diff --git a/usr.sbin/pwd_mkdb/pwd_mkdb.8 b/usr.sbin/pwd_mkdb/pwd_mkdb.8 index 0a8b0143569c..52044f5b4364 100644 --- a/usr.sbin/pwd_mkdb/pwd_mkdb.8 +++ b/usr.sbin/pwd_mkdb/pwd_mkdb.8 @@ -1,185 +1,185 @@ .\" Copyright (c) 1991, 1993 .\" The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. .\" .\" Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without .\" modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions .\" are met: .\" 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright .\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. .\" 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright .\" notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the .\" documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. .\" 3. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors .\" may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software .\" without specific prior written permission. .\" .\" THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND .\" ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE .\" IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE .\" ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE .\" FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL .\" DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS .\" OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) .\" HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT .\" LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY .\" OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF .\" SUCH DAMAGE. .\" .\" @(#)pwd_mkdb.8 8.1 (Berkeley) 6/6/93 .\" $FreeBSD$ .\" -.Dd October 20, 2018 +.Dd March 25, 2023 .Dt PWD_MKDB 8 .Os .Sh NAME .Nm pwd_mkdb .Nd "generate the password databases" .Sh SYNOPSIS .Nm .Op Fl CiNp .Op Fl d Ar directory .Op Fl s Ar cachesize .Op Fl u Ar username .Ar file .Sh DESCRIPTION The .Nm utility creates .Xr db 3 style secure and insecure databases for the specified file. These databases are then installed into .Pa /etc/spwd.db and .Pa /etc/pwd.db respectively. The file is installed into .Pa /etc/master.passwd . The file must be in the correct format (see .Xr passwd 5 ) . It is important to note that the format used in this system is different from the historic Version 7 style format. .Pp The options are as follows: .Bl -tag -width flag .It Fl C Check if the password file is in the correct format. Do not change, add, or remove any files. +.It Fl d Ar directory +Store databases into specified destination directory instead of +.Pa /etc . +.It Fl i +Ignore locking failure of the +.Pa master.passwd +file. +This option is intended to be used to build password files in +the release process over NFS where no contention can happen. +A non-default directory must also be specified with the +.Fl d +option for locking to be ignored. +Other use of this option is strongly discouraged. .It Fl N Tell .Nm to exit with an error if it cannot obtain a lock on the file. By default, we block waiting for a lock on the source file. The lock is held through the rebuilding of the database. .It Fl p Create a Version 7 style password file and install it into .Pa /etc/passwd . -.It Fl i -Ignore locking failure of the -.Pa master.passwd -file. -This option is intended to be used to build password files in -the release process over NFS where no contention can happen. -A non-default directory must also be specified with the -.Fl d -option for locking to be ignored. -Other use of this option is strongly discouraged. -.It Fl d Ar directory -Store databases into specified destination directory instead of -.Pa /etc . -.It Fl u Ar username -Only update the record for the specified user. -Utilities that -operate on a single user can use this option to avoid the -overhead of rebuilding the entire database. .It Fl s Ar cachesize Specify in megabytes the size of the memory cache used by the hashing library. On systems with a large user base, a small cache size can lead to prohibitively long database file rebuild times. As a rough guide, the memory usage of .Nm in megabytes will be a little bit more than twice the figure specified here. The default is 2 megabytes. +.It Fl u Ar username +Only update the record for the specified user. +Utilities that +operate on a single user can use this option to avoid the +overhead of rebuilding the entire database. .El .Pp The two databases differ in that the secure version contains the user's encrypted password and the insecure version has an asterisk (``*'') .Pp The databases are used by the C library password routines (see .Xr getpwent 3 ) . .Pp The .Nm utility exits zero on success, non-zero on failure. .Sh ENVIRONMENT If the .Ev PW_SCAN_BIG_IDS environment variable is set, .Nm will suppress the warning messages that are normally generated for large user and group IDs. Such IDs can cause serious problems with software that makes assumptions about the values of IDs. .Sh FILES .Bl -tag -width Pa -compact .It Pa /etc/pwd.db The insecure password database file. .It Pa /etc/pwd.db.tmp A temporary file. .It Pa /etc/spwd.db The secure password database file. .It Pa /etc/spwd.db.tmp A temporary file. .It Pa /etc/master.passwd The current password file. .It Pa /etc/passwd A Version 7 format password file. .El .Sh EXAMPLES Regenerate the password database after manually editing or replacing the password file: .Bd -literal -offset -indent /usr/sbin/pwd_mkdb -p /etc/master.passwd .Ed .Sh COMPATIBILITY Previous versions of the system had a program similar to .Nm , .Xr mkpasswd 8 , which built .Xr dbm 3 style databases for the password file but depended on the calling programs to install them. The program was renamed in order that previous users of the program not be surprised by the changes in functionality. .Sh SEE ALSO .Xr chpass 1 , .Xr passwd 1 , .Xr db 3 , .Xr getpwent 3 , .Xr passwd 5 , .Xr vipw 8 .Sh BUGS Because of the necessity for atomic update of the password files, .Nm uses .Xr rename 2 to install them. This, however, requires that the file specified on the command line live on the same file system as the .Pa /etc directory. .Pp There are the obvious races with multiple people running .Nm on different password files at the same time. The front-ends to .Nm , .Xr chpass 1 , .Xr passwd 1 and .Xr vipw 8 , handle the locking necessary to avoid this problem. diff --git a/usr.sbin/pwd_mkdb/pwd_mkdb.c b/usr.sbin/pwd_mkdb/pwd_mkdb.c index 261e7951a126..f843b7eae376 100644 --- a/usr.sbin/pwd_mkdb/pwd_mkdb.c +++ b/usr.sbin/pwd_mkdb/pwd_mkdb.c @@ -1,680 +1,680 @@ /*- * SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause * * Copyright (c) 1991, 1993, 1994 * The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * 3. Neither the name of the University nor the names of its contributors * may be used to endorse or promote products derived from this software * without specific prior written permission. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE REGENTS AND CONTRIBUTORS ``AS IS'' AND * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE REGENTS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * SUCH DAMAGE. */ #if 0 #ifndef lint static const char copyright[] = "@(#) Copyright (c) 1991, 1993, 1994\n\ The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved.\n"; #endif /* not lint */ #ifndef lint static char sccsid[] = "@(#)pwd_mkdb.c 8.5 (Berkeley) 4/20/94"; #endif /* not lint */ #endif #include __FBSDID("$FreeBSD$"); #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "pw_scan.h" #define INSECURE 1 #define SECURE 2 #define PERM_INSECURE (S_IRUSR|S_IWUSR|S_IRGRP|S_IROTH) #define PERM_SECURE (S_IRUSR|S_IWUSR) #define LEGACY_VERSION(x) _PW_VERSIONED(x, 3) #define CURRENT_VERSION(x) _PW_VERSIONED(x, 4) static HASHINFO openinfo = { 4096, /* bsize */ 32, /* ffactor */ 256, /* nelem */ 2048 * 1024, /* cachesize */ NULL, /* hash() */ BIG_ENDIAN /* lorder */ }; static enum state { FILE_INSECURE, FILE_SECURE, FILE_ORIG } clean; static struct passwd pwd; /* password structure */ static char *pname; /* password file name */ static char prefix[MAXPATHLEN]; static int is_comment; /* flag for comments */ static char line[LINE_MAX]; void cleanup(void); void error(const char *); void cp(char *, char *, mode_t mode); void mv(char *, char *); int scan(FILE *, struct passwd *); static void usage(void); int main(int argc, char *argv[]) { static char verskey[] = _PWD_VERSION_KEY; char version = _PWD_CURRENT_VERSION; DB *dp, *sdp, *pw_db; DBT data, sdata, key; FILE *fp, *oldfp; sigset_t set; int ch, cnt, ypcnt, makeold, tfd, yp_enabled = 0; unsigned int len; uint32_t store; const char *t; char *p; char buf[MAX(MAXPATHLEN, LINE_MAX * 2)], tbuf[1024]; char sbuf[MAX(MAXPATHLEN, LINE_MAX * 2)]; char buf2[MAXPATHLEN]; char sbuf2[MAXPATHLEN]; char *username; u_int method, methoduid; int Cflag, dflag, iflag; int nblock = 0; iflag = dflag = Cflag = 0; strcpy(prefix, _PATH_PWD); makeold = 0; username = NULL; oldfp = NULL; - while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "CNd:ips:u:v")) != -1) + while ((ch = getopt(argc, argv, "Cd:iNps:u:v")) != -1) switch(ch) { case 'C': /* verify only */ Cflag = 1; break; - case 'N': /* do not wait for lock */ - nblock = LOCK_NB; /* will fail if locked */ - break; case 'd': dflag++; strlcpy(prefix, optarg, sizeof(prefix)); break; case 'i': iflag++; break; + case 'N': /* do not wait for lock */ + nblock = LOCK_NB; /* will fail if locked */ + break; case 'p': /* create V7 "file.orig" */ makeold = 1; break; case 's': /* change default cachesize */ openinfo.cachesize = atoi(optarg) * 1024 * 1024; break; case 'u': /* only update this record */ username = optarg; break; case 'v': /* backward compatible */ break; default: usage(); } argc -= optind; argv += optind; if (argc != 1 || (username && (*username == '+' || *username == '-'))) usage(); /* * This could be changed to allow the user to interrupt. * Probably not worth the effort. */ sigemptyset(&set); sigaddset(&set, SIGTSTP); sigaddset(&set, SIGHUP); sigaddset(&set, SIGINT); sigaddset(&set, SIGQUIT); sigaddset(&set, SIGTERM); (void)sigprocmask(SIG_BLOCK, &set, (sigset_t *)NULL); /* We don't care what the user wants. */ (void)umask(0); pname = *argv; /* * Open and lock the original password file. We have to check * the hardlink count after we get the lock to handle any potential * unlink/rename race. * * This lock is necessary when someone runs pwd_mkdb manually, directly * on master.passwd, to handle the case where a user might try to * change his password while pwd_mkdb is running. */ for (;;) { struct stat st; if (!(fp = fopen(pname, "r"))) error(pname); if (flock(fileno(fp), LOCK_EX|nblock) < 0 && !(dflag && iflag)) error("flock"); if (fstat(fileno(fp), &st) < 0) error(pname); if (st.st_nlink != 0) break; fclose(fp); fp = NULL; } /* check only if password database is valid */ if (Cflag) { while (scan(fp, &pwd)) if (!is_comment && strlen(pwd.pw_name) >= MAXLOGNAME) { warnx("%s: username too long", pwd.pw_name); exit(1); } exit(0); } /* Open the temporary insecure password database. */ (void)snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s/%s.tmp", prefix, _MP_DB); (void)snprintf(sbuf, sizeof(sbuf), "%s/%s.tmp", prefix, _SMP_DB); if (username) { int use_version; (void)snprintf(buf2, sizeof(buf2), "%s/%s", prefix, _MP_DB); (void)snprintf(sbuf2, sizeof(sbuf2), "%s/%s", prefix, _SMP_DB); clean = FILE_INSECURE; cp(buf2, buf, PERM_INSECURE); dp = dbopen(buf, O_RDWR|O_EXCL, PERM_INSECURE, DB_HASH, &openinfo); if (dp == NULL) error(buf); clean = FILE_SECURE; cp(sbuf2, sbuf, PERM_SECURE); sdp = dbopen(sbuf, O_RDWR|O_EXCL, PERM_SECURE, DB_HASH, &openinfo); if (sdp == NULL) error(sbuf); /* * Do some trouble to check if we should store this users * uid. Don't use getpwnam/getpwuid as that interferes * with NIS. */ pw_db = dbopen(_PATH_MP_DB, O_RDONLY, 0, DB_HASH, NULL); if (!pw_db) error(_MP_DB); key.data = verskey; key.size = sizeof(verskey)-1; if ((pw_db->get)(pw_db, &key, &data, 0) == 0) use_version = *(unsigned char *)data.data; else use_version = 3; buf[0] = _PW_VERSIONED(_PW_KEYBYNAME, use_version); len = strlen(username); /* Only check that username fits in buffer */ memmove(buf + 1, username, MIN(len, sizeof(buf) - 1)); key.data = (u_char *)buf; key.size = len + 1; if ((pw_db->get)(pw_db, &key, &data, 0) == 0) { p = (char *)data.data; /* jump over pw_name and pw_passwd, to get to pw_uid */ while (*p++) ; while (*p++) ; buf[0] = _PW_VERSIONED(_PW_KEYBYUID, use_version); memmove(buf + 1, p, sizeof(store)); key.data = (u_char *)buf; key.size = sizeof(store) + 1; if ((pw_db->get)(pw_db, &key, &data, 0) == 0) { /* First field of data.data holds pw_pwname */ if (!strcmp(data.data, username)) methoduid = 0; else methoduid = R_NOOVERWRITE; } else { methoduid = R_NOOVERWRITE; } } else { methoduid = R_NOOVERWRITE; } if ((pw_db->close)(pw_db)) error("close pw_db"); method = 0; } else { dp = dbopen(buf, O_RDWR|O_CREAT|O_EXCL, PERM_INSECURE, DB_HASH, &openinfo); if (dp == NULL) error(buf); clean = FILE_INSECURE; sdp = dbopen(sbuf, O_RDWR|O_CREAT|O_EXCL, PERM_SECURE, DB_HASH, &openinfo); if (sdp == NULL) error(sbuf); clean = FILE_SECURE; method = R_NOOVERWRITE; methoduid = R_NOOVERWRITE; } /* * Open file for old password file. Minor trickiness -- don't want to * chance the file already existing, since someone (stupidly) might * still be using this for permission checking. So, open it first and * fdopen the resulting fd. The resulting file should be readable by * everyone. */ if (makeold) { (void)snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s.orig", pname); if ((tfd = open(buf, O_WRONLY|O_CREAT|O_EXCL, PERM_INSECURE)) < 0) error(buf); if ((oldfp = fdopen(tfd, "w")) == NULL) error(buf); clean = FILE_ORIG; } /* * The databases actually contain three copies of the original data. * Each password file entry is converted into a rough approximation * of a ``struct passwd'', with the strings placed inline. This * object is then stored as the data for three separate keys. The * first key * is the pw_name field prepended by the _PW_KEYBYNAME * character. The second key is the pw_uid field prepended by the * _PW_KEYBYUID character. The third key is the line number in the * original file prepended by the _PW_KEYBYNUM character. (The special * characters are prepended to ensure that the keys do not collide.) */ /* In order to transition this file into a machine-independent * form, we have to change the format of entries. However, since * older binaries will still expect the old MD format entries, we * create those as usual and use versioned tags for the new entries. */ if (username == NULL) { /* Do not add the VERSION tag when updating a single * user. When operating on `old format' databases, this * would result in applications `seeing' only the updated * entries. */ key.data = verskey; key.size = sizeof(verskey)-1; data.data = &version; data.size = 1; if ((dp->put)(dp, &key, &data, 0) == -1) error("put"); if ((sdp->put)(sdp, &key, &data, 0) == -1) error("put"); } ypcnt = 0; data.data = (u_char *)buf; sdata.data = (u_char *)sbuf; key.data = (u_char *)tbuf; for (cnt = 1; scan(fp, &pwd); ++cnt) { if (!is_comment && (pwd.pw_name[0] == '+' || pwd.pw_name[0] == '-')) { yp_enabled = 1; ypcnt++; } if (is_comment) --cnt; #define COMPACT(e) t = e; while ((*p++ = *t++)); #define SCALAR(e) store = htonl((uint32_t)(e)); \ memmove(p, &store, sizeof(store)); \ p += sizeof(store); #define LSCALAR(e) store = HTOL((uint32_t)(e)); \ memmove(p, &store, sizeof(store)); \ p += sizeof(store); #define HTOL(e) (openinfo.lorder == BYTE_ORDER ? \ (uint32_t)(e) : \ bswap32((uint32_t)(e))) if (!is_comment && (!username || (strcmp(username, pwd.pw_name) == 0))) { /* Create insecure data. */ p = buf; COMPACT(pwd.pw_name); COMPACT("*"); SCALAR(pwd.pw_uid); SCALAR(pwd.pw_gid); SCALAR(pwd.pw_change); COMPACT(pwd.pw_class); COMPACT(pwd.pw_gecos); COMPACT(pwd.pw_dir); COMPACT(pwd.pw_shell); SCALAR(pwd.pw_expire); SCALAR(pwd.pw_fields); data.size = p - buf; /* Create secure data. */ p = sbuf; COMPACT(pwd.pw_name); COMPACT(pwd.pw_passwd); SCALAR(pwd.pw_uid); SCALAR(pwd.pw_gid); SCALAR(pwd.pw_change); COMPACT(pwd.pw_class); COMPACT(pwd.pw_gecos); COMPACT(pwd.pw_dir); COMPACT(pwd.pw_shell); SCALAR(pwd.pw_expire); SCALAR(pwd.pw_fields); sdata.size = p - sbuf; /* Store insecure by name. */ tbuf[0] = CURRENT_VERSION(_PW_KEYBYNAME); len = strlen(pwd.pw_name); memmove(tbuf + 1, pwd.pw_name, len); key.size = len + 1; if ((dp->put)(dp, &key, &data, method) == -1) error("put"); /* Store insecure by number. */ tbuf[0] = CURRENT_VERSION(_PW_KEYBYNUM); store = htonl(cnt); memmove(tbuf + 1, &store, sizeof(store)); key.size = sizeof(store) + 1; if ((dp->put)(dp, &key, &data, method) == -1) error("put"); /* Store insecure by uid. */ tbuf[0] = CURRENT_VERSION(_PW_KEYBYUID); store = htonl(pwd.pw_uid); memmove(tbuf + 1, &store, sizeof(store)); key.size = sizeof(store) + 1; if ((dp->put)(dp, &key, &data, methoduid) == -1) error("put"); /* Store secure by name. */ tbuf[0] = CURRENT_VERSION(_PW_KEYBYNAME); len = strlen(pwd.pw_name); memmove(tbuf + 1, pwd.pw_name, len); key.size = len + 1; if ((sdp->put)(sdp, &key, &sdata, method) == -1) error("put"); /* Store secure by number. */ tbuf[0] = CURRENT_VERSION(_PW_KEYBYNUM); store = htonl(cnt); memmove(tbuf + 1, &store, sizeof(store)); key.size = sizeof(store) + 1; if ((sdp->put)(sdp, &key, &sdata, method) == -1) error("put"); /* Store secure by uid. */ tbuf[0] = CURRENT_VERSION(_PW_KEYBYUID); store = htonl(pwd.pw_uid); memmove(tbuf + 1, &store, sizeof(store)); key.size = sizeof(store) + 1; if ((sdp->put)(sdp, &key, &sdata, methoduid) == -1) error("put"); /* Store insecure and secure special plus and special minus */ if (pwd.pw_name[0] == '+' || pwd.pw_name[0] == '-') { tbuf[0] = CURRENT_VERSION(_PW_KEYYPBYNUM); store = htonl(ypcnt); memmove(tbuf + 1, &store, sizeof(store)); key.size = sizeof(store) + 1; if ((dp->put)(dp, &key, &data, method) == -1) error("put"); if ((sdp->put)(sdp, &key, &sdata, method) == -1) error("put"); } } /* * Create original style password file entry. * * Don't copy comments since this could reveal encrypted * passwords if entries have been simply commented out * in master.passwd. */ if (makeold && !is_comment) { char uidstr[20]; char gidstr[20]; snprintf(uidstr, sizeof(uidstr), "%u", pwd.pw_uid); snprintf(gidstr, sizeof(gidstr), "%u", pwd.pw_gid); if (fprintf(oldfp, "%s:*:%s:%s:%s:%s:%s\n", pwd.pw_name, pwd.pw_fields & _PWF_UID ? uidstr : "", pwd.pw_fields & _PWF_GID ? gidstr : "", pwd.pw_gecos, pwd.pw_dir, pwd.pw_shell) < 0) error("write old"); } } /* If YP enabled, set flag. */ if (yp_enabled) { buf[0] = yp_enabled + 2; data.size = 1; key.size = 1; tbuf[0] = CURRENT_VERSION(_PW_KEYYPENABLED); if ((dp->put)(dp, &key, &data, method) == -1) error("put"); if ((sdp->put)(sdp, &key, &data, method) == -1) error("put"); } if ((dp->close)(dp) == -1) error("close"); if ((sdp->close)(sdp) == -1) error("close"); if (makeold) { (void)fflush(oldfp); if (fclose(oldfp) == EOF) error("close old"); } /* Set master.passwd permissions, in case caller forgot. */ (void)fchmod(fileno(fp), S_IRUSR|S_IWUSR); /* Install as the real password files. */ (void)snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s/%s.tmp", prefix, _MP_DB); (void)snprintf(buf2, sizeof(buf2), "%s/%s", prefix, _MP_DB); mv(buf, buf2); (void)snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s/%s.tmp", prefix, _SMP_DB); (void)snprintf(buf2, sizeof(buf2), "%s/%s", prefix, _SMP_DB); mv(buf, buf2); if (makeold) { (void)snprintf(buf2, sizeof(buf2), "%s/%s", prefix, _PASSWD); (void)snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s.orig", pname); mv(buf, buf2); } /* * Move the master password LAST -- chpass(1), passwd(1) and vipw(8) * all use flock(2) on it to block other incarnations of themselves. * The rename means that everything is unlocked, as the original file * can no longer be accessed. */ (void)snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s/%s", prefix, _MASTERPASSWD); mv(pname, buf); /* * Close locked password file after rename() */ if (fclose(fp) == EOF) error("close fp"); exit(0); } int scan(FILE *fp, struct passwd *pw) { static int lcnt; size_t len; char *p; p = fgetln(fp, &len); if (p == NULL) return (0); ++lcnt; /* * ``... if I swallow anything evil, put your fingers down my * throat...'' * -- The Who */ if (len > 0 && p[len - 1] == '\n') len--; if (len >= sizeof(line) - 1) { warnx("line #%d too long", lcnt); goto fmt; } memcpy(line, p, len); line[len] = '\0'; /* * Ignore comments: ^[ \t]*# */ for (p = line; *p != '\0'; p++) if (*p != ' ' && *p != '\t') break; if (*p == '#' || *p == '\0') { is_comment = 1; return(1); } else is_comment = 0; if (!__pw_scan(line, pw, _PWSCAN_WARN|_PWSCAN_MASTER)) { warnx("at line #%d", lcnt); fmt: errno = EFTYPE; /* XXX */ error(pname); } return (1); } void cp(char *from, char *to, mode_t mode) { static char buf[MAXBSIZE]; int from_fd, rcount, to_fd, wcount; if ((from_fd = open(from, O_RDONLY, 0)) < 0) error(from); if ((to_fd = open(to, O_WRONLY|O_CREAT|O_EXCL, mode)) < 0) error(to); while ((rcount = read(from_fd, buf, MAXBSIZE)) > 0) { wcount = write(to_fd, buf, rcount); if (rcount != wcount || wcount == -1) { int sverrno = errno; (void)snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s to %s", from, to); errno = sverrno; error(buf); } } if (rcount < 0) { int sverrno = errno; (void)snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s to %s", from, to); errno = sverrno; error(buf); } } void mv(char *from, char *to) { char buf[MAXPATHLEN]; char *to_dir; int to_dir_fd = -1; /* * Make sure file is safe on disk. To improve performance we will call * fsync() to the directory where file lies */ if (rename(from, to) != 0 || (to_dir = dirname(to)) == NULL || (to_dir_fd = open(to_dir, O_RDONLY|O_DIRECTORY)) == -1 || fsync(to_dir_fd) != 0) { int sverrno = errno; (void)snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s to %s", from, to); errno = sverrno; if (to_dir_fd != -1) close(to_dir_fd); error(buf); } if (to_dir_fd != -1) close(to_dir_fd); } void error(const char *name) { warn("%s", name); cleanup(); exit(1); } void cleanup(void) { char buf[MAXPATHLEN]; switch(clean) { case FILE_ORIG: (void)snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s.orig", pname); (void)unlink(buf); /* FALLTHROUGH */ case FILE_SECURE: (void)snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s/%s.tmp", prefix, _SMP_DB); (void)unlink(buf); /* FALLTHROUGH */ case FILE_INSECURE: (void)snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s/%s.tmp", prefix, _MP_DB); (void)unlink(buf); } } static void usage(void) { (void)fprintf(stderr, -"usage: pwd_mkdb [-BCiLNp] [-d directory] [-s cachesize] [-u username] file\n"); +"usage: pwd_mkdb [-CiNp] [-d directory] [-s cachesize] [-u username] file\n"); exit(1); }