_ECC] & CERT_PKEY_VALID; #endif mask_k = 0; mask_a = 0; #ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG fprintf(stderr, "dht=%d re=%d rs=%d ds=%d\n", dh_tmp, rsa_enc, rsa_sign, dsa_sign); #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST if (ssl_has_cert(s, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512)) { mask_k |= SSL_kGOST; mask_a |= SSL_aGOST12; } if (ssl_has_cert(s, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256)) { mask_k |= SSL_kGOST; mask_a |= SSL_aGOST12; } if (ssl_has_cert(s, SSL_PKEY_GOST01)) { mask_k |= SSL_kGOST; mask_a |= SSL_aGOST01; } #endif if (rsa_enc) mask_k |= SSL_kRSA; if (dh_tmp) mask_k |= SSL_kDHE; /* * If we only have an RSA-PSS certificate allow RSA authentication * if TLS 1.2 and peer supports it. */ if (rsa_enc || rsa_sign || (ssl_has_cert(s, SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN) && pvalid[SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN] & CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN && TLS1_get_version(s) == TLS1_2_VERSION)) mask_a |= SSL_aRSA; if (dsa_sign) { mask_a |= SSL_aDSS; } mask_a |= SSL_aNULL; /* * An ECC certificate may be usable for ECDH and/or ECDSA cipher suites * depending on the key usage extension. */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC if (have_ecc_cert) { uint32_t ex_kusage; ex_kusage = X509_get_key_usage(c->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].x509); ecdsa_ok = ex_kusage & X509v3_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE; if (!(pvalid[SSL_PKEY_ECC] & CERT_PKEY_SIGN)) ecdsa_ok = 0; if (ecdsa_ok) mask_a |= SSL_aECDSA; } /* Allow Ed25519 for TLS 1.2 if peer supports it */ if (!(mask_a & SSL_aECDSA) && ssl_has_cert(s, SSL_PKEY_ED25519) && pvalid[SSL_PKEY_ED25519] & CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN && TLS1_get_version(s) == TLS1_2_VERSION) mask_a |= SSL_aECDSA; /* Allow Ed448 for TLS 1.2 if peer supports it */ if (!(mask_a & SSL_aECDSA) && ssl_has_cert(s, SSL_PKEY_ED448) && pvalid[SSL_PKEY_ED448] & CERT_PKEY_EXPLICIT_SIGN && TLS1_get_version(s) == TLS1_2_VERSION) mask_a |= SSL_aECDSA; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC mask_k |= SSL_kECDHE; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK mask_k |= SSL_kPSK; mask_a |= SSL_aPSK; if (mask_k & SSL_kRSA) mask_k |= SSL_kRSAPSK; if (mask_k & SSL_kDHE) mask_k |= SSL_kDHEPSK; if (mask_k & SSL_kECDHE) mask_k |= SSL_kECDHEPSK; #endif s->s3->tmp.mask_k = mask_k; s->s3->tmp.mask_a = mask_a; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC int ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(X509 *x, SSL *s) { if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aECDSA) { /* key usage, if present, must allow signing */ if (!(X509_get_key_usage(x) & X509v3_KU_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CHECK_SRVR_ECC_CERT_AND_ALG, SSL_R_ECC_CERT_NOT_FOR_SIGNING); return 0; } } return 1; /* all checks are ok */ } #endif int ssl_get_server_cert_serverinfo(SSL *s, const unsigned char **serverinfo, size_t *serverinfo_length) { CERT_PKEY *cpk = s->s3->tmp.cert; *serverinfo_length = 0; if (cpk == NULL || cpk->serverinfo == NULL) return 0; *serverinfo = cpk->serverinfo; *serverinfo_length = cpk->serverinfo_length; return 1; } void ssl_update_cache(SSL *s, int mode) { int i; /* * If the session_id_length is 0, we are not supposed to cache it, and it * would be rather hard to do anyway :-) */ if (s->session->session_id_length == 0) return; /* * If sid_ctx_length is 0 there is no specific application context * associated with this session, so when we try to resume it and * SSL_VERIFY_PEER is requested to verify the client identity, we have no * indication that this is actually a session for the proper application * context, and the *handshake* will fail, not just the resumption attempt. * Do not cache (on the server) these sessions that are not resumable * (clients can set SSL_VERIFY_PEER without needing a sid_ctx set). */ if (s->server && s->session->sid_ctx_length == 0 && (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) != 0) return; i = s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode; if ((i & mode) != 0 && (!s->hit || SSL_IS_TLS13(s))) { /* * Add the session to the internal cache. In server side TLSv1.3 we * normally don't do this because by default it's a full stateless ticket * with only a dummy session id so there is no reason to cache it, * unless: * - we are doing early_data, in which case we cache so that we can * detect replays * - the application has set a remove_session_cb so needs to know about * session timeout events * - SSL_OP_NO_TICKET is set in which case it is a stateful ticket */ if ((i & SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_INTERNAL_STORE) == 0 && (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || !s->server || (s->max_early_data > 0 && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ANTI_REPLAY) == 0) || s->session_ctx->remove_session_cb != NULL || (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_TICKET) != 0)) SSL_CTX_add_session(s->session_ctx, s->session); /* * Add the session to the external cache. We do this even in server side * TLSv1.3 without early data because some applications just want to * know about the creation of a session and aren't doing a full cache. */ if (s->session_ctx->new_session_cb != NULL) { SSL_SESSION_up_ref(s->session); if (!s->session_ctx->new_session_cb(s, s->session)) SSL_SESSION_free(s->session); } } /* auto flush every 255 connections */ if ((!(i & SSL_SESS_CACHE_NO_AUTO_CLEAR)) && ((i & mode) == mode)) { TSAN_QUALIFIER int *stat; if (mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT) stat = &s->session_ctx->stats.sess_connect_good; else stat = &s->session_ctx->stats.sess_accept_good; if ((tsan_load(stat) & 0xff) == 0xff) SSL_CTX_flush_sessions(s->session_ctx, (unsigned long)time(NULL)); } } const SSL_METHOD *SSL_CTX_get_ssl_method(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->method; } const SSL_METHOD *SSL_get_ssl_method(const SSL *s) { return s->method; } int SSL_set_ssl_method(SSL *s, const SSL_METHOD *meth) { int ret = 1; if (s->method != meth) { const SSL_METHOD *sm = s->method; int (*hf) (SSL *) = s->handshake_func; if (sm->version == meth->version) s->method = meth; else { sm->ssl_free(s); s->method = meth; ret = s->method->ssl_new(s); } if (hf == sm->ssl_connect) s->handshake_func = meth->ssl_connect; else if (hf == sm->ssl_accept) s->handshake_func = meth->ssl_accept; } return ret; } int SSL_get_error(const SSL *s, int i) { int reason; unsigned long l; BIO *bio; if (i > 0) return SSL_ERROR_NONE; /* * Make things return SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL when doing SSL_do_handshake etc, * where we do encode the error */ if ((l = ERR_peek_error()) != 0) { if (ERR_GET_LIB(l) == ERR_LIB_SYS) return SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL; else return SSL_ERROR_SSL; } if (SSL_want_read(s)) { bio = SSL_get_rbio(s); if (BIO_should_read(bio)) return SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ; else if (BIO_should_write(bio)) /* * This one doesn't make too much sense ... We never try to write * to the rbio, and an application program where rbio and wbio * are separate couldn't even know what it should wait for. * However if we ever set s->rwstate incorrectly (so that we have * SSL_want_read(s) instead of SSL_want_write(s)) and rbio and * wbio *are* the same, this test works around that bug; so it * might be safer to keep it. */ return SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE; else if (BIO_should_io_special(bio)) { reason = BIO_get_retry_reason(bio); if (reason == BIO_RR_CONNECT) return SSL_ERROR_WANT_CONNECT; else if (reason == BIO_RR_ACCEPT) return SSL_ERROR_WANT_ACCEPT; else return SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL; /* unknown */ } } if (SSL_want_write(s)) { /* Access wbio directly - in order to use the buffered bio if present */ bio = s->wbio; if (BIO_should_write(bio)) return SSL_ERROR_WANT_WRITE; else if (BIO_should_read(bio)) /* * See above (SSL_want_read(s) with BIO_should_write(bio)) */ return SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ; else if (BIO_should_io_special(bio)) { reason = BIO_get_retry_reason(bio); if (reason == BIO_RR_CONNECT) return SSL_ERROR_WANT_CONNECT; else if (reason == BIO_RR_ACCEPT) return SSL_ERROR_WANT_ACCEPT; else return SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL; } } if (SSL_want_x509_lookup(s)) return SSL_ERROR_WANT_X509_LOOKUP; if (SSL_want_async(s)) return SSL_ERROR_WANT_ASYNC; if (SSL_want_async_job(s)) return SSL_ERROR_WANT_ASYNC_JOB; if (SSL_want_client_hello_cb(s)) return SSL_ERROR_WANT_CLIENT_HELLO_CB; if ((s->shutdown & SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN) && (s->s3->warn_alert == SSL_AD_CLOSE_NOTIFY)) return SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN; return SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL; } static int ssl_do_handshake_intern(void *vargs) { struct ssl_async_args *args; SSL *s; args = (struct ssl_async_args *)vargs; s = args->s; return s->handshake_func(s); } int SSL_do_handshake(SSL *s) { int ret = 1; if (s->handshake_func == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_DO_HANDSHAKE, SSL_R_CONNECTION_TYPE_NOT_SET); return -1; } ossl_statem_check_finish_init(s, -1); s->method->ssl_renegotiate_check(s, 0); if (SSL_in_init(s) || SSL_in_before(s)) { if ((s->mode & SSL_MODE_ASYNC) && ASYNC_get_current_job() == NULL) { struct ssl_async_args args; args.s = s; ret = ssl_start_async_job(s, &args, ssl_do_handshake_intern); } else { ret = s->handshake_func(s); } } return ret; } void SSL_set_accept_state(SSL *s) { s->server = 1; s->shutdown = 0; ossl_statem_clear(s); s->handshake_func = s->method->ssl_accept; clear_ciphers(s); } void SSL_set_connect_state(SSL *s) { s->server = 0; s->shutdown = 0; ossl_statem_clear(s); s->handshake_func = s->method->ssl_connect; clear_ciphers(s); } int ssl_undefined_function(SSL *s) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_UNDEFINED_FUNCTION, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); return 0; } int ssl_undefined_void_function(void) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_UNDEFINED_VOID_FUNCTION, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); return 0; } int ssl_undefined_const_function(const SSL *s) { return 0; } const SSL_METHOD *ssl_bad_method(int ver) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BAD_METHOD, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED); return NULL; } const char *ssl_protocol_to_string(int version) { switch(version) { case TLS1_3_VERSION: return "TLSv1.3"; case TLS1_2_VERSION: return "TLSv1.2"; case TLS1_1_VERSION: return "TLSv1.1"; case TLS1_VERSION: return "TLSv1"; case SSL3_VERSION: return "SSLv3"; case DTLS1_BAD_VER: return "DTLSv0.9"; case DTLS1_VERSION: return "DTLSv1"; case DTLS1_2_VERSION: return "DTLSv1.2"; default: return "unknown"; } } const char *SSL_get_version(const SSL *s) { return ssl_protocol_to_string(s->version); } static int dup_ca_names(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) **dst, STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *src) { STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk; X509_NAME *xn; int i; if (src == NULL) { *dst = NULL; return 1; } if ((sk = sk_X509_NAME_new_null()) == NULL) return 0; for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(src); i++) { xn = X509_NAME_dup(sk_X509_NAME_value(src, i)); if (xn == NULL) { sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(sk, X509_NAME_free); return 0; } if (sk_X509_NAME_insert(sk, xn, i) == 0) { X509_NAME_free(xn); sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(sk, X509_NAME_free); return 0; } } *dst = sk; return 1; } SSL *SSL_dup(SSL *s) { SSL *ret; int i; /* If we're not quiescent, just up_ref! */ if (!SSL_in_init(s) || !SSL_in_before(s)) { CRYPTO_UP_REF(&s->references, &i, s->lock); return s; } /* * Otherwise, copy configuration state, and session if set. */ if ((ret = SSL_new(SSL_get_SSL_CTX(s))) == NULL) return NULL; if (s->session != NULL) { /* * Arranges to share the same session via up_ref. This "copies" * session-id, SSL_METHOD, sid_ctx, and 'cert' */ if (!SSL_copy_session_id(ret, s)) goto err; } else { /* * No session has been established yet, so we have to expect that * s->cert or ret->cert will be changed later -- they should not both * point to the same object, and thus we can't use * SSL_copy_session_id. */ if (!SSL_set_ssl_method(ret, s->method)) goto err; if (s->cert != NULL) { ssl_cert_free(ret->cert); ret->cert = ssl_cert_dup(s->cert); if (ret->cert == NULL) goto err; } if (!SSL_set_session_id_context(ret, s->sid_ctx, (int)s->sid_ctx_length)) goto err; } if (!ssl_dane_dup(ret, s)) goto err; ret->version = s->version; ret->options = s->options; ret->min_proto_version = s->min_proto_version; ret->max_proto_version = s->max_proto_version; ret->mode = s->mode; SSL_set_max_cert_list(ret, SSL_get_max_cert_list(s)); SSL_set_read_ahead(ret, SSL_get_read_ahead(s)); ret->msg_callback = s->msg_callback; ret->msg_callback_arg = s->msg_callback_arg; SSL_set_verify(ret, SSL_get_verify_mode(s), SSL_get_verify_callback(s)); SSL_set_verify_depth(ret, SSL_get_verify_depth(s)); ret->generate_session_id = s->generate_session_id; SSL_set_info_callback(ret, SSL_get_info_callback(s)); /* copy app data, a little dangerous perhaps */ if (!CRYPTO_dup_ex_data(CRYPTO_EX_INDEX_SSL, &ret->ex_data, &s->ex_data)) goto err; ret->server = s->server; if (s->handshake_func) { if (s->server) SSL_set_accept_state(ret); else SSL_set_connect_state(ret); } ret->shutdown = s->shutdown; ret->hit = s->hit; ret->default_passwd_callback = s->default_passwd_callback; ret->default_passwd_callback_userdata = s->default_passwd_callback_userdata; X509_VERIFY_PARAM_inherit(ret->param, s->param); /* dup the cipher_list and cipher_list_by_id stacks */ if (s->cipher_list != NULL) { if ((ret->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->cipher_list)) == NULL) goto err; } if (s->cipher_list_by_id != NULL) if ((ret->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->cipher_list_by_id)) == NULL) goto err; /* Dup the client_CA list */ if (!dup_ca_names(&ret->ca_names, s->ca_names) || !dup_ca_names(&ret->client_ca_names, s->client_ca_names)) goto err; return ret; err: SSL_free(ret); return NULL; } void ssl_clear_cipher_ctx(SSL *s) { if (s->enc_read_ctx != NULL) { EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(s->enc_read_ctx); s->enc_read_ctx = NULL; } if (s->enc_write_ctx != NULL) { EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(s->enc_write_ctx); s->enc_write_ctx = NULL; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP COMP_CTX_free(s->expand); s->expand = NULL; COMP_CTX_free(s->compress); s->compress = NULL; #endif } X509 *SSL_get_certificate(const SSL *s) { if (s->cert != NULL) return s->cert->key->x509; else return NULL; } EVP_PKEY *SSL_get_privatekey(const SSL *s) { if (s->cert != NULL) return s->cert->key->privatekey; else return NULL; } X509 *SSL_CTX_get0_certificate(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { if (ctx->cert != NULL) return ctx->cert->key->x509; else return NULL; } EVP_PKEY *SSL_CTX_get0_privatekey(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { if (ctx->cert != NULL) return ctx->cert->key->privatekey; else return NULL; } const SSL_CIPHER *SSL_get_current_cipher(const SSL *s) { if ((s->session != NULL) && (s->session->cipher != NULL)) return s->session->cipher; return NULL; } const SSL_CIPHER *SSL_get_pending_cipher(const SSL *s) { return s->s3->tmp.new_cipher; } const COMP_METHOD *SSL_get_current_compression(const SSL *s) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP return s->compress ? COMP_CTX_get_method(s->compress) : NULL; #else return NULL; #endif } const COMP_METHOD *SSL_get_current_expansion(const SSL *s) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP return s->expand ? COMP_CTX_get_method(s->expand) : NULL; #else return NULL; #endif } int ssl_init_wbio_buffer(SSL *s) { BIO *bbio; if (s->bbio != NULL) { /* Already buffered. */ return 1; } bbio = BIO_new(BIO_f_buffer()); if (bbio == NULL || !BIO_set_read_buffer_size(bbio, 1)) { BIO_free(bbio); SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_INIT_WBIO_BUFFER, ERR_R_BUF_LIB); return 0; } s->bbio = bbio; s->wbio = BIO_push(bbio, s->wbio); return 1; } int ssl_free_wbio_buffer(SSL *s) { /* callers ensure s is never null */ if (s->bbio == NULL) return 1; s->wbio = BIO_pop(s->wbio); BIO_free(s->bbio); s->bbio = NULL; return 1; } void SSL_CTX_set_quiet_shutdown(SSL_CTX *ctx, int mode) { ctx->quiet_shutdown = mode; } int SSL_CTX_get_quiet_shutdown(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->quiet_shutdown; } void SSL_set_quiet_shutdown(SSL *s, int mode) { s->quiet_shutdown = mode; } int SSL_get_quiet_shutdown(const SSL *s) { return s->quiet_shutdown; } void SSL_set_shutdown(SSL *s, int mode) { s->shutdown = mode; } int SSL_get_shutdown(const SSL *s) { return s->shutdown; } int SSL_version(const SSL *s) { return s->version; } int SSL_client_version(const SSL *s) { return s->client_version; } SSL_CTX *SSL_get_SSL_CTX(const SSL *ssl) { return ssl->ctx; } SSL_CTX *SSL_set_SSL_CTX(SSL *ssl, SSL_CTX *ctx) { CERT *new_cert; if (ssl->ctx == ctx) return ssl->ctx; if (ctx == NULL) ctx = ssl->session_ctx; new_cert = ssl_cert_dup(ctx->cert); if (new_cert == NULL) { return NULL; } if (!custom_exts_copy_flags(&new_cert->custext, &ssl->cert->custext)) { ssl_cert_free(new_cert); return NULL; } ssl_cert_free(ssl->cert); ssl->cert = new_cert; /* * Program invariant: |sid_ctx| has fixed size (SSL_MAX_SID_CTX_LENGTH), * so setter APIs must prevent invalid lengths from entering the system. */ if (!ossl_assert(ssl->sid_ctx_length <= sizeof(ssl->sid_ctx))) return NULL; /* * If the session ID context matches that of the parent SSL_CTX, * inherit it from the new SSL_CTX as well. If however the context does * not match (i.e., it was set per-ssl with SSL_set_session_id_context), * leave it unchanged. */ if ((ssl->ctx != NULL) && (ssl->sid_ctx_length == ssl->ctx->sid_ctx_length) && (memcmp(ssl->sid_ctx, ssl->ctx->sid_ctx, ssl->sid_ctx_length) == 0)) { ssl->sid_ctx_length = ctx->sid_ctx_length; memcpy(&ssl->sid_ctx, &ctx->sid_ctx, sizeof(ssl->sid_ctx)); } SSL_CTX_up_ref(ctx); SSL_CTX_free(ssl->ctx); /* decrement reference count */ ssl->ctx = ctx; return ssl->ctx; } int SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_paths(SSL_CTX *ctx) { return X509_STORE_set_default_paths(ctx->cert_store); } int SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_dir(SSL_CTX *ctx) { X509_LOOKUP *lookup; lookup = X509_STORE_add_lookup(ctx->cert_store, X509_LOOKUP_hash_dir()); if (lookup == NULL) return 0; X509_LOOKUP_add_dir(lookup, NULL, X509_FILETYPE_DEFAULT); /* Clear any errors if the default directory does not exist */ ERR_clear_error(); return 1; } int SSL_CTX_set_default_verify_file(SSL_CTX *ctx) { X509_LOOKUP *lookup; lookup = X509_STORE_add_lookup(ctx->cert_store, X509_LOOKUP_file()); if (lookup == NULL) return 0; X509_LOOKUP_load_file(lookup, NULL, X509_FILETYPE_DEFAULT); /* Clear any errors if the default file does not exist */ ERR_clear_error(); return 1; } int SSL_CTX_load_verify_locations(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *CAfile, const char *CApath) { return X509_STORE_load_locations(ctx->cert_store, CAfile, CApath); } void SSL_set_info_callback(SSL *ssl, void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val)) { ssl->info_callback = cb; } /* * One compiler (Diab DCC) doesn't like argument names in returned function * pointer. */ void (*SSL_get_info_callback(const SSL *ssl)) (const SSL * /* ssl */ , int /* type */ , int /* val */ ) { return ssl->info_callback; } void SSL_set_verify_result(SSL *ssl, long arg) { ssl->verify_result = arg; } long SSL_get_verify_result(const SSL *ssl) { return ssl->verify_result; } size_t SSL_get_client_random(const SSL *ssl, unsigned char *out, size_t outlen) { if (outlen == 0) return sizeof(ssl->s3->client_random); if (outlen > sizeof(ssl->s3->client_random)) outlen = sizeof(ssl->s3->client_random); memcpy(out, ssl->s3->client_random, outlen); return outlen; } size_t SSL_get_server_random(const SSL *ssl, unsigned char *out, size_t outlen) { if (outlen == 0) return sizeof(ssl->s3->server_random); if (outlen > sizeof(ssl->s3->server_random)) outlen = sizeof(ssl->s3->server_random); memcpy(out, ssl->s3->server_random, outlen); return outlen; } size_t SSL_SESSION_get_master_key(const SSL_SESSION *session, unsigned char *out, size_t outlen) { if (outlen == 0) return session->master_key_length; if (outlen > session->master_key_length) outlen = session->master_key_length; memcpy(out, session->master_key, outlen); return outlen; } int SSL_SESSION_set1_master_key(SSL_SESSION *sess, const unsigned char *in, size_t len) { if (len > sizeof(sess->master_key)) return 0; memcpy(sess->master_key, in, len); sess->master_key_length = len; return 1; } int SSL_set_ex_data(SSL *s, int idx, void *arg) { return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&s->ex_data, idx, arg); } void *SSL_get_ex_data(const SSL *s, int idx) { return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&s->ex_data, idx); } int SSL_CTX_set_ex_data(SSL_CTX *s, int idx, void *arg) { return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&s->ex_data, idx, arg); } void *SSL_CTX_get_ex_data(const SSL_CTX *s, int idx) { return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&s->ex_data, idx); } X509_STORE *SSL_CTX_get_cert_store(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->cert_store; } void SSL_CTX_set_cert_store(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store) { X509_STORE_free(ctx->cert_store); ctx->cert_store = store; } void SSL_CTX_set1_cert_store(SSL_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store) { if (store != NULL) X509_STORE_up_ref(store); SSL_CTX_set_cert_store(ctx, store); } int SSL_want(const SSL *s) { return s->rwstate; } /** * \brief Set the callback for generating temporary DH keys. * \param ctx the SSL context. * \param dh the callback */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH void SSL_CTX_set_tmp_dh_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, DH *(*dh) (SSL *ssl, int is_export, int keylength)) { SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(ctx, SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_DH_CB, (void (*)(void))dh); } void SSL_set_tmp_dh_callback(SSL *ssl, DH *(*dh) (SSL *ssl, int is_export, int keylength)) { SSL_callback_ctrl(ssl, SSL_CTRL_SET_TMP_DH_CB, (void (*)(void))dh); } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK int SSL_CTX_use_psk_identity_hint(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *identity_hint) { if (identity_hint != NULL && strlen(identity_hint) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_PSK_IDENTITY_HINT, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); return 0; } OPENSSL_free(ctx->cert->psk_identity_hint); if (identity_hint != NULL) { ctx->cert->psk_identity_hint = OPENSSL_strdup(identity_hint); if (ctx->cert->psk_identity_hint == NULL) return 0; } else ctx->cert->psk_identity_hint = NULL; return 1; } int SSL_use_psk_identity_hint(SSL *s, const char *identity_hint) { if (s == NULL) return 0; if (identity_hint != NULL && strlen(identity_hint) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_USE_PSK_IDENTITY_HINT, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); return 0; } OPENSSL_free(s->cert->psk_identity_hint); if (identity_hint != NULL) { s->cert->psk_identity_hint = OPENSSL_strdup(identity_hint); if (s->cert->psk_identity_hint == NULL) return 0; } else s->cert->psk_identity_hint = NULL; return 1; } const char *SSL_get_psk_identity_hint(const SSL *s) { if (s == NULL || s->session == NULL) return NULL; return s->session->psk_identity_hint; } const char *SSL_get_psk_identity(const SSL *s) { if (s == NULL || s->session == NULL) return NULL; return s->session->psk_identity; } void SSL_set_psk_client_callback(SSL *s, SSL_psk_client_cb_func cb) { s->psk_client_callback = cb; } void SSL_CTX_set_psk_client_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_psk_client_cb_func cb) { ctx->psk_client_callback = cb; } void SSL_set_psk_server_callback(SSL *s, SSL_psk_server_cb_func cb) { s->psk_server_callback = cb; } void SSL_CTX_set_psk_server_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_psk_server_cb_func cb) { ctx->psk_server_callback = cb; } #endif void SSL_set_psk_find_session_callback(SSL *s, SSL_psk_find_session_cb_func cb) { s->psk_find_session_cb = cb; } void SSL_CTX_set_psk_find_session_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_psk_find_session_cb_func cb) { ctx->psk_find_session_cb = cb; } void SSL_set_psk_use_session_callback(SSL *s, SSL_psk_use_session_cb_func cb) { s->psk_use_session_cb = cb; } void SSL_CTX_set_psk_use_session_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_psk_use_session_cb_func cb) { ctx->psk_use_session_cb = cb; } void SSL_CTX_set_msg_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, void (*cb) (int write_p, int version, int content_type, const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg)) { SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(ctx, SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK, (void (*)(void))cb); } void SSL_set_msg_callback(SSL *ssl, void (*cb) (int write_p, int version, int content_type, const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg)) { SSL_callback_ctrl(ssl, SSL_CTRL_SET_MSG_CALLBACK, (void (*)(void))cb); } void SSL_CTX_set_not_resumable_session_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*cb) (SSL *ssl, int is_forward_secure)) { SSL_CTX_callback_ctrl(ctx, SSL_CTRL_SET_NOT_RESUMABLE_SESS_CB, (void (*)(void))cb); } void SSL_set_not_resumable_session_callback(SSL *ssl, int (*cb) (SSL *ssl, int is_forward_secure)) { SSL_callback_ctrl(ssl, SSL_CTRL_SET_NOT_RESUMABLE_SESS_CB, (void (*)(void))cb); } void SSL_CTX_set_record_padding_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, size_t (*cb) (SSL *ssl, int type, size_t len, void *arg)) { ctx->record_padding_cb = cb; } void SSL_CTX_set_record_padding_callback_arg(SSL_CTX *ctx, void *arg) { ctx->record_padding_arg = arg; } void *SSL_CTX_get_record_padding_callback_arg(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->record_padding_arg; } int SSL_CTX_set_block_padding(SSL_CTX *ctx, size_t block_size) { /* block size of 0 or 1 is basically no padding */ if (block_size == 1) ctx->block_padding = 0; else if (block_size <= SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH) ctx->block_padding = block_size; else return 0; return 1; } void SSL_set_record_padding_callback(SSL *ssl, size_t (*cb) (SSL *ssl, int type, size_t len, void *arg)) { ssl->record_padding_cb = cb; } void SSL_set_record_padding_callback_arg(SSL *ssl, void *arg) { ssl->record_padding_arg = arg; } void *SSL_get_record_padding_callback_arg(const SSL *ssl) { return ssl->record_padding_arg; } int SSL_set_block_padding(SSL *ssl, size_t block_size) { /* block size of 0 or 1 is basically no padding */ if (block_size == 1) ssl->block_padding = 0; else if (block_size <= SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH) ssl->block_padding = block_size; else return 0; return 1; } int SSL_set_num_tickets(SSL *s, size_t num_tickets) { s->num_tickets = num_tickets; return 1; } size_t SSL_get_num_tickets(const SSL *s) { return s->num_tickets; } int SSL_CTX_set_num_tickets(SSL_CTX *ctx, size_t num_tickets) { ctx->num_tickets = num_tickets; return 1; } size_t SSL_CTX_get_num_tickets(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->num_tickets; } /* * Allocates new EVP_MD_CTX and sets pointer to it into given pointer * variable, freeing EVP_MD_CTX previously stored in that variable, if any. * If EVP_MD pointer is passed, initializes ctx with this |md|. * Returns the newly allocated ctx; */ EVP_MD_CTX *ssl_replace_hash(EVP_MD_CTX **hash, const EVP_MD *md) { ssl_clear_hash_ctx(hash); *hash = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); if (*hash == NULL || (md && EVP_DigestInit_ex(*hash, md, NULL) <= 0)) { EVP_MD_CTX_free(*hash); *hash = NULL; return NULL; } return *hash; } void ssl_clear_hash_ctx(EVP_MD_CTX **hash) { EVP_MD_CTX_free(*hash); *hash = NULL; } /* Retrieve handshake hashes */ int ssl_handshake_hash(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, size_t outlen, size_t *hashlen) { EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = NULL; EVP_MD_CTX *hdgst = s->s3->handshake_dgst; int hashleni = EVP_MD_CTX_size(hdgst); int ret = 0; if (hashleni < 0 || (size_t)hashleni > outlen) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_HANDSHAKE_HASH, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); if (ctx == NULL) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_HANDSHAKE_HASH, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(ctx, hdgst) || EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx, out, NULL) <= 0) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_HANDSHAKE_HASH, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } *hashlen = hashleni; ret = 1; err: EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx); return ret; } int SSL_session_reused(const SSL *s) { return s->hit; } int SSL_is_server(const SSL *s) { return s->server; } #if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L void SSL_set_debug(SSL *s, int debug) { /* Old function was do-nothing anyway... */ (void)s; (void)debug; } #endif void SSL_set_security_level(SSL *s, int level) { s->cert->sec_level = level; } int SSL_get_security_level(const SSL *s) { return s->cert->sec_level; } void SSL_set_security_callback(SSL *s, int (*cb) (const SSL *s, const SSL_CTX *ctx, int op, int bits, int nid, void *other, void *ex)) { s->cert->sec_cb = cb; } int (*SSL_get_security_callback(const SSL *s)) (const SSL *s, const SSL_CTX *ctx, int op, int bits, int nid, void *other, void *ex) { return s->cert->sec_cb; } void SSL_set0_security_ex_data(SSL *s, void *ex) { s->cert->sec_ex = ex; } void *SSL_get0_security_ex_data(const SSL *s) { return s->cert->sec_ex; } void SSL_CTX_set_security_level(SSL_CTX *ctx, int level) { ctx->cert->sec_level = level; } int SSL_CTX_get_security_level(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->cert->sec_level; } void SSL_CTX_set_security_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, int (*cb) (const SSL *s, const SSL_CTX *ctx, int op, int bits, int nid, void *other, void *ex)) { ctx->cert->sec_cb = cb; } int (*SSL_CTX_get_security_callback(const SSL_CTX *ctx)) (const SSL *s, const SSL_CTX *ctx, int op, int bits, int nid, void *other, void *ex) { return ctx->cert->sec_cb; } void SSL_CTX_set0_security_ex_data(SSL_CTX *ctx, void *ex) { ctx->cert->sec_ex = ex; } void *SSL_CTX_get0_security_ex_data(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->cert->sec_ex; } /* * Get/Set/Clear options in SSL_CTX or SSL, formerly macros, now functions that * can return unsigned long, instead of the generic long return value from the * control interface. */ unsigned long SSL_CTX_get_options(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->options; } unsigned long SSL_get_options(const SSL *s) { return s->options; } unsigned long SSL_CTX_set_options(SSL_CTX *ctx, unsigned long op) { return ctx->options |= op; } unsigned long SSL_set_options(SSL *s, unsigned long op) { return s->options |= op; } unsigned long SSL_CTX_clear_options(SSL_CTX *ctx, unsigned long op) { return ctx->options &= ~op; } unsigned long SSL_clear_options(SSL *s, unsigned long op) { return s->options &= ~op; } STACK_OF(X509) *SSL_get0_verified_chain(const SSL *s) { return s->verified_chain; } IMPLEMENT_OBJ_BSEARCH_GLOBAL_CMP_FN(SSL_CIPHER, SSL_CIPHER, ssl_cipher_id); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT /* * Moves SCTs from the |src| stack to the |dst| stack. * The source of each SCT will be set to |origin|. * If |dst| points to a NULL pointer, a new stack will be created and owned by * the caller. * Returns the number of SCTs moved, or a negative integer if an error occurs. */ static int ct_move_scts(STACK_OF(SCT) **dst, STACK_OF(SCT) *src, sct_source_t origin) { int scts_moved = 0; SCT *sct = NULL; if (*dst == NULL) { *dst = sk_SCT_new_null(); if (*dst == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_CT_MOVE_SCTS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } } while ((sct = sk_SCT_pop(src)) != NULL) { if (SCT_set_source(sct, origin) != 1) goto err; if (sk_SCT_push(*dst, sct) <= 0) goto err; scts_moved += 1; } return scts_moved; err: if (sct != NULL) sk_SCT_push(src, sct); /* Put the SCT back */ return -1; } /* * Look for data collected during ServerHello and parse if found. * Returns the number of SCTs extracted. */ static int ct_extract_tls_extension_scts(SSL *s) { int scts_extracted = 0; if (s->ext.scts != NULL) { const unsigned char *p = s->ext.scts; STACK_OF(SCT) *scts = o2i_SCT_LIST(NULL, &p, s->ext.scts_len); scts_extracted = ct_move_scts(&s->scts, scts, SCT_SOURCE_TLS_EXTENSION); SCT_LIST_free(scts); } return scts_extracted; } /* * Checks for an OCSP response and then attempts to extract any SCTs found if it * contains an SCT X509 extension. They will be stored in |s->scts|. * Returns: * - The number of SCTs extracted, assuming an OCSP response exists. * - 0 if no OCSP response exists or it contains no SCTs. * - A negative integer if an error occurs. */ static int ct_extract_ocsp_response_scts(SSL *s) { # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP int scts_extracted = 0; const unsigned char *p; OCSP_BASICRESP *br = NULL; OCSP_RESPONSE *rsp = NULL; STACK_OF(SCT) *scts = NULL; int i; if (s->ext.ocsp.resp == NULL || s->ext.ocsp.resp_len == 0) goto err; p = s->ext.ocsp.resp; rsp = d2i_OCSP_RESPONSE(NULL, &p, (int)s->ext.ocsp.resp_len); if (rsp == NULL) goto err; br = OCSP_response_get1_basic(rsp); if (br == NULL) goto err; for (i = 0; i < OCSP_resp_count(br); ++i) { OCSP_SINGLERESP *single = OCSP_resp_get0(br, i); if (single == NULL) continue; scts = OCSP_SINGLERESP_get1_ext_d2i(single, NID_ct_cert_scts, NULL, NULL); scts_extracted = ct_move_scts(&s->scts, scts, SCT_SOURCE_OCSP_STAPLED_RESPONSE); if (scts_extracted < 0) goto err; } err: SCT_LIST_free(scts); OCSP_BASICRESP_free(br); OCSP_RESPONSE_free(rsp); return scts_extracted; # else /* Behave as if no OCSP response exists */ return 0; # endif } /* * Attempts to extract SCTs from the peer certificate. * Return the number of SCTs extracted, or a negative integer if an error * occurs. */ static int ct_extract_x509v3_extension_scts(SSL *s) { int scts_extracted = 0; X509 *cert = s->session != NULL ? s->session->peer : NULL; if (cert != NULL) { STACK_OF(SCT) *scts = X509_get_ext_d2i(cert, NID_ct_precert_scts, NULL, NULL); scts_extracted = ct_move_scts(&s->scts, scts, SCT_SOURCE_X509V3_EXTENSION); SCT_LIST_free(scts); } return scts_extracted; } /* * Attempts to find all received SCTs by checking TLS extensions, the OCSP * response (if it exists) and X509v3 extensions in the certificate. * Returns NULL if an error occurs. */ const STACK_OF(SCT) *SSL_get0_peer_scts(SSL *s) { if (!s->scts_parsed) { if (ct_extract_tls_extension_scts(s) < 0 || ct_extract_ocsp_response_scts(s) < 0 || ct_extract_x509v3_extension_scts(s) < 0) goto err; s->scts_parsed = 1; } return s->scts; err: return NULL; } static int ct_permissive(const CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX * ctx, const STACK_OF(SCT) *scts, void *unused_arg) { return 1; } static int ct_strict(const CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX * ctx, const STACK_OF(SCT) *scts, void *unused_arg) { int count = scts != NULL ? sk_SCT_num(scts) : 0; int i; for (i = 0; i < count; ++i) { SCT *sct = sk_SCT_value(scts, i); int status = SCT_get_validation_status(sct); if (status == SCT_VALIDATION_STATUS_VALID) return 1; } SSLerr(SSL_F_CT_STRICT, SSL_R_NO_VALID_SCTS); return 0; } int SSL_set_ct_validation_callback(SSL *s, ssl_ct_validation_cb callback, void *arg) { /* * Since code exists that uses the custom extension handler for CT, look * for this and throw an error if they have already registered to use CT. */ if (callback != NULL && SSL_CTX_has_client_custom_ext(s->ctx, TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_SET_CT_VALIDATION_CALLBACK, SSL_R_CUSTOM_EXT_HANDLER_ALREADY_INSTALLED); return 0; } if (callback != NULL) { /* * If we are validating CT, then we MUST accept SCTs served via OCSP */ if (!SSL_set_tlsext_status_type(s, TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp)) return 0; } s->ct_validation_callback = callback; s->ct_validation_callback_arg = arg; return 1; } int SSL_CTX_set_ct_validation_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, ssl_ct_validation_cb callback, void *arg) { /* * Since code exists that uses the custom extension handler for CT, look for * this and throw an error if they have already registered to use CT. */ if (callback != NULL && SSL_CTX_has_client_custom_ext(ctx, TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_CT_VALIDATION_CALLBACK, SSL_R_CUSTOM_EXT_HANDLER_ALREADY_INSTALLED); return 0; } ctx->ct_validation_callback = callback; ctx->ct_validation_callback_arg = arg; return 1; } int SSL_ct_is_enabled(const SSL *s) { return s->ct_validation_callback != NULL; } int SSL_CTX_ct_is_enabled(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->ct_validation_callback != NULL; } int ssl_validate_ct(SSL *s) { int ret = 0; X509 *cert = s->session != NULL ? s->session->peer : NULL; X509 *issuer; SSL_DANE *dane = &s->dane; CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX *ctx = NULL; const STACK_OF(SCT) *scts; /* * If no callback is set, the peer is anonymous, or its chain is invalid, * skip SCT validation - just return success. Applications that continue * handshakes without certificates, with unverified chains, or pinned leaf * certificates are outside the scope of the WebPKI and CT. * * The above exclusions notwithstanding the vast majority of peers will * have rather ordinary certificate chains validated by typical * applications that perform certificate verification and therefore will * process SCTs when enabled. */ if (s->ct_validation_callback == NULL || cert == NULL || s->verify_result != X509_V_OK || s->verified_chain == NULL || sk_X509_num(s->verified_chain) <= 1) return 1; /* * CT not applicable for chains validated via DANE-TA(2) or DANE-EE(3) * trust-anchors. See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7671#section-4.2 */ if (DANETLS_ENABLED(dane) && dane->mtlsa != NULL) { switch (dane->mtlsa->usage) { case DANETLS_USAGE_DANE_TA: case DANETLS_USAGE_DANE_EE: return 1; } } ctx = CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_new(); if (ctx == NULL) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_VALIDATE_CT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto end; } issuer = sk_X509_value(s->verified_chain, 1); CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_set1_cert(ctx, cert); CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_set1_issuer(ctx, issuer); CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_set_shared_CTLOG_STORE(ctx, s->ctx->ctlog_store); CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_set_time( ctx, (uint64_t)SSL_SESSION_get_time(SSL_get0_session(s)) * 1000); scts = SSL_get0_peer_scts(s); /* * This function returns success (> 0) only when all the SCTs are valid, 0 * when some are invalid, and < 0 on various internal errors (out of * memory, etc.). Having some, or even all, invalid SCTs is not sufficient * reason to abort the handshake, that decision is up to the callback. * Therefore, we error out only in the unexpected case that the return * value is negative. * * XXX: One might well argue that the return value of this function is an * unfortunate design choice. Its job is only to determine the validation * status of each of the provided SCTs. So long as it correctly separates * the wheat from the chaff it should return success. Failure in this case * ought to correspond to an inability to carry out its duties. */ if (SCT_LIST_validate(scts, ctx) < 0) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_SSL_VALIDATE_CT, SSL_R_SCT_VERIFICATION_FAILED); goto end; } ret = s->ct_validation_callback(ctx, scts, s->ct_validation_callback_arg); if (ret < 0) ret = 0; /* This function returns 0 on failure */ if (!ret) SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_SSL_VALIDATE_CT, SSL_R_CALLBACK_FAILED); end: CT_POLICY_EVAL_CTX_free(ctx); /* * With SSL_VERIFY_NONE the session may be cached and re-used despite a * failure return code here. Also the application may wish the complete * the handshake, and then disconnect cleanly at a higher layer, after * checking the verification status of the completed connection. * * We therefore force a certificate verification failure which will be * visible via SSL_get_verify_result() and cached as part of any resumed * session. * * Note: the permissive callback is for information gathering only, always * returns success, and does not affect verification status. Only the * strict callback or a custom application-specified callback can trigger * connection failure or record a verification error. */ if (ret <= 0) s->verify_result = X509_V_ERR_NO_VALID_SCTS; return ret; } int SSL_CTX_enable_ct(SSL_CTX *ctx, int validation_mode) { switch (validation_mode) { default: SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_ENABLE_CT, SSL_R_INVALID_CT_VALIDATION_TYPE); return 0; case SSL_CT_VALIDATION_PERMISSIVE: return SSL_CTX_set_ct_validation_callback(ctx, ct_permissive, NULL); case SSL_CT_VALIDATION_STRICT: return SSL_CTX_set_ct_validation_callback(ctx, ct_strict, NULL); } } int SSL_enable_ct(SSL *s, int validation_mode) { switch (validation_mode) { default: SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ENABLE_CT, SSL_R_INVALID_CT_VALIDATION_TYPE); return 0; case SSL_CT_VALIDATION_PERMISSIVE: return SSL_set_ct_validation_callback(s, ct_permissive, NULL); case SSL_CT_VALIDATION_STRICT: return SSL_set_ct_validation_callback(s, ct_strict, NULL); } } int SSL_CTX_set_default_ctlog_list_file(SSL_CTX *ctx) { return CTLOG_STORE_load_default_file(ctx->ctlog_store); } int SSL_CTX_set_ctlog_list_file(SSL_CTX *ctx, const char *path) { return CTLOG_STORE_load_file(ctx->ctlog_store, path); } void SSL_CTX_set0_ctlog_store(SSL_CTX *ctx, CTLOG_STORE * logs) { CTLOG_STORE_free(ctx->ctlog_store); ctx->ctlog_store = logs; } const CTLOG_STORE *SSL_CTX_get0_ctlog_store(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->ctlog_store; } #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_CT */ void SSL_CTX_set_client_hello_cb(SSL_CTX *c, SSL_client_hello_cb_fn cb, void *arg) { c->client_hello_cb = cb; c->client_hello_cb_arg = arg; } int SSL_client_hello_isv2(SSL *s) { if (s->clienthello == NULL) return 0; return s->clienthello->isv2; } unsigned int SSL_client_hello_get0_legacy_version(SSL *s) { if (s->clienthello == NULL) return 0; return s->clienthello->legacy_version; } size_t SSL_client_hello_get0_random(SSL *s, const unsigned char **out) { if (s->clienthello == NULL) return 0; if (out != NULL) *out = s->clienthello->random; return SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; } size_t SSL_client_hello_get0_session_id(SSL *s, const unsigned char **out) { if (s->clienthello == NULL) return 0; if (out != NULL) *out = s->clienthello->session_id; return s->clienthello->session_id_len; } size_t SSL_client_hello_get0_ciphers(SSL *s, const unsigned char **out) { if (s->clienthello == NULL) return 0; if (out != NULL) *out = PACKET_data(&s->clienthello->ciphersuites); return PACKET_remaining(&s->clienthello->ciphersuites); } size_t SSL_client_hello_get0_compression_methods(SSL *s, const unsigned char **out) { if (s->clienthello == NULL) return 0; if (out != NULL) *out = s->clienthello->compressions; return s->clienthello->compressions_len; } int SSL_client_hello_get1_extensions_present(SSL *s, int **out, size_t *outlen) { RAW_EXTENSION *ext; int *present; size_t num = 0, i; if (s->clienthello == NULL || out == NULL || outlen == NULL) return 0; for (i = 0; i < s->clienthello->pre_proc_exts_len; i++) { ext = s->clienthello->pre_proc_exts + i; if (ext->present) num++; } if (num == 0) { *out = NULL; *outlen = 0; return 1; } if ((present = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*present) * num)) == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CLIENT_HELLO_GET1_EXTENSIONS_PRESENT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } for (i = 0; i < s->clienthello->pre_proc_exts_len; i++) { ext = s->clienthello->pre_proc_exts + i; if (ext->present) { if (ext->received_order >= num) goto err; present[ext->received_order] = ext->type; } } *out = present; *outlen = num; return 1; err: OPENSSL_free(present); return 0; } int SSL_client_hello_get0_ext(SSL *s, unsigned int type, const unsigned char **out, size_t *outlen) { size_t i; RAW_EXTENSION *r; if (s->clienthello == NULL) return 0; for (i = 0; i < s->clienthello->pre_proc_exts_len; ++i) { r = s->clienthello->pre_proc_exts + i; if (r->present && r->type == type) { if (out != NULL) *out = PACKET_data(&r->data); if (outlen != NULL) *outlen = PACKET_remaining(&r->data); return 1; } } return 0; } int SSL_free_buffers(SSL *ssl) { RECORD_LAYER *rl = &ssl->rlayer; if (RECORD_LAYER_read_pending(rl) || RECORD_LAYER_write_pending(rl)) return 0; RECORD_LAYER_release(rl); return 1; } int SSL_alloc_buffers(SSL *ssl) { return ssl3_setup_buffers(ssl); } void SSL_CTX_set_keylog_callback(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_CTX_keylog_cb_func cb) { ctx->keylog_callback = cb; } SSL_CTX_keylog_cb_func SSL_CTX_get_keylog_callback(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->keylog_callback; } static int nss_keylog_int(const char *prefix, SSL *ssl, const uint8_t *parameter_1, size_t parameter_1_len, const uint8_t *parameter_2, size_t parameter_2_len) { char *out = NULL; char *cursor = NULL; size_t out_len = 0; size_t i; size_t prefix_len; if (ssl->ctx->keylog_callback == NULL) return 1; /* * Our output buffer will contain the following strings, rendered with * space characters in between, terminated by a NULL character: first the * prefix, then the first parameter, then the second parameter. The * meaning of each parameter depends on the specific key material being * logged. Note that the first and second parameters are encoded in * hexadecimal, so we need a buffer that is twice their lengths. */ prefix_len = strlen(prefix); out_len = prefix_len + (2 * parameter_1_len) + (2 * parameter_2_len) + 3; if ((out = cursor = OPENSSL_malloc(out_len)) == NULL) { SSLfatal(ssl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_NSS_KEYLOG_INT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } strcpy(cursor, prefix); cursor += prefix_len; *cursor++ = ' '; for (i = 0; i < parameter_1_len; i++) { sprintf(cursor, "%02x", parameter_1[i]); cursor += 2; } *cursor++ = ' '; for (i = 0; i < parameter_2_len; i++) { sprintf(cursor, "%02x", parameter_2[i]); cursor += 2; } *cursor = '\0'; ssl->ctx->keylog_callback(ssl, (const char *)out); OPENSSL_clear_free(out, out_len); return 1; } int ssl_log_rsa_client_key_exchange(SSL *ssl, const uint8_t *encrypted_premaster, size_t encrypted_premaster_len, const uint8_t *premaster, size_t premaster_len) { if (encrypted_premaster_len < 8) { SSLfatal(ssl, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_LOG_RSA_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } /* We only want the first 8 bytes of the encrypted premaster as a tag. */ return nss_keylog_int("RSA", ssl, encrypted_premaster, 8, premaster, premaster_len); } int ssl_log_secret(SSL *ssl, const char *label, const uint8_t *secret, size_t secret_len) { return nss_keylog_int(label, ssl, ssl->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, secret, secret_len); } #define SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN 3 int ssl_cache_cipherlist(SSL *s, PACKET *cipher_suites, int sslv2format) { int n; n = sslv2format ? SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN : TLS_CIPHER_LEN; if (PACKET_remaining(cipher_suites) == 0) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_SSL_CACHE_CIPHERLIST, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED); return 0; } if (PACKET_remaining(cipher_suites) % n != 0) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_CACHE_CIPHERLIST, SSL_R_ERROR_IN_RECEIVED_CIPHER_LIST); return 0; } OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.ciphers_raw); s->s3->tmp.ciphers_raw = NULL; s->s3->tmp.ciphers_rawlen = 0; if (sslv2format) { size_t numciphers = PACKET_remaining(cipher_suites) / n; PACKET sslv2ciphers = *cipher_suites; unsigned int leadbyte; unsigned char *raw; /* * We store the raw ciphers list in SSLv3+ format so we need to do some * preprocessing to convert the list first. If there are any SSLv2 only * ciphersuites with a non-zero leading byte then we are going to * slightly over allocate because we won't store those. But that isn't a * problem. */ raw = OPENSSL_malloc(numciphers * TLS_CIPHER_LEN); s->s3->tmp.ciphers_raw = raw; if (raw == NULL) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_CACHE_CIPHERLIST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } for (s->s3->tmp.ciphers_rawlen = 0; PACKET_remaining(&sslv2ciphers) > 0; raw += TLS_CIPHER_LEN) { if (!PACKET_get_1(&sslv2ciphers, &leadbyte) || (leadbyte == 0 && !PACKET_copy_bytes(&sslv2ciphers, raw, TLS_CIPHER_LEN)) || (leadbyte != 0 && !PACKET_forward(&sslv2ciphers, TLS_CIPHER_LEN))) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_CACHE_CIPHERLIST, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET); OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.ciphers_raw); s->s3->tmp.ciphers_raw = NULL; s->s3->tmp.ciphers_rawlen = 0; return 0; } if (leadbyte == 0) s->s3->tmp.ciphers_rawlen += TLS_CIPHER_LEN; } } else if (!PACKET_memdup(cipher_suites, &s->s3->tmp.ciphers_raw, &s->s3->tmp.ciphers_rawlen)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_CACHE_CIPHERLIST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } return 1; } int SSL_bytes_to_cipher_list(SSL *s, const unsigned char *bytes, size_t len, int isv2format, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) **sk, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) **scsvs) { PACKET pkt; if (!PACKET_buf_init(&pkt, bytes, len)) return 0; return bytes_to_cipher_list(s, &pkt, sk, scsvs, isv2format, 0); } int bytes_to_cipher_list(SSL *s, PACKET *cipher_suites, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) **skp, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) **scsvs_out, int sslv2format, int fatal) { const SSL_CIPHER *c; STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk = NULL; STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *scsvs = NULL; int n; /* 3 = SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN > TLS_CIPHER_LEN = 2. */ unsigned char cipher[SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN]; n = sslv2format ? SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN : TLS_CIPHER_LEN; if (PACKET_remaining(cipher_suites) == 0) { if (fatal) SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED); else SSLerr(SSL_F_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED); return 0; } if (PACKET_remaining(cipher_suites) % n != 0) { if (fatal) SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, SSL_R_ERROR_IN_RECEIVED_CIPHER_LIST); else SSLerr(SSL_F_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, SSL_R_ERROR_IN_RECEIVED_CIPHER_LIST); return 0; } sk = sk_SSL_CIPHER_new_null(); scsvs = sk_SSL_CIPHER_new_null(); if (sk == NULL || scsvs == NULL) { if (fatal) SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); else SSLerr(SSL_F_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } while (PACKET_copy_bytes(cipher_suites, cipher, n)) { /* * SSLv3 ciphers wrapped in an SSLv2-compatible ClientHello have the * first byte set to zero, while true SSLv2 ciphers have a non-zero * first byte. We don't support any true SSLv2 ciphers, so skip them. */ if (sslv2format && cipher[0] != '\0') continue; /* For SSLv2-compat, ignore leading 0-byte. */ c = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, sslv2format ? &cipher[1] : cipher, 1); if (c != NULL) { if ((c->valid && !sk_SSL_CIPHER_push(sk, c)) || (!c->valid && !sk_SSL_CIPHER_push(scsvs, c))) { if (fatal) SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); else SSLerr(SSL_F_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } } } if (PACKET_remaining(cipher_suites) > 0) { if (fatal) SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH); else SSLerr(SSL_F_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH); goto err; } if (skp != NULL) *skp = sk; else sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(sk); if (scsvs_out != NULL) *scsvs_out = scsvs; else sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(scsvs); return 1; err: sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(sk); sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(scsvs); return 0; } int SSL_CTX_set_max_early_data(SSL_CTX *ctx, uint32_t max_early_data) { ctx->max_early_data = max_early_data; return 1; } uint32_t SSL_CTX_get_max_early_data(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->max_early_data; } int SSL_set_max_early_data(SSL *s, uint32_t max_early_data) { s->max_early_data = max_early_data; return 1; } uint32_t SSL_get_max_early_data(const SSL *s) { return s->max_early_data; } int SSL_CTX_set_recv_max_early_data(SSL_CTX *ctx, uint32_t recv_max_early_data) { ctx->recv_max_early_data = recv_max_early_data; return 1; } uint32_t SSL_CTX_get_recv_max_early_data(const SSL_CTX *ctx) { return ctx->recv_max_early_data; } int SSL_set_recv_max_early_data(SSL *s, uint32_t recv_max_early_data) { s->recv_max_early_data = recv_max_early_data; return 1; } uint32_t SSL_get_recv_max_early_data(const SSL *s) { return s->recv_max_early_data; } __owur unsigned int ssl_get_max_send_fragment(const SSL *ssl) { /* Return any active Max Fragment Len extension */ if (ssl->session != NULL && USE_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT(ssl->session)) return GET_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH(ssl->session); /* return current SSL connection setting */ return ssl->max_send_fragment; } __owur unsigned int ssl_get_split_send_fragment(const SSL *ssl) { /* Return a value regarding an active Max Fragment Len extension */ if (ssl->session != NULL && USE_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT(ssl->session) && ssl->split_send_fragment > GET_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH(ssl->session)) return GET_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH(ssl->session); /* else limit |split_send_fragment| to current |max_send_fragment| */ if (ssl->split_send_fragment > ssl->max_send_fragment) return ssl->max_send_fragment; /* return current SSL connection setting */ return ssl->split_send_fragment; } int SSL_stateless(SSL *s) { int ret; /* Ensure there is no state left over from a previous invocation */ if (!SSL_clear(s)) return 0; ERR_clear_error(); s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_STATELESS; ret = SSL_accept(s); s->s3->flags &= ~TLS1_FLAGS_STATELESS; if (ret > 0 && s->ext.cookieok) return 1; if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING && !ossl_statem_in_error(s)) return 0; return -1; } void SSL_CTX_set_post_handshake_auth(SSL_CTX *ctx, int val) { ctx->pha_enabled = val; } void SSL_set_post_handshake_auth(SSL *ssl, int val) { ssl->pha_enabled = val; } int SSL_verify_client_post_handshake(SSL *ssl) { if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(ssl)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_POST_HANDSHAKE, SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION); return 0; } if (!ssl->server) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_POST_HANDSHAKE, SSL_R_NOT_SERVER); return 0; } if (!SSL_is_init_finished(ssl)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_POST_HANDSHAKE, SSL_R_STILL_IN_INIT); return 0; } switch (ssl->post_handshake_auth) { case SSL_PHA_NONE: SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_POST_HANDSHAKE, SSL_R_EXTENSION_NOT_RECEIVED); return 0; default: case SSL_PHA_EXT_SENT: SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_POST_HANDSHAKE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; case SSL_PHA_EXT_RECEIVED: break; case SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING: SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_POST_HANDSHAKE, SSL_R_REQUEST_PENDING); return 0; case SSL_PHA_REQUESTED: SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_POST_HANDSHAKE, SSL_R_REQUEST_SENT); return 0; } ssl->post_handshake_auth = SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING; /* checks verify_mode and algorithm_auth */ if (!send_certificate_request(ssl)) { ssl->post_handshake_auth = SSL_PHA_EXT_RECEIVED; /* restore on error */ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_POST_HANDSHAKE, SSL_R_INVALID_CONFIG); return 0; } ossl_statem_set_in_init(ssl, 1); return 1; } int SSL_CTX_set_session_ticket_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_CTX_generate_session_ticket_fn gen_cb, SSL_CTX_decrypt_session_ticket_fn dec_cb, void *arg) { ctx->generate_ticket_cb = gen_cb; ctx->decrypt_ticket_cb = dec_cb; ctx->ticket_cb_data = arg; return 1; } void SSL_CTX_set_allow_early_data_cb(SSL_CTX *ctx, SSL_allow_early_data_cb_fn cb, void *arg) { ctx->allow_early_data_cb = cb; ctx->allow_early_data_cb_data = arg; } void SSL_set_allow_early_data_cb(SSL *s, SSL_allow_early_data_cb_fn cb, void *arg) { s->allow_early_data_cb = cb; s->allow_early_data_cb_data = arg; } diff --git a/ssl/ssl_local.h b/ssl/ssl_local.h index f92472117a1b..9f346e30e8f4 100644 --- a/ssl/ssl_local.h +++ b/ssl/ssl_local.h @@ -1,2671 +1,2671 @@ /* * Copyright 1995-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #ifndef OSSL_SSL_LOCAL_H # define OSSL_SSL_LOCAL_H # include "e_os.h" /* struct timeval for DTLS */ # include # include # include # include # include # include # include # include # include # include # include # include # include # include # include "record/record.h" # include "statem/statem.h" # include "packet_local.h" # include "internal/dane.h" # include "internal/refcount.h" # include "internal/tsan_assist.h" # ifdef OPENSSL_BUILD_SHLIBSSL # undef OPENSSL_EXTERN # define OPENSSL_EXTERN OPENSSL_EXPORT # endif # define c2l(c,l) (l = ((unsigned long)(*((c)++))) , \ l|=(((unsigned long)(*((c)++)))<< 8), \ l|=(((unsigned long)(*((c)++)))<<16), \ l|=(((unsigned long)(*((c)++)))<<24)) /* NOTE - c is not incremented as per c2l */ # define c2ln(c,l1,l2,n) { \ c+=n; \ l1=l2=0; \ switch (n) { \ case 8: l2 =((unsigned long)(*(--(c))))<<24; \ case 7: l2|=((unsigned long)(*(--(c))))<<16; \ case 6: l2|=((unsigned long)(*(--(c))))<< 8; \ case 5: l2|=((unsigned long)(*(--(c)))); \ case 4: l1 =((unsigned long)(*(--(c))))<<24; \ case 3: l1|=((unsigned long)(*(--(c))))<<16; \ case 2: l1|=((unsigned long)(*(--(c))))<< 8; \ case 1: l1|=((unsigned long)(*(--(c)))); \ } \ } # define l2c(l,c) (*((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l) )&0xff), \ *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>> 8)&0xff), \ *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>16)&0xff), \ *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>24)&0xff)) # define n2l(c,l) (l =((unsigned long)(*((c)++)))<<24, \ l|=((unsigned long)(*((c)++)))<<16, \ l|=((unsigned long)(*((c)++)))<< 8, \ l|=((unsigned long)(*((c)++)))) # define n2l8(c,l) (l =((uint64_t)(*((c)++)))<<56, \ l|=((uint64_t)(*((c)++)))<<48, \ l|=((uint64_t)(*((c)++)))<<40, \ l|=((uint64_t)(*((c)++)))<<32, \ l|=((uint64_t)(*((c)++)))<<24, \ l|=((uint64_t)(*((c)++)))<<16, \ l|=((uint64_t)(*((c)++)))<< 8, \ l|=((uint64_t)(*((c)++)))) # define l2n(l,c) (*((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>24)&0xff), \ *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>16)&0xff), \ *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>> 8)&0xff), \ *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l) )&0xff)) # define l2n6(l,c) (*((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>40)&0xff), \ *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>32)&0xff), \ *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>24)&0xff), \ *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>16)&0xff), \ *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>> 8)&0xff), \ *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l) )&0xff)) # define l2n8(l,c) (*((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>56)&0xff), \ *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>48)&0xff), \ *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>40)&0xff), \ *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>32)&0xff), \ *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>24)&0xff), \ *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>>16)&0xff), \ *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l)>> 8)&0xff), \ *((c)++)=(unsigned char)(((l) )&0xff)) /* NOTE - c is not incremented as per l2c */ # define l2cn(l1,l2,c,n) { \ c+=n; \ switch (n) { \ case 8: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l2)>>24)&0xff); \ case 7: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l2)>>16)&0xff); \ case 6: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l2)>> 8)&0xff); \ case 5: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l2) )&0xff); \ case 4: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l1)>>24)&0xff); \ case 3: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l1)>>16)&0xff); \ case 2: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l1)>> 8)&0xff); \ case 1: *(--(c))=(unsigned char)(((l1) )&0xff); \ } \ } # define n2s(c,s) ((s=(((unsigned int)((c)[0]))<< 8)| \ (((unsigned int)((c)[1])) )),(c)+=2) # define s2n(s,c) (((c)[0]=(unsigned char)(((s)>> 8)&0xff), \ (c)[1]=(unsigned char)(((s) )&0xff)),(c)+=2) # define n2l3(c,l) ((l =(((unsigned long)((c)[0]))<<16)| \ (((unsigned long)((c)[1]))<< 8)| \ (((unsigned long)((c)[2])) )),(c)+=3) # define l2n3(l,c) (((c)[0]=(unsigned char)(((l)>>16)&0xff), \ (c)[1]=(unsigned char)(((l)>> 8)&0xff), \ (c)[2]=(unsigned char)(((l) )&0xff)),(c)+=3) /* * DTLS version numbers are strange because they're inverted. Except for * DTLS1_BAD_VER, which should be considered "lower" than the rest. */ # define dtls_ver_ordinal(v1) (((v1) == DTLS1_BAD_VER) ? 0xff00 : (v1)) # define DTLS_VERSION_GT(v1, v2) (dtls_ver_ordinal(v1) < dtls_ver_ordinal(v2)) # define DTLS_VERSION_GE(v1, v2) (dtls_ver_ordinal(v1) <= dtls_ver_ordinal(v2)) # define DTLS_VERSION_LT(v1, v2) (dtls_ver_ordinal(v1) > dtls_ver_ordinal(v2)) # define DTLS_VERSION_LE(v1, v2) (dtls_ver_ordinal(v1) >= dtls_ver_ordinal(v2)) /* * Define the Bitmasks for SSL_CIPHER.algorithms. * This bits are used packed as dense as possible. If new methods/ciphers * etc will be added, the bits a likely to change, so this information * is for internal library use only, even though SSL_CIPHER.algorithms * can be publicly accessed. * Use the according functions for cipher management instead. * * The bit mask handling in the selection and sorting scheme in * ssl_create_cipher_list() has only limited capabilities, reflecting * that the different entities within are mutually exclusive: * ONLY ONE BIT PER MASK CAN BE SET AT A TIME. */ /* Bits for algorithm_mkey (key exchange algorithm) */ /* RSA key exchange */ # define SSL_kRSA 0x00000001U /* tmp DH key no DH cert */ # define SSL_kDHE 0x00000002U /* synonym */ # define SSL_kEDH SSL_kDHE /* ephemeral ECDH */ # define SSL_kECDHE 0x00000004U /* synonym */ # define SSL_kEECDH SSL_kECDHE /* PSK */ # define SSL_kPSK 0x00000008U /* GOST key exchange */ # define SSL_kGOST 0x00000010U /* SRP */ # define SSL_kSRP 0x00000020U # define SSL_kRSAPSK 0x00000040U # define SSL_kECDHEPSK 0x00000080U # define SSL_kDHEPSK 0x00000100U /* all PSK */ # define SSL_PSK (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK | SSL_kECDHEPSK | SSL_kDHEPSK) /* Any appropriate key exchange algorithm (for TLS 1.3 ciphersuites) */ # define SSL_kANY 0x00000000U /* Bits for algorithm_auth (server authentication) */ /* RSA auth */ # define SSL_aRSA 0x00000001U /* DSS auth */ # define SSL_aDSS 0x00000002U /* no auth (i.e. use ADH or AECDH) */ # define SSL_aNULL 0x00000004U /* ECDSA auth*/ # define SSL_aECDSA 0x00000008U /* PSK auth */ # define SSL_aPSK 0x00000010U /* GOST R 34.10-2001 signature auth */ # define SSL_aGOST01 0x00000020U /* SRP auth */ # define SSL_aSRP 0x00000040U /* GOST R 34.10-2012 signature auth */ # define SSL_aGOST12 0x00000080U /* Any appropriate signature auth (for TLS 1.3 ciphersuites) */ # define SSL_aANY 0x00000000U /* All bits requiring a certificate */ #define SSL_aCERT \ (SSL_aRSA | SSL_aDSS | SSL_aECDSA | SSL_aGOST01 | SSL_aGOST12) /* Bits for algorithm_enc (symmetric encryption) */ # define SSL_DES 0x00000001U # define SSL_3DES 0x00000002U # define SSL_RC4 0x00000004U # define SSL_RC2 0x00000008U # define SSL_IDEA 0x00000010U # define SSL_eNULL 0x00000020U # define SSL_AES128 0x00000040U # define SSL_AES256 0x00000080U # define SSL_CAMELLIA128 0x00000100U # define SSL_CAMELLIA256 0x00000200U # define SSL_eGOST2814789CNT 0x00000400U # define SSL_SEED 0x00000800U # define SSL_AES128GCM 0x00001000U # define SSL_AES256GCM 0x00002000U # define SSL_AES128CCM 0x00004000U # define SSL_AES256CCM 0x00008000U # define SSL_AES128CCM8 0x00010000U # define SSL_AES256CCM8 0x00020000U # define SSL_eGOST2814789CNT12 0x00040000U # define SSL_CHACHA20POLY1305 0x00080000U # define SSL_ARIA128GCM 0x00100000U # define SSL_ARIA256GCM 0x00200000U # define SSL_AESGCM (SSL_AES128GCM | SSL_AES256GCM) # define SSL_AESCCM (SSL_AES128CCM | SSL_AES256CCM | SSL_AES128CCM8 | SSL_AES256CCM8) # define SSL_AES (SSL_AES128|SSL_AES256|SSL_AESGCM|SSL_AESCCM) # define SSL_CAMELLIA (SSL_CAMELLIA128|SSL_CAMELLIA256) # define SSL_CHACHA20 (SSL_CHACHA20POLY1305) # define SSL_ARIAGCM (SSL_ARIA128GCM | SSL_ARIA256GCM) # define SSL_ARIA (SSL_ARIAGCM) /* Bits for algorithm_mac (symmetric authentication) */ # define SSL_MD5 0x00000001U # define SSL_SHA1 0x00000002U # define SSL_GOST94 0x00000004U # define SSL_GOST89MAC 0x00000008U # define SSL_SHA256 0x00000010U # define SSL_SHA384 0x00000020U /* Not a real MAC, just an indication it is part of cipher */ # define SSL_AEAD 0x00000040U # define SSL_GOST12_256 0x00000080U # define SSL_GOST89MAC12 0x00000100U # define SSL_GOST12_512 0x00000200U /* * When adding new digest in the ssl_ciph.c and increment SSL_MD_NUM_IDX make * sure to update this constant too */ # define SSL_MD_MD5_IDX 0 # define SSL_MD_SHA1_IDX 1 # define SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX 2 # define SSL_MD_GOST89MAC_IDX 3 # define SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX 4 # define SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX 5 # define SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX 6 # define SSL_MD_GOST89MAC12_IDX 7 # define SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX 8 # define SSL_MD_MD5_SHA1_IDX 9 # define SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX 10 # define SSL_MD_SHA512_IDX 11 # define SSL_MAX_DIGEST 12 /* Bits for algorithm2 (handshake digests and other extra flags) */ /* Bits 0-7 are handshake MAC */ # define SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_MASK 0xFF # define SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_MD5_SHA1 SSL_MD_MD5_SHA1_IDX # define SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA256 SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX # define SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_SHA384 SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX # define SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_GOST94 SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX # define SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_GOST12_256 SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX # define SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_GOST12_512 SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX # define SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_DEFAULT SSL_HANDSHAKE_MAC_MD5_SHA1 /* Bits 8-15 bits are PRF */ # define TLS1_PRF_DGST_SHIFT 8 # define TLS1_PRF_SHA1_MD5 (SSL_MD_MD5_SHA1_IDX << TLS1_PRF_DGST_SHIFT) # define TLS1_PRF_SHA256 (SSL_MD_SHA256_IDX << TLS1_PRF_DGST_SHIFT) # define TLS1_PRF_SHA384 (SSL_MD_SHA384_IDX << TLS1_PRF_DGST_SHIFT) # define TLS1_PRF_GOST94 (SSL_MD_GOST94_IDX << TLS1_PRF_DGST_SHIFT) # define TLS1_PRF_GOST12_256 (SSL_MD_GOST12_256_IDX << TLS1_PRF_DGST_SHIFT) # define TLS1_PRF_GOST12_512 (SSL_MD_GOST12_512_IDX << TLS1_PRF_DGST_SHIFT) # define TLS1_PRF (SSL_MD_MD5_SHA1_IDX << TLS1_PRF_DGST_SHIFT) /* * Stream MAC for GOST ciphersuites from cryptopro draft (currently this also * goes into algorithm2) */ # define TLS1_STREAM_MAC 0x10000 # define SSL_STRONG_MASK 0x0000001FU # define SSL_DEFAULT_MASK 0X00000020U # define SSL_STRONG_NONE 0x00000001U # define SSL_LOW 0x00000002U # define SSL_MEDIUM 0x00000004U # define SSL_HIGH 0x00000008U # define SSL_FIPS 0x00000010U # define SSL_NOT_DEFAULT 0x00000020U /* we have used 0000003f - 26 bits left to go */ /* Flag used on OpenSSL ciphersuite ids to indicate they are for SSLv3+ */ # define SSL3_CK_CIPHERSUITE_FLAG 0x03000000 /* Check if an SSL structure is using DTLS */ # define SSL_IS_DTLS(s) (s->method->ssl3_enc->enc_flags & SSL_ENC_FLAG_DTLS) /* Check if we are using TLSv1.3 */ # define SSL_IS_TLS13(s) (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) \ && (s)->method->version >= TLS1_3_VERSION \ && (s)->method->version != TLS_ANY_VERSION) # define SSL_TREAT_AS_TLS13(s) \ (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || (s)->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING \ || (s)->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECT_RETRY \ || (s)->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITING \ || (s)->early_data_state == SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_RETRY \ || (s)->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) # define SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(S) ((s)->s3->tmp.finish_md_len == 0 \ || (s)->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len == 0) /* See if we need explicit IV */ # define SSL_USE_EXPLICIT_IV(s) \ (s->method->ssl3_enc->enc_flags & SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV) /* * See if we use signature algorithms extension and signature algorithm * before signatures. */ # define SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) \ (s->method->ssl3_enc->enc_flags & SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS) /* * Allow TLS 1.2 ciphersuites: applies to DTLS 1.2 as well as TLS 1.2: may * apply to others in future. */ # define SSL_USE_TLS1_2_CIPHERS(s) \ (s->method->ssl3_enc->enc_flags & SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS) /* * Determine if a client can use TLS 1.2 ciphersuites: can't rely on method * flags because it may not be set to correct version yet. */ # define SSL_CLIENT_USE_TLS1_2_CIPHERS(s) \ ((!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->client_version >= TLS1_2_VERSION) || \ (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && DTLS_VERSION_GE(s->client_version, DTLS1_2_VERSION))) /* * Determine if a client should send signature algorithms extension: * as with TLS1.2 cipher we can't rely on method flags. */ # define SSL_CLIENT_USE_SIGALGS(s) \ SSL_CLIENT_USE_TLS1_2_CIPHERS(s) # define IS_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT_VALID(value) \ (((value) >= TLSEXT_max_fragment_length_512) && \ ((value) <= TLSEXT_max_fragment_length_4096)) # define USE_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT(session) \ IS_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT_VALID(session->ext.max_fragment_len_mode) # define GET_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH(session) \ (512U << (session->ext.max_fragment_len_mode - 1)) # define SSL_READ_ETM(s) (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC_READ) # define SSL_WRITE_ETM(s) (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC_WRITE) /* Mostly for SSLv3 */ # define SSL_PKEY_RSA 0 # define SSL_PKEY_RSA_PSS_SIGN 1 # define SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN 2 # define SSL_PKEY_ECC 3 # define SSL_PKEY_GOST01 4 # define SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256 5 # define SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512 6 # define SSL_PKEY_ED25519 7 # define SSL_PKEY_ED448 8 # define SSL_PKEY_NUM 9 /*- * SSL_kRSA <- RSA_ENC * SSL_kDH <- DH_ENC & (RSA_ENC | RSA_SIGN | DSA_SIGN) * SSL_kDHE <- RSA_ENC | RSA_SIGN | DSA_SIGN * SSL_aRSA <- RSA_ENC | RSA_SIGN * SSL_aDSS <- DSA_SIGN */ /*- #define CERT_INVALID 0 #define CERT_PUBLIC_KEY 1 #define CERT_PRIVATE_KEY 2 */ /* Post-Handshake Authentication state */ typedef enum { SSL_PHA_NONE = 0, SSL_PHA_EXT_SENT, /* client-side only: extension sent */ SSL_PHA_EXT_RECEIVED, /* server-side only: extension received */ SSL_PHA_REQUEST_PENDING, /* server-side only: request pending */ SSL_PHA_REQUESTED /* request received by client, or sent by server */ } SSL_PHA_STATE; /* CipherSuite length. SSLv3 and all TLS versions. */ # define TLS_CIPHER_LEN 2 /* used to hold info on the particular ciphers used */ struct ssl_cipher_st { uint32_t valid; const char *name; /* text name */ const char *stdname; /* RFC name */ uint32_t id; /* id, 4 bytes, first is version */ /* * changed in 1.0.0: these four used to be portions of a single value * 'algorithms' */ uint32_t algorithm_mkey; /* key exchange algorithm */ uint32_t algorithm_auth; /* server authentication */ uint32_t algorithm_enc; /* symmetric encryption */ uint32_t algorithm_mac; /* symmetric authentication */ int min_tls; /* minimum SSL/TLS protocol version */ int max_tls; /* maximum SSL/TLS protocol version */ int min_dtls; /* minimum DTLS protocol version */ int max_dtls; /* maximum DTLS protocol version */ uint32_t algo_strength; /* strength and export flags */ uint32_t algorithm2; /* Extra flags */ int32_t strength_bits; /* Number of bits really used */ uint32_t alg_bits; /* Number of bits for algorithm */ }; /* Used to hold SSL/TLS functions */ struct ssl_method_st { int version; unsigned flags; unsigned long mask; int (*ssl_new) (SSL *s); int (*ssl_clear) (SSL *s); void (*ssl_free) (SSL *s); int (*ssl_accept) (SSL *s); int (*ssl_connect) (SSL *s); int (*ssl_read) (SSL *s, void *buf, size_t len, size_t *readbytes); int (*ssl_peek) (SSL *s, void *buf, size_t len, size_t *readbytes); int (*ssl_write) (SSL *s, const void *buf, size_t len, size_t *written); int (*ssl_shutdown) (SSL *s); int (*ssl_renegotiate) (SSL *s); int (*ssl_renegotiate_check) (SSL *s, int); int (*ssl_read_bytes) (SSL *s, int type, int *recvd_type, unsigned char *buf, size_t len, int peek, size_t *readbytes); int (*ssl_write_bytes) (SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, size_t len, size_t *written); int (*ssl_dispatch_alert) (SSL *s); long (*ssl_ctrl) (SSL *s, int cmd, long larg, void *parg); long (*ssl_ctx_ctrl) (SSL_CTX *ctx, int cmd, long larg, void *parg); const SSL_CIPHER *(*get_cipher_by_char) (const unsigned char *ptr); int (*put_cipher_by_char) (const SSL_CIPHER *cipher, WPACKET *pkt, size_t *len); size_t (*ssl_pending) (const SSL *s); int (*num_ciphers) (void); const SSL_CIPHER *(*get_cipher) (unsigned ncipher); long (*get_timeout) (void); const struct ssl3_enc_method *ssl3_enc; /* Extra SSLv3/TLS stuff */ int (*ssl_version) (void); long (*ssl_callback_ctrl) (SSL *s, int cb_id, void (*fp) (void)); long (*ssl_ctx_callback_ctrl) (SSL_CTX *s, int cb_id, void (*fp) (void)); }; /* * Matches the length of PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN. We keep it the same value for * consistency, even in the event of OPENSSL_NO_PSK being defined. */ # define TLS13_MAX_RESUMPTION_PSK_LENGTH 256 /*- * Lets make this into an ASN.1 type structure as follows * SSL_SESSION_ID ::= SEQUENCE { * version INTEGER, -- structure version number * SSLversion INTEGER, -- SSL version number * Cipher OCTET STRING, -- the 3 byte cipher ID * Session_ID OCTET STRING, -- the Session ID * Master_key OCTET STRING, -- the master key * Key_Arg [ 0 ] IMPLICIT OCTET STRING, -- the optional Key argument * Time [ 1 ] EXPLICIT INTEGER, -- optional Start Time * Timeout [ 2 ] EXPLICIT INTEGER, -- optional Timeout ins seconds * Peer [ 3 ] EXPLICIT X509, -- optional Peer Certificate * Session_ID_context [ 4 ] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING, -- the Session ID context * Verify_result [ 5 ] EXPLICIT INTEGER, -- X509_V_... code for `Peer' * HostName [ 6 ] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING, -- optional HostName from servername TLS extension * PSK_identity_hint [ 7 ] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING, -- optional PSK identity hint * PSK_identity [ 8 ] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING, -- optional PSK identity * Ticket_lifetime_hint [9] EXPLICIT INTEGER, -- server's lifetime hint for session ticket * Ticket [10] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING, -- session ticket (clients only) * Compression_meth [11] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING, -- optional compression method * SRP_username [ 12 ] EXPLICIT OCTET STRING -- optional SRP username * flags [ 13 ] EXPLICIT INTEGER -- optional flags * } * Look in ssl/ssl_asn1.c for more details * I'm using EXPLICIT tags so I can read the damn things using asn1parse :-). */ struct ssl_session_st { int ssl_version; /* what ssl version session info is being kept * in here? */ size_t master_key_length; /* TLSv1.3 early_secret used for external PSKs */ unsigned char early_secret[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; /* * For <=TLS1.2 this is the master_key. For TLS1.3 this is the resumption * PSK */ unsigned char master_key[TLS13_MAX_RESUMPTION_PSK_LENGTH]; /* session_id - valid? */ size_t session_id_length; unsigned char session_id[SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH]; /* * this is used to determine whether the session is being reused in the * appropriate context. It is up to the application to set this, via * SSL_new */ size_t sid_ctx_length; unsigned char sid_ctx[SSL_MAX_SID_CTX_LENGTH]; # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK char *psk_identity_hint; char *psk_identity; # endif /* * Used to indicate that session resumption is not allowed. Applications * can also set this bit for a new session via not_resumable_session_cb * to disable session caching and tickets. */ int not_resumable; /* This is the cert and type for the other end. */ X509 *peer; /* Certificate chain peer sent. */ STACK_OF(X509) *peer_chain; /* * when app_verify_callback accepts a session where the peer's * certificate is not ok, we must remember the error for session reuse: */ long verify_result; /* only for servers */ CRYPTO_REF_COUNT references; long timeout; long time; unsigned int compress_meth; /* Need to lookup the method */ const SSL_CIPHER *cipher; unsigned long cipher_id; /* when ASN.1 loaded, this needs to be used to * load the 'cipher' structure */ CRYPTO_EX_DATA ex_data; /* application specific data */ /* * These are used to make removal of session-ids more efficient and to * implement a maximum cache size. */ struct ssl_session_st *prev, *next; struct { char *hostname; /* RFC4507 info */ unsigned char *tick; /* Session ticket */ size_t ticklen; /* Session ticket length */ /* Session lifetime hint in seconds */ unsigned long tick_lifetime_hint; uint32_t tick_age_add; /* Max number of bytes that can be sent as early data */ uint32_t max_early_data; /* The ALPN protocol selected for this session */ unsigned char *alpn_selected; size_t alpn_selected_len; /* * Maximum Fragment Length as per RFC 4366. * If this value does not contain RFC 4366 allowed values (1-4) then * either the Maximum Fragment Length Negotiation failed or was not * performed at all. */ uint8_t max_fragment_len_mode; } ext; # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP char *srp_username; # endif unsigned char *ticket_appdata; size_t ticket_appdata_len; uint32_t flags; CRYPTO_RWLOCK *lock; }; /* Extended master secret support */ # define SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS 0x1 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP typedef struct srp_ctx_st { /* param for all the callbacks */ void *SRP_cb_arg; /* set client Hello login callback */ int (*TLS_ext_srp_username_callback) (SSL *, int *, void *); /* set SRP N/g param callback for verification */ int (*SRP_verify_param_callback) (SSL *, void *); /* set SRP client passwd callback */ char *(*SRP_give_srp_client_pwd_callback) (SSL *, void *); char *login; BIGNUM *N, *g, *s, *B, *A; BIGNUM *a, *b, *v; char *info; int strength; unsigned long srp_Mask; } SRP_CTX; # endif typedef enum { SSL_EARLY_DATA_NONE = 0, SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECT_RETRY, SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING, SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_RETRY, SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITING, SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_FLUSH, SSL_EARLY_DATA_UNAUTH_WRITING, SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING, SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPT_RETRY, SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTING, SSL_EARLY_DATA_READ_RETRY, SSL_EARLY_DATA_READING, SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_READING } SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATE; /* * We check that the amount of unreadable early data doesn't exceed * max_early_data. max_early_data is given in plaintext bytes. However if it is * unreadable then we only know the number of ciphertext bytes. We also don't * know how much the overhead should be because it depends on the ciphersuite. * We make a small allowance. We assume 5 records of actual data plus the end * of early data alert record. Each record has a tag and a content type byte. * The longest tag length we know of is EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN. We don't count the * content of the alert record either which is 2 bytes. */ # define EARLY_DATA_CIPHERTEXT_OVERHEAD ((6 * (EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN + 1)) + 2) /* * The allowance we have between the client's calculated ticket age and our own. * We allow for 10 seconds (units are in ms). If a ticket is presented and the * client's age calculation is different by more than this than our own then we * do not allow that ticket for early_data. */ # define TICKET_AGE_ALLOWANCE (10 * 1000) #define MAX_COMPRESSIONS_SIZE 255 struct ssl_comp_st { int id; const char *name; COMP_METHOD *method; }; typedef struct raw_extension_st { /* Raw packet data for the extension */ PACKET data; /* Set to 1 if the extension is present or 0 otherwise */ int present; /* Set to 1 if we have already parsed the extension or 0 otherwise */ int parsed; /* The type of this extension, i.e. a TLSEXT_TYPE_* value */ unsigned int type; /* Track what order extensions are received in (0-based). */ size_t received_order; } RAW_EXTENSION; typedef struct { unsigned int isv2; unsigned int legacy_version; unsigned char random[SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE]; size_t session_id_len; unsigned char session_id[SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH]; size_t dtls_cookie_len; unsigned char dtls_cookie[DTLS1_COOKIE_LENGTH]; PACKET ciphersuites; size_t compressions_len; unsigned char compressions[MAX_COMPRESSIONS_SIZE]; PACKET extensions; size_t pre_proc_exts_len; RAW_EXTENSION *pre_proc_exts; } CLIENTHELLO_MSG; /* * Extension index values NOTE: Any updates to these defines should be mirrored * with equivalent updates to ext_defs in extensions.c */ typedef enum tlsext_index_en { TLSEXT_IDX_renegotiate, TLSEXT_IDX_server_name, TLSEXT_IDX_max_fragment_length, TLSEXT_IDX_srp, TLSEXT_IDX_ec_point_formats, TLSEXT_IDX_supported_groups, TLSEXT_IDX_session_ticket, TLSEXT_IDX_status_request, TLSEXT_IDX_next_proto_neg, TLSEXT_IDX_application_layer_protocol_negotiation, TLSEXT_IDX_use_srtp, TLSEXT_IDX_encrypt_then_mac, TLSEXT_IDX_signed_certificate_timestamp, TLSEXT_IDX_extended_master_secret, TLSEXT_IDX_signature_algorithms_cert, TLSEXT_IDX_post_handshake_auth, TLSEXT_IDX_signature_algorithms, TLSEXT_IDX_supported_versions, TLSEXT_IDX_psk_kex_modes, TLSEXT_IDX_key_share, TLSEXT_IDX_cookie, TLSEXT_IDX_cryptopro_bug, TLSEXT_IDX_early_data, TLSEXT_IDX_certificate_authorities, TLSEXT_IDX_padding, TLSEXT_IDX_psk, /* Dummy index - must always be the last entry */ TLSEXT_IDX_num_builtins } TLSEXT_INDEX; DEFINE_LHASH_OF(SSL_SESSION); /* Needed in ssl_cert.c */ DEFINE_LHASH_OF(X509_NAME); # define TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH 16 # define TLSEXT_TICK_KEY_LENGTH 32 typedef struct ssl_ctx_ext_secure_st { unsigned char tick_hmac_key[TLSEXT_TICK_KEY_LENGTH]; unsigned char tick_aes_key[TLSEXT_TICK_KEY_LENGTH]; } SSL_CTX_EXT_SECURE; struct ssl_ctx_st { const SSL_METHOD *method; STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_list; /* same as above but sorted for lookup */ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_list_by_id; /* TLSv1.3 specific ciphersuites */ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *tls13_ciphersuites; struct x509_store_st /* X509_STORE */ *cert_store; LHASH_OF(SSL_SESSION) *sessions; /* * Most session-ids that will be cached, default is * SSL_SESSION_CACHE_MAX_SIZE_DEFAULT. 0 is unlimited. */ size_t session_cache_size; struct ssl_session_st *session_cache_head; struct ssl_session_st *session_cache_tail; /* * This can have one of 2 values, ored together, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT, * SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER, Default is SSL_SESSION_CACHE_SERVER, which * means only SSL_accept will cache SSL_SESSIONS. */ uint32_t session_cache_mode; /* * If timeout is not 0, it is the default timeout value set when * SSL_new() is called. This has been put in to make life easier to set * things up */ long session_timeout; /* * If this callback is not null, it will be called each time a session id * is added to the cache. If this function returns 1, it means that the * callback will do a SSL_SESSION_free() when it has finished using it. * Otherwise, on 0, it means the callback has finished with it. If * remove_session_cb is not null, it will be called when a session-id is * removed from the cache. After the call, OpenSSL will * SSL_SESSION_free() it. */ int (*new_session_cb) (struct ssl_st *ssl, SSL_SESSION *sess); void (*remove_session_cb) (struct ssl_ctx_st *ctx, SSL_SESSION *sess); SSL_SESSION *(*get_session_cb) (struct ssl_st *ssl, const unsigned char *data, int len, int *copy); struct { TSAN_QUALIFIER int sess_connect; /* SSL new conn - started */ TSAN_QUALIFIER int sess_connect_renegotiate; /* SSL reneg - requested */ TSAN_QUALIFIER int sess_connect_good; /* SSL new conne/reneg - finished */ TSAN_QUALIFIER int sess_accept; /* SSL new accept - started */ TSAN_QUALIFIER int sess_accept_renegotiate; /* SSL reneg - requested */ TSAN_QUALIFIER int sess_accept_good; /* SSL accept/reneg - finished */ TSAN_QUALIFIER int sess_miss; /* session lookup misses */ TSAN_QUALIFIER int sess_timeout; /* reuse attempt on timeouted session */ TSAN_QUALIFIER int sess_cache_full; /* session removed due to full cache */ TSAN_QUALIFIER int sess_hit; /* session reuse actually done */ TSAN_QUALIFIER int sess_cb_hit; /* session-id that was not in * the cache was passed back via * the callback. This indicates * that the application is * supplying session-id's from * other processes - spooky * :-) */ } stats; CRYPTO_REF_COUNT references; /* if defined, these override the X509_verify_cert() calls */ int (*app_verify_callback) (X509_STORE_CTX *, void *); void *app_verify_arg; /* * before OpenSSL 0.9.7, 'app_verify_arg' was ignored * ('app_verify_callback' was called with just one argument) */ /* Default password callback. */ pem_password_cb *default_passwd_callback; /* Default password callback user data. */ void *default_passwd_callback_userdata; /* get client cert callback */ int (*client_cert_cb) (SSL *ssl, X509 **x509, EVP_PKEY **pkey); /* cookie generate callback */ int (*app_gen_cookie_cb) (SSL *ssl, unsigned char *cookie, unsigned int *cookie_len); /* verify cookie callback */ int (*app_verify_cookie_cb) (SSL *ssl, const unsigned char *cookie, unsigned int cookie_len); /* TLS1.3 app-controlled cookie generate callback */ int (*gen_stateless_cookie_cb) (SSL *ssl, unsigned char *cookie, size_t *cookie_len); /* TLS1.3 verify app-controlled cookie callback */ int (*verify_stateless_cookie_cb) (SSL *ssl, const unsigned char *cookie, size_t cookie_len); CRYPTO_EX_DATA ex_data; const EVP_MD *md5; /* For SSLv3/TLSv1 'ssl3-md5' */ const EVP_MD *sha1; /* For SSLv3/TLSv1 'ssl3->sha1' */ STACK_OF(X509) *extra_certs; STACK_OF(SSL_COMP) *comp_methods; /* stack of SSL_COMP, SSLv3/TLSv1 */ /* Default values used when no per-SSL value is defined follow */ /* used if SSL's info_callback is NULL */ void (*info_callback) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val); /* * What we put in certificate_authorities extension for TLS 1.3 * (ClientHello and CertificateRequest) or just client cert requests for * earlier versions. If client_ca_names is populated then it is only used * for client cert requests, and in preference to ca_names. */ STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_names; STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *client_ca_names; /* * Default values to use in SSL structures follow (these are copied by * SSL_new) */ uint32_t options; uint32_t mode; int min_proto_version; int max_proto_version; size_t max_cert_list; struct cert_st /* CERT */ *cert; int read_ahead; /* callback that allows applications to peek at protocol messages */ void (*msg_callback) (int write_p, int version, int content_type, const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg); void *msg_callback_arg; uint32_t verify_mode; size_t sid_ctx_length; unsigned char sid_ctx[SSL_MAX_SID_CTX_LENGTH]; /* called 'verify_callback' in the SSL */ int (*default_verify_callback) (int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); /* Default generate session ID callback. */ GEN_SESSION_CB generate_session_id; X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param; int quiet_shutdown; # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT CTLOG_STORE *ctlog_store; /* CT Log Store */ /* * Validates that the SCTs (Signed Certificate Timestamps) are sufficient. * If they are not, the connection should be aborted. */ ssl_ct_validation_cb ct_validation_callback; void *ct_validation_callback_arg; # endif /* * If we're using more than one pipeline how should we divide the data * up between the pipes? */ size_t split_send_fragment; /* * Maximum amount of data to send in one fragment. actual record size can * be more than this due to padding and MAC overheads. */ size_t max_send_fragment; /* Up to how many pipelines should we use? If 0 then 1 is assumed */ size_t max_pipelines; /* The default read buffer length to use (0 means not set) */ size_t default_read_buf_len; # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE /* * Engine to pass requests for client certs to */ ENGINE *client_cert_engine; # endif /* ClientHello callback. Mostly for extensions, but not entirely. */ SSL_client_hello_cb_fn client_hello_cb; void *client_hello_cb_arg; /* TLS extensions. */ struct { /* TLS extensions servername callback */ int (*servername_cb) (SSL *, int *, void *); void *servername_arg; /* RFC 4507 session ticket keys */ unsigned char tick_key_name[TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH]; SSL_CTX_EXT_SECURE *secure; /* Callback to support customisation of ticket key setting */ int (*ticket_key_cb) (SSL *ssl, unsigned char *name, unsigned char *iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ectx, HMAC_CTX *hctx, int enc); /* certificate status request info */ /* Callback for status request */ int (*status_cb) (SSL *ssl, void *arg); void *status_arg; /* ext status type used for CSR extension (OCSP Stapling) */ int status_type; /* RFC 4366 Maximum Fragment Length Negotiation */ uint8_t max_fragment_len_mode; # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC /* EC extension values inherited by SSL structure */ size_t ecpointformats_len; unsigned char *ecpointformats; size_t supportedgroups_len; uint16_t *supportedgroups; # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ /* * ALPN information (we are in the process of transitioning from NPN to * ALPN.) */ /*- * For a server, this contains a callback function that allows the * server to select the protocol for the connection. * out: on successful return, this must point to the raw protocol * name (without the length prefix). * outlen: on successful return, this contains the length of |*out|. * in: points to the client's list of supported protocols in * wire-format. * inlen: the length of |in|. */ int (*alpn_select_cb) (SSL *s, const unsigned char **out, unsigned char *outlen, const unsigned char *in, unsigned int inlen, void *arg); void *alpn_select_cb_arg; /* * For a client, this contains the list of supported protocols in wire * format. */ unsigned char *alpn; size_t alpn_len; # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG /* Next protocol negotiation information */ /* * For a server, this contains a callback function by which the set of * advertised protocols can be provided. */ SSL_CTX_npn_advertised_cb_func npn_advertised_cb; void *npn_advertised_cb_arg; /* * For a client, this contains a callback function that selects the next * protocol from the list provided by the server. */ SSL_CTX_npn_select_cb_func npn_select_cb; void *npn_select_cb_arg; # endif unsigned char cookie_hmac_key[SHA256_DIGEST_LENGTH]; } ext; # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK SSL_psk_client_cb_func psk_client_callback; SSL_psk_server_cb_func psk_server_callback; # endif SSL_psk_find_session_cb_func psk_find_session_cb; SSL_psk_use_session_cb_func psk_use_session_cb; # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP SRP_CTX srp_ctx; /* ctx for SRP authentication */ # endif /* Shared DANE context */ struct dane_ctx_st dane; # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP /* SRTP profiles we are willing to do from RFC 5764 */ STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *srtp_profiles; # endif /* * Callback for disabling session caching and ticket support on a session * basis, depending on the chosen cipher. */ int (*not_resumable_session_cb) (SSL *ssl, int is_forward_secure); CRYPTO_RWLOCK *lock; /* * Callback for logging key material for use with debugging tools like * Wireshark. The callback should log `line` followed by a newline. */ SSL_CTX_keylog_cb_func keylog_callback; /* * The maximum number of bytes advertised in session tickets that can be * sent as early data. */ uint32_t max_early_data; /* * The maximum number of bytes of early data that a server will tolerate * (which should be at least as much as max_early_data). */ uint32_t recv_max_early_data; /* TLS1.3 padding callback */ size_t (*record_padding_cb)(SSL *s, int type, size_t len, void *arg); void *record_padding_arg; size_t block_padding; /* Session ticket appdata */ SSL_CTX_generate_session_ticket_fn generate_ticket_cb; SSL_CTX_decrypt_session_ticket_fn decrypt_ticket_cb; void *ticket_cb_data; /* The number of TLS1.3 tickets to automatically send */ size_t num_tickets; /* Callback to determine if early_data is acceptable or not */ SSL_allow_early_data_cb_fn allow_early_data_cb; void *allow_early_data_cb_data; /* Do we advertise Post-handshake auth support? */ int pha_enabled; }; struct ssl_st { /* * protocol version (one of SSL2_VERSION, SSL3_VERSION, TLS1_VERSION, * DTLS1_VERSION) */ int version; /* SSLv3 */ const SSL_METHOD *method; /* * There are 2 BIO's even though they are normally both the same. This * is so data can be read and written to different handlers */ /* used by SSL_read */ BIO *rbio; /* used by SSL_write */ BIO *wbio; /* used during session-id reuse to concatenate messages */ BIO *bbio; /* * This holds a variable that indicates what we were doing when a 0 or -1 * is returned. This is needed for non-blocking IO so we know what * request needs re-doing when in SSL_accept or SSL_connect */ int rwstate; int (*handshake_func) (SSL *); /* * Imagine that here's a boolean member "init" that is switched as soon * as SSL_set_{accept/connect}_state is called for the first time, so * that "state" and "handshake_func" are properly initialized. But as * handshake_func is == 0 until then, we use this test instead of an * "init" member. */ /* are we the server side? */ int server; /* * Generate a new session or reuse an old one. * NB: For servers, the 'new' session may actually be a previously * cached session or even the previous session unless * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION is set */ int new_session; /* don't send shutdown packets */ int quiet_shutdown; /* we have shut things down, 0x01 sent, 0x02 for received */ int shutdown; /* where we are */ OSSL_STATEM statem; SSL_EARLY_DATA_STATE early_data_state; BUF_MEM *init_buf; /* buffer used during init */ void *init_msg; /* pointer to handshake message body, set by * ssl3_get_message() */ size_t init_num; /* amount read/written */ size_t init_off; /* amount read/written */ struct ssl3_state_st *s3; /* SSLv3 variables */ struct dtls1_state_st *d1; /* DTLSv1 variables */ /* callback that allows applications to peek at protocol messages */ void (*msg_callback) (int write_p, int version, int content_type, const void *buf, size_t len, SSL *ssl, void *arg); void *msg_callback_arg; int hit; /* reusing a previous session */ X509_VERIFY_PARAM *param; /* Per connection DANE state */ SSL_DANE dane; /* crypto */ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *peer_ciphers; STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_list; STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_list_by_id; /* TLSv1.3 specific ciphersuites */ STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *tls13_ciphersuites; /* * These are the ones being used, the ones in SSL_SESSION are the ones to * be 'copied' into these ones */ uint32_t mac_flags; /* * The TLS1.3 secrets. */ unsigned char early_secret[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; unsigned char handshake_secret[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; unsigned char master_secret[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; unsigned char resumption_master_secret[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; unsigned char client_finished_secret[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; unsigned char server_finished_secret[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; unsigned char server_finished_hash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; unsigned char handshake_traffic_hash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; unsigned char client_app_traffic_secret[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; unsigned char server_app_traffic_secret[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; unsigned char exporter_master_secret[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; unsigned char early_exporter_master_secret[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; EVP_CIPHER_CTX *enc_read_ctx; /* cryptographic state */ unsigned char read_iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH]; /* TLSv1.3 static read IV */ EVP_MD_CTX *read_hash; /* used for mac generation */ COMP_CTX *compress; /* compression */ COMP_CTX *expand; /* uncompress */ EVP_CIPHER_CTX *enc_write_ctx; /* cryptographic state */ unsigned char write_iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH]; /* TLSv1.3 static write IV */ EVP_MD_CTX *write_hash; /* used for mac generation */ /* session info */ /* client cert? */ /* This is used to hold the server certificate used */ struct cert_st /* CERT */ *cert; /* * The hash of all messages prior to the CertificateVerify, and the length * of that hash. */ unsigned char cert_verify_hash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; size_t cert_verify_hash_len; /* Flag to indicate whether we should send a HelloRetryRequest or not */ enum {SSL_HRR_NONE = 0, SSL_HRR_PENDING, SSL_HRR_COMPLETE} hello_retry_request; /* * the session_id_context is used to ensure sessions are only reused in * the appropriate context */ size_t sid_ctx_length; unsigned char sid_ctx[SSL_MAX_SID_CTX_LENGTH]; /* This can also be in the session once a session is established */ SSL_SESSION *session; /* TLSv1.3 PSK session */ SSL_SESSION *psksession; unsigned char *psksession_id; size_t psksession_id_len; /* Default generate session ID callback. */ GEN_SESSION_CB generate_session_id; /* * The temporary TLSv1.3 session id. This isn't really a session id at all * but is a random value sent in the legacy session id field. */ unsigned char tmp_session_id[SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH]; size_t tmp_session_id_len; /* Used in SSL3 */ /* * 0 don't care about verify failure. * 1 fail if verify fails */ uint32_t verify_mode; /* fail if callback returns 0 */ int (*verify_callback) (int ok, X509_STORE_CTX *ctx); /* optional informational callback */ void (*info_callback) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val); /* error bytes to be written */ int error; /* actual code */ int error_code; # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK SSL_psk_client_cb_func psk_client_callback; SSL_psk_server_cb_func psk_server_callback; # endif SSL_psk_find_session_cb_func psk_find_session_cb; SSL_psk_use_session_cb_func psk_use_session_cb; SSL_CTX *ctx; /* Verified chain of peer */ STACK_OF(X509) *verified_chain; long verify_result; /* extra application data */ CRYPTO_EX_DATA ex_data; /* * What we put in certificate_authorities extension for TLS 1.3 * (ClientHello and CertificateRequest) or just client cert requests for * earlier versions. If client_ca_names is populated then it is only used * for client cert requests, and in preference to ca_names. */ STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_names; STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *client_ca_names; CRYPTO_REF_COUNT references; /* protocol behaviour */ uint32_t options; /* API behaviour */ uint32_t mode; int min_proto_version; int max_proto_version; size_t max_cert_list; int first_packet; /* * What was passed in ClientHello.legacy_version. Used for RSA pre-master * secret and SSLv3/TLS (<=1.2) rollback check */ int client_version; /* * If we're using more than one pipeline how should we divide the data * up between the pipes? */ size_t split_send_fragment; /* * Maximum amount of data to send in one fragment. actual record size can * be more than this due to padding and MAC overheads. */ size_t max_send_fragment; /* Up to how many pipelines should we use? If 0 then 1 is assumed */ size_t max_pipelines; struct { /* Built-in extension flags */ uint8_t extflags[TLSEXT_IDX_num_builtins]; /* TLS extension debug callback */ void (*debug_cb)(SSL *s, int client_server, int type, const unsigned char *data, int len, void *arg); void *debug_arg; char *hostname; /* certificate status request info */ /* Status type or -1 if no status type */ int status_type; /* Raw extension data, if seen */ unsigned char *scts; /* Length of raw extension data, if seen */ uint16_t scts_len; /* Expect OCSP CertificateStatus message */ int status_expected; struct { /* OCSP status request only */ STACK_OF(OCSP_RESPID) *ids; X509_EXTENSIONS *exts; /* OCSP response received or to be sent */ unsigned char *resp; size_t resp_len; } ocsp; /* RFC4507 session ticket expected to be received or sent */ int ticket_expected; # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC size_t ecpointformats_len; /* our list */ unsigned char *ecpointformats; size_t peer_ecpointformats_len; /* peer's list */ unsigned char *peer_ecpointformats; # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ size_t supportedgroups_len; /* our list */ uint16_t *supportedgroups; size_t peer_supportedgroups_len; /* peer's list */ uint16_t *peer_supportedgroups; /* TLS Session Ticket extension override */ TLS_SESSION_TICKET_EXT *session_ticket; /* TLS Session Ticket extension callback */ tls_session_ticket_ext_cb_fn session_ticket_cb; void *session_ticket_cb_arg; /* TLS pre-shared secret session resumption */ tls_session_secret_cb_fn session_secret_cb; void *session_secret_cb_arg; /* * For a client, this contains the list of supported protocols in wire * format. */ unsigned char *alpn; size_t alpn_len; /* * Next protocol negotiation. For the client, this is the protocol that * we sent in NextProtocol and is set when handling ServerHello * extensions. For a server, this is the client's selected_protocol from * NextProtocol and is set when handling the NextProtocol message, before * the Finished message. */ unsigned char *npn; size_t npn_len; /* The available PSK key exchange modes */ int psk_kex_mode; /* Set to one if we have negotiated ETM */ int use_etm; /* Are we expecting to receive early data? */ int early_data; /* Is the session suitable for early data? */ int early_data_ok; /* May be sent by a server in HRR. Must be echoed back in ClientHello */ unsigned char *tls13_cookie; size_t tls13_cookie_len; /* Have we received a cookie from the client? */ int cookieok; /* * Maximum Fragment Length as per RFC 4366. * If this member contains one of the allowed values (1-4) * then we should include Maximum Fragment Length Negotiation * extension in Client Hello. * Please note that value of this member does not have direct * effect. The actual (binding) value is stored in SSL_SESSION, * as this extension is optional on server side. */ uint8_t max_fragment_len_mode; /* * On the client side the number of ticket identities we sent in the * ClientHello. On the server side the identity of the ticket we * selected. */ int tick_identity; } ext; /* * Parsed form of the ClientHello, kept around across client_hello_cb * calls. */ CLIENTHELLO_MSG *clienthello; /*- * no further mod of servername * 0 : call the servername extension callback. * 1 : prepare 2, allow last ack just after in server callback. * 2 : don't call servername callback, no ack in server hello */ int servername_done; # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT /* * Validates that the SCTs (Signed Certificate Timestamps) are sufficient. * If they are not, the connection should be aborted. */ ssl_ct_validation_cb ct_validation_callback; /* User-supplied argument that is passed to the ct_validation_callback */ void *ct_validation_callback_arg; /* * Consolidated stack of SCTs from all sources. * Lazily populated by CT_get_peer_scts(SSL*) */ STACK_OF(SCT) *scts; /* Have we attempted to find/parse SCTs yet? */ int scts_parsed; # endif SSL_CTX *session_ctx; /* initial ctx, used to store sessions */ # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP /* What we'll do */ STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *srtp_profiles; /* What's been chosen */ SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *srtp_profile; # endif /*- * 1 if we are renegotiating. * 2 if we are a server and are inside a handshake * (i.e. not just sending a HelloRequest) */ int renegotiate; /* If sending a KeyUpdate is pending */ int key_update; /* Post-handshake authentication state */ SSL_PHA_STATE post_handshake_auth; int pha_enabled; uint8_t* pha_context; size_t pha_context_len; int certreqs_sent; EVP_MD_CTX *pha_dgst; /* this is just the digest through ClientFinished */ # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP /* ctx for SRP authentication */ SRP_CTX srp_ctx; # endif /* * Callback for disabling session caching and ticket support on a session * basis, depending on the chosen cipher. */ int (*not_resumable_session_cb) (SSL *ssl, int is_forward_secure); RECORD_LAYER rlayer; /* Default password callback. */ pem_password_cb *default_passwd_callback; /* Default password callback user data. */ void *default_passwd_callback_userdata; /* Async Job info */ ASYNC_JOB *job; ASYNC_WAIT_CTX *waitctx; size_t asyncrw; /* * The maximum number of bytes advertised in session tickets that can be * sent as early data. */ uint32_t max_early_data; /* * The maximum number of bytes of early data that a server will tolerate * (which should be at least as much as max_early_data). */ uint32_t recv_max_early_data; /* * The number of bytes of early data received so far. If we accepted early * data then this is a count of the plaintext bytes. If we rejected it then * this is a count of the ciphertext bytes. */ uint32_t early_data_count; /* TLS1.3 padding callback */ size_t (*record_padding_cb)(SSL *s, int type, size_t len, void *arg); void *record_padding_arg; size_t block_padding; CRYPTO_RWLOCK *lock; /* The number of TLS1.3 tickets to automatically send */ size_t num_tickets; /* The number of TLS1.3 tickets actually sent so far */ size_t sent_tickets; /* The next nonce value to use when we send a ticket on this connection */ uint64_t next_ticket_nonce; /* Callback to determine if early_data is acceptable or not */ SSL_allow_early_data_cb_fn allow_early_data_cb; void *allow_early_data_cb_data; /* * Signature algorithms shared by client and server: cached because these * are used most often. */ const struct sigalg_lookup_st **shared_sigalgs; size_t shared_sigalgslen; }; /* * Structure containing table entry of values associated with the signature * algorithms (signature scheme) extension */ typedef struct sigalg_lookup_st { /* TLS 1.3 signature scheme name */ const char *name; /* Raw value used in extension */ uint16_t sigalg; /* NID of hash algorithm or NID_undef if no hash */ int hash; /* Index of hash algorithm or -1 if no hash algorithm */ int hash_idx; /* NID of signature algorithm */ int sig; /* Index of signature algorithm */ int sig_idx; /* Combined hash and signature NID, if any */ int sigandhash; /* Required public key curve (ECDSA only) */ int curve; } SIGALG_LOOKUP; typedef struct tls_group_info_st { int nid; /* Curve NID */ int secbits; /* Bits of security (from SP800-57) */ uint16_t flags; /* Flags: currently just group type */ } TLS_GROUP_INFO; /* flags values */ # define TLS_CURVE_TYPE 0x3 /* Mask for group type */ # define TLS_CURVE_PRIME 0x0 # define TLS_CURVE_CHAR2 0x1 # define TLS_CURVE_CUSTOM 0x2 typedef struct cert_pkey_st CERT_PKEY; /* * Structure containing table entry of certificate info corresponding to * CERT_PKEY entries */ typedef struct { int nid; /* NID of public key algorithm */ uint32_t amask; /* authmask corresponding to key type */ } SSL_CERT_LOOKUP; typedef struct ssl3_state_st { long flags; size_t read_mac_secret_size; unsigned char read_mac_secret[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; size_t write_mac_secret_size; unsigned char write_mac_secret[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; unsigned char server_random[SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE]; unsigned char client_random[SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE]; /* flags for countermeasure against known-IV weakness */ int need_empty_fragments; int empty_fragment_done; /* used during startup, digest all incoming/outgoing packets */ BIO *handshake_buffer; /* * When handshake digest is determined, buffer is hashed and * freed and MD_CTX for the required digest is stored here. */ EVP_MD_CTX *handshake_dgst; /* * Set whenever an expected ChangeCipherSpec message is processed. * Unset when the peer's Finished message is received. * Unexpected ChangeCipherSpec messages trigger a fatal alert. */ int change_cipher_spec; int warn_alert; int fatal_alert; /* * we allow one fatal and one warning alert to be outstanding, send close * alert via the warning alert */ int alert_dispatch; unsigned char send_alert[2]; /* * This flag is set when we should renegotiate ASAP, basically when there * is no more data in the read or write buffers */ int renegotiate; int total_renegotiations; int num_renegotiations; int in_read_app_data; struct { /* actually only need to be 16+20 for SSLv3 and 12 for TLS */ unsigned char finish_md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE * 2]; size_t finish_md_len; unsigned char peer_finish_md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE * 2]; size_t peer_finish_md_len; size_t message_size; int message_type; /* used to hold the new cipher we are going to use */ const SSL_CIPHER *new_cipher; # if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) EVP_PKEY *pkey; /* holds short lived DH/ECDH key */ # endif /* used for certificate requests */ int cert_req; /* Certificate types in certificate request message. */ uint8_t *ctype; size_t ctype_len; /* Certificate authorities list peer sent */ STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *peer_ca_names; size_t key_block_length; unsigned char *key_block; const EVP_CIPHER *new_sym_enc; const EVP_MD *new_hash; int new_mac_pkey_type; size_t new_mac_secret_size; # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP const SSL_COMP *new_compression; # else char *new_compression; # endif int cert_request; /* Raw values of the cipher list from a client */ unsigned char *ciphers_raw; size_t ciphers_rawlen; /* Temporary storage for premaster secret */ unsigned char *pms; size_t pmslen; # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK /* Temporary storage for PSK key */ unsigned char *psk; size_t psklen; # endif /* Signature algorithm we actually use */ const SIGALG_LOOKUP *sigalg; /* Pointer to certificate we use */ CERT_PKEY *cert; /* * signature algorithms peer reports: e.g. supported signature * algorithms extension for server or as part of a certificate * request for client. * Keep track of the algorithms for TLS and X.509 usage separately. */ uint16_t *peer_sigalgs; uint16_t *peer_cert_sigalgs; /* Size of above arrays */ size_t peer_sigalgslen; size_t peer_cert_sigalgslen; /* Sigalg peer actually uses */ const SIGALG_LOOKUP *peer_sigalg; /* * Set if corresponding CERT_PKEY can be used with current * SSL session: e.g. appropriate curve, signature algorithms etc. * If zero it can't be used at all. */ uint32_t valid_flags[SSL_PKEY_NUM]; /* * For servers the following masks are for the key and auth algorithms * that are supported by the certs below. For clients they are masks of * *disabled* algorithms based on the current session. */ uint32_t mask_k; uint32_t mask_a; /* * The following are used by the client to see if a cipher is allowed or * not. It contains the minimum and maximum version the client's using * based on what it knows so far. */ int min_ver; int max_ver; } tmp; /* Connection binding to prevent renegotiation attacks */ unsigned char previous_client_finished[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; size_t previous_client_finished_len; unsigned char previous_server_finished[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; size_t previous_server_finished_len; int send_connection_binding; /* TODOEKR */ # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG /* * Set if we saw the Next Protocol Negotiation extension from our peer. */ int npn_seen; # endif /* * ALPN information (we are in the process of transitioning from NPN to * ALPN.) */ /* * In a server these point to the selected ALPN protocol after the * ClientHello has been processed. In a client these contain the protocol * that the server selected once the ServerHello has been processed. */ unsigned char *alpn_selected; size_t alpn_selected_len; /* used by the server to know what options were proposed */ unsigned char *alpn_proposed; size_t alpn_proposed_len; /* used by the client to know if it actually sent alpn */ int alpn_sent; # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC /* * This is set to true if we believe that this is a version of Safari * running on OS X 10.6 or newer. We wish to know this because Safari on * 10.8 .. 10.8.3 has broken ECDHE-ECDSA support. */ char is_probably_safari; # endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */ /* For clients: peer temporary key */ # if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) /* The group_id for the DH/ECDH key */ uint16_t group_id; EVP_PKEY *peer_tmp; # endif } SSL3_STATE; /* DTLS structures */ # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP # define DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL "EXPORTER_DTLS_OVER_SCTP" # endif /* Max MTU overhead we know about so far is 40 for IPv6 + 8 for UDP */ # define DTLS1_MAX_MTU_OVERHEAD 48 /* * Flag used in message reuse to indicate the buffer contains the record * header as well as the handshake message header. */ # define DTLS1_SKIP_RECORD_HEADER 2 struct dtls1_retransmit_state { EVP_CIPHER_CTX *enc_write_ctx; /* cryptographic state */ EVP_MD_CTX *write_hash; /* used for mac generation */ COMP_CTX *compress; /* compression */ SSL_SESSION *session; unsigned short epoch; }; struct hm_header_st { unsigned char type; size_t msg_len; unsigned short seq; size_t frag_off; size_t frag_len; unsigned int is_ccs; struct dtls1_retransmit_state saved_retransmit_state; }; struct dtls1_timeout_st { /* Number of read timeouts so far */ unsigned int read_timeouts; /* Number of write timeouts so far */ unsigned int write_timeouts; /* Number of alerts received so far */ unsigned int num_alerts; }; typedef struct hm_fragment_st { struct hm_header_st msg_header; unsigned char *fragment; unsigned char *reassembly; } hm_fragment; typedef struct pqueue_st pqueue; typedef struct pitem_st pitem; struct pitem_st { unsigned char priority[8]; /* 64-bit value in big-endian encoding */ void *data; pitem *next; }; typedef struct pitem_st *piterator; pitem *pitem_new(unsigned char *prio64be, void *data); void pitem_free(pitem *item); pqueue *pqueue_new(void); void pqueue_free(pqueue *pq); pitem *pqueue_insert(pqueue *pq, pitem *item); pitem *pqueue_peek(pqueue *pq); pitem *pqueue_pop(pqueue *pq); pitem *pqueue_find(pqueue *pq, unsigned char *prio64be); pitem *pqueue_iterator(pqueue *pq); pitem *pqueue_next(piterator *iter); size_t pqueue_size(pqueue *pq); typedef struct dtls1_state_st { unsigned char cookie[DTLS1_COOKIE_LENGTH]; size_t cookie_len; unsigned int cookie_verified; /* handshake message numbers */ unsigned short handshake_write_seq; unsigned short next_handshake_write_seq; unsigned short handshake_read_seq; /* Buffered handshake messages */ pqueue *buffered_messages; /* Buffered (sent) handshake records */ pqueue *sent_messages; size_t link_mtu; /* max on-the-wire DTLS packet size */ size_t mtu; /* max DTLS packet size */ struct hm_header_st w_msg_hdr; struct hm_header_st r_msg_hdr; struct dtls1_timeout_st timeout; /* * Indicates when the last handshake msg sent will timeout */ struct timeval next_timeout; /* Timeout duration */ unsigned int timeout_duration_us; unsigned int retransmitting; # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP int shutdown_received; # endif DTLS_timer_cb timer_cb; } DTLS1_STATE; # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC /* * From ECC-TLS draft, used in encoding the curve type in ECParameters */ # define EXPLICIT_PRIME_CURVE_TYPE 1 # define EXPLICIT_CHAR2_CURVE_TYPE 2 # define NAMED_CURVE_TYPE 3 # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ struct cert_pkey_st { X509 *x509; EVP_PKEY *privatekey; /* Chain for this certificate */ STACK_OF(X509) *chain; /*- * serverinfo data for this certificate. The data is in TLS Extension * wire format, specifically it's a series of records like: * uint16_t extension_type; // (RFC 5246, 7.4.1.4, Extension) * uint16_t length; * uint8_t data[length]; */ unsigned char *serverinfo; size_t serverinfo_length; }; /* Retrieve Suite B flags */ # define tls1_suiteb(s) (s->cert->cert_flags & SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS) /* Uses to check strict mode: suite B modes are always strict */ # define SSL_CERT_FLAGS_CHECK_TLS_STRICT \ (SSL_CERT_FLAG_SUITEB_128_LOS|SSL_CERT_FLAG_TLS_STRICT) typedef enum { ENDPOINT_CLIENT = 0, ENDPOINT_SERVER, ENDPOINT_BOTH } ENDPOINT; typedef struct { unsigned short ext_type; ENDPOINT role; /* The context which this extension applies to */ unsigned int context; /* * Per-connection flags relating to this extension type: not used if * part of an SSL_CTX structure. */ uint32_t ext_flags; SSL_custom_ext_add_cb_ex add_cb; SSL_custom_ext_free_cb_ex free_cb; void *add_arg; SSL_custom_ext_parse_cb_ex parse_cb; void *parse_arg; } custom_ext_method; /* ext_flags values */ /* * Indicates an extension has been received. Used to check for unsolicited or * duplicate extensions. */ # define SSL_EXT_FLAG_RECEIVED 0x1 /* * Indicates an extension has been sent: used to enable sending of * corresponding ServerHello extension. */ # define SSL_EXT_FLAG_SENT 0x2 typedef struct { custom_ext_method *meths; size_t meths_count; } custom_ext_methods; typedef struct cert_st { /* Current active set */ /* * ALWAYS points to an element of the pkeys array * Probably it would make more sense to store * an index, not a pointer. */ CERT_PKEY *key; # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH EVP_PKEY *dh_tmp; DH *(*dh_tmp_cb) (SSL *ssl, int is_export, int keysize); int dh_tmp_auto; # endif /* Flags related to certificates */ uint32_t cert_flags; CERT_PKEY pkeys[SSL_PKEY_NUM]; /* Custom certificate types sent in certificate request message. */ uint8_t *ctype; size_t ctype_len; /* * supported signature algorithms. When set on a client this is sent in * the client hello as the supported signature algorithms extension. For * servers it represents the signature algorithms we are willing to use. */ uint16_t *conf_sigalgs; /* Size of above array */ size_t conf_sigalgslen; /* * Client authentication signature algorithms, if not set then uses * conf_sigalgs. On servers these will be the signature algorithms sent * to the client in a certificate request for TLS 1.2. On a client this * represents the signature algorithms we are willing to use for client * authentication. */ uint16_t *client_sigalgs; /* Size of above array */ size_t client_sigalgslen; /* * Certificate setup callback: if set is called whenever a certificate * may be required (client or server). the callback can then examine any * appropriate parameters and setup any certificates required. This * allows advanced applications to select certificates on the fly: for * example based on supported signature algorithms or curves. */ int (*cert_cb) (SSL *ssl, void *arg); void *cert_cb_arg; /* * Optional X509_STORE for chain building or certificate validation If * NULL the parent SSL_CTX store is used instead. */ X509_STORE *chain_store; X509_STORE *verify_store; /* Custom extensions */ custom_ext_methods custext; /* Security callback */ int (*sec_cb) (const SSL *s, const SSL_CTX *ctx, int op, int bits, int nid, void *other, void *ex); /* Security level */ int sec_level; void *sec_ex; # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK /* If not NULL psk identity hint to use for servers */ char *psk_identity_hint; # endif CRYPTO_REF_COUNT references; /* >1 only if SSL_copy_session_id is used */ CRYPTO_RWLOCK *lock; } CERT; # define FP_ICC (int (*)(const void *,const void *)) /* * This is for the SSLv3/TLSv1.0 differences in crypto/hash stuff It is a bit * of a mess of functions, but hell, think of it as an opaque structure :-) */ typedef struct ssl3_enc_method { int (*enc) (SSL *, SSL3_RECORD *, size_t, int); int (*mac) (SSL *, SSL3_RECORD *, unsigned char *, int); int (*setup_key_block) (SSL *); int (*generate_master_secret) (SSL *, unsigned char *, unsigned char *, size_t, size_t *); int (*change_cipher_state) (SSL *, int); size_t (*final_finish_mac) (SSL *, const char *, size_t, unsigned char *); const char *client_finished_label; size_t client_finished_label_len; const char *server_finished_label; size_t server_finished_label_len; int (*alert_value) (int); int (*export_keying_material) (SSL *, unsigned char *, size_t, const char *, size_t, const unsigned char *, size_t, int use_context); /* Various flags indicating protocol version requirements */ uint32_t enc_flags; /* Set the handshake header */ int (*set_handshake_header) (SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int type); /* Close construction of the handshake message */ int (*close_construct_packet) (SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int htype); /* Write out handshake message */ int (*do_write) (SSL *s); } SSL3_ENC_METHOD; # define ssl_set_handshake_header(s, pkt, htype) \ s->method->ssl3_enc->set_handshake_header((s), (pkt), (htype)) # define ssl_close_construct_packet(s, pkt, htype) \ s->method->ssl3_enc->close_construct_packet((s), (pkt), (htype)) # define ssl_do_write(s) s->method->ssl3_enc->do_write(s) /* Values for enc_flags */ /* Uses explicit IV for CBC mode */ # define SSL_ENC_FLAG_EXPLICIT_IV 0x1 /* Uses signature algorithms extension */ # define SSL_ENC_FLAG_SIGALGS 0x2 /* Uses SHA256 default PRF */ # define SSL_ENC_FLAG_SHA256_PRF 0x4 /* Is DTLS */ # define SSL_ENC_FLAG_DTLS 0x8 /* * Allow TLS 1.2 ciphersuites: applies to DTLS 1.2 as well as TLS 1.2: may * apply to others in future. */ # define SSL_ENC_FLAG_TLS1_2_CIPHERS 0x10 # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP /* Used for holding the relevant compression methods loaded into SSL_CTX */ typedef struct ssl3_comp_st { int comp_id; /* The identifier byte for this compression * type */ char *name; /* Text name used for the compression type */ COMP_METHOD *method; /* The method :-) */ } SSL3_COMP; # endif typedef enum downgrade_en { DOWNGRADE_NONE, DOWNGRADE_TO_1_2, DOWNGRADE_TO_1_1 } DOWNGRADE; /* * Dummy status type for the status_type extension. Indicates no status type * set */ #define TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_nothing -1 /* Sigalgs values */ #define TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256 0x0403 #define TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384 0x0503 #define TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512 0x0603 #define TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha224 0x0303 #define TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha1 0x0203 #define TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha256 0x0804 #define TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha384 0x0805 #define TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_rsae_sha512 0x0806 #define TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha256 0x0809 #define TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha384 0x080a #define TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha512 0x080b #define TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha256 0x0401 #define TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha384 0x0501 #define TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha512 0x0601 #define TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha224 0x0301 #define TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pkcs1_sha1 0x0201 #define TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha256 0x0402 #define TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha384 0x0502 #define TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha512 0x0602 #define TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha224 0x0302 #define TLSEXT_SIGALG_dsa_sha1 0x0202 #define TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_gostr34112012_256 0xeeee #define TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_gostr34112012_512 0xefef #define TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102001_gostr3411 0xeded #define TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed25519 0x0807 #define TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed448 0x0808 /* Known PSK key exchange modes */ #define TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_KE 0x00 #define TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_KE_DHE 0x01 /* * Internal representations of key exchange modes */ #define TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_NONE 0 #define TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE 1 #define TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE_DHE 2 #define SSL_USE_PSS(s) (s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalg != NULL && \ s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalg->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) /* A dummy signature value not valid for TLSv1.2 signature algs */ #define TLSEXT_signature_rsa_pss 0x0101 /* TLSv1.3 downgrade protection sentinel values */ extern const unsigned char tls11downgrade[8]; extern const unsigned char tls12downgrade[8]; extern SSL3_ENC_METHOD ssl3_undef_enc_method; __owur const SSL_METHOD *ssl_bad_method(int ver); __owur const SSL_METHOD *sslv3_method(void); __owur const SSL_METHOD *sslv3_server_method(void); __owur const SSL_METHOD *sslv3_client_method(void); __owur const SSL_METHOD *tlsv1_method(void); __owur const SSL_METHOD *tlsv1_server_method(void); __owur const SSL_METHOD *tlsv1_client_method(void); __owur const SSL_METHOD *tlsv1_1_method(void); __owur const SSL_METHOD *tlsv1_1_server_method(void); __owur const SSL_METHOD *tlsv1_1_client_method(void); __owur const SSL_METHOD *tlsv1_2_method(void); __owur const SSL_METHOD *tlsv1_2_server_method(void); __owur const SSL_METHOD *tlsv1_2_client_method(void); __owur const SSL_METHOD *tlsv1_3_method(void); __owur const SSL_METHOD *tlsv1_3_server_method(void); __owur const SSL_METHOD *tlsv1_3_client_method(void); __owur const SSL_METHOD *dtlsv1_method(void); __owur const SSL_METHOD *dtlsv1_server_method(void); __owur const SSL_METHOD *dtlsv1_client_method(void); __owur const SSL_METHOD *dtls_bad_ver_client_method(void); __owur const SSL_METHOD *dtlsv1_2_method(void); __owur const SSL_METHOD *dtlsv1_2_server_method(void); __owur const SSL_METHOD *dtlsv1_2_client_method(void); extern const SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_enc_data; extern const SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_1_enc_data; extern const SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_2_enc_data; extern const SSL3_ENC_METHOD TLSv1_3_enc_data; extern const SSL3_ENC_METHOD SSLv3_enc_data; extern const SSL3_ENC_METHOD DTLSv1_enc_data; extern const SSL3_ENC_METHOD DTLSv1_2_enc_data; /* * Flags for SSL methods */ # define SSL_METHOD_NO_FIPS (1U<<0) # define SSL_METHOD_NO_SUITEB (1U<<1) # define IMPLEMENT_tls_meth_func(version, flags, mask, func_name, s_accept, \ s_connect, enc_data) \ const SSL_METHOD *func_name(void) \ { \ static const SSL_METHOD func_name##_data= { \ version, \ flags, \ mask, \ tls1_new, \ tls1_clear, \ tls1_free, \ s_accept, \ s_connect, \ ssl3_read, \ ssl3_peek, \ ssl3_write, \ ssl3_shutdown, \ ssl3_renegotiate, \ ssl3_renegotiate_check, \ ssl3_read_bytes, \ ssl3_write_bytes, \ ssl3_dispatch_alert, \ ssl3_ctrl, \ ssl3_ctx_ctrl, \ ssl3_get_cipher_by_char, \ ssl3_put_cipher_by_char, \ ssl3_pending, \ ssl3_num_ciphers, \ ssl3_get_cipher, \ tls1_default_timeout, \ &enc_data, \ ssl_undefined_void_function, \ ssl3_callback_ctrl, \ ssl3_ctx_callback_ctrl, \ }; \ return &func_name##_data; \ } # define IMPLEMENT_ssl3_meth_func(func_name, s_accept, s_connect) \ const SSL_METHOD *func_name(void) \ { \ static const SSL_METHOD func_name##_data= { \ SSL3_VERSION, \ SSL_METHOD_NO_FIPS | SSL_METHOD_NO_SUITEB, \ SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3, \ ssl3_new, \ ssl3_clear, \ ssl3_free, \ s_accept, \ s_connect, \ ssl3_read, \ ssl3_peek, \ ssl3_write, \ ssl3_shutdown, \ ssl3_renegotiate, \ ssl3_renegotiate_check, \ ssl3_read_bytes, \ ssl3_write_bytes, \ ssl3_dispatch_alert, \ ssl3_ctrl, \ ssl3_ctx_ctrl, \ ssl3_get_cipher_by_char, \ ssl3_put_cipher_by_char, \ ssl3_pending, \ ssl3_num_ciphers, \ ssl3_get_cipher, \ ssl3_default_timeout, \ &SSLv3_enc_data, \ ssl_undefined_void_function, \ ssl3_callback_ctrl, \ ssl3_ctx_callback_ctrl, \ }; \ return &func_name##_data; \ } # define IMPLEMENT_dtls1_meth_func(version, flags, mask, func_name, s_accept, \ s_connect, enc_data) \ const SSL_METHOD *func_name(void) \ { \ static const SSL_METHOD func_name##_data= { \ version, \ flags, \ mask, \ dtls1_new, \ dtls1_clear, \ dtls1_free, \ s_accept, \ s_connect, \ ssl3_read, \ ssl3_peek, \ ssl3_write, \ dtls1_shutdown, \ ssl3_renegotiate, \ ssl3_renegotiate_check, \ dtls1_read_bytes, \ dtls1_write_app_data_bytes, \ dtls1_dispatch_alert, \ dtls1_ctrl, \ ssl3_ctx_ctrl, \ ssl3_get_cipher_by_char, \ ssl3_put_cipher_by_char, \ ssl3_pending, \ ssl3_num_ciphers, \ ssl3_get_cipher, \ dtls1_default_timeout, \ &enc_data, \ ssl_undefined_void_function, \ ssl3_callback_ctrl, \ ssl3_ctx_callback_ctrl, \ }; \ return &func_name##_data; \ } struct openssl_ssl_test_functions { int (*p_ssl_init_wbio_buffer) (SSL *s); int (*p_ssl3_setup_buffers) (SSL *s); }; const char *ssl_protocol_to_string(int version); /* Returns true if certificate and private key for 'idx' are present */ static ossl_inline int ssl_has_cert(const SSL *s, int idx) { if (idx < 0 || idx >= SSL_PKEY_NUM) return 0; return s->cert->pkeys[idx].x509 != NULL && s->cert->pkeys[idx].privatekey != NULL; } static ossl_inline void tls1_get_peer_groups(SSL *s, const uint16_t **pgroups, size_t *pgroupslen) { *pgroups = s->ext.peer_supportedgroups; *pgroupslen = s->ext.peer_supportedgroups_len; } # ifndef OPENSSL_UNIT_TEST __owur int ssl_read_internal(SSL *s, void *buf, size_t num, size_t *readbytes); __owur int ssl_write_internal(SSL *s, const void *buf, size_t num, size_t *written); void ssl_clear_cipher_ctx(SSL *s); int ssl_clear_bad_session(SSL *s); __owur CERT *ssl_cert_new(void); __owur CERT *ssl_cert_dup(CERT *cert); void ssl_cert_clear_certs(CERT *c); void ssl_cert_free(CERT *c); __owur int ssl_generate_session_id(SSL *s, SSL_SESSION *ss); __owur int ssl_get_new_session(SSL *s, int session); __owur SSL_SESSION *lookup_sess_in_cache(SSL *s, const unsigned char *sess_id, size_t sess_id_len); __owur int ssl_get_prev_session(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello); __owur SSL_SESSION *ssl_session_dup(SSL_SESSION *src, int ticket); __owur int ssl_cipher_id_cmp(const SSL_CIPHER *a, const SSL_CIPHER *b); DECLARE_OBJ_BSEARCH_GLOBAL_CMP_FN(SSL_CIPHER, SSL_CIPHER, ssl_cipher_id); __owur int ssl_cipher_ptr_id_cmp(const SSL_CIPHER *const *ap, const SSL_CIPHER *const *bp); __owur STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_create_cipher_list(const SSL_METHOD *ssl_method, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *tls13_ciphersuites, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) **cipher_list, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) **cipher_list_by_id, const char *rule_str, CERT *c); __owur int ssl_cache_cipherlist(SSL *s, PACKET *cipher_suites, int sslv2format); __owur int bytes_to_cipher_list(SSL *s, PACKET *cipher_suites, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) **skp, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) **scsvs, int sslv2format, int fatal); void ssl_update_cache(SSL *s, int mode); __owur int ssl_cipher_get_evp(const SSL_SESSION *s, const EVP_CIPHER **enc, const EVP_MD **md, int *mac_pkey_type, size_t *mac_secret_size, SSL_COMP **comp, int use_etm); __owur int ssl_cipher_get_overhead(const SSL_CIPHER *c, size_t *mac_overhead, size_t *int_overhead, size_t *blocksize, size_t *ext_overhead); __owur int ssl_cert_is_disabled(size_t idx); __owur const SSL_CIPHER *ssl_get_cipher_by_char(SSL *ssl, const unsigned char *ptr, int all); __owur int ssl_cert_set0_chain(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *chain); __owur int ssl_cert_set1_chain(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *chain); __owur int ssl_cert_add0_chain_cert(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x); __owur int ssl_cert_add1_chain_cert(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x); __owur int ssl_cert_select_current(CERT *c, X509 *x); __owur int ssl_cert_set_current(CERT *c, long arg); void ssl_cert_set_cert_cb(CERT *c, int (*cb) (SSL *ssl, void *arg), void *arg); __owur int ssl_verify_cert_chain(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509) *sk); __owur int ssl_build_cert_chain(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, int flags); __owur int ssl_cert_set_cert_store(CERT *c, X509_STORE *store, int chain, int ref); __owur int ssl_security(const SSL *s, int op, int bits, int nid, void *other); __owur int ssl_ctx_security(const SSL_CTX *ctx, int op, int bits, int nid, void *other); int ssl_get_security_level_bits(const SSL *s, const SSL_CTX *ctx, int *levelp); __owur int ssl_cert_lookup_by_nid(int nid, size_t *pidx); __owur const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(const EVP_PKEY *pk, size_t *pidx); __owur const SSL_CERT_LOOKUP *ssl_cert_lookup_by_idx(size_t idx); int ssl_undefined_function(SSL *s); __owur int ssl_undefined_void_function(void); __owur int ssl_undefined_const_function(const SSL *s); __owur int ssl_get_server_cert_serverinfo(SSL *s, const unsigned char **serverinfo, size_t *serverinfo_length); void ssl_set_masks(SSL *s); __owur STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_get_ciphers_by_id(SSL *s); __owur int ssl_x509err2alert(int type); void ssl_sort_cipher_list(void); int ssl_load_ciphers(void); __owur int ssl_fill_hello_random(SSL *s, int server, unsigned char *field, size_t len, DOWNGRADE dgrd); __owur int ssl_generate_master_secret(SSL *s, unsigned char *pms, size_t pmslen, int free_pms); __owur EVP_PKEY *ssl_generate_pkey(EVP_PKEY *pm); __owur int ssl_derive(SSL *s, EVP_PKEY *privkey, EVP_PKEY *pubkey, int genmaster); __owur EVP_PKEY *ssl_dh_to_pkey(DH *dh); __owur unsigned int ssl_get_max_send_fragment(const SSL *ssl); __owur unsigned int ssl_get_split_send_fragment(const SSL *ssl); __owur const SSL_CIPHER *ssl3_get_cipher_by_id(uint32_t id); __owur const SSL_CIPHER *ssl3_get_cipher_by_std_name(const char *stdname); __owur const SSL_CIPHER *ssl3_get_cipher_by_char(const unsigned char *p); __owur int ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(const SSL_CIPHER *c, WPACKET *pkt, size_t *len); int ssl3_init_finished_mac(SSL *s); __owur int ssl3_setup_key_block(SSL *s); __owur int ssl3_change_cipher_state(SSL *s, int which); void ssl3_cleanup_key_block(SSL *s); __owur int ssl3_do_write(SSL *s, int type); int ssl3_send_alert(SSL *s, int level, int desc); __owur int ssl3_generate_master_secret(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, unsigned char *p, size_t len, size_t *secret_size); __owur int ssl3_get_req_cert_type(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt); __owur int ssl3_num_ciphers(void); __owur const SSL_CIPHER *ssl3_get_cipher(unsigned int u); int ssl3_renegotiate(SSL *ssl); int ssl3_renegotiate_check(SSL *ssl, int initok); __owur int ssl3_dispatch_alert(SSL *s); __owur size_t ssl3_final_finish_mac(SSL *s, const char *sender, size_t slen, unsigned char *p); __owur int ssl3_finish_mac(SSL *s, const unsigned char *buf, size_t len); void ssl3_free_digest_list(SSL *s); __owur unsigned long ssl3_output_cert_chain(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, CERT_PKEY *cpk); __owur const SSL_CIPHER *ssl3_choose_cipher(SSL *ssl, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *clnt, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *srvr); __owur int ssl3_digest_cached_records(SSL *s, int keep); __owur int ssl3_new(SSL *s); void ssl3_free(SSL *s); __owur int ssl3_read(SSL *s, void *buf, size_t len, size_t *readbytes); __owur int ssl3_peek(SSL *s, void *buf, size_t len, size_t *readbytes); __owur int ssl3_write(SSL *s, const void *buf, size_t len, size_t *written); __owur int ssl3_shutdown(SSL *s); int ssl3_clear(SSL *s); __owur long ssl3_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, long larg, void *parg); __owur long ssl3_ctx_ctrl(SSL_CTX *s, int cmd, long larg, void *parg); __owur long ssl3_callback_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, void (*fp) (void)); __owur long ssl3_ctx_callback_ctrl(SSL_CTX *s, int cmd, void (*fp) (void)); __owur int ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(SSL *ssl); __owur long ssl3_default_timeout(void); __owur int ssl3_set_handshake_header(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int htype); __owur int tls_close_construct_packet(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int htype); __owur int tls_setup_handshake(SSL *s); __owur int dtls1_set_handshake_header(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int htype); __owur int dtls1_close_construct_packet(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int htype); __owur int ssl3_handshake_write(SSL *s); __owur int ssl_allow_compression(SSL *s); __owur int ssl_version_supported(const SSL *s, int version, const SSL_METHOD **meth); __owur int ssl_set_client_hello_version(SSL *s); __owur int ssl_check_version_downgrade(SSL *s); __owur int ssl_set_version_bound(int method_version, int version, int *bound); __owur int ssl_choose_server_version(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello, DOWNGRADE *dgrd); __owur int ssl_choose_client_version(SSL *s, int version, RAW_EXTENSION *extensions); __owur int ssl_get_min_max_version(const SSL *s, int *min_version, int *max_version, int *real_max); __owur long tls1_default_timeout(void); __owur int dtls1_do_write(SSL *s, int type); void dtls1_set_message_header(SSL *s, unsigned char mt, size_t len, size_t frag_off, size_t frag_len); int dtls1_write_app_data_bytes(SSL *s, int type, const void *buf_, size_t len, size_t *written); __owur int dtls1_read_failed(SSL *s, int code); __owur int dtls1_buffer_message(SSL *s, int ccs); __owur int dtls1_retransmit_message(SSL *s, unsigned short seq, int *found); __owur int dtls1_get_queue_priority(unsigned short seq, int is_ccs); int dtls1_retransmit_buffered_messages(SSL *s); void dtls1_clear_received_buffer(SSL *s); void dtls1_clear_sent_buffer(SSL *s); void dtls1_get_message_header(unsigned char *data, struct hm_header_st *msg_hdr); __owur long dtls1_default_timeout(void); __owur struct timeval *dtls1_get_timeout(SSL *s, struct timeval *timeleft); __owur int dtls1_check_timeout_num(SSL *s); __owur int dtls1_handle_timeout(SSL *s); void dtls1_start_timer(SSL *s); void dtls1_stop_timer(SSL *s); __owur int dtls1_is_timer_expired(SSL *s); __owur int dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(WPACKET *pkt, unsigned char *cookie, size_t cookie_len); __owur size_t dtls1_min_mtu(SSL *s); void dtls1_hm_fragment_free(hm_fragment *frag); __owur int dtls1_query_mtu(SSL *s); __owur int tls1_new(SSL *s); void tls1_free(SSL *s); int tls1_clear(SSL *s); __owur int dtls1_new(SSL *s); void dtls1_free(SSL *s); int dtls1_clear(SSL *s); long dtls1_ctrl(SSL *s, int cmd, long larg, void *parg); __owur int dtls1_shutdown(SSL *s); __owur int dtls1_dispatch_alert(SSL *s); __owur int ssl_init_wbio_buffer(SSL *s); int ssl_free_wbio_buffer(SSL *s); __owur int tls1_change_cipher_state(SSL *s, int which); __owur int tls1_setup_key_block(SSL *s); __owur size_t tls1_final_finish_mac(SSL *s, const char *str, size_t slen, unsigned char *p); __owur int tls1_generate_master_secret(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, unsigned char *p, size_t len, size_t *secret_size); __owur int tls13_setup_key_block(SSL *s); __owur size_t tls13_final_finish_mac(SSL *s, const char *str, size_t slen, unsigned char *p); __owur int tls13_change_cipher_state(SSL *s, int which); __owur int tls13_update_key(SSL *s, int send); __owur int tls13_hkdf_expand(SSL *s, const EVP_MD *md, const unsigned char *secret, const unsigned char *label, size_t labellen, const unsigned char *data, size_t datalen, unsigned char *out, size_t outlen, int fatal); __owur int tls13_derive_key(SSL *s, const EVP_MD *md, const unsigned char *secret, unsigned char *key, size_t keylen); __owur int tls13_derive_iv(SSL *s, const EVP_MD *md, const unsigned char *secret, unsigned char *iv, size_t ivlen); __owur int tls13_derive_finishedkey(SSL *s, const EVP_MD *md, const unsigned char *secret, unsigned char *fin, size_t finlen); int tls13_generate_secret(SSL *s, const EVP_MD *md, const unsigned char *prevsecret, const unsigned char *insecret, size_t insecretlen, unsigned char *outsecret); __owur int tls13_generate_handshake_secret(SSL *s, const unsigned char *insecret, size_t insecretlen); __owur int tls13_generate_master_secret(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, unsigned char *prev, size_t prevlen, size_t *secret_size); __owur int tls1_export_keying_material(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, size_t olen, const char *label, size_t llen, const unsigned char *p, size_t plen, int use_context); __owur int tls13_export_keying_material(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, size_t olen, const char *label, size_t llen, const unsigned char *context, size_t contextlen, int use_context); __owur int tls13_export_keying_material_early(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, size_t olen, const char *label, size_t llen, const unsigned char *context, size_t contextlen); __owur int tls1_alert_code(int code); __owur int tls13_alert_code(int code); __owur int ssl3_alert_code(int code); # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC __owur int ssl_check_srvr_ecc_cert_and_alg(X509 *x, SSL *s); # endif SSL_COMP *ssl3_comp_find(STACK_OF(SSL_COMP) *sk, int n); # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC __owur const TLS_GROUP_INFO *tls1_group_id_lookup(uint16_t curve_id); __owur int tls1_check_group_id(SSL *s, uint16_t group_id, int check_own_curves); __owur uint16_t tls1_shared_group(SSL *s, int nmatch); __owur int tls1_set_groups(uint16_t **pext, size_t *pextlen, int *curves, size_t ncurves); __owur int tls1_set_groups_list(uint16_t **pext, size_t *pextlen, const char *str); void tls1_get_formatlist(SSL *s, const unsigned char **pformats, size_t *num_formats); __owur int tls1_check_ec_tmp_key(SSL *s, unsigned long id); __owur EVP_PKEY *ssl_generate_pkey_group(SSL *s, uint16_t id); __owur EVP_PKEY *ssl_generate_param_group(uint16_t id); # endif /* OPENSSL_NO_EC */ __owur int tls_curve_allowed(SSL *s, uint16_t curve, int op); void tls1_get_supported_groups(SSL *s, const uint16_t **pgroups, size_t *pgroupslen); __owur int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL *s); __owur SSL_TICKET_STATUS tls_get_ticket_from_client(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello, SSL_SESSION **ret); __owur SSL_TICKET_STATUS tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick, size_t eticklen, const unsigned char *sess_id, size_t sesslen, SSL_SESSION **psess); __owur int tls_use_ticket(SSL *s); void ssl_set_sig_mask(uint32_t *pmask_a, SSL *s, int op); __owur int tls1_set_sigalgs_list(CERT *c, const char *str, int client); __owur int tls1_set_raw_sigalgs(CERT *c, const uint16_t *psigs, size_t salglen, int client); __owur int tls1_set_sigalgs(CERT *c, const int *salg, size_t salglen, int client); int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain, int idx); void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s); # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT __owur int ssl_validate_ct(SSL *s); # endif # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH __owur DH *ssl_get_auto_dh(SSL *s); # endif __owur int ssl_security_cert(SSL *s, SSL_CTX *ctx, X509 *x, int vfy, int is_ee); __owur int ssl_security_cert_chain(SSL *s, STACK_OF(X509) *sk, X509 *ex, int vfy); int tls_choose_sigalg(SSL *s, int fatalerrs); __owur EVP_MD_CTX *ssl_replace_hash(EVP_MD_CTX **hash, const EVP_MD *md); void ssl_clear_hash_ctx(EVP_MD_CTX **hash); __owur long ssl_get_algorithm2(SSL *s); __owur int tls12_copy_sigalgs(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, const uint16_t *psig, size_t psiglen); __owur int tls1_save_u16(PACKET *pkt, uint16_t **pdest, size_t *pdestlen); __owur int tls1_save_sigalgs(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, int cert); __owur int tls1_process_sigalgs(SSL *s); __owur int tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(SSL *s, const EVP_PKEY *pkey); __owur int tls1_lookup_md(const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu, const EVP_MD **pmd); __owur size_t tls12_get_psigalgs(SSL *s, int sent, const uint16_t **psigs); # ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC __owur int tls_check_sigalg_curve(const SSL *s, int curve); # endif __owur int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(SSL *s, uint16_t, EVP_PKEY *pkey); __owur int ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s); __owur int ssl_cipher_disabled(const SSL *s, const SSL_CIPHER *c, int op, int echde); __owur int ssl_handshake_hash(SSL *s, unsigned char *out, size_t outlen, size_t *hashlen); __owur const EVP_MD *ssl_md(int idx); __owur const EVP_MD *ssl_handshake_md(SSL *s); __owur const EVP_MD *ssl_prf_md(SSL *s); /* * ssl_log_rsa_client_key_exchange logs |premaster| to the SSL_CTX associated * with |ssl|, if logging is enabled. It returns one on success and zero on * failure. The entry is identified by the first 8 bytes of * |encrypted_premaster|. */ __owur int ssl_log_rsa_client_key_exchange(SSL *ssl, const uint8_t *encrypted_premaster, size_t encrypted_premaster_len, const uint8_t *premaster, size_t premaster_len); /* * ssl_log_secret logs |secret| to the SSL_CTX associated with |ssl|, if * logging is available. It returns one on success and zero on failure. It tags * the entry with |label|. */ __owur int ssl_log_secret(SSL *ssl, const char *label, const uint8_t *secret, size_t secret_len); #define MASTER_SECRET_LABEL "CLIENT_RANDOM" #define CLIENT_EARLY_LABEL "CLIENT_EARLY_TRAFFIC_SECRET" #define CLIENT_HANDSHAKE_LABEL "CLIENT_HANDSHAKE_TRAFFIC_SECRET" #define SERVER_HANDSHAKE_LABEL "SERVER_HANDSHAKE_TRAFFIC_SECRET" #define CLIENT_APPLICATION_LABEL "CLIENT_TRAFFIC_SECRET_0" #define SERVER_APPLICATION_LABEL "SERVER_TRAFFIC_SECRET_0" #define EARLY_EXPORTER_SECRET_LABEL "EARLY_EXPORTER_SECRET" #define EXPORTER_SECRET_LABEL "EXPORTER_SECRET" /* s3_cbc.c */ __owur char ssl3_cbc_record_digest_supported(const EVP_MD_CTX *ctx); __owur int ssl3_cbc_digest_record(const EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *md_out, size_t *md_out_size, - const unsigned char header[13], + const unsigned char *header, const unsigned char *data, size_t data_plus_mac_size, size_t data_plus_mac_plus_padding_size, const unsigned char *mac_secret, size_t mac_secret_length, char is_sslv3); __owur int srp_generate_server_master_secret(SSL *s); __owur int srp_generate_client_master_secret(SSL *s); __owur int srp_verify_server_param(SSL *s); /* statem/statem_srvr.c */ __owur int send_certificate_request(SSL *s); /* statem/extensions_cust.c */ custom_ext_method *custom_ext_find(const custom_ext_methods *exts, ENDPOINT role, unsigned int ext_type, size_t *idx); void custom_ext_init(custom_ext_methods *meths); __owur int custom_ext_parse(SSL *s, unsigned int context, unsigned int ext_type, const unsigned char *ext_data, size_t ext_size, X509 *x, size_t chainidx); __owur int custom_ext_add(SSL *s, int context, WPACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int maxversion); __owur int custom_exts_copy(custom_ext_methods *dst, const custom_ext_methods *src); __owur int custom_exts_copy_flags(custom_ext_methods *dst, const custom_ext_methods *src); void custom_exts_free(custom_ext_methods *exts); void ssl_comp_free_compression_methods_int(void); /* ssl_mcnf.c */ void ssl_ctx_system_config(SSL_CTX *ctx); # else /* OPENSSL_UNIT_TEST */ # define ssl_init_wbio_buffer SSL_test_functions()->p_ssl_init_wbio_buffer # define ssl3_setup_buffers SSL_test_functions()->p_ssl3_setup_buffers # endif #endif diff --git a/ssl/statem/README b/ssl/statem/README index 86cc06637291..bafe33060c92 100644 --- a/ssl/statem/README +++ b/ssl/statem/README @@ -1,63 +1,63 @@ State Machine Design ==================== This file provides some guidance on the thinking behind the design of the state machine code to aid future maintenance. The state machine code replaces an older state machine present in OpenSSL versions 1.0.2 and below. The new state machine has the following objectives: - Remove duplication of state code between client and server - Remove duplication of state code between TLS and DTLS - Simplify transitions and bring the logic together in a single location so that it is easier to validate - Remove duplication of code between each of the message handling functions - Receive a message first and then work out whether that is a valid transition - not the other way around (the other way causes lots of issues where we are expecting one type of message next but actually get something else) - Separate message flow state from handshake state (in order to better understand each) - message flow state = when to flush buffers; handling restarts in the event of NBIO events; handling the common flow of steps for reading a message and the common flow of steps for writing a message etc - handshake state = what handshake message are we working on now - Control complexity: only the state machine can change state: keep all the state changes local to the state machine component The message flow state machine is divided into a reading sub-state machine and a writing sub-state machine. See the source comments in statem.c for a more detailed description of the various states and transitions possible. Conceptually the state machine component is designed as follows: libssl | ---------------------------|-----statem.h-------------------------------------- | _______V____________________ | | | statem.c | | | | Core state machine code | |____________________________| statem_local.h ^ ^ _________| |_______ | | _____________|____________ _____________|____________ | | | | | statem_clnt.c | | statem_srvr.c | | | | | | TLS/DTLS client specific | | TLS/DTLS server specific | | state machine code | | state machine code | |__________________________| |__________________________| | |_______________|__ | | ________________| | | | | | | ____________V_______V________ ________V______V_______________ | | | | - | statem_both.c | | statem_dtls.c | + | statem_lib.c | | statem_dtls.c | | | | | | Non core functions common | | Non core functions common to | | to both servers and clients | | both DTLS servers and clients | |_____________________________| |_______________________________| diff --git a/ssl/statem/extensions_clnt.c b/ssl/statem/extensions_clnt.c index ce8a75794c3a..9d38ac23b5f0 100644 --- a/ssl/statem/extensions_clnt.c +++ b/ssl/statem/extensions_clnt.c @@ -1,2011 +1,2014 @@ /* * Copyright 2016-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include "../ssl_local.h" #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include "statem_local.h" EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_renegotiate(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, size_t chainidx) { /* Add RI if renegotiating */ if (!s->renegotiate) return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate) || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, s->s3->previous_client_finished, s->s3->previous_client_finished_len) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_RENEGOTIATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } return EXT_RETURN_SENT; } EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_server_name(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, size_t chainidx) { if (s->ext.hostname == NULL) return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; /* Add TLS extension servername to the Client Hello message */ if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name) /* Sub-packet for server_name extension */ || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) /* Sub-packet for servername list (always 1 hostname)*/ || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, TLSEXT_NAMETYPE_host_name) || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->ext.hostname, strlen(s->ext.hostname)) || !WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SERVER_NAME, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } return EXT_RETURN_SENT; } /* Push a Max Fragment Len extension into ClientHello */ EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_maxfragmentlen(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, size_t chainidx) { if (s->ext.max_fragment_len_mode == TLSEXT_max_fragment_length_DISABLED) return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; /* Add Max Fragment Length extension if client enabled it. */ /*- * 4 bytes for this extension type and extension length * 1 byte for the Max Fragment Length code value. */ if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_max_fragment_length) /* Sub-packet for Max Fragment Length extension (1 byte) */ || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, s->ext.max_fragment_len_mode) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_MAXFRAGMENTLEN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } return EXT_RETURN_SENT; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_srp(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, size_t chainidx) { /* Add SRP username if there is one */ if (s->srp_ctx.login == NULL) return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_srp) /* Sub-packet for SRP extension */ || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt) /* login must not be zero...internal error if so */ || !WPACKET_set_flags(pkt, WPACKET_FLAGS_NON_ZERO_LENGTH) || !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->srp_ctx.login, strlen(s->srp_ctx.login)) || !WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SRP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } return EXT_RETURN_SENT; } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC static int use_ecc(SSL *s) { int i, end, ret = 0; unsigned long alg_k, alg_a; STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *cipher_stack = NULL; /* See if we support any ECC ciphersuites */ if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) return 0; cipher_stack = SSL_get1_supported_ciphers(s); end = sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(cipher_stack); for (i = 0; i < end; i++) { const SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(cipher_stack, i); alg_k = c->algorithm_mkey; alg_a = c->algorithm_auth; if ((alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) || (alg_a & SSL_aECDSA) || c->min_tls >= TLS1_3_VERSION) { ret = 1; break; } } sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(cipher_stack); return ret; } EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_ec_pt_formats(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, size_t chainidx) { const unsigned char *pformats; size_t num_formats; if (!use_ecc(s)) return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; /* Add TLS extension ECPointFormats to the ClientHello message */ tls1_get_formatlist(s, &pformats, &num_formats); if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats) /* Sub-packet for formats extension */ || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(pkt, pformats, num_formats) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EC_PT_FORMATS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } return EXT_RETURN_SENT; } EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_supported_groups(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, size_t chainidx) { const uint16_t *pgroups = NULL; size_t num_groups = 0, i; if (!use_ecc(s)) return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; /* * Add TLS extension supported_groups to the ClientHello message */ /* TODO(TLS1.3): Add support for DHE groups */ tls1_get_supported_groups(s, &pgroups, &num_groups); if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_groups) /* Sub-packet for supported_groups extension */ || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SUPPORTED_GROUPS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } /* Copy curve ID if supported */ for (i = 0; i < num_groups; i++) { uint16_t ctmp = pgroups[i]; if (tls_curve_allowed(s, ctmp, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED)) { if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, ctmp)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SUPPORTED_GROUPS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } } } if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SUPPORTED_GROUPS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } return EXT_RETURN_SENT; } #endif EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_session_ticket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, size_t chainidx) { size_t ticklen; if (!tls_use_ticket(s)) return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; if (!s->new_session && s->session != NULL && s->session->ext.tick != NULL && s->session->ssl_version != TLS1_3_VERSION) { ticklen = s->session->ext.ticklen; } else if (s->session && s->ext.session_ticket != NULL && s->ext.session_ticket->data != NULL) { ticklen = s->ext.session_ticket->length; s->session->ext.tick = OPENSSL_malloc(ticklen); if (s->session->ext.tick == NULL) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } memcpy(s->session->ext.tick, s->ext.session_ticket->data, ticklen); s->session->ext.ticklen = ticklen; } else { ticklen = 0; } if (ticklen == 0 && s->ext.session_ticket != NULL && s->ext.session_ticket->data == NULL) return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket) || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->session->ext.tick, ticklen)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SESSION_TICKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } return EXT_RETURN_SENT; } EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_sig_algs(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, size_t chainidx) { size_t salglen; const uint16_t *salg; if (!SSL_CLIENT_USE_SIGALGS(s)) return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; salglen = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, 1, &salg); if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms) /* Sub-packet for sig-algs extension */ || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) /* Sub-packet for the actual list */ || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) || !tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, pkt, salg, salglen) || !WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SIG_ALGS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } return EXT_RETURN_SENT; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_status_request(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, size_t chainidx) { int i; /* This extension isn't defined for client Certificates */ if (x != NULL) return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; if (s->ext.status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request) /* Sub-packet for status request extension */ || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) /* Sub-packet for the ids */ || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } for (i = 0; i < sk_OCSP_RESPID_num(s->ext.ocsp.ids); i++) { unsigned char *idbytes; OCSP_RESPID *id = sk_OCSP_RESPID_value(s->ext.ocsp.ids, i); int idlen = i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, NULL); if (idlen <= 0 /* Sub-packet for an individual id */ || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, idlen, &idbytes) || i2d_OCSP_RESPID(id, &idbytes) != idlen) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } } if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } if (s->ext.ocsp.exts) { unsigned char *extbytes; int extlen = i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->ext.ocsp.exts, NULL); if (extlen < 0) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } if (!WPACKET_allocate_bytes(pkt, extlen, &extbytes) || i2d_X509_EXTENSIONS(s->ext.ocsp.exts, &extbytes) != extlen) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } } if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_STATUS_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } return EXT_RETURN_SENT; } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_npn(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, size_t chainidx) { if (s->ctx->ext.npn_select_cb == NULL || !SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; /* * The client advertises an empty extension to indicate its support * for Next Protocol Negotiation */ if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg) || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_NPN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } return EXT_RETURN_SENT; } #endif EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_alpn(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, size_t chainidx) { s->s3->alpn_sent = 0; if (s->ext.alpn == NULL || !SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation) /* Sub-packet ALPN extension */ || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->ext.alpn, s->ext.alpn_len) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_ALPN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } s->s3->alpn_sent = 1; return EXT_RETURN_SENT; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_use_srtp(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, size_t chainidx) { STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *clnt = SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s); int i, end; if (clnt == NULL) return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp) /* Sub-packet for SRTP extension */ || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) /* Sub-packet for the protection profile list */ || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_USE_SRTP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } end = sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_num(clnt); for (i = 0; i < end; i++) { const SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *prof = sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_value(clnt, i); if (prof == NULL || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, prof->id)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_USE_SRTP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } } if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) /* Add an empty use_mki value */ || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, 0) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_USE_SRTP, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } return EXT_RETURN_SENT; } #endif EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_etm(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, size_t chainidx) { if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac) || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_ETM, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } return EXT_RETURN_SENT; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_sct(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, size_t chainidx) { if (s->ct_validation_callback == NULL) return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; /* Not defined for client Certificates */ if (x != NULL) return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp) || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SCT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } return EXT_RETURN_SENT; } #endif EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_ems(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, size_t chainidx) { if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret) || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, 0)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EMS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } return EXT_RETURN_SENT; } EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_supported_versions(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, size_t chainidx) { int currv, min_version, max_version, reason; reason = ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &min_version, &max_version, NULL); if (reason != 0) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS, reason); return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } /* * Don't include this if we can't negotiate TLSv1.3. We can do a straight * comparison here because we will never be called in DTLS. */ if (max_version < TLS1_3_VERSION) return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_versions) || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } for (currv = max_version; currv >= min_version; currv--) { if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, currv)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } } if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } return EXT_RETURN_SENT; } /* * Construct a psk_kex_modes extension. */ EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_psk_kex_modes(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, size_t chainidx) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3 int nodhe = s->options & SSL_OP_ALLOW_NO_DHE_KEX; if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_psk_kex_modes) || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(pkt) || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_KE_DHE) || (nodhe && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_KE)) || !WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PSK_KEX_MODES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } s->ext.psk_kex_mode = TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE_DHE; if (nodhe) s->ext.psk_kex_mode |= TLSEXT_KEX_MODE_FLAG_KE; #endif return EXT_RETURN_SENT; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3 static int add_key_share(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int curve_id) { unsigned char *encoded_point = NULL; EVP_PKEY *key_share_key = NULL; size_t encodedlen; if (s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL) { if (!ossl_assert(s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_ADD_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } /* * Could happen if we got an HRR that wasn't requesting a new key_share */ key_share_key = s->s3->tmp.pkey; } else { key_share_key = ssl_generate_pkey_group(s, curve_id); if (key_share_key == NULL) { /* SSLfatal() already called */ return 0; } } /* Encode the public key. */ encodedlen = EVP_PKEY_get1_tls_encodedpoint(key_share_key, &encoded_point); if (encodedlen == 0) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_ADD_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_EC_LIB); goto err; } /* Create KeyShareEntry */ if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, curve_id) || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, encoded_point, encodedlen)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_ADD_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } /* * TODO(TLS1.3): When changing to send more than one key_share we're * going to need to be able to save more than one EVP_PKEY. For now * we reuse the existing tmp.pkey */ s->s3->tmp.pkey = key_share_key; s->s3->group_id = curve_id; OPENSSL_free(encoded_point); return 1; err: if (s->s3->tmp.pkey == NULL) EVP_PKEY_free(key_share_key); OPENSSL_free(encoded_point); return 0; } #endif EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_key_share(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, size_t chainidx) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3 size_t i, num_groups = 0; const uint16_t *pgroups = NULL; uint16_t curve_id = 0; /* key_share extension */ if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_key_share) /* Extension data sub-packet */ || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) /* KeyShare list sub-packet */ || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } tls1_get_supported_groups(s, &pgroups, &num_groups); /* * TODO(TLS1.3): Make the number of key_shares sent configurable. For * now, just send one */ if (s->s3->group_id != 0) { curve_id = s->s3->group_id; } else { for (i = 0; i < num_groups; i++) { if (!tls_curve_allowed(s, pgroups[i], SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED)) continue; curve_id = pgroups[i]; break; } } if (curve_id == 0) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_KEY_SHARE); return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } if (!add_key_share(s, pkt, curve_id)) { /* SSLfatal() already called */ return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } return EXT_RETURN_SENT; #else return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; #endif } EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_cookie(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, size_t chainidx) { EXT_RETURN ret = EXT_RETURN_FAIL; /* Should only be set if we've had an HRR */ if (s->ext.tls13_cookie_len == 0) return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_cookie) /* Extension data sub-packet */ || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) || !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->ext.tls13_cookie, s->ext.tls13_cookie_len) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_COOKIE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto end; } ret = EXT_RETURN_SENT; end: OPENSSL_free(s->ext.tls13_cookie); s->ext.tls13_cookie = NULL; s->ext.tls13_cookie_len = 0; return ret; } EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_early_data(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, size_t chainidx) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK char identity[PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN + 1]; #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */ const unsigned char *id = NULL; size_t idlen = 0; SSL_SESSION *psksess = NULL; SSL_SESSION *edsess = NULL; const EVP_MD *handmd = NULL; if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) handmd = ssl_handshake_md(s); if (s->psk_use_session_cb != NULL && (!s->psk_use_session_cb(s, handmd, &id, &idlen, &psksess) || (psksess != NULL && psksess->ssl_version != TLS1_3_VERSION))) { SSL_SESSION_free(psksess); SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EARLY_DATA, SSL_R_BAD_PSK); return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK if (psksess == NULL && s->psk_client_callback != NULL) { unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN]; size_t psklen = 0; memset(identity, 0, sizeof(identity)); psklen = s->psk_client_callback(s, NULL, identity, sizeof(identity) - 1, psk, sizeof(psk)); if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EARLY_DATA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } else if (psklen > 0) { const unsigned char tls13_aes128gcmsha256_id[] = { 0x13, 0x01 }; const SSL_CIPHER *cipher; idlen = strlen(identity); if (idlen > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EARLY_DATA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } id = (unsigned char *)identity; /* * We found a PSK using an old style callback. We don't know * the digest so we default to SHA256 as per the TLSv1.3 spec */ cipher = SSL_CIPHER_find(s, tls13_aes128gcmsha256_id); if (cipher == NULL) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EARLY_DATA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } psksess = SSL_SESSION_new(); if (psksess == NULL || !SSL_SESSION_set1_master_key(psksess, psk, psklen) || !SSL_SESSION_set_cipher(psksess, cipher) || !SSL_SESSION_set_protocol_version(psksess, TLS1_3_VERSION)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EARLY_DATA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen); return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen); } } #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_PSK */ SSL_SESSION_free(s->psksession); s->psksession = psksess; if (psksess != NULL) { OPENSSL_free(s->psksession_id); s->psksession_id = OPENSSL_memdup(id, idlen); if (s->psksession_id == NULL) { s->psksession_id_len = 0; SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EARLY_DATA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } s->psksession_id_len = idlen; } if (s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_CONNECTING || (s->session->ext.max_early_data == 0 && (psksess == NULL || psksess->ext.max_early_data == 0))) { s->max_early_data = 0; return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; } edsess = s->session->ext.max_early_data != 0 ? s->session : psksess; s->max_early_data = edsess->ext.max_early_data; if (edsess->ext.hostname != NULL) { if (s->ext.hostname == NULL || (s->ext.hostname != NULL && strcmp(s->ext.hostname, edsess->ext.hostname) != 0)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EARLY_DATA, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_EARLY_DATA_SNI); return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } } if ((s->ext.alpn == NULL && edsess->ext.alpn_selected != NULL)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EARLY_DATA, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_EARLY_DATA_ALPN); return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } /* * Verify that we are offering an ALPN protocol consistent with the early * data. */ if (edsess->ext.alpn_selected != NULL) { PACKET prots, alpnpkt; int found = 0; if (!PACKET_buf_init(&prots, s->ext.alpn, s->ext.alpn_len)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EARLY_DATA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } while (PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(&prots, &alpnpkt)) { if (PACKET_equal(&alpnpkt, edsess->ext.alpn_selected, edsess->ext.alpn_selected_len)) { found = 1; break; } } if (!found) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EARLY_DATA, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_EARLY_DATA_ALPN); return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } } if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_early_data) || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_EARLY_DATA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } /* * We set this to rejected here. Later, if the server acknowledges the * extension, we set it to accepted. */ s->ext.early_data = SSL_EARLY_DATA_REJECTED; s->ext.early_data_ok = 1; return EXT_RETURN_SENT; } #define F5_WORKAROUND_MIN_MSG_LEN 0xff #define F5_WORKAROUND_MAX_MSG_LEN 0x200 /* * PSK pre binder overhead = * 2 bytes for TLSEXT_TYPE_psk * 2 bytes for extension length * 2 bytes for identities list length * 2 bytes for identity length * 4 bytes for obfuscated_ticket_age * 2 bytes for binder list length * 1 byte for binder length * The above excludes the number of bytes for the identity itself and the * subsequent binder bytes */ #define PSK_PRE_BINDER_OVERHEAD (2 + 2 + 2 + 2 + 4 + 2 + 1) EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_padding(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, size_t chainidx) { unsigned char *padbytes; size_t hlen; if ((s->options & SSL_OP_TLSEXT_PADDING) == 0) return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; /* * Add padding to workaround bugs in F5 terminators. See RFC7685. * This code calculates the length of all extensions added so far but * excludes the PSK extension (because that MUST be written last). Therefore * this extension MUST always appear second to last. */ if (!WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &hlen)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PADDING, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } /* * If we're going to send a PSK then that will be written out after this * extension, so we need to calculate how long it is going to be. */ if (s->session->ssl_version == TLS1_3_VERSION && s->session->ext.ticklen != 0 && s->session->cipher != NULL) { const EVP_MD *md = ssl_md(s->session->cipher->algorithm2); if (md != NULL) { /* * Add the fixed PSK overhead, the identity length and the binder * length. */ hlen += PSK_PRE_BINDER_OVERHEAD + s->session->ext.ticklen + EVP_MD_size(md); } } if (hlen > F5_WORKAROUND_MIN_MSG_LEN && hlen < F5_WORKAROUND_MAX_MSG_LEN) { /* Calculate the amount of padding we need to add */ hlen = F5_WORKAROUND_MAX_MSG_LEN - hlen; /* * Take off the size of extension header itself (2 bytes for type and * 2 bytes for length bytes), but ensure that the extension is at least * 1 byte long so as not to have an empty extension last (WebSphere 7.x, * 8.x are intolerant of that condition) */ if (hlen > 4) hlen -= 4; else hlen = 1; if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_padding) || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, hlen, &padbytes)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PADDING, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } memset(padbytes, 0, hlen); } return EXT_RETURN_SENT; } /* * Construct the pre_shared_key extension */ EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_psk(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, size_t chainidx) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3 uint32_t now, agesec, agems = 0; size_t reshashsize = 0, pskhashsize = 0, binderoffset, msglen; unsigned char *resbinder = NULL, *pskbinder = NULL, *msgstart = NULL; const EVP_MD *handmd = NULL, *mdres = NULL, *mdpsk = NULL; int dores = 0; s->ext.tick_identity = 0; /* * Note: At this stage of the code we only support adding a single * resumption PSK. If we add support for multiple PSKs then the length * calculations in the padding extension will need to be adjusted. */ /* * If this is an incompatible or new session then we have nothing to resume * so don't add this extension. */ if (s->session->ssl_version != TLS1_3_VERSION || (s->session->ext.ticklen == 0 && s->psksession == NULL)) return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING) handmd = ssl_handshake_md(s); if (s->session->ext.ticklen != 0) { /* Get the digest associated with the ciphersuite in the session */ if (s->session->cipher == NULL) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PSK, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } mdres = ssl_md(s->session->cipher->algorithm2); if (mdres == NULL) { /* * Don't recognize this cipher so we can't use the session. * Ignore it */ goto dopsksess; } if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING && mdres != handmd) { /* * Selected ciphersuite hash does not match the hash for the session * so we can't use it. */ goto dopsksess; } /* * Technically the C standard just says time() returns a time_t and says * nothing about the encoding of that type. In practice most * implementations follow POSIX which holds it as an integral type in * seconds since epoch. We've already made the assumption that we can do * this in multiple places in the code, so portability shouldn't be an * issue. */ now = (uint32_t)time(NULL); agesec = now - (uint32_t)s->session->time; /* * We calculate the age in seconds but the server may work in ms. Due to * rounding errors we could overestimate the age by up to 1s. It is * better to underestimate it. Otherwise, if the RTT is very short, when * the server calculates the age reported by the client it could be * bigger than the age calculated on the server - which should never * happen. */ if (agesec > 0) agesec--; if (s->session->ext.tick_lifetime_hint < agesec) { /* Ticket is too old. Ignore it. */ goto dopsksess; } /* * Calculate age in ms. We're just doing it to nearest second. Should be * good enough. */ agems = agesec * (uint32_t)1000; if (agesec != 0 && agems / (uint32_t)1000 != agesec) { /* * Overflow. Shouldn't happen unless this is a *really* old session. * If so we just ignore it. */ goto dopsksess; } /* * Obfuscate the age. Overflow here is fine, this addition is supposed * to be mod 2^32. */ agems += s->session->ext.tick_age_add; reshashsize = EVP_MD_size(mdres); s->ext.tick_identity++; dores = 1; } dopsksess: if (!dores && s->psksession == NULL) return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; if (s->psksession != NULL) { mdpsk = ssl_md(s->psksession->cipher->algorithm2); if (mdpsk == NULL) { /* * Don't recognize this cipher so we can't use the session. * If this happens it's an application bug. */ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PSK, SSL_R_BAD_PSK); return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } if (s->hello_retry_request == SSL_HRR_PENDING && mdpsk != handmd) { /* * Selected ciphersuite hash does not match the hash for the PSK * session. This is an application bug. */ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PSK, SSL_R_BAD_PSK); return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } pskhashsize = EVP_MD_size(mdpsk); } /* Create the extension, but skip over the binder for now */ if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_psk) || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PSK, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } if (dores) { if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->session->ext.tick, s->session->ext.ticklen) || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, agems)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PSK, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } } if (s->psksession != NULL) { if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, s->psksession_id, s->psksession_id_len) || !WPACKET_put_bytes_u32(pkt, 0)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PSK, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } s->ext.tick_identity++; } if (!WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &binderoffset) || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) || (dores && !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u8(pkt, reshashsize, &resbinder)) || (s->psksession != NULL && !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u8(pkt, pskhashsize, &pskbinder)) || !WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt) || !WPACKET_get_total_written(pkt, &msglen) /* * We need to fill in all the sub-packet lengths now so we can * calculate the HMAC of the message up to the binders */ || !WPACKET_fill_lengths(pkt)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_PSK, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } msgstart = WPACKET_get_curr(pkt) - msglen; if (dores && tls_psk_do_binder(s, mdres, msgstart, binderoffset, NULL, resbinder, s->session, 1, 0) != 1) { /* SSLfatal() already called */ return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } if (s->psksession != NULL && tls_psk_do_binder(s, mdpsk, msgstart, binderoffset, NULL, pskbinder, s->psksession, 1, 1) != 1) { /* SSLfatal() already called */ return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } return EXT_RETURN_SENT; #else return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; #endif } EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_post_handshake_auth(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, size_t chainidx) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3 if (!s->pha_enabled) return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; /* construct extension - 0 length, no contents */ if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_post_handshake_auth) || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_POST_HANDSHAKE_AUTH, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return EXT_RETURN_FAIL; } s->post_handshake_auth = SSL_PHA_EXT_SENT; return EXT_RETURN_SENT; #else return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT; #endif } /* * Parse the server's renegotiation binding and abort if it's not right */ int tls_parse_stoc_renegotiate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, size_t chainidx) { size_t expected_len = s->s3->previous_client_finished_len + s->s3->previous_server_finished_len; size_t ilen; const unsigned char *data; /* Check for logic errors */ if (!ossl_assert(expected_len == 0 || s->s3->previous_client_finished_len != 0) || !ossl_assert(expected_len == 0 || s->s3->previous_server_finished_len != 0)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_RENEGOTIATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } /* Parse the length byte */ if (!PACKET_get_1_len(pkt, &ilen)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_RENEGOTIATE, SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_ENCODING_ERR); return 0; } /* Consistency check */ if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != ilen) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_RENEGOTIATE, SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_ENCODING_ERR); return 0; } /* Check that the extension matches */ if (ilen != expected_len) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_RENEGOTIATE, SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH); return 0; } if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, s->s3->previous_client_finished_len) || memcmp(data, s->s3->previous_client_finished, s->s3->previous_client_finished_len) != 0) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_RENEGOTIATE, SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH); return 0; } if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, s->s3->previous_server_finished_len) || memcmp(data, s->s3->previous_server_finished, s->s3->previous_server_finished_len) != 0) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_RENEGOTIATE, SSL_R_RENEGOTIATION_MISMATCH); return 0; } s->s3->send_connection_binding = 1; return 1; } /* Parse the server's max fragment len extension packet */ int tls_parse_stoc_maxfragmentlen(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, size_t chainidx) { unsigned int value; if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 1 || !PACKET_get_1(pkt, &value)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_MAXFRAGMENTLEN, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); return 0; } /* |value| should contains a valid max-fragment-length code. */ if (!IS_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT_VALID(value)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_MAXFRAGMENTLEN, SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH); return 0; } /* Must be the same value as client-configured one who was sent to server */ /*- * RFC 6066: if a client receives a maximum fragment length negotiation * response that differs from the length it requested, ... * It must abort with SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER alert */ if (value != s->ext.max_fragment_len_mode) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_MAXFRAGMENTLEN, SSL_R_SSL3_EXT_INVALID_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH); return 0; } /* * Maximum Fragment Length Negotiation succeeded. * The negotiated Maximum Fragment Length is binding now. */ s->session->ext.max_fragment_len_mode = value; return 1; } int tls_parse_stoc_server_name(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, size_t chainidx) { if (s->ext.hostname == NULL) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_SERVER_NAME, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_SERVER_NAME, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); return 0; } if (!s->hit) { if (s->session->ext.hostname != NULL) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_SERVER_NAME, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } s->session->ext.hostname = OPENSSL_strdup(s->ext.hostname); if (s->session->ext.hostname == NULL) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_SERVER_NAME, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } } return 1; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC int tls_parse_stoc_ec_pt_formats(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, size_t chainidx) { size_t ecpointformats_len; PACKET ecptformatlist; if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &ecptformatlist)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_EC_PT_FORMATS, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); return 0; } if (!s->hit) { ecpointformats_len = PACKET_remaining(&ecptformatlist); if (ecpointformats_len == 0) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_EC_PT_FORMATS, SSL_R_BAD_LENGTH); return 0; } s->ext.peer_ecpointformats_len = 0; OPENSSL_free(s->ext.peer_ecpointformats); s->ext.peer_ecpointformats = OPENSSL_malloc(ecpointformats_len); if (s->ext.peer_ecpointformats == NULL) { s->ext.peer_ecpointformats_len = 0; SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_EC_PT_FORMATS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } s->ext.peer_ecpointformats_len = ecpointformats_len; if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&ecptformatlist, s->ext.peer_ecpointformats, ecpointformats_len)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_EC_PT_FORMATS, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } } return 1; } #endif int tls_parse_stoc_session_ticket(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, size_t chainidx) { if (s->ext.session_ticket_cb != NULL && !s->ext.session_ticket_cb(s, PACKET_data(pkt), PACKET_remaining(pkt), s->ext.session_ticket_cb_arg)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); return 0; } if (!tls_use_ticket(s)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); return 0; } if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_SESSION_TICKET, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); return 0; } s->ext.ticket_expected = 1; return 1; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP int tls_parse_stoc_status_request(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, size_t chainidx) { if (context == SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) { /* We ignore this if the server sends a CertificateRequest */ /* TODO(TLS1.3): Add support for this */ return 1; } /* * MUST only be sent if we've requested a status * request message. In TLS <= 1.2 it must also be empty. */ if (s->ext.status_type != TLSEXT_STATUSTYPE_ocsp) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_STATUS_REQUEST, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); return 0; } if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_STATUS_REQUEST, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); return 0; } if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { /* We only know how to handle this if it's for the first Certificate in * the chain. We ignore any other responses. */ if (chainidx != 0) return 1; /* SSLfatal() already called */ return tls_process_cert_status_body(s, pkt); } /* Set flag to expect CertificateStatus message */ s->ext.status_expected = 1; return 1; } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT int tls_parse_stoc_sct(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, size_t chainidx) { if (context == SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST) { /* We ignore this if the server sends it in a CertificateRequest */ /* TODO(TLS1.3): Add support for this */ return 1; } /* * Only take it if we asked for it - i.e if there is no CT validation * callback set, then a custom extension MAY be processing it, so we * need to let control continue to flow to that. */ if (s->ct_validation_callback != NULL) { size_t size = PACKET_remaining(pkt); /* Simply copy it off for later processing */ OPENSSL_free(s->ext.scts); s->ext.scts = NULL; s->ext.scts_len = (uint16_t)size; if (size > 0) { s->ext.scts = OPENSSL_malloc(size); if (s->ext.scts == NULL) { s->ext.scts_len = 0; SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_SCT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->ext.scts, size)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_SCT, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } } } else { ENDPOINT role = (context & SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO) != 0 ? ENDPOINT_CLIENT : ENDPOINT_BOTH; /* * If we didn't ask for it then there must be a custom extension, * otherwise this is unsolicited. */ if (custom_ext_find(&s->cert->custext, role, TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp, NULL) == NULL) { SSLfatal(s, TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_SCT, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); return 0; } if (!custom_ext_parse(s, context, TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp, PACKET_data(pkt), PACKET_remaining(pkt), x, chainidx)) { /* SSLfatal already called */ return 0; } } return 1; } #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG /* * ssl_next_proto_validate validates a Next Protocol Negotiation block. No * elements of zero length are allowed and the set of elements must exactly * fill the length of the block. Returns 1 on success or 0 on failure. */ static int ssl_next_proto_validate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) { PACKET tmp_protocol; while (PACKET_remaining(pkt)) { if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &tmp_protocol) || PACKET_remaining(&tmp_protocol) == 0) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_NEXT_PROTO_VALIDATE, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); return 0; } } return 1; } int tls_parse_stoc_npn(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, size_t chainidx) { unsigned char *selected; unsigned char selected_len; PACKET tmppkt; /* Check if we are in a renegotiation. If so ignore this extension */ if (!SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) return 1; /* We must have requested it. */ if (s->ctx->ext.npn_select_cb == NULL) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_NPN, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); return 0; } /* The data must be valid */ tmppkt = *pkt; if (!ssl_next_proto_validate(s, &tmppkt)) { /* SSLfatal() already called */ return 0; } if (s->ctx->ext.npn_select_cb(s, &selected, &selected_len, PACKET_data(pkt), PACKET_remaining(pkt), s->ctx->ext.npn_select_cb_arg) != SSL_TLSEXT_ERR_OK) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_NPN, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); return 0; } /* * Could be non-NULL if server has sent multiple NPN extensions in * a single Serverhello */ OPENSSL_free(s->ext.npn); s->ext.npn = OPENSSL_malloc(selected_len); if (s->ext.npn == NULL) { s->ext.npn_len = 0; SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_NPN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } memcpy(s->ext.npn, selected, selected_len); s->ext.npn_len = selected_len; s->s3->npn_seen = 1; return 1; } #endif int tls_parse_stoc_alpn(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, size_t chainidx) { size_t len; /* We must have requested it. */ if (!s->s3->alpn_sent) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_ALPN, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); return 0; } /*- * The extension data consists of: * uint16 list_length * uint8 proto_length; * uint8 proto[proto_length]; */ if (!PACKET_get_net_2_len(pkt, &len) || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != len || !PACKET_get_1_len(pkt, &len) || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != len) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_ALPN, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); return 0; } OPENSSL_free(s->s3->alpn_selected); s->s3->alpn_selected = OPENSSL_malloc(len); if (s->s3->alpn_selected == NULL) { s->s3->alpn_selected_len = 0; SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_ALPN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->s3->alpn_selected, len)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_ALPN, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); return 0; } s->s3->alpn_selected_len = len; if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL || s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len != len || memcmp(s->session->ext.alpn_selected, s->s3->alpn_selected, len) != 0) { /* ALPN not consistent with the old session so cannot use early_data */ s->ext.early_data_ok = 0; } if (!s->hit) { /* * This is a new session and so alpn_selected should have been * initialised to NULL. We should update it with the selected ALPN. */ if (!ossl_assert(s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_ALPN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } s->session->ext.alpn_selected = OPENSSL_memdup(s->s3->alpn_selected, s->s3->alpn_selected_len); if (s->session->ext.alpn_selected == NULL) { s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len = 0; SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_ALPN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } s->session->ext.alpn_selected_len = s->s3->alpn_selected_len; } return 1; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP int tls_parse_stoc_use_srtp(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, size_t chainidx) { unsigned int id, ct, mki; int i; STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *clnt; SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *prof; if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &ct) || ct != 2 || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &id) || !PACKET_get_1(pkt, &mki) || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_USE_SRTP, SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST); return 0; } if (mki != 0) { /* Must be no MKI, since we never offer one */ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_USE_SRTP, SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_MKI_VALUE); return 0; } /* Throw an error if the server gave us an unsolicited extension */ clnt = SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s); if (clnt == NULL) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_USE_SRTP, SSL_R_NO_SRTP_PROFILES); return 0; } /* * Check to see if the server gave us something we support (and * presumably offered) */ for (i = 0; i < sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_num(clnt); i++) { prof = sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_value(clnt, i); if (prof->id == id) { s->srtp_profile = prof; return 1; } } SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_USE_SRTP, SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST); return 0; } #endif int tls_parse_stoc_etm(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, size_t chainidx) { /* Ignore if inappropriate ciphersuite */ if (!(s->options & SSL_OP_NO_ENCRYPT_THEN_MAC) && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mac != SSL_AEAD - && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc != SSL_RC4) + && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc != SSL_RC4 + && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc != SSL_eGOST2814789CNT + && s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_enc != SSL_eGOST2814789CNT12) s->ext.use_etm = 1; return 1; } int tls_parse_stoc_ems(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, size_t chainidx) { s->s3->flags |= TLS1_FLAGS_RECEIVED_EXTMS; if (!s->hit) s->session->flags |= SSL_SESS_FLAG_EXTMS; return 1; } int tls_parse_stoc_supported_versions(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, size_t chainidx) { unsigned int version; if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &version) || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); return 0; } /* * The only protocol version we support which is valid in this extension in * a ServerHello is TLSv1.3 therefore we shouldn't be getting anything else. */ if (version != TLS1_3_VERSION) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS, SSL_R_BAD_PROTOCOL_VERSION_NUMBER); return 0; } /* We ignore this extension for HRRs except to sanity check it */ if (context == SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST) return 1; /* We just set it here. We validate it in ssl_choose_client_version */ s->version = version; return 1; } int tls_parse_stoc_key_share(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, size_t chainidx) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3 unsigned int group_id; PACKET encoded_pt; EVP_PKEY *ckey = s->s3->tmp.pkey, *skey = NULL; /* Sanity check */ if (ckey == NULL || s->s3->peer_tmp != NULL) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &group_id)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); return 0; } if ((context & SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST) != 0) { const uint16_t *pgroups = NULL; size_t i, num_groups; if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); return 0; } /* * It is an error if the HelloRetryRequest wants a key_share that we * already sent in the first ClientHello */ if (group_id == s->s3->group_id) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_SHARE); return 0; } /* Validate the selected group is one we support */ tls1_get_supported_groups(s, &pgroups, &num_groups); for (i = 0; i < num_groups; i++) { if (group_id == pgroups[i]) break; } if (i >= num_groups || !tls_curve_allowed(s, group_id, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_SUPPORTED)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_SHARE); return 0; } s->s3->group_id = group_id; EVP_PKEY_free(s->s3->tmp.pkey); s->s3->tmp.pkey = NULL; return 1; } if (group_id != s->s3->group_id) { /* * This isn't for the group that we sent in the original * key_share! */ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_SHARE); return 0; } if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &encoded_pt) || PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt) == 0) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); return 0; } skey = EVP_PKEY_new(); if (skey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(skey, ckey) <= 0) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + EVP_PKEY_free(skey); return 0; } if (!EVP_PKEY_set1_tls_encodedpoint(skey, PACKET_data(&encoded_pt), PACKET_remaining(&encoded_pt))) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_KEY_SHARE, SSL_R_BAD_ECPOINT); EVP_PKEY_free(skey); return 0; } if (ssl_derive(s, ckey, skey, 1) == 0) { /* SSLfatal() already called */ EVP_PKEY_free(skey); return 0; } s->s3->peer_tmp = skey; #endif return 1; } int tls_parse_stoc_cookie(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, size_t chainidx) { PACKET cookie; if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &cookie) || !PACKET_memdup(&cookie, &s->ext.tls13_cookie, &s->ext.tls13_cookie_len)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_COOKIE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); return 0; } return 1; } int tls_parse_stoc_early_data(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, size_t chainidx) { if (context == SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_NEW_SESSION_TICKET) { unsigned long max_early_data; if (!PACKET_get_net_4(pkt, &max_early_data) || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_EARLY_DATA, SSL_R_INVALID_MAX_EARLY_DATA); return 0; } s->session->ext.max_early_data = max_early_data; return 1; } if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_EARLY_DATA, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); return 0; } if (!s->ext.early_data_ok || !s->hit) { /* * If we get here then we didn't send early data, or we didn't resume * using the first identity, or the SNI/ALPN is not consistent so the * server should not be accepting it. */ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_EARLY_DATA, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); return 0; } s->ext.early_data = SSL_EARLY_DATA_ACCEPTED; return 1; } int tls_parse_stoc_psk(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt, unsigned int context, X509 *x, size_t chainidx) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3 unsigned int identity; if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &identity) || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_PSK, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); return 0; } if (identity >= (unsigned int)s->ext.tick_identity) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_PSK, SSL_R_BAD_PSK_IDENTITY); return 0; } /* * Session resumption tickets are always sent before PSK tickets. If the * ticket index is 0 then it must be for a session resumption ticket if we * sent two tickets, or if we didn't send a PSK ticket. */ if (identity == 0 && (s->psksession == NULL || s->ext.tick_identity == 2)) { s->hit = 1; SSL_SESSION_free(s->psksession); s->psksession = NULL; return 1; } if (s->psksession == NULL) { /* Should never happen */ SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PARSE_STOC_PSK, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } /* * If we used the external PSK for sending early_data then s->early_secret * is already set up, so don't overwrite it. Otherwise we copy the * early_secret across that we generated earlier. */ if ((s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_WRITE_RETRY && s->early_data_state != SSL_EARLY_DATA_FINISHED_WRITING) || s->session->ext.max_early_data > 0 || s->psksession->ext.max_early_data == 0) memcpy(s->early_secret, s->psksession->early_secret, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE); SSL_SESSION_free(s->session); s->session = s->psksession; s->psksession = NULL; s->hit = 1; /* Early data is only allowed if we used the first ticket */ if (identity != 0) s->ext.early_data_ok = 0; #endif return 1; } diff --git a/ssl/statem/extensions_cust.c b/ssl/statem/extensions_cust.c index a0ba18efa704..1fe226f9f264 100644 --- a/ssl/statem/extensions_cust.c +++ b/ssl/statem/extensions_cust.c @@ -1,533 +1,534 @@ /* - * Copyright 2014-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 2014-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ /* Custom extension utility functions */ #include #include "../ssl_local.h" #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include "statem_local.h" typedef struct { void *add_arg; custom_ext_add_cb add_cb; custom_ext_free_cb free_cb; } custom_ext_add_cb_wrap; typedef struct { void *parse_arg; custom_ext_parse_cb parse_cb; } custom_ext_parse_cb_wrap; /* * Provide thin wrapper callbacks which convert new style arguments to old style */ static int custom_ext_add_old_cb_wrap(SSL *s, unsigned int ext_type, unsigned int context, const unsigned char **out, size_t *outlen, X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al, void *add_arg) { custom_ext_add_cb_wrap *add_cb_wrap = (custom_ext_add_cb_wrap *)add_arg; if (add_cb_wrap->add_cb == NULL) return 1; return add_cb_wrap->add_cb(s, ext_type, out, outlen, al, add_cb_wrap->add_arg); } static void custom_ext_free_old_cb_wrap(SSL *s, unsigned int ext_type, unsigned int context, const unsigned char *out, void *add_arg) { custom_ext_add_cb_wrap *add_cb_wrap = (custom_ext_add_cb_wrap *)add_arg; if (add_cb_wrap->free_cb == NULL) return; add_cb_wrap->free_cb(s, ext_type, out, add_cb_wrap->add_arg); } static int custom_ext_parse_old_cb_wrap(SSL *s, unsigned int ext_type, unsigned int context, const unsigned char *in, size_t inlen, X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int *al, void *parse_arg) { custom_ext_parse_cb_wrap *parse_cb_wrap = (custom_ext_parse_cb_wrap *)parse_arg; if (parse_cb_wrap->parse_cb == NULL) return 1; return parse_cb_wrap->parse_cb(s, ext_type, in, inlen, al, parse_cb_wrap->parse_arg); } /* * Find a custom extension from the list. The |role| param is there to * support the legacy API where custom extensions for client and server could * be set independently on the same SSL_CTX. It is set to ENDPOINT_SERVER if we * are trying to find a method relevant to the server, ENDPOINT_CLIENT for the * client, or ENDPOINT_BOTH for either */ custom_ext_method *custom_ext_find(const custom_ext_methods *exts, ENDPOINT role, unsigned int ext_type, size_t *idx) { size_t i; custom_ext_method *meth = exts->meths; for (i = 0; i < exts->meths_count; i++, meth++) { if (ext_type == meth->ext_type && (role == ENDPOINT_BOTH || role == meth->role || meth->role == ENDPOINT_BOTH)) { if (idx != NULL) *idx = i; return meth; } } return NULL; } /* * Initialise custom extensions flags to indicate neither sent nor received. */ void custom_ext_init(custom_ext_methods *exts) { size_t i; custom_ext_method *meth = exts->meths; for (i = 0; i < exts->meths_count; i++, meth++) meth->ext_flags = 0; } /* Pass received custom extension data to the application for parsing. */ int custom_ext_parse(SSL *s, unsigned int context, unsigned int ext_type, const unsigned char *ext_data, size_t ext_size, X509 *x, size_t chainidx) { int al; custom_ext_methods *exts = &s->cert->custext; custom_ext_method *meth; ENDPOINT role = ENDPOINT_BOTH; if ((context & (SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO)) != 0) role = s->server ? ENDPOINT_SERVER : ENDPOINT_CLIENT; meth = custom_ext_find(exts, role, ext_type, NULL); /* If not found return success */ if (!meth) return 1; /* Check if extension is defined for our protocol. If not, skip */ if (!extension_is_relevant(s, meth->context, context)) return 1; if ((context & (SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS)) != 0) { /* * If it's ServerHello or EncryptedExtensions we can't have any * extensions not sent in ClientHello. */ if ((meth->ext_flags & SSL_EXT_FLAG_SENT) == 0) { SSLfatal(s, TLS1_AD_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION, SSL_F_CUSTOM_EXT_PARSE, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); return 0; } } /* - * Extensions received in the ClientHello are marked with the - * SSL_EXT_FLAG_RECEIVED. This is so we know to add the equivalent - * extensions in the ServerHello/EncryptedExtensions message + * Extensions received in the ClientHello or CertificateRequest are marked + * with the SSL_EXT_FLAG_RECEIVED. This is so we know to add the equivalent + * extensions in the response messages */ - if ((context & SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO) != 0) + if ((context & (SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST)) + != 0) meth->ext_flags |= SSL_EXT_FLAG_RECEIVED; /* If no parse function set return success */ if (!meth->parse_cb) return 1; if (meth->parse_cb(s, ext_type, context, ext_data, ext_size, x, chainidx, &al, meth->parse_arg) <= 0) { SSLfatal(s, al, SSL_F_CUSTOM_EXT_PARSE, SSL_R_BAD_EXTENSION); return 0; } return 1; } /* * Request custom extension data from the application and add to the return * buffer. */ int custom_ext_add(SSL *s, int context, WPACKET *pkt, X509 *x, size_t chainidx, int maxversion) { custom_ext_methods *exts = &s->cert->custext; custom_ext_method *meth; size_t i; int al; for (i = 0; i < exts->meths_count; i++) { const unsigned char *out = NULL; size_t outlen = 0; meth = exts->meths + i; if (!should_add_extension(s, meth->context, context, maxversion)) continue; if ((context & (SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_ENCRYPTED_EXTENSIONS | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_HELLO_RETRY_REQUEST)) != 0) { - /* Only send extensions present in ClientHello. */ + /* Only send extensions present in ClientHello/CertificateRequest */ if (!(meth->ext_flags & SSL_EXT_FLAG_RECEIVED)) continue; } /* * We skip it if the callback is absent - except for a ClientHello where * we add an empty extension. */ if ((context & SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO) == 0 && meth->add_cb == NULL) continue; if (meth->add_cb != NULL) { int cb_retval = meth->add_cb(s, meth->ext_type, context, &out, &outlen, x, chainidx, &al, meth->add_arg); if (cb_retval < 0) { SSLfatal(s, al, SSL_F_CUSTOM_EXT_ADD, SSL_R_CALLBACK_FAILED); return 0; /* error */ } if (cb_retval == 0) continue; /* skip this extension */ } if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, meth->ext_type) || !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt) || (outlen > 0 && !WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, out, outlen)) || !WPACKET_close(pkt)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CUSTOM_EXT_ADD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } if ((context & SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO) != 0) { /* * We can't send duplicates: code logic should prevent this. */ if (!ossl_assert((meth->ext_flags & SSL_EXT_FLAG_SENT) == 0)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CUSTOM_EXT_ADD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } /* * Indicate extension has been sent: this is both a sanity check to * ensure we don't send duplicate extensions and indicates that it * is not an error if the extension is present in ServerHello. */ meth->ext_flags |= SSL_EXT_FLAG_SENT; } if (meth->free_cb != NULL) meth->free_cb(s, meth->ext_type, context, out, meth->add_arg); } return 1; } /* Copy the flags from src to dst for any extensions that exist in both */ int custom_exts_copy_flags(custom_ext_methods *dst, const custom_ext_methods *src) { size_t i; custom_ext_method *methsrc = src->meths; for (i = 0; i < src->meths_count; i++, methsrc++) { custom_ext_method *methdst = custom_ext_find(dst, methsrc->role, methsrc->ext_type, NULL); if (methdst == NULL) continue; methdst->ext_flags = methsrc->ext_flags; } return 1; } /* Copy table of custom extensions */ int custom_exts_copy(custom_ext_methods *dst, const custom_ext_methods *src) { size_t i; int err = 0; if (src->meths_count > 0) { dst->meths = OPENSSL_memdup(src->meths, sizeof(*src->meths) * src->meths_count); if (dst->meths == NULL) return 0; dst->meths_count = src->meths_count; for (i = 0; i < src->meths_count; i++) { custom_ext_method *methsrc = src->meths + i; custom_ext_method *methdst = dst->meths + i; if (methsrc->add_cb != custom_ext_add_old_cb_wrap) continue; /* * We have found an old style API wrapper. We need to copy the * arguments too. */ if (err) { methdst->add_arg = NULL; methdst->parse_arg = NULL; continue; } methdst->add_arg = OPENSSL_memdup(methsrc->add_arg, sizeof(custom_ext_add_cb_wrap)); methdst->parse_arg = OPENSSL_memdup(methsrc->parse_arg, sizeof(custom_ext_parse_cb_wrap)); if (methdst->add_arg == NULL || methdst->parse_arg == NULL) err = 1; } } if (err) { custom_exts_free(dst); return 0; } return 1; } void custom_exts_free(custom_ext_methods *exts) { size_t i; custom_ext_method *meth; for (i = 0, meth = exts->meths; i < exts->meths_count; i++, meth++) { if (meth->add_cb != custom_ext_add_old_cb_wrap) continue; /* Old style API wrapper. Need to free the arguments too */ OPENSSL_free(meth->add_arg); OPENSSL_free(meth->parse_arg); } OPENSSL_free(exts->meths); } /* Return true if a client custom extension exists, false otherwise */ int SSL_CTX_has_client_custom_ext(const SSL_CTX *ctx, unsigned int ext_type) { return custom_ext_find(&ctx->cert->custext, ENDPOINT_CLIENT, ext_type, NULL) != NULL; } static int add_custom_ext_intern(SSL_CTX *ctx, ENDPOINT role, unsigned int ext_type, unsigned int context, SSL_custom_ext_add_cb_ex add_cb, SSL_custom_ext_free_cb_ex free_cb, void *add_arg, SSL_custom_ext_parse_cb_ex parse_cb, void *parse_arg) { custom_ext_methods *exts = &ctx->cert->custext; custom_ext_method *meth, *tmp; /* * Check application error: if add_cb is not set free_cb will never be * called. */ if (add_cb == NULL && free_cb != NULL) return 0; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT /* * We don't want applications registering callbacks for SCT extensions * whilst simultaneously using the built-in SCT validation features, as * these two things may not play well together. */ if (ext_type == TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp && (context & SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO) != 0 && SSL_CTX_ct_is_enabled(ctx)) return 0; #endif /* * Don't add if extension supported internally, but make exception * for extension types that previously were not supported, but now are. */ if (SSL_extension_supported(ext_type) && ext_type != TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp) return 0; /* Extension type must fit in 16 bits */ if (ext_type > 0xffff) return 0; /* Search for duplicate */ if (custom_ext_find(exts, role, ext_type, NULL)) return 0; tmp = OPENSSL_realloc(exts->meths, (exts->meths_count + 1) * sizeof(custom_ext_method)); if (tmp == NULL) return 0; exts->meths = tmp; meth = exts->meths + exts->meths_count; memset(meth, 0, sizeof(*meth)); meth->role = role; meth->context = context; meth->parse_cb = parse_cb; meth->add_cb = add_cb; meth->free_cb = free_cb; meth->ext_type = ext_type; meth->add_arg = add_arg; meth->parse_arg = parse_arg; exts->meths_count++; return 1; } static int add_old_custom_ext(SSL_CTX *ctx, ENDPOINT role, unsigned int ext_type, unsigned int context, custom_ext_add_cb add_cb, custom_ext_free_cb free_cb, void *add_arg, custom_ext_parse_cb parse_cb, void *parse_arg) { custom_ext_add_cb_wrap *add_cb_wrap = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*add_cb_wrap)); custom_ext_parse_cb_wrap *parse_cb_wrap = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*parse_cb_wrap)); int ret; if (add_cb_wrap == NULL || parse_cb_wrap == NULL) { OPENSSL_free(add_cb_wrap); OPENSSL_free(parse_cb_wrap); return 0; } add_cb_wrap->add_arg = add_arg; add_cb_wrap->add_cb = add_cb; add_cb_wrap->free_cb = free_cb; parse_cb_wrap->parse_arg = parse_arg; parse_cb_wrap->parse_cb = parse_cb; ret = add_custom_ext_intern(ctx, role, ext_type, context, custom_ext_add_old_cb_wrap, custom_ext_free_old_cb_wrap, add_cb_wrap, custom_ext_parse_old_cb_wrap, parse_cb_wrap); if (!ret) { OPENSSL_free(add_cb_wrap); OPENSSL_free(parse_cb_wrap); } return ret; } /* Application level functions to add the old custom extension callbacks */ int SSL_CTX_add_client_custom_ext(SSL_CTX *ctx, unsigned int ext_type, custom_ext_add_cb add_cb, custom_ext_free_cb free_cb, void *add_arg, custom_ext_parse_cb parse_cb, void *parse_arg) { return add_old_custom_ext(ctx, ENDPOINT_CLIENT, ext_type, SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_AND_BELOW_ONLY | SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO | SSL_EXT_IGNORE_ON_RESUMPTION, add_cb, free_cb, add_arg, parse_cb, parse_arg); } int SSL_CTX_add_server_custom_ext(SSL_CTX *ctx, unsigned int ext_type, custom_ext_add_cb add_cb, custom_ext_free_cb free_cb, void *add_arg, custom_ext_parse_cb parse_cb, void *parse_arg) { return add_old_custom_ext(ctx, ENDPOINT_SERVER, ext_type, SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_AND_BELOW_ONLY | SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO | SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO | SSL_EXT_IGNORE_ON_RESUMPTION, add_cb, free_cb, add_arg, parse_cb, parse_arg); } int SSL_CTX_add_custom_ext(SSL_CTX *ctx, unsigned int ext_type, unsigned int context, SSL_custom_ext_add_cb_ex add_cb, SSL_custom_ext_free_cb_ex free_cb, void *add_arg, SSL_custom_ext_parse_cb_ex parse_cb, void *parse_arg) { return add_custom_ext_intern(ctx, ENDPOINT_BOTH, ext_type, context, add_cb, free_cb, add_arg, parse_cb, parse_arg); } int SSL_extension_supported(unsigned int ext_type) { switch (ext_type) { /* Internally supported extensions. */ case TLSEXT_TYPE_application_layer_protocol_negotiation: #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC case TLSEXT_TYPE_ec_point_formats: case TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_groups: case TLSEXT_TYPE_key_share: #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG case TLSEXT_TYPE_next_proto_neg: #endif case TLSEXT_TYPE_padding: case TLSEXT_TYPE_renegotiate: case TLSEXT_TYPE_max_fragment_length: case TLSEXT_TYPE_server_name: case TLSEXT_TYPE_session_ticket: case TLSEXT_TYPE_signature_algorithms: #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP case TLSEXT_TYPE_srp: #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_OCSP case TLSEXT_TYPE_status_request: #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CT case TLSEXT_TYPE_signed_certificate_timestamp: #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRTP case TLSEXT_TYPE_use_srtp: #endif case TLSEXT_TYPE_encrypt_then_mac: case TLSEXT_TYPE_supported_versions: case TLSEXT_TYPE_extended_master_secret: case TLSEXT_TYPE_psk_kex_modes: case TLSEXT_TYPE_cookie: case TLSEXT_TYPE_early_data: case TLSEXT_TYPE_certificate_authorities: case TLSEXT_TYPE_psk: case TLSEXT_TYPE_post_handshake_auth: return 1; default: return 0; } } diff --git a/ssl/statem/statem_lib.c b/ssl/statem/statem_lib.c index c3b6f8f4569a..695caab3d628 100644 --- a/ssl/statem/statem_lib.c +++ b/ssl/statem/statem_lib.c @@ -1,2439 +1,2441 @@ /* - * Copyright 1995-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * Copyright 1995-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved * * Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include #include "../ssl_local.h" #include "statem_local.h" #include "internal/cryptlib.h" #include #include #include #include /* * Map error codes to TLS/SSL alart types. */ typedef struct x509err2alert_st { int x509err; int alert; } X509ERR2ALERT; /* Fixed value used in the ServerHello random field to identify an HRR */ const unsigned char hrrrandom[] = { 0xcf, 0x21, 0xad, 0x74, 0xe5, 0x9a, 0x61, 0x11, 0xbe, 0x1d, 0x8c, 0x02, 0x1e, 0x65, 0xb8, 0x91, 0xc2, 0xa2, 0x11, 0x16, 0x7a, 0xbb, 0x8c, 0x5e, 0x07, 0x9e, 0x09, 0xe2, 0xc8, 0xa8, 0x33, 0x9c }; /* * send s->init_buf in records of type 'type' (SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE or * SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) */ int ssl3_do_write(SSL *s, int type) { int ret; size_t written = 0; ret = ssl3_write_bytes(s, type, &s->init_buf->data[s->init_off], s->init_num, &written); if (ret < 0) return -1; if (type == SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) /* * should not be done for 'Hello Request's, but in that case we'll * ignore the result anyway * TLS1.3 KeyUpdate and NewSessionTicket do not need to be added */ if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || (s->statem.hand_state != TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET && s->statem.hand_state != TLS_ST_CW_KEY_UPDATE && s->statem.hand_state != TLS_ST_SW_KEY_UPDATE)) if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)&s->init_buf->data[s->init_off], written)) return -1; if (written == s->init_num) { if (s->msg_callback) s->msg_callback(1, s->version, type, s->init_buf->data, (size_t)(s->init_off + s->init_num), s, s->msg_callback_arg); return 1; } s->init_off += written; s->init_num -= written; return 0; } int tls_close_construct_packet(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, int htype) { size_t msglen; if ((htype != SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC && !WPACKET_close(pkt)) || !WPACKET_get_length(pkt, &msglen) || msglen > INT_MAX) return 0; s->init_num = (int)msglen; s->init_off = 0; return 1; } int tls_setup_handshake(SSL *s) { if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) { /* SSLfatal() already called */ return 0; } /* Reset any extension flags */ memset(s->ext.extflags, 0, sizeof(s->ext.extflags)); if (s->server) { STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = SSL_get_ciphers(s); int i, ver_min, ver_max, ok = 0; /* * Sanity check that the maximum version we accept has ciphers * enabled. For clients we do this check during construction of the * ClientHello. */ if (ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &ver_min, &ver_max, NULL) != 0) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_SETUP_HANDSHAKE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) { const SSL_CIPHER *c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i); if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { if (DTLS_VERSION_GE(ver_max, c->min_dtls) && DTLS_VERSION_LE(ver_max, c->max_dtls)) ok = 1; } else if (ver_max >= c->min_tls && ver_max <= c->max_tls) { ok = 1; } if (ok) break; } if (!ok) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE, SSL_F_TLS_SETUP_HANDSHAKE, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_AVAILABLE); ERR_add_error_data(1, "No ciphers enabled for max supported " "SSL/TLS version"); return 0; } if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) { /* N.B. s->session_ctx == s->ctx here */ tsan_counter(&s->session_ctx->stats.sess_accept); } else { /* N.B. s->ctx may not equal s->session_ctx */ tsan_counter(&s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_renegotiate); s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 0; } } else { if (SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) tsan_counter(&s->session_ctx->stats.sess_connect); else tsan_counter(&s->session_ctx->stats.sess_connect_renegotiate); /* mark client_random uninitialized */ memset(s->s3->client_random, 0, sizeof(s->s3->client_random)); s->hit = 0; s->s3->tmp.cert_req = 0; if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) s->statem.use_timer = 1; } return 1; } /* * Size of the to-be-signed TLS13 data, without the hash size itself: * 64 bytes of value 32, 33 context bytes, 1 byte separator */ #define TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE 64 #define TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE (TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE + 33 + 1) static int get_cert_verify_tbs_data(SSL *s, unsigned char *tls13tbs, void **hdata, size_t *hdatalen) { #ifdef CHARSET_EBCDIC static const char servercontext[] = { 0x54, 0x4c, 0x53, 0x20, 0x31, 0x2e, 0x33, 0x2c, 0x20, 0x73, 0x65, 0x72, 0x76, 0x65, 0x72, 0x20, 0x43, 0x65, 0x72, 0x74, 0x69, 0x66, 0x69, 0x63, 0x61, 0x74, 0x65, 0x56, 0x65, 0x72, 0x69, 0x66, 0x79, 0x00 }; static const char clientcontext[] = { 0x54, 0x4c, 0x53, 0x20, 0x31, 0x2e, 0x33, 0x2c, 0x20, 0x63, 0x6c, 0x69, 0x65, 0x6e, 0x74, 0x20, 0x43, 0x65, 0x72, 0x74, 0x69, 0x66, 0x69, 0x63, 0x61, 0x74, 0x65, 0x56, 0x65, 0x72, 0x69, 0x66, 0x79, 0x00 }; #else static const char servercontext[] = "TLS 1.3, server CertificateVerify"; static const char clientcontext[] = "TLS 1.3, client CertificateVerify"; #endif if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { size_t hashlen; /* Set the first 64 bytes of to-be-signed data to octet 32 */ memset(tls13tbs, 32, TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE); /* This copies the 33 bytes of context plus the 0 separator byte */ if (s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY || s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_SW_CERT_VRFY) strcpy((char *)tls13tbs + TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE, servercontext); else strcpy((char *)tls13tbs + TLS13_TBS_START_SIZE, clientcontext); /* * If we're currently reading then we need to use the saved handshake * hash value. We can't use the current handshake hash state because * that includes the CertVerify itself. */ if (s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_CR_CERT_VRFY || s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY) { memcpy(tls13tbs + TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE, s->cert_verify_hash, s->cert_verify_hash_len); hashlen = s->cert_verify_hash_len; } else if (!ssl_handshake_hash(s, tls13tbs + TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE, &hashlen)) { /* SSLfatal() already called */ return 0; } *hdata = tls13tbs; *hdatalen = TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE + hashlen; } else { size_t retlen; long retlen_l; retlen = retlen_l = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, hdata); if (retlen_l <= 0) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_GET_CERT_VERIFY_TBS_DATA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } *hdatalen = retlen; } return 1; } int tls_construct_cert_verify(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) { EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; const EVP_MD *md = NULL; EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = NULL; EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL; size_t hdatalen = 0, siglen = 0; void *hdata; unsigned char *sig = NULL; unsigned char tls13tbs[TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu = s->s3->tmp.sigalg; if (lu == NULL || s->s3->tmp.cert == NULL) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } pkey = s->s3->tmp.cert->privatekey; if (pkey == NULL || !tls1_lookup_md(lu, &md)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); if (mctx == NULL) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } /* Get the data to be signed */ if (!get_cert_verify_tbs_data(s, tls13tbs, &hdata, &hdatalen)) { /* SSLfatal() already called */ goto err; } if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) && !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, lu->sigalg)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } siglen = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey); sig = OPENSSL_malloc(siglen); if (sig == NULL) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } if (EVP_DigestSignInit(mctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey) <= 0) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); goto err; } if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) { if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx, RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); goto err; } } if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) { if (EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mctx, hdata, hdatalen) <= 0 || !EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET, (int)s->session->master_key_length, s->session->master_key) || EVP_DigestSignFinal(mctx, sig, &siglen) <= 0) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); goto err; } } else if (EVP_DigestSign(mctx, sig, &siglen, hdata, hdatalen) <= 0) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); goto err; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST { int pktype = lu->sig; if (pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2001 || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256 || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512) BUF_reverse(sig, NULL, siglen); } #endif if (!WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u16(pkt, sig, siglen)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } /* Digest cached records and discard handshake buffer */ if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) { /* SSLfatal() already called */ goto err; } OPENSSL_free(sig); EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx); return 1; err: OPENSSL_free(sig); EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx); return 0; } MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_verify(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) { EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; const unsigned char *data; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST unsigned char *gost_data = NULL; #endif MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; int j; unsigned int len; X509 *peer; const EVP_MD *md = NULL; size_t hdatalen = 0; void *hdata; unsigned char tls13tbs[TLS13_TBS_PREAMBLE_SIZE + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); EVP_PKEY_CTX *pctx = NULL; if (mctx == NULL) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } peer = s->session->peer; pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(peer); if (pkey == NULL) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } if (ssl_cert_lookup_by_pkey(pkey, NULL) == NULL) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE); goto err; } if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { unsigned int sigalg; if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &sigalg)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_PACKET); goto err; } if (tls12_check_peer_sigalg(s, sigalg, pkey) <= 0) { /* SSLfatal() already called */ goto err; } } else if (!tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(s, pkey)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } if (!tls1_lookup_md(s->s3->tmp.peer_sigalg, &md)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } #ifdef SSL_DEBUG if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", md == NULL ? "n/a" : EVP_MD_name(md)); #endif /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */ /* * If key is GOST and len is exactly 64 or 128, it is signature without * length field (CryptoPro implementations at least till TLS 1.2) */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST if (!SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s) && ((PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 64 && (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == NID_id_GostR3410_2001 || EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256)) || (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 128 && EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512))) { len = PACKET_remaining(pkt); } else #endif if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &len)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto err; } j = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey); if (((int)len > j) || ((int)PACKET_remaining(pkt) > j) || (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE); goto err; } if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, len)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto err; } if (!get_cert_verify_tbs_data(s, tls13tbs, &hdata, &hdatalen)) { /* SSLfatal() already called */ goto err; } #ifdef SSL_DEBUG fprintf(stderr, "Using client verify alg %s\n", md == NULL ? "n/a" : EVP_MD_name(md)); #endif if (EVP_DigestVerifyInit(mctx, &pctx, md, NULL, pkey) <= 0) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); goto err; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST { int pktype = EVP_PKEY_id(pkey); if (pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2001 || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256 || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512) { if ((gost_data = OPENSSL_malloc(len)) == NULL) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } BUF_reverse(gost_data, data, len); data = gost_data; } } #endif if (SSL_USE_PSS(s)) { if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_padding(pctx, RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) <= 0 || EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(pctx, RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) <= 0) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); goto err; } } if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) { if (EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(mctx, hdata, hdatalen) <= 0 || !EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET, (int)s->session->master_key_length, s->session->master_key)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); goto err; } if (EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(mctx, data, len) <= 0) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE); goto err; } } else { j = EVP_DigestVerify(mctx, data, len, hdata, hdatalen); if (j <= 0) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE); goto err; } } /* * In TLSv1.3 on the client side we make sure we prepare the client * certificate after the CertVerify instead of when we get the * CertificateRequest. This is because in TLSv1.3 the CertificateRequest * comes *before* the Certificate message. In TLSv1.2 it comes after. We * want to make sure that SSL_get_peer_certificate() will return the actual * server certificate from the client_cert_cb callback. */ if (!s->server && SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 1) ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING; else ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; err: BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer); s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL; EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST OPENSSL_free(gost_data); #endif return ret; } int tls_construct_finished(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) { size_t finish_md_len; const char *sender; size_t slen; /* This is a real handshake so make sure we clean it up at the end */ if (!s->server && s->post_handshake_auth != SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) s->statem.cleanuphand = 1; /* * We only change the keys if we didn't already do this when we sent the * client certificate */ if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !s->server && s->s3->tmp.cert_req == 0 && (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, SSL3_CC_HANDSHAKE | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_WRITE))) {; /* SSLfatal() already called */ return 0; } if (s->server) { sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label; slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len; } else { sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label; slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len; } finish_md_len = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s, sender, slen, s->s3->tmp.finish_md); if (finish_md_len == 0) { /* SSLfatal() already called */ return 0; } s->s3->tmp.finish_md_len = finish_md_len; if (!WPACKET_memcpy(pkt, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, finish_md_len)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_FINISHED, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } /* * Log the master secret, if logging is enabled. We don't log it for * TLSv1.3: there's a different key schedule for that. */ if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !ssl_log_secret(s, MASTER_SECRET_LABEL, s->session->master_key, s->session->master_key_length)) { /* SSLfatal() already called */ return 0; } /* * Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks */ if (!ossl_assert(finish_md_len <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_FINISHED, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } if (!s->server) { memcpy(s->s3->previous_client_finished, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, finish_md_len); s->s3->previous_client_finished_len = finish_md_len; } else { memcpy(s->s3->previous_server_finished, s->s3->tmp.finish_md, finish_md_len); s->s3->previous_server_finished_len = finish_md_len; } return 1; } int tls_construct_key_update(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) { if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, s->key_update)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_KEY_UPDATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } s->key_update = SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NONE; return 1; } MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_key_update(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) { unsigned int updatetype; /* * A KeyUpdate message signals a key change so the end of the message must * be on a record boundary. */ if (RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_UPDATE, SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY); return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; } if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &updatetype) || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_UPDATE, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_UPDATE); return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; } /* * There are only two defined key update types. Fail if we get a value we * didn't recognise. */ if (updatetype != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NOT_REQUESTED && updatetype != SSL_KEY_UPDATE_REQUESTED) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_KEY_UPDATE, SSL_R_BAD_KEY_UPDATE); return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; } /* * If we get a request for us to update our sending keys too then, we need * to additionally send a KeyUpdate message. However that message should * not also request an update (otherwise we get into an infinite loop). */ if (updatetype == SSL_KEY_UPDATE_REQUESTED) s->key_update = SSL_KEY_UPDATE_NOT_REQUESTED; if (!tls13_update_key(s, 0)) { /* SSLfatal() already called */ return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; } return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING; } /* * ssl3_take_mac calculates the Finished MAC for the handshakes messages seen * to far. */ int ssl3_take_mac(SSL *s) { const char *sender; size_t slen; if (!s->server) { sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label; slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len; } else { sender = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label; slen = s->method->ssl3_enc->client_finished_label_len; } s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len = s->method->ssl3_enc->final_finish_mac(s, sender, slen, s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md); if (s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len == 0) { /* SSLfatal() already called */ return 0; } return 1; } MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) { size_t remain; remain = PACKET_remaining(pkt); /* * 'Change Cipher Spec' is just a single byte, which should already have * been consumed by ssl_get_message() so there should be no bytes left, * unless we're using DTLS1_BAD_VER, which has an extra 2 bytes */ if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { if ((s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER && remain != DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH + 1) || (s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER && remain != DTLS1_CCS_HEADER_LENGTH - 1)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC); return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; } } else { if (remain != 0) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC); return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; } } /* Check we have a cipher to change to */ if (s->s3->tmp.new_cipher == NULL) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; } s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 1; if (!ssl3_do_change_cipher_spec(s)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; } if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_READ); if (s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) s->d1->handshake_read_seq++; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP /* * Remember that a CCS has been received, so that an old key of * SCTP-Auth can be deleted when a CCS is sent. Will be ignored if no * SCTP is used */ BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_AUTH_CCS_RCVD, 1, NULL); #endif } return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; } MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_finished(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) { size_t md_len; /* This is a real handshake so make sure we clean it up at the end */ if (s->server) { /* * To get this far we must have read encrypted data from the client. We * no longer tolerate unencrypted alerts. This value is ignored if less * than TLSv1.3 */ s->statem.enc_read_state = ENC_READ_STATE_VALID; if (s->post_handshake_auth != SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) s->statem.cleanuphand = 1; if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !tls13_save_handshake_digest_for_pha(s)) { /* SSLfatal() already called */ return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; } } /* * In TLSv1.3 a Finished message signals a key change so the end of the * message must be on a record boundary. */ if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && RECORD_LAYER_processed_read_pending(&s->rlayer)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_NOT_ON_RECORD_BOUNDARY); return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; } /* If this occurs, we have missed a message */ if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !s->s3->change_cipher_spec) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_GOT_A_FIN_BEFORE_A_CCS); return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; } s->s3->change_cipher_spec = 0; md_len = s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md_len; if (md_len != PACKET_remaining(pkt)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_BAD_DIGEST_LENGTH); return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; } if (CRYPTO_memcmp(PACKET_data(pkt), s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, md_len) != 0) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, SSL_R_DIGEST_CHECK_FAILED); return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; } /* * Copy the finished so we can use it for renegotiation checks */ if (!ossl_assert(md_len <= EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_FINISHED, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; } if (s->server) { memcpy(s->s3->previous_client_finished, s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, md_len); s->s3->previous_client_finished_len = md_len; } else { memcpy(s->s3->previous_server_finished, s->s3->tmp.peer_finish_md, md_len); s->s3->previous_server_finished_len = md_len; } /* * In TLS1.3 we also have to change cipher state and do any final processing * of the initial server flight (if we are a client) */ if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { if (s->server) { if (s->post_handshake_auth != SSL_PHA_REQUESTED && !s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_READ)) { /* SSLfatal() already called */ return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; } } else { /* TLS 1.3 gets the secret size from the handshake md */ size_t dummy; if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s, s->master_secret, s->handshake_secret, 0, &dummy)) { /* SSLfatal() already called */ return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; } if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, SSL3_CC_APPLICATION | SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_CLIENT_READ)) { /* SSLfatal() already called */ return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; } if (!tls_process_initial_server_flight(s)) { /* SSLfatal() already called */ return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; } } } return MSG_PROCESS_FINISHED_READING; } int tls_construct_change_cipher_spec(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt) { if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u8(pkt, SSL3_MT_CCS)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } return 1; } /* Add a certificate to the WPACKET */ static int ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, X509 *x, int chain) { int len; unsigned char *outbytes; len = i2d_X509(x, NULL); if (len < 0) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_TO_WPACKET, ERR_R_BUF_LIB); return 0; } if (!WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u24(pkt, len, &outbytes) || i2d_X509(x, &outbytes) != len) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_TO_WPACKET, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !tls_construct_extensions(s, pkt, SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_CERTIFICATE, x, chain)) { /* SSLfatal() already called */ return 0; } return 1; } /* Add certificate chain to provided WPACKET */ static int ssl_add_cert_chain(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, CERT_PKEY *cpk) { int i, chain_count; X509 *x; STACK_OF(X509) *extra_certs; STACK_OF(X509) *chain = NULL; X509_STORE *chain_store; if (cpk == NULL || cpk->x509 == NULL) return 1; x = cpk->x509; /* * If we have a certificate specific chain use it, else use parent ctx. */ if (cpk->chain != NULL) extra_certs = cpk->chain; else extra_certs = s->ctx->extra_certs; if ((s->mode & SSL_MODE_NO_AUTO_CHAIN) || extra_certs) chain_store = NULL; else if (s->cert->chain_store) chain_store = s->cert->chain_store; else chain_store = s->ctx->cert_store; if (chain_store != NULL) { X509_STORE_CTX *xs_ctx = X509_STORE_CTX_new(); if (xs_ctx == NULL) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(xs_ctx, chain_store, x, NULL)) { X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx); SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, ERR_R_X509_LIB); return 0; } /* * It is valid for the chain not to be complete (because normally we * don't include the root cert in the chain). Therefore we deliberately * ignore the error return from this call. We're not actually verifying * the cert - we're just building as much of the chain as we can */ (void)X509_verify_cert(xs_ctx); /* Don't leave errors in the queue */ ERR_clear_error(); chain = X509_STORE_CTX_get0_chain(xs_ctx); i = ssl_security_cert_chain(s, chain, NULL, 0); if (i != 1) { #if 0 /* Dummy error calls so mkerr generates them */ SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, SSL_R_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL); SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, SSL_R_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL); SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, SSL_R_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK); #endif X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx); SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, i); return 0; } chain_count = sk_X509_num(chain); for (i = 0; i < chain_count; i++) { x = sk_X509_value(chain, i); if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s, pkt, x, i)) { /* SSLfatal() already called */ X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx); return 0; } } X509_STORE_CTX_free(xs_ctx); } else { i = ssl_security_cert_chain(s, extra_certs, x, 0); if (i != 1) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CERT_CHAIN, i); return 0; } if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s, pkt, x, 0)) { /* SSLfatal() already called */ return 0; } for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_num(extra_certs); i++) { x = sk_X509_value(extra_certs, i); if (!ssl_add_cert_to_wpacket(s, pkt, x, i + 1)) { /* SSLfatal() already called */ return 0; } } } return 1; } unsigned long ssl3_output_cert_chain(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, CERT_PKEY *cpk) { if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u24(pkt)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } if (!ssl_add_cert_chain(s, pkt, cpk)) return 0; if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_SSL3_OUTPUT_CERT_CHAIN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } return 1; } /* * Tidy up after the end of a handshake. In the case of SCTP this may result * in NBIO events. If |clearbufs| is set then init_buf and the wbio buffer is * freed up as well. */ WORK_STATE tls_finish_handshake(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst, int clearbufs, int stop) { void (*cb) (const SSL *ssl, int type, int val) = NULL; int cleanuphand = s->statem.cleanuphand; if (clearbufs) { if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP /* * RFC6083: SCTP provides a reliable and in-sequence transport service for DTLS * messages that require it. Therefore, DTLS procedures for retransmissions * MUST NOT be used. * Hence the init_buf can be cleared when DTLS over SCTP as transport is used. */ || BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s)) #endif ) { /* * We don't do this in DTLS over UDP because we may still need the init_buf * in case there are any unexpected retransmits */ BUF_MEM_free(s->init_buf); s->init_buf = NULL; } if (!ssl_free_wbio_buffer(s)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_FINISH_HANDSHAKE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return WORK_ERROR; } s->init_num = 0; } if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) && !s->server && s->post_handshake_auth == SSL_PHA_REQUESTED) s->post_handshake_auth = SSL_PHA_EXT_SENT; /* * Only set if there was a Finished message and this isn't after a TLSv1.3 * post handshake exchange */ if (cleanuphand) { /* skipped if we just sent a HelloRequest */ s->renegotiate = 0; s->new_session = 0; s->statem.cleanuphand = 0; s->ext.ticket_expected = 0; ssl3_cleanup_key_block(s); if (s->server) { /* * In TLSv1.3 we update the cache as part of constructing the * NewSessionTicket */ if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER); /* N.B. s->ctx may not equal s->session_ctx */ tsan_counter(&s->ctx->stats.sess_accept_good); s->handshake_func = ossl_statem_accept; } else { if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { /* * We encourage applications to only use TLSv1.3 tickets once, * so we remove this one from the cache. */ if ((s->session_ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT) != 0) SSL_CTX_remove_session(s->session_ctx, s->session); } else { /* * In TLSv1.3 we update the cache as part of processing the * NewSessionTicket */ ssl_update_cache(s, SSL_SESS_CACHE_CLIENT); } if (s->hit) tsan_counter(&s->session_ctx->stats.sess_hit); s->handshake_func = ossl_statem_connect; tsan_counter(&s->session_ctx->stats.sess_connect_good); } if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { /* done with handshaking */ s->d1->handshake_read_seq = 0; s->d1->handshake_write_seq = 0; s->d1->next_handshake_write_seq = 0; dtls1_clear_received_buffer(s); } } if (s->info_callback != NULL) cb = s->info_callback; else if (s->ctx->info_callback != NULL) cb = s->ctx->info_callback; /* The callback may expect us to not be in init at handshake done */ ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0); if (cb != NULL) { if (cleanuphand || !SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) cb(s, SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE, 1); } if (!stop) { /* If we've got more work to do we go back into init */ ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 1); return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; } return WORK_FINISHED_STOP; } int tls_get_message_header(SSL *s, int *mt) { /* s->init_num < SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH */ int skip_message, i, recvd_type; unsigned char *p; size_t l, readbytes; p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; do { while (s->init_num < SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) { i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, &recvd_type, &p[s->init_num], SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH - s->init_num, 0, &readbytes); if (i <= 0) { s->rwstate = SSL_READING; return 0; } if (recvd_type == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { /* * A ChangeCipherSpec must be a single byte and may not occur * in the middle of a handshake message. */ if (s->init_num != 0 || readbytes != 1 || p[0] != SSL3_MT_CCS) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER, SSL_R_BAD_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC); return 0; } if (s->statem.hand_state == TLS_ST_BEFORE && (s->s3->flags & TLS1_FLAGS_STATELESS) != 0) { /* * We are stateless and we received a CCS. Probably this is * from a client between the first and second ClientHellos. * We should ignore this, but return an error because we do * not return success until we see the second ClientHello * with a valid cookie. */ return 0; } s->s3->tmp.message_type = *mt = SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC; s->init_num = readbytes - 1; s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data; s->s3->tmp.message_size = readbytes; return 1; } else if (recvd_type != SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE, SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER, SSL_R_CCS_RECEIVED_EARLY); return 0; } s->init_num += readbytes; } skip_message = 0; if (!s->server) if (s->statem.hand_state != TLS_ST_OK && p[0] == SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST) /* * The server may always send 'Hello Request' messages -- * we are doing a handshake anyway now, so ignore them if * their format is correct. Does not count for 'Finished' * MAC. */ if (p[1] == 0 && p[2] == 0 && p[3] == 0) { s->init_num = 0; skip_message = 1; if (s->msg_callback) s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, p, SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, s, s->msg_callback_arg); } } while (skip_message); /* s->init_num == SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH */ *mt = *p; s->s3->tmp.message_type = *(p++); if (RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer)) { /* * Only happens with SSLv3+ in an SSLv2 backward compatible * ClientHello * * Total message size is the remaining record bytes to read * plus the SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH bytes that we already read */ l = RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec_length(&s->rlayer) + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; s->s3->tmp.message_size = l; s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data; s->init_num = SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; } else { n2l3(p, l); /* BUF_MEM_grow takes an 'int' parameter */ if (l > (INT_MAX - SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_TLS_GET_MESSAGE_HEADER, SSL_R_EXCESSIVE_MESSAGE_SIZE); return 0; } s->s3->tmp.message_size = l; s->init_msg = s->init_buf->data + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; s->init_num = 0; } return 1; } int tls_get_message_body(SSL *s, size_t *len) { size_t n, readbytes; unsigned char *p; int i; if (s->s3->tmp.message_type == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { /* We've already read everything in */ *len = (unsigned long)s->init_num; return 1; } p = s->init_msg; n = s->s3->tmp.message_size - s->init_num; while (n > 0) { i = s->method->ssl_read_bytes(s, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, NULL, &p[s->init_num], n, 0, &readbytes); if (i <= 0) { s->rwstate = SSL_READING; *len = 0; return 0; } s->init_num += readbytes; n -= readbytes; } /* * If receiving Finished, record MAC of prior handshake messages for * Finished verification. */ if (*(s->init_buf->data) == SSL3_MT_FINISHED && !ssl3_take_mac(s)) { /* SSLfatal() already called */ *len = 0; return 0; } /* Feed this message into MAC computation. */ if (RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer)) { if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data, s->init_num)) { /* SSLfatal() already called */ *len = 0; return 0; } if (s->msg_callback) s->msg_callback(0, SSL2_VERSION, 0, s->init_buf->data, (size_t)s->init_num, s, s->msg_callback_arg); } else { /* * We defer feeding in the HRR until later. We'll do it as part of * processing the message * The TLsv1.3 handshake transcript stops at the ClientFinished * message. */ #define SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_OFFSET (SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH + 2) /* KeyUpdate and NewSessionTicket do not need to be added */ if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET && s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_KEY_UPDATE)) { if (s->s3->tmp.message_type != SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO || s->init_num < SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_OFFSET + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE || memcmp(hrrrandom, s->init_buf->data + SERVER_HELLO_RANDOM_OFFSET, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) != 0) { if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data, s->init_num + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH)) { /* SSLfatal() already called */ *len = 0; return 0; } } } if (s->msg_callback) s->msg_callback(0, s->version, SSL3_RT_HANDSHAKE, s->init_buf->data, (size_t)s->init_num + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH, s, s->msg_callback_arg); } *len = s->init_num; return 1; } static const X509ERR2ALERT x509table[] = { {X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION, SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE}, {X509_V_ERR_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, {X509_V_ERR_EC_KEY_EXPLICIT_PARAMS, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, {X509_V_ERR_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, {X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA}, {X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED}, {X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, {X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, {X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_REVOKED}, {X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR}, {X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, {X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_EXPIRED}, {X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, {X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE, SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR}, {X509_V_ERR_DANE_NO_MATCH, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, {X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA}, {X509_V_ERR_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, {X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, {X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, {X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, {X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, {X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, {X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, {X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA}, {X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR}, {X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE, SSL_AD_UNSUPPORTED_CERTIFICATE}, {X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, {X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR}, {X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA}, {X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA}, {X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR}, {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CERT_SIGNATURE, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CRL_SIGNATURE, SSL_AD_BAD_CERTIFICATE}, {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA}, {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA}, {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA}, {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA}, {X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE, SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_CA}, {X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR}, /* Last entry; return this if we don't find the value above. */ {X509_V_OK, SSL_AD_CERTIFICATE_UNKNOWN} }; int ssl_x509err2alert(int x509err) { const X509ERR2ALERT *tp; for (tp = x509table; tp->x509err != X509_V_OK; ++tp) if (tp->x509err == x509err) break; return tp->alert; } int ssl_allow_compression(SSL *s) { if (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION) return 0; return ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_COMPRESSION, 0, 0, NULL); } static int version_cmp(const SSL *s, int a, int b) { int dtls = SSL_IS_DTLS(s); if (a == b) return 0; if (!dtls) return a < b ? -1 : 1; return DTLS_VERSION_LT(a, b) ? -1 : 1; } typedef struct { int version; const SSL_METHOD *(*cmeth) (void); const SSL_METHOD *(*smeth) (void); } version_info; #if TLS_MAX_VERSION != TLS1_3_VERSION # error Code needs update for TLS_method() support beyond TLS1_3_VERSION. #endif /* Must be in order high to low */ static const version_info tls_version_table[] = { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3 {TLS1_3_VERSION, tlsv1_3_client_method, tlsv1_3_server_method}, #else {TLS1_3_VERSION, NULL, NULL}, #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2 {TLS1_2_VERSION, tlsv1_2_client_method, tlsv1_2_server_method}, #else {TLS1_2_VERSION, NULL, NULL}, #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_1 {TLS1_1_VERSION, tlsv1_1_client_method, tlsv1_1_server_method}, #else {TLS1_1_VERSION, NULL, NULL}, #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1 {TLS1_VERSION, tlsv1_client_method, tlsv1_server_method}, #else {TLS1_VERSION, NULL, NULL}, #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SSL3 {SSL3_VERSION, sslv3_client_method, sslv3_server_method}, #else {SSL3_VERSION, NULL, NULL}, #endif {0, NULL, NULL}, }; #if DTLS_MAX_VERSION != DTLS1_2_VERSION # error Code needs update for DTLS_method() support beyond DTLS1_2_VERSION. #endif /* Must be in order high to low */ static const version_info dtls_version_table[] = { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1_2 {DTLS1_2_VERSION, dtlsv1_2_client_method, dtlsv1_2_server_method}, #else {DTLS1_2_VERSION, NULL, NULL}, #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DTLS1 {DTLS1_VERSION, dtlsv1_client_method, dtlsv1_server_method}, {DTLS1_BAD_VER, dtls_bad_ver_client_method, NULL}, #else {DTLS1_VERSION, NULL, NULL}, {DTLS1_BAD_VER, NULL, NULL}, #endif {0, NULL, NULL}, }; /* * ssl_method_error - Check whether an SSL_METHOD is enabled. * * @s: The SSL handle for the candidate method * @method: the intended method. * * Returns 0 on success, or an SSL error reason on failure. */ static int ssl_method_error(const SSL *s, const SSL_METHOD *method) { int version = method->version; if ((s->min_proto_version != 0 && version_cmp(s, version, s->min_proto_version) < 0) || ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_VERSION, 0, version, NULL) == 0) return SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW; if (s->max_proto_version != 0 && version_cmp(s, version, s->max_proto_version) > 0) return SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_HIGH; if ((s->options & method->mask) != 0) return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL; if ((method->flags & SSL_METHOD_NO_SUITEB) != 0 && tls1_suiteb(s)) return SSL_R_AT_LEAST_TLS_1_2_NEEDED_IN_SUITEB_MODE; return 0; } /* * Only called by servers. Returns 1 if the server has a TLSv1.3 capable * certificate type, or has PSK or a certificate callback configured, or has * a servername callback configured. Otherwise returns 0. */ static int is_tls13_capable(const SSL *s) { int i; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC int curve; EC_KEY *eckey; #endif if (!ossl_assert(s->ctx != NULL) || !ossl_assert(s->session_ctx != NULL)) return 0; /* * A servername callback can change the available certs, so if a servername * cb is set then we just assume TLSv1.3 will be ok */ if (s->ctx->ext.servername_cb != NULL || s->session_ctx->ext.servername_cb != NULL) return 1; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK if (s->psk_server_callback != NULL) return 1; #endif if (s->psk_find_session_cb != NULL || s->cert->cert_cb != NULL) return 1; for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) { /* Skip over certs disallowed for TLSv1.3 */ switch (i) { case SSL_PKEY_DSA_SIGN: case SSL_PKEY_GOST01: case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256: case SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512: continue; default: break; } if (!ssl_has_cert(s, i)) continue; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC if (i != SSL_PKEY_ECC) return 1; /* * Prior to TLSv1.3 sig algs allowed any curve to be used. TLSv1.3 is * more restrictive so check that our sig algs are consistent with this * EC cert. See section 4.2.3 of RFC8446. */ eckey = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey); if (eckey == NULL) continue; curve = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(EC_KEY_get0_group(eckey)); if (tls_check_sigalg_curve(s, curve)) return 1; #else return 1; #endif } return 0; } /* * ssl_version_supported - Check that the specified `version` is supported by * `SSL *` instance * * @s: The SSL handle for the candidate method * @version: Protocol version to test against * * Returns 1 when supported, otherwise 0 */ int ssl_version_supported(const SSL *s, int version, const SSL_METHOD **meth) { const version_info *vent; const version_info *table; switch (s->method->version) { default: /* Version should match method version for non-ANY method */ return version_cmp(s, version, s->version) == 0; case TLS_ANY_VERSION: table = tls_version_table; break; case DTLS_ANY_VERSION: table = dtls_version_table; break; } for (vent = table; vent->version != 0 && version_cmp(s, version, vent->version) <= 0; ++vent) { if (vent->cmeth != NULL && version_cmp(s, version, vent->version) == 0 && ssl_method_error(s, vent->cmeth()) == 0 && (!s->server || version != TLS1_3_VERSION || is_tls13_capable(s))) { if (meth != NULL) *meth = vent->cmeth(); return 1; } } return 0; } /* * ssl_check_version_downgrade - In response to RFC7507 SCSV version * fallback indication from a client check whether we're using the highest * supported protocol version. * * @s server SSL handle. * * Returns 1 when using the highest enabled version, 0 otherwise. */ int ssl_check_version_downgrade(SSL *s) { const version_info *vent; const version_info *table; /* * Check that the current protocol is the highest enabled version * (according to s->ctx->method, as version negotiation may have changed * s->method). */ if (s->version == s->ctx->method->version) return 1; /* * Apparently we're using a version-flexible SSL_METHOD (not at its * highest protocol version). */ if (s->ctx->method->version == TLS_method()->version) table = tls_version_table; else if (s->ctx->method->version == DTLS_method()->version) table = dtls_version_table; else { /* Unexpected state; fail closed. */ return 0; } for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) { if (vent->smeth != NULL && ssl_method_error(s, vent->smeth()) == 0) return s->version == vent->version; } return 0; } /* * ssl_set_version_bound - set an upper or lower bound on the supported (D)TLS * protocols, provided the initial (D)TLS method is version-flexible. This * function sanity-checks the proposed value and makes sure the method is * version-flexible, then sets the limit if all is well. * * @method_version: The version of the current SSL_METHOD. * @version: the intended limit. * @bound: pointer to limit to be updated. * * Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure. */ int ssl_set_version_bound(int method_version, int version, int *bound) { int valid_tls; int valid_dtls; if (version == 0) { *bound = version; return 1; } valid_tls = version >= SSL3_VERSION && version <= TLS_MAX_VERSION; valid_dtls = DTLS_VERSION_LE(version, DTLS_MAX_VERSION) && DTLS_VERSION_GE(version, DTLS1_BAD_VER); if (!valid_tls && !valid_dtls) return 0; /*- * Restrict TLS methods to TLS protocol versions. * Restrict DTLS methods to DTLS protocol versions. * Note, DTLS version numbers are decreasing, use comparison macros. * * Note that for both lower-bounds we use explicit versions, not * (D)TLS_MIN_VERSION. This is because we don't want to break user * configurations. If the MIN (supported) version ever rises, the user's * "floor" remains valid even if no longer available. We don't expect the * MAX ceiling to ever get lower, so making that variable makes sense. * * We ignore attempts to set bounds on version-inflexible methods, * returning success. */ switch (method_version) { default: break; case TLS_ANY_VERSION: if (valid_tls) *bound = version; break; case DTLS_ANY_VERSION: if (valid_dtls) *bound = version; break; } return 1; } static void check_for_downgrade(SSL *s, int vers, DOWNGRADE *dgrd) { if (vers == TLS1_2_VERSION && ssl_version_supported(s, TLS1_3_VERSION, NULL)) { *dgrd = DOWNGRADE_TO_1_2; } else if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && vers < TLS1_2_VERSION /* * We need to ensure that a server that disables TLSv1.2 * (creating a hole between TLSv1.3 and TLSv1.1) can still * complete handshakes with clients that support TLSv1.2 and * below. Therefore we do not enable the sentinel if TLSv1.3 is * enabled and TLSv1.2 is not. */ && ssl_version_supported(s, TLS1_2_VERSION, NULL)) { *dgrd = DOWNGRADE_TO_1_1; } else { *dgrd = DOWNGRADE_NONE; } } /* * ssl_choose_server_version - Choose server (D)TLS version. Called when the * client HELLO is received to select the final server protocol version and * the version specific method. * * @s: server SSL handle. * * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure. */ int ssl_choose_server_version(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello, DOWNGRADE *dgrd) { /*- * With version-flexible methods we have an initial state with: * * s->method->version == (D)TLS_ANY_VERSION, * s->version == (D)TLS_MAX_VERSION. * * So we detect version-flexible methods via the method version, not the * handle version. */ int server_version = s->method->version; int client_version = hello->legacy_version; const version_info *vent; const version_info *table; int disabled = 0; RAW_EXTENSION *suppversions; s->client_version = client_version; switch (server_version) { default: if (!SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) { if (version_cmp(s, client_version, s->version) < 0) return SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION; *dgrd = DOWNGRADE_NONE; /* * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't * (and never did) check min/max FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return * ssl_method_error(s, s->method) */ return 0; } /* * Fall through if we are TLSv1.3 already (this means we must be after * a HelloRetryRequest */ /* fall thru */ case TLS_ANY_VERSION: table = tls_version_table; break; case DTLS_ANY_VERSION: table = dtls_version_table; break; } suppversions = &hello->pre_proc_exts[TLSEXT_IDX_supported_versions]; /* If we did an HRR then supported versions is mandatory */ if (!suppversions->present && s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_NONE) return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL; if (suppversions->present && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { unsigned int candidate_vers = 0; unsigned int best_vers = 0; const SSL_METHOD *best_method = NULL; PACKET versionslist; suppversions->parsed = 1; if (!PACKET_as_length_prefixed_1(&suppversions->data, &versionslist)) { /* Trailing or invalid data? */ return SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH; } /* * The TLSv1.3 spec says the client MUST set this to TLS1_2_VERSION. * The spec only requires servers to check that it isn't SSLv3: * "Any endpoint receiving a Hello message with * ClientHello.legacy_version or ServerHello.legacy_version set to * 0x0300 MUST abort the handshake with a "protocol_version" alert." * We are slightly stricter and require that it isn't SSLv3 or lower. * We tolerate TLSv1 and TLSv1.1. */ if (client_version <= SSL3_VERSION) return SSL_R_BAD_LEGACY_VERSION; while (PACKET_get_net_2(&versionslist, &candidate_vers)) { if (version_cmp(s, candidate_vers, best_vers) <= 0) continue; if (ssl_version_supported(s, candidate_vers, &best_method)) best_vers = candidate_vers; } if (PACKET_remaining(&versionslist) != 0) { /* Trailing data? */ return SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH; } if (best_vers > 0) { if (s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_NONE) { /* * This is after a HelloRetryRequest so we better check that we * negotiated TLSv1.3 */ if (best_vers != TLS1_3_VERSION) return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL; return 0; } check_for_downgrade(s, best_vers, dgrd); s->version = best_vers; s->method = best_method; return 0; } return SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL; } /* * If the supported versions extension isn't present, then the highest * version we can negotiate is TLSv1.2 */ if (version_cmp(s, client_version, TLS1_3_VERSION) >= 0) client_version = TLS1_2_VERSION; /* * No supported versions extension, so we just use the version supplied in * the ClientHello. */ for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) { const SSL_METHOD *method; if (vent->smeth == NULL || version_cmp(s, client_version, vent->version) < 0) continue; method = vent->smeth(); if (ssl_method_error(s, method) == 0) { check_for_downgrade(s, vent->version, dgrd); s->version = vent->version; s->method = method; return 0; } disabled = 1; } return disabled ? SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL : SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW; } /* * ssl_choose_client_version - Choose client (D)TLS version. Called when the * server HELLO is received to select the final client protocol version and * the version specific method. * * @s: client SSL handle. * @version: The proposed version from the server's HELLO. * @extensions: The extensions received * * Returns 1 on success or 0 on error. */ int ssl_choose_client_version(SSL *s, int version, RAW_EXTENSION *extensions) { const version_info *vent; const version_info *table; int ret, ver_min, ver_max, real_max, origv; origv = s->version; s->version = version; /* This will overwrite s->version if the extension is present */ if (!tls_parse_extension(s, TLSEXT_IDX_supported_versions, SSL_EXT_TLS1_2_SERVER_HELLO | SSL_EXT_TLS1_3_SERVER_HELLO, extensions, NULL, 0)) { s->version = origv; return 0; } if (s->hello_retry_request != SSL_HRR_NONE && s->version != TLS1_3_VERSION) { s->version = origv; SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION, SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION); return 0; } switch (s->method->version) { default: if (s->version != s->method->version) { s->version = origv; SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION, SSL_R_WRONG_SSL_VERSION); return 0; } /* * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't * (and never did) check min/max, FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return * ssl_method_error(s, s->method) */ return 1; case TLS_ANY_VERSION: table = tls_version_table; break; case DTLS_ANY_VERSION: table = dtls_version_table; break; } ret = ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &ver_min, &ver_max, &real_max); if (ret != 0) { s->version = origv; SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION, ret); return 0; } if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) ? DTLS_VERSION_LT(s->version, ver_min) : s->version < ver_min) { s->version = origv; SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL); return 0; } else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) ? DTLS_VERSION_GT(s->version, ver_max) : s->version > ver_max) { s->version = origv; SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL); return 0; } if ((s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV) == 0) real_max = ver_max; /* Check for downgrades */ if (s->version == TLS1_2_VERSION && real_max > s->version) { if (memcmp(tls12downgrade, s->s3->server_random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE - sizeof(tls12downgrade), sizeof(tls12downgrade)) == 0) { s->version = origv; SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION, SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK); return 0; } } else if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->version < TLS1_2_VERSION && real_max > s->version) { if (memcmp(tls11downgrade, s->s3->server_random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE - sizeof(tls11downgrade), sizeof(tls11downgrade)) == 0) { s->version = origv; SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER, SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION, SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK); return 0; } } for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) { if (vent->cmeth == NULL || s->version != vent->version) continue; s->method = vent->cmeth(); return 1; } s->version = origv; SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION, SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL); return 0; } /* * ssl_get_min_max_version - get minimum and maximum protocol version * @s: The SSL connection * @min_version: The minimum supported version * @max_version: The maximum supported version * @real_max: The highest version below the lowest compile time version hole * where that hole lies above at least one run-time enabled * protocol. * * Work out what version we should be using for the initial ClientHello if the * version is initially (D)TLS_ANY_VERSION. We apply any explicit SSL_OP_NO_xxx * options, the MinProtocol and MaxProtocol configuration commands, any Suite B * constraints and any floor imposed by the security level here, * so we don't advertise the wrong protocol version to only reject the outcome later. * * Computing the right floor matters. If, e.g., TLS 1.0 and 1.2 are enabled, * TLS 1.1 is disabled, but the security level, Suite-B and/or MinProtocol * only allow TLS 1.2, we want to advertise TLS1.2, *not* TLS1. * * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure. On failure * min_version and max_version will also be set to 0. */ int ssl_get_min_max_version(const SSL *s, int *min_version, int *max_version, int *real_max) { int version, tmp_real_max; int hole; const SSL_METHOD *single = NULL; const SSL_METHOD *method; const version_info *table; const version_info *vent; switch (s->method->version) { default: /* * If this SSL handle is not from a version flexible method we don't * (and never did) check min/max FIPS or Suite B constraints. Hope * that's OK. It is up to the caller to not choose fixed protocol * versions they don't want. If not, then easy to fix, just return * ssl_method_error(s, s->method) */ *min_version = *max_version = s->version; /* * Providing a real_max only makes sense where we're using a version * flexible method. */ if (!ossl_assert(real_max == NULL)) return ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR; return 0; case TLS_ANY_VERSION: table = tls_version_table; break; case DTLS_ANY_VERSION: table = dtls_version_table; break; } /* * SSL_OP_NO_X disables all protocols above X *if* there are some protocols * below X enabled. This is required in order to maintain the "version * capability" vector contiguous. Any versions with a NULL client method * (protocol version client is disabled at compile-time) is also a "hole". * * Our initial state is hole == 1, version == 0. That is, versions above * the first version in the method table are disabled (a "hole" above * the valid protocol entries) and we don't have a selected version yet. * * Whenever "hole == 1", and we hit an enabled method, its version becomes * the selected version, and the method becomes a candidate "single" * method. We're no longer in a hole, so "hole" becomes 0. * * If "hole == 0" and we hit an enabled method, then "single" is cleared, * as we support a contiguous range of at least two methods. If we hit * a disabled method, then hole becomes true again, but nothing else * changes yet, because all the remaining methods may be disabled too. * If we again hit an enabled method after the new hole, it becomes * selected, as we start from scratch. */ *min_version = version = 0; hole = 1; if (real_max != NULL) *real_max = 0; tmp_real_max = 0; for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) { /* * A table entry with a NULL client method is still a hole in the * "version capability" vector. */ if (vent->cmeth == NULL) { hole = 1; tmp_real_max = 0; continue; } method = vent->cmeth(); if (hole == 1 && tmp_real_max == 0) tmp_real_max = vent->version; if (ssl_method_error(s, method) != 0) { hole = 1; } else if (!hole) { single = NULL; *min_version = method->version; } else { if (real_max != NULL && tmp_real_max != 0) *real_max = tmp_real_max; version = (single = method)->version; *min_version = version; hole = 0; } } *max_version = version; /* Fail if everything is disabled */ if (version == 0) return SSL_R_NO_PROTOCOLS_AVAILABLE; return 0; } /* * ssl_set_client_hello_version - Work out what version we should be using for * the initial ClientHello.legacy_version field. * * @s: client SSL handle. * * Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure. */ int ssl_set_client_hello_version(SSL *s) { int ver_min, ver_max, ret; /* * In a renegotiation we always send the same client_version that we sent * last time, regardless of which version we eventually negotiated. */ if (!SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s)) return 0; ret = ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &ver_min, &ver_max, NULL); if (ret != 0) return ret; s->version = ver_max; /* TLS1.3 always uses TLS1.2 in the legacy_version field */ if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && ver_max > TLS1_2_VERSION) ver_max = TLS1_2_VERSION; s->client_version = ver_max; return 0; } /* * Checks a list of |groups| to determine if the |group_id| is in it. If it is * and |checkallow| is 1 then additionally check if the group is allowed to be * used. Returns 1 if the group is in the list (and allowed if |checkallow| is * 1) or 0 otherwise. */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC int check_in_list(SSL *s, uint16_t group_id, const uint16_t *groups, size_t num_groups, int checkallow) { size_t i; if (groups == NULL || num_groups == 0) return 0; for (i = 0; i < num_groups; i++) { uint16_t group = groups[i]; if (group_id == group && (!checkallow || tls_curve_allowed(s, group, SSL_SECOP_CURVE_CHECK))) { return 1; } } return 0; } #endif /* Replace ClientHello1 in the transcript hash with a synthetic message */ int create_synthetic_message_hash(SSL *s, const unsigned char *hashval, size_t hashlen, const unsigned char *hrr, size_t hrrlen) { unsigned char hashvaltmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; unsigned char msghdr[SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH]; memset(msghdr, 0, sizeof(msghdr)); if (hashval == NULL) { hashval = hashvaltmp; hashlen = 0; /* Get the hash of the initial ClientHello */ if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0) || !ssl_handshake_hash(s, hashvaltmp, sizeof(hashvaltmp), &hashlen)) { /* SSLfatal() already called */ return 0; } } /* Reinitialise the transcript hash */ if (!ssl3_init_finished_mac(s)) { /* SSLfatal() already called */ return 0; } /* Inject the synthetic message_hash message */ msghdr[0] = SSL3_MT_MESSAGE_HASH; msghdr[SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH - 1] = (unsigned char)hashlen; if (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, msghdr, SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH) || !ssl3_finish_mac(s, hashval, hashlen)) { /* SSLfatal() already called */ return 0; } /* * Now re-inject the HRR and current message if appropriate (we just deleted * it when we reinitialised the transcript hash above). Only necessary after * receiving a ClientHello2 with a cookie. */ if (hrr != NULL && (!ssl3_finish_mac(s, hrr, hrrlen) || !ssl3_finish_mac(s, (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data, s->s3->tmp.message_size + SSL3_HM_HEADER_LENGTH))) { /* SSLfatal() already called */ return 0; } return 1; } static int ca_dn_cmp(const X509_NAME *const *a, const X509_NAME *const *b) { return X509_NAME_cmp(*a, *b); } int parse_ca_names(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) { STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk = sk_X509_NAME_new(ca_dn_cmp); X509_NAME *xn = NULL; PACKET cadns; if (ca_sk == NULL) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } /* get the CA RDNs */ if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &cadns)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR,SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto err; } while (PACKET_remaining(&cadns)) { const unsigned char *namestart, *namebytes; unsigned int name_len; if (!PACKET_get_net_2(&cadns, &name_len) || !PACKET_get_bytes(&cadns, &namebytes, name_len)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto err; } namestart = namebytes; if ((xn = d2i_X509_NAME(NULL, &namebytes, name_len)) == NULL) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB); goto err; } if (namebytes != (namestart + name_len)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR, SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES, SSL_R_CA_DN_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto err; } if (!sk_X509_NAME_push(ca_sk, xn)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_PARSE_CA_NAMES, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } xn = NULL; } sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(s->s3->tmp.peer_ca_names, X509_NAME_free); s->s3->tmp.peer_ca_names = ca_sk; return 1; err: sk_X509_NAME_pop_free(ca_sk, X509_NAME_free); X509_NAME_free(xn); return 0; } const STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *get_ca_names(SSL *s) { const STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk = NULL;; if (s->server) { ca_sk = SSL_get_client_CA_list(s); if (ca_sk != NULL && sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_sk) == 0) ca_sk = NULL; } if (ca_sk == NULL) ca_sk = SSL_get0_CA_list(s); return ca_sk; } int construct_ca_names(SSL *s, const STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_sk, WPACKET *pkt) { /* Start sub-packet for client CA list */ if (!WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u16(pkt)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_CA_NAMES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } if (ca_sk != NULL) { int i; for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(ca_sk); i++) { unsigned char *namebytes; X509_NAME *name = sk_X509_NAME_value(ca_sk, i); int namelen; if (name == NULL || (namelen = i2d_X509_NAME(name, NULL)) < 0 || !WPACKET_sub_allocate_bytes_u16(pkt, namelen, &namebytes) || i2d_X509_NAME(name, &namebytes) != namelen) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_CA_NAMES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } } } if (!WPACKET_close(pkt)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_CA_NAMES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } return 1; } /* Create a buffer containing data to be signed for server key exchange */ size_t construct_key_exchange_tbs(SSL *s, unsigned char **ptbs, const void *param, size_t paramlen) { size_t tbslen = 2 * SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE + paramlen; unsigned char *tbs = OPENSSL_malloc(tbslen); if (tbs == NULL) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_CONSTRUCT_KEY_EXCHANGE_TBS, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } memcpy(tbs, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); memcpy(tbs + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); memcpy(tbs + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE * 2, param, paramlen); *ptbs = tbs; return tbslen; } /* * Saves the current handshake digest for Post-Handshake Auth, * Done after ClientFinished is processed, done exactly once */ int tls13_save_handshake_digest_for_pha(SSL *s) { if (s->pha_dgst == NULL) { if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1)) /* SSLfatal() already called */ return 0; s->pha_dgst = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); if (s->pha_dgst == NULL) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS13_SAVE_HANDSHAKE_DIGEST_FOR_PHA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(s->pha_dgst, s->s3->handshake_dgst)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS13_SAVE_HANDSHAKE_DIGEST_FOR_PHA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); + EVP_MD_CTX_free(s->pha_dgst); + s->pha_dgst = NULL; return 0; } } return 1; } /* * Restores the Post-Handshake Auth handshake digest * Done just before sending/processing the Cert Request */ int tls13_restore_handshake_digest_for_pha(SSL *s) { if (s->pha_dgst == NULL) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS13_RESTORE_HANDSHAKE_DIGEST_FOR_PHA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(s->s3->handshake_dgst, s->pha_dgst)) { SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS13_RESTORE_HANDSHAKE_DIGEST_FOR_PHA, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); return 0; } return 1; }